

**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1969–1976**

**VOLUME XXXIII**

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**SALT II,  
1972–1980**



**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

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Volume XXXIII

## SALT II, 1972–1980

*Editor* Erin R. Mahan  
*General Editor* Adam M. Howard

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
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# Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Because of the long-term nature of the SALT II negotiations, this volume also in-

cludes the administration of President Jimmy Carter. It therefore covers U.S. policy on SALT II from October 1972 until November 1980.

While the editor believes this volume stands on its own, it is best read in conjunction with several other volumes. *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, documents the decision-making and negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms from the beginning of the first Nixon administration through the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms at the May 1972 Moscow Summit. In addition, a number of volumes print documentation in full that is presented in part in this volume. Documentation relating to Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States, Kissinger's March and April 1974 visits to the Soviet Union, and Nixon's June 1974 meetings with Brezhnev in Moscow is printed in full in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974. Full documentation on conversations between Ford and Brezhnev at the November 1974 Vladivostok Summit can be found in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976. Other volumes that provide useful context for the issues covered in this volume include *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972; Vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976; Vol. E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972; Vol. E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control, 1973–1976; and *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Vol. IV, National Security Policy; and Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

#### *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection*

The SALT II negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union extended across three Presidential administrations, as Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter worked to resolve the complex, evolving, and interrelated issues necessary to reach an agreement. All three presidents sought to go beyond the Interim Agreement signed at the Moscow Summit in May 1972 through the achievement of a formal treaty on strategic arms. The negotiations were a central component of foreign policy for all three administrations, demanding sustained attention at the highest level of government. This volume offers a rare direct comparison of bureaucratic processes and leadership styles as well as the personal and institutional interplay across these administrations.

The documentation illuminates the sustained high-level attention to these negotiations and the difficulties involved in establishing agreement—first on U.S. Government positions and negotiating strategies and then with the Soviet Union. The volume picks up where *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972 leaves off, with the Nixon administration working to establish objectives and negotiating

positions beginning in October 1972. This work is represented primarily through the internal memoranda drafted by National Security Council staff members; the formal interagency process is reflected in minutes of the Verification Panel and the National Security Council, with the subsequent decisions reflected in six National Security Decision Memoranda. As in previous volumes, the reader encounters extraordinary working relationships between top U.S. and Soviet interlocutors in the form of Henry Kissinger's backchannel with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and his negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, as well as Nixon's summit with Brezhnev in June 1974, a period in which his presidency was collapsing.

President Ford accepted the U.S. position as he found it on his arrival in office, though it was to evolve in his negotiations with the Soviet Union. The documentation for his administration reflects his emphasis on open decision making with fourteen NSC meetings, compared with four during the Nixon years covered in this volume. The Department of State is better represented in this administration than in the Nixon years, as Kissinger served as Secretary of State for the entirety of Ford's presidency.

President Carter came to office determined to push for lower levels of strategic arms than those Ford and Brezhnev agreed to at the Vladivostok Summit in November 1974. Carter was "wiping the slate clean of the packages Kissinger put forward," as he put it. After Brezhnev balked at simply discarding the hard-fought Vladivostok package, Carter and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, used the Special Coordination Committee extensively as a forum for interagency discussions of the SALT II negotiations; minutes and summaries of the SCC are well represented in the documentation. Once Carter and Brezhnev finally signed the SALT II Treaty in June 1979, the documentation then focuses on the battle for ratification in the U.S. Senate—specifically, strategies for building domestic support and countering a letter summarizing serious concerns signed by 19 senators. Ultimately, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led the Carter administration to recall the treaty from Senate consideration. The volume concludes by documenting the administration's deliberations on whether, how, and when, to resume efforts toward ratification.

Throughout these three administrations, critics of the SALT II deliberations warned of the implications for the strategic balance. In a time of rapid modernization and expansion in Soviet strategic forces, they were especially anxious about the divergence between the United States and Soviet Union when it came to missile throw-weight, an asymmetry of particular concern with the advent of MIRV'd ICBMs. The selections in this volume include letters from Senator Henry

Jackson outlining his concerns; NSC minutes and other memoranda of conversation portray him as a constant thorn in the side of the White House and the Department of State.

The views of the uniformed military are represented in CJCS and JCS memoranda, and in comments captured in the NSC, Verification Panel and other meetings. The Central Intelligence Agency contributed to the decision-making process through its presentations of Soviet forces and their projected growth, and through recurrent assessments of Soviet decision making and priorities.

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and

policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

#### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

#### *Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review*

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential



Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

### *Nixon White House Tapes*

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President's Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers' inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this vol-

ume, which began in 2008 and was completed in 2012, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excisions of a paragraph or more in 15 documents, and minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 21 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of U.S. foreign policy on SALT II.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland; the editor also wishes to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. The editor thanks the staffs of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, particularly Geir Gunderson, Karen Holzhausen, Donna Lehman, and Helmi Raaska, and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, especially Ceri McCarron, David Stanhope, and James Yancey, for their valuable and tireless assistance. Thanks are also due to Nancy Smith, former Director of the Presidential Materials Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration, and to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. John Haynes and Ernest Emrich of the Library of Congress expedited access to and copied the Kissinger Papers and the Harold Brown Papers respectively. The editor used the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, and the Brown Papers with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger and Harold Brown. The CIA and DoD provided full access to their records. The editor would like particularly to thank Sandy Meagher for expediting the use of DoD files.

Erin Mahan collected the documents, made the selections, and annotated the documents for this volume. The volume was completed under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, then General Editor of the series. Chris Tudda collected documents from the Library of Congress and compiled the lists of abbreviations, persons, and sources. He also coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman and Carl Ashley, successive Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Erin F. Cozens did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs  
August 2013

**Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.**  
*The Historian*



# Contents

Preface .....	III
Sources .....	XIII
Abbreviations and Terms .....	XIX
Persons .....	XXIII
SALT II .....	1
Index .....	991



# Sources

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The 1991 *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The Department’s central file for 1973–1976 is available in electronic or microfilm format at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland (Archives II), and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter as well as other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Henry Kissinger and Harold Brown have approved access to their papers at the Library of Congress. Department of State historians also have full access to records of the Department of Defense,

particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense as well as their major assistants. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided full access to its files.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Library, the Ford Presidential Library, the Carter Presidential Library, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all of the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. The staffs of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidential libraries are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Some of the research for this volume was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980*

The records of the Department of State are essential to understanding how each administration's SALT policy was conceived. Most important are the records contained in the lot files of the Office of the Counselor (Helmut Sonnenfeldt), Marshall Shulman, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The first contains important material pertaining to the Nixon and Ford administrations' position on SALT, while the latter two contain valuable memoranda of the high-level negotiations on SALT that occurred between Vance and Soviet Premier Andrei Gromyko. Relevant telegrams, papers, and memoranda are also located in the Department's central file.

The records of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, and the papers of Henry Kissinger and Harold Brown at the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, are useful to greater and lesser degrees, but it should be noted that the latter two are presently closed to the public. The staff at the Office of the Historian have found that the Kissinger papers are useful for obtaining occasional material not found—or not easily found—at the Nixon and Ford

Libraries or in Record Group 59 at the National Archives. Similarly, while the Brown papers contain some unique documents, including memoranda of conversation, studies, and other documentation generated within the Department of Defense, most of the documentation in this collection is duplicated in the relevant files at the Carter Library. The CIA records, which are in Agency custody, contain various studies and research related to SALT but, as with the DoD material, the highest-level documents are in the Ford and Carter National Security Adviser files.

For the Ford period, research should begin at the Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The editor found the files of the National Security Adviser to be an essential starting point. Within these files, the Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussion collection is especially valuable. The National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), in particular the National Security Decision Memoranda, the National Security Council Meetings, and the Verification Panel Meetings Files, also contain crucial documentation on the SALT issue.

For the Carter period, research should begin at the Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia. As with the Ford Administration, the editor found the records of National Security Adviser—in this case Zbigniew Brzezinski—the best place to start; within the Brzezinski Material, the Subject File was particularly fruitful. Also valuable were the NSC Institutional Files for this period.

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

**Central Foreign Policy Files.** *See* National Archives and Records Administration below.

**Lot Files.** For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, *see* National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files.

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Lot 82D241, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance Files

Lot 81D109, Marshall Shulman Files

### National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Files of the Department of State



### *Central Foreign Policy File*

#### *Lot Files*

- Lot 77D112, S/P Files, Policy Planning Staff, Director's File (Winston Lord)
- Lot 81D286, S/S Files, Records of Counselor of the Department (Helmuth Sonnenfeldt)
- Lot 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77

### **Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

- Diary of Thomas H. Moorer

### **Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California**

#### National Security Council Files

- Backchannel Messages
- Exchange of Notes Between Kissinger and Dobrynin
- Presidential-HAK Memcons
- President's Trip File, Dobrynin/Kissinger
- SALT TWO

#### Kissinger Office Files

- Country Files, Europe—USSR
- Dobrynin/Kissinger
- HAK Trip Files

#### National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)

- National Security Council Meetings
- National Security Council Minutes
- National Security Decision Memoranda Files
- Policy Papers
- Verification Panel Meetings
- Verification Panel Minutes

#### White House Central Files

- Staff Members and Office Files: President's Daily Diary

#### White House Tapes

### **Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan**

#### National Security Adviser

- Backchannel Messages
- Kissinger Reports on USSR, Middle East, and China
- Memoranda of Conversation
- NSC Program Analysis Staff Files
  - Jan Lodal Convenience Files
- Outside the System
  - Chronological File
- Presidential Subject File
- Staff Assistant, Peter Rodman Files

Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger  
Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)

National Security Decision Memoranda Files  
National Security Council Meetings  
SALT

Verification Panel Meetings

President's Daily Diary

**Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia**

Cabinet Meeting Minutes

Brzezinski Donated Material

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material  
Agency File  
Brzezinski Office File  
Country File  
President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File  
Subject File  
Trip File  
Staff Material  
Office File  
Outside the System  
Special Projects File

National Security Council

NSC Institutional Files

Office of Congressional Liaison, Beckel

Plains Files

White House Central File

Subject File

**Central Intelligence Agency**

Files of the Office of the Director of Intelligence

Executive Registry Files

Job 80-M01048A

**Library of Congress, Washington, DC**

Manuscript Division

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger  
Geopolitical File  
Papers of Harold Brown

**National Security Council, Washington, DC**

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dents of the United States: Gerald Ford, 1974, 1975, 1976-1977*. Washington, D.C.: U.S.  
Government Printing Office, 1975, 1977, 1979.

United States. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presi-  
dents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, 1979*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-  
ment Printing Office, 1977, 1979.

*The Washington Post*

# Abbreviations and Terms

**ABM**, anti-ballistic missile  
**ABRES**, Advanced Ballistic Reentry System  
**ACDA**, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**ACDA/D**, Office of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**ACDA/DD**, Office of the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**ACDA/IR**, Office of International Relations, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission  
**ALCM**, air-launched cruise missile  
**ASBM**, anti-ship ballistic missile  
**ASM**, air-to-surface missile  
**ASROC**, anti-submarine rocket  
**ASW**, anti-submarine warfare  
**AWACS**, airborne warning and control system

**B-1**, supersonic four-engine variable-sweep wing strategic bomber (U.S. Air Force)  
**B-52**, all weather, intercontinental strategic heavy bomber  
**BOMARC**, Boeing and University of Michigan Aeronautical Research Center

**CEP**, circular error probable/probability  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CJCS**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**CM**, cruise missile  
**CMC**, cruise missile carrier  
**CNO**, Chief of Naval Operations  
**CONUS**, continental United States  
**CPSU**, Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**CSCE**, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
**CTB**, Comprehensive Test Ban

**D&P**, Derazhyna and Pervomaysk  
**DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence  
**Del**, delegate  
**Dept**, Department  
**DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**Dog House radars**, large phased array radars deployed near Moscow at Naro-Fominsk that functioned much like the Perimeter Acquisition Radar of the U.S. Sentinel/Safeguard ABM system.  
**DOS**, Department of State

**ECM**, electronic countermeasures  
**Exdis**, exclusive distribution

**F-4**, supersonic tandem, two-seat, twin-engine jet interceptor fighter/fighter-bomber (U.S. Navy)  
**F-111**, medium-range interdicator and tactical strike fighter (U.S. Air Force)

**F-111B**, fleet air-defense, carrier-based fighter carrying long range air-to-air missiles  
(U.S. Navy)

**FBS**, forward-based systems

**FEBA**, forward edge of battle area

**FOBS**, Fractional Orbital Bombardment Missile Systems

**FonOff**, Foreign Office

**FRC**, Federal Records Center

**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany

**FRODS**, functionally-related observable differences

**FY**, fiscal year

**FYDP**, Five-Year Defense Program

**FYI**, for your information

**GDR**, German Democratic Republic

**GLBM**, ground-launched ballistic missile

**GLCM**, ground-launched cruise missile

**HAK**, Henry A. Kissinger

**Hakto**, series indicator for messages from Kissinger

**IA**, Interim Agreement (SALT I)

**ICBM**, inter-continental ballistic missile

**ICCM**, inter-continental cruise missile

**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**IOC**, initial operating capability

**IRBM**, intermediate-range ballistic missile

**ISA**, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

**JC**, Jimmy Carter

**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**JCSM**, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

**JDT**, Joint Draft Text

**K**, Kissinger

**km**, kilometer

**LB**, land-based

**Limdis**, limited distribution

**LLCM**, land-launched cruise missile

**LRA**, long-range aviation

**LRTNF**, Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces

**MAD**, mutual assured destruction

**MAP**, Multiple Aim Point

**MARV**, maneuverable reentry vehicle

**MBFR**, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

**memcon**, memorandum of conversation

**MIRV**, multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle

**MLBM**, modern large ballistic missile

**MM**, Minuteman

**MOD**, Minister of Defense

**MOU**, memorandum of understanding

**MPS**, multiple protective structure

**MRBM**, multiple-range ballistic missile

**MRV**, multiple reentry vehicle  
**MSOR**, maximum system operational range  
**mtg**, meeting  
**M-X**, Missile Experimental

**NAC**, North Atlantic Council  
**NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NCA**, National Command Authority  
**NIC**, National Intelligence Council  
**NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate  
**nm**, nautical mile  
**Nodis**, no distribution  
**NPG**, Nuclear Planning Group  
**NPT**, Non-Proliferation Treaty  
**NSC**, National Security Council  
**NSDM**, National Security Decision Memorandum  
**NTM**, national technical means

**O&M**, Operation and Maintenance  
**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget  
**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**OST**, Office of Science and Technology

**P**, President  
**P.L.**, Public Law  
**para**, paragraph  
**PD**, Presidential Directive  
**PM**, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**PRC**, People's Republic of China  
**Pres**, President

**R&D**, research and development  
**reftel**, reference telegram  
**RG**, Record Group  
**RN**, Richard M. Nixon  
**RPV**, remotely-piloted vehicle  
**RV**, reentry vehicle

**S**, Office of the Secretary of State  
**SAC**, Strategic Air Command  
**SAL**, strategic arms limitation  
**SALT**, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
**SAM**, surface-to-air missile  
**SB**, sea-based  
**SC**, Security Council (United Nations)  
**SCAD**, subsonic cruise armed decoy  
**SCC**, Standing Consultative Commission; Special Coordination Committee (National Security Council)  
**SecDef**, Secretary of Defense  
**SecState**, Secretary of State  
**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while on travel  
**septel**, separate telegram  
**SFRC**, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**SIOP**, Single Integrated Operational Plan  
**SLBM**, submarine-launched ballistic missile  
**SLCM**, sea-launched cruise missile  
**SNDV**, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle  
**S/P**, Policy Planning Council or Staff, Department of State  
**SRAM**, short-range air-to-surface missile  
**SS-9**, Soviet ICBM, the high accuracy of which made it a threat to U.S. ICBMs  
**SS-11**, Soviet ICBM, Soviet counterpart to the U.S. Minuteman system in quantity, size, and purpose, believed effective against only soft targets  
**SS-17**, Soviet MIRV ICBM  
**SS-18**, Soviet MIRV ICBM with 20 warheads; believed to give the Soviet Union a potential first-strike capability because of its heavy throw weight  
**SS-N-8**, Soviet sea-based ICBM deployed on Soviet Delta-class submarines; carried a single warhead  
**SS-X-16**, first Soviet mobile ICBM; carried a single warhead  
**SS-X-18**, Soviet MIRV ICBM with 8 warheads; designed to attack and destroy U.S. ICBMs and hardened missiles  
**SSBN**, Ballistic Nuclear Submarine  
**SSN**, Nuclear Attack Submarine  
**SST**, supersonic transport  
**SU**, Soviet Union

**TEL**, transport and erector launcher  
**telcon**, telephone conversation  
**TERCOM**, Terrain Contour Matching (navigation system for cruise missiles)  
**TNF**, Theater Nuclear Forces  
**TOA**, total obligational authority  
**Tohak**, series indicator for messages to Kissinger  
**Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while on travel  
**TS**, Top Secret  
**TVA**, Tennessee Valley Authority

**UK**, United Kingdom  
**UN**, United Nations  
**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly  
**US**, United States  
**USDEL**, United States Delegation  
**USG**, United States Government  
**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**VP**, Verification Panel

**Z**, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)

# Persons

- Aaron, David**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until January 1981
- Akalovsky, Alexander**, staff member, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
- Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andrei M.**, Assistant to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev
- Bahr, Egon**, State Secretary, West German Federal Chancellery; Federal Minister for Special Affairs until 1974; Minister for Economic Cooperation, from 1974 until 1976
- Baker, Howard**, Senator (R-Tennessee)
- Bartholomew, Reginald**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of Defense, from 1973 until 1974; Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1974 until 1977; Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, from 1979 until 1981
- Bessmertnykh, Alexander A.**, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States
- Boverie, Richard T.**, Colonel, USAF, Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council Staff, from August 1974 until January 1977
- Bowie, Robert R.**, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from 1977 until 1979
- Brandt, Willy**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until May 7, 1974
- Brezhnev, Leonid I.**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Brown, George S.**, General, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, from August 1, 1973, until June 30, 1974; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1, 1974, until June 20, 1978
- Brown, Harold**, Secretary of Defense from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Bush, George H.W.**, Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from October 21, 1974, until December 7, 1975; Director of Central Intelligence from January 30, 1976, until January 20, 1977
- Byrd, Robert C.**, Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader
- Callaghan, James**, British Prime Minister from April 1976 until May 4, 1979
- Carlucci, Frank C., III**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 until 1981
- Carter, Jimmy (James Earl)**, President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Ceausescu, Nicolae**, Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party and President of Romania
- Cheney, Richard B.**, White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President from November 21, 1975, until January 20, 1977
- Christopher, Warren C.**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 1977 to January 20, 1981
- Clements, William P.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1973 until 1976
- Clift, A. Denis**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1971 to 1976; Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981
- Colby, William E.**, Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973, until January 30, 1976



**Cranston, Alan**, Senator (D-California)

**Cutler, Lloyd N.**, White House Counsel from 1977 until 1981; Special Counsel to the President and Consultant to the President on the Ratification of SALT II Treaties, 1979

**Davis, Jeanne W.**, National Security Council Staff Secretary

**Dobrynin, Anatoliy F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

**Duckett, Carl**, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, until June 1, 1976

**Duncan, Charles W.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1977 until 1981

**Earle, Ralph, II**, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Representative on the U.S. SALT Delegation from 1973 until May 11, 1977; Alternate Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation from May 12, 1977, until August 31, 1978; Chief of the U.S. SALT Delegation from September 1, 1978, until 1980; Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from January 1980 until January 1981

**Ellsworth, Robert F.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from June 5, 1974, until December 22, 1975; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 10, 1977

**Ford, Gerald R.**, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan); House Minority Leader until December 6, 1973; thereafter, Vice President of the United States until August 9, 1974; thereafter, President of the United States until January 20, 1977

**Gelb, Leslie H.**, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from February 23, 1977, until June 30, 1979

**Genscher, Hans Dietrich**, West German Foreign Minister from 1974 until 1992

**Graybeal, Sidney**, U.S. Chairman, SALT Standing Consultative Commission

**Grechko, Andrei**, Soviet Defense Minister until April 26, 1976

**Grinevsky, Oleg**, member, Soviet SALT Delegation

**Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister from 1957 until 1985

**Haig, Alexander M., Jr.**, Brigadier General, USA, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until January 1973; Army Vice Chief of Staff from 1973 until 1974; Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from May 1973 until August 1974; Commander-in-Chief, European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe from December 16, 1974, until July 1, 1979

**Harlow, Bryce N.**, Counselor to the President

**Hart, Gary**, Senator (D-Colorado)

**Hartman, Arthur A.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 8, 1974, until June 8, 1977

**Helms, Richard M.**, Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973; Ambassador to Iran from April 1973 until December 1976

**Holloway, James L., III**, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations from 1974 until 1978

**Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr.**, Senator (D-Minnesota)

**Hunter, Robert**, member, National Security Council Staff

**Hyland, William G.**, senior member, National Security Council Staff, until January 1974; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 1974 until November 1975; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 1975 until January 1977; member, National Security Council Staff, from February 1977

**Ikle, Frederick C.**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from July 10, 1973, until January 20, 1977

**Ingersoll, Robert S.**, Deputy Secretary of State from July 10, 1974, until March 31, 1976

- Irwin, John M., II**, Deputy Secretary of State from 1972 until 1973; Ambassador to France from 1973 until 1974
- Jackson, Henry M. (Scoop)**, Senator (D-Washington)
- Johnson, U. Alexis**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until February 1, 1973; Chief of the U.S. SALT Delegation from 1973 until 1977
- Jordan, Hamilton M.**, White House Chief of Staff from 1979 until 1980
- Keeny, Spurgeon**, Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Kennan, George F.**, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and long-time Soviet expert
- Kennedy, Edward M.**, Senator (D-Massachusetts)
- Kirilenko, Andrei Pavlovich**, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973, until January 20, 1977
- Knoche, Enno H.**, Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence until July 3, 1976; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from July 7, 1976, until August 1, 1977; Acting Director of Central Intelligence from January 20 until March 9, 1977
- Komplektov, Viktor G.**, Deputy Chief of the United States of America Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Kornienko (Korniienko), Georgi M.**, Director, United States of America Department, and member of the Collegium, both in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Kosygin, Alexei N.**, Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
- Kozlov, Mikhail M.**, Colonel General (Major General), Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union
- Kraft, Joseph**, syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*
- Laird, Melvin R.**, Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973; Counselor to the President for Domestic Affairs from June 1973 until February 1974
- Lance, Thomas Bertram (Bert)**, Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 1977 until September 1977
- Lehman, John F., Jr.**, member, National Security Council Staff, until September 1974; Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1974 until January 1977
- Lodal, Jan M.**, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1973 until 1974; Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council Staff, from August 1974 until August 1975
- Lord, Winston**, Director, Policy Planning Staff (until February 27, 1974, known as the Policy and Coordination Staff), Department of State, from October 12, 1973, until January 20, 1977
- Mahon, George H.**, Representative (D-Texas)
- Mansfield, Michael J. (Mike)**, Senator (D-Montana); Senate Majority Leader until 1977, thereafter, U.S. Ambassador to Japan
- Mathias, Charles McC.**, Senator (R-Maryland)
- McClellan, John L.**, Senator (D-Arkansas)
- McCrory, Raymond**, Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Agency
- McFarlane, Robert C. (Bud)**, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1974 until 1977; Special Assistant to the President from 1976 until 1977
- McGovern, George**, Senator (D-South Dakota)
- McIntyre, Thomas J.**, Senator (D-New Hampshire)

**Molander, Roger**, member, National Security Council Staff

**Mondale, Walter F. (Fritz)**, Senator (D-Minnesota) from 1964 until 1976; Vice President of the United States from January 21, 1977, until January 20, 1981

**Moorer, Thomas H.**, Admiral, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 until July 1, 1974

**Muskie, Edmund S.**, Senator (D-Maine) until May 7, 1980; Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 20, 1981

**Newhouse, John**, Assistant Director, Bureau of International Security Programs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1977 to 1979

**Nitze, Paul H.**, member, U.S. SALT Delegation, from 1969 until 1973; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1973 until 1976

**Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974

**Odeen, Philip A.**, Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff

**Odom, William E.**, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981

**Podgorny, Nikolay Viktorovich**, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union

**Porter, William J.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 2, 1973, until February 18, 1974

**Powell, Joseph L. (Jody)**, White House Press Secretary from January 1977 until January 1981

**Reagan, Ronald**, Governor of California; Republican Presidential candidate in 1980

**Richardson, Elliot L.**, Secretary of Defense from January 30, 1973, until May 24, 1973

**Rockefeller, Nelson A.**, Vice President of the United States from December 19, 1974, until January 20, 1977

**Rodman, Peter W.**, member, National Security Council Staff and Office of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger

**Rogers, William P.**, Secretary of State until August 23, 1973

**Rowny, Edward L.**, Lieutenant General, USA, U.S. Representative to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from 1971 to 1979

**Rumsfeld, Donald H.**, Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from September 27, 1974, until November 19, 1975; Secretary of Defense from November 20, 1975, until January 20, 1977

**Rush, Kenneth W.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 1973; Deputy Secretary of State from February 2, 1973, until May 29, 1974

**Scali, John A.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations from February 20, 1973, until June 29, 1975

**Schlesinger, James R.**, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until February 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from February 2 until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975; Special Adviser to the President for Energy from January 1977 until September 1977; Secretary of Energy from October 1977 to July 1979

**Schmidt, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from May 16, 1974

**Scott, Hugh D., Jr.**, Senator (R-Pennsylvania) until January 3, 1977; Senate Minority Leader

**Scowcroft, Brent A.**, Major General, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from April 1973 until November 3, 1975; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 3, 1975, until January 20, 1977

- Seignious, George M., II**, General, USA, member, U.S. SALT Delegation, from 1978 until 1979; Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from December 4, 1978, until January 3, 1980
- Semenov, Vladimir Semenovich**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of the Soviet SALT Delegation
- Shchukin, Aleksandr**, member of the Soviet SALT Delegation
- Shulman, Marshall**, Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs to Secretary of State Vance from 1977 until 1980
- Shultz, George P.**, Secretary of the Treasury from 1972 until 1974
- Sick, Gary**, member, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East from January 1977 until January 1980
- Sisco, Joseph J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 18, 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 20, 1974, until June 30, 1976
- Slocombe, Walter B.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1979 until January 1981
- Sloss, Leon**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1973 until 1975; Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1976 until 1978
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 until January 4, 1973; Chief of the U.S. SALT Delegation until 1973; Special Assistant to the President for Non- Proliferation Matters from 1977 until 1980
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr**, Soviet author and dissident
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut**, senior member, National Security Council Staff; Counselor of the Department of State from January 7, 1974, until February 21, 1977
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until August 2, 1973
- Stennis, John C.**, Senator (D-Mississippi); Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until January 7, 1974; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1974 until 1976; U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1976 until 1980
- Sukhodrev, Viktor M.**, First Secretary, Soviet Foreign Ministry, and interpreter
- Teller, Edward**, founder, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
- Toon, Malcolm**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 18, 1977, until 1979
- Tower, John**, Senator (R-Texas)
- Trusov, General Konstantin A.**, Senior Military Representative, Soviet SALT Delegation
- Tucker, Gardiner L.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis until March 30, 1973
- Turner, Stansfield M., Admiral**, Director of Central Intelligence from January 1977 until January 1981
- Utgoff, Victor**, member, National Security Council Staff
- Vance, Cyrus R.**, Secretary of State from January 1977 until April 28, 1980
- Vavilov, Andrei**, official, United States of America Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Vorontsov, Yuly**, Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in the United States
- Wade, James P., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Director of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Task Force, Department of Defense; Chairman of the Defense Review Panel Working Group

**Walters, Vernon A.**, Lieutenant General, USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until July 7, 1976

**Warnke, Paul**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 14, 1977, until October 31, 1978

**Weiss, Seymour**, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from August 6, 1973, until January 17, 1974

**Wickham, John A., Jr.**, Major General, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1973 until 1976

**Wikner, N. Frederick**, Chairman of the SALT Task Force, Department of Defense, from September 1973 until 1974

**Wolfowitz, Paul**, staff member, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1972 until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs from 1977 until 1980

**Young, Milton R.**, Senator (D-North Dakota)

**Ziegler, Ronald L.**, White House Press Secretary and Assistant to the President from 1973 until 1974

**Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr.**, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations until June 29, 1974

# SALT II, 1972–1980

## 1. Note From the Soviet Union to the United States<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, undated.

1. The Soviet side confirms its consent to resume the negotiations between the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms on November 21 in Geneva, with a view that this phase of the negotiations would be short in time (a month or a bit longer) and would be of preparatory nature. Then the negotiations would be continued at the beginning of the next year.

2. The Soviet side proceeds from the possibility and desirability of further progress in limitation and reduction of strategic arms that may follow on, and it approaches the negotiations with the American side accordingly. At the same time agreement stated in the already concluded agreements, constitutes a good common basis for moving ahead.

We believe, furthermore, that the exchanges of views, that took place between the leaders of both states, deem it possible to make a conclusion about the existence of coinciding elements in the approach of the sides to the forthcoming new phase of the negotiations on limitation of strategic arms, which resume after the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons have entered into force.

Both sides seem to agree upon concentrating their efforts on the following:

a) Solution of the questions arising in connection with putting into operation the machinery of the agreements which have already been concluded, i.e. the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement as well as the Agreement on measures to lessen the danger of outbreak of nuclear war. Both sides spoke in favor of agreeing, first of all, in this respect on the Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission and the procedures of its functioning so as to contribute to ensuring the confi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14. Top Secret. A handwritten note reads: "Handed to K[issinger] by D[obrynin] 1:30 pm, 10/24/72." No further record of the meeting has been found.

dence of the sides in the implementation of the provisions of the agreements in force.<sup>2</sup>

b) Achievement of agreement on more complete measures of limiting strategic offensive arms and possible conversion of the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms into permanent agreement with the appropriate expansion of its contents.

c) Consideration of the possibilities that both sides undertake to exercise restraint in the areas, not limited by the agreement, as well as not to start new major programs in the field of strategic offensive arms.

It goes without saying that at the forthcoming negotiations it would be necessary to consider thoroughly the ways leading to the solution of those problems. If both governments give their respective delegations to the negotiations instructions of this very kind it would facilitate progress in achieving mutually acceptable agreement.

3. Both sides, as it seems, will have yet to work quite intensively on how to resolve the task of converting the Interim Agreement into permanent one. It appears to us, that permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, including the provisions of the Interim Agreement, that limit the number of ICBMs on submarines, as they have already been agreed upon by the sides, should in our view also contain, in accordance with the principle of equal security and of inadmissibility of unilateral advantages, the solution of such questions, as:

—Withdrawal of advanced based nuclear means along with the liquidation of appropriate bases;

—Liquidation of ballistic missile submarine bases on the territory of third countries and limitation of the operation areas of such submarines;

—Limitations with regard to strategic air force.

We would be prepared to discuss, besides that, the questions of measures, excluding the development of offensive strategic arms, the deployment of which would increase the danger of nuclear war, for example, the question of prohibiting: stationing of strategic ballistic missiles on submarines and on any fixed or mobile launchers, placed on

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<sup>2</sup> The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the SALT I agreement) and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972, are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 317 and 316, respectively. The ABM Treaty called for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission to “promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions” of the Treaty. For documentation on the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on June 22, 1973, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

the sea and ocean bed, including territorial seas and internal waters; construction, testing and deployment of cruise (winged) missiles of intercontinental range; stationing of ballistic missiles on air-based launchers etc.

We would also be prepared to discuss other questions related to the problem of limiting strategic arms.

4. Taking the above into consideration the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States in the process of pending phase of negotiations could work up a joint working program, which would possibly include the list of questions for further negotiations on strategic offensive arms. In our view the above mentioned questions might be a good basis for working out this program.

In the course of the work of the delegations in Geneva or upon completion of the mentioned phase it could be possible to additionally discuss through the confidential channel questions of mutual interest as well as to exchange views with regard to a direction of the work of the delegations.



## 2. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 31, 1972, 4:05–5:47 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

John N. Irwin, II

B. Scott Custer

Frank Perez

John P. Shaw

*DOD*

Kenneth Rush

Dr. Gardiner Tucker

Paul H. Nitze

Archie Wood

*JCS*

LTG Royal B. Allison

*CIA*

Richard Helms

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Gerard Smith

Philip J. Farley

*OST*

Dr. Edward David

*AEC*

James Schlesinger

*NSC Staff*

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

William Hyland

Col. Jack Merritt

Col. William DeGraf

Jeanne W. Davis

Mr. Kissinger: Professor Duckett?

Mr. Duckett: [10 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Why do they want a larger missile than the SS-9?

Mr. Duckett: We don't know. Possibly for MIRVing.

Mr. Kissinger: Can they use the same holes?

Mr. Duckett: Yes, in fact it seems to be [number not declassified] smaller than the SS-9 hole. If the missile were as large or larger it would require some scheme to get it out of the silo because of the heat that would be generated. They need another stage to push it out of the hole—that's known as a cold launch.

[10 lines not declassified] In any event, we believe the existence of a big new missile has been confirmed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72–6/4/74 [1 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. All brackets except those that indicate text not declassified are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Odeen and Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a briefing memorandum on October 24 in which they explained: "The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the major issues underlying SALT Two and to get views on how we should proceed in the first round of SALT." (Ibid., Box H-12, Verification Panel Meeting, 10/31/72, 1 of 3)

Mr. Kissinger: Would they use this to replace all their SS-9's?

Mr. Duckett: We believe that's what they have in mind.

Mr. Kissinger: Why are they building the new holes?

Mr. Duckett: It may be for additional hardening. Or, they may want to have enough additional holes so that they can replace them one or a few at a time and would not have to take their SS-9's out of action while they were being replaced.

Mr. Kissinger: So they will start putting 25 of the new missiles into the new holes.

Mr. Duckett: Yes, and as soon as they are ready they can tear down 25 SS-9's.

*[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]*

At the ABM sites in Moscow it looks as though all four radar pedestals will have large parabolic-type antennae. We think it is more likely that these are for communications—possibly satellite communications—than directly related to ABM. There is, however, a new development in a cable bridge which suggests there may be some tie between this area and the ABM radar. This seems to be a very hard site and could be a command and control center.

At Sary Shagan the two old ABM launchers have been removed which brings them down below 15 which is the legal limit. You will recall the original movable radar. Now there are two more pedestals which starts to look like a big research and testing program. They will be able to have three radars under test simultaneously which is bigger than we expected.

Mr. Kissinger: What conclusion do you draw from this?

Mr. Duckett: That, despite SALT, the Soviets intend to continue with a very active R&D program. They could be testing a system associated with hard point defense. If not, it could still be troublesome. It could allow a very rapid buildup and deployment.

Mr. Kissinger: Right. It would only take six months to install them.

Mr. Duckett: Yes. They could be getting themselves postured in a way we don't like.

Dr. Tucker: What we do about that is MIRV. MIRV is important to penetrate.

Mr. Duckett: On the number of ABM launchers, they are now down to 13 at Sary Shagan. They have taken out the two oldest launchers and one Galosh.

Mr. Nitze: Could they put new ABM launchers on the old pads?

Mr. Duckett: They could put them back at any time. *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Nitze: This is something we should talk about. The agreement says they should be dismantled according to agreed procedures.

Mr. Duckett: In Complex L they have bulldozed over the sites. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: If they proliferate radars, could they proliferate missile launchers to go with them?

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Could they build radars in sheds and we wouldn't know about them until they are in place?

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Schlesinger: They probably have a committee which is working out changes in their procedures so as to avoid early detection.

Mr. Kissinger: How long after their testing could they be in mass production?

Mr. Duckett: Probably in less than a year.

Mr. Kissinger: How many of these would it take to cover a substantial part of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Duckett: With the SA-5 we figure 100 locations and about 250–300 radars. If the SA-5 had an ABM capability it would give them substantial coverage.

On the Y-class submarine that was being modified, it is apparent that this is a major modification. They have cut the whole top off. They have now brought a second boat in alongside the first, so this is more than just [5 lines not declassified]

Dr. Tucker: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I want today to have a preliminary discussion of the first phase of SALT II. I understand this phase will be fairly brief—from November 21 to shortly before Christmas. First we might discuss the matter of the Standing Consultative Commission and its operations and then some general principles for SALT II. I believe there is some agreement within the government that we should try to make the quantitative limitations a little more permanent. We might begin to discuss what if anything we want to do about qualitative limitations. (to Mr. Smith) When are you leaving?

Mr. Smith: Tentatively on November 17. We plan to touch base with the North Atlantic Council on the 20th and the talks open on the 21st.

Mr. Kissinger: We could do some preliminary thinking on how to proceed. We're in reasonably good shape on SCC, aren't we? We'll move a memorandum to the President for resolution of the repre-

sentation question. We have no substantive problem about what it should do, do we?

Mr. Smith: No.

Mr. Kissinger: The issue is whether our SCC delegation should be the same as the SALT delegation or whether it should have independent status.

Mr. Smith: We are all agreed that it should have independent status eventually. The only question is whether it should not be the same as the SALT delegation or tied to the SALT delegation while the SALT talks are going on.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand ACDA and JCS want to keep it on the SALT track and State and OSD prefer a more independent status.

Gen. Allison: We think it should be independent, but for the first meeting perhaps two or three delegates could wear two hats—both an SCC hat and a SALT hat. But we think the SCC should be established as a separate body.

Mr. Kissinger: Personally I have no view on this. The President will decide. (to Mr. Smith) Could we have your views on the substance of the work? What would it be useful to do?

Mr. Smith: I don't think we should start with any large areas ruled out. I would like to have a broad hunting license. For example, I would like to discuss equal aggregates and try to draw the Soviets out. They will want to talk about forward based systems right away. We might see if they have any interest in qualitative controls. I think we should go into all the possibilities including Defense's concern over throw-weight constraints. We could talk about reductions in theory. I think we should try to push back the cloudy area on exactly what is within the ball park. I think we'll have trouble with the Congress if we tell them we are only going to talk about numbers and that there are no possibilities in the qualitative field.

Mr. Kissinger: Why would we have trouble with Congress?

Mr. Smith: The liberals will say we are not trying to get controls on testing or on throw-weight.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we should first discuss how we can approach the subject of quantitative limitations intellectually at these meetings, then go on to qualitative limitations. This can be done without any prejudice to including qualitative limitations. How can we go about discussing quantitative limitations?

Mr. Smith: The Soviets will probably see if there is any softness in the U.S. position on the equality of numbers. We should meet this head on and make it clear that we have no interest in any arrangement that does not give us the right to have equal numbers of strategic systems. The question would be what systems to include at the first instance and

what mixtures would be allowed. For example, if they insist on inclusion of mothballed bombers, we would demand freedom to mix.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me be the devil's advocate. Senator Jackson would say that we already have a freeze that is disadvantageous to us. How could we claim equality by throwing in more systems to be counted—the F-111's, mothballed B-52's. He could say that this is a fraud; that we are making a permanent agreement freezing all the inequities of the interim agreement.

Mr. Smith: If we want equality in aggregates we will have to classify more systems as being strategic with the freedom to mix.

Mr. Kissinger: Then our answer to Jackson would be that if we don't want more ICBMs, we should have more mothballed bombers that can be converted.

Mr. Smith: If we don't have the same numbers we should have the right to convert.

Mr. Irwin: Are you equating one bomber with one missile launcher?

Mr. Smith: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Jack [Irwin], what do you think?

Mr. Irwin: I think we should stick on equality first. The question is the best way to define equality. I wouldn't disagree with Gerry [Smith] if we have the capability and the right to go to equality directly or to shift from one system to the other. But I'm more sure on the principle than I am on the method.

Mr. Kissinger: Ken [Rush], what do you think?

Mr. Rush: I agree with Gerry [Smith] that we should be able to shift.

Mr. Nitze: This reinforces the desirability of getting reductions thereafter.

Dr. Tucker: There's a difference between including mothballed bombers and including fighter bombers or F-111's.

Mr. Nitze: Only the FB-111's are called strategic.

Mr. Irwin: Do we have any FB-111's in Europe?

Mr. Nitze: They're all in the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger: What's the difference between the F-111 and the FB-111?

Dr. Tucker: The B is the bomber version.

Gen. Allison: They have a larger stress factor and larger wing span.

Dr. Tucker: There's a serious question whether it is politically feasible to include strategic forces over the present level.

Mr. Kissinger: This would not be a requirement, only an option.

Dr. Tucker: Yes, but we may not exercise the option.

Mr. Kissinger: Wouldn't the only other course be to force them to reduce? How would we do this? Say they can't have more than 1054 ICBM's? As I understand it, Gerry [Smith] doesn't exclude this. The question is whether to begin with Smith's approach as a step toward reduction or some other. (to Gen. Allison) Can the Chiefs live with equal aggregates?

Gen. Allison: What are put into the aggregates are matters of definition. It depends on how you start. Do we take our total forces and say this is the aggregate?

Mr. Kissinger: How can you establish a total aggregate that doesn't define what it is?

Gen. Allison: What about F-111's; medium bombers? Do we include them?

Mr. Kissinger: Is it in our interest to include Soviet medium bombers? With freedom to mix, if they have an aggregate of 2500 and include mothballed bombers we have the option to increase our land-based force. We might have to give up something to get the freedom to mix. What would we lose by including mothballed bombers in the aggregate total?

Gen. Allison: The difficulty lies in whether we should decide in principle on equal aggregates before we decide what goes into it. Then how do you deal with the asymmetries on both sides? They have great capability in air defense, SLCM's etc. They will talk about our forward based systems.

Mr. Kissinger: The JCS want the principle of equal aggregates. How do we define it?

Gen. Allison: Central strategic systems [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: You would exclude FB-111's. You don't mind including mothballed bombers?

Gen. Allison: No.

Mr. Kissinger: If we include their tankers they will want to include ours.

Gen. Allison: Yes, but they're an entirely different kind of airplane.

Mr. Kissinger: Paul [Nitze], what do you think?

Mr. Nitze: I think Gerry Smith's on the right track. We have to define what goes into the aggregate.

Mr. Helms: How can you add up to an aggregate if you don't know what you're adding.

Mr. Irwin: Are we going to have illustrative examples or just speak generally? Can you talk aggregates without going into specifics?

Mr. Nitze: There's also the question of their Backfire bombers.

Mr. Kissinger: The principle of equal aggregates should be discussed but it's hard to visualize getting Congressional approval.

Mr. Smith: We should be firm that we're not interested on any basis other than equal aggregates.

Mr. Kissinger: They might try to freeze us permanently into fixed numbers. They might agree on equal aggregates and not on freedom to mix.

Mr. Nitze: They have been in favor of freedom to mix in the past.

Mr. Smith: They could change their position.

Mr. Rush: Also, the Air Force wants to build some more B-52's.

Dr. Tucker: Those in Southeast Asia are running out of service.

Mr. Kissinger: We should give illustrative examples of equal aggregates. We should make it clear what we're not authorized to include. I'm going to shoot for an NSC meeting before Gerry [Smith] leaves.

Mr. Smith: I hope we can get something to the North Atlantic Council by November 9.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we get this in shape?

Mr. Smith: I have a draft report to NAC which has been gone over by State and Defense—there are a number of splits.

Mr. Kissinger: Send it over here.

(Mr. Smith handed Mr. Kissinger the draft paper.)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Kissinger: How about forward-based systems?

Mr. Smith: Our position should be as in the past. These systems have marginal strategic utility. The Soviets have similar systems. We should learn more about what they have in mind. At the end of SALT I they were more interested in our submarines. They may be thinking about forward-based submarines, or about the capability of our fighter-bombers in the Far East. They also talk about our ringing them with nuclear bases. We need to find out more about what's irking them.

Mr. Kissinger: I worry that when we explore something we make it legitimate. If we're not willing to consider it, why should we explore it?

Mr. Smith: If our government decides to do nothing on forward-based systems, that's okay. But we said at Helsinki that after the central systems were taken care of we would consider non-central systems.

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<sup>2</sup> The October 26 draft report to the NAC is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-013, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT, 11/2/72.

Mr. Kissinger: In the same agreement?

Mr. Smith: That wasn't clear.

Mr. Nitze: It would be part of the same negotiations but at the very end.

Mr. Smith: If we get a good deal otherwise with equal aggregates, and forward-based systems are the only missing link, we should consider them seriously. The Europeans might like it. A ceiling would be potentially a floor.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the Defense view?

Mr. Rush: We shouldn't use forward-based systems as a part of the negotiations at all nor should we compensate for their not being included.

Gen. Allison: I agree.

Mr. Irwin: I agree, if we could get away with it. But I agree with Gerry Smith that if we can get controls on the central systems and the forward-based systems only are left, we could accept equal controls.

Mr. Nitze: At a minimum we should bat down their arguments for inclusion of forward-based systems.

Mr. Smith: If we take a flat position, we will find ourselves in the same place we were in 1971. We had to decide then whether to make it into a breaking issue. I can't see breaking down completely on forward-based systems. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't try.

Mr. Kissinger: We're agreed on an equal aggregates proposition but we don't have an idea of what to include. On FBS, should we exclude altogether or see what the Soviets have in mind—see how they bring this together with their non-central system.

Mr. Irwin: What if we take a flat position at first, then break off. Would we be better or worse off?

Mr. Smith: I can't give you a useful judgment. It depends on the U.S. position in extremis.

Mr. Irwin: If we'd be worse off, I could accept your initial argument.

Mr. Rush: I favor no fall-back position at all. A fall-back position is likely to become our position. It will leak. This is a vital issue and we should leave it out. We can't refuse to talk about it, but we should put it off to the end and not let it become a breaking point midway in the negotiations.

Mr. Smith: We did just that in 1970–71—put it off to the end. Then the Soviets wouldn't come up with numbers. They insisted on acceptance of the concept first. Unless the Soviet approach is different, we would just get back into the mud.



Mr. Rush: Sticking to our position is more important than early progress in the talks.

Mr. Shaw: There is a middle road we might take. We have discussed this with NATO and they seemed to approve. It would apply to both the U.S. and Soviet non-central systems. There would be no numerical ceiling but neither side would take any action to undermine the viability of the agreement.

Mr. Schlesinger: Would we include forward-based systems in the equal aggregates or not?

Mr. Smith: They would not affect the aggregate at all. There are other ways to think about it. If the Soviets were asked to make a deal on their SLBMs, ICBMs, etc., with no limit on our carrier-based aircraft, for example, they would ask why they should agree.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's have the Working Group do a paper for the President laying out the choices on forward-based systems and on equal aggregates. FBS have never been considered a part of the equal aggregates, have they?

Mr. Smith: No. But in the Working Group paper there are examples of how to take FBS into account.

Mr. Kissinger: You want to brief NAC on the 9th. I doubt if I can get the President's attention before the 8th, but I will try.

Mr. Smith: One difficulty is that FBS is a subject that NAC wants to get its teeth into. We have held them back. If we take the position that it's out, they won't believe it. They will want to set up a working group and we will have to have NAC consideration of forward-based systems.

Gen. Allison: I agree.

Mr. Nitze: We have two problems: what we tell NAC and what to say to the Russians. We shouldn't say more to the Russians than we do to NAC.

Mr. Irwin: They will know what's in NAC. (to Kissinger) You say everyone agrees on equal aggregates and we should come up with something for the President to consider. Are you implying that this would contain numbers?

Mr. Kissinger: No, we don't need numbers. But if we don't want to include FBS, let's not raise it as an issue. Let's give him an idea of what we're thinking about. A primary issue would be whether to include mothballed bombers under the categories listed. How many do we have? 79?

Dr. Tucker: We should define what we want to include on the Soviet side too, then decide what U.S. items are consistent. We don't want freedom to mix if it would give them undue freedom.

Mr. Nitze: Or if they included Backfire if we included FB-111's.

Gen. Allison: They're quite different aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we have a few words about qualitative limitations.

Mr. Schlesinger: We should be careful not to be trapped by terminology. There is nothing more quantitative than throw-weight, particularly when forces are MIRVed. Throw-weight should be part of our consideration of equal aggregates.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean this would give us the right to triple our Minute Man force?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Either that or give us the right to build larger missiles.

Mr. Schlesinger: Throw-weight is quite different from other qualitative limitations. Throw-weight is measurable, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Smith: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Gen. Allison: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any question that our land-based missiles yield a lower throw-weight than theirs?

Mr. Nitze: Throw-weight provides a more direct dimension than the measurement of silos.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's be more concrete about equal aggregates. Would they yield to us on throw-weight?

Mr. Schlesinger: No.

Mr. Irwin: If we throw our bombers in, yes.

Mr. Nitze: But the throw-weight of missiles and the payload of bombers are not comparable.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we agree to equal aggregates with freedom to mix, but the throw-weight of the aggregate must be equal?

Mr. Nitze: Equal aggregates of numbers of launchers. The aggregate throw-weight of each side must be equal, but we would measure only missiles.

Mr. Kissinger: Then the Soviets would have to reduce the number of their missiles.

Mr. Nitze: Yes, if they were to have less than [*number not declassified*] pounds.

Mr. Kissinger: Would this give us the right to build up to [*number not declassified*] pounds?

Dr. Tucker: It would be more meaningful to set a lower limit.

Mr. Kissinger: They won't be eager to agree. My experience with the Russians indicates that if we can't threaten them with something

they won't play the game. If we say unless they agree to limitations on throw-weight we will build up our force to their throw-weight, it might mean something. Fairness won't compel them to do it.

Mr. Nitze: If the limit is high enough, it would be an inducement for us to build up to the limit. We would likely get reduced accuracy if that were the game.

Dr. Tucker: [2 lines not declassified] can be converted to a strategic imbalance. We can't have that.

Mr. Kissinger: Must this be introduced in the discussion of principles at the first round? Are we all agreed that when we present our position on equal aggregates we should insist on equal throw-weight?

Gen. Allison: No. This analysis depends on a series of things. We assume the Soviets follow the same path as we do. [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Let me understand this. They have [less than 1 line not declassified] and we have [less than 1 line not declassified] What do we stand to gain if there is no limit. What could we do?

Gen. Allison: If we go to all-up Minute Man we could conservatively [less than 1 line not declassified] if we find we need it.

Mr. Irwin: Then you would have no limit on throw-weight?

Gen. Allison: Right.

Mr. Kissinger: They have an extraordinarily larger missile force than ours.

Gen. Allison: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: We have no such missile under construction. Why are we likely to suffer more from throw-weight limitations?

Gen. Allison: We want [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I had understood there would be a total limit on throw-weight within which each side would be free to apportion throw-weight.

Dr. Tucker: The principle is equal aggregate throw-weight. The question is whether to put limitations on throw-weight of individual missiles.

Mr. Smith: If the purpose is to get an improvement in the Minute Man vulnerability issue, this doesn't do it. As accuracy improves we can do the job with throw-weight limitations. [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I have enormous intellectual difficulty in coming to grips with qualitative limitations. Whether we have an agreement or not, we would certainly have in mind the Soviet's throw-weight capability and our answer to it. Do we ease the problem by throw-weight limitations or are we willing to live with our intelligence estimates and

adjust our own position accordingly? Under the offensive freeze we're now prohibited from building missiles larger than the existing silos plus 15%.

Gen. Allison: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: We would keep the existing holes.

Mr. Smith: We could work out anything. We wouldn't have to stick to the terms of the interim agreement.

Mr. Kissinger: The only point in having throw-weight limitations is to have them below the present figure.

Mr. Schlesinger: If they put larger missiles in the SS-9 holes, they are adding to their throw-weight.

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: They have larger holes, therefore they have a better chance at a bigger payload than we do.

Mr. Irwin: If we keep the limitations in their present form.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it inconsistent that they should increase the payload of the SS-11 as they have of the SS-9?

Mr. Smith: We're in the process of increasing our payload through superior technology.

Mr. Kissinger: The side that has the larger holes can have the larger payload. They're bound to catch up to us in technology.

Mr. Nitze: Then we get into MIRV and accuracy constraints.

Dr. Tucker: The problem is not just Minute Man survivability. At any time the Soviets can make their missile force a Minute Man killer. We can't solve the question of Minute Man vulnerability. If the Soviets have a two-to-one advantage in throw-weight, we will back down. Throw-weight imbalance converts into strategic imbalance in the long run.

Mr. Smith: How would you handle our advantage in throw-weight from our higher bomber level?

Dr. Tucker: We could move toward equality of their missile throw-weight with our bomber payload.

Mr. Smith: It would require the demolition of all their SS-9's to get to the four million pound level. I can't say they would blow up their SS-9's.

Mr. Kissinger: And we would keep everything? That's a good deal.

Dr. Tucker: Any salable deal must involve both U.S. and Soviet reductions. It would mean Soviet reductions in SS-9's over time and some SS-11's, and U.S. reductions in our bombers, even mothballed bombers, and some ICBMs. If we trade for equal numbers and throw-weight, we would give up half our Minute Men which would be

a significant advantage to them. We can get throw-weight equality which would give us stability for several years.

Mr. Kissinger: We have the bureaucratic problem of how to get this decided.

Mr. Irwin: Before we decide, we have to look at the qualitative arguments to see how they are or are not related. It's hard to decide in isolation.

Mr. Kissinger: Say we set the throw-weight limitations at five million pounds. The JCS doesn't believe this would actually curtail the Soviet throw-weight that much, and it would keep us from increasing. If we set it at the existing Soviet level of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] it wouldn't bother the JCS. It really won't constrain the Soviets in their present configuration, but it might constrain them if they wanted to put new larger missiles in the SS-11 holes. We must consider first whether we want throw-weight limitations at all and, if we do, should we set them low or at the present Soviet level so as to give us a comfortable margin for increase.

Gen. Allison: I propose we also add limitations on the throw-weight of specific missiles.

Mr. Kissinger: I hadn't heard that before.

Dr. Tucker: That came up in discussing illustrative proposals. We shouldn't get into that until we understand the principle.

Mr. Kissinger: We will have to have another meeting this week. Now can we have a brief presentation on qualitative limitations.

Mr. Wood: When you talk of the effect of qualitative limits on reducing the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs, the extent of the destruction depends on the number of ICBMs attacked and the reliability, yield and accuracy of the weapons. The Soviets probably have [*number not declassified*] ICBMs [*number not declassified*] of which may be large. They have this force deployed today. The only thing protecting our Minute Men is the inaccuracy of the Soviet force. They have enough ICBMs to cover us whether they are MIRVed or not, therefore limitations on accuracy are essential for Minute Man survivability. Without MIRV, with [*number not declassified*] missiles, they could have a reliability factor of [*number not declassified*] If MIRVed, reliability would fall to [*number not declassified*] No sane person would attack with these reliability estimates, but we still have to consider it. In theory, our counter-force capability would remain. But qualitative missile limitations would cut more than one way. Suppose we were reduced to [*number not declassified*] Minute Men. The ABM treaty permits six Moscow radar complexes. With a MIRV ban we would not have enough RV's to destroy the Moscow radars.

(Handing out charts)<sup>3</sup> I'd like to hand out three curves from the qualitative limitations paper. You can see on Curve A that as Soviet accuracy improves, Minute Man survivability drops to [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: What's the point?

Mr. Wood: If there are no effective accuracy restrictions we could not solve the Minute Man survivability problem.

Dr. Tucker: Without accuracy controls we can't solve the problem. Can we get accuracy controls?

Mr. Kissinger: This is too important a subject to compress into the little time we have left. We'll schedule another meeting of this group on Thursday. Mr. Wood can make his presentation more completely and someone can make the case in favor of qualitative restrictions. The conclusions of this paper point in the opposite direction. Gerry [Smith], will you be responsible for finding someone to make a 10-minute presentation in favor of qualitative restrictions. Mr. Wood will talk against them. We will confine the Thursday session to this subject.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Irwin: Gardiner Tucker should also speak to the verifiability of this in comparison to throw-weights.

Dr. Tucker: All right.

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<sup>3</sup> The charts were not found.

<sup>4</sup> No minutes of the November 2 Verification Panel meeting have been found.

3. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

Further Thoughts on the Soviet SALT II Proposals

It is apparent from the discussions of the last few days and the contents of Dobrynin's note (copy at Tab B)<sup>2</sup> that we agree with the Soviets on the priority of a permanent agreement (rather than another interim solution), that is more comprehensive. It is also clear that both sides perceive serious deficiencies in the Interim Agreement.<sup>3</sup> The perceptions of the deficiencies, however, are quite different and point either toward a serious stalemate, or the possibility of defining some ground for bargaining.

Allowing for their usual tactics of stating their maximum objectives, the Soviet note nevertheless conveys the view that the Interim Agreement is unsatisfactory to them because it fails to deal with the question of our forward bases, our bombers, and probable new US programs. (The forward base issue is probably perceived by the Soviets in much the same way as we perceive at least a part of the problem posed for us by the numerical disparities contained in the Interim Agreement. That is, they find these bases obnoxious mostly for diplomatic/political/psychological reasons rather than because they pose serious military threats, much as we find the 62:41 submarine ratio politically unacceptable as a long-term arrangement.)

In putting forward their proposals for dealing with these issues, however, the Soviets seem to be saying that they are *add-ons* to the Interim Agreement, *rather than areas for negotiations* in which the terms of the present Interim Agreement might be adjusted.

For example, the Soviets raise our submarine bases and restrictions on SLBM operating radius. At the same time, they confirm the SLBM levels of the Interim Agreement. Taken at face value this is unacceptable especially since the Soviets themselves have justified the 62:41

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO-I-(Geneva), Nov. 21, 1972–March 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. Kissinger wrote on the top of the first page: "Excellent—see p. 4. HK." The reference is to Kissinger's handwritten note in footnote 7 below.

<sup>2</sup> Document 1.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 1.

ratio in part because of our advantage in forward basing. But it would be a different matter if they were proposing to renegotiate the SLBM or ICBM levels if our bases were abandoned.

Our perception of some of the deficiencies of the Interim Agreement of course are quite different than those outlined in the Soviet note. We clearly face the problem of the vulnerability of our land-based force, which in part is a function of the unequal levels in the Interim Agreement and, in part, a function of the lack of any restraints on technology. Moreover, as noted above, for political-diplomatic reasons, the perpetuation of unequal numbers is regarded by a certain body of opinion, reflected by Senator Jackson, as an unacceptable long term arrangement, and acceptable in the short-term only because we still have technological advantages and strategic systems not covered by the agreement, and because theoretically at least, we can break out after 5 years.

Thus, the unanswered question posed by the Soviet approach, is whether they would consider accommodating our concerns, if we in turn consider the measures they propose, *or* whether we are faced with a series of additional demands that proceed from the assumption that the Interim Agreement will be the unalterable foundation for the permanent agreement.

Of the issues raised, we might divide them into categories where we could consider some bargaining, and those which we have very little freedom of action.

*Submarine Bases*, as the attached portion of the InterAgency study indicates (Tab A),<sup>4</sup> are not a vital element to our capabilities in the long term. The reduction of time on station would be about 20 percent, if we did not operate out of Holy Loch and Rota. The study concludes that the "prompt retaliatory capability would be somewhat reduced", but no reduction in overall survivability of the force or its retaliatory capability. Most important, the advent of Trident means this basing is almost irrelevant, strategically, though still important politically.

There is, however, a limit on the stand off radius that we could accept, without seriously degrading the prompt retaliatory capability. For example, 1200 nm restrictions reduce the number of RVs from Poseidon targetted on Moscow by 45 percent.

The point is that this may be an area for negotiation, if it is clear that, in return, we would aim for throw-weight units, or SS-9 reduc-

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<sup>4</sup> Tab A, which contains the page of the interagency study described, is attached but not printed. The page discusses SSBN operational deployment and contains the explanation that "because of geographical constraints, the U.S. already stands off at least 500 nm from the Soviet Union in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and most of the Norwegian Sea. Denial of ports is an important consideration for a standoff measure."



tions. The Soviets will also argue, of course, that they must receive compensation for the British and French submarines [although even this implies only 50 Soviet submarines].

*Forward Based Aircraft and Missiles*, are quite a different issue. They are integral to our European commitment and the plans for theater warfare. Even a partial withdrawal would raise political issues that could not be mitigated by some Soviet concession on equal central systems. We are highly unlikely to convince the Allies that giving up, say carrier aircraft in the Mediterranean and withdrawing F-111s from England, would be an acceptable price to pay for the reduction of some number of Soviet ICBMs.

Yet, we can be fairly certain that the Soviet General Staff would vigorously resist equal central systems, especially any reduction of a key system such as the SS-9, while our entire FBS arsenal was left untouched.

A *third area* of possible bargaining—if this is a legitimate interpretation of the Soviet note—relates to our *new programs*. They state that not starting major new strategic programs is an issue for SALT II. Their open literature suggests that they will make a strong case against the B-1 and Trident as “destabilizing.” Obviously, this is loaded against us. They propose, for example, to restrict the operational range of SLBMs, and presumably, also propose that we abandon Trident. In this light their proposal offers us nothing.<sup>5</sup>

The question for us to think about, therefore, is whether there is any freedom of action to adjust or even abandon these programs. While I feel this is highly damaging, we might want to consider: (1) whether our postponement of Trident by some years, or an agreed pace of deployment would be negotiable in return for, say, a lower Soviet SLBM level, or a deferral of the deployment of the new SS-9; (2) whether postponement or [less palatable] abandonment of B-1 is negotiable for reductions in the SS-9s, reductions in throw weight, etc. Since the Soviets have also raised bomber armaments, we might also consider such limits as part of the bargaining.

Finally there is the proposal to “*exercise restraint* in areas not limited by the agreement as well as not to start new major programs in the field of strategic offensive arms.” *It is worth pointing out that this is lifted almost verbatim from the paper you gave Dobrynin,*<sup>6</sup> *except that our proposal read to exercise restraint “on the understanding that neither side would undertake major new programs that had as their goal the destruction of the deterrent forces of the other side.”* By dropping this phrase the

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<sup>5</sup> Kissinger highlighted the last sentence of this paragraph.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

Soviet proposal becomes a different issue. Whereas we had in mind counterforce capabilities, they are directing their proposal toward the Trident and B-1. Nevertheless, the key importance may be the *implied suggestion that if there is no agreement on including a specific item* (such as carrier based aircraft), they might be satisfied with a general promise to “exercise restraint.”

In sum, what strikes me about the Soviet proposal is the possibility that we might think about matching their demands against ours to establish a bargaining framework. Rather than countering their proposal for restrictions on SLBM operations with a flat rejection, we might propose to put this concession in the perspective of an overall settlement that establishes equality. Rather than trying to bargain our FBS against *their* non-central system, we might, for example, tie a general constraint to the settlement of equal throw weight in central systems. We might also match the B-1 against the SS-9 as possible bargaining areas, and the Trident against equal SLBM-ICBM levels. In short, we might simply say that we will consider their propositions, *not* as additions to the Interim Agreement but as elements paralleling our own concerns, which could constitute trading material for a permanent settlement.<sup>7</sup>

All of this leads me to think that we should not yet be too truculent in rejecting the Soviet approach, but concentrate on establishing our own parallel concerns. To some extent our demands are on the record in the papers you gave to Dobrynin for Brezhnev, and should be reinforced in the November–December discussions.

In the foregoing we would set aside qualitative limits, and try first of all to exploit Soviet concerns to achieve throw weight equality or SS-9 reductions, or perhaps SLBM equality. In this approach it would be important that we stress to the Soviets the vulnerability of their SS-9 force, which carries a large percentage of their megatonnage. To underline this vulnerability it is important that we not offer to trade our MIRVs at this stage. Any incentives to bargain that we hold out to the Soviets would thus be reinforced by the implied threat to develop our counterforce capability against their land-based systems.

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<sup>7</sup> Kissinger highlighted this paragraph and wrote in the margin: “Hal—will you try this?”

#### 4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 8, 1972.

##### SUBJECT

Issues in SALT

The first session of SALT opens in Geneva on November 21. Although this session will be exploratory, there are a number of issues which will need to be addressed so that our Delegation can conduct the explorations in a manner that does not foreclose key decisions after the first round.

The Verification Panel met two times last week,<sup>2</sup> and certain general categories of issues have been discussed. There is a consensus that a permanent agreement, rather than another interim agreement should be the product of the next phase of SALT. This memorandum brings you up to date on the discussions and foreshadows the issues which will be discussed further in the Verification Panel and presented to the NSC.<sup>3</sup>

The issues are:

—What weapons systems should be included in a permanent agreement and at what level of the numerical limits.

—How do we respond to Soviet arguments pointed towards including our forward-based aircraft, missiles and submarines.

—Whether we raise the issue of qualitative limits such as MIRV bans and, if so, how far to go in the exploratory round.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO—I-(Geneva), Nov. 21, 1972–March 1973. Secret. A note on the first page indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> For the Verification Panel meeting on October 31, see Document 2; for the meeting on November 2, see footnote 4 thereto.

<sup>3</sup> The issues were discussed further at the November 14 Verification Panel meeting, during which Kissinger told the Panel that since the President would not return from Camp David before the delegation left for Geneva, there would be no NSC meeting and the issues would be presented to the President in a memorandum. According to the Summary of Conclusions, the U.S. Delegation would adhere to the ban on mobile launchers, but if there was a possibility of reciprocity, would reexamine the position; would not initiate discussion on submarine FBS, unless discussions of equal aggregates could not be achieved without it; would not discuss ASW limitations; and would not discuss air defenses, unless it had bargaining value in the context of heavy bombers. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72–6/4/74 [1 of 5])

## I. *Quantitative Limits*

There is general acceptance that a minimum requirement of a permanent agreement is that the U.S. and USSR have equal aggregate number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers with freedom to mix—that is to change the number of each system within the overall total so long as the number of ICBMs does not increase.

Beyond that, however, there are three basic issues to be considered:

- The specific composition of the equal aggregate.
- The numerical level of the equal aggregate.
- Whether the aggregate should provide equality in missile throw-weight.

*On the issue of composition*, there is a consensus that the aggregate shall cover ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. There is common understanding on what constitutes ICBMs and SLBMs. However, the definition of bombers will lead to three questions:

- Should we include the 110 mothballed B-52 heavy bombers?
- Should we include the FB-111s? We have 70 of these aircraft which are part of our Strategic Air Command and built to perform the strategic bombing mission, but they are “medium” bombers.
- If we include the FB-111 should we also include the large number of Soviet medium bombers.

Including the mothballed B-52s and the FB-111s could be to our advantage in that we might later deploy more Trident missiles to substitute for them. By the same token, including the Soviet medium bombers means that they would be free to later replace them with far more capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The question of whether to include these systems also depends on the aggregate numerical level we wish to achieve. We presently consider our aggregate level (2,200) to include only *operational heavy bombers*. Including the mothballed B-52s and FB-111s makes the most sense only if we want an agreement with a higher numerical level to allow us room to build up.

Another issue is whether we continue to oppose deployment of mobile ICBMs. You will recall that we have earlier argued to prohibit mobile ICBMs. In the face of Soviet insistence that mobile ICBMs be permitted we simply deferred the issue in the initial agreements. Inasmuch as mobile ICBMs are an important way to increase land-based missile survivability we need to consider carefully our position.

*The issue of the numerical level of the aggregate limit* on offensive forces comes down to three alternatives:

—*Do we want to build up to the Soviet level (about 2,500).* This is probably the easiest agreement to achieve. The question for us is whether the Congress would support a buildup of U.S. systems.

—*Do we want to reduce the Soviets to the U.S. level (about 2,200).* This is clearly desirable, particularly if we can induce the Soviets to reduce SS-9s. The question is whether we have the bargaining leverage to achieve such unilateral Soviet reductions.

—*Do we want significant reductions (to about 1,500)* requiring both sides to make large cuts in their strategic forces. This holds out the *possibility* of making a significant favorable impact on the strategic balance. However, we are still reviewing this question and there are still too many unresolved aspects to make a serious reduction proposal in the first round of talks.

Equality in missile throw-weight would rectify the major asymmetry in the strategic balance favoring the Soviets. (This stems from Soviet deployment of 300 heavy SS-9s.) Missile throw-weight—in effect its payload—is the basic determinant of MIRV capacity and other qualitative improvements. Thus for some, throw-weight is considered a problem of qualitative limits. However, in its simpler form it is a numerical problem and is treated as such in the Interim Agreement which freezes the number of “heavy ICBMs.”

Equal throw-weight is desired out of concern that the Soviet advantage in throw-weight might eventually be exploited to increase the vulnerability of Minuteman. To reduce this threat, the level of throw-weight would have to be set at *our* level and would in effect require phasing out the Soviet SS-9 force. In this connection, the current USSR throw-weight advantage would become a real threat to Minuteman as the Soviets proceed with their MIRV program.

There are three alternative throw-weight levels that could be chosen:

—*Soviet level*—This would be the most easily negotiable and would prevent further Soviet increases. However, it would be of doubtful strategic value to the U.S. The main question is whether the Congress would support development and deployment of a large new U.S. missile to take advantage of the limit.

—*U.S. level*—This would require the Soviets to unilaterally destroy their SS-9 missiles and new large missile. Without a MIRV ban, however, it would not remove the long-term threat to Minuteman from smaller Soviet missiles.

—*Some intermediate level*—Could be used to limit SS-9s to a reduced level, and allow some U.S. increase. (It would also be possible to pose a direct limit on the number of large missiles on both sides.) This would not have any direct effect on the problem of Minuteman vulnerability.

In sum, you may wish to confine the Delegation to simply emphasizing the need for equal aggregates in central strategic offensive systems. However, you may want to authorize them to go beyond this

to explore how this might be achieved—by building up to the Soviet level, by Soviet reductions to our level or appropriate reductions.

In addition, we could also raise the issue of equal throw-weight. For the initial talks we would not have to spell out how equality would be achieved. While a negotiable agreement on throw-weight may not be attainable, raising this issue from the outset could help build bargaining leverage for a more equitable overall agreement.

## II. *Forward-Based Systems (FBS)*

We are already on notice that the Soviets will raise the question of our forward-based aircraft and missiles and our submarine bases at Holy Loch and Rota. This issue is critical to our Allies and, of course, critical to the flexibility we have to deploy forces in the future.

Our choices of responses in the initial round seem to be:

(1) We take a very firm line at least in the first round arguing that the issue of FBS cannot be addressed until the questions concerning central systems are resolved.

(2) We could reintroduce some variant of our earlier approach which only involves a general undertaking not to circumvent the agreement by rapidly building up systems not covered by the agreement.

(3) We could try to defer the issue by token measures such as including F-111s in the U.K. on the grounds that they *can* fly a low-level, two-way mission to Moscow.

(4) Argue that all of the equivalent Soviet systems which can reach our forces or bases must be included if ours are counted. For example, Soviet MR/IRBMs, submarine-launched *cruise* missiles, medium bombers are all in this class. This would create a virtual "Pandora's Box," and implies acceptance of the legitimacy of fringe systems in SALT.

## III. *Qualitative Limitations*

There are a number of potential qualitative limitations which have been considered. They vary widely in their verifiability and their effectiveness. These constraints can be grouped into the following categories:

(1) Major limits which have decisive strategic impact, for example, a ban or limit on MIRVs, a ban on new missiles and components.

(2) Measures which have a strategic impact but of lesser importance; they could be treated separately or added to measures in the first category.

(3) Measures whose effect is largely to retard the pace of development, such as a limit on the annual number of missile tests, which also could be combined with other measures.

The principal issue is whether we want to open *any discussion* of qualitative limits in November. There are enormous differences in the government as to the strategic acceptability of various measures, and the confidence in verifying them.

Should we decide to open the discussion, there are three alternative approaches which we could take to this area of discussion in the first session:

A. We can *keep the discussion very general*, leaving any specific limits for the next session of the talks. In this way we may see if the Soviets have any interest in qualitative limits without clearly committing ourselves to anything.

B. We could go somewhat further and *select certain key limits* to discuss. This approach permits us to focus on limits of interest to us but it also tends to commit us to proposals.

C. Or, we could go even further and *discuss all of the various* qualitative limits, indicating to the Soviets no preference, yet sounding them out on a wide range. This would have the disadvantage of opening up possible issues that we are not certain we want to pursue and of putting effort into uninteresting areas.

#### IV. *Standing Consultative Commission*

The final element which should be taken up in the exploratory discussion is the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The first job for the SCC will be to determine destruction and replacement procedures. There are no important issues to be taken up regarding the SCC. There has been a minor controversy relative to organization which is being referred to you by separate memorandum.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

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### 5. **Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

We have reviewed the Soviet communication of October 24,<sup>2</sup> concerning the strategic arms limitation talks. We are in agreement that the first session should be preparatory in nature and should develop a working program for the next sessions. The American delegation will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 498, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 4. No classification marking. A note on the first page reads: "Handed by K to D 12:30 pm, Tues, 11/14/72."

<sup>2</sup> Document 1.

be instructed to proceed along this line and will place certain items on a work program for further discussion. In doing so we will accept the points made by the Soviet side as issues for the program.

We apparently agree that the Standing Consultative Commission should be established as soon as possible and the regulations for its operation developed.

We also agree that more complete measures for limiting strategic offensive arms should be considered in connection with moving from the Interim Agreement to a permanent agreement.

On the third point raised by the Soviet side—exercising restraint in areas not covered by the agreement as well as questions related to starting major new programs—these would also be appropriate subjects for discussion.

In considering the Interim Agreement, there seems to be agreement that both sides consider it a point of departure. The Soviet side also notes certain measures to be negotiated in the next phase:

—“Withdrawal of advanced based nuclear means along with the liquidation of appropriate bases;

—Liquidation of ballistic missile submarine bases on the territory of third countries and limitation on the operating of such submarines;

—Limitations with regard to strategic air forces.”

As noted in our earlier communication on elements of a permanent agreement, the US approaches the negotiations from a different perspective. We believe the goal of the permanent agreement should be to establish a high order of equivalence in the aggregate numbers and overall capabilities of the main strategic systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. In this context, ICBMs have unique capabilities that make equality an essential feature of an agreement.

The question remains of how equivalence is to be measured and how to reach equitable levels for both sides. In our view the throw weight of land-based ICBMs is the critical feature that determines the capabilities of the entire system. Equal numbers and a limit on throw weight would be a major contribution to strategic stability on a long-term basis.

At the same time, reducing to a mutually agreeable level, if accomplished over a specified period of time, would be a more stabilizing approach to dealing with the asymmetries on both sides.

In our view the foregoing considerations could be set alongside of the Soviet concerns and in this manner a framework for negotiation might be established.



**6. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 14, 1972.

**SUBJECT**

SALT Objectives and Approaches

I recommend the U.S. delegation to SALT be instructed:

1. To tell the Soviets the U.S. seeks a treaty which:
  - a. Provides the basis for enduring strategic stability and parity.
  - b. Deals only with ICBM and SLBM systems and heavy bombers.
  - c. Provides equal aggregate numbers of these systems for the two sides.
  - d. In addition, provides equal aggregate missile throw weights for the two sides.
  - e. Reduces the aggregate numbers and throw weights of offensive systems in a step-by-step process over time.
2. Not to propose, initially, any reduction in U.S. heavy bombers, but to express U.S. willingness to reduce heavy bombers within the equal aggregate numbers when such an offer is useful to reach agreement on the objectives cited above.
3. Not to initiate discussion of MIRV bans or other qualitative limits (except those associated with verification of missile throw weight limits), and to respond to any Soviet discussion of such limits with the view that they are not useful in establishing an enduring strategic balance and should not be included in the treaty.
4. Not to initiate discussion of U.S. forward bases or forward based systems, and to rebut any Soviet proposals to limit, reduce or compensate for these systems or their bases. Only when an adequate treaty is clearly within reach should we consider agreeing that neither side will upset the resulting strategic balance through major shifts in its level or deployment of other nuclear systems.

I further recommend that no fall-back positions be formulated or authorized at this time. We wish to negotiate as forcefully as possible for the treaty outlined above. Only after such an intensive negotiating effort should we determine what fall-back positions, if any, may be nec-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-013, Verification Panel Meetings, SALT, 11/14/72. Top Secret. On November 16, Deputy Secretary of State Irwin also sent Kissinger, at his request, his advice on strategy for SALT II. Irwin suggested "that we avoid putting forth detailed proposals at the first session." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO-I-(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973)

essary or desirable. Establishment of fall-back positions at this time may weaken our negotiating effort, or may leak and so weaken our negotiating effectiveness.

My reasons:

I believe our objective in SALT-II must be a treaty limiting strategic offensive systems which can provide the basis for strategic stability and parity with the Soviets over the long term.

To do this with confidence the treaty must provide for the elimination, over time, of the Soviet advantages in the number and the throw weight of strategic missiles.

The reason is that we cannot confidently stop the Soviets from bringing their technology of MIRVs and missile accuracy up to the level of ours, yet when the Soviets do close this technology gap they can convert their missile throw weight advantage into a major strategic advantage. Specifically they could then deliver substantially more warheads of a given yield accurately onto targets than we can. This means that in nuclear exchanges they could raise the ante more times than we, while still holding in reserve an ultimate retaliatory capability. We would therefore be under great pressure to back away from any major confrontation with the Soviets.

The treaty must, moreover, equalize the number and throw weight of strategic missiles by requiring Soviet reductions rather than depending upon U.S. deployments of missiles with very large throw weights.

The reason is the uncertainty of Congressional support for such major new programs, and the fact that fixed undefended ICBM launchers on both sides may be expected to become vulnerable to missile attack in the next few years. We should therefore be reducing rather than increasing their numbers and their share of the total strategic capability.

A MIRV ban would not be in the U.S. interest even if it were verifiable. We need MIRV as a hedge against Soviet violation of the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty permits stockpiling of ABM interceptors and launchers, partly because we cannot verify the level of stockpiling. With the radar base permitted the Soviets, and the possibility for rapid deployment of such stockpiles, we could not have confidence in our retaliatory capability without MIRVs. We also need MIRV to provide adequate target coverage in retaliation or in escalating limited exchanges. Other qualitative limits serve at best only to slow the rate at which the Soviets close the gap in technology, but cannot prevent them from closing it.

The Soviets will be pressing us hard on Forward Bases and Forward Based Nuclear Systems (FBS). Our NATO allies will be watching

for signs of U.S. willingness to compromise our NATO commitment for our own security. We must resist inclusion of FBS or compensation for FBS in the aggregates.

Soviet agreement on all these points is not likely to be reached easily or quickly. But our goal should be to negotiate, before the end of the 5-year duration of the Interim Offense Agreement, a treaty of enduring strategic value.

To arrive at an acceptable treaty will require that we continue to develop major new strategic options such as Trident and the B-1 which could lead to significant U.S. strategic growth after the expiration of the Interim Offense Agreement. It will also require great firmness in our negotiating stance.

Our starting position must be clear, tough and strategically defensible. Even if we should later decide to settle for an agreement which does not provide substantial reductions or full equalization of aggregate missile throw weights, we will be in a superior negotiating posture if we have made these objectives clear and firm.

**Melvin R. Laird**

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## **7. National Security Decision Memorandum 197<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 18, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Geneva, November 21, 1972

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on November 21 in Geneva.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H-208, Policy Papers, NSDM 151–200 [Originals]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

1. The overall U.S. objective is a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. While the Interim Agreement is an acceptable point of departure, a permanent agreement should be based on essential equivalence in central strategic systems. We should not reopen issues related to the ABM Treaty.

2. In the initial talks the U.S. will not offer specific proposals. These talks should be preparatory in nature and lay the groundwork for a more systematic negotiation next year. To this end, the Delegation's objective should be to obtain Soviet views in order to aid the development of future U.S. positions. Therefore, the Delegation should avoid prejudging such positions. The U.S. Delegation should propose developing a work program for the next round of negotiations. However, in accepting subjects for further discussion, it should be made clear that we are not thereby committed to the inclusion of any given measures in the final agreement.

3. For the U.S. Delegation, the first order of business should be the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission, as called for in the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.<sup>2</sup> As soon as feasible, negotiations could also begin on establishing agreed dismantling and replacement procedures.

4. The U.S. presentation at the initial talks should focus on (a) establishing priority for the negotiation of limitations on central strategic weapons—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; (b) establishing a high degree of equivalency in this overall category, and (c) stressing our strong concerns over the unique capabilities that the USSR derives from its greater ICBM throw weight and the potentially destabilizing effect of the Soviet advantage in Modern Large Ballistic Missiles. The Delegation should seek to have these issues reflected in any work program.

5. The Delegation should stress that a fundamental principle of a permanent agreement should be overall numerical equality in central systems, and within this framework, our goal is equality in ICBM numbers and overall ICBM throw weight.

6. The U.S. Delegation should not offer for discussion any specific numerical limits for an overall aggregate of central systems. The Delegation should indicate that its preferred approach is that equal aggre-

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<sup>2</sup> NSDM 198, issued November 18, established guidance for the formation of the U.S. portion of the SCC. The President would appoint a Commissioner and a Deputy, who would be supported by a staff headed by an Executive Secretary. They would not serve on the U.S. SALT Delegation, but would maintain liaison with it through the Executive Secretary. The Commission would operate under the direction of the Verification Panel. Until the Commissioner was appointed, the Chief of the U.S. SALT Delegation would act as the Commissioner. (Ibid.)

gates should be established through reductions. The work program should encompass the questions of reductions.

7. The U.S. should raise freedom to mix among central systems as a characteristic of a permanent agreement. Limits on freedom to mix would be dependent on other features of the limits on central systems.

8. If the Soviets should raise the question of mobile ICBMs, the Delegation should accept it for discussion as part of the discussion of central systems.

9. The U.S. Delegation should not raise forward based aircraft or missiles, or our submarine bases abroad. If the Soviet Delegation addresses these questions the U.S. can accept them for further discussion; it should be made clear that we do not thereby acknowledge the legitimacy of these systems as “strategic” or as an element in the composition of an overall aggregate. In this connection, if tactical aircraft are a subject for further discussion, the U.S. should indicate that we will raise non-central Soviet systems, as well as systems capable of attacking our bases and forces.

10. The U.S. should not raise non-transfer of strategic offensive weapons, but if necessary could accept the issue as an item in a work program.

On both issues—forward based systems and non-transfer—the U.S. should make it clear that they will be addressed by the U.S. side only after an initial negotiation of issues related to limitation on central systems. No further comment should be made on these subjects.

11. The U.S. should hold open the question of qualitative limitations as a general category for subsequent discussion without dealing in the specifics of limitations.

12. The U.S. Delegation should not foreclose raising the air defense issue in later phases of the negotiation. At an appropriate time, the Soviet Delegation should be made aware that we will discuss it later.

13. The formality or informality with which the discussions are conducted should be determined by the Chairman of the Delegation.

14. It is not envisaged that this round should cover more than about four weeks. At an appropriate time during the initial talks, the Delegation should seek instructions on the date of resumption.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

8. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 1, 1972.

SUBJECT

SALT Guidance

While you are in Paris we anticipate some tactical issues in SALT on which we need your guidance. Thus far, we have spelled out the concept of equal aggregates to be reached through reductions, equal ICBMs, and throw weight limitations. On FBS we have simply said that the Soviets are aware of our previous position.

The Soviets have spelled out a maximum position: confirming provisions of the Interim Agreement as already agreed, withdrawal of missiles and aircraft from third countries if they are "strategic" by the Soviet definition, and withdrawal of submarines and aircraft carriers beyond reach of Soviet territory; liquidation of bases, etc. In addition, the Soviets have put forward an almost ludicrous series of limitations on strategic bombers; agreed numerical limits, ban on the use of bombers as carriers of nuclear weapons (*sic*); ban on development and testing of long-range air-to-surface missiles, ban on development, testing and production of new strategic bombers.

In light of the Soviet emphasis on FBS, and their apparent tactic of presenting far-reaching limits on the US, *the delegation wants to make a hard hitting rebuttal on FBS.*

—The NSDM,<sup>2</sup> if taken at face value, only permits them to accept the FBS issue for the work program. The idea of a new round of polemics is not envisaged.

—Focusing on the Soviet order of issues, rather than presenting our views, is playing their game; a detailed discussion of FBS, even for rebuttal tends to legitimize the priority of the issues; arguments that they are not "strategic" may backfire if we want to limit the new Soviet medium bomber; sub bases are also potential bargaining chip; rather than arguing FBS which the Soviets will insist be resolved, we should continue to emphasize our own concerns.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO-I-(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973. Secret. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. On the last page, an unknown hand wrote, "RTK informed 0045 hrs 5 Dec."

<sup>2</sup> Document 7.

—On the other hand, silence could be interpreted as acquiescence; turning down a delegation recommendation might be read as reflecting some nefarious Washington (White House) scheme. Rejecting the Soviet position has some residual value when debriefing the Allies.

*On balance, I recommend that we make only brief intervention to underscore that we do not agree with Soviet views and only agree to consider FBS on the work program, as instructed in the NSDM.*

The second tactical issue is whether to prod the delegation to raise air defense. The sweeping Soviet proposal to virtually do away with strategic bombers is probably tactical posturing and not very serious. At the same time, the Soviets will try to limit bomber armaments which is in their interest, and to attack plans for the B-1. Air defense, which has its own merits, is an ideal counter at this stage of SALT. The Soviets ought to be put on notice that we have maximal positions.

*Recommendation*

1. That the delegation be instructed *not* to make a detailed FBS rebuttal, but limit their remarks to a statement of disagreement, and concentrate on developing the priority for central systems.

2. That the delegation be instructed to raise air defense *now* as an item for the work program.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Kissinger approved both recommendations.

9. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Next Meeting with Dobrynin<sup>2</sup>

SALT

The talks are to recess next week. There is an ad referendum agreement to resume February 27 but this *awaits your approval*.

The only concrete result will be a memorandum on the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC). This also awaits your approval. (Smith has wired you separately on it.)<sup>3</sup> Guidelines for regulations governing the operations of the SCC are hung up with the agencies here but we hope to get this straightened out before the recess. If not, the memorandum alone could be signed. There also will be a broadly-phrased work program.

Substantively, the talks are really deadlocked over our insistence that we concentrate on equal aggregates in central systems (including throw weight) and Soviet insistence that we in effect not tamper with the interim agreement but add on to it a series of measures affecting FBS, submarine operations and aircraft armaments.

The Soviets have talked to Smith about the possibility of some additional interim agreement(s) for the next summit but it is not clear what measures they have in mind other than those with clearly detrimental effects for us.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 67, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Map Room, [Aug. 1972–May 31 1973, 1 of 3]. Confidential; Sensitive; Eyes Only. This memorandum is printed in full as Document 70 in *Foreign Relations 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

<sup>2</sup> According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, he met with Dobrynin on December 16 from 8:42 to 9:50 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, Aug. 1970–Aug. 1973) No other record of Kissinger's conversation with Dobrynin has been found.

<sup>3</sup> In backchannel message 56 to Kissinger, December 13, Smith reported that Semenov had authority to sign a memorandum of understanding on the SCC, and asked that he be given the same authority as Semenov. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1972–SALT) The draft memorandum of understanding was transmitted in telegram 65 from USDEL SALT II Geneva. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO–I–(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973)



The Soviets, I believe, owe you a reaction to your written response<sup>4</sup> to the paper Dobrynin gave you some weeks ago,<sup>5</sup> and the contents of which they have since put on the table in Geneva.

There has been some probing by Soviet delegates on qualitative restraints (MIRVs) but no initiative—indeed, the inference has been left that we should make the proposals.

It seems to me that since you have already left the message that there may be some bargaining room on matters of Soviet concern if they show flexibility on what bothers us, you should stand pat for now. I would judge that the Soviets feel some pressure to come up with potential deals for the Brezhnev visit (whenever that may in fact occur) and that we should be relaxed in this regard for now. Our message on central systems should stand undiluted as the Soviet leaders gather for their anniversary celebration.

[Omitted here is discussion of topics other than SALT.]

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<sup>4</sup> Document 5.

<sup>5</sup> Document 1.

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# **10. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Smith) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 20, 1972, 1503Z.

75. Eyes Only for the President.

Dear Mr. President:

On winding up my SALT responsibilities, I thought it might be useful to give you my personal observations of this first round of SALT Two.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1972–SALT. Top Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> The session in Geneva concluded on December 21. On January 4, Gerard Smith resigned as Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and as Director of ACDA. U. Alexis Johnson was named to replace Smith as Chief of the SALT Delegation.

I. The Soviets have staked out a good negotiating position in their concept that SLBM and ICBM levels have now been fixed indefinitely by the Interim Agreement of May 26th.

II. Their main target now is limiting “strategic aviation.” This is a difficult issue for them since the US has a substantial advantage. It also overlaps the so-called FBS question. The Soviet delegation presented the absurd proposal that nuclear weapons not be carried in strategic bombers. They proposed that new strategic bombers not be developed, that strategic bombers not carry long range air-to-surface missiles, and that carrier-based strike aircraft be withdrawn from range of the Soviet Union. They seemed especially sensitive to the threat that potential US air-launched ICBM’s could offer in the future.

Their FBS position has hardened from its last spellout in 1971. They propose that these types of systems capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union be withdrawn from forward bases and the bases liquidated. This is a political as well as a military issue. I think we will have to find some solution to it, however minimal.

The Soviets want to ban intercontinental cruise missiles. I gather they see this type of missile as presenting unique difficulties for Soviet defenses.

III. They made several informal probes as to American ideas for an interim limitation that might be ripe for agreement at a 1973 summit. We were non-committal.

The Soviets are interested in some undefined arrangement which would put restraints on new systems while negotiations continue to limit older systems. While they agree that such restraints should be reciprocal, the main object appears to be US systems such as B-1 and Trident.

For the first time in SALT, there were a number of indications of Soviet interest in some sort of MIRV control. They were not specific as to the nature of the control or how it could be verified. They see it as less than a comprehensive MIRV ban. They say they must continue MIRV testing.

IV. I was surprised at how specific the Soviets were at this very early stage of SALT Two.

I believe that our hard FBS line chagrined them. I believe they had some expectation that after May, 1972, we would start adjusting our FBS position gradually. They attribute our FBS position to considerations involving our allies.

They will press hard for a provision to prevent us from transferring weapons and their technology limited by an agreement to other nations.

There is some evidence that the Soviet delegation was disgruntled at the generality of the positions the US maintained.

V. The only concrete result of the session was formal establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission. I believe we should not expect great things from this new piece of machinery in the near future; but over the years this may prove to be an important forum for US/Soviet strategic dialogue, which could damp down unnecessary swings in strategic weapon building.<sup>3</sup>

I believe that with persistence and hard slogging, other SALT agreements in the interest of the United States can in time be negotiated.

It has been a great privilege to represent you in the SALT talks 1969–1972.

Respectfully,

**Gerard Smith**

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of the joint communiqué issued on December 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1973, p. 60.

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## **11. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 12, 1973.

### **SUBJECT**

Establishment of Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

The Standing Consultative Commission was established on 21 December 1972 with the signing in Geneva of a Memorandum of Understanding.<sup>2</sup> I believe we should move quickly to appoint the US contingent to this US/USSR commission for the following reasons.

—Quick US compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding would have maximum political impact on the USSR, demonstrating US

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO—I-(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the MOU is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1973, p. 60–61.

determination to implement the provisions of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement.

—Immediate establishment of the SCC could provide an early recognition of compliance and implementation problems that must be avoided in future SALT agreements.

—There already are issues of procedures for compliance (e.g., the need for “mutually agreed” procedures for dismantling and destruction of ABM R&D launchers in excess of the number permitted in the treaty) which need attention.

—Sensitive questions may arise at any time which need careful technical and policy consideration before initiating discussions with the Soviets, having to do with perceived Soviet actions which may be in violation of the agreements and the extent to which we might reveal our intelligence capabilities by challenging Soviet actions.

—Concurrent operation of the SCC and the SALT delegations would give us more flexibility in the forthcoming sessions of SALT in assigning issues for negotiation, to the SCC or to the SALT Delegation, as our negotiating strategy and tactics dictate.

The immediate actions which need to be taken to establish the SCC are:

—Presidential appointment of the US Commissioner (a State position), and of the Deputy US Commissioner (a Defense position).

—Formation of a staff to support the US Commissioners (State and Defense assignments).

Since future success of SALT negotiations could be linked to what happens in the SCC, the SCC should be established quickly and staff work begun immediately.

I am prepared to recommend candidates for these positions and initiate staff support.

**Melvin R. Laird**

## 12. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

CJCS Memo M-10-73

Washington, February 12, 1973.

SUBJ

Meeting with SecDef, Monday, 12 February 1973 [1602/1811]

ENCL

(1) Bargaining Leverage Options

1. *SALT Discussion (Tucker)*. SecDef agreed NSDM 197.<sup>2</sup> SecDef said do we have leverage? Is Trident and B-1 enough? How might we use other defense programs as leverage? Can we propose another program? Problems:

- Penetration ABM (a) MIRV and (b) Maneuverability
- Mobile Minuteman
- FBS

Tucker presented curve showing options for MIRV and he states "... Soviets have hard kill and can exceed US missiles. Soviets can beat us in warheads.

2. SecDef to Paul Nitze: What capability do Soviets have to project?  
Ans: Good, they are prepared to launch on warning.

—Wood (1) New silos harder (2) testing silos for hardness.

SecDef: Each side aware capabilities of both sides destabilizing.

Tucker: Some question of vulnerability of Minuteman.

—MIRVing and MIRV. We opposed MIRV ban because:

- (1) Penetrate ABM
- (2) We argued that made Treaty on ABM because of MIRV
- (3) Target coverage
- (4) MIRV Ban did not solve threat of SST

Wood: Upgrade of SAM. Possible use of MARV (maneuvering vehicle) some development funded in Trident (ABRES). Have flown 500 pound missile. A MIRVed MARV is a problem.

SecDef: What is advantage of MIRVed MARV? We may need MARV to deter upgrade of SAM. Piece together a program that gets sufficiency without freezing Soviets in a position of inferiority.

Tucker: Mobile Minuteman

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, January 1973 to March 1973. Sensitive; Hold Close. The undated enclosure, "Bargaining Leverage Options," is not printed. Brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Document 7.

Wood: Approaches (1) Offroad mobile; (2) Public lands 18,000 square miles. Soviets can cover with barrage. Rule out Mobile ICBM (3) Shelter basing cost 1/2M/shelter (1.3).

Tucker: Must have freedom to mix from LB to SB.

Wood: If we go three shelters per missile the 70% or 700 survival—then 100 on 6 MARVs plus 100 on industry would provide assured destruction. Then we could agree MIRV Ban. Soviets partial ban—US no throw weight limit. If shelters permitted they could build at rate.

Where go from here?<sup>3</sup>

Tucker: (1) Maintain present posture (2) Do homework:

- a. Specifics on time-phased reductions;
- b. What leverage do we need to force Soviets to negotiate with costs
- c. Formulate what alternatives can use—MARVs, MIRVs, Mobile Shelters, etc.

SecDef: How can we make it credible? How can we convince Congress? If we lean too hard we may give impression we made bad deal. If we don't make case then can't convince Congress. Thus we need a sequential negotiating game plan. Deal is okay deal if Soviets had been willing to adhere to parity. No MIRV no accuracy improvement. Becoming clear that the Soviets are now exploiting Agreement and are trying to get superiority.

3. Leave on 8 March. SecDef will arrange Congressional Briefing.

4. Tucker: (1) Stay with posture (2) R&D strategy that will let us surface leverage (3) ICBM survivability (4) What are combinations that will give stable parity? (5) Short time actions if President wants to talk to the Soviets. We should not use FBS now. But FBS must be used as bargaining chip. How do we convert FBS into bargaining chip?

**T.H. Moorer<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> This sentence was handwritten in an unknown hand.

<sup>4</sup> Moorer initialed "TM" above this typed signature.

13. **Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 24, 1973.

SUBJECT

Minuteman Survivability and SALT

As you know, *virtually all of our analysis of the strategic consequences of SALT rest on calculations of Minuteman survivability.* In part this reflects real concern over the vulnerability of our ICBMs. But in part it is because it is one aspect of the problem that is readily calculable.

Because of the great attention given these calculations, I want to give you my views on:

- Whether the calculations are realistic;
- What they really mean, particularly for our position in SALT.

*Are the Calculations Realistic?*

There are three issues here:

- Are the threats realistic?
- Are the attacks realistic?
- Is it realistic to exclude SLBMs?

*Threats.* We have been using extremely advanced Soviet threats. This is justified on the grounds that we are seeking *permanent* agreement. The effect, however, is to exaggerate the *time* when Minuteman will become highly vulnerable, and to obscure the near and medium term effects of certain SALT limits (such as a ban on heavy ICBM MIRVs). In the long run, however, the message is clear: both sides will have forces capable of attacking fixed ICBMs.

*The Attacks.* The JCS is making a strong pitch that an effective first strike on Minuteman is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Such an attack must be very carefully timed and carried out. For practical reasons all the attacking weapons cannot arrive simultaneously. Therefore, the attack must be precisely spaced, in time and in the order of targets attacked, so that succeeding RVs are not killed nor their accuracy significantly degraded by earlier explosions. There is a big debate in the Pentagon over this issue, with OSD trying to minimize the problem. But the *main implication is that our calculations are too pessimistic*

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<sup>1</sup>Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO—I-(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973. Secret.

*and the task of eliminating Minuteman is much more difficult than our analysis assumes.*

*Role of SLBM.* In our calculations, we always consider ICBMs against ICBMs; SLBMs are left aside. In fact, however, we target Poseidon on Soviet silos and they may do the same, at least in the future. One can argue over whether it makes sense to use up SLBM forces for this purpose, but it is possible, and even reasonable, if there are a large number of SLBM RVs. If the Soviets do this, the long term effect could be to decrease further the survivability of Minuteman.

#### *What Does Minuteman Vulnerability Mean?*

On balance, we will have to count on Minuteman becoming quite vulnerable over the next two decades if the Soviets choose to make the required counterforce effort.

*This does not mean that what we have called crisis stability will necessarily be undermined.* First, we will have more than 5,000 highly survivable missile warheads at sea. Second, it is not clear what the Soviets could gain by attacking first.

The decision to embark on nuclear war will have more important issues to consider than the question of what fraction of the USSR ICBM force is required to destroy a given fraction of the U.S. ICBM force. Once a decision to engage in nuclear war is made, such considerations might become important (an attack on Minuteman might be a major flexible response option) but a decision to strike first, based largely on vulnerability calculations, is simply unreal.

On the other hand, as and when Minuteman becomes vulnerable we *will* have a problem we did not have before. We can have endless arguments over how important the problem is, but *the main fact is that the strategic situation will have changed, and not for the better.*

*As a result, there will be inevitable pressure to deploy new systems to provide greater survivability.* That is what the argument over land mobile ICBMs in SALT is all about; OSD does not want to foreclose this survivability option. *That is what the debate over throw weight should also be about.* Should we get into an aggregate ICBM and SLBM throw weight deal, if this inevitably reduces our flexibility to move to sea—an option that at this point looks more attractive than land mobile ICBMs.

#### *Survivability and SALT*

Thus, a main issue we face in SALT is whether we can postpone and discourage the development of ICBM killing counterforce while keeping open our options to respond to such a threat if it develops. In fact, keeping open such options is one aspect of discouraging such developments.



A second order issue is how to avoid a SALT deal which has unequal effects on the survivability of the two sides. We do not want a deal (such as a land-based MIRV ban with unequal numbers and throw weight freeze) that will leave our ICBMs vulnerable in the long run but keep the Soviet ICBM force highly survivable.

To meet these problems, OSD basically wants to use SALT as a means of joint U.S. and Soviet strategic planning. They want to negotiate changes in the force structure of both sides so as to enhance long-term U.S. and Soviet ICBM survivability. While this is a laudable objective, it is probably unrealistic at this stage in our relationship with the Soviet Union.

*What we can do is take more modest steps* (partial MIRV ban, ceiling on ICBM throw weight). This can lay the foundation, and buy time, for the kind of negotiation in the future that OSD wants, while protecting our survivability options so that we can deal with the Minuteman vulnerability problem unilaterally if need be.

## 14. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1973, 10:10–11:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—The President

The Vice President

*State*

William Rogers

Kenneth Rush

Ronald Spiers

U. Alexis Johnson

*Defense*

Elliot Richardson

William Clements

Paul Nitze

*JCS*

Admiral Thomas Moorer

*CIA*

James Schlesinger

Carl Duckett (briefing only)

*ACDA*

Phil Farley

*NSC*

Henry A. Kissinger

General Brent Scowcroft

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Philip A. Odeen

The President: Let's hear from CIA first. Director Schlesinger, do you want to brief us on the latest developments on the Soviet threat.

Mr. Schlesinger: Mr. President, the SALT I agreements, which put a limit on the number of Soviet ICBM launchers and a potential limit on the number of missile launcher submarines, have slowed the Soviet strategic force expansion. The Soviets can, however, continue to make technological improvements in their weapons. Our evidence indicates that they are continuing to develop new weapons systems and have a broad R&D program.

I should like briefly to do two things today. First, I will discuss the highlights of Soviet strategic force developments related to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which were signed last May. Then I will relate Soviet technological accomplishments to the future strategic posture of the Soviet Union.

Weapons currently undergoing tests include three new ICBMs. Included are two liquid propellant ICBMs, one of the SS-11 and one of the SS-9 class. In addition, they are testing a solid propellant ICBM

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1971 to 6-20-74. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. There is a White House tape of this meeting. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation 117-2)

which may be mobile. [2 lines not declassified] The Soviets have not yet tested a MIRV, but such tests are considered likely and we anticipate we will see them first on the new large, SS-9 size missile. In addition, a new ABM system is under development which has a rapidly deployable radar.

A new submarine-launched missile is also being developed. This missile, the SS-N-8, has been tested to an extended range of about 4,300 miles. This is about the range we hope to get for the Trident missile.

Three new ICBMs are shown on this chart (see chart 1).<sup>2</sup> For comparison we've included the principal operational Soviet ICBMs, as well as the U.S. Minuteman. Two new types of silos are under construction in the ICBM fields. One is larger than the other. The larger one looks like it is for the SS-9 size new missile; the other for the SS-11 size new missile.

We expect that one of the new systems, the SS-X-18, is the large ICBM that will be deployed in 25 new silos at the SS-9 complexes (see photo 1). We expect that it will have a heavier payload than the SS-9, and believe it will have a MIRV. But to date the Soviet tests have used only a single payload. The new missile uses a zero-stage to pop it out of its silo; this permits it to carry a greater payload. This missile could be ready for deployment in 1975.

R&D and the new ABM system is being pursued at the Sary Shagan Test Center. The photo shows the new type phased radar to be used in this system (see photo 2). It is being tested with a Galosh type ABM missile. Our analysis indicates this system would not be very effective against current U.S. strategic missiles. But it could have considerable capability against less sophisticated missiles such as those of the Chinese, our Polaris missiles, and the French and British missiles.

The next chart (no copy available) summarizes the major events in the Soviet R&D on new missiles since early 1972. You will note there has been considerable activity in terms of testing since the SALT agreements were signed last May. The SS-X-16, the new solid fueled missile, was tested before the May agreements. The other two new missiles, both liquid fueled ICBMs, were tested the first time after the May agreement.

The President: What have we tested since May?

Admiral Moorer: Nothing, except confidence testing of existing missiles. The Trident I missile will be ready to be tested in about a year; the Trident II missile in about two years.

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<sup>2</sup> None of the charts or photographs were found.

The President: Is there anything we should be doing that we're not doing because of the Agreement?

Admiral Moorer: No. We're moving forward on technology and developing new missiles. We're testing everything we should be.

The President: Let's get something clear. We should test everything we need. I don't want any nonsense on slowing down needed testing just to show good faith on SALT.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Schlesinger: Let me now discuss the implications of ongoing developments in Soviet weapons, in particular launcher numbers, throw weight, and MIRVs. Let's begin with an examination of the number of launchers on each side (chart not available). The Interim Agreement limits the Soviets to 1,618 launchers. This is the number operational or under construction on July 1, 1972. The decline in the numbers of Soviet ICBM launchers beginning in 1975 reflects the phasing of the older SS-7s and SS-8s. Toward the end of the decade, the Soviets have probably replaced both the SS-9 and SS-11 with new ICBMs under development. The drop in U.S. total reflects the possible phaseout of 54 Titan missiles.

Let's now look at ballistic missile submarines. The Interim Agreement permits the Soviets to have 740 ballistic missile launchers in modern nuclear submarines. This total could become 950 if they phase out their older ICBMs or ballistic missile launchers and older submarines. In making substitutions, however, the Soviets may not increase their force of modern ballistic missile submarines above 62 boats. You will notice an increase above this level in 1977. This reflects the nine older H-class nuclear submarines, which are not counted as modern ballistic missile submarines. In our projections we assume they will phase out the H-class submarine in 1977. The Soviets appear to have limited interest in the H-class submarine.

The increase in the U.S. submarines beginning in 1977 marks the introduction of the Trident submarine. All U.S. submarine launchers are expected to be MIRVed.

As you know, Mr. President, throw weight indicates the potential capability of the missile force to deliver nuclear warheads. The Interim Agreement did not directly control throw weight. The Soviets now have an advantage of four to one in ICBM throw weight, and we expect the ratio will remain largely unchanged over time. U.S. throw weight is expected to be relatively steady over the next ten years and remain at about two million pounds.

As you know, throw weight plus technology is equivalent to the potential of the Soviet ICBM force. There are various ways they could use their throw weight capability. If they take their throw weight ad-

vantage and couple it with the U.S. level of technology, they could produce very large numbers of MIRVs. For example, they could put 20 Mark-12 type RVs on the SS-9 and six on the SS-11, giving them about 12,000 MIRVs.

We don't think this approach is likely, however. The most likely case is where they optimize their missile force for a counterforce role (see chart 2). Under this approach they would put 12 MIRVs in their large missile and three on the small missile. [*1 line not declassified*] In this case, the Soviets would ultimately have counterforce capability against Minuteman with either the SS-9 or the SS-11 force.

The U.S. numbers on the chart equal the currently programmed force as well as the option to deploy all 1,000 Minuteman with three MIRV which we could do.

In conclusion, the present U.S. advantage is based on the superior weapons technology. This capability has resulted in a very large number of small, accurate MIRVs. These weapons compensate for the Soviet advantages in throw weight and numbers of launchers. Over time, this advantage can be eroded by the USSR; the Soviet disadvantage and technology can be overcome. If they can do this, their technology coupled with their throw weight can give them a substantial number of MIRVs in about ten years. Therefore, the Soviets could eventually have advantage in MIRVs and a substantial counterforce capability.

The President: Where are the Soviets on MIRV technology?

Mr. Schlesinger: They've had no tests of MIRVs thus far, but we think they are likely to do so soon. Once they begin testing, it would take about two and a half years to start deploying MIRV missiles.

The President: This is based on our experience?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes. We think this is a conservative estimate. It would probably take them somewhat longer. We believe that sometime in the early 1980s the Soviets could have a large force of deployed MIRV ICBMs.

The President: What is the Soviet objective in this buildup? Are they going for first strike capability? Also, we only have second strike capability; is that correct?

Mr. Schlesinger: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] It's our expectation that they want to get an advantage in strategic weapons.

The President: What really matters in strategic weapons is numbers and throw weight. Is that correct?

Mr. Schlesinger: Potentially, yes. The Soviets probably want to appear ahead for political and psychological reasons.

The President: We are ahead, of course, in technology?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes.

The President: What about bombers?

Mr. Schlesinger: We have a very big lead.

The President: Do the Soviets care about our bombers?

Mr. Schlesinger: Yes, they do. They spend an enormous sum of money on air defense because of their concern for our bombers.

Mr. Richardson: I was going to mention bombers as well. They are very important to us and provide an important deterrent. I'm glad you raised the question of the bombers.

The President: Bombers have a great second strike retaliatory capability and they have very substantial payload.

Mr. Richardson: Yes, that's correct.

The President: Jim, what are the Soviets doing on bombers?

Mr. Schlesinger: They are developing a new medium bomber called the Backfire. They need a tanker force in order to make it into an effective force against the U.S.

Mr. Richardson: They could, of course, use their Backfire and fly one-way missions, landing in Cuba. The Backfire has a range of about 4,000 miles.

Admiral Moorer: In the case of a war the Soviets wouldn't worry about one-way missions.

The President: All the missions would be one-way for both sides. Aren't the Soviet air defenses considerably better than those over Hanoi?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, they have large numbers of missiles and aircraft. The missiles include newer ones than were available in Hanoi.

Mr. Richardson: The B-1 bombers which we are developing will be better and will be able to penetrate the Soviet defenses.

Admiral Moorer: Yes. It will carry advanced decoys, ECM, etc.

The President: Henry, would you lay out the major issues for us.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Kissinger: The Interim SALT Agreement only limited numbers of weapons systems on either side, but both sides can continue to improve their systems. Both countries are doing this and the Soviets are moving faster than we are.

The key problem we need to address is what are our SALT objectives. We face a situation in which very accurate MIRVs may make fixed ICBMs highly vulnerable in time. The difficult question is what is the strategic significance of vulnerable, land-based missiles. If bombers and SLBMs are survivable, what difference does it make if the ICBMs

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<sup>3</sup> Kissinger's presentation, entitled "The Strategic Situation" and dated March 6, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-033, NSC Meetings, SALT II, 3/8/72.

are vulnerable? One factor, of course, is that as one component of our strategic force becomes vulnerable the Soviets can concentrate their efforts on the other ones.

In SALT One we agreed to give the Soviets quantitative advantages in return for our qualitative advantage. But if we look ten years in the future, the Soviets could MIRV their forces. This would give them very great first-strike capability. If this happens, there will be a growing gap between first and second-strike capability.

Everyone agrees that one of our most fundamental objectives in SALT Two is equality. The real question is, how do we define equality. Do we mean (1) equality in first-strike capability, (2) equality in second strike capability, (3) equality in numbers of launchers and re-entry vehicles, or (4) equality in assured destruction capability.

The President: Another important factor, as Jim Schlesinger said, is how does this all appear to other countries, since this is what affects our foreign policy.

Dr. Kissinger: The Verification Panel met four or five times to discuss the issues that we face in SALT Two. Let me first discuss the strategic balance. Under the Interim Agreement the Soviets can have 2,359 ICBMs and SLBMs compared to 1,710 for the United States. Heavy bombers are not limited by the Interim Agreement. We have a lead of 550 to 140, including 110 mothballed bombers. Even if we add bombers, the Soviets have an advantage in strategic launchers of about 2,500 to 2,260 for the United States. In addition, the Soviet Union has a very big advantage in payload. We have a large bomber payload, but missile throw weight and bomber payload are not comparable. Throw weight has first-strike capability while bomber payload is second-strike capability.

Our SALT Two agreement can't result in serious inequalities in numbers of delivery vehicles, if for no other reason than that other countries will look at these differences and assume we are inferior. Therefore, it will affect our foreign policy.

When we look at different numerical levels that might be considered in SALT, we need to answer three questions: First, would these levels ratify the current strategic situation; second, what options would each side have under this agreement; and third, would each country be able to implement its options?

The easiest level to agree on would be the current Soviet level of about 2,500 launchers. Under this level we would have the right to build up. Whether this is a real or theoretical right is hard to say.

The President: Not much question, it sure is theoretical.

Dr. Kissinger: This level, however, would give us maximum flexibility.

The President: Sorry to interrupt, Henry, but I had breakfast this morning with Senator McClellan and Senator Young.<sup>4</sup> Both of them have always been strong supporters of our policy, particularly where military matters are concerned. They said that as far as the Senate was concerned, we were going to have real troubles on defense matters. Even Senator McClellan is talking of making cuts in our NATO forces. He said he is doing this not because he wants to, but he needs to take this position in order to avoid even deeper cuts that would be imposed by the Senate.

The Senate, with the exception of Senators Jackson and Tower, simply won't back us on these issues. We won't be able to get the Senate to support us on many of these issues, unless we are willing to go up and really scare them and that would have a very bad effect on the country.

Proceed Henry.

Dr. Kissinger: We must distinguish between real equivalence and theoretical equivalence.

Mr. Richardson: We need to consider time phasing when we address this. The question is, over what time are we considering our buildup and how long will it take the Soviets to convert that throw weight capability to effective MIRVs.

I've only recently become aware of how many important and impressive developments we have underway. In part this resulted from my recent trip out to SAC. We have Trident, the B-1, and a new Minuteman warhead program. If we consider how impressive these programs are and the potential they have and then factor in Soviet intransigence on SALT, we may be able to get the backing in time to go forward. We may have more leverage with the Soviets than we think with these new programs. Moreover, we have already justified the B-1 and the Trident to the Congress, so we should be able to proceed with them. Also, the improved Minuteman warhead is not an expensive program.

The President: I'm planning to send a memo to the Secretaries of State and Defense and perhaps to CIA also to stress the need to make a major effort on Defense and NATO with the Congress. We want a one-on-one effort in both the Senate and House. We must give these people the facts. We've got to stop the euphoria about SALT One, etc., which leads them to think they can cut back on defense spending. This euphoria is also affecting men like McClellan. We just have to get on top of this. Everyone should send out their Assistant Secretaries and

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<sup>4</sup> Senator John L. McClellan (D-Arkansas) and Senator Milton Young (D-North Dakota).



their other key aides, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, also the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS, of course, will have to be objective, you know in what way I mean. Unless we can get Congressional support, it's going to undercut our efforts to negotiate in SALT and MBFR. Even McClellan is pushing a cut of 30,000 in NATO, an action that undercuts our negotiation position.

The Vice President: What is the cost of the B-1 program?

Mr. Richardson: Approximately \$13 billion; they cost about \$35 million per copy.

The President: Is the airplane any good?

Mr. Richardson: Yes sir, I've been very impressed by what I've seen, and it looks like a fine airplane.

The Vice President: Can we afford it?

Mr. Richardson: Funds to cover it are already in the five-year defense program. Therefore, if we can continue getting about the present level of funds for defense, we can afford it.

The President: Let's get back to Dr. Kissinger's presentation.

Dr. Kissinger: I'd like to make one point regarding the comments that Secretary Richardson made. One thing we've learned from SALT is that we need ongoing programs. The only reason we got the SALT One agreement is the fact that we had an ongoing ABM program. B-1 and the Trident program give us some leverage for SALT Two, but they don't give us leverage on numerical levels. In fact, as these programs phase in, the plans are that the overall forces would be cut back. For example, as we bring in the B-1, we'll retire old B-52s and the overall size of the bomber force will decrease.

The trend in weapons development is toward fewer, more costly and complex weapons; therefore, in looking at levels, we should be considering lower numbers. If we go for the Soviet level, the result is likely to be only theoretical equality.

We could push for the U.S. level as the objective in SALT, or we might consider a lower level of small cuts for both sides—perhaps something like 2,000. This would be consistent with their own planning. The real question, of course, is what we would have to pay to get the Soviets to agree to this level. We could even go lower, say, down to 1,500, but this doesn't solve the vulnerability problem. In fact, our forces may be even more vulnerable as they get smaller. The real threat comes from the number of accurate MIRV warheads, not the number of launchers.

Mr. President, we'll need to provide you with strategic implications of these various levels so that you can make a decision, but you don't need to decide this issue at this time.

The considerations for throw weight levels are about the same as for numerical levels. [3 lines not declassified]

The second issue is one of the scope of the throw weight agreement. Should we only consider ICBM throw weights or do we also include in SLBMs and possibly bomber payload as well. ICBM throw weight is what concerns us the most. The SS-9 with its throw weight has the greatest MIRV potential. But we could also add in submarines, and we could add in bombers.

Bomber payload poses a different problem. It is not first-strike payload. We have a very large bomber payload advantage. If we add it to the missile payload, it looks like we have rough overall equivalence. But the strategic implications are very different. They would have substantial first-strike capability while we wouldn't. Therefore, over time we would have to plan to convert this bomber payload to missile throw weight or perhaps we could hope over time to go to reductions.

If we are interested in lower levels of throw weight, the question is, what is the appropriate level. At some levels it begins to impact on our programs, such as the Trident program which is very important to us. If we set the limit at 6.5 million pounds for missiles, we are not constrained in any way while we force the Soviets to make deep cuts and get rid of many of their big missiles. I have great confidence in Alex's negotiating ability, but I'm not sure he could get that kind of a level for us.

If we reach a lower throw weight level, say, four million pounds, we also force the Soviets to make deep reductions. But when we get to that level we begin to constrain ourselves, particularly the Trident program. Also, as you reduce the levels you begin to have some impact on the numerical levels that are feasible. If you get down to four or five million pounds of throw weight, you'd have to hold the numerical levels down to somewhere around 2,000 or possibly lower.

Of course, if the throw weight limit is below 4 million pounds, both sides would be forced to make significant cuts in their force levels.

(Gap in my notes at this point)

Therefore, the ideal limit would be about 6.5 million pounds. This lets us do everything but forces the Soviets to phase out their SS-9s. It also tends to drive the Soviet level down to around 2,000 which is about the force level we are thinking about. If we go to higher throw weight levels, we tend to ratify the Soviet advantage. The question is, in this case, can we ever expect to convert our bomber payload to missile throw weight.

Our fundamental point is that we are for equivalence in throw weight and numbers of launchers. We don't need to make a decision on levels specifically for some weeks yet, but at some point we'll have to say what our proposed throw weight and numerical targets are.

Ambassador Johnson: I might point out that the last NSDM<sup>5</sup> only talked about ICBM throw weight and ICBM numbers being equal.

President: Sounds like a great outcome; keep at it.

Kissinger: Therefore, our big major choice is, do we want to press for numerical and throw weight equivalence and either keep MIRVs out of the equation or perhaps have equal MIRV limits, or alternatively are we for equivalence in general but are willing to consider some type of trade; for example, a MIRV advantage for us in return for a Soviet throw weight and numerical advantage.

If we follow the first route, the Soviets will undoubtedly insist on equality in MIRVs in the next round of SALT. Also, by that time it may be too late to get a meaningful control on MIRVs if we ever wanted to do so.

Richardson: Let me comment on that. We have to consider the timeframe over which we are planning. If we are considering freedom to mix over a long period of time, say until 1995, it's one thing. It's another if we consider the short term, before they MIRV and begin making more efficient use of their throw weight advantage. To say another way, let's look at the issue as a long-term one and factor in reductions over that time period. If you look at it this way, whether this Congress or the next Congress gives us the money to build up our forces is of less consequence. Do you agree, Henry?

Kissinger: I agree that the timeframe is important. As Ken pointed out at the last Verification Panel meeting,<sup>6</sup> time is most important when you look at the MIRV issue. As he said, we have perhaps a year and a half to get a control over Soviet MIRVs. If we don't do it by then, they will start testing and it will be impossible to verify an agreement. Therefore, at least as far as this issue is concerned, it is time urgent. As you will recall, four years ago the President rejected moves to limit our MIRV program which was in its infancy. In retrospect, that was a very wise decision. Now we have to face up to the question of whether or not we are going to try to get a hold on the Soviet MIRV program when it is in its infancy.

Once both sides MIRV their missile forces, reductions really don't lead to stability. The key to instability is not the number of launchers but the number of accurate MIRVs on each launcher. Unless we could

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<sup>5</sup> Document 7.

<sup>6</sup> The Verification Panel met on March 2; the Summary of Conclusions and minutes are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74 [3 of 5]. The Summary of Conclusions and minutes of the previous Verification Panel meeting on February 5 are *ibid*.

specify the kinds of forces that have to be reduced reductions may lead to greater instability.

Rogers: Admiral Moorer, if we were to agree to a moratorium of two years on MIRV tests and during this time we'd have to stand where we are, would this hurt us very much?

Admiral Moorer: It depends on length of time of the moratorium. The new RV for the Trident missile will be tested for the first time in about a year. The full Trident warhead with the bus and MIRVs will be tested in about two years. Also, the new large warhead for Minuteman III will be tested in about two years. If you stop testing in a freeze or a moratorium, you're liable to lose all your best technical people, and our technological capability will be dissipated.

The President: The case would be very much like NASA.

Secretary Rush: The real issue is not whether we are hurt or not, but do we get more from such an agreement than we'd lose.

Dr. Kissinger: We should remember that the Soviets have not said what they really mean by MIRV limits. When they start being more specific, what they propose may be totally unacceptable.

Secretary Rogers: I agree. They'll probably want something outrageous. They'll probably want to keep testing and say we can't test on the basis we are ahead in the technology.

Dr. Kissinger: The real choice we face is between two broad paths. We can continue pressing for real equivalence with the Soviets or we can come up with a trade where we maintain our technological advantage and let the Soviets keep a numerical advantage. We must remember, of course, that nothing is free when you deal with the Soviets. The question is what price they are going to charge. I find it hard to imagine they would let us constrain their new systems while we continue our new MIRV systems without our paying a very heavy price.

Admiral Moorer: Even if there is a MIRV freeze, they can still continue to develop MIRVs.

Mr. Schlesinger: They can develop a missile launcher and guidance system, but they couldn't test a MIRV system. In time, they could break out of the agreement and take advantage of their throw weight advantage. [*2 lines not declassified*]

Secretary Clements: Our advantage is in technology. We have better technology. We don't need all that throw weight. Our current missiles are good enough at the size they are.

Dr. Kissinger: But if both sides have equivalent technology, the side with the throw weight advantage has more flexibility.

Secretary Rogers: If we agree to let them have an advantage in throw weight, we will always have to be ahead in technology.

Secretary Clements: Yes. I think we must essentially do that.

Secretary Richardson: That's why the timeframe is so important. Over the long term equality in throw weight is important. Equality in throw weight lends itself more easily to reductions. We face a fork in the road. There are two forms of parity that we can go for. Asymmetrical parity, something along the line of the current situation. We keep our advantages; they keep theirs. The problem is that we can't get from there to more equal outcome over time.

A moratorium may give the wrong impression to the public and the Congress. They'll think if we can have a moratorium, we have a solution to MIRVs and therefore we won't get enough money for our programs. Before we go into moratorium, we have to be very sure that we are willing to live with that kind of a situation since that may be where it comes out.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two separable questions here. If we judge we can get an agreement in a year or so we may still be able to get a hold on Soviet MIRVs. We wouldn't have to take the risk of a MIRVed moratorium. Of course, if we eventually get close to a MIRV agreement with the Soviets we might then consider a test moratorium to preserve our chance to get a verifiable agreement.

The President: I guess I'm a minority of one in this group. I was never very high on the nuclear test ban treaty. It was a gimmicky-type arrangement. It didn't really have much of an effect on the situation. The same might be true of a MIRV test moratorium. It could also be considered a gimmick. This would not necessarily be bad; in some cases, we need something like this to sell an agreement or make it acceptable in some quarters. The real question is who would be hurt most by a one-year test ban? Forget about all the political after-effects and euphoria. Who would be hurt most directly; militarily?

Admiral Moorer: It depends on who has the most new programs underway. The Soviets have more that they are testing right now while we won't be testing for the next year. Therefore, the Soviets would be hurt the most.

The President: Then you're saying that the Soviets would be hurt more by a one-year moratorium?

Admiral Moorer: Yes. But we've got to be very careful here. We had two advantages when SALT began—ABM technology and MIRVs. We've already given up one of these two advantages.

The President: The problem as I see it is what the impact is. Look at the nuclear test ban. It didn't result in the world putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle.

The Vice President: Sitting in this chair for the past four years and watching key decisions, it seems that we always fall back on our belief in our technological superiority. That situation may not continue. With

respect to Japan and West Germany, we just can't rely on our continuing to have a technological advantage. We must recognize that that could change and keep this in mind. Let's negotiate on this basis remembering that our technology may not always be superior. We should assume they will eventually be equivalent.

Secretary Richardson: How does the Vice President's point cut? Should we focus on numbers and throw weight since we can't be sure we will maintain our technology lead or does it mean we should try to get a handle on Soviet technology to prevent their catching up?

The Vice President: We must also consider verification. We can't limit technology without verification. If we could have onsite inspection, we might be able to verify but that is not likely to happen.

Secretary Rush: I'd like to expand the Vice President's point. We can't do anything to increase our numbers of launchers for about five years. It will be about that long before our new systems are ready for deployment. It would be a mistake to let them catch up on MIRVs during that time period.

The President: Then you would "tilt" toward a MIRV limit, Ken?

Secretary Rush: Yes, sir.

Secretary Rogers: I'm not ready to make a recommendation on this issue yet. I think we should let Alex explore the MIRV issue. We can defer a final decision perhaps as long as 4–5 months.

The President: In dealing from the MIRV issue, we have to keep in mind that in the earlier phase of SALT we felt we had to be forthcoming. It's good to make proposals; it makes specific recommendations to the Soviets. That was probably necessary as it was important to get some momentum going in these talks and to develop the assurance that a SALT could succeed. But the situation has changed. We don't have to worry anymore about propaganda; we don't have to worry about making points. Our position should be that we will explore in a hardheaded way.

Secretary Richardson: We haven't made enough of the hard line uncompromising position the Soviets took in the last round of SALT. Alex should keep pressing them to take a more reasonable position. As you recall, they said a number of things. First, we should withdraw all of our forward-based systems and dismantle the bases. Secondly, we should withdraw our forward-based submarines and close the bases. Third, we should make the Interim Agreement permanent with the advantage for them. Four, we should ban nuclear weapons on bombers and nuclear air-to-surface missiles. Finally, they propose that we exercise restraint. On our side that meant stopping the Trident and B-1. On their side, it wouldn't stop anything. Our own opening position was more reasonable. Even the ICBM throw weight equality is more reasonable than the Soviet position.

Dr. Kissinger: We have two problems. First, the problem of what we say to the Soviets. They weren't ready to negotiate last time. They obviously weren't prepared and they just told Semenov to pile all the old arguments on the table. The second, and more important problem is, what do we say to ourselves. Conceptually, we must choose between the two routes. We need a framework; we must decide on what our approach to SALT is going to be and then we have to stick with it. We can't keep shifting our approach. We also need to decide on the MIRV issue fairly soon, probably next month. Finally, if MIRVs are not going to be controlled, we'll have to be much tougher on throw weight limits. We also must factor these considerations into our own defense planning for the next ten years. We've got to have the right kind of programs if we are ever going to reach equality.

Secretary Clements: Yes. That's right.

Secretary Rogers: We changed our position many times in SALT One, yet we came out okay.

Dr. Kissinger: But we didn't alter our conceptual framework. We changed our tactical position, but not our overall framework, except on the ABM issue.

Ambassador Johnson: I need some guidance as to which direction you want to go. Equivalence in numbers or throw weight or trading their numerical advantage for our qualitative advantage. I can explore for a few weeks, but after that I'm going to need some guidance. I don't necessarily need a detailed option, just the direction I'm supposed to point.

The President: If you can negotiate with the Japanese, you must know how to point 13 different directions at one time. You don't need any help or guidance from us (laughter).

This has been a very helpful discussion today. We are coming down to the fundamental issues. The real issue is the impact what we agree on will have on the decision-makers in Washington and the decision-makers in Moscow. Our view of our advantages or disadvantages will determine whether we can pursue an aggressive or timid foreign policy. The same will be true for the Soviets. If we all recognize we are not at a substantial disadvantage as the Soviets, we have great potential and power.

We must of course, also consider the impact of the agreement on the public, the Congress and other countries—what they think matters very much. In SALT One the criticism came not from the budget cutting elements but from the right. When we finally reach agreement in SALT we can help reassure the right by pointing to all of the outrageous things the Soviets asked for that we didn't give in on. The Allies are very much like the hawks in Congress. They must understand that we are negotiating a firm matter and that we've held to our position very

strongly. They must realize that the final Agreement doesn't jeopardize our deterrent or our support for them. We too must be confident in our capabilities.

Finally, we must realize we are at a very critical juncture. The country is relieved that the Vietnam war is finally at an end. Our successes in China and Moscow also have led to a major relief on the part of the public. But it has created some very wrong incentives. Many people want to cut back on Defense spending and weaken ourselves. There is a real mood of euphoria, and we are going to have to do some swimming up stream.

Let's return to Dr. Kissinger's briefing and all the excellent work of the Verification Panel. We must make the right deal in SALT. The various disparities that we have today are really not critical to the leadership of the Soviet Union. They'll look at the risks of any kind of a nuclear attack. If the risk of attack is too high, they won't try anything. But to our Allies and the public, appearances matter. If we appear to be Number 2, our friends will get scared. Also we must insure the right doesn't cause a storm over the agreement we reach which would frighten our friends and allies. But, the key is what the Kremlin believes about the situation and they will be aware of the real facts. We all recognize that the Soviet leaders are not fools and they'd be fools to attack us. The risks are so high the chances of an attack are slim.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.



**15. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 8, 1973, 1:10–2:50 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to arms control.]

We then turned to SALT.<sup>2</sup> Dobrynin raised the issue. Dobrynin said that in his opinion it wasn't easy to make progress on SALT unless there was the nuclear treaty.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet military were taking the position that it was too soon to have a follow-on agreement when the first one was less than a year old. Moreover, we had to understand that in the Soviet system, unless Brezhnev personally gave an order, SALT would move very slowly. For example, he could tell me in confidence that the Soviet Ministry of Defense had deliberately put its most unimaginative and unenterprising general on the SALT Delegation consistently. When Semenov asked the general to request instructions from the Ministry of Defense, his standard answer was that the Minister of Defense, if he wanted to give instructions, would issue them, and that he did not have the right to request them. When the Foreign Ministry called the Defense Ministry the experience was summed up by an exchange he, Dobrynin, had had with Grechko in which Grechko said, "If you want my personal opinion I'll give it to you. If you want my official opinion the standard answer is no."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Map Room of the White House. The memorandum of conversation was attached to an undated memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon summarizing his conversations with Dobrynin on March 6 and 8.

<sup>2</sup> Dobrynin met with Nixon and Kissinger prior to this meeting, from 12:46 p.m. to 1:15 in the Oval Office. According to a transcript of the conversation, only a brief mention of SALT was made. Nixon stated, "I am determined that we should have a SALT agreement. I think this morning one of our people said it would take three to five years. So, I expect you and Henry to work something out so it takes three to five months." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 872–11)

<sup>3</sup> In a February 21 letter to Nixon, Brezhnev stated that prior to his meeting with the President tentatively set for June, both sides needed to finish "a Treaty between our countries relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons against each other." Brezhnev later stated that transforming the "Interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms into a permanent one with a certain broadening of its content will be by itself an important step." He then suggested that the permanent agreement would put limitations on both quantitative and qualitative improvement of strategic arms. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 495, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 15) The letter is printed as Document 78 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

For all these reasons, Dobrynin then said, it was essential to do two things. One, unless we made a concrete proposal which went to Brezhnev and which Brezhnev could then push on his bureaucracy, there was no chance of any real progress. Secondly, we had to give Brezhnev some excuse to do it. I told him we could live without a SALT Agreement this year but when we had a concrete proposal we would be prepared to advance it.

We then reviewed a number of the second-level issues, without anything of notable significance, except that Dobrynin asked us to make a specific proposal on chemical warfare if we wanted an agreement in that area.

We agreed to meet the following week in order to continue the discussions, especially on the nuclear treaty.

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## 16. National Security Decision Memorandum 206<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 11, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Head of the U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Geneva, March 12, 1973

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on March 12 in Geneva.

1. In the initial phase of this round, the Delegation should make a vigorous effort to elicit more specific Soviet views. On the basis of these discussions, the President will wish to consider whether to provide further specific guidance.

2. The focus of the U.S. Delegation's effort should be to seek Soviet agreement to the principle of a permanent agreement limiting strategic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, NSDM 201–NSDM 250, [Originals]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.

offensive arms and providing essential equivalence in the aggregate number of central strategic systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Delegation should endeavor to ascertain Soviet views on aggregate levels including the Soviet attitude on reducing below their current level. In this connection, the Delegation should emphasize that equal sub-limits on ICBM numbers and equal ICBM throw weight levels are integral elements in the U.S. approach to equal aggregate limitations on central systems.

3. The President wishes to hold open the decisions on how to deal with MIRVs. In light of the Chief of the Soviet Delegation's request that we give serious attention to the question of MIRV, the Head of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to elicit further Soviet views without, however, making any commitment as to possible U.S. positions or foreclosing the possibility of U.S. initiatives on this subject. If after three to four weeks the Soviet Delegation has not put forward more specific views, the Head of the U.S. Delegation should seek instructions on whether he might advance U.S. views on MIRV.

4. On Soviet proposals to exercise restraint in new strategic programs, the Delegation should make clear that it would be premature to consider restraints without a better understanding of the specific limitations on central strategic systems that may be acceptable to both sides.

5. The U.S. Delegation should raise the issue of how SALT can enhance the survivability of strategic deterrent forces.

6. If the Soviets pursue their proposals to limit bomber armaments, the Delegation should take the position that this cannot be considered unless the Soviets are prepared to place appropriate limitations on air defenses.

7. The guidance contained in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 12, and 13 of NSDM 197<sup>2</sup> remain in effect.

The President wishes to emphasize the continued importance of avoiding leaks on SALT.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>2</sup> Document 7.

17. **Memorandum From Philip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 26, 1973.

SUBJECT

SALT Developments

This memo provides a wrap-up on where we stand in SALT, both in Geneva and in the Verification Panel Working Group. Briefly,

—*The negotiations are unfolding slowly. The Soviets are stressing FBS but have raised MIRV (on which they may be aiming for an interim deal) and are pressing for more specifics on our position on aggregate levels.*

—*There has been no formal mention of the SCC; the Soviets seem to be downplaying it. The VPWG has developed draft instructions for the Delegation, and we will shortly send you a memo on the decisions required on SCC issues.*

—*We have tasked the bureaucracy with additional work. The key papers are on alternative aggregate levels and MIRV. They will be ready for a Verification Panel meeting tentatively scheduled for April 18, but we may want to consider sending further instructions to the Delegation sooner.*<sup>2</sup>

These points are elaborated below.

*The Negotiations*

There have been *only minor changes in the Soviet positions* on specific substantial issues. Both sides are pushing for further elaboration of the other side's positions. *The Delegations are at loggerheads over the FBS issue although the Soviets have shown a willingness to discuss other subjects (e.g., levels, MIRVs) while the FBS pot stews.*

The Soviets have expressed concern that the U.S. position is “unchanged” from the first round, and *they claim to have the instructions they need to move ahead rapidly once accord is reached on broad outlines of an agreement.* The question of when a new agreement can be reached (and an implied sense of urgency) has been voiced by several members of the Soviet Delegation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 888, SALT, SALT TWO—I-(Geneva), November 21, 1972–March 1973. Secret. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> The Verification Panel met on April 25; minutes are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74 [3 of 5]. Papers on alternative aggregate levels and MIRV options are *ibid.*, Box H-015, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT, 4/25/73.

Basically, the Soviet Delegation seems to be stuck with instructions that make it essential to include FBS in any permanent deal. *This means that as a procedural matter, the talks are deadlocked on this issue.* However, the Soviets have not pressed their concept of turning the Interim Agreement into a permanent one by adding on such items as FBS. Instead, *Semenov has indicated that they may have in mind something of an interim nature that would be billed as contributing to a permanent agreement.*

This may be the basis for Soviet Delegation's expressions of urgency in moving forward (in which they must have the Summit in mind). *The only real candidate for such an interim step is MIRV and possibly some "framework" May 20-type agreement on FBS and equal aggregates.* This is, in part, speculation but it would explain why the Soviets are stressing urgency while taking a maximum position on FBS and why Semenov, without solving the deadlock over FBS and composition of equal aggregate limits, is willing to go into the question of limiting MIRV.

The highlights on specific topics are as follows.

*Central Systems Aggregate:* In accordance with NSDM 206,<sup>3</sup> the U.S. Delegation has focused on equal aggregate limits on central systems, equal ICBMs and equal ICBM throw weight. The Soviets have not commented directly on the U.S. position but have taken the tactic of pressing for specifics about our proposed ceiling on central systems. They have expressed disappointment that the U.S. Delegation has stuck to general principles and "philosophy" and not put forth concrete proposals.

*FBS:* The Soviets have said our emphasis on central systems is one sided and imply that there was an understanding in reaching the SALT agreements of last May that FBS would be considered in SALT Two. As expected, *the Soviets are pressing hard on this issue and there has been some slight modification in their position which is as follows:*

—Withdraw to national territory by an agreed date nuclear armed aircraft and missiles from third countries which are capable of striking the other side and liquidation by an agreed date of corresponding bases in third countries. Shchukin claims that the Soviets are showing flexibility by calling for withdrawal by an agreed date rather than immediately.

—Withdrawal of SSBNs beyond striking range of each side and liquidation of SSBN bases in third countries by an agreed date. *The Soviets have linked these two proposals for the first time.* Nonetheless, they argue the case for liquidation of SSBN bases on the grounds that this in effect gives us operational advantage equivalent to a numerical advantage.

—Aircraft carriers should be withdrawn to agreed lines and there should be agreed limits on the number of aircraft carriers and the number of

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<sup>3</sup> Document 16.

*nuclear capable aircraft aboard such carriers for both sides. On its face, this is toughening of their position on carrier-based aircraft but it also suggests that what the Soviets really hope to get is some limit on carrier-based aircraft in the Mediterranean.*

*The Soviets have made no mention of compensation for FBS. In fact, they have suggested that land-based FBS and carrier aircraft should be included in the composition of strategic aviation systems to be limited.*

The U.S. Delegation has continued to insist that central systems be addressed on a priority basis. (Privately Grenevsky has been pressing to find out *what has to be accomplished on central systems before the U.S. will address FBS.*) However, Johnson has now proposed that he “counterattack” on FBS taking the line that the Soviets have an advantage in non-central systems. We are opposing this on the tactical grounds that it will open the door negotiating over FBS.

*Reductions: The Soviets have remained vague about reductions. They formally have taken the line that we first need to set the levels of strategic systems (including FBS) and in this connection there could be reductions or minor increases, but that bilateral reductions would be considered subsequent to achieving a further SALT agreement. Informally, Shchukin has expressed doubt about any substantial reductions because military prestige would stand in the way; symbolic reductions he said are a possibility. The Delegation draws the conclusion (to which we agree) that the Soviet Delegation is setting the stage for U.S. reductions only—in all likelihood FBS—in the next stage of agreement.*

*Bombers: The Soviets have simplified and toughened their stand on bombers. There should be agreed limits (as opposed to a freeze) on strategic bombers and there should be a ban on equipping strategic bombers with nuclear weapons including air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). Shchukin has explained that this concept of a ban on nuclear weapons is the Soviet response to the U.S. linking limits on bomber armaments to limits on air defense.*

*MIRV: After prodding by the U.S. side, the Soviets (Semenov) raised MIRV privately with Ambassador Johnson. He requested that the U.S. Delegation “clarify the attitude of the U.S. in reference to limitations on the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs which would be MIRVed.” Semenov added that the Soviet Delegation is talking about “searching” for ways of setting limits on qualitative developments; setting such limits is not in the competence of the Delegations, but rather a matter for higher authorities. Johnson ducked any direct comment on Semenov’s question but has reported that he would welcome any suggestions or instructions Washington may have.*

#### *Further Instructions for the U.S. Delegation*

*The key question is whether we want to give the Delegation further guidance at this time on the question of levels and MIRV. The draft NSDM we*

prepared before your vacation (attached) would provide guidance on these points.<sup>4</sup> It instructs the Delegation to:

—Indicate that the current U.S. level would be appropriate for an aggregate limit on central systems, and if the Soviets raise the possibility of a lower level, they should be invited to make a suggestion.

—Suggest that MIRV limits be confined to ICBMs.

—Make clear that the U.S. cannot accept an outcome for SALT that permits a Soviet advantage in numbers and throw weight and equality in MIRVs.

NSDM 206 directs that the U.S. Delegation seek instructions on the MIRV issue after three to four weeks of talks. We have tentatively scheduled a Verification Panel meeting for the week of April 16 which could consider whether we want to put forward U.S. views on MIRVs and which could also discuss further the question of the level of equal aggregates. The Delegation can continue to pursue the line it is now taking pressing the concept of equivalence, equality in aggregates and ICBMs, and survivability as well as focusing on contradictions in the Soviet position.

*However, if we wait another three weeks before giving the Delegation any additional guidance there is some risk that we may turn off Soviet willingness to address levels and MIRV as well as FBS.*

*We believe it would be useful if we could meet with you later this week to review both substantive and tactical issues in the negotiations prior to your departure for California. We will provide a background memo addressing the basic issues and alternative directions we could go in SALT in preparation for such a meeting and for your study while you are in California.*

#### *SALT Work Program*

We have the SALT Verification Panel Working Group addressing a number of outstanding issues.

—The MIRV options paper is being revised to incorporate an ICBM MIRV freeze proposal and to resolve several detailed issues regarding collateral constraints. The objective is to have fully staffed-out proposals for the eventuality that we would wish to put forward a concrete proposal.

—A paper on alternative aggregate levels is being prepared which will relate these levels to our ongoing programs and force options over time. It will present the pros and cons of alternative levels so as to provide a vehicle for settling in our preferences.

These papers are to be completed in time for the VP meeting the week of April 16.

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

In addition, we are also completing work on the following items:

- Bomber payload and throw weight
- U.S. leverage in SALT
- Soviet problems in carrying out a first strike on Minuteman
- Cost implications of land mobile ICBMs
- Soviet motivations in the strategic weapons program
- FBS options
- FBS political implications

We will provide you analytical summaries of these papers as appropriate.

*Standing Consultative Committee*

We have completed work on two papers which provide the basis for further instructions to the Delegation on the SCC—one on the substantive issues of notification, replacement and dismantling, and another on administrative planning and SCC procedures.

*We will shortly provide you with a memo on the issues that need to be decided so that the SCC can begin work.* In this connection, the Soviets have not raised the SCC in Geneva. The only comment, made informally by the Soviet Commissioner General Ustinov, that *he did not see much work for the SCC beyond basic regulations for SCC procedures.* We, of course, have a substantial interest in getting into the substantive questions of notification, replacement and dismantling particularly as it affects Soviet actions under the Interim Agreement.

*Recommendation*

That you make available some time soon to discuss SALT.

Schedule a meeting this week.

Schedule it in California.<sup>5</sup>

Other.

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<sup>5</sup> Kissinger initialed his approval of this option.



**18. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Johnson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, March 29, 1973, 1634Z.

94. Eyes Only for Dr. Henry Kissinger (delivery during business hours).

1. As you will see from my recent messages, especially my 121 on my talk with Semenov yesterday,<sup>2</sup> Semenov is really stepping up the pressure to get something that can be signed at time of Brezhnev's visit.<sup>3</sup> I, of course, have continued to maintain a relaxed and not too sympathetic attitude toward the whole problem, steadily drumming at the theme of a permanent agreement within the framework of my present instructions. While they complain of my singing the same tune, I have felt no embarrassment as, except for some signs on MIRVs in our private talks, they are simply rehashing their old extreme bargaining positions while trying to dress them up in new clothes. Thus from my standpoint I feel the situation has developed very satisfactorily, with their being the ones to feel the heat on their backs.

2. However the pressure on them arising because of the Brezhnev visit will, of course, disappear when he has come and gone, and we must therefore shortly be making a decision on whether, when and how to exploit the present situation. In this connection I presume that, not having been able to make any headway here with me, you will probably be hearing something of the same refrain from Dobrynin. (I will, of course, be interested in anything you can tell me on this, so I can take a consistent position here.) In any event, the President will be wanting to consider what, if anything, he would want to do on SALT at the time of the visit in light of the total relationship. In either event he will also want to consider in what direction the pressures will flow following the visit. In this connection, I am inclined to give some credence to Shchukin's remarks yesterday to Harold Brown that if Brezhnev is not able to show some progress on SALT at the time of the visit, it will greatly strengthen the hands of those in the Soviet Union urging preparations for bigger strategic programs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva. Top Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Backchannel message 121 from Geneva, March 28, is *ibid*.

<sup>3</sup> Brezhnev's visit was scheduled for June.

3. In an effort to come up with a catalogue of possibilities that might be considered for Brezhnev's visit, I have discussed the matter in depth both collectively and individually with delegation members. (In this connection, Harold Brown is returning Sunday,<sup>4</sup> and you might want to get hold of him while you are in San Clemente.)

4. The only suggestion I can come up with as having some merit for us and being in the negotiating ball park would be an agreement on their part not to MIRV the SS-9 or any other large missile. The agreement would probably have to be in the form of the right of both sides to MIRV to an equal number of light ICBMs (I recognize verification problem on this) and an equal obligation not to MIRV heavy ICBMs. In turn they will press hard for limitation on bomber armaments, especially on ASMs having range of more than one thousand kilometers and on MARVs. They will probably also want to have some other items drawn from their March 27 list.<sup>5</sup> They will also press for terms of reference for subsequent SALT negotiations to take account of FBS—perhaps by agreement to simultaneous discussion of central and non-central systems. (This would, of course, raise NATO problems.) (In framing an agreement to include MIRVs it would of course have to be done in such a way as to be permanent, because a simple “add-on” to the Interim Agreement expiring in four years would have little value.)

5. If we were going to go for anything of this kind, it would of course take some hard and intensive negotiations here in order to get the issues sufficiently refined for what I would assume would have to be summit decisions before or just during the visit. (We would of course go in with a much harder bargaining position—I would not be embarrassed at going in with a MIRV ban for them, at least on ICBMs.)

6. When I left there was discussion of a meeting at San Clemente next week which I might attend. I would, of course, welcome the opportunity to participate in any discussion of my follow-on instructions, so as to have as much background as possible. Thus if and when decisions are made on the meeting would appreciate word from you as soon as possible.<sup>6</sup>

7. I have used this channel to get my views to you as frankly as possible without unnecessarily and prematurely stirring the pot back

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<sup>4</sup> April 2.

<sup>5</sup> In his statement at the March 27 meeting, Semenov listed certain types of strategic arms whose development, testing, and deployment would be banned. (Telegram 119 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, March 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>6</sup> In backchannel message WH30893 to Johnson, March 30, Kissinger stated that “at the moment I doubt that we will be far enough along to have a useful meeting in San Clemente.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)

there. However, I would have no objection—in fact would welcome—your letting Ken Rush, Elliot Richardson and Phil Farley know the direction of my thinking. If you feel it would be helpful, I will be glad to put the substance of the foregoing, perhaps with some expanded argumentation, into a regular cable.

8. Regards.

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**19. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1973.

SUBJECT

The Soviet SALT Position

Attached is the omnibus proposal that the Soviets tabled on April 6.<sup>2</sup> It incorporates their previous speeches in a formal "Understanding", which they say should be the basis for an agreement at the summit along the lines of May 20—i.e., agreed high level instructions to the delegations.

It seems to divide into three parts:

1) Provisions relating to the main limitations, (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers), numerical limits as well as qualitative (MIRVs not mentioned as such), FBS, and restraints on modernization and replacements and prohibitions on new types of strategic weapons.

2) The second part seems to be a possible interim agreement, since it was introduced under the idea of steps that could be taken more or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO-I-(Geneva), April 1973. Confidential. All brackets are in the original. The memorandum was not initialed by Hyland. Kissinger sent an undated memorandum to the President summarizing the issues and asking for guidance. The "central and most difficult issue," Kissinger told Nixon, was whether to limit MIRV in some way, as the Soviets proposed, a decision which could "have a decisive impact on the kind of further SALT agreement we can expect to achieve." According to an April 4 note on the undated memorandum, the President saw it. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> A report on the April 6 meeting and Johnson's and Semenov's statements are in telegrams 144, 145, and 146 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, April 6. (All *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

less immediately, since all of the provisions are bans (cruise missiles etc.).

3) The last substantive provision is non-transfer. It is curiously worded: “not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with its [the understanding’s] main provisions” and to assume “obligations not to take actions which could result in the provisions of the understanding being weakened”. Presumably, this is directed against the Poseidon for the UK since a number on the Soviet delegation have mentioned it, but it is not a strong provision.

On balance, it is a maximum statement, but nevertheless interesting in that the Soviets felt compelled to get it on the table and promote it as a summit outcome. It provides the framework for a counterproposal.

## Attachment

### Soviet Proposal<sup>3</sup>

Undated.

The understanding on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms will include the following basic provisions:

- (a) establishment of levels for strategic offensive arms;
- (b) establishment of quantitative and qualitative limitations on land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and on submarines, on the basis of existing agreements;
- (c) establishment of agreed limitations with respect to strategic aircraft and their armaments for the purpose of precluding a strategic arms race in that field and the upsetting of strategic stability, bearing in mind that the limitation of strategic aircraft and their armaments is of great importance from the standpoint of maintaining strategic stability, as is the limitation of ICBMs and SLBMs.
- (d) resolution of the question of withdrawal of strategic offensive nuclear systems and liquidation of corresponding bases on the territory of third countries in accordance with the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage;
- (e) resolution of the question of qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, which would be consistent with the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage;
- (f) subject to the agreed limitations, modernization and replacement, as well as research, development and testing of strategic offen-

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking. The full text of the Soviet Union’s proposed “Basic Principles of an Understanding on More Complete Measures Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms” is in telegram 147 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, April 6. (Ibid.)

sive arms, shall be permitted. The number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and other strategic offensive arms for use in testing and training would be limited to agreed levels.

To ensure a more effective curbing of the strategic arms race, the sides will not carry out new major strategic defensive arms programs, will ban development and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms which could increase the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, and will also assume the obligation to exercise restraint in fields not limited by the understanding.

Guided by the urgent interests of curbing the race in strategic offensive arms, the sides will ban the development, testing and deployment of certain types of strategic offensive weapons, such as:

- (a) new types of strategic aircraft;
- (b) long range air-to-surface missiles;
- (c) intercontinental cruise missiles and sea-based cruise missiles, specially designed to strike land targets;
- (d) strategic ballistic missiles on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;
- (e) strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms;
- (f) any fixed or mobile devices for launching ballistic missiles, which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial sea and internal waters.

For the purpose of enhancing the viability and effectiveness of the understanding, the sides will agree not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with its provisions, and will assume the obligation not to take actions which could result in the provisions of the understanding being weakened or circumvented through a third state or third states.

For the purpose of providing assurances of compliance with the provisions of the understanding, each side shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal. Each side will undertake not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other side and not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the understanding, the sides will use the standing consultative commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the USSR and the USA on December 21, 1972 in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

Agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms will be of unlimited duration, at the same time providing that either side may withdraw from the understanding if extraordinary

events related to the subject matter of the understanding jeopardize the supreme interests of the country in question.

In working out the understanding limiting strategic offensive arms, other proposals in the spirit of the Soviet-American agreements already concluded may also be considered, having as a point of departure the agreed policy of both states on curbing the race in strategic offensive arms, their limitation and subsequent reduction on the basis of the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage.

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**20. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Johnson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 9, 1973, 1328Z.

96. Eyes Only for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (deliver during working hours).

1. You can tell Dobrynin for me that I do not know who is kidding whom, but there is not a meeting that now passes in which Semenov as well as individual members of his staff do not push as clearly as they ever do anything on the urgency of getting something ready for the summit.<sup>2</sup> As you know, I have not and I will not mention what might be negotiated for a summit meeting, but the problem is that virtually everything that Semenov puts forward is done in the context of preparations for the summit—the most recent and clear-cut being the proposed declaration contained USDEL SALT TWO-II 147.<sup>3</sup> As this was so clearly in summit context in my reporting message I simply said that I did not intend to comment on the proposal at next meeting. Of course problem is that, as entire Soviet position as encompassed in that proposal, any comment whatever by me on their position from now on inferentially

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva. Top Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> In backchannel message WH30909 to Johnson, April 9, Kissinger told Johnson that Dobrynin stated that Johnson had been “implying an urgency in regard to the upcoming Summit.” While Kissinger realized it was not true, he told Johnson to avoid discussions of what might be negotiated for the Summit. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 19.

involves that proposal. It is also for this reason that I have not sought instructions or made suggestions on handling the proposal in regular channels, as I had assumed you will want to handle it in the light of summit plans and would give me any related guidance. We could, of course, reject the proposal out of hand, but I assume we would want to demonstrate that there had been a decent interval for its consideration by Washington. On the other hand we could take some of the rhetoric in the proposal and turn the substance into a counterdraft we could accept. However, it seems to me this would have to await the pending decisions on the directions in which we want to go. I am working at some counterdrafts which I will have available if and when you want them. In the meanwhile I am not sending in any messages on this in regular channels, but if we are going to continue meeting for the time being I would hope Washington would send me something in the way of instructions I can circulate to my delegation.

2. I am still awaiting word on what I should do about a recess.<sup>4</sup>

3. Kind regards.

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<sup>4</sup> In backchannel message WH30920 to Johnson, Kissinger told him to plan for an Easter recess beginning on April 19 with talks resuming on April 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)

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## 21. United States Proposal<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### *Strategic Arms Limitations*

We wish to put forward some considerations on how we might proceed in the SALT talks to prepare for the General Secretary's visit.

We both agree that a more complete and permanent agreement is our objective. This is our interpretation of the Soviet proposals of April 6, submitted in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union suggests that we reach an understanding on basic provisions of a permanent agreement based es-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16, April 1973. Top Secret. A note states that the proposal was handed to Dobrynin by Kissinger on April 27.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 19.

sentially on the Interim Agreement but expanded to include a number of areas not covered by limitations.

The US believes the Interim Agreement is a starting point for discussions, though there should be some modifications in accord with the aims of a longer term agreement. We both agree, however, that questions of qualitative improvements will be an important aspect of a permanent agreement.

It thus appears that we have an opportunity to sustain the momentum created by our previous success by working out an understanding as proposed by the Soviet side.

Thus the following steps could be adopted:

1. Negotiation on the basic provisions of a permanent agreement should proceed in Geneva with the objective of developing by the General Secretary's visit an understanding on (a) numerical limitations on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, (b) limitations on qualitative improvements, especially on MIRV for land-based ICBMs; (c) how to deal with those nuclear systems that would not be precisely limited so as not to circumvent the main agreement; and (d) general questions related to the exercise of restraint in developing and deploying new or more modern strategic systems.

Simultaneously, in order to take advantage of the favorable atmosphere for negotiations, we could proceed to develop for signature as soon as possible a provisional agreement that would supplement the existing Interim Agreement. The US believes there is an opportunity to work out agreed limits on the testing and deployment of MIRV/MRVs for land-based ICBMs based on the existing situation.

In our view the two processes—of developing an understanding on the basic provisions of a permanent agreement and negotiating a provisional agreement on MIRVs—are related. Conclusion of a provisional agreement on MIRVs would facilitate progress on a permanent agreement and would be based on the understanding that the actual negotiations for a permanent agreement would be completed as soon as possible.

It is possible to envisage a joint announcement during the summit meeting in Washington.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the US delegation in Geneva will proceed to develop views on a permanent agreement in more detail,

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<sup>3</sup> A draft joint announcement, entitled "Basic Principles on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons," was also handed to Dobrynin by Kissinger on April 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16) This was a counterproposal, prepared in response to a Soviet draft of basic principles that was transmitted in backchannel message WH30981 from Kissinger to Johnson, May 2. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)



and Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to discuss the attached documents explaining our position.

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**22. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 2, 1973.

SUBJ

Approach for SALT Phase TWO

1. During the Verification Panel meeting on 30 April,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Clements and I discussed a sequential four-step proposal which we believe should form the basis of instructions to the US SALT Delegation for the remainder of the second session of SALT Phase TWO.

2. The four-step proposal would be presented as a three-step package to the Soviet side, but the United States would insist that each step would be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon before deliberations were initiated on succeeding steps. Briefly summarized, the four steps are:

a. *Step 1.* Achieve agreement in principle on equal aggregate totals in central systems for each side with a sub-limit on MLBMs. Full freedom-to-mix should be permitted among heavy bombers and launchers for SLBMs, MLBMs, and light ICBMs. Equal sub-limits should be negotiated for the two sides of 313 modern large ballistic missiles.<sup>3</sup>

b. *Step 2.* Indicate that the United States is prepared to enter deliberations that would lead to agreement on phased reductions of central strategic systems over time, with first phase reductions down to about the 2200 level sometime prior to the expiration of the Interim Agreement (1977) before proceeding to subsequent reduction phases. Com-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, April 1973 to July 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. Moorer sent the memorandum as an enclosure to memorandum CJCS M-44-73, dated May 2. Two additional enclosures, "Summary of JCS Approach to SALT Phase II," undated, and "CJCS Concept and Approach to SALT," undated, are not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of the meeting are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, 3-5-72 to 6-4-74, Originals, 3 of 5.

<sup>3</sup> Moorer wrote "Jackson" in the margin, a reference to Senator Henry Jackson.

pletion of this step would be followed by negotiations aimed at step-by-step reductions over an agreed period of time.

c. *Step 3.* A two-tiered approach as follows:

(1) Indicate to the USSR a willingness on the part of the United States to mutually ban development of air mobile ICBMs and/or long-range ASMs (greater than 1500NM in range) provided that the Soviet side will agree not to MRV/MIRV their MLBMs. MRV/MIRV deployment on light ICBM and sea-based systems would not be constrained.

(2) After serious negotiations on the proposal in paragraph 2c(1) above and if agreement cannot be reached, indicate to the USSR a willingness on the part of the United States to halt the Minuteman III MIRV program at the 550 level provided that the Soviet side will agree not to MRV/MIRV their MLBMs and constrain deployment of MRV/MIRVs on light ICBMs at the 550 level. (The light ICBM MIRV constraint is very risky since it cannot be verified with any degree of confidence). MRV/MIRV deployment on sea-based systems would not be constrained.

d. *Step 4.* Indicate to the USSR, at the appropriate time, that the United States will be prepared to address FBS following satisfactory agreement on Steps 1, 2, and 3. At that time, the US delegation should be authorized to put forth a rebuttal explaining in detail why forward-based systems cannot be negotiated in the SALT context. Until then, the Delegation should be instructed to concentrate on negotiating equal aggregates on central systems and to avoid any discussion of non-central systems.

3. As indicated above, it is imperative that each of these steps be negotiated sequentially. It is preferable that the Soviets agree to reducing down to the 2200 level before proceeding on to Step 3. However, should the Soviets refuse to agree to equal aggregates except at the 2500 level, the United States still has certain options to achieve equality in launchers above the number currently deployed. For example, we could retain the Polaris submarines and B-52s, take B-52s out of mothballs, and build more B-1s and Tridents. The point is that it is much more important to achieve agreement on equal aggregates of central systems, even at the 2500 level, than it is to accept an agreement which is asymmetrically in favor of the Soviets in numbers of launchers.

4. I believe that the approach outlined above is the maximum initiative that can be taken without undue risk. Further, it:

a. Reflects the firm US resolve with regard to non-central systems;

b. Incorporates equal aggregates and will, therefore, protect our standing with third countries, our allies and our adversaries;

- c. Provides for essential equivalence from a military as well as political image point of view;
- d. Maintains our flexibility to structure our forces to adapt to future uncertainties;
- e. Helps maintain a strong US technological base by permitting full freedom to modernize US strategic forces.

**T.H. Moorer**

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## 23. National Security Decision Memorandum 213<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 3, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Acting Secretary of Defense  
The Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for SALT Talks

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on May 4, 1973 in Geneva.

1. The overall U.S. objective continues to be a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms which provides a high degree of equivalency in central strategic systems—ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

2. The U.S. Delegation should emphasize again that such a permanent agreement must incorporate equal aggregate limits on the number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The Delegation should take the position that the U.S. would be prepared to accept an equal level for both sides of 2,350. There would be appropriate provisions to permit the substitution of SLBMs and heavy bombers for ICBMs and for each other. In this context the United States would be prepared to consider:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 201–NSDM 250, Originals. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.

a. qualitative limitations on strategic offensive ballistic missile forces;

b. prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of air-to-surface missiles with a maximum range greater than 3,000 kilometers;

c. measures to assure that the agreement would not be circumvented through deployment of non-central systems;

d. the Soviet proposal to ban the development, testing and deployment of:

- cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
- strategic ballistic missiles on water-borne vehicles other than submarines;
- strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms;
- fixed or mobile devices for launching ballistic missiles, which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial sea and internal waters;

e. a program for achieving a reduced level of strategic forces.

3. At a meeting subsequent to outlining this position on a permanent agreement, the U.S. Delegation should state that the United States is prepared to move ahead promptly to conclude a provisional agreement freezing ICBM MIRVs to accompany the Interim Agreement. This provisional agreement would prohibit the development, testing, production, and deployment of new and modified MIRV/MRV systems for ICBMs. Deployment of other ICBM MIRV/MRV systems would be limited to those operational and under conversion as of July 1, 1973, and confidence testing of such ICBM MIRV/MRV systems would be permitted.

In presenting this proposal, the U.S. Delegation should emphasize the importance of controlling MIRVs on ICBMs promptly in order to preserve the survivability of deterrent forces, enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. The provisional agreement on MIRVs would remain in force until supplanted by a permanent agreement. In this connection the Delegation should make clear that the provisions of a permanent agreement regarding MIRV could be modified to reflect the degree of permanent equivalence achieved in the overall levels of strategic forces.

4. In elaborating on this proposal, the U.S. Delegation should present the following basic provisions and collateral constraints:

—The development, flight testing, production and deployment of new or modified ICBM MRV/MIRV systems (either dispensing mechanisms or RVs) is prohibited. New ICBM MRV/MIRV systems are defined as those ICBM MRV/MIRV systems which had not been flight tested as of January 1, 1973.

—The deployment of other ICBM MIRV/MRV systems is limited to numbers operational or under construction/conversion as of July 1, 1973.

—The flight testing of ICBM MRV/MIRVs is limited to confidence testing of the MRV/MIRV systems currently deployed and only in association with missiles with which they have been flight tested previously.

—The development, flight testing, production and deployment of endoatmospheric penetration aids and new or modified dispensing mechanisms for exoatmospheric decoys is prohibited.

—The development, flight testing, production and deployment of maneuvering re-entry vehicles for ICBMs is prohibited.

5. On the question of restraint, the U.S. should put forth the view that restraints should support specific agreements limiting strategic offensive arms, and should be aimed at developments which threaten the survivability of the deterrent forces of the other side. It is not possible to deal with the restraints question in specific terms until the terms of a possible concrete agreement become clear.

6. On the question of throw weight, the Delegation should take the position that in the context of adequate controls on MIRV a ceiling on further increases in ICBM throw weight would be acceptable. (Such a proposal would be pursued in the context of paragraph 2a above).

The President has asked me to emphasize once again the importance of avoiding leaks on this subject.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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## **24. Editorial Note**

On May 4, 1973, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, traveled to Moscow to meet with Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They met to discuss a variety of issues, including strategic arms limitation, in preparation for the upcoming June summit in Washington. The first meeting was held on May 5, from 11:30 a.m. to 1:55 p.m., in Brezhnev's office in the Politburo Villa at Zavidovo, the Politburo's hunting preserve located outside Moscow. According to the memorandum of conversation Kissinger and Brezhnev discussed primarily an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Their comments concerning a further strategic arms limitation agreement were strictly in the context of the nuclear agreement. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo,

May 5–8, 1973) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is printed as Document 104 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

In message Hakto 6 to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft, May 5, Kissinger summarized his limited discussion with Brezhnev about SALT: “I get strong impression that they do not want anything concrete at summit but see agreement on principles. I intend to stress very strongly the desirability of making summit as concrete as possible on SALT.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Trip Files, HAK Moscow, London Trip, HAKTO & Misc., May 4–11, 1973)

Kissinger and Brezhnev returned to the subject of SALT during conversations on May 7 at Zavidovo. During their first meeting, from 11:35 a.m. to 2:55 p.m., Brezhnev handed Kissinger a Soviet draft, “Basic Principles on Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” which they discussed in general terms in their meeting from 7:40 to 11:40 p.m. Kissinger described his conversation and the Soviet draft in message Hakto 19A to Scowcroft, May 8, with instructions to inform the President:

“I again made strong argument that principles alone would not advance SALT Two very far since they were bound to contain much compromise language which would later be subject to dispute. I agreed to continue working on principles but urged major effort to obtain some concrete agreement, to supplement present Interim Agreement, on urgent aspects of MIRV problem, as discussed in Verification Panel and approved by you. So far, Brezhnev has shown no inclination to proceed with concrete negotiations. As regards the principles, there are the expected differences on such points as forward-based systems and it is unlikely that a document can be agreed here during my stay. This will give us opportunity to decide whether it is desirable to have such a document on principles promulgated at the summit.”

For the memoranda of conversation and Kissinger’s message, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 108, 109, and 110, respectively. The text of the Soviet draft of SALT principles is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Kissinger Conversations at Zavidovo, May 5–8, 1973.

**25. National Security Decision Memorandum 216<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 7, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Acting Secretary of Defense  
The Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for SALT Talks

1. The U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks should be guided by the following additional instructions, in addition to those contained in NSDM 213.<sup>2</sup>

2. The elements of the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms which are not modified by NSDM 213 remain part of the U.S. position on a permanent SALT agreement. Specifically:

(a) There is to be no construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers.

(b) There is to be no conversion of light and older ICBM launchers into launchers for modern large ballistic missiles.

(c) There would have to be appropriate provisions which would provide for the orderly and equitable transition from the provisions of Article III and the Protocol of the Interim Agreement to the terms of the new permanent agreement.

(d) There would be provisions in a permanent agreement along the lines of Articles IV, V, VI and VIII.

3. The specific provisions under paragraph 4 of NSDM 213 relating to endoatmospheric penetration aids and dispensing mechanisms for exoatmospheric decoys should apply only to ICBMs.

**Henry A. Kissinger<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 87, National Security Council, 1969–1976, NSDM, August 1971–January 1974. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Document 23.

<sup>3</sup> Scowcroft signed for Kissinger above this typed signature.

**26. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 11, 1973.

[Omitted here is discussion of the summit announcement.]

Kissinger: Now, we have a massive problem with the Chiefs and Clements, who's stupid but well meaning on SALT.

Nixon: Ah, yes.

Kissinger: And I'm not going to bother you with the technical details, but they are digging in on almost everything. The point is, the Russians will turn down almost anything, and we—

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: —just the—the issue is they want to nail the Russians now to agree to equal numbers on both sides before they will talk about MIRVs. Now, the MIRV proposal they are making is so unilaterally advantageous to us. Namely, that we should stop deployment of our land-based missiles, MIRVs, of which we have already completed nine-tenths of our program. If they don't put any MIRVs on their land-based missiles, there's no chance that it will ever be accepted, but if we can make it and get them to turn it down—but, if they did accept it, it would be spectacularly advantageous to us because we—our program would be nearly complete—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: —and they would never start theirs.

Nixon: That's right. Right. Right. All right, what do you want me to do? To get the Chiefs—

Kissinger: I—

Nixon: —in and what else?

Kissinger: No, no—

Nixon: And tell them—

Kissinger: No, no—

Nixon: By God, then, I will—

Kissinger: I—

Nixon: —because I've had enough with these goddamn Chiefs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 916–14. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.



Kissinger: I'll draft a memo for your signature today to send over to them.<sup>2</sup>

Nixon: All right, let me say: make it tough. Say that I have—you know, I have thought this thing through. This is a decision, and I expect it to be loyally and scrupulously adhered to, and I'm placing personal responsibility on everyone who gets the memorandum to see that there is no undercutting, and no playing members of the Congress, or with the press—

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: —on this matter. How's that sound to you?

Kissinger: That's excellent.

Nixon: Put the words in to that effect. Ok?

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to SALT.]

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

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**27. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1973.

SUBJECT

SALT without MIRV?

The Soviet position on MIRV limitations during your recent Moscow visit<sup>2</sup> raises this question: *What is the purpose and utility of SALT if MIRVs cannot be controlled?*

This question may, of course, be premature. The Soviets could be taking a tough stance in order to increase their leverage to get the kind of MIRV deal they want. They may feel that we have stepped back substantially from the position we took last fall when you proposed that MIRVs be limited to one type ICBM. Now, of course, we are proposing that they have no MIRVs on any of their ICBMs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO—I–Geneva, April 1973. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 24.

The Soviets may eventually accept some minimum MIRV deal.

—MIRVs on 1,000 light ICBMs on both sides.

—MIRVs on Soviet heavy ICBMs and on light U.S. ICBMs.

Since it now appears that the Soviets want to MIRV the heavy ICBMs, the latter may be what they want as a SALT outcome. As we discussed in San Clemente, these MIRV outcomes would be better than unlimited Soviet MIRVing. Even limiting Soviet MIRVs to their heavy ICBMs would be an accomplishment, but we should try in that case to limit the number of RVs per missile (e.g., three or four).

Even if the Soviet Delegation in Geneva completely rejects any MIRV limits, I see no reason to change our position now. We may want to dig in and try to make them pay some price for having a free hand on MIRV, as well as make clear that it is *they* not *we* who are not prepared to tackle MIRV limits.

#### *Alternatives to MIRV Limitations*

Nonetheless, there is a real question as to what our objectives might be if a significant limit on MIRVs is not achievable in SALT. If SALT is to become moribund without MIRV limits, we should know that now and plan accordingly—both in our strategic programs and in our diplomacy. However, on balance I do not believe that SALT would necessarily become a worthless and empty exercise.

There are essentially two broad approaches we would take toward SALT in the absence of MIRV limits.

—We could adopt strictly a quantitative approach, possibly involving reductions.

—We could seek mutual restraints on specific strategic weapon programs.

These approaches are not of course mutually exclusive.

#### *More Comprehensive Quantitative Approach*

This is the approach to SALT favored by the JCS and OSD. It would involve *seeking an equal aggregate at the Soviet level, full freedom to mix and some rhetorical or real commitment to future reductions.*

We would gain in two respects compared to the Interim Agreement:

—Freedom to build more submarines than 710.

—Freedom to substitute other systems for the expected vulnerability of land-based ICBMs.

We could get the same freedom by letting the Interim Agreement lapse. However, we would also lose control over the numerical level of Soviet missile forces. Thus, a new numerical agreement would basic-

ally be aimed at giving us greater freedom of action but holding the Soviets to their current levels.

We might have to pay a high price for such an agreement. We undoubtedly would have to put in our bombers, solve the FBS problem and possibly take a number of steps of interest to the Soviets as well, such as limiting ASMs.

As you are aware this approach will do nothing for us in terms of survivability, since MIRVs would be permitted. In fact, the survivability problem would be aggravated if we actually reduce our ICBMs. The only way reductions can help us in terms of ICBM survivability is if we can deploy mobile ICBMs and drastically cut Soviet throw weight, in other words phase out their MLBMs. Achieving the latter is an even more remote possibility than limiting Soviet MIRVs.

Finally, the quantitative approach will do little to restrain strategic arms developments and deployments on either side. Nor would it avoid most of the tensions, uncertainties and costs of what is now clearly a qualitative competition in strategic forces. In all likelihood it would do nothing to curb Soviet programs and inevitably would lead to pressures for new U.S. programs.

#### *Restraints*

The other possibility would be to develop an agreement which would place concrete restraints on specific identifiable strategic programs. This might make a purely quantitative approach more meaningful, in terms of strategic stability and real security concerns. For example:

—The Soviets might agree on a conversion schedule for their ICBMs which would minimize uncertainties on our part, e.g., convert SS-9 to SS-18 at the rate of 20 per year, SS-11 to SS-17 at the rate of 50 per year.

—In return we might restrain the pace of Trident, B-1 or perhaps our air-to-surface missile programs.

—Alternatively, we might seek prohibitions designed to enhance survivability of other components of our strategic forces such as our bombers. This could involve a ban on depressed trajectory SLBMs and submarine standoff arrangements.

The purpose of this approach would be similar to MIRV limits. It would try to postpone the day when Minuteman or our bombers become highly vulnerable. It would also try to avoid the possibility of sudden changes in the strategic balance and therefore reduce somewhat the need for expensive and elaborate hedging programs.

It would make SALT an open ended process, for we would need to continually return to the negotiating table to deal with new potential strategic systems.

This approach can be criticized as being mindless arms control. However, it is far less mindless than simple quantitative limitations or reductions. Moreover, it can make a serious contribution to stability—stability in the pace of weapon programs on both sides and in the confidence that each side can have over time in its strategic posture.

The major problem with this approach is that it may be difficult for either side to bargain in this fashion, i.e., trading schedules for major weapon developments and deployments. It would be strongly resisted by our own military and the degree of candor that may be required on the part of the Soviets could easily exceed their capacity for talking frankly (which is near zero at least thus far in SALT).

### *Conclusions*

We should continue to make a strong effort to reach a MIRV limitation that is in our interest. If after some long time the Soviets are not prepared to limit MIRVs, we need not despair that there is no possible role for SALT. Further quantitative limitations particularly if combined with some concrete restraints on the most dangerous strategic programs can be useful in enhancing our security. However, we should not consider switching to this approach until our programs are more near to maturity and our bargaining leverage is enhanced—sometime late next year.

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## **28. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1973.

### **SUBJECT**

SALT Developments

This memo provides a summary of developments in SALT, both in Geneva and in the Verification Panel Working Group since your Moscow trip. Briefly,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO—I–Geneva, April 1973. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

—*The U.S. Delegation has been unfolding our SALT position as contained in NSDMs 213 and 216.*<sup>2</sup>

—*The Soviets have continued to play on nuances of their FBS theme; they have given no clear response to the U.S. proposals.*

—We have tasked the bureaucracy with additional work in a number of areas including the development of our non-circumvention approach on FBS, detailed formulation of the ICBM MIRV freeze and other issues that have arisen in interpreting current guidance (e.g., composition of the 2350 aggregate on each side).

These points are elaborated below.

#### *Events in Geneva*

The U.S. Delegation has been unfolding the U.S. SALT position. The Delegation opened with a presentation on equal aggregates at the 2350 level and other elements of the basic U.S. position. At subsequent meetings Johnson has outlined the U.S. proposal for a provisional agreement freezing MRV/MIRVs on ICBMs and our non-circumvention proposal for FBS.<sup>3</sup>

*The Soviets have provided little indication of their reaction to the U.S. proposals.*

Semenov has confined his formal statements to largely non-substantive discussions of principles and to repeating the Soviet position on FBS. However, his most recent formal statement (May 22) all but rejected the U.S. proposal for equal aggregates of central systems in a permanent agreement.<sup>4</sup> *Privately*, he has added little except to acknowledge that the U.S. proposals are important and are receiving careful study in Moscow. He recently voiced to Johnson the thought that Brezhnev could not concentrate his attention on SALT until his return from Bonn on May 22.

Other members of the Soviet Delegation have been a little more forthcoming, seeking elaboration of the U.S. proposals and hinting at some areas of possible agreement or disagreement with U.S. views.

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<sup>2</sup> Documents 23 and 25.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S. position on equal aggregates was presented on May 8, the provisional agreement to freeze MIRVs on ICBMs was tabled on May 11, and the non-circumvention proposal on May 15. (Telegrams 179, May 8; 184, May 11; and 191, May 15, from USDEL SALT II; all in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Johnson apprised Kissinger of the presentations in backchannel messages 100 and 102 from Geneva, May 7 and 11. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)

<sup>4</sup> A translation of Semenov's statement is in telegram 207 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, May 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

*Equal Aggregates*

The Soviet Delegation has been most negative on the U.S. proposal for equal aggregates of 2350 central systems. Semenov stated that the principle of equal security “cannot be embodied in an agreement in the form of an elementary arithmetical equality for some portion of strategic offensive weapons . . .” Semenov’s May 22 formal statement said the permanent agreement “must include the principal provisions of the Interim Agreement in the form in which they were agreed between the sides.”

Trusov has asked how U.S. plans to take account of geographic factors, FBS, aircraft carriers and allied SLBMs in establishing levels for each side. Shchukin commented to Nitze that the sides should have unequal aggregates to take account of the factors enumerated by Trusov.

*MIRVs*

*There has been little Soviet comment reported on the ICBM MIRV freeze proposed by the U.S.* Trusov commented that the proposal is not verifiable (you will recall Brezhnev said the same thing). Shchukin has indicated he thinks limitations on SLBM MIRVs should be included in the discussions. (Brezhnev said Soviet SLBM MIRVs were a long way off.)

*SSBN Standoff and Forward Basing*

Shchukin has pressed Nitze on the idea of deploying SSBNs out of range of the territory of the other side. Nitze raised the Soviets 4000 nm SS-N-8 SLBM saying it was virtually impossible to deploy such a missile out of range of the U.S. Shchukin responded by saying the Soviets had not deployed any long range missiles on operational submarines and would be prepared to agree not to deploy them for an extended number of years. Shchukin concluded by saying it would be important to discuss restriction of deployment areas more fully in the near future. Nitze believes Shchukin may have in mind a softening of Soviet FBS line in return for restrictions on SSBN deployment. (Presumably it would also involve elimination of the SSBN forward bases since U.S. SSBNs are in range of Soviet targets from these bases.) In his most recent private discussion with Johnson, Semenov devoted considerable attention to the Soviet proposal that U.S. withdraw from SSBN overseas bases as “first step” toward solution of FBS.

In related probing Smolin asked Graybeal about the U.S. response to the Soviet proposed “phased withdrawal” of FBS, the first phase of which involves U.S. withdrawal from SSBN overseas bases. Smolin pointed out this first phase dealt only with “central systems.” Smolin seemed to be hinting that this phase might be separable from the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. FBS.

Semenov in his formal statements has reiterated the Soviet April 12 proposal for phased withdrawal of SSBN overseas bases and all U.S. FBS and liquidation of their bases and requested that the U.S. “again consider (it) with all seriousness.”<sup>5</sup> Belitsky said non-circumvention was not in accord with the principle of equal security since it didn’t take into account FBS systems already deployed.

*Standing Consultative Commission*

The SCC will hold its first meeting May 24. Johnson is the acting U.S. Commissioner, and he is drawing on the SALT Delegation for staff support. The first meeting will be limited to discussion and adoption of the regulations for operating the SCC.

At the second SCC meeting, the U.S. will present its views on the notification, replacement and dismantling issues.

*Verification Panel Working Group*

We have asked the bureaucracy for a number of papers to help flesh out aspects of the U.S. proposal:

—*FBS–Non-circumvention Policy*. This fleshes out the U.S. non-circumvention policy including an examination of what kinds of assurances we might give the Soviets, their impact on our deployments and options and our approach to consultation with the Allies.

—*Composition of the Aggregate*. This paper examines the issues relating to composition of the 2350 aggregate for both sides, asymmetries within the framework of the current U.S. proposal (e.g., the Soviets would retain their ICBM throw weight advantage), freedom-to-mix provisions and sublimits.

—*All Other NSDM-related Issues*. This paper is largely concerned with reviewing past analysis on provisions such as those banning strategic systems on ships other than submarines, and from territorial waters and inland waterways as well as addressing minor definitional issues (e.g., defining an inter-continental cruise missile).

In addition to this new work, we have ongoing papers examining our SALT leverage, a political assessment of the FBS issue, a comparison of missile and bomber throw weight, and the practicability and problem of ICBM counterforce attacks on silos (i.e., fratricide problem).

We will forward summaries of these papers when they are complete.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The April 12 Soviet proposal was reported in telegram 158 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, April 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>6</sup> Summaries of the papers have not been found; drafts of the Verification Panel Working Group papers are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–15, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT, 7/19/73.

## 29. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### SUBJECT

#### SALT MIRV Limitations

Limitations on MIRV appear to be the critical issue in SALT and could determine whether there is any SALT agreement for your meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev. Your guidance is required on how to proceed on this question.

#### *The Current Situation*

Our intelligence indicates that the Soviets are pressing forward with strategic programs that will provide a MIRV capability. Unlimited deployment of MIRVs will greatly enhance the strategic posture of the Soviet Union and eventually could place us in a disadvantageous position. However, unlimited U.S. MIRV deployment can also threaten the Soviet Union. Possibly for this reason, Soviet representatives have urged that we give priority attention to MIRV limits and have implied that agreement could be reached by the time of the summit meetings.

#### *MIRV Options*

All the agencies in the National Security Council agree that we should seek to limit Soviet MIRV at the expense of limiting our own freedom of action to some extent. You need to decide which of the possible MIRV measures discussed in the Verification Panel outlined below should be advanced at this stage.<sup>2</sup>

*OPTION 1:* We could seek a *total MIRV freeze* which would bar the Soviets from any acquisition of MIRV technology or capability.

—Under this approach the Soviet Union could neither test nor deploy any MIRVs. This could preserve our strategic advantages and greatly enhance the survivability of our ICBMs. It would be verifiable with high confidence.

—Our MIRV technology and deployments would be frozen. We would halt at 350 Minuteman MIRV missiles rather than the 550 we plan and 416 Poseidon MIRV missiles instead of the planned 496. More

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO—I-Geneva, April 1973. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The last Verification Panel meeting occurred on April 30; minutes are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Meeting Minutes, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74, Originals.



important, we would undoubtedly have to forego new MIRV missile systems such as Trident.

A basic political question is whether—six weeks before the Summit—we should put forward such a one-sided approach in the face of what appears to be a Soviet effort to reach an early agreement on MIRVs.

If we do, there is likely to be an equally one-sided Soviet counter proposal: for example, that we tear down our MIRVs. The result will be a deadlock. It would be doubtful that Brezhnev could resolve this in Washington without full politburo decision.

*OPTION 2:* At the other end of the spectrum, a minimum MIRV agreement would be only to ban MIRV on heavy ICBMs—i.e., the Soviet SS-9. This, too, is clearly in our interest since the SS-9 poses the most massive MIRV threat. This option would not limit our options since we do not plan to deploy very large ICBMs.

—The Soviets would be free to develop both SLBM and ICBM MIRVs for their light missiles. They could deploy MIRVs on all 1100 light ICBMs.

—There would be some verification risks: MIRVs on light ICBMs could be transferred illegally to heavy ICBMs that the Soviets could, thereby, gain an unexpected heavy MIRV capability in a short period of time. Even without this, however, the Soviets could gain a substantial counterforce capability against our Minuteman ICBM force by MIRVing their light ICBMs. Nonetheless, this type of agreement has advantages over no limits on Soviet MIRVs.

*OPTION 3:* In between these approaches we could propose a freeze on all land based ICBM MIRVs.

—We would stop at 350 Minuteman MIRVs and the Soviets would have none.

—Both sides could have SLBM MIRVs. To balance our MIRV advantage, the Soviets could retain roughly their current advantage in the number of strategic missiles.

—This approach would make a major contribution to strategic stability and could have minimal verification risks. It would require that we stop short of MIRVing 200 additional Minuteman ICBM as we now plan. Some believe that this is too great a price to pay to stop all Soviet ICBM MIRV deployments.

Even if this approach proves unacceptable, as is quite possible, it has the added advantage of permitting you to move in either of the other directions—towards a total MIRV freeze or a more moderate numerical limit on the types of ICBMs that can be MIRVed.

#### *Assessment*

The State Department supports the total freeze proposal mainly to demonstrate to the Congress that we made the effort to block the Soviet

MIRV program. The Defense Department is opposed to putting our Trident missile program in jeopardy.

The Defense Department favors a variant on the heavy ICBM MIRV ban in which both sides would also agree to deploy no more than 550 light ICBMs with MIRVs. However, because of verification difficulties we would have to assume that all 1100 Soviet missiles are eventually MIRVed. The Defense Department would also recommend we seek reductions in overall levels—a feature that could be a part of the other approaches as well.

The third approach—the ICBM MIRV freeze—could be an advantageous starting point. It is not a totally maximalist position that might convince the Soviets we are not serious. But it also gives up little and does not jeopardize Trident—which could be the result of advancing a total MIRV freeze.

Realistically, heavy ICBM MIRV ban with equal MIRV deployment for light ICBMs, may be the best we can accomplish. The question now is, should we try to use Soviet desire to retain their current numbers in overall strategic forces to gain the real strategic advantages of maintaining our edge in MIRVs by an ICBM MIRV freeze. If this failed, we could agree to equal MIRVs on light ICBMs if we can get equal overall numerical limit on strategic forces.

#### *Your Decision*

That you authorize proposing one of the MIRV limitation options outlined in this memo to the Soviet Union.

—*Option 1.* Total MIRV Freeze. Soviets get no MIRVs. U.S. stops all MIRVs and foregoes Trident.

—*Option 2.* Heavy ICBM MIRV ban. Each side MIRVs equal number of light ICBMs.

—*Option 3.* ICBM MIRV Freeze. Soviets get no ICBM MIRV, but retain numerical edge while we retain MIRV advantage. Trident is unaffected.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Nixon signed his approval of option 3.

### 30. Editorial Note

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, visited Washington for a summit with President Richard Nixon June 18–25, 1973. Discussion of the strategic arms limitation talks was limited, if not tangential, to discussions of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear war. President Nixon indicated his desire to steer conversations toward the subject of SALT in his meeting with Brezhnev on June 18, 12:35–3:15 p.m. According to the memorandum of conversation, the President stated: “Let me close with two brief points. One is the very historic agreement that we will sign on Friday. It will be seen as more words than substance unless we can move along on SALT. I hope we can talk about moving SALT along.” On June 20, during a meeting at Camp David, Nixon raised the subject of the SALT principles that Brezhnev had handed to Henry Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, during his visit to Moscow in early May (see Document 24). Nixon told Brezhnev that he hoped they could include in the principles 1974 as a goal for completing a SALT II agreement. Brezhnev responded with a joke that Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had also left the question open. On June 21, the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Arms was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev; ten additional agreements on other U.S.-Soviet issues were also signed during the summit. The Basic Principles reiterated that both the United States and Soviet Union were committed to the May 1972 agreements and asserted that active negotiations toward a permanent agreement would continue, with the hope of concluding such an agreement in 1974. The full texts of all memoranda of conversation between Nixon and Brezhnev are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974. The full text of the SALT Basic Principles is in *Department of State Bulletin*, July 23, 1973, p. 158.

31. **Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 25, 1973.

SUBJECT

JCS Views on SALT

Secretary Clements has forwarded for your information the views and concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SALT.<sup>2</sup> For some reason it took four weeks for Clements to forward the JCS memo despite Moorer's request that it be forwarded to you at the earliest possible date.

In brief the JCS:

—Support the current NSDM guidance on equal aggregate ceilings,<sup>3</sup> but, *would modify it to permit both sides full freedom-to-mix within equal sublimit on MLBMs*. They argue that this is essential to provide maximum flexibility to adapt U.S. forces to future contingencies and to insure a high degree of equivalence in the eyes of Congress, the public and the world.

—*Continue to flatly oppose limitations on MIRVs*. The only reason they cite is that MIRV testing constraints are not verifiable by national technical means. As you are aware, the intelligence community does not support the JCS view on verification.

—If the U.S. is to press MIRV limits, the Chiefs would make any MIRV deal *contingent on prior Soviet acceptance of equal aggregates, equal MLBMs and full freedom-to-mix*.

—The JCS continue to oppose *any* specific constraints on FBS. They do endorse the current U.S. position of non-circumvention assurances.

—The Chiefs make clear that they would like to put the subject of reductions far off into the distant future.

The JCS views come as no surprise; they differ with the current U.S. position in several key areas. Moreover, in the coming months as we evolve our position toward a permanent agreement, it may be increasingly difficult to keep them in line. Clements has so far echoed the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO—I–Geneva, April 1973. Top Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is memorandum JCSM–211–73 to Schlesinger, May 19, and a June 18 note from Clements forwarding it.

<sup>3</sup> Document 23.

JCS line on SALT and showed no willingness to take a more realistic view or strike out on his own. In his short memo forwarding the JCS paper, Clements reiterates his own strong support for the JCS line of equal aggregates, equal MLBMs, and full freedom-to-mix. In this context it will be particularly important that Jim Schlesinger take a strong role in the Pentagon on SALT matters.

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**32. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 8, 1973.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Dobrynin: (1) MBFR, and (2) SALT

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

2. *SALT*

The best tactic in response to the Soviet paper of July 27<sup>2</sup> is to claim that we agree on the importance of MIRVs but it is up to the Soviets to make a specific proposal, while we present them with some of the problems—verification, light versus heavy missiles, whether to include SLBMs, and how to establish any limit on the numbers. This opens up the proposal already discussed last year and in Zavidovo of excluding heavy missiles from MIRVing.

The paper also makes the further point that if MIRVs are treated equally on both sides, other SALT aspects—numbers and throw weight—should also be treated equally. Alternatively, if MIRV arrangements can be made to offset the Soviet advantage in numbers and throw weight, we might accept some inequalities.

The paper also rebuts FBS points. While we could ignore this, it is probably a better tactic in this first post-summit communication to take a fairly rigid position.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Box 214, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Background Papers, September 1972–December 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Tab A, a paper for Dobrynin on MBFR, is attached but not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Tab C, printed below.

*The main points for you to underscore with Dobrynin are:*

—That the Soviets apparently are asking for major advantages in numbers, major advantages in throw weight, and then claiming pure symmetry in MIRV, while making MIRV limits conditional on a US concession on FBS. This is not surprising, but is scarcely consistent with early or rapid progress.

—Until we have a good idea what is achievable in MIRV limits, we cannot resolve the question of levels, or almost any other aspect of SALT. It will make a decisive difference whether we are to coexist in a world of full MIRVing or in a strategic atmosphere of limitations.

—For the first time we are both prepared to discuss MIRV/MRV; we have already made numerous suggestions, and the Soviets simply have to be more precise.

## **Tab B**

### **United States Paper<sup>3</sup>**

We agree with the Soviet communication of July 27 on strategic arms limitation that on the basis of the principles signed in Washington we can begin a thorough discussion of the outstanding issues that remain to be resolved in order to meet the goal of a permanent agreement in 1974. The Soviet side suggests that the main questions are the inclusion of all weapons systems capable of striking the other side's territory, the establishment of levels for strategic offensive arms, and the question of multiple warheads.

The US believes that the problem of limiting multiple warheads will determine the answers to the main questions of a permanent agreement. There seem to be two alternatives: (1) if MIRV/MRV limits are to be completely identical for both sides, then there would also have to be full equality in the aggregate number of central strategic systems, and perhaps in the overall throw weight of ICBMs as well; (2) if a MIRV/MRV limit could be achieved that would offset the Soviet advantage in numbers and ICBM throw weight, the US could consider an agreement that permitted some inequality in numbers, along the lines discussed in Zavidovo. The Soviet approach—limiting numbers of MIRV for ICBM and SLBMs—involves the following considerations.

First, as discussed in Zavidovo between the General Secretary and Dr. Kissinger, determining the deployment of MIRV/MRV by national technical means is extremely difficult. Therefore, if there would be a

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<sup>3</sup> Top Secret. A handwritten note reads: "Sent to Soviet Embassy August 10, 1973."

limit on the number of MIRV/MRVs it should be established by category of weapons, i.e., light or heavy ICBMs, or a particular type of SLBM or submarine.

Second, the Soviet approach raises the question of what level to limit MIRV/MRVs. Since the US views of this question have been elaborated in Geneva it would be useful if the USSR would spell out more precisely in this channel what is meant by an obligation to equip only a certain part of ICBMs and SLBMs with multiple warheads.

Third, there is the question of adequate verification by national technical means. As applied to MIRV limitation, it has been the view of the US that reliable verification would involve a limitation on the kinds of MIRV/MRV that could be tested.

Concerning nuclear delivery systems other than ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the general approach of non-circumvention as proposed by the US would be equitable for both sides. To go beyond this approach would raise a number of major issues concerning regional military balances and alliance relationships. On the issue of compensation for US forward bases, the US position is that the USSR already has offsetting strategic advantages in the greater throw weight of its ICBMs, and, depending on how the MIRV/MRV issue is resolved, in the number of the warheads its MIRVs can carry as well.

In sum, progress could now be made if the Soviet side made a specific proposal concerning MIRV/MRV and the level of central systems. Such a proposal could be given, first of all, in the confidential channel, and there could be further exchanges prior to the resumption of talks in Geneva. Above all, we need to determine in this channel whether there is common ground for resolving the question of MIRV/MRV.

## **Tab C**

### **Soviet Paper<sup>4</sup>**

The main directions of the negotiations on limitation of strategic offensive arms were comprehensively discussed during L.I. Brezhnev's visit this summer to the United States. As a result of these negotiations "Basic Principles of negotiations on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms" were adopted, which constitute a good basis for fruitful search of mutually acceptable decisions.

It follows from this document that the two sides have reached an understanding that the principle of equal security and inadmissibility

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<sup>4</sup> No classification marking.

of unilateral advantages is the cornerstone principle, on the basis which negotiations should be conducted. The Soviet Union proceeds just from this in its study of the questions of limitation of strategic offensive arms.

In conformity with such an objective approach, subject to limitation should be all types of strategic offensive arms capable of hitting targets on the territory of the other side, including nuclear means of forward bases, with due account of the specifics of geographic situation of the sides and of availability of nuclear weapons in third countries. Evidently with such a comprehensive approach it would be possible to set just levels of limitation of strategic offensive arms.<sup>5</sup>

As for the question of limitation of multiple warheads<sup>6</sup> of the strategic missiles it is, naturally, one of the component parts of the problem and should also be solved on the basis of principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantages, which should be complied with. Proposals of the US side to that effect are, of course, not in conformity with this principle.<sup>7</sup>

Within the framework of solution of the main questions of limitation of strategic offensive arms, including the means of forward bases, it would be possible to consider limitations concerning multiple warheads, for example, by taking an obligation to equip with such warheads only a certain part of ICBMs and SLBMs.<sup>8</sup>

It is considered useful in Moscow to discuss in confidential channel the present situation in the negotiations on limitation of strategic offensive arms. And concrete ways should be mapped out on which to concentrate attention in exchange of views in confidential channel and in the negotiations in Geneva with the aim of expediting the process of working out a permanent agreement on limitation of strategic offensive arms.

While setting forth some considerations we expect that the US side will inform us of its views on the above questions and will express its opinion as to directions in which the efforts of the two sides should be concentrated in the first place in order to carry into life the planned goal.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Kissinger underlined most of the sentence.

<sup>6</sup> Kissinger underlined "multiple warheads."

<sup>7</sup> Kissinger underlined and highlighted the last sentence of the paragraph.

<sup>8</sup> Kissinger underlined the first part of the sentence and underlined and highlighted the text beginning with "taking an obligation."

<sup>9</sup> Kissinger highlighted this paragraph.



### 33. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 9, 1973.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Anatol Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

We met for the usual lavish lunch at 1:15.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

*SALT.* Dobrynin then turned the conversation to SALT. He asked whether we had any reactions. I told him I would send him a formal paper the next day [as sent, Tab A],<sup>2</sup> but I could say now the following: It seemed to me that the Soviet Union was insisting on equivalence in the numbers of MIRVed vehicles. Dobrynin replied that this was not absolutely true but it seemed to be the direction in which they were going. If this was the case, I said, there had to be an equivalence in the total number of weapons on both sides—that is to say, equal aggregates. Dobrynin asked how the Forward-Based Systems would fit into it. I said that since one could not inspect the total number of warheads on each vehicle, it seemed to me that the better solution was to give the Soviets compensation in larger throw weights and perhaps in letting them have more MIRVs on each vehicle, if that was the direction their development went, and this seemed to me to be what Brezhnev was saying. Thirdly, I said the limitations of MIRVed vehicles would have to be by classes. That is to say, certain types could not be MIRVed at all because we did not think that any upper limit could be established that was verifiable. Dobrynin asked how that could be. I said that we had confidence that we could determine whether, for example, the SS-9's were MIRVed, but whether 200 or 250 of the SS-9's were MIRVed was impossible to determine.

I asked Dobrynin what he thought the purpose of a SALT agreement would be under these conditions. Dobrynin replied that he was speaking strictly for himself, but it seemed to him that we should make a big step forward and not just agree to do what we were going to do anyway, which he thought was the case with the Interim Agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 19, July 13–October 11, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. All brackets, except for those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

<sup>2</sup> Dobrynin is referring to the Soviet paper of July 27 printed as Tab C to Document 32. The U.S. paper attached to this memorandum of conversation at Tab A is printed as Tab B to Document 32.

Specifically, Dobrynin felt that we might perhaps agree not to deploy any new missiles for a ten-year period. I asked Dobrynin whether he meant Trident. He said, yes. I said would they then in turn agree not to deploy the SS-17 and 18, and the mobile missiles? He said that seemed to be implied by his statement, although he reiterated that he had no authority to make it. I told him I would study this and let him know.

I then said that it seemed to me difficult to explain why the Soviet Union was developing missiles and at such a rate and how Grechko justified his expenditures before the Politburo. Dobrynin said he could assure me that there was no Soviet doctrine of a first strike and that Grechko justified it with two arguments: (1) a force strong enough to deal with both China and the United States simultaneously, (2) by arguments with respect to weapons development in the United States. He thought that the Soviet Union would never have gone into MIRV unless we had preceded them. He felt, therefore, that we were driving the Soviet program. I said, of course, our perception was exactly the opposite. Dobrynin replied this is why a ten-year moratorium on new missiles would be desirable. He could already see the day coming when the Soviet Union would develop its own version of the Trident submarine, although it didn't make nearly so much sense for them as a land-locked country. (I didn't point out to him that given its range it would make more sense for them than for us.)

I gave Dobrynin another note on the problem of the new Soviet silos which they claimed to be modernized command facilities. [Tab B]<sup>3</sup>  
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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<sup>3</sup> Tab B is attached but not printed.

**34. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1973, 3:04–4:31 p.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

William Porter

Seymour Weiss

Boris Klosson

John Ausland

*Defense*

William Clements

Robert C. Hill

Archie Wood

Paul Nitze

*JCS*

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny

*CIA*

William Colby

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Fred Ikle

Charles Zemel

*NSC*

Brig. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Philip Odeen

William Hyland

Peter Zimmerman

Jeanne W. Davis

*[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]**[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]*

Mr. Kissinger: From my talks with Brezhnev<sup>2</sup> I have no idea that they will forego MIRVs. I thought there was a slight chance that they might forego them on their heavies. But if they are testing, there is no chance. Where does that leave our proposal?

Adm. Moorer: You mean the Provisional Agreement?<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Kissinger: Both.

Mr. Clements: On the Provisional, that was essentially a State Department position.

Mr. Kissinger: But we tabled it. They don't know all the nuances. They are suffering from the illusion that that was a US Government position.

Mr. Porter: We were trying to get it forward as a matter of record. We had no illusions about it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72–6/4/74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 24.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the U.S. proposal for a provisional agreement to freeze MIRVs on ICBMs tabled at Geneva on May 11; see Document 28 and footnote 3 thereto.

Mr. Kissinger: Brezhnev thinks the Provisional Agreement was so disadvantageous to them that it was an insult to his intelligence. Some of our people apparently feel the same way about it so far as we are concerned. Either way, it won't be accepted. So where are we?

Mr. Porter: With no qualitative-quantitative equation.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Nitze) What do you think?

Mr. Nitze: If the problem is a domestic one, we can demonstrate that we have made a serious effort to negotiate a MIRV ban.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm not saying we're through with that position. I think it would be a mistake to leave a position before we get a formal answer from them.

Dr. Ikle: I'm not clear what we would gain by leaving it.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two problems. First, in the negotiation, we should proceed for a while on our present position. Two things will happen: (1) there will be so many tests that the Provisional Agreement will no longer be meaningful whether they reject it or not; and (2) they will have put something forward on the Permanent Agreement.

Adm. Moorer: So isn't the next move up to them?

Mr. Porter: They may just leave us hanging.

Mr. Kissinger: They will make a counter-proposal. Do we agree we have no real reason to leave the present agreement we tabled in early June or late May?

Adm. Moorer: You mean equal aggregates with freedom to mix with sublimits for MLBMs?

Mr. Kissinger: Plus the provision on MIRVing.

Adm. Moorer: Even if they reject it, we should stick with it.

Mr. Kissinger: The factual basis on MIRVs has changed with the new tests. But it hasn't changed on equal aggregates. The Provisional Agreement conceded them an advantage in throw-weight if they did not MIRV their land-based missiles. [1 line not declassified]

Dr. Ikle: Perhaps we could take an alternate verification approach. Our testing approach will be no longer valid by next fall. We may want to indicate as much.

Mr. Kissinger: Do you assume it will be invalid by next fall?

Mr. Duckett: By a year from today, if they continue their present program.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose they came in in October and accepted the Provisional Agreement?

Mr. Duckett: We would likely still be safe in October. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Weiss: With the one qualification that we know the least about [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Weiss: How many tests they need to satisfy themselves on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] depends on what they want to achieve and our ability to observe them.

Mr. Odeen: That's a statistical rather than a doctrinal matter.

Mr. Kissinger: I just don't want to be driven by the negotiation. Two things are certain: (1) the number of tests will outrun our proposal, and (2) the Soviets will reject the Provisional Agreement. If they accept, we will reach the point where we will have to add a deployment ban on the 17s and 18s. We couldn't live with a Provisional Agreement which permits deployment. If they should accept by October 1 and it were signed by October 30, we might hold Tom (Moorer) down. But he's figured out how to use SALT to increase his weapons.

Adm. Moorer: My problems now are with Symington, not SALT.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless the Soviets accept quickly, the number of tests will reach a point that requires a deployment ban on the 17s and 18s. This would be meaningful only if the 17 or 18 required silo modification before it could be installed. If no modification is required, we can't live with the Provisional Agreement.

Mr. Clements: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Nitze: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Nitze: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: [6 lines not declassified]

Mr. Weiss: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [4 lines not declassified]

Mr. Nitze: Do you have no worries about the 19?

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Nitze: Then they have three missiles.

Mr. Kissinger: [3 lines not declassified]

Adm. Moorer: They have a Los Alamos-Livermore operation going.

Mr. Kissinger: You think they will pick one and not both?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming the Provisional Agreement won't work, what is our SALT position going to be? What will we be trying to achieve?

Mr. Nitze: Equality in reality and in appearance. Some increase in strategic stability between the two countries to diminish the chances of a first strike.

Mr. Kissinger: How does this apply to MIRVs?

Mr. Nitze: We need to make a real try to reduce throw-weight or we have to improve the survivability of our own forces.

Mr. Clements: And there have to be reductions over time.

Mr. Kissinger: In a MIRVed world, reductions make you more vulnerable.

Mr. Clements: I'm talking about staged reductions over time.

Mr. Weiss: We want equal vulnerability.

Mr. Kissinger: That puts a premium on the first strike. What is our position on MIRVs? Let's assume they propose equal MIRV vehicles.

Mr. Nitze: That would be disadvantageous. They have more yield.

Mr. Weiss: We have to find a way to bring the numbers or the throw-weight down.

Mr. Clements: You're saying equal aggregates.

Mr. Nitze: What if they say 1000 missiles; that's no good.

Adm. Moorer: We could always come back to equal aggregates with freedom to mix.

Mr. Kissinger: That is our position; no one is contesting it. The question is what is our response to their proposal. In a year they can deploy MIRVs and we will have to face the question of how we handle it. We can't abolish it unless we use deployment restrictions on the 17, 18 and 19.

Mr. Clements: We gave you a paper putting equality at [*number not declassified*] each in anticipation that they would do this.

Mr. Kissinger: But we will already have [*number not declassified*] by the end of the year. If we're talking about equal land-based missiles at [*number not declassified*] we would have to tear some down and they could build up. [*7 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: [*1 line not declassified*]

Adm. Moorer: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: Then we would have to count them. We would count all the 9 holes plus the difference in the 11 holes.

Mr. Clements: Yes. If we start with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] where we'd end.

Mr. Kissinger: We might end with a number that's equal. What is the implication for us? Suppose the 9 holes don't have to be modified. [less than 1 line not declassified] would give 1800 plus 2600 warheads for them and 1500 for us. [less than 1 line not declassified] You now have equal numbers but what the hell else?

Adm. Moorer: Our current force structure was decided some time ago. [less than 1 line not declassified] The question is what we should trade off to get them down. We have our bombers and our technical superiority.

Mr. Kissinger: I keep hearing about our technical superiority. We haven't developed a new missile for 15 years and they have three new ones. Where is our technical superiority?

Adm. Moorer: We could make a much more accurate missile to compensate for their yield.

Mr. Kissinger: How? [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: What is our largest?

Adm. Moorer: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Adm. Moorer: Maybe we'd better get busy on a fast program of new MLBMs.

Mr. Kissinger: We don't know what that implies. There's a new air-to-surface missile, but there are too many people afraid of losing the B-1.

Mr. Clements: Let's not get sidetracked.

Mr. Weiss: We would have to look at our situation. If we couldn't get a satisfactory resolution of the problem, we might have to go back to that.

Mr. Kissinger: This is great stuff. But what do we do without an agreement? I have no sense that Congress is prepared to appropriate a helluva lot of money for a new program. In our last negotiation, without the ABM we would have had nothing. In the Interim Agreement we didn't give up anything we were going to do anyhow. Now we see them MIRVing. The scientific community will say this is crap—that we can kill them five times already. Even if Minuteman is vulnerable, we can kill them four times with Poseidon and our bombers.

Mr. Weiss: We should look at the range of alternatives that are domestically feasible.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean restoring the ABM?

Mr. Weiss: Yes. This could also have an impact on the negotiation. There is the question of the national mood. We have to consider

whether we would want an agreement that was inadequate just because without an agreement we would be worse off.

Mr. Kissinger: We need some analysis of (1) a reasonable SALT position, and (2) any pressures we could bring to bear—threats or trade-offs. We don't have many except for the fear that we might kick off an arms race. I've been trying to get this problem addressed since June. If the Soviets continue their present activities, what is a realistic SALT position? Even if the Soviets should accept rapidly, we can't go with the Provisional Agreement without silo modification. My talks with Brezhnev indicated they would never look at the Provisional Agreement. We can play it a little longer. I don't like to presume that we know they will turn it down. What would be a reasonable position? Our suggestion for equal numbers of MIRVed missiles in March or April was based on the assumption that heavy missiles would not be MIRVed. It was not based on the assumption that they would have freedom to mix light and medium missiles. On that basis, the SS-11 follow-on might be much larger. From my judgment of the way their minds work, it would make sense that each new warhead would be as big as the SS-11.

Mr. Duckett: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Kissinger: We will know about the weight in 30 days. Let's ask the Working Group to look at the problem: (1) What is a MIRV position we can take in this world? (2) What pressures can we bring on the negotiation in terms of defense programs? (3) Assuming we can't permit a MIRV freeze, what is there left to talk about? I can't get excited about equal aggregates. *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Clements: DOD agrees, but we would seek agreement on some program of reductions. Our goal must be to bring about some program of reductions.

Mr. Kissinger: My goal is to understand what the hell we are talking about. Reductions may be great but if they were all in submarines, for example, you would have the damndest most vulnerable world you've ever seen.

Mr. Weiss: There are two aspects to this: the strategic implications and the political implications. These could be very significant. We have already told the U.S. public and our allies that because of a qualitative asymmetry, we would be able to accept a quantitative asymmetry.

Mr. Kissinger: But we have no program to achieve it. We have nothing to modernize or to slow down as a result of the Provisional Agreement.

Mr. Weiss: We can't expect a deep degree of sophistication from our allies. We told them we were qualitatively superior. We can't now say that that doesn't make any difference.



Mr. Kissinger: I agree. That's why we need to assess the new events and design a new proposal. We can have fake equality with equal numbers, but each of their vehicles carries more and has more yield than ours. If we can conclude a meaningful reduction program, fine.

Adm. Moorer: We're dealing with two areas: our military application and our political posture. When we discussed SALT I with Congress and the public, we were attacked on the ground that the Soviets were allowed to do something that we were not allowed to do. Even though we weren't planning to do it, they thought we should be allowed to. The purpose of our entire disarmament effort was to give the American people a feeling that some effort was being made to stop the eternal escalation. Our force structure was predestined in the 1960s. The best idea was to have a ceiling on delivery vehicles. If theirs were better than ours, we could improve ours. You can't reduce throw-weight without reducing delivery vehicles.

Mr. Kissinger: So you would drop all MIRV restrictions, go to equal aggregates with freedom to mix, maybe reductions—never mind MIRV superiority as long as we have the right to become a mirror image of the Soviet force?

Adm. Moorer: Unless you have another answer to the problem of leverage.

Mr. Kissinger: Our leverage is zero.

Adm. Moorer: Then we had better come home.

Mr. Kissinger: What is our best position, leaving aside the question of leverage? They may want to keep going for other reasons—maybe economic reasons, maybe other aspects of détente.

Mr. Clements: But we should put some limitations on MIRVs.

Mr. Kissinger: Tom (Moorer) says we shouldn't have qualitative restrictions. We should have equal numbers as a prelude to reductions. If we want to redesign our forces, we can. That gives up on MIRV limitations. It may create an illusory feeling that accommodation is best. It will be difficult to redesign our forces, but it may be the best we can do. Then SALT II would only be a continuation of SALT I.

Adm. Moorer: We have to get out of the idea that the Soviets have more numbers. That doesn't count throw-weight.

Mr. Kissinger: They'll soon have three times as many warheads.

Adm. Moorer: The warheads are about the same. The difference is in yield.

Dr. Ikle: The sea-based situation is still open. We could do something on sea-based missiles.

Mr. Clements: There is another alternative—our bomber force is better. Our cruise missile is being seriously developed. We have all kinds of things.

Mr. Kissinger: But I am confident that that cruise missile won't come into the force until the B-1 is built. Any more than I expect to see the Trident missile until the Trident submarine is built.

Mr. Clements: Let's not get sidetracked. The technological gap is in our favor.

Mr. Kissinger: What technological gap?

Mr. Clements: We have the ability to develop a highly accurate mode.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose we both try to meet the gap of the other. [3 lines not declassified]

Adm. Moorer: There's been too much zeroing in on the vulnerability of Minuteman. We still have our submarines and our bombers.

Mr. Kissinger: Then why are you so worried about equal aggregates? We have it if we count our bombers.

Adm. Moorer: The right key is freedom to mix.

Mr. Clements: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified] The fact that we have zero CEP is compensated for by the yield. This puts an unbelievable premium on the first strike. Both sides could wipe out the other's land-based missiles in the first strike. There would be an enormous gap between the first and second strike. That's equality but not stability.

Adm. Moorer: We don't want inequality.

Mr. Nitze: That would be the result of not going forward with improving accuracy in the small missiles.

Mr. Kissinger: Who's stopping that? When have we stopped accuracy development?

Mr. Clements: We haven't. We are marching ahead.

Adm. Moorer: We have improved our capability [1 line not declassified] We were bleeding and dying to get ABM by a 51/50 vote. We should get the highest capability system.

Mr. Kissinger: No question. But we have a negotiation coming up. In no proposal I am aware of is there any limitation on accuracy.

Mr. Nitze: We're all agreed that if it is within the parameters of the negotiation to achieve improvements in strategic stability, we should. But have we got the trade-offs?

Mr. Kissinger: What would we want to get strategic stability?

Mr. Nitze: We would want a provisional MIRV ban, but that's not negotiable. I don't see the types of measures that would be negotiable which would reduce our problem of survivability.

Mr. Weiss: There's another possibility—land mobiles.

Mr. Nitze: But it's the *absence* of limitations, not the limitations. We shouldn't cut off the possibility of mobiles.

Mr. Kissinger: We have one concrete problem. The negotiation opens in September and our negotiator needs instructions. Our proposal will either be irrelevant or rejected. We need a goddamned proposal.

Dr. Ikle: Can't that wait until November?

Mr. Kissinger: Knowing the men at this table, we will have to start now. I agree we should stick with our present position when we reconvene; we should make no new proposal but wait for the Soviets to reject our present proposal.

Mr. Porter: But we should work on it publicly when they reject it.

Mr. Kissinger: Certainly. But some time in the fall we will have to withdraw the Provisional Agreement if the Soviets have not already rejected it because we would no longer be able to live with it.

Mr. Nitze: We could live with it. We have said that no one can deploy a system that was tested after January 1973. These were all tested after that time.

Mr. Kissinger: We could live with it only if the silos have to be modified. Sometime in the fall, if they want to make a serious effort, they will table something. At that point we need to know what we want. That's why I want to start work now. If we go for MIRV limitations, what do we want? Could the Working Group address this rapidly? Should we give up MIRV limitations; go for equal aggregates? Also, FBS is on the agenda. I'm not in favor of including FBS beyond the noncircumvention approach we have discussed. Do we want MIRV limitations and, if so, what are they to be? If not, can we get equal aggregates without it? What about a program of reductions? We will get from Duckett as quickly as possible some judgment as to the modifications of the silos that would be required. [2 lines not declassified] The negotiation begins on September 24. Our instructions to Alex (Johnson) on September 24 will be to stick with our present position and that it is up to the Soviets to respond. That gives us four or six weeks—maybe to Christmas.

Mr. Porter: If the Soviets come back with a negative, what will we do in the meantime?

Mr. Kissinger: That's why I want to get a position. I have no preconceived notion as to what it should be. I have more questions than answers. If we don't want an agreement, we can talk it to death.

Mr. Hyland: Aren't you excluding some of your options by waiting? If we want to stop the SS-X-18, you'll be giving them an opportunity to conduct more tests.

Mr. Kissinger: We have until September. Maybe we will want to make an immediate counter-proposal. We should clarify our own thinking.

Mr. Hyland: The longer you wait, the longer they can test and the fewer your options.

Mr. Kissinger: All I'm trying for is what we think a reasonable proposal might be. The tendency is to go on fighting the goddamned problem. We are in a negotiation. I do not want to be driven by the other side's position, not to mention the Congressional pressure.

Mr. Clements: The question is what they're doing mechanically as well as in the negotiation. They have an on-going program with no intention of changing it.

Mr. Kissinger: If our overwhelming desire is to stop it, what would we pay to stop it? If, beyond six or seven tests, our options are gone, we have to look at the deployment option if we want to restrain a MIRV buildup. If the MIRV buildup can't be restrained, we should look at aggregates. We should also look at the alternatives of not having a MIRV agreement. We could have a world with inequality of warheads, development and aggregates. Some of our people are saying we have enough to kill the Russians so it doesn't matter. I'm trying to get it looked at. Let's aim for a Verification Panel meeting to look at our basic strategic choices about mid-September. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: Yes.

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**35. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 29, 1973.

SUBJECT

SALT Reexamined

*The Soviet Perspective*

It is important to bear in mind that the present stage of SALT coincides with a transitional period in Soviet strategic deployments. In effect, *a decade of Soviet force build-up ended with the completion of the last SS-9, SS-11 silos*, and the establishment of a ceiling on both land and sea-based ballistic missiles.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO–I–Geneva, April 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was not initialed by Hyland. An attached note indicates it was sent to Kissinger as message Tohak 321, August 29.

For at least 5–7 years:

—The main backbone of the Soviet force will be about 1300 liquid propellant ICBMs, equipped primarily with single warheads and with a very limited hard target capability.

—The Soviet SLBM force will be about one-half Y-Class, with the limited range SS-N-6 and about one-half with the extended range SS-N-8 with little MIRV capability; the last of the 62 submarines permitted will become operational about 1978.

—The Soviets have not chosen to produce a new heavy bomber; their force of about 140 will become more or less obsolete. The Soviet force is a duad for all practical strategic purposes.

For public policy purposes, the Soviets claim that “parity” has been achieved, but in important areas of technology and in an overall strategic posture, the Soviets suffer from inferiority.

There is every chance that they can overcome their technical inferiorities and even achieve certain strategic advantages, particularly in the threat against our land-based missiles and bombers. This effort is now in its initial stage and its relationship to SALT is a key variable.

Having come this far since the Cuban missile debacle, and having achieved the plateau from which important advantages can now be reached, it is almost certain that the Soviets will not see SALT as a means to freeze the status quo, or to bargain away their opportunities. Given the record of obsession with “equality,” and their persistence in defining the global balance to include all of our striking forces, the Soviets are going to insist that their forces can in no way be “inferior.”

This means that they must be survivable—which means new, hardened silos; they must be more sophisticated than the first and second generation of ICBMs and SLBMs—which means more accurate; they must give the General Staff planners a greater degree of flexibility in strategic options—which means MIRVs.

In short, there is very little chance that we can use SALT to head off or drastically limit the next phase of Soviet strategic development.

Does SALT, then, have any strategic value, or is it to be pure politics?

### *SALT Alternatives*

The answer is that SALT still has value as a means of stabilizing the relationship with the USSR, provided that we can work out an understanding about the pace of change in the next decade.

Both sides are contemplating major changes in their strategic arsenals—the US with the Trident and B-1 and perhaps an improved ICBM, and the USSR with a new family of ICBMs and probably yet one more version of an SLBM. If these systems are brought into operation at

crash speeds and publicly justified as compensation for threats from the other side, then the impact will be unsettling politically and strategically. The ABM agreement will eventually come under attack, as it is now in some parts of the government. The chances for a viable SALT agreement will be reduced.

There is reason to believe that the Soviets, while not wanting to sacrifice major programs, are willing to negotiate about how each side makes changes. In the original SALT principles, the Soviets proposed the US and the USSR would “exercise mutual restraint with regard to new programs of armaments . . .” You will recall that we redrafted this to include both armaments that would be limited (ICBMs, etc.) and those not limited (FBS). The Soviets accepted this provision, but we dropped it.<sup>2</sup>

The point is that there has been some expression of Soviet interest in “restraint” and this could be the genesis of the Trident–SS 16/17/18 discussion.

The testing of new ICBMs is being pressed on all fronts, but some intelligence suggests that the deployment of the SS–18, for example, may follow the pattern established in the build-up of the SS–9. Thus, we have intelligence that through 1975 production calls for 215 missile/containers for the SS–18; some percentage of these are used for testing. Since we know that the target for 1974 and 1975 is 50 per year, a retrofitting program of about 40–45 would be plausible. Allowing about an 18 month period for silo retrofitting, beginning early next year, the full program would be completed in about 7 years or more.

In short, the SS–18 would be fully operational about the end of 1981. This is about the pace of the SS–9 deployment. Similarly, if the SS–17 or 19 replaces the SS–11, and the pace of the SS–11 deployment is followed, then we are also dealing with about an 8 year period of about 100 missiles per year.

The Soviets could plan to establish their new ICBM force by around 1981–82. The purpose of SALT would be to stretch this period by as many years as possible.

SALT could become a framework in which each side would proceed with its modernization but at an agreed pace. In effect we would buy time, time which we need to sort out our own response to the basic question of force survivability. We would postpone or defer the maximum threat to our land-based force by X years through an agreement in which each side will deploy only so many new ICBMs or SLBMs each year.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 21.

During this period the US could and should decide whether to adopt the blue water option of shifting to sea or to procure a mobile ICBM or both. We could establish in SALT the schedule for Trident and for the B-1, along with a schedule for the SS-18 and the SS-17/19. Verification would be facilitated by the fact that the Soviets would be permitted to reconstruct their older silos for the new missiles.

For the US there would be the advantage that SALT would be predicated on the advent of our new systems. Thus Congress would be more or less obligated to accept them in the name of strategic stability. Yet the “arms race” would be greatly elongated, the changes in strategic arsenals could be accommodated since each side could gradually adjust its posture.

#### *How Would MIRV Limits Fit In?*

Perhaps the simplest approach would be to allow MIRVing and put the effort on controlling the deployments. Since the Soviets are certainly not going to hold their testing while we negotiate, denying MIRVs will become almost academic. In fact, if the approach of a slow-down is adopted, it may be in our interest to permit a free hand in developing the newer SS-17/18 systems as the MIRV carrier. In this way, we reduce any incentive to transfer MIRV from SS-17s and 18s to SS-11s and 9s. The Soviets can bring up their new MIRV force, but at a pace that is agreed through limits on the number of silos retrofitted.

Obviously, a tight constraint on MIRV would be preferable to defer a threat to Minuteman, but, on balance, it is probably utopian to expect the Soviets to abandon a major area of strategic technology. Our strategy, as suggested in this memorandum, should be to accept the inevitability of Soviet strategic “equality” and to concentrate on codifying through SALT those US programs that will offset the Soviet technological growth, and thereby make SALT politically dependent on their adoption in this country.

#### *The Outline of an Agreement*

1. New ICBM silo construction would be frozen as in the Interim Agreement.

2. Technology for Soviet ICBMs would be frozen at present models; the USSR could develop the SS-17, 18 or 19, with a defined number of RVs.

3. The retrofitting of silos would be set at, say, 100 in an 18 month period, i.e., no more than 100 would be torn down and reconstructed, and of this total no more than, say, 30 SS-9 type silos.

4. Mobile ICBMs would be permitted up to some agreed number, say 200, provided that fixed ICBMs were dismantled one for one.

5. The Soviets could complete their SLBM build-up as in the Interim Agreement; at that point, however, modernization of SLBMs would then proceed according to an agreed schedule; this schedule would apply to Trident except that the US would have up to 740 SLBMs to accommodate ten 24-tube boats if necessary.

6. Bombers would be frozen at present levels; an agreed schedule for the B-1 would be negotiated.

7. Compensation for FBS would be in the Soviet throw weight and numerical advantages.

The net result would be something along the following lines:

—The Soviets would probably decide to deploy about 200 SS-16 mobiles, perhaps tearing down 60 SS-13 silos and 140 SS-11s.

—They would then have a force of about 1200 fixed ICBMs.

—Starting in 1974 they could modernize this force; if the agreement allowed 100 per 18 months, they could overhaul one-half of their force by 1983; if they abided by a 30 silo limit on heavy ICBM launchers for every 18 months, it would take 15 years to replace the SS-9 force. (Probably they would seek a faster pace, say 100–150 a year for all ICBMs. This would still require 8–12 years.)

—If the SLBM replacement rate were, say, three submarines per year beginning in 1979, then it would take until 1989 to modernize the Y Class with SS-N-8 or a follow-on missile.

—By the time the Soviets have a fully MIRVed force, the US could complete the changeover to Trident, B-1 and/or mobiles.

In sum, neither side could have an expectation of being able to launch, or to be threatened by a disarming strike, at least not before 1983. The impact of such an arrangement should give a major impetus to “stability” and “restraint.”

This could be the kind of protracted process that the Soviets might accept. It would be “equal”, but not require them to abandon their projected programs.

It is in the nature of a fallback, from the present course of limiting MIRV. It assumes that this effort will fail, in that no significant limits will be negotiable. It meets some of the JCS concerns about flexibility of force planning, yet includes sufficient “arms control” to satisfy others. Above all, it builds into an agreement with the USSR the right (and obligation) to proceed with modernization of the US strategic force and puts the worst case “threats” far into the future.



**36. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

CJCS Memo M-72-73

Washington, August 30, 1973.

SUBJ

Meeting with SecDef on SALT, Wednesday, 29 Aug 1973 (U)

1. Present: SecDef, DepSecDef, CJCS, Paul Nitze, Rowny, Sullivan—and others.

2. The first part of the meeting was devoted to organization of a SALT Task Force within OSD. It was finally decided to establish a “small group” with a Director, reporting directly to SecDef. This group would draw its support from “regular facilities within OSD.” And, would be primarily tasked:

- a. To propose to SecDef SALT policies and approaches;
- b. Respond to communications from the Delegation overseas;
- c. Conduct analyses of various proposals.

3. With respect to who would head up the Task Force, I recommended either Doctor Wikner, or, Ralph Earle with a slight tilt towards Earle.

4. SecDef then took the floor and, with slides, put forth a possible approach to SALT. He said that we should tackle the Soviets head on. We should point out to them that the Protocol<sup>2</sup> states that neither side should seek advantage over the other. The US agreed to SALT I because of qualitative advantages in MIRV. Now that the Soviets have MIRVed the advantage is fading away; consequently, it is up to the Soviets to take official action to prevent violation of the Protocol. For instance, the Soviets should reduce Land Based Missiles from 1400 to 1,000 to match the US 1,000, as they increase warheads in the MIRVed SS11s (SS17s) they should reduce SS9s until they are all gone. This would leave both sides with about 1,000 missiles and about 3000–3100 warheads on these 1,000 missiles and it would also give the Soviets an advantage in throw weight, by reducing them from 7.0 to 3.7 while the US would have about 1.7 to 1.8.

5. SecDef said that we should tell the Soviets that the imbalance developing was intolerable to the US and that, unless they took action to compensate, we would take action on our own. We should advise them

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of Chairman, Moorer Diary, August 1973–November 1973. Sensitive; Hold Close.

<sup>2</sup> The Protocol to the Interim Agreement, May 26, 1972, is Document 318 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, January 1969–October 1972. The Protocol is also printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, p. 921.

that our proposals will permit them to eliminate their old SS9s which, at the same time, have been in the ground for 10–12 years. And, also, would relieve them of the necessity of spending \$15B to replace. SecDef came back to the point that we should emphasize to the Soviets that the US will not tolerate the SALT I Interim Agreement past the five year period. He listed certain leverages and then said that, perhaps, we could tell the Soviets that if they were concerned about the Chinese we would not object to the emplacement of additional IRBMs—aimed at China. We would weep only “crocodile tears.”

6. Paul Nitze said he approved the Agreement, apparently, HAK approved the Agreement. SecDef wound up by saying that we must talk more about SALT II. We must emphasize that the US is reasonable—the Soviets have been unreasonable and that, again, he said that we should tell the Soviets that the situation is intolerable.

7. Nitze suggested that we limit MIRVing to missiles no larger than 4,000 pound throw weight. SecDef said that we should leave the option open to building mobiles and should not ban Cruise or Mobile missiles.

T.H. Moorer<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Moorer initialed “TM” above this typed signature.

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**37. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1973.

SUBJECT

SALT

This memo is to give you some final thoughts on SALT. Some of the problems I see in the SALT community and my views on two substantive issues, throw weight and MIRVs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 890, SALT, SALT TWO—I–Geneva (Sept. 1973). Top Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

### 1. *Problems in the SALT Community*

*There is a wide gap between the bureaucracy and your own thinking on SALT. As I understand your views, you are convinced we must expect to pay a real price, in terms of ongoing U.S. programs, to stop ongoing Soviet programs. No agency will acknowledge this. In the past ACDA and State could be expected to contribute to such a discussion, but as you saw at the Verification Panel with new personnel and a new orientation they are moving away from this role. Now, along with OSD, they either argue for pie-in-the-sky reductions or act as though the Soviets will limit their capabilities because it is “logical,” “fair,” in the interest of improved relations or because the Soviets fear an American buildup in the distant future.*

To get the bureaucracy thinking sensibly about a deal that involves our programs will be very difficult. In SALT I there was a built-in expectation that the Safeguard ABM program would be limited to some extent. The President made this clear from the outset. There is no such expectation concerning Trident and B-1. In fact, the emphasis has been on not portraying these programs as bargaining chips but rather as needed replacement programs (Schlesinger is an exception—he understands the problem and will be flexible).

### 2. *The Role of Program Analysis in SALT*

*It will be the task of the Verification Panel Working Group to bring much of the bureaucracy along. To do this at the right speed, not so fast as to generate backfires and not so slow as to create serious reaction when a major move is made, the Program Analysis shop will have to get guidance from you.*

In the past we have known generally what was going on in your private channel. That was and is the only basis on which we could make a useful analytical input such as our recent memo on Trident. Without a clear understanding of what is relevant and timely, you will only get mindless analysis, no matter how good the analyst. So whatever channels you set up under your new responsibilities,<sup>2</sup> you should take into account the need to keep your analysis team up to speed. It is the only way they can perform their basic task of helping you stay ahead of the rest of the government and bring the bureaucracy along at the right pace.

### 3. *Substantive Issues*

On the substance of SALT, Program Analysis will be providing you soon with memos on throw weight and on the B-1 and bomber ar-

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<sup>2</sup> Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State on September 21. He served concurrently as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

maments, in the vein of the recent memo on Trident. They will also be taking a hard look at the leverage that a hard target MIRV program can provide. My last minute comments on throw weight and the hard target MIRV are indicated below.

### *Throw Weight*

Any throw weight/payload aggregate is an arbitrary concept. It can be used to take care of the FBS problem by creating a framework of apparent equality, but we must first reach an acceptable agreement with the Soviets and then find a throw weight definition to fit it. For example, we could agree that the current aggregate throw weight of our ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and FBS are equal and then find a definition to express that agreement. If we try to work the other way—by proposing a particular definition and specific level aggregate of throw weight, the bureaucracies on both sides will hamstring the negotiations by manipulating definitions and numbers and jockeying for marginal advantage.

### *Hard Target U.S. MIRVs*

There is a theory (pushed by Jim Schlesinger) that only the prospect of a U.S. silo killing capability will bring the Soviets to negotiate seriously to limit their MIRVs. While I have some sympathy with this theory, two points should be kept in mind:

(1) To get SALT leverage from a hard target capability requires a *visible* program which we would presumably offer to stop. The Congress will probably not support such a visible program in the first place.

(2) The Soviets are already concerned about our counterforce capability—a primary goal of their new silos is greatly increasing hardening. The Soviet price for halting their new silos will undoubtedly include no new U.S. higher yield RVs. *Once our high yield RV program passes a certain point, the Soviets are unlikely to be willing to forego the new silos. This will mean that our ability to limit the new Soviet ICBMs and MIRVs through limits on silo modification will be out the window.* What point that will be is unclear, hopefully we are not already past it.

**38. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1973.

## PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko  
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here are comments by Gromyko unrelated to SALT II.]

[Gromyko:] Now, about SALT and the agreements already achieved. There is no need to talk about their significance. All of this is very obvious and we must now look to the future. We want to find ways to convert the provisional to a permanent agreement, and reach understandings on additional matters of interest. I am familiar in a general way with the views given at your instruction to Dobrynin by Dr. Kissinger.<sup>2</sup> I should add that this is a subject we are studying with the greatest attention, and in all of its aspects. We want to find points of contact and a basis for agreement. So far we have not completed our studies on a number of possible variants, but we will do so soon. The General Secretary and I are only just back from our vacation—although for him it was not much of a vacation. But he has not yet studied it from the point of view of the next stage, but he is now doing so and giving it all the attention the subject merits. As regards the ideas put forward by Dr. Kissinger, we are studying them with all due attention, as they should be studied, in the context referred to above.

[Omitted here are comments by Gromyko unrelated to SALT II.]

The President: First, Mr. Foreign Minister, please extend to the General Secretary and all his colleagues my good wishes. Second, with regard to my visit to the Soviet Union—as far as my own view is concerned, the timing could be the latter part of May or early June, but we

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 19, July 13–October 11, 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger met with Dobrynin on several occasions after the June summit and touched on these “additional matters” related to SALT II. During a conversation on July 10, Kissinger requested verifiable evidence that new Soviet construction at a launch site was not for additional ICBM launchers. At the July 10 meeting, Dobrynin also stated that the Soviets might be prepared to resume SALT II talks in August. The memorandum of conversation is Document 134 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974. A briefing memorandum for a meeting in early August is Document 32.

should recognize that we want a major accomplishment and that is why SALT has such a high priority. I think that is what the General Secretary and I agreed to. So we should be sure that a permanent agreement will be on the way, plus anything else that your fertile minds can come up with. It should not just be symbolic.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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### 39. National Security Decision Memorandum 233<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 28, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for SALT, Geneva, September 24, 1973

During the initial stages of this phase of negotiations the U.S. Delegation should seek to obtain USSR reaction to the U.S. proposals put forward in Geneva last May. The U.S. position set forth in NSDM 213 and 216 remains unchanged,<sup>2</sup> and will be reviewed by the President only after receiving the USSR response.

In supporting the U.S. position, the Delegation should emphasize the following points:

1. The U.S. Delegation is guided by the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms.<sup>3</sup> The position of the United States is fully consistent with these SALT principles.

2. The U.S. position is also based on the conviction that SALT must deal effectively, and in a verifiable manner, with the need to control developments which would provide first strike capabilities against major components of either side's deterrent forces. The ICBM programs now

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 87, National Security Council, 1969–1976, NSDM, August 1971–January 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 23 and 25.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 30.

being pursued by the Soviet Union are of particular concern in this regard.

No action should be taken by the Delegation to foreshadow any changes in the U.S. position. If the USSR Delegation seeks further details of the U.S. position going beyond existing guidance (NSDMs 213, 216 and as appropriate 206 and 197),<sup>4</sup> the Chairman of the Delegation should seek additional instructions. In the event of counterproposals by the USSR, the U.S. Delegation should seek their full exposition but refrain from expressing any U.S. views until receipt of instructions.

Henry A. Kissinger

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<sup>4</sup> Documents 16 and 7.

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**40. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt and David Aaron  
of the National Security Council Staff to the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 9, 1973.

SUBJECT

SALT New Soviet Proposals

*Soviets have tabled draft permanent SALT agreement at Geneva.* It calls for:

—Limiting multiple reentry vehicles to “an agreed portion of the total number” of ICBMs and SLBMs permitted under the agreement;

—Limiting ICBMs and SLBMs to the numbers each side *has* on signing the agreement;

—Limiting strategic bombers to agreed levels and barring all nuclear air to surface missiles;

—Banning a “new generation” of SLBM submarines.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 890, SALT, SALT TWO—I–Geneva, Sept. 1973. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for urgent action. A note on the memorandum by Scowcroft indicates Kissinger saw it.

On other issues FBS, other strategic systems, etc., the Soviet position is unchanged. (See attached summary cable.)<sup>2</sup>

#### *New Wrinkles*

The Soviet proposal closely parallels the line you have received in your discussions with Dobrynin with two exceptions.<sup>3</sup>

—First, though the language is ambiguous, the MIRV/MRV proposal appears to aim for equal percentages of MIRVed ICBMs/SLBMs—thus giving the Soviets an advantage. The proposal makes no distinction as to categories of missiles—the light or heavy—let alone among types of such missiles (e.g., SS-X-17 or SS-X-19). Nor does it include any flight test limits. As a result it is not at all verifiable. But the real significance is that they have taken the step of tabling a MIRV proposal which though highly self serving, is not completely outrageous and does improve the prospects of a constructive discussion of MIRV limits.

—Second, by stipulating a limit on the number of ICBM/SLBM, the proposal opens up the possibility that the Soviets want to be able to build new ICBM silos as replacements for other systems. This will further degrade verification of any MIRV/MRV deployment limits, as well as numerical limits on ICBMs, limits on the size of ICBM silos and sublimits on MLBMs.

#### *Significance of Proposal*

The main significance of the proposal is that we can now begin to deal concretely with specific aspects of the Soviet position without making any further commitments on FBS. Thus there has been a change in the Soviet de facto position that they could not deal with specifics of other aspects of SALT until we made some move on FBS. Their position on FBS is as hard as ever but they may have dropped FBS as a pre-condition by putting it in the context of a complete draft agreement.

#### *Next Steps*

Alex's instructions, in the event of a Soviet proposal, have been to try and draw the Soviet delegation out as far as possible but not to comment without instructions. This position should be reaffirmed by cable and should hold the Delegation for a few weeks. (Semenov has said he will take at least two weeks to go through the Soviet proposal.)

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<sup>2</sup> A copy of telegram 5358 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, dated October 9, is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 38.



You may also want to consider in light of your schedule when Alex should be brought home for a review of our position. The alternatives are before you depart for China on the 26th of this month or early in November. In the meantime we will have the Verification Panel Working Group analyzing alternatives to our present position.

As soon as we have the full text of the proposal we will give you a more considered assessment of it.

#### *Recommendations*

That Alex Johnson be instructed to seek clarification of the ambiguities in the Soviet proposal but refrain from indicating a U.S. reaction pending further instructions.<sup>4</sup>

That Alex be told to expect to return at least briefly for a review of the negotiations.

Before your China trip<sup>5</sup>

In early November

Other, let's discuss

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<sup>4</sup> Kissinger did not indicate his approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger initialed his approval of this option.

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## 41. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Soviet leaders in Moscow October 22–23, 1973, primarily to discuss the Arab-Israeli War. During a meeting on October 22 from 8:45 to 9:45 a.m., he had the following exchange with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko concerning SALT II:

"Gromyko: In Geneva our representatives at SALT seem to be doing an honest job.

"Kissinger: It is completely stalemated.

"Gromyko: But in some time we should review where we are.

"Kissinger: In the US we're having a debate about whether to make proposals that are as outrageous as yours, or stick with ours. As extreme as yours. I will assume we will have some considerations. And you've not yet completed your studies.

"Gromyko: About half way.

"Kissinger: We'll stick with ours. There is no need to introduce any new ones. We'll wait until you have something to say.

"Gromyko: It doesn't mean you should stop thinking.

"Kissinger: No. It's a very tough problem, as you must have discovered in your deliberations. The ideas I've discussed thinking out loud with your Ambassador we could consider."

On November 3, Kissinger handed Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin a letter from President Richard Nixon to Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the letter, Nixon wrote:

"The negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms have not progressed as rapidly as I had hoped following our agreement on basic principles in Washington last June. Secretary Kissinger has told me of Foreign Minister Gromyko's comments to him on this subject during your most recent meeting with him in Moscow. I will of course look forward with keen anticipation to the results of your own review of the difficult issues involved but I want to assure you that for our part we are not standing still. We are seeking to establish the elements that would make up a meaningful and equitable agreement which would place permanent limitations on the strategic offensive arms of both sides and which would place the strategic relationship of our two countries on a basis of enduring stability. I recognize, as I know you do, that the complexities involved are great because the technology of strategic weaponry is difficult to bring under control and because there are many differences in the military requirements of our two countries which any agreement must take into account. Because of these complexities it is important that we continue our frank and informal exchanges and Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger keep in close touch, so that neither sides 'freezes' itself into rigid negotiating positions. I would like you to know, incidentally, that it is precisely for this reason that our side has not tabled a new proposal in Geneva following the submission of your most recent proposal."

Brezhnev replied to Nixon in an undated note hand-delivered to Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, by Yuri Babenko, Soviet Third Secretary, on November 10. The note reads in part:

"As for the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms going on in Geneva, indeed, no special progress has been shown as yet there. Attaching great importance to that question, we are considering all its aspects now. We shall be also prepared to review carefully those concrete thoughts which some time ago Dr. Kissinger promised to send us by the end of October but which we have not yet received. In this question as well, the main thing now as it was in the past is that, while taking any steps on the limitation of strategic arms, the interests of nei-

ther side are infringed upon and equal security for them is provided, taking into account as well the unequal strategic position of both sides. Proceeding from that main premise, we would like to find real points in common between our respective positions and to work out a joint good basis for agreement. Of course, we agree that a confidential exchange of views on that question should continue between Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary of State Kissinger.”

The full text of the memorandum of conversation and the letters between Nixon to Brezhnev are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 144, 152, and 153.

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#### **42. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1973.

SUBJECT

SALT

We are getting rolled by a combination of State-Defense-JCS on the matter of tabling a tough US counterdraft in Geneva. Alex Johnson has sent Ralph Earle back to explain the draft which the delegation has worked out and which he wants the VPWG to examine.<sup>2</sup>

I just want to register my position: I am totally opposed to our tabling a counterdraft. The theory seems to be that since the Soviets tabled an unacceptable draft we should put in one of our own to show how tough we are. But plainly if there is ever going to be an agreement it will be a compromise and I can see absolutely no reason to provide a score card that will enable Administration critics, in and out, to show how much we “give away” from our original position. Moreover, it is senseless to get into a mammoth argument in the VP now on a counter-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 890, SALT, SALT TWO–I–Geneva, Sept. 1973. Secret; Personal; Exclusively Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for urgent action. A note by Scowcroft on the memorandum indicates it was seen by Kissinger and that the message to Johnson was on Kissinger’s desk for signature on October 26.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. counterdraft to the Soviet draft treaty tabled on October 9 (see Document 40) is in telegram 5598 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

proposal which has no real bearing on what will be negotiated. The Soviets have our proposal; you have told them we will make no further proposal until we have heard from them following their current “review.” Our *failure* to table a counterproposal is the equivalent of tabling an *unacceptable* one since we have already made clear that the Soviet proposal is unacceptable.

We need your authority to stop this exercise and to keep the VP working on real problems rather than posturing.

This will take direct orders from you to (1) Weiss and (2) Ikle; calls from you to (1) Schlesinger and (2) Moorer, telling them that the VP is to continue its examination of *issues* and not to be diverted to *drafting a formal proposal*. You can tell them the Soviets know full well that their proposal is unacceptable and that they are going to have to come up with a more reasonable one.

If you do not want to be peremptory, you should convene a brief VP—hard as that may be on your schedule right now—to hear the arguments pro and con (there won’t be any of the latter unless you get Ikle to make them) and then issue a directive turning off the counterproposal idea.

We will do an analysis of the Johnson draft, but you need to slow him down and answer his message of Monday (Tab B).<sup>3</sup>

A draft reply is at Tab A.<sup>4</sup>

*Recommendation:*

That you send the message to Ambassador Johnson at Tab A.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Tab B, attached but not printed, is a copy of backchannel message 978 from Johnson to Scowcroft, October 22, in which Johnson informed Kissinger that he was sending Ralph Earle back to Washington to explain the delegation’s proposed counter-draft. Johnson admitted that the delegation draft was “hard line,” but argued that it was the best response for the present time. Johnson stated he had built into the draft “negotiating elbow room” and that it was not a final position, just a negotiating position.

<sup>4</sup> The handwritten note “Aaron has seen” follows this sentence. Tab A was not attached.

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger did not indicate his approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

**43. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 23, 1973.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

Kenneth Rush

U. Alexis Johnson

Seymour Weiss

Frank Perez

*DOD*

William Clements

Dr. Fred Wickner

Paul Nitze

*JCS*

Lt. Gen. Edward Rowney

*CIA*

William Colby

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Dr. Fred Ikle

Sydney Graybeal

Ralph Earle

*NSC Staff*

Major Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Jan Lodal

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

David Aaron

Jeanne W. Davis

[Omitted here are the Summary of Conclusions and Duckett's briefing and discussion related to it.]

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Lodal) Can we do this?

Mr. Lodal: Yes; we'll do it.

Secretary Kissinger: This is important. Alex (Johnson), do you want to tell us about Geneva?

Mr. Johnson: You have all seen the October 9 Soviet proposal.<sup>2</sup> I understand there was some surprise in Washington at its extreme nature. We on the delegation weren't surprised. The Russians have told me that they are teaching me the dialectic. They present an extreme position, and we reply with an extreme position, we work from each one

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72 to 6/4/74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret; Nodis; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the Summary of Conclusions, not printed, the Panel agreed that the "Working Group will examine the entire verification question with regard to MIRVs" and "develop a range of choices for a new U.S. position, to include ways of handling MLBM MIRV testing in the short term and in a permanent agreement, and other elements [that] might be required."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 40.

and get a synthesis. The chief issue is forward based systems. They have made it clear that they can't talk about FBS in any rational discussion; that they have their instructions from the highest levels and that they can't move on the question. They say if we will concede on FBS, they will concede on aggregates (by implication, equal aggregates), with an allowance for the French and British submarines. If we don't concede on FBS, we will have to give them some compensation on the aggregate. They won't talk about aggregates on central systems until the FBS issue is solved. They have come down hard on Trident and the B-1—they're trying to stop them. They say if we give up Trident, they will give up the next generation D-class submarines. On the bombers, they will give up a new heavy bomber for the B-1. When I say "you don't mention your new ICBMs", they are quiet. They have also put emphasis on bomber armament and long-range air to surface missiles.

On the positive side, the October 9 proposal for the first time indicated that they would consider something short of total MIRVing on both sides. They didn't expand on it though. They have a very clever position. It is obvious that a larger number of ICBMs and SLBMs means a larger number of MIRVs. They have built in many retreat positions in their draft. On the submarines, they talk about no new "generation", but on bombers they talk about new "types."

Mr. Duckett: If the new sub is a modified D-class, they could argue that it is not a new type.

Mr. Johnson: If we are going to get close to an agreement, we have to have some definitions of terms like modernization, modification, replacement, new types, new generation. We need help on this problem of definitions. Also, we have got them to accept the concept that throw-weight is a valid measure of capability. They have said: "If you don't like our draft, where are your counter-proposals? Our instructions permit us to start negotiations. Let's get down to specifics."

Secretary Kissinger: For what it is worth, they're telling me the exact opposite. Both Brezhnev and Gromyko told me they haven't completed their studies yet.

Mr. Rush: I'd put more weight in what they told you.

Mr. Johnson: So would I. I'm not clear on how Semenov gets his instructions. He has made some tough attacks, saying he was under instructions, on U.S. expansion of strategic programs. When I counterattack, he has no stomach for pursuing the issue. Shchukin has told Paul (Nitze), at least by implication, that Brezhnev and Kosygin are not challenging us. There must be someone in a Working Group in Moscow who tells Semenov to make a tough speech about something. In his last attack, he was so careful to say that he was acting under instructions. Also, he made a proposal on an interim agreement on non-transfer. I

told him that puzzled me. Why should we try for an interim agreement when we don't know what we want in a permanent agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: We could have an interim agreement, but it would be stupid to make it.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. We agreed to meet again in mid-December.

Secretary Kissinger: Paul (Nitze), do you have anything to add?

Mr. Nitze: In addition to the advantage in number of missiles MIRVed, it would also give them a substantial advantage in throw-weight.

Mr. Johnson: That's an important point.

Dr. Ikle: Assuming our throw-weight were frozen.

Mr. Johnson: The agreement says no *new* MLBMs. They already have theirs and we couldn't convert ours.

Gen. Rowny: Their military people apparently get good marks for "progress". They're constantly asking if there isn't something we can discuss: the preamble, the last clause. They think there must be something we can agree on.

Mr. Johnson: I was silent for two or three weeks when we first went over there and that bothered them.

Secretary Kissinger: We have the subsidiary issue of whether we resume in mid-December or resume when we have something to say. We also have the problem of what to say; whether to do something in Geneva; whether to have the President do something with Brezhnev; whether to take an extreme position. In conversations with me, the Russians indicated they were having problems with their studies. Therefore, they said it would be helpful to them to get an idea of what seems conceivable to us. This indicates they are taking a holding position. There's not much sense in the U.S. putting in a holding position. I told them we don't plan to propose anything new. We need to get a clearer idea of where we're heading. We need to decide whether to put in an extreme position, or something like our present position with some trade-offs. We need a clear goal. We're agreed on equal aggregates, but, in itself, that is not a great conceptual breakthrough when MIRV testing is in its present state. The situation will be out of control in a few months. We need a time limit on MIRV modification. We have two problems: 1) to define our view of how to handle MIRVs: to get some categories of choices; and 2) if we can't get a handle on the MIRV question, where does this take us? What is the purpose of an agreement? We throw around phrases like equal aggregates and reductions, but these have quite different meanings if you're talking about single RVs or MIRVs. I don't want to pre-judge the issue, but I want to discuss the direction in which we want to go. What are we trying to communicate to the Soviets?

Mr. Rush: Our most immediate concern is the MIRVing of the MLBMs, and the possibility of a test ban on MIRVing MLBMs.

Gen. Rowny: They won't give up on FBS until the very end.

Mr. Rush: We shouldn't either.

Secretary Kissinger: If our allies let us.

Mr. Rush: Yes. We need clear guidance on FBS and on a test ban for MIRVing MLBMs.

Mr. Clements: We've already tried that.

Mr. Rush: But we didn't offer them anything for it. What can we give? If we have a ban through 1974, it gives us a good base to say that we're not changing the game until 1975.

Mr. Duckett: You could read encouragement in their testing of a single RV on the SS-X-18. That might be a signal that they would give up MIRV. We shouldn't ignore it.

Secretary Kissinger: How many tests have they had on the 18?

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Paul (Nitze), what do you think?

Mr. Nitze: I'm not sure this is a holding position.

Secretary Kissinger: What difference does that make?

Mr. Nitze: I agree we should first make up our minds on the general direction. The most important is FBS versus equal aggregates. We shouldn't accept either horn of that dilemma. We couldn't get a treaty through the Congress that included unequal aggregates, nor could we accept destruction of our allies. In 1971 they offered to let us keep FBS for compensation. Now they say equal aggregates for FBS. I think the next play is unequal aggregates.

Mr. Johnson: That is inherent in what they have said.

Mr. Nitze: We want more than equal aggregates—something that contributes to stability. If we can get rid of MIRVs on the large missiles, we're ahead of the game. And there would be some gain if we could get rid of them on the smaller missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, but any limits on MIRVs must be by category. We can't accept MIRVing X number of missiles and leave each country free to choose what they MIRV.

Mr. Johnson: We had been proceeding on that basis in the delegation.

Gen. Rowny: By types or by numbers within types.

Secretary Kissinger: We can accept limitations of MIRVed missiles or say they must exclude certain categories from MIRVing. [1 line not declassified]



Mr. Duckett: We would always have a doubt about [*number not declassified*] silos. If they stop testing now, we'd be safe, except for [*number not declassified*] silos. Otherwise, we would always have a doubt.

Secretary Kissinger: Assuming the existing MLBM silos can't handle the new missiles?

Mr. Duckett: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: If their flight testing were completed, they would have 30 new missiles unless they modified the silos.

Mr. Duckett: The limit would have to be no silo modification.

Mr. Nitze: There are four general principles: 1) no unequal numbers of throw-weight of MIRVs; 2) handle MIRVing of missiles by category; 3) it is more advantageous to stop MIRVing on the biggest missiles; and 4) there would still be some advantage to stopping MIRVing on the medium missiles. If you accept those four principles, there are a lot of different ways to handle them.

Secretary Kissinger: We have only [*number not declassified*] categories to MIRV.

Mr. Johnson: We have the Titans, although we would have to put in a new missile.

Secretary Kissinger: But that's only [*number not declassified*] If we started a new program, we wouldn't hold ourselves to [*number not declassified*]

Mr. Weiss: We have SLBMs.

Mr. Nitze: You could consider three categories: 1) less than [*range of numbers not declassified*] which would mean their SS-X-16, SS-6 and SS-8 and our Minuteman; 2) from [*range of numbers not declassified*] which would include their SS-X-17 and 19 and our Trident; and 3) the heavy category from [*range of numbers not declassified*]. This way we could make more sense of the discussion. Also, we should not foreclose the mobile option. We could have a throw-weight aggregate. If we won't accept it unless they include SLBMs, they will want an equivalence factor for our bombers. Say [*range of numbers not declassified*] for heavy bombers. They would have sacrificed throw-weight in missiles and we in bombers. You might sell that to the Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: You could make throw-weight a political cover for an agreement made for other reasons. That would be fine with me.

Mr. Johnson: It's a way of getting at the MLBMs. They would have to dismantle some to get to an equal throw-weight aggregate if you include bombers at 5000 pounds.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had many brilliant discussions in this group in the past listing the things we want them to give up. But somehow I believe giving up MLBMs is not their top priority. Every

Verification Panel meeting has been a revival meeting to prove how tough we are. I would be delighted to get them to give up MLBMs, but we shouldn't do it piecemeal. We should put together an approach that reflects our thinking. What are we willing to give up to get an agreement?

Dr. Ikle: We do not necessarily have to fix throw-weight at the lower levels. If there is freedom to mix, we can move around within the next 10 or 15 years. We can change bombers to missiles if that seems desirable.

Secretary Kissinger: What are we willing to pay? The MLBM MIRV issue is very time-sensitive. Suppose we should want to break this situation out. What would we be willing to pay to keep them from testing MIRVs while an agreement is being negotiated?

Mr. Rush: We could also discontinue testing MIRVing of Trident during this period.

Secretary Kissinger: We have two restraints on the SS-X-18: 1) stop testing immediately; and 2) prohibit silo modification. If they agree to prohibit silo modification we can be reasonably confident the SS-X-18 wouldn't be MIRVed.

Mr. Colby: That's a judgment.

Mr. Duckett: We would want some additional restraints, if possible—the number of tests per year, for example.

Secretary Kissinger: If you think it is urgent, we have to have a quid pro quo for the X-18 testing program. If we can rely on silo modification, we would wrap up the MLBMs in a package with throw-weight or other things.

Mr. Colby: With silo modification, plus one or two other things, we would be reasonably safe.

Secretary Kissinger: What could we propose of a temporary nature to stop the X-18 MIRV testing program while the rest of the program is being negotiated?

Mr. Rush: Stopping testing of Trident for 1974 means nothing.

Mr. Clements: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Navy would leak they hadn't intended to test it.

Mr. Johnson: We might give up MIRV on Trident for MLBM. I'm not suggesting it, though.

Mr. Colby: The Russians would like to get in on our domestic Trident and B-1 argument.

Dr. Ikle: They want to stop the MIRVing of Minuteman.

Secretary Kissinger: Congress is doing that.

Mr. Weiss: (to Secretary Kissinger) Do you understand that they have already raised the question of inclusion of bombers and FBS in the throw-weight aggregate?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I'm not opposed. How to set the bomber equivalent becomes a political equivalent. Inclusion of throw-weight is a good way of handling (Senator) Jackson. But there would have to be a prior decision on MLBMs. I have no objection. It's a good way to handle our domestic situation. It's not a way of finding a solution, but it gives us a good rationale. We would have to set bomber throw-weight arbitrarily on the basis of a prior agreement on the future of the MLBM. But each country could decide how to mix within their throw-weight.

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] their X-18 program. It would be dicey, but the Russians may be looking for something like that.

Mr. Johnson: They have laid heavy emphasis [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in the FBS context. That's a separable issue, but I'm skeptical whether it would stop their MIRVing the 18.

Dr. Ikle: The timing is awkward. We need a freeze in the next two months, and we couldn't deal with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in that time.

Mr. Clements: I don't believe they'll agree not to MIRV the 18.

Mr. Rush: But we should keep this open for the permanent treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: The first thing to decide is if it is worthwhile to make an interim approach on MIRVing the 18. Let's assemble some quid pro quos for their stopping their test program. It would be dangerous for us to give up a base, which is a permanent thing, for a MIRV test ban, which could be temporary. We need to give up something temporarily or something we were going to give up anyhow.

Mr. Weiss: We would do it in some time frame.

Secretary Kissinger: We could do that in the permanent agreement.

Mr. Nitze: What if we agreed to count FBS at 150% of the aggregate?

Mr. Rush: That wouldn't stop testing.

Mr. Clements: Are we going to have a new agreement or build on the interim agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: If we have equal aggregates, we're not building on the interim agreement. I think we should stop these theological debates and develop an American position. We should also decide whether we want a permanent agreement or a 10 or 15 year agreement. Paul (Nitze), what do you think?

Mr. Nitze: I'd rather have a five-year additional agreement, to carry us from 1977 to 1982, than a permanent agreement if it is not fully equal.

Dr. Ikle: How about verifiability?

Mr. Johnson: I don't think we face the issue of building on the interim agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: When I think of Trident it's one thing to give it up for ten years and another to give it up permanently. It would be possible to have an interim agreement—five or seven years—which fixed some numbers of the permanent agreement but delayed on some. Something like that would be okay for ten years, but would be dangerous if it were permanent. Let's have the Working Group in the next two or three weeks develop a systematic range of choices: 1) How can we handle MLBM MIRV testing in the short term: 2) How can it be handled in a permanent agreement, and what other elements would be required? It would be easier to handle this by a clear statement to the Soviets on our whole position rather than trying to break out the MIRVs. 3) What would a new agreement look like? Then we can decide how to proceed: whether to take an extreme position, or a realistic position plus 10%.

Mr. Johnson: A lot of our discussions get confused between our starting point and our ending point. Any solution will be phased over a period of time. We have to consider what the situation is at the beginning and what we should aim for over a period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: The preeminent problem is to get our government to agree on what we really want. We're not near any clear consensus. Equal aggregates are too easy. They're no longer the key issue in a MIRVed world. Our aggregates are going down.

Dr. Ikle: They're going up with Trident.

Secretary Kissinger: Equal aggregates are the beginning of wisdom, not the end.

Gen. Rowley: The JCS don't see anything they would pay for an MLBM MIRV testing agreement that would be worth it.

Mr. Rush: We have to look at it as a whole. We should take the various segments and decide what we would be willing to give.

Mr. Colby: The Russians want most to get FBS.

Mr. Rush: What are our priorities?

Secretary Kissinger: We're hipped on NATO and on MLBMs and on ten other things. I want to see an integrated scheme that we could put forward in good conscience as a contribution to stability.

Mr. Nitze: That's what we tried to do in the counter-draft that we sent you.

Secretary Kissinger: And I don't want to provide a check list for opponents if there is any deviation from our extreme position in the agreement. That would just give them examples of how we had caved.

Mr. Nitze: That's a minor problem.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it's a significant problem.

Mr. Rush: They have taken an extreme position. We could show what they gave up.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's first work out what we really want.

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#### 44. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, December 22, 1973, 1:30–4:25 p.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Foreign Ministry (Interpreter)

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

##### SUBJECTS

Middle East; US-GDR relations; Summit preparations; SALT; CSCE; MBFR;  
Trade; Brezhnev visit to Cuba; Pompidou and Brandt visits to USSR

[After a brief photo opportunity, the conversation began informally in the anteroom.]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

Minister Gromyko: Then, of course, the question will surely arise of strategic arms and a possible new agreement on that score, the question of conversion of the provisional agreement into a permanent one. I recall great conviction and forcefulness with which the President spoke on this, in the summer with General Secretary Brezhnev and in the fall with me.<sup>2</sup> We are certainly in favor of such new agreements and arrangements. In fact, General Secretary Brezhnev was emphatic on this with me, and stressed the need to achieve this.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Gromyko, 1973. Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy in Geneva. Gromyko and Kissinger were attending the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. Printed in full as Document 155 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974*.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 30 and 38.

Secretary Kissinger: But how do we proceed? Because we're not even in the same framework yet.

Minister Gromyko: We are certainly engaged in a very intensive study of this issue and we have made substantial progress in the formation of our positions in terms of the forthcoming Summit. You know as well as we know that our delegations in Geneva have made no substantive progress, and if you have any thoughts on this. . . .

Secretary Kissinger: We lack a theory of what we're trying to do. In the first SALT, we had a rough outline in terms of numbers and could work out the details. Now we don't even have a rough idea of what we want to do.

Minister Gromyko: I would suggest the crux of the matter is not that we lack a theory to guide us in finding practical solutions. I think we have common premises, but we lack practical concepts to convert theory to practice. You said we shouldn't allow ourselves to be thrown back. We both agree. We proceed from the assumption that we have traversed a very important path in the past by achieving the agreements already signed. For example, we are both in agreement that we are faced with the task of converting the provisional agreement into a permanent one, or else the task of elaborating or covering the provisional one in a new agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Or extending it, for say ten years.

Minister Gromyko: At least there is no great theoretical difference. The task is to elaborate it to the point of figures.

Secretary Kissinger: And criteria. Have you any ideas?

Minister Gromyko: When you mentioned figures at one time to our Ambassador, you said that you might add something to the considerations you gave. Then you said it was not precisely a promise to give new considerations. Do you have or don't you have something new, just so we know?

Secretary Kissinger: What figures do you mean?

Minister Gromyko: You mentioned certain figures concerning the Far East, China. You said you might add something—and you even had certain figures—to take into account the Far East. Do you have any precise considerations on this?

Secretary Kissinger: [Picks up briefing papers and reads them to himself]. I just wanted to review some figures. [Reads]. In the context of some limitation on MIRV, for example, if we said that each side had equal throwweight of MIRVs, we might be able to consider some inequality in numbers—not in a permanent but in an extended provisional agreement. For example, if we said you could put MIRVs on . . . The difficulty is that your missiles have more MIRVs—you have four and we have three. Sometimes you have even more than four. Suppose

we said the throwweight of MIRVs should be about equal, then you could MIRV somewhat fewer missiles but we could live with some inequality in numbers—including the ones with single warheads. If you MIRV 300 and we MIRV 500, because of the inequality of the number of warheads, then we would not insist on your reducing the overall number of your missiles. You could keep your 1400 and we could keep our 1100—but you would MIRV 300 and we would MIRV 500. We would not ask you to reduce your number.

Minister Gromyko: When you say “extended provisional agreement,” you mean a “reviewed” provisional agreement, or in terms of time?

Secretary Kissinger: In terms of time. But with these new figures.

Minister Gromyko: With these new figures. [Viktor translates Kissinger’s presentation into Russian]. And how about compensation for the Chinese factor?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot compensate for that in words—but you would have 1400 missiles and we would have 1100, so you would have 300 more than we.

Minister Gromyko: Yes, but then you say you will MIRV 500 of yours while we MIRV 300. That makes the total throwweight equal. Therefore the question of compensation for our geographic factor doesn’t come into the picture. And there is no mention of your forward-based missiles. The geographic factor is in your favor.

Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the first point, the total throwweight of the MIRVed missiles will be equal. The total throwweight of *all* missiles will be strongly in your favor.

Minister Gromyko: What I am asking is, does that mean you are ignoring the forward-based strategic arms altogether, or simply haven’t reached that question?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me distinguish two things. The Chinese factor is included—we have to be more precise with the figures in a negotiation—because the MIRVed missiles are equal but on top of that you have 900 more and we have 600. Those 300 should certainly compensate for the Chinese factor.

Minister Gromyko: You are approaching that question from an end angle, as it were. The Chinese factor is taken care of in that calculation. It’s built into this calculation.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. You’ll see when you study these figures. It gives you an overall advantage in throwweight and an overall advantage in numbers. It gives a certain equality in MIRVs.

Minister Gromyko: I understand you sort of built that factor into that calculation so it doesn’t poke out of the sack to be visible. But you have elsewhere your forward-based missiles—your heavy bombers,

submarines, intermediate-range rockets, and other types of weapons. Is it right that you've eased them out of the picture? We shouldn't leave that out, especially after blini.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't fully studied it. But you have certain weapons that can reach these countries. I haven't studied it fully.

Minister Gromyko: I ask all these questions because we do want to find a common language on this issue. You mentioned figures to our Ambassador some time ago—figures that were supposed to serve as compensation for Chinese factor. I was prepared to say we do not exclude reaching agreement on that basis.

Secretary Kissinger: What figures do you have in mind?

Minister Gromyko: You mentioned 200 additional. The principle itself which you mentioned at that time—but the figures weren't enough—but I was prepared to say that.

Secretary Kissinger: The principle is still acceptable.

Minister Gromyko: But not the figures.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand.

Minister Gromyko: But now, when you formulated your remarks, your ideas suggest you want to place us in an equal position in one area but you fail to mention other areas.

Secretary Kissinger: Only MIRV. Beyond MIRV you have the advantage.

Minister Gromyko: But you leave out an entire area. Perhaps you can give this further thought and convey your views to our Ambassador. Preferably before your visit.

Secretary Kissinger: Definitely.

Minister Gromyko: Because this is a field in which one has to be objective because it is so important.

Secretary Kissinger: Definitely before the end of January. If you have any new ideas, let me know through Dobrynin, so we can study it.

Minister Gromyko: Yes, but we will await your ideas.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]



**45. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 28, 1973, 10:06–11:41 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

SALT

**PARTICIPANTS**

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

Kenneth Rush

U. Alexis Johnson

Leon Sloss

Frank Perez

*Defense*

James Schlesinger

Paul Nitze

N. Frederick Wikner

*JCS*

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny

*CIA*

William Colby

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Fred Ikle

Ralph Earle

Sidney Graybeal

*NSC Staff*

Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Jan Lodal

David Aaron

William Hyland

Jeanne W. Davis

**SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS**

It was agreed that the Working Group would:

... work up more precise throw-weight limits on MIRVs, their relationship to the aggregate and to overall throw-weight;

... consider the DOD suggestion of a comprehensive proposal involving definition of missiles in three weight categories and requiring reductions over a six-year period.

[Omitted here are Duckett's briefing and discussion of it.]

Secretary Kissinger: At this meeting I think we should try to clarify where we think we are going in both substance and tactics. We discussed last time three possible types of agreement: a moratorium on MIRVing, an interim agreement and a permanent agreement.<sup>2</sup> Today we should discuss what priority should be given to trying to stop MLBM deployment as a separate issue. What price are we prepared to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72–6/4/74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret; Nodis; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 43.

pay? I assume we can't use MFN for emigration, transformation of the Soviet system and stopping MLBMs.

Mr. Schlesinger: (Senator) Jackson thinks we can.

Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the longer-term interim agreement or a permanent agreement, the problems are somewhat comparable. In an interim agreement, we could agree to a stretch-out of the new systems more easily than in a permanent agreement. We don't have to decide this immediately once we know what the building blocks are. In an interim agreement, the new factor is the MIRVs. What do we do about the numbers and the throw-weight with regard both to MIRVs and to the total force? I had a long talk with (Soviet Foreign Minister) Gromyko in Geneva.<sup>3</sup> He said they were doing a lot of work on this. He said they would appreciate some advance notice if we intended a major change in our position—some indication of the nature of the change before we made any major new proposal. He said they would do the same for us. I think their conceptual problems are at least as bad as ours. If we try for a MLBM moratorium, we should try to get the testing of the -18 stopped almost immediately.

Mr. Duckett: Yes, the sooner the better. I'm talking about only a few months.

Secretary Kissinger: First we have to agree that this should be the topic of conversation, than give ourselves a deadline. Personally I think this is a complete non-starter. That's just not the way the Russians think.

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: On the chance that we make such a proposal, how long a moratorium do we want?

Dr. Ikle: Long enough to negotiate more comprehensive limits—through 1974.

Mr. Rush: We could have a time period with provision for renewal.

Secretary Kissinger: What would we be prepared not to do in 1974?

Mr. Schlesinger: We could decelerate Trident, stretch out the B-1. We could give them what we will probably have to do anyway.

Mr. Johnson: How about Minuteman III deployment?

Mr. Schlesinger: An MLBM moratorium is worth something but we have to be careful that the price doesn't hurt us. We have only one missile. When we slow down the MIRVing of our one missile for a slow-down in the MIRVing of one of their four missiles, we suffer more than they do. If the Secretary (Kissinger) can negotiate with (Foreign

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 44.

Minister) Gromyko so that they slip their program and we slip ours in ways in which we will probably be forced programmatically anyway, that would be all right.

Secretary Kissinger: I have a problem in breaking out the MLBMs unless we link it to something else. If we table MLBMs as the most time urgent matter, it might work. But if that is the only thing we suggest, they may increase the price for an MLBM stretch-out.

Mr. Rush: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: When we ask them not to test new weapons for a year or two, is there something we can agree not to test? How about Trident?

Mr. Wikner: *[1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: Even Trident I?

Mr. Nitze: *[1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: How about an air-to-surface missile?

Mr. Wikner: We're not testing anything.

Mr. Schlesinger: *[1 line not declassified]* to give you some negotiating capital. *[1 line not declassified]* This is just a little sabre rattling.

Secretary Kissinger: *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Schlesinger: Not in the present circumstances.

Secretary Kissinger: We had better go ahead with the test, then we could agree not to do any more. Unless we have actually done a test, they won't believe us if we say we were planning to.

Mr. Wikner: That test doesn't come until September or October 1974.

Mr. Sloss: How much would it hurt us if we agreed not to deploy Minuteman?

Mr. Schlesinger: There would be a budgetary impact.

Secretary Kissinger: Once we stop deployment, it's a helluva lot harder for us to resume than it is for them.

Dr. Ikle: How about SLBMs?

Mr. Schlesinger: We will be forced to delay programmatically. It won't delay the first submarine, but there will be a slow-down after the first one. When the Appropriations Committee cut our request on Trident, they asked us to report back to them on March 31 on whether to go ahead with funding of the second Trident boat.

Secretary Kissinger: (Senator) Jackson is calling me every day on this.

Mr. Schlesinger: Me too. We could slow down without too much damage.

Secretary Kissinger: My worry is that we would be paying over a 10-year period for what they can do in two or three years.

Mr. Johnson: We shouldn't give up our currency for negotiating a broader agreement.

Mr. Schlesinger: But a little slip in the second Trident is something that we may have anyhow.

Mr. Johnson: We need something more comparable.

Dr. Ikle: If we say we will slip the second Trident, they will say they will slip the second group of -18s.

Mr. Duckett: They might offer to stop deployment rather than stop testing. If they say they won't stop testing the -18 but will stop deployment, and we see no program for new silos . . .

Mr. Schlesinger: Both sides would be giving away something they don't have. There would be a budgetary impact if we stopped Minuteman III. They have 1100 SS-11s or the equivalent. They would be free to MIRV all of them with limitations only on the MLBMs. We would be constrained but they would not.

Dr. Ikle: Constraints on MLBMs would be a stop gap while we negotiated an agreement. We might stop Minuteman III at [*number not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: If we already paid with low deployment for testing, it would be hard to stop it a second time.

Dr. Ikle: We could stop at [*number not declassified*] Minutemen. If we don't get the limitations we want, we could go on to [*number not declassified*] On Trident, we would be trading the second and third boat for an immediate stopping of testing.

Secretary Kissinger: One fallback position might be a low rate of deployment of new missiles.

Mr. Johnson: But our ultimate objective is that they not deploy the -18 at all.

Mr. Schlesinger: And closer equivalence in terms of numbers.

Mr. Johnson: We can see it if they deploy the -18. It's verifiable. How much difference would it make if they continued testing? We will still see the deployment. How much should we pay for stopping testing?

Mr. Schlesinger: With their present force in excess of eight million tons of throw-weight, the -18 itself is now more marginal than before.

Dr. Ikle: Stopping the -18 is only a partial contribution.

Mr. Johnson: We might go for a more comprehensive agreement, then see what we could break out as a temporary stand-still while we negotiate a broader agreement.

Mr. Schlesinger: In conceptual terms, I agree that is the way to go, but I don't think it would work.

Mr. Rush: It would eliminate the possibility of a test ban on the –18.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, but how important is it to get a test ban on the –18.

Mr. Rush: We won't get it.

Secretary Kissinger: Not alone. But if we have an agreement similar to the May agreement, there might be one chance in three of keeping the option alive.

Dr. Ikke: A test ban might lead to an agreement which banned MLBM deployment.

Secretary Kissinger: Suppose we agree to aim for extension of the interim agreement for five years, coupled with MIRV throw-weight limitations. We would still have a helluva negotiation over how to determine MIRV throw-weight. But we might have a sub-negotiation on MLBM deployment. I don't think we can send Alex (Johnson) back only with an MLBM test ban. I might be able to discuss the matter with Gromyko in a larger context. But for Brezhnev to tell the Politburo that he is stopping a program would be like Admiral Zumwalt telling Admiral Rickover he was stopping Trident.

Let's go through the list of things that could be done and find out if there is anything we could stop testing. How about B-1 flight testing for a year? How about air-to-surface missile testing?

Mr. Schlesinger: You don't want to press on with the MLBM ban?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do want to. But I don't want to be in the position of last May when we made a proposal to the Soviets that they considered an insult to their intelligence. It just sets us back if our proposals are substantively or politically preposterous.

Mr. Schlesinger: But we shouldn't allow them a monopoly on preposterous proposals.

Secretary Kissinger: That's okay for the public sessions, but I think Gromyko really wants to define some limitations. Don't misunderstand me. I think we'll still have a helluva problem on forward based systems, but we might talk about a more comprehensive agreement. As I understand it, the Soviet proposal is that an agreed portion of missiles will be MIRVed.<sup>4</sup> That would be unequal given the larger throw-weight and numbers of their missiles.

Mr. Johnson: Their proposal is an equal percentage.

Secretary Kissinger: So they would wind up with more missiles and more MIRVed missiles? It hadn't gotten through to me that they

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Soviet proposal tabled at Geneva in October; see Document 40.

were talking about an equal percentage. That's out of the question. Even an equal number of MIRVed missiles would be tough for us.

Mr. Johnson: Unless it were defined so as to approximate equal throw-weight. There are formulae that would give equal throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: If we have equal throw-weight, would we have fewer Soviet MIRVed missiles?

Mr. Sloss: We have an advantage in SLBM throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: They would have to shift more to the SLBMs or to the -16s. If they have the -17, -18 and -19 they would have fewer MIRVed missiles.

Mr. Johnson: There's no way they could come out MIRVing the -18s.

Secretary Kissinger: If we use the throw-weight criterion we wouldn't care what they excluded from inspection. If they MIRVed the -18, it would be so much more throw-weight. [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Rush: And restrict throw-weight to missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Throw-weight computation for the total force is a political gimmick, but throw-weight computation for MIRVs has some strategic reality. If throw-weight were equal for MIRVs we wouldn't care so much if they MIRVed the -18. If there were throw-weight limits on MIRVs without sublimits on categories we would rely on verification and on their need to modify the silos.

Mr. Johnson: They could distribute the throw-weight any way they wanted as long as we could verify.

Secretary Kissinger: So our confidence in an agreement would be based on the need for modification of the silos. Maybe that's the way to limit deployment of the -17s, -18s and -19s.

Mr. Duckett: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: What would that do to Trident?

Dr. Ikle: [*1 line not declassified*] That might be a way to come to grips with the question of qualitative improvements.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we shouldn't pay a high price for stopping the -18. If we can get it cheaply, fine.

Mr. Johnson: Exactly.

Secretary Kissinger: What happens to the -16?

Mr. Nitze: The -16 fits in all the holes.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. So if the -16 turns into a MIRV ...

Mr. Schlesinger: If they put it in silos it would be a small pay-load missile. That would be fine. If they can MIRV the payload equivalent, so can we.

Secretary Kissinger: Assume under throw-weight limits the SLBMs would be included at 3.5 million pounds and 1.5 million pounds could go into ICBMs. We would have [*less than 1 line not declassified*] What if they started putting –16s on top of the –17, –18s and –19s authorized in the agreement? They could pop them into the SS–11 holes. We would be ahead only if the –16 throw-weight were counted. If the limits applied to the –17s and –19s and they got the –16s free, the agreement wouldn't be doing what we want it to do.

Mr. Rush: All the mobiles should be counted.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not worried about the mobiles. I'm worried about their putting –16s into the SS–11 holes, also MIRVed. I'm worried about their cheating with the –16s.

Mr. Schlesinger: But they would cheat themselves more than they cheat us.

Mr. Hyland: The MIRVs would be so small they wouldn't do them any good.

Secretary Kissinger: The –16 is as big as Minuteman III. They could have 200 –17s and –19s MIRVed for the equivalent of the Minuteman payload.

Mr. Duckett: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Assume we get an agreement along the lines of the first option with 250 –17s and –19s and [*number not declassified*] Minutemen. On top of the 250 –17s and –19s, they could cheat in the remaining holes with –16s.

Mr. Hyland: The –16 and the –13 are virtually the same missile. They could put them in the –13 holes without detection.

Mr. Rush: We could limit the number of holes.

Secretary Kissinger: If we get them to deploy the –16s as part of their authorized throw-weight, great! That would compare roughly with ours. We can be reasonably confident about throw-weight limits because we have a reasonable expectation that they can't deploy the bigger missiles in existing holes without observable modification. How could they use the existing holes so we couldn't detect it? What about a missile that already exists and can be put in the holes? They could have 250 –17s and –19s, plus 600 –16s.

Mr. Schlesinger: But if they substitute –16s for 19s, they give up two-thirds of their throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: If they tell us they are deploying the –16s, fine! My nightmare is that they will say they are using their quota for –17s and –19s, then they will just put MIRVed –16s into the SS–11 holes.

Mr. Schlesinger: They would be sacrificing four million pounds of throw-weight.

Mr. Lodal: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Schlesinger: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: If they get the –16s to the efficiency of Minuteman III and in the SS–11 holes, would they be better off with that or with keeping the SS–11s?

Mr. Schlesinger: That's hard to determine.

Mr. Johnson: It may be more a political problem than an actual one.

Mr. Nitze: We're only talking about MIRVed throw-weight. They would sacrifice some excess throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm worried about throw-weight because it might be converted into something else.

Mr. Nitze: Single warheads are more lethal on a single target than MIRVs.

Mr. Schlesinger: If they cheat with the –16, their kill rate would be less than if they MIRV the –19s.

Dr. Ikke: If they could have one more missile, they might choose between the –16 and a new ICBM.

Mr. Duckett: [3 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Do I detect a consensus here that the way to tackle MIRVs in the next round is to ask for equal throw-weight?

Mr. Nitze: Trying to get throw-weight equality is more important than MIRVed throw-weight.

Mr. Johnson: I have difficulty in seeing us negotiate throw-weight as such. It would be difficult to write an agreement with throw-weight numbers in it. We should approach the throw-weight problem through types of missiles.

Mr. Schlesinger: But if we go after the throw-weight issue piecemeal by composition of forces, we are going after the –17s, –19s and –18s. It may be easier to track all three to say equal throw-weight.

Mr. Johnson: We would have to include SLBMs.

Mr. Schlesinger: I assume we would include SLBMs in the total package.

Mr. Johnson: I have no argument with going after equal throw-weight.

Dr. Ikke: We could start explaining it in terms of equal throw-weight, then go after specific missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: That would just get us back to our original position. We insist on equal throw-weight in the agreement, then they start throwing in non-commensurate things like bombers.



Mr. Johnson: The Soviets will throw in bomber throw-weight on the basis of a single aggregate throw-weight number.

Secretary Kissinger: We have two problems: (1) the equal aggregates, equal throw-weight issue which we have discussed here at great length; and (2) we have to have some idea of how to approach MIRVs or the whole thing will get away from us. The question is what we should propose on MIRVs. That doesn't prejudice equal throw-weight in the overall agreement.

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: That's a good point. We would have to count all the new missiles as MIRVed missiles. They would have to stop testing the -18s. Deployment would be constrained by the aggregates and the throw-weight limits of the agreement. If they continued testing, the warheads would be counted.

Mr. Johnson: We would have to approach it by missile category.

Secretary Kissinger: That deprives them of freedom to mix.

Mr. Nitze: There couldn't be additional launchers which would hold MIRVed missiles.

Dr. Ikle: A MIRV-tested missile would be counted as a MIRV. That would include our Minuteman III.

Mr. Johnson: That could get us into trouble.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have some Minuteman III with a single warhead?

Mr. Johnson: Also, they have the *New York Times* and the *Congressional Record* for verification.

Secretary Kissinger: I can see defining that any missile tested in a MIRV mode has to be counted. But that has to apply to us. [less than 1 line not declassified] How many would they have?

Mr. Nitze: With 2.2 million pounds throw-weight, about 400.

Mr. Colby: How could they get that through the Politburo?

Secretary Kissinger: The only way might be if the interim agreement numbers are maintained. They would have a larger total number and we would have larger MIRVed numbers. We could try for a 7–10 year interim agreement. In effect, this would add to the interim agreement the numbers limitations on MIRVs in terms of throw-weight. It wouldn't do us any good if we don't have a program to go beyond [number not declassified] Minutemen. This argues in the direction of putting the limits in terms of numbers. We could say 200 -19s to [number not declassified] Minutemen and explain that they give us an equivalence in throw-weight. They can probably justify equal throw-weight with the Politburo.

Mr. Hyland: They have more RVs per missile.

Secretary Kissinger: If we keep the interim agreement total numbers, they would be equal in RVs.

Mr. Graybeal: [*1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Let's test it and let them see it. Then we can give it up.

Dr. Ikke: If they want to deploy the -18s, they will have to stop testing them with MIRVs or they will be counted.

Secretary Kissinger: The package would have to be that any new missile that had been MIRV tested would be counted.

Mr. Nitze: Or any silo that could be used would be counted as a launcher. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Rush: We would bring any mobiles under the umbrella.

Secretary Kissinger: But we don't have mobiles.

Mr. Graybeal: Would Minutemen in mobiles be counted as MIRVed?

Secretary Kissinger: Should we count the throw-weight of all Minuteman III but not necessarily use them for MIRVs? We could use them for throw-weight calculation. We could set throw-weight at 1000 Minuteman III plus Poseidon.

Mr. Nitze: If we include Trident, we would have to phase out some Minutemen.

Secretary Kissinger: You would let the Soviets have close to 400 MIRVed -17s and 19s? They could put it all into -17s and -19s if they chose?

Mr. Johnson: They would insist on the right to MIRV SLBMs but that would be all to the good.

(Deputy Secretary Rush left the meeting.)

Secretary Kissinger: If we set throw-weight limits, with no sub-limits, at the Minuteman III plus Poseidon level, what are we giving them?

Mr. Schlesinger: A helluva lot.

Secretary Kissinger: If there are no sub-limits, we would be letting them MIRV 750 -17s and -19s. [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: They might accept. They could MIRV their entire land-based force, then start testing seabased missiles while the interim agreement runs.

Mr. Sloss: We could stand down Minuteman III.

Secretary Kissinger: Would we let them inspect those we claim are single warheads?

Mr. Schlesinger: We could offer to, but they wouldn't accept.

Secretary Kissinger: We say any new silo would be considered MIRVed. We have [*number not declassified*] modified silos but insist that [*number not declassified*] missiles are single warhead. They would have no means of verification. If we have to dismantle [*number not declassified*] Minuteman III we might wind up with no Minuteman III and no missile to take its place. MIRV throw-weight limits gives them a low number of MIRVed missiles. This may solve our problem.

Mr. Colby: There would be some advantage in offering them inspection.

Mr. Graybeal: But if they accept, we could assume they would invite us to inspect some single-warhead –17s and –19s. But it would only take them a few hours to change these back to MIRVs.

Mr. Duckett: Our Minutemen are entirely different missiles.

Mr. Wikner: The single-warhead Minuteman is Minuteman II. It's an entirely different missile from Minuteman III. The silos have to be converted.

Secretary Kissinger: If we have [*number not declassified*] Minuteman III and the rest are IIs, can it be seen that IIs are not able to hold the III warhead?

Mr. Wikner: Yes, they are entirely different missiles. You can tell by looking at them.

Mr. Sloss: Could you tell by satellite inspection?

Mr. Wikner: No.

Dr. Ikle: The risk of our substituting IIIs for IIs is no worse than their substituting –16s for –11s.

Mr. Hyland: If we count every silo, they already have all the SS–9s and SS–11s that can take MRVs, and some are deployed.

Mr. Duckett: There would have to be a test ban.

Secretary Kissinger: We have agreed that we would have to have some sort of test ban to go with it. Otherwise we would have a whole new generation of missiles.

Mr. Wikner: We would insist on some troop training testing.

Mr. Nitze: We could distinguish between the old missiles with MRVs.

Mr. Sloss: We could also distinguish troop training from testing.

Mr. Duckett: We would have to say no MIRV testing on the SS–11s and –9s.

Mr. Johnson: What would happen to the D–5, the new Trident?

Mr. Schlesinger: It would disappear.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless it had a single warhead.

Mr. Nitze: We would count it at its throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: Not if it were not tested as a MIRV.

Mr. Nitze: But we would want it MIRVed.

Mr. Colby: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Let's get the Working Group to work up more precise throw-weight limits on MIRVs. See how they relate to aggregates and how they relate to overall throw-weight limits.

Mr. Schlesinger: Do I understand that the delegation would be going back with instructions to put forward a somewhat comprehensive proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: We still have to discuss tactics.

Mr. Schlesinger: But we're drifting toward tabling a comprehensive proposal?

Mr. Johnson: We shouldn't abandon the position we took in May of essential equivalence.

Secretary Kissinger: If we extend the interim agreement and ask them to accept inequality in numbers of MIRVed missiles, can we stick with the interim agreement numbers for five years?

Mr. Johnson: We have already laid the basis for that. We have said that in exchange for asymmetry in MIRVs we would accept asymmetry in numbers. Both throw-weight and numbers of launchers. We have a take-off point.

Mr. Schlesinger: If MIRV throw-weight looks like something we would be happy with, would we table a comprehensive proposal with essential equivalence and some reductions, then fall back?

Mr. Johnson: My preference would be to table a permanent agreement proposal incorporating these elements which could be broken out. Then we might accept it as an interim agreement.

Dr. Ikke: It would be a bridge, not a fall back.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's have a meeting a week from today to look at the throw-weight concept with regard to MIRVs, its relationship to the aggregate and to total throw-weight. Let's see what sort of comprehensive proposal we can come up with. This sort of approach may be more appropriate for a longer-term interim agreement than a permanent agreement.

Mr. Johnson: I think of a permanent agreement as 10–15 years. Whatever is accomplished will have to be phased. Everyone will want to look at it again. There are no verities for the eternal future.

Mr. Nitze: The ABM treaty has become much firmer over time.

Secretary Kissinger: We all promise ourselves how fierce we will be if an agreement doesn't work, but it never happens.

Mr. Schlesinger: On building a bridge between an interim agreement and a quasi-permanent agreement, we may want to table a comprehensive proposal.

Mr. Johnson: The only thing to add is the aggregate.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Schlesinger) What would be the basic approach of your comprehensive proposal?

Mr. Nitze: We would define missiles in three categories: light, up to 1100 kilograms; medium, 1100–2500 kilograms; and heavy, 2500 plus kilograms. In a ceiling of 2350, this would require reductions over a six-year period, partly in the heavy category. We would permit mobiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Why would the Soviets agree to phase out their heavy missiles?

Mr. Nitze: Maybe they won't. But it's better to go for reductions on their part than for us to build up for equivalence.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree, but what would be the incentive for the Soviets?

Mr. Colby: They have a certain drive to get an agreement.

Mr. Nitze: The position is perfectly acceptable and it gets parity and stability without our building up.

Secretary Kissinger: That depends on their assessment of what we will do. They still think superiority is better than equality.

Mr. Schlesinger: If they think we will replace Minuteman III with 6000 pound missiles, they would be better off.

Secretary Kissinger: What program exists to do that?

Mr. Schlesinger: It will exist.

Mr. Johnson: They're concerned about Trident I.

Dr. Ikle: Trident I wouldn't be limited.

Mr. Johnson: I'm talking about incentives. The question is whether they would be strong enough to get them to give up their heavies.

Mr. Nitze: They may want to keep 50 heavies. Under the throw-weight ceiling, they could. It doesn't necessarily mean they would give up heavy MIRVs.

Secretary Kissinger: You're talking about equal throw-weight in MIRVs?

Mr. Nitze: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: That might be manageable. The Working Group will look at the DOD idea and we will meet again next Friday (January 4, 1974).

46. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 8, 1974, 10:12–11:32 a.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

Kenneth Rush

U. Alexis Johnson

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Seymour Weiss

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Boris Klosson

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James Schlesinger

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Lt. Gen. Edward Rowney

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Sydney Graybeal

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Major Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Jan Lodai

William Hyland

David Aaron

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## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

1) Ambassador Johnson would prepare a comprehensive proposal on equal aggregates with reductions over a ten year period.

2) the Working Group will prepare a proposal on MIRV throw-weight which could be translated into specific missile programs.

3) the Verification Panel will meet again to consider the proposals and the issue will be raised with the President in an NSC meeting prior to the resumption of the Geneva talks.

[Omitted here are Duckett's briefing and discussion of it.]

Secretary Kissinger: We can't stop them from firing until we can approach them with some concept. They won't give us a test ban for nothing. By April 1 we must be in a position to float a test ban. Give or take three weeks, they must have some idea of where we are going. If

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74 [4 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

Alex (Johnson) goes back and tells them we would like them to stop testing the –17 and –18, it would be a waste of time.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. If I had some larger, more comprehensive package, then said it . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Yes; to get them to stop testing, we must have some sort of a package.

Dr. Ikke: Or at least some comprehensive approach.

Secretary Kissinger: We need to relook at our proposal. I think we all agree that we will have to make a comprehensive proposal. We might break out MIRV limits later. Within this framework, we should have a different MIRV package. We have a comprehensive proposal on the table. Alex (Johnson) added equal aggregates and reductions over a 10-year period. But under this, we give up nothing.

Mr. Schlesinger: That's not true. Our program is unstructured. We can go to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The Russians can't assume that we will drop the B-52s and Polaris. Our number looks like [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Alex's plan started with 2350 equal aggregates and went to 2000 in ten years. That would be a modification of our existing proposal in terms of aggregates. If we add MIRV, we could agree to do it in terms of throw-weight.

Mr. Johnson: We might do it in numbers of types of missiles that reach certain throw-weight limits. We could talk about overall aggregate throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: My experience with the Russians is that the basic decision that we have to make is on a concept. After that, we can play with the numbers. I have no doubt we can express equal throw-weight in some numerical limits.

Mr. Schlesinger: Alex is suggesting we strengthen the equal MIRV throw-weight approach by dealing with specific classes.

Mr. Johnson: I agree we should start with the concept of equal throw-weight, but we could express it by category.

Mr. Schlesinger: It's a reinforcing mechanism.

Secretary Kissinger: The advantage of expressing it in throw-weight is that inequality of numbers would be the choice of the country concerned. We would not be structuring the other guy's force and he wouldn't be structuring ours.

Dr. Ikke: The choice would still be open for them.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two approaches. We could approach it by keeping SLBMs unconstrained. We could begin with the ICBM proposal. They will scream about SLBMs. We say "fine", and include them as a concession. Intellectually I am sure we will wind up with SLBM constraints. How we do it is a negotiating question.

Mr. Johnson: My bias would be to include SLBMs initially.

Secretary Kissinger: That's a negotiating question. I think we should accept the judgment of the delegation on that.

Mr. Johnson: I have no problem in expressing it in terms of overall throw-weight limits. We might end by writing it in terms of categories.

Mr. Rush: Are you going for equal throw-weight and equal MIRV throw-weight?

Secretary Kissinger: Overall throw-weight just gets into a great can of worms.

Mr. Johnson: Only MIRV throw-weight. I would be inclined to start with Option B.

Secretary Kissinger: And then fall back to D? That would mean a unilateral MLBM MIRV ban by the Soviets

Mr. Johnson: I would start with B, then move toward something like Option C. That's the State Department proposal, although I have some views on details.

Secretary Kissinger: Equal MIRV throw-weight and equal MIRV launcher improvements.

Mr. Weiss: If we permit them to have the -19, they would have to let us have a -19.

Secretary Kissinger: In other words, let them MIRV what they have in turn for MIRVing something we don't have.

Mr. Weiss: It wouldn't be that hard on us. We have the SLBMs.

Secretary Kissinger: If we have equal launchers and freedom to mix, they can give up a smaller for a larger missile. If we have throw-weight limits, there is nothing to keep you from building larger missiles.

Mr. Johnson: If we lump the ICBMs together in a single aggregate, we can reach close to their figure with SLBMs. With [*number not declassified*] Minutemen, [*number not declassified*] Poseidon and Trident I we can reach pretty much equal aggregates in launchers and throw-weight.

Dr. Ikle: Provided the Soviet MIRVed SLBMs are light.

Secretary Kissinger: Unequal MIRVed missiles are good. That is their problem.

Mr. Schlesinger: The breaking point on MIRVing is when an RV becomes a Minuteman killer. We might start by pushing the light missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: If they have a big MIRV test program on the -17, -19 and -18, and we say they can deploy only on the -16, on which they have had no tests of MIRVs, they will just laugh at us. Our pro-



posals tell them to stop the –17 and –18. We have to decide what price we are willing to pay for a ban on the –18. [3½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: We need: 1) a redefinition of our comprehensive proposal—equal aggregates of 2350 with reductions to 2000 over a ten-year period; 2) a definition of throw-weight limits by specific weight which could be translated into specific programs; 3) what this does to specific missile types. Should we push for a test ban on the –17 and/or the –19? Or should we let them run free to use up throw-weight. It depends on the break-out problem and on silo modification. We need this quickly. Can we get it within a week? Alex, can you work up your proposal?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Schlesinger: A proposal on MIRV throw-weight?

Mr. Johnson: Designed to achieve equal throw-weight, MIRVed and non-MIRVed through elimination of the heavies. If we are prepared to accept asymmetry of non-MIRVed throw-weight, we can modify it.

Mr. Schlesinger: We have two objectives: our short range objective is to cut off MIRV deployment in a significant way; our long-range objective is equally weighted aggregates. To the extent that we achieve the former without compromising the latter, okay. But we will have to proceed very carefully not to compromise equal weighted aggregates.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Schlesinger) If you are right about what we can do with the Congress on new programs, we can use bomber throw-weight with freedom to mix or we can maintain our options to push up our throw-weight by not saying anything.

Dr. Ikke: We may want throw-weight restrictions on single RVs. We wouldn't want 500 more SS-9s.

Dr. Wikner: If all 300 –19s were MIRVed, we don't want 600 single –19s in other silos.

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot permit single warhead versions of MIRV-tested missiles. If we have high confidence that silo modifications can be observed, it depends on how we want to play testing. If we let them complete their tests on the –17, we have to be brutal on silo modification. If we can stop testing of the –17s, we can be more permissive on silo modification. The III G would have to be limited to a number agreed on in the MIRV agreement. Let's have the Working Group go through the other business and have Alex (Johnson) come up with a comprehensive proposal. We'll meet again a week from tomorrow. We should also have an NSC meeting. These things should go before the President.

Mr. Johnson: On non-MIRVed throw-weight, we should start with something that would accommodate overall throw-weight, with our having the same rights.

Secretary Kissinger: Everyone has his pet theories, but we have to decide what will bring them to a point where something can be negotiated. We should strip away all these cute variations and get down to fundamentals. Start with equal aggregates, with reductions from 2350 to 2000 over ten years.

Mr. Schlesinger: It's a question of the price we pay. U.S. bargaining power is not in Trident or B-1. U.S. bargaining power lies in stirring up the American people and persuading the Soviets that we insist on essential equivalence. If they won't bargain, we will start a major program, which will lead to instability and will end détente. That is the true bargaining power of the U.S.

Secretary Kissinger: If they believe it. If we can get more in the Defense budget and show them programs that really worry them. If Congress doesn't strip away the fruits of détente. At present, Congress is stripping away any incentive toward détente. If we can show the Soviets the fruits of détente, and the dangers of proceeding otherwise, okay.

Mr. Weiss: We can't expect Congressional support in the present environment, but if we stir up the people . . .

Secretary Kissinger: What the hell have the Soviets gotten out of détente? If I were sitting in the Politburo I could make a devastating case against Brezhnev and détente.

Mr. Weiss: But you could argue that we could get a larger defense budget in a different environment.

Mr. Schlesinger: If they are willing to bargain, they can get stability.

Secretary Kissinger: It's a question of whether they see benefits from détente. Congress has to give us the fruits of détente.

Mr. Schlesinger: (Senator) Jackson deprives you of the carrot and supports the stick. Others deprive you of the stick and support the carrot. Some deprive you of both.

Secretary Kissinger: This has been a good meeting. That was a superb briefing, Carl (Duckett).

**47. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 24, 1974, 3–5:30 p.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

*Principals*

President Nixon  
Vice President Ford  
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  
Deputy Secretary of State Rush  
JCS Acting Chairman  
Admiral Zumwalt  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Colby  
Director, Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency Ikle  
Chairman, SALT Delegation,  
Ambassador U. Johnson

*State*

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt  
Mr. William Hyland

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary Clements  
Mr. Paul Nitze (SALT Delegation)

*JCS*

Lt. Gen. Rowny (SALT  
Delegation)

*CIA*

Mr. Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Mr. Sidney Graybeal, Chairman,  
SALT Consultative  
Committee

*White House*

Assistant to the President  
Kissinger

Mr. Melvin Laird  
Mr. Bryce Harlow

*NSC*

Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft  
Mr. Jan M. Lodal

[Omitted here is the President's explanation of how he wanted the NSC to work during the remainder of his second term, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 26.*]

Mr. Duckett: (Starts his briefing—says he will not stress ABMs or bombers since little has changed, but mentions there is one new ABM.)<sup>2</sup>

President Nixon: What, if anything, are the Chinese doing on the ABMs?

Mr. Duckett: They have nearly completed a radar which looks very much like the Soviet Dog House radar. It is clear that it is probably bore-sighted on Moscow and is, therefore, an anti-Soviet system. They are also developing some surface-to-air missiles, so it is clear that even-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1971 thru 6–20–74. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> The briefing is *ibid.*, Box H-33, NSC Meeting, SALT, 1/24/74.

tually they plan to get into ABMs, but I would not predict it in the near future.

President Nixon: At one of our next meetings, I would like to get a briefing on what the Chinese will look like in 10–15 years. When he was in San Clemente and we were talking about China, I said they would be a big power in 20–25 years; Brezhnev said that he thought the Chinese would be a significant power in 10 years. We often tend to underestimate what they would do, so I would like your analysis. Just give us an overview—will it be 15 years or 20 years? What do you think? I would also like to know what Japan could do if they decided to go into business for themselves.

Mr. Duckett: We will be happy to work on that for you, Mr. President. I would like to emphasize the four new Soviet ICBM programs. But first, I would like to show you a map indicating where the major Soviet ICBM installations are. (Secretary Rush drops the sugar dish.)

President Nixon: If I could interject a lighter remark here—Rush just smashed the silver, which reminds me of a story about Napoleon, who in his second year of exile, when his allowance was cut by the British King by 10,000 pounds per year, smashed up all the silverware and sold it so he could pay his bills (laughter).

Mr. Duckett: (Continues with briefing on Soviet missiles—970 SS-11s, liquid fueled; 288 SS-9s; 60 new small silos for SS-11 mod 3s. 33 Y-class submarines with SS-N-6s of 1300 nautical mile range. A new version with a 1600 nautical mile range and two RVs.)

President Nixon: Are you going to talk about the Soviet navy here?

Mr. Duckett: Only, sir, about the strategic missile launching submarines.

President Nixon: At some point I would like to have a briefing with regard to what Soviets are doing naval-wise compared to the U.S. The little reading I do in this area, I hear various stories, that despite the fact that we might have more numbers, our Navy is older and tired. I really want to know what the story is. We've increased our budget this year—you're all happy with the budget, aren't you? Is that a good budget?

Adm. Zumwalt: It's the best budget on my watch, sir.

President Nixon: Well, cut it! (laughter).

Mr. Duckett: (Continues with briefing on SS-N-6 and new missiles. Talks about D-class submarines and their 4300 nautical mile missile. Discusses "stretched" D-class boat. Goes on to new ICBMs. Shows chart on different sized ICBMs. Describes SS-18, pop-up missile which replaces the SS-9. Describes SS-16—replaces the SS-13; perhaps mobile; no MIRVs, but testing a bus. Describes SS-17 and SS-19, says they're probably in competition, but this is not unusual. Says the SS-19

has a much more efficient propellant, and, therefore, has [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the throw weight of the SS–11. Shows chart on test program and describes where each system is in its program. Points out that the programs were ongoing at the time of SALT I signing. [*3 lines not declassified*])

President Nixon: I recall an early press conference, I believe it was in '69, Henry, where there was a tremendous argument over whether or not Soviets were moving ahead on MIRVs. I would like to know—have they gone as fast as we have expected them to?

Mr. Duckett: Well, sir, the answer is mixed. They started somewhat later than we expected them to—we had predicted they would begin testing MIRVs as early as two years before they did. However, they are now moving very rapidly with more systems than we expected. Thus, there are indications in both directions.

Secretary Schlesinger: In other words, Mr. President, we are not surprised by the pace of their programs, but by their breadth and depth. This is an extraordinary development; it reflects a major effort on their part.

Mr. Duckett: (Goes over chart used last March by Schlesinger as DCI. Explains what Soviets could do in total number of RVs under various assumptions. Emphasizes that the big change since last July is that the “medium” missiles are so much larger than we expected. The heavy ICBMs are no longer the major threat. They could deploy more throw weight through the 19 or 17 than through the 18.)

President Nixon: What I hear you say is that in the field of MIRVs, it's somewhat mixed, but overall, they have done more than we expected.

Mr. Duckett: Yes, sir. Once again, the biggest surprise has been that the replacements for the SS–11 are over twice as large as the 11.

President Nixon: What about accuracy?

Mr. Duckett: [*3 lines not declassified*]

President Nixon: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified*]

President Nixon: Do we expect demonstrations in Canberra? (Laughter)

Mr. Duckett: [*2 lines not declassified*]

President Nixon: Do others have any questions?

Secretary Schlesinger: Carl, with 300 SS–18s, they could get some 5 million pounds of throw weight. They could get another 7 million pounds or so with their medium missiles, giving them a total of 12 million pounds of throw weight. This compares with something like 2 mil-

lion pounds for the U.S. As good technology ultimately becomes available to both sides, throw weight becomes the main determinant of capabilities. We can live with some disparity, but that much disparity, over 5 to 1, is of some concern to us.

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: I would like to emphasize that right now they have no great advantage. Up until the 1980s, they will have no counter-force capability against us. But we must be concerned with what we might end up with through a permanent agreement.

President Nixon: What do you mean by counter-force capability?

Secretary Schlesinger: Destruction of silos is one part of a counter-force capability. We can trade off yield for accuracy to some extent, but in the real world, one can never be sure about accuracies. The small degradation in accuracy would degrade our counterforce capabilities much faster than theirs since they rely on high-yield weapons. They might be able to contemplate a first strike against our silos, but so could we in all likelihood. Nonetheless, such a great disparity would be very bad for us politically.

President Nixon: What is the situation with respect to our tactical nuclear weapons? [less than 1 line not declassified] Are the Soviets developing them, and are they of any use? Are they of some use against China?

Mr. Duckett: They have a wide range of tactical nuclear weapons deployed. They have mobiles along the Chinese border, and they have a large inventory of tactical nuclear aircraft. Also, as you recall from the recent mid-East conflict, they have the SCUD missile, which was one of their first tactical nuclear weapons.

President Nixon: What's the yield of that missile?

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

President Nixon: That's quite a lot.

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

President Nixon: How many of those could they use versus the Chinese?

Mr. Duckett: They have approximately a hundred mobiles deployed along the Chinese border.

President Nixon: What do you mean by mobile?

Mr. Duckett: It's something like a tank—it moves on its own, and has its own launcher, erector, etc.

President Nixon: What are they doing about mobility now—are their programs static?

Mr. Duckett: They have some systems under development.

President Nixon: What is our situation with respect to mobile tactical nukes?

Secretary Schlesinger: We have movable tactical nuclear weapons such as Pershing.

President Nixon: But they are not like tanks?

Secretary Schlesinger: No.

President Nixon: We decided against that, if I remember correctly.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. Our emphasis is on accuracy and small yields. But we have no very good doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons. It's not clear how we would employ them.

President Nixon: It all has to do with doctrine, doesn't it? It finally gets down to that. I think we need more discussion on doctrine.

Secretary Kissinger: That has been one of my losing battles. When you say we have no use for them, what you should say is that we have no agreed doctrine. We don't know how we would use them. And once we figure it out ourselves, we would have no agreement with our Allies.

Secretary Schlesinger: However, things seemed to be improving at the last NATO nuclear planning group meeting. They are beginning to focus on this problem.

President Nixon: I'm concerned about Western Europe—we think in terms of a decision by the President of the United States and the General Secretary when one of them pushes a button and kills 70 million people, and the other pushes a button and kills 70 million on the other side. That's not much of an option.

Secretary Kissinger: Any leader who had only the option of killing 70 million people would not use it. I should say that there has been a tremendous improvement in this area in your administration. The targeting flexibility has increased tremendously. The new doctrine, which you recently issued in a new NSDM, has made a significant improvement in giving the military the doctrine they need to provide for flexible targeting.<sup>3</sup> I must say it has not been matched with regards to tactical nuclear weapons.

President Nixon: I remember hearing the SIOP briefings, and I agree that no one would kill 70 million people just like that. Of course, escalation up to that point may be inevitable. [*1 line not declassified*]

General Rowny: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President Nixon: Do they have mobiles in Europe?

General Rowny: Yes.

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably NSDM 242, "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," issued on January 17.

Amb Johnson: It's also important to remember they have medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles deployed against Western Europe and China. These somewhat offset our tactical nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: They also have SS-11s targeted versus China.

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

President Nixon: To what extent do they assess the importance of our tactical nuclear weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't know how they assess ours, but we do know that they plan an early massive use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Their plans call for such fast use that an orderly war might not really be possible.

Director Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

President Nixon: What have we decided about our weapons?

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't found out how to use ours.

President Nixon: Do we have much mobility in Europe?

Secretary Schlesinger: We have such a different doctrine; we have highly vulnerable nuclear assets in Europe, and the irrationality of our policy gives them no assurance we would not use them. So they act as something of a deterrent.

Secretary Kissinger: There is certainly no way they could figure out how we would use our weapons, since we have not figured it out for ourselves.

Mr. Clements: The location of these weapons is apparent to everyone.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are moving to less vulnerable weapons which should allow us to remove some of the weapons we now have in Europe. We are also talking about trying to get agreement to localize use of weapons to say +30 miles of the FEBA. This would hopefully keep Germany from being totally destroyed.

Vice President Ford: Will this require new weapons or just a change in doctrine?

Secretary Schlesinger: There might be some change in the stockpile required, but with existing weapons like Lance, we can do most of it.

President Nixon: Alex, the Soviets always complain that we never count the British and French forces?

Amb. Johnson: There are two issues here. First, what we call in our shorthand FBS—our Forward-Based Systems and, second, the French and British strategic submarines. They say they are entitled to compensation for the British and French submarines. They have not raised the issue of French MRBMs.

President Nixon: And the British MRBMs?



Amb. Johnson: There are no British MRBMs—just the submarines, and of course, the bombers.

President Nixon: Well, what good are bombers! (laughter) I guess there is no one from the Air Force here—

Amb. Johnson: The Soviet MR/IRBMs are a significant compensation for our FBS.

President Nixon: Let's move on to Henry's description of the issues.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, the changes since we first talked about SALT have been very great. Then, we were talking about forces with single warheads, and there was a narrow gap between first and second strike capabilities. Now, the situation with MIRVs has inherent instabilities. There is a widening gap between a first and second strike when you have MIRVs, even leaving aside the question of throw weight. With five or more warheads on each missile, there is an apparent instability.

President Nixon: MIRVs provide an enormous advantage to the nation which strikes first?

Secretary Kissinger: Accurate MIRVs do, yes. This makes it much harder to determine our objectives in SALT. This is the big difference between SALT II and SALT I. For example, it affects a question like reductions. With single warheads, if you reduce, you make the first strike harder. But with MIRVs, reductions do not necessarily improve stability. This is not an acute issue, but it indicates some of the complexities we face in SALT II.

I would like to talk about two major aspects of SALT II. First, numbers and, second, warheads. That is, the question of the total aggregate, and how to handle warheads.

Secretary Kissinger: What we propose is to have a Verification Panel meeting and narrow the issues for your decision, and then have another NSC, perhaps more quickly than the thirty days you mentioned.

President Nixon: Whatever you say.

Secretary Kissinger: Continuing with the first set of issues I mentioned, mainly overall numbers—there are several different measures possible here. First, there is overall throw weight. Throw weight can be translated into a measure of the capability of each side. But there are problems associated with it. Second, the forces of each side are not commensurable. We have bombers and they have none; their SLBMs are inferior; we have already deployed MIRVed Minuteman, and the Soviets have not yet deployed any MIRVed ICBMs; nevertheless, they have a massive MIRV ICBM development program underway. They have [*number not declassified*] warheads per missiles, and if what Brezhnev

said to me is right, that could go up to as many as eight. [1 line not declassified]

This would be bad enough with our existing systems, but the Soviets are also asking compensation for our allies and our FBS.

Overall, this is a situation of extraordinary complexity.

I agree with Jim that what we want is essential equivalence. But we have to be careful that we do not accept essential inequivalence in an arms race because we could not get what we thought was equivalence in SALT. The Interim Agreement has been criticized because the numbers are different, but what is important is that the Interim Agreement stopped no U.S. programs, and yet may have stopped several Soviet programs. In the absence of the Interim Agreement, we could have had much greater disparities between the two forces.

With respect to essential equivalence, one way to define it is by numbers of systems. But given the disparities in our forces, this would be difficult. We would have to count bombers; this gets into throw weight, and theoretically we could get equal limits of throw weight. But the throw weight of bombers is not the same as that of missiles—bombers are not a first strike weapon. Equivalence of throw weight overall is, in my opinion, primarily a way to convince Congress that we have reached an agreement of essential equivalence.

Many people have insisted on absolute equivalence in throw weight. I wish the same rigor were applied to our military programs as is applied to our SALT position. People have yet to explain how the throw weight of bombers gets related to the throw weight of missiles.

Nonetheless, the consensus is that equal aggregates at about 2350, reduced to something like 2000 over ten years, is a good position to start with. In my judgment, this position will not survive, but we don't have to debate that now. I don't think it will survive because it requires the Soviets to reduce and us to build up. Nevertheless, this is where we stand in terms of numbers. If the position doesn't survive, we could start programs and see if our new programs might induce the Soviets to accept our position.

Now, going on to MIRVs. As you know, there is no way to reliably inspect whether a missile is MIRVed. Thus, there are two ways of controlling MIRVs—first, stopping the testing of MIRVs and, second, if we have confidence in our intelligence, we can monitor deployment of MIRVs if the missiles capable of carrying them require silo modifications. However, any weapon which has been tested in a MIRV mode must be considered as MIRVed. They could not test the SS-18 with both MIRVs and single warheads, and then be allowed to deploy it claiming it has only single warheads and not MIRVs. There is a consensus that the SS-19 would require silo modifications and that we could pick up

its deployment. The SS-17 is not clear. On the SS-18, Carl, it sounded like you were saying it would fit in the existing silos?

Mr. Duckett: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we don't have to settle that here.

We have abandoned two of our early approaches to controlling MIRVs—first, trying to achieve equal MIRVed missiles. Their missiles are considerably larger and can carry more warheads and higher yields. Thus, equal missiles would not be an equal deal. Second, limits on the number of individual warheads. The difficulty here is inspecting the number of warheads on each missile.

This leaves us with throw weight limits. There has been something of a consensus building around setting throw weight limits for the MIRVed missiles on both sides. We would be able to MIRV more missiles, since the throw weight of each of our missiles is less, but there would be an element of essential equivalence.

This raises the issue of an ICBM sublimit. If we have an overall limit on MIRV throw weight but if there is no sublimit on ICBMs, the Soviet Union might put most of their MIRVs into ICBMs which would give them a first strike counterforce capability. If the ICBM sublimit is much smaller, there would be considerably less of a threat. Thus, the tendency today is toward a total ceiling on MIRV throw weight, with no more than X million pounds allowed in ICBMs.

This approach has never been put to the Soviets in any formal way—it was discussed very briefly only in a conceptual way, but it has never been put forward in a formal proposal.

We have a chart which we sent to you which shows how the various throw weight limits might translate into different forces, but that is somewhat premature at this point.

There is also the issue of limits of SLBM MIRVs. We could live without a limit on SLBMs, but the Soviet Union will insist on a SLBM limit. If we pick the right limit, we could avoid interference with our follow-on SLBM program.

As my confused presentation has probably indicated, the main point is that SALT II is conceptually much more difficult than SALT I. There is no disagreement regarding the desirability of essential equivalence, but there is disagreement on what that might mean. There is substantial agreement that MIRVs can be limited only by throw weight and that we can limit MIRVed deployments only as far as silo modifications are required.

We will narrow the remaining issues, which, as you can see, are in many cases quite technical, and bring them to you in the next two weeks so Alex can have a position to put to the Soviets.

I would like to say once again that it is important that we compare possible agreements with what is likely to result in the absence of an agreement, and not simply evaluate the proposal in the abstract. We must be realistic about what we will do without an agreement.

President Nixon: This is certainly more complex than SALT I. It is also true that they have a better bargaining position than we do. We talk as if we can have an agreement or not, but within this room, we shouldn't fool ourselves—we probably aren't fooling them either.

Suppose Brezhnev wants to agree, but his military does not. Their military may decide to go like hell. The U.S. might also wish to agree, and our military, while supporting an agreement, might think that a particular agreement is lousy. But we have to look at the political situation. Despite the fact that we could steam the country up in the absence of agreement, and tell them that we are in an all-out arms race, it is far more likely that the Soviets will move ahead more rapidly than we will.

Amb. Johnson: But the Soviets must account for the unpredictability of our reaction. They cannot assume we will do nothing.

President Nixon: That is right. We could turn hard right. Even some of the extreme peaceniks who two years ago said that we must have détente at any price are for political reasons now saying that détente is bad. But I don't mind Jackson and Mondale rattling around like they do. In the back of their minds the Soviets know that we might turn to the right.

But we should look at the hard facts. We are putting in a bigger Defense budget, and maybe we'll get it; but it may be substantially cut. What we have to figure on here is this—we talk about essential equivalence and other such gobbledegook, but suppose we can't get it. Looking at the two countries, lacking an agreement, and having an all-out arms race. We just might not get the new programs from Congress. Especially when 56 percent of our budget is spent on personnel versus 26 percent of theirs.

I don't mean to be telling our chief negotiator that we are in a weak position. We have got to go all out to get the agreement. But when you have your Verification Panel and when we make these decisions, we have got to realize that an all-out arms race may not be to our advantage.

Let me raise another strategic concept. We talk about the Soviet Union and the U.S., but by 1980 the Soviet Union will face Britain and France, who don't have much, and potentially a very substantial China. For the U.S., we talk about planning for a two-ocean war or a one-ocean war. But at present, the threat from the Chinese is obviously considerably less. And Western Europe is no threat to us. For the Soviet Union it is not as easy—they have to worry about the U.S. first, but also Western Europe, which may matter at some point in the future, and the Chinese.

Thus, central to our policy is what happens in China. Suppose there were a Soviet-Chinese détente or alliance. Dr. Judd was unhappy with our opening to China and I was not terribly happy about what it did to our friends in Taiwan. Also, we can't forget that it was not an anti-Soviet move—at least that is what we say; we see good relations with both sides.

And without that, the U.S. ten years from now would be in a very dangerous position. Within ten years, as Brezhnev says, or within twenty to twenty-five years, it will happen—the Chinese will be very strong.

Dr. Kissinger: Both you and Brezhnev may be right at the same time. They could be a significant threat to the Soviets within ten years, although it might be twenty years before they were a threat to the U.S.

President Nixon: That is a good point, Henry.

Carl Duckett: [4 lines not declassified]

President Nixon: I remember when we were in Moscow for SALT—I must say I never went through such a week—our Russian friends do their business after midnight, right, Henry? During the Middle East negotiations at the last summit, Henry, as you remember, most of our conversations were between midnight and 3:00 a.m. In SALT I, everything was after midnight and went on all night long—at least that is what you said you were doing (laughter).

In a group of experts like this, this probably sounds poor, but I think we have to keep asking ourselves—why do we have it? What is it going to be worth ten years from now?

Brezhnev—he showers love and kisses on the U.S.—and bear hugs—he is a very physical man. But, when I saw him alone both here and at San Clemente, all he talked about was China. It might be an act, but it could be very real. If it is an act, he is the best actor in the world.

Dr. Kissinger: And so are the Chinese.

President Nixon: The Soviets are looking at this not in terms of SALT II, but ten years from now. They are thinking, as they always do, in historical terms. They know that the Chinese and the U.S., while not friends, are not opponents. So, in the long term, they have to think in terms of a much larger force. Today it is just the Soviet Union versus the U.S., but their worry is 1985. Alex, what do they say about the Chinese question?

Amb. Johnson: The word “China” has never been used in my conversations, although they frequently talk about “third powers.”

President Nixon: Yes, they refer to “those powers,” but they clearly aren't interested in India or Ceylon—they mean the Chinese.

Vice President Ford: If there is no agreement, we clearly have the resources and the know-how, but perhaps not the political will. I as-

sume they have the will and the know-how, but do they have the resources?

President Nixon: Sure. We always have underestimated them—they have plenty of resources.

Director Colby: However, they do have an incentive to agree. Brezhnev has his entire reputation tied up in this, and also there are others behind him who are looking at the economic advantages of détente.

President Nixon: Yes, Brezhnev has staked a great deal on agreements with the U.S. Stalin killed everyone off, perhaps for pretty good reason, since they were out to get him—but we should remember, in the final analysis, because of the authoritarian character of their system, that it is in our interest to have a government in the Soviet Union as peaceful as Brezhnev seems to be now, even though they are being very tough in these negotiations. It could be a lot worse.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree as Bill Colby has pointed out that Brezhnev has an interest in agreement. Therefore, I think we can arrive at least at “formal” equality which will allow us to build up to a level equal to theirs. We might not get the funds to do it, but I think it is important for appearance’s sake to have formal equality. We might have to accept their level of forces. But then, the pressure is on Congress to provide the essential equivalence they insist we must have. Today we spend only \$8 billion on strategic forces—we probably spend that much on food stamps.

President Nixon: A lousy program.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could go up easily. They have an incentive to avoid a U.S. build-up.

President Nixon: Don’t misunderstand me. Our public position will have to be that we have the will, and will undertake the necessary programs. We don’t need agreement if they don’t want it. But in this room, we have to look realistically at a world where we go up and up. It is not clear such a world is in our interest. I don’t mind sounding like a peacenik here in this room—but I hope it doesn’t get outside.

Vice President Ford: Jim, are you saying we only spend about 10 percent of our budget on strategic forces?

Secretary Schlesinger: About 10 to 15 percent. We are spending less now than we were in 1964 in constant dollar terms. And with about \$2 billion a year more we could undertake significant new programs.

Admiral Zumwalt: Two billion dollars would buy two more submarines a year.

Secretary Kissinger: Zumwalt will prove that to you no matter how a naval battle comes out—you would have been better off with more ships (laughter)

Mr. Clements: The point is, it is relatively cheap to go up if we have to.

President Nixon: We will try to do it if we have to, but hopefully we will be able to get agreement with the Soviets. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

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**48. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 26, 1974.

SUBJECT

Answers to Three Soviet Questions on MIRVs

On January 22 Dobrynin gave you three questions (Tab B).<sup>2</sup> A proposed written response is at Tab A. You will note that the response is essentially confined to the questions raised by the Soviets and does not attempt to elaborate on various implications of the equal MIRV throw weight approach such as the resulting number of warheads, overall Soviet numerical advantages, etc. In other words, it is a relatively simple response to the direct questions posed by the Soviets.

*Recommendation*

That you review the proposed written response to Dobrynin and, if it is satisfactory, provide it either to him or to Gromyko at the time of the latter's visit here.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, SALT, December 1973–February 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for urgent action. Hyland concurred with this memorandum. Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the page: "OK, Put in a letter for channel."

<sup>2</sup> No further record of a meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 22 has been found. According to a transcript of a telephone conversation, January 21, 5:45 p.m., the two men agreed to speak on the telephone the next day but no mention of SALT was made at that time. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)

**Tab A****Draft Response to the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)<sup>3</sup>**

Undated.

In response to the three questions which have been raised, the U.S. objective is to develop a concept for qualitative limitations which will provide equality for each side. The concept discussed by Secretary Kissinger with Minister Gromyko is that each side should have the right to the same aggregate throw weight for ICBMs with MIRVs.<sup>4</sup> Within this equal level, each side would be able to deploy a specified number of ICBMs with MIRVs; the sum total (aggregate) throw weight of these ICBMs could not exceed the agreed level.

1. Because the Soviet ICBMs with MIRVs are larger and have greater throw weight than the U.S. Minuteman III MIRV ICBM, the number of ICBMs with MIRVs on each side would not be the same, i.e., the U.S. number would be larger. Thus, the difference in the number of ICBMs with MIRVs would not result from a difference in rights, but from the fact that the Soviet side is developing larger ICBMs.

2. The approach of equal aggregate throw weight for both sides mentioned by Secretary Kissinger would apply only to deployment of ICBMs with a demonstrated capability to carry MIRVs, not to all ICBMs.

3. We do not exclude also seeking a mutually acceptable concept for dealing with SLBMs and their MIRVs. But we believe that our ICBM MIRV limitation is more urgent and should be given priority.

**Tab B****Questions From the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, January 22, 1974.

**QUESTIONS CONCERNING MIRVs**

1) What is meant in the suggestion—a right for the U.S. to have a greater number of MIRV's or a greater number of missiles with MIRV (the latter was the case earlier).

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 44.

<sup>5</sup> No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: "Dobrynin to HAK Jan. 22, p.m."



2) To establish equal aggregate throw weight—does it cover only missiles with MIRV or all missiles of each side (the latter was the case in the U.S. position in Geneva, but in the last talk with Minister A.A. Gromyko Secretary H. Kissinger mentioned “the throw weight of MIRVs”).

3) Is it suggested to put limitations on MIRVs only for land-based ICBMs as it was proposed by the U.S. side earlier, or is it now suggested to have MIRV limitations also for SLBMs?

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**49. Memorandum From Jan Lodol of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 29, 1974.

SUBJECT

Including SLBMs in an Equal MIRV Throw Weight Proposal

*You have indicated on several occasions that you believe inclusion of SLBMs in a MIRV throw weight limit proposal is basically a “tactical” issue; the Soviets will certainly insist that we do so, and, intellectually, we have no good arguments for not including them. Thus, you have indicated that we should leave it up to Ambassador Johnson as to when and how he includes SLBMs.*

*We disagree strongly with this approach.* Although we have outlined our reasoning in several other memos and in past meetings, this memo attempts to put all our arguments in one place.

*The main argument against including SLBMs is that they represent our major bargaining chip and leverage in SALT II.* Much as we traded our ABM capabilities to get Soviet limits on ICBMs in SALT I, success in SALT II is likely to require trading some of our momentum in SLBMs for Soviet limitations on their ICBM programs, and *SLBM MIRV throw weight limits at reasonable levels represent de facto limits on Trident.*

Our major MIRV throw weight is planned for SLBMs. Minuteman III will have 1.3 million pounds of MIRV throw weight, but Poseidon alone will have 2.1 million pounds. A full Trident program would add an additional 1.3 million pounds—an amount equivalent to our entire

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 891, SALT, SALT TWO—Geneva—January, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Completely Outside the System. Sent for urgent information.

land based ICBM MIRV throw weight—to the Poseidon base, for a total of 3.4 million pounds of sea-based MIRV missile throw weight. *If we tabled a proposal initially with a throw weight level high enough to permit our full SLBM program plus Minuteman III (4.7 million pounds), it would be almost impossible to argue for a low ICBM sublimit.* The Soviets would probably agree to the 4.7 million pound level, but would insist on taking the bulk of their throw weight in ICBMs to offset our SLBM advantage. *This would lead to a strategically meaningless agreement.* Perhaps we will eventually have to fall back to something like this; nevertheless, we should first attempt to get a strategically meaningful limit on ICBMs, something we do not believe we could negotiate if we started with the high level required to give us our full SLBM program.

Of course, we could start with a lower total throw weight. However, a lower level would constrain us to deploy Trident only as a replacement for Poseidon. Since we could never convince Congress to replace perfectly good Poseidon boats with Trident, this would obviously kill the Trident program. Thus, *a lower total level, while perhaps permitting us to negotiate a more meaningful ICBM limit, would do so at the cost of our Trident program.* We might very well want to do this at some point, but we should not do it in our initial proposal.

There are three other reasons why we believe we should hold up introducing SLBMs into the MIRV throw weight deal:

(1) *Verification of SLBMs is more complex.* We will almost certainly have to go to a categories or “block” approach for SLBM verification. There seems to be no way to verify deployment of SLBMs within a single category. However, *including SLBMs initially, with their associated categories approach, would make it much harder to avoid a categories approach to ICBMs.*

(2) *Throw weight is harder to measure for SLBMs.* It’s much easier to trade off range for payload on SLBMs. For example, our Trident I missile *could* have almost 50% more throw weight than Poseidon. It will not have more throw weight only because we are using all of the additional thrust capability of the missile to increase its range, not its throw weight. We could end up in endless arguments with the Soviets about how to measure SLBM throw weight. *Such arguments could prejudice our entire throw weight concept for dealing with MIRV.* We would be much better off if we could get agreement in principle on ICBMs first.

(3) *MIRVs on SLBMs are simply not the threat they are on ICBMs.* You are familiar with most of the reasons why this is the case. SLBMs are much more difficult to control, their accuracy is not as good as ICBMs, and they carry smaller warheads than Soviet ICBMs. Thus, *SLBM MIRV throw weight limitations are considerably more cosmetic and less strategic than are ICBM limits.*

In conclusion, we agree that SLBMs will eventually have to be thrown in. We might very well have to allow the Soviets an edge in ICBM throw weight to offset our edge in SLBM throw weight. Likewise, we might have to limit Trident in return for restraints on Soviet ICBM programs. However, we believe the best way to get to this point is to start by pressing hard for limits on ICBM MIRV throw weight. We can certainly make it clear to the Soviets that we are willing to consider SLBMs if we can get agreement in principle on the agreed MIRV throw weight concept. But we should not start with a specific SLBM program. It leads us down many slippery slopes which can be much better dealt with if we first have agreement in principle on equal MIRV throw weight.

We believe these considerations are particularly important with respect to what is put on the table in Geneva. Even if you wish to open the issue of SLBMs relatively early in your channel, it could be quite dangerous to let the delegation get out in front of you in Geneva.

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#### 50. Letter From Senator Henry Jackson to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 29, 1974.

Dear Mr. President:

The tabling of a wholly unacceptable draft treaty at Geneva by the Soviets along with the relentless buildup of their strategic forces makes it essential, in my judgment, that we table at Geneva a proposal for serious strategic arms reductions down to a common ceiling.

In a speech on the Senate floor on December 4, 1973 I outlined the essential features of such a proposal.<sup>2</sup> I am persuaded that if we were to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 891, SALT, SALT TWO—I–Geneva, Jan. 1974. No classification marking. In a February 1 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger stated: “Senator Jackson’s letter raises some important decisions and his pledge of continued Congressional support for our strategic programs is heartening. However, simple quantitative equality, in a world where qualitative developments are unconstrained, may have little prospect of stabilizing the strategic balance or curbing the arms competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we are at present time analyzing the subject of reductions in regard to our security requirements and possible reductions to other elements of a U.S. negotiating position.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In his speech, Jackson claimed that the SALT negotiations were at an impasse and proposed that each side reduce its ICBMs and land- and sea-based launchers to 1,760 and equalize the total payload of the launchers. (“Jackson Sees U.S.-Soviet ‘Impasse’,” *The New York Times*, December 5, 1973, p. 4)

make such an offer, the Soviets (whatever they may say now) would have great difficulty simply dismissing out of hand such a simple and obviously fair and equitable program for strategic arms reductions that would leave the United States and the Soviet Union in a position of manifest equality. For the Soviets to peremptorily reject such a program would risk the political gains they associate with the developing détente. During the negotiating interim following the making of such an offer, I am confident that we could mobilize Congressional support for the strategic budget, and, in the longer term, I am convinced that the Congress of the United States would give full support to any necessary defense effort following a failure to achieve equality through a mutual arms reduction proposal such as I suggest.

By reducing the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union to a total aggregate level of 1,760 strategic launchers we could achieve stability at a lower level of armament and expenditure, and by negotiating a formula providing for equal throw weight we will go quite far in diminishing the importance of MIRV as a destabilizing factor in the strategic balance.

I seriously doubt that we can expect to control effectively nuclear weapons *technology* through arms control agreements. This is especially true at a moment in history when the principal technical development impacting on strategic offensive capabilities is the improvement in missile accuracy—an area in which the verification problems are probably insurmountable and in which one would have to expect the possibility of rapid developments following the expiration of any limiting agreement of limited duration. In my judgment preoccupation with partial efforts to obtain limited and questionable limits on MIRV and/or missile accuracy are a diversion—perhaps a dangerous one—from what ought to be the main thrust of our approach to SALT II: the establishment of equal ceilings at reduced levels of strategic launchers.

Passage of my amendment to the SALT I Interim Agreement authorizing resolution,<sup>3</sup> by placing the Congress on record in support of a SALT II agreement reflecting “equal numbers of intercontinental strategic launchers taking account of throw weight” was an important step in the process of building a Congressional base for a firm American negotiating position. I am concerned that proposals that reflect only cosmetic arrangements or that inflate the strategic assets of the United States by counting non-operational systems (such as mothballed aircraft) or by counting U.S. systems at numerical values greater than the actual number of units (e.g., considering 320 SLBMs as 480 because the

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Jackson Amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 241 on the Interim Strategic Offensive Arms Agreement, August 7, 1972. The amendment mandated equality in U.S. and Soviet strategic arms.

320 are based abroad) or by exaggerating the value of individual units (e.g., bomber throw weight) will do much to erode—perhaps even reverse—the profound and helpful concern and the negotiating leverage expressed in that amendment.

If, in order to facilitate *any* agreement we first convey the impression that the numbers in the SALT I Interim Agreement do constitute equality, our negotiating position will suffer irreparable harm. And if, in the worst event, U.S. proposals based on such an impression fail to eventuate in an agreement, we will be left in a weaker position than ever.

On the positive side I am optimistic that a proposal along the lines that I suggested on December 4 would have great appeal at home and consequent force internationally.

I hope that you will give serious consideration to such an approach.

If the Administration makes a determined good faith effort to negotiate stable strategic equality on the basis of mutual strategic force reductions, and if it becomes clear that the USSR remains intransigent rather than responsive to such a fair-minded and equitable initiative, I have no doubt that Congress will support whatever strategic programs are required to maintain Soviet-American strategic equality.

In the past thirty years, Congress has never failed to support a major strategic program when convincingly argued as being in the national interest. This is true of the land-based ICBM, the Polaris system, the ABM, and, most recently, the Trident and B-1 weapons systems. For the Administration to design its arms control proposals on the assumption that the Congress will not support strategic equality, especially with the language of my amendment now a part of our public law, would represent a most serious and unacceptable misreading or disregard by the Administration of Congressional will.

Recent Soviet commentary on Congressional sentiment indicates that the Soviets see the Congress as one major source of a “stiffening” in the American attitude toward these negotiations. It is fundamentally wrong to view the Congress as a weak link, rather than a source of strength, for the American negotiating position.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely yours,

**Henry M. Jackson**

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<sup>4</sup> Nixon wrote on Kissinger’s February 1 memorandum: “K, remember that his letter & our reply will be used by him for press purposes.” The President’s reply to Jackson is Document 56.

51. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 30, 1974, 10:18–11:50 a.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

Kenneth Rush

U. Alexis Johnson\*

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Seymour Weiss

Boris Klosson\*

Harold Brown\*

*Defense*

William Clements

Paul Nitze\*

Frederick Wikner

*JCS*

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

LTG Edward Rowny\*

\*Member, SALT Delegation

\*\*SCC Chairman

*CIA*

LTG Vernon Walters

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Dr. Fred Ikle

Sidney Graybeal\*\*

Ralph Earle, II\*

*NSC Staff*

Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Jan Lodal

David Aaron

Peter Zimmerman

Jeanne W. Davis

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the Working Group would prepare analysis on:

... a conceptual approach on reductions;

... the bomber issue;

... a new generation of single RV missiles with higher yield and greater accuracy;

... a test ban on the SS–X–16;

—the Verification Panel would meet again on Tuesday, February 5;<sup>2</sup>—the issues will be discussed with the President in an NSC meeting, hopefully by the end of the week beginning February 4.<sup>3</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3–15–72 to 6–4–74 [4 of 5]. Top Secret; Nodis; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> The next Verification Panel meeting was on February 15. See Document 54.

<sup>3</sup> The next NSC meeting was not until March 21. See Document 58.

Secretary Kissinger: Before we have the briefing, I have been getting calls from Senators telling me that certain things musn't happen—that we must not discuss certain proposals.<sup>4</sup> This is absolutely intolerable. We cannot have people making calls to various Senators on their favorite options or on options they don't want discussed. We have no position yet. We are still discussing this whole issue. But we are going ahead with SALT and we won't be stopped. No one can stop us from considering a proposal that everyone will have a crack at. We're not steering this toward some fore-ordained conclusion, but we must not be told what we must not even discuss. It is a great strain on the President to have to answer questions on things he hasn't even seen or which have not been suggested and may never be suggested. I assure you that nothing will be accepted that all the people around this table don't know about and haven't had a chance at. Now, let's proceed with the briefing.

[Omitted here are Duckett's briefing and discussion of it.]

Secretary Kissinger: The first issue I'd like to discuss today is that of throw-weight limitations on MIRVs. We have three issues: 1) at what level to set the limitations; 2) whether to include the SLBMs from the beginning or as a fall-back; and 3) if SLBMs are included, whether we should have a sub-limit for ICBM throw-weight, say no more than X number of pounds of throw-weight in ICBMs. That would give freedom to mix but would not permit conversion of SLBM throw-weight to ICBM throw-weight. Positions are shifting so rapidly these days, that I'm not sure I understand where we are. Whether or not SLBMs are included, do we agree on a sub-ceiling for ICBM throw-weight?

Mr. Johnson: In any event, we will probably end with the Soviets having higher land-based ICBM throw-weight which we will balance with higher SLBM throw-weight. If we have an ICBM sub-limit, would that show as inequality in our ICBM throw-weight and Soviet ICBM throw-weight? It could be expressed in terms of an overall ceiling.

Dr. Ikle: As an outcome, we want limitations on Soviet SLBM MIRVing. As a tactical question, we may not want to mention it.

Secretary Kissinger: We have two problems: 1) whether or not to include SLBMs at the outset; and 2) if we agree on a sub-ceiling on ICBMs, whether the ICBM sub-ceiling should be our total proposal or a sub-ceiling of a proposal which includes SLBMs. I'm looking for an isolatable problem.

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<sup>4</sup> According to Kissinger's telephone transcripts from January 23 to 29, the Secretary spoke with Senator Scott on January 23, 3:46 p.m.; Senator Fulbright on January 23, 4:25 p.m.; Senator Stennis on January 28, 2:45 p.m.; and Senator Mansfield on January 29, 4:09 p.m. He discussed SALT only with Fulbright. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)

Mr. Johnson: I would agree with an ICBM sub-limitation.

Mr. Nitze: There are two ways to go about it: 1) an aggregate of ICBM MIRV throw-weight; or 2) ICBMs no greater than a certain throw-weight could be MIRVed. I would prefer to go in with the second version.

Secretary Kissinger: My ambition is extremely modest. If we accept Paul's (Nitze) second proposition, a sub-ceiling on ICBM MIRVs could be explained as total MIRV throw-weight of which no greater than X amount of ICBM throw-weight could be MIRVed. Could this group discuss a figure?

Gen. Rowny: If the total is low enough, we don't need a sub-limit. We would be better not to have one.

Secretary Kissinger: I have seen no figure low enough to make this irrelevant.

Dr. Ikle: It doesn't make a decisive difference if all their throw-weight up to 4.8 million pounds is in ICBMs. There would be some advantage to us, but not much. They have higher accuracy with ICBM MIRVs than with SLBMs.

Secretary Kissinger: It's harder to launch a counter-force attack from submarines than with an ICBM. We'd be better off to reduce ICBM MIRV throw-weight to the lowest possible level. But an upper limit on ICBMs would be desirable.

Adm. Moorer: The higher accuracy of the land-based missile over the sea-based missile won't prevail indefinitely. There's no point in paying something for it.

Secretary Kissinger: No one is being asked to pay anything for it. The Soviet ICBM warhead is larger than ours. We think it can be made more accurate. We haven't seen a MIRV on a SLBM, but we are reasonably confident that they will be smaller and less accurate. We have no program for additional missiles or for additional MIRVs on land-based missiles. What are we paying? If we constrain them to our ceiling on land-based programs, what are we giving up?

Dr. Ikle: It's a question of how much we insist.

Secretary Kissinger: Once we have a position, we can make up a fall-back. But if you are more at ease with discussing the fall-back, I'm willing to do anything in order to discuss numbers. Let's first address the question of what our proposal should be, then what we would give up.

Dr. Brown: I'm not one of those people who equate the survivability of Minuteman with the survivability of the United States, but the more we can limit the Soviet ability to knock out Minuteman, the better we are.



Secretary Kissinger: We have two options on MIRV throw-weight.  
[2 lines not declassified]

Gen. Rowny: That costs nothing and gains us something.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't prove it would cost us nothing. But it might be desirable to set the limit [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Adm. Moorer: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: If we do it by blocks, we don't need MIRV throw-weight limits.

Mr. Nitze: We would have to limit the size of the missiles in the blocks.

Secretary Kissinger: We're reserving MFN to give them in exchange for a change in the Soviet system! We can't use it for this, too. What would we give up for changing missiles in blocks? I can construct a package so it would look good to Senator Jackson, but how would we get it?

Mr. Nitze: Is it in our interest to have them MIRV nothing but the SS-X-16s?

Secretary Kissinger: In existing holes?

Mr. Nitze: Yes. The -16 is as big as Minuteman III. It is in our interest that they MIRV the -16 rather than the -19. But the question of negotiability is another issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Does anyone really believe they will scrap the -17, -18 and -19? For what?

Mr. Nitze: I agree there is a negotiability problem.

Mr. Rush: But there are degrees of negotiability.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But it has to be in a framework that makes sense to us and has a chance of being negotiated.

Let's talk about block limitations. If we do it by blocks, we don't need throw-weight limitations. If we put the limit at 2.4 million and they deploy their -16s, they can MIRV all their holes. The utility of throw-weight limits is that it leaves the composition of their forces up to each side. The treaty could be written to allow for MIRVing of "light" or "medium" missiles. If we use throw-weight limits, it permits each side to compose its forces by its own criteria. [2 lines not declassified] And the limitations would have to say no missile tested in a MIRV mode beyond the limits set by the throw-weight limitations. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Otherwise, we couldn't have throw weight limits. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to weigh the risk of cheating [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as opposed to MIRVing 1100 holes with -17s and -19s. Under the block approach we would weigh the number

of warheads and the throw-weight of all Minutemen and all 1100 –17s and –19s. That would mean a substantial disparity in both deliverable warheads and throw-weight.

Mr. Nitze: We could have the block approach at lower levels and phase out some Minutemen and ICBMs.

Secretary Kissinger: Not in the first phase.

Mr. Johnson: The two things are not mutually exclusive. We could set throw-weight limits. Then by working through the verification problem we might come out with the block approach.

Dr. Ikle: The block approach means no MIRV limitations on the –19s.

Secretary Kissinger: No MIRVs on MLBMs.

Dr. Ikle: And possible limits on SLBMs later.

Secretary Kissinger: The operational significance is that they will put –18s in the holes. We would be proposing a unilateral ban on MLBM MIRVing.

Dr. Ikle: It might be premature to go for blocks before we have tried for some collateral constraints.

Secretary Kissinger: It's not inconsistent to have throw-weight limitations coupled with reductions. That's not inconceivable. We cannot ask the Soviets to tear down all their MIRVed missiles, but we can relate reductions to throw-weight limits. If there are an equal number of MIRVed missiles, we can probably say that the non-MIRVed missiles would be the first candidates for reduction. If they opt for the –19s, we can't get all the non-MIRVed missiles eliminated. We would wind up with unequal numbers in our favor. Having the first candidate the un-MIRVed missiles would be compatible with the throw-weight approach but not the block approach. It's not compatible if we want the MLBMs torn down. We all want them torn down, but no one has told us how to do it.

Could we discuss, without prejudice, the various arguments for the 2.4 million pound limitation as opposed to the 1.3 million pound.

Mr. Nitze: 1.3 is better for us, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Nitze: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: 2.4 enables them to MIRV 440 –19s. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Nitze: But they could put –16s in unMIRVed holes.

Adm. Moorer: *[less than 1 line not declassified]* All they have to do is read our budget.

Secretary Kissinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Mr. Clements: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Brown: One advantage of the 1.3 figure is that we have it and we don't have 2.4.

Gen. Rowney: Neither do they.

Secretary Kissinger: The 2.4 figure means that under a SALT agreement we would be building more than we would have if there had been no agreement.

Mr. Weiss: But we wouldn't have to.

Secretary Kissinger: The worst possible thing would be to agree to limitations to which they would almost certainly build up and we would not.

Dr. Wikner: We might put them to sea.

Adm. Moorer: That argument that we won't do something so we might as well forget it—you can't explain that to the public or the Congress. They won't accept an agreement that permits them to do something that we can't do.

Secretary Kissinger: There has been too much demagoguery on SALT I. In the five years we have been talking about this, I have never heard of any new U.S. MLBM or SLBM program. They were permitted to keep something they already had. They were not permitted to do something they had not done. And what did they get? What did we give up? If anyone was stopped somewhere, it was they, not we.

Adm. Moorer: I'm not talking about SALT I.

Secretary Kissinger: What if there had been no SALT I? They would have gone on digging holes. And they would have had 82 submarines at the rate of 9 a year. And we would have had nothing on our side.

Adm. Moorer: I have made this argument again and again before Congress. But they zero in on the idea that they were permitted something we can't have.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be easier to negotiate the block approach. But our conclusion had been that equal numbers of MIRVed vehicles would give the Soviets more RVs and more throw-weight. That's the reason we went to throw-weight limitations. We would give them a smaller number of MIRVed vehicles and a slightly larger number of RVs for equal throw-weight.

Dr. Ikle: 1600 for us and 2600 for them.

Secretary Kissinger: That depends on how they MIRVed. At 1.3 it would be 1440 vs. 1650 MIRVed ICBM RVs. At 2.4 the MIRVed vehicles would be slightly larger.

Mr. Johnson: A sub-limit on ICBMs is desirable and the lower the better.

Secretary Kissinger: Are throw-weight limitations on MIRVs the best way to approach it? If we have equal numbers, unless we force them to the –16s, this would be a disadvantage to us. If we have an ICBM sub-limit, do we agree the lower the better? Should it be at 1.3, the present program?

Dr. Brown: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: There are two points. First, they could not deploy the –19, –18 or –17 except by having it counted toward the MIRV limitation. Under the throw-weight limitations, theoretically we don't care. The more 18s they have, the fewer missiles they would have. *[3 lines not declassified]*

Mr. Nitze: We could handle this by a MIRV testing ban on the –16. But if we plan to maintain our *[number not declassified]* Minuteman holes, Shchukin will say, as he has said before, that our MIRV proposal isn't verifiable. Since he claims they couldn't verify our compliance, we could forget about verification of the Soviet side. We have argued that they can read our *Congressional Record* and other public documents and find out anything they want to know, but they would say they couldn't tell whether we were putting Minuteman III in the additional holes. That's technically correct, and we would have a hard time getting any correlation.

Secretary Kissinger: We probably ought to start with 1.3 although we may have to go to 2.4.

Mr. Nitze: Or offer to dismantle additional Minuteman holes.

Secretary Kissinger: What would we ask them to dismantle? At 1.3 they have 240 SS–19 holes. Would you dismantle an equal number of holes?

Mr. Nitze: The logic of the position is better even if they don't accept it.

Secretary Kissinger: We would dismantle *[number not declassified]* missiles and they would dismantle 850. That would mean numerical inequality and inequality of RVs at 1.3. That's just not do-able. I buy the proposition that we should offer reductions of non-MIRVed Minuteman. What would we propose they reduce? We could do it in terms of equal throw-weight. If the throw-weight equals *[number not declassified]* Minutemen.

Mr. Nitze: I would have no embarrassment in offering to reduce Minuteman to *[number not declassified]* to make it verifiable, then say "you do the same." They will say they can't because they would end with unequal numbers. We could then say "not if you MIRV the smaller missile."

Secretary Kissinger: If we want a sensible agreement, we have to consider what the Soviet Government can reasonably be asked to do. They can't go from 1100 to 240 holes. They can be asked to go to equal aggregates or go to equal throw-weight.

Mr. Johnson: Do we assume they will MIRV all their SLBMs?

Mr. Nitze: When you look at the end point, we can't stick on the 1.3 level for them.

Secretary Kissinger: My experience in negotiating with the Soviets is that if you give them a basic concept you have a chance of getting a negotiation. If you play around with numbers and take a tough position, they will do the same. That's the reason I'm relaxed about throw-weight. We have a concept. But I don't know the concept of reductions so I'm less relaxed with that. In the face of what's happening to them here—MFN, Solzhenitsyn, etc.—if they are confronted with proposals which they believe are completely cynical they may say "the hell with it."

Mr. Duckett: A rough calculation, if they used all the new holes and didn't convert any more, they would arrive at around the 1.3 figure.

Secretary Kissinger: I like Paul's (Nitze) idea of reductions. Let's see if the Working Group can quickly come up with a conceptual approach to reductions. That wouldn't be a bad position to have, but we shouldn't debate it without having the analysis.

(Gen. Scowcroft was called from the meeting)

Dr. Wikner: We have the variation of Option B which has been discussed in the Working Group. That is 4.8 million pounds of MIRVed throw-weight with proposed reductions of unMIRVed land-based ICBMs. Each side would have 550 MIRVed missiles, and the U.S. would have more at sea. There would be no sub-limits. This would be less divisive but would have the same numbers.

Mr. Aaron: They would tear down twice as many launchers.

Dr. Wikner: They would have larger reductions in ICBMs.

Mr. Weiss: The numbers would be the same as Option B for us. Why is there different throw-weight?

Secretary Kissinger: You don't have sub-limits for ICBMs or SLBMs.

Mr. Johnson: Each side chooses what it wants.

Mr. Aaron: They could MIRV all their –18s.

Secretary Kissinger: What if they put their 4.8 million pounds into ICBMs?

Dr. Wikner: They would have no SLBMs.

Mr. Nitze: They would have 881 if they kept all their –19s.

Adm. Moorer: And 300 if they kept their big missiles.

Mr. Johnson: It would be easier not to have sub-limits if that is bearable. In the overall aggregate, each side is free to do what it chooses.

Secretary Kissinger: The 4.8 figure is exactly our program. We'd be asking them to stop at our level.

Dr. Wikner: They have four ICBMs under test.

Mr. Johnson: We could phase out [*number not declassified*] Minutemen and 300 bombers, perhaps.

Dr. Wikner: Or we could phase down to 450 B-52s. We don't have to build the B-1.

Gen. Rowny: If we have the 4.8 figure, equal throw-weight of MIRVed missiles is sensible and defensible. If we go to a higher number, we should look at sub-limits on ICBMs. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*1 line not declassified*] If there is no sub-limit, they have to tell us how they plan to compose their force. [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Wikner: We would speak of the number of land-based MIRVed missiles.

Dr. Ikle: Let the sides choose and declare what sub-limits they have chosen.

Mr. Clements: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: That is the vaguest of all possibilities. They could have 800-plus -17s or -19s. It would take them 5-8 years to reach that level. Until the end of the third or fourth year we wouldn't have a leg to stand on. Then they could begin thinking of SLBM MIRVs. [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Ikle: We would need some sort of declaration.

Secretary Kissinger: If we need a declaration, we would have sub-limits. We would either make the statement in the agreement or sign the agreement then notify the other side. It would still be a free choice. The high limit, without sub-ceilings offers the greatest possibility of cheating. They probably wouldn't deploy more than 80 missiles in a year. Have they ever deployed more?

Mr. Nitze: Yes, 200 once.

(General Scowcroft returned)

Mr. Duckett: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: If the sub-limits are "no greater than," they would not be symmetrical. They can't dig holes on land while they are bringing their SLBMs along. Throw-weight limits without a ceiling at the high level are practically no agreement at all.

Mr. Nitze: Unless you have radical reductions.

Dr. Brown: The lower the MIRV sub-limits, the slower Minuteman becomes vulnerable.

Dr. Wikner: Single RVs are as useful for attacking silos as MIRVs.  
[less than 1 line not declassified]

Gen. Rowny: Without reductions, it's not a viable program.

Secretary Kissinger: How about a continued arms program—is that a viable program? If we have a prohibition against putting new missiles into holes capable of handling MIRVed missiles, they wouldn't have a first strike capability unless they got greatly improved accuracy. If you count any missile put into an existing hole as MIRVed, we would have a restraint for the considerable future. I like the reduction option if we can come up with a concept. The Working Group will spend a day or two quickly on this option. But if they have substantial MIRV forces plus an accurate single RV, that would be tough.

Dr. Wikner: (to Mr. Duckett) Can the Soviets improve the SS-11 with the existing guidance system?

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Dr. Ikle: There is the question of restrictions on single RVs and on testing.

Secretary Kissinger: We would need a test ban on the -16.

Dr. Ikle: And on future missiles with a single RV of higher yield and greater accuracy.

Secretary Kissinger: If they're willing to give up anything it will probably be the -16.

Mr. Johnson: That could be deployed as a mobile. If they tested it with MIRV then went mobile, [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: All of this will have to go to an NSC meeting. The President can't decide this on the basis of a piece of paper. I would hope to get an NSC by the end of next week. Whatever ICBM limits we have we would have to include mobiles.

Mr. Duckett: [4 lines not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: What is your thinking on an SLBM ceiling?

Mr. Clements: We passed around a paper on Option B and a variant, B-2. Either would accomplish what we want. We'd be better off with the whole freedom to mix situation as opposed to sub-limits.

Adm. Moorer: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: Why is it in our interest, since we retain freedom to mix in our submarine force, to give them the option to develop the largest number of ICBMs—the thing they do best? It is to our

advantage to limit their ICBM MIRVing. What do we gain by giving them the maximum number of ICBMs?

Mr. Nitze: It's negotiable. We need 3.5 million pounds of throw-weight for our SLBM program. We want 1.3 million for ICBMs. That's an aggregate of 4.8.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't sell 1.3 land-based and 3.5 SLBMs.

Mr. Nitze: We have confidence in the survivability of our SLBMs. Unless they phase out the SS-9s, they have a potential missile throw-weight of 12–15 million pounds. We can't meet that because Congress won't permit us to build a single RV missile. Strategically, we can meet it by having a lot of survivors at sea.

Secretary Kissinger: If there is no agreement, that is guaranteed to happen. In the absence of an agreement this is a certainty.

Mr. Nitze: With an agreement, it is a certainty.

Mr. Clements: We made that choice years ago to go to SLBMs rather than ICBMs.

Dr. Ikle: Depending on the reductions, we might accept a lower number of SLBMs.

Mr. Nitze: If we can get reductions. That's not certain. In the absence of reductions, with MIRVed throw-weight limits we are faced with a big differential.

Mr. Clements: And we won't start digging any new silos for ICBMs.

Mr. Nitze: Limited to single RVs.

Dr. Brown: We also have our bomber force.

Mr. Nitze: It is hard to justify a difference in missile throw-weight by bombers.

Mr. Weiss: Why not, if in theory we have the capability to go from bombers to SLBMs.

Mr. Nitze: Congress won't let us build SLBMs with single RVs.

Secretary Kissinger: I get tough letters after every one of these meetings from Congressmen saying they have never refused to do the right thing and we should not sell out the country by dropping Trident on the ground that Congress won't fund it. Why couldn't we get single RVs?

Mr. Clements: We don't want them.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly

Dr. Brown: A large discrepancy in single RV throw-weight is not that important.

Secretary Kissinger: If we need single RV equivalence, we should go to the Congress and try to get it.



Mr. Clements: Alex (Johnson) should encourage the Soviets to dig more holes and put bigger missiles in them. The bigger the holes, and the missiles and the bigger the single RVs, the better.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill, with that remark you have outstripped the intellectual capacity of this group. At 4.8, one of two things is true: either single RVs don't make a difference or they do. The easy way to deal with it is through reductions.

Mr. Nitze: They do make a difference but not as much.

Dr. Brown: Not enough for us to want to match them.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't attack an agreement on the ground that we won't do the things necessary to maintain it that are permitted us. Throw-weight limits on MIRVs won't limit single RV deployment in the absence of an agreement. It is in our advantage to match the Soviet single RVs if we want to. I have ten votes from Congressmen who say they will vote anything the Administration asks.

Dr. Ikle: The option is freedom to mix.

Secretary Kissinger: We're agreed on freedom to mix. Let's go over again what is in the 3.5 figure. I'm just trying to understand it.

Mr. Nitze: That is our program. It's reasonable. It gives us a large number of missiles at sea, about half of which are alert and survivable.

Secretary Kissinger: This gives us 10 Trident boats instead of Polaris.

Adm. Moorer: Polaris is unMIRVed.

Dr. Brown: If we pick the smaller number, there is no room for MIRVed Trident except as replacements for Poseidon.

Secretary Kissinger: Once tested as a MIRV, Trident must be counted as MIRVed. It would be the same as the -18. Suppose Trident were a replacement for some Poseidons.

Dr. Wikner: You would have a smaller number of missiles, larger throw-weight and longer range.

Adm. Moorer: Ultimately we will do it.

Mr. Clements: In twenty years.

Adm. Moorer: Any agreement will be built up by each side in terms of their current programs. It won't be a mirror image.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. One advantage of the MIRV throw-weight concept is that each side composes its forces with its existing weapons. There are no numbers games with weapons of different character. At anything less than 3.5, we would trade Trident for Poseidon, but it would not be on a one-for-one submarine basis.

Mr. Weiss: We could trade Minuteman III.

Secretary Kissinger: We couldn't trade one Trident for one Poseidon missile.

Mr. Zimmerman: Trident I is less than Poseidon. Trident II could have more throw-weight at shorter range.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the advantage of the Trident I missile?

Mr. Lodal: Longer range and less vulnerability.

Secretary Kissinger: That's not affected by throw-weight.

Mr. Lodal: That's right.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't put the Trident II missile in the Poseidon boat. The II missile needs the new submarine. For each Trident II missile, we would retire how many Poseidons?

Mr. Lodal: Not quite 1½.

Secretary Kissinger: For two Trident boats, we would retire three Poseidons.

Mr. Zimmerman: The Trident II is not designed yet. We can have more throw-weight at shorter range.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets would count Trident II at maximum throw-weight. If we have throw-weight limits of less than 3.5, we would be trading Poseidon for Trident. We don't have to settle this now. If we had sub-limits it would keep us free to go to 3.5 in SLBMs. Now I see how you got to 4.8. You'd be telling the Soviets to put most of their MIRV throw-weight in programs that are not yet designed. If you have a sub-limit on land-based MIRVs of 1.3, with 3.5 in SLBMs you have given them an insulting proposal. You would be telling them they would have to put most of their MIRVed throw-weight in a missile no one has even seen. And that is likely to be less good than their land-based missiles. That makes no sense for them.

Adm. Moorer: Don't forget they had a 4200 mile missile six years before we did.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm in favor of ICBM sub-limits. But at these limits I don't think they will take it.

Mr. Johnson: The first telegram I send after I make that proposal would be to say that the Soviets had replied that they could give such a proposal no serious consideration without knowing our proposal on bombers and bomber armament.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be included in the total aggregate.

Mr. Clements: Yes, that's not MIRVed throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: Do they assert we would put MIRVs on bombers?

Mr. Johnson: They say long-range missiles on bombers are the same as MIRVs.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Adm. Moorer: You can have four bombs in the bomb-bay that go four different places.

Mr. Weiss: They will raise the throw-weight issue on bombers.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't raise the bomber issue under MIRV throw-weight limits, but they will in total throw-weight limits. They may raise the question of bomber armament. I assume we're not putting MIRVs on bombers.

Mr. Clements: That's semantics.

Mr. Johnson: Our previous position was that we would not put air-to-surface missiles on bombers over a 3000-kilometer range. Their position was not to exceed 600 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: MIRV or aggregate?

Mr. Johnson: Aggregate.

Secretary Kissinger: I think bomber armament will come up. They will want assurances there are no MIRVs on bombers.

Adm. Moorer: We already have them. [*1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: My judgment is that they are likely to raise the armament issue on the bombers.

Mr. Weiss: In reply we can raise the question of their substantial air defense as we have in the past.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's have the Working Group work out the reductions concept and look at the bomber issue. They should also look at a new generation of missiles and a test-ban on the -16s. We'll have another Verification Panel meeting on Tuesday of next week.

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## 52. Editorial Note

On February 1, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met for dinner at the Department of State, primarily to discuss Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Washington and his meeting with President Nixon on February 4. The discussion turned to other issues including SALT II. According to the memorandum of conversation by Kissinger:

"We then turned to SALT.

"Dobrynin said that the equal throw-weight proposal was creating major problems in Moscow. The Soviet military were pointing out that this would mean, first, that they would have much fewer MIRVed missiles, and second, that their large missiles could have no MIRVs at all. I said no, their large missiles could have MIRVs. He said yes, but in that case they could only have 50 or 60 MIRVed missiles.

"I told him one way of handling this problem would be to reduce some of the non-MIRVed missiles. Dobrynin seemed surprised and

asked whether we would really be prepared to dismantle some of our missiles. I said in principle, yes. Dobrynin asked whether we would be willing to dismantle some submarines too. I said in principle it was more difficult for us, but we would be prepared to discuss reductions in all categories, including airplanes.

“Dobrynin said in his judgment this was not a matter in which we could make any progress with Gromyko. It had to be settled with Brezhnev when I got there in March. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22, January–April 1974)

On February 4, President Nixon met with Gromyko and discussed multiple topics. On SALT II, the President told the Foreign Minister: “our intentions are to reach an agreement at the summit and this will have my personal attention.” (Ibid., Box 71, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Gromyko 1974) Both memoranda of conversation are printed in full as Documents 157 and 159 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

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**53. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 5, 1974.

**SUBJECT**

SALT—Flexibility in the MIRV Throw Weight Approach

In light of Soviet reactions thus far to MIRV throw weight concept, this memo explains how this approach can meet possible Soviet concerns while advancing our security interests.

*Our Present ICBM MIRV Throw Weight Proposal*

The proposal you suggested to Gromyko would allow both sides 1.3 million pounds ICBM MIRV throw weight.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets would get

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 891, SALT, SALT TWO–I–Geneva, January 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for urgent information.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 44.

about 240 of *their* SS–19 medium ICBMs. For strategic and verification reasons, the other Soviet MIRV and ICBMs (SS–17 and 18) would be banned. *The U.S. could have about 550 MM III.* There could be no changes to silos not containing MIRV ICBMs.

Under our proposal, we would have the advantage in MIRV launchers and RVs while the Soviets would have the advantage in non-MIRV launchers and total throw weight.

The Soviets may have several concerns with this approach.

—They clearly want to limit our SLBM MIRV program.

—They probably want to deploy more than 1.3 million pounds of MIRVed ICBM throw weight.

—They almost certainly do not want to ban the SS–17 and 18 (they may want to deploy some of each missile).

This memo deals with these issues in two parts. Section I discusses how our SLBMs might be folded in to provide higher MIRV throw weight levels yet give both sides a more equitable position. Section II addresses the issues involved in the ICBM sublimit—in particular banning the SS–17 and 18 and the collateral control needed if they are to be permitted.

#### I. SLBMs and the Level of MIRV Throw Weight

In SALT I, our negotiating strategy focused on the linkage between ABMs and offensive systems. We exploited the leverage of our ongoing ABM program to set a ceiling on the Soviet offensive buildup in addition to halting ABMs.

Our basic objective in SALT II is to achieve significant limits on the Soviets' new ICBM programs. These new programs, if unconstrained by SALT, will translate a strategically meaningless Soviet ICBM number and throw weight advantage into a potent strategic advantage which could open up *counterforce options for the Soviets that would be unavailable to the U.S.* and destabilizing.

While Schlesinger talks bravely of starting up new U.S. ICBM programs and new counterforce RVs to match the Soviets, in fact, *the real source of our bargaining leverage in SALT II is our dynamic SLBM program* (e.g., the Trident missiles and boat) and probably the B–1 and ASMs.

Moreover, *there is strategic connection in this linkage.* If we cannot control Soviet counterforce development, we will want the most modern and advanced SLBM and bomber forces. But if worthwhile controls are possible, we can afford to give up at least some of the most advanced SLBM options (e.g., Trident II missile).

In sum, *how SLBMs are folded into an agreement is not a tactical question but is a focal point of our SALT strategy, and probably your strongest card.*

### *The U.S. Program—Trident*

As you are aware, the Trident program has three basic elements:

—The *Trident I* missile which will carry a *Poseidon*-size payload to a range of about 4,000–4,500 n.m. It can be deployed in either *Poseidon* or *Trident* boats and thus *greatly improve their survivability*.

—The *Trident* submarine itself is about twice the size of a *Poseidon* submarine and will *initially carry the Trident I* missile when it is deployed in the late 1970s.

—The *Trident II* missile is much larger than *Trident I* and will fully utilize the large tube volume available in the big *Trident* boat. *It can only fit in the Trident boat*. It can come in two versions: a 6,500 mile *Poseidon/Trident I* size payload of 4,000 pounds, or a high throw weight 6,000 pound payload with only 3,000 mile range.

—An *alternative to Trident submarine* is in the new budget; a smaller, cheaper, but equally effective boat based on the so-called *Narwhal* natural circulation reactor. *The Narwhal alternative is a Poseidon size submarine which would carry Poseidon size tubes (i.e., it could carry Trident I but not Trident II)*.

The main point is that despite the large political investment and risk, *the Trident boat and Trident II missiles are expendable at SALT*. But, we must play the *Trident* card reasonably soon. Now that Congress has got wind of a serious competitor, the *Trident* boat may well be killed.

### *The Soviet SLBM Program*

While we have very little hard intelligence, CIA's best estimate is that they have MIRV missiles under development for *both the Y and D Class*. This information is based on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] modifications underway at various SLBM facilities. We have no idea what the throw weight of Soviet SLBMs might be and it is difficult to assess how a MIRV throw weight limit would impact the Soviet SLBM program.

### *Flexibility Under the MIRV Throw Weight Approach*

The Soviets are likely to push our basic ICBM MIRV throw weight proposal in two directions:

—First, the Soviets probably want to deploy *more than 1.3 million pounds of ICBM MIRV throw weight* and will try to drive up the ICBM level.

—Second, the Soviets undoubtedly *want to include SLBMs* in such an agreement and will try and *stop some aspect of Trident* as well.

The key is the linkage between the two: how low we limit ICBM MIRV throw weight will affect the stringency of limits on our SLBMs.

*Our options are basically as follows:*

*OPTION 1. If the Soviets accept the 1.3 million pound ICBM MIRV throw weight limit, we should be willing to hold our SLBM MIRVs to our current level of 500 Poseidons, i.e., 2.1 million pounds. We could deploy Trident I missile since it has the same throw weight as Poseidon. Deployment of the Trident or Narwhal boat, if permitted at all, would have to be as a replacement for Poseidon. The combined ICBM/SLBM total would be 3.4 million pounds. The Soviets would get 240–300 SS-19/17s and could MIRV both the Y and D class submarines.*

The ICBM/SLBM forces of the two sides would be:

OPTION ONE  
MIRV FORCES

United States		Soviet	
Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)	Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)
550 MM III	1.3	240–300 SS-17/19	1.2–1.6
496 Poseidon/ Trident I	2.1	950 SLBM MIRV	1.8–2.2
MIRV Subtotal	1046	1190–1250	3.4

UNMIRVED FORCES

United States		Soviet	
Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)	Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)
450 MM II	1.0	790–730 SS-11	1.8
54 Titans	.4	60 SS-13/16	.1
160 Polaris	.2	300 SS-9	3.9
UnMIRVed Subtotal	664	1150–1090	5.8
Total Launchers	<u>1710</u>	<u>2340</u>	

*OPTION 2. If the Soviets want higher ICBM MIRV throw weight limit, at or below 2.4 million pounds (i.e., equivalent to 1000 MM III); we would still limit SLBMs to 2.1 million pounds. However, we would insist on the right to 1000 MM IIIs and on freedom to mix to sea to deploy additional SLBM MIRVs as replacement for Polaris (either Trident or Narwhal) instead of MIRVing additional ICBMs. The combined ICBM/SLBM total would be about 4.5 million pounds.*

This would give us theoretical advantage of up to 1000 MM III MIRV launchers and it would allow the Soviets to deploy up to 440/500 SS-17/19s.

However, if we had an ICBM MIRV throw weight limit at this level, it is more in our interest to deploy the additional MIRV throw weight in our SLBMs instead of MIRVing the rest of our Minuteman force. This would give us an advantage in SLBMs and we could deploy it either in Trident ships, or if we give up the Trident boat, in a Narwhal SLBM carrying Trident I missiles.

The ICBM/SLBM forces of the two sides would be:

#### OPTION TWO

##### MIRV FORCES

United States		Soviet	
<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Throw Weight</u> (million lbs)	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Throw Weight</u> (million lbs)
550 MM III	1.3	550/440 SS-17/19	2.4
496 Poseidon/ Trident I	2.1	950 SLBM MIRV	2.1
240 Narwhal/ Trident I	1.0		
MIRV Total	1286	1450–1390	4.5

##### UNMIRVED FORCES

United States		Soviet	
<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Throw Weight</u> (million lbs)	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Throw Weight</u> (million lbs)
450 MM II	1.0	530–590 SS-11	1.4
		60 SS-13/16	.1
		300 SS-9	3.9
UnMirved Total	450	890–950	5.4
Total Launchers	<u>1736</u>	<u>2340</u>	

*OPTION 3.* If the Soviets want even more ICBM throw weight or no sublimit, we would want to deploy Trident II. We would want to use high throw weight Trident IIs and possibly more MM-IIIs as compensation for Soviet ICBM advantages. We could have up to 3.5 million pounds of SLBM MIRV throw weight and the combined ICBM/SLBM MIRV throw weight level could be as high as 5–6 million pounds. *At these levels, the concept of limiting MIRV throw weight becomes somewhat ludicrous* and we might be better off to look at some other concept and simply use MIRV throw weight as one measure of the equity of the deal.



The ICBM/SLBM forces of the two sides would be:

OPTION THREE

MIRV FORCES

United States		Soviet	
Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)	Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)
1000 MM-III	2.4	675 SS-17/19	3.7
496 Poseidon/ Trident	2.1	950 SLBM MIRV	2.1
<u>240</u> Trident II	<u>1.4</u>		
MIRV Forces 1736	5.9	1625	5.8

UNMIRVED FORCES

United States		Soviet	
Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)	Launchers	Throw Weight (million lbs)
00	00	355 SS-11	.9
00	00	60 SS-13/16	.1
<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>300</u> SS-9	<u>3.9</u>
UnMIRVed Total 00	00	715	4.9
Total Launchers	<u>1736</u>	<u>2340</u>	

In conclusion, there are several key points to keep in mind concerning the flexibility of the MIRV throw weight concept and its limitations.

—First, in limiting ICBM MIRVs, *we should try for the lowest level*. We can accept deployment of the 17 and 19, but it is essential that the Soviets accept the concept of limiting MIRVed ICBMs to specified complexes and to accept a ban on modifying unMIRVed silos. (More on this in Section II below.)

—Second, we should *not agree to stop the Trident II* missile and Trident ship *unless the Soviets stop some of their programs* that are of great concern to us; i.e.; the SS-18.

—Third, while we are willing to give up the Trident II missile and ship, *we must have the Trident I* missiles because of its contribution to SLBM survivability. It is truly a modernization of Poseidon and not a new system. Moreover, the Soviets already have a 4000 n.m. SLBM in their D-class boat.

—Finally, if we give up the Trident boat, *we must have the right to replace our Polaris SLBMs and Titans* with a new SLBM when they grow

old. We would build a Poseidon-size ship carrying Trident I missiles but would not need to do so before the mid-1980s.

## II. *Limits on ICBMs*

Even if the overall outline of an agreement can be worked out, there are some key specifics mainly relating to verification risks that will need to be resolved:

—Which, if any, of the new ICBMs must be banned?

—What other collateral constraints are needed and what are their implications?

### *To Ban or Not to Ban the SS-17 and 18*

The bureaucracy is largely agreed we can monitor deployment of the SS-19 because it won't fit into existing SS-11 silos. The problem lies with the SS-17 and 18 which many believe should be banned. Our view is that we could tolerate the SS-17 but that we should still try to ban the large SS-18. The argument is as follows:

1. *The SS-17.* The SS-17 is the new pop-up medium ICBM. Its throw weight is similar to that of the SS-19 (about 5000 pounds), however, it appears to be several feet shorter. *We are certain the SS-17 can fit physically in SS-11 silos. And because of its pop-up launch technique, there is a significant risk that SS-17s can fly out of SS-11 silos without deepening or other visible modifications.* Thus, from a verification standpoint, the SS-17 is the most troublesome of the new Soviet missiles. Nonetheless, CIA and DIA believe we could have high to moderate confidence of detecting 100 illegal deployments because of the necessary activities associated with this system.

You should bear in mind that the SS-17 also comes in a single RV version with a 5 megaton warhead. If the 17 is permitted, this version must be controlled not only because of cheating possibilities, but because *its five megaton single RVs could provide the Soviets with a more potent counterforce weapon than the SS-11.*

2. *The SS-18.* If we do not ban the SS-18 but only control deployment, *the intelligence community believes that the Soviets might be able to deploy up to 50–100 SS-18s before we could detect them.* Because of the SS-18's high throw weight, cheating of that magnitude would be very significant from a strategic standpoint. Even if the Soviets are allowed only to test and deploy the SS-18 with single RVs, they will have an enormous MIRV *breakout potential*, and in any agreement of limited duration we could be under serious pressure as the agreement drew to a close. Banning the SS-18 would lead to gradual obsolescence of the SS-9s and would eliminate their potentially significant role in the strategic equation.

On balance, we believe that *it is more important to try to ban the SS-X-18 and could tolerate deployment of the SS-X-17*. The SS-X-18 is the least successful Soviet MIRV ICBM in this test program, but politically and strategically the most important to us. To get such a ban we should be prepared to forego long-range ASMs (which the Air Force doesn't want anyway) and air-launched ICBMs. Depending on how the overall MIRV throw weight deal works out, we may also stop the Trident submarine which would be additional leverage to stop the SS-X-18.

#### *Collateral Constraints Required*

As you well know, verifying such an agreement would not be easy and supplementary provisions are required to give us confidence in verification. The key collateral constraints are:

—MIRVed ICBMs can be deployed only in designated complexes and all ICBMs in those complexes must be counted as MIRVed ICBMs.

—There can not be any changes in the depth, diameter, or configuration of silos at complexes where unMIRVed ICBMs are deployed, nor changes in routine maintenance.

#### *Designated Complexes*

The idea of limiting deployment of MIRVed ICBMs to specific complexes is particularly important if we permit the SS-X-17. With such a restriction, CIA has high confidence (DIA moderate) that we could detect 100 illegal SS-X-17s.

*A major question is what complexes would be preferred.* Sixty silos at two Soviet SS-11 complexes (Derazhnya and Pervomaysk in western USSR) are already compatible with the SS-19 and others there are now being modified. The Soviets have 180 launchers at these two sites. However, the newer modifications do not appear to include deepening so they may be intended for the SS-17 or SS-11 Mod III.

In addition, the Soviets could deploy MIRVed SS-19s-17s at ten other SS-11 sites in the USSR with 50 to 120 SS-11 launchers at each site (any SS-17 deployment would have to be counted as a MIRVed ICBM). *A likely candidate as the third site for MIRV deployment is Tatishchevo where a silo modification program is about to get underway* and a large III-X silo was recently detected under construction. At Tatishchevo, the Soviets have 120 SS-11s deployed, thus the Soviets could have 300 SS-19s/17s at these three sites. CIA recently examined all of the SS-11 complexes from the standpoint of planned satellite coverage, weather, and other factors, and *rated Tatishchevo* above the other SS-11 sites as the complex which is *best for permitting MIRVed ICBM deployment—(in other words, we can monitor the other locations better for violations).*

The U.S. plans to deploy 550 MM-III. Five hundred of these will be deployed at three complexes at Minot, Grand Forks, and Warren Air

Force Base. Each of these complexes will have MM-III and *no un-MIRVed missiles*. Thus, if we are dealing with the SS-19/17, *we are in a position to suggest that both sides deploy MIRVed ICBMs at only three ICBM sites*.

Permitting the SS-X-18 raises special problems if we want to limit areas of deployment. There is at least one new SS-18 (III-F) type silo at every SS-9 complex. Even token deployment at every complex could badly confuse our monitoring capabilities. On the other hand, the silos are not complete and if work were stopped at prohibited sites, the silos need not be destroyed.

#### *Ban on Silo Modification*

We are confident that the SS-19 cannot be fired from SS-11 silos without detectable silo modification and there is surmise but not hard proof that some changes would be required for the SS-17 as well—the estimate of its length has increased because we have identified the zero stage and now there is only about five feet of rattle space in the original SS-11 silo. Consequently, *the second essential collateral constraint is a ban on changes in the depth, diameter, or configuration and maintenance of silos where unMIRVed missiles are deployed*. UnMIRVed missile silos (e.g., MM-II silos, etc.) could not be upgraded or deepened in any detectable way. Both sides could, of course, upgrade silos where MIRVed missiles were deployed.

In the case of the U.S., this means that we would have to forego the planned hardening of 300 MM-II silos. In the Soviet case, the impact could be more severe. *The Soviets would have to forego hardening of up to 730 SS-11 silos*, as well as their MLBM silos. This may overstate the impact since the Soviets have been upgrading their 200 older SS-11 silos in the Far East to take the SS-11 MOD-3 and this work could be completed. Also, the impact of this constraint will depend on the duration of the agreement. Nevertheless, this provision will undoubtedly cause problems with the Soviets.

#### *In Sum*

—We can accept deployment of both the SS-19 and 17 if the Soviets will confine this to designated areas and not make changes elsewhere.

—We should still try to ban the SS-X-18.

—Both sides could have the same number of ICBM MIRV fields, (i.e. 3).

**54. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 15, 1974, 10:12–10:51 a.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

Kenneth Rush

U. Alexis Johnson\*

Seymour Weiss

Frank Perez

Boris Klosson\*

Helmuth Sonnenfeldt

*DOD*

James Schlesinger

William Clements

Dr. Fred Wikner

Paul Nitze\*

\*Member, SALT Delegation

*JCS*

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. Edward Rowney\*

*CIA*

William Colby

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Dr. Fred Ikle

Charles Zemach

Ralph Earle, II\*

*NSC Staff*

Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Jan Lodai

David Aaron

Peter Zimmerman

Jeanne W. Davis

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—in the initial phase of the resumed SALT talks our delegation will explore various concepts without getting into a discussion of specific numbers;

—a NSDM along these lines would be drafted and reviewed by the principals today, and Secretary Kissinger would discuss it with the President tomorrow.

[Omitted here are Duckett's briefing and discussion of it.]

Secretary Kissinger: A lot of work has been done since the last meeting.<sup>2</sup> The delegation leaves tomorrow. (to Amb. Johnson) After this meeting maybe you and Paul (Nitze) and Jim (Schlesinger) and I might get together. The problem now is what sort of instructions to give the delegation. In the absence of another NSC meeting and since

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74 [4 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 51.

the President has not had a chance to look at the options, and because we are considering some startling new stuff, our present inclination is not to table any numbers. We could begin with a general exploration of some concepts—MIRV throw-weight, essential equivalence, and the like. After we have some Soviet response we will have a better sense of what is in the ball-park.

Amb. Johnson: I have no problem with that approach in my initial presentation. But I think it is unlikely that we will get any response from them until we table some numbers.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm trying to avoid an immediate brawl on numbers without having some concepts worked out.

Amb. Johnson: I agree it will be a big job to get the concepts across.

Secretary Kissinger: We need a definition of MIRV throw-weight, and the nature of a MIRVed missile has to be explored. (to Nitze) Paul, was that a personal copy of the paper on what might be said?<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Nitze: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Amb. Johnson) Do you approve of that approach?

Amb. Johnson: Yes, but it depends on what our instructions are.

Secretary Kissinger: As a way of getting into the issues I think it has possibilities. We're not in a position without another NSC or the President's focussing on the problem to come down hard on a set of numbers. The President hasn't analyzed the latest OSD option.<sup>4</sup> This will be very difficult for the Soviets to absorb. Reduced non-MIRVed missiles are a big gulp. I ran the idea of MIRV throw-weight past Gromyko and it took them three weeks to understand it. Now they understand it, but they don't like it. They're having a helluva time. They understand the issues less than we do. As I understand it many of the concepts we have developed can work at various numerical levels. Rather than engage in a brawl at this stage on numbers, have them raise FBS, etc., we could in the first phase explore concepts. As you know, I expect to be in Moscow in the second half of March. If SALT is on the agenda, I would expect Alex (Johnson) to come too.

Mr. Clements: I agree. Are you implying that reductions would be a part of the concept?

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<sup>3</sup> The paper has not been further identified.

<sup>4</sup> The OSD option was Variant B-2, which called for equal MIRV throw-weight at 4.8 million pounds and a deep reduction from 2,500 to 1,700 in central delivery systems, i.e. land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers. (Memorandum from Lord to Rush, February 9; National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Lot File 77D112, Box 345, Director's Files (Winston Lord), Feb. 1974)

Secretary Kissinger: I have no problem with reductions as part of the concept. We are talking about reductions over a ten-year period. We could begin implementing one part, and explore reductions later.

Sec. Schlesinger: We can develop the concept of phasing to maintain stability.

Amb. Johnson: If we can talk about the concept of achieving equal MIRV throw-weight and reductions, we can work this for a couple of weeks.

Secretary Kissinger: By that time we will have had another NSC meeting and we get some feel for the degree of urgency the Soviets feel. Then, as we did in SALT I, we might give them three variations of how it might look and tell them we are willing to talk about any of the three. That way they won't have to come down hard on one US position. I have talked to Gromyko both in Geneva and here. They're having trouble getting a consensus in their government. They want SALT because they see détente falling apart, with MFN and Solzhenitsyn. They're having trouble with their military. We haven't heard a word from our military since they figured out how SALT could get them a bigger military establishment. It's the best legitimization of Trident they have. (Senator) Symington has told me they don't know how many SALT agreements we can afford.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think this approach is fine. We want to explore the question of essential equivalence. (to Amb. Johnson) You may want to use that throw-weight chart.<sup>5</sup> You can do a hard sell on the concept of stability which could lead you into the case for mutual reductions.

Amb. Johnson: Let me have the chart.

Secretary Kissinger: So we will avoid numbers in the first phase. Can you keep the delegation together on this?

Mr. Johnson: That's no problem. But we shouldn't raise our expectations too high that the Soviets will respond to concepts and principles.

Secretary Kissinger: But we should get some of these considerations into their decision-making.

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: We need to have some discussion of MIRV throw-weight and get some definition of the problem.

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<sup>5</sup> The chart was not attached but was apparently the OSD Variant B-2 chart attached as tab A to the memorandum from Lord to Rush, February 9. The chart provides "illustrative MIRV forces after reductions" for the United States and Soviet Union as well as "forces following reductions." (Ibid.)

Mr. Johnson: Very much so. I'd like to know whether we have a consensus here on definition.

Mr. Schlesinger: There are differences but the range is so small that anything the Soviets might accept would be acceptable here.

Mr. Johnson: We need to distinguish between MRVs and MIRVs.

Mr. Duckett: You're talking about a number which is nothing more than a gross cut. Any definition is okay if you take into account the uncertainties.

Dr. Ikle: SLBM throw-weight is harder because it depends on the range.

Dr. Wikner: You can use demonstrated throw-weight—at whatever range you pick.

Secretary Kissinger: If you do it on the maximum then fire it at shorter range, won't you get distortion?

Mr. Schlesinger: Any reasonable definition reduces the discrepancies.

Mr. Johnson: The difference is whether you talk about normalized or demonstrated throw-weight.

Mr. Schlesinger: Either one is satisfactory. We should decide on which is better for us.

Secretary Kissinger: Should we let them raise the issue?

Mr. Nitze: It would be helpful if we could present a definition. On the SLBMs we should use demonstrated throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: What is that?

Mr. Nitze: The maximum throw-weight demonstrated at any range.

(Secretary Kissinger left the room)

Mr. Clements: You mean at the closest range, you have the highest throw-weight.

Mr. Nitze: That's why our throw-weight is so high. You have low throw-weight at maximum range, high at short range.

Mr. Johnson: Some people have raised a question about paragraph 4. (reading from paper)<sup>6</sup> "Under this definition, throw-weight will be taken as the maximum that has been demonstrated on any test or training flight of the missile except that it shall not be less than the maximum capability calculated at a range of re-entry vehicles of 10,000 kilometers from launch point to a single impact point, discounting the effects of the earth's rotation." This will be very hard to explain. Is there any problem in taking it out?

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<sup>6</sup> Apparent reference to the paper referred to in footnote 3 above, which has not been further identified.



Dr. Ikle: I have no problem with it.

(Secretary Kissinger returned)

Mr. Johnson: Then let's take it out. How much emphasis do we want to place on ICBM MIRVs? They are the most destabilizing.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Let them raise SLBMs. No matter what approach we take, whether we wind up with a total aggregate or ICBMs, if there is a total aggregate there will have to be a side agreement on ICBMs or you have no agreement at all. If you agree on a total and they use it all in ICBMs before they have their SLBM ready . . .

Dr. Ikle: Shouldn't the expression of principles also go into some of the verification problems?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Ikle: Also slowing down new generations of missiles.

Mr. Johnson: Do we want that or not?

Mr. Clements: That's a whole new issue.

Mr. Schlesinger: (to Dr. Ikle) What do you mean by new generations?

Dr. Ikle: What can be developed in years to come.

Mr. Schlesinger: That cuts off our program.

Dr. Ikle: But they can do it faster than we can.

Secretary Kissinger: If the concept is accepted, the issue would be raised. At the present time this would complicate things beyond what the system can stand.

Mr. Schlesinger: The instability of MIRVs has to be tied to throw-weight. A heavily MIRVed -16 is better than a lightly MIRVed -18. On that non-rotating earth point, we have to hold on that. They're firing west and we are firing east. That's a significant penalty for us. We should check this out before we drop the point.

Mr. Johnson: Okay.

Mr. Schlesinger: We can't drop the point until we see the concept.

Secretary Kissinger: What would they be firing west? ICBMs?

Mr. Duckett: Their test firing is west.

Secretary Kissinger: Their demonstrated throw-weight is lower because we're firing east on tests?

Mr. Johnson: To whose advantage?

Mr. Duckett: Theirs.

Mr. Clements: The earth will continue to rotate. We have to include this point.

Dr. Ikle: What should we say about the -17 and additional collateral constraints on verification?

Mr. Johnson: I wouldn't talk to specific missiles at this stage. We can talk about the principles we might want to apply to specific missiles. On verification, we can talk about fitting missiles into existing holes.

Secretary Kissinger: You can talk about specific missiles if you don't talk about numbers. You could say there is a gray area with the -17.

Mr. Johnson: I would welcome the ability to talk about specifics.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no problem with that but I don't want to get locked to specific numbers. If we can get the theory accepted, I understand the community here can live with various levels.

Mr. Johnson: Very good.

Mr. Colby: Collateral constraints cause a lot of agony on their side.

Mr. Duckett: Security-wise, we can say we are aware of two medium-sized missiles flown from silos—one new and one -17.

Mr. Johnson: There are two concepts: the block approach and collateral constraints.

Secretary Kissinger: The trouble with the block approach is that they may apply it to every hole. That has some utility as long as it is tied to reductions.

Mr. Schlesinger: No, it must be tied to MIRV throw-weight.

Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the -18 and -19, if we can ban or limit deployment of the missiles we can be reasonably confident that we can get at the MIRV problem.

Mr. Nitze: As long as we take the position that any silo from which a missile has been tested in a MIRV mode would be assumed to have a MIRVed missile deployed.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, yes. I misunderstood what you meant by the block approach. That leaves open the -16 and the -11 holes.

Dr. Wikner: The Russians don't know the difference between Minuteman II and III in the silos.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm trying to think how to move forward. Suppose Alex Johnson, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Jan Lodol and Fred Ikle draft a NSDM this afternoon. Then Jim (Schlesinger) and Tom (Moorer) can look at it. I'll be in Key Biscayne tonight and can talk to the President tomorrow morning. As long as it is general, I think the President will agree to whatever we agree on. If we talk about numbers, probably not.

Mr. Johnson: I can make my Tuesday speech very broad, as long as I get instructions by the Thursday meeting.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The session of the SALT II negotiations began in Geneva on Tuesday, February 19. Johnson's opening statement was transmitted in telegram 1030 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

Secretary Kissinger: There are two ways to go about it. We can draft it here and send it to you for your comments, or we can draft it today and look at it. Everyone will get a look at it today and I'll talk to the President tomorrow. Is that reasonable?

Mr. Schlesinger: Fine.

Secretary Kissinger: We're agreed on the basic concepts. This verification work has been very useful.

Mr. Schlesinger: If we shift the emphasis from the individual components of the force to the overall stability of the force structure, this will lead in the direction of a higher proportion of the force being in SLBMs. They can have more launchers with less throw-weight or fewer launchers.

Mr. Johnson: This will be a very long process.

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## 55. National Security Decision Memorandum 245<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 19, 1974.

TO

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks, Geneva, February 19, 1974

The President has reviewed NSDM's 213, 216 and 233<sup>2</sup> and the work of the Verification Panel and has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on February 19, 1974, in Geneva.

1. The Delegation should make clear that the United States has undertaken an extensive review of both sides' approach to the negotiations. The overall U.S. objective continues to be a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms which provides a high degree of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-208, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 201–250 [Originals]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 23, 25, and 39.

equivalence in central strategic systems—ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers.

2. The Delegation should reemphasize that the U.S. considers the establishment of equal aggregate limits on the number, and substantially equal aggregate throw weight, of central strategic systems to be primary elements in establishing such equivalence. The Delegation should continue to support an initial aggregate ceiling for both sides of 2,350.

3. The Delegation should also state that, in the context of a permanent agreement, the U.S. supports phased mutual reductions consistent with equal aggregate numerical limits.

4. The Delegation should review in depth with the Soviets the underlying strategic conceptions that bear on the long-term emerging strategic relationship and agreements thereon. These are stability, essential equivalence, and verifiability.

5. The Delegation should reaffirm the importance of controlling selective qualitative aspects of the strategic relationship and, in particular, the importance of controlling MIRV's on ICBM's promptly in order to preserve the survivability of deterrent forces, enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. The SALT Basic Principles signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev recognized the importance of such qualitative limitations and made clear that the process of future modernization should be in accordance with agreed conditions.<sup>3</sup>

6. In this context, the Delegation should propose that priority consideration be given in the negotiations to the concept of establishing limitations on the throw weight of MIRVed missiles. Under this concept, each side should have the right to essentially the same aggregate throw weight for ICBM's with MIRV's. Within this equal level, each side would be able to deploy a specified number of ICBM's with MIRV's, the sum total (aggregate) throw weight of these ICBM's not to exceed an agreed level.<sup>4</sup> The Delegation should make clear that the proposed MIRV throw weight concept applies only to systems with true MIRV capability and not to existing MRV missiles. The Delegation may discuss the definitions of MIRV throw weight, MIRV and MRV after clearing its proposed definitions with Washington.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 30.

<sup>4</sup> While the Delegation should not discuss specific throw weight levels, the Delegation should be aware that the U.S. cannot accept throw weight levels for MIRVed ICBM's above the level represented by the Minuteman III program potential; furthermore, the U.S. will strive to achieve equal levels much below the Minuteman III potential level. [Footnote is in the original.]

7. In elaborating the ICBM MIRV throw weight concept, the Delegation should emphasize that the U.S. attaches great importance to the principle that any agreement should be adequately verifiable by national technical means. The Delegation should set forth the problems of MIRV missile verification and attempt to elicit Soviet views on this issue without, at this time, discussing possible solutions.

8. In presenting the ICBM MIRV throw weight concept, the Delegation should explain that the U.S. does not exclude seeking a mutually acceptable concept for dealing with SLBM's and their MIRV's. If the Soviet side presses the Delegation on the question of SLBM MIRV limitations, the Delegation should explain that, provided the Soviet Union will limit ICBM MIRV throw weight to agreed levels, the U.S. is prepared to consider limitations on SLBM MIRV throw weight as well.

9. In implementing the instructions contained in paragraphs three through eight above, the Delegation should refrain from mentioning any specific levels. If the Soviet side suggests any such specific throw weight level or program of reductions, the Delegation should seek instructions.

10. The Delegation should say that it believes an active exchange of views with the Soviet Delegation on the U.S. MIRV proposal is necessary in order to provide a foundation for progress in the negotiations.

11. If the Soviet Delegation inquires as to the status of prior U.S. proposals in areas not specifically mentioned above, the U.S. Delegation should indicate that it is the U.S. position to focus the present negotiations on the major concepts stated in the foregoing paragraphs. The Delegation should note that the resolution of other issues is dependent upon the development of a common approach to these major concepts and that it prefers to set aside for the present discussion of other issues.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

## 56. Letter From President Nixon to Senator Henry Jackson<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1974.

Dear Senator Jackson:

Your letter of January 29, 1974, concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,<sup>2</sup> was a welcome contribution to my thinking as we resumed the SALT negotiations in Geneva.

In reaching my decisions on our approach to these negotiations, I have instructed the U.S. Delegation to give particular attention to three elements: (1) numerical levels of the forces on both sides, taking account of throw weight; (2) a program of phased mutual reductions in the level of strategic armaments; and, (3) the need for qualitative as well as quantitative controls over the continued competition in strategic arms.

Like yourself, I am particularly hopeful that strategic equivalence can be achieved at reduced levels of forces on both sides. As you know, the SALT Basic Principles which I signed with General Secretary Brezhnev last June<sup>3</sup> pledge both sides to "continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction."

However, until clear strategic equivalence is achieved on a permanent basis, I am committed to maintaining the existing U.S. margin of qualitative superiority in strategic weaponry. Further, we cannot ignore the determined efforts of the Soviet Union to match and even surpass the U.S. in the qualitative aspects of weaponry—such as MIRV. To do so would pose a grave risk to our security and to the stability of the strategic balance.

I am, therefore, moving on two fronts. As you know, I have included additional funds in my Fiscal 1975 Budget to initiate research and development on a number of new strategic program options. If the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 891, SALT, SALT TWO—I-Geneva, January 1974. No classification marking. In a covering March 5 memorandum recommending that the President sign the letter to Jackson, which the President saw, Kissinger summarized Jackson's letter and made the following observations: 1) Jackson's proposed reductions to 1,760 strategic launchers would be one-sided and unacceptable to the Soviets, requiring them to reduce more than twice as many of their existing launchers as the United States; 2) a reductions-only program "places no real restraint" on new Soviet programs, especially their MIRV capacity; 3) Jackson's threat of a new series of U.S. strategic programs if the Soviets did not respond to his proposed reductions would probably cause SALT to collapse. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Document 50.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 30.

momentum of Soviet qualitative developments continues unchecked, it will be essential that the United States exercise some of these options and undertake new deployments. At the same time, we shall make a determined effort—through negotiations with the Soviet Union—to forestall the need for another such round in the qualitative arms race.

I was gratified by your pledge of continued Congressional support for our defense program, particularly our strategic forces, and I hope you will urge your colleagues to support our initiatives in the new budget. As you know, only by maintaining a vigorous defense program can we provide the best environment for a successful outcome for SALT—one that insures that our security will remain undiminished.

With continued good wishes,  
Sincerely,

**Richard Nixon**

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## 57. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

For the past several weeks the U.S. and Soviet Delegations in Geneva have been presenting some general considerations on a SALT agreement arising out of the review that both sides have undertaken. In particular, the U.S. Delegation has set forth a number of concepts which could form the basis for a comprehensive agreement on strategic offensive arms. In this confidential channel, the U.S. side believes it would be worthwhile to concentrate on the most urgent of these concepts; namely, controls on qualitative changes which threaten to upset the strategic balance. In anticipation of Secretary Kissinger's impending visit, the U.S. side wishes to set forth its views on a most significant as-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, 1964–1978, Box CL 232, Soviet Union, Chronological File, March–April 1974. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: "Handed to Dobrynin by Secretary 1:00 p.m. March 20 1974." According to February 22 memorandum from Lodal, Hyland, and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, they prepared a draft of this note for use by the Secretary in his confidential channel with Dobrynin. The initial draft contained "some more detail: i.e., a suggestion that 2350 be the *starting point* for numerical limits, a suggestion that the ICBM MIRV throw weight level should be the current planned US level (about 500) and some indication of the verification problems including stopping testing and restricting silo modifications." (Ibid., Soviet Union, Chronological File, September 1973–February 1974)

pect of qualitative change, with the aim of reaching agreement or narrowing our differences to the point that a common framework for a SALT agreement will be ready for consideration at the highest political levels.

The U.S. side has already discussed in a preliminary manner a new concept for limiting MIRVs. In our view, an appropriate means to achieve such equality is to limit the aggregate throw weight of the MIRVed missiles of each side to an agreed equal level.

It would be necessary to agree to procedures which would ensure that the elements of any agreement are adequately verifiable. This is particularly difficult in the case of verifying the deployment levels of MIRV missiles. Both sides will need to examine mutual measures to assure that the following basic principles are met:

—Once a missile has been fully flight tested with MIRVs, all launchers in which that missile is deployed shall be counted as containing MIRVs.

—The deployment of ICBMs with MIRVs shall be limited to specific fields (complexes). Furthermore, all launchers at MIRV fields shall be counted as containing MIRV missiles.

—Modification to launchers and changes in operating procedures which would permit the deployment of missiles with MIRVs shall be prohibited except at ICBM fields designated as MIRV fields.

The U.S. side understands, of course, that other solutions to the general problem of achieving equal limitations on MIRV deployments are possible. It would greatly facilitate progress if the Soviet side could now indicate whether it would be willing to accept the principle of equal limitations on the deployment of MIRVed missiles and would present its position.

The U.S. side will give serious and immediate consideration to any views the Soviet side is prepared to express on the various aspects of qualitative restrictions on strategic arms.



**58. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1974, 4–5:30 p.m.

**PRINCIPALS**

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  
Deputy Secretary of State Rush  
JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Walters  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Ikle

**OTHER ATTENDEES**

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt	Assistant to the President
	Kissinger
<i>Defense</i>	General Alexander M. Haig
Deputy Secretary Clements	Major General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. Paul Nitze (SALT Delegation)	
<i>Treasury</i>	NSC
Secretary Shultz	Mr. Jan M. Lodal
<i>CIA</i>	
Mr. Carl Duckett	
<i>ACDA</i>	
Mr. Sidney Graybeal, Chairman	
SALT Consultative	
Committee	

President Nixon: Gentlemen, I am sorry to have held you up for an hour. I had to take care of some matters with Secretary Butz. Shall we start with the CIA briefing? Will you give it, General Walters?

General Walters: No sir, Carl Duckett will give it.

Mr. Duckett: I'd like to start with a quick review of the technical characteristics of the new Soviet ICBMs. (Shows chart illustrating new Soviet ICBMs.)<sup>2</sup> As I went over last time,<sup>3</sup> they are developing four new systems—the SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18, and SS-X-19. The SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 are medium size systems probably designed to replace the SS-11. The SS-X-18 is a large system designed to replace the SS-9. All three carry MIRVs. The SS-X-16 has not yet been tested with MIRV, although it appears to have such a capability.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1971 thru 6-20-74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> The CIA charts were not found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 47.

I would now like to go on to talk about force projections over the next five years and show what some of the Soviet programs might look like, particularly what they might look like in the absence of a SALT agreement.

President Nixon: George (Shultz) and perhaps some of the others were not here last time, so feel free to go over once again any of the items you covered then.

Mr. Duckett: Thank you, sir. My first chart shows the number of delivery vehicles. As it shows, the Soviets could get up to 3500 with an all-out program by 1982. What we think is more likely is a program of about 2500, compared with a US programmed force of about 2200.

President Nixon: Let me ask a question about the total bang we are talking about. What's the total bang of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] versus what was used in Nagasaki?

Mr. Duckett: [*3 lines not declassified*]

President Nixon: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I understand that decisions have been made by the US, by the Department of Defense for smaller missiles and warheads than the Soviets. But still, we need some perspective on the size of these weapons.

Mr. Duckett: I would now like to go to a chart on missile throw weight. As this shows, the Soviets could go as high as 16,000 pounds in an all-out program by 1982, compared to 4,000 pounds for the US program. Even in the more likely case, we would expect them to go to something like 11,000 pounds.

President Nixon: Once again, we have to keep this in perspective. [*1 line not declassified*] The numbers are different, particularly if we have precision as well as numbers.

Mr. Duckett: That's right. Dropped on Washington, there is essentially no difference [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President Nixon: And Manhattan is even smaller than Washington.

Mr. Duckett: This next chart shows the throw weight including an allowance for bombers. As it shows, when you include the bombers, we are ahead of the likely Soviet force.

President Nixon: You mean we are ahead in bombers? But I thought they were as obsolete as the battleship?

Mr. Duckett: Jim will have to speak on that.

President Nixon: I know every time you go to SAC, they say bombers are terribly important. But do the Soviets consider them important? Let me ask our chief negotiator.

Dr. Ikle: Yes, they are concerned about bombers and bomber armaments.

President Nixon: Is some of that negotiating leverage?

Dr. Ikle: Perhaps some of it, but they do seem to have some concern. While they don't have a new strategic bomber, they are building a new medium bomber—the Backfire. This may be their choice for how to go on bombers.

Mr. Duckett: I should also point out that the Soviets continue to spend large sums of money on air defense. They have a vast air defense system and we often have trouble understanding why they keep adding to it. This is perhaps the most important indicator that they consider bombers serious.

President Nixon: They have lots of experience with air defense in Vietnam; we don't have much experience.

Vice President Ford: *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[1 line not declassified]*

Vice President Ford: *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: No, the throw weight also includes the bus. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Clements: Carl, in your chart, did you include the B-1 in the bomber numbers?

Mr. Duckett: Yes, we have included it, phased in as presently programmed. I don't know the exact numbers.

Secretary Schlesinger: Is the Backfire in for the Soviets?

Mr. Duckett: No, we have not included it.

President Nixon: I understand that the rationale for bombers is the flexibility they give us; but for a first strike, given the response time, isn't the bomber irrelevant?

Admiral Moorer: If you are talking about a US surprise attack, yes. But you have to remember that the bomber was the first strategic weapon we had. We have gone with a "Triad" concept to guard against any technological breakthrough that might threaten one type of weapon system. Also, you can use the bomber in other manners. There are three main advantages to the bombers. First, you can launch them when you get strategic warning. Second, they can be recalled. Third, they carry a big load of accurate weapons. One could look upon bombers as air breathing MIRV vehicles.

Dr. Ikle: In a crisis, they could be put on airborne alert, increasing the forces available.

President Nixon: Yes, I understand that with the crisis we can put them on alert.

Secretary Schlesinger: A bomber is also recoverable. You can bring it back and reload it. It has a number of unique characteristics, and while we would not want to rely exclusively on bombers, as a compo-

ment of our force, the bomber has a role to play in stabilizing the strategic balance.

Mr. Duckett: I would also like to point out that up to 1970, the Soviets planned only for a full strategic exchange. We now know that since 1970 they have been planning on selective use of nuclear weapons, at least in the theater. Aircraft have a big advantage in this kind of role.

President Nixon: Let me ask, what kind of missile warning time would we have if the Soviets attacked us?

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President Nixon: And the bombers can get off in that time?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Secretary Schlesinger: They do have a capability to launch SLBMs on depressed trajectories which could hit our bomber bases in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] minutes, but we believe the bomber force we plan into the 1980s could still be flushed in that time.

President Nixon: We must also remember that our warning almost always comes diplomatically.

Mr. Clements: One other point about bombers—the B-1 also is the equivalent of 8 Minuteman missiles.

Secretary Shultz: What's the probability the bombers will get through the defense?

Mr. Duckett: It's hard to say. They have a sophisticated system and the bombers would have a rough ride.

Admiral Moorer: We would have the same experience as we did in North Vietnam. The first bombers would have heavy losses, but then their defense would be degraded.

Mr. Clements: I disagree with Carl. The ability of the bombers to penetrate will be high. The first then would have heavy losses but their overall ability would be high.

Mr. Rush: We could turn the argument around about their air defenses—they might give a response to our bombers.

Mr. Duckett: [*5 lines not declassified*]

Vice President Ford: How many warheads do they have on each missile?

Mr. Duckett: [*4 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Rush: Is there a relationship between accuracy and weight?

Mr. Duckett: Accuracy is much more important than throw weight when it comes to kill probability.

Mr. Clements: Within our budget, we are increasing our accuracy to twice its present level.

Mr. Duckett: I should also mention that the US is not locked into the program shown on these charts. This is only an illustrative program—the present plans.

President Nixon: Today, we have a substantial accuracy advantage. But they are gaining on us. With no agreement, on the accuracy side, will our advantage narrow or increase? I remember everyone jumping up and down about Sputnik, but we caught up and passed them.

Mr. Duckett: *[5 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: Would they need a new warhead to achieve this accuracy?

Mr. Duckett: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

President Nixon: In our SALT discussions, we're not suggesting any restrictions on accuracy?

Dr. Ikke: That's correct, we have not suggested any restrictions on accuracy.

President Nixon: Therefore, no matter what we do, they will get there—our accuracy advantage will narrow, correct?

Mr. Duckett: Yes.

Secretary Schlesinger: In the real world, no one can count on knowing accuracy exactly. We hope not to find out. We expect some operational degradation. The size of weapons reduces one's dependence on accuracy, so there will always remain some advantage to bigger weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course we never have fired a missile from an operational silo.

Mr. Clements: But that's why, at your suggestion, Henry, we now have the Operational Base Launch Program.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, one of the purposes of this program is to see what kind of accuracy we get from operational silos, but we still have never fired a missile north. We can't measure accuracy perfectly until there is an actual exchange.

President Nixon: Thank you, Carl. Now let's turn to Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: Carl covered some of the points I'd like to make. Let me sum up where we stand, then go over some of the choices that will come up. In Geneva, we have presented four concepts based on essential equivalence. Equal aggregates at a level of about 2350; equal aggregate throw weight; a program of reductions; and qualitative controls through equivalence of MIRV throw weight. We have not received an enthusiastic response to our position. I believe we are not destined to receive a favorable response, for one overriding reason. Ten years ago, we decided deliberately to produce low throw weight mis-

siles. The present disparity is a result of decisions made in the 1960s and it is very hard to redress these disparities through a SALT agreement now.

On the question of controlling MIRVs, we have gone through a number of phases. First, we favored limiting testing. But the SS-19 and probably the SS-17 is probably too far advanced, and we have no equivalent testing program to stop. We've also looked at the Soviet approach for equal numbers of MIRV launchers. [1 line not declassified] Their missiles have either [number not declassified] warheads.

Mr. Duckett: I might mention that they have recently had 2 SS-17 and 3 SS-18 long-range tests in the Pacific. They have previously tested the SS-19 so this means, except for the SS-16, that they have now tested all of their new missiles to full range.

Secretary Kissinger: On our overall program, I am pessimistic because we can't get equality in throw weight and numbers unless they tear down heavy weapons or we start a new program to significantly build up our heavy weapons.

To try to cut off the Soviet MIRV programs, we developed a concept of limiting MIRVs on the basis of throw weight. Under this concept, we would have more missiles—the exact difference would depend on the particular missiles they choose to deploy—but we would have on the order of 2-1 in MIRVed missiles if the throw weight concept were accepted.

As Carl has pointed out, we have to look at the relative positions of the US and the Soviets if current programs are carried forward on both sides. In this case, the gap will increase against us.

The Soviets have also emphasized FBS, which we refrain to discuss out of consideration of our allies, and they have indicated that they require more missiles because of a threat we don't face yet but which they do.

President Nixon: I presume you mean China.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Our basic problem is that our forces have been designed unilaterally in asymmetrical ways. We have chosen smaller ICBMs; the Soviets have no modern bomber force; and it's hard to equate missiles and bombers in any event. You have to allow for air defense, bombers can be reloaded. I might say that we have not counted B-1s as 8 Minuteman in anything I have seen. I suspect we will never hear that number from OSD again.

Secretary Schlesinger: No, that's not true. We count a bomber as approximately equivalent to an SS-9 or SS-18, and a Minuteman is counted as about  $\frac{1}{8}$  of an SS-9.

President Nixon: But these calculations presume only one use of the bomber? The Deputy Secretary made the point that the bomber can be reused.

Secretary Schlesinger: Their new missiles, the SS–17 and SS–19 (*sic*), use a pop-up technique. That means their missile silos can be re-loaded also.

President Nixon: Isn't that another reason not to bother with bombers? The argument that bombers can be used twice goes away if you can use missiles twice. In any event, let's go ahead to a less esoteric discussion.

Secretary Schlesinger: That's true with our currently programmed forces in 1975, but our new budget has the start of a new ICBM. It could allow us to deploy up to 6000 new RVs.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we would have to decide not only on the number of US forces needed by themselves, but also the Soviet reaction. The disparity can only be closed if we redesign our forces and deploy higher throw weight missiles.

President Nixon: We must be careful about any assumption that we will continue forward and they will stay where they are. If we goose up our programs, they will goose up their programs also.

Vice President Ford: Jim, if it turned out that no SALT agreement was possible, and you had "x" million dollars extra, would you put it into strategic forces or conventional forces?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would put about \$2 billion in strategic forces.

President Nixon: We mustn't kid ourselves. If we start running faster, they will start running faster. So double that number.

Secretary Schlesinger: We might not have to go that high. We would only have to do that if they were to break out of an agreement in a manner which threatens essential equivalence.

Secretary Kissinger: When could your new missile be available?

Secretary Schlesinger: By about 1979. Let me make it clear that we prefer to hold both sides at present levels; present levels are quite stable. But we have to get across the message to the Soviets that if they are interested in racing, we will match them, and therefore it is in the interest of both sides to put a cap on the forces.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had some recent conversations with Dobrynin. He indicated that the Soviets may be ready to consider limitations on MIRVs. They don't like our idea of throw weight, but they may be willing to accept the disparity in the number of MIRV launchers. I think it is possible we can work out the practical equivalent of equal throw weight by expressing it numerically. The issue we have to face is what to do if they offer us an extension of the Interim Agreement and a MIRV deal—would we be prepared to go along? We have received no proposition from them on any numbers or what the mix of forces will be. Internally, we have always assumed that any missiles

tested with MIRVs must count as MIRVed. Therefore, the SS-19 and the SS-17 would have to be considered as MIRVs. We might be able to slow down their deployment of these systems by tying this to some kind of codicil on the Interim Agreement which lasts during the same period. Then the US programs will put pressure on them during the continuing negotiations. We have to decide whether we want a MIRV agreement in the Interim Agreement or to push forward to a permanent agreement; if we do the latter, we have to decide how much time we will take and set a deadline for ourselves.

We can either slow down their rate or increase ours. To do nothing will produce a bigger gap, given the state of their deployments.

If the Soviet proposition is unacceptable, our practical choice will be to set an internal time limit and kick off development of Jim's program. [1½ lines not declassified] They've got 1500 weapons with 6 to 8 MIRVs each. The disparity will increase. With SALT II, we may be able to slow down the rate and use Jim's new systems for leverage; or we can set a cutoff point and hold out for a permanent agreement. The worst possible situation is to continue negotiating for a permanent agreement and continue with our present programs.

President Nixon: Are we talking about any limitations on R&D?

Secretary Kissinger: No, except for MIRV limitations. I told the Chiefs I will bring back any Soviet proposal before we agree to it.

President Nixon: But in the agreements we are talking about, R&D is not inhibited?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

President Nixon: Let's keep the money in for the R&D. But we want to avoid the Navy, Army, and Air Force fighting about who has the most officers' clubs and use the money for R&D.

Vice President Ford: In the 1950s and 1960s, we seemed always to reach a plateau of new systems. First we had the B-52, then ICBMs, and so forth. In our R&D programs, is there a plateau we see coming?

Secretary Schlesinger: No. We have cruise missiles and some new things.

President Nixon: Well, try to think about that hard, Jim.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are worried about our cruise missiles, although we don't have much of a program for them.

Mr. Clements: But, Henry, at your suggestion we now have a cruise missile program.

Dr. Ikle: There's a third option we might take with respect to relating a MIRV agreement to an overall agreement. We might negotiate a separate limit on MIRVs and agree that it is the first step in an overall agreement.



Secretary Kissinger: Let me make it clear that the hint I received from the Soviets must not be fed back into Geneva.

Vice President Ford: Let me ask about the China threat that allegedly only the Soviets face. One of Secretary McNamara's early rationalizations for the ABM was for use against third countries.

President Nixon: In my first or second press conference, I made the point that the ABM was quite useful against minor nuclear powers, and I've had to live with that ever since.<sup>4</sup> Henry gave me that advice.

Secretary Kissinger: Once China has the missile force that the Soviets have today, that's when we have a very dangerous situation. Then whichever side they choose to go with has the advantage.

Mr. Rush: I have some concern that reaching an Interim Agreement on MIRVs, we might be giving up some of our bargaining leverage for an overall agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: This is where we stand—there is no prospect of a comprehensive agreement this year because of FBS and comparability problems. It may be possible to get a MIRV deal.

President Nixon: I think we want to keep this exclusively in this room.

Secretary Kissinger: They've implored me not to mention their openings.

President Nixon: Also, we don't want to let it out that there is no chance for a comprehensive agreement, and that we might be looking toward a MIRV agreement as a codicil. We don't want any source stories out that we have no chance for a comprehensive agreement—we don't want to throw that away yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm only concerned that if we keep building expectations for a comprehensive agreement, (Senator) Jackson will accuse us of selling out when we don't get it.

President Nixon: There have been too many source stories on these topics; they have to stop. Among ourselves, we can be clear—if we can't get a comprehensive agreement, that's just tough, but we have to be careful about what we say. We're talking about cooperation, space, environment, trade, and cancer research; but on this issue, each country is talking about its basic survival and its position in the world. We have to speak with one voice.

Secretary Kissinger: If we slow the rate of deployment of the Soviet MIRVs, we would also slow down the rate of deployment of the new missiles, given our present understanding that they can't MIRV their existing missiles.

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<sup>4</sup> Nixon is referring to his press conference on March 14, 1969. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 208–216.

Secretary Schlesinger: They could deploy the new missiles with single RVs.

Secretary Kissinger: No, not unless they stop flight testing. Under our concept, once the missile has been tested as MIRVed, any deployment has to be counted as a MIRVed missile, regardless of its warheads. We will count all –18s and –17s as MIRVs. If we can slow down the rate of deployment of their new –18s, this will also degrade the worth of their existing SS–9 force.

President Nixon: Our main concern is about R&D. We have a tendency to get wedded to a particular system. We've got Polaris, Poseidon, and what's it called—Trident, but I can't emphasize too strongly we have to get this research going. Give it to Rand or some eggheads—no, they don't want to do it—all they want to do is work on the environment. But if we can find some smart ones around, have them think about this—think about new weapons systems. Our Navy has been out in front on this.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, sir; we're a technological service.

President Nixon: I'm a complete layman at this, but I do understand history. The great weakness of any major power is to become frozen in its forces. The French, before WWII, thought they had the best army in the world.

Gen. Walters: The Maginot Line was supposed to be the ultimate weapon.

President Nixon: The Soviets and the Chinese are very good in this area of new ideas.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe I saw an assessment that indicated that in starting from a zero base, the Chinese had done the best in nuclear weapons development.

President Nixon: The Soviets do have a problem with the Chinese. I remember saying to Brezhnev that in 20 years they would become a major power; he said no, that it would be ten years—we talked about this last time.

Secretary Kissinger: Both could be right—the threat could be against the Soviets in ten years, but not against us for 20.

Mr. Duckett: My main concern is that the Soviets might make some breakthrough in defense efforts such as a high energy laser ABM.

President Nixon: Are we doing that?

Secretary Schlesinger: No.

President Nixon: How much would it cost to do that?

Secretary Schlesinger: Probably about 60 million.

President Nixon: Give us a recommendation. I want to see that. It's extremely important. But whatever we're doing, double it again if it

can be well spent and make sure it's an add-on—don't take the money away from any place else.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our problem is with Senator McIntyre.<sup>5</sup>

President Nixon: That's why I have to strongly urge you, Jim—you have great credibility on the Hill—they see you as an outer-space-type-thinker—to use your efforts to get these through and don't short change R&D.

Vice President Ford: We have some leverage on McIntyre—he will be in bad trouble in November if he keeps this up.

President Nixon: New Hampshire is a hawk state.

Mr. Clements: They have cut our R&D program.

President Nixon: We get a lot of criticism like what are we doing sending men around and around in space. What you learn is a by-product not just what you find out while you're up there. On Sputnik, Paul Nitze was probably here, and we were all scared to death. We got the briefing from the chief scientist—what was his name?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Kistiakowsky.

President Nixon: Yes, why does everyone have to be from Harvard? (Laughter) In any event, he was a good man. He came down to tell us what we could learn from satellites. He told us about weather, science, etc. At the end, he turned to President Eisenhower, I was sitting across the table there, and said, Mr. President, I'm sure the most important thing we will learn from this program is not on the chart. That's why I'm an R&D man. Henry, will you get us a proposal on the lasers? Do you have further comments?

Secretary Kissinger: No, Mr. President. To sum up, there is nothing in range in Geneva, and nothing in your channel except what I have mentioned. I think they are having a very hard time.

President Nixon: Jim, I understand that DOD could and should only take the position that we have to have equivalence and I know you're not taking this position just to be a hard-liner, to look good if something should go wrong. What is your advice on how we should proceed?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think it is an advantage to both sides to restrain any breakouts in aggregates and throw weight. We have to convince the Soviets that we will match them in these areas. They will come around to the view that we should match each other somewhere between our present level and their level.

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<sup>5</sup> Senator Thomas J. McIntyre (D-New Hampshire) was on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

President Nixon: Well, let's not state it publicly now that we have given up on this. We have an increase in our budget in the works.

Secretary Kissinger: The increased budget has already had an important impact; without B-1 and Trident, we wouldn't even have the bites we have now.

President Nixon: Jim is right. It has to be clearly understood that if they want to race, we're ready. On the other hand, we're prepared to negotiate, but not into an inferior position. It's going to be a very tough negotiation. I have sympathy for the Defense position. I know the JCS is concerned that we will give away the store. We will make a deal only if it is in our own interest. I might add that if they think it's not in their interest, they won't agree either. We have to look at what's in our interest, and what we can get, and then bargain to get it. They will be more brutal, starting out with outrageous positions.

We shouldn't lightly say that if they don't want a deal, we're ready and it will only cost us 2 billion dollars a year. That doesn't mean we'll get a deal for a deal's sake.

Secretary Schlesinger: Let me say one more thing about the DOD position. I think it would be tragic if we cannot get a SALT agreement that ultimately leads to comprehensive equality. But we endorse a MIRV agreement, but more as a way-station on the road to permanent agreement providing essential equivalence. Adding a MIRV agreement to an Interim Agreement may be beneficial. In the long run, throw-weight is important but in the short run, it's not so important since they cannot exploit it. There is no risk before 1980 that the Soviet Union could obtain a measurable advantage. In the longer run they could have a measurable degree of superiority. Today, their throw-weight advantage is only 2 to 1, and we can live with that. But it could get up to 6 to 1 and we could not tolerate that. We don't want to mirror image their forces. But your successors might not feel that they're in a position to stand up to Soviet diplomatic pressures if they had a 6 to 1 advantage. I have two charts I would like to show you if it's all right.<sup>6</sup>

President Nixon: Go ahead.

Vice President Ford: If Congress doesn't go along with your supplemental and new budget, we will have trouble. It's crucial that we get the budget through.

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<sup>6</sup> The charts were not found. According to a March 20 briefing memorandum from Lodal to Kissinger, Schlesinger prepared three briefing charts for this NSC meeting: 1) the Geneva positions of the U.S. focus on equal aggregates, reductions, and MIRVs and the Soviet emphasis on FBS; 2) a separate MIRV deal prejudicing the terms of a permanent agreement on aggregates and suggesting that high levels of unMIRVed missile throw weight were undesirable because of the verification risk; 3) U.S. and Soviet ICBM force levels at present and in 10 years. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-33, NSC Meetings, SALT, 3/21/74)

Secretary Schlesinger: As this chart shows, they already have about a two-to-one throw weight advantage, but it's not exploitable—they don't have the re-entry vehicles, accuracy or MIRV capability. But this position will erode. Their new ICBMs represent a threefold to fourfold increase in throw weight. By 1982, they could increase their advantage to sixfold. With equal weight RVs, they could have 20,000 to 3,000 for us. [6 lines not declassified]

We don't have to match them number for number, but with a 6 to 1 advantage, their robustness in diplomatic negotiations will be such that your successor might not be able to stand up to them.

Secretary Kissinger: This is why it is highly desirable to slow down MIRVs to the greatest extent possible. If we can slow down MIRVs, we can slow down these new missiles.

President Nixon: A Soviet decision to reduce the gap would be quite difficult. They would have to destroy how much?

Secretary Schlesinger: Hopefully we can get them to avoid replacing existing systems with new ones. It will cost them 15 billion dollars to replace the SS-9 with the SS-18. If we can keep the SS-18 out, we will have helped considerably. The question is how do we achieve essential equivalence taking into account bombers and SLBMs at the same time? If we propose a program to significantly limit deployments, we can be taking the high ground and wearing a white hat.

President Nixon: This has been a helpful meeting. Now we have the feel out; this will be followed by the crunch, like it was leading up to the Summit two years ago. I want to say that I understand that reasonable men will disagree. I can recall many tough decisions on Vietnam. My advisors disagreed, and some of them even put their disagreement in writing so that if the decision turned out to be wrong, they would be okay. That's perfectly understandable. But I want to make it clear that in the end, I take the responsibility. First, we must get an agreement that does not put us in an inferior position. We will probably find that, as in SALT I and with the Interim Agreement, concern will be expressed. But we have to make hard choices.

59. United States Note<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

The US is prepared to consider an extension of the Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons for 2–3 years past its expiration date of October 1977. In this connection some modifications in the agreement might be needed, but the essence of the agreement could be continued.

In this case, we suggest that limitations on ICBM/MIRV missiles be established, for the same period, using the US deployment of Minuteman III ICBMs as the baseline. Thus, the US would be prepared to freeze its ICBM/MIRV deployment to 550 silos, and, on this basis, to establish a ratio between the US deployment and the Soviet deployment. For example, a ratio of 2 to 1 would permit about 270 Soviet ICBMs with MIRV. Under this approach, however, it would be necessary to establish a ceiling on the number of launchers for new Soviet heavy ICBMs (which we designate the SS–18) that could be equipped with MIRVs. This subceiling, in our view, could be expressed as a percentage of the number of heavy ICBM silos that the USSR has currently deployed or under construction. An appropriate percentage might be about 15 percent of the total of Soviet heavy ICBMs.

Other numerical combinations would be possible but only in so far as no significant disparity were created in the total numbers of ICBM multiple re-entry vehicles deployed on each side.

This type of agreement would be verified by national technical means, but certain constraints would be desirable to ensure adequate verification. For example:

—As in the ABM treaty, we should consider geographical limitations on ICBM/MIRV deployment.

—We would want to establish that once any ICBM was fully flight-tested as a MIRV, that missile would then be considered limited under the MIRV agreement, even if its deployment mode was with a single warhead.

—Measures should be agreed to assure that modifications to ICBM launchers and changes in operating procedures will be appropriately constrained at all ICBM complexes, so as to increase confidence that MIRV missile limitations are being observed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, 1964–1978, Box CL 232, Soviet Union, Chronological File, March–April 1974. No classification marking. A handwritten message on the note reads, “Handed to A [Dobrynin] by HAK 7:00 pm 3/21/74.”

The foregoing is based on our assumption that negotiations will continue for a comprehensive agreement that would establish essential equivalence between the sides and include a program of phased reductions. An appropriate agreement to this effect would accompany the agreement on MIRV limitations and the extension of the Interim Agreement.

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## 60. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, March 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m.–1:57 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU,  
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary  
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the MFA; Chief of USA  
Department  
Victor M. Sukhodrev, USA Department, MFA (Interpreter)  
Andrei Vavilov, USA Department  
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department  
  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
William G. Hyland, Director—INR  
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

### SUBJECTS

US-Soviet Relations; SALT; Other Arms Control

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Secretary Kissinger's Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons & Reports, March 24–28, 1974. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except for those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting took place in Brezhnev's office in the Council of Ministers Building at the Kremlin. Kissinger visited Moscow March 24–28 to meet with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other Soviet officials. Kissinger and Brezhnev had an additional, inconclusive discussion about SALT from 5:45 to 10:32 p.m. The full text of both memoranda of conversation are printed as Documents 165 and 166 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

*Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*

Brezhnev: We start with strategic arms.

Kissinger: Please.

I gave to your Ambassador, Mr. General Secretary, some ideas which we developed to advance the discussion [Tab C, US note of March 21].<sup>2</sup> I don't know if we should use those as a starting point.

Brezhnev: I think we should basically proceed from the fact that our delegations discussing the matter find themselves deadlocked. They have engaged in discussions but have not moved very far. Past experience has shown that this is the time for decisions to be taken at a higher level.

Kissinger: That is our view.

Brezhnev: I would just like to make an observation here: If we let our purely military men into this sphere we'll end up with an unprecedented arms race; I say that in a full sense of responsibility. Your military men and ours are the same. You can't really blame them. What they say is, we don't care about all these policies, and there is the Secretary of Defense saying the United States has to be militarily stronger.<sup>3</sup> And there are others in the United States echoing these views and saying "We have to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of military strength."

Surely, Dr. Kissinger, if we let ourselves be carried away by that kind of talk, all our discussions will come to nothing. What we have based ourselves on in the past, and the greatness of what we have achieved, is that we first of all achieved a freeze of existing arms and agreed on reductions, but without changing the balance. Only on that basis can we maintain coexistence.

So let us endeavor to decide something at this level without giving new instructions at Geneva. If we achieve something, our delegates will talk a different language.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. The note included the following proposal: 1) limits on MIRVed ICBM deployments to three launch sites, which would permit 500 Minuteman III for the United States and either 300 SS-19s or 180 SS-19s and 64 SS-18s for the Soviets; 2) a limit of approximately 1,500 MIRV re-entry vehicles (warheads); 3) a statement keeping the question of SLBM limitations open; and 4) a proposal on extension of the Interim Agreement, assuming some modifications.

<sup>3</sup> Possibly a reference to a statement by Schlesinger on March 3 when he released the Department of Defense annual report to Congress on the U.S. Military posture. He expressed his concern that the Soviet Union was trying to exploit the numerical advantage in missiles it was granted in the Interim Agreement to gain diplomatic leverage over the United States. He believed the Soviets were striving to achieve equality in the number of MIRVed missiles and he urged the United States to begin development of new weapons. ("Schlesinger Defends Pentagon Budget," *The Washington Post*, March 4, 1974, p. A2)



Kissinger: I agree, this is the best way to proceed.

Brezhnev: But I really would like you to pay attention to this fact, all those statements about the United States needing to be strong.

Aleksandrov: [Correcting Sukhodrev's translation] Stronger.

Brezhnev: Unless we put a stop to this kind of talk in the United States, people will become accustomed to this need, that is, the need to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. And not for the record, perhaps, but let me say that living generations of Americans have never experienced war on their own territory and never experienced a fascist advance as far as Stalingrad—so they are prone to this kind of talk. Americans have not had 20 million deaths from war.

Gromyko: Think of how many widows and orphans there are.

Brezhnev: In Belorussia, every fourth person died in the war. That is why we in this country—I can't speak for the United States—are very sensitive to these issues. I have emphasized this to everyone—to Chancellor Brandt, for instance. Even if the Senate didn't appropriate additional sums of money to the Pentagon, and if the Pentagon didn't always shout about it, it would still be a very sensitive subject for us. But the sensitivity is heightened by these statements. We can't help it.

I would like to emphasize, Dr. Kissinger, you and I don't have an easy task before us, but we are duty bound—I repeat, duty bound—to find an acceptable solution, a solution which will give no advantage to either side. That is the principle we agreed on with President Nixon, and I would like to see it observed.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, the entire policy of the Administration is based on the presupposition that neither side can achieve military superiority over the other and should not attempt to achieve military superiority over the other. If either tries to talk to the other from a position of strength, it will be a disaster for our two peoples and for all mankind. I have made this point in every public statement, and so has the President. Since we speak here as friends, I can tell you certain circles in the United States have taken advantage of certain domestic developments to say things that would be difficult to permit otherwise. But the basic direction of our foreign policy is fixed. And of course our people are also watching Soviet developments, and as the Soviet Union develops new weapons, they are used as a justification for our new weapons.

Brezhnev: I don't quite agree on that, and here is why:

By the time the SALT agreement was signed, the United States already had its multiple reentry vehicles and we were behind the United States in that field. But nonetheless we did agree to sign the agreement on that score, proceeding from the most humane goal, which is embodied in the preamble of that [agreement]. And we undertook not to

introduce any new missile systems and we accepted certain conditions for those, and those are being scrupulously observed.

Kissinger: We don't question that.

Brezhnev: By the beginning of next year, perhaps I or perhaps someone else will be entrusted with making the relevant report, but we will accurately report what is taken out of commission and made into submarines. But we are not making any new weapons. It was agreed we both could engage in certain improvements but without any increase in diameter or any new systems. We have developed a MIRV but that is all that is taking place. So it is wrong to say we are devising something new. Even if something is being invented, we are not deploying anything in contravention of the agreement.

President Nixon said there are new submarines being developed in the United States, but while there are 42 . . .

Kissinger: 62.

Brezhnev: Yes, 62, we won't develop any new ones.

Kissinger: If you want to make it 42, we won't object.

Brezhnev: We scrupulously observe that. We know you are making MIRVs on the submarines and replacing Poseidons with Minutemen.

Kissinger: No.

Brezhnev: You're installing new missiles in place of older models.

Kissinger: That is true.

Brezhnev: Within the limits of the improvements allowed by the agreement. So it is wrong to conclude that we're doing anything in contravention of the agreement. So as of this time, it is certainly a fact you are ahead of us in multiple warheads. As this is one aspect that can't lend itself to control by national means of detection. Since you were ahead, we assume you have more. If we have to apologize for something we're not doing . . . The numbers you have are in excess of what we have. I'm not complaining about that. We should both scrupulously observe the agreement. You are refusing to take into account forward-based systems. Who are these aimed at? Not against France, because France can't declare war on the United States.

Kissinger: But this may change if things keep up

Brezhnev: Or Holland or Belgium, or the GDR or the FRG. I can show you a map. You said the agreement should relate to American missiles that could reach the Soviet Union and Soviet missiles that could reach the United States. That is the significance of those forward-based missiles. [He shows a small map] They can reach Tashkent, or Baku.

Kissinger: The submarines?

Brezhnev: Yes. And air bases. More than one-half of the European part of the Soviet Union is within range of those.

Kissinger: We have to separate the problems.

First of all, if M. Jobert makes more of his speeches, we'll need some of those missiles against France.

Brezhnev: You can't blame me for that! No speech ever caused destruction; only weapons have.

Kissinger: This shows submarines?

Brezhnev: It shows all kinds of bases and ships.

Kissinger: So this line is the range of the submarines, and they're being counted. They are part of the agreement. They are not forward-based systems. They are counted in the Interim Agreement.

Gromyko: But they are pointed at us—whether submarines or carrier-based aircraft. The first agreement left aside strategic aviation.

Kissinger: I agree with that. That's a separate problem.

These are our fighter aircraft?

Brezhnev: It's not a good picture, is it? Those are European-based aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Then nothing else remains for us but to have our aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or missiles.

Kissinger: I have two separate problems, Mr. General Secretary. According to our estimate, you're developing four new missiles. That's not in violation of the agreement. In fact, one of them impresses our people very much, and if that's only an improvement, I'd hate to see what a new system looked like. In fact, if I see Mr. Smirnov. I'll congratulate him on this new system.

Brezhnev: I can reply in place of Mr. Smirnov, and I can say we're not making a single new missile. We are improving our missiles.

Kissinger: It's just a question of definition. It's such a great improvement that to our people it looks like a new one. But I won't debate it. But we're not saying it's in violation of the agreement.

Brezhnev: Let us not proceed from what people think but from official statements of governments, and from what lends itself to control.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: If we really get down to business, we should proceed from the assumption that in the time left before President Nixon's visit, our delegations will hardly be able to proceed without us. We will hardly be able to work out a solution that can be a permanent agreement.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Let me suggest, perhaps then we could undertake to enter into a new arrangement where the first operative paragraph—after the preamble—says that the two sides have agreed to prolong the

provisional agreement in its full measure, let's say, until the year 1980. That's the first point. That is, both remain with the existing levels. But just that alone would not exactly satisfy certain circles in US.

Kissinger: Not in its exact details.

Quite candidly, this would be quite impossible in present conditions in the United States. It would strengthen Senator Jackson, quite frankly.

Brezhnev: So then, after this, we could have a second paragraph couched in the most categorical terms, which would say roughly that the two sides undertake that their delegations will continue their work to convert the provisional agreement into a permanent one. But even that would not be enough, I gather. Since these multi-warheads are constantly in the news, let's decide on a certain number of warheads on a certain number of missiles.

Korniyenko: The number of missiles to be equipped with multiple warheads.

Gromyko: That will be MIRVed.

Brezhnev: They could be listed in quantities or in percentages. For example, the United States will be entitled to MIRV 1,000 missiles and we will be entitled to MIRV 1,000 ICBM's.

Kissinger: ICBMs or missiles?

Brezhnev: It is only about land-based ICBM's.

[Aleksandrov gets up and confers with Brezhnev and Gromyko]

Gromyko: Both land-based and sea-based.

Brezhnev: One total percentage, and it is for the side itself to decide whether it wants them on land or sea. Therefore if we decide to install more on submarines, then we can do less on land. And that will be done at the discretion of each side. And that certainly will be a substantial element.

Kissinger: Is that a firm figure, or just a suggestion? The 1,000.

Brezhnev: I put it forward as a proposal for discussion.

Kissinger: To 1980, or now?

Gromyko: Until 1980.

Brezhnev: Since, as we suggested, paragraph one would state that the provisional agreement is prolonged until year 1980, this third point, regarding MIRVed missiles, would also apply until the year 1980. Here, one point is the fact that you have more missiles on submarines than we do.

Kissinger: But not by 1980.

Brezhnev: Yes, but the agreement in substance gives us seven submarines but to compensate from that, we have to withdraw some of the land-based ICBMs.

Kissinger: What seven?

Brezhnev: Under the agreement we withdraw some of our missiles of land-based type and replace them with missiles on submarines. We had an additional seven submarines to compensate for the geographical factor. For the rest, we have to withdraw the land-based.

Kissinger: They are dying of old age.

Brezhnev: They're not all that bad. They can still carry atomic weapons.

Kissinger: That's a correct statement. I won't argue.

Brezhnev: [draws a silo diagram on a piece of paper] Say we had a silo launcher and our designer invents a narrower one; it's not a new missile. So we're free either to reconstruct this or install it on a submarine.

Kissinger: Now I understand the difference between a new missile and an improvement. I have to compliment your designers; they've used the existing space with great skill.

Brezhnev: I can just say you have some very wonderful designers too. They've put Minuteman III in the same hole, though it is a new rocket.

Kissinger: [Laughs] All I can say is, I hope you never come up with a new missile.

Brezhnev: Yours too.

Kissinger: But basically we both have the same problem. Could I take a two-minute break?

Brezhnev: Certainly.

[There is a break in the meeting from 12:58–1:02 p.m. At a table near the wall, they look at a blow-up of a picture taken of Major General Brezhnev in Red Square at the Victory parade on June 24, 1945. The meeting then resumes.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you said the situation would change by 1980. That is true; the situation can change. But if so, we will revise the terms. But another thing that can happen is that we can prolong the agreement until 1980, add a couple of paragraphs to it, then let's say by 1975, by the time I pay another visit to the United States, our delegations could reach an agreement, and if so, we could sign a new agreement without waiting until 1980. That is another possibility. But until that happens, and considering that the delegations up to now have been unable to find common language, we could sign an agreement with a good preamble, and with a paragraph one saying the agreement is prolonged, and another paragraph saying the delegations are charged with making every effort to convert it into a permanent agreement, and then a paragraph on multiple warheads, saying that each

side is limited to 1,000 MIRVed missiles, and it is up to each side to decide whether to MIRV land-based or sea-based missiles.

Also, and concurrently, we could also reach a new understanding on ABM systems. Under our agreement, you remember we both agreed the United States was building one ABM area and the Soviet Union was building one, and both were entitled to build another. So we could refrain from building the additional ABM area and agree we both stay with the one we have.

Further, you've been working on the B-1 bomber, and we are building our plane, the 160. We could agree to cease work on the 160 on our side if you agree to cease on the B-1.

If we want to proceed towards détente, all those would be elements of détente.

That could of course be part of a separate understanding, but I am just mentioning them in one package.

Let us reach an agreement to end underground nuclear testing. Let us agree, say as of an agreed date, say 1975, 1976, or 1977, we shall both cease underground nuclear tests and call upon all others to do so. Say by January 1, 1976. And we would add a paragraph that if other nations do not discontinue testing, then each of us will be free to act at our own discretion.

Also, we could enter into an agreement that United States and Soviet Union could agree to withdraw all nuclear systems from the Mediterranean.

Kissinger: Ban them?

Brezhnev: Withdraw them. We'd withdraw all nuclear weapons carriers, and you too. Both surface vessels and submarines.

Kissinger: Missiles, or anything?

Gromyko: Carriers of any type of nuclear weapons.

Brezhnev: Of course, conventional naval vessels would be permitted to remain in the Mediterranean.

There, Dr. Kissinger, you have before you a program for strengthening security, and equal security for both sides.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer.]

One more suggestion. Our provisional agreement is due to last until 1977. At that time President Nixon said the United States would engage in a new type of submarine, the Trident, but that the United States would not manufacture those submarines until 1977.

Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: We accepted that. But I guess there are certain pressures in the United States to build them.

Kissinger: Not to complete them until 1977.

Brezhnev: Not commissioned until 1977.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: But I have to be very frank, that if you commission Trident, we will have to build new submarines too. So let us agree that neither of us commissions them—or if either of us does, we do so in equal measure. But that would continue the arms race.

Kissinger: By 1980.

Gromyko: Yes, if we prolong the agreement.

Brezhnev: Those are the suggestions I wanted to make. And I suppose they all presuppose equality of strength.

Kissinger: May I make some comments, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Certainly. Please.

Kissinger: As you know, Mr. General Secretary, we have come under strong attack in the United States for the existing agreement, so extending it is not an easy matter. But let me leave this problem aside for the time being.

Of your additional suggestions, first, elimination of the additional ABM, we will probably be able to accept.

Brezhnev: I'd suggest that that would be a necessary step and would not create any problems.

Kissinger: On the B-1, I don't know what your 160 is—we are not familiar with that. We can only hope your airplane designers are not as good as your missile designers. But we don't know it.

Brezhnev: They're both lethal weapons. Whether the plane is better, or the missile, both are the same.

Kissinger: It hasn't flown yet?

Brezhnev: They haven't told me yet.

Kissinger: [Laughs] They do that to us too. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force reports to the President that he's just flown a new airplane.

Brezhnev: I saw one of your aircraft journals 10 years ago. There was a picture of what purported to be an atomic-powered aircraft flying over Moscow. But no one has built one.

Kissinger: If so, it is flying over Moscow, because we don't have it in America.

Brezhnev: The staffs tell you anything.

Kissinger: On the B-1 airplane, we can agree it would not enter our force during the extension of this agreement.

Brezhnev: What would you mean by that, Dr. Kissinger? It was built but not introduced into the Air Force? It would just stay on the ground? What we are suggesting is that you don't build it, just as we wouldn't build our 160. We take a serious view of our agreement.

Kissinger: I think not building it is going to be difficult. The rate of deploying it is something else. But I am afraid it would raise major problems of what is operational.

Brezhnev: It means aircraft tested and introduced into service.

Kissinger: I think we could find it, but as you know, an aircraft is tested for many years before it becomes operational.

Brezhnev: That is quite true. But every new test brings closer the time when it is part of the armament.

Kissinger: That is true.

Brezhnev: It usually takes five–six years, but the end result is that a new plane is born.

Kissinger: That is true.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, all that from a purely human standpoint is aimed at lessening the temptation to increase nuclear weapons on both sides.

[Gromyko gives Brezhnev a paper]

It turns out, on the one hand, that we write and sign very good papers and proclaim very good objectives, and on the other hand we listen to our staffs and we build the Trident and B-1 long-range bombers, and we on our side build the 160 bomber with long-range nuclear missiles. When the people get to the bottom of what is happening, they will start criticizing us.

Kissinger: Let me turn to the 1000 missiles that the General Secretary mentioned. There are a number of problems in connection with this.

One, the fact that you have more warheads on each of your missiles than we do. Or will have. And each of the warheads is of greater weight.

Secondly, you do not yet have multiple warheads for submarines. So if you put all your permitted warheads on land-based missiles, then by the end of this period, you will be free to put multiple warheads on all your submarines. And since there is only a certain amount you can do anyway, this only means that we are only endorsing your existing program. The end result would be that on land-based missiles you would have many more warheads than we do.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I listen to you and I hear the exact words of our general staff when they report to me. But vice versa. Our people say the Americans have more than we do.

Kissinger: True.

Brezhnev: And you have 12 on a rocket.

Kissinger: What 12?



Brezhnev: They say the Americans are putting multiple warheads on their older missiles. So in your place I keep seeing our chief of the general staff reporting on developments in the United States. What is a warhead? One block with a capacity of a million tons. When you divide it into six warheads, the capacity will no longer be a million tons. The whole thing becomes weaker by half.

Then there are those in the military who believe it is better to have one warhead but a bigger one, and there is another school of thought who think the more the better. But what is the difference between one kiloton and 50 kilotons? Both mean death and destruction. In World War II, you dropped two and wiped out populations.

I read the American press quite attentively and I don't think anybody in the United States is so critical of the agreement. What they are proposing has nothing to do with the agreement.

Kissinger: No, there is increasing criticism—but we should not debate it. Most of it is by dishonest people, I must say.

Brezhnev: Undoubtedly.

Kissinger: But that is an American domestic complexity.

Brezhnev: What do you suggest in place of it?

Kissinger: We gave you our ideas in the note to your Ambassador on Thursday. [The note is at Tab C]

We don't exclude a limit on the number of missiles that can be MIRVed, and we would have to make some calculations to see whether 1000 or 900—that clearly is not unacceptable. And you would certainly listen to a counter proposal on this.

Brezhnev: I am waiting for it.

Kissinger: I have just heard your idea for the first time. Let me think about the number for a while. Our basic problem is that it would have to be based on an agreement on how many would have to be land-based.

Brezhnev: This is not something—MIRVing—that can be done in just one year, so it is hard to predetermine at once the number of land-based missiles.

Kissinger: Since we may have completed 80% of our MIRVing, while you haven't even started, the practical result is that we would have to stop for five years while you were given time to catch up. That is how it would be seen in America.

Gromyko: But you will have advantages in that situation. You have got it in your pocket already.

Kissinger: Yes, but then why is it in our interest to tie ourselves to figures we have already?

Gromyko: Otherwise, the whole question of limitations will simply soar. It will be an unlimited race.

Kissinger: If the Soviet side could accept some of the principles in the paper we gave to the Ambassador, then we could consider an upper ceiling. Then we could consider numbers.

Brezhnev: Although within the limits of the agreement you have already in fact violated the balance of forces.

Kissinger: How?

Gromyko: Of this proposed agreement. Now we have agreed not to build any new missiles until 1977. But improvement is permitted, and you want to deprive us of any chance to improve it.

Kissinger: I think, Mr. General Secretary, we are arguing semantically about new missiles and improvements. My briefers tell me about your new systems. We do not have any change of that same magnitude. We are not saying it is a violation of the agreement, Mr. Brezhnev. I can only answer in the same vein.

Brezhnev: You have built an entirely new type of missile. Instead of one warhead, now each carries five.

Dobrynin: What is the number?

Kissinger: That we would have to discuss. I agree to an interval, because I have a slight insurrection on my staff.

Gromyko: We will issue a communiqué to the press about our meetings at the end of the day.

Kissinger: Good. We won't report back to Washington yet.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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## 61. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 27, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger asked me to provide you with the following report of his final meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Secretary Kissinger's Pre-Summit Trip to Moscow, Memcons and Reports, March 24–28, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of conversation, March 27, 5:50–9:10 p.m., is *ibid.* and is printed in full as Document 170 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

"The meetings with Brezhnev were completed this evening with a four-hour session in which Brezhnev was genial in mood. We tentatively agreed that your visit would begin June 24 and run about a week. He left details as to possible travel to your wishes though he stressed his preference for the Crimea.

"On SALT Brezhnev, evidently on the basis of a Politburo meeting which produced a six-hour delay in our session today, made a slightly revised proposal. It was that in the context of the Interim Agreement extended to 1980 we could have 1100 SLBM and ICBM MIRVed launchers and they could have 1000. He left the question of subceiling for ICBM's (or SLBM's) confused, and apparently was unable to understand the verification problems associated with a simple numerical limit on MIRVed missiles. I told him that as stated the Soviet proposal was not acceptable but that I would give Dobrynin a detailed critique explaining particularly the verification problems that have to be addressed in any MIRV agreement.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

"I suggested that if further exchanges indicate the possibility of reaching a SALT Agreement by the time of the summit, I might return to Moscow in May for further detailed negotiations."

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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**62. Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Johnson)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 28, 1974, 1227Z.

WH40808. This does not answer all questions in SALT 31,<sup>2</sup> since messages crossed. FYI—HAK plans to be out of town from Saturday noon through all of next week—end FYI.

From: Secretary Kissinger

Please send following to Alex Johnson in Geneva.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1973/74, SALT, Geneva. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In backchannel message SALT 31 to Kissinger, March 28, 1039Z, Johnson requested that the U.S. delegation stay in Geneva if instructions were issued to them soon. (Ibid.)

My discussions with Brezhnev were inconclusive. He indicated that Soviets did not envisage conclusion of a permanent agreement this year and proposed extension until 1980 of Interim Agreement. In that context, he suggested that there could be agreement of identical duration on levels of MIRVed missiles for both sides, i.e. he no longer insisted on percentage approach of last October. He was not however prepared to consider any specification of permitted categories of MIRVed missiles, nor any subceilings within the agreed levels. He was not prepared to talk about verification problems, though he indicated some readiness to consider them. By way of illustration Brezhnev talked of 1000 MIRVed missiles (both ICBMs and SLBMs) for each side. I explained at some length our problem with any arrangement that did not have a limit on ICBM MIRVs, noting their advantage in throw-weight, and numbers and size of MIRV RVs. I also pointed out that simple numerical agreement is unsatisfactory since we would have to count any silo and submarine tube capable of holding MIRV-tested missile as in fact representing MIRVed missile.

Thus while Soviets have apparently dropped their percentage approach of last October, you can see we are a long way from home. It was agreed that I would have further exchanges with Dobrynin after my return from Mexico.

Please keep this message exclusively to yourself.

Warm regards. End of message to Johnson.<sup>3</sup>

Warm regards.

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<sup>3</sup> In backchannel message SALT 32 to Scowcroft, March 29, 0857Z, Johnson expressed appreciation for the summary of Kissinger's talks with Brezhnev. Johnson stated that it was clear from Kissinger's message that no activity would take place in Geneva for several weeks and therefore he would return to Washington. (Ibid.)

**63. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1974, 11:05 a.m.–12:55 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.

Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)

[Omitted here is an exchange of professions of their commitment to détente by Nixon and Gromyko.]

[Gromyko:] When Dr. Kissinger was in Moscow—and you discussed this briefly with Podgorny in Paris<sup>2</sup>—we discussed in detail the possibility of a new SALT agreement. We also had an opportunity to discuss this matter when I was last in Washington about three months ago.<sup>3</sup> As hitherto, we attach great importance to reaching agreement on this question. Our determination to search for agreement with you has not abated. At the conclusion of our discussions with Dr. Kissinger in Moscow we, that is Brezhnev, submitted a proposal<sup>4</sup> and we are now awaiting the official reply to it. Toward the end of the discussions the General Secretary said that it is not all that easy for us to come to a formulation of a proposal. We had to weigh all factors very carefully before making the proposal and we hope that the US appreciates it. After all, there is considerable disparity in numbers of missiles to be allowed under the agreement—1000 to 1100, meaning an advantage of 100 for you—and considering that each missile, that is, each naval missile will have 10—at least 10—MIRVs, the US will have an advantage of 1000 warheads.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Memcons–HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The original is incorrectly dated April 11. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Kissinger and Gromyko on April 12 from 11:02 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) The full memorandum of conversation is Document 173 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of conversation of Nixon's meeting with Podgorny in Paris is printed as Document 171, *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> See Document 52.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 61.

Kissinger: They don't trust our information, Mr. President. We tested it once with 12 warheads but only used 10, but it doesn't make any difference.

Gromyko: I would like to stress that if we reach agreement on this basis, it would mean in fact that the US would be ahead of the Soviet Union for the entire duration of the next agreement. Of course it is hard to say how the gap will progress, whether it will narrow or widen and how the "scissor" will move exactly; but the US will always be ahead. This really makes for a double inequality—formal and factual.

And I would like to mention one other point. Voices are sometimes heard in the US alleging that the US and the President should make every effort to "correct" the previous agreement and obtain a sizable advantage. Anyone can, of course, interpret an agreement as he wants. But we categorically reject that the Soviet Union was in a better position as a result of the last agreement. We categorically reject that. We should like to hope that you as Head of State and of the US Administration will take an objective approach to this question, proceeding from the assumption that the previous agreement places both sides in a position of equality. If there were any inequality, it would be the US who would be at an advantage because of one factor, your forward based systems. I hope all this will be weighed carefully and you will give an appropriate answer to those shouters who want to place difficulties in the way of understanding. I don't know if they base themselves more on domestic or on foreign considerations but in any case they should be disabused of their false views.

President: Let me comment briefly on the entire area of strategic weapons. We have some areas for reaching an understanding. First, defensive weapons. Each side agrees not to construct site number two. Second, this is more technical—the question of not testing nuclear weapons above a certain threshold. This is very technical but I have instructed Dr. Kissinger to work with your people and we should be able to agree at least in principle. Third, this is more difficult still. We had hoped to get a permanent agreement but this is not possible. So we are talking about MIRVs because they most affect the balance. Now you mention numbers but you have enormous advantages in throw weight. Consequently, in the discussions of MIRVs we have to consider throw weight as well as numbers. And also whether MIRVs apply both to land and sea-based missiles or only to one or the other. But this is a difficult problem for us internally. There are those critical of the Interim Agreement because of the great Soviet advantage in throw weight. But we want agreement in SALT III—Summit III—as we had in SALT I and SALT II. Now we have already suggested a threshold test ban. On the MIRV agreement, having in mind the numbers problem, we should negotiate and attempt to reach agreement with you having in mind that

we have a problem and we having in mind that you have a problem. We cannot negotiate ourselves into an inferior position. Nor can you. It is possible to reach agreement in that area provided there is an intention on both sides. And that is certainly true of Mr. Brezhnev and of you, and of me and Dr. Kissinger and others. I think you would agree, Secretary Kissinger.

Kissinger: Yes, it is very difficult but we should do it. On the test ban, we should have technical talks soon. On SALT, we have the problem that the two forces were designed in different ways and that now makes it difficult to establish equivalence. We each designed our forces independently not with each other's advice, although our critics are trying to blame the Soviets for decisions we made years ago. We have to relate numbers in some way: how many of each category to MIRV and over what period of time. I will talk to Mr. Gromyko at lunch on the technical aspects and won't hold you up with that now, Mr. President. We are now studying very carefully the Soviet proposal and we will submit our position first to you, Mr. President, and then to you and the General Secretary within about ten days. But I must say our press has really been unfair on this whole subject.

President: We are determined that unless we come to some sort of impasse this is a problem that can be negotiated. Both sides have to approach it in this way: Mr. Brezhnev cannot make an agreement that gives us an advantage and I cannot make an agreement that gives you an advantage. That is the spirit we should conduct negotiations in.

64. Minutes of a Meeting of the Verification Panel<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 23, 1974, 10:19–11:45 a.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*State*

U. Alexis Johnson

Joseph Sisco

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

William Hyland

Boris Klosson

*Defense*

William Clements

Dr. Fred Wikner

Paul Nitze

*JCS*

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Lt. Gen. Edward Rowny

*CIA*

William Colby

Carl Duckett

*ACDA*

Dr. Fred Ikle

Dr. Charles Zemach

Ralph Earle

*NSC Staff*

Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Jan Lodai

Peter Zimmerman

Jeanne W. Davis

(The first three minutes of the meeting were confined to pleasantries and were filmed by an ABC-TV camera crew for use in a documentary on Secretary Kissinger)

Secretary Kissinger: We have three arms control issues which the Soviets have put before us: 1) ABMs, 2) a test ban and 3) SALT. Before we begin this discussion I want to say that we will never get this debate settled if we condition public discussion in this country on who is selling out to the Russians, who is for quick fixes, who is doing what to whom. Where would we have been without détente in our relations with China, with Russia, in Europe and the Middle East? This constant campaign will force us into answering back which won't do any of us any good. These constant attacks on SALT I as a sell-out must stop. We had no missile program. Not one US program was stopped by SALT I. It may be that some Soviet programs were stopped. Indeed, several US programs were accelerated. This was during a period when Congress was cutting three to five billion a year from our defense budget. These

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74 [4 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.



attacks are close to irresponsibility. The warhead advantage of the US doubled during the Interim Agreement. If this campaign continues, we will be forced to answer back, and this would have serious consequences for our defense budget. These attacks are untrue and they're phony and they have to stop. (Senator) Jackson is getting briefings from somewhere. I have never heard any argument as to a need or desire for the US to build a big missile. I still haven't. If numbers are so important, why did we mothball the B-52s? They were free under the Interim Agreement. Why didn't we build more planes, or put ASMs on our planes? They were free under the Interim Agreement. We are attempting to conduct a fairly hard-nosed policy, but when we go on a military alert for twenty-four hours, we have a Congressional investigation. This problem is of increasing concern to the President.

Mr. Clements: Is there something in addition to (Senator) Jackson's speeches?

Secretary Kissinger: That's one phenomenon. But it has become axiomatic that SALT I was rushed to help the President politically. This is total nonsense. There was unanimity among the Joint Chiefs that they did not want to build strategic submarines but wanted to focus on attack subs. That was a rational position. What was the US giving up? I know there are briefings in the Departments on those things that must be prevented in the future. If they continue, we will counter them and we will have a goddamned mess

Adm. Moorer: We wanted to build Trident instead of Poseidon.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. You wanted to build the Trident and it couldn't be done for five years. What were we giving up? We were only limiting our program to what we were doing anyhow. The Soviets gave up 209 or 210 old missiles and kept their program at less than their capacity, although possibly not less than what they were planning to do. Their land-based missiles were limited to 90 a year, and we had no plans even on the drawing board. During the Interim Agreement the gap in warheads between the US and the USSR doubled. But this won't help Alex (Johnson) in Geneva or help the defense budget. [*1 line not declassified*] We have no intention of taking this any more. We will reply to the next spate of attacks. I'm not holding you responsible for what every idiot writes, but we can usually tell who is briefing. It was not the Russians who made us build small missiles. This was a Defense Department decision. We would be in a different throw-weight situation with 1000 large missiles. But our throw-weight disadvantage resulted from our decision, not theirs.

Do we need a long discussion on ABMs or test ban at this time? Both of these issues are being studied in the departments. The test ban

question is out in a NSSM (195)<sup>2</sup> and will come back to us. There is the question of foregoing the second ABM site.

Dr. Ikle: One option would be to restrict both sides to one site with freedom to choose between NCA or missile defense, or we could prohibit a second site.

Secretary Kissinger: Would you have to tear down the first site while we were building the second? Otherwise, one could get two sites by pretending to do only one.

Dr. Ikle: We would have to specify, possibly by phasing the number of launchers.

Mr. Clements: Our position on ABM is that we want to retain the technology.

Secretary Kissinger: Can't you do that at the one permitted site?

Mr. Clements: I think we could.

Mr. Nitze: It depends on how long the deal is for. It's hard to foresee what we might want in five or ten years. We might not want a defense of Washington in the next five years, but we might in the future.

Mr. Johnson: There are two ways to do this. We could amend the treaty or have an expression of intent by both sides.

Adm. Moorer: They already cover NCA plus 500 missiles with their ABM site.

Mr. Rowny: We could make an ABM agreement co-terminus with the Interim Agreement.

Mr. Clements: One fear in DOD is that if we give up the second ABM site, Congress might cut our funds for R&D and make it hard for us to keep abreast.

Mr. Johnson: I don't see how this would change the R&D problem.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It wouldn't change the statement threatening to abrogate the whole deal.

Dr. Ikle: If you want R&D on ABM technology, you may want to keep an option as to the site.

Mr. Clements: It goes beyond the question of the site. It's the whole state of the art.

Mr. Colby: They're doing a lot of R&D on lasers.

Secretary Kissinger: Are we?

Mr. Clements: You bet

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<sup>2</sup> NSSM 195, February 20, is entitled "Nuclear Test Ban Policy." It is scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control, 1973–1976.

Adm. Moorer: I agree with Paul (Nitze). A long-term elimination of any option for an NCA site wouldn't be good.

Dr. Ikle: We could make it a treaty amendment and make it temporary.

Secretary Kissinger: What is your definition of long-term?

Adm. Moorer: Five to eight years.

Secretary Kissinger: So the questions are whether we go for an amendment to the treaty or multilateral expressions of intent and whether we make it permanent or temporary.

Dr. Ikle: We could make it temporary by an amendment to the treaty prohibiting the second site for five or ten years.

Secretary Kissinger: There's also the question as to whether it should be a separate agreement or an amendment to the original treaty. If it is done on a permanent basis, the two sides should have the option of location of the site. If you make it interchangeable and temporary, you're not doing a goddamned thing.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets in 1972 proposed a three to five year deferral of the second site.

Mr. Kissinger: This has given me enough guidance for my discussion with Gromyko. I will clarify what the Soviets have in mind and then come back to the Verification Panel. Once we get a position, we can throw this into the Geneva discussions.

On a test ban, they are proposing a threshold test ban and they want a proposal from us. They want it effective as of January 1, 1976. We might get an agreement in principle at the Summit and work out the details later. We think we should set a seismic level at the Summit. We have a NSSM out on this which is due May 1.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Ikle: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Dr. Wikner: *[2 lines not declassified]*

(Mr. Sisco left the meeting at Secretary Kissinger's request to take a phone call from Ambassador Scali at the UN)

Mr. Clements: Would a ban of this kind work to the advantage or disadvantage of either side?

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on the program of both sides. It would stop the testing of large warheads unless they were decoupled. They would undoubtedly complete their current series of tests. It's a question of how many large warheads we want to test.

Mr. Clements: Would this affect Trident?

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<sup>3</sup> Possibly a reference to NSSM 202, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," issued on May 23.

Secretary Kissinger: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Dr. Wikner: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Ikle: But they are testing more high-yield weapons than we are.

Dr. Wikner: We have been trying for smaller yields and greater accuracy.

Mr. Nitze: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Wikner: [*1 line not declassified*]

Dr. Ikle: Did they make no reference to China?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We told them we wouldn't accept any reference to any third country.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That affects the forum for discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We owe them an answer on this.

Could we turn to SALT. You are all familiar with the latest Soviet proposal that calls for extension of the Interim Agreement to 1980 and MIRV limits of 1100 to 1000 in our favor. I don't consider the 1100–1000 figures as necessarily final. We owe them an answer on this, too. I told them I did not have much expectation that it would work, but the form of our answer can be 'yes', 'no' or a counter-proposal.

Adm. Moorer: There are several aspects to this. Nothing has been added to US force levels for the five-year period of the Interim Agreement. We really should get some quid. If the agreement is extended to 1980 they should decrease their submarine missiles or we should increase ours or something. Just to slip the agreement to 1980 would degrade the rationale we used for SALT I and would create a problem in the Congress. We would have to tie it to something.

Secretary Kissinger: We would tie it to MIRV limitations.

Dr. Ikle: It might be a free-standing MIRV limit.

Secretary Kissinger: If there were a free-standing MIRV limit without extension of the Interim Agreement, we would have to assume that some were single warheads. Now they have to take out the SS–11s to put in the SS–17s or –19s. If it were free-standing, they could build new silos. This would create massive verification and break-out problems. They would build new silos for the –17s and –19s and use the –11 silos for break-out.

Dr. Ikle: But in the meantime we would be negotiating for limits on the aggregate.

Secretary Kissinger: But the balance would be shifting against us.

Dr. Ikle: Not with Trident and the new bomber.

Secretary Kissinger: If the agreement goes to 1980, we could adjust the Interim Agreement figures by 30–40 on submarines, trade in the Titans for Tridents, and we could maintain our program. The Titans have stayed in our program only under urgent White House pressure.

If we can assume three Tridents by 1980 that would give us [*number not declassified*] missiles.

Mr. Johnson: Assuming Trident keeps on schedule.

Secretary Kissinger: We could maintain our program by phasing out 54 Titans and increasing the limits on submarines from 710 to 740 or 750. That would be within our existing program.

Mr. Nitze: Might this not cast the shadow of a permanent agreement? We might live with it until 1980 but we may want a different program under a permanent agreement.

Dr. Ikle: We should also consider the effect of a MIRV agreement on the number of RVs.

Secretary Kissinger: The question is the effect of *no* MIRV agreement on the number of RVs. Let's assume an advantage of 1100–1000 is worth extension of the Interim Agreement. Without an agreement, we will fulfill our program and the gap against us will increase. Except for the 54 Titans, the numbers are our exact program. Would we be greatly increasing our program in the absence of the Interim Agreement? I understand the argument that we should have an agreement, and I understand the argument that we should greatly increase our strategic forces. But I don't believe we are putting pressure on the negotiations with our present program. If we continue, the gaps that favor us will close. What are the chances of a greatly increased program? At the present time, I think the liberal Senators are putting their hatred of the President before their convictions. I don't believe Senators Mondale, Muskie or Kennedy will stick to this line. In 1973, \$60 billion was enough and 500 missiles were plenty. Brookings and the *New York Times* praised Charlie Schultze's paper to the skies.<sup>4</sup> But Watergate has created a highly unusual situation. It depends on how long that will last.

We have three choices on the Soviet proposal in its present form: we can say "yes," "no," or offer a counterproposal picking up some of their ideas. It is my impression that they are eager for an agreement. They are hitting us weekly for a counterproposal. Let's look at the disadvantages of extending the Interim Agreement. There is Paul's (Nitze) point that it creates the presumption that these are the figures that will be maintained in a permanent agreement. But if we retain freedom to mix and give up our penchant for mothballing, we can trade planes for missiles. Then the numbers aren't so bad. We can put missiles on our planes and close any missile gap.

Mr. Clements: I have told you each B-1 is equal to eight Minutemen.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified. At this time, Charles Schultze was with the Brookings Institute.

Dr. Ikle: That depends on the Soviet bomber program.

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev told me they were designing a new bomber—the 160. He said they would trade it for the B–1. I told him we would trade the B–3 for the 160. I do have the impression that they are planning a big submarine.

Mr. Clements: Beyond the Delta class?

Secretary Kissinger: I told them we couldn't consider a new Interim Agreement that did not allow room for Trident. They said that was okay if they could build the same type of submarine.

Mr. Johnson: And you don't think they were talking about the stretched Delta?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We think this was something new.

Secretary Kissinger: That was my impression.

Mr. Duckett: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They are so ritualistic about saying they are doing nothing new—just modifying existing vehicles.

Mr. Clements: Did they mention a cruise missile?

Secretary Kissinger: No. They implied that they were having trouble with the submarine MIRVs.

Mr. Clements: So are we

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They think we have magnificent submarines.

Secretary Kissinger: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Adm. Moorer: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Dr. Ikle: What are the Soviet reasons for wanting to extend the Interim Agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I think they believe both sides have an interest in preventing the break-out problem. And both sides foresee changes in their administrations. It will be certain in the US in 1976 and probable in the USSR before too much longer. They may be scared by the talk that we might accelerate our program. The question is when to cash in on that feeling. Also, they need some concrete achievement from détente. We have talked ourselves into thinking that détente is a one-way street. But I could make an overwhelming case against Brezhnev if I were a Politburo member. Its effect on China and in Europe. Without détente, we will see the French and Germans returning to the posture that they have to press the U.S. to be more flexible. Brezhnev needs some momentum. I have the impression that the figures they gave us were not extracted easily from the Soviet military. There was a four-hour Politburo meeting and they brought Grechko back.

Mr. Johnson: The figures substantially protect their program.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They would for all practical purposes protect the program of both sides. I don't have any real evidence to go on, but I think the figures are adjustable.

(Mr. Sisco returned to the meeting.)

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

Mr. Clements: (returning to the SALT discussions) How much adjustment do you think is possible in the numbers?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea, and I didn't want to ask because I didn't want to indicate that the approach might be acceptable. My impression is that those numbers are not the final word. We might get the gap up to 175 or 200.

Mr. Johnson: It comes down to the value they attach to extension of the Interim Agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: And how much value they attach to a SALT agreement.

Adm. Moorer: Extension of the Interim Agreement could lead us right into a permanent agreement.

Mr. Johnson: Not necessarily. If we get something substantial in trade, it might be worth it.

Adm. Moorer: Would we have to go back to the Congress?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we would go back to Congress for a concurrent resolution.

Dr. Ikle: We should try to lower the Soviet programs rather than increase our own.

Secretary Kissinger: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Mr. Clements: But it is substantially what we think their program is.

Secretary Kissinger: So is 1100 for us, plus or minus 40 missiles. The proposal substantially ratifies both programs and protects against a sudden break-out.

Mr. Nitze: Wasn't our program based on the assumption that we would negotiate a permanent agreement prior to 1977?

Mr. Clements: That's a fair statement.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We will have 31 Poseidon boats with Trident as an add-on rather than a substitute.

Mr. Nitze: We assumed we would also get some other things.

Dr. Ikle: We must consider RV numbers through collateral constraints or somehow.

Mr. Johnson: The conventional wisdom has it that a larger number of smaller warheads are better for us.

Secretary Kissinger: We should do a projection of what would happen if there were no agreement. What is the strategic consequence of the throw-weight situation? [*1½ lines not declassified*] What will they do with more throw-weight? We should analyze what is right. [*5 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Nitze: Those calculations are in the MIRV paper.<sup>5</sup>

Dr. Ikke: The desirable feature of a MIRV agreement is that it limits the competition in warheads.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree it is desirable. But we have talked ourselves into a national psychosis on how far behind we are. How can they convert that to their political benefit?

Dr. Ikke: Then we wouldn't have the anxiety about their overtaking us in warheads.

Mr. Colby: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: At the rate MIRVing is going, getting us 300 more missiles doesn't help a helluva lot. I'm very concerned about the way the debate is going on reductions. Reductions while MIRVing is running free don't solve the problem—they make it worse. The SS-19 gives them everything they need to get Minuteman. I don't have any real evidence, but I don't think the SS-18 is going well, and I don't think their submarines are going well. All their talk was about the -17s and the -19s—of course they don't use the numbers but they talk about their deployable missiles. When I said we would have to count 432 submarine missiles as being MIRVed, they were insulted. They said they couldn't possibly MIRV those missiles.

Mr. Johnson: We don't think they could either.

Secretary Kissinger: My impression is that they have great confidence in one missile and little confidence in their submarines. They also claim that they do not have six RVs on the SS-18.

Mr. Duckett: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Johnson: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Adm. Moorer: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: My instinct tells me that we won't get a sub-limit on ICBMs but we might get one on MLBMs. We won't get them to zero but we might get a lower figure. We have to decide how we are going to respond to their proposal. I talked to Jim Schlesinger about this this morning, and he is doing something on it. I'll need something by Friday—not a firm position but some idea of our thinking so I can tell Gromyko when I see him next week. We can put in our formal proposal for discussion at Geneva. Then the options will be an agreement

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<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.



by June, an agreement in principle by June, or no agreement. The President gets absolutely no political advantage from an agreement. This has nothing to do with the domestic political situation. The President will lose the people he may need domestically and gain no one by an agreement. We're not dying for an agreement for any reason other than our concern for the evolution of Soviet policy and what will happen to our foreign policy in China, Europe and the Middle East if we get into a confrontation with the Soviet Union. I asked Jim Schlesinger to take various numbers—1100 to 1000, 1100 to 950, 1100 to 850, etc.—and project them to 1984. Extension of the Interim Agreement to 1984 might be too long, but a three-year extension might minimize the problems.

Dr. Ikle: That would be another argument for a free-standing MIRV agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: We might have both: extend the Interim Agreement to 1980 and have a 10-year MIRV agreement. If the MIRV agreement were longer, that would be okay. By 1977, the Soviets will be tempted to keep the SS-11s. They could start building new silos for the MIRVs and keep the -11s as a reserve force. Then they could really out-race us. We don't even have a design for a land-based missile yet. And when we go to the Congress, it won't be in a very happy climate. It's not normal for Joe Kraft to be worried about the numbers of our strategic forces. That's my worry about ending the Interim Agreement and just having a MIRV agreement.

Mr. Johnson: A free-standing MIRV agreement would have to be surrounded by so many things that it would be practically a comprehensive agreement except for the bombers.

(Secretary Kissinger left the meeting.)

Mr. Johnson: We could have something in between. We might agree on a set of principles with respect to MIRVs to be incorporated in a permanent agreement.

Mr. Nitze: I'm lost as to what we buy with a MIRV agreement as high as 850 with no ICBM sublimits.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Nothing in terms of survivability of the ICBM force, but it gives them the problem of how to apportion their forces.

Gen. Scowcroft: It would prevent break-out.

Mr. Clements: That's the only thing you can say for it.

Mr. Nitze: But none of these deals improves our position above no-agreement.

Dr. Ikle: We would gain on residual RVs after 1980.

Mr. Nitze: No. We would have more residual RVs in the no-agreement case than in any other.

Mr. Johnson: An asymmetrical agreement on MIRV launchers would strengthen their case for asymmetry in their favor on total launchers.

Adm. Moorer: What is their objection to equal aggregates with freedom to mix?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: FBS.

Mr. Nitze: We can't get to essential equivalence unless we deal directly with FBS. That has been clear for three years.

Mr. Johnson: I have a feeling that they are not as firmly attached to FBS as they once were.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Not when they talk about a permanent agreement.

Mr. Johnson: They say it's not a question of the facts but a political decision. They are defensive, hesitant, unwilling to debate on this.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Every time they brief Brezhnev they show him a map of the Soviet Union surrounded.

(Secretary Kissinger returned to the meeting.)

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev showed us the map which is very accurate. It showed the range of our submarines and our F-4s.

Mr. Johnson: They can make a tremendous case.

Secretary Kissinger: They just don't consider their attack capability in Europe and the exchanges in a general war on the same level.

Mr. Clements: (to Kissinger) Why do you feel so strongly that reductions don't accomplish anything?

Secretary Kissinger: Reductions coupled with MIRV restrictions would be useful, but reductions as a substitute for MIRV restrictions would be useless.

Mr. Nitze: I'm not sure. It depends whether you look just at the survivability of Minuteman or at the whole strategic situation. It helps the latter.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Nitze: It reduces their throw-weight and targets. We come out better on the difference between a first and second strike.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't reduce land-based missiles.

Mr. Nitze: I admit there is a question of negotiability.

Secretary Kissinger: They believe that we are so far ahead at sea, and that we are trying to force them to go to sea, where they are vastly inferior to us, and take them out of the land medium where they are much better off. They have a completely irrational reaction to any attempt to force them to sea. At Zavidovo they were violent on the subject. This last time Brezhnev as much as admitted that they were no good at sea. He said they couldn't possibly meet the 432 missile figure by 1980. They don't know how good their SLBM will be. They believe they can make some confident predictions on their land-based MIRVs but not on their SLBMs. Certainly now, and probably for the next four

years, we can't force them to sea. They would consider this an outrageously unilateral offer and it would just undermine our position. If they take any reductions they will take them in submarines.

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Every time I try to make this argument, Dobrynin takes me aside and tells me I am antagonizing everyone.

Mr. Nitze: If we went to sea and they didn't we would be at a strategic advantage. The only question is whether we would be advantaged by reductions.

Secretary Kissinger: With fully MIRVed forces, on the theory that we take our reductions in land-based missiles, we would lose more quickly.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That would make the throw-weight argument greater.

Mr. Johnson: They would have the option of not MIRVing the -18.

Secretary Kissinger: They haven't refused limits on MLBMs as violently as they have on ICBMs.

Mr. Johnson: To trade extension of the Interim Agreement when they're not MIRVing any -18s would be out of the ballpark.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It would require that they stop testing the -18 in a MIRV mode. Anything that stops their testing anything we already have would not be acceptable to them.

Secretary Kissinger: My guess would be that they would not agree. They might agree to stop deployment but not testing.

Mr. Duckett: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot confirm on the basis of our Moscow conversations that our estimate that we can check deployment is correct. Brezhnev was not particularly well briefed on this. When we talked about the size of the silos he thought we were talking about possible violations of the Interim Agreement. He wouldn't admit that they would have to modify the SS-11 holes to put the -18s in. I finally convinced him that, under those circumstances, we would have to count every -11 hole as MIRVed.

Mr. Johnson: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Duckett: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Adm. Moorer: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They could keep the SS-9.

Secretary Kissinger: My impression, which is not based on any real evidence, is that they will not accept no MIRVing of MLBMs but they might accept a low number.

Let's look at the Working Group options<sup>6</sup> and try to assess what might be obtainable. Option 2 would have us accept the basic Soviet approach, but insist on a larger disparity in launchers (200 versus 100) and an ICBM sublimit. I don't believe they will accept an ICBM sublimit but they might accept a disparity of 200 in launchers.

Option 3 would increase the numerical disparity to 200 missiles and ask for a ban on MLBM MIRVs rather than an ICBM sublimit. This might work with a low ICBM sublimit.

Option 4a would have us accept no ICBM or MLBM sublimits but ask for a disparity of 250 missiles and a 10-year MIRV agreement rather than a 6-year agreement. I have no feel for this option—it's never been raised. I think today's idea of extending the Interim Agreement to 1980 and a MIRV agreement to 1984 is an interesting one. We don't want to be in the position of negotiating an agreement in 1980. Better in 1979 or 1981.

Option 9 wouldn't have a chance unless we were willing to throw in Trident and/or the B-1s.

These are my assessments. Since Jim Schlesinger is thinking about this, I suggest we meet again Friday afternoon or Saturday morning to give me a better idea of where we might be heading prior to my seeing Gromyko. How about 9:00 a.m. Saturday morning?<sup>7</sup>

All agreed.

Secretary Kissinger: On ABMs and a test ban, I can keep going on these until the study groups have reported.

Dr. Ikle: We have the final analysis on the ABM.

Secretary Kissinger: I got a good flavor here today of the ABM issue, and we can have another brief discussion on a test ban. But I have to understand our direction on SALT before I see Gromyko.

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<sup>6</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>7</sup> The Verification Panel met on Saturday, April 27 for a long discussion. Kissinger opened the meeting by stating that he wanted to discuss arms control with the Panel before his meeting with Gromyko. Kissinger stated: "I want to make it clear that no proposal will be made to the Soviets in Geneva. All I intend to do is to probe Gromyko to get a sense of how much flexibility he has. Based on that we can then formulate a proposal in the next few weeks." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3-15-72 to 6-4-74 [4 of 5]) For the memorandum of conversation of the meeting between Kissinger and Gromyko, see Document 66.

**65. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

The US has carefully considered the ideas for MIRV limitations set forth by General Secretary Brezhnev in his discussions with Secretary Kissinger.<sup>2</sup> As we understand it there are three integral elements: an agreement to limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs; an agreement to extend the duration of the Interim Agreement; and an agreement to continue the negotiations for a permanent agreement limiting as well as reducing offensive strategic weapons.

The Soviet side indicated that the Interim Agreement could be extended for three years, terminating in October 1980, and in this connection there would be agreed limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs: no more than 1,000 for the USSR and no more than 1100 for the US. In addition, it was indicated in Moscow that it would be possible to develop an agreement on the exchange of information to facilitate verification of the agreement on MIRV limitations by national technical means.

The US wishes to present some general considerations concerning this general approach:

1. In light of the differential in the numerical limits in the current Interim Agreement, in the level of ICBMs and SLBMs on each side, the US suggests that a MIRV limitation should be set at about 850 for the USSR and 1100 for the US, if such agreement is to accompany an extension of the Interim Agreement through 1980.

2. If, however, the USSR was prepared to consider an extension of the Interim Agreement, through say 1983, the limits on MIRV missiles, ICBMs and SLBMs, could be adjusted: for the US about 1200 and for the USSR about 1000.

3. Should the Interim Agreement be extended beyond its current expiration date of October 1977, the US would wish to modify the terms of the protocol to the Interim Agreement, which sets a ceiling on the number of modern nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines and on the number of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The limitations on the US side would be raised by 30 SLBMs, so that the maximum number of SLBMs permitted to the US would be 740 rather than 710 in the current agreement; the number of submarines permitted

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Memcons–HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974. The note was Tab A to Document 66. A note on the first page indicates the note was sent to Dobrynin by messenger on April 23.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 60 and 61.

the US would remain at 44. Except for the net increase in the US level of 30 SLBMs, the US, as stipulated in the current Interim Agreement, would reach the 740 level by dismantling older land based ICBMs and older models of ballistic missile submarines.

4. In addition, there should be a discussion of the timing and manner of commissioning for sea trials of new models of ballistic missile submarines, known in the US as the Trident system. This system would be limited by the provisions of the revised Interim Agreement (i.e., no more than 44 submarines and 740 SLBMs) and would be subject to the ceiling agreed upon for ICBM and SLBM MIRVs. The US would be willing to discuss in this context a schedule of deployments (for sea trials) of these new models, and discuss a similar scheduling for the commissioning for sea trials of comparable Soviet models. The number of new model Tridents would vary, of course, depending on whether the agreement was extended to 1980 or 1983.

5. Finally, some further discussion will be necessary in Geneva or in this channel concerning the verification provisions of a MIRV agreement, particularly the provision for verifying the number of submarines equipped with MIRVs.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> On April 24, Lodal sent Scowcroft a memorandum in which he informed him of "several blunders in the note passed to Dobrynin." Lodal described four of them: "1) no mention of limits on MLBM MIRVs (SS-18s); 2) numbers for 1980 internally inconsistent; 3) U.S. number for 1983 (1200) somewhat low; 4) Soviet numbers (850 for 1980 and 1000 for 1983) too high." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 891, SALT, SALT TWO-I–Geneva, January 1974)

**66. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 29, 1974, 3–4:45 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo, Central Committee CPSU, and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium, MFA, Chief of USA Division  
(at end)  
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Gromyko (at end)  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, MFA (interpreter)  
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to President for  
National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department (at end)  
Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large  
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
William G. Hyland, Director, INR  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

**SUBJECTS**

SALT; Joint Statement

**SALT**

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Could I say a few words, first?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All of the discussions that have gone on until now on this subject [SALT] were certainly necessary and useful since, of course, it is necessary to clarify the positions of each side. Without that, no agreement is possible. But I must say, frankly, that so far we do not see an agreement materializing. The latest considerations you gave to us [U.S. Note of April 23, Tab A],<sup>2</sup> frankly, are not the basis for an agreement, because, frankly, they are one-sided.

Secretary Kissinger (laughs): May I say that the Joint Chiefs are completely in agreement with the Politburo on that.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I understand what you mean. I would like to make several observations to show why we think as we do.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Memcons–HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. Kissinger was in Geneva on April 28–29 to discuss bilateral issues with Gromyko. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Suite in the InterContinental Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 65.

Secretary Kissinger (interrupts the translation): You know how many submarine missiles the Joint Chiefs would like? 856.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: There are almost no figures, within the limits of what is realistic, that could compensate us for the one very big advantage which you have, which is forward-based weapons. And if you really want to know, within our own circle, a lot has been said that the agreement that has been achieved does not fully coincide with the interests of both sides. In your country many voices can be heard, but we have a different view on that score. Nonetheless, we deemed it possible, on the basis of the proposal which was made by General Secretary Brezhnev to you in Moscow,<sup>3</sup> to reach agreement by the time of the forthcoming Summit on the continuation of the Interim Agreement with the addition of certain figures. These figures are known, so I needn't go into detail.

Secretary Kissinger: The figures General Secretary Brezhnev gave me on MIRV?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes. 1000, 1100. Apart from that, there is the second factor, which we have mentioned on several occasions—though we could have mentioned it but once, we did so several times—that there are certain third countries, and we cannot but take that into account. You know their names and we needn't go into detail.

Secretary Kissinger: France.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: And you know about the so-called "eastern factor." If we didn't take account of this, we would be acting contrary to our own security interests, and that we cannot do.

And therefore we should certainly like to believe that you still have the possibility to give some additional thought on this matter and will find it in you to take a more realistic position. As for the possibility of an agreement, we both know its importance and needn't say more. We, for our part, want an agreement by the time of the forthcoming Soviet-American summit, which would serve the cause of peace.

Secretary Kissinger: What aspects of it did you see as one-sided? So we can understand.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In your latest proposals you seek to revise the Interim Agreement and you alter the figures in such a way as to considerably improve your own situation and considerably worsen our own.

Secretary Kissinger: I can't believe that 26 weapons considerably worsen the security of the Soviet Union.

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 60 and 61.



We are now entitled to 710 missiles; we now propose 736. So in effect the total number permitted under the Interim Agreement is increased by 26. We don't mind your increasing yours by 26.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The Interim Agreement is the Interim Agreement. As I said, you have voices in the United States saying it's slanted in favor of the Soviet Union. We don't accept that. In fact, we maintain the opposite view, that you are in a better position. But the Agreement is there. Now you want to slant it in favor of the United States.

You will have 26 more plus an additional 250 MIRVs and then another 54 missiles in the letter—which I want to go into.<sup>4</sup>

Secretary Kissinger: In the overall forces of the two sides we'll get only 26. We can't use the whole 30; only 26. To get those 26, we have to destroy 54 land-based. So the Foreign Minister is not correct that we get 26 plus 54. We get a net of 26. We are shifting the 54 from land to submarines.

Ambassador Dobrynin: What about the 44 submarines?

Secretary Kissinger: The agreement allows 44; there is a side agreement that we'll stay with 41, or 756. We propose that the side agreement just lapses in 1977.

Ambassador Dobrynin: So this is the second change in your proposal.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't get 54 extra; we get 26 extra. Concretely we want three submarines with 72 missiles. 72 minus 54 is 18. By 1980 we can do it with 728. By 1982 we can do it by 736. But at any rate we're talking about either 18 or 26 net gain in missiles, not 54.

Ambassador Dobrynin: But there was the assumption that there were three out [on the basis of the letter].

Secretary Kissinger: If the agreement lapses, we'll build many more.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We are probably talking in different languages. What we're talking about is the letter—which I assume all the gentlemen here are familiar with . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: So you have the right to 54 missiles but the letter says you won't make use of that right. Then there is the Trident; now you say you want to go full steam ahead on implementing that program. We will draw the necessary conclusions. That means both sides will go ahead. What you say in effect is that you want unilaterally—or rather, in the interests of one side—to change in your favor

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<sup>4</sup> A reference to Tab A, printed as Document 65.

the material content of the agreement. Of course we realize perhaps it may be good for you. But what we're talking about is a mutually-acceptable agreement and it certainly couldn't be acceptable to us.

[Secretary Kissinger goes out to take a phone call. In the meantime Mr. Hyland explains the numbers to Ambassador Dobrynin. Secretary Kissinger then returns.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The Pentagon was calling?

Secretary Kissinger: (laughs): Yes. If they only knew! We have a serious problem, Mr. Foreign Minister. Simply on numbers. The total number of missiles by which our forces would increase by 1980 is 18. These Tridents wouldn't be in the force; they'd be only on sea trials.

The only reason we mentioned it is that under the definition of the agreement the old ones have to be destroyed once the new ones go on sea trials. On the assumption of three Trident submarines.

[Sonnenfeldt comes in]

The total force increases by 18, land and sea-based. The sea-based increase by 72; the land-based decrease by 54. Even those figures are not correct: The land-based would be destroyed before the others become operational. So the strategic effect is zero.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I can't quite understand your line of reasoning. According to your latest proposal—1100 for you, 850 for us—what's in it for us?

Secretary Kissinger: MIRVed?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes. So then, according to the corrections you now want to introduce to the agreement itself, your combination with sea-based missiles, you want 30 more than us plus 54 according to the letter, whereby you turn the right into an actuality. Which means 250 plus 30 plus 54. All told, it means 334 more than us.

In reality, take the 250 [advantage] related to the MIRVs—and you do have the right to install them all on submarines—that means each would have 10. This means 250 times 10, which is 2500. Again, plus 30, plus 54 which are not MIRVed. This means 2800 more than us.

That is the arithmetic we reach from your figures. Tell us where we're wrong.

Secretary Kissinger [laughs]: A masterful dialectic

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Subject to correction.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's separate the number of missiles from the number of MIRVed. You lumped them together.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All right. Separate them.

Secretary Kissinger: In the agreement, there are 1054 ICBMs and 656 submarine missiles. You have the right to 1409 and 950, which is 2359.

This is incontrovertible. We are entitled to 1710. By our proposal, by 1980 we would have 1000 instead of 1054, and we would have 728 instead of 656. Making a total of 18 missiles gained. In terms of missiles.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We're not accumulating the 54; we're destroying 54.

Ambassador Dobrynin: The only question he asks is, if it's the agreement as it is now, and a prolongation, you're saying we should just forget the letter. If you just held to 41, you wouldn't have to ask us.

Secretary Kissinger: If we held to 41, we would still keep 54 Titans. We can still get Tridents under the Interim Agreement by giving up Polaris.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Right. But for two Tridents, not three. Then there is the separate case my Minister made about MIRVs.

Secretary Kissinger: That's separate.

Ambassador Dobrynin: But you would have 2500 warheads, as he showed.

Secretary Kissinger: But your warheads are bigger.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes, but if you believe the obligation regarding 54 will cease to operate after 1980, that's wrong. Because if we prolong the agreement, we have to prolong it in its entirety. Otherwise, it's like buying a horse and you find yourself holding the bridle and the horseshoes but the horse isn't there.

Let's try to understand each other in matters of substance. I see that here the matter lies not in the distribution of figures or how you read the figures but in the desire on your part to alter the material substance. It is a different approach in principle. We propose that the agreement be prolonged in its entirety, with an additional document.

Secretary Kissinger: We consider this change a very minor modification of the agreement; it does not go to the material substance of the agreement.

Ambassador Dobrynin: How can you treat it as additional correction? You just seem to want another Trident. If you wanted a correction just on MIRVs, that would be easier.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. If we widen the gap on MIRVs, we could hold to the existing agreement.

I think both our General Staffs won't allow a ban in an agreement on something they don't want to do anyway! All hell breaks loose when this is even suggested.

On MIRVs, we're making a very considerable concession. We could build more Tridents; and we could MIRV 500 more ICBMs. On

the other hand, if the gap in MIRVs is larger, then we don't have to play around with the Interim Agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, I think we have understood each other very well. There is no misunderstanding here; it's simply that there are different approaches.

[Omitted here is discussion of the joint statement to be issued after Kissinger's and Gromyko's discussion. The statement as agreed upon is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 24, 1974, p. 677.]

#### SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As I see it, we understand each other well enough [on SALT], and there is no misunderstanding here. Nothing changes according to what end you start listing your figures from. You are altering the material content of the agreement, but what we're talking about is prolonging it, and changing it only by an additional protocol or something.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand this. I explained to your Ambassador why for us to accept figures of 1100 or 1200 is a major concession for us. I won't go into it now; he can write it down for the consideration of your colleagues. It is a concession not only regarding MIRVs but also regarding types of missiles. If we do it, it will be less like the ones we have now and more like the ones you've tested so successfully recently.

I understand your concerns on the Interim Agreement. We have to study whether by changing the replacement formulation [i.e., using the time when submarines become operational rather than the beginning of sea trials] we can accomplish the same result as we sought in the formulation we gave you. But we are sincerely attempting to limit the escalation that is sure to take place.

We will be in touch with you shortly after I return. Hal [Sonnenfeldt] and Bill [Hyland], you and Lodal will do the studies.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of the joint statement.]

#### SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I have one final question regarding your last remarks on SALT. What version do you have in mind? Are you referring to 1100–1200, or to what you said to Ambassador Dobrynin on the increase of 84 missiles by 1983? You can get in touch with us.

Secretary Kissinger: In light of your considerations, we had better think in terms of 1980 rather than 1983. I can tell you your proposal of 1100–1000 can't be accepted. It means a reduction of our program; there is no real equivalence.

Let me give you my impression of what you have said. Our impression from what you said is that we have suggested two categories

of changes—one in the numbers we presented to the General Secretary and one in the numbers of the Interim Agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: You find it difficult to discuss both changes simultaneously.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: [Laughter]: They are difficult to be considered taken separately too

Secretary Kissinger: I understand your point. Let us see whether we can—in terms of replacement, the categories in the Interim Agreement, and modifications of the MIRV numbers—come up with a scheme that we might be prepared to sign. I'll let the Ambassador know within days of my return. Maybe if we meet again, I'll have a preliminary view.

[Omitted here is discussion of the timing of the release of the joint statement.]

**67. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

The U.S. side agrees that the ABM treaty be amended by a new protocol which would restrict each side to one ABM deployment. In addition, as discussed with Foreign Minister Gromyko, the U.S. believes that it cannot renounce permanently its right to defend its national capital. Thus, the U.S. proposes that both sides retain the right to change the location of its one ABM system.

For the U.S. this would mean we could dismantle our present deployment and replace it with a site around Washington, and the USSR would have the same right to change location from Moscow to an ICBM field as specified by the treaty.

The U.S. view is that this right could be invoked at the time of the periodic reviews provided by the treaty, which would be during 1977, during 1982, etc. If this change of sites were actually made, it would become permanent and there would be no further right to change sites. Moreover, the implementation of the agreement would have to be carried out in accordance with procedures for ABM replacement and dismantling to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

If the Soviet side agrees in principle with this approach, the U.S. will provide through this channel a revised draft protocol, based on the draft given to Secretary Kissinger in Geneva.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Memcons–HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: “Delivered to Amb. D. via messenger on 5/6/74, 11:00 a.m.” A covering letter from Scowcroft to Dobrynin, dated the same day, indicates that the note was a follow-up to Kissinger’s discussions with Gromyko in Geneva. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger and Gromyko discussed ABM limitation on April 28 from 10 to 11:45 p.m., and Gromyko gave Kissinger a draft agreement on ABMs during the meeting. The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 175.

## 68. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 20, 1974, 3:10–5:10 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PRINCIPALS

The President  
 Secretary of State Kissinger  
 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  
 JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer  
 Director of Central Intelligence Colby  
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Ikle

### OTHER ATTENDEES

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Under Secretary Sisco	Mr. Kenneth Rush, Counselor
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt	to the President
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson	General Alexander Haig, Chief of
	Staff
<i>Defense</i>	Mr. Ron Ziegler, Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary Clements	President
Major General John Wickham	Major General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. Robert Ellsworth	
<i>CIA</i>	<i>NSC</i>
Mr. Carl Duckett	Mr. Jan M. Lodol
<i>ACDA</i>	
Mr. Sidney Graybeal, Chairman	
SALT Consultative	
Commission	

President Nixon: Henry, before we start our review, would you like to outline the issues first, or do you prefer to have an intelligence briefing?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe we should see some of Bill Colby's charts which show what would happen without an agreement first.

Mr. Colby: (See attachment for transcript of remarks read by Mr. Colby and copies of charts.)<sup>2</sup>

President Nixon: Thank you Bill. Henry, would you like to outline the issues?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1971 thru 6-20-74. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> Colby's briefing, but not the charts, are *ibid.*, Box H-33, NSC Meeting, SALT, 6/20/74.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, as I understood your purpose for this meeting, you would like to go through a summary of the issues likely to arise at the Summit on arms control matters. There are three major topics likely to arise—ABM, SALT, and the threshold test ban. I suggest we take up the ABM issue first. It is the simplest and, I believe, relatively non-controversial.

President Nixon: Then let's go to the next one! (Laughter) Senator Fulbright said this morning that the ABM was no good, so we don't need to talk about it anymore

Secretary Kissinger: Fulbright also said he did not understand how we had rejected a Soviet proposal to drop our B-1 and Trident programs.

President Nixon: Well, he knows more than we do.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm sure they would let us drop them.

With respect to the ABM, the background to this issue is that, as you know, in 1972 we reached agreement which permitted each side to have two ABM sites—one at the national capital and one at an ICBM site. We opted for defending our ICBMs, and the Soviets chose their capital. Neither side has proceeded to construct a second site. As you know, the Soviets proposed several months ago dropping the rights of each side to deploy a second site. We have reviewed this in the Verification Panel, and I understand that the consensus among the agencies is that it is alright—that we can move our defense from our missiles to our capital if we wish. The Soviets have accepted our proposal that either side would have the right to switch once on the occasion of the five year review provided in the ABM treaty.<sup>3</sup> On the basis of what we know now, I believe we would recommend that you sign a protocol to the ABM agreement with these provisions. I do not believe that there is any interagency disagreement on this issue.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is one minor issue I would like to raise. First, this agreement is certainly consistent with our budget submissions of the past several years. We have not asked for a second site. However, the preference of the Defense Department would be for a termination date in the agreement of something like 1980, rather than having a permanent agreement. This is an issue of detail and not of principle. Admiral Moorer may have something more to say on this.

Admiral Moorer: The Chiefs have supported two ABM sites consistently. Our site defense program has in the past received support from Congress by only five votes. We figure that with a reduction to one site, we may lose this program altogether. Also, we would certainly want the right to relocate as you have discussed—this is a key provi-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 67.



sion. Finally, the Soviet Union does have one advantage—their NCA defense also covers 300 of their missiles, although our missile defense does not cover Washington. There is this asymmetry between the two sides. But if such an agreement were restrained timewise, such as to the duration of the Interim Agreement, it would probably be all right.

Secretary Kissinger: The question of the time limit is not a detail. What we are proposing is a protocol to the permanent ABM agreement.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Would our rights to switch expire?

Secretary Kissinger: No that option would not expire.

Admiral Moorer: You mentioned a five year review.

Secretary Kissinger: I was speaking of the five year review provisions in the ABM agreement.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It's very important to retain the options to switch to a defense of our NCA. Having such an option on a continuing basis is important.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is no disagreement on that. As to Henry's point that this is not a detail, I still say that it is secondary to the main issue. Relative to the basic choice of both sides to go from two sites to one site, this is a detail. If we didn't have a limited time, it would not be very significant with respect to the future of the strategic balance.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, perhaps we should turn to the second area—a more difficult one—SALT.

President Nixon: Why don't we take up the threshold test ban next.

[Omitted here is discussion of a threshold test ban, which is scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. E-14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control, 1973–1976.]

Secretary Kissinger: On SALT, we've had several discussions here. It's not easy to predict which way things will go. Therefore, perhaps it's best if I review where we stand. With respect to the strategic balance, it remains much today as it was in 1972 when we signed the Interim Agreement. The Soviets remain ahead in the number of missiles, and throw weight, and we remain ahead in numbers of warheads. In '72, we had a three-to-one advantage in total number of weapons, including bombers, and about two-to-one advantage in missile warheads.

Today, we have over a three-to-one advantage overall and somewhat greater than two-to-one advantage in missile warheads. But as Bill Colby has pointed out, this will reverse in the 1980's if we stick to our program and they go ahead.

We should remember that the structure of US forces, in terms of numbers of launchers and throw weight, does not result from anything

we have done in SALT. Rather, it results from unilateral US decisions. SALT stopped not one US program. Low throw weight is a result of our own decisions and has not been imposed upon us by SALT agreements. We could have greater throw weight in existing silos with systems compatible with the Interim Agreement. I think Admiral Moorer can tell you this. And I know of no request for any large missiles that has been turned down at this level in this Administration.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could have a 6,000 pound throw weight missile the same size as the SS-19.

President Nixon: I would be willing to take a recommendation now.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have just had money approved by Congress to develop a larger missile.

Secretary Kissinger: The US can close the throw weight gap whenever we chose to do so, within the Interim Agreement. In addition, when multiple warheads were first developed, they were perceived primarily as a counter weight to ABMs. Since ABMs do not exist now, the strategic impact is different today than when the systems were first designed.

With no added US forces, the Soviet Union will pass the US in number of MIRVed missiles by the 1980's, perhaps by 1980, maybe by 1982. This depends on the rate of building. At the maximum rate they have gone in the past, the gap would become quite dramatic. Our real choice is either to achieve constraints on their programs, or have a build-up of our own. The worse case is to have no constraints on their program and no build-up of our own.

President Nixon: I want to reemphasize that this is not just a theoretical exercise. Henry's point brings up that we should take a hard look not just at what they can do but what they will do. If there were no constraints, we could raise hell to try to drum up Congressional support and that might happen. But I am mainly concerned that it might not happen either. Thus, we have to consider reasonable proposals for constraints. If we can constrain them, we've gained something. No matter what the plans are that we talk about here in the NSC and get developed in DOD, we might not get support for these programs.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the status of any negotiations, the negotiations for a permanent agreement in Geneva have been based on the notion of essential equivalent, which we have defined as equal aggregates at 2350, equal MIRV throw weight, and other propositions. The difficulty of the Geneva negotiations has been that both sides can look at the other as attempting to prevent the things they are best at. The practical consequences of their proposal are to eliminate B-1 and Trident. In our favor, 2350 has the effect of increasing US forces by 200 and reducing theirs by 250. Therefore, we have a stalemate. We have

also argued for equal MIRV throw weight. This would restrict the Soviets to 300 MIRVed missiles, although Bill's projections show they are easily capable of going greater than a thousand. Therefore, the status of the negotiations is as follows. The current scheme we were talking about would be an extension of the Interim Agreement numbers to perhaps 1979 or 80—the date is important here because Trident comes in in the 1977–78 period. In return for this, we would expect to achieve limits on the total number of MIRVed missiles. They have offered us 1100 versus a thousand for them. We have told them that this is not adequate. It would stop us essentially in the next year or so, and allow the Soviet build-up to continue. I know of no one in the government that recommends accepting this approach. But they may offer a better differential. The question is what our position should be if they offer a better differential. Especially if we were able to fulfill our program while we restrained theirs, we should consider it. In any event, we would be able to put bigger missiles in our force so that we would not be constrained from increasing our throw weight. Right now, Mr. President, you have no decisions to make.

We have an offer, but only an unsatisfactory offer.

But suppose they should increase the gap—would we then be prepared to extend the Interim Agreement to 1979 or 1980, and bring some larger missiles into our deployments. This would deprive us only of the option to increase our number, not limiting our improvements in our existing system. You may face such decisions. I have no indication that you will, and in fact my prediction is that you will not have to face it, because they won't offer an increase in the differential.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is a relationship between MIRVs, throw weight, and stability. As Henry indicated, we can increase the throw weight of our existing missiles. But it is undesirable for both sides to increase MIRVed throw weight—particularly the ICBM throw weight. There are particular problems with ICBMs—they have greater accuracy and yield and are on alert. The reasoning used when you proposed equal ICBM MIRV throw weight is still valid. When Secretary McNamara first made the decision on MIRVs, he looked upon MIRVing as a way to hold down increases in the size of the force—to hold down counter force capability. Matching throw weight increases would create instabilities. Our concern is that an expansion on both sides collectively is not in our mutual interest.

Mr. President, you asked that we consider what we might do in this area, taking into account our objectives. We have gotten together inside the Defense Department and we all agreed that it is advantageous to both sides to exercise restraints. If the Soviets are willing to exercise restraints, we should pay the price. We have developed a new proposal with five elements, which I believe is workable: (1) We would

agree that neither side would have more than 2500 launchers. This would help with our Congressional problem in establishing the basis of equality. (2) The US and the Soviet Union would agree to discuss seriously reductions from the 2500 level. (3) The Soviets would agree not to deploy more than 360 MIRVed ICBMs by 1979. (4) The US would be limited to no more than 550 Minuteman III and would agree to cease Minuteman III production. With no agreement, I recommend we go with Minuteman III to at least 700. (5) We would extend the Interim Agreement during this period.

This would give us in a formal sense approximately equal MIRV throw weight and help with the reduction of instabilities. The impact on the Soviet program would be to reduce their deployment from 200 per year to approximately 85 per year. We think this is a reasonable price for them to pay in order to bring about restraints in US programs. We would be giving up the ability to deploy more Minuteman III.

As Henry indicated, it is important that we provide restraint. This would provide restraint on both sides. The Soviet Union could say that it had headed off a US build-up. We believe this a reasonable package. It would give the Soviet Union 2100 MIRV reentry vehicles—a powerful force—powerful enough according to some analysts to threaten our Minuteman, although I do not subscribe to that analysis.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I believe that it is important to make it very clear that this is a proposal which the Soviet Union has already rejected. First, it stops Minuteman at about our current program. Second, it leaves MIRV submarine launchers free. We have 496, and with three Trident boats coming in we'll have up to 6000 warheads. But by the end of the Interim Agreement, the Soviets could have no more than about 100 MIRVed SLBMs. Therefore, when we look only at 360 to 550, this would be acceptable if there were no other weapons. But it is unacceptable when you consider the SLBMs. This is essentially the proposal we made in Moscow in March, and they made their counterproposal of a thousand. With respect to the 2500, total number, this might be all right in a permanent agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger: It would also be helpful in an Interim Agreement. It provides a good base. It says we could have 800 bombers, considering the other constraints of the Interim Agreement, which everyone knows we would not deploy. But it would still set an equal base. I was not aware that they rejected 360. My understanding was in March that they rejected 200 missiles. Our proposal for 360 is somewhat more. On SLBMs, this approach would leave the Soviets free to deploy SLBMs. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* But one cannot compare ICBMs and SLBMs simply by counting warheads. An SS-9 *[less than 1 line not declassified]* could destroy all of Los Angeles, but a Poseidon, with its 14

warheads, if dumped on the city would leave one-half of the city surviving.

There are advantages to the Soviet Union in this approach. We cease Minuteman deployment and avoid a build-up in our forces. The Soviets have always been worried about stirring the American public into counteraction. I'm not aware they have rejected 360 and I would urge you to try it out on them.

Secretary Kissinger: No, they rejected 200, but I can assure you they will reject 360 also.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. Brezhnev has a very high respect for you, Mr. President. You can be very persuasive—you have great forensic skills. I believe if you can persuade them to slow down to 85 per year versus 200 per year, you will have achieved a major breakthrough. The Chiefs have been apprehensive about MIRV agreements, but I believe that most of them would endorse this approach.

Admiral Moorer: The Chiefs have been apprehensive about any extension of the Interim Agreement. We believe this leaves the US in a disadvantageous position if we need to break out and start our program. We were testifying before Jackson's committee this morning, and several members of the committee, including Stennis and others, indicated that they would support an increase in our budget if we can't get an agreement. I should mention that the CNO, I believe he sent a 17 June letter to you,<sup>4</sup> did not support this approach. Also we have to examine verification constraints. [*1½ lines not declassified*] Overall, I believe the proposal the Secretary of Defense has made offers a means for breaking our deadlock.

President Nixon: What does the CNO recommend?

Admiral Moorer: I believe he has five points. First, he was concerned about some of the verification problems [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President Nixon: That's a profound observation

Secretary Schlesinger: Let me see if I can summarize his arguments. He is in favor of going only for a permanent comprehensive agreement. He believes we should go for a straight out attempt to get such an agreement.

President Nixon: You mean he prefers no agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger: No, he just wants only a permanent agreement.

President Nixon: Let's put it all out on the table. When he suggests something that has no chance of success, that means he wants no agree-

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified. Admiral Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations.

ment. He has now written his letter for the record and I'm sure he will go out and say it publicly. But that's OK; I will have to take responsibility for it, he won't have to.

Secretary Schlesinger: I believe the other four Chiefs support the approach I've outlined. Also, it fits in well with the test ban approach you have discussed.

President Nixon: Alex, what do you think about this?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, I'm confident the Soviets would come back hard on the SLBMs. The SLBMs would be the big question.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have too many warheads in our force now. We have more small yield warheads than we need. They were first developed for ABM penetration. The thrust of the Soviet program lies in forces of large missiles being MIRVed. And there's definitely a difference between an SS-18 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and a Poseidon with [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I want to say that I believe there's no level of forensic ability with which you could sell this program. Thus, the practical results of it would be that we would go forward unconstrained—the Soviet Union deploying at the rate described by Bill Colby, we deploying heavy missiles in our silos. This would be our only choice, and clearly would lead to instability.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I would urge you to put your forensic ability to the test. I think you should try out this approach. And another point: the break-out situation described by Bill Colby is a projection which assumes that the Interim Agreement were abrogated. Otherwise, we have three years left in order to get the degree of restraint that I want, Henry wants, and Colby wants.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Mr. President, I believe there would be therapeutic value to doing that. You have only two or two and one-half years to go. I believe the treatment you would receive that would come about from taking that position—treatment from the American public and from your friends in the Senate—would be very favorable.

Dr. Ikke: We talk a lot about bargaining chips and so forth, and new programs. I think it's important that, in whatever Summit statement is made, we emphasize the outstanding work which needs to be accomplished by follow-on negotiations. There are very important items left such as cruise missiles and bombers.

President Nixon: Well, it will be interesting to see what Mr. Brezhnev will have to say. We all tend to be experts in predicting how the Soviets will react. But no one ever knows until we sit down. But based on our past experience, unless Brezhnev becomes totally convinced that his interests are being served, no amount of forensic excel-

lence affects him much. We will try—we will run out every option before getting down to our bottom line. But comparing today to before 1972 or 1973, I think we should realize that his bottom line is so far from ours, that the possibility of reaching agreement is unlikely. We won't go in with that attitude—we will say the right things. It's going to be a cold turkey proposition. There will be no amount of midnight sessions and toasts which will change our position on this.

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: Carl's proposition would be fine if we could get them to agree. The Soviets are aware of the importance of large throw weight. They have certainly invested a large amount of money in it.

President Nixon: I'll go into the wrestling match, I hope, as well prepared as Brezhnev will be—maybe better prepared. This will be a real test of Soviet intentions. They have been making statements about "they think the Summit will be successful" and so forth. If we are able to reach agreement, it will be only after extensive discussion. It will be one we can support in the national interest. But I will say that one thing that we will not accept are patently cheap shots such as what CNO has done—after the support the Navy has received from this Administration, which he's aware of. He knows what we have gone through. We saved the US from a diplomatic disaster by the wrong kind of end to the war in Vietnam. To come forth on paper with a position, which he knows to be unacceptable, and I'm sure he plans to go public with it. I hear a lot of this from our military—of course not from anyone in this room. The rest of you have different opinions. Under our system, that's why the decision has to be made at the highest levels, taking into account all views. But I hope you will all support whatever happens. You may end up not having to support anything. But if that is the way it ends up, no one will be able to say much more than who won the debate. And who won the debate isn't going to mean much. People will say "I won; my point of view prevailed." But that will not help us. That is why we have to take a hard look at all that has been said. I cannot accept a proposition that an arms race with no constraints is in our interest. And also I will have to respectfully disagree; the US public is not going to react strongly like we did to Sputnik. There are strong tides running in this country and fires building—many fires which were fed by Vietnam. But thank God for some people like Stennis and his Armed Services group. Other than that, we have a majority only in the House, and only barely.

If we have no agreement, we will do our best to match them. But the tendency of many of us is to look at this too lightly—to see what the consequences of failing to make progress in this area would be. They're potentially very great.

Let me close on one point. Worse than an arms race would be agreeing to freeze us in a position of inferiority. We won't do that. But somewhere there's a middle ground. That is what we will look for.

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**69. Minutes of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Principals and Regional Staff Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 21, 1974, 3 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion related to the upcoming Moscow Summit but unrelated to SALT II.]

[Armitage:] What can we expect?

SALT, of course, is the center of everybody's interest. And we have wanted to move from the temporary interim agreement on the limitation of SLBMs and ICBMs to some more permanent and comprehensive agreement. And the Geneva discussions have pretty well revealed that for this year that is not in the cards. And since that we have, of course, explored the possibility of more limited agreement, which would be centered on limiting the deployment of MIRVs in conjunction with a brief extension of the interim agreement. We are hopeful that this agreement in principle will come out of the summit. And we will sort of shape the outlines which this agreement might take. "Hopeful" is still the word.

We have been discussing, of course, further limitations of ABMs to reduce it to one site. And we expect to get some agreement on this.

Also we expect to sign some agreed procedures for the Standing Consultative Committee, which is the outfit set up by the initial SALT to define how they were going to implement the provisions on dismantling and replacement, destruction of strategic weapons.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, Lot File 78D443, 1973–1977, Box 4, Mr. Sisco's Principals' and Regionals' Staff Mtg, 6/21/1974 to Secretary's Staff Mtg, 10/08/1974. Secret. Ingersoll and the Regional Assistant Secretaries attended the meeting.



## 70. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, June 28, 1974, 4–5:30 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU  
 Nikolay V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet  
 Aleksey N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR  
 Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
 Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.  
 Georgy M. Kornienko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Andrey M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary

President Nixon

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs

General Alexander M. Haig, USA (ret.), Assistant to the President

Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department

William G. Hyland, Director, INR

Jan Lodai, NSC Senior Staff

### SUBJECTS

ABM; Test Ban

Brezhnev: Mr. President, what is the first subject for discussion today?

President: I think ABM. We want to make sure that Kissinger and Gromyko don't sign something that is not in our interest.

Brezhnev: Yes, that is very important. For my part, it is important and we are setting about a solution in the correct way. A certain time has passed and our scientists have concluded that we can spare this and I feel we should agree with their findings. Not only will we be saving money but we will also prove the direction we want to go is toward peace. It will be most expedient and significant in terms of increasing confidence between our two countries and, therefore, I feel sure that we will reach a unanimous decision in this field. And so we are prepared to sign an agreement tomorrow.

President: Good. Yes, we will then be limited to one ABM for each side but will have the right to exercise a change.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files–Europe–USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in St. Catherine's Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace. Nixon arrived in Moscow on June 27 for the Summit with Brezhnev. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full as Document 187 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

Brezhnev: Yes, at the option of that side. As far as the zone for ABM is concerned I only request that the area not be in the region where Dr. Kissinger lives.

Kissinger: You see what understanding I have achieved in only two years.

Brezhnev: You see how solicitous we are of your health.

President: Considering our bureaucracy we could probably do without Washington easier than you could do without Moscow.

Brezhnev: The scientists show that ABM has little effect but let them have their one area and do what they want although we could get by without ABMs altogether. We feel people will take the correct view. They will regard it as another step to gain confidence. You always advance step by step and perhaps we can eliminate the one remaining site in the field.

Kosygin: The main thing to point out to the public is that we are removing and limiting ABMs not because we are technically unable to produce a new system but that we do not need it. There are two ways the public may react. There will be a feeling of concern that they are not adequately protected. But the other way will be the result of increased confidence on both sides.

Podgorny: In short, people will be more certain that neither side wants to attack the other.<sup>2</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT or ABM.]

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<sup>2</sup> The Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was among the seven protocols, treaties, and agreements signed in Moscow on July 3. The Protocol addressed the deployment and destruction of ABMs; the full text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 29, 1974, p. 216.

**71. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Oreanda, June 30, 1974, 3:15–5:45 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, Central Committee of the CPSU  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States  
Andrei M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary  
Georgi M. Kornienko, Member of the Collegium, Head of USA Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Generals Kozlov and Afonofsky, Soviet General Staff  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
  
President Richard Nixon  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, USA (retd.), Assistant to the President  
Maj. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Helmuth Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, State Department  
William G. Hyland, Director, INR

[Note: Conversation begins as other participants join the President and General Secretary who have been meeting alone.]

Brezhnev: I was telling the President that we appreciate him sending Dr. Kissinger to Moscow. He took a tough line with us in March, and we candidly told him our view. We told him our limits. The truth is there somewhere, so he should tell us where we should start to reach agreement.

President: As far as the conversation the General Secretary and I were having—we have left the issues for a larger group to discuss; if there is to be any agreement, we have to discuss the specific problems in this group.

Brezhnev: I confirm that.

President: I made the point only that the failure to reach any agreement will inevitably lead us to step up US expenditures and programs in the November budget, with an inevitable Soviet response and this kind of increase in the arms race could jeopardize our relations in other areas as well. Consequently, it is important, in addition to agreements

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at Brezhnev's Beach House Grotto in Oreanda. On the afternoon of June 29, Nixon traveled with Brezhnev from Moscow to Oreanda, located in the Crimea near Yalta. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

already reached, to see what agreements are possible in this area, and to see what are the points of view. In fact, we have a Wednesday<sup>2</sup> deadline. If nothing can be agreed upon, we had better learn it now. I presented the themes, we both recognize our positions are far apart, that is where we stand.

Brezhnev: (To Dr. Kissinger) This is one occasion where the best possible answer is not to comment.

President: We agree we ought to agree, but Dr. Kissinger should tell us how.

Brezhnev: Suppose we take as the starting point the agreements already achieved, but we can't start from the very beginning.

President: All right.

Brezhnev: Since we have already discussed with the President, through Dr. Kissinger that time he was here, we have set out our point of view. He promised to think it over and come back to us, but since then we have had nothing. Perhaps by now some new considerations have matured; some principles, because failure of this talk would be quite detrimental, but let's proceed in an attitude of confidence and belief in our goal.

Kissinger: Mr. President, we made an informal suggestion to the Soviet side that represented our own best thinking. We said we would do our utmost to continue the Interim Agreement. Continuing this agreement, with its numerical advantage to the Soviet side, would be agreed along with limitations on MIRV that gave us a slight advantage. Thus we accept the basic principle that the General Secretary developed.

President: Only a slight US advantage?

Kissinger: Substantially a US advantage.

Brezhnev: Well, let me recall it: We suggest that the US be limited to 1100 MIRVs and 1000 for the Soviet side. This means 100 MIRV missiles more for the American side.

Kissinger: We pointed out that this was impossible for us. We will have to stop our MIRV programs next year, but the Soviets will continue for four more years at their maximum capacity. This will be represented in the US as our freezing while permitting the Soviets to catch up.

Brezhnev: Well, let's talk about it.

Kissinger: This agreement should be seen not only in terms of the numbers that are established but in terms of what each side could do

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<sup>2</sup> July 3, the last day of the summit.

without an agreement. Without an agreement, for example, we could put MIRVs on 500 more Minuteman missiles.

Gromyko: In this period?

Kissinger: Yes, in two years.

Dobrynin: After two years?

Kissinger: Let's talk concretely: the numbers we propose are expressed as a percentage of the base, but amount to the equivalent of 1150 for the US and 750 for the USSR, and no large missiles with MIRVs. In this agreement, we will be accused of stopping the US while not stopping the USSR. We will be at the level of 1050 by next year which means that for the 4 years thereafter we would add only 100 MIRVs, so in terms of what we are refraining from doing this is a very major concession on our part.

In addition to this part of our proposal we agree to continue the Interim Agreement numbers which are favorable to the Soviet Union. So that is our basic proposal. What we can do in addition is to express this proposal in a manner so that the actual numbers do not appear. This is the paper I gave informally to your Ambassador.<sup>3</sup>

Gromyko: However you express it the results are the same.

Kissinger: No, you are getting more MIRVed missiles. Formally, the results are the same but the percentages are different.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger wants a vast supremacy which can't be met by equality in percentages. I don't see any basis for equality in this. If this is the final US position there is no sense wasting time. We negotiated an agreement in principle about not using nuclear weapons against each other. This was the principle. This was a great achievement. Without being unnecessarily modest we can say this agreement affected the entire world situation. In SALT we also have an agreement which registered a numerical level in terms of launchers. We did not publish those figures but you did. The agreement stated that we would have more submarines than you have and the Protocol indicated which levels we agreed on. And we also agreed that we could make the necessary improvements. Now you are a little ahead in perfecting some weapons. And you have found a way to use the same silo for a bigger Minuteman though with some violations. You have also tested 5 RVs and under our agreement you have this right.

Kissinger: Unfortunately, our missiles do not have 5 MIRVs.

Brezhnev: I think I am right in this. You do not have the right numbers.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

Kissinger: On the Minuteman we have 3.

Brezhnev: You know I told you in March about this.<sup>4</sup>

Kissinger: (To the President) He is referring to a test of an ABM which exploded into several parts.

Brezhnev: I don't know about this but if you say it exploded . . .

Kissinger: Let's be specific. One basis for cooperation is the proposal we now suggest in which we refrain from improving our weapons whereas you suggest you would have MIRVs and eventually overtake us in warheads.

Brezhnev: You already have them on the Minuteman.

Kissinger: On one half of the forces only.

Brezhnev: So where do we go. To an increased arms race or to a freeze or to use the time for reductions. This is what we were talking about last time but now you say you will add 500 more Minuteman. That would be an arms race.

Kissinger: I am saying that in the absence of an agreement we can add 500 more.

Brezhnev: If that is to be the basis for our relations I can't say how many more we would add. We don't want to MIRV a single missile.

Kissinger: You don't want MIRVs?

Brezhnev: But getting rid of them is another matter.

Kissinger: To return to our proposal, under our approach we would add only 100 MIRVed missiles while the USSR would build up to 750. In effect you are allowed to MIRV 650 more missiles than we would.

Brezhnev: But generally the point is on what basis do we have equal rights. Why do you want to restrict our rights to armaments under an agreement. We knew you had Poseidon with MIRV missiles at the time of the Interim Agreement, but we didn't allow this to interfere with our calculations. But now you want to overrule our rights.

Kissinger: But in the Interim Agreement you had a larger number of launchers than we did.

Brezhnev: But you have other factors.

Gromyko: There are the forward base weapons in the Mediterranean and in Italy and Greece. We agreed not to take that into account. If we don't count them so who is being generous. How will it look to our people if we do not talk about these bases.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 60.

Brezhnev: We hope to achieve restrictions and not get into arguments whether we get advantages or not. Overall it was the same. I stand by what I pledged even though I could be accused of having given privileges and advantages.

Kissinger: We recognize that the Interim Agreement was fair to both sides. We are not saying that you got the better of the bargain. But, obviously, if we are now to create limits on MIRVed missiles our purpose must be to restrain each side below the buildup to their maximum. Even in our proposal, in the US many would say that we will be going at a much slower rate than the USSR. We are restraining our possibilities much more so than we are asking for your restraint. We would have enormous difficulties with this type of agreement domestically. You may have seen some of the columns in our press yesterday that reflect the views of a vocal minority.

Brezhnev: But we cannot let newspapers decide. We can publish our views in *Pravda* too.

Gromyko: *The New York Times* would crucify you for any agreements.

Kissinger: It is not a question of *The New York Times* but the extent that it reflects views of many of our own people. If we look at the next five years in terms of disparities you could say that the proposal we are making is more favorable for you but we consider it fair. Some will say you can deploy more rapidly than we can.

Brezhnev: I agree that we can deploy rapidly. By tripling our efforts we could catch up but this is not what we want.

Kissinger: We consider our approach as fair in this regard.

Brezhnev: But how many MIRVs do you have and nuclear weapons overseas. If, as you say, you will complete your program within one year you will have several thousands of weapons and we wouldn't have any MIRVs.

Kissinger: What we are saying is that if you go for your maximum capability and we do what we can do on our side then there will be a tendency to have very high warhead numbers on both sides.

Brezhnev: But you say you will complete your program in one year.

Kissinger: I am saying that within one year's time we can complete our MIRV program up to the level of the proposal we are making. Within some years thereafter we can add another 500 Minuteman but which we would not do if you agree to the numbers we are talking about in our proposal. So you have a certain percentage of your numbers in MIRVs and we have about 1/2 and we could do more but we would not do so. That is the agreement we are proposing to you.

Brezhnev: But this is an old proposal you made in March.

Kissinger: No, this is different. The figures are different. What we discussed in March in terms of throw weight for the Soviet side the figures would have translated into only about 300 MIRV missiles.

Brezhnev: It is important to preserve equality. You have the Minuteman and you are replacing it with an even more powerful weapon.

Kissinger: No, this is not true. We could do it but we are not doing it.

Brezhnev: But you are covering the silos.

Kissinger: But we are not covering the silos to put in a more powerful missile.

Brezhnev: We would not oppose if you did as long as you stayed within the limit that we agreed.

Kissinger: We do have the right to put in a more powerful missile and we could do it without violations.

Brezhnev: That is what you are doing.

Kissinger: No, the missile we have is essentially the same as the Minuteman II only it has MIRVs. Under the proposal we are making we limited [*listened to?*] what you had to say about SLBMs so we have proposed that you be limited at 750. Under this you may have more land based than sea based if you choose. We have made the assumption that you will not have MIRVs on SLBMs until the end of the period we are talking about so that in land based there will be near equality.

Brezhnev: But I didn't give you any assurances about our SLBM MIRV.

Kissinger: No, only you spoke of your plans.

Brezhnev: I told you we would be building a new type but I gave you no assurances.

Kissinger: It does not make any difference under our proposal because our numbers combine sea based and land based. You choose as you see fit between the two.

Brezhnev: Right, that is how we agreed.

Kissinger: Right, we do not need an assurance on sea based.

Brezhnev: Well, it is very hard to talk on that basis of your proposal. We will have to think afresh but I think it violates an underlying principle of our relations.

Nixon: First, as far as accuracy is concerned, when we get into numbers of this magnitude it is almost beyond comprehension. It really doesn't mean too much. The fundamental thing is to reach an agreement.

Brezhnev: I agree. It is important to reach an agreement but it should be one that restrains the race, slows it down. Under the proposal



Dr. Kissinger is making the US does not do far less than they would do without an agreement.

Kissinger: No, the US would do far less than we could do without an agreement. The Soviet Union would do somewhat less than they could do otherwise. There would be actual restraint. The restraint would be greater on the US than on the Soviet Union. The other point is, and we do not put this as a threat, but we can MIRV an additional 500 more Minuteman and without an agreement there will be pressures to do so and the Soviet Union should think about that.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, let me say that if what Dr. Kissinger has outlined is the last word on this subject there is no basis for an agreement. I will tell you why. The US has in land based MIRVs now 1200 and with another 2530 on submarines. You already therefore have 4720. You are suggesting 1150 which means 8500 warheads. You are suggesting we have only 750 and with a great effort we can have 4500 warheads. Therefore, you will have 4,000 more than we do.

Dr. Kissinger: With all due respect, you have to add your other warheads. From the 2380 or so you have, 750 will have MIRVs and you will have 1630 single warhead missiles left and if you add that in you have 6100.

Brezhnev: But you are adding things that can't be added. You know full well that if you add up all you have that you have 16,498 nuclear charges including the forward based systems and the strategic force. When I spoke of 1100 for MIRVs we were proceeding on the assumption that we are not going to war. That enabled you to have a certain quantity and you know that in that time we would have to make a very great effort to reach our goal.

Kissinger: Our military would make the argument quite differently.

Brezhnev: And you have a MIRV submarine.

Kissinger: Yes, and we are supposed to stop at our level and we are talking only of the next five years. If you are speaking only of equality we could say you are violating it under this principle.

Brezhnev: How come?

Nixon: If you want equality some in our country will argue that we are giving you the right to do more under the present agreement than we could do.

Brezhnev: But we have the right to do so under the agreement. We agreed on the numbers that were registered in the Protocol and we agreed to overlook your forward bases. I don't see the logic of this argument. The figures I gave you are incontrovertible.

Kissinger: 16,000 is much too high.

Brezhnev: You only have to check this to verify it. I am always very meticulous about figures. I am never erroneous.

Kissinger: It depends on what you count. But we would have to count figures on your side that are comparable. Our first figures we gave you are correct.

Brezhnev: I know that you have certain information on the Soviet Union and I do not like to play word games. What you say leads to inequality. It leads to unilateral advantages and to the arms race.

Kissinger: The basic point is that we are prepared to move more slowly in MIRVs than the USSR.

Brezhnev: What kind of concession is that? You can afford to be tranquil because you are well ahead and don't think we don't know it.

Kissinger: In this proposal we are going far beyond the view in our government and this proposal would produce a great debate. It would not be construed as taking advantage of the Soviet Union. Quite the contrary.

Brezhnev: You can't blame me for what Jackson's interpretations are.

Kissinger: I am not talking about Jackson. He certainly would be one of them. But there are others. I am saying it would be very difficult to get approval and could not be done without a bitter struggle. And some would say we are giving you an advantage in land-based MIRVs. What we have tried to do is to construct a fair proposal that takes into account all factors.

Brezhnev: When we negotiated and signed the previous agreement we took into account all factors including geography. Nothing new has occurred to change this.

Kissinger: As long as we were talking of only single warhead then your level of throw weight was not so much, but with the advent of MIRVs this changes.

Brezhnev: But it is a fact you are using the same missile to increase from .2 to .4 megatons.

Kissinger: This is not yet a fact but it will be done if we cannot agree. This is a fact. Why do you say that the Minuteman is not the same.

Brezhnev: It is not.

Kissinger: No, but there will be changes.

Brezhnev: How could you complain about violations.

Kissinger: The fact is that your new SS-19 is half again as large as the Minuteman. It has six warheads.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, why do you keep inventing things that do not exist. Why do you give me figures where we have six warheads.

Kissinger: You said you would have 4500 under our proposal which limits you to 750. If you divide 4500 by 750 this equals 6 warheads for each missile.

Brezhnev: You know when we have our tests and we know when you have yours. You have your observation ships and you know that we have 3 warheads, not six.

Kissinger: But the figures you gave equal six warheads.

Brezhnev: But this is only if we complete our program. It will be many years of work and you already have five times more than we.

Gromyko: We have heard your argument that if there is no agreement and that if the US goes ahead and that if the USSR goes ahead, that the gap will increase. Let us leave aside this argument. If we resort to this kind of agreement at our discussions we are talking about a broad proliferation of weapons, not disarmament. You say you will forge ahead but we are a big people and the disparity may increase but I hardly think such arguments will instill confidence in our minds about the need for an agreement. We are talking now about an important issue of disarmament and second, generally speaking, on the entire question of limiting MIRVs, on the proposal you raised with our Ambassador, if we accept the point that the agreement already achieved is based on fairness and is equal then why not extend it in its present form because the figures and content do in fact reflect equality and I fully agree with Comrade Brezhnev that all factors must be taken into account. And if we could ask an unbiased judge to weigh all the advantages to the US of forward based systems the advantages would clearly be on the US side. This is a factor of great importance. It takes no great strategist to realize who has the advantage, the US or the USSR. So what is being said by the American side about advantages is not sufficient to characterize the true impact of all the factors that give the US an advantage. It is very hard for us to justify the fairness of the existing agreement if you look at the map and see all your bases in Europe and Asia. The numbers in the existing agreement hardly compensate adequately. When we were negotiating we knew that you had MIRV and you knew that we would have MIRVs so we agreed to change silos without increasing their dimensions. Now this is being taken out of context and isolated and so turned by you to make equality disappear.

Kissinger: That is not exactly my statement. We tend to repeat each other's arguments about the agreement. We are not saying we will continue to increase the gap but the obvious reality is as follows: without an agreement for two years we would increase the gap. After that two years you will then close the gap under our proposal. After both sides have tens of thousands of warheads as the President said, it doesn't make much difference because there are no targets. We certainly have no targets for 16,000 weapons. Even if we did have 16,000 which we do

not have, there would be no targets. What we are trying to do is put a limit on this situation and that is better in our view than no agreement.

Gromyko: To cite one thing to illustrate the problem of forward based systems, Secretary Laird<sup>5</sup> stated that if the Soviet Union had a submarine base in Cuba this would be tantamount to a 30 percent increase in our weapons. Even if he exaggerated, you see what we mean.

Kissinger: This is one reason why the Soviet Union has more submarines in the Interim Agreement. But even with increased launchers for SLBMs this is no longer a correct analogy.

Gromyko: But geography has not changed.

Kissinger: But you have an advantage of 62 submarines to our 41.

Gromyko: But that is another matter, as we discussed in March. This involved quite a few other questions.

Brezhnev: Now Dr. Kissinger is bringing up new questions.

Nixon: I think the General Secretary had planned that we recess about now and perhaps go out on the water. This has been an important discussion and we will have to give it serious thought.

Brezhnev: I agree it is time to go out on the water.

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<sup>5</sup> Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense until January 1973.

## 72. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, July 1, 1974, 9:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Restricted U.S.–Soviet Meeting, July 1: SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *USSR*

A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs

G.M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter

#### *US*

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador

Gromyko: The situation is very complicated. I noted you practically didn't mention the B-1 and the Trident. These should be strictly limited.

Kissinger: If we extend the Agreement for five years, we could slow down the development of Trident relative to the present program. It is now planned to have two a year. This could be slowed down to one. Thus, there would be only two by the end of the interim period.

Korniyenko: There would be four or five by the end of 1979.

Kissinger: Two would be on sea trials. Only one would be commissioned by the end of 1979.

Gromyko: In March, you said there would be three. Have you reduced the number?

Korniyenko: In March you were talking about 1980.

Kissinger: I think I spoke of the end of 1979. I will have to look this up. Maybe there would be none at all—certainly not more than one.

Gromyko: And not more than two on sea trials by the end of 1979?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And the B-1?

Kissinger: I don't think there will be very many by the end of 1979. I can check and let you know tomorrow.

Gromyko: I mention this because you didn't cover this in detail. And what about the main figures?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files—Europe—USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Stoessel. The conversation took place at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Reception House.

Kissinger: This would be 750 for you and no large missiles. There would be 1150 for us. And the Interim Agreement would be extended until the end of 1979.

Gromyko: Those figures are so unrealistic.

Kissinger: Then we should send our Secretary of Defense to talk to you. He thinks you would accept 350.

We would have to explain why we let you build 750. We would build 150 more, and you would get 600 more to catch up. It would be presented this way in the U.S.

Our people say the maximum you can do is 900–1000 in that period. Maybe this is wrong.

Gromyko: We can't accept your arguments as they relate to your own internal position. You know your own position. I must say we have a strange impression of your position; we're surprised by it. It doesn't seem realistic. I don't see hope if you maintain your position.

I wonder if it is worth repeating again the argument about FBS which was presented by the General Secretary yesterday.<sup>2</sup> You know our position on this. The distance between our positions does not narrow, but increases. There is no forward movement.

Kissinger: What are your concrete ideas?

Gromyko: You know them. We presented our figures. We'd like to hear your views. If you have something more realistic to say about the figures, this would be interesting.

Kissinger: I don't have any different figures. I would point out that the figures we gave are not basically disadvantageous to you. They give you a greater rate than they give the U.S.

The General Secretary told me that you won't have MIRVs on submarines until the end of that period. By that time, you will be in a position to add rapidly to your sea-based MIRVs, and you'll still have more land-based missiles than we will.

Gromyko: We have quite different views about the figures. You had no arguments to make against the figures presented by the General Secretary. Your remarks about our heavy missiles as presented in Washington were really not arguments for serious discussion.

Kissinger: What remarks are you thinking of?

Gromyko: Those which you presented in Washington and which you are now talking about with regard to MIRVing our heavy missiles. These are not for serious discussion.

Kissinger: That may be, but it is a serious proposal.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 71.

Gromyko: Then this is all you have for the moment?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: That's bad. The situation is gloomy. What should we put in the Communiqué on this?

Korniyenko: We have nothing at the moment.

Kissinger: This is quite a serious matter. It is very difficult for us to fight for an existing agreement with nothing.

Gromyko: We can't accept any agreement which would violate the principle of equality as stated in the present agreement.

Kissinger: We could put language in the Communiqué saying that the parties seek energetically to limit MIRVs in relation to a possible broadening of the Interim Agreement without getting into figures.

Gromyko: And will continue negotiations for this purpose.

Kissinger: Something like that.

(Korniyenko then read off language which might be used in the Communiqué containing these thoughts.)

Gromyko: Tomorrow the President indicated that he would like to talk at the highest level about the Middle East and the Vienna talks. Sometime during the plenary perhaps you and I could work on the Communiqué. We should also discuss the threshold test ban.

Kissinger: I suggest the plenary be at 11. You and I could meet at 9:30.

Gromyko: This is not good for me. I have another meeting at 9:30.

Kissinger: We should meet on the test ban before the plenary. We could talk about the Communiqué after the plenary.

(There was further discussion about timing of the plenary, discussion of the test ban, and signing of agreements. The Secretary said that he would look again at the language on environment—perhaps we could come up with a new idea.)

Gromyko: Well, let's adjourn.

Kissinger: (Getting up.) Yes. I'm discouraged about SALT. (The Secretary and Gromyko then moved off to a corner of the room.) I don't want to be forced into an admission of failure. If we can't agree now, we should think of some way to keep up movement.

Gromyko: We have our delegations in Geneva. They could meet.

Kissinger: When do you propose they assemble?

Gromyko: (Answer inaudible.) A crucial point is the proportion of weapons. We need realism in the figures.

Kissinger: I am really a strong proponent of a solution. I am not bargaining.

We will have a violent discussion at home about all of this. We'll look at it again, but it's going to be very difficult.

Gromyko: Jackson has frightened everyone?

Kissinger: Jackson alone we could handle.

Gromyko: Your military is frightened, too?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: It is difficult for both sides. We're constantly being asked what is the matter and why won't the United States agree.

Kissinger: You can't compare a Phantom fighter with a missile with a 20 megaton bomb.

Gromyko: All of this data is known to everyone. You shouldn't have the view that we underrate the importance of an agreement. We want to find a solution.

Your figures seem to have changed.

Kissinger: If we let you put MIRVs on all your missiles, this would involve 1400 land-based missiles.

Gromyko: You will be ahead. Maybe for the sake of polemic, you could argue the other way. We're not going to MIRV all of our missiles. We're talking about *this* agreement. (Note: Presumably, Interim Agreement.) For the future, we will consider another agreement. This could represent something new.

Kissinger: We could see if we could find an entirely different basis for an agreement over a longer period with different figures. This could change the overall situation.

Gromyko: So after this agreement, a new, longer one could be agreed on, perhaps for 10 years.

Kissinger: Yes, for 10 years starting now. Maybe this could be on a new basis.

Gromyko: The present agreement expires in 1977. A new agreement would go to 1985?

Kissinger: We could see. This may be the only solution. It could affect the degree of optimism in the Communiqué. We could note the urgency of the problem and the desire of both sides to reach an agreement. Then we could discuss it later. We could say that the two parties agreed to consider a longer-term agreement upon the expiration of the present interim agreement.

Gromyko: Could you formulate a text?

Kissinger: Yes. This could be the best solution. At present, we may be too frozen with each side calculating movements.

Gromyko: This could be a good thing. It would give a sense of a new approach.

Kissinger: If we change the overall numbers, we *could* be more flexible about the number of MIRVs.



Gromyko: Then, if there is no agreement for the present, this could be superseded by a more general understanding. It is vague, but in a sense it is an intriguing formulation. It could touch the imagination.

Kissinger: And it could force us to use our imagination.

Gromyko: We should stress our serious intentions to reach an agreement.

Kissinger: I agree. Let's talk about it tomorrow.<sup>3</sup>

The meeting then adjourned at approximately 10:45 p.m.

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<sup>3</sup> On July 2, Kissinger and Gromyko discussed language for the communiqué. The memorandum of conversation of that meeting is printed as Document 197 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974. The Joint Communiqué signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on July 3 is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1974*, pp. 567–577.

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### 73. Editorial Note

After Richard Nixon resigned on August 8, 1974, Vice President Gerald Ford assumed the Presidency. On August 30, during a meeting of the Verification Panel, Kissinger informed the group of President Ford's thinking on SALT:

"Secretary Kissinger: I want this to be only a brief meeting. I want to pass on to you what the President has in mind for the next round opening up in mid-September, which will be either the week of the 16th or 23rd. In the first phase, the President has decided—has in mind—that he does not want to put forth any specific proposals. He just wants to set forth some general principles for a ten-year program. I plan to take a trip to Moscow at the end of October. At that time I'll want to have some illustrative numbers and get into more of the details on a program. I would like the Working Group to work out a set of principles that could be embodied in a NSDM to go to the Delegation. I would like to have an NSC Meeting on SALT in mid-September, say the 13th or the 14th that would review the principles and only begin to discuss specific proposals. I hope the President will approve the principles, and then we can send Alex (Amb. Johnson) off with some guidance. We can then see if we need another NSC Meeting in early October.

"As the President has said, he is determined to make a serious effort on SALT. We have to keep in mind the consequences of not having an agreement. Sure, everyone would like to see low MIRV levels for the

Soviets and high levels for us. But, are we better off to let it all run free or take what's attainable? My impression of the June discussions in Moscow is that we are both hung up on contradictory, symbolic things. The U.S. is hung up on the spread in numbers in the interim agreement, and they are hung up on the spread in numbers of MIRVd missiles. Both these differences are symbolic. My impression of the Soviets is that they cannot handle super-complicated issues. Therefore, I would like to give them only three or four simple principles to work on.

"The President has not seen any of the various proposals we have been working on. He has seen a statistical summary of the implications of the proposals, but no pros and cons on specific proposals. I have no idea of which way he is tending, except that he does want an agreement that is realistic and within a reasonable framework. This is where we are starting from. We want to cut out all the doctrinaire statements. The first time the President will be hearing the various options we have in mind will be at the NSC Meeting just before the Delegation departs."

After a short discussion on the timing of the NSC meeting, the resumption of SALT negotiations at Geneva, and briefing of NATO, Kissinger added:

"It is important that you hear what the President has to say before you go out. The President doesn't want a public debate on this thing. He wants to do it within a realistic framework. He wants to be able to compare a realistic outcome with where we would be without an agreement." (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 1, Verification Panel Meeting, 8/30/74–SALT(1)–(3))

**74. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1974, 10:08 a.m.–noon.

**SUBJECT**

SALT

**PRINCIPALS**

The President  
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger  
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown  
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

**OTHER ATTENDEES**

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll	Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson,	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
U.S. Representative, SALT	NSC
<i>Defense</i>	Jan M. Lodol
Deputy Secretary William	
Clements	
CIA	
Carl Duckett	

President Ford: Thank you all for coming; it's such a nice Saturday morning outside. It's been a very busy week, and this was the only day we could work in the meeting. I see you survived well yesterday, Bill (to Mr. Colby—referring to his public appearance on covert operations).

Mr. Colby: Just barely—sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me

President Ford: I'm glad to see someone else feels that way. I have scheduled a press conference for next Monday night, probably on live TV. I'm glad someone else has laid the groundwork for me.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill faced a group of NSC trained questioners.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 8, NSC Meeting 9/14/74–SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The Verification Panel met on September 9 in anticipation of this NSC meeting. Kissinger told the Panel that the NSC meeting would be “partly educational for the President, but largely to bless the instructions to the delegation.” Kissinger noted that the NSC in this meeting and the subsequent one “won’t develop an absolutely final detailed proposal that is sufficiently precise to elicit a Soviet response. There are no hard or soft positions so far as the President is aware. In fact, he is not aware of any positions.” (Ibid., Box 23, Meeting Minutes–Verification Panel (Originals), August–September 1974)

Mr. Colby: Kissinger trained! (laughter)

President Ford: (to Ambassador Johnson) Alex, it's nice to see you here before you take off on this most important mission.<sup>2</sup> I hope we can give you some good guidelines which can contribute to your efforts.

At the outset, I would like to make two points. First, about two weeks ago, we had some problems about discussions in other levels of the government, with the press getting information before we had made announcements. Since then, I think we have done better. I hope the attitude is one of keeping things to ourselves until announcements are made. I do think things are getting better, but our critics will not be letting us off easy.

Second, I'd like to give you my overall attitudes on SALT. I think SALT is good for the country. We have the obligation of finding common ground for a proper agreement. It's better to go in with this attitude than to go through on cynical or skeptical grounds, saying we want an agreement, but making it so hard that it won't work. Not just any agreement is acceptable—the terms might not be acceptable. But reaching an agreement is in our best interests. We should proceed on the basis that this is the case.

Bill, perhaps you would like to start by giving us some background. Let me add that we need not reach any final decisions today—The purpose of this meeting is to get clarification on our broad principles. We will talk again at a later date about specifics. We can then give instructions to Alex, Henry, and myself (*sic*) concerning what we ought to have in a proposal.

Mr. Colby: The current Soviet programs for development of inter-continental attack weapons are unprecedented in scope. Four new ICBMs are being tested, three with MIRVs. Additional ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles, perhaps with MIRVs, are in early stages of development. This effort, together with recent Soviet negotiating approaches, strongly suggests that Moscow is determined to proceed with a major modernization of its strategic attack forces, particularly ICBMs.

This chart<sup>3</sup> shows the three current and four new Soviet ICBMs. The SS-X-16, as you will recall, is the small, solid propellant missile which will replace the SS-13. We continue to believe that the Soviets are developing a mobile version of this missile. The 17 and the 19 are the two successors to the SS-11, the most widely deployed Soviet

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<sup>2</sup> As Chief of the U.S. SALT Delegation, Johnson was scheduled to return to Geneva on September 18.

<sup>3</sup> The CIA charts and photographs were not found.

system, but they have at least double the 11's throw weight. The 18 is the replacement for the large SS-9.

All the new systems represent improvements in terms of accuracy, flexibility, and survivability. Moreover, the 17 and 18 are being tested with MIRVs. The next chart shows that the Soviets are still firing most of their new ICBMs at a rapid pace. Experience indicates that Soviet test procedures require about 20 successful launches before an ICBM is ready for deployment. All of the new ICBMs are nearing that figure, and we believe that some version of each will be ready for deployment in the next six months.

President Ford: Their MIRV missiles also?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

As the test program for these new missiles nears completion, the Soviets are preparing silos for their deployment. This photograph shows the massive new segments that are installed after removing major parts of an old SS-11 silo, to prepare it for the 19 missile system. We call this *silo conversion*, and it takes about a year.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I might point out that they are not permitted to build new silos under the Interim Agreement.

President Ford: But this modification is permissible?

Mr. Colby: Yes, they have to use the same hole but can modify it.

President Ford: Isn't there a size limitation?

Mr. Colby: Yes, 15 percent.

President Ford: This is a limitation?

Mr. Duckett: Yes—[1½ lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: It's just that they might be more than 15 percent bigger in volume. [2 lines not declassified]

President Ford: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: I might point out that the fact that they have to modify the silos creates something of an advantage for us. This permits us to tell which ones have MIRVs. Without the modifications, we were worried that they could pop a new missile in the 11 holes, giving us no way to tell which have new missiles. This is the reason we have confidence we could verify the MIRV agreements we had proposed—we were convinced they can't deploy the new missiles without modifying silos.

Mr. Duckett: [3 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. By way of background, Mr. President, you might be interested in knowing what happened in 1972. Brezhnev first said they wanted the agreement to permit no modifications to the

silos. The next day, Gromyko had to sheepishly withdraw this and insist on permitting a 15 percent increase.

Secretary Schlesinger: These new missiles will have three or four times the throw weight of the ones they are replacing. Thus, while the modifications may be an intelligence advantage, they are a strategic disadvantage.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Colby: In monitoring the expected deployment, the fact that the silos for each type of new system have unique configurations will help us.

This newly acquired photograph shows silo components for the 17 at one complex. This is the first evidence of conversion for this system in the field.

Mr. Duckett: [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Colby: There are indications that a grand total of 601 SS-11 silos will be converted. There is also silo conversion activity at SS-9 complexes, to prepare for deployment of the 18. If the Soviets go this route for the whole SS-9 force, about 300 more silos would be involved. There is also a program to modernize certain SS-11 silos for a newer version of the missile. There are indications that 420 SS-11 silos will be modernized. The SS-11, you will recall, does not carry MIRVs.

Thus, on the basis of these and other developments, there appears to be a Soviet potential for about 1,000 MIRVed missiles (including some submarine launched) by around 1980. This total is close to the SALT limits for 1980 which the Soviets proposed last March.<sup>5</sup>

To explore future possibilities, let me assume two situations, some results of which we can see on the charts I will show. The first situation assumes that the Soviets will intensify their weapons development programs, anticipating that the Interim Agreement will lapse in 1977. In this projection we assume that they would pursue all attractive options, successfully push the limits of technology, and deploy at sustained rates similar to the highest annual rate demonstrated in the past. The second situation assumes that the launcher limits for the Interim Agreement will be adhered to for the indefinite future. It also incorporates

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<sup>4</sup> On September 13, Lodal sent Kissinger a memorandum about missile throw weight that was less clear-cut than the picture painted by Schlesinger. Lodal set forth projections for a missile throw weight at three levels of 6, 7, and 10 million pounds. At 6 million, the United States would retain an advantage of 14,000 to 6,000 in number of weapons; at 7 million pounds, the Soviets would have to dismantle all MLBMs and limit their SS-11/SS-19 deployment to 600 while the United States would only have to convert 350 Minuteman III to the 7,000-pound throw weight Minuteman IV; at 10 million pounds, the Soviets would have to dismantle far more than the United States, which would only have to replace 1,000 Minuteman III with Minuteman IV. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 8, NSC Meeting, 9/14/74-SALT)

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 60 and 61.

our “best estimate” of what the Soviets are likely to do on ICBM modernization and conversion programs, and a MIRV program for ballistic missile submarines. It attempts to reflect the Soviets’ plan to upgrade their force and may be compared with current US programmed forces shown on the chart.

In the first situation, we project an increase in heavy ICBM deployment, a large mobile missile force, and a ballistic missile submarine force larger than allowed by the Interim Agreement. Under these conditions, US forces would presumably also go up. On the other hand, the “best estimate” is constrained by the levels of the Interim Agreement, and envisions a slower rate of deployment and technical achievement. A new heavy bomber is projected in the first case but is not included in our “best projection”. Neither force includes the Backfire—the new Soviet swing-wing bomber intended primarily for operations in Europe and Asia, but with a potential for attacking the US. If the Backfire were included, it could add—in our “best estimate”—as many as 250 delivery vehicles to the 1985 total.

President Ford: How much of a jump would that be?

Mr. Colby: It would just be a little jump in the curves.

President Ford: It would be a comparable jump in both curves?

Mr. Duckett: Yes—The fourth one has heavy bombers, but not Backfire.

Mr. Colby: The next chart, of on-line missile reentry vehicles, both ICBMs and SLBMs, shows that even though the number of Soviet missiles is constrained by the Interim Agreement, the total number of reentry vehicles deployed is likely to surpass the programmed number of US missile RVs by 1980.

President Ford: May I look at that again? They catch up with no more missiles?

Mr. Colby: Yes. The reason for the current disparity is MIRVs, which they deploy.

Secretary Kissinger: These charts contain no bombers?

Mr. Colby: That’s correct—they’re missiles only.

President Ford: But they include the submarines?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I should point out that on this chart, the Soviet MIRVs are approximately one megaton each, whereas the bulk of ours are much smaller, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] We deployed a large number of small warheads in order to represent no hard target threat to the Soviets. Theirs will be a hard target threat to us.

Mr. Duckett: Perhaps another way of saying that is that they have less need for accuracy with one megaton weapons.

Mr. Colby: The next chart shows the number of weapons with bombers added.

President Ford: Does this one include Backfire?

Mr. Colby: The next chart adds in the weapons carried by bombers. Because of the US superiority in bombers, the total number of weapons in the US programmed force remains above our best estimate of the Soviet force for well past 1980. The Soviets consider bombers important to the strategic balance, however, and have nearly 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers to employ against them.

Mr. President, we should now address the question of how the Soviets view the quantitative relationship of the strategic forces, now and in the future. This chart illustrates our view of how they might expect this balance to appear in 1974, 1980, and 1985. The chart shows how the present modernization and MIRV program expands the number of weapons—warheads, and bombs—in spite of a relatively stable number of delivery vehicles—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Western forces include the bombers and missiles of our European allies, as well as US forward based aircraft—all of which the Soviets believe must be considered. They have also indicated that they include a threat from China (which we have not shown) along with the Western threat.

The chart also shows Soviet medium bombers, MRBMs, and IRBMs in dashed lines. While the Soviets resist inclusion of these forces in SALT negotiations, we know that they consider them in their own evaluation of the overall strategic balance. We believe that the comparative number of weapons is an important strategic measure to the Soviets. They now have fewer weapons than the US, but lead in throw weight and megatonnage. Looked at from this point of view, the Soviets can tell themselves that their new programs are designed to narrow the gap in an area where the present balance favors the US.

Ultimately, military power depends on how effectively it can be used to deter, influence, or wage war. Evaluating total strategic force is a complex matter.

President Ford: These charts presume we do not change our throw weight?

Mr. Duckett: We have just shown the programmed forces and not tried to guess what we might do. We think they may assume that our throw weight will be increased.

Secretary Kissinger: In our discussions with them they don't discuss throw weight; they have emphasized the number of reentry vehicles. It is perhaps likely that their focus on the number of reentry vehicles which can be put on missiles may be because of their throw weight advantage, but they profess that RVs, and not throw weight, concern them.



Mr. Colby: We have not tried to estimate their estimate of us—we have shown only the US program.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our budget has in it R&D for a larger missile, either for replacement in our present silos, or, if we needed to, we could change the basing. They know we have this program. But I should point out that increases in throw weight and RVs are bad for both sides. One of our main objectives is to preserve the present crisis stability by avoiding an explosion in RVs and throw weight.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Also, through our R&D we can do a lot—we are planning to double the throw weight on Minuteman III.

President Ford: If we make the decision to deploy.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, and hopefully to double the accuracy.

President Ford: Within the 15 percent limit?

Secretary Kissinger: You're saying that the existing missile will have more throw weight?

Secretary Schlesinger: No—That we will double the yield, not the throw weight.

Deputy Secretary Clements: I was trying to use the simplest of terms—it's the yield that matters, that's what you use the throw weight for. And we plan to double the yield and the accuracy.

Secretary Kissinger: In addition, you are developing a larger missile—there are two separate things at work here.

President Ford: And when you increase the size, you obviously will increase the yield.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, and we will increase the yield on the Minuteman III through improved miniaturization.

Secretary Kissinger: By applying our technology, on a bigger missile we can get either many more RVs, or higher yields.

Dr. Ikle: The Soviets can also within their existing silos build missiles of greater throw weight.

Deputy Secretary Clements: There is a technology gap in our favor. It's only a guess, but I would say it's 8–10 years. They couldn't do now what we can do.

President Ford: What about the testing limitations—Are we precluded from any of this?

Secretary Schlesinger: No sir—Our estimate is we will have this ready by May 1, 1976.

President Ford: That is within the threshold agreement?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

President Ford: If they are behind in technology, aren't they precluded from doing this by the threshold agreement?

Secretary Schlesinger: In addition to yield-to-weight ratio, we are improving accuracy, which they can do also. There will be some constraints on high yield weapons, but we estimate that we have no advantage in high yield weapons, but only in lower yield weapons.

Mr. Duckett: This chart shows what they could do with an accelerated program. The throw weight goes off the scale, and the megatonnage would match this slope.

Secretary Schlesinger: Bomber payload and missile throw weight are not completely comparable. That chart shows bomber loadings, but we have to remember they have 10,000 SAMs. This means that bomber penetration is degraded.

Mr. Colby: I would like to mention two aspects of this problem—the survivability of ICBM forces, and the number of fatalities a nuclear exchange could produce. The first of these will be significantly influenced by force developments on both sides.

This chart shows hypothetical US and Soviet views of the survivability of their fixed ICBM force from 1974 through 1985. Any such calculation is subject to a number of uncertainties, only one of which is illustrated. Two methods of targeting—one weapon per silo, and a multiple allocation of up to three weapons per target—are shown because of considerable uncertainty regarding the number of RVs that could be allocated with confidence to a target. The US Minuteman Force is assumed to be upgraded to 1,000 Minuteman III missiles, with improved guidance and yield.

The projected qualitative improvement in the Soviet ICBM force in our current best estimate causes the number of Minuteman survivors to decrease rapidly by the 80s. Soviet ICBM survivors will increase through the 70s, as the new harder Soviet silos become operational, but could decrease if the US deploys the improved version of the Minuteman III.

General Brown: This depends somewhat on targeting. In our operational plans, we don't know how to do the targeting well enough to get that many weapons on each silo, and we think we're as good as they are at targeting. In other words, our war games don't come out quite so pessimistic.

President Ford: The targeting problem affects both sides?

Mr. Colby: Yes.

Mr. Duckett: There's an interesting sidelight concerning the new silos. [4 lines not declassified]

President Ford: How do we do it?

Deputy Secretary Clements: Well, our method is no better—the hole ends up the same depth! (laughter) It's not a damn bit better.

Mr. Duckett: I understand some recent work by the Defense Science Board indicates that only two rather than three weapons can be put on each silo, so this chart might be a little misleading.

Mr. Colby: The other charts show that even with this survivability problem, [*1½ lines not declassified*]

President Ford: With the forces that are left?

Mr. Colby: Yes. In addition, they could do enormous industrial damage.

Secretary Schlesinger: That assumes they don't relocate their population. They could reduce their population fatalities dramatically by relocating their population out of the cities, although we could continue to destroy their industrial floor space.

Dr. Ikle: Their people would still be subject to fallout.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, they would have to contain the fallout.

General Brown: We do our computations looking at the long-term effects. You might remember on your trip to Omaha, Mr. President, that we target for 70 percent damage on the industrial floor space, and, of course, this gets much of the population.

President Ford: Is there any evidence of their planning for relocation?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes—they have an extensive civil defense program. We don't know how well trained their population is, but they have a big program.

Mr. Duckett: In this respect, we see no facilities to handle this population once they're outside the city—they seem to have no food supplies, and so forth.

President Ford: Well all I can say is, that I hope their effort works out better than our aborted effort has in this respect.

Mr. Colby: The conclusion of all this is that the basis of a mutually deterrent strategic balance is likely to remain essentially intact. But many specific features of the forces of both sides will change. Uncertainties about the quality and operational practices of these forces will become more important to the assessment of the strategic balance than simple quantitative measures, like numbers of launchers and warheads.

These, Mr. President, are some of the basic elements of the strategic relationship we see ahead. I would now like to consider that relationship within the broader context of how the Soviets view the total Soviet-American relationship, as this will be the framework in which they approach the forthcoming SALT negotiations. Marxism-Leninism still provides the Soviet leaders with a set of ready-made prejudices, but their appraisals of the outside world are increasingly pragmatic.

Both from what they say, and how they behave, the Soviets clearly regard the US as a potent competitor.

In economic terms, they have great respect for our economic strength, and have not concluded that US problems are gravely debilitating. They are particularly conscious of our lead in the technological field. Their military concerns, in turn, stem chiefly from the technological gap. Consequently, and despite all their own gains, the Soviets do not feel they have achieved a guaranteed strategic equality with the US. They tend to over-insure, and they want to catch up in areas where they are behind—like MIRVs—as well as prevent any erosion in their relative position.

In the world arena, the Soviets believe that their military buildup of the last decade is the primary factor that has forced Washington to turn from cold war to *détente*. Although they believe the relative position of the US has declined, they still take a sober view of the magnitude and scope of US influence. They expect, however, so long as *détente* is maintained, to be able to advance their interests. Moreover, they still seem convinced they can maintain *détente* while pursuing vigorous military programs.

These perceptions have a number of implications for SALT. First, much as the Russians might want the image of strategic superiority for its political value, they doubt that the US will allow them to gain an overall strategic lead in the next ten years. (In fact, they may see a chance that we will pull ahead in some areas.) Their hope is for an opportunity to forge ahead in the longer run. Second, the Soviets see much to be done in other areas—economic, technological, political. *Détente* is their current strategy creating the most favorable atmosphere for making progress in these areas.

Brezhnev himself probably wants some kind of deal on SALT, but he has proven a hard bargainer, and cannot act independently of his Politburo colleagues. Both he and they are heavily dependent on the military to formulate their views of the present and future strategic relationship. The Soviet military almost monopolize both the data and the expertise in this area, and is inclined to present “worst case” analyses of US strengths.

President Ford: Worse case from their point of view?

Mr. Colby: Yes. Finally, the Soviet leadership as a group is aging. Their successors will probably want to preserve *détente*. But their in-fighting could make it harder to take specific decisions in the sensitive area of arms control.

In the meantime, Mr. President, the Soviets see no promising alternative to *détente* as a way of meeting their problems. If they came to think *détente* was in genuine danger, they would want to try to shore it up. As they approach a new US President, they will be anxious to

learn—and to influence—your concept of the relationship. In particular, they will want to assess your terms for a strategic arms agreement, whether you are prepared to offer significant limits on US programs, and how you might react to a failure to reach agreement.

President Ford: Thanks very much, Bill. Could I look at the economic comparison chart once again—I was listening to you talk.

Mr. Colby: Yes. This chart is taken from open Soviet publications, and we think it is an accurate picture of their view.

President Ford: They are 85 percent as good in agriculture?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, that's in grain output only.

Mr. Colby: With about 30 percent of their population compared to a much smaller percentage for ours. Their productivity is much worse.

Deputy Secretary Clements: This would also be much changed if you included the whole Western world rather than just the US versus the Soviets.

President Ford: Even if you included the Bloc countries?

Mr. Colby: Yes—The Bloc countries add very little.

Deputy Secretary Ingersoll: Also, their per capita income figures are not on the same qualitative basis. These figures don't recognize the qualitative difference.

Dr. Ikle: These are from their public sources.

President Ford: You said these are not public?

Mr. Colby: No. They are public. We have reasonable confidence they are accurate. Of course, in the military area, they close off all information entirely.

President Ford: Thank you, Bill. Henry, now why don't you give us your ideas on where we should go in this meeting and what we should do to prepare for Alex's return.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I would like to first review the status of our SALT preparations. Then I will go over the general strategy we might follow in the upcoming talks. All of this has been reviewed by the Working Group of the Verification Panel and the Verification Panel itself. First, to pick up on Bill's point. There is no question but that détente serves some Soviet purposes—they wouldn't be in it otherwise. However, the question we have to ask ourselves is, what American purposes are served by détente. We should remember that from 1969 through 1971, we refused to offer them any significant trade or other concessions until the Soviets had moderated some of their foreign policy conduct. The SALT negotiations accelerated right when we were in the middle of the Vietnam war, and there was serious question about our ability to maintain our programs. In 1971, the Defense budgets were being cut everywhere. Thus, the situation has to be seen in the context of what we could have sustained otherwise.

We need not be driven by previous considerations; I'm speaking of the past and that is subject to change. But there are a number of considerations that apply to our current situation.

First, it is easy to talk about superiority, but this is one of those concepts which is peculiarly difficult to translate into strategic and military usefulness. There might be some political effect associated with the perception of superiority, but the level of fatalities involved makes the deliberate decision to initiate general strategic nuclear war perhaps the most difficult decision any leader can make. Thus, when we consider investments in strategic forces, we have to consider their usefulness, and whether it is better to put our efforts into more strategic forces or into tactical forces.

Second, as Bill's charts show, with the multiplication of weapons and the explosion of technology, after the next rounds of arms deployments are completed, both sides will still be essentially in strategic equilibrium. If both sides can realize this, perhaps we can at least slow the buildup or arrest it, or perhaps turn it around.

Third, over an indefinite period, an unconstrained strategic arms race is not compatible with a political relaxation of tensions. If we were to sustain an arms race, we have to demonstrate an overwhelming Soviet threat. It would be hard to sustain trade and other relations in this environment. It is obvious that the US cannot fall behind. If Soviet forces increase, that is what we will have to do. But the political dimensions will also change. In the past, we have attempted to get an equitable agreement to avoid this situation. A relationship can continue to be constructed if we can get an equitable agreement, leaving behind the question of what is an equitable agreement.

Turning now to our objectives in SALT, Mr. President, we have had four objectives:

—First, to break the momentum of the Soviet buildup and set ceilings on the level of forces. We have concentrated on equal aggregates.

—Second, to control the qualitative arms race, which has been a codeword for MIRVs. For other qualitative improvements, such as accuracy and yield-to-weight ratios, we have made essentially no efforts. "Qualitative improvements" has been a codeword for MIRVs.

—Third, to moderate the deployment of new generations of weapons.

—And fourth, to turn down the arms race with reductions. Of course, reductions require the interim negotiation of an upper ceiling. For example, if we agreed on a level of 2,000 by 1985 but no interim ceiling, the Soviets could continue building up to, for example, 2800 by 1984 and tell you that they would take all the reductions in the last year.

Thus, we need some kind of ceiling, but this could be expressed in many ways.

SALT I was a step in meeting our first objective, numerical ceilings. SALT I dealt with numbers in a situation where we had no programs to increase numbers. The JCS, both as a group and individuals, did not want new submarine programs; they wanted to concentrate on Trident. Thus, there was no possibility of an increase in land-based missiles, and no interest in an increase in sea-based missiles, and bombers were not constrained by the agreement. It is open to some argument whether we stopped the Soviet program or just did to them what we did to ourselves and froze their existing program. At any rate, there were no constraints on US programs growing out of the agreement. One could make a reasonable argument that the agreement was used to accelerate US programs—that Trident, accuracy, and other programs would not have been funded without the SALT I agreements.

But as Bill Colby's charts show, the Interim Agreement becomes obsolete in 1977. Before then the Soviets will put new launchers in old holes, but without the Interim Agreement we could see an increase in numbers. It is less costly to dig new holes than to modify the old ones. When this is considered, seeing the Soviet program to modify silos, it is clear that the Interim Agreement constrained numbers significantly.

Dr. Ikle: It cost more or less the same to modify the silos or build new ones.

Secretary Schlesinger: If we had to enlarge the holes, we would have to remodel concrete.

Deputy Secretary Clements: But we have sufficient volume or "cube" in our holes so that our technology permits large increase in missile size in the same holes.

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have to dig new holes to increase our capability.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't that right, George?

General Brown: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Without an Interim Agreement, we could be talking about quite substantial numbers.

Turning to the present situation, SALT is stalemated. In Geneva, both sides have presented positions which reinforce the perception of the other that they are trying for unilateral advantage. I think we have been more responsible than they have, but our proposals have primarily constrained their programs. Of course their proposals constrain us but do not constrain their own programs.

In Geneva, we have focused on equal aggregates and equal throw weight. We have made essentially no progress with this approach.

In March, during my conversations with Brezhnev, the Soviets proposed a different approach—a continuation of the Interim Agreement numbers for a three-year period, while giving us an 1100 to 1000 advantage in numbers of MIRV missiles. But this would have constrained our Trident program—we would have been able to deploy it only by replacing Poseidon and Polaris. At the same time, it constrained essentially nothing on their side.

President Ford: What would have been the impact on the B-1 program?

Secretary Kissinger: None. Under the Interim Agreement, both sides can increase the number of bombers. We can also put missiles on airplanes, something they are concerned about. That's why I have been asking the DOD to do this, to demonstrate a capability.

President Ford: Do we have any affirmative program for this?

General Brown: We have one—the air-launched cruise missile program.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are also going to demonstrate, first over the desert and then over the ocean, the capability to launch a missile from a C-5. But we have no full-fledged program—this is just a demonstration to show the Soviets we can do it.

President Ford: Will they know in advance about it?

Ambassador Johnson: It has already been in the press.

Secretary Kissinger: They seem to be worried about this capability. In all their propositions, they have suggested limits on air-to-surface missiles.

In any event, their proposal in March was unacceptable and this led to a deadlock. At the Summit this year, President Nixon proposed a shorter two-year extension of the Interim Agreement to 1979, to fit in better with our Trident program, to be coupled with MIRV limits of 1100 launchers and 700 for them.

President Ford: And they stuck with 1100 to 1000?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But even our proposal would have required them to retire very little. The Soviets seem to be considering it seriously. They had two Politburo meetings, and at the airport in one meeting, Brezhnev asked me to explain it to Ustinov, the head of their defense industries. But they had two generals there, and every time I said something, they jumped up showing Brezhnev charts with how much harm it would do—they probably wanted to change the squadron size! (laughter)

Mr. President, in MBFR, I don't want to get into the details, but we are thinking of giving up some squadrons, but George keeps changing the squadron size—pretty soon he will only have two airplanes per squadron! (laughter)



President Ford: He just wants more generals

Secretary Kissinger: At any rate, we were trying what we thought was a fair proposal, but they finally refused it. And then we proposed a new agreement on a 10-year basis. There are several advantages to this:

—First, any five-year proposal cuts into both sides' programs, or simply ratifies what both sides are doing anyway. It also cuts off our programs, when the other side could easily break out. There are many uncertainties in a five-year period. Even if they would limit MIRVs to 750, they might be below the number at the end of the period, but then could really take off with their programs in 1979 or 1980. The same is true for us. The full impact of our Trident and B-1 programs will not be felt until 1980 and later. Therefore, we thought that if we could go to a 1985 approach, we could constrain or stretch out programs, and in this atmosphere, we would be less vulnerable to a breakout.

—Second, Brezhnev kept saying that he needed the appearance of equality, which he doesn't believe they now have, given our lead in weapons. I should point out that for some measures like throw weight, it is our choice that we are behind. They didn't force us to deploy smaller missiles.

Secretary Schlesinger: The reason the US chose small missiles was because we were trying to exercise restraint, so that the Soviets would not perceive any threatening hard target capability. This was Secretary McNamara's explicit decision. He was trying to counter a potential 7000 interceptor ABM, and he did it by fractionating our existing payload. The Soviets are increasing their payload by a factor of at least two as they fractionate.

Secretary Kissinger: But Brezhnev's major point, that with the warhead gap there would not be an appearance of equality, had merit. We have expressed a need for a numerical equality in numbers of weapons through our equal aggregates approach ourselves.

As Bill said, and I have had no prior discussion with him about this, I believe this is an unusually good time to make progress.

President Ford: Have they agreed on the principle of ten years?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

It is my impression that their bureaucratic problem is worse than ours. For example, prior to Gromyko's joining the Politburo, he was not permitted at Politburo meetings even to comment on military programs. He was not permitted any research or analytical staff for military matters. All military input and technical data came from the defense department.

Deputy Secretary Clements: That sounds like a great system! (laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: (to Clements) That cuts you out too, Bill

Secretary Kissinger: The result of the bureaucratic situation is that historically, every arms control idea has come from the US. Whenever they generate a scheme, they have to stick to it because they have no flexibility. Dobrynin once told me that the general at the Geneva talks has instructions not to agree with Semenov on anything so that it all has to go back to Moscow for decision.

President Ford: So their civilian representative can make no decisions.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. At the beginning of SALT I, we knew more about Soviet programs than the Soviet civilians on their Delegation.

Ambassador Johnson: One of their military men asked us not to talk so much about their programs, saying that they did not provide this information to their own civilians.

Secretary Kissinger: Even now, Gromyko is so far behind the power curve that he can do little but repeat his briefing papers. He can't say anything on his own. Thus, if we don't break the deadlock, it is inconceivable that they could come up with a new approach.

Bureaucratically, if we do come up with a new idea, we will have to submit it through your channels to Brezhnev directly, so that he can study it before it has been beaten down by his bureaucracy. If it is submitted through Alex in Geneva, it will be beaten down before it has a chance.

All of this, Mr. President, affects the strategy of how we should proceed. Alex should go back and talk principles—he should convey primarily a mood, not concrete proposals. He can also explore some areas we have not yet explored. Then in early October, after one or two more NSC meetings, we can give our ideas in your channels to Brezhnev. Then I will go to Moscow, and if we can agree on principles, we can feed this back to Geneva, where it will take months, and maybe years, to work out the details of the final agreement.

At today's meeting, we want to put before you some of the problems, although we do not yet have solutions. For example, there is the question of aggregates. If we agree to numbers at the Soviet level, we will have to build up. At lower levels, the Soviets will have to reduce considerably before we do. Or finally, we could try to balance some slight numerical advantage for an advantage in some other measure.

A second problem is attempting to balance the number of RVs on each side. We have a large lead in the number of RVs, but our yield is infinitesimal compared to the Soviets.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is no problem if Henry can obtain MIRV limits on us versus throw weight limits on them. We can reduce

the number of reentry vehicles. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] To the extent they worry about numbers, we can adapt, although I don't believe it is in the Soviets interest to have us do this.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not saying any particular formulation is the answer, but just what the issues are.

Third, there is the question of the throw weight to numbers area. And, fourth, there is the Soviets' constant reference to overseas based systems. Ideally, we can move this discussion to MBFR—when you talk to Resor later today, we will have some time to talk about this. But this is not likely to come up in the next month, so Alex need not discuss this in Geneva.

Ambassador Johnson: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no need to modify our previous positions in Geneva. However, it is important for Alex to indicate some flexibility in the context of a ten-year agreement. Second, he can raise issues we have not dealt with before—for example, reductions, which we have not seriously talked about. Another area, which is full of complexities and details, concerns the deployment rates of new systems.

President Ford: Deployment rates of new systems?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We could either prohibit new systems, but that is tough to monitor. Or we could permit, for example, if we had a limit of 1000 MIRVs over a ten-year period, we could also add a limit on construction of less than 100 a year.

Mr. Duckett: I should point out, Mr. President, that at the peak of the deployments of their SS-9s and SS-11s, they were digging 265 holes a year. This would compare to numbers even lower than those Henry mentioned.

Secretary Kissinger: If we could stretch their deployments over a ten-year period, there would be a different strategic significance. Alex could discuss this in general, although we don't have a final position on it.

In the Verification Panel, we are trying to put together various numerical schemes. Perhaps within the next two weeks, we can present them to you here.

President Ford: And then we would submit them in my channels to Brezhnev.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Even after you approve a particular approach, we have several ways of handling it. We could give them one scheme, or perhaps two or three of different levels of complexity. It makes no sense to give them three schemes of the same complexity and let them choose, but for example, we could give them one very crude approach, with numbers only, and others more complex.

In the next day or two, we will give you the various instructions received from the agencies for your choice, and then we can give instructions to Alex for his talks which begin on Wednesday.<sup>6</sup>

President Ford: Then these instructions will follow the overall pattern of more flexibility?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes—perhaps not so much flexibility, but a better tone. He can also open up these new areas. On the aggregates, I see little he can do other than repeat our past statements.

Ambassador Johnson: The key is how forcefully I repeat our past requirements for equal aggregates. If I don't repeat this, it will be seen as significant. If I do repeat it, they may just say this is the same old stuff.

President Ford: But if the past pattern remains true, they won't have any new ideas either.

Secretary Kissinger: I am certain they will have no new proposal. It's possible they will present their old proposal in a more flexible manner, but if they had a new proposal they would submit it directly to you, not to Alex through Semenov. But Brezhnev has no system to develop new proposals, unless it is in reaction to a proposal of ours.

President Ford: Their military is so dominant, that they are completely inflexible without pressure from Brezhnev.

Secretary Kissinger: Finally, they will come down on one approach, and they won't care what the analysis is. For example, they gave us some numbers in Moscow, which if you counted all aircraft carriers on station and all F-111s in the world with maximum loadings, you could work out a scheme with those numbers, but they had no flexibility.

President Ford: Our approach will have to be predicated on that assumption?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Grechko is a very able guy, but he doesn't think in SALT terms. If we come in with a proposal, Brezhnev can do something more which might go beyond just satisfying their bureaucracy.

President Ford: Jim, do you have any comments?

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I have a presentation which gives the details of the force balance. I could give this now or later as you prefer. Also I have some observations. There are two main objectives of arms control—to improve the crisis stability of the situation, and to improve the arms balance. To improve crisis stability, we prefer to hold down the size of the forces. As we add to destructive capability,

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<sup>6</sup> September 18.

with a constant number of aim points on each side, there could be a growing temptation to strike first.

On the other hand, when talking to the arms balance, we are talking about what is perceived as a relation of the two sides. At present, their force is not greater than ours. But I think Alex should stress the functional relationship between their force deployments and ours. What they decide to deploy affects our deployments. In effect, they are choosing our deployments.

Because of some of the factors Henry has described, I don't think they understand this. The Soviet military perceive that they can unilaterally adjust their forces, thus I think it is worthwhile for Alex to stress this relationship.

President Ford: What you are saying is true, but among ourselves in this room, we have to recognize that we have a problem they don't have. We have to sell our programs to the Congress. We should recognize this among ourselves, although I don't think Alex should say this to them in Geneva (laughter)—but as a practical matter, this is what we face.

Secretary Schlesinger: But the Soviets' perception is that the US can move fast when the climate is right. In 1958, when they launched Sputnik we reacted and had a man on the moon in ten years. In 1961, shortly after we perceived a missile gap, we were putting Minutemen out at the rate of one every two days. They believe that if they ever arouse American concerns, we can respond, and that it is not in their interest to do so.

I might now show you just a few charts.<sup>7</sup>

(Referring to models of an SS-9 and a Minuteman III) This is their SS-9 missile. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] By comparison our Minuteman is much smaller. Their follow-on missile, the SS-18, is about the same size as the SS-9. Each one has eight times the payload capacity of a Minuteman.

President Ford: Just to clarify this, as you go to higher yields, as you mentioned Bill (Clements), doesn't this make a difference?

Secretary Schlesinger: It depends on the size and the yield-weight ratios. In the long run, with this size, we can't retain our technological advantages in yield-to-weight ratios. We may retain our advantages in accuracy, but as Soviet accuracies improve, this gets less important.

President Ford: Bill, how does the eight-to-one ratio change—it must if you double the yield.

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<sup>7</sup> Not found.

Secretary Schlesinger: The ratio doesn't change—our yield, pound for pound, is better.

Deputy Secretary Clements: When we double the yield, the dimensions don't change. But in any event, accuracy is more important than yield. The capability of the little ones grows enormously with accuracy. If technology stays the same, which it probably will do over the next ten years, we will have this advantage.

President Ford: And the impact on the targeting will be the same if we can get the accuracy?

Secretary Schlesinger: No—no one in the real world will know accuracy precisely. We will know about different degrees of accuracy, but never know precisely what our accuracy is. Throw weight can compensate for accuracy, as is shown in this chart. This shows the impact of uncertain inaccuracy. At quarter nautical mile accuracy, using 80% of their forces, they could reduce Minutemen to about 100 survivors. These other curves show what happens if there is uncertainty in their accuracy.

Secretary Kissinger: 80% of their ICBMs?

Secretary Schlesinger: 80% of the missile reentry vehicles which could be used for hard targets.

[1½ lines not declassified] But degradations and operational accuracies can drive our hard target capability to the dogs. This is true for our small weapons, but not their larger weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: There would be some downward adjustment in this curve, yes.

Ambassador Johnson: Of course, accuracy is important only in a counterforce role, not for soft targets.

Secretary Schlesinger: Accuracy is important for any selective targeting. For cities, it matters not at all.

Mr. Colby: Of course, even if they destroy our Minuteman, we have other elements remaining—our submarines and bombers.

Secretary Schlesinger: In March, our proposal recognized the substantial difference between ICBMs and SLBMs, in yield, accuracy, and command and control. ICBMs are the basis of both counterforce and selective attack capabilities. They are the main threat.

The Soviets may tend to brood about our lead in warheads, but here are some indications of the overall balance (shows chart titled "perceived balance").

President Ford: Is this as perceived by us or by them?

Secretary Schlesinger: The numbers are simply the facts as we know them. The issue is how these numbers are perceived in Europe,

China, and elsewhere. They are behind in bombers, which is somewhat offset by their fighters, but only somewhat. But they are ahead in megatonnage and throw weight. In warheads, we also have an advantage, but they are closing that gap. They tend to dwell on the one area where they have a disadvantage.

But over the next seven years, the Soviets will be leading in all areas. They will increase substantially their missile throw weight, over double the present. The bomber gap will be narrowed, and they will reach warhead parity, unless we can constrain the development of MIRVs, which tend to drive the warhead balance. By most criteria, the US would be perceived as having less capable forces.

President Ford: This is if they do what we project them to do, and we do what we plan?

Dr. Ikke: There is one other factor here, and that is our advantage in ASW capability.

Secretary Schlesinger: Now I would like to show you the situation we faced at the end of SALT I as we proceeded into SALT II. This is a chart which I presented to President Nixon when I was in Bill's job at the CIA. The US had some advantages, and the Soviets had other advantages, plus as we now see in retrospect, an impressive ongoing development program. But things came out a rough balance. However, our positions of advantage, many technological, are transitory. As they get on-board computers and other technology, our advantages will wane, if not disappear.

In 1972, by fractionating to very small RVs, we could deploy a large number of RVs. But if they support their throw weight, ultimately, they could outclass the US. We could react in two ways. First, we could expand, increasing our forces, but this would also increase instabilities. Second, what we would prefer to do, is to hold down each side.

This is why I think Alex should stress the functional relationship between their choices and our responses.

President Ford: Alex should tell them that instead of being guided by an inflexible military, they should be guided by their knowledge of the opposite situation on our side.

Secretary Schlesinger: Henry is in a better position than I am to judge if that is the proper message, but we can be educated. The US must convey the US intent to match them.

Secretary Kissinger: Many of these inequalities are not the result of the Interim Agreement. They existed before the agreement and would have existed regardless of the agreement. All our ongoing missile programs are permitted by the agreement—we could increase our throw weight if we desire.

Mr. President, we have to look at what we can realistically do. It is not a bad message to give them, that their deployment rate affects ours. To do this, I hope our Defense shows the maximum number of new developments, but if we are realistic, we have to realize that they have four new programs, which represent a major investment in resources. They cannot give up their approach. In any ten-year program, maybe they could give up one, but the 17 and 19 will survive, and the 18 too in one form or another. The question is what price we want to pay to have a single warhead instead of MIRVs, and from some of the things I have heard recently, I am not convinced it is all that much in our interest to pay much of a price for that. But if we can stretch out their missile deployments over an 8-year period, this would help.

We also should have a sense of the time frame in which we are dealing. Throw weight is worrisome if it can be translated into accuracy and yield. Up to now, the most they have tested is eight warheads on their larger missile and six on their smaller. We have to assess what they can do in the time period. If they can modify only about 610 holes, with no more than six warheads each, the advantage of the throw weight will be apparent only in the 80's. The throw weight problem is not upon us now—when it is upon us we will have to tell you.

Most of the analysis, yield, and accuracy relate to ability against fixed targets. Thus, the percent of your force which is fixed versus mobile is important, and the percent of theirs that is fixed is much greater.

We cannot drive them to smaller missiles over the next 10 years. Their system doesn't permit changing the type of their weapons. Perhaps we can change the numbers, but not the types. The question is that at some point both sides will equal out, and where does technological advantage even out.

Secretary Schlesinger: If we can constrain their MIRV, it would help. With seven or eight million pounds of throw weight MIRVed, that puts our Minuteman force at risk. We would have to put missiles on aircraft or take other action, or convince them to slow down their rate of deployment.

Secretary Kissinger: If Alex can make as his first point that they are determining our force through their decisions, this will help.

Ambassador Johnson: If I could also convince them of the desirability of providing some information on what they plan to do, this would reduce our uncertainty.

President Ford: Have they ever done this?

Secretary Kissinger: Not at Alex's level. In March, they told us that they were having trouble with their SLBM MIRVs, and that their SLBM MIRVs would be slower than their ICBMs. I believe this is the first time they have formally told us something like this.



President Ford: Is there any harm in asking them for such information?

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how Alex does it.

Alex: I would simply state the desirability of having the information not offered as a proposal.

Dr. Ikle: If we could get this point across to their military, by stating that the lack of information is harmful.

Secretary Kissinger: Over the next few months, about the most Alex can hope to do is to get them to understand that an all out deployment by them is not costless. The information idea is OK, but it is not relevant until we have some agreement in principle on doing something about the deployment rates.

President Ford: So Alex will follow this course, of the US being more flexible. If we can then get the right terms in an agreement, we will sign it, even though we are saying that if they pursue their programs, we will have to do something to respond.

Secretary Schlesinger: And if RVs are of major concern to them we are willing to do something about them.

Mr. Colby: Ultimately, we have to get both sides to ask the question of how much is enough.

Secretary Kissinger: We are dealing here in two time frames. First, the major thing Alex can do by the end of October is to emphasize the new approach of the ten-year agreement and that their programs are forcing us into new programs. Jim's suggestion can help. We can convince them that every military program is not a net asset. Second, we can open new areas, for example reductions. Then in early October, we can put some models before them. Alex will know them, although he will not discuss them in Geneva. Then if we can get agreement in principle, Alex will have a real negotiation on his hands.

President Ford: Of course, the credibility of Alex saying that we will match them is related to the actions of Congress on the military budget now before them.

Secretary Schlesinger: Every item in the strategic forces has been approved.

President Ford: We should make this more visible.

Secretary Schlesinger: The House vote was taken on the day of the Soviet parliamentarian's visit here. Ed Hebert, partially to embarrass Bella, called for a vote, and it passed 390 to 35.

Deputy Secretary Clements: That is why the cruise missile program is so important. The Soviets are very sensitive to this. Right Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: Right—I'm chuckling because I have been trying to keep it going.

President Ford: Well gentlemen, this meeting has been very helpful. We will have to put in writing the kind of direction Alex should take. Alex, when do you need this?

Ambassador Johnson: I am leaving Monday morning.

Secretary Kissinger: We can send them to him by cable. We want time to put before you the various proposals made by the agencies.

Ambassador Johnson: I have to be walking something of a tight rope throughout these talks.

President Ford: Like walking across Niagara Falls! George do you have any comments?

General Brown: I would only remind us that many of their deployment programs start now, while ours come later. We could get ourself in a box, and jeopardize our B-1 and Trident.

Ambassador Johnson: But you would have no objection to my saying that their deployment rates are higher than we like.

Deputy Secretary Clements: They should know this.

Secretary Schlesinger: We should stress our flexibility. We do not have to start our new programs and increase our budget which can be adjusted to their programs. We are prepared to sacrifice large throw weight missiles. There is no need to deploy them, but we will maintain the balance.

President Ford: Fred, do you have any comment?

Dr. Ikle: Only that I think we do face a major opportunity.

President Ford: Well thank you gentlemen, and good luck Alex. With you there, I have confidence that the negotiations are in good hands.

**75. National Security Decision Memorandum 271<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 24, 1974.

TO

Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary of State  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Chairman, United States SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks  
Geneva, September 18, 1974

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on September 18, 1974, in Geneva.

1. The Delegation should state that, in the U.S. view, the purpose of the current session is to exchange views on an agreement which will limit strategic offensive arms through 1985 and will replace the Interim Agreement of 1972. However, the Delegation should avoid discussion of the precise relationship between the Interim Agreement and a new agreement, i.e., whether the new agreement is to extend, follow, or replace the Interim Agreement.

2. The Delegation should emphasize that the United States believes that:

—An equitable new agreement can be concluded to cover both quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms.

—The mutually agreed objective of reaching a new agreement extending until 1985 offers new negotiating opportunities for both sides.

—This new agreement must be an acceptable point of departure for a permanent agreement, but need not deal with all the issues which should be addressed in a permanent comprehensive agreement.

3. The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation should inform his counterpart that the U.S. views the current phase of negotiations as exploratory and will initially not advance specific proposals, pending a thorough

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 55, NSDM 271, Instructions for SALT Talks, Geneva, 9/18/74. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On September 23, Kissinger sent the NSDM to Ford under a covering memorandum in which he indicated that "the details of the approach specified by the instructions do not vary significantly from our earlier approaches to a permanent agreement. In addition, the instructions emphasize two areas for discussion which have not previously received thorough attention—reductions and restraint in rates of modernization." Ford initialed his approval of the NSDM. (Ibid.)

discussion of the principles which might serve as a framework for an agreement through 1985.

4. The Delegation should point to the impact that the characteristics, magnitude, and deployment rate of Soviet strategic programs have on U.S. programs and force structure, especially in the absence of an effective agreement. The future U.S. strategic force level will be determined, to a major degree, by the outcome of the negotiations. The Delegation should convey the notion that the size and characteristics of the central system forces of each side are functionally related, and that the U.S. strategic force will not be less than Soviet strategic force, either in perception or reality.

5. The Delegation should state that any agreement must provide a high degree of equivalence in central strategic systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Delegation should elaborate this principle in light of the following elements of equivalence and should ascertain Soviet views on each:

a. *Aggregate Numbers.* The United States believes that equivalence in aggregate numbers of central strategic systems is best achieved through phased mutual reductions to a mutually acceptable common lower level.

b. *Throw Weight.* In order to constrain the potential destructive capability of central strategic systems, the agreement should provide for limitations on throw weight, taking into account bomber payload.

c. *MIRV Limitations.* The Delegation should stress the importance which the United States attaches to limiting qualitative aspects of the strategic arms competition, including the deployment of current MIRVs and the development of new MIRVs. The United States believes that the next agreement should limit the number of MIRVed missiles, taking into account the throw weight and number of reentry vehicles of permitted MIRV systems.

6. The Delegation should state that while both sides have expressed support for the goal of reductions, the two sides have not discussed this subject sufficiently to provide the basis for a specific approach. Thus, reductions should be a major topic of discussion at this session of the negotiations. The United States believes that its preferred approach of phased mutual reduction to a common lower level can reduce the momentum of arms competition and enhance the stability of the strategic balance. The Delegation should solicit Soviet views on how best to provide for reductions in a 1985 agreement.

7. The Delegation should reassert U.S. commitment to achieving an agreement which will contribute to stability in the long-term strategic relationship between the two sides and a stable security relationship in time of crisis. The U.S. views this as a fundamental criterion for assessing the political and security implications of a possible SALT agreement. For our part, the level and composition of U.S. forces—in-

cluding new systems—can be subject to negotiation assuming that current and prospective Soviet forces could be subject to agreed limits.

8. The United States believes that a new agreement should not codify the existing and projected programs of the two sides, but must also constrain the pace and magnitude of quantitative and qualitative developments in strategic offensive arms. In this regard, the U.S. supports the principle of agreed mutual and equitable restraint in the modernization and replacement of strategic systems.

9. Concerning land mobile ICBMs, the U.S. Delegation should reflect no change from the unilateral statement of May 1972. If the Soviet Delegation should raise the issue of land-mobile ICBMs, the Delegation should seek clarification from the Soviets on how they propose that mobiles would be dealt with in the agreement and how an agreement which included land-mobiles would be adequately verified.

10. The Delegation should reaffirm the principle that the provisions of any strategic arms limitation agreement must be adequately verifiable. The Delegation should state that there will be a need for special measures to permit adequate verification in certain cases, such as in limits on MIRV deployments.

11. If the Soviet side should raise the issue of forward-based systems, the Delegation should not enter into a discussion beyond repeating the U.S. view that mutual assurances concerning non-circumvention would form a suitable basis for dealing with non-central systems.

12. The above principles should be developed in both formal and informal meetings with the Soviets, as the Chairman of the Delegation deems most effective. In all cases, a principal aim of the Delegation will be to seek Soviet views as to these principles and any other concepts the Soviets might have for an offensive strategic agreement through 1985. The Delegation is not authorized to discuss any specific proposals the Soviet side might make, emphasizing the importance at this stage of setting a general framework for agreement.

**Henry A. Kissinger<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Scowcroft signed for Kissinger above this typed signature.

76. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 7, 1974, 2:55–4:35 p.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PRINCIPALS

The President  
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger  
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Vernon A. Walters

## OTHER ATTENDEES

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll	Mr. Donald Rumsfeld,
	Assistant to the President
<i>Defense</i>	Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary William	
Clements	NSC
<i>CIA</i>	Jan M. Lodai
Carl Duckett	

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

[President Ford:] We have some important decisions which have to be reached. We have to give guidance to Henry and our negotiators for use in their contacts with the Soviet Union leading up to a SALT agreement, if one is achievable. I understand that you have had some previous meetings in which you went over various options. Henry, would you like to proceed and explain the options to us?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, rather than give you the packages we have studied, I will give you the major issues involved. After we have had some discussion here and received some guidance, we can take the packages and put them into options which can be considered at another NSC meeting that could take place in about two weeks.

In considering the major issues, we have to keep in mind three aspects:

—The projected programs of each side, as far as we can foresee them now,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings, Box 1, NSC Meeting, October 7, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

- The internal design of the forces on each side,
- The negotiating history of SALT thus far.

The negotiating history affects our choice, since making a dramatic change from our past positions would have foreign policy implications even apart from the substance of the change itself.

We have no formal program for the 1980s—our present projections stop at about 1980. Thus, we have great flexibility in composing our program for the 1980s. This is one of the bargaining chips we have—Soviet fear that we might go into a full-scale race.

At present, we have 1000 Minuteman ICBMs, 496 MIRVed Poseidon SLBMs, 160 Polaris, and 250 B-52 bombers. We are also holding some 50 older ICBMs and 200 older B-52 bombers in the force structure until we have a SALT agreement, even though we would prefer to phase out these older systems even now for budgetary reasons.

Once we have deployed our new Trident system, which will have about 240 missiles, and our B-1, of which there will be 240, we could envisage a force structure containing about 2,000 missiles and bombers in the 1980s—1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, 740 SLBMs, including 240 Trident, and 240 bombers. In addition, we could keep older B-52s, and increase the number of Tridents and B-1s. But these 2,000 are the planned forces. Thus, if we accepted a number like 2,000, we would have to cut nothing planned out of our forces.

President Ford: The 2,000 number assumes all launch vehicles we now have planned?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, except that we would phase out the older Polaris and B-52s.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could easily keep 250 B-52s into the 1990s, giving us a level of about 2250.

Secretary Kissinger: We have considerable flexibility. We could stop at 2,000, or go to 2250, without excessive restraint on our programs.

In contrast, the Soviets probably plan to keep a force of about 2500 missiles and bombers—1400 ICBMs, 950 SLBMs, and 150 bombers. This is their projected level under the current agreement. They also have some flexibility—when the Interim Agreement expires in 1977, they could dig new holes, keeping their older SS-11s. My impression is that it would be cheaper for them to dig these new holes than to modify the old ones. Nonetheless, 2500 seems to be a good working number for the Soviet program.

The design of the forces on both sides is further affected by the fact that the two sides have taken different routes. First, we have our heavy bombers, but the Soviets' are obsolete. They have not built a new one since the late 1950s. Second, we have smaller missiles with less throw

weight, but with better accuracy. They have larger missiles, so far of lesser quality than the US missiles, but with higher throw weight which could eventually be convertible into better accuracy, more warheads, and increased yields. In SLBMs, our systems are far superior. The portion of throw weight in SLBMs versus land-based missiles is reversed for the two sides; the US has chosen about 2 to 1 in favor of SLBMs, while the Soviets have chosen 6 or 7 to 1 in favor of the land-based missiles.

President Ford: This difference is in throw weight?

Secretary Kissinger: In throw weight, but also in qualitative and other factors, the US has emphasized SLBMs and the Soviets ICBMs. The Soviets have not yet tested an SLBM MIRV. During my March trip, Brezhnev said they would not do so until the late 1970s and indicated that they were considerably behind in this technology.

Secretary Schlesinger: Given the backward state of Soviet computer technology, all the throw weight of their SLBMs might be devoted to computers alone once they start to MIRV them.

Secretary Kissinger: These differences between the two sides have been reflected in the negotiating history. In particular, whenever we have sought equal aggregates, we have been confronted with the Soviet argument that our FBS have to be taken into account. We have also sought limitations on throw weight, but in all cases, these limits would have forced the Soviets either to redesign their systems or accept a larger disparity in numbers.

For example, in Moscow last March, I proposed equal throw weight on ICBMs equipped with MIRVs, but no restraints on SLBM MIRVs.<sup>2</sup> Brezhnev wouldn't listen to this because of the US advantage in SLBMs. He said we wanted no restraint on technology in which we were good, while we were trying to constrain the technology in which they were good.

In both March and June, we attempted to deal with MIRV limitations.<sup>3</sup> We proposed to the Soviets that we would accept the Interim Agreement figures through 1979 if they would accept a disparity in MIRV launchers of 1,100 for the US versus 700 for the Soviets in that period. They rejected this, even though we gave them unequal aggregates in the total. Thus, they must plan more than 700 MIRVs by 1974 or they wouldn't have rejected it.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 60.

<sup>3</sup> For the discussions at the June Moscow summit, see Documents 70–72.



The Soviets also rejected sublimits on ICBMs, although I think there may be a loophole here concerning the larger missile. They might agree not to MIRV their heavy ICBM.

This is a crude summary of the issues as they have emerged in the negotiations and as they affect our assessment of what proposals they might find acceptable.

I would now like to go through the major issues. First, the question of limits on aggregate numbers. The simplest proposal would be to limit both sides to an equal number of missiles and bombers, say 2,000.

President Ford: Two thousand each?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, leaving the composition of the forces to each side. We would reach 2,000 by giving up our older B-52s and Polaris to get where we plan to be at by 1980—ten Trident submarines, 240 B-1 bombers, and 1,000 Minuteman.

Secretary Schlesinger: It would be 1985 before we had the Trident and B-1.

Secretary Kissinger: We would be at the composition I described by '85, by having to phase out only our older B-52s and Polaris.

I am not bothering you now with exactly how we would get there, but there are questions such as whether we would permit a bulge in the numbers or not. To be negotiable, we would probably have to permit 2400 in '75 and then go down. But this is true about any proposal for the total aggregate; we would have to permit some kind of a bulge before we go down.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We would want some kind of numerical limit on the size of the bulge.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We would have to have a ceiling, and a floor which would be reached before the agreement expires. Otherwise, the Soviets could run up against the deadline before taking their reductions. My guess is that by 1983 we would want to be at the final level.

In terms of planned programs, the Soviet reductions would be more severe than ours. Furthermore, we would face arguments about FBS, our Allies, etc. We would also face internal arguments here.

The equal aggregates approach would also mean our giving up on proposals we had made for the last one and a half years on MIRV limits. This would require a thorough analysis on the Soviet side of why we had given up on MIRV limits. It is my guess that they would presume we were up to something—probably that we planned an all-MIRVed force. Finally, under the equal aggregates approach, there would be a domestic debate on what we had achieved. The agreement would cap off the numerical levels, but leave qualitative issues open.

President Ford: There would be no MIRV limits on either us or them?

Secretary Kissinger: Under this model, no. This approach would let each side design its own forces. If we wanted more throw weight, we could increase it; if we were worried about the number of MIRVs, we could increase that, also. The agreement would set a basic cap—there could be no unlimited quantitative arms race. But we would be giving up on qualitative restraints. The Soviets would presume we intended to MIRV all our missiles. Undoubtedly, they would do the same.

Another alternative is that equal aggregates could be combined with qualitative limits. Equal aggregates could stand alone, or it could be combined with measures such as equality of throw weight, either total missiles, or land-based missiles, or MIRV throw weight. One option we have considered is equal aggregates plus limits on missile throw weight to 6 million pounds.

President Ford: On the total throw weight?

Secretary Kissinger: On the total missile throw weight; there would be no bombers included in the calculation. This approach would present a negotiating problem, since the Soviets want bombers included. They want to have a ceiling on the throw weight of bombers.

Under a 6 million-pound limit, it would be difficult for the Soviet Union, with the missiles they have, to reach substantial numbers. If they wanted large numbers, they would have to go to more submarine MIRV missiles. They would have to dismantle all their heavy missiles, and could deploy only about 400 SS-17s and 19s out of a potential 1030. And they would have to reduce their SLBM single RV force by about 200.

Under this throw weight limit, it is hard to say exactly how they would compose such a force, but if they wanted to take their throw weight all in SS-17s and 19s, they could have no more than 900 missiles, and they would have to give up all those submarines and other ICBMs.

President Ford: How do we know they have limited themselves to 6 million pounds?

Secretary Kissinger: We know which missiles they have deployed. We know that the 17 and 19 have about 7,000 pounds throw weight, and the 18 has about 14,000 pounds.

President Ford: So we just add them up.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and we know when they have deployed one of their new missiles, because they have redesigned their silos for the new missiles. When we see a redesigned silo, we have to assume it has a new missile in it.

Mr. Duckett: We now have some encouraging information in that we have seen a new version of their SS–11 missile undergoing deployment in 420 of their silos. This leaves only 610 candidates for deployment of the SS–17 and 19.

President Ford: That is a large throw weight missile?

Mr. Duckett: No, it is relatively small—about the size of our Minuteman.

Secretary Kissinger: In those 420 silos, they will be putting a missile much like our Polaris A–3—an unMIRVed multiple warhead missile. That would leave them 610 candidates for MIRVing, plus most of their 300-missile S–9 force.

The point is that with a 6 million pound throw weight limit, they could have only about 850 SS–17s and 19s, and to get to that level, they would have to give up all their heavy SS–18s and their submarine missiles. An optimum combination for them would probably be about 400 SS–17s and 19s, keeping SS–11 for the rest of their ICBMs, and reducing their submarines by about 170. Thus, the major point is that a throw weight restriction represents not just a numbers problem. It would force the Soviets to a major redesign of their force or to smaller missiles.

One of the arguments used in favor of this approach is that it would increase strategic stability. But it would require a major Soviet decision.

President Ford: What would these limits do to us?

Secretary Kissinger: We are at about 4.5 million pounds, so it would have essentially no effect on us.

Secretary Schlesinger: RV limits would affect us, but not throw weight limits.

Secretary Kissinger: Another proposal has been a limit of 4 million pounds on MIRV throw weight—the SS–17, 19, and 18. There are similar arguments concerning this approach. This limit gets permitted missiles down even further, unless they choose to go to sea with their MIRVs.

Secretary Schlesinger: The argument on 4 million pounds MIRV throw weight is less strong than that on the overall throw weight. On the over-all throw weight, we could go up to 7 or 8 million pounds. That would not require major Soviet reductions.

Secretary Kissinger: Four million pounds would permit them only about 380 MIRV missiles if all were taken in SS–17s and 19s.

Secretary Schlesinger: But we would suppose they would put in more of their lighter unMIRVed missiles. The rest could be accommodated within the 4 million pound limit. The point is that limiting MIRV throw weight is the most important. It is this throw weight that they can exploit to obtain an advantage.

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on whether the 4 million pounds of throw weight is on top of an overall limit, or whether there is no limit on the total.

Secretary Schlesinger: But a 6 million pound total limit drives them toward the same number.

Secretary Kissinger: With 4 million pounds MIRV throw weight permitted, they could get only up to the figure they rejected in June. They could get only 600 land-based missiles, or 400 land-based and 400 sea-based missiles.

In either case, this would be well below the 1,000 missiles they seem to have in their program, and it would be on a 10-year basis rather than the shorter basis we were discussing. The maximum land-based MIRVs they could have would be 600. They could have a lot of single warhead missiles if there were no further limit on total throw weight. I mention this not to criticize the proposal, but to point out that if we make a 4 million pound MIRV throw weight proposal, we will be asking them to accept for a 10-year period what they rejected for a five-year period.

Deputy Secretary Clements: I don't think it is realistic.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe they will accept substantially unequal numbers of MIRV missiles overall. When we were at the Crimea, their generals were there, George, yelling about essential equivalence (laughter).

General Brown: It's nice to know that we agree with them on something

President Ford: You should have told them you had heard their arguments before

Secretary Kissinger: Under the two preceding options of equal numbers and equal missile throw weight, MIRVs would be left unchecked, or we could have other limits on MIRVs, such as one based on the throw weight of MIRV missiles. A variant of the second option would be to limit the throw weight of missiles that have MIRVs to 4 million pounds to each side. For the Soviets, they could then not have MIRVs on more than about 40 of their heavy SS-18 missiles, or more than 380 of their new SS-19s, plus no more than 240 SLBM MIRVs, for a total of about 700, plus or minus 50. In this connection, the Soviets rejected a sublimit of 380 on their ICBM MIRVs, and an overall limit of 700. They offered a proposal of 1000 MIRVed missiles for themselves and 1100 for us over a five-year period. There was unanimity that we should reject that proposal; it would have required us to stop our program immediately while they were given time to catch up.

A third option would be to abandon the equal aggregates approach in favor of one you might call balanced advantages or equal

asymmetries or something like that. Fred has a somewhat complex approach with these ideas in it, one which I'm not sure we have enough time left this afternoon to pursue (laughter), one he refers to as "equal rights unequally exercised". But the basic theory is the same in these approaches. The Soviets would be permitted an advantage in overall numbers, say 2000 versus 2200, while we would be permitted an advantage in MIRV missiles such as 1350 to 1050. There might also be a ban on MIRVs on heavy missiles and a limit on the total number of heavy systems to 250—including both large missiles and heavy bombers.

The Soviets would probably want to balance no MIRVs on their SS-18 with no long range missiles on our B-1.

President Ford: In other words, under this proposal, there would be limits on both numbers of MIRVs and total numbers of missiles, but if we wanted more MIRVs, we would have to have less total missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: That would be a variant of Fred's approach where each side could choose either to have more missiles and less MIRVs or vice versa, but not both. From what I have seen about Soviet decision making, I suspect we would have to present to them what we want—namely, more missiles for them and more MIRVs for us, but we could take that approach.

President Ford: But you couldn't have both more MIRVs and more missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. It is not exactly the same argument Fred has discussed, but it is the same concept.

You have heard the arguments versus the interim agreement because it has unequal numbers—that if the agreement were to break down, the Soviets would have a numerical advantage which they could exploit. The throw weight would not be specifically limited and the Soviets could concentrate their MIRVs in heavy missiles and a few light ones, giving them a breakout potential later in the 1980s. But the problem we face is that we are not planning a total force as high as they are in the first place.

There are an almost infinite variety of other approaches, some of which we discussed in the Verification Panel. For example, we have talked about limits on numbers of warheads. Through 1985, we are likely to remain somewhat ahead in warheads, so there may be some negotiating room here, but we have not developed specific options.

But in summary, there are two basic approaches. First, we could emphasize equal numbers and equal missile throw weight and maybe reentry vehicles. The second approach would be to accept some inequality if we can get an advantage in another area.

We have put these approaches into seven different options, but we all agreed at the Verification Panel that it would be too much of a burden if we ask you to choose among the options now. Thus, we wanted to give you the basic issues, as they are affected by the negotiating history, since any radical change would present a cause for a long examination in the Soviet Union of your motives.

President Ford: George, if we had balanced advantages, and you had to choose between MIRVs and missiles or missiles and bombers, what would you choose?

General Brown: On the bombers, we would want to maintain a reasonable bomber force, perhaps four to five hundred, or perhaps the last number we talked about of 240. But the basic thing we are after is equal aggregates and a downward trend in the total numbers.

President Ford: Do you have any comments, Jim?

Secretary Schlesinger: There are a number of general issues and a number of specific issues. The general issue is how SALT fits into the timing of your détente policy. SALT is an important component of your overall policy, so the timing is a subject you want to consider. If you want a fairly quick treaty, you cannot wait for the long educational process that it would take to bring the Soviets to understand some of our concerns about stability. If you want a simple agreement, you can set the numbers on each side. If we want to foster stability, we will have to do so with limits on MIRVs and throw weight and this will take more time for an educational process. You would not be able to consummate a treaty until later.

The chief issue you face is whether or not to go for equal aggregates. If I could show you one chart (shows chart on "Non-central Systems").<sup>4</sup> The chief argument the Soviets have used about unequal aggregates is the need for compensation for our FBS. However, if we look at our non-central systems, it is not clear we have any advantage. They have 600 medium range and intermediate range missiles and 400 cruise missiles and many medium bombers. The French have a much smaller number of intermediate range missiles, although the Soviets have argued about our Allied forces. If you look at the FBS as Alliance-related forces, it is not clear that the US and its Allies have any advantage on balance.

We could agree to count our non-central systems, and an agreement could operate in such a way as to have an overall balance and at the same time maintain equality in central systems.

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<sup>4</sup> Not found attached.

Inherently, this kind of decision is simple to make. The question is whether militarily, diplomatically, and politically, you want to move rapidly toward the Soviet proposal of giving the U.S. inferiority in numbers. This would be very difficult to justify. Unequal numbers would not have much Congressional support, and would violate the Jackson Amendment which requires equal numbers. It would be difficult to persuade the American public that any position other than equal aggregates, especially as our going-in position, is the correct one.

In 1972, we accepted unequal aggregates. As Henry has pointed out, in 1972 we had no systems we were ready to deploy in the near future and we had a U.S. technological advantage. But these reasons are weakened as time passes. We will not have the technological advantage forever. And we now have programs in place with which we can achieve equal aggregates. The focal point for equality is equal aggregates. I hope this is where we can come out, but it is certainly where we should go in.

President Ford: If we talk about equal aggregates, we are effectively talking about our program, and the question is what do they intend to have.

Secretary Schlesinger: They would have their program as adjusted by the agreement, and we would have ours as adjusted by the agreement. We could move to 2,000 by 1980; to go beyond that, it would cost more than we now anticipate. Maybe Congress won't fund the extra numbers, but we should have rights to them.

President Ford: What point is there in having rights if our program is not in place to exercise them or if Congress will not fund them?

Secretary Schlesinger: We are talking about 11 years out—there will be a different administration and a different political situation. The question is whether some future government should be constrained by a treaty requiring unequal numbers.

Deputy Secretary Clements: I agree. As we phase in our new Trident and B-1 systems, we can retain our older systems. We have flexibility in increasing the numbers.

President Ford: You are as familiar as I am with the fact that we lost \$4.7 billion in new obligational authority in this year's Defense budget, and we had to work like the devil even then. I noticed just recently that the Gallup and the Roper polls said that 54 percent of the American people wanted to decrease defense spending, and only 36 percent wanted to increase it. I am opposed to that view, but the American people, perhaps mistakenly, aren't going to give us a blank check.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have never been cut back in our strategic programs. That Gallup poll showed 44 percent thought we were spending too much, 12 percent thought we were spending too little,

and 32 percent thought it was about right, making the same 44 percent who thought we were spending too little or about the right amount as the percentage who thought we were too high. With the vicissitudes of public opinion over an 11 year period, I would recommend strongly against a treaty where it could be criticized by both the left and the right because of the inequality. If you go that way, I think it would be easier to sell after the '76 election. Otherwise, you would get criticized not only from the right but the left.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Our negotiating position would be weakened if we think we can't do more because of lack of domestic support.

President Ford: I don't share, Jim, your optimism with respect to the Congress. I remember the ABM fight where they beat us. And the recent five percent cuts across the board. And I am talking about our present Congress, and we will probably get a more unsupportive Congress in the next election. I am not optimistic that you can assume there will be increases in defense budgets, unless there is a crisis.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree that with an atmosphere of the current sort we see, to get support for an arms competition we are in poor shape. But we can go to 2,600 if we keep B-52's and Polaris plus our Tridents and B-1s. So the cost to get up to 2,600 is not too great.

President Ford: What would it cost?

Secretary Schlesinger: About a billion dollars per year.

Secretary Kissinger: Including personnel?

Secretary Schlesinger: I can give you precise costs at a later time. But if one can start the negotiations with equal numbers, I can assure you that they can be achieved.

President Ford: What numbers should the Soviets have?

Mr. Duckett: About 2,250—we can assume we are talking about something between 2,000 and 2,500.

President Ford: So they would have to cut back.

Mr. Duckett: For what Jim is talking about, they would not have to make any reductions, but they would not be able to deploy any new systems.

Secretary Schlesinger: At 2,500, there would be no cutbacks. But if we accept the principle of inequality, militarily and diplomatically, we would face a severe penalty.

President Ford: Could we just take their 2,500 and assume we would have our 2,500?

Secretary Schlesinger: No, they argue against equal aggregates in principle. They say we have an FBS advantage. But we could negotiate an overall equality, including non-central systems. NATO and the



Warsaw Pact are about equal in other systems, so we could have overall equality, with a sub-limit of equality on central systems. After we put forward this principle, it is a secondary issue of the level—2,500 or 2,000. We prefer 2,000 or 2,200.

President Ford: Do you think the Soviets would be willing to cut back?

Secretary Schlesinger: Probably not to 2,000, but maybe to 2,300 or 2,400.

Secretary Kissinger: None of the options we are considering recommend simple unequal aggregates not offset by some other advantage. The unequal aggregate option we have considered includes unequal aggregates in numbers of MIRV missiles. We would have a 300 missile advantage in the number of MIRVs, versus a 200 advantage in total numbers for the Soviets.

Secretary Schlesinger: Once you are over about 600 to 700 MIRVed missiles, the additional 300 have considerably less value. I would be less inclined to trade off the visually very important equality in aggregates to get 300 less MIRVed missiles.

President Ford: You say you want unequal aggregates and are less concerned with having the 300 MIRVed missiles?

Secretary Schlesinger: They are not that strategically important.

President Ford: I thought what you said was that the MIRVs were important.

Secretary Schlesinger: If the U.S. is perceived as being unequal in numbers, it would be very harmful. But the political perceptions are not so strong on numbers of MIRV missiles.

President Ford: George, do you agree with that?

General Brown: Once you get more than about 600 heavy missiles, you have so much overkill that the extra 300 wouldn't make much difference.

President Ford: Why are we MIRVing so many then?

General Brown: We have a different concept. We had large numbers of much smaller missiles. Each of our Poseidon warheads is quite small. We are not even loading the missiles to their maximum number now because we have no need for them.

President Ford: It sounds like we are doing the wrong thing.

General Brown: Someone did the wrong thing many years ago.

President Ford: Jim says that the overall perceptions are more important than 300 MIRV missiles. You say you are concerned about an increase of 300 in the bigger Soviet missiles?

General Brown: With 600 MIRV missiles, each with a more significant throw weight and each with a bigger yield than we have, this will be a very effective Soviet force. Above 600, the benefits get academic.

Secretary Schlesinger: They'll have some 4,000 one-megaton reentry vehicles, to which you can add 2,000 RVs on single warhead missiles. Stopping an extra 300 MIRVed missiles at this point is not worth not only the problems in perceptions, but the numbers difference with 200 fewer or 300 fewer is not worth it. The average fellow on the Hill will say the U.S. accepted an unequal treaty.

President Ford: I would like to debate you on the floor of the Congress on that point. If I could say that with our launching systems, we had all we need, but we had a 300 MIRV missile advantage, I could make a good argument.

Secretary Schlesinger: Not if you go into the details. With the throw weight they have, they could have 15,000 warheads. If the Soviets go that way, to attain equality, we would have to increase our throw weight.

President Ford: I don't think you can win your argument.

General Brown: You remember from your trip to SAC, that after you put two or three weapons on a target, more don't help very much.

Secretary Kissinger: It works both ways—if 300 MIRVed missiles are not much help, then 200 extra launchers would not be much harm.

Secretary Schlesinger: No, because that affects both the number of aim points and perceptions.

General Brown: We have a large number of very small weapons, many per aim point. Our predecessors made this judgment. We are putting weapons on target in numbers that, if we didn't have them, wouldn't matter. We are using three or four when two would be acceptable. We are not loading Poseidon all the way up, because we prefer to have the extra range. We have a lot of flexibility in our force, bought and paid for years ago, but frankly, we have more MIRV capacity than we need.

President Ford: I would like to take this on in a debate. You take 2,000 launchers and I'll take more MIRVs. It is more important that we wind up with weapons on targets than with numbers. I think the American people can understand that better than they can a lot of talk about holes and numbers of bombers.

Secretary Schlesinger: Not with a disadvantage in both areas.

President Ford: If we want equality in both, we would have to spend more money.

Dr. Ikle: Unless we could go to lower levels through reductions.

President Ford: Sure, if we could get them to agree.

Secretary Kissinger: The only way we can get the Soviets to reduce significantly would be to stonewall the negotiations and kick off a big U.S. program. They have to see we will go up and not just hear us say it. 2,200 to 2,300 may be achievable, but much lower cuts into their pro-

gram could be achieved only with the threat of a massive U.S. build-up. Also, I want to say again that if we give up totally our MIRV limits, the Soviet leadership must conclude that we are on to something, probably a big MIRV buildup.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would be perfectly happy to go ahead with MIRV limits. With our present force structure, we plan to be about two-thirds MIRVed anyway, and more wouldn't matter.

President Ford: By when?

Secretary Schlesinger: By the early 1980s.

Secretary Kissinger: If we abandon MIRV limits, the Soviets will wonder what's happening here.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am not suggesting we abandon them—I'm happy to have MIRV limits or throw weight limits. But the central feature is equal aggregates.

President Ford: So you defend equal aggregates?

Secretary Schlesinger: If we could get them started at 2,500 vehicles with intercontinental capability, and the U.S. at the same number.

President Ford: Total missiles and bombers?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, throwing in our bombers.

President Ford: Total missiles, bombers, and SLBMs?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets will argue the China threat and FBS. There is one difference between our FBS and their non-central systems—our FBS can reach them, but theirs cannot reach us. In a first strike, we have the capability of using ours against them.

With respect to what we could achieve, I think that, with difficulty, equal aggregates of 2,500, we might get in a year. Lower levels would be harder. Then we would have the problem of defending an agreement which required us to increase our numbers. As we get close to 2,000, we will have to have a sustained growth in our forces to convince them. Between 2,250 and 2,500, perhaps if we give up [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Holy Loch which we don't need anyway, so that we make gestures on FBS, it is conceivable that they might agree. But as we go toward 2,000, we would need a confrontation.

President Ford: Jim, on equal aggregates, you would want MIRV limits also?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would prefer them, if they were equitable.

President Ford: Equal numbers of MIRVs?

Secretary Schlesinger: My concern is the throw weight and, in particular, the MIRVed throw weight. A Poseidon RV [*less than 1 line not declassified*] versus one of the warheads on the SS-18, is no match. Our [*less than 1 line not declassified*] warhead is not comparable.

There are two arguments the Soviets make against equality. First, they argue that we have more warheads. But we can reduce these. Second, they argue FBS. Henry mentioned that our missiles can strike them, but their submarine-launched cruise missiles, of which they have 400, can hit us. That is almost as many as the total number of aircraft we have deployed forward. Our Pershings can hit Eastern Europe, but not the Soviet Union, and they have all their IRBMs.

President Ford: Is there any disagreement about this assessment?

Mr. Duckett: The general consensus is that they do not have the guidance systems on their submarine cruise missiles for an offensive attack.

Secretary Schlesinger: They can certainly hit the coastal cities. Furthermore, when you look at our F-4s, our capability is also only conceptual. They don't have the range to hit Soviet cities. We should have the same conceptual constraints when we look at the equality of non-central systems on both sides.

Deputy Secretary Clements: I think 2,500 might be feasible. Is that what you had in mind, Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: A proposal of simple equal aggregates would lead to a several-month hiatus while they tried to figure out what we were up to. Putting a cap on our forces is OK, but at 2,500, with no limits on MIRVs, I would have a hard time defending it intellectually, to myself.

Secretary Schlesinger: Any MIRV or throw weight limits you can add on would be OK.

Secretary Kissinger: You will ask for unequal MIRVs with unequal aggregates.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are prepared to reduce our number of RVs, if it is associated with constraints on the offensive capability of Soviet forces. They could have 12½ million pounds of throw weight versus our 2 million pounds. If I could show you the second chart (shows chart with drawdown curves), this shows the effect of both sides MIRVing with that amount of throw weight. When you get to 7 or 8 million pounds, versus 3 or 4 million pounds, you have a high confidence capability versus U.S. ICBMs plus all other urban targets. Fred would prefer 2 million pounds for stability, but 4 or 5 million pounds is far better than 8 or 10 million pounds.

Mr. Duckett: Our current data is that we are firm that they will MIRV 610 missiles. We see them putting a single warhead SS-11 Mod 3s in the other 420 launch silos. On the SS-18, it might also be a single warhead missile. Thus, 610 MIRVs are all we know for sure that they want.

Secretary Kissinger: At the summit, we were willing to give them unequal aggregates—an extension of the Interim Agreement—if they were willing to confine their program to 700 MIRVs. They rejected that, so they must plan for more than 700 MIRVs, or they would have been crazy to turn it down.

Secretary Schlesinger: They may have been crazy.

Dr. Ikle: It is important that any agreement not just ratify the programs on the two sides. If the agreement doesn't change the programs, it will just be rewarding the Soviet military. Therefore, we want to bring the programs down to give a message to the Soviet military.

Mr. Duckett: Our point about 610 was not to argue that they won't have more, but to say that there is optimism as long as we have no firm evidence of more.

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe they wouldn't accept 700 because they were concerned about perceptual inequalities, as we are; that may have been the driving constraint. If so, we were willing to pay a penalty in numbers of RVs.

President Ford: At 2,500, our throw weight would be 2.5 million pounds and the Soviets would have 10 million pounds?

Secretary Schlesinger: We would have 2.5 million pounds in ICBMs, and 3 million pounds in SLBMs.

President Ford: And the Soviets 10 million pounds?

Secretary Schlesinger: Depending upon whether you count bombers or missiles only.

President Ford: In all delivery systems.

Secretary Schlesinger: Then they would have 17 million pounds.

President Ford: Where did I hear 10 million pounds?

Secretary Schlesinger: They could add 200 large new bombers.

President Ford: Is there any evidence that they are doing that?

Secretary Schlesinger: There is the Backfire.

President Ford: Have you included Backfires in your numbers?

Secretary Schlesinger: I have included about 150 Backfires.

Secretary Kissinger: The Backfire is more comparable to the FB-111 than to the B-1.

Secretary Schlesinger: It is larger than the F-111.

President Ford: Well, whatever it is—17 million pounds or 10 million pounds—you recommend that we accept equality in reentry vehicles.

Secretary Schlesinger: No, if we go for equal RVs, they should accept a limit on MIRV throw weight.

President Ford: I wrote down equal RVs when you said it before.

Secretary Schlesinger: It is the problem of the weight of the RVs, or more precisely, the weight of the RVs on MIRV missiles.

President Ford: Maybe I am oversimplifying, but what you want is equal delivery systems and I thought you said equal RVs. But you are starting with the assumption of 10 million pounds of throw weight versus 17 million pounds.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that Jim is saying he would accept equal RVs if they would accept equal throw weight.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are willing to pay the price in numbers of RVs, if they are willing to accept limits on throw weight.

Secretary Kissinger: They wouldn't know that we had reduced our RVs.

Secretary Schlesinger: We would let them conduct an inspection. I doubt that they would be willing to make the same offer.

President Ford: Well, I think we will have to have another meeting on this. I will think all this over, but I am of the opinion that Congress is not in any mood to increase the defense budget. We should keep that in mind for whatever impact it has on the decision we make. The worst position we could be in is with no agreement and no increased spending for defense.

Secretary Schlesinger: In order to maintain equality we can do cheap things. But to have the U.S. go in with an initial position that the U.S. is willing to accept an unequal treaty, would be hard to explain.

President Ford: I would like to take you on in that debate if I had 300 more MIRV missiles.

**77. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 8, 1974, 9 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

Kissinger: On SALT, if you proposed offsetting asymmetries, you would be in a bad position. Yesterday,<sup>2</sup> you were told: (1) We'll be in a better situation after 1976; (2) with time you could educate the public about strategic stability; and (3) your options are a quick fix now or a careful deal later. It is absurd to say that anything above 700 MIRV is useless but the difference between 2,000 and 2,200 is decisive.

When you say one megaton is more useful than 40 kilotons, it's true but that depends for what?

The arguments were shoddy, but they have put you in a box. You will be accused of moving under pressure at my advice, misusing the NSC system, and that you could have had a better deal by waiting six months. I think we should stick with equal aggregates at 2,200 with a 60 percent MIRV limitation. I don't know what the Soviets will think.

President: At 2,200, won't we be accused of no arms control at all?

Kissinger: Yes. But the USSR would have to cut back. If all restraints were off, the Soviet Union could build new holes and go up in their totals very rapidly.

President: I was mad. They were totally inflexible.

Kissinger: The real problem is they have a united bureaucratic front.

This proposal would at best not be an insult. It would have to emerge out of Vladivostok, not before. You would have to ram it down DOD's throat. If they wanted more throw weight, they could come in with a program. The arguments were fraudulent. (Poseidon at 5 MIRV). If the Soviets don't accept this, we could fall back to balanced asymmetries.

President: I don't like it but go ahead. Give me a comparative chart of this versus balanced asymmetries.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 6. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to the October 7 NSC meeting; see Document 76.

I thought Jim was inflexible, Clements was better and Brown was embarrassed.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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## 78. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

The United States believes that major progress toward a new agreement limiting strategic offensive arms through 1985 should be made during the discussions with Secretary Kissinger in Moscow. Our aim is to lay the groundwork for agreement at the highest level on the principal objectives of a new agreement; this would provide the delegations in Geneva with a framework for developing a final agreement during 1975.

In this light the US side suggests that the following general approach to a new agreement be discussed in the Moscow talks.

1. Both sides would agree to make a maximum effort, primarily through a combination of reductions and other limitations, to establish a viable strategic balance.

2. This approach would require a phased reduction in the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers:

- a. The numerical limits of the Interim Agreement would remain in effect without change until October 1977.

- b. Over a five year period beginning at that time (October 1977), both sides would agree to reduce their ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers to no more than 2350 by 1982. Between the end of the Interim Agreement and 1982, the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers cannot exceed 2500, and the total number of modern large ICBMs cannot exceed 300.

- c. By the end of 1983, both sides would reduce to 2200.

- d. By the end of 1983, both sides would reduce to no more than 250 heavy systems, including both heavy missiles and heavy bombers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 8, NSC Meeting, 10/18/74–SALT. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: “To Dobrynin (10/9/74).” According to marginalia on another copy of the note, Scowcroft and Sonnenfeldt handed it to Dobrynin, along with an itinerary for Kissinger’s upcoming visit to Moscow, at 2:15 p.m. on October 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, October 1974)



3. Both sides would limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs to 60 percent of their reduced forces, that is, no more than 1320 MIRV missiles; MIRVs will be banned on heavy ICBMs, and air-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 3,000 km will be banned from deployment on heavy bombers.

4. Both sides would agree to limit their total deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers, including those deployed for purposes of replacement or modernization, to no more than 175 missiles and bombers combined in any one year.

5. This provision as well as the numerical limit on missiles equipped with MIRVs would enter into effect with signing of the new agreement.

6. There would also be agreement that the provision of the Interim Agreement prohibiting the construction of new ICBM silos should be incorporated into any new agreement.

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**79. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

**The Relationship of SALT and Détente**

Brezhnev and other Soviet spokesmen have said more than once that political détente must be accompanied by military détente. Where SALT is concerned, the question is whether the Soviets see the need to translate this principle into specific decisions and actions, rather than merely covering up political, strategic, and economic contradictions under generalities.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80M01048A, OPI 10, Box 8, Folder 28. Secret. Sent under an October 18 covering memorandum from Colby to Kissinger in which Colby wrote: "As I proposed to you last month, we have given some thought to the kinds of arguments which might be useful, if directed to and discussed among Soviet leaders, in nudging them into action on the SALT question. Enclosed is a short background paper on the Soviet political factors affecting this matter." Also attached to Colby's memorandum was what Colby described as a "presentation, cast in the form of an intelligence assessment, of the broad gains available to the USSR in a SALT II agreement, as well as the losses which the USSR is likely to suffer in the absence of an agreement. It is for your possible use or even passage to a Soviet counterpart, if you think that desirable." (Ibid.)

Opinion in the Soviet leadership no doubt strongly favors preserving SALT as a process.

—How interested the Soviet leaders are in obtaining significant new agreements in the next stage of SALT is another matter.

Most probably, there are uncertainties within the Politburo as to what suitable terms would be. To complicate matters, much of the expert advice on which they base their assessment of the present and future strategic balance is slanted toward a worst-case analysis.

There are also questions of timing.

—An appreciation of Soviet technological inferiority can be used *either* as an argument for holding off until something has been done to repair it, or for moving to agreement before the lag becomes wider.

—Similarly, uncertainty over the policy direction the new US administration will take can be seen as a reason for delay and caution, *or* for trying to achieve an agreement that will help to sustain US interest in détente.

—And the slow pace of movement in other areas of US-Soviet relations may prompt some to urge a tough stand at SALT and others to look at progress in SALT as a means of developing momentum in these other areas.

Which way Brezhnev leans will have a good deal to do with the Soviet position. He cannot simply impose his own views on his colleagues. The evidence available suggests that, for all the growth in his authority in recent years, he works to a very large extent through consensus. Senior leaders such as Kosygin and Suslov—and Grechko—cannot be easily bypassed. Moreover, uncertainty generated by the change in administrations in Washington may on balance make Brezhnev somewhat more cautious than in the recent past about taking a forward position concerning US-Soviet relations. But Brezhnev is the pivotal influence; unless he pushes, Soviet SALT policy is unlikely to budge.

Brezhnev's interest in further agreements on the limitation or reduction of strategic arms is probably genuine. In speaking of détente and the need to make it "irreversible," he has argued that, though there are risks in limiting or reducing arms, there are greater risks in continuing the arms race. But his attitude toward arms limitation also derives in good part from his commitment to détente in general. This policy has become a big ingredient in his political strength over the past four years. It is also the basis for many domestic programs and plans with which he is identified. The consumer programs, the large-scale development projects, the attempt to promote economic growth with Western technology, and the efforts at long-range planning all assume to varying degrees that international relations and the arms burden will remain manageable and that commerce with the West will expand.

A serious setback to détente need not be politically fatal for Brezhnev. But it would mean, at least, a diminution of his authority and require him to search for new political alliances and new policies in many areas. He can be expected to go a long way to avoid that, particularly at this advanced stage in his probable political tenure. His eagerness for arms agreements will depend, among other things, on how much damage he believes an impasse on this question would do to the overall US-Soviet relationship.

The following paper is cast in the form of an intelligence assessment. Without taking up the specifics of a possible SALT agreement, it analyzes the broad consequences of success or its absence in the broad SALT undertaking. It is meant to organize a set of arguments which, accompanied by personal elaborations, could impress Brezhnev and his colleagues with the value of a success in this enterprise and, conversely, the ramified costs to Soviet interests of a continued stalemate.

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**80. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1974.

SUBJECT

SALT Options

*Background*

There is probably uncertainty in Moscow over the new Administration's policies and over the likely course of Soviet/American relations. It is fairly clear that the Soviets have decided to temper their détente rhetoric.

—This does not mean they are changing course, but that they see the situation as sufficiently murky to warrant a more prudent posture toward your Administration.

—Moreover, the “crisis of capitalism” brought on by Western economic problems may give them grounds to believe that events will turn in their favor without Soviet concessions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 8, NSC Meeting, 10/18/74–SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was not initialed by Kissinger. It was included in his briefing papers for the NSC meeting of October 18; see Document 81.

—Thus, Brezhnev may feel that the burden of proof is on the US to demonstrate continuity.

With this background, it is likely that SALT will be the key issue. Brezhnev clearly understands that a reduction of tensions is impossible while both sides continue an unlimited buildup of arms, threatening the basic security of both sides.

Reaching some accommodation on SALT is crucial to the further development of US/Soviet relations.

#### *Your Negotiating Options*

You are aware of the proposal I have discussed with Dobrynin informally for Soviet consideration.<sup>2</sup> The key elements are:

—Reductions to equal aggregate levels of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers at 2200 each.

—No more than 60% of each side's launchers can be MIRVed missiles (i.e., no more than 1320 MIRVed missiles each).

—No more than 250 "heavy" systems, either missiles or bombers.

—No MIRVs on heavy missiles or long-range missiles on heavy bombers.

—No more than 175 new missiles on bombers deployed in any one year by either side.

This approach picks up the best elements of each of the options considered by the Verification Panel; it represents the only feasible starting point we could take with the Soviets.

It is already apparent from the position taken by the Soviet delegation in Geneva that I will have to defend this approach against a Soviet counterattack. The strongest Soviet argument will be against equal aggregates. They will argue that our FBS advantage and the threat they face from our Allies and from China justify unequal numbers in their favor. This raises the question of how to respond to the Soviet counterattack.

It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will go along with any agreement which does not provide at least a minimal face-saving for them on major elements of their position. In particular, they will probably insist on:

—Some concessions on FBS.

—At least a slight inequality in the aggregate numbers in their favor (although this can be balanced by other inequalities in our favor).

—Flexibility concerning limits on the throw weight of their missiles.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 78.

—A MIRV limit high enough to give them a chance to reduce the gap in total warheads.

—A fair accounting of the overwhelming US advantage in heavy bombers.

Of course, we do not have to accept the Soviet position in its entirety on any of these points; the key difficulty is convincing those within the Administration and Congress who insist on a maximum approach to the negotiations that some compromise and flexibility is essential if we are to reach an accommodation. Many who take an inflexible position do not want an agreement; they sincerely believe that we will prevail in an arms race with the Soviets.

In my opinion, this attitude is risky. It ignores:

—The economic problems we face which would make it very difficult to support the \$5.7 billion per year increase in the Defense budget we would need to carry out such an arms race.

—The risk to international peace and stability which would be associated with the inevitable breakdown of US/Soviet relations.

—The near majority in the Senate who take a “minimum deterrence” approach to strategic forces, believing that we need no additional strategic forces, regardless of what the Soviets deploy.

The interagency working group has continued to refine the various options discussed at the last NSC meeting.<sup>3</sup> The key elements of each are as follows:

#### *Agency Options*

—*Option A.* The first option is a simple “equal aggregates” approach with reductions to 2,000. There would be no other significant limitations.

—*Option B.* The second approach adds strict constraints on total missile throw weight and MIRV missile throw weight to an agreement on equal aggregates.

—*Option C.* The third approach balances a Soviet advantage in total numbers versus a US advantage in MIRVs.

—*Option D.* The fourth approach is one you suggested at the last meeting—giving each side the right to have either more total missiles and bombers or more MIRVed missiles, but not both; each side would be free to choose its program. This approach provides “equal rights” to each side.

I have prepared tables giving numerical comparisons for each option if you would like to study them further.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 76.

Other issues have also been considered by the interagency working group.

—There is little disagreement concerning the desirability of grouping heavy missiles and heavy bombers into a single category and attempting to negotiate sublimits on the number of launchers in this category.

—On FBS, there is little opposition to two concessions: agreeing to consider reduction of European-based nuclear forces in MBFR, and eventual withdrawal from our European submarine bases, which we will not need once the longer-range Trident I missile is deployed.

—Finally, there is the issue of limitations on total missile warheads. This issue is complex technically, and you need not take it on unless the Soviets raise objections to our warhead advantage. In this case, we may wish to counter with a proposal to limit warheads to equal levels.

On strategic grounds, there are few differences between most of the options. In all cases, our Minuteman will become “technically vulnerable.” Soviet rejection of the “equal MIRV throw weight” approach we proposed last winter made this inevitable.

Nevertheless, only Option A, which has no qualitative limits, would permit Soviet force levels so high that they could have any confidence in a first-strike attack against our Minuteman.

While there is considerable agreement that the options do not differ significantly in their strategic impact, there is considerable disagreement concerning their impact on the “political perceptions” of the strategic balance.

Secretary Schlesinger and the JCS have argued strongly, as has Senator Jackson, that we must have absolute equality in the number of central system launchers. They argue that any inequality will lead to a widespread perception that the US has accepted a position of inferiority.

There are serious questions concerning the validity of this argument. In particular:

—I do not believe the Congress, the American people, or our Allies have such a simplistic view of the strategic balance that they ignore all considerations other than the number of missiles and bombers.

At a minimum, it is difficult to see how the Soviets can ignore British and French SLBMs which are clearly no threat to us but a threat to them.

In the absence of an arms control agreement, there is no question but that our military would choose to have relatively smaller numbers of higher capability systems, rather than sacrificing quality for quan-

tity. Thus, they are arguing that we cannot accept in an agreement what we would inevitably do without an agreement.

Finally, no one has proposed agreeing to an inequality in total levels without a compensating US advantage in other areas, such as a number of MIRV launchers.

### *Conclusions*

In sum, the major issue you face is whether to allow for a flexibility and some compromise with the Soviets, or to stand firm on a position we know they will find unacceptable, leading to an inevitable stalemate.

### **Attachment<sup>4</sup>**

Undated.

#### OPTION A—Equal Aggregates of Control Systems

	<i>"Baseline"</i>		Option		Change from <i>"Baseline"</i> Program	
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
Missiles and Bombers	2292 <sup>5</sup>	2600 <sup>6</sup>	2000	2000	−292	−600
MIRVed Missiles	1786	1794	1661	1364	−125	−430
Total Warheads	19246	10662	17201	3432	−2045	−2230
Missile Throw Weight	6.4	14.2	6.1	12.1	−0.3	−2.1
Total Throw Weight (Including Bombers)	13.9	15.7	11.2	12.1	−2.7	−3.6

—Under this option, there would be no constraints on modernization or deployment of MIRVs. U.S. deploys Trident, MX, and B-1; Soviets MIRV all of their ICBMs and one-third of their SLBMs.

—Soviets must reduce 600 below projected force level of 2600. Reductions would include 100 bombers and 500 ICBMs.

<sup>4</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>5</sup> Baseline includes the planned 2000 "first line" launcher (1000 MM, 496 Poseidon, 240 Trident, 240 B-1), plus 50 "modernized" Titan launchers and 250 older bombers. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>6</sup> Includes 1090 light ICBMs; 300 heavy ICBMs; 950 SLBMs; 180 land-mobile ICBMs, and 90 bombers. [Footnote is in the original.]

—Rough equality in missile RVs; Soviet throw weight advantage balanced by a U.S. advantage in total warheads.

OPTION B—Equal Aggregates With Throw Weight Limits

	<u>"Baseline"</u>		<u>Option</u>		<u>Change from "Baseline" Program</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Missiles and Bombers	2292	2600	1986	2000	−306	−600
MIRVed Missiles	1786	1794	1286	912	−500	−882
Total Warheads	19246	10662	14764	7676	−4482	−2986
Missile Throw Weight	6.4	14.2	4.4	6.0	−2.0	−8.2
Total Throw Weight (Including Bombers)	13.9	15.7	7.2	9.7	−6.7	−6.0

A limitation on total missile throw weight of 6 million pounds and on MIRV missile throw weight of 4 million pounds would have the effect of requiring either a radical restructuring of Soviet forces, or of limiting them to numbers of MIRV well under proposals they have already rejected because:

—They would have to reduce virtually *all* of their heavy missile force (308).

—They would have to limit their new medium ICBM to no more than 380 out of a possible 1030 if they wanted to maintain a level of SLBMs close to their projected force.

—To reach their MIRV throw weight limit, they could have only 900 MIRV launchers, a 50% reduction in projected MIRV deployments.

OPTION C—Compensating Asymmetries

	<u>"Baseline"</u>		<u>Option</u>		<u>Change from "Baseline" Program</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Missiles and Bombers	2292	2600	1986	2200	−306	−400
MIRVed Missiles	1786	1794	1286	1050	−500	−744
Total Warheads	19246	10662	15726	6138	−3520	−4524
Missile Throw Weight	6.4	14.2	5.7	11.3	−0.7	−2.9
Total Throw Weight (Including Bombers)	13.9	15.7	9.4	11.3	−4.5	−4.4



—Soviet advantage in number of missiles and bombers balanced by U.S. advantage in MIRVed launchers.

—Soviets retain large throw weight advantage, but most throw weight is in unMIRVed missiles.

—Heavy systems (missiles and bombers) limited to set ceiling on throw weight.

—Soviets' MIRVs would include 650 ICBMs and 400 SLBMs; U.S. would have 550 MIRVed ICBMs and 740 SLBMs.

#### OPTION D—Equal Deployment Rights

	"Baseline"		Option		Change from "Baseline" Program	
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR
Missiles and Bombers	2292	2600	1986	2200	−306	−400
MIRVed Missiles	1786	1794	1286	1050	−500	−744
Total Warheads	19246	10662	14976	6138	−4270	−4524
Missile Throw Weight	6.4	14.2	5.0	11.3	−1.4	−2.9
Total Throw Weight (Including Bombers)	13.9	15.7	8.7	11.3	−5.2	−4.4

—Both sides have choice of one of two force levels by 1985:

Aggregate of 2000 with 1300 MIRV launchers

Aggregate of 2200 with 1050 MIRV launchers

—Designed to achieve equality in heavy systems and to limit competition in medium and light missiles through throw weight and RV ceilings.

—Soviet force same as Option C; U.S. limited to 100 MX rather than 250 as in "Baseline" and Option C because of RV ceiling for medium and light missiles.

81. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 18, 1974, 3:40–5:45 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Mid East Status, SALT

## PRINCIPALS

The President  
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
 Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger  
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
 Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones  
 Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby

## OTHER ATTENDEES

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll	Mr. Donald Rumsfeld,
	Assistant to the President
<i>Defense</i>	Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary William Clements	NSC
<i>CIA</i>	Jan M. Lodai
Mr. Carl Duckett	

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

## SALT

President Ford: Perhaps we should move to SALT. Alex, could you give us a rundown on the negotiations in Geneva so far?

Ambassador Johnson: First, I would like to say the instructions I received are the best I have ever had since I have been in my job.<sup>2</sup> They were excellent, and with them I believe I have laid a base for any direction we might go.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 9, SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. In preparation for this NSC meeting, Kissinger convened the Verification Panel on October 17. According to minutes of the meeting, Kissinger opened by stating that they were "about where we were two weeks ago" and he wanted to have the meeting before the NSC meeting "to be sure there were no nuances that have escaped us that might arise tomorrow." After listing the various options, Kissinger stated that it was his "personal view is that if we go to asymmetries, we should do so in the form of equal deployment rights." (Ibid., Box 23, Meeting Minutes–Verification Panel (Originals), October 1974–January 1975)

<sup>2</sup> Document 75. Johnson's summary and analysis of the SALT session is in telegram 111 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, October 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

Compared with previous sessions, the Soviets definitely tried to give the impression of more flexibility than they have shown in the past. I am not sure how much of this is atmospherics—the man with whom I deal is obviously under instructions—or how much was his personal action. I don't believe the substance of what they said was as important as the fact that they were trying to show flexibility. Much of what they said was old wine in new bottles, but there were some changes in their position.

FBS constituted the rubric for all else they said. They made more speeches on FBS and stressed it more than anything else. In the past, they had hoped to convince us to withdraw all our FBS. They now seem to want only our agreement in principle to withdraw.

Secretary Kissinger: Alex hopes to make a deal giving them only principles

Ambassador Johnson: They are not willing to settle *just* for principles! They said they thought they had laid the basis for settling this issue over the time period through 1985. Their basic approach was to insist on compensation for what we don't withdraw. If they don't get withdrawal, they say they are entitled to more forces as compensation.

They put considerable emphasis on carrying forward the Interim Agreement numbers, first through 1977, and then on through 1985. On aggregates, my instructions were to discuss aggregates, throw weight, MIRVs, with the final aggregate level to be reached by reductions to a common lower level. The Soviets accepted the idea that there should be a limit or limits on overall aggregates—whether “limit” is singular or plural is significant—and they accepted the principle of reductions, unlike in their previous position which was that reductions should be subsequent. But, they were very hedged concerning the specifics of reductions.

On MIRVs, they proposed that an equal proportion on each side should be MIRVed. On throw weight, they demonstrated no enthusiasm as a measure of strategic capability. But, if it were considered, they insisted that we also consider bombers and our FBS, including carrier aircraft, at their maximum payload capability. Thus, their position on throw weight remained quite far out. I was not authorized, nor did I discuss, how we might take account of bombers.

Previously, they had pressed for banning the B-1 and Trident. They have now moved to a proposal to limit the deployment rates and numbers of B-1 and Trident—controlling the pace and magnitude of the program.

President Ford: They are basically talking about the scheduling of the program——

Ambassador Johnson: The scheduling and the magnitude of the deployment. They said this would apply to their systems, but never gave an answer to what systems.

On aggregates and FBS, they insisted on compensation for our FBS and for third countries. They previously referred to NATO, but now referred to third countries, raising China. In the past, they referred to British and French submarines, but now they implied they included the Chinese submarines also.

President Ford: Were they referring to Chinese submarines, or their land-based missiles also?

Ambassador Johnson: They referred specifically to Chinese submarines, but seemed to include their ICBMs. They claimed they needed an allowance to deal with China.

In addition, they have stressed that account needs to be taken of “geographic” factors. This embraces the differences on their side of submarines getting out to sea—having to go through narrow channels.

In summary, they showed some flexibility and made some interesting departures. But they gave no new proposals; no breakthrough.

President Ford: They offered no counter-proposals?

Ambassador Johnson: No counter-proposals, except on B-1 and Trident, where they offered some specifics. They seemed interested in talking. They seemed interested in getting an agreement, but they maintained a forward position—a hard position.

President Ford: Do any of the rest of you have questions for Alex?

Secretary Schlesinger: Are they willing to have 50 percent of the submarines, but don’t care how the other 50 percent are divided between NATO and the U.S.?

Ambassador Johnson: No.

Secretary Schlesinger: What do they mean by compensation?

Ambassador Johnson: The same thing as they meant in their 1972 Moscow statements—greater numbers.

President Ford: Thank you, Alex.

I know the Verification Panel has been considering four options. Henry, would you like to present them to us now?

Secretary Kissinger: At the last meeting, we went through basic approaches and issues—aggregates, throw weight, MIRVs, balancing advantages, and reductions.<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, we have put these approaches into packages to illustrate the concepts. We have come up with four major options, and have put them on some charts. (Chart shown for each option as it is discussed—see attachment.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 76.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached. Tables representing each option were in the President’s briefing materials for the meeting and are printed as attachments to Document 80.

The first option is more or less the JCS option. It provides for equal aggregates—initially at 2500 and reduced to 2000 by 1985. My view is that we would have to reach the final level sometime before then, by 1983. We can't wait until the agreement is about to lapse to make the final reductions. We need some time to assess where we are before the agreement lapses. I don't know how much it should be—one year, or six months, but some time before 1985—the negotiators can work out the specific time. The final level would be at 2000. We would of course be delighted to have it at an even lower level.

There would be a sublimit on modern large missiles of 300. There would be no limits on throw weight or MIRVs. These could be added, but the basic option is intended to remain simple. It is based on the premise that equality in aggregate numbers of central systems is the most visible and easily perceived measure of essential equivalence. Equality in the number of central systems has been an essential element of the U.S. approach to SALT since mid-1970.

The option stresses conceptual simplicity by its proposal of exact symmetry across a limited number of provisions, and its lack of MIRV and throw weight constraints and their potential verification problems.

The Soviets would have to reduce about 600 from their projected force of 2600, probably eliminating about 100 MIRVed ICBMs, 400 un-MIRVed ICBMs, and 100 older heavy bombers. The U.S. would have to eliminate 54 Titan ICBMs, and 250 older bombers—B-52s. I think it is fair to say that these are systems we are planning to phase out anyway. But whether or not we plan to phase them out anyway, they are probably the units we would take out.

The MIRVing would be up to each country. The Soviets could MIRV all their ICBMs, including their 300 heavy missiles, unless we put in a specific restraint against this.

The main advantage of this approach is simplicity. The disadvantage is that it gives us no handle on qualitative improvements.

We would face a difficulty in the negotiations, because the Soviets would have to conclude that we were on to something, rightly or wrongly. There would be a hiatus while they studied what was happening. Alex, don't you believe that if we drop MIRVs it would produce a careful study on their part?

Ambassador Johnson: Yes. For two years we have argued about MIRVs.

Secretary Kissinger: For two years, and they finally agreed, and now we would be saying we were no longer interested. This is no argument against this option, however, but it would produce a hiatus.

Director Colby: You might add a ban on SS-18 MIRVs, plus a ban on SLBM MIRVs such as they have hinted at.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't accept a ban on SLBM MIRVs under any circumstances.

Ambassador Johnson: They won't accept it.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It is not necessarily bad to make them question what we are doing.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not necessarily bad, but I was just pointing out that the consequence of this proposal would be to produce a long analysis on their part. We should ask ourselves the question: What if they conclude we are trying for some kind of break-out in MIRVs? What would be their response? I don't know, but I suspect there would be some response.

Director Colby: *[2 lines not declassified]*

President Ford: *[1 line not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[2½ lines not declassified]*

Director Ikle: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: We have always assumed that once a missile is tested to operational status with MIRVs, we would have to presume any deployment of it was MIRVed. Any deployment of the SS-17 or the SS-19, given their present state of testing, we would have to assume was MIRVed. They would have to convert the silos to deploy them, and we would count all the converted silos as MIRVed.

Director Colby: One of the provisions in the collateral constraints would be no other changes in the silos—no hardening, for example.

Secretary Kissinger: Any silo once converted would be counted as containing a MIRVed missile.

Director Colby: They might say they were not converting them.

President Ford: You are saying that as soon as construction begins, we would have to count it as a MIRV?

Secretary Kissinger: As soon as they made the silo capable of accepting a 17 or 19, we would count it as MIRVed.

President Ford: If they allege they are not doing it for MIRVs, we could not accept that.

Director Colby: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[2½ lines not declassified]*

Director Ikle: There would be further constraints required for SLBMs.

Ambassador Johnson: We should remember that they also have an interest in verifying us. They have brought this up in the talks.

Director Colby: They would have to agree to this extensive list of collateral constraints.

Secretary Schlesinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[3 lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[3 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[3 lines not declassified]*

President Ford: *[1 line not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

President Ford: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[9½ lines not declassified]*

Director Colby: *[1 line not declassified]*

Director Ikke: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[3 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[4½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: In the past it has always been said that they have to modify the silos to deploy MIRVs.

Director Colby: With the collateral constraints.

Secretary Kissinger: These collateral constraints have not been presented to the Verification Panel. We have seen pictures which have shown that they have to change the silos. Once they have made a change, we would have to count the silo as containing a MIRV. But we have been given innumerable briefings that they have to change the silos.

President Ford: Is this something that has gotten greater emphasis from the CIA recently?

Director Colby: No, but I believe the complexity of the verification problem is a factor in choosing among the options.

Director Ikke: *[1½ lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: *[1 line not declassified]*

Ambassador Johnson: The problem is that these collateral constraints have not been scrubbed down.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Isn't the point here that there would be risks?

Director Colby: When we last made an estimate about six months ago, we said we would be able to tell the numbers to about plus or minus 100.<sup>5</sup>

President Ford: Plus or minus 100 17s and 19s in 17 and 19 holes? Or in any other holes?

Secretary Schlesinger: I must share Henry's observation concerning the importance of this. Bill seems to be saying that unless we can negotiate very complicated collateral constraints, we can't detect MIRVing or count the number deployed.

Director Colby: That is correct without the constraints.

President Ford: But with them you could count with a margin of 100 or so?

Director Colby: Yes. If we said they had 1000, the real number might be 1100.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill is talking negotiability here. What it comes down to is what we can let them change in the silos. We have to scrub down these constraints. We have to consider do we want exceptions for some modification, such as 45 days as Jim mentioned. We need to do some more technical work in the Verification Panel on this.

President Ford: In any event, won't this problem be the same in any option?

Director Colby: Not in Option 1—there are no MIRV limits.

Director Ikke: You still need collaterals to count launchers.

Director Colby: Only for mobiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to define what constituted impermissible digging up. For hardening, there would be a gray area. We need more technical work.

Secretary Schlesinger: Some of the difference in MIRVing permitted in Option C might be lost in the verification noise.

Ambassador Johnson: They have shown an interest in verifiability on both sides.

President Ford: They have mentioned collateral constraints?

Ambassador Johnson: They haven't discussed that specifically, but they have seemed sufficiently interested in problems associated with verifying MIRVs. I think they would be interested in discussing them.

President Ford: We need to find out ourselves what we want first.

Secretary Kissinger: We need a list of what we would need if we wanted MIRV limits.

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<sup>5</sup> Possibly a reference to NIE 11-8-73, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack," January 25, 1974. (Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA Electronic Reading Room)



Ambassador Johnson: My line has been that we would see what kind of an agreement that we wanted first, before we got into the details of verification.

Director Ikle: But the kind of agreement you want is affected by the verification problems, so this is something of a chicken and egg problem.

Secretary Kissinger: I am worried—we have gotten into a tremendous argument about MIRVs while discussing an option with no MIRV limits! (Laughter) Mr. President, in the NSC, the behavior follows a very high standard, compared to the Verification Panel! (Laughter)

Going on to the second option, it also provides equal aggregates at 2500 initially reduced to 2000. There would be equal missile throw weight at 8 million pounds for each side, reducing to 6 million pounds by 1985, although these figures are arbitrary, set to suit us, or they could be changed to fit the negotiating situation. The basic theory is that each side would be at an equal level, but enough lower to force the Soviets down. There would be a sublimit of 4 million pounds on MIRV throw weight.

As discussed at the last meeting, this type of agreement would have very little impact on our MIRV programs. We could deploy a fully MIRVed SLBM force of 736 missiles and 550 MIRV Minuteman for a total of nearly 1300 MIRV missiles. It would affect primarily our future MIRV force. We could not deploy additional heavy MIRVs, or go beyond what we now have programmed. In contrast, the Soviets would have to dismantle their entire MLBM force. They could deploy only about 400 MIRVed SS-17s and 19s. They could add an additional 500 light ICBMs or SLBMs, but could not get above about 900 MIRV launchers. We would have a better than two to one advantage in RVs under this option. We would also have a substantial advantage in bomber payload.

The basic issue this option poses, as Jim pointed out last time, is not just the ceiling it sets on Soviet forces, but that it brings about a redesign of their force. They would change their force to be much more like ours—not an exact mirror image, but the same in concept—smaller missiles, lighter warheads, more bombers and submarines. This would provide an increase in stability. It would be the most difficult to negotiate. A variant of this has already been rejected. They may turn around, but it would represent the most intrusive effects on their program.

I said that if we presented them Option A, they would need some months to study it. If we gave them Option B, they could accept it only by a massive bureaucratic rearrangement. It would take years to nego-

tiate and require a long educational process to convince them of its advantages.

President Ford: In the meantime, they would proceed with their programs.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, they will not stop because we have put forth a proposition they previously rejected.

President Ford: The longer they proceed, the harder it becomes for them to reverse course.

Secretary Kissinger: From the point of view of stability, the end result of the option, a first strike would be most difficult. But we would change next to nothing, while the Soviets would have to redesign their force. They would either have to deploy so many less missiles that the difference in numbers would be worrisome to them, or redesign their missiles to make them smaller.

President Ford: In the meantime, we could increase the size of our own missiles with the R&D we are doing—

Secretary Kissinger: We could continue our own program with no interruption. Our own missiles are not as threatening to stability as the Soviet missiles. The Soviets would have to decrease their land-based missile force, moving to numbers which would not be a plausible threat, or develop a new smaller missile.

With this approach, we will be turned down flat. I think Alex will agree. We would have to be prepared to go the long route. There could be no fallback from this approach. We would have to develop a plausible breakout for 1977 to make them worry about what we would do if they don't stop their program. There is not a chance of doing something with this option before 1977.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think Henry has put the case very clearly. This is the toughest option for them. The U.S. force has been structured to be consistent with arms control after MIRVs. The Soviet force has not. If we were successful with this option, it would provide a degree of stability not attained with other options, particularly with Option A. The question is whether you want a relatively quick agreement, or whether you want to push for more arms control.

President Ford: If you were the Secretary of Defense in the Soviet Union, would you buy this option?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

President Ford: Dave, would you?

General Jones: I think so. I would have to look at it long and hard—

President Ford: Even though you would have to change your programs which had been designed for the last ten years?

General Jones: If I were looking for a stable world, I would be inclined to accept it, but if I were going for an advantage, perhaps not.

President Ford: How could a military person or a Secretary of Defense, after promoting large throw weight for all these years, shift gears so quickly?

Secretary Schlesinger: The same way we abandoned our ABM. We should remember that it will cost them \$35 to \$40 billion just to replace the SS-9 with the SS-18. It has been in the ground ten years and will have to be replaced. They have a cost incentive not to do it.

There are two objectives that members of the Soviet Ministry of Defense may have. In the past, they have shown little interest in bilateral stability.

Ambassador Johnson: They have never accepted the theory. The Soviet military believes that bigger is better.

Secretary Kissinger: There are three factors behind that. First, the Soviets, rightly or wrongly, feel they are behind. They are driven by fear of our superiority. Second, they may not have the technical capability to do what we can do with smaller missiles.

Deputy Secretary Clements: That is right.

Secretary Kissinger: The issue is their size potential when coupled with technology such as ours.

Secretary Schlesinger: Which they will have by 1985.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying it won't happen. Third, there are considerations of instability, affecting the viability of our land-based systems. Fourth, the Soviets' interest in stability depends on the threat they perceive to their own force.

What Dave said can be considered as a fair statement only if the Soviets believe that failure to agree would get us into increased throw weight missiles which threaten their land-based force. If we go this route, we will have to start new missiles that threaten their land-based force. And, I am not talking about just jazzing up Minuteman. We could do that within this option. We would have to start something which we could not build with the option. With an abstract view of stability, we will not get it. Our vulnerability does not worry them.

President Ford: They give up what we see on the chart, but we give up nothing.

Secretary Schlesinger: Well, we give up something—

President Ford: What?

Secretary Schlesinger: At 4 million pounds, our MIRV throw weight is less than we are planning with our Trident force. And we have other programs.

We should also remember that in replacing their SS-9, they have to spend quite a bit of money. We have our MX program, which we could not deploy. We have said we will match them in the absence of a rea-

sonable agreement. This option would have the greatest arms control payoff, if it were successful. We should remember that their new missiles, which they will be deploying by 1975, by our own standards are in violation of the SALT I agreement. We said that any missile heavier than the SS-11 would be a “heavy” missile. With these new missiles, even with no 7s and 8s, they will have 12 million pounds of throw weight, which is potentially destabilizing. There will be a threat to Minuteman and to our other forces from their large RVs. We are concerned about the megatonnage also.

Ambassador Johnson: Do they have more megatonnage if you include our bombers?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. I believe it is on the order of two to one.

President Ford: What about the next option?

Secretary Kissinger: The next two options are more or less the same. They are both variants of the compensating asymmetries approach, which is consistent with our past negotiating history and the planned programs of the two sides. The initial U.S. aggregate would be at 2250 and the Soviets at 2500, reducing to 2000 and 2200 by 1985. We would receive compensation by MIRV limits of 1300 missiles for us versus 1050 for the Soviets. Thus, we would have more MIRV missiles, but they would have more total launchers. There would also be a limit on heavy delivery systems—heavy bombers and heavy missiles—initially at 500, reducing to 250 by 1985, and no increase in the number of MLBM launchers.

This option is based on the premise that equivalence can more readily be achieved by balancing existing asymmetries than by removing them. The Soviets could claim they got some compensation for FBS, and we could claim an advantage in technology. Under this option, we would deploy essentially our presently planned program and we could introduce a new Minuteman IV missile. The Soviets would deploy their projected force of 600 MIRVed 17s and 19s and 400 MIRVed SLBMs. It would put a cap on the Soviet MIRV force. We would retain a large advantage in numbers of weapons to counter the Soviet advantage in missile throw weight. We could increase our missile throw weight by deploying the Minuteman IV.

This option is similar to that which we pursued earlier this year whereby the Soviets would have been permitted to retain their Interim Agreement numerical advantage until 1980 in exchange for a U.S. advantage in MIRVed launchers. Thus, it fits best into the negotiating history. This is no argument for it, but it provides the most continuity.

Ambassador Johnson: It is consistent with what we have been discussing with them in the past.

Secretary Kissinger: The main argument against this option has been that the unequal aggregates would lead to a perception of U.S. in-

feriority. What you would have to judge, Mr. President, is whether 200 older unMIRVed Soviet missiles would give them an advantage when compared to our advantage in MIRVed missiles. But this is how we would claim equivalence. A further point is that if the present agreement ends, we would likely accept an inequality in the numbers anyway, as a fact, if not as an agreement.

In summary, the main advantages of the offsetting asymmetries approach are that it may be more negotiable than equal aggregates since it reflects the differences in the baseline force levels for the two sides; it gives the U.S. a MIRV launcher number advantage; it levels off Soviet programs well below the 1985 projections; and it would ban MIRVs on heavy missiles and reduce their number, resulting in a ceiling on throw weight.

The disadvantages are that unequal aggregates might mean that some would perceive a U.S. inferiority. It does not directly constrain throw weight, the MLBM MIRV ban might be difficult to negotiate, and the verification would require the collateral constraints which we just discussed earlier.

One way to solve the perceptions problem—

President Ford: Let me ask as we go through these options—A, B, C, and D—what is the difference in funding for DOD?

Secretary Schlesinger: The funding would rise as you go to the right on the chart.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Secretary Schlesinger: A and B provide more constraints.

Secretary Kissinger: A provides no constraints on MIRVs. There would be a MIRV buildup.

Secretary Schlesinger: You are quite right. A, C, and D would be more costly. B precludes any new systems.

President Ford: B would be least costly, but least likely to be negotiable—

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

Director Ikle: In comparing C versus D, D would contain a limit on throw weight. You would save costs in D compared to C.

Secretary Kissinger: A would be the most costly.

Secretary Schlesinger: Under C and D, larger missiles would be permitted also.

Ambassador Johnson: If we could get B only if they saw us building a larger force, wouldn't it cost more dollars to get there?

Secretary Kissinger: B would have the paradoxical consequence that we could get it only with a larger missile and a buildup. Short of a massive buildup, I don't see how the Soviets could accept it.

We have talked about going to 2500, and the argument has been made that we could reach that level cheaply.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could keep B-52s and Polaris.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But if the Interim Agreement lapses, the Soviets can keep their SS-11s and dig new holes for their new missiles. We could also keep older systems, but in a breakout race, they could go faster. At 2500, the price would be small. But beyond 2500, their price would not go up much, only the operating costs of the SS-11 force—but we would have to get entirely new programs.

Secretary Schlesinger: I beg to differ with you on that, Henry.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Henry, that's not right.

Secretary Schlesinger: The difference in costs is only the cost of the silos. The rest is the same.

Secretary Kissinger: They have to pay for new silos in either case.

Secretary Schlesinger: We would have to pay for a new silo and they don't. The rest is the same.

Secretary Kissinger: My point is, though, that they have already paid for the SS-17 and 19. It is in their program.

Secretary Schlesinger: We could add silos and retain Minuteman IIs.

Secretary Kissinger: But we have no program to do this.

President Ford: We have the missiles?

Secretary Schlesinger: We will have 500 Minuteman II.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is that the Soviets have already budgeted for their new missiles. Beyond 2500, we have to get into real money. This has to be assessed in terms of what we can get from Congress.

Director Ikle: We have never considered agreements which go beyond 2500.

Secretary Kissinger: I know that—I am talking about the breakout potential.

President Ford: Going back, from a budgetary point of view, Option A would call for a program for greater throw weight.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Our plan does not have to be driven by bigger missiles.

President Ford: But by a bigger bang perhaps.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We could increase the Minuteman III yield with no other changes. On a cost effective basis, this is the best thing we could do.

President Ford: Maybe on a cost effective basis, but how much would it cost in dollars?

Secretary Schlesinger: It would cost about \$2 billion to get 2500, or \$4 billion a year to go to 3000.

President Ford: B would be the least expensive, the most difficult to obtain, but the most expensive if we failed.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be the least expensive after we have it. On the way to getting it, we would have to increase our budget.

Secretary Schlesinger: That is what we are doing anyway.

President Ford: And C and D would cost about the same as we are now spending.

Secretary Kissinger: It would probably come down somewhat.

Director Ikle: D would come down, but C has to throw weight limit.

President Ford: Under D we would not need a bigger missile?

Secretary Schlesinger: Option D has a 7 million pound throw weight limit. If we raised our throw weight to 7 million pounds, we would have to invest in Minuteman IV. Unless the Soviets agree to restricting their program, we will have to put money in R&D and it will cost money to retain equivalence.

Secretary Kissinger: If we feel we have to match throw weight, we could go either route—bigger missiles or increasing yield.

Deputy Secretary Clements: With no ceiling at all, it would be expensive.

President Ford: The question is, can we get Soviet agreement to one of these approaches—

Secretary Schlesinger: You can mix up the provisions of the various approaches.

Director Ikle: Mr. President, there are two gut issues here. The first is whether we simply shift the competition from one area to another. In Option A, the competition would be shifted from numbers to yield, accuracy, and so forth. The second issue is whether we will let throw weight increase, starting a new competition, getting larger missiles, and driving up force levels. Throw weight limits, even if not so low as in Option B, could cut out this competition, at least in the next generation. In SALT I we had no MIRV limits, and we are now seeing a MIRV competition. In the next agreement, we should avoid a throw weight competition. Hence, we need throw weight limits such as in Option D, even if not as low as in D.

Secretary Schlesinger: I agree.

Director Ikle: Another alternative is to go to even somewhat lower levels—perhaps 200 lower than those in Option D (shows chart). For the Soviets, they would have 200 less medium missiles. Other reductions would be similar. Stretched over a ten-year period, this could be

achieved. A larger reduction would further détente. With controls on throw weight, it would save dollars and be politically attractive.

We do not want the Soviets to increase in the 1975–1985 period, but to reduce. Increased accuracy and weapon yield will drive capabilities up. Thus, unless there is a substantial reduction in numbers, there will be a net increase overall.

Hence, I think a worthwhile goal would be 2000 on their side and 1800 on our side. If we can't get it, we can always increase the numbers later. I am not sure the Russians would be opposed over a ten-year period to lower numbers.

Under Option C, they would deploy 12 MIRVs for each single warhead missile reduced. Under Option D, they would deploy only 3 MIRVs for each single warhead missile reduced.

Secretary Kissinger: How do you get those numbers?

Director Ikle: Under C, they would reduce 84 unMIRVed missiles and deploy 1000 MIRVed missiles, for a ratio of about 12 to 1. Under D, they would reduce 284 unMIRVed missiles and deploy 950 MIRVed missiles, for a ratio of about 3 to 1. Their MIRVed missile program would be a costly expansion. Therefore, they may agree to the lower numbers.

Secretary Schlesinger: For the Soviets to replace their ICBMs alone will cost them \$35 billion. They would be giving up one hell of a cost liability. Their military people will not include the cost liability in their analyses. But their political people will see the importance.

Secretary Kissinger: There are several elements in D which could also be put in C. The essential difference is not the throw weight limit—that could be added to either C or D. It is the concept of equal rights. This would avoid the perception of inequality. Each side would have the right to pick either a larger total or a larger number of MIRVs, as in the ABM treaty. They could pick either 2200 total and 1050 MIRVs, or 2000 total and 1300 MIRVs.

President Ford: Would each side have to designate which course it chose?

Secretary Kissinger: You would probably want it designated at the beginning.

Director Ikle: With, perhaps, a review every five years.

Secretary Kissinger: There might be a right to change, as in the ABM treaty. In that treaty, it is reviewed every five years, and each side can change once. I haven't analyzed the effect of such a provision in this case.

Mr. Duckett: Off the cuff, I would say you could allow them to switch to more MIRVs, but not the other way around.



Secretary Schlesinger: If the Russians have the same verification standards we do, they could not accept either C or D. If they have to assume that any silo which could accept a MIRV missile contained MIRVs, they would have to assume we have 1000 MIRVed ICBMs.

Secretary Kissinger: That is theoretically true, but they have never raised that problem with us.

Director Ikle: Mr. President, I would like to make one more point supporting lower levels. It would reduce the importance of the verification problems. If they took out 200 more SS-11s, that would mean they would have only 250 SS-11s left. It would be only these we would have to worry about, which would be no big problem.

Director Colby: That would be to our margin of error.

Director Ikle: If there were further reductions after 1985, we might end up with no verification problem.

President Ford: Could it be possible that both sides would make the same choice?

Secretary Kissinger: No. But if the Soviets did choose 2000 missiles and 1300 MIRVs, that would be a very interesting decision. It would represent a drastic cut in their program.

Ambassador Johnson: They will always choose the higher aggregates. They want a perception of a higher aggregate—

Secretary Schlesinger: Exactly the reason why we want equal aggregates.

Secretary Kissinger: I think they want the perception of the higher aggregates more for their own internal bureaucracy rather than for third countries.

President Ford: We want the perception plus our own extra capability

Secretary Schlesinger: I was just talking to Yamanaka on this—the Japanese Minister of Defense. He asked me why we accepted an unequal agreement in 1972. I answered him that we had a technological advantage. But this is to point out that the perception is there in third parties. The Japanese are perhaps stronger than others, but Don can tell you that there is a problem of appearance in Europe. The agreement is perceived as unequal.

Ambassador Johnson: I briefed the NAC just yesterday on our approach, and got a very good reaction.<sup>6</sup>

Secretary Schlesinger: But our present position is generally tougher than these options.

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<sup>6</sup> No further record of his briefing has been found.

Ambassador Johnson: No, I wouldn't say so. It leaves open the question of equal aggregates. I told the NAC that we had to look at aggregate numbers, throw weight, and MIRV launchers, and that equivalence is the sum of all taken together. This is essentially the approach taken in C and D. It is the sum which is of interest.

Secretary Schlesinger: If we had Option D, I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that we choose 2200 aggregates for the perception, rather than more MIRVs. So both sides would be equal even under Option D.

Secretary Kissinger: If the President accepted your advice—(laughter)

President Ford: If you picked 2200, what would that mean to our present MIRV program?

Secretary Schlesinger: We would have to slow it down.

Secretary Kissinger: If we went to 1000 MIRV missiles, we would have to stop now. 1300 would accommodate our present program.

President Ford: Under either B or D, we could still increase our yield—

Ambassador Johnson: One thing we might consider is a reduction in RVs. The Soviets have emphasized this.

Secretary Schlesinger: If they agree to limits on throw weight, we could reduce our RVs. We have too many on Poseidon and Minuteman.

Ambassador Johnson: Too many on Minuteman?

Secretary Schlesinger: We don't need three. We could go to two. We have a one-megaton warhead under development.

Deputy Secretary Clements: That is the other side of the coin—

Secretary Kissinger: They would appreciate a few more concessions like that! (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: That is precisely the point. The Soviets, by ignoring throw weight, are increasing instability.

General Jones: There is one more consideration. It is easier to go from Option B to Option C or from Option B to Option D, as the negotiations move on, than it is the other way around. The key is equal aggregates. Once we concede our willingness to accept unequal aggregates, it would be hard to go back on it. As to whether we are perceived as equal to the Soviets, it depends on how seriously you take our new programs—air-mobile ICBM, the seven-MIRV missiles we are working on, and so forth. But we have unequal aggregates in Europe, with a qualitative advantage, and in Europe they ignore qualitative factors.

President Ford: Our allies?

General Jones: Yes. Our allies count numbers of tanks and so forth, with no consideration of quality. Whether or not they would accept equal aggregates depends on how seriously they take these other programs. But we can move off it later, if it comes up as non-negotiable.

President Ford: Your point is that to move from D to B is harder than from B to D.

General Jones: Yes. In both C and D we agree that we don't need equal aggregates.

Deputy Secretary Clements: It is harder to move to the left than to the right on the chart. You can start with A, fill in the MIRV limits and throw weight limits as you come up to the right. But you should start with equal aggregates which is simple and understandable.

Director Colby: These options are meant to represent the end of the negotiations, not the beginning.

Secretary Schlesinger: You want to be fairly tough in the beginning. If you have a few minutes, I do have a few more points—

President Ford: I do have my economic advisors who have been waiting for thirty minutes—

Secretary Schlesinger: I have one chart which lays out the basic tradeoffs you will have to make that I worked out as I was going to bed.

President Ford: How long will it take?

Secretary Schlesinger: Only about ten minutes.

President Ford: Let's do it.

Counselor Rumsfeld: You keep chart materials in your bedroom?  
(Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: (Talking to chart—see attachment)<sup>7</sup>—You have two basic objectives in SALT—arms balance and arms stability. If you want to emphasize arms balance, you have to go for equal aggregates. If you want to emphasize arms stability, you need control over throw weight, yields, as well as numbers. In 1972, we achieved both arms stability and arms balance. U.S. technology offset grosser Soviet numerical advantages, and we had bombers.

On stability, the Soviets had cruder forces and poorer accuracy. The U.S. had smaller yield and throw weight and uncertain accuracy.

But by 1985, we face a different situation. The U.S. advantage in MIRVs disappears. We face the inequality of Interim Agreement numbers, and bombers are outside the agreement. On arms stability, the Soviets are increasing their throw weight and MIRVing their forces. There will be greater Soviet sophistication in accuracy.

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<sup>7</sup> Not attached.

One possible solution emphasizing arms balance is to move toward equal aggregates and adjust our forces, increasing their throw weight or changing their basing, going to land or air-mobile as necessary. The alternative is to go for arms stability in 1985. To do this, you need control over throw weight, yield, and numbers.

The relative difficulty of the two approaches is as follows. Going for arms balance is conceptually easy. It is easier to understand and quicker to negotiate than going for stability. But there is greater future risk in cost. Going for stability would be more difficult to negotiate. The Soviets don't understand stability arguments. They have always talked strength. Bilateral stability is beyond their grasp, or they pretend that it is beyond their grasp. It would be a time consuming process to get them to agree.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with the chart as a way of posing issues. I would only add that I see only one way to get to the last point—to have a plausible program we would have to race them. In taking the road we would have to go to get it, we would have to enhance instabilities in the short run, in order to convince them of the importance of stability. The question is how long we could sustain the race. We could sustain it, if we could get Congress to approve it.

President Ford: If we have the will—

Secretary Kissinger: We have to have a plausible program and rapid deployments.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am not trying to advocate one approach or the other—

Secretary Kissinger: I just raise this as an issue.

Secretary Schlesinger: If you want a relatively quick agreement, Option B is unattractive. If you want an agreement in 1975, you don't put stress on arms stability; you have to stress arms balance.

President Ford: I think this is a good chart—could I have a copy of it? But you have to put on the alternative we would face with nothing. You can't put Congress on the chart very easily—

Secretary Schlesinger: On the question of equal aggregates, it is politically and diplomatically crucial. Perhaps, it is the most critical feature. We can live with an increase in instability, but it would be difficult not to come up to their level.

President Ford: Thank you very much. I would only hope we could get Congress to agree.

**82. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 25, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this morning.<sup>2</sup>

"I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev in the Kremlin with the same participants as yesterday. He had just received your message<sup>3</sup> which he read through in my presence and then commented on very positively. He said he liked its positive spirit and would answer, probably after our current meetings are finished. He reverted to the message a second time later in our session, again with favorable comment saying he laid great stress on his relationship with you.

"Brezhnev today was in a dark blue suit and white shirt, probably because he is to meet Bhutto later today. He was not at his most cogent or precise and in fact at times seemed almost frivolous in his banter. He failed to focus seriously on our SALT proposal,<sup>4</sup> though I finally had an opportunity to give him a detailed summary of it. Before that I spent about an hour answering Brezhnev's "two questions," whether we wanted strategic superiority and what I thought of the prospect for nuclear war. I explained our strategic force planning and concerns about Soviet weapons developments and noting the irrationality of initiation of nuclear war by either side, I stressed that if the Soviet strategic build-up continued in the absence of a SALT agreement we were certain to match it and, given our technological lead, probably exceed it. Thus, this was a crucial moment for coming to an agreement. I did point out the danger of local conflicts resulting in escalation.

"In his typical debating style, Brezhnev complained of the technical nature of my responses and then launched into a rambling response of his own, the upshot of which was that there can be no nuclear war. In the process he complained about our MIRV programs and rejected the assertion that the Soviets have more missiles than we.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 24–27, 1974, Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A note, "The Pres has seen," is handwritten at the top of the page.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of conversation, October 25, 11:05 a.m.–1:28 p.m., is Document 69 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976. Kissinger was in Moscow October 23–27.

<sup>3</sup> The letter from Ford to Brezhnev set forth the President's general views on the future course of U.S.–USSR relations. See *ibid.*, Document 67.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 78.

It was rather defensive and amateurish performance, though delivered without rancor.

"Brezhnev raised virtually no serious and systematic issues about our SALT proposal but what he did say seemed to reflect a misapprehension that we are trying to curtail Soviet SS-17 and SS-19 programs by our proposed restriction on 'heavy' Soviet missiles. He was also apparently leading up to rejecting MIRV prohibition for the SS-18. Again in typical style, he diverted our discussions to complain about our placing netting over our silos.

"Finally, after his desultory comments he did make two specific comments on our proposal: (1) he did not like our breaking up the period until 1984 into stages and wants a single stage from 1977–1984; and (2) he objected to our equal 2200 aggregates and proposed instead 2000 for us and 2400 for them. He will take this up later this afternoon in greater detail.

"We are to continue at 6:30 this evening but I must say from Brezhnev's performance today I find it very difficult to see how even a set of principles can be worked out before your meeting with him in November. Brezhnev has stalled and his comments have been unfocused, sometimes even frivolous and uninformed. So far, they have not even been calculated to draw me out. This may change in three remaining sessions but even then we would have to break all past records to arrive at meaningful conclusions by Saturday night.<sup>5</sup> I do intend to impress on Brezhnev the need for concrete progress if we are to avoid new U.S. programs in reaction to major Soviet building programs now underway, a point I have already made explicitly. If this remains the Soviet position it is clear that we are paying a price for our domestic disarray, especially the Congressional irresponsibility. The Soviets may calculate (1) that Congress has circumscribed our ability to give them credits and trade by placing a ceiling on credits and by the Jackson Amendment which they consider a profound insult;<sup>6</sup> and (2) that Congress will not vote increases in the Defense Budget so that they risk nothing by stonewalling on SALT.

"In these conditions a \$1 billion cut to meet our \$300 billion goal would reinforce their convictions."

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<sup>5</sup> October 26.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which denied most-favored-nation status to countries that restricted emigration.

**83. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 25, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this evening.<sup>2</sup>

"After an hour's delay I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev this evening. Meeting was again in a paneled Kremlin conference room with green felt conference table and pictures of Marx and Lenin watching. Brezhnev was more serious and to the point than this morning. His briefings on our SALT proposal<sup>3</sup> clearly have predisposed him to see it as designed to freeze Soviets into a disadvantage. Gromyko, who has only slightly better grasp of technical issues involved than Brezhnev, reinforces Brezhnev's prejudice. The main thrust of Soviet comments on our proposal was that they ignored special Soviet requirements due to capabilities of their [*third?*] countries—especially China—geographic position and our forward bases. They also saw our 2200 aggregate as allowing us to increase our present numbers while they would have to cut theirs—a statement which is essentially true. They continued also to stress our warhead advantages. Thus basic Soviet response was quite negative, even after I noted that under our concept Soviets might have 2–300 missile/bomber advantage over us in 1982 before both of us go to equal 2200 level. Brezhnev reacted with special emotion against our proposed prohibition on MIRVed SS–18s. Judging from Gromyko's almost obsessive references to Chinese threat, Soviets may be looking to SS–18 as their long-term weapon against China.

"After about two hours of argument on above issues, during which Soviet group huddled several times, Brezhnev folded up his papers and announced we were far apart because U.S. was seeking an advantage. I responded that we had no such intention and stressed that this would be third Moscow meeting in a row that would end in failure. I said this was regretful for me personally since I had been staunch advocate of a new agreement and had labored hard on our proposal despite much opposition in our government. I said there was bound to be a hiatus in efforts to find arms limitations and we would just have to see what happens next.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 24–27, 1974, Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Ford's initials are at the top of the page.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of conversation, October 25, 7:30–10 p.m., is Document 71 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 78.

"This produced somewhat more positive manner in Brezhnev but he again flatly rejected our proposal. But he then asked whether we might consider a 15-year agreement. I agreed to consider it. Brezhnev then alluded to a proposition he had raised alone with President Nixon at the last Summit and said he wanted to discuss it with me privately tomorrow.<sup>4</sup> Scowcroft can brief you on essence of that proposition which Brezhnev might possibly view as precondition to any SALT agreement this year and he may try to get you to approve it at Vladivostok. This is a matter I will have to discuss with you orally on my return.

"For now I see little prospect of progress on SALT for the reasons mentioned in my previous reports. But we will have several hours more tomorrow which may give me a clearer basis for an assessment. It is clear to me that if the deadlock remains, our only possibility of getting the Russians to move will be through a substantial increase in strategic budget in the coming fiscal year."

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<sup>4</sup> Brezhnev reportedly proposed to Nixon privately in Oreanda on June 30 a treaty of mutual non-aggression between the United States and the Soviet Union. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 190, footnote 2.

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#### 84. **Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his Saturday afternoon meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

"I had seven and a half hours with Brezhnev starting at 4:30 p.m.<sup>2</sup> The first two and a half hours were in his office, with only Gromyko on his side and Sonnenfeldt with me. The session was entirely devoted to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 24–27, 1974, Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: "Transmitted to President 271607Z Oct 74. President has seen."

<sup>2</sup> The memoranda of conversation, October 26, 4:30–6:45 p.m. and 7:10 p.m.–midnight, are Documents 73 and 74 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.



recapitulation of the proposition Brezhnev made to President Nixon privately at the last summit, which is too sensitive for cable traffic.<sup>3</sup> Brezhnev demonstrated his rather bizarre sense of occasion by spending virtually the entire time he was talking also fidgeting with a model artillery piece, training it now at me, now at Sonnenfeldt. He eventually succeeded in loading it with a dummy shell, but several tugs at the lanyard produced no result until about an hour and a half into the conversation, when a loud bang sounded.

"A three and a half hour meeting with the larger group in the conference room resulted in a major Soviet SALT proposal evidently put together in the Politburo this morning. Brezhnev recited it from memory, a rather remarkable intellectual feat which came as quite a surprise after his undisciplined performances earlier. The essence of the proposal involves equal aggregates by 1985 at 2400, but a Soviet advantage of 2400 to 2200 throughout the process. The final aggregate would also involve a deduction for the U.S. equal to the British force. Other features are equal MIRVs as in our paper, but no prohibition on heavy MIRVs. The most complex and difficult aspect relates to bomber armaments, for which the Soviets would demand some sort of compensation. I will give you more details on my return when I also expect to have from Dobrynin a more precise rendition.

"This proposal is a major step forward toward a SALT agreement in 1975, and perhaps a significant announcement at Vladivostok. However, in its present form it would be shredded by DOD, leaked to the press and Jackson and destroyed before we can shape it. I am reasonably confident that we will be able to distill a sensible proposal out of it that DOD will buy, but only after I return. I therefore propose to have Scowcroft tell Schlesinger that the Soviets responded in a conciliatory fashion to considerations you gave him, but they will not give us a formal reply for several weeks.

"In a further hour and a half, Brezhnev tried to get me to accept the Soviet SALT position on the spot; I simply told him we would examine the Soviet position, viewing it as a serious response to our ideas, and that I would have some considerations to provide before Vladivostok.

"My assessment is that the Soviets did make an effort to bring their position closer to ours and that we may have some possibility of developing agreed principles on aggregates, MIRVs, and possibly a few other issues during your meeting with Brezhnev. For now, I think it is essential that elements of the Soviet position be kept totally outside in-

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 83.

teragency process until I have had an opportunity to analyze it further and discuss the next steps with you.

"I believe on the whole that my Moscow visit has had more positive results than I thought likely, in that the Soviets were willing to respond substantively on SALT. Brezhnev himself was explicit in saying that he wanted to avoid disputes with you in his first meeting, suggesting that he remains interested in maintaining forward movement in our relations. But it remains to be seen whether sufficient flexibility can be mustered on both sides to bring SALT positions into real negotiating range."

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**85. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Our SALT Proposal

Prior to my October meeting with Brezhnev,<sup>2</sup> we had proposed the following:

1. Both sides limited to 2500 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, with reductions to 2350 by the end of 1982 and 2200 by the end of 1983.
2. No more than 250 heavy systems on each side, including both heavy missiles and heavy bombers.
3. No more than 1320 MIRVed missiles for each side.
4. No MIRVs on heavy missiles or long-range missiles on heavy bombers.

Brezhnev's response was as follows:

1. He accepted the limit of 1320 on MIRVed missiles.
2. He agreed to the limit on long-range air-to-surface missiles on heavy bombers (which we have), but did not accept the corresponding

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 19, SALT (10)–(21) [Nov. 1974–Aug 1975]. Secret; Sensitive. Ford initialed the memorandum. In a November 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Lodal, Sonnenfeldt, and Hyland analyzed the Soviet proposals, Brezhnev's proposal in Moscow, and a note from the Soviet Embassy delivered at 12:24 p.m. on November 8, which they considered "generally consistent." The note and the memorandum are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 82–84.

prohibition of MIRVs on heavy missiles (which they have). Further, he insisted that any short-range missiles deployed on heavy bombers would have to be counted within any aggregate numerical limit one-for-one as strategic launchers.

3. He did not comment on the proposed limit of 250 on heavy systems, other than to implicitly reject it by stating that each side should have the right to determine what type of systems it deploys.

4. On the basic numbers, he proposed 2400 for the Soviets and 2200 for the U.S., with the U.S. achieving “rights” to 2400 in 1985. Apparently, he would expect us to agree not to exercise our rights to go to 2400. He justified the differential of 200 on the grounds that our Allies also have SLBMs. (Significantly, Brezhnev did not also insist on compensation for our “forward-based” systems.)

5. Brezhnev also proposed a limit of ten on the number of Trident submarines and comparable Soviet submarines (which he referred to as “Typhoons”).

Brezhnev’s proposal has several obvious difficulties:

—His insistence that we count short-range air-to-surface missiles on bombers as strategic launchers is nonsense. Most of these weapons are short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses. They are more analogous to the warheads on a missile than they are to the missile itself.

—His insistence that we limit the range of air-to-surface missiles on bombers without a compensating Soviet concession, such as banning MIRVs on heavy missiles or banning land-mobile missiles, is also unacceptable.

—His two proposals concerning (1) aggregate numbers and (2) limits on Trident/Typhoon, while not acceptable in their present form, are serious proposals which could form the basis for constructive negotiations in Vladivostok.

The following sections analyze Brezhnev’s proposal in more detail and suggest elements of a possible U.S. counter-proposal.

### *Aggregates*

Brezhnev’s proposal essentially comes down to 2400 launchers for the Soviets versus 2200 for the U.S. In strategic or programmatic terms, such an arrangement would present few difficulties; the problem with it is political in that it might not provide the “perception of equality”.

The basic U.S. program consists of 1976 launchers—1000 Minuteman ICBMs, 496 missiles on Poseidon submarines, 240 missiles on Trident submarines, and 240 B-1 aircraft. Thus, even to reach 2200 we will have to retain some combination of 224 obsolete Polaris missiles and B-52 bombers. To go above 2200, we would have to retain even

more obsolete systems (at high operating costs), or build additional Tridents and B-1s (at very high procurement costs).

On the Soviet side, the extra 200 launchers they would be permitted would consist entirely of unMIRVed missiles, since neither side could have more than 1320 MIRVed missiles. Given the tremendous difference in military capability between MIRVed missiles and single warhead missiles, these 200 launchers would be worth very little in strategic terms.

Nevertheless, given the adverse political reaction you might suffer if you accepted this disparity in launchers, I believe we must press Brezhnev to accept numerical equality. He has indicated, in a somewhat ambiguous manner, that he would agree to equality at the end of the period. However, to be meaningful, equality must be reached sometime before the end of the period. I would suggest that we insist on rights to equal numbers of central systems at least throughout the final two years of the agreement—1984 and 1985. Through 1983, we could accept limits of 2200 on the U.S. versus 2400 on the Soviets, but only if the Soviets agree to some compensating asymmetry in our favor, such as a U.S. advantage of 200 MIRVed missiles. Thus, we could stick with our proposal of limiting MIRVed missiles to 1320, but insist that prior to 1984, the Soviets build up to no more than 1120 MIRVed missiles. Correspondingly, while the final limit on launchers would be 2400, we would agree to stay 200 below this level (at 2200) through 1983.

This scheme would provide for a superficial equivalence. In practice, we would have to make a choice between having our permitted 1320 MIRVed missiles in 1983, and having 2400 total launchers in 1985. The reasoning behind this is somewhat complex; however, it can be summarized as follows:

—If we meet our MIRV limit of 1320 in 1983, we will be able to increase our force levels in 1984 and 1985 only by deploying new unMIRVed systems. We could not build up by using older systems, because any excess in older systems above 2200 would have to be phased out before 1984 to stay within the earlier 2200 limit. Thus, we would be left with the B-1—the only new unMIRVed system we will have available to deploy. Our planned production rate for the B-1 is four per month, and it would require an all-out crash program to deploy more than four per month, or 96 during this two-year period. Thus, we could add only 96 new launchers to our 2200, leaving us at 2296—104 short of our limit of 2400.

—Alternatively, we could stretch out the Trident program, leaving the last four ships with 96 missiles for deployment during 1984 and

1985. Since these would be MIRVed, we would have to stay 96 below our MIRV limit of 1320 in order to have room to add these Trident missiles to our force.

In practice, we would probably do something between these two alternatives. The present Trident program calls for nine ships to be completed by the end of 1983. This would give us 1262 MIRVed missiles at that time, 58 short of our 1320 limit. In 1984 and 1985, we could build 96 B-1s and 3 more Trident ships with 72 missiles. This would give us a total force of 2344 (56 short of our permitted 2400), with 1318 MIRVed missiles.

What this means in practice is that you have some bargaining room concerning Soviet insistence on counting Allied SLBMs. In the past, the Soviets have insisted on compensation for both our Allies' SLBMs and our "forward-based systems". Brezhnev has now limited this to Allied SLBMs alone. Further, in my October talks with him, he strongly indicated that his primary concern was with British SLBMs, implying that he would be willing to overlook the French SLBMs.

There are 64 British SLBMs on four Polaris submarines. There is virtually no chance that the British will want to increase this force during the next ten years. Thus, counting them within our 2400 limit would leave us 2336 launchers—only eight short of the maximum number of 2344 we would be able to deploy in any event. In Vladivostok, you will not want to sign any statement which explicitly acknowledges that we will count the British SLBMs. However, if Brezhnev is insistent on this, you may wish to indicate that we will give it favorable consideration, even though we want to leave it open for the time being.

It should be pointed out that during the period of the agreement, we could also, if we choose to do so, replace all 496 Poseidon C-3 MIRVed missiles on Poseidon submarines with the new higher-capability C-4 missile being developed as part of the Trident program. Furthermore, we could triple the throw weight of our land-based MIRVs by replacing MM-III with the new M-X missile.

The prospective agreement would leave the forces of the two sides in rough overall balance. Both sides would have about 7500–10,000 missile warheads, depending on exactly how each side chooses to configure its MIRV force. The Soviet missiles would be heavier—their total missile throw weight would be 14.2 million pounds versus 4.5–6.5 million pounds for the US. On the other hand, the US would have 6–10,000 bomber weapons, compared to only a few hundred for the Soviets. We would also retain our forward-based systems, although this capability would be offset by the Soviet medium bombers and intermediate range missiles.

*Limits on Trident*

Brezhnev proposed a limit of 10 on the number of Tridents and an equal limit on the number of comparable Soviet "Typhoons". We have no evidence that the "Typhoon" exists, although the Soviets would certainly be capable of building such a ship within the next 10 years.

The only difficulty with the limit of 10 on Tridents is that it would force us either to stretch out our Trident program or to terminate it before the end of the agreement. If we terminated Trident, we would have no active missile program at the end of the agreement, giving the Soviets a potential break-out capability relative to us. Thus, we suggest you accept Brezhnev's proposal in concept, but counter-propose a limit of 12 rather than 10. Twelve would allow us to continue the Trident program at its planned rate of one ship every 8 months through 1985.

*Heavy Missiles and Heavy Bombers*

As mentioned above, Brezhnev pocketed the half of our proposed limits on heavy missile MIRVs and bomber armaments favorable to him and rejected the limits on heavy MIRVs favorable to us. Furthermore, his position on bomber air-to-surface missiles was totally unacceptable.

I believe you should make every effort to avoid getting bogged down on the topic of bomber armament and heavy MIRVs at Vladivostok. Time will be very short and you should concentrate on getting agreement on basic numbers. Thus, I suggest that we simplify our approach, proposing numerical limits on the numbers of new heavy bombers (250) and new heavy missiles (180), eliminating all reference to heavy MIRVs or bomber armaments.

*Summary and Recommendations*

In summary, although Brezhnev's proposal contains some unacceptable provisions, it offers a basis for further negotiations. I suggest that we follow up with a counterproposal with the following key elements:

1. A limit on total launchers of 2400 and MIRV missiles of 1320 for the last two years of the agreement (1984 and 1985).
2. Through 1983, US agreement to stay 200 below the 2400 launcher limit, and Soviet agreement to stay 200 below the 1320 MIRV missile limit.
3. A limit of 250 new strategic bombers, 312 SLBMs on Trident-type ships (13 ships), and 180 new heavy ICBMs.

This approach would lead to something like the following forces on the two sides:

At the End of 1983			
	US		USSR
<u>MIRVed Missiles</u>			
MM-III	– 550	SS-17/19	– 730
Poseidon C-3/C-4	– 496	SS-18	– 180
Trident C-4	– 216	Typhoon	– 210
	1262		1120
<u>Other Missiles</u>			
MM-III	– 450	SS-9	– 128
Polaris	– 48	SS-16	– 60
		SS-11	– 300
		D-class	– 408
		Y-class	– 318
	498		1214
<u>Total Missiles</u>	<u>1760</u>		<u>2334</u>
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-1	– 154	Bear/Bison	– 66
B-52	– 286		
	440		66
Total Launchers	<u>2200</u>		<u>2400</u>

At the End of 1985			
	US		USSR
<u>MIRVed Missiles</u>			
MM-III	– 550	SS-17/19	– 930
Poseidon C-4	– 480	SS-18	– 180
Trident C-4	– 288	Typhoon	– 210
	1318		1320
<u>Other Missiles</u>			
MM-III	– 450	SS-9	– 128
Polaris	– 48	SS-16	– 60
		SS-11	– 220
		D-class	– 408
		Y-class	– 318
	498		1134
<u>Total Missiles</u>	<u>1816</u>		<u>2334</u>

*Bombers*

B-1	– 250	Bear/Bison	– 66
B-52	– 278		
	528		66
Total Launchers	<u>2344</u>		<u>2400</u>

If you approve, I will pass on this counterproposal to Dobrynin in order to give Brezhnev time to study it before the Vladivostok meeting.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 86.

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## 86. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

1. Beginning in October 1977, and for the period through January 1, 1984, the number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy strategic bombers will be limited as follows: for the US no more than 2200; for the USSR no more than 2400.

2. Thereafter, in the period lasting through the end of the new agreement (December 31, 1985), the number of weapons specified in paragraph 1 will be no more than 2400 for the US and for the USSR, unless agreement is reached beforehand on additional mutual reductions.

3. During the period from October 1977 through January 1, 1984, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs will be limited as follows: for the US no more than 1320 and for the USSR no more than 1120.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, Box 6, SALT, November–December 1977. No classification marking. A covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger explains that the note was to be passed to Dobrynin and that it had incorporated the changes in paragraph 5 that Kissinger had requested. (Ibid.) Kissinger gave Dobrynin the note on November 13. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 27, USSR, The “D” File)



4. Thereafter, in the period lasting through the end of the new agreement (December 31, 1985), the limits on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs will be 1320 for both the US and the USSR.

5. During the period of a new agreement, from October 1977 through December 1985, both the US and the USSR will have the right to deploy (a) no more than 250 new heavy strategic bombers, (b) no more than 288 modern SLBMs on new types of modern ballistic missile submarines, (c) no more than 180 new, modern large ICBMs equipped with MIRVs.

6. By the beginning of 1984, at the latest, the US and USSR will resume negotiations on a further agreement limiting strategic arms, with the aim of agreeing on a program of phased reductions to take effect after 1985.

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## 87. Editorial Note

President Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held a summit in Vladivostok November 23–24, 1974. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) dominated the agenda. The two leaders opened the summit on November 23 at 2:20 p.m. with discussions about SALT II as well as general U.S.-Soviet relations and the Middle East. They met again at 6:15 p.m. to talk exclusively about SALT II. Memoranda of conversation are in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Discussions on USSR, Middle East, and China, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, November 23–24, 1974, Vladivostok Summit. The memoranda of conversation of all the Vladivostok summit meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976*.

Ford and Brezhnev held their final SALT II discussion on November 24 from 10:10 a.m. to 1:40 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is Document 88. After their last meeting, Ford and Brezhnev attended a ceremony in the conference hall at Okeanskaya Sanitorium, where they signed a joint communiqué. The two sides also released a joint statement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The full text of these two statements is in *Public Papers: Ford, 1974*, pages 657–662. Kissinger held a press conference following the ceremony to answers queries about the summit. The transcript of the press confer-

ence is in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 23, 1974, pages 898–905.

## 88. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, 10:10 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### US

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Akalovsky

#### USSR

General Secretary Brezhnev  
Foreign Minister Gromyko  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

### SUBJECT

SALT II, Cyprus, Middle East, CSCE, Trade Bill

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I have consulted with not only Dr. Kissinger but also others. In a spirit of progress in the area of strategic arms limitation as well as other areas in our relations, we considered the various issues before us, including that of bombers. I know you have deep concern about counting ballistic missiles on aircraft. In the spirit of progress in our negotiations and broader aspects of our relations we can agree to count any ballistic missile with the range of over 700 kilometers within the 2400 ceiling. This in effect will mean a serious limitation on our capability to use such systems.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So what you are suggesting is that any ballistic missile over 700 kilometers in range should be counted as one launcher?

The President: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I have here a small souvenir for you. We also have some more souvenirs elsewhere, but I know that you are a pipe smoker and I thought I would give you this one now. It is a set of pipes and a pipe stand, which I hope you will enjoy.

The President: I will very proudly have this on my desk. I really don't know how to thank you.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, Box 6, SALT, November–December 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held in the Okeanskaya Sanatorium near Vladivostok.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There will also be a souvenir for Mrs. Ford from Mrs. Brezhnev.

The President: Thank you very much. I talked with Mrs. Ford this morning and I told her that we were having very constructive discussions in an excellent atmosphere. She is looking forward to meeting Mrs. Brezhnev in the United States.

General Secretary Brezhnev: For our part, we would be very pleased to see Mrs. Ford in Moscow and we will accord her a very warm welcome when she comes here.

The President: When you come to the United States, I would like to take you to the Merriweather Post Estate in Florida. I've never been there myself but I'm told it's a most beautiful place. It was given by Mrs. Merriweather Post to the American government.

The Secretary: To be used as a government guest house.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, where is your home?

The President: I was born in Nebraska, but the home where I was born has been torn down. I didn't live in Nebraska too long and spent most of my life in Michigan.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The house in which I was born was an apartment building housing a number of families, including ours. Later, when I was on the City Council in my hometown, I was once told that there was a house in very bad repair and that in fact it was a hazard for the fifteen or so families living there. So I went to look at the house and it turned out to be the one I was born in. As I inspected the house, I saw props in the basement to support the first floor, then props on the first floor to support the second floor, and so all the way up to the top floor. When I said let's get trucks and move out everybody, however, all those families came to me and demanded three room apartments.

The President: When I went to Omaha, Nebraska, I found just an empty lot where my house of birth had been. It had been leveled by a bulldozer.

Mr. General Secretary, I hope you will recognize that over strong objections of many of my people, although not all, I have made a really significant move which is in the spirit of what we want to achieve here. It is a major shift on our part when we agree to include in the aggregate ballistic missiles on aircraft. Frankly, this move is not unanimously approved on our side, but I made this decision myself in order to break the impasse we got into last night after five or six hours of generally constructive talks.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When I went to bed last night, I had difficulty falling asleep and kept thinking about our talks. I thought they had been fruitful and reflected a spirit of frankness and respect,

both personal between ourselves and between our two nations. As I was thinking, all kinds of figures came to my mind, although in some respect I believe it is really regrettable that we have to discuss atomic arms at all. Personally, I did not have the impression that we were in an impasse. After all, these issues have many serious implications and we should not make hasty decisions. Last night, we did not specify bombers, we discussed them only in general terms. Today, you put forward an interesting suggestion. What we have in mind is that bombers, specifically the B-1's, carrying missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometers be counted as one launcher. Bombers carrying missiles with a range from 600 to 3000 kilometers should be counted according to the number of missiles they carry. All bomber-carried missiles over 3000 kilometers should be banned. Perhaps this could resolve this entire problem, and then we could say that we have made a great contribution to détente. I believe this golden medium could solve this problem.

The Secretary: Ambassador Dobrynin is an expert as regards the design of our weaponry.

General Secretary Brezhnev: He's your chief designer

Ambassador Dobrynin: What the General Secretary has just suggested is basically what you, too, have in mind; the only difference is whether the lower range should be 600 or 700 kilometers.

General Secretary Brezhnev: This would be a beautiful solution, especially for your side.

The Secretary: If we abolish the B-1, it would sound even better

The President: Mr. General Secretary, a total ban on anything over 3000 kilometers is a principle that is very hard for me to accept. It would look as if we had capitulated in an area where I believe many of our people think we should go forward. As far as counting as one unit missiles from 600 to 3000 kilometers, I don't think that should be any problem. But I know that a total ban on everything over 3000 kilometers would be seriously objected to by some of my advisors. In order to come to what I believe is a fair proposition in this very important, indeed vital, area I would make a counter-proposal that I think would fit very well into what we want to achieve. I would suggest that there be a limit of 200 on your MIRVed heavy missiles so that while we would give up aircraft-carried ballistic missiles with a range of over 3000 kilometers, you would limit the number of your MIRVed heavy missiles to 200.

(At this point, the members of the Soviet group engaged in a lively discussion among themselves, with Dobrynin arguing in favor of the President's suggestion and Gromyko, on the contrary, telling Brezhnev that a limit on Soviet heavy missiles with MIRVs was out of the question.)

The Secretary: To be quite candid, the problem of strategic missiles is both strategic and political. Strategically, whether you have a limit or not—whether you have 200 or 300 heavy missiles with MIRVs—would make no difference as regards the strategic equation. Politically, however, our limit on B-1's should be counterbalanced by your limit on heavy missiles. This would be of great help politically and of significant symbolic importance in the United States. In principle, you could retain 300 heavy missiles but MIRV only 200 of them.

The President: I believe you should recognize that I am making a very basic decision in banning missiles over 3000 kilometers on our bombers. Many of our experts will object to this, but I believe I can make this move provided I can say that you have agreed to limit the number of your heavy MIRVed missiles to 200.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But the principle of equal security is not observed under such an arrangement, and this is a very important point.

The Secretary: How is that?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Missiles over 3000 kilometers can reach from Leningrad to the Urals. The distance from Moscow to Kiev is only 700 kilometers. Moreover, frankly speaking, such long range missiles would be launched from an area not covered by our anti-aircraft defenses. The fact is that bombers could fly 5000 kilometers, and if you add the range of the missile, which is over 3000 kilometers and could be even 5000 kilometers, you can see that our entire country would be covered. After all, the distance from Moscow to Vladivostok is 9,000 kilometers! So there would be no equal security.

The President: But, Mr. General Secretary, we would count ballistic missiles on aircraft as part of the aggregate of 2400 missiles. So I don't understand the strategic difference, because in order to put a missile on a bomber we would have to give up a land-based missile. Our land-based missiles have the same range capability, so that it is only a question of choice on our part.

The Secretary: I have the impression that Mr. Gromyko is rejecting the General Secretary's proposal. Let me sum up the President's suggestion.

On the lower end, the difference is 600 versus 700 kilometers. I'm sure we could find a solution to this 100-kilometer problem very quickly, perhaps in 5 minutes. Then you said that everything over 3000 kilometers should be banned. The President said that this would be all right provided there is a limit of 200 on your MIRVed heavy missiles. But we would still count everything between 600 and 3000 kilometers as part of the aggregate of 2400. So the only problem is the limit of 200 on your MIRVed heavy missiles. I don't believe you want to MIRV more than this number anyway. So this is the only issue. You should

keep in mind that if there are 10 ballistic missiles on an aircraft, and those missiles have a range of over 700 kilometers, they will count against the aggregate.

(At this point, members of the Soviet team again engaged in consultation among themselves, with Dobrynin pointing out that the Secretary was right that the USSR would not want to MIRV more than 200 heavy missiles. Brezhnev, supported by Gromyko, maintained that while this might be so, the Soviets should retain the right to exceed that number.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: Could we have a fifteen minute break?

The President: No objection.

(After the break, the meeting resumed with Mr. Sonnenfeldt joining the U.S. group. The break lasted almost an hour.)

The President: I smoked one of the pipes you gave me, Mr. General Secretary, and I find it excellent.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Doesn't a pipe have to be broken in?

The President: Yes, it has to be done slowly.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I have the following question: how would the liquidation of one of your submarine bases, that is Rota, we agreed upon yesterday be implemented in practice after 1983?

The Secretary: We would give you a letter just as we did as regards the 54 Titans. That is our intention.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When would you give us such a letter?

The Secretary: When we sign the agreement, in the summer.

The President: Our intention is to preclude the use of Rota by nuclear submarines.

The Secretary: You would get a letter from the President that our intention is not to use Rota after 1983 for submarines equipped with nuclear weapons.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, do you believe that the new agreement should be signed in Washington?

The President: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Alright, so let's sum up. The U.S. would have the right to have 2400 launchers of all types, on land, on the sea, and in the air. The same would apply to the Soviet Union, which would be entitled to 2400 launchers of all types, land, sea and air. As regards MIRVs, the United States would have 1320 MIRVed vehicles, and the USSR would also have 1320 such vehicles. United States aircraft carrying missiles up to 600 kilometers would count as one launcher,

whereas aircraft carrying missiles over 600 kilometers in range would be counted according to the number of missiles they carried. In other words, if an aircraft carried 15 missiles, it would count as 15 launchers—if it carried 20, it would count as 20 launchers. All this would be counted against the ceiling of 2400. Under this arrangement, we would meet each other half way. As regards heavy missiles, there would be no limit either for us or for you. Also, as was agreed yesterday, neither we nor you would build new silos. Nor would there be a limit on our heavy missiles as regards MIRVing. This is what you proposed this morning.

The Secretary: But these limitations regarding bombers would apply to both sides, wouldn't they?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, on the basis of reciprocity.

The President: There would be no limit on our capability of over 3000 kilometers?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Correct, but each missile over 600 kilometers would be counted within and against the ceiling.

The Secretary: I just whispered to the President that I would be willing to bet any amount that the Soviet Union will not MIRV over 200 heavy missiles and the United States will not build air missiles with a range of over 3000 kilometers. But it seems that weapons designers have won.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, each side will retain the right to proceed in these areas.

The President: This is fine with us. I would suggest that Dr. Kissinger come to the Soviet Union sometime in the spring, prior to your visit, Mr. General Secretary, so that there would be no difficulty later.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Agree.

The Secretary: But this time I will go to Leningrad! I believe we should give this agreement in principle to our Geneva negotiators to work on it for two or three months in order to develop all the details, and then we can finish whatever is left when I come to the Soviet Union in the spring, so that the agreement can be signed in the summer.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: When would Dr. Kissinger come to Moscow?

The Secretary: Perhaps in early April.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That would be all right with us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So, Mr. President, this meeting was not in vain

The President: Certainly not, it has been very constructive.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, we have another souvenir for you, this time from a local artist. It is a portrait of you made of inlaid wood.

The President: Thank you very much, but this portrait makes me much more handsome, and Mrs. Ford will think she is married to a new man. It is really amazing how an artist can find different shades of wood to render the color of the skin, hair, and eyes. This is really true art

Ambassador Dobrynin: Well, Mr. President, this man found a picture of you in a newspaper, and frankly speaking not a very good picture, and did this portrait from it. He then sent the portrait to comrade Brezhnev and asked him if he would like to present it to you.

The President: Well, I would like to meet the artist and thank him personally, if that is possible.

Ambassador Dobrynin: I don't know where he lives, but I'm sure we can find him. Mr. Aleksandrov can do that.

The President: But I don't want to make too much trouble for you, so perhaps you can find out his address and I will write him a note.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Yes, that might be simpler.

The Secretary: Time is getting short, so may I raise a few practical questions before we move to the next topic. My impression is that you, Mr. President, and the General Secretary have agreed that a separate statement on strategic arms limitation will be issued in addition to the communiqué.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That's right.

The Secretary: We can ask Sonnenfeldt and Kornienko to work on this.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That would be fine. We have a draft of such a statement that is based on the draft you had given us.

The Secretary: We should release this statement a few hours before the President departs, so that our press can use it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Simultaneously with the communiqué?

The Secretary: Yes, at the same time. Then, perhaps during the banquet, I can brief the press. Our press will leave with the President and won't have opportunity to file unless it gets the statement before then.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is entirely up to you.

The Secretary: Perhaps we can release the communiqué sometime around 3 o'clock with an embargo until 5 o'clock?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: No, that would be too early. I suggest that the embargo be until 6 o'clock, because otherwise our press in Moscow, given the time differential, will have problems.



The Secretary: That wouldn't make any difference to us.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, then, it will be still better if we embargo until 7 o'clock local time.

The Secretary: No problem. Where is the signing of the communiqué going to take place?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Here, in this room.

The Secretary: As regards numbers, Mr. President, my instinct is that you will have to brief congressional leaders. Thus the figures will come out, but only 2400 and 1320 and not those about bombers.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: This is not a good idea, because there is much yet to be clarified. After all, the agreement will be signed only in the future.

The Secretary: But we can use the language we suggested without figures, can't we?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

The Secretary: All right, but after the President talks with congressional leaders the numbers are bound to come out.<sup>2</sup>

The President: The document we're issuing will have to refer to equivalence regarding both missiles and MIRVs.

Mr. Aleksandrov (who had just joined the group): We have language on this point.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps Mr. Sonnenfeldt can now meet with Kornienko to work on the text.

The Secretary: As regards the communiqué, there are two points that are still unresolved.

(At this point the Secretary asked General Scowcroft to join the U.S. group.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: Perhaps after our return to Moscow and Washington respectively we could exchange, through our embassies, aides-mémoire on the figures we have arrived at.

The Secretary: Yes, that is very important.

The President: We will do this as soon as the Secretary returns from his trip.

The Secretary: A week from tomorrow, would that be all right?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Agree.

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<sup>2</sup> When Ford briefed Congressional leaders on the agreement on November 26, he emphasized that the figures were "off the record." The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 94.

The Secretary: We would state it exactly as the General Secretary has summed it up.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

The Secretary: To return to the communiqué, perhaps we could complete it now and then we could discuss other subjects. I know that the President and the General Secretary also want to discuss a restricted subject.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Then Sonnenfeldt and Kornienko should come back to the room.

The Secretary: Sonnenfeldt yes, but not Kornienko! But maybe they deserve each other

General Secretary Brezhnev: They sure do! Mr. President, may I excuse myself for 10 or 15 minutes, I have some personal business to attend to.

The President: I'll also leave the room for a while.

(At this point, Ambassador Stoessel and Assistant Secretary Hartman were invited to join the U.S. group.)

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In the draft communiqué, you have a bracketed reference to strategic arms limitation. I think we should drop it, now that there will be a separate statement on this subject.

The Secretary: I think the communiqué without any reference to the most important subject of strategic arms limitation would look rather peculiar. I believe we should have some language stating that the subject was discussed and that a separate statement on it is being issued.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All right, perhaps we can have a sentence reading as follows: "A joint statement on the question of limiting offensive strategic arms is being published separately."

The Secretary: That sounds all right.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cyprus and the Middle East.]

**89. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 30, 1974.

**SUBJECT**

Comments on Soviet Aide-Mémoire

The Soviet Aide-Mémoire (Tab A) on the Vladivostok agreement is generally helpful. For example, the Aide-Mémoire refers to “heavy bombers” as opposed to “strategic bombers”, which the Soviets previously used. The new terminology confirms that the Soviets have fallen off FBS. It also makes it easier for us to argue for the inclusion of the Backfire (which may have only a peripheral, “non-strategic” role despite its being a heavy bomber) and for the exemption of the FB-111 (which has a strategic role but is only a medium bomber in the Badger category).

There are some problems with the Aide-Mémoire:

—Paragraph 3 broadens the coverage of the agreed provision on *ballistic* air-to-surface missiles of 600 km or greater range to apply to *all* air-to-surface missiles of such range, *ballistic* and *cruise*. The stand-off cruise missile we are developing for the B-52 and B-1 would have a range of some 3000 km. Some 10–20 could be carried per airplane. Thus, it would be a significant disadvantage to accede to the Soviet reinterpretation and I believe you must challenge it.

—Paragraph 4 allows each side “to determine by itself the types and numbers” of its 1320 missiles which will be equipped with MIRVs. While this wording may simply be a reaffirmation of their non-acceptance of limits on SS-18 MIRVs, it may also be an attempt at eroding our principle of verifying MIRVs by types and classes. As you know, this verification issue may pose the major hurdle to be overcome in reaching a SALT agreement in 1975. Thus, I believe you should point out to the Soviets that we agree to their wording in paragraph 4 but only subject to any collateral constraints which may be necessary for adequate verification.

—The paragraph 5 ban on modifying light ICBM launchers into heavy launchers does not pick up the ban, in Article II of the Interim Agreement, on converting pre-1964 heavy launchers (i.e., for SS-7, SS-8, Titan II) into more modern types. While the Soviets are most probably assuming that they will have to phase out the SS-7s and SS-8s

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Staff Assistant Peter Rodman Files, Box 1, SALT, Oct.–Nov. 1974. Secret; Completely Outside the System.

to reach 2400, you might want to make clear to them that the ban on older to modern heavies continues.

—The reference to incorporating in the new agreement “the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement” is potentially troublesome because of its possible reference to the Interim Agreement ban on additional construction of SLBM launchers and modern submarines. However, since the provisions of the Interim Agreement relating to no new ICBM silos and no conversion of light launchers into heavy launchers are picked up in paragraph 5, the reference to the Interim Agreement is probably to peripheral provisions, such as use of national technical means and of the SCC. However, you might wish to tie down once and for all that the submarine sublimits expire in 1977.

## Tab A

### Soviet Draft Aide-Mémoire<sup>2</sup>

November, 1974.

#### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In accordance with an agreement reached during the meeting of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford on November 23–24 1974, agreed provisions are laid down below to be followed by the sides in working out a new agreement on limitations of strategic offensive armaments.

1. A new agreement, the work on which is to be completed in the nearest time with a view of signing it in 1975, will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985 and will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force till October 1977.

2. A new agreement will be based on the principle of equality and equal security of both sides.

3. During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will be entitled to an aggregate number of delivery vehicles of strategic arms not exceeding 2,400. This number includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ballistic missiles on submarines (SLBMs) and heavy bombers if the latter are equipped with bombs and air-to-surface missiles with a range not exceeding 600 kilometers. When a bomber is

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<sup>2</sup> Confidential. A handwritten note indicates the aide-mémoire was delivered to the White House at 7:15 p.m. on November 29. The final text, agreed upon by the United States and Soviet Union, is Document 91.

equipped with air-to-surface missiles with a range over 600 kilometers, each of such missiles will be counted as one delivery vehicle in their aggregate number (2,400).

4. During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will be entitled to an aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads not exceeding 1,320. Within this aggregate number each of the sides will be entitled to determine by itself the types and numbers of its missiles to be equipped with such warheads.

5. During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will not construct new silos for launchers of ICBMs and will not modify launchers for light ICBMs into the launchers for heavy ICBMs.

6. A new agreement could also provide for additional limitations on deployment of new types of strategic arms during the time of its action.

7. A new agreement will also include a provision to the effect that not later than 1980–1981 negotiations should start on further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms for the post 1985 period.

8. Negotiations between the delegations of the USSR and the US to work out a new agreement will resume in Geneva, in January 1975. A precise date of their resumption will be agreed upon in the nearest time.

90. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 2, 1974, 10:40–11:35 a.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PRINCIPALS

The President  
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger  
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
 Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby

## OTHER ATTENDEES

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll	Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Counselor
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson,	to the President
U.S. Representative, SALT	Mr. Robert Hartman, Counselor to
	the President
<i>Defense</i>	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary William	
Clements	NSC
	Mr. Jan M. Lodol

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

[President Ford:] In Vladivostok, General Secretary Brezhnev and I established a good working relationship. He knows I was firm, and I understand his firmness. We were both acting in the best interest of our countries.

The main accomplishment was that we went from non-equivalence to equivalence. We agreed on a limit of 2400 on the aggregates and 1320 on the number of MIRV missiles. There's no compensation for FBS or the nuclear capability of the French and the British. I think we came away with a good agreement. George, I think you understand the 600 km range limitation—anything more would be counted, anything less not counted.

We put a cap on the arms race. Sure, we would have liked to have gotten 1700 or 2000, but these were negotiations. I was looking at the estimates of the intelligence community and when I saw that the minimum, median, and maximum were all higher than the limit we negotiated, I see that where we ended up was very good. If the public is given

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 1, SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

this information, I think they will agree. There are people on either side, both the left and the right, who don't understand the facts.

Mr. Colby: Mr. President, that is equally true on MIRVs (shows chart).<sup>2</sup>

President Ford: Right—I looked at the figures. How much of this can we safely let out?

Mr. Colby: Many of these projections are judgmental and might be open to attack.

Secretary Schlesinger: You can make two observations. First, it is universally recognized that the Soviet program could go beyond 2400 SDVs, and second, the numbers here are lower than the numbers in the Interim Agreement.

Ambassador Johnson: We also got a start on controlling MIRVs.

Secretary Kissinger: You can make an absolutely flat statement that these numbers are below what the Soviets could have done in the absence of the agreement and below the numbers permitted in the Interim Agreement. They wanted a thousand MIRVs and a five-year agreement and we knew that was their minimum program.

Ambassador Johnson: Will you give out the numbers tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to see Dobrynin at 2:30, and I am sure we will be able to give out the numbers, although there are a few other minor problems being worked out.<sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Johnson: That will be helpful if you can give out the numbers.

President Ford: I agree. We have to go on the attack. I have no qualms about the agreement; I think it was good. At the end of the first night, Henry, I didn't think we would come out this well.

Secretary Kissinger: When we talked the next morning, we thought we would have to show more flexibility. I had got in touch with Jim, and we wanted to protect the SRAM on the B-1—nothing else. As it turned out, we did a hell of a lot better than that. There are many things we accomplished—equal aggregates; no FBS compensation; no compensation for the Chinese or what they have called geographic disparities. These are all out for a ten-year period. And anyone who talks about strategic superiority—our FBS might not be worth much in a second strike, but in a first strike, they could do a lot of damage to the Soviet Union—

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<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>3</sup> No record of Kissinger's meeting with Dobrynin has been found. The two men talked at 10:23 a.m. and agreed to meet at 2:30 p.m. at the Department of State. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)

Secretary Schlesinger: I hope you will not use that argument publicly

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are concerned about FBS. Grechko once showed me a map showing the capabilities.

We would not trade our forces in the 1980's for theirs, and we have great flexibility. If we want more throw weight, we can deploy a bigger missile. We can put missiles on aircraft. We have 200 extra launchers we can play with. We could go heavier on Trident if we wanted to.

Secretary Schlesinger: We shall.

Secretary Kissinger: We know they plan 200 or more mobiles, and these will now have to come out of their ceiling. We got far beyond what we thought we could.

A number of people have argued that this was a quickie deal. That is nonsense. We had several NSC meetings here. Then the President in October ordered a combination of the Chiefs position and some MIRV limits. In Moscow we started with two gory days of battle. Finally, on Saturday, I took Brezhnev aside and told him that if we had no agreement, we were going to increase our force levels.<sup>4</sup> I also told him that it was important to agree in 1975 because 1976 was an election year. I told him the President could go either way. He called a politburo meeting and came back and proposed equal aggregates in 1985, but unequal in the Interim. The U.S. would be limited to 2200. There would also be a 2000 kilometer limit on ASM range and a limit of ten on the number of Tridents and "Typhoons".

At one point he proposed a limit on their 160 bomber—I said we would trade the B-3 for that! (laughter)

But this was the state we were in after my trip to Moscow. After our deliberations here, the President then ordered that we propose to accept the unequal aggregates through 1973, but with a MIRVed differential to offset it plus a sublimit on heavy missiles with MIRVs.

We met for six hours the first evening. Brezhnev even cancelled a state dinner he had planned. He started out insisting that we count the British and the French submarines and accept a 3000 kilometer limit on ASMs. He had two generals sitting behind him and every time he moved, they came up with a piece of paper.<sup>5</sup>

Secretary Schlesinger: We could arrange that for you also, Mr. President! (laughter)

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<sup>4</sup> Saturday, October 26; see Document 84.

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger is referring to the meeting on the evening of November 23; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 91.



Secretary Kissinger: You should have seen how he solved that problem—He insisted that we continue in a restricted meeting

Ambassador Johnson: Do you know who they were?

Secretary Kissinger: One was the Deputy Chief of their general staff—Hyland knows both of them.

In the end, we proposed a limit of 200 on MLBMs MIRVs. Their people said they were not planning any more, but their generals, and generals must be the same the world over, would not give up rights to have more. I think they were stupid. They will have to count all their 18s as MIRVs or keep the 9 in the force.

With what we came up with, what difference does it make whether the ceiling was 2400 or 2200. There's no difference. When people say we have negotiated to leave a machine gun in everyone's hands, that is nonsense. An overkill capability exists at any level.

Secretary Schlesinger: We should stay away from that argument publicly. We are trying to get our defense budget passed, and if we tell them we have overkill, it won't help.

President Ford: Now that we have set a cap, we have to fight to keep our forces up to the agreed level.

Secretary Kissinger: If the Congress does not agree to keep our forces up, they are buying perceived inferiority. All the arguments we made before on the defense program can be made now.

I would also like to say that I think this could have been done only at the Summit. Semenov could never have agreed to equal aggregates with no compensation.

Ambassador Johnson: I said right here in this room that it would be very difficult to get equal aggregates in 1985—I made that point at every opportunity.

President Ford: I remember that.

Secretary Kissinger: I think our allies will see this as an unbelievable achievement. We have gotten rid of the FBS problem for 10 years. They didn't even ask for noncircumvention.

Ambassador Johnson: Is that still open?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we would have to do it if they asked.

Ambassador Johnson: If it's properly framed, it's probably in our interest so that they can't build up their non-central system.

President Ford: What does this mean?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of agreeing not to circumvent the limits by building up systems not covered.

I think we were able to get the agreement for several reasons. Brezhnev was dealing with a new President, and wanted to do so in a constructive way. Détente has been under attack, and he knew he

would be dealing with the President who could be around for six years and was not a lame duck. He wanted to strengthen détente. And I think he was somewhat afraid of an arms race with the U.S. He knew you were making final plans for your defense budget. Finally, Brezhnev wanted, with the new President, to get off in the right direction. But this agreement could not have been made at any lower level.

Without the agreement, the total would have been even higher again and we would have been less capable of getting an agreement later. On MIRVs, the only way we could have gotten a lower level was to have a big program of our own. Once the Russians would see what Congress was doing, we would never get agreement. If we hadn't done this, we would have been in the worst possible position—no programs and no agreement—if we had stuck at 2100.

President Ford: The next Congress will give us even more trouble. I think one thing that might have helped was that in my opening statement I told Brezhnev that I had to decide on our defense budget very soon.

Secretary Kissinger: One of the dangers is that if we try to drive the defense budget down now, there are a thousand ways to hang up the agreement between now and the next Summit. If the Soviets really believe that we haven't a chance of meeting our levels, they could hang it up. This is why we have to have at least Jim's budget. I'm opposed to cutting it in the executive branch.

If this agreement becomes like the trade issue, I think we will see a massive reversal of the Soviet position on détente. This agreement will not be easy for Brezhnev. For him, every weapon comes out of somebody's pocket. The levels permit us to go up.

President Ford: We have even more flexibility than we would have under the 2200 limit in 1983.

Secretary Kissinger: In China, nothing helped as much as having made the agreement in Vladivostok.<sup>6</sup> In our first meeting, the Chinese said "we hear that our relations are not so good. That's not true on our side; is it true on your side?" On the other hand, the fact that you are going to go to China will help tremendously with the Soviets. We have this triangular game going again as a result of Vladivostok. The more we talk Soviet strategic superiority, the more it hurts us with China. It's imperative that they not believe we are inferior militarily to the Soviets. We can make a good case here for this agreement.

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<sup>6</sup> Kissinger visited Japan and China November 25–29 after leaving Vladivostok.

President Ford: Brezhnev started out charging that we had violated the agreement, talking about covers over our silos. He had his generals there—

Secretary Kissinger: He kept saying that Kissinger tells us the concrete gets soft without the covers! (laughter)

President Ford: We agreed that neither party can build new missile silos.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets had no objection to counting land mobiles.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, you can win on this—you've got the high ground. This is an equal agreement. Some will say that until 1980, it will reduce the incentive for reductions. But you can say that we want reductions, are prepared for them, and hope to induce the Soviets to reduce, but we will not reduce unilaterally as long as I am President of the United States.

As you said, we did better than we expected, but don't say that publicly! In the next round, Brezhnev will not ask how soft your position is. You held on equal numbers and no FBS. We should come up with the right position and stick with it.

In the area of violations, you do have some vulnerability. People will say that even if the agreement is good, how do we know the Soviets will hold to it if they violate their existing agreements? This has to be thought out with considerable care. With respect to SALT I, you can simply say that there are ambiguities and that we are going to discuss them with the Soviets.

President Ford: And we have a good system of verification.

Secretary Kissinger: You can say that if we are convinced of a violation, we will take action. There are always ambiguities and we will get clarification. If we don't get clarification, we will take action.

I agree with Jim—we should be positive about this. But I think it is equally important that we do not say that this proves what we can get if we were tough. We should say that both sides looked at the situation and concluded that this was right. It would not hurt to praise Soviet statesmanship somewhat. If we say that this proves what a tough President can achieve, this will simply force the Soviets to be tougher in the future. We should say that we stuck with a reasonable position and the Soviets responded in a statesmanlike manner.

Deputy Secretary Clements: I would like to endorse what Jim said about reductions. I talked to Brent about this—we should emphasize that further talks will start not later than 1980 as agreed. The public wants some reduction of the threshold. We should emphasize that we had to first cap off the race, then discuss reductions.

President Ford: I raised this with the Congressional leadership; we can and will emphasize this point.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. The point was that with the forces going up, we didn't have an agreed base from which to begin reductions. We should calmly speak about reductions, but not be too anxious on reductions. First, we have to support our defense budget. And second, we don't want the Soviets to get the idea that we are so anxious for changes in the agreement until we get this one signed and sealed.

Secretary Schlesinger: We can say that we are prepared for reductions and that this provides the basis for reductions.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

President Ford: Jim, I want to talk to you about your budget levels. I understand you want about \$95 billion and OMB wants about \$93 billion. I want to talk to you, George, and Henry about both the substance of your request and this question of perceptions related to the agreement. Do you want \$95 billion?

Secretary Schlesinger: \$94.6 billion in outlays. But the real problem is in TOA. We have to make good significant underfunding in our procurement because of inflation. To be frank, we can manage outlay somewhat. The outlays this year are less serious. We can make \$94.6 billion in outlays without reducing our programs.

President Ford: For procurement?

Secretary Schlesinger: Total, including procurement. The FY 75 budget was first projected out to \$93 billion, but then we have projected the inflation since then. I think Roy has agreed to \$94 billion, but I would like for him to speak for himself.

President Ford: We should get together and discuss this on both substance and perception grounds.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is one other question, on throw weight. On this you can say that throw weight is just one variable. We are prepared to agree on limits, but it requires unilateral (*sic*) agreement. But the agreement you have made does not permit them to outclass us. There is no limit on throw weight. From an arms control standpoint, it would be more advantageous for both sides to agree to limits on throw weight.

President Ford: We have the flexibility to increase our throw weight; we have the flexibility to deploy a new larger land-based missile or deploy missiles on aircraft. We can do this if our military decide they want to go up from our present throw weight to a substantially larger throw weight.

It was interesting that when this topic came up, Brezhnev drew silos. He and Henry got into an argument about whether we are ex-

panding our throw weight. Henry pointed out that they were digging their silos deeper.

Secretary Kissinger: His argument was that to deploy their new missiles they were making their silos narrower. I said yes, but that they were digging them deeper. Brezhnev said “you were more far-sighted—you left room in your silos to deploy larger missiles, and I know you are doing it. Kissinger keeps trying to tell us that the covers are there because of the sun and the rain, but he knows it’s because you’re deploying larger missiles.” He said we were increasing our silos by 15% and deploying a new missile up to 200 tons in weight. He said he knows we can increase 15%, but pointed out that even the existing holes can take bigger missiles. He said “I don’t object,” and said repeatedly that they were deploying no new silos.

Secretary Schlesinger: If he were smart they would object and accept restraints on themselves in return for restraints on us.

Secretary Kissinger: If he were smart, but he was taking his military’s position into account.

Secretary Schlesinger: Most of what was in the *Wall Street* editorial was nonsense.<sup>7</sup> Mr. President, you can say categorically that you have not put the U.S. in a position of inferiority.

Secretary Kissinger: This agreement will not put us in a position of inferiority. If we are inferior, it will be by our own decision, but I wouldn’t say that publicly.

President Ford: Should we think of a rebuttal to this editorial?

Secretary Schlesinger: We should get the other side out—these criticisms are all being fed by the Jackson staff.

Counselor Rumsfeld: Perhaps you could use this exchange of aides-mémoire. Since the President has now come out with the details, they could get off the hook, now that they have the numbers.

President Ford: The editorial says they have 500 medium bombers in Cuba. George is that right?

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe they’re talking about Backfire.

General Brown: They have 135 Bears, 35 Bisons, and 35 Backfires.

Secretary Kissinger: They are talking about bombers going to Cuba and back?

Secretary Clements: They’re talking about the Badgers.

Secretary Schlesinger: Those are offsets to our FBS.

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<sup>7</sup> The editorial, entitled “Whose Triumph?”, published on December 2, contended that President Ford had reached an agreement that meant there would be no meaningful reduction in nuclear arms until 1985 and that allowed the Soviet Union a three-to-one advantage in missile force over the United States. (*Wall Street Journal*, December 2, 1974, p. 18)

President Ford: Logistically, they have no armaments in Cuba and they aren't prepared to operate there.

Secretary Kissinger: If our Air Force saw these bombers heading to Cuba after launch—

President Ford: If they launch 500 aircraft, we're not going to sit around and let them have a free ride.

I have another meeting in five or ten minutes so unless there are any questions, perhaps we should wrap up—Fred?

Dr. Ikke: On verification, I think it is important if we can be very forthcoming on the covers. Otherwise, we will lose our argumentation on that.

President Ford: I'm not sure I understand you—

Dr. Ikke: The Soviets have argued that we cover our missiles, and if we don't agree to do something about it, they will argue that they can cover theirs. We don't want this.

Secretary Kissinger: We scheduled a Verification Panel meeting to look at both these compliance issues and the whole verification question, prior to another NSC. We should be prepared for an NSC within a month.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, the attack will probably come from the left, not the right. The Jackson staff has gone haywire on this, and I think Scoop will suffer for it. Jackson has always argued for equal aggregates, and you got that.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem will come from the left. But we can say we will put a ceiling on. There were two alternatives—to let the Soviets increase, only to counter their build-up, and continue to build on both sides, or the agreement.

Dr. Ikke: How soon will the negotiations on further reductions be resumed?

President Ford: We have to get this one signed and sealed first, but we are flexible. Sometime between 1975 and 1980 we can move for additional reductions.

Dr. Ikke: Now that we have this framework, we can add additional restraints.

Secretary Kissinger: But our major object is to get this agreement signed. We should not get too cute about further reductions and restraints until we get this one signed.

President Ford: We will have 4½ years subsequent to getting this one completed for the other matters.

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure some of this attack isn't beneficial. If the whole attack were from the left, you might have even more of a problem.

President Ford: We need to be unified and forthright. We should make a maximum effort in the coming days.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Preparations for the next round of negotiations in Geneva continued in the Verification Panel, which met on January 3, 1975. According to a memorandum from Lodal and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger dated January 2, the purpose of the meeting was to get a handle on four issues: "counting definitions (or collateral constraints) required for adequate verification of the 1320 limitation on MIRVed launchers; how to handle air-launched cruise missiles; whether to propose a combined ban on land-mobile and air-mobile ICBMs because of the verification problems associated with these systems; and how to define a heavy bomber, with particular emphasis on whether or not Backfire and the FB-11 will be included in the definition." (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 3, Verification Panel Meeting, 1/3/75, MIRV Verification) Minutes of the January 3 VP meeting are *ibid.*, Box 23, Meeting Minutes–Verification Panel (Originals), January 1975. At a Verification Panel meeting on January 10, Kissinger informed the participants that "the President has ordered me to tell you all that there is to be no further discussion of the characteristics of various weapons or of the positions to be taken when the talks resume." Minutes of the meeting are *ibid.*

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## 91. Aide-Mémoire<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 10, 1974.

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In accordance with the agreement reached during the meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev on November 23–24, 1974, agreed provisions enumerated below will be followed by both sides in working out a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments.

1. A new agreement will be completed as soon as possible, with the objective of signing it in 1975; it will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985, and will incorporate relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and the Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, November 23–24, 1974, Vladivostok Summit. Secret. A handwritten note reads: "Handed to Amb D. by Sec. Kissinger at 10 a.m. 12–10–74." Kissinger met Dobrynin on December 10 from 9:21 to 10:02 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) No substantive record of the meeting has been found. Kissinger initialed both pages of the aide-mémoire.

2. Based on the principle of equality and equal security of both sides, the new agreement will include in particular the following limitations which will apply for the duration of the new agreement:

a. During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will be entitled to an aggregate number of delivery vehicles of strategic arms not exceeding 2400. This number includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) launchers, ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs), and heavy bombers if the latter are equipped with bombs or air-to-surface missiles with a range not exceeding 600 kilometers. When a bomber is equipped with air-to-surface missiles with a range over 600 kilometers, each of such missiles will be counted as one delivery vehicle in the aggregate number (2400).

b. Within this overall limitation each side will be free to determine the composition of the aggregate subject to the agreed prohibition on the construction of new land-based ICBM launchers.

c. Both sides will be limited to no more than 1320 ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); within this total number each side will be entitled to determine the types and numbers of missiles equipped with such warheads.

3. The provisions of Articles I and II of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972 will be incorporated into a new agreement. The Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding dated May 26, 1972, relating to limitations on increasing the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers by greater than 10–15 percent will also be incorporated into the new agreement.<sup>2</sup>

4. Subject to the provisions of Articles I and II of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive armaments, covered by the new agreement, may be undertaken.

5. A new agreement could also provide for additional limitations on deployment of new types of strategic arms during the period of its effectiveness.

6. A new agreement will also include a provision to the effect that no later than 1980–81 negotiations should start on further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms.

7. Negotiations between the delegations of the US and USSR to work out a new agreement will resume in Geneva, in January 1975. A precise date of their resumption will be agreed upon in the near future.

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 315.



**92. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Vice President Rockefeller<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 29, 1975.

**SUBJECT**

Minutes of National Security Council Meeting on SALT, January 29, 1975

I have enclosed for your information the minutes of the National Security Council meeting on SALT held last week (Tab A).<sup>2</sup> The highlights of the discussion are as follows:

—Director Colby summarized the strategic programs of the Soviet Union and the strategic implications of the Vladivostok agreement.<sup>3</sup> He concluded that the Vladivostok agreement, when implemented, would remove the worry that the Soviet Union might achieve numerical advantage in strategic launchers and delivery vehicles. During the next ten years, Soviet attention is expected to turn increasingly to qualitative competition with the US. Although this competition implies a vigorous Soviet R&D program, Director Colby does not foresee technological advances which would sharply alter the strategic balance in favor of the USSR.

—Secretary Kissinger reviewed the major issues related to the Vladivostok agreement. His key points were:

- On the general question of verifying the MIRV limits of the Vladivostok agreement, the US should initially take a flexible, exploratory approach in which we describe a number of problems which we believe could arise. We would not submit a formal list of rules for counting MIRVed missiles, but would instead try to draw out the Soviets before putting together an overall MIRV verification package.

- Regarding cruise missiles, there is apparently some legitimate ground for confusion on these systems from the negotiating record at Vladivostok. The Soviets will claim that the Vladivostok agreement requires that each air-to-surface missile with a range over 600 km carried on a bomber will be counted in the total of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles permitted each side; we understood that the limit on air-to-surface missiles applied only to ballistic missiles, not to cruise missiles. Since the US has a strong interest in deploying long-range air-launched

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 9, NSC Meeting, 1/29/75, SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached, but minutes of the January 29 NSC meeting, which was held from 4:39 to 6:19 p.m., are *ibid.*, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 1.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 91.

cruise missiles to improve bomber penetration, we should begin our discussion with the Soviets on this issue by stating that it is the US understanding that the 600 km limitation on air-to-surface missiles applies only to ballistic missiles.

- Another problem concerns whether the new Soviet bomber, Backfire, should be considered a “heavy” bomber and counted within the 2400 limit. It is about 2/3 the size of our B-1, but has the identical range/payload characteristics of the Bison bomber, which we have always considered a heavy bomber. The US should propose counting the Backfire as a heavy bomber, although the Soviets are certain to resist strongly this position. Initial Backfire deployments have been with naval units, and our intelligence indicates that it is primarily intended for peripheral missions against China and Europe rather than for inter-continental missions against the US.

—There was a long discussion of the MIRV verification issue; general agreement was reached that the US should take a flexible approach, but that we should start by describing four MIRV verification problems and the US views on how these problems might be resolved. The US views should be that:

- Any missile of a type flight tested as a MIRVed missile should be counted as MIRVed when deployed, even if a single warhead version of the missile has also been developed.

- All ICBM launchers of a type modified for the purpose of permitting the deployment of MIRVed missiles should be counted as MIRVed.

- All SLBM launchers on a submarine should be counted as MIRVed if any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.

- ICBM and SLBM launchers once counted as MIRVed should always count as MIRVed unless dismantled, destroyed or converted to unMIRVed launchers under mutually agreed procedures.

—Secretary Schlesinger thought that we would not be able to obtain Soviet agreement to count SLBMs by submarine class; he was also doubtful that the Soviets would agree to count Backfire as a “heavy” bomber, although on both issues he felt that we should initially be hard-nosed. Secretary Schlesinger also stated that we need to obtain agreement on a definition of a “heavy” missile and that we might also want to seek agreement on the definition of a “medium” ICBM; such agreements might form the basis for eventual limits on missile throw weight.

—Secretary Kissinger emphasized that, while the broad outlines of a new agreement were reached at Vladivostok, the major outstanding issues could be contentious and will require careful negotiating in the months ahead.

—The President indicated that he felt that we were making headway in understanding the issues, and that our goal in the SALT negotiations at Geneva should be to obtain a new ten-year SALT agreement that could be signed when Brezhnev arrives this summer.

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### 93. National Security Decision Memorandum 285<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 6, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva, January 31, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on January 31, 1975, in Geneva:

1. The Delegation should state that, in the U.S. view, the basis for the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms is contained in the provisions of the Aide-Mémoire initialed by the two sides on December 10, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Delegation should call attention to the Aide-Mémoire provision which states that the Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding dated May 26, 1972, relating to limitations on increases in the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers<sup>3</sup> will also be incorporated into the new agreement. The Delegation should indicate the need for additional agreements including *inter alia*:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 57, NSDM 285, Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva, 1/31/75. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Sonnenfeldt and Lodal drafted the NSDM, which they sent under a covering memorandum to Kissinger, January 29. (Ibid.) On February 5, Kissinger sent the NSDM to Ford, who initialed his approval. The instructions were sent to the delegation in telegram 27482 to USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, February 6. (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 22, SALT, State Department Telegrams, NODIS from SecState)

<sup>2</sup> Document 91.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 91.

—Appropriate definitions such as those for ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy ICBMs, and ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs.

—An agreement on ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers similar to the Agreed Interpretation signed on May 26, 1972.

3. On the issue of defining a heavy ICBM, the U.S. Delegation should state that a heavy ICBM should be defined as an ICBM of volume or throw weight greater than the largest non-heavy ICBM deployed on either side on the date of signature of the agreement.

4. Concerning the limitations in the Aide-Mémoire on air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), the Delegation should state that it is the U.S. understanding that the 600 km limitation on ASMs applies only to ballistic ASMs carried on bombers.

The President has also decided in principle that the U.S. could agree to further limitations on cruise missiles and ballistic ASMs. As a minimum the U.S. could agree to:

—Count all cruise missiles of range greater than 3000 km in the aggregate.

—Extend the ASM provisions of the agreement to cover ASMs launched from all aircraft, not just those launched from bombers.

However, the Delegation should not put forth this position until authorized by Washington.

5. The Delegation should emphasize that the parties must undertake not to interfere with or impede national technical means including means for verifying the limitations of the MIRV provisions of the agreement.

6. Concerning the limitation on the permitted number of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, the Delegation should emphasize the need for a frank mutual exchange on the problems which could arise in verifying such a limitation. In particular, the Delegation should describe and obtain Soviet views on the following problems:

—Whether it is possible to verify which version of a particular missile is deployed when the missile has been tested with both single RV and MIRVed payloads. It is the U.S. view that any missile of a type tested with MIRVs should be counted as MIRVed when deployed.

—Verifying which SLBM launchers in a particular SSBN class contain MIRVed missiles when there exist both MIRVed and unMIRVed missiles compatible with these launchers. It is the U.S. view that all SLBM launchers on a submarine should be counted as MIRVed if any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.

—Verifying whether a particular ICBM or SLBM launcher contains a MIRVed missile if it has been modified, for example, through changes to length or diameter. It is the U.S. view that all ICBM and SLBM launchers of types modified for the purpose of permitting the deploy-

ment of MIRVed missiles should be counted under the MIRV limit. To illustrate this point the Delegation may cite for example that any SS-17, SS-18, or SS-19 type silos must be counted as containing MIRVed missiles.

—Determining whether a launcher which once contained a MIRVed missile and has been converted to an unMIRVed launcher can be verified as no longer containing MIRVs. It is the U.S. view that the conversion of launchers which contain MIRVed missiles to unMIRVed launchers should be permitted only under procedures agreed in the SCC.

In making the above points and explaining each verification problem, the Delegation should emphasize that the U.S. welcomes Soviet proposals concerning how to solve these problems and that all such proposals will receive careful U.S. consideration.

7. The U.S. Delegation should not raise the issue of limitations on land-mobile and air-mobile ICBM systems. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to ban air-mobile ICBMs, the U.S. Delegation should state that the issue of banning air-launched ballistic missiles of ICBM range is complex and related not only to the broader issue of strategic aircraft and their armaments, but also to other types of mobile ICBMs. In this context, the U.S. would be willing to consider how provisions which include air-mobile ICBMs might be included in the final agreement and will study carefully any Soviet proposals in this regard.

8. On the issue of defining a heavy bomber, the U.S. Delegation should state that current heavy bombers include the B-52 and B-1 on the U.S. side, and the Bear, Bison, and Backfire on the Soviet side. If the Soviets claim that Backfire is not a heavy bomber, the U.S. Delegation should challenge this contention in the light of the technical capabilities and characteristics of the Backfire and methods of improvement in Backfire capability.

9. With respect to Paragraph 6 of the Aide-Mémoire, the Delegation should state that negotiations on further limitation and reduction of strategic arms should start as soon as possible after the new agreement is concluded, and that a provision to this effect should be included in the new agreement.

10. If the Soviets make proposals in areas other than those covered above, e.g., non-transfer, ballistic missile launchers on sea beds, ballistic missile ships or maneuvering reentry vehicles, the Delegation should not comment on these proposals and should seek guidance from Washington.

11. If the Soviets table a draft treaty early in the session, the Delegation should indicate that consideration of a draft treaty would be premature until the issues have been adequately discussed. After adequate discussion of U.S. and Soviet views, the Delegation should submit for

Washington approval draft treaty provisions which could be proposed to the Soviets.

Henry A. Kissinger

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**94. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 5, 1975, 7:34–8:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

SALT Compliance

PRINCIPALS

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen George S. Brown

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

OTHER ATTENDEES

*State*

Deputy Secretary Robert  
Ingersoll

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary William  
Clements

*CIA*

Mr. Carl Duckett

*White House*

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld,  
Assistant to the President

*NSC*

Brent Scowcroft  
Jan M. Lodol

President Ford: Good Morning. There are four or five issues on compliance with the SALT I Agreements, questions we have raised with the Soviets—Henry, do you want to sum up where the problem is—maybe Carl and Bill could add to it also—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Mr. President—I would like to begin by bringing you up-to-date on the status of the Geneva Talks, and then we can turn to compliance. The Soviets tabled a draft treaty at the first

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 1. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

SALT meeting in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> On a number of issues, they differed with our views.

On MIRV Verification, they have said that our existing national technical means of verification are adequate. We have put forth several counting rules for distinguishing MIRV launchers—the ones we went through at the last NSC meeting.<sup>3</sup> We have now put these in a protocol to our own draft treaty, but we have left it open for them to tell us what characteristics of their systems our national technical means can use to distinguish MIRVs. If they can tell us, we will bring the proposal here to you.

There is the expected disagreement over cruise versus ballistic missiles. We have not yet had an opportunity to explore our compromise of banning cruise missiles on everything except bombers.

The Soviets' draft also contained two provisions that went beyond the Vladivostok Agreement. One of these is a limit of 240 on new types of SLBMs, including our Trident. At your instruction, I pointed out to Gromyko that we would not negotiate on items inconsistent with Vladivostok.<sup>4</sup> They have not yet dropped it, but he said they would consider this point carefully.

We will table a draft treaty very shortly, if we have not already done so.

Mr. Graybeal: We plan to table it today.<sup>5</sup>

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will table a draft treaty today. In summary, the differences that exist are manageable if the Soviets really want an agreement, or they can be used to stall if they don't want an agreement. Unless they can satisfy us that our national technical means can distinguish their MIRVs, we will not accept their approach. Of course, their position has one advantage, in that it indicates they will not press us on the distinctions between Minuteman II and Minuteman III.

In short, it is too early to tell how it will come out.

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<sup>2</sup> The text of the Soviet draft was transmitted in telegram 10 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, February 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>3</sup> See Document 92.

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger and Gromyko met in Geneva February 16–17. They briefly discussed SALT at their first meeting on February 16; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 128.

<sup>5</sup> On March 5, Johnson tabled a draft agreement based on a modified version of the instructions in NSDM 285 (Document 93). The text of the draft is in telegram 67 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Discussions between the two delegations on the draft are in subsequent telegrams from the delegation, all of which are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 22, SALT, State Department Telegrams, EXDIS to SecState.

On compliance, Senator Jackson has been holding hearings on the issues of compliance. Bill testified last week, and I think Jim is scheduled sometime this week.

Secretary Schlesinger: George and I plan to go up sometime tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: At least if Jackson pulls out JCS documents, George will know what he is talking about! (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: That is not certain

Secretary Kissinger: The last time I went up there, Jackson pulled out some JCS documents which I had never seen, and wouldn't show them to me, but he wanted me to confirm them. (Laughter)

Jackson is clearly trying to build a case against the Vladivostok Agreement by pointing to loopholes and ambiguities in the first agreement, so these can be used as an issue on Vladivostok.

There are four issues which we should discuss—

—[less than 1 line not declassified]

—[less than 1 line not declassified]

—[less than 1 line not declassified]

—[less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: Isn't this a political loser for Jackson? Isn't he just losing ground by attacking Vladivostok?

President Ford: I think he is.

Secretary Kissinger: I would have thought so.

President Ford: He has quieted down some from his first blast, but with these hearings, perhaps he is trying to build a new case so that he can be ready when the agreement is finished.

Secretary Schlesinger: He has been very inconsistent. He is trying to run with both the hounds and the hares.

President Ford: Other politicians have tried that also—ask Rumsfeld about it—he is a master! (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: On the substance, I agree with Jim—he is inconsistent. He said the SALT I numbers were too low, and the SALT II numbers too high. Perhaps that's why he is now focusing on verification problems, so he can call the whole thing no good.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our position has to be clear on this—there are verification problems, but we can handle them. We are not in some Utopia—

Secretary Kissinger: Our ultimate position should be consistent with the position you outlined.

[Omitted here is discussion of SALT I and the Soviet Union's compliance with it.]



**95. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 26, 1975.

SUBJECT

Jackson Proposal on SALT

Senator Jackson has delivered a floor speech (text at Tab A)<sup>2</sup> in which he proposes that in a codicil to the SALT II agreement each side designate 700 “older” strategic systems which would remain “unmodernized” over the period of the agreement. Jackson states that these 700 systems would then become the most likely candidates for reductions which might be negotiated in a follow-on SALT agreement. He alleges that potential savings from such a move could amount to \$70 billion.

Jackson’s calculation assumes that the average procurement and 10 year O&M cost of a modernized bomber or missile is \$100 million. Although this may be true for the B–1 bomber, the 10 year system cost of a new silo based-ICBM would be about \$10 million. Even a new mobile ICBM would cost less than \$20–30 million. Each new Trident SLBM will have a ten-year cost of about \$80 million including the submarine cost. In any event, we have no plans to modernize our 700 oldest systems. Thus, there would be no savings whatsoever when compared to our present program.

Jackson states that he will introduce an amendment or resolution calling upon the Administration to put this proposal to the Soviets and to report back on the results of its efforts to gain Soviet acceptance of it.

Elsewhere in the speech, Jackson describes the 2400 and 1320 agreed levels as “astonishingly high.” He implies that these levels might end up as a strategic systems floor rather than a ceiling. He also criticizes the Soviet throw weight advantage allowed by Vladivostok.

As is usual with Jackson’s proposals, there are many ambiguities concerning the specific provisions. Nevertheless, with a reasonable interpretation, his proposal has essentially no effect on the programs of the two sides. The US has 700 systems it plans to keep until 1985 but

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 19, SALT (10)–(21). Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note from Sonnenfeldt at the top of the page reads: “The Secretary should see before press briefings, Thursday, 3/27.” Another handwritten note in an unknown hand reads: “Gen[eral] S[cowcroft] discussed w/Lodal by phone a.m., 3/31.”

<sup>2</sup> Tab A, a press release from Jackson’s office containing his remarks on the Senate Floor, March 26, is attached but not printed.

does not plan to modernize, and the Soviets probably have the same. Of course, both sides could modernize these systems—the point is that they are not likely to do so with or without Jackson’s provisions in an agreement. The following table shows the older systems not likely to be modernized by 1985 for the two sides.

<u>US</u>		<u>Soviet</u>	
Minuteman II	450	Bears	105
Poseidon C-3	160	Y Class SS-N-6	200
B-52—Active	250	SS-11 Mod 3	400
B-52—Mothballed	<u>170</u>		
Total	1030	Total	<u>705</u>

Of course, these numbers are somewhat speculative. Nevertheless, they illustrate the main point—there is a reasonable chance that neither side would modernize its 700 oldest systems by 1985 in any event.

In summary, Jackson’s proposal, while superficially appealing, would have only a limited effect on the programs of the two sides. This is not to say that such an agreement would be harmful—it would certainly be in our interest if the Soviets would agree. But it is one sided, not very significant, and undoubtedly not acceptable to the Soviets.

#### *How to Proceed*

There are three separate issues concerning what to do next:

—What the State Department press spokesmen and/or the White House should say if questioned about Jackson’s speech.

—What you might wish to say on background about his proposal.

—How to respond to a Jackson initiative to amend the Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale resolution.<sup>3</sup>

We believe the Administration should quickly and firmly indicate that any attempt to add an amendment such as Jackson is proposing to the Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale resolution would be counterproductive. We believe the Congress must be told in no uncertain terms that this is another example of Jackson’s tendency to go too far, that the present negotiations to complete the Vladivostok Agreement are difficult enough as they are.

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<sup>3</sup> On December 12, 1974, Senators Edward Kennedy (D–Massachusetts), Charles Mathias (R–Maryland) and Walter Mondale (D–Minnesota) introduced a resolution expressing broad support for a SALT II agreement as negotiated at the Vladivostok Summit but calling on President Ford to negotiate even lower ceilings for Soviet and U.S. force levels before submitting a treaty to the Senate for approval.

Concerning your background statements, we suggest you make some of the points outlined in the above memorandum.

As to short-term reaction which White House and State Department press spokesmen might give, we suggest a response along the lines of the following:

Q: What is the Department's reaction to the Jackson proposal to designate 700 older strategic systems which will not be modernized during the life of a SALT II agreement?

A: The Department always considers seriously proposals made by Members of Congress. Senator Jackson's proposal will be given serious consideration.

Concerning the on-going negotiations in Geneva on implementing the Vladivostok Agreement, the Administration has made clear its firm belief that we must successfully complete the negotiations before going on to further measures.

We consider the Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale Resolution a helpful contribution, and we have already made it clear that we look forward to commencement of follow-on negotiations aimed at reductions in the level of strategic systems as soon as possible following conclusion of a SALT II agreement based upon Vladivostok. But an insistence on legislative proposals which go beyond Vladivostok will be counterproductive to this effort.

*Recommendation:*

- a. That you approve the above comment by the State spokesman.<sup>4</sup>
- b. That you approve instructing White House and State Department congressional liaison officers to oppose Jackson's change to the Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale resolution.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Kissinger initialed his approval of this recommendation.

<sup>5</sup> Kissinger did not indicate his approval or disapproval of this recommendation.

96. **Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 24, 1975.

SUBJECT

Status of SALT Negotiations

You are familiar with the principal SALT Issues which are continuing to divide the two sides in Geneva:

- MIRV verification
- Cruise missiles
- Mobile ICBMs
- Inclusion of Backfire in the aggregate

By way of review, we have outlined below where we stand on each of the principal issues and how we might come out in each case. We have also included a brief discussion on several other issues on which the two sides differ; while these “other issues” may not represent major points of dispute, there are a disturbingly large number of such issues, and in combination they could represent a difficult negotiating obstacle.

*Principal Issues*

*MIRV Verification*—The recent May/Shchukin exchanges on MIRV verification indicate that the Soviets may have some negotiating flexibility regarding our MIRV counting rules. While the Soviet formal response has been to reject our counting rules on the ground that National Technical Means (NTM) alone is adequate to verify the provisions of the agreement, Shchukin on April 4 informally asked May whether it would make any difference if MIRVed ICBMs were deployed in certain “fields” or “complexes” and unMIRVed ICBMs in other “fields”. Shchukin further pursued the issue of “fields” by asking May what effect designation and deployment by “fields” would have on the US draft provision to count as MIRVed any missile that has been flight-tested one or more times with a MIRV system.<sup>2</sup>

Although the May/Shchukin exchanges may be misleading, they seem to indicate that the Soviet objections to our MIRV counting rules

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 19, SALT (10)–(21). Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> A summary of the post-meeting discussions between May and Shchukin are in telegram 125 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, April 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

center on the treatment of the SS–18. The Soviets apparently believe that counting SS–18s by “fields” would be a possible approach to removing their objections if the US modified its definition of a MIRVed missile to avoid counting as MIRVed the single RV version of the SS–18. While informal discussion of the remaining US counting rules has been limited, Shchukin has repeatedly indicated that he felt that the “SLBM MIRV problem would be easier.”

The Verification Panel Working Group is currently reassessing the US position on MIRV verification in light of the May/Shchukin exchanges. It is probably still too early to consider modifying our counting rules, since it appears that further discussions with Shchukin may reveal more of the Soviet position on MIRV verification. However, we may ultimately wish to consider exempting the SS–18 from our definition of a MIRVed system, or dropping the definition altogether, in exchange for Soviet agreement to deploy MIRVed SS–18s in designated complexes. In any event, once the Soviet position has become clearer, the US MIRV verification provisions should probably be carefully reassessed in a VP meeting following Alex’s return.

*Cruise Missiles*—To this point, there has been no movement on this issue, either formally or informally, although both sides probably have some negotiating room. For example, the Soviet proposal to ban air-to-surface missiles on all aircraft other than bombers<sup>3</sup> reflects the Soviet concern over the ambiguity in the Aide-Mémoire on strategic delivery vehicles launched from non-bomber aircraft. A US fallback position that we have not exercised would extend the ASM provisions of the agreement to cover ASMs launched from all aircraft, not just from bombers. However, we would count ASMs on aircraft other than bombers, not ban them as the Soviets have proposed.

To try to smoke out the Soviet position on the cruise missile issue, we are presently considering in the VPWG some movement on this issue before Alex comes home. We might start with a proposal to count all cruise missiles of greater than intercontinental range (about 5500 km).

This is a step toward the fallback position in NSDM 285<sup>4</sup> to count all cruise missiles of range greater than 3000 km. Negotiating from a range limit of 5500 km could improve the prospects for eventual agreement at 3000 km, and could signal a general tone of flexibility which

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<sup>3</sup> The telegrams from the U.S. Delegation reporting on the numerous Soviet proposals on cruise missiles, mobile missiles, and other topics discussed in this memorandum are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 22, SALT, State Department Telegrams, EXDIS to SecState; and National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number].

<sup>4</sup> Document 93.

might break loose some other issues that have been delaying the progress of the drafting groups.

*Mobile Missiles*—It is not clear from the discussions in Geneva how this issue will be resolved. The Soviets have in essence proposed a ban on air mobile ICBMs. The US has rejected this proposal, indicating that it is inconsistent with the Vladivostok understanding.

There are several approaches the US might take on this issue:

—Continue to reject the Soviet proposal to ban air-mobile ICBMs and stick with the Vladivostok understanding that both air- and land-mobile ICBMs should be permitted and counted.

—Explore with the Soviets a combined ban on deployment of air- and land-mobile ICBMs, possibly extending the deployment ban to include ballistic missiles on surface ships.

Because the Soviets have not been pressing their proposal to ban air-mobile ICBMs, the US Delegation has not discussed the issue of banning air-mobile ICBMs in the broader context of limits on other types of mobile ICBMs or strategic aircraft and their armament. You may wish to approach the Soviets directly on this issue through your own channels to see if they are interested in a combined ban on both air and land-mobile systems.

*Inclusion of Backfire*—Although the two sides are far apart on whether Backfire should be considered a current “heavy bomber,” the US bargaining position on this issue is sound: the Backfire is at least as good an intercontinental bomber as the Bison. In addition, we have a good deal of negotiating room on this issue. Although the US has proposed that the Backfire be considered a current heavy bomber, the NSDM anticipates an eventual US fallback to an understanding whereby Backfire would not be counted as long as the Soviets do not deploy a companion tanker force, train in an intercontinental delivery mode, etc. However, there is no reason yet to consider such a fallback position, and the Delegation should continue to press the Soviets on including the Backfire in the 2400 aggregate based upon its capabilities with being comparable with those of the Bison.

#### *Other Issues*

Although there are a good many “other issues” on which the two sides differ, we consider the following to be the most important remaining issues:

*Non-Transfer*—The Soviets in their draft text<sup>5</sup> have proposed a non-transfer provision which would ban the transfer of strategic offensive arms, including components, technical descriptions, and blue-

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 94.

prints. They have also proposed an additional commitment not to assist in the development of strategic offensive arms for other states.

Although our current draft<sup>6</sup> contains no provisions on non-transfer, it will probably be very difficult to avoid a non-transfer provision of some kind in the new agreement. However, we should obviously try to obtain as non-restrictive a non-transfer provision as possible. We are currently studying this issue in an effort to determine what type of non-transfer provision might be acceptable under our current commitments.

*Increases in Silo Dimensions*—To remove the ambiguity of the Interim Agreement language regarding permitted increases in silo dimensions, the US draft agreement explicitly states that the permitted increase in ICBM launcher size (15%) “shall be limited to one dimension, either length or diameter.”

In Geneva, the Soviets have responded that their understanding always has been that the Interim Agreement permits a 10–15% increase in both silo length and diameter. However, they have indicated that if the US wishes to propose that the new agreement limit silo dimension increases to one dimension only, they would consider such a proposal. Consistent with your understanding of the negotiations on this issue at the Summit, Alex will be rebutting Semenov shortly on the Soviet understanding of the IA restrictions on increases in silo dimensions. At the same time, Alex will propose that the *sum* of the percentage increases in the original length and diameter of the silos be limited to 15%.

*Heavy ICBM Definitions*—The US has proposed that the SS-19 be the upper limit in both volume and throw weight for “non-heavy” ICBMs. Predictably, the Soviets have maintained that the IA language on permitted increases in silo launcher dimensions is adequate to define heavy ICBM launchers, and that there is no need for a separate heavy ICBM definition. There has been no movement on this issue, either formally or informally, since the negotiations began on the draft agreements.

*Other Systems*—The Soviets have proposed banning the development, testing, and deployment of intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCMs), missiles on seabeds, and ballistic missiles on surface ships. Although the US draft treaty is presently mute on these “other systems,” we can probably make some movement on individual systems by proposing to:

—Count ICCMs, which is in effect the step we are proposing on the general cruise missile issue.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5, Document 94.

—Consider limiting ballistic missiles on surface ships as part of an overall approach to the general mobile missile issue.

—Ban missiles on seabeds at an appropriate time in the negotiations for bargaining leverage on other issues.

### *Conclusion*

As you know, Alex Johnson will be returning home in approximately two weeks. While Alex is in Washington, you will probably want to have a VP and an NSC meeting to see where we stand and to consider making some move on the current SALT issues discussed above. Finally, you should consider soon attempting to break loose some of the deadlocks in your channels.

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## **97. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

The negotiations in Geneva have failed to make progress on three general sets of issues that could now be considered in the confidential channel with the aim of agreeing on the instructions to be given both delegations when the talks resume.

1. The first set of issues relates to the US proposal for verification of the limitation on missiles equipped with MIRVs.<sup>2</sup> It is essential that the final agreement contain provisions that leave no room for questioning whether the limit of 1320 MIRVed missiles is being exceeded; national technical means will be unable to monitor this limitation unless there is specific agreement on certain rules of deployment. Without such rules, we cannot expect an agreement to be accepted by the US Congress.

The MIRV verification proposal put forward by the US Delegation meets our concerns, but we understand the Soviet argument that it could result in counting some single-warhead ICBMs as MIRVed. Our understanding of the Soviet position, however, is that this concern ap-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, May 19–20, 1975–Kissinger/Gromyko meetings in Vienna (2). Secret. The note was sent to Dobrynin by Scowcroft under a covering letter of May 10. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> On February 28, Johnson reported his presentation of the most recent U.S. proposal on MIRVs in telegram 58 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Subsequent reporting telegrams are *ibid.*



plies only to the new heavy ICBMs, known in the US as the SS-18. Proceeding from this assumption, it might be possible to consider a modification in the US position to take account of the special case of this ICBM. Thus, the US would be willing to discuss the following approach:

—There would be an agreement that for the Soviet ICBM known as the SS-18, the USSR would specify those ICBM complexes where the MIRVed version of this missile would be deployed; this specification would be made prior to the actual deployment, and the total number of SS-18 launchers contained in those specified complexes would be counted against the 1320 limit.

—The presence of MIRV-related ground support equipment and facilities at complexes that contain SS-18s with single warheads would not be permitted.

In all other respects, the US position on MIRV verification remains as presented by the US Delegation.

2. The second set of issues relates to cruise missiles and bombers. The US continues to believe that long-range cruise missiles carried on bombers are essential for certain purposes other than strategic attack. As such, these missiles are not strategic weapons. At the same time, the US recognizes that beyond certain ranges cruise missiles could become strategic delivery vehicles. The issue, therefore, is to define a dividing line that meets the US position and takes account of Soviet concerns.

The US side would be willing to accept a dividing line set at 3000 km. Cruise missiles with a range up to 3000 km carried on heavy bombers would be permitted without limitation and would not count against the aggregate of 2400. Cruise missiles with a range greater than 3000 km carried on heavy bombers, however, would qualify as strategic delivery vehicles and would count against the limit of 2400.

In light of Soviet concerns related to other types of cruise missiles, the US would also be willing to apply the 3000 km dividing line to sea-based and land-based cruise missiles, counting those with ranges greater than 3000 km in the 2400 aggregate.

In return for these concessions to the Soviet view, the US would expect that the Soviet side would agree that the potential strategic capabilities of the Backfire aircraft warrant its being classified as a heavy bomber. While the US recognizes that at present this aircraft is being used for missions that are not intercontinental, such use does not solve the problem that this bomber has inherent capabilities as great as those aircraft which both sides have agreed to count as heavy bombers.

Nevertheless, to accommodate Soviet objections to counting bombers currently deployed for peripheral missions, we believe that it should be possible to reach agreement on certain criteria which would

provide the basis for exceptions to the general rule that the Backfire must be counted within the 2400 limitation. As an example, those Backfire aircraft deployed with naval units operating out of bases in the Southern USSR and not supported by aerial tankers might, under certain circumstances, not be counted in the 2400 aggregate.

3. The third set of issues relates to mobile missiles. Quite frankly, we are uncertain of the Soviet position. We assume that the USSR reserves the right to deploy a land-mobile ICBM, and that, if this occurs, all such missiles would automatically be counted against the 2400 limit. At the same time, the USSR takes the position that all air-launched ballistic missiles carried on aircraft other than bombers will be banned, that MIRVs will be banned on air-launched ballistic missiles, and that deployment of long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships will also be banned. This approach, of course, greatly favors the side that has an interest in land-mobile ICBMs.

It would be helpful if the Soviet side could clarify its position more precisely, in light of the following question: Would it be preferable to ban all mobile missile deployments other than SLBMs—land, sea or air-launched—or would it be preferable to permit all of them, but to count them against the aggregate of 2400?

4. One final problem that should be discussed relates to the timing of further negotiations after the present agreement is completed. As agreed at Vladivostok, further negotiations on limitations and possible reductions are to start no later than 1980–81. Since the Vladivostok meeting, there have been expressions in the US Congress of the view that negotiations should, in fact, start earlier—that is, as soon as possible after the Vladivostok accords are completed and ratified. As a practical matter, this would mean that negotiations would probably resume during 1977. It would seem in the interest of both sides to resume discussions on strategic weapons during the year in which the Interim Agreement would expire and the new agreement goes into effect. In any case, it would be of considerable value in facilitating acceptance by Congress if we could specify that negotiations could begin within a year of the ratification of the Vladivostok agreement.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> During a meeting in Vienna, May 20, 10:20 a.m.–3:03 p.m., Kissinger asked Gromyko to comment on the U.S. note. Gromyko raised concerns that the United States was moving away from national technical means toward injecting international control measures for verification. He also objected to U.S. attempts to re-define heavy missiles and include the Soviet Backfire bomber, rather than use the clauses agreed to in the Aide-Mémoire of Vladivostok (Document 91). His final objection concerned the question of forward-based weapons, which he argued the United States continually refused to discuss. The memorandum of conversation is Document 150 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

**98. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 15, 1975.

SUBJECT

Gromyko's Plan

Following are the elements of the plan outlined to you by Foreign Minister Gromyko.<sup>2</sup>

*1. MIRV Verification*

—Any ICBM tested as a MIRV will be counted as a MIRV within the 1320 ceiling, if and when it is deployed; specifically for the USSR this will include the ICBMs SS-17, 18 and 19.

—The same principle will apply to SLBMs: i.e., if an SLBM is tested in a MIRV mode it will be counted as a MIRV within the 1320 ceiling.

—These provisions are mutual, applying to both sides.

—Under the right to modernize ICBMs [and SLBMs]<sup>3</sup> an ICBM equipped with a single warhead can be replaced with an ICBM tested *only* with a single warhead.

—The ICBMs tested only as single warheads will be of a different “type” than MIRVed ICBMs.

—This provision is also reciprocal.

—The foregoing is “organically” linked to the following proposal on cruise missiles.

*2. Cruise Missiles*

—All air-to-ground cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km, if installed on a strategic bomber, will be counted with ceiling of 2400 for all strategic vehicles.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 10–11, 1975–Kissinger/Gromyko, Geneva (1). Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger and Gromyko held two discussions relating to SALT during their meetings in Geneva July 10–11. During their first meeting, July 10 from 6:55 to 9:30 p.m., they decided that they would reach agreement in principle and then give it to the delegations for concrete formulation. Gromyko outlined the Soviet response to the U.S. proposal of May 10 (Document 97). They also met on July 11, from 1:10 to 2:02 p.m., when Gromyko complained that the U.S. Delegation at Geneva was reluctant to discuss matters other than general principles. Kissinger and Gromyko agreed to instruct their delegations on other matters that could be discussed. The memoranda of conversation are Documents 159 and 162 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

<sup>3</sup> Brackets are in the original.

—Cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km will be banned from deployment on surface ships, transport type aircraft, submarines other than ballistic missile submarines.

—Land-based cruise missiles with an intercontinental range (intercontinental as defined in the Interim Agreement) will be banned.

—Land-based cruise missiles with a range short of intercontinental range, as defined above, will *not* be restricted or covered in the current agreement.

### 3. *Silo Dimension Changes*

—The modification of ICBM silo launchers to preclude a non-heavy launcher from being converted to a launcher for a heavy ICBM will be:

—a silo can be increased by no more than 15% in depth (NOTE: not clear in Soviet position);

—if a silo is increased in depth by 15%, then the diameter can also be increased provided that such increase does not result in more than a total increase in silo volume of 32%;

—in *all* cases of increases in *both* silo dimensions the net result cannot be an increase in silo volume of more than 32%.

—NOTE: It is apparently the Soviet position that an increase in silo depth could exceed 15% in dimension but not more than 32% in volume, since the latter would be the equivalent of 32% in volume if taken in depth alone.

### 4. *Definitions of Light and Heavy Missiles*

—In process of modernization of ICBMs, as permitted under the agreement, a heavy ICBM will be *any* ICBM with a “launching” weight in excess of that of the heaviest light missile deployed on either side at the time of signature of the agreement.

—This would be the SS-19 on the Soviet side.

### 5. *Period for Implementing the 2400 Ceiling*

—It is agreed that this period will not exceed 12 months (may be earlier).

### 6. *Beginning Follow-On Talks*

—The negotiations concerning possible reductions will begin in the same year that Vladivostok agreement enters into force (i.e., October 3, 1977).

### 7. *Mobile Missiles*

—Land-based mobile ICBM launchers will be banned for duration of the agreement.

—Air mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed on bombers will be counted under ceiling of 2400.

—Intercontinental range ballistic missiles will be banned from deployment on other aircraft.

—Testing of mobile ICBM missiles and launchers will be permitted.

#### 8. *New Systems*

—Would include a ban on cruise missiles of intercontinental range.

—Also a ban against deployment of ICBMs on sea-based or ocean floor (including territorial waters).

—Ban on deployment of ballistic missiles with range in excess of 600 km on surface ships.

—Other systems not now existing also to be dealt with.

#### 9. *Backfire Bomber*

—Not considered a strategic bomber.

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### 99. National Security Decision Memorandum 301<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 18, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva, July 2, 1975

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on July 2, 1975 in Geneva. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 60, NSDM 301, Instructions for SALT Talks in Geneva, 7/2/75. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>2</sup> Document 93.

1. At an appropriate time, and in a manner of its choosing, the Delegation should indicate willingness to consider the Soviet proposal to ban the development, testing, and deployment of systems for placing nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction into earth orbit if the provision is broadened to include present and future fractional orbit bombardment systems (FOBS). Prior to discussing treaty language for dealing with this system, alternatives to the Soviet language should be submitted to Washington for approval.

2. With respect to the effective date of the 2,400 aggregate limitation, while it is the US view that both sides should be at this level by October 3, 1977, the US is prepared to consider a reasonable proposal (a few months) from the Soviet side as to what mutually agreed period of time after that date might be required in order to attain that level. The agreed period of time should reflect an expedited program of dismantling and destruction of those strategic delivery vehicles in excess of 2,400.

3. In connection with discussion of the effective date of the 2,400 aggregate limitation, the Delegation should note that the US believes the other obligations in the agreement, which are not inconsistent with the Interim Agreement, should become effective upon entry into force (i.e., exchange of instruments of ratification) of the new agreement.

4. On the question of impeding verification by national technical means contained in Article XVII of the Joint Draft Text,<sup>3</sup> paragraph 3 should be reworded as follows:

“Each Party undertakes not to use any measure or practice, including measures and practices associated with testing and development, which deliberately impedes verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. The parties undertake to avoid measures or practices which result in unintended interference with national technical means of verification of the other party.”

5. The following language should be substituted for the current US version of Article XVI of the Joint Draft Text:

“The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms, beginning no later than one year following entry into force of this agreement, with the objective of achieving further limitations and reductions of strategic arms at the earliest possible date. The Parties shall also have the objective of concluding negotia-

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<sup>3</sup> Regarding the Soviet and U.S. treaty drafts, see footnotes 2 and 5, Document 94. A Joint Draft Text was worked out piecemeal in drafting working group meetings in Geneva. All telegrams are in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File. The working group submitted the Joint Draft Text to the delegation heads on May 7. (Telegram 202 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, May 7; *ibid.*)

tions, well in advance of the expiration of this Agreement, on an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to become effective upon such expiration.”

6. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the unbracketed portions of the JDT are acceptable to the US Government with the exception of Article VII and paragraph 3 of Article XVII which should be modified as described above. Concerning some issues contained within the bracketed portions of the JDT:

a. Preamble: Either bracketed formulation would be acceptable and resolution of this issue is left to the Delegation.

b. Article II: The phrase “capable of ranges” should be substituted for “with a range” in the US definition of ICBMs, ASBMs, and any subsequent definitions based on range.

c. Article IV: The term “depth” may be used in place of “length” provided the negotiating record reflects the understanding of both sides that “depth” is defined as the total internal distance from the top to the bottom of an ICBM silo launcher. In connection with discussion of this Article, if the Soviet side continues to reject the US formula set forth in the JDT the Delegation should explore alternative formulae.

Henry A. Kissinger

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## 100. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### SUBJECT

Analysis of Soviet SALT Proposals

I have provided below my preliminary analysis of the current Soviet positions on the outstanding SALT issues.<sup>2</sup> This analysis will pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 5, Verification Panel Meeting, 7/24/75–SALT. Top Secret; Sensitive. Lodal drafted the memorandum for Kissinger on July 16 and sent it under a covering memorandum that explained it would help prepare the President for his Helsinki meeting. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum, but it was included as Tab E to Kissinger’s briefing materials for the Verification Panel meeting, July 24. (Ibid.) The unsigned memorandum was also included as Tab F to Ford’s briefing materials for the NSC meeting scheduled for July 25. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 98.

vide background for your meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in Helsinki.

By way of summary, I believe we are now in the following situation on the major issues:

—On MIRV verification, the Soviets have made a major move in agreeing to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed. However, a major problem still remains with counting MIRVs on SLBMs. If MIRVs are deployed only on part of a submarine class, we probably cannot verify that the remaining missiles on that class are not also MIRVed.

—Regarding cruise missiles, they have not made a major movement. However, our only strategically important interest is in air-launched cruise missiles, and we could probably trade off cruise missiles launched from other platforms for what we want in this area.

—Their position favoring a ban on the deployment of land-mobile and most air-mobile ICBMs could create some bureaucratic problems, but on balance, a combined ban would be in the US interest.

—The Backfire bomber issue could be a problem, unless Gromyko's failure to explicitly reject a tanker prohibition indicates some flexibility on this point.

—Regarding the definition of a heavy missile, there seems to have been a breakthrough. It appears that what they have in mind for the definition of a heavy missile may not be much worse, and in some ways may be even better, than what we had proposed.

—Their proposal on limitations on increases in the size of ICBM silos is unacceptable. However, they were confused on this even among themselves, and I am confident we will be able to reach agreement on this issue.

—Finally, the Soviet position on the resumption of follow-on negotiations is essentially what we had proposed.

A more detailed discussion and analysis of each of these issues follows.

### *MIRV Verification*

On verification of the 1320 MIRV limit, the Soviets accepted our rule counting all missiles tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed. This is significant for resolving potentially serious ambiguities associated with such systems as the SS-18. However, there are two other potentially serious verification ambiguities which remain unresolved:

—The deployment of MIRVed SLBMs on only part of a submarine class if the MIRVed launchers on submarines of the class are indistinguishable from unMIRVed launchers.



—The deployment of single RV missiles in silos modified in a manner which will permit the deployment of MIRVed missiles.

Concerning SLBMs, there could be a significant verification uncertainty regarding the total number of MIRVed launchers if the Soviets develop MIRVed and unMIRVed SLBM launchers which are indistinguishable. Because of this uncertainty, we have proposed in Geneva to count all SLBMs in a submarine class when the first submarine in the class is equipped with a MIRVed missile.

Although the Soviets have rejected this approach to SLBM MIRV verification, we have some latitude in our position which we have not yet exercised. In particular, we could lessen the immediate impact of the rule on the Soviets by tying the SLBM MIRV count to an overhaul or conversion cycle. For example, counting submarines of a class as MIRVed when they complete overhaul or when they go to sea after construction or conversion could be more negotiable than counting all the launchers of the class at the time the first MIRV is deployed. If at the same time we specify that, after an agreed period, all submarines of a MIRVed class would be counted as MIRVed, we would not have lost our ultimate verification goal of counting all SLBMs by submarine class. Nevertheless, this concession on timing is not likely to be seen as a major one by the Soviets. This issue may end up being the most difficult one remaining.

We can afford to be more flexible on our remaining ICBM counting rules which address the deployment of ostensibly unMIRVed missiles in silos designed to accommodate, or which could accommodate, missiles equipped with MIRVs. The Soviets may well decide to modify single RV silos to MIRV-type silos for hardening purposes and then deploy single RV missiles in the upgraded silos. They have already done this for 60 silos, although they will probably soon replace the unMIRVed missiles with MIRVs.

The problem, of course, is that if the Soviets choose to upgrade all of their ICBM silos to MIRV-type silos, we may have no way of determining which, if any, of these silos contain unMIRVed missiles. The resulting ambiguities could cause us to conservatively estimate that Soviet MIRV deployment is significantly in excess of the actual number. To resolve the ambiguity, our current position specifies that any ICBM launcher which will permit the deployment of MIRVed missiles must count within the 1320 MIRV limit.

The problem with our present counting rule is that it is not sufficient to cover all potentially difficult situations. It only resolves the most obvious ambiguities. For example, the Soviets could still deploy a new MIRVed missile which fits in existing silos or harden existing silos under a new design which they claim is not MIRV-related but which

we could not distinguish from MIRV-related activity. Our present counting rule would not resolve either of these ambiguities.

Consequently, we can probably consider modifying our present rule on silo modifications to permit greater Soviet latitude in modernizing unMIRVed silos, a point they strongly emphasized at my last meeting. At the same time, however, we can still eliminate glaring ambiguities of the type which currently exist in which unMIRVed missiles are deployed in unique, MIRV-type silos. For example, we could ask the Soviets for assurances that they will not modernize unMIRVed silos in the same manner that they have modernized silos for MIRVed missiles.

In sum, the Soviets have made a significant movement toward our verification position by accepting our "once tested with MIRVs, all versions count as MIRVed" counting rule. However, significant verification ambiguities remain unresolved. The most important of the remaining ambiguities, MIRVed SLBMs which are compatible with all launchers in a submarine class, may be resolved by modifying our present SLBM position to lessen the immediate impact of the counting rules on the Soviets. In addition, we can probably live without our present rule regarding modified ICBM silos; however, before dropping such a rule altogether, we should seek Soviet assurances on silo modifications which will prevent them from modifying unMIRVed silos in exactly the same manner that they have modernized silos for MIRVed missiles.

### *Mobile ICBMs*

Before my last meeting with Gromyko, the Soviet position regarding mobile ICBMs had been extremely one sided: their proposal would have effectively banned air-mobile ICBMs, a system in which we have considerable interest, while permitting land-mobile ICBMs, which have been under active development in the Soviet Union for several years.

We rejected the Soviet proposal on mobile ICBMs, but indicated that we were prepared to consider equitable proposals under which the limits on mobile systems would impact equally on the two sides. Responding to this, the Soviets indicated at my last meeting that they were prepared to ban the deployment of land-mobile ICBMs for the duration of the new agreement. Coupled with their present formal position effectively banning air-mobile ICBMs, the new Soviet proposal amounts to a combined ban on both air- and land-mobile ICBM systems (although a limited air-mobile system might still be permitted).

The bureaucracy is very divided on the mobile issue. OSD (and to a lesser degree JCS) is likely to object strongly to a combined mobile

ban. They will probably argue on behalf of a US mobile program in light of new Soviet developments in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) which could allegedly threaten our sea-based deterrent. However, there remains considerable interest in the other agencies in a combined mobile ban. CIA continues to emphasize the serious verification problems associated with mobiles, while ACDA and State argue that public and Congressional acceptability of SALT II, as an arms control agreement, would be enhanced substantially by including a ban on mobiles.

In spite of OSD's concerns, there still remains no strong rationale for mobile ICBM deployment. The principal strategic rationale for developing a mobile missile—a hedge against future vulnerability of not only silo-based ICBMs, but SLBMs and bombers as well—is an extremely unlikely contingency during the life of this agreement. OSD's concern about recent Soviet developments in ASW are greatly exaggerated, and Soviet developments in ASW which may occur over the next decade should be more than offset by our own Trident program. In short, the retaliatory capability of both our SLBMs and bombers should remain intact.

Beyond this, there continues to be two practical problems associated with mobile systems:

—We do not have a feasible land-mobile option owing to land availability and political factors.

—It is unlikely that we could develop and deploy an operational air mobile ICBM prior to the end of the 1985 agreement period in any event.

On this last point, OSD currently projects an operational capability for a US mobile ICBM system (air- or land-based) by 1985. Although this could probably be moved up by two or three years under an accelerated development schedule, it would be virtually impossible to get the required funds from Congress over the next few years.

*In sum, it would be in the US interest for the 10 years of the agreement to agree to a combined ban on air- and land-mobile ICBM systems.* However, in view of the strong DOD interest in doing development work on mobile ICBM systems, we should confirm the apparent Soviet position that the ban applies only to deployment, and not to development and testing as well.

### *Cruise Missiles*

The Soviets are continuing to claim that the air-to-surface missile (ASM) limitation agreed to at Vladivostok (counting ASMs greater than 600 km range in the aggregate) should apply to all ASMs, both cruise and ballistic, while we are holding to the position that this agreed 600

km limitation should only apply to ballistic ASMs. Their overall cruise missile position can be summarized as follows:

*Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs).* Count ALCMs of range greater than 600 km deployed on bombers in the 2400 aggregate; ban ALCMs of greater than 600 km range on all aircraft other than bombers.

*Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs).* Ban the development, testing, and deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km (includes SLCMs launched from both submarines and surface ships).

*Land-Based Cruise Missiles.* Ban the development, testing and deployment of land-based cruise missiles of range greater than 5500 km.

In your channels we have told the Soviets that we could agree to a limitation under which all cruise missiles of greater than 3000 km range would be counted in the aggregate, independent of launch platform; nevertheless, they are continuing to insist on the rigid limits described above.

The only strategic issue with respect to cruise missiles concerns the need to retain the option to deploy long-range air-launched cruise missiles; we could readily accept the proposed 600 km limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and the 5500 km limitation on land-based cruise missiles.

The issue with respect to ALCMs is the need to retain long-range ALCMs as a hedge against future threats to bomber penetration, and in particular as a hedge against the uncertainties regarding eventual B-1 deployment.

The air defense threat of principal concern is Soviet deployment of an extraterritorial barrier defense consisting of airborne radars such as US AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and long-range fighter interceptors. Such a defense, capable of engaging US bombers at a distance of about 1000 km from the Soviet border, is projected to be deployed in the early 1980s. There are two possible approaches to penetration of such a defense:

—Launch long-range stand-off air-launched cruise missiles outside the defenses (i.e., 1000 km from the Soviet borders) which penetrate by saturating the barrier defense with a very large number of attacking objects.

—“Fight your way in” using anti-AWACS and anti-interceptor air-to-air missiles to punch holes in the barrier defense.

At the present time, there is much greater confidence in the feasibility of the stand-off cruise missile approach; the required hardware is in an advanced state of development and the penetration technique, saturation, is presently considered much more effective. In contrast to the ALCM, work is just beginning on an anti-AWACS and anti-

interceptor missile. The required technology is much more sophisticated and the penetration approach is much more vulnerable to countermeasures such as decoys, air-to-air missiles, etc. For this reason we have favored retaining the option to deploy a long-range ALCM as the preferred method for insuring bomber penetration in the 1980s. In addition, there is concern that the B-1 might never be deployed in significant numbers because of cost considerations, independent of SALT; in such a situation, B-52 penetration, even with an anti-AWACS missile, could be questioned. In contrast, the B-52 would make a very good stand-off cruise missile carrier.

The range required for a stand-off cruise missile option depends on the target coverage required. A 3000 km ALCM will provide coverage of about 70 percent of the Soviet urban/industrial target base, assuming an AWACS barrier at 1000 km from the border; 2500 km will provide coverage of about 50 percent of these targets including Moscow. However at 2000 km only 25 percent of the Soviet urban/industrial target base could be covered, and coverage of Moscow would be lost.

On the other side of the argument is the question of how long-range ALCMs would affect Soviet bomber capability. With a 2500–3000 km ALCM, the Backfire can cover most of the more populated regions of the US and recover in the Soviet Union. On the other hand on one-way missions complete coverage of the US is possible, with or without long-range cruise missiles. However, even if Backfire is not classed as a heavy bomber, there would still presumably be a restriction on equipping medium bombers such as Backfire with long-range ASMs (e.g., more than 600 km). Thus a 2500–3000 km ALCM limit would not give the Soviets a unilateral advantage because of extension of Backfire capability.

With respect to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), the US strategic SLCM program has no strategic utility; even with a 3000 km SLCM limit, SLCM submarines would be less survivable than our SSBN forces because they must approach much closer to Soviet shores to launch their missiles. If our SSBN force survives, the increased target coverage is certainly not needed. Similarly the SSBN force can satisfy any requirements for a more survivable theater tactical nuclear capability to replace the current theater nuclear-capable tactical aircraft. In addition, equipping attack submarines with missiles for use against land targets could detract from their principal mission of anti-submarine warfare and the protection of shipping lanes.

The Navy has recently expressed some interest in a tactical ship-to-ship SLCM with range in excess of 600 km. However, almost all tactical SLCM missions can be satisfied by a cruise missile of less than 600 km range, as is evidenced by the choice of 550 km for the range of the

tactical variant of the strategic SLCM currently under development. It is unlikely that the Navy will ever rely on attacking Soviet surface ships from very long ranges with tactical SLCMs since US attack submarines are projected to be able to easily approach within a few hundred kilometers of Soviet surface vessels without fear of detection into the foreseeable future.

With respect to intercontinental range land-based cruise missiles, which would be banned by the Soviet proposal, there has been some minor interest in DOD in preserving the option to develop recallable land-based intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCMs). However, there is no anticipation of deploying such systems before 1985. There is also some interest in deploying long-range land-based cruise missiles as tactical weapons in Europe. The Soviets are probably proposing a 5500 km limit on land-based cruise missiles to avoid prejudicing their position on air-to-surface (ASMs) where they emphasize the difficulty of distinguishing between cruise and ballistic ASMs. They may also wish to retain the option to deploy long-range land-based cruise missiles for use against China and Western Europe. In any event, there are no problems with accepting their proposal for a 5500 km limit on land-based cruise missiles.

There has been some concern expressed about the verification problem of different range limits on different types of cruise missiles since cruise missiles are readily adapted to different launch platforms. However, the verification problem is probably tractable in a situation where the range limits on ALCMs and land-based cruise missiles are substantially greater than that on SLCMs; it is highly unlikely that the Soviets could conduct a covert test program for long-range SLCMs of the magnitude required to operationally deploy such SLCMs without US detection of the test program. In addition, it is unlikely that by 1985 the Soviets could develop a long-range cruise missile which could be launched from torpedo tubes. The Soviets do have large launchers on current Soviet SLCM submarines, but these submarines are old and currently must surface to launch their missiles. Thus, a 2500–3000 limit on ALCMs, a 5500 km limit on land-based cruise missiles, and a 600 km limit on SLCMs would be acceptable from a verification standpoint if the limit on SLCMs bans testing, development, and deployment as the Soviets have proposed. Since ALCMs would be permitted and counted above 2500–3000 km, the longer range limit on land-based cruise missiles does not create a verification problem.

It will be important to obtain some progress on this issue at your meeting with Brezhnev in Helsinki. I suggest you impress on him that long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers are bomber armament and not strategic delivery vehicles like ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition,

we should tie our concessions on the cruise missile issue to our position on Backfire.

*ASMs on Non-Bomber Aircraft*

From the US viewpoint, there are two issues which bear on the Soviet proposal to ban all types of ASMs of range greater than 600 km on aircraft other than bombers:

—Whether air-mobile ICBMs are going to be banned or permitted.

—The need to retain the option to deploy long-range cruise missiles on transport aircraft (e.g., C-5 and 747) as well as on bombers such as the B-1 and the B-52.

With respect to deploying air-mobile ICBMs on non-bomber aircraft, as noted above, it is extremely unlikely that we could retain this option and also obtain a ban on land-mobile ICBMs. On the other hand, if we decided to forego the ban on land-mobiles, we would have to retain the right to deploy long-range ASMs on non-bomber aircraft (in particular on transport aircraft) if we are to have a viable air-mobile ICBM option.

Regarding the second issue, the B-1 and the B-52 would both be adequate cruise missile launch platforms in the 1985 timeframe. Although deployment of long-range ALCMs on modified transport aircraft is an option which has been given serious consideration, it is not imperative that this option be retained in a 1985 agreement.

If we do agree in principle to accept a ban on long-range ASMs on non-bomber aircraft, this ban should apply to non-heavy bombers as well as to non-bomber aircraft in order to avoid the problems of long-range ASMs on Backfire and the other Soviet medium bombers. The Soviet proposal in Geneva was somewhat ambiguous on this issue since it was couched in terms of a ban on long-range ASMs on “strategic” bombers.

*Backfire*

The Soviets have shown no sign of movement on this issue. This is hardly surprising. We have known from the beginning that we would have to compromise on Backfire, since the Soviets clearly had no intention of including the Backfire in the 2400 aggregate when this limit was negotiated at Vladivostok.

Disturbingly, however, the Backfire has become something of a public issue, and the longer the issue drags on the more people will dig in their heels and claim it is a heavy bomber. As you know, our intelligence seems to confirm Soviet statements that the Backfire will not be used for intercontinental roles, and consequently we could probably fall off designating the Backfire as a heavy bomber if deployment indicators continue to confirm Soviet statements.

To nail down specific indicators which would improve our confidence that Backfire was not being used for intercontinental roles, but which still permit the Soviets to exempt the Backfire from the 2400 aggregate, we have tried through your channels to obtain Soviet agreement to limit Backfire deployment to certain bases in the Southern USSR and to prohibit a companion tanker force from supporting Backfire operations. To date the Soviets have rejected this compromise approach, although there are some indications that they may consider a tanker prohibition.

Consequently, we should continue to explore the possibility of a tanker prohibition for Backfire operations. The ban on long-range ASMs on all non-heavy bombers discussed above will also assist in inhibiting development of an intercontinental capability for the Backfire. In addition, we should continue the linkage, which we established in our note to Dobrynin,<sup>3</sup> between Soviet acceptance of constraints on Backfire operations and US movement toward the Soviet position on cruise missiles.

#### *Silo Dimensions*

We agreed at Vladivostok to retain the Interim Agreement provision which limits increases in silo dimensions to 10–15 percent. This limit is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether one or both dimensions of a silo (depth and diameter) may be increased by 10–15 percent. To remove this ambiguity we have proposed that the sum of the individual increases in depth and diameter should be limited to 15 percent. In Geneva, Gromyko proposed that a 32 percent limit on volume increases be substituted for the 10–15 percent limit on increases in dimensions. Since we want to retain the 15 percent limit on depth increases, a reasonable compromise would be to supplement a 15 percent limit on increases in dimensions with the 32 percent volume limit proposed by the Soviets.

#### *Heavy ICBM Definition*

The Soviets have finally conceded that the new agreement should include an explicit heavy ICBM definition. However, they have not agreed to our proposal for a definition based on throw weight, but instead have proposed that a heavy ICBM be defined on the basis of missile gross weight, with the SS–19 as the dividing line between heavy and non-heavy ICBMs. Our analyses indicate that missile gross weight is less desirable than throw weight as the basis for a definition, but significantly more desirable than basing a definition only on missile volume. For example, if the heavy ICBM limit is pegged to the SS–19

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 97.



gross weight (about 185,000 lb), the best advanced technology missile which the Soviets could deploy would have about 9,000 lb throw weight, as compared to the 7000 lb throw weight of the current SS-19. A 185,000 lb limit would not affect the US M-X advanced ICBM design which is estimated to have a gross weight of 150,000 lb.

The only problem with missile gross weight is that it does not take into account the possibility of “cold” launch, i.e., a launch assist device, such as the Soviets use on the SS-17 and SS-18. This technique can substantially increase the throw weight for a given gross weight missile. In principle, two approaches to this problem are possible:

—Include the weight of the launch assist device for cold-launched missiles in calculating missile gross weight.

—Have a separate definition for cold-launched and hot-launched missiles, e.g., the definition of cold-launched missiles could be tied to the SS-17.

For the sake of simplicity in the negotiations, the first approach of adding the weight of the launch assist device is preferable. This can be worked out by the Delegation in Geneva.

The problems of verifying missile gross weight are comparable to those for verifying throw weight. Telemetry is an important factor, although knowledge of missile volume and fuel type can produce acceptable estimates of gross weight.

If this issue comes up in your discussions with Secretary Brezhnev, you could indicate to him that you believe that agreement on a heavy ICBM definition can be reached using missile gross weight as the defining parameter. However, you should indicate that there is also a need for placing an upper limit on heavy ICBMs as well and argue for limiting heavy ICBMs to the gross weight of the SS-18. Without such a limit the only restraint on heavy missile size would be the limit on silo dimension increases.

#### *How to Proceed*

I believe we should prepare a response to the Soviet proposals that we could transmit to Brezhnev through Dobrynin.<sup>4</sup> This will set the agenda for your meeting with Brezhnev and insure that the important issues are covered.

The principal issue which you will have to face in making your decisions is the necessity for keeping open options which the military believes might be of interest in the 1980s. Clearly all options can't be kept

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<sup>4</sup> Lodal and Sonnenfeldt prepared a note to the Soviet Union on SALT and sent a draft to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, July 25. There is no indication that the note was given to Dobrynin. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 21, SALT, Chronological)

open or we would never have substantive arms control agreements. The Soviets are apparently willing to close a number of possible areas of possible strategic arms competition. By accepting some of their proposals, we could clearly enhance the arms control impact and public acceptability of the new agreement.

## 101. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 25, 1975, 4:15–5:37 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The Soviet Union And SALT

### PRINCIPALS

The President  
 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
 Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger  
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
 Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby

### OTHER ATTENDEES

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll	Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
<i>Defense</i>	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary William Clements	NSC Jan M. Lodal
<i>CIA</i>	
Mr. Carl Duckett	

### SALT

President Ford: I am sorry we were delayed. The suggestion was made that I go on national television to explain what the Turks have done and the impact on us, and to urge the House to make a different decision. I might do it tonight, or I might do it from Helsinki.

Bill, why don't you give us a rundown on where we stand—

Director Colby: Mr. President, let me discuss Brezhnev's concerns and his position, on the eve of his meeting with you in Helsinki.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Last winter, when Brezhnev took a seven-week medical leave, his retirement was very much in the air. More recently he himself referred vaguely to it when he met with Senators Humphrey, Scott, and others.

We think it certain, however, that he means to stay on at least through the Party Congress next February. He knows it is his last Congress—they occur every five years—and he doubtless sees it as the occasion for securing his place in Soviet history.

A health accident cannot be ruled out, but he *is* pacing himself carefully. The odds are good that he will make it through the Congress.

On the foreign policy front, Brezhnev wants to go before the Congress proclaiming the success of détente. The calendar is arranged to provide a crescendo for this theme, with next week's European security conference and his visit here next fall as high points along the way.

Brezhnev's chief claim as a statesman rests on the successful management of the Soviet-American relationship.

And SALT, of course, lies at the center of that relationship.

This leads straight to the question of how much room for maneuver he has in defining Soviet terms for an agreement.

He has had some recent political troubles. The trade bill was an important setback. The USSR has slipped further in the Middle East. Most important of all, Brezhnev's age and health are bound to make him seem a bit of a lame duck. To the extent that his colleagues believe that his days are numbered, they will turn their minds to their own fortunes and futures.

Against this, however, Brezhnev still enjoys imposing political strengths.

—Détente, despite the disappointments of the past year, remains unchallenged as the Soviet general line. It is serving a host of Soviet interests, and serving them well. There are doubtless recurrent differences over specific issues, but the whole Politburo would be dismayed at the thought of a summit failure or cancellation that would bring détente into question.

—There have been notable successes under Brezhnev's leadership in the past year.

—There are no obvious challengers since the purge of Shelepin last spring.

A key figure in SALT decisionmaking is Marshal Grechko, the 71-year-old Minister of Defense whom Brezhnev elevated to the Politburo in 1973. [3 lines not declassified]

If Grechko vouches in the Politburo for the acceptability of Brezhnev's SALT proposals, attesting that they would not impair Soviet security, other members would find it difficult to object effectively.

Also, I should note that the Soviets are keenly aware of the growing tendency in the US to look critically at détente, and the fact that 1976 is an election year. They are realistic enough to reckon that SALT TWO should best be settled fairly quickly.

All this is not to say that Brezhnev is ready to meet our demands on the whole range of issues under dispute in SALT TWO. But the political factors I have discussed *do* suggest that, in the face of a firm yet even-handed US position, he will make some concessions to assure the success of the negotiations. This conclusion seems to be confirmed by Gromyko's latest presentation in Geneva.<sup>2</sup>

Assuming that there will be a SALT TWO agreement, one of the problems will be monitoring Soviet compliance. My remarks today on monitoring a SALT TWO agreement have to be preliminary. A definitive assessment will depend on the provisions of the agreement, including measures to aid verification.

To put the monitoring problem into perspective, I believe the Soviets will have strong incentives *not* to violate a SALT TWO agreement.

With the ceilings set at Vladivostok, only a large scale cheating effort could be militarily significant as measured by, for example, the potential numbers of Soviet first-strike warheads and the numbers of US warheads which could survive such a strike. Such an effort would carry high risk of detection and serious political risks.

Nevertheless, I feel sure we will still have to contend with monitoring ambiguities and suspicious activities in the SALT TWO era.

This board<sup>3</sup> summarizes our evaluation of our capability to monitor the 2,400 aggregate ceiling. As it shows, [2 lines not declassified]

As you know, the Soviets have adamantly opposed including their new Backfire bomber in the aggregate. We believe that Backfire is being deployed initially for use in peripheral operations; its use against the US is an open question.

The bomber has a range capability comparable to the Bison heavy bomber which the Soviets have agreed to count in the aggregate. On a one-way mission from present bases in the USSR without tanker support, Backfire can cover the entire US. Use of tankers or Arctic bases would permit it to make two-way missions.

[7 paragraphs (17 lines) not declassified]

This board shows our current estimate of our ability to monitor the 1,320 MIRV limit in the light of Secretary Kissinger's talks with Mr. Gromyko.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 98.

<sup>3</sup> The "boards," or charts, were not attached to Colby's briefing, which is entitled "The Soviet Union and SALT," July 25. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 10, NSC Meeting, 7/25/75-SALT)

If the Soviets agree that all missiles of types tested with both MIRVed and non-MIRVed payloads—like the SS-18—will be counted as MIRVed when deployed, a major ambiguity would be removed.

There is some potential for covert deployment of MIRVed ICBMs. As I pointed out earlier, I think such cheating would be unlikely. Nevertheless, we have evaluated our ability to detect it.

This potential would be limited if the Soviet strategic force evolves as the Intelligence Community has projected.

*[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]*

*[less than 1 line not declassified]* Our capabilities to monitor future deployment will depend on the characteristics of the missile and on any treaty measures which might be adopted to aid monitoring.

Our ability to monitor precise numerical limits—both the aggregate and the MIRV sublimit—depends on measures to aid verification and other treaty provisions such as whether mobile ICBMs and long-range cruise missiles are allowed or banned.

The uncertainties which will probably exist should raise no questions about Soviet compliance with the 1,320 ceiling until at least 1980, because the Soviet MIRV force will be well below the limit until then.

By the time the Soviets approach the ceiling, our knowledge of first-generation MIRVed systems probably will have improved significantly. But the follow-on MIRVed systems we expect the Soviets to deploy before 1985 will introduce new ambiguities and uncertainties.

In summary, my judgment is that we will continue to face uncertainties and ambiguities in monitoring a SALT TWO agreement—especially the MIRV limit. We can recognize some of the problems likely to arise in this decade and attempt to introduce treaty measures to make them more manageable.

Such measures are desirable because they can reduce our present monitoring problems, can make cheating more difficult, lessen the chances of controversy, and set useful precedents for handling systems of later generations and for follow-on negotiations involving reductions.

In the 1980s, as new Soviet weapon systems are introduced, new problems will arise which we cannot yet fully anticipate. Our ability to resolve the issues of the eighties will depend on the adequacy of treaty measures to aid monitoring, the effectiveness of the Standing Consultative Commission and—in a very important sense—on our future intelligence collection systems and analytical capabilities.

President Ford: Could I have a copy of that?

Director Colby: You may have this one (Hands briefing script to the President).

President Ford: Does anyone have any questions for Bill?

Secretary Schlesinger: [6 lines not declassified]

Director Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

President Ford: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Director Colby: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [4 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is the same on the other side if you permit land mobiles—you still don't solve this problem.

Secretary Schlesinger: You solve it only if you ban all land mobiles, including the IRBMs.

President Ford: Henry, perhaps you could go over the options, review the alternatives, and tell us where we are.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I don't think I will go over the Soviet proposals since everyone here is familiar with them. As you know, we have had some earlier discussions with Jim and a meeting with the Verification Panel yesterday.<sup>4</sup> I will try to synthesize the range of issues and add some thinking done overnight which hasn't yet been considered on an interagency basis.

On MIRV verification, we believe we can't go much further on your level and should now shift that to Geneva. There needs to be a technical discussion of how the counting rules are implemented—how to count SLBMs, how to deal with silo changes, and so forth. These are not very suitable for your discussion with Brezhnev. They have accepted our principles, and until we see if we differ on the application of these principles, we're not ready for a further political decision.

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<sup>4</sup> At the Verification Panel meeting on July 24, Schlesinger offered alternative reactions to the issues mentioned here. According to minutes of the meeting, he believed that the problems of ICBM MIRV verification were essentially solved and the SLBM problems could be worked out through some variant of the class rule. He also argued that a ban on mobile deployment would eliminate the mobile ICBM program. (Ibid., Box 5, Verification Panel Meeting Minutes, 7/24/75–SALT)

The same is true on silo dimensions. We can carry over the Interim Agreement language prohibiting increases more than 15% in any dimension and add that volume increases must be less than 32%. This doesn't lend itself to discussion with Brezhnev either.

Secretary Schlesinger: Would this include a 32% increase in length?

Secretary Kissinger: No—the Interim Agreement provisions would be retained and in addition a 32% limit on volume. If they went 15% down, this would give them a few percent in width. If they went 15% in diameter, that would be all they could do. They could not go more than 15% deeper. It also avoids the situation where if they narrow the diameter, they could even go further down than 32%.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, this has eventually no significance militarily, but it is a political problem.

President Ford: Ok.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have also proposed to ban ballistic missiles greater than 600 km on surface ships and on the sea beds; this is already in another agreement. They have also proposed to ban weapons in earth orbit, which is also in another agreement, although I don't remember which one.

Mr. Colby: The outer space agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is still the question of the FOBS.

Fred C. Ikle: The FOBS is being discussed in Geneva now.

Secretary Kissinger: They want the 2400 to be reached within one year after the agreement begins. You could accept this in principle and shift it to Geneva, with instructions to Alex Johnson to reduce the time by as much as he can get.

This brings us to more controversial issues. On the definition of a heavy ICBM, we could accept their principle that the overall launching weight be no greater than the SS-19 and add to it a limit on throw weight.

Secretary Clements: There is a vulnerability there not covered when you limit them to the 19 throw weight. As of today, that is a certain technology. But they could change that technology and improve their yields.

President Ford: Just like we can.

Secretary Clements: This is a fuzzy area, and I am not suggesting anything, I just wanted you to understand.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't ask them to limit their yield. This leaves three issues—first, the definition of a heavy missile.

Dr. Ikle: There is also the question of the 18. We should insist on no further increases.

Secretary Kissinger: That is better left in Geneva. That leaves the two biggest issues—

Secretary Schlesinger: Why should we leave the throw weight of the 18 to Geneva? It lends itself naturally to a general discussion of throw weight by the President. If you get into it with regard to the 19, you could have a paragraph and say that in addition, we have raised at Geneva that there should be a limit on the 18 as well.

President Ford: Let's get to the tough ones—

Secretary Kissinger: That's cruise missiles and the Backfire. On cruise missiles, the Soviet position was that cruise missiles on transport planes are banned. Cruise missiles on bombers greater than 600 km range would be counted. Cruise missiles on surface ships and submarines greater than 600 km would be banned. Intercontinental cruise missiles would be banned, while other land-based cruise missiles short of 5500 km range would be permitted.

I just noted from my notes that the Soviets would permit on transport aircraft cruise missiles less than 600 km, but ban them above 600 km. I don't know what the significance of this is.

President Ford: They are permitted on both bombers and transport aircraft?

Secretary Kissinger: On bombers, above 600 km, they are permitted but counted. On ships, they are permitted to 600 km, but banned above, and on land, they are permitted to 5500 km, but banned above.

I should add that we have massive verification problems with every cruise missile issue. The range could be extended—we have a 50% uncertainty about ranges. At higher range its confidence becomes very uncertain. There is an additional problem in that the cruise missile we are developing is the same for ships and aircraft. If we accept a limit on cruise missiles on ships less than aircraft cruise missiles, they will have to take our word for it—but that is their problem.

There is a sense of consensus that we could accept their proposition on intercontinental cruise missiles—to ban those of intercontinental range.

President Ford: That's the 5500 km—

Secretary Kissinger: Below 5500 km, they would be permitted. Frankly, I am somewhat puzzled about this proposition. If we put land-base cruise missiles of 2000 miles range in Europe, we can cover most of the Soviet territory. But they cannot cover our territory. I don't understand quite why they made this proposal.

Mr. Duckett: The lack of air defenses in China may have figured in here.

President Ford: They can get China with this kind of weapon?

Secretary Clements: It works to our advantage in Europe.



President Ford: Is there any disagreement on this?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no disparity that I am aware of.

The air launch cruise missile is needed for penetration purposes out to a range of about 3000 km, although George Brown and Jim indicated they could go somewhat below that. But this would be premature in your first talk with Brezhnev—we could put forward 3,000 km.

President Ford: We would count anything over 3000 km?

Secretary Schlesinger: We could ban them over 3000 km.

Secretary Kissinger: We would be better off if we banned them.

Dr. Ikle: It would be much better for verification reasons.

President Ford: There is agreement on this—not to count but to ban?

Secretary Kissinger: Counting above 3000 km gets you essentially nothing.

Secretary Schlesinger: Except a lot of legal problems in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Secretary Clements: Verification if you count is impossible.

President Ford: I would think as a layman that verification would be nil. Suppose you went to 2500 km—would you want to ban above that range also?

Mr. Duckett: As a general rule, regardless of the number put on range, you should ban above that range.

Secretary Kissinger: I can't see how we could handle the verification hearings if we counted above the cut off.

The next question concerns submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). We have difficulties with the 600 km Soviet proposal. With their forces, it is optimal for their needs, but it is not enough range for us. They can reach our population along our coast from 350 km, but we need more range for symmetrical coverage of their cities.

President Ford: Their proposal is 600 km?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes—to ban all SLCMs above 600 km.

Director Colby: They see these weapons in part as an anti-ship and anti-carrier force.

Secretary Kissinger: Yesterday in the Verification Panel we reviewed one alternative. If the range were set at 1500 km for SLCMs and 3000 km for ALCMs, everyone thought we could live with it—but this was not staffed out and I don't know if it survived overnight.

President Ford: The air-launched limit would be 3000 km?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. One advantage is that the Vladivostok Agreement contained no limits at all on SLCMs, so this would be a move. The longer range would give us good coverage of Europe and

additional coverage of China, but not much more coverage of the Soviet Union. If we want to go into the Soviet Union, we would have ALCMs and could put our land-based cruise missiles in Europe. This may not be our final position, but it seems our best beginning negotiating position.

President Ford: So we would go from 600 to 1500 km on submarine-launched and stay with 3000 km on air-launched.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have never yet gone to 3000 km on air-launched.

Secretary Kissinger: Up to now we have not given them 3000—

President Ford: But we said that they counted—

Secretary Kissinger: No, until now we have had a preposterous position that they are not covered by the Vladivostok Agreement.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our positions have been bilaterally preposterous.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Mr. President, we should look at the 3000 km proposal for air-launched as an important concession—as a fall—

President Ford: As a what?

Deputy Secretary Clements: As a fall—a limit where before we agreed to no limit at all.

Secretary Kissinger: While it is something of a concession, they would figure it out in a minute.

Secretary Schlesinger: It's a bigger concession than any they have made to date.

Mr. Duckett: Mr. President, I should point out that on surface ships and submarines, the Soviets have 400 launch tubes in their fleet today. *[1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: The 1500 km range was planned to meet our Navy's needs.

President Ford: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[2 lines not declassified]*

Secretary Schlesinger: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Director Ikle: *[1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Duckett: *[1 line not declassified]*

Secretary Kissinger: Therefore, any ban on certain types must include a ban on testing of those types.

President Ford: Testing and deployment—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. This means we could not try out ours to longer ranges in the same way.

Director Ikle: We would not test our sea-based ones beyond the permitted range anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: This brings us to the Backfire aircraft. To date, we have excluded the Backfire but included the Bison. The problem is that the dimensions are about the same and the capability is probably superior for the Bison. Bill, do you have the chart? (Colby shows chart comparing Soviet bombers.)

Mr. Duckett: As this shows, the range of the Backfire and the Bison are exactly the same, but the Backfire has a refueling capability, whereas the Bison does not.

Secretary Kissinger: In the Verification Panel we discussed a proposal whereby 75 to 100 Backfires would not be counted in the aggregate if they were kept in naval aviation and if they retire some of their Bears in naval aviation when they deploy them.

President Ford: Retire their Bears and Bison?

Mr. Duckett: They have a slightly different version of their Bear bomber in naval aviation for reconnaissance.

Secretary Kissinger: We then had the added thought that we would agree to keep our FB-111s below 100 to have the agreement written in a symmetrical fashion. This is a negotiating ploy since we have no plans for a similar aircraft as the Backfire.

President Ford: In other words, all our FB-111s would be free and they would get 100 Backfires on the assumption that they replace their Bears with Backfires.

Secretary Kissinger: We had thought they would probably get rid of their Bears anyway because of the agreement.

President Ford: To get down to the 2400 level.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We assumed they would reduce their older bombers to get down to the level.

Mr. Duckett: Mr. President, it is not my area of expertise, but I might mention that under this approach you might receive some criticism that it is now possible to get the aggregate raised by 100 over the 2400 level.

Director Ikle: You might consider putting Backfire and cruise missiles in a separate agreement. They are both borderline cases.

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to explain what we did on Backfire in any event.

Director Ikle: Putting them separately would simplify the main agreement.

President Ford: Carl raises the point, if it's true we look like we're adding 100 to the aggregate—

Secretary Kissinger: In theory we can make an overwhelming case that these 100 are not strategic bombers. We have a very good case that they are not strategic bombers, but that we were giving them 100 only if the proper collateral evidence was available.

Secretary Schlesinger: And in addition we required a reduction in their existing Bears.

Director Colby: Some of the Backfires are assigned to long-range aviation, so you have to deal with those, also.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not sorted that out. Perhaps they would be counted.

President Ford: The FB-111 are not counted now?

Director Colby: No, they don't have the range.

Secretary Kissinger: We have them free anyhow. We would throw them in only for negotiating symmetry.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have to be careful how we offset the FB-111 versus the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: How should we do it?

Secretary Schlesinger: We should not do it symmetrically since they have different capabilities. If after we have received agreement to not put Backfires outside of naval aviation, we might say that the US would then agree to hold to 72 FB-111s.

Secretary Kissinger: This brings us to the mobile missiles. The Soviets have agreed to ban them, not to deploy them. I am sure the Soviets thought they were meeting our concerns on this, given the negotiating history. There are really only two alternatives—we can accept their position, or insist that they be permitted, but counted.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our preference is that this not be discussed with the Soviets now.

Secretary Kissinger: They would agree not to deploy them, but permit development.

President Ford: Is your feeling concerned with research and development on mobile ICBMs?

Secretary Schlesinger: The US should look carefully into that. We have a limited number of ICBM holes, and given what we're seeing in the Philippine Sea with regard to improved ASW, as their counterforce capabilities increase, we should explore additional basing modes. If we ban deployment, we increase Congressional problems with regard to R&D funding. Preferably, this could be bypassed in Helsinki, while we here in the US could do a careful study before consenting to a ban on mobiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We could not deploy a mobile before 1983 in any event. Therefore, the issue is whether a ban harms R&D. This depends in part on what happens when once it becomes known the Soviets have offered a ban which we rejected. The question is which way we can better get R&D funds—with a ban, or having rejected a ban.

Secretary Schlesinger: An initial option might be to ban deployment until 1980, at which time both sides would agree to review the situation. Until we see the Soviet counterforce threat developing, we should keep our options open. If we want the option to pursue development, we should be careful to keep it open. They have completed 25 tests of the SS-X-16, many of which were perhaps mobile launchers. Their development program is essentially complete, so they don't need a development option in order to deploy a system.

Secretary Kissinger: They specifically propose that development would be permitted—only deployment would be banned.

President Ford: If we went with a ban on deployment plus a ban on R&D, we would not be in good shape, since they are so far down the road.

Secretary Kissinger: Jim's point is that it would be hard to get money for development.

President Ford: I'm not so pessimistic provided Congress is told the Soviets have done so. How much would it cost and how much would it take to go through a development program for a land-based mobile system?

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, we can throw around some unsatisfactory figures—about \$2–\$3 billion.

Deputy Secretary Clements: One reason it is so expensive is because we don't know what system concept we would come down on. We would have to do several different prototypes to determine.

President Ford: In the 50's, the Air Force had developed some models of mobile ICBMs on trains.

General Brown: We went further than models—we actually put them in the fields.

Secretary Kissinger: On trains?

General Brown: Yes, but as the Secretary says, problems relating to the public became evident.

President Ford: I was talking to Mel Laird about that—the tests were not encouraging because of public opinion.

Secretary Schlesinger: Those were random trains moving throughout the country. Now, we are talking about using public lands in the West.

President Ford: That made some of my colleagues on the Hill wince. It didn't make me wince, but I didn't think they would be taking

them to Michigan! (Laughter) If you have had trouble with Sanguine,<sup>5</sup> you will have similar trouble with the environmentalists on this.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are planning to use desert lands, the salt flats west of Salt Lake City. There are some public lands that are unattractive even to the environmentalists. But we need to study this further.

President Ford: My quick reaction is that we should go for an R&D program. I am not as pessimistic about getting it from Congress. I think we could get it and would be in a better position when we bring in their testing of the SS-16.

Mr. Duckett: It is at least a basis for argument.

Secretary Kissinger: Those are the major issues.

President Ford: Thank you, Henry. Jim, do you have any comments?

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, it is clear Brezhnev is anxious for this agreement. We would be inclined to give only a little ground, showing a considerable degree of firmness, responding to their tactics in kind. Brezhnev reiterated their Geneva position. The package Henry outlined is as forthcoming as they have been.

We would strongly urge that 1500 km be the minimum range on SLCMs, and that we stick with 3000 km on the ALCM. On Backfire, equal aggregates were obtained at Vladivostok and everyone recognized that. We must be careful to not appear that they can now escape from that. If it becomes open-ended, we will lose the advantage of equal aggregates.

The light versus heavy missile question is very important. With improved propellants in the SS-19, they could have 12000 pounds throw weight under their definition. This would leave us in a ludicrous position with regard to the modern large ballistic missile constraint negotiated in SALT I. If we hold at 7,000 pounds, that would be the best definition achievable at this point.

On mobiles, we prefer to wait.

President Ford: Mobile ICBMs?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes—we should study the options for the US first. If they develop a major counterforce capability which is a threat to our systems, we should not exclude additional basing modes.

President Ford: If we ban mobiles and continue with an R&D program, that will cut out part of the problem.

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<sup>5</sup> Probably a reference to the Sanguine Project, a controversial 1968 project of the U.S. Navy to build a low-frequency radio transmitter facility in Wisconsin to communicate with submarines.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. It really becomes a concern in the early or mid 80s. We see no possibility of a mobile deployment for 5–7 years.

President Ford: Under any considerations, we need the research and development. It is a matter of how to best get the research and development money.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

President Ford: What are your observations, George?

General Brown: Mr. President, I believe that item is a terribly important issue. As a fallback position, provided it is understood as that, we subscribe to the formula the Secretary put forward. At Vladivostok, you agreed to equality. But to give up on equality, that would be very difficult to explain.

On cruise missiles, we can accept a proposal to ban intercontinental cruise missiles. We can accept 3,000 km on air launch cruise missiles, and would prefer 3,000 km on SLCMs, but came up with 1500 km if we have to go lower on SLCMs.

We do have a problem concerning the commonality of SLCMs and ALCMs. In our program, they are basically the same missile. We put the SLCM in a can which falls off when it is launched. Once it flies out, it is very similar to the ALCM. This is their verification problem, but there is a chance we are going to be accused we were cheating.

President Ford: They can't distinguish the one launched from the air from the one launched from sea?

General Brown: They have *Aviation Week* which tells them—

Secretary Kissinger: There is also our testing—

General Brown: That's true, but we can trade warhead weight for range.

President Ford: Like they can.

General Brown: If we can fly 1500 km, we can fly further. I just don't want you to get in a position where you are accused of bad faith.

President Ford: All of this has been in *Aviation Week*?

Secretary Clements: There's been pretty much in *Aviation Week*—the engines are the same, the airframes are the same, the guidance is the same, and so forth.

Secretary Kissinger: I've never understood how *Aviation Week* gets all that—

You should have seen Clements three years ago; he wanted to scrap the whole program

Secretary Clements: That's not true! (laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: This should go to Geneva where it is their problem to raise the verification problem. After all, Minuteman II and

Minuteman III silos are the same, and they haven't raised that. So we'll let them raise this.

Secretary Schlesinger: We have a parallel problem. We will not be in a position to say we have any precision in verification in the cruise missile area. We will be relying pretty much on good faith.

Dr. Ikle: Mr. President, for this reason I think you should consider putting the cruise missiles in a separate protocol which could be kept apart from the main agreement.

President Ford: If we don't include cruise missiles, there will be a hell of a big reaction.

Secretary Kissinger: In either event, they will have to be presented simultaneously. In any event, we can't present a SALT agreement that lets cruise missiles run free.

President Ford: We would be laughed out of town.

Secretary Clements: Absolutely.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing—George thought he could live with a limit on the number of cruise missiles on each aircraft. Did you say you could live with that, George?

General Brown: I could live with it, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President Ford: How many will we have on each aircraft?

Secretary Clements: The B-52 will have six on either side, or 12 altogether.

President Ford: Both on the B-1 and the B-52?

General Brown: More on the B-1—

Secretary Kissinger: You can see why this is a problem for the Soviets since each one has a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] weapon on it.

Secretary Clements: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The commonality of the missiles is the big thing. It's the same missile on the aircraft as is in the torpedo tubes.

Secretary Kissinger: Would you carry them on bombers in lieu of bombs?

General Brown: I don't think so.

President Ford: What is the problem if we get no SALT II agreement? What dollars in hardware are we going to have to take to Congress then?

Secretary Schlesinger: Probably two to three billion dollars increase to the budget over a period of years. Until 1977, we are constrained anyway.

President Ford: Until fiscal 77?

Secretary Schlesinger: Calendar 77—until the 5 year interim agreement runs out.



President Ford: Across the board, or only on launchers?

Secretary Kissinger: We are constrained on the deployment of land-based and submarine-based missiles. We are not limited on bombers or cruise missiles.

Dr. Ikke: We couldn't deploy more in any event.

Secretary Schlesinger: If there were no agreement, we would have to increase our capability.

President Ford: I've asked Henry to get from DOD the figures on the options we would have to face, to get projections of your needs for the next five years in terms of money and hardware—what you would send to Congress.

Secretary Schlesinger: Not by tomorrow morning before you go on the aircraft—

President Ford: No.

Director Colby: I don't want to sound like I'm against cruise missiles, but I should point out that they have an air defense and we don't. If they were tempted, they might push very hard in the cruise missile area.

Secretary Schlesinger: That's the reverse of the fact that we have to have cruise missiles because of the air defense.

Mr. Duckett: In the last ten years, they have spent about the same amount on defenses as they have on offensive forces.

Director Colby: They have 10,000 surface to air missiles deployed.

President Ford: Are those effective vs ALCMs and SLCMs?

Director Colby: No, but it shows their philosophy.

Secretary Clements: Our cruise missile projects drive them up the wall because their defense will not protect them from our cruise missiles, and they know it. Cruise missiles cause them plenty of pain and agony. They give us real leverage.

President Ford: How soon will they be operational?

Secretary Schlesinger: By 1980.

President Ford: I have a technical question—why aren't their present air defenses effective vs ALCMs and SLCMs?

Director Colby: Because of low altitude penetration.

Secretary Kissinger: What speed do they go?

General Brown: Subsonic—not too fast, but they go very low.

Mr. Duckett: I don't want to debate their vulnerability, but their radar network in the entire western USSR is now down to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I would not be willing to depend on the invulnerability of air breathing vehicles in the 1980s.

Secretary Kissinger: In any event, the cruise missile would force them to spend a lot of money on air defense which otherwise they would spend elsewhere.

General Brown: There is another point, Mr. President. This is not like a football game, where it is one play at a time. [2 lines not declassified]

Director Colby: They were very shook up by the Hanoi attack—that was a very heavily defended area.

President Ford: With what?

General Brown: The B-52 attack.

Secretary Kissinger: Their entire defense was exhausted at the end.

Dr. Ikle: In the end, several years from now, the Russians will catch up on cruise missile technology. In the end they may build MIRVs even larger. So we should also look at what we get from limits on their cruise missiles. In addition, there is the verification problem.

General Brown: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] You not only penetrate the defenses, but you destroy the defenses. It's not like Hanoi. It's a very different situation.

President Ford: Well, if there are no other comments, thank you all very much.

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## 102. Editorial Note

The third and final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was held in Helsinki July 30–August 2, 1975. Although the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were not a central issue, President Ford and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, nevertheless had several discussions on the subject. They discussed SALT II on July 30 at 9:35 a.m. at the American Ambassador's residence and again on August 2 at 9:05 a.m. at the Soviet Embassy. Near the end of the August 2 discussion, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the following summary remarks:

"I believe we could say that we have agreed to refer to Geneva certain points on which we have reached agreement without specifying those points. As I see it, we have agreed that: (a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on surface ships will be banned; (b) ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on the seabed, including in territorial waters, will be banned; (c) placing nuclear weapons in orbit will be banned; (d) development, testing, and deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on aircraft other than bombers will be banned; and (e) development of land-based cruise missiles of inter-

continental range will be banned. So all these items should be referred to Geneva, but all we would say to the public is that a number of issues have been referred to Geneva.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 30–August 2, 1975, Ford/Brezhnev Meetings in Helsinki, CSCE)

The full texts of all memoranda of conversation of the meetings in Helsinki are in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIX, European Security, and *ibid.*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

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### 103. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 9, 1975, 9:45–11:20 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

Middle East, SALT

#### PRINCIPALS

The President  
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger  
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown  
Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby

#### OTHER ATTENDEES

<i>State</i>	<i>White House</i>
Under Secretary Joseph Sisco	Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft
<i>Defense</i>	<i>NSC</i>
Deputy Secretary William Clements	Roger Molander
<i>CIA</i>	
Mr. Carl Duckett	

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

President Ford: The main reason for this meeting is to bring you all up to date on where we are on SALT. We had two meetings with

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Brezhnev in Helsinki.<sup>2</sup> We made some progress but not a lot. Let me tell you what we have agreed to and then we can talk about those issues which we are still hung up on.

We have agreed to ban cruise missiles of range greater than 600 kilometers on aircraft other than heavy bombers. We have also agreed to ban intercontinental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of greater than 600 kilometers range on surface ships. We have also agreed to a ban on ballistic missiles on the seabeds and inland waterways. We also discussed a fifth issue related to weapons in orbit, but I understand that this has already been taken up in Geneva. We thus come down to the problem of cruise missiles—air-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles—and the question of the Backfire. Henry, will you run through the details of where we stand on these issues?

Secretary Kissinger: Without endorsing what the Soviets say, let me tell you what Dobrynin told me in the meeting I had with him yesterday.<sup>3</sup> He indicated that they were having real problems with our position. They figure that the ALCMs would give us 11,000 free warheads which are not counted under the aggregate. I assume that they are calculating something like 32 missiles on each B-1 with 240 B-1s and 12 on each B-52 with 400 B-52s. This comes to about 11,000. He indicated they don't know what to do with this sort of situation. He claimed it is absolutely impossible to agree to a situation where there are 8,000 warheads limited in the aggregate and 11,000 warheads that run free.

The second point Dobrynin brought up is that they want to have a SALT agreement in preparation for the next Party Congress. They want to be able to go to that Congress and ask for real reductions in military expenditures. But with our cruise missile position, they say they'll have to ask for additional expenditures in two areas. They say they will have to spend additional money on increasing air defenses and then also deploy cruise missiles themselves, neither one of which they had intended to do. This presents a problem on cruise missiles which is unavoidable since we want to deploy them.

With respect to Backfire—this issue became rather heated at Helsinki—Brezhnev claimed that the Backfire has only half the capability of the Bison and the President challenged him on this. This really became acrimonious between the President and Brezhnev.

President Ford: I just quoted your figure, Bill.

Secretary Kissinger: They consider our position on Backfire to be cynical. They just think we are just bargaining. They say we should know that the Backfire is being deployed for use against Europe and

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 102.

<sup>3</sup> No record of a meeting has been found.

China and not against the United States. They claim that they gave up on FBS, which was the same type of issue. They claim that if you count refueling, you have to count all F-111's and F-4's too because with refueling they also can reach the Soviet Union. They say our position on the Backfire gives them a problem which is simply unmanageable.

In my conversation with Dobrynin I asked him if the Soviets really wanted an agreement. Dobrynin said yes, that it had been in their program for this year.

The question now is what to propose on these issues. These are the arguments the Soviets give. I repeat I am not endorsing these arguments, but these are the ones which Dobrynin put forth. Dobrynin got a summary cable from Moscow on the Helsinki discussions which listed the unresolved issues. He didn't mention the throw weight issue so I asked him if the summary cable had listed that. He said that it listed mobiles, cruise missiles, and Backfire. I asked him what about throw weight? Dobrynin said it wasn't listed. It's clearly not at the same level as these other problems. Also we didn't get nearly as big a reaction with respect to throw weight as we did on Backfire in Helsinki.

President Ford: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev didn't explode over throw weight like he did over Backfire.

President Ford: In discussing cruise missiles, we got into a discussion about who was going to move their industrial complexes. We told them they should move theirs closer to their borders to make the situation comparable. We were kidding them about this.

Secretary Schlesinger: Kidding? That was the next proposal we were going to make. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I thought you were becoming more conciliatory. I said we would move all our cities inland.

President Ford: If we continue with our position of a 3,000 kilometer limit on ALCMs and a 1500 kilometer limit on SLCMs and if, in addition, we make no movement on how we want to handle Backfire, then I don't think there's going to be an agreement.

I previously had a conversation with Jim to try and resolve what our course of action would be if it looked like there weren't going to be an agreement. I asked what military appropriations Jim might come up with for a FY 76 supplement plus a five year program. The figures are astounding. George, I guess you've seen these, but I would just like to run through them for you, Bill, and others.

In FY 76—this is in 1976 constant dollars—the figure would be 206 million dollars. Then for the transitional quarter would be another 114 million. In 1977 two billion, five hundred; in 1978, 2 billion and seven;

in 1979, 4 billion and five; in 1989, 5 billion and eight; and 1981, 8 billion and six. That's not a very good picture to have to go to the Hill with.

Secretary Kissinger: This is without additional money for ABM.

Secretary Schlesinger: We will be spending a lot of money on ABM R&D, however, but no money for ABM deployment.

Secretary Kissinger: There's another column here that has the price increases that would take place with a reasonable rate of inflation. For example, if we take the last entry under 1981 and crank in an inflation figure, it would be 11.5 billion. In 1988 the 5.8 billion figure goes to 7.4 billion with inflation dollars. This gives you some idea of the magnitude of what we would be up against if there were no agreement.

I believe the choice is some modification to our current position or this alternative which I have just described. Now I think it is important from an internal point of view to get an agreement, an agreement that would not sacrifice national security. I'm not talking about an agreement that's just a one-way street, but I believe a two-way street agreement can be achieved which will be in the national interest and in the world interest. I must say my assessment is that if we don't get an agreement, we will be in trouble on the Hill since we simply won't get the money we need. Getting additional appropriations for defense won't be any less difficult, with or without an agreement, and the figures we have just gone through are really unbelievable and unacceptable. When it comes to submitting this budget it won't be believed or accepted. We'll end up further behind. We need an agreement to protect our national interest and the world interest as well. What we have to do is find where we can make some modification in the cruise missile and Backfire areas.

One other fact, anyone who has dealt with Brezhnev recently must conclude that his life expectancy is limited. It's not a question of his political survival but after 45 minutes in our meetings he simply ran out of steam. The Romanians whose dislike for the Russians is pathological—if Ceausescu keeps up the way he's going he might trigger some action on the part of the Soviets. They feel only Brezhnev can put over a SALT agreement with the Soviet military. Grechko is too encrusted and couldn't do it. If the Soviets have a new leader, especially if it is Kirilenko, he will have to play all the party factions. Thus it may be that we will have to work aggressively toward an agreement because of the time problem. Brezhnev was like Pompidou was in Iceland when he met with Nixon. Brezhnev could only bat the ball back with extreme mental slowness, things had to be explained to him two or three times.

Director Colby: That's our assessment as well. He only has a short time. After he dies or steps down he will probably be succeeded by a person of collective acceptability who won't be aggressive in pursuing a SALT agreement. The track record of the Soviet Union is that there is

a transition period of three to five years before a new leader can be aggressive in international affairs. The question of who will be the successor, whether it will be someone like Kirilenko or a military man like Grechko.

Secretary Kissinger: Everyone in Europe thinks it will be Kirilenko, but it might work out that it's someone like Malenkov, who will only last for a year.

President Ford: Let me ask a question. If there is no agreement and Brezhnev is out and there is an interim period, their momentum figures they will keep going in all areas—aircraft, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Everyone will probably try and line up the military on their side. Once the momentum gets going it will become even more difficult for whoever succeeds Brezhnev to stop it, just like with us.

Director Colby: We have been working out of a triad but now on cruise missiles we're really talking about a quartet. We have the balance in strategic forces that we need. If we have reductions it will mean reductions for us not for them. The SALT limits which were agreed assure a Soviet buildup. We would have problems with reductions. Within the next five years the only real danger is that fighting will break out in a conventional war not a strategic war. We see no technical developments that are likely to give them a strategic first strike against us. If we continue the stalemate in strategic systems, it is likely that their naval buildup and their buildup in conventional forces in Europe will continue. This will form the basis for competition between us, along with third world military aid. If we have to put money into strategic systems, we'll have to also put money into conventional forces.

President Ford: We can't gamble on our national security. If a deal can be worked which eliminates the Backfire and cruise missile problems, then we should work toward it.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing Dobrynin said to me was why did we introduce these new elements, cruise missiles and Backfire, into the negotiations. I said we need cruise missiles for penetration of their defenses. He said it was their own estimate that within three years our bomber force would have an overwhelming problem getting into the Soviet Union. He said if we deploy cruise missiles, they will have to increase their air defenses.

President Ford: George?

General Brown: I don't share Bill's optimism with respect to the ten year period. Ten years is too long a time. I am worried that the situation might change dramatically through the application of lasers.

President Ford: If they run free.

Secretary Kissinger: They do anyway.

Director Colby: In the ten year period, the Soviets still could not develop a first strike capability, but they could substantially improve their offensive capability.

President Ford: Let me ask a question; assume we get an agreement, laser development is free anyhow, is it not?

Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes.

President Ford: Are we proceeding with lasers of our own.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Yes, we have additional money in the current budget. Right now we are spending all we reasonably can.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets have had a more aggressive program in the past.

General Brown: The Soviets would have a motivation to work faster on lasers without an agreement.

President Ford: Right, George.

Dr. Ikle: Without an agreement we will be diverted to work on numbers for political reasons.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, with respect to what's agreed, what is meant by the term "other than heavy bombers"—cruise missiles on transports?

President Ford: Yes—on transports.

Secretary Kissinger: Cruise missiles of greater than 600 kilometer range would be banned on transports.

Secretary Schlesinger: Tactical cruise missiles carried by tactical aircraft are not limited?

President Ford: Right.

Secretary Schlesinger: So we're talking about strategic nuclear-armed missiles.

As for the points of issue—as for Backfire. We may be unable to suck out of anybody on the Soviet side what they think about this. [3 lines not declassified] However, we could be wrong about Backfire capability since we still have no measure of fuel capacity. It's very complicated, but we always come up with the same 3000 mile figure plus or minus five to ten percent off.

We have set up a development advisory group on Backfire. It may be that our estimates are too high; however, the report is not completed. Nevertheless, the Soviets claim that the Backfire range is one half that of the Bison is very unlikely.

Secretary Kissinger: They said in capability.

General Brown: We agree that it is probably designed for peripheral missions.

Secretary Schlesinger: If Backfire can only attack by overflying the US on a one-way mission, it is less important substantively versus po-



litically terms. Critics on the Hill will argue that if the aggregate is 2400 and the Backfire is free, they will be able to do more than us.

If the Soviets can give us assurances on the Backfire, the political problem will be alleviated. The question is what will they provide.

President Ford: I believe we should not be adamant on this issue; nevertheless, we should take a firm position. We can challenge them as to what proof they have.

Director Colby: The intelligence community differs on this issue—not the numbers but on Backfire employment.

President Ford: Jim is right. If the range is 3000 miles, political opponents will say the aircraft has a one-way capability to strike the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: So does the F-111 against the Soviet Union.

Director Colby: But the Backfire is not a first strike weapon. Compared to ballistic missiles, slow flying aircraft are not useful for first strike.

Dr. Ikle: We seem to have made some progress on throw weight.

Secretary Kissinger: All they did on throw weight was to not reject our proposal. I'm not sure what their position is. Throw weight was not included in the reporting cables sent to Dobrynin as one of the unsolved issues. There's no explanation for this. Brezhnev was not very fast on his feet on this issue. He asked me what we meant by our position. I told him we wanted a definition based on launching weight and throw weight. He asked for what missile. I said for the SS-19, and he didn't reject this.

Dr. Ikle: With progress on the throw weight issue, we will be able to halt the expansion of Soviet first-strike capability.

President Ford: Jim, what are your observations on the cruise missile problem.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is more give on SLCMs; they have a role in sub-SIOP missions. SLCMs are one way to do other missions. ALCMs are a more difficult subject. From the point of view of numbers of weapons which the Soviets raised, we could also substantially increase the number of bombs as well as the number of missiles. Because of decisions made while McNamara was Secretary of Defense we have the current number of bombs on the B-52s. The B-1 carries [*less than 1 line not declassified*] We could increase the number of bombs to [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

General Brown: [*1 line not declassified*] We have the capability to deploy [*1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Schlesinger: We can probably estimate a numerical limit of five to six thousand ALCMs by 1985. This is far less than the potential number of bombs. For reasons relating to maintaining our desire to

continue to be able to penetrate, we are developing ALCMs. The Soviets don't need ALCMs to penetrate our air defenses. Our interests should be in controlling warheads, not missiles. We need a better fix on the parameters of discussion before we reach a solution.

Secretary Kissinger: Like what?

Secretary Schlesinger: For example, the Soviet argument that we are expanding the number of warheads is a characteristic of bombs not just missiles. We are not limited to [less than 1 line not declassified] A constraint on the number of ALCMs could be sufficient to satisfy their concerns on this issue.

President Ford: Let me ask you this. Put us in their shoes—if we limit the number of cruise missiles on the B-52 and the B-1, how will they know if we have not modified these aircraft to carry more missiles without verification.

Secretary Schlesinger: Verification is an important issue.

President Ford: It goes both ways.

Secretary Kissinger: If we say 5000 to 6000 cruise missiles as a limit it will get a horrible reaction from the Soviets. Better to limit the number of planes with cruise missiles. Maybe we could bring this into relation with the Backfire. We could still end up with a reasonable cruise missile force.

Secretary Schlesinger: The B-52 is not worth making into a penetrating bomber in the time frame of interest. Comparing the B-52 vs the B-1, the B-52 will be dependent on ALCMs for penetration.

Secretary Kissinger: If we put a 6,000 limit on cruise missiles, it will put a real burden on verification. If only x planes carried cruise missiles, it would be much better.

Director Colby: This will be hard to monitor.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets will argue that we will put 24 on each bomber.

Secretary Schlesinger [Kissinger?]: They can get all the information they need from *Aviation Week*. Dobrynin will claim that we will carry them in the body as well as under the wings.

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe we can arrange to have *Aviation Week* visit the Backfire factory.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We will only carry them internally on the B-1. They will be carried in pods on the B-52.

Director Colby: For once verification is on our side. We should send them a subscription to *Aviation Week*. (Laughter)

Dr. Ikle: The shoe will be on their foot.

Secretary Kissinger: How many can we carry inside?

General Brown: [number not declassified]

Dr. Ikle: We have concerns about the way they do some things, and they have concerns about the way we do things. Perhaps this will make them more forthcoming in the future at the SCC.

President Ford: If we limit the number of aircraft, perhaps they will make some concessions on Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: If we could get SLCMs down to their position and ALCMs down from 3000 kilometers and then limit the number of cruise missiles carrying aircraft, we could get a hearing. There would be a weird aspect in that these limits would mean next to nothing in terms of verification. Both sides would be free to test cruise missiles up to 5000 kilometer range. Perhaps we could go to 2000 kilometers on ALCMs. The only difference between 2000 and 3000 is with respect to fuel. We could test to the 2000 kilometer limit from aircraft and use land-based missiles to test to longer ranges. Even the SLCM limit is not that significant. You could juggle fuel and payload there too. Even if cruise missiles above 600 kilometers are banned on ships and above 2000 kilometers on aircraft, if I understand this technology, you can still do what you want. It is easy to go from 2000 to 3000 kilometers.

President Ford: Just put in a lighter warhead and add more fuel.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless I misunderstand the problem, we could come down in distance on the cruise missiles. Perhaps a package where we go way down on SLCMs, a little on air-launched cruise missiles, and then limit the number of aircraft equipped with cruise missiles. This will give them something to study. They are stuck on what to do on this issue.

President Ford: I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: You saw Gromyko jumping up and down to talk to Brezhnev when we were discussing this question.

President Ford: George, you had something you wanted to say.

General Brown: Yes. We could trade fuel for weight, download fuel to decrease range.

President Ford: And we wouldn't have to test to longer ranges to have the capability.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We are constantly developing more exotic fuels which will drastically increase range.

Dr. Ikle: We have to be careful or maybe we will get into a trap and end up fighting among ourselves whether we or they have violated these limits. We need to nail down a definition of cruise missile range.

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't agreed to take cruise missiles to Geneva.

Dr. Ikle: Except for intercontinental cruise missiles. Definitions will be a difficult problem.

President Ford: I think we understand where we are and the dilemma we face on this issue. It is far better for us to look at a package which contains legitimate proposals in the cruise missile and Backfire areas. If we're not careful we could end up with nothing. I don't want to compromise our national security, none of us do. We need to come up with some modification to our current position.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Russians need to be more forthcoming on Backfire information. SLCMs are not of direct concern as a strategic system. We might want 50 or 60 SLCMs for peripheral missions, a small number.

Secretary Kissinger: 50 to 60? There's no objection if they're under 600 kilometers.

Secretary Schlesinger: We are interested in the possibility of sub-SIOP missions such as in Iran. It's part of deterrence in areas where we have no base structure. It's a secure way to deliver nuclear weapons. The real problem is massive deployment of cruise missiles, so a cruise missile solution is probably workable. On ALCMs we don't know yet what kind of numerical limits we could accept. But we can't back off to the point where bombers can't penetrate.

General Brown: We are looking at some form of limit such as those suggested by Henry, but we have not found a way to work this out yet. We need to work Backfire in if we modify our position. In any case the Soviets probably will raise the FB-111 issue.

President Ford: Well what is the time frame we ought to establish for something for us to come up with bearing in mind Brezhnev's health problem.

Secretary Kissinger: We should try and have something in about ten days.

Secretary Schlesinger: We should have something ready when the President returns.

Secretary Kissinger: That's on the 25th.

President Ford: Why not say by the 25th we'll have something. Henry will be here to see how things are evolving.

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe we can talk before then.

Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe by the end of next week we'll have something.

President Ford: When you come to see me, Henry, you can bring me up to date on where we are.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

**104. National Security Decision Memorandum 303<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 20, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, US SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285 and NSDM 301.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the US is willing to ban the development, testing, and deployment of the following systems:

- Land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
- Ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 600 km carried on waterborne vehicles other than submarines;
- Installations for launching ballistic missiles which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor, including territorial seas or inland waters.

2. The Delegation should propose the following definition of a cruise missile:

A cruise missile is any armed, unmanned, self-propelled, guided missile which sustains flight through use of aerodynamic lift over most of its range.

3. The following language should be substituted for the current US version of Article VII of the Joint Draft Text:<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 61, NSDM 303, Instructions for SALT Talks in Geneva. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. On August 13, Molander and Sonnenfeldt sent Schlesinger's comments on a draft of this NSDM to Kissinger, under a covering memorandum in which they explained the Secretary of Defense's two objections. To meet Schlesinger's first objection Kissinger approved the recommendation to "redraft the NSDM to provide for an indefinite delay in tabling the proposed ban on cruise missiles above 600 km range carried on aircraft other than heavy bombers." Kissinger wrote "crazy" in the margin of the paragraph in which Molander and Sonnenfeldt stated that Schlesinger wanted to "change the cruise missile definition in paragraph 2 to read 'nuclear-armed' rather than 'armed.'" (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Documents 93 and 99.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 99.

a. The limitation provided for in Article III of this agreement shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers.

b. The parties agree that:

(1) There shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers for heavy ICBMs.

(2) Construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(3) Operational ICBM and SLBM launchers used for testing or training shall be considered operational launchers.

In discussing the proposed language for Article VII, the Delegation should indicate that it is the US interpretation of Article VII that all operational launchers, wherever located, should be counted in the 2400 aggregate. The Delegation should also state that in the US view an increase of 15% would constitute a “significant increase” within the meaning of paragraph 2a of Article VII and solicit a Soviet response to this statement.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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## 105. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 17, 1975.

President Ford: It's been a long day. We had a long Cabinet Meeting<sup>2</sup> and have been running a little behind ever since.

We are getting to a point where we have to make some basic decisions on where we are going in these negotiations. This is precipitated by the visit of Gromyko tomorrow. If we are going to make headway, we have to have some new answers. As you know, I think it is in the national interests to get a SALT II agreement—I mean the right kind—but a SALT II agreement is in the country's interest. If we don't get it in 1975, the political environment will make it hard in 1976, in the turmoil of the political campaign.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. This is apparently a transcript of a tape of the meeting. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 3:46 to 5:35 p.m., and the following people attended: President Ford, Rockefeller, Kissinger, Sisco, U. Alexis Johnson, Schlesinger, Clements, Duckett, Colby, Brown, Ikke, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, and Lodal. (Ibid., Staff Secretary's File, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> The Cabinet meeting was from 11:02 a.m. to 12:58 p.m. (Ibid.)

I want us to be as forthcoming as possible. We have to take a fresh look, and have a frank, forthcoming discussion.

I would expect that I will not make any decisions here. I want the Verification Panel to take up these issues after I've asked some questions and heard some other comments, and in a day or two give me a solid position that is negotiable so that I can talk to Gromyko not tomorrow, but on what the Verification Panel has done—later after we have had this discussion and the Verification Panel has met.

I heard there was a quite free discussion in the Verification Panel with no resolution of the issues.<sup>3</sup> We have got to do better than that.

Bill, could you as usual let us know where things stand? I then want Henry to summarize the issues and have Jim give his views.

[Omitted here is Helms's briefing.]

Mr Duckett: Mr. President, I might say that earlier, we have seen as many as 260 silos under construction at one time, which is about what this assumes. So it is not unprecedented.

Secretary Schlesinger: I will be surprised to see more than 250 a year or 1000 by 1980, which is what your chart<sup>4</sup> shows.

President Ford: Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I would like to sum up the issues and review what requires your decision. First, commenting on what was referred to by Bill, there are pressures on the Soviet leaders, and I thought I would give you my perception of the Soviet leaders. Brezhnev has been in power for 10 years and is reaching the end of his career. With him will go the entire age group that has such a morbid fear of war, based on their World War II experience. This group has caved in crises with a speed that their successors will not inevitably show. Brezhnev may retire at the upcoming Party Congress, but whether he retires at the Party Congress or stays on for a bit longer, he is near the end of his career.

A third factor is that after Brezhnev leaves we will face two or three years of uncertainty. Nobody will be in a position to make decisions—major decisions will just not be doable for two or three years.

In the US détente is often described as a one-way street. But the proponents of détente could make the opposite case. On credit, his credits were cut off by an Administrative government decision. It is now illegal to give credit beyond a total which is trivial at least in comparison with what the Western Europeans are giving. They did not get

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<sup>3</sup> The only record found of the September 10 Verification Panel meeting are two-page handwritten notes. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 22, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel–Notes (3)).

<sup>4</sup> This chart and all others mentioned were not attached and have not been found.

MFN. They have witnessed a surge of anti-Soviet sentiment in the US which has swamped the peace movement. This has been unprecedented in recent years and was not seen even in the cold war. Some of the benefits they have received can not be ascribed to Soviet policy. The situations in Portugal, Greece, and Turkey have been exploited by the Soviets but were not created by them. If they were to draw a balance sheet, they would not have too much to count.

I believe the next two or three months will be decisive. Brezhnev has some latitude but if it goes beyond what he thinks is tolerable, he will have to start reversing his position two or three months before the Party Congress. Thus, in the next two months, we will discover the limits beyond on which he can not go.

Brezhnev would like to come to the Party Congress with a successful American Summit behind him, including a SALT agreement and a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. This would help him to claim that détente has been irreversible. This would also be of some help to us, limiting what they could do in the Mid-East and places such as Berlin. Thus, what happens to SALT is quite significant to the entire future course of our relations with the Soviets. The major decisions will be made in the next two months. My feeling is that he believes he has made major concessions on SALT. On the other hand, the US has not made significant concessions recently, at least since you have been President. They have agreed to equal aggregates; they have dropped FBS, which they had insisted upon for six years. Likewise, although it's less important, they dropped their distance on Trident and B-1 limits. And they have accepted our counting rules on verification. This may be because their situation was less reasonable to begin with than ours, but we have not made great concessions.

I would like now to turn to the specific issues—Backfire, cruise missiles, and throw weight—the definition of heavy missiles. These issues have to be decided in relation to the situation in the Soviet Union on the one hand, and in relation to the situation we would face with no agreement. For example, Backfire would be subject to no limits at all without an agreement. Looking at these charts, we would have to see if we can match the numbers of the Soviet buildup and at what costs.

### *Second Tape*

Turning now to the specific issues. Backfire is perhaps the most baffling. It is clear that it has an intercontinental capability at least on one-way missions. There is also no question but that if we count the one-way missions, we would have to consider our FBS. When I stopped at Mildenhall a short while back, the local commander bragged to me about how every plane he had could make it to Moscow! (Laughter)

General Brown: I brought a map to show you where they are assigned to go.



Secretary Kissinger: No, he didn't say they were assigned to Moscow; he was speaking of their capability.

The capability of the Backfire is clearly enough to permit it to attack the US, but our FBS can also reach the Soviet Union. The dilemma is that if we don't count the Backfire, we have a political problem within the US. If we do count it we have a negotiating problem with the Soviets.

It is highly improbable that Brezhnev presented the Backfire for inclusion in the 2400 when he gave our Vladivostok position to the Politburo. For him to say he would have to get rid of the Backfire or 400 other units would cause him a massive problem. This is reinforced by his position in Helsinki, where he made a passionate assertion that the Backfire was not a strategic bomber.

Secretary Schlesinger: My assessment is about what Henry described—with regard to the difficulty of negotiating Backfire into the 2400 ceiling.

Secretary Kissinger: In the Verification Panel we have discussed a number of alternatives. At first, we thought if it could perhaps be placed in the southern USSR, perhaps we could leave it out. Or if they were to visibly [There is a gap in the original.] other aircraft with it, or agree not to provide it tankers. We might use these as indicators of its capability. This is a vulnerable approach, but it is one way to handle it.

President Ford: Could we monitor this, Bill?

Mr Colby: Fairly well.

President Ford: We have that kind of capability?

Mr. Colby: Yes here are the capabilities (shows chart on verification confidence of Backfire collateral constraint).

Secretary Kissinger: Another idea was to count 100 Backfire and the FB-111s outside the agreement. This a little phoney because we have the FB-111s anyway. Furthermore, the result was an overall total of 2500. After the 100, you would have to count any additional Backfire. In my view, this only modifies the problem—I doubt if they would accept it.

President Ford: It would be hard to sell here after we got the 2400 and were told it was too high anyhow.

Secretary Kissinger: The practical effect would be to raise the ceiling to 2500.

A third approach would be to take the Soviets at their word that Backfire was not strategic. We would balance Backfire off versus certain types of US cruise missiles. There would be a trade off between cruise missiles and Backfires in a follow-on negotiation.

President Ford: They would be in addition to the 2400?

Secretary Kissinger: You would say that Backfire is not a strategic bomber, and trade it off versus some tactical aircraft armament. You would have an agreement, for example X number of 100s of Backfires and we would have Y platforms for tactical cruise missiles. I will talk about how to do this—whether to count platforms or conventional cruise missiles—later.

Backfire is the issue with which I have the greatest intellectual problem. We would either have to count its deployment, let them have 100, or move it to a follow-on negotiation, taking Backfire and cruise missiles out, using cruise missiles as pressure to get some kind of ceiling on Backfire.

On cruise missiles, there are a host of problems. There is the type of cruise missile, the range, whether to count or ban, and the platforms on which they are permitted.

I think it is important to keep in mind what the Soviets have heard on cruise missiles. We cannot radically change our scheme of proposals—we cannot come up with something they have never seen. This would guarantee a six week study in Moscow while they check for all the hookers in it. I don't believe their system is prepared to handle this. What they have heard is on ALCMs 3000 km and on SLCMs 1500 km. On land-based, we have accepted 5500 km, which is something of an absurdity. Why the Soviets want it, I don't know.

Mr. President, you told Brezhnev in Helsinki that we had some flexibility on these ranges—we could reduce somewhat on air launch cruise missiles and sea launch cruise missiles, but you didn't nail down a specific number. That is what they have heard and what they have rejected. The rationale is that we would be permitted 11,000 ALCMs on heavy bombers alone. We would wind up with a SALT agreement with 8,000 warheads limited and more than the number limited on cruise missiles. Second, they have said there would be a vast expenditure on cruise missiles to match our program, and one reason they wanted the agreement was to show that there could be a reduction of costs and budgets.

Submarine launch cruise missiles and other sea-based launched cruise missiles were not issues at Vladivostok. We talked only about submarine launched ballistic missiles. Thus, we are well within range of the Vladivostok agreement. Thus, the question is can we reach an agreed position on an air launched cruise missile range that reaches our military requirements and a SLCM range that breaks the deadlock.

The second issue is whether to count cruise missiles above the agreed range or to ban them and the third issue is whether to confine the limits to nuclear armed cruise missiles, or all cruise missiles. If we take the position to count all missiles above the range, and we permit all conventional cruise missiles, verification becomes impossible.

Mr. Colby: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: Everything can be tested as a conventional missile.

Mr. Johnson: You also have the problem of surface to surface. There are no limits on surface to surface cruise missiles less than inter-continental range.

Secretary Kissinger: Up to now, our permission [*position*] has been that cruise missiles are permitted on heavy bombers, but banned on other airplanes, and are permitted on ships and submarines below the agreed range. If we wish to keep open the possibility of deployment on other airplanes, we will have to use Backfire as a tradeoff, or we could use the conventional-nuclear distinction to trade. I have great concerns about covering nuclear only—it leaves an open loophole and makes verification impossible. We could trade Backfire versus the tactical platforms. Or we could take out the SLCMs and use them versus the Backfires. The trouble is, this is quite different from what they have heard, and they might consider it a retrogression.

On the heavy ICBM, the Soviets have moved toward us by proposing to limit the launchway. We have insisted on throw weight, I believe position is essentially correct and we should stick with it. In any event, it is premature to discuss it here today.

Ambassador Johnson: I think that's right.

Secretary Kissinger: They ought to accept it. It's hard to justify why we need a throw weight greater than that of the SS-19.

### *Third Tape*

Ambassador Johnson: There is the related question of a ceiling on the 18.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I consider these subsidiary issues. There are other issues, such as the date at which the reductions to 2400 must be complete. They have proposed 12 months, and we have proposed the effective date. This can be worked out by providing a few months leeway. But these issues of the importance of cruise missiles and Backfire.

In the Verification Panel we tried to develop a series of options for you. But it became clear that it would be better to expose you to the nature of the problems and give you a chance to get any other ideas. We can write in the numbers after you have made your decision on the general issues.

President Ford: Thank you very much—

Ambassador Johnson: There's the problem of mobiles—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Mobiles is one other issue. In SALT I, we made a unilateral statement that mobiles could not be deployed, and as

the Soviets have now accepted our position, we have had increasing second thoughts. My impression is they thought they were moving toward us. This is especially illustrated in that they did not include air mobiles, which they have every reason to believe we would be more capable of deploying. If we decided to go for land mobiles, I do not believe the negotiations would break down. But there are verification problems, plus the problem of Congressional funding.

President Ford: The biggest problem is selling Congress on the location. Everybody wants it in somebody else's backyard. If you put it in a remote area, it is wilderness or national park. I don't think we can sell them.

Secretary Kissinger: In my judgment, the Backfire and cruise missile issues could break the negotiations. The effective date and the mobiles can be settled. Do you agree Alex?

Ambassador Johnson: Yes.

President Ford: It would be interesting if you could find a way to do it and not be disclosed to take a poll of the members of the Congress as whether they would prefer to ban the mobiles for both the US and the Soviets, or to remove the ban with the possibility that we would have to deploy some mobiles. I predict there would be 10 to 1 or more against it. This is based on politics, and has nothing to do with security. But politically, that's just the fact of it.

Ambassador Johnson: I might point out that our position in Geneva is to count, we have never proposed a ban.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with Defense that fixed systems will by the end of the period become vulnerable. If the Soviets keep most of their force in fixed systems as they have it now, they will be extraordinarily vulnerable.

President Ford: Put it the other way—suppose we remove the ban. Which is more difficult—for us to detect theirs, or they ours?

Secretary Schlesinger: To detect and destroy?

President Ford: You have to detect them before you destroy them—

Secretary Schlesinger: They will know our location, but it will be harder for them to destroy them than our fixed land based force.

President Ford: They have a much larger land mass—it would be much harder to detect them.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't believe that is so. This is because once they are deployed, there will be a pattern of deployment which we will be able to detect. We will be able to determine the number and location. In addition, if they draw down 6000 or 7000 pounds of throw weight and replace it with 1000 pounds on mobiles, we are better off strategically.

Secretary Kissinger: The first problem is to monitor the number deployed.

Mr. Colby: We believe we can count within a percent of error. If they put 200 out, we could catch them within 100.

Secretary Kissinger: Is that the same if they deploy 500?

Mr. Colby: It would still be about 100.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mobiles would represent hedges for both sides. Letting both sides deploy them would increase stability in the 1985 time period.

President Ford: It would be interesting to take a cross section of Congress. I bet they would be 10 to 1 against it.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I believe this one is your call—it is not a negotiating problem. It is really your decision on the US program.

President Ford: Have they taken any position Alex?

Ambassador Johnson: No, they have avoided discussing it. Their position implicitly accepts them.

Secretary Kissinger: In Geneva, Gromyko, last May, proposed to ban land mobiles.<sup>5</sup> He thought this was a concern to the US.

Ambassador Johnson: They have avoided discussing it in Geneva.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I agree there is presently a predilection against land mobiles in the Congress. But if we worked on the stability argument, I believe we could turn them around.

President Ford: I can remember, when most of you were not around—you were too young then! (Laughter) I have just learned to use that argument!—The Air Force, in about 1956, brought up a model train. They were going to run mobile ICBM on the train, all over the US. They said this was the best way to do it, and they brought it to the House Armed Services Committee.

General Brown: We even built the system and carried out field trials

President Ford: On the Committee, everyone said, they are fine, but just don't run them in North Carolina or Michigan! You're an optimist if you think you can sell this.

Secretary Schlesinger: We would not try to sell a train mobile—I can promise we would not run it through Chicago! But in the West, we have significant amounts of federal lands that are unoccupied. West of Salt Lake, and some in Idaho. The Soviets would require for the construction of a land mobile force a much higher percent of their force. I

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<sup>5</sup> See Documents 66 and 67.

don't see what we gain by banning them, and we retain some improvement in stability if we keep them.

Mr. Clements: I agree. I should add that we are in the early design stages, and we have lots of ways to deploy them. We may think of new ways. We should retain this option if we can.

President Ford: Let's drop this for now. I will have to think about how to experiment to find out what the Congressional reaction might be.

Mr. Clements: I'm sure you are right.

Dr. Ikle: The decision is different on the R&D program.

General Brown: Our current concept is quite different from the trains—it uses unoccupied land.

President Ford: You would be surprised how many coyotes have to be preserved! (Laughter) It's a totally different world—

General Brown: Well I would bow to your judgment on that.

President Ford: How far along are the systems?

General Brown: We are completing the concept studies.

President Ford: Would this be a variation of the Minuteman—the same type of missile?

General Brown: They would be laid out in a geometric pattern and the missile would move, perhaps on warning—with 20 minutes warning it could move to the shelters, which are hard enough that they could not destroy them.

President Ford: How much separation is there—five miles?

General Brown: No, more like two or three miles.

Secretary Schlesinger: If we ban them, the fellows who criticize the lack of ban will also criticize the ban as reducing stability.

President Ford: Am I correct that you even considered the concept of ballistic missiles in the Great Lakes?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, and you know the only Great Lake we control completely? It is Lake Michigan! (Laughter)

Ambassador Johnson: Now, we have agreed not to do that on your instructions.

President Ford: I would like to get out the newspaper stories when that rumor first broke

Secretary Schlesinger: At RAND, I tried to persuade the Air Force on Great Lakes basing, but since it involved water, they thought of it as a Navy mission and wouldn't touch it

President Ford: I'm sorry, but I think you've got a massive problem.

Secretary Schlesinger: (Talking to charts) On Backfire, we agree that it was designed for peripheral missions. All our studies agree that

it was optimized that way. The difference between what Brezhnev claimed and us might have been a different mission profile—more supersonic flight or more low altitude flight. We fly high altitude nonsupersonic to give it the range to cover all the US.

The biggest problem on Backfire is political—how it will be viewed on the Hill. But we don't want an impossible negotiating position. So I believe one approach might be to set a numerical limit of 200, or conceivably 250.

President Ford: Do they have that many now?

Director Colby: They have only 60 or 70.

Secretary Schlesinger: This would allow criticism on the grounds that it escapes the 2400. We would also try to get estimates on performance factors—engines, and fuel factors—which we have looked at. We don't like putting collateral constraints into the agreement, but we would stress these as indicators.

In the context of this proposal, we believe they should agree to stop discussing FBS. These would be confined to discussion of alliance oriented systems. They have the capability to hit us with Backfire, but we don't count it, so they should not talk about our FBS which are by and large designed for other missions.

President Ford: In Helsinki, they never talked about FBS.<sup>6</sup>

Secretary Kissinger: They agreed not to raise it for this discussion. But they reserve the right to raise it in the next negotiations. I believe Brezhnev needs to be able to say this for political reasons. They did this in SALT I to put it off.

President Ford: It never really came up in Helsinki.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is not an issue now.

Secretary Schlesinger: They have a tendency to bring it up. But these systems are alliance oriented—they are appropriate for MBFR negotiations along with our Allies. As we make concessions on Backfire, this would be useful to obtain.

Turning to the SLCM area. We think of Backfire as having the capability to reach the US. For SLCMs, we intended these for sub-SIOP options. The Soviets talk of them as being used against the Soviet Union. Therefore, we should be willing to indicate our intention not to use them in that manner. Both sides see the capability of the other, but do not look at the intention. Thus, one option would be to permit both sides to have no more than 100 nuclear-armed SLCMs of greater than 300 km range.

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 102.

Secretary Kissinger: The 100 greater than 300 km range could be of any range?

Secretary Schlesinger: We would be prepared to keep it below 1500 km range.

Secretary Kissinger: But there would be no limit on conventionally-armed SLCMs of any range?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

President Ford: Henry, would you ask that first question again—I didn't quite understand it—

Secretary Kissinger: I was questioning the limit beyond which the 100 permitted would not be permitted to go. Jim replied that 1500 km would be the upper limit. In other words, each side would be permitted 100 nuclear-armed cruise missiles in the range of 300 to 1500 km. Both sides would state they were not intended to attack the other, even though they had the capability to do so.

Secretary Schlesinger: The Soviets have been concerned about an opened-ended SLCM program. This approach would limit the numbers, and it would also pick up the Soviet SSN-3 which has a range of about 400 km. They set their range of 600 km to catch our systems but leave theirs out, so we have moved it down to 300 km to catch some of their systems. These would count if they are nuclear armed.

Secretary Kissinger: How many do they have?

Secretary Schlesinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Our cruise missile technology is far, far ahead of theirs with regard to accuracy. For the next decade, we will be alone in the ability to deploy our Tercom very accurate guidance systems. They can accurately hit ships with their radar guidance.

President Ford: At 400 km, these are principally for ship-to-ship attacks?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. We picked the 300 km limit to include theirs.

Mr. Duckett: [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: They could hit New York if they got within 350 km.

General Brown: Why would we have an upper limit on the range?

Secretary Schlesinger: As Henry has said, our position has been 1500 km—

Secretary Kissinger: If you had to count everything above 300 km, they wouldn't care about the range so much.

Secretary Schlesinger: They have 300 SS-N-3s that they wouldn't want to count.



Secretary Kissinger: But they would have to get rid of 200 under your procedure.

Secretary Schlesinger: They don't have a hundred that are nuclear armed—only the 28 are nuclear armed.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing for sure is that Gromyko will not be able to understand all this

Secretary Schlesinger: Turning to the ALCM—these will be necessary to insure bomber penetration. We don't accept the rationale the Soviets presented to Henry for their position, that we would have 11,000 cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: They got it out of *Aviation Week!* (Laughter)

Secretary Schlesinger: We don't accept it. Our heavy bomber payload to some extent offsets their missile payload. They can use their throw weight as it suits their interests, and we should retain the right to use our bomber payload as it suits our interests. As a result of their choice, they could have more smaller yield weapons or fewer greater yield weapons.

If necessary, we could also limit the number of bombers carrying ALCMs to something like 300.

Secretary Kissinger: Coupled with a 2500 km limit?

Secretary Schlesinger: Our analysts keep coming up with 3,000 km. But if necessary, to sweeten it, we could squeeze it to 2500 km.

One controversial issue has been the definition of a cruise missile. We are tremendously excited about the possibilities for conventional cruise missiles.

President Ford: Surface-to-surface?

Secretary Schlesinger: Any kind in a conventional role. For example, in the Black Sea, this could put much of their assets at risks. Either in the form of missiles or RPVs, this is one of the most exciting new systems.

Against the background of Vladivostok, in the discussion there you talked about limits on ballistic missiles; they, apparently in translation, said missiles or including cruise missiles. The Aide-Mémoire<sup>7</sup> just said missiles. If we wind up with a definition which excludes conventional deployment, this will put substantial limits on us and be something of an embarrassment, since we will have yield [*wheeled*] 180 degrees from Vladivostok.

Secretary Kissinger: Why is this off our position in Vladivostok?

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<sup>7</sup> Document 91.

Secretary Schlesinger: Because we said we were prepared to count ballistic missiles on aircraft greater than 600 km range, but did not wish to ban cruise missiles greater than 600 km.

Secretary Kissinger: It was never that clearly stated.

Secretary Schlesinger: Concerning verification, the cruise missile verification problem is inherently unsolvable. In any event, we will have little verification. Thus, we do not wish to constrain our new conventional forces. We feel strongly about their potential. This does not have to be done in the form of a definition, which has raised much controversy. Somewhere else than in the definition it could be stated that the constraints in the agreement do not apply to other than strategic arms.

(Referring to chart) These are some of the systems we have—the Firebee, which has been in operation for several years. The conventional SLCM, which now has a 3700 km range, which would have to be brought down somewhat. A tactical version of the [omission in original] which has a 1700 mile range. We do not want to abandon this type of weapon. (This section should be filled in with the help of Wade’s chart.)

This is an area in which we cannot go to Congress and say we have high confidence in verification. Giving up conventional missiles only slightly improves our verification, but is a major disadvantage. We think the definition should cover only nuclear armed.

Secretary Kissinger: Cruise missiles of any range on any platform would be unlimited as long as they have a conventional warhead?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

Director Ikle: Wouldn’t the range of the conventional ones be lower?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.

Director Ikle: This leaves the alternative of cutting off the range. We would still have the verification problem, but less blatant.

Secretary Schlesinger: We can play around with it, but the Soviets have proposed an agreement that bans ALCMs greater than 600 km on all aircraft other than heavy bombers. But there has been no indication, Alex, that we should accept that—

President Ford: As I understand, we submitted in the Budget for FY 76 both an Air Force and a Navy cruise missile program. The House Appropriations Subcommittee knocked the funds off the Air Force program, leaving only the Navy program. I don’t know why we went with one Navy and one Air Force program—

Secretary Schlesinger: We didn’t want to change our program before Vladivostok. It was the imagery before Vladivostok.

General Brown: Also, the Air Force was ahead in engines, but the Navy ahead in guidance. (This may be backwards.)

Deputy Secretary Clements: We have always planned to bring them together. When we get further along, we will bring them together to make one program.

President Ford: It is awfully naive to think that two programs, which started out as one for the Navy and one for the Air Force, will end up as one program common for both Services—you are not that naive

Secretary Kissinger: When will these become operational?

Secretary Schlesinger: In 1980.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me see if I understand your position—nuclear-armed cruise missiles would be permitted on heavy bombers up to 2500 km, and we would count above that range.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't care whether we count or ban.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, then ban as a way to verify the limit. But would conventional cruise missiles be unlimited, or subject to the 2500 km limit?

Secretary Schlesinger: They have a higher weight than the nuclear ones, so there would be none with range greater than 2500 km.

Secretary Kissinger: So you would be prepared to ban them above that range.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would prefer 3,000 km, but we could go to 2500.

Secretary Kissinger: But your position is that any other ALCMs on any aircraft, would be permitted if conventionally armed. Nuclear armed would be permitted only on heavy bombers, with a range of 2500 km or less. There would be no testing of any ALCM greater than 2500 km range and no nuclear-armed ALCM on any aircraft except heavy bombers—I'm just looking for the specific handles we have here—

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure I'm prepared to go that far—I'm not sure Al Haig would not want to have cruise missiles nuclear armed for his mission in SHAPE.

Secretary Kissinger: If we hang nuclear armed cruise missiles on our FBS, this would cause major problems.

Secretary Schlesinger: Land-based cruise missiles in Europe would be allowed in any case.

Secretary Kissinger: This is an anomaly.

Secretary Schlesinger: It is somewhat nutty.

Secretary Kissinger: It's not clear why they proposed it.

Secretary Schlesinger: But I think your basic point is well taken.

Secretary Kissinger: We might get away by saying that conventionally-armed cruise missiles are not counted. But I see no chance of permitting nuclear armed on our FBS.

Deputy Secretary Clements: You're right.

Secretary Schlesinger: I hadn't thought that through, so I have no complete answer. But we feel strongly that the conventionally-armed cruise missiles will be a major weapon of the next decade.

Director Ikle: Would it be acceptable if we set a 3,000 km limit for all of them? (I am not sure I have this right.)

Secretary Kissinger: We should stick to the numbers we've used in the past—2500 km.

It would be much better if we could have the same limit for both conventional and nuclear SLCMs, and the same limit for both conventional and nuclear ALCMs.

Secretary Schlesinger: We hope to develop a small nuclear-powered ship which would have the conventional punch of a carrier by using cruise missiles at a much smaller cost. This is one of the reasons why we get excited about cruise missiles in the conventional role.

Ambassador Johnson: What about the surface-to-surface cruise missiles below 5500 km?

Secretary Schlesinger: I am happy to let them ride free—

Secretary Kissinger: The cruise missile field is shot through with problems. Have they raised the cruise missile definition in Geneva?

Ambassador Johnson: No.

Secretary Kissinger: It might not be a problem. It has not been raised in any other channels.

How set are you on 300 km?

Secretary Schlesinger: It puts some pressure on the Soviets. We may have to back off to 500 or 600 km. The disadvantage is that we would lose the SS-N-3.

Director Ikle: What advantage is there to these cruise missiles if you are limited to 1500 km?

Secretary Schlesinger: They would be helpful for sub-SIOP options.

Secretary Kissinger: Why do you want 100 nuclear-armed cruise missiles between the lower limit at 1500 km? You propose a lower limit of 300 km above which only 100 would be permitted. Why?

Secretary Schlesinger: For the sub-SIOP options—

Secretary Kissinger: Why would you use cruise missiles for this?

Secretary Schlesinger: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: Why couldn't you use Polaris?

Secretary Schlesinger: Better accuracy with the cruise missiles.

General Brown: Also, low yield and only one warhead on one weapon.

Secretary Schlesinger: This would allow us to exercise limited nuclear options without exposing our bases. We have more than enough warheads for the SIOP.

So in summary, on Backfire, we have sweetened it considerably from the Soviet position—

Secretary Kissinger: (Laughing) I was just looking at Alex who has to negotiate it with the Soviets—it probably doesn't look too sweet to him

Secretary Schlesinger: We agree we will lose this ultimately. We believe we should reserve this as part of a package to get a better agreement on cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: But you don't want Backfire in a separate cruise missile tradeoff?

Secretary Schlesinger: No—although Fred's idea is not a bad one.

On cruise missiles, we want the conventional option, since you can't verify in any event.

Director Colby: [2 lines not declassified]

President Ford: Which one of these would you trade off if I chose to become more flexible on mobiles?

Secretary Schlesinger: You should not have to pay a price to get the position we want on mobiles.

President Ford: You have to pay a price with me! (Laughter) You have to negotiate with me, also, on that! I don't believe you'll get Congress to approve it—

Director Colby: The decision on the system is down stream. We are only talking now about the ban—we don't have to say now we are going to deploy it.

Secretary Schlesinger: I believe the hedge is worth it. I see no great advantage in banning mobiles.

Secretary Kissinger: May I make a procedural suggestion? Jim and I could meet, perhaps Friday morning.<sup>8</sup> It might be possible to construct something for the Soviets to consider seriously. We could then get a counter-proposal and have a serious negotiation underway. But rather than do it here at the table, I think we have enough elements, if we put in some sweeteners, we might be able to handle the conventionally armed cruise missiles, and might be able to develop a package

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<sup>8</sup> No record of a meeting on Friday, September 19, has been found.

which I believe could be negotiable. We could then come back on Saturday morning to you—

President Ford: I won't be back in town until Monday evening.

Secretary Kissinger: Gromyko will be here until the middle of next week. You can't negotiate with him anyway. We can just get his position from him.

President Ford: On Monday night, I could meet with you Henry, or with the NSC. We could then tell Gromyko before he goes back.

Director Ikle: Mr. President, you might consider a separate agreement on cruise missiles and Backfires—

Secretary Kissinger: There's no chance of that working out.

Director Ikle: This would remove the less verifiable elements from the rest of the agreement and may allow us to get a better result for focusing on the relation of SLCMs and Backfires.

President Ford: I think we have gotten the basic ideas. It would be helpful, Jim, if you could have a verification meeting with Henry and I'll get with Henry when I return.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

**106. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1975, 6:17–6:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
The Counselor  
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson  
William G. Hyland, Director, INR  
Jan Lodal, NSC  
John H. Kelly—C (Notetaker)

Kissinger: That was not the most exalted meeting I have ever been in. [A reference to the just concluded meeting with Gromyko.]<sup>2</sup> Both sides are just digging in. Our position is impossible. Over the last 15 months, we have made no concessions. They made a massive concession on FBS at Vladivostok. Now they have conceded on verification. We just keep on inventing things to put in the agreement. Two years ago, I couldn't even get Defense to agree to put a cruise missile on a 747 or a bomber.

Sonnenfeldt: Gromyko wanted to know if we agree to ban cruise missiles from the ocean floor.

Kissinger: Of course, we agree. We hadn't even conceived that anyone would want to put cruise missiles on the ocean floor. We've got a massive problem with these escalating cruise missile programs.

Johnson: Did you make any progress on Backfire?

Kissinger: The Backfire issue is a fraud. If the Backfire is strategic, then our Forward Based Systems (FBS) are strategic. Both can hit the other on one-way missions. Since Backfire cannot reach us, they can use our argument with which we exclude FBS. To try to include Backfire is an outrage.

Johnson: Yes, Backfire is one issue that seems non-negotiable. If it were included, the Soviets would have to cut even more to reach 2400.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, Box 6, SALT, July–October 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kelly. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. According to an unidentified note in the margin: "JK[elly] says HS[onnenfeldt] does not need to see."

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger met with Gromyko at the Department of State on September 19, 4–6:04 p.m.; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 193.

My thought has always been to deal with Backfire through non-circumvention and assurances.

Kissinger: There are two ways of dealing with this. One is the Schlesinger approach, which is impossible. The Soviets will never give us written assurance not to raise FBS in SALT III. If Schlesinger goes to Jackson on this he will raise hell.

Johnson: Cruise missiles are going to stir up a storm with the Doves on the Hill. I don't see why we need it.

Kissinger: Schlesinger thinks he needs the SLCM so he can hit Murmansk in case the Soviets invade Northern Norway.

Sonnenfeldt: He can use Poseidon.

Kissinger: He doesn't know what to use the other warheads on Poseidon for. He says he does not want to use nuclear weapons. He wants to use a conventional cruise missile. That won't do any good. He can't destroy anything with that.

Sonnenfeldt: Their studies indicate that the conventional cruise missile will have a zero CEP.

Lodal: But there is no chance in putting one 2000-pound HE warhead on Murmansk.

Kissinger: It would be criminal to drop an HE warhead with a five million dollar platform on Russia, but he says the cruise missile will only cost 800 thousand dollars.

Lodal: That's ridiculous. It will cost more than that.

Kissinger: How much will it cost?

Lodal: I would guess a couple of million dollars.

Kissinger: Can you do a cost effectiveness study for me?

Lodal: Yes.

Kissinger: I want you to do a cost effectiveness study on how much it would cost to take out the docks in Murmansk. Take a look at his other case, too, which is Iran.

Hyland: If he wants a single warhead, why not keep the Polaris A-1 on station?

Kissinger: It's ludicrous to think that if the Soviets invaded Norway, all we would do would be to destroy the docks in Murmansk.

Sonnenfeldt: Schlesinger's theory is that this is a godsend to keep nuclear wars limited to small exchanges.

Kissinger: This is a road to strategic disaster. If Schlesinger goes on down this road of blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear armed cruise missiles, we will not build a breakout capability. The Soviets will build interchangeable warheads so they can break out anytime they want. If they put a 2000-kilometer ALCM on a Badger aircraft, that old clunker will have a significant strategic capability. These



cruise missiles will enable the Soviets to saturate the US with their medium bomber force. This will enable the Soviets to solve the fratricide problem. They would follow the ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. It would be a nightmare, and Schlesinger admitted it would be. This is really a Kabuki play, it will make no difference in the end. Then there is the Ikle idea of trading Backfire against SLCM platforms. He has to be nuts if he thinks the Soviets would trade 300 planes against 300 ships.

Johnson: Does he want to trade the Backfire against the platform or the individual SLCM?

Sonnenfeldt: The platform.

Kissinger: That's nuts. Trading 400 Backfire against 400 SLCM platforms means a virtually unlimited threat against the Soviets. I thought maybe we could accept the 600 kilometers on SLCMs. [To Johnson] Are you going to share all of this with your delegation? One of our problems is that you read private instructions to everybody on your delegation.

Johnson: No, no. I tried that once to try to take care of a problem. It won't happen again.

Kissinger: Schlesinger wants us to trade Backfire against our 75 FB-111s and 200 SLCMs. Will the Soviets buy?

Johnson: I don't know.

Hyland: The Soviets feel they can sweat it out to the end. Gromyko is under no pressure now to make any concessions.

Johnson: What do we get for the 375 Backfire?

Kissinger: We get eyewash for Congress.

Johnson: Congress will say that makes a new ceiling on the aggregate.

Sonnenfeldt: I can conceive of Congress ratifying the treaty but voting against cruise missiles.

Lodal: Congress will say the agreement is an engine of proliferation.

Kissinger: If we have no new SALT agreement by winter, Congress may solve the cruise missile problem for us.

Hyland: Can we really trade 300 Backfire against 200 SLCMs?

Kissinger: If you take Schlesinger's position, which is wrong, because he makes no distinction between conventional and nuclear armed cruise missiles, and then ban cruise missiles on all aircraft but heavy bombers ...

Lodal: Schlesinger may not want ...

Hyland: Schlesinger doesn't want nuclear warheads on any ALCMs except those on heavy bombers.

Lodal: But the FB–111s are already equipped with a nuclear SRAM, so that's nutty.

Kissinger: Is Schlesinger willing to have no nuclear armed cruise missiles on any aircraft except heavy bombers?

Lodal: He's willing to seek some sort of mutual assurances.

Hyland: Under this approach, would Backfire and SLCMs be outside the agreement?

Kissinger: Yes, these are hybrid systems. I thought up the 200 SLCMs.

Hyland: What do we do on ALCMs?

Kissinger: We could tell the Russians that we will accept a 600-kilometer ALCM limit on all aircraft but heavy bombers. But when should we surface the nuclear versus conventional arming? If I can sign Schlesinger on for a deal without a cruise missile definition, he will then have a vested interest in the deal. How can we tell the Soviets that conventional cruise missiles would run free? How could they be sure we would play it straight?

Sonnenfeldt: Especially after the cobra toxin publicity.<sup>3</sup>

Hyland: There is no way to verify which is nuclear armed and which is conventional.

Kissinger: We should get the proposal on the table with no reference to the conventional armed angle. If they don't accept it, there is no harm done. If they do accept it, then we can send it to Geneva and table the definition. Then the President can overrule Defense so we can compromise with the Soviets.

Sonnenfeldt: It will be very tough to overrule Defense after we have tabled a proposal.

Kissinger: It is very tough to overrule Defense now. When we go to Geneva with this, they will say it is the first time we have mentioned the conventional angle.

Lodal: We can reduce the range.

Kissinger: We'll be driven back to low ranges for conventional warheads. Alex can table this, the Soviets will scream, and we can go back to range issues.

Lodal: One of the problems is that Schlesinger does not know his own programs. The only sensible program is the RPV.

Sonnenfeldt: Someone better get some studies on this terminal guidance system.

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<sup>3</sup> During a Congressional investigation of CIA abuses in September, it was revealed that the CIA had maintained a small stock of biological weapons, including cobra venom.

Kissinger: If we give the Soviets 600 kilometers on SLCMs and on cruise missiles other than heavy bombers, and limit the number of heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs, the Soviets get quite a bit. We will have tough sledding on the nuclear versus conventional arming, but if the HE warhead reduces the range so much it may drive ALCMs back. We need a cost effectiveness study. I'll give Gromyko these ideas. We are meeting them on lots of points. If they plan to build 375 Backfire, then offering them 300 outside the agreement is not bad. We can trade those off against SLCMs and the FB-111. We will hold all SLCMs at 600 kilometers except the 200 which will be matched against Backfire.

Lodal: Are we going to permit the 200 SLCMs outside the 2400?

Kissinger: We might agree to count them in the aggregate. We will have room since we won't build to 2400 anyway.

Hyland: Would the Soviets have freedom to choose between Backfire and SLCMs?

Kissinger: No, they can't have SLCMs between 600 and 2000 kilometers. We can.

Hyland: We can ban ALCMs above the range limit and above 600 on aircraft other than heavy bombers.

Sonnenfeldt: We could even improve on that. We'll have quite a few unfilled positions in the 2400 with which we could count ALCMs.

Johnson: What about ICCMs?

Kissinger: They will stay as it is, but I might tell Gromyko that we would be willing to drop down to 3000 kilometers. I can't imagine why the Soviets accepted 5500 kilometers on ICCMs.

Johnson: The Germans want to build surface-to-surface conventional cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Surface-to-surface conventional cruise missiles are a fraud. They are only good for one thing—nuclear warheads.

Sonnenfeldt: By leaving the ICCM range unchanged, DOD can get all the development they want for cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Why don't they use the cruise missiles for Murmansk from land instead of putting them on F-4s? They could put the land-based cruise missile in Norway.

Lodal: They could build recoverable cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Do we have a chance of selling this package?

Sonnenfeldt: I don't think so, not after the discussion of silo modification.

Johnson: Did you get into that today?

Kissinger: Gromyko just doesn't understand silo dimensions. He says they will accept 32 percent, that they will not widen the dimen-

sions, but he claims they are permitted to go straight down forever. Either Gromyko is a pain in the neck or they're developing a new long, skinny missile.

Johnson: Why the hassle?

Kissinger: If the Soviets give in on throw-weight, we can give them the silo dimension.

Sonnenfeldt: But if we don't get throw-weight, then we need them.

Hyland: We know from an intercept that Brezhnev checked on the size of their new missiles in 1972. They knew the dimension meant 15 percent in either direction. They have not exceeded that.

Kissinger: I'll tell Gromyko we'll take throw-weight in return for the silo dimensions.

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**107. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 20, 1975.

SUBJECT

SALT: U.S. Position

Attached is a note which you may wish to pass to Gromyko in New York. The note conveys the essence of the position you outlined on September 19 after the conclusion of the first SALT session with Gromyko.<sup>2</sup> That position is:

—2500 kilometer range limit on cruise missiles on heavy bombers, with a ban on development, testing, and deployment above that range.

—No more than 300 heavy bombers to be equipped with cruise missiles above 600 kilometer range.

—A separate limit of 275 marginally strategic systems for each side:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 21, SALT, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 106. The note is printed as Document 108. Kissinger and Gromyko also met on September 21, 9:30–11:30 p.m., at the Soviet UN Mission in New York. The memorandum of conversation is Document 196 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

—For the US, FB-111s and SLCMs with ranges between 600 and 2000 kilometers

—For the Soviets, Backfire aircraft.

—Sea-based cruise missiles above 2000 kilometer range would be banned.

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#### 108. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

The US proposes the following approach to resolve the outstanding issues in the new agreement for the limitation of strategic offense armaments.

1. Regarding air launched cruise missiles, the US proposes that they be limited as follows: (a) the development, testing, and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2500 km will be banned; (b) each side will be permitted no more than 300 heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles with a range between 600 and 2500 km; (c) as proposed by the Soviet side cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km will be banned on other aircraft.

2. For the limitation of sea-based cruise missiles, the US accepts the Soviet proposal to ban the deployment of sea-based cruise missiles with a range over 600 except as noted below.

3. The US proposes to ban the development, deployment and testing of sea-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 2000 km.

4. As for the Soviet Backfire bomber the US accepts the Soviet assurance that it is not intended for use as a heavy bomber. With respect to systems in a hybrid category, such as the Backfire bomber, sea-based cruise missiles with a range between 600 km and 2000 km and the US FB-111 bomber, we propose that they not be counted in the ceiling of 2400, but that both sides would be limited to no more than a total of 300 of such systems; for the US this would include the FB-111 bomber and sea-based cruise missiles with a range of between 600 and 2000 km in

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, September 18–21, 1975–Talks with Gromyko. No classification marking. A handwritten note indicates that Gromyko was given this note on September 21 during his meeting with Kissinger in New York; see footnote 2, Document 107.

any combination; for the USSR any combination of Backfire aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles with a range between 600 km and 2000 km.

5. The US position on defining a heavy ICBM remains as previously proposed.

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**109. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 25, 1975.

SUBJECT

Discussion with Foreign Minister Gromyko

The bulk of my discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko were on SALT and the Middle East. There were two fairly long sessions on SALT, one in Washington and the other at the Soviet UN Mission in New York on Sunday.<sup>2</sup>

No particular progress was anticipated on SALT, since Gromyko has to check with the Politburo on such a major issue. And Gromyko is reluctant to be drawn into a dialogue on weapons systems and so forth.

Nevertheless, he made no real attempt to find an opening for moving ahead. At first he repeated the exact same position that the Soviets held at the time of the Helsinki meeting. He belittled the movement we had made at that meeting and since.

In this light, I deferred discussing a resolution of the issue and I warned him that failure to make some progress in October and November would throw the entire question into an election year, which was the least advantageous time for a rational debate in the Congress over ratification, or defer a new agreement until 1977 when the current agreement expires.

In the second session, I outlined a general approach that we could take on the issues of cruise missiles and Backfire bombers. I said, in effect, that we could meet most of their concerns about cruise missiles by agreeing on the range of air-launched missiles that would be permitted

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 33, USSR, Gromyko File, 9/21/75–9/25/75. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 106 and footnote 2, Document 107.

(2500 km) and putting sea-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber into a separate category of hybrid systems.

I suggested that if we could agree on this general framework, we could discuss such issues as the number of bombers armed with cruise missiles and could limit the number of Backfire and sea-based cruise missiles on the Soviet side and the number of FB-111 bombers, sea-based cruise missiles on our side; this agreed level would be outside the 2400 ceiling. He asked a few questions about the meaning of this approach, but, of course, only offered to report our position. Later he told me that it would take two weeks of analysis, and two Politburo meetings to frame a reply.

In general, Gromyko's reactions suggest that Moscow has two very strongly held positions:

1. The Soviets adamantly refuse to agree to open what they call a new "channel" of competition in cruise missiles; they probably, in fact, do see this as a new frontier of strategic weaponry in which our technology gives a commanding advantage, at least in the short run; they probably believe that to allow a virtually unchecked deployment of cruise missiles, even of intermediate ranges, undermines the 2400 ceiling which they so reluctantly conceded in Vladivostok.

2. The second very tough point is their claim, now tied to Brezhnev's personal word, that the Backfire is not a heavy bomber; Gromyko and other members of his staff said bluntly that our position on this convinced them we were not really serious about SALT at all.

—This controversy has a very disturbing aspect: we can find no way that their claim for Backfire's range and payload could be accurate; but if so, it is puzzling why they are so intransigent in maintaining our calculations are dead wrong.

In any case, the upshot of this meeting is that we still have a stalemate, and the hopes of breaking the impasse, if we adhere to our present position, are not favorable.

Moreover, the increasingly severe deadlock in SALT seems to be coming on top of uncertainties and frustrations in Moscow: uncertainties over the grain negotiations, frustration over Portugal and the Middle East, and over their inability to convene a conference of Communist parties in Europe; there are some signs of internal debate on the strategy of other communist parties.

Above all, the impasse on SALT seems to be coinciding with the succession to Brezhnev:

—Gromyko set out a timetable for possible meetings, which makes it fairly obvious that Brezhnev will not come in December, though he held open a possible meeting between you and Brezhnev in Europe as a kind of safety valve.

—Gromyko's conversation suggests (though this is not certain) that they may even have in mind a visit in the spring by someone other than Brezhnev—even though they know that is inconvenient and raises political problems.

—Rumors and reports of Brezhnev's retirement keep reappearing, and we must seriously consider whether the Soviet leadership is not caught up in a debate about his retirement and succession.

—If this is so, then the delays on SALT and the possible collapse of the Vladivostok agreement may add greatly to the uncertainty in Moscow, and SALT may even become an issue in a succession debate.

We have tentatively agreed that we might meet in Europe in early November.

Once we have in hand their response to the SALT position I outlined, we will have to reassess the individual issues, and re-examine the chances for reaching a successful SALT agreement this year.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> On September 25, Kissinger discussed the chances of an agreement by the end of 1975 with the President: "I don't think we will get a SALT agreement. There will be no Brezhnev visit. So we need an alternative strategy. I think the reaction here to Vladivostok really shook them. If we sign and have a brawl here during their Party Congress, that would be very bad for them. I think they want to wait until their Party Congress is over." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 15) Brezhnev and Ford exchanged letters on October 27 and November 4 and again on November 16 and 20 on the impasse in the negotiations; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 212, 214, 217, and 219.



**110. Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 10, 1975.

**SUBJECT**

Viewing SALT from the US-USSR Political Perspective

The difficulties presently being encountered in the SALT negotiations and the related diminishing likelihood of a Summit meeting before the 25th Soviet Party Congress require that the political implications of SALT issues receive the same careful attention as the technical/strategic issues. A SALT agreement—fully acceptable to the United States—and summit before February are important to the direction that the US-Soviet relationship will take in the coming year. Failure of one or both to take place will unquestionably have an impact on the relationship, with the extent of change to be expected the only uncertainty. (This question is addressed more fully in the NIE “The Soviet Assessment of the US,”<sup>2</sup> staffed under NSC Log #7222.) *It is with the political implications of the current situation in the arms negotiations in mind, and the hope that a fresh perspective might be helpful,* that I offer the following thoughts on a possible opportunity for movement in the talks in keeping with U.S. interests.

The negotiations to convert the Vladivostok Accords into a ten year arms agreement have become stalled on three issues: cruise missiles, the Backfire Bomber, and the definition of a heavy ICBM. As I understand it, the current U.S. position provided to the USSR during Foreign Minister Gromyko's recent visit<sup>3</sup> is that the Backfire and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) might be counted in a separate limit in addition to the aggregate of 2400 (i.e., in effect raising the aggregate), that air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) would be constrained only by a 2500 km range limit, and that the heavy ICBM defini-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 20, SALT. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote the following comment at the top of the page: “It is certainly an option to be examined.” On November 3, Scowcroft replaced Kissinger as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, leaving Kissinger to serve only as Secretary of State. Ford announced this and several other significant Cabinet-level personnel changes, including the nomination of Donald Rumsfeld to replace Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, in a press conference that day. (*Public Papers: Ford*, 1975, pp. 1791–1793)

<sup>2</sup> A summary of NIE 11–5–75, “The Soviet Assessment of the US,” October 9, is Document 216 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 106 and footnote 2, Document 107.

tion should be based on throwweight. It is a fact, however, that not one of these issues is specifically addressed in the Vladivostok Aide-Mémoire.<sup>4</sup> These are complicating peripheral issues which emerged during the past year's efforts to tie down the loose ends as required for a formal agreement.

In my opinion, any attempt to incorporate limits on SLCMs and Backfire in an agreement by raising the aggregate will become subject to serious criticism, *and rightly so*, as undermining one of the principal achievements at Vladivostok and the entire concept of arms limitation. It simply is not "limiting" to move from 2400 to e.g., 2600.

*The prospect for an agreement before February changes in my view if the United States is prepared to negotiate central, offensive strategic systems strictly within the confines of the Vladivostok accords (as the US interprets them) and acknowledge that Backfire and cruise missiles are peripheral to the negotiations at this stage.* This apparently was the prevailing view in the SALT community until this year. It is my understanding that NSC and Verification Panel meetings last year focused almost exclusively on questions concerning the aggregate and MIRV levels, with little attention being given to Backfire and cruise missiles. It seems to me that, in fact, while Backfire is an offensive system, the non-central character of the Backfire is supported by intelligence community agreement that the plane is not capable of realistic two way missions against the U.S. without mid-air refueling and that its principal mission is for peripheral attack against China and Europe. By the same token, I understand there is not a strong strategic or tactical requirement for long-range SLCMs and that the Air Force views the ALCM as supplementary to the B-1 bomber and has had no long-standing commitment to a stand-off air-to-surface cruise missile.

If it is realistic to consider that Backfire and cruise missiles are neither central systems nor central issues in the *current* strategic equation, I believe one can consider concluding a worthwhile strategic arms agreement that serves our national security interests. This would involve putting aside systems on which opposing views are for the present irreconcilable, a decision which would be consistent with the building block approach to arms negotiation practiced for the past twelve years and best typified by postponement of consideration of FBS.

In the context of this approach to a SALT agreement, the United States might communicate the following to the Soviet Union:

—The cause of making further concrete progress in the strategic arms negotiations remains central to the interest we share in seeking to reduce the chance of nuclear war.

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<sup>4</sup> Document 91.

—The Vladivostok Accords continue to provide the basis for an agreement that will serve further to reduce tensions and that will meet the national security interests and requirements of both countries.

—The two sides should agree to an aggregate of 2400 delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers (not to include Backfire).

—Both sides will be limited to no more than 1320 ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

—When an aircraft is equipped with air-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range over 600 kilometers, each of such missiles will be counted as one delivery vehicle in the aggregate.

—The Backfire bomber and cruise missiles should be considered peripheral systems and, as such, should not be included in this agreement. Negotiation of limitations on these systems and other peripheral systems such as FBS, will be undertaken in the next stage of SALT to begin immediately after signature of the present agreement.

This would involve a political decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to formally implement the understanding reached at Vladivostok. It would involve the political admission that further talks on outstanding issues are immediately required if the two countries are to continue the SALT process in good faith.

An agreement based upon the above would be subject to criticism. However, past arms agreements, because of their limited character, have also been subjected to criticism. All steps forward in the process of controlling nuclear weapons since 1963 have been limited, but collectively the Test Ban Treaty, the Seabeds Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement have made historic progress toward lessening the danger of general nuclear war and toward gradually expanding the umbrella of controls over strategic arms. The alternative to these steps toward effective limitation of nuclear weapons cannot be failure to make any progress at all.

# 111. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 15, 1975.

## SUBJECT

CIA Views on the Implications for Soviet Policy of the Current SALT Impasse

Director Colby has sent you a memorandum (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> describing the CIA's views of the impact of the current SALT impasse on the Soviet policy toward SALT. The memo covers détente, the Soviet leadership, the future of SALT, and includes the following principal points:

—The Soviets have probably been disappointed with lack of recent benefits from détente and are becoming apprehensive about the strength of the U.S. commitment to détente.

—Although changes in leadership at the Party Congress are possible, the most likely outcome is that Brezhnev will maintain his present position well into 1976.

—On SALT, the Soviets feel as if the U.S. has not responded with concessions comparable to those which the Soviets made in agreeing to drop forward-based systems (FBS) and count all missiles tested with MIRVs as MIRVed when deployed.

—Brezhnev evidently has decided that while another arms control agreement is desirable, it is not essential.

—In view of U.S. election year uncertainties, the Soviets may find it prudent to proceed cautiously during the coming months and are prepared to wait, if necessary, until 1977 to conclude a new agreement.

—However, failure to conclude a new SALT agreement in 1976 would probably dampen Soviet enthusiasm for détente.

—A new agreement could be difficult to negotiate in 1977 since the Soviet leadership will probably be in transition and lack the flexibility to make the concessions necessary to achieve a new agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 20, SALT (22)–(33). Secret. A stamped notation reads: "The President has seen," and the memorandum bears Ford's initials.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are a memorandum from Colby, December 5, on "The Implications for Soviet Policy of the SALT II Impasse," and a covering memorandum from Colby to the President noting: "I asked my analysts to take a look at how SALT II will fit into broader Soviet policy in 1976 and thereafter, taking into account the Party Congress and leadership changes. They conclude that there are strong factors of continuity behind the present Soviet approach to both SALT and détente, but with a chance of some hardening in the medium-term future."

The CIA assessment concludes with the admonition that the breakdown of SALT could undermine the recent efforts at confidence building between the two sides and have an adverse impact on the prospects for positive long-run change in the Soviet system.

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**112. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

SALT Verification Panel Meeting, Friday, December 19, 1975<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this meeting is to continue the discussion of options for dealing with the Backfire and cruise missile issues.

At the last Verification Panel meeting,<sup>3</sup> there was general agreement that the U.S. could agree to include heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit and ban SLCMs above 600 km on submarines. This agreement was reflected in the Options paper which followed (Tab D)<sup>4</sup> where most of the options included these limitations. However, as you are aware, DOD tied these concessions on cruise missiles to counting Backfire in the 2400 aggregate and continued to insist that only nuclear-armed cruise missiles should be limited. This position was given further emphasis by the memo which the Chiefs sent to Rumsfeld (Tab E) in which they took a strong stand against an agreement which included substantive cruise missile limits but which did not count Backfire in the aggregate.

The impact of no agreement on Soviet force levels and the alternative approaches which we could take at this stage of the negotiations are discussed below.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 6, NSC Meetings, SALT, 12/19/1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. Scowcroft did not initial the memorandum. The memorandum was in the briefing material for Kissinger for the Verification Panel meeting of December 19.

<sup>2</sup> Draft minutes of the meeting are *ibid.*, Box 23, Meeting Minutes–Verification Panel, Notes (4).

<sup>3</sup> Minutes of the meeting have not been found; notes of the meeting prepared by the ACDA representative are *ibid.*, Box 6, Verification Panel Meeting, 12/19/75–SALT (2).

<sup>4</sup> Tabs A–E are attached but not printed. Tab E, JCSM–425–75, is dated December 5; the others are undated.

*Impact of No Agreement*

The new NIE on Soviet strategic forces (NIE 11–3/8–75)<sup>5</sup> contained two force projections for the case of no new SALT agreement. One of these (Force 2) assumed that both sides, after the lapse of the Interim Agreement, continues to support the SALT negotiating process and that U.S.-Soviet relations do not deteriorate significantly. The other (Force 4) assumed that U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorate drastically. This force represents the highest level of deployment effort and technological achievement which we believe is possible for the Soviets and is highly unlikely. In the table below, the 1980 Soviet force levels under these last two force projections are compared with the Best Estimate (Force 1) for Soviet force levels under a new SALT agreement based on the Vladivostok accords.

	<u>Force 1</u>	<u>Force 2</u>	<u>Force 4</u>
ICBM Silos	1,398	1,398	1,510
SLBMs	916	958	958
Mobile ICBMs	—	60	100
MIRVed Missiles	958	1,098	1,462
Backfires <sup>6</sup>	110	110	120
Heavy ICBMs	254	254	340
New Heavy Bombers	5	5	15

The differences in these projected forces become striking by 1985, although any force projections ten years into the future are extremely difficult to support.

*Alternative Approaches*

At this stage, there are four basic approaches which we could take to dealing with the Backfire and cruise missile issues. These approaches, which were reflected in the five options considered in the Options paper (the table on the next page summarizes four of the options),<sup>7</sup> are as follows:

—*Deferral (e.g., Option A)*. We could defer the Backfire and cruise missile issues to a later negotiation and attempt to wrap up the other issues at this time. DOD prefers this option since they are ready to fall off on Backfire if there are no limits on cruise missiles. However, this

<sup>5</sup> NIE 11–3/8–75, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s," November 17, is in Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 80M01012A. The NIE is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976.

<sup>6</sup> Not counted in SALT TWO forces under the assumptions used. [Footnote is in the original.]

<sup>7</sup> The table was not attached.

option should only be considered as a fallback in the event we can find no solution to Backfire and cruise missiles and the two sides agree on the need to complete some agreement next year. It should not be a U.S. going-in position since if it fails, SALT TWO will probably fail along with it.

—*Moderate Cruise Missile and Backfire Limits (e.g., Option B)*. We could propose that this agreement include moderate limits on Backfire and cruise missiles with the understanding that both of these issues would be fair game for SALT THREE. The limits on Backfire might consist of simple assurances while cruise missiles could be banned above some unrestrictive range (e.g., 2500 km for ALCMs and 2000–3000 km for SLCMs). Option B is of this nature and adds the additional limit of counting heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit. This option may be acceptable to DOD since it essentially defers the Backfire and SLCM issues, even though the ALCM limits are more substantive.

—*A Tough Initial Position (e.g., Option E)*. We could hang tough at or near our current position and wait for the Soviets to make a substantive move on either Backfire or cruise missiles. This is the current DOD preference if we do not go for deferral. Option E represents such a position with substantive cruise missile limits balanced by a demand that Backfire be counted in the aggregate. It is significant in this option that DOD can agree to significant cruise missile limits, even though they make the political judgment that this is only acceptable with strict limits on Backfire.

—*A Forthcoming U.S. Position (e.g., Options C and D)*. At this time, we could make a major step to accommodate Soviet concerns and agree to impose substantive cruise missile limits and drop the idea of numerical limits on the Backfire force. Since there is now general agreement that the U.S. could accept substantive cruise missile limits in this agreement, the major issue under such an approach is the political acceptability of assurances and collateral constraints on Backfire as opposed to numerical limitations. A major factor in this regard is whether the collateral constraints include strict Backfire tanker limitations; with such limitations, it can legitimately be argued that Backfire will be restricted to one-way missions against the U.S. and thus, be of the same character as U.S. forward-based aircraft.

The latter approach is the most promising for achieving an agreement next year. However, to follow such an approach, DOD must be persuaded to drop their insistence on strict numerical limits on Backfire.

### *Conduct of the Meeting*

Carl Duckett will be prepared to review the latest intelligence on Soviet strategic systems of which the new SLBM tests are the most sig-

nificant. You should avoid a lengthy discussion on the new intelligence and go quickly to a discussion of the options. CIA has prepared a table<sup>8</sup> describing the options covered in the Options paper with the following modifications:

—ACDA has, in its option (C), replaced counting ALCM-carrying heavy bombers in the 1320 MIRV limit with a limit of 300 on such bombers.

—A new option has been added at the request of ACDA; it is essentially an amalgam of the option given to the Soviets in September and their Option C.

**Brent Scowcroft<sup>9</sup>**

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<sup>8</sup> CIA's table was not attached.

<sup>9</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### **113. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 22, 1975, 9:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

SALT (and Angola)

PRINCIPALS

The President

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omissions from the text, are in the original.



## OTHER ATTENDEES

*White House*

Mr. Richard Cheney,  
Assistant to the President  
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security  
Affairs

*State*

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary William  
Clements

*CIA*

Mr. Carl Duckett

*NSC Staff*

Colonel Richard T. Boverie

[Omitted here is discussion of Angola.]

President Ford: Let's explore the issues (SALT). We want to have a position for Henry to take to Moscow in January. The Verification Panel paper<sup>2</sup> gives us some alternatives to look at.

Secretary Kissinger: Bill [Colby], do you have a briefing for us?<sup>3</sup>

Director Colby: Yes. I will start. (Note: The charts used in the briefing are attached at Tab A.)<sup>4</sup>

As you know, Mr. President, the Intelligence Community has recently completed a new estimate on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the Mid-1980s. I would like to emphasize some of the key conclusions of that estimate—particularly as they relate to a prospective SALT TWO agreement.

First of all, I would remind you that the Estimate concluded that, in regard to strategic offensive forces, the Soviets are continuing their broad program of major improvements.

—The trends are about as we had forecast in last year's Estimate,<sup>5</sup> but the diversity of the ballistic missile submarine program and the potential hard-target capabilities of the new Soviet ICBM systems are somewhat greater than we anticipated.

—This chart shows our projections of the combined size of Soviet ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber forces in 1980 and 1985 under different assumptions. It compares our "Best Estimate" of total delivery vehicles and MIRVed missile launchers under the Vladivostok limits with alternative forces the Soviets might build in the absence of such limits.

—The chart illustrates some potential benefits to the U.S. of the ceilings agreed at Vladivostok:

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 112.

<sup>3</sup> Colby's briefing, entitled "Key Points of NIE 11-3/8-75 Related to SALT," is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 20, SALT (22)–(33).

<sup>4</sup> The following charts were attached but are not printed: "Projected Soviet Force Levels Under Varying Assumptions (Total Delivery Vehicles);" "Distance Contours from Long Range Aviation Home and Staging Bases;" "Backfire Production and Deployment, NIE 11-3/8-75, Forces 1 and 2;" "Projected On-Line Missile RVs;" "Projected On-Line Missile RVs and Bomber Weapons;" and "US Silos Surviving Soviet ICBM Attack."

<sup>5</sup> NIE 11-3/8-74; see footnote 5, Document 112.

- a small reduction in Soviet forces to get down to the 2,400 ceiling;
- limitation of the Soviet buildup in both total vehicles and MIRVed launchers which would likely occur without SALT TWO.

[Omitted here is discussion of Colby's briefing.]

[Director Colby:] To sum up, Mr. President, the most important judgments in this year's Estimate are:

During the next ten years, the Soviets almost certainly will not have a first-strike capability to prevent devastating retaliation by the United States.

Short of this, however, Soviet strategic programs present what we believe are real and more proximate dangers to the United States—with or without a SALT TWO agreement. We think there will probably be a continuation of rough strategic equality between the U.S. and USSR, but in the qualitative competition the U.S. technological lead will come under increasing challenge.

Assuming that the judgments of the Estimate are reasonably correct, I believe that foreseeable Soviet strategic forces would not eliminate the USSR's vulnerability to retaliation. Consequently, a crisis resolution probably would not rest on the strategic weapons balance, but rather would depend on other factors, such as the comparative strengths and dispositions of U.S. and Soviet conventional forces. It is relevant in this connection to note the steady increases occurring in Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO, and in the Soviet Navy.

Let me now turn to the future of Soviet politics, which could affect the Soviet strategic posture fully as much as force projections or progress in R&D. These future developments are best looked at in three stages:

—At the present, in the two months before the Party Congress, Brezhnev still is the dominant Soviet leader. His authority seems to be in a slow decline, along with his physical vigor. He is still interested in a SALT agreement, but is clearly prepared to go into the Congress without one if necessary. He doubtless recognizes that both sides have to change their existing formal positions to reach a deal, and he has some room for maneuver—though not, we believe, to the extent of agreeing to include Backfire in a 2,400 aggregate.

—In the months after the Congress, we will probably have roughly the same Soviet leadership, and no major change in SALT policy. But the gradual erosion of Brezhnev's position will continue, as his colleagues begin to cast their minds forward to the post-Brezhnev period. The further this process goes, the more the individual Politburo members will be inclined to avoid risky decisions that might lay them open to attack at a later, more intense phase of the succession competition.

- More important in this period, however, will be Soviet concern about the uncertainties of the U.S. political process. They will be cautious about such hazards as negotiating during an election year, when the whole Soviet-American relations could be pushed into the forefront of partisan debate. We do not believe they will out-and-out refuse to continue discussions, but they seem prepared to wait until 1977 if necessary.

—In the third phase, over the next several years, the Politburo will get deeply into what we expect to be a prolonged succession process. Real factional struggles might develop, with none of the aspirants for power wanting to antagonize the military. Thus the preferences of the marshals will probably be given greater weight in strategic and arms control matters.

Finally, what can we say about the prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations if there is no SALT TWO? We believe Moscow sees this as primarily up to the Americans. The Soviets find détente too useful to want to repudiate it, and would hope to continue on a pragmatic course, governed by the opportunities and risks of specific situations, and still call it détente.

The chief consequences for Soviet foreign policy, therefore, of no SALT agreement would lie more in the area of underlying attitudes than in specific behavior on the international scene. Soviet uncertainty about the future strategic balance would encourage darker interpretations of U.S. intentions.

If the strategic dialogue ended, the beginnings of confidence-building would be interrupted. In the absence of treaty limitations, the Soviet military would be relieved of the healthy necessity to dismantle older systems, and to divulge strategic facts to their chief opponents. All this would clearly be damaging to the prospects for positive long-run change in the Soviet system.

These effects would be magnified if the U.S. reaction to a SALT failure was to discredit détente altogether from the Western side.

President Ford: Thank you, Bill. Any comments?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to comment. Looking back at the seven years I have been here, we have never had to manage a crisis under the current difficult conditions. In 1973, Admiral Zumwalt did not tell us our Navy was vulnerable. We conducted ourselves on the basis of naval superiority. The Soviets had no MIRVs at all—only the single warhead SS-11 and SS-9. In one crisis, we had a 10–1 warhead superiority on the U.S. side—and the Soviets caved. In 1962, we had a 100–1 advantage. Never were the Soviets conscious of parity. In every confrontation under circumstances of U.S. superiority, the Soviets caved inordinately rapidly.

We will not be in that position in the future, and we will have a crisis management problem. Therefore we have to look at the Soviet

threat and capability over the next ten years. SALT may give us no strategic benefits, but it would give us political benefits.

Our most glaring deficiency will be in dealing with regional conflicts. No President has had to manage a crisis in such a situation where we were not overwhelmingly superior in strategic forces. During the Berlin crisis, the Soviets had no strategic capability. In 1962, they had 70 long-range missiles which took seven hours to fuel.

The situation is changed, and this will present a real strategic problem, not only in a crisis, but in the way the Soviets throw their weight around. This is one reason why Angola is so important; we don't want to whet the Soviet appetite.

[Omitted here is discussion of Angola.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Now let's move into the SALT discussion.

Mr. President, we are not here to ask you for a decision. We simply want to put the issues before you to give you a chance to think about them when you are in Vail. When you come back, we will have a more detailed discussion of the issues.

At Vladivostok, we agreed on the total number of vehicles and MIRVs. We said that missiles with greater than 600 km range on bombers would be counted. There is an ambiguity here as to whether these include cruise missiles or only ballistic missiles. We said they were ballistic missiles; the Soviets said that all air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers should be counted. Nothing was said about SLCMs—submarine-launched or ship-launched.

The Soviets would perceive it as a concession on their part if we end up counting anything less than all the cruise missiles. Nothing was said at Vladivostok about the Backfire. This issue emerged afterwards.

Therefore, we have two hang-ups: one the Backfire and the other the cruise missile situation. Our position had been that we should count the Backfire. Their position has been that we should count cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 km on heavy bombers and ban all other cruise missiles. Gromyko told me that SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km were not negotiable.

Since Vladivostok, it is fair to say that the Soviets have made one major concession: that is, they are using our counting rules for MIRVs. The practical effect of this is to limit them to less than 1300 MIRVs unless they MIRV all SS-18s. So far, however, all of their SS-18s have only single warheads. They apparently are planning no more than 180 SS-18s with MIRVs. This would give them a total of 1,180 MIRV launchers rather than 1,316. At 12 RVs each, this gives us around 2,200 warheads free. However, they have linked the MIRV counting rule to the cruise missile issue.

This leaves us now with the following issues: First, how do we deal with the Backfire in light of the forward based system problem and the fact that this is a big issue in the Soviet mind? Second, what do we do about cruise missiles with greater than 600 km range on heavy bombers? Third, how do we deal with SLCMs with greater than 600 km range on submarines or ships? And fourth, what do we do about land-based cruise missiles? The Soviets want to permit land-based cruise missiles up to a 5,500 km range. This is hard to understand; we could cover the Soviet Union with deployments in Europe. This would also be a disadvantage since the Soviets could use their land-based cruise missile program to test all conceivable modes. Our view is that we should limit land-based cruise missiles to a 2,500 km range.

Six options were presented to the Verification Panel for consideration. Don and I have narrowed these to three for purposes of simplification. The first option is one which would be preferred by the Joint Chiefs. It would defer any limitation on Backfire and cruise missiles at this time, but these would be taken up in the next round of SALT talks in 1977. The Chiefs would agree to a time limit on the negotiations—for example, two years—to settle the Backfire and cruise missile issues.

This option would consolidate the gains made at Vladivostok which would go into effect in October 1977. The follow-on agreement would take effect in 1979 or 1980.

An advantage of this option is that it would use cruise missiles to offset Backfire; therefore, both would run free.

I have said I have doubts about the negotiability of this option. First, the Soviets have rejected counting Backfire in SALT as a matter of principle. The Soviets would also feel that it would be bad for them to let cruise missiles run free. They would feel they would be losing in the process. They think our Backfire position is a trick anyway.

From the domestic point of view, I wonder whether there is a danger in this option because all arms controllers will scream “fraud.” They will say this will leave more cruise missiles uncontrolled than ballistic missiles controlled. Therefore, the liberal Democrats will be against us on our cruise missile programs and our request for funds for cruise missiles.

I saw Muskie at the football game yesterday and Harriman at dinner last night. They told me, “We will help you by cutting off funds for the cruise missile.”

We will be driven by our own debate to limiting cruise missiles to the Backfire numbers. Also, we will have a massive FBS problem.

President Ford: We would be giving up what we gained in Vladivostok.

Secretary Kissinger: Once we accept a unilateral construction, even if the Soviets break it, we are going to have hellish ability to go ahead. I

cannot believe the Soviets will give us both the MIRV counting rule, plus a throw weight limitation on the SS-19, plus cruise missiles.

We could only go back to a crude version of Vladivostok, if at all. However, the option does have these advantages. It is the least contentious option; it would consolidate the Vladivostok gains; and it would maintain momentum in SALT.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is an opposite argument to the one Henry made. In the event we agree on this option, it may improve the position of the cruise missile in Congress. We would have an argument similar to the one for MBFR troop levels in Europe—the last thing we want to do is reduce unilaterally. Therefore, this may actually decrease Congressional leverage on the cruise missile.

Secretary Clements: I want to endorse what Don has said. I talked to McIntyre about this and Don is right. They've gone along with us on cruise missiles because it is part of our SALT negotiations. They don't want us to constrain ourselves.

President Ford: In the House they knocked out the Air Force cruise missile, but kept the SLCM.

Secretary Clements: Well, the Congress did this, but not to help our negotiations. The Air Force cruise missile is built by Boeing, but the SLCM is built by LTV. Only one person, George Mahon, wanted to eliminate the Air Force cruise missile, and he did this, in my view, to help LTV and to eliminate the Air Force competition. However, in conference, both programs were put back in. Mahon has been the only one who had been fighting the Air Force program.

President Ford: He was taking care of Dallas.

Secretary Clements: And screwing Boeing.

Secretary Kissinger: In my opinion, there is only one chance in 20 that the Soviets would accept this option. They will not accept straight deferral, in my judgment.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The test is to find some language that does not prejudge the matter at all, which could be the Soviet hang-up. We ought to be able to find a way to find the right kind of language.

President Ford: Doesn't deferral give them a free hand to let them go ahead with their cruise missile program?

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is no question about it. However, this option is not really the preferred option. It is useful only in that it would avoid not having any SALT agreement at all. What it does is allow us to state that we have two problem areas which we have not yet resolved.

President Ford: I can see it from our point of view, but we must face the reality of whether they would do it.

Director Colby: The Soviets see the cruise missile as an enormous problem to them. They have an enormous investment in air defenses and they see the cruise missile as our way to get around their air defenses.

Secretary Clements: They will have an interest in cruise missile programs but it will not be the same interest as ours. They do not have the capability of air-launching cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: They won't see them coming.

Director Colby: We have no air defenses on our side. The Soviets have no urgent reason to develop air-launched cruise missiles.

Mr. Duckett: Our last photography shows that the Soviets have a new cruise missile at the test site. We have not determined its characteristics yet.

Secretary Kissinger: They have no requirement for a cruise missile. Therefore, we can constrain their optimum size, keeping good ones for us and bad for them. We can make great strides.

Secretary Rumsfeld: This is why we have some leverage with cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Why must they answer cruise missiles with cruise missiles? Maybe they would answer our cruise missile programs with ballistic missiles.

President Ford: Because they may want to take advantage of their program.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's discuss another option. We could count Backfire in the 2400 aggregate. We could count, within the 1320 MIRV limit, those heavy bombers with cruise missiles of greater than 600 km range. We could ban SLCMs above 600 km on submarines. SLCMs with a 2500 km range or 2000 km range on surface ships would run free.

This would involve two significant concessions: we would ban long-range cruise missiles on submarines and we would count heavy bombers with ALCMs as MIRVs.

General Brown: If we want all our bombers to carry ALCMs, we would have to knock off that many MIRVed missiles.

President Ford: Even if we pulled B-52s out of mothballs, we would not get up to the 2400 level.

Brent Scowcroft: The applicable ceiling here is the 1320 MIRV limit.

Secretary Kissinger: This is a most creative approach. It will interest the Soviets. However, its chief difficulty is whether the Soviets would count Backfire. I do not believe they will count the Backfire. If they have to count 400 Backfire, they will have to dismantle some ICBMs. It will also cause an FBS problem and a domestic political problem for the Soviets.

President Ford: If the Backfire is counted as a strategic weapon, and if they had developed a cruise missile they could put ALCMs on the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would count against the MIRV ceiling. Without an ALCM, the Backfire would be counted in the 2400 level alone. Or, if it carries an ALCM, it would count both against the 2400 level and the 1320 ceiling.

General Brown: I think there was only one reason why they would go to an ALCM for the Backfire. If they get the accuracy with their ALCM, it is better than a gravity bomb.

Director Colby: They could use a shorter range ALCM.

General Brown: It goes back to the fact that we don't have any air defenses to speak of.

Secretary Kissinger: This is worse than the October proposal which they have already rejected. In this option, we would be letting SLCMs go free and counting their Backfire. This is harder than the October proposal where SLCMs and Backfires were outside the basic accords in some kind of grey area. The October proposal was closer to deferral. Their view of this option would be that they would be losing a handle on SLCMs while having to count Backfire.

Mr. President, we are not asking for a decision at this time. We just want to present this for your consideration. The Verification Panel must do more work before we could confidently sell this in Moscow.

Secretary Rumsfeld: One advantage of this option is that the Soviets are already counting a heavy bomber, the Bison. From a domestic standpoint, this has assisted somewhat.

A second point is that we must consider the world perception, as Secretary Kissinger has mentioned. If the Backfire is not counted, we must consider the perception here, in Europe, and elsewhere. Statistically, the Backfire has a substantial capability.

The point I am making is that while we might lose at negotiability, it would help us in selling it here and elsewhere. Whatever we come up with must lend itself to public discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: I am arguing not just for negotiability. What we have must be both negotiable and equitable from a strategic viewpoint.

Director Colby: Could we reduce the land-based cruise missile range to 2500 km as a counter to SLCMs? [No answer.]

Secretary Kissinger: If these options are not saleable and acceptable, then we have two issues: Negotiating tactics, and a decision on where we go.

With respect to negotiating tactics, how do we present an option if there is a 90 percent chance that it will be rejected? Also, what can we table that will have a chance of acceptance?



There are two schools of thought on negotiating tactics. One is that we should take a tough stance. The other is that we should make “preemptive concessions,” as Don’s predecessor phrased it. My view is that this is the better negotiating tactic. We go ahead with some concessions but we then stick hard on what we do have. The other tactics may look tough, but they lose credibility. I think we should get to our concession point fast, but then don’t yield. Of course, we must build some air into our proposal for retreat purposes.

With the Chinese, we give them our best judgment and if they agree, they say “ok.” However, with the Soviets, if we hand their own proposal to them, they must argue about it for nights and then take it to the Politburo.

Let’s now look at the third option category. Basically, this looks for a way of not counting the Backfire, plus it includes elements of the second option counting heavy bombers with ALCMs as MIRVs.

There is a shopping list of elements in these packages.

To hang the Backfire on Soviet assurances would be dangerous. Assurances are inherently soft. For example, if the Soviets staged their bombers through Arctic bases in a crisis, would this result in an abrogation of SALT?

What else could we do with the Backfire? There are several possibilities.

First, we need not offer the Soviets the whole SLCM package. We could go back to something like the October proposal. We could say that all cruise missiles, with the exception of ship-launched cruise missiles, would be limited. We could use the ship-launched SLCM limit as an offset to the Backfire. If they increase their Backfire deployments above a certain number, then our other cruise missile limitations would be off.

As Fred [Ikle] has suggested, we can put all offset systems into a separate Protocol addressing hybrid systems—the grey area. We could balance Backfire against the ship-launched SLCMs up to 1980 or 1981 in this Protocol.

Alternatively, we could ask the Soviets to agree to reducing the aggregate to 2300, or even 2200. However, I do not think it would be possible to get the Soviets to agree to a 2200 level. The 2300 level would be a strain on the Soviets, but not on us. This would have the effect of counting 100 Backfires.

No one recommends letting the Backfire run free on assurances alone. Therefore, this would entail having some kind of trade-off such as reducing the total aggregate level, or having a separate Protocol.

Dr. Ikle: The theater balance is of concern to the Soviets. If we use a separate Protocol, it may be more negotiable since no Backfires would be in SALT. It would also limit the upgrading of cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: This would be a compromise. We could have a mixed option where some cruise missiles run free against their Backfire. This hopefully avoids the FBS problem and gives the Soviets a way out. However, we wouldn't want an agreement on a mixed option that takes Backfire out of the count that is not saleable or in the strategic interests of the United States. The Chiefs and others are now working on developing some kind of updated mixed package.

Director Colby: The Soviets will do nothing on Backfire without raising the FBS issue.

General Brown: If they raise the FBS issue, it automatically brings the Backfire into the picture.

Secretary Kissinger: We can consider various mixed packages. We can have a Protocol as Fred [Ikle] has suggested. We can have a unilateral U.S. statement that says, "When the Soviets produce Backfire above a certain number, the deployment restraints on SLCMs are off."

We can have a mixed package where the Soviets agree to reducing to the 2300 aggregate level and we set off the SLCMs versus Backfire; we can sell this as reducing the Backfire.

President Ford: The perception associated with reducing the aggregate from 2400 to 2300 would be very saleable.

Dr. Ikle: As long as it is not considered a substitute for follow-on reductions.

President Ford: I want to compliment you all for taking a fresh look and expanding the alternatives. There is some flexibility here. Between now and the first week in January, I would like you to look at something beyond the first two options and give me the prospects. Perhaps we can come up with something which is in the best interests of the United States and is saleable.

In the next two weeks, I would like you to finely tune your options and give Henry an option in addition to the first two. Maybe this won't work, but at least we will have made our best possible effort.

Mr. Duckett: Mr. President, I'd like to take one minute on a compliance issue.

Secretary Rumsfeld: In developing a mixed package, we must consider the acceptability in a strategic sense, its negotiability, and its saleability at home. For any mixed package, we must ask also about its simplicity. We must ask whether it can be explained sensibly.

Dr. Ikle: The verification problem of cruise missiles is hard to explain. I believe we will be able to explain it only if we have a separate Protocol. Otherwise, the verification problem is almost impossible to explain for cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We must recall the elements to consider. We have to consider the relationship of the FBS and Backfire issues. We

must understand the degree to which cruise missiles running free offset Backfire. We must understand the degree to which not counting Backfire is offset, for example, by its inability to carry long-range cruise missiles.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We must also remember the importance of not using soft assurances.

Secretary Kissinger: Assurances are only frosting on the cake.

President Ford: The kind of trust that has been built negates the use of assurances. They won't be bought.

Mr. Duckett: [4 lines not declassified]

President Ford: You have late photography?

Director Colby: Yes, all of the places in question were along pipelines so we started looking closely at the pipelines.

Secretary Kissinger: This is a good example of the need to put this kind of information in a temporary hold status.

Director Colby: I agree.

President Ford: Thank you very much. Have a good holiday.

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#### 114. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 8, 1976, 4–6:30 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

SALT

##### PRINCIPALS

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

## OTHER ATTENDEES

*White House*

Mr. Richard Cheney,  
Assistant to the President  
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

*State*

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt,  
Counselor  
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary William  
Clements  
Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)  
James P. Wade, Jr.

*NSC Staff*

Colonel Richard T. Boverie

President Ford: We are back at a subject (SALT) we have gone over before. This is probably the most important decision I will have to make this term. With respect to both the long-term and short-term interests of this country, a good SALT agreement is extremely important. We should try to seek as much unanimity as possible. I have read and re-read the options and studied the variety of alternatives.<sup>2</sup> For the meeting today, I would like you to give me the best possible condensation and listing of alternatives so that I can make a decision. Bill (Colby), will you start with a summary of intelligence.

Director Colby: (*Note:* The charts used by Director Colby are attached at Tab A.)<sup>3</sup> Mr. President, at your last NSC meeting on SALT, in December, I reviewed some of our key conclusions about trends in Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict, particularly as they might be affected by a SALT II agreement. As we again approach the problem of negotiating with the Soviets, I would like to remind you of the way they are likely to view the quantitative relationship of strategic forces.

We have been unable to deduce this view with precision, for the Soviets consider many factors in assessing the strategic balance, but we do know from their writings, deployments, and some of their SALT positions that they view strategic forces as comprising both systems designed for peripheral attack and those for intercontinental attack.

In that context, these charts illustrate how they might expect the quantitative balance to appear now and in 1980 if the SALT II understanding is codified. If there is no SALT II agreement, we would expect Soviet force levels to be somewhat higher than shown here in 1980 and 1985.

President Ford: Somewhat higher?

Director Colby: Somewhat higher, if they are not limited, if there is no SALT II.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 112, which was discussed at the previous NSC meeting on December 22, 1975 (see Document 113).

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed are two charts: "Possible Soviet View of 1976 'Strategic' Forces;" "Possible Soviet View of 1980 'Strategic' Forces."

President Ford: How do you estimate what we would do?

Director Colby: We use our programmed forces.

We have not shown 1985 figures for the Soviets since there are too many uncertainties in trying to estimate that far out.

The Western forces shown include the intercontinental strike forces of the U.S. and, in dashed lines, the nuclear bombers and missiles of our European allies as well as our forward based nuclear systems—all of which the Soviets have insisted contribute to the strategic balance. They also include a numerically small threat from China (which we have not shown here).

The charts also show Soviet medium bombers, MRBMs, and IRBMs in dashed lines. We know that the Soviets include these systems in their own evaluation of the overall balance, although they have resisted their inclusion in SALT.

The 1980 chart illustrates that in our best SALT-limited estimate, the present modernization and MIRV programs will considerably expand the number of Soviet weapons—warheads and bombs—in spite of a relatively stable number of delivery vehicles—ICBMs, SLCMs, and bombers.

The Backfire is shown separately on this chart.<sup>4</sup> We believe that at Vladivostok the Soviets agreed to limit intercontinental systems to equal aggregate levels without including either Backfire or FBS in those levels.

President Ford: By 1980 they will add around 200 Backfires?

Director Colby: The Backfire production by 1980 will be around 140 for their long-range aviation forces, and 140 for naval aviation.

The comparative number of weapons is evidently an important strategic measure to the Soviets. As you see, they now have fewer weapons than the U.S. and could, therefore, view their current conversion and deployment programs in part as rectifying this imbalance.

Other quantitative measures are also important to the Soviets:

—The Soviets currently lead the U.S. in equivalent megatonnage (and in missile throw weight, not shown here), which the character of their chosen weapon systems indicates they value higher. We project that, with their current programs, their advantages in these respects will continue to grow.

—The Soviets also consider the capability of their forces to survive and to attack various target sets under various scenarios. Thus, these boards provide only an indication of how they might view the balance,

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<sup>4</sup> Apparent reference to a chart on Backfire production, which was shown at the previous NSC meeting on December 22, 1975; see footnote 4, Document 113.

rather than a definitive treatment of the outcome of a strategic exchange.

As I indicated at the last NSC meeting, SALT II limitations would hold down the gross numbers of Soviet delivery vehicles to some extent and would limit the more extreme possibilities for growth in numbers of Soviet weapons. They would not change other asymmetries in the forces of the two sides, such as megatons and missile throw weight, or reduce the qualitative improvements in Soviet forces which we expect.

Finally, Mr. President, I would note that the Soviets view these issues against the overall Soviet-U.S. relationship. We believe that the following factors are prominent in Brezhnev's current negotiating perspective:

—His view that the Soviets have already moved further than the U.S. in SALT negotiations by agreeing at Vladivostok to equal aggregates without forward-based systems and by subsequently promising to meet U.S. requirements on MIRV counting rules;

—Second, his probable feeling that the U.S. is displaying a degree of ambivalence about its role in the world that makes it unnecessary for the USSR to concede more than the U.S. on remaining SALT II issues; and

—Last, the likelihood that the USSR's own foreign policy and economic setbacks, an imminent Party Congress, and Brezhnev's diminished vigor all combine to make it seem unwise for him to try to accommodate maximum U.S. demands on Backfire and cruise missiles.

President Ford: Thank you, Bill. Are there any questions?

Dr. Ikle: Do your force charts include cruise missiles?

Director Colby: No.

General Brown: I would be interested in the details of how you computed megatonnage. We computed megatonnage for 1985, and at a hasty glance, I believe it is quite different from Bill's. I won't discuss it further, but my silence does not imply agreement. Colby's numbers show an insignificant contribution from the Backfire. Ours show that in 1985, with about 500 Backfire, the Backfire contributes about 30–40 percent of the total force megatonnage.

President Ford: What percent?

General Brown: 30–40 percent of the megatonnage.

Secretary Kissinger: That assumes it is all for use against the U.S. It does not take into account the cruise missiles or FBS factors.

General Brown: I'm speaking of it only in terms of percentage of the Soviet force.

Director Colby: In 1980 they will have produced around 270 Backfires. By 1985 they will have 550 Backfire. Therefore, if you double the number of Backfire, you double the megatonnage shown here.

Secretary Rumsfeld: But that would not be near 30 to 40 percent.

General Brown: Our people should get together and look at this.

Brent Scowcroft: If you loaded the Soviet forces with Badgers, you would come out about the same, but there is no worry about the Badger.

General Brown: This relates to Secretary Kissinger's concern (expressed at the recent SIOP briefing)<sup>5</sup> about holding forces in reserve. One way for the Soviets to use their force is to employ their heavy missiles and air-launch missiles against us and use their bombers for non-time-urgent targets, and they would still have a sizeable reserve. This is our concept of reserve forces.

Secretary Kissinger: You have killed 140 million Americans.

General Brown: They would hit the industrial base to kill civilians.

Secretary Kissinger: Then why do the Soviets have a missile force?

General Brown: Why do we have our missile force?

President Ford: Is there a question about the Badgers?

General Brown: Not with me.

President Ford: Are they comparable with the Backfire?

General Brown: They are not the same percentage of the force as Backfire.

President Ford: This is a startling chart;<sup>6</sup> I am surprised I have not seen it before.

General Brown: There are two factors. First, we have drawn up a revised Backfire production estimate—from 300 to 500. Second, the first time the information was shown in this form was this week. The Backfire megatonnage is now up to 40 percent for 1985. Bill Colby's chart shows the percentage only for 1980.

President Ford: The chart shows that the U.S. has only slightly better than 50 percent of the Soviet megatonnage. Even that bar in 1980 is significant.

Director Colby: We will get together with the JCS and DIA and come up with 1985 figures for Backfire.

President Ford: I would like to see what you come up with.

Dr. Ikle: There are so many ways to cover megatonnage.

Director Colby: This chart for 1976 includes approximately 580 medium bombers in the European threat. It leaves out about 2000 fighter/bomber types not currently configured for nuclear weapons.

Secretary Rumsfeld: What about U.S. FBS?

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<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>6</sup> This Defense Department chart on the Backfire was not found.

Director Colby: U.S. FBS include 770 odd systems approximately, including those in the Pacific. There are about 1000 additional U.S. and NATO weapons not configured for nuclear weapons.

President Ford: Henry, would you proceed with your briefing.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to sum up the options prepared by the VP. These are summarized on the chart,<sup>7</sup> and are self-explanatory. The chart shows four options categories. You can put together different variations once the basic principle is decided—the principle you want to follow.

For each of the options, one must ask three questions.

First, is the option compatible with the national interest, in the national interest? This depends on its strategic impact, not just its negotiability. We have done detailed analyses on each of the options, far more detailed than simply counting megatonnage.

Second, one must ask what the situation would be in the absence of an agreement. How do you count Backfire megatonnage if there is no agreement? What are the specific countermeasures?

Third, you must ask if the option is negotiable. This goes back to Bill Colby's point—what is the negotiating position as the Soviets see our relative forces?

I agree with Bill (Colby) that the Soviets have made all the concessions in this round. There have been no U.S. concessions except to play with the numbers. The Soviets took FBS out at Vladivostok. They are using our counting rules, which give us some 120 SS-18s or 2000 warheads for nothing. Every SS-18 is counted as a MIRV, and every one deployed to date has not been MIRVed.

The Soviet position is that Backfire should not be counted; that all missiles with greater than 600 kilometer range on heavy bombers should be counted; and that all missiles with greater than 600 kilometer range on other platforms should be banned. Therefore, every one of our options requests a Soviet change. Thus, it is not correct to put forth an option simply to see how they will respond.

Ambassador Johnson: The Soviets want to permit land-based cruise missiles up to 5500 kilometer range.

Secretary Kissinger: Right, but the change we ask is in our favor.

We must ask whether an option is salable. Given the discussions the past two years in this country, we may have a hell of a time selling it. Mr. President, you must take this into account.

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 113.



In addition, you (President Ford) will have to decide by what method we should negotiate. We can take one leap to our final position, or we can have a series of fallbacks leading to our final position.

My instinct is that in Geneva you take small steps. But in Moscow with Brezhnev you give him something he can put to the Politburo. Therefore, our position should be as close to our final position as we can make it.

I would now like to discuss the options. Some of these we can use as fallbacks but some we cannot.

For Option I, the basic proposal is to codify Vladivostok. We would defer the Backfire and cruise missile negotiations until an agreed later date. In the future, they could run free, or if they would agree to build no more than a certain number of Backfire, we would build no more than a certain number of cruise missiles.

President Ford: How far along are we in codification of Vladivostok as Henry defines it.

Ambassador Johnson: We are quite far down the road.

Secretary Kissinger: In my judgment, deferral is almost certain not to be accepted by the Soviets, at least not initially. It implies Backfire will be counted. Since the counting rules are linked to resolution of the cruise missile issue, there would be no throw weight limit until the cruise missile issue is settled.

It is conceivable that if we go through other options and fail, then we might arrive at a version of deferral when we are at the end of the line. But we would end up without the counting rule; we would then have to rely on national technical means for MIRV verification.

We might have a chance of Option I at the last stage of negotiations, but without a throw weight limit and without the counting rule.

Secretary Rumsfeld: This depends on agreement by a date certain.

Secretary Kissinger: But both Backfire and cruise missiles could run free until 1985. It depends on how the negotiations go. Until November 1979 we could say we would not deploy beyond a certain number of cruise missiles if they do not go beyond a certain number of Backfires. We could say July 1, 1979. The problem is what do we do on July 1, 1979 if there is no agreement. Either the basic agreement lapses or we go into cruise missile deployment.

President Ford: There would be no constraints on their cruise missile program either. They couldn't deploy them but they could do R&D.

Secretary Kissinger: This would make a tough decision in 1977. The agreement would lapse in 1979, or continue to 1985 with cruise missiles running free.

Secretary Rumsfeld: If they say they have given up on FBS as being out of SALT II, the Backfire can be given up too.

Secretary Kissinger: We can take the same position with the Backfire as they do with FBS. We can treat it in SALT III, not SALT II.

Ambassador Johnson: I agree with Don's point—that they may not come back without also saying that we need to include FBS in the follow-on negotiations.

Secretary Kissinger: This option is unlikely to be accepted; as an opening position it would probably be rejected. It should be viewed as an absolutely desperate last attempt—at the end of the line. My instinct is that it would bring in FBS but would not result in the counting rule or throw weight limit. (There was a brief interruption of the meeting at this time as a note was brought to the President informing him of the death of Chou En Lai.)

Secretary Kissinger: My recommendation is that we try any of the other options as a first step and then surface Option I. If we first try Option I and it is turned down we have no place to go. We would have to go from simplicity to complexity.

My recommendation is that even if we want Option I we should take one of the others first for negotiating purposes.

Let's now look at Option IV. From the standpoint of salability here and our national interest this is probably the best.

Option IV would count Backfire in the aggregate. It would ban ALCMs on heavy bombers above 2500 kilometers. It would count heavy bombers with ALCMs above 600 kilometers in the MIRV limit. It would ban ALCMs above 600 kilometers on other aircraft. It would ban SLCMs on submarines above 600 kilometers. It would ban SLCMs on surface ships above 2500 kilometers. It would ban land-based cruise missiles above 2500 kilometers.

From the point of view of our strategic interests, and the throw weight considerations of General Brown, Option IV is the most manageable. The only significant concession that it makes is that it counts heavy bombers with ALCMs as MIRVs.

President Ford: ALCMs up to 2500 kilometers?

General Brown: Correct. But we would like long-range SLCMs on submarines, but this is not a hard point.

Secretary Kissinger: We would be giving up some Minuteman III or Poseidons for ALCMs. For the Soviets, they must count 500 Backfire in the 2400 aggregate. Already they must destroy 200 systems. Therefore, under this option they would have to destroy 700 of their existing missiles, or about 25 to 30% of their force.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Or modify some of their force.

Secretary Kissinger: How?

Secretary Rumsfeld: If they agree to Option IV they could get around destroying some of their force by modifying the Backfire so it is no longer a gray area system.

Secretary Kissinger: Once it is a bomber, they would have to redesign it completely.

Secretary Clements: No. General Rowny and I say the Russians could modify it—clip its wings so to speak.

Secretary Kissinger: This means they would have to count the Backfire or redesign it. I don't know how you (General Brown) react to modifying your force. But nobody who has talked to the Soviets says there is any chance of counting the Backfire in the aggregate. I spoke to Gromyko when we were considering hybrid systems. I asked him how many in the Politboro understand SALT. He said four. I knew he was exaggerating since he doesn't understand it himself. But they do understand the Backfire and it is clear they are not going to count the Backfire.

If we want to get Option I, a good way would be to start with Option IV.

Ambassador Johnson: I heartily agree.

Secretary Kissinger: The next option we will look at is Option II. I believe we are unanimous in saying that the Soviets probably will not accept it and that it is not salable in this country. It has no constraints on Backfire, and the only limit on cruise missiles is one which has already been rejected. It would be better to the Soviets than our last proposal with respect to Backfire, but worse with respect to cruise missiles. The Soviets won't accept it, and in the U.S. it would not sell.

President Ford: It is not salable here because of no constraints on Backfire?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. You would be vulnerable to the right because it has no constraints on Backfire; and vulnerable to the left because there are no constraints on cruise missiles. People will say this is a phony agreement and that it jeopardizes our national interest.

Let's look at Option III. It explicitly puts Backfire and surface ship SLCMs in a hybrid systems category—weapons not designed for a primary strategic mission but capable of performing such missions. It includes a numerical limit on Backfire.

President Ford: Above the 2400 level?

Secretary Kissinger: Above 2400. It also has a comfortable limit on surface ships SLCMs; for example we might have 50 ships with 15 missiles each or about 750 cruise missiles. This would be a two to one ratio relative to the Backfire. Option III would involve a separate protocol to be reviewed at some date together with the whole hybrid systems problem. The rest of Option III's features are the same as Option IV.

In terms of negotiations, a more elegant way to approach it would be to give the Soviets a separate limit of 400 for Backfire, not 300, but

reduce the aggregate from 2400 to 2300 thereby effectively counting an additional 100 Backfires.

General Brown: We talked about a separate limit of 300 Backfires, not 400.

Secretary Kissinger: This other approach would have a 400 limit, but by reducing the aggregate from 2400 to 2300 this gives a net separate limit of 300. Option III is probably negotiable. In terms of salability there is still the problem with the Backfire numbers. One argument against this option is the FBS argument.

Long-range ALCMs would be banned from Backfire because they could only be deployed on heavy bombers. Surface ships SLCMs with greater than 600 kilometer range would be prohibited for the Soviets but permitted for us. On hybrid systems, each side makes its selection at the beginning.

President Ford: If they have Backfire, then they would have no surface ship SLCMs?

Secretary Kissinger: Right. We did this with the ABM. Each side had the right to defend either a city or a missile site.

This option (Option III) is the most nearly negotiable.

Everyone is most comfortable with Option IV from the U.S. view. Some think that we should try Option IV, and when it is rejected, we should try a variation of Option III, if the Soviets would agree to limiting SS-18 deployment to a level of 100. At that point we can make a final decision whether to go to Option III. This approach lends itself to Geneva—we could start hard with Option IV and let out a little at a time. But the Soviets may conclude that we want no agreement this year.

President Ford: Why does this include a ban on land-based cruise missiles over 2500 kilometers range? Was this called for by Vladivostok?

Secretary Kissinger: This would be the easiest feature to get. However, there is no agreement on limiting land-based cruise missiles to 2500 kilometers.

Dr. Ikle: We would want this if we could limit ALCMs at the same time.

Secretary Kissinger: But then we are into cruise missile negotiations.

General Brown: The key point is that the only lever on the Backfire is the cruise missile. If we give on cruise missiles, then we have no lever on Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: We should also get a presentation on what the DOD/JCS plan is to counter the Backfire in the absence of an agreement.

Each option permits us to carry out almost all of our plans in the cruise missile field anyway—only we would have to give up 200 Poseidon or Minuteman III missiles.

President Ford (to General Brown): If there is no agreement and Backfire runs free, and they have an estimated 400–500 Backfire, do we go into an air defense program?

General Brown: We would have to recommend that. This is why it is imperative to cap the Backfire.

President Ford: None of the SALT contingency proposals I have seen include initiation of an air defense program.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You haven't seen our proposal.

President Ford: I saw two from your predecessor. (Laughter)

General Brown: We disown those. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: SALT does not obviate the need for air defenses. If Backfire constitutes 20% of the numbers and 40% of the throw weight and "is certainly a strategic weapon" and "is certainly going to be upgraded" then we will "certainly need air defense".

Dr. Ikke: We will have savings because of curtailment of the Soviet missile force.

General Brown: This points out one major imbalance: the Soviets have air defenses, but we do not. The bombers will do the job but they will pay the price. If bombers are in a situation like Vietnam where conventional weapons are used, they will take a beating; but in a nuclear conflict the bombers will go in only once.

President Ford: My memory of the 1950s is that we wasted many hundreds of millions of dollars on BOMARC.<sup>8</sup> Those of us who were for it were wrong.

General Brown: All of us were wrong on the basis of the threat.

President Ford: All our Nikes are gone; we would have to start from scratch—not in terms of technology but in terms of hardware.

Secretary Kissinger: My basic point is that if we need air defense, we will need it in any case. My question is how do you offset Backfire megatonnage in a no-SALT environment.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You mean no Option I?

President Ford: No, nothing.

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<sup>8</sup> The BOMARC (Boeing and University of Michigan Aeronautical Research Center) surface-to-air guided missile program was a joint effort between the United States and Canada, started in 1957, to protect North America against the threat of Soviet strategic bombers. The program involved the deployment of BOMARC long-range anti-aircraft missiles to tactical stations along the east and west coasts of North America, as well as the interior of the continent. BOMARC went through a series of costly test launches throughout the 1950s.

Secretary Kissinger: The Interim Agreement runs out in 1977. We must decide to extend it or let all run free.

Vice President Rockefeller (to Secretary Kissinger): Option III addresses the hybrid systems. Does this mean that the Russians could not have both the aircraft and the cruise missiles?

Secretary Kissinger: They could not have both Backfire and long-range cruise missiles on surface ships. Both sides can have ALCMs on heavy bombers but they would count. They could not have ALCMs on Backfire unless they would count them.

We would have cruise missiles on heavy bombers, cruise missiles on other aircraft provided the range is less than 600 kilometers, and cruise missiles on surface ships.

They would have no long-range cruise missiles on surface ships or Backfire.

Vice President Rockefeller: Is the 600 kilometer range longer than they have a capability for now?

Secretary Clements: It is about what they have now. The platforms would be counted in the MIRV total. Each B-52 bomber would count—not each missile—in the MIRV total.

Ambassador Johnson: Ship platforms would not be counted in the MIRV total.

Secretary Kissinger: One B-52 would count as one MIRV launcher no matter how many ALCMs each bomber carried. What would a B-52 carry—12 on each?

General Brown: 12—maybe up to 20.

This brings us back to air defenses. There is merit in addressing 2400 vehicles the Soviets can use to hit the U.S. We cannot by treaty defend against their missiles, but we would like to constrain the Backfire.

Secretary Rumsfeld: George, why is it important to constrain the Backfire?

General Brown: It will be useful in support of ratification. It would be justification for having the Backfire outside the game.

Secretary Kissinger: Option III and Option II contain certain collateral constraints on the Backfire. There are additional benefits, but not decisive.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We have fallen into the habit of addressing selling it at home. It is worth elaborating all the points. The first question is the strategic implications. Also, we must know how to communicate the meaning to others. This is broader than Congressional ratification. We need to debate the effect on our country, our allies, and neutrals in the world. Developing arguments against Options I, II, III, and IV, and preparing answers to these arguments, is a useful process.

Option IV has been explained. Option I has been explained. All of us have set aside Option II.

With respect to Option III, its positive elements are it has separate limits, some constraints on Backfire, and may be negotiable.

The problems with Option III are, first, that you have broken the 2400 level and gone up to 2700 vehicles, instead of reducing the level. There is another problem. We are counting the Bison in the total, but here we have a new aircraft (the Backfire) with about the same range but we are not counting it—yet it is comparable.

President Ford: How many Bisons are being counted in the 2400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok?

Ambassador Johnson: We have no idea. We are counting 120 Bisons and Bears. But we have no indication from them what they are counting.

Secretary Kissinger: They will probably get rid of 180 Bisons just to get down to the 2400 ceiling, and the tanker force.

President Ford: Are the tankers interchangeable?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes.

General Brown: The same tanker can service either the Bison or the Backfire.

Ambassador Johnson: They have only 50 tankers.

President Ford: How many tankers do they need to get the Backfire to the U.S.?

General Brown: 50 tankers are adequate to get them here, and out of the country, although not necessarily back to the Soviet Union. Since they have no air defenses to penetrate, they have a tremendous plus.

Secretary Kissinger: What can offset the Backfire is our FBS. Also, they can have no ALCMs on Backfire and we can have a force of surface SLCMs in some ratio to Backfire.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree that we must use this as an offset, but carefully.

President Ford: What kind of surface ships? Navy men-of-war? Merchant ships?

General Brown: Not merchant ships.

President Ford: Do we have to build different kinds of ships?

General Brown: Existing ships will do. We can replace existing guns and missiles.

President Ford: Can you go down as far as destroyers?

Secretary Clements: Destroyers and even frigates can carry cruise missiles.

Ambassador Johnson: Would these have a strategic or tactical capability?

Secretary Clements: A tactical role, a regional mission like in the Mediterranean.

Secretary Kissinger: You could reach Kiev easily from the Mediterranean with the ranges you are talking about.

Dr. Ikle: You can have some assurances on the modes of operations.

President Ford: Would you be able to identify the ships carrying cruise missiles?

Director Colby: You could identify the ships with national technical means.

President Ford: And we could verify surface ships with SLCMs.

Director Colby: We can and with their means they can also.

Ambassador Johnson: You can see the launchers on the deck.

General Brown: This is the only aspect of cruise missiles that is verifiable.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There are two other thoughts that need to be discussed.

First, there is the marketing or public discussion of any agreement. Here we must consider a complex versus a simple agreement. There is a general feeling among all I have talked to that the extent to which we can make it simple, the better. It is better in terms of verification, the SCC, explaining it to the Congress, and explaining it to the public and our allies. Simplicity is one of the advantages of Vladivostok.

Inevitably, with Options II, III, or IV, Jackson will come down hard on us just like he did with me at my confirmation hearings. He will want to know about verification of cruise missiles, about distinguishing between nuclear and conventional-armed cruise missiles.

President Ford: That is a Soviet problem.

Brent Scowcroft: The problem is theirs, not ours.

Secretary Rumsfeld: That is an answer to it. That is one answer.

Secretary Clements: There is one major problem which makes all other problems insignificant. That would be raising the ceiling above the 2400 level. The public applauded the 2400 ceiling agreed to at Vladivostok. If we break the ceiling, I am afraid all other matters will get lost in the charge that "you have raised the ceiling".

Secretary Kissinger: Option I raises the ceiling too. Backfire runs free.

Secretary Clements: Backfire runs free for now, but it is a matter that would continue to be negotiated.

Secretary Kissinger: The day the agreement goes into effect, the ceiling would be 2400 plus Backfire, which would be 175 by 1979.



Secretary Rumsfeld: But in 1976, the public would understand that we were proceeding with the negotiation on Backfire.

Brent Scowcroft: We could avoid the perception of breaking the 2400 ceiling by having a separate protocol—not “SALT II” but we would say “separately the Soviets have agreed to continue to negotiate the Backfire.”

Secretary Kissinger: SALT III starts in 1977 on negotiations on reductions. The only option which avoids breaking the 2400 ceiling is Option IV. Options I, II, and III increase the ceiling, if you count Backfire as a heavy bomber.

As Don said, Backfire is a hybrid system not designed for strategic strike. It does have additional capability which they could use in the event that they wanted to against the United States.

The same thing is true of cruise missiles. They would not be very good for use as strategic system since the Soviets can see them coming for five hours.

One must analyze these issues very carefully.

President Ford: If we equate publicly the surface ship SLCM with the Backfire would this be a problem? Should we treat them separately? Militarily, George, can you equate the SLCM with the Backfire?

General Brown: I have not thought about it.

President Ford: Can you give me a reasonable guess.

General Brown: Yes, I think you can equate them as a reasonable guess.

President Ford: Seems to make sense.

Dr. Ikke: Equating the cruise missile with the Backfire.

Brent Scowcroft: But not equating the ship with the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: Is there some ratio of Backfires to ships that makes sense? For example two?

General Brown: I worry about the defense of ships. The Soviets have a large number of submarines which make our ships very vulnerable. Therefore, I hesitate to equate these two forces.

Vice President Rockefeller: The American people think about freedom of the seas. They think we have freedom of the seas. I ask the CNO what would happen if there were a war in Europe. He said we would have to abandon Japan to keep the sea lines open to Europe, and that we would have to abandon Israel. The public would spend money to put cruise missiles on ships. They have a major potential in defense of freedom of the seas. Cruise missiles are our chance to balance our position on the seas.

President Ford: The Soviets have 400 Backfires. How many surface platforms will we need to balance them?

Dr. Ikle: There is an 80 to 1 difference in payload. If you multiply the number of cruise missiles on each ship by the number of ships you could look at this. If you have 80 cruise missiles on a ship (including re-loadings), it would equal a Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: We talk about Option III as though it is a concession to the Soviets, but for the Soviets it is a tremendous political decision. They would have to give us long-range surface ship SLCMs. We must remember that they have tied the counting rule to cruise missiles and the counting rule gives us 120 missiles free.

If we agree on Option III we can expect a 10 percent slip at the margin. Option III is at the margin of what the Soviets can agree to.

If we say we can have 80 cruise missiles per ship and 80 ships the Soviets will say no. If we say we are going to have 15 cruise missiles per ship and 50 ships that might work.

The significant part is that they would not have any cruise missiles on their ships.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is a big difference between Options III and IV. If we end up with Option III, we must be able to say that we tried initially to get the Backfire included.

Secretary Kissinger: We have made that attempt for two years.

President Ford: At Helsinki we made the attempt and they made a flat categorical turn down.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Assuming this is a religious matter with the Soviets, then there will be gray area systems. If one says it is a matter of theology and cannot include it, it will be a future problem also. What if, for example, we decided to call the B-1 a medium bomber.

Brent Scowcroft: We did this on FBS. We took a theological position.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The future gets cloudy if things do not fit neatly into theater or strategic category. We need some way to address gray areas as we go down the road. This sets a precedent.

Dr. Ikle: Option III helps move in that direction.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We need to look for something to hold up. They can say to their people that they have 2700 systems. What is there for us to hold up? We need a technique of handling these matters. We need to look at options on the side like Option G [III?].

Dr. Ikle: The position we can take on Option III is to say that we have covered more systems than Vladivostok covered—that we have avoided unlimited arms expansion.

President Ford (to General Brown): For Option III, can you militarily defend the ALCM ranges?

General Brown: We could.

President Ford: I'm talking about the Committee giving us a hard time.

General Brown: The ALCM ranges are adequate for penetration aids against the Soviets. With the ground missiles, we could cover all NATO targets from Germany and Turkey. We have looked at that.

President Ford: You can defend the limitations on ALCM and SLCM ranges?

General Brown: Yes, and the 600 km bottom range.

President Ford: For SLCMs?

General Brown: Yes. The only thing that would give the U.S. a problem—and the Vice President identified this—would be how it would affect our anti-ship role. But in the anti-ship role there is no need for nuclear warheads. This is one reason for the arguments on the definitional problem.

Secretary Kissinger: This would be an enormous disadvantage to us because we have a large surface fleet.

General Brown: They do too.

President Ford (to General Brown): Would your colleagues also be able to defend these limits?

General Brown: Yes sir.

Secretary Kissinger: It will make a difference if you say it does not apply to conventional cruise missiles.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Since SALT is nuclear.

Secretary Kissinger: Therefore no test ban makes any sense since they can test to any range and call them "conventional". Everybody agrees you can screw on another warhead in ten minutes. It would be the edge of absurdity if we go to the Hill and say "This does not apply to conventional cruise missiles." Therefore my argument on Backfire would no longer be good since they can put on conventional missiles. I can just imagine what Jackson will do to us.

General Brown: This is not a new point. If this were the only problem with verification of cruise missiles, I would remain quiet. But no element of cruise missiles can be verified.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Even on Option IV, we must be able to defend our position on cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: If we try to sell this to the Soviets and say "conventional okay"—

General Brown: "As do you."

Secretary Kissinger: This lets cruise missiles run free.

General Brown: The same thing applies to range limits, if range limits can be violated.

Secretary Kissinger: We have some hope on range verification; we can see them test. I would not want to present this to the high levels of the Soviet government. If we want to do this we should let Alex do it in Geneva. We have no conventional ICBMs yet.

General Brown: But we have conventional bombers. We used bombers in a conventional role in Vietnam.

Brent Scowcroft: But the B-52s count regardless.

General Brown: We may want to use the B-52 in some other role, but I can't conceive of using the ICBM as a conventional weapon.

Alex Johnson: We could say we can do anything we want to on the basis of the conventional definition. We don't want to get in that position.

Dr. Ikke: We could put conventional cruise missiles on ships.

President Ford (to General Brown): Militarily, if we ban conventional missiles above the limit, what harm would that do?

General Brown: It would hurt us primarily in the anti-shipping role. We can get cruise missiles with tens of feet accuracy. Therefore we can use high explosive warheads.

Secretary Clements: There is no question about that.

Secretary Kissinger: We could have a 2500 km limit on surface ship SLCMs.

Dr. Ikke: This would simply be diverting strategic weapons to conventional weapons—as we have done with the B-52.

President Ford: On surface ships, we can have nuclear missiles to 2500 km, plus conventional to 2500 km?

General Response: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure how we would handle this.

President Ford: George, your concern is with the ban on conventional cruise missiles at any range. What is the military handicap?

General Brown: It forecloses tactical non-nuclear use, which is possible given our accuracy predictions.

Secretary Clements: We can use cruise missiles from carriers or the 963. We can replace some aircraft missiles with cruise missiles. Therefore we can use them in a tactical, attack, or regional mission on the 963 or the strike cruiser, or even the frigate.

Brent Scowcroft: What about target acquisition? You could not acquire targets.

Secretary Clements: In some instances this would be difficult; in other instances it could be handled.

Secretary Kissinger: Now carrier air must go over the target.

Secretary Clements: Would these limits all apply to nuclear-armed missiles?

Secretary Kissinger: There are two ways we can handle this. We can accept the range restriction, then try to make the distinction—but just try to sell this to Congressional Committees. Then Option III is ridiculous. You can call missiles conventional and this lets them run free.

General Brown: The missiles are all the same. You can test them, then put them in a submarine or on an aircraft. This makes a mockery of SALT. You can't verify them.

Dr. Ikle: The Soviets have other means of verification.

Vice President Rockefeller: How far behind us are the Soviets in cruise missiles—a couple of years?

Director Colby: More than that.

Secretary Clements: Five years or more behind us.

Vice President Rockefeller: Our freedom of use in cruise missiles to defend the Navy is a powerful argument. But 2500 km is quite a distance. However, in general we should go to 5000 km.

General Brown: Ultimately, but that is conceptual only.

President Ford: If you had a 5000 km missile, why would you even need to have them on a ship then?

Secretary Kissinger: If you accept 5500 km for land-missiles, you can cover the whole ocean.

Director Colby: The Soviet basic strategy is retaliation. This is the basic strategy, whether the Backfire is included or not. In negotiations this is a hard point. The Soviets feel that they have yielded to us so far.

Secretary Kissinger: They think our Congress will not raise the budget. We have to think in terms of salability to the left and the right. We may not get cruise missiles.

Secretary Rumsfeld: How do we respond to Congress on verification of cruise missiles?

Director Colby: They are difficult to verify. There is almost no distinction between conventional and nuclear missiles.

President Ford: Then how do we know about those they have in development?

Director Colby: [3 lines not declassified]

Dr. Ikle: There's a difference between missiles with 600 to 2500 km range, and those with 5500 km range. We will know if they have massive deployment of ships with SLCMs.

Director Colby: If they employ missiles in the thousands, we can begin to pick it up. However, if they deploy only a small number, it really does not make any difference.

Vice President Rockefeller: On balance, I believe Option III looks pretty good. I am for developing land-based cruise missiles.

President Ford: What about counting the 300–400 Backfires above the limit.

Vice President Rockefeller: That doesn't bother me. I want to protect the Navy.

President Ford: What did I do on the Navy appeals in the Budget?

Secretary Clements: You approved them.

President Ford: That takes the Navy pretty far out.

Vice President Rockefeller: We need cruise missiles for the Navy.

President Ford: If we accept this premise, then carriers are not worth a thing.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We need to consider the number of Navy ships.

President Ford: In terms of ship-to-ship capability, the Harpoon is operational.

Secretary Kissinger: There can be a large number of attack submarines with cruise missiles—not a negligible weapon. It is a potent weapon. There is no law of nature that says you have to attack ships from a distance. At a distance it would take 5 hours for the cruise missile to get to its target. The submarines gain in invisibility.

General Brown: There are two points. We should not confuse current capability with future capability. Much is still far off in the future. Target acquisition is missing, although maybe eventually we can use satellites. My second point: stuffing missiles in submarines has its limits too. We don't know how to communicate with submarines unless they come up like surface ships.

President Ford: Then why can't we sell the Seafarer in Michigan?<sup>9</sup>  
(Laughter)

General Brown: The communications problem is difficult.

President Ford: Nelson, what is your reaction to Option III?

Vice President Rockefeller: I believe it is a good compromise. It is impressive.

President Ford: Is there anything more to add?

Secretary Clements: One last thing. This would raise the limit to more than 2400 systems. This is a political aspect which only you can judge. My feeling is that this is important. The other aspects will simply get lost.

President Ford: What if there is no SALT agreement?

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<sup>9</sup> The Seafarer Project was a follow-on to the Sanguine Project (see footnote 5, Document 101) to build extremely low-frequency radio transmitters for communication with submarines.

Secretary Kissinger: The only way to stay within the 2400 is to ask for Option IV.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Option I would do it.

Secretary Clements: I'd go to Option I.

Brent Scowcroft: Option I goes above the 2400 level.

Secretary Rumsfeld: If we go to Option I, it won't say we are above 2400.

Director Colby: This is true of Option II also.

Secretary Clements: Option I is perfectly honest and straightforward. We can say we can't get agreement and we are continuing to look at it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: With Option I we can anticipate agreement during this year or early next.

Vice President Rockefeller: I think the country is drifting to the left (?) at the moment.

President Ford: That is an understatement.

Vice President Rockefeller: If we have no agreement, we will have to ask for more money. There is little chance to get it. I like Option III.

Secretary Kissinger: I want the record to show that I agree with the Vice President. I did not talk to the Vice President about this.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Come on, Henry, you passed him a note. (Laughter)

Vice President Rockefeller: Congress won't allow us the money for cruise missiles.

President Ford: I think we would be in a better position to defend it if we had Option III.

Secretary Clements: I defer to you at this point.

Brent Scowcroft: Bill, what would change that would make this more negotiable in one or two years?

Secretary Clements: The Soviets are more concerned with our cruise missiles than we are with their Backfire—We want to get the President through the election.

President Ford: If we are not in in '76, those that would follow would get a less beneficial settlement than what we would get.

General Brown: We should make a good college try for Option IV first, then Option III—rather than start on the assumption that we can't get Backfire counted.

President Ford (to General Brown): Militarily, can you defend Option III?

General Brown: It is very difficult from the standpoint of the Backfire and the fact that it would increase the totals. But if we tried Option

IV at first and failed—and the best we can get is Option III—I have a reasonable story to tell.

President Ford: If we can say we have surface SLCMs with 2500 km range, is this a fair trade-off for the military to defend?

General Brown: No, sir. But a sweetener would be to reduce their heavy missiles—to bring the 309 missiles down to some lesser number.

Secretary Kissinger: It is conceivable that Brezhnev would write you a letter, Mr. President. He could say that even though 1320 MIRVed missiles is okay, he is planning only 180 SS-18s, thereby giving us 120 MIRVs. This is conceivable, but hard to get.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Henry, what would you say in trying to defend Option III? What would you say is offsetting the 300 Backfires?

Secretary Kissinger: If there is no agreement, all Backfires run free. You have to begin by saying what do you do without an agreement. How do you offset Backfire under a no-SALT condition? That is the first question. Then, you say that Backfire is for the peripheral role as are our FBS. So FBS offset the Backfire. We would also say they can have no long-range ALCMs on their Backfire. We had not featured Backfire before Vladivostok—but if the Soviets had known this in Vladivostok, they would have wanted us to trade FBS for Backfire.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Don't their FBS offset our FBS?

Ambassador Johnson: No. Their FBS can't reach the United States.

Unknown Speaker: But they can reach NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: I will not go to Moscow as the guy who refused to accept Option IV, and then testify before the committees on my "preemptive concessions."

Secretary Rumsfeld: Henry, the deal is that the guy highest in the popularity polls has to take the heat. (Laughter)

President Ford: That's not me. (Laughter)

Secretary Kissinger: I have tried for six months to get Option IV. I have tried every conceivable variation to try to get Backfire counted. You, Mr. President, personally heard them reject this position. Option III is even worse than the one Schlesinger and I had which they have seen. We have tried Option IV. Therefore, if we want Option IV, send it to them through Alex or Dobrynin. It is a total waste of time to take up Option IV with Brezhnev. If we would rather delay SALT, then we should go with Option IV.

President Ford (to Ambassador Johnson): When do you go back to Geneva?

Ambassador Johnson: The 28th—it is geared to Henry's trip. We had earlier said the 12th, but the Soviets have agreed to change it to the 28th to tie it to Henry's trip.



President Ford: Can I have photostats of the charts on the options?

Director Colby: Yes. We will get them to you right away.

Brent Scowcroft: If we first try Option IV, then this adds to the liability of Option III. Jackson will say that this (Option IV) is what we wanted, and we gave to the Soviets.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to make it clear that I am not sure the Soviets will even buy Option III. We have some things going for us: their Party Congress, and Angola—Brezhnev can't afford a major failure and Angola simultaneously. Option III is going to be dicey.

President Ford: We have hashed and rehashed all the options. Let me think it over. (To Secretary Kissinger) When do you plan to leave, the 18th or the 17th?

Secretary Kissinger: I appealed to the Soviets yesterday. I wanted to be here for the State of the Union address. The Soviets accepted my appeal—I will leave the night of the 19th.

President Ford: Is there anything to add? Thank you very much.

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#### 115. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

The United States has re-examined the outstanding issues in the negotiations for a new strategic arms limitations agreement based on the Vladivostok accords. In order to facilitate the discussion between Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow, the United States believes the following represents an equitable resolution of the current differences over limits on cruise missiles and the Soviet bomber known as "Backfire."

With respect to cruise missile limitations, the following provisions would apply:

1. Any heavy bomber equipped with cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 km and up to 2500 km would be considered as the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot File 91D414, 1973–77, Box 15, Misc. Docs, Tels, Etc. 1975 (Folder 6). Secret. A handwritten note at the top of the first page indicates that Kissinger handed the note to Dobrynin at 6:30 p.m. on January 14 at the Department of State. No record of their meeting has been found, but Kissinger described the meeting to President Ford the next day. For the memorandum of conversation of that January 15 meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 244.

equivalent of a MIRVed missile and therefore each such bomber would be counted in the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed missiles.

2. Similarly, any surface ship equipped with cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km and up to a range of 2500 km would also be considered the equivalent of a MIRVed missile and therefore each ship would also count against the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed missiles.

3. Air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers or cruise missiles on surface ships with a range greater than 2500 km would be banned.

4. No air-launched cruise missile with a range greater than 600 km could be deployed on any aircraft other than a heavy bomber.

5. Cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be banned from deployment on any submarine, as proposed by the Soviet side.

6. The US suggests that the previous understanding permitting land-based cruise missiles up to intercontinental range be reconsidered; consistent with the new US proposals concerning limitations on other cruise missiles, the US believes that the development and deployment of land-based cruise missiles be limited to a range no greater than 2500 km.

The foregoing limitations on cruise missiles represent a significant movement toward the Soviet position and a compromise which should meet Soviet concerns.

As for the question of the "Backfire" bomber, the US believes that a compromise on this issue is also called for, along the following lines:

a. The US would agree that no Backfire aircraft produced prior to the entry into force of the new Agreement (October 3, 1977) would be counted in the ceiling of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles.

b. Subsequent to the entry into force of the new Agreement, all Backfire aircraft produced would be counted in the ceiling of 2400, under the same procedures agreed for counting other bombers included in the 2400.

The US has put forward these new proposals on the assumption that there will be an agreement on the question of verification of MIRV ICBMs and SLBMs along the lines already conditionally accepted by the Soviet side in discussions with Secretary Kissinger. Moreover, the US also proceeds from the assumption that there will be a satisfactory agreement on defining a heavy missile as any ICBM having a launching weight or a throw weight greater than the Soviet ICBM known as the SS-19.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On January 16, at 3:50 p.m., Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke on the telephone about the U.S. proposal. A transcript of their conversation, which was elliptical in substance, is *ibid.*, Document 245.

**116. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 19, 1976, 9:57–11:40 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

SALT

**PRINCIPALS**

The President  
Vice President  
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle  
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

**OTHER ATTENDEES***White House*

Mr. Richard Cheney,  
Assistant to the President  
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security  
Affairs

*State*

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson  
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary William  
Clements

Dr. James P. Wade

*CIA*

Mr. Carl Duckett

*NSC Staff*

Dr. Roger C. Molander

President Ford: This is the last meeting before Henry goes off to Moscow after my State of the Union Address and I want to review the situation as we have laid it out and insure that there is no uncertainty about our position. Henry described our position to Dobrynin last Wednesday or Thursday,<sup>2</sup> the modification of Option IV, which brought from Dobrynin a negative reaction. Nevertheless, they have the position and Henry will go there and start from that position and do his utmost to argue for that position. Nevertheless, he is in a position to go from Modified IV to Variant IV which gives them the right to leave out of the 2400 120–130 Bisons and Bears as I understand it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: It's 115.

President Ford: I won't argue the numbers, whatever it is. Anyway, after Henry negotiates on Wednesday on the basis of Modified IV and Variant IV, and gets a feel for their attitudes and reactions,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 115.

under our agreed procedures, he will communicate with me Wednesday evening our time.<sup>3</sup> From those comments I will get Bill Clements, Admiral Holloway, Fred Ikle, and Bill Colby together to discuss the content of Henry's communication. Following that meeting, we expect to go to Option III. We can't be definite, but that's the plan. It would be particularly helpful if we could get an aggregate of 2300, in which case the upper limit on the Backfire could be raised to 400 under Option III. I have talked to General Brown and it seems to me that Option III with 300–400 on Backfire and an equal aggregate on surface ships makes a good tradeoff. It is my impression that this will be a good position if we can't get the Soviets to agree to either of the other two options. If the Soviets say "no" on all of our first three positions, then we would go to Option I. Several variants of this option have been suggested. Some have suggested an October 3, 1977 deadline for negotiating Backfire and cruise missiles, but those things will have to be discussed with the Soviets. With those brief remarks, I'd like to ask Henry to offer his comments.

Secretary Kissinger: I presented the Modified Option IV to Dobrynin. He, of course, had no instructions, and thus, his reaction was on the basis of what he knew about their basic position. He said that in his judgment, there was no possibility of their counting Backfire—that this was a major policy issue. He didn't reject it; however, he thought that before I got there, it might be rejected; however, this has not happened, so he was wrong about that. He said that Option IV, in any variant which counted Backfire in the 2400, was simply not doable. Thus if we are going to stick with a variant of Option IV, then we would be better off to get Alex Johnson to propose it in Geneva, since we will not be able to penetrate the top leadership of the Soviets with such a proposal. We would be proposing to count Backfire, even though they have already rejected the offer I gave Gromyko in September,<sup>4</sup> which was more generous. However, I suppose it's entirely possible that they might accept a proposal like Variant IV, since I've never heard any official comment on their position on the Bear and Bison variants.

Ambassador Johnson: We've had considerable discussion on that issue. They've countered our position by proposing that there be equal aggregates on tankers and a provision that bans conversion of tankers to heavy bombers, but I don't know how high that went in the Kremlin.

Secretary Kissinger: Anyway, I had no problem putting forth such a proposal to Dobrynin and as I indicated, he said he thought it would be rejected. I then proposed Option I as a way out to Dobrynin. Do-

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<sup>3</sup> Wednesday, January 21, when Kissinger was in Moscow meeting with Brezhnev; see Document 117.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 108 and 109.

brynin said that there was no possibility that they would accept the MIRV counting rule without cruise missile limitations and that they made acceptance of any MIRV counting rule dependent on such limitations.

President Ford: You mean on ALCMs and SLCMs?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, they had made it dependent on those limitations when they initially put it forward. I asked Dobrynin whether a compromise was possible on a different basis. He said that, in his judgment, they might possibly agree to deferral if Backfire were out and if we could settle on the ALCM part of our proposal, then we might be able to leave SLCMs out.

Ambassador Johnson: We might find a compromise between their proposal and our proposal if we set a fixed time for the agreement within your term, say January 15 or January 1.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be a hellish price to write such an agreement that says that we'll settle on January 1. Dobrynin spoke without authority; I can't believe the Soviet Ambassador really speaks with authority of the leadership. I had tried deferral before and it had been rejected the first time. This appears to be some give, but I don't believe that they would go for a long deferral.

President Ford: Any comments, Nelson?

Vice President Rockefeller: Henry did not mention land-based cruise missiles. In a meeting of one of your advisory groups, one of the members said that he was worried about their capability being different from ours. In particular, with respect to civil defense, we could kill only 14 million people and 27% of the industry, whereas their kill would be 147–149 million Americans. The deterrent factor we would have if they moved their people out and we can only get 14% of their people would be very bad. They are equal to us in ballistic missiles, but in cruise missiles, which are based on electronics only, they are way ahead. They also are developing the SS–20 and the SS–16 and have in the work mobile ICBMs. I feel, and I have talked to Henry about this, that we should have the right to substitute for ICBMs cruise missiles which can reach the Soviet Union. With the new swing-wing being developed at Ames, we would be able to reach the Soviet Union with cruise missiles in five years. We could use mobile launch from highways and confuse their air defenses; this does present us with the only real possibility of a breakthrough. I read the notes prepared for you for the meeting and on page 2, paragraph 6, it recommends that we move to a lower range on land-based cruise missiles. I don't think we should retain the right to substantial deployment in this area. I know this is a later arrival, but I think that it's important that we save this program.

I could not get an estimate from the Joint Chiefs on our own intercontinental kill capability to compare with the figures I've just given.

General Brown: Both the CIA and we have calculated this capability and we have different numbers since it's done on a different basis. However, there are numbers given in the NIE<sup>5</sup> on which there is general agreement.

President Ford: It's an interesting point.

Brent Scowcroft: If we worry about the Soviets increasing their capability, they might very well add intercontinental cruise missiles. It's really not in our interest to permit intercontinental cruise missiles. We need more ICBM capability, not cruise missile capability, to change the force ratios.

Vice President Rockefeller: I am only passing on the views of Teller<sup>6</sup> and his associates who are looking down the road. They are not recommending that the Defense Department start a program; however, they feel that this is the most exciting and significant development to emerge recently and an area in which we have a real advantage over the Soviets.

President Ford: How long will it take for a 5500 kilometer cruise missile to reach its target?

Secretary Kissinger: Eight hours.

Vice President Rockefeller: With the swing-wing, we could cut the time in half. It would cost a few million dollars for each missile, compared to tens of million for ballistic missiles.

President Ford: George, as you envision the development of the intercontinental cruise missiles, would you want to substitute cruise missiles for ballistic missiles?

General Brown: We have not talked about this; however, we see a real problem in going from subsonic to supersonic flight for intercontinental cruise missiles. It would be hard to know whether it would be practical until we have completed advanced development. There could be advantages to a mobile system in a great deal of situations; for example, they are land-based in Europe. However, we have not ruled out other deployment areas. If the Soviets are willing to bring down the range limit to 2500 km, we would still be able to get a land-based cruise missile program in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I think a land-based cruise missile program in Europe will be limited by the ideology of people who don't want nu-

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 112.

<sup>6</sup> Edward Teller, theoretical physicist, member of the Manhattan Project, and head of Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, was an advocate of a strong nuclear arsenal and nuclear testing.

clear weapons in Europe, not by SALT. I agree that we should look ahead in our thinking but I question what land-based cruise missiles could be used for, except possibly for accuracy in the attack of hard targets. But they're not good for hard targets which you want to hit in the first hour or half hour, not in four hours. They don't have a first-strike capability if they can only get there in four hours. It would also certainly push the cost up if they were supersonic and highly accurate. You would then have basically pilotless aircraft, not the type of cruise missile that we now have. I think that we should bring down the range limit on intercontinental cruise missiles if we can get it. We would be better off if we could get a lower range limit rather than keeping open an option which has no application other than attacking hard targets.

General Brown: I agree with the point that Henry made. You really want to attack hard targets in the first 20 minutes. In addition, the cost of going supersonic will be four to six times the cost over subsonic because of the severe structural problems.

President Ford: To go 5500 miles supersonically would be a tough mechanical burden.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It would be like trying to build an airplane.

Vice President Rockefeller: I only mentioned this because PFIAB thinks it's attractive.

General Brown: You say Ed Teller is pushing it?

Vice President Rockefeller: I only mentioned this because Teller suggested the atom bomb and he was right about that and the posture we are in now is far more serious.

Director Colby: With respect to the comment the Vice President made on civil defense, we have been watching this quite closely. They are making preparations to protect their command structure. There are no indications right now that they are doing more than that; however, with respect to the discussion earlier, they could go to even more evacuation. If there is a buildup in the amount of the population that can be evacuated and if they have considerable warning time, then it could be accomplished. If they send all these people to the country, they would have to be organized with stocks of food, etc.

President Ford: They're not as far along as the Chinese.

Director Colby: It's hard to tell.

Vice President Rockefeller: They have 40 flag officers and 45,000 troops working on civil defense.

Dr. Ikle: But none of the civil defense will be able to protect their industrial plants.

Vice President Rockefeller: Even the industrial plants can be protected. When we studied this 20 years ago, we found that you could re-

habilitate if you mothballed your used machinery tools and have them available to bring back. The Germans were very successful at this.

President Ford: Let me ask this question. As I understand, it's the question of a range limit on cruise missiles. If the range limit is 5500 kilometers on land-based cruise missiles, won't we then have a verification problem on the range limits on ALCMs and SLCMs and cruise missiles on surface ships?

Director Colby: Yes, Mr. President. There is already enough of a verification problem on cruise missiles anyway. If long-range tests were permitted from land-based launchers, it would be difficult to tell if long-range cruise missiles are deployed on other launchers.

President Ford: Where do we stand now on land-based cruise missiles?

Secretary Kissinger: They have proposed 5500 kilometers. With such a limit, we could test with a heavier warhead within the 5500 kilometer test limit and still have an inherent intercontinental capability.

Ambassador Johnson: We have accepted 5500 kilometers in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: If we stick with that position, Ed Teller's problem is settled. However, if we go to 2500 kilometers, we could put 2500 kilometer cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, in Europe, in Guam, and in Alaska and cover the Soviet Union.

Vice President Rockefeller: I think your argument's wrong; we would be better to have them in the U.S.

Brent Scowcroft: We could saturate the Soviet Union from the forward launch areas.

Secretary Kissinger: Brent's right. We could saturate the Soviet Union. I personally favor cruise missiles for penetration and for the land-based European option. With the 2500 kilometers under Option IV, which has not yet been accepted, we could cover all of European Russia from Western Europe and they would have no equivalent system.

Dr. Ikle: The question is what the Soviets would tolerate under SALT. They have made a point about U.S. systems deployed in Europe.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The dilemma is not a question of technology where we are clearly ahead in an important new area. Human beings tend to deal with problems in the abstract. We become ahead and then we want to restrain the other side as much as possible. The defense of the agreement will be much easier with parallelism on range. Ratification will be a son-of-a-gun on the Hill in any case. Because of the interchangeability of cruise missiles, it will weaken our case on the Hill if we have different range limits.



President Ford: On one side, verification argues for a range limit of 2500 km, but on the basis of developing weapon systems, it would appear that 5500 km would be desirable.

Secretary Clements: 5500 km would not provide substantial capability. Five-eighths of 5500 is only 3,000 nautical miles which is not substantial for an intercontinental missile. The second thing, Mr. President, is that there is no way we can anticipate 1990–2000 and know what the technology will be like then. With respect to the ALCM and SLCM, these both fly this year, but they will be obsolete as the dodo by 1985. By 2000, we don't know what the technology will be like at supersonic speeds. We can't anticipate looking from the ground up what the limits of technology will be in a whole new field. Cruise missiles is a whole new frontier.

Vice President Rockefeller: And it's the best one we've got.

President Ford: We want to be sure that we can accept counting surface ship cruise missile platforms in the MIRV limit.

General Brown: It's the ship itself which carries cruise missiles of greater than 600 km which counts?

President Ford: Yes, we would count every ship of that type as a MIRV.

General Brown: Count every ship?

President Ford: In other words, a ship which carries cruise missiles between 600 and 2500 km would be counted. How many cruise missiles of 2500 km range could such a ship have?

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to limit these cruise missiles to some number, say 15. Then the ratio of cruise missiles to Backfire would be something like 1.5 to 1.

Secretary Clements: We haven't yet discussed the specific number.

Secretary Kissinger: In our last discussion, we discussed 15. There's no sense going any higher. They will not be increased beyond that. At the last VP, 12 cruise missiles per ship was mentioned.<sup>7</sup> We might establish a ratio of 2:1. It stands to reason that we would not get the Soviets to agree to an unlimited number of surface ships in return for a limit on Backfire.

President Ford: If we give them 300 Backfire, and if they do not have a strategic bombing capability, then we will have a marginal system and they will have a marginal system which will be equivalent.

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<sup>7</sup> The Verification Panel met on January 5. Draft minutes of the meeting are in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 22 Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel, Drafts, January–February 1976. Briefing memoranda, papers, and charts prepared for the meeting are *ibid.*, Box 6, Verification Panel Meeting, 1/5/76, SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: In Option III, surface ships would not count as MIRVs, but there would be a ceiling on the number of ships and on the number of cruise missiles. In this case, we might have to count 75 FB-111's as well. If they have 400 Backfire, we would then get 75 FB-111's.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Where did this come from?

General Brown: I urge not to do that. We're being double-dipped on that one.

Secretary Kissinger: There's no reason why they couldn't be in our count. We should stick with what we told them before. Our proposal in September was 300 Backfire and we would count 75 FB-111's. Schlesinger agreed to this. The idea was that we would count one SLCM for each Backfire.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The missiles would not be counted?

Secretary Kissinger: What was proposed was worked out with Schlesinger. He said he was willing to let Backfire run free if they would promise never to raise FBS again. The proposal in September called for 225 heavy bombers with ALCMs. We would be permitted 200 SLCMs on ships and we would count 75 FB-111's. Now we are talking about a proposal that really gives nothing to them. We would be permitted two SLCMs per Backfire; thus we have changed the balance in our favor on the SLCM count.

President Ford: (Pointing to a piece of paper.) There is the September proposal.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I'd like to see a copy of that sometime.

Secretary Kissinger: (Reading from the paper provided by the President.) It was a limit of 300 heavy bombers with cruise missiles and it was to be a limit of 300 on Backfire and SLCMs as I said.

General Brown: Including the FB-111?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have offered that to them two or three times. It's really a minor problem.

General Brown: We do have some slack in the 2400.

Secretary Kissinger: In Option III, they would not be in the 2400. They would be hybrid systems. The 75 FB-111's would apply only under the limit of three or four hundred. I am saying this is a possibility. If the Soviets get 300–400 Backfire, and we get SLCMs up to 2500 km on ships at some ratio, we could offset 75 Backfire with FB-111's and offset the others with 650 SLCMs up to 2500 km range.

General Brown: I don't know what the right SLCM ratio to Backfire is. If I'm offsetting those systems, it would be hard to say how many SLCMs offset how many Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: But there's an equal number of cruise missiles in the aggregate as Backfire.

General Brown: If there were a limit of 300 on the platforms, then there would never be a question of the balance.

Secretary Kissinger: I disagree with that; we'll never have 300 ships.

General Brown: As currently envisioned, we would have to strengthen the ship in order to put SLCMs on it and we couldn't put them on the ships with torpedo tubes. I don't know how many launchers we could actually put on each ship.

President Ford: It's my impression that we could offset 300–400 Backfire with SLCMs. By cutting the number of ships on which we put cruise missiles of a certain number, we could improve the ratio.

General Brown: Better than 1:1?

President Ford: 1:1 or 2:1 or whatever ratio. It's my impression that we could offset Backfire with cruise missiles in this manner.

Mr. Hyland: That's what the Verification Panel option was—a choice between cruise missiles or Backfire for the Soviets. Two problems came out which led us to that. If the Soviets were permitted the choice, they might deploy 275 Backfire and 25 surface ships. For that reason, it was decided that it would be best if they were forced to choose between the two.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You're referring to the Working Group, not the Verification Panel.

Mr. Hyland: This was the option developed in the Working Group and presented at the VP.

President Ford: It was my understanding that if they go to 300 Backfire, they are precluded from surface ship deployment.

Dr. Ikle: The choice was one or the other. It's really a question of the ratio—a question of what rationale you would give. Payload is not the only differential.

Secretary Kissinger: We give the B-52 10,000 pounds and the Backfire 20,000 pounds.

General Brown: It's the question of how it's loaded.

President Ford: As a practical matter, how many surface ships do we now have in mind would be deployed with cruise missiles?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, there's no way of answering that question. As we have indicated, the technology is very new. There's no way to get anyone to come with 50 or any other number. As for an answer to your question, we will know in five years.

General Brown: There are no more than 200 ships today that could take such cruise missiles.

President Ford: I can't believe we'd have 200, that we would deploy cruise missiles on all 200.

General Brown: I agree, but I'd have to go back to Bill's point about future capability.

Secretary Kissinger: We are in a never-never land here. No one has the foggiest idea what kind of cruise missile program we would have on surface ships. The agreement will end in eight years at the end of 1985. If we agree to 50 ships, the only serious criticism people will make will be that there will be no way that we can achieve 50 ships if the IOC is 1982. In any case, if we drop the surface ship platform limit from Option III, there will be no basis for an agreement.

Secretary Rumsfeld: How many cruise missiles are carried on the Backfire?

Brent Scowcroft: There's not any now.

General Brown: I go back to the question of the ratio between Backfire and SLCMs. They could have as many as eight bombs on each Backfire.

Brent Scowcroft: My impression is that with 50 ships and 15 launchers, we would have 750 launchers to offset the Backfires.

President Ford: How does this SLCM deployment compare with 300 Backfire in military capability?

General Brown: I think it would be less, Mr. President, since you could load each Backfire with eight bombs.

Secretary Kissinger: That SLCM limit would be on the number of launchers.

Brent Scowcroft: There would be no limit on the actual number of SLCMs.

Secretary Kissinger: I'll make one flat prediction: without SALT, the number of Backfires will be much greater than 300, whereas the number of SLCMs on surface ships will be less than 50.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Are we talking launchers or missiles?

Mr. Hyland: We'd want to fudge that to avoid a limit on the number of missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Theoretically, we could have more than one ICBM missile per launcher.

Ambassador Johnson: We have agreement on ICBM reload capability—it is banned.

Secretary Kissinger: In SALT II, but not in SALT I.

Ambassador Johnson: That's correct. There are no limitations on reload capability under SALT I.

Mr. Hyland: Mr President, the loading on each Backfire is [*1½ lines not declassified*]

General Brown: [*3 lines not declassified*]

Director Colby: [4 lines not declassified] The last chart leaves out those Backfire in naval aviation. Under normal use, these actually would be left out of any Soviet attack. As the Soviets would look at it, it would be as in the last chart.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Bill, if you look at the question of launchers versus SLCMs, doesn't this raise the question of "nuclear-armed" versus "armed?"

Director Colby: If we counted all possible launchers, we could really have a bundle. We have to guess at the load for Backfire and we assume [1 line not declassified] The B-52 holds four bombs and eight SRAMs, although I believe the SRAM rack could hold 12 missiles.

General Brown: As the pilot goes beyond four targets, the prospects for survivability get very low and it becomes unrealistic to add more bombs.

President Ford: Do ALCMs of range up to 2500 km obviate the need for SRAM?

General Brown: No, we will still need SRAM. When we get ALCMs, then we will have to develop the tactics to go with it. SRAM gives a defense suppression capability for the bombers. The cruise missile does help me, but it helps the guy behind me more. SRAM is a rocket and much faster and can be shot abeam, forward, to the rear, or in ballistic trajectory out to 80 miles. ALCMs would not set aside the need for SRAMs.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You can use the same rack for SRAMs and cruise missiles?

General Brown: Yes.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Would any SRAM launcher capable of launching a cruise missile be counted?

Secretary Kissinger: You would not count the launcher but the airplane.

Dr. Ikle: Mr. President, there is a serious verification problem on all cruise missiles. We should look on this as a limit on us to get an agreement. We should not claim that it will limit the Soviets except in a weak manner. You can get lost in a morass in cruise missile verification. We need to look at cruise missile limits as a way to get an agreement. The Russians look at verification differently; they are much less concerned about it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There are other things which also cause arguments in the ratification of the agreement.

Brent Scowcroft: If the Soviets are five years behind us in cruise missiles, then when the agreement expires, they will have none.

Director Colby: What is important is the verification of a strategically significant add-on. Our chance of picking up a strategically sig-

nificant cruise missile deployment in violation of the agreement is very good. We would be able to use both agents and photographs for this purpose.

Vice President Rockefeller: I totally agree with Henry on the difficulty of obtaining Congressional support in financing the cruise missiles programs in the absence of an agreement. My only concern is the limitations on land-based cruise missiles. I am concerned that some hard-line scientists will oppose a SALT agreement which has such limitations. My only thing is this limit on land-based cruise missiles.

President Ford: You are saying that on Option I or on any option, you prefer no ban on any intercontinental cruise missiles?

Secretary Kissinger: The only difference is the addition of a fuel tank.

Dr. Ikle: But that's not legitimate. We couldn't have such a program.

Secretary Kissinger: We could go to 3000 km and then have the capability to build up to 4000 or 5000.

Secretary Clements: There would be no limits on technology.

Secretary Kissinger: If you could do unlimited testing at 3000 km range, this would leave open all options for deployment in the late-1980's. The extrapolation for cruise missiles is better than with ICBMs. We accepted the ban above 5500 km several months ago without any objections from anyone. If we want to open up possibility of intercontinental cruise missiles in the future, this might be done, since this agreement will only last until 1985.

Dr. Ikle: Mr. President, it is not clear why we would want cruise missiles on land-based launchers anyway. Ships or submarines are much better platforms, since they would be more survivable.

Vice President Rockefeller: But the intercontinental cruise missiles would be mobile land-based.

President Ford: Well, I think that the procedure that we outlined is the proper one.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to be candid about this. I will not be the fall guy for this group. We must be specific about what we have agreed. Are we going to propose a limit of 40–50 ships?

General Brown: I think that's reasonable and can probably be defended with whatever formula we come out with.

Secretary Kissinger: If I talk to Brezhnev, I've got to give him some figures. If not, the trip will just abort and he will think that I will have been sent just to give us an excuse to toughen relations. If I go in a mode of stonewalling, he'll think it's to give us an excuse to go back and say détente has failed. By this discussion, if I say to him that the numbers would be agreed later, then it would be better if it were done by Alex in

Geneva and not me with Brezhnev. Rather, the numbers must be agreed upon if I am going to go to Moscow. Otherwise, Brezhnev will go to the Politburo and they will say what's the ratio and if he can't answer them, they will oppose the agreement.

The Politburo will probably also ask why if they don't count FBS in the agreement, why Backfire should be counted.

General Brown: Hopefully, we will be able to count two cruise missiles for Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: I concluded from the session last time that the preference was for 15 cruise missiles per ship up to 2500 kilometers with unlimited cruise missiles below 600 km. This could be translated into a formula for the Soviets.

General Brown: The point is that we would have 2:1 ratio between SLCMs and Backfire. However, we should note that we do not have enough SLCMs authorized to fill our options.

President Ford: What confuses me is that when you go to Option IV, you count the platforms in the MIRV limit. If the platforms are the ships, are the number of cruise missiles also limited?

Secretary Kissinger: Only the number of launchers.

President Ford: On surface ships, Option IV would appear to me to be more restrictive than Option III.

Secretary Rumsfeld: This is probably true.

President Ford: If you count each surface ship with SLCMs as a platform in the 1320 limit, then there are weaker limits on surface-ship SLCMs in Option III as compared to Option IV.

Dr. Ikke: That's probably right.

Mr. Hyland: However, Option IV is tougher on Backfire. They are asked to count each Backfire after October 3, 1977 in the 2400, whereas in Option III, we would pull back from that position and establish a general ratio between Backfires and cruise missiles or an upper limit on the number of Backfires.

President Ford: On the basis of actual military capability, if this were staffed out, from this aspect, would Option IV be more restrictive on our military capability than Option III?

General Brown: But as Bill said, in Option IV, the Backfire is counted in the aggregate.

President Ford: After October of 1977 which I understand would allow the first 120 to be free.

Secretary Kissinger: If we throw in the Bear and Bison tankers and other variants, there would be, in effect, 235 Backfire free. If we give them 235 Backfire free in Option IV by not counting the variants, then

there is not that much difference between the Backfire limits in Option III and Option IV.

Director Colby: Don't we already have an understanding on the variants?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but I'm just trying to give an explanation of the difference between Option III and Option IV. We should keep in mind that if I raise the "variant" issue with Brezhnev, he will not understand it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I'm amazed if that's true. These aircraft have been extensively discussed in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: That's true, but you can't assume that Brezhnev will have heard about it. What I'm trying to say is that on the basis of counting the variants, the Soviets are permitted only 65 more Backfire in III. Under Option IV, you will, in effect, give 235 free Backfire; 115 because we would not count the Bear and Bison variants which could be converted to bombers as easily as it would be to use Backfires in intercontinental missions.

President Ford: But in IV, we would count the surface ships which would take away from the 1320 missiles and bombers; thus, Option IV would appear to be less advantageous to us militarily than Option III. It has to work out that way.

Secretary Kissinger: Our basic problem is pure public relations. No U.S. programs will be limited by this agreement. The problem is how to present it. There would be more Backfires without SALT than under these limitations. We would not have 50 surface ships with cruise missiles by '83 or '84. George's point is how do we present it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Your point's valid. The presentation for Option IV modified would be different from that for Option III. There are other pieces and other considerations, such as what may be the implication for future SALT agreements. We should discuss how we handle Backfire in terms of it being a "grey area" system and the precedent that it sets for future negotiations—especially under Option IV, although it would be easier to defend than the other options.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be easier, but the problem is how to get the Soviets to accept it. We need to analyze the programs affected in terms of strategic situation and where we would be without SALT for every option.

General Brown: We give on some of our options by including heavy bombers; we'll probably be up to 1320 by 1985.

Secretary Kissinger: But you don't like Poseidon anyway.

General Brown: You're right; we prefer Trident to Poseidon.

Secretary Kissinger: There would be only one year in which you would probably be squeezed and you could probably stretch the Trident program for one year to accommodate this.



General Brown: I don't assume we'll be in a position to go over 1320 before 1985.

Secretary Kissinger: We should have plans developed on the presumption that there will be new negotiations on what happens after 1985.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There's another question which is raised if we reserve the right to deploy mobiles. The impact would depend on the size of the aggregate.

Secretary Kissinger: If we leave the mobile ICBM option open, then there is nothing in the agreement which would constrain our programs. From the standpoint of SALT, then the decision for the President is whether there is a military advantage to banning or permitting mobiles. Since the Soviets used to favor permitting mobiles and are now arguing that their deployment should be banned, we must conclude that they are willing to give up mobiles in an agreement, at least through 1985.

President Ford: Is it our view that we want mobiles?

General Brown: If we want to protect our ICBMs, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: If we kill mobiles on surface ships and leave the others open, the Navy will be the ones who scream.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We should leave the option open for mobiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We really don't have to discuss that now. I think that the question of mobile ICBMs should be deferred at this time and left out of all of the options.

Vice President Rockefeller: And we should also leave open the option of land-based mobile cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: In my view, we could accept the 5500 km and when the agreement lapses, retain the option to deploy after 1985 if we need it; however, there is no need to retain this option through 1985. The 5500 km range would allow as much technology to go forward as is needed.

Vice President Rockefeller: Because they're guided missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Another option is to modify the Soviet idea of deferral—the thing Dobrynin proposed to me. We could make a five-year agreement on Backfire and cruise missiles—say, until 1982. We could allow the Soviets 275, and maybe 250 Backfire while we would agree to have no more than 25 surface ships with launchers. This constrains us not at all since our IOC is not before 1980 at the earliest, and we would not have 25 ships by 1982. This would give us maximum leverage in the follow-on negotiations.

Vice President Rockefeller: What about land-mobile cruise missiles?

Secretary Kissinger: This would be no problem up to 2500 km.

President Ford: When will their cruise missiles become operative?

Secretary Kissinger: They would not have long-range cruise missiles for at least five years.

Dr. Ikke: A five-year agreement on cruise missiles would also have the advantage of allowing time to see how difficult cruise missile verification is going to be.

Secretary Kissinger: We would then have a starting point from which to trade constraints on their cruise missiles for constraints on our cruise missiles.

President Ford: Let me make this request. Take Modified IV, every option seeks in some way to exchange Backfires for cruise missiles on surface ships. We need a military estimate of the impact of the 115 Backfires difference between IV and III versus counting platforms on ships in the MIRV limit. We need a military estimate of the difference between III and IV where you would in III compare the permitted Backfire versus the surface ships cruise missile limit using 50 platforms and 15 launchers per platform.

Secretary Clements: Then we should also do an option with 100 ships and 250 ships.

President Ford: This is a question that will be raised in any justification of the agreement. What is the military difference between these two proposals? My non-technical visceral feeling is that IV Modified is less desirable from a technical standpoint than Option III.

Secretary Kissinger: My analysis of the foreign policy situation is the following. The trip is being made at the request of the Soviets; we have changed the date on them three different times and have made a public statement that we would be willing to make a major effort to settle the outstanding issues. They must assume that we are going there to settle the issues, not just to discuss them or to nit-pick. Otherwise, we could just as well have the proposal put forward in Geneva. However, the way their system works, is in order for them to accept Option IV modified, which I personally have no problem putting forward, would require an enormous change in their current position.

Brent Scowcroft: They made their last statement after we had given them Modified IV.

Secretary Kissinger: In that case, if they accept Modified Option IV, there would be no problem. But if they don't accept it, then we could give them the variant of Option IV and on Wednesday night, they would be able to have time to translate it into Russian and have a Politburo meeting on Thursday. But there's no way that we would get anything done unless it follows that sort of program, nor do I really know what they are likely to do after they reject Option IV as they are likely to

do. As I always do, I will cable back at the end of the day what happened on Wednesday. There must be some flexibility to go to a variation of Option I or a five-year agreement or Option III. There must be some latitude or it will be a very strained situation. They are certain to draw conclusions about our performance; if they conclude that I was only sent there to stonewall, they will conclude that we are in a new phase in our relationship. They can have Angola fail, but they can't have a SALT stalemate on their plate simultaneously. If they are in a condition of maximum readiness to settle, then there's a question of what they will do to reach an agreement. I don't know what it will be.

General Brown: The only thing they know is Option IV or Modified Option I.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There's a possibility that they could offer us a counterproposal.

Secretary Kissinger: In the whole history of the arms control negotiations, they have never made a reasonable counterproposal. When a decision is made by the Politburo, that decision is cast in concrete. They are much more likely to give us a variation of our own proposal. If they accept Option IV in principle but propose different numbers, what do I do then? Suppose they come back and say they will want 250 Backfire and are willing to count all Backfire above that. At that point, what do I say? Nothing? But I really can't give you any idea what their response will be.

President Ford: Well, Henry, I think you have to have some flexibility. We've put forward Modified IV and we can go to Variant IV next—and you know that you can always go to Option I with, say January 1, 1979 as a target date, or to a five-year agreement. We know that Option III is a possibility and as you proceed, we can start back here moving to a decision on what kind of flexibility you might put forward. You should communicate to me your recommendation on the best way to proceed.

You are going there, not for a stalemate, but for the purpose of getting an agreement. If we don't get an agreement, that is the worst of all. If we don't have an agreement, both strategic and conventional requirements will strain the defense budget and there's no assurance that we can get the required budget through Congress if we ask them for more funds. The worst of all would be no agreement in my judgment. You have to have some flexibility without prejudging yet where we will go. With flexibility and communication and judgment from here, I think we can do it. The trip is needed and desirable. There isn't any question about it; no agreement is the worst possibility.

Vice President Rockefeller: I agree, and in that agreement, I think we should maintain the flexibility to keep the Soviets at 5500 km on land-based cruise missiles.

Secretary Rumsfeld: No agreement is the worst option—if you mean within the scope of those options which we are considering. However, a worse option is a bad agreement. As far as what Henry said goes, the only fall guy in this is you. It's your judgment which will be called into question. This discussion is not nit-picking; to the extent that our relationship with the Soviet Union is to be durable, we have to be sure that we get a good agreement—thus we are not nit-picking, but demonstrating our seriousness of purpose.

The level of deterrence suitable for Brezhnev is not necessarily the level of deterrence suitable for us. We can now see the difference between these options. The position we take must be fashioned in a manner which can be sold to Congress. It would be more damaging to go with a bad position than to delay in going forward with a proposal to the Soviets. We must keep in mind the problems that we will have in the Congress. It will be tough to get any agreement through.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to emphasize that we must be precise in what we are proposing to the Soviets. I can't tell Brezhnev that we want to limit Backfire to a level of 300 in return for a limit on the number on surface ships which will be agreed later. We must give him our side of this issue.

Secretary Rumsfeld: One of the things that serves us well is our ability to discuss these issues in a forthcoming manner. I don't know whether it will be disastrous for the détente if the key details are not worked [out] while you are in Moscow. But if we can fashion a package that's acceptable on both sides, then we can come back and work further on the details.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not saying everything has to be agreed. But Brezhnev has to sell it to the Politburo. You can't tell him that you'll let him know in 72 hours what the number on our side is or to tell him that we'll do it in Geneva. That's just not doable. It all goes to Geneva eventually for working out the details. I was there three times before Vladivostok. If we are approaching each other, then there will be no problem. But if they perceive that I'm stonewalling, then they and we will have to draw the obvious conclusions. In that case, we would be better off to give them a proposal in Geneva than to have me to go to Moscow.

President Ford: Let me just make some concluding comments. Substantively, we should try and get the best agreement we can. If we can get an agreement that can be substantively defended, then we should do it. It will be a tough political atmosphere and some people will be inclined to play politics with it; but if we can defend the agreement substantively, then we can win. I want to emphasize the substance, not the political aspects. If we can get a good substantive agreement, then we should do it.

Secretary Kissinger: What I resent these days is that they're saying that SALT I was not carefully considered. They're claiming that it was not worked out in Helsinki, but rather by me in Moscow, which is a myth. I consulted with the JCS on all of the major issues and no American program was stopped, but in fact, they were accelerated. All American programs were left intact. The forces that were in being in 1972 were the results of decisions made in the 1960's. There is a myth that there was great White House pressure on the agencies to accept the agreement—but only in the last few weeks did the White House really get involved.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You agree, however, Henry, that in the environment that we're in the public will always have 20–20 hind sight.

Secretary Kissinger: But if all the departments are behind it, it will be accepted.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, but this agreement will be nit-picked and fly-specked.

Secretary Kissinger: This is, in part, due to no one in the Defense Department taking a strong position defending the SALT I agreements. The JCS supported it, Admiral Zumwalt supported it; I talked to Admiral Moorer separately about this agreement, and he asked that we go for the submarine limits which we did. That fact, and the fact that no American programs were stopped, and that some American programs were accelerated, are being lost sight of. There was no example of White House pressure in the course of negotiating the agreements. I defy anyone to produce one cable in which we pressured for something that was not acceptable to the rest of the community. I don't know if Wade was here then, but until 1972, it was the Delegation that was pushing us for an agreement.

President Ford: Let me reiterate. It is not in our interest to have no agreement, but we want a good substantive defensible SALT agreement. If we can't go to other people and say that this is a good agreement, then we shouldn't accept it; but it's up to us to defend it. Thank you all.

**117. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 21, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger has just sent you the following report of his first meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.<sup>2</sup>

The meeting with Brezhnev has just ended. Brezhnev led off with a fairly conciliatory statement emphasizing his interest in concluding a SALT agreement. I then made an opening statement in a similar spirit but I hit hard on the consequences of Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola, which drew a sharp, prolonged response from Brezhnev, disclaiming any responsibility for Angola. At one point, he referred to the State of the Union<sup>3</sup> and the increase in our Defense budgets as a sign of the obstacles arising in Soviet-American relations. However, he calmed down somewhat and expressed his appreciation that you and I were still committed to an improvement in relations despite increasingly sharp attacks from critics.

At this point, we returned to SALT and I asked Brezhnev to respond to our latest proposal.<sup>4</sup> He then proceeded to present an item-by-item proposal of his own based upon our position. He began by calling attention to their concession on MIRV verification and he emphasized very strongly that this was organically linked to a solution of all outstanding problems and stressed there should be no misunderstanding about this linkage.

He then addressed the ALCM problem and said they still preferred to count each individual cruise missile on heavy bombers. However, they were prepared to accept our proposal that heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs over 600 km in range would count as a MIRV against the ceiling of 1320. But he introduced a new wrinkle by claiming that each B-52 would count as one, but the B-1 would count as three. Second, he accepted our proposal that all ALCMs over 2500 km in range would be banned. Third, he addressed sea-based cruise missiles and took note of the fact that we now both agree that SLCMs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976, Kissinger Moscow Trip (1). Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Kissinger met with Brezhnev on January 21, 11 a.m.–1:50 p.m., in Brezhnev's office at the Kremlin. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*; it is also Document 249 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

<sup>3</sup> The text of Ford's State of the Union Speech, January 19, in which Ford stated "only from a position of strength can we negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the growth of nuclear arms," is in *Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77*, pp. 31–44.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 115.

over 600 km in range would be banned from deployment on submarines. Nevertheless, he said the Soviets still proposed that all sea-based missiles over 600 km in range should be banned altogether. On land-based cruise missiles, Brezhnev took a new position. He claimed that the previous agreement to ban land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range was meant to ban all cruise missiles of shorter ranges as well. In order to clear up any misunderstanding, he now proposed a ban on all land-based cruise missiles over 600 km in range. Finally, he turned to the question of Backfire and began by emphatically denying that the Backfire bomber could be considered a strategic weapon. He referred to his previous statement to you on this matter<sup>5</sup> and said that he could now officially give us the official range estimate for this bomber and that this could be made a matter of record in the negotiations. He stated that the radius of the Backfire was 2200 km.

At this point, I interrupted to ask some questions about the Backfire estimate; namely, what conditions of flight altitude, subsonic or sonic, etc., were assumed in this estimate of 2200. Brezhnev turned the question over to General Kozlov who said this range reflected an altitude of 10,000 meters with a maximum load. I asked what the radius would be for a subsonic mission at a higher altitude, say 15,000 meters, and General Kozlov said it might be 2400 km. Brezhnev then suggested that we recess to reflect upon what he had said and proposed reconvening at 5:00 p.m. this evening Moscow time.

In addition to the foregoing, Gromyko told me privately last night and again before lunch today that a deferral option was completely out of the question. He characterized it as a present to the United States since they believe Backfire should not be counted in any case.

In light of Brezhnev's presentations and Gromyko's remarks, my strong recommendation is that we not proceed with a straightforward presentation of Option 3 which would merely challenge Brezhnev on the Backfire and without benefit of some preliminary discussion of the concept behind Option 3. What I propose to do is to explore with Brezhnev the modified version of Option 3 which we discussed briefly in the NSC meeting<sup>6</sup> in which Backfire and surface ship cruise missiles would be put in a separate category for limitations during a five-year period beginning in 1977 through 1982. This has the advantage that the Soviets would not be able to develop or deploy sophisticated cruise missiles in this period, while our surface ship cruise missile program would be approaching an optimal level for breakout or for putting pressure on the negotiations. Moreover, this approach would ease the verification problem since the Soviets would not be able to deploy the

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 102.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 116.

cruise missile at long range. In addition, since the Soviets claim that the Backfire has a 2400 km radius this provides an opening to group both the Backfire and cruise missiles of a similar range. I would start out by suggesting a separate limit on Backfire during this period at about 250 and in this way, allow Brezhnev to save face and to keep open all our significant cruise missile options. As discussed at the NSC, I would outline a limit on surface ship cruise missiles at about 25 ships with 10–15 launchers, but my main aim this evening will be to persuade Brezhnev this is an equitable compromise without yet committing ourselves to specific numbers. On land-based cruise missiles I will say that we have two choices, either to return to the original agreement banning intercontinental missiles and therefore permitting shorter ranges, or to accept our new position of banning above the range of 2500 km.

I anticipate a lengthy evening session but it is also likely that Brezhnev will have to consider what we say and take it to the Politburo probably tomorrow, which means we may have a decisive session on Thursday afternoon. I will report this evening my impressions of what the prospects for an agreement are.<sup>7</sup> As of now, I am impressed with Brezhnev's determination to get into the substance of SALT, signified by the presence of some of his SALT experts and his willingness to respond in detail to our proposal. Nevertheless, it is clear that on Backfire, at least, he has a tough political problem, and his claim that it is not strategic is being backed up by official military estimates. Thus, this evening's session is almost certain to be very tough going.

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<sup>7</sup> Document 118.



**118. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, January 21, 1976, 2159Z.

Hakto 4. Subject: Evening Session on SALT.

1. We began the second session with Brezhnev this evening, and I proceeded along the lines I had indicated in my previous report.<sup>2</sup>

2. First, I asked some more questions about Brezhnev's assurance on the Backfire range to determine what flight profile they had used and what they would estimate the range to be in all high altitude mode at subsonic speed. This drew only a repeat by General Kozlov of the "official" Brezhnev guarantee that the aircraft had a "maximum operational" radius of 2200–2400 KM.

3. I then proceeded to sum up the points of agreement and differences in our two positions. I noted that on ALCMs we both had the same approach: to count as MIRVed, and to ban above 2500 KM, and ban on other aircraft above 600 KM. I said we could not accept their counting of the B–1 as equal to 3 MIRVed vehicles. This brought a lame rejoinder from Gromyko that the reason was that the B–1 was supersonic and could reach the target earlier than the B–52, but this was not pressed seriously.

4. On sea based cruise missiles I noted we agreed on submarines but not on surface ship cruise missiles between 600 KM and 2500 KM. I then said that we were surprised by their interpretation of the ban on intercontinental land based cruise missiles, which led to a long confused debate. Gromyko first claimed that they assumed all along that all land based cruise missiles over 600 KM would be banned, and that was implicit in their proposal. I knocked this down, but it was finally left that they would consider the question again: either to return to the original interpretation, leaving all land based missiles up to intercontinental range free, or banning only those above 2500 KM.

5. I noted the similarity in range between their claim of 2200–2400 KM for the Backfire and our proposal for SLCMs on surface ships up to 2500 KM, and I as well contrasted our willingness to include SLCMs as strategic weapons in SALT and their resistance on Backfire. I suggested

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 28, Kissinger Trip File, January 20–25, 1976–Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, TOHAK (1)–(3). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which was held in Brezhnev's Kremlin office from 5:02 to 6:30 p.m., is Document 251 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Document 117.

a separate five year agreement in which they would not deploy more than 275 Backfire in the period up to the end of 1982, and we would not deploy more than 25 surface ships with cruise missiles for the five year period. I said this was a conditional proposal subject to agreement as all outstanding issues.

6. In this context I proposed that we also reduce from 2400 to 2300 by 1980. This last point caused some consternation. Brezhnev said that he could not revise Vladivostok, and both Gromyko and Brezhnev repeated that Backfire was not strategic. After considerable discussion on the Soviet side Brezhnev said he did not reject our ideas out of hand, but proposed a recess until 12 noon tomorrow, which I assume means he will hold a Politburo meeting in the morning.

7. My strategy tomorrow will be to listen to whatever they produce, assuming they continue to reject any numerical limit on Backfire. I will concentrate mainly on the cruise missiles and try to draw Brezhnev out further on any assurances about Backfire. Incidentally, Dobrynin “guaranteed” that the Politburo would never agree to count Backfire, because it has been sold as a peripheral attack system.

8. Unless there is an unexpected break in the Soviet position, which is not entirely ruled out, all I can do is narrow the differences to the point that they can be considered again in Washington. Basically, we may leave here with a reasonable cruise missiles package plus some assurances on Backfire’s range and other indicators. If so, we can evaluate what such an overall agreement would look like in Washington.

9. In this light I really see no reason to go to a pure version of Option III, nor do I see deferral as a real option unless the Soviets get desperate.

**119. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 21, 1976, 5:30–7 p.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PRINCIPALS

The President

The Vice President

Acting Secretary of State Joseph Sisco

Acting Secretary of Defense William Clements

Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James L. Holloway III

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

## OTHER ATTENDEES

*White House*Mr. John Marsh, Counselor  
to the PresidentMr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to  
the PresidentLt Col Robert McFarlane, USMC,  
Military Assistant to the  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs*State*

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

*JCS*Lt General Edward L. Rowny,  
USA*NSC Staff*

Colonel Richard T. Boverie, USAF

President Ford: All of you have received a copy of Henry's message. (Note: A copy of the message is attached at Tab A.)<sup>2</sup> Therefore, I don't have to go into it in detail with you and read it.

Brezhnev emphasized again that the Backfire could not be counted as a strategic weapon. Also, through General Kozlov, he gave us more specific information on its radius—2200 to 2400 km.

Brezhnev also proposed a ban on all land-based cruise missiles over 600 km.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. In message Tohak 15, January 21, Scowcroft told Kissinger that the President read the report of his first meeting with Brezhnev and "observed that Brezhnev appeared to be taking the negotiations very seriously and noted that he was even making specific counterproposals, extreme though some of them might be." Scowcroft reported that Ford called for an NSC meeting at 5:30 p.m. "to state his concurrence with your plan of action." (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 28, Kissinger Trip Files, January 20–25, 1976–Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, TOHAK (1))

<sup>2</sup> Printed as Document 117.

Gromyko also told Henry that deferral was out of the question since this would be a unilateral favor to us, inasmuch as they did not believe that Backfire should be counted under any circumstances.

In light of Brezhnev's and Gromyko's remarks, Henry believes we should explore a modified version of Option III. His approach would put Backfire and surface ship SLCMs in a separate category of limitations which would run for only five years, from 1977 to 1982.

Henry would start out by proposing the inclusion in the separate category of 250 Backfires and about 25 surface ships with 10–15 launchers each. I believe this would permit the number of Backfire we anticipate will be produced.

Director Colby: Approximately. I think they would have about 340 in the inventory, and 375 in terms of total production.

President Ford: That is not significantly different.

Director Colby: Right.

President Ford: Brezhnev has come up for the first time with an idea to count the B-1 as three systems within the 1320 MIRV limit. This is a new gimmick. On the other hand, they have accepted our ALCM proposal.

I think, as I read Henry's suggested approach, rather than confronting Brezhnev on the issue of the number of Backfire in 1985, this proposal would not challenge Brezhnev on a position he is solid on, and backed by the Politburo. I would like to get from all of you your views. I realize you have not had much time to analyze this. We should explore the five year agreement.

I know the Navy, Jim (Admiral Holloway), plans around 10 SLCM launchers per ship—no reason to go to 15?

Admiral Holloway: We have no surface ship SLCM program at this time. We have thought about a submarine program, but we haven't even looked at the figures for modifying surface ships. Our first request for funds would be in the FY 78 budget. The nuclear cruisers are the only ships now which can take cruise missiles without substantial alteration of the ship design. Therefore, we would only have six warships with SLCMs by the end of 1982.

President Ford: It was my impression that you could fire SLCMs from torpedo tubes, and that you have a number of surface ships with torpedo tubes.

Admiral Holloway: We can fire them from 21-inch tubes, the kind we have on submarines. However, our surface ships have lightweight ASW tubes which are only 13 inches in diameter and carry torpedoes one-fourth the weight of SLCMs. The surface tubes are just a canister to dump the torpedoes in the water. But SLCMs need considerable initial blast-off since they go airborne. We can carry more of the SLCMs in the

strike cruiser. We can take our cruisers, formerly nuclear frigates, and put missile pods on them. The cruiser can handle eight missiles without degrading ship performance. We could put more on the Spruance class destroyer but we would have to take something else off, such as 8-inch guns, or helicopters. This would be difficult without a surface SLCM program. We have only attempted to be prepared. Putting them on the Spruance class destroyer would be very difficult.

Secretary Clements: You could make block changes in the production line.

Dr. Ikle: How many surface SLCM platforms would you have?

Admiral Holloway: Six by 1982.

President Ford: This absolutely surprises me. In modified Option IV, Defense agreed to count surface ship SLCM platforms in the MIRV limit. How could you put this forth? I am dumbfounded by what you are saying today.

Admiral Holloway: We have looked at surface SLCMs for the future. However, the Navy plans are for submarines. We have no plans for surface SLCMs but we have looked at them to be prepared—something for the future.

Dr. Ikle: Modified Option IV was for a 10 year period, not five years. That can affect how you look at surface SLCMs.

Secretary Clements: Same thing is true for land-based cruise missiles. We have no program for them. We have two programs—one for submarines, and one for ALCMs.

President Ford: Is there any way to put SLCMs on surface ships—for example put better tubes on the decks?

Admiral Holloway: Putting them on the decks would be a problem. They must be able to take the impulse from zero length launchers.

President Ford: Will you repeat again your program for frigates and DLGNs. How soon and how many for what purposes?

Admiral Holloway: We have nuclear cruisers which are authorized and funded. By 1982 we will have six of them.

President Ford: In the 1977–1982 span you will have six?

Admiral Holloway: Yes. We will have a capability the last two years of the period.

President Ford: What about the Spruance class destroyer?

Admiral Holloway: We have 30 authorized and funded. However, the shipyards are in trouble and the last one will be somewhere between two to four years late. We would have to take off the guns to put on SLCMs.

President Ford: Forward or aft guns?

Admiral Holloway: Forward guns. If we put SLCMs on the aft end, the helicopters would have to come off. I cannot give you a high confidence estimate on these ships. It would be nip and tuck if we have any of these ships altered, unless it becomes a program of the highest priority. I doubt that we could have more than two or three Spruance destroyers operational with SLCMs by 1982.

President Ford: Therefore, you could have eight to nine ships with a SLCM capability.

Admiral Holloway: That is probably on the low side. Let's say we could have 10–15 ships if we give the program the highest possible priority.

Secretary Clements: We could make block changes.

President Ford: You say you would "not have many" with a SLCM capability?

Admiral Holloway: We could put eight SLCMs on a ship. That would be reasonable. We could strip the ships, but then they would be vulnerable to attack—only a floating barge with missiles. The ships need an inherent fighting capability to defend themselves.

We should also remember that when we talk about SLCMs on 20 ships, only one-third of those ships would be on station at any time. If we went to blue and gold crews like we do with our SSBNs, we could maintain perhaps up to 60 percent on station. Therefore, we might have 12 SLCM capable platforms on station if we had 20 ships.

In any event they would be limited with a 2500 km range. (Admiral Holloway takes out a chart<sup>3</sup> and shows it to the President.) They would be limited in terms of where they could be stationed to hit the Soviet Union. On this chart you see one small circle near Crete where the ships could hit the USSR. There is another small circle near Iceland.

Brent Scowcroft: But that would be if we used the missiles for strategic purposes.

Secretary Clements: That's right, Brent. But the 2500 km limit also includes tactical use.

Dr. Ikle: I think this could be a benefit. We could say we would not be adding to the strategic arsenal—that these are gray area systems.

Admiral Holloway: If we did this, we would have to have all our ships committed to a single purpose. They would be single purpose, dedicated platforms, which would be hard to make available for other purposes.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

Secretary Clements: And if we would have to put them out there, they would be easy to spot and highly vulnerable. I hope we don't attach great hope to these as strategic platforms.

Brent Scowcroft: This was not addressed in any meeting. We have been talking about tactical use.

Secretary Clements: It is different if we talk about attack subs. An attack sub would have a strategic capability.

President Ford: Back to Option IV as presented, I gathered that we were equating Backfire with surface ship SLCMs with a 2400 km range. This means to me that DOD says the Backfire is not a strategic weapon either.

Admiral Holloway: No, that is not our intention. If Backfire is strategic and we address it in a separate compartment, we have to look at our offsetting capability—surface SLCMs. If we have 25 ships with 10 missiles each, that gives us 250 SLCMs. Is that an equivalent balance with 250 Backfires? I don't see it as equivalent with the Backfire. [2½ lines not declassified]

President Ford: You can reload the surface ships, but you can't reload the Backfire.

Admiral Holloway: No, sir. Eight pods would be it. Only the strike cruiser might have a reload capability if we develop it.

Submarines would have a reload capability.

Dr. Ikle: How many submarines with SLCMs could you have by 1982?

Admiral Holloway: We could have 70, all SSNs.

President Ford: Are those already counted?

Admiral Holloway: No, they are attack subs.

Secretary Clements: We could change the mission of the SSN 688s. We have only thought of having 2 to 3 on board for strategic capability. We didn't want to degrade their original mission.

Admiral Holloway: We have been talking more in terms of options and flexibility for the future. The planner who looks to the future thinks in terms of having 24 spaces in an attack sub. He might use 4–8 of those for SLCMs, and 20–16 for torpedoes. Then in his normal day-to-day operations, he would have a strategic reserve. It is important to understand that the planner is not looking at intentions, but at capability.

President Ford: How many of our submarines count in the 2400 total and the 1320 subceiling?

Admiral Holloway: Forty-one SSBNs—Polaris and Poseidon. Trident will add to that total. We now have approved 10 Trident boats.

President Ford: As the Trident comes in, will you be subtracting from the 41 Polaris and Poseidon boats?

Admiral Holloway: We will not subtract on a one-for-one basis.

Ambassador Johnson: The missiles count but not the boats.

Admiral Holloway: We will have a shortage of launchers. We will have to accelerate the Trident or extend the life of the current launchers.

Dr. Ikle: There will be more of a constraint on MIRV counting from bombers with ALCMs than with the new Trident and Poseidon.

President Ford: What is anybody's reaction to having 250 Backfire in a five-year agreement, matching them with surface ships with cruise missiles of 2400 to 2500 km range? This is assuming the ships are reconfigured or planned and constructed.

Secretary Clements: We could add a class of ships, the FFG, which we use to call the Patrol Frigate. We will have a large number of them in production in three shipyards. We could do something perhaps with them.

However, I have been thinking that this is a surprise. This never surfaced in the Verification Panel. I frankly don't agree with it. It is a very poor trade. The difference in megatonnage is just one gauge. All other gauges are also in the negative. In addition, the Backfire as a system is much more flexible, whereas ships are constrained by their environment. Backfire is enormously more flexible than any ship mode.

Vice President Rockefeller: And the Backfire can be refueled, too.

Secretary Clements: Right. I don't know what kind of rationale we would use to explain the trade. The ten to one relationship is exactly reversed of what it should be. It should be 250 ships and 25 Backfires. But I defer, Mr. President, to your position.

What worries me the most is Brezhnev's statement about the radius of the Backfire. How can he make that kind of statement about the Backfire? The range is one-half of what we say it is. How can you trade with him seriously when he gives us such false premise? There is no sense for that. I don't know what we are trading.

President Ford: Bill (Colby), what do you think?

Director Colby: Brezhnev is saying the Backfire has a 2200 km radius. Our estimate is that it has a 2700–2900 nautical mile radius. Brezhnev's figure is startling.

Secretary Clements: Brezhnev's figure is wrong as hell

Director Colby: If the Backfire radius were only 2200 km, there would be no problem at all.

President Ford: In Option IV, those Backfire produced after October 1977 would count. We would also count surface SLCM platforms and the MIRV limit. Let's look at this on the premise that the Backfire



has a longer range. General Brown's memo (Note: Memo to the SecDef, dated 19 Jan 1976)<sup>4</sup> makes the following statements:

"Backfire was loaded as follows:

[3 paragraphs (18½ lines) not declassified]

In figuring this, it says that you count the platforms in the MIRV limit—the ships under the 1320 ceiling. Therefore, considering everything you have said, doesn't that change the analysis?

Dr. Ikle: It puts additional pressure on MIRVs.

President Ford: For every ship, a missile comes out.

Director Colby: The 1320 subceiling doesn't hurt them for a long time.

President Ford: But it affects us. If you add all this, and take it out of the 1320, it changes the charts. You are saying the ships are not as powerful as thought.

Dr. Ikle: The ships give some pressure on the MIRVed missiles; you might have to give up some Minuteman III.

President Ford: If you go to the limit for Option IV, you must subtract something, also.

Dr. Ikle: The penalty is that you have fewer that you can MIRV, but you are not necessarily affecting the megatonnage.

Brent Scowcroft: You may or may not be.

Admiral Holloway: There are an infinite number of variations.

President Ford: The paper doesn't present all the options accurately.

Director Colby: The surface ships are below other systems in megatonnage.

Brent Scowcroft: We are setting aside the Backfire and surface SLCMs not so much for an equal trade, but we are setting aside the gray area systems.

We don't always have comparability in SALT. You can't compare a fully loaded B-52 with an SSN-6. There is no comparison, but both systems count. We have no comparability now.

We all agreed on Modified 4 and Variant 4. This would have given us 235 Backfire by 1985 which would not count—115 free and 120 by 1977.

It seems to me that the five-year program gives us a chance to stop the Backfire where it was. In 1982 we will be ready for maximum de-

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<sup>4</sup> The memorandum is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 28, Kissinger Trip Files, January 20–25, 1976–Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, TOHAK (1).

ployment of cruise missiles. This is the advantage of a five-year agreement versus straight Option III.

Dr. Ikle: I am troubled by the relationship of 25 ships to 250 Backfire. Instead we could propose “gray areas.” We could say they are not strategic forces, and there is some equitability in relating platforms to Backfires. Also, there is an asymmetry resulting from the verification problem.

Brent Scowcroft: They will have no cruise missiles by 1982.

Dr. Ikle: But they could by 1985.

Vice President Rockefeller: They can do the same thing with cruise missiles that we can.

Brent Scowcroft: But they can’t have cruise missiles on surface ships.

Vice President Rockefeller: But they can have some cruise missiles.

President Ford: No, not on surface ships or on the Backfire.

Dr. Ikle: There will be uncertainty regarding their range. The Soviets might say their missiles are “600 km” in range, but they could be as much as 1500 km, simply from using a high profile versus a low profile. Therefore, there is uncertainty.

The same is true with submarines. For us it would be 600 km, but theirs would be uncertain. They could be about 1200–1500 km, which would put them in range of the U.S. from their submarines. Their surface ships might have somewhat longer range SLCMs maybe.

Brent Scowcroft: I don’t see what follows from that.

Director Colby: On verification, we might not be able to obtain precise evidence of the kind that you could use in the world court, but our total intelligence collection would let us know if they were undertaking a massive effort to cheat. We could pick that up.

Dr. Ikle: You mean massive numbers? Or the range of ALCMs on Backfire?

Director Colby: We could detect massive strategic deployments.

President Ford: They cannot have ALCM on Backfire.

Dr. Ikle: Yes, they can have Backfire up to 600 km. There would be a constant uncertainty; this would be a corrosive irritant.

Admiral Holloway: The fundamental problem is the question of 250 Backfire versus 25 surface ships with SLCMs. This is not an equitable solution. We need special programs in the Navy to modify ships within this time frame. [2 lines not declassified] In terms of warheads our ships would have 200 warheads and their Backfire force would have 1,000 warheads.

People would say that we are accelerating our strategic weapons program, not limiting them, and that we would end up with less than the Soviets.

In addition, at the end of the five year period, we would be stuck with ships that don't fit into our overall plans—ships with a degraded general purpose capability.

President Ford: Well, why did DOD propose Option IV?

Admiral Holloway: We in the Navy didn't think much about SLCMs on surface ships since they are not that good.

President Ford: Well, you can't have it both ways. DOD proposed modified Option IV. You have undercut the validity of IV.

Admiral Holloway: We hope that by putting surface SLCMs on the MIRV limit it would help kill SLCMs on surface ships.

President Ford: Okay. But then you are letting Backfire go free without any offset. You are undercutting DOD's proposal on Option IV modified. All I am saying is that I have been acting on the basis that DOD supported modified Option IV. Your argument raises questions about Option IV.

Dr. Ikle: There is also a question on Option III. If the Soviets do not count 150 Bison variants in the total in Geneva, both the Backfire and the Bison variants would be outside the total.

President Ford: Let's talk about the suggestions on land-based cruise missiles. Option III and Option IV modified proposed banning them over 2500 km. Henry discussed this with them.

Ambassador Johnson: The Soviets now propose to ban them over 600 km. This is a new position.

Secretary Clements: The Soviet proposal to ban them over 600 km is new to us. It destroys part of what safety valve on technology we have. Our proposal on land-based cruise missiles left us a window on technology, but now the Soviets have jerked the rug out from under us.

Vice President Rockefeller: When we talk about land-based cruise missiles I would like to know why the Soviets are so anxious to limit our use of them.

Brent Scowcroft: They are worried about Europe. The 600 km range would prevent us in Europe from hitting the Soviets.

Ambassador Johnson: And the Soviets are worried about the Germans.

Vice President Rockefeller: They know the Backfire—they have them. However, we only have a beginning on cruise missiles. If we limit our new weapons, we may be hobbling ourselves.

Brent Scowcroft: This is one advantage of the five-year agreement. In the interim if we find some new use, we can always make adjustments.

Vice President Rockefeller: What happened to the 5500 km range?

Ambassador Johnson: This is a new position. We want to ban them over 2500 km.

President Ford: One proposal was to limit the range to 600 km, which we have not accepted. Another proposal is to limit range to 2500 km, which would protect our ability to deploy cruise missiles in Western Europe. Or we could stick with a 5500 km range, which is approximately 3,000 miles.

Ambassador Johnson: The 5500 km range definition for strategic systems arises from the Interim Agreement. It is the range from the northeast United States to the northwest part of the Soviet Union.

President Ford: What observations are there on the three options? We don't seem to want the 600 km limit, so it boils down to 5500 km versus 2500 km.

Dr. Ikle: There is a slight advantage to the 2500 km figure with respect to verification.

Brent Scowcroft: It is not a slight advantage. Once they test them at that range they can put them on any vehicle.

Dr. Ikle: But verification is easier.

Vice President Rockefeller: Are we about five years ahead of the Soviets in cruise missiles?

Secretary Clements: More like eight to ten years ahead.

Vice President Rockefeller: What about verification problems?

President Ford: Bill (Colby), can you verify the beginning of a test program?

Director Colby: We may have a little trouble. We have a systems problem. We may lose our ability to detect cruise missile tests by the early 1980s unless we get new systems.

If they test at a legitimate range, they still can make longer ranges very easily.

President Ford: Do we have a land-based cruise missile program?

Secretary Clements: No.

Admiral Holloway: We in the Navy are keeping the Army and Air Force informed about our cruise missile program, but there is no land-based cruise missile program yet.

President Ford: Well, if you would go to such a program, it would be 5500 km, not 2500 km except for European deployment.

Secretary Clements: Why 5500 km?

President Ford: For our own purposes; developing a 2500 km missile is no good.

Secretary Clements: We can give them to our conventional forces in Europe.

President Ford: That is what I said. If we are talking about strategic missiles, we are talking about 5500 km.

Dr. Ikle: That brings us to the Backfire. The Russians argue that it has a theater mission.

President Ford: Well, how do we stand on 2500 km versus 5500 km?

Ambassador Johnson: I prefer 2500 km. It protects us for the five-year period. And it gives us a small verification gain.

Vice President Rockefeller: But they will have nothing in five years.

Ambassador Johnson: The principle of the single limit for cruise missiles is good. But if they are to be truly intercontinental, they would need a much greater range than 5500 km.

President Ford: If we went to 2500 km, how much of a technological jump would there be to get a true intercontinental missile?

Admiral Holloway: For land-based missiles, not much of a problem. The greatest demand is on the sea-based missiles because of the 21-inch tube constraint. There is only a problem of scale after that. With the TERCOM guidance system, accuracy is good regardless of the range.

President Ford: If we go with the 2500 km technology for the five-year period, could we at the end of five years extend the range easily?

Admiral Holloway: Yes.

President Ford: Therefore, 2500 km makes sense. And there is a verification gain.

Secretary Clements: That's okay. This is not a big issue with us.

President Ford: Are there any other comments?

Dr. Ikle: The five-year Option III probably would give us leverage for the next five years to keep the number of Backfire low. It would also preserve the concessions on ALCMs as MIRVs and limit the number of launchers per platform to less than 15.

Secretary Clements: The 10 to 1 ratio makes no sense. It is an uneven trade. It is next to impossible to defend.

Brent Scowcroft: One option would be modified IV. Otherwise, we may have no agreement at all. Therefore, they would have 375 Backfires by 1982, and we would have at least six surface ships.

Director Colby: The megatonnage comparison is one we gave up consciously. We consciously chose small weapons.

President Ford: We have the capability to increase the megatonnage if we want.

Admiral Holloway: We can think about Henry's "gray area" and try to find an offset for Backfire. Possibly we can offset Backfire with all SLCM platforms—submarine or surface ship, or the freedom to mix. We want to find a rationale that relates SLCM platforms and Backfire.

President Ford: That's the right thing to do, bearing in mind the problem of how many surface ships we would have ready. If an alternate platform such as submarines makes sense, then it might be a good thing to do. I had the impression that we could get 25 ships, but you are telling me this is difficult to do unless we use submarines. Look at this as quickly as you can.

Vice President Rockefeller: If the U.S. attacked the Soviets, we could only kill 27 percent of their missiles. What could they do against us? Higher?

Director Colby: I have some figures here.

Secretary Clements: Our fundamental problem is the premise of the range of the Backfire.

Vice President Rockefeller: If we eliminate cruise missiles as potential intercontinental missiles, even if it is only a five-year agreement, it may turn out to a disadvantage to us. I think the longer the range we can get the better for us.

President Ford: Except technically it is not difficult to add to the range if we develop a 2500 km technology.

Director Colby: In any event, we are projected to continue to have our retaliatory capability in the years ahead. We will have enough surviving warheads. Deterrence will still work.

President Ford: How much of total deterrence is represented by the Backfire and surface ship SLCMs?

Dr. Ikle: Surface ships are vulnerable.

President Ford: With respect to their bombers, we have had the option of augmenting our air defenses. But there was a decision by us not to do so. We spent millions of dollars on BOMARC and then we phased it out.

Brent Scowcroft: I would like to make one comment. We have an ongoing negotiation and we can't sit on this.

Vice President Rockefeller: We could take the front half—2500 km versus 5500 km.

President Ford: This is no problem.

Dr. Ikle: I believe we should consider the throw weight limit on the SS-18 and 19. The end result is very important. We have made some agreements.

Brent Scowcroft: We have not agreed to anything.

Secretary Clements: What do we do about their position on Backfire radius? Accept it? We must face up to this

Brent Scowcroft: We can't accept it.

Secretary Clements: Then, what is our strategy?

President Ford: If we have separate agreement on the gray areas, we can offset a gray area system with a gray area system.

Ambassador Johnson: What should we do about it?

Secretary Clements: This is the real issue. If what he says is true about the Backfire radius, there is no issue.

President Ford: We don't accept their range figure. We will accept it as a gray area. We can use something else to offset it.

Director Colby: The 2500 km figure is startling.

Dr. Ikle: There is disagreement on the Backfire range. How do we settle the cruise missile range?

Vice President Rockefeller: We are limiting ourselves if we limit cruise missiles.

President Ford: Jim (Admiral Holloway), will you get that study in. If we have no agreement, we have nothing. They will be able to do what they want to do with Backfire. The Backfire is in production but the cruise missiles are not.

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## 120. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1976, 0501Z.

Tohak 20/WH60092. I have just come from a two-hour NSC meeting which I can only describe as surreal.<sup>2</sup> The President opened with a good summary of where we stand, stressing the Soviet concessions and the advantages of your approach for dealing with Backfire and cruise missiles in a separate agreement with a five year limitation. He then asked Admiral Holloway what the Navy program was for the number of SLCM launchers per ship.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 28, Kissinger Trip Files, January 20–25, 1976–Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, TOHAK (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Via Black Patch.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 119.

Holloway thereupon launched into an incredible commentary on the unacceptability of the proposed Backfire-surface ship SLCM trade off. He stated that there is no U.S. surface ship SLCM program; that the Navy has always envisioned using submarines as the platform for cruise missiles; that the first money for developing a surface ship cruise missile capability isn't programmed until '78 and that the maximum deployment by '82 would be limited to six ships (nuclear strike cruisers). Under heavy prodding from Clements, he later acknowledged that it might be possible to reach as many as fifteen ships, if the Spruance class frigates were reconfigured, but bad-mouthed that approach as seriously degrading the Spruance class for other missions. He said almost in as many words that he was not sure the surface ship cruise missile concept had any merit at all.

The President was visibly shocked and expressed his amazement at this Defense reversal, in view of their acceptance of modified Option IV. Neither Holloway nor Clements could provide any kind of a logical explanation for this turnabout. In the course of this mess Holloway also stated that they planned no more than eight launchers on each ship and that there would be no repeat no reload capability.

The President pressed the point that, particularly in light of our uncertainty on cruise missile deployments, the concept of considering them together with Backfire as a gray area made sense. Clements dismissed this argument and asserted that Defense had never repeat never seriously considered surface ship SLCMs as a reasonable trade-off for Backfire. He stated that such a separate agreement would be indefensible because of the inequity of the ten to one aircraft to ship ratio. He also dwelled on the point that Brezhnev's assertion of the Backfire range as 2400 kilometers, almost 100 percent less than the capability we give it, so seriously called into question Soviet good faith as to require resolution of this issue before proceeding further to discuss anything at all. Clements insisted it was clear that the radius of Backfire is at least 2700 nautical miles—almost twice the Russian figure. Several times I pointed out the irrelevancy of these arguments, e.g., counting B-52 as the same as an SSN-6 also makes little sense but we do that, and tried to refocus the argument back on what is achievable against what happens without an agreement.

Ikle delivered a convoluted pitch that the number of Backfires should equal the number of U.S. platforms in any separate agreement, on a freedom to mix basis—the mix apparently being bombers of the Backfire variety, surface ship SLCMs and submarine SLCMs. He also raised the heavy missile definition as a vital point for you to resolve.

The Vice President then weighed in with his Teller arguments again, maintaining we really shouldn't limit ourselves on cruise missiles. The only effect he had was on the land based cruise missile range.



On that point, Clements said that the difference between 5500 and 2500 was, for Defense, no big issue. I pointed out that the real issue was verification, which argued for 2500; Colby and Ikle agreed. After the meeting, however, the President said he would go with the Vice President and he came down on 5500.

Toward the end Clements and Holloway came out firmly against the 250–25 equation. By this time the President was thoroughly disgusted. He told Clements and Holloway in clear terms what he thought of the inconsistency of their positions today against Monday<sup>3</sup> (but he was not visibly mad enough). He ended the meeting by directing Holloway to send over a paper on acceptable tradeoffs by tomorrow morning. It is apparent to me that the tradeoff Holloway will propose is submarine cruise missiles, notwithstanding the fact that everyone agreed months ago to ban them over 600 kilometers.

After the meeting the President was angrier than I have ever seen him. He ranted about the total inconsistency with previous Defense positions, said that Rumsfeld and Brown could god damn well try themselves to get the extra money necessary when we failed to get a SALT agreement, and stormed out to go to the Kennedy Center.

It was a complete debacle, and I really don't know where we stand now. Holloway virtually removed the surface ship SLCM as a system we had any real interest in, much less one we should pay something to protect. He will probably come in with a proposal that each side can have 250 platforms of gray area systems—Backfire, surface ships and submarines, that is almost indistinguishable from the deferral option.

The President was so mad I cannot predict what he will do in the cold light of morning. I suggest you not for the moment lock up the submarine SLCM ban. I really see no Defense support for any variety of Option III at the moment, although we have not heard from Rumsfeld and Brown.<sup>4</sup> In fact, I am driven to the hypothesis that the JCS don't want an agreement and will pursue any convenient argument to prevent it.

I will keep you abreast of developments in the morning as they occur. Right now I am depressed.

Warm regards.

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<sup>3</sup> January 19; see Document 116.

<sup>4</sup> Rumsfeld and General Brown were in Hamburg attending a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

**121. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, January 22, 1976, 0905Z.

Hakto 5. Ref: Tohak 20.<sup>2</sup> Have just now read your report on the NSC meeting. There are several points I want to emphasize strongly to the President. First, we have had two Verification Panels and four NSC meetings at which agreed options were developed.

Second, the President approved, at DOD urging, Option 4 which includes a ban on submarine launched SLCMs beyond 600 kms and this was submitted to the Soviets in writing. Thus, we cannot simply repudiate it.

Third, the President approved as a fallback Option 3 including the numbers for a Backfire/surface ship trade off. I submitted a modified Option 3 which is much more advantageous to the US. We cannot blithely sweep away these numbers after discussing them with the Soviets. The JCS first complained the SLCM numbers were too low, that they might want hundreds of surface SLCM platforms. Now they say the numbers are too high, they'll have only eight. The whole concept of the grey area is being challenged after being proposed by Rumsfeld and approved at the NSC meetings.

Fourth, it makes no sense at all to keep asking for new papers from the JCS. The only result will be piling up a record that will be used against us later. Finally, as I reported in my last message,<sup>3</sup> I intend to listen to Brezhnev's presentation this morning and to concentrate on cruise missiles.

I strongly request that the President reconvene the NSC and lay down the law. He should recount the record of the last two months, the fact that unanimous agreement was reached on Option 4, that he personally approved Option 3, that what I have offered is better, that I was authorized to deal with SLCMs and Backfire as a grey area, and that now the whole concept is being undone by irresponsible and totally new ideas. You should inform the President that under these conditions I will not reach any agreement here and will simply bring all of the issues back to Washington. No matter what the Soviet reply, I have been driven to a deferral option which is less favorable to us than what we have tabled and which has already been rejected.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 28, Kissinger Trip Files, January 20–25, 1976–Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, TOHAK (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Document 120.

<sup>3</sup> Document 118.

Please make sure the President knows my thinking including this message.

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**122. Message From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, January 22, 1976, 0911Z.

Hakto 6. The Secretary is sending his reply to the account of the NSC meeting,<sup>2</sup> but we wanted you to know that he is being too restrained given the outrageous performance at the NSC. It is incredible that in the middle of these negotiations, after some progress has been made, and with Brezhnev now considering our approach, that the entire agreed framework should be collapsed by new positions or 180 degree turns that were never heard before. How can Clements say that there was never any grey area, after Rumsfeld sponsored it repeatedly, or Holloway say they only want a program of a few ships with eight launchers when we have been hearing the most glowing advocacy of it, and the most scurrilous attacks on the Secretary for allegedly giving it away. Where were they all this time? We do not see how we can proceed in these weird circumstances. It is all the more devastating when you consider that the Soviets are showing a serious interest and obviously trying to find some middle ground without capitulating. If we were in the Secretary's place we would simply abandon the effort or quit, but we will certainly advise him to persevere. We could make progress here today, but not without absolute, unqualified support from Washington. What all this is doing is to drive us to a position where even if the Soviets today show some give we will have to propose deferral of the Backfire/SLCM issues which you and we know is worse for our interest than any of the options we have been negotiating. We are not, obviously, blaming you but for the first time in our careers are giving vent to a real outrage at what is being perpetrated to the utmost potential damage to our country.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976, Kissinger Moscow Trip (1). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Document 121.

# 123. Message From the White House Situation Room to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1976, 1443Z.

Tohak 23/WH60095. The following message was received from Rumsfeld:

1. Brent, please pass to Kissinger and Clements if President feels advisable.

2. Received SecDef 212037Z Jan 76, cable of Scowcroft's memo to President which sets forth a progress report on SecState's meeting with Brezhnev on 21 Jan 76.<sup>2</sup> General Brown and I have studied the cable and we have these thoughts.

3. Cable states that Brezhnev accepted U.S. proposal to ban ALCMs with range over 2500 KM; we assume that means on heavy bombers, in view of the ranges discussed in the NSC. However, banning all ALCMs above 2500 KM is not a big give for the U.S.

4. Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet MIRV verification concession is linked organically to all outstanding problems sounds entirely new. In VP and NSC meetings we recall Soviet position has been described as a link between MIRV verification and counting rules and the cruise missiles.

5. The Soviet statement on Backfire radius at 2200 kilometers to 2400 kilometers differs so substantially from the U.S. community estimate at about 2600 nautical miles (or 4100 kilometers) that it appears to be a factual subject meriting further technical study and discussion.

6. We recommend against moving toward an agreement which would count each individual missile on heavy bombers as Brezhnev has proposed. That would be like counting every bomb on B-52's.

7. Counting B-1's as three MIRVs when B-1 and B-52 payloads are so close, and when the U.S. is pressing the MIRV limit, would be inadvisable. In addition, it could prove to be an unwise precedent.

8. Brezhnev's proposal to ban surface ship launched cruise missiles with ranges over 600 KM is new. Although specific plans for over 600 KM are not developed, we suggest the 2500 KM figure we have discussed in the NSC, to protect an anti-shipping option in the next

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976, Kissinger Moscow Trip (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Via Black Patch. Deliver immediately upon receipt.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 117.

decades. If we do move to a lower number, the U.S. should get something for it, in that this is new technology in which we are well ahead.

9. Brezhnev's claim that the previous agreement to ban land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range was meant to ban all cruise missiles at shorter ranges is new to us, his proposal to ban all land-based cruise missiles over 600 KM would again limit a new technology in which the U.S. has a substantial lead. We recommend sticking to 2500 kilometer range.

10. On the point in paragraph 8, you should be aware that during the NPG meeting here in Hamburg, Europeans, led by FRG MOD Leber, expressed concern on this subject. They see the cruise missile as a counter to IRBM and MRBM threats in NATO Europe, and urge U.S. to protect the cruise missile at ranges necessary for the European theater, which is estimated to be 2500 KM.

11. As to the idea of pursuing the approach of putting Backfire and surface ship cruise missiles in a separate category for a five-year period (1977 to 1982), it is not clear from the cable what surface ship cruise missile range he is considering. We recommend the 2500 KM figure discussed in paragraph eight above.

12. The idea of linking Backfire and surface SLCM is appropriate but, of course, acceptability depends on the specific numbers and what else is in the package.

13. SecState indicated he is thinking of starting at 250 Backfires. The slippery slope problem we have discussed suggests that the outside limit would be 300 Backfires at the 2400 total of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, or 400 Backfires at the 2300 reduced limit.

14. SecState indicated intention to outline a limit of about 24 ships with 10–15 launchers each. Present preliminary Navy program suggests acceptable limit of 50 ships with 10 launchers each. Range requirements for surface ships are discussed in paragraph eleven above, and for land-based cruise missiles in paragraphs nine and ten.

15. In view of factual differences outstanding regarding Backfire capabilities, the new elements which have been raised in Moscow, and the fact that time is not pressing on the U.S. side, our feeling is that SecState could politely say that he wishes to discuss these new ideas personally with the President and come home, with the understanding that he would get back to the Soviets in the weeks ahead. The next best approach would be to pursue Option One modified. I also suggest that, if he is to return home as suggested, we all exercise great care in any backgrounding of the press. The news should be the fact that you—the President—take these matters seriously and that you are proceeding in a measured, careful manner, as you are, and, that discussion will continue in an orderly way. Warm regards.

**124. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 22, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger asked me to provide you with the following report of his latest meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.<sup>2</sup>

1. Have concluded four-hour evening session which yielded important progress, specifically Soviet concession on throw weight and a willingness to consider reductions even beyond 2300. Moreover, we have narrowed differences on SLCMs and obtained concrete assurances on Backfire performance. It is clear that significant agreement is within our grasp, but decision will have to be made by you after my return.

2. Following are the details of the session. Brezhnev began by picking up the previous discussion with Gromyko on the definition of a heavy missile and the interpretation of the increase in silo dimensions by no more than 10–15 percent. He accepted my proposal of September that they would agree to define a heavy missile as any ICBM having a launching weight and throw weight greater than the largest light missile existing on either side at the time the agreement goes into effect. This means of course the SS–19 now becomes the threshold. In return, we agreed to their interpretation that the original silo could be increased by no more than 32 percent of its volume. This has no meaning as long as the throw weight definition has been agreed. So that represented a significant concession we have been insisting on for years in both SALT negotiations.

3. Then Brezhnev turned to a point-by-point discussion of the five-year interim agreement. First, he noted that we now agreed on banning ALCMs on any aircraft other than heavy bombers, banning any ALCM over 2500 KM, and banning cruise missiles over 600 KM on submarines. I confirmed this description of the status of the discussions. Brezhnev then went into the counting of B–1 as three MIRVed ve-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976, Kissinger Moscow Trip (1). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is *ibid.*; it is also Document 256 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, 1974–1976. In message Tohak 31, January 23, Scowcroft reported to Kissinger that President Ford reacted “with enthusiasm” to this report and had not anticipated Kissinger could make so much progress “with such difficult circumstances” in Washington at the most recent NSC meeting. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976, Kissinger Moscow Trip (1))

hicles and B-52 as only one. I had said at the second meeting that we would agree to limit the number of ALCMs on the B-1 to no more than the number of any individual B-52. (Of course, both aircraft are designed to carry 20.) Brezhnev argued against this but I feel this was mostly bargaining material. He then turned to the five-year interim agreement and rejected it both on grounds that it included Backfire and that they still wanted a ban on SLCMs over 600 KM on surface ships. He repeated their proposal that all land-based cruise missiles over 600 KM should be banned.

4. At this point he went over his assurances on the Backfire performance, and emphasized that he would make the limit of performance at 2200 KM a matter of record that would be binding for the duration of the agreement, if we would agree that this issue was completely settled and would not be raised in subsequent talks. He also agreed that there would be no upgrading of Backfire and that he would discuss specific criteria.

5. Then he made a new proposal, namely that they would agree to reduction to 2300 and “even larger” if we accepted their proposal on land-based and sea-based cruise missiles, that is to ban them over 600 KM.

6. He would not be drawn out further on the scale of reductions but certainly 2200 is possible in light of his statements. I probed to see whether they might come back to the counting of sea-based SLCMs as MIRV and this probably is not a firm position. I asked some questions about the criteria on Backfire performance, but it was clear that we will have to give them the specifics if we want to go in this direction.

7. I consider that we have now achieved significant concessions on the issues we have pressed: First, the MIRV counting rules can be confirmed in return for the ALCM counting as MIRV; second, we have set a limit on throw weight; third, we have the opportunity to dictate a set of limitations on Backfire performance; fourth, we have a chance at a significant reduction in Soviet forces, that would constitute almost 20 percent of their present force, and we can probably work out a cruise missile solution that counts land-based intercontinental cruise missiles and counts SLCMs on surface ships as MIRV. I could probably have wrapped up the agreement under normal conditions. In light of the discussions in Washington that Brent has reported<sup>2</sup> I could not go further than to say this was a constructive initiative on Brezhnev’s part, but that I would have to report it and we would reply within two or three weeks. Given the massive confusions reflected in the NSC meeting, I

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 120.

had no choice but to let the opportunity to exploit this breakthrough go by.

8. I raised Angola very privately with Brezhnev and warned him we would not be passive in the face of the Cuban expeditionary force. I then said it for the record in the large meeting, and Gromyko and I will meet on it tomorrow morning.

9. I believe that what has been achieved here in two days offers us the chance for an agreement that is clearly in our interest. I intend to brief the press that progress has been made, and that some issues have been settled while the difference on others have been narrowed.

10. Finally, it is imperative that everyone now be quiet until we can return and review where we stand.

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**125. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1976, 2341Z.

Tohak 35/WH60110. 1. The President met with Rumsfeld this morning and, except for a couple of sentences about the NPG, the discussion was entirely devoted to SALT.<sup>2</sup> I did not attend the first part of the meeting so I have no way of knowing whether DOD performances at the last NSC meeting<sup>3</sup> was discussed. Other than a couple of brief references, it was not discussed in my presence.

2. We went down the points in your last cable<sup>4</sup> in great detail. The President was extremely laudatory, emphasized the advantages of the various aspects at every conceivable opportunity, several times saying he thought you had done magnificently under extremely difficult circumstances.

3. Rumsfeld reacted quite well to the presentation. As always, he was extremely cautious and did not commit on anything specifically. Nevertheless, he did say that he thought definite progress was being

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, Box 28, Kissinger Trip Files, January 20–25, 1976–Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, HAKTO. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Via Black Patch.

<sup>2</sup> Ford and Cheney met with Rumsfeld from 9:30 to 10:30 a.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary's File, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 119.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 124.



made and that the situation was much improved. He did not react critically on any individual aspect.

4. Some of the specific points commented on were the Brezhnev proposal to ban land-based cruise missiles over 600 KM, which Rumsfeld said would be a problem, especially in NATO as the result of Schlesinger proselytizing on cruise missiles. Rumsfeld got enthusiastic about the Backfire performance, wondering if it meant the Soviets were going to alter the aircraft to insure the performance specified by Brezhnev. I cautioned against any such interpretation on Backfire and suggested that we should not eliminate mission profile as the source of the differences in performance. The President was enthusiastic about the possibility of reducing the 2400 total. He believed that would draw a very favorable public reaction. The President also liked the thought of allowing but counting ICCMs. Rumsfeld said he couldn't imagine us wanting to deploy them but the President said that this arrangement would allow us to go ahead on research and development, protect our options and thus solve the problem that the Vice President had raised after his meeting with Ed Teller.

5. The President said he would prefer that Rumsfeld not discuss the details with anybody but Clements until Wade and Brown returned. He said he wanted first to meet with you and then to talk quietly and leisurely with you, Don and me before we get started again in the interagency process.

6. In sum, it was a very upbeat meeting and, to the extent Rumsfeld ever commits to anything, he seemed to feel that very substantial progress had been made.

[Omitted here is discussion of Angola.]

126. Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 29, 1976.

## NEW SALT OPTIONS

I. *Current Status*

The US and Soviet package proposals as put forward during Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to Moscow are shown in the table below.

	<u>US</u>	<u>Soviet</u>
ALCMs on Heavy Bombers	Ban above 2500 km; Count H.B. w/ALCMs in 1320	Ban above 2500 km; Count H.B. w/ALCMs in 1320; B-1 counts as three
ALCMs on Aircraft Other than Heavy Bombers	Ban above 600 km	Ban above 600 km
SLCMs on Submarines	Ban above 600 km	Ban above 600 km
SLCMs on Surface Ships	Ban above 2500 km; (1) <sup>2</sup> Count platforms in 1320 (2) <sup>2</sup> Limit of 25 platforms in 5-year agreement	Ban above 600 km
Land-Launched Cruise Missiles	Ban above 2500 km	Ban above 600 km
Backfire	(1) Count in 2400 aggregate after October 1977 (2) Limit of 275 in 5-year agreement	Assurances on maximum operational radius and intercontinental capability
Aggregate	(1) 2400 (2) 2300 by October 1980 with 5-year agreement	2300 or lower if cruise missile limits are accepted

[Omitted here are sections on the various SALT packages.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodol Convenience Files, Box 41, SALT General Subseries, New SALT Options. Top Secret; Sensitive. The paper was sent under a covering memorandum from Molander to the SALT Verification Panel Working Group for consideration at the Verification Panel meeting scheduled for January 31, but postponed until February 5. Draft minutes of the VP meeting are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files, Box 22, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel (Drafts), January–February 1976.

<sup>2</sup> (1) Designates the US position at the start of the Moscow discussions; (2) designates the US position at the conclusion of the discussions. [Footnote is in the original.]

**127. National Security Decision Memorandum 316<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 4, 1976.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva

The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDMs 285, 301, and 303.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Delegation should continue to take the position that the U.S. is willing to agree to a resolution of the silo dimension and heavy ICBM definition issues along the following lines:

—The original volume of ICBM silo launchers cannot be increased by more than 32 percent. In this case, there will no longer be a need to specify separate limitations on increases in either the depth or diameter of silo launchers.

—A heavy ICBM will be defined as any ICBM having either a throw weight or a launching weight greater than that of the largest non-heavy ICBM deployed on either side on the date of signature of the agreement.

—The U.S. considers that these two issues have been agreed in principle.

2. The Delegation should modify the U.S. proposal for a ceiling on heavy ICBMs contained in Article IV, Paragraph 7,<sup>3</sup> by replacing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 63, NSDM 316, Instructions for SALT Negotiations. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Scowcroft sent this NSDM to Ford under a January 30 covering memorandum for the President's approval. Scowcroft noted that the NSDM approved the compromise on silo dimension increase achieved by Kissinger in Moscow and contained "an agreed interagency throw weight definition and instructions to seek a heavy ICBM ceiling based on the same parameters, throw weight and launching weight, contained in the heavy ICBM definition." (Ibid.) Ford initialed his approval of this NSDM.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 93, 99, and 104.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to the Joint Draft Text. According to telegram 6 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, January 30, the most recent Joint Draft Text was agreed upon by the U.S. and Soviet Delegations in Geneva at the end of the negotiating session on December 18, 1975. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) The full text of the JDT has not been found, but specific clauses as modified and debated in Geneva in the months following are in telegrams from the delegation, *ibid.*

“volume or throw weight” with “launching weight or throw weight” and inform the Soviets that the U.S. considers it essential that agreement be reached on such a ceiling.

3. The Delegation should propose a definition for the term “throw weight” along the following lines:

The throw weight of a ballistic missile is the sum of the weight of: (1) its reentry vehicles, (2) its penetration aids, and (3) any buses or other devices it has for propulsion, guidance, control, or release which can cause multiple reentry vehicles or penetration aids to reenter the atmosphere at different locations or times.

4. The U.S. Delegation should seek an explicit agreement on the numerical upper limits on the throw weight and launching weight of non-heavy and heavy ICBMs. However, prior to making precise proposals the Delegation should submit for Washington approval a recommended approach on this issue.

5. The U.S. Delegation should bear in mind that the negotiating history has been that the U.S. has cited the SS-19 as the non-heavy ICBM currently possessing the largest throw weight.

**Brent Scowcroft**

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**128. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Johnson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, February 5, 1976, 1512Z.

31. Dear Brent: While I have tried to avoid being a “fifth wheel” in the bureaucratic process and thus further complicating decisions on SALT which the President faces, I felt that I should not, at this stage of the negotiations, any longer refrain from expressing my own very personal views for whatever help they may be to him. I have done this in the form of the following paper, which I would appreciate your passing on to him, if you think it would be helpful. I would also appreciate your passing a copy to Henry, but would hope that at this stage circulation could literally be confined to them.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Backchannel Messages, Box 8, SALT, Geneva, Incoming, 2/76. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Deliver during business hours.

“Premises:

1. Throughout SALT II three of our major objectives have been: first, equal aggregates with no compensation for FBS; second, reductions in central systems; and third, throw-weight limitations on the destructive potential of missiles, especially ICBMs. An agreement which accomplishes these objectives is in our interest and defensible.

2. Our first priority interest in cruise missiles is in their strategic role as penetration aids for heavy bombers against unconstrained Soviet air defenses.

3. Our interest in sea and land based cruise missiles is essentially in their tactical role, and decisions with respect to them should be based on the prudent assumption that within the period of this agreement the Soviets can and will deploy cruise-missile systems substantially comparable to our own. These weapons are not, and we should not seek their development by ourselves (and accordingly also by the Soviets) as, a fourth element in the present triad of “central systems.”

4. Because of our requirement to keep sea lanes open and the proximity of our population to the ocean, it is in our interest to limit to the degree possible the development of Soviet surface-ship and submarine-launched cruise missile capabilities, both nuclear and conventionally armed. The corollary is that such capabilities are of relatively less importance to us vis-à-vis the Soviets.

5. Decisions with respect to land-based cruise missiles (both nuclear and conventional) should be based primarily on tactical requirements and the future balance as foreseen in the NATO area. This, of course, requires taking account of the attitude of our allies with respect to our possible deployments, as well as the possibility of our allies seeking to obtain comparable weapons. (As a footnote, in negotiations with the Soviets we could point out that cruise missiles in the NATO area are at least in part a logical response to the Backfire.)

6. The present Backfire is not a “central system” as the term has heretofore been used in SALT, and its theoretical unrefueled capability to attack the U.S. could, if felt necessary, be considerably offset by the deployment of such additional air-defense capabilities as to require that a realistic flight profile for the aircraft be something less than an optimum long-range cruise profile. (If in fact the Backfire is considered to be a strategic threat, the development of such air-defense capabilities would seem to be required whether or not it is included in the aggregate of central systems.) Assurances with respect to substantially upgrading Backfire unrefueled capabilities or the development of tanker capabilities for a substantial part of the projected Backfire fleet could be adequately verified by our present and projected ‘national technical means.’

7. While they should not drive our decisions, the difficult verification questions with respect to cruise missiles are somewhat reduced to the degree that range limits are lower and uniform as between various types of missiles, and to the degree there are no distinctions in the armament of missiles.

Conclusions:

Based on the foregoing premises and my understanding of the present negotiating positions of the Soviets and ourselves, I recommend working for the following end positions:

1. Accept a ban on ALCMs above 2,500 KMs and a ban on ALCMs between 600 KMs and 2,500 KMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers. In the absence of Soviet agreement to include some Backfire in the aggregate or otherwise to accept some limitation on its numbers, I would withdraw our proposal to include heavy bombers with ALCMs in the MIRV aggregate.

2. Obtain as specific and detailed assurances as possible against further upgrading of the long-range unrefueled capabilities of the Backfire, as well as specific commitments on the development of a tanker fleet for its support.

3. Conditional on Soviet agreement to a 2,200 or lower aggregate to be reached by the end of 1980, abandon efforts to obtain agreement to 2,500 KM SLCMs on a limited number of surface-ship platforms and agree to a single lower limit for all SLCMs, both surface ship and submarine mounted. (For this purpose a ban above 600 KMs seems reasonable to me and probably in our interest.)

4. Also conditional on Soviet agreement to a 2,200 or lower aggregate, agree to a ban on a range lower than 2,500 KMs for land-based cruise missiles. (I believe the range should be determined solely by the military requirement for tactical cruise missiles for use within the NATO "battlefield area" and do not have the basis for a judgment for how much, if any, this range should exceed 600 KMs.)"

Best wishes, Alex

**129. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

2:30 p.m.

The Cabinet Room

*I. Purpose*

To review the options that might constitute a reply to the last Soviet offer made by Brezhnev in Moscow.

*II. Background, Participants & Press Plan*

*A. Background:* The following are the common elements in our position as they stand now, following Secretary Kissinger's discussion with Brezhnev:

*1. Air Launched Cruise Missiles Above 600 km in Range:*

The Soviets agree that:

- ALCMs can only be deployed on heavy bombers that are included in the aggregate of 2400 and, therefore, banned on other aircraft;
- are completely banned over 2500 km in range; and
- that each heavy bomber equipped with air launched cruise missiles of a range between 600 and 2500 km will count as the same as a MIRVed missile, and therefore counted in the 1320 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok.

Additionally, the Soviets proposed, and we rejected, that the B-1, if equipped with ALCMs, would count as three MIRVed vehicles.

*2. Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles:*

—Our positions coincide on banning any cruise missile over 600 km in range from deployment on submarines.

*3. Cruise Missiles Over 600 km on Surface Ships:*

—The Soviets propose that cruise missiles with a range over 600 km be banned from deployment on surface ships.

—We made two proposals: (1) that each surface ship equipped with any cruise missiles over 600 km in range count as a MIRVed vehicle; and (2) that the US be permitted to deploy 25 surface ships, in a separate limit that also includes 275 Backfire bombers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. Tabs A–C, which contain charts of SALT Options, a "No-SALT Contingency Budget," and a list of participants, are attached but not printed.

#### 4. *Land Based Cruise Missiles*

At Helsinki we had agreed that cruise missiles of intercontinental range would be banned:

—In our last proposal, however, we proposed that the range be reduced to 2500 km (to coincide with other range limits), and all land based cruise missiles above that range would be banned from deployment.

—This led the Soviets to claim that all along they had meant that all land based cruise missiles with a range over 600 km would be banned; and they confirmed this in a formal proposal.

#### 5. *Backfire:*

The Soviets, of course, have opposed including Backfire in SALT:

—In this last round Brezhnev presented official performance data to support his claim that it was a heavy bomber; he claimed that the maximum operational range of the Backfire with a minimal payload, flying both subsonically and supersonically, was 2200 km radius—as opposed to our current estimate of about 4000 km in radius.

—He also proposed that as part of the SALT record he would include a formal pledge not to give the Backfire an intercontinental capability.

We made two proposals concerning Backfire in Moscow:

(1) that all Backfire produced after the effective date of the agreement (October, 1977) would be counted in the 2400 aggregate; and

(2) that Backfire would be subject to a separate limit (of no more than 275) for five years through 1982.

Both proposals were rejected by Brezhnev.

#### 6. *Reductions:*

As part of the modified Option III proposal presented to Brezhnev, in which there would be a 275 upper ceiling for five years on Backfire, we also proposed a reduction from 2400 to 2300 by 1980.

—Brezhnev countered that he would agree to reductions to 2300 or “even larger,” if we accepted his position on cruise missiles (i.e., ban them over 600 km on surface ships and on land).

#### *Options for a Counterproposal*

The Verification Panel has gone through several sets of Options to define the basic approaches, which you might adopt as the framework for a reply to Brezhnev. The three approaches are:

I. To set numerical limits on Backfire;

II. To exclude Backfire, in return for reductions of heavy ICBMs;

III. To defer both Backfire and sea and land based cruise missiles for an interim period.



*Option I:*

The rationale for this option is that Backfire *must* be counted either in the 2400 aggregate or in a separate limit.

*Optional I. A.*—is essentially the old modified IV, which was our opening position in Moscow.

*Option I. B.*

This is a rough approximation of old Option III:

—Backfire would be in a separate category, and limited to 250; the US would be free to build up to 250 surface ships and/or submarines with SLCMs over 600 km.

—Other cruise missiles, land based, would be limited to 2500 km.

—A reduction to 2150 by 1980.

*Option II: Backfire Excluded from Reductions*

The basic idea is to allow the Backfire to go free outside of SALT, but to propose a significant Soviet concession in the form of reductions of heavy ICBMs.

—In other respects the proposal would be the same as Option I. A, that is ALCMs and surface ship SLCMs between 600–2500 km, as MIRVs, submarine launched cruise missiles over 600 km banned, and land based permitted up to 2500 km.

—The Soviets would agree to reduce to 2150 by 1980, and in the process would reduce 100–200 of their older heavy missiles, the SS–9. (Note: the latest NIE estimates that by mid-1977, the Soviets would have about 160 SS–9s and 248 other SS–9 silos either already converted, or in the process of conversion to SS–18 type silos; thus a maximum reduction probably would be about 160; a more plausible number might be about 75–100, which would constitute about 30–40 percent of the total reduction of 240 required to get to the 2150 level.)

*Option III: A Modified Deferral*

The basic idea of this option is to defer the remaining issues on cruise missiles and Backfire for a defined period, say through 1980, but to exchange commitments about constraining each side during the interim.

—The US, for its part, would pledge that land and sea based cruise missiles would be tested only up to 2500 in range, and our development program would not be accelerated, which would mean these cruise missiles would not be deployed in this period.

—The Soviets would pledge not to accelerate Backfire deployments beyond an agreed schedule.

—The Vladivostok agreement would be signed, including counting ALCMs as MIRVed vehicles, in order to clinch the other unsettled points—MIRV verification.

*The No SALT Environment*

You asked for a contingency budget that might be considered if SALT failed. The paper being prepared by the Defense Department is

still not quite finished with interagency clearance, but the main outlines are emerging:

In the near term we would have three general courses of action, depending in part on the Soviet posture:

1. Maintain our present budget for FY 77 on the ground that it already includes a 20 percent growth in strategic force spending for modernization, under the option that the Soviets will show some restraint even without an agreement.

2. Gradually increase strategic spending starting with an amendment in the budget request of about \$800 million, to provide a basis for force expansion aiming at equivalence over a period of 5 years; continuation of such a program over 5 years would require up to \$7.6 billion for Defense and \$400 million for ERDA; (Alternative 1 in paper at Tab B.)

3. Accelerate strategic force modernization starting with a supplemental to the FY 76/77 budget of about \$320 million and a \$2.1 billion increase in the FY 1977 budget; continuation of such a program would over the next five years if necessary require \$19.6 billion for Defense and \$3.3 (Alternate 2 in the draft study at Tab B) billion for ERDA.

In the gradual build up, the bulk of the spending would be for a full [*less than 1 line not declassified*] production, including the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] acceleration of the new [*less than 1 line not declassified*] ICBM operational capability to 1983, instead of 1985, and acceleration of the ALCM and SLCM program to earlier operational capabilities.

Under the rapid build up, the same programs would be adopted, plus increased Trident production, acceleration of B-1, acceleration of the Trident II missile operational capability to 1983.

If the US chose under either build up to add improvement of conventional forces, it is estimated that a program might cost an additional \$10.3 billion over five years.

(Note: None of the options include major spending for air defense.)

B. *Participants*: List at Tab C.

[Omitted here is section III, "Talking Points."]

**130. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 11, 1976, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

SALT

**PRINCIPALS**

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle  
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

**OTHER ATTENDEES***White House*

Mr. Richard Cheney,  
Assistant to the President  
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

*State*

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

*Defense*

Deputy Secretary William  
Clements

*CIA*

Mr. Carl Duckett (who departed  
after presenting the  
intelligence briefing at the  
opening of the meeting)

*NSC Staff*

Colonel Richard T. Boverie

President: I think it is important that we give some reply to Brezhnev before their Party Congress. If we have no specific counter proposal, I think we ought to give him a total negative or the general direction in which we will proceed.

Henry has made some headway in his last several meetings with Brezhnev. There are still some areas of difference. There have been one or more Verification Panel meetings which have explored the options and looked over the options paper.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 126. Another Verification Panel meeting was held on February 10 at which the restructuring of the SALT options was discussed. Handwritten draft minutes are in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 22, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel (Drafts), January–February 1976. Papers and briefing memoranda prepared for the meeting are *ibid.*, Box 6, Verification Panel Meeting, February 10, 1976.

I want to reiterate that I think it is in the best interest of this country to achieve a SALT II agreement. I intend to push to the extent possible to get a good one. But if a deadlock occurs, we will have to make a 180 degree change in our course. By 180 degrees I mean we can stand still; or go to Option 2, which would be the least of my efforts; or go to Option 3, which would be my preference.

The options I am referring to now are Don's options for a SALT contingency budget.

Rumsfeld: You must have got a copy of the SALT Contingency Plan out of channels. It is still being worked on at the working level and is not yet agreed on.<sup>3</sup>

President: Option 1 says we would stand still. I would not do that. Option 2 says we would have a moderate program. This is the least I would do. Option 3 is the one I think would be necessary.

I will wait for the final version of the paper.

I want to reassert that a SALT agreement is in the best interests of this country! It is possible to do this. I reassert this with emphasis

George [Bush], do you have something for us?

Director Bush: We have analyzed the Backfire bomber. The Soviet data do not alter the CIA's present estimate that it has the capability of intercontinental operations.

Mr. Duckett: [Note: Copies of the charts used by Mr. Duckett are at Tab A.]<sup>4</sup> At the top of the chart you will see three sets of flight conditions per Soviet claims. The question is do they match our estimates for the Backfire? For the first case, they volunteered that most of the flight is subsonic, and that some is supersonic. It was said the operational radius is 2200 kilometers. However, they did not say how much of the flight was supersonic, or how much payload was carried in this profile.

President: How does its payload compare with the B-52?

General Brown: The B-52 payload is around 50,000 lbs.

Mr. Duckett: The Backfire carries 20,000 pounds in bombs. Its payload is 25,000 pounds when it carries external weapons.

The US estimate for the Backfire ranges from 1,000 kilometers to 3,500 kilometers at the extremes, depending on the length of supersonic dash.

We could reduce the uncertainties in our estimate if we had more data. If we want more data, we could ask the Soviets for it. However, we do not think this will solve the problem about Backfire's ability to strike US targets.

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached.

The operational range includes a 10 percent fuel reserve.

The Soviets also say that the maximum technical range is 5,000 kilometers. Our estimates are that the maximum range is between 2,100 kilometers and 7,300 kilometers.

Therefore, we cannot tell what the Soviet figures represent.

The third case is ridiculous—it represents a profile no one would fly.

We asked the Soviets how far it could fly at 15,000 meters altitude but this is the wrong altitude for the Backfire. It was the wrong question to ask. We believe it has no capability of sustained flight at 15,000 meters.

Kissinger: The major problem was that I raised the question while General Kozlov was with Brezhnev. They had made no serious study of the question. The problem was that Kozlov didn't want to deviate from what Brezhnev said. Therefore, it was not a carefully considered statement. It was not a thoughtful reply.

Mr. Duckett: On the other board you see our study of Backfire flight profiles. It shows that our estimate of the Backfire radius is greater than 5000 kilometers. Also it shows that we have seen the aircraft actually fly to a radius of 2775 kilometers. I agree with Secretary Kissinger that the Soviet estimate was off the top of their head.

With some additional data, we could generate some high confidence estimate. We would like to know from the Soviets the maximum gross take-off weight, maximum fuel load, internal bomb payload, and cruise lift-to-drag ratio. But this does not change our judgment that the Backfire has an intercontinental capability.

President: Your estimate is that the maximum radius is 5,125 kilometers?

Mr. Duckett: Yes, with an 8,125 pound payload.

President: With no supersonic dash?

Mr. Duckett: No supersonic dash.

President: Therefore your figures would indicate the Backfire has a range of 5,400 to 5,500 nautical miles.

Clements: You have actually tracked the Backfire?

Mr. Duckett: Their radar has, and we have some telemetry. We have some late data which may make the numbers slightly smaller, 100 kilometers, but this doesn't solve the problem.

General Brown: Do you have an assessment of the new photos? Do you have greater confidence in your estimate for the engine?

Mr. Duckett: Yes. We now believe they are using the older engine. Also, Bill Hyland saw the nomenclature in Moscow. Therefore they are not using the best engine at this time.

President: If they fly that profile, is it militarily desirable?

General Brown: The typical flight profile is the one in the center, where as the aircraft climbs it burns off fuel.

President: Would they fly 5100 kilometers in that pattern one way, without a dash, to attack a military objective?

General Brown: Yes, against the US, since we have minimum air defenses.

Kissinger: What would they hit?

General Brown: Airfields, industrial areas of a city, and targets such as that.

Director Bush: We have a chart on possible bases. Carl (Duckett) can explain it.

Mr. Duckett: They have two airfields being equipped with Backfire. With a 5000 nautical mile capability, they could cover all of the US on a one way mission.

Director Bush: Cuba would not be a suitable recovery location for the aircraft.

Mr. Duckett: I believe it would be more likely that they would go back to northern Canada, or even ditch at sea near ships.

If the Soviets go to Arctic basing, then even 4,000 nautical miles covers most of the US. They have some poor facilities there, some good. One thing we would want is an assurance that the Soviets would not use Arctic basing.

President: Are those bases not usable in normal course for use against China?

General Brown: There would be no reason for them to use those bases.

Mr. Duckett: I doubt they plan to refurbish these two bases.

General Scowcroft: For your payload calculations, did you load the Backfire the same way you loaded it for the megatonnage chart?

Mr. Duckett: Yes. The maximum loading was 20,000 pounds, which depends upon the amount of space in the aircraft. The 8100 pounds is a conventional load.

President: Henry?

Kissinger: We have had a number of Verification Panel meetings in the spirit of harmony. (Laughter)

We have gone through a number of options on some conceptual basis. The first option is that we would count Backfire. The second option would exclude Backfire from strict limits. The third would defer a permanent solution of the Backfire and cruise missile issues for various periods of time.

In assessing these options, we have to consider several things. We have to know what its intrinsic merit is. We have to consider the negotiating history—if we introduce an option which has already been rejected, this has significance. We also have to consider the consequences of where we would be without an agreement.

In Option I we would count the Backfire. Option I A is the old modified Option 4. That is, we would go back to the Soviets with exactly the same proposal as we started in Moscow.

I have a note which says the Chiefs even want to add reductions to Option I A.

General Brown: I know nothing about that.

Kissinger: I have a note here which says that's what the Chiefs want.<sup>5</sup> Where did this come from?

Mr. Hyland: General Rowny called the NSC staff.

General Brown: What we have said is that we agree with the principle of reductions.

Kissinger: Option I A is the old Option IV. Option I B is in effect the old Option III. You have to assess whether, in terms of negotiating history, this is right. If you assess that they will make an agreement under any conditions, that is one matter. But we will have gone from IV to III and then back to IV.

I agree with Option 4 on its merits, but this would certainly cause us negotiating problems.

Now Option IB. My recollection is that what happened in Moscow, Mr. President, is that I did not use all of the authority you gave me. Our position was the Soviets would have 275 Backfire and we would have 25 surface-ship SLCM platforms by 1982. This would give us the high breakout potential with our cruise missiles.

SLCM's on submarines would be banned above 600 km.

Option I B is a toughening of our last position in Moscow. It reduces the Backfire limit, removes the submarine SLCM limit, and reduces the aggregate to 2150. From a negotiating standpoint, this is Option III, minus certain features. Our counterproposal would be worse than what they have already rejected. This doesn't mean they would not cave.

Therefore, Option IA and IB put limits on the Backfire. In IA, Backfire is counted in the 2400 aggregate. IB is a toughened version of the old Option III, which the Soviets have already rejected.

There is a second category of options which excludes Backfire from strict SALT limitations. It includes assurances against Backfire up-

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<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

grading and includes additional collateral constraints. This would reduce the aggregate to 2150 by 1980. We would count heavy bombers and surface ship platforms under the aggregate and the MIRV sub-ceiling. It would ban submarine SLCMs above 600 km.

In return, the aggregate would be reduced from 2400 to 2150. The Soviets would have to dismantle a significant percentage of their heavy throw weight missiles. In the working group, 200 heavy missiles were discussed, but this is an empty possibility; the Soviets would never do this. Some figure might be possible.

In terms of negotiability, I doubt that the Soviets would accept this, but they would have to study it seriously. It would not be interpreted as an attempt to drive them to the wall.

President Ford: Does this mean they would reduce their SS-9's?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and the overall totals.

If we say we count land-based cruise missiles above 600 km, we can have them, although something else would have to come out. And this is an American decision. [to Vice President Rockefeller]: This takes care of Edward (presumably Edward Teller).<sup>6</sup>

The end result is that we could have land-based cruise missiles up to 2500 km, but counted in one form or another. A 2150 aggregate brings pressure on the total number.

George's concern is that Option IIA would have some upper ceiling on the Backfire—so that they could not have, for example, 1000. I don't think we can get the Soviets to write this into an agreement. But maybe there could be a letter from Brezhnev to you, Mr. President, saying that they plan on having X number of bombers. They can then have some force—not specified in the treaty—and we can have our assurances.

There was another option within Option II, but it has been dropped. It was a State Department option and was highly negotiable. But we should not have it if it is not supported by the military and supported only by the State Department.

The third major option is deferral. I have tried this three times and it has always been rejected. But it was never linked with a cruise missile settlement.

We could defer SLCM and land-based cruise missile deployment. How we would do this depends on your decision.

We could ask the Soviets not to increase the rate of Backfire production. We would not deploy cruise missiles—except on bombers—

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 6, Document 116.



beyond 600 km through an agreed date. From the standpoint of the Soviets, the later the date the better. For the US, the sooner the better.

We would be free to test cruise missiles through a certain range. The Soviets could continue Backfire production.

There is basic agreement on what this option does. It would codify what has been done. For an interim period, it defers the Backfire and some cruise missile limits.

President Ford: Would it ban cruise missiles over 600 km on heavy bombers?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It would permit cruise missiles with ranges from 600 to 2500 km on heavy bombers, but these bombers would count in the 1320 sub-ceiling.

This is the basic deferral option.

To sum up—considering the impact on the Soviets:

I believe that Option I would result in a prolonged deadlock at a minimum. A last minute yield is possible, but I don't believe this will happen.

Option II would get us into the negotiation. Option III is a good fallback position. But we could also do Option III immediately—it is your choice, Mr. President.

President Ford: How much different is Option II from that which was done in Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: It is significantly different. We never described to them where they should take their reductions. If we specify their heavy throw weight missiles, it is an unprecedented new step. Also, the Soviets would have to back off from the 600 km cruise missile limitation.

But Backfire would be free for the Soviets, except for an unclassified letter from Brezhnev on assurances, which we would ask them for since there would be restrictions on cruise missile ranges.

My judgment is that they would turn down Option II, but that they must study it carefully, and then would come back with something.

Vice President Rockefeller: I am concerned about cruise missiles at longer distances. The Soviets are developing three different SLBMs. Why should we interrupt cruise missile applications for land or submarines. This is such a new thing; we really do not know what its potential is, and we should keep our options open in cruise missiles.

Brent Scowcroft: In Option II, 2500 kilometers is the upper limit.

Vice President Rockefeller: This is why I am concerned. The Soviets have three new missiles on submarines and five new missiles on land. The only thing going for us is our cruise missile with excellent guidance accuracy.

Secretary Kissinger: We have the Trident and the MX.

Bill Hyland: And the B-1.

Brent Scowcroft: And two new Trident missiles.

General Brown: Both sides have sea-based ballistic missiles. There is no reason to replace them with cruise missiles. They can't defend against the ballistic missile, but they can defend against the cruise missile.

The cruise missile can be used to protect the sea lines of communication and perhaps have an ASW role. However there is no reason for them simply to lie off the beach for attacks against the Soviets. We are not warhead limited.

Vice President Rockefeller: You say that we would have no objection to limiting them for submarines. But that means they would get something for nothing. Five to ten years from now our present plans could be obsolete and we may want to do this—but there would be a 600 km limit on cruise missiles.

The Soviets have leapfrogged us in naval force structure. We must be in a position to leapfrog them with cruise missiles.

General Brown: The only way they could guard against the ballistic missile is if the ABM Treaty fell apart.

Dr. Ikle: Theatre uses are more important for cruise missiles.

Vice President Rockefeller: If you are not going to use them, they shouldn't worry.

President Ford: This is like our argument with them on the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: If we counted every cruise missile, we would have over a thousand missiles. Then we would bust the 2150 total strategic level, considering naval and regional uses.

If we count ships with 600 to 2500 km missiles as MIRVs, we could use them against the Soviet Union, but the in-theatre forces would be free. Fifty ships still doesn't hurt the MIRV total very much.

There have been lots of press arguments about this, but the fact as we know it from the SIOP is that we don't need all those MIRV warheads except if the ABM Treaty is abrogated. We would be better off in many cases with single warhead missiles.

If we count these on a one for one basis, we would very rapidly be in bad trouble with the 2150 or the 2400 level.

Secretary Clements: Mr. Vice President, during the ten-year period while we are developing our technology, we can move forward in the state of the art. For periods greater than ten years, we don't know where we will be going. Within the timeframe, with a 2500 km range, and with the platforms, we can develop the needed technology.

Vice President Rockefeller: But we would be limited at long ranges.

Secretary Clements: Not at the end of the treaty time.

Secretary Kissinger: This would be no problem with the deferral option since we are talking about roughly 1982.

President Ford: And we would have a clearer picture of the situation at that time.

Secretary Kissinger: If we want to go to deferral, we are better off getting at it by one more substantive proposal, then using deferral as a fallback. I do not believe the Soviets would accept Option II, but they would give it a serious response. The Soviets would not go along with Option I in my view.

Vice President Rockefeller: We should get a clearer idea about the use of non-nuclear missiles for any range.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two problems.

The reason many want to surface the nuclear/non nuclear problem is that they are convinced they will be given away in the last period of the negotiations. If we have a disciplined government, you would establish the range principle now. You would then table the conventional definition in Geneva and handle it on the technical level. If the Soviets balk, we could always say that SALT never has handled conventional weapons.

If we permit an enormous disparity between what is permitted in conventional and nuclear missiles, it will be a tremendous domestic problem. If we say that it applies only to nuclear armed missiles, the verification problem would be totally unmanageable.

Vice President Rockefeller: This would be only for ten years. It could be covered in a new agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: The way to handle it—I would prefer a four or five-year interim agreement on deferral, with less strict standards. If we have an eight to ten-year agreement, then we must think carefully about the definitional problem because the Soviets can have them then.

President Ford: Henry, what you are saying is that rather than surface the distinction at the outset, let's settle the range matter first, and then we can move at the technical level on the other?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We could simply act stupid. We could say that SALT never addressed conventional weapons at any time. We could do this in Geneva, rather than spring it on Brezhnev and make him answer to the Politburo. If we do it my way, he then would have a commitment to something he has agreed to.

Secretary Clements: Was this raised at Vladivostok?

Secretary Kissinger: No, and neither were cruise missiles.

Dr. Ikle: Option III helps with verification issues versus Option II. Cruise missiles of 600 km are hard to verify. Option III gives us the time to understand the verification problem.

President Ford: Is a five-year period better than a two-year period to defend?

Dr. Ikle: We could use four years, that is 1980, since that is the approximate time for IOC of the cruise missile.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem Brezhnev has is that he must say he got something of his proposal. That's why 600 km is significant.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I would like to walk through some of these things.

First, I think we should clear up the outstanding issues of both sides in the SCC. We will be criticized if we don't try to do this before having a new agreement.

Second, there are a number of smaller questions around that can get big later on. The reason the armed/nuclear armed definition is important is not that we might be "raped" as Henry stated, but because it makes a difference. As long as we can understand what we want to do here about the nuclear definition, that is fine. I won't argue the tactics, but the substance is important.

President Ford (to Secretary Kissinger): In your approach we would freeze the range, then solve the technical differences on the definition at Geneva.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The reason I raised it is because it makes a difference.

My third point has to do with the range of cruise missiles. Range is complicated. If one changes the warhead and increases the range, we have a problem.

Fourth, you have to consider non-circumvention and non-transfer. These are important.

Our goal should be long-term arms limitation—not confrontation. Therefore I believe it is important to have simplicity, symmetry, and higher verification, not less.

The problem with Option II on Backfire, if not counted in the aggregate, is that we would have no definition of a heavy bomber. It would be like the heavy missile problem. We would have problems in SALT III. You should take the long view—don't do something in SALT II that makes SALT III difficult.

I also want to point out that if we reduce the aggregate further and Backfire goes free, Backfire's importance grows.

Vice President Rockefeller: What are your specific points? What are your specific proposals?

Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been here one hour and ten minutes and have not spoken a word. I am coming to my specific points.

In weighing the three options, we have to consider the balance for SALT and détente.

First, we could do something which would leave the U.S. weak. Second, we could accept an agreement which we could not easily verify and we could expect reaction. Third, we could be stiff and unyielding. Fourth, we could be doing something now, for example, letting the Backfire go free, which would cause us problems in going for SALT III.

On Option IA, we are including 150 variants which were not offered earlier. This gives us a way to get back into negotiation.

For Option IB, we would be rolling back from a smaller number of SLCM platforms to a larger number, so that we would have symmetry. This would be an advantage of the option.

Option II is appealing if we can get them to reduce 200 heavy missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: We can't get them to reduce 200 heavy missiles.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been patient so far. But it is a marginal option even if they reduce by 200 heavy missiles because of SALT III—that is, there would be no heavy bomber definition. And we could expect them to reduce a smaller number than 200 missiles.

Therefore, deferral is in my view the best option. It is the most honest. We would say that there are gray area systems which we cannot solve now, and that it shouldn't surprise us that we can't get them in.

Deferral would permit us to codify Vladivostok. Space and sea-bed weapons would be banned. Mobile missiles would not be banned but would be counted. Intercontinental cruise missiles would be banned at 5500 kilometers.

It may also be possible to get the MIRV verification rule by throwing in the ALCM limit at 2500 kilometers and counting the platforms in the 1320 sub-ceiling.

Secretary Kissinger: The only way deferral can work is by using numbers the Soviets have already seen. There is a chance deferral would work as a fallback position—if there were a 600 km limit, and no deployment.

There is a chance of deferral working as a fallback position—if there is a 600 kilometer limit, no deployment for 3–4–5–X years. And we could continue R&D. There is a chance of its working.

There is no chance of permitting 5500 kilometer land-based missiles, but we will have none by 1981 anyway.

Secretary Rumsfeld: What about the cruise missile limit?

Secretary Kissinger: ALCMs would be permitted at 2500 kilometers; all others would be 600 kilometers until 1980 or 81.

President Ford: And what about research and development?

Secretary Kissinger: R&D and testing could continue.

Mr. Hyland: The working group had proposed that in the interim period, there would be restraint on testing of SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles beyond, for example 2500 kilometers, and on development. This would possibly include not deploying SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles above 600 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: The come on is the deployment limit. But this is phoney, since there will be no deployment anyway.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Therefore there is a question on timing. Under this option, would it be a 10 year treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: No. It would be 8 years, since it would start in 1977, on Vladivostok, MIRV counting, ALCMs on bombers, and throw-weight. All others—cruise missiles and Backfire—would be for an interim period through around 1980 or 1981.

We would not deploy SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles above 600 kilometers. With the Soviets we would have assurance that the Backfire production rate would not be greater than the present rate. This interim period would expire at the precise moment of our maximum break-out capability for cruise missiles.

For the Soviets, 2 years is not realistic. My view is that it is better to go to 1980 or 81.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I believe we should use a target date shorter rather than longer so that we can get along on resolving the issues. For example we could use October 1977, when SALT I expires.

President Ford: But SALT II is a follow-on from SALT I. And if we have deferral, it could go for two to four years.

Secretary Kissinger: I've raised deferral with the Soviets three times and they have rejected it every time.

President Ford: But this is a version they have not seen.

Secretary Kissinger: This will be a comedown for them, but it won't present a political crisis if we propose it.

Director Bush: Is there any way to get additional data on the Backfire?

Secretary Kissinger: We can't go to the Soviets for data to formulate our position. We could say we will let Backfire go free if they give us data to confirm its role. Therefore we could have Option II.

Dr. Ikle: In Option III, if we don't accelerate, they don't accelerate.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The ALCM is part of the central systems, and we would be dealing with central systems. We could set aside the grey areas right?

Secretary Kissinger: For Option III, a one to two year interim period won't work.

President Ford: It is better for us to have a three to four year period for cruise missile testing. We won't know much more in one to two years.

Secretary Clements: We are starting to fly them now.

President Ford: And we will know more in three to four years. And we will be better off at four years for break-out.

Dr. Ikle: We want to avoid legitimizing Backfire deployment while making cruise missiles illegitimate.

President Ford: If we agree on a Backfire production rate and we proceed with research and development on cruise missiles then in three years if there are no negotiations we are in a better position to go ahead with cruise missiles than they are with the Backfire.

Secretary Kissinger: That is why the damn thing may not work. They will buy a 600 kilometer limit on cruise missiles but they would not go for an eight year period without the limit. Too little is known.

Dr. Ikle: Does this mean we should settle the limits?

Secretary Kissinger: Only on deployments for X number of years. But we have to accept the 600 kilometer limit. We would be able to deploy up to the 600 kilometer limit. Brezhnev can tell the Politburo it got something.

The advantage for us would be our break-out position. There would be no verification problem.

Vice President Rockefeller: Would test ranges be unlimited?

Secretary Kissinger: Test ranges would be unlimited or at 2500 kilometers.

President Ford: Would Option II or III be okay from a military standpoint?

General Brown: No. The Chiefs view is that we should give up as little cruise missile capability as we can. It is one point of our leverage on the Soviets. We propose that the Backfire be counted, but recognize that this may not be possible. We could slide to deferral. But deferral should be stated positively like Don (Rumsfeld) stated it, not negatively as is shown on the chart.

Deferral would be a good position for us in this country. It formalizes Vladivostok, which we applauded. Vladivostok was simple, gave us symmetry, and provided equivalent balance for the U.S. But after a year and a half it is still not codified.

President Ford: I would be concerned if there were no agreement and no codification of Vladivostok. There is a 50/50 chance there will be no deal.

General Brown: Before you left for Vladivostok, you were told you couldn't get certain things. But you came home with what you were told you couldn't get.

Secretary Kissinger: That is not true.

General Brown: I remember it explicitly.

President Ford: From the military view if you freeze the SS-18 and reduce the SS-9s, is this a significant gain?

General Brown: Yes. But if the Backfire runs free they can make up the difference easily with the Backfire. If they reduce their heavy missiles by 200, this would be significant. But in my judgment, they won't buy it.

Secretary Kissinger: Before Vladivostok, we said equal aggregates and equal MIRVs, or unequal aggregates and unequal MIRVs.

President Ford: (To Secretary Kissinger) How do you recommend proceeding with one or the other option or should one option be followed by the other.

Secretary Kissinger: We should treat the options separately, or have one as a fallback. If we go with Option II we can probably get a letter from Brezhnev saying they would have no more than 450 Backfires. And they would go down by 250 systems from Vladivostok.

Or we can go with Option III. This might work but it would be better if we first went with Option II and then go to Option III if the other fails. But we could do Option III first and then Option II.

There are a lot of advantages in Option III. It is simpler. But if we go from III to II, it would be difficult. We may not be able to get II if III fails. But we might be able to get III if II fails.

President Ford: Could we give them the option of one or the other?

Secretary Kissinger: No. We did that once in the ABM negotiations; we gave them three options, but they picked the wrong one and we rejected it. (Laughter)

Secretary Rumsfeld: We could have a statement that if they go beyond certain limits they will have circumvented the treaty. They could give us a Backfire production rate, or some limit, and we could say that we would make some overt act if they exceeded these limits, such as deploying cruise missiles in Europe. However, this causes a problem because we might want to deploy missiles like that anyway and not depend upon what they do on the Backfire.

I like the deferral option. It is honest and in the interest of long-term arms limitation. I believe it is negotiable. We don't mix the



threat on grey area systems. However we may need to discuss this with our allies since they have an interest in the Backfire and cruise missiles.

President Ford: We don't want to bring in problems of allies.

Secretary Rumsfeld: They will bring in the problems.

Dr. Ikke: The simplicity of Option III is a significant advantage over Option II. And it gives us time to resolve the verification problem.

President Ford: I would like to see the refined material on the assumptions of what we would do if there were a deadlock. (Note: This presumably refers to the SALT contingency plan.)

General Scowcroft: It is being reviewed now by the principals. This is still a working group paper.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Here is a later draft.<sup>7</sup> It is going to the principals. It shows that we would need from one to twenty billion dollars over a five-year period. It uses a building block approach and has a variety of levels of activity. In the event of a Soviet breakout, it calls for another \$10 billion in non-strategic forces. Therefore, the plan ranges from one to thirty billion dollars.

President Ford: My own visceral reaction is that if there is no SALT, their plans are not such that they would have to do more. For us, I will not stand still.

General Scowcroft: The air defense system is not in the earlier package.

General Brown: It is part of this package.

Secretary Kissinger: Nothing prohibits us from building an air defense. If we are so worried by Backfire, we should do this regardless. It is independent of an agreement.

General Brown: I agree.

Secretary Clements: We will take care of it.

General Brown: The air defense today would not be the same as in earlier years.

President Ford: I was going to say I want no more BOMARC.

General Brown: We would have AWACS plus interceptors currently in the program. In times of tension we would bring in the interceptors. It would be far more effective than the old system.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Before we close, Mr. President—you asked George if there are military objections to Option 2.

The real objections are not military, but objections from an arms control standpoint. We have to try to deal with the effect on SALT III, and this makes the definition of bombers important.

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<sup>7</sup> The draft of the SALT contingency plan, not attached, is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 11, NSC Meeting, 2/11/76-SALT(1).

The throw weight buffs, such as Nitze, would applaud it if we reduced their heavy missiles.

General Brown: If we get enough of their heavy missiles.

Secretary Kissinger: Option II was the DOD option.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I am not ashamed of it. We have attempted to get as many different options as we can which are realistic. But that doesn't mean I can't analyze them. Even if we got all 200 missiles, there would be no throw weight definition for heavy bombers. The problem gets worse downstream.

Secretary Kissinger: The dividing line would be that any upgrading of Backfire equals a heavy bomber.

I have no preference between Option II versus III.

General Scowcroft: But Option II permits us to bring the 2400 level down.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Option III does that also.

Secretary Kissinger: But you won't get it in Option III. Deferral will keep us still at the 2400 figure.

General Brown: Some would argue that if Backfire runs free, we have broken Vladivostok.

President Ford: Thanks.

Secretary Kissinger: If we choose Option 3, we don't want to define the systems as grey area systems, since that would then bring in FBS. We should put it as unsettled issues, for later negotiation, before we panic Europe.

President Ford: If nothing out of this NSC meeting shows up in the newspaper, it will be an all time record for my time in office. It will be of major significance if nothing is leaked out. If it does, I'll throw up my hands and say that's it. The first god-damned newspaper story on this, I will say it ends the prospects for a SALT agreement.

**131. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 16, 1976, 10:10–10:20 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Ford

Dr. Fred C. Ikle, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: I wanted to bring you up to date about a decision I made over the weekend. It will be delivered to Dobrynin this morning.<sup>2</sup> It is deferral, under the concept of buying time for Backfire and cruise missiles. We picked January '79 as the best time before our deployment of cruise missiles and which will still keep some restraint on Backfire. I thought it best to include ALCMs in the treaty. For other cruise missiles, their deployment is banned over 600 kilometers. On "nuclear-armed," I thought it best to defer that to Geneva in order not to overload the Soviets at the moment.

Don is in agreement and I will talk to George [Brown] this afternoon.<sup>3</sup> I think it is the best we can do under the circumstances. I don't think it has much chance.

Ikle: We don't want to get into competition on intercontinental cruise missiles. I think it can easily be defended and supported. I have a couple of minor nitpicks I can tell Brent.

Kissinger: Don has a couple of points here.

[Discussion and rejection by the President of last proposed fix.]

I told the President I far prefer Option II. I am most worried about the date.

President: This is not my preferred way to go, but I think it is manageable, and as long as we have everyone on board we have something we can move forward with.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Ford and Kissinger briefly discussed SALT when they met before this meeting, beginning at 9:35 a.m. The memorandum of conversation is Document 262 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 132.

<sup>3</sup> Ford and Scowcroft met with Rumsfeld, Brown, and Bush at 3:45 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 17.

### 132. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

The United States proposes that the two sides proceed in the following manner:

1. The U.S. and USSR agree to consolidate, and sign as soon as possible, the areas of agreement in a SALT II Treaty and defer the Backfire and certain “intermediate range” cruise missile issues for an agreed interim period, during which negotiations on these issues would continue.

2. In addition to those provisions already settled or still under discussion in Geneva, the treaty would also include provisions (a) to ban deployment of cruise missiles with a range over 600 km from all aircraft except those heavy bombers that are counted in the ceiling of 2,400; (b) to ban testing or production of air-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 2,500 km; (c) to consider each heavy bomber equipped with a cruise missile with a range over 600 and up to 2,500 km as a MIRVed launcher and therefore to be counted against the ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed vehicles; and (d) at a time to be agreed upon, to review the range threshold limits on cruise missiles.

3. On this basis the treaty would also include an agreement on the provisions for the verification of the deployment of MIRVed missiles, along the lines tentatively agreed in high level discussions, and, as well, agreement on the distinction between heavy and non-heavy ICBM’s and the definition of a heavy missile.

4. As a part of resolving the issues of the Backfire bomber and sea- and land-based cruise missiles, the two sides would agree that their common intention is to reduce strategic armaments below the 2,400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok.

5. The U.S. and USSR would also conclude an interim agreement for the period beginning with the signature of the new treaty until January 1, 1979, to include the following mutual constraints: (a) during the interim period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles would be tested to a range greater than 2,500 km; (b) during this period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 17. No classification marking. Numerous drafts of the note, dated February 12–16, are *ibid.*, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File. Kissinger gave the note to Dobrynin on February 16 at 11:15 a.m., along with a letter from Ford to Brezhnev expressing his concern at the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and hope for a new strategic arms limitation treaty. For the letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 263.

km would be operationally deployed on surface ships, on submarines, or on land; (c) the Soviet side would provide assurances that during this period the rate of production of the Soviet Backfire bomber would not be accelerated beyond the current and agreed rate, that the operational capabilities would not be improved, and, through other assurances to be agreed, that the Backfire bomber would not be deployed or operated in an intercontinental mode; (d) both sides would agree that their common objective would be to reach a mutually acceptable definitive solution to the problems of intermediate range sea- and land-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber as soon as possible. Negotiations to this end should begin immediately following the signing of the treaty based on Vladivostok; (e) negotiations on the resolution of the issues covered by the interim agreement would not replace the commitment, as currently reflected in the draft treaty being negotiated in Geneva, to conduct further negotiations beginning in 1977 for a more comprehensive agreement.

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**133. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 17, 1976.

Dear Mr. President,

I and my colleagues have thoroughly studied the consideration set forth in your letter of February 16, 1976<sup>2</sup> about current situation in the relations between our countries.

It appears that we and you are evaluating in different ways the causes of certain difficulties which cropped up into these relations lately. We have already expounded to you our point of view on that matter. It remains the same. It is important, however, that both you and we stand for overcoming the existing difficulties, for further improvement of the Soviet-American relations.

On our part we do not feel any hesitations in choosing the path. It was very recently stated at the highest forum of our country—the 25th Congress of the CPSU that the Soviet Union intends firmly to continue the course for further improving Soviet-American relations in strict

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological Files, Box 4, March 5–30, 1976. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 132.

compliance with the spirit and letter of the concluded agreements and the undertaken commitments.

We definitely proceed from the assumption that there objectively exist necessary prerequisites that, granted mutual desire, the relations between our countries should continue to be developed and strengthened in the interests of our two peoples and the cause of world peace.

In this connection we as well as you, Mr. President, attach top priority to an early conclusion of working out and signing a long-term agreement on the whole complex of questions of limiting strategic weapons on the basis of the agreement reached between us in Vladivostok.

In the course of the talks already after Vladivostok—and you, certainly know it well—the Soviet side took a number of important steps to meet the American side in attempts to find mutually acceptable resolutions to the remaining issues.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the position of the American side including the latest proposals which you call compromise ones in your letter.

Let us, however, look whether they are really of such nature.

It is known that in meeting the wishes of the American side we expressed readiness to count as MIRVed missiles (1320 units) all missiles of the types which have been tested with MIRV, under condition that simultaneously agreement would be reached on the whole complex of cruise missiles. Up till now the American side as well agreed to that.

Yet now the American side proposes to consider as agreed only the first question—about the way of counting MIRVed missiles, putting it in long-term agreement while leaving under the terms of these proposals actually unresolved the question of sea-based and land-based cruise missiles.

True, you propose that missiles of these two types should not be operationally deployed until January 1, 1979, but their production and testing would not be banned. But let us speak frankly—actually it would be a sanctioning of a new channel of strategic arms race because it is unrealistic to think that it would be easier to agree on banning long-range cruise missiles after they have been developed and, possibly, even put into mass production and not now when it hasn't happened yet.

Trying to remove from limiting these really strategic types of weapons the American side at the same time attempts as before to put limitation of some kind on Soviet medium-range bomber which it calls "Backfire" and which is in no way related to the subject of the negotiations. The artificial character of including this issue into agenda and persistency shown by the American side in that matter cannot but bring

inference that someone is deliberately trying to put roadblocks on the way to reaching an agreement.

Thus we do not see any forward movement in the US proposals of February 16 in comparison with what was discussed during Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow last January.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, there is a certain movement backward. It first of all applies to a linked solution of the questions of MIRVed missiles and cruise missiles, which I have mentioned above. Further, the US side agreed in January with the complete ban on submarine cruise missiles with the range over 600 km. and now it backed away from this agreement.

So, can one consider, Mr. President, such proposals as compromise ones?

I am saying this with all directness, because in such serious business one cannot leave any ambiguities.

We believe that the proposals which we set forth at the conclusion of the talks with Mr. Kissinger in Moscow constitute the realistic basis for solving the remaining issues of strategic arms limitations which are not yet agreed upon, and we hope that the US side would once again thoroughly weigh them from that very point of view.

There remain not so many unresolved issues, and if energetic efforts are taken for settling them the work on the Agreement can be completed within a very short period of time, which both sides are equally interested in.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that in our deep conviction we can and must provide—proceeding from what has already been accomplished in Soviet-American relations and not succumbing to influences of various momentary considerations—for onward movement across the wide field of those relations.

Sincerely,

**L. Brezhnev<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 117, 118, and 124.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

134. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 18, 1976, 9:35–10:15 a.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: There is nothing in the Soviet letter [the Brezhnev letter of March 17].<sup>2</sup> They misled us all day long. Voronstov briefed the press that we could have an agreement in two months. He called me and said it didn't meet all our points but was positive.<sup>3</sup> [He describes the letter.] They proposed going back to their January position as a basis.

President: Their idea for reductions has appealed to me.

Kissinger: We have two problems: How to handle the letter so it doesn't do damage next week; and how to conduct our affairs in the government.

I think we are undermining détente. Except for Angola, I think the Soviets are getting a bum rap. I don't believe they have massively increased their forces. It is a gradual trend and will continue no matter what. They have been quiet in the Middle East. Only Angola was out of bounds.

The next thing which will happen is the Democrats will say SALT has collapsed and we have ruined détente. The Democrats may seize the peace issue.

President: Reagan hasn't made headway with his charges as long as we are at peace and moving. SALT is in our national interest. The question is how to proceed.

Kissinger: We could have an NSC meeting late tomorrow. Hand out the letter, warn them against all leaks, and say we want a proposal for the next step within two weeks.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 18. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Scowcroft prepared talking points for Ford, which are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> Document 133.

<sup>3</sup> No record of Kissinger's conversation with Voronstov on March 18 has been found. However, in a March 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt relayed the substance of his conversation with the Soviet Minister Counselor: "Voronstov said he was expecting, possibly still today, a letter from Brezhnev to the President which, he thought, would advance the SALT dialogue. Vorontsov said he would contact you as soon as he has precise instructions. He added that our last position offered some possibility for discussion but 'did not save enough face.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, Box 7, Soviet Union, Jan–April 1976)



Scowcroft: It will leak. I would suggest instead that you call in just the principals, show them the note, and tell them you want to think about next steps.

President: I think it should be principals only. Maybe just here in the office—the three of us, Don, George, and George Bush.

Kissinger: I think Ikle also.

President: Let's have a meeting late Friday with those people.<sup>4</sup> Say it is not to distribute or it will leak. Say start a study the first of next week.

Kissinger: I agree with Brent. Say you just want to think about it over the weekend. Then have an NSC next Wednesday. I would even mention the option of suspending the talks. None of them will want to take the heat for it! [There is discussion of notifying Rumsfeld ahead of the others.]

You could then decide whether to go for one or not. If not, you could respond—which I don't recommend—or string out the talks.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT II.]

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<sup>4</sup> Ford and Kissinger met later in the day, 6:45–7:15 p.m., with Rumsfeld, Bush, Iklé, and Rockefeller. The President opened the meeting by stating: "This [Soviet] note raises the possibility—if we pursue our present course—that we will be forced to suspend the talks for 1976." The participants then briefly discussed different tactical approaches to take with the Soviets. The memorandum of conversation is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 18.

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### 135. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 24, 1976, 5:50–7 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Fred Ikle, Director, ACDA

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 18. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

SUBJECT

SALT

[Discussion of how to deal with press inquiries. It was decided to acknowledge that we have received an answer from the Soviet Union. We should say they have given us their considerations and this is another step in our continuing discussion.]

The President: Don, why don't you start?

Rumsfeld: I am inclined to a procedural approach.

The President: What do you mean?

Rumsfeld: Asking them what they would propose is no good because they think they have something on the table. We don't have anything new. I would think put off until January; a summit without SALT, where the two of you can just talk. I would just shy away from dusting off a proposal we had made.

The President: George?

Brown: I heaved a sigh of relief. I thought our last proposal had some problems, so I tend to the procedural approach.

The President: Fred?

Ikle: I don't think we should do anything in the meantime which would interfere with SALT—like Minuteman III. Then perhaps we could put some more issues into Geneva—not the central ones. We could then also undertake to educate them on these ambiguous systems.

The President: Henry?

Kissinger: There are three possibilities—deferral, stall, or make one final proposal.

[Discusses the three options]

The President: Putting it to Geneva is no good. I think we either suspend and ask for more money, or we look at the January proposals and see if there is anything to work with. Why not have the Verification Panel work at it for two weeks? If we can come up with a new wrinkle, fine. If not, we suspend and go to the Congress for more money.

Rumsfeld: I don't think we necessarily need to ask for more money unless they start to break out.

I would urge you to expand your guidance to include the procedural option and not just review our two proposals and breaking off.

Scowcroft: We should set a deadline and ought to keep working on it.

The President: I don't want to dilly dally around with Geneva or other procedures. I want either a new crack at it or to break it off.

[Much discussion]

I would like it if the Verification Panel would take these points of impasse and see if there is some place we can get some movement. I am just not willing to do nothing for five or six months without sending up a request for more money.

Rumsfeld: I don't think you should go up for more money just because we are delayed for five or six months. To do that, we should show that the Soviet Union has done something—the fact is they haven't.

[Much discussion]

The President: Let's have the Verification Panel look into the possibilities of modifying our last proposal or the one Henry and Brezhnev discussed.

Rumsfeld: It will certainly leak. We should think about getting out a statement about the Brezhnev response.

Scowcroft: That looks bad. We can have a question planted.

The President: And we could just say they gave us their considerations, and we will study them. This is just another step in the negotiating process.

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### 136. National Security Decision Memorandum 331<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 1, 1976.

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

Instructions for the SALT Talks, Geneva, June 1, 1976

The following instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks beginning on June 1, 1976, in Geneva have been approved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 66, NSDM 331, Instructions for SALT Talks, Geneva, 6/1/76. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. The original memorandum is incorrectly dated June 11.

1. The Delegation should maintain the current U.S. JDT language<sup>2</sup> referring to “bombers” to describe those aircraft which carry ASBMs.

2. The Delegation should maintain the position that the classification of future aircraft as heavy bombers should be determined through consultations on a case-by-case basis.

3. With respect to heavy bomber variants, the Delegation should request that the Soviets provide technical information which would support their contention that the Bear and Bison heavy bombers are readily distinguishable from the tanker, ASW, and reconnaissance variants of these aircraft and that conversion of these variants to heavy bombers would require a substantial period of time.

4. The Delegation should not raise the issue of a minimum range for those SLBMs whose launchers are to be covered by the agreement.

5. The Delegation should maintain the position that “throw weight” should be defined so as to include single-RV post boost vehicles.

6. The Delegation is authorized to accept the term “light” to describe those ICBMs which do not satisfy the heavy ICBM definition, but such acceptance is conditioned on a satisfactory resolution of throw weight definition and heavy ICBM ceiling issues along the lines proposed by the U.S. The Delegation should also insert into the record a clear statement to the effect that the U.S. does not consider all “light” missiles as comparable. Thus, at some later point, we may return to the question of missile classifications.<sup>3</sup>

**Brent Scowcroft**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 127.

<sup>3</sup> The Verification Panel discussed missile classifications briefly and inconclusively at its last meeting during the Ford administration on July 13. Handwritten draft minutes of the meeting are in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 22, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel (Drafts), April–July 1976.

**137. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 15, 1975.

**SALT ALTERNATIVES***Introduction*

This paper reviews alternative approaches to resolving the major outstanding SALT issues in the light of the U.S. proposals of January and February and the Soviet responses. (The proposals put forth by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in January are described in Annex A.)

In February, the U.S. communicated a proposal based on completion of the Vladivostok Agreement plus an interim agreement for the period through January 1979 that would restrict sea-launched and land-launched cruise missile testing and deployment as well as limit Backfire production. The elements of the proposed agreements (also provided in Annex B) are:

1. *The Vladivostok Agreement (to last through 1985)*

—All provisions relating to Vladivostok agreed to thus far in Geneva plus other agreed Joint Draft Text (JDT) provisions.

—Agreement that any missile whose booster has been tested with MIRVs will be considered to be MIRVed.

—Ceiling on the throw weight and launch weight of heavy and non-heavy ICBMs (since agreed in Geneva).

—Ban on ALCMs with range over 2500 km, restrict ALCMs over 600 km to deployment only on heavy bombers, count heavy bombers equipped with 600–2500 km ALCMs in the 1320 total.

—Reduction in the aggregate to some level below 2400.

2. *Interim Agreement (to last through January 1979)*

—Limit testing of all sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), i.e., cruise missiles launched from submarines and surface ships, and land-launched cruise missiles (LLCMs) to a maximum range of 2500 km.

—Ban deployment of SLCMs and LLCMs over 600 km.

—Prohibit acceleration of Backfire production beyond the current and agreed rate.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 33, USSR, Gromyko File, October 1, 1976. Top Secret; Sensitive. All annexes are attached but not printed.

—Ban on improvements in Backfire capability.

—Commitment to resolve the Backfire and cruise missile issues as soon as possible.

The Soviet response was negative, claiming this proposal represented a step backwards from our January position, that resolution of the cruise missile issue would not become easier in the future as testing progressed, and that Backfire was an artificial issue.

The Soviets have not introduced any new elements in their response to our latest proposal but reaffirmed the last position they had put forth in January in Moscow. Our general alternatives in this situation are:

—Maintain our most recent position as put forward in February.

—Continue to pursue the concept of a combined Vladivostok/Interim Agreement approach, as proposed in February, but with some modifications.

—Return to the concept of a single comprehensive 1985 agreement and propose a new approach which incorporates major elements from our initial January proposal and emphasizes reductions, including heavy missile reductions.

These alternatives are analyzed in the sections which follow. (An aspect which relates to all of the approaches, the cruise missile definition issue, is discussed in Annex C.)

#### *I. Maintain Our Present (i.e., February) Position*

The principal advantage of the Vladivostok/Interim Agreement approach which we proposed in February is that an interim agreement covering Backfire, SLCMs, and LLCMs gains time for more deliberate discussion and debate on these issues. At the same time it places no severe constraints on Backfire or SLCM and LLCM programs and permits consolidation of what has been agreed up to now. If no agreement can be reached on Backfire and cruise missiles by January 1979, the Soviets would be in a position to deploy Backfire without constraints while we would have the balancing option to proceed with unlimited deployment of long-range SLCMs and LLCMs.

The arguments for maintaining our current position relate both to an assessment of the tactical situation and to the merits of the position:

—On the one hand, failure to reassert the position may convince the Soviets that it was merely a negotiating gambit, and that by stonewalling they can obtain further modifications and concessions.

—On the other hand, the Soviets have shown no interest in the concept of deferral of the Backfire and cruise missile issues; their own proposal emphasizes reductions linked to strict cruise missile limits

and suggests that a comprehensive settlement along such lines may still be negotiable.

## II. *Variations on the February Proposal*

If it is decided to continue to pursue the concept of a combined Vladivostok/Interim Agreement approach, then consideration could be given to attempting to make the February proposal more attractive to the Soviets. Three possible modifications to the February proposal of potential interest are:

—Include a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of all cruise missiles above 2500 km in the 1985 Vladivostok Agreement (i.e., extend the ban on ALCMs over 2500 km to all cruise missiles).

—Include the above ban on cruise missiles above 2500 km in the Vladivostok Agreement and, in addition, drop the interim agreement concept in its entirety.

—Extend the period of the interim agreement through October 1980 (i.e., allow three years after the new agreement goes into effect for negotiation of limits on SLCMs, LLCMs, and Backfire).

A ban on the testing and deployment of all cruise missiles of range greater than 2500 km would be consistent with theater and tactical roles for land-, submarine-, and surface-ship-launched cruise missiles but would sharply constrain a strategic capability for U.S. SLCMs. The nuclear-armed Tomahawk SLCM could be modified to conform to a 2500 km maximum range limit.

Although including the 2500 km cruise missile ban in the Vladivostok Agreement has the advantage of making the proposal more attractive to the Soviets, it will decrease the prospects for successful negotiation of Backfire limits before January 1979. Thus, in the context of banning cruise missiles over 2500 km in the Vladivostok Agreement, we might drop the interim agreement idea altogether and instead pursue limitations on Backfire in the negotiations of a follow-on agreement or some other forum.

Extending the interim agreement expiration date from January 1979 to October 1980 would have the following impact on cruise missiles and Backfire:

—*Cruise Missiles.* Extending the 2500 km SLCM/LLCM test ban to October 1980 would have minimal impact on the development program for Tomahawk. Only a few maximum range demonstrations in 1978 and 1979 might have to be curtailed. All technical goals could be met. With initial SLCM deployment presently scheduled for January 1980, a ban on deployment of SLCMs and LLCMs above 600 km through October 1980 would, as a minimum, slip actual deployment by nine months. In addition, production and deployment funds might be eliminated by Congress pending resolution of the deployment ban.

(This could lead to a deployment delay of several years because production funds are normally allocated two to three years prior to actual deployment.) There is also the possibility that there will be pressures to extend the terms of the interim agreement even if no agreement on SLCM, LLCM, and Backfire limits are achieved by October 1980.

—*Backfire*. The number of Backfire deployed by October 1980, assuming agreement on a fixed three per month production rate (see Annex D), would be about 240 compared to the otherwise projected total of about 280 by that time. It is difficult to say how much the possibility of numerical limitations on Backfire would be enhanced by somewhat lower deployment levels.

### III. *Modified January Proposal: Emphasis on Reductions*

Under this approach, we would retain much of the substance of our January proposal for a comprehensive agreement (Annex A), with the principal exception of: (1) dropping the demand for strict numerical limits on Backfire and (2) including reductions to 2150, part of these reductions (e.g., about 100) to be taken in heavy missiles. The basic provisions of the proposed agreement would be:

—Soviet statement on the number of Backfire they plan to produce by 1985.

—Freeze deployment of SS-18s; reduce 100 (or more) SS-9s.

—Ban ALCMs above 2500 km; ban ALCMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers above 600 km; count heavy bombers with 600–2500 km ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV total.

—Ban SLCMs on submarines above 600 km.

—Ban SLCMs on surface ships above 2500 km.

—Ban land-launched cruise missiles above 2500 km.

—Collateral constraints on Backfire, including upgrading.

—Reductions to 2150 by 1982.

Under this option, there would be no agreed numerical limitations on Backfire; however, the requirement that the Soviets provide a unilateral statement on the total number of Backfire they plan to produce by 1985 could help build confidence that Backfire would not be deployed in such large numbers that it could be viewed as a circumvention of the agreement. (See table below for projected Backfire production.) This option is formulated on the assumption that the 1985 Backfire number provided by the Soviets would be consistent with our intelligence estimate (about 550) or less. If the number were significantly greater than 550, the package would need to be reconsidered in this light.



		<u>Projected Backfire Production</u>			
	<u>Mid-1976</u>	<u>January 1979</u>	<u>October 1980</u>	<u>December 1982</u>	<u>December 1985</u>
LRA	20	70	120	190	240
SNA	20	70	115	185	210
Other	<u>44</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>100</u>
Total	84	185	273	410	550

At Vladivostok, it was agreed to carry over from the SALT ONE Interim Agreement the provisions which froze modern heavy ballistic missiles (MLBMs) at their current levels. The U.S. has no MLBMs while the Soviets have 326 (this number includes 18 launchers at the Tyuratum test sites which are believed to be operational). With the recently agreed heavy ICBM definition and heavy ICBM ceiling, the Soviets will be allowed over 2.5 million pounds of ICBM throw weight more than the U.S. With reductions in force size, this asymmetry in allowed force capability becomes increasingly important. In light of this situation, this option would freeze SS-18 deployment to those operational or under conversion as of the date of signature (currently about 122—see Annex E). By adding the requirements to phase out, e.g., 100 SS-9 launchers by 1982, the ICBM force throw weight asymmetry which results from the Soviet heavy missile advantage can be significantly reduced.

In order to achieve the desired heavy missile reduction (i.e., at least about 100), the U.S. might take the approach of initially proposing much larger heavy missile reductions, possibly even proposing that the Soviets eliminate all remaining SS-9s not under conversion. Reductions in heavy missiles in this agreement could also pave the way for preferential reductions in SALT THREE to eliminate all heavy missiles.

#### *Force Table*

In the light of the possibility of agreement on reductions to an aggregate of 2150, Tables 1 and 2 of Annex F provide illustrative Soviet and U.S. force structures through 1985 assuming an aggregate of 2150 is achieved by the end of 1982. Table 3 of Annex F describes the current FYDP forces; it should be noted that the U.S. force in October of 1984 was designed under the assumption of a SALT limit of 2400.

**138. Memorandum From Vice President Rockefeller to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 29, 1976.

## SUBJECT

SALT—Cruise Missile

Since I will be unable to attend Friday's NSC meeting,<sup>2</sup> I wanted to share with you a question I had about cruise missile development after reviewing the background papers on SALT options.

As you know, I feel there are important advantages to developing our cruise missile technology to its full potential. Although I understand that the sea launched strategic cruise missile (SLCM) is designed for a range of about 3700 KM, a 2500 KM testing limitation is being considered in SALT. Given our geographical disadvantages, we may want to explore the feasibility of accelerating testing of the SLCM to its maximum design range prior to finalizing a 2500 KM SALT limitation. This might assure a capability to deploy a longer range weapon rapidly if necessary at some future time.

For verification purposes, there would be advantages in having not ever tested beyond 2500 KM, and we may conceivably be able to develop a capability without actually testing to the full range. Nonetheless, I believe it is worth exploring the feasibility of accelerating testing to at least 3700 KM.

If only nuclear armed applications are limited in SALT, we might legally be able to develop a longer range cruise missile capability. But this complicated verification question has not yet been resolved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 21, SALT (34)–(42), [Feb. 1976–Jan. 1977]. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 139.

**139. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 30, 1976, 9:30–11 a.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PRINCIPALS

The President  
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
The Director of Central Intelligence George Bush  
Acting Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency John Lehman  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

## OTHER ATTENDEES

*White House*

Mr. Richard Cheney,  
Assistant to the President  
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

*Defense*

Dr. James P. Wade

*NSC Staff*

Col Richard T. Boverie

*State*

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson  
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

President Ford: This is the meeting that was to have been held last week. I want to emphasize that it is decidedly in the national interest to proceed to seek a good agreement for SALT TWO. There is no urgency to dictate a bad agreement. But there is no reason to avoid negotiations for what I take to be essential for the national interest.

We have proceeded since Vladivostok with a number of attempts and several different formulas. However, we have not been able to move because of the Backfire and cruise missile problems. We have to be cognizant that we are moving closer to the deadline. If the US government gets to that deadline with no action, serious consequences could result. Regardless of any political problems, I think we should proceed affirmatively.

Henry, would you please review the alternatives that have been suggested.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, it would be helpful if we review where the negotiations have been and what the Verification Panel has discussed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

Last September, we introduced the idea of treating sea-based cruise missiles and Backfire as hybrid or gray areas. We proposed a common limit of 300 hybrid systems on the two sides—for the Soviets, Backfires and SLCMs (submarine launched cruise missiles) up to 2000 kilometers in range, and for us, FB-111s and SLCMs up to 2000 kilometers. The effect would have been for the Soviets to forego cruise missiles if they wanted a full complement of Backfire. That proposal also included a limit of 300 heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles) up to 2500 kilometers in range.<sup>2</sup>

Brezhnev rejected that proposal in October. He rejected it with respect to the numbers and with respect to treating Backfire as a hybrid.<sup>3</sup>

Secretary Rumsfeld: Did he reject the concept of hybrid systems? Was the concept of hybrid as we talk about it rejected?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. He used the word hybrid.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Did he reject hybrid or was he referring simply to the Backfire?

Secretary Kissinger: They said that Backfire was not in SALT, and that cruise missiles over 600 kilometers were to be covered. This was their basic decision.

In January we proposed to them the following:<sup>4</sup>

—Counting all Backfire produced after October 1977 in the 2400 aggregate.

—Counting heavy bombers with 600–2500 kilometer ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV ceiling.

—Banning submarine SLCMs over 600 kilometers in range.

—Banning land-based cruise missiles and surface-ship cruise missiles over 2500 kilometers.

—Counting each surface-ship armed with 600–2500 kilometer SLCMs in the 1320 MIRV ceiling.

Brezhnev insisted that the Backfire was not a strategic bomber and supplied some numbers to support his contention.

President Ford: Was this in Brezhnev's letter?

Secretary Kissinger: No. He said this in Moscow.<sup>5</sup>

President Ford: And in Helsinki.<sup>6</sup>

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but more specifically in Moscow.

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 108 and 109.

<sup>3</sup> Kissinger is presumably referring to Brezhnev's letter of October 27, 1975; see footnote 3, Document 109.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 115.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 117 and 124.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 102.

We then proposed a tougher version of the fallback you had approved.

President Ford: Was this in February?

Secretary Kissinger: No, this was in Moscow in January.

It included a five-year agreement limiting Backfire to 275 aircraft through 1982. The number of surface-ships equipped with 600–2500 kilometer SLCMs would be limited to a ceiling of 25 within this same five year period. The other provisions of the proposals were as we had originally proposed except that we also proposed reductions to less than 2300 by 1982. Brezhnev did not reject our position but offered a counterproposal which remains the present Soviet position:

—He accepted our approach on the ALCMs—to treat them as MIRVed vehicles with the exception of wanting to count the B–1 as three MIRVed vehicles. I am certain his proposal on the B–1 was not serious. He accepted our proposal for defining a heavy missile on the basis of throw weight. He offered to give a written commitment that Backfire would not be given a capability against the US. He reiterated their position that all SLCMs and land-launched cruise missiles should be limited to 600 kilometers. He offered to consider reductions to a level even below 2300, if there were a satisfactory solution to the cruise missile issue. All of their concessions on MIRV counting and throw weight are dependent upon resolution of the cruise missile issue. These are not independent concessions.

We considered the Brezhnev position in February and we came up with a proposal using a different approach—more like last September. It includes:<sup>7</sup>

—All provisions relating to Vladivostok agreed to thus far in Geneva plus other agreed joint draft text provisions.

—Agreement that any missile whose booster has been tested with MIRVs will consider to be MIRVed.

—Ceiling on the throw weight and launch weight of heavy and non-heavy ICBMs.

—Ban on ALCMs with range over 2500 kilometers, restrict ALCMs over 600 kilometers to deployment only on heavy bombers, count heavy bombers equipped with 600–2500 kilometer ALCMs in the 1320 total.

—Reduction in the aggregate to some level below 2400.

Some of these provisions had been discussed in January. In addition, we proposed an interim agreement to last to January 1979:

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 132.

—Limit testing of SLCMs (on surface-ships and submarines) and LLCMs (land-launched cruise missiles) to a maximum of 2500 kilometers.

—Ban deployment of SLCMs and LLCMs over 600 kilometers.

—Prohibit acceleration of Backfire production beyond the current and agreed rate.

—Ban on improvements in Backfire capability.

—Commitment to resolve the Backfire and cruise missile issues as soon as possible.

In March, this approach was also rejected by Brezhnev.<sup>8</sup> He characterized the US proposal as moving backward from our position in January; in particular, he criticized the withdrawal of our proposal for a 600 kilometer limit on submarine SLCMs. He claimed it was unrealistic to think it would be easier to ban long-range cruise missiles after they had been tested and even produced.

Since then, in effect, there have been no communications between us. Dobrynin has asked us if in principle we are ready to continue negotiations. We said yes. Also Alex (Johnson) has been negotiating in Geneva on technical issues. But there has been no momentum on the fundamental proposals.

The Verification Panel has been looking at alternatives and has come up with two basic approaches.<sup>9</sup>

The first approach is to maintain the February position. We could do this in two ways: either by saying nothing, or by writing Brezhnev a letter, which is a more formal approach. The argument for maintaining the February position is that the Soviets will not give it serious consideration unless we stick to our position.

The second approach would be to maintain our February position but add some variations to make the concept more attractive.

For example, we could extend the ban on ALCMs over 2500 kilometers in the Vladivostok agreement to cover all cruise missiles in the permanent agreement. This would assure the Soviets that regardless of the outcome of the follow-on negotiations, there would be a ban on SLCMs and land-launched cruise missiles over 2500 kilometers. An argument against this is that it might reduce our leverage in follow-on negotiations. If we don't add a ban, it would leave Backfire and most cruise missiles out altogether and save them for SALT THREE.

Another variation is to extend the period of the Interim Agreement which now goes to January 1979. It is unlikely any agreement would be

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 133.

<sup>9</sup> At its meeting of July 13; see footnote 3, Document 136.

ratified until March 1977. Therefore, an Interim Agreement to January 1979 would not be extraordinarily meaningful. So we could extend it to October 1980, which would be a period of three years after the entry into force of the Vladivostok Agreement to negotiate follow-on limitations on Backfire and sea- and land-launched cruise missiles.

This would have more of an impact on the US SLCM program since initial deployment is currently scheduled for early 1980.

The argument against this variation is that once we have any kind of ban, it tends to become permanent. We might find the SLCM in Congress to be in the same situation as the B-1.

President Ford: This one item—including a ban on all cruise missiles greater than 2500 kilometers—how does that differ from the February proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: The February proposal included a ban only on ALCMs over 2500 kilometers. Here we have added the ban to all cruise missiles. It might make it more serious if we stick to the concept since it is an elaboration of the concept. It leaves open whether SLCMs from 600 to 2500 kilometers could be deployed. They could not be deployed up to the limit of the Interim Agreement.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Which variation on the February proposal are you talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: Variation 1 of the February proposal.

Secretary Rumsfeld: But that puts it into a permanent limit.

Secretary Kissinger: In the Interim Agreement nothing can be deployed beyond 600 kilometers until day X. At the end of the Interim Agreement, 600–2500 kilometers SLCMs can be deployed.

Ambassador Johnson: The Interim Agreement went to 1979.

Secretary Kissinger: In the February proposal, there would be a permanent agreement on agreed items, and an Interim Agreement on those not agreed. What this adds is whatever happens after the Interim Agreement, we could not deploy cruise missiles beyond 2500 kilometers.

President Ford: Maybe I don't understand this, but if we go with this, we go from 600 to 2500 kilometers on SLCMs. How would that be a benefit to the Soviets?

Secretary Kissinger: We won't go beyond 2500 kilometers for any purpose. If we go the reductions route, or any or all of the modifications, we have to consider what happens at the end of the Interim Agreement.

Ambassador Johnson: May I point out Mr. President, that we do have an agreement in Geneva that provides for follow-on negotiations in 1977.

Secretary Kissinger: That's why we would drop the Interim Agreement. We would settle what we can settle and then go into follow-on negotiations. If we have an Interim Agreement, we might have trouble funding our systems. And once the Interim Agreement lapses, we would be back to where we were.

Our other principal option would be to go for reductions. This alternative would give us the opportunity to build on where the negotiations left off in mid January. We would propose to include reductions to 2150 by 1982, and to include reduction of 100 SS-9s on the Soviet side.

If they reduced heavy missiles, we would fall off our demand for strict numerical limits on Backfire; however, there would be a letter from Brezhnev to you on what their program is.

We would also take Brezhnev up on his offer to give us assurances that Backfire would not be given an intercontinental capability and we might also seek other collateral constraints.

The cruise missile limitations would be similar to our January discussion. SLCMs over 600 kilometers on submarines are banned, but permitted on surface-ships and land up to 2500 kilometers in range; ALCMs on heavy bombers are counted as MIRVs and banned on other aircraft.

We would also like to get a freeze on SS-18 deployment so that all of their permitted heavy missiles would not be MIRVed. If the freeze were effective as of the end of this year, after a reduction of 100 they would be left with about 134 SS-18s and about 92 SS-9s, but in the more likely case of a freeze in October 1977 they would have about 188 SS-18s and about 20 SS-9s.

The practical difference between the reductions option and the February proposal is that if we add a 2500 kilometer test and deployment ban, under February there would be an unlimited number of SLCMs greater than 600 kilometers—but no constraints on Backfire and no reductions beyond 2400.

Summing up, we have to consider where we would be in either of the two approaches as well as the case of no agreement:

—If we stick with the last proposal, we would thereby be betting that after five months of deadlock, Brezhnev will switch his position. If we want to string out the negotiations, then this probably guarantees it. It has the virtue of displaying our refusal to budge; if the talks collapse we could defend it; if we add the 2500 kilometer range limit for all cruise missiles, particularly through 1980, we have to compare whether this outcome is better than the reductions option.

In the reductions option, we could deploy longer range ship-based missiles but in the Interim Agreement approach we could not; Backfire



would reach 270 by October 1980, while running free in the reductions proposal, but the total Backfire in 1980 would be about the same, because production will not increase until late in 1980.

In short, the Interim Agreement may not buy us much. Thus we could consider dropping it altogether—but this approach is likely to be strongly resisted by the Soviets; Backfire runs free, but all we obtain compared to the reductions option is the freedom to deploy SLCMs on submarines.

The reductions option has what most critics have wanted for SALT THREE, namely low level reductions, and throw weight reductions.

Our forces would not be severely affected at the 2150 level, but the Soviets would have to take down over 400 missiles and bombers; CIA estimates they would reduce about 225 ICBMs, 128 SLCMs, and 70 bombers. To be realistic, however, we should recognize that the Soviets might accept reductions, but will resist specific reductions of heavy missiles. They will not let us specify the category of reductions.

These are the principal options. However, none will emerge pure from negotiations.

President Ford: Alex (Johnson), where are you on the technical discussions?

Ambassador Johnson: We have reached substantial agreement on heavy missiles. We have reached substantial agreement on a cap on heavy missiles. We have reached substantial agreement on throw weight.

We have spent much time on MIRV verification. As a quick word, the issue is not so much whether a missile tested as a MIRV is a MIRV. The issue now raised by the Soviets is how to count launchers. Their view is that we count these on a one-by-one basis. Our view is that this is impractical and we say that all launchers must be counted.

Secretary Kissinger: They have already agreed to the MIRV counting rule.

Ambassador Johnson: They have agreed that once a missile is tested as a MIRV, it will be counted as a MIRV. But the problem is to construct a bridge from the missile to the launcher in the field.

President Ford: My understanding was that where they were to have 300 SS-18s, they had planned to MIRV only 120, but they would count all SS-18s as MIRVed.

Ambassador Johnson: If SS-18s are there in the launchers. The problem is the bridge to count all launchers as containing SS-18 missiles. We formerly thought that they agreed to a group/complex rule, but they have walked away from that.

Secretary Kissinger: They can deploy the SS-18 without modifying the silo.

Ambassador Johnson: The SS-18 is not as much an issue as is the SS-19.

Secretary Kissinger: They can't put unMIRVed SS-19s in SS-18 launchers and count them as unMIRVed. In any event, the MIRV counting rule depends upon resolution of the cruise missile issue.

If they say they have an SS-11 in a hole, and if they admit it is an SS-19 hole, they cannot claim it as a single RV.

Ambassador Johnson: If they say they have an SS-11 in an SS-19 hole, they want to say that it is not counted as a MIRV launcher.

Secretary Kissinger: My instinct is that if we settle the cruise missile issue, the counting rule will be settled.

Ambassador Johnson: The Soviets have also shown a willingness to talk about the data base. I believe this will be manageable.

President Ford: Don?

Secretary Rumsfeld: What are people's views on going to Geneva with the mobile ICBM issue? We have agreed that the land mobile is not to be banned, but it has not been to Geneva yet.

Ambassador Johnson: Not yet. The draft treaty says it is okay to have land mobile missiles. Their position is to ban ICBMs on aircraft other than bombers—that is air-mobile ICBMs. Their position is silent on land-mobile missiles. They have not rejected them, but they have not accepted them either.

Secretary Rumsfeld: It will take time to settle this. At some point we should tell them our views. We should also address another issue: cruise missile definition—unarmed, nuclear armed, armed.

President Ford: What is your point?

Secretary Rumsfeld: We here have a definition. The issue is: when is it appropriate to get work going in Geneva on this, since it will take time to resolve. It is best to get working on this.

Ambassador Johnson: With regard to mobile missiles, we will encounter some resistance on air-mobile ICBMs.

Secretary Kissinger: If we introduce these issues without answering the basic questions, they will just stall. I've never understood the point on cruise missiles: why do we want conventional cruise missiles over 2500 kilometers? I don't understand the point.

General Brown: 600 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: 2500 on aircraft. If we open up possible evasions of specifications and propose calling missiles conventional and then put nuclear warheads on them, we will have problems. The NSC should consider this more carefully. Why start a brawl on that before we settle the other more fundamental issues?

Secretary Rumsfeld: We can't predict how the Soviets will react. They might consider it a positive sign, feeling that this is a signal that we are seriously interested.

President Ford: I would like a paper, with pros and cons, on this issue. I will decide whether to submit it to Geneva or not. When can you get such a paper, Brent?

Brent Scowcroft: Early next week.

President Ford: George (Brown), I understand the Chiefs recommend washing out all previous submissions other than February.

General Brown: Yes, sir. It is time for the Chiefs to be on record, since the JCS have not done anything in writing for a year. Senator Jackson hit me on this hard. There are three things:

—We believe we should clean the slate of proposals prior to the February proposal.

—We believe we should capture the Backfire, with the cruise missile providing the necessary leverage. We think we should emphasize to the Soviets that our approach to these negotiations has been through comprehensive package proposals. They have been taking selected items from the package, not the package itself.

—We believe we should stay with the February proposal.

Listening to the discussions this morning, it could well be seen that every time we reach a hard point we give something more to the Soviets. But the February proposal was tougher than the January proposal.

President Ford: Why was February tougher than January?

General Brown: Since it had some constraints on Backfire—but the January fallback did not.

President Ford: But January had reductions from 2400 to 2150 or 2200.

General Brown: That was the fallback.

President Ford: I understand in the two proposals the only thing that differs is the 2500 kilometer limit.

Secretary Kissinger: The major difference is that the February proposal removes the 600 kilometer limit on submarine launched SLCMs. The practical consequence of this is that after 1979 the Backfire, SLCM, and LLCM run free.

President Ford: George (Brown), what is the significant difference from a military point of view?

General Brown: The January proposal counts the SLCM on surface-ships in the 1320 MIRV limit.

President Ford: But you have no real program to put SLCMs on surface-ships.

General Brown: But we have a capability to achieve more than double the 25 ships in the proposal.

President Ford: When?

Dr. Wade: Probably not until after 1985. We have no program for this.

President Ford: Do we have any shipbuilding program for this?

Secretary Rumsfeld: The Chiefs and Services have looked hard at this. There had not been a specific IOC or doctrine.

President Ford: Is there a military desirability for that doctrine? If no doctrine is developed, how can there be a significant difference?

Dr. Wade: In the shipbuilding study which we briefed you on earlier, we identified this as an add-on to the heavy carrier force. It would be an add-on for the capital ships, not the carriers themselves. We are looking into their use in theater warfare, anti-ship warfare, and as augmentation for tactical aircraft. We have requested R&D money for this and we are now focusing on this.

President Ford: It seems like such a vague concept—to say it is significantly different. George says it is different. I hear a lot of words, but I see nothing in writing—no concept.

General Brown: But in the January fallback position, we were limited to 25 ships.

Mr. Hyland: It was proposed in January.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The President asked distinction between the January and February proposal.

Secretary Kissinger: It was part of the five year Interim Agreement. You said there was no way to have more than 25 ships through 1982.

General Brown: We said we had no program.

Secretary Kissinger: We were talking about through 1982, not 1985.

Dr. Lehman: Dr. Ikle feels that the most important impact is not military but the flexibility and leverage for future negotiations on grey area systems, and the freedom for theater deployments.

President Ford: This is confusing. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is arguing military strategy.

Dr. Lehman: No. We feel the whole grey area cannot be settled in an asymmetrical way.

Secretary Rumsfeld: If we look at this incrementally, if our goal is to get a grip on systems like these, and specifically the Backfire, the theory is that we made a decision to count the bombers with ALCMs in the 1320 limit in an attempt to get a hold on the Backfire. And we have made other attempts to get a hold on the Backfire. But as we look at the charts, we see that pieces of our leverage are moving away. They have

dissipated. Incrementally, not any one piece is significant, but the cumulative effect is.

Secretary Kissinger: We have three basic prospects over the next 10 years.

We can have no agreement and the race starts at 2580 for the Soviets and 2150 for us. Cruise missiles and Backfire go unconstrained.

We could also stick with the February proposal for an aggregate of 2400. ALCMs would be limited to 2500 kilometers. After 1979, my prediction will be that SLCMs and Backfire will be unconstrained.

Under a reductions agreement, the aggregate would be 2150 or 2200. Backfire would be unconstrained, but we would have assurances regarding the Backfire ceiling and upgrading. ALCMs would be limited to the same as under the February proposal. SLCMs would be limited to 600 kilometers for submarines; and there would be something to be negotiated for surface-ship SLCMs that could have a range as great as 2500 kilometers.

The difference between the proposals is that there would be unconstrained submarine SLCMs, higher ceilings, unconstrained Backfire, and the advent of unconstrained submarine SLCMs.

Dr. Lehman: In the reductions agreement, cruise missiles on submarines go free?

Mr. Hyland: No. They would be banned above 600 kilometers and free up to 2500 kilometers on surface-ships.

Secretary Kissinger: That won't be saleable. What will be saleable is having the platforms counted as MIRVs. Running totally free will not be saleable.

General Brown: Cruise missiles on submarines are no great leverage on the Soviets.

Secretary Rumsfeld: It seems to me that one side of the coin is that if it is fuzzy—and it is—doesn't that mean that the difference is not greater or as fuzzy? The answer is yes. There is another way to look at it. We are looking at US technology where we have a lead—costs, adequacy, utility. Therefore because we have a lead—and this represents explosive potential—capping is great leverage. We can look at the cup as half full or half empty. We must be very careful; we have a great lead and we may be giving up what we lead in.

President Ford: We must be realistic in two areas. Senator Humphrey has been calling for a ban on all development and testing of cruise missiles. If he prevails, this takes away our lead.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Not really. Some would like to abolish the whole Department of Defense, but we must fight it.

Secretary Kissinger: None of the limitations give up much in the way of technology—either January or February.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I am addressing the idea of concern. On one side we have no full doctrine but on the other side is technology.

Secretary Kissinger: You would just be giving a little range, that's all.

General Brown: The only way we can tell the range of cruise missiles is from what we see in testing.

President Ford: As I read the opposition to Defense, if I were in uniform I would be scared. We might well have fewer dollars in some areas. I assume what they (the opponents) say they mean.

Secretary Rumsfeld: But no one around here assumes they will come into power.

President Ford: Yes, but if we look at the overall picture, we must put that into the formula.

General Brown: We are calling this matter exactly the way we see it—no matter who comes into office—it's not a matter of outcome of the election.

President Ford: But we cannot be oblivious to this. Plus there is this fuzziness, since, as Jim Wade mentioned, there is no doctrine for cruise missiles.

General Brown: Like Jim Wade says, it is the potential of these weapons that holds the attraction. We must protect the potential in the interest of the country.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is an analogy, albeit an imperfect analogy. There are those who contend that miniaturization and the accuracy it can produce is a revolution that is as dramatic as that of atomic weapons. If you transfer back to the days when we were thinking about developing atomic weapons, if we had limited the ability to develop atomic weapons, where would we be today? You take a guy like Admiral Noel Gaylor—he makes the case that overhead and underwater detection systems would permit us to vector out our cruise missiles.

President Ford: To where?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Enemy ships or submarines.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it goes a little too far to talk about cruise missiles as being the same as nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles are accurate also, but it is no great advantage if cruise missiles get there in five hours rather than 20 minutes. But I don't want to argue against cruise missiles. I would be against anything that limits cruise missiles in all modes. I am just talking about some range limits.

Secretary Rumsfeld: But what do we get in return for it?

Secretary Kissinger: Two to three years ago we had an elegant discussion on how we could not possibly live with a perceived inequality where the Soviets would have 2580 versus our 2150 baseline.

Between the two options we have the following:

—The February proposal would give us each 2400 and let SLCMs on surface-ships and submarines go free.

—The January proposal would give us 2200 or 2150, with a 600 kilometer limit on SLCMs on submarines.

We are considering only 12 aircraft carriers now. We could have 50 platforms with cruise missiles additionally.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We have a desire to disperse our standoff capability.

Secretary Kissinger: In our desire to modify our forces, we must ask if it is worth it. There is not that huge a difference between the January and February proposals. In fact there is only a marginal difference.

President Ford: Assume it is 1985. In the interim period, we have had the opportunity to proceed with research and development on surface-ship SLCMs. But in the interim we have limited the range. But at the end of the agreement we can do what we want with the range. We have no ship-building program—the earliest we could get ships is 1982 to 85. We could be testing. We could be developing the concept in the hardware so that we can have a breakthrough at the end of the agreement.

General Brown: I agree. We will have no new ships for SLCMs. But we could initially equip our fleet with SLCMs through modification of existing ships, for example by pulling off ASROC launchers.

President Ford: Do you see a need for surface SLCMs greater than 2500 kilometers?

General Brown: Not in the near term.

President Ford: Therefore you have no real program for these.

General Brown: It is all a concept.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We can use existing ships.

President Ford: That's not what Admiral Holloway said earlier.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Clements and Holloway went back after that earlier meeting to look into this—as you will recall I was not at that meeting.<sup>10</sup> I do not want to say that cruise missiles can't be touched; they already have been touched.

We have had the same four basic proposals since last year. We have the February proposal on the table. We should look at the Backfire—we have the working group and the CIA looking at this.

President Ford: How soon will we have a report on the Backfire?

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<sup>10</sup> See Document 119.

Director Bush: September, but we don't expect community agreement.

Secretary Rumsfeld: How big a difference is there between the CIA and the Air Force on the Backfire.

Director Bush: There is a strong opinion on the part of General Keegan, the Air Force Director of Intelligence.

Mr. Hyland: There is a study by FTD (the Air Force Foreign Technology Division).

Secretary Rumsfeld: And we have information on the SS-X-20.

President Ford: Do we have any more information on the TU-160 Soviet bomber?

Director Bush: Nothing more.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Do we have a timetable on the SS-X-20?

Director Bush: We have nothing on Backfire flights to the Azores, and can't confirm the newspaper reports to this effect.

Brent Scowcroft: If we want a SALT Agreement we ought to look at this in terms of its negotiability. The Soviets have given no indication of pursuing the February proposal. Maybe they are just stalling. But we might end up with no SALT if we do not work on something else.

Secretary Rumsfeld: All of us want SALT and we should go back to them. But the question is to go back to them with what.

Brent Scowcroft: The Soviets to date say that they are not interested in the February proposal. If this is true, then the difference is between no SALT or approaching them with something negotiable.

President Ford: The Soviets feel that the February proposal is unacceptable. If we don't change, we must face the prospect of having no SALT agreement. Therefore we must either decide to modify our proposal or abandon SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: They are working around us in the intellectual community saying we should give up the B-1 and the Trident.

Brent Scowcroft: And they say they would give up the Typhoon and TU-160.

President Ford: Thank you all.



**140. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Lehman) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 6, 1976.

SUBJECT

SALT

Following the NSC meeting of last week,<sup>2</sup> Dr. Iklé and I believe it useful to summarize our recommendations to you regarding SALT.

1. We believe another initiative on SALT should now be taken at your level.

2. We believe the February offer<sup>3</sup> or its modified form are the only options of those discussed that offer a realistic chance of concluding an equitable agreement this year.

3. It is of the highest importance that the SALT II outcome be verifiable and that it be symmetrical in its treatment of gray-area systems. Negotiations to limit these gray area systems should begin as soon as a SALT II agreement is concluded, addressing squarely the issue of intermediate bombers and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles.

We are concerned about the verification problems that would be raised by any further concessions to the Russian position on cruise missiles.

Most of those cruise missile limits are essentially unverifiable. Already we have proposed range limitations which we do not really know how to verify. But at least at medium ranges like 2500 km, the military significance of cheating is less severe, and the verification problem posed by existing Soviet cruise missiles is less acute. At the ranges proposed by the Soviets, however, cheating could offer significant military advantages.

Moreover, large numbers of the existing Soviet cruise missiles, particularly their sea-based cruise missiles, have capabilities substantially in excess of 600 kilometers if they choose to modify them through unobservable changes in the guidance or payload of currently deployed Soviet missiles. We could not—in all honesty—tell the American people that we could hold the Soviets to these cruise missile limits through national technical means.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 21, SALT, Chronological. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 139.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 132.

Our verification capabilities may in fact decline, rather than improve, in the future, because of new Soviet concealment measures. The Soviets have put us on notice in Geneva that they do not consider that the SALT agreement places any restrictions on telemetry transmission, including encryption. Telemetry is a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of what information we do have about Soviet cruise missile capabilities, and the adoption of such practices for cruise missiles would make an already bad situation worse.

Our present position is a fair and defensible one, fair to the Soviets and defensible to the American people. Everything that was discussed at Vladivostok has been settled. The Soviet concerns which are to be deferred—SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles—were not mentioned in the Vladivostok aide-mémoire.<sup>4</sup> We might make our February position more satisfactory to the Soviets by dropping any interim limits on these deferred systems, addressing them instead in immediate follow-on negotiations with a fixed deadline. But we should not make major changes or further concessions in our position.

If the Russians are serious about SALT, they have been given a proposal which is fair, which handles the major systems, and which does not prejudice the position of either side in future discussion of “gray” area systems. It is the product of repeated efforts on our part to satisfy Soviet concerns. We cannot make progress in SALT now unless the Soviets move.

**John Lehman**

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<sup>4</sup> Document 91.

**141. Memorandum From Richard Boverie of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 2, 1976.

SUBJECT

Semenov Comments on SALT TWO Prospects

[2 lines not declassified] Semenov reportedly made the following points:

—Keeping the Americans involved in the negotiating process is more important than the agreements themselves.

—It would be impolitic for the Soviet Union to sign a SALT TWO Agreement this year, and a new agreement will probably be signed in April or May.

—Semenov indicated that “there are no great gaps between the latest US proposals and what the Soviet side is able to offer,” and that they could sign an agreement now on the basis of the current American position.

—Semenov's aide stated that the Soviets had settled on a position which resolved the remaining issues. He noted that cruise missiles would not be a problem and that “we are ready to settle the Backfire issue.”

—Semenov also observed that Ustinov had been selected by Brezhnev as Defense Minister to counter and limit military influence in the Politburo and SALT policy. He noted that except for the military the Soviets could have accepted “Kissinger's first proposal on cruise missiles.”

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 41, SALT General Subseries, Intelligence Matters. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum.

## 142. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 20, 1976.

### SUBJECT

Letter from Fred Ikle on SALT

Fred Ikle has written you (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> to recommend that you publicly explain your basic objectives and approach on SALT. Ikle feels that the "public is entitled to know authentically what our position is, rather than having to glean it from leaks and innuendo." In his view, public disclosure would strengthen our position in the negotiations; forestall unfair distortions of your position; and ensure that the Soviets are blamed if the stalemate continues.

Ikle recommends that a modified "February proposal" with emphasis on early reductions be chosen as the basis for this public exposition. He feels that "all your advisors could readily agree" on this approach. (As you know, this is not the case.) Specifically, he recommends that your public explanation include the following points:

—Your position would permit a new SALT agreement to be signed quickly and resolves all issues except for Backfire and intermediate range sea-based cruise missiles which would be deferred to follow-on negotiations.

—You are proposing that the aggregate ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles be lowered to 2000 within three to four years. (At present 2150 is the lowest number under consideration in the inter-agency forum.)

—The U.S. is working to overcome MIRV verification problems, but no measures have yet been found to permit adequate verification of certain cruise missile limits. (This is an overstated view which would tend to undermine any cruise missile limits.)

—You are proposing follow-on negotiations in "gray-area" systems to avoid a dangerous imbalance in regional nuclear forces. (This proposal was implicit in Ikle's recent speech in Los Angeles.)<sup>3</sup>

These are familiar Ikle views; the only new twist is his recommendation that you publicly present the details of the SALT position fa-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 21, SALT (34)–(42), [Feb. 1976–Jan. 1977]. Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Ikle's letter, dated September 1, is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> In his speech to the Town Hall of California on August 31, Ikle contended that the Soviet deployment of a new MIRVed missile in Eastern Europe altered the strategic balance in Europe and jeopardized a future strategic arms limitation agreement. ("U.S. Aide Accuses Soviet on New Missile," *The New York Times*, September 1, 1976, p. 2)

vored by Ikle. I can think of few things which would be more damaging to our ability to reach a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union than to go public with our negotiating position.

Fred Ikle's memorandum requires no specific action and has been forwarded for your information only.

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### 143. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 29, 1976, 8–11:40 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Vasilii Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister  
Yuly M. Vorontsov, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)  
  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

#### SUBJECTS

FRG; Africa; U.S. politics; agrément for Toon; SALT; Middle East; MBFR; Law of the Sea; U.S.-Soviet maritime and civil aviation agreements; Iran

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

#### *Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*

Kissinger: Maybe we should say a few words about SALT.

Gromyko: Good.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 29, USSR, Gromyko File (33), 9/29/76. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Kissinger and Gromyko were attending the UN General Assembly session.

Kissinger: I know we owe you an answer. There are many complicated reasons for it. One is the difficulty of coming to clearcut decisions. But let me ask you this question: What is your reason against deferring some of the items—like seabased cruise missiles and Backfire—for later negotiations? Because if we could defer those, we could come to agreement fairly rapidly.

[Dessert is served.]

Is Mrs. Gromyko with you?

Gromyko: Yes, she's my chief of staff, I told you.

Kissinger: Nancy sends her regards.

Gromyko: Thank you, and my best regards to Nancy.

Kissinger: Thank you.

Gromyko: What is this wine?

Waiter: California.

Gromyko: It's very good. Why don't they make propaganda for it?

Dobrynin: They do

Gromyko: We have always emphasized all the important questions should be resolved in a complex, without separating one or two of these important problems from the rest. You will recall which questions were discussed, and there was an exchange of statements about this, about treating them all as a complex. Especially in Geneva.

And we were in agreement. Which, in fact, is the one and only possible method of going about these solutions.

So we don't think there is any good to come out of separating them. Let us abide by what is agreed. These considerations should reflect in our discussions.

Kissinger: Bill, do you want to say something?

Hyland: The point you made is there is a chance to make major progress on what was agreed at Vladivostok, between the President and the General Secretary. And we should take advantage of this. The remaining issues of cruise missiles and Backfire might be solved after Vladivostok is finished.

The Agreement we proposed in February<sup>2</sup> would not work to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, but would put substantial limits on American programs.

Gromyko: Are we moving to the other room now?

Kissinger: [rises] I wanted to say a few words.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 132.

You and I have been meeting for many years now. As we look back on the years, we can say that on the whole U.S.-Soviet relations have progressed.

You will see in my speech tomorrow,<sup>3</sup> except for some slight retaliations, I'll call attention to the importance of our relationship, which is important to the peace of the world. We have differences of ideology, and because we are great powers we have differences of national interest. But we have special responsibilities for the peace of the world for reasons that we two countries can appreciate.

It is idle to deny there have been setbacks—some because of our domestic position, some because of what we see as unnecessary Soviet action.

But it is clear that the course on which we embarked in 1971 and 1972 was the correct one. And the future of the world depends on whether our two powers can find and continue a correct relationship.

On the personal level, I want to say I appreciate our working together, and I want to propose a toast to the friendship of our two countries. [Toast]

Gromyko: [rises in reply] It is extremely good to deliver two speeches in two days, yesterday in the General Assembly, and today at this table. But my consolation is this one will be shorter. [Laughter].

There are many problems that are to be discussed. I am ready to discuss those problems. On many of them, there are some aspects on which there is an understanding at least in principle. On others, there is not. But on those, an exchange of opinion must take place.

But on number 1—I had in mind the subject we just talked about—the impact of this problem is obvious. We believe it must be solved on the basis of the Vladivostok understanding. This is our position. From the beginning, we await your answer to our proposals. Several times it was postponed; I won't count how many times it was postponed. It was not so simple; it was complicated in this country, for certain circumstances—but you know better than we how to cope with those circumstances.

The problems must be solved. The more important they are, the better the solutions will come from an exchange of views.

[Omitted here are Gromyko's comments on the Middle East and U.S.-Soviet relations.]

Kissinger: If we could defer some items it would be easier to make progress.

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<sup>3</sup> The text of the Secretary's speech to the UN General Assembly on September 30 is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1976, pp. 497–510.

Gromyko: It won't work to try and separate some of the issues from the others.

That approach is unacceptable. Let's be brief and to the point. We have many other questions. We cannot accept an agreement that leaves open the bomber and cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Do you think if we would send some technical experts to Geneva and explain the advantages, you would change your mind?

Not all cruise missiles, only sea-based.

Gromyko: What will that do? I don't think it would work. They couldn't prove anything to us. I am treating that as a joke.

Kissinger: What is your answer to this argument? There are some weapons that are a grey area which can be used strategically but are not necessarily strategic—such as some of our cruise missiles and some of your bombers.

Gromyko: What exactly do you have in mind? If you mean our bomber, an appropriate explanation was given you [in January in Moscow] by the General Secretary. It is you that refer to that bomber and system that can be used strategically, but we rule that out.

Kissinger: I would suggest you discuss this question of deferral with the President.<sup>4</sup> With more substantive arguments. Because I know the substantive arguments. Bill?

Hyland: It would be helpful.

Kissinger: You said you made certain concessions in Geneva as a package.

Gromyko: On an extremely important matter. The matter you said was the "most important."

Kissinger: On the counting rules.

Gromyko: On the counting matter.

Kissinger: If you could point out the linkage you established then, because some of our people think it's settled. Between us there is no misunderstanding. I've always understood some of the concessions made by the General Secretary were all linked to a satisfactory understanding on other issues.

Hyland: It might be helpful if you went over the January proposals, especially Brezhnev's proposals.

Kissinger: If you could give a brief summary of where we stood in January, and the linkage, and your position on deferral.

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<sup>4</sup> When Ford and Gromyko met on October 1 in Washington, Gromyko reiterated the Soviet position. The memorandum of conversation is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–1977, Box 21. It is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 292.



Gromyko: All this consumes some time.

Hyland: We have 90 minutes scheduled, but really it's two hours.<sup>5</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to this conversation; no record of another meeting in New York has been found.

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**144. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 30, 1976.

SUBJECT

SALT MIRV Verification

At yesterday's SALT meeting in Geneva and in informal conversation today the Soviets indicated that they can accept a major portion of our position on verification of ICBM MIRVs.<sup>2</sup> In particular, they have indicated that they would count all SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 launchers in the 1320 MIRV limit, with the exception that the launchers at two fields, Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, must be considered as a special case. While the Soviet leadership has previously indicated to you that it is willing to consider as MIRVed any missile tested with MIRVs, this is the first time the Soviets have agreed in Geneva to our position on MIRV launchers. It is also the first indication that the troublesome problem of deployment of SS-11 missiles in SS-19 launchers is confined to two fields, and will not be a widespread problem. The Soviet move in Geneva, of course, was not linked to cruise missile limits.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, Box 6, SALT, July 1976-. Secret. Sent under a covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt, who commented: "I thought the Soviets would drag their feet on this technical issue, because of the linkage with the cruise missile issue. This linkage evidently still exists, as Gromyko made clear in New York. Nevertheless, they are apparently moving to clean up the MIRV verification issue itself, by telling us that: (1) they would count all SS-17, 18, and 19 launchers in the 1320 limit, except those in two particular fields, which will have to be considered as a special case." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Johnson sent his comments on the meeting in telegram 7593 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, September 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760367-1010)

These Soviet comments are in response to a series of detailed questions which the U.S. Delegation asked at the last session, citing Derazhnya and Pervomaysk specifically. These two fields have a total of 180 launchers, all of the type we associate with the SS–19; but intelligence indicates some contain SS–11's and some SS–19's, with no hard evidence on the mix. The Soviets said yesterday that more of these launchers contain non-MIRV missiles than MIRV missiles. The Soviets have indicated that they are willing to address the situation at these two fields in more detail. In addition to working out a solution for Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, the Delegations can now address the SLBM MIRV launcher issue. This development moves the Geneva negotiations forward by a major step.

Fred C. Ikle

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**145. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld<sup>1</sup>**

JCSM–396–76

Washington, December 1, 1976.

SUBJECT

SAL Negotiations (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the military implications of ongoing SAL negotiations. They believe that the fundamental US objective in these negotiations should be to assure rough equivalence between the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the USSR, preferably at lower force levels.

2. (TS) At the present there is an unfavorable trend in the balance between US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Comparisons of current and projected US and USSR weapons development and deployments indicate a serious challenge to our ability to maintain credible strategic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 21, SALT (34)–(42) [Feb. 1976–Jan. 1977]. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum from Boverie to Scowcroft, December 17, Rumsfeld forwarded this memorandum to Scowcroft on December 11. Boverie noted “that these are familiar JCS views, and I believe no further action is necessary.” In his December 11 forwarding note, Rumsfeld stated that “the proposals which the US has made should be viewed as package proposals. US proposals regarding limitations on cruise missiles, as well as the Backfire bomber, should therefore be considered only in the context of the packages of which they are a part.” (Ibid.)

equivalence and warfighting capability. The United States must preserve the necessary technological options to redress this unfavorable trend and maintain the strategic nuclear balance, under all conditions. SAL negotiations thus are but one facet of the over-all approach to maintaining a stable strategic relationship between the two major powers, and any constraints on the strategic nuclear forces of both sides should be accepted only in the context of furthering increased strategic nuclear stability.

3. (TS) The United States has depended on its technological edge to offset quantitative advantages possessed by the Soviet Union. The deployment of a new generation of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and such systems as Backfire and the SS-X-20 cannot be counter-balanced if US technology is constrained by a SAL treaty. The US has a decided advantage over the Soviets in cruise missile technology that could be potentially very significant in maintaining the strategic balance between the US and USSR. However, most cruise missile constraints proposed to date would prevent the US from fully capitalizing on this advantage. Furthermore, in SAL negotiations the US should not agree to any provision which would limit the application of technology to non-strategic weapon systems, for example, anti-ship missiles.

4. (TS) In the February proposal cruise missile constraints were offered as an inducement for Soviet commitment to resolve the Backfire issue by January 1979. The intent was to include Backfire in the 2400 aggregate at that later date, while at the same time accepting cruise missile constraints pertaining to ALCMs (ban ALCMs over 2500 km, restrict ALCMs over 600 km to heavy bombers, and count ALCM-equipped heavy bombers in the 1320 MIRV limit) that would last until 1985. Since the Soviets have rejected this proposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the US negotiating slate be wiped clean. US proposals should not offer significant cruise missile concessions unless Backfire is included in the aggregate. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously expressed concern over the process that permits picking and choosing from SAL package proposals (JCSM-276–76).<sup>2</sup> They again stress that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the various proposals as comprehensive packages, the elements of which are inseparable.

5. (TS) During the past session of the SAL negotiations in Geneva, MIRV verification received particular attention. The MIRV counting rule (a missile is MIRVed if its booster has been tested one or more times with a MIRV system; i.e., “Once a MIRV, always a MIRV”) together with provisions necessary for its effective implementation, pro-

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

vide the conceptual framework for the US approach to MIRV verification. Central to effective implementation is Soviet acceptance of the launcher type rule (all launchers of a type, one of which has launched or contained a MIRVed missile, will count in the 1320 MIRV limit) or some similar provision. The MIRV counting rule by itself would provide low confidence verification at best because of our inability to determine if a particular launcher contains a MIRVed missile. Earlier the Joint Chiefs of Staff had understood that the Soviets had agreed in principle to effective MIRV verification procedures. However, the Soviets stated during the past session in Geneva that resolution of the MIRV verification issue is inseparably linked to cruise missile limitations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that verification is a neutral issue for which neither side should be required to pay. Therefore, Soviet attempts to extract concessions for verification procedures must be rejected.

6. (TS) Considering the essentiality of having agreed data regarding numbers of limited systems deployed by the two sides and in view of the difficulties encountered with respect to definitions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the concept of an exchange of data is becoming increasingly important and should be supported as a negotiating position. It should be noted that data exchange is not a substitute for verification by national technical means but would help insure the two sides have a common understanding on the applications of the provisions of the agreement.

7. (TS) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

- a. The US maintain the integrity of the SAL package proposals.
- b. The negotiating slate be wiped clean.
- c. US proposals should continue to include Backfire in the 2400 aggregate with significant constraints on US cruise missile programs being accepted only if Backfire is so counted.
- d. The US maintain its current approach to MIRV verification and reject Soviet attempts to extract concessions for verification provisions.
- e. The US insist on a concept of data exchange.
- f. These views be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**George S. Brown**

*Chairman*

*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

**146. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 6, 1976.

**SUBJECT**

Letter from Ambassador Johnson on the Status of the SALT Negotiations

The Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, has sent you a letter (Tab 1) describing the current status of the Geneva SALT negotiations.<sup>2</sup> He has included a copy of the latest annotated version of the Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the new SALT agreement along with brief papers describing some of the unresolved issues under consideration in Geneva. (This excludes the Backfire, cruise missile, and MIRV verification issues.)

As Ambassador Johnson notes, a significant number of issues beyond those agreed at Vladivostok have been resolved in the post-Vladivostok Geneva negotiations. Of particular significance in this regard is the negotiation of agreed language for: (1) the ceiling on the throw weight and launch weight of light and heavy ICBMs along with definitions for throw weight and launch weight; (2) the limitations on increases in ICBM silo dimensions; (3) bans on intercontinental cruise missiles and ballistic missiles above 600 km on surface ships; (4) permitted grace periods for dismantling of excess launchers; and (5) a commitment to future negotiations to include reductions.

Ambassador Johnson cites nine specific issues under consideration in Geneva on which the sides have not as yet reached agreement. The most significant of these are the ICBM launcher definition, MIRV verification, deliberate concealment (telemetry encryption) and non-transfer/non-circumvention issues. There has been substantial progress on the ICBM launcher definition and MIRV verification issues and agreement on these issues is not far off. The deliberate concealment issue is driven by the question of how to handle telemetry encryption which will probably have to be resolved at a higher level. The other five JDT issues which Ambassador Johnson cites are less contentious and should be readily resolvable once the Backfire and cruise missile issues are resolved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 21, SALT (34)–(42), [Feb. 1976–Jan. 1977]. Secret. Drafted by Boverie and sent as an attachment to a memorandum to Scowcroft, November 30, with an added handwritten query: "Should we do a reply to Alex thanking him for his work, etc." Scowcroft wrote "Sure." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Johnson's letter was not attached and has not been found. The session in Geneva ended on November 21.

**147. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 2<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 24, 1977.

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

SALT

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee undertake a review of the SALT negotiations.

The initial stage of the review should include:

1. An analysis of the major SALT issues, including: (1) concise summaries of the individual issues and (2) more detailed analytical background papers on these issues if such are not currently available. The initial effort in this regard should focus on the following issues: cruise missiles, Backfire, mobile ICBM's, MIRV verification, reductions, telemetry encryption, non-circumvention/non-transfer, and ICBM vulnerability.

2. A description of the major strategic policy issues which bear on the SALT negotiations.

3. The impact of Defense programs and pending budget decisions on SALT.

This initial review should be completed by January 28.

In the next stage of the review, alternative general approaches which the U.S. could propose at this stage of the negotiations, including alternatives for long-range approaches, will be identified and analyzed.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 3, Defense Department, 1-2/77. Top Secret. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. This copy was sent under a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Brown indicating that he wanted to schedule an SCC meeting for February 3 to discuss SALT II. (Ibid.)

**148. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1977, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President  
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Affairs Assistant

*Strategic Issues*

President Carter began by stating he would like to move rapidly—aggressively—on arms control issues with the Soviet Union. He mentioned that he had been encouraged by the messages he received this summer from Secretary General Brezhnev. He would like to see Brezhnev's good wishes translated into positive results. The President added that his Inaugural Speech and his recent letter to Secretary Brezhnev expressed his views on U.S.-Soviet relations.<sup>2</sup>

*SALT*

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if the President had a timetable for SALT. The President was non-committal.

*Cruise Missile, Backfire, and Missile Reductions*

The President asked how Dobrynin felt about the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber in relation to SALT II. Dobrynin responded that the cruise missile should be included within the SALT II framework. With respect to the Backfire, Dobrynin said that the aircraft does not have a strategic capability. The President asked if the Soviet Union had tankers to refuel the Backfire. Dobrynin replied that he was not prepared to answer the question. He did, however, add that the Soviets would not go "intercontinental" with the Backfire. Secretary Vance asked if that meant the Soviets would not deploy the Backfire so that it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT, Chronology, 1/24/77–3/24/77. Secret. Ellipsis is in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Brzezinski sent Carter a briefing memorandum on January 31, which is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> The full text of Carter's Inaugural Address is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, pp. 1–4. In a letter to Brezhnev, January 26, Carter wrote: "I have said to the American people that my firm goal is to eliminate all nuclear weapons. There are three areas where progress can be made toward this goal. A critical first step should be the achievement of a SALT II agreement without delay, and an agreement to proceed toward additional limitations and reductions in strategic weapons." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence, 1–2/1977)

would have a return capability. Dobrynin responded by asking “where would we put them?”

The President said that he preferred to separate the cruise missile and Backfire issues from SALT II. He indicated he wanted to confine SALT II to numbers, but that other issues would be open to negotiation later. Following a successful conclusion to SALT II, the President said, he would like to move quickly to reduce the size of our respective nuclear arsenals. The President said he would like to see the total number of nuclear missiles reduced, by several hundred. He added that we could, at that time, decide which would be sea-launched, land-based, etc.

The President stated his desire to reach a minimum number of missiles, one that would allow each nation to feel secure from a preemptive strike. He wanted the remaining missiles to be easily monitored and secure from destruction.

Dobrynin raised the question of ceilings on MIRV and the numbers of ICBMs. The President said he would like to see ICBMs reduced to 1,000 with one warhead apiece (100 kts).

Dobrynin asked about range limitations for sea-based cruise missiles. The President explained that our population is located on the sea-coast; the Soviet Union’s in the interior. A 600 kilometer range is, therefore, a threat. The President said that if we could agree on a lesser range for the sea-based cruise missile . . . 300–400 kilometers instead of 600—this might alleviate our concerns.

#### *Throw-weight and Accuracy Advantages*

The President commented that the Soviets have a throw-weight advantage. Dobrynin responded that the United States has an accuracy advantage and, therefore, their throw-weight advantage is necessary.

The President asked whether the Soviets would consider reducing their throw-weight advantage if we would forego escalating our quality advantage. Dobrynin responded that this might be considered after SALT II. To include this equation in SALT II would make it more complicated, he said.

#### *Fixed and Mobile Missiles*

The President asked whether the Soviets would forego the use of mobile ICBMs. Dobrynin said the Soviets have mobile medium-range missiles because of China. The President then asked about the SS-20 and the SS-16. The SS-20 is mobile; the SS-16 is not. The SS-16 has the range to hit the United States. The President mentioned that it is difficult for us to tell the difference between the two missiles.

Dobrynin stated that he didn’t see any difficulty in medium range mobile missiles. He added that the Soviet Union has no need for



long-range mobiles because it has sufficient numbers of fixed ICBM missiles. The President asked how we could confirm the difference between the two. Dobrynin said, "I will pass the question to my people."

The President suggested the Soviets might consider keeping their present SS-20s, but adding no additional ones or new types of mobile missiles. He added that he would like mobile missiles eliminated. He again asked if Dobrynin could tell us how to distinguish between the two missiles.

*Advance Notice of Missile Test Firings*

The President indicated that he would like to reach a formal agreement with the Soviet Union to have advance notice—at least 24 hours—of missile test firings. This, according to the President, would allow us to avoid any misunderstandings on intentions. This advance notice would include sea-launched missiles. Dobrynin responded: "that is a good idea."

[Omitted here is discussion related to other arms control issues.]

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**149. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 3, 1977, 9:06–10:48 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary Report for your Information and Reaction of the Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Feb. 3

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

The President (for the first half of the meeting)  
The Vice President  
A. Denis Clift

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 113, SALT: 1–2/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the page is Carter's handwritten note that reads: "OK, J.C."

*State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Leslie Gelb

U. Alexis Johnson

*DOD*

Secretary Harold Brown

Charles W. Duncan

Walter Slocombe

*JCS*

Gen. George S. Brown

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny

*CIA*

Enno Knoche

Howard Stoertz

*OMB*

Bert Lance

*ACDA*

Leon Sloss

Paul Wolfowitz

*NSC*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

William G. Hyland

Dr. Victor Utgoff

Dr. Roger Molander

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS<sup>2</sup>

1) The President asked for an analysis of the previous SALT negotiating history, and for some specific options directly related to the Vladivostok agreement, without profound deviation, including what our negotiating position should be on limits on cruise missiles and Backfire. He indicated that he wished to become thoroughly familiar with the details concerning these matters, including the consequences for the U.S. of various negotiating positions.

2) The President asked for an analysis of an ultimate relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which would include profound mutual reductions in overall strategic nuclear capability, carefully monitored, which would not be unfavorable to either side. He indicated his desire to go as low as possible while still retaining an adequate deterrent capability. He suggested the possibility of including at a later date France and the PRC in mutual program reductions.

3) The President confirmed his commitment to the military leaders that we would not put forward positions without adequate prior consultation and that he would not permit circumvention of normal discussions.

4) The President indicated that, while he would hate ever to have to make the decision, he had no intention of foregoing the use of nuclear weapons to defend the US or the freedom of our European allies.

5) The President asked Secretary Brown to prepare a brief summary of our ASW capability.

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<sup>2</sup> No minutes of SCC meetings were found unless otherwise indicated. The minutes of this meeting are *ibid.*, Institutional Files, Box 84, SCC 002, 2/3/77, SALT. Typically, Gary Sick prepared summaries of the meetings for Brzezinski's review, who then gave them to President Carter within hours of the meeting. Carter often made handwritten comments in the margins, and the annotated version was then used as the first item of business at the following SCC meeting. (Sick, *All Fall Down*, p. 247)

6) The Vice President stressed the importance of absolute security for these internal U.S. deliberations so as to permit a free exploration and exchange of ideas, some of which may never be considered seriously.

7) The President agreed that we need to let our European allies know what we are doing but that we must not allow their nervousness to drive our negotiations.

8) The President asked for further information on any agreements we have with the British and Germans on prior notification.

9) Dr. Brzezinski suggested proceeding as follows on four major issues:

- analyze a range of options for a SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok formula;

- analyze the possibility of a SALT TWO agreement based on significant reductions;

- provide a recommendation to the President as to whether we should stick to Vladivostok for the present or go to a reductions proposal immediately;

- look at other aspects which might also be considered, such as the Test Ban, a Civil Defense Ban (as an extension of the ABM agreement), or exchange of sensitive information.

10) It was agreed to inform the President that the preliminary feeling of the SCC was that it was questionable whether it was negotiable or desirable to omit cruise missiles and Backfire from a SALT TWO agreement. However, some participants felt that for tactical negotiating reasons this option should not be publicly excluded.

11) It was agreed that the Working Group should prepare the following packages (either or both of which might be explored in Moscow by Secretary Vance in March) for another meeting of the SCC to take place after February 22:

- some packages based on the Vladivostok agreement, some of which would be related to the January 1976 proposal and some of which would depart from that proposal;

- a preliminary package involving significant reductions from the Vladivostok levels.

These packages should contain assessments of related political, military and verification issues.

150. Memorandum From Senator Henry M. Jackson to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ON SALT

Summary Comment

In what follows I have tried to review those SALT issues that will determine the success of your administration in realizing its goal of reducing dependence on the resort to nuclear destruction while providing for the security of our country and its allies.

A sound SALT agreement could be an important element in your efforts to achieve this goal; an unsound agreement could impair those efforts and make that goal more remote.

It is essential to remember that not all negotiable agreements are in our interest; that some agreements may be worse than none; that the failure to obtain an agreement now does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of doing so in the future; and that an unsound agreement now could make it difficult or impossible to obtain a sound one later.

The previous administration often forgot these obvious truths. Too often it persuaded itself that its choice had narrowed to a risky agreement on Soviet terms or no agreement at all. Too often it lost sight of the goals that a sound SALT agreement could promote; often agreement itself became its goal.<sup>2</sup>

The previous administration helped to create a climate of urgency that made it difficult to think carefully about these complex issues. Cliches about the spiraling “arms race” have obscured the fact that we have been spending and doing less while the Soviets were spending and doing more. Despite a general impression to the contrary, the U.S. strategic budget actually peaked in the 1950’s and declined from then

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT, 1–2/77. No classification marking. Jackson sent the memorandum to President Carter as an enclosure to a February 15 memorandum, in which he wrote: “In accordance with our discussion at the White House breakfast on Friday, February 4, I am enclosing a memorandum to you on SALT, together with a summary comment.” Carter handwrote on the covering memorandum that copies were to be sent to Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski for their comment. On February 17, Carter sent Jackson a brief handwritten note that reads: “Your SALT memorandum is excellent, and of great help to me. I will stay in touch with you concerning future developments—Thank you!” (Ibid.) Carter and Jackson had breakfast together the morning of February 4. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion was found.

<sup>2</sup> In the margin an unknown hand (presumably Brown) wrote, “The nukes are in the Balance not agreements.”

until FY 1976.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, from FY 1961 to FY 1976 the U.S. strategic budget declined at an average annual rate, in constant dollars, of eight percent—while the Soviet strategic budget increased rapidly after 1964.

In form the SALT negotiations have been and remain bi-lateral. In substance they have come increasingly to affect our allies, particularly NATO.<sup>4</sup> They affect the triangular balance among the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Success at SALT now requires intense consultations with our allies; more thorough study of our common defense requirements and the ways in which those requirements are affected by SALT; and concern for its impact on our, and the Soviet, relationship with China.

Originally SALT was intended to deal with the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. Increasingly it has come to affect the potential development of conventional defense forces and theater nuclear deployments. The negotiations have now evolved in such a way as to put at risk the most promising new approaches to the conventional defense of Europe. We can and should resist the hasty conclusion of a treaty that would permit the threat to NATO to grow graver than it now is while limiting our freedom to protect against that threat.<sup>5</sup>

On an interim basis it may be possible to achieve a limited follow-on to the SALT I agreement that would neither worsen our security or that of our allies nor impede your long term efforts to achieve the goals you have set for the administration. But even this modest short-term goal will require great skill and patience and determination. I fear that you will get little help from a bureaucracy that has become increasingly committed to an improvident search for easy solutions to hard problems.

Both in this memorandum and elsewhere I have discussed the issue of serious reductions of strategic forces. I believe that carefully negotiated reductions, if they do not require the sacrifice of essential security interests, could do much to promote our goals. This is a complex subject and one that requires elaboration, perhaps in a follow-on to this memorandum.

I believe that the Congress will support you in your effort to take the time that is necessary to avoid hasty decisions or truncated negotiations against deadlines that work to the advantage of the Soviet Union. I am confident that you will get our strong support for a long-term ef-

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<sup>3</sup> The same hand underlined “strategic budget actually peaked in the 1950’s” and wrote an illegible comment in the margin.

<sup>4</sup> The same hand highlighted this sentence and wrote “agree” in the margin.

<sup>5</sup> The same hand wrote “overstated” in the margin next to the last sentence of this paragraph.

fort to design defense and negotiating policies that stand a fair chance of realizing your goals.

I believe that this memorandum approaches these issues in a deliberate and thoughtful manner. It is the product of a careful review by me and some hard work by my staff. Much of what I have had to say is in conflict with much of the advice that you will receive from executive departments which, even now, are largely following the path of the previous administration. I welcome the further opportunity to elaborate these ideas and to continue to provide an essential perspective that I am persuaded you ought to have.

[Omitted here are the memorandum on SALT and a table of contents for the four sections: "The Criteria for a Sound SALT Agreement, SALT Agreement Criteria and the Soviet Position, Near-term Follow-on to the SALT I Interim Agreement," and "Negotiating Tactics."]

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**151. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, undated.

Dear Mr. President,

I have carefully studied your letter dated February 14, 1977.<sup>2</sup> I want to talk bluntly about our impression and thoughts it evoked. As I understand, you are for such straightforward talk.

The statements of a general nature in support of peace and curtailing arms race contained in the letter are certainly consonant with our own aspirations. We are definitely for working towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and even more, towards general and complete disarmament under an effective international control.

However, the movement toward these lofty goals will by no means be expedited but on the contrary it will be hindered if we, first of all, do

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence, 1-2/77. No classification marking. Unofficial translation. Brzezinski noted in his memoirs that Brezhnev's letter was received on February 25. (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 154)

<sup>2</sup> Carter's February 14 letter to Brezhnev is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Vol. VI, Soviet Union*. In the letter, Carter suggested that a SALT II agreement include "some substantial force level reductions" and that it might be helpful to separate cruise missiles and Backfire bombers from SALT II and save them for follow-on negotiations.

not treasure what has already been achieved in that direction over recent years and, secondly, if we supplant a balanced and realistic approach to the definition of further specific steps with putting forward deliberately unacceptable proposals.

Looking at your considerations from this very angle, we unfortunately did not see in many of them a striving for a constructive approach, a readiness for seeking mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which are the subject of our exchange of views.

As I have already written to you,<sup>3</sup> we firmly proceed from the premise that it is necessary in the first place to complete the working out of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis that was agreed upon in Vladivostok. It is a fact that the basic parameters of the agreement which were put down there, as well as additional provisions specifying those parameters which were agreed on during later negotiations, were the product of enormous efforts. On a number of occasions not easy decisions were required indeed for finding a mutually acceptable way out of the situations which seemed deadlocked. And to the extent that the agreement has already been completed, all its elements are interconnected, i.e. it is impossible to remove any important element from it without destroying its whole foundation.

It is sufficient to remind, for example—and it should be known to you, Mr. President, from the documents on the negotiations—that the method of counting the missiles equipped with MIRVs was clearly conditioned by achievement of agreement on the whole complex of cruise missiles. The US side not only agreed with that in principle, but in January last year a concrete formula for the accounting of air-to-surface cruise missiles within the aggregate of strategic arms was practically agreed upon. It remained to agree on concrete formulation regarding sea-based and land-based cruise missiles. True, the US side did try later to propose to leave the issue of sea-based and land-based cruise missiles outside the main agreement, but we categorically rejected such an attempt to depart from the agreement reached earlier.

Now we are invited to leave altogether outside the agreement the whole question of cruise missiles. How should we understand that return to the stage left far behind, to a completely non-perspective raising of the question? To agree with this proposal would mean that by closing one channel of the strategic arms race we open right away still another channel. And what is the difference indeed for people what kind of missile will kill them—a cruise missile or a non-cruise missile?

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<sup>3</sup> Brezhnev had replied on February 4 to a January 27 letter from Carter. Documentation on the exchange is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

There is no basis whatsoever also to think that it will be easier to resolve the question of cruise missiles later when the sides start deploying them, if we fail to do it now when they are still at the stage of development. The experience testifies convincingly to the contrary.

The continued intention, as is seen from your letter, to artificially retain the question of the Soviet medium-range bomber code-named Backfire in the US does not correspond in any way to what was agreed. Let be no doubts to this effect: we resolutely reject such an approach as not in keeping with the aims and the subject of negotiations and as pursuing only one thing—to complicate deliberately and even generally to cast a doubt upon the conclusion of an agreement.

And is the United States less interested than the Soviet Union in this agreement? We do not believe it and if someone thinks otherwise then it is a serious delusion.

In connection with the question you raised on a possibility of substantial reduction of levels of strategic forces agreed in Vladivostok it is appropriate to remind that we, on our part, have been and are in favor of ending the arms race and for the reduction of strategic forces as well. Agreement reached in Vladivostok testifies to that which for the USSR means a unilateral reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. This is a strive in deeds and not in words for reduction of armaments.

We are for confirming the results achieved in Vladivostok in an agreement without further delay and for moving on ahead. As it was agreed, we are ready immediately after the conclusion of the said agreement to proceed to talks about next steps and to discuss also possible reductions in the future.

However, there should be full clarity: any such steps should be first of all and in full degree in conformity with the principle of equality and equal security of the sides. I think, Mr. President, that no one can challenge the legitimacy of such a position.

Then, how does the idea of drastic reduction of the nuclear and missile forces of the USSR and US look like in that light? In your letter it is advanced separately from all the other aspects of the existing situation. Meanwhile it is evident that in that case there would be an immeasurable increase of importance—and to the unilateral benefit of the US—of such factors as differences in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of the US forward based nuclear systems and aircraft carrier aviation in the proximity of the USSR territory, the possession of nuclear weapons by the US NATO allies and other circumstances which cannot be discarded. The impossibility to ignore all these factors in considering the question of reducing the nuclear missile forces of the USSR and the US is so evident that we cannot fail to raise the question what is the true goal of putting forward proposals of that kind—which outwardly may be appealing to laymen but in fact are aimed at gaining



unilateral advantages. You yourself justly note that attempts to seek at negotiations advantages for one side over the other can only be counterproductive.

The same one-sidedness can be discerned in proposals about prohibiting all mobile missiles (meaning also intermediate missiles which have nothing to do with the subject matter of the Soviet-American negotiations), limiting throw weight, on-site inspections.

You know better, of course, the reason for presenting all those questions in such an unconstructive way. We, on our part, are in favour of having from the very beginning a business-like talk, for seeking mutually acceptable—I stress mutually acceptable—agreements. The Soviet Union will henceforth defend firmly its own interests in all issues while a realistic and constructive approach by the US side will always be met with our understanding and readiness to reach agreement. It is that balanced approach that we hope to see when Secretary Vance comes to Moscow.

It applies both to the problem of the limitation of strategic arms and other questions related to ending the arms race.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to SALT II.]

**L. Brezhnev**

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<sup>4</sup> Carter sent Brezhnev a letter, March 4, in which he replied generally to Brezhnev's points. Carter noted: "The fact is that no final agreement was ever reached at Vladivostok nor in the subsequent negotiations regarding cruise missiles or the Backfire bomber. I am confident that such agreements can be attained in the future, and I am eager to seek them." Carter suggested "the rapid conclusion of a formal agreement between us on those issues on which both of us seem predisposed to agree." The letter is also scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

## 152. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 25, 1977, 4–6 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President  
Denis Clift

*State*  
Deputy Secretary-Designate  
Warren Christopher  
Leslie H. Gelb  
*DOD*  
Secretary Harold Brown  
Deputy Secretary Charles W.  
Duncan  
Walter Slocombe

*JCS*  
Admiral James L. Holloway  
Lieutenant General Edward  
Rowny

*CIA*  
Enno Knoche  
Howard Stoertz

*ACDA*  
Leon Sloss  
Paul Warnke  
*OMB*  
Bert Lance  
David Sitrin  
*NSC*  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
William G. Hyland  
Dr. Victor Utgoff  
Dr. Roger Molander

### SUMMARY

1. Dr. Brzezinski outlined a rough schedule of preparations for Secretary Vance's visit to Moscow with the effort focusing on getting a proposal to the Soviets about a week before Secretary Vance's departure.

2. Dr. Brzezinski then walked through the content of the "SALT packages" tables prepared for the meeting, describing the content and objectives of each.<sup>2</sup> He indicated that the President wanted the SCC to look seriously at reductions to 1500 as one of a set of proposals to be put to the Soviets.

3. In the discussion of the various packages, Secretary Brown expressed the view that deferral needs to be defined better and it was de-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 113, SALT: 3–4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> These tables are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files, Box 84, SCC 005, 2/25/77, SALT–Negotiating Options & Issues.

cided to have the Working Group analyze the various deferral options in greater detail.

4. Secretary Brown indicated that he preferred the option of strict limits on Backfire even though he was not particularly concerned about the Backfire as a military threat. His next preference on Backfire and cruise missiles was deferral and finally some kind of compromise. Of the compromises he preferred the option of loose limits on cruise missiles (first column under the compromises) and objected to the 1500 km across-the-board solution as setting the range limit at the steep part of the target coverage curve.

5. Admiral Holloway expressed concern about the Backfire but indicated that it could be countered with improvements in U.S. air defenses.

6. Deputy Secretary Christopher pointed out that a real arms control option would be to count Backfire after October 1977 and put a 300 km limit on all cruise missiles.

7. Discussion of the GLCM issue focused on the possible interest in a theater-based capability for deep strikes weighed against concerns about decoupling theater and strategic systems.

8. Les Gelb raised a concern that if we insist on restricting Backfire, the Soviets could reopen the FBS issue.

9. Secretary Brown expressed a dim view of the future effectiveness of Backfire collateral constraints in light of the Soviets' having taken advantage of relatively unspecific SALT ONE limits.

10. The cruise missile definition was raised with some concerns expressed about the impact of limiting all cruise missiles (i.e., nuclear-armed, conventionally-armed, and unarmed) weighed against the verification problems of limiting only nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

11. Dr. Brzezinski circulated a Table outlining a possible approach to the negotiations which included the possibility of agreeing in SALT TWO that all cruise missiles below 1500 km would be tactical and out of SALT, while those above 1500 km would be considered strategic and subject to negotiation in SALT THREE.

12. It was decided to focus the next meeting on a discussion of reductions to 2000 and the appropriate Backfire /cruise missile combinations at that level.

13. Mr. Warnke raised the issue of U.S. negotiating priorities and the Working Group was asked to look at possible approaches to structuring this issue.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

**153. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 15, 1977.

Dear Mr. President,

Having studied your letter of March 4,<sup>2</sup> I would like to set forth once more the substance of our understanding of the way the things are with the working out of an agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation (to be effective till 1985), as well as to state in more detail our position on specific questions which are still outstanding.

Here are some general observations to start with. We are naturally in favor of concluding an agreement as soon as possible, without delay. However, an attempt to do it on the basis of some artificially simplified version does not by any means expedite the matter if we keep in view the aim we place before us, namely, to really limit strategic arms, being guided by the principle of undiminished security for either of the contracting parties. Just the same, the preparation of an agreement would in no way be expedited if, putting aside some questions which, for that matter, have been worked up in many respects, we would start attaching to it some new issues which, besides, have no direct relation to the subject matter of the agreement.

Conclusion of a new agreement between our countries on limiting strategic arms would certainly have great political significance both for Soviet-US relations and on a broader plane. However, it will be feasible only if the agreement constitutes a real step in the direction of limiting strategic arms. Otherwise, it would be counterproductive.

That would be precisely the case if the question of cruise missiles were left outside the agreement. That question is not only most directly related to the core of the new agreement but it also—which is essential—has been worked up in many respects. Even some specific formulas have been agreed upon. To propose now to put cruise missiles outside the framework of the agreement would mean not only a step back to the initial positions but would also leave a way open for expanding the arms race to a new dangerous direction.

That, we think, corresponds in no way to the goals of rapid conclusion of an agreement on limiting strategic arms. Therefore we confirm our concrete proposals on the whole complex of cruise missiles, namely:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR, Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence, March to April 1977. No classification marking. Unofficial translation.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 151.

—To consider heavy bombers when equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600 to 2500 kilometers as delivery vehicles equipped with MIRVs and to count them correspondingly in a certain ratio (depending upon the type of a heavy bomber) against the agreed level for such delivery vehicles—1320; air-to-surface cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2500 kilometers should be completely banned; the equipping with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600 to 2500 kilometers of other aircraft except heavy bombers, should be also banned;

—All sea-based and land-based cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers should be completely banned.

I would like to remind once again that our agreement to include into the aggregate number of the missiles equipped with MIRVs (1320) all the missiles of the types, of which even one has been tested with MIRVs, was and remains conditioned upon reaching a final agreement on the questions of cruise missiles.

As for the Soviet medium bomber code-named by you Backfire, we have given official data about the range of this aircraft (2200 km) and expressed readiness to enter into the records of the negotiations this data as well as our intention not to provide this aircraft with capabilities to operate at intercontinental distances—all this on the condition that the issue of Backfire is completely and totally withdrawn from further negotiations. We confirm that position of ours.

The issue of mobile launchers for ballistic missiles of intercontinental range naturally should find its solution in the agreement in question. Earlier we proposed to agree that over the period that agreement remains in force the sides should refrain from deploying land-based mobile ICBM launchers.

Our approach to the question of a possibility for subsequent reductions of the USSR and US strategic forces is set forth in my letter of February 25.<sup>3</sup> I repeat that we shall be ready to proceed to the discussions of this issue immediately after the signing of the agreement. However, it is necessary that account should be taken here of those factors which I already wrote you about on February 25, i.e. such factors as differences in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of the US forward based nuclear systems and aircraft carrier aviation in the proximity of the USSR territory, the possession of nuclear weapons by the US NATO allies and other circumstances which cannot be discarded.

Having in mind these factors and the above mentioned considerations regarding cruise missiles, it could be possible not only to limit the levels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides (2400 and

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<sup>3</sup> Document 151.

1320) but also to consider the number of such delivery vehicles to be reduced even before the expiration of the agreement being worked out.

The above considerations represent our position of principle which we intend to adhere to in the forthcoming talks with Secretary Vance. The additional questions which are mentioned in your letter, Mr. President, also undoubtedly deserve attention. We shall be prepared to set forth our preliminary considerations on those matters. On those of them, where a prospect appears for finding mutually acceptable solutions special negotiations would be conducted. If progress is achieved, appropriate agreements could be signed simultaneously with the strategic arms limitation agreement.

In conclusion I would like to note, Mr. President, that I do not quite understand the meaning of your reference to the tone of my letter of February 25. Its tone is usual—business-like and considerate. If you have in mind the direct and frank way in which it expounds our views, then I proceeded and do now from the premise that a dialogue of that very nature is in the interests of the matter. If you yet have in mind our attitude of principle toward the attempts to raise issues which go beyond the relations between states, and in general are far-fetched, then no other reaction from our side can be expected.

I assume that our personal correspondence will serve the interests of constructive development of the relations between our countries.

Sincerely,

**L. Brezhnev**

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**154. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1977.

SUBJECT

SALT

You will have two fundamental SALT decisions to make for Secretary Vance's visit:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 1/24/77–3/24/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. All Tabs except Tab H are not attached; all Tabs are not printed.

—The number and character of basic options which you wish to put to the Soviets. The four alternative approaches proposed to you are: (1) deferral at the Vladivostok level; (2) a comprehensive settlement at the Vladivostok level, i.e., Backfire and cruise missiles included; (3) a comprehensive settlement with reductions to 2,000; and (4) a comprehensive settlement with reductions to 1,500.<sup>2</sup>

—The nature of the options to be proposed; in particular, how to handle the Backfire, cruise missile, and mobile ICBM issues.

Your decisions on these issues will constitute a decision on your overall objectives for this stage of the negotiations.

Our discussions in the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) have led to an emphasis on two of the four basic approaches:

—Deferral at the Vladivostok level.

—A comprehensive settlement with reductions to 2000, including reduction in the MIRV level (to 1200) and reduction of 150 Soviet heavy ICBMs.

These are discussed in detail below, along with the other approaches of a comprehensive settlement at the Vladivostok level or the level of 1500.

### *Deferral*

As you are well aware, the Soviet response to date on deferral has been very negative.<sup>3</sup> As a consequence, in reiterating your interest in deferral, you may wish to choose some variant which could make the basic deferral approach more attractive to the Soviets. The SALT Working Group has looked at several alternatives to total omission of Backfire and cruise missiles in SALT TWO. These include:

—Agreement in SALT TWO that cruise missiles below 1500 km are tactical and will not be subject to limitation in SALT while those above 1500 km are strategic and subject to negotiation in SALT THREE; omission or loose constraints on Backfire.

—Loose constraints on cruise missiles and on Backfire (e.g., a ban on cruise missiles over 3000 km and a ban on Backfire tankers and Arctic basing).

—Loose constraints (such as those cited above) of limited duration, e.g., 1–3 years.

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<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski sent Carter a memorandum on March 14 summarizing discussions among Vance, Harold Brown, George Brown, Warnke, Turner, Aaron, and himself at a meeting beginning at 2 p.m. on March 12. The options presented to the President were the same as described here, but numbered differently. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 153.

—Partial cruise missile deferral (e.g., ban on cruise missiles over 600 km on submarines and on aircraft other than heavy bombers with no limits on other cruise missiles); loose constraints on Backfire.

The second of these alternatives is probably the most attractive in terms of making deferral more appealing to the Soviets; at the same time, it does not foreclose any of the cruise missile options of potential interest to the U.S.

#### *Reductions to 2000*

The SCC considered a number of possible approaches at a level of 2000 (see the decision tree at Tab A) and decided to focus on an approach which included a reduction in the MIRV level (to 1200), and a reduction of those Soviet heavy ICBMs (SS-9s) for which conversion to the SS-18 will not have begun by the date of signature of the agreement (essentially a reduction of about 150 heavy ICBMs, assuming an agreement is signed sometime this summer).

The objectives of a comprehensive agreement which includes significant reductions of this nature are:

—To take a significant step in SALT TWO toward major reductions in strategic force levels, including reductions in those force characteristics (MIRVs and throw weight) which are the major source of the current momentum in the strategic arms competition.

—To settle at this time the issue of limitations on those peripheral systems, Backfire and cruise missiles, which, in spite of being of marginal strategic significance compared to the central strategic systems, have proved a major impediment to progress in SALT.

The options which the SCC principals favor at this level of reductions are shown in the table at Tab B. The table also includes an option (labeled "New Option") which emerged from a recent meeting of SCC principals. This option, which can be viewed as a position which all SCC principals could probably support, is discussed in detail in the Working Group paper at Tab F.

The major arguments on the basic issues are provided below:

*Cruise Missiles.* As you can see from the table at Tab B, there is a wide range of views on acceptable cruise missile limitations. This in part reflects our inability at this time to define unique military requirements for long-range cruise missiles other than ALCMs on heavy bombers.

In seeking a compromise settlement on the cruise missile issue, the basic question is whether it is more in the U.S. interest to seek a combination of different range and platform limits such as Harold Brown favors (cf table at Tab B), or a straightforward across-the-board range limit such as Cy Vance and Paul Warnke favor. The two issues which drive this question are the range requirements for ALCMs on heavy



bombers and GLCMs. A 1500 km limit on ALCMs on heavy bombers is probably acceptable through 1985, but a longer-range limit, such as 2500 km, could be required thereafter if anticipated Soviet air defense improvements cannot be countered (by improvements in the U.S. bomber force, e.g., B-1) or limited in later phases of SALT. With respect to GLCMs, 1500 km is adequate to perform the deep interdiction missions of theater nuclear aircraft. However, 2500 km is required if we want to make a policy change and give the Allies a capability to strike strategic targets deep in the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup>

The basic advantages of the across-the-board range limit of 1500 km are that it offers simplicity and improved verifiability while maintaining substantial cruise missile capability. In addition, a 1500 km limit on all cruise missile platforms would make acceptable a cruise missile definition which includes all types of armament (nuclear- and conventionally-armed). The approach of mixed range limits—some at 2500 km, others at 600 km or lower—hedges on cruise missile range limits on those platforms of principal interest (e.g., heavy bombers), while accepting strict range limits on other platforms (e.g., submarines).<sup>5</sup> A cruise missile definition which includes all types of cruise missiles would be more difficult under this approach.

Tab D provides a map of GLCM target coverage for ranges of 1500 km and 2500 km. Tab E provides a chart showing ALCM target coverage for two cases of bomber standoff outside a Soviet AWACS defense and one case where the AWACS is attacked (the Air Force is developing a missile for this purpose). In the latter case, the bomber penetrates to launch points outside heavy Soviet air defenses. A map showing the location of those defenses is also included at Tab E.

*Backfire.* With the exception of the JCS, there is agreement in the SCC that Backfire is not a militarily significant weapons system.<sup>6</sup> It has no second-strike capability (since it would not survive a U.S. first-strike) and its first-strike capability is limited to mopping up whatever targets of interest might be left after the Soviet missile force has decimated the U.S. Nevertheless, its acknowledged ability to strike the U.S. on one-way high-altitude subsonic missions has made it a significant political issue.

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<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote in the margin, "SS 20 Tradeoff."

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote in the margin, "CMs on Backfire?"

<sup>6</sup> General Brown sent a memorandum on March 10 to Secretary of Defense Brown formally stating the JCS view that the Backfire had intercontinental capability and was therefore a heavy bomber and should be included in the aggregate of strategic nuclear delivery systems. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 3/77) Brzezinski summarized Brown's memorandum for the President in an undated memorandum, which the President saw. (Ibid., Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: Chronology: 1/24/77)

The Backfire options shown in the table at Tab B vary from counting Backfire above 120 in the aggregate to a separate limit of 300 Backfire. While these represent potentially interesting going-in positions, you should be aware that there is virtually no chance of a Soviet settlement along either of these lines. The previous administration on two occasions (in September 1975 and January 1976—described in the negotiating history at Tab G)<sup>7</sup> proposed Backfire limits of around 300 with very forthcoming cruise missile positions. The Soviet response, as it has always been, was an adamant statement that Backfire is a theater weapon and not a legitimate subject for limitation in SALT. As indicated previously, there is considerable legitimacy to this argument since our FBS also constitutes a theater system whose capability to “strike the territory of the other side” is unquestioned. The alternative to restrictive limits on Backfire is collateral constraints to limit Backfire’s intercontinental capability (limits on refueling, basing, replacement of medium bombers, etc.) plus a Soviet statement on Backfire production through 1985.

*Mobile ICBMs.* The Soviets have been arguing for a ban on mobile ICBM *deployment* in SALT TWO, i.e., for the period through 1985. While agreement to such a proposal would not affect M–X (initial M–X deployment is not scheduled before 1985), there is some question whether we should agree to such a ban. Development funds could be difficult to procure and we may decide in the interim that there is no mobile ICBM concept which is cost-effective and politically acceptable. If U.S. abandonment of a mobile M–X leads to abandonment of the M–X program in its entirety (a likely outcome since silo-basing is not attractive), we would be virtually guaranteeing the Soviets that we would not develop a hard-target capability against their ICBMs. Since this would be a major U.S. concession, it argues for either: (1) delaying a decision on mobile ICBMs to SALT THREE where the leverage could be useful, i.e., permit and count mobiles in SALT TWO; or (2) trying to get something significant for a ban on M–X *development and deployment* in SALT TWO (discussed below).

*ICBM Freeze.* The ICBM freeze is designed to garner significant Soviet concessions in return for the U.S. giving up the M–X program. It would freeze the deployment of current ICBMs (the Soviets will match our 550 MIRVed ICBMs in mid-1977), ban the development of new or improved ICBMs, and limit ICBM testing to confidence tests. If accepted, this proposal would not only curb a major source of momentum in the strategic arms race but would also enhance the prospects for long-term survivability of the silo-based ICBM force. The

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<sup>7</sup> A copy of the paper is attached to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance and Harold Brown, February 2. (Ibid., Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 1–2/77)

Soviet response to such a proposal is likely to include a similar freeze on SLBMs and heavy bombers.

#### *Vladivostok Level*

The table at Tab C shows agency preferences for a Backfire/cruise settlement at the Vladivostok level. As you can see, the preferences are essentially unchanged at this level with the exception that Cy Vance's first choice on cruise missiles shifts to a 2500 km limit on ALCMs on heavy bombers and a 300 km limit on all other cruise missiles. He sees this as a close competitor to an across-the-board limit of 1500 km.

#### *Reductions to 1500*

The SCC principals are dubious that reductions to a level of 1500 can be achieved in SALT TWO. As a consequence, they see a proposal along these lines as more illustrative of our objectives for SALT THREE. The Backfire/cruise missile arguments are basically the same at this level as they are at 2000.

The Working Group has analyzed deep reductions assuming an aggregate level of 1500 and a MIRV level of 1000. The analysis shows that reductions from 2400/1320 to 1500/1000 would not have a significant impact on ICBM survivability, pre- and post-attack static relative measures (throw weight, RVs, etc.) or U.S. capability to destroy critical Soviet economic and military targets. These conclusions remain true even if the reductions include preferential reductions of 150 MLBMs and a freeze on ICBM MIRVs. This leads to the conclusion that further constraints, such as limitations on modernization and testing, will probably be required to give deep reductions significant military impact. The analysis also indicates that non-limited "gray-area" systems may warrant greater concern at these reduced levels.

#### *Summary Assessment*

The SCC principals believe your best approach at this stage of the negotiations would be:

- To reaffirm your interest in deferral.
- At the same time, indicate that an acceptable alternative would be to negotiate significant reductions in SALT TWO.

With regard to a proposal on significant reductions, it is important that you decide at the outset how you want to handle the Backfire issue. If you are prepared to accept a Backfire compromise involving collateral constraints plus a Backfire production statement (anticipated to be around 450), then there are strong arguments for taking that position immediately, both bureaucratically and in the negotiations:

- If you start with a hard-line position and then opt for a compromise, you could be subject to criticism for being "outnegotiated" by the Soviets.

—In moving to a compromise, the military will argue for a cruise missile/Backfire linkage and U.S. withdrawal of any forthcoming proposals on cruise missiles.

—An initial hard-line U.S. proposal on Backfire is not likely to generate a constructive Soviet response and could seriously undermine the negotiations, in particular if accompanied by tough proposals on reductions and an ICBM freeze.

One way to approach this issue is to avoid taking a position on Backfire in making a reductions proposal (which includes cruise missile limits) to the Soviets. If they respond constructively to a reductions proposal, you can then indicate your willingness to accept collateral constraints and a production statement on Backfire.

### *Negotiating Tactics for Moscow*

In addition to deciding on your preferred options, you will want to consider the question of how to present them:

—We could present one opening proposal in advance of Vance's departure and, if necessary, let him introduce an alternative during the talks. For example, we could propose the deferral position and, if the Soviets resist, as is likely, then introduce a comprehensive agreement at a reductions level of 2000.

—Alternatively, we could present two options and press the Soviets to choose a general direction; for example, ask them to choose between deferral or reductions. In this case, you will want to consider whether Vance should be armed with some fallback position.

More broadly, you will want to consider what the general outcome of Vance's mission would be. If a deadlock develops on SALT, should he strive to soften the impact by including other issues such as the test ban or the Indian Ocean. Alternatively, if a breakthrough seems possible on the basis of a Soviet counterproposal in SALT, should we attempt to nail it down in Moscow or pause and consider it further in Washington? Since Vance's mission is assuming growing importance in the public eye, it would obviously be desirable if the meetings yielded an impression of success rather than failure. On the other hand, we will want to avoid being drawn toward an agreement which is not politically acceptable in the U.S.

In issuing a Presidential Directive (PD) for Vance's trip, you will want to take account of the bureaucratic complications on this issue (in particular, as regards the Backfire) as well as the political factors described above. On balance, you may find it desirable to include three acceptable outcomes in the PD:

—1. Deferral at the Vladivostok level as one of two alternatives to be initially presented to the Soviets.

—2. A comprehensive settlement at a reduction level of 2000 as the second initial alternative—including a cruise missile proposal, but initially holding back on a proposed Backfire settlement.

—3. A fallback proposal which might be implemented at an aggregate level of 2200–2400.

The rationale for including the fallback position is to signal to the various agencies the type of comprehensive settlement you are willing to accept at an aggregate level above 2000, in the event Soviets move in this direction. This will avoid opening a new dispute in the government on the acceptable settlement at such a level.

A draft PD along the above lines is at Tab H. It includes the following details on the above three proposals:

—1. *Deferral*. Total deferral of the Backfire and cruise missile issues.

—2. *Reductions to 2000*. ICBM freeze; across-the-board range limit of 1500 km on all cruise missiles; compromise settlement on Backfire acceptable (e.g. collateral constraints plus a Soviet production statement) but initially withheld.

—3. *Fallback*. At an aggregate level of 2200–2400, accept a Soviet production statement on Backfire if the Soviets are prepared to accept 1500–2000 km as the dividing line between tactical and strategic missiles; i.e., those cruise missiles above 1500–2000 km would not be limited in SALT, while limits on those above 1500–2000 km would be subject to negotiation in SALT THREE.

# 155. Memorandum of Conversation of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1977, 4–5:25 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

The President  
 The Vice President  
 Secretary of State Vance  
 Secretary of Defense Brown  
 Deputy Secretary of Defense Duncan  
 Paul Warnke, Director, ACDA  
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Bert Lance, Director, OMB (Part time)  
 Stu Eizenstat, Assistant to the President  
 William G. Hyland, NSC Staff  
 General George Brown, Chairman, JCS  
 Admiral Stan Turner, Director, CIA

Brzezinski: Mr. President, I am distributing a draft Presidential Directive which was developed as a consequence of discussion in the NSC and the working group; it contains three options, reported as a basic framework, including another document on collateral constraints on Backfire, a second paper on four items that need to be discussed in any agreement.<sup>2</sup>

President: I am having lunch with the Joint Chiefs tomorrow to discuss the CTB, and we can follow up on this discussion as well.<sup>3</sup> I believe this may be one of the most important meetings I will attend. If the Soviets are willing to negotiate in good faith, we can set the tone for years to come. The Soviets are attaching great importance to the visit of Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke. We have to face several important though tangential subjects: adequate verification—we will have to have Soviet good faith; second, in connection with circumvention, I agree that the Soviets are living up to the letter of the agreements, but my analysis shows that previous agreements allow the Soviets to pursue research and development; the agreements have been carefully

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 1/24/77–3/24/77. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omissions, are in the original. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

<sup>2</sup> The draft Presidential Directive was attached. For the Presidential Directive as approved, see Document 156. The second paper was not found.

<sup>3</sup> The President held a luncheon meeting with the Chiefs on March 23. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.

worded so that they would not impede the building of a strong strategic force. Another important element is that we must maintain an overall balance in order for the American people and Congress to accept it. It has to be balanced. Up to now the negotiations have laid the ground work for continued competition; there have been no real limits up to now, and they are out competing us; they have 27 future systems; and because of tight constraints and public awareness of our own budgets, they can always out compete us. We have a credible position because of our technology: we are ahead in warheads, accuracy, ASW and aerial surveillance; and they are ahead in throw weight. I have spent some time looking at the globe from the Soviet view, and they would appear to be surrounded by enemies—China and Europe. We have no equivalent threat from Canada or Mexico. We have to picture our own proposals in that framework.

What I would like to do on this trip is to test the USSR interest in turning toward peaceful resolutions, and to see if they are prepared to negotiate in good faith. If they are not, then we have to come back and reassess the strategic arms race, which means continuing it with no end in sight. The Soviets have not violated the language of the agreements, but have made a maximum effort to evade and circumvent. That has to be kept in mind in Moscow and subsequently, to be sure that there are no loopholes. We have a bold and comprehensive proposal, and if they agree it means a basic opportunity for progress. The intent of our two basic approaches is clear: we want to reach an agreement. If there appear to be disadvantages to one side, we can try to resolve them. We must remember that what we decide is binding on our country, even if details are left to be negotiated.

We have two approaches: a comprehensive reduction to about 2000, and a resolution of Backfire and cruise missiles; and a deferral of backfire and cruise missiles, in effect ratifying Vladivostok. We can't cover all eventualities, but Cy Vance can say something about each.

President: (Reads sentences from text of draft PD)

There is one question about the M-X; if we have a higher degree of accuracy, the way I understand it, if we had a missile so accurate that it could impact directly right on the silo, we would still not be invulnerable—and it would be so expensive and still with no security—we could have a massive launch and then they would launch.

Harold Brown: I doubt that they could have this capability now, but 8–10 years from now they could launch without warning.

President: We have no capability to launch an attack before they could launch enough weapons to wipe out our cities; we might get one, but this would be expensive and not be a quantum leap; they would still have submarine-launched missiles, and we would have peripheral systems.

Harold Brown: Both are left open to attacks.

President: (Continues reading from PD) On the MIRV level, we are saying that it is not mandatory but desirable? If we were writing an agreement from scratch, I would not favor them having 300–308 heavy missiles, giving them this unilateral advantage, but now we are saying that they can convert up to one half to SS–18s; in effect, a freeze at present levels; this also perpetuates their advantage.

Brzezinski: We could say it is not mandatory, but this is for your determination, but MIRV levels in this proposal would go down.

President: So we have two proposals (on levels and on MIRVs), and they are not necessarily tied, but in these proposals the two go together.

Harold Brown: We need to make a distinction between where we go into the negotiations and where we come out. This is a negotiating question.

President: My concept of these proposals is that it is where we go in. We should adhere to it, so that where we go in we also come out. Of course, we can't write Russian responses.

Harold Brown: But we should know how much leeway we want.

President: Yes, I agree.

Harold Brown: Specifically, what about the rest of the SS–9s?

Vance: They end up with only 150.

Harold Brown: But they have 308; so we are saying all SS–9s not converted are eliminated.

Brzezinski: Yes, we are cutting them by one half.

Vance: So I start with 2000 and 1200; this is on the table, and say this is part of a package.

President: Yes, they reduce by one half, which they haven't agreed to. (Continues reading from text, including part on number of missile tests)

Harold Brown: I understand that this number is not staffed.

President: But they test 25–30 per year.

Brzezinski: Would it make sense to say 12 tests?

We are putting our systems on the line the same as they will.

George Brown: If we give them 12 tests, they will use all of them to improve accuracy—ratio of 6 is better; the words in this paper are what we would want.

President: (continues reading sentences on ban on deployment, development, etc.) The whole concept contains two components: (1) reductions; (2) freeze on development, deployment and testing of systems. I think it is to our advantage, but not to their disadvantage. (continues reading "mobile missiles") I understand the JCS have ex-



pressed their concern about this. The Soviet have—correct me—the SS–20 under development; its range is as high as 2500–3000 miles; they are beginning to deploy; there are doubts about the range, some say 2900 miles; they are deploying on the Chinese border and in the western part of the Soviet Union. By adding one more stage it becomes the SS–16, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] We have no mobile except for the M–X, which we are not deploying until 1985. If we are sure we can identify the 16, I am willing to trade off deploying mobiles. Cy should raise the SS–20. [*2 lines not declassified*]

Admiral Turner: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President: This would gradually change the balance. If we agree on what this means (inclusion of SS–20 in the talks), then FBS may come up. We previously agreed in past exchanges that FBS was to our advantage, but I am not convinced; the Soviets have 600–700 launchers and bombers that can strike harder than what we have even if you include the British and French; all our systems can't reach Moscow. We probably can't avoid discussion of FBS, at least in SALT III.

Vance: But not in SALT II.

President: No, not in SALT II. Brezhnev said that excluding FBS was doing us a favor in a response to us. He said if we'd go back on cruise missiles, they can go back on FBS.

President: (continues reading text) The Soviet side freezes their SS–17, 18 and 19s that are operational or under construction at the time of the agreement, but in no case more than 550; we forego improvement on Minute Man and they forego deployment and further development of the SS–16, [*4 lines not declassified*]

Brzezinski: You raised the question of the number of 17s, 18s, 19s; we propose allowing up to 550 or under, but in any case frozen at 550.

President: How many do they have?

Paul Warnke: 374.

Brown: Below 550, that is.

President: Including the largest missiles?

Brown: Yes.

President: Including SS–9s?

Harold Brown: No, the 9s are not in the 550; they would have to destroy the remainder but they could keep the SS–11s within the total aggregate, but there is a new problem because CIA thinks the silos may be deep enough for the 19s.

Brzezinski: We could say that the freeze should be at the level of no more than 550, "at a level not in excess of 550".

Brown: This may be ambiguous if they don't have that many.

Brzezinski: We should decide what we mean, whether freeze at 370 or at 550.

Brown: Presumably at whichever is higher.

David Aaron: We should not tie it to the date of signature because they might go up to get there.

Brzezinski: No, we are freezing at 550.

President: What is wrong with the language we have?

Brzezinski: They might be at 400 but we are permitting 550.

Vice President: Say one or the other, whichever is higher?

President: That is provided they reduce their large missiles.

Brown: They could add 17, 18, 19, to bring it up to 550.

President: It is better to tie it together.

Brzezinski: It would state that the number of SS-17s, 18s, 19s would be frozen at a level not in excess of 550, with the SS-18 component not in excess of 150.

President: On cruise missiles, as I understand it, we have the capability to deploy them as early as 1978. All of this concerns Brezhnev, as Dobrynin said. We have a 5–6 year lead time, and an advantage in range and accuracy. But they have larger numbers of short range ones up to 600 km, and our population is located along the coasts, so that 600 km is equivalent to 1500–2500 km for us.

General Brown: I recall you put in a figure of 300 km, but he then withdrew it.

Harold Brown: We talked about it, and it is not totally unreasonable.

President: (Continues reading: "Finally, ban cruise missiles above . . .") If we receive a favorable response, we can consider the Soviet position on the Backfire, but not make a proposal.

Vance: What does this mean? Would we say something on constraints?

Brzezinski: They have said they will give an assurance, and we could respond on constraints.

Vance: I don't understand what latitude we have.

Brzezinski: That is an issue.

Vance: I would put a bracket around the last part (not to make any proposal).

President: Presumably we would not be the ones to make a proposal, they would. What bothers me is not the range of the Backfire now, but if they have 450 and arm it with a 2500 km cruise missile, it would completely distort the balance. We can put in 300–600 air-launched, but that is not strategic, and constraints on bases in Arctic, or

on refuelling tankers, or appendages on the bomber for refuelling. This is difficult to verify. I am not as deeply concerned as the JCS as far as the present capabilities are concerned. But if they can base it, and refuel it, and put on a long range cruise missile, then they should put in writing what they won't do, and I would require an assessment if they can conceal upgrading.

Vance: I understand this to mean we can consider their position, that is the Soviet position, with constraints.

Harold Brown: I don't have much confidence in constraints. I think it would be sensible to limit them [Backfires] at 120, but since we are only limiting cruise missiles at 2500 km, but because this serves a real need, I am worried if because of Backfire . . .

President: I see 2500 km cruise missile as an adequate counter-measure. We could deploy cruise missiles much faster than they could build Backfire. We can put out 1000 cruise missiles in Europe, if they say 1500–2000 km, we ought to be tougher on Backfire. If so, we would then judge Backfire as a future threat, so we would put in one phrase: "provided in no instance would Backfire be deployed as a strategic weapon," and not based in the Arctic, or refuelling, or have long range cruise missiles.

Brown: Yes, we agree that no long range cruise missiles can be deployed on aircraft other than strategic bombers.

Brzezinski: So we add the phrase "provided in no instance . . ."

President: General Brown, did you have a question?

General Brown: No, I have read ahead and I see the balance in the proposal. As for the ban on M-X, it violates the older principle of freedom to mix, and may deprive us of leverage for the next round.

President: I want to say that we are wiping the slate clean of the packages Kissinger put forward. They are all gone. This is our package, and it is well balanced. They can't take one item and accept it, as they did before.

Harold Brown: They will try to, but in this case it is harder to do. I share the concern about giving up M-X; it is a valuable card; but we can't leave it out because this is a tightly knit narrative.

General Brown: This involves a difficulty because of the SS-20 and 16; development makes it impossible to sort out. We worry that this puts a premium on cheating.

Harold Brown: But the proposal does say there will be arrangements on 20 and 16.

General Brown: One other point is that I think Cy should push for on-site inspection; this is imperative, because the situation is not even-handed. We are an open society and theirs is closed.

President: I agree with that. But if we had all M–X substituted for MM, and they had all 16s, I don’t see how that would change; it would still be a standoff.

Harold Brown: They say mobility leads to stability.

President: Well, if they had mobile SS–18s maybe, but if we had M–X and they attack, we still could launch, and this would even be giving an advantage to a second strike, because I would rather have them firing at Dakota than landing in New York.

Harold Brown: This is true, but this puts us on a hair trigger; if we have bombers, that is the safety valve.

President: True, but giving up the M–X is what the military is concerned about (continues reading: sentences on B–1, Trident, etc.)

Harold Brown: If they come back on this we also say freeze Backfire.

President: My guess is that they will say they can’t discuss it.

Brzezinski: And we have civil defense ban in here.

President: That goes in the package. Shelters we can monitor; the Intelligence Community is doing a study on Kiev. If they agree we can say we have that as a working goal.

Vance: I don’t understand, that it is “not part of the package.” Should be talk about it on the side, or as part of this proposal?

Brzezinski: It means that we will include it as part of this package.

Vance: I’m afraid of overloading.

Aaron: I don’t know what it means; do we mean shelters only?

Harold Brown: We are concerned here about exercises. Our concern is not only about shelters, but about exercise capabilities.

President: What bothers me is the conclusion by proponents to mean that they intend to launch first, to preempt.

Vance: It seems to me that we want a side discussion, leading to a supplementary agreement.

Brzezinski: We could state that it is not necessarily part of this package.

Vance: Just say “not” part of this package.

Brzezinski: Alright, while not part of this package . . .

Vance: They will understand that we want to discuss it.

President: Dobrynin said they would talk about it.

President: (Continues reading. “Alternatively” para. 2)

Vance: (Referring to separate paper) Are sub-issues to be put aside, or are some not necessary?

Harold Brown: On MIRV verification, if this is not in there is no meaning to the agreement.

Vance: MIRV verification must be in.

President: They agree to a missile if tested as a MIRV is a MIRV, but we don't know about their launchers.

Brown: They have not agreed on the launcher "type" rule. They did agree to designate certain ICBM fields as MIRVed ones, but they always come back and say this is tied to cruise missiles.

Vance: We can say we can work it out.

President: On the data base, it is a good idea to have an exchange of inventories; this would demonstrate Soviet good faith.

Vance: What about non circumvention and non transfer. They will raise it.

President: They are afraid of what we will give the British.

Harold Brown: And deliberate concealment?

President: Yes, on telemetry, is what they are doing a violation?

Brown: No.

President: [*1½ lines not declassified*]

Turner: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President: Do we encrypt telemetry?

General Brown: No, but we reduce power of signals.

Vance: We say here are all the remaining issues; do we mean this is all?

President: Including everything already on the table.

Aaron: There are other issues raised in Geneva, but these are the most important; telemetry encryption is most important to the first option.

President: It should apply to all three: first, second and third options.

Harold Brown: Dave Aaron is right on the importance of testing in the first option.

Brzezinski: This is an extremely sensitive subject, very few in the government know about telemetry encryption.

President: (Continues reading sentences: "Third item—option") We might discuss a 2000 km option (continues reading)

Warnke: Is this a variant on deferral.

President: What I have in mind is to use the lesser range on the cruise missiles as a trade off against the Backfire, but we won't put that in writing.

Warnke: If this is a variant on deferral, then . . .

President: Yes, a swap of lesser cruise missile ranges.

Warnke: We could have a 2500 limit at this time, but leave open lower limit for later stage.

Brzezinski: We had in mind 2000 km; we could change about to “something up to . . .

President: In the future say: if you came below (on Backfire), we come below on . . .

Brzezinski: It’s a question of going down to a 2000 minimum range.

Brown: If you say less than, then Soviets will say lower number.

President: Say something less . . .

Aaron: Put in 2000–2500.

Vance: I understand it, let’s leave it that if they put limit on Backfire, I’ll bring it down to 2000.

General Brown: Limit Backfire and count them?

Vance: Limit outside the aggregate.

General Brown: Is that what this means? Limit outside?

President: Yes, a limit outside of the total. We are not taking away anything crucial at 2000 km.

Harold Brown: I’d argue about that later, it’s subject to study.

President: Do we need to say “in any case” or just begin with “all cruise missiles . . .”?

Brzezinski: Are you deciding that this third item is for introduction in Moscow?

President: Yes, for Moscow.

Vance: But I come back to you [the President] first.

President: Yes.

Vance: We give the other [options] a chance; if they are serious they will go for number one; if they are not serious, then maybe one of the others.

Brown: This last is a variant of deferral.

Vance: We do not do that until we are walking out on the last day.

President: (Continues reading)

Brzezinski: Drop paragraph five?

President: Yes, (finishes reading). Are there any concerns you want to raise?

Vance: Are we agreed in option number one on how to handle MIRVs.

Harold Brown: Freeze at 550 on land and the rest in submarines.

Vance: I have a problem, where we say freeze in strategic systems, but they have not deployed submarine launched.

President: How many land-based MIRVs?

Brown: 350.

President: Defined as . . .

Harold Brown: By type all will be on land.

Warnke: 550 means that they cannot go to 918 land-based; can't change from sea to land.

President: We are forcing them to go to sea.

Harold Brown: What is unique is that we are not proposing an SLBM freeze. If they say no Trident, then that denies you (the Soviets) your SLBM MIRV.

Brzezinski: If they do buy this [option 1] we may have to have an extension on the Interim Agreement, it will take time to negotiate it.

President: If they had plugged the holes this would not be bad . . .

Brzezinski: But if we get an agreement, then the political atmosphere would allow extension.

Warnke: I would not be too negative on Option three, because three may be preferable to an extension of the Interim Agreement. If they buy two, then number one may be gone.

Brzezinski: They may prefer three and continue talking about number one. This is tied in paragraph four.

Brown: Why wouldn't they settle on deferral and then talk about one; I would ask them what kind of cuts, small or deep.

Warnke: I prefer three to two.

Harold Brown: But both put us back in negotiations over cruise missiles.

Brzezinski: The case for Option I is a political one; we need to convince the Soviets that it gives us a new basis for Soviet-American relations, for a more stable relationship; it is more challenging, but if they buy it, we are on the way to an historically more important change.

Warnke: And if they don't agree?

Brown: It may take more time to negotiate number three than one; as soon as we start talking about three, we carry over baggage of previous negotiations.

Vance: We all agree number one is preferable, and we should do our damndest to sell it.

President: They may be stubborn.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Brzezinski: On the SS-18s, we take the position that they can have a number not in excess of 550, with the SS-18 component not higher than 150.

Turner: Our ability to verify what is in a launcher is difficult, and also distinguishing between SS-20s and 16s.

President: We would want, first, on-site inspection, and, second, some arrangements to help distinguish; what can we tell on the size of those shacks at the SS-20; can we tell within 6 feet?

Turner: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Harold Brown: We have seen the launch site, and they use the same transport and erector launcher (TEL) for both the SS-16 and 20.

Aaron: No, we have never seen the SS-16 launcher.

Turner: But we have seen the TEL for the SS-20.

President: This problem is their responsibility; we may wish to go for on-site inspection; this is a possibility. I was talking with Callaghan and Genscher, no it was Brandt; they both think the Soviets want an agreement. I don't know.

Vance: Brandt and Bahr conclude that the Soviets want an agreement.

Harold Brown: I think so too.

President: Since we come forward with Option I it is obvious that we want an agreement.

Vance: If they truly believe in parity then they will move toward number one.

Brzezinski: This goes further than parity, it moves toward stability.

President: But with one exception, that is our ability to rapidly deploy cruise missiles.

Brzezinski: That is why in the long run it may be in the mutual interest not to deploy long range cruise missiles.

Harold Brown: Not necessarily; it may be in the long run; but this proposal is fair, there is no unilateral advantage.

President: What happens if they say OK, if your cruise missiles are included in a freeze on development and testing.

Harold Brown: Then we say only if you eliminate your throw weight advantage.

Brzezinski: We are already saying freeze your SS-18s.

Harold Brown: Yes, that's true.

Vance: In the period 1980–85, we will still have an advantage in warheads and reduce throw weight disadvantage; we have 7500 RVs, and they have 6400; they have a 2 to 1 advantage in throw weight under Option one.

Harold Brown: In total throw weight? or land-based missiles?

Vance: Overall throw weight.

Brown: You're including Poseidon and Trident then.

President: I think we can sell Option number one to the Congress and to the American people; they can understand it. (Brief discussion on Vance meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee.)



**156. Presidential Directive/NSC-7<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 23, 1977.

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

SALT Negotiations

I have reviewed the options for the U.S. position in the SALT negotiations. My conclusion is that there are two general outcomes that would constitute acceptable SALT TWO agreements: (1) a comprehensive agreement based on reductions to a level of about 2000 and resolution of the Backfire and cruise missile issues, and (2) a Vladivostok-based agreement which defers the cruise missile and Backfire bomber issues to SALT THREE. I authorize the following more detailed positions to be put forward by Secretary Vance in his discussions in Moscow:

1. As its preferred option, the United States should set forth a proposal to achieve a greater measure of strategic stability through reductions in the potential vulnerability of fixed ICBMs on both sides. This would involve reductions to a level of 1800–2000 strategic delivery vehicles to be achieved as soon as possible. This proposal should also include reductions in the MIRV level to 1100–1200, and a reduction in the total of Soviet MLBMs (both SS–9 and SS–18), as amplified later within this Option. On this basis the U.S. also should propose that both sides be prepared to: (1) freeze deployment of existing ICBMs; (2) ban modifications to existing ICBMs and limit the number of annual flight tests of these ICBMs (e.g., 6 per annum for ICBMs and for SLBMs respectively); (3) ban development, testing and deployment of new ICBMs, and (4) ban development, testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs.

In specific terms, this means I am prepared to: freeze Minuteman III deployment at 550; forego further improvements in all existing US ICBMs; abandon the M–X program for both silo and mobile basing; and forego all other new ICBMs. On the Soviet side I would expect them to freeze the number of SS–17, SS–18, and SS–19 launchers at a number not in excess of 550, with the MLBM component not higher than the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, NSC Meetings, Box 26, Institutional File, #1500s–1800s, 2–4/77. Top Secret. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

total of 150; forego improvements in these missiles; abandon the deployment and further development of the SS-16; and forego all other new ICBMs. Moreover, the Soviet side should be prepared to undertake arrangements which enable the US to differentiate between the SS-20 and the SS-16. Finally, we should propose to ban all transcontinental cruise missiles, nuclear—or conventionally—armed, with ranges over 2500 km. If this general scheme receives a favorable response, the US is willing to consider the Soviet position on the Backfire bomber, provided in no instance is the Backfire deployed as a strategic weapon. It should be noted that, while not part of this package, a civil defense freeze would reinforce the political acceptability of the agreement in the United States.

Moreover, the US side would be prepared to consider favorably, if the Soviet side raises the B-1 and Trident issues, a comprehensive freeze on all strategic systems, including the Backfire, banning their deployment and testing.

2. As an alternative to the foregoing, the United States is prepared to set aside the contentious cruise missile and Backfire bomber issues; if this can be agreed, the United States is prepared to move as quickly as possible to resolve all remaining issues and sign a new treaty. In this context, the U.S. should propose a slight reduction in the Vladivostok levels, from 2400 to 2300, as a token of the intent of both sides to move toward reductions in subsequent agreements. Mobile ICBMs would be permitted under this agreement, and counted against the overall totals.

3. I am also willing to accept a third, but less desirable, outcome based on an aggregate level of 2200–2400 as follows: If the Soviets will agree in a separate document to set a ceiling on the number of Backfire bombers produced through 1985, then I am prepared to set aside the Backfire issue if the Soviets also agree to draw the dividing line between tactical and strategic cruise missiles at about 2500 km. In this case, it would be agreed that all cruise missiles with longer ranges would either be banned, or subject to a temporary ban on deployment and given reconsideration in the next SALT agreement. Mobile ICBMs would be permitted under this agreement, and counted against the overall totals.

4. I do not wish that the proposal under paragraph 3 above be given to the Soviet side without an opportunity for further reflection in light of the ongoing discussions in Moscow. In any case, an outcome along these lines may be dependent on whether the Soviet side will lower the 2400 aggregate to 2200–2300 and join in a commitment to negotiate in the direction of the proposal set forth in paragraph 1 above and toward lower reductions in subsequent stages.

5. In all three alternatives it is understood that an agreement will include a satisfactory resolution of the issues of MIRV verification, ex-

change of a data base and prohibition of deliberate concealment measures, as well as other issues already discussed in Geneva.

6. In general, I consider that the burden for resolving the Backfire is on the Soviet side, and we should press for definite proposals in this respect.

7. We should propose that the Geneva negotiations be resumed at an early date, no later than May 1, and preferably earlier to complete the work already underway.

**Jimmy Carter**

### **Attachment**

Undated.

### **Supplementary Decisions**

In addition to the decisions incorporated into the main Presidential Directive, the following decisions were also taken as a result of the NSC meeting:<sup>2</sup>

1. In a discussion of constraints on the Backfire bomber, Secretary Vance is authorized to bring up restrictions on Arctic basing, refuelling capabilities, and a prohibition against this aircraft being armed with cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

2. The third option should not be advanced during the Moscow discussions without my approval; if negotiations warrant, I will consider a range limit at about 2000 kilometers, but only in connection with tighter limits on the Backfire bomber.

3. In regard to mobile ICBMs, the burden will be on the Soviet side to propose adequate and satisfactory verification procedures to guard against the upgrading of SS-20 IRBMs. The US would, in this case, wish to explore possible forms of on-site inspection.

**J.C.**

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 155.

## 157. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Vance visited Moscow March 27–30, 1977. On March 28, Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in the Kremlin for a meeting on SALT that lasted from 5:30 to 7:45 p.m. During that discussion Vance outlined the two preferred U.S. options as authorized in Presidential Directive 7 (Document 156) and presented Gromyko with written texts in English and Russian. Gromyko noted that since Vance had given him a formal proposal, he would need time to prepare an official response. The memorandum of conversation of the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Volume VI, Soviet Union. In telegram Secto 3032 from Vance to the President, March 29, 1945Z, the Secretary reported that “the Soviets are clearly going through a very thorough analysis of our comprehensive proposal on SALT”—which Vance had presented Gromyko in their March 28 meeting. If the Soviet counterproposal could be the basis for negotiation, Vance asked to be able to use, at his discretion, option 3 as outlined in the PD. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77) Vance met with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev from 5:30 to 6:45 p.m. on March 30 at the Kremlin to discuss SALT and other issues. The memorandum of conversation of that meeting is also scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Volume VI, Soviet Union. After the meeting, Vance sent telegram Secto 3053 to the President, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Brzezinski, and Acting Secretary of State Christopher, March 30, 2150Z. Vance reported:

“1. As I reported earlier, Brezhnev and I met today for an hour, and he read through a formal written rejection of both of our SALT proposals. Though he used some strong language about inequitability and inconsistency with Vladivostok, he was very careful to tie his presentation in with our agreement to resume discussions with Gromyko in May. At one point he said that we should not conclude that negotiations were doomed and that there was still time to think and talk about the question before my meeting with Gromyko in May. He was also careful to take note that we had made progress on other issues, which, in fact, is quite true.

“2. He spent the remainder of his half-hour presentation on the Middle East and MBFR. He stressed that we must cooperate in the Middle East, and again referred to my meeting with Gromyko. On MBFR, he spoke, I believe for the record in attacking our proposals.

“3. One note of concern was his statement that in light of the developments, he believed that FBS problem, which had been deferred,

would not [*now?*] have to be settled within the framework of the present negotiations. This may be real trouble.

"4. I carefully rebutted his characterization of our proposals as one-sided, noting that deferral was consistent with Vladivostok, and that the comprehensive proposal was a bold new step in the interests of both sides. Brezhnev had no negotiating room. He obviously wanted to end the session, and did not appear very happy with the outcome. I took on his statement about FBS pointing out this would cause us to bring in the IRBMs including the SS-20 if they persisted.

"5. My view is that they have calculated, perhaps mistakenly, that pressure will build on us to take another position. One of their problems apparently is they feel that we have departed too far from the basic Vladivostok framework. They may believe that this reflects on Brezhnev personally, since he was the cosigner of the Vladivostok accords. Indeed, one constant theme of theirs was that agreements are made by governments, not personalities.

"6. In any case, although the results on SALT were definitely disappointing, we should not be discouraged. A certain testing period was probably to be expected. The Soviets have not ended the discussions, and, indeed, seem eager to keep SALT as a key element in my next meeting with Gromyko.

"7. We made some progress on other arms constraints which will be tested when the various expert working groups get under way. You will have received the joint communiqué which strikes a neutral tone, and indication that the Soviets still wish to keep the door open." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 3-5/77)

At a news conference in Moscow on March 30, Vance said that he was "disappointed that we didn't make progress and establish a framework." Transcripts of his news conferences on March 27, 28, 29, and 30 and en route to London and Paris on April 1, and the Joint Communiqué of March 30 are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1977, pages 389–408. After Vance's departure the morning of March 31, Gromyko held a televised news conference in which he rejected the "so-called narrow alternative proposal of the United States" and accused the Carter administration of distorting the Soviet position. Excerpts of Gromyko's statement were published in *The New York Times*, April 1, 1977, page 9.

**158. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

**SUBJECT**

SALT and Other Arms Control Issues Addressed in Moscow

The following summarizes the outcome of the SCC meeting of April 7, 1977.

**SALT**

Our public posture will be to make clear that SALT is a long-term process requiring our patient efforts to try to achieve an agreement. We will not underplay the potential difficulties, and we should avoid over-optimistic assessments. We should play down the significance of the May meeting between Gromyko and the Secretary of State. In this connection, it was decided to propose that the Geneva discussion be resumed as soon as practical under Paul Warnke's chairmanship of the U.S. Delegation to address remaining SALT technical issues (verification data base, etc.) and to provide a possible channel for exchanging views on our proposals. Guidance on the technical issues will be developed by the SCC Working Group.

In our private discussions with the Soviets, we should emphasize our preference for the comprehensive approach.<sup>2</sup> We should try to obtain a more specific Soviet critique of our proposals and Soviet counter-proposals. These discussions with the Soviets should be guided by PD/NSC-7.<sup>3</sup>

The SALT Special Coordination Committee and its Working Group will undertake a detailed examination of the phasing of reductions in the comprehensive proposal—the time at which the Soviets can be expected to exceed our proposed 550 limit for MIRVed ICBMs, the kinds of constraints that might apply to Trident, the B-1, and Soviet SLBM and strategic bomber forces. There should be a systematic and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Also sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The memorandum was not signed by Brzezinski, but on April 9 Aaron, with Brzezinski's concurrence, sent a memorandum to Carter explaining that while the SCC discussion did not merit a PD or PRM, it should serve as guidance for further action. Carter approved it and its distribution. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined the second half of this sentence.

<sup>3</sup> Document 156.

comprehensive examination of all possible constraints on Backfire. There should be an analysis of the number of missile flight tests that would be appropriate to our comprehensive proposal, including the question of the definition of what is a test. There should be an examination of the definition of cruise missile range.

The elements of the comprehensive proposal should be examined to determine the sensitivity of changes of individual elements and how they would impact on U.S. and Soviet interests. There should also be an examination of how elements of our comprehensive proposal could be added to the deferral package, ranging from establishing agreed principles for SALT III to undertaking specific commitments to keep aspects of our comprehensive proposal viable, such as a limit on the number of MIRVed ICBMs. In this connection, there should be a careful examination of those cruise missile and Backfire constraints that might be acceptable.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to SALT.]

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**159. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1977.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: SALT

*Soviet Proposals:*

Negotiations should proceed on the basis of the Vladivostok Agreement—though each side would be free to characterize it as it pleased.

The SALT II agreement would keep the levels as agreed at Vladivostok, for both missile launchers/bombers and MIRVs. Air-launched cruise missiles would be dealt with as agreed with Secretary Kissinger

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also at the meeting, which lasted from 4 to 4:40 p.m., were Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, and Hunter. The memorandum of conversation of the meeting is *ibid*.

in January 1976 (range limit of 2500 kms.; each bomber would count as a MIRV); sea-launched and land-launched cruise missiles could be left for SALT III, provided they were not tested. Mobile missiles could be included or excluded from SALT II; if included, they could either be prohibited or “counted.”

The SALT II agreement would contain a statement—or other mutually satisfactory procedure—concerning the prompt beginning of SALT III negotiations, leading to a reduction of the Vladivostok levels. No numbers would be mentioned in the SALT II agreement. Reductions decided at SALT III could be implemented without waiting for the SALT II agreement to expire: this too could be included in the SALT II statement.

(Note: Ambassador Dobrynin dropped a comment at the end of the talk that indicated some reductions in numbers could come in SALT II: but it was not a clear statement, and was not followed up—page 9 of Memorandum of Conversation).

After negotiations have proceeded for a brief period, the Soviet Union would provide its thinking on the lowest levels of reductions that would be possible for 1982 or 1985.

#### *United States Proposals:*

The United States would provide the Soviet Union with a summary of subjects to be included at SALT II. The Soviet Union would delete those it did not wish to consider and negotiations would proceed on that basis.

The United States would raise again the problem of assurances on *Backfire*, and the Soviet Ambassador should indicate to the General Secretary that simple assertions are not sufficient.

The United States would present a memorandum on notification of missile tests, with the Soviet Union perhaps being allowed to exempt some tests totally within its own country.



**160. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1977.

**SUBJECT**

Follow-Up to Dobrynin

1. Dobrynin certainly went away feeling that we accept their view that Option 1 is dead, at least for now. I think that we should have kept that matter open longer and pressed them for more specific criticisms, thereby engaging them in a fuller discussion of Option 1.

2. In any case, with respect to Option 2, I take it we will begin fuller explorations, pointing perhaps to these adjustments:

a. Accept limit of 2,500 km on ALCMs (but not count the platforms as MIRVs);

b. Defer to SALT 3 further discussion of cruise missiles;<sup>2</sup>

c. Either insist on constraints in SALT 2 on the Backfire or make it plain that the Backfire, too, is deferred to SALT 3—though in the latter case the question arises what do we receive in return for the ALCM limitation?<sup>3</sup>

d. Seek to obtain some reduction in the Vladivostok aggregates for SALT 2 (e.g., to 2,300 total and 1,250 MIRV);<sup>4</sup>

e. Obtain explicit agreement in SALT 2 that SALT 3 will aim at lower aggregates (like our Option 1), and that these could become effective within the life span of SALT 2;<sup>5</sup>

f. I still feel that we should aim for some elements of the freeze even within SALT 2; otherwise the situation will become more awkward for all of us, especially with the new generation of Soviet missiles coming into play.<sup>6</sup>

Subject to your approval, at the lunch with Dobrynin I propose to press him for more explicit Soviet criticisms of our comprehensive

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "OK" in the margin next to points a and b.

<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined "insist on constraints in SALT 2 on the Backfire" and wrote "characteristics, not numbers—we need USSR intentions on quantity & reserve this as SALT 3 item" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "Prefer 2200–1200—They've mentioned 10%" at the end of this point.

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote "crucial" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>6</sup> Carter wrote "on new missiles—ok—not on their buildup to 550 ICBM MIRVs" in the margin next to this point.

package; and to feel him out on the rest of the above and then report back to you and to Cy.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Carter wrote his initials, but not to indicate approval or disapproval. He wrote at the end of the memorandum: "My strong commitment is to comprehensive reductions. I consider ratifying Vladivostok agreements only marking time. Include limit on tests, CBT, nonattack of satellites, etc. J." On April 13, Brzezinski met with Dobrynin from 12:30 to 2:20 p.m. He later told Carter that while the conversation was "somewhat repetitive" of the previous Soviet position, "we are still in a good position to insist" that SALT should have symbolic cuts in the total aggregate, that SALT II involve "an explicit acceptance of lower aggregates as targets for SALT 3," that in negotiating SALT a freeze of ICBMs still should be discussed, and that the door be opened in SALT to "some discussion of self-imposed limits during the negotiating phase between SALT 2 and SALT 3." Dobrynin insisted, according to Brzezinski, that successful SALT negotiations required a political decision at the Carter–Brezhnev level. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77)

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## 161. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 15, 1977.

### SUBJECT

Defining the US Position for SALT Negotiations

On the basis of the conversations with you and Secretaries Vance and Brown, and taking into account the memoranda they have submitted as well as your own marginal notations on my earlier memorandum,<sup>2</sup> I take it our SALT position will be along the following lines, subject to a resolution of the undecided issues listed at the end of this memorandum.

### 1. *Negotiating Strategy*

Secretary Vance will begin immediately a series of meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, essentially "thinking out loud." His aim would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 11, Harold Brown–Private File, SALT 1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: "Zbig—Let's set up mtg soon—Me, you, Cy, Harold, VP, Paul." For the account of that meeting, see Document 163.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Document 154.

be to develop a consensus, as far as possible, on the contents of SALT II, and at least a preliminary agreement on some elements of SALT III.

Assuming these talks make some progress, the next step would be an exchange of letters between you and Brezhnev consolidating the areas of agreement and resolving any remaining issues.

Following this exchange, formal negotiations would then resume in Geneva.

## *2. Our Basic Approach*

Our point of departure will be the deferral Option II, including the following particulars:

### *A. Backfire*

We will accept a high-level Soviet assurance that in no instance will the Backfire bomber be deployed or used as a strategic system.

—In addition, we will press for a series of constraints to reinforce this basic assurance.

We would propose that the Backfire:

(1) will not participate in training activities associated with inter-continental strategic missions of Soviet heavy bombers;

(2) will not be tested, based or otherwise associated with tankers employed with heavy bombers or with tankers of comparable capability;

(3) will not be used at or flown to bases lying north of 63° north latitude;

(4) will not be modified to increase its range/payload capability;

(5) will not be equipped with an air-launched cruise missile with a range over 600 km.

—We will also propose that the Soviets give us a separate statement setting forth the maximum number of Backfires that will be produced during the period of the SALT II agreement (i.e., through December 1985).

### *B. Cruise Missiles*

—Limitations on sea-based and land-based cruise missiles with a range over 600 km will be deferred until SALT III (some undecided questions in this connection are in Section 3).

—Air-launched cruise missiles, with a range between 600 km and 2500 km, will be deployed only on heavy bombers, and banned from deployment on other aircraft. The US is *not* prepared to count each such heavy bomber as the equivalent of a MIRVed missile and thus to be counted against the MIRV ceiling; the US might be willing to limit the number of heavy bombers so equipped with ALCM's to no more than

200, or, as an alternative, the US could accept an outcome in which the number of heavy bombers equipped with ALCM's was pegged to the total number of Backfires deployed.

### *C. Reductions*

We will propose a reduction in SALT II from the Vladivostok aggregate of 2400 to 2200, or as a fallback, 2300; this level would be reached within an agreed period during the lifetime of the SALT II agreement, say within a year or 18 months after entry into force of the agreement.

—In this connection, the US will seek to incorporate into the SALT II agreement, or in a separate document if necessary, a joint commitment to undertake immediately negotiations toward completion in SALT III of a comprehensive agreement, including substantial additional reductions in the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles (without necessarily specifying the numerical level).

—Should it prove impossible to agree on a reduction from 2400 to 2200–2300 in the SALT II agreement, the US would then require that the commitment to negotiate a comprehensive agreement in SALT III specify as an agreed objective that the aggregate will be reduced to 1800–2000.

—We will propose, in connection with the reduction in the SALT II aggregate to 2200–2300, to reduce the level of MIRVed missiles from 1320 to 1250; and, in this connection, also propose that there be a joint commitment to negotiate in SALT III a further reduction in the MIRV level, including the establishment of subceilings for land-based ICBM MIRV's.

### *D. Mobile Missiles*

The US will not agree to ban mobile ICBM development or deployment as a part of SALT II; we will continue to press for arrangements that permit a distinction between the SS–20 and the SS–16 if the latter is to be deployed.

### *E. Associated Measures*

The US will seek to include in a SALT II agreement, or in a parallel agreement, mutual notification procedures for missile test firings. A satisfactory SALT II agreement must also include a resolution of the issues of (a) data base (exchanging numbers of various categories of limited systems expressed in broad terms; e.g., so many MIRV launchers, heavy bombers, etc.); (b) adequate measures to verify the number and type of MIRVed missiles and launchers; (c) prohibitions against deliberate concealment practices, including a ban on encryption of telemetry.

### 3. *Undecided Issues*

A. Since the Soviets will at some point exceed the level of 550 MIRVed ICBM's, should we propose some understanding on restraint in their buildup of MIRV's beyond this level?<sup>2</sup>

—If so, would we be prepared to reciprocate, and in what area: cruise missile testing and deployments?<sup>3</sup>

B. Should we press for a commitment now or an understanding that SALT III will include restrictions in the development of new ICBM's, as we proposed in our comprehensive agreement?<sup>4</sup>

—If so, would we be prepared to discuss similar restrictions on B-1 or Trident, if the Soviets make such a counterproposal?<sup>5</sup>

—Or, is it preferable to leave this entire question for the actual negotiations?

C. Should we commit ourselves not to test *any* cruise missiles beyond a range of 2500 km, including those cruise missiles which are not limited in SALT II? If so, what is the Soviet quid pro quo?<sup>6</sup>

—Should we also propose (as recommended by Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke) that for a period of two years, no sea-launched or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 2000 km would be deployed?<sup>7</sup>

D. Should we propose as a Backfire "constraint" that there be a one-for-one replacement of Backfire for older medium bombers, thereby setting an implicit ceiling on all Soviet medium bombers? (Secretary Brown proposed this: it would be a severe constraint.)

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "Yes" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "Try mutual, equal restraint" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "Propose—not press" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote "Yes" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>6</sup> Carter wrote "no" in the margin next to this point.

<sup>7</sup> Carter wrote "Let's not get into this now" in the margin next to this point.

**162. Memorandum From William E. Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1977.

SUBJECT

Thoughts on Soviet Approaches to SALT

The American approach to SALT has always had a "scholastic" quality in its emphasis on technical calculations. The Soviet approach has emphasized "principles" with strong political overtones, not data.

Although there may be many reasons for Soviet reluctance to indulgence in the U.S. approach, a *major* one must be China. The Chinese watch "principles" in U.S.-Soviet dealings, and the Soviets know that. The Soviet "nuclear war fighting" approach to a deterrent posture is imperative for Soviet relations with China; Soviet acceptance of American "mutual assured destruction" assumptions would be a Chinese victory in "principle," that is, a Soviet admission that China, as it develops a retaliatory force, cannot be defeated in nuclear war while the USSR survives.

Seen in this light, Soviet behavior in SALT looks impressively shrewd for handling American "idealism" on the one hand and Chinese "dogmatism" on the other.

Another *major* reason for Soviet reluctance lies in the rate of technological change. George Kennan said recently:

"As these words are being written, the SALT talks are about to reopen. This is good, so far as it goes. There cannot be too much in the way of communication between the two governments about the problems involved.

"But even the best results that could be expected from these talks are unlikely to be enough. The main reason for this is that the pace of advancement in military technology is faster than the predictable pace of any negotiations of this nature. The technological background against which the instructions to the two delegations would be drawn up would be one that no longer entirely prevailed at any time they were concluded, so that any agreements reached would be bound to be partially overtaken by events."

The Soviets keenly share this understanding with Kennan, and so do I, if the object of SALT is to stabilize and control certain aspects of our strategic relationship with Moscow.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 3-4/77. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the first page of the memorandum: "good, ZB."

What are the implications of all this for our own SALT tactics?

—Reaching signed agreements is not as important as the negotiating process itself.

—Detailed data must take a supplementary role to principles and precedents.

—Discovering strategic intentions and inferring motivations are extremely important negotiating objectives in their own right.

—SALT must be seen as merely part of the broader strategic relationship, important but not always key.

—We must never lose sight of the invisible Chinese presence at SALT.

Finally, I want to call into question something you have said publicly about our technique of making proposals directly to the top Soviet leadership in order to bypass the Soviet military bureaucracy. If your assertion is serious, not for public purposes only, then I take issue with it.

First, do you believe Brezhnev or Gromyko sit down after they have received our SALT packages untouched by Soviet military hands, and carefully review the data? Of course not! He turns it over to Marshal Ogarkov and the General Staff, the only organization competent to review our proposals. Probably no institution in the USSR has the record of candid debate with the top leadership enjoyed by the General Staff. Stalin himself cultivated this climate, and there is evidence that it survives. The General Staff is not beholden to any particular military weapons system or branch of service. It is responsible for combining all systems. It has traditionally resisted Service parochialism. Our JCS is in no sense analogous to it because each Service Chief remains a prisoner of his Service. The United States has no authoritative military center equivalent to the Soviet General Staff.

There is a strong inclination in CIA analysis to blame the Soviet military and the mechanism of the State Defense Council for bamboozling the majority of the Politburo on military policy issues, SALT in particular. This technique is as old as the Soviet system. Yet we have been slow to recognize it. And then the wrong inferences are drawn: if only the “good guys” in the Politburo had an informed view of Soviet SALT policy, the Soviet position would be more moderate, congenial to our own. In fact, those other Politburo members would hardly modify the position if they controlled the Defense Council. The SALT position is not an issue. Who controls the Defense Council is. Whoever controls it will rely on the General Staff. Not even Gromyko would turn over SALT staffing to the Foreign Ministry! At the same time, the Defense Council ensures that “policy,” not “technical” considerations prevail in decisions.

163. Memorandum of a Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 23, 1977.

## SUBJECT

U.S. Position on SALT, As Derived from the Meeting of the President, the Vice President, The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, ACDA Director, and NSC Assistant

The President has directed that:

1. SALT II is to be a two-year agreement from October 1977 through October 1979. SALT II is to include a commitment toward substantial reductions and an ICBM improvement freeze in SALT III. We will seek a comprehensive SALT III agreement but individual elements shall be implemented whenever possible, even within the lifespan of SALT II. Accordingly, the parties are to undertake immediately after the conclusion of SALT II negotiations toward completion of a comprehensive agreement on control of strategic nuclear arms, including (a) substantial additional reductions in the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; (b) reductions in the aggregate number of launchers of MIRV missiles and in subcategories of launchers of missiles; (c) restrictions on the development of new or modification of existing ICBMs; (d) limits on missile test firing, and (e) other steps to insure strategic stability and equal security.<sup>2</sup>

2. The SALT II agreement is to include a reduction from the total strategic weapons aggregate of 2400 to 2200, and a reduction in the level of MIRVed missiles from 1320 to 1200, by an agreed date.

3. During the period of the SALT II agreement, the U.S. will sub-limit the number of heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs with ranges

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President met on April 23 with his advisers from 9:30 to 11:20 a.m. in the White House Cabinet Room. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) In an April 25 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski sent these "decision minutes" of the meeting for the President's approval as "guidance to Vance and Warnke only for present exploratory talks." Carter approved and wrote "correct" next to the language on exploratory talks. Brzezinski also attached an April 25 memorandum from Harold Brown to the President expressing concerns about the strategy. Brzezinski agreed with several of Brown's points, especially that the two-year limit might become permanent and that the U.S. negotiating technique might result in too much speculation among the Soviet leadership about U.S. concessions and too little about Soviet concessions. (Ibid., National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77) Brown's memorandum is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski sent these "decision minutes" to Vance, Harold Brown, and Warnke under a covering memorandum of April 26 with the caveat that they "represent guidance from him [the President] for present exploratory stage only, and that the contents are not to be presented to the Soviet side as a formal negotiating proposal. Any actual proposal will depend on Soviet reaction and on formal staffing within the U.S. Government." (Ibid.)



up to 2500 km to a total of 250; during the same period, the Soviet Union will also limit the production and deployment of Backfires to the total of 250. ALCMs over 600 km are to be deployed on heavy bombers only. The U.S. is *not* prepared to count each such heavy bomber as the equivalent of a MIRVed missile launcher, to be counted against the MIRV ceiling.

4. During the period of the SALT II agreement, ground-based cruise missiles, sea-based cruise missiles, and ALCMs other than for heavy bombers are not to be tested at or deployed with ranges over 600 km. Any test over 600 km shall be air launched.

5. The Soviet Union will hold the deployment of MIRVed MLBMs, as defined through volume limits in the interim agreement, at 190. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the U.S. will not test nor deploy new types of MIRVed ICBMs during the period of the SALT II agreement.

6. During the period of the SALT II agreement, both sides agree not to deploy mobile ICBMs, and the Soviet side is to take special steps to facilitate arrangements enabling the U.S. side to verify that the SS–20 facilities are not being used for SS–16 deployment.

7. The U.S. will seek to include in the SALT II agreement, or in a parallel agreement, mutual notification procedures for missile test firings. A satisfactory SALT II agreement must also include a resolution of the issues of (a) data base (exchanging numbers of various categories of limited systems expressed in broad terms; e.g., so many MIRV launchers, heavy bombers, etc.); (b) adequate measures to verify the number and type of MIRVed missile launchers; (c) prohibitions against deliberate concealment practices, including a ban on encryption of telemetry.

8. The Soviets will extend a high level assurance that in no instance will the Backfire bomber be deployed or used as a strategic system. In addition, we will press for a series of constraints to reinforce this basic assurance.

We will propose that the Backfire:

(1) will not participate in training activities associated with inter-continental strategic missions of Soviet heavy bombers;

(2) will not be tested, based or otherwise associated with tankers employed with heavy bombers or with tankers of comparable capability;

(3) will not be used at or flown to bases lying north of 63° north latitude;

(4) will not be modified to increase its range/payload capability;

(5) will not be equipped with an air-launched cruise missile with a range over 600 km.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

**164. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 27, 1977.

Messrs. Vance and Warnke met with Ambassador Dobrynin at 1:30 pm on April 27, 1977. Mr. Vance opened the discussion of SALT by stating that both sides have indicated interest in moving ahead with negotiations. The Soviet leadership believes the best way to do so is to sign an agreement based on the Vladivostok accords before taking up a more comprehensive set of provisions. We want to move as rapidly as possible toward an agreement that truly controls strategic arms by major reductions and a freeze on new ICBMs. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the Soviet approach is to take the Vladivostok undertaking and press it a little further at this time.

Secretary Vance said that we would like to think out loud about a method by which we could move forward. He suggested that, for exploratory purposes only, and not as any formal negotiating proposal, we think about a three part Vladivostok-type package. This would involve a setting of ceilings somewhat reduced from the Vladivostok levels, which would continue as ceilings but not as floors through 1985. Other parts of the package could remain in effect for two years. As a third piece, the parties would agree to enter forthwith into negotiations moving toward a comprehensive SALT THREE agreement.

Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that this third piece would be a "declaration of a set of principles." As for reductions, he maintained that previous assertions of a willingness to go below the Vladivostok levels were intended to mean that, if agreement could be reached on SALT TWO, the parties could proceed at once on negotiations on reductions to 2300 or somewhat below.<sup>2</sup> He was told that we had regarded these assertions as indicating a willingness to reduce the levels in a SALT TWO agreement and, in any event, this is what we were suggesting for exploratory purposes.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: "Cy—It is a time for inflexibility, and for them to make specific proposals. The 2-year limit on Backfire, SLBM, GLCM, & large missiles are necessary window dressing & show good faith. J."

<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "He's trying to change his position" in the margin next to this paragraph.

The contents of the President's guidance in the Brzezinski memorandum of April 23, 1977,<sup>3</sup> were then discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin. Again, it was emphasized that this was not a formal proposal, but merely an effort to keep both sides thinking about the problem.

At the conclusion of this presentation, Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether we wanted him to get a formal response or whether he might give his own preliminary assessment of how these various points would be regarded. He explained that he, of course, could not negotiate and that this would have to take place at the Foreign Minister level. He was asked to give his own personal reactions.

Ambassador Dobrynin gave the following response to the various points:

1. With regard to the reductions, from 2400 to 2200 on aggregates and from 1320 to 1200 on launchers for MIRVed missiles, he noted only that reductions had not been accepted by the Soviet side until now, and that they had talked of reductions to 2300 in SALT THREE to be implemented perhaps during the term of SALT TWO.<sup>4</sup>

2. With respect to the two-year term, he said that this would raise some difficulties. Mr. Vance explained that we were raising this possibility as a means to get over the problems that have stalled SALT TWO. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he thought that they would be against it. Mr. Vance noted that we could not possibly consider restrictions of this kind through 1985. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he would pass on this possibility for consideration.

3. In the cruise missile area, he observed that the range limits for air launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers would be the same as had been previously discussed. He questioned, however, the concept of a platform limit of 250 heavy bombers to be equipped with ALCMs with a range between 600 kms and 2500 kms. He said that previously it had been agreed that heavy bombers with ALCMs of this range would be counted against the MIRVed ceiling. He contended that all of this had been agreed except for the Soviet proposal that a B-1 with such ALCMs should count as three MIRVs.

Now, he asserted, we would take all heavy bombers with ALCMs out of the MIRV count and thus would add to the MIRV total. It was explained to him that we did not believe it was appropriate to treat heavy bombers with ALCMs as if they were MIRVed missiles and that this would interfere with desirable reductions in the MIRV ceiling. Ambassador Dobrynin repeated again that the Soviet side believes it was agreed to treat these bombers as MIRVs and that any move would be a

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<sup>3</sup> Document 163.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "B.S." in the margin next to this paragraph.

revision of a definite understanding. Mr. Vance said that the Soviet side would have to show some flexibility and asked that this possible treatment of the problem be explored.

The idea of a moratorium on testing and deployment of other types of cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kms appeared to elicit a favorable reaction.

4. With regard to the Backfire constraints, Ambassador Dobrynin said that some of them could be acceptable but that, in his opinion, they could not accept any geographical limit on deployment. He said that it was their plane and their territory and that this constraint would be regarded as designed to push them down from NATO's northern flank.

5. As for undertaking a production limit of 250 Backfires, he said he did not know what the reaction would be, but that he thought it would be negative as part of an agreement. He evidenced some uncertainty as to what the anticipated production would be but appeared to feel that, if the production rate would bring them to less than 250 Backfires by October 1979, as we assume, some way might be found to handle this question.

6. As for a limit of 190 on the deployment of MIRVed MLBMs, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he recognized this would be a different proposal than the limit of 150 on MLBMs of all kinds. Mr. Vance said that such a limit would be totally reasonable and should receive favorable consideration.

7. As for a ban on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, he observed that Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union would be prepared to go either way.

8. He seemed untroubled by the suggested undertaking that the Soviet Union and the United States would not test or deploy new types of MIRVed ICBMs for the two year period.

9. Finally, he said that a declaration of intentions with respect to SALT THREE could be acceptable.

It was left that Ambassador Dobrynin would convey these informal thoughts to his principals in Moscow, just as ideas for exploration and not as a US proposal. He was asked to try and get a reaction for us, preferably before Mr. Vance leaves in early May, or at least before Mr. Warnke goes to Geneva on May 10th. He said he would try but was not sure it would be possible.

He commented further that Mr. Gromyko might respond himself when he meets with Mr. Vance in Geneva. In any event, he suggested that Mr. Gromyko at least would be able to "think out loud." In response to the repeated suggestion that it would be helpful if we could have a reaction before then, Ambassador Dobrynin said he would try

to get one by the 10th and that he would be returning to Moscow himself on the 12 or 13th.<sup>5</sup>

Cyrus R. Vance

Paul C. Warnke<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Dobrynin and Warnke met on May 9, and the Soviet Ambassador reiterated his concerns as expressed in this memorandum. He told Warnke he was leaving for Moscow on May 13 and hoped to talk with Gromyko about SALT. (Memorandum from Warnke to Vance, May 9; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that only Warnke signed.

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## 165. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated.

### ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW SALT TWO CONCEPT

The following material discusses the features of the new SALT TWO concept, makes several observations on its overall relative merit, and offers some variations that may improve its chances of success.

#### *Discussion of the Features of the New SALT TWO Concept*

*Reductions.* The proposed aggregate level (2200) and MIRV level (1200) would be a significant improvement over the Vladivostok levels which clearly exceed our strategic requirements.

The reduction to 2200 will not impact on planned US programs; a few mothballed B–52's will have to be eliminated initially with additional older systems (older B–52's, Titan, and Polaris) eliminated in the early 1980's if B–1 and Trident are deployed. On the other hand, the Soviets will be required to eliminate immediately about 300 delivery vehicles.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 3–4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Brzezinski sent this paper to Carter under cover of an April 30 memorandum, noting that he had his “systems analysis people do a short analysis of the new SALT TWO concept.” He also included a table comparing the new proposal to the comprehensive proposal and the current Soviet position, which is printed as an attachment below. Carter wrote on this covering memorandum: “Good analysis. J.” (Ibid.)

The first impact of the MIRV limit would occur in mid-1983 when the initiation of sea trials for the 7th Trident submarine would put the US over the 1200 MIRV limit.<sup>2</sup>

*Throw Weight.* The limit of 190 MIRVed MLBMs will essentially freeze the Soviet MLBM modernization program since about 190 MLBM silos will have completed conversion or be under conversion to the SS-18 configuration by early fall. This could set the stage for a SALT THREE agreement in which the Soviets agree to tear down the remaining unconverted SS-9 silos and possibly some of the converted SS-18's.

*Mobile ICBMs.* A ban on mobile ICBM deployment for two years would clearly have no impact on the current US M-X development program. However, it could bias Congressional attitudes toward continued funding of the M-X since support for the program is currently somewhat tenuous. Loss of the M-X program at this time would be very undesirable since it would remove a major source of our SALT THREE bargaining leverage.

The two-year mobile deployment ban is unlikely to have any impact on the Soviet mobile ICBM program since they apparently don't plan to deploy the current model of the SS-X-16 in a mobile mode. The first flight tests of a new model of the 16 and a new larger solid-fuel ICBM, either of which could be the Soviet mobile ICBM, are expected sometime this year. However, the proposed deployment ban will ensure that the Soviets do not take the step of deploying a mobile ICBM, a step which could make a total ban on mobile ICBMs (such as that contained in our comprehensive Moscow proposal) difficult to achieve.

Since our mobile M-X would not be ready for deployment before 1985 and since the Soviets offered to ban mobile ICBM deployment through 1985, extension of this new Interim Agreement well beyond 1979 could be acceptable from the mobile ICBM standpoint. However, without any restrictions on improvements to existing ICBMs, US silo-based ICBM survivability could start to degrade in the early 1980's. Thus, we might want the right to deploy mobile ICBMs after 1985.

*ICBM Modernization.* The ban on testing of new MIRVed ICBMs will have no impact on US programs since the M-X is not scheduled to enter testing until 1981. Similarly, it would not have a major impact on the Soviets even though they are expected to start testing of a new solid-fueled ICBM later this year and two new liquid-fueled ICBMs (one light, one heavy) in 1978 or 1979. The reason for this lack of impact is that the missiles could easily be tested with single RVs or as MRVs (multiple RVs without independent targeting) to escape the ban on

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<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined "7th Trident submarine."

testing new MIRVed ICBMs. In fact, the first five tests of the SS–17 and first nine tests of the SS–18 were unMIRVed. Permitting MRV tests also raises some verification problems. This argues strongly for dropping the “MIRVed” criterion in the proposed testing ban in which case the impact on the Soviet ICBM R&D program would be substantial.<sup>3</sup>

Extension of the two-year agreement beyond 1979 could have a major impact on the momentum of the Soviet ICBM modernization program, even if they could test new unMIRVed ICBMs.

*ALCMs.* The proposed ban on ALCMs over 2500 km on heavy bombers and the 250 limit on platforms would have no impact on the US ALCM program for the period through October 1979. Even if extended beyond 1979, the 2500 km range limit would only require a small decrease in the ALCM B design range (currently 2800 km—the ALCM A range is 1500 km). Similarly, extension of the 250 platform limit beyond 1979 would have little impact since only the 270 B–52G/H’s are currently serious candidates for long-range ALCM deployment.

The 600 km limit on ALCMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers would not have any impact on US programs for the period through October 1979 (although it would restrict air-launched cruise missile tests beyond 600 km to B–52’s or B–1’s). If the agreement is extended, this range limit would eventually constrain certain potential theater applications which may be of interest in the late 1980’s. A 600 km limit on ALCMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers would not impact on the Soviets for the period through 1979. However, in the long term, it would provide the desired constraint on Backfire intercontinental capability.

*SLCMs and GLCMs.* To date, the longest SLCM/GLCM test has been to a range of about 1500 km (although the test platform was an aircraft). A 600 km SLCM/GLCM testing limit would significantly impact on the planned test program, since virtually all the roughly 80 tests planned for the next two and one half years would be to ranges in excess of 600 km. Restricting these tests to 600 km would not constrain verification of the missile’s maximum range capability (which is already complete) but would limit the ability to fully test the guidance and terrain following systems. The overall impact would probably be to delay system IOC (currently 1980) by at most a year.

In light of the above situation, extension beyond 1979 could make the SLCM/GLCM limits much more attractive to the Soviets.

*Backfire.* By October of 1979, the Soviets will only have produced about 180 Backfires. As a consequence, the proposed 250 limit on Back-

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<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote “Ban testing new ICBM’s” in the margin next to this paragraph.

fire would not impact the production program unless it were extended well beyond 1979. (The 250 production figure will be reached in the fall of 1981.)<sup>4</sup>

The proposed Backfire collateral constraints are:

- A ban on training with intercontinental bomber forces.
- A ban on training with the tankers from the intercontinental bomber forces or tankers of comparable capability.
- A ban on utilization of bases north of 63° N. latitude.
- A ban on improvements in range/payload capability.
- A ban on equipping Backfires with ALCMs over 600 km.

These constraints should severely restrict the potential utilization of the Backfire in an intercontinental role, although the tanker restriction does have a loophole in that it would still permit tankers of substantial capacity. Such tankers could probably be utilized to give the Backfire some two-way intercontinental capability; thus a complete ban on Backfire tankers may be preferable.

With the exception of the 63° N. latitude basing restriction, none of the proposed constraints would severely restrict planned employment of the Backfire force. Since the Soviets currently stage naval aviation Backfires and other medium bombers through a base on the Kola Peninsula (about 66° N. latitude), the proposed basing restriction would severely restrict Backfire's utilization as a naval weapon system in the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic. Since this is not our intention and is certain to meet strong Soviet objection, it might be preferable to restrict basing to 63° N. (or possibly even 60° N.) but permit staging through a single naval air base at higher latitude.

#### *Observations on the Relative Impact of the New SALT TWO Concept*

A major difference between the comprehensive Moscow proposal and the new concept is the change in the impact on the Soviet ICBM modernization program. Whereas the comprehensive proposal stopped this modernization program in its tracks, the new concept would place numerical constraints only on the MLBM modernization program and more importantly would permit improvements to existing ICBMs and unlimited testing which could give them a counterforce capability. However, the commitment to freeze ICBM modernization in SALT THREE could lead to restoration of the impact of the comprehensive agreement.

A second significant change is the reduced range limit placed on SLCMs and GLCMs. This change will impact sharply on our own cruise missile testing program as well as on the cruise missile interests

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<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined "250" and "1981."



of our NATO allies who will be concerned about extension of the limits and prejudicing the cruise missile outcome in SALT THREE.

Finally, the apparent linkage between heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs and the Backfire will have the effect of more sharply identifying the Backfire as a strategic system *not* included in the aggregate—which may not be in our interest in the ratification proceedings.

From the Soviets' perspective, the most important features of the new concept will probably be the prejudicial nature of the numerical limits on Backfire and the lack of significant restrictions on the number of heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs. They will probably recognize that the MIRVed ICBM testing restrictions in this proposal will not have a significant impact on their new programs, at least through 1979. They may even view extension of these restrictions as in their interest since it would kill the M-X program while they would be free to improve their SS-17, 18, and 19.

#### *Possible Variations on the New Proposal*

As indicated above, we believe the ban on testing "new MIRVed ICBMs" should be changed to a ban on testing "new ICBMs." In addition, the loophole on Backfire tankers should be closed and we should consider permitting Backfire staging (but not basing) through a single naval air base above 63° N. latitude.

An additional variation that we would suggest making would be to replace the current linkage between Backfire and heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs by a linkage between MLBMs and such heavy bombers. The basis of this linkage would be to tie the largest throw weight systems on the US side to the largest throw weight systems on the Soviet side. This linkage would not have the political disadvantage of linking Backfire explicitly with a strategic system, and would balance the MLBM asymmetry favoring the Soviets with a heavy bomber/long-range ALCM asymmetry for the United States. A limit of 200 would be of interest.<sup>5</sup>

Consideration might also be given to extending the agreement for another year. This would not have a substantial impact, would permit unhurried ratification, and allow the time which may be needed for negotiation of SALT THREE.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Summary Assessment*

In sum, the proposal does not appear to compromise any of our own or our allies' most important near-term interests. At the same time,

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<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined the last sentence of this paragraph.

<sup>6</sup> Carter wrote "3 years" in the margin next to this paragraph.

it should be more attractive to the Soviets and set the stage for a more comprehensive SALT THREE agreement.

### Attachment

Washington, undated.

	SOVIET POSITION	MOSCOW COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL	NEW SALT TWO CONCEPT
Expiration Date	December 1985	December 1985	December 1985 for aggregate and MIRV level; October 1979 <sup>7</sup> for other Measures.
Aggregate	2400	1800–2000	2200
MIRV Level	1320	1100–1200 550 MIRVed ICBMs	1200
Throw Weight	—	Limit of 150 MLBMs	Limit of 190 MIRVed MLBMs
Mobile ICBMs	Ban Deployment	Ban Development, Testing, and Deployment	Ban Deployment
ICBM Modernization	—	Ban Modifications of Existing ICBMs and Limit Flight Tests to 6 Per Year; Ban Testing and Deployment of New ICBMs	Ban Testing and Deployment of New MIRVed ICBMs
SLBM Modernization	—	Limit Flight Tests of Existing and New SLBMs to 6 Per Year	—
ALCMs on Heavy Bombers	Ban Over 2500 km; Count Platforms in 1320	Ban Over 2500 km	Ban Over 2500 km; Limit of 250 Platforms
ALCMs on Aircraft Other Than Heavy Bombers	Ban Over 600 km	Ban Over 600 km	Ban Over 600 km
SLCMs and GLCMs	Ban Over 600 km	Ban Over 2500 km	Ban Testing Over 600 km; Ban Deployment of SLCMs/GLCMs with Ranges Over 600 km

<sup>7</sup> Carter underlined “October 1979” and wrote “Δ to 1980” in the margin.

Backfire	—	No Deployment as a Strategic Weapon; Collateral Constraints	Production Limit of 250; No Deployment as a Strategic Weapon; Collateral Constraints
Specific Commitments to Follow-on Negotiations	—	None	Substantial Reductions Plus ICBM Modernization Freeze

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## 166. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 3, 1977.

### Soviet Views of the Strategic Implications of the US Moscow Proposals

From the Soviet perspective, the arms control proposals presented in Moscow in March left a lot to be desired.

—The comprehensive proposal appeared to be biased in favor of the US because it required immediate sacrifices in Soviet programs in return for future US sacrifices.

—The Vladivostok-based proposal did not resolve the cruise missile issue, and the Soviets are determined to constrain the US lead in this new area of strategic competition.

This memorandum examines Soviet perceptions of these proposals in terms of

- the general Soviet approach to strategic forces,
- the specific elements of the proposals.

#### *General Soviet Approach to Strategic Forces*

Soviet objectives for SALT—and for the strategic competition generally—do not parallel those of the US:

—Soviet military doctrine, applied to nuclear as well as conventional conflict, stresses deterrence through the ability to fight, survive, and win a war. Counterforce capabilities are central to this doctrine.

—Accordingly, the Soviets almost certainly do *not* share the purpose of the US proposal, to “achieve a greater measure of strategic sta-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret. This memorandum is unsigned and without attribution. Carter wrote “Zbig—excellent. J” at the top of the first page.

bility through reductions in the potential vulnerability of fixed ICBMs on both sides.”

—Visible military power is important to the Soviets for its political as well as its military utility. Reduced levels of military strength, even if paralleled by US cuts, would be difficult for the Soviets.

—ICBMs are the backbone of the Soviet strategic force. They offer the Soviets the best combination of attributes necessary for war-fighting. Heavy ICBMs are seen by the Soviets as giving them a large advantage—both for their war-fighting utility and for their political and bargaining value.

—The proposed distribution of MIRVs among ICBMs and SLBMs runs counter to this priority and to Soviet planning. Programs for MIRVing the ICBM force are well advanced, whereas MIRVs are only now being introduced in the SLBM force.

—The Soviets are concerned about US technological breakthroughs that could quickly shift the strategic balance against them. They view the strategic cruise missile in this light.

More broadly, the primary Soviet objective in SALT is not to create a stable strategic relationship. Their thinking still runs in terms of advantage, however distant its attainment may appear.

This does not necessarily mean that the USSR will agree only to terms that clearly favor its interests one-sidedly. For the Soviets, SALT agreements also serve their political interest in fostering bilateral relations and détente.

In short, any agreements of substance between the USSR and US will probably have to be based not on shared objectives but on finding measures which serve the differing objectives of each.

### *Appraisal of the Comprehensive Proposal*

*Aggregate Limit of 1800–2000*—A ceiling at this level might well be below what the Soviets consider necessary for an adequate force posture at this time. Over the past ten years they have expended considerable resources in building their strategic forces to the existing levels of about 2500 strategic delivery vehicles. Moreover, the Soviets would be forced to alter drastically their current strategic force plan. Under this ceiling the Soviets would, at a minimum, be required to dismantle 500 to 700 delivery vehicles, including some of their more modern ones—probably Y-class SSBNs and silo-based ICBMs such as the modernized SS-11. Reductions on this scale would certainly meet strong opposition by the defense establishment.

The Soviets have argued that the deeper the cut, the greater the relative importance of other weapon systems, not regulated by SALT, that can strike Soviet territory. They identify three classes of such systems:

- US forward-based systems
- US cruise missiles
- third-country forces (China, France, and the UK).

The Soviets can partially compensate for third country threats with weapons of their own (such as the SS-X-20) which would not be restricted by SALT. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that they see bargaining utility in these arguments, we believe that, from the Soviet perspective, they also reflect concerns that militate against substantial reductions.

*MIRV Limit of 1100–1200*—The Soviets evidently considered a lower MIRV limit prior to the establishment of 1320 at Vladivostok in 1974. Because they are still in the early stages of their MIRV deployment program, these lower limits would have been seen as desirable, particularly if they constrained US MIRV programs more than their own.

*Reduction of MLBMs to 150*—The Soviets have 326 launchers for modern large ballistic missiles—including 18 SS-9s at the Tyuratam test range—completed or in the process of conversion—in their operational force. About 150 of these are for the SS-18. We estimate that they intend all 308 MLBMs at deployed complexes to be SS-18s—the key system for implementing their counterforce strategy. They are also aware of the bargaining value of this system. The US proposal doubtless appeared to them as a demand for an unrequited concession, or, at best, a major present concession for a future US one—abandonment of M-X.

*Freeze deployment of MIRVed ICBMs at 550 (including 150 MLBMs)*—The Soviets apparently plan to field about 900 of their new ICBMs, the majority of them MIRVed.<sup>2</sup> A ceiling on deployment at 550 in combination with the MLBM limits would require drastic cutbacks in their ongoing ICBM programs. As compensation, they saw themselves offered only US future self-denial in further MIRVing of its ICBMs. In their eyes, the US is demanding that the USSR adopt the mix of ICBM and SLBM forces that the Americans have chosen for themselves, i.e., under a 1100–1200 MIRV limit, 550 ICBMs and the balance in SLBMs. One result—given the lag in Soviet SLBM MIRVing—would be to delay by several years Soviet attainment of the permitted MIRV ceilings.

*Ban modifications to ICBMs, limit flight tests to six each for ICBMs and SLBMs, and prohibit testing and deployment of new ICBMs*—Soviet practice has been to develop several variants of their missiles and to test all systems extensively. By 1980, the Soviets apparently plan to have deployed about 10 ICBM variants and half a dozen SLBM variants. Under the proposed flight test limit, the Soviets would be unable to test each

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<sup>2</sup> This total is made up of about 600 SS-17s and SS-19s plus 308 SS-18s. Under the counting rules proposed by the US, all SS-17, -18, and -19 launchers would be counted under the MIRV ceilings, though we expect the Soviets to deploy some number of single-warhead missiles. [Footnote is in the original.]

of their existing missile variants even once a year, leading to loss of confidence in the systems and crew proficiency. In an implied admission of qualitative inferiority, Gromyko has said that a mutual ban on missile modernization would lock the USSR into a disadvantageous position.

Under the ban on new missiles, the Soviets would have to cancel several new systems now under development. In return, the US would abandon the M-X program, in itself a welcome development for the USSR but probably not of equivalent value when ranged against all of the concessions required of the USSR.

*Ban mobile ICBMs*—Subsequent to the Interim Agreement, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to ban land-mobile ICBMs. They have developed a mobile version of the SS-X-16 and apparently are keeping their deployment options open, at least pending the outcome of SALT negotiations.

*Ban cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2500 km*—The significant US qualitative advantage in cruise missile technology causes the Soviets extraordinary concern. If these systems are not constrained, they see the US as possibly gaining a significant strategic advantage in the 1980s. By proposing a simple restriction of 2500 km, regardless of basing mode, the current US proposal appeared to the Soviets to be a step backward from progress they thought had been achieved on cruise missile limitations.<sup>3</sup>

*Collateral constraints on Backfire bombers*—The Soviets doubtless welcomed this proposal as signifying an end to US efforts to count Backfires in the aggregate or establish side numerical limits on them. They have offered some assurances that Backfire would not be given an intercontinental capability and are probably willing to consider specific collateral constraints.

#### *Appraisal of the Vladivostok-Based Proposal*

The key to Soviet rejection of this proposal is almost certainly its failure to accommodate their concerns over US cruise missiles. The proposal in other respects, including token reductions in the aggregate ceiling, appears to suit Soviet interests. Their rejection, then, is a clear indication of the strength of their attitude on cruise missiles. Deferral of the question of Backfire—a system which they contend should not be

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<sup>3</sup> During the post-Vladivostok negotiations, the sides tentatively agreed to ban intercontinental cruise missiles, to permit air-launched cruise missiles with ranges up to 2500 kms on heavy bombers (ALCMs), and to restrict cruise missiles on submarines (SLCMs) to ranges of 600 kms or less. Cruise missiles on surface ships (SLCMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) remained outstanding issues, with the Soviets wanting range restrictions to 600 kms or less and the US wanting limits of 2500 kms. [Footnote is in the original.]

included in SALT—does not in the Soviet view, compensate for an absence of cruise missile restrictions.

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## 167. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Vance met in Geneva from May 18 to 20, 1977, to discuss SALT II and the Middle East. According to the memorandum of conversation of the first meeting on May 18 at 3 p.m., “the Secretary thought it would be a good procedure to start exchanging views without presenting anything as formal as a proposal. He thought that it would be useful for him and the Foreign Minister to think out loud together, as it were, in an effort to get a better understanding of each other’s views and to see if they could find common ground.” Gromyko commented in his introductory remarks, “Unfortunately, the proposals which the Secretary had brought with him to Moscow were of such a one-sided nature that their implementation would have been of benefit to the United States only. It would have harmed the security interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership had said this to the Secretary in Moscow, and yet, after the meeting some statements made in Washington concerning the results of the talks had clearly distorted the true state of affairs. The Soviet leadership could not understand why it had been necessary with lightning speed to offer comments on these talks, comments that were definitively one-sided. This had simply forced the Soviet side to respond.” At the end of the meeting, Vance proposed structuring the SALT II negotiations around three elements: an Interim Agreement, which would be valid for two years; a Treaty, which would be valid until 1985; and a Statement of Principles for SALT III, which would be signed by both parties. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Box 17, 3/25/77–4/2/77 Vance Trip to Moscow: 5/10–31/77)

The second meeting, held on May 19 at 11 a.m., focused on Vance’s three-part framework. The memorandum of conversation noted: “The Secretary thought that Gromyko had indicated yesterday that in general terms the three-part structure would be acceptable. In his view, this was an important and constructive step, because it would allow us now to put our views in a structure and to move seriously to resolve remaining differences.” Gromyko, however, was not enamored with the three-part approach. Later in that same conversation, he remarked: “Suddenly three documents had made their appearance instead of one

comprehensive document—a Treaty—which had been under discussion all along. Then the Secretary had proceeded to discuss a list of six specific items on which there were differences [long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers, mobile missiles, Backfire, heavy missiles, overall aggregates, and the Joint Statement of Principles]. He [Gromyko] had difficulty in understanding such an approach.” (Ibid.)

Later that day, Gromyko and Vance met at 5 p.m., to discuss the Middle East. In their fourth meeting, held on May 20 at 11 a.m., Gromyko responded to Vance’s framework and the six “problem” areas that he had discussed the previous day. Gromyko began by saying that “he and his colleagues had carefully considered everything the Secretary had said here in Geneva, in particular the positions presented at yesterday’s meeting. He had to say that on the whole these positions were still of a lopsided nature. In many aspects they were aimed at changing the balance of interests found during the Vladivostok meeting and in the course of subsequent negotiations to the one-sided benefit of the United States.” Gromyko also continued to take issue with the format, stating that “the Soviet side believed it to be most appropriate and correct to formalize and include all the questions relating to the subject of our negotiations in one single document, an Agreement or a Treaty, to last until 1985.” (Ibid.)

In their final meeting on May 20 at 5:45 p.m., Vance and Gromyko offered their concluding remarks. With regard to the framework, Vance said that the United States was willing to accept the proposed Soviet Protocol to the Treaty in lieu of an Interim Agreement. However, he continued to discuss SALT II in his three-part framework. Gromyko responded that he agreed to a treaty and a protocol, but no additional components. He reflected on the meetings by stating: “in spite of the fact that with regard to some questions the positions of the two sides had come closer together (and he noted that both sides had said so), a great deal of work would still be required, a great deal of assiduous and very hard and persistent work would be required in order to ensure a successful outcome of our negotiations.” A discussion of the communiqué concluded their negotiations. (Ibid.) The Joint Communiqué was issued in Geneva on May 21; for the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1977, page 633.



**168. Memorandum From Roger Molander and Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1977.

SUBJECT

US Position in SALT

On the basis of the outcome of the Geneva discussions between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko (outlined in the table at Tab A),<sup>2</sup> there appear to be two issues on which the sides are in serious disagreement:

—*ALCMs*, where the Soviets are continuing to insist that ALCMs should be covered in the 1985 agreement and that heavy bombers equipped with 600–2500 km ALCMs should be counted in the MIRV total; and

—*MLBMs*, where the Soviets have strongly rejected our “proposal” for a sublimit of 190 MIRVed MLBMs in the interim protocol.

In addition, it is also important to note that the Soviets may not be correctly interpreting our ambiguous proposal for interim testing and deployment limits on SLCMs and GLCMs; i.e., they may believe we have proposed a ban on testing and deployment of SLCMs and GLCMs *with a range* in excess of 600 km or that our proposal would preclude testing of the Tomahawk cruise missile (our SLCM/GLCM) from aircraft.

Beyond these issues, the remaining issues do not appear unresolvable:

—*Aggregate*. The sides are not far apart and a compromise on this issue appears readily achievable.

—*MIRV Level*. The Soviets are either indifferent to reductions or have a preference for 1320.

—*New ICBMs*. The Soviet willingness to ban the testing of “new types of ICBMs” may not extend to new versions of existing ICBMs, which we would prefer. Our “thoughts” on this issue have been ambiguous but biased toward only covering new types of ICBMs, since our Moscow proposal made a distinction between “new ICBMs” and modified versions of existing ICBMs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File. Box 52, SALT: 5–6/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached; not found.

—*Backfire*. The Soviets apparently view our proposed collateral constraints (with the exception of the ban on using bases above 60° N. latitude) as less restrictive than the assurances they have offered—in which case they should be willing to include such constraints in a unilateral statement (which would appear to be an acceptable procedure for assuring such constraints). Although they will continue to resist specifying a numerical limit on Backfire, they may give us the 1985 production figure or indicate that they will not increase the current production rate (which is more constraining than a 250 limit for three years).

#### *Possible Next Steps*

Before setting forth an explicit position in the formal SALT negotiations (as opposed to our “thinking out loud” posture), we may wish to take advantage of the progress that was made in Geneva to make an effort to resolve the two remaining difficult issues (ALCMs and MLBMs) identified above. In this context, a proposal which seeks to forge a compromise between the Soviet interest in limiting ALCMs in the 1985 agreement and our interest in MLBM limits could be of interest. Specifically, we could offer to include *in the 1985 agreement* the following limitations:

—Heavy bombers equipped with 600–2500 km ALCMs and MIRVed MLBMs would be limited to an aggregate total not to exceed 190 (or 200).

—However, the limit on no new MLBMs would be retained so that the US would continue to forego the right to MLBMs.

If we propose these limitations, the Soviets’ current unilateral advantage in MLBMs would be reduced to simply a freedom-to-mix from MLBMs to heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs that we would not have. In fact, we might want the Soviets to have this slight advantage since trading in MIRVed MLBMs for ALCM-carrying heavy bombers would be a move toward more stabilizing systems.

Finally, while the 190 figure is less than our proposal for 250 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers, 190 such aircraft would provide a major ALCM force (nearly 4000 ALCMs at 20 per B-52) and a good compromise on the Vladivostok “air-to-surface missiles” disagreement.

In addition to considering a move such as that outlined above, it is clear that we should make our SLCM/GLCM position clear to the Soviets so that their offer to accept our “out loud thoughts” on SLCMs and GLCMs does not disappear when the sides put forth differing interpretations of these “thoughts.”

**169. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1977.

**SUBJECT**

An Assessment of Soviet Perceptions on SALT—May 1977

You asked for an assessment of probable Soviet reactions to the latest US positions on SALT as follows:

—Strategic cruise missiles are now central to Soviet security/arms control concerns. The Soviets probably will press hard to incorporate limits on air-launched cruise missiles in the treaty through 1985 rather than in the three-year protocol.

—The strong Soviet resistance to interference with their ongoing strategic programs makes any but token reductions in force levels in SALT II unlikely.

—The Soviets are unlikely to agree to substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs in SALT II, although they might accept a token cut.

—The Soviets probably see a mobile ICBM ban—which would head off a mobile M–X—as an attractive exchange for not deploying (and having to count) their own already-developed SS–X–16 ICBM.

—Given their concern about US technological advantages, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will agree to any constraints on ICBM testing which would impede materially their planned improvements in current systems or development of new systems. Both new and modified Soviet ICBMs will be ready for initial flight testing during the period of the protocol. The Soviets may stick to the position that only new MIRVed ICBMs should not be tested during that time. They could meet substantially all of their missile test objectives in this period without testing a new missile with an actual MIRV payload. They could also claim—and the US would be hard put to disprove—that all their testing during the protocol period concerned modified rather than new ICBMs.

—The Soviets may give unilateral assurances that the Backfire bomber will not be deployed for a strategic role. But they will resist any collateral constraints that would limit its use in other roles, and they will not include Backfire in any way in a formal treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 5–6/77. Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote a note on the top of the first page asking Brzezinski to give copies to Vance and Warnke. In a June 6 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hyland characterized this CIA memorandum as a “disappointing and cautious piece of analysis” that simply stated the Soviet position and suggested that nothing more could be expected except “some minor tuning.” Hyland concluded that the “Soviets have only begun to reveal their bargaining position, and they will take the negotiations down to the wire in September.” Then, Hyland believed, “we will discover the bottom line.” (Ibid., Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 17)

—In further negotiations, the Soviets will use the issue of forward-based systems as a weapon to try to keep the US close to the Vladivostok framework.

The rationale behind these predictions of probable Soviet reactions is discussed below.

### *Cruise Missile Limitations*

As the Soviet appreciation for the extent of the US lead in cruise missile technology has matured, this issue has increasingly assumed a central position in their SALT concerns. Their guiding principle with respect to cruise missiles in the post-Vladivostok negotiations, in their reaction to the US proposals in March, and in their own May proposals is to prevent the US from achieving a strategic advantage by adding this new dimension to the threat.

This concern suggests that the Soviets may offer a somewhat higher price for cruise missile limitations in future bargaining. Because the US Geneva position offers some limitations, they will be encouraged to explore the subject further. In connection with the US linkage between cruise missile limitations and Soviet reductions in heavy ICBMs, they may ease their position that the number of heavy ICBMs has been agreed and is not subject to revision, but any changes here will probably be minor.

Another real issue for the Soviets is the duration of constraints on air-launched cruise missiles. The strength of the Soviet attitude on placing air-launched cruise missile limitations in the Treaty rather than the protocol probably is rooted in the leverage they ascribe to the US. Currently, before a SALT II agreement—and again in 1985, when all issues once more will be open to negotiation—the Soviets themselves hold some strong cards. But if they bargain their strengths into a long-term agreement and permit cruise missiles to be limited only for three years, then they foresee the US as having a disproportionate advantage in later negotiations to replace the protocol.

The greatest threat the Soviets see from cruise missiles is in the sea and land-launched versions. To them, air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers do not by themselves tip the strategic balance qualitatively, because the number of heavy bombers will be constrained by the aggregate limit and, under the Soviet proposals, would be counted as MIRVed systems. But surface-launched missiles not limited by SALT would affect the balance because of their potential for deployment by the US and its allies in vast numbers within range of targets in the USSR. Their agreement that cruise missiles with a range less than 600 km would not be limited is necessary to protect their own anti-ship cruise missiles and probably promoted by a view that short-range missiles do not pose a serious threat to the USSR.

The Soviet position that heavy bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles should be counted in the MIRV total appears to be an indirect attempt to limit further the number of US ICBM and SLBM MIRVs as well as to constrain cruise missile deployments. This point and the insistence that cruise missile limits extend to 1985 will probably emerge as the hardest elements of future Soviet bargaining on cruise missiles.

#### *Heavy ICBMs*

The SS-18 heavy ICBM is seen by the Soviets as the key system for implementing a counterforce strategy. These missiles probably are regarded highly both for their ability to destroy hardened targets and for their political value. The Soviets evidently intend to have completed the conversion of all 308 SS-9 launchers at operational complexes to SS-18s by the end of 1980.

The US proposal to restrict conversion to 190 for the duration of the protocol probably is seen by the Soviets as some movement forward from the comprehensive proposal of March 1976. But the Soviet position remains that the issue was settled in the first Interim Agreement of 1972 and at Vladivostok, and that further limitations on heavy ICBMs are unacceptable. The Soviets probably will remain wedded to this position with the possible exception of some token alterations in response to other US concessions. "Unofficial" Soviet spokesmen have mentioned recently the possibility of a ten percent cut in heavy missiles.

#### *Mobile ICBMs*

The Soviet proposal that the deployment of mobile ICBMs be banned during the three-year period of the protocol is consistent with their past record.

While the Soviets have developed a mobile ICBM—the SS-X-16—and the US has not, there is probably some ambivalence in their attitude toward its deployment. The SS-X-16 is limited in capabilities when compared to the other fourth-generation Soviet ICBMs, but we believe some of them are being produced. The Soviets probably would forego the deployment of the SS-X-16 if they were convinced that to do so would prevent US development of the mobile M-X ICBM.

As for the US position that the Soviets should make arrangements for verifying that launchers for the SS-X-20 are not capable of launching the SS-X-16, the Soviet position is that, because the SS-X-20 is not an ICBM, it is not subject to negotiations. The Soviets apparently view the SS-X-20 in the same light as the Backfire and do not wish to set a precedent of negotiating on what they claim to be a peripheral attack weapon. Eventually, they might provide some unilateral extra-

treaty assistance on this point as they evidently are willing to do with the Backfire.

The Soviet position contained no prohibition on *development* of mobile ICBMs, and they did not respond to the US proposal banning further tests of the SS-X-16. Their apparent acceptance of a ban on tests of *new* MIRVed ICBMs, in their eyes, would probably not prohibit tests of the modified version of the SS-X-16 they are developing, even if it carries MIRVs. We believe that the Soviets would not consider a modified SS-X-16 to be a new ICBM.

### *Reductions*

The US proposed to reduce the Vladivostok aggregate and MIRV limits by 240 and 120 respectively, with reductions to be completed by October 1979. The Soviets responded by proposing a reduction of 150 in the aggregate, with dismantling not to begin until after 1980.

To meet either of these lower aggregate limits, the Soviets would have to retire systems such as Y-class SSBNs, and SS-11 or SS-13 ICBMs. They would be reluctant to dismantle these systems, which still have many years of useful service. Yet they recognize the need, from a political standpoint, to respond to the idea of reductions.

Their Geneva move to put off any reductions until after 1980 probably reflects their commitment to current plans and programs; 1980 marks the last year of the current five-year plan. Changes are harder for the USSR—with its tradition of planning, which it conducts in five-year blocks—than for the US—which revises its five-year projections annually in a rolling fashion, although they could nonetheless make some alterations.

Equally important, if the US is to be freed of cruise missile constraints when the protocol expires in 1980, the Soviets do not want at that time to be in the position of already having made substantial reductions in their own intercontinental systems.

Finally, the Soviets have a general resistance to reductions because, to reach an equal lower ceiling, they would have to make cuts, whereas the US would not.

The Soviets did not react to the US proposal regarding a lower MIRV limit. During the negotiations leading up to Vladivostok, it appeared that they were willing to accept MIRV limits lower than 1320. Our best estimate now is that—under SALT II based on Vladivostok—they intend to field close to 1300 MIRVed systems by about the mid-1980s.

The Soviets might be willing to accept reduction of 120 from the 1320 MIRV limit since it would have a corresponding dampening effect on US MIRV programs and, under their proposal, on deployment of long-range air-launched cruise missiles. The key to Soviet acceptance of

lower MIRV limits probably lies in whether the US agrees to count heavy bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles in the MIRV total.

The Soviets have indicated a willingness to accept the US MIRV counting rule that would require them to include in the MIRV total some systems which actually contain single RVs. Should they accept a reduction in MIRVed systems from Vladivostok levels, they could become more resistant to the US counting rule, since at lower levels there would be a penalty imposed on their planned programs either for single RV or MIRVed versions of their newest ICBMs.

#### *Backfire*

The Soviets have steadfastly contended that the Backfire bomber is not a strategic system, and they have been unmoved by US arguments that it *could* be used for intercontinental attack. They will continue to adhere to the principle that SALT is not the environment for them to make concessions on non-strategic systems. Because the US is not now insisting that Backfire be included in the formal treaty, the Soviets probably see a softening of the US position.

The Soviets probably will provide some collateral assurances not to provide a strategic role for Backfire. Assurances which deal directly with strategic performance—no new tanker force or no training with acknowledged heavy bombers—they might find palatable. Other assurances which the US has proposed—no flights north of 63° latitude or a ceiling on production—would surely be regarded by the Soviets as interference with their legitimate use of a non-strategic system and would be rejected.

#### *Testing of New ICBMs*

The Soviets have strong incentives to continue ICBM improvements during the next several years in order to narrow or overcome US technological advantages. We believe there are at least six ICBMs now under development—three we classify as modifications of existing systems, two we classify as completely new missiles, and one that is difficult to classify. Four of these systems, including the last one, probably will be ready for flight testing during the proposed period of the protocol.

The Soviets probably would expect that, under a ban on testing of “new” ICBMs, they would be able to do a great deal of testing that they could represent as involving existing ICBMs. We estimate, for example, that through modifications of existing systems the Soviets could achieve accuracies comparable to that potentially available with Minuteman III.

Given their incentives to improve their ICBM force characteristics, the Soviets would probably plan on following one of two routes under a testing ban:

—if MIRVed ICBM testing were prohibited, they could fulfill most of their requirements with single-RV tests, leaving open the option of subsequent MIRVing;

—if all “new” ICBM testing were prohibited, they could conduct considerable testing and represent it as the improvement of existing missile systems, knowing that the US would have difficulty in identifying and proving the contrary.

Moreover, we encounter many difficulties in applying the distinction between “new” and “modified” ICBMs, and some of our designations are necessarily rather arbitrary. This is due not only to limits on our information, but also to inherent difficulties in drawing a line between “new” and “modified” even in the presence of considerable data. The Soviets could be expected to stretch to the limit the definition of “modified.”

The apparent Soviet position at Geneva would ban testing of new ICBMs only if they were MIRVed. An agreement along this line would give them a different kind of maneuvering room. They could continue development of all new systems using a post-boost vehicle with little or no change in their program by conducting initial flight tests with a single RV (as they did with the SS-18 in an unconstrained environment) and achieve qualitative gains in preparation for post-protocol negotiations. Subsequent incorporation of MIRVs on a missile already tested with a post-boost vehicle could be accomplished fairly quickly and easily.

#### *Forward-Based Systems*

The Soviets believe they have a strong case—and one that could be particularly effective in influencing foreign public opinion—that US forward-based systems are a strategic asymmetry in US favor and are a proper subject for bilateral limitations on strategic arms. Gromyko made clear at Geneva that they intended to use this issue as a weapon to keep the US close to the Vladivostok framework.

If the Soviets can achieve satisfactory agreement on cruise missile limitations and on non-transfer and non-circumvention, then we expect that they would drop their demand for a US statement on forward-based systems. If they cannot achieve these aims or if the US insists on sizeable reductions in the aggregate levels before 1980, then we expect the Soviets to continue to insist on a US declaration that forward-based systems will not be increased through 1985. The second Soviet demand—that the US *reduce* forward-based systems—is one they probably will not ultimately insist on.

The much more substantial demands the Soviets raise with respect to forward-based systems if the US presses for major “revisions” of the Vladivostok Accord seem primarily designed to forestall US pressure for revisions. The Soviets probably do not expect these demands to be



met in SALT II. They will want to include them in their portion of the Joint Statement of principles that will accompany the Treaty and Protocol. The Soviets probably hope to use the US desire for reductions in intercontinental systems to force it to reconsider its long-held position that forward-based systems are not a subject for bilateral SALT negotiations.

Stansfield Turner<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**170. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Summary Report for Your Information and Reaction of the Special Coordinating Committee Meeting, June 7, 1977

TIME AND PLACE

3:30 p.m.–5:00 p.m., White House Situation Room

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

*State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Leslie Gelb

*Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
General George S. Brown (JCS)  
Lt. Gen. Edward Rowney (JCS)  
Walter Slocombe

*CIA*

Admiral Stanfield Turner  
Dr. Robert Bowie  
Raymond McCrory

*ACDA*

Paul Warnke  
Spurgeon Keeny

*NSC*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
William G. Hyland  
Dr. Victor Utgoff  
Dr. Roger Molander

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, RG 59, Files of Secretary of State Vance, 1977–1980, Lot File 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS Mem-cons. Top Secret; Exdis. Carter initialed the memorandum.

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Secretary Vance summarized the outcome of his meeting with Gromyko in Geneva and his view of where we stood on the major issues.<sup>2</sup> He said we had achieved an adequate framework for negotiations. He highlighted the major unresolved issues as: (a) Cruise missiles; (b) Limits on Soviet heavy missiles; (c) How to handle the Backfire question; and (d) The problem of reducing both the aggregate level of 2400 and the MIRV level of 1320. On the question of whether we should maintain our current positions or introduce modifications, all of the participants agreed that we should adhere to our current substantive position, leaving it to the Soviets to make the next move. However, it was also agreed that the Working Group would need to undertake various tasks to clarify and elaborate our position.

### *I. The Treaty Through 1985*

The SCC agreed that our position is that by October 1979 there should be a reduction in the 2400 aggregate by 10% (to 2160) and a reduction in the 1320 MIRV level down to about 1200. The Soviets might compromise on the aggregate at 2200 (from their current position of 2250) but would probably resist, at least in the immediate future, reduction in the MIRV level.

It was agreed by all participants that we should adhere to our current position, and that Secretary Vance in his discussions with Dobrynin should explore: (1) why the Soviets are resisting a reduction in the MIRV level (since it would impact on the US first); (2) the Soviet rationale for proposing a reduction to 2250; (3) the Soviet rationale for proposing "after 1980" as the effective date for reductions.

It was agreed that we should continue to reject Soviet proposals to include in the long-term treaty a limitation on heavy bomber ALCMs and to count each such bomber in the 1320 ceiling on MIRVed launchers. We will maintain our position that this was a subject for the Protocol. (As discussed below.)

### *II. The Three Year Protocol* (US and Soviet positions are summarized in the attached table)<sup>3</sup>

#### *Cruise Missiles:*

Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of whether the Soviets fully understood the linkage between our proposed 250 limit on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and a ceiling of 250 on Backfire. Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke both said that they believed this was under-

<sup>2</sup> See Document 167.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached.

stood but it was agreed that the position should be specifically reconfirmed with the Russians.

On sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles, Dr. Brzezinski asked specifically whether the Russians understood the intricacies of our position, especially on our testing of the Tomahawk missile from aircraft up to 2500 km. Secretary Vance said that he had carefully read this position into the record in Geneva but could not be sure that the Soviets fully understood it at that time. It was agreed that the best course would be to clarify our position and that Paul Warnke would undertake to do this with Dobrynin.

Dr. Brzezinski asked to what degree the Allies understood our position and the discussion that followed suggested that they did not. It was agreed we should have another round of discussions with the Allies which Paul Warnke would take care of on his way back from the Indian Ocean discussions in Moscow in late June.

Secretary Brown noted that he will be discussing cruise missiles with the Allies at the NPG in Ottawa this week. He said we would have to follow a careful line between not encouraging the Allies on cruise missiles, and not looking like we are holding back or suggesting that the cruise missile system would not be useful to the Allies.

#### *Soviet Heavy Missiles*

Secretary Vance noted that this was an extremely important aspect of our position and that we should not recede from our proposal to limit the number of MLBMs to 190. But he added that the Soviets were very strongly resisting this limitation on grounds that the question of limitations on heavy missiles had been agreed in the Vladivostok Accords.

In light of the Soviet opposition, there was a discussion of whether the same objective of limiting the buildup of Soviet ICBM counterforce could be achieved by freezing SS-17 and SS-19 silo conversion. It was agreed that we should maintain our position on limits of SS-18 silos to 190, but that the Working Group should undertake an analysis of limits on SS-17s and SS-19s as a possible alternative position.

#### *Ban on New ICBMs*

There was a discussion of whether we understood our own position on banning the testing of new ICBMs in sufficient detail. Secretary Brown asked, for example, whether a change in only the “front end” of the missile would constitute a new ICBM. It was agreed that the Working Group should prepare a paper on the alternative definitions for new ICBMs. It was also agreed that once this paper was completed and a US position firmly established, this whole subject could be taken up by the SALT Delegation in Geneva.

*Ban on the Deployment of Mobile ICBMs*

In order to help verify a ban on mobile ICBM deployment in light of the difficulties posed by the Soviet SS-20 IRBM, it was suggested that we should include a ban on mobile ICBM production—which the Soviets have indicated they could accept. [1½ lines not declassified] The SCC agreed to add this to a formal presentation of our position.

The participants also agreed that we should continue to press the Soviets to suggest satisfactory arrangements for verification, and that this issue should be pursued by the SALT Delegation in Geneva (even though no one knew what might be done in this regard). Paul Warnke noted that his counterpart Semenov would not enter into such a discussion unless instructed to do so by Moscow; therefore, Dobrynin should be asked that Moscow provide appropriate instructions to their Delegation in Geneva.

*Backfire*

On the Backfire issue, Secretary Vance said that he believed the ball was definitely in the Soviet court—that Gromyko had said he understood our positions and would think about them and specifically that he understood our concern about tankers, about training activities, and about a ceiling on the total number. On the question of how the Soviets would formalize their position on the Backfire, Secretary Vance said that what the Soviets had in mind was a unilateral statement outside the SALT framework. It was agreed that we should press the Soviets for specific language so that we would obtain a better appreciation of just what they are willing to do.

*III. Principles for SALT THREE*

On the question of how specific we should be in stating the principles for SALT THREE, it was agreed we should propose specific numbers for the aggregate and MIRV level—i.e., reductions to a level not greater than 1800–2000 for the aggregate, and 1000–1100 for the MIRV level. It was agreed that the Working Group should now develop specific language for the proposed principles. The issue of whether the statement of principles should be only those on which both sides could agree or whether each side would put in certain unilateral statements was left for later SCC consideration.

*IV. On Negotiating Strategy*

There was agreement that we should, in general, sit tight for now and let the Soviets come to us. In particular we would listen to what Dobrynin might have to say on SALT in a meeting scheduled for next week. There was also an agreement that it would not be a wise tactic to press the Soviets to put their position into writing. Secretary Vance

noted that he would meet twice with Gromyko, first between the 1st and 10th of September and then later in September in the US.

#### V. *Other Issues*

##### *Soviet Silo Concealment*

It was agreed that possible concealment practices by the Soviets at ICBM sites, if widespread, would be contrary to the spirit of the present agreement and not a precedent that we would like to see established for the next agreement.

It was agreed that this issue should be pressed with the Soviets, both as part of the SALT TWO negotiations and by the SALT Standing Consultative Commission.

##### *Non-Circumvention/Non-Transfer*

It was agreed that the Working Group should analyze possible approaches and work up language to prepare for Paul Warnke's consultation with our Allies.

##### *MIRV Verification*

The Soviets have indicated that they can accept our MIRV counting rules if the 120 SS-19 type launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk (which we believe currently contain SS-11s) are made an exception to those rules. Paul Warnke proposes that we ask the Soviets to provide us with a description of any arrangements that they could undertake to satisfy us that these silos, which are also used for the MIRVed SS-19, are not in fact converted to SS-19s. He believes that we can undertake such a discussion without prejudice to our final decision on whether to grant an exception for these 120 silos. Secretary Brown and General Brown believe it would prejudice such a decision. They see an exception for these 120 silos as a significant US concession which might be made part of a package deal to limit Soviet MLBMs to 190.

In light of the disagreement at the meeting, the President's guidance will be sought.<sup>4</sup> In considering this issue it should be noted that, while virtually everyone is resigned to at some time making a concession on these 120 launchers, there is very little chance that the Soviets could undertake any arrangements (short of on-site inspection) [1 line not declassified]

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<sup>4</sup> Brzezinski sent Carter an undated memorandum explaining this disagreement and asking for his decision. Carter approved an option that reads: "Do not make any overtures to the Soviet on this issue at this time pending review of this issue in the context of the overall progress of the negotiations." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT, 5-6/77)

## 171. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 20, 1977, 3–4:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Leslie Gelb

#### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Charles W. Duncan  
Walter Slocombe

#### *JCS*

General George S. Brown  
Lt Gen William Y. Smith

#### *CIA*

Robert Bowie  
Howard Stoertz

#### *ACDA*

Paul Warnke  
Spurgeon Keeny

#### *NSC*

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
William Hyland  
Victor Utgoff  
Roger Molander

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

### *Non-Circumvention/Non-Transfer*

Paul Warnke described the state of play in Geneva with respect to the Soviet proposals for non-circumvention and non-transfer provisions. The Soviet non-circumvention provision is fairly general and refers to circumvention of the agreement through a third state or in any other manner. Their non-transfer proposal is highly restrictive and includes a commitment not to transfer strategic weapons or to assist in their development by third countries.

Warnke indicated that he feels it is time to consult with our Allies and move on these issues on the grounds that some kind of non-circumvention provision is unavoidable and that facing this issue now is preferable to leaving it to the final stages of the negotiations. He described two alternative non-circumvention provisions that we would hope would serve as a solution to both the non-circumvention and non-transfer provisions. These two provisions differ only in that one refers explicitly to the possibility of circumvention through another country, whereas the other speaks only to circumvention in general.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chronology, Box 113, SALT: 5–6/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

Warnke expressed the view that the Soviets would prefer a provision that does call out the possibility of circumvention through third countries, and that we recognize this and could also accept such a provision.

Secretary Vance indicated that he supported Paul Warnke's proposal that we take up this issue now with the Allies in anticipation of initiating negotiations with the Soviets in the near future. He indicated a preference for starting with the non-circumvention provision that does not refer to third countries and falling back to the one that does when the Soviets raise objections to the first approach.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of just what our intentions were with respect to such a non-circumvention provision. Secretary Brown indicated that he thought it was simply a political assurance that would assuage some of the Soviet concerns with respect to such issues as the Germans obtaining large numbers of GLCMs on which they might put French warheads.

Secretary Vance indicated that we also had an interest in such a provision as a basis for objecting to possible future Soviet actions. Secretary Brown pointed out that there was no danger of the Soviets circumventing the agreement through third countries.

General Brown raised a question of whether we would gain as much politically with the Soviets through such a provision as compared to the cost with our Allies, who in general would prefer no non-circumvention provision of any type. There was general agreement that such a provision is probably unavoidable and will have to be handled carefully with the Allies. Paul Warnke indicated that he thought the approach of covering both non-circumvention and non-transfer with a single non-circumvention provision could be sold to the Allies.

The SCC then discussed how Paul Warnke might respond to Allied questions about the meaning of a non-circumvention provision to include such issues as whether we could transfer cruise missiles, TERCOM, geodetic data, etc. It became clear that some of these questions were difficult to answer. In this context, David Aaron raised the issue of whether we might not be better off with some specific non-transfer provisions to remove some of the ambiguity on this issue. Secretary Brown said that he saw any provision as a vehicle which the Soviets could use for making mischief with the Alliance which he believed to be their principal objective in seeking non-circumvention and non-transfer provisions. It was agreed that we should continue on the track of a general non-circumvention provision, that this should be discussed with the Allies, and that in preparation for this discussion, the

Working Group should tune up the Q's and A's in the paper which was provided for the meeting.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Definition of Cruise Missile Range*

Dr. Brzezinski then asked for comments on the issue of the definition of cruise missile range. Secretary Brown described the fundamental problem associated with this issue; namely, the differences in flight profiles for various cruise missiles, the difficulty in verifying maximum ranges, etc. His conclusion is that we should pursue a cruise missile range definition based on the maximum system operational range or the maximum demonstrated range, whichever is greater.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the verification issue with respect to these definitions and there was general agreement that verification [*less than 1 line not declassified*] was extremely difficult. Paul Warnke indicated that we had no idea as to how the Soviets viewed this issue, although their proposals for cruise missile range limits were consistent with a maximum system operational range definition. He also described his recent discussions with Dobrynin and, in particular, Dobrynin's reaction to his emphasis on the distinction between the testing limitations and the deployment limitations in our cruise missile position. He came away with the impression that Dobrynin may, in fact, understand our position although it is still not certain. He noted that Dobrynin had once described the testing limitations as meaningless. This led to a discussion of our cruise missile range requirements and their impact on the range definition.

There was general agreement in the end that a range definition was required, that the preferred range definition appeared to be maximum system operational range or maximum demonstrated range, whichever is greater, that there was no urgency in getting to the Soviets on this issue, and that the Working Group should review its analysis of this issue on the basis of the SCC discussion.

#### *Cruise Missile Definition*

Secretary Vance offered his view that we should go with a cruise missile definition that includes all *armed* cruise missiles, but that *unarmed* cruise missiles (i.e., reconnaissance vehicles) should not be included. Secretary Brown raised the problem of using the same airframe for reconnaissance vehicles and weapons delivery systems. This led to the discussion of the possibility of demanding that reconnaissance vehicles use different airframes from armed cruise missiles.

Secretary Brown offered his view that cruise missile limitations should apply only to *nuclear-armed* cruise missiles, since otherwise the

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.



impact on conventional weapons systems was potentially too great. This led to a discussion in which David Aaron questioned whether we had really thought out what we really wanted in terms of cruise missiles. Paul Warnke defended our current approach on cruise missiles as being consistent with permitting consideration of this issue while we negotiate cruise missile limitations in a follow-on agreement. Secretary Brown expressed skepticism that we would be able to change the cruise missile limitations in such a follow-on negotiation, and that we really did need to consider at this time what the impact would be if these limitations were made part of a long-term agreement. Warnke disagreed with this view on the basis that the proposed protocol did not prejudice the eventual cruise missile limitations to that degree.

Secretary Brown expressed strong concerns about the cruise missile range/payload trade-off problem and its lack of verifiability. He argued that in the light of this problem, we should propose a cruise missile definition which was in our interest—which in his view was a definition that only covered nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

David Aaron again raised the question of when we will know what we really want in terms of cruise missiles, which led to a discussion of the tradeoff between cruise missiles and aircraft and at what point in terms of aircraft attrition (e.g., five percent) cruise missiles became a more attractive alternative.

William Hyland raised the possibility of deferring the cruise missile definition issue until the follow-on negotiations. Under this approach, the cruise missile definition would be considered at the same time that long-term cruise missile range and platform limitations were under negotiation. This approach could provide some additional negotiating leverage in the follow-on negotiations. Paul Warnke raised the question of what we would say if the Soviets accepted our current position and then asked whether the limitations covered both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles. This led to further discussion about what our long-term interest was on cruise missiles. Dr. Brzezinski questioned whether we were using them to exact concessions from the Soviets or whether we really needed these weapons systems. Discussion on this issue was inconclusive, but there was general agreement that at this point in time, it was very difficult to make a judgment about what cruise missile requirements for us and the Allies would be in the long term. On the issue of what the Soviets' interpretation might be, it was pointed out that our Moscow proposal for a 2500 km across-the-board cruise missile range limitation was explicitly stated to cover both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

It was finally agreed that views on the cruise missile definition issue would be prepared and provided to the President, with Secretary

Vance and Paul Warnke providing the argument for a definition covering all *armed* cruise missiles and Secretary Brown providing the argument for a definition that applied only to *nuclear-armed* cruise missiles.

It was also decided to notify the Congress of our intent to move on the non-circumvention issue with the Soviets.

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## 172. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 23, 1977, 12:40–2:50 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union

I had lunch today (12:40–2:50) with Ambassador Dobrynin, on his initiative. The luncheon was a compromise-picnic: I provided the White House meal and he provided vodka and caviar, a bargain that I felt was equitable to both sides.

[Omitted here is general discussion about U.S.-Soviet relations.]

Turning to SALT, Dobrynin emphasized that the Soviet position is that the United States is deliberately attempting to significantly affect the central component of the Soviet nuclear force, namely ground-based missiles. This he feels is unequal and one-sided. He also stressed that the Soviet Union made a deliberate bow to the President by proposing recently that both sides reduce their arsenals to 2250; he emphasized this point, stressing that this had not been the Soviet intention but that it was a goodwill gesture aimed at the President personally.

I stressed to Dobrynin that he should make it clear to his Soviet colleagues that there are certain things which the U.S. President can and cannot control. I cited the example of the Concorde as something which foreigners find very difficult to comprehend, and I emphasized that it is important for him to stress to Brezhnev that the Congressional defense budget process, and statements by legislators, are not under executive control in this country. Moreover, I indicated to him that the President's desire to decrease nuclear weaponry is a very genuine one, and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 1–9/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place at the White House. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled to be printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

that it had been counterproductive for the Soviet side to misconstrue it as an attempt to gain a unilateral advantage. He acknowledged this point and stated that he was trying to convince his colleagues back home of this fact.

He became somewhat indignant when I cited to him the fact that some Soviet spokesmen had spoken of deeper cuts than those proposed by Gromyko, involving at least 10%. He spoke with some vehemence to the effect that we make a mistake in taking seriously Soviet academicians who pretend to speak for the top Soviet leadership. He pointed out that the most prominent one of them has seen Brezhnev only once a year and that it is really a figment of our own imaginations to consider them as serious spokesmen for the Soviet government. He noted, for example, that the Soviet academic who publicly proposed in Moscow a mutual 10% cut was reprimanded and will not make such proposals again.

While generally concerned with the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, he was unwilling to be specific as to what ought to be done about it. He was rather inclined to press me for my views, which I did not elaborate beyond those summarized earlier. He agreed that it might be useful to try to see whether a more concerted effort could not be made in SALT in order to make certain that there is more definite progress by September; that it might be useful to take a closer look at some of the issues that provoked the greatest degree of sensitivity on both sides, differentiating between those which cannot be subject to governmental control and those which perhaps can be ameliorated by initiatives taken by the leaders; and that more thought ought to be given to the possibility of a Carter-Brezhnev meeting. We further agreed that it might be useful to have again a talk focusing not so much on specific issues but on the larger dimensions of the Soviet-American relationship, and that he would pursue this subject also in his conversations with the Secretary of State.

[Omitted here is general discussion on U.S.-Soviet relations.]

### 173. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 11, 1977, 11 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

SALT

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Leslie Gelb

##### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Charles W. Duncan  
Walter Slocombe

##### *JCS*

General George S. Brown  
Lt Col William Y. Smith

##### *CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Robert Bowie  
Ray McCrory

##### *ACDA*

Paul Warnke  
Spurgeon Keeny

##### *NSC*

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
William Hyland  
Roger Molander

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by outlining the agenda of topics to be covered. These included:

- Definitions of new types of ICBMs.
- Ban on deployment of mobile ICBMs.
- Reductions in the aggregate and MIRV level.
- Principles for SALT THREE.
- Cruise missile definitions.
- Verification and counting rules.
- Deliberate concealment (telemetry encryption, etc.).

Secretary Vance indicated that the meeting should probably also take up the issue of extension of the Interim Agreement and how this might be handled with the Soviets and the Congress.

Secretary Vance then outlined the status of the discussions that had been going on with Dobrynin with respect to those items to be sent to Geneva for consideration by the Delegations. The Soviets wanted to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, RG 59, Files of Secretary of State Vance, 1977–1980, Lot File 84D241, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski sent this Summary of Conclusions to Vance under cover of a memorandum dated July 11. (Ibid.)

take up the cruise missile issue in Geneva but we argued that this would be inappropriate and they eventually agreed. They have agreed to take up the issue of banning land-mobile ICBM deployment; however, they also want to have a ban on land-mobile ICBM testing. We indicated that we were only prepared to agree to a ban on land-mobile deployment as we had stated in the May meetings in Geneva. It was also agreed that the Delegations would take up the issue of reductions in the aggregate, pre-notification of missile test flights, and the issue of the principles for SALT THREE. The Soviets have not as yet agreed to take up the issue of reductions in the MIRV level; however, we will propose this in Geneva. They also have not as yet agreed to take up the issue of the ban on testing new types of ICBMs, however, they have agreed to take this under consideration and we will table a proposal for such a limitation in Geneva.

Paul Warnke then described his discussion in Moscow with Korniyenko and Komplektov. He indicated that the discussions were relatively unproductive and that Komplektov was “at his sneering worst.” The discussion was principally a rehash of arguments that both sides had made before on the various issues. The only new insight on Soviet thinking was the indication by Korniyenko and Komplektov that the thing that the Soviets found most objectionable in our March comprehensive proposal was the retreat to a limitation of 2500 km on all cruise missiles which they saw as a major step backward from the status of the negotiations with the US prior to that time. On the current negotiations, Warnke indicated that he took the line that they should accept limits on MLBMs even though these were not agreed at Vladivostok since we were being asked to and had agreed to accept limitations on GLCMs and SLCMs which clearly were not discussed at Vladivostok. On Backfire, Korniyenko and Komplektov appeared to take the position that we should be satisfied with assurances by Brezhnev that the Backfire would not be used as an intercontinental bomber—which would be a significant retreat from the position that had been taken in the May meetings with Gromyko.

Dr. Brzezinski then raised the issue of the overall Soviet attitude to SALT and what we can conclude from the public pronouncements and the various exchanges, both here and in Geneva. Secretary Vance indicated that he felt that we should proceed with a business as usual attitude trying to resolve those issues in Geneva which we could, while considering our position on the cruise missile and heavy missile issues. Paul Warnke indicated agreement and pointed out that the Soviets had been reasonable in the formal negotiations in Geneva, he felt we had been much less forthcoming in Geneva, a situation which he thought should be rectified.

Secretary Vance pointed out that there was no question that SALT was still the centerpiece of our relationship with the Soviets. They ap-

parently think that they can put pressure on us through our European Allies and through the American public in order to push us to make concessions on SALT in the coming months. From that standpoint he felt that it was in our interest to make known that we were continuing to make progress in SALT and that various issues were being turned over to the Delegations in Geneva after having been resolved at the higher levels. He indicated that as far as the problem with the Interim Agreement, he thought it would be preferable not to seek an extension now either with the Congress or with the Soviets. However, he thought we might raise it with the Congress before he meets Gromyko in Europe around September 8th.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of whether in fact it might be better to raise the Interim Agreement with the Soviets now since the Soviets might otherwise build pressure to do something in September which could be defused somewhat if there were agreement on the extension of the Interim Agreement. Secretary Vance indicated that he thought that it would be undesirable to have a deliberation in Congress at this time on the Interim Agreement and SALT in general. Secretary Brown pointed out that since the Congress would likely be gone the entire month of August, we would be restricted to discussing the issue with the leadership anyway. Secretary Vance pointed out that he had stated publicly that we were prepared to consider extension of the Interim Agreement or to simply let it lapse but that the most important thing was that we got a good SALT TWO agreement. David Aaron pointed out the undesirability of having the Soviets reject extension of the Interim Agreement at this time. After further discussion it was agreed that we would take no action at this time on the issue of extending the Interim Agreement.

The meeting then turned to a discussion of the individual issues.

Paul Warnke outlined a possible approach for resolving the ALCM and MLBM issues. The approach would be to have an aggregate ceiling of 250 on the number of heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs and the number of MIRVed heavy missiles at a level of 250. This limit would be included in the 1985 Agreement rather than in the Protocol. He argued that this would protect a sound ALCM option while at the same time meeting the Soviet concern about having ALCMs limited in the 1985 Agreement. He indicated that we might also agree to count any new heavy bomber equipped with long-range ALCMs, e.g. a wide-bodied aircraft such as a 747, in the 1320 MIRV limit. Secretary Brown questioned whether a limit of 250 on MIRVed MLBMs would be at all meaningful to which Warnke replied that it would be just as meaningful as a limit of 190. Secretary Brown also raised the possibility of the Soviets in the future arguing for reductions in this ceiling as a means of reducing our ALCM force. Warnke argued

that we would simply reject such a proposal. Secretary Brown expressed skepticism as to how easy that might be to do.

Dr. Brzezinski raised the issue of whether we might take the approach of a limit of 650 MIRVed ICBMs rather than focusing on a limit on MIRVed heavy missiles. There was a consensus that this would have about the same effect as the heavy missile MIRV limit, however, it was not clear whether the Soviets would find it more or less palatable. In this context Bill Hyland raised the issue of the 120 disputed launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk which are SS-19 type launchers but which currently contain SS-11's. There was general agreement that we should take this issue into consideration in our deliberations on the appropriate MIRV level etc.

Harold Brown then raised the possibility of having a limit on heavy bombers (independent of whether they had cruise missiles) and heavy missiles (independent of whether they were MIRVed). He indicated that possibility of having a limit of 250 on such an aggregate under which the Soviets would have to throw away heavy missiles or heavy bombers. There was a general feeling that we would probably have to make such a limit higher than 250 in order to make it palatable to the Soviets. In the context, Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we might simply have a limit of 308 so that they could keep all of their heavy missiles if they got rid of their 140 heavy bombers. It was finally decided that the Working Group should do an options paper on the ALCM and MLBM issues.

Paul Warnke interjected the thought that we should not lose sight in these deliberations of the content of the SALT TWO agreement which is currently taking shape. He argued that this agreement really was useful to us in getting a handle on Soviet systems without getting into the FBS issue.

The group then discussed the issue of the definition of new types of ICBMs in the context of the proposed ban on testing such ICBMs for the period of the Protocol. It was decided to propose a definition to the Soviets which was highly restrictive—new types of ICBMs would be defined as any ICBM which has a new booster, variations in its payload (e.g., increased numbers of RVs), changes in guidance systems, etc.

With respect to the ban on deployment of mobile ICBMs for the period of the Protocol, it was agreed to go ahead with the tabling of language on this issue. Secretary Brown raised the question of how we were going to deal with the SS-16. It was decided to continue to propose a ban on the development testing, deployment and production of the SS-16 but to avoid coupling this to the mobile ICBM issue.

On the reductions issue it was decided to proceed to propose those limits which we had initially proposed in Geneva in May, i.e., 2160 on the aggregate and 1200 on the MIRV level.

The discussion then turned to the issue of the principles for SALT THREE. This discussion focused on whether we wanted to broaden the list of principles beyond those which had been presented to Gromyko in May. David Aaron argued that we might want to try and deal with such issues as bomber pre-launch survivability in SALT THREE, e.g., by a ban on testing SLBMs on depressed trajectories. The issue of SSBN standoff to enhance bomber survivability was also discussed. The issue was also raised of whether the principles should be very general, e.g., simply refer to reduction in SALT THREE, or be quite specific, e.g., refer to reductions to a specific level or not to exceed a specific level. The Working Group was tasked with doing further analysis on these issues in anticipation of further discussion at a later SCC meeting.

It was decided not to make any proposal to the Soviets on the cruise missile definition issue (i.e., armed versus nuclear-armed) or the issue of the definition of cruise missile range pending further progress on the overall cruise missile issue.

On the issue of deliberate concealment, i.e., telemetry encryption, it was decided to push for a ban on all forms of telemetry denial, i.e., encryption, encapsulation, etc. However, Admiral Turner reserved judgment on whether we should put this proposal to the Soviets at this time.

On the issue of the 120 ambiguous SS-19-type launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, it was decided to continue to hold back on making any concessions on these launchers.

Secretary Brown then raised the issue of the concealment practices (camouflage netting) at Tyuratam and how this was going to be raised with the Soviets. Dr. Brzezinski noted that in spite of the disagreement on whether this concealment was a SALT ONE issue, there appeared to be agreement on what to do, i.e., to raise the issue in both the SALT ONE and SALT TWO contexts.



**174. Memorandum From President Carter to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

Based on the meeting of the Special Coordination Committee on August 18,<sup>2</sup> the President has approved the following for guidance concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.<sup>3</sup>

*General Approach to SALT TWO.* Between now and the meeting between Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Gromyko, we should attempt through Ambassador Dobrynin to convey our basic concerns on the outstanding SALT issues: the question of limits on ALCM carrying bombers and on the Soviet ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs, in particular the modern large ballistic missiles.

*Extension of the Interim Agreement (IA).* We should propose to the Soviets that each side issue parallel, unilateral statements indicating that they will not take any action inconsistent with the IA as long as the negotiations toward a follow-on SALT TWO agreement are underway and as long as the other side also adheres to the IA. We should initiate consultations with the Congress on this matter as soon as it returns.

*Derazhnya and Pervomaysk.* We should offer to exempt from the MIRV total for the three-year period of the Protocol those 120 SS–19 type launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk which currently contain SS–11s if the Soviets agree to the following conditions: (1) the disposition of these launchers will be subject to negotiation in SALT THREE; (2) these launchers are not converted to SS–19 launchers for three years; (3) the Soviets accept our launcher-type MIRV counting rule for all other launchers; and (4) the Soviets agree to our proposal for a MIRV level of 1200 starting in October 1979. This proposition should be presented to Gromyko in Vienna but foreshadowed to Dobrynin beforehand.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 8/9–31/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

<sup>2</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of this meeting is *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> On August 19, Brzezinski sent Carter a memorandum asking for approval of this guidance and noting that there was no SCC consensus on whether the definition of cruise missiles “should apply to all ‘armed’ missiles or only ‘nuclear-armed’ missiles.” Defense supported “nuclear-armed” and State and ACDA favored “armed.” Carter approved defining cruise missiles as “nuclear-armed,” but with the possibility of changing in return for Soviet accommodation on verification. (*Ibid.*)

*Bomber Variants.* We should offer to exempt all of the Soviet heavy bomber variants (i.e., ASW, reconnaissance, and tanker versions of the Bear and Bison) from the aggregate if the Soviets accept the following conditions: (1) agree to a ban on conversion of variants of heavy bombers and vice versa, and (2) our proposed reduction level of 2160. If they are unwilling to agree to the 2160 level, we can also accept 2220, but only if the 60 ASW and tanker variants are counted.

*New Types of ICBMs.* We should continue to press for a ban on tests of new types of ICBMs in the Protocol rather than relaxing this to new types of MIRVed ICBMs as the Soviets have proposed.

*Cruise Missile Range Definition.* We should propose that the range of a cruise missile be defined as its “maximum system operational range.”

*Cruise Missile Definition.* The United States should take the position that cruise missile definition includes only nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The United States may eventually accept a definition of cruise missiles that includes all armed cruise missiles, but this should only be done in return for appropriate Soviet accommodation on the issue of verification.

*Prenotification of Missile Flight Tests.* We should initially propose that prenotification be given only for ICBM tests and not SLBM tests and space launches.

*Backfire.* We should push the Soviets to provide us with a set of draft assurances on the Backfire issue.

*ABM Treaty Review.* The President will decide upon the scope, substantive content and specific timing of the Special SCC meeting on the ABM Treaty review after assessing the outcome of the meeting between the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna in September.

**Jimmy Carter**

**175. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the  
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
(Warnke) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 30, 1977.

SUBJECT

SALT

This memorandum (1) assesses what we can expect from the Soviets at our next meeting; (2) addresses what we believe should be our minimum goals; and (3) presents the case for going beyond the minimum to try to break the current deadlock on the major outstanding issues.

*Prospects*

The heart of the matter for the Soviets is that the new Administration has changed the framework and terms of reference which they had been negotiating for over two years. They argue predictably that they have made important concessions since Vladivostok while we have pressed them for even more. While they overstate their case and exaggerate what had been agreed to, they have a point. Our March proposal went well beyond past negotiations in an effort to achieve a more far-reaching arms control agreement. The Soviets proved unready to match this vision.

For SALT II, we believe that we must continue to make the first moves. If we do not, we must accept the high probability that the next meeting will end in further deadlock and US-Soviet relations will deteriorate.

*Minimum Goals*

First, we should seek announced agreement to lower the ceiling on central strategic systems from 2400 to 2160 or 2220 (following your guidance on the bomber variants). This would cement your first goal of further reductions in nuclear arms. We should recognize that a definitive settlement which lowers the ceiling on MIRVs from 1320 to 1200 will depend on some resolution of the MIRV–ALCMed bomber issue (discussed below).

Second, we should jointly and publicly reaffirm the ABM Treaty, subject only to minor perfecting modifications. This is the centerpiece

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 7–9/77. Secret.

of strategic stability, the one real arms control agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. No senior official in your Administration is proposing a major change in this Treaty at this time. Some judge that our silence on this issue will gain us leverage in SALT. We believe this judgment is without foundation. Whatever maneuvers we might adopt, the Soviets know that this Treaty is fully as important to us as to them, and instead of gaining leverage, it could provoke a hardening in the Soviet stance. Moreover, if other points cannot be agreed on, it is all the more necessary to use the opportunity to reaffirm the ABM Treaty. Such an approach would cap a successful meeting with Gromyko and cushion an unsuccessful one.

Third, all of the above but especially the reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty is essential to lay the groundwork for announcing the extension of the Interim Agreement. Your guidance on parallel, unilateral statements is workable with the Soviets. But its acceptability to Congress, in our assessment, will depend heavily on the progress made in the SALT negotiations. If we can demonstrate to Congress that progress has been made and that agreement can be expected in a reasonable period of time, the opposition to informal extension will be manageable. If we cannot, any extension of the Interim Agreement will be seriously questioned and opposed in Congress. Even achievement of the very modest minimum goals set forth here would leave Congressional support for informal extension in doubt.

#### *Dealing with the Major Issues*

Whether or not we achieve these minimum objectives, we will still face major issues that need to be resolved to move toward eventual agreement. These are how to manage Soviet insistence on counting B-52s with ALCMs in the MIRV total and achieving some constraints on Soviet MIRVed ICBMs. In our view we should try to lay the groundwork for settling these questions by fielding some alternatives in advance of our meeting with Gromyko.

In our judgment, the new analytical papers and the discussion in the SCC lead to only one conclusion: that the strategic military differences between our current position on these issues and almost all of the alternatives receiving serious deliberation are not significant. We are talking about 50 to 100 Soviet MIRVed ICBMs one way or the other, or MLBM sublimits versus MIRVed ICBM sublimits, or combined sublimits on MLBMs and ALCMs. They would have only marginal effects on our programs through 1985 and practically no effect for the three-year period of the Protocol. They vary primarily in their possible acceptability to the Soviets.

The following two packages seem to us to offer a basis for dealing with the Soviets on these issues.

*Package 1*

- 2160/1200 aggregates
- 750 MIRVed ICBMs
- 250 ALCMed heavy bombers

*Package 3B*

- 2160/1200 aggregates
- 750 sublimit on combined total MIRVed ICBMs and ALCMed heavy bombers

We have no problem with Package 1, so long as it is presented in conjunction with Package 3B. The Soviets may well look at Package 1 as a step back from our current position. Our current position would allow them 50 more MIRVed ICBMs than would be allowed under Package 1.

Both alternatives would result in only minor differences in overall strategic capabilities and in the potential threat to our Minuteman force. Neither would significantly ease the long-term problem of ICBM survivability. Either would, however, begin to move toward reductions in MIRVed ICBMs that would lessen the threat to Minuteman. This would be a valuable precedent for SALT Three. Both would protect essential US programs and would provide a reasonable base for SALT Three. Each reflects diminished emphasis in Washington on Soviet MLBMs and increasing focus on the possible capability of the potentially much larger force of SS-17's and 19's and their future replacement. (A sheet explaining the net effects on the US and the Soviet Union for Package 3B is attached.)

We would propose to put the two alternatives to Dobrynin as soon as possible. We would tell him that we plan to table them with Gromyko in addition to our current proposal on the following terms:

—We have made our best effort to find alternative solutions that meet their concerns and ours and these represent the best we can do. If neither of them is acceptable to the Soviets, then it will be clearly up to them to make a similar effort to find and propose solutions.

—Both these proposals treat MIRVed ICBMs without singling out MLBMs.

—We believe that Package 3B substantially meets the principal Soviet concerns on the treatment of bombers with ALCMs and MLBMs.

—Package 3B establishes a systematic relationship between the MIRV aggregate and bombers with ALCMs by linking the latter with MIRVed ICBMs. This goes far towards satisfying the strategic relationship implied in the Soviet proposal to count bombers with ALCMs within the MIRV aggregate.

—Package 1 sets a specific 250 ceiling on ALCMed heavy bombers while 3B does not.

—In addition, we could say that if the Soviet Union will accept this solution to the problem, including the rest of our position on cruise missiles, we would agree that the restraints would apply to all armed cruise missiles.

Our basic aim in this approach is to convince the Soviets that we mean business: that we have done our best to find reasonable and fair solutions that balance our concerns; and that we have gone as far as we can. We think there is enough prospect of a workable Soviet response to try this approach.

You should be aware, however, that Gromyko still might respond that we have not sufficiently met two key Soviet concerns: their insistence on counting ALCMed bombers in the MIRVed total and putting restrictions on ALCMed bombers in the Treaty, rather than the Protocol. We would propose to deal with this contingency in a separate memorandum to you prior to the Gromyko visit.

From our perspective, our overriding objective should be stability in US-Soviet relations. The stability represented by a SALT II agreement is as important to arms control as the content of the likely agreement itself. This done, we can move quickly to begin negotiating the deeper limitations you and we envision for SALT III.

### Attachment

Washington, undated.

#### PACKAGE 3B

- 2160/1200 Aggregates
- 750 Sublimit on combined total of MIRVed ICBMs and ALCMed Heavy Bombers

#### Illustrative Force Structures (MIRVed systems only):

<u>United States</u>	<u>Mid-1980</u>	<u>Mid-1985 (a)</u>
MM III	550	464
Poseidon C3	496	496
Trident C4	<u>48</u>	<u>240</u>
MIRV Total	1094	1200

ALCMed B–52s	0	286 (allowed)
ALCMed B–52s plus MIRVed ICBMs	550	750

(a) Assumes US retires only enough MM III to allow for 240 Trident under 1200 limit; US could retire more MM III to allow all 349 B–52s to have ALCMs.

<u>Soviet Union (b)</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
SS–17	32	0
SS–18	308 (b)	308
SS–19	410	442
SS–NX–18	192 (b)	208 (c)
New SLBM	<u>40</u>	<u>240 (c)</u>
MIRV Total	982	1198

(b) Assumes Soviets do not deploy ALCMs on heavy bombers.

(c) Includes 54 silos on which conversion is not complete.

(d) Assumes Soviets accelerate SLBM deployment rates.

#### *Net Effect on US*

—286 ALCMed B–52s allowed with no additional cost under 750 sublimit (we would have to reduce to 464 MM III by 1985 in any case to accommodate 240 Trident SLBMs under 1200 MIRV ceiling).

—Putting ALCMs on all 349 B–52s would cost US additional 63 MM III, although overall US capabilities increase compared to case in which all MM III are retained because Trident II and ALCMed B–52s have more capability than MM III.

#### *Net Effect on SU*

—Loses 170 MIRVed ICBMs; forced to emphasize MIRVed SLBMs with their lower throw-weight.

—Deterred from deploying ALCMs on heavy bombers because would have to further reduce MIRVed SS–19s.

—Still can reach 1200 MIRV ceiling by 1985 if Delta-III SSBN program extended and/or new SSBN/SLBM deployments accelerated (e.g., if 208 [vs. 176] SS–NX–18s and 240 [vs. 220] new SLBMs deployed).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Brackets in the original.

# 176. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 31, 1977.

SUBJECT

SALT

The Special Coordination Committee (SCC) met on August 30 to discuss the current SALT negotiating situation. The discussion focused on alternative ways of repackaging our current position. At Tab A is a summary of conclusions from the meeting.<sup>2</sup>

The next SALT meeting will be an NSC meeting (set for Tuesday, September 6, 9 a.m.) at which time you will determine the position that we will take in the next round of top level meetings. We anticipate that the Soviets will agree to our proposal to cancel the Vienna meeting so that the next top level meetings will take place on September 22–23 when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko comes to Washington. The agenda for the NSC meeting will consist of the following topics:

1. General SALT approach and alternatives to our current position;
2. The cruise missile definition;
3. Soviet heavy bomber variants;
4. Backfire; and
5. The ABM Treaty Review.

## *General SALT Approach and Alternatives to Our Current Position*

You will recall that our current SALT position calls for: (1) an aggregate of 2160 by October 1979; (2) a MIRV level of 1200; (3) a MIRVed MLBM limit of 190 in the three-year Protocol; (4) an ALCM-carrying heavy bomber limit of 250, also in the Protocol; and (5) other Protocol testing/deployment limits on SLCMs and GLCMs, mobile ICBMs, and new types of ICBMs. This position, which we put to the Soviets in May, was a significant departure from our March proposal with its focus on constraints on ICBM modernization including a limit of 150 MLBMs and 550 MIRVed ICBMs.

The discussion at the August 30 SCC meeting focused on alternative ways of repackaging our current position with the objective of making that position more palatable to the Soviets while at the same time retaining our basic objectives (restraining the Soviet ICBM program while resisting unacceptably restrictive limits on ALCM-carrying

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 8/9–31/77. Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached; the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting, August 30, is *ibid*.



heavy bombers). The two alternative packages that emerged from the meeting as being of principal interest (labeled 1 and 3B since they came from a large selection) are shown in the table on the next page.

Package 1 responds to the argument that the Soviets cannot politically accept a MIRVed MLBM sublimit and instead proposes a limit of 700 MIRVed ICBMs. This limit is well below the 800 MIRVed ICBMs the Soviets were projected to have under the current position and the 920 they would have with no MIRVed ICBM sublimits at all.

Package 3B couples MIRVed ICBMs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers in a sublimit designed to cosmetically meet some of the Soviet concerns about unconstrained numbers of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. A range of 750–800 is given in the table pending an analysis of the military and programmatic impact of 750 vice 800 (which should be available at the time of the NSC meeting).<sup>3</sup>

ALTERNATIVE PACKAGES FOR MLBMs, ICBMs, HEAVY BOMBERS, AND ALCMs

	<u>Current Position</u>	<u>Package 1</u>	<u>Package 3B</u>
MLBMs and ICBMs	190 MIRVed MLBMs	700 MIRVed ICBMs	
			750–800 for sum of MIRVed ICBMs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers
Heavy Bombers and ALCMs	250 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers	250 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers	
MIRVs	1200 MIRV ceiling	1200 MIRV ceiling	1200 MIRV ceiling (but ALCM's not counted under it)

The basic issues which you will have to decide at the meeting are:

1. *Acceptability of Packages 1 and 3B.* Would the alternative Packages 1 and 3B safeguard basic US interests as expressed in the current US position? This raises the issue of the “precedential” character of the 3B linkage between ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and MIRVed ICBMs. Harold Brown is concerned that such an approach could inhibit future US efforts to reduce Soviet ICBMs. Others, myself included, view this as a purely cosmetic linkage that provides the Soviets with a politically palatable means of accepting the basic US approach to these issues.

2. *1985 Versus the Protocol.* Should we propose that the MIRVed ICBM and ALCM limits be included in the 1985 portion of the Treaty or

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

in the Protocol?<sup>4</sup> None of these limits would have any significant impact if they were only for the period of the Protocol (for example, we will have essentially zero ALCM-carrying heavy bombers by the end of the Protocol period). We have generally been evaluating these limits in terms of their long-term impact. In addition, we would not want to see the ALCM issue reopened in the follow-on negotiations if a settlement acceptable through 1985 could be obtained. Furthermore, inclusion of ALCMs in the 1985 portion of the Treaty would also meet the Soviet position and encourage their acceptance of the MIRVed ICBM limits which we are proposing. If these issues were moved to the 1985 portion of the Treaty, the issues that would be covered in the Protocol would be SLCMs, GLCMs, limits on new types of ICBMs, and mobile ICBMs.<sup>5</sup>

3. *Tactics.* In the event we decide to take the initiative and “modify” our current position, how should we present this to the Soviets? The two basic alternatives are: (1) to present both Packages 1 and 3B to the Soviets and let them take their choice or (2) to present Package 1 first and reserve Package 3B as a fallback. Harold Brown is likely to favor starting with Package 1. Paul Warnke and Cy Vance see Package 3B as our best hope for an agreement but see no problems in offering both alternatives to the Soviets.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Cruise Missile Definition*

You are familiar with the cruise missile definition issue which is basically a question of whether the cruise missile limits in the agreement should apply to all “armed” cruise missiles or only to “nuclear-armed” cruise missiles.<sup>7</sup> Cy Vance and Paul Warnke feel very strongly that the limits should apply to all armed cruise missiles and have submitted a reclama (Tab B)<sup>8</sup> to your decision (page 2 of Tab C)<sup>9</sup> on this issue. At the NSC meeting, you should ask Harold Brown to give the opposite case on this issue.

#### *Bomber Variants*

Your approval of the decision minutes of the August 18 SCC meeting (Tab C) endorsed a recommendation that we fall off on counting the Soviet heavy bomber variants (Bear, ASW, and reconnais-

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<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote “yes” in the margin next to this sentence.

<sup>5</sup> Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this sentence.

<sup>6</sup> Carter wrote “Simple 1200/2200 limit?” in the margin at the end of this paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> Carter wrote a “?” in the margin next to this sentence.

<sup>8</sup> Tab B is not attached, but is attached as Tab H to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated, which was attached to a September 5 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 8/9–31/77)

<sup>9</sup> Tab C is printed as Document 174.

sance aircraft and Bison tankers) if the Soviets accept our proposal for a 2160 aggregate.

The JCS may ask for reconsideration of this decision at the meeting. Although some of these variants can probably be converted to heavy bombers in a few weeks, there is virtually no possibility that the Soviets will accept reductions in the 2400 if we insist that any of these variants count. In fact, they are unlikely ever to agree to count these variants since they are clearly not heavy bombers.

#### *Backfire*

We will want to reconfirm our willingness to accept appropriate Soviet assurances on the Backfire issue. The Soviets owe us a response on this issue.<sup>10</sup>

#### *ABM Treaty Review*

The ABM Treaty Review is scheduled to take place this fall after the regular session of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission. The decision memo at Tab C indicated that you would decide on the scope and content of the Review after the Vienna meetings which have now been cancelled. Cy Vance would like to see a joint US-Soviet statement reaffirming the ABM Treaty<sup>11</sup> issued in the near future (prior to the Review). There is some question as to whether this is necessary or prudent in the light of the continued uncertainty about SALT Two.

#### *Approved Decisions*

For your information, we have compiled a list of the approved decisions on the principal SALT issues. These are shown in the tables at Tab D.<sup>12</sup> *However*, one of these issues, the disposition of the 120 SS-19 type launchers at *Derazhnya* and *Pervomaysk* (p. 1, Tab D) which currently contain SS-11s, may have to be reopened if the Package 1 or Package 3B limits are included in the 1985 portion of the Treaty. For example, if the Soviets accept a 700 or 750 limit on MIRVed ICBMs through 1985, then we might exempt the 120 launchers at *Derazhnya* and *Pervomaysk* provided they are not modified in any way. However, if the only MIRV constraint through 1985 is a 1200 limit on MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, then there is no reason for us to offer to exempt these launchers.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Carter underlined "The Soviets owe us a response."

<sup>11</sup> Carter underlined "joint US-Soviet statement reaffirming the ABM Treaty" and wrote "ok" in the margin next to it.

<sup>12</sup> Not attached.

<sup>13</sup> Carter highlighted this last sentence and wrote "better" in the margin next to it.

# 177. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 1, 1977.

## SUBJECT

### Our SALT Position

You will have received from Zbig the results of the Special Coordination Committee's discussion of our options for repackaging our current SALT position in a manner that might be more negotiable with the Soviets.<sup>2</sup> Briefly, the two SCC options are:

—Option 1, which would change our proposed sub-limit of 190 on heavy missiles into a combined sub-limit on all ICBM MIRVs at the level of about 700.

—Option 3-B, which would establish a sub-limit of 700–800 on ICBM MIRVs together with bombers carrying ALCMs.

The main feature of both of these proposals is to get around the strong Soviet objection to singling out heavy ICBMs with MIRVs for a specific and additional limitation. Option 3-B would also help meet Soviet insistence for placing bombers with ALCMs under some kind of a MIRV limit.

Option 1 would be an achievement but difficult to negotiate. Option 3-B has strong support from Cy and Paul. However, there are serious reservations in Defense. My personal view is that this formula would create difficult political problems, not only because it artificially treats bombers with long-range ALCMs the same as ICBMs with MIRVs but because it lacks the perception of equality.

While the formula allows both sides the same number of "heavy bomber ALCM/ICBM MIRVs", the result would not be equal. Our ICBM MIRVs would be limited to less than 550 while the Soviets would get 700–800. The formula would limit our first-line bombers but place no real limits on new Soviet bombers. The reason is that our future bombers will have to be equipped with ALCMs in order to go against Soviet air defenses. They will then count under this formula. New Soviet bombers (which we see under development) will not need ALCMs since we have no air defenses and will not be limited by this formula.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 7–9/77. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum was not initialed by Mondale, but Carter wrote "Fritz—Sounds good pending detailed analysis—Simplicity is a major attraction for me. J" at the top of the first page.

<sup>2</sup> Document 176.

Thus, I believe the agreement will be seen as one-sided: permitting the Soviets a large number of ICBM MIRVs and large potential bomber forces while tightly constraining both our ICBM MIRVs and the kind of bomber forces we will need to have in the future. As a result, I believe we would run into real difficulties in Congress. We would find it extremely difficult to explain why this formula is in our interest or how it is equal. I recommend against it.

I believe, however, there is an alternative developed within the NSC staff, which has the virtue of simplicity and of being based squarely on our current position.

*Much the same effect as Option 1 and 3-B on the Soviets could be achieved by dropping these proposed subceilings on ICBM MIRVs and simply sticking to our present proposal for an overall reduction in the Vladivostok MIRV ceiling from 1320 to 1200.*

Before 1983 the Soviets will have to choose between SLBMs and ICBMs with MIRVs. They have a very large investment in new facilities for the production of what appear to be SLBM MIRVs. It is our estimate that the Soviets are headed towards an SLBM MIRV program of about 400. Under a 1200 MIRV ceiling, that would mean their MIRV ICBM program would have to stop at approximately 800. Similarly, Option 1 and Option 3-B would in the end give the Soviets about 800 to 750 ICBMs with MIRVs as compared to the 918 we now project they will attempt to build.

It is of course conceivable that the Soviets would continue to deploy ICBM MIRVs and limit their SLBM program instead. However, it is the judgment of the CIA that this is unlikely.

This approach has the virtue of being simple and emphasizing reductions. It sets some restraints on the Soviets and opens the way for further restraint if we negotiate more reductions but without linking it to our bombers with ALCMs. A 1200 ceiling would also restrain us beginning in 1983 with the launching of the 7th Trident boat. At that time we would have to begin trading in either ICBMs with MIRVs or older Poseidon launchers.

In short, my recommendation is that we make an offer to drop our proposal for limits on heavy missiles if the Soviets accept the 1200 MIRV ceiling (or even better 1100) to take effect, for example, within three years. This would also be conditioned on the Soviets dropping their proposal to count heavy bombers with ALCMs as MIRVs. We would stick with our proposal of a separate limit of 250 on heavy bombers carrying ALCMs.

The SALT Working Group is proceeding with a systematic analysis of this approach.

**178. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 6, 1977, 9–11 a.m.; 7–9:45 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

National Security Council Meeting

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President  
 The Vice President  
 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
 Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Paul Warnke  
 Director of Central Intelligence Agency Admiral Stansfield Turner  
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown  
 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski  
 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs David Aaron  
 NSC Staff Member William G. Hyland

*Summary and Conclusions*

The morning session was entirely devoted to a discussion of alternatives to the current US position on ALCM and MIRV limits.<sup>2</sup> Three alternatives were discussed: (1) an option that would include reductions to 2160 in the aggregate, an overall MIRV ceiling of 1200, and a combined subceiling of ICBM MIRVs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers at 700–800; (2) an alternative that would set a subceiling on MIRVed ICBMs at about 700; (3) an alternative that would set a MIRV ceiling at 1100–1200 and include a subceiling on heavy missiles.

Each of the participants was asked by the President for views on the relative merits of each option and an order of preference.<sup>3</sup> There was a general agreement that the strategic differences among options were not significant for either US or Soviet programs, but that there would be differing impacts on the negotiating process and their accept-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 55, NSC 7, SALT, 9/6/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of the morning session are *ibid.* No minutes for the evening session have been found.

<sup>3</sup> In a September 23 memorandum to Harold Brown, numbered CM 1631–77, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman George Brown stated that it was his understanding that “the President fully understood the JCS view that the United States should take no new initiative in SALT,” but if that was unacceptable, then the JCS could support package 1. The NSC agreed upon a negotiating ladder on which the JCS was not given time to comment. General Brown stated that he accepted that “the decision was taken with full knowledge of the JCS views presented at the NSC meeting,” but he attached a detailed analysis of the three options which he hoped would be of value in future SALT negotiations. (*Ibid.*, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/6/77–11/22/77)

ance in the Congress. The President indicated he believed that each option would probably be generally acceptable but wished to continue the discussion in the evening.

After the discussions resumed, the President indicated that we should present one or two alternatives to Ambassador Dobrynin prior to Gromyko's arrival in order to familiarize the Soviets with our thinking and especially with our concerns. He also indicated that while we wanted to understand Soviet concerns, we could not simply advance new variations each time the Soviets rebuffed our proposals. After further discussion of the order of presentation to the Soviets, some other variations were presented and discussed. They were (1) an alternative that would include reductions to 2160, to a MIRV level of 1200, and establish an equal numerical limit on both Soviet heavy MIRVed missiles and, separately, on US ALCM carrying bombers, with the aim of agreeing on a number between 200–300; (2) an alternative that would also include reductions to 2160, a ceiling on land-based MIRVs at 800, a subceiling on heavy MIRVed missiles at 220, and for US ALCM-carrying heavy bombers at 250; and (3) reductions to 2160, a combined ceiling for MIRVed missiles and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers of 1320, with a subceiling for MIRVed missiles of no more than 1100, and subceiling of 220 for heavy MIRVed missiles and 220 for ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. After further discussions of these alternatives, it was agreed they all would be acceptable as outcomes.

The President indicated that Secretary Vance and Paul Warnke could discuss the first two positions with Ambassador Dobrynin to determine Soviet reaction, but that the third option would be kept in reserve. All three would be analyzed. The President would consider how to proceed on the basis of the first meetings between Secretary Vance and Gromyko.

#### *Cruise Missile Definitions*

There was a discussion of the definition of cruise missiles as only "nuclear armed" or simply "armed". The problems of verifying a difference between a conventionally armed cruise missile and a nuclear armed one was discussed. It was agreed not to make a final agreement on a definition for SALT purposes. Conventionally armed SLCMs and GLCMs would not be deployed during the three year protocol but the issue would be open; no differentiation would be made between conventionally armed and nuclear armed ALCMs over 600 km for the three year protocol.

#### *Bomber Variants*

There was a discussion of the problem of how to count those Soviet tankers and reconnaissance ASW aircraft which could be converted to bombers. It was agreed that we could propose counting only 60 in the

aggregate of 2160 and if the Soviets objected to raise the level to 2220. The President noted it was not a major issue.

*Backfire*

The President asked where we stood. There was a brief discussion to the effect that the Soviets owed us an answer.

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**179. Presidential Directive/NSC–20<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1977.

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

U.S. SALT Position

As a result of the NSC meeting of September 6, 1977,<sup>2</sup> the President has made the following decisions regarding the discussions with the Soviet Union, prior to and during Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings in the U.S.

*1. Aggregate Levels*

The U.S. should continue to press for reductions from Vladivostok ceilings from 2400 to 2160 to be achieved by late 1980.

—In this connection the U.S. should propose a solution to the question of bomber variants, by offering initially to count no more than 60 Bison tankers and Bear ASW aircraft in the 2160 aggregate. The U.S. could agree to a level of 2220, including the 60 bomber variants. The President wishes to reconsider this issue after the initial discussions with Gromyko.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 11, Box 55, Harold Brown–Private File, SALT 1977. Top Secret. Also sent to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. In an undated memorandum, Brzezinski sent this Presidential Directive for Carter's approval. Carter approved the PD and wrote: "ok, but the joint limit of MLBM & ALCM/B of 100–300 not indicated. J." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> For a summary, see Document 178.



## 2. *MIRV Levels*

A basic U.S. objective is to reach agreement on reductions in the MIRV level from 1320 to 1200, or lower, to be achieved by late 1980.

—The U.S. is willing to exempt from its MIRV counting rule 120 silos at Derazhnya and Pervomaisk for a three-year period, after which all 120 would be counted against any MIRV limits or ceilings.

## 3. *ALCMs and MIRV Limits*

During the period leading up to the meeting with Gromyko, the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will explore with Ambassador Dobrynin and subsequently, with Foreign Minister Gromyko, the following concepts in order to determine the Soviet reaction:

A. As a variation of our present proposal, the U.S. is willing to explore a package that would include reductions in the aggregate level to 2160, in the MIRV level to 1200 and numerical sublimits for MIRVed MLBMs at about 220, for MIRVed ICBMs at about 800, and for ALCM carriers at about 250 (but outside of the MIRV level). These limitations would apply for the treaty period through 1985, unless replaced by further agreements in SALT III.

B. Alternatively, we might consider a package that would include reductions to an aggregate level of 2160, to a MIRV level of 1200, and agreement on the same numerical limit for MIRVed MLBMs, and, separately, for ALCM carriers with the aim of establishing the agreed limit at, say, 220 each (though the ALCMs would not be within the MIRV level). These limits would apply for the treaty period through 1985, unless replaced by further agreements in SALT III.

C. The President has also approved the following concept as the basis for a possible settlement, but does not wish it to be discussed with the Soviets at this time: reductions to 2160 in the aggregate and an overall combined ceiling for MIRVed missiles and ALCM carriers at no more than 1320, with the following sublimits: for MIRVed MLBMs no more than 220; for all MIRVed missiles no more than 1100; and for ALCM carriers no more than 220; these limitations to apply for the treaty period through 1985. In light of the discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko, the President may wish to consider this package as a U.S. proposal.

## 4. *Cruise Missile Definitions*

The U.S. does not wish to settle the issue of differentiating between armed and nuclear armed cruise missiles for the entire treaty period. The U.S. reserves the right in future negotiations to propose different limitations for nuclear and conventionally armed GLCMs and SLCMs. During the three-year Protocol period, however, the U.S. will not dif-

ferentiate between nuclear and conventionally armed ALCMs as far as any agreed testing or deployment limitations are concerned. This position should be made clear to the Soviet Union.

#### *5. Backfire Bombers*

The U.S. should press for written assurances regarding the limits on upgrading, training, and refueling of the Backfire bomber, as well as an assurance regarding the maximum production level for the three-year Protocol period (e.g. a total of 250). Such assurances can be separate from the treaty and Protocol, but must be intended for public use by the U.S.

#### *6. Other Issues*

On other issues the U.S. position remains unchanged from positions taken in the Geneva discussions, and the previous negotiations between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

#### *7. Interim Agreement Extension*

The U.S. is willing to issue a parallel statement with the USSR that would have the effect of extending the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, by announcing that neither side will take actions inconsistent with, or contrary to that Agreement while active negotiations continue for a new agreement. The U.S. envisages that the period would not exceed four to six months, but no time limit should be set.

#### *8. ABM Treaty Review*

The U.S. should reaffirm publicly its intention of continuing the ABM Treaty in force, without seeking major modifications during the ABM Treaty review.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

**180. Memorandum From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Instructions for SALT Discussions with the Soviets

In your preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, and in the initial meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko, you should emphasize the importance of three continuing U.S. concerns: aggregate reductions, limits on the level of heavy ICBM MIRV deployments, and limits on the overall MIRV level. You will wish to make it clear that reductions in both the aggregate and MIRV level from the Vladivostok ceiling are prime U.S. objectives. The period for such reductions can be negotiated, if the principle is agreed.

You should also emphasize that with our decision to forego deployment of the B-1, any SALT agreement must take into account the fact that Soviet air defenses are not constrained by permitting the deployment of an appropriate number of bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles. You may acknowledge Soviet concerns about U.S. cruise missile deployment and indicate our willingness to find a satisfactory formula that takes account of the concerns of both sides.

Within this framework, the following concepts should be explored with Dobrynin, as soon as possible, in order for him to report to Moscow, and to determine a preliminary Soviet reaction prior to Gromyko's arrival if possible:

—As a more flexible variation of our proposal (i.e., within the context of an aggregate level of 2160 and MIRV levels of 1200) the U.S. is willing to discuss raising the limit for MIRVed MLBM's to no more than 220 so long as an overall limit of 800 is placed on all MIRVed ICBM's. We would maintain our position of a separate limit of 250 on ALCM-carrying bombers. However, as a further concession, we would be prepared to include the limit of 250 in the treaty so long as the other limits on MIRVed ballistic missiles are acceptable to the Soviet Union and also included in the treaty.

Alternatively, after Gromyko's arrival and depending on any intervening Soviet reaction, we will be prepared to modify the above approach by dropping the sublimit of 800 under ICBM/MIRV and setting

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 8/9–31/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates it was sent on September 9.

the limit on MLBMs and the limit on ALCM-carrying bombers at the same level but with ALCMs not counted within the MIRV total). For illustrative purposes you may suggest that the level could be set at about 220 each; these limits would apply for the entire period of the treaty through 1985, but would be subject to further negotiations for a SALT III agreement.

As discussed in the NSC meeting,<sup>2</sup> I am considering another solution that I wish to reserve for possible discussions when I meet with Gromyko and if the circumstances of your talks warrant putting forward a proposal. If, however, the concepts that you will be discussing seem to indicate a serious interest by the Soviet side, I will be prepared to continue that line of negotiation with Foreign Minister Gromyko. If those preliminary talks do not indicate a serious Soviet interest in either concept, I will ask for your recommendations on whether to proceed with the third alternative as discussed at the NSC meeting, and set forth in my Directive NSC-20 of September 9, 1977.<sup>3</sup>

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the meeting, see Document 178.

<sup>3</sup> Document 179.

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## **181. National Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>**

NIM 77-025

Washington, September 19, 1977.

### **THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON SALT**

1. Soviet leaders view their relations with the United States as basically competitive and approach SALT from that perspective. They want to secure and, if possible, enlarge hard-won Soviet strategic gains of the past decade and to enhance the Soviet military-political position vis-à-vis the United States, while at the same time reliably controlling the risks of nuclear war. They believe that these objectives can better and more safely be pursued when the strategic arms competition with the United States is constrained by SALT.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SALT: 7-9/77. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. This was the President's copy, which Carter initialed.

2. For the Soviet leaders, SALT is important

—as a *process* for influencing the broad political environment of US-Soviet relations, including the braking of US arms programs, even without agreements;

—and *substantively* as a means of achieving specific agreements. The process and substantive aspects of SALT are probably linked in their minds, both being valued above all for their political effects.

3. In their view, the SALT *process* is one of the means for:

—registering and reinforcing the co-equal superpower status of the USSR;

—keeping the Soviet Union in the forefront of US foreign policy and security concerns;

—maintaining the strategic nuclear balance as the crux of US-Soviet relations, thus overshadowing Soviet disadvantages in other aspects of the global competition with the United States, e.g., economics, technology.

4. *Substantively*, the Soviets see SALT as a forum for negotiating agreements

—to avert US weapons or force developments that could sharply upset the strategic balance. Stopping US ABM efforts was the major case of this kind;

—to protect their strategic gains. For example, they regard the Interim Agreement and the Vladivostok Accord as having sanctioned a continuing Soviet advantage in heavy ICBMs, purchased by what the Soviets regard as a major (but temporary) concession on FBS;

—to constrain future US strategic developments in areas of likely US advantage at minimum cost to the USSR. The Soviet effort to curtail future US cruise missile programs without a reduction in their own ongoing MIRVed heavy ICBM deployment is an example of this kind.

5. The Soviets appreciate that they and the US approach SALT from different frameworks of military doctrine. Both wish to preserve deterrence. But the United States adheres to a concept of stable deterrence through maximum survivability of forces and mutual assured destruction (MAD). The USSR, on the other hand, still tends to see the pursuit of capabilities to wage, survive, and, if possible, to win a nuclear war as the right way to manage the nuclear dilemma, however difficult. This difference frequently presents a direct conflict of strategic preferences. For example, the United States wishes to limit heavy missiles with MIRVs because they threaten our silo-based ICBMs. The USSR values them for just that reason. The United States values the cruise missile as an effective penetrating weapon in a retaliatory role. The Soviets see it as yet another hard-to-defend-against threat to their homeland. Given the asymmetries in the strategic preferences and present and programmed forces of the two sides, SALT proposals

based on US-favored criteria impose limitations on strategic assets of a type that Moscow values more highly than does Washington.

6. Soviet leaders believe that the global “correlation of forces” is shifting inexorably, if gradually and unevenly, in their favor. But they still fear the potential of superior American technology and industrial capacity in an unconstrained arms race. How strongly these fears incline the Soviets to accommodate to US SALT requirements depends on their estimate of the will and capability of the US government to concert its objectives and sustain its negotiating positions and, in the absence of agreement, to press its technological and industrial advantages. For the Soviets, this is essentially a political judgment.

7. The Soviets would probably be content to reap the benefits of the SALT process without concluding fresh agreements that compelled them to make painful concessions. They appreciate that SALT as a process can constrain U.S. moves and limit its advantages in areas not covered by explicit agreement if that process appears to have forward momentum and to enjoy broad US public support. But they appear to believe that periodic agreements formally registering progress are needed to sustain momentum. It is much less clear whether they appreciate how their own arms programs undermine the strength of tacit political constraints on US behavior.

8. Thus the conception of SALT as a forum in which the two sides conscientiously and jointly attempt to work out “fair” agreements to stabilize their strategic relationship along MAD lines is alien to the Soviet political mind. The Soviet leaders are not readily persuaded that the US side really frames its proposals in strict accordance with such a conception. In the Soviet view, each party in SALT seeks agreements to regulate those aspects of the strategic nuclear force relationship in which unconstrained competition would be either disadvantageous or superfluous from its point of view, while reserving for unregulated national strategic policy those aspects deemed most advantageous and/or critical to it. At points where these unilateral interests are congruent, agreement can be reached.

9. Accordingly, the Soviets measure American “good faith” by the extent to which we are willing to negotiate within a framework in which the Soviets can press their own preferences and protect their most highly valued strategic assets, as they expect the U.S. side to do, in a process of hard, detailed bargaining. Indeed, American “seriousness” rather than “good faith” is a more appropriate description of Soviet concerns when assessing new U.S. proposals. For the Soviets, a “serious” U.S. proposal is one that reflects a strong American preference to achieve a less than optimal agreement rather than no agreement at all and that suggests a U.S. willingness to accommodate Soviet positions on issues deemed most fundamental by Moscow.

10. The Soviet reaction to the March U.S. SALT proposals reflected Soviet irritation at losing earlier negotiating gains, which was amplified by heightened Soviet fears of new U.S. military technologies contemplated or under development. The Soviets reacted with a hard line to redirect pressure back on to the American side, relieving political and propaganda disadvantages under which they were temporarily placed, and avoiding the internal difficulties of formulating new positions themselves. The Soviet leaders probably believe their hard tactics since March have moved the negotiations back closer to their strongly preferred Vladivostok baseline.

11. It is difficult to know what precise mixture of puzzlement, concern and hard-headed pursuit of tactical advantage is involved in public and private Soviet statements on SALT. Elements of all seem present. They reinforce one another in encouraging the Soviet leaders to persist during the September talks in hard tactics in order to discover where U.S. positions may finally settle down.

12. Given the broad Soviet perspective on SALT and the tactical line Moscow has pursued in discussions since March, we expect the Soviet side to approach the September talks with the following posture:

a) They are unlikely to produce substantial new proposals of their own so long as they have reason to believe that U.S. positions on a new negotiating framework remain fluid, or that more acceptable American fall-back positions are being held in reserve;

b) They can be expected to exploit any openings offered by new U.S. proposals to bring the negotiating framework back closer to Vladivostok lines;

c) They will continue to demand stringent cruise missile restraints and can be expected to express dissatisfaction with whatever may be offered by the U.S. side in that regard;

d) They will probably attempt to work out a mutual understanding to extend the Interim Agreement and to reaffirm the ABM Treaty.<sup>2</sup>

13. An important indication that the Soviets believe the discussions have reached a sufficiently “ripe” stage would be their signalling this week of any willingness to limit ongoing Soviet programs—such as their MIRVed ICBM or, more significantly, their MIRVed heavy ICBM program—in exchange for the limitations on U.S. programs which they seek. Soviet failure to transmit such signals would not necessarily indicate they believe the discussions are hopelessly stalemated, but could reflect either: (a) their belief that the beneficial possibilities of working for fresh U.S. concessions have not yet been exhausted; or (b) that the Soviets are unwilling to agree to any interruptions of their ongoing MIRVed ICBM and MLBM programs.

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<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined portions of a, b, c, and d.

**182. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1977, 6:30–6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

*USSR*

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Gromyko recalled that a few days ago the Secretary had, on behalf of his government, expressed concern over the following issue. It was Gromyko's understanding that the U.S. side wanted the new agreement to contain a provision to the effect that the total number of land-based MIRVed missiles must not exceed 800. He asked if his understanding was correct.

The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Gromyko said that in that case he wanted to express the following thought to the Secretary. If the question of Soviet heavy missiles were eliminated, and provided that the question of ALCMs on heavy bombers was resolved on the basis of the Soviet proposal, i.e., that each heavy bomber equipped with ALCMs be counted as one MIRVed unit, then the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree that the number of land-based MIRVed ICBMs be limited to 820. Gromyko added that this almost coincided with what had been proposed by the United States. He wanted to convey this thought to the Secretary before his meeting with President Carter tomorrow.

The Secretary said he would communicate this to the President as soon as possible.

Gromyko had a second idea he wanted to convey to the Secretary; this concerned the bomber called "Backfire" in the United States. He understood this was also a matter of great concern to the U.S. side. He had prepared a verbal communication in English which he would now read:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Vance, 1977–1980, Lot File 84D241, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer and approved in S on October 12. The meeting took place in Vance's office at the Department of State.



“As a good will gesture the Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet medium-range bomber Tu-22-M, called ‘Backfire’ in the United States, has a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers, and that the Soviet Union does not intend to give it the capability of operating at inter-continental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of this aircraft so as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA, nor does it intend to give that aircraft this capability in any other manner, including by means of in-air refueling. At the same time, the Soviet Union states that it will not increase production rates of this aircraft as compared to the present rate.”

The Secretary said that this was certainly of interest. He would convey both statements to the President, so that he would have them tonight. He was going to have breakfast with the President tomorrow morning, but would also talk to him about this tonight.<sup>2</sup>

Gromyko expressed his appreciation and thought that their conversation today<sup>3</sup> could be ended on that note.

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<sup>2</sup> There is no record in the President’s Daily Diary that Vance spoke to Carter the evening of September 22, but Carter held a breakfast meeting the next morning with Vance, Mondale, Harold Brown, Warnke, and Brzezinski. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> Vance and Gromyko, accompanied by their advisers, had a long discussion on SALT from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. on September 22. The memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Vance, 1977–1980, Lot File 84D241, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977.

183. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 23, 1977, 10:30 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

## SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

## PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
 Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
 Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
 Ambassador Paul Warnke  
 Mr. Hamilton Jordan  
 Mr. David Aaron  
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
 Mr. William G. Hyland  
 Mr. Reginald Bartholomew  
 Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter  
 Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
 Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko  
 Mr. V. Makarov  
 Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
 Mr. M.N. Detinov  
 Mr. V.G. Komplektov  
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Turning to the *SALT* negotiations, "the question of questions," Gromyko pointed out that he had set forth the Soviet position to Secretary Vance on the two major issues still outstanding—air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and those Soviet missiles which the US side refers to as heavy, terrible and awful, with which it constantly frightened its people.<sup>2</sup> Gromyko said that he had already presented arguments in support of his position, and there was hardly any need to do so again. Concerning the Soviet position he could say the same thing that had been said to Soviet troops during the battle of Stalingrad: "There is no land beyond the Volga," no room for retreat. That applied to both the issues he had mentioned. He wanted to recall the many concessions toward the US position the Soviet Union had already made. In Geneva, knowing the significance President Carter attached to reductions in the overall aggregate ceiling of strategic delivery vehicles, the

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President, 9/19–9/30/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 182.

Soviet Union had agreed to reduce that aggregate by 150. Another major concession had been Soviet agreement to the principle of counting MIRVed missiles, which stated that once even a single missile has been tested with MIRVs, then all other missiles of that type would be counted as MIRVs. The Soviet Union had accepted the framework for SALT II, which had been proposed by the US side. Of course, all this had been agreed to contingent upon achieving overall agreement on the entire subject of SALT II. All elements were interlinked and it would be wrong to accept a concession on one element while refusing to yield on another, on which the first was contingent. He wanted to say most emphatically that if the two major issues he had mentioned could be agreed upon, he was convinced that work on the SALT II agreement could be completed and the agreement signed. He would ask the President to take a look at this matter from a realistic position, look at it with Soviet eyes as it were. The President probably received a great deal of advice, but Gromyko was certain that what he had suggested was the most correct solution to this question. If the two major issues still outstanding could be resolved during the current meeting, the road would be clear to conclusion of the SALT II agreement. As for our respective interpretations of what clearly happened at Vladivostok, here the interpretations were different indeed. When the two sides had met in Vladivostok no exceptions for any specific type of missile had been mentioned. Some components had been talked about, including land-based and sea-based missiles, but now an additional component had been introduced. Well, even with respect to this component Gromyko had made an important proposal to the Secretary of State yesterday. That was done in order to facilitate agreement on all issues. In particular, the new Soviet proposal for a sub-limit on MIRVed missiles had gone a long way to meet the US position. Naturally, he was anxious to get a response before his return to Moscow. Also, he would express the wish to the President directly that an end be put to the many statements frightening the people of the United States with the spectre of a first-strike by the Soviet Union. Why was this being done? The answer seemed to be clear—to increase tensions. As he and the Soviet leadership saw it from Moscow, the only reason could be the striving for ever-higher military budgets. What first-strike by the Soviet Union was being talked about? The Soviet Union had no intention of using nuclear weapons against anyone in the world. It had made proposals to preclude the possibility of a first-strike to the parties at the European Security Conference. He felt strongly that the President needed to take steps to stop frightening the people of the United States by a first-strike by the Soviet Union. That was a non-existent possibility. It had never existed and will never exist.

Gromyko said that just before his departure for the United States he had a talk with Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev asked him to convey his

personal regards to President Carter and also wanted him to convey the following, on which Gromyko had taken detailed notes.

Brezhnev personally and the entire people of the Soviet Union were active fighters for peace. In a spirit of good faith the whole leadership of the Soviet Union was deeply convinced that the whole question of maintaining peace can and must be resolved not arithmetically, but politically. There was no other alternative. No attempts at smearing each other could produce anything good. Brezhnev personally felt that conclusion of a SALT II agreement would even further increase the prestige of the Soviet Union and the United States, while the people of the whole world would heave a sigh of relief. Gromyko emphasized that he had read Brezhnev's words from his notes.

He wanted to say a few words about a possible *meeting* between President Carter and President Brezhnev. Brezhnev and the other leaders of the Soviet Union were by no means against such a meeting. It would be a major event provided it were properly prepared and if it could be crowned by a major political step forward. He believed that this would be in the best interests of both our countries, and emphasized that a major step forward was required. A meeting should not be held simply for the sake of holding a meeting, because that could turn out to be a backward step in the relations between us. But, if a major political step were taken as a result of such a meeting, that would be a good reason for arranging it.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

[The President said] On the subject of SALT, it is the "question of questions" as Gromyko said. The President said we recognized that our views on the meaning of the Vladivostok understanding differ. That understanding had been achieved with a different perspective, in different circumstances. There was no mention at Vladivostok or in the Interim Agreement of ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles. We were not trying to take advantage in their respect. We believed, and knew that the Soviet side disagreed, that there had been no discussion of air-launched cruise missiles at Vladivostok. The President could understand how this could have happened, since Gromyko had been there and he had not. As a matter of fact, we did not want any unilateral advantage over the Soviet Union in any SALT negotiation, because that would not be constructive, would invite violation and create an imbalance and increase tensions. We did have some political considerations to take into account in our country. The President could not conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union even if his Cabinet was fully in accord, without such agreement being ratified by Congress. Gromyko was surely aware of the difficulty that would arise during ratification. The President had to protect the interests of our country and on occasion take stands with which the Soviet Union disagreed. In this connec-

tion he noted that the Soviet side saw no significant threat in their large missiles. From our point of view they created explosive capability for the Soviet Union that was three to four times greater than our weapons. This was not what we had anticipated, it was a new development. He was not arguing about who was at fault, but when Gromyko had said that there was no land beyond the Volga, no further discussion, he was greatly concerned and regretted such rigidity. Large missiles, something the Soviet Union was entitled to have, but we were not, represented a concession on our part. The President hoped that the Soviet Union would be flexible enough with regard to cruise missiles. His own impression was that the SU had not been forthcoming in the negotiations. We had made many proposals to which we had received no reply. We will continue to be flexible, but obviously there was a limit to such flexibility. He hoped the Soviet Union can show some flexibility. The President expressed the hope that eventually we could arrive at a situation when there would be no nuclear weapons on earth. After SALT II, if progress were made, we would proceed to SALT III negotiations and would be prepared for reductions of as much as 50% and further reductions, recognizing that other countries—France and China—should not be able to create a threat to us. The President was very eager to reach an agreement now that would be the basis for reductions in the future. Gromyko had spoken of several concessions the SU had made to us. The President did not view a reduction in overall ceilings as a concession to us, because it was not something that provided a unilateral advantage; it applied equally to both sides. This was all the more true when the SU had the right to build very large missiles, while we did not have the right to do so. We could not view this as a concession. This President noted that Gromyko had said that the SU had conceded to us on the method of counting MIRVed missiles. But, he would point out, that until the limit for MIRVs was reached, this represented no constraint at all. That factor could be important to both sides as they approached the MIRV limit. It was our understanding that the SU was indeed converting its missiles to MIRVs. As for the framework for the SALT II agreement, it presented no particular advantages to the US, since it applied to both sides.

Gromyko interjected that it had represented a concession toward the position of the US.

The President repeated that we did not view this as a concession from the Soviet side.

The President said that before concluding this meeting he wanted to point out that there were two items which Gromyko had described as causing the main problem between us. He wanted to set them aside and come back to them. He wanted first to outline his understanding of where we stood on other issues, based on the earlier conversations with

Secretary Vance. First, for the total aggregate of nuclear delivery vehicles the SU's position provided for a reduction from 2400 to 2250 at the end of five years. We would like to see a limit of 2160. Thus, the difference between us was 90 missiles and this could be resolved. As for ground-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles both sides had agreed to limit their range to 600 kilometers for three years. On the Backfire bomber, the SU had proposed to guarantee that its radius of action would not exceed 2200 km, and that the present rate of construction would not be exceeded. Of course, we did have an estimate of the present rate of construction, but it would be helpful to know what that rate was. (Gromyko interjected "your information is good.") On the question of mobile missiles, we had a disagreement on whether it would be best to ban them and for what period of time, as we had proposed to do in the Protocol, or as the Soviet side had proposed to ban their flight testing and deployment until 1985 in the basic Treaty. The President thought we were not very far apart on that issue. There was a difference between us on the matter of testing new ICBMs. We wanted to prohibit testing and deployment of all new ICBMs, while the SU wanted to apply this to MIRVed ICBMs only. The President wanted to understand the reason for this difference. He asked Gromyko whether he had described these points accurately so far, including minor differences.

[\* Gromyko pointed out that, as he had already said, when he had spoken of concessions, he had meant concessions toward the position of the US. It could go without saying that all these provisions applied equally to both sides. He recalled that when the SU had moved toward the position of the US on the question of counting MIRVed missiles, that had been met with enormous satisfaction. Yesterday he had communicated to Secretary Vance the figure of 820 for a sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs, almost coinciding with the figure proposed by the US. That was a matter of significance in principle. As for the overall ceiling of 2400, when the US had suggested to reduce it to 2160, the Soviet side had immediately reduced its proposal by 150 units. Thus, there was a compromise figure here which, moreover, moved more than halfway in the direction of the US position. Thus, there was hardly any need to minimize the importance of these steps. Of course, they were mutual in that they applied to both the US and SU. As for ground-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers, for some reason the US side had spoken of permitting testing from airborne platforms. Gromyko and his delegation had noted that yesterday; what did that mean? It meant that ground-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles would still be tested, but from airborne platforms only; however, once they were fully tested, they could be produced and built up very rapidly, like pancakes, by the thousands. There were other questions where the SU

had moved toward the position of the US. However, the two questions he had mentioned earlier were those that constituted the principal obstacles to reaching agreement; these were the questions of heavy missiles and of air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers. Gromyko said that if he had understood the President's comments correctly, the US was inclined to rest on its previous positions in spite of everything that had been said in Geneva and subsequently. If that was indeed so, then he would have to point out that everything that he had described as concessions would have to be withdrawn.\*]<sup>3</sup>

(The above portion of Gromyko's statement indicated by asterisks at beginning and end was not interpreted into English because the President interrupted with the following statement.)

The President said that he had purposely spent many hours in an effort to understand the history of the SALT negotiations and the security interests of the SU as well as ours. We were trying to be accommodating to the interests expressed by the SU, and would hope that the Soviet side would reciprocate by recognizing our concerns in a political as well as substantive sense. We were prepared to drop the question of Modern Large Ballistic Missiles, leaving the SU entitled to 308, as agreed in connection with the Interim Agreement. We were prepared to accept a sublimit of 820 for MIRVed ICBMs. We were prepared to agree to a combined limit of 1320 for MIRVed entities, including ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as heavy bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. However, we would like to include a sublimit of 1200 for MIRVed missiles, including ICBMs and SLBMs. This combination of proposals, the President thought, was almost exactly what the SU had wanted, except for the sublimit of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. This would permit the sides to have 120 extra MIRVed entities above the original figure of 1200 we had proposed, including heavy bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. Below the 1200 limit for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs the sides could have any mixture they wanted. In addition, the President presumed that within the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs the 120 ICBM launchers in question at Derazhnya and Pervomaisk would be included. At this point the difference between the sides was that on air-launched cruise missiles the Soviet side wanted to include the 2500 km range limitation in the Treaty with a duration until 1985, while our proposal was to include that limit in the three-year Protocol, providing time for further negotiations on this item.

The President said he had one further matter to raise and that was a request for clarification of what Gromyko had proposed yesterday for

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<sup>3</sup> Brackets in the original.

the Backfire bomber. Our own information was that production was 30 per year.

Gromyko said he did not want to go into figures. He was sure the President was acquainted with the statement he had read yesterday. He believed there was an inaccuracy in the President's understanding of that statement. What he had said was that the Soviet side would not increase the radius of that aircraft so as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA, and that it did not intend to give the aircraft this capability in any other manner, including by means of in-air refueling. Explaining the words "this capability" Gromyko said that it meant the capability of striking targets on the territory of the USA. At the same time, the SU would state that it will not increase production rates of this aircraft as compared to the present rate.

The President said that this interpretation would obviously create an uncertainty. We had anticipated that the Backfire radius would be limited to 2200 km, but now Gromyko had made it clear that this would not be the case; it could be increased to 2400. In that case, we would prefer a more specific mention of the radius, such as 2400 km or 2500 km, rather than leave it up to the SU to interpret what the radius would be that would enable that aircraft to reach the US. It was not a matter of distrusting the SU, but simply desire to have an agreement that was clear and unambiguous, in order to prevent disputes from arising in the future.

Gromyko thought that both sides had reached agreement on the distance between the Soviet Union and the US. The President said that would depend on where one started.

Gromyko said that from any point at all the closest distance between the two countries was 5500 km, and that distance had been agreed upon between the sides as a criterion for inter-continental range.

The President pointed out that, as Gromyko possibly knew, there was a threat from bombers on a one-way trip. Radius was not the only criterion. We were not trying to be argumentative, but would prefer a more specific statement. We would prefer to spell out the range in kilometers rather than engage in disputes in the future about the figures necessary to attack the US. He would say that this was a good proposal, but it needed to be made specific.

Gromyko said that in that case even a Phantom aircraft with multiple in-air refueling could be considered to have intercontinental range. (Gromyko read his statement in Russian and his interpreter read it in English as worded yesterday.) Gromyko added that the words "that capability" meant the capability of striking targets on the territory of the USA.



The President thought this was a matter that could be discussed this afternoon between Gromyko and Secretary Vance.<sup>4</sup>

Gromyko referred to the President's remarks and said that while he would, of course, return to more detailed discussion of it later, his first impression was that this was not very promising. What the President had suggested did provide a unilateral advantage to the US; he did not believe this to be the right way of moving toward agreement.

The President said he wanted to respond to that. Every single limit proposed was identical in terms of what the SU would be free to do and in terms of what the US would be free to do, with only one exception, and that was that the SU could deploy 300 very large missiles, while we could not. There were no other differences at all. Any restriction which applied to us also applied to the SU, and the only exception was the provision for large missiles which worked to the advantage of the SU. We recognized that advantage, because it had been agreed upon several years ago. We had accommodated to this, but he would challenge Gromyko to show any other place in the agreement that did this.

Gromyko pointed out that the President had omitted one very important factor. Did he know why the SU had received that advantage at Vladivostok? It had been agreed there that the SU was to have freedom as far as what the US called heavy missiles were concerned, while the US was allowed in return not to record any specific commitment to do away with its forward-based strategic nuclear systems. This was the accommodation which had led to the break-through at Vladivostok, and this was how the problem had been resolved. Up to now, Gromyko had not mentioned this to the President because he believed that he was all too well aware of all of this. But now he did have to mention it in view of the President's raising the subject. The heavy missile/FBS resolution had been reached with due account for the security interests of both sides and had established the necessary balance. After all, since then nothing had been changed as far as forward-based nuclear systems were concerned. True, the US Administration had changed. But, could the SU now be expected to modify its position on heavy missiles?

The President replied that there was perhaps a misunderstanding here. We were not demanding that the SU modify anything in connection with its heavy missiles. The only point was that this was the only point of inequity in the arrangement. We had granted this advantage to the SU, and Gromyko had explained what he viewed as good reasons for that advantage. He hoped that Gromyko did not expect him to offer

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<sup>4</sup> Vance and Gromyko met the same day from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. to discuss this issue, the proposals made by the President to Gromyko, and other SALT issues. (Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Vance 1977–1980, Lot File 84D241, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977)

him a proposal going even beyond the one he had explained. We had agreed to the 1320 overall aggregate for MIRVs. We had yielded on the SU position on modern large ballistic missiles. We had also yielded to Soviet insistence that a heavy bomber with air-launched cruise missiles be counted as a MIRVed unit. He really felt that this proposal could not be considered as a sign of weakness on our part or simply as a negotiating position. If the Soviet Union accepted it, it would put an end to uncertainty for 3 years, and in the President's view it accommodated the special strategic needs and the special political needs of the SU. The result was consistent with what had been agreed between former President Ford and President Brezhnev. This afternoon Gromyko would have a chance to discuss it further with Secretary Vance. If there were still difficulties that had not been resolved while Gromyko was still in this country, the President would try to remove them. He believed that our proposals accommodated the difficulties of the SU and also met our security interests.

The President said in closing that he had enjoyed getting to know Gromyko. Gromyko had been preceded by a reputation which was a clear advantage to the SU.

Gromyko thanked the President for this meeting and for his time. He said that it appeared to him the US was still trying to gain advantages, but through the back door. But he would continue with Secretary Vance. This was just his first general impression. He asked the President not to forget the words to the effect that the SU was anxious to see the important negotiations between us crowned by success. This would, of course, depend upon the efforts of both sides.

**184. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 27, 1977, 8–9:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

SALT

**PARTICIPANTS***US*

President Jimmy Carter  
Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
Ambassador Paul C. Warnke  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Mr. William G. Hyland  
Mr. David Aaron  
Mr. Hamilton Jordan  
Mr. Jody Powell  
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

*USSR*

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Deputy Foreign Minister V.G. Korniyenko  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Mr. V.G. Makarov  
Mr. N.N. Detinov  
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President told Foreign Minister Gromyko that he had watched him on television today during his General Assembly speech. He noted that Gromyko seemed to be getting more publicity than the President himself.

Gromyko first wanted to express his appreciation to the President for his having found it possible to meet with him at this late hour. He recalled that during their last conversation<sup>2</sup> the President had said that if the Soviet side had some additional considerations to offer in the light of their last discussion, these thoughts could be conveyed to the President personally or to the Secretary of State. Gromyko had wondered how to proceed correctly. In short, he was here in order to express these considerations and, in particular, on the issues discussed the last time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 18. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. An unknown hand made several edits to the text of the document, which is marked "Draft." The substantive changes have been accounted for in the footnotes below.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 183.

Gromyko said the President might have noted that he had told the U.N. General Assembly that the positions of the sides on concluding a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms had come somewhat closer together.<sup>3</sup> Gromyko would add that this was very good indeed. He believed that what he had to say tonight would be of some interest to the President. What he had said before the General Assembly had already taken into account what he was going to say tonight.

During his last meeting with the President and his conversations with Secretary Vance,<sup>4</sup> the efforts of both sides had resulted in substantial forward movement in terms of resolving those issues which, he would say directly, had been blocking the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. In this connection he had in mind above all the questions of cruise missiles and so-called heavy missiles. At the same time, the US side had raised some new questions. The President would recall that he had raised them toward the end of his statement.

Naturally, the Soviet side had to take a certain minimum amount of time to compare and analyze the respective positions of the sides,<sup>5</sup> and reconsider them from various angles in view of the new questions raised. The Soviet side had thoroughly reflected on what the President had said, and Gromyko was now prepared to present its views, in short, the Soviet position.

First: the President had proposed that within the overall limit of 1,320 MIRVed strategic delivery vehicles—a number that would include MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers—a separate level would be established for the total number of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs. In this connection, the President had named the figure of 1,200 for that level. This new figure had not appeared in our discussions before that. The Soviet Union was now agreeing to the establishment of a separate sub-level for the total number of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs, but in the amount of 1,250, not 1,200 as the President had proposed. The President could see that the difference was very small.

Second: in connection with the understanding achieved to establish a separate sub-level for MIRVed ICBM launchers—a level of 820—the President had said that this figure must include all the ICBM

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<sup>3</sup> Excerpts of Gromyko's speech were published in *The New York Times*, September 28, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> For Vance's conversations with Gromyko, see footnote 3, Document 182, footnote 4, Document 183.

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand added "and analyze."

launchers deployed in the Derazhnya and Pervomaisk areas, invoking the argument that it was difficult to establish with certainty which ICBM launchers there were equipped with MIRVs and which were not so equipped. Gromyko had to say that in the view of the Soviet side this question, raised by the U.S. side, was artificially contrived. He was convinced that the national technical means at U.S. disposal made it possible to ascertain everything necessary in this respect. National technical means make it possible to distinguish between MIRVed ICBM launchers and non-MIRVed ICBM launchers by the specific features peculiar to MIRVed launchers, which were not hidden away somewhere but could be observed. Nevertheless, on the basis of its policy, based on principle and aimed at earliest possible completion of the new agreement, the Soviet side could now agree to include all (Gromyko repeated and stressed the word “all”) ICBM launchers deployed in the Derazhnya and Pervomaisk areas in the sub-level to be established for MIRVed ICBM launchers, i.e., in the figure of 820. The Soviet Union had taken this decision with an account for the President’s statement to the effect that within the limits of the aforementioned sub-level for MIRVed ICBM launchers there would be no sub-limit for heavy missiles; in other words, no restrictions on equipping heavy missiles with MIRVs.

Gromyko pointed out that everything he had said so far and would say further on had been very carefully considered, and not only by himself and his colleagues here. He had been in touch with Moscow where this had been analyzed, and Leonid Brezhnev personally had given close attention to the considerations expressed by the President the other day.

Third: the Soviet side will not object to the President’s proposal that the provision banning air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range in excess of 2,500 kilometers be included in the Protocol rather than in the basic treaty. In this connection it is anticipated that the question of the maximum range of such missiles for the period after expiration of the Protocol would be considered subsequently. The Soviet side was confident that the President looked at this issue the same way. As for the provision banning the equipping of aircraft other than heavy bombers with ALCMs with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, the Soviet side reaffirmed the previous understanding that a clause to that effect should be included in the basic agreement or treaty. He did not think there would be any argument between the sides about this issue.

Fourth: the Soviet side accepted the President’s proposal that the three-year Protocol should not include a ban on the testing of land-based mobile ICBM launchers. However, deployment of such launchers and missiles for them would be prohibited, as already agreed, and the testing of such missiles would also be banned.

Summing up, Gromyko said that the Soviet Union had once again taken several major steps forward toward the position of the U.S. side. He recalled that the President did not like the word “concession;” therefore, he had not used it this time. He was speaking of steps toward the position of the U.S. side in the interests of finding mutually acceptable solutions. He expressed his trust that this would be duly appreciated by the U.S. side, and that in turn the U.S. would take a realistic approach to the solution of those questions which had not as yet been fully resolved. He did not know how to categorize the remaining questions, but would say that they were questions of the second or third category, in any case of secondary importance.

Gromyko added he would not say that the matters on which he had presented new Soviet proposals tonight in order to meet the President’s wishes were not complex and difficult. Some of the decisions which had to be taken in order to present these proposals had been quite painful for the Soviet Union, in particular the question of the launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaisk areas. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government had taken the necessary decisions in order to meet the U.S. position. He wanted to repeat for the sake of clarity that all the missiles in those areas would be included in the sub-limit of 820.

This completed what Gromyko had to communicate to the President tonight. If the President believed it possible to comment, he would like to hear his reaction.

The President noted that there were two or three other items which had not been discussed. One was the matter of further missile testing. We would like very much for the testing of all new intercontinental missiles to cease. He understood that the previous Soviet position was to ban the testing of new MIRVed ICBMs only. We would prefer to see an end to the testing of all new ICBMs.<sup>6</sup>

Gromyko acknowledged that, of course, there were several questions that had so far not been completely resolved. He had addressed those issues tonight which one might characterize as being of crucial importance for the two sides, agreement on which in his view had put the sides on the road to completion of the new agreement. However, since the President had touched on some unagreed issues, Gromyko would speak about them, including the one the President had mentioned. The following were the questions which had not as yet been polished to perfection, as it were.

First: with reference to the overall aggregate of strategic delivery vehicles, the Soviet side believed it possible to agree to a reduction of

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<sup>6</sup> In this paragraph, the same unknown hand added “two or,” substituted “intercontinental missiles” for “ICBMs,” and crossed out “ban” and added in its place, “see an end to.”

that aggregate by 150 units after 1980, i.e., to a reduction from 2,400 to 2,250. He would tell the President quite frankly that to some extent this was somewhat painful for the Soviet side because the 2,400 level had already been agreed upon earlier. Of course, the President had named a figure that was different from the one he had just specified. The Soviet side had decided to propose a compromise figure, closer to the U.S. proposal than to the original level.

Second: with reference to new types of MIRVed missiles, the Soviet side reaffirmed its readiness to agree that the three-year Protocol include an obligation for the sides not to test or deploy new types of MIRVed ICBMs (Gromyko repeated and stressed “MIRVed ICBMs”), not new types of ICBMs generally. In the interests of strategic stability the Soviet side was also prepared to agree that the Protocol include an obligation for the sides not to test or deploy new types of MIRVed SLBMs as well.

Third: as for the limitation on SLCMs and GLCMs, he thought there was agreement between us that deployment of such missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers will be prohibited for the duration of the Protocol. In this respect there was no difference of views between the sides. In this connection there remained the question that had not yet been fully resolved and agreed upon, i.e., the question of the testing of such missiles. The Soviet side continued to believe that all further testing of such missiles should be prohibited. He repeated that he was speaking about SLCMs and GLCMs, and that it was the Soviet view that all testing of such missiles should be banned.

In conclusion, Gromyko believed it necessary to remind the President that there were still some other unagreed issues, not yet fully polished, such as the obligations not to transfer strategic arms to third countries and not to circumvent the agreement in any other manner. Without an appropriate solution of these matters the agreement would not be effective. These questions had already been tackled by the delegations, in other words, by “our wise men in Geneva.” Gromyko expressed the hope that they, too, would be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Summing up, Gromyko wanted to note the productive nature of the current talks, as he saw it. He believed this would not be different from the President’s opinion. In his view there was now every reason to believe that the work on the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms had entered into the home stretch, and that there was every opportunity now to complete the agreement in the not too distant future if both sides were really interested in doing so. He would also note that the four or five questions he had mentioned toward the end of his statement, which had not been mentioned by the President, although important, could be classified as secondary questions, and he

believed that the delegations in Geneva could exert the necessary effort to agree upon them. The fundamental issues were the ones he had addressed in the first part of his statement. They belonged to the first category and were knocking on the door as it were, begging to be resolved. Incidentally, he also thought that if a green light were given on these crucial issues, it would make it easier for the delegations to deal with the other still unagreed issues as well. If the President was not in a position to comment definitively on some questions tonight, he might want to do so later, but Gromyko would certainly very much like to hear what the President could say. The tough decisions taken by the Soviet side were of a fundamental nature and went a long way to meet the U.S. position; this should make it possible to complete the agreement. After all, who could refuse to accept concessions?

The President said he would respond as follows:

First: he believed that the discussions during this past week had been fruitful and had moved us in the right direction. He felt there was now an extra burden on him because he had to protect the interests of our country; Gromyko had been so generous that the President now felt obligated to protect the interests of Gromyko's country as well. (Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that the Soviet side should perhaps take back some of its concessions.)

The President said that since there were so few occasions when they could meet with himself participating, it would be good to accomplish as much as possible at this meeting, if not reach agreement, at least be sure that we understood the Soviet position, and clarify any possible differences.

First he wanted to ask a question: when Gromyko had referred to sub-limits of 1,200 and 820, he had assumed that no sub-limit would apply to the very large missiles of the Soviet side. He took it that the limit of 308 would remain in effect.

Gromyko said there was no question about it at all. Since Soviet heavy missiles were ICBMs, they would be subject to the sub-level of 820 for MIRVed ICBMs. Thereby, they would also be included in the broader sub-level of 1,250. Gromyko noted that he was speaking of a sub-level of 1,250, not 1,200, as the President had said, for both land-based ICBMs and SLBMs.

The President wanted to make it clear that there would be three sub-limits: a sub-limit of 1,250 for the total number of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs; a sub-limit of 820 for MIRVed ICBMs; and a sub-limit of 308 for heavy missiles. Was that correct?

Gromyko replied that the 820 sub-limit would apply to all land-based ICBMs, and therefore all Soviet heavy missiles. The sub-limit of 1,250 would apply to all land-based ICBMs plus SLBMs.



The President said he understood, but still wanted to know whether there would be a limit on the total number of very large missiles in the amount of 308.

Gromyko replied: "Absolutely, no question about it."

The President wanted to go down the list and make sure that there were no different interpretations:

—The figure 1,320 for the MIRVed ALCM aggregate was agreed.<sup>7</sup>

—The figure 820 for MIRVed ICBMs was agreed.

—Very large missiles would continue to be limited to 308.<sup>8</sup>

—At this point we would not agree on the sub-limit of 1,250 for the total of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs, and the President would explain somewhat later why we preferred 1,200.

—The range limit of 2,500 kilometers for ALCMs was agreed, as well as inclusion of a provision to that effect in the Protocol only.

—We still needed to discuss in Geneva the definition of heavy bombers on which ALCMs would be mounted. He did not think that there would be a difference between us in this respect.

—On mobile ICBM launchers, we had agreed to ban their deployment and include a provision to that effect in the Protocol.

—With reference to the overall aggregate of 2,250, it had been our understanding that the Soviet side wanted to include this in the Treaty which would be effective through 1985, but now we understood that this would apply only after 1980. This was not a major point and we could decide it later on. Of course, we preferred a lower overall figure and earlier reductions.

—With reference to testing new ICBMs, the President said he would hope that the Soviet side could agree with us on this point in order to stop further testing and deployment of new types of missiles. As Gromyko knew, it was not possible to detect surely whether a new missile being tested was equipped with MIRVs or with just one warhead. As far as we were concerned, if there were specific missiles the Soviet side wanted to name as an exception to this provision, missiles on which it was currently working, that might be possible provided we could do the same.<sup>9</sup> But on the whole we would like to freeze new ICBMs.

—On SLBMs, this matter could also be resolved by naming specific missiles in which we already had a considerable investment; for example, for the Soviet side these could be SS-NX-18's and for us, Trident I. Both sides might possibly have other plans for the future, but if it could be specified at the level of our Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, which missiles we would continue testing, that could provide a solution. The President wanted to explore that idea with Gromyko so as to end the testing of all new ICBMs except specified missiles. We would also like to discuss with Gromyko ending the testing of all new SLBMs except those on which much work had already been done.

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<sup>7</sup> The same unknown hand added the word "ALCM."

<sup>8</sup> The same unknown hand substituted the phrase "would continue to be" for "were."

<sup>9</sup> The same unknown hand added the word "missiles."

The President now wanted to return to the proposed sub-levels—1,200 proposed by the U.S. and 1,250 proposed by the Soviet side.<sup>10</sup> As Gromyko had pointed out, this difference was small. For us, however, it was important because, as the President had said last week, we felt that the SALT agreement provided exactly equal limits on every item except one—very large missiles—and here the Soviet side had a significant advantage. The difference of 120 (between 1,320 and 1,200) could be used for heavy bombers with ALCMs, and we saw it as justifiable as a balance against the Soviet advantage in heavy missiles,<sup>11</sup> recognizing that if the Soviets choose to deploy heavy bombers with ALCMs, they might of course do so as well. So that our Congress, the American people, and the President himself could see that we had a general balance between the two sides, the sub-level of 1,200 was important for us. We would have liked to say 1,100,<sup>12</sup> but had put out the figure of 1,200, not as a negotiating position, but because we felt it did provide the necessary balance. If the Soviet side could accommodate us on this point, the President believed that we could then very quickly resolve the present difference between us on the testing of new ICBMs and SLBMs.

Gromyko replied that he had no new position on overall aggregate levels except the one he had set forth tonight. The same applied to the sub-limit of 1,250. He would emphasize, however, that the concessions the Soviet side had made tonight toward the position of the United States were on very fundamental issues, as he had pointed out in his remarks. As for his comments tonight on still unresolved questions, most of them were already before the delegations in Geneva, or should by mutual agreement and accompanied by appropriate instructions be referred to the delegations. The overwhelming majority of the President's comments had concerned these questions of the second category, which, although important, were subordinate.

Gromyko had one question to ask. If he had understood the President correctly, the President had said that it was not possible during the testing of missiles to distinguish between MIRVed and non-MIRVed missiles. The President had said that in connection with the testing of new types of missiles. This was something new for Gromyko. Up to now it had been his understanding that national technical means were capable of distinguishing between them. What had changed?

The President said he would be glad to reply. He was sure that Soviet observation capabilities were better than ours. Within the limits of our technical capabilities he thought Gromyko would agree that one

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<sup>10</sup> The same unknown hand added the word "proposed."

<sup>11</sup> The same unknown hand added the phrase "justifiable as."

<sup>12</sup> Above this sentence, the same unknown hand wrote "are prepared to accept a lower number, to," but the original text was not crossed out.

could test a number of new delivery vehicles and simply install existing MIRVs on them after the test. What we would like to see would be, he thought, to our mutual advantage—an end to testing all new ICBMs so as not to engage in a race in terms of improving the propulsion of new delivery vehicles, after which standardized warheads which had already been tested could be installed on the missiles.

Gromyko suggested that if there was a difference on this issue between us, the delegations and experts discuss this subject, too. He believed it to be a very strange approach indeed to hold that the Soviet Union had the capability of distinguishing between MIRVed and non-MIRVed missiles during testing, while the U.S. did not. Since when was the U.S. a technically underdeveloped country?<sup>13</sup> But, knowledgeable people, technicians, should discuss this matter; let them talk and try to overcome the problem.<sup>14</sup> In short, with reference to the second category of questions, other obstacles can indeed arise, but they should be discussed and hopefully resolved at the level of experts. It might turn out as a result of such discussion that what appeared to be a mountain today could turn out to be a molehill tomorrow.<sup>15</sup> Gromyko expressed his hope that the President personally and his Government would duly evaluate what had been proposed tonight as a serious effort to move toward the United States position with minor rectifications. After all, it would not be a negotiation if one side always responded simply “yes” or “no” to the proposals of the other. Slight amendments and reservations were the rule rather than the exception. The proposals Gromyko had brought with him tonight contained a minimum of such rectifications.

The President wanted to bring up two more points so there would be no more misunderstanding.

The first concerned the testing of our GLCMs and SLCMs, where in the past we had one missile that was launched from the ground, from the sea, and from the air. Any testing of cruise missiles in the future with a range of more than 600 kilometers would be only from aircraft. He did not want to mislead the other side, because in the past we had tested missiles from the sea, from the ground, and from the air, because they were the same missile.

Gromyko acknowledged that there was a difference between the positions of the sides on this item, which had been discussed between him and Secretary Vance and Mr. Warnke. The Soviet side did indeed believe that there should be a ban on testing, including air-launched

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<sup>13</sup> The same unknown hand added the words “a” and “country.”

<sup>14</sup> The same unknown hand substituted “should” for “had to.”

<sup>15</sup> The same unknown hand added the phrase “turn out to.”

testing of GLCMs and SLCMs, because after all, if a missile has been tested, even if only from the air, it could at a moment's notice be mass-produced on a conveyor belt and then be used in a ground-launched and sea-launched mode. He would suggest that this question, too, be thoroughly and jointly ventilated and viewed from all technical angles. One of the arguments made on the US side had been that it did not make any difference whether a missile was tested for subsequent use only from a heavy bomber or for use from the ground or sea. The Soviet side believed that it did make a difference. This question should be thoroughly investigated. In any case, it would do no harm to do so. He would repeat that the Soviet position was to provide a ban on both deployment and testing of such missiles, including air-launched testing. But, he would suggest that the delegations take a look at this matter, and thought it would be difficult to object to such a suggestion, even for a President.

The President said he would not object.

The President presented Gromyko with a mock-up showing the relative size and date of first deployment of Soviet and American missiles. He thought Gromyko would be interested in seeing it and pointed out the model of the Soviet SS-18.

Gromyko pointed to the model of the Titan missile and said, "Here is the most terrifying of all the missiles; its name speaks for itself, while Soviet missiles are designated by letters and numbers only."

The President expressed his pleasure at having met with the Foreign Minister again. He thought the two sides had made progress in the current talks, and looked forward to the continuing discussions, in which Mr. Warnke will be our major negotiator. He believed that Gromyko's attitude had been very constructive. Where differences between us existed, he thought it would be clear to Gromyko that we were urging lower limits and earlier reductions. He hoped that we would come to an early conclusion of the new SALT agreement, hopefully in combination with a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosives, so as to curb the costly arms race between us. We were ready to meet the other side halfway or better. He would agree that the outstanding matters be turned over to our respective negotiators to continue negotiations and hopefully complete the new agreement which was very important for both our countries.

Gromyko thanked the President for his remarks and asked him to understand the great significance of the concessions he had brought with him tonight. In particular, he would draw the President's attention to the concession regarding the Derazhnya and Pervomaisk areas, and ask him to realize what this had meant for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, considering the great importance the President had attached to this issue, the Soviet side had agreed to the U.S. proposal.

**185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

**SUBJECT**

Vance-Gromyko SALT Discussion, September 30

Attached is Cy's report on his talk Friday with Gromyko on SALT.<sup>2</sup> In essence, Gromyko:

—Stood firm on 2250 and asked that we not insist on a lower figure.

—Said they insist on 1250 and will accept no other figure.<sup>3</sup>

—Reacted strongly on Backfire, saying they have gone as far as they can; and refused to refer the issue to Geneva, but agreed to consult further with Cy.

—Proposed to refer testing of new missiles to Geneva and agreed that our proposal on SLBMs could be considered.<sup>4</sup>

—"Lightly referred" to your press statement indicating the Soviets showed flexibility.<sup>5</sup>

Cy told him you would be talking to key Senators and he would urge confidentiality. Gromyko said that was for us, but that public statements must be done carefully to avoid the need for Soviet rebuttal.

Cy feels Gromyko was softer on 2160 than 1200 and that Gromyko implied the Soviets would reopen FBS if we continue to press on Backfire.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 9/16/77–10/5/77. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Carter initialed "C" at the top of the page.

<sup>2</sup> The talk took place at the Soviet UN Mission on September 30 during the UN General Assembly meeting. The memorandum of conversation was not attached, but is in the Department of State, Files of Secretary of State Vance, 1977–1980, Lot File 84D241, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Brzezinski sent the President guidance for Vance for his discussion with Gromyko under cover of a memorandum of September 29. Carter approved the guidance with the comment: "Zbig—ok as is, but Gromyko has not agreed to any 2200km radius limit on Backfire. J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 9/16/77–10/5/77)

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "most important" in the margin next to this sentence.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "important" in the margin next to this sentence.

<sup>5</sup> The text of the President's press conference, September 29, is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pp. 1684–1693; the response to the question on SALT is on pp. 1689–1690.

**186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Warnke)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 4, 1977.

SUBJECT

Instructions for the US SALT Delegation

The President has approved the following instructions for the next round of SALT.

1. The issue of the aggregate level of strategic delivery systems and the level of launchers of MIRVed missiles will continue to be addressed at a political level but as appropriate you may emphasize our position that the appropriate levels are 2160 beginning in 1980, and 1200, respectively.

2. The United States is prepared to accept in the Treaty a sublimit on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs of 820, provided: (a) the other aggregate totals are settled on a mutually acceptable basis; and (b) the Soviets accept a "launcher type" rule that *inter alia* counts the 120 disputed launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk in the MIRVed ICBM sublimit.

3. You should accept the concept of including in the Treaty a sublimit of 1320 on launchers of MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km. However, you should make clear that US acceptance of this sublimit is contingent on satisfactory resolution of the issues cited in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The US can accept in the Treaty: (a) a ban on deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers and (b) a ban on testing of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km from aircraft other than heavy bombers, contingent on revision of the definition of a heavy bomber to include any aircraft equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 9/16/77–10/5/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Brzezinski sent these instructions to Carter for his approval under a covering memorandum dated October 4 and suggested that the President pay special attention to paragraphs 9 and 10. Carter approved the instructions, but added the following comments. "a.) Method of determining range limit on Backfire same as for cruise missiles; b) In non-transfer, etc. let apply to any weapon limited or prevented in SALT II; c) Define cruise missile (atomic warhead). J." (Ibid.)

5. You should propose to include in the Protocol:

a. A ban on testing and deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2500 km.

b. A ban on testing of cruise missiles to ranges in excess of 600 km from sea-based and ground-based launchers.

c. A ban on deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on sea-based and ground-based launchers.

6. The US can accept an agreed statement to the effect that the cruise missile limitations in the 1985 portion of the Treaty and the Protocol will apply to any unmanned, self-propelled guided weapons delivery vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its range. However, the Delegation should make clear that the US reserves the right in future negotiations to propose different provisions for conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles deployed on sea-based launchers, ground-based launchers, and aircraft other than heavy bombers.

7. The US can accept an agreed statement that for the purpose of this agreement, the range capability of a cruise missile is considered to be the maximum system operational range; i.e., the maximum distance at which a target can be effectively engaged by the missile system when it is operating in its standard full system design mode.

8. You are authorized to accept in the Protocol a ban on the testing of ICBMs from mobile launchers, contingent on Soviet agreement that there will be no restrictions on the testing of launchers for mobile ICBMs.

9. You should propose to include in the Protocol a ban on the testing and deployment of new types of MIRVed and non-MIRVed ICBMs. "New types" should be defined as set forth in State 177386 of July 28, 1977.<sup>2</sup> In response to a Soviet proposal to include new types of SLBMs under this prohibition, you should indicate a willingness to consider doing so provided: (a) the ban applies to new types of MIRVed and non-MIRVed SLBMs; and (b) further flight tests of SLBMs not operationally deployed as of January 1, 1977, will be banned with the exception of Trident I for the US and SS-NX-18 for the USSR.

10. On the question of non-transfer and non-circumvention, the Delegation should continue to press for a generalized non-circumvention formula. At an appropriate time at the discretion of the Chairman, the Delegation should seek instructions to advance the position that the US is prepared to add the words "through any other

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 177386 to USDEL SALT Geneva, July 28, is in the Central Foreign Policy File, D770271-0315.

state or states, or in any other manner” to the US-proposed non-circumvention provision.

11. Your instructions on all other outstanding issues remain in force.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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**187. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 17, 1977.

**SUBJECT**

Principal Points Raised by Ambassador Dobrynin During Lunch on Friday, October 14, 1977

1. What are the priorities of this Administration, notably the President, in regards to existing differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions in SALT (I told Dobrynin that while all of the conflicting issues are of importance to us, the two points with which I would begin would be ICBM modernization and the 1200 MIRV sublimit).

2. He expressed concern about implications for SALT of the FB111–H decisions (I told him this was not an Administration policy).

3. He expressed the thought that once SALT II has been successfully completed, there may be a need for an intermediate forum to deal with issues which are covered neither in SALT nor in MBFR.

4. He asked if we would be tempted to delay artificially SALT ratification because of the pressure of other business, such as Panama, the Middle East, etc.

5. We discussed the Middle East, and I urged him to use Soviet influence to obtain Syrian cooperation.

6. He said that he was convinced initially that the President genuinely desired reductions in nuclear arms, but Brezhnev and others felt that our March proposals were completely one-sided.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/5/77–11/22/77. No classification marking.



**188. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 4, 1977.

SUBJECT

SALT

Though we are some distance from a SALT II agreement, we are already well into what amounts to a spreading ratification debate, with a vigorous opposition campaign developing based on leaks and a mix of misunderstandings and apprehensions.<sup>2</sup> This memorandum:

- reviews where we stand in the SALT negotiations;
- gives a general comparative evaluation of the emerging agreement; and
- delineates and addresses the major criticisms that have been made against the agreement thus far.

*I. Where We Stand in the Negotiations*

The charts at Tab A<sup>3</sup> are a comprehensive update of U.S. and Soviet positions on the major elements of the Treaty, Protocol, and Principles.

On the issues that have not yet been put into the Geneva forum:

—We are still at 2160 vs 2250 for the overall aggregate and 1200 vs 1250 for the MIRVed missile ceiling.

—On Backfire, the Soviets have not moved on giving us specific figures/commitments on production rate, upgrading, refueling, and assumptions for their range calculations.

On the issues recently put into the Geneva forum, the following developments have taken place:

—While agreeing to count all launchers at D&P as MIRVed, the Soviets still claim that the launchers at D&P are of two different types. A launcher type rule which does not set the precedent of classifying all of the launchers at D&P as the same type is virtually useless.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/6/77–11/22/77. Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> In a November 4 memorandum to the President, Harold Brown reported he had met with Senator Jackson on November 2. According to Brown, Jackson was “annoyed” that the Senate had not been more closely consulted on SALT, was convinced that the Protocol limits would become permanent, doubted Congress would approve funds for the MX if it was limited in the Protocol, and was dismayed at “a steady erosion of our position in the face of Soviet toughness.” Jackson implied, according to Brown, that even if the administration won all the remaining points, he would find SALT unacceptable. (Ibid., Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 10–11/77)

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

—The Soviets are opposing our heavy bomber definition which in effect permits the deployment of cruise missiles over 600 km on transport aircraft so long as they are counted as heavy bombers.

—The Soviets' definition of "new types" of missiles is much less stringent than ours. They are vigorously opposed to limits on the "modernization" of existing (i.e., SS-17/18/19) systems while we have essentially proposed a ban on all hardware changes for existing missiles. This is a crunch issue directly related to the question of whether SALT II will do anything to enhance the prospects for Minuteman survivability—a major Congressional concern.

—The Soviets have challenged the idea of limiting all cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers through the Protocol period and only nuclear-armed cruise missiles on such aircraft thereafter.

In a very positive and important development, the Soviets yesterday basically accepted our Protocol position on cruise missile range limits. This will permit the testing of Tomahawk to 2500 km from heavy bombers and to 600 km from sea- and ground-based launchers. Our ability to thus continue the Tomahawk development program will be a major help in selling the cruise missile limits both to the Congress and our Allies. In addition, the Soviet SALT Delegation has indicated that they are prepared to negotiate the aggregate and MIRV level limits in Geneva.

## *II. General Evaluation*

In evaluating the merits of the emerging agreement insofar as its impact on strategic forces, the basic issues are:

—Comparison between US and Soviet forces and measures of strategic capability under the agreement.

—Comparison between forces under the agreement and projected 1985 forces in the "no-SALT" case.

While there is some interest in comparing the emerging agreement with earlier negotiating positions (Vladivostok, February 1976, the Comprehensive March 1977 proposal, etc.), the acceptability of the agreement will eventually be much more dependent on the comparisons described above.

At Tab B<sup>4</sup> is a set of force tables which provides the desired comparisons. While these tables are complicated, they represent the level of detail at which the arguments on these issues will be made. The tables reveal the following features of the emerging agreement:

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

*US Versus Soviet Forces Under the Agreement*

—The US has a number of reasonable alternatives (four are shown) for dealing with the 1320 limit on MIRVed missiles and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers.

—The US will retain a significant advantage in numbers of strategic weapons (12,000–14,000 for the US in 1985 versus about 8500 for the Soviets). Missile RV numbers on the two sides will be about equal (about 8000).

—The Soviet Union will maintain a significant advantage in missile throw weight (12 million pounds versus over 4 million pounds for the US). However, when bomber throw weight is included, the differential narrows to 3–4 million pounds.

—The US cannot reach an aggregate of 2160 operational delivery vehicles without maintaining the Polaris SSBNs on operational status.

*Comparison with the “No-SALT” Case* (Based on “moderate best estimates”)

—The Soviet Union will have to dismantle over 600 delivery vehicles compared to the No-SALT case while the US will have to dismantle between 86 and 114 vehicles depending on how forces are distributed within the 1320 limit.

—The Soviets will also have to forego building an additional 150–190 delivery vehicles while the US would not build 24 Trident SLBMs and 20–33 heavy bombers with cruise missiles compared to the No-SALT case.

—The Soviet MIRV level will be 750 below the “No-SALT” level while the difference in the US MIRV level would be at most about 250 missiles (100 Minuteman III and 24 Trident which we would deploy plus additional Minuteman III and Poseidons).

—The Soviet missile RV level will be reduced by 2000–2500. In contrast, the impact on the US is about 500 RVs and possibly a few hundred bomber weapons.

Beyond the issue of static measures, there is also the issue of the impact of the agreement, in particular the Protocol, on development programs. The agreement will have no impact on US missile programs (M-X and Trident I) or the US ALCM development program. There will be restrictions on SLCM and GLCM testing to beyond 600 km but no real impact on the development program as long as Tomahawk can be tested from heavy bombers. In contrast, the Protocol will clearly delay testing of at least several of the new Soviet ICBMs as well as possibly the Typhoon SLBM.

As you are aware, it is difficult to predict what impact the collapse of SALT would have on US and Soviet force levels. Although the forces shown in the “No-SALT” case are our current “best estimates” under

the assumption that neither side escalates the production of strategic weapons, they should clearly be recognized as “estimates”.

### III. Criticisms and Responses

The principal public critics of the emerging agreement have been Senator Jackson, Paul Nitze, and the *Wall Street Journal*. As you know, the JCS have expressed some concern about certain provisions of the agreement (Backfire, etc.), although we anticipate that on balance they will support the agreement. The material which follows summarizes the major criticisms of the agreement and outlines appropriate responses.

- *The US made too many concessions, in particular as compared to the March proposal.* This criticism will focus on our negotiating ability, not the agreement itself. The response:

- The agreement should be evaluated on its merits, not on how we got there.

- We believe our tactics in taking the high ground in March helped us to get the agreement we now have achieved.

- We have not abandoned the goals of the March proposal; some were achieved in the Treaty, the others are reflected in the Protocol, and Principles.

- *We have conceded the Soviets a permanent throw weight advantage in their heavy ICBM force.* This criticism may also tie the Soviet heavy ICBM advantage to the Minuteman survivability issue. The response:

- We agreed to let the Soviets keep their heavy ICBMs in SALT Two since this had essentially been agreed at Vladivostok.

- In spite of its throw weight, the SS-18 has only marginally better military capability than the SS-19. In this context, we thought that a limit on MIRVed ICBMs would be as good as a limit on heavy missiles.

- We are past the point where a limit on heavy missiles would impact on Minuteman survivability; this was true even of the 150 limit in our March proposal.

- Under the limits agreed so far, we could, if we desired, deploy heavy *mobile* ICBMs or heavy SLBMs to redress the throw weight disadvantage.

- *The agreement does nothing for Minuteman survivability.* This argument should focus on the issue of restricting accuracy improvements. The response:

- It is extremely difficult to limit missile accuracy. Our proposal for a ban on new types of ICBMs should slow down the rate at which the Soviets improve their ICBM accuracy if we can ban hardware improvements. However, even this would only be a first step and further more restrictive measures, including testing limitations, would have to

be agreed in SALT III to assure a significant impact on Minuteman survivability.

—Vladivostok would have done nothing for Minuteman survivability.

- *The SLCM and GLCM range limits are too restrictive.* This criticism is likely to be tied to Allied interest in such cruise missiles. The response:

—We have essentially set aside the issue of SLCM and GLCM limits for negotiation in SALT II. The Protocol limits on SLCMs and GLCMs will not prejudice our position on these issues in SALT III.

—We had not planned to deploy SLCMs and GLCMs during the period of the Protocol.

—Because we will be testing the Tomahawk from heavy bombers, there will be significant limits on the SLCM/GLCM development program.

- *The ALCM range limit of 2500 km is too low.* The concern will be the extension of this limit beyond 1980. The response:

—We have only agreed to this limit for the period of the Protocol. The limit for the period after the Protocol is a subject for future negotiations.

—A 2500 km ALCM range would provide adequate target coverage through 1985 under conservative projections of air defense improvements.

—While 2500 km standoff ALCMs cannot quite cover all targets in the Soviet Union, the combined coverage of the ALCMs and the penetrating bombers does achieve that coverage.

—We will be seeking air defense constraints in SALT III which could impact favorably on this issue.

- *Backfire should be counted as a heavy bomber.* There may be criticism of the Soviet unilateral statement when it is negotiated. The response:

—The Soviet unilateral statement will freeze the Backfire production rate and impose further constraints on Backfire improvements, training, and refueling.

—The freeze in the production rate will result in a Backfire force 140 less than our previous best estimate of the 1985 Backfire force level.

- *The cruise missile limitations are unverifiable.* This criticism will probably focus on the range limits. The response:

—Cruise missile limitations admittedly raise difficult verification problems, though more in some areas (e.g., conventional vs nuclear armed and range) than in others (e.g., the number of aircraft equipped with cruise missiles).

—Today we are confident in our intelligence on current Soviet cruise missile developments and technology. If the Soviets maintain their current cruise missile test and deployment practices, this confidence should be maintained.

—We are looking at the possibility of alternative approaches to help cruise missile verification (such as the type rules which enhance MIRV verification).

—As with other verification elements, the Soviets would have to consider the consequences of violation. We have high confidence in being able to identify violations on a scale which would be strategically significant.

• *Mobile ICBMs should be permitted since there is so little chance of saving Minuteman.* Nitze, in particular, is adamant on this issue. The response:

—The ban on mobile ICBMs is only for the period of the Protocol and will have no impact on the US M–X mobile ICBM development program. In the interim, we have halted the Soviet mobile ICBM program.

—If in fact, we can do nothing in SALT Three to enhance Minuteman survivability, then we will weigh the various strategic alternatives including deployment of mobile ICBMs.

—Permitting deployment of mobile ICBMs would open a new avenue in the strategic arms race and cause serious arms control verification problems. We have essentially deferred that important decision.

#### IV. Conclusion

I would stress two issues which, depending on how we get our message across, may have more to do with support for the emerging agreement than the debate on this or that specific. (If the issue is, in fact, joined at the concrete and technical level, then we will win handily because the numbers and provisions that are emerging are, in fact, good and readily defensible.)

First, the most dangerous dimension of the current campaign of criticism—and, in fact, the engine which powers so much of the anxiety and attacks—is the argument that we were forced to make concession after concession and gave up far more than we got. The Moscow proposal is generally held up as the measure of how far we have collapsed.<sup>5</sup> For much of the public and many on the Hill, this is the level at which they evaluate what has been done—not the specifics of the agreement. Those making the argument can draw on the very deep-

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the March 1977 proposals put forward by Vance in Moscow.

rooted public suspicion of Soviet aims and actions, and endemic fears that they will somehow successfully connive to get the best of us.

We should hit this concessions/competence argument very hard along these lines: The Moscow proposal was designed to push the Soviets off the Vladivostok proposal (which the United States had accepted) toward a more comprehensive and effective arms control agreement. It put terrific pressure on the Soviets, not least by challenging their claims to be the leaders in the effort for peace and arms control, and this, without any doubt, played a part in their flat rejection of it. We then entered a process—as one normally does in a serious negotiation—of seeking adjustments in the starting positions of both sides that would serve *our* purposes and move us toward *our* goals. We did not abandon the Moscow goals and, in fact, moved the Soviets a considerable distance toward accepting ideas that they at first bitterly resisted. We had to reckon with the broad consequences of continuing stalemate or even confrontation in SALT, but these consequences were, if anything, even more threatening for the Soviets, and it was probably this that impelled them to make the concessions they had to to move SALT forward.

Second, we cannot let the public discussions focus on this dimension or on the nuts and the bolts of the agreement without considering our larger objectives of strategic stability and reducing the risk of nuclear war; enhancing our security; and contributing to a more stable US/Soviet relationship overall, with all that implies for the outcomes of other major issues and, indeed, for the entire structure of world politics. Bluntly put, critics of the agreement cannot be permitted to define the issue of acceptance or rejection of a SALT agreement solely in terms of whether there are 50 or 100 missiles one way or the other, or 20 more or less ALCMed heavy bombers. These are differences at the margin of truly massive arsenals on both sides. More importantly, the critics must be forced—as we are—to weigh into the balance, when considering these specific issues, whether they are worth the failure of SALT with all the stability, security and political consequences that implies.

Finally, if the critics can draw on public fear and suspicion of the Soviets, so must we draw on the equally if not more powerful public impulse in favor of controlling nuclear armaments and reducing the risk of nuclear war.

**189. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 16, 1977.

**SUBJECT**

Your Meeting Thursday Afternoon on SALT<sup>2</sup>

I have attached an annotated agenda at Tab A<sup>3</sup> for your use.

The principal issue you need to address at this meeting is the pace and strategy of our overall SALT effort at this stage, taking into account the domestic political situation and the concerns of our Allies. There is increasing evidence that a premature SALT agreement would conflict with ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. Moreover, for SALT to be acceptable domestically and with our Allies will require time to present our case. It also in my judgment will require a display of toughness on your part with the Soviets to overcome the impression that we have given too much away.

Accordingly, I believe you will want to consult tomorrow on the appropriate pace for the negotiation. It is my view that the United States should be firm on all the major points still at issue with the Soviets. In particular, we should stick hard on limitations on the testing of new ICBMs.<sup>4</sup> This would not exclude discussion with the Soviets of variations that they may propose, nor probing them to say why they wish to leave open the option of testing new single warhead ICBMs. But this is a crucial aspect of limiting those Soviet forces that threaten us and about which Jackson has been effective in expressing concern, so we need to hold on this point.

I also believe we should stay firm on the other SALT issues—aggregates and principles for SALT Three. The more detailed questions such as bomber variants, telemetry encryption and heavy mobile missiles, should be left for SCC discussion; but I have included notes on them in the agenda at Tab A should they come up.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/6/77–11/22/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten "C" in the upper right hand corner indicates that Carter saw this memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting was held on November 17 from 2:40 to 4:48 p.m. with a 5-minute interruption when Carter and Brzezinski left to meet Israeli Prime Minister Begin. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Tab A was not attached.

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined the end of this sentence.



A second principal area should be a discussion of our approach to the Congress.<sup>5</sup> You should find out what Cy and Paul's plans are and emphasize that what we want at this stage is not a crash publicity campaign but a basic tutorial with Senators and Congressmen and key staff. We have sound strategic policies and programs and we should lay those out and place SALT in that context.

Finally, you may wish to address our Allies' concerns on cruise missiles and non-circumvention/non-transfer. I have attached a note on this for you at Tab B.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In a November 17 memorandum to Brzezinski, his Special Assistant Rick Inderfurth reported that Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) had told Inderfurth that the Carter administration should make better use of its "Hill supporters to respond to SALT attacks and criticisms." Hart also suggested trying to "split the Republicans on SALT" by identifying a half dozen Senators sympathetic to SALT and courting them. Hart recommended shifting the "focus of the SALT debate away from Jackson's subcommittee," and toward the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and outside SALT advisers. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 11/77)

<sup>6</sup> Tab B was not attached.

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**190. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

**SUBJECT**

Instructions for the SALT Delegation

Based on the meeting of the Special Coordination Committee on November 22nd,<sup>2</sup> the President has approved the following guidance for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

*Aggregate/MIRV Levels.* The US Delegation should attempt to elicit a proposal from the Soviet Delegation on a compromise aggregate level and effective date. If the Soviets make such a proposal, the US Delegation

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/5/77–11/22/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is *ibid*.

tion should seek an aggregate level as close to 2160 as possible, but a level of 2200 is acceptable. The effective date for completion of dismantling should be the expiration date of the Protocol. Dismantling should take place over the same schedule established for reaching the 2400 aggregate; i.e., six months for SLBM launchers, four months for ICBM launchers, and three months for heavy bombers. The US Delegation should maintain the current position of a limit of 1200 on launchers of MIRVed missiles.

*New Types of SLBMs.* The US Delegation prefers to prohibit new SLBM types except the Trident I and SS-NX-18. However, the US prefers no limits on new types of SLBMs to the Soviet proposal for exempting the Typhoon SLBM.

*Principles for SALT Three.* The US Delegation should continue to seek Soviet agreement to our proposed Principles for SALT Three. The US Delegation should not broach or comment on the issue of gray-area systems negotiations pending completion of the ongoing interagency analysis of this issue and further discussions of this issue with our Allies.

*Non-Circumvention/Non-Transfer.* At this time, the US Delegation should maintain the current position on this issue. At an appropriate time, the Chairman of the US Delegation will be authorized to informally seek to determine whether the US fallback non-circumvention formula might serve as an acceptable compromise on this issue. However, the US Delegation should not discuss this possibility with the Soviets in any manner pending completion of the initial Quadripartite discussions of this issue and appropriate authorization from Washington.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

**191. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 6, 1978.

## SUBJECT

SALT—Remaining Key Issues

While great progress has been made, a number of important issues remain unresolved in SALT: This memo sets forth my views on what the US must achieve in their resolution.

*Timing.* We should seek to sign a treaty and protocol in early spring. Both internationally (in terms of dealing with the Soviets and our allies) and domestically (in terms of achieving ratification before the 1978 congressional elections) that is a good window. The expected Senate action on the Panama Canal Treaties before the end of March, which we now have some reason to expect to be affirmative, should also be good. (I am, incidentally, inclined to doubt that a CTB can be ready by that time, if only because of the problem of “defining” a nuclear explosion, which is actually a problem of possible considerable difference in erosion of stockpile confidence as between the US and the USSR).

But while that is a good window, it is not a vital one. We must not let a target schedule governed basically by domestic political concerns make us the demandeur with the Soviets, i.e., more eager for an agreement than they. We should be clear with ourselves—and as necessary with them—that if they are not prepared to agree promptly to the terms on which we insist, we are quite capable of waiting them out.

Nor should we delude ourselves that a March signature is a sufficient condition for 1978 ratification, although it almost certainly is a necessary one. We may need a considerable time to persuade the nation and the Congress of the value of the agreement. We have learned that, I believe, from the Panama Canal effort. The 1972 experience with a 3-month campaign ending in overwhelming support is a valuable corrective to excessive pessimism now. But it is not, I think, a preview of the SALT Two experience. SALT has become vastly more controversial—and the Republicans will not have any party reasons to support the President this time. We must recognize that this time too there will be technical ambiguities and strategic objections. Some of the latter are already being made; how many of the former are left will depend on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 91, SCC 050, 1/9/78, SALT, Negotiating Options and Instructions. Top Secret.

the resolution of some matters now strongly at issue between us and the Soviets. Concerns of the sort that emerged fully only after SALT One ratification will be aired before and affect the ratification of SALT Two.

### *Substance*

*Heavy bomber definition.* This is an issue of utmost importance to the US and to the ratification process. It is also one on which the US and Soviet positions are far apart. We must maintain the right for the US to decide, free of Soviet veto, which aircraft the US will equip to serve as cruise missile carriers (CMCs). Also we must continue to rebut, as we have, Soviet arguments that large CMCs should possibly count as more than one in the MIRV count or the aggregate count. (Our bringing up the SS-18 seems to be effectively making this rebuttal.)

The SCC decided that the US can accept a type counting rule based on physical distinguishability corresponding to functional differences for distinguishing between: (1) heavy bombers and heavy bomber variants, and (2) heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs and other heavy bombers. I believe that such a rule can be developed which protects US rights to equip its aircraft with ALCMs as needed. Whether the Soviets will accept such a rule, and whether we can devise one which also meets our goals with respect to Soviet bomber variants, remains to be seen. Ideally, only *functional* differences would be recognized as a basis for distinctions. However, verifying such distinctions would probably require cooperative measures. It does not appear, for example, that B-52s carrying ALCMs *need be* externally different from those without them. This issue of what, if any, cooperative measures are acceptable and useful is still under technical review. We would probably be prepared to accept some, including a measure of on-site inspection, that the Soviets would find too intrusive. I continue to believe that unwillingness to provide such cooperative verification should inhibit the side that declines to do so, not both sides.

The application of these rules to the Soviet bomber variants could be difficult. Only functional distinctions give us much protection—and even these would not deal with the potential for rapid conversion. However, it may not be possible to devise a rule which catches all of the troublesome Soviet variants—including quickly convertible Bear ASW aircraft—but does not catch the less troublesome ones, i.e., the Bear reconnaissance versions, or transport variants of US CMCs or non-ALCM B-52s. However, letting the ASW Bear and future such variants go in return for the type counting rule we seek for ALCM carriers, which will count Bison tankers, may be an acceptable compromise. In that case, any exemption for Bison bombers converted to tankers or for the tankers would depend on working out conversion rules that would

make reconversion to a bomber very difficult; we have not yet worked them out.

This rather arcane discussion suggests that technical ambiguities will not easily be eliminated from SALT Two. We need to take the time within the US government to come up with a defensible heavy bomber definition and then persuade the Soviets to accept it, because it is the sort of issue that Congressional opponents are likely to make much of.

*Non-Circumvention.* I believe we cannot, to maintain the alliance support we have gradually been gathering, go beyond our fallback language. (Even that should be presented only after a further round of consultation; in the present context we cannot rely on prior acquiescence.) For the present, however, I believe we should stand firm on our present position. There have been some hints from the Soviets that they will eventually move toward our position, but until we have some unequivocal indication that the fallback will be accepted, we cannot afford to present it, since once it is presented we have no maneuvering room left.

More generally, I think it important to move very carefully in any authoritative interpretation to either allies or the Soviets of what limits we believe the clause would put on our relations with the allies. Broad formulas like “giving primacy to alliance security interests” may in the end prove the best course, and are far less likely than detailed discussions of specific hypothetical cases to destroy the prospect of Soviet agreement to a generalized claim. Even so, we should have clear agreement on what to say before embarking on any interpretations—and no such agreed interpretations now exist. We need to work on this, and we are doing so.

*Aggregates and Timing.* I think that as an outcome, the current guidance—2200/1200/reductions completed by the expiration of the Protocol—remains acceptable. The 1200 MIRV level is essential to maintain the 120 gap before AHBs count as MIRVs. I underscore, however, the importance of a related issue: The duration of the Protocol. We should for the moment hold to our current proposal of expiration on 30 September 1980. A shift to “three years from signature” is acceptable if signature comes before, say, 1 April. Extending the Protocol limits to three years from ratification would almost certainly mean early 1982. This would be inconsistent with our repeated assurances as to the minimal impact of the Protocol on cruise missile deployment schedule and MX work. In addition to its effect on our programs such a date would significantly hurt ratification.

These timing issues are, I believe, far more important than the SNDV aggregate: We should not agree to delayed effectiveness (or a longer Protocol) merely to get an aggregate at the low end of the 2160–2250 range.

*New Types.* A form of “single RV” exemption may prove attractive: It is now being studied, and I want to reserve final judgment until I can consider the results, especially in terms of effects on US programs. Any exemption is, in any case, most acceptable if the Soviets agree to our comprehensive ban on hardware changes in existing ICBMs. (That nonetheless, as we have informed the Soviets, permits us MK-12A since it has already been tested.) Also, any exemption must be reciprocal: i.e., the US would have a right to replace MMII with a silo-based single RV follow-on missile, of fully up-to-date design, provided only that its throw weight did not exceed that of the Soviet exemption (quite possibly the SS-19 throw weight, not that of the SS-11). For the Protocol period, that right may be academic, but symmetry is essential—and consideration of what it would permit the US makes it clear that the requested exemption is not trivial.

*Cruise Missile Payload Definition.* The Soviets have made a great play of the “absolute unacceptability” of our position that the cruise missile limits apply to conventionally armed CMs during the Protocol only, with later limits applying only to nuclear-armed cruise missiles on launch platforms other than heavy bombers, unless some other rule is later agreed. Because of the legitimate middle-term potential of conventional CMs, the very strong representations we’ve made to our allies and strong Senatorial opposition to limiting non-nuclear CMs, we should stand firm on this point. We should, of course, be prepared to consider a variety of formulas that might enable the Soviets to agree to the substance of our position. For example, we might have a separate limit on conventional CMs on other aircraft in the Protocol that expires with it; putting conventional CMs in a separate provision would indicate that nuclear-armed and conventionally armed cruise missiles are separate matters.

However, the Treaty already includes limits on ALCMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers that continue after the Protocol expires, so we cannot sidestep the post-Protocol definitional issue altogether. And we cannot leave until later defining what the Treaty limit covers. It is the US position that the post-Protocol Treaty is a complete agreement, to be supplemented by other agreements to be sure, if and as they are reached, but itself valid after the Protocol expires without requiring reaffirmation or further agreement. Requiring subsequent agreement on the scope of the post-Protocol Treaty provision limiting ALCMs on other aircraft would be inconsistent with that position.

More generally, our position on the payload issue is wholly reasonable and one we should not shrink from vigorously maintaining. The verification advantages of a broad definition are illusory, given the difficulty of verifying *any* CM limits—and in any event we can turn on the Soviets their old refrain that “national technical means are adequate

to verify compliance with this provision if only you will take advantage of them and stop trying to expand the scope of the limitations in the name of verification." The analogy to ballistic missiles is simply false. There is no prospect of any nation developing ballistic missiles of intercontinental range for use with non-nuclear warheads, but there is a very serious prospect of useful conventionally-armed cruise missiles with greater than 600 km range, and whatever else SALT is about it isn't a proper forum for limiting conventional weapons.

*Cruise Missile Range.* Here again, we need to stand firm that the measure of range is maximum system operational range (MSOR), not distance which can be flown on an operational profile to fuel exhaustion (as the Soviets propose). We have given repeated assurances to Congress and to the allies—and we ourselves accepted the limits—on the basis that 2500 km was the militarily useful range we would have available, not something less.

However, the concept is not simple in application and it may well be appropriate to explain our definition more fully, along the following lines:

—MSOR means militarily useful range and how a CM achieves that inherently reflects a variety of design and operational judgments as to such matters as type of fuel, altitude and speed profile, size and weight of payload, methods of controlling time of arrival, guidance and target acquisition requirements, assumed fuel consumption rates under different wind and weather conditions, and the like.

—Different judgments on many of these matters would, of course, produce different MSORs, but what counts is not how the system in question might have been used differently and, in particular, not its fuel exhaustion range, but how it is in fact planned to be used. The MSOR concept (like the Soviet "operational profile" concept) recognizes that the agreement does not seek to control how those judgments are made.

—Some variations in these elements would, we recognize, produce potentially a discrepancy between launch to target distance and odometer distance traveled. In that connection, the US is prepared to agree that such discrepancies shall not exceed 30% for a 2500 km range or 100% for a 600 km range. It must be understood that this percentage is applicable only to actual discrepancies between odometer distance and target range, and does not include the increased distance that could hypothetically be flown under different mission concepts, for example by using up all the fuel reserve intended to accommodate variations in weather conditions.

*Statement of Principles.* It is now clear that we are not going to get Soviet agreement to the sort of statement of SALT Three Principles we originally had in mind—an agreed fairly specific agenda for the next

round. In particular, their FBS position guarantees (as it was no doubt intended to do) that agreed Principles would require long negotiations and, worse, payment of a substantive price for an agreed list. On the whole, we have little to lose from shifting to essentially rhetorical agreed principles. The domestic cost—retreat from the comprehensive proposal of March—should be manageable (and couldn't be avoided by non-binding principles in any event if they were agreed):

- The concept of the March proposal was to advance a thoroughgoing offer dealing with fundamental current problems. That commitment remains for SALT Three—and can be reasserted in whatever unilateral statements accompany the Principles.

- Very general agreed principles permit sidestepping the whole complex of FBS–CM–TNF issues with the Soviets, permitting time for the US to reach substantive conclusions on our objective in this area—and agree on those conclusions with our allies.

Abandoning the pretense of an agreed agenda permits us a more adventurous unilateral list: We could, for example, make clear that we would propose eventually to return to the Backfire issue, or that of throw-weight inequalities.

In sum, I would favor moving to the two lists approach not seeking to go further with the agreed Statement than where we are now. (Indeed, in the context of dropping the unagreed specifics, we might carefully also drop the one that is agreed<sup>2</sup>—which could be read in the ratification process as contradicting slightly our position that the Protocol sets no precedent). More particularly, I do not think we should, in the face of their rejection of a “Shanghai Communiqué” or “two list” approach, seek any Soviet acquiescence to or recognition of the unilateral statement of SALT Three goals we would make, nor should we give any such status to whatever they may choose to say about FBS or the neutron bomb. It would be enough to say we expect to be making a policy statement of the US longer range goals for SALT.

*Backfire.* This issue is far from resolved. It is a matter to which the JCS attach great importance. In contrast to many other SALT issues, it is simple to understand and easily dramatized, with a concomitant potential impact on public opinion. The facts—the inherent intercontinental capability of the airplane—as well as ratification considerations justify insistence that the Soviets must give considerably more specific assurances than Gromyko offered in September, if the US is to change

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<sup>2</sup> The JDT contains an agreed objective “Resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” in the context of the negotiations relating to the aforementioned principles and objectives. [Footnote is in the original.]



its JDT position that the plane count in the SNDV aggregate. Such assurances should include:

- an explicit statement of the current production rate;
- a definition of the profile on which the supposed 2200 km combat radius is achieved (and a statement of its *range* on such a profile; to avoid accepting that only two-way missions count—as you know, few US bomber missions are planned two-way in the SIOF);
- an agreement that existing medium bombers (Badgers and Blinders) will be retired in appropriate numbers as Backfires are built.
- more detailed and comprehensive limits on specific activities associated with preparation for an intercontinental mission, such as training, refueling, Arctic staging, technical upgrade, and equipping with cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km.

While this issue need not be discussed at Geneva, in deference to Soviet views that it's not a fit SALT subject, it should not be deferred to a Summit. As we decided at our recent SCC meeting, the new US position should be presented through diplomatic channels. (Personally, I believe this is a good issue on which to establish the proposition that Mac Toon should be as much a SALT channel for the US as Dobrynin is for the Soviets.) Given the technical character of the question and the sensitivity of the JCS on the issue, it is particularly important that the process of negotiating the details be one which lends itself to thorough staffing and technical precision, as well as high level review.

Finally, we should consider consulting with key congressional leaders (as well as seeking the advice of counsel) on the appropriate form for the Soviet Backfire undertaking: We can agree to an obligation *separate* from SALT; we will have trouble with Congress if we agree to one *less binding* than the Treaty and Protocol.

*MIRV Verification.* We may be close to a satisfactory outcome here but the issue is of considerable importance and we need to understand where we are. The Soviets have accepted a “missile type” rule (if a missile is tested with MIRVs, all missiles of that type will be considered MIRVed missiles) and a “launcher type” rule (if a launcher is a MIRV launcher, all launchers of that type will be considered MIRV launchers). However, it is clear that the sides do not share an explicit common view on what is meant by “launcher type.” The Soviets are willing to acknowledge that Minuteman II and Minuteman III launchers are of different types, which is the US position. However, they continue to insist that the launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk (which are indistinguishable to us) are also of two types, one MIRV and one non-MIRV—which, however, as a concession, they are willing to count all as MIRV. Moreover, they have withdrawn their footnote in the JDT that they are of two types. (The US earlier withdrew a proposed common understanding that they are of only one type.)

If the Soviets are eventually willing to acknowledge that the launchers at D&P are of one (MIRV) type, we will have achieved what we have sought, i.e., an implicit recognition that launchers we cannot identify as non-MIRV will count as MIRV. In this case I believe we could rely on the Minuteman and D&P precedents for the future. I believe that on balance this is the preferred outcome and we should seek it.

However, if the Soviets will not acknowledge that all launchers at D&P are of one MIRV type, then we will not have a satisfactory precedent and must seek a different approach for the future. One such approach is an explicit rule that for the future (new or modified launchers) launchers which “look alike” (i.e., have the same external appearance to overhead photography) “count alike.” Although such a rule would not be foolproof (one would prefer that distinguishing features which permit launchers to be counted differently be related to capability to launch MIRVs, but this is probably not practical), it would be an aid to verification. Note that it could also be a nuisance for us in the future, should we, for example, want to replace some or all of our Minuteman IIs with a modern missile; we might be required to make unnecessary modifications to certain of the Minuteman launchers in order to preclude counting non-MIRVed Minuteman launchers as MIRV.

In my view all these outcomes are attainable in the negotiations—and attainable in time for a signature in early spring (in time for a fair shot at completing ratification this year). I believe an agreement with these provisions would be in our national security interest—and would be so clearly so as to be ratifiable despite all the doubts and questions. Conversely, I believe that failure to achieve the substance of these results would call into question both the acceptability of an agreement on the merits and the likelihood of its being ratified.

**Harold Brown**

**192. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Instructions to the SALT Delegation

Based on the meeting of the Special Coordination Committee on January 9th, the President has approved the following guidance for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.<sup>2</sup>

*Heavy Bomber Variants/ALCM-Carrier Type Rules.* The US Delegation should explore with the Soviets an approach under which the sides agree on a counting rule based on functionally-related observable differences, employing cooperative measures where required for verification, for distinguishing between: (1) heavy bombers and heavy bomber variants and (2) heavy bombers equipped with long-range ALCMs and other aircraft. However, before broaching this issue with the Soviets, the US Delegation should await further guidance from Washington on situations in which cooperative measures might be required and the nature of such measures.

*MIRV Verification.* The US can accept a resolution of the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk one type/two types issue through an approach in which the sides agree that in the future, MIRVed and unMIRVed missiles will not be deployed in launchers that have the same external appearance. The US Delegation should provide recommended language to effect this outcome for Washington review.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. "Jan 9, 1978 (?)" is handwritten at the top of the first page.

<sup>2</sup> In an undated memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski summarized the January 9 SCC meeting, which asked the Working Group to conduct more analysis on the cruise missile range definition, ICBM new types exemption, SALT III principles, and Backfire issues. The SCC decided to pursue a functionally-related observable differences (FRODS) approach to the heavy bomber variant and ALCM-carrier issues, consult with the NATO allies on the non-circumvention fallback, and seek Soviet agreement that in the future MIRVed and unMIRVed missiles would not be deployed in launchers that had the same external appearance. In this same memorandum, Brzezinski asked for and received Carter's approval of the instructions to the SALT Delegation. (Ibid.)

*Aggregate/MIRV Levels.* The previous guidance on this issue based on the November 22, 1977 SCC meeting remains valid.<sup>3</sup> However, the US Delegation should maintain the present position on this issue, pending a decision on the possibility of coupling this issue to the new types single-RV ICBM exemption.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 190.

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**193. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1978.

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to receive your letter of January 12.<sup>2</sup> I was particularly gratified by your view—which I share—that the predominant trend in U.S.-Soviet relations is a constructive one, based on our jointly shared determination “to reduce the danger of war, to limit and subsequently reduce armaments, to prevent and eliminate dangerous hotbeds of international tensions.” Our personal dialogue is dedicated to these ends.

Let me add that I am also gratified by the progress that we made in 1977. Despite the complexities inherent in SALT, our delegations have moved forward—and Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Washington was particularly helpful in overcoming some obstacles. We also initiated a wide range of additional negotiations, all of which have the pur-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. No classification marking. The letter is scheduled to be printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

<sup>2</sup> Brezhnev’s January 12 letter to Carter, which covered a number of issues, made only a few statements about SALT II: “There is mutual understanding between us as to the direction of a new agreement and its main components. Nevertheless, the preparation of the agreement has not yet been completed. In the course of subsequent negotiations we again showed readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding questions. Unfortunately, in all candor, we do not see equivalent steps from the US side towards us.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78) Brezhnev’s letter is also scheduled to be printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

pose of shaping a more stable and cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship, an objective that I consider essential.

I hope, therefore, that we can move expeditiously toward a SALT II agreement. I have so instructed the U.S. delegation. At the same time, I am sure that Ambassador Dobrynin keeps you fully informed regarding the strong domestic opposition already generated by the concessions we have made. U.S. willingness to count heavy bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) within the 1320 total for both MIRVs and ALCMs and to limit cruise missiles has been perceived by many Americans as insufficiently offset by Soviet concessions, complicating the eventual process of ratification. This is why I hope that the Soviet side will adopt a very positive attitude regarding the outstanding issues, notably on the questions pertaining to MIRV sub-limits, modernization, and the Backfire bomber.

Agreement in SALT would doubtless help us both generate a wider movement in many of the other negotiations between our two governments.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to SALT II.]

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

## 194. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 6, 1978, 12:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Mr. Leslie Gelb, Director, Office of  
Politico-Military Affairs

#### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan  
Mr. Walter Slocombe, Principal  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for International Security  
Affairs

#### *JCS*

General David Jones  
Lt Gen William Y. Smith

#### *CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Mr. Ray McCrory, Chief, SALT  
Support Staff

#### *ACDA*

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny  
Mr. John Newhouse, Assistant  
Director for the Bureau of  
International Security  
Programs

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Mr. David Aaron

#### *NSC Staff*

Mr. Reginald Bartholomew  
Dr. Roger Molander

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

*Backfire.* Secretary Vance should meet with Ambassador Dobrynin and describe to him the commitments which we would like to see in the Soviet letter on Backfire. However, he should not provide Ambassador Dobrynin with a draft letter at this time. The list of commitments described should be based on that version of the draft letter prepared for consideration at the March 6 SCC meeting which includes the detailed description of the flight profile/payload configuration association with the specific Backfire operational range figure modified to include a commitment to at least one-for-one replacement of older medium bombers (attached). Next steps on this issue will be reviewed in the light of the Soviet reaction to this discussion.

*New Types.* The US should not agree to any exemption in our proposed ban on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

interpretation of our proposed “new types” definition should be adjusted as required so that adequate verification of the new types ban is assured.

*Heavy Bomber Variants/ALCM-Carrier Type Rules.* In our proposed counting rule for distinguishing between (1) heavy bombers and range cruise missiles and other aircraft (cf. Summary of Conclusions from January 9, 1978 SCC meeting),<sup>2</sup> the term “functionally-related observable difference” should refer to differences in the observable features of aircraft which indicate whether the aircraft has the *capability* to perform the SALT-limited function (i.e., the heavy bomber or ALCM-carrier function). However, we should seek agreement on a grandfather clause which exempts Bear ASW aircraft from counting as heavy bombers and B-52’s without ALCM-related equipment from counting as ALCM carriers. The US position on the Bison bombers and tankers remains the same, i.e., that all Bison aircraft should count as heavy bombers until they are dismantled or converted under agreed procedures.

*Cruise Missile Definition.* The inconsistency between our proposals for the cruise missile definition and the heavy bomber definition should be eliminated in the context of other adjustments to our proposed heavy bomber definition. State and ACDA believe that the ban on ALCMs over 600km on aircraft other than heavy bombers should apply to conventionally-armed as well as nuclear-armed cruise missiles after the expiration of the Protocol. OSD and JCS believe that we should maintain the current position where there are no limits on conventionally-armed ALCMs on aircraft other than heavy bombers after the expiration of the Protocol.<sup>3</sup>

*MIRV Verification.* As a supplement to the agreed language on the MIRV verification launcher-type rule, we should seek Soviet agreement that, for the future, deployment of MIRVed missiles in launchers that look like launchers of unMIRVed missiles should be banned, and vice versa.

*Non-Circumvention/Non-Transfer.* We should provide the Germans and other allies with a description of the interpretative statement on non-circumvention which we would provide to the NAC and the Congress subsequent to Treaty signing, with a view to allaying their reservations. Once we have Allied reactions, the Delegation will be instructed to informally approach the Soviets in Geneva on the acceptability of our fallback language for settling the non-circumvention and non-transfer issues. The fallback will not be formally tabled until we

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<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the January 9 SCC meeting, see footnote 2, Document 192.

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten note by Brzezinski after this paragraph reads: “The President decided to maintain the current position. 3.14. ZB.”

are confident that it will close off the non-circumvention/non-transfer issue.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

### **Attachment<sup>4</sup>**

Undated.

#### Exchange of Letters Including Information on the Flight Profile

##### *Soviet Letter*

The United States has raised the question of the Tupolev variable-geometry wing aircraft, called "Backfire" in the United States, during the negotiations of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. To facilitate the successful conclusion of those negotiations, the Soviet Union hereby provides to the United States the following declarations and statements of obligations which shall apply for the duration of that Treaty.

The Soviet Union hereby declares that the Tupolev variable-geometry wing aircraft (including all variants thereof), called "Backfire" in the United States, is a replacement for current \_\_\_\_\_ medium bombers and is presently being produced at a rate of \_\_\_\_\_ units per year and that it has a range of \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers under the conditions given in the attached list. The Soviet Union undertakes not to increase the present production rate and not to increase the operational range of this aircraft. The Soviet Union undertakes not to operate this aircraft from Arctic bases associated with an intercontinental strategic mission, to remove external refueling probes, not to conduct aerial refueling operations between this aircraft and any other aircraft, not to otherwise improve its range/payload capability and to dismantle current \_\_\_\_\_ medium bombers as they are replaced by this aircraft. These \_\_\_\_\_ medium bombers will be dismantled at a rate equal to or greater than the production rate of this aircraft. The Soviet Union undertakes not to test or deploy this aircraft with cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers, and not to fly this aircraft to intercontinental ranges in exercises or otherwise associate this aircraft with an intercontinental mission.

The Soviet Union trusts that the declarations made and obligations undertaken in this letter will lead to a satisfactory resolution of this question.

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<sup>4</sup> Secret. All omissions indicated by blank underlining are in the original.



*US Letter*

The United States acknowledges the letter from the Soviet Union dated \_\_\_\_\_, concerning the Tupolev variable-geometry wing aircraft, called “Backfire” in the United States. The United States is signing the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in reliance on the obligations undertaken in that letter, and considers them essential to the integrity of the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

**Attachment<sup>5</sup>****List Appended to Soviet Letter**

Undated.

The range of \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers is attained under the following conditions;

with a payload of \_\_\_\_\_ kilograms dropped at the midpoint,  
with a flight profile consisting of segments flown

- (1) at \_\_\_\_\_ meters altitude, \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers per hour true air speed for \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers distance, with \_\_\_\_\_ degrees wing sweep angle,
- (2) at \_\_\_\_\_ meters altitude, \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers per hour true air speed for \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers distance, with \_\_\_\_\_ degrees wing sweep angle,
- (3) .....<sup>6</sup>

This range is attained when the aircraft, which has a gross take-off weight of \_\_\_\_\_ kilograms, takes off with a full fuel loading of \_\_\_\_\_ kilograms, is loaded with an external payload of (*list number and type of missiles, if any*) is flown to maximize range under the conditions given above, and lands with a \_\_\_\_\_ percent fuel reserve.

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<sup>5</sup> Secret. All omissions indicated by blank underlining are in the original.

<sup>6</sup> As on the original.

**195. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1978.

Dear Mr. President,

Having studied your letter of March 4,<sup>2</sup> I would like to set forth once more the substance of our understanding of the way the things are with the working out of an agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation (to be effective till 1985), as well as to state in more detail our position on specific questions which are still outstanding.

Here are some general observations to start with. We are naturally in favor of concluding an agreement as soon as possible, without delay. However, an attempt to do it on the basis of some artificially simplified version does not by any means expedite the matter if we keep in view the aim we place before us, namely, to really limit strategic arms, being guided by the principle of undiminished security for either of the contracting parties. Just the same, the preparation of an agreement would in no way be expedited if, putting aside some questions which, for that matter, have been worked up in many respects, we would start attaching to it some new issues which, besides, have no direct relation to the subject matter of the agreement.

Conclusion of a new agreement between our countries on limiting strategic arms would certainly have great political significance both for Soviet-US relations and on a broader plane. However, it will be feasible only if the agreement constitutes a real step in the direction of limiting strategic arms. Otherwise, it would be counterproductive.

That would be precisely the case if the question of cruise missiles were left outside the agreement. That question is not only most directly related to the core of the new agreement but it also—which is essential—has been worked up in many respects. Even some specific formulas have been agreed upon. To propose now to put cruise missiles outside the framework of the agreement would mean not only a step back to the initial positions but would also leave a way open for expanding the arms race to a new dangerous direction.

That, we think, corresponds in no way to the goals of rapid conclusion of an agreement on limiting strategic arms. Therefore we confirm our concrete proposals on the whole complex of cruise missiles, namely:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence, March–April 1978. No classification marking. Unofficial translation.

<sup>2</sup> Carter's March 4 letter to Brezhnev is *ibid.*

—To consider heavy bombers when equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600 to 2500 kilometers as delivery vehicles equipped with MIRVs and to count them correspondingly in a certain ratio (depending upon the type of a heavy bomber) against the agreed level for such delivery vehicles—1320; air-to-surface cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2500 kilometers should be completely banned; the equipping with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600 to 2500 kilometers of other aircraft except heavy bombers, should be also banned;

—All sea-based and land-based cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers should be completely banned.

I would like to remind once again that our agreement to include into the aggregate number of the missiles equipped with MIRVs (1320) all the missiles of the types, of which even one has been tested with MIRVs, was and remains conditioned upon reaching a final agreement on the questions of cruise missiles.

As for the Soviet medium bomber code-named by you Backfire, we have given official data about the range of this aircraft (2200 km) and expressed readiness to enter into the records of the negotiations this data as well as our intention not to provide this aircraft with capabilities to operate at intercontinental distances—all this on the condition that the issue of Backfire is completely and totally withdrawn from further negotiations. We confirm that position of ours.

The issue of mobile launchers for ballistic missiles of intercontinental range naturally should find its solution in the agreement in question. Earlier we proposed to agree that over the period that agreement remains in force the sides should refrain from deploying land-based mobile ICBM launchers.

Our approach to the question of a possibility for subsequent reductions of the USSR and US strategic forces is set forth in my letter of February 25.<sup>3</sup> I repeat that we shall be ready to proceed to the discussions of this issue immediately after the signing of the agreement. However, it is necessary that account should be taken here of those factors which I already wrote you about on February 25, i.e. such factors as differences in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of the US forward based nuclear systems and aircraft carrier aviation in the proximity of the USSR territory, the possession of nuclear weapons by the US NATO allies and other circumstances which cannot be discarded.

Having in mind these factors and the above mentioned considerations regarding cruise missiles, it could be possible not only to limit the levels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides (2400 and

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<sup>3</sup> Brezhnev's February 25 letter is *ibid.*

1320) but also to consider the number of such delivery vehicles to be reduced even before the expiration of the agreement being worked out.

The above considerations represent our position of principle which we intend to adhere to in the forthcoming talks with Secretary Vance. The additional questions which are mentioned in your letter, Mr. President, also undoubtedly deserve attention. We shall be prepared to set forth our preliminary considerations on those matters. On those of them, where a prospect appears for finding mutually acceptable solutions special negotiations would be conducted. If progress is achieved, appropriate agreements could be signed simultaneously with the strategic arms limitation agreement.

In conclusion I would like to note, Mr. President, that I do not quite understand the meaning of your reference to the tone of my letter of February 25. Its tone is usual—business-like and considerate. If you have in mind the direct and frank way in which it expounds our views, then I proceeded and do now from the premise that a dialogue of that very nature is in the interests of the matter. If you yet have in mind our attitude of principle toward the attempts to raise issues which go beyond the relations between states, and in general are far-fetched, then no other reaction from our side can be expected.

I assume that our personal correspondence will serve the interests of constructive development of the relations between our countries.

Sincerely,

**L. Brezhnev<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.

**196. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1978.

## SUBJECT

Backfire

## PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Leslie H. Gelb

Marshall Shulman

*USSR*

Alexander A. Bessmertnykh

I began by saying that we had something to communicate to the Soviet Government on Backfire—that Secretary Vance had been instructed to raise this item with Ambassador Dobrynin. But, because their agenda was crowded and since this issue required some time, Secretary Vance did not raise it and instead he directed me to make the following points. I then read verbatim from the attached interagency-agreed talking points.

Bessmertnykh made the following points in response:

—We thought this issue was settled by the draft letter Gromyko gave to Vance last September.<sup>2</sup>

—This represents a hardening of the American position and we would tend to view it in the context of our having moved in Geneva over the last four months, while there has been no movement on the American side.

—Why are you raising this issue with us now?

We responded along the following lines:

—The Soviet Government should have had no reason to believe that the Backfire issue had been resolved by the draft Soviet letter. We said, at the time, that we would need to study the letter and come back to them.

—Our coming back at this time means, in the first instance, that it had taken us this long to carefully review the subject. We wanted the Soviet Government to understand that this was a compromise position on our part, one on which there was much heat within. This position on Backfire was even a compromise for those who would like to see an early SALT agreement between our two countries. I said that for us the fact of the matter is, whatever the intended use of optimal design capa-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78. Secret. Drafted by Gelb.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

bilities of the Backfire, it can reach large parts of the United States on a one-way mission. For our part, we feel we have already made an important concession to the Soviet Union by agreeing to include cruise missiles in SALT II and by saying that we are prepared to accept an adequate letter of assurances on Backfire in lieu of including Backfire in the SALT aggregate. We stressed that this is an issue of crucial importance for us both on the merits and because of the politics.

—We added that the fact of our coming to the Soviets now with our position should also be seen in the context of our expectation that both sides can make progress on SALT in the coming months. It was an indication that we want to make progress towards resolving the Backfire issue even as we expect to make progress in Geneva, and not to have the Backfire lag behind Geneva.

Bessmertnykh responded that the Soviet draft letter had also been the product of hard-fought compromise and repeated some of his other points.

We repeated ours.

I also used the attached talking points on the Soviet tanker program. He took note of these and said he would bring back a response to both subjects.

## **Attachment**

### **Talking Points on Backfire**

Undated.

—We have been gratified by the progress our delegations in Geneva have made in recent months on reaching an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

—It remains the aim of my Government to complete as soon as possible a SALT II agreement which is sound, equitable, and serves the interests of both sides, and, indeed, that of mankind as a whole.

—Because of these concerns, we wish to turn our efforts now to a solution of the Backfire problem. The indisputable capability of the Backfire to carry out strategic missions against the U.S. under certain circumstances, whether or not it has been designed or intended for such missions, continues to present us with a dilemma.

—We nevertheless have retreated from our earlier insistence that it be included in categories of bombers limited by the provisions of the new treaty. In a spirit of compromise we accepted the offer of the Soviet Government to provide us with a statement concerning the capability and the intended use of the aircraft.

—We consider that the draft letter presented by the Soviet side during the Foreign Minister's visit here in September to have been a definite step forward. We nevertheless believe that additional clarifications are required.

—I would like to discuss with you informally today what the nature of these undertakings would be. I would welcome your reaction now, and the considered reaction of your government as soon as it can be obtained.

You should at this point hand Dobrynin the non-paper,<sup>3</sup> perhaps reading through it with him, using the following points.)

—The Soviet Union has offered to make a commitment that it will not increase the production rate of this aircraft as compared to the present rate. The U.S. regards this as a significant element of these commitments. Our view is that this commitment should be accompanied by a statement of the current production rate to avoid future misunderstandings.

—As an indication that Backfire is not intended as an intercontinental bomber, the U.S. requests that the Soviet Union indicate that Backfire will replace current Soviet medium-range bombers, and that these bombers will be dismantled at a rate equal to or greater than the production rate of the Backfire aircraft.

—The Soviet Union has stated that it does not intend to give the Backfire aircraft the capability of operating at intercontinental distances by increasing its combat radius or in any other manner, including any means of in-air fueling. To affirm that Backfire is not intended for intercontinental missions, we believe that in support of the commitment not to increase Backfire's capabilities, the Soviet Union should undertake not to improve the range/payload capability of this aircraft, not to fly this aircraft to intercontinental ranges in exercises or otherwise associate it with an intercontinental mission, not to conduct aerial refueling operations with this aircraft, and to remove external refueling probes.

—To further ensure that the Backfire bomber is not intended for intercontinental missions, a commitment should be made that this aircraft will not operate from Arctic bases associated with an intercontinental mission.

—The Soviet Union has offered to specify the "radius of action" of the Backfire aircraft. In our view, the combat range of this aircraft should be specified, rather than the radius. The range capability of an aircraft is related to the operational profile it flies. Therefore, additional information on the assumed flight profile should be provided, in-

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

cluding information on the payload carried, the fuel load at take off and at landing, and the distance flown at specific altitudes, air speeds, and wing-sweep angles.

—Finally, to further ensure that Backfire is not intended for inter-continental missions, the U.S. believes there should be a Soviet commitment not to test or deploy cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers on this aircraft.

—We assume the Soviet obligation would be contained in a letter signed by the highest authority of the Soviet Union.

—The U.S. would respond with a letter signed by the President acknowledging the Soviet letter and stating that the U.S. is signing the SALT Treaty in reliance on the obligations undertaken in the Soviet letter. The U.S. would state its view that those obligations are essential to the integrity of the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

—We would send these letters to Congress along with the SALT agreement. This is required under the Case Act which states that the Administration must inform Congress of executive agreements. The Act does not require that the agreement be subject to formal Congressional approval.

## **Attachment**

### **Talking Points on the Backfire/Tanker Issue**

Undated.

—Since the Delegations in Geneva do not discuss questions related to Backfire, there is another point I would like to raise with you.

—The Soviet SALT Delegation has stated the intention of the USSR to convert at least some existing Bison heavy bombers into tanker aircraft.

—In view of the small size of the Soviet tanker force to date, and the decreasing size of the Soviet heavy bomber force which can be supported by aerial tankers, I am puzzled as to the need for additional tankers.

—I believe there will be concerns on the part of the American public that these tankers could be used with Backfire.

—Could you clarify the intended uses of the additional tankers?



**197. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1978.

**SUBJECT**

SALT Strategy

The attached memo (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> from Cy and Paul came over on Sunday. I asked Harold for his views and they are at Tab B.<sup>3</sup>

Obviously the decisive factor in realizing any SALT strategy is whether and when we can work out terms with the Soviets that we can accept and get ratified. We still have a good amount of ground to cover on issues that are important from various standpoints (Harold classifies them neatly) and on which opinions within the Administration differ as to what is acceptable and ratifiable (as Harold's memo shows). It follows that while we might set a June summit as a target, we ought not to get locked in to any specific time table until we are quite confident that we are within sure reach of a good agreement.

Looking at the outline Cy and Paul have given you, I have these first reactions:

(1) One can argue that the SALT III principles should be agreed at the summit rather than during Cy's Moscow trip since they link back to the comprehensive proposal and set guidelines for the future. If we drop specific reduction numbers and accept language calling for "significant" or "substantial" reductions (for which there is widespread interagency support) then we probably can settle this in time for Cy to seal it in Moscow. On the other hand, it could be that just as Brezhnev

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 12/77–3/78. Top Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is March 25 memorandum from Vance and Warnke to Carter on "strategy for completion of SALT at Summit meeting," in which they laid out the issues to be resolved in Geneva and the issues to be "pre-cooked" by Vance in Moscow. Essentially, Geneva would handle the technical issues and Vance in Moscow the substantive ones.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is a memorandum from Brown to Carter, March 27, entitled "SALT II: Strategy for Completing the Process," in which Brown commented on Vance and Warnke's memorandum. Brown identified SALT issues that were "vital militarily," vital to U.S. Allies, and those that were symbols of who "won" the negotiations. He agreed with the Geneva/Moscow strategy, but noted that some technical issues had military significance. If they could not be resolved at Geneva, "they will have to go higher."

was ready to set a framework at Vladivostok, he might be prepared to accept some specifics at a summit with you.<sup>4</sup>

(2) Strategy for the single RV exception and the general new types issues has to be shaped in light of where we want to come out. I think there is much to be said for permitting each side one new ICBM through the 1985 period, holding the final playing of this card for the summit.<sup>5</sup>

(3) The Gromyko meetings in May could prove as decisive as last September's, and I believe they should be a separate, special target for our planning rather than rolled up with the summit as they are in Cy and Paul's outline.<sup>6</sup>

(4) The summit agenda has to be balanced in a way that curtails any appearance of major Presidential concessions. Thus, while Backfire will probably have to be dealt with there, the issue has to be worked carefully here as well as with the Soviets so that the outcome does not appear as a sharp break with earlier positions.<sup>7</sup>

As for how we proceed, I think we need to do more work, starting from Cy and Paul's outline, to flesh out a strategy and consider our alternatives looking to a meeting the week of your return with Cy, Harold, Paul (whom we will ask to return from Geneva). In the interim, things can move forward in Geneva—we have just sent new instructions implementing the SCC conclusions you approved, and we will shortly be sending additional instructions.

Two final observations. Bringing the JCS along on whatever strategy and positions you settle on will take careful handling. My own view is that we should not start to bring them into the picture until we have a clearer view of it ourselves.

Finally, without brandishing the spectre of linkage, we do have to recognize that there is some evidence of a review of US-Soviet relations underway in Moscow and that its outcome can affect the prospects for SALT and our strategy for managing it.

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<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined "SALT III," and in the margin of the paragraph wrote, "general language—probe SU on specifics."

<sup>5</sup> In the margin, Carter wrote, "MX—U.S., ?—SU."

<sup>6</sup> Carter underlined "meetings in May" and in the margin wrote, "w/Whom?" At the bottom of the memorandum, he wrote, "Nitze, Wed."

<sup>7</sup> In the margin, Carter wrote, "I agree."

**198. Summary of Conclusions of a National Security Council Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 11, 1978, 3:30–4:30 p.m.

## SUBJECT

SALT

## PARTICIPANTS

*White House*

The President

Vice President Mondale

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

NSC

Reginald Bartholomew

ACDA

Paul C. Warnke

*State*

Cyrus Vance

*Defense*

Harold Brown

Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary  
of Defense*JCS*General David Jones, Acting  
Chairman

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The NSC met to consider the SALT positions to be pursued by Secretary Vance in the April 20–22, 1978 Moscow meetings and reached the following conclusions approved by the President.

1. *Backfire*

We should continue firmly to convey to the Soviets our concerns about Backfire and stress that it is the most difficult and important issue from the ratification perspective. The issue cannot be settled in Moscow or Geneva, but will have to be resolved between the President and Chairman Brezhnev.

The Soviets should be informed that we are prepared to compromise on our earlier proposal for a formal exchange of statements on Backfire. We should tell the Soviets that: we can accept a Soviet statement, with an oral US statement that we are signing the SALT agreement in reliance on the assurances in the Soviet statement and that we regard these as essential to the obligations assumed under the agree-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 1 NSC Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The President wrote "OK, JC" on the first page. No minutes of the meeting have been found. On April 13, Brzezinski forwarded the Summary of Conclusions to the following: Mondale, Vance, Harold Brown, Warnke, George Brown, and Turner. Brzezinski's covering memorandum reads: "This will constitute the instructions on SALT for the meetings in Moscow next week. Concerning the modernization of ICBMs: in seeking a limit on increases in the number of RVs flight tested, we should also seek to ban testing of RVs lighter than those previously flight tested on a given ICBM." (Ibid.)

ment; that we will transmit the Soviet statement to Congress with the SALT agreement, and with a statement repeating our oral statement; and that the Soviets should expect Congress to ratify on the same basis that we would be signing SALT.

Our need for reassurances on the following points should be made clear to the Soviets in Moscow without seeking to negotiate them: production rate, no increase in range/payload capability, no refueling operations and refueling probes, no training for intercontinental missions including deployment at Arctic bases associated with intercontinental missions, the problem of Backfire replacement of current medium bombers, and a clarification of their definition of operational range.

## *2. Non-Circumvention*

Paul Warnke will informally broach the fallback (“ . . . through any other state or states, or in any other manner.”) before the Moscow trip, indicating that we would be prepared to offer this compromise formally in Moscow *only* if the Soviets indicate beforehand they will officially accept it.

Any Soviet effort to establish a restrictive interpretation of this provision should be rejected.

## *3. Duration of Protocol/Completion of Dismantling*

The following compromise should be advanced in Moscow: Extend the Protocol to December 31, 1980, maintain the January 1, 1980 date for initiation of dismantling, but allow 12 months for completion.

## *4. Principles for SALT Three*

We can replace the numerical reduction goals in our current proposal (1800–2000 SNDV aggregate and 1000–1100 MIRV launcher aggregate) with the formula “significant reductions.”

The Soviets should be informed that the President intends to raise the question of numerical reduction goals in the SALT III Principles with Chairman Brezhnev.

## *5. Overall Aggregate and MIRV Launcher Aggregate*

We should advance the proposal in Moscow that if the Soviets will accept a MIRV launcher aggregate of 1200, we can accept an overall aggregate of 2200.

## *6. Modernization of ICBMs*

A definition of new types of ICBMs with the following elements should be tabled in Geneva as soon as possible and pursued in the Moscow meetings:

General characteristics: no change in number of stages, overall missile length, largest missile diameter, launch weight, throw weight.

Propulsion stages: no change in propellant type (liquid or solid), initial stage weight, total stage impulse.

Post-boost vehicles: no change in propellant type, initial weight, capability to provide additional velocity to their reentry vehicle or vehicles and penetration aids.

Total number of RVs: no increase in the maximum number of RVs above the maximum number flight tested on that type of ICBM as of the baseline date.

Variations of up to five percent in the quantitative measures would be permitted.

During the Moscow meetings, we should initially press the Soviets to drop their position on the single RV ICBM exception in the Protocol. If the Soviets hold to this position, we should propose to the Soviets that the new types definition apply to the period of the agreement to 1985 and that each side be permitted one new ICBM (MIRVed or un-MIRVed) exception for the period of the agreement to 1985.

In this connection, we should propose two alternatives in Moscow on the treatment of SLBMs: a) either there would be no limits on SLBM modernization or new types for the period of the agreement to 1985; b) or the limits on and the definition of new types of ICBMs would be extended to SLBMs with each side permitted one new SLBM—Trident II and Typhoon—for the period of the agreement to 1985 (Trident I as well as SS-NX-18 would be considered existing SLBMs).

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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## 199. Editorial Note

On April 14, 1978, President Jimmy Carter sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance instructions for his scheduled trip to Moscow to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko about SALT II and other issues. Carter wrote: "It is in the interest of both countries that SALT succeed. However, I am concerned that Soviet strategy is to focus attention on SALT as proof of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations while the Soviet Union pursues its political objectives elsewhere by military means. Therefore, you should begin the discussions with a broad review of U.S.-Soviet relations, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a *détente* that is increasingly comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal. Unless this happens, some of the central factors of our relationship, including SALT, will be adversely affected by the consequent deterioration in the political environment. It is for this reason that you should stress that *détente* cannot be compartmentalized and that mutual restraint lies at

the core of a détente relationship.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78)

Carter also discussed SALT II in the context of the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa: “For this reason you should explain to the Soviets that we believe our relationship is now at a watershed. We are willing, anxious and ready to try to improve it, to widen the scope of cooperation to other areas, and to work together on the widest possible range of issues; but we cannot accept a selective détente. Decisions made in the near future on SALT as well as other issues such as Africa will affect our relationship for many years to come. On SALT you will receive separate instructions. You should make clear we are willing to negotiate SALT on its own terms but that it cannot of course be pursued in isolation from the rest of our relationship. (Ibid.) The full text of Carter’s letter to Vance is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union. For Vance’s specific instructions on SALT, see Document 197.

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**200. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 20, 1978, 2135Z.

Secto 4122. For Christopher from the Secretary. Department pass White House for the President and Brzezinski and DOD for Secretary Brown. Subject: Private Discussion With Gromyko April 20.

1. After morning and afternoon sessions with our full delegations,<sup>2</sup> he and I had a productive private meeting this evening. We covered the following points:

2. Non-circumvention: Gromyko agreed to our fallback language. To his argument that we must agree on the meaning of the language, I replied only that the language speaks for itself and that we will not circumvent the agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78. Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. Vance was in Moscow April 19–23. Memoranda of conversation of his discussions in Moscow are in the Department of State, Marshall Shulman Files, Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot File 81D109, Vance to Moscow, 4/20–22, 1978.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 201.

3. Aggregates: Gromyko agreed to the 1200 limit on MIRVed ballistic missiles provided we accept the 2250 SNDV level.<sup>3</sup> (Incidentally Gromyko seemed confused on how the 1320/1200/820 numbers worked, e.g., whether they were compelled to build up to the various levels. I finally straightened him out on this.)

4. New types: He delayed any response on our revised definition of “new type” until tomorrow. I made clear that our discussion of other new types issues proceeded on the assumption that we would reach a satisfactory agreement on definitions. On the exception, he tentatively agreed that the excepted ICBM would be either MIRVed or not but he said he would have to consult with his colleagues before he could respond to my proposal that the new types limits would apply for the full period of the agreement through 1985.<sup>4</sup> He promised to give me a position in our next meeting. The question of ICBMs new types did not come up; I will seek to clarify the issue tomorrow.

5. Backfire: This was hard going indeed. The Soviets suggest in their position that the Backfire lacks the range for CONUS missions. (Ogarkov wanted Rowny to try to fly a Backfire from the USSR to Cuba without refueling and promised flowers for the widow.) They insist they will not go beyond their “good will” unilateral statement—though they accepted our proposal for an oral response stating that we are signing the SALT agreement in part in reliance on the Soviets’ Backfire statement, and recognized that it would be given to Congress. However, in the text of the statement as they read it to us, they said they were giving us the production rate assurance only “as a matter of information.” They insist that phrase was in their September statement, but it is not in our memcons. As to the rate itself, Gromyko refused to offer a number, but proposed that we state the rate in our oral response and they would not contradict it.<sup>5</sup>

6. On the whole, I am convinced they want an agreement, that we can solve the numbers/duration issue and that we cannot settle the Backfire question here. We may know their reaction to the conclusion of the new ICBM ban in the treaty tomorrow.

7. My next private meeting with Gromyko is at 11 a.m. Moscow time Friday (3 a.m. Washington time).

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<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined “provided we accept the 2250” and wrote in the margin “2220 enough.”

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined “new types limits would apply for the full period of the agreement through 1985” and wrote in the margin “most important.”

<sup>5</sup> In the margin, Carter wrote, “Make clear to Br. that this issue is crucial to US public acceptance and ratification.” Brzezinski wrote in the margin, “i.e., subject to change.”

8. Action requested:

A. I recommend that you authorize me to accept the 2250/1200 package, if it includes a Soviet agreement to the duration/timing position I presented this morning, that is reductions beginning January 1, 1980 and proceeding at a steady pace to completion not later than Dec 31, 1980, on which date the Protocol would expire.<sup>6</sup>

B. Dismantling and reduction of excess systems:

Gromyko has indicated a Soviet willingness to consider an arrangement whereby systems to be dismantled or destroyed might be rendered inoperable before the end of the Protocol period if we could accept a longer period for complete dismantling or destruction. Should we indicate an interest in extending the period for complete dismantling or destruction beyond Dec 31, 1980, in the context of such earlier “deactivation”? This is clearly a political decision, particularly if we were to get responsible, verifiable assurances regarding early deactivation of systems to be destroyed at the outset of the period. I recommend I be given authority to exercise my judgment in light of the then existing circumstances.<sup>7</sup>

Vance

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<sup>6</sup> Brzezinski wrote, “No, 1200 was trade-off for 1320 ALCMs and MIRV; 220 is a compromise between 2160 and 2250. Yes—provided earlier=late.”

<sup>7</sup> At the bottom of the page, Brzezinski wrote, “Vance, convening a meeting with Harold and the JCS prior to Presidential decision. Suggest you discuss wider issues in our relationship and we shall develop our response by Friday morning our time. Brzezinski.”

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**201. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 20, 1978, 2215Z.

Secto 4123. For Christopher and Brzezinski from the Secretary, pass DOD for Secretary Brown. Subject: April 20 Meetings With Gromyko.

1. I met for three hours with Gromyko this morning and one hour this afternoon with our full delegations. Participants on the Soviet side

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 39, SALT–Chronology: [10/6/77–7/10/78]. Secret; Nodis; Immediate.



included First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff Ogarkov, his deputy Koslov, Korniyenko, Dobrynin and Semenov. Following the afternoon session he and I met privately, accompanied only by interpreters.

2. During the morning session I gave an overview and then presented our positions on aggregates, duration, dismantling, new types and principles. I suggested that we discuss Backfire privately. Lacking any response to Warnke's Washington presentation on non-circumvention,<sup>2</sup> I made only a brief reference to our previous position. I did not initially go into the exemption question.

3. Gromyko's response in the morning session was a dusty replay of previous Soviet positions. He complained at length about U.S. positions and public statements. A few points were of interest:

A. He warned that the Soviets have to take decisions on "new programs" in the immediate future which depend on whether there is to be a new agreement, noted calls in the U.S. for new (military) appropriations, warned that further delay in agreeing on SALT II could jeopardize arms control accomplishments already achieved, and urged that we should take account of each other's interest.

4. On duration of the Protocol and duration of the dismantling period, Gromyko after recapitulating their position said nevertheless that, provided agreement were reached on overall time limits for reducing aggregates, "thought could be given" to ways to give confidence in the early stages that systems to be dismantled and destroyed would be ruled out of operational employment. When I sought to clarify whether the systems would be rendered inoperable he was vague, saying that since by the end of the period the systems would be destroyed thought could be given to ways to provide confidence that that was being done.

5. He was firm on exception for single warhead RV, and Korniyenko told Warnke privately that there can be no agreement without such an exception.

6. He was also firm on range definition for cruise missiles, no use of transports for cruise missiles, and a bomber-type rule for counting ALCM-equipped heavy bombers.

7. He reiterated the Soviet position on Backfire despite my suggestion we discuss it privately.

8. He did not react to our new types definition proposal.

9. In view of the fact that he confined himself to going over old ground in the morning session and did not react to our movement, in the afternoon session I treated him to a lengthy recapitulation of the ne-

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<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

gotiations on some key issues in order to clarify the record. At the end he complained that he had heard nothing new and brushed aside our new types proposal. I pointed out that we had presented several new proposals but had heard nothing new from them, and said that I would respond to their exceptions proposal when they responded to my new types proposal. He quarrelled with our position on cruise missile carriers, to which I responded. He then asked whether I would be prepared to discuss levels in the context of a discussion of an exception from the new types rule. I said I would. At that point Gromyko proposed that we meet in private. That meeting is reported separately.

Vance

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## 202. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 12, 1978, 2:30–3:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Mr. Leslie Gelb, Director,  
Politico/Military Affairs

#### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan  
Walter Slocombe, Principal  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for International Security  
Affairs

#### *JCS*

General David Jones  
Lt Gen William Smith, Assistant  
to the Chairman, JCS

#### *CIA*

Dr. Robert Bowie, Deputy  
Director  
Ray McCrory, Chief, SALT Staff

#### *ACDA*

Paul Warnke  
Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director

#### *White House*

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Reginald Bartholomew  
Roger Molander

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

*Cruise Missile Definition.* We should maintain our current position on the cruise missile definition issue. The Working Group should analyze further the possibility of supplementing our current proposal with an airframe type rule that would allow the sides to distinguish between long-range and short-range and between conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed ALCMs.

*Cruise Missile Range Definition.* We should seek Soviet agreement to an approach whereby for land-attack cruise missiles, the “maximum system operational range” concept is supplemented by an odometer range allowance for operational factors. For antiship cruise missiles, we would retain the “maximum system operational range concept” but not supplement it with an odometer range allowance. If the Soviets accept this approach, we should propose a 40 percent odometer range allowance for 2500 km ALCMs for bargaining purposes. We will decide at a later date what the minimal acceptable odometer range allowance is. The Working Group should analyze the acceptable odometer allowance for 600 km land-attack ALCMs and for land-attack GLCMs and SLCMs.

*Dismantling to Reach 2250: “Assured Inoperability.”* In the context of Soviet agreement to our proposal for initiation of dismantling on January 1, 1980 and expiration of the Protocol on December 31, 1980, the US can accept the concept of placing systems to be reduced in an initial stage of inoperability under the following criteria:

—ICBMs. Destruction of silo headworks.

—SLBMs. Removal of missile tubes and reinforcing collars; place missile tubes on static display pending completion of full dismantling procedures.

—Heavy Bombers. Cut the bomber fuselage in two pieces; leave these pieces on display pending completion of full dismantling procedures.

The US should propose this approach under the following conditions: (1) all systems to be eliminated should satisfy the assured inoperability criteria cited above by April 30, 1980; and (2) the first one-third of the systems to be dismantled should satisfy the full dismantling procedures by June 30, 1980, the second one-third by September 30, 1980, and the final one-third by December 31, 1980.

*Telemetry Encryption.* The Chairman of the US SALT Delegation should reiterate to the Soviets that we understand the provisions of Article XV regarding deliberate concealment measures to prohibit the deliberate denial of telemetry by measures such as encryption which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and seek Soviet confirmation that they have a similar understanding.

*New Types.* We should propose to the Soviets that in the context of an exemption (MIRVed or unMIRVed) to the ban on new types of ICBMs, any exempt MIRVed ICBM should not be tested or deployed with a number of RVs greater than the maximum number tested or deployed by either side as of April 15, 1978. If there are exemptions to a ban on new types of SLBMs, a similar limit on exempt MIRVed SLBMs would apply.

*Mobile ICBMs.* The Secretary of Defense raised an important issue for resolution concerning the relationship between multiple aim point mobile M–X concepts and SALT launcher definition. It was agreed to review the issue at the next SCC meeting.<sup>2</sup>

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>2</sup> On May 15, Warnke sent Carter a memorandum in which he voiced grave concerns that Brown's question raised the possibility of "virtual abandonment of SALT as it has thus far been conceived and negotiated." Warnke urged Carter to "direct the Defense Department to consider M–X options which are consistent with this agreed language, specifically disapproving for the life of the SALT Two agreement the concept based on proliferation of ICBM silos." (Ibid.) On May 17, Brzezinski sent the Summary of Conclusions and corresponding instructions for the SALT Delegation to Carter under a covering memorandum that reads: "You will note that Harold Brown raised the question as to whether the latest DOD multiple aim point mobile ICBM concept—proliferation of ICBM silos with a transporter which covertly moves a 'launcher capsule' from silo-to-silo—would be permitted under SALT." Brzezinski concluded: "This is a very sensitive and critical issue which could lead to major problems in the negotiations if Defense argues at this late stage that we should go to the Soviets and seek explicit acceptance of such a multiple silo mobile ICBM concept." Carter approved the instructions. (Ibid.)

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### 203. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 26, 1978.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Gromyko: SALT Material

You have what you need on political subjects for the meeting. This memo covers SALT.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive.

As for the conduct of the meeting, Cy and I suggest that you cover SALT first and after that go at Gromyko on the political subjects. It would be tactically best to get Gromyko to make a substantive presentation first to see what he has to offer. Thus, we propose that you open the meeting by doing the amenities as host; note that Cy had made an initial SALT presentation including some new ideas during his April visit to Moscow; and then invite Gromyko to speak first.

The main SALT issues are new types and Backfire and points you might draw on are at Tab A.<sup>2</sup>

Gromyko apparently hinted to Cy that he may have something new to say on Backfire. We suggest that you not get into a negotiation on whatever new proposals he has to offer but accept them and say we will consider them further.

Gromyko may also raise the issue of a limit (20) on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber and the schedule for dismantling to 2250; the SALT Three principles may also come up (though this is unlikely). Contingency points on these issues are at Tab B.

At some point in the discussion, Cy has a prepared statement to make on the mobile ICBM issue which the SCC has approved. It was drafted by Harold and will emphasize our interest in a mobile system (of a character yet to be specified) in the post-Protocol period as a response to the improvements in Soviet hard target kill capability.<sup>3</sup>

The SALT issues are discussed briefly below.

#### *New Types*

In Moscow, Cy offered the Soviets a choice of: (1) a ban on all new types of ICBMs for the period of the Protocol, or (2) a ban for the period of the Treaty with one exemption, MIRVed or unMIRVed, for each side.<sup>4</sup> You have decided that we should give strong emphasis to the second of these alternatives as our preferred outcome.

The deciding factor on this issue will probably be the impact of the new types definition on the new missiles which are projected to replace the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19. If the designs for these new missiles are within the five percent change in current missile parameters permitted under the new types definition (a real possibility), the Soviets might very well be prepared to accept our proposal for one exemption for the period of the Treaty.

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<sup>2</sup> Tabs A and B were not attached.

<sup>3</sup> In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote, "no."

<sup>4</sup> Carter circled "Treaty" and wrote in the margin, "not a treaty." He also underlined "one exemption, MIRVed or unMIRVed."

On SLBMs, we have told the Soviets that we are prepared to accept a Trident II/Typhoon exemption for the period of the Treaty—or no limits whatever on new types of SLBMs.<sup>5</sup>

On the new types definition issue, the Soviets recently tabled a new proposal which accepts the five percent criterion and most of the missile parameters which we included in our definition.

### *Backfire*

We have proposed to the Soviets that they provide us with the following set of assurances on Backfire:

- A figure for the current production rate.
- A commitment that Backfire would replace current Soviet medium bombers on a 1:1 basis.
- A commitment not to train for intercontinental missions.
- A ban on aerial refueling operations.
- Removal of fuel probes from Backfire.
- A ban on increased range/payload capability.
- A ban on Arctic basing.
- A request for operational range figure with flight profile.
- A ban on long-range ALCMs on the Backfire.<sup>6</sup>

There are good arguments for all of these assurances and none would have a significant impact on the employment of Backfire in its role as a medium bomber.<sup>7</sup>

To date, the Soviets have only offered the production freeze and, at that, have failed to give us a specific number. While we may not need all of the above assurances, it will be critically important to obtain assurances at a minimum on production rate, training, upgrading, and refueling.

### *Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber*

The Soviets in Geneva recently proposed a limit of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber. This is probably a response to our proposal for a limit on the maximum number of RVs per missile. Semenov has indicated that Gromyko may raise this issue in the current series of SALT discussions.

There is no way that we can accept a limit of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber. It would kill the wide-bodied cruise missile carrier program—a major selling point for both the B-1 decision and our acceptance of counting ALCM-carrying heavy bombers in the 1320.

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<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined “SLBMs,” “Trident II/Typhoon,” and “or no limits.”

<sup>6</sup> Carter underlined portions of all these points.

<sup>7</sup> Carter underlined “none.”

There are also good reasons why, in principle, the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber should not be limited in SALT Two. In particular, bomber armament limitations of this type should be coupled to air defense<sup>8</sup> limitations which do not yet exist—in contrast to the situation for ICBMs and SLBMs where the ABM Treaty mitigates the need for further missile fractionation.<sup>9</sup>

*Dismantling to 2250*

We have tabled in Geneva the recently approved approach to dismantling to reach 2250. You will recall that this approach calls for: (1) a January 1, 1980 effective date for the 2250; (2) rendering systems “inoperable” by April 30, 1980; and (3) completion of dismantling in stages by December 31, 1980.<sup>10</sup>

It is possible that Gromyko may raise this issue and propose extension of the dates for completion of dismantling. We may be able to slip these dates by, for example three months, but our agreement to 2250 certainly undercuts the argument that dismantling would be burdensome because of the numbers involved.

*Principles for SALT Three*

We expect to be tabling a reviewed set of SALT Three Principles in Geneva within a few weeks. We are moving toward very general principles and, although some negotiating will be necessary, this issue should not prove difficult to resolve.

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<sup>8</sup> Carter underlined “ALCMs” in the previous sentence and “air defense” in this sentence and drew a line between the two.

<sup>9</sup> Carter underlined “ICBMs” and “ABM” in this sentence and drew a line between the two.

<sup>10</sup> Carter underlined portions of this paragraph, including all the dates.

## 204. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 27, 1978, 8 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

### SUBJECTS

SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights

### U.S. PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Ambassador Paul C. Warnke  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Mr. David Aaron  
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew  
Mr. Hamilton Jordan  
Mr. Jody Powell  
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

### USSR PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko  
Ambassador V. Makarov  
Minister Counselor A.A. Bessmertnykh  
Mr. V.G. Komplektov  
Mr. N.N. Detinov  
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

### SALT

In embarking upon discussion of SALT problems, Gromyko wanted first of all to note the positive outcome of Secretary Vance's last visit to Moscow.<sup>2</sup> It would be hard to measure in specifics how much had already been accomplished. At the same time, on some issues serious problems remained. The President was surely aware of the Soviet leadership's positive assessment of the state of affairs today in terms of working out agreed limitations on strategic offensive arms, and the approach based on principle, which the Soviet side had brought to the negotiation of that accord. These principles had recently been clearly set forth to Secretary Vance during his last visit to Moscow by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Marshall Shulman Files, Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot File 81D109, Gromyko to U.S., 5/26–27, 1978. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Drafted by Krimer.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 200 and 201.



L.I. Brezhnev and by Gromyko himself. He would not hesitate to repeat what he had already said—that the Soviet side was most resolutely in favor of completing the work on the new agreement and signing it as soon as possible. He was convinced that this would meet the national interests of both our countries to an equal degree, and would have long-term positive effects on our relations with each other. Furthermore, it would break the dangerous trend of the continuing arms race. The fact that the arms race was unfortunately continuing could hardly be disputed by anyone familiar with the facts. The Soviet approach was now concretely embodied in the specific and truly major steps taken by the Soviet side with the objective of finding mutually acceptable solutions, i.e., solutions acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Naturally only an approach of this kind could produce appropriate results. It should be sufficient to recall the major steps the Soviet side had taken here in Washington last year during the meetings with the President<sup>3</sup> to which the President had referred in his remarks. After those meetings the Soviet side had acted accordingly, appropriately dealing with the strategic problems involved in the limitation of strategic arms, and that policy had also been consistently pursued by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva.

Gromyko noted that unfortunately it had not yet proved possible to complete the new agreement. Why this was so had been addressed by the Soviet side in its assessment of the current state of affairs at the negotiations; the Secretary was surely aware of that assessment and Gromyko would not want to lose time repeating it. He simply wanted to emphasize again that the Soviet approach, based on principle, had not changed; as demonstrated during the recent discussions with the Secretary of State in Moscow, the Soviet side continued to do all in its power to resolve outstanding issues. It would go without saying that in that process it was absolutely necessary not to deviate from the agreed principle of equality and equal security. That principle was the very cornerstone on which the SALT negotiations rested. Without observing it strictly it would not prove possible to find appropriate solutions for the issues before our two countries. When Secretary Vance was in Moscow about one month ago, he had told the Soviet leadership that President Carter personally and the U.S. Government were resolutely in favor of prompt resolution of the questions still at issue. The Soviet side was in favor of that, too, believed that all remaining issues must be resolved and was prepared to make every effort toward that end.

Gromyko would first address the question of a ban on new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. This was not a new question; it had been discussed with the President last fall, and with the Secretary of State quite

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 183 and 184.

recently. In Moscow it had been discussed in the context of the agreed maximum level for launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. The Soviet side had informed the Secretary of State, and Gromyko wanted to confirm this today, that in the event, and only in the event of mutually acceptable resolution of the question of new types the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree that the level for MIRVed ballistic missiles be established not at the earlier figure of 1,250, but at 1,200. In taking this decision the Soviet side had taken into consideration the importance President Carter personally attached to the question of levels, to which he had referred on several occasions. He would recall that at their second meeting here in Washington last September President Carter had said that if the Soviet side agreed to establish the level of MIRVed missiles at 1,200, the United States might meet the Soviet side in the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Originally the Soviet side had proposed that for the period of the Protocol a ban be placed on all flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with a single reentry vehicle. The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs would also be banned for the same period of time, except that such a ban would not apply to RSM-52 SLBMs for the USSR and to Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. In view of the fact that, as the Soviet side understood it, the U.S. side preferred that the question of new types of ICBMs be resolved within the framework of the Treaty with a term through 1985 rather than within the framework of the three-year Protocol, the Soviet side had in the course of the talks in Moscow expressed its readiness to accept this variant of resolving the question, bearing in mind that in that event an exception would be made for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, which each side would have the right to test and deploy during that period. At the same time, there would be a ban on new types of SLBMs, except that it would not apply to RSM-52 SLBMs for the USSR or Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. If the U.S. side preferred that the aforementioned provisions for SLBMs remain in effect only for the term of the three-year Protocol rather than for the term of the Treaty, the question could be resolved in this manner as well. The Soviet side had repeatedly set forth appropriate arguments and had frankly stated the reasons why it believed it necessary to have an exception for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. Gromyko was sure that even if the Soviet side had not marshalled its own arguments in favor of that exception, the President's experts would have explained the reasons to him. That need had been prompted by the actual state of affairs in this area, and was in large measure due to the steps the Soviet side had taken to meet the U.S. position with regard to MIRV verification. In this connection he had in mind, above all, the preliminarily

agreed principle of counting all ICBM launchers of a type as MIRVed if they had at least once been tested with MIRVs. That had been a major concession on the part of the Soviet Union and had been appropriately regarded as such by the U.S. side as well. This, in conjunction with establishing a special maximum level of 820 for MIRVed ICBMs had been agreed upon at this very table in Washington last year. The Soviet side had also agreed that all ICBM launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk would accordingly be counted as MIRVed, although most of them even today had not been MIRVed, as the President must surely be aware. At the same time, the testing and deployment by each side of one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, the need for which, he would repeat, was prompted for the Soviet side by practical necessity, would not in any way change the strategic situation that had emerged, and thus would not be contrary to the objectives of the agreement being worked out. (Gromyko repeated "would not be contrary to the objectives.") However, there was no way that the Soviet side could agree to the U.S. having the right to test and deploy one new type of ICBM equipped with MIRVs rather than with one reentry vehicle, since these were an entirely different category of missiles and were different, *inter alia*, from the standpoint of their impact upon the strategic situation. Gromyko doubted if anyone would dispute this fact. After all, it was the U.S. side itself that had on many occasions emphasized the destabilizing impact of MIRVed ICBMs. Therefore, he would repeat, the Soviet Union could not in any way agree to this variant of resolving the issue.

As for SLBMs, Gromyko recalled that some time ago the U.S. side had proposed that an exception be made from the ban on flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs, for one new type of such missiles for each side. The Soviet side had agreed to such an exception, but it could not in any way agree and could not accept that such an exception violate the principle of equality, equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage. And yet, in actual fact the U.S. proposal was aimed at precisely such unilateral advantage in providing that the exception should apply to Trident-I SLBMs for the United States and to RSM-50 SLBMs for the USSR, rather than to RSM-52 SLBMs. Such an approach could not be justified from the standpoint of both the substance and the letter of the Treaty being worked out. After all, both RSM-52 SLBMs and Trident-I SLBMs were new missiles, missiles of the second generation of MIRVed SLBMs. At the same time, already agreed provisions of the Treaty stated quite directly that existing types of MIRVed SLBMs were Soviet RSM-50 SLBMs and U.S. Poseidon SLBMs. How then could one now refer to RSM-50 SLBMs as new missiles? That would be tantamount to calling a chicken a fish. For this reason the Soviet Union had resolutely defended its position that the exception from the ban on new types of SLBMs apply to RSM-52 SLBMs for the USSR and Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. Both

were new types of missiles. In that way each side would have the right to develop one new type of missile. Thus there would be no grounds in the future for any disputes or arguments about these SLBMs.

The Soviet Union considered the two aforementioned variants for a solution to the question of new types of missiles as being fully justified, and was prepared to reach agreement on that basis. He would ask the President to take a look at these proposals very closely.

Nonetheless, having once again carefully weighed all the aspects of the question of the ban on new types of missiles, the Soviet Union believed it possible to reach agreement on the basis of still one more variant for resolving this question. The U.S. side had proposed that the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs be banned for the term of the Protocol. The Soviet Union was now suggesting to go even further and to ban the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, regardless of whether they were equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle. Along with that there would also have to be a ban for the term of the Treaty on the flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs, here again with an exception from such a ban for RSM-52 and Trident-I SLBMs. In stating its willingness to accept such a solution of this issue, the Soviet side would indeed forfeit the opportunity to satisfy its practical needs to which he had earlier referred. What those needs were the President would be well aware of on the basis of what his experts could tell him. Nevertheless, guided by the interests of successfully completing the new agreement, the Soviet Union was once again demonstrating its good will in taking into account the U.S. position on this question.

Contingent upon agreement by the U.S. side to one of the variants of resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, as set forth above, the Soviet Union would be prepared to take one more step to meet the position of the U.S. side. Gromyko had just presented three variants for a solution to this issue, and it would be up to the United States to decide which would suit it best. For a long period of time now it had been a matter of importance of principle for the United States to put a limit on the number of additional warheads that could be placed on Soviet ICBMs, above all on Soviet heavy missiles. Countless were the fears expressed in connection with those missiles in terms of a Soviet threat, a first strike, etc. The Soviet Union would now tell the United States officially that it was prepared to include in the Treaty a provision to the effect that in the course of modernization of existing types of ICBMs, which had been flight-tested as of January 1, 1977, the sides undertake not to increase the number of warheads on such missiles. Gromyko was well aware of the fact that the U.S. side had attached great importance to such a limitation. Secretary Vance had

made that very clear during his recent visit to Moscow. Thus it would be possible to find a solution to this question as well in the context of the proposals Gromyko had presented today. He repeated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to include such a provision in the Treaty on the condition that the U.S. side agreed to one of the aforementioned variants for resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, and also bearing in mind the following: (a) that a mutually acceptable solution be found for the definition of new types of ICBMs, i.e., that the sides agree on the criteria with the help of which limits would in fact be established on the modernization of existing types of ICBMs; (b) that the sides assume the obligation to limit the maximum number of cruise missiles with ranges between 600 and 2,500 kilometers that could be installed on each bomber carrying such missiles, namely that that number be no more than 20; (c) as the Soviet side understood it, the U.S. side had now agreed that the overall aggregate of strategic offensive arms be reduced from 2,400 to 2,250. That, too, was a question to which the President had always attached great importance. Taking this into account, the Soviet side would be prepared to agree that such reductions be carried out over a period of 12 months beginning December 30, 1980. Thus, the Soviet side was prepared to shorten the time for reductions by 6 months as compared to the time it had earlier proposed for achieving necessary reductions, although for purely practical reasons this was a very difficult decision for the Soviet side to take. In this connection, Gromyko would ask the President to take into account the fact that any other solution to the question of timing of reductions, one that would come closer to what the U.S. side had suggested, would, for purely practical reasons, be totally impossible for the Soviet Union to comply with. Gromyko would therefore ask the President not to insist further, and to accept the Soviet proposal in this regard, bearing in mind that the Soviet side could not go any further. Indeed, in this connection, what was it we were talking about? After all, what was involved here was dismantling or destruction of systems in excess of established limits. Surely there could be no question here of threatening or undermining the security of either side. The Soviet side was once again moving to meet the position of the U.S. side in order to finish with this question as well, thereby ensuring genuine progress toward completing the new agreement. He would like to hope that the question of reducing the aggregates of strategic offensive arms and of timing of reductions could now be considered as agreed. He would hope that the President would simply say yes.

Gromyko handed the President a one-page document listing the three variants for resolution of the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, together with a working English translation. He asked the President to regard the proposals on new types set forth in that docu-

ment as alternative proposals. The text of this document reads as follows:

“ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS

The Soviet side proposes the following three possible variants for resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs:

*First variant.* The flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs must be banned for the term of the three-year Protocol, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the same period, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM-52 missile; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.

*Second variant.* The flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs must be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the term of the three-year Protocol or for the term of the Treaty, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM-52 missile; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.

*Third variant.* The flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, i.e., of those with a single reentry vehicle and those with multiple reentry vehicles, must be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the same period, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM-52; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.”

Gromyko said that he had one more final question to address, one of an entirely different category. This was the question of the Soviet medium bomber TU-22-M, the Backfire, as it was called in the United States. He could only express regret over the fact that this issue was still being raised at the negotiations, although there was no justification whatsoever for that, neither *de facto* nor *de jure*. He had told Secretary Vance the other day that perhaps the Soviet side had been mistaken to discuss this airplane in the first place, because it was clearly not a strategic weapons system. However, the Soviet side had assumed that the questions raised about this bomber might be based on someone harboring an honest misconception about it. Still, he would not rule out that at some point the Soviet side might simply refuse to discuss this airplane any further. The President was surely aware of the fundamental position of the Soviet Union in this regard, which had been clearly set forth in the course of previous meetings and discussions, in-

cluding the meeting with the President last year. That position had not changed and could not change, simply because the airplane itself had not changed. The fact that the U.S. side continued to raise this issue, and the way in which that was done, gave rise to serious doubts which went far beyond the limits of the issue itself. Frankly, he believed that the President and his advisors had been fed some false information concerning this bomber. It would be hard for him to tell whether or not this had been done deliberately. Whatever the reason, the Soviet side felt that the motivation for supplying wrong information about this bomber was opposition to the very idea of concluding a strategic arms agreement between our two countries. After all, there were surely those on the U.S. side who knew the true state of affairs. The bomber was not a needle in a haystack that could be hidden, never to be found. In any case, he could only sympathize with the President for having received such erroneous information. If the Soviet Union was now expressing its readiness unilaterally to provide certain clarifications, this was a reflection of its good will at the negotiations, and it should be properly appreciated. It was now high time to close out this contrived question. The fact that the question was still open made it difficult for the Soviet side to escape the conviction that those who were raising it constantly were pursuing much more far-reaching objectives. They surely knew very well that the Soviet Union had much more reason to raise questions about American aircraft that were not covered by the term "heavy bomber," but could in fact strike Soviet territory. Thus, if the Soviet side had wanted to put obstacles in the way of concluding an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, it could have raised much more justified questions about U.S. aircraft. He believed, therefore, that this matter should be approached from a position of principle and not be allowed artificially to block agreement until the very last moment, in the hope that this would enable the U.S. side to obtain something further from the Soviet side. An approach of that kind will not lead to anything useful. The Soviet leaders sometimes engaged in half serious speculation concerning the reasons why that airplane was so awe-inspiring for some Americans. They had speculated that perhaps it was the name given that aircraft in the United States, or some feature of the external appearance of that aircraft that had so frightened many Americans. In any case, they had come to the conclusion that those who raised questions about it pursued more far-reaching aims than met the eye. He would ask the President to take another look at this matter.

In this connection, Gromyko once again confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to make a unilateral statement concerning the TU-22-M airplane. The text of that statement could be communicated to the U.S. side subsequently. Moreover, in view of the insistent wishes voiced by the Secretary of State during his recent visit to Moscow, the Soviet side had deemed it possible to revise the content of such a state-

ment in a way designed to meet the wishes of the U.S. side. The President would recall that Gromyko had informed him of the content of such a statement when they had met at this very table last year. Thus, he was sure, the President would immediately see that the Soviet side had moved further than it had intended in an effort to demonstrate good will.

For all the above reasons, the Soviet side would be prepared to make the following unilateral statement which took into account the additional issues Secretary Vance had raised during his visit to Moscow. The Secretary's questions in Moscow were not answered at that time due to lack of time, since they had been raised toward the end of his visit. The text follows:

"As a gesture of good will, the Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet medium-range bomber TU-22-M, called Backfire in the United States, has a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers when flying at subsonic speed with a normal payload at altitudes of 8,000 to 12,000 meters, and that it, i.e., the Soviet side, does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. It does not intend to give that airplane such capability in any other manner, including by way of in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present production rate."

Gromyko pointed out that the statement as just read included exhaustive data concerning the flight profile of the airplane in connection with its stated radius of action. These data had not been supplied earlier not because of any lack of good will, but simply because the Soviet side had thought the statement to be sufficient as it had then been drafted. Representatives of the U.S. side had repeatedly asked questions about the flight profile at which this aircraft had a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers. The answer was now contained in the statement as read. It specified the speed as subsonic, the altitude as 8–12,000 meters and the payload as normal. These data definitely confirmed the fact that the TU-22-M was a medium range bomber although, he would repeat, the Soviet side was sure that the President's experts had been well aware of that fact all along. If any of them had not known these facts, the statement in its present form would raise the level of their awareness. Apart from that, and here again at the insistence of the U.S. side, the Soviet side had deleted the words "by way of information" from the last sentence of the statement, since Secretary Vance in Moscow had strenuously objected to these words. In fact, however, this had not changed anything since it would go without saying that this



editorial change did not in any way change the nature of the Soviet statement; it was a unilateral statement made to demonstrate the good will of the Soviet side. Gromyko expressed the hope that the President would correctly understand and appreciate the willingness of the Soviet side to take into account certain wishes of the U.S. side and to make that unilateral statement more specific.

Gromyko said that this should finally put the Backfire issue to rest, and put it to rest right now, so that neither today nor in the future it be raised as an issue on which reaching agreement depended. Judging by everything said about the Backfire in the past, there were some people who did indeed wish to block agreement by using false information about this airplane. It was not in the interests of either country to encourage such people.

Gromyko had a few more words to say regarding the Backfire. The Soviet leadership had carefully followed discussion of this issue in the United States and had tried to identify those who made statements about it. Such statements were frequently made by representatives of the U.S. Congress, but sometimes also by representatives of the U.S. Administration. In this way one statement by one group provides a stimulus to statements by another group and reinforced and inflated the current myths that had been created around this aircraft. Eventually some of those who created the myths might even begin to believe their own misstatements. Since this whole issue was based on myths and not on reality, what was needed to resolve it was common sense and reason. It could be resolved much easier than many of the other issues already resolved. And yet, statements were still being made referring to the Backfire as the main political issue at the negotiations. The Soviet leadership simply could not understand such an approach. (Gromyko repeated the words "could not understand.") He believed that it was necessary for both sides to approach all the questions at the negotiations from the standpoint of reason and facts. If the U.S. side agreed with that premise, then it was necessary for the U.S. Administration to take active steps to prove that this aircraft is not a strategic weapons system and cannot in any way constitute a block to reaching agreement.

To what he had already said Gromyko wanted to add that the unilateral text he had read would be transmitted to the U.S. side in written form at the appropriate moment. This would be done on the condition that no one say or imply that this statement was part of the agreement or that it was an official document. If anything to that effect were said, the Soviet side would deny it. Today he would limit himself to having read the statement verbally, but it would eventually be transmitted in written form.

Before concluding his presentation, Gromyko wanted to note the great importance the Soviet side attached to the fact that in the course of the recent meetings in Moscow it had proved possible to agree on the text of the Treaty article dealing with the obligation not to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty. Agreement on this article had been reached mainly as a result of the concessions made by the Soviet side. In this connection, the Soviet side would continue to proceed from the understanding of the obligations contained in that article as discussed in the course of reaching agreement on the text of the non-circumvention provision. What that understanding was was clearly recorded in the memcons of each side.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to draw the President's attention to the new and major steps the Soviet side was prepared to take in the interests of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining questions at the negotiations. He expressed the hope that the U.S. side would reciprocate by similar efforts and that they would be able on that basis to conclude working out the agreement at last, ensuring that it would be signed and enter into force at an early stage. He would conclude his statement on this note and would be pleased to hear any comments the President might want to make.

The President first wanted to tell Gromyko that he had learned a lesson this morning. He could see that it had been a mistake to start their meeting so early. Had they started later, Gromyko might have been more forthcoming and cooperative. He wanted to respond briefly to Gromyko's comments on SALT and put the whole discussion in perspective.

The President pointed out that we were talking about a Protocol period that would be relatively short—according to our proposal the Protocol would expire at the end of 1980. We were also discussing a more extensive agreement to last through the end of 1985. The two sides had agreed on some key numerical levels for the agreement. Referring to the various categories of arms, the significant numbers were 820, 1,200, 1,320 and 2,250. The Soviet Union had a special advantage in having 308 very large missiles which it had moved to MIRV. That continued to be a constant source of concern to the United States. However, this matter had been resolved with mutual concessions he believed, and we were willing to live with an agreement on the basis of these numbers. Two major items remained: one concerned the issue of new types of missiles and the other the characteristics and capabilities of the Backfire bomber, an issue Gromyko had discounted, although we attached importance to it.

We had some important differences concerning the ban on new types of missiles as it applied to SLBMs. In terms of their relative importance and advanced stage of development we equated the Trident-I

SLBM to the Soviet RSM–50 SLBM. As an alternative, we equated our Trident-II missile to the Soviet RSM–52 missile. If the Soviet Union could not accept these equations, our position would be that during the term of the agreement through 1985 there should be no ban on new types of SLBMs. However one viewed any of the three options offered as a basis for agreement, we cannot accept that the Trident-I SLBM, a missile in an advanced stage of development, was equivalent to the Soviet RSM–52 SLBM, which we called the Typhoon, which was still in the conceptual stage.

On ICBMs we had put forward two alternative proposals. One applied to the Protocol period which was relatively brief, and would not impose a significant limit because after expiration of the Protocol there could be rapid deployment of new types of ICBMs. Our preference was that for the entire period of the Treaty through 1985 we put a significant limit on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs with one exception for each side. Since a new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle would not have any significance for us, we would prefer to have a reasonable and significant limit established for the Treaty period by providing one exception for each side, the excepted type of ICBM to be equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle at the discretion of each side. We would in any case be bound by the 820 maximum limit for MIRVed ICBMs, but how we chose to use that limit should be a matter for us to decide. Either alternative was acceptable to us, but our preference would be one exception for each side, MIRVing to be decided at the discretion of each Party, and to be included for the Treaty period through 1985.

The President said there was another subject he wanted to touch on in passing—the dismantling schedule for excess systems. While it could best be negotiated at the level of the Secretary of State and the Delegations in Geneva, he saw no reason to extend that schedule an additional year. He noted that the two sides might reach agreement this year. As he understood the Soviet proposal, dismantling of excess systems would not be completed until the end of 1981, i.e., 3½ years from now. We were convinced that if dismantling commenced at the beginning of 1980, the missiles to be dismantled could be rendered inoperative within 2 or 3 months, and dismantling could be completed by the end of 1980. In this connection we were talking about 150 missiles and, as he understood it, this certainly was within the bounds of Soviet capabilities. On occasion the Soviet Union had built missiles faster than that; thus it should be able to dismantle missiles already deployed within the time period we had proposed.

The President turned to the Backfire issue. On the basis of the information he was receiving from all his advisors, who had no motive or desire to mislead him, he felt very strongly that this bomber had inter-

continental capabilities, certainly if it were refueled in flight or stationed at advanced Arctic bases. In a time of crisis the total range of this aircraft was what concerned us and not just the radius of action. We believed that Gromyko had taken a step in the right direction in describing the flight profile related to the stated radius of action. However, the President noted, this language did not preclude substantial increases in the range of the Backfire, and did not preclude refueling capabilities. We were concerned about this just as we were about the absence of a ban on mounting long-range cruise missiles on the Backfire bomber. Further, the statement Gromyko had read also had not provided specifics concerning a production rate base on which we could depend. Was the Soviet side willing to accept our estimate of the production rate? This was a question Gromyko might answer, since we needed to have mutually agreed numbers for the production rate in order to eliminate this matter. The President's own belief was that the more specific the Soviet side could be, the easier it would be for us to resolve this question. As he had understood Gromyko's statement, the Soviet side felt that this was not a concern for the Soviet Union and should not even be discussed; for us, however, the Backfire was a formidable weapons system if stationed at advanced Arctic bases or equipped with long-range cruise missiles, or produced at a higher rate. All of these were serious problems for us, to which we attached great significance.

The President said that these very briefly were his concerns with the differences between us he saw as still remaining. He asked if Gromyko might want to respond briefly before the President turned to discussion of questions other than SALT.

Gromyko first addressed the possibility of the Backfire being equipped with long-range cruise missiles. He said that, as regards this, the Soviet Union would certainly very strictly abide by the obligations the sides would assume in their regard under the Treaty. The Soviet Union would abide by these obligations just as, he was sure, would the United States. Here he could not add or subtract anything. As for the production rate of the Backfire bomber, on several occasions the U.S. side had been informed in official statements that the production rate of that airplane would remain approximately at the present level. This had also been said to President Carter's predecessor in practically the same terms. As for in-flight refueling, there was nothing Gromyko could add to what he had said. The draft statement he had read stated very clearly that the Soviet side would not give that aircraft intercontinental capabilities, including by means of in-flight refueling. If anyone wanted to indulge in speculations to the effect that this aircraft could be refueled five or six or ten times, he would only ask the President to consider how many American aircraft could be refueled in the same

manner. In that event the Phantom would certainly have to be considered a heavy bomber. He was sure the President would not agree to have it so considered, but would ask him to let the Soviet side know if he did agree. As for the Phantom, this would not simply be theory. Phantoms had actually crossed the Atlantic a number of times; thus, if anyone were to raise such questions, it should be the Soviet side rather than the U.S. Phantoms could certainly reach the territory of the Soviet Union, particularly with in-flight refueling. Furthermore, some of them were based in various areas from where they could easily reach Soviet territory. What could the President reply to this?

The President said that one could, of course, speculate back and forth. He believed that a clear statement from the Soviet side would be helpful here. Would the Soviet Union disagree with a unilateral statement to be made by the United States, specifying that it was our estimate that the Soviet Union was producing two Backfires per month? We needed to have clear understanding in this matter.

Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet statement would be at the disposal of the United States. It clearly said that the rate at which this aircraft had been produced and was being produced now would remain in effect. He recalled that the same thing had also been said to President Ford in Helsinki at a meeting he himself had attended.<sup>4</sup> This had been the occasion of signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At a meeting between President Ford, L.I. Brezhnev and Secretary Kissinger, President Ford had been told that the production rate of that bomber would not be changed. Also at that same occasion the Soviet side had not disputed the production rate data in the possession of the U.S. side. There a statement had been made, and Gromyko had repeated it today. Of course, it would be up to the President how best to explain this to the U.S. Congress and U.S. public opinion.

The President repeated his question: if we made a unilateral statement to the effect that the production rate of the Backfire bomber was two aircraft per month, and that the Soviet Union agreed with that figure, would that statement remain unchallenged?

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would take responsibility for its own statement. What was included in that statement had not been questioned by the U.S. side. Surely the President had data from his own experts. The production rate would remain approximately the same. As to how this should be explained, that would be entirely up to the President. Gromyko would only ask him not to force the Soviet Union to specify numbers; for the Soviet Union this was a matter of principle. There should really be no question here. The Soviet Union knew that

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 102.

the U.S. knew what the production rate was, and the U.S. knew that the Soviet Union knew that the U.S. knew, etc. It would seem there should be no question here at all and no need for polemics between the two sides. Indeed, how could one take two different figures for the production rate? One figure had been stated in Helsinki, and a different one here in Washington. If this was going to continue, Gromyko could not hope to keep up. Just last year the President had named a figure that was different from the one he had named today. Surely his experts could be more precise.

The President said we needed to have a clear understanding here. We had spoken of a figure of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  planes per month, i.e., 30 per year. The President needed to tell the American people that our assessment of the production rate was reliable, and that that production rate would not be exceeded. He did not want to find himself in a situation five years from now to discover that the production rate had been, say, 4 planes per month. We needed to tie down this matter.

The President had an additional question to ask: did the Soviet Union intend to retain the refueling capabilities of the Backfire bomber? This was a question to which we needed to have an answer.

Gromyko pointed out that, after all, he had never said that the Soviet Union would assume the obligation to deprive the Backfire bomber of any refueling capability. He had emphasized several times—in Moscow and here—that the Soviet Union would not give that aircraft an intercontinental capability in any manner, including by means of in-flight refueling. This was what he had particularly emphasized today. As for the production rate, he believed he had answered the President's question. The Soviet formula remained. If the President would translate that rate into numbers, and if he would not deviate from the numbers he had when the Soviet Union first proposed that text, there would be no grounds for any polemics between the two sides now, or two or three or four years from now. However, in this connection, he would not want the U.S. side to speak on the basis of one figure one year and a different figure next year.

The President thought he should be frank to tell Gromyko that the Backfire statement suggested by Gromyko was not satisfactory. The total range of that aircraft, that would not be increased in the future, was adequate now with one refueling to strike our country. This would be a serious problem for us, because on a one-way flight without refueling the Backfire could cover 4,400 kilometers, and with refueling could easily reach U.S. territory. The President did not discern anything in the statement Gromyko had read that would state that the 2,200 kilometer range would be retained, that the aircraft would not have refueling capabilities. Above all, he did not want Gromyko to underestimate the difficulty this aircraft presented for us in terms of a SALT agreement.

(The meeting was briefly recessed to allow Mrs. Rose Kennedy to say hello to Gromyko. After resumption of the meeting, and some kind words by the President and by Gromyko with regard to Mrs. Kennedy, Gromyko returned to the subject under discussion.)

Gromyko said that when he returned to Moscow he would have to report to his colleagues in the Politburo, chaired by Brezhnev, that President Carter and Secretary of State Vance had argued that with additional refueling the TU-22-M bomber could reach U.S. territory, and that this was a matter of major concern to the United States. He would ask the President to imagine what the reaction of the Politburo would be. It would mean that in preparing the new agreement the U.S. side was thinking and talking about a Soviet aircraft which could reach the United States with one refueling. This will naturally also mean that the same arguments could be turned around and applied to large numbers of U.S. aircraft. Could one really say that the two sides were thereby enhancing mutual trust during preparation of the new SALT agreement? No one in the Soviet Union will have an understanding for such an approach. He apologized for saying this to the President quite forthrightly. It was better to say this directly than to harbor such thoughts secretly. He would ask what the real reason was that the U.S. Administration was frightening itself over this question. During the recess he had already said jokingly that the United States seemed to be putting out too many detective stories.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

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## **205. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 20, 1978.

### **SUBJECT**

Summary of Conclusions from the June 12 SCC Meeting on SALT

You raised a number of questions on my June 15 package to you (attached) submitting the June 12 SALT SCC Summary and corresponding instructions to the delegation for your approval.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote "Zbig, JC" at the top of the first page.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

You note that you think the protocol limit on new types permitting MX is best and that you like the idea of MAP being assessed for Minuteman. The new types and MAP issues are, of course, related, and the interagency SALT working group is now assessing the alternatives on both and how they play against each other. If the analysis shows that MAP is feasible in SALT verification terms for Minuteman, this would open the possibility of accepting the Gromyko proposal for a no-exceptions ban on new types in the 1985 agreement.<sup>3</sup> If we went this way, we could then MAP Minuteman, drop MX (or rather hold it as a post-1985 option), and build whatever counterforce capability required into Trident II which could itself be developed to have the potential for conversion into a post-1985 MX.

If, however, MAP represents unmanageable verification problems, then another mobile basing mode will have to be found<sup>4</sup> and the option for a pre-'85 MX preserved.<sup>5</sup> In this event possible options for resolving this issue in SALT would include a protocol limit on new types with an exception for each side, or putting over the new types issue to SALT III.

At this point, I think we need to stick to our current new types position until we can see our way more clearly through this thicket of issues. We will review the issue at another SALT SCC now scheduled for June 26, looking to a future Vance-Gromyko meeting.

As you also noted, Jones's ideas on Backfire are indeed reasonable. We will have to review precisely what we would keep and what we would drop in the current list of assurances we have presented to the Soviets. We will very likely need to reject the flight profile<sup>6</sup> the Soviets have offered us and tell them that we will rely on our own analyses as the benchmark and basis for evaluating Backfire's performance and any upgrading.

We will especially need to consider how we play this new Backfire card with the Soviets and what we try to get for accepting a slimmed down version of our original proposal. Since it would represent a substantial step on our side we should try to get something substantial from them such as movement toward us on new types. We will be back

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<sup>3</sup> Carter double underlined "If" in this sentence and wrote "true" in the margin next to the sentence.

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined "another mobile basing mode will have to be found" and wrote a question mark in the margin next to it.

<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined "the option for a pre-'85 MX preserved" and wrote "true" in the margin next to it.

<sup>6</sup> Carter underlined "reject the flight profile" and wrote "true" in the margin next to it.



to you once we have taken a look at the substance and tactics of a possible new Backfire approach.<sup>7</sup>

On the SALT III principles,<sup>8</sup> the footnote you questioned should not be there. It refers to an earlier proposal opposed by the JCS to delete a reference to survivability. The issue was settled by accepting a JCS proposed phrase at the top of page 2 of the principles referring to “measures to increase confidence in the mutual security of permitted strategic offensive arms.”

On your question re “grey areas” the approach we have developed with the Allies is to go on record about future grey area limitations in a way that holds open all our options both on substance and on the negotiating forum. As you may recall, the French oppose any grey area negotiations, but if they take place prefer that SALT be the forum. The Germans are quite interested in grey area negotiations but want a forum other than SALT. The British are skeptical of grey area negotiations and ambivalent about how they might be negotiated. Finally, neither we nor the Allies know what we want to achieve in such negotiations nor which grey area capabilities we are prepared to forego. We have a PRM on this issue under preparation<sup>9</sup> and plan systematic substantive consultations with the Allies to begin in the fall.

In this situation, our plan is to make a unilateral statement in SALT in connection with the Principles that any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.<sup>10</sup> This puts down a marker on “grey areas” with the USSR but keeps open all our options while we work the problem through here and with the Allies.

#### *Recommendation*

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A of the attached package.

That you approve the instructions to the SALT Delegation at Tab B of the attached package. The footnote on page 2 of the principles will be deleted.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Carter underlined “how we play this new Backfire card” in the first sentence and wrote “expedite” next to the last sentence of this paragraph.

<sup>8</sup> The SALT III Principles as approved for the SALT Delegation (with “Agreement” replacing “Treaty”) are attached to a memorandum from Brzezinski to Mondale, Vance, and Brown, June 23. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78)

<sup>9</sup> Presumably a reference to PRM 38, “Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control,” issued on June 22.

<sup>10</sup> Carter underlined “any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems” and wrote “ok” in the margin.

<sup>11</sup> Carter approved both recommendations and in reference to the second wrote, “as edited. Also, why not include in SALT III principles? Do not use ‘Treaty’ any more. J.”

**206. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 7, 1978.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions from July 5 SCC Meeting on SALT

The SCC met July 5 to discuss positions for Cy Vance's July 12/13 meetings with Gromyko. The Summary of Conclusions is at Tab A.<sup>2</sup>

In brief, there is a consensus that we should make a new proposal on the new types issue under which each side would be permitted to flight test but not deploy one new type of ICBM through 1985. (In the current M-X program, testing begins in 1983 or 1984 with initial deployment in 1986.) This proposal would be made contingent on Soviet acceptance of one of our proposed alternatives on new types of SLBMs, our new types definition, our proposed missile fractionation limit, and dropping their proposal for a limit on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. This approach may entail a decision to go to MAP for Minuteman III during the Agreement and to deploy M-X after 1985, in order to assure the necessary political support here, including the JCS. Harold has reservations about how firmly you can or should make such a commitment since the costs and other program issues are still unclear. He also noted that if we go this way on new types, then we will have to go to full-scale development of M-X in the next budget or SALT ratification will be much more difficult.

On the Backfire, you will have to decide whether to maintain our current position or propose a reduced set of assurances. In essence, Cy and Paul both want to go forward now and propose a reduced set of assurances. They think this might make the Soviets more forthcoming on new types. I believe we can go with a reduced set of assurances but that this concession should be saved for a Summit meeting and traded for identifiable quid pro quos such as changing the Protocol cruise missile limits to a statement similar to the Backfire statement, and counting Bison in the aggregate. Harold and Dave Jones agree with this approach. Harold also feels we need more time to consider possible military counters to Backfire.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

I have attached memoranda from Cy and Paul (Tab B) and Harold and the JCS (Tab C)<sup>3</sup> endorsing the new proposal on new types (although with some minor variations). On the assumption that you approve the approach proposed, on which all are in agreement, I do not believe it is necessary for you to read in detail their memoranda. I attach them, however, for the record.

To get the full flavor of the issues regarding new types and Backfire, you might wish to review the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A prior to checking the decision boxes below.

*Issues for Decision*

*New Types Alternatives*

—Offer new proposal under which each side would be permitted to test but not deploy one new type of ICBM through 1985. This proposal would be made contingent on Soviet acceptance of one of our proposed alternatives on new types of SLBMs, our new types definition, our proposed missile fractionation limit, and dropping their proposal for a limit on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. (Consensus position.)

—Maintain current position.

*Your Decision:*<sup>4</sup>

Approve new proposal as above

Maintain current position

*Backfire Alternatives*

—Maintain for now current position (i.e., continue to insist on complete set of assurances) looking towards a trade-off at the Summit. (Harold, the JCS, and I recommend.)

—Offer *now* to accept reduced set of assurances covering freeze on production rate, ban on upgrading, and no association with an inter-continental mission. (Cy and Paul recommend.)

*Your Decision:*<sup>5</sup>

Maintain current position, looking to a trade-off at the Summit.

Offer to accept reduced set of assurances as above.

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<sup>3</sup> Brown's memorandum, July 7 is attached; Vance's and Warnke's has not been found.

<sup>4</sup> Carter approved the new proposal.

<sup>5</sup> Carter approved the second option, but added the following note: "but only if SU responds favorably (accepts) US offer re new types."

*Other Issues from July 5 Meeting*

—Recommend that you approve SCC conclusions on other issues as set forward at Tab A and corresponding instructions to the Delegation (Tab D).<sup>6</sup>

Approve

Disapprove

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<sup>6</sup> Carter did not act on this recommendation. Tab D is printed as Document 207.

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**207. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 10, 1978.

SUBJECT

SALT Instructions

With reference to the July 12–13 Geneva talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko:

1. *New Types*: The US should offer a new proposal in which each side would be permitted to test but not deploy one new type of ICBM through 1985. This proposal is contingent on Soviet agreement to one of the US proposed alternatives on new types of SLBMs, the US new types definition, the US proposed missile fractionation limit, and on Soviet agreement to drop their proposal for a limit on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber.

2. *Backfire*: If the Soviets accept the US proposal on new types, and only after they have explicitly done so, the US may raise with the Soviets an offer to accept a reduced set of Backfire assurances covering: a freeze on the production rate with the number provided by the Soviets; a commitment not to upgrade the present range/payload capability of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Backfire; a commitment not to associate Backfire with an intercontinental mission. With respect to the production rate freeze, a rate of 2.5 per month or lower would be acceptable.

With reference to other SALT issues:

1. *Construction/Conversion of Transport Aircraft for Use As Cruise Missile Carriers*. The US can accept a ban on the conversion of existing aircraft for use as cruise missile carriers provided there is an exemption for converting 8 aircraft for use as test platforms where these test aircraft would not be counted in the aggregate or the 1320. This position, when presented to the Soviets, should be linked to Soviet acceptance of the US position on functionally-related observable differences, in particular as it relates to the existing Bison tankers and the prospective conversion of existing Bison bombers to tankers.

2. US positions on other unresolved issues should be maintained in accord with earlier instructions.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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## **208. Editorial Note**

Secretary of State Vance was in Geneva from July 11 to 13, 1978, for discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. SALT was the principal topic discussed. In telegram Secto 8019, July 12, Vance reported on his morning meeting of July 12 in which he made a formal presentation on SALT at the opening of the session. Vance read the following statement:

“This morning I propose that we focus on one of the most important issues remaining to be resolved in the agreement: limitations on the introduction of new types of strategic missiles and on modernization of existing types of strategic missiles.

“I would first like to review where we stand on the issues of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs and of modernization of existing types.

“In previous discussions we have proposed a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs in the Protocol. This would prohibit introduction of new types of ICBMs through 1980 while we discuss how to deal with this issue in SALT III.

“We have also indicated that we could accept a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that either side could test and deploy one new ICBM, MIRVed, or non-MIRVed. This would permit you to go ahead with the new, single RV ICBM,

which fits your force structure, and would permit us to proceed with a new MIRVed ICBM, which would fit into our force structure. This would provide for equality and equal security on both sides.

"Either of these proposals would represent a satisfactory solution of the ICBM new types issue.

"In the context of a Protocol ban on new types of ICBMs, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs, allowing for continued testing and deployment of Trident I and for the SS-N-18.

"In the context of a ban on new types of ICBMs through 1985 with one exemption, MIRVed or non-MIRVed, for each side, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs for the same period, with one exemption. In our case this would be the Trident II, and in your case this would be the Typhoon (RSM-52). Under this proposal, Trident I and the SS-N-18 would be considered existing types.

"You have proposed a ban on new types of ICBMs for the Protocol period, except that each side would be permitted to test and deploy one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. This proposal would prevent us from testing any new missile, while allowing you to go ahead with a new single RV ICBM for which we have no program and no need. This is inequitable and unacceptable to us.

"You have also proposed a ban on new types through 1985, with the same exemption for a new single RV ICBM. This is even more one-sided:

"—The U.S. would have no new ICBM for the duration of the 1985 agreement, since we have no program or requirement for a new single RV ICBM.

"—The Soviet Union would, however, be able to deploy its entirely new type of single RV ICBM.

"Finally, you have proposed a ban on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, without exception. This proposal indicates that you can forego a new single RV ICBM. In that sense, it represents a constructive step to which we have given consideration in our own thinking. The logic of this proposal argues that you should be able to accept our proposal for a Protocol ban on all new types, which would impose equal constraints on both sides.

"As for SLBM new types, your proposal is the same for all variants: a ban on flight testing and deployment for either the Protocol or the 1985 period, with an exception for Trident I and the Typhoon. This is not equitable. Trident I has already begun flight-testing and should be treated the same as SS-N-18. Soviet rights to a new, untested SLBM must be balanced by equal rights for the US. This means that Trident II and Typhoon must be treated comparably. Either they must both be banned or both be exempted.

"There is also the question of how to define a new type of ICBM, which is being addressed by the delegations. The US has made a major move in the direction of the Soviet side, so we are closer to agreement on this issue. However, significant differences remain.

"I want to emphasize the importance of a prohibition on an increase in the number of reentry vehicles on existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The US side notes the Soviet inclusion in its May 1978 proposal of the rule that in the course of modernization of an existing type, the number of RVs on that type should not be increased. We welcome this indication that you agree that fractionation limits for ballistic missiles are a valuable part of dealing meaningfully with the new types issue.

"In this connection, we believe each side should specify how many RVs have been tested on existing types.

"The US also regards as important the elements of our definition of new types about restricting changes in individual stages and in the relevant characteristics of what we call the post-boost vehicle for current missiles.

"We also believe that an exempted new type of ICBM should not have more than 10 reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number tested to date on an ICBM on either side. Similarly, if we agree to exempt a new type of SLBM, there should be a limit on the number of reentry vehicles at 14, the maximum number tested by either side to date on an SLBM.

"It is clearly important to limit the number of reentry vehicles on exempted missiles. This provision, along with the ban on increasing the number of reentry vehicles on existing ballistic missiles, would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a new types ban and to the stability of the strategic balance.

"We have explained the rationale for the two alternatives for a ban on new types of ICBMs we have offered, and I continue to believe that either would lead to an equitable solution of this issue.

"As I said at the beginning, the new types issue is one of the most important political-level issues remaining to be resolved in the agreement. If we are able to reach a satisfactory solution, I believe we will have made a great stride toward a final agreement.

"In recognition of the importance of the issue for the progress of these negotiations, and in light of those constructive elements of the Soviet May 1978 proposals, and in an effort to bridge the gap between your proposals and ours, I am prepared to offer the following compromise.

"I want to emphasize that in our view the new types issue has several related elements which apply to both ICBMs and SLBMs: a ban on new types, a definition of permitted modernization of existing types

which prevents increases in the number of RVs on an existing type; and possible exemptions for new types. Our new proposal has been designed to resolve all these elements as a whole. It forms an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts.

“We are prepared to prohibit testing and deployment of any new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that each side would be permitted to flight-test one new type of ICBM, MIRVed or non-MIRVed. However, deployment of new types of ICBMs would be prohibited through 1985.

“—New types of ICBMs would be determined by the definition which we have proposed, including a ban on an increase in the maximum number of reentry vehicles on any existing type of missile. The exempted ICBM could have no more than 10 reentry vehicles.

“—This proposal, when considered in relation to the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs, represents a meaningful arms control step. Yet it gives both sides flexibility in deciding how to structure its mix of MIRVed and single warhead ICBMs.

“We are also prepared to agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs through 1985, except that one new type of SLBM could be tested and deployed. The SLBM exemption would apply to the Typhoon on your side and Trident II on our side. The Trident I and the SS-N-18 would be considered existing SLBMs.

“There would be a prohibition on increases in the number of reentry vehicles for existing types of SLBMs. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on an exempted SLBM would be 14.

“This proposal takes into account the essential elements of the approaches taken by both sides: you wanted to ban new ICBMs through 1985, and they could be banned. We have sought to obtain equality of constraints on both sides. It is good arms control and it gives each side flexibility to structure its own forces.

“In making this proposal, I want also to make it clear that the US cannot accept a limit on the number of ALCMs carried by an aircraft limited under the 1320 ceiling, and this new proposal is contingent on your agreement that there be no such limits.

“As I said, this new proposal is offered as an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts. We offer it in an effort to seek a fair and a prompt resolution of this issue.

“I want to make two points in conclusion.

“The United States has had no new ICBMs since the MM III, first deployed almost a decade ago. The Soviet Union has deployed several ICBMs in that period, most of them MIRVed and far larger than the MM III.



"I must emphasize that by making this proposal the US has made a serious and substantial political commitment to conclude a new agreement." (Department of State, Marshall Shulman Files, Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot File 81D109, Vance/Gromyko: Geneva, 7/12–13, 1978)

After hearing Vance's statement, Gromyko asked for a recess until 3 p.m. when the delegations met again. In telegram Secto 8022, July 12, Vance reported on the significant portion of Gromyko's response as follows:

"1. At the end of this afternoon's meeting, Gromyko came to what he described as the 'core' of his statement: 'I wish to ask a direct question—this is the core of my statement—if the U.S. really attaches paramount importance to the solution of the question of new types of ballistic missiles on the basis it proposes, will it be prepared to regard as agreed all other questions (cruise missiles on bombers, timing for reductions, Backfire, etc.) on the basis of our proposals, in the event we were to consent to U.S. proposals that for the duration of the treaty—i.e. to the end of 1985—within the limits of the relevant aggregate levels of strategic arms and MIRVed vehicles—each side would have the right to flight test and to deploy one new type of ICBM which it could equip at its own discretion either with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle, while there would be no limitations whatsoever on new types of SLBMs?'

"2. There are a number of important ambiguities in the foregoing. For instance: when Gromyko speaks of accepting the U.S. position on 'new types of ballistic missiles', does he mean our full position on the definition of new types? What does he mean by 'etc.'? Do the Soviets accept that our MIRV type rules would apply to their new single war-head missile?

"3. I would intend to explore these and other ambiguities without flatly rejecting the proposal implicit in Gromyko's question. This would give us a basis for further evaluation and response.

"4. I do not intend to raise any new points with regard to Backfire since the Soviets did not accept our proposal as you directed it be made.

"5. Gromyko's 'question' was preceded by his usual colorful remarks. He once again urged us to be firmer in our public support for SALT, and I told him we were already being firm. He accused us of seeking unilateral advantages, and I responded that it was the Soviets who were doing just that and that our proposals were fair. He was predictably sour about our new types proposal that I made this morning, saying that it was simply a ruse to allow us to continue our own programs and block Soviet programs. I stressed that it was an effort to bridge the gap, taking into account the national interests of both sides. I

believe that the Soviets have not had time to give it any serious consideration." (Ibid.)

In telegram Secto 8033, dated July 13, Vance reported on that day's discussion of SALT:

"1. In SALT portion of meeting, Gromyko provided the following clarification of their proposal of yesterday.

"A. The Soviet proposal related only to its actual words, i.e., that each side could have one new ICBM type, MIRVed or not.

"B. The proposal did not exclude or include fractionation or definition issues. Definition, which he described as when modernization makes an existing type a new missile, should be handled by delegations. He said they agree that a fractionation limit was a sound principle and should be included, but was linked to a solution of the major issues, i.e., their acceptance of our position on freedom to choose a MIRVed or single RV ICBM in return for our acceptance of their position on cruise missile fractionation, timing of reductions and Backfire. Limits on numbers of SLBM RVs was similarly a side question that could be discussed by delegations.

"C. The Soviet proposal for handling exceptions (one ICBM, no limit on SLBMs) was linked only to U.S. acceptance of Soviet positions on the three items specifically identified—Backfire, ALCM limits per aircraft, and timing of reductions. There is, as he put it, 'no et cetera.' He said the Soviets could not retreat on Backfire—ALCM numbers, but sounded a little more flexible on timing of reductions. On Backfire, however, he repeated that while they 'could not add one comma, they could make it more compact' eliminating some matters, if that was what we wanted.

"D. The aggregates referred to are the 2400, 2250, 1320, 1200, 820. On what he called the 'secondary issues' i.e., those not listed, he seemed to want to suggest that the Soviets could be flexible, saying that the other matters were open for discussion by the delegations and all they had said was that they should be settled 'on the basis' of their proposals.

"2. In side conversation, Dobrynin said that 'because of China' there could never be limits on air defenses, and suggested Soviets had come to Geneva with their proposal and had not considered our new proposal in great detail." (Ibid.)

The memoranda of conversations of the meetings reported in the telegrams above are *ibid.* The telegrams are scheduled to be printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union.*

**209. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 3, 1978.

## SUBJECT

SALT: Protecting our MAP Option

The Soviet Union, through the Acting Foreign Minister, has explicitly and unequivocally rejected our position that the present JDT language, by permitting “mobile ICBM launchers,” permits a multiple aim point (MAP) system with hardened shelters. Clearly we cannot accept the Soviet interpretation or consider ourselves bound by it. This memo addresses the importance of preserving the MAP option, and our course in response to the Soviet position.

I want to begin by emphasizing the difference in my view between whether SALT should preserve our legal *right* to deploy MAP and whether we are now ready to decide we want to build the system. I believe it is important that we preserve the *right*, but I also believe we are not ready to decide the program issue—and should not do so until we have answers to some important remaining questions about the concept’s effectiveness, our ability to count Soviet launchers in a similar system, costs and security.

1. *A major US defense interest is at stake.* The unchallenged technical judgment is that by 1986 when SALT II expires, the US fixed ICBM force will be subject to virtual elimination by a Soviet attack. The US response to this challenge is among the most fundamental defense policy decisions you will face. There are important reasons to seek to preserve a survivable land-based element in our strategic nuclear force if it is feasible to do so at an acceptable cost. The Defense Department is still considering technical issues, and I am not yet in a position to make a definite recommendation. It is important to avoid a premature decision. However, many experts, both military and civilian, who have considered possible US responses have converged on the proposition that a system using multiple hardened shelters among which the launchers and missiles are moved is the most promising of the various alternatives. Some of them say it is the only feasible one. I am not convinced of that, and have directed the examination of other alternatives.

2. *If militarily and technically feasible, construction of a MAP mobile ICBM system would be consistent with sound arms control policies.* Most

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 97, SCC 100, 8/10/78, SALT Negotiating Options and Issues. Top Secret.

fundamentally, restoration of a situation of survivable land-based forces would contribute very greatly to strategic stability, which is the basic objective of our arms control efforts.

The principal specific objection to MAP on arms control grounds is verification, and especially the problem of whether the US could count Soviet launchers with sufficient accuracy if the Soviets adopted a MAP system. Undoubtedly there will be greater uncertainties about counting the launchers in a MAP (or other mobile) system than there are where only silos are used and we assume no Soviet efforts to hide silos. Our ability to count the Soviet launchers in the face of efforts to conceal, including a Soviet MAP system, is one of the issues still being examined. However, from the arms control point of view, the basic conclusion is clear: if the MAP system is to be *militarily* effective, our intelligence must be able to measure the size of the Soviet RV force with sufficient confidence to establish the necessary size of the US MAP system, i.e., to tell how many Soviet RVs the US system must be able to absorb. [9 lines not declassified] Clearly, we cannot ever be 100% sure of an answer to the question of precise numbers that depends on such methods. The issue is whether we *can* by these means count Soviet forces within margins of error sufficient for us to have confidence that the Soviets could not by clandestine deployment of additional RVs, in a MAP system or otherwise, defeat the survivability of a MAP system.

The arms control significance of this is, of course, that if we have that *military* confidence in our intelligence, we also would have confidence in the adequacy of verification for arms control purposes. For in this context as in others we do not require absolute certainty of verification but rather that no undetected cheating could alter the strategic balance or produce a significant unanticipated threat to the US.

It is also possible that we could establish practices by agreement that would contribute to confidence in our counts, but if the system is to be *militarily* effective, we cannot rely solely on them. Therefore, the likelihood of Soviet refusal to agree to complex (or perhaps even simple) cooperative measures is not decisive as to the compatibility of MAP with arms control—providing that our count of Soviet launchers is judged adequate in the absence of such measures.

3. *A MAP system is compatible with our policies for SALT II and the terms agreed upon:*

—Most important, we are considering a MAP system seriously only because the Soviets have throughout SALT II refused to agree to limits on their forces which we proposed that would have reduced to more tolerable levels their threat to our ICBM silos. Indeed, they have even refused to accept in principle that the threat is a problem—and it isn't to them, because the US ICBM force projected through the mid-1980's cannot threaten the Soviet silo force.

—The Soviets agreed last fall that mobile ICBM launchers would be permitted after the Protocol expires. At the time the Soviets agreed, the US was considering only hardened mobile systems, including the vertical shelters now favored as well as the trench then most prominently discussed. Both in logic and law a system is no less mobile because the launchers move, as the MAP system launchers would, among hardened shelters rather than, as the Soviet SS–16 would, among concealed prepared surface positions. All the verification problems of the hardened shelter system are also present with the soft surface systems.

—The fact that the launchers would be concealed while deployed in the field cannot be regarded as a violation of the ban on deliberate concealment unless other actions with similar effects that both sides engage in are also violations—submerging submarines being the most straightforward case. The SALT obligation is to refrain from concealment that impedes verification of the agreement's terms by national technical means. Provided that other aspects of the production, deployment and support of a system can be monitored sufficiently to count the numbers limited, concealment of operational deployment location is not barred.

—The fact that the shelters could, with the insertion of substantial additional equipment, be made capable of launching a missile does not make them additional fixed launchers whose construction is banned. The US has accepted the Soviet position that their III–X silos (presumably launch control complexes) are not launchers, precisely on the ground that, although they have all the hardening of launchers and could be converted to launchers by insertion of the appropriate equipment, we are satisfied that they do not now have the necessary equipment to serve as launchers. The Soviets are seeking to impose on us a rule they have explicitly rejected for themselves.

4. *A basic test of the acceptability of a SALT agreement in the US will be whether it is consistent with US development and deployment of a MAP system.* Whether a MAP system of one kind or another eventually is judged to be feasible on technical and military grounds, and to make a sufficient contribution to our national security to be worth its costs will be an important issue; it is one on which I have made no recommendation and on which you need not make a judgment now. Quite a different issue is whether it would be acceptable to the Administration, the Congress and the public, to have that judgment driven by SALT limitations. The defense technical community and the JCS views on this latter matter are strong ones. All other considerations aside, I am still of the view that no SALT agreement is likely to be ratifiable unless the Administration is able to demonstrate that under it, the US has the right to test, develop and deploy a MAP system, making the necessary judg-

ments as to technical, military, and cost issues essentially unconstrained by SALT.

That brings us to the issue of what to do in order to be able to make that demonstration. The Soviet position is a basic challenge to the SALT process and at best represents, in my view, an effort to gain bargaining leverage by repudiating past Soviet agreement on the mobile ICBM issue.

Ideally, it would be best both in substance and from the point of view of ratification, if the Soviets were to withdraw their rejection of our interpretation and agree in a suitable form that our interpretation is correct. This course, however, may not be necessary: Unilateral US action backing up reassertion of our interpretation can, if consistently adhered to, be an adequate substitute for Soviet agreement.

By such an announcement we would in effect say to the Soviets, "You are asking for the US to agree to an added restriction not now in the agreement text (no hardened shelters for mobile ICM launchers) and we do not agree to any such restriction. You can join us in working out the other issues and sign an agreement or not as you like, but we will not negotiate the MAP issue or treat the agreement as imposing any limits on our choice of whether to pursue the option of a MAP system."

In light of the controversy over unilateral statements in SALT I, we must expect some criticism of this approach; some will press us to obtain explicit Soviet agreement. There is, however, a crucial difference between unilateral US declaration of what we will do ourselves and unilateral efforts to impose restrictions on the actions of the USSR.

The necessary elements of such a course are:

—An explicit, prompt and firm public declaration that the US interprets the Joint Draft Text as allowing the deployment of a MAP system, and an announcement that we will decide on our response to the challenge to the survivability of our Minuteman force on that basis: i.e., that we will consider technical, military (including intelligence), strategic (including effects on the arms competition), and economic factors as we would have done had there been no SALT agreement. While such a statement will not in itself commit us to build a MAP system—and I would strongly urge against any such commitment at this time—we must recognize that the credibility of this approach with the Soviets and with the Congress and public will be measured in large part by our subsequent program decisions. In the face of the Soviet position, many critics will assert that any later decision *against* MAP is "really" dictated by SALT considerations—which they asserted about B-1 with no more justification.

—It is important that any such announcement be cast affirmatively. An essential feature of such a declaration is the assertion that we

are satisfied that a MAP system such as we are considering is permitted under SALT. It may be true that we will not choose to deploy the system if we decide it can't be verified by NTM. But that would be a judgment made for military reasons—if, because of a Soviet MAP, we wouldn't know how many Soviet RVs a US MAP system faced, we would not be able to size our system. But to make an announcement now in terms of not deploying a non-verifiable system would undoubtedly be interpreted by many as making our MAP decision governed by potential SALT limitations—the very burden we should avoid putting on SALT.

—Even if we do not seek explicit Soviet withdrawal of their rejection of our interpretation, and adopt the declaratory approach that I believe may be equally effective, we must, I think, also repeat our interpretation consistently in the negotiation. We cannot afford to leave the negotiating record with the Soviets having had the last word, without a US response. Public statements, however prominent, are not themselves part of the negotiating record. (We, for example, do not so regard *Pravda* editorials, despite their obvious authoritative character.) For reasons both of avoiding pressures for premature program commitments and for preserving our ability to secure ratification, I believe we must make our position clear directly to the Soviets in the context of the negotiations as well as in public statements—and we may very well need to repeat that interpretation at the point of final agreement on other issues.

**Harold Brown**

210. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 2, 1978, 9–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Paul Warnke, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
 General David C. Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence  
 Reginald Bartholomew, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

At the President's request, Dr. Brzezinski began the meeting by reviewing the attached comprehensive package proposal and its relationship to the proposal Gromyko had advanced in Geneva in July.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Brzezinski: If the Soviets seek a lower SLBM RV limit, say ten, we can turn this to our bargaining advantage.

Secretary Brown: It may be simpler to have an RV limit at ten for both ICBMs and SLBMs.

The President: How would ten RVs on SLBMs hurt us?

Secretary Brown: It would not. It is simply that our current plans call for 14 RVs on SLBMs. But we have room to bargain on this.

The President: What is the difference in new types definition?

Secretary Brown: Our definition gives us an extra handle on RV fractionation.

The President: I think the Soviets will strongly object to no limits on numbers of ALCMs to 1985. I see that we are finessing it.

Dr. Brzezinski: Yes, we are using the same sort of approach that they are with Backfire.

General Jones: We have some problems and concerns with the fall-back on ICCMs—i.e., no limits. It is to our advantage to have a number somewhere in the agreement greater than 2500 km. A ban on ICCMs at 5500 km means that 2500 km is not necessarily the upper limit for ALCMs.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 2, NSC Meeting #13, 9/2/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

<sup>2</sup> The comprehensive package proposal was attached; the approved version is Document 212. Regarding Gromyko's proposal, see Document 208.



Admiral Turner: Is it in our interest to ban ICCMs?

Secretary Brown: It may not be in the long run.

Mr. Warnke: I think the Soviets would accept a ban on ICCMs without a specific range number.

Dr. Brzezinski: We are all agreed that we should pursue depressed trajectory but that it is not worth that much and that we should not pay anything for it.

Admiral Turner: Our intelligence estimate of the order of Soviet objections to the comprehensive package is 2, 5, 6 and 7 (fractionation, number of ALCMs per heavy bomber, cruise missile range, and cruise missile definition).

The President: Do we all agree that number of ALCMs is what concerns the Soviets most?

Admiral Turner: Yes, but I believe they are equally concerned with fractionation.

Secretary Brown: I think they are using this for bargaining purposes because they can't get to the proposed fractionation limits during the period of the agreement.

The President: Let's go to the last two issues—dismantling and duration of the Protocol, and Backfire. Paul, why don't you begin.

Mr. Warnke: My trip will be a waste of time unless we come up with something on the three elements that Gromyko raised in Geneva: number of ALCMs, dismantling and Protocol, duration, and Backfire.

Secretary Vance: I agree.

Mr. Warnke: Our proposal on number of ALCMs is not really responsive to the Soviets, but it is the best we can do. The question is what we can do on the other two elements. The most important thing for us is to tie dismantling and Protocol duration together and to have them coterminous. What we are proposing to the Soviets is minimally responsive, but a good position.

The President: I have no objection. I do not see this is an issue.

Secretary Brown: I am concerned about the tactics of the issue. I agree that the dates should be coterminous and that this is the key. But should we offer anything on dates before the Soviets accept that the dates will be coterminous? The Soviets could pocket our new date on dismantling and hold to their position on the Protocol. It might be better to tell the Soviets that if they agree that the Protocol will expire in 1981 and that dismantling will be completed on the same date, then we will be prepared to propose a later date than our current position.

Mr. Warnke (and others): But this would imply that we may accept their December 1981 date.

Mr. Warnke: The way I would put it to the Soviets is to tell them that it is essential to have dismantling and the Protocol end on the same

date and that if they will agree to have the Protocol terminate on June 30, 1981, then we are prepared to agree to have dismantling completed on the same date.

The President: I think that is acceptable. What about Backfire?

Secretary Brown: David Jones has something to say on this that I think would be useful to hear at this point.

General Jones: The Backfire issue is more than one of tactics. We are now at a crossroads in SALT. I would like to give an overview of the situation which reflects a JCS consensus. Looking at the strategic balance and the overall military balance, there has been a dramatic shift from superiority to a balance that is moving against us. This is the direction of the trends. The Soviets may think that they can get some strategic advantage which would be useable in the early days of a crisis or conflict. I am not speaking of a spasm war in which the differences between the strategic forces are minimal. I am talking about the Soviets' war-fighting doctrine and plans as described, for example, in NIE 11–4.<sup>3</sup> We are heading into a situation in which any dramatic event in strategic forces could change the world's perception of the balance. I would say this is the bottom line: we are a little better off in the balance today than is generally believed but will be substantially worse off in the future than is generally believed if the trends continue.

SALT will provide few restraints on either side. The US will be more restrained in a practical sense. Soviet programs are already underway. We have yet to start up our programs and it is always harder politically and financially to start programs. The throw weight imbalance will continue in SALT. We see increasing accuracy for the SS–17, 18 and 19. The Soviet new types definition will permit their ICBM programs and developments to go forward, and they will have a new types exemption as well. Then there is Typhoon and Backfire. There are some real limits. The 820 is one of them, but the reductions provided in the limits are really more conversions. For example, the SS–11 peripheral attack mission is being replaced by the SS–20.

This is probably too bleak a description of SALT, but it is as accurate as statements that oversell SALT. The most important thing in SALT II is to get a cap on strategic forces. Maybe in SALT III we can get real reductions. Now Backfire is not important in a spasm war. But if there are substantial reductions in SALT III and Backfire numbers grow, then we have a real problem. Backfire will replace 80% of the Bisons as well as replace the Badgers and Blinders. There is no controversy about the intercontinental capability of Backfire, though the

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<sup>3</sup> NIE 4–11–77, "Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Area," is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. IV, National Security Policy.

range is an issue. A recent study shows the Backfire has the same range as the B-52D using the same flight profile and payload. In military to military contacts between the US and the Soviets we have gotten Backfire range estimates all the way up to 9000 km. It is only when the discussions are in the political to political channel that the range comes down. Brezhnev said Backfire had one-half the range of Bison. He also said the range was calculated including some supersonic flight. But the most recent estimate given to us by Gromyko says it includes no supersonic flight so the Soviets are playing games on Backfire range, and there will be a problem unless this is resolved.

So the question is what to do. We think we should get all the mileage out of Backfire that we can. If we indicate we are prepared to talk about it, to be forthcoming, we will lose the leverage and we need leverage on the content of issues that count for us and run up against Soviet resistance—number of ALCMs and cruise missile range.

The JCS could support the comprehensive package proposal and are trying to be helpful. But we are close to the edge of what is acceptable. I cannot say whether the JCS will accept the SALT agreement if Backfire is not counted. The JCS have not addressed this question and they have not yet seen the whole final package. If we offer something on Backfire now—and we have to recognize that this comprehensive package proposal is unlikely to be the final package—we will be using our last arrow and this will cause great difficulty with some JCS members. If Backfire were held until the really final point, that would make things easier. So we would recommend that Paul say to the Soviets that they have given us a lot of ranges and that this creates difficulties that must be resolved. We would challenge the Soviets and make them worry on Backfire. If the Soviets say our package proposal is unacceptable, we would still have Backfire leverage available. If, on the other hand, the Soviets say the package is reasonable and they are prepared to accept it if we relent on Backfire, then we are in a good position. We will be better off either way with the JCS because we will have gotten a lot from Backfire. I also think that the Soviets have already discounted the Backfire so the absence of anything on it in our package will not make them less receptive to the package. Backfire is not just a symbolic problem for the JCS. There is sincere concern that though the Soviets may not plan to use it on intercontinental missions, Backfire gives them a break out capability in the post-1985 context with refueling and the like. The JCS can address any new proposal on Backfire rapidly.

Mr. Warnke: Backfire is an issue of tactics not substance. The issue is how to best use Backfire to get what we want on other things. There is no chance of counting Backfire. It would reopen FBS, create verifica-

tion problems, and mean potential restrictions on us. Just stating this would make the issue more difficult.

The President: I agree with the JCS. To tell the Soviets now that Cy may be forthcoming may get the Soviets to discount Backfire. I see equal and superior advantage in saying that the President and JCS are deeply concerned about Backfire and that it is the most difficult political issue in ratification. We should tell the Soviets that this set of proposals in the comprehensive package is a definitive package, not a contingency package. We recognize that Brezhnev is concerned about the Backfire, too. But if the Soviets settle the outstanding issues on the basis of our package, then the President will personally try to resolve the Backfire issue. I think that if we instead give them an indication that Cy will be forthcoming on Backfire that they may drag their feet on the other issues.

I do not want to write off Backfire. It is the most difficult issue I see with the US public. It is easy to grasp. Here is a regular bomber that is not counted.

These ten points in our package really are our final offer. I am not going to yield on ALCMs and the like. I do not feel strongly on dismantling and destruction. Brezhnev should note that I am deeply concerned about the Backfire issue and will consider it personally on a very sensitive basis with him. I want to reserve our options to be tough on Backfire, but you all understand that we will be forthcoming on Backfire.

Dr. Brzezinski: I am concerned that this may not be the best way to use the leverage that I think we have in this situation. The Soviets want SALT and a Summit. They are worried about the PRC connection. I think we should subtly use their desire for a summit as leverage to get them to accept our positions on the issues, including Backfire. We will not be able to do this if Backfire is left for the summit.

The President: I think what we are saying to the Soviets is that unless we can resolve the outstanding issues on the basis of our package then Backfire will be left to Brezhnev and the President. If they say the issue can be resolved on this basis, then we could tell them that Vance will be ready to trade on Backfire. If they accept our entire package in its totality, then the JCS could support the agreement including the treatment of Backfire.

Dr. Brzezinski: We should not tell the Soviets that Backfire will be left for the summit. We could lose the leverage on Backfire on the Soviets' desire for a summit. They would think that they could do nothing on Backfire, resolve the other issues, and then say let's go to a summit with Backfire still open and put the burden on us.

The President: Then I think we disagree. The only difference is whether we use the Vance-Gromyko level as the point to resolve Back-

fire or tell them now that it would be resolved in the Brezhnev-Carter level if they are ready to deal. We should not equivocate on our package in the meetings with Gromyko if there are substantial differences with the Soviets.

Mr. Warnke: I should underscore with the Soviets the importance of the Backfire issue by referring to the President without saying that Backfire will be settled at the summit.

The President: You should not say that Vance will be forthcoming. It should be a more serious tone, that I am personally concerned about it, and making clear that it is still a serious issue.

Secretary Vance: We should tell them that this comprehensive package meets their needs; the President believes that Backfire is critically important because of its political sensitivity; and that it must be resolved before the summit itself to insure the success of the summit and SALT ratification.

Secretary Brown: I think that as a general point we should take the stand that it will be the final, closing issue wherever it is dealt with.

Dr. Brzezinski: But what if the Soviets essentially accept our package and then propose to move to a summit with Backfire still unresolved.

Secretary Brown: But this means we would have what we want.

The President: The Backfire is politically almost as important as all the rest of the issues put together. Nothing equals it for Congress and the public. Other issues are more important militarily and strategically. But the whole tone of how we enter SALT III and the progress we make will be shaped by Backfire.

Dr. Brzezinski: And cruise missile definition.

The President: Yes. Escalating Backfire to its proper level of importance with the Soviets is the essence.

Dr. Brzezinski: So Paul will lay out the ten points in our package; note that Backfire is of critical importance to the President; that the Soviets have given us all kinds of ranges and that the Backfire issue is difficult for the President militarily, strategically and politically; that we will try to be accommodating provided the Soviets are accommodating on our package which is fair on its own; and the President will do his best to resolve the Backfire issue in the context of a settlement of the other issues on the basis of this package.

Secretary Brown: We should say that Backfire can only be resolved in the context of complete agreement on the other issues based on the proposals in our package.

The President: The essence is to reescalate the Backfire issue. Paul should say he met with me and this is what I told him.

Dr. Brzezinski: So Paul will say: (1) this package is fair and balanced and meets your concerns; (2) he will stress the central critical importance of Backfire and the President's direct and personal concern, and will raise the range problem; (3) and he will say that the Backfire issue can be resolved only if all other issues are resolved on the basis of our comprehensive proposal.

General Jones: I think he should add a last point repeating the seriousness of the Backfire issue.

Admiral Turner: Before the meeting ends, I want to address an item [*less than 1 line not declassified*] We noted that the Soviets are re-opening work on the SS-19, which would put them 30 over the 820. We thought that they would reduce 30 SS-17s and noted that work on the SS-17s had slowed down. But just yesterday we learned that work is now back to normal pace on the SS-17. Though it is too early to say, this could relate to the single RV; or it may be a signal to put pressure on you on SALT.

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

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**211. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Instructions to the US SALT Delegation

Based on the September 1, 1978, meeting of the Special Coordination Committee and the September 2, 1978, meeting of the National Security Council,<sup>2</sup> the President has approved the following instructions for the US SALT Delegation:

*Depressed Trajectory Ban.* Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that we would like to include in the agreement a ban on the flight

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 7/11/78–9/8/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the SCC meeting is *ibid.* For the NSC meeting, see Document 210.

testing of SLBMs in depressed trajectories. The following definition for a depressed trajectory should be proposed:

A depressed trajectory is one for which the time of flight of a missile outside the atmosphere, i.e., the time its altitude is greater than 100,000 meters, is less than 80 percent of the time of flight of a missile on a minimum energy trajectory from the same launch point to the same impact point.

*Dismantling/Destruction Procedures for Bombers.* Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that we would be prepared to discuss in the Standing Consultative Commission any proposals which the Soviet Union might have on the issue of dismantling, destruction, and conversion procedures for bombers.

*Telemetry Encryption.* In light of the RV telemetry encryption on the July 29 SS-18 test, Delegation should again raise the telemetry encryption issue with the Soviets following the approach taken in the attached talking points.<sup>3</sup>

*Cruise Missile Range Allowance.* Delegation should indicate to Soviets that, as supplement to MSOR definition of cruise missile range, US can accept following odometer range allowances for all cruise missiles (including land-attack and antiship):

- 120 percent allowance for 600 km range limitations;
- 40 percent allowance for 2500 km range limitations; and
- 20 percent allowance for 5500 km range limitations.

Delegation is authorized to indicate that US could modify above proposal to include fuel reserves, in which case range allowances noted above would, however, have to be increased somewhat. If Soviets agree in principle to this approach, Washington will provide guidance on allowances. Delegation may table appropriate language for implementing odometer allowance only approach but should consult with Washington prior to tabling language for approach that includes fuel reserves.

*Cruise Missile Definition.* Delegation is authorized to propose, as a supplement to US position on cruise missile definition, the following rule: cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft shall have externally observable design features which distinguish them from air-launched cruise missiles not capable of such ranges. To the extent that the provisions of subparagraph 3c of Article II and Article VIII of the Treaty apply after the period of the Protocol only to air-launched cruise missiles that are nuclear-weapon-delivery vehicles, as will be the case in the absence of

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

further agreement, then air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km which are conventional-weapon-delivery vehicles would have to have externally observable design features to distinguish them from air-launched cruise missiles which are nuclear-weapon-delivery vehicles.

With the exception of the instruction on Dismantling/Destruction Procedures for Bombers, these instructions should not be implemented until after Ambassador Warnke's trip to Moscow.

Zbigniew Brzezinski<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears Brzezinski's typed signature.

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**212. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 4, 1978.

SUBJECT

U.S. SALT Positions

Based on the September 2 meeting of the National Security Council,<sup>2</sup> the President has approved the following comprehensive package to be outlined by Ambassador Warnke to Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow, looking to the meetings with Gromyko to take place in the United States later this month.

*Comprehensive Package*

1. Exemptions

—ICBMs	Test and deploy one new type
—SLBMs	No limits

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 11, Harold Brown–Private File–SALT 1978. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Brzezinski initialed at the bottom of each page.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 210.



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|--|---|
| 2. Fractionation                                 |   |
| —ICBMs   | Fractionation freeze on current types and limit of 10 on new types  |
| —SLBMs   | Fractionation limit of 14 RVs/SLBM  |
| 3. Definition                                    | US-proposed definition  |
| 4. Size of ICBM                                  | Light exemption; ban heavy mobile missiles  |
| Exemption/Heavy Mobile Missiles                  |   |
| 5. Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber              | No limits; statement on capabilities for Protocol period, SALT THREE, etc.  |
| 6. Cruise Missile Definition                     | Current US position + ALCM airframe type rule   |
| 7. Cruise Missile Range Definition               | Odometer allowance + authority to include fuel reserve allowance  |
| 8. Intercontinental Cruise Missile               | Ban on ICCMs through 1985   |
| 9. Multiple Warhead Cruise Missile               | No limits; statement on capabilities for Protocol period, SALT THREE, etc., regarding ALCMs only  |
| 10. Depressed Trajectories                       | Ban testing SLBMs on depressed trajectories   |
| 11. Dismantling to 2250/<br>Duration of Protocol | If Soviets will accept June 30, 1981, expiration of Protocol, we are prepared to accept June 30, 1981, as date for completion of dismantling. |

Having presented our comprehensive package to Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Warnke should make the following points on Backfire:

1. The comprehensive package we are advancing is fair and balanced and responsive to your concerns.

2. The President has directed me personally to stress strongly to you the importance of the Backfire issue to a stable and mutually fair SALT agreement. This is a centrally important strategic as well as political issue in which the President has a direct and personal interest and which also could affect materially the prospects for ratification of a SALT agreement. I also must note to you that the Backfire flight profile that you have provided us does not stand up to any rational analysis and is inconsistent with earlier Soviet statements on Backfire range.

3. The Backfire issue can be resolved only if all other outstanding SALT issues are resolved on the basis of the comprehensive package which we have presented.

The approved statement on number of ALCMs per heavy bomber and on multiple warhead cruise missiles is attached.<sup>3</sup>

The specifics on other issues in the comprehensive package are as contained in the instruction to the U.S. SALT Delegation concerning follow-on implementation, which is being separately issued.<sup>4</sup>

The President has also approved the following alternative positions on issues in the comprehensive package for possible presentation subsequent to the Warnke-Gromyko meeting, depending on developments: SLBM fractionation—no limits or 10 RVs; ICBM new types definition—the Soviet-proposed definition; ICCMs—no limits.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Document 211.

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**213. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 11, 1978.

**SUBJECT**

Moscow SALT Discussions

As indicated by our reporting cables,<sup>2</sup> the Soviet response to our SALT package, while reiterating established Soviet positions, was not discouraging. Of possible significance is the fact that neither Foreign Minister Gromyko nor, in later private conversations, First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, objected to our suggested statement on lack

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harold Brown Papers, Box 11, Harold Brown–Private File–SALT, 1978. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski.

<sup>2</sup> Warnke met with Soviet officials September 7–8. Telegram 21551 from Moscow, September 8, contains a report of Warnke's meeting that day with Gromyko. Vance commented on Warnke's second meeting with Gromyko in telegram Secto 11007 from USUN, September 8. Both are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 7/11/78–9/8/78.

of capability to deploy more than twenty long-range cruise missiles per heavy bomber for the period of the Protocol, with later decisions to be dependent upon Soviet force structure developments, including air defense.

While Gromyko stressed that we should not consider that their acceptance of our new types proposals is “in our pocket,” he also stressed that they are willing to negotiate on all of the other remaining issues and are not putting their proposals on a “take it or leave it” basis.

It is also worth noting that in neither the formal sessions nor the private talks did any of the Soviet officials refer to MAP or to our position on non-circumvention.

On Protocol duration, Gromyko perhaps was signalling that the Soviets could accept three years from date of signature, or even our June 30, 1981 date, once signature is imminent. He clearly is concerned that setting an expiration date now may let us drag our feet on completing the negotiations.

When Ambassador Toon and I met alone with Gromyko, the discussion related exclusively to the Mid-East, apart from my handing him your letter to Chairman Brezhnev.<sup>3</sup> We were told on Wednesday evening that Brezhnev was not in Moscow, but was “a long way away” and that I should give the letter to Gromyko. We were told that he would return on Monday, September 11, but he returned on Saturday, September 9 to meet with Senator Kennedy.

Other comments of some interest came out of my private discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko about our SALT package. I clarified with him that our proposals on restrictions on modernization and modification of existing ICBMs would not apply to the exempted ICBMs. The only constraint we are proposing on an exempted ICBM is that it should be light and be tested and deployed with no more than ten reentry vehicles. On new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the only constraint would be a limit of fourteen reentry vehicles. If there is no limit on the number of new types of SLBMs, then obviously any existing SLBMs could be modified in any respect and could be fitted out with fourteen reentry vehicles.

In response to Korniyenko’s questions, I explained that the freeze on fractionation of existing ICBMs would be by type and that accordingly, only SS–18s could have ten reentry vehicles, with SS–19s limited to six, and SS–17s limited to four.

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<sup>3</sup> In this letter, September 2, Carter suggested renewing their direct exchange of correspondence and stated that “the proposals which Ambassador Warnke bears reflect our serious effort to work out mutually-acceptable solutions to the handful of problems that stand in the way of a final agreement.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Outside the System, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence, 1–12/78) The letter is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

With regard to Backfire, he inquired whether my presentation represented a hardening of our position. I replied only that this was a matter of considerable personal concern to you and that you would endeavor to resolve it. He repeated Gromyko's contention that all Soviet statements on Backfire range had been consistent and asked where we saw any inconsistencies. I pointed out that the earlier Brezhnev letter,<sup>4</sup> although it contained the same figure on range as presented to you by Gromyko in May, did so in the context of a profile including some supersonic flight, whereas the profile presented by Gromyko purported to be for a completely subsonic mission. Korniyenko said he would look into this but that in any event the Backfire was not a strategic bomber.

The overall tone of the meetings and discussions was pleasant and non-polemic. Korniyenko, whom I believe to be particularly informed on, and particularly important to, SALT, was less dour and acerbic than usual. Within the limitations of his resources, he could almost have been called affable. Gromyko, although he did not read your letter to Brezhnev while Ambassador Toon and I were there, expressed his appreciation of it and extended his best regards to you and Secretary Vance.

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<sup>4</sup> Document 153.

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## **214. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1978.

1. During our conversation on Thursday<sup>2</sup> you asked me to put in writing the views I expressed on ways to improve the impact and chances for ratification of a SALT II Agreement. My basic feeling is that initialing of the SALT Agreement would provide you a wonderful opportunity to put it into context by announcing (either there or on its submission to Congress) your concept of what kinds of strategic forces

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 8–9/78. Secret. At the top of the first page, Carter wrote, "Zbig—Work on these ideas. J."

<sup>2</sup> Carter and Turner met from 1:15 to 1:40 p.m. on September 21. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this conversation has been found.

are going to be needed for the security of our country in the decade ahead. On the one hand you would enumerate the ways in which the SALT Agreement limited our options for strategic forces; on the other hand you would describe how the forces we need can be built within the limitations of the SALT Agreement.<sup>3</sup> This accent on a positive program to protect the country through SALT and deterrent forces could, I believe, offset some of the potential criticisms of the inhibiting features of SALT and disarm some of the critics.

2. The basic issue which must be addressed is the ways in which you plan to offset the increasing vulnerability of our fixed ICBM force.<sup>4</sup> I made my recent prognosis to you that the day of vulnerability was going to be two to three years earlier than we had previously anticipated only after considerable analysis of the evidence. I do believe it is likely to be the case. I personally do not believe that this means that the Soviets would be likely to be tempted to launch a strategic attack against us. Thus in theory we could maintain the present program for strategic forces and take the position that these combined with the SALT Agreement will leave us in an adequate posture.

3. But I do believe that the perception of superiority that will give to the Soviets, and perhaps to our allies and others, is unacceptable to us. Therefore, I think that this is the key issue which must be addressed. There are two basic options for doing it:

(1) Undertaking new programs which would enhance the survivability of fixed or semi-fixed ICBMs, e.g., multiple aim point program, hardening of existing silos, an ABM program, ICBMs on submerged barges.

(2) Letting the fixed ICBM force atrophy because of its increasing vulnerability and move on instead to alternatives such as the cruise missile technology or larger sea-borne missile forces. The cruise missile option would mean developing some mix of intercontinental cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, surface ship-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles from forward bases.<sup>5</sup>

4. My suggestion would be that your announcement which would accompany the SALT Agreement would only establish which of these basic options you were going to pursue. The exact mix of forces to be constructed would be something that you would have the Secretary of Defense study over a period of months, but you would direct that added monies be spent immediately on developmental work for your option.

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<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined much of this sentence and the preceding one and wrote in the margin, "I agree."

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined the last part of this sentence beginning with "plan."

<sup>5</sup> Carter made a checkmark in the margin next to each of these points.

5. I would additionally suggest that such an announcement would enhance the confidence of our European allies that the United States does have a consistent and adequate defense program. Although we do have a consistent and adequate defense program, I sense that this is not generally accepted in Europe as being the case today.

Stansfield Turner<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Turner signed "Stan" above this typed signature.

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## 215. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Vance met in New York to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during Gromyko's annual trip to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Their initial meeting took place on September 27, 1978 at the Soviet Mission in New York. At the meeting both men reaffirmed their commitment to approve and sign SALT II. The September 27 plenary session focused on Gromyko's presentation of the Soviet SALT views. He asked Vance if the United States would agree to all outstanding issues on the basis of the proposals made by the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union agreed to the U.S.-proposed limit of the duration of the treaty and agreed that each side had the right to test and deploy one new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during the length of the treaty. He also reaffirmed the Soviet proposal of a 20 long-range cruise missile limit per bomber for the duration of the treaty. Gromyko reiterated that the Soviets were apprehensive about what it considered new and unrelated proposals by the United States, which were put forth at each meeting. Gromyko thought this was not the way to reach an agreement. (Department of State, Marshall Shulman Files, Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot File 81D109, Vance/Gromyko meeting, 9/78)

On September 28, the two men met at the U.S. Mission in the morning to continue their talks. Vance began by responding to Gromyko's statement of the previous day and reiterating the U.S. proposal. With regard to the new types of ICBMs, the two sides were in agreement on one new missile. However, Vance reiterated that differences remained between the two sides regarding a dismantling protocol and specifically the timing of the reduction of each side to the agreed 2,250 limit on delivery vehicles. He also noted that the definitions of cruise

missiles and cruise missile range were still being negotiated. Gromyko followed up by restating the Soviet proposal and agreed that a date for dismantling and destruction still remained undetermined. The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of the Middle East. (Ibid.)

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**216. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1978.

SUBJECT

SALT Position

This memorandum comments on the proposals being made by Cy to resolve remaining SALT issues in preparation for your participation in the SCC meeting this afternoon.

1. *Limits on ALCM Carriers*

The Soviets are making a demand for which they are offering nothing in return,<sup>2</sup> though tactically they have linked it to their agreement on new types. It is difficult to see how we can defend accepting any specific numerical limits on cruise missile carrier aircraft when we dropped our demands on heavy missiles, when we have conceded any effective controls on their Backfire aircraft and when air launched cruise missile carriers are already limited by being counted in the 1320 aggregate.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is my view that we should stand firm on the ALCM carrier question. Only if Gromyko hears it from you will he believe that we are really firm on this issue.

—At a minimum, the Soviet proposal would have a presumptive effect on our post-1985 program, and it could limit the options before that—if in fact such options exist (and you might ask Harold about that).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 9/29/78–10/22/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined “they are offering nothing in return.”

<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined “we dropped our demands on heavy missiles,” “we have conceded any effective controls on their Backfire aircraft,” and “cruise missile carriers are already limited by being counted in the 1320 aggregate.”

—We have argued that we cannot limit numbers of cruise missiles on aircraft nor MIRV warheads on cruise missiles because Soviet air defenses are unlimited. This is a logical way of distinguishing our position on cruise missiles from our position on ballistic missile warheads which we do wish to limit—the reason being that ABM is limited; air defense is not.<sup>4</sup>

—Harold has expressed concern that even within SALT limits the Soviets might be able to overtake our lead in number of warheads, thus rough equivalence where our warhead superiority balances their throw-weight superiority would be overturned. Harold's hedge against this possibility is the cruise missile and in particular the cruise missile carrier.

—A negotiating record shows that the Soviets raised this issue late, only 5 months ago.<sup>5</sup> They clearly understand that the limits they propose have no practical meaning. Their principal objective is to set up a precedent.

Gromyko's proposal to count some cruise missile carriers as two or three is outrageous, violating the basic principle of the agreement that all platforms count as one. It is a bald regression to their initial position that bombers as ALCMs should count as more than one in the 1320 aggregate. Your best response is to simply ask why we should not count heavy missiles as two or three. The concept of an average, in my view, only conveys uncertainty and underscores the fact that we don't know what we want and yet have accepted limits nonetheless.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. *Cruise Missile Range Definition*

The facts are these:

—We accept their willingness to drop any limits above 600 km. It is to our advantage because the Chiefs were worried that 2500 km was insufficient for a standoff missile on heavy bombers.<sup>7</sup> However, you should note that it involves accepting the Soviet position that there be no limits on intercontinental range cruise missiles but, as you know, we had already agreed among ourselves that we could fall back to this.<sup>8</sup> It is my personal view that we will soon see a very large long-range cruise

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<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined "Soviet air defenses are unlimited," and "ABM is limited; air defense is not."

<sup>5</sup> Carter underlined "the Soviets raised this issue late, only 5 months ago."

<sup>6</sup> Carter wrote "Proposal re limit on ICBM, SLBM, etc., RV's—How to make benefit U.S? Freeze?" in the margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> Carter underlined "We accept," "drop any limits above 600 km," and "to our advantage," then wrote "no limit on GLCMs?" in the margin next to this section.

<sup>8</sup> Carter underlined "no limits on intercontinental range cruise missiles" and wrote "ok" in the margin next to it.



missile being tested by the Soviets, if only as a “political-psychological” response to our cruise missile superiority.

—Their 600 km range definition is “to fuel exhaustion.” Our definition measured in similar terms would be to 1320 km (120 percent) margin. Despite this additional allowance, the cruise missile would not be permitted to engage targets at greater than 600 km range as the crow flies.<sup>9</sup>

—Thus, we are arguing about cruise missiles that would have a range some place between 600 and 1320 km fuel-exhaustion range. We do not intend to either test or deploy missiles with such capabilities during the period of the Protocol. Nor do we intend to deploy ALCM’s in the 600–1320 km fuel-exhaustion range before 1985,<sup>10</sup> though we may have an interest in testing conventionally armed versions of them. GLCM’s and SLCM’s, of course, are not limited after the Protocol.

—Our Allies are extremely neuralgic about our cruise missile limits.<sup>11</sup> If we proceed to accept the Soviet proposal, they will see immediate implications for SALT III cruise missile limits and will feel that we have once again mortgaged their options.

I would suggest consideration of the following approach to the 600 km range definition based on the concept that we agree to disagree and continue negotiating over the issue of range definition:

—We would inform the Soviets that in accepting the 600 km range limitation on deployment for the period of the Protocol<sup>12</sup> for GLCM’s and SLCM’s and ALCM’s on other than heavy bombers, we could also state that we did not agree with their range definition but would be willing to pledge that we would not deploy any systems at variance with it if they would make a similar commitment in regard to our definition.<sup>13</sup>

—Similarly, with respect to the 600 km ALCM limits beyond the period of the Protocol, we would be prepared to respect their definition in regard to deployment but could only respect our definition in regard to testing.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Carter wrote a question mark next to this paragraph.

<sup>10</sup> Carter underlined the first half of this sentence, and wrote “Use same definition as on Backfire” in the adjacent margin.

<sup>11</sup> Carter underlined “neuralgic” and wrote an exclamation point next to this sentence.

<sup>12</sup> Carter underlined “deployment” and “period of the Protocol” and wrote “none” in the adjacent margin.

<sup>13</sup> Carter underlined “their range,” “deploy,” and “our definition.” He wrote “interesting—doubt SU will accept” in the left-hand margin and wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin.

<sup>14</sup> Carter wrote “Brown?” in the left-hand margin and “’til ’85?” in right-hand margin of this point.

—Our acceptance of this approach would be conditional on Soviet acceptance of our position on the cruise missile definition issue, i.e. that the 600 km limit on ALCM's on aircraft other than heavy bombers would apply only to nuclear-armed ALCMs after the Protocol.

—Negotiations to resolve definitively the cruise missile range definition question would continue and, in any event, would be necessary by virtue of our reciprocal commitment to negotiate the question of GLCM's and SLCM's in SALT III. This would also be consistent with our position that definitive resolution of the cruise missile definition issue should also be deferred to SALT III.

I believe this is a much more satisfactory outcome than adopting the Soviet range definition. The only alternative to this would be to get the Soviets to agree to a reduced allowance (e.g., 60 percent vice 120 percent) for 600 km cruise missiles. However, the Soviets have never been willing thus far to accept the principle of an allowance except for vertical movement of cruise missiles. Moreover, Defense is likely to have serious reservations on a smaller allowance.

### *3. Dismantling to 2250/Protocol Expiration*

The Soviets seem to be tougher on the period for dismantling than the Protocol expiration. They insist that they cannot start their reductions before December 30, 1980 and that they cannot complete them in less than 12 months, i.e. December 30, 1981. In New York, Gromyko also tied this to the agreements entering into force no later than January 1, 1979 or March 31, 1979 at the latest.

The facts are:

—Extending the Protocol beyond our currently proposed June 30, 1981 expiration date to the end of the year would have no impact on our cruise missile programs. However, all issues connected with the Protocol, including its duration, are politically sensitive for the Allies. When we recently consulted them on the six months extension to June 30, 1981, they did not react once they learned it had no programmatic impact.

—There is some advantage to having the Protocol expire and reductions completed at the same time to reduce any chance that the Soviets would try to leverage their reductions in the SALT III negotiations if we were hung up over the Protocol issues.

Cy suggests that we maintain our proposed June 30, 1981 date for Protocol expiration and permit the Soviets twelve months (i.e. to December 30, 1981) to complete dismantling to 2250. I believe that this would be an acceptable compromise *if* the Soviets also accept our proposal on "assured inoperability" for the systems to be dismantled. Under this proposal, specific dismantling steps would be taken within

three months<sup>15</sup> of the initiation of dismantling—destruction of head-works for ICBM's, removal of missile tubes for SSBN's and cutting in half for heavy bombers.

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<sup>15</sup> Carter underlined "assured inoperability" and "within three months."

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## **217. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 29, 1978.

### **SUBJECT**

Your SALT Meeting with Gromyko

Attached at Tab A is a table summarizing the current US and Soviet SALT positions and the agreed recommended changes in the US position as discussed at today's SCC meeting.<sup>2</sup> The issues on which you will have to make a decision are described below. (Issues are numbered as in Tab A.)<sup>3</sup>

*5/9. Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber/Multiple Warhead Cruise Missiles*

*ISSUE:* How do we respond to the Soviet proposal for limits on heavy bombers equipped with more than 20 ALCMs and a ban on multiple warhead cruise missiles?

*Option A.* US statement indicating that we will continue to develop and test cruise missile concepts and various cruise missile carriers, but do not plan to deploy cruise missile carriers with more than 20 ALCMs or to deploy multiple-warhead ALCMs during the period of the agreement dependent on deployment of Soviet air defense and other forces including the total number of Soviet warheads.

*Option B.* Same as Alternative A but delete the conditional part of the statement (dependent on . . . Soviet warheads.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 8–9/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> The table at Tab A was not attached. The summary of the SCC meeting, September 29, is *ibid.*, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 9/29/78–10/22/78.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum also dated September 29, Brzezinski informed the President that the NSC Staff supported option A on the number of ALCM and heavy bombers, option A on cruise missile definitions, and option A on Backfire. (*Ibid.*, Box 53, SALT: 8–9/77)

*Option C.* Count cruise missile carriers equipped with more than 20 ALCMs as “two” in the 1320. Provide statement that US has no plans for multiple warhead ALCM deployment prior to 1985.

(NB: The agreed cruise missile definition is that the cruise missile limits in the Protocol apply to both *nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed* cruise missiles. After the expiration of the Protocol, our position is that the ban on ALCMs over 600 km on non-heavy bombers applies *only to nuclear-armed CMs* unless determined otherwise in future negotiations. The Soviets want the definition to cover nuclear and conventional ALCMs. We have also stated that we reserve the right to propose different limits on nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed GLCMs and SLCMs in future negotiations. Acceptance of the Soviet definition would affect this negotiation position.

*Option A.* Offer to accept the new Soviet proposal on the cruise missile range definition *if* they accept our position on the cruise missile definition issue, making it clear that we have not accepted limitation of any conventionally armed cruise missile after the expiration of the Protocol.

*Option B.* Accept the new Soviet proposal on the cruise missile range definition; be prepared to accept the Soviet position on the cruise missile definition issue.

#### *Agency Positions/Arguments*

*SecDef and CJCS favor Option A.* To make the Soviet range definition acceptable, we must have Soviet agreement to our current position on cruise missile definition. Otherwise the Soviet range definition would impact heavily on ongoing programs for conventionally-armed cruise missiles, including anti-ship Tomahawk, the radar harassment vehicle, and “returnable cruise missiles” to attack airfields, etc. Restrictions on conventional weapons have no place in SALT and would create grave political problems, both here and with our allies.

In addition, to reduce problems with the allies, it must be clear within the USG that the non-circumvention clause would not preclude us from cooperating with our allies on cruise missile tests to beyond 600 km, for deployment after the Protocol. We already have a cooperative program with the FRG for a conventional weapon which could be caught by the Soviet range definition, and preservation of the right to cooperate on cruise missiles for theater nuclear applications is important for the credibility of our argument that we have left NATO options unconstrained.

*State/ACDA favor Option B.* Soviets made major concession to us on no limits on ALCM range (overcomes our air defense problems through 1985 by permitting unlimited stand-off capability and unlimited maneuvers against defense) in return for the 600 km limit on GLCMs and SLCMs. If we now tie this to other issues, we jeopardize

this concession. In any event, we are not hurt by the 600 limit since it is only for the Protocol for GLCMs and SLCMs.

Additionally, State/ACDA believe that instead of tying this issue to Soviet acceptance of our CM definition, we should be prepared to accept the Soviet all-armed definition. Our current position cannot be verified and would allow deployment of “alleged” conventionally-armed, long-range CMs on Backfire. In any event, GLCMs and SLCMs are covered only in the Protocol.

## 12. *Backfire*

*ISSUE:* Should the ban on association with an intercontinental mission be included in our list of Backfire assurances?

There is agreement on including the freeze on the Backfire production rate (2½ per month) and the ban on upgrade in range/payload capability. There is also agreement that we should state to the Soviets (and publicly) that we retain the right to deploy an aircraft comparable to the Backfire.

*Option A.* Include the ban on association with an intercontinental mission.

*Option B.* Do not include the ban on association with an intercontinental mission.

### *Agency Positions/Arguments*

*State/ACDA favor Option A.* Since we could monitor the Soviets’ changing Backfire operations from theater to strategic, this ban would provide some additional constraint on the use of the Backfire. It thus provides a basis for challenging changes in Backfire missions. In these ways, it improves our case with Congress.

*SecDef and CJCS position.* The JCS position remains that Backfire should count in the aggregate.

In the event it is not, the ban on “association” is not crucial. It would provide some basis for challenging Soviet actions, but even without it, conversion of forces not covered by SALT for intercontinental missions would raise compliance and non-circumvention problems. To avoid the appearance of trusting in Soviet assurances that are not verifiable and pose easy breakout opportunities, DOD prefers *Option B*, i.e., to drop the “association” assurance.

The table at Tab A shows where there is *interagency agreement* on other unresolved issues.

—2. *ICBM Fractionation.* Oppose the Gromyko proposal for a 6-RV limit on the exempted ICBM, in particular in light of the existence of a 10-RV variant of the SS-18. Hold to 10 RVs.

—3. *New Types Definition.* This issue can be quickly settled in Geneva, since Gromyko indicated flexibility.

—4. *Size of ICBM Exemption/Heavy Mobile Missiles*. Gromyko did not address our proposed ban on heavy mobile missiles (heavy mobile ICBMs, heavy SLBMs, and heavy ASBMs). It need not be mentioned since initial Soviet reactions in Geneva to this proposal have been positive and it should be easy to resolve.

—8. *Intercontinental Cruise Missiles (ICCMs)*. In agreeing to the Soviet proposal to drop all cruise missile range limits over 600 km, we would also be dropping our proposal to ban ICCMs through 1985. This might be noted for Gromyko in discussing the cruise missile range definition issue.

—10. *Depressed Trajectories*. Our proposed ban on testing SLBMs on depressed trajectories would be desirable, although this will not be a barrier to completion of the agreement.

—11. *Dismantling to 2250/Duration of Protocol*. Accept the Soviet-proposed December 30, 1981 date for completion of dismantling, provided: (1) they accept June 30, 1981 for Protocol termination and (2) those systems to be dismantled to reach 2250 are put in a state of irreversible inoperability by June 30, 1981. With regard to the second point, we have tabled in Geneva criteria for rendering inoperable systems to be dismantled to reach 2250. We are willing to negotiate on them.

—13. *Telemetry Encryption*. We have proposed in Geneva that the sides agree on a Common Understanding to clarify the issue of telemetry encryption. This Common Understanding would obligate the sides not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, which impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. You might reiterate this position to Gromyko and stress its importance.

It would be appropriate to mention to Gromyko that there are a number of other issues that need to be resolved in Geneva, without naming them. (This includes such items as bomber counting rules, database issues, statement of SALT Three principles, ICBM test notification, etc.)

**218. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 30, 1978, 9:33 a.m.–1:18 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Carter-Gromyko Private Meeting

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The President

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

*U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

**SALT**

The President thought it was now time to move on to SALT discussions. He had carefully studied the proposals Gromyko had presented to Secretary Vance,<sup>2</sup> thus there would be no need to repeat them. Perhaps Gromyko had some additional suggestions to present before the President responded.

Gromyko said he did want to present a few considerations. He would not say that they would add something on substance, but would provide additional clarification of how the Soviets assessed the current situation.

Gromyko said his attention had been drawn to recent statements that the President and other officials had made, expressing optimistic views on the prospects of concluding a SALT Agreement. Such statements could only be welcomed. Throughout the SALT negotiations the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/26–9/30/78. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room. This portion of the meeting apparently took place in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum indicates that the meeting lasted from 9:15 until 9:45 p.m., which is in error. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting began in the Oval Office at 9:33 a.m. with a meeting among Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, and Gromyko plus interpreters. Then at 9:44 a.m., the group went to the Cabinet Room and met until 1:18 p.m. During this meeting, the President left at 12:18 p.m. and met with Warnke, Malcolm Toon, and Reginald Bartholomew from 12:19 to 12:24 p.m. At 12:24 p.m., Carter returned to the meeting with Gromyko in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) An unknown hand made several edits to the text of the document. The substantive changes have been accounted for in the footnotes below.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 215.

Soviet Union, for its part, had sought to bring them to a successful conclusion. To that end the Soviets had made their own proposals and had carefully studied US proposals. Their position today remained unchanged—they were in favor of concluding the Agreement as rapidly as possible. They felt that completion of the agreement and its signing at an early date was a feasible and realistic goal, providing, of course, that both sides were prepared to work energetically in that direction and to seek resolution of questions remaining unresolved, and there were such questions, on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

If one analyzed the remaining questions from the standpoint of their true significance, it became clear that not that many truly substantive questions were left. It would seem that by now they should have been resolved. In fact, however, and unfortunately, this had not happened. In effect, today we were still grappling with the same questions we had tried to resolve during his meeting with the President last September.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, in a number of instances, these questions had become more complicated. The US side kept putting forward more and more problems, although as often as not there was no real need to raise them. What was the situation today as far as resolution of outstanding questions was concerned?

—*New Types of ICBMs and SLBMs:*

This issue had first been raised by the US side last year. US representatives and the President personally had repeatedly stressed the particular importance of this issue for the United States. The Soviets had been told that a solution that would be satisfactory to the United States with respect to this issue would to a significant extent facilitate resolution of the other issues. This had been said at this very table. Without going into detail, Gromyko would remind the President that the Soviet side had proposed a number of variants for a fair solution to the question of new types of ballistic missiles. Unfortunately, however, none of these has been accepted. Subsequently, once again carefully weighing the pros and cons, and guided by a desire for earliest possible conclusion of the agreement, the Soviets had taken a difficult political decision. Gromyko wanted to tell the President quite frankly that it had not been arrived at easily. The Soviet Union had taken a truly major step forward by expressing its willingness to accept the US position on new types on condition that the United States consent to resolving the other remaining issues on the basis of Soviet proposals. In this connection, he would emphasize the words “on the basis of”; that did not mean that those proposals could not be adjusted or that not a single

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 183 and 184.



comma could be moved. What had been meant by the words “on the basis of” referred to substance only. It would hardly be possible to question the fairness and validity of an approach under which on the question of new types, as on many other questions, the Soviet Union had made major moves to meet US proposals. In fact, however, the US side had continued to adhere to its previous positions, with the result that the other remaining questions were still unagreed and, he would say frankly, had been complicated even further. This particularly concerned the entire complex of the issues involved in long-range cruise missiles.

—*Long-Range Cruise Missiles:*

Indeed, the two sides had reached a firm understanding on the limitation of these missiles; notably, they had agreed that cruise missiles would be deployed only on bombers. They had also reached agreement on the process by which cruise missiles on bombers would be counted within the appropriate category of strategic vehicles, and on establishing upper and lower limits for the range of cruise missiles—600 and 2,500 km. That agreement was reached and had been confirmed several times. Then, however, the US side started to exert efforts to bring those important understandings to naught. The purpose here was clear—in one way or another to exempt a considerable number of cruise missiles from all limitations and thus obtain the opportunity of having thousands of such missiles. Naturally, the Soviet side had immediately understood what the US side was aiming at. There was no other way to explain these proposals, other than as being aimed at, in effect, doubling agreed ranges of cruise missiles with nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, and possibly MIRVing them. Cruise missiles with non-nuclear warheads were a completely new aspect that had been introduced. Further, it had been attempted to eliminate all numerical limits on the number of long-range cruise missiles that could be carried by a bomber.

In this way the appearance of a SALT Agreement would be created, while a very major component of strategic offensive arms, which quite naturally should be covered by the Agreement, would remain outside of it. What kind of an agreement would that be?

The Soviet side believed that such an attitude toward understandings already achieved was completely unacceptable and could not serve the purpose of bringing the positions of the sides closer together.

Gromyko said that the Soviet side had set out its positions on all aspects of cruise missiles more than once. He would remind the President that the Soviets were in favor of retaining established limits on cruise missile range—600 and 2,500 km—as minimum and maximum distances, to be determined by projecting the missile’s flight path onto

the surface of the earth. At the same time, at the current round of negotiations the Soviet Union had proposed a compromise solution, in accordance with which the lower limit, i.e. 600 km., which divided cruise missiles into two fundamental categories—those limited and those not limited—would be retained with the Soviet definition of range, while the upper limit would be abolished altogether. Roughly this would mean that the Soviet Union accepted one-half of the US proposal, although it continues to believe that the original arrangement was better.

Of paramount importance was the question of limiting the number of cruise missiles on one bomber. This was elementary, and understanding on this must be achieved. The Soviet side had proposed that for the entire duration of the treaty, i.e. through 1985, that number not exceed 20. The President would probably not recall the discussions that had preceded that proposal, because those discussions had been with his predecessor. At the outset the Soviet side had proposed to equate one bomber with 20 cruise missiles with two or even three MIRVed vehicles. Subsequently, as a result of lengthy and difficult negotiations, the Soviet side had finally agreed to equate one bomber with 20 cruise missiles with one MIRVed vehicle, and to count it as such within the aggregate level of MIRVed vehicles, i.e. 1,320.

At the current round of talks, with a view to facilitating early conclusion of the Agreement, Gromyko had told the Secretary of State at their meeting in New York that the Soviets would be willing to accept a variant under which the sides could have bombers with more than 20 cruise missiles per bomber, but in that event and depending on the number of cruise missiles in excess of 20 to be carried by the bomber, it would be counted within the agreed 1,320 level of MIRVed vehicles with an appropriate coefficient, such as two or three, etc.

Gromyko wanted to repeat that although the Soviet side preferred the previous solution, i.e. no more than 20 cruise missiles on one bomber, it would be prepared to accept this "coefficient variant." It could not agree to a bomber carrying more than 20 cruise missiles, unless that coefficient is applied, because that method would be tantamount to the sides having as many cruise missiles as there are raindrops. If the coefficient variant were accepted, the US could build aircraft with any number of cruise missiles, providing those aircraft were counted appropriately.

There was an additional point Gromyko wanted to make in this connection. He had already stated and wished to confirm again now that without limiting the number of cruise missiles on bombers for the duration of the Treaty, as proposed, the Soviet side could not agree not to increase the number of warheads on existing ICBMs in the process of their modernization. If agreement is reached on limitations on numbers of cruise missiles per bomber that was acceptable to the Soviet Union, it

would be prepared to agree to establishing a limit on increases in the number of warheads on existing ICMBs in the course of their modernization.<sup>4</sup> This question, too, had been viewed by the United States as well as the Soviet Union as being of great importance.

—*Fractionation of New Types:*

With regard to the question of numbers of warheads on ballistic missiles, Gromyko wanted to draw the President's attention to the fact that at the current meetings here in the US, the Soviet side had reacted constructively to a US proposal by agreeing to establish a limit on the number of warheads that could be installed on ICBMs and SLBMs of new types (Gromyko repeated "ICBMs and SLBMs of new types") as 6 and 14 respectively, and also to limit the number of warheads on existing SLBMs to 14.

—*Timing of Reductions:*

For a long period of time discussions were held on the subject of a time limit for reducing the aggregate level of strategic arms from 2,400 down to 2,250. The Soviet side proposed that such reductions be accomplished within 12 months, beginning December 30, 1980, on condition that the Treaty enter into force no later than January 1, 1979 or at the very latest March 31, 1979. No harm of any kind could result from this for the United States, neither from the standpoint of national security nor anything else. After all, here we were dealing with reducing by dismantling or destruction of the numbers of strategic offensive arms, and not of building up some new and terrible type of weapon. Whether this was done today or tomorrow or in three days could not possibly be a matter of concern or principle. Surely, this would have no effect whatsoever on the security of the United States. Any other time period was simply not realistic and could not be effectively observed for purely practical considerations. Gromyko hoped that the President would not read some sort of sinister purpose into the time period required for Soviet reductions. He felt that the practical considerations should be obvious to all.

—*Backfire:*

On every convenient or inconvenient occasion the US had kept returning to the question of the Soviet medium bomber TU 22-M (Backfire). Quite recently the situation was depicted in such a way as to imply that this question had great importance for the Soviet Union, and accordingly attempts were made to tie it in to other questions in the hope of obtaining some sort of concessions. This great importance for

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand added the phrase "increases in."

the Soviet Union had obviously been invented in the offices of the President's State Department. It does not have any such importance and cannot have any such importance, neither now or in the future. For this reason it would be quite unrealistic to expect any concessions from the Soviet side. Of course, medium-range bombers do exist, but in actual fact the Backfire question simply does not exist in terms of an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. The Soviet Union does not make it a habit to go back on its word, once given. Therefore, Gromyko would confirm today that this contrived question can only be resolved on the basis of the unilateral statement whose text had been given to the President.<sup>5</sup> If the Soviets had not given their word to provide the statement, they would not be discussing this question today, just as they would not discuss various US medium-range weapons. The statement to which he had just referred did in his view provide a solution to this whole matter.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to add that the Soviet position graphically demonstrates that throughout the SALT negotiations, including the current round of talks, the Soviet Union had exerted every possible effort to find mutually acceptable solutions and resolve all outstanding issues on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security, in order to complete the negotiations successfully and sign the agreement promptly, the more promptly the better. Time was not always an ally. Sometimes time helps, sometimes it complicates negotiations. He would end by saying that the efforts of both sides were required to bring everything to successful fruition.

The President said that, although we disagreed on the terms of the SALT Agreement, he did not doubt that the Soviet Union was negotiating in good faith or that it had done so from the very outset. Today he would start by describing the items where we agreed and disagreed, and then put forth the US position for concluding the negotiations without further delay.

—*New Types*:

The President noted that we had agreement to the effect that during the term of the agreement, i.e. through 1985, each side would be allowed to test and deploy one new type of ICBM. There would be no limit on new types of SLBMs, except a fractionation limit of 14 on SLBM's of new types.<sup>6</sup> We had agreement to exempt mobile light ICBMs.

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<sup>5</sup> Gromyko gave Carter the unilateral statement during their meeting on May 27; see Document 204.

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand added the phrase "SLBMs of new types."

—*Cruise Missile Range:*

We now agreed on the lower limit for cruise missile range—600 km—and that above that there would be no limit. That included ICCMs.

Items which the President understood were still disagreed, although some of these were now being worked on in Geneva:

—*Definition of New Missiles:*

The President believed this was being worked out satisfactorily in Geneva.

—*Heavy Mobile Missiles:*

Our proposal to ban heavy mobile missiles was on the table, but the Soviet Union had not yet responded.

—*Fractionation Limit on New ICBMs:*

Our proposal was to set a limit of 10 warheads on new ICBMs, and we were strongly urging that limit. The Soviet proposal was to limit them to six. We would prefer to agree on ten.<sup>7</sup>

—*ICCMs:*

Our position was to ban them, the Soviet position was to place no limit on them. We were prepared to agree to setting no limit.

—*Depressed Trajectory:*

We had made a proposal recently, not for the purpose of introducing confusion, but because we believed it to be of mutual advantage, to the effect that testing of missiles from subs in a depressed trajectory be banned. This would remove the prospect of a quick attack without adequate warning. We believed this to be to the mutual advantage of both sides, but the Soviet side had not yet responded.

—*Dismantling:*

The timing of dismantling was still unagreed. The Soviet position was three years for the duration of the Protocol, and dismantling by the end of 1981, provided the Agreement was concluded by March 1979. Our position was that dismantling should be concluded by the end of

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<sup>7</sup> Dobrynin and Vance met at 4 p.m. to clarify certain statements that the President had made. Vance told Dobrynin that when the President said “prefer” he meant “want” and that the United States “had to have 10.” According to Vance, Carter was “only being polite.” On the figures for ALCM carriers, Vance explained that the average would be 35. Dobrynin asked if there could be “40 on some and less on others.” Vance said yes. Dobrynin suggested that if the Soviet Union accepted 10 warheads on new type ICBMs, “could the U.S. accept 20 ALCM per carrier?” Responding to Dobrynin’s response for clarification on Backfire, Vance said there if there was a commitment not to increase the production rate figure, the “previous Soviet statement would be acceptable without a profile range figure.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 9/29/78–10/22/78)

June 1981, i.e. six months earlier, and that the Protocol period expire on the same date, June 30, 1981.

—*Fractionation of Cruise Missiles:*

On MIRVing cruise missiles the Soviet position was to ban it, ours was to place no limit.

—*Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber:*

The Soviet position was to limit that number to 20, ours—as in the case of bombs for bombers—no limit.

—*Cruise Missile Definition:*

The Soviet position was that the agreement provide limits on both nuclear-armed and conventional-armed cruise missiles (the latter was a recent position). Ours was that the SALT negotiations are no place for setting limits on conventional arms. We were willing to include conventionally-armed cruise missiles for the Protocol period, and agree that only nuclear warheads would be installed on cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km.

—*Cruise Missile Range:*

Our position was not the same as the Soviet position on cruise missiles above 600 km. The Soviet position was that 600 km. be determined by projection of the missile's flight path onto the surface of the earth, with the missile flying to fuel exhaustion. Ours was that a cruise missile capable of a range of less than 600 km. not be able to attack targets further than 600 km. from the launch point.

—*Backfire:*

We had a sharp disagreement on Backfire which was not artificial. Our position was not intended to induce the Soviets to modify their position on other items.

The President summed up by saying that these were the positions as he understood them. He would take them up item by item.

—*Fractionation of ALCMs and number of ALCMs per bomber:*<sup>8</sup>

To reach agreement on setting a limit on the number of ALCMs per bomber, we have two options: one would be for the United States to make a statement, such as the Soviet statement on Backfire, indicating that we will develop and test cruise missile carriers capable of carrying more than 20 cruise missiles, but would not deploy them, and that we would not deploy MIRVed cruise missiles during the term of the Agreement, depending on Soviet air defenses, the level of Soviet forces, and the number of warheads on the Soviet side. The other option would be to limit the number of cruise missiles per bomber to an average of 35, and additionally to make a statement that we would not

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<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand added the phrase "and number of ALCMs per bomber."

equip cruise missiles with MIRVs for the term of the Agreement through 1985.

—*Cruise Missile Range:*

We were willing to accept the Soviet proposal and definition of the 600 km. ALCM range, to be determined by projection of the missile's flight path onto the surface of the earth, provided that the Soviet side accepted the US proposal for the definition of cruise missiles, also making it clear that we did not accept the Soviet position on conventionally-armed cruise missiles for the period after expiration of the Protocol. The President added that we would give a distinctive air-frame configuration to any conventionally-armed cruise missile, so as to enable the Soviets to distinguish them easily from nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

—*Backfire:*

The President said that we considered the Soviet position on Backfire to be inadequate. However, to resolve this question, we would accept the Soviet proposal that would be to give us a document or letter to say that the Soviet Union would not increase the production rate of this aircraft. We understood that rate to be two and a half planes per month, or 30 per year. Further, the statement would specify that there would be no upgrading of the Backfire aircraft to give it a range greater than it has at this time. In response we would state to the Soviet Union that the United States retains the right to deploy similar aircraft.

—*Protocol Duration and Dismantling Schedule:*

The President said that we would accept the Soviet position on the dismantling schedule, provided there would be steady progress in dismantling, and the Soviets would not wait until the last month to initiate dismantling. As for the Protocol, its term is to expire June 30, 1981, and missiles to be dismantled were to be made irreversibly inoperable by the end of June 1981. In Geneva we had already described what we would consider irreversibly inoperable. Dismantling was to be completed by the end of 1981. The President added that the dismantling provision he had cited obviously referred not only to missiles, but also to bombers subject to dismantling.

Gromyko asked a question concerning the Soviet statement on *Backfire*. He asked the President to draw no conclusions from the fact that he was asking the question. Would the President clarify whether his mention of the Soviets giving the US a letter on Backfire meant that there would be no change in the text of the statement he had already provided.

The President replied that what he would like to see in that letter would be a commitment on the part of the Soviet Union not to increase the production rate of the Backfire and not to give it intercontinental ca-

pabilities. We would prefer that the statement not include any mention of the 2,200 km. range, because if it were included, we would have to dispute it as inconsistent with our understanding.

—*Telemetry Encryption*:

Another item we considered very important was our ability to verify compliance with the Agreement. Therefore, we would like to have a clear prohibition on encryption of telemetry during testing.

The President said that there were other items under discussion in Geneva which we did not consider to be difficult issues, although they were important to us, such as prior notification of ICBM tests, and the principles to guide the SALT III negotiations.

The President summed up by saying that these were our proposals, and expressed his hope that they would be adequate to reach early agreement. He hoped that there would be no further delays. Some questions had political importance for us, as well as substantive importance. We had tried to be as forthcoming as we could, but if there were other items Gromyko wanted to raise, he would invite him to do so now.

Gromyko asked by way of clarification whether the limitations on cruise missiles mentioned by the President would operate for the term of the Treaty, through 1985. He was not talking about the distinction between conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed missiles, but of the basic issues. He had understood the President to have the term of the Treaty in mind for these limitations. He would ask the President again not to draw any conclusions from the fact that he was asking these questions.

The President replied that everything he had described applying to ALCMs was meant to operate for the term of the Treaty/Agreement.

Gromyko acknowledged that everything was now clear. He did note some shifts in the US position on some issues, unfortunately [*fortunately?*] on not too many. He would need to have the opportunity of studying what the President had said and reflecting on it. He would suggest that perhaps later today or tomorrow another meeting be convened, at whatever level the President believed useful, in order to make maximum use of this round of talks in Washington and to sum up what had been accomplished. On some issues it might be necessary for him to get in touch with Moscow.

The President said he was sure that Gromyko would be eager to notify Moscow of the great victory he had won at these negotiations. The President was saddened by the fact that he would not be able to join in the celebration. As for the additional meeting suggested by Gromyko, he could not be available himself, but Secretary Vance would be



available.<sup>9</sup> It would be good if we could obtain a quick response. The President really believed that this quick response would provide the basis for completing the Agreement. If Gromyko could tell us that the Soviet Union accepted our suggestions for resolution of the outstanding issues, it would benefit both our countries.

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<sup>9</sup> Vance and Gromyko met again on October 1. A partial memorandum of conversation is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 9/29/78–10/22/78. The full memoranda of conversation of their meetings are in the Department of State, Marshall Shulman Files, Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot File 81D109, Vance/Gromyko, 9/78.

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## **219. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 22, 1978.

SUBJECT

SALT

Cy Vance met with Gromyko today (cables at Tabs A, B, and C)<sup>2</sup> and received the following new proposals:

—The concept of averaging for ALCMs on heavy bombers is acceptable provided: (1) the average limit is 25 ALCMs per carrier, (vice our proposal for 35); (2) multiple independently targetable warhead ALCMs are banned in the Treaty, (vice our proposed statement of intentions); (3) there is a limit of 10 RVs per ICBM for *current* ICBMs as well as the exempted ICBM, (vice the previously *agreed freeze* on fractionation for existing ICBMs).

—That we consider in SALT III the issue of limiting SLBM depressed trajectory tests on the grounds that this was just one part of the larger problem of reducing the risk of surprise attacks—which we did not have the time to deal with in SALT II.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 10–11/78. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Tab A was telegram 25514 from Moscow, October 22; Tab B was telegram Secto 12109 from Moscow, October 22; and Tab C was telegram Secto 12111 from Moscow, October 22. All attached but not printed. Vance was in Moscow October 21–24 to discuss SALT with Brezhnev and Gromyko.

—That, in the context of the agreement to prenotify all multiple missile tests, a multiple missile test should be defined as any test in which two missiles are in flight at the same time, (vice their earlier proposal for a definition based on launch within 10 minutes and our position of launch within 60 minutes).

—That all heavy mobile missiles, i.e. mobile ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles, be banned (as we had proposed).

The Soviets have rejected our positions on all other outstanding issues (see Tab C) and, in particular, have made no changes on the critically important cruise missile definition and telemetry encryption issues. You will also note they have rejected our proposed Backfire statement with no substantive counterproposal. Thus, *the major question is whether to respond to the new Soviet proposals in the absence of movements on their part on the cruise missile definition and telemetry encryption issues.*

I have discussed these issues with Harold who in turn has discussed them with Davey Jones. Our views on these issues are as follows:

—*Prenotification of ICBM Flight Tests*: Cy should accept the Soviet proposal on the definition of a multiple ICBM test and drop our insistence on prenotification for all single test launches from operational sites.

—*ALCM Numbers/ICBM Fractionation*: Cy should offer the agreed fallback of an average of 30 ALCMs per heavy bomber. He should strongly reject the Soviet proposal to substitute a 10 RV fractionation limit for the previously agreed fractionation freeze for current ICBMs.

—*Ban on Multiple Warhead ALCMs*: Substantively we can accept this limit in the Treaty rather than a unilateral U.S. statement. It has no impact on planned programs. However, it does have the problem of creating a precedent for follow-on negotiations and could create more ratification difficulties. The JCS are prepared to be reasonable on this issue (probably because it would reduce their fears of an unmanned bomber program). We need your decision on whether to offer this concession and when.

—*Depressed Trajectories*: We all believe that we can accept Cy's recommendation to drop the depressed trajectory proposal in return for a reference to dealing with this and other such issues in the SALT III Principles. However, it is essentially the only proposal we have that we can withdraw. Thus we may not want to concede on this point until and unless the Soviets drop some of their other demands.

As noted above, we face a critical tactical question whether to be responsive on the above issues when the Soviets have not as yet been forthcoming on the cruise missile definition and telemetry encryption

issues. Our recommendation is to indicate generally to the Soviets that we are prepared to be constructive on “MIRVed” cruise missiles and Depressed Trajectories (subject to your decision) if the Soviets are forthcoming on the cruise missile definition and telemetry encryption issues; but, until they do so, not specifically agree to the Soviet proposals.

We will need your decision on these issues this evening.

*Your Decision*

That Cy be authorized to take the positions outlined above on the ALCM numbers, ICBM fractionation and ICBM test prenotification issues.

Whether to agree to ban multiple warhead ALCMs through 1985 and drop our proposed ban on depressed trajectory SLBM tests and adjust the SALT III Principles but only if the Soviets meet our concerns on the cruise missile definition and telemetry encryption issues.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> According to a handwritten note, Carter approved both recommendations by phone on October 22. Vance was notified in telegram WH81382, October 23. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79)

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**220. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1978.

SUBJECT

JCS Memorandum “SALT II in Perspective”

I am forwarding to you the latest statement of the views of the JCS on SALT, as expressed in the attached paper, “SALT II in Perspective.”<sup>2</sup> While reserving final judgment until all negotiating and related program issues are settled, the JCS conclude that the agreement “could make a contribution to our overall strategic posture”. It is important to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–81–0202, USSR 388.3. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is JSCM–321–78, October 12, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Brown.

recognize that this conclusion is a qualified one, conditioned on the ultimate agreement meeting the following tests:

1. Satisfactory resolution of the outstanding issues consistent with our current positions. (While the JCS refer to the US position as of 11 October, I believe there is nothing in your instructions of 14 October inconsistent with their view.)

I would add that these views correspond to my own previously expressed comment that in many areas, our current positions are such that we have essentially no room for concessions, in terms both of our security interest and of maintaining support for the results.

On Backfire, the JCS note their “regret” over the decision not to insist on counting it in the aggregate, and conclude that “if the Backfire is not to be counted in the aggregate, we must take its capabilities into account in our analyses and programs”.

2. Assurances that we intend to exercise the freedom preserved by the agreement for transfer of cruise missiles and their technology to our allies and for exploitation of conventional cruise missile potentials.

I fully agree that both these issues are important, militarily and politically. While it is clearly premature to decide on specific programs, the importance of our willingness to cooperate with our allies in meeting the deficiencies perceived to exist in theater nuclear forces has been highlighted by the recent consultations bilaterally and with the alliance generally. Similarly, both the negotiations and technical developments have made clear that the need to preserve our flexibility to use cruise missiles for conventional roles is not only an issue of principle, but one of practical military importance.

3. A “substantive and formal commitment by the Executive Branch to defense programs necessary to maintain the balance” to be made before initialling the agreement and without reducing funds for tactical nuclear or conventional programs.

The JCS stress that in their view SALT II “can make only a modest contribution to US security” and must be regarded as “but one component of a broader, balanced program of arms control negotiations and military programs”. They repeat their previously stated view that the “safeguards” called for by the JCS at the time of SALT I have not been vigorously pursued, and that we face an adverse trend in the strategic situation which must be reversed.

Here again, I am in full agreement on the necessity—both on strictly military grounds and politically—for the conclusion of a SALT II agreement to be accompanied by a definite strategic force program for the future. The work we in the Defense Department have underway, and which I have discussed with you, will provide the basis for my recommendations as to the content of that program.

In connection with the JCS reservation of final judgment and their emphasis on the importance of the remaining negotiating issues, I believe it is appropriate to stress the need to continue to ensure that the JCS have an adequate opportunity to participate in the process, so that you will know their views when you make the crucial decisions on any remaining issues in SALT, and on the necessary force structure decisions that SALT II must preserve as possibilities, but which are not assured as programs simply by reaching a SALT agreement.

Finally, I would call your attention to these specific points of interest referred to in the attached paper:

—The prominence given to exercise of the rights we have preserved in the non-circumvention clause.

—The emphasis on the telemetry encryption issue.

—The call for inclusion in the Statement of Principles of an acknowledgment that NTM must be augmented when necessary by co-operative measures.

—The emphasis on conventional cruise missiles.

**Harold Brown**

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## **221. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 23, 1978, 1402Z.

25594. Exclusively for the President from Secretary Vance.

Subject: Meeting with Gromyko October 23, 1978.

1. We met again this morning for three hours with Messrs. Gromyko, Korniyenko, and Dobrynin. I spent about 30 minutes alone with Gromyko.

2. I carried out instructions in your telegram (WH81382).<sup>2</sup> No fundamental new ground was broken, as we reviewed the yet unresolved issues. Gromyko did state categorically that so far as our statement on Backfire was concerned we of course could state whatever we chose to say. I hit him hard on the need for confirmation pointing out that the problem was not merely our problem but also theirs if they wanted ratification to be voted. We have agreed with Soviets to call the talks

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Secret; Flash; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 219.

“useful and constructive” and point out that some issues remain unresolved. We will not go into any detail with the press on which issues are unresolved or what specific progress has been made. I suggest no statements be made back home until I have a chance to report to you tomorrow.

3. I will be meeting with President Brezhnev starting at 6:00 P.M. Paul [Warnke] and Mac [Toon] will accompany me.

4. Gromyko gave a luncheon for us this noon from which we have just returned. At lunch, Korniyenko suggested to Paul that our position on telemetry encryption was not accurately stated in our proposed common understanding. Without commitment, he asked if it would not be more correct to state that the parties agree that methods of transmitting telemetric information are not limited, including encryption, unless there is deliberate concealment that impedes verification. Also without commitment, Paul invited them to make this counterproposal in Geneva.

Vance

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## 222. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the White House<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 23, 1978, 1827Z.

25640. Exclusively for the President. Subject: My Meeting With Brezhnev.

1. We just had a meeting of one and one-half hours with President Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Marshal Ogarkov, Ambassador Dobrynin, and Messrs. Aleksandrov and Kornienko.

2. The President read a rather long statement which was moderate in tone and positive in his hopes for better relations with the US—both from an overall international standpoint and from the standpoint of bilateral relations. He started off by calling for an active dialogue. After reviewing the situation in the SALT negotiations in a non-polemical way, Brezhnev said the Soviets are prepared to look ahead and develop a stable base for and a rising curve in our relations. Brezhnev went on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Secret; Flash; Eyes Only.

to state that our two nations have no alternative but to learn how to live together, and it is our duty to our people and to the world to do so.

3. Brezhnev said that he hoped that you shared his hope for a summit meeting soon. He said this would of course require the necessary basis in terms of a SALT agreement to sign. He said venue would be no problem.

4. He also covered other subjects, including some off-the-record remarks on the need to reduce the chance of nuclear war, which I will describe when we meet.

5. I responded to his statement, point-by-point, noting that I must express disappointment at backward movement in two areas—the suggestion that they should be permitted 10 RVs per existing missile, and their position on the telemetry issue. I then dealt with each of the other points, including your desire for a more stable and better relationship, for a reduction in nuclear weapons, for early completion of a SALT agreement, and for a summit meeting at an appropriate time.

6. The tone of the meeting was friendly, and he closed by warmly sending his very best wishes to you.

7. Brezhnev seemed to be fit—in better shape than when I saw him last—and his diction was considerably improved.

**Vance**

## 223. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 3, 1978, 2–4:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Mr. Leslie Gelb, Director, Office  
of Politico-Military Affairs  
General George Seignious,  
At-Large Member of the  
SALT Delegation

#### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Mr. Walter Slocombe, Principal  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for International Security  
Affairs

#### *JCS*

General David Jones  
Lt General William Smith,  
Assistant to the Chairman,  
JCS

#### *CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Mr. Robert Bowie, Director,  
National Foreign Assessment  
Center  
Mr. Ray McCrory, Chief, SALT  
Task Force

#### *ACDA*

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Acting  
Director  
Ambassador Ralph Earle,  
Alternate Chairman, US  
SALT Delegation  
Mr. John Newhouse, Assistant  
Director, International  
Security Programs

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Mr. David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Mr. Reginald Bartholomew  
Dr. Roger C. Molander

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

*ALCMs.* There was a consensus that the US should indicate that in the context of Soviet agreement to a limit of 30 on the average number of ALCMs, the US could accept a limit of 20 ALCMs on current types of operational heavy bombers (i.e., B-52's, Bears, and Bisons). If the Soviets raise the issue of the prototype B-1's, we could indicate that the 20-ALCM limit would apply to these aircraft as well. For the purpose of counting, the number of ALCMs on a heavy bomber should be counted

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.



as the maximum number for which a heavy bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. Zbig Brzezinski noted his concern that a 20-ALCM limit on current heavy bombers could be viewed as yet another US ALCM concession which could have the political consequence of complicating ratification. Aaron is also concerned that the Soviets will try to bargain us down from the newly proposed limit.

On the issue of multiple independently-targetable warheads on ALCMs, the US should propose an exchange of statements along the following lines:

The United States side informs the Soviet side that the United States side will not exercise its right to deploy, prior to the expiration of the Treaty, airplanes equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently-targetable warheads.

*Cruise Missile Definition.* Cy Vance and Spurgeon Keeny continue to believe that we can accept having the ban on ALCMs over 600 km on non-heavy bombers apply to conventionally-armed as well as nuclear-armed ALCMs after the expiration of the Protocol. Harold Brown, Davey Jones, and Zbig Brzezinski believe we should maintain our current position of no limits on conventionally-armed ALCMs on non-heavy bombers after the Protocol.

*Backfire.* The preferred language for our statement on the Backfire issue is:

The United States acknowledges receipt of the statement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the Soviet bomber designated TU-22-M in the Soviet Union and called Backfire in the United States. One of the issues addressed in the course of the SALT Two negotiations was the appropriate manner to deal with the capability of this aircraft to carry out intercontinental missions. The United States enters into the SALT Two agreement on the basis of the Soviet statement which the US regards as a commitment that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not significantly increase the range/payload capability of this airplane in any manner, and will not produce this aircraft at a rate of more than 30 per year. The United States considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the SALT Two agreement.

In presenting this statement to the Soviets, we should indicate that we interpret the term “significantly” to mean less than five percent.

*Telemetry Encryption.* We should clarify our position on the telemetry encryption issue by revising our proposed Common Understanding as follows:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote next to this paragraph, “Zbig—Stan [Turner] wants us to pursue tougher proposal first. Then fall back. JC.”

The sides agree that the negotiating record reflects the Common Understanding that, although each side is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, the sides are obligated not to engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, *whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.*

Before tabling this revision, we should describe to the Soviets in Geneva those limitations in the agreement for which denial of telemetry would impede verification. The Working Group should prepare a list of such limitations.

*Other Issues.* As agreed at the October 26 SCC meeting:<sup>3</sup>

—*ICBM Fractionation.* We should hold to our current position of a freeze on the fractionation of current ICBMs, tell the Soviets that their proposal of a limit of 10 RVs on all ICBMs is retrogressive, and reject the linkage on this issue with other issues such as ALCM numbers.

—*Cruise Missile Range Definition.* We should maintain the position that the approach proposed by the Soviets on this issue is acceptable if they accept our position on the cruise missile definition issue.

—*Depressed Trajectories.* We are willing to defer this issue to SALT Three if the Soviets accept an appropriate reference to measures to decrease the risk of surprise attack in the Principles.

—*Dismantling to 2250/Duration of Protocol.* We should hold back on these issues for now, pending further progress. The Soviets may be willing to accept three years from date of signature for Protocol expiration.

*Tactics.* Cy Vance should impress on Dobrynin the importance we attach to satisfactory resolution of the telemetry encryption issue and indicate that we will be discussing this issue further in Geneva. On the other issues, he should indicate that we are awaiting a considered Soviet response to the proposals we made in Moscow.

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<sup>3</sup> The Summary of Conclusions of the October 26 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79.

**224. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 9, 1978.

## SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #79

1. *Opinion*

There are two issues which, if allowed to drift, could very badly damage your leadership: SALT and the Middle East. Both issues may soon require some *basic strategic choices*:

## SALT

There is no doubt that SALT is seen by many Americans as a litmus test of our ability to manage the relationship. Approaching our third year, we thus confront two basic options: either to get a SALT agreement quickly or, alternatively, make publicly the case that you were unwilling to make concessions which would jeopardize U.S. national security.

As a result, I think the time has come to tell the Soviets, in effect, what you said in your interview this week with *The New York Times*: that we cannot back down any more without damaging seriously the chances of the treaty's ratification; that the "window" for the agreement is December–January; and that slippage beyond that point would mean postponement, at the earliest, to the fall of 1979.<sup>2</sup>

This message should be conveyed without anxiety on our part—for that could simply stimulate the Soviets to hang tough on the remaining issues. One way of conveying it would be through a personal letter from you to Brezhnev. Alternatively, you might send a personal emissary to talk to him, perhaps even under arrangements that would guarantee secrecy. For all of the negotiations we have had with the Soviets, I do not believe that we have yet had a firm and comprehensive "heart-to-heart" talk with them about all of the basic issues that are at stake and about the nature of our long-term relationship.

In addition to the above, you perhaps might wish to talk with Senator Byrd quite frankly about some other alternatives to treaty ratification in the light of the elections:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 29, NSC Weekly Reports, 6–12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the memorandum at the top of the first page.

<sup>2</sup> The transcript of Carter's interview was published in *The New York Times*, November 6, 1978.

—An agreement approved by majority action of both houses.

or

—We would abide by the agreement or treaty (so long as the Soviets do, too) pending a more propitious time to seek Congressional action.

The latter course would make the most sense only after we tried to get Congressional approval and it appeared we did not have the votes. It is fully consistent with international law and there is no constitutional impediment so long as the agreement has not actually been rejected by the Congress.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to SALT.]

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## 225. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 16, 1978.

### SUBJECT

Meeting with the JCS on SALT and Strategic Force Modernization

You are meeting with the JCS (and Harold Brown and Charles Duncan) on Friday, November 17, to discuss SALT and strategic force modernization.<sup>2</sup> This meeting grew out of a recent JCS memorandum on this issue which Harold forwarded to you (Tab A).<sup>3</sup>

In preparation for the meeting, I believe it will be adequate that you simply review my cover memorandum and Harold's transmittal

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 10–11/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Carter initialed at the top of the first page and wrote: "JCS—Summit, Security leaks, Budget limit/priority."

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with the Chiefs from 9 to 9:35 a.m. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Tab A, a memorandum dated October 23 from Brown to Brzezinski, is attached but not printed. In his October 25 covering memorandum to the President, Brzezinski noted that the "JCS are adopting a cautiously positive attitude towards the SALT TWO agreement, conditioned on satisfactory resolution of the outstanding issues." Brzezinski urged caution with respect to the JCS request for a Presidential commitment for an "aggressive strategic force modernization program" before initialing the SALT II treaty and "explicit assurances" on exploitation and transfer of cruise missile technology to U.S. allies. He recommended instead general Presidential assurances to the Chiefs on "strategic force improvements and strengthening the NATO alliance." (Ibid., National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 10–11/78)

memo which summarizes the JCS views. I suggest that you take this opportunity to:

—Confirm that the JCS are still on board at this stage of the SALT negotiations.

—Let them know that you will expect their strong support in the SALT ratification proceedings.

—Assure them that you do not interpret the SALT non-circumvention provision as necessarily restricting our rights to transfer cruise missiles and related technology to our Allies.

—Assure them of your commitment to a strong national defense and, in particular, a vigorous strategic force modernization program (while deflecting their request for a “formal commitment” to programs at this time).

Since the Chiefs are undoubtedly aware of the questions raised at the recent Defense budget review about the need for a Triad, they may broach this issue at the meeting. You will want to indicate your willingness to continue efforts to respond to the problem of Minuteman vulnerability.

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## **226. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 2, 1978.

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #81

### *1. Opinion*

#### *On Negotiating*

The comments which follow are not meant to be just negative—but I feel that I should share my concern that the way we have been conducting our negotiations on some key issues may be reducing our credibility and therefore also our ability to attain our goals.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 29, NSC Weekly Reports #81, 6–12/78. Secret. At the top of the first page, Carter wrote: “Zbig—You comment as though you’ve not been involved in the process, & that everyone else has been wrong except you. J.”

In negotiations there often comes the time to force the issue to a head by making the other side take stock of the consequences of failure. One should even be willing to deliberately create such circumstances, as Sadat has done from time to time. Of course, before one does so one should carefully marshal one's resources and calculate timing very carefully.

#### *SALT*

We have been dribbling our concessions, and asserting from time to time that we would go no further. Yet time after time we would then make additional concessions.<sup>2</sup>

The latest example pertains to the ALCMs: as a major concession we told the Soviets that we would accept the limit of 35 as an average. The Soviets countered with 25. We immediately offered 30 as a compromise. The Soviets are now talking of a figure of between 25 and 30 as the outcome, despite our accommodation on the definition issue.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, Cy put the new definition to Dobrynin earlier this week on the assumption that this would solve all the remaining issues—an assumption Dobrynin led us to suspect is true. The opposite has happened, and the Soviets are even reopening some old issues.

I am convinced the Soviets want a SALT agreement, and I think there is a good probability that we could have obtained one some months ago had we been prepared to establish credibly the position that we are no longer able to make further adjustments and that we can wait.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to SALT.]

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "SU does the same" in the margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> Carter wrote "only symbolically important" in the margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>4</sup> Carter wrote "B.S. We've waited 2 years" in the margin next to this paragraph.

**227. Letter From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 20, 1978.

To The Secretary of State

Your next meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko is potentially the most important of all the discussions we have held with the Soviet Government since this Administration came into office. We have the opportunity to conclude, at least in principle, a SALT II agreement, to encourage the appropriate political environment for its positive acceptance by the Congress and to begin preparations for a summit meeting in the United States.

You will be receiving separate instructions covering the principal outstanding issues in SALT.<sup>2</sup> Our willingness to show flexibility on the cruise missile definition, on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber and on the modalities of dismantling are all designed to facilitate prompt conclusion of a SALT agreement which meets our concerns on verification, Protocol duration, ICBM fractionation and the Backfire bomber. I want to emphasize the importance I attach to the Soviet Government accommodating our concerns regarding telemetry encryption on the basis of our proposed common understanding. If necessary, you should explain to Foreign Minister Gromyko that unwillingness to meet these concerns could lead to a breakdown in negotiations since adequate verification goes to the heart of a viable SALT process and is essential<sup>3</sup> for SALT ratification.

I also want you to address recent international developments in particular, China, Iran, the Middle East and Africa. On China, you should reiterate my personal assurances to Brezhnev that the step of normalization with Peking is not aimed at any other country. As we develop a more normal relationship with China, we also look forward to strengthening relations with the Soviet Union. On Iran, you should reiterate the main points of my private message to Brezhnev: we intend to maintain our close bilateral relationship with Iran, but we do not intend to intervene in Iranian affairs and expect that other countries will abstain from any interference in Iranian affairs. Any Soviet interference in Iran would be a matter of utmost gravity to us. In the Middle East and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 12/78. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 228.

<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined "essential."

Africa, as in other parts of the world, it is extremely important for U.S.-Soviet relations that restraint be exercised toward areas of turbulence and tension. You should draw Foreign Minister Gromyko's attention to the fact that the ratification of a SALT agreement will in some measure be a referendum on U.S.-Soviet relations and the exercise of restraint is therefore of central importance.

Assuming that satisfactory progress has been made in SALT you should begin privately to address the following ideas for a summit meeting.

The completion and signature of the SALT II Agreement will be the center piece of the Summit. However, I would also like to use this opportunity to have full discussion of the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship and the range of bilateral and international issues of interest to the two sides.

For these purposes, I would like to invite President Brezhnev to the United States for a Summit lasting five days, January 15–January 19. The first day and a half and part of the last day would take place in Washington. During the middle of the period envisaged for the Summit, I would like to invite President Brezhnev to St. Simons Island, Georgia, to pursue our discussions. Should President Brezhnev wish to arrive in the United States before the formal opening of the Summit on January 15 (e.g., January 13 or 14), we would be happy to arrange suitable accommodations.

I envisage four broad headings for the substantive discussions:

—The general relationship: I would like to begin the Summit meetings with a discussion of the general relationship and its future development. This general theme, in particular the future development of the relationship, could be further discussed in a final meeting at the end of the Summit.

—SALT and arms control: The completion and signature of the SALT II Agreement would be the main objective. I wish in addition to have a substantive exchange of views on the directions for SALT III. The result might be a strengthening of the SALT III Principles accompanying the SALT II Agreement and added impetus for SALT III.

—Bilateral relations: I envisage discussion of economic and commercial relations. Questions concerning the state of our bilateral exchange agreements could also be addressed.

—International issues: I propose a full discussion of major international problems, including the Middle East and Africa, the Helsinki Accords, and the contribution the sides might make to global stability and development.



You should seek Gromyko's response to this approach and solicit any suggestions he may have on either substantive issues or procedural arrangements.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**228. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 20, 1978.

SUBJECT

U.S. SALT Instructions

The President has approved the following SALT position to be adopted during Secretary Vance's discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva beginning December 21:

1. *Cruise Missile Definition*: Owing to concerns regarding the problems of verifying the distinction between conventional- and nuclear-armed cruise missiles on Soviet non-heavy bombers, the President has decided that the provisions of the Treaty limiting cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers should apply to all armed missiles for the duration of the agreement through 1985.

2. *ALCMs Per Heavy Bomber*: In order to achieve agreement on the principal outstanding SALT II issues, we are prepared to be flexible on the issue of limiting the number of long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers in the region of the current U.S. position of an average of 30 ALCMs per heavy bomber. The U.S. is prepared to accept as a final outcome no lower than an average of 28 ALCMs per heavy bomber. The Soviets may be told that the U.S. will not deploy more than 20 ALCMs on B-52 bombers for the period through 1985, on the understanding

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 53, SALT: 12/78. Top Secret. Also sent to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. At the top of the first page, Carter wrote, "ok, J.C."

that the Soviets also will not deploy more than 20 ALCMs on the Bears and Bisons for the period through 1985.<sup>2</sup>

3. *ICBM Fractionation*: The U.S. should maintain its position that the maximum number of RVs permitted on existing types of ICBMs should be restricted to the maximum number flight tested to date and that the limit on the maximum number of RVs on the single permitted new type of ICBM be set at 10.

4. *Protocol Duration*: The U.S. cannot accept the concept of Protocol expiration three years from the date of entry into force of the agreement. The Protocol expiration date must be a date certain. The U.S. position is that the date for Protocol expiration is June 30, 1981.

5. *Dismantling to 2250*: The U.S. position is that all systems to be dismantled to reach 2250 must be rendered observably inoperable by June 30, 1981 and that dismantling or destruction should proceed at a steady rate. We have defined a steady rate as completion of dismantling and destruction of one-third of the systems within six months of the initiation of the dismantling period, two-thirds within nine months and all dismantling and destruction completed by the end of the twelve month dismantling period. As explicit a commitment along these lines as possible should be sought from the Soviets without this issue becoming an obstacle to final agreement.

6. *Telemetry Encryption*: The importance of the telemetry encryption issue should be underscored by making clear to the Soviets that failure to settle this issue on the basis of the U.S. proposed common understanding will block any further progress toward a SALT II agreement.

7. *Backfire*: The Soviets should be informed that upon receipt of the Soviet statement on Backfire, the U.S. will make the attached statement which will cite a specific maximum Backfire production rate of 30 aircraft per year.<sup>3</sup> We will be prepared to consider this matter satisfactorily resolved if the Soviets are prepared to confirm at the highest levels that the current Backfire production rate does not exceed this level, and that this confirmation by Brezhnev personally to the President will be part of the negotiating record.

It should be made clear to the Soviet representatives our expectation that movement on the part of the U.S. will be met by Soviet responsiveness to our concerns and result in agreement on the principal outstanding SALT II issues. In the course of the negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. representatives should stress that the limitations contained in the

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote the following in the margin next to this paragraph, "Cy—30 would really help us with JCS & ratification—try to hold on this."

<sup>3</sup> Not attached; presumably the statement is the one in Document 223.

Protocol and the Treaty do not establish a precedent of any kind for subsequent negotiations and agreements in SALT III.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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**229. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, December 22, 1978, 2348Z.

Secto 15013. White House for the President, Department for Christopher, Department pass DOD for Sec. Brown. Subject: Second Vance-Gromyko meeting, Dec. 22, 1978.<sup>2</sup>

1. This message will summarize my meeting this afternoon and offer my recommendations:

2. On cruise missile definition, Soviets agreed to separate definitions in Treaty and Protocol. Treaty definition would cover only those air-launched CMs limited by treaty; Protocol definition would cover GL/SLCMs and would expire with Protocol. Gromyko several times underscored that everything in the Protocol expires at the end of the Protocol. He said this three times. Language is to be worked out by delegations.<sup>3</sup>

3. On multiple warhead cruise missiles, Gromyko recognized that “since the circumstances had changed since the time when they proposed a universal definition,” it would be appropriate to deal with multiple warhead cruise missiles only for the Protocol period. However, (perhaps since the Politburo had approved the instructions on this point) he would have to seek approval from Moscow for any

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Cherokee. The telegram was sent to Plains, Georgia, where the President was spending Christmas, as telegram WH81684. At the top of the first page of the telegram sent to Georgia, Carter wrote his initial. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram Secto 15005 to the White House, Christopher, and Brown, December 21, 2251Z, Vance summarized the opening plenary morning session. Vance noted that Gromyko stated that cruise missile definitions should cover nuclear, conventional, and unarmed missiles; suggested that a ban on cruise missiles with multiple warheads could be a treaty article or agreed statement; confirmed Soviet willingness to accept U.S. ICBM fractionation proposals conditional on cruise missile resolution; indicated willingness to amend the Soviet telemetry proposal; and renewed the issue of Minuteman II/III. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram WH81685 to Vance, December 22, Brzezinski informed Vance that Carter approved paragraph 2 subject to a final review of language based on Defense Department concerns. (Ibid., Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 17)

change in position. My assessment is that they will agree to include the ban on multiple independently-targetable warhead cruise missiles in the Protocol only, and I would recommend acceptance of such a provision in the Protocol.

4. On the definition of new types, Gromyko raised a new point, acknowledging as he did so that it was “not on the agenda, but very important.” The new point was a proposal that the definition of new types should ban increases of five percent in the limited categories, but permit decreases of up to twenty percent. (The Soviet position recently tabled permits only five percent increases, but unlimited decreases.) Presumably this is intended to accommodate some Soviet program. In this connection, I observed that the delegations should be given instructions to resolve remaining issues forthwith.<sup>4</sup>

5. On telemetry encryption, I began by reaffirming our view that access to information transmitted telemetrically is relevant to verification. Gromyko did not disagree; nor did he respond affirmatively. I think it significant that for the first time in the course of our discussions of this issue, he, by silence, did not dissent from my assertion of the relevance of telemetry to verification. Following that, he offered to recommend to Moscow new language to deal with the issue, which conformed to the “non-proposal” Ambassador Earle had given the Soviet side a few hours earlier, with the addition of three words, provided I would provide the language he proposed to Washington for consideration. The language, with his insertions, follows:

“The sides agree that the negotiating record reflects the common understanding that each party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV, neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.” (The three added Soviet words are “including its encryption.”)<sup>5</sup>

6. Finally, on the issue of unarmed, pilotless aircraft (RPVs), I noted that we had proposed a type rule that appears to meet what we understood to be our mutual concerns. I indicated that we hope for a prompt, affirmative answer, adding that I thought we should be able to

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram WH81685, Brzezinski informed Vance that Carter instructed him in regard to paragraph 4 to “tell the Soviets that we are concerned that the insertion of this new and complicated issue may be designed to provide the Soviet Union in effect with an additional exemption for a new ICBM, and we therefore cannot accept this.” (Ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> In telegram WH81685, Brzezinski informed Vance that Carter instructed him in regard to paragraph 5 to tell the Soviets that the United States could accept the addition of the three words, “including its encryption,” but if it was used as it was in a July 29, 1978, test of an SS-16, it would be considered “deliberate concealment.” (Ibid.)

settle this tomorrow. I expect Gromyko will be able to settle on the basis of a type rule, and I suspect that the only reason he could not agree on the spot is the need for Politburo approval of a change in a Politburo-approved position.<sup>6</sup>

7. In private conversation, he confirmed an annual production rate of 30 for Backfire, and said he would recommend that Brezhnev confirm the same number, expressing his view that it was not certain that this could be done.<sup>7</sup>

8. There was no further discussion of the ALCM average number or agreement to limit the number of ALCMs deployed on existing bombers (B-52, Bear, Bison) to 20.

9. My recommendations on these issues are as follows:

A. Telemetry encryption: Earle “non-paper” language preserves all essential elements of US position. Only Soviet addition is “including its encryption.” Gromyko commented that additional words are already “buried” in “methods” and are countered by Soviet acceptance of “such as” and “denial.” Recommend that I be authorized to accept our revised formulation with non-substantive Soviet addition. This should be taken in context of Gromyko’s not disputing my assertion of relevance of telemetry to verification.<sup>8</sup>

B. Cruise missile definition: Also recommend that Earle be authorized to pursue separate definitions applicable to all cruise missiles in Protocol and ALCMs only in Treaty. In this context, I would plan to state that the inclusion of conventionally-armed cruise missiles in the definition of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles does not constitute a precedent for the scope of any limits on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles that might be agreed in the future.<sup>9</sup>

C. RPVs: Authorize Earle to pursue solutions to unarmed RPV/cruise missile problem on basis of type rule.

D. New types definition: Authorize Earle to use 20 percent downside rule as leverage for Soviet agreement to most important parts of US new types definition. Washington should forthwith define priorities in this area, including any areas in which 20 percent reduction not acceptable.

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<sup>6</sup> According to telegram WH81685, the President agreed regarding paragraph 6. (Ibid.)

<sup>7</sup> With regard to paragraph 7, the President agreed subject to Brezhnev’s confirmation to Carter or acceptance of Gromyko’s verbal confirmation “as part of the negotiating record.” (Ibid.)

<sup>8</sup> On the copy sent to Plains, Carter underlined this sentence beginning with “my assertion” and wrote in the margin, “Gromyko agree.” (Ibid.)

<sup>9</sup> In telegram WH81685, Brzezinski noted that Carter thought the statement important and Vance should make it. (Ibid.)

10. I intend to table language along the following lines for an exchange of letters on the number of cruise missiles on existing heavy bombers:

“The US side informs the Soviet side that during the term of the Treaty the maximum number of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 KM for which the United States of America will equip any existing heavy bomber for one operational mission is 20.”

This language parallels Backfire letter. The Soviets would provide an identical letter, dealing with Bison and Bear.<sup>10</sup>

Vance

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<sup>10</sup> Brzezinski instructed Vance in telegram WH81685 to change in paragraph 10 “any existing heavy bomber” to “B-52s” with the understanding that the Soviet letter would cover the Bison and the Bear. If the B-1 bomber was raised, current instructions stood. (Ibid.)

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### 230. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House<sup>1</sup>

December 24, 1978, 1340Z.

Secto 15029. Dept pass SecDef for Secretary Brown. Subject: December 23 Morning Meeting With Gromyko.

1. In three hour meeting, mostly one-on-one without interpreters, the atmosphere was soured compared to yesterday, and we made little progress. Gromyko, however, did not contradict my statement that the 29 July practice would impede verification even under their language.

2. On telemetry encryption, in private session, I read relevant paragraph of instruction. Gromyko did not contradict. He reaffirmed his acceptance of the modified language, and said he would recommend its acceptance to the Politburo.

3. On RPVs, Gromyko took a wholly new and more difficult approach. He maintained that all unarmed cruise missiles be counted, but suggested that there could be an exemption for a specified number. He gave great prominence to our failure to respond to a somewhat casual

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee. The telegram was sent from Vance’s aircraft. A note on the first page indicates it was read to Brzezinski on December 24 and was sent to the President in Plains.

request yesterday for the numbers of cruise missiles used for what they described as “peaceful purposes”. In side conversations, they made clear they were concerned about ground and sea, as well as air launched, RPVs.

4. On Protocol, he was fixed on three years from entry into force.

5. On cruise missile definition, he agreed with my statement that we had agreed on separate definition. I did not use the precedent statement, judging that it should not be used in the difficult atmosphere that had developed.

6. I handed over draft statement on not deploying more than 20 ALCMs on existing B–52 bombers. Soviets raised issue of omission of B–1 from list. Gromyko suggested that he believed that US would agree not to deploy more than 20 ALCMs on any aircraft. I said that was clearly wrong, that the only aircraft at issue were existing ones, and that the idea of a maximum of 20 on all aircraft, including those built subsequently was inconsistent with the concept of averaging.

7. Gromyko agreed to 10 RVs being permitted on ASBMs.

**Vance**

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## 231. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House<sup>1</sup>

Brussels, December 24, 1978, 0038Z.

Secto 15025. Dept pass SecDef for Secretary Brown. Subject: Dec. 23 Afternoon Session With Gromyko.

1. In sum, I believe we got our positions on the key issues: the Backfire production figure set up for final confirmation at the summit, telemetry encryption and, in effect, ICBM fractionation. In addition, it looks like the multiple warhead cruise missile and the Protocol issues will be settled satisfactorily to us. We also got our position on 10 RVs on ASBMs. In my view, it is the Soviets who will have to fall back essentially on the other questions.

2. We need to consider why the Soviets were basically responsive on the major issues and so difficult on other issues (unarmed cruise

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Secret; Nodis; Cherokee. The telegram was sent to Plains as telegram WH81695, December 24, 00311Z; Carter wrote his initial on the first page. (Ibid.)

missiles and their notion of a de facto limit of 20 ALCMs/heavy bomber). It may be that they were seeking to delay completion in order to have their summit with us come after the China summit.<sup>2</sup> Or, it may be they were trying to build up leverage on the ALCM issues. In either case, they did not want to appear obstructive on the major issues. Following summarizes my review of the list of outstanding issues.

3. RPVs. I said that in the time available we could not provide precise data on numbers and other details of RPVs, but it was clear the number was large on both sides, and they were used for many purposes. I added this was 12th hour issue, and we could not accept their approach, but should use a type rule. Gromyko said Soviet position remains valid, and he had nothing to add, but suggested the question be referred to the delegations.

4. ALCMs on B-52s. We added phrase “or any existing B-1 heavy bombers” to the draft letter presented earlier.

Full text, as revised, is:

*Begin text.* The U.S. side informs the Soviet side that during the term of the Treaty the maximum number of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 KM for which the United States of America will equip any B-52 heavy bomber or any existing B-1 heavy bomber for one operational mission is 20. *End text.*

Gromyko asked whether the U.S. could in addition envision making a statement at signing, similar to what he claimed to have been told earlier, to the effect that we do not plan to “develop” more than 20 ALCMs on any type of aircraft during Treaty period. When I replied that earlier statements had referred to “deployment,” he said the difference does not matter. Gromyko said Soviet side will look at new U.S. words. I said that we would consider this request for a no-plan-to-deploy statement.

5. Cruise missile definition. Kornienko agreed that there could be separate definitions, in Protocol for GL/SLCMs, in Treaty for ALCMs, but they would have to be identical in their terms. I did not think this an appropriate context in which to make the non-precedent statement.

6. Telemetry. I referred to the fact that we had discussed this issue both yesterday and this morning with Gromyko. Gromyko said that while he had no doubts about the formula, it was a technical issue and formal approval would have to come from Moscow. There was no further discussion of the July 29 example, which I had covered per instructions in my morning meeting.

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<sup>2</sup> On the copy sent to Plains, Carter underlined most of this sentence. (Ibid.) After U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China on December 15, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited the United States January 29–February 5, 1979, and U.S. officials anticipated an invitation to Carter to visit China.



7. ALCM numbers average. We noted the Soviet position of 27, U.S. of 28. Gromyko said this difference was so slight that the public would be amused if it were published.

8. Protocol duration. We each reiterated our positions but Gromyko, in his only flexibility of the afternoon, said that if the Treaty entered into force by March 31, 1979, the Soviets would be prepared to agree that the Protocol would last for only two years and 9 months. I stressed that we could give no commitment on the date of the ratification.

9. Fractionation. Gromyko agreed that, subject of course to settlement of ALCM issues, there would be a freeze on RVs on existing ICBMs, a limit of 10 on the exempt ICBMs and maximum of 10 on ASBMs, and 14 on SLBMs.

10. MW/CM. The Soviets devoted an inordinate amount of time to this. Gromyko rejected disposing of this issue by putting the MW/CM provisions all in the Protocol. He insisted that the ban continue as to ALCMs after the Protocol expired, and that both the Protocol and Treaty provisions should include a ban on testing as well as deployment. Soviets argued that MIRV ALCM ban included a ban on multiple warhead ALCM testing repeat testing through 1985. We repudiated that statement and stood firmly on our position as expressed yesterday.

**Vance**

## 232. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 12, 1979, 9:18–10:28 a.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Jerry Kahan, Dep. Dir.,  
Political-Military Aff.

#### *OSD*

Secretary Harold Brown  
Charles Duncan (DepSec)  
Walter Slocombe, Prin. Dep. Asst.  
Sec. for Intl. Security Affairs

#### *JCS*

General David Jones  
Lt Gen William Y. Smith

#### *CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Ray McCrory, Chief, SALT Task  
Force

#### *ACDA*

Director George Seignious  
Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Dir.

#### *White House*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Reginald Bartholomew  
Roger Molander

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. *Telemetry.* The issue was whether to reiterate in Geneva any or all of the statement which Secy. Vance made to Foreign Minister Gromyko on December 23 regarding extending the encryption practiced on the July 29, 1978 SS test to a new or modified ICBM.<sup>2</sup> Stan Turner favored a complete reiteration of the statement and noting to the Soviets in Geneva that Foreign Minister Gromyko had not registered any disagreement with the statement.<sup>3</sup> Cy Vance argued that it would be insulting to Gromyko to describe their exchange on this issue, in particular, since President Carter would also make the statement to President Brezhnev at the Summit. David Jones emphasized the importance of

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/15/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 230.

<sup>3</sup> In a January 12 memorandum, Turner argued that, contrary to the consensus position reached at this SCC meeting, the lack of a positive Soviet affirmation of agreement to the U.S. statement that extension of the telemetry on the July 29 SS-18 test would impede verification and hurt the ratification process. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 10/23/78–1/5/79)

having as tight a negotiating record as possible on the telemetry encryption issue. The consensus decision was to have Ralph Earle reiterate the statement on the July 29 test (with a reference to the December 21 test and without the reference to the President's making the statement at the Summit); however, Earle would not make any comment on Gromyko's lack of response to the statement on December 23.

2. *Number of ALCMs per Heavy Bomber.* The issue was how to respond to the Soviet proposal for a US statement that we did not plan to deploy more than 20 ALCMs on *any* (vice existing) heavy bombers through 1985. It was agreed that we should reject this proposal. Cy Vance proposed that we offer to remove the modifier "existing" with respect to B-1s in our statement on deploying more than 20 ALCMs on existing heavy bombers. Harold Brown and David Jones objected to this proposal because of the option under consideration to deploy more than 20 ALCMs on a modified B-1. It was decided to present this issue to the President for a decision.<sup>4</sup>

3. *AS-3 /SRAM Racks.* The issue was how to handle the mid-1960s tests of the AS-3 carried on 69 Bear bombers to over 600 km, and the Soviet claim that all B-52s with SRAM racks should count in the 1320 because the ALCM-A was launched from a SRAM rack. It was decided to defer a decision on whether to link these issues and focus on the AS-3 problem. It was decided to seek clarification from the Soviets on the AS-3 issue to determine whether the tests to over 600 km did take place, whether the AS-3 currently deployed is the same as that tested to over 600 km, and whether the Soviets believe tests to over 600 km should be permitted for cruise missiles with ostensible ranges less than 600 km. In the latter context it was decided to propose including the criterion "or maximum demonstrated range, whichever is greater" in the cruise missile range definition. Further decisions on this issue will await the Soviet response to our requests for clarification.

4. *MM II/MM III Distinguishability and Minuteman Shelters.* The issue was when to cease use of the Minuteman environmental shelters and whether to propose a common understanding prohibiting the use of shelters which impede verification, even if they are not for the purpose of deliberate concealment. David [Jones] has indicated that it would be preferable not to cease the use of the shelters until late spring, e.g., around May 31. It was decided that we could accept an April 30, 1979 date for ceasing use of the shelters and that we should seek a common understanding along the lines described for future shelters.

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<sup>4</sup> In a January 15 memorandum to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Warnke, Jones, and Turner, Brzezinski wrote that the President had made the following decision: "The US can accept removal of the modifier 'existing' with respect to B-1s in our statement on the deployment of more than 20 ALCMs on current heavy bombers." (Ibid.)

### 233. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 20, 1979.

SUBJECT

SALT

Set forth below is an assessment of the Soviet oral message on SALT prepared by Cy's, Harold's and my principal assistants on SALT (Les Gelb, Walt Slocombe and David Aaron). It does not represent our views but provides a useful basis for discussion and decision. The items below follow the order of the Soviet oral note.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Cruise Missile Definition*

Les Gelb said that Cy's position is to agree with the Soviet proposal that there be a single definition of cruise missile covering nuclear and conventional for both the treaty and the protocol. One argument in favor of that decision is that it would make it easier to turn back the Soviet proposal to include unarmed pilotless vehicles in SALT.

On the other side, you might recall that the principal JCS objection to the "all armed" cruise missile definition for ALCMs was that it would set a precedent for how GLCMs and SLCMs will be handled following the expiration of the protocol. You stressed to them your determination not to accept the establishment of such a precedent. Going along with the Soviet position that there should be a single definition of cruise missile which includes both conventional and nuclear and covers ALCMs, SLCMs and GLCMs would create in the treaty a strong presumption that by definition conventional GLCMs and SLCMs would be limited in following negotiations. Moreover, it is not a question of closing a verification loophole—which was the principal reason you decided to close the option to have conventionally armed ALCMs on other than heavy bombers. It is perfectly feasible to have separate definitions for the protocol and the treaty without any verification risk. Such language has been tabled in Geneva by the U.S.

#### *Backfire*

The staff recommends that "approximately" should be removed from the assurance we are given on the number of aircraft the Soviets

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 1/16/79–2/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Both Carter and Brzezinski initialed the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

produce annually.<sup>3</sup> Otherwise, the number might actually prove to be 34. Also, the question was raised as to what precisely Gromyko had said to Secretary Vance, and it was suggested that we satisfy ourselves that the formula Gromyko used with Cy is fully satisfactory if Brezhnev uses it with you.

#### *Dismantling and Destruction*

So far as it goes, the Soviet proposal as contained in the oral note appears acceptable. However, it is pointed out that we have also asked that dismantling would be carried out at a “steady rate” and that all of the systems to be dismantled be functionally inoperable within six months. In this connection, we are prepared to relax our standards as to what can be considered functionally inoperable. It is not clear, therefore, whether the Soviet proposal in the oral note includes these concepts.

#### *Ballistic Missile Fractionation*

The staff recommends that the Soviet proposal on fractionation be accepted. However, an additional point needs to be added, at least in Geneva. There must be an agreed date by which new and old ICBMs are defined and tests of increased numbers of RVs on old ICBMs are no longer permitted (e.g., the date of signature, April 15, 1979, or some specific alternative).

#### *Telemetry Encryption*

Assuming that the Soviet Union does not take issue with our unilateral examples which would accompany the common understanding, the Soviet proposal coincides with our position and is acceptable. Ralph Earle should proceed to provide our unilateral examples in Geneva. We must recognize that this issue is a subject of intense interest in the Senate<sup>4</sup> and we may well face a reservation which would significantly toughen our interpretation of this common understanding. For this reason, you may wish to dwell on this issue and its importance at some length in your conversations with Brezhnev.

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<sup>3</sup> The section in the Soviet oral note on Backfire reads: “In connection with the wish expressed on behalf of President Carter, the Soviet side is willing to repeat at the signature of the Treaty at the highest level what was said to the Secretary of State in Geneva regarding our attitude to the U.S. data on the present rate of production of that airplane. If the U.S. side considers it necessary to publicly state that according to its knowledge such rate is [approximately] 30 aircraft annually, no denials will be made in that case on our part.” The brackets are in the original.

<sup>4</sup> Carter underlined “intense.”

*Protocol Expiration*

The date of expiration for the protocol of December 31, 1981 is recommended as acceptable.

*Pilotless Vehicles*

The Soviet proposal to include unarmed pilotless vehicles as though they were armed cruise missiles is not considered acceptable. The limit of 250 would be inadequate for our purposes. We already have more than 150 such vehicles in storage (and possibly more). There are plans to develop 3300 radar harassment vehicles which might be limited by such an agreement. The subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD) which we put on the B-52 does not have more than 600 km range.

We have proposed to the Soviets that any such pilotless vehicles be functionally distinguishable from armed cruise missiles. We could go beyond this to pick up a portion of the Soviet proposal and prohibit the "conversion of such vehicles into weapon delivery cruise missiles." This would be a somewhat cosmetic limitation but might help satisfy any real Soviet concerns. David points out that the Soviet proposal may belie a Soviet program to produce pilotless vehicles which are indistinguishable from cruise missiles. This is why they may prefer a limit and do not like our approach. Thus, we have a positive interest in Soviet agreement to the functionally distinguishable definition of pilotless vehicles.

*ALCM Averaging*

Obviously 28 is better than 27. However, the staff has some concern about the Soviet formulation: "... the number of long range cruise missiles on *one bomber* be limited under the treaty on the average ... to 28." (*italics ours*) The issue is whether the term "one bomber" might vitiate the concept of an average. Normal English would have simply used the term "bombers." We should make clear to the Soviets (as we have in Geneva) that the average applies to all bombers armed with cruise missiles so that we can average B-52's carrying 12 missiles against cruise missile carriers carrying 50 or more.

*MIRV Cruise Missiles*

We should be prepared to accept the Soviet proposal to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of MIRV cruise missiles for the duration of the treaty. However, it is suggested that we limit this prohibition to MIRV *nuclear* cruise missiles, thus safeguarding the possibility of developing conventional "smart" cruise missiles and establishing the useful precedent of distinguishing between conventional and nuclear cruise missile limitations.

*New Types of ICBMs*

It is recommended that we not accept the Soviet proposal since it would permit a new ICBM to be developed. In this connection, the delegation in Geneva has been authorized to relax somewhat our definition of a new ICBM (to coincide with our verification capability). This bargaining material has not yet been used and should be employed so as to encourage the Soviets to accept our plus or minus 5 percent definition.

It is also important to note that we have not yet resolved another definitional question—when a new ICBM should be considered to be developed. The Soviets say only *after it is deployed*, leaving open the possibility of the development of many missiles while reserving their deployment for after the period of the treaty. We have insisted that a missile be considered developed after 20 tests. This too is an important technical loophole that needs to be closed by the agreement.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> At the end of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “Subject to your guidance, we will either hold an SCC—or perhaps an NSC with you (and with the JCS & ACDA also).”

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**234. U.S. Oral Message to the Soviet Leadership<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 1, 1979.

The US side has reviewed the recent communication from the Soviet side on issues which remain to be resolved in the SALT negotiations.<sup>2</sup> We concur in the assessment that the substantial progress made at the December meeting between the Foreign Ministers now makes it possible to proceed to complete without delay the preparation of the final agreement.

I. First, regarding the issues which were listed in the agreed category:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 1/16/79–2/79. Secret. Tarnoff sent a copy of the message to Brzezinski under a covering memorandum of February 2 that reads: “The attached, for your personal use, is a copy of the final version of our oral message which the Secretary passed to Dobrynin today.” The positions contained therein were incorporated from the Summary of Conclusions of a January 23 SCC meeting, which Brzezinski sent to Carter under a covering memorandum dated January 25, and on which Carter initialed his approval. The Summary of Conclusions of the January 23 SCC meeting is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 233 and footnote 2 thereto.

*Cruise Missile Definition*

The United States has indicated that it is willing to modify its position on the cruise missile definition issue to include both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles under the Treaty limitations on cruise missiles on heavy bombers and aircraft other than heavy bombers. In addition, for some time, we have agreed that the limitations on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles in the Protocol would apply to all armed cruise missiles. In each case, this agreement is without prejudice with respect to the issue of whether conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles will be subject to the same limitations in any future agreements. We believe that the language recently proposed by the US Delegation in Geneva meets the concerns of both sides on this issue and is fully consistent with the agreement between the Foreign Ministers that there would be separate cruise missile definitions in the Treaty and the Protocol.

*Backfire (TU-22M)*

Our understanding on this is that the Soviet side will provide us, at the time of signature of the Treaty, a unilateral statement on the Backfire bomber. The statement would be the one you gave to us informally in Moscow in October, which reads as follows:

“The Soviet side informs the US side that the Soviet TU-22M aircraft, called Backfire in the United States, is a medium-range bomber and that the Soviet side does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States.

“The Soviet side does not intend to give it such capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling.

“At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate.”

As we have informed you, the President will make a unilateral statement at that time.

In light of the importance of this issue to the United States and to the ratification of the Treaty by the US Senate, we will state that the Backfire production rate will not exceed 30 aircraft per year for the period of the Treaty. The United States welcomes the willingness of the Soviet Union to confirm at the highest level at the time of signature of the Treaty the understanding of the US side that the current Backfire production rate will not be increased, and that that production rate does not exceed 30 per year. We believe these formulations are appropriate to the commitment that the Soviet side has made with respect to this aircraft, and we expect the Soviet side to make it clear that it will not contradict this figure.



*Dismantling and Destruction*

We agree that reduction of the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles from 2400 to 2250 will be carried out within 12 months starting from December 30, 1980. It is understood that dismantling and destruction of these surplus systems will continue throughout the period until completion on December 31, 1981, and that Article XI, Paragraph 3 of the Treaty will be made to correspond to this understanding. The US is prepared to drop its proposals for an explicit reductions schedule and the requirement that all systems be rendered observably inoperable by June 30, 1980.

*ICBM Fractionation*

We agree that the number of warheads on existing types of ICBMs should be limited to the maximum number with which each type has been tested or deployed prior to November 1, 1978; and that the maximum number of warheads on the new type permitted under the Treaty will be ten. We agree further that the maximum number of warheads on ASBMs would be ten also. In addition, with respect to SLBMs, the limit on warheads will be 14.

*Telemetry*

The US side confirms that there is mutual agreement on the language of the Common Understanding to Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the draft treaty dealing with the issue of telemetry, and that this agreement is based upon the mutual understanding that telemetric information is relevant to verification.

II. Concerning the other issues listed in your oral message:

*Protocol Expiration*

The US side accepts the proposal of the Soviet side with respect to the date of December 31, 1981, for expiration of the Protocol.

*Unarmed Pilotless Vehicles*

The US side continues to believe that the issue of unarmed pilotless vehicles and their relationship to the agreed limitation on cruise missiles is best dealt with by a type rule which requires that these two classes of vehicles will have externally observable distinguishing design features. The US side does not find justified or practical and cannot accept a limitation on the number of unarmed pilotless vehicles. However, in an effort to meet the concerns of the Soviet side on this issue, the US is prepared to accept a ban on the conversion of unarmed pilotless vehicles to cruise missiles and, conversely, a ban on the conversion of cruise missiles to unarmed pilotless vehicles.

*ALCM Number Average*

We agree that the number of ALCMs capable of a range over 600 kilometers on heavy bombers be limited under the Treaty to an average

of 28. We regard your step on this matter as a positive contribution toward a final agreement. The US side suggests that the respective Delegations be instructed immediately to draft appropriate language reflecting this agreement.

#### *ALCM Numbers on Heavy Bombers*

The US side is prepared to accept the Soviet proposal that the exchange of statements on the deployment of no more than 20 cruise missiles on existing heavy bombers cover all B-52 and B-1 bombers and all Myasishchev and TU-95 heavy bombers which might be deployed during the period of the Treaty. In this context, the US cannot make a statement that it does not plan to deploy more than 20 cruise missiles on any aircraft during the period of the Treaty.

#### *MIRVed Cruise Missiles*

With respect to the testing and deployment of multiple independently targetable warhead cruise missiles, the US reaffirms its willingness to meet Soviet concerns on this issue by agreeing to: (1) a ban on the testing and deployment of all such cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers for the period of the Protocol and (2) a ban on the deployment of such cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers on aircraft for the period of the Treaty. The US believes that its willingness to undertake these commitments constitutes an adequate means of resolving this issue for the purpose of this agreement.

#### *ICBM New Types Definition*

The US side notes that the two sides are in agreement that only one new type of ICBM will be permitted on each side for the period of the Treaty. The US has proposed in Geneva that, in the context of modernization of existing types of ICBMs and subject to the agreed ceilings on launch weight and throw weight, some changes be permitted in those missile parameters included in the definition of new types of ICBMs. We are prepared to pursue this matter further. Specifically, the US has proposed that increases or decreases of up to 5 percent be permitted in these parameters. This is an essential ingredient in the US position for limiting new types of ICBMs.

The US side cannot accept a decrease of 20 percent as has been proposed by the Soviet side. To permit changes of this magnitude in the key parameters for existing types of ICBMs would undercut and negate the effectiveness of the agreed provisions regarding new types of ICBMs. The US reaffirms its position that permitting decreases up to 5 percent in the new types definition is fully adequate to meet the modernization needs of both sides for existing types of missiles. To emphasize this point, the US calls attention to the broad spectrum of new missile designs that would be permitted if the Soviet Union were permitted to

test and deploy ostensibly modified versions of the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missiles with decreases in the relevant parameters of up to 20 percent.

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**235. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 11, 1979.

Dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of March 7.<sup>2</sup> Like you, I feel satisfied with the fact that we are on the threshold of completing the preparation of the strategic arms limitation agreement. I am confident that our compromise proposals, including those transmitted recently through Secretary Vance,<sup>3</sup> on the few outstanding issues make it possible to complete this work really in the nearest future.

As for the question of telemetric information which you raised in your letter, frankly, I am surprised that you return to this issue once again since it has been considered already closed by mutual agreement of the sides.

I must say it straight that from the very beginning the US side introduced into the question of telemetric information many far-fetched things that are not related to the agreement being worked out.

Nevertheless, here again we have shown good will. As a result, during the Geneva meeting of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Vance last December<sup>4</sup> a mutually acceptable formulation was worked out which provides that each side has the right to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, in-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 3/79–5/23/79. No classification marking. Unofficial translation. A covering March 12 memorandum from Tarnoff to Aaron indicates that Dobrynin handed the letter to Warren Christopher that day and that a copy was sent to Vance. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In his March 7 letter to Brezhnev, Carter raised concerns that the issue of telemetry was impeding reaching a final SALT II agreement. He wrote, "My own personal belief is that any encryption of telemetry from the testing of strategic missiles is unnecessary and ill advised." He explained, however, that Soviet acceptance of the Common Understanding and the statement on record at Geneva in connection with it was necessary for U.S. Senate ratification of the treaty. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 233 and 234.

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 229–231.

cluding its encryption, except for those cases when it would impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

We confirm that we intend to strictly adhere to the reached agreement having in mind that in practice there should be no encryption of such telemetric information which could become necessary for verification of the provisions of the concluded Treaty. I would like to remind in this connection that we proposed earlier to the US side that it names a list of parameters transmitted by telemetry which, in its view, would not be subject to encryption.

However, the US side would not come along. It was agreed that in case of any ambiguities in future regarding the telemetric information they will be considered at the Standing Consultative Commission which has been established precisely for the purpose of removing any misunderstandings whenever they arise. Indeed, practice has shown that the Commission effectively performs its duties.

There was even no discussion at all that at the time of including the worked out formulation in the agreement any additional statements or interpretations would be made.

Meanwhile, on January 31, when the understanding on telemetric information, worked out by the Ministers, was technically included in the draft agreement the head of the US delegation accompanied the text with a statement which cannot be considered otherwise but as an attempt to undermine the reached understanding.

Suffice it to point out the assertion contained in that statement to the effect that “*any* encryption of telemetric information could impede verification.” It is perfectly clear indeed that such an assertion obviously contradicts the text of the very formulation which speaks of the right to encrypt telemetric information *except for those cases* when it impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

Ambiguous, to say the least, is also the point contained in the said statement to the effect that the use in future of “such for example, encryption” of telemetric information which was used by the Soviet side in some tests in the past would contradict the agreement. Such statement can be interpreted in such a way as if *all encryption* which was used in the cases in question would be illegal as applicable to the agreement. This would again put in doubt the right of the sides, embodied in the earlier agreed formulation, to encrypt telemetric information about those parameters which are not regulated by the agreement and thus are not related to the verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

Therefore it is quite natural that the Soviet delegation could not pass in silence over the unilateral statement made by the US delegation at the inclusion of the formulation on telemetric information worked

out by the Ministers in the agreement. On its part, it stated at once that this formulation does not require additional interpretations.

Thus, Mr. President, if there is someone who undermines the achieved agreement on telemetric information the guilty ones should certainly be looked for among representatives not of the Soviet but of the US side. Evidently, it would not take you much effort to find them.

We confirm our readiness to consider the question of telemetric information resolved having in view the inclusion in the agreement of the formulation on this subject worked out earlier with the understanding that in case of any ambiguities in future regarding telemetric information they will be referred to the Standing Consultative Commission. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is instructed to proceed exactly from this.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will also give appropriate instructions on this matter to the US delegation.

Sincerely,

**L. Brezhnev**<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears Brezhnev's typed signature.

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## **236. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

JCSM-77-79

Washington, March 16, 1979.

SUBJECT

SALT

1. In accordance with our memorandum<sup>2</sup> of 12 October 1978, we have conducted an assessment<sup>3</sup> of the emerging SALT II agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 54, SALT: 3/79. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> JCSM-321-78, 12 October 1978, "SALT II in Perspective (U)" [Footnote is in the original. For a summary of JCSM-321-78, see Document 220.]

<sup>3</sup> Assessment distributed through SAO channels; cite no. TSC 565723/79 [Footnote is in the original.]

2. Throughout our efforts to reach a final judgment on the strategic implications of SALT II, we have been deeply concerned by a number of ambiguities which, if left unresolved, would render the agreement seriously flawed. In our judgment, unless these ambiguities are favorably resolved before the treaty is signed, SALT II cannot be considered to serve the national security interest.

a. *Verification.* Capturing Soviet fractionation potential is such a fundamental objective, and our already fragile verification capability is so central to success, that any ambiguity on limits or any impediments to verification would raise serious doubts as to the integrity of the agreement as a whole. In particular, we believe it is essential to gain explicit Soviet acknowledgment of these ICBM fractionation limits: SS-17=4; SS-18=10; SS-19=6. We strongly support the President's commitment not to sign a SALT II treaty that cannot be adequately verified and, in our view, access to unencrypted telemetry that is essential for verification is an irreducible requirement without which Soviet adherence to fractionation limits and other critical constraints cannot be assured. We believe that these US understandings and interpretations regarding verification must be excluded from further negotiation or concession on our part and clearly recognized by the Soviets.

b. *Protocol.* If it were within the realm of practicality, we would prefer that the Protocol be dropped altogether in that its restrictions apply principally to US systems. Even though the Protocol has little practical near-term effect from a programmatic standpoint, our broader concern is that such a "temporary" device may become the baseline of an unnegotiated extension. In view of the Soviet theater nuclear threat, especially the SS-20, extending Protocol limitations on SLCM and GLCM without suitable Soviet concessions would be very harmful to Western security and undoubtedly would cause serious problems with our Allies. We recognize that the three-tiered approach is probably too deeply imbedded in the foundation of SALT II to be dislodged at this stage of the negotiations. Even so, we believe it is essential that US policy on the Protocol be clearly articulated, preferably by Presidential declaration, to include full assurance that no restrictions in the Protocol will be precedential.

c. *Noncircumvention.* No interpretation of noncircumvention provisions in SALT II must interfere with our options to share with our NATO Allies the technology required to counter the Soviet long-range theater nuclear threat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that US policy on this issue should be explicit and unmistakable (both to the Soviets and to our Allies) and should be made by a Presidential declaration.

d. *MX Basing.* One of the dominant factors in the eroding strategic balance is the growing vulnerability of the US land-based ICBM force.

SALT II cannot be permitted to impede programmatic solutions to this problem, and any interpretation of SALT II which forecloses the deployment of MX in an appropriate multiple protective structure (MPS) mode would run counter to US security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that US policy on this issue should be explicit and unmistakable (both to the Soviets and to the American public) and should be made by a Presidential declaration.

3. It is critical that the remaining negotiating issues be satisfactorily resolved. The ones of greatest concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff are that:

a. The armed definition of ALCM not be allowed to be applied to the GLCMs and SLCMs, except as the United States has specified in the Protocol.

b. Unarmed pilotless vehicles not be included in SAL.

c. ICBM "new type" limits be constrained so there truly would be only one new type.

4. Beyond ambiguities in language and intent and the need to resolve the remaining negotiating issues, we have further concerns with some of the more fundamental provisions of the emerging agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently recommended, and would have preferred, more extensive mutual reductions and constraints than SALT II will impose. The emerging treaty is at best an imperfect vehicle for advancing US strategic interests, for, throughout the treaty period, the Soviets will be able to continue with most of their strategic programs, and the numbers and accuracy of their reentry vehicles (RVs) will increase substantially.

5. Primarily as a consequence of actions and inactions extending back at least a decade, essential equivalence will be lost in the early 1980's, with or without the emerging SAL agreement. Contributing heavily to this relative US decline will be the fact that we were unable to negotiate reductions in the 300-plus Soviet MLBMs or to capture the intercontinental-capable Backfire within the SNDV limit. All the Joint Chiefs of Staff share a deep concern over the impact of these systems on the strategic balance in the near term, as well as the longer term breakout potential they represent, and believe our national security interest is not served by failing to constrain these systems further. We prefer action that would redress these imbalances through restructuring of the treaty. Should the treaty not be restructured, these asymmetries will add to the substantial effort already required to redress the strategic balance and keep the US deterrent effective against threats to the United States and its allies.

6. These far-term actions must be accompanied by a longer term resolve to avoid the mistakes of previous years, especially the post-SALT

I period, which have brought the nation to the certain prospect of strategic inferiority. We believe the American public does not adequately understand the magnitude of the Soviet military buildup or of the broader consequences of Soviet strategic superiority in terms of stability, global power relationships, and long-term US interests. The decades of US strategic preeminence and exaggerated expectations over the SALT process have bred a complacency which, in the final analysis, may represent the greatest potential risk in our arms control efforts. Some public figures assert that only by rejecting SALT II can the American public be “shocked” out of this complacency and induced to support the necessary measures to restore parity. We believe the more appropriate course is to cast SALT II in a balanced and realistic perspective, provided the ambiguities and other concerns expressed above can be satisfactorily resolved. SALT II should be acknowledged as a modest but useful framework which gives the United States flexibility to regain ultimate strategic parity, but it is by no means a risk-free panacea nor a substitute for modernization programs.

7. If concluding a SALT II treaty were to contribute to a perpetuation of public complacency, it would clearly not be in the country’s best interests. In such a climate, there would be virtually no prospect of gaining a firm commitment to the R&D and force modernization necessary to redress the strategic balance or of negotiating a follow-on SALT III agreement effecting substantial force reductions in a manner that is compatible with the country’s security interests. It should be recognized that, with or without a SALT II agreement, the strategic balance will continue to erode in the early 1980’s, further aggravating the adverse trends in the overall US-Soviet military balance. We highlighted in our memorandum<sup>4</sup> of 26 December 1978, which forwarded to you the Joint Strategic Planning Document for FY 1981–1988, that the Soviets have already solidified their conventional superiority over us and that the currently programmed US force does not provide reasonable assurance that we can execute the national military strategy. Under these circumstances, prompt and resolute action to arrest, and ultimately reverse, the steady erosion of our relative strategic posture must become an objective of the highest national priority.

8. We request that you endorse these views and forward this memorandum to the President. Furthermore, we request an opportunity to meet with you and the President to discuss these issues and their im-

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<sup>4</sup> JCSM–359–78, 26 December 1978, “Joint Strategic Planning Document for FY 1981 Through FY 1988 (U)” [Footnote is in the original.]



plications before any final action is taken to consummate a SALT II agreement.<sup>5</sup>

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**David C. Jones**

*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

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<sup>5</sup> According to a June 12 memorandum from Fritz Ermarth of the NSC Staff to Brzezinski, "Harold apparently decided not to send the JCS memo. His office told me 'not to worry; Harold is taking care of this by himself.'" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 54, SALT: 3/79)

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### **237. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1979.

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the discussion of telemetry encryption, I would like to reaffirm our adherence to the agreed common understanding on telemetry that has been recorded in the Joint Draft Text.<sup>2</sup> It is very important that we share a common view of the meaning of the language so as to avoid disagreements on this issue in the future.

We both recognize that certain telemetric information is relevant to verification of the agreement because such telemetry provides information concerning compliance with the provisions of the agreement; and that the deliberate denial of such telemetric information, such as by encryption, is therefore prohibited.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 3/79–5/23/79. No classification marking. A March 22 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter to the Summary of Conclusions of the SCC meeting of March 21 indicates that the President intended for this letter to close out the telemetry issue and that it was to be accompanied by an oral note to be transmitted by Vance to Dobrynin that reads: "I also wanted to clarify a possible misinterpretation regarding our citing of the July 29 and December 21 SS–18 tests in connection with the Common Understanding on this issue. We are not asserting that all encryption used in the tests we cited would be illegal. These tests, however, included some encryption of information which, in the case of a new or a modified missile, would impede the verification of specific characteristics limited by the agreement." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 235.

We also both recognize that certain telemetric information is not relevant to verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and that the deliberate denial of that information which is not relevant to verification of the provisions of the agreement, such as by encryption, is therefore not prohibited.

It is my hope and expectation that the negotiating record on this issue may be considered complete and that with the agreed common understanding and this letter we can consider the telemetry issue as resolved.

This is another indication that we continue to make progress in settling the outstanding issues and that we can, in the near future, complete the agreement and have our long delayed meeting.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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**238. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1979.

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #96

[Omitted here is information unrelated to SALT II.]

*2. Alert*

*Soviets Still Seek Two New ICBMs in SALT?*

You should be aware of the possibility that one of the critical issues presumably settled between Vance and Dobrynin (the test constraints to ensure only one new ICBM) may not be resolved. Moreover, the Soviets may attempt to use the pressure of the summit to wring a crucial technical concession from us that will permit them to build two and not just one new ICBM.

We have had intelligence that indicates that the Soviet Union is developing a new lighter missile to replace the aging SS-11s. All the nego-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 29, NSC Weekly Reports, 4-9, 1979. Top Secret; Codeword. Sent for information.

tiations on new ICBM parameters seemed aimed at permitting just such a development in addition to developing another new MIRV missile under the ICBM exception in the agreement.

They finally accepted our position that anything that varied more than  $\pm 5\%$  would be considered a new missile, but with one qualification: the Soviets want to be able to test a missile with a payload and launch weight significantly lighter than the existing missiles. We have agreed to this on the theory that if the Soviets want to offload warheads on an existing missile and still hit Kamchatka, they could reduce launch weight by offloading fuel. However, it is not at all clear that the Soviets have agreed that the weight reductions will be due to offloading fuel. Indeed the position, tabled in Geneva after Cy and Dobrynin presumably reached agreement, does not specify fuel offloading. If we fail to specify this point, then the Soviets can simply use this qualification to develop the new lighter single warhead missile they have planned all along.<sup>2</sup>

I believe we should brace ourselves for the possibility that the Soviets will try to roll us over on this technical issue in the final days before the summit.

This would be fully consistent with their negotiating strategy in SALT I where they sought at the last minute and obtained from Nixon an increase of 15% in diameter and depth of ICBM silos which permitted them to deploy a whole new generation of ICBMs (the SS-17/19).

I also note that the Soviets did not announce that the major substantive SALT issues had been completed. Moreover, their announcement of the summit date and place described it as “tentative.”<sup>3</sup> The Soviets apparently may not appreciate the fact that if the SALT agreement permits them to build two new missiles it may well not be ratified by the Senate.

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<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote “We should head this off now—You & Cy advise” in the margin next to this paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> On May 10, Vance announced at the White House that he and Dobrynin had concluded their negotiations on the remaining issues and the U.S. and Soviet SALT Delegations in Geneva had been instructed to incorporate those agreements into the Joint Draft Text. He also announced that the time and location for a summit were under discussion. Brown also made a statement endorsing the agreement. For the text of both Vance’s and Brown’s statements, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1979, p. 23. The next day, Soviet news agency TASS also reported the agreement and announced that the summit was “tentatively” set for June 15–18 in Vienna. (*The New York Times*, May 13, 1979, p. E1)

239. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Vienna, June 16, 1979, 5:35–7:20 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The President  
 Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
 General David Jones  
 Mr. Hamilton Jordan  
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
 Ambassador Ralph E. Earle II  
 Mr. Jody Powell  
 General George Seignious  
 Mr. Roger Molander  
 Mr. D. Arensburger, Interpreter

*USSR*

President Leonid I. Brezhnev  
 Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko  
 Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov  
 Mr. K.U. Chernenko  
 Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
 Marshal Nikolay Vasil'yevich Ogarkov  
 Ambassador V.P. Karpov  
 Mr. Korniyenko  
 Mr. Aleksandrov-Agentov  
 Mr. Rochetrov  
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

## SUBJECT

## SALT II

President Carter, in his capacity as host at this meeting, invited President Brezhnev to speak first.

Brezhnev, reading from prepared notes, said that there was no need for him to speak in detail about the great significance of the SALT II Treaty which he and the President would be signing shortly. This was an event of major significance far beyond the framework of the bilateral relations of our two countries. Working out that Treaty had proven to be no easy task. Frankly, its completion had required an un-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 6/79. Secret. This meeting took place at the U.S. Embassy. President Carter arrived in Vienna for the summit with Brezhnev on June 15. Documentation on the summit is scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

justifiably long period of time. In part, this was because we were dealing with a complex and diverse subject at the negotiations. He was recalling this only to be sure that the two sides took good care of what had been achieved with such difficulty.

The President indicated agreement.

Brezhnev continued that the SALT II Treaty would not, of course, be enough to end an arms race. The Treaty contained what it had proven possible to achieve at this stage. He wanted to say frankly that the Soviet Union was not satisfied with everything contained in that Treaty. It had to make some hard decisions before agreeing to some of the Treaty provisions. But in general he thought that it could be stated that the Treaty, in its present form, met the interests of both states and was consistent with the principle of equality and equal security. He thought that the President shared this view because otherwise there would have been no Treaty.

The President concurred.

Brezhnev continued by saying that thus, we now had before us a fully agreed text of the Treaty and the other associated documents, which were ready to be fully approved and were prepared for signature. It had been agreed that the two Presidents would make several statements.

Brezhnev said that, to begin with, the two Presidents, as agreed, had to make identical statements on the question of new types of cruise missile carrier aircraft. Brezhnev read the following statement:

“The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that it has no plans to deploy during the term of the SALT II Treaty new types of aircraft equipped with more than 20 cruise missiles capable of a range of over 600 kilometers.”

Brezhnev continued that secondly, the President had to make a unilateral statement, to be handed over in writing, to the effect that modernized U.S. Minuteman II ICBM launchers did not contain Minuteman III missiles and did not have the capability of launching such missiles.

Brezhnev continued that by way of the third item, he was making the following unilateral statement:

“The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet Tu–22M airplane called Backfire in the USA, is a medium-range bomber and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not in-

crease the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate.”

Brezhnev handed over a written copy of the statement (attached).<sup>2</sup> He wanted to emphasize that this statement was being made strictly as an act of good will because the airplanes in question were not within the category of arms being limited by the Treaty. Also, in a spirit of good will and taking into account the desires expressed by the President personally, Brezhnev could add that if the U.S. side considered it necessary to state publicly that according to its own information, the production rate of this airplane did not exceed 30 per year, the Soviet side would not deny that in any form.

Brezhnev continued that once the President had made the two statements he had mentioned earlier, that is, with respect to new types of cruise missile carrier aircraft and on modernization of Minuteman II launchers, all issues pertaining to signing the SALT II Treaty could be considered fully resolved. Today we should also address the question of further steps to be taken after the signing of the SALT II Treaty. Clearly, until that Treaty had been ratified by both sides, and until it had entered into force, it could not bind the two sides in form or in fact. Accordingly, it was in the mutual interest of both sides to ensure ratification of the Treaty. Of course, how this was accomplished was a domestic matter for each of the sides, but inasmuch as the ultimate result would affect both sides, Brezhnev wanted to discuss this matter in brief. In the Soviet Union, the Treaty and all associated documents would be considered very thoroughly by the USSR Supreme Soviet, but Brezhnev was sure—he wanted to repeat, he was sure—that the supreme legislative body of the Soviet Union will ratify the Treaty in the form in which it was now agreed and in the form in which it would be signed by the two Presidents. As Brezhnev understood it, the situation in the United States was different. There were numerous opponents of the Treaty—Brezhnev emphasized that he was speaking of the U.S.—but they were very vulnerable in one respect. These opponents, in speaking out against the Treaty, were thereby exposing themselves as being against an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and against disarmament and in favor of the arms race and, in the final analysis, they were proponents of war. Brezhnev did not believe that it would be to the benefit of such politicians to be seen by the American people in that role. The Soviet leadership believed that the members of the U.S. Administration, including the President personally, took this into account when making statements on this subject. The Soviet leadership adhered to the same approach in its contacts with visiting U.S. public figures. It

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<sup>2</sup> Not attached. The statement is also printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 1079.

seemed to Brezhnev that if the leaders of our two countries were to make parallel statements along these lines, the opponents of the Treaty would be unable to achieve their goal. Opponents of the Treaty made it sound as if somehow the Treaty was advantageous only to the Soviet Union and as if the Soviet Union devoted all its thoughts to striking the U.S. The President was, of course, fully aware of the absurdity of such arguments. Brezhnev already had occasion to say that in the area of defense the Soviet Union was doing only what was necessary for the security of its country, its friends and its allies. The Soviet Union was not doing anything beyond that. Brezhnev, in his capacity as Chairman of the highest Soviet military body, that is, the Defense Council, could state with full authority that Soviet military doctrine did not provide for first use by the Soviet Union of nuclear or conventional arms. He wanted to repeat that the Soviet Union had no intention of being first to use arms against the U.S. or against its NATO allies. Brezhnev would be happy to hear the President make a similar statement on behalf of the United States. If such statements were made publicly, that would be of enormous significance, including from the standpoint of entry into force of the SALT II Treaty. That would be a major setback to those who have already been speaking of making ratification contingent on adoption of amendments, and to those who were advocating a step-up in new military programs. Brezhnev wanted to say quite frankly that based on considerations of reality, the only treaty which was acceptable to the Soviet Union was the one which would be signed shortly by the two Presidents. That was the only treaty that could enter into force. There must be no lack of clarity on that score.

There was one other point that Brezhnev wanted to touch on before proceeding to SALT III. Naturally, the Soviet leadership had noted the statement recently made in Washington, and approved personally by the President, concerning plans to develop and deploy the new MX ICBM.<sup>3</sup> He wanted to say quite candidly that adoption of that decision, especially on the eve of the signing of the SALT II Treaty, could hardly be viewed as promoting the objectives of that Treaty, that is, to limit strategic offensive arms and to curb the arms race in general. It was difficult to understand why this was done, especially at a time when the peoples of virtually the entire world were awaiting the signing of the SALT II Treaty and its entry into force. After all, adoption of that decision in effect meant building a foundation for the further intensification of the arms race and, Brezhnev wanted to repeat, this was directly contrary to the objectives we would be agreeing to in signing the SALT II

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<sup>3</sup> The full text of Deputy Press Secretary Granum's remarks, June 8, on Carter's decision to deploy the MX missile, an ICBM in a mobile basing mode, is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 1016.

Treaty. He was not even speaking of the discussions in the U.S. of alternative deployment modes at multiple sites, that is, the silo and tunnel modes, which would be contrary to the present Treaty. He had already said that clearly any deployment mode which prevented verification by national technical means of the deployment of strategic missiles would be tantamount to undermining follow-on negotiations and the prospects for concluding a SALT III Treaty.

Brezhnev continued that with respect to further negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, they must begin after entry into force of the SALT II Treaty. It had already been agreed that, like the SALT II negotiations, the follow-on negotiations must strictly adhere to the principle of equality and equal security. Some guidelines have already been drafted for the follow-on negotiations, others have to be considered thoroughly. Clearly, it was necessary to address those issues which were not covered by the SALT II Treaty, but which were subject to the interim and short-term Protocol. He was referring, in particular, to sea-based and land-based long-range cruise missiles. Without these, the Treaty would lose much in value. Furthermore, in working out the SALT III Treaty, it was necessary to take into account such strategic factors as the potential in nuclear and missile forces of NATO allies and, of course, of China. These were very significant factors from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. The President, no doubt, was fully aware of the significance of that problem for the Soviet Union. The question of how to involve these countries in the process of limiting strategic offensive arms was certainly a difficult question. Still, it had to be resolved because one could not seriously expect that the Soviet Union and the U.S. would again and again reduce their missile and nuclear arsenals, while the other countries were continuing to build them up. In any event, such a prospect was not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev continued that at SALT III negotiations, it was also mandatory to consider U.S. forward-based nuclear systems. After all, these forces were targeted to cover a major portion of the territory of the Soviet Union. No one could deny that. In the West there was frequent talk of a "gray zone." That concept was rather "foggy." At the same time, it had to be noted that Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft could not reach U.S. territory, while U.S. short range systems, deployed in Europe and in adjacent areas, certainly could strike Soviet territory. Under these conditions it was very difficult to determine which of these systems were "gray" and which were "black." The Soviet Union was prepared to discuss with all relevant countries any types of arms on a reciprocal basis. Specifically, the Soviet Union was also prepared to discuss medium-range arms in Europe, but such a discussion necessarily had to involve U.S. forward-based systems, that is, U.S. nuclear



systems. Pointing to a matchbook on the table, Brezhnev said that if this were a missile capable of a range of 10 kilometers (prompted by Gromyko, the Soviet interpreter said 100 or several hundred kilometers), it would not be included among intercontinental-range missiles. Nevertheless, it could strike very important centers in the Soviet Union. How could one but take into account such arms? In short, there were numerous problems. We would yet have occasion to exchange views on that score, but at present the important thing was to conclude the SALT II Treaty.

The President said in response that first he wanted to address SALT II issues and would subsequently respond to Brezhnev's other points.

Brezhnev remarked that he was in favor of such an approach.

The President said the SALT II Treaty which we were now preparing to sign, was the result of ten years of effort, involving skill and patience, and our success was greatly attributable to Brezhnev's personal efforts working with three U.S. Presidents. It was very important in itself to constrain nuclear weapons, as this was described in the SALT II Treaty. Brezhnev had been correct in pointing out that the SALT II Treaty was part of a continuing process which ultimately would lead to much greater control of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The President noted that Brezhnev had been a superb negotiator and had served his country well, and on most issues where the debate was long and difficult, it appeared to us that the Soviet Union had prevailed.

At this time, the President wanted to make his response on the question of cruise missiles:

"The Government of the United States states that it has no plans to deploy during the term of the SALT II Treaty new types of aircraft equipped with more than 20 cruise missiles capable of a range of over 600 kilometers."

Brezhnev noted that this applied to the term of the SALT II Treaty and the President concurred.

The President next made a statement on U.S. Minuteman launchers:

"The United States has 450 Minuteman II launchers and 550 Minuteman III launchers operationally deployed; there are no Minuteman III missiles in Minuteman II launchers; Minuteman II launchers are not capable of launching Minuteman III missiles, and if we convert Minuteman II launchers to give them a capability for launching Minuteman III missiles, they would have to have externally observable design features which would distinguish them from Minuteman II launchers."

The President handed a copy of the text to Brezhnev.

The President then turned to the Backfire bomber. He said that we have agreed to conclude at this time our long discussions about the Soviet bomber, called Backfire in the U.S. As Brezhnev knew, the United States had serious concerns about the capabilities and potential mission of this bomber, but in the interests of completing SALT II, the U.S. had agreed to exclude the Backfire from the SALT II aggregate limits, conditioned on the Soviet Union's making a statement on this issue. Brezhnev had made a statement to us. The two sides had also agreed that the President would respond. The President wanted to say that this statement was important, and he acknowledged receipt of it. The United States entered into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the Soviet statement which the U.S. regarded as a commitment that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not significantly increase the range/payload capability of this airplane in any manner, and will not produce this aircraft at a rate of more than 30 per year. The United States considered the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the SALT II agreement. As the President understood it, Brezhnev agreed that the maximum production rate of the Backfire would not exceed 30 per year. Would Brezhnev state that the maximum production rate of the Backfire would not exceed 30 per year?

Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that no answer was required.

The President asked for confirmation that this was the basis on which we would be signing the SALT II Treaty. He added that the U.S. had the right to an aircraft comparable to the Backfire.

The President wanted to turn to the issue of verification which would be, we believed, a major focus not only of our discussions now but as we move towards our negotiations on SALT III. He noted that he could not stress too strongly the utmost importance of the ability to verify compliance to the relations between our two countries, to the prospects for ratification, and to the success of future negotiations. He said that the agreement cannot survive if the United States determines that our monitoring efforts are being impeded.

The President wanted to turn now to a special element of verification, telemetry encryption, a subject which was vital to ratification of the SALT agreement and to the viability of the agreement after it entered into force. We have, after long and complex negotiations, successfully settled this question, adequate to conclude the SALT II Treaty. Our understanding was that the USSR agreed with us that certain telemetric information was relevant to verification of the provisions of the agreement because such telemetric information provided information concerning compliance with the provisions of the agreement, and that the deliberate denial of such telemetric information, such as by encryption, was therefore prohibited. And our understanding was also that

we agreed that certain telemetric information was not relevant to verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and that the deliberate denial of that information which was not relevant to verification of the provisions of the agreement, such as by encryption, was therefore not prohibited.

The President asked Brezhnev to confirm that his understanding of this aspect of the encryption matter was the same as ours, because this particular issue was critically important in connection with entry into force of the Treaty.

Brezhnev said that this question had been discussed on numerous occasions by Gromyko and Vance.

Gromyko confirmed that he had discussed this matter with Vance on several occasions, while the SALT Delegations have discussed it dozens, perhaps hundreds, of times. It had been agreed that there must be no encryption of information involving parameters covered by the Treaty. He wanted to repeat, there must be no encryption of information involving parameters covered by the Treaty. Though he hoped that no misunderstandings would arise on this score, if they did, they could be considered in the Standing Consultative Commission. Accordingly, an understanding had been reached on that score.

Brezhnev agreed with Gromyko's statement. Brezhnev continued that in short, the sides must not encrypt that telemetry information which was necessary for verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. That is, they must not impede verification by national technical means of compliance with parameters governed by the Treaty. The Soviet side had proposed to discuss compilation of a specific list of data which must not be encrypted. The President's representatives, however, had refused to do so, and it was agreed that in the event of ambiguities in the future, they would be considered in the Standing Consultative Commission. Thus, the Soviet Union proceeded from that premise.

The President said that we proceeded on the basis of that Soviet understanding.

The President wanted to address several points which concerned him. He thought that Brezhnev's statement that until the Treaty was ratified its provisions were not binding on the two sides constituted a departure from past experience and from international custom. The U.S. was prepared to take no action which would be inconsistent with the terms of the Treaty from the time of signature. He hopes that the USSR would make the same commitment. The President noted that this was the case with the limited test ban treaty and with the Vladivostok understanding. He considered this to be consistent with international law. He knew of no case in which two sides had signed an agreement that they did not abide by immediately. We were prepared to abide by

the provisions of the Treaty from the time of signature and requested the Soviet Union to do the same.

Brezhnev replied that Gromyko had discussed this matter with Vance on dozens of occasions.

Gromyko said that it had been discussed yesterday.

The President could not understand why the Soviet side was unwilling to agree to that.

Gromyko said that there was no international tradition, no universally accepted tradition, under which treaties or agreements entered into force immediately after signing, if they required ratification. The Soviet Union had concluded over 11,000 agreements and treaties with other states, but not one of these agreements or treaties had entered into force automatically if it required ratification. The sides were not bound by provisions of treaties or agreement which had not entered into force. He had previously discussed this matter at length with Vance. Today Brezhnev had made a statement of principle on that score. The Soviet position remained as stated. The Soviet Union retained that position.

Brezhnev asked what was troubling the President.

The President said that he would pursue this matter one more time. Obviously, this would have to be a Soviet decision. He wanted to hope, however, that once he and Brezhnev had reached an agreement on behalf of our two countries, that agreement would be binding. Previously we had extended the provisions of the SALT I agreement beyond expiration of the Interim Agreement on the basis of the word of the President of the USSR and the President of the U.S. He also wanted to point out that, as he had mentioned earlier, despite the fact that the U.S. still had not ratified the limited test ban treaty, all terms of that treaty were being honored. He thought that a departure from that practice would set a bad precedent and it was of concern to us. He would not pursue this matter further because this was a decision to be taken by the Soviet Union. But he was concerned about a departure from previous practice. No matter what the Soviet Union would do, it was the President's intent not to undertake any actions which would be inconsistent with the SALT II Treaty.

Brezhnev said that it was time to turn to the next question because we had spent too much time on a totally clear issue.

The President noted Brezhnev's statement that the Soviet Union had no intention of being the first to use conventional arms or nuclear arms against any other country, that is, that it would not engage in "first use." If a statement were to be prepared along these lines, covering conventional arms, as well as nuclear arms, we would be prepared to agree to such a statement. The President thought that if we

could pursue this further, perhaps we could make a joint statement if its wording could be agreed upon.

Brezhnev thought that this would be possible.

The President said that another issue frequently being raised by the Soviet Union concerned the U.S. decision to develop the MX missile. He wanted to point out that the MX was not nearly as formidable a system as the Soviet SS-18 missile and that in throw-weight and other characteristics it was equivalent to the SS-19. This was not a new or drastic escalation of weapons in a qualitative sense beyond what the Soviet Union was familiar with over years of experience.

Moreover, as the President had informed Brezhnev in an earlier personal message, deployment of the MX, when developed, would not involve its exclusion from verification by national technical means.

The President noted that Brezhnev, in referring to the Protocol, had spoken of the need to extend it while discussing further arms limitation in SALT III. These matters would be negotiated, but extension of the Protocol was not a presumption at this point. It would be part of negotiations, of future SALT agreements. The Protocol terms should not be assumed to be precedential. The Protocol would expire in accordance with the terms already negotiated.

The President noted that several times Brezhnev had mentioned future discussion of the SS-20, the Backfire, the SS-4 and the SS-5, and U.S. forward-based systems, as well as the arms of our allies and China. Inasmuch as the next session would be devoted to future negotiations, he thought that we could discuss these matters tomorrow.

Brezhnev expressed the view that today we have had useful discussion on some issues, while on others we had repeated what we had said on previous occasions, but repetition was the mother of learning. He was pleased with the course of today's discussion.

## 240. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Vienna, June 18, 1979, 11:50 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Fifth and Last Plenary Meeting Between President Carter and President Brezhnev

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

The President  
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
General David Jones  
Mr. Hamilton Jordan  
General G. Seignious  
Mr. Frank Moore  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Mr. Joseph Powell  
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew  
Mr. Jerrold Schecter  
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

#### *U.S.S.R.*

President L.I. Brezhnev  
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Marshal D.F. Ustinov  
Mr. K.U. Chernenko  
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko  
Marshal N.V. Ogarkov  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov  
Mr. L.M. Zamyatin  
Mr. V.G. Komplektov  
Mr. A.M. Vavilov  
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

President Carter said that President Brezhnev and he had agreed between them that this meeting would be brief, to enable them to get back on schedule and be on time for the signing ceremony.

The President said he considered this conference in Vienna to have been very satisfactory to him personally, to our nation and, he hoped, to the Soviet Union and the world at large. The signing of the SALT II

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 6/79. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. Drafted by Krimer on June 21.

Treaty in a few minutes will be a historic contribution to world peace. The President expressed his gratitude to Brezhnev for his leadership role in making this achievement possible. His own hope and belief is that the SALT II Treaty will be a basis on which it will be possible more expeditiously to conclude discussions leading to agreement between our two countries on many other matters. At their private meeting this morning he and President Brezhnev had agreed to increase the frequency of meetings between them, and had extended mutual invitations to visit their respective countries. The President looked forward to the opportunity of exchanging visits without having to wait for a crisis or some other momentous event, simply for the purpose of routine discussions of issues and for the purpose of understanding each other better. The President also remarked that he and Brezhnev had agreed that the two Presidents at such routine meetings would be in a position to correct the mistakes that would inevitably be made by their Foreign Ministers. (Foreign Minister Gromyko protested vigorously.)

The President said that he and Brezhnev had agreed that in the relations between our nations they would never act in such a way as to threaten peaceful relations between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to avoid misunderstandings between our countries, they will also continue their personal correspondence to keep each other informed of questions of mutual interest. Finally, they both greatly valued the statements each had made and had listened to each other with great care. Both had agreed to examine each other's statements with additional care when they returned home. Each had in particular remarked on the substantive conformity of and correlation between the plans Brezhnev had suggested for future arms talks and the ideas on arms control the President had put forward. He hoped they would be able to build on these without further delay as they moved toward SALT III. To summarize, the President said he was grateful for the progress achieved and hoped to continue making progress in their common work in the future.

Reading from a prepared statement, Brezhnev noted that he and President Carter had the same view—that conclusion of the SALT II Treaty should generate more favorable conditions and, he would say, a more favorable climate for solving other problems of Soviet-American relations.

[Omitted here is Brezhnev's statement on the need for better U.S.–USSR bilateral ties, institutional contacts, and regularization of trade. Brezhnev complained that “discriminatory legislation” had brought these contacts and trade to “a state of stagnation.” Carter responded that he did not have time to respond to Brezhnev's points,

since they must shortly sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, but he would have Secretary Vance investigate the problems.]<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The Joint Communiqué issued on June 18 in Vienna is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 1081–1087.

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#### 241. Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms<sup>1</sup>

Vienna, June 18, 1979.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,<sup>2</sup>

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: *Documents on Disarmament*, 1979, pp. 189–198. The Treaty was signed by Carter and Brezhnev at the summit. The Protocol to the Treaty, also signed at Vienna, is Document 242. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty; the Memorandum of Understanding on a database on numbers of strategic offensive weapons and U.S. and Soviet statements on the numbers of weapons on the date of the Treaty signing, signed by Earle and Karpov; the Statement of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations, signed by Carter and Brezhnev, are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1979, pp. 199–221. All are also printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 1051–1079. Brezhnev's and Carter's remarks on signing the Treaty are *ibid.*, pp. 1079–1081.

<sup>2</sup> Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Basic Principles in Moscow; see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–635.



Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament,

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article I

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty.

#### Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.

3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:

(a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types;

(b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above;

(c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and

(d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs.

4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.

5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the

types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

6. ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs.

7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX.

### Article III

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.

2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.

3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

6. Reductions of the numbers of the strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI.

### Article IV

1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.

3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two percent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

5. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements;

(b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers;

(c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.

7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose.

9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.

10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date.

11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy bombers.

#### Article V

1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320.

2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200.

3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

#### Article VI

1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) in the final stage of construction;
- (c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.

2. Those arms in the final stage of construction are:

- (a) SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea trials;
- (b) ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped for such missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed;

(c) other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility after they have been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed.

3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows:

(a) fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first definitely indicates that they are being so converted;

(b) SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine first goes to sea after their conversion has been performed.

4. ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such conversion has been performed.

5. A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. A bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

#### Article VII

1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training.

2. The parties agree that:

(a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training;

(c) there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in Article III.

Article VIII

1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II.

Article IX

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;

(d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or

(f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.

## Article X

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

## Article XI

1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following periods from that date: four months for ICBM launchers; six months for SLBM launchers; and three months for heavy bombers.

3. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated no later than January 1, 1981, shall be carried out throughout the ensuing twelve-month period, and shall be completed no later than December 31, 1981.

4. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time, but not later than six months after the entry into force of this Treaty.

## Article XII

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner.

## Article XIII

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

## Article XIV

The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration.

## Article XV

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

## Article XVI

1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory.

2. The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

## Article XVII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972.<sup>3</sup>

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unin-

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<sup>3</sup> The memorandum of understanding was signed by Gerard Smith and Semenov in Geneva; it is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1973, pp. 60–61. See also Document 11.



tended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling or destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979.

#### Article XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

#### Article XIX

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**242. Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms<sup>1</sup>**

Vienna, June 18, 1979.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty,

Have agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs from such launchers.

Article II

1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.

3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, respectively.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: *Documents on Disarmament: 1979*, pp. 198–199. The Protocol was signed by Carter and Brezhnev at the summit.

Done at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The evening of his return to Washington on June 18, President Carter addressed a joint session of Congress to announce the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in Moscow and outline its provisions. His address is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 1087–1092.

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## 243. Editorial Note

On June 22, 1979, President Carter sent the Treaty and Protocol, along with the other related documents, to the Senate for its advice and ratification. For the text of his message, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 1155–1156.

During September and October 1979, the Carter administration discussed ratification of the Treaty at Cabinet meetings. On September 10, the following remarks were made: “Secretary Brown said that the Administration’s view regarding the presence of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba should not be linked to Senate action regarding the SALT II Treaty. He noted, however, the fact that the two are being linked by the American people and by the Senators. The President summarized his view of the status of the Treaty’s consideration in the Senate by observing that each of the major concerns that had been expressed during the Senate debate had been answered, and that he fully anticipated the latest concern over the presence of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba would be satisfactorily resolved so that the Senate could act quickly on SALT II.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 12/21/78–12/13/80)

The Carter administration discussed additional aspects of the Treaty’s path through the Senate at a Cabinet meeting on October 24. The discussion of SALT ratification reads as follows:

“1. The President opened the meeting by asking Lloyd Cutler to briefly summarize the status of the Senate’s consideration of the SALT Treaty.

“—Mr. Cutler noted that the Treaty was being marked-up by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Eight conditions to the Treaty have been added by the Committee, two of which require consent by the Soviet Union. Yesterday the Committee narrowly defeated one so-called ‘killer’ Amendment 8–7, with several more pending before the Committee.

“—The President noted the Treaty represented a very careful balancing of interests and views; that it was fair and verifiable. He asked for the help of the Cabinet in getting Senate support for the passage of the SALT Treaty. He noted how critical the passage of the SALT Treaty is to the conduct of American foreign policy.

“—The President asked Mr. Cutler to circulate SALT briefing papers to members of the Cabinet.

“—Secretary Brown noted that problems facing the Treaty would be as severe on the floor of the Senate as they are before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.” (Ibid.)

The administration also implemented a series of efforts, described as “SALT outreach,” by which it hoped to increase the likelihood of Senate ratification of the Treaty. On December 4, Assistant to the President for Public Liaison Anne Wexler sent a memorandum to President Carter, Special Counsel and Consultant to the President Lloyd Cutler, and White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan in which she provided an update of these activities. She described the SALT outreach activities under the categories of labor/liberal support, which included meetings with a coalition of unions and other groups; business support, which included contacting major corporations; religious support, which included contacting clergymen and using mass mailings; East Room briefings for selected people; media, which included talk show events and press lists; and grass-roots state activities and coordination. Wexler also stated that three additional efforts were being implemented: a Christmas peace/SALT message nationwide; establishment of a working group to coordinate state-by-state strategies with Washington-based activities; and a proposal for a “total SALT strategy” for consideration by the SALT working group. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Box FO-42, Subject File, Foreign Affairs)

**244. Letter From Nineteen Senators to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 17, 1979.

Dear Mr. President:

For some months now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Intelligence Committee have been carefully examining the SALT II agreement to determine if it meets our nation's national security interests. Public hearings on the Treaty have been accompanied by numerous private meetings among Senators of both parties, Administration officials, and other individuals possessing experience and expertise in arms control and related matters.

From the hearings and from those individual meetings, a number of important issues have emerged regarding both the proposed SALT II Treaty and the state of our nation's defense posture.

With respect to the Treaty, we as individual Senators are deeply concerned over certain provisions of, and omissions from, the Treaty. We hope that during the course of Senate deliberations our concerns can be met. We are concerned over the Protocol terms and their precedential effect. We are also concerned over the Treaty provisions relating to "heavy" missiles, verification, limitations on potential basing modes for the MX missile, the threat posed to the United States by the Backfire and other Soviet weapons not limited by the Treaty, and other issues. We are hopeful that these problem areas can be resolved in a manner that strengthens the SALT Treaty and improves the SALT process.

In addition to these Treaty issues, we are also concerned over the ongoing slippage in America's comparative military position, awareness of which has been accentuated by the Senate's deliberations on SALT and by recent international events. In the last decade, the Soviet Union has attained at the very least essential equivalence in strategic weapons, has eliminated NATO's longstanding superiority in theater nuclear forces, and has expanded an already preponderant advantage in ground forces and civil defense capability. Furthermore, the Soviets are reducing our qualitative edge in tactical air forces and have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Office of Congressional Liaison, Beckel, SALT II, Box 232, SALT II: Sen. Sam Nunn, 4/30/79–12/17/79. No classification marking. The letter was signed by the following Senators: Sam Nunn (D-GA), John W. Warner (R-VA), Lawton Chiles (D-FL), Henry Bellmon (R-OK), John Danforth (R-MO), Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN), Harrison Schmitt (R-NM), Pete Domenici (R-NM), Edward Zorinsky (R-NE), John Heinz (R-PA), Daniel Boren (D-OK), Richard Schweiker (R-PA), Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), S.I. Hayakawa (R-CA), J.J. Exon (D-NE), Larry Pressler (R-SD), Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), David Durenberger (R-MN), and Alan Simpson (R-WY).

constructed a navy that, for the first time in modern history, threatens traditional Western supremacy on the high seas. These trends have been accompanied by a growing Soviet and Soviet-sponsored threat to the West's sources of energy and raw materials.

The erosion that has taken place in the East-West military balance can be principally attributed to the failure of the U.S. and our Allies to compete effectively with Moscow in the military arena in the past 15 years. While diverting substantial conventional forces to the conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960's and early 1970's, we remained, in the category of nuclear arms, basically content to live off of capital invested in the 1950's and early 1960's. In so doing, we provided the Soviet Union the opportunity to steal a massive military march on the West. That the Soviets took advantage of that opportunity is no longer questioned.

During the period 1970–1978, the Soviet Union invested a total of \$104 billion more than the United States in military equipment and facilities, and \$40 billion more in research and development. According to the CIA, the Soviet Union is still militarily outspending the United States overall by at least 40 percent annually; in the critical categories of investment in weapons procurement and research and development, they are outspending us by a 2:1 ratio.

We do not believe that the SALT II agreement currently before the Senate can be held directly responsible for this erosion in America's military position. However, during the seven years that the agreement was in negotiation, the hopes for significant arms control did influence our force planning and the support for defense initiatives. Thus, efforts which may have been needed to counter the mounting Soviet threat were delayed, curtailed, or even abandoned. Ratification of a SALT II Treaty will not reverse trends in the military balance adverse to the United States.

We applaud the statements by both you and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown relating to the Five-Year Defense Program.<sup>2</sup> We reserve the right to examine the submittal in detail, but it does represent a positive step in acknowledging the Soviet buildup and in committing to real increases in defense spending and capability.

We have ourselves met on several occasions to discuss those considerations that will be foremost on our minds as the Senate approaches its full floor debate on the Treaty. All of us are agreed that the Treaty issues mentioned above are important and that the manner in which they are resolved will influence our final decision on Treaty ratification.

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<sup>2</sup> Apparent reference to Carter's December 12 remarks to the members of the Business Council on U.S. defense spending. The text is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 2232–2237.

We are also agreed that the SALT II Treaty cannot be judged in a vacuum. In our view, the Treaty represents but one facet of a much broader East-West relationship that encompasses political and economic, as well as military dimensions. Our final judgment on the Treaty will therefore not be confined solely to the merits or flaws of the Treaty alone. We regard the following considerations as crucial:

1. The absence of definitive Administration proposals designed to narrow the strategic nuclear window of vulnerability which will occur during the early and mid-1980's.

2. The longstanding adverse trends in our own defense posture, and the extent to which the Administration's proposed Fiscal 1981 Defense Budget and Five-Year Defense Plan establishes a firm foundation for reversing those trends, in both conventional and nuclear forces. We believe that an objective review must be made in the immediate future as to our manpower procurement problems.

3. The plans and programs envisioned by the Administration to improve our intelligence capabilities, with particular emphasis on investment in high-technology collection systems and professional analytic resources. The need is also apparent to reconstitute our sensitive operational intelligence capabilities.

4. The impact of the SALT II Treaty on our ability in concert with our NATO allies, to modernize European-based nuclear and conventional forces. We are particularly interested in the Administration plans as to the deployment date for ground-launched cruise missiles.

5. The global military and political climate, particularly the increasingly aggressive activities in the Third World of the Soviet Union and its proxies. We are interested in the Administration plans to deter and counter such behavior over the coming decade. We regard such behavior as inconsistent with the underlying spirit of the SALT process.

6. The effect of the Treaty on long-term prospects for meaningful arms control, with respect not only to the attainment in SALT III of "deep cuts" in existing levels of strategic armaments, but also to significant progress in our other arms control efforts such as the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. The SALT process so far has failed to restrain the momentum of the Soviet Union's ongoing military buildup.

We believe that the Salt II debate will provide a unique opportunity not only to examine the Treaty itself, but also to seek a bipartisan consensus on long-range national security strategy and arms control.

Further, we attach great value to the pursuit of arms control, provided it enhances our nation's security. Should circumstances arise in which there are insufficient votes either to strengthen or to ratify the Treaty, we believe that serious consideration should be given to post-

ponement. In view of the unforeseen delays in the Senate debate, persistent worldwide tensions, and national political considerations, any such postponement should be effective through the Presidential and Senatorial elections of 1980. As we have indicated, we regard an effective SALT process as being in our nation's interest.

Each of the undersigned, of course, gives different weight to these individual items but this letter expresses our general concerns. Because of our concerns, largely covered by this letter, we are uncommitted as to how we will cast our votes on the SALT II Treaty and proposed changes.

We look forward to discussing these issues in detail with you and members of your Administration.

Sincerely,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The letter is signed by all 19 Senators. Carter replied in December 19 letters to each of the Senators, noting his "desire to achieve a bipartisan consensus on these issues of long-range national security strategy and arms control." See *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 2256–2257.



**245. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 2, 1980, 1–3:25 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Iran, Christopher Mission to Afghanistan, SALT and Brown Trip to China

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

The Vice President

*State*

Secretary Vance

Deputy Secretary Christopher

*Defense*

Secretary Brown

Deputy Secretary Claytor

*CIA*

Deputy Director Carlucci

*White House*

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Hamilton Jordan

Lloyd Cutler

Jody Powell

David Aaron

**MINUTES**

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

Dr. Brzezinski said the first issue was SALT. The President said that he had talked to Robert Byrd and the Majority Leader wanted to keep SALT on the calendar but not bring it up onto the Floor.<sup>2</sup>

The President said that he had been able to persuade Byrd not to make a statement to that effect when he left the White House. It was the President's view that we ought to leave it on the calendar and maintain our approach of working closely with the Majority Leader on this issue.

Dr. Brzezinski said that SALT was important regardless of our relationship to the U.S.S.R., but we will have to accept that at this time it is not advisable to bring it to a vote. Lloyd Cutler agreed. There was no sense to withdraw it completely since it was in our security interest, but that we cannot get the requisite as long as Iran and Afghanistan are unresolved.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, he thought we should defer bringing it to the Floor but leave it on the calendar. However, if the Soviets veto sanc-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #26 Held 1/2/80, 1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

<sup>2</sup> Carter met with Senator Byrd on December 31 from 2:20 to 2:48 p.m., and they spoke briefly on the telephone late in the evening of January 1. (Ibid., Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> Iranian students seized the Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, taking 52 Americans hostage, and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979.

tions on Iran, we may have to look even at the possibility of withdrawing it from the calendar.

The President said that Robert Byrd had reminded him that the Executive Branch has no control over the Senate's calendar and that he, the President, could not pull it back by himself. However, he indicated that he would be prepared to consult with us and cooperate.

The Secretary of Defense said the most we can do is to keep SALT alive. He thought that as part of our rationale we could explain that SALT was in our global interest, but that since other negotiations, such as the Indian Ocean talks, were affected by the movement into Afghanistan, we would terminate them. We would make clear the Soviets have removed the basis for Indian Ocean arms control which was to reduce great power rivalry in the region. On the other hand, the basis for SALT was to lessen the danger of nuclear war and avoid an arms race in the nuclear area, particularly when our priorities were to increase our conventional capabilities. Therefore, we were not pulling back the SALT Treaty. We were simply not going forward onto the Floor with it.

Dr. Brzezinski said he thought that leaving arms control activities out of the measures of retaliation against the Soviet Union is consistent with the position that had been adopted with our NATO allies. He pointed to the continuation of MBFR in this connection. Moreover, singling out the Indian talks for rejection would be unwise since the Soviets would exploit this with a new Indian government. However, given that it is dead already, he would be in favor of simply leaving it moribund.

Secretary Brown explained that the Indian Ocean negotiations were not concerned with arms control but rather with arms deployments. He said he was tempted to say that this was true for the conventional arms talks as well. Dr. Brzezinski replied that if we are trying to pursue punitive action, this did not help since the Indian Ocean talks were already dead. Moreover, it would not enhance our position or embarrass them because they could turn cancellation of the Indian Ocean talks against us with the Indians.

The Secretary of State agreed with Dr. Brzezinski. As for the conventional arms talks, he felt it should be left on the table. But he would not go forward with the meeting next week between the heads of delegation. On SALT, he thought it was important to leave it on the calendar. He reported that Senator Hart and others had heard that Robert Byrd had urged that we pull it all the way back. The President said no, Senator Byrd did not want to do that.

The Deputy Secretary of State said that the Europeans place great store by SALT. They would like the approach that we are considering. They want to keep other arms control negotiations going. On MBFR,

the ball is in the Soviet court anyway. Our action to defer SALT would be widely understood by our European allies.<sup>4</sup>

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to SALT.]

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<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum of January 3 to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner, Brzezinski informed them that, in accordance with the decision at this NSC meeting, "The SALT Treaty will be left on the Senate calendar. There will be no effort to bring it to the Floor for a vote. Our public posture will be to reaffirm that SALT is important irrespective of the tone of our relationship with the Soviet Union, but, at this time, we do not believe it is advisable to bring it to a vote." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #26 Held 1/2/80, 1/80)

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## 246. Letter From President Carter to Senator Byrd<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 3, 1980.

Dear Senator Byrd:

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.<sup>2</sup>

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #26 Held 1/2/80, 1/80. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> In a speech to the nation on January 4 on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter announced that he had asked the Senate to defer further action on ratification of the SALT II Treaty. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 21–24.

**247. Memorandum From Roger Molander of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 3, 1980.

SUBJECT

Keeping SALT Alive

Based on the President's letter to Senator Byrd,<sup>2</sup> we have been providing press guidance consistent with the objective of keeping the SALT process alive, i.e., maintaining the option of the Senate taking up the SALT II Treaty at a future date. In this context, two issues have been raised:

—Will we and the Soviets continue to informally adhere to the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement?

—If there is a prolonged delay in Senate action on the SALT II Treaty, what actions might the Soviets take with respect to strategic systems covered by the Treaty which would make the ratification issue moot?

On the first issue, the press guidance has been that we intend to continue to informally adhere to the terms of the IA (so long as the Soviets also do so) and, furthermore, that we have no reason to believe that the Soviets will not similarly comport themselves—although we have not explicitly addressed this issue with them. You may recall that the announcement of the informal extension of the IA indicated that we were taking this action “while the SALT II negotiations are being completed.” This implied that the signing of the SALT II agreement would eliminate the need for continued informal adherence to the IA. However, since the Soviets were not willing to agree to a SALT II “standstill,” we decided to take the position that we would continue to informally adhere to the IA pending information on what the Soviets' position on this question would be. At the fall 1979 SCC session, the Soviets did provide data relating to dismantling and new deployments as required under the provisions of the IA. The next time we will get concrete information on whether this continues to be their position will be at the SCC session beginning in mid-March.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #26 Held 1/2/80, 1/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Cutler and Jasper Welch of the NSC Staff.

<sup>2</sup> Document 246.

Since informal Soviet adherence to the provisions of the IA requires dismantling of older SSBNs as new SSBNs are deployed (to meet the 950 SLBM and 62 SSBN limits), we have a military as well as diplomatic interest in their continuing to adhere to this agreement.

With respect to the Soviets' actions which might undercut the SALT II Treaty, the following are near-term possibilities:

- Testing more than one new type of ICBM;
- Initiation of conversion of ICBM launchers to MIRVs above the 820;
- Testing or simulating more than 10 RVs on the SS-18; and
- Encryption of a nature which impedes verification.

You will note that either of the last two actions could take place tomorrow.

One would expect/hope that the Soviets would continue to adhere to the IA and not take any actions inconsistent with the SALT II Treaty. However, we should be prepared to deal with contrary actions and their implications.

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**248. Memorandum From Roger Molander and Madeleine Albright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 16, 1980.

SUBJECT

SALT

The purpose of this memo is to assess the current situation with respect to SALT and related issues to include:

- Continued adherence to the SALT I Interim Agreement;
- Prospects for ratification of the SALT II Treaty; and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT, 12/79–3/80. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Not printed are Tab A, "Continued Adherence to the SALT I Interim Agreement;" Tab B, "Ratification of the SALT II Treaty;" Tab C, "Maintaining the ABM Treaty in the Possible Absence of an Agreement Limiting Strategic Offensive Weapons." On January 11, Molander sent Brzezinski and Aaron a brief memorandum in which he explained that he was preparing this memorandum and on which Brzezinski wrote, "Grim, what is to be done?" (Ibid.)

—Maintaining the ABM Treaty in the possible absence of an agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons.

We will also be working with our colleagues in the coming weeks to include the following topics in this assessment:

- Impact of a SALT delay/failure on M-X;
- Impact of a SALT delay/failure on the defense budget; and
- Impact of a SALT delay/failure on TNF modernization.

Each of the first three issues listed above is treated in detail at Tabs A–C, respectively. A summary of the assessment for each of these issues is provided below.

#### *Interim Agreement (IA)*

It will be in our interest to maintain the informal adherence to the Interim Agreement for the foreseeable future, principally as a means of keeping the SALT process alive. We do not as yet know whether the Soviets are willing to continue to adhere to the IA. We should probably not raise this issue with them until just before (or at) the next SCC session which begins on March 18. When the first Trident SSBN goes on sea trials in July 1980, we will have to initiate dismantling of two Polaris SSBNs. The Navy has already removed two Polaris SSBNs from service, independent of SALT. Procurement of the funds required to dismantle these SSBNs under SALT procedures (about \$5 million) could encounter stiff resistance in the Congress.

#### *SALT II Treaty*

The President's letter to Senator Byrd<sup>2</sup> did not preclude a subsequent request that the Senate take up the Treaty in 1980. Senators up for reelection and the President's political advisors will undoubtedly argue that in the current and projected 1980 environment, a vote for SALT will be a political liability for both Senators and the President—with the worst of both worlds, narrow defeat of the Treaty, a real possibility. Several scheduling problems will also occur if an effort is made to shoe-horn SALT into the mid-1980 Senate calendar. At the same time, none of the basic arguments we have been making for SALT are invalidated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, an environment which would permit these arguments to gain currency (in contrast to the anti-SALT linkage arguments) is unlikely to occur naturally in 1980. While a dedicated effort to create such an environment in 1980 is possible, it is clearly a dubious proposition.

If Senate consideration of the SALT II Treaty is delayed until 1981, there clearly will be internal pressures in the Soviet Union to give up on

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<sup>2</sup> Document 246.

SALT II on the grounds that the prospects for ratification would be worse in 1981 than they appeared prior to the invasion of Afghanistan. The particular irreversible actions which they might take which are restrained by the SALT II Treaty include: (1) deployment of more than 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers; (2) full encryption of all ICBM and SLBM flight tests; and (3) testing of more than 10 RVs on the SS-18.

If Senate consideration of the SALT II Treaty is delayed until 1981, the terms of the Treaty dealing with the dismantling schedule will have to be renegotiated. In addition, the Soviets will probably insist on either extending the Protocol or, in light of our TNF decision, making the SLCM/GLCM negotiation a part of SALT II.

If settlement of the SLCM/GLCM issue is a prerequisite to completion of a new SALT II agreement, we are likely to find ourselves in a full-blown negotiation on long-range TNF in SALT II—with no assurance of being able to reach a settlement in any reasonable period of time.

If Senate consideration of the SALT II Treaty is delayed until 1981, the Treaty under Senate rules will be sent back to the SFRC, new hearings would probably be held, changes in at least the dismantling provisions would have to be made and negotiated with the Soviets, and, even under an optimistic schedule, ratification could not occur before mid-1981.

In light of the problems described above, we could seek Soviet agreement to a more formal “standstill” (i.e., specific agreement to abide by the terms of SALT II pending ratification). However, we unsuccessfully sought Soviet agreement to such a standstill both before and at Vienna. There is no assurance that the Soviets would accept a SALT II standstill in the current environment. Senate reaction would probably be negative. However, we could argue that it takes them off the hook for 1980, and point out that they always have the alternative of taking up the Treaty.

In sum, there are no good alternatives. A SALT vote in 1980 would require an extraordinary act of political courage on the part of the President and many senators. Soviet exercise of restraint until mid-1981 is a matter of hope—and may not be politically possible for the Soviet leadership in the current environment. An effort to achieve a SALT II standstill makes sense, and an initiative along these lines should be attempted as soon as the air clears a little. However, even a successful standstill agreement could leave formidable renegotiation problems in 1981 relating to Protocol duration and future SLCM/GLCM limits.

#### *ABM Treaty*

Because the ABM Treaty limits each side to strategically insignificant ABM levels, it ensures the penetration of not only US ballistic mis-

sile RVs but also those of Great Britain, France, and China. As a consequence, in the absence of an agreement limiting strategic offensive strategic weapons, the Soviets could be motivated to abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM system as a means of negating the retaliatory capability of Chinese, French, and British forces—as well as limit damage in a nuclear war with the US. If the Soviets deployed a nationwide ABM system, we would become increasingly concerned about not only the capability of the deployed system, but also the possibility of upgrading current and projected SAM air defense systems.

The absence of an agreement on offensive weapons could also stimulate Soviet interest in abandoning the ABM Treaty in order to defend their major investment in silo-based ICBMs.

In the absence of an agreement on offensive weapons, there will be increasing interest on the US side (already manifest in some newspaper articles) in abandoning the ABM Treaty and defending an MPS system (race track or vertical shelter) with an ABM system. We do not as yet have an estimate of the cost of an ABM system which would maintain the retaliatory capability projected for the race track MPS in the “with SALT” case—taking into account a probable Soviet ABM system. However, it is clear that the cost of such a system would be prodigious and undoubtedly face severe skepticism as to whether it would actually work.

Both Great Britain and France (and presumably also China) are in the process of designing their follow-on strategic ballistic missile programs for the balance of the century. With the ABM Treaty intact, these nations are virtually guaranteed a substantial retaliatory capability against the Soviet Union—and thus a deterrent. With a nationwide Soviet ABM, it is dubious whether any of these nations can maintain a retaliatory capability sufficient to deter Soviet attack without extraordinary and possibly prohibitive expenditures. The political consequences of this situation, in particular for Sino-Soviet relations, are unpredictable.

In sum, taking into account our own strategic interests *and* those of our Allies and China, it would not appear to be in our interest to abandon the ABM Treaty—or take steps that would indicate to the Soviets that we might move in such a direction. At the same time, we must be prepared to face a situation where the Soviets unilaterally move to terminate the Treaty, possibly invoking (with legitimacy) the emerging US threat to their silo-based ICBMs.

#### *Summary*

Bleak.



**249. Memorandum From Roger Molander, James Thomson, and Fritz Ermath of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 3, 1980.

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on SALT/TNF—June 6, 1980

The principal purpose of this meeting is to review current US policy on SALT II ratification and the US/Allied position regarding negotiations on Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) in the light of the current SALT II/III situation and Soviet efforts to split the NATO Alliance on the TNF issue. As we understand the outcome of the May 23 Foreign Policy breakfast, the motivation for this review is the likelihood of substantive discussions of SALT/LRTNF issues at the upcoming Venice Summit.<sup>2</sup> This meeting will also provide an opportunity for Secretary Muskie to engage in a focused discussion with the other SCC Principals on SALT II/III/LRTNF.

If time permits, the meeting could also address the “SALT and M–X” and “SALT I/II monitoring” issues that we were directed to include on the agenda. However, at the working level, no agency sees any need for the SCC to address these issues. Background papers on all of these matters have been prepared (Tabs B–F) and are referenced in the discussion below. A rough agenda for the meeting is at Tab A. The remainder of this memo follows the agenda.

*Handling SALT II/III/LRTNF Pending SALT II Ratification*  
(Agenda Item 1)

*This is the main agenda item.* Since the weeks immediately following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, our position on SALT II ratification has remained essentially unchanged. It was originally articulated in the President's letter to Senator Byrd<sup>3</sup> as an interest in seeing SALT restored to the Senate calendar whenever the “legislative and other measures required to respond to the (Afghanistan) crisis . . . have been addressed” and later simplified to the posture that we would seek

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 21, SCC Meeting: #319, held 6/6/80, 6/80. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped note on the memorandum indicates Brzezinski saw it. All Tabs are attached but not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Economic Summit of industrialized nations in Venice June 22–23.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 246.

ratification as soon as it is politically feasible. In light of current political realities, this position in effect says that any push for SALT II ratification could not occur prior to the November elections. SALT's linkage to Afghanistan (and that of other arms control negotiations) has always been stated as an indirect matter of inability to obtain domestic political support for ratification rather than as an Administration response to Soviet behavior directly. The Administration has consistently stated that arms control should go forward on its own merits and not be linked to Soviet behavior. It is a fair question to ask—as Secretary Muskie has—whether this remains our policy. This situation also raises a number of issues involving SALT II, SALT III, and LRTNF arms control which are summarized in the interagency paper at Tab B. We strongly recommend that you take the time to read that paper, the highlights of which are summarized below.

A major question with respect to the decision on pushing for SALT II ratification is whether the domestic political support necessary to effect ratification can be established if the Soviets remain in Afghanistan. While the Administration has not linked its continued support for SALT ratification to Soviet actions in Afghanistan, practical political realities have led to the current delay and would continue to play in post-November 4 decision-making on the ratification issue. Assuming no significant change in the Soviet posture in Afghanistan, the critical question is whether the Western response to the Afghanistan crisis is seen as effective in safeguarding Western security interests—thus, permitting us to go ahead on another matter which is clearly in our national security interest on its own merits. As you know, Secretary Muskie and others are skeptical at this point as to whether we will be able to garner the necessary political support. At the same time, we must keep in mind that we will undoubtedly face a changed political situation after November 4 (in what direction remains to be seen), in particular, after the strong focus on national security issues which will clearly be a seminal part of the 1980 Presidential campaign. In any case, renewed efforts to achieve ratification will generate increased political pressures to show what US policies since Afghanistan have achieved, to chart our future policies in the US-Soviet competition, and to commit the Administration to new defense spending.

In anticipation that we are likely to want to go ahead with “SALT” as soon as possible after the November 4 elections, the paper at Tab B outlines three possible scenarios. These are:

—*Scenario 1: Crash Effort.* Immediate post-election consultations with the Senate leadership and the Soviets with the objective of ratifying the SALT II Treaty in the spring of 1981 with no changes (except probably for an adjustment in the dismantling schedule).

—*Scenario 2: Crash Effort Delayed by Protocol Problem.* Basically the same as the first scenario except that new negotiations with the Soviets

would be required based on the presumption that the Soviets would insist on reopening the Protocol expiration date issue.

—*Scenario 3: Major Delay, Possibly Including New Negotiations.* One side or both sides insist on reopening negotiations on a number of SALT II issues—which the two sides undertake in the context of a more formal SALT II standstill (in anticipation of lengthy negotiations).

As discussed in the paper at Tab B, the first of these scenarios is substantively the most attractive since it would capture the accomplishments of SALT II and permit early negotiations on SALT III/TNF—if the necessary political support can be fostered. So that we can continue to sustain Allied support for TNF negotiations in SALT III and, therefore, for TNF modernization, this is the scenario we should tell our Allies we are aiming for.

The second scenario, while possible in principle, opens a highly contentious issue and could easily result in protracted negotiations—and over time drift into the third scenario of a major delay.

The third scenario could result from either US or Soviet interest in “changing” the current agreement. We might take this approach if we thought that the current SALT II Treaty had too much of a political stigma associated with it to be ratified, and that a “new” SALT Treaty could garner support from Senators who had damned SALT II, as is, but were prepared to support a modified Treaty. There is, however, the very real danger (drawing on the SALT II experience) that a new Treaty could not be put together in a short period of time—mainly because the complex of TNF issues would probably have to be addressed—and the accomplishments of SALT II effectively lost, along with the President’s hope for major accomplishments in nuclear arms control during his period in office.

Perhaps the most sobering aspect of seeking a significant revised Treaty is coming to grips with the LRTNF arms control issue—where, at least to date, neither side has put forward even a framework for an agreement (i.e., systems to be covered), to say nothing of the details, that is remotely likely to be acceptable to the other side.

Turning to the specific agenda questions (Tab A), it would appear in light of the above discussion, that there is no reason to change either our current general approach to the SALT II/III/LRTNF problem or our publicly articulated policy on SALT II ratification. *Turning to the last page of the paper at Tab A, we suggest that you handle Agenda Item 1 by confirming that all agree with conclusions stated there.* In terms of anticipating our likely posture after the November 4 elections, the President may wish to “tilt” now toward a preference for early SALT II ratification, although any such decision would have to be restricted to his closest advisors. Clearly, the final decision on our approach could not be made until after November 4; however, an early tilt could provide rough guidance to our approach to the Allies on the TNF issue.

In looking to post-November 4 decision-making, we need to keep in mind that the environment for ratification then could be no better than it is today, and possibly even worse. This argues strongly for maintaining the current posture on SALT II since it would permit the President to move comfortably after November 4 to a position in consonance with a political environment hostile to SALT.

The paper that was provided to the UK, FRG, and France as a basis for discussion at the Economic Summit is at Tab C. It provides a candid appraisal of the problems we face in SALT and LRTNF arms control, and you may wish to skim over it for the SCC meeting.

*SALT and TNF: Opportunities for Soviet Wedge-Driving in NATO*  
(Agenda Item 2)

Since we can anticipate continued Soviet effort to divide the Alliance over TNF and SALT, it is desirable to examine possible Soviet strategies and US/Allied responses (paper at Tab D). Examples of Soviet tactics cited in the paper include conditioning TNF arms control negotiations on halting the LRTNF program (the current Soviet position) or SALT II ratification (which they are beginning to play up); proposing a mutual freeze on LRTNF production/deployment; and a threat to deploy more LRTNF systems. The paper emphasizes bolstering the current Allied position through clear and unambiguous US commitment to TNF modernization as well as reinforcing our willingness to engage in preliminary discussion on TNF arms control. More detailed tactical responses to various Soviet initiatives are provided in the paper.

In terms of the specific agenda questions (Item 2), *you will want to confirm that there is no reason to change our current approach*. However, we may encounter some tricky problems with our Allies if the Soviets drop their preconditions for preliminary discussions on LRTNF arms control. Despite possible Senate objections about negotiations while SALT II is unratified, we would have to undertake the negotiations or face deep suspicions in Europe. The divergence of views between the sides on the systems to be included in such negotiations would become acutely apparent immediately. Early Allied pressures to abandon the NATO position, to include possibly “taking into account” British and French SLBM systems, would be likely.

You may also want to raise the question of Schmidt’s visit to Moscow; specifically: How stern should we be with him concerning his “moratorium” proposal?<sup>4</sup> What do we want him to tell the Soviets?

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<sup>4</sup>Schmidt had called for a 3-year moratorium on NATO deployment of new missiles.

*SALT and M-X (Agenda Item 3)*

Everyone at the working level was surprised at the request to have “SALT and M-X” as an agenda item for this meeting. As a consequence, we have listed this subject as an optional topic on the Agenda at Tab A. While there have been some evolutionary changes in the M-X design, an ad hoc interagency monitoring group has continued to review these changes with an eye to ensuring that the number of M-X launchers would be adequately verifiable—and that we would find a Soviet mirror imaging of the M-X system acceptable. This approach and the other aspects of SALT and M-X are summarized in the paper at Tab E. *We suggest that you simply refer to the paper to see if any of the SCC Principals want to discuss the matter at the meeting.*

*Monitoring Compliance with the SALT Treaties (Agenda Item 4)*

This item also probably does not need to be discussed at the meeting. As described in the paper at Tab F, the Intelligence Community is monitoring Soviet compliance with the provisions of the SALT II Treaty as if the agreement were in effect. *The only possible topic which might warrant discussion is Soviet telemetry encryption*, in particular, as regards the new NE-4 SLBM. We may wish to mention to the Soviets at an opportune time in the next few months that we have taken note of the encryption on the tests of the new SLBM and reemphasize our concerns on this general issue.

## 250. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 6, 1980, 9:30–10:35 a.m.

### SUBJECT

SALT and Afghanistan

### PARTICIPANTS

*State*  
Secretary Muskie  
Reg Bartholomew, Dir.,  
Polit.-Military Affairs

*OSD*  
Secretary Brown  
Walter Slocombe, Under Sec. for  
Policy

*JCS*  
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Chairman

*CIA*  
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Ray McCrory, Chief, Arms  
Control Intelligence Staff

*ACDA*  
Ralph Earle  
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*White House*  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Lloyd Cutler

*NSC*  
Roger Molander  
Jasper Welch

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. *SALT and Afghanistan*. We will proceed to prepare a policy statement on SALT and Afghanistan which will provide the basis for drafting a platform plank on these issues. The statement will stress that our interest in SALT II ratification and a strong response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are not incompatible—and that this is not a new statement of Administration policy. We will complete a draft for presentation to the President on Monday.<sup>2</sup>

Whereas we should make no decisions until after November 4 on seeking SALT ratification in early 1981 versus a “lame duck” 1980 session, there is considerable skepticism as to the feasibility of a lame duck session.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 21, SCC Meeting: #319 Held 6/6/80, 6/80. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> Monday, June 9; not found.

We need to make clear to the Allies that their support of a tough response to Afghanistan will be critical to our successfully making the SALT/Afghanistan case.

2. *SALT II Dismantling Schedule and Protocol Extension.* We should let the Soviets be the demandeurs on the issue of relaxing or modifying the SALT II dismantling schedule (which affects only the Soviets). However, we can probably accept some slippage in the schedule, e.g., six months. On the Protocol extension issue, there was general agreement that such extension would open a multitude of problems with the Allies and the Senate, and that we should take a strong position against it if it is raised by the Soviets.

3. *Soviets' Wedge-Driving Efforts on TNF.* With respect to Soviet efforts at driving a wedge between the US and NATO on the TNF issue, it was agreed that we should maintain our current position of a willingness to have preliminary discussions on TNF without preconditions prior to SALT II ratification. At the same time, we should take the opportunity of the Venice Summit and any other near-future meetings with German officials to persuade the FRG that Schmidt should not pursue a TNF moratorium or any other new TNF ideas in his meeting with Brezhnev in late June.

4. *SALT and M-X.* In a brief discussion of SALT and M-X, Harold Brown summarized the continuing effort to refine the M-X design while at the same time ensuring that it meets verification requirements.

5. *Soviet Actions vis-à-vis SALT II.* On the issue of Soviet informal compliance with SALT II, it was agreed that we should take an early opportunity to emphasize to the Soviets the importance of adherence to the telemetry encryption provisions. It was agreed that this should be done at the same time that our policy statement on SALT and Afghanistan is conveyed to them, and that this should be done in the context of a general statement about not taking actions inconsistent with the SALT II agreement pending ratification.

6. *Exchanges with Soviets.* We need to carefully plan the extent and nature of our future dialogue with the Soviets in order not to mislead the Allies into thinking we are using the pursuit of arms control as a cover for going back to "business-as-usual" with the Soviets. In this context, the alternative of having Ralph Earle convey our SALT position and our concerns on telemetry to the Soviets through Dobrynin was raised.

251. **Memorandum From Roger Molander of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and Special Counsel and Consultant to the President Lloyd Cutler<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1980.

SUBJECT

Pre-November 4 Thoughts on SALT II Ratification

The purpose of this memo is to convey some thoughts on SALT II ratification in the relative calm of the pre-election environment. You can properly infer that such a statement connotes a concern that there may be a "rush to judgment" with respect to the handling of SALT II in the anticipated (and deserved) euphoria following the President's reelection.

We know that the political and congressional environment following the November 4 elections will be dramatically different from that in which we have previously sought ratification. At the same time, we cannot at this time project with confidence what the characteristics of that environment will be in many important respects. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are four important areas in which we need to examine this issue:

—*Mandate from the Electorate.* A victory by the President on November 4 in a context where SALT II has been a/the major campaign issue will result in *at least* a modest mandate from the electorate for moving forward on SALT II. There remains a possibility that this mandate will be more profound, and that the election will, in fact, be legitimately interpretable as a national referendum on SALT II with the power to dictate to the Senate that the SALT II agreement should be ratified essentially in its present form.

—*Composition of the Senate.* We will need to carefully assess the impact of the possible loss of key senators from several standpoints. For example, we need to assess whether the loss of a particular senator means: (1) the loss only of a vote for SALT II (e.g., McGovern); (2) the loss of a vote for SALT II and the loss of a senator who would be critically important in making the case for the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor (e.g., Hart or Culver); or (3) the additional loss of a senator who might have been able to deliver other senators (e.g., Cranston). Beyond this, with respect to new senators, we will also need to gain an appreci-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 37, Serial XS-10/80-12/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Welch and Albright.



ation of “where their heads are.” Some may be of a moderate/conservative bent, but still vulnerable to the rational arguments in favor of SALT II.

—*Atmosphere in the Senate.* When we were pushing the SALT II Treaty in the Senate in mid/late 1979, the President’s chances for reelection did not appear bright, and many senators were angry with Jimmy Carter for a multitude of different reasons. The attitude in the Senate toward a reelected Jimmy Carter will be profoundly different. All 100 of “them” are politicians of various sorts and hardly blind to the realities of having to deal with a President who will be around for four more years, and whose reelection is interpretable as a personal mandate reaching well beyond the national security area (and deep into their individual states).

—*Howard Baker.* It seems clear from the Panama Canal Treaties’ experience and the SALT II ratification experience to date that Howard Baker is a key senator on the SALT II ratification issue—but not necessarily the key Senator. Baker’s support for the Treaty would probably be *sufficient* to ensure its ratification, but Baker’s support for the Treaty may not be *necessary* for that ratification if this Administration has its wits about it in terms of Senate strategy. Baker’s likely ability to assure SALT II ratification argues, of course, that we should make every effort to gain his support for the Treaty *as is* (i.e., as “modified” by the SFRC). This should include offering him the farm (a new TVA, “take me back to Nashville” as the new national anthem, or whatever), but we should not take the precipitous and dangerous step of bargaining with Baker on substantive amendments to the Treaty that would garner his support for it (see discussion below). If it appears that Baker’s support for the Treaty cannot be achieved by non-SALT carrots, then our first line of defense should be to minimize the impact of Baker’s lack of support. Howard Baker is not Everett Dirksen (much less Lyndon Johnson); he does not “deliver” his party, and it is possible to minimize the damage from Baker’s lack of support by approaching individual Republican Senators on the SALT II Treaty issue on its merits. We found that out in late 1979. Nevertheless, we should make every effort to cultivate Baker and to ply him with non-SALT concessions, since support from him (without substantive changes to the Treaty) is clearly the easiest route to ratification of the SALT II Treaty by the US *and* the Soviet Union. We should keep in mind that Baker is a thoughtful man as evidenced by his final statement on SALT in the SFRC hearings:

“I believe in the SALT process. I believe there is a moral imperative that should require the great nations of the world to try to reach an accord on the limitation of nuclear weapons . . . this treaty might be a good treaty at another time: After we have remedied the defects in our verification procedure; after we have moved along the development and deployment of our new weapon systems; after we are secure in the

knowledge that we do, in fact, have a survivable and effective counter-force structure, the ability to retaliate that we are about to lose. It is not that this treaty is bad, *per se*, but it is bad at this time."

You can properly infer that I (and virtually every other member of the SALT community involved in the actual negotiations of the Treaty) am deeply concerned that we might seek major substantive changes in the Treaty as the vehicle for obtaining SALT II ratification. Such changes would clearly prolong the ratification process—when we are already critically close to having the SALT II Treaty overtaken by events. For example, increased delays could make reopening of the Protocol duration issue an imperative.

I recognize that, at some point (after we have fully assimilated and analyzed the characteristics of the problems in the Senate), we may conclude that a substantive change to the Treaty will be necessary to gain ratification. If it comes to this, we will need to carefully assess which substantive changes might be sold to the Russians. Based on the experience of nearly seven years of SALT II negotiations, my preliminary judgment is that we *might* be able to sell the following attractive substantive changes to the Treaty:

- Equal US rights to heavy *silo-based* ICBMs in a context where heavy mobile ICBMs continue to be banned for both sides; and

- Extension of the Treaty period for an additional five years, i.e., to the end of 1990, possibly in return for a one-year extension of the Protocol. (My personal preference continues to be making the SALT II Treaty permanent with a five-year review clause as is the case with the SALT I ABM Treaty.)

In this context, I continue to believe that there is *no chance* of the Soviets accepting certain other substantive changes to the Treaty that have been raised at various times over the last twelve months, such as:

- Counting Backfire in the aggregate in return for counting US FB-111's;

- Imposing an explicit numerical ceiling (e.g., 350 or less) on Backfire production;

- Banning all telemetry encryption; and

- Adjusting the heavy ICBM limitations to permit the US the rights to mobile heavy ICBMs in a context where we are also permitted the rights to 308 heavy silo-based ICBMs.

In the next few weeks, I will have a restricted subset of the SALT Working Group do some further thinking on the acceptable/unacceptable concessions question. In the interim, the message of this memo is: As we prepare to let the clutch out after November 4, let's let it out in first gear, not in fourth.

**252. Editorial Note**

On November 4, 1980, the U.S. elections were held and the Republican Presidential candidate, Governor Ronald Reagan, overwhelmingly defeated the Democratic candidate, President Jimmy Carter. Reagan received 50.7 percent of the popular vote to Carter's 41 percent and won 489 electoral votes to Carter's 49. Reagan had been critical of SALT during the campaign. On November 20, from 2:07 to 3:32 p.m. President Carter and President-Elect Reagan met in the Oval Office of the White House. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) According to his memoirs, Carter "listed some of the advantages to our country of honoring the terms of SALT II, pending its ratification, and of maintaining a strong nonproliferation policy." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, page 577) The Treaty, however, was never ratified by the Senate.

# Index

## References are to document numbers

- Aaron, David:  
Backfire bombers, 196  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184, 204  
Gromyko-Vance meetings, 219  
NSC meetings, 178, 198, 245  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 154, 155, 198  
Oral message exchange on SALT, 233  
Post-signing questions about SALT, 247, 248  
Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 247, 248  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 158, 170, 171, 173, 194, 202, 223, 232, 250  
Verification Panel meetings, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54
- ABC-TV, 64
- Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group, 126
- Afghanistan, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250
- Africa, 227
- Aggregate levels (*see also* Equal aggregates):  
Reduction of, 179  
Soviet position, 166, 169, 183, 184, 200, 218  
U.S. position, 165, 184, 190, 191, 192
- Agreements, Soviet-U.S. (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Interim Agreement; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)):  
Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding (May 26, 1972), 91, 93  
Basic Principles of Negotiation on Strategic Arms Limitation (June 1973), 21, 24, 30, 39, 55, 56  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (proposed), 191  
Mutual nuclear defense pact (proposed), 83  
No-first-use agreement proposal, 239  
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 241  
Outer Space Treaty, 110  
Agreements, Soviet-U.S. (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Interim Agreement; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II))—*Continued*  
Seabeds Treaty, 110  
Strategic Arms Limitation Protocol (SALT II), text of, 242  
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), 51, 64, 74, 90, 105, 116  
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), text of, 241  
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 63, 64, 105, 110
- Air defense, 8, 208
- Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 100, 130, 154
- Aircraft (*see also* Bombers):  
747 transport, 100  
C-5, 100  
Concorde, 172  
F-111, 2  
Reconnaissance, 174, 178  
Tankers, 174, 178  
Transport, 100, 207
- Aircraft carriers, 17
- Akalovsky, Alexander, 88
- Alaska, 116
- Albright, Madeleine, 248
- Aleksandrov, Andrei M., 60, 70, 71, 88, 222
- Aleksandrov-Agentov, Anatoly, 239, 240
- Allison, Lt. Gen. Royal B., 2
- Angola, 113, 114, 117, 124, 125, 134
- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (*see also* Missiles):  
Abrogation of, 130, 248  
Amendment for limitation to one ABM-protected area, 60, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70  
Article XIII, 19  
Attacks on, 34  
Implementation of, 1, 67  
Joint affirmation as U.S. goal, 175  
MIRV as hedge against Soviet violation of, 6

- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (*see also* Missiles)—*Continued*  
Protocol to, 72  
Radar complexes allowed by, 2  
Reviews of, 7, 174, 176, 179  
Standing Consultative Commission  
role, 7, 67
- Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 74, 130, 139, 149, 174
- Arab-Israeli War (Oct. 1973), 41
- Arctic basing, 101, 113, 130, 154, 156
- Arensburger, D., 239
- Armitage, Richard, 69
- Arms balance, 74
- Arms control (*see also* Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)), 245
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 2, 112, 139, 217
- Arms race, 60, 81, 82
- Assured inoperability, 202, 203, 204
- Ausland, John, 34
- Aviation Week*, 101, 103, 105
- Babenko, Yuri, 41
- Backfire bombers. *See* Bombers.
- Bahr, Egon, 155
- Baker, Howard, 251
- Balanced advantages, 76
- Balanced asymmetries, 77
- Bartholomew, Reginald:  
Backfire bombers, 196  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 240  
Comprehensive package proposal, 210  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 204, 218  
NSC meetings, 198  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 198  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 194, 202, 223, 232, 250
- Bellmon, Henry, 244
- Belorussia, 60
- Bentsen, Lloyd, 244
- Berlin crisis (1953), 113
- Bessmertnykh, Alexander A., 196, 204
- Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 82
- Boeing, 113
- Bombers (*see also* Aircraft; Missiles; Soviet Union)—*Continued*  
Assured inoperability, 202, 203, 204  
B-1:  
As bargaining chip, 3  
As replacement aircraft, 35  
Count in MIRV total of, 117, 118, 119  
Cruise missiles for, 89, 101, 231  
Inclusion in strategic weapons limits of, 81, 105, 173  
Non-deployment of, possible, 51, 60, 139  
Planned numbers for deployment, 34, 72, 76, 100  
SRAM, 90, 116  
Test ban on, proposed, 60, 68  
B-3, 64, 90  
B-52:  
Count in MIRV total, 114, 117, 118  
Cruise missiles for, 89, 101, 231  
Mothballing of, 2, 14, 64, 76, 81  
Numbers of, 51, 76  
B-52D, 210  
Backfire, 76  
As heavy bomber, 93, 154  
As obstacle to agreement, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113, 117, 204, 218  
ASMs on, 100  
Backfire/SCLM proposal, 119  
Ban on association with intercontinental mission, 217  
Capabilities of, 101, 103, 130, 194  
Chinese People's Republic as target for, 101  
Collateral restraints on:  
Soviet position, 168, 182, 200, 203, 204, 239  
U.S. flight profile request, 194  
U.S. position, 156, 161, 165, 183, 196, 207, 234, 239  
Comprehensive package proposal for, 210, 212  
Congressional views of, 210  
Cruise missile limits for, 156  
Development of, 14, 58, 74  
DOD views on, 103, 217  
In Cuba, 90  
Inclusion in strategic weapons limits of, 89, 92, 96, 97, 105, 116, 118, 228  
JCS views on, 154, 188, 191, 210, 217, 220

- Bombers (*see also* Aircraft; Missiles; Soviet Union)—*Continued*
- Backfire—*Continued*
- Johnson's recommendations for, 128
  - Military counters to, 206
  - Percentage of total force megatonnage in, 114
  - Production levels of, 165, 229, 234
  - SALT III discussion of, 112, 114, 130
  - Soviet views on, 109, 182, 196, 200, 203, 204, 210, 213, 218, 239
  - U.S. proposals for, 132, 156, 165, 179, 198, 223
  - U.S. talking points on, 196
- Badger, 89, 90, 106, 114, 191, 210
- Bear, 90, 101, 114, 116, 136, 174, 179, 194
- Bison, 90, 92, 101, 114, 116, 136, 174, 179, 194
- Blinder, 191, 210
- Conversion of tankers and reconnaissance aircraft to, 174, 178
- Dismantling/destruction procedures for, 211, 216, 217, 218, 233, 234, 241, 250
- F-4, 76, 103, 106
- FB-111, 2, 76, 89, 90, 101, 103, 105, 106, 116
- FB-111-H, 187
- FRODS approach to, 192
- Heavy bombers:
- Averaging for ALCMs on, 219, 233, 234
  - Backfire as, 93, 154
  - Definitions, 93, 136, 191, 194
- Inclusion in strategic weapons limits of:
- B-1, 81, 105, 173
  - Backfire, 89, 92, 96, 97, 105, 116, 118, 228
- Phantom, 204
- Range limit for long-range missiles on, 88
- Soviet bargaining position on, 17
- Soviet force as obsolescent, 35
- Soviet proposal for non-transport of nuclear weapons in strategic, 10
- Treaty provisions for, 241
- TU-22-M. *See* Backfire *above*.
- TU-160 (Soviet), 60, 64, 90, 139
- U.S. payload advantages in, 14
- Bombers (*see also* Aircraft; Missiles; Soviet Union)—*Continued*
- U.S. superiority in, 58
- Boren, Daniel, 244
- Boschwitz, Rudy, 244
- Boverie, Col. Richard T.:
  - JCS's negotiating perspectives, 145
  - NSC meetings, 113, 114, 119, 130, 139
  - Soviet view of prospects for SALT, 141
  - Status of SALT negotiations (Johnson letter), 146
- Bowie, Robert, 170, 171, 173, 202, 223
- Brandt, Willy, 60, 155
- Bratchikov, Alexander, 72
- Brezhnev, Leonid I.:
  - ABM Treaty, 70
  - Backfire bomber, 109, 210, 239
  - Carter summit with (Vienna, June 1979), 227, 239, 240
  - Chinese People's Republic, 47
  - Cruise missile definitions, 233
  - Deadline for SALT II agreement, 30
  - Desire for SALT agreement, 74
  - Détente, 79, 80, 90, 101
  - Helsinki Summit, 100, 102, 103, 204
  - Implications for Soviet policy of SALT II impasse, 111
  - Kissinger's meetings with:
    - May 1973, 24, 32, 34
    - Mar. 1974, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66
    - Oct. 1974, 82, 83, 84, 85
    - Jan. 1976, 114, 117, 118, 119, 123, 124, 125, 133
  - Messages:
    - From Carter, 148, 151, 153, 193, 195, 213, 235, 237
    - From Ford, 82, 133
    - From Nixon, 41
    - To Carter, 148, 151, 153, 193, 195, 235
    - To Ford, 133, 134
    - To Nixon, 15, 41, 43
  - Military parity vs. superiority, 60
  - MX missile development, 239
  - Nixon meetings with, 68, 69, 70, 71
  - Political strength of, 101, 113
  - SALT II proposal of Oct. 1974, 84
  - Schmidt meetings with, 249, 250
  - Signing of SALT Treaty and Protocol, 241, 242
  - Soviet 15-year agreement proposal, 83
  - Soviet MIRV development, 47

- Brezhnev, Leonid I.—*Continued*  
Soviet objections to equality in throw-weight, 52  
Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of Mar. 1976, 133, 134, 135, 139  
Stalemate in SALT II talks, 83  
Telemetry, 235, 237  
Timetable for negotiations in SALT II, 15  
U.S. notes on SALT II, 60  
U.S. pre-talks proposals, 3  
U.S. presidential power, 172  
U.S.-Soviet relations, 183  
Vance's meetings with, 157, 221, 222  
Visits:  
    Bonn (May 1973), 28  
    United States (June 1973), 18, 20, 21, 29, 30, 32, 56  
    United States (Summer 1975), 92  
    Vienna (June 1979), 239  
Vladivostok summit (Nov. 1974), 82, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91  
Brezhnev, Viktoria, 88  
Brookings Institution, 64  
Brown, Gen. George S.:  
    Backfire as heavy bomber, 154  
    Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 125  
    Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 212  
    Deferral option, 131, 152  
    DOD-White House disagreements, 120  
    Efforts for SALT treaty ratification, 243  
    Guidance for Gromyko-Vance talks, 179, 207, 228  
    Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 104, 186, 211  
    JCS's perspectives on SALT, 145, 220  
    NSC meetings, 74, 76, 90, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114, 116, 130, 139, 178  
    Options for Vance's Moscow talks (Mar. 1977), 154, 155, 156  
    SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 179  
    Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 245  
    Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of Mar. 1976, 135  
    Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 158, 170, 171, 173  
Brown, Harold:  
    ALCMs, 173, 216, 228, 232  
    Backfire bombers, 154, 217  
Brown, Harold—*Continued*  
    Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239, 240  
    Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus for SALT agreement, 18  
    Carter-JCS meetings, 225  
    Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 210, 212  
    Cruise missiles, 217  
    Gromyko-Carter meetings, 184, 204  
    Gromyko-Vance meetings, 179, 200, 201, 206, 219, 228, 229  
    Gromyko-Warnke meetings, 213  
    Heavy bomber definitions, 191, 223  
    Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 174, 186, 190, 192, 211  
    Jackson's views on SALT, 150, 188  
    JCS problems with SALT, 236  
    MIRV verification, 191  
    Missile testing, 184  
    Negotiating strategies for SALT, 161, 163  
    Non-circumvention, 191  
    NSC meetings, 178, 198, 245  
    Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 154, 155, 156, 198  
    Protection of options for multiple aim point (MAP) systems, 209  
    Review of SALT, 147  
    SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 179  
    SALT III principles, 205  
    Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 158, 170, 171, 173, 194, 202, 206, 223, 232, 250  
    Timing for SALT treaty signing, 191  
    Two-package proposal, 176  
    U.S. strategies for SALT in 1978, 197  
    Verification Panel meetings, 51  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew:  
    ABM Treaty, 176  
    ALCMs, 216, 217, 223, 228, 232  
    Backfire as heavy bomber, 154  
    Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239, 240  
    Chinese People's Republic impact on Soviet negotiating strategies, 162  
    Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 210, 212  
    Deferral option, 154  
    Dismantling/destruction procedures for bombers, 216, 217  
    Dobrynin-Carter meetings, 148, 159, 160

- Brzezinski, Zbigniew—*Continued*  
 Dobrynin's meetings with, 159, 172, 187  
 Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 203, 204, 217, 218  
 Gromyko-Vance meetings, 179, 185, 200, 201, 206, 207, 228  
 Gromyko-Warnke meetings, 213  
 Informal adherence to Interim Agreement, 248  
 Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 186, 190, 192, 202, 211  
 Jackson memo to Carter, 150  
 Negotiating strategies for SALT, 161, 163, 165, 166, 226  
 New types of missiles, 238  
 NSC meetings, 178, 198, 245  
 Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 154, 155, 198  
 Oral message exchange on SALT, 233, 234  
 Outstanding issues in SALT talks, 188  
 Pace and strategy for U.S. efforts in SALT, 189  
 Political effects of SALT stalemate, 224  
 Post-signing questions about SALT, 247, 248, 249, 250  
 Prospects for SALT treaty ratification, 214, 251  
 SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 179  
 SALT III principles, 205  
 SALT review, 147  
 Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 245, 247, 248, 249  
 Soviet perceptions on SALT, CIA assessment of, 169  
 Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 158, 170, 171, 173, 176, 194, 202, 205, 206, 216, 223, 232, 249, 250  
 Telemetry, 237  
 Two-package proposal, 176  
 U.S. position on SALT, 168  
 U.S. strategies for SALT in 1978, 197  
 Bush, George H. W., 130, 134, 139  
 Butz, Earl, 58  
 Byrd, Robert, 224, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249
- Callahan, James, 155  
 Carlucci, Frank, 245  
 Carter, James E. "Jimmy":  
 ABM Treaty, 174, 175, 176, 179
- Carter, James E. "Jimmy"—*Continued*  
 ALCMs, 118, 216, 217, 232  
 Backfire bombers, 210, 213, 239  
 Brezhnev summit with (Vienna, June 1979), 227, 239, 240  
 Brezhnev-Vance meetings, 221, 222  
 Comprehensive package proposal, 210, 212  
 Cruise missile definitions, 174, 179, 211, 228  
 Deferral option, 154  
 Dismantling/destruction procedures for bombers, 216, 217, 218  
 Dobrynin-Vance meetings, 164  
 Dobrynin's meetings with, 148, 159, 160  
 Electoral defeat of, 252  
 Gromyko-Vance meetings, 185, 200, 219, 227, 228, 229  
 Guidance for, 179, 206, 227, 228  
 Gromyko-Warnke meetings, 213  
 Gromyko's meetings with:  
 Sept. 1977, 180, 183, 184, 218  
 May 1978, 197, 203, 204  
 Sept. 1978, 217, 218  
 Heavy bomber definitions, 191  
 Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 174, 186, 190, 192, 202, 211  
 JCS's meetings with, 225  
 JCS's perspectives on SALT, 145, 220  
 Kissinger's proposals as abandoned by, 155  
 Messages:  
 From Brezhnev, 148, 151, 153, 193, 195, 235  
 From Jackson, 150  
 To Brezhnev, 148, 151, 153, 193, 195, 213, 235, 237  
 To Byrd, 246, 247, 249  
 To Vance, 227  
 MIRV verification, 191  
 Negotiating strategies for SALT, 161, 163, 165, 166, 226  
 New types of missiles, 238  
 Non-circumvention, 191, 225  
 NSC meetings, 178, 198, 245  
 Options for Vance's Moscow talks:  
 Mar. 1977, 154, 155, 156  
 Apr. 1978, 198, 199  
 Oral message exchange on SALT, 233, 234  
 Outstanding issues in SALT talks, 188



- Carter, James E. "Jimmy"—*Continued*  
Pace and strategy for U.S. efforts in SALT, 189  
Political effects of SALT stalemate, 224  
Prospects and goals for SALT, 175  
Prospects for SALT treaty ratification, 214  
Protection of options for multiple aim point (MAP) systems, 209  
Review of SALT, 147, 149  
SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 179, 180  
Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 245, 247  
Signing of SALT Treaty and Protocol, 191, 241, 242  
Soviet perceptions on SALT, CIA assessment of, 169, 181  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 158, 170, 176, 202, 205, 206, 216  
Summit invitation, 227  
Telemetry, 235, 237  
Two-package proposal, 176, 177  
U.S. strategies for SALT in 1978, 197  
Visit to Vienna (June 1979), 239
- Case Act, 196
- Ceaușescu, Nicolae, 103
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):  
Backfire capability estimates, 101, 103, 130  
Détente, 79  
Forward-based systems, 169  
Implications for Soviet policy of SALT II impasse, 111  
Negotiating strategies for SALT, 166  
Soviet perceptions on SALT, 169, 181  
Soviet vs. U.S. military spending, 244  
Verification as emphasis in SALT II, 81
- Chemical warfare, 15
- Cheney, Richard, 113, 114, 116, 119, 125, 130, 139
- Chernenko, Konstantin U., 239, 240
- Chiles, Lawton, 244
- China, People's Republic of, 33  
ABMs, 47  
As future power, 47  
As threat to Soviet Union, 83  
Inclusion in SALT, possible, 249  
MIRVs for Soviet defense against, 44  
Missiles of, 81, 248
- China, People's Republic of—*Continued*  
Mobile missiles as Soviet defense against, 148  
Radar of, 47  
Soviet bombers as prepared for use in, 101  
Soviet defenses against, 44, 148, 208  
Soviet negotiating strategies as impacted by, 162  
Strategic arms reduction, 149  
Submarine forces of, 81  
United States, relations with, 40, 90, 227
- China, Republic of, 47
- Chou En-lai, 114
- Christopher, Warren:  
Efforts for SALT treaty ratification, 243  
Gromyko-Vance meetings, 200, 201, 229  
NSC meetings, 245  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 152  
Visit to Afghanistan (1980), 245
- Civil defense, 74, 116, 149, 155, 156
- Clarke, Bruce, 250
- Claytor, W. Graham, Jr., 245
- Clements, William P., Jr.:  
Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 125  
Future SALT talks, 90  
JCS views on SALT, 31  
JCS-White House conflict over SALT II, 26  
NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76, 81, 90, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114, 116, 119, 130  
Verification Panel meetings, 22, 34, 43, 46, 51, 54, 64
- Clift, A. Denis, 149
- Colby, William E., 127  
Détente and SALT II, 79  
Implications for Soviet policy of SALT II impasse, 111  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 39, 55, 104  
NSC meetings, 47, 68, 74, 81, 90, 92, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114, 116, 119  
Verification Panel meetings, 34, 43, 45, 46, 54, 64
- Cold launches, 2
- Compensating asymmetries, 80, 81, 85

- Conference on Security and  
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (*see also* Helsinki Summit), 102, 183, 204
- Congress, U.S. (*see also* House of Representatives, U.S.; Senate, U.S.):  
Attacks on SALT by members of, 80, 183, 188, 189  
Backfire bombers, 210  
Case Act, 196  
Cruise missile funding, 113  
DOD, relations with, 12  
Equal aggregates, insistence on, 43, 90  
Interim Agreement extension, 64, 173, 174  
Jackson Amendment, 76, 82  
Mobile (MX) ICBMs, 100, 244  
NATO budget cuts by, 14  
Non-circumvention, 171, 194  
Protection of options for multiple aim point (MAP) systems, 209  
Question of willingness to fund arms race, 81, 82  
Two-package proposal, 177  
*Congressional Record*, 45  
Cranston, Alan, 251  
Crisis of capitalism, 80  
Crisis stability, 74  
Cuba, 90, 117, 124, 243  
Cuban missile crisis, 35  
Culver, John C., 251  
Custer, B. Scott, 2  
Cutler, Lloyd, 243, 245, 247, 250, 251
- Danforth, John, 244  
Data exchange, 145, 242  
David, Edward, 2  
Davis, Jeanne W.:  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149  
Verification Panel meetings, 2, 34, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64
- DeConcini, Dennis, 244  
Decoys, 14, 25
- Defense, U.S. Department of (DOD):  
Backfire bombers, 103, 217  
Briefing charts for position on SALT, 58  
Budget approval, 74  
Budget cuts for, 14, 76  
Budget projections for, 47, 103  
Congress, relations with, 12  
MIRV limitations, 29  
Defense, U.S. Department of (DOD)—*Continued*  
Multiple aim point (MAP) mobile ICBMs, 202  
Soviet SALT proposals, 84  
Throw-weight decisions by, 64  
Total obligational authority (TOA), 90  
U.S. response to Soviet draft permanent agreement, 42  
White House disagreements with, 77, 119, 120, 121, 122, 139
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 114  
Defense Science Board, 74  
DeGraf, Col. William, 2  
Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing):  
U.S. visit, 231  
Depressed trajectory ban, 211, 218, 219  
Derazhnya, 144, 173, 176, 183, 184, 186, 204
- Détente:  
As U.S. political issue, 47, 134  
Military, 79  
Political, 79  
Soviet position, 46, 54, 60, 74, 79, 80, 90, 101, 105, 111  
U.S. position, 64, 74
- Detinov, M. N., 183, 184, 204  
Dialectics, 43  
Dirksen, Everett M., 251  
Dobrynin, Anatoly F.:  
ABM Treaty, 67  
Air defenses against Chinese People's Republic, 208  
ALCMs, 178  
Backfire bombers, 118, 194, 196  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239, 240  
Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 60  
Brezhnev-Vance meetings, 222  
Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus for SALT agreement, 18, 20, 21  
Brzezinski's meetings with, 159, 172, 187  
Carter's meetings with, 148, 159, 160  
Deadline for SALT II agreement, 30  
Deferral option, 131  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184, 204  
Gromyko-Kissinger meetings, 66, 143  
Gromyko-Vance meetings, 221  
Helsinki Summit, 103  
Kissinger's meetings with:  
Dec. 16, 1972, 9  
Mar. 8, 1973, 15

Dobrynin, Anatoly F.—*Continued*  
Kissinger's meetings with—*Continued*  
July 10, 1973, 38  
Aug. 9, 1973, 32, 33, 38  
Feb. 1, 1974, 52  
Mar. 20, 1974, 57  
Oct. 9, 1974, 78, 80  
Dec. 2, 1974, 90  
Dec. 10, 1974, 91  
MIRV, 48, 58, 61, 178  
New types of missiles, 238  
Nixon-Gromyko meetings, 38, 52, 63  
Nixon message to Brezhnev, 41  
Soviet objectives for SALT II, 1, 3, 5, 9, 84  
Telemetry, 237, 250  
U.S. domestic opposition to SALT, 193  
U.S. notes on SALT II, 57, 59, 60, 65, 78, 86, 97, 100, 115  
U.S. SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 180  
Vance's meetings with, 161, 164, 194, 203, 218  
Vladivostok summit (Nov. 1974), 88, 90  
Warnke's meetings with, 164, 171  
Domenici, Pete, 244  
Drones (RPVs), 105, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234  
Duckett, Carl:  
NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76, 81, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 116, 130  
Verification Panel meetings, 2, 34, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64, 112  
Duncan, Charles W., 155, 198, 225  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 171, 173, 194, 202, 232  
Durenberger, David, 244  
Earle, Ralph E., II, 36, 42  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239  
Data exchange on strategic arms, 242  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 223, 250  
Telemetry, 229, 232, 233, 250  
Verification Panel meetings, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64  
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 58  
Eizenstat, Stu, 155  
Elections, U.S.:  
1976, 76, 90, 101, 109

Elections, U.S.—*Continued*  
1980, 244, 249, 250, 251, 252  
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), 14  
Ellsworth, Robert, 68  
Encryption. *See* Telemetry encryption.  
Endoatmospheric penetration aids, 25  
Equal aggregates (*see also* Aggregate levels):  
Agreement on, 90, 105  
Congressional insistence on, 43, 90  
Deadlocking of talks over, 9, 74  
European position, 81  
MIRV limits vs., 76  
Option on, 80  
Qualitative limits combined with, 76  
Soviet position, 84, 105  
Throw-weight limits with, 80  
U.S. position, 2, 4, 17, 23, 28, 46, 55, 75, 76  
Equal asymmetries, 76  
Equal deployment rights, 80, 81  
Erath, Fritz, 249  
Ermarth, Fritz, 236  
European Security Conference. *See* Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); Helsinki Summit.  
Exoatmospheric decoys, 25  
Exon, J.J., 244  
Farley, Philip J., 2, 14, 18  
Final Act of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 204  
Firebee (drone), 105  
Five Year Defense Program, 244  
Ford, Betty, 88  
Ford, Gerald R.:  
Assumption of Presidency by, 73  
Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings:  
Oct. 1974, 82, 83, 84, 85  
Jan. 1976, 117, 119, 124, 125  
Cruise missile development, 138  
Deferral option, 131  
DOD-White House disagreements, 77, 119, 120, 121  
Feb. 1976 U.S. proposal for SALT, 140, 142  
Helsinki Summit, 100, 102, 103, 204  
Implications for Soviet policy of SALT II impasse, 111  
Instructions for U.S. delegation to SALT II, 75, 93, 99, 127

- Ford, Gerald R.—*Continued*  
 Johnson's recommendations for SALT  
   II agreement, 128  
 Messages:  
   From Brezhnev, 133, 134  
   From Johnson, 146  
   To Brezhnev, 82, 133  
 NSC meetings, 47, 58, 74, 76, 81, 90,  
   92, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114,  
   116, 119, 130, 139  
 Scowcroft appointment as NSA  
   assistant, 110  
 Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of  
   Mar. 1976, 134, 135  
 Soviet SALT II objectives, 84, 85  
 Stalemate in SALT II talks, 83  
 State of the Union speech (Jan. 1976),  
   117  
 Status of SALT negotiations (Johnson  
   letter), 146  
 Vladivostok Agreement, 100  
 Vladivostok summit (Nov. 1974), 77,  
   82, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91
- Forward-based systems (FBS):  
 As subject for bargaining, 3  
 Deadlock in talks over, 17  
 In SALT III talks, 106, 114, 239  
 NATO position, 6  
 Soviet perceptions on, CIA  
   assessment of, 169  
 Soviet position:  
   As future issue, 106, 239  
   Dropping as precondition  
     movement on, 40  
   Hardening of, 10, 71, 72  
   Insistence on compensation, 81  
   Revival as issue of, 157  
   Softening of, 64  
   U.S. rebuttal to, 8, 28  
   U.S. capabilities in, 90  
   U.S. position, 2, 4, 114
- Fractional orbit bombardment systems  
 (FOBS), 99, 101
- France:  
 Grey area negotiation, 205  
 Missile forces, 76, 248  
 SLBMs, 80, 85  
 Strategic arms reduction, 149  
 Submarines, 47  
 Theater nuclear forces, 249
- Freedom of the seas, 114
- Fulbright, J. William, 51, 68
- Functionally-related observable  
 differences (FRODS) approach, 192
- Gallup polls, 76
- Gelb, Leslie:  
 Backfire bombers, 196  
 Oral message exchange on SALT, 233  
 Special Coordination Committee  
   meetings, 149, 152, 170, 171, 173,  
   194, 202, 223
- General Staff (Soviet), 162
- Geneva talks. *See* Strategic Arms  
 Limitation Talks (SALT II).
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 155
- Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG):  
 Cruise missile development by, 106,  
   217  
 Defense of, 114  
 Grey area negotiation, 205  
 Theater nuclear forces, 249  
 U.S. technological advantage over, 14  
 Use of tactical nuclear weapons in, 47
- Granum, Rex L., 239
- Graybeal, Sidney N.:  
 Forward-based systems, 28  
 NSC meetings, 47, 58, 68, 94  
 Verification Panel meetings, 43, 45,  
   46, 51
- Great Britain. *See* United Kingdom.
- Grechko, Marshall Andrei A.:  
 Attitude toward SALT, 64, 74, 101,  
   103  
 Détente and SALT II, 79  
 Development of SS-17 and 18  
   missiles, 33  
 Soviet negotiating instructions, 15  
 U.S. forward-based systems, 90
- Greece, 105
- Grey area negotiation, 205
- Grinevsky, Oleg, 17
- Gromyko, Andrei A.:  
 ABM Treaty, 67  
 ALCMs, 216, 219  
 Backfire bombers, 182, 196, 200, 203,  
   204, 210, 213, 218  
 Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979),  
   239, 240  
 Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 60, 84,  
   117, 118, 119  
 Brezhnev-Nixon meetings, 70, 71  
 Brezhnev-Vance meetings, 222  
 Carter's meetings with:  
   Sept. 1977, 180, 183, 184, 218  
   May 1978, 197, 203, 204  
   Sept. 1978, 217, 218

- Gromyko, Andrei A.—*Continued*  
Comprehensive package proposal,  
212, 213  
Cruise missile definitions, 229, 230,  
231  
Cruise missiles as obstacle to  
agreement, 113  
Dismantling/destruction procedures  
for bombers, 216, 218  
Kissinger's meetings with:  
Oct. 22, 1973, 41, 44  
Dec. 22, 1973, 44  
Apr. 29, 1974, 64, 66  
July 1, 1974, 72  
July 10–11, 1975, 98  
Sept. 19, 1975, 105, 106  
Sept. 21, 1975, 107  
Jan. 23, 1976, 124  
Sept. 29, 1976, 143  
MIRVs, 45, 48, 144, 178  
Nixon meetings with:  
Sept. 28, 1973, 38, 44  
Feb. 4, 1974, 52  
Apr. 12, 1974, 63  
Six problem areas in SALT  
negotiations, 167  
Soviet SALT talk instructions, 43  
Stalemate in SALT II talks, 83  
Three-part structure for SALT  
negotiations, 167  
U.S. notes on SALT II, 66, 97, 108  
Vance's meetings with:  
Mar. 1977, 157  
May 1977, 164, 167, 170  
Sept. 1977, 174, 175, 176, 182, 183,  
185  
Apr. 1978, 198, 199, 200, 201  
July 1978, 206, 207, 208, 210  
Sept.–Oct. 1978, 212, 215, 218, 219,  
221  
Dec. 1978, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231,  
232, 235  
Visits:  
New York, Washington (Sept.  
1978), 212, 215, 218  
Washington (Feb. 1974), 52  
Washington (Sept. 1977), 174, 175,  
176, 179, 182, 193  
Vladivostok Agreement, 94, 98  
Vladivostok summit (Nov. 1974), 88  
Warnke's meeting with, 211, 212, 213  
Gromyko, Lydia D., 143  
Guam, 116  
Haig, Gen. Alexander M., 58, 68, 70, 71,  
74  
Harlow, Bryce, 47  
Harriman, W. Averell, 113  
Hart, Gary, 189, 245, 251  
Hartman, Arthur A., 60, 66, 88, 90, 143  
Hayakawa, S.I., 244  
Hebert, Edward, 74  
Heinz, John, 244  
Helms, Richard M., 2, 16  
Helsinki Summit (*see also* Conference on  
Security and Cooperation in  
Europe (CSCE)), 100, 102, 103, 204,  
227  
Hill, Robert C., 34  
Holloway, Adm. James L., III, 127  
DOD-White House disagreements,  
119, 120, 139  
NSC meetings, 119  
Options for SALT II negotiations, 116  
Special Coordination Committee  
meetings, 152  
Holy Loch, 3, 4, 76  
Horn of Africa, 199  
House of Representatives, U.S.:  
Appropriations Subcommittee, 105  
Armed Services Committee, 105  
Defense budget approval by, 74  
Humphrey, Hubert H., 101, 139  
Hunter, Robert, 159  
Hyland, William:  
ABM Treaty, 34  
Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 60  
Brezhnev-Nixon meetings (June  
1974), 70, 71  
DOD-White House disagreements,  
122  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184  
Gromyko-Kissinger meetings, 66, 143  
Kissinger-Dobrynin meeting, 32  
NSC meetings, 113, 114, 116, 130, 139,  
178  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks  
(Mar. 1977), 155  
Reexamination of SALT II, 35  
SALT II second session, Soviet  
omnibus proposal, 19  
Soviet perceptions on SALT, CIA  
assessment of, 169  
Soviet SALT II objectives, proposal of  
Oct. 1974, 85  
Special Coordination Committee  
meetings, 149, 152, 170, 171, 173  
Three Soviet questions on MIRVs, 48

- Hyland, William—*Continued*  
 U.S. note on SALT II, 57, 86  
 Verification Panel meetings, 2, 34, 45, 46, 64
- Iceland, 103
- Ikle, Fred:  
 Deferral option, 131  
 Feb. 1976 U.S. proposal for SALT, 140, 142  
 Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 39, 55, 75, 93, 99, 104, 127, 136  
 MIRV verification, 144  
 NSC meetings, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76, 81, 90, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114, 116, 119, 130  
 Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of Mar. 1976, 134, 135  
 U.S. counterdraft as response to Soviet draft permanent agreement, 42  
 Verification Panel meetings, 34, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64
- India, 245
- Indian Ocean, 154, 245
- Ingersoll, Robert S.:  
 Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 75, 104  
 NSC meetings, 74, 76, 81, 90, 94, 101  
 Standing Consultative Commission, 69
- Initial operational capability (IOC), 139
- Interagency Working Group, 80
- Interim Agreement (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.):  
 Article I, 91  
 Article II, 89, 91  
 Article III, 25  
 Article IV, 25  
 Article V, 25  
 Article VI, 25  
 Article VIII, 25  
 Congressional deliberation on, 64, 173, 174  
 Criticisms of, 47  
 Expiration of, 114  
 Extension of:  
   Soviet proposals, 58, 62, 64, 68  
   U.S. proposal, 59, 64, 65, 74, 75, 139, 155, 174, 179  
   U.S.-Soviet discussions on, 60, 72  
 Implementation of, 1  
 Incremental nature of, 110  
 Interim Agreement (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.)—*Continued*  
 Inequities of, 2, 3, 50  
 Informal adherence to, 247, 248  
 Jackson's views on, 2, 3, 50  
 Lapsing of, 74  
 MIRVs in, 45  
 Protocol to, 25, 36  
 SCC, provisions for, 89  
 Silo dimensions, 100, 101  
 Soviet provision of data on requirements of, 247  
 Standing Consultative Commission as called for in, 7, 69, 89  
 Submarine restrictions, 14, 66  
 U.S. military capabilities as affected by, 64  
 U.S. views on Soviet position, 3, 21, 34
- Iran, 103, 106, 227, 245
- Irwin, John N., II, 2, 6
- Israel, 103, 114
- Jackson Amendment, 76, 82
- Jackson, Henry M.:  
 As hawk, 47  
 Codicil proposal for SALT agreement, 95  
 Criticisms of SALT II, 188  
 Defense spending cuts, 14  
 Equal aggregates, 50, 90  
 Interim Agreement, 2, 3, 50, 60  
 Launcher equality, 80  
 Messages:  
   From Nixon, 56  
   To Carter, 150  
   To Nixon, 50  
 MFN status for the Soviet Union, 45  
 Proposals for SALT II, 50, 150  
 Seen as obstacle in negotiations, 46, 64, 71  
 Throw-weight, 43  
 Verification of treaty provisions, 94, 114
- Japan, 14, 47, 114
- Jobert, Michel, 60
- Johnson, Lyndon B., 251
- Johnson, U. Alexis:  
 Appointment as head of U.S. SALT II delegation, 17  
 Backfire bombers, 128  
 Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 62

- Johnson, U. Alexis—*Continued*  
Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus  
for SALT agreement, 18, 20, 21  
FBS, 17  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to  
SALT II, 23, 25, 39, 40, 55, 73, 74,  
75, 81, 93, 99, 104, 127, 136  
Message to Ford, 146  
MIRVs, 17, 97  
NSC meetings, 14, 47, 68, 74, 90, 105,  
114, 116, 119, 139  
Recommendations for SALT II  
agreement, 128  
Silo size increase limits, 96  
Special Coordination Committee  
meetings, 149  
SSBN standoff, 28  
Standing Consultative Commission  
meetings, 28  
Status of SALT negotiations, 28, 146  
U.S. counterdraft as response to  
Soviet draft permanent  
agreement, 42  
Verification Panel meetings, 43, 45,  
46, 51, 54, 64  
Vladivostok Agreement, 94
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):  
ABM Treaty, 68  
Backfire as seen by, 154, 188, 191, 210,  
217, 220  
Bargaining options for SALT II, 12,  
81, 113  
Carter's meetings with, 225  
Comprehensive quantitative  
approach as favored by, 27  
Cruise missiles, 112, 217  
DOD-White House disagreements,  
120, 121  
Feb. 1976 U.S. proposal for SALT, 139  
Interim Agreement extension, 68  
Launcher equality, 80  
Memoranda:  
CJCS Memo M-10-73, 12  
CJCS Memo M-44-73, 22  
CJCS Memo M-72-73, 36  
JCSM-77-79, 236  
JCSM-359-78, 236  
JCSM-396-76, 145  
JCSM-425-75, 112  
Minuteman survivability, 13  
Mobile ICBMs, 100  
MX missiles, 236  
Non-circumvention provisions, 236
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—*Continued*  
Percentage of total force  
megatonnage in Backfire, 114  
Perspectives on SALT II, 31, 145, 178,  
220  
Problems with SALT, 236  
Protection of options for multiple aim  
point (MAP) systems, 209  
SALT I, 74, 116  
SALT III principles, 205  
Schlesinger meeting with (Aug. 30,  
1973), 36  
Special Coordination Committee  
meetings, 206  
Standing Consultative Commission  
role as seen by, 2  
Three year protocol proposal, 236  
U.S. counterdraft as response to  
Soviet draft permanent  
agreement, 42  
U.S. strategies for SALT in 1978, 197  
Verification, 145, 236  
White House, conflict over SALT II  
with, 26
- Joint Strategic Planning Document  
(1980-1981), 236
- Jones, Gen. David C.:  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979),  
239, 240  
Comprehensive package proposal,  
210  
Gromyko-Vance meetings, 219  
JCS position on SALT, 236  
NSC meetings, 81, 198  
Number of ALCMs per bomber, 232  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks,  
198  
Senate's declining to move SALT  
treaty to floor, 245  
Special Coordination Committee  
meetings, 194, 202, 206, 223, 232
- Jordan, Hamilton, 183, 184, 204, 239,  
240, 245
- Judd, Walter, 47
- Kahan, Jerry, 232  
Karpov, V. P., 239, 242  
Keegan, Gen. George J., Jr., 139  
Keeny, Spurgeon:  
Backfire bombers, 196  
Special Coordination Committee  
meetings, 170, 171, 173, 194, 202,  
223, 232, 250
- Kelly, John H., 106

- Kennan, George, 162  
 Kennedy, Edward M., 64, 95  
 Kennedy, Rose, 204  
 Kirilenko, Andrei P., 103  
 Kissinger, Henry A.:  
   ABM Treaty, 7, 67, 68  
   ALCMs, 112, 159  
   Backfire bombers, 100, 101, 105, 113  
   Backfire/SCLM proposal, 119  
   Brezhnev-Nixon meetings, 70, 71  
   Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus  
     for SALT agreement, 18, 20, 21  
   Brezhnev's meetings with:  
     May 1973, 24, 32, 34  
     Mar. 1974, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66  
     Oct. 1974, 82, 83, 84, 85  
     Jan. 1976, 114, 117, 118, 119, 123,  
       124, 125, 133  
   Briefing charts for DOD's SALT  
     position, 58  
   Carter's abandonment of proposals  
     of, 155  
   Cruise missiles, 100, 101, 105, 113  
   Deadline for SALT II agreement, 30  
   Defense budget projections, 47  
   Deferral option, 131  
   Détente, 79  
   Dobrynin's meetings with:  
     Dec. 16, 1972, 9  
     Mar. 8, 1973, 15  
     July 10, 1973, 38  
     Aug. 9, 1973, 32, 33, 38  
     Feb. 1, 1974, 52  
     Mar. 20, 1974, 57  
     Oct. 9, 1974, 78, 80  
     Dec. 2, 1974, 90  
     Dec. 10, 1974, 91  
   DOD-White House disagreements,  
     77, 120, 121, 122  
   Gromyko-Nixon meetings, 38, 52, 63  
   Gromyko's meetings with:  
     Oct. 22, 1973, 41, 44  
     Dec. 22, 1973, 44  
     Apr. 29, 1974, 64, 66  
     July 1, 1974, 72  
     July 10–11, 1975, 98  
     Sept. 19, 1975, 105, 106  
     Sept. 21, 1975, 107  
     Sept. 25, 1975, 109  
     Jan. 23, 1976, 124  
     Sept. 29, 1976, 143  
   Heavy ICBMs, 100, 105  
   Helsinki Summit, 102, 103, 204  
 Kissinger, Henry A.—*Continued*  
   Instructions for U.S. delegates to  
     SALT II, 7, 16, 39, 54, 55, 75, 93,  
     104, 127, 136  
   Interim Agreement, 36  
   Issues for SALT II's first session, 4  
   Jackson's SALT II proposal, 50  
   JCS-White House conflict over SALT  
     II, 26  
   Johnson's recommendations for SALT  
     II agreement, 128  
   Military parity vs. superiority, 60  
   Minuteman survivability, 13  
   MIRVs:  
     Alternatives for limitations, 14, 27,  
       29  
     Limitation as critical issue in  
       negotiations, 24, 29  
     Three Soviet questions on, 48  
     Throw-weight proposal for, 46, 51,  
       58  
     Verification of, 100, 144  
   Mobile ICBMs, 100  
   Nixon message to Brezhnev, 41  
   NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76,  
     81, 92, 94, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114,  
     116, 130, 139  
   Reexamination of SALT II, 35  
   SALT I, 64  
   Soviet objections to equality in  
     throw-weight, 53  
   Soviet objectives for SALT, 1, 84, 85  
   Soviet omnibus proposal, 19  
   Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of  
     Mar. 1976, 134, 135, 139  
   Soviet SALT II objectives, 3, 5, 9, 40  
   Speech to UNGA (Sept. 30, 1976), 143  
   Status of negotiations in SALT II, 17,  
     28  
   Status of SALT II negotiations, 17, 28,  
     96  
   Thinking within the bureaucracy  
     about SALT, 37  
   U.S. counterdraft as response to  
     Soviet draft permanent  
     agreement, 42  
   U.S. four-step proposal, 22  
   U.S. notes on SALT II, 57, 59, 60, 78,  
     86, 97, 108, 115  
   U.S. position on SALT II, 107  
   Verification Panel meetings, 2, 4, 22,  
     34, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64, 90  
   Visits:  
     China (Nov. 1973), 40



Kissinger, Henry A.—*Continued*

Visits—*Continued*

Geneva (Dec. 1973), 44  
Geneva (Apr. 1974), 66  
Moscow (May 1973), 24, 32, 34  
Moscow (Oct. 1973), 41  
Moscow (Mar. 1974), 54, 60, 63  
Moscow (June–July 1974), 38, 54,  
60, 63, 71, 72, 76  
Moscow (Oct. 1974), 73, 78  
Moscow (Apr. 1975) (proposed), 88  
Moscow (Jan. 1976), 114, 117, 118,  
123, 124, 125, 133  
Vladivostok Agreement, 93, 94, 95,  
100, 106  
Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974), 87,  
88, 89, 91  
Kissinger, Nancy, 143  
Kistiakowsky, George, 58  
Klosson, Boris, 34, 46, 51, 54, 64  
Knoche, Enno, 149, 152  
Komplektov, Viktor G., 173, 183, 204,  
240  
Korniyenko, Georgi M.:  
Brezhnev–Carter summit (June, 1979),  
239, 240  
Brezhnev–Kissinger meetings, 60  
Brezhnev–Nixon meetings, 70, 71  
Brezhnev–Vance meetings, 222  
Gromyko–Carter meetings, 183, 184,  
204  
Gromyko–Kissinger meetings, 66, 72,  
143  
Gromyko–Vance meetings, 201, 221,  
231  
Vladivostok Summit, 88  
Warnke’s meetings with, 173, 213  
Kosygin, Alexei N., 43, 70, 71, 79  
Kozlov, Gen. Mikhail M., 117, 118, 119,  
130, 201  
Kraft, Joseph, 64  
Kramer, William D., 182, 183, 184, 204,  
218

Laird, Melvin R.:

Bargaining leverage options for SALT  
II, 12  
Forward-based systems, 71  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to  
SALT II, 6, 7, 16  
Mobile ICBMs, 101  
NSC meetings, 47  
Standing Consultative Commission,  
11

Lance, Bert, 149, 152, 155

Lasers, 58, 64, 103

Launchers (*see also* Silos):

Definitions, 191, 192, 194, 202  
Equality of, 80  
Limitations on, 14  
Minuteman II and III, 191, 239  
Soviet proposal for banning from  
seabed, 23, 96  
Transport and erector (TEL), 155

Leber, Georg, 123

Lehman, John F., 139, 140

Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), 113

Lodal, Jan M.:

Brezhnev–Kissinger meetings, 60  
Brezhnev–Nixon meetings, June 1974,  
70  
Briefing charts for DOD’s SALT  
position, 58  
NSC meetings, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76, 90,  
94, 101, 105  
Projections for throw-weight of  
missiles, 74  
Soviet Aide-Mémoire, 89  
Soviet objections to equality in  
throw-weight, 53  
Soviet SALT II proposal of Oct. 1974,  
85  
Three Soviet questions on MIRVs, 48  
U.S. notes on SALT II, 57, 65  
U.S. position on SALT II, 107  
Verification Panel meetings, 43, 45,  
46, 51, 54, 64, 90  
Vladivostok Agreement, 95, 100  
Vladivostok Summit, 89  
Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces  
(LRTNF), 248, 249, 250  
Lord, Winston, 54, 143

Mahon, George H., 113

Makarov, Vasili, 66, 143, 183, 184, 204

Malenkov, Georgy, 103

Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles  
(MARVs), 12

Mansfield, Mike, 51

Marsh, John, 119

Mathias, Charles, 95

Maximum system operational range  
(MSOR), 191, 211

McClellan, John L., 14

McCloskey, Robert J., 66

McCrary, Raymond, 170, 173, 194, 202,  
223, 232, 250

McFarlane, Lt. Col. Robert, 119

- McGovern, George, 251  
 McIntyre, Thomas J., 58, 113  
 McNamara, Robert, 58, 68, 74, 103  
 Mediterranean nuclear-free zone  
   proposal, 60  
 Merritt, Col. Jack, 2  
 Middle East, 41, 72, 101, 103, 109, 114,  
   134, 157, 187, 215  
 Mildenhall, RAF, 105  
 Military parity, 60  
 Minimum deterrence, 80  
 Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile  
   (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple  
   independently-targeted re-entry  
   vehicles (MIRVS); Soviet Union;  
   Submarines; Throw-weight):  
 ABMs:  
   Chinese People's Republic, 47, 81  
   Funding for, 103  
   Galosh-type, 14  
   Reduction in number of areas  
     allowed for, 60, 64, 67, 68, 69  
   Restoration of, 34  
   Soviet removal of, 2  
 Accuracy of, 148  
 Air-to-surface (ASM), 85, 93, 100  
 Anti-submarine rockets (ASROC), 139  
 AS-3, 232  
 Assured inoperability, 202, 203, 204  
 BOMARC, 114, 119, 130  
 British strategic missile program, 248  
 Categorization by weight, 45  
 Cruise:  
   Air-launched (ALCM):  
     Agreement on, 118, 119, 123  
     Alternative U.S. proposals for,  
       178  
     Averaging on heavy bombers of,  
       219, 233, 234  
     Carrier limits, 216, 217  
     Disagreement on, 168  
     Distinguishing payload types,  
       211  
     Helsinki Summit discussion of,  
       102, 103  
     Number per bomber of, 203, 216,  
       223, 228, 232, 236  
     Soviet position, 100, 117  
     U.S. position, 101, 105, 110, 112,  
       114, 128, 159, 165, 173  
   As obstacle to agreement, 111, 112,  
     113  
   B-1 bombers as carrier of, 89, 101,  
     231  
   Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile  
     (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple  
     independently-targeted re-entry  
     vehicles (MIRVS); Soviet Union;  
     Submarines; Throw-  
     weight)—*Continued*  
   Cruise—*Continued*  
     B-52 bombers as carrier of, 89, 101,  
       231  
     Backfire bomber limits for, 156  
     Carter-era proposals for, 161  
     Congressional funding for, 113  
     Costs of, 106  
     Definitions of:  
       Soviet position, 229, 230, 231, 233  
       U.S. position, 104, 171, 174, 176,  
         178, 179, 194, 202, 211, 223,  
         228, 234  
     Development of, 138  
     German Federal Republic  
       development of, 106, 217  
     Ground-launched (GLCM), 165,  
       168  
     Intercontinental (ICCM), 96, 100,  
       106  
     JCS position, 112, 217  
     Lack of doctrine for, 139  
     Limitations on, 92, 96, 98, 241  
     Long-range, 88, 92, 218  
     MIRVing of, 236  
     NATO interest in, 125, 128  
     Payload definitions, 191  
     Range of:  
       Allowance for, 211  
       Definitions of, 216  
       Soviet change of position on, 117,  
         118, 119, 123, 130  
       U.S. position, 171, 174, 191, 202,  
         218  
     Returnable, 217  
     SALT III discussion of, 112  
     Sea-launched (SLCM), 105, 114,  
       119, 128, 138, 139, 165, 168  
     Soviet call for limiting/banning of,  
       23, 100, 153  
     Soviet development of, 64  
     Swing-wing, 116  
     Transport aircraft use to carry, 207  
     U.S. programs for, 74, 89, 100  
     U.S. proposal for, 132  
     Verification issues, 101, 128  
   Defining as "heavy," 98, 100, 105,  
     110, 124, 127, 169, 170  
   For space exploration, 241

Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); Soviet Union; Submarines; Throw-weight)—*Continued*  
Fractionation limit for, 206, 208, 213, 218, 228, 233, 234  
French, 76, 248  
Harpoon, 114  
Intercontinental cruise missiles (ICCM), 96, 100, 106  
Minuteman:  
Limitation of MIRVs on, 29, 43, 71  
Limits on numbers of, 46, 68, 81  
Mobility of, 12  
Planned numbers for deployment, 76  
Silos for, 101  
Survivability of, 2, 13, 34, 51, 188  
Minuteman II, 54, 81, 94, 101, 191, 232, 239  
Minuteman III, 94, 208  
Deployment of, 45  
Launchers of, 191, 239  
Limits on numbers of, 114, 156  
Replacement of, 85  
Shelters for, 232  
Silos for, 101  
U.S. proposals for MIRV limitations on, 22  
Minuteman IV, 74, 81  
Mobile ICBMs:  
Banning effect on MX development, 188  
For Soviet defense against Chinese People's Republic, 148  
JCS position, 100  
Multiple aim point, 202  
Public opinion on, 101  
Soviet proposal for banning of, 96, 98, 100, 166  
U.S. position on deployment of, 4, 161, 165, 170  
Modern large ballistic missiles (MLBM), 166, 168  
Modernization of, 165, 198  
Multiple aim point (MAP) systems, 202, 205, 206, 209  
MX:  
Ban on mobile ICBMs and, 188  
Banning of, 81  
Congressional concern over, 100, 244

Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); Soviet Union; Submarines; Throw-weight)—*Continued*  
MX—*Continued*  
Delays in development of, 205  
Designing of, 105, 249, 250  
Development of, 101, 206, 239  
JCS position, 236  
MIRVing of, 85  
SALT launcher definition and, 202  
Soviet perspectives on, 239  
U.S. willingness to abandon program for, 156  
Verification of, 239, 249, 250  
Vulnerability of, 155  
Weight limit's effect on, 100  
NE-4, 249  
New types of ICBMs:  
Soviet position, 167, 200, 204, 208, 218, 233, 238  
U.S. position, 53, 170, 194, 203, 206, 207, 208, 218, 236  
Nike, 114  
Polaris, 46, 53, 76, 81, 248  
Poseidon:  
C-3, 85  
Limitation of MIRVs on, 29  
Limits on numbers of, 46, 81, 114  
Replacement of, 49, 116  
Targeting of, 13  
Trident as modernization of, 53, 64, 116  
Present and projected numbers of, 76  
Range limits for use on bombers, 88  
RSM-50, 204  
RSM-52 (Typhoon), 190, 199, 203, 204, 208  
SCUD, 47  
Short-range attack missiles (SRAMs), 85, 90, 106, 116, 232  
SLBMs:  
British, 80, 85  
French, 80, 85  
Inclusion in Equal MIRV throw-weight proposal of, 49, 53  
NE-4, 249  
Soviet proposals on, 3, 10, 19, 28, 39, 117, 204  
Typhoon, 190, 199, 203, 204, 208

- Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); Soviet Union; Submarines; Throw-weight)—*Continued*
- SLBMs—*Continued*
- U.S. proposals on, 3, 7, 13, 46, 65, 68, 92, 190
- Verification of MIRVs on, 100
- Soviet proposal for banning of airborne platforms, 23
- Soviet varieties of, 58
- SS-6, 43
- SS-7, 89
- SS-8, 43, 89
- SS-9:
- Numbers of, 46, 47, 130, 155
- Replacements for, 2, 27, 74
- Silos for, 35
- Testing of, 14
- SS-11:
- Improvements to, 51
- In SS-19 launchers, 144
- Number allowed in possible agreement, 45
- Numbers deployed of, 47
- Payload increases in, 2
- Replacements for, 27, 34, 35, 47, 74
- Silos for, 35, 64, 76
- Testing of, 14
- SS-13, 45, 47, 74
- SS-16, 45, 47, 116, 148, 156, 229, 232
- SS-17:
- As replacement for SS-11, 34, 35, 74
- Banning of, 33, 34, 46, 51, 53
- Limits on, 76, 82, 156, 213
- Testing of, 58
- SS-18:
- Banning of, 33, 34, 46, 53, 81, 83
- Counted by "fields," 96
- Limits on, 89, 97, 139, 155, 156, 213
- MIRVing of, 43, 47, 139
- Production levels, 35
- Replacement of SS-9s by, 27, 74
- Testing of, 45, 58, 64, 211
- SS-19:
- As heavy missile, 124, 127
- As replacement for SS-11, 27, 35, 74
- Deployment of, 34, 210
- Description of, 47
- Limits on, 53, 76, 82, 100, 156, 213
- Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); Soviet Union; Submarines; Throw-weight)—*Continued*
- SS-19—*Continued*
- Size and effectiveness of, 64, 71
- SS-11s in launchers of, 144
- SS-20, 116, 148, 155, 156, 236
- SS-N-3, 105
- SS-N-6, 47
- SS-N-8, 14, 28
- SS-NX-18, 190, 198, 208
- SS-X-16, 43
- Mobile version of, 74
- Test ban on, 46, 51
- Testing of, 14, 58, 169
- SS-X-17, 43, 45
- SS-X-18:
- Banning of, 53
- Development of, 14, 34, 43, 184
- MIRVing of, 45, 51
- SS-X-19, 39, 43, 45
- SS-X-20, 145, 169
- Surface-to-air (SAM), 74, 248
- Test firings of:
- Definition of, 158
- Limitations on, 46, 51, 166, 169, 174, 184
- Prenotification of, 148, 159, 219
- Soviet, 14, 45, 58, 64, 169, 211
- Trident moratorium on, 45, 68
- Titan, 53, 64, 80, 81, 88
- Titan II, 89
- Tomahawk, 137, 168, 170, 188, 217
- Treaty provisions for, 241
- Trident:
- As modernization of Poseidon, 53, 64, 116
- Banning of, 53, 190
- C-4, 85
- Capabilities of, 51
- Increased production due to SALT II failure, 129
- Limits on numbers of, 46, 81
- MIRVing of, 43, 49
- Planned numbers for deployment, 72
- Range of, 14
- Soviet proposals for, 3, 33
- Testing moratorium, 45, 68
- U.S. development of, 6, 14, 29, 34, 43, 64, 248

- Missiles (*see also* Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Bombers; Multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); Soviet Union; Submarines; Throw-weight)—*Continued*
- Trident I, 184, 198, 202, 203, 208  
Trident II, 198, 203, 208  
Typhoon SLBM, 190, 199, 203, 204, 208
- Molander, Roger:  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 104  
NSC meetings, 103, 116  
Options for SALT II negotiations, 126  
Post-signing questions about SALT, 247, 248  
Prospects for SALT treaty ratification, 251  
Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 247, 248  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 170, 171, 173, 194, 202, 223, 249, 250  
U.S. position on SALT, 168
- Mondale, Walter:  
ALCMs, 228  
Carter-era negotiating strategies for SALT, 161, 163  
Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 212  
Defense budget, 64  
Détente, 47  
Dobrynin-Carter meetings, 159  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184  
Gromyko-Warnke meetings, 213  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 190, 211  
Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale resolution, 95  
NSC meetings, 178, 198, 245  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 155, 156, 198  
Review of SALT, 147, 149  
SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 179  
SALT III principles, 205  
Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 245  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 158, 232  
Two-package proposal, 177
- Moore, Frank, 240
- Moorer, Adm. Thomas H.:  
ABM Treaty, 64, 68  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 7, 16, 25, 39, 55  
NSC meetings, 14, 58, 68  
SALT I, 116  
Schlesinger-JCS meeting (Aug. 30, 1973), 36  
U.S. counterdraft as response to Soviet draft permanent agreement, 42  
U.S. four-step proposal, 22  
Verification Panel meetings, 34, 46, 51, 54, 64
- Most-favored nation status (MFN), 45, 51, 54, 105
- Multiple aim point (MAP) systems, 202, 205, 206, 209
- Multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) (*see also* Missiles):  
Alternative U.S. proposals for, 178  
As bargaining chips, 3  
As hedge against Soviet violation of ABM Treaty, 6  
B-1 use of, 117, 118, 119  
B-52 use of, 114, 117, 118  
Bombers counting as "one" in total for, 114  
Control of, 10  
First-strike advantages of, 47  
For Soviet defense against Chinese People's Republic, 44  
Freestanding agreement on, possible, 64  
In interim agreement, 45  
Limitations on:  
Alternatives to, 14, 27, 29  
As critical issue in negotiations, 24, 29  
By category, 43  
DOD position, 29  
Equal aggregates vs., 76  
For Poseidon missiles, 29  
Numerical disagreements, 71  
Principles for negotiation on, 32  
Progress in agreement on, 90  
Reduction on levels, 179  
Soviet position, 58, 166  
U.S. proposals, 97
- MARVs used with, 12
- Minuteman limits for, 29, 43, 71
- On cruise missiles, 236

- Multiple independently-targeted  
 re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) (*see also*  
 Missiles)—*Continued*  
 On MX, 85  
 On SS-18, 43, 47, 139  
 On SS-X-18, 45, 51  
 On Trident missiles, 43, 49  
 Qualitative improvements as  
   codeword for, 74, 81  
 SLBMs as included in throw-weight  
   limit proposal for, 49, 53  
 Soviet development of, 47  
 Soviet flexibility on, 40  
 Soviet paper on, 32  
 Soviet position, 16, 17, 33, 233  
 Soviet's three questions on, 48  
 Standing Consultative Commission  
   monitoring of deployment of,  
   101  
 Throw-weight proposal for, 46, 51,  
   55, 58  
 Throw-weight, stability and, 68  
 U.S. proposal for banning of, 23  
 U.S. proposals for limits on  
   Minuteman IIIs, 22  
 Verification of:  
   JCS position, 145  
   Launcher type definitions, 191, 192,  
   194  
   On SLBMs, 100  
   Problems of, 92  
   Soviet position, 51, 96, 98, 144, 170  
   U.S. position, 32, 61, 93, 145, 156  
 Vladivostok Summit discussions of,  
   88  
 Multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs), 54  
 Murmansk, 106  
 Muskie, Edmund, 64, 113, 249, 250  
 Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions  
   (MBFR), 32, 80, 113, 157, 244, 245  
 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD),  
   181  
 National Aeronautics and Space  
   Administration (NASA), 14  
 National Intelligence Estimates:  
   NIE 4-11-77, 210  
   NIE 11-3/8-75, 112, 116  
   NIE 11-5-75, 110  
   NIE 11-8-73, 82  
 National Intelligence Memorandum  
   (NIM 77-025), 181  
 National Security Council (NSC):  
   Bargaining options for SALT II  
     negotiations, 129  
   Meetings:  
     Mar. 8, 1973, 14  
     Jan. 24, 1974, 47  
     Mar. 21, 1974, 51, 58  
     Jun. 20, 1974, 68  
     Sept. 14, 1974, 73, 74  
     Oct. 7, 1974, 73, 76, 77, 80  
     Oct. 18, 1974, 81  
     Dec. 2, 1974, 90  
     Jan. 29, 1975, 92  
     Mar. 5, 1975, 94  
     July 25, 1975, 101  
     Aug. 9, 1975, 103  
     Sept. 17, 1975, 105  
     Dec. 22, 1975, 113, 114  
     Jan. 8, 1976, 114  
     Jan. 19, 1976, 116  
     Jan. 21, 1976, 119, 120, 122, 125  
     Feb. 11, 1976, 130  
     July 30, 1976, 138, 139, 140  
     Sept. 6, 1977, 176, 178, 179, 180  
     Apr. 11, 1978, 198  
     Sept. 2, 1978, 210, 211  
     Jan. 2, 1980, 245  
   Weekly Report #79, 224  
   Weekly Report #81, 226  
   Weekly Report #96, 238  
 National Security Decision Memoranda:  
   NSDM 197, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, 39  
   NSDM 198, 7  
   NSDM 206, 16, 17, 39  
   NSDM 213, 23, 25, 28, 39, 55  
   NSDM 216, 25, 28, 31, 39, 55  
   NSDM 233, 39, 55  
   NSDM 242, 47  
   NSDM 245, 54, 55  
   NSDM 271, 75  
   NSDM 285, 92, 94, 96, 99, 104, 127  
   NSDM 301, 99, 104, 127  
   NSDM 303, 127  
   NSDM 316, 127  
   NSDM 331, 136  
 National Security Study Memorandum,  
   NSSM 195, 64  
 NSSM 202, 64  
 National Technical Means (NTM), 96,  
   184, 209, 239, 241  
 Navy, Soviet, 113  
 Navy, U.S., 100

- New York Times*, 45, 64, 71, 224  
Newhouse, John, 194, 223  
Nitze, Paul H., 12, 28, 36, 130, 188, 197  
    NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58  
    Verification Panel meetings, 2, 34, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64  
Nixon, Richard M.:  
    ABM Treaty, 7, 68, 70  
    Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 61  
    Brezhnev meetings with, 68, 69, 70, 71  
    Brezhnev visit (June 1973), 30  
    Chinese People's Republic, 47  
    Deadline for SALT II agreement, 30  
    Gromyko meetings with:  
        Sept. 28, 1973, 38, 44  
        Feb. 4, 1974, 52  
        Apr. 12, 1974, 63  
    Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 7, 16, 23  
    Jackson's SALT II proposal, 50  
    Japan, 47  
    JCS, conflict over SALT II with, 26  
    Messages:  
        From Brezhnev, 15, 41, 43  
        From Jackson, 50  
        To Brezhnev, 41  
        To Jackson, 56  
    Military parity vs. superiority, 60  
    MIRV limitations as critical issue in negotiations, 29  
    NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68  
    Podgorny's talks with, 63  
    Pompidou meeting with (Reykjavik, May 1973), 103  
    Resignation of, 73  
    SALT II first session, 4, 7, 10  
    Silo size, 238  
    Soviet omnibus proposal, 19  
    Standing Consultative Committee, 2, 11  
    Visits:  
        Moscow (June-July 1974), 70, 71, 72  
        Reykjavik (May 1973), 103  
Non-central systems, 76  
Non-circumvention/Non-transfer issues:  
    Congressional views on, 171, 194  
    JCS position, 236  
    Soviet position, 90, 96, 200  
    U.S. consultation with allies on, 170, 171  
    U.S. position, 96, 186, 190, 191, 194, 198, 225  
North Atlantic Council, 2, 81, 194  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):  
    Arms control, 245  
    Congressional budget cuts on, 14  
    Cruise missiles, 125, 128  
    European nuclear powers within, 153  
    Forward-based systems, 6  
    Non-central systems, 76  
    SALT negotiations effect on, 150  
    Soviet wedge-driving opportunities in, 249, 250  
    Warsaw Pact forces in relation to, 76, 113  
Norway, 106  
Nuclear-free zone proposals, 60  
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 123  
Nuclear-powered ships, 105  
Nuclear testing:  
    Policy on, 64  
    Threshold ban, 63, 64, 105, 110  
    Underground ban, 60  
Nuclear war:  
    Fatality levels from, 74  
    Minuteman survivability during, 2, 13, 34, 51, 188  
    Soviet-U.S. discussions of, 82  
Nuclear weapons:  
    Soviet proposal for non-transport in strategic bombers of, 10  
    Tactical, 47  
Nunn, Sam, 244  
Odeen, Philip:  
    Alternatives to limitations on MIRVs, 27  
    Minuteman survivability, 13  
    NSC meetings, 14  
    Status of SALT II negotiations, 17, 28  
    Thinking within the bureaucracy about SALT, 37  
    Verification Panel meetings, 2, 34  
Odom, William E., 162  
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 90  
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD):  
    Minuteman survivability, 13  
    Mobile ICBMs, 100  
    Options for SALT II talks, 54  
    SALT Task Force, 36  
    Standing Consultative Commission's role as seen by, 2

- Ogarkov, Marshal Nikolai N., 162, 200, 201, 222, 239, 240  
 Operational Base Launch Program, 58  
 Outer space, 110, 241
- Panama, 187  
 Panama Canal Treaty, 189, 191, 251  
 Perez, Frank, 2, 43, 45, 46, 54  
 Pervomaysk, 144, 173, 174, 176, 183, 184, 186, 204  
 Philippine Sea, 101  
 Podgorny, Nikolai V., 63, 70, 71  
 Pompidou, Georges, 103  
 Porter, William, 34  
 Portugal, 105, 109  
 Powell, Jody, 184, 204, 239, 240, 245  
*Pravda*, 71, 209  
 Preemptive concessions, 113  
 Presidential Directive/NSC 7, 154, 155, 156, 158  
 Presidential Directive/NSC 20, 179, 180  
 Presidential power, 172  
 Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 2, 147  
 Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 38, 205  
 Pressler, Larry, 244  
 Program analysis, 37  
 Pustay, Lt. Gen. John, 250
- Qualitative improvements, 74, 81  
 Qualitative limitations, 4, 76
- Radar:  
   Chinese, 47  
   Dog House (Soviet), 47  
 Radar harassment vehicles, 217  
 RAND Corporation, 105  
 Reagan, Ronald W., 134, 252  
 Remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs), 105, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234  
 Research and Development (R&D), 2, 58, 64, 74, 101  
 Richardson, Elliot L., 14, 18, 23, 25  
 Rickover, Adm. Hyman, 45  
 Rockefeller, Nelson A.:  
   Cruise missile development, 138  
   NSC meetings, 94, 105, 114, 116, 119, 130  
   Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of Mar. 1976, 134  
 Rodman, Peter W., 44, 60, 66, 143  
 Rogers, William P., 14, 15, 23, 25  
 Romania, 103  
 Roper polls, 76  
 Rota, 3, 4, 88  
 Rowny, Lt. Gen. Edward L., 130  
   Backfire bombers, 114, 200  
   NSC meetings, 47, 119  
   Schlesinger-JCS meeting (Aug. 30, 1973), 36  
   Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 170  
   Verification Panel meetings, 34, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64
- Rumsfeld, Donald:  
   Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 125  
   Cruise missiles, 112  
   Deferral option, 131  
   DOD-White House disagreements, 120  
   Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 127, 136  
   JCS's negotiating perspectives, 145  
   NSC meetings, 76, 81, 90, 94, 101, 105, 113, 114, 116, 130, 139  
   Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of Mar. 1976, 134
- Rush, Kenneth:  
   Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus for SALT agreement, 18  
   NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68  
   SALT II, Instructions for U.S. delegates to, 55  
   Verification Panel meetings, 2, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54
- Sadat, Anwar, 226  
 Sary Shagan, 2  
 Sanguine Project, 101, 114  
 Scali, John, 64  
 Schecter, Jerrold, 240  
 Schlesinger, James R.:  
   ABM Treaty, 68  
   Backfire bombers, 92  
   Cruise missiles, 125  
   Forward-based systems, 106  
   Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 16, 25, 39, 55, 93, 99, 104  
   JCS meeting with (Aug. 30, 1973), 36  
   JCS views on SALT II, 31  
   Launcher equality, 80  
   New ICBM program, call for, 53  
   NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76, 81, 90, 92, 94, 101, 103, 105  
   Soviet's SALT II proposal of Oct. 1974, 84



- Schlesinger, James R.—*Continued*  
U.S. counterdraft as response to  
Soviet draft permanent  
agreement, 42  
Verification Panel meetings, 2, 45, 46,  
54
- Schmidt, Helmut, 249, 250
- Schmitt, Harrison, 244
- Schultz, George, 58
- Schweiker, Richard, 244
- Scott, Hugh, 51, 101
- Scowcroft, Gen. Brent, 39, 40, 42  
ABM Treaty, 67  
ALCMs, 112  
Appointment as NSA assistant, 110  
Bargaining options for SALT II  
negotiations, 129  
Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings:  
May 1973, 24  
Mar. 1974, 61, 62  
Oct. 1974, 82, 83, 84  
Jan. 1976, 117, 118, 119, 124, 125  
Brezhnev message to Nixon, 41  
Brezhnev-Nixon meetings (June  
1974), 71  
Deferral option, 131  
DOD-White House disagreements,  
77, 119, 120, 121, 122  
Future SALT talks, 90  
Heavy missiles, 124  
Implications for Soviet policy of  
SALT II impasse, 111  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to  
SALT II, 25, 75  
JCS's negotiating perspectives, 145  
Johnson's recommendations for SALT  
II agreement, 128  
NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68, 74, 76,  
81, 90, 101, 103, 105, 113, 114,  
116, 119, 130, 139  
Soviet 15-year agreement proposal,  
83  
Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of  
Mar. 1976, 134, 135  
Soviet view of prospects for SALT,  
141  
Status of SALT negotiations (Johnson  
letter), 146  
U.S. notes on SALT II, 65, 78, 97  
Verification Panel meetings, 34, 43,  
45, 46, 51, 54, 64  
Vladivostok Agreement, Jackson  
codicil proposal for, 95  
Vladivostok Summit, 88
- Seafarer Project, 114
- Seignious, Gen. George, 223, 232, 239,  
240
- Semenov, Vladimir S.:  
Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus  
for SALT agreement, 18, 20  
Deadlock in talks over FBS issue, 17  
Equal aggregates, 28  
MIRVs, 17  
SALT II instructions for, 43  
Silo size increase limits, 96  
Soviet Defense Ministry views on  
SALT II, 15, 74  
Soviet view of prospects for SALT II,  
141  
SSBN standoff, 28  
Standing Consultative Commission, 9  
Weakness in negotiating authority of,  
90
- Senate, U.S.:  
Armed Services Committee, 68, 244  
Declining to bring SALT treaty to  
floor, 245, 247, 248, 249  
Defense appropriations, 60  
Foreign Relations Committee, 189,  
243, 244, 248, 251  
Intelligence Committee, 244  
Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale  
resolution, 95  
Minimum deterrence, 80  
Prospects for SALT treaty ratification,  
234, 248, 251
- Shanghai Communiqué, 191
- Shaw, John P., 2
- Shchukin, Aleksandr N., 17, 18, 28, 43,  
51, 96
- Shelepin, Alexander N., 101
- Ships, 105, 119
- Shulman, Marshall, 196
- Shultz, Charles, 64
- Sick, Gary, 149
- Silos (*see also* Launchers):  
Contents verification, 90, 100  
Covers for, 90  
For Minuteman, 101  
Interim Agreement on dimensions of,  
100, 101  
Limits on increases in size for, 93, 96,  
98, 101, 124, 127, 238  
Moratorium on construction of, 78, 90  
Soviet:  
Building of new, 37, 40  
Concealment of, 170, 173  
Conversion of, 74, 76, 81

- Silos (*see also* Launchers)—*Continued*  
 Soviet—*Continued*  
     Current numbers of, 47, 53  
     For SS-9, 35  
     For SS-11 missiles, 35, 64, 76  
     III-X, 209  
     U.S., 37, 82  
 Simpson, Alan, 244  
 Sinai, 103  
 Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP), 114, 130  
 Sisco, Joseph, 64, 68, 69, 103, 105, 119  
 Sitrin, David, 152  
 Slocombe, Walter:  
     Backfire bombers, 196  
     Soviet oral message on SALT, 233  
     Special Coordination Committee meetings, 149, 152, 170, 171, 173, 194, 202, 223, 232, 250  
 Sloss, Leon, 45, 149, 152  
 Smith, Gerard C., 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17  
 Smith, Lt. Gen. William Y., 171, 173, 194, 196, 202, 223, 232  
 Smolin, Victor, 28  
 Sokolov, Oleg, 60  
 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., 51, 54  
 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut:  
     Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 60, 84  
     Brezhnev-Nixon meetings (June 1974), 70, 71  
     DOD-White House disagreements, 122  
     Gromyko-Kissinger meetings, 66, 72, 143  
     Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 8, 104  
     Interim Agreement, 3  
     MIRVs, 48, 144  
     Nixon-Gromyko meetings, 38, 63  
     NSC meetings, 14, 47, 58, 68, 113, 114, 116, 130, 139  
     Reexamination of SALT II, 35  
     Soviet objections to equality in throw-weight, 53  
     Soviet SALT II objectives, 3, 84, 85  
     Status of SALT II negotiations, 17, 96  
     U.S. counterdraft as response to Soviet draft permanent agreement, 42  
     U.S. notes on SALT II, 57, 86, 100  
     U.S. position on SALT II, 107  
     Verification Panel meetings, 2, 43, 46, 51, 54, 64, 90  
 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut—*Continued*  
     Vladivostok Agreement, Jackson codicil proposal for, 95  
     Vladivostok Summit, 88  
 Soviet Union (*see also* Bombers; Missiles; Multiple independently-target re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); Silos; Soviet subheadings under other subjects; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II); Vladivostok Summit):  
     ABM removal by, 2  
     Afghanistan invasion, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250  
     Banning of mobile ICBMs, proposal for, 96, 98, 100, 166  
     Chemical warfare proposal requested by, 15  
     Chinese People's Republic as threat to, 83  
     Civil defense program of, 74  
     Communist Party Congress (25th, Feb.-Mar. 1976), 101, 103, 105, 109, 133  
     Cruise missiles:  
         Definitions of, 229, 230, 231, 233  
         Development of, 64  
         Limiting/banning of, 23, 100, 153  
         Range of, 117, 118, 119, 123, 130  
     Defense ministry views on SALT II, 15, 74  
     Defenses against Chinese People's Republic, 44, 148, 208  
     Détente, 46, 54, 60, 74, 79, 80, 90, 105, 111  
     Dismantling/destruction procedures for bombers, 211, 216, 217, 218, 233, 241, 250  
     Doghouse radar, 47  
     Economic situation, 74, 79  
     Equal aggregates, 17, 28, 84, 105  
     First-strike capacity prospects of, 113  
     Forces for international conflict of, estimated, 113, 114  
     Forward-based systems:  
         Dropping as precondition movement on, 40  
         Hardening of position on, 10, 71, 72  
         U.S. rebuttal to proposals on, 8, 28  
     General Staff's role in, 162  
     Grey area negotiation, 205  
     Interim Agreement:  
         Extension of, 58, 60, 62, 64, 68, 72  
         Provision of data required by, 247

- Soviet Union (*see also* Bombers;  
Missiles; Multiple  
independently-target re-entry  
vehicles (MIRVs); Silos; Soviet  
*subheadings under other subjects*;  
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
(SALT II); Vladivostok  
Summit)—*Continued*  
Interim Agreement—*Continued*  
    U.S. views on Soviet position, 3, 21,  
    34  
Invasion of Norway, possible, 106  
LRTNF wedge-driving opportunities  
    in NATO by, 249, 250  
Military spending levels, 244  
Mutual nuclear defense pact proposal  
    by, 83  
Naval power of, 113, 244  
Negotiating instructions for SALT,  
    15, 43  
Non-transport of weapons in  
    strategic bombers, proposal by,  
    10  
Nuclear war discussions of, 82  
Omnibus SALT II proposal before  
    Brezhnev visit, 19, 20, 21  
Oral message exchange on SALT,  
    233, 234  
Policy implications for SALT II  
    impasse, 111  
SALT II talks resumption as  
    confirmed by, 1  
SLBMs, 3, 10, 19, 28, 39, 204  
Special Consultative Committee, 17,  
    247  
Standing Consultative Commission,  
    17, 247  
Strategic forces as seen in, 166  
Submarine force levels, 35, 47, 60  
Survivability of missile forces of, 74  
Tactical nuclear weapons  
    development by, 47  
Throw-weight, 14, 52, 53, 81, 105  
Trident proposals by, 3, 33  
United States, relations with, 74, 79,  
    80, 183, 227, 239  
U.S. credit restrictions, 105  
U.S. grain sales to, 109  
U.S. military spending vs. that of, 244  
U.S. sentiment against, 105  
Verification rules, 105, 144  
Vladivostok Agreement, 98, 100, 111  
Special Coordination Committee (SCC):  
    Heavy bomber definitions, 191  
    Meetings:  
        Feb. 3, 1977, 149  
Special Coordination Committee  
    (SCC)—*Continued*  
    Meetings—*Continued*  
        Feb. 25, 1977, 152  
        Apr. 7, 1977, 158  
        June 7, 1977, 170  
        June 20, 1977, 171  
        July 11, 1977, 173  
        Aug. 18, 1977, 174, 176  
        Aug. 30, 1977, 176  
        Jan. 9, 1978, 192  
        Mar. 6, 1978, 194  
        May. 12, 1978, 202  
        June 12, 1978, 205  
        July 7, 1978, 206  
        Sept. 1, 1978, 211  
        Sept. 29, 1978, 216, 217  
        Oct. 26, 1978, 223  
        Nov. 3, 1978, 223  
        Jan. 12, 1979, 232  
        Mar. 21, 1979, 237  
        June 6, 1980, 249, 250  
    Review of SALT, 147, 149  
Spiers, Ronald, 14  
Stalin, Joseph, 47, 162  
Standing Consultative Commission  
    (SCC):  
        Dismantling/destruction procedures  
            for bombers, 211  
        Establishment of, 4, 7, 10, 11  
        Guidelines for formation of, 1, 7, 9  
        Interim Agreement provisions for, 7,  
        69, 89  
        JCS view of, 2  
        Meetings of, 28, 247, 248  
        Memorandum of Understanding on,  
        11, 19, 241  
        MIRV deployment as monitored by,  
        101  
        OSD view of role of, 2  
        Role in ABM Treaty of, 7, 67  
        Roles for, 2, 17  
        Signing of agreed procedures for, 69  
        Soviet downplaying of, 17  
        Soviet provision of data on  
            requirements of Interim  
            Agreement, 247  
        Telemetry, 235, 239  
        Treaty role of, 241  
        U.S. staffing of, 2, 11  
        Verification Panel role in, 7  
Stennis, John, 51, 68  
Stoertz, Howard, 149, 152, 171

- Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 60, 70, 71, 72, 88
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.; SALT *subheadings under other subjects*; Soviet Union; Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974)):
- Backfire as obstacle to agreement, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113, 117, 204, 218
  - Backfire/SCLM proposal, 119
  - Bargaining options for, 12, 81, 112, 113, 114, 116, 121, 126, 129
  - Brezhnev's 1973 U.S. visit as impetus for agreement, 18, 20, 21
  - Briefing charts for DOD position, 58
  - Carter-era negotiating strategies, 161, 163, 165, 166, 170, 226
  - Chinese People's Republic impact on Soviet negotiating strategies, 162
  - Chinese People's Republic inclusion in, possible, 249
  - Communiqués for, 72
  - Comprehensive agreement seen as unlikely, 58
  - Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 210, 212, 213
  - Comprehensive quantitative approach to, 27
  - Congressional attacks on, 80, 183, 188, 189
  - Critique of U.S. negotiating strategies for, 226
  - Cruise missiles as obstacle to agreement, 111, 112, 113
  - Data exchange, 145, 242
  - Dates for resumption of, possible, 38, 39
  - Deadline for agreement, 30
  - Deferral option, 131, 152, 154
  - Depressed trajectory ban proposal, 211, 218, 219
  - Discussion of U.S. and Soviet proposals (Oct. 1974), 84
  - DOD-White House disagreements on, 77, 119, 120, 121, 122, 139
  - Entering into force of, 239
  - European position, 81
  - First session:
    - Deadlocking of, 9
    - Instructions for U.S. delegates to, 6, 7, 8
    - Opening of, 4
    - Recessing of, 9
    - Results of, 10
  - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.; SALT *subheadings under other subjects*; Soviet Union; Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974))—*Continued*
    - First session—*Continued*
      - Soviet objectives for, 1, 3, 5, 9
      - U.S. objectives for, 2
    - French inclusion in, possible, 149
    - Future SALT talks, 90, 91, 97
    - Guidance for Gromyko-Vance talks, 179, 206, 207, 227, 228
    - Guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 179, 180
    - Helsinki Summit discussion of, 100, 102, 103, 204, 227
    - Instruction to U.S. delegates:
      - First session (Nov.—Dec. 1972, 6, 7, 8
        - Mar. 1973, 16, 17
        - May 1973, 23, 25
        - Sept. 1973, 39, 39A
        - Feb. 1974, 54, 55
        - Sept. 1974, 73, 74, 75, 81
        - Jan. 1975, 93
        - July 1975, 99
        - Aug. 1975, 104
        - Feb. 1976, 127
        - June 1976, 136
        - Aug. 1977, 174
        - Oct. 1977, 186
        - Nov. 1977, 190
        - Jan. 1978, 192
        - May 1978, 202
        - Sept. 1978, 211
    - Instructions for Soviet delegates to, 15, 43
    - Interagency Working Group options for, 80, 81
    - Jackson's views on, 50, 60, 150, 188
    - JCS position, 31, 35, 80, 145, 178, 220, 225, 236
    - JCS-White House conflict over, 26
    - Joint draft text (JDT), 146, 209
    - Minimum goals for, 175
    - NATO as affected by, 150
    - Options for Vance's Moscow visits, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 198, 199
    - Oral message exchange on, 233, 234
    - OSD options for, 54
    - Outline of U.S. proposal for agreement, 35, 78
    - Outstanding issues in, 188, 191

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.; SALT *subheadings under other subjects*; Soviet Union; Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974))—*Continued*

Pace and strategy for U.S. efforts in, 189

Political implications, 110, 224, 227

Post-signing changes to, possible, 251

Post-signing questions about, 247, 248, 249, 250

Program analysis' role in, 37

Projected strategic balance, 74

Prospects for, 175

Ratification of Treaty:

Efforts for, 243, 248

Prospects for, 214, 234, 248, 251

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan effect on, 245, 246, 248, 249, 250

Reexamination of, 35

Restraints on specific strategic programs, 27

Resumption of in 1977, 158

Review of, 147, 149

Senate decision to not bring treaty to floor, 245, 247, 248, 249

Signing of, 240, 241, 242

Six problem areas in, 167

Soviet draft on basic principles of negotiation, 21, 24, 30

Soviet draft permanent agreements, 40, 42

Soviet fifteen-year agreement proposal, 83

Soviet notes on, 1, 133

Soviet objectives for, 1, 3, 5, 9, 84, 85

Draft on basic principles of negotiation, 21, 24, 30

Draft permanent agreement, 40, 42

Fifteen-year agreement proposal, 83

Proposal for banning of mobile missiles, 96, 98, 100, 166

Proposal of Oct. 1974, 84, 85

U.S. position, 3, 5, 9

Soviet omnibus proposal, 19, 20, 21

Soviet paper (July 27, 1973) and U.S. response, 32

Soviet perceptions on, CIA assessment of, 169, 181

Soviet proposal of Oct. 1974, 84, 85

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.; SALT *subheadings under other subjects*; Soviet Union; Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974))—*Continued*

Soviet rejection of U.S. proposal of Mar. 1976, 133, 134, 135, 139

Soviet view of prospects for, 141

Stalemates in, 83, 224

Status of negotiations, 17, 28, 96, 146

Strategic arms levels as affected by lack of SALT agreement, 112, 129, 188

Task force, 36

Technological change's impact on Soviet negotiating strategies, 162

Text of Protocol to treaty, 242

Text of treaty, 241

Thinking within the bureaucracy about, 37

Three-part structure for, 167

Three year protocol proposal, 167, 170, 198, 204, 210, 213, 218, 228, 231, 233, 236

Timetable for, 15, 148

Two-package proposal, 175, 176, 177

U.S. domestic opposition to, 193

U.S. four-step proposal, 22

U.S. notes on, 57, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 78, 86, 97, 100, 108, 115, 132

U.S. objectives for, 74

U.S. position, 38, 107, 168

U.S. pre-talks proposals, 3

U.S. proposal (Feb. 1976), 132, 139, 140, 142

U.S. proposal (Mar. 1976), 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139

U.S.-Soviet differences in negotiating history on, 76

U.S. strategies for 1978, 197

U.S. timing for treaty signing, 191

Verification Panel options, 80, 81

Vladivostok Agreement, 93, 94

As basis for negotiations, 159

Impasse in, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111

Jackson codicil proposal for, 95

Joint draft text, 99, 104, 202, 211, 234

Soviet plans for resolution of issues in, 98, 100

Unraveling of, 106

U.S. issues for further discussion, 96

- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) (*see also* Agreements, Soviet-U.S.; SALT subheadings under other subjects; Soviet Union; Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974))—*Continued*  
Weakness of arguing on principles, 24
- Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), 51, 64, 74, 90, 105, 116
- Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT III):  
Backfire bombers in, 112, 114, 130  
Cruise missiles in, 112  
Forward-based systems in, 106, 114, 239  
Principles for:  
Depressed trajectories, 219  
Establishment of, 158, 170, 191, 203  
JCS position, 205  
Strategies for negotiation on, 197  
Strengthening of, 227  
U.S. proposals, 190, 198  
Soviet desire for, 74  
Theater nuclear force discussion in, 249  
U.S. desire for, 63
- Strategic force modernization, 225
- Strategic forces, 166
- Submarine bases:  
As subject for bargaining, 3  
Holy Loch, 3, 4, 76  
Rota, 3, 4, 88
- Submarines (*see also* Missiles):  
British, 47  
Chinese, 81  
D-class, 43, 53, 64  
French, 47  
Interim Agreement restrictions on, 14, 66  
Soviet force levels of, 35, 47, 60  
Standoff on deployment of SSBNs, 28  
Sturgeon-class (SSM-668), 119  
Trident, 34, 60, 139  
Limiting of, 85, 90, 105  
Planned numbers for deployment, 76  
Typhoon (Soviet), 85, 90, 139  
RSM-52 missiles for, 190, 199, 203, 204, 208  
U.S. force levels of, 64
- Subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD), 233
- Sukhodrev, Victor M.:  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239, 240
- Sukhodrev, Victor M.—*Continued*  
Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings, 60  
Brezhnev-Nixon meetings, 71  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184, 204, 218  
Gromyko-Kissinger meetings, 143  
Gromyko Washington visit (Sept. 1977), 182  
Kissinger-Dobrynin meetings, 38  
Kissinger-Gromyko meetings, 44, 66  
Nixon-Gromyko meetings, 63  
Vladivostok summit (Nov. 1974), 88
- Survivability:  
Of Minuteman during nuclear war, 2, 13, 34, 51, 188  
Of Soviet missile forces, 74
- Suslov, Mikhail A., 79
- Symington, Stuart, 34, 54
- Syria, 187
- Target acquisition, 114
- Technological change, 162
- Telemetry encryption (*see also* Verification):  
Article XV on, 202  
Ban proposal for, 173  
Common Understanding proposal, 217, 223  
Soviet position, 140, 219, 229, 233, 235  
Standing Consultative Committee jurisdiction over disputes on, 235, 239  
U.S. position, 146, 155, 211, 218, 228, 232, 234, 237, 239, 249, 250
- Teller, Edward, 116, 125, 130
- Terrain contour matching (TERCOM) navigation system, 105, 119
- Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF), 248, 249, 250
- Thompson, James, 249
- Throw-weight (*see also* Missiles), 37  
Accuracy vs., 148  
As bargaining point, 43  
Deadlocking of talks over, 74  
DOD decisions regarding, 64  
Equal aggregates with, 80  
Levels of, 4, 14  
MIRV proposal on, 46, 51, 55, 58  
MIRVs, stability and, 68  
Normalized vs. demonstrated, 54  
Of SLBMs, 49, 53  
Projections for, 74  
Soviet advantages in, 14  
Soviet objections to equality in, 52, 53

- Throw-weight (*see also* Missiles)—*Continued*  
Soviet position, 81, 105  
U.S. position, 75, 76, 90
- Toon, Malcolm, 218
- Backfire bombers, 191
- Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239, 240
- Brezhnev-Vance meetings, 221
- Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184, 204
- Gromyko-Warnke meetings, 213
- Total obligational authority (TOA), 90
- Tower, John, 14
- Transport and erector launchers (TEL), 155
- Trusov, Konstantin A., 28
- Tucker, Gardiner, 2, 12
- Turkey, 105, 114
- Turner, Stansfield M.:  
Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 210, 212  
Guidance for Gromyko-Vance talks, 179, 207, 228  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 211  
NSC meetings, 178  
Number of ALCMs per bomber, 232  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 154, 155, 156, 198  
Prospects for SALT treaty ratification, 214  
SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 179  
Senate's declining to move SALT treaty to floor, 245  
Soviet perceptions on SALT, CIA assessment of, 169  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 158, 170, 173, 194, 223, 232
- Tyruratum test site, 137, 166, 173
- Undersecretary of State's Principals and Regional Staff Meeting, 69
- United Kingdom (UK), 116  
Grey area negotiation, 205  
SLBMs, 80, 85  
Strategic missile program, 248  
Submarines of, 47  
Theater nuclear forces, 249
- United Nations Charter (Article 102), 241
- United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 143, 215
- Ustinov, Dmitriy F., 74, 141, 239, 240
- Utgoff, Victor, 149, 152, 168, 170, 171
- Vance, Cyrus R.:  
ABM Treaty, 175, 176  
Backfire bombers, 154, 182, 196, 200  
Brezhnev-Carter summit (June 1979), 239, 240  
Brezhnev's meetings with, 157, 221, 222  
Carter-era negotiating strategies for SALT, 161, 163, 166  
Comprehensive package proposal, 207, 210, 212  
Cruise missile definitions, 223, 233  
Dismantling/destruction procedures for bombers, 216  
Dobrynin-Carter meetings, 148, 159  
Dobrynin's meetings with, 161, 164, 194, 203, 218  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184, 204, 218  
Gromyko-Warnke meetings, 213  
Gromyko's meetings with:  
Mar. 1977, 157  
May 1977, 164, 167, 170  
Sept. 1977, 174, 175, 176, 182, 183, 185  
Apr. 1978, 198, 199, 200, 201  
July 1978, 206, 207, 208, 210  
Sept.-Oct. 1978, 212, 215, 218, 219, 221  
Dec. 1978, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235  
Guidance for talks with Gromyko, 179, 206, 207, 227, 228  
Heavy missiles, 170  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 186, 190, 192, 211  
Jackson memo to Carter, 150  
Message from Carter, 227  
New types of missiles, 238  
NSC meetings, 178, 198, 245  
Number of ALCMs per bomber, 228, 232  
Options for Moscow talks:  
Mar. 1977, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156  
Apr. 1978, 198, 199  
Pace and strategy for U.S. efforts in SALT, 189  
Prospects and goals for SALT, 175  
SALT III principles, 205

- Vance, Cyrus R.—*Continued*  
 Senate's declining to move SALT  
 treaty to floor, 245  
 Six problem areas in SALT  
 negotiations, 167  
 Soviet perceptions on SALT, CIA  
 assessment of, 169  
 Special Coordination Committee  
 meetings, 149, 158, 170, 171, 173,  
 194, 202, 206, 216, 223, 232  
 Telemetry, 237  
 Three-part structure for SALT  
 negotiations, 167  
 Two-package proposal, 176, 177  
 U.S. strategies for SALT in 1978, 197  
 Visits:  
 Moscow (Mar. 1977), 151, 152, 154,  
 155, 156, 157, 166  
 Moscow (Apr. 1978), 197, 198, 199,  
 200, 201, 204  
 Vavilov, Andrei, 60, 240  
 Venice Summit, 249, 250  
 Verification (*see also* Telemetry  
 encryption):  
 CIA emphasis on, 81  
 Cruise missiles, 101, 128  
 Jackson hearings on, 94, 114  
 JCS position, 145, 236  
 MIRVs:  
 JCS position, 145  
 Launcher type definitions, 191, 192,  
 194  
 On SLBMs, 100  
 Problems of, 92  
 Soviet position, 51, 96, 98, 144, 170  
 U.S. position, 32, 61, 93, 145, 156  
 Multiple aim point (MAP) systems,  
 205, 209  
 MX missiles, 239, 249, 250  
 Silo contents, 90, 100  
 Soviet acceptance of U.S. rules on,  
 105, 144  
 Treaty provisions for, 241  
 Verification Panel:  
 Meetings, 14, 68  
 Oct. 31, 1972, 2, 4  
 Nov. 3, 1972, 2, 4  
 Mar. 2, 1973, 14  
 Apr. 25, 1973, 17  
 Apr. 30, 1973, 22, 29  
 Aug. 15, 1973, 34  
 Mid-Sept. 1973 (proposed), 34  
 Nov. 23, 1973, 43  
 Dec. 28, 1973, 45  
 Verification Panel—*Continued*  
 Meetings—*Continued*  
 Jan. 8, 1974, 46  
 Jan. 30, 1974, 51  
 Feb. 15, 1974, 51, 54  
 Apr. 23, 1974, 64  
 Apr. 27, 1974, 64  
 Aug. 30, 1974, 73  
 Sept. 9, 1974, 74  
 Oct. 17, 1974, 81  
 Jan. 3, 1975, 90  
 Jan. 10, 1975, 90  
 July 24, 1975, 100, 101  
 Sept. 10, 1975, 105  
 Dec. 19, 1975, 112  
 Jan. 5, 1976, 116  
 Feb. 5, 1976, 126  
 Feb. 10, 1976, 130  
 July 13, 1976, 136, 139  
 MIRVs, 46  
 Papers prepared by, 17, 28  
 SALT II options, 80, 81  
 Standing Consultative Commission  
 as directed by, 7  
 Vienna talks, 72  
 Vietnam War, 14, 68, 101  
 Vladivostok Summit (Nov. 1974) (*see*  
*also* Soviet Union; Strategic Arms  
 Limitation Talks (SALT II)):  
 Accomplishments of, 90  
 Agenda of, 87  
 Agreements made at, 93, 94  
 Joint communiqué, 88  
 Soviet Aide-Mémoire, 89  
 Soviet inflexibility, 77  
 Soviet proposal of Oct. 1974, 84, 85  
 U.S. Aide-Mémoire, 91  
 Vorontsov, Yuli M., 134, 143  
 Wade, James P., Jr., 105, 114, 116, 125,  
 139  
*Wall Street Journal*, 90, 188  
 Walters, Lt. Gen. Vernon A., 51, 58, 76  
 Warner, John W., 244  
 Warnke, Paul, 218  
 ABM Treaty, 175  
 ALCMs, 173, 232  
 Brezhnev-Vance meetings, 221  
 Carter-era negotiating strategies for  
 SALT, 161, 163  
 Comprehensive package proposal,  
 207, 210, 212  
 Dobrynin-Vance meetings, 164



Warnke, Paul—*Continued*

Dobrynin's meetings with, 164, 171  
Gromyko-Carter meetings, 183, 184, 204  
Gromyko's meeting with (Sept. 1978), 211, 212, 213  
Guidance for Gromyko-Vance talks, 179, 206, 207, 228  
Instructions for U.S. delegates to SALT II, 211  
Korniyenko's meetings with, 173, 213  
NSC meetings, 178, 198  
Options for Vance's Moscow talks, 154, 155, 156, 198  
Pace and strategy for U.S. efforts in SALT, 189  
Prospects and goals for SALT, 175  
Resumption of SALT talks in 1977, 158  
Review of SALT, 147  
SALT guidance for Gromyko visit (Sept. 1977), 174, 179, 180  
Soviet perceptions on SALT, CIA assessment of, 169  
Special Coordination Committee meetings, 152, 158, 170, 171, 173, 202, 206

Warnke, Paul—*Continued*

Two-package proposal, 176, 177  
U.S. strategies for SALT in 1978, 197  
Visit to Moscow (Sept. 1978), 211, 212, 213  
Warsaw Pact, 76, 113  
Watergate, 64  
Weiss, Seymour, 34, 42, 43, 46, 51, 54  
Welch, Jasper, 247, 250  
Western Europe, 116, 153  
Wexler, Anne, 243  
Wickham, Maj. Gen. John, 68  
Wikner, N. Frederick, 36, 43, 45, 46, 51, 54, 64  
Wolfowitz, Paul, 149  
Wood, Archie, 2, 12, 34  
  
Yamanaka, Sadanori, 81  
Young, Milton, 14  
  
Zamyatin, Leonid M., 240  
Zemach, Charles, 34, 54, 64  
Ziegler, Ron, 68  
Zimmerman, Peter, 34, 51, 54, 64  
Zorinsky, Edward, 244  
Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo, 45, 47, 68, 113, 116