Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The volume documents U.S. national security policy from 1973 to 1976,


This volume documents the Nixon and Ford administrations’ formulation and implementation of national security policy primarily vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the People’s Republic of China. It also documents intelligence and its role in the policy process, as well as the Ford administration’s efforts to bolster U.S. telecommunications security. Finally, the volume presents documents on the Hughes Glomar Explorer, the centerpiece of a secret mission organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to raise a Soviet submarine sunk in the Pacific Ocean.

The first three chapters of the volume deal with the formulation and implementation of national security policy by the second Nixon administration and by the Ford administration, a topic documented by the records of the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the private papers of Henry A. Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1969 until November 1975 and Secretary of State from September 1973 until January 1977, and James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense from July 1973 until November 1975. Chapter one focuses on the Nixon administration’s handling of national security policy. Distracted by the unfolding Watergate scandal, neither Nixon nor Kissinger took as active an interest in this area as they had during Nixon’s first term in office. The President nevertheless began his second term by outlining—in meetings with Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Defense from January to May 1973; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Department of State and administration officials; and various lawmakers—his views on the importance of maintaining a strong defense posture, primarily to provide
him with bargaining chips in arms control negotiations with Soviet premier Leonid I. Brezhnev. As the documents indicate, the Nixon administration reached a number of major decisions, including ones to overhaul U.S. Asian and nuclear strategies, the latter moving from massive retaliation toward limited nuclear employment options, as specified in National Security Decision Memorandum 242, January 17, 1974.

The second and third chapters examine national security policy under the Ford administration, whose activities in this area accelerated during the presidential election year of 1976. The United States’ defense posture relative to that of the Soviet Union became a resonant issue during President Ford’s quest for the Republican presidential nomination against former California Governor Ronald Reagan, his closest competitor, who charged that the administration had allowed the nation to slip behind while focusing on détente. As the documents show, Ford adopted a tough public stance on defense, declaring that, under his watch, “the United States will never become second to anybody, period,” and submitting increased defense budgets to Congress. Once Ford secured the nomination, his administration initiated major studies of the nation’s civil defense posture and its overall military strategy. To handle such defense issues, the administration created the Defense Review Panel (DRP), a National Security Council subcommittee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense from November 1975 until January 1977. The DRP was a reconstituted version of the Defense Program Review Committee, which had become moribund after being highly involved in national security matters throughout the first Nixon administration and into early 1973. Just before leaving office in January 1977, the Ford administration reached several important policy decisions, including one regarding naval shipbuilding, a topic under review since early 1973. Also, on January 20—the day of incoming President Jimmy Carter’s inauguration—President Ford signed National Security Decision Memorandum 348, the first major overhaul of U.S. defense policy and military posture since 1969.

The fourth chapter deals with a closely related topic: the U.S. intelligence community’s estimation of Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Chinese military capabilities. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union had greatly increased its capabilities, narrowing the once-large strategic gap between it and the United States. A decade later, Soviet capabilities had increased to the point that the question became whether Moscow sought strategic parity or superiority relative to the United States. As the documents show, a debate raged within both the Nixon and Ford administrations regarding Soviet intentions, the accepted assessment of which would go a long way toward determining the appropriate U.S. defense posture. The CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11–318–74, November 14, 1974, reiterated earlier estimates that the So-
viets probably sought no less than equality with the United States plus “some degree of strategic advantage,” if possible. Critics charged that the CIA’s estimates, including NIE 11–318–74, consistently underestimated Soviet capabilities and misinterpreted Soviet intentions. According to the documents, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) led the charge, recommending to President Ford in August 1975 that an experiment in competitive analysis be undertaken to subject the intelligence community’s methodology and assumptions to rigorous examination. PFIAB’s proposal called for a team of outside experts—subsequently nicknamed “Team B”—to produce its own “competitive” Soviet estimate based upon the same data used by national intelligence officers—“Team A”—in reaching their official one. Each team released its report at the very end of 1976, both of which are printed herein. In addition to finished intelligence, previously classified records generated by the White House, PFIAB, CIA, and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) illuminate this important and controversial episode in intelligence history. In addition to the Team A/Team B controversy, a number of other important issues are documented in this chapter, including national net assessment, estimates of Soviet defense spending, and their attendant methodological challenges.

Chapter five documents the Ford administration’s efforts to improve the security of U.S. telecommunications in the wake of reports that the Soviets were intercepting the calls of key Washington officials. PFIAB took an especial interest in this episode, concerned that classified and/or sensitive information would be further compromised. The Ford administration issued a number of decision memoranda instituting short- and longer-term measures to rectify the problem.

The sixth chapter documents the Hughes Glomar Explorer’s secret mission to raise a sunken Soviet submarine, documented by previously classified records of the CIA, the USIB, the White House, and the 40 Committee, the National Security Council subcommittee responsible for covert operations. In March 1968, a Soviet Golf 11-class submarine suffered an internal explosion and sank on a routine patrol mission in the Pacific Ocean. The Soviet Union subsequently conducted a fruitless search for the downed submarine. The United States located it in August 1968 and surveyed the crash site. In 1970, USIB Chairman Richard Helms made raising the submarine a high priority because the ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, and cipher materials that it contained would provide valuable insights into Soviet military technology and cryptography. The 40 Committee charged the CIA with the mission to recover the entire submarine. It took several years to develop the sophisticated technology required, a process overseen by the CIA’s Office of Science and Technology. As the documents show, firms owned by
billionaire industrialist Howard Hughes and a defense contractor actually built the hardware: a ship, the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*; an enormous barge to hold the recovered submarine; and a capture vehicle, which consisted of gigantic claws designed to descend below the water’s surface and to raise the vessel from its great depth. The cover story developed was that the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* was being built for Hughes’ private commercial venture to mine manganese nodules located on the ocean floor. The ship’s first mission, approved by President Nixon on June 7, 1974, was only partially successful. Amidst preparations for a second mission, press reports in March 1975 exposed the operation and blew its cover. As a result, the Soviet Union became aware of the *Hughes Glomar Explorer*’s actual purpose, a factor that weighed on Ford administration officials’ minds as they considered whether or not to proceed with the planned second mission. On March 28, 1975, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby argued that it was “inadvisable to undertake a second mission” due to the operation’s exposure. On June 5, the 40 Committee met and concluded that the program should be terminated. On June 16, President Ford officially approved the committee’s recommendation to discontinue the operation.

Like all recent *Foreign Relations* volumes in the Nixon-Ford sub-series, the emphasis of this volume is on the formulation of policy, rather than its implementation. Regarding national security policy, the key players in the policymaking process were the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, with input from the Department of State; on certain issues, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the United States Intelligence Board also played important roles.

**Editorial Methodology**

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the docu-
ments are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original document.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers saw the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Historical Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Historical Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 21 11 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRNIPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to formally notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the released of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2007 and was completed in 2014, resulted in the decision to deny 7 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 22 documents, and make minor excisions of a paragraph or less in 53 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-
rual notes presented here provide an accurate and comprehensive—
given limitations of space—account of National Security Policy,

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Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. U.S. foreign policy agencies and Departments—the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, and the Gerald R. Ford Library at Ann Arbor, Michigan—have complied fully with this law and provided complete access to their relevant records. In addition, Henry Kissinger, Elliot Richardson, and James Schlesinger have approved access to their private papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are key sources for the Nixon-Ford subseries.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV

The Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, held a number of important record collections used in documenting the formulation and implementation of national security policy; these records were transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library, in Yorba Linda, California, after research for this volume was completed. The National Security Council (NSC) Institutional Files (H-Files) are particularly important. The H-Files contain the working files and meeting minutes of the National Security Council and its various subgroups under Nixon, including the Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, and the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), the subcommittee responsible for defense matters. Those bodies often met to discuss the many defense-related studies conducted by the administration. The H-Files contain the materials associated with those study memoranda, called National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), and the resulting policy papers, or National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs). The H-Files' Intelligence Files,
especially those pertaining to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), shed light upon the Team A/Team B exercise and telecommunications security. The NSC Files are also useful, notably their Subject Files and Agency Files, which include sub-files for the Department of Defense, PFIAB, and other official bodies. Those interested in the views of President Nixon or his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger should consult the President/HAK Memcons (part of the NSC Files), the White House Tapes, and the White House Special Files, especially the latter’s President’s Handwriting Files, Memoranda for the President, and Memoranda from the President.

The Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, similarly holds several important collections. The NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) are, again, the place to start. The H-Files hold NSSMs, NSDMs, and the files and minutes associated with the meetings of the National Security Council and its various subcommittees under Ford, including the Senior Review Group, the Verification Panel, and the Defense Review Panel (DRP). Researchers should pay close attention to the records of the DRP, as in 1976 it replaced the DPRC as the NSC subgroup responsible for defense matters. The National Security Adviser Files at the Ford Library are also crucial. Notable are the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files and the Presidential Agency Files, which contain sub-files regarding the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other agencies. The National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversation show that President Ford and his Assistants for National Security Affairs—first Kissinger; later Brent Scowcroft—regularly discussed national security policy alone or with other officials, including Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld. The NSC Program Analysis Staff Files should not be missed, for they contain unique documentation regarding the DRP and the Team A/Team B controversy. Material about that episode is also found in the files of Counselor to the President John O. Marsh. It is a challenge to document President Ford’s views, but the Presidential Handwriting File and the Presidential Files of the White House Special Files do shed some light on them when it comes to the defense budget.

For the Department of State’s positions on national security matters, researchers should consult the National Archives. The Central Foreign Policy File contains a significant amount of non-cable traffic—internal memoranda and studies—about security assistance. Lot Files are another important resource. Lot 80D212 contains NSSMs and associated materials. Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson often represented the Department at meetings held to discuss defense policy during Secretary of State Kissinger’s many absences. His Lot File—Lot 77D117—contains unique records of some DRP and NSC meetings held in 1976. The transcripts of Secretary Kissinger’s staff meetings reveal a
great deal about his views and those of other Department officials about security assistance and other defense issues.

The Library of Congress holds a number of private papers of former officials intimately involved in the making of national security policy during the Nixon and Ford years. The Kissinger Papers are indispensable. Their Subject File contains the copies of the minutes of Kissinger’s occasional meetings with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger during which a wide range of defense and foreign policy issues were discussed. Like Robinson’s Lot File, the Kissinger Papers include copies of the minutes of NSC and NSC subgroup meetings not found in the Ford Library. These records are in the Papers’ files on the NSC, Committees and Panels. Also at the Library of Congress are the private papers of all three secretaries of defense from 1973 to 1976: Elliot Richardson, James Schlesinger, and Donald Rumsfeld. Richardson’s papers are not particularly valuable as he served as Secretary of Defense for only a few months. The Schlesinger Papers’ Action Memoranda are important—not only for his time at the Pentagon, but also for his stint as Director of Central Intelligence—and should be consulted. The editor was not granted access to Secretary Rumsfeld’s papers.

Researchers should consult the decimal files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense held at the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, which contain internal Department of Defense studies, memoranda, and correspondence. Each year’s files, which are extensive, are divided into two separate collections, Secret and Top Secret; see the source list below. Also useful are the Records of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, held at the National Archives.

As for intelligence matters—namely Team A/Team B and the Hughes Glomar Explorer—two sets of records, in addition to those listed above, are noteworthy. The National Security Council in Washington, D.C. maintains the records of the so-called NSC intelligence files. Of inestimable historical value, these files contain NSC and CIA studies and correspondence, including memoranda to the President. The centerpiece of these files is the records of the NSC subcommittee responsible for covert actions. During most of the Nixon and Ford administrations, this committee was known as the 40 Committee. The Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia also maintains a number of indispensable records. Those dealing with the production of finished intelligence are centered in the National Intelligence Council Files, while the Executive Registry contains the records of the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
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Study Memoranda

White House Central Files
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Abbreviations and Terms

AAW, anti-air warfare
ABM, anti-ballistic missile; anti-ballistic missile defense system
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Air Force
AFB, Air Force Base
AFL, American Federation of Labor
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
AGI, intelligence collecting vessel
AGS, hydrographic survey vessel
AID, Agency for International Development
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
ALCOM, Alaskan Command
ANIO/SP, Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Central Intelligence Agency
ARCS, acquisition radar and control system
ARM, anti-radiation missile
ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
ASAT, anti-satellite
ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD (I), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
ASD (SA), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASM, air-to-surface missile
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
ATA, seagoing auxiliary tug
ATA/R, seagoing auxiliary/rescue tug
ATF, seagoing fleet tug
AT&T, American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
AVF, all-volunteer armed force
AWACS, airborne warning and control system
AZORIAN, code name for the first Hughes Glomar Explorer mission

B, billion
BACKFIRE, Soviet long-range bomber
B–1, four-engine, variable-sweep wing, supersonic strategic bomber (USAF)
BW, biological weapon(s)

C, classified; confidential; Counselor of the Department
C3, command, control, and communications
C3S, command, control, communications, and surveillance systems
CAIG, Cost Analysis Improvement Group
CAS, Close Air Support
CBR, chemical-biological-radiological
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CCC, command, control, and communications
CCD, United Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
XXII  Abbreviations and Terms

CCP, Chinese Communist Party
CD, civil defense
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEP, Council on Economic Policy; circular error probability
CFI, Committee on Foreign Intelligence
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CIEPDM, Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum
CIEPSM, Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CJCS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C-NSI, Confidential—National Security Information
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
Co., corporation
COLC, Cost of Living Council
COMINT, communications intelligence
CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command
CONUS, continental United States
CQ, command, control, and communications
CRA, continuing resolution authority
CRAF, Civil Reserve Air Fleet
crypto, cryptographic
CSGN, nuclear-powered strike cruiser
CSS–1 (Donfeng 2), Chinese medium-range (surface-to-surface) ballistic missile with a range of 1,250 nm
CSS–2 (Donfeng 3), Chinese intermediate-range (surface-to-surface) ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 nm
CSS–X–3 (Donfeng), Chinese intermediate-range (surface-to-surface) ballistic missile with a range of 2,750–3,500 nm
CSS–X–4 (Donfeng), Chinese intercontinental ballistic (surface-to-surface) ballistic missile with a range of up to 7,000 nm
CVN, aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered
CVV, aircraft carrier, vertical takeoff and landing
CW, chemical weapon(s)
CY, calendar year
D, Democrat; deployment
DAO, Defense Attache Office
DAR, Daughters of the American Revolution
DASD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DC, District of Columbia
DCA, Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCPA, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
D/DICI/NIO, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers
DDG, guided missile frigate
DDR&E, Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DEFO, Defense Field Office
DEPSECEDEF, Deputy Secretary of Defense
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DI/OSR, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency
DIPP, Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning
DIRDIA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
DLGN, nuclear-powered guided missile frigate
DOD, Department of Defense
DOMP, Deep Ocean Mining Project
DPPG, Defense Policy and Planning Guidance
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
DRP, Defense Review Panel
DRPWG, Defense Review Panel Working Group
DSARC, Defense System Acquisition Review Council

ECCM, electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM, electronic countermeasures
ELINT, electronic intelligence
EMT, equivalent megatonnage
EO, Executive Order
ERDA, Energy Research and Development Administration
ESVN, Executive Secure Voice Network
Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank

F, Fahrenheit
FAA, Foreign Assistance Act; Federal Aviation Administration
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBM, fleet ballistic missile
FBS, forward based systems
FCC, Federal Communications Commission
FDAA, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
FEBA, forward edge of the battle area
FFG, guided missile frigate
FMS, foreign military sales
FMSA, Foreign Military Sales Act
FOI, follow-on interceptor
FPA, Federal Preparedness Agency
FRB, Federal Reserve Board
FRC, Federal Records Center
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
ft, feet
FY, fiscal year
FYDP, Five-Year Defense Program

GAO, General Accounting Office
GB, nerve agent sarin
GC, general civilian
GCI, ground-controlled intercept system
GIUK gap, a defensive line in the North Atlantic Ocean formed by bridging the gaps separating Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom
GM, General Motors
GNP, gross national product
GOP, Republican Party
GPF, general purpose forces
GPS, Global Positioning System
GSA, General Services Administration
GSFG, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
XXIV  Abbreviations and Terms

GSP, General Strike Plan
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

H, Congressional Relations, Department of State
HASC, House Armed Services Committee
HEL, high-energy lasers
HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
HGE, Hughes Glomar Explorer
HR, House of Representatives
HTGR, high temperature gas reactor
HUD, Department of Housing and Urban Development

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC, Interagency Contingency Review Committee
IG, Interdepartmental Group(s)
IGFMA, Interdepartmental Group for Politico-Military Affairs
IIM, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
IL–28, Soviet Ilyushin jet bomber
IMET, international military education and training
Inc., incorporated
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IOC, initial operational capability
IR, intermediate range; Intelligence Report
IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ISC, interagency steering committee
IST, integrated systems tests

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSBS, Joint Strategic Bomber Study
JSOP, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSTPS, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

km, kilometer
KT, kiloton

L, Legal Adviser, Department of State
LA, Los Angeles
LAP, loading, assembling, and packing
Limdis, Limited Distribution
L/M, Assistant Legal Adviser for Management, Legal Adviser, Department of State
LRA, long-range aviation
LSD, landing ship, dock
LTG, lieutenant general

M, million; mobilization
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MARV, maneuvering reentry vehicle
MATADOR, code name for the second Hughes Glomar Explorer mission
MBFR, mutual and balanced force reductions
MC, Military Committee; Marine Corps
MCA, Military Construction Authorization
MFN, most favored nation
MIRV, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MK, mark
mm, millimeter
MM, Minuteman
MR, medium range
MSPG, Materiel Support Planning Guidance
MTT, mobile training team
MX Missile, an experimental MIRVed ICBM under development by the United States

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA, National Command Authorities
NCO, noncommissioned officer
NEA, Northeast Asia
NFIB, National Foreign Intelligence Board
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIO, National Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
NIO/SP, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Central Intelligence Agency
NIPP, National Intelligence Projections for Planning
NK, North Korea
NM or nm, nautical mile
NMCC, National Military Command Center
NNTAP, National Nuclear Targeting and Attack Policy
NOA, new obligational authority
Nodis, No Distribution
NPG, Nuclear Planning Group
NPR, Naval Petroleum Reserve
NPW, nuclear powered warship
NRO, National Reconnaissance Office
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIC, National Security Council Intelligence Committee
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NSTAP, National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy
NUWEP, nuclear weapon employment policy
N.Y., New York

OAG, Operations Advisory Group
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
ODC, Office of Defense Cooperation
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OJCS, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
O/L, outlays
O&M, operations and maintenance
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
ONE, Office of National Estimates
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
XXVI  Abbreviations and Terms

OSD/ISA/DASD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

OSR, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

OST, Office of Science and Technology

OT&E, Operational Test and Evaluation

OTP, Office of Telecommunications Policy

PACOM, Pacific Command

PCS, process control system

PCZ, protected communications zone

PDM, Program Decision Memorandum

PDR, processing data rate

P&E, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

PE, Planning and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

PF, patrol frigate; police force; popular force

PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PL, Public Law

PLA, People’s Liberation Army (PRC)

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/NPO, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNE, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

POM, Program Objectives Memorandum

PPBS, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

PRC, People’s Republic of China

PRM, protected radio modulation

R, Republican

R&D, research and development

RDT&E, research, development, testing, and evaluation

RF, reserve force; regional force

RG, record group

RISOP, Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan

ROC, Republic of China (Taiwan)

ROK, Republic of (South) Korea

RV, reentry vehicle; long-range seagoing rescue vessel

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

S, Secret; Senate

SA, Systems Analysis

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, European Command

SAL, strategic arms limitation

SALT (II), Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty; strategic arms limitation talks

SAM, surface-to-air missile

SAPRC, Security Assistance Program Review Committee

SCN, shipbuilding and conversion, Navy

SEA, Southeast Asia

SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Sec Def, Secretary of Defense

SIOP, Single Integrated Operations Plan
SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile  
SLEP, Service Life Extension Program  
SLOC, Sea Line of Communication  
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate  
SOUTHCOM, Southern Command  
S/P, Policy Planning Staff  
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff  
SR, Strategic Research  
SRAM, short-range attack missile  
SRG, Senior Review Group  
SS–11, Soviet light ICBM and counterpart to U.S. Minuteman  
S/S, Executive Secretariat  
SSBN, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine  
S/S–I, Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section  
SSM, surface-to-surface missile  
SSN, nuclear-powered submarine  
STOL, short takeoff and landing  
SVN, South Vietnam  

T, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Department of State  
TAFT, technical assistance field team  
TAT, technical assistance team  
TDY, temporary duty  
TNF, theater nuclear forces  
TOA, total obligational authority  
TOR, terms of reference  
TOW, tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided anti-tank missile  
TRIDENT, SLBM equipped with MIRVs  
TS, Top Secret; telecommunications security  
TTB, threshold test ban  
TU-16, Soviet Tupelov twin-engine jet bomber  
TV, television  

U, unclassified; uranium  
UK, United Kingdom  
UN, United Nations  
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly  
UNREP, underway replenishment  
UPI, United Press International  
US, United States  
USA, United States Army  
USAF, United States Air Force  
USG, United States Government  
USGPO, United States Government Printing Office  
USIB, United States Intelligence Board  
USMC, United States Marine Corps  
USN, United States Navy  
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  

VP, Verification Panel; Vice President  
VSS, helicopter carrier  
V/STOL, vertical/short takeoff and landing  
VTA, military transport aviation
XXVIII  Abbreviations and Terms

WG, working group
WPC, Warsaw Pact Countries
WPI, Wholesale Price Index

X, experimental
Persons

Aaron, Harold R., Major General, USA; Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Abramowitz, Morton I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Abrams, Creighton W., General, USA; Chief of Staff until September 4, 1974
Adams, Brockman (Brock), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington)
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States until October 10, 1973
Aldridge, Edward C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation; Director for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Defense, from May 18, 1976
Allen, Lew, Jr., Lieutenant General, USAF; Director of the National Security Agency from August 1973
Anderson, George W., Jr., Admiral, USN; Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board until 1976
Armstrong, Anne Legendre, Counselor to the President for Special Affairs and Women until 1974; U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 17, 1976
Ash, Roy L., Assistant to the President for Management and Budget and Director, Office of Management and Budget from February 2, 1973 until February 3, 1975
Ashley, Thomas L., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ohio)

Baker, Howard H., Jr., Senator (R-Tennessee)
Baker, William O., President of Bell Telephone Laboratories and Member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Barnes, Thomas J., member, National Security Council Staff from September 1975 until September 1976
Bartlett, Dewey Follett, Senator (R-Oklahoma)
Behr, Robert M., Assistant, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Bellmon, Henry L., Republican Senator from Oklahoma
Borg, C. Arthur, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department from July 12, 1976
Boverie, Richard T., General, USAF; member, National Security Council Staff from August 1973 until April 1976
Bray, Leslie, Jr., Major General, USAF; Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency
Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Brock, William Emerson, III, Senator (R-Tennessee)
Broomfield, William S., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan)
Brown, George S., General, USAF; Air Force Chief of Staff from August 1, 1973 until June 30, 1974; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1, 1974
Buchen, Philip W., Legal Counsel to the President from August 15, 1974
Buffum, William Burnside, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon until January 17, 1974; Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs from February 4, 1974 until December 18, 1975
Bush, George H.W., Representative to the United Nations until January 18, 1973; Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from October 21, 1974 until December 7, 1975; Director of Central Intelligence from January 30, 1976 until January 20, 1977
Byers, Wheaton B., Executive Secretary of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1973 until 1976
XXX Persons

Cannon, James M., Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Director of the Domestic Council from February 28, 1975
Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), Jr., President of the United States from January 20, 1977
Carver, George A., Jr., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers
Case, Clifford Philip, Senator (R-New Jersey)
Casey, William J., Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission until 1973; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February 2, 1973 until March 14, 1974; President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank until 1976; member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1976
Cederberg, Elford A., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan)
Cheney, Richard B., Deputy Assistant to the President from December 1974 until November 1975; White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President thereafter
Cherne, Leo, Member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from June 28, 1973 until March 11, 1976; thereafter Chairman
Chiles, Lawton Mainor, Jr., Senator (D-Florida)
Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), Premier of the People’s Republic of China until January 8, 1976
Clements, William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 30, 1973
Clift, Denis A., member, National Security Council staff
Colbert, Evelyn, National intelligence officer for Japan and Pacific-Asia, Central Intelligence Agency
Colby, William E., Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency from March 2 until August 24, 1973; Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board from September 4, 1973 until January 30, 1976
Conable, Barber B., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New York)
Cotter, Donald R., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy
Cranston, Alan M., Senator (D-California)
Currie, Malcolm R., Director of Defense Research and Engineering from June 21, 1973
Curtis, Carl Thomas, Senator (R-Nebraska)
Cushman, Robert E., Jr., General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps until June 30, 1975

David, Edward E., Jr., Chairman of the National Security Council’s Special Panel on Telecommunications Security
Davis, Jeanne W., Staff Secretary, National Security Council
DeBruler, Henson R. (Ray), Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Central Intelligence Agency
Dole, Robert (Bob) Joseph, Senator (R-Kansas)
Domenici, Pete Vichi, Senator (R-New Mexico)
Duckett, Carl E., Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency until June 1, 1976

Eckerd, Jack, Administrator of the General Services Administration
Edwards, William Jackson (Jack), member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Alabama)
Elliott, David D., member, National Security Council staff
Ellsworth, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from June 5, 1974 until December 22, 1975; Deputy Secretary of Defense from December 23, 1975 until January 10, 1977
Enders, Thomas Ostrom, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs from July 24, 1974 until December 22, 1975; U.S. Ambassador to Canada from February 17, 1976

Farley, Philip J., Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973

Flanigan, Peter M., Assistant to the President until August 15, 1974

Ford, Gerald R., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan) and House Minority Leader until December 6, 1973; Vice President of the United States from December 6, 1973 until August 9, 1974; President of the United States from August 9, 1974

Foster, John S., Jr., Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense until June 21, 1973; member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from June 28, 1973

Franco Bahamonde, Francisco, General; Chief of State, Spain

Friedersdorf, Max L., Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs from January until June 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs from June 1973 until January 1975; Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs thereafter

Fullbright, J. William, Senator (D-Arkansas) and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations until 1974

Galvin, Robert W., member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from June 18, 1973; Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Motorola, Inc.

Garment, Leonard, Special Consultant to the President until May 9, 1973; Counsel to the President from May 10, 1973 until January 3, 1974; Assistant to the President from January 4, 1974 until August 9, 1974

Giaimo, Robert N., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Connecticut)

Gibbons, Sam Melville, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida)

Goldwater, Barry Morris, Senator (R-Arizona)

Goodby, James E., Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Goodpaster, General Andrew J., Commander in Chief, European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe until December 1974

Gorog, William F., Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs

Graham, Daniel, Lieutenant General, USA; Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from September 1974 until December 1975

Granger, Clinton E., member, National Security Council staff from August 1974 until September 1976

Gray, Gordon, member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Director of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

Greener, William I., Jr., White House Deputy Press Secretary from April 15, 1975 until December 20, 1975; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs from December 21, 1975 until July 31, 1976

Griffin, Robert P., Senator (R-Michigan)

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Guhin, Michael A., member, National Security Council staff until December 1974

Habib, Philip C., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from September 27, 1974 until June 30, 1976

Haig, Alexander M., Jr., Brigadier General, USA; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until January 1973; Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1973; Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from August 1973 until August 9, 1974; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1974

Hall, Albert C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence until March 25, 1976
XXXII Persons

Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from January 8, 1974
Hartmann, Robert T., Counselor to the President from August 9, 1974
Hebert, Felix Edward, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Louisiana) and Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 2, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to Iran from March 1973
Hill, Robert C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from May 11, 1973 until January 5, 1974
Holcomb, M. Staser, Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1976
Hollings, Ernest F., Senator (D-South Carolina)
Holloway, James L., III, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations from July 1, 1974
Howard, Robert, Office of Management and Budget
Hughes, Howard R., Jr., industrialist
Hughes, John T., Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board
Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from July 12, 1976
Humphrey, Hubert Horatio, Jr., Senator (D-Minnesota)
Hyland, William G., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from January 21, 1974 until November 24, 1975; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs thereafter
Ikle, Fred Charles, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from July 10, 1973
Ingersoll, Robert S., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from January 8, 1974 until July 9, 1974; Deputy Secretary of State and Chairman of the National Undersecretaries Committee from July 10, 1974 until March 31, 1976
Inman, Bobby R., Rear Admiral, USN; Director of Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Jackson, Henry Martin (Scoop), Senator (D-Washington)
Javits, Jacob Koppel, Senator (R-New York)
Jones, David C., General, USAF; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force from July 1, 1974
Keegan, George J., Major General, USAF; Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Air Force
Kennedy, Richard T., Director of Planning and Coordination, National Security Council until January 23, 1975
Kim Il-sung, President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973
Kleppe, Thomas, Secretary of the Interior
Knoche, E. Henry, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from July 3, 1976
Korologos, Tom C., Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs from 1973 until 1974
Kubitsch, Jack B., Assistant Secretary for Geographic Areas from May 29, 1973 until September 4, 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Greece from September 26, 1974
Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973; Counselor to the President for Domestic Affairs from 1973 until 1974
Land, Edwin H., member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Chairman of the Board, Polaroid Corporation
Leggett, Robert L., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California)

Lehman, John F. Jr., member, National Security Council staff until September 1974; thereafter Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Lodal, Jan M., member, National Security Council Staff from 1973 until 1974; Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council from August 1974 until August 1975

Lord, Winston, member, National Security Council staff until 1973; Director of the Department’s Planning and Coordination Staff from October 12, 1973 until February 26, 1974; Director of the Department’s Policy Planning Staff from February 27, 1974

Luce, Clare Boothe, member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from June 28, 1973

Lynn, James T., Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development from February 2, 1973 until February 5, 1975; thereafter Assistant to the President for Management and Budget and Director, Office of Management and Budget

MacDonald, Donald A., member, National Security Council Staff from August 1974 until June 1976

Malek, Frederic V., Special Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget from 1973 until 1975

Mahon, George H., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas) and Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations

Mansfield, Michael J. (Mike), Senator from (D-Montana) and Senate Majority Leader

Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, People’s Republic of China

Marsh, John O., Jr., Counselor to the President from August 10, 1974

Marshall, Andrew W., Consultant to the National Security Council; Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council Staff, until 1973; thereafter Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Maw, Carlyle E., Legal Adviser of the Department from November 27, 1973 until July 9, 1974; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance from July 10, 1974 until September 17, 1976

McAuliffe, Eugene V., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from May 6, 1976

McClellan, John Little, Senator (D-Arkansas) and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations

McCloskey, Robert J., U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus from June 20, 1973 until January 14, 1974; Ambassador at Large from February 14, 1974 until February 20, 1975; Ambassador at Large and Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs from February 21, 1975 until September 10, 1976; U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands from October 22, 1976

McClure, James A., Senator (R-Idaho)

McGovern, George S., Senator (D-South Dakota); unsuccessful Democratic nominee for President of the United States in 1972

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1961 until February 29, 1968

Middendorf, J. William, II, U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands until June 10, 1973; thereafter Secretary of the Navy

Michel, Robert Henry, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)

Moorer, Thomas H., Admiral, USN; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1, 1974

Muskie, Edmund Sixtus, Senator (D-Maine) and Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Budget

Newsom, David D., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until January 13, 1974; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia

Nitze, Paul H., Department of Defense representative to the United States SALT delegation
XXXIV  Persons

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States until August 9, 1974
Nunn, Samuel (Sam) Augustus, Senator (D-Georgia)

Ober, Richard, National Security Council Senior Staff member for Intelligence Coordination from August 1974 until September 1976
Odeen, Philip, member, National Security Council staff
Ogilvie, Donald G., Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget
O’Neill, Paul H., Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget from 1973 until 1974; Deputy Director thereafter
O’Neill, Thomas P. (Tip), Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) and House Majority Leader

Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 until 1971
Pastore, John O., Senator (D-Rhode Island); Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy from 1975 until 1976
Pell, Claiborne, Senator (D-Rhode Island)
Pickering, Thomas R., Executive Secretary of the Department of State from July 30, 1973 until January 31, 1974; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
Potter, David S., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development from September 14, 1973 until August 16, 1974
Proctor, Edward W., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Quillen, James Henry, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Tennessee)

Ratliff, Rob Roy, Central Intelligence Agency; Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee
Ray, Dixy Lee, Chairperson, Atomic Energy Commission from February 6, 1973 until January 19, 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from January 19, 1975 until June 20, 1975
Reagan, Ronald, Governor of California and candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1976
Rhodes, John Jacob, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Arizona) and House Minority Leader from 1973
Rickover, Hyman G., Admiral, USN; Director, Naval Reactors Branch, Bureau of Ships and Division of Reactor Development, Atomic Energy Commission
Robinson, Charles W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from January 3, 1975 until April 9, 1976; thereafter Deputy Secretary of State
Rockefeller, Nelson A., Vice President of the United States from December 1974; member, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board until December 19, 1975
Rogers, William D., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from October 7, 1974 until June 18, 1976; Under Secretary for Economic Affairs from June 18, 1976 until December 31, 1976
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State until September 3, 1973
Rumsfeld, Donald H., Permanent Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from February 2, 1973 until December 5, 1974; Assistant to the President from September 27, 1974 until November 19, 1975; Secretary of Defense from November 20, 1975
Rush, Kenneth, Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973; Deputy Secretary of State from February 2, 1973 until May 29, 1974; Acting Secretary of State from September 3, 1973 until September 22, 1973; Counselor to the President for Economic Policy from May 1974 until September 1974; U.S. Ambassador to France from November 21, 1974

Ryan, John D., General, USAF; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force until July 31, 1973

Saunders, Harold H., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from December 1, 1975

Schlesinger, James R., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission until 1973; Director, Central Intelligence Agency from February 2, 1973 until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973 until November 19, 1975

Scott, Hugh Doggett, Jr., Senator (R-Pennsylvania) and Senate Minority Leader

Scott, William Lloyd, Senator (R-Virginia)

Scowcroft, Brent, Major General, USAF; Military Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1973 until 1975; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 20, 1975

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., Secretary of the Air Force until May 14, 1973; President of the National Academy of Engineering from May 1973 until December 1974; Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration thereafter

Shultz, George P., Director, Office of Management and Budget from 1970 until 1972; Secretary of the Treasury from June 12, 1972 until May 8, 1974; member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Simon, William E., Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from February 1973 until May 1974; Administrator, Federal Energy Office from December 1973 until April 1974; Secretary of the Treasury from May 1974 until January 1977

Sisco, Joseph John, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 18, 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 19, 1974

Smith, William Y., Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Solomon, Richard H., member, National Security Council staff from August 1974 until June 1976

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member, National Security Council staff until 1974; Counselor, Department of State from January 7, 1974

Spiers, Ronald I., Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until August 2, 1973; U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas from September 7, 1973 until September 2, 1974

Springsteen, George S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department from January 31, 1974 until July 14, 1976; thereafter Director of the Foreign Service Institute

Stein, Herbert, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers until 1974

Stennis, John Cornelius, Senator (D-Mississippi) and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Stoertz, Howard, Jr., National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Central Intelligence Agency


Symington, William Stuart, Senator (D-Missouri) and member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Teller, Edward, University Professor of Physics and Associate Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California; member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
XXXVI  Persons

Teng Hsiao-p'ing (Deng Xiaoping), Vice Premier of State Council, People's Republic of China from 1973 until 1974

Thurmond, James Strom, Senator (D-South Carolina)

Timmons, William E., Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs until 1974

Tower, John G., Senator (R-Texas) and member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Tucker, Gardiner L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis until March 30, 1973

Vest, George S., Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from April 29, 1974

Wade, James P., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Director of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Task Force, Department of Defense; Chairman of the Defense Review Panel Working Group

Walsh, Paul, Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Walters Vernon A., Lieutenant General, USA; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until July 2, 1976; Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July 2, 1973 until September 4, 1973

Warner, John W., Secretary of the Navy until April 8, 1974

Weinberger, Caspar W., Director, Office of Management and Budget until February 1, 1973; Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare from February 12, 1973 until August 8, 1975

Weiss, Seymour, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from August 6, 1973 until January 17, 1974; U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas from September 11, 1974 until December 15, 1976

Weyand, Frederick C., General, USA; Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam from 1972 until 1973; Chief of Staff, United States Army from October 3, 1974 until October 1, 1976

Wickham, John A., Jr., Major General, USA; Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1973 until 1976

Wilson, Louis H., General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps from July 1, 1975

Wilson, Samuel V., Lieutenant General, USA; Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from May 1976

Wilson, Robert Carlton (Bob), member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-California)

Young, Ruben Milton, Senator (R-North Dakota)

Ziegler, Ronald L., Press Secretary to the President until 1973

Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until July 1, 1974
Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.
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covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives origi-
nally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

**NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee**

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.5

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing

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other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.\(^7\)

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.\(^8\)

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.\(^9\)

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established

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\(^7\) Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 82.

a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive”

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.
¹² Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57.
covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an an-
annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration,
but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business
came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee
actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI sub-
mitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved op-
eration. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40
Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual
covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided
broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received
briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations,
moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in
1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’ etat against Chilean Presi-
dent Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.14

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government ap-
proved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for
each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the
CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert
actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed
Congress that the proposed operation was important to national
security.15

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18,
1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activ-
ities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee
with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s As-
sistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and De-
defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who re-
tained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert
operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop
recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to
conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905
also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in po-
litical assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding
executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence
activities.16

14 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence,
pp. 54–55, 57.
15 Public Law 93–559.
16 Executive Order 11905, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” Weekly
National Security Policy,
1973–1976

National Security Policy

1. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) for the President’s Files

Washington, January 4, 1973, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President, Secretary of Defense Designate Elliot Richardson, and Henry A. Kissinger on January 4, 1973 at 11:45 a.m. in the Oval Office

Secretary Richardson remarked that he had met with all the Presidential appointees in the new Administration. He now sought an opportunity to get more fully what his approach ought to be. He was ready to discuss the issues involved and wanted the President’s guidance.

The President then went over with Secretary Richardson his intentions with respect to the Department of Defense. First, he wanted the number of Assistant Secretaries cut by one-third. He did not want those jobs filled. The McNamara system was to be dismantled. The President emphasized that he expected a reorganization of the Defense Depart-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Box 1025, MemCon—The President, Sec. Richardson, and HAK, Jan. 4, 1973. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is not initialed by Kissinger. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, concluded at 12:37 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) There is a tape recording of this conversation. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 833–11)

2 On November 8, 1972, the day after Nixon won reelection, Secretary of Defense Laird submitted his letter of resignation, effective January 1973. (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Personal Files, Name/Subject File, Box 10, Laird, Melvin) During his November 28 news briefing, Press Secretary Ziegler announced that the President intended to nominate Richardson to succeed Laird. (Public Papers: Richard Nixon, 1972, pp. 1152, E–I)

ment. He did not want the McNamara people around; he did not like them nor trust them. The Department always ran the Secretary rather than the Secretary running the Department, and that must be changed.

The enormous duplication of the intelligence effort must be stopped, the President continued. We couldn’t have five competing organizations. We wouldn’t have four competing tactical air operations. The greatest waste in the Defense Department was R&D. The subsidies of educational institutions were shocking. They used it for salaries, not R&D. This would have to be cut. The R&D had to be done by those who favor a strong defense, not by those who opposed it like the universities.

The President then emphasized to Secretary Richardson that he wanted the Secretary to participate heavily in the NSC. We had an NSC system and the President wanted Secretary Richardson to work it. He should meet frequently with Henry [Kissinger] and work closely with him.

The President also remarked that the Secretary should look over the SIOP. The President then emphasized that we had to get a rationale into defense policy. We hadn’t had a Secretary of Defense who was really Secretary. We had had brokers but no guiding principles. The President stressed that the White House would not be in competition with the Secretary of Defense. Anything that the Secretary sent to him would get to him. And, of course, the President would be glad to see Secretary Richardson from time to time. He could just come over to the White House and the President would let him be seen.

Secretary Richardson welcomed this. He told the President that he had been probing into strategic doctrine. He saw a need for a new consensus for a peacetime defense policy, but a new consensus had not yet surfaced. The question was how did we design a defense policy that served the needs of peace in a new period.

The President agreed. He advised Secretary Richardson not to get bogged down in the details of management. We had had the theme of a generation of peace, but the question indeed was how do we preserve it. A lot of hot shots wanted to be Secretary of Defense. But this would round out Richardson’s career. He would have been in Defense, State and HEW in the highest positions. The President advised Secretary Richardson not to join the doves, and not to become a weak Secretary. Enough was not enough—unless it was as much as the other guy had. The Secretary should make people proud of wearing the uniform.

The President indicated that we would also take a hard look at the command structure. When he looked around for a new Chairman [of

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4 Richardson served as Under Secretary of State from January 23, 1969 to June 23, 1970.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he wanted to keep the Haig model in mind. Abrams was no good at Army; the Secretary should lean on Haig. Haig should look around for good, young men as well. The Secretary should take a look at the service academies. They were too large and the Secretary should see whether they could be cut.

Secretary Richardson replied that his budget approach was that he was in a position to urge high levels of defense spending because he had come from HEW. But we would face a tough situation in the Committee.\(^5\) We had lost four votes. There was no Republican who could deliver votes. The President advised Secretary Richardson to give Senator Tower tender loving care.

The Secretary should read Churchill’s account of World War I,\(^6\) the President continued. Especially the account of the Eastern front. The military never had a conceptual strategic approach. The military never had concepts. Ike\(^7\) was not a strategist but a politician. When the U.S. Army had the biggest tactical air set up, something was wrong.

The President said that he would be seeing Admiral Moorer from time to time alone. But the Secretary would be fully informed. The President advised the Secretary to have the closest communication at all times with Henry. There would be many changes in the State Department, although he didn’t know yet precisely what they would be.

The President closed by saying that he would always welcome Secretary Richardson’s recommendations.

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\(^5\) A reference to the Senate Committee on Armed Services.


\(^7\) During the Second World War, General Dwight D. (Ike) Eisenhower was the supreme commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. He later served as President of the United States from 1953 to 1961, during which time Nixon was his Vice President.
2. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Tucker) to Secretary of Defense Richardson


SUBJECT

Taking Stock

I. Major Accomplishments and Important Unfinished Business

The past four years have seen many accomplishments in national security planning; I have noted below those which, in my opinion, are the most significant. It is important to bear in mind, however, that history will record them as accomplishments only to the extent that the necessary follow-on work associated with each is diligently conducted.

A. Vietnamization. The conviction that the only confident way to achieve U.S. objectives in SEA was to build the self-Defense capability of the South Vietnamese was probably the most important single contribution of this Department. Our resolute actions based on that conviction have largely extricated U.S. forces and have given our South Vietnamese allies a reasonable chance to survive as a free nation. These actions have induced the North Vietnamese to negotiate an acceptable settlement.

Vietnamization is the crucial first step in implementation of the Nixon doctrine. It will require continuing realistic analysis and resolute action to build the capability and shift the burden of self-defense increasingly to our Asian allies, and to reduce U.S. presence and the likelihood of U.S. involvement in future conflicts, while maintaining at all times the joint capability for deterrence or defense. An adequate

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Gardiner Tucker. Tucker sent this “status report” to Richardson under a covering memorandum of January 30. On the covering memorandum, Richardson wrote on February 11, "This impresses me as an absolutely first-rate paper. Would like to discuss with you ASAP." Tucker later sent the memorandum to Secretary of Defense-designate Schlesinger under a covering memorandum of May 17. A stamp on a June 1 OSD covering memorandum indicates that Schlesinger saw it. (Ibid.) Under a covering memorandum, February 3, Tucker sent Richardson and Clements another lengthy paper, this one an overview of current defense strategies and missions. (Ibid.)

2 On July 25, 1969, during a tour of Asia, President Nixon outlined what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, which prescribed a post-Vietnam American disengagement from Asia. While the United States would honor its “treaty commitments,” henceforth Americans would seek to “avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam.” Consequently, the United States would generally avoid direct military involvement in the region. Instead, it would “encourage” Asian nations to be responsible for their own security. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 544–556)
policy and realistic program for development of post-war Asian security arrangements has yet to be established.

B. SALT. This Department has provided crucial leadership by presenting the President with constructive proposals and realistic assessments of potential Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, and by keeping in perspective the goals of security and stability rather than ease of negotiation or popularity. We have been influential because we have been realistic rather than extreme, and because we have been able to pull the Department of Defense together on the essential issues. Without our leadership, unwise agreements might well have been reached.

The Phase I SALT agreements\(^3\) represent an important first step in establishing security and stability in our strategic relations with the Soviet Union. But the agreements do not by themselves provide an acceptable basis for secure and stable relations over several years. A treaty limiting offensive systems to provide equality and stability—and to do so through reductions in Soviet forces rather than major increases in U.S. forces—is essential. The SALT–I agreements, however, leave us little leverage in the next year or so to persuade the Soviets to reach such an agreement unless we compromise seriously the Forward Based Nuclear Systems in Europe which form the most visible assurance to our NATO allies of our commitment to the nuclear defense of NATO. We must not expect, therefore, to be able to negotiate an acceptable offense treaty soon, and must pursue with clear Congressional support the major strategic programs which will be needed if negotiations fail and the Soviet threat improves, and which will provide the negotiating leverage necessary. It will again require persistent DoD leadership to steer this course.

C. MBFR. There is much work ahead to establish a rational, constructive U.S. posture in MBFR, but DoD has made a crucial contribution by turning the U.S. conceptual approach around. Rather than viewing MBFR as a necessary evil and a cover to rationalize or delay inevitable, Congressionally imposed, unilateral U.S. reductions, we now view MBFR as a potential instrument for improving NATO security, the stability of East-West relations in Europe, and the cohesiveness of the alliance. Also, as a result of DoD positions taken within the U.S.

\(^3\) On May 26, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed two SALT accords: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The former limited each signatory’s deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, including the national command authority. The latter was an agreement in principle to limit the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. For the full texts of the agreements, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 316 and 317.
community, the U.S. is now searching for a comprehensive, phased approach to MBFR to include constraints and verification measures as well as actual force reductions.

Most discussions of MBFR both within the U.S. Government and within the NATO alliance, however, start from the premise that the Warsaw Pact has a large and growing advantage over NATO in conventional forces so that it could rapidly muster an attack which could quickly penetrate deep into NATO territory. It is, moreover, assumed that symmetric force reductions in Central Europe will very much favor the Pact since Soviet capability to reintroduce forces is so much more rapid than ours. Our most recent analyses discredit both premises. It is urgent, unfinished business that we promulgate within the U.S. Government and NATO an undistorted view of the current NATO-Pact balance as a rational starting point for realistic evaluations of MBFR goals and options.

D. NNTAP. DoD has laid the basis for replacing dangerously unrealistic, incomplete and inconsistent formulations of policies dealing with nuclear strategy, weapons acquisition and weapons employment with a realistic, complete and consistent formulation which can provide the President with a realistic appraisal of his nuclear options in crisis situations, provide DoD with a rational, defensive nuclear weapons program, and make more effective our nuclear deterrent.

There is a tendency for the proponents of various nuclear systems and options to use the new formulation of policy to justify their preferences. A deliberate, continuing effort to develop specific implementation plans, assess their utility and consequences in realistic scenarios, and modify the policy formulation will be necessary, as well as an effort to assess our nuclear weapons inventory, deployment, command and control, and modernization programs in terms of their adequacy to support the policy.

II. Utilization of Defense Resources

A. Fiscal Reality. An inescapable part of the background against which all Defense planning analyses and decisions must be viewed is the current and future competition for federal resources.

1. Within DoD. We have made significant progress within DoD in analysis of alternative Federal fiscal policies and their impacts on national economic goals. We have been able with some confidence to simulate the interaction of alternative Federal policies (spending levels, tax programs and wage-price controls) with major variables such as inflation and employment, and then analyze the effects on Federal revenue and the Federal deficit. These studies lead us to conclude that our stated economic goals cannot be achieved over the next few years except through reduction of projected levels of federal spending, and that
such reductions cannot realistically be achieved through adjustment of the so-called “controllable” expenditures (i.e., those unilaterally controlled by the Administration) alone, but will require adjustments to presently legislated programs as well.

I believe we have finally gotten the message across within DoD that the total resources allocated to defense will not increase significantly in the next several years and that some painful adjustments will have to be made if we are to plan a balanced program of modernization, manpower, forces, readiness and support within likely resource levels. Whereas the realization of fiscal reality has finally been achieved, however, the painful adjustments are still largely in the future.

2. Within the Administration. I believe we have also finally been successful in getting the rest of the Administration to recognize that projected fiscal imbalances and deficits are of such a magnitude and the requirements of national security so irreducible, that national goals of full employment, low inflation and real growth cannot be achieved except through painful adjustments to non-Defense federal programs. Here too, however, it is only the realization, which has been achieved. The painful adjustments are still to come. Such adjustments require Administration-wide analysis and multi-year, not just annual, planning and decision making. We have been frustrated, however, in attempts to precipitate or participate in interagency or Administration-wide studies of these matters.

It is especially disappointing that we have not succeeded in developing a constructive dialogue in the DPRC on the priorities for allocation of total federal resources amongst alternative claimants, nor have we been able to induce the Administration to address the multi-year fiscal planning which is so crucial to effective economic and Defense planning, nor even to determine early and firmly the annual level of the Defense budget. Instead, we go through months of unresolved struggle over the levels of Defense expenditures annually in other forums, and this struggle precludes an open dialogue over Defense programs and issues at the DPRC because each issue is likely to reopen the battle over resources. Similarly, efforts to generate constructive discussion of the extent and manner in which Federal expenditures can be controlled have been unsuccessful.

B. Participatory Management

1. Within the Administration. Our attempts to elicit an Administration-wide participatory approach to the management of relevant defense issues has met with only partial success. The DPRC has succeeded in producing a much better understanding of Defense capabilities, limitations, requirements, issues and programs on the part of the principal advisors to the President. This has helped to avoid a repeat of the 1969
NSC meeting\(^4\) on the defense budget at which some of the members reflected serious misconceptions or misunderstandings of Defense programs and requirements. The members of the DPRC and their staffs, however, still have a tendency to probe extensively into defense projects of secondary importance in an effort to discredit us, rather than concentrating on the major missions of Defense, our capability to discharge them, and the resources available and needed. As reflected by the comments above on fiscal realities, our attempts to participate on an Administration-wide basis in the management of total federal resource allocation and policy questions has been largely thwarted.

2. With Congress. Last year at our Airlie House conference\(^5\) you stressed that the Congress was a coequal branch of the U.S. Government. You said it was essential that we transform our relations with the Congress from a kind of adversary confrontation to a partnership in which they share in facing and solving some of our problems, not just in criticizing our actions and proposals. You said we should bring them more deeply into the issues and considerations of national security, even though it risked exposing them to facts and factors which could be used to attack our programs, because national security could not be assured over the several years without strong commitment and support from Congress of a kind which can only come from active participation in the critical decisions.

As a trial first step we invited the key staff members of the four committees to the Pentagon for a seminar on selected Defense problems. Bob Moot\(^6\) discussed fiscal realities, John Foster discussed technological competition with the Soviets, and I discussed cost growth in weapon systems and the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. It is my impression that the Congressional staff responded enthusiastically to this frank dialogue and urged that it be pursued further after the budget hearings and elections. Another of our initial efforts at being completely open was the 1972 Defense Manpower Report which was well received by Congress and I believe improved DoD’s credibility during subsequent Congressional hearings.

Thus, we have made a small beginning on what must become a major new relationship. Before it can come to fruition, however, I be-

\(^4\) The NSC met several times during 1969 to discuss national security policy. For the records of those meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 5, 7, 8, 16, 36, and 103.

\(^5\) Defense officials regularly held meetings at Arlie House, a conference center located in Virginia. No record of the previous meeting, held in September 1972, was found.

believe we must develop a franker, better organized dialogue and consensus within DoD itself on the missions, capabilities and limitations of Defense.

3. Within DoD. By giving every component a sense of sharing in DoD decision making, participatory management has been the major tool for achieving DoD cohesiveness under pressure. One of the major accomplishments of the past four years has been pulling the hitherto often disparate, independent and conflicting components of DoD together into a cohesive unity. It has enabled DoD to weather effectively attacks on Defense programs and budgets from within the Administration and from Congressional and public sources which otherwise might have eroded national security seriously.

C. PPBS. One of the most important opportunities for implementing participatory management within DoD—and perhaps its most successful manifestation—has been the PPBS. This institution has by now given us the most orderly planning cycle in several years. It must, however, be judged not just by how orderly or participatory it is, but by how confidently it adjusts the Defense program to implement the policies, objectives and strategies of defense. By these criteria I believe it is only just beginning to work and most of its accomplishment must still lie ahead. It is my view that this summer we began to make a few program decisions which were based in a discriminating way on the policy guidance and a realistic appraisal of our capabilities. I also believe that in this next PPBS cycle there is a chance that we may see considerable progress toward a realistic and discriminating JSOP which brings the military judgments of the JCS and their staff to bear systematically on the practical issues and alternatives of defense planning. This year, for the first time, we have seen POMs from the Military Departments which attempt to present their proposed programs as rationally derived from their missions and strategies after considering the threat and allied capabilities. Much of the logic is still specious or incomplete, but the conceptual framework is beginning to appear.

The Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) now contains the most definitive, complete and unambiguous formulation of Defense policy, strategy and planning guidance which has ever been put together. It still contains many ambiguities and uncertainties and will properly be subject to a number of challenges. Nonetheless, it provides for the first time a realistic, consistent and discriminating conceptual basis on which defense planning issues can be resolved. Without such a policy basis, no major improvements in the effectiveness of defense planning are likely. One of the best indicators that the PPBS is beginning to achieve rational planning, that is, to connect program decisions with policy guidance, is the renewed interest on the part of Service Chiefs and Secretaries in the formulation of the DPPG; witness particu-
larly the current effort mobilized by Warner and Zumwalt to reexamine and reformulate the "Nixon Doctrine." By and large, however, there still is lacking a systematic and comprehensive logic which relates our forces and programs to the policies and strategies of the DPPG, and our planning is often driven by influences which do not emanate from that document. To make the DPPG effective, Defense program decisions must be tied in an explicit and discriminating way to the policy and guidance it contains.

The Materiel Support Planning Guidance (MSPG) contains operative policy guidance to the Services which should insure a reasonable balance between General Purpose Forces and their materiel support capability. The policies and planning concepts enunciated should assure that, for the first time in U.S. history, the war-to-peace transition in our materiel (particularly munitions) procurement programs will be consciously managed so as to build adequate war reserve stockpiles and at the same time protect our industrial preparedness. The combined impact of DPPG, fiscal guidance, and MSPG on our materiel support planning has promise of ultimately producing the best peacetime balance of combat forces and materiel support capability the nation has ever had. We have made significant progress in forcing a convergence of the Service processes of war reserve "requirements" development and actual resource allocation. We have for the first time detailed, explicit guidance on industrial preparedness that is wholly consistent with our approved force structure and strategy. However, due to a generally low internal Service priority, I believe the broad area of materiel support capability will continue to require OSD attention and firm guidance if an acceptable peacetime force/materiel support balance is to be achieved and maintained.

D. Total Force Planning.

1. U.S. Forces. The concept of total force planning is by now firmly established. It has led to some positive actions. Significant improvements in Reserve equipment and training, for example, have been programmed. The explicit inclusion of allied forces makes a substantial difference in our assessments of capabilities and requirements for land forces in Asia, sea lane defense, etc. Some new efforts have been started to explore the capability of one Service to contribute to the missions normally assigned to another Service, e.g., recent AF studies of its ability to contribute to sea lane defense. Many of the tough decisions required to implement total force planning in a realistic way still lie ahead, however. They must probably await more comprehensive analyses of the capability of our programmed forces to implement the DPPG mission before they can be driven home. I believe we will discover that the size of our Army reserve is larger than can be utilized effectively in the missions we have defined, even with the policy that our
active forces should be augmented in a crisis from the reserves first rather than through a civilian draft. We will therefore need to move towards an Army reserve which is smaller as well as better equipped, trained and integrated with active units in order to tune our total forces better to our missions. On the other hand, we may also discover that a larger, well-equipped Air Force reserve can support our total mission requirements with reduced active units, so that we should begin to transfer equipment and spaces from active to reserve units. Wherever total force planning leads to the conclusion that some parts of our force structure should be reduced while others are strengthened, the implementing decisions will be tough.

2. Forces of Allies. The DPPG stresses that we should have a joint capability with full participation of our allies to mount a conventional forward defense in NATO or in NEA or in SEA. It stresses that our allies should develop a greater self-defense capability. I believe effective planning for such joint capability and burden-shifting can only be based on a common and realistic joint understanding of the threat, the requirements of the strategy, the capability or inadequacies of our combined forces to implement the strategy, and our respective plans for changes. For various reasons, many of our spokesmen have portrayed an unrealistically pessimistic assessment of the threat and Allied capabilities in Europe, and we have not discussed long range strategy and deployment plans frankly with our Asian allies. In the absence of realistic and candid discussion our allies draw more pessimistic or sinister inferences than they should, and our influence is degraded. The advent of MBFR in Europe and post-war adjustments in Asia make such frank dialogue particularly urgent.

III. Progress in Analysis: Missions, Forces and Capabilities

We have concentrated in analysis on the fundamental assessment of the capability of our current and programmed force to perform the missions identified in the Policy and Planning Guidance. We have attempted to conduct this analysis in a cooperative way with the military service or services affected or with the Joint Staff, and with full participation from the intelligence community, to make sure that the data, assumptions and methods are challenged and explored at each step, and to build a consensus of support and understanding of the analytic results even when they may differ from what the intuition or interest of the participants might have preferred. It has taken a great deal of time and effort to establish an adequate basis of trust and so some of these cooperative analyses are just now getting underway. Others are still incomplete. Nonetheless, a number of important inferences are beginning to emerge.
While discussing MBFR, I alluded to recent analyses of the current NATO-Pact balance. More specifically, our joint study with the Army\(^7\) indicates that under the assumptions set forth in the Policy and Planning Guidance, the NATO alliance currently has a land force structure which is adequate for a successful nonnuclear forward defense of NATO territory against a nonnuclear attack by those Warsaw Pact forces designated against the NATO central region. It also indicates a force structure adequate to slow the Pact attack and deny the loss of Germany during the first 90 days of conflict if the designated Pact forces are augmented with another 40 Soviet divisions drawn from the other Soviet military districts and the Chinese border. This analysis does not yet take into account NATO or Pact logistic constraints nor the contributions of tactical air to the ground battle. Preliminary examination indicates, however, that each of these factors will favor NATO so the indications above should not change qualitatively. Our analysis also indicates that the NATO conventional capability for Europe is improving faster than the Pact conventional capability.

These preliminary analytic results differ remarkably from the intuitions or assertions of many of our military commanders and our NATO allies, who have tended to assume that a NATO conventional defense would begin to crumble after a few days of Pact attack after which it would be mandatory to escalate to a nuclear defense. If these preliminary indications continue to be supported as the analytic work progresses, they can exert a very considerable influence on NATO strategy and on the planning and budgeting of the NATO Allies. Because the analytic results challenge more common judgements so deeply, however, great care and finesse will be required to bring their influence effectively to bear in strategy and planning.

Four recent analyses have addressed our capability to reinforce NATO in the presence of a concentrated Soviet antishipping campaign in the Atlantic. The Navy NARAC–G and SEAMIX studies\(^8\) assessed U.S. shipping losses and Soviet submarine losses assuming U.S. and allied FY 73 forces for sea lane protection, and FY 81 forces, respectively. The interagency SPANS study addressed the adequacy of available merchant shipping. The Joint Staff CAPFORCE study assessed our capability to supply and reinforce our forces in NATO given the ships available and shipping losses from the other studies and given the assumptions of the Policy and Planning Guidance. These analyses make the following clear: We would sustain heavy shipping losses (25–50%) in the first 30 days of an intensive Soviet antishipping campaign, and

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\(^{7}\) Not found.

\(^{8}\) The referenced NARAC–G, SEAMIX, SPANS, and CAPFORCE studies were not found.
moderate losses (10–20%) over 90 days, but the percentage loss of Soviet submarines (the principal antishipping threat) would be much higher than the percentage loss of NATO ASW assets, so that the balance improves in favor of NATO as the campaign continues; A significant fraction of Soviet submarine losses would be attributed to allied ASW forces; In spite of shipping losses, NATO has adequate cargo ships available to carry the military supplies needed to sustain 90 days or more of a NATO-Pact conflict; U.S. prepositioned equipment plus sealift and airlift capability are adequate to provide the reinforcement and supply called for by JSOP under the DPPG assumptions. (However, we do not now maintain nor program to procure munitions, equipment, and other supplies to replace those lost aboard attritted cargo ships.) The analyses further indicate that the forces programmed for FY 81 will be better able to protect sea lanes from the projected FY 81 threat than the current forces can protect against the current threat. The principal item which is missing from the supply analysis to date is a realistic assessment of the vulnerability of prepositioned equipment, though some preliminary assessments indicate that it is not as vulnerable as usually thought, given limited Soviet bombing capabilities.

These analytic results again appear to differ significantly from the judgments of some of our military commanders who have asserted that our sea lane defense forces will prove inadequate to reinforce or support our land and air forces in Europe, or that our cargo fleet has inadequate capacity. All of the above analyses assume that sea lane protection has the highest priority claim on naval forces. Navy combat forces (carriers) are vulnerable to submarine attack and must compete with sea lane defense for allocation of ASW assets if they are deployed forward during the early stages of conflict. This competition for resources amongst alternative missions and how it is best resolved in terms of our overall strategy has yet to receive critical analysis. Those commanders who judge our sea lane defense inadequate may in fact have assumed first priority for defense of our carrier task forces rather than for sea lane defense, even though the DPPG states otherwise.

A third example of analytic progress deals with the requirements for conventional land forces to implement a forward defense strategy in Asia and the extent to which those requirements can be met over time by the improving defense capabilities of our Asian allies as a result of our security assistance. We have subjected this question to extensive analysis and continuing dialogue with the joint staff. We have not achieved consensus, but have considerably narrowed the range of differences of view. The result is that, except in a “worst case” in which the Chinese draw their forces away from their border with the Soviet Union in order to augment the forces they can send to North Korea, or all regular South Vietnamese and Thai forces are needed to control in-
surgent activities, all estimates of requirements for a conventional defense of South Korea or Southeast Asia, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand (but not Burma) against a combined Chinese-North Korean or Chinese-North Vietnamese conventional attack fall within projected allied forces plus the forces the U.S. could deploy with our planned program without call-up of the reserves or draw down of NATO committed forces. In the unlikely “worst case,” we could still meet the highest estimates of requirements without an undue NATO draw down by mobilizing reserve forces. The major weaknesses in this analysis to date are the lack of adequate treatment of the extent to which allied regular forces in SEA may be tied down in controlling insurgent activity and therefore unavailable for conventional defense (in other than the “worst case,” we have assumed that Regional, Popular and Police forces would be adequate for counter-insurgency), the uncertainties associated with logistical constraints in SEA and the will and determination of our SEA allies to fight, and the lack of consistent treatment of the contribution of tactical air to the ground battle.

In each of the above examples of analytic progress a significant shortcoming is the lack of a consensus on the effects of tactical air on the land or sea battle. Past separate analyses by SA or by the Service involved of tactical air requirements to contribute to the various missions of defense have lead to widely divergent results and very different conclusion regarding the adequacy of our forces. Some time ago Bob Seamans and I initiated a joint effort to pin down and narrow differences regarding data and assumptions. We have just initiated joint analytic work which will take several months to complete. John Warner and I have very recently initiated a joint study to assess the capability of our forces to perform missions involving naval forces. I hope that these joint studies will be as productive of understanding and consensus as the joint study with the Army has begun to be.

Together with the Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Navy and the Joint Staff, we have been conducting a series of studies of Close Air Support. The first of these studies led to the conclusion that both helicopter and fixed wing aircraft are probably necessary for CAS missions, and defined a number of criteria to which candidate aircraft should be tested. The outcome of the resultant tests led the Army to propose dropping the Cheyenne as a candidate and defining a new helicopter for development. The tests specified for the A–9/A–10 have not yet been completed. The second of the studies has identified a number of problems without systems and procedures for command and control of CAS aircraft and has again led to the identification of a needed program of test and evaluation. In spite of the strong partisan interests and emotions involved in CAS we have so far been able to keep the Services, the Joint Staff and OSD together on studies and con-
clusions. We have, however, not yet positioned ourselves to attack the most controversial question—that of "roles and missions." When we are ready to attack that question I believe it will be necessary for us to change our mode of attack from a study in which all parties participate continuously to one in which OSD generates a study on which each Service and the JCS then comment.

Through the MSPG and continual OSD/Service staff dialogue we have helped influence the Air Force to develop an analytical methodology for identifying the "optimum" future mix of air-to-surface munitions to be stockpiled. To the extent that our actual munitions procurement programs continue to be shaped by that planning tool, future munitions stockpiles will contain enough of the modern, much more effective air munitions that will permit us to extract the maximum combat capability from our increasingly expensive tactical air sortie capability. We have had considerably less success with the Navy in this area; however, that dialogue continues.

To a completely unprecedented degree U.S. decision making for policy and activities in Southeast Asia has been supported by an extensive, authenticated factual data base and by penetrating, impartial and timely analyses of military, demographic and economic developments. The assessments of hamlet security, patterns of enemy activity, quality of ARVN leadership, effectiveness of U.S. air interdiction, and impact of U.S. presence on SVN inflation have supported improved allocations of RVN forces, shifts from air to ground interdiction efforts against supply routes and caches, and significant reductions in inflationary pressures. The control situation in SVN has been monitored, portrayed and analyzed on a periodic basis as have military developments in Cambodia. This has provided an accurate and timely overview of Vietnamization's progress.

In the strategic mission area, I have already pointed to the Foster Panel NNTAP report as one of the major accomplishments of the past four years. The new nuclear weapons employment policy developed in this report gives us the basis for fresh assessment of the adequacy and appropriateness of our nuclear forces to perform the missions assigned to them. Particularly for theatre-related missions, an adequate policy and conceptual framework for such assessment has heretofore been lacking. Careful joint study will be necessary with the Joint Staff to begin to achieve a consensus on requirements and adequacy of our forces.

Continuing analytic progress has been made on strategic nuclear weapons. Particularly important has been the "Oberbeck" study of the

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The referenced Foster Panel report and the Oberbeck study were not found.
survivability of strategic forces, in which JCS, OSD and the Services participated, and which made clear: That our FBM submarines at sea are nearly invulnerable in a short sudden strategic war today, but could become more vulnerable in the later 1970s or beyond; That straightforward Soviet technological improvement of their ICBM force in ways we have already proven feasible could make our fixed Minuteman silos very vulnerable; That Soviet development and deployment of a “depressed trajectory” mode of operation for their growing SLBM force could reduce the warning time for attack on our bomber bases from 15–30 minutes to 5–7 minutes, thereby making their prelaunch survival more uncertain than their ability to penetrate Soviet air defenses; That our SAFEGUARD system was itself vulnerable to concentrated attack on its radars.

A second important strategic analysis was done of alternative air defense objectives. This analysis defined alternative objectives in terms of attack size and warning and analyzed these. It resulted in a less ambitious set of objectives for our air defenses. Thus, where previously we were planning our air defenses for a large surprise bomber attack, it is now our objective to plan for defense against a small attack which might result from a deep international crisis from which we would obtain warning. Because this analysis was done on one of the “closehold” issues identified by the Shultz-Kissinger-Packard triumvirate reviewing the FY 73–77 program, it was conducted within Systems Analysis without participation by the AF or the JCS. One consequence is that the AF and the JCS have been fighting the conclusions and recommendations since. It is thus an example of a first-rate analysis whose impact is made much more difficult because it was not managed in a participatory way. Of course, a participatory approach to analysis is much more difficult and time consuming than performing private staff studies. But its impact on Defense policy and programming can be much greater because it tends to form a consensus and its results must be taken seriously, rather than being dismissed as the product of bright but uninformed civilians who lack military judgment.

In spite of these difficulties, we have begun to build a systematic, logical basis for assessment of the capability of our current and programmed forces to perform the missions of Defense as defined in the DPPG. This basis is beginning to illuminate both policy questions and specific programming and weapon acquisition decisions.

We have not yet nearly completed a first careful participatory pass through assessment of our major forces to perform our major missions.

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Much more pioneering and original work is still required. Moreover
the essential cooperation of the Services and the Joint Staff is still fragile
and hesitant. But I believe that the foundations we have already laid are
the surest that Defense has ever had, and the directions we have started
on can produce a superior, systematic understanding of defense capa-
ibilities and efficient paths to their improvement. I look forward to the
day when the confidence of this department in our analytic base will be
sufficient enough so that tough and discriminating program and policy
decisions will be based on it.

[Omitted here is Section IV, dealing with manpower issues.]

Gardiner L. Tucker
Assistant Secretary of Defense

3. National Security Decision Memorandum 203


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT
Revised Guidelines for Stockpile Planning

The President has reviewed the current guidelines for Stockpile
planning. To bring the National Stockpiles of Strategic and Critical Ma-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-238, NSDM 203. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury.

2 On December 26, 1972, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum recommending that the stockpile of strategic and critical materials, valued at $6.6 billion, be reduced to $1.3 billion. Nixon approved the cuts. Rather than authorizing an attached draft NSDM ordering the reductions, however, Nixon, according to his handwritten note on Kissinger’s memorandum, instructed that the NSDM be revised “to reflect my very dim view of this whole program—unless cuts mortally affect the economy in the U.S., make them.” Kissinger’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 446. According to memoranda addressed to Kissinger and Scowcroft, January 19 and February 3, 1973 respectively, Odeen subsequently revised the draft NSDM in accord with the President’s wishes. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 396, Subject Files, Stockpile (1973))
materials into correspondence with national security requirements, he has directed that the determination of the quantitative levels and materials composition of stockpile inventories shall be based on three principal assumptions:

1. The impact on material demand and supply during a national emergency will be no greater than that which would occur if:
   A. Military conflict arose in Europe and Asia for a period of up to one year.
   B. The U.S. were to support a military force of up to 5,000,000 men for the duration of conflict.3

2. Imports to the United States during such a conflict will be available as normal with the following exceptions:
   A. Imports will not be available from Communist bloc countries and countries in the war zone.
   B. Imports will be available at reduced levels from other countries where political disruption or hostile action at sea is expected to impede normal import patterns.

3. Extraordinary measures, including limitations on real personal consumption, will be taken if necessary within the national economy to sustain defense production. These measures shall not cause per capita living standards to fall significantly below levels attained in the most recent preconflict year.

   Determination of specific material requirements shall:
   —Take into account the capacity of the national economy to adjust to rapid change in the demand for and availability of materials.
   —Reflect, in particular, the possibilities for substitution of non-critical materials for critical materials in production processes.

   The aggregate value of materials held against estimated inventory requirements shall not exceed $1,500 million (June 1972 prices).

   The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, shall adjust the stockpile inventory requirements to reflect the Revised Guidelines. New material purchase or disposal actions shall not be initiated until the Director has prepared a Stockpile Report which includes:
   —A comprehensive list of material requirements.
   —A review of demand estimates for materials, where purchase or disposal action in the FY 1973–75 time period appears contingent upon substitution possibilities.
   —A determination as to any need for adjustment in the dollar value of the ceiling on stockpile inventory requirements.

3 According to Kissinger’s memorandum, the then-prevailing guidance was premised on a three-year war in Europe and Asia with the United States supporting 5 million soldiers.
This report shall be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs within fifteen days from this issuance.

The Administrator, General Services Administration, shall advise the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs with regard to possible market entries by the Government for major disposals or purchases pursuant to the specific material requirements established by the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

The Secretary of State shall advise the President with regard to the implications of stockpile disposal actions for United States foreign relations.

Henry A. Kissinger

4. National Security Study Memorandum 169


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Nuclear Policy

The President has directed a review of existing U.S. nuclear policy in light of the changes in the strategic situation which has occurred since the guidance was published.

The review should embrace all U.S. nuclear forces, including strategic, theater, and tactical. It should evaluate alternative changes to current policies on the basis of:

—desirability of the recommended changes as related to basic national policy;
— the impact on relations with allies (particularly NATO) and potential adversaries;

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs—104–206. Top Secret; Sensitive.

—the implications of any changes for SALT planning;
—the relationship and effect on U.S. weapons acquisition policy;
—the validity of the supporting assumptions; and,
—the question of declaratory statements of policy and implementing procedures should these changes be adopted.

The review should take into account the material recently provided to the President by the Secretary of Defense3 as well as other material that is relevant to the issues involved.

This review is to be conducted by a special ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Department of Defense and composed of one representative each from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSC staff.

This review should be completed by April 15 for review by the Defense Program Review Committee prior to consideration by the National Security Council.

Henry A. Kissinger

3 Under a covering memorandum, December 26, 1972, Laird sent Nixon a DOD paper, October 24, entitled “Revised Tentative Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” that proposed the adoption of several new, more flexible employment options. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–195, Study Memoranda, NSSM 169)
National Security Study Memorandum 171


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategy for Asia

The President has directed that in the aftermath of the Vietnamese conflict, current U.S. strategy for Asia should be reviewed.

The study should define current U.S. strategy in Asia and changes that the U.S. could adopt for the future. In developing these policy options the study should consider:

—A range of specific defense objectives.
—Alternative goals of U.S. security assistance programs in terms of the size and type of threat allied forces could be structured to meet. Economic and political constraints should be considered.
—Associated U.S. conventional force requirements and the likely impact on overall U.S. force levels. In considering the impact on overall force levels, the study should assume no change in U.S. strategy for defense of NATO.
—The impact of adopting these policy options on relations with our Allies and potential adversaries. This work should consider, among other things, the political factors that are likely to influence relations between Asian nations over the coming five years.

The study should assess our current nuclear doctrines, forces, and employment planning in Asia and develop alternative doctrines which could be used to support our future planning. The focus should be on the use of nuclear weapons in support of conventional forces (Allied and U.S.). The relationship between these alternative doctrines and U.S. nuclear delivery systems and deployments should be considered.

The study should also evaluate alternative U.S. military basing postures for the Asian mainland and Western Pacific islands for the FY74 to FY75 period in terms of:

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—Capabilities to support alternative military strategies against the current and projected threat. For example, the capability inherent in various deployment postures to move the necessary men and material should be evaluated.

—Allied reactions to alternative basing postures including the phasing from our current deployment posture to the alternative considered. Particular attention should be given to an evaluation of how various deployment postures would impact on Allied perceptions of U.S. capability and willingness to support strategy objectives.

The analysis should be based upon the work done previously for the NSSM–69 study\(^2\) and should be completed by March 30, 1973, for review by the Defense Program Review Committee prior to its consideration by the President. The study will be prepared by a committee composed of the representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by a representative of the Department of Defense.

Henry A. Kissinger


6. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, February 15, 1973, 1:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Box 1026, January–March 1973. Secret; Nodis. The luncheon meeting ended at 2:36 p.m. Also in attendance were: Clements, Warner, Seams, Moorer, Zumwalt, Abrams, Cushman, Goodpaster, Foster, Ziegler, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Jerry W. Friedheim, Under Secretary of the Army Kenneth E. Belieu, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Jonathan Moore, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, and General Horace M. Wade, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, who was substituting for Ryan. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
President: You know, I am known as following a “hard line,” and in the Presidential campaign my opponent took a soft line.

Without the ABM, we would not have had a SALT agreement. In addition, there were many in Congress who wanted to “bug out” from Vietnam, and there were many close votes on that issue. Had those efforts succeeded, our POWs would have come home to a defeated country.

What I’m getting at is the growing strength of isolationism in the United States. This tendency is fed by the information media. But still, thank God we don’t have government television, putting out just one line.

Other countries have to have the support of the peaceniks to survive. During the recent bombing, the only ones to stand with us were the British, the Germans, and the Turks. All the others took a cheap shot at the bombing. Trudeau, Tanaka, Schmidt. The bombings in World War II killed millions but that was a “good war.” This is a “bad war,” so the bombing was “evil.” There is a real double standard, and isolationism is rampant.

Clinking glasses with the Chinese and the Soviet leaders wasn’t friendship but mutual interests. We talk to both countries, not to divide them but to seek sound relations with them. We must realize, however, that good relations don’t come simply from knowing other people better.

There is a tendency in the rimland of Asia and elsewhere to tell the U.S. to go home. But Indonesia and Suharto don’t. Should this develop in the NATO countries, or should they reduce their forces, the Congress will jump at the chance to cut all NATO forces. We are in danger of not getting enough from Congress, and Europe will encourage these forces which will want us to come home. We would like to be able to put the DOD budget into welfare, but if we did, the world would eventually fall under the Communist system. Despite the setback in South Asia and pressure from Congress, the situation is not hopeless. That is what the Chinese and Soviet initiatives were all about. Expansion is an article of Communist faith, but so also is caution.

The Korean War was not about Korea, but basically about Japan. The U.S. stand in Korea was a watershed. So it is with Vietnam, although the domino theory is rejected. Vietnam was important not for itself but because of what it demonstrated in terms of support for our

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3 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada; Helmut Schmidt, West German Minister of Finance until May 16, 1974 and Chancellor thereafter; and Kakuei Tanaka, Prime Minister of Japan until December 9, 1974.
4 General Suharto, President of Indonesia.
friends and allies and in terms of showing our will to our enemies. We had to see it through. I could have “bugged out” free in Vietnam after the ’68 election, but we had to see it through—but not necessarily the way it had been fought up to them. We have made strong moves in such crises as Jordan,\(^5\) Cienfuegos,\(^6\) etc. All these were important in demonstrating our commitments to our friends and our determination to our enemies.

I understand what vilification you, the military, have gone through over Vietnam, but you should remember that the big issue in the war was the American spirit.

I will conclude by saying that we must regain the respect for our military or we will end up with a country and a world which is unsafe. We must also remember and honor our POWs, our MIAs, all those killed or all those who served honorably in Vietnam.

[Omitted here is discussion of returning POWs and aid to North Vietnam]

[President:] One other point. I also want to stress that this will be the year of Europe, and we should, within the next two months, review NATO strategy.

I want to emphasize that I want not just a consensus but a variety of views on ground [grand] strategy for the years ahead. The State Department knew diplomacy not strategy, and the Defense Department vice versa. Fortunately, Elliot combines the knowledge of both fields. The Defense Department is full of smart people. It’s important to let them know we need them and intend to use them.

There are a number of areas that need to be studied, such as our posture in Southeast Asia after Vietnam; Indonesia—military and or more economic aid; Korea; the Fleet; the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and the energy crisis, for example.

\(^{5}\) Reference is to the Jordan crisis of September 1970. This crisis confronted the Nixon administration with the possibility that King Hussein, a major U.S. ally in the Middle East, would not survive. President Nixon responded to the crisis by positioning the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet off the coast of Israel, near Jordan, and sent additional carrier task forces and the Marine assault ship USS Guam to supplement the Sixth Fleet. For more on the U.S. response to the Jordan crisis see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970.

\(^{6}\) Reference is to the Soviet decision in 1970 to build a submarine base on the southeastern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos. Warnings were issued by U.S. officials that continued construction of the base would be viewed with the “utmost gravity” and as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. For more on the U.S. response to Cienfuegos see, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 207–208, 210–215, and 219–226.
I think the Nixon Doctrine\(^7\) has been largely misinterpreted. Mansfield, for example, thinks that it is a way to get out. It’s not; it’s a way to maintain our forces overseas but to get a decent effort from the countries supported, especially in terms of manpower. I want Defense involved, as well as State, in the upcoming study efforts.

Richardson: I have ordered a meeting to work out what we are doing, what are the gaps, and what we don’t need to do again.

President: We will pay attention to your views.

[Omitted here is discussion of claims resulting from the war in Vietnam.]

\(^7\) See footnote 2, Document 2.

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7. **Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (Korologos) for the President’s Files\(^1\)**


**SUBJECT**

Meeting with Senator Milton Young (R–ND), and Senator John McClellan (D–Ark) of the Senate Appropriations Committee

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

Senator John McClellan (Chairman)

Senator Milton Young (Ranking Republican)

Tom C. Korologos

Roy Ash

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

The President then turned to the military budget in general and to NATO specifically. The President told the Senators that he has a meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev of the USSR coming up this summer\(^2\)

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Office Files, Box 91, Memoranda for the President—Beginning March 4, [1973]. Secret. The breakfast meeting, held in the private dining room on the first floor of the White House, lasted from 8:27–9:48 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

and he was going to a NSC meeting immediately after the breakfast to discuss the next SALT moves. He said the next SALT meeting would be very important.

In the first one we got a freeze on defensive weapons and we are now going to try and get a cutback in the SS9’s and in the offensive weapons, he said. He told the Senators that there was going to be tough bargaining ahead but he was confident that we could succeed. He said that around July 1, (and the date has not been agreed upon yet), when Brezhnev is here, the President would be greatly dismayed if Congress were to cut defense or cut NATO.

This “would seriously erode our bargaining position” the President said. He urged McClellan and Young to hold the line on the military budget and not cave in to the anti-war Doves who would want to slash it way back. On the question of NATO troops, he said we are not going to talk to the Soviets about cuts just yet. He said we are already talking to our European allies about a Mutual Balance Force Reduction and we are trying to get a common position before the U.S. and our NATO allies go to the Russians to present them a proposition on cutbacks. He told McClellan and Young that if we were to cut our troops in NATO before the Soviets do, again, serious negotiations would be hampered and it could have a very harmful impact on our success.

The President understood fully the balance of payments situation and those areas, but he said that the name of the game is, “to get the Soviet military cut down” and this is the best way he knows of doing it. He said to McClellan and Young that if the negotiations fall apart, he will certainly tell them so that they can act accordingly. But, for now, we have the talks with the Soviet Union on the overall question, and the talks with our allies prior to going to the Soviet Union on the European question.

He urged them again not to weaken our bargaining position because he feels we are going to do well. He told them that the Soviet Union wants to do business with us in the worst way and Brezhnev wants to succeed in his summit meeting when he comes to Washington, and “we are going to make him pay a hell of a price for that success”.

The discussion then turned to a very sensitive conversation about the U.S. relationship with the People’s Republic of China as well as the Soviet Union. The essence and the bottom line was that in our negotia-

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4 See footnote 3, Document 2.

5 A Soviet ICBM carrying a nuclear warhead first deployed in 1967.
tions and dealings with both the Soviet Union and the Chinese, “we must deal from strength”. He told McClellan and Young that our defense budget is “enough” and we are doing our best to negotiate downward the offensive and the military budgets both here and in the Soviet Union. However, if Congress decides unilaterally, to reduce the American military budget then we are in deep trouble. The President told the Appropriations Committee leaders that “if we cut our defense budget, Brezhnev is likely to roll over me. We have got to have that threat in our hands.”

McClellan told the President that he has been strong for defense and he is willing to go as strong as necessary to help the President.

“However, we have got to have some tactics”, McClellan said, “and we must take a stance of trying to reduce some of the military budget.” McClellan told the President that we could be confronted with a majority vote against the defense budget and pointed out a generally discouraging picture of possible success.

He said that we must talk to the House too and see how we are going to do and somehow see if we can come out with some good figures from the Conference.

McClellan said if we just go in and insist on all our military figures we are going to lose the whole thing. We must make some sacrifices. The President argued back that if McClellan were to give in, the dike is likely to burst. The President said “they’ll say McClellan says they can cut 3 or 4 billion dollars, and then they will end up taking 10 billion dollars. Hold back,” the President plead with McClellan, “until the bargaining days are over.”

[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Southeast Asia.]

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6 During a Cabinet meeting held on March 9, 1973, Nixon offered a similar defense of the military budget, saying that successful negotiations with the PRC and the USSR depended upon a high budget and the image of United States strength it conveyed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 91, Memoranda for the President—Beginning March 4, [1973])

7 On March 6, Nixon also discussed the defense budget during his meeting with Secretary Rogers and senior Department officials. Fighting domestic critics required “a united front for maintaining adequate defense and foreign assistance. We must get across the point that to have the US turn inward would be dangerous.” He continued, “The day the US ceases to be a formidable defense and diplomatic power, economics will not be enough to hold it together. It is a dangerous situation,” the President repeated. “The old isolationists and the new isolationists could be a majority. Our failure to succeed could lead to a period when we could draw away from our responsibility. We must inform the country that, having ended the war and with our new initiatives in China and the Soviet Union, this is the time for the US to continue to play a forceful role in the world—militarily, economically, and diplomatically.” Nixon added, “With the Vietnam war over, we must inspire the American spirit and accept the role of world leadership.” The record of the meeting is ibid.
8. Memorandum for the President’s File by Raymond K. Price, Jr.\(^1\)


SUBJECT
CABINET MEETING Friday, March 9, 1973

PARTICIPANTS
At Cabinet Table
- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary Butz
- Secretary Dent
- Secretary Rogers
- Secretary Weinberger
- Deputy Secretary Simon
- Secretary Lynn
- Secretary Richardson
- Secretary Brinegar
- Atty General Kleindienst
- Director Ash
- Deputy Secretary Simon
- Counsellor Armstrong
- Secretary Richardson
- Secretary Brinegar
- Atty General Kleindienst
- Director Ash
- Under Secretary Whitaker
- Ambassador Scali

Unable to Attend
- Secretary Shultz—Europe
- Secretary Morton—California
- Secretary Brennan—California
- Unable to Attend
- Others
- Secretary Shultz—Europe
- Honorable George Bush, RNC
- Secretary Morton—California
- Honorable Donald Johnson, VA
- Secretary Brennan—California
- Honorable Wm. Ruckelshaus, EPA
- Honorable Herbert Stein
- Honorable Russell Train, CEQ

Staff
- John D. Ehrlichman
- Ken W. Clawson
- H. R. Haldeman
- Lawrence M. Higby
- Peter M. Flanigan
- David R. Gergen
- Wm. E. Timmons
- David N. Parker
- Ronald L. Ziegler
- Stanley S. Scott
- Herbert G. Klein
- Kenneth Cole, Jr.
- Leonard Garment
- Frank Gannon
- Raymond K. Price, Jr.
- John Guthrie
- William Baroody
- Tod R. Hullin
- Richard A. Moore
- Frederic V. Malek
- Patrick J. Buchanan
- Arthur Sohmer

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Office Files, Box 91, President’s Meetings File—Beginning March 4 [1973]. Administratively Confidential. Not initialed by Price. There is a tape recording of this entire conversation. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 117-7)
MEETING OF THE CABINET

The Cabinet was called for 10:00 on what was an exceptionally warm, sunny March morning; besides the Cabinet itself, an unusually large number of staff members were included.

The President’s entry at 10:10 opened the meeting; he said that he had wanted all the Cabinet to be here not only for Bill Rogers’ report on the Vietnam aid situation, which would be the second matter on the agenda, but also for a discussion of what we need in the way of an operation to fight the battle of the budget. He asked John Ehrlichman to make the presentation. John went to a lectern at the end of the table, explained that he’d like to use the “music stand,” set a sheaf of papers on it, and the papers promptly fell to the floor.

“I’ve always told you—just one page!” said the President, laughingly, as John bent down to retrieve his notes.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

The President: You’ll also hear about priorities—why not cut defense by $10 billion? People say—in 1972 we had the China summit,\(^2\) the Russian summit,\(^3\) arms limitation,\(^4\) and just days after the year was over we ended the war in Vietnam\(^5\)—so why not cut defense by $10 billion?

The most important answer is: Why were we successful?

In China, and in Russia even more so, it was because we were strong—and because we had something we wanted to give as well as get.

This year we’ve got another meeting with the Russians\(^6\) that will be even more difficult—involving the mutual reduction of forces in Europe. If Congress prior to this unilaterally cuts our budget, it will be down the tube. We do arms control because we want to limit arms; they do arms control because they’re afraid we’ll get ahead of them.

\(^3\) Nixon met with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, May 22–28, 1972.
\(^6\) See footnote 2, Document 7.
In the last four years we doubled the amount of the budget going for domestic—we held defense even, which means that we’ve cut it. “That’s the razor’s edge. There cannot be any significant cuts in the arms budget.”

Rogers: We reduced our armed forces from 3.5 million to 2.2 million.

Richardson: And that’s the lowest level since 1950.

The President: That means it’s the lowest level in a quarter of a century. And another point: it means not only that we’ve made that kind of reduction, but that no young Americans are being drafted.

[Omitted here is discussion of assistance to Vietnam.]

Richardson: About the defense budget—there are facts—the overall manpower level is the lowest since 1950; the defense proportion of the total budget is the lowest since 1950, etc.

But also—we’re confronting problems arising from the success of our foreign policy initiatives—MBFR, etc. But these successes were achieved so far because we had the strength. It was possible to negotiate on a basis that allowed us to give for what we got. For us to cut below the levels in the budget would take away the very tools that have achieved what has been achieved. We’ve had SALT I, but we’re going into SALT II. MBFR is at the earliest stage. We need to be able to ensure observation of the peace agreements, etc.

The Vice President: Another point—to have diplomatic credibility, we must have strength, and to negotiate on trade, we’ve got to have diplomatic credibility.

Richardson: I’ve seen encouraging signs lately among liberal commentators of an awareness of the connection between military strength and our foreign policy successes. Our Carrier Task Force in the Mediterranean performs a peace-keeping function—and it maintains a presence which in itself contributes to preserving a balance. And among the American people, if the balance shifts against us, we’ll see a cornered rat syndrome—and then we’ll see a surge back in the other direction.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]
9. Draft Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Richardson, the Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (Timmons), and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Camp David, Maryland, March 10, 1973.

I am sending this memorandum “Eyes Only” not because it has Top Secret information in it, but because it would not be helpful to have a memorandum of this type hit the press and thereby raise an issue with the Congress that we are trying to lobby the Congress on our Defense budget.

I see a massive problem developing within the Congress with regard to the Defense budget and the Foreign Assistance budget. Part of this problem is already showing itself insofar as the statements that have been made about aid to North Vietnam. The other part shows itself when Congressmen and Senators come in and say that they are for our ceiling on spending but they want to change the priorities.

We have the Congress in the hard place. They know they will be on the wrong side of the issue if they vote for spending above our ceiling which could lead to a price increase or a tax increase or both. Consequently, in order to support their pet domestic projects, they are going to have to take it out of the Defense and Foreign Assistance budgets.

Too often in the past four years, the primary responsibility for getting the votes on the ABM and the other tough issues has been left to the Congressional Liaison Office of the White House with, of course, very strong assistance from the State Department and the Defense Department. Both the Defense Department and the State Department have done a superb job over these past four years in working the members of the Committees who handle their affairs. What we need now is to have both State and Defense work on the entire Congress rather than concentrating primarily on their Committees. It means a great deal more to a congressman or a senator who is not on the Foreign Relations Committee, for example, to be talked to by the Secretary of State or one of the Under Secretaries or an Assistant Secretary, for that matter. By the same token, it means a great deal more to some congressman or senator who is not on the Armed Services Committee to have the Secretary of

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Personal File, Box 4, Memoranda from the President, Memos—March 1973. Eyes Only. Nixon departed Washington for Camp David the afternoon of March 9 and returned from the presidential retreat the evening of March 10. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or one of the Assistant Secretaries or Deputy Secretaries of Defense talk to him.

What is really involved here is the possible success or failure of our entire foreign policy and of our initiatives toward peace which have had such great momentum in 1972. Our SALT talks with the Russians and the MBFR talks later in the year will be disastrous if we have substantial cuts in the Defense budget prior to that time. And, of course, the whole peace settlement in Vietnam depends upon our ability to hold Foreign Assistance at its present level and to defeat any attempt to cut North Vietnam out of the Foreign Assistance recipients.

Timmons should make a thorough study, in cooperation with the Congressional Liaison people in both State and Defense, of every member of the House and Senate who could potentially be enlisted on our side in these issues. Then, on a man-to-man basis, it is essential that each one be covered, and covered soon. What is important is to keep them from making statements or writing letters which will commit them on making huge cuts in Defense or opposing aid to North Vietnam so that we will find it impossible to turn them around later.

The primary targets, of course, should be the Republicans and Southern Democrats. Then try to pick up as many Northern Democrats as possible, as well as some of the Liberal Republicans.

I think the best way to handle this is for the Secretary of State to chair a group made up of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and Bill Timmons, and whatever other people you want from these various offices. Let's get a game plan and then see to it that it is followed up. Timmons will have the responsibility for doing the technical work. As far as the contacts are concerned, the primary burden must be borne by the State Department and the Defense Department.

Kissinger's office can be helpful with several of the individuals involved but, generally speaking, we would like to have this effort carried on outside of the White House rather than from the White House alone.
10. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Malek) to President Nixon\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Reducing the Strategic Stockpile

I. Background

The Strategic Materials Stockpile is currently valued at $6.5 billion and consists mainly of materials such as aluminum, rubber, chromite, diamonds, tin, zinc, copper, and the like. The new policy\(^2\) you recently approved permits lowering this inventory to under $700 million. Existing law authorizes the sale of $1.7 billion, but additional legislation will be needed to sell the remaining $4.1 billion.

A Working Group including Herb Stein, Bill Simon, and representatives from the Domestic Council, GSA, COLC, OEP, State, and the NSC concur with the recommendations presented below.

II. Administrative Actions

Administrative actions to intensify sales of $1.7 billion of materials can be taken on several fronts:

1. I recommend a departure from existing restrictive policies concerning the market impact of disposals. This change would permit GSA to increase sale of commodities at lower prices as long as resulting market prices remained above those of a year ago.\(^3\) If prices fall below that level for any commodity, the disposal policy will be restudied. These revised guidelines would allay congressional and industry concern over undue market disruption.\(^4\)

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 21, President’s Handwriting Files, March 11–31, 1973. No classification marking. Sent for action. A note on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Nixon decided during a March 9 meeting, held in the Oval Office to discuss the previous day’s announcement of an increase in the WPI and mounting criticism of the administration’s economic policies, that “stockpile sales should be vigorously pushed” and that Malek be “placed in charge of doing it.” His decision was prompted by Stein, Simon, and Ehrlichman’s shared view that there had been a “failure as yet to implement a policy of more rapid sales of stockpiled industrial materials, which seemed especially important in view of the big increase of industrial prices just reported.” The record of the meeting is ibid., Box 91, Memoranda for the President—Beginning March 4 [1973].

\(^2\) See Document 3.

\(^3\) Nixon underlined the phrase “resulting market prices remained above those of a year ago,” circled the word “above,” and drew a line from that word to the margin, where he wrote “no.”

\(^4\) The President initialed his disapproval and wrote, “go ahead even if there is heat from Industry because of lower prices.”
2. $650 million (mostly aluminum, lead, and zinc) is under long-term contract to producers. GSA will ask these producers to step up the purchase schedule or, in the case of lead and zinc, face the prospect of GSA selling to users on the open market. The sales prospects are summarized at Tab A. This action is likely to encounter some industry resistance, but I recommend you authorize pursuit of this course because disposal of the materials in question could have a significant, near-term stabilizing impact on prices.

3. At Tab B is a decision memo from Henry Kissinger recommending a removal of the ban on sale of tin. This would permit sale from the $75 million of excess tin at a rate that would prevent further price increases. A second and acceptable choice of Dr. Kissinger, and the one I recommend, is to permit sales at a rate that would stabilize the tin price at a level equivalent to the price that prevailed before devaluation.

4. On the remainder of the commodities for which we have authorization, I recommend having OEP remove present administrative limitations on sales, enabling GSA to step up disposals of these commodities. Commodities affected and specific goals to be reached are identified at Tab A, and we would place first priority on those items identified by the Cost of Living Council as most contributing to the WPI increase. This action is likely to encounter resistance from domestic industry, but we would attempt to ameliorate this through advance briefings. We can also expect protest from foreign producers, particularly the Thai, Malaysians, and Indonesians who will be affected by sale of both tin and rubber. State will consult with these countries on the proposed disposal actions. The Secretary of State will advise you if sales will jeopardize our interests in this area.

The net result of these administrative actions will increase fourth quarter dollar sales by 70% and FY 1974 sales by 50%.

III. Legislative Actions

In addition to the Working Group mentioned above, the recommendations below have been coordinated with and agreed to by Bill Timmons. We recommend the following legislative strategy:

1. Include all commodities in a single bill with individual authorization for each major commodity. This would reduce the potential criticism of encroachment on Congressional oversight, and yet would permit flexibility in the event the bill became stymied owing to an objection on a specific commodity.

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5 Attached, but not printed.
6 Kissinger’s March 16 memorandum to Nixon is attached, but not printed.
7 The President initialed his approval of recommendations 2–4 in this section.
2. Brief Bi-Partisan Leadership at the meeting now being scheduled for March 29th, at which time trade will also be covered. This would be followed by briefings that afternoon for the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and other Congressional Members who have a strong interest in specific commodities. Principals who would be involved in the briefings would be Deputy Secretaries Clements and Simon.

3. Follow the briefings with promulgation of revised stockpile objectives by OEP, a Presidential Message, and introduction of the legislation immediately thereafter. Present in the context of changed national security requirements resulting from the lessening of world tensions and as an anti-inflation measure.

As I see the current situation, congressional acceptance of the new policy and approval of the required legislation is our paramount objective since this will release up to $4 billion of stockpile materials for sale. Thus, we must move with some caution in the next few weeks on accelerated disposals to prevent the political backlash which could endanger passage of the required legislation.

Subject to this timing constraint, I am confident that the actions above will significantly increase sales from our Strategic Stockpile, and members of the Working Group advise that this should have a significant impact on price levels. We will follow through vigorously to ensure that sales are made on time and in quantities consistent with the guidelines recommended above.

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8 The President corrected the date by writing a 9 over the 7 and in the margin wrote: “29th not 27th.”

9 The President initialed his approval of recommendations 1 and 2 in this section.


11 The President initialed his approval and wrote, “Emphasize this as the major reason.” During his March 15 news conference, Nixon, in response to a reporter’s question, confirmed that he had decided “to very substantially reduce our stockpiles,” explaining that the “irrelevant” stockpile inventories had been established when “we were thinking of a very different kind of conflict than we presently might be confronted with in the world.” Though he expected complaints to come “from those who produce and sell some of the materials” scheduled for reduction, Nixon explained that he opted for cuts “first, because the Government doesn’t need this much for its national security and, second, because in this particular period, we need to take every action we possibly can to drive down prices.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, p. 207)

12 On May 11, Under Secretary of State Casey sent Kissinger a memorandum indicating that, while the Department generally supported the President’s plan to dispose of commodities, it believed that the proposed disposal rates for seven strategic materials—tin, industrial diamond stones and crushing bort, metallurgical grade manganese, quartz crystals, muscovite mica, tantalum, and tungsten—“would present serious foreign relations problems with producers of these commodities.” Casey continued, “I strongly urge that the Department’s recommendations on disposal levels be approved so as to reduce the foreign relations problems involved in these programs.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I File, Lot 80D212, NSDM 203)

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Selective Service System

SUBJECT

Standby Draft

Based on the NSSM 165 study,² the President has decided that future planning for the Selective Service System will be governed by the following guidelines:

For fiscal year 1974:

—The calendar year 1973 lottery has been held as scheduled and classification of registrants will continue for calendar year 1973 in compliance with the Military Selective Service Act.

—The Selective Service State Headquarters and local board structure will be maintained during fiscal year 1974 but with acceleration of the collocation of local appeal boards. This will reduce the number of sites to about 925 during fiscal year 1974.

For the years beyond fiscal year 1974:

—Assuming continued success in the all-volunteer force effort, a standby draft structure similar to that of the Office of Selective Service Records which existed in 1947 and 1948 is anticipated. Operations of both local and state organizations would then be suspended pending future reactivation of the draft authority should that be required.

—This decision will be reconsidered next summer before the submission of the fiscal year 1975 budget in a study conducted under NSC auspices. The exact details of the contingency operation will also be considered at that time.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs 145–264. Confidential.

12. **National Security Study Memorandum 177**


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Military Mission’s Involving Naval Forces

The President has directed a review of U.S. capability to support existing strategy in Europe and Asia against the threat posed by the Soviet navy.

The purpose of the study should be to: (a) consider the likely future development and current military and diplomatic significance of the Soviet naval threat; (b) assess the future adequacy of currently planned U.S. forces to carry out missions which involve naval forces; and, (c) consider the diplomatic value of our naval force presence and ways in which naval forces could be used to enhance U.S. negotiating positions.

In pursuit of these broad objectives, the review should provide as a minimum:

(1) Analysis of the Soviet naval threat and other forces capable of attacking U.S. naval forces at sea including:
   —past and current trends in Soviet shipbuilding and fleet composition and their implications for Soviet naval strategy;
   —projections of future Soviet capabilities under alternative assumptions regarding Soviet intentions and economic capabilities;
   —trends and projections of Soviet naval deployments, including an assessment of the diplomatic significance of these deployments.

(2) Based on this assessment of the Soviet naval threat, the review should evaluate our ability to support existing strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East including, as a minimum, the following kinds of military missions:
   —unilateral military intervention in support of U.S. policies and interests in a limited contingency (e.g., Middle East and elsewhere);
   —protection of the Atlantic sea lanes of communication in support of a NATO conflict;

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs Nos. 104–206. Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer.
—a conflict at sea with the Soviets, including the implications of possible Soviet involvement in the Pacific in support of a conflict in Europe or in Asia;
—a war in Asia involving the PRC or assistance to Allies against non-PRC threats;
—peacetime presence including the diplomatic and political value of maintaining current types and levels of naval force deployments.

Particular attention should be given to the role of the attack aircraft carrier: its value in a limited war, all-out war with the Soviets and its diplomatic and political value in peacetime.

The analysis should take into account possible Allied contributions in support of these missions in both Europe and Asia.

(3) Based on the above analysis, alternative means of supporting national strategic objectives should be developed along with alternative force postures for each of the major missions.

The study will be prepared by an ad hoc committee composed of the addresses and NSC staff and chaired by a representative of the Department of Defense. The study should be completed by June 30, 1973, for review by the Defense Program Review Committee prior to its consideration by the President.

NSSM 50 is hereby rescinded.

Henry A. Kissinger

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13. Conversation among President Nixon and Republican Congressional Leaders\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Nixon: But I can’t go in and tell them to take it out of Defense, because I can’t be responsible for saying that I know that, for example, several fellows got—put in something saying that the UN—and some of our good guys—they’re all good guys—they’re trying to think these things through. We’re going through the same rather deadly [unclear] syndrome that they went through before we had our last meeting with the Soviets. You remember? Remember what they said? “Why don’t we have a moratorium on our defense expenditures, particularly the new items, until we have the SALT talks?” Remember? Remember? “Don’t build the ABM. Don’t commit to it until we have the SALT talks.” Then you don’t have any built.

The whole point was, if you had ever sat in those negotiations with Brezhnev, there wouldn’t have been any arms limitation unless we’d have had something to give to them that they wanted to stop. And if we had stopped it unilaterally, they’d say, “Fine. Now, what else do you have to give?” Now, at this point, believe me, at this point, we have two very significant things tonight. This relates to our whole budget.

The argument that you’re going to hear is to take it out of Defense. At this point, you’ll have the argument that, first, we can cut it out of Defense and particularly since we are going to have—which we are—very significant arms talks with the Russians some time this year. But I can assure you that in the event that the Congress, before those talks, cuts the Defense budget, or refuses to approve those items we have asked for, I will not be able to negotiate an arms settlement. In other words, ironically, those who are for disarmament and who think they are voting for it by unilaterally cutting armaments will be torpedoing the best chance this country’s ever had to have a real arms limitation. That’s what it is. And those who vote for, and what we have asked for

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Conversation No. 119–2. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation that occurred between 8:38 and 10:26 a.m. Attendees were as follows: Senators Scott, Griffin, Tower, Cotton, Bennett, and Brock, Hansen, Bellmon, Cook, and Bartlett; Representatives Ford, Arends, Anderson, Edwards, Rhodes, Conable, Wilson, Martin, Devine, Clawson, Talcott, Collier, and Johnson; administration officials Stein, Dunlop, Ash, Ehrlichman, Cole, Timmons, Cook, Korologos, and Ziegler; and Chairman of the Republican National Committee George H.W. Bush. Ford left the meeting at 9:15 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
in arms, will give us the chips that we need to negotiate with the Russians to stop their buildup.

Look, what is the danger in the world today and tomorrow? Does the United States threaten anybody? Not at all. But you look what the Russians are doing, their big SS–9s. Most of those things are MIRV’d. We are going to have a threat such as—it may not frighten us, but it will certainly, completely demoralize our allies in Europe, the Japanese, and the rest who are damned easily demoralized.

You know, let me come back to the other thing. In other words, on Defense, it isn’t just a question of budget on Defense. The question is whether you want to torpedo the great opportunities that we have, the greatest opportunity for limitation of arms on a permanent basis that we’ve had in this century, probably in history. That’s exactly what’s going to happen. So, I’m going to have to fight it right down the line, and I shall. And that’s the way it’s going to be presented.

Now, you take the—you take the European troop thing. I noticed Herman Talmadge, a very strong man, a good national defense man, coming out and saying we should take maybe a 100,000 of our 300,000 out of Europe. Sure we should. We should take them all back. Why shouldn’t these Europeans defend themselves? They’re rich enough. It’s their Europe, et cetera, et cetera. Why are we there? You can make those arguments. I could do it. All of us on Defense, you fellows have done about as good as the other side anymore, but more responsible. But why won’t you do it now? The reason is that in the fall we are going to have some very important negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries, including the Russians, about the mutual reductions of forces in Europe.

Now, if the Congress before that says, “Oh, we’re going to reduce our forces by 200,000,” what does that mean? All incentive they have to reduce theirs is lost and you increase the threat of war. But more important, you increase the threat of blackmail on their part of their weaker Europeans. You destroy the balance. What I am saying is this: the two—I’m always amused by the fact that they give in—not amused, but puzzled by it, shall I say, that never did anything but puzzle me, that I see they feel that some of our critics and then in the press, and the rest, praising the administration about the great initiative toward China, the great initiative toward the Soviet Union, and arms limitation. Isn’t this all marvelous and so forth and so on? And now we’ve got the end of the war in Vietnam. Within a week everybody, we trust, will be home, and all our POWs will be home. And as a result of that,

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2 See footnote 5, Document 7.
3 Senator Herman Talmadge (D-Georgia).
now is the time for us to cut back on our arms and cut back on our forces in Europe because we have a new era of peace.

What we have to realize is that the great initiatives of 1972 could not have happened had we not had the strength in defense and the forces in Europe which we have today. And, what is more important, we can’t now really cap it all with permanent limitations on offensive weapons, which is what’s involved in the next SALT, and with the possible beginning on a mutual reduction in Europe unless the United States is in a position to say, “We’ve got something that you want to reduce, now what are you going to tell us?” That’s where it is.

So, under these circumstances, we—we’re in the ironic position—and I know that many—I know many of you as sort of the hawks, you’re the Senate hawks, or whatever you want to call it, or the big defense men, you go home to your districts and you speak before a high school or in front of a student body and they’ll say: “Why are you pro-war? Why are you for armaments? Why is it that you fellows always want to spend more? Why aren’t you for spending money for the ghettos, and more for those poor folks, and all the rest?” And the point is: the men who have had the guts to stand up on a strong, national defense are the men who are responsible for the greatest progress in reducing tensions in the world that the world has seen in the year 1972: the China initiative, the Russia initiative, and the end of the war in Vietnam. And now, in the year 1973, to change that game plan at half time and to lose it all in the second half would be the greatest irresponsibility I could think of. And that’s the thing we’ve got to do. I know it’s hard to stand up to them. I know that. And, incidentally, I’m going to—I think you ought to—have to be warned a bit on this. The fellows that can go back and talk to their colleges, and talk to their muddled-headed newspaper people, editors, and so forth, some are Republican and some are not. But when they go back and say, “Gee, I’m really for peace because, you see, I think we should now that we’ve got Vietnam over with and the rest that now’s the time for the United States to cut ten billion dollars out of the Defense budget, to get this great danger of nuclear war that hangs over the world reduced.” Think a moment before you do that. It will sell to those clowns out there. They don’t know better.

But what is the danger to the world today? Does the U.S. threaten anybody in the world? Do [sic] our nuclear power threaten anybody in the world? Of course not. The only threat to the world’s freedom and the world’s peace is the Soviet Union today and the PRC twenty years from now and therefore the United States, therefore, has to use this last,

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4 See footnotes 2–4, Document 8.
5 See footnote 5, Document 8.
ultimate moment. It is the last moment because whenever we fall behind we’ll have no chips at all. This last moment, when we’re still even, to attempt to negotiate a mutual reduction. If it’s done mutually, Europe will continue to be safe. If it’s done unilaterally, with us going down and the Russians staying up, the Germans [snaps] ... like that and Europe’s finished.

And if it’s done unilaterally in terms of arms, in terms of the big—shall we say, the SS–9s, and the Trident, and all the rest, the U.S. says, “No, we’re not going to build all these weapons. We’re going to sort of have some Research and Development,” when our intelligence shows the Russians are building them like crazy today. They’re building them like crazy. Why? You know why? Because they’re building them bigger that we may have a freeze. Um-mmm. So what do we do while they build? We cut back? They’ll do two things. It means that if they’re too high then they’ll want to freeze us at a lower level, and that would be bad. But the other point is that in order to really have a world in which there is a chance for peace, and it’s never going to be because, as I’ve said, I mentioned to many of you, it’s because Chou En-Lai and Nixon shook hands and got to know each other; Brezhnev and Nixon hit it off because they both came from poor families; all that gobbeldy-gook you read in the columns. That’s all crap. It happens only because the president of the United States, whoever he is, represents a nation that is strong enough and respected enough to be paid attention to. We are the force for peace in the world. As long as I’m here, and I’m sure as long as whoever succeeds me here, Democrat or Republican I trust, the power of this country will always be used for the purpose of reducing the danger of war, not increasing it, for reducing the burden of armaments, not increase [sic] it. And so, what do we do? Throw away that power? And then say, “Well, maybe the Russians, they will be number one and we’ll be number two?” And that’s what’s really involved. Can you really believe that Brezhnev, or Podgorny, or Kosygin—that’s the top—or those younger military guys that I saw sitting around them, those cold-eyed, tough, ruthless fellows who may succeed, that when they’re number one they’re going to come and say, “Look, we’ve got to reduce the danger of war in the world, so we are going to unilaterally reduce?” Baloney. What are they going to do? They’re going to come down when we come down. And they’re going to come down only because we have something that we’re doing that they want to limit. And they will deal with something they’re doing. Well, this is all digression.

What I really want to get at is this: You’re going to hear the argument made, you’re going to hear a few in your conference, you’re going to hear it in [unclear] and I understand it, and from some of our good Republicans who say, “My God, after going through last year, and after all these great things toward peace and so forth, why don’t we just take
it out of the Armed Services budget?” It isn’t there, first. But, even assuming that it was there, let me say: you will cut the legs off the President of the United States as he tries to negotiate the two most important agreements since World War Two: the limitation of arms with the Russians, on the limited basis of nuclear arms; and, the reduction of forces in Europe. That’s what you’re voting for. So, under these circumstances there’s no easy way out. You can’t say, “Look, I’m for a two-hundred fifty billion [dollars], two-sixty-nine ceiling, and I’m for 600 million more for the Vocational Rehabilitation because that’s an important program. Where are you going to get it, Senator? Well, that’s easy: we can cut it out of the arms budget.” That’s an escape act, but it’s not an honest one. It won’t work.

[Omitted here is general discussion about the Defense budget, MBFR, and Ostpolitik.]

14. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)\(^1\)


Nixon: How’d you like what I said about national defense, Admiral?\(^2\)
Moorer: That was fine, sir. We’ve been up struggling on—
Nixon: Look, fight like hell for the budget. We cannot cut the budget.
Moorer: Yes, sir. We spent five days already on it, and we are working hard on the Symington committee now.

Nixon: Put it to them on the basis that if they cut this budget they will destroy the chances for MBFR and for the deal with the Soviet. The Soviet—Brezhnev, I know, I’m going to meet the son-of-a-bitch this summer.\(^3\) And he’ll be there. And if we’ve already cut, he won’t give me a damn thing.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of a Conversation between Nixon and Moorer, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 44–92. No classification marking. The editors transcribed this tape recording specifically for this volume.

\(^2\) On March 29, Nixon addressed the nation regarding Vietnam and domestic problems, devoting a portion of his remarks to defending the military and the defense budget. For the full text of Nixon’s address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 234–238.

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 7.
Moorer: You’re right, sir. That’s exactly what—
Nixon: I think I got that point across. You can’t—that the rule of diplomacy, one unbreakable rule—is that you can’t get anything unless you’ve got something to give.
Moorer: Exactly. Yes, sir. Well we’re doing our best. We’re finished with the Senate now. We’ve got the House Appropriations Committee and then the Armed Services Committee.
Nixon: Just make the point—
Moorer: Yes, sir.
Nixon:—that those who cut the budget will destroy the chances for reduction of armaments, or limitation of armaments, and for peace.
Moorer: Right, sir.
Nixon: Okay.
Moorer: Well we’ll lay it on them as hard as we can.
Nixon: All right. Thank you, Admiral.
Moorer: Again, thank you, sir.
15. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 18, 1973, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Vice President Agnew
Elliot Richardson, Attorney General
Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor
Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture
Frederick B. Dent, Secretary of Commerce
Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior
James T. Lynn, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Anne Armstrong, Counsellor to the President
Amb. George Bush, Ambassador to the UN
William E. Simon, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Frank C. Carlucci, Under Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Cabinet Meeting

[The President invited each Cabinet member to review his or her activities:]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

[The President:] These are problems—but when we came into office, we weren’t talking to the PRC and not really to the Soviet Union. There was war in the Middle East and there were high casualties in Southeast Asia.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons—Presidential/HAK, January–March 1973. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except for those added by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The memorandum of conversation incorrectly lists the date of the meeting as March 18. It was actually held on May 18, according to the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 On April 30, Nixon announced the resignations of several key members of his administration in the midst of the Watergate investigation, including Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman, and Counsel to the President John W. Dean, III. Nixon also announced that he intended to nominate Richardson to replace Kleindienst. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 326–28) Richardson would not officially hold the position until May 25, however. Transcripts of Richardson’s telephone conversations indicate his response to the nomination. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Richardson Papers, Box 190, Secretary of Defense Files, Telephone Conversations, Jan.–May 1973)
We have come a long way, but we must realize we never would have gotten here if we had had the thinking which dominates the Senate and much of the press. A weak U.S. which can’t command respect, we will find. So if we need three billion to balance it [the budget], the easy thing is to squeeze it from DOD. But if the cost is to make the U.S. the second strongest power, having the cleanest cities won’t matter because we won’t be able to enjoy them.

I stand for a strong U.S. because no one else can keep stability in the world. Do you want a world where there is a prosperous U.S. but a leaner, tougher country decides the issues of peace and freedom in the world? You are going through a tough period. Most of the people in this Administration are fine. We have come a long way and the improvement is because of us. [War in the cities, etc.]

Agnew: In the provinces, there is not the focus on Watergate like here. People come up to tell me of their confidence in the President.

The President: I am not Pollyanish. It is rough and will get rougher. They will go after us. My concern is not myself but all our family. The crap will fly, but don’t think we have to deny every charge. Most of the charges will come from those who don’t want us to succeed. Don’t be deflected from your purpose. Be proud of our record and work to make it better.

Our major problem is with the politicians—ours too.

Agnew: Not even here.

The President: Go to the press—don’t hide. But don’t comment on the charges because of the legal processes. Just say you don’t believe the President is involved. Express confidence in the judicial system.
16. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Malek) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Stockpile Disposal Program

In March you directed me to take action to reduce the National Stockpile and you subsequently approved a number of actions for so doing (see Tab A). This memorandum reports progress since then and outlines further steps to be taken.

1. Aggregate Sales. Sales by GSA in April and May have totaled $170 million. These sales exceed the new target you approved by 80% and are 320% above sales at an unaccelerated rate. While these sales have not yet had much impact on the industrial commodities sector of the wholesale price index, they should help absorb some of the excess industrial demand and prevent sustained price increases for certain key commodities. We will continue to ensure maximum sales efforts by GSA. Our overall impact will be improved upon passage of the stockpile legislation discussed below.

2. Commodities Under Long-Term Contracts. Sales of aluminum, lead, and zinc have increased over that required by binding long-term contracts and are greater than the target rates. Aluminum producers have agreed to double their FY 1974 purchases from $60 million to $120 million. This represents roughly 20% of the aluminum stockpile and should help ease a tight supply situation. The Cost of Living Council is meeting with the lead/zinc producers this week to discuss increased disposal rates. GSA will follow up with a meeting next week to renegotiate the long-term contracts.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President’s Office Files, Box 22, President’s Handwriting Files, June 1–15, 1973. No classification marking. Sent for information. Nixon wrote, “good job,” on the memorandum. In a June 14 memorandum to Special Assistant to the President Bruce A. Kehrl, Scowcroft concurred with Malek’s memorandum. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–238, Policy Papers, NSDM 203)

2 Document 10.
3. Legislation Introduced. The stockpile disposal bill has been introduced in both Houses of Congress.³ This would give us additional disposal authority for roughly $4.1 billion worth of commodities. Dates for hearings have not yet been set, but I will be working with Bill Timmons to speed up Congressional consideration and action.

4. Foreign Consultations. State Department foreign consultations resulted in short delays in the sale of some commodities. However, accommodation has been reached in most areas with no major problems. The letters you signed last week to the heads of state in Thailand and Bolivia permit us to move ahead now with tin sales.⁴

5. Foreign Sales. The Council on Economic Policy has been asked to develop a foreign sales program. An increase in foreign sales will help long-range price stabilization goals while supporting our balance of payments objectives. CEP will be working closely with the Council on International Economic Policy in this effort.

In sum, we are exceeding your sales targets and have no major problems. The chief remaining roadblock is securing passage of legislation which will permit greatly increased sales.

³ On April 16, Nixon had sent a special message to Congress in support of such a measure, and on September 10 he complained in another special message that Congress had yet to pass legislation authorizing the disposal of stockpiled commodities. On December 31, however, the President announced the signing of six bills approved by Congress on December 28 authorizing the GSA to dispose of approximately $900 million of aluminum, copper, zinc, molybdenum, silicon carbide, and opium. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 767, 1031)

⁴ On June 4, Nixon sent letters to General Hugo Banzer, President of Bolivia, and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, Prime Minister of Thailand, informing them of his decision to reduce sales of stockpiled tin to 1,500 tons for the remainder of FY 1973 and to 5,000 tons for the first six months of FY 1974, after which time the sales’ impact on the price of tin would be reviewed. In a July 19 memorandum to Nixon, Malek recommended that, as the price of tin actually had increased by 18 percent since the beginning of the year, the disposal rate be increased to 17,000 tons for the first half of FY 1974, subject to review. The President initialed his approval of Malek’s recommendations and directed the Department to begin consultations with tin producing nations. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 22, President’s Handwriting Files, July 1973)
17. **Summary Report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on NSSM 169**


NSSM 169—US Nuclear Policy Summary Report

NSSM 169 directed a review of existing US nuclear policy, to embrace all nuclear forces, and an evaluation of possible changes to current nuclear policy. This report summarizes the analysis and recommendations of the NSSM 169 Working Group.

The Working Group concluded that a new policy for employment of strategic and theater nuclear forces based on the following concepts is both desirable and feasible:

—Development of objectives and guidelines for a greater range of nuclear attack options to provide greater flexibility to the National Command Authorities (NCA), i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors.

—With regard to these options, establishing control of escalation as a means of terminating conflict while protecting U.S. vital interests should deterrence and diplomacy fail.

—Targeting in large-scale retaliation those political, economic, and military targets critical to the enemy’s post-war power and recovery. This is intended to serve as a more direct coercive threat to the main power blocs in the USSR and PRC, as a deterrent to major nuclear attacks and, if control of escalation becomes impossible, to be more directly in the US interest by denying any substantive gain to an opponent through such a retaliatory attack.

—Providing a relatively small, specified reserve force, even after major US retaliation, in order to deter post-war coercion of the United States and its allies.

The Working Group also concluded that it is desirable to promulgate an integrated nuclear policy which would enable nuclear force ac-

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2 Document 4.
The Working Group has put together a number of Background Papers and they are referenced at appropriate places in the summary report as Paper A, Paper B, etc. The repeated references to these papers is indicative of the fact that the Working Group feels they contain some of the more important material taken into account in this review. However, the Working Group has made no attempt to develop agreed texts of these papers and some may wish to dissociate themselves from particular sections. A listing of the papers with a brief summary description and their origin is found at Appendix II.3

[Omitted here is the introduction.]

The goal of this review of US nuclear policy is to identify problems in current policy and to propose a consistent policy structure for approval. This must necessarily be the beginning of a long term process of change, rather than a complete, one-time revision.

B. The Elements and Objectives of US Nuclear Policy

US nuclear policy should provide both broad and specific guidelines for planning of strategic and theater nuclear force programs, budgets, and operations by the Department of Defense and for the planning of related activities by other agencies of the US Government, including US relations with other countries and the negotiation of arms control agreements.

In addressing nuclear policy, it is important to recognize that there are multiple aspects to this policy. The major elements are:

—Employment policy—how the weapons available today are targeted and would be used during nuclear conflict.

—Deployment policy—how we deploy nuclear forces and warheads, especially overseas.

—Acquisition policy—the planning criteria used to develop and procure nuclear weapon systems for the future.

—Declaratory statements on policy—how we describe our policy to the public, allies, and adversaries.

It is also necessary to consider US arms control objectives and ongoing arms control efforts. The primary US arms control objective is to

3 Neither attached appendix—including Appendix I, a draft NSDM to implement the paper’s recommendations—is printed.
enhance US security by preserving US strategic sufficiency through negotiations rather than unconstrained competition, by reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, and by enhancing the stability of the arms competition. Arms control efforts support US nuclear policy—primarily acquisition policy—by seeking to limit the forces of enemies. This does not mean that we plan US forces on the assumption that our arms control goals will necessarily be achieved. In fact, our acquisition policy should provide hedges against the failure of negotiations, but at the same time should provide added incentive for our adversaries to reach agreement. But arms control factors must be considered when framing nuclear policy.

The elements of nuclear policy should mutually support the broad national objectives for nuclear forces. These objectives provide a point of departure for evaluating current policy and proposing changes thereto. They are:\[4\]

1. To deter, first and foremost, any use of nuclear force against the United States.
2. To contribute to deterrence of:
   a. Conflict which involves allies or other nations considered vital to US security which are threatened by nuclear powers.
   b. Conventional attacks on the United States, its allies, or its forces overseas.
3. As a corollary, to inhibit threats of use of nuclear weapons that might be posed by an enemy for coercion of the United States, its allies, or other nations considered vital to US security.
4. If deterrence fails, to stop conflict at the lowest possible level with minimum loss to the United States and its allies, and to deny to an enemy the objective he seeks when vital U.S. interests are involved.
5. To encourage nuclear postures that contribute to stability in two senses:
   a. By reducing incentives to use nuclear weapons, particularly in crisis situations.
   b. By reducing potential pressures for unproductive or counter-productive arms competition.

\[4\] These objectives are stated with various degrees of explicitness in the President’s Foreign Policy Reports, and are equally applicable, with appropriate minor modifications, to all military forces as instruments of national policy. [Footnote in the original. Nixon’s Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy includes a summary of strategic policy. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 480–482.]
C. Current Nuclear Policy and the Need for Change

1. Current National Nuclear Policy Documents

Except for SALT NSDMs, NSDM 16, dated June 24, 1969, is the only formal Presidential guidance regarding nuclear policy. It addresses acquisition policy and states that, pending further study, US strategic forces will be planned to meet four criteria. In brief, they are:

—Maintain an assured retaliatory capability.
—US forces should not encourage a Soviet first strike.
—The Soviets should not be able to cause significantly greater urban industrial damage to the United States than they themselves would suffer.
—Provide a light area ABM defense of the United States.

This formal guidance has been amplified in the President’s Foreign Policy Reports and in the Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG).7

The current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP) provides guidance for the employment of strategic forces and some theater nuclear forces.8 This policy, established in the early 1960s, states that the US objective in general nuclear war is to defeat the Soviet Union and its allies and end the war under terms favorable to the United States. The NSTAP emphasizes large damage-limiting attacks against Soviet nuclear forces and the destruction of the enemy war-supporting industry. Five Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) attack options are provided; the smallest of these in recent SIOP revisions uses 2500 warheads.

In addition to the SIOP, theater commanders have contingency plans for limited use of nuclear weapons. In addition, SACEUR’s General Strike Plan (GSP) provides for employment of NATO nuclear forces. The existing nuclear planning system has an inherent capability for generating new limited attack options for strategic or theater forces.

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7 Richardson distributed the DPPG for FY 75–79 under a March 26 covering memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330–76–0117, 381)

8 For purposes of this paper, the term “strategic forces” means ICBMs, SLBMs, and intercontinental bombers. All other US nuclear forces will be considered “theater nuclear forces.” [Footnote in the original.]
but there is no national policy document providing objectives and guidelines for such planning.

2. The Need for Change

The NSDM 16 criteria are inadequate or dated in a number of ways. They are vague and subject to varying interpretations; the area defense criterion is no longer meaningful in light of the ABM treaty; and they fail to provide guidance for weapons employment and for acquisition and deployment of theater nuclear forces.

There are other, more fundamental, reasons why current nuclear policy needs revision.

—In the 1950s and into the 1960s, when the United States had a preponderance of nuclear strength, the threat of large-scale retaliation against either military or population/industrial targets could be considered a credible deterrent to Soviet nuclear or conventional attacks anywhere in the world, but times have changed. The Soviets now have a highly capable deterrent to strategic attack and this has been codified by the SALT I agreements. As a consequence, the credibility of large-scale retaliation as a deterrent to anything but a massive attack on the United States may have become seriously eroded.

—As a result of the changed strategic balance and other factors, there has been a changed perception by US allies, perhaps especially in NATO, of the strength and credibility of the US deterrent as it applies to them. This has given rise to concerns about US security guarantees.

—There are discrepancies among the “popular” view of the US nuclear deterrent threat, current declaratory statements, and the actual employment policy. Current nuclear policy emphasizes the threat of large-scale retaliation to deter nuclear attacks. The popular view continues to regard population and industry as the targets for this threat; Administration statements do not identify the targets, and the current employment policy results in the major weight of effort being on the enemy’s military forces.

—No national policy guidance for acquisition and deployment of theater nuclear weapon systems has been promulgated.

—Despite several Presidential statements indicating a desire for a flexible range of nuclear employment options “to respond at levels appropriate to the provocation”, neither these options nor the required planning mechanism exist in a form likely to be adequately responsive

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9 See Paper A (“Review of U.S. Policy for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons”) and Paper C (“U.S. Nuclear Policy”) for a more detailed critique of NSDM 16 and other elements of current nuclear policy. [Footnote in the original. The background papers were not found attached.]

10 See footnote 3, Document 2.
to the crisis needs of the NCA. The creation of a system of plans and procedures for limited nuclear attacks is feasible, but national-level policy for such planning has not been provided.

—Because of the inadequacies in current US nuclear policy, US SALT and MBFR positions do not necessarily reflect coherent, consistent policy goals. Recent arms control analyses have, however, sought to reflect a broader range of considerations, including some of those discussed in this report.

In sum, today not all the decisions embodied in NSDM 16 can be implemented effectively and the programs based on the NSDM 16 policy guidance may not deter less than all-out nuclear war. No steps at the national level have been taken to implement the declared policy of flexible nuclear options. There are gaps (e.g., the absence of a policy for theater nuclear forces) and inconsistencies (e.g., declared versus actual employment policy) in U.S. nuclear policy, and the world political-military environment has changed drastically since US nuclear policy was last subject to a comprehensive review.

D. Proposed Employment Policy

The NSSM 169 Working Group focused on employment policy. Other aspects, including acquisition policy, were considered, but the most detailed study was given to planning the use of available weapons, and rather less analysis was devoted to how new weapons should be bought. The work of necessity also touched on arms control and declaratory policy. Acquisition policy, arms control considerations, and declaratory statements of policy are discussed in Section E.

In this section key aspects of the proposed employment policy are examined:

—Major changes from current policy.
—Planning considerations.
—Conclusions of the NSSM 169 Working Group.

1. Employment Policy Changes

The proposed employment policy contains the following important provisions:11

11 Paper B contains the proposed new employment policy forwarded to the President by the Secretary of Defense. Paper A contains supporting rationale and a comparison with the current NSTAP. The proposed employment policy does not provide guidance for planning the employment of nuclear air defense, anti-ballistic missile and anti-submarine warfare forces nor does it explicitly cover related and ancillary activities such as reconnaissance and non-nuclear forces whose coherent application would be anticipated. These matters will be the subject of further work by the Department of Defense. [Footnote in the original. According to Appendix II, Paper B, drafted by DOD in October 1972, was entitled “Revised Tentative Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons.” The paper was not found attached.]
—The guidance applies to all theater nuclear offensive forces, as well as strategic offensive forces.

—If deterrence fails, the objectives are to control escalation and terminate the war with minimum damage, while protecting vital US interests and preserving the capability to escalate further if necessary.

—To the extent that escalation cannot be controlled, the objective is to destroy those political, economic, and military targets critical to the enemy’s post-war power and recovery.

—Targeting and attack concepts for controlling escalation are identified, including options to conduct nuclear war within clearly defined boundaries, deterrence of further enemy escalation, trans-attack stability, and avoidance of the enemy’s national command and control.

—Targeting and attack concepts for major nuclear conflict are identified, including destruction of enemy political controls, the resources most necessary for enemy post-attack recovery, and enemy military forces (especially conventional forces) which could otherwise exercise internal control, secure external resources, and threaten the United States and its allies.

—There is a flexible structure of preplanned and preplanable attack options embodying these concepts.

—Relative priorities for allocating weapons to targets in nuclear war plans are specified, with some priorities varying, depending on whether the US attack initiates nuclear conflict or responds to the enemy’s initiation. For example, in a US second-strike, Soviet ICBMs would have lowest priority, in a US first-strike they would have higher priority.

—There is to be a specified reserve force which will be withheld from all attacks unless specifically executed by the NCA. This force is intended for deterring post-war coercion, but could also be used in part to augment attacks at the discretion of the NCA.

—There is provision for NCA review of employment plans during peacetime and for NCA involvement during a crisis in adapting employment options to immediate political-military requirements.

—The proposed guidance contained in Paper B is formulated in two parts, broad policy guidance and more detailed planning guidance (including objectives and guidelines for specific attack options), to facilitate evolution of the latter.

12 Attack options most likely to be withheld for the purpose of deterring further enemy escalation should involve forces and C³ systems with sufficient enduring survivability that they can be withheld over an extended period of conflict and then executed in a timely, effective manner. [Footnote in the original.]
Of these changes, three are key to the proposed employment policy and merit more detailed discussion: the attack option structure, control of escalation, and targeting concepts for major nuclear conflict.

a. Structure of Attack Options

There would be four types of employment options: Major Attack Options, Selected Attack Options, Limited Nuclear Options, and Regional Nuclear Options. This contrasts with the NSTAP, which provides (in the proposed nomenclature) for the Major Attack Options and a lesser number of Selected Attack Options. The principal characteristics of these classes are displayed in Figure 1.13

Figure 1

STRUCTURE OF ATTACK OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR ATTACK OPTIONS</th>
<th>LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Large Scale, Preplanned</td>
<td>• Generally Small Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Separation of Soviet, PRC Options</td>
<td>• Preplanned or Preplannable in Crisis or Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Counter-Military Options Have Nuclear and Conventional Targets</td>
<td>• Strategic and Theater Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Counter-Value Options Have Political, Economic, Military Targets</td>
<td>• Purpose: Signaling, Response in Kind, Local Advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NCA Choice of Options, Withholds</td>
<td>• NCA Specification of Objectives, Approval and Choice of Options</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECTED ATTACK OPTIONS</th>
<th>REGIONAL NUCLEAR OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Moderate Scale, Preplanned</td>
<td>• Attack Size and Forces Keyed to Local Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Counter—Military</td>
<td>• General Plans Approved in Advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subsets of Major Attack Options</td>
<td>• Purpose:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Escalation Boundaries:</td>
<td>• Counter Enemy Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regions, Target Classes, U.S. Forces</td>
<td>• Inhibit Opportunity for Further Aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NCA Choice of Options, Withholds, Augmentation</td>
<td>• Facilitate Political Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCA Direction Through Objectives And Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The motivation for this formal structure is to obtain the benefits of advance planning where that is possible but also to provide for flexible, responsive planning where that is necessary. Each class of options is designed to support the concepts of escalation control discussed in the

next section. The boundaries between the classes of options are not altogether distinct and no particular purpose is served by drawing rigid distinctions.

*Major Attack Options* provide for massive attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies or the PRC and its allies. Attacks on the Soviet Union and the PRC are separated totally allowing attacks on either country or both. Attacks on some of or all allies of each nation may be withheld.

*Selected Attack Options* provide for moderate scale, preplanned attacks on selected regions or target classes, designed for an added measure of flexibility in attempting to control escalation. Each Selected Attack Option is a subset of the military portion of a Major Attack Option and is constructed so that it may be executed separately, in conjunction with other Selected Attack Options, or as part of its Major Attack Option.

*Limited Nuclear Options* are intended to meet currently unforeseen circumstances in which the Major and Selected Attack Options would be inappropriate for the political-military objectives that may be desired. These options, generally of lower intensity, may be developed during the normal planning process in anticipation of crisis situations, during the course of crises, or during hostilities. The rapid development of effective Limited Nuclear Options would be facilitated by the advanced planning for Major and Selected Attack Options, even to the point of using some of their weapon-target combinations.

*Regional Nuclear Options* are intended for circumstances in which the interests of the United States and its allies can best be served by responding against an enemy attack with nuclear forces and resources immediately available within the theater of operations and clearly committed for the defense of that area. The objective for Regional Nuclear Options is to counter, in concert with conventional forces, the enemy military forces engaged in aggressive actions while seeking to create a state of affairs permitting political arrangements to end the conflict. Because of the nature of Regional Nuclear Options, detailed planning may only be possible shortly prior to execution and will ordinarily be carried out by military commanders responsible for military operations within the local conflict area. However, to insure that the overall objectives of the United States will be taken into account, as well as the local tactical military situation, the proposed policy provides that general plans, covering likely contingencies, should be prepared well ahead of time and examined for effectiveness and conformance to the employment policy. It also states that during hostilities there will be a high de-

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14 This definition is not intended to exclude the use of Poseidon RVs committed to NATO or other “strategic” systems deployed in the theater. [Footnote in the original.]
gree of control by the NCA exercised by means of detailed rules of engagement, review and possible modification of proposed nuclear strike operations, or some combination of these.

b. *The Concept of Control of Escalation*

Under the current employment policy, limitation of damage is regarded in the purely military sense of counterforce attacks on nuclear threats and, at least against the Soviet Union, offers little confidence of holding damage to a low level. The political-military concept of limiting damage through the control of escalation, on the other hand, appears to be a promising approach that would both provide meaningful options to the NCA in a crisis and enhance attainment of national objectives.\(^\text{15}\)

This is a major departure from current US employment policy. It rests on a key assumption and a key reservation:

—It assumes the participants have limits in terms of their objectives and the losses they are willing to suffer to achieve them. US efforts to control escalation would show restraint in using nuclear force while seeking to convince the opponent that his limits would be exceeded if he persists. This would permit opportunities for him to reconsider.  

—It recognizes that, to the extent the enemy either is willing to suffer any losses or lacks the means to pause and reconsider, such a concept may not work. Consequently, the policy affords the NCA the opportunity to attempt escalation control by setting up the requisite machinery, but it does not commit the NCA to this course and does not compromise the US capability for major nuclear conflict.

The prospects for escalation control are examined in Section G\(^\text{16}\) (Issue 1), as are the possible effects of these employment policy changes on deterrence (Issue 2). The possible perceptions and reactions of adversaries are also discussed in Issue 3 and in Paper H.\(^\text{17}\)

The following are considered appropriate for this part of the employment policy:

—A capability to conduct discrete limited attacks on enemy forces in an immediate area to deny a local objective while holding some vital enemy targets hostage, thereby seeking to influence the enemy’s as-

\(^{15}\) See Paper A (“Review of US Policy for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons”), for further discussion of these points. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^{16}\) Section G, not printed, addresses five issues: the prospects for control of escalation, the effect of proposed policy changes on deterrence of nuclear warfare, possible Soviet reactions to the new nuclear policy, flexible nuclear options and the perceptions of allies, and feasibility and implementation.

\(^{17}\) According to Appendix II, the CIA submitted Paper H, “Perceptions and Reactions of Adversaries,” in response to NSSM 169.
essment of potential gains and losses while giving him time to reconsider.

—A structure of nuclear attack options which permits application of nuclear force to achieve specific objectives within clearly defined boundaries at levels well below those of massive attacks on an opponent.

—Withholding for possible subsequent use a capability for massive attack on targets highly valued by the enemy leadership as a deterrent to further escalation.

—Withholding of attacks on the enemy’s national level command, control, communication, and surveillance systems, to allow enemy leaders to discern the nature of US attacks, restrain their forces, and negotiate with the United States.

Control of escalation would be introduced into employment plans by specifying detailed objectives for preplanned and preplannable military attacks at various levels of intensity against selected targets, within geographic limits. There would also be provisions for modifying these objectives and the supporting plans in response to a developing crisis. Thus, planning for limited nuclear conflict would be shifted from an approach which places specific targets foremost to an approach with specific crisis-related political-military objectives established by the NCA as paramount.

c. Major Nuclear Conflict

If escalation cannot be controlled and the United States becomes engaged in a major nuclear conflict, the U.S. objective in the proposed employment policy is to secure the best possible postwar position of power relative to other powers. In contrast the fundamental concept of the current NSTAP is to terminate the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. This has been frequently measured in terms of the number of strategic forces remaining to each side.

The current NSTAP concept of an ultimate threat of large-scale retaliation is retained, but there is a revised basis for targeting which threatens the destruction of the following targets critical to the enemy postwar power and recovery:

—The enemy regime and its control apparatus.

—Those urban, industrial, and economic resources critical to the enemy’s national and military recovery.

—Those enemy forces (particularly conventional forces) which could otherwise play a major role in exercising internal control over the post-attack recovery, securing external resources for the enemy’s post-attack recovery, and continuing to threaten the United States and its allies.
The threatened destruction of the enemy political, economic, and military targets critical to post-attack recovery is also an important element in controlling escalation, because large-scale attacks on these targets would be withheld in a limited conflict to deter further escalation. By logical extension, the threatened destruction of these targets should be part of the deterrent to any nuclear conflict. Consequently, it appears that the ultimate sanction of large-scale retaliation against targets critical to post-war power of the enemy’s regime should become a part of US declaratory policy, in place of the more general threat of destruction of the population and industry of an opponent.

No one is certain—or even highly confident—that he understands what will deter the Soviet Union or the PRC from nuclear threats or attacks. The Working Group believes, however, that the proposed policy supported by appropriate declaratory statements would have at least as much deterrent effect as the current popular view of threatening population and industry, or the official view of not specifying the targets. Further, it sees the following benefits to the proposed policy:

—These revised criteria for targeting are coercive in that they establish a direct threat to each of the three main power blocs within the Soviet Union and the PRC, namely, the political regime, the technocrats, and the military.

—More importantly, they emphasize the denial of any substantive gain to an opponent from making a nuclear attack.

—There would be close alignment between the declared deterrent threat and the actions which would be in the best interests of the United States in a major nuclear conflict. This change would establish a common theme for deterrence that would provide a consistent framework for the declaratory and employment elements of policy. The deterrent threat and the targeting would coincide.

The proposed change in targeting objectives is judged by the NSSM 169 Working Group to be preferable to the threat of indiscriminate destruction of population or other targets, both for declaratory purposes and to bring the deterrent threat and actual targeting into close alignment.

Some believe that this change will enhance deterrence of general nuclear war and, if general nuclear war nevertheless occurs, will improve the outcome for the United States and its allies.

However, questions have been raised as to whether such a change would, in fact, result in any real distinctions, in terms of results, if the Major Attack Options were executed. Because of the nature of nuclear weapon effects and the co-location and co-mingling of Soviet and PRC urban population with the specific political, economic, and military targets described above, attacks on these targets will unavoidably result in substantial fatalities. It is also not clear how the proposed change
would be perceived by others. These questions are treated in greater
detail in Issue 2 in Section G.

d. Reserve Force

The proposed employment policy specifies a “swing force” in the
reserve in addition to forces withheld from execution and that portion
of our strategic forces which can be generated to alert status or reconsti-
tuted from previous missions. The purpose of the swing force is two-
fold: First, to provide, in addition to any forces which may be withheld,
reserve with high trans-attack stability (see Page 8, especially Foot-
note 6)\textsuperscript{18} to prevent post-attack nuclear coercion, even after major U.S.
retaliation. Second, to provide a flexible capability for use in Limited
Nuclear Options and a capability to augment Selected Attack Options,
if, in attempting to control escalation, additional weight of effort on a
Selected Attack Option is desired at the time of execution.

The swing force will be withheld unless explicitly authorized for
execution by the NCA for these purposes. In order to provide diversity
in weapon system characteristics, the swing force will be composed of
some of each of the strategic force components. Because of the require-
ments that may be placed on it by the National Command Authorities,
planning for swing force employment will provide for flexible retar-
targeting procedures as well as prepositioned target data.

2. Planning Considerations

The NSSM 169 Working Group takes note of the DOD judgment
that the proposed employment policy changes can be implemented to a
useful degree with the U.S. nuclear forces programmed for Fiscal Year
1974, and finds no reason to dispute this judgment. The actual oper-
atational planning which marries U.S. force capabilities to objectives is a
detailed process currently estimated at twenty-four months. Refer to
Paper F\textsuperscript{19} for a description of what is involved. The Working Group
does not take the position that the Fiscal Year 1974 forces are neces-
sarily optimal for implementing the employment policy\textsuperscript{20} but rather
they are confident that this policy with programmed forces will better
support U.S. objectives than will the current NSTAP with programmed
forces. Some of the reasons for this conclusion have already been dis-
cussed, but certain points of feasibility need further elaboration:

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\textsuperscript{18} A reference to footnote 12 above.
\textsuperscript{19} According to Appendix II, Paper F, submitted by the DOD on April 5, 1973 in re-
sponse to NSSM 169, outlined an operational plan to implement the proposed employ-
ment policy.
\textsuperscript{20} Weapon acquisition implications and issues are discussed in Section E and in
Paper G (“Weapon Systems Acquisition Policy Issues”). [Footnote in the original. Ac-
cording to Appendix II, the DOD submitted Paper G on June 5 in response to NSSM 169.]
—Are there situations in which limited nuclear attack options would be in the U.S. interests?
—How does the proposed employment policy relate to regional considerations, especially U.S. commitments in NATO?
—What changes in the nuclear planning system would be required?

a. The Utility of Limited Attack Options

While current U.S. nuclear capabilities permit the use of nuclear weapons under many circumstances, it is not immediately clear that the United States would ever use these weapons in other than large-scale retaliation for a major nuclear attack on CONUS. Can specific purposes be identified for which a limited use would be a credible response?

One situation in which the United States would want to have options for limited nuclear war is Soviet initiation of nuclear conflict on a limited scale. Soviet doctrine calls for theater-wide nuclear attacks in Europe if the Soviets believe NATO is about to launch a nuclear attack. Their doctrine is silent as to whether attacks on CONUS would accompany the strikes on NATO Europe. More limited Soviet nuclear attacks within the European or Asian theaters cannot be ruled out either, although they are disavowed in the formal doctrine.

There may also be situations in which bold U.S. action, including the first, limited use of nuclear weapons, may be the best course in the face of grim alternatives.

It is proposed that the employment of nuclear weapons in such situations would follow the concept of control of escalation set forth in Section D.1.b. on pages 12 and 13. There is, of course, no guarantee that escalation can be controlled. Issue 1 starting on page 42 discusses the prospects for control of escalation. These prospects depend upon many factors and each situation must be judged in terms of the full military and political context. In general, however, the risks and uncertainties associated with attempts to control escalation appear higher if the level and scope of violence is large, if the attacks involve targets within super power homelands, and if the attacks involve targeting of strategic forces.

In devising the attack option structure and the guidelines and objectives for attack options set forth in Paper B there was an effort to visualize specific political-military situations which might call for limited nuclear attacks, rather than to develop an undirected menu of options. It is recognized that further analysis may result in specific modifications of the proposed structure and guidelines.

To check the validity of the structure and guidelines initially developed, a series of case studies was developed which examined pos-
sible conflicts in which the use of nuclear weapons might be considered, including first use by the United States. From this work, which is described in Paper D,\textsuperscript{21} it appears that:

—potential situations do exist where nuclear weapons could be the most appropriate military force to use in limited conflict;

—feasible nuclear options could be created for several levels of potential conflict;

—such options could and should include both strategic and theater nuclear weapons;

—establishment of such options could enhance the attainment of national objectives in limited conflict without in themselves increasing the incentives of either side for large-scale nuclear attacks.

b. Regional Considerations

The NSSM 169 Working Group examined current policy for theater employment of nuclear weapons and found a need to define this policy more clearly. Theater commanders have numerous nuclear contingency plans, but there is no overall national policy related to these plans. Present procedures for obtaining selective release of theater nuclear weapons are cumbersome and time-consuming, and these procedures have not been practiced by senior officials at the NCA level. As a result, the prospects for timely NCA approval to utilize nuclear weapons in an overseas theater are not good.

An additional consideration is that the use of theater nuclear forces must take into account the views of friendly and allied states, especially those on whose territory such operations might be undertaken. In NATO’s Allied Command Europe, plans for use of theater nuclear forces are approved by SACEUR and are based on MC 14/3\textsuperscript{22} and the agreed NATO political guidelines for such use. SACEUR’s present procedures for requesting selective release of theater nuclear weapons by NATO forces in Europe are well defined but, under certain agreed circumstances, decisions on these requests involve political consultations among the NATO nations in connection with the nuclear power(s) decision on release requests. Senior allied officials involved in these consultations seldom practice implementation of the procedures pre-

\textsuperscript{21} According to Appendix II, an OSD study group prepared Paper D, “Employment of Nuclear Weapons in Local Conflict,” that, as amended in March 1973, contained one introductory section and five case studies.

\textsuperscript{22} On January 16, 1968, NATO’s Defense Planning Committee adopted NATO’s Military Committee’s report, MC 14/3, as an overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. MC 14/3 stated that theater nuclear forces were meant to deter conventional attacks and, if deterrence failed, to respond to attacks and to confront the enemy with escalation of the conflict. (Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969 (Brussels: NATO, 1997), pp. 345–370)
scribed by the Athens Guidelines. As a result, under some consultative circumstances, timely decisions on theater requests for use of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe might not be effected.

Because there is no national policy for theater nuclear force employment, existing plans do not necessarily reflect NCA crisis management perspectives. The concept of escalation control requires that theater nuclear force planning have a political-military orientation.

(1) Roles for Theater Nuclear Forces in the Proposed Employment Policy.

There are two major roles for theater nuclear forces in the proposed employment policy. First, theater forces would be targeted in Major Attack Options to help achieve U.S. objectives in general nuclear war. Because of their limited range, theater forces presumably would be primarily targeted against forward echelons of enemy military forces. In NATO’s Allied Command Europe, these forces are currently targeted against enemy military forces in the forward (battlefield) areas as well as in depth against military targets in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and in the western part of the USSR.

Second, theater forces would be targeted in Selected Attack Options, Limited Nuclear Options, and Regional Nuclear Options. It is the view of the Working Group that in these options the use of theater weapons should signal to the enemy that US objectives are limited, but should also be of sufficient force to check the enemy long enough for our political process to effect war termination. While political measures and conventional military operations may in some cases dissuade the enemy from exploiting his advantage, military action by nuclear forces might be required in order to convince the enemy that his potential losses are not worth his potential gains. However, extension of such attacks in area, destruction, and duration beyond what is necessary to accomplish the above could well increase the incentives of the enemy to prolong and enlarge the conflict, if only to establish a tolerable basis for negotiation from his viewpoint. Thus, restraint would be an important element if escalation is to be controlled.

Currently the nuclear options of the NCA in such circumstances are basically of two types:

—selective release of theater nuclear weapons in response to ad hoc requests during conflict by local commanders or direction from the NCA;

23 At the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens, Greece, May 4–6, 1962, foreign and defense ministers from the member countries approved guidelines regarding the use of nuclear weapons by NATO in self-defense. For a summary of the meeting, see Document 137, Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, Vol. XIII, West Europe and Canada.
—execution of theater-wide preplanned nuclear strikes such as SACEUR’s General Strike Plan (GSP),\(^2\) or execution of strategic strikes using the SIOP.

Between these extremes there could be planning for nuclear options that use theater and strategic nuclear forces as necessary to counter enemy forces. The purpose of these options would be to make the political process leading to termination of the conflict on terms acceptable to both sides the only rational action open to the enemy. It is just this sort of planning that is called for in the proposed employment policy.

(2) *Regional Nuclear Options*

Of particular importance in this approach to theater nuclear conflict are the Regional Nuclear Options. The proposed employment policy sets forth the following guidelines for developing plans in support of Regional Nuclear Options:

—These plans will include attacks on deployed forces, their local support, and fixed support bases in the rear, subject to rules of engagement promulgated by the National Command Authorities.

—The JCS should provide a capability for rapid development, assessment, and execution of Regional Nuclear Options in response to NCA requirements. This capability should include provisions for informing the NCA of the military effects, uncertainties, and risks of proposed nuclear attacks and include provisions for coordination with the Allies.

—These plans should seek to minimize collateral damage to civilians and to allied military forces through appropriate selection of yields, delivery vehicles, and targets.

—Control of the enemy national leadership over its theater nuclear forces should be left intact to facilitate control of escalation.

—Military commanders should be prepared to use nuclear weapons under any of the following circumstances: in response to enemy nuclear attacks, initially after prolonged conventional conflict, or initially during the early phases of a conventional conflict.

The effect of the foregoing would be to provide, prior to or during hostilities, a range of options based on the above criteria and reviewed by the NCA. New plans could be developed or preplanned options modified by the NCA as appropriate to meet the specific needs of the crisis. In the event of hostilities the appropriate military commander could request the authority to apply one or a combination of these op-

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\(^2\) While the GSP can in theory be executed independently of the SIOP, its effectiveness is dependent on simultaneous SIOP execution. [Footnote in the original.]
tions consistent with the political and military circumstances applicable at that time. Alternatively, the NCA might initiate execution of one or several options.

(3) Special NATO and Asian Considerations

The provisions of the proposed employment policy for theater nuclear forces apply generally worldwide, but they are particularly applicable for NATO. The NATO strategy of flexible response set forth in MC 14/3 and amplified in other nuclear planning documents was a major consideration in formulating these provisions. The Working Group believes the theater nuclear guidance and indeed the entire employment policy are consistent with MC 14/3, although it may not be so interpreted by some Europeans. This policy may highlight issues which are inherent in the ambiguities of MC 14/3—for example, some Europeans may perceive too great an emphasis on nuclear forces, others may fear the decoupling of U.S. strategic forces. These questions are discussed in Issue 4 of Section G.

There are some distinct differences between the European and Asian theaters. First, there is not the degree of joint planning with our allies in Asia that there is in Europe. Indeed we do not have nuclear cooperation agreements with any Asian allies and thus no legal authority for meaningful joint nuclear planning. Second, for the foreseeable future, the risks of escalation from limited nuclear employment are far less with the PRC than they would be with the Soviet Union. Third, we have not developed the sort of arrangements for crisis consultation with the PRC (e.g., the hot line) that we have with the Soviets. Fourth, in the absence of an alliance structure in Asia it is by no means clear that we could use nuclear weapons based in the territory of one nation to defend against an attack on another nation, or that third parties would permit transit of nuclear weapons of delivery systems in times of crisis if the threat of nuclear conflict were apparent to them. Finally, while our Asian allies seek the general protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, they might strongly object to the actual use of nuclear weapons by non-Asians against Asians, particularly if their own territory is not directly threatened. The cumulative impact of these differences in Asia does not detract from the value of this policy for Asia but serves to underscore the different strategic problems we have in Asia compared to Europe.

While the Working Group agrees that the United States should have available a range of options which will permit limited use of theater forces without also using strategic forces, it notes that there may be serious political problems vis-a-vis our NATO allies in having options for extensive use of theater weapons without engaging U.S. strategic
forces. Consequently, there are differing views as to whether there should be a separate category of Regional Nuclear Options since allied knowledge of the existence of such a category could raise their concerns about the decoupling of U.S. strategic forces. This question is examined in Issue 4 in Section G.

c. Concurrent Changes in the Planning Systems

The proposed changes in existing employment policy guidelines, and the resulting attack plans and procedures, would require greater responsiveness by the nuclear war planning system to the NCA.

The JCS would require the capability for rapid development, assessment, and execution of Limited and Regional Nuclear Options in response to the request of the NCA. There should be a high degree of interaction, both in peacetime planning and during a crisis, among the NCA, the JCS, and those Unified and Specified Commanders with nuclear forces in selecting attack details. In addition, there should be adequate political staff support for nuclear planning in crisis management and coordination with allies. During a crisis, the JCS would have to keep the NCA informed of pertinent details about the tactical situation generally and the status of limited nuclear attacks in particular. This would be necessary to ensure that the NCA can coordinate political and diplomatic actions with military actions, can modify rules of engagement to suit changing circumstances, and can direct additional military actions when necessary.

The JCS planning system already provides the structure for developing Major Attack Options. This capability also provides the basis for planning Selected Attack Options, since they are subsets of Major Attack Options.

To be fully effective, this planning system would necessarily have to conduct peacetime exercises, involving participation by all U.S. elements including the NCA and their advisory staffs. These exercises would be designed to test and evaluate the interaction among the NCA, the supporting political staffs, the JCS, and appropriate Unified and Specified Commanders in order to familiarize all participants with their critical roles in the decision-making process. They would also be designed to examine the validity and responsiveness of the plans, procedures, and facilities to be used in wartime. These exercises would provide the means in peacetime for the NCA to thoroughly understand and be able to choose thoughtfully among the options during a crisis.

3. Conclusions

It is the view of the NSSM 169 Working Group that the concepts embodied in the Revised Tentative Guidance for the Employment of
Nuclear Weapons, if adopted, would bring about major improvements in current nuclear employment policy and in its responsiveness to the NCA. There are, of course, other major aspects of nuclear policy which must be considered in relation to the proposed employment policy. These are addressed in Section E.

It is not the purpose of this review to prescribe guidelines for actual US actions in any given conflict or crisis. Rather, emphasis has been given to deriving a realistic and feasible structure of options that could be used by the NCA in such situations, and to defining the machinery necessary to develop, select and execute such options. The process of implementation is lengthy (estimated to be about twenty-four months once the President has approved the basic concepts of the proposed policy). Moreover, there are procedural and technical deficiencies (such as command and control capabilities) that must be examined in further detail. These matters are discussed in Section F and in Paper G.

E. Major Policy Considerations Related to the Proposed Employment Policy

The NSSM 169 Working Group considers that a more integrated approach to the elements of nuclear policy is desirable. To this end, this section examines possible effects of the proposed employment policy changes on acquisition policy, SALT, and declaratory statements of policy.

The Working Group did not consider changes to nuclear force deployments that might serve to enhance the effectiveness of the proposed changes in employment policy. However, it took note of the work being conducted in NSSM 168 and NSSM 171 as much more keyed to the specific questions associated with force deployment.

1. Weapon Systems Acquisition Policy

When considering the proposed employment policy changes, the question of the implications for US strategic and theater nuclear weapon programs naturally arises. Would major increases in the strategic budget be required? Would strategic or theater nuclear force programs be required which could have a destabilizing effect on the balance of US and Soviet nuclear forces, adversely affect US relations with its NATO allies, or encounter strong Congressional opposition?

As stated earlier, significant features of the proposed employment policy are feasible with FY 74 forces. By this is meant that there are gen-

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25 Contained in Paper B. [Footnote in the original.]
erally enough warheads, enough flexibility inherent in the nuclear forces, and enough C³ hardware capability to make it possible to implement to a significant degree the concepts of the policy in the near term. This does not mean, however, that US nuclear forces necessarily are optimal for carrying out the proposed employment policy.

The Working Group did not examine specific weapon systems programs in light of the employment policy changes. Nor did it study acquisition policy in the same depth as the employment policy. It has, however, considered the general relation between employment and acquisition policy and examined some acquisition policy issues.

a. Relation Between Employment and Acquisition Policies

Employment policy and acquisition policy have a common purpose—to support basic US security objectives—but they also have important differences. Employment policy provides guidance for targeting and using the nuclear weapons available today. Acquisition policy provides guidance for developing and procuring weapon systems for the future.

Formulation of acquisition policy must take into account the employment policy, since the capability to carry out the employment policy in the future is determined by the forces provided by the acquisition policy. But there are broader political, arms control, and fiscal considerations which indicate that acquisition policy cannot be formulated solely on the basis of employment policy objectives.

The major factors affecting the formulation of acquisition policy are:

— The capability to fulfill the objectives of the employment policy.
— The need to hedge against the uncertainties of future threats and the future performance of US weapons.
— The effects that weapon acquisition programs could have upon allied perceptions of the US commitment to their defense and the US capabilities to carry out that commitment.
— The interaction between weapon acquisition policy and programs and our objectives and negotiating positions for arms control.
— Stability goals with the Soviet Union (stable nuclear arms balance, crisis stability, and trans-attack stability).
— Economic constraints.

These factors result in conflicting pressures which must be resolved in the formulation of acquisition policy. As a result, it may be decided not to provide forces for all employment policy objectives and to accept the consequent risks in the event of nuclear conflict. It may also be decided to provide forces for purposes other than the objectives of employment policy.
b. Effects of the Proposed Employment Policy on Acquisition Policy

For many years employment policy has had little influence on acquisition policy. The NSTAP calls for a well-hedged attack capability against a large target system that includes war supporting industry (Task C), the enemy nuclear threat (Task A), and other military targets (Task B). It includes options for a large effort against all the military targets including the nuclear threat, or against the nuclear threat only. The fundamental concept of the NSTAP is to terminate the war on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. This has frequently been measured in terms of the number of surviving strategic offensive forces.

The acquisition policy has provided for well-hedged force planning to provide an assured retaliatory capability against urban/industrial targets, frequently measured in terms of prompt deaths. However, it has specified that strategic forces should not be procured specifically for attacks on military targets. The “well-hedged planning” for the retaliatory capability has provided forces and warheads well in excess of those required for Task C; these forces are targeted in the SIOP against military targets.

The more integrated approach to nuclear policy proposed by the Working Group would bring employment and acquisition policies into greater consistency in two ways, while taking full cognizance of the political, arms control, and economic factors affecting acquisition policy.

First, the major gap between deterrence and warfighting objectives in nuclear planning would be eliminated. Under the current policy, a major shift in mental attitude is required in passing between employment planning and acquisition planning, with one focusing on winning an all-out nuclear war and the other on deterring all-out nuclear war. As a result, until recently the problems of crisis control and limited nuclear war have received insufficient attention in both employment and acquisition planning for strategic forces. The proposed changes in employment policy help eliminate this gap.

Second, if deterrence fails, the immediate objective of the employment policy would be to deter further escalation. This requires that acquisition policy provide forces for this purpose as well as well-hedged forces for large scale retaliation.

A related step would be to reorient the acquisition policy for well-hedged forces toward the objective of destroying Soviet and PRC political, economic, and military targets critical to their post-attack recovery.28 This would result in the following measure of continuity be-

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28 There are a number of major unresolved issues associated with acquiring nuclear forces for attacking Soviet military targets critical to post-attack recovery. These are discussed in Paper G. [Footnote in the original.]
between employment policy and acquisition policy. The threatened de-
struction of the political, economic, and military targets critical to post-
attack recovery would be the basis of the U.S. deterrent to nuclear war. If
deterrence failed, the threatened destruction of these targets, coupled
with limited use of nuclear force, would be the basis for controlling es-
calation. If escalation could not be controlled, the actual destruction of
these targets would be the means of achieving as much postwar U.S.
power as possible.

Having some common objectives between the acquisition and em-
ployment policies and, more generally, giving explicit consideration to
employment objectives as well as to other national objectives in formu-
lating acquisition policy provides a more systematic framework for the
Secretary of Defense and the DPRC to evaluate specific program and
budget tradeoffs among these objectives.

c. Effects of the Proposed Employment Policy on Weapon Systems Pro-
grams and Budgets

There are many factors which determine whether a new weapon
program is initiated, the pace of the program, the characteristics of the
weapon, and the procurement level. These factors are listed in Table 1
on the following page. Most of these factors are not affected by the
proposed changes in employment policy. Thus, on-going major pro-
grams such as the B–1 and TRIDENT are generally consistent with both
the current NSTAP or the proposed employment policy. The major
factors affecting the initiation, pace, and characteristics of these pro-
grams to date have been assumptions about future Soviet threats; the
desire to have highly survivable deterrent forces, even against unex-
pected technological advances by the Soviets; the desire to hedge
against Soviet deployment of a nationwide ABM defense; the feeling
that politically it is necessary to match the pace of Soviet nuclear
weapons development activity; and the desire to increase U.S. bar-
gaining leverage in SALT.

Of course, current programs will require detailed review in light of
the proposed changes. Such a review is recommended in Section F. One
aspect of this examination should be the characteristics of US nuclear
forces and their command, control, and communications for limited
nuclear conflict. Another aspect is the adequacy of force levels and
characteristics for the full range of flexible attack options called for in
the employment policy, including capabilities for attacking the post-
war recovery target structure.

29 Table 1, attached, but not printed, lists 15 factors affecting weapons system acqui-
sition, including assumptions about future enemy threats, the need to hedge against
unexpected future enemy technological breakthroughs, the need to replace aging
systems, arms control considerations, and costs.
There is the possibility that adoption of the proposed employment policy will result in a major upswing in demand for increased nuclear forces and counterforce capabilities on the grounds that Soviet nuclear and conventional forces would play a significant role in post-attack recovery. Some argue that this ought not to be a major concern—if a policy and the weapon systems required to support that policy are clearly in the national interests, then they might well be approved, even if large expenditures are required.

The problem, however, is that statements of national objectives are so general that a list of weapon system requirements cannot be directly and rigorously deduced therefrom. Without specific weapon acquisition policy guidelines, adoption of the proposed employment policy could be used by advocates of various special interests to lobby within the DoD, elsewhere within the Administration, and probably within the Congress for their programs. This could create strong pressures for programs which are of marginal importance for national security. Without specific acquisition guidelines to channel the efforts of DoD planners, it will be difficult to systematically carry out debates and analyses in such a way as to allow the Secretary of Defense and the DPRC to consider all US objectives—not just those of employment policy—in making program and budget decisions. Furthermore, unless we are precise about our acquisition policies there is a possibility that our declaratory statements may imply acquisition policies we do not intend to pursue. In this case the Soviets might react with new and additional acquisition policies of their own.

Adoption of the proposed employment policy does not necessarily imply the need for any changes in current programs. Some changes may, however, be desirable. These must be judged on their specific merits. The following are some issues which must be considered:

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Acquisition of forces to cover military targets critical to post-attack recovery.

—Hard-target counterforce capabilities.

—First strike capabilities against PRC nuclear forces.

—Theater nuclear force posture.

—Characteristics of U.S. nuclear forces and associated C³ for limited and controlled attacks (e.g., enduring survival).

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30 A detailed discussion of these issues is in Paper C (“US Nuclear Policy”) and in Paper G (“Weapon Systems Acquisition Policy Issues”). [Footnote in the original.]

31 Coverage of a class of targets means having enough independently targetable warheads on surviving US bombers and missiles to penetrate enemy defenses and detonate, suitably distributed, so as to destroy the bulk of targets of that class. See Paper B, Part II on Targeting and Damage Criteria. [Footnote in the original.]
As noted elsewhere, revised operational plans for current and near term forces will result in a substantial capability to meet the objectives of the employment policy. As the degree of any shortfalls become apparent, programs to correct these shortfalls will have to be dealt with on a case by case basis in terms of cost, benefits, and implications for overall nuclear policy objectives including arms control.

d. Considerations for Defensive Forces

This policy review has focused on offensive forces and thus has not given extensive attention to the contribution which defensive forces could make to U.S. security. This fact notwithstanding there are four considerations which bear importantly on the issue:

—First, we do have, and under any conceivable circumstances are likely to continue to maintain some missile and bomber defense. These (a) would serve to provide some degree of protection against limited enemy attacks; (b) can help to police U.S. air space; and (c) complicate enemy strategic planning and programming.

—Second, at present the ABM Treaty limits U.S. ballistic missile defense to 200 launchers at two sites. Current policy orients the CONUS air defense posture towards defending against a small bomber attack and limits the forces to those needed for this objective.

—Third, the U.S. is continuing major programs of R&D to provide for improved missile defense in the event added reliance on such defense in the future is deemed in the U.S. interest.

—Fourth, defensive forces with nuclear capabilities are deployed in the theater. Such forces should be taken into consideration in developing limited and regional options.

For the foregoing reasons, it is proposed that the Secretary of Defense, in reviewing the acquisition implications of the proposed nuclear policy, present an assessment of the role, nature, and potential utility of existing levels of defense as well as possible future alternative levels which may be in the U.S. interest, including the fiscal and arms control implications of such future levels.

2. Nuclear Policy and Arms Control

The basic objective of the proposed nuclear policy is to provide for a more effective and stable deterrent to war, and to make the outcome less catastrophic should nuclear weapons, for some reason, come to be used. As such it is supportive of U.S. arms control policy. The principal concern that may affect arms control is how the new policy is perceived by the public, our allies, and the Soviet Union.

The Working Group believes there should be little direct effect of the employment policy on current US arms control positions in SALT and MBFR, but that the employment policy changes, if they result in
certain changes in acquisition policy, would have an indirect effect on these positions.

There is the risk that the new policy will be interpreted as a sharp departure from past policies with a greater emphasis on nuclear “war fighting” as opposed to deterrence through assured destruction. This could be seen as requiring new strategic capabilities to which the Soviet Union would have to respond, thereby intensifying strategic arms competition and impairing the prospects for further arms control negotiations. However, it also can be argued that the prospect of new US strategic programs which could be implied by the revised employment policy might encourage the Soviets to negotiate more seriously in order to forestall such programs.

Emphasis on the theme that the new policy is not a radical departure and does not imply any large procurement or development programs would mitigate (but perhaps not wholly eliminate) any possible impact on SALT. In this regard, budget requests and other actions could demonstrate that the policy will not increase the U.S. Defense budget, or stimulate an arms race.\(^\text{32}\)

\[a. \text{Impact of the Proposed Employment Policy on Arms Control}\]

There should be no major impact of the proposed employment policy as such on arms control.

It is possible in the future that the United States will have to consider SALT limits on the operations of nuclear forces—for example, restrictions on the operating areas of SSBNs or aircraft carriers. In general, such proposals would have to be evaluated with respect to overall U.S. policy, including nuclear employment policy. Although the Soviets have made such proposals, the United States has made none and in fact has argued that operational practices are not within the purview of SALT.

SALT potentially could result in limits on the basing of U.S. nuclear forces. The Soviets have argued that U.S. forward-basing of SSBNs and other systems (e.g., dual-capable tactical aircraft) should be dealt with in SALT. Similar proposals are likely to arise in MBFR. Again, such proposals should be evaluated with respect to overall U.S. policy, including employment policy. The United States has, however, repeatedly rejected efforts in SALT to limit its forward-based systems and has made clear that it would not consider any SALT limits which would undermine the security of its allies or its ability to fulfill its NATO obligations.

\(^\text{32}\) Refer to Section E3.d. [Footnote in the original.]
b. **Acquisition Policy and Arms Control**

U.S. arms control efforts should support overall nuclear policy in two ways. First, they should protect the policy through agreements which allow the objectives of this policy to be fulfilled and, second, they should enhance the policy through reduction or stabilization of the current or future threat opposing U.S. and allied forces.

If acquisition policy is properly formulated, it should reflect the considered judgments of the President and the Secretary of Defense about the essential objectives, roles, and characteristics of U.S. nuclear forces. As discussed above, these judgments should consider employment policy requirements, but should also consider the other factors which bear on weapon acquisition (e.g., stability, budgets, and allied perceptions). Thus, the Working Group believes that arms control should interact primarily with acquisition policy.

The following are examples of acquisition policy issues related to the employment policy changes which could, depending on how they are resolved, affect U.S. positions in SALT:

—An increased emphasis in acquisition policy on covering military targets would affect the evaluation of proposals which reduce the total U.S. nuclear payload or which constrain U.S. offensive capabilities such as MIRV.

—An emphasis in acquisition policy on high reliability in those forces needed for limited attacks would affect evaluation of proposals for limiting missile flight tests.

—Consideration about the respective roles of various elements of the strategic offensive forces—a facet of acquisition policy—could affect U.S. SALT positions on qualitative limits on U.S. strategic systems. We might, for example, look to use of land-based missiles only for certain options in a limited nuclear war and, therefore, be less concerned about an attack on them by hard target capable Soviet ICBMs. Alternatively, while maintaining TRIAD capabilities, we might want to negotiate mutual reductions in systems perceived to require major improvements in the face of prospective threats or we might choose to negotiate other measures permitting a “freedom to mix” within an overall fixed force level.

—The proposed nuclear policy assumes a continuing need to support vital interests outside CONUS. Objectives in this area could be satisfied through the use of bomber aircraft to deliver conventional or nuclear warheads. Thus, proposals to trade U.S. strategic bombers for Soviet ICBMs should be considered in terms of the dual role of bomber aircraft.

—The U.S. position on forward-based systems in SALT and on possible MBFR limits for theater nuclear forces could be influenced by refinements to the current acquisition policy for theater nuclear forces. For example, current theater nuclear acquisition policy calls for essentially a “status quo” posture with minor modernization. Initiation of major modernization programs for these forces could serve as “leverage” or could create negotiating problems.
Some possible changes in the acquisition policy that appear to have little direct impact on arms control positions are:

—Greater emphasis on trans-attack survivability in C^3 and nuclear forces, in the sense that survivability of forces over time is already a key consideration in SALT, and C^3 programs have not been the subject of negotiations (and probably will not be).
—Greater emphasis on retargeting capability.

Thus, the revised employment policy could have some effect on U.S. arms control positions, primarily through acquisition policy implications, but at this point the effect can be considered as minor. The way employment policy is explained may, however, have greater effect on the SALT negotiations themselves.

3. Declaratory Statements of Policy

If the proposed employment policy changes are implemented, there are at least four reasons why some disclosure to our allies, potential enemies, and the public at large will be called for:

—The U.S. commitment to NATO for consultation on nuclear strategy and plans through the Nuclear Planning Group and for coordination of certain aspects of nuclear planning through combined NATO military staffs.
—The desire to create an environment in which the leaders of countries with nuclear weapons give consideration to controlling escalation in a nuclear war, rather than making automatic, preplanned responses.
—The continued public interest in a fuller explanation of what is meant by Presidential statements of a requirement for flexible options.
—The responsibility and the necessity to provide an explanation for our policy to the Congress and the public at large as the rationale for specific defense programs.

Depending upon the extent to which policy changes are made now, rather than after further studies have been completed, it may be possible to say relatively little about any changes, at least for a while. This would permit further insight into acquisition policy questions, and enable the Administration to respond to questions from the Congress and allies from a more extensive base of firm policy. However, even if acquisition policy decisions are delayed, it is necessary to get started now on a detailed plan for declaratory statements because of the necessity to respond to any unauthorized disclosure of the policy changes or the ongoing studies, and to deal with questions that may arise from limited disclosures already made.

Any public statements about nuclear policy will have a multiple audience: the U.S. public and Congress; allies and other friends; the Soviet Union, the PRC and their allies. Declaratory statements of policy must adequately address all of these potential listeners.
Reactions by all audiences to changes in U.S. nuclear policy will depend on how the new policy is presented and how they perceive it affects them. There are elements of the proposed changes in employment policy that could create foreign policy issues with both allies and adversaries and could cause domestic problems. These are discussed below and in Issues 3 and 4 of Section G. Careful presentation can minimize such possibilities, both through a plan for phased explanation of the main features of the new policy, thereby avoiding dramatic statements, and by stress on the theme that changes envisioned are procedural and evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Nuclear weapons are generally an emotional subject, and the reactions to any proposals that suggest something new in the way of U.S. nuclear policy are not fully predictable. The Working Group believes, however, that the following will be the likely reactions or major concerns with respect to proposed changes.

a. Congress and Public

They will be primarily concerned about whether the new policy involves increases in defense spending. They also may be concerned about reopening arms competition. In addition, those who have in the past heavily emphasized the “assured destruction only” theme will probably be vocal critics of any changes which imply a policy other than this. On the other hand, there are vocal critics of “assured destruction only” who would be receptive to the changes.

b. Potential Adversaries

There are two different perspectives which must be considered:

—The new policy, with its stress on restrained use of nuclear weapons, could be interpreted as a weakening of U.S. will and, therefore, of deterrence, thereby increasing the risk of aggressive acts by adversaries.

—The new policy, if fully revealed to potential adversaries, may be seen as a more pragmatic approach in contending with the Soviet and PRC strategic buildup than past policy statements emphasizing massive retaliation. If so perceived, it could increase respect for U.S. interests and commitments. There is, of course, the risk that the threat of coercive use of nuclear weapons could ultimately increase tensions, stimulate arms competition and impair arms control negotiations. Alternatively, it could correspond to Soviet perceptions of what U.S. nuclear policy actually has been and thus may have little effect.

33 Paper E provides an expanded discussion of these potential problems and a plan for alleviating them through declaratory statements of policy. [Footnote in the original. According to Appendix II, Paper E, “Impact on Relations with Allies and Adversaries (With Declaratory Statements),” submitted by the Department of State in response to NSSM 169, discussed “the impact of the proposed policy on relations with allies and adversaries, and includes a suggested outline of declaratory policy.”]
c. Allies and Friends

There are distinct advantages to the proposed policy in terms of relations with our allies. These ought to be stressed in any declaratory statements.

—The emergence of a secure Soviet retaliatory capability has tended to erode allied confidence that the United States would be prepared to use large numbers of strategic nuclear forces in their defense. The development of selected and limited options would make use of nuclear forces in defense of our allies more credible.

—The integration within the proposed policy of theater and strategic forces is likely to be attractive to our allies if it is demonstrated to them that there is, in fact, effective linkage between theater and strategic forces and that it will operate to couple U.S. strategic forces more closely to the defense of Europe rather than to decouple them.

The potential major concerns of our allies could be:

(Refer also to Issue 434 and Paper E for amplified discussion of these points.)

—In spite of the strategic-theater force integration, the existence of Regional Nuclear Options as a separate attack category could imply the possible decoupling of U.S. strategic forces from the defense of Western Europe and Asia.

—Possible conflict of the new concepts with UK and French strategies which rely on minimum deterrence. They may be apprehensive about changes in U.S. policy if they perceive that such changes tend to denigrate their deterrent.

—The possibility that these policy changes would lead to a weakening of the allied role in nuclear decision making.

—The possibility that the new policy implies greater emphasis in U.S. strategy on nuclear weapons, and thus could lead to increasing tensions with the Soviets and impair current prospects for detente. Should this be the allied perception, they could diminish their efforts to provide conventional force improvements.

In particular, there is a potential risk of a divisive strategic debate in NATO if the proposed changes in nuclear policy are perceived as major changes adversely affecting NATO. On the other hand, the proposed policy offers the opportunity for a more realistic approach by the United States and its NATO allies to the role of nuclear weapons in NATO defense planning.

d. Approach

The Working Group has considered how to describe and explain the proposed changes in nuclear policy to each of the above audiences

so as to reduce the potential risks. The recommended approach emphasizes relations with allies, since the concept of control of escalation will no doubt be the change most difficult for them to accept, as discussed in Issue 4 in Section G and amplified in Paper E. This approach involves a time-phased, progressively more detailed exposition of the new policy, emphasizing that it is consistent with past policy and that it will enhance attainment of U.S. objectives and, in the case of allies, the objectives they share with the United States.

The proposed approach is both substantive and procedural. Substantively it would involve:

1. Demonstrating that this policy is consistent with past U.S. policy in that its principal objective is deterrence and that it threatens no adversary who is not intent on aggression.
2. Emphasizing and describing how the policy changes will enhance deterrence at all levels of conflict (especially important for allies), while also showing that it enhances the coupling of all U.S. forces to the defense of Europe and Asia.
3. Emphasizing the more humane and moral aspects of the policy as compared to “assured destruction.”
4. Demonstrating by budget requests and other actions that the policy will not increase the U.S. Defense budget, proliferate U.S. nuclear weapons, or stimulate an arms race.
5. Emphasizing that the policy is a pragmatic approach to contending with potential threats in today’s world.

Procedurally, this approach to declaratory statements would involve:

1. Describing the policy as a natural, evolutionary change.
2. Briefing key members of Congress in a series of frank, detailed discussions.
3. Conducting extensive consultations in NATO (primarily in the NPG) and bilaterally, based on well prepared prior positions.
4. Identifying in detail the probable sources of objection and developing cogent responses to each.

Paper E contains a more detailed description of this approach to declaratory statements.

F. Implementing Procedures

The Working Group believes that the integrated approach to nuclear policy proposed in this report will foster greater consistency among the various elements of nuclear policy and will enable nuclear force acquisition, deployment, and employment plans together with arms control efforts and declaratory statements to mutually support
basic U.S. objectives. In addition it will serve to sharpen the analysis of many unresolved nuclear issues.

The Working Group suggests that if the proposed policy changes are accepted, the implementing process be evolutionary in nature for two reasons:

—First, the actual production of the operational plans which marry U.S. force capabilities to objectives (e.g., revision to the SIOP and other nuclear operational plans) is a detailed, time-consuming process (estimated at 24 months) that cannot officially begin until revisions to current employment policy are approved. A summary description of this process and what is involved is contained in Paper F. As noted therein, many of the preliminary steps of this process are underway, but full implementation of proposed policy changes must be an iterative process to ensure the existence of viable operations plans throughout the process of change.

—The second is because changes, if any, in weapon systems acquisition policy and programs will depend upon further analysis which will consider factors in addition to employment objectives, including fiscal resources. This is discussed above in Section E.1 and also in Paper G.

However, based on preliminary analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Working Group has concluded that the proposed employment policy can be implemented to a useful degree with forces programmed for Fiscal Year 1974. That is, the resulting plans will constitute a significant improvement over current employment plans. These improvements are in terms of (i) plans for large scale attacks more directly in the national interest should such attacks be necessary, and (ii) plans for moderate and small scale attacks that provide greater flexibility and more cogent options for use of nuclear weapons in local conflict should that be necessary.

Thus, adoption of the proposed employment policy does not require changes in programmed forces at this time. However, the proposed policy does sharpen the need for eliminating deficiencies in surveillance, warning, and C3 that are known today.

The recommended course of action is to direct implementation of the proposed revisions to U.S. nuclear policy and then proceed, with a clear understanding that policy revisions may be necessary in specific areas as problems are identified.

The Working Group believes that the broad policy guidelines which have been formulated in this effort are needed to clarify existing policy. It also believes that steps can be initiated to revise employment policy without prejudging acquisition decisions, which must be subjected to further study before a satisfactory basis can be established for a Presidential decision. It, therefore, recommends the following ap-
proach to implementation of the recommendations contained in this report.\(^{35}\)

1. Approval of the overall nuclear policy objectives and supporting framework developed in this report. These objectives would be subject to further review and possible revision after additional efforts outlined below.

2. Approval of the proposed changes in nuclear weapons employment policy as the basis for evolutionary revision in U.S. nuclear policy. This would be accomplished by directing the Secretary of Defense to issue policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons as the basis for nuclear weapons employment planning.\(^{36}\)

Pursuant to this guidance, the planning system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would then: (a) develop operational plans, assess them in terms of the objectives and guidelines set forth in the guidance, and at significant phase points advise the NCA as to their findings; (b) establish procedures for crisis management to respond to further guidance from the NCA as to which situations and toward which objectives plans for local conflict should be developed; and (c) prepare for and conduct peacetime exercises to test and evaluate the interaction between the NCA and its advisory staffs, the NMCC, supporting military and political staffs in Washington, the JSTPS, and appropriate unified and specified commands. The previously discussed need for iteration in this planning process may necessitate further adjustment to the guidance.

The employment guidance places special emphasis on mutually supporting military and political measures that seek to control escalation. Accordingly, to support the flexibility inherent in the options under this policy guidance, the need for rapid response and the importance to the NCA and their immediate policy advisors of having political and military advice in relation to possible nuclear usage, a senior staff level mechanism for providing such rapid reaction advice is necessary. The staff involved must be collocated, must have full access to all relevant information, and must have full capability to communicate to their respective superiors. The current emergency operations procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the current program to expand the NMCC should be reviewed and modified as appropriate to meet this requirement.

3. Direction by the Department of State of further development of a detailed plan of declaratory policy, based on the initial plan presented in Paper E, for communicating the policy changes, including appro-

\(^{35}\) This approach has been incorporated in a proposed NSDM contained in Appendix I. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^{36}\) That is, the draft language in Paper B would be appropriately modified to reflect Presidential decisions. [Footnote in the original.]
appropriate statements for use with U.S. Allies, and for explanation (either public or private) to potential adversaries. The plan would take into account the existing channels within the NATO military structure as well as the normal diplomatic channels. In support of this effort, the Central Intelligence Agency should prepare a special assessment of likely Soviet and PRC reactions to the new policies, based on the initial work in Paper H, and how these reactions might be influenced by U.S. statements and actions. Detailed planning of the aspects of declaratory policy could serve to alleviate possible problems noted earlier.

4. Direction of an overall analysis by the Department of State of the impact that pursuit of the basic objectives will have on current U.S. positions with respect to MBFR and SALT II. The report of this review should recommend changes in the current negotiating approach in support of the basic objectives and also should recommend any necessary changes to the objectives to support arms control positions. The Working Group is fully cognizant that acquisition decisions can influence arms control negotiations, but did not examine the current considerations in SALT II. As a consequence the planning objectives for acquisition do not contain any explicit provisions for the sole purpose of facilitating arms control.

5. Continuing review by the Department of Defense of the implications for the development, acquisition, and deployment of nuclear forces (both strategic and theater) appropriate to support the changes proposed herein. The initial results of this review would be reported to the President prior to final decisions on the Fiscal Year 1975 budget. This review must consider a range of policies and programs in terms of fiscal resources, arms control considerations, and the degree to which they would meet the deterrent, employment, and planning objectives previously set forth. This effort has been directed already by the Secretary of Defense, with work to commence after review and decisions on the policy changes discussed in this report. This work should be done within the framework suggested in Paper G.

[Omitted here are Section G and Appendices I and II.]
18. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting


DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategy in Asia (NSSM 171)

PARTICIPATION

State
Kenneth Rush
Leslie Brown
Richard Sneider

ACDA
Robert Behr
John Twombly

DOD
Willaim Clements
Paul Brands
Major Gen. William Schoning

OMB
Ellis Veatch

NSC Staff
Brig. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Lawrence Eagleburger

JCS
Philip Odeen
Col. T. C. Pinckney

CIA
John Knubel

Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
Brice Clarke

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that the Defense Department would:

1. prepare an analysis of the PRC nuclear escalatory capability over the next ten years;³
2. study the possibility of increasing the mobility of the U.S. division in Korea and treating it as a theatre reserve;⁴

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, Minutes of Meetings, Defense Program Review Committee Minutes, Originals, '69–'73 [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

² Document 5.

³ Under a November 8 covering memorandum, Clements forwarded a DOD paper to Kissinger, Rush, Colby, Ash, and Ikle concluding that the PRC would probably acquire nuclear escalatory capability over the next decade, but that its willingness to use that newfound capability was less certain. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–187, 040, National Security Council, 1973)

⁴ Under an October 13 covering memorandum, Clements forwarded a DOD paper to Kissinger, Rush, Colby, Ash, and Ikle weighing the pros and cons of two main alternatives, leaving the Army Division based in South Korea unchanged or assigning it a PACOM-wide contingency role. (National Archives, RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer, NSSM 171)
... prepare a schedule for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan;\(^5\)  
... prepare a paper on alternative plans for a phase-down of U.S. military presence in Thailand.\(^6\)

Mr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Walters) Do you have a briefing?  
Gen. Walters: We have no real briefing today.

Mr. Kissinger: Then I want to discuss the following questions:  
1) what our basic military strategy in Asia should be; are the assumptions of NSDM 27\(^7\) still valid?  
2) what should be the role of U.S. forces in relation to this strategy?  
3) what should be the relationship of these general judgments to U.S. deployment?  
4) [1½ lines not declassified]  
There are some questions of security assistance but I think these are largely theoretical.

So far as our basic strategy goes, is it still valid? The assumptions of NSDM 27 were that we would try to build up local forces to resist local attacks. [2 lines not declassified] You should remember this was considered a very progressive policy in 1969. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Rush: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: I am listening and learning on this subject, but our people say yes.

Gen. Walters: Of course, the situation in the PRC has changed. Our assumptions are no longer as they were. We have made some input to reflect this change, but not totally successfully.

Mr. Kissinger: You can argue about the probability of a PRC attack, but in case of an attack, are we agreed that our assumptions are still valid?  
All agreed.

\(^5\) Under a November 8 covering memorandum, Clements forwarded a DOD paper to Kissinger, Rush, Colby, Ash, and Ikle proposing a three-phased withdrawal of tactical airlift forces from Taiwan. Under the plan, United States forces stationed in Taiwan would be reduced to 2,800 by March 1976. On December 5, Kissinger approved the reductions when he initialed a memorandum sent to him by Hummel. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–196, Policy Papers, NSSM 171 [1 of 2])

\(^6\) Under an October 13 covering memorandum, Clements forwarded a DOD paper to Kissinger, Rush, Colby, Ash, and Ikle summarizing two options, one favored by the OSD and other by the JCS and ISA, to reduce the number of United States personnel stationed in Thailand to 32,200. In a memorandum, November 21, Kissinger informed Schlesinger that the President, after reviewing Clements’ memorandum, had decided that, due to the threat of a North Vietnamese offensive, there be no force reductions in Thailand until the end of the FY 74 dry season. Kissinger also directed the DOD to prepare a plan to withdraw forces to the 32,200 level commencing at the end of the dry season and ending by the end of FY 75. (Ibid.) On January 22, 1974, Schlesinger sent a memorandum to Kissinger outlining the plan. (Ibid., RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer, NSSM 171)

Mr. Kissinger: But we disagree as to the U.S. forces required to resist such an attack. [3 lines not declassified] This puzzles me. [2 lines not declassified] I know we went through this three years ago and the systems analysts tried to convince me. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Brands: The analysis in Southeast Asia indicated a range of force needs would be [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t want to debate it. [2 lines not declassified] What does this imply for force projections? [2 lines not declassified] What are your views?

Mr. Rush: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Rush: Theoretically, perhaps, but not practically. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: You are right, there is no chance of more divisions in the foreseeable future. [1 line not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: Sure. It is a question of priority. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Rush: In that $17 billion figure of Senator Mansfield’s, how many divisions are dedicated to NATO?

Mr. Odeen: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Odeen: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: You would have a serious problem with timing. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [2 line not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s assume Sino-Soviet relations are likely to stay as they are. It is not likely that the Soviets would attack in Europe if we should get involved with the PRC. The Russians might want to keep us going with the Chinese.

Mr. Rush: Perhaps, but the more deeply involved we become, the more dangerous it would be—the more the Soviets might be tempted to move in Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sneider: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Rush: And we had nothing left for NATO then. What better time could it have been for the Russians to move?
Gen. Walters: [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Weinel) [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: No.
Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified] With our present forces could he make this decision?
Adm. Weinel: [less than 1 line not declassified] We could live with that. Of course, [1 line not declassified] That’s easy to say, but not easy to do.
Mr. Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified] He almost convinced me that it was closer there than it would have been in Europe. [2 lines not declassified] How long would it take to get them out there?
Mr. Brand: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: What about supplies?
Mr. Clements: I just don’t believe you could do it that fast.
Mr. Kissinger: Maybe after you build a headquarters for 50,000 men.
Mr. Clements: [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: [less than 1 line not declassified] then it would slow down.
Mr. Kissinger: Because of supplies?
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Sneider: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]
Mr. Odeen: They might hit Thailand and South Vietnam simultaneously.
Mr. Kissinger: I just can’t see the Chinese moving into South Vietnam. For what purpose? Why should they help the North Vietnamese create a large country at their flank? That is not a realistic danger. [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mr. Sneider: And it’s closer to Russia so the risk increases.
Mr. Kissinger: As long as the PRC faces the Northern threat, they won’t take on the U.S. How much time did you say it would take to get troops to Southeast Asia?
Mr. Brand: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: Is that based on the assumption of U.S. withdrawals?
Mr. Brand: Yes, but we would have retained our bases.
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Clements: I think Admiral Weinel is using an average of [less than 1 line not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Gen. Walters: [1 line not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]

Gen. Walters: But you were facing a different PRC then.

Mr. Kissinger: There was no PRC then. [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Rush: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I hear the Korean Army is pretty good. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sneider: Of course, we would have some warning time.

Gen. Walters: The Kim Il Sung Trail is deep in the water.

Mr. Kissinger: What does that mean?

Gen. Walters: It means it is easier to control a peninsula with water on both sides if you have naval superiority. This wasn't true in Vietnam. You could not apply naval power on the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [1 line not declassified] We could give them great staying power.

Adm. Weinel: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified] So we should stop talking about it. Do you all agree?

Adm. Weinel: In security assistance doctrine we might see a goal of self-sufficiency in time. That's OK as a planning objective, but it is not very pragmatic. In Korea when we have completed modernization, it should follow that in the total force context it would not take [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: But it would take some?

Adm. Weinel: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Adm. Weinel: Well-stated.

Mr. Kissinger: Could you explain the rationale? [2 lines not declassified] I am just trying to elicit a coherent statement of the role of tactical nuclear weapons before the end of the second term.

Mr. Rush: [2 lines not declassified] Where do we stop?

Mr. Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Rush: But the losing side would escalate.

Mr. Kissinger: The reason for my question is to see if we can develop [less than 1 line not declassified] I get two different statements. [less
than 1 line not declassified] Then we should plan without them. [1 line not declassified] This moment will arrive earlier with fewer divisions.

Gen. Walters: [1½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: [4 lines not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: There is no protection against stupidity.
Adm. Weinel: True, but it would be extremely difficult to use [less than 1 line not declassified]—a viable organization. If you don’t have that, how could you use the weapons?

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]
Mr. Rush: In the first stage we would certainly operate without [less than 1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified] Let me be the devil’s advocate. [2 lines not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: We couldn’t bring ourselves to do it before.
Mr. Kissinger: But a lot of things have changed. We couldn’t bring ourselves to mine Haiphong harbor.
Mr. Rush: World opinion would be against us.
Mr. Kissinger: World opinion is against a loser. There are no awards for losing with restraint.
Mr. Rush: I agree.
Mr. Kissinger: [4½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Rush: [1 line not declassified] I agree with you on what we want them to think.

Mr. Kissinger: [2½ lines not declassified]
Gen. Walters: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: [2½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Rush: Absolutely.
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: I still have had no briefing on the deployment of nuclear weapons.
Adm. Weinel: Any time!
Mr. Kissinger: The PRC will have how many—[less than 1 line not declassified] by 1976?
Mr. Clarke: Including short and medium-range missiles, about [less than 1 line not declassified] altogether by 1976.
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified] It would be insanity, but they might do it.
Mr. Sneider: They might go for our rear supply area.
Gen. Walters: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Rush: The psychological impact would be enormous.

Gen. Walters: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified] I just don’t think they [1½ lines not declassified]

Gen. Walters: Knowing the excellence of our intelligence, they wouldn’t try.

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
[2 lines not declassified]
Mr. Odeen: [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: That’s ancient history.

Mr. Rush: We have [less than 1 line not declassified] troops in Korea. How many are in the division?

Mr. Odeen: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sneider) What would Japan do if the Chinese should attack?

Mr. Sneider: [2 lines not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: That’s my guess too.
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Sneider: [3½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified] We have a separate problem on deployments on Taiwan and a separate problem on Thailand. On Korea and Okinawa, what is your judgment about deployment?

Mr. Rush: [6 lines not declassified] I think we need to work out a plan on what we want to do over a five-year period.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s what I am asking.
Mr. Rush: I think we should work out a five-year plan.
Mr. Kissinger: But you would prefer not to take them out?
Mr. Rush: Yes.
Mr. Clements: Yes.
Mr. Kissinger: Then what would you plan?
Mr. Rush: It would be directed toward alternatives, [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: On the basis of what contingency? [1½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Rush: It would depend on the course of negotiations between North and South Korea. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: That is what I would like to see.

Adm. Weinel: That would be a little quick. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Rush: But it’s not in the right place.
Gen. Walters: Maybe not militarily, but it is politically.
Mr. Kissinger: Where would you put it?
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Rush: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Rush: [1½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Kissinger: What is the advantage of having a division in the Marianas rather than in Korea? Particularly when Korea wants them and the others do not.
Mr. Rush: There is no issue in either Micronesia or the Marianas on force levels.
Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified] What is the Korean problem? If we can get something from North Korea for it—?
Mr. Sneider: It’s a Congressional problem.
Mr. Rush: The Congressional problem in Korea would not be eased by transferring them to the Marianas.
Mr. Rush: (Senator) Mansfield wants all our troops home.
Mr. Kissinger: But he will always want that.
Mr. Rush: I pointed out that we won’t save a cent by taking forces out of Europe, so that what the Congress is really talking about is cutting the defense budget. Mansfield countered by saying money was not the factor—that he was interested only in the principle that American boys should not be overseas.
Mr. Kissinger: That is a question of Congressional strategy. You could argue that the Executive Branch is best protected by sticking to what it believes is right, with a rational explanation to the Congress, rather than by letting the Congress force us back, step by bloody step.
Mr. Rush: I agree.
Mr. Kissinger: Congress may force us to take something out of Korea. Or we may decide that our forces might be better deployed elsewhere. If we think we are better off in Korea unless we get a major agreement with North Korea or with the PRC, [2 lines not declassified]
Mr. Sneider: [2 lines not declassified]
Mr. Rush: [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Clements: We could cut the forces—take out less than the total.
Adm. Weinel: [1½ lines not declassified]
Mr. Sneider: We have talked about making the [1 line not declassified]
Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified] A joint PRC-North Korean move wouldn’t have the option of [1 line not declassified]
Mr. Sneider: The present division is tied to Korea. We can see some advantage to having some mobility in another area of East Asia. We are only talking about changing the character of the division.

Gen. Walters: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified] I have no views on your proposal, but you could argue that the PRC might leave them alone if the division were tied to South Korea. But if it were usable elsewhere, it would be a different problem. But if someone wants to study this, by all means do so.

Adm. Weinel: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sneider: [2 lines not declassified]

Gen. Walters: Mobility requires more money.

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Sneider: Okinawa is a small island, and we are building roads and establishing communication centers all over it. In a five-year period there will be real land pressure.

Mr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sneider: Yes.

Adm. Weinel: You can make a division mobile just by saying so. This is a matter of policy rather than hardware. If you declare that the division could be used elsewhere, it’s mobile.

Mr. Sneider: Also Korea will want to cut its ground forces, in which case the Congress will ask why we keep one division there when the Koreans are cutting their forces. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s have Defense study this.

Mr. Clements: We’ll do a paper for you.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we consider Taiwan? The Shanghai communique\(^8\) said specifically that, as tensions in the area diminish, we would consider withdrawing troops from Taiwan. Tensions in the area have diminished and we have 3,000 more troops there than at the time of the communique. I’d just like to call this to the attention of Defense. Get those troops the hell out of there. We are obligated to get our forces below the level at the time of the Shanghai communique. We can’t put in 3,000 additional forces and then withdraw them and sell that as a cut-back, a concession. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sneider: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: We need to take some out in the next fiscal year. The Chinese are not panicky, but we need some action. [less than 1 line not declassified]

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Mr. Rush: That is up to you—it’s a political problem.
Mr. Kissinger: I will play with that.
Mr. Sneider: The next crunch depends on when we can replace the planes the ROC sent to Vietnam.

19. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 2, 1973, 8:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
General John Wickham, Military Assistant to Secretary Schlesinger

Schlesinger: These, I see it, are the key aspects. One, what are the prospects for control of escalation? What are the constraints? In Europe, for example, we could warn them we will hit within 10 miles of the FEBA.

Wickham: The planners have not had any national-level objectives against which to plan.

Schlesinger: Second, what is the effect of changes in employment policy on deterrence?—We decided² that flexibility strengthened deterrence.—We tried to codify the target system—to hit things which destroyed the regime; to get military forces, including conventional forces which could attack after a nuclear exchange.

We do not target the industry of friends.

We want to look at the political details. For example, Russians are less than 50% of the population of the USSR. Should we say we will hit Russians and let the “Golden Horde” take over? Targeting is against the Party, economics, the Army.

Third, what is the anticipated Soviet/Chinese reaction?

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973 [3 of 5]. Secret; Nodis. In an August 1 memorandum, Odeen informed Kissinger that the breakfast meeting’s main topic was expected to be United States nuclear policy. (Ibid., Box 232, Agency Files, Defense, Vol. 20)

² The DOD’s position is reflected in the response to NSSM 169. See Document 17.
Damage limitation by force of arms is not likely, given the possibility of secure second strikes. Therefore there is an inducement toward this method of limiting damage.

Soviet declaratory policy would probably oppose on this.

We have broken the targets into packages to play with. There is no practical way to get complete flexibility.

If the policy is approved, it will take two years to complete the change in plans.

Fourth, allied reaction. They will be concerned about any possible decoupling.

The Europeans think an attack on Soviet cities is not a very credible option for an attack on Europe. Therefore they would support broadened options which are credible.

Kissinger: What we need are options which the President has beforehand. When a crisis comes, there is not time to figure these things out. We can't wait two years either.

Schlesinger: There is the big problem with the troops that executing the options will degrade the SIOP.

Kissinger: I am impressed with your work. What we need is the details.

Our declaratory policy is now ahead of our ability to execute.

I am comfortable for the moment with what the Secretary has said as declaratory policy.

Schlesinger: We must leave uncertainty in the Soviets' mind that we might be willing to use nuclear weapons for something less than direct defense of the United States.

Kissinger: We need a meeting next week on current plans.³

Schlesinger: We need a couple of European packages—an interdiction strike in East Poland, a strike within 10 miles of FEBA.

³ See Document 22.
20. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 9, 1973, 8:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Carl Duckett, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Roberge,2 JCS briefer
Mr. Welch,3 JCS briefer

Kissinger: Can’t Stennis get control when he gets back?4
Moorer: I think that is part of the game. Symington is not going to give up power easily.

Schlesinger: Symington’s comments about CIA5 were an attack on Stennis. We will go after Hughes.6 Ask if he wants more men killed, etc.

[Some talk about the progress of the Defense Appropriations.]

Moorer: We should not modify it in a way that we degrade the present SIOP.

Kissinger: Isn’t that Catch 22?
Moorer: No, we can do it, it depends on how long we take. It depends on how quick we can get a decision and how quickly we can retarget.

There is a clear distinction between operations on a third country and those on the USSR itself. The latter certainly risks a general war. The problem is not military—it’s political and policy. It would be helpful if we could get the President involved in exercises, etc.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK MemCons, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973 [3 of 5], Secret; Nodis. The breakfast meeting was held at the Pentagon. In a memorandum, August 8, Odeen informed Kissinger that the meeting’s main topic of discussion would be United States nuclear policy, the subject of NSSM 169. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–195, Study Memorandums, NSSM 169 [1 of 3]) All brackets in original memorandum.


3 Captain Edward F. Welch, Jr., Plans and Policy Directorate.

4 On January 30, Stennis was shot twice during a robbery attempt in front of his Washington home. He did not return to the Senate until September 5. Symington served as acting chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services during his absence. (New York Times, January 31, 1973, p. 1; September 6, 1973, p. 39)

5 Not further identified.

6 Senator Harold Everett Hughes (D–Iowa).
Kissinger: The President has to know in a crisis what options are available. Then we can get him involved in exercises.

Moorer: There’s a difference between tactical and strategic weapons.

Kissinger: The President will not authorize their use in the blind, without knowing just what will happen.

Moorer: A quick decision is what I was referring to.

Kissinger: The President must know at least the categories of targets—airfields, etc.

Clements: The NSDM is deceptive. We don’t have the capability to do what the NSDM asked for. The forces aren’t that flexible.

The President shouldn’t think he will have these options if he approves them.

Schlesinger: It’s a matter of time. We can’t put the mechanical flexibility into the forces until we know what is wanted.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union is building forces for something. I want to avoid the military telling the President they can do anything he orders.

Moorer: We can do better in preemption than in retaliation.

Schlesinger: I am not sure a strike (very limited) on the Soviet Union is more hazardous than taking out all the airfields in Poland.

Roberge [begins briefing:] We are looking at the different options which would cover the whole range of possibilities. In outline, there are:

—Regional options—theater options.
—Limited options.
—Selected options.
—Major options.

The prime change in target base was in army units and political and economic targets.

We identified five Soviet attack options.

(1) The Soviet nuclear threat to U.S.—7,000
(2) The Soviet nuclear threat to Europe—886
(3) The Soviet nuclear threat to forces in Asia
(4) The PRC nuclear threat to U.S.
(5) The PRC nuclear threat to U.S. forces in Asia

Kissinger: But the key is what it is we are trying to accomplish.

Schlesinger: For example, what are the political and military options?

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7 A reference to the draft NSDM appended to the response to NSSM 169, which is Document 17.
Roberge: Those were our criteria for developing these options.

Kissinger: We would like to know what those are.

Schlesinger: We need to show the ultimate objective—not that it is “the destruction of 11th Rocket Army.”

Welch: We would like to have you look at the case studies and tell us if these are the kinds of things we need.

Kissinger: What is the next step?

Schlesinger: We are trying to convey a message to stop. “We are showing your vulnerability and demonstrating the hazards of further escalation.”

Otherwise you would have to look over the whole 4,000 target list individually.

For example, we destroy the targets on the Chinese border, leaving the USSR open to Chinese attack; that could convey a signal of a US–PRC alliance, which may or may not exist.

You tell us what message you want to convey.

Kissinger: It’s the chicken and the egg. We had done good contingency planning in Jordan and it went well in ’70.8 We wouldn’t have an idea what to do in case of an attack on Iran or Europe.

If the Soviets could make us back down anywhere in the world, the result would be disastrous.

Moorer: You are right about the chicken and the egg. That is why we need a dialogue.

Duckett: Should we include options where disengagement is easy? Air or sea attack?

Kissinger: There are several categories. A European incident; a Soviet move against third countries; a third country conflict which may involve the United States.

Take Jordan—I think we scared the Soviets by pouring forces in at a reckless rate.

I think a serious crisis is almost inevitable with the world the way it is.

Schlesinger: Take Tito’s death.9

Kissinger: Yes. I’ve had a NSSM on this kicking around for a year.10
Conceptually there are two theories: escalate slowly, or take a big jump at once.

Schlesinger: Computationally I lean to the second. Nuclear, I lean toward the first.

In Iran, for example, if we were to fly in some F–111s, we convey a message. Then maybe privately refer to Caspian oil fields.

Kissinger: We need to move this discussion from the theoretical to actual packages for actual areas. The most likely areas are not too legion. Let’s meet after Labor Day.


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia

Based on a review of the NSSM 171 study, the President has decided that the following guidance should govern our future military planning for Asia.

Strategic Planning

The basic strategic guidance for Asia as originally defined by NSDM 27 shall remain in force. U.S. forces should be planned so that U.S. and Allied forces would be capable of conducting a combined con-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–242, Policy Papers, NSDM 230. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Ikle, Walters, Moorer, and Ash. Kissinger, following the July 26 DRPC meeting (Document 18), forwarded the NSDM to Nixon under a covering memorandum, August 1, with the recommendation that he approve its issuance. (Ibid.)

2 An 83-page study, April 27, submitted in response to NSSM 171 (Document 5) identified issues for presidential decision, summarized current U.S. force planning for Asia, discussed U.S. deployments in the region for FY 1974–78, and examined uncertainties that affected planning. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–196, Study Memoranda, NSSM 171)

ventional defense against a joint PRC/Communist ally attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia as well as a non-PRC attack in the other Asian theater. The U.S. should continue to plan for an adequate capability to reinforce our Allies in support of this strategy, including the full range of land, naval, and tactical air forces.

Tactical nuclear forces should be planned in Asia as a hedge against the failure of a conventional defense. However, this does not preclude early use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a major PRC attack.

Security Assistance planning will continue to focus on assisting our Allies to meet indigenous and non-PRC communist nation threats. Planning will not be based on building Allied self-sufficiency in meeting major threats from the PRC. However, improvements in Allied capabilities to enhance a joint U.S./Allied defense will be planned as a lower priority goal.

U.S. Deployments

U.S. planning for the next five years should include Asian baseline deployments at essentially current levels in Korea, Japan/Okinawa, and the Philippines. Normal minor adjustments in manning and support forces would be made; but, any proposed changes in combat force levels or major changes in manpower levels should be submitted to the President for approval. Deployments on Taiwan and in Thailand will be kept under continuous review. There will be no increases in forces or manpower on Taiwan without prior Presidential approval.

The Department of State should develop a scenario for informing the governments of Korea, Philippines, and Japan and other governments they believe appropriate of our deployment plans for FY 74. This scenario should be submitted to the President for approval by August 15, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger

4 On August 28, Rush sent a memorandum to the President outlining the scenario. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–242, Policy Papers, NSDM 230)

5 During their December 5 breakfast meeting, Schlesinger told Kissinger that the strategy delineated by NSDM 230 had been “overtaken” by Kissinger’s trip to China, November 10–14. “We must shift forces toward stabilization of the area and not counter the Chinese,” Schlesinger said. “There is no possibility of PRC fighting us,” Kissinger agreed, adding that United States strategy and deployments in Asia should again be reviewed. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Box 14, Kissinger Meetings) According to another record of the meeting, however, Kissinger said that there was another, political, “reason for our forces in Asia, that is, China policy.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations—Nixon Administration, Box 3) For the record of Kissinger’s talks with Chinese leaders while in the PRC, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Documents 8–14.
22. Minutes of Verification Panel Meeting

Washington, August 9, 1973, 3:40–4:31 p.m.

SUBJECT
Nuclear Policy (NSSM 169)²

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman
Henry A. Kissinger

CIA
William Colby

State
William Porter
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Seymour Weiss
Sidney Graybeal

Leon Sloss
NSC

Defense
B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Robert Hill
Lawrence Eagleburger

B/Gen. Jasper Welch
Philip Odeen

D.R. Cotter
William DeGraf

JCS
Jeanne W. Davis

V/Adm. John P. Weinel

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

... The Working Group will redraft the proposed NSDM³ in the light of the discussion at the meeting. Agency objections or suggestions should be provided to the WG Chairman.

... The JCS should commence operational planning based on the draft NSDM.

Mr. Kissinger: We have been discussing this topic for four years⁴ and have come to no conclusions. This is probably by JCS design.

Adm. Weinel: You give us undue credit.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought I would see the Chairman [Moorer] here today.

Adm. Weinel: He is still testifying; he may get here by 4 p.m.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–108, Minutes of Meetings, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals 3–15–72 to 6–4–74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Document 4.

³ See footnote 3, Document 17.

Mr. Kissinger: Our basic objective in this exercise was not to develop another theoretical paper. We wanted to get different options that the President could absorb before a crisis develops and he is called upon to make a decision. We want a theoretical guide, of course, but not at the price of options. If necessary, we will adjust the options to the theory. We are in an entirely new situation where the other side has thousands of weapons. It is not unreasonable for us to desire some options. Some Europeans, I know, believe it is necessary that we guarantee our own destruction to give them the assurances they claim they need. However, to deprive ourselves of options paralyzes us. In 1914 the Belgians did not insist that the UK destroy itself. The new European doctrine, however, insists on our destruction before the Europeans will agree to defend themselves. Incidentally, I think some first class work has been done on this draft NSDM.

Let’s go through the categories and, in each category, try to get a statement of what the issue is and where the paper stands. Then we might have a general discussion to see what adjustments are necessary. We have many levels of issues: What do we mean by control of escalation? The relationship to SIOP and other plans; Diplomacy—how much should we tell our allies, the Soviet Union; what should we tell them? Those are the categories we should discuss. Could the JCS give us a briefing on the development of the papers?

Gen. Welch: There are several levels of consideration on control of escalation. Initially it was a slogan.

Mr. Kissinger: We’re good at that.

Gen. Welch: One question was the character of the tactical options. They were intended to make the other fellow change his mind and to persuade him that further military action was not in the best interest. First, they should deny him gains from his ongoing military operations. Second, they should carry the spectre of further retaliation if necessary: in this regard we must be sure that the smaller options do not vitiate the larger threat. Third, we should not extend the attacks beyond what is necessary to accomplish the first and second objectives. We would try for negotiation, try to make him understand our objectives. The tough point is to figure out what his objectives are. We must be careful not to go so far as to confuse him as to our objectives.

The planning structure envisaged four types of employment options: major attack, selected attack, limited nuclear and regional nuclear options. The piecemeal application of forces tends to fritter them away. We have tried to approach the problem from the item by item technical level to see if we can’t have our cake and eat it too. The major

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5 Document 17.
tactical options correspond closely to SIOP in that the PRC and the Soviet Union are treated as separate matters. Military attacks are further broken down in the selected attack options including a candidate list which is, of course, subject to revision and review. We have tried to organize the sorties so that a given bomber will be assigned targets of a unified type. They would already have the sorties, weapons, etc. organized so that there is some chance that the thing will happen as advertised. We have also divided between East and West Russia, conventional and nuclear threats, in Europe among army, navy and air facilities, and between strategic and theatre forces alone. In China, we would strike at nuclear facilities, conventional forces and command leadership.

Mr. Kissinger: What are you talking about? Is this on paper?

Gen. Welch: The objectives and guidelines have been established. The JCS has done the analysis on how many targets, the reasonable weapons to be assigned, how well we could do, recommendations for modifications, and assessment of the risks involved and how useful the various activities would be. We have done nothing on routes, timing or operational planning.

Mr. Kissinger: So these are war games?

Gen. Welch: If you will.

Mr. Kissinger: Can they be ordered?

Adm. Weinel: This is an entirely new national policy. It has not been approved and is not in effect. Therefore, we can’t really make any changes yet. But we are in the starting blocks. If this NSDM is approved we’ll be off and running.

Gen. Welch: This is our proposal and we are asking if this is what you had in mind. It looks good to us.

Mr. Kissinger: This is one of the reasons for this meeting.

Mr. Cotter: The NSDM would legitimize recasting our plans and pulling assets away from SIOP.

Mr. Odeen: Isn’t the main thing to redo SIOP—take each target and assign new bombers and a new mission?

Gen. Welch: Yes. We need more flexibility than the current laydown permits us.

Adm. Weinel: (to Mr. Kissinger) I know you have heard statements saying that this will take 18 months to 2 years. But if this NSDM is approved, in 730 days it would be 100 percent completed; but in 720 days it would be 98 percent ready, and in 50 days it would be 5 percent ready. There are lots of things going on all the time. Right now we don’t know which targets would do the most damage.
Mr. Kissinger: The SIOP doesn’t distinguish between retaliation and first strike, except maybe Option C. One of the purposes of the redo is so that, in a retaliatory strike, we don’t hit empty holes. Now, if we take Options A or B we would be hitting empty holes.

Gen. Welch: The current SIOP calls for attacks on conventional forces. These have not been heavily targeted in the past because we had fewer warheads. As the MIRVs come on line, and we get more warheads, the targets have grown. In current policy they will grow even further. SIOP is revised every six months and the planners have done what they could within the bounds of legality to get ready for this new policy. I want to dispel any illusions anyone might have that there has been any lack of progress.

Mr. Kissinger: We are not sitting in judgment here. I want to get into the President’s head some idea of what he can do. If military actions are recommended to him for a decision, I want him to know what he is doing when he decides. He has had nothing on this except for a SIOP briefing. This was three or four years ago and it didn’t fill him with enthusiasm.

Mr. Porter: We want a simpler NSDM. This one is too long and complex. We want to see fewer options with sufficient detail so that the President could really understand them. We aren’t quarreling with the substance of the DM—we agree with the thrust.

Mr. Weiss: There are two aspects of this. First, how to get a grip on definite understood options for discussion with the President.

Mr. Kissinger: And whether or not we have the capability of carrying them out. We could be discussing plans for which we have no earmarked forces.

Mr. Weiss: The second area is the way in which these moves are perceived during a time of peace. I see a potential problem with the public. Some people, Weisner and Panofsky, for example, may not perceive this change as all that desirable. They believe assured destruction is best.

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6 In an August 8 memorandum, Odeen summarized SIOP for Kissinger. SIOP, the general United States war plan, utilized ICBMs, strategic bombers, SLBMs, and certain tactical aircraft to attack three classes of strategic targets: Task Alpha [A]—strategic nuclear threats to the United States and its allies; Task Bravo [B]—other military targets; and Task Charlie [C]—urban and industrial targets in the USSR and the PRC. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–195, Study Memorandums, NSSM 169 [1 of 3])

7 Jerome Bert Weisner, former science adviser to President John F. Kennedy and President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1971 to 1980.

8 Wolfgang K.H. (Pief) Panofsky, professor of physics at Stanford University and consultant to President Nixon’s Office of Science and Technology until 1973.
Mr. Kissinger: That’s because they want limited military budgets. They considered me a genius when I wrote about limited nuclear war because they saw this as a restraint on our defense budget.

Mr. Weiss: They would see a change as a pretext for adding major warfighting capabilities.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree, but they will do that anyhow.

Mr. Weiss: We can argue with our allies that this improves the deterrence and that it’s in their interest to support it. The problem is how far you go. If you play the limited game with maximum deterrence and controlled escalation, you need some sort of commonality of views with the Soviets. Insofar as it’s necessary to convey something to the Soviets to achieve that commonality, you bring problems with the allies and with the public.

Dr. Ikle: Some of these problems may be reduced by using the criterion of post-attack recovery capability. But that raises a number of questions. How does that differ from Option C? What would the cost be? Would it create the impression that we are planning for World War III? We might go back to planning for US-Soviet competition after an all out nuclear exchange. The question of civil defense is not mentioned. All our objectives can be accomplished without stressing post-attack recovery.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

Dr. Ikle: If it means attacking smaller towns, smaller targets, this affects our acquisition problems. We would need different weapons. It might create the undesirable impression of relying less on deterrence and more on post-war competition. You would lose the Congress on this.

Adm. Weinel: Now our objective is 70 percent of the floor space of war-supporting industry. A better criterion would be the post-recovery rate plus hitting the Soviet Army to prevent it from overrunning Europe. Another choice is to go for people—a goal of 70 million Russians for example.

Dr. Ikle: It’s a question to what extent we distinguish between economic and military resources and make a specific effort to analyze what would be important for post-attack recovery. The departure from Option C isn’t all that great. It may require only updating Option C. If it requires adjustment of resources, it may be undesirable. If it creates an impression in the Congress that we are placing less reliance on deterrence, it might be undesirable.

Adm. Weinel: We don’t brief SIOP to the Congress.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Colby) What do you think?

Mr. Colby: The Soviets want to preempt at the first indication of U.S. use of nuclear weapons. They think they will pick up such indications and they will then preempt with a large strike.
Mr. Kissinger: In Europe?

Mr. Colby: First in Europe. If we have a limited concept, we should communicate it to them. Otherwise they might react automatically to some indications through a misunderstanding of what they mean.

Mr. Weiss: It’s hard to discuss this until we really see what we are talking about.

Mr. Kissinger: We don’t brief Congress on SIOP or on selected options. With regard to Europe, certain catch phrases have developed: decoupling the U.S. strategic deterrent; undermining the U.S. guarantee. We have lived with this while the Soviets have been building up to massive proportions. We are living in a completely new world. How can we deter the Soviets, and how can we stop them if we cannot deter them? One theory is that we will make war look so attractive that we undermine the deterrent. That’s never never land. What we have now would have been enough to deter Hitler. But we are talking in a different order of reality. Hitler promised his generals a quick victory. Under the minimum options, it is not easy to demonstrate how victory would be achieved or indeed, how a defense could be established. With regard to Europe they don’t know now what we will be doing. We have agreed NATO doctrine for the use of ten weapons. But after that, General Goodpaster will do what he feels necessary.

Mr. Sloss: The Europeans have twice been briefed on SIOP.

Mr. Kissinger: The Europeans can’t ask us not to have options. They could demand that we use Option 19 earlier than we might wish to, but they can’t ask us to commit suicide.

Mr. Weiss: We are beginning to have some impact with the Europeans. We are emphasizing more conventional capability and they’re not all that resistant. Their fear is that in a conventional war, the U.S. and the Soviets might sit back and wage war on European territory.

Mr. Kissinger: They may choose not to fight.

Mr. Weiss: They might choose preemptive surrender.

Mr. Colby: If the Europeans believe the options mean that we would be prepared to help them on a limited scale, they may resent it but at least they will know they will get help. If the initial nuclear option is all-out or all-in, that makes the course difficult for them. It would be vital that the Soviets know we have limited options.

Mr. Kissinger: On the one hand we want the Soviets to think that the situation might get out of hand, while on the other hand we want to persuade them not to let it get out of hand. The Soviets might stop without a major nuclear exchange. I don’t believe they have an unlim-

\footnote{SIOP’s Task Alpha.}
ited urge to escalate. I think they will be looking for excuses *not* to escalate.

Mr. Colby: But they could get into it by a misunderstanding or by a misguessing of indications.

Mr. Kissinger: This paper will be useful if it could produce some options so that in a crisis the President will have a feeling of where he is going. Concrete options should be briefed in detail, but the President could wait for final completion if he knew what was coming. He has only heard SIOP and if that’s all there is, he won’t do it.

Gen. Welch: It’s a shame that the President hasn’t heard of the various contingency plans.

Mr. Kissinger: He should be briefed on them. I am not being critical but, as I have said before, my nightmare is that with the growth of Soviet power and with our domestic problems, someone might decide to take a run at us.

Adm. Weinel: We could put together options rather rapidly.

Gen. Welch: We were reluctant to bring something forward until we knew whether or not we were on the mark.

Mr. Kissinger: I have not said this critically. We have been so focussed on Vietnam that we simply haven’t been able to get into this. On the NSDM, we’ll approve anything that can get the program forward. Our principle concern is not to get an impeccable document. We need something so that the Chiefs can put together some options. The President and his Cabinet officers can then analyze the options in terms of their crisis management responsibilities. Then we can analyze them with regard to the public and the Russians.

Mr. Porter: We should also analyze the cost.

Mr. Kissinger: Weisner and Panofsky won’t be satisfied unless the budget is under $20 billion. They believe in assured destruction because it guarantees the smallest expenditure. To have the only option that of killing 80 million people is the height of immorality.

Mr. Porter: But we should have a cost read-out with each option.

Adm. Weinel: We can do it all within our programmed 1976 forces. We have been searching for additional viable options but that doesn’t involve buying billions more in forces.

Mr. Kissinger: It re-does SIOP so as to earmark forces for the options. It would mean there were not so many dual-purpose forces.

Gen. Welch: Yes, we would rework it so the beer and pretzels come out even.

Dr. Ikle: There is also the question of CQ vulnerability.

Mr. Kissinger: What is CQ?

Dr. Ikle: Command and control.
Gen. Welch: Work on improvement of CQ is going on anyway. It is badly needed.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we get the NSDM fixed?

Mr. Porter: I suggest you instruct us to redraft it with a view to simplifying it.

Mr. Kissinger: Can the Working Group do that?

Mr. Odeen: Yes.

Mr. Cotter: How simplify? The NSDM has a one-page work program.

Mr. Odeen: It is seven pages long.

Mr. Porter: Maybe it can’t be done, but I think we should try.

Gen Welch: I agree, but let me give you a rationale as to why it was done this way. (Referring to the basic study.) The only part that is needed to meet Mr. Kissinger’s first priority is the first page and the pages beginning on 69–70 which refer to deployment. We don’t want to be for employment only—we want both deterrence and employment. The big, miserable part starts on page 70 with the planning guidance for forces. This was included to stifle concerns that this is a call for huge new forces.

Mr. Kissinger: We should look at this honestly. Congress can’t do much more damage to us than they already have. To this extent we’re liberated to do what is right. We prefer to do this within the existing budget. But if new expenditures are needed we will ask for new expenditures. Someone else will be sitting here in the late 1970s. By that time the Soviet systems will be more mature. Our successors will be living in a nightmare if we don’t do what is right. Hopefully we can keep within our present budget. If we can’t, we should ask for more. If we can’t get it, we will have to stay within our existing funds. But we must understand what is right.

OSD and JCS have to do the initial planning on this. Will the other agencies please let them have their substantive disagreements or objections and then we will discuss them. We already have Fred Ikle’s objections.

Mr. Porter: We don’t quarrel with the thrust of the draft NSDM, but we would like to undertake some further exploration of alternate options. We may have some other ideas, particularly concerning our allies.

Mr. Kissinger: The JCS should start planning as though the NSDM were approved. Whatever we come out with will be close enough to the draft that you should go ahead with it now.

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10 See footnote 5 above.
Adm. Weinel: We are actually out of the starting blocks on some of these things now.

Mr. Kissinger: The plan will be approved, possibly with some State department refinements. Then we’ll get a small group of Cabinet officers and other crisis management people together. As the options are refined, the President might get a briefing in the JCS room with real time. He could get a feeling for the decisions he will have to make in an emergency. I know the President will be eager to do this. Are you all agreed that this is a workable plan?

All agreed.

Mr. Odeen: If the agencies will get their comments to me, I will get them to the JCS.

23. Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

Washington, August 17, 1973, 3:11–4:09 p.m.

SUBJECT

General Purpose Force Modernization

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
William Porter
Seymour Weiss
Leslie Brown
Defense
William Clements
Robert C. Hill
John Ahearne
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
CIA
William Colby
Bruce Clarke

OMB
Roy Ash
Ellis Veatch
ACDA
Dr. Fred Ikle
Col. Robert Behr
Treasury
William Morrell
NSC
B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Philip Odeen
John Knubel
Jeanne Davis
James Barnum

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–118, Minutes of Meetings, DPRC Minutes, Originals, ’69–’73 [3 of 3]. Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

. . . a small group will meet shortly after Mr. Kissinger's return from San Clemente\(^2\) for consideration of contingencies in the 1980's and to lay the basis for an analysis of our force level projections based upon these considerations.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get on to the subject of the DPRC. It would be helpful to have a briefing from Defense.

Mr. Clements: (Referring to Mr. Ahearne) John has some charts to show you as a starting point. (Charts attached at Tab A.)\(^3\)

Mr. Ahearne: These are projections of force levels. The first chart that you have shows the total amount of dollars estimated to be available to the DOD. If the large blob on the top for Southeast Asia war costs is subtracted, you can get an idea of our force planning. As you will note, DOD funding is roughly constant if you subtract what the Congress may be expected to cut out.

Mr. Clements: Is manpower included?

Mr. Ahearne: That shows up on the second chart. After 1974, it doesn't take much more of the defense budget. That's assuming the all-volunteer force\(^4\) works.

Mr. Kissinger: And if it does not?

Mr. Clements: We haven't considered that.

Mr. Kissinger: What are the cost implications if it doesn't work?

Mr. Clements: This is highly problematical. What do you do about pay scales? It opens a whole Pandora's Box of questions. It's a helluva problem. But I am not prepared to talk about this today. The costs are

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\(^2\) Nixon was in San Clemente, California from August 20 through August 31. Kissinger visited with him on several occasions during that period. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

\(^3\) Not found attached. Under an August 8 covering memorandum, Davis sent DPRC members a paper prepared by the DOD in advance of the meeting. The paper, July 13, reviews current and projected manpower costs as well as DOD operational funding and procurement programs. The paper also includes eleven charts: DOD Real Program Value, DOD Manpower and Related Costs As a Percent of DOD Total Program Costs, General Purpose Nuclear Submarines, Attack—Multimission Carriers, Active Escorts ASW & AAW, Support Ships (UNREP, Tender, and Minor Support), Air Force Fighter/Attack, Navy/Marine Fighter/Attack Aircraft, Fighter/Attack Aircraft Cost Trend, Attack Helicopters, Impacts of Trend Toward More Expensive Systems. The paper and Davis' memorandum are in ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–106, Meeting Files, DPRC Meeting, 8/17/73.

reasonably comparable with the civilian sector, but if we have to start over, it will be a tremendous problem.

Mr. Kissinger: The alternative to AVF is the draft, isn’t it, unless you start impressing people on the street. Aren’t the manpower costs of the draft the same or less?

Mr. Clements: I’m not sure that’s right.

Mr. Kissinger: Why does the draft cost more?

Mr. Clements: Not more, the same.

Mr. Kissinger: If it’s the same, the percentage will not go higher?

Adm. Moorer: It won’t, at present pay and force levels.

Mr. Kissinger: If it hasn’t increased, why the jump from 45% to 60%?

Mr. Weiss: How does the 44% compare to 1964?

Mr. Kissinger: What was it in 1961?

Mr. Odeen: It is about the same level as in 1961; there has not been much change.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the Soviet manpower cost percentage?

Adm. Moorer: Somewhere between 26 and 30%. About 70% plus of their budget goes for hardware; ours is about 40 percent.

Mr. Weiss: The cultural lag!

Mr. Clements: Our manpower costs are twice as much as theirs.

Mr. Odeen: Manpower costs cover more than military pay. It includes training and a lot of civilian pay.

Adm. Moorer: Our retirement costs are figured in there. Defense is the only place in the Government where retirement pay is figured in the yearly budget.

Mr. Ash: Could we shift it to the Veterans Administration? I want to keep it in the proper committee.

Mr. Ahearne: If you accept a constant manpower cost, the money available for non-manpower purposes will be roughly constant.

Mr. Kissinger: Am I to assume that our purchasing power will decline infinitely?

Mr. Ahearne: All these figures are in constant dollars. In the remaining charts we have addressed specific weapons systems. You will notice that the first one on general purpose nuclear subs . . .

Mr. Kissinger: What do we use attack subs for? To interdict the sea lanes?

Adm. Moorer: They attack other subs.

Mr. Clements: All kinds of things. They are the best sub defense we have.

Mr. Kissinger: Why is the increase in attack subs so dramatic?
Adm. Moorer: It isn’t—it’s actually reduced. We now have 105 subs, both nuclear and diesel.
Mr. Kissinger: And these are all nuclear?
Adm. Moorer: Yes, we’ve reduced by 15. We’re replacing diesels with nuclears.

Mr. Ahearne: (Turning to the carrier charts) The dotted line shows our carrier force. Two carriers are currently under construction. A third will be ready in 1978. We will be in trouble in 1987 when we will have 12 carriers that are over-age. It takes 5–7 years to build one carrier and there aren’t many shipyards that can build one.

Mr. Weiss: In thirty years carriers will be that much more expensive.

Adm. Moorer: We figure 30 years for submarines, 25 for surface ships.

Mr. Clements: The problem is that as the carriers age, they are not very efficient. Their systems get to a state of obsolescence.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t understand this down-turn in carriers. Will this happen unless we reach decisions soon?
Mr. Ahearne: We will have to reduce the force level or keep them for over 30 years.

Adm. Moorer: During the Eisenhower Administration we built a large number of carriers very fast. We retire them when they get to be 30 years old.

Mr. Kissinger: When do these decisions have to be made?

Mr. Clements: The lead time on a carrier is seven years.

Adm. Moorer: Counting the budget process, contracting and construction.

Mr. Clements: Right now we are under pressure to build more carriers. We have to look seven or eight years ahead.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we planning to do this?

Mr. Clements: That’s a subject of considerable discussion. We haven’t decided yet.

Mr. Kissinger: It will be decided on what basis?

Mr. Clements: There are a lot of unanswered questions: strategy, mission, force structure. We can’t decide it now. But when we start buying carriers we had better have something in mind.

Mr. Kissinger: As a veteran of the Middle Eastern and other crises I want to make sure the decision is not made on the basis of surface considerations. We need an analysis of our strategy. If we hadn’t had our carriers in the Middle East and Vietnam we would have been in a helluva position. In 1988 maybe we will need more but smaller carriers. Before we decide on a turn-down in carriers, we need some analysis.
Mr. Clements: (to Mr. Kissinger) Do you want to be a part of that consideration?

Mr. Kissinger: I want to take part in consideration of contingencies in the 1980s. State should, too. Whether we have 8, 10, 12 or 15 carriers could be an important consideration in what the President can do in the 1980s. If we decide our carriers in the Mediterranean couldn’t survive in the ’80s, that’s a different situation. That part of the decision I want to get a look at.

Adm. Moorer: We have to start with our military objectives. What are our tasks? That’s what dictates our force levels. Then we have two choices: if we reduce our force levels, we have to reduce our commitments or increase the risks. If we can’t meet our commitments, we have to raise force levels. The levels are driven by what we expect the forces to do. Some people just don’t understand that.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s the point I’m making. We have to get a little group together to look at the conceivable contingency situations in the late ’80s. (to General Scowcroft) See that we get that done. Jim Schlesinger agrees.

Mr. Clements: Admiral Moorer and I agree.

Adm. Moorer: We have our basic NATO commitments and the latest NSDM on the Far East (NSDM 230). That’s a basis for addressing additional contingencies. Assuming we maintain our NATO commitment, that anchors part of our force.

Mr. Clements: Some of the concepts in DOD as to how the threat might be met are still evolving. We don’t want to get locked in.

Adm. Moorer: Primarily because of changes on the other side.

Mr. Clements: We should have complete flexibility on how we approach the problem.

Mr. Kissinger: On the projection of the construction budget, will we be funding carriers?

Mr. Ahearne: We have two under construction, and one in 1978.

Mr. Kissinger: And there will be a down-turn under present construction plans?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: We would have to increase if we want to keep 12 carriers?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: The dotted line (on the carrier chart) shows what will happen on current projection?

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5 Document 21.
Adm. Moorer: The top dotted line.

Mr. Ahearne: (Referring to the Active Escorts ASW and AAW chart) On escorts we have a sharp drop leading into 1974, then the FYDP starts rising.

Mr. Kissinger: But without procurement, that’s not likely.

Mr. Ahearne: That’s right.

Adm. Moorer: We made a deliberate decision to sacrifice quantity for quality. That’s the reason for the abrupt drop. We deactivated ships to get the money for modernization.

Mr. Clements: The drop is 43% in the actual number of ships. We’ve reduced numbers but increased quality. There’s a real efficiency factor but, of course, we can’t prove that one F–14 equals three or four F–4s.

Mr. Kissinger: You can’t have one F–14 in four different places.

Adm. Moorer: Yes. And we have to observe what the other side is doing.

Mr. Weiss: In the last two years we have had to decommit some category A ships to NATO. Will we have to in next year’s budget?

Adm. Moorer: If we’re down to 12 carriers we can’t maintain our current deployment levels without home-porting.

Mr. Weiss: If we could get that information sooner rather than later, it would help.

Adm. Moorer: We don’t know what the Congress will do. If they reduce personnel we will have to reduce forces.

Mr. Clements: In our commitment to NATO, the quality factor was considered a plus. They were counting surface units—old destroyers, for instance. We’ll let you know.

Mr. Porter: Have you decided on your home-porting requirements?

Mr. Clements: No.

Mr. Weiss: (to Mr. Clements) You still owe us some judgments on Greece.

Mr. Clements: I didn’t know that.

Adm. Moorer: Secretary Rogers owes something to Senator Fulbright.

Mr. Hill: (to Mr. Clements) We just got that.

Mr. Clements: We want home-porting.

Mr. Kissinger: Is that why you won’t answer?

Mr. Clements: There’s no question in the Pentagon about this. We need to get together. (to Mr. Porter) I’ll get something to you.

Mr. Kissinger: The DPRC promotes togetherness.
Mr. Ahearne: (referring to the Support Ships chart). We see somewhat less demand for support ships for deployed forces.

Mr. Kissinger: If we don’t have some real improvement, our Navy is going under.

Adm. Moorer: That’s absolutely right.

Mr. Ahearne: (referring to the aircraft charts) When the Air Force planes get older, they tend to put them in the reserves. So the FYDP line and the procurement line are relatively close. The Navy and Marine aircraft are under greater strain, and after 12 years the line drops steeply. This is partly related to the negotiations that were underway when the budget was submitted.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Clements: We were having the big fight with Grumman. The F–14 is shown at 135 on the curve. As we move forward in the out year, the full number is not now in the budget. It would have a significant impact if we were talking about 400 planes.

Mr. Odeen: You mean the money for 400 planes is not in here?

Mr. Clements: No. Congress is aware that modernization of the Navy fighter program must be addressed, but we’re having a helluva fight with Grumman.

Mr. Kissinger: The only available plane for modernization is the F–14?

Mr. Clements: At the moment. We’re trying to improve that. We’re trying to get to a total of 700.

Mr. Ash: We’re back to the same situation we were in with the carriers. We have to reduce elsewhere.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two choices: to take from existing forces or increase the budget. Since our forces are dropping, would you say our budget is inadequate?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Mr. Ash: The FYPD doesn’t build in any adjustment in the numbers to reflect greater performance. Where we have fewer numbers showing in the out years, if we adjust for equivalent performance, it would not be exactly as the charts show.

Mr. Clements: It would not be as dramatic.

Mr. Ash: If we could draw performance capability lines, the gap between the lines might close.

Mr. Clements: Conceivably, but this relates to plans, contingencies, force levels. My judgment is that the capability curve would not come up to the FYDP level.

Adm. Moorer: We also have to consider the improved quality of the other side.
Mr. Clements: With regard to Trident, the Russians have their first Delta boat in operation. They have 4 in the water and 11 in the program. There are 16 new Russians subs while we argue whether or not to continue the first Trident on the 1978 schedule. That’s damn serious.

Mr. Kissinger: I have an uneasy feeling our technology rather than our strategy is driving our weapons development. Every service is building bigger or more complex systems. Their missions are invented by what the technology makes possible.

Mr. Clements: In part, you’re right. But our industrial base and our society is one of high technology. The tendency is to get less manpower and more technology.

Mr. Kissinger: Over Vietnam 60% of our missions were either diverted or scrubbed. Our planes must have been designed for fighting over the desert at 40,000 feet. And the weather in Europe is not much better than in Vietnam. We have designed a plan for nuclear war, but we don’t have any doctrine for tactical nuclear war. And we would have to adapt it for conventional war. We have substituted masses of materiel for thought.

Mr. Clements: One of the best services we could perform would be to start thinking about what the hell we are trying to do.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Clements) I’ll call you and Tom (Moorer) to see how we can do this without getting into your area.

Adm. Moorer: There was nothing wrong with our airplanes. We got 300–400 planes over Hanoi and out again in 30 minutes. But you wanted weapons that could home on a weapon or a truck, while the rules of engagement limited us to targets outside the city limits. The difficulty was in the area of weaponry, not in aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: That could be.

Adm. Moorer: I was on the mock-up board for the F–4 in 1955. No one then thought of it as a bomber, but it turned out to be a pretty good bomber. When we build a plane, we don’t always know how it will be used. Cost means what it costs to place a weapon on a target. On Trident, it’s the cost of the missiles, not the cost of the ship.

Mr. Kissinger: My remarks were not addressed to Trident. I have no opinion one way or the other. But we can’t substitute resources for thought. We need a conceptual base. We have to know our likely targets and mode. If we had had a stand-off missile with a 300 mile range in Vietnam, we might have done more good.

Adm. Moorer: Not necessarily.

Mr. Kissinger: But it wasn’t ever really considered. The F–4 turned out to be a pretty good airplane for a purpose for which it was not designed.

Mr. Clements: Versatility is a great virtue.
Mr. Colby: These curves are pushing us toward an agreed reduction of forces on both sides. There are other kinds of confrontation.

Mr. Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Colby: Buying them off. Subversion.

Mr. Kissinger: I see no one is commenting.

Mr. Ahearne: On the fighter attack aircraft cost trend chart, the cost increases for the 100th unit are a function of time.

Mr. Ash: These data deal with front end R&D in the same way. The contracts could be different.

Mr. Ahearne: These are actual production costs. The R&D cost is not in here.

Mr. Kissinger: (referring to chart) What does CAIG mean?

Mr. Ahearne: Cost Analysis Improvement Group.

Mr. Odeen: This is estimated as opposed to the official projection.

Mr. Ash: Each is treated the same even if it is bought under a different contract.

Dr. Ikle: Are the F–14s worth it?

Mr. Ahearne: It depends on what you mean by “worth it”.

Mr. Ash: We could always go back to the P–38.

Adm. Moorer: The first squadron I reported to had an airplane called an F–4—a Boeing plane. One of today’s F–4 weighs more and costs more than all 18 planes in that squadron. And it can fly faster straight up than my first airplane could fly straight down.

Mr. Kissinger: And what is the lesson?

Adm. Moorer: If you want performance you have to pay for it.

Mr. Ahearne: On the helicopter chart, there is a gap between what the Army wants and those under 10 years old.

Mr. Weiss: Suppose we met the FYDP level? What amount of increase are we talking about?

Mr. Ahearne: $2½ billion a year for procurement including support items.

Mr. Clements: In making these evaluations it was agreed that some concepts of weapons systems will change.

Mr. Kissinger: When we understand what we are talking about, we will have to get the President involved. Where does that leave us?

Mr. Clements: We’re talking about the budget we’re going with now. We’re comfortable with it. We’ve cut the cloth to fit the pattern. Until your questions are answered, we wouldn’t suggest any major changes.

Mr. Kissinger: You have fewer units, but you haven’t shown what that does to the Army, for example. What about tanks?
Mr. Ahearne: There’s not much problem there.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the impact of the reductions in the Navy on our flexibility?

Adm. Moorer: They bring into question our ability to support NATO. If we’re fighting in NATO, we’re fighting the Russians, and we would be fighting in the Pacific as much as in the Atlantic. We would be limited in the sea areas that could be covered. Also, we would have the energy problem. In 1980, we will have a super-tanker at sea every 50 miles. That gives the Soviets a chance to go for the jugular.

Mr. Porter: And another line going to Japan.

Adm. Moorer: Three subs could beat Japan.

Mr. Clements: What should the Japanese be doing for themselves? How much responsibility should they take and how far out?

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll be lucky if they don’t push out 10,000 miles.

Adm. Moorer: That’s right.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll have a meeting on this the first week I’m back.

Mr. Porter: How soon will we know the effect of the recruiting shortfall on our overseas units—in Korea, for example?

Mr. Clements: These shortfalls are not as serious as the newspapers are making them out to be. The Army is the only service that’s really affected. We will be plus or minus 15,000 when we finish the fiscal year. I think the all-volunteer force will work. There will be some pains and some soft spots and it will take a different mentality.

Mr. Kissinger: What will be the percentage of blacks?

Mr. Clements: Around 20%.

Adm. Moorer: It’s around 18% now. I’ve been up on the Hill eleven times on this budget. It would be suicide to tell them we now want to change the FY74 budget. The first time we can do anything is in FY75.

Mr. Ash: If then. The situation is not wide open.

Mr. Kissinger: The President will fight for his ’74 budget and will ask for more in ’75.

Mr. Ash: That’s agreed.

Mr. Clements: Roy Ash has conveyed that to us.

Mr. Kissinger: We have to do what is right.

Mr. Ash: The budget strategy is simple. We need to provide the rationale to the Congress to get the highest possible figure.
24. Memorandum of the President’s Meeting with the Republican Congressional Leadership


SUBJECT
Defense Procurement and MFN

President: I would like to say we owe leaders a vote of thanks. I take back things I said to the Senate. Reversing that troop cut vote was enormously important. I am meeting with Gromyko tomorrow and it would be useless if the cuts had been voted.

Griffin: Tower and Thurmond are doing a great job managing the Hill. We got some great help from the White House.

President: I called some, too. I called Long who usually goes along but he said he was so committed he couldn’t do it. Which way did Randolph go?

B: Bad.

Schlesinger: You are all familiar with the bill. We have two major objectives this year. (1) to avoid crippling amendments, like troop cuts for our forces overseas, and (2) to build the forces of the future. We

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 2, September 27, 1973—Nixon, GOP Leadership. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 9:00 to 10:21 a.m. Other attendees included: Senators Brock, Scott, Wallace F. Bennett, Norris Cotton, and George D. Aiken; Representatives Leslie C. Arends, John B. Anderson, Barber Conable, Jr., Robert H. Michel, and William S. Mailliard; and administration officials Agnew, Anne Armstrong, Ash, Friedersdorf, Haig, Korologos, Timmons, Ziegler, Counselor to the President Bryce N. Harlow, and Executive Director of the Domestic Council Kenneth R. Cole, Jr. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

2 In an October 2 memorandum, Korologos informed Nixon that the Senate had rejected by a vote of 44–51 an amendment, sponsored by Senator Cranston, to the FY 74 Defense authorization bill (HR 9286) that called for a 40 percent reduction over a three-year period in the number of United States troops stationed overseas. (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, President’s Handwriting, Box 23, October 1973) The final legislation (PL 93–155), approved by Congress on November 5, funded an active-duty military force of 2,165,000 troops, down 68,000 from the administration’s request. The measure also authorized $21.3 billion for weapons procurement and military research in FY 74. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 155–157)


4 Senator Russell Billiu Long (D–Louisiana).

5 Senator Jennings Randolph (D–West Virginia).

6 Presumably either Bennett or Brock.
must not dismantle overseas posture. Yesterday was gratifying. The vote today on the Humphrey amendment\(^7\) is of less concern.

President: What do you mean less concern? The principle is the same. If we unilaterally cut, we can’t negotiate and the Senate would be responsible. We can’t say “Isn’t peace wonderful—look at our China and Soviet initiatives and let’s reduce unilaterally.”

Thurmond: That is our position. On Humphrey, should we compromise or stonewall?

Schlesinger: The rate of withdrawal is the same, only it drops the third year. Our Europe troops must stay; it’s important to the Koreans that we keep our divisions there. So we have little room for reduction.

Kissinger: We are proposing 10–15% mutual reductions in Europe. You may say even that is disadvantageous. If we cut unilaterally it is a disaster. Whether it’s 40% over three years or 25% over two years is irrelevant. It will ruin negotiations in Europe. If it’s done in Asia it would have a serious effect on the Japanese and the Chinese.

President: The most serious effect is on the Chinese.

Tower: All these points have been made and that military force is a tool of diplomacy.

President: Who has been withdrawing forces? I know who sent them there—the Democrats, in Southeast Asia and Korea. We have brought home 500,000 from Southeast Asia and 100,000 from elsewhere, and eliminated the draft. The Democrats brought the war; we brought peace. If they want it dirty we can play it.

Thurmond: Better precise arguments and not jump on the Democrats.

President: The road to peace is not bug-out. The road to war is to be weak so we aren’t respected. If we are weak, the Chinese will desert us, the Japanese, etc.

Let’s make it clear we brought the troops home, we are working for offset, etc. Are we going to have a mutual reduction hopefully bringing peace to the world? We can’t do it if we reduce unilaterally.

Anybody who votes to make the U.S. weaker is voting for war.

Look at the intelligence. The Soviets are going all out. Make appeal on the basis of peace.

\(^7\) According to Korologos’ October 2 memorandum, on September 27 the Senate adopted, 48–36, an amendment to HR 9286, introduced by Humphrey, calling for an incremental reduction of overseas troops over a three-year period totaling 110,000. On October 1, the Senate rejected, 47–51, another amendment, originally introduced by Humphrey, that would have cut the authorization by $750 million. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, President’s Handwriting, Box 23, October 1973)
Tower: We have made it. Now we need backroom persuasion.
Griffin: We shouldn’t overlook that yesterday Brooke, Case, Javits and Percy\textsuperscript{8} were with us.
President: Take Javits. A vote for Israel in the Senate is always 80–20. Those who would be in the biggest trouble if we reduced in Europe would be the Israelis. If we hadn’t had NATO and the Sixth Fleet in the Jordan crisis, we couldn’t have saved the situation.
Kissinger: Without NATO we wouldn’t have had a plausible deterrent in the Jordanian crisis.
President: The basic question is whether we will have the strength to negotiate reductions and bring peace. Our goal is to get reductions, peace, and bring the troops home.
I am meeting with Kirk.\textsuperscript{9} He’s a nice guy but he thinks the answer to peace is to give everyone another bowl of rice. Why did we die in World War II, in Korea, Vietnam? Only to bring peace—not for aggrandizement. Who fears the U.S.? No one.
Are we now to take away the impression which we have used and need to build peace?
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

\textsuperscript{8} Republican Senators Edward William Brooke, III (Massachusetts), Case, Javits (New York), and Charles Harting Percy (Illinois).

25. \textbf{Memorandum of Conversation}\textsuperscript{1}


\textbf{SUBJECT}
Cabinet Room

Schlesinger: Let’s start with the international environment. This is an era of détente. Our military posture is geared to Soviet moves. Since

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 2, October 4, 1973—Cabinet Meeting. Secret; Nodis. The meeting, held in the White House Cabinet Room from 9:05 to 10:34 a.m., was also attended by, among others: Agnew, Rush, Simon, Richardson, Weinberger, Ash, Laird, Colby, Stein, Scowcroft, Haig, Ziegler, Timmons, Harlow, Flanigan, Secretary of the Interior Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz, and Secretary of Transportation Claude S. Brinegar. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
1960 they have increased their manpower, primarily in the Far East. Their defense budget is expanding at about 3 percent a year. They have passed us in ICBM’s—thus far they haven’t even been able to exploit their throwweight advantage, but with MIRV’s they might. We still have the advantage in tactical air, but they are now ahead in ships and they are increasing their divisions. We are down to 12 from 19½; they are up to 167 from 148. We also have substantial overseas deployments.

In NATO we have a rough balance with the Warsaw Pact. There is an advantage in tacair which helps counter-balance their advantage in ground forces, which is slight in numbers.

It is a myth that the U.S. “carries the burden” in NATO. Allies have been contributing more and more. We are doing less in NATO than the Soviets are in the Warsaw Pact.

DOD expenditures are down by one third since 1968. It is a smaller military budget than in the ‘50’s when we were emphasizing massive retaliation. It is important to maintain a balanced force structure. The people who objected to massive retaliation in the 50’s are frequently now opposed to conventional strength.

We took the Vietnam dividend before the end of the war. We demobilized before the cease fire from 3.6 million men to 2.3 million men.

The Department of Defense is not the driving force behind inflation. I told Symington that the three services get the same percentage of the GNP that the Air Force did when he was Secretary.

Expenditures are at the lowest level since before Pearl Harbor. The driving force behind government expenditures has not been defense but social services.

We must maintain balanced expenditures to be able to move anywhere in the world.

On SALT II—we hope to restrain the Soviets’ strategic growth, but we must retain rough parity between the two sides.

Laird: We must understand that while Soviet military expenditures are about equal to ours their personnel costs about 20 percent of the total; ours cost about 60 percent of the total. We are falling behind in the strategic arms area. It will take great leadership to keep us in the ball game with them.

Our problem with the Congress is this. Other Cabinet members don’t try to dump everything into DOD.

President: These are good points, especially on manpower. The Soviet Union is moving forward in a number of strategic systems. Our Navy is still superior, but ours is an old Navy—the Soviets’ is a new one. Like the Germans going into World War II. What is involved is not just the U.S.-Soviet balance but the ability of the U.S. to play the role in the world we must play if we are to have peace. No other state can play
that role. No one fears the United States. If we end up as a number two, we are unable to keep the peace—and we are responsible for maintaining peace around the world. We have a tendency after every war to turn inward—it’s even worse this time because of the knuckle-headed professors.

If we don’t stay strong, NATO will fall apart, and the Japanese would have to assert themselves or make a deal with the Soviets. In the Third World, if we are number two, our influence for peace will go down. In the Middle East, those who want us to reduce defense are in the forefront of those urging arms to Israel.\(^2\) We can maybe be second in some areas, but in the Navy we can’t afford it.

As a result of our initiatives, we have cut military expenditures. We can go ahead in mutual arms cuts, but if we cut unilaterally, forget it.

While the goal of our policy is peace, it is ironic that the peaceniks’ policy [is] one that we could [not] tolerate.\(^3\)

Strength by itself is no policy. Neither is negotiation by itself—they must be in combination. Disarmament can’t be an end in itself. Where you have the Soviet Union as a threat to the world—which may be turning in now, but could break out any time—disarmament unilaterally would threaten a peaceful world. That would encourage aggression.

The Chinese—with the possible exception of the Japanese, the greatest event will be what happens to China. They have the capability to become the best and most productive. Right now the U.S. is their best friend.

They hate us, but if they are outside the club in 20 years, we could be in trouble. We must keep a balance, so the Soviet Union can’t feel it can give up the Chinese and get away with it.

The issue is whether our children will sit here in peace or in fear.

President: With prices and need going up, the development of the Soviet gas fields may be imperative. We are going like molasses in the nuclear field—let’s get moving.

On my decision, energy comes first and environment second.

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\(^2\) Nixon said, “Moment U.S. is #2, Israel is down the tube,” according to a draft memorandum of the conversation. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 2, October 4, 1973—Cabinet Meeting)

\(^3\) According to the draft memorandum of conversation, Nixon said, “Our policy has in fact been ‘PEACE.’ The demonstrators who said they wanted same would have created situation where we wouldn’t have peace today.” The President went on to note that he “Went to Quaker college—believed in peace, no arms at all. I’ve only shot a gun once in my life—a .45—in the Navy—missed target so far they never asked me to shoot again.” (Ibid.)
26. Editorial Note

On November 7, 1973, Congress dealt President Nixon a legislative setback when it voted to override his veto and to enact House Joint Resolution 542, known as the War Powers Resolution. As passed, the War Powers Act (Public Law 93–148), widely seen as a reassertion of congressional authority over foreign policy in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, where United States troops fought without a formal declaration of war, required the President to notify the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate within 48 hours of any commitment or substantial enlargement of United States combat forces abroad. The new legislation also stipulated that troop commitments be terminated within 60 days of the President’s initial report unless Congress declared war, specifically authorized continuation, or was unable to convene due to an armed attack upon the United States. Furthermore, it permitted Congress, at any time United States forces were engaged without a declaration of war or specific congressional authorization, by concurrent resolution to direct the President to withdraw such troops. The House of Representatives voted 284–135 in favor of the measure, four votes more than the two-thirds majority necessary under the Constitution to override; the Senate voted 75–18 to override. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 849–851)

President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution on October 24, just four days after his controversial firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. According to Nixon’s accompanying message to Congress, he vetoed the measure because the restrictions it imposed “upon the authorities of the President are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.” Specifically, he contended that the resolution’s 60-day limit on troop deployments and its provision by which Congress could effect troop withdrawal by mere joint resolution encroached upon the chief executive’s Constitutional powers. Moreover, he claimed that the resolution “would seriously undermine this Nation’s ability to act decisively and convincingly in time of international crisis. As a result, the confidence of our allies in our ability to assist them could be diminished and the respect of our adversaries for our deterrent posture could decline.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 893–895, 915)
27. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Roy Ash, Director, OMB
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (Ret’d), Assistant to the President
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: We must save our international airlines. You will have to draw down from DOD jet fuel. It’s tough, but we can’t let our airlines go down the tube. It’s imperative. The international lines are in a difficult situation.

Schlesinger: I will discuss it with Simon.

President: Tell me what you are going to do.

Schlesinger: In real program dollars, we will be going down steadily. We’ve done fairly well on the Hill. We expected a cut of $5 billion; they cut $3 billion.

As we look to FY 1975, the Department’s request came in at $95 billion, and outlays of $90 billion, to get to $84.

The increase in fuel costs will cost about $1 billion.

We are shrinking in total employment, and defense industry also. For each $1 billion in outlays, there are about 60,000 jobs and secondary employment of 90,000.

—We think our drawdowns should be rapidly replaced.
—Readiness is poor.
—We need increased airlift capability.
—We need increased rate of modernization.
—We need a strategic force option to offset any success or failure of SALT.
—There’s a major shortfall in incentives.
—We’re behind in ship and aircraft overhaul.
—In critical armor—TOW 19 percent, Maverick 30 percent—we are in bad shape.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Memcons—HAK & Presidential, Presidential/HAK Memcons, December 1973 [1 of 2]. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office from 3:11 to 4:04 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
—Airlift: To support NATO we need to be able to move one Division every five days. Now it takes 12 days.
—Our conventional force is aging.
—We need a new strategic capability and bargaining chips for SALT.
—The supplemental for FY 1974:
  • It has out-year implications adding $4 billion to out-year requests for TOA.
  • We need to improve our airlift capability.
  • This would stabilize the real-dollar program rather than allow the yearly shrinkage now taking place.

I would like to ask you to consider a supplemental—to add $3 billion in FY 1975 outlay.

As for the Intelligence Community: There’s been a fifty-percent manpower decrease since 1969. Output is reduced by one-third. It was bloated, but further reductions beyond what are presently programmed would jeopardize our take.

President: Roy [Ash]?

Ash: I agree in principle with the numbers. We are at the best possible tradeoff. We need to spend on things that have maximum impact on the economy in the short term.

President: What would it do to the budget?

Ash: It would add $3 billion to 1975. We are right around 300 now. It might bring us to 305. Revenues are at 292–294 now. We’ll probably have a deficit just about fitting the economy this year, just at the edge of . . .

This has to go in as a supplemental in January or we won’t see it for a year. We need the impact next summer. It is a good program.

President: Is defense the best place to put the money?

Ash: In certain areas. Increase inventory, O&M—this gets the money into the economy as rapidly as anything.

President: What is the Hill view?

Ash: McClellan will back it.

Schlesinger: Mahon is ambivalent. Stennis will back it. Oddly enough, our ’75 budget requires your decision before the ’74 supplemental.

President: What about the $2.2 (billion for Israel)? It’s sailing right through.

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2 On October 19, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, President Nixon asked the Congress for $2.2 billion in emergency security assistance funding for Israel to pay for equipment sent during the airlift. For the text of the President’s message, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 884–886.
Schlesinger: Yes.
President: What is the spending situation? Can we drag our feet?
Schlesinger: We have spent $1 billion. We are holding back on major items to give Henry leverage.
President: Hold back 25 percent more than Henry wants. Hold back, filibuster, drag your feet. We may want to goose it later, but now [we] don’t want to build Israel up to intransigence, but we want to have some carrot too.
I don’t have Henry’s confidence of Israeli cooperation. What is this Arab blackmail stuff? The Arabs just want what has been promised.
Be very slow in committing.
I want to see everything we are sending to Israel.
I want to go on the supplemental. If we need excess spending, I want to put it into Defense. None of this HEW. Same in Housing.
Al [Haig], get Timmons to start work on Mahon. Get Laird too. That is double-edged because it will start backfires.
Get the defense and military lobby going. We need to spend the money and I would like to spend it on Defense.
We are hurt in Southeast Asia, Laird says, in the budget.
Schlesinger: We got some of it back.
President: Why has the sentiment toward DOD changed?
Schlesinger: I think because of the Middle East war, the new equipment which proved so effective.
Cranston wanted the 2.2 out of DOD for the Israeli supplemental.
President: That is the L.A. lobby. The Jews have been doves in Vietnam and Hawks in the Middle East. If Golda loses, they may dig their heels in and lose the chance for peace.
But slow down on Israel.
Schlesinger: We have said we couldn’t spend until the supplemental is signed.
President: Scowcroft, I will sign only on the last day. Roy, here goes your balanced budget. But we need a strong defense and if we throw around money, here is the best place.
Any place else we could spend it? Energy?
Schlesinger: Energy, it won’t show up.

3 Reference is to Israel’s Knesset (parliament) elections held on December 31, 1973. Golda Meir’s Labor “alignment” retained 51 of 121 Knesset seats (down from 56). The Likud Party, Labor’s chief opposition, increased its membership by 25 percent—from 31 to 39 seats. With its victory, Meir was asked by the Israeli President to form a government and retained her position as Prime Minister.
President: Then let’s go. Is this enough?
Ash: We can’t do too much without pushing the effect into the out years. We want an immediate effect.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

28. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President: Carrero Blanco was a great man.
Moorer: The Spanish were very good during the Middle East war.
Zumwalt: So were the Arabs.

The President: With all the kicking around of the Europeans and Japanese, in their position, what would you do? The British are on a three-day week. Whose side would you be on? It is blackmail, but for over five years there has been no give in five years. We can’t deliver, and the Israelis dig in. So they won’t ship oil until there is movement. Their interests are realistic. If the Israelis dig in after their elections, all hell will break loose. The Arabs have learned to fight, not so well as the Israelis, but they did well. We normally side with Israel for many reasons, but we must realize this is the time for a settlement. I hope the hawks in Israel realize that.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 3, December 22, 1973—Nixon, Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs. Secret. Ellipses in the original. The meeting, also attended by Clements and Haig, was held in the White House Cabinet Room. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

2 Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Prime Minister of Spain from 1973 until his assassination on December 20.

3 See footnote 3, Document 27.
The Europeans should have cooperated with us because of the Soviet Union, but the basis of their position is how can they live without oil.

Moorer: NATO cannot fight without Arab oil.

The President: I want to say a couple of things. It came out better than expected on our appropriations. I was afraid that after Vietnam, the peaceniks would cut $15 billion. Ironically, the Middle East war helped us come out well. The Israeli lobby helped defend against cuts in the defense budget. Southeast Asia is still dangerous and our hands are tied. But the GVN will fight well.

Our Soviet summits bear on these things. But the basic fact is that our strength has to be such that we can play a peacemaking role in the world. Many Americans don’t want us to, but who else can? Japan and Germany could, but the world doesn’t want them to. Who else is big? The Soviet Union, the Chinese, and possibly the Japanese. The Japanese-American alliance is essential if the Japanese are not to make a deal with the Soviet Union against China; they could possibly make a deal with China but that is dangerous without our help. The rest of the world matters in humanitarian and raw material terms, but not in power terms.

Critical to us playing our role in the world is our strength and a policy which will command respect.

That gets us to our Armed Forces—and your problems. On the All-Volunteer force—I hope it will work but I’m afraid the quality will decline. If you can keep up the quality of the officer corps. Good people go to the academies in war and depression. I talked with Jim [Schlesinger]. We will support a strong budget. Jim, have you told them about the increased numbers?

Schlesinger: I said you were considering it.

The President: We are helped right now by the Israeli crisis. That will help with the airlift; and energy, which will cause some slack in the economy. Not much, but we will get Congressional support to boosting the budget a bit. We need the money in defense—particularly in hardware areas. But we won’t get it unless there are good reasons. We won’t get unlimited amounts but we want to look at some ideas.

My major concern is the power balance. But in order to sell it, we have to use the energy and airlift factors to get the money. That is where we stand.

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4 On December 20, Congress passed the FY 1974 Defense appropriations measure (HR 11575—PL 93–238), which approved $73.7 billion in spending. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 155–156)
I can’t tell you where we stand in SALT and MBFR except it will be tough.

With all our talks with the Soviet Union and the Chinese, we must realize they are basically antagonistic toward us—and with each other. The Chinese need us against the Soviet Union. We talk with them without illusions. We have to convince the American people that we are trying to have peaceful relations. But without adequate strength, our stance in the world wouldn’t matter. The Prime Minister of Chad doesn’t matter; we treat them nice, but none of them matter.

I have a bearish attitude about Europe. A united Europe is premature. The Europeans are essentially parochial. The chance they will form a third bloc is premature. We will stand with NATO, but the leadership won’t come from the Europeans—it must come from us.

If I had my way, I would add $20 billion to the budget but we can’t do that. The Soviet Union doesn’t care about that.

Admiral, you head off.

Admiral Moorer: This Christmas was better than last. Last year there was a major equipment push into Vietnam. This fall another push into Israel. We have reduced our staying power.

It was a good move, which had JCS support. Israel was not defeated and Arabs weren’t either.

We now need to look at the worldwide posture and our base structure. We need bases. The Portuguese have bases clear around Africa.

We should renegotiate Diego Garcia and readjust our deployment patterns, perhaps focusing on the Indian Ocean. We need bases, and we will be making recommendations. Ethiopia, for example. Subic is 5,000 miles from the Indian Ocean.

We could discuss SALT and MBFR later if we have time.

The President: It’s probably premature. We want a deal, but we will be tough.

Admiral Moorer: Defense has closed ranks. The Soviet position is intolerable and we will be very tough.

Admiral Zumwalt: I applaud your decision to add to the budget. I would like to compare the Mediterranean fleet now with where we were after Jordan.\(^5\) We have now less cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean than we had before. There are three elements: First is force levels. In ’70, we already were starting down. The most worrisome is the drop to 13 carriers from the peak of 24.

The President: Jim told me about that.

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Admiral Zumwalt: Vietnam pushed us back and the Middle East crisis has delayed the climb back up.

On the good side, we have used part of the money for laid-up ships to buy new ones. We are now buying at more than the replacement rates if Congress gives us our program.

We need to procure some low-cost ships in order to get numbers. The Soviet Union does this; they still buy diesel submarines. We in ’75 will have a cruise missile submarine.

Congress doesn’t like this—they are giving us two DLGN, which will cost $7–8 million. Conventional ships. We have to have a mix.

The President: Brent [Scowcroft], make a note on the bases and on the force mix.

All these Prime Ministers know the importance of the Indian Ocean. Bhutto—who is basically a left-wing clown—knows that India is important this way.

Why are the Thais shifting? Because they fear we may be leaving. There is a feeling in that part of the world that the U.S. is going home. What we have to do from a foreign policy standpoint—the U.S. has to have bases and naval strength. Everyone has to play a role—it must look apparent.

Take the British and the great role they played. It is the appearances of strength. We need that now in terms of bases, less expensive carriers. If the Air Force . . . You buy less expensive planes. We need the numbers. We need to have a presence, get the flag out. There will be bitching, but it is essential. We need to maintain a presence in Japan, Korea, irrespective of the real threat.

Admiral Zumwalt: You just took my conclusion out of my mouth, Mr. President. I wind up with 55 in our current capacity and 45 into modernization in ’70. Next year it is just the reverse. We will be able to keep up now with the Soviet rate.

The President: Abe [Abrams]?

General Abrams: I am trying to make the Army we have as combat-ready as we can. On manpower, we will make the combat level of the Army stronger and bigger. Even though the Army is smaller, the combat need is larger.

The President: What does that mean?

General Abrams: It means we reduce headquarters, consolidation, modify the training establishment. Maybe we’ll do more than we should, but we’ve got to go that way.

President: I agree if that is right—but not just because it is popular.

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Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan.
General Abrams: Materiel—here we have been supplying our friends with what we need for ourselves. As we are able to replace these, combat readiness will improve. The third thing is the officer and NCO esprit. They have to have strength to take the brick bats.

The President: I remember talking to MacArthur. He was tough in practice. Your people are in the service because you believe. That is what we must have. The British again, they would pick the military because it was a way to serve. We want to be sure you all know we’ve got to have a strong officer and NCO Corps. The great earlier military leaders led rabble. The leadership is important. I know in an All-Volunteer force the blacks have gone up. Don’t wring your hands about them. They can become fine men. The job of the military is not rehabilitation but it is a great service the military performs and they can turn into fine Americans. In sports, the blacks might not have the brains and education, but they have more drive and guts. Americans are snobs—about color, education, etc. The blacks, with the training the service can give them, can contribute to this country.

General Abrams: We are snobs. When we decided to help the RF/PF, we made a rule that the only people who could work with them were those who had served in a rifle company. That was because a rifle company combat forces men to change their values. They come out of this experience with a better sense of values.

The President: They see who the men are.

General Abrams: I was addressing a group once and a black asked me about the number of blacks coming into the Army. I told him it was of no concern to me. The audience went wild with applause. The same thing with women. They are trying harder; they have a motivation the men don’t have.

The President: Are our tanks inferior to Soviet tanks—straight out?

General Abrams: No, they are not.

The President: Do we need more and better tanks and anti-tank weapons?

General Abrams: Tanks.

On supplying our allies, we have got to do it. That damned State Department. Take Peru—some of the Latin Americans need tanks as a front. But they will buy them and we should sell them. If you get more money, what is the first thing you would do? Which would affect production?

General Abrams: Tanks.

The President: I want a hard look at getting more tanks.

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Let’s hear from the Air Force.

General Brown: In this supplemental, I think the dollars will count for a lot. These are not manpower dollars. The inspired airlift will help us greatly.

The President: We were better in the October airlift. Why?

General Brown: Because of the C–5’s.

The President: Should we buy more?

General Brown: We are studying both the C–5 and 747.

Secretary Clements: We need to study this.

The President: All our talk of bases may come to naught because of Fulbright and the others. The airlift is an impressive thing that people see. Won’t the C–5 and 747 produce jobs quickly?

Secretary Clements: Yes, but it will take time for Lockheed.

The President: Don’t discuss jobs outside this room, but unemployment could go to 6–7% and still we’d get nothing. Congress will go to public service jobs—that means nothing to the country. To goose the economy, the private sector is the best place. In government the best place is the military, because it helps the country. Don’t write any memos on this. We are doing it for the right reasons—the recession just gives us the excuse.

General Brown: I have two other points, in addition to the need for bases. We will get programs to increase your options in strategic forces and to apply the lessons of the Middle East. We are working on stand-off systems—and we will use the supplemental to keep this going—for us and for the Israelis if war comes again.

Our manpower quality has never been higher.

The President: I read every day about the improved Soviet strategic capability. Aren’t we falling behind?

General Brown: The Soviet Union is doing development rather than prototypes; we used to, but we try to do it now on paper. That is where they have it over us.

The President: Let’s do more of that.

For MAP, let’s try to have not just the most sophisticated systems, but something we can sell that they can use.

General Brown: We will increase the yield of the Minuteman. We are looking at a bigger missile.

The President: Do we need it?

General Brown: Yes. Depending on SALT.

The President: Yes. The fact that we are ahead of the Soviets in Navy helped us in SALT I. We are ahead in submarines and navy missiles, aren’t we?
General Cushman: We need to modernize. We get tanks and anti-tank from the Army and ships from the Navy, so whatever helps them there, helps us. People are our secret weapon. I agree with Abe, but my only concern with the blacks is they tend to concentrate in units where the fighting would be, leaving us open—wrongly—to racial charges.

The President: This add-on idea is mine and it will be a job selling it. In your speeches, don’t put it into anti-Soviet tones, but say that we must be second to none; if SALT fails we have to be able to take care of our needs. Stress being number one—not anti-Soviet stridency. We can’t afford to be number two. We need a sense of direction and the right perspectives.

You were magnificent today. I think people should be proud of the uniform. Wear your uniforms when you are out—tell your people to.

The great sadness in America today—and we are part of the elite—is the state of the elite class. The ministers, professors, the media,—with many exceptions in all of them—these groups who mold the youth are wrong-headed. Much of this comes from businessmen also.

The character flaw in the elite is they are ashamed of our country. They are unilateral disarmers. They don’t believe we should play a role in the world. They won’t face the question: if we don’t play the role, who will?

I have met with all of them. You are part of the elite. You must confront them, try to show them what should be our real values. Look at the leaders of our opponents—they come from the soil. They are simple and tough—they’re peasants. If it weren’t for their terrible Communist system, we would be in terrible trouble. Our system is better. America has a crisis in its elite class. Will we go the way of the British, French, Italians, and maybe even the Germans? Their problem is they are afraid of the left. Their idea is: no role in the world, just take care of ourselves. It would be easy for you to pander to these elite attitudes, but unless some of the elite start to speak up, we will be finished in 5–10 years. The day we look down on the threats and we blink, we are finished.

Let me say in conclusion, we must be proud of the United States and every war we have fought in this country. We are nonaggressive; we have no designs on anyone. We have never had a greater chance for dealing with the Soviet Union and the Chinese and in the Middle East. The key to it all is in this room. We won’t get all we want, but what we need is the spirit of our military and with the elite.

I know you are sick of the speeches to Kiwanis and all that, and the badgering you take, but stick with it. We have to carry the burden.

Thank you.
29. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting

Washington, January 7, 1974, 12:10–1:02 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Sy [Weiss]—on overseas bases?

Mr. Weiss: You’ve asked from time to time that we try to bring to your attention things that are on a somewhat longer basis—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Weiss:—and I wasn’t going to repeat Winston’s [Lord] remarks. You know, there are essentially three points that we touch on in the paper. The first has to do with the growing nature of the quid pro quo, what it might get them. The defense budget might usefully lend itself to this with regard to aid. And the second is the terms and circumstances under which negotiations—

Secretary Kissinger: I made some marginal comments on it when I read it. Now I’ve forgotten.

Mr. Weiss: In any event, the second had to do with the extent to which we may find it necessary—or even in our interests—to build a treaty group with respect to other ways of extending agreements. The third had to do with the special ways of extending Mediterranean bases.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what I’m interested in, before we get to the technical issues, is to get a look at our base structure today—whether we’re in a position to fight in those areas where we are most likely to fight—and, especially, to analyze what are strategically the most important areas. I would think that the Persian Gulf and the Middle East rate very high now.

Now, is our base structure directed towards involving ourselves in those areas? I would doubt it very seriously.

Mr. Weiss: It is not, and we’ve known this for some time. And we’ve had a difficult time in the past getting people to face up to this fact. Congress has defended their base structure in the past. Wherever we move you’re going to face hell getting it. I’ve talked with a number
of the senior people in Defense, and this was a very sobering experience for them. And we are now trying to pursue this with them.

Secretary Kissinger: What bases did they think they could use in the event they couldn’t use some?

Mr. Weiss: Well, even Spain, for example. Of course, the Spaniards did to some extent turn, you know—turn away.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. But any FSO–8 who works on the Spanish Desk could have told them that the Spaniards wouldn’t let them use bases directed against the Arabs.

Mr. Weiss: We know that, and we did tell them. But they resisted.

Secretary Kissinger: Is there such a thing as an FSO–8?

Mr. Brown: Very few!

(Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: You are the Career Minister?

Mr. Brown: That’s right.

Mr. Weiss: We’re doing precisely now what you suggest. I don’t know how soon we’ll have the results, but I think the major difference is that the people in Defense—Bill [Casey] may want to speak to this; he’s involved in various aspects of it—are now becoming more realistic. The alternatives are not the answer; the alternatives are not terribly promising. There are very useful places where one could say, from a political point of view, we very likely could utilize it—and in a particular contingency, in an Arab-Israeli engagement.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have two problems. One is an Arab-Israeli engagement; the other is the possibility that we may have to intervene at some time to protect access to raw materials.

And we are now living in a never-never land, I am certain, in which tiny, poor and weak nations can hold up for ransom some of the industrialized world. So once you get a lowering of the living standard of the world, it’s untenable.

This may be five years away. I cannot believe that all nations will permit a situation like this over a period of time. In addition to whether you want to do it, your capability of doing it will affect the assessment that these rulers make as to what they can get away with.

Mr. Weiss: And there is a further interaction because if we do get to that point in time then—

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me for talking like this!

(Laughter.)

Mr. Weiss:—the political willingness, of course, of some of these states may change too. For example, if the Europeans reach the same conclusion that it becomes untenable to be squeezed in that way, then
their willingness to let us utilize bases would be quite different than in
the present circumstances.

Well, these are things that we’re now looking at. It will be a long
time.

Secretary Kissinger: If we wanted to intervene in the Persian Gulf
today, what would be our capabilities? Is it possible to get an analysis
of that question?

Mr. Weiss: Yes; we can get it. I can tell you offhand it depends on
the precise circumstances. For example, you have Diego [Garcia]. We
have another memo on its way to you.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with Diego we have trouble flying re-
connaissance planes out right now.

Mr. Weiss: Well, there has been some further discussion with the
British. Defense has a very large increase in its budget for substantially
updating its facilities. They’re including a larger airfield and so forth.
We’re going to have some problems with the British on this because, as
you know, we treated it as an austere operating facility and now we’re
talking about making it into a more updated base. I don’t think it’s un-
necessary, undue.

Mr. Casey: Is one of the problems the long-term lease of one of
those facilities?

Mr. Weiss: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: They collect more!

(Laughter.)

Mr. Rush: What page is he on in that book, do you know?

Secretary Kissinger: At least a hundred pages worth of cables to
me!

(Laughter.)

Mr. Weiss: But there are other possibilities out there. As I’m sure
you’re aware, Defense is thinking about Ethiopia—the air capability
there. Now, how durable these things are there—I think we’re a long
way—

Secretary Kissinger: After pushing us away.

Mr. Newsom: Can I make a comment on this paper, Mr. Secret-
tary? I think the discussion of possible defense funding doesn’t really
highlight enough two aspects of quid pro quos for bases. One is the
volume of money—the amount of money—that would be required. It
would be very difficult to get out of the usual defense budget. And the
second is the fact that many of the developing countries which may be

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4 The referenced paper is not further identified.
prepared to offer us bases do not want to receive money which looks like rent. They want to receive assistance which they can use for their own political advantages. And I think any study of this kind should highlight the fact that the real resources that we can use for quid pro quo—military—and, to a lesser extent, economic assistance—are declining, and declining substantially, so that we can’t really begin to talk.

The Ethiopians are a perfect case. If we go back into Ethiopia with any substantial activity, we’re going to have to talk to them in terms of military assistance of a volume quite beyond anything that is feasible at the present time. And just defense fund rent is not going to meet either the political or the financial requirements of the situation.

Mr. Weiss: I agree with Dave [Newsom], but all this really points up is the kind of dilemma that we have—because, on the one hand, is our desire to have a capacity, flexibility, to involve ourselves, if it’s in our national interest to do so. On the other hand, the two sources that anybody has thought about—neither seems to be readily available or necessarily suitable in all respects.

Secretary Kissinger: Tom [Pickering], would you ask Scowcroft to get an NSC study of this problem?

Mr. Pickering: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think we can do it entirely in State—to get a NSSM out on, first, the strategic implications of base structure—and, second, raising the legal and funding problems that Sy has raised—and give it a fairly short deadline—say, six weeks.

Mr. Pickering: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: And it should be related to foreseeable threats and foreseeable diplomacy.

You know, Defense has an idea to use Portuguese bases.

Mr. Porter: That’s right. Extension bases. But they’re getting pretty hot about it.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. I think that’s an expensive thing.

Mr. Weiss: May I ask one question in this regard? You would like this, in effect, worldwide and not just limited to the Persian Gulf?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, worldwide. And then I want to identify possible areas in which the United States might have to operate over the next 15 years—or, if it does not have to operate, they may want to project military or economic influence—because if you have no plausible capability of intervening, then you can’t even use your military power.

I’d like to do that on a worldwide basis and then see what types of bases and where we should strive for. Then we should look at the funding problems in that context.
Mr. Ingersoll: May I raise a point on the funding? The recommendation of rentals being offered would set a bad precedent for Japan and the Philippines, where we paid our rentals.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Ingersoll: This would increase the bill. Whenever you do it someplace, then you have to look at it elsewhere.

Secretary Kissinger: In those cases where we are familiar with the bases—such as Japan or Spain—I think the pressures are to move in the direction of more political things.

Mr. Weiss: Absolutely; that’s what they really want.

Secretary Kissinger: And, therefore, I don’t think that the defense rule is going to be politically the most accepted.

Mr. Weiss: I agree with that. This is one of the things that we’re looking at in this study that we looked at earlier—namely, the aid program. We may have to put increased emphasis on that. But, at this point, it’s going to be hard to be optimistic to persuade Mr. Fulbright that you should get more money for extension of AID programs overseas.

Mr. Ingersoll: But we want to get AID to pay more of the cost rather than for us to pay them.

Mr. Weiss: But a similar situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the honeymoon with Fulbright is going to end on that issue.

Dave?

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]
30. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**

Washington, undated.

**SUBJECT**

Nuclear Policy

The Verification Panel of the National Security Council has been examining our nuclear policies, both for strategic warfare and for theater use, with the objective of providing you a more flexible nuclear employment policy. The initial results of this effort are contained in the draft National Security Decision Memorandum at Tab A.

The draft NSDM is a major first step in providing comprehensive Presidential guidance for consideration of the basic elements of nuclear policy:

— _Strategic Objectives._ It reiterates the deterrence objectives of U.S. nuclear strategy along the lines of your annual foreign policy report.

— _Employment Policy._ It provides Presidential guidance for development of more flexible war plans for the use of available U.S. forces against specific target systems under limited as well as general war scenarios.

— _Declaratory Policy._ The Department of State is to prepare recommendations on how and to what extent the U.S. explains its nuclear policies to other countries, both friend and foe.

The draft NSDM provides the first comprehensive national framework for coordinating each of these aspects of our nuclear policy. As such, it will be helpful in streamlining our nuclear posture, making it more effective and responsive to Presidential direction. It also will provide a conceptual basis which should strengthen the justification for our nuclear arms programs before the Congress.

Equally important, the draft NSDM would establish a dynamic process of review, analysis and evaluation of our nuclear policies and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–202, Study Memorandums, NSSM 191 [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Lodal forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum of December 29, 1973 and recommended that Kissinger send it to the President. Lodal’s memorandum also recommended issuing two directives on nuclear policy—a NSDM on employment and a NSSM on acquisition—as the response to NSSM 169 had left unresolved “serious ambiguities” pertaining to the latter issue. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–242, Policy Papers, NSDM 242 1 of 2 [2 of 2])

2 See Document 22.

3 The revised NSDM, as signed, is Document 31.

4 See footnote 4, Document 17.
their practical consequences. This will assist coordination and refinement of our plans and policies and insure that proposals for implementing actions are carefully considered within the NSC system.

**Employment Policy**

Until now there has been no Presidential guidance on how the U.S. should plan for a nuclear conflict. The only options at the national level were developed by the JCS. This was done at a time when we had massive nuclear superiority. As a result, the only planned options we have in response to aggression require major attack on the Soviet Union despite the fact that there is now approximate nuclear parity between the two countries.

The concept that we could “win” a war through virtually unlimited nuclear exchanges has become increasingly irrational as the Soviets acquired the capability to destroy the United States—even if the U.S. were to strike first. This has resulted in concern that such a strategy is no longer credible and that it detracts from our overall deterrent.

To overcome these shortcomings, the proposed NSDM sets forth employment policy which:

1. Provides for the development of a broad range of limited options aimed at terminating war on terms acceptable to the U.S. at the lowest level of conflict feasible. To do this, the options must control escalation by setting clear boundaries on the scale of the attack. Both strategic and theater nuclear forces are covered in this guidance.

2. Maintains the major SIOP-type options in the event that escalation cannot be controlled. However, instead of wholesale destruction of Soviet military forces, people and industry, these options are to aim at:
   - Inhibiting the early return of the Soviet Union to major power status by systematic attacks on Soviet military, economic and political structures.
   - Limiting damage to the U.S. to the extent feasible.
   - Maintaining a survivable strategic reserve force for continued protection of the U.S. after a major conflict.

**NSC Review Process**

The proposed policy guidance could, in time, bring about far-reaching changes in our nuclear posture. Therefore, it was considered prudent to establish a process for examination and review within the NSC of the practical consequences of the policy before significant changes are made in our nuclear postures. Specifically, the draft NSDM calls for:

- The first set of limited options to be submitted to you for approval within three months and thereafter a quarterly review of the available and proposed nuclear employment options.
—An evaluation by Defense of the capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with the new major attack plans and procedures.

In addition, there will be a requirement that agencies concerned review their crisis management procedures. At the same time, the Defense Department is instructed to develop for your consideration, recommendations on a senior level staff organization to provide you advice in a crisis.

Political Considerations

The Verification Panel has also considered the political aspects of the new policy guidance.

—Our allies tend to see any changes whatsoever in U.S. nuclear policy as an attempt to decouple our strategic forces from the deterrence of local aggression in Europe and Asia. However, we believe they will come to realize that the proposed policy is designed to have the opposite effect.

—The Soviet Union and the PRC of course cannot be expected to respond favorably, but neither is the new policy likely to harm our improving relations with either country.

—The Congressional reaction in the main, will be focused on the impact of the policy on new weapons expenditures and on our arms control efforts. We believe the new NSDM will strengthen our ability to argue the case for sound weapons programs and our arms control posture.

The draft NSDM deals with these concerns in two additional ways:

—First, the Departments concerned are instructed to treat the new guidance as an evolution and refinement of US policy and not as a sharp new departure in strategy. The Presidential guidance would not be made public.

—Second, the need to inform our allies and the reaction of the USSR and the PRC will be examined by State and CIA. Their conclusions and recommendations will be made available to you through the NSC system.

These steps should enable us to moderate and maintain the political impact of the new policy guidance.

Acquisition Policy

At present, Presidential guidance for nuclear forces is contained in NSDM 163 issued in June 1969. It established criteria for the acquisition of strategic nuclear forces but does not cover their employment. The ac-

acquisition guidance in NSDM 16⁶ is no longer adequate, and new guidance is needed in light of Soviet nuclear advances, the SALT agreements, and the need for greater flexibility in options for the possible use of nuclear forces.

While some work has been done, further work is needed before I can recommend to you a proposed policy for future acquisition of nuclear systems. Attached at Tab B⁷ is a draft NSSM which would direct a study of U.S. policy for the acquisition of nuclear forces. The study will develop recommended acquisition policy guidelines to support the deterrent and employment objectives set forth in the proposed NSDM on employment policy. In addition, the study will take into account such issues as:

—U.S. ability to respond to projected threats to strategic offensive forces;
—Future counterforce capabilities for strategic missiles;
—Realignments of forward nuclear deployments in Asia;
—Modernizing nuclear forces deployed in NATO.

The study also directs ACDA to assess the impact of the draft NSDM and of the recommended acquisition policy upon our arms control positions. This is intended to ensure that the U.S. position on various arms control issues advances our basic security needs.

The results of this study will allow us to establish criteria for acquisition of U.S. nuclear forces, which take into account both their deterrent role and the need for flexibility in the employment of these forces should deterrence fail.

Summary

The draft NSDM:

(1) Provides more realistic, unified, encompassing nuclear policy than we now have.

(2) Requires the development of limited nuclear options for your review and approval.

(3) Gives guidance to review our major attack options to orient them toward enhancing the relative post-war position of the U.S. and less toward wholesale destruction of potential opponents.

⁶ NSDM 16 contains four acquisition criteria: (1) maintain high confidence in US second strike capability; (2) insure Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the US first; (3) maintain capability to deny Soviets ability to inflict more deaths and industrial damage on US than Soviets suffer; and, (4) deploy defenses which limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Not found attached. The NSSM, as signed, is Document 32.
(4) Calls for the necessary command, control and communication systems and crisis management arrangements to support a more flexible nuclear posture.

(5) Establishes a dynamic process for the review of the practical results of the new guidance and of the guidance itself to ensure it meets our policy needs.

The draft NSSM will allow us to establish criteria for acquisition of U.S. nuclear forces, which take into account both their deterrent role and the need for flexibility in the employment of these forces should deterrence fail.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab A.
That you authorize me to sign the NSSM at Tab B. 8

8 The President initialed his approval of both recommendations, circled the phrases “me to sign,” and wrote, “RN will sign.”

31. National Security Decision Memorandum 242


TO

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons

Based on a review of the study conducted in response to NSSM 169 and discussions by the Verification Panel, I have reached the following decisions on United States policy regarding planning for nuclear weapons employment. These decisions do not constitute a major

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs 145–264. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Ray and Moorer.
2 See Document 17.
3 See Document 22.
new departure in U.S. nuclear strategy; rather, they are an elaboration of existing policy. The decisions reflect both existing political and military realities and my desire for a more flexible nuclear posture.

This NSDM provides the policy framework for planning the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons. It also establishes the process by which the principal aspects of this policy will be coordinated, reviewed and revised.

Planning Nuclear Weapons Employment for Deterrence

The fundamental mission of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear war, and plans for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces should support this mission. Our deterrence objectives are:

1. To deter nuclear attacks against the United States, its forces, and its bases overseas.
2. In conjunction with other U.S. and allied forces, to deter attacks—conventional and nuclear—by nuclear powers against U.S. allies and those other nations whose security is deemed important to U.S. interests.
3. To inhibit coercion of the United States by nuclear powers and, in conjunction with other U.S. and allied forces, help inhibit coercion of U.S. allies by such powers.

The United States will rely primarily on U.S. and allied conventional forces to deter conventional aggression by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Nevertheless, this does not preclude U.S. use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression.

Planning Limited Nuclear Employment Options

Should conflict occur, the most critical employment objective is to seek early war termination, on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies, at the lowest level of conflict feasible. This objective requires planning a wide range of limited nuclear employment options which could be used in conjunction with supporting political and military measures (including conventional forces) to control escalation.

Plans should be developed for limited employment options which enable the United States to conduct selected nuclear operations, in concert with conventional forces, which protect vital U.S. interests and limit enemy capabilities to continue aggression. In addition, these options should enable the United States to communicate to the enemy a determination to resist aggression, coupled with a desire to exercise restraint.

Thus, options should be developed in which the level, scope, and duration of violence is limited in a manner which can be clearly and credibly communicated to the enemy. The options should (a) hold
some vital enemy targets hostage to subsequent destruction by survivable nuclear forces, and (b) permit control over the timing and pace of attack execution, in order to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider his actions.

Planning for General War

In the event that escalation cannot be controlled, the objective for employment of nuclear forces is to obtain the best possible outcome for the United States and its allies. To achieve this objective, employment plans should be developed which provide to the degree practicable with available forces for the following:

1. Maintenance of survivable strategic forces in reserve for protection and coercion during and after major nuclear conflict.

2. Destruction of the political, economic, and military resources critical to the enemy’s postwar power, influence, and ability to recover at an early time as a major power.

3. Limitation of damage to those political, economic, and military resources critical to the continued power and influence of the United States and its allies.

Further Guidance and Presidential Review of Employment Plans

The Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance consistent with this NSDM to serve as the basis for the revision of operational plans for the employment of nuclear forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An information copy of this guidance should be provided to the President and Secretary of State.

Within three months, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review an initial set of limited employment options. At quarterly intervals thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review a summary of available options and an analysis of any additional recommended options. Each presentation should include illustrative scenarios for each limited employment option.

Within six months the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President an analysis of the political, economic, and selected military targets considered critical to potential enemy’s postwar power influence and recovery as a major power. Appropriate aspects of this analysis should be coordinated with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence.

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4 Under an April 10 covering memoranda, Wickham forwarded to Scowcroft the OSD’s “Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” which set forth strategic concepts, planning concepts, major and selected attack options, and limited and regional nuclear options. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–243, Policy Papers, NSDM 242, 1 of 2 [2 of 2])
In addition, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the President an evaluation of the effectiveness, limitations and risks of the resultant operational plans. Interim results of this evaluation should be reported approximately every six months at significant points in the process of revision.

Command, Control, and Crisis Management

To insure that nuclear forces are responsive to the national command authorities, employment planning for command, control, communications and surveillance must support decision-making and force execution, taking into account U.S. nuclear employment objectives and options, the survivability of the forces themselves, and the consequences of direct attack on the command control systems. At a minimum, this planning should provide for:

1. Essential support to decision-making and execution of retaliatory strikes in the event of large attacks on the United States.

2. Adequate support for decision-making and flexible use of nuclear forces in attempts to control escalation in local conflict. Employment planning for this function may assume that the national level command, control, and communications systems and associated sensors supporting the National Command Authorities are not subject to direct attack.

With regard to crisis management procedures:

1. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall refine their crisis management procedures to provide timely political-military assessments and recommendations to the National Command Authority to support potential nuclear employment decisions. The revised procedures should be submitted to the President for review by March 31, 1974.

2. The Secretary of Defense shall in addition submit to the President by March 31, 1974, detailed recommendations on the desirability, composition, operations, facilities, and physical location of a senior level staff to provide prompt military advice to the National Command Authority on the possible use of nuclear forces in a crisis.

3. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, shall conduct a continuing evaluation of the national level crisis management procedures. Within six months, the Defense Program Review Committee shall prepare an initial report on the adequacy of present interagency organizational arrangements for Presidential review. Future annual reports shall contain evaluations of appropriate tests and exercises of these procedures.

Additional Actions

The Secretary of State shall prepare an analysis of any necessary actions related to informing the NATO Alliance and other states, in-
including the Soviet Union and the PRC, of changes in U.S. nuclear policy. The analysis should include a discussion of the extent to which we need to inform other states and the key considerations in making decisions on these issues. This study should identify for each alliance and, as applicable, on a nation-by-nation basis, those aspects whose disclosures should be avoided. In support of this effort, the Director of Central Intelligence should prepare a special assessment of likely Soviet and PRC reactions to the new policies, and how these might be influenced by US statements and actions.

The Secretary of Defense should prepare an analysis, from the point of view of military preparedness, of the desirability of any changes in current arrangements for allied participation in NATO nuclear planning.

The results of these additional actions should be submitted for review by the Verification Panel by March 31, 1974.

Richard Nixon

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5 Under a May 10 covering memorandum, Rush distributed the Department’s report on declaratory policy, which noted that foreign reactions to the new U.S. nuclear employment policy had been “varied.” Whereas, Japan and the PRC had responded with “near silence,” Western European “reactions have been largely favorable, reflecting the view that the strengthening of the US military capability would enhance their own security.” Meanwhile, Soviet reactions were “negative,” reflecting “concern that the new doctrine is inconsistent” with SALT. (Ibid., RG 59, S/S-1 Files, Lot File 83D305, NSDMs, 1969–1977, NSDM 242)
32. National Security Study Memorandum 191


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT
Policy for Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Forces

In order to develop policy guidelines for the acquisition of nuclear weapon systems which will support the deterrent and employment objectives set forth in NSDM 242, I direct the preparation of a study of U.S. policy for the acquisition of nuclear forces. Within this context, the proposed policy should include:

—specific planning objectives to be met by the U.S. nuclear force posture;
—desired aggregate characteristics of the U.S. nuclear force posture.

The study should draw heavily on earlier study efforts such as the response to NSSM 169 and should take into consideration such issues as:

—U.S. ability to respond to projected threats to strategic offensive forces;
—future counterforce capabilities for U.S. strategic missiles;
—realignments of forward nuclear deployments in Asia;
—modernization of nuclear forces deployed in NATO;
—current U.S. arms control policies and approaches to be undertaken in MBFR, SALT II and negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The study should provide background rationale for each major policy recommendation, identifying how each differs from or is consonant with past policy statements in both language and substance. It should identify features of the proposed policy that would foster departures from the currently planned force posture and describe the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs Nos. 104–206. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Ray and Moorer.
2 Document 31.
3 Document 17.
nature of such departures and their military and foreign policy implications.

The study should be conducted by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense and composed of representatives from each of the addressees, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the NSC staff. (The arms control portion of the study should be chaired by a representative of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)

The study should be submitted for my consideration by April 1, 1974.4

Richard Nixon

4 In a February 4, 1976 memorandum to Scowcroft, Boverie recommended closing the books on NSSM 191, the response to which was “long overdue” and “unlikely to be completed.” Although Scowcroft did not approve Boverie’s recommendation, no further action pertinent to the study was taken. (Ibid., Box H–202, Study Memorandums, NSSM 191 [2 of 2])

33. National Security Study Memorandum 192


TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Chemical Weapons Policy

The President has noted the NSSM 157 reports2 and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee’s second annual review of U.S. chemical

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs Nos. 104–206. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. Kissinger forwarded the NSSM to Nixon under an undated covering memorandum with the recommendation that he approve its issuance. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, Study Memoranda, NSSM 157 [1 of 4])

warfare and biological research programs—which considered, *inter alia*, the need for further examination of U.S. CW posture options following a decision on NSSM 157.

However, prior to deciding what, if any, CW limitations are in the interests of the United States, the President has directed a study of United States deterrent/retaliatory posture options for chemical weapons.

Drawing upon past reports as appropriate, including those noted above, this study should comprise (1) an updated summary of the threat and of the rationale for chemical weapons; (2) an updated review of the U.S. and allied chemical warfare capability and programs, and existing and potential constraints on these programs; and (3) full analysis, with advantages and disadvantages, of such CW posture options as the following:

—Improved offensive and defensive CW capability, with particular emphasis on planned and prospective binary capabilities and forward deployment.

—Reliance on the existing CW capability, including consideration of what actions might be required to avoid significant deterioration of this capability over time.

—Reliance on a more limited CW retaliatory option with some improved defensive measures.

—Reliance on improved defensive measures only (recognizing that this calls into question the retaliatory aspect of the present deterrent/retaliatory policy).

The study should also note the relationship of the above considerations and options to the arms control alternatives set forth in the NSSM 157 report.

The President has directed that this study be performed by an NSC Ad Hoc Group, comprising representatives of the addressees and chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The study should be submitted for consideration of the Senior Review Group by March 29, 1974.

Henry A. Kissinger

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3 Not found.
34. National Security Study Memorandum 196


TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Overseas Military Base Structure

The President has directed that a study be made of the requirements for maintaining a viable overseas military base structure to support US strategy over the next 10 years. The study should address the adequacy of our overseas bases and access thereto in terms of the consequences of political restriction or denial on US ability to: (a) contribute to regional stability through our military presence; (b) provide logistic, technical or other non-combat support for our allies and friends in a crisis or conflict and for our overseas activities; and (c) respond to a crisis or conflict with US military forces.

The study should be conducted in two phases. The first phase should identify, on a world-wide basis, deficiencies in our current overseas military base structure. This portion of the study should identify:

—scenarios which would require the use of US overseas military bases;
— the extent to which our access to and use of these bases is likely to be subject to political restrictions or denial in these scenarios;
— the impact on our overseas base requirements of restrictions in overflight rights.

The second phase of the study should address, on a regional basis, the means to correct the deficiencies in the current overseas base structure. This portion of the study should identify:

—actions which could be taken to lessen the likelihood of restrictions on the use of current bases and existing overflight rights;
—hardware or other alternatives expected to be available within the 10 year period which could reduce US overseas base requirements or the vulnerability of overseas bases to political denial or restrictions;

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–203, Study Memorandums, NSSM 196 [1 of 2]. Secret. Copies were sent to Moorer and Ash. Kissinger referred to this study in his staff meeting, January 7, the record of which is Document 29.
—possible basing and access alternatives which are needed to correct any remaining deficiencies;
—for each such alternative, the related budgetary costs, Congressional implications, vulnerability to political denial or restrictions, and likely reactions by other countries.

To the extent applicable, the study should take into account the assessment contained in the December 1968 report entitled "A Study of US Overseas Base Requirements in the 1970’s" (SDG 68–033), prepared by the special State-Defense study group under the direction of General Robert J. Wood, USA.2

The study should be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of Defense. The study should be submitted by April 30, 1974, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to its consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger


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35. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting1

Washington, March 15, 1974, 3:13–4:04 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Secretary Kissinger: All right, Sy [Weiss]; do you want to talk about the aircraft carrier?

Mr. Weiss: Yes, sir. We’ve been looking at the aircraft carrier problem against the importance that they’ve had to us in the past and the recognition that they may be even more important in the future, given the increasing inflexibility that we expect that we’re going to...
suffer as a result of a contracting base structure—either because the bases won’t be there or they won’t be there when we need them.

The carrier has a very special kind of flexibility in that situation.

Against that background, the defense plans are interesting and, in some respects, not too encouraging. They plan to reduce the current 15-carrier level down to 12 by 1977, and this raises a number of questions that we thought we could usefully focus on and, if we can come to some conclusions, perhaps engage Defense on them.

The first and most obvious question, of course, is: Can we keep a 15-carrier level?

There are a number of problems related to this—just to tick off a few of them: The cost is an enormous consideration. New carriers costs about a billion dollars, and that’s just a start. That’s just starting with the nuclear carrier. The air group that goes with it—anywhere from 2 and a half to 5 million dollars over a ten-year period.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But the air group would cost us that no matter where we put it.

Mr. Weiss: Yes. But if you have 12 carriers, you don’t have 15 air groups.

Secretary Kissinger: But if you put them on land, you still would need that much for airplanes.

Mr. Weiss: You would, except I’m saying the probability is there is a relationship between the number of air groups and the carriers, at least, that you have. In terms of the bases, you’re right. But the question is: Will we have the bases to put them overseas?

Secretary Kissinger: My point is: If you count the airplanes as a cost consideration, do you need them or not?

Mr. Weiss: Oh, absolutely.

Secretary Kissinger: And if you need them, whether they’re on carriers or someplace else doesn’t increase the cost.

Mr. Weiss: Well, the point is: Your need is not unrelated to the base—whether it’s a floating base or a physical base. Now, if we think we have the bases overseas, then we have to have them.

Secretary Kissinger: No. You don’t get my point. My point is it is not proper to count the airplanes as part of the expense of a carrier—

Mr. Weiss: No, but—

Secretary Kissinger: —because either you need the airplanes or you don’t need the airplanes. If you need the airplanes, you’ll either need them on a carrier or you’ll need them someplace else.

Mr. Weiss: O.K.

Secretary Kissinger: The carrier is an additional investment if you have overseas bases. I happen to be for carriers.
Mr. Weiss: I know; I know.

Secretary Kissinger: I’d be in favor of more and smaller carriers.

Mr. Weiss: I was going to get to that in just a second here, because that is an option. Nevertheless, even the cost of the carrier is a problem. As you know, it’s run into a problem in Congress. There’s the lead time in question. It takes about seven years from the point that you lay the keel to the point where you have an operational capability.

Defense is looking at a whole range of options. For example, they have instructed the Navy to take a look at building a carrier—what can you build within 550 million dollars—which still sounds like an awful lot of dough. The fact of the matter is that’s in a very early stage of planning.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, has the Navy decided on a submarine?

Mr. Weiss: They haven’t decided on anything yet. It hasn’t gotten that far. It’s probably true that that development of the carrier will be related to a V–STOL aircraft, because one of the features of these larger carriers is the arresting gear and so forth. And what they’d like to do is do away with that.

Secretary Kissinger: But the question also is whether you need all of that sophisticated aircraft for the circumstances in which you are most likely to use carriers.

Mr. Weiss: That’s correct; absolutely right.

Secretary Kissinger: In Viet-Nam it turned out that [the] most effective weapons were the least sophisticated ones and that the most sophisticated ones were, in many cases, irrelevant—on truck kills. I think 85 percent came from these DC–4 gunships.

Mr. Weiss: That, again, is one of the issues we raise. And Defense—they’re not totally resistant to this. On the other hand, you know, this sea-controlled ship that they went up for this past year—which is a carrier which will be in the order of 120 to 170 million dollars—can carry helicopters and V–STOL aircraft in limited numbers—had a helluva time with the Congress. It just could not get receptive to that kind of capability, even though from our point of view it responds to the issue you’re raising. There’s also the possibility of re-modifying some of these.

I think when Zumwalt leaves, it won’t surprise me if it disappears. It keeps the guy who’s been pushing because he recognizes that a good deal of the carrier requirement is projection of presence and so forth. You can modify these carriers, but you can’t keep them afloat forever. When they get to about 30 years of age, they get very expensive to run. The larger, heavier aircraft can’t run on them. And the question you raise—correctly: Why not keep more unsophisticated aircraft?
And that is an issue we can discuss with Defense. The point is that is not the way they will necessarily go, unless there is some outside influence and discussion.

So let me just finish for one second on the 15. My point would be that in the absence of some outside intervention—without regard now to whether 15 is the right figure or 12, plus some other less sophisticated kinds of carriers, what have you—unless there is some outside intervention by 1977, you will have a 12-carrier force.

Now, that, in turn, poses two immediate issues. First of all, if you do have to live with the 12-carrier force, how do you allocate your assets? And in our paper we have taken a look at alternatives. We have got a couple of charts here that might be interesting for you to look at. There’s nothing magical at all; these were arbitrary, obviously. But we plotted from 15 down to 12 (showing two charts.)

Looking at a requirement—well, it might be better to look at the one on the right first, where basically you’re looking at the Mediterranean and the Pacific without homeporting and with homeporting. This is essentially what we are now doing. Leave aside now the Indian Ocean for just a moment. You’ve got two carriers in the Med and one to try to keep, if you can—as many as three carriers in the Pacific. We arbitrarily put one in the Indian Ocean; that would, presumably, come from the Pacific requirement.

If you go down to 12 carriers, you can see that you can’t even keep two in the Med on a permanent basis. You can’t keep anything like three in the Pacific—including the Indian Ocean—and, therefore, your requirements become much tighter.

Now, when you get to homeporting, it buys you something. It doesn’t buy a helluva lot, but it gives you some additional flexibility. The purpose of homeporting is primarily related to this recruiting problem, as you well know; but it does buy you some additional time on station.

Now, the question is: If you do go down to 12 carriers, then you raise some interesting questions. Let me illustrate with a couple.

For example, a large part of our carrier inventory is tied up with our NATO commitment.

Secretary Kissinger: What’s the difference between these two charts?

Mr. Brown: We’ve got the titles wrong.

(Laughter.)

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2 Not found.
This is the Mediterranean; this is the Indian Ocean (indicating). The other is the Mediterranean and Pacific.

Mr. Weiss: The one on the right here is simply what we have now in terms of our current force deployments. Now, you could draw up different charts showing, you know, South Atlantic or elsewhere, where you think you might need them; but I think the key point here is that since it takes about two carriers behind every one that is forward-deployed, your current force is very largely limited, (a), because you’ve got two in the Med—and there are very good reasons why they’re there—but there are some questions you could raise as to why you couldn’t get more flexibility in other ways without keeping two carriers continuously in the Med. It may be a bad idea, but at least it’s worth looking at.

Similarly, your NATO commitment. Something like 10 of your carriers are committed to NATO on a 48-hour basis on Category A. That restricts your flexibility for the use of those carriers.

So there are political questions now that you could go—

Secretary Kissinger: Ten carriers are what?

Mr. Weiss: Are so-called Category A commitments to NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: Meaning what?

Mr. Weiss: Meaning that they must be available within 48 hours of a war.

Secretary Kissinger: But that’s nonsense. We ought to look at that.

Mr. Weiss: That’s what we’re saying.

Secretary Kissinger: We ought to look at the whole Navy deployment for NATO, which seems to me to be geared to a 1940-type war. Every time we scratch NATO deployments we get some other story of expectations of a 120-day re-supply, and God knows what else they have in mind. But I don’t think this is the forum to do it. We have to use the NSC machinery. There’s no sense in our developing papers here.

And, Jerry, would you tell Brent [Scowcroft] to put this into the NSC machinery?

Mr. Bremer: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: And then tell your people (addressing Mr. Weiss) to put this into the NSC machinery.

Mr. Weiss: We tried twice, Mr. Secretary, through the NSC; and we’ve had NSSM 50\(^3\) and 177\(^4\) and we can’t—you know, I’m not saying we can’t be any more successful, but at least you ought to think through about your bilateral relationship with Jim [Schlesinger] on the grounds

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\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 12.

\(^4\) Document 12.
that there are important foreign policy considerations. You might be able to get them to move. In a way it may not be right, but at least I think you ought to think about it.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it’s a bad way to make major national decisions—to do it over breakfast—as much as I regret it.

Mr. Weiss: No; I don’t think you should do it. But, I mean, get some people from his building and this building to sit down and work out a paper that poses the issue so you can decide it in a measured way.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we can consider it, but at any rate we shouldn’t do it unilaterally here—because we’re just going to be spinning wheels if we do this.

I mean I appreciate what you did, and I think it’s important and we should continue it. But I don’t think we can carry it beyond a certain point without Defense cooperation.

Mr. Weiss: Absolutely; no question.

Mr. Rush: I differ with you, Sy. This is obviously a question for the NSC machinery. And to have it settled by Defense, by Henry and Jim, is not the way to settle these things, in my opinion.

Mr. Brown: The difficulty will be getting the Defense Department to pose the issues to us and to the NSC and answer them.

Secretary Kissinger: I think what I do have to do is to have Scowcroft to arrange a breakfast with Schlesinger.

Mr. Bremer: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: I will raise that issue and work out a machinery by which, maybe in a restricted group, he will permit working on it. In fact, the President has ordered that 177 be completed. And I have held off, in my other capacity, transmitting that order in writing, in order not to get another slowdown.

So will you do this (addressing Mr. Bremer)?

Mr. Bremer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Weiss: I think internally, within the building, there’s the need to get the various Regional Secretaries.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, it will be in the newspapers. We’ll do this in every Bureau.

Mr. Weiss: No, no. I didn’t finish my point. I thought you would have wanted their assessment of what the implications will be.

Let me take the case of the two carriers in the Med. You probably know that better than anybody. But, nevertheless, there are a variety of alternative things anyone can do, including the question of whether you can’t land-base some of the airplanes on the southern flank.

Secretary Kissinger: Where?

Mr. Weiss: Well, Turkey might be a case in point.
Mr. Stabler: At one point it was considered you might be able to do this in Italy.

Secretary Kissinger: But our experience—if you take the foreseeable military contingencies and our experience, you know that there’s no littoral country which will let us use the airfields for military operations in an Israeli-Arab war.

Mr. Weiss: That’s correct. But let me make my point. You have the carriers. One is NATO-committed; the other is looking in the other direction.

Now, I’m not arguing this because I’m not sure that this is right. It’s conceivable that the NATO-commitment portion you might want to put ashore.

Now, you’ve got a carrier, you know—a base that’s free to float around and use other—you know, you may be looking in the other direction. That is, you may be looking in the Middle East. And you may meet the carrier requirement without having the carrier—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, to tell you the truth, I’ve gone through three Middle East crises, and we’ve moved these carriers around without regard to the NATO commitment. I didn’t know there was a NATO Command.

Mr. Stabler: It operates entirely at the U.S. Command—the U.S. Force.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ve put a third carrier into the Mediterranean and the crisis developed every time. So I don’t see how we can do with less than two. And I’d like a third one available to get there, you know, on three or four days’ notice. I mean this would be—on the basis of our experience, this has been the deployment we’ve always concluded we needed.

Mr. Ingersoll: That’s right. I’d hate to see us go down to one and a half in the Pacific.

Mr. Rush: So would I.

Mr. Weiss: But let me just interject. I don’t disagree with Bob [Ingersoll], but nobody wants to go below two in the Med and nobody wants to go below three in the Pacific; and you’ve got some NATO commitments.

Now, something has to give. Now, the answer may be NATO commitments—where there are other NATO-committed carriers—

Secretary Kissinger: Doing what?

Mr. Brown: Backing up the two carriers in the Med.

Mr. Weiss: You can always upsurge for a brief period. You can always move them about. But, basically, they’re stationed—

Mr. Rush: When you have an alert.
Secretary Kissinger: What do we need attack carriers for as a part of the NATO commitment? We either need them for anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic as well as in the Mediterranean—for which these big ones are much too expensive—or we need them for a possible move against the Soviet Union—for which, in fact, we’re better off.

Mr. Weiss: The northern flank.

Secretary Kissinger: What does the northern flank have to do with it?

Mr. Weiss: If you have a flank going up to Norway, that’s highly useful to us. It has been in the past. I think it will continue because I think the Norwegians have nothing.

Secretary Kissinger: There has been a flank up there for 12 months a year, because we can pull it down from Norway into the Mediterranean. For crisis purposes, I’d consider that a carrier up in Norway was perfectly useful for the Mediterranean. We wouldn’t insist, if we have a reserve carrier, that it’s got to be right outside the Straits of Gibraltar. We pulled one down, in the last crisis, from Glasgow somewhere?5

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Is Glasgow a seaport?

(Laughter.)

Mr. Brown: What it really says: There are not enough carriers to go around in the three oceans. With 12 carriers you simply can not keep the kinds of deployments that we currently have. Something has got to give.

Mr. Weiss: I’m not suggesting that you’re going to want to keep a carrier in the Indian Ocean for 12 months round. Maybe you want to do it for six. But if you keep it there for 12 months round and if you look at your 12-carrier figure, you can’t keep two carriers in the Med, a carrier in the Indian Ocean, and three carriers in the Far East. You can’t keep two in the Pacific.

It can’t be done; you just don’t have them.

Secretary Kissinger: I suppose one thing—the Navy always tells you you need three carriers to keep one deployed.

Mr. Weiss: Normally two, without homeporting two to keep one deployed.

Secretary Kissinger: So reducing the Fleet by three it should reduce deployments only by a little more than one. I mean they can’t lead to a result of three less carriers.

Mr. Weiss: No, but this is—no, no. This is where they’re deployed (indicating on chart). My point is: If they reduce by three carriers, then you almost ought to be able to throw a dart at the oceans and say, “One of them loses one.”

Mr. Brown: There it is; that’s where it disappeared from (indicating on chart). You’ve got one in the Indian Ocean. This more than three affects the Mediterranean and you’re lost in the Pacific.

Secretary Kissinger: Now wait a minute. You lose one in the Indian Ocean, one in the Pacific.

Mr. Brown: Yes, that’s right.

Mr. Weiss: Now, of course, if you say, “Well, we don’t have to deploy in the Indian Ocean full time,” that’s another option.

Mr. Lord: So you need a carrier for political influence in some other kind of activity.

Secretary Kissinger: The basic point, it seems to me, is that you lose one carrier either in the Indian Ocean or in the Pacific—

Mr. Weiss: That’s right.

Secretary Kissinger:—provided you don’t pull one out of the Atlantic.

Mr. Weiss: That’s right. But that’s another option.

Secretary Kissinger: But how did they get in the Atlantic at any one time?

Mr. Brown: The way they’re divided now, it’s roughly eight and—let’s see—out of 15, I think seven in the Atlantic and eight in the Pacific. And those seven are required, basically, to keep the two in the Med. That’s how it works.

Secretary Kissinger: Then there’s none deployed in the Atlantic at all.

Mr. Brown: I mean there will be a couple in overhaul. A couple will be training down in Puerto Rico, getting ready to replace the carriers—if you have an extra one maybe or something.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think you’ve put your finger on an important problem. I think we ought to get an NSC-type study. I’ll work it out next week with Schlesinger. And I think we certainly ought to make our inputs felt for more and smaller carriers.

Mr. Brown: One other political factor too is the question of homeporting.

Mr. Davies: This emphasizes the rationale or the soundness of homeporting in Greece, Mr. Secretary. It gives us an extra carrier. This is a very significant factor.

Mr. Ingersoll: We’ve worked that out in Japan. It’s worked out very well.
Mr. Brown: And they may want to consider more homeporting in the Pacific—Subic Bay or Australia—if it’s important to keep two carriers full time in the Western Pacific.

Mr. Weiss: In the Philippines, then, you get into a base negotiation. You have to pay a price for it.

Mr. Rush: Yes.

Mr. Ingersoll: We’re paying that right now.

Secretary Kissinger: I have a group that is coming.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security.]

36. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (Cotter) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger


SUBJECT

Discussion of Illustrative Nuclear Options With Dr. Kissinger

1. On March 20, 1974, the JCS briefing on illustrative nuclear options for local conflict was presented to Dr. Kissinger (see attached summary). In attendance were Admiral Moorer, Col. Roberge2 (JCS briefer), Seymour Weiss, Larry Eagleburger, General Scowcroft, Jan Lodal (NSC staff), Ben Huberman (NSC staff), General Haig (for part), General Welch3 and myself.

2. Dr. Kissinger asked to look at Central Europe and Soviet-PRC scenarios first. [place not declassified] was then covered; Kissinger specifically asked General Haig to join for [place not declassified]

3. Dr. Kissinger made several points of note:

a. He expressed concern that many of the options appeared to him as too timid. He judged that nuclear use must have a decisive military effect in order to achieve the desired political goal—convince enemy to stop. Too mild a nuclear option is likely to convince the enemy to persevere, or respond tit for tat, or both.

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2 See footnote 2, Document 20.

3 See footnote 3, Document 20.
b. He agreed with our careful attention to avoiding targets near cities and to minimizing civilian casualties through yield selection.

c. He was very interested in limited options using SIOP forces, and thought we had slighted this aspect.

d. He reiterated his requirement for real plans before we talk to the President. He asked to see real plans soon and no later than May.

e. He expressed concern for the time required for U.S. to mount strikes, especially in [place not declassified], where we proposed staging nuclear forces in country. General Haig raised the important point that the [place not declassified] ground forces would have to defend in depth to make some of the nuclear options work—but there is an awkwardness in getting them to do this.

f. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

g. His questions on Europe indicated some lack of awareness of the SACEUR versus CINCEUR role of General Goodpaster. He was not at all opposed to U.S. unilateral planning.

4. As I see it, in order to be substantially responsive to Dr. Kissinger’s expressed desires, the JCS should do the following:

a. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

b. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

c. [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

These are listed in ascending order of difficulty, both for planning and execution.

5. You should recognize that, until you issue the new employment policy, the JCS are legally bound to work under the existing National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy. [2 lines not declassified] The JCS have been remarkably forthcoming in preparing themselves for the new policy. For practical and legal reasons we cannot expect much more progress without the issuance of the new employment policy.

6. Recommend that you issue the new employment policy at the soonest. Recommend that you discuss with Admiral Moorer the appropriate level of additional planning prior to our review with Dr. Kissinger and the President.

D. R. Cotter
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Atomic Energy)

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4 On April 3, Schlesinger issued revised guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons as directed by NSDM 242 (Document 31). The guidance dealt with strategic and planning concepts, major and selected attack options, and limited and regional nuclear options. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs Nos. 145–264)
Attachment

Summary of Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing

Washington, undated.

Illustrative Nuclear Options

—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
—[1 line not declassified]
—political actions fleshed out, including typical message texts.
—JCS has conducted politico-military exercises, nickname SCYLLA—last one interagency (e.g., Weiss).
—CINCEUR and JSTPS now developing actual plans.


5 No drafting information appears on the summary.

37. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 23, 1974, 7:45–10:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: I have been saying for years that NATO deployment is disgraceful.

Schlesinger: The Germans understate their strength. Within 24 hours they can put 1.2 million men into the field. I think they now believe in a conventional capability—the British are fighting it; the Dutch

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, Memcons—HAK & Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974 [2 of 4]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Secretary of Defense’s Dining Room at the Pentagon.
are with us. Their military posture in the central region is vastly improved.

  Kissinger: How about tanks?

  Schlesinger: The difference is overstated, and ours are better. The Soviet Union will never throw away a tank. American forces are good.

  Kissinger: Why do we need the B–1? For selective attacks, I would think we would use missiles.

  Schlesinger: No, maybe on the periphery. And use of a missile tears down the face structure; a bomber can be re-used. It would use an ASM.

  Kissinger: I like the ASM. We need more.

  The bomber with standoff missiles is great. And unconstrained by SALT I.

  Schlesinger: It will be in SALT II under aggregates.

  Kissinger: Only in a permanent agreement.

  Schlesinger: I think there is more potential in the near term in MBFR than in SALT.

  Kissinger: I don’t think our MBFR position is so far off that it isn’t more negotiable. This country is completely cynical. As soon as détente is over, the Democrats will move back to the left.

  Schlesinger: We can expand our deployment program on short notice.

  Kissinger: There are three issues: ABM, TTB and MIRV.

  Schlesinger: I am not worried about the first. The only problem is adding it to the treaty. The argument is their one site covers more than ours—the Hill may make something of this.

  Kissinger: Next is TTB at a seismic signal of five.

  Schlesinger: That sounds good. In the strategic area, the Soviets will be more constrained than we.

  Kissinger: They want it to start in 1976.

  Schlesinger: I don’t think the TTB does much damage. SALT doesn’t sound so good—at 1100 versus 1000.

  Kissinger: My impression is that the precise numbers are negotiable.

  Schlesinger: That is no constraint at all.

  Kissinger: Are we better off than without one?

  Schlesinger: We have one until 1977. What we want is a constraint on the future force structure.

  Kissinger: Your people must stop pissing on SALT I. The constraints on numbers and throwweight come out of our programs.

  Schlesinger: There is nothing wrong with the SALT I numbers.
Kissinger: Someone told Les Gelb\textsuperscript{2} that I agreed with the JCS on Trident for support in SALT and welched on the deal. That is totally wrong. I support Trident and the B–1 because it is better than nothing.

Schlesinger: I am prepared to go either with Narwhal or Trident. I defend SALT I.

Kissinger: If this keeps up I will talk back. [\textit{1 line not declassified}]

How come we mothball 180 B–52s if the numbers are important? Why not build ASMs which are unconstrained?

Schlesinger: Gelb said you said there was a military-industrial-academic complex.\textsuperscript{3} There is sniping coming from State too. I thought I had eliminated the sniping from here.

Kissinger: Who defended the Defense budget with Mel Laird? Laird would ship me a one-third lower budget after publicly supporting a bigger one. Then he would make a deal with Mahon. Did you call Laird about Ford’s comment? Sidey\textsuperscript{4} said you did.

Brezhnev told me that they couldn’t even come close in warheads by 1980. I told him he could take out the Minuteman. He said we would still have 7000 left, so what kind of sense did it make?\textsuperscript{5}

Schlesinger: There’s no question that both sides can destroy each other’s cities.

Kissinger: We are the only ones who could gain in a first strike because most of their force is land-based.

My guess is they won’t have an SLBM MIRV before 1978–79. [\textit{1 line not declassified}]

Schlesinger: It is the world’s best warhead.

Kissinger: Can we boost the yield?

Schlesinger: Yes, but it requires more AEC plants. The AEC and OMB want to cut.

I am not worried about a two-or-three to one throwweight disparity, but a six-to-one does worry me.

\textsuperscript{2}Leslie H. Gelb, national security correspondent for the \textit{New York Times}.

\textsuperscript{3}On April 21, Gelb reported in the \textit{New York Times} that Kissinger had requested the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s assistance in fighting the “military-industrial intellectual complex,” which “was seeking to destroy the improved relations with Moscow. Their aim, according to Mr. Kissinger, is to stay militarily ahead and to insist on the liberalization of Soviet society as a condition for agreements.” (\textit{New York Times}, April 21, 1974, p. 1, 16)

\textsuperscript{4}Hugh Sidey, \textit{Time} magazine’s political and White House correspondent and columnist.

Kissinger: If the Soviets took out the Minuteman, we would lose one million people also. That is bad. That the Soviets would calculate that they could do it, though, successfully and without retaliation, is highly unlikely. More likely is a selective strike, taking out a dam or a factory and leaving critical targets alone. We would be better at that. With the SLBM we can fire from a direction they know couldn’t be a massive attack.

Schlesinger: You are giving my speech.

Kissinger: So why are we talking about throwweight? We are talking ourselves into a psychosis.

Schlesinger: I think it is under control. I say a counterforce attack is not reasonable. [1 line not declassified]

We need a big warhead.

Kissinger: Why, if we are not going to knock out their silos?

Schlesinger: Just so they don’t think they are ahead. A discrepancy of 10-fold in yield is significant.

Kissinger: What can they do with it?

Schlesinger: Right now we are better off. But the perception is different.

Kissinger: Yes, fed by the Pentagon and Jackson. By the 1980’s your successor will be hanging on by his fingertips. What constituency do you have for defense absent the President and detente?

Schlesinger: I don’t think the Pentagon is behind it. Simple people look at the difference in numbers and see us behind.

Kissinger: You say we want a big missile.

Schlesinger: I would prefer to restrain their programs. But if we can’t, I would like a big warhead.

Kissinger: But it would be as vulnerable as Minuteman.

Schlesinger: I have never bought the Minuteman vulnerability argument. That is the NSC staff—Wayne Smith.6

But the programs they [Soviet Union]7 have prepared don’t constrain their progress.

Kissinger: How about to 1984?

Schlesinger: I would have to look at the numbers.

Kissinger: What it would do is prevent a Soviet breakout. Brezhnev and Nixon won’t last forever. We need detente to keep the Chinese and the Europeans honest.

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7 Brackets in original memorandum.
Schlesinger: Even Germany?
Kissinger: The Bahr’s\(^8\) in Germany. With détente Leber\(^9\) can keep Bahr under control.
Schlesinger: What went on in Moscow?\(^10\)
Kissinger: I think Brezhnev wants an agreement, but he is having troubles like us.
Schlesinger: Suppose 900 is their program by 1980?
Kissinger: No. Not unless we throw in Trident and B–1.
Schlesinger: That is possible. Trident won’t happen by 1980 anyway.
Kissinger: Brezhnev said we are trying to constrain them where they are doing well and leaving them open where they are doing poorly. Brezhnev’s obsession on warheads was like Nitze’s on throwweight.

How can we sort it out? A SALT agreement is not good politically for the President. He will infuriate the conservatives and not gain the liberals.

Schlesinger: Why does the President go in June?
Kissinger: Because we can’t piss away the Soviet relationship. Why do you think the Chinese are playing with us?
Schlesinger: Aren’t the Chinese turning on us?
Kissinger: I had a very interesting meeting with the new guy, Teng.\(^11\)
Schlesinger: Why is Chou through?
Kissinger: I think because the number two is vulnerable and he is a victim of Watergate—he gambled on a strong President. There is no change in their policy, but there isn’t an elaboration.
Schlesinger: Throwweight is important. Warheads are too.
Kissinger: If Brezhnev goes down the tube, no Soviet leader will deal with the U.S. Are we better with the Soviet Union having détente with Europe and Japan and us on the outside? Or having us play with the Soviet Union and have Europe and the Japanese worry? What have the Soviets gotten from SALT? Wheat—and that was our own stupidity.

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\(^8\) Egon Bahr, who at the time served as Minister Without Portfolio, FRG.
\(^9\) Georg Leber, Minister of Defense, FRG.
\(^10\) Kissinger traveled from March 24 to 28 to Moscow, where he discussed preparations for the upcoming summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev to be held in Moscow from June 27 through July 3.
Schlesinger: Isn’t it in the Soviet interest to have good relations with us?

Kissinger: Marginally, but I think Brezhnev is a political idiot and has given us all sorts of gains. What is the constituency of the Democrats? The liberals—and they will kill us except under detente. Kennedy\textsuperscript{12} came in as a tough guy, turned soft and gave us a legacy of problems.

An agreement in SALT only hurts the President. But we need to respond to Brezhnev.


Kissinger: What do I tell Gromyko?

Schlesinger: Let me give you some ideas.

Kissinger: The best thing would be to set a direction in June and a year to work it out.

Schlesinger: June is bad—if impeachment starts. We need something concrete to get past impeachment.

Kissinger: I think the Soviet Union is tottering. Gromyko is doing crazy things.

Schlesinger: Can’t we throw them a fish?

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East and other matters unrelated to national security.]

\textsuperscript{12} John F. Kennedy, former President of the United States, 1961–1963.
38. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 196


NSSM 196—"OVERSEAS MILITARY BASE STRUCTURE"

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Problem

The response to NSSM 196 which follows is the third major analytical study in recent years to assess the adequacy of the basing, support, and operating rights structure the U.S. maintains overseas. Unlike its predecessors, the Nash and the Wood studies, this study—which was prompted in large measure by our difficulties in routing supplies to the Middle East during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war—seeks to identify (a) future basing requirements and (b) pressures and trends which impact upon base negotiations and on basing usage.

The aim is to produce suggested courses of action to retain the bases, facilities and operating rights deemed vital, to make them more reliable for contingencies of interest to the United States, to look for other locations where necessary, and to suggest possible alternatives to current overseas basing. The review centers on an examination of less-than-general war contingencies because the constraints with which this study deals would presumably not apply under general war conditions.

The Assumptions

The study takes a ten year look ahead. It assumes that while changes—including reductions in our overseas presence and denial of certain specific bases and operating rights—will doubtless occur during that time, we will not be confronted with changes which will have a major impact on the general pattern of requirements for basing and operating rights. Thus, we postulate no revolutionary changes in U.S. interests, in the basic threats to those interests, or in the strategies evolved to advance those interests of such a nature as to affect our

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–203, Study Memorandums, NSSM 196 [1 of 2]. Secret. The study was prepared by an interagency NSC Ad Hoc group under the chairmanship of the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Plans, and NSC Affairs, OASD/ISA, according to a May 25 covering memorandum under which Wickham forwarded the study to Scowcroft. Davis forwarded the study, under a June 7 covering memorandum, to Clements, Sisco, Ash, Colby, and Moorer for review. (Ibid., [2 of 2])

2 Document 34.

3 The Nash study is not further identified. For the Wood study, see footnote 2, Document 34.
needs for access to major allies and free transit through and over the high seas. These assumptions—based on our best estimate of the future—permit us to deal substantially and accurately with the most likely sets of basing and operating difficulties we will encounter in non-general war situations during the next ten years.

**Categories of Basing Requirements**

There are roughly three categories of base/facilities requirements. The first such category relates to bases and facilities necessary to support technical and relatively routine collection and support operations, such as communications stations, navigational support, intelligence collection, nuclear event detection, space tracking, and so forth. These activities are normally not controversial, not widely known, and not, therefore, subject to the kinds of pressures applied against more visibly active facilities.

Forward deployed U.S. forces in vital areas like Korea and Germany fall into a second category. While issues and frictions can arise as a result of our presence in these areas, and while we can get involved in highly complex negotiations on the financial aspects of our presence (e.g., offset in Germany), the host countries basically accept the U.S. presence as important, if not essential, to their own defense. With a few exceptions, these facilities are exempted from this study under the general war exclusion.4

The third category—and the major focus of this study because it presents the thorniest political problems—embraces those bases and facilities which are used for operational and support requirements outside the host country. Since usage involves activities which are not related to the defense of the host country and which may not conform to its policies and interests, pressures can arise which restrict or otherwise impact upon that usage.

**Forms of Pressure on Basing**

Pressures on our basing presence are not all foreign in origin; some arise from our own situation at home. For ease of analysis, potentially restrictive pressures on basing, staging, and overflight rights have been grouped into four functional categories: (a) those which are primarily political; (b) those which are primarily economic/commercial; (c) those which are primarily technological; and (d) those which are primarily ecological. These functional pressures vary according to the sources from which they arise, i.e., the host country (“theirs”); the United States (“ours”); and/or some third country or international entity (“multina-

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4 Exceptions are Iceland, or the use of some NATO bases in support of lesser contingencies. [Footnote in the original.]
Political pressures are the most common and frequently the least tractible, because of the broader foreign policy implications they have. Pressures in the “theirs” grouping involve at their heart the sovereign right of a host country to regulate the activities of foreign military forces on its soil. Such regulation can run from petty harassment through restrictions on certain kinds of operations to a complete turn-about in relations resulting, for instance, in a request that we withdraw. Pressures in the “ours” grouping result from changes in our domestic political priorities which produce policy decisions contracting or otherwise affecting our operations overseas. A special case involves problems we face in maintaining support domestically for basing arrangements in countries whose form of government or whose policies are distasteful to many Americans, e.g. Greece. Another special case is the Senate’s effort, through various legislative proposals, to establish a direct participatory role for the Legislative Branch on all major basing agreements.

In the “multilateral” category are such pressures as are produced by international terrorist activities, as well as considerations growing out of Law of the Sea or other United Nations activities.

Economic pressures are also either “theirs” or “ours,” or “multinational.” One of the most frequent “theirs” pressures grows from changes in land-use patterns near overseas bases. Limitations in the aggregate or in the allocation (or both) of the kinds of quids used to support base negotiations and base rights are the most frequent pressures on our side. And a most recent illustration of a “multinational” economic pressure was the threat—and in some cases application—of a petroleum boycott by the Arab oil producers.5

Technological and ecological pressures are less noteworthy, but important nonetheless. Technological advances, e.g., in weapons systems, can have the incidental effect of reducing or otherwise modifying overseas basing requirements. To that extent they can be regarded as potential “ours” pressures. In addition, it should be noted that technology can also be a tool in the deliberate search for alternatives to needed overseas bases. Some of the “hardware” alternatives reviewed in this study—though very few are in a state of development enabling them to make an early impact on the current basing structure—fall into this category. Ecological pressures—mostly “theirs”—focus heavily on pollution considerations, but include also sensitivity to NPW visits and nuclear weapons storage.

Illustrative Scenarios

We dramatized these pressures and examined their operational limitations through a set of nine scenarios requiring the deployment of U.S. forces in support of U.S. interests. The scenarios are aimed primarily at exercising the routing structure on which we would have to depend in or enroute the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, east Africa, south, southeast, and northeast Asia, and southern South America.

Conclusions

Based on this analysis, we concluded that:

(1) The maintenance of a substantial forward basing structure is vital to our ability to meet security commitments abroad. While this structure is likely to be modified in the next ten years as a result of pressures noted above, the general pattern of overseas basing requirements is not likely to change markedly.

(2) In particular, the facilities and operating rights we have at strategic locations around the rim of Eurasia are critical in a variety of ways to our ability to project military power into crisis situations in that vast area. The following locations were specifically singled out.

   a. Japan: routing and staging for northeast Asia; fleet support; basing.
   b. The Philippines: routing and staging for southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean area; fleet support; basing.
   c. Greece and Spain: routing and staging to the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; fleet support; basing.
   d. Azores: ASW operations; staging to the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Europe.
   e. Iceland: ASW and maritime surveillance; northern route staging to Europe; and North Atlantic aircraft surveillance and warning facilities.
   f. Bahrain and Diego Garcia: fleet support and communications in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea area; Diego Garcia can also provide staging into the Middle East area from the Pacific.
   g. Thailand: operating and staging rights and facilities, as distinct from the presence of combat forces which are important in the near term as a symbol of our potential to support operations in Indochina but which are of lesser importance as time goes by.

(3) Of these, the most vulnerable, in the near term, are Lajes AFB in the Azores (ASW and enroute staging to the Middle East) for which we are now attempting to negotiate an extension; certain bases in Spain (airlift staging and aircraft tanker support) which are included in comprehensive renewal negotiations over the next 16 months; Iceland (marin-
time surveillance in the North Atlantic), also the subject of ongoing negotiations; our facilities and rights in Thailand; and our naval facility at Bahrain.

(4) The principal problem we face with regard to our current network of bases, facilities and operating rights is not its adequacy but rather its reliability in those less-than-general war contingencies in which the interests of the United States and of the host country are not in harmony.

(5) Moreover, in the ten year period ahead, without effective U.S. action the pressures on usage, the types of agreements we can get, the quids that may be demanded and probable instability in some host countries, will tend to combine to make our network of bases and facilities less reliable than it is today.

(6) Finally, this reliability factor affects different facilities and installations—even within the same country—in varying degrees, having little impact on those facilities which are essentially static in their function (category 1 above), but having a marked impact on facilities which visibly reflect an ebb and flow directly related to events outside the immediate area (e.g., those in category III above).

Alternative Base Strategies

Moving from the problem to the possibilities for solution (and thus to Phase II of the NSSM), suggestions were developed which could give some hope of improving the reliability of the bases identified as critical to our worldwide interests. Alternatives to the current structure were also examined, including the possibilities offered by technological innovation, to reduce our dependence on current overseas bases.

The recommendations of the NSSM response are contained in three basic options, the principal distinction among them being one of urgency. Thus they are essentially additive rather than sharply differentiated courses of action.

Option 1—Continue Present Planning

This option presupposes that the problems identified are not of sufficient severity to warrant special responses. Under this option, we would continue with present planning and negotiation efforts, employing present procedures and existing inter-agency mechanisms. We would also continue to press forward with current programs and negotiations for Tinian and Diego Garcia.

The advantages of such a program are that it requires no revisions to existing programs or structures, nor any significant new funding requirements. The disadvantages are that it may underestimate the severity of the problem and leave us relatively unprepared should we be
confronted with a repeat of the restrictions imposed on us during the Mid East war.

Option 2—Enhanced Warning and Planning

This option would (1) more systematically alert the U.S. government to the existence of the overseas basing problem and (2) institute coordinated planning that focuses on the timely identification of specific problems and provides alternative solutions. Under this option, we would:

1. Continue to move forward with plans and negotiations for Tinian and Diego Garcia.
2. Develop coordinated policy mechanisms within the NSC system for relating base and operating rights with the total range of quids available.
3. Establish, on a close-hold basis, a “courting” list of nations in which we have a potential future basing or operating rights interest so that we might conduct our relations with them in such a way as to improve chances of a positive response, if and when we ask.
4. Include, in all major planning cycles, assumptions about the availability/non-availability of overseas basing during contingencies.
5. Additionally, we would:
   a. Inject alternate routes/basing into all contingency plans;
   b. Establish hardware alternatives as a major R&D management objective;
   c. Develop real-time net assessments which would signal not merely the alternatives for action but the routing and base alternatives necessary for support;
   d. Establish an intelligence requirement to identify pressures on bases and routing; and
   e. Establish, at suitably senior military and civilian levels, base retention councils (if not already in existence) to advise Ambassadors and appropriate Washington agencies of those matters affecting base usage and other rights in their areas.
   f. Actively pursue aerial refueling training for strategic airlift crew members (C–5s) so that inflight refueling becomes a viable alternative to enroute staging.

The advantages of such a low key program would be cost—it would be relatively inexpensive—and improved institutionalization of

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6 Clements and Harry D. Train II, Director of the Joint Staff, JCS, endorsed this option in a July 30 memorandum to Kissinger and a June 21 memorandum to Schlesinger respectively. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–203, Study Memoranda, NSSM 196 [2 of 2])
our efforts to deal with an emerging problem. It would permit emphasis on an active overseas presence as well. The principal disadvantage is that it may be a half-speed solution to a possibly full-speed problem.

**Option 3—Urgent Hedging**

This option would include essentially all measures listed in the preceding option, and in addition these actions:

1. Develop specific plans for possible alternate bases and staging facilities, to include facility engineering studies, costs, relocation times, etc.
2. Accelerate the development of large aircraft tankers.
3. Accelerate the in-flight refueling and fuselage “stretch” programs for C–141 strategic airlift.
4. Accelerate those R&D programs which provide hardware alternatives to technical overseas facilities such as communications and intelligence.
5. Review the technology for constructing artificial fixed or floating islands.
6. Search actively for real estate such as islands that may be available in critical areas.

The advantages of such a program are that it anticipates the problems, takes a positive, “now” approach, keeps the emphasis on an active overseas presence, and possibly puts us in a position to deal better, at an earlier stage with the next less-than-general war crisis we face.

The disadvantages are those mainly of cost, in terms of dealing with a problem the significance of which may not yet be sufficient to sustain Congressional and other public interest. The program could also spark charges of new imperialism in the third world where memories of the last imperial variant are still vivid.

**Catalog of Alternatives**

As an aid in organizing the large amount of information involved in this study and in choosing among alternative means of satisfying requirements, Table A7 was developed to display legal, hardware, political, economic and other possible alternatives. Table B8 arrays for the most significant countries our current facilities, the legal instruments underlying U.S. presence, the current and projected pressures on that

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7 Table A, entitled “Compendium of Alternative Measures,” is attached, but not printed.
8 Table B, entitled “Alternatives by Key Countries,” is attached, but not printed.
presence and how they may be manifested, and the feasible alternatives for coping with such restrictions and denials which may result from these pressures. These tables consolidate information; they make no recommendations.

[Omitted here are Sections I through VI of the paper: U.S. Basing and Operating Rights, Assumptions Regarding U.S. Interests and Strategies, Current Overseas Base Usage, Pressures on Overseas Basing Structure, Illustrative Scenarios and Feasible Impacts, Options and Alternatives.]

39. Paper Prepared by the National Security Study Memorandum 192 Ad Hoc Group

Washington, undated.

RESPONSE TO NSSM 192

UNITED STATES CHEMICAL WEAPONS POSTURE

A. Rationale for Chemical Weapons

The US has a no-first-use policy for lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons.

The purposes of maintaining a chemical weapons capability are to deter the wartime use of chemical weapons by an adversary against US forces and, if this deterrence fails, to enable US forces to retaliate with chemical weapons.3

Nuclear weapons may or may not be as credible a deterrent to chemical warfare as a capability to retaliate in kind. At any rate, a CW

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-202, Study Memorandums, NSSM 192. Top Secret. Guhin, the Ad Hoc Group’s chairman, forwarded the paper under a covering memorandum, June 6, to the other members of the group, drawn from the Department, OSD, CIA, and ACDA. Davis forwarded the paper for review to Schlesinger, Sisco, Ikle, Colby, and Moorer under a covering memorandum, June 11. (Ibid.)

2 Document 33.

3 In the absence of a comparative analysis of all alternatives, the State and ACDA representatives do not believe the need for retaliation in kind has been demonstrated. The State representative believes that an adversary may also be discouraged from initiating use of chemical weapons by an effective CW defensive capability combined with US conventional and nuclear capabilities. [Footnote in the original.]
retaliatory and defensive capability can limit any expectation by an
adversary that a significant military advantage might be achieved
through initiation of chemical warfare in a conventional conflict. It is
generally concluded that a perceived US capability for fullest possible
retaliation in kind to any use of CW, including defensive measures and
equipment, had an important deterrent effect against the possible use
of chemical weapons by Germany in World War II.

There is no real CW threat to CONUS. The primary concern today
is possible use by the Soviet Union against US and Allied forces as the
Soviets are considered to be well equipped for CW, whereas US and
Allied forces are not. The major area of concern is in Europe. Agreed
NATO strategy calls for the possession of the capability to employ ef-
fectively lethal CW agents in retaliation on a limited scale.

The Soviets could initiate use of chemical weapons in a conven-
tional war against the US and its allies, despite an international legal
obligation not to do so, although Soviet writings and doctrine on CW
indicate that they usually consider that any use of chemical weapons
would take place in a nuclear warfare environment. The US military
doctrine considers chemical weapons of limited usefulness in terms of
affecting the overall military situation in a nuclear warfare environ-
ment although their tactical utility would remain.

The US rationale for maintaining a chemical weapons capability is
to neutralize any tactical advantage gained by an adversary from the
use of CW. If an adversary were to initiate use of CW in war, he could
gain a significant tactical net advantage against the defender de-
pending upon the latter’s defensive capabilities and retaliatory reac-
tions. The extent of any overall military advantage would depend upon
the timing extent of the adversary’s use of CW. There may be no overall
advantage in a nuclear warfare environment.

Even if the best protective equipment currently available were
used by the defender, he would still suffer a serious net disadvantage
in casualties and tactical mobility since his forces would be encum-
bered by the necessary protective equipment. The military disadvan-
tage imposed by the use of CW could not be redressed without either
effective CW retaliation, thereby imposing similar severe operational

4 The State and ACDA representatives do not believe available evidence indicates
that the Soviets are well equipped offensively in the CW field. [Footnote in the original.]
5 The DOD and CIA representatives note that two sources have indicated that So-
viet use of CW would not necessarily be restricted to a nuclear warfare environment.
[Footnote in the original.]
6 The ACDA representative believes that in the event nuclear weapons were used,
they would so completely dominate the battlefield situation and possibilities for war ter-
mination that use or non-use of chemical weapons would not affect the outcome. [Foot-
note in the original.]
constraints on the attacker, or effective retaliation with tactical nuclear weapons.\(^7\) (Presumably, however, an initiator of CW would be well prepared in a higher protective posture, at least in the first stages, to operate in a toxic environment.)

A capability to respond effectively in kind with CW would provide the President a similar weapon retaliation option to attempt to redress the situation imposed by an adversary’s use of CW at an intermediate, non-nuclear level.\(^8\) This CW retaliatory option may not, however, eliminate a need eventually to move to tactical use of nuclear weapons to redress the overall conflict situation. In addition, as noted in the later sections, there are currently chemical materiel shortages, insufficient prepositioning of chemical munitions, and marginal defensive postures on the part of the US and its Allies generally. Unless these shortages and deficiencies were corrected by Allies as well as by the US, there may well be no effective response other than to employ tactical nuclear weapons to redress losses and gain the initiative should an enemy initiate large-scale chemical operations.\(^9\)

[Omitted here is Section B, entitled “Threat Assessment and Other Foreign Capabilities.” For a summary of this section, see the attachment to Document 51.]

C. US Capabilities and Possible Improvements

The overall capability of the US must be measured in terms of both the defensive capability of US forces to operate in a toxic environment and the offensive capability to conduct retaliatory operations. Although these capabilities are clearly interrelated, they are discussed separately below and, in any event, the major defensive deficiencies need to be addressed in large part irrespective of the offensive posture. Allied CW capabilities, although clearly related to the overall US posture, are addressed separately.

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\(^7\) Based on analysis to date, the State and ACDA representatives are not convinced of the validity of the military judgments expressed in this paragraph. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^8\) The DOD and CIA representatives believe that an adequate CW capability would make the need to resort to tactical nuclear weapons less likely in the event CW was initiated against US forces, and that abandonment of a CW capability could possibly lower the nuclear threshold. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^9\) The ACDA representative believes that if US and Allied CW defensive capabilities were improved, an increased response with conventional weapons would be sufficient to redress the military situation. [Footnote in the original.]
Defensive Capability

The current capability of all US forces to operate in a chemical or toxic environment\(^{10}\) has been improving but is still generally inadequate and marginal at best. US forces are today ill-prepared to survive or launch chemical attacks or to continue operations in a chemically-contaminated environment.

Protective masks are adequate in both quality and quantity for most US forces. However, masks need to be developed for crew members of high performance aircraft and other specialized applications. Some manual detection and very few collectively protected vehicles, vans, and shelters (where personnel can operate without wearing individual protective equipment) are available. Protective clothing liners are available for less than half of all US Army forces. They are available for all Army forces stationed in Europe, but this type clothing needs to be complemented by an outer-garment for front line units. Medical materiel is generally adequate for the treatment of CW casualties except that an effective therapy for soman [less than 1 line not declassified] has not yet been developed.

There are deficiencies in most other types of defensive equipment either because quantities procured to date are insufficient or because the items have not yet completed development. The primary deficiencies are in the following areas:

—Automatic CW point detectors/alarms are being procured, but will not be available in adequate quantities until FY 80; and area scanning CW detectors/alarms are being developed.
—Inadequate stocks of protective clothing for all US forces.
—Protected shelters for command, medical, and logistics support in any toxic environment and protective equipment for specialized vans and vehicles are in inadequate supply.
—Decontamination equipment for operations in any toxic environment is in limited supply. Improved decontaminating techniques are being developed, but decontaminants, especially for aircraft and ships, require further technological advances.

A lack of other more specialized defensive equipment collectively contributes to the general inadequacy of the current US defensive posture against CW.

\(^{10}\) A toxic environment may be chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR). With the exception of detection, alarms, and medical countermeasures, defensive measures against a biological attack are generally common to those for chemical attack. Although there are measures or items which are unique to a radiologically-contaminated environment, there are important areas noted below where improvements in chemical defense would equally improve the defensive capability of US forces in a biological or radiological environment. Similarly, an inadequate capability in these specific areas means an inadequacy of US forces to operate in any toxic environment. [Footnote in the original.]
However, one of the fundamental deficiencies is the lack of emphasis, despite recent improvements, given to training of forces for operations in a toxic environment. Inadequately trained forces cannot take full advantage of either the defensive or offensive capabilities available to them.

The chemical (and directly related biological and radiological) defensive RDT&E budget from FY 69 through FY 74 has averaged $14.6 million annually. The budget for procurement of defensive items has averaged $14 million over the same time period. Funding at this level has not provided an adequate defensive posture.

**Improving Defensive Capabilities**

**Projected Adequate Posture.** Development of certain items generally within the current state-of-the-art, procurement of the major items which are in insufficient supply today, and improvements in training could provide US forces with an adequate defensive posture. Relatively few qualitative deficiencies need to be overcome to achieve the improvements necessary to this posture. Its achievement is dependent primarily on the acquisition of adequate quantities of equipment (mainly detectors/alarms, protective shelters, and protective clothing) already standardized or in the latter stages of development and on improved training. Based on current service projections, an overall adequate defensive posture (as now conceived) could not be attained until sometime in the mid 1980’s, although specific improvements will be attained prior to that time. DOD estimates that to achieve this posture for US forces would require expenditures in the range of $560–$720 million spread out over the next 8 years.

**Substantially Improved Posture.** Acquisition of larger quantities of already standard defensive equipment plus the solution to a greater number of qualitative deficiencies in current defensive equipment would provide a substantially improved defensive posture wherein the average degradation in individual and unit performance capability could be significantly less than 20%. In addition to the improvements outlined in the above section, achievement of this posture would require qualitative and quantitative improvements in detection equipment, air crew protection, a greater variety and increased numbers of protected shelters and vehicles, and a more extensive decontamination

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11 As used here, “adequate” means that US forces will be able to defend themselves, but there will be a significant degradation (about 20%) in the performance capability of individuals and units. [Footnote in the original.]

12 Such a defensive posture is conceived to exist somewhere between what is currently foreseen as adequate and an idealized defensive system, but cannot be further defined at this time. [Footnote in the original.]
capability. However, solutions to some of the qualitative problems (for example, developing improved decontaminants for aircraft and ships) are not yet in sight. DOD estimates that costs for achieving this posture for US forces might range from $1.25 billion upwards spread out over 10–12 years, but further definition would be required to estimate actual costs and to conduct cost-benefit analysis.

**Sophisticated Defensive Posture.** A very sophisticated defensive posture would be one where forces could not only defend against chemical attack, but also operate in a toxic environment for extended periods with little or no degradation of performance. Significant qualitative improvements would have to be achieved through research and development in most defensive equipment, but most particularly in individual protective equipment which, if it were relatively comfortable and caused no significant impairment of normal activity, might reduce requirements for shelters and decontamination equipment. Some such qualitative improvements are believed to be technically feasible; it is not known if others will be. DOD estimates that costs to achieve this posture for US forces might range from $3 billion upwards spread out over 15 years, but even more definition would be required to estimate actual costs than in the preceding posture.

**Offensive Capability**

US policy, established by NSDM 35 of November 1969, calls for the maintenance of a deterrent/retaliatory CW posture. The JCS military objective, in the event US forces were subjected to CW attack, is a CW capability to conduct the operations required at all levels in a conventional chemical warfare environment until hostilities and/or the use of CW are terminated. Estimated requirements of the commanders-in-chief are based on the 90-day standard stockage objective for conventional equipment for war in Europe and the 180-day capability standard for other theaters. These requirements are being evaluated by the JCS.

Such requirements have never been integrated into an overall national requirement. Moreover, what the US CW posture should be has never been defined at higher levels.

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13 The ACDA representative believes that basic research on vaccination against nerve agents has been encouraging and that, if vaccination proves feasible, it could significantly improve the US and Allied defensive posture in the mid-1980s. [Footnote in the original.]


15 The estimated munitions requirements are still greater for Europe because of the greater number of US divisions earmarked for deployment there. [Footnote in the original.]
Basing requirements on the 90-day and 180-day stockage standard may be open to question given (1) the indications that the Soviets usually consider that any use of CW would take place in a nuclear warfare environment;\(^\text{16}\) (2) US and Allied emphasis on conventional and nuclear capabilities; (3) the very limited capability of US Allies to defend against CW; and (4) the absence of Allied offensive CW capabilities.

**Current Stockpile.** Excluding those agents/munitions scheduled for disposal or considered excess, the current national stockpile consists of approximately 22,400 agent tons, including 14,000 tons of nerve agent GB and VX and 8,400 tons of mustard in bulk and filled munitions as indicated by the table below.

**CURRENT STOCKPILE (in Agent Tons)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Ground Munitions</th>
<th>Air Munitions</th>
<th>Bulk</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>3,843</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>9,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VX</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>4,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustard</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>8,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,522</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>22,432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The stockpile is deployed as follows: 92% is stored in CONUS; 6% on Johnston Island in the Pacific; and 2% in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

**Durability of CW Stocks.** CW agents generally have a very extended (decades) and perhaps indefinite storage life, whether stored in suitable munitions or in bulk containers. The toxicity of the CW agents themselves is not known to be significantly degraded during storage.

Experience during the recent disposal of lethal chemical agents has indicated, however, a possible physical deterioration of GB and bulk mustard agents. Their toxicity still appears unchanged, but some of these agents might have to be further purified prior to loading into munitions, with a resultant 5–10% loss of volume of any amount that requires purification.

Most CW filled munitions are considered to have a storage life of at least 20 years. An exception is a USAF, VX filled spray tank which had a designed storage life of only five years. The munition reached that age in 1973 and after inspection, the storage life was extended another five years. Similar extensions in the future cannot be assumed.

The useful life of the CW munitions is generally controlled more by possible phase-out of delivery systems than by deterioration of the
agents or munitions. The 4.2 inch mortar (1,390 tons of mustard, about half of which is considered a requirement in the Pacific theater) and the single-purpose M–91 rocket launcher (2,600 tons of nerve agent in M55 rockets for the European theater) may be phased out by the Army in the 1980’s. When and if these actions were taken, they would reduce the employable munitions inventory from 11,400 to 7,400 agent tons. The storage life of the spray tank mentioned above might expire within the same time frame, and thereby reduce the current munition inventory by 680 agent tons. The 105 mm howitzer (1,540 agent tons, half of which is mustard) is presently used only by US airborne and air mobile units and some US allies. The agents themselves can be recovered from un-serviceable or phased-out munitions, but the process entails a loss of 2–10% of the agents involved.

The remaining filled munitions are not expected to have any problems of obsolescence or deterioration at least through the 1980’s and perhaps much longer.

Employment Capability. Various illustrative examples on employment capabilities with the current stockpile are given below. These illustrations are based upon JCS estimated average military requirements of 8 agent tons per US division per day in Europe. These illustrations also focus on the area of the primary perceived threat—the Soviet threat to NATO—and include illustrative limited support levels for US Allies since it is unlikely that any of them (except possibly France) could independently acquire any meaningful capability during a period of strategic warning of impending hostilities.

Prepositioned stocks in Europe could provide combat support with nerve agent artillery shells for only 4–7 US divisions for about a week or for 3 days for 13–15 divisions if appropriately distributed. No air munitions are prepositioned in Europe.

Present chemical munitions could begin arriving in the field from CONUS by air in 7–10 days from their storage depots. This time could be shortened to about 5–7 days if sufficient priority and airlift allocation were assigned. To provide adequate stocks on a continuing basis for 15 US divisions, would require approximately 25% of the current Air Force strategic airlift capability (but a significantly lesser percentage of the potential national strategic airlift capability). The first CW supplies from CONUS to Europe by surface transport would re-

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17 The State and ACDA representatives note that an analytical base for this estimated military requirement has not been presented. [Footnote in the original.]
quire approximately 60 days. Adequate quantities could be provided thereafter on a continuing basis with one shipload every three days.  

If all currently employable munitions in the national stockpile were provided and distributed appropriately in Europe, they would provide full support for 13–15 divisions in that theater for about 30 days but only marginal support for 90 days since there is only 45 days of one type (GB) of 155 mm artillery and about 30 days of filled air munitions. (The residual capability of the refillable spray tanks would provide only limited air support.)

If 13–15 US divisions were to utilize estimated requirements for 30 days, the remaining US stocks of employable munitions (not including bulk) could provide some support in ground munitions for about 30 Allied divisions for this same period, but at best only extremely limited support in ground munitions for 90 days. Any support to Allies would require either greater demands on US resupply capabilities or the provision of less than the estimated daily requirements for US forces.

The days of support in Europe provided by the currently employable munitions would be reduced if munitions earmarked for US forces in that theater were to be phased-out by the Army or become unserviceable, or if any support earmarked for Europe were diverted to other theaters (for example, the Pacific).

If the US were capable of filling existing bulk agent into the necessary munitions on a timely basis (which it is not at present, see improvements section below), the estimated employment capabilities mentioned above would be almost doubled although some deficiencies in nerve agent munitions could still exist.

**Deficiencies in US CW Offensive Capability.** Strictly in terms of total tonnage, but not in terms of its overall composition, the current CW stockpile of 22,400 agent tons exceeds the 18,000 to 20,000 agent tons which the JCS previously estimated to be required for an adequate CW deterrent/retributory capability for all US forces. However, given the estimated military requirement of at least a 90-day full support capability for 13–15+ US divisions in Europe and 10–12+ US divisions in other theaters, there are two broad deficiencies in our current stockpile capability.

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18 The State and ACDA representatives note that under current planning the US could field 9 divisions in Europe within 20 days of the mobilization decision and that the 15 division figure would not be attained before 70–80 days after mobilization. [Footnote in the original.]

19 The State and ACDA representatives note that the deficiencies discussed in this section are derived from previously stated requirements for which no analytical base had been presented. They believe that the possibility of trade-offs between munitions stocks and improved defensive capabilities should be considered. [Footnote in the original.]
The composition of the existing stockpile is considered unsatisfactory in several respects. Specifically, (1) more air munitions and more of one type of artillery shell (155 mm GB) would be required to increase the present 30-day full support capability for 13–15 US divisions in Europe to a 90-day capability; (2) a far greater number of the above and of almost all other munitions would be required to provide a 180-day full support capability for US divisions in other theaters; (3) about 31% of the filled munitions capability and 40% of the bulk stocks consist of mustard agent which is less effective than nerve agent; and (4) the bulk nerve agent is not useable until loaded into munitions and this could not be accomplished today on a timely basis in the event of chemical warfare. (The number of available filled munitions would be reduced if the Army were to phase-out some delivery systems in the 1980’s or if some munitions became unserviceable.)

We have very limited forward deployment. It is doubtful that the prepositioned stocks (440 agent tons) in the FRG could support local tactical operations for 4–7 divisions for as much as a week, and no air munitions (which are necessary for adequate support) are prepositioned. Moreover, there are stocks at only one site. Even in an emergency and assuming sufficient priority, it would take at least 5–7 days before stocks could begin to arrive from CONUS. Finally, there are no prepositioned stocks for other theaters, although 6% of the stockpile is located on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

Limited forward deployment is considered a deficiency because it could well mean delay in responding to an adversary’s use of CW in war. If stocks were moved during strategic warning time or any time prior to the use of CW, then limited forward deployment in peacetime is not a major deficiency. If not moved, however, then CW retaliation with other than the limited prepositioned stocks would be delayed until shipments could begin arriving from CONUS. To do this quickly would require 25% of the Air Force’s strategic airlift capability (although a significantly lesser percentage of the national airlift capability).

Possible Improvements Using Existing Agent Stockpile

Very significant improvements in the US CW offensive capability could be made without further production of CW agents. Actions which could be taken to improve the CW stockpile substantially include:

—Using existing bulk agent to fill additional munitions, prior to any impending hostilities. This would entail manufacture of munition hardware, reactivation and expansion of the filling lines for VX at Newport, Indiana, and establishment of filling lines at Tooele, Utah—where

20 Since mustard solidifies at 57°F, it is quite effective in tropical climates (e.g., the Pacific theater) but of limited usefulness in temperate areas (e.g., Europe). However, it has a proven casualty-producing capability under any circumstances. In warmer climes, it has a relatively persistent vapor threat which can force troops into prolonged wearing of protective clothing. Given a favorable climate (a tropical area or summertime in Europe), mustard could be used as a substitute in some of the roles where persistent nerve agent VX is considered more effective. [Footnote in the original.]
most of the other bulk stocks are stored. There would be no need to ship agent to filling lines during peacetime, but there might be a problem regarding storage of filled munitions rather than bulk agent at Newport. DOD roughly estimates costs for filling existing bulk stocks at Newport (VX) and Tooele (GB and VX) in the range of $200 million to $400 million spread out over several years. These cost estimates do not include inflation factors or operation and maintenance.

—In addition to the improvements in the above section, the impact of any phasing-out of munitions could be further reduced substantially by recovering the agent during demilitarization to fill new munitions rather than disposing of it. Such a course could also require reactivation or construction of munition filling facilities and acquisition of munition hardware as noted above. Costs of recovering the agent are insignificant in relation to the overall disposal costs.

—Establishing a capability to produce complete CW munitions within 30–45 days using bulk agent stocks could reduce the amount of CW munitions required in any existing stockpile. This would require (1) establishing a stockpile of fuses and other long lead-time hardware items sufficient to allow filling operations to proceed until newly produced items become available, and (2) maintaining munition filling facilities in a high state of readiness (including periodic production/filling test runs and an adequate work force at least on call). DOD roughly estimated costs (not including inflation factors) for accomplishing this warm base capability range from $850 million to $1 billion spread out over 5 years.21

Reconfiguration of existing stocks could essentially eliminate the impact of potential degradation of the existing stockpile by the phasing-out of delivery systems in the 1980’s. (This is time sensitive, however, since phasing-out munition types would mean a degradation of the existing stockpile unless or until a substitute capability were made available.)

In addition, the US could achieve a 90-day full support capability for 13–15 US divisions in Europe by reconfiguring almost all of the existing agent tons of bulk nerve agent stocks into munitions. Reconfiguration of the remaining bulk stocks or agent recovered through demilitarization could in principle provide enough munitions for the JCS estimated adequate capability, but 57–66% of the support for theaters other than Europe would consist of useful but less effective mustard agent. Reconfiguration of present stocks would neither enable the US to replace its less effective mustard agent with nerve agent, nor provide a means of attempting to increase forward deployment. Total reconfiguration would probably mean some transportation of agents and/or munitions.

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21 A warm base capability alone could extend the days of support for CW but a capability to begin providing adequate support from bulk agent stocks within 90 days after a decision to fill and load would involve very high costs. [Footnote in the original.]
Improvements Using Binary CW Munitions

Binary munitions would contain two relatively safe, separate chemical components which combine to form the standard lethal nerve agents GB or VX while the munition is en route to target. There are DOD plans to correct the major deficiencies in the composition of the current stockpile by acquisition of binary munitions. Binaries could eventually replace all existing CW munitions and bulk agents stocks. Binaries are not planned to represent a net increase in the total CW stockpile level.

The binary program is concentrating first on artillery rounds and then projects development of aerially delivered bombs. Present programmed production is limited to artillery munitions for which production is scheduled to begin in 1976 or 1977. DOD estimated total remaining costs—including RDT&E, procurement, and production base support for these artillery shells are about $180 million. Development of air munitions will require 4–5 years before production could begin. Procurement of artillery and aerial delivered munitions in the sufficient quantities and agent types outlined below would correct the present estimated deficiencies in the agent and munition composition of the stockpile.22

Based on JCS’s previous estimate that 18,000–20,000 agent tons in filled munitions would be required to provide full support for all US forces (25–27 divisions), the following actions would be necessary to correct the deficiencies in the composition of the current stockpile.

—Construction of at least two production, filling, and loading facilities, and manufacture of hardware. (Funds have been requested for establishing one production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. One component for each agent and munition hardware will be procured from industry by contract.)

—Production and stockpiling of the binary equivalent of 9,000–11,000 nerve agent tons in filled munitions. (The binary equivalent for this amount of nerve agent would be 11,250–13,750 agent tons.) However, the production and stockpiling of the binary equivalent of 6,500 agent tons in filled munitions (or 8,125 binary agent tons), combined with existing munitions earmarked for Europe, would provide a 90-day full support capability for 13–15 US divisions in that theater if the Army does not phase-out existing CW rockets.

—Very limited open-air testing (beginning in the 1975–76 time frame) may prove necessary prior to procurement of munitions. How-

22 Since the Army Matériel Command has not yet provided technical information on the effectiveness of binaries requested by ACDA, the ACDA representative reserves judgment on whether or not binary munitions would be as effective as their non-binary counterparts [Footnote in the original.]
ever, an extensive simulation program is being conducted which is designed to reduce/eliminate the requirement for open-air testing.\(^\text{23}\)

DOD estimated costs for the currently projected binary program (about 7,600 binary agent tons in ground and air munitions) are $333 million spread out over the next 5+ years. To attain what the JCS estimates is needed to acquire an adequate capability overall would require about an additional 3,650–6,150 binary agent tons. These costs do not include either operation and maintenance of facilities or any inflation factors, or demilitarization costs.\(^\text{24}\)

**Peacetime Forward Deployment**

From a military standpoint, it would be highly desirable to achieve a fully adequate retaliatory capability. To achieve this would require an increase in peacetime forward deployment regardless of what actions are or are not taken to correct some or all of the deficiencies in the composition of the stockpile.

Forward deployment and some dispersal of 840–1,200 agent tons in filled munitions would be needed to provide full support for 15 US divisions for 7–10 days (that is, until the first supplies from CONUS could arrive by air). (Only 440 agent tons are now prepositioned.) From the military point of view, forward deployed stocks would preferably be on the order of 7,500 agent tons in filled munitions to provide full support for 15 US divisions until surface shipments could arrive from CONUS.

Increasing peacetime forward deployment with existing CW munitions is not considered possible under present circumstances. Binaries would provide a means to shorten the time for rapid deployment by a couple days and/or to seek increased peacetime forward deployment because of their safety advantages in storage and transport. As noted in a later section, however, political factors in western

\(^{23}\) The stimulant program to date has resolved most of the technical questions regarding the artillery shells raised by as OST technical experts panel in a 1973 report submitted as part of NSSM 157. However, the potential and significant problem of “flashing” (very rapid burning and consequent destruction of the binary agent) has not yet been resolved. In the opinion of the OST panel, final standardization of munitions may at any rate necessitate open-air testing with lethal agents. Any DOD proposal to conduct such testing would be forwarded for Presidential approval. [Footnote in the original. The OST forwarded its report on CW stockpile stability and the binary program, summarized above, to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 29, 1973. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, Meeting Files, 1969–1974, Senior Review Group Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73)]

\(^{24}\) Costs for the above binary program and for previously discussed improvements using the existing stockpile do not include substantial demilitarization costs which would be incurred under both courses of action, although initially (10 years) they would be higher under the binary option. [Footnote in the original.]
Europe would make it very difficult to obtain approval for increased peacetime forward deployment and dispersal.

Binaries would also offer an option of forward deploying the complete munition minus one relatively light component which could be easily shipped to Europe or other theaters, although some additional complete munitions would still need to be forward deployed for JCS estimated fully adequate support.

[Omitted here are Section D, “European Allies’ Capabilities,” and Section E, “Non-Military Constraints on Present Capability.”]

F. Posture Alternatives

There are three basic alternatives relative to the US CW posture. As noted below, each posture alternative has different implications for the arms control options considered in the NSSM 157 report.25 The NSSM 157 options included (1) limiting CW stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels; (2) banning production of CW agents; and (3) banning production and stockpiles of CW agents and munitions. These limitations could be embodied in a treaty proposal, a unilateral declaration of policy, or parallel US and USSR declarations of policy (that is, in effect, a bilateral moratorium).

The basic US CW posture alternatives are:

Alternative 1. Acquisition of Binary Chemical Weapons.

Full plans for the binary program have not been completed. Current DOD projections include the acquisition of about 7,600 nerve agent tons in ground and air munitions. DOD estimates the total cost at $333 million over 5 or more years. This estimate does not include any inflation factor, operation and maintenance costs, or demilitarization costs for an equivalent portion of the existing stockpile.

The currently projected level of binary acquisition, combined with the existing filled munitions, would not achieve what the JCS previously estimated for an adequate deterrent/retaliatory capability for all US forces. Based on estimated military requirements, the projected stocks with acquisition of binaries would provide full support in ground munitions for about 23 US divisions for 90 days—but only about 60 days full support in air munitions for 13–15 US divisions.

DOD’s estimated adequate CW defensive posture for this alternative would encompass improvements in the quantity and quality of defensive equipment and improved training at DOD’s currently projected levels of $560 million to $720 million over 8 years. A substantially improved defensive posture above the currently projected level would be militarily desirable, and would mainly involve higher quantitative and qualitative improvements in equipment.

25 See footnote 2, Document 33.
Arms Control Interface. This alternative would be compatible with only Option 1 of the NSSM 157 study (limiting stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels), whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral declaration of policy, or bilateral US/USSR moratorium.

Advantages

—Binary acquisition at the currently projected level (coupled with an improved defensive posture) would provide a significantly improved CW retaliatory capability for US forces, thus enhancing the non-nuclear option in the event an adversary initiated use of CW in war, and correcting a major portion of the deficiencies in the composition of the existing stockpile.
—Acquisition of a significant binary capability may provide a better deterrent against use of CW in a future conventional conflict.
—Binaries would involve essentially no potential safety hazards in their peacetime manufacture, storage, handling, and transportation; and would therefore probably not be subject to the same federal legal restrictions on peacetime storage and movement in CONUS as are the current stocks.
—Binaries would facilitate rapid deployment in war or crises.
—If the Navy were to carry binary chemical weapons routinely in peacetime, this could reduce dependence on forward deployment in Europe. (Navy policy is not to carry existing chemical stocks in peacetime.)
—Binaries would provide the only possibility for increasing peacetime forward deployment in Europe and, if desired and accomplished by the US, this would greatly reduce problems of CW munitions re-supply in a conflict. (However, it would be politically difficult to achieve increased peacetime forward deployment, and this could not be achieved without incurring substantial political opposition in Allied governments and publics.)
—Binary acquisition at higher levels than currently projected would enable the US to acquire what the JCS has estimated as a fully adequate CW stockpile and, if the US were able to accomplish increased peacetime forward deployment, a fully adequate CW posture.

Disadvantages

—Acquisition of binary chemical weapons in peacetime would undoubtedly be controversial in Congress. (Any CW budget increases
would be highly visible politically. Binary dollar costs would be low in comparison to other DOD programs. But the binary program, not to mention defensive improvements, would require sustaining substantial budget increases over the current funding level for several years. If binaries were inadequately funded by Congress, the US could incur much of the disadvantages below without achieving a significant military advantage.

—Limited open-air testing may prove necessary prior to procurement, and this would certainly be controversial in the US.
—Binary acquisition would be perceived internationally and domestically as contrary to our declared interest in further CW arms control, and the US would be criticized by the Soviets and others at the CCD and the UNGA for "refueling a CW arms race."
—This might spur further Soviet programs in the CW area, an area where they are not subject to similar political restraints, and the adequacy of the proposed improvements could be called into question by a significant augmentation in the Soviet capability.
—The deterrent effect of a significantly improved US CW capability might be reduced if the Soviets viewed it as signalling a US intention or threat to initiate use of CW in wartime.29
—This might lead to further proliferation of CW capabilities.30

Alternative 2. Reliance on Existing CW Offensive Capability.

This alternative would rely on the existing CW filled munitions capability and not entail production of any CW agents (binary or non-binary). It does not rule out filling munitions from existing bulk agent stocks to compensate for any phasing-out of delivery systems in the 1980’s. To maintain the existing capability might require some filling actions as early as the late 1970’s or early 1980’s. This alternative does not contemplate significantly improving the US CW retaliatory capability by reconfiguring most existing bulk agent stocks in munitions.31

29 The DOD representative questions this conclusion in the absence of supporting analysis. [Footnote in the original.]
30 The JCS representative believes that binaries would not necessarily lead to any proliferation of CW capabilities. The ACDA representative believes that unless proliferation of CW capabilities is controlled, the possibility that third countries may initiate CW against US Allies may become a more serious concern in the long-term than the threat of use in Europe. [Footnote in the original.]
31 The State and ACDA representatives note that the option to improve the existing CW capability by reconfiguration of bulk stocks would be left open, even if an agent production ban were desired and successfully negotiated. If filling facilities were later established to compensate for potential phaseout of some munitions, a gradual but substantial improvement of the overall capability could be undertaken with comparatively little additional dollar costs. This could provide, for example, almost a 90-day full support capability for 15 US divisions in Europe.

The State and ACDA representatives believe this course for significantly improving the US CW capability would be less controversial and provocative internationally and less expensive than acquisition of binaries, as it could be presented as a continuation of the current program. This could be particularly the case if the US were to negotiate an agent production ban.
The current filled munitions could provide full support for 13–15 US divisions in Europe for about 30 days. The then remaining ground munitions could either provide marginal support for the next 60 days for 13–15 US divisions, or be used in other theaters, or be used to support about 30 allied divisions for the initial 30 days.

This option envisions maintenance of an adequate CW R&D program in all phases and does not rule out continuing R&D on binary munitions.

As with the preceding alternative, DOD estimates that improvements in training and CW defensive equipment would be required at least at the currently projected level. However, in contrast to the preceding alternative, it would be even more desirable militarily to achieve the substantially improved defensive posture discussed previously, which would entail more CW defensive dollar costs than DOD’s currently projected level.\[Footnote in the original.\]32

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative would be most compatible with Option 2 (prohibiting further production of CW agents) of the NSSM 157 study, whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral US declaration of policy, or parallel US and USSR declarations of policy (i.e., a bilateral moratorium).\[Footnote in the original.\]33 As long as the manufacture of munitions and the filling of these munitions with existing bulk agent stocks were not prohibited, the US would retain the right to compensate for any diminution of its existing capability through possible phase-out of delivery systems in the 1980’s.

**Advantages**

—The US would retain its existing CW capability (although limited) to deter the use of CW against US forces and, if deterrence fails, to retaliate in kind.

—This would be a less controversial and provocative posture, domestically and internationally, than any other alternative at least up until the time that any filling were undertaken to compensate for phase-out of some delivery systems.

—This would be consistent with our declared commitment to seek effective measures to control CW, could provide more flexibility for arms control negotiations than the other alternatives if a ban on production of CW agents were desired.

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32 The JCS representative believes that it would be necessary to achieve the substantially improved defensive posture under this alternative. [Footnote in the original.]

33 The State representative believes that if the US decided to seek a prohibition on producing CW agents, the advanced state of binary R&D would place the US in a strong bargaining position. [Footnote in the original.]
—This would be less likely than the preceding alternative to encourage the Soviets to increase their CW capability or to encourage any further proliferation of CW capabilities.

—This would cost somewhat less than the preceding alternative, even if filling actions were undertaken later (much less if they were not), and substantially less than the following alternative.

Disadvantages

—This would not enable the US to attain what the JCS estimates to be an adequate deterrent/retaliatory CW capability because the previously discussed deficiencies in the composition and, secondarily, in the deployment of the stockpile would remain.

—To maintain the existing filled munitions capability would require some reconfiguration of existing bulk stocks into munitions sometime after 1978, and this would undoubtedly be controversial, in Congress and US public opinion, and involve highly visible budget increases.

—Potential safety hazards associated in the public mind with peacetime storage and transportation of existing lethal chemical weapons would not be alleviated. (No need for peacetime transportation of agents or munitions is foreseen for at least 5 years. Significant local pressures to destroy stocks at certain storage sites is considered unlikely in the foreseeable future although this could occur as manifested by the experience with the stocks at Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver.)

Alternative 3. Reliance Only on Conventional and Nuclear Forces and Improved CW Defensive Capability, with No Ready CW Stockpile.

This alternative envisions within 10–15 years reliance only on US conventional and nuclear capabilities, combined with an improved CW defensive posture, to provide deterrence against the wartime use of CW by an adversary and for retaliation in the event such deterrence fails. If CW were used on a significant scale against US forces, retaliation with tactical nuclear and conventional weapons could redress the overall military disadvantage imposed by the adversary’s use of CW.

The existing filled munitions capability would, however, remain for the first 5–8 years. This would envision as a minimum the attainment of the improvements in the defensive posture at DOD’s currently projected levels before any substantial disposal of the munitions stockpile were made, other than that resulting from some munitions possibly becoming unserviceable. By the time disposal is completed, it would be highly desirable militarily to have achieved the substantially improved and more expensive defensive posture discussed previously. It would be even more desirable militarily to have achieved the sophisticated defensive posture, if technologically possible, which would allow forces to operate in a toxic environment for extended periods with little degradation of performance.
Arms Control Interface. This alternative coincides with Option 3 (prohibiting both stockpiles and production of CW agents and munitions) of the NSSM 157 study, whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral US declaration of policy, or bilateral US/USSR moratorium.

Advantages

—This would be welcomed internationally and domestically by some as a US initiative to restrain CW.
—This would avoid the political costs of binary acquisition under Alternative 1 or any possible reconfiguration of existing bulk stocks under Alternative 2.
—This would provide an opportunity (if desired) to place political and legal constraints on Soviet CW stockpiling and production through CW arms control, although such constraints could not be reliably verified.
—A sophisticated defensive posture, if attainable, would greatly reduce but not necessarily eliminate the overall advantages an adversary could gain through initiating the use of CW in a conventional conflict.

Disadvantages

—The absence of any significant ready CW retaliatory capability could be more likely to tempt the Soviets to initiate use of CW in a conventional war, although they would still have to consider the likelihood of a tactical nuclear response by the US or its Allies.
—If chemical weapons were used by the Soviets against US and Allied forces on a significant or large scale in a conventional war, there would be no military option to respond in kind and, therefore, it would probably be necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons to redress the military situation. ³⁴
—There would be strong controversy in Congress and, to a lesser degree, with some Allies for the above reasons and because we would not be able to determine what the Soviets are doing in this area.

³⁴ However, as noted previously, unless the existing CW offensive and defensive deficiencies were corrected by the US and its Allies, tactical nuclear weapons may at any rate provide the only effective response to redress the military situation should the Soviets initiate chemical operations in war.

The ACDA representative believes that if US and Allied forces had achieved a substantially improved CW defensive posture, a response with conventional weapons would be sufficient to redress the military situation.

Moreover, the ACDA representative believes that any increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, whether explicit or implicit, would be undesirable from the arms control point of view and that this disadvantage would seem to outweigh the arms control benefits of this alternative. The ACDA representative believes, however, that there is a variant of Alternative 3 which should be considered. This variant would place reliance only on conventional forces and an improved CW defensive posture. It would not explicitly introduce the question of tactical nuclear weapons use, but at the same time recognizes that any large-scale war in Europe would pose for the aggressor a risk of nuclear escalation in any event—whether or not he introduced the use of chemical weapons. [Footnote in the original.]
—This would entail higher dollar costs over the next 10–15 years than Alternative 2 and somewhat higher dollar costs than Alternative 1 (but possibly lower costs thereafter).

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40. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Sisco) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, July 1, 1974.

**SUBJECT**

Department of State Comments on the Draft Response\(^2\) to NSSM 196\(^3\) on Overseas Military Base Structure

By memorandum dated June 7, 1974,\(^4\) we were asked to provide formal agency comments on the study on Overseas Military Base Structure which was prepared by an Ad Hoc Group in response to NSSM 196 dated February 25, 1974.

Judged in its entirety, the draft response to NSSM 196 on the U.S. Overseas Military Base Structure does point up, in considerable detail, the increasing vulnerability of our overseas basing structure to restrictive pressures which are both foreign and domestic in origin. It especially highlights the problems we face when we attempt to use bases and facilities for purposes which are either not shared with the host country or not part of the original rationale for the base. As such, the response reinforces the lessons we learned during the 1973 October war in the Middle East.

In that limited sense, the NSSM response is both a useful analysis of a very complex and evolving problem which affects most of our bases and facilities overseas, as well as a catalog of our basing structure as it now stands. It is a useful, if incomplete, compendium also of the measures we might conceivably take over the next ten years to at least partially alleviate the problems we face in routing and base usage and in operating and overflight rights overseas, either through measures aimed mainly at reducing our dependence on bases or through im-

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–203, Study Memorandums, NSSM 196 [2 of 2]. Secret.

\(^2\) Document 38.

\(^3\) Document 34.

\(^4\) See footnote 1, Document 38.
proving the reliability of our bases and operating rights at times and for purposes of our own choosing, or both.

However, the Department of State\(^5\) has had major conceptual and substantive difficulties with the NSSM response at each stage of its evolution. Although many of our concerns have been met, many still remain, and they cast doubt, in our minds, on the document’s utility as a whole as a focus for policy decision at the Presidential level.

We base our judgement in this respect on a number of considerations. The most important of these are:

(1) The NSSM response as now drafted is based on a set of assumptions which suggest a basically straight-line projection of events and circumstances as they are today throughout the entire ten-year period with which we are dealing. While we are prepared, in broad terms, to assume a continuing absence of general war and a continuing search for Great Power accommodation and détente—indeed the base usage with which we are dealing almost requires such an assumption—we cannot assume away the reality of growing Congressional concern with the dimensions and purposes of our overseas forces and their bases and thus the very real prospect of substantial withdrawals of U.S. forces from overseas bases during the ten-year period ahead. And in East Asia (as elsewhere), we cannot assume that relationships will remain so static, even in relative terms, as to permit a continuation of our overseas presence and facilities and operating rights at current or near-current levels.

(2) The basing structure described is all of the same cloth, and nowhere in this document is there an analysis of priorities among our overseas facilities with respect to supporting contingencies or of the minimum network which would be necessary to continue to support a forward defense strategy. Neither is there any analysis—as requested by the NSSM—of the Congressional implications, related budgetary costs, vulnerability to political denial or restrictions, and likely reactions of other countries for the indicated alternatives cited in the document; this is particularly noteworthy with regard to the so-called “courting list” of possible alternative host nations for basing which appears in Section Five of the draft response but which remains—in our eyes, and despite heavy caveating—an unevaluated and superficial treatment of possible alternatives to those locations we presently occupy.

(3) The scenarios developed in the NSSM response do not really satisfy the requirements of the NSSM, since they are illustrative rather than indicative of real contingencies with which we must be able to deal. While some of the scenarios do, in fact, exercise the routing problems we could face in getting at potentially troubled but relatively remote areas in which we have important interests, there are others

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\(^5\) The Department’s principal officers discussed overseas military bases during the Secretary’s staff meeting of June 26, a meeting chaired by Sisco in the absence of Kissinger, who was attending the Moscow Summit. The record of the meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Lot File 78D443, Box 4, Chronological File)
which are so unreal that even as illustrations of usage, they prejudice the case. In particular, we take strong exception to the South Asia/Indian Ocean and the Thai scenarios. We have made this point at several stages in the drafting process but to no avail, and our alternative scenarios have been largely ignored.

(4) The options portion of the NSSM response, despite its rather comprehensive nature, is deficient in at least one very important respect; it identifies clearly in Section IV that we face Congressional problems in retaining and renegotiating our base structure overseas, but it offers no measures among the options to deal with this problem. We recognize that this is a subject—especially as it relates to the Congressional pressure for a more active foreign policy role—upon which wide differences of opinion have existed for some time between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the U.S. Government as well as within the Executive Branch (and within the Department of State) itself. While this NSSM response may well not be the appropriate vehicle for resolving these differences, it could and should at least discuss the various possibilities as a part of the options of which the policy-maker should be aware.

It was for these various reasons that the Department of State faced a major dilemma during the final drafting stages of the NSSM response. On the one hand, there remained significant differences between the Departments of Defense and State on various portions of the study; on the other hand, the Department had no major problems—apart from those noted in the immediately preceding paragraph—with the conclusions and recommendations which appeared to be emerging from the exhaustive and occasionally unreconciled discussion within the main body of the document.

We contrived a solution, at least in terms of moving the document out of the NSC Ad Hoc Group charged with its preparation, by putting the areas of agreement, including conclusions and recommendations, into a more comprehensive Executive Summary than originally envisioned by Defense. We drafted, Defense embellished and agreed, and it was on the basis of that Executive Summary that the Department of State concurred in the transmittal of the NSSM response to the NSC by the Chairman of the NSC Ad Hoc Group. The language of the Department’s position at the time was as follows:

QUOTE: The Department of State’s concurrence (in transmittal to the NSC) is based on its agreement with the findings and recommendations of the study as they are reflected in the Executive Summary. We continue to have fundamental problems with portions of the main body of the study, in particular the political judgements involved in some of the assumptions, in several of the scenarios, and in certain of the projections of base usage and basing alternatives.

Thus the Department of State recommends that the SRG Principals focus their attentions on the Executive Summary, without attempting to reconcile these problems in the main body of the study. UNQUOTE.
Even more fundamental questions, however, arise at this point in the life of this study.

For instance, are the questions requiring resolution really ones for which Presidential involvement is necessary? Of that we are quite dubious. Even with a modified and expanded Executive Summary, the central question before the policy-maker is mainly a judgement on the urgency of the problems we will face over the next ten years and on the relative pace of the various remedies suggested, which are in any event, independently selectable.

Still another question: Is there enough cost data upon which to make decisions, at whatever the level they are to be made? On that we would say no. Costing data, required by the NSSM itself, is lacking, and the study, as a policy document, is poorer as a result.

The question then becomes: Should the study be abandoned? Should it be redone? Or should it be retained in a modified form for whatever usefulness it has already served and can continue to serve?

On that our views are clear. As noted above, we believe that the study is useful and should not be abandoned, even though it falls considerably short of the NSSM request. We believe, moreover, that while some updating and some factual and conceptual adjustments may make certain portions of the study more valuable than they are now, we doubt that it would be worth the effort to re-do the study to remedy all its faults, some of which appear to us ingrained in institutional biases and few of which, in any event, prejudice the conclusions and options in the Executive Summary.

Thus, our recommendation to the NSC is that it:

(a) return the NSSM response to the Ad Hoc Group for conversion of the Executive Summary into the formal NSSM response and the main body of the study into a series of annexes;

(b) instruct the Ad Hoc Group to modify the Executive Summary—principally by the Department of State—to take greater account of Congressional problems and possible remedies and to attempt, where possible, to relate other options to regional problems;

(c) direct the Ad Hoc Group to: (1) update those portions of the main body of the existing study which have been clearly overtaken by events; (2) go through the document as a whole so as to eliminate, where possible, those references which are so timely as to be dependent on a day-to-day reading of events; and, (3) secure more precise and factual identification of facilities mentioned or alluded to in Section III.

(d) direct the Ad Hoc Group to produce cost data, where appropriate, for incorporation into the Summary and into Section VI so that the policy-maker can have a clearer picture of the cost comparisons in choosing among options and measures.

Joseph J. Sisco
Acting Secretary
Editorial Note

In the midst of congressional impeachment proceedings stemming from the Watergate investigation, President Richard M. Nixon announced on August 8, 1974 that he would resign the presidency effective the next day. Vice President Gerald R. Ford was duly sworn in as President at noon on August 9. That afternoon, Ford met with Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Brigadier General Richard L. Lawson, the President’s Military Assistant. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) Ford received a briefing on the Single Integrated Operations Plan from Lawson during that meeting, according to the minutes of the meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group also held on August 9 to discuss the presidential transition. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, NSC, Box TS 81, WSAG, Apr. 1973–March. 1975) That day, President Ford also sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger that placed in effect certain instructions for the expenditure of nuclear weapons in the event of a national emergency, procedures first established during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, General Subject Files, Box 19, Nuclear Command and Control [8/1974])

On August 12, Ford gave an address, broadcast nationwide via radio and television, to a joint session of Congress in which he outlined his guiding principles and objectives as President. After discussing domestic and economic policy, he turned to foreign policy and defense issues:

“Now, let there be no doubt or any misunderstanding anywhere, and I emphasize anywhere: There are no opportunities to exploit, should anyone so desire. There will be no change of course, no relaxation of vigilance, no abandonment of the helm of our ship of state as the watch changes.

“We stand by our commitments and we will live up to our responsibilities in our formal alliances, in our friendships, and in our improving relations with potential adversaries.

“On this, Americans are united and strong. Under my term of leadership, I hope we will become more united. I am certain America will remain strong.

“A strong defense is the surest way to peace. Strength makes détente attainable. Weakness invites war, as my generation—my generation—knows from four very bitter experiences.
“Just as America’s will for peace is second to none, so will America’s strength be second to none.

“We cannot rely on the forbearance of others to protect this Nation. The power and diversity of the Armed Forces, active Guard and Reserve, the resolve of our fellow citizens, the flexibility in our command to navigate international waters that remain troubled are all essential to our security.

“I shall continue to insist on civilian control of our superb military establishment. The Constitution plainly requires the President to be Commander in Chief, and I will be.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1974, p. 11)

42. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Gen. George S. Brown, USAF, Chairman
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, USA
Adm. James L. Holloway, III, CNO
Gen. David C. Jones, USAF
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: I gave a real pitch to McClellan. He was sympathetic but scared of floor action. There are some pretty hard noses to crack on the Committee—Case, for example.

Number one, it is nice to see you, George [Brown], and your associates. I have had wonderful experience in the 12 years on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee where we had tough problems to solve

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 4, August 13, 1974—Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Joint Chiefs. Top Secret. The meeting, held in the White House Cabinet Room, lasted from 3:11 to 4:20 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) All brackets are in the original memorandum.
and a chance to know, love and admire our military. I hope that message gets out to the forces.

If we are to make headway in meeting our responsibilities for defense, we must keep the leadership and money. I am worried about the money. A $5.5 billion cut is too deep. I would hope the cuts would be different from the House so we could get a $1 billion restoration. Anything we can do ought to be a major effort.

Schlesinger: We expect to get back to about $4.2 billion.

President: Let’s do better than that. My comments about being Commander-in-Chief were not said routinely but people expect to hear it.

As for the workings of the NSC or the system. If you object to actions of the JCS, the Secretary, or a Service Secretary, you have the right to come to me. I affirm that, but the best way is through the Secretary and the NSC to me. If that breaks down, exercise your legal right. But I reemphasize the system ought to work. How about a rundown on where we are?

Gen. Brown (Chairman, JCS): We appreciate your thoughts. The openness and communication in the Department is the best in 15 years, so your contingency shouldn’t arise. [He takes out charts on US military forces:] 3

Chart number 1: We have 2.1 million men in uniform or in support of these units.

Chart number 2 shows 1.5 [million?] people in the reserves.

Chart number 3: Forces divided into US commands.

Chart number 4 shows foreign forces.

President: What is our strength in Korea?

Schlesinger: 38,000.

President: Are there any plans to change it? There have been changes in the situation there and you will want to examine the whole situation in Korea—the political problems.

Gen. Brown: The current plan in Thailand is to draw down from 30,000 to 7,000 forces in two years.

Chart Number 5 shows 191,000 personnel in Central Europe.

We can’t count on French forces, but we have private assurances about their availability. It’s five divisions, 3,000 tanks, 600 aircraft. The

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2 See Document 41.
3 The referenced 32 charts and maps are in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser Files, Presidential Agency Files, Box 14, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Presidential Briefing, 8/74.
strategy is defensive; we think it is adequate but we are prepared for two months.

Chart Number 6: We watch the Soviets in the southern flanks. We have forces that could evacuate Cyprus and supervise the Suez clearing operation.

Chart Number 7: The 82nd Airborne can move out in 18 hours.
Kissinger: How about the other divisions?
Gen. Abrams (Army): Any of the seven can be moved in 18 hours.
President: But we don’t have the airlift.

Gen. Abrams: Navy, MAC, and TAC have been working with the divisions very well over the last year to try to improve our lift ability. We have reduced lift tonnage by ten percent.

Kissinger: How long would it take to move one division to the Middle East?
Gen. Abrams: It depends on basing. I can’t give you a specific answer.

Gen. Brown: Our NATO commitment is 10 days for the first division into Europe. We could beat that if we got the planes in there.

Schlesinger: With Lajes it would take upwards of a week.

Brown: We planned a light Division last October and wouldn’t have had much staging power. The Second and Third fleets.

Chart number 8: We are revising the SIOP to provide a range of limited options. Theater nuclear forces augment the conventional forces.

Some of our Minutemen are being modernized to carry three warheads and Polaris are being converted to Poseidon.

Chart Number 9 shows four submarines in the Pacific Command; 149 bombers; 11 subs in the Atlantic Command and four in CINCEUR.

Adm. Holloway (CNO): The Navy is flexible, mobile and multi-purpose.

Chart number 11 shows Naval postures and contingencies for limited war and general war (either with general-purpose forces or nuclear). All our major ships can operate either conventionally or nuclear.

Chart number 12: To protect NATO’s southern flank or any US contingencies. We have 21 ballistic-missile submarines on patrol. One tactical nuclear sub is usually in the Barents Sea for reconnaissance.

Chart number 13: To support our Asian allies and national tasking. Since World War II, the 7th Fleet has been combat ten years.

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4 Lajes Field in the Azores was a United States Air Force, Army, and Navy base.
One nuclear sub is on reconnaissance off Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk. There is a Persian Gulf Task Force. We now know we can stay in Bahrain.

Chart number 14 shows our augmentation capability. Since October we have put a major force into the Indian Ocean for three or four quarters. It is difficult to support.

Kissinger: The Chinese are a great supporter of this deployment.

Adm. Holloway: It is difficult to do; that is why we want to see Diego Garcia upgraded.

President: Did the authorization\(^5\) knock out the limitation?

Scowcroft: Stennis put in $14.8 million which put it in the door.

President: But the authorization didn’t prevent it?

Scowcroft: No.

Kissinger: This Indian Ocean deployment is crucial for our foreign policy.

President: Is the harbor adequate?

Adm. Holloway: No. Even with dredging it could take only the oiler. We have only carrier ports like Mombasa. But we have a force going in in November for bilateral operations with the Iranian Navy. We go around South Africa once a year.

Chart number 15 shows the payoff in a crisis.

Chart number 16: If we want to give more we could immediately deploy 75 percent of our ships.

Chart number 17 shows the decline. It’s growing again now, but slowly.

Chart number 18: As we decline, Soviet strength grows, especially their capacity for blue-water operations.

President: What is the range of ship missiles?

Adm. Holloway: Early missiles were 350 miles, now about only 70–75. Our big concern is the 25-mile missile, because of the problem of detection time.

Cushman: To complement the Navy are the Marines—196,000 of them.

Chart number 20 shows three balanced Division-Wing teams.

President: What strength is a Marine Division?

\(^5\) PL 93–636, as passed by both houses of Congress on December 18, authorized $3.1 billion for FY 1975 military construction. The measure included no funding to expand the U.S. base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia as requested by the administration. It did, however, permit the Navy and the Air Force to divert construction funds to Diego Garcia, provided that the requirements of the authorization bill were met. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 162)
Gen. Cushman (USMC): 17,000 about. The East Coast team is earmarked for NATO. There is a reinforced battalion in the Mediterranean. One Division-Wing Team in Okinawa. A Third Division team on the West Coast—for any contingency.

Chart number 21: Our sea projection force.
We have fought with the Army twice in twenty years. Our logistics services can meld with either the Navy or the Army.
President: How long would it be to mobilize the 4th Division?
Gen. Cushman: Sixty days to get to the West Coast to train.
President: Do you have any trouble recruiting for the reserves?
Gen. Cushman: Yes. There are a few incentives.
President: Are you up to strength?
Gen. Cushman: We are down about 10,000. It will get worse not better.

Gen. Abrams: Chart number 24 shows four and a third divisions in Europe. It was torn up during the Vietnam war. It has turned around now. The General now is Davison. Discipline and leadership are back.

The Jackson-Nunn Amendment wants us to take out support and replace it with combat. We are working on it and are in favor of it. I think we can do it.

The emphasis now is on anti-tank capability. We are trying to improve that.

President: Is the problem a shortage of tanks?
Gen. Abrams: I’d like to come back to that.

Chart number 25: Japan was probably what the Korean war was fought about, and what we do there [in Korea] relates to Japan.
The Division there has about 2,500 Koreans in it, but it is an elite, well-led Division.

President: What uniforms do those Korean forces wear?
Gen. Abrams: Ours. They are identical except for pay.
President: I don’t want to take the time now, but do they stay 20 years?
Gen. Abrams: Only three years, because the Korean Government wants to process the maximum through that Division.

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6 General Michael S. Davison, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Europe and Commander, Central Army Group, NATO.
7 The FY 1975 defense authorization measure (HR 14592—PL 93–365) included a provision making a 12,500 cut in overseas troop strength, reducing the total to 452,000. The final bill also included an amendment requiring a cut of 18,000 in non-combatant support troops stationed in Europe, but allowing the substitution of an equal number of combat troops. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 160–161)
Chart number 26: We have a brigade in Panama. We are cutting Headquarters.

Chart number 27: Eight reserve Divisions not shown.
We are after 875,000 in end-strength and bring it from 13- to 16-division force.

President: Can you do that?
Gen. Abrams: Yes. I can do it.

President: Where will you put them?
Gen. Abrams: Ord, Polk, Stuart. There is no population pressure except at Ord.

President: It gives you more flexibility.

Gen. Jones (USAF): I’d like to concentrate on two issues: strategic forces and NATO.

Adm. Moorer left SAC in good shape and we are unmatched.

President: Who is the Commander in Chief?
Gen. Jones: Dougherty.8 We are trying to expand the mission, like in the maritime area. We are trying to give you more options and more flexibility. The Minuteman is kept open. With improved RV’s.

Kissinger: What is the yield?
Gen. Jones: [1½ lines not declassified].

President: What about the accuracy?
Gen. Jones: We’re working [less than 1 line not declassified].

We call this Missile X.

Next month we will drop a Minuteman from a C–5 by parachute.
We also have an air-launched cruise missile.

President: Is there a mobile missile with rail or car?
Gen. Jones: We’re looking at both.9 The rails are fewer now.

President: I remember a rail one in the early ’60’s.

Gen. Jones: We have 500 aircraft in NATO and can double it in 96 hours and increase rapidly from these. We exercise into Boulder. It takes 24 hours. We are looking at an airlift enhancement program, in cooperation with wide-bodied airliners.

President: Is that CRAF?

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8 General Russell E. Dougherty, CINCSAC from August 1, 1974.

9 In a memorandum dated December 20, 1973, Moorer informed Clements that the Air Force was studying the M–X Advanced ICBM Technology Program, a mobile ICBM deployment option. The Air Force considered the M–X program to be “a sound approach for maintaining the option to permit a full scale development decision for a follow-on ICBM system, which could include mobile basing options, in FY 1977/78.” (National Archives, RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer, CM File, 3007–73 to 3072–73)
Gen. Jones: Yes, but we want to expand cooperation.
President: How quickly can you commandeer it?
Gen. Jones: On an agreed basis, within 24 hours.
President: Did you use it in the Middle East?\textsuperscript{10}
Gen. Jones: No. The airlines were worried about Arab retaliation.
Gen. Brown: We had an arrangement for them to take up the slack around the world while we did the Israeli bit.
Gen. Jones: The lightweight fighter. We are working for standardization with the Allies. In NATO, no one service or country can solve the problem. NATO air has balance, but with each going his own way, we can’t exploit it. It is an inefficient operation which hurts. There is much to be done.
Gen. Brown: We are all mindful of the great pressures of inflation and manpower, and we have got to modernize.
President: We have to get you enough money. Anything I can do, I will.
Thank you, and I reiterate that you can come to me on anything through Jim [Schlesinger] and the NSC if they stop it.

\textsuperscript{10} Reference is to the U.S. airlift of military equipment during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

43. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, October 10, 1974, 7:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser’s Files, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6, October 10, 1974—Ford, Schlesinger. Top Secret; Nodis. The breakfast meeting, held in the First Floor Private Dining Room of the White House, lasted until 8:58 a.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) All brackets, except for those included by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original.
Schlesinger: The Birch Society Congressmen are starting to work against Defense on economic grounds. I am going hopefully to join the Democratic study group. Dick Bolling\(^2\) I think can be good.

President: Bolling is good. Ullman\(^3\) is also good.

Schlesinger: I think we will do all right in the House. Even Joe Biden\(^4\) is getting educated.

[There is more light discussion of the Congressional situation.]

President: Virginia has a lot of Defense installations.

Schlesinger: Do you mind if I close some of them after the elections?

President: No. Which ones?

Schlesinger: The toughest is the Frankford Arsenal. It has been kept open because of Hugh Scott for 15 years.

President: How big is it?

Schlesinger: About 5,000 people. It is old and the mission is obsolete. The personnel are ill trained. I also proposed the Pueblo Arsenal. Senator Dominick\(^5\) called and asked me to keep it open until after November.

President: What is its mission?

Schlesinger: It is a depot. We have gone down from 6.3 million to 2.1 million people without shrinking the base structure.

One is in McFall’s\(^6\) and one is in Leggett’s\(^7\) District. We must shrink the Army system so we can get to 16 divisions. It has long been overblown.

President: Military bases?

Schlesinger: Fort Dix is the biggest one.

President: Clifford Case hasn’t helped us.

Schlesinger: He is okay on conventional forces. He’s a frail reed, but he hasn’t been too bad. We just don’t need all the training facilities. We are also closing Fort Monroe.

President: Can you show the cost-to-benefit ratio?

Schlesinger: Yes. They have cut manpower by 30,000. I can take that without cutting strength. We will consolidate the two in California.

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\(^2\) Representative Richard Walker Bolling (D–Missouri).

\(^3\) Representative Albert Conrad Ullman (D–Oregon).

\(^4\) Senator Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr. (D–Delaware).

\(^5\) Senator Peter Hoyt Dominick (R–Colorado).


\(^7\) Representative Robert Louis Leggett (D–California).
in McFall’s district rather than in Leggett’s, though it will cost one-half million more.

President: We won’t have closings to help someone else. I heard an Army base closed in Omaha and one opened in Louisiana. If you have to move, ok, but don’t do it to help people out.

Schlesinger: I stopped the Navy from moving Suitland to Mississippi. Stennis is very nervous. Pastore wanted it moved to Rhode Island. The Navy wanted to help Stennis.

President: These districts who forgot to get bases are in the long run better off. I didn’t try to get any. It is a snare and a delusion. It’s much too uncertain.

Schlesinger: I agree. The facilities in Mendel Rivers’ district are slipping away. But I need your support with Scott. He is a patriot.

President: On any of these, get me a 10-page paper showing all the background. Hugh [Scott] is a statesman if you show common sense and political savvy.

Schlesinger: I hope Dominick pulls through. The AFL–CIO said they wouldn’t forget Milton Young.

President: Milton Young is very good. It’s just his age. How can the AFL—with Meany’s strength—support Hart in Colorado? Pete [Dominick] needs all the help he can get.

Schlesinger: The problem is Hart is going moderate.

President: The strange race is in South Dakota. Thorsness is likeable.

Schlesinger: McGovern is actually a moderate.

President: I’m hearing Javits is in trouble.

Schlesinger: I think he’s o.k. I will talk to the AFL about it. The Democrats have done well in the Governor races—a moderate does better than a radical. But they can’t do that in a Senate race unless they can get the Jews.

President: The Cuba trip didn’t help him.
I am worried about tank production.\(^{13}\)

Schlesinger: It’s a big problem. Basically the marginal foundries are being put out of business by the environmental laws.

President: If you had your druthers, how much would you increase it?

Schlesinger: From 260 to 1200. And despite all this Stratton\(^{14}\) isn’t satisfied at Water Vliet. We make gun turrets there.

We have trouble if we give 200 tanks to Israel. The Saudis complained they had to wait two years and Israel gets it right away.

President: If you started now, how long would it take to get going?

Schlesinger: We’re up to about 500 now; I had hoped to be to 800. But I am out of foundries and may have to get them in Germany.

President: Who builds them? And how much do they cost?

Schlesinger: About \$35,000. Chrysler does it in an old World-War II plant.

President: Rhodes was after me to get some government-owned foundry on the market so GM could move in.

If Congress cut us \$7 billion from \$304 billion and the Department of Defense had to cut short, where would you get it?

Schlesinger: I would cut civil service. But O & M is the only way to get it quickly. I probably would have to cut Navy overseas deployment—in the Mediterranean, for example.

President: This would give an excuse to close those facilities. Would you cut military or civilians?

Schlesinger: I would slow recruitment, but wouldn’t reduce end strength. We took a cut in O & M this year.

I told you everything looked like \$96 billion in ’76 outlays. It now looks like \$95 billion. We are very thin on strength.

You can keep current levels. We are at 5.6% of GNP as compared to 9.6% ten years ago. We can’t keep on doing this and stay second to none. FY ’75 spending will be between \$83 and \$84 billion.

President: Where will the cuts come?

Schlesinger: From slowing procurement. The problem is we are coming into a lot of procurement from prior years.

\(^{13}\) According to Scowcroft’s October 9 memorandum briefing Ford on the next day’s meeting with Schlesinger, “Heavy competition for the use of tank capacity to produce non-military goods and major shortfall in the inventory of tanks in US active forces have led DOD to propose Government intervention to establish tank production as a program of ‘Highest National Priority.’” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser’s Files, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6, October 10, 1974—Ford, Schlesinger)

\(^{14}\) Representative Samuel Studdiford Stratton (D–New York).
Inflation has cost us $9 billion. To repair the Department we have to face up to the costs.

I told Ullman our defense strengths in proportion to the share of GNP.

President: Can’t DOD help us over NPR No. 1 and No. 4? Number 1 would be very helpful now. Why won’t Eddie [Hebert?] go along?

Schlesinger: I think a deal is possible. Number 4 is tougher than Number 1. I think you can’t with 750 million go into a production base in Number 4 in terms of developing national resources. It would worry the producers.

President: You mean if we prove out Number 4 that that would ease the pressure on Number 1?

Schlesinger: No. We would continue to have resistance on production from Number 1.

President: Everyone on the California delegation is after me. They know the alternative is drilling in the channel. Can we get a deal with Eddie?

Schlesinger: We will work on it. Vinson\textsuperscript{15} advised Hebert against it unequivocally.

President: I don’t understand. It could help us right away.

Schlesinger: Conservation for the Navy is a secular religion going back to Pinchot.

President: With the Navy going nuclear, how can they need more oil than 20 years ago?

Schlesinger: It’s not rational, just conservative.

We are sending you a revised Unified Command Plan.\textsuperscript{16} It leaked and was embarrassing, in that it has been given to Bunker\textsuperscript{17} as a goodie in his negotiations.

President: Are the Panamanians against it?

Schlesinger: Yes. SOUTHCOM does serve a useful purpose politically. It was proposed in ’70 and rejected. Haig and Walters were opposed. On political grounds JCS now support it. I think it will get no support on the Hill.

\textsuperscript{15} Presumably a reference to Carl Vinson, longtime Democratic Representative from Georgia and former Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs and the House Committee on Armed Services.

\textsuperscript{16} Schlesinger sent the proposed revision to the United Command Plan to Ford under a covering memorandum, December 17. The proposed revision called for the disestablishment of the United States Southern Command in the Panama Canal Zone, of the Alaskan Command, and of the Continental Air Defense Command, the latter to be replaced by a proposed Air Force Aerospace Defense Command. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Action Memoranda, December 1974)

\textsuperscript{17} Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador at Large from October 11, 1973.
President: Will PACOM take it over?

Schlesinger: No. We would have forces take over the headquarters. It mostly handles MAP and we can do it from Washington. It is a colonial vestige. We also want to eliminate ALCAN [ALCOM?]. That is a Ted Stevens\textsuperscript{18} problem. It would become part of CONAD. It’s the only state having a separate defense command. They still worry about World War II. I can put 5 divisions into Alaska in five days. I think we can swing it if we can have a 3-star flag there.

We just can’t afford these luxuries anymore.

President: That will help your general officer problem.

Schlesinger: I think we have solved that problem. I think the Hill will turn to something else. I am optimistic on the Hill.

President: Again, we did well last year, but if we get 50 more liberals in the House and 5 or 6 more in the Senate, we’re in trouble.

Who will take Weyand’s place?

Schlesinger: The Army would recommend Kerwin.\textsuperscript{19} I am toying with the idea of saying to get someone under 54. I am trying to get the average age down. Kerwin is 58. The idea is he would be in for 18 months and then get a younger man. You would then decide whether to keep Weyand around after he’s 60 in 1976.

The Army is cooperating to reduce the age of 3 and 4 star people. The Air Force applies a 5-year/35 year rule. The Army hasn’t.

President: What do you think about the Vietnam situation?

Schlesinger: We need $2–300 million more. McFall thinks we can slip it through. The Senate doesn’t back that. Maybe I can use some drawdown.

On the ’76 budget, we are getting a low wave. Before, Ash and I had agreed on $94 billion. That is still a shrinking percentage of the GNP. I think we have to maintain that expenditures level if we want to stay second to none. Otherwise we would be second to one. We are operating on a procurement level which is half of what it was in ’68. We are 25% below the levels of ’58–65. We must push that back up. We are at the lowest level in procurement, manpower, and conventional forces since Forrestal.\textsuperscript{20}

President: How about the Navy? How are they making out?

Schlesinger: We lost four frigates. Next year we may have to fight for the Navy. The Air Force is doing well. The B–1 may get some flak.

\textsuperscript{18} Senator Theodore F. (Ted) Stevens (R–Alaska).

\textsuperscript{19} General Walter T. (Dutch) Kerwin, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from October 1974.

\textsuperscript{20} James Vincent Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, September 17, 1947 to March 28, 1949.
The B–1 roll-out is October 26. There is a fight now between California and Texas for production.

President: The California delegation doesn’t help us much.

Schlesinger: California votes only for the B–1.

President: I would take Cranston and Tunney.21

Schlesinger: Cranston is more consistent and strong-minded than Tunney. Tunney can be persuaded.

President: Cranston headed some crazy Democratic alliance. He is a fighter and can help you if he is with you. Tunney is inconsistent.

Schlesinger: I talked to Tunney on the Azores and the Tunney Amendment.22 He said he would help if no one was told.

President: What is the present Portuguese situation?

Schlesinger: I talked to Kissinger about contingency planning—[less than 1 line not declassified] You may be able to weather it because of the Israeli situation.

President: It would raise a UN problem. We would really catch the flak then.

Schlesinger: Even then you’d be surprised at the chariness to attack the UN then. We never fight back—if we start to, the better ones might change.

President: What is the Europeans’ attitude?

Schlesinger: They would welcome it if the case is strong.

President: I’d better go, unless you wanted to raise something else specific.

Schlesinger: I brought a book to discuss SALT about weapons characteristics—when a MIRV is not a MIRV.

President: How about next week? Possibly after next Thursday or Friday.

Schlesinger: How about Friday?

President: Personnel.

[Omitted here is discussion of military personnel.]

21 John Varick Tunney (D–California).

22 In 1973, Senator Tunney co-sponsored an amendment to that year’s foreign assistance legislation that suspended U.S. economic or military assistance used in direct support of Portugal’s war in Angola, a Portuguese colony until 1975. Congress failed to adopt that measure. However, in December 1975, following disclosures that the United States had secretly supplied arms and funds to factions fighting in Angola’s civil war, Tunney led a coalition of Senators that successfully added an amendment to the FY 76 Defense appropriations bill that banned the use of any of the bill’s funds for “any activities involving Angola.” The final bill (HR 9861—PL 94–212) was signed into law in January 1976 with Tunney’s language intact. (New York Times, November 14, 1973, p A2; Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 867)
President: The mission has changed. Civil Defense is now more a disaster thing.

Schlesinger: The Soviets have a formidable capacity in civil defense. I am trying to get some plans for evacuation.

President: The Chinese capability in that is even better.

[The Secretary and the President conferred for 5 minutes alone at the end.]

44. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 31, 1974, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Roy Ash, Director, Office of Management and Budget
Donald Ogilvie, Acting Associate Director Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT

DOD Budget Cuts

Schlesinger: The possible cuts are in two categories: One, items we didn’t ask for. We would not strongly oppose these. The others are items we would strenuously oppose. By internal logic we should make repairs to remain second to none, through a supplemental. We could defer that to 1976 because of the climate, but Stennis expects one, and Mahon is more experienced. If we go back, after the leadership (McClellan and Mahon) have said they have taken everything possible out of the DOD budget—if we then take more, we start an unraveling process. We have also worked hard to keep our Allies from reducing their budgets, and we would undercut that. As well for our potential enemies, who would see the reason for the slide.

On a substantive basis, we are in bad shape, about 30 percent below our strength before and about 25 percent below the average of

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser’s Files, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6, October 31, 1974—Ford, Schlesinger, Ash, Ogilvie. Confidential. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, ended at 11:25 a.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)
the 1960s. The Rivers Amendment cancellation\(^2\) would save us $150
million this year and $500 million next year in base pay adjustments.

President: Let’s go through the list. I favor deferring promotions
across the board. Why not do it for six months?

Ash: This is tied up with Executive pay. The question is how much
is enough.

President: Three is probably psychologically better, but with eco-
nomic positions like they are, not so many will want to get out.

Schlesinger: The bonuses item is okay. The reserve item is okay.
We didn’t ask for the money.

President: How does maintenance fit with base closures?
Schlesinger: There’s no connection. Depot maintenance decreases
readiness. Property maintenance is not so bad as depot.

President: Let’s leave operations for the moment.
Ash: I would leave out the civilian cut now.
President: Let’s cut the Texas package. No on shipbuilding.

\(^2\) In 1967, a bill (HR 13510—PL 90–207) passed by Congress to raise military pay in-
cluded an amendment, proposed by Representative L. Mendel Rivers (D–South Car-
olina), Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, providing that such future
raises be automatic and equal to salary increases for federal civilian employees. (*Congress

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45. **Memorandum of Conversation**\(^1\)

Washington, November 14, 1974, 12:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Subject Files,
Box CL 431, Schlesinger, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1975. Secret; Nodis. The
meeting was held in Kissinger’s State Department office.
[Kissinger:] How do you feel about the airborne missile on the B–1?

Schlesinger: It’s not the preferred way to go. It’s the ALCM missile.

Kissinger: What is it?

Schlesinger: It is a long-range area weapon, as opposed to the SRAM. Its chief advantage is that it screws up their air defense problem.

Kissinger: Can you get accuracy with an airborne ICBM?

Schlesinger: Yes. But the problem is location. After we establish a space-borne navigation platform, we can—though it will take 10 years. It’s a waste of money to put a stand-off missile on the B–1.

Kissinger: Why do we need a penetrating bomber?

Schlesinger: Accuracy, use for our options, and it makes them spend money on air defense.

Kissinger: In a selective strike, wouldn’t we use missiles? With bombers, wouldn’t we have to have a massive air-defense suppression?

Schlesinger: It would pop up and launch a SRAM from a standoff position.

Kissinger: But you don’t need the B–1 for that. Intellectually I have trouble with the B–1. Why does it have to penetrate? I would use missiles for a selective strike, and in a massive attack we would have leveled out their air defenses beforehand.

Schlesinger: Give me one minute on Iran. Where are we going?

Kissinger: The Shah is the one guy who has a strategic conception. He is with us on everything but oil and there he only wants money—and he could put $10 billion into the U.S. He would like to open the C–5 line for us.

Schlesinger: But he expects payments of $12 million for any aircraft that anyone else buys.

Kissinger: I told him we were sympathetic on co-production and you would do it. He is also willing to refuel us in the event of a Middle East war.
46. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 15, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of SALT.]

The President: What is so important about the military construction authorization?

Secretary Schlesinger: Lots of things we need.

Secretary Kissinger: If we don’t get it this year, we won’t.

The President: Mansfield will be away. Can’t we win it in the Senate? I think we should stick with Hebert and hang tough. It is a hard knockout.

Secretary Schlesinger: On the ’75–’76 budget we have to make reviews in 1975 of what the impact will be on 1976. I’ve got to take it from the procurement for operations. In ’76 we have an agreement with OMB to build in the inflation on procurement. That gives us $107–108 billion in the budget and $95.1 billion in outlays. Since we have to take it from the procurement for operations, we should put it back in in ’76.

The President: Does the $95.1 include everything?

Secretary Schlesinger: It is just a continuation of the present program.

The President: What would $94 billion do?

Secretary Schlesinger: I’ll get you a readout. We can manipulate expenditures. The problem is in the TOA area. The budget savings is in the process which will reduce the Services by $3 billion to get to $95.1.

The President: What would they add?

Secretary Schlesinger: It would not be a precise add-on, more a chipping away.

The President: Roy [Ash] says you don’t want to stall promotions.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser’s Files, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7, November 15, 1974—Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger. Top Secret. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, concluded at 1:09 p.m. Kissinger departed at 12:54 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)
Secretary Schlesinger: I’d be happy to go on a government-wide basis, but not on DOD alone. Otherwise I would rather get the savings elsewhere. Across the government, it would be okay.

The President: How would you save it?

Secretary Schlesinger: In the personnel account, PCS, etcetera. I worry about the discriminatory aspect.

The President: If you can give Roy the $27 million from elsewhere, okay. Do I have to make a decision on the $95.1 today?

Secretary Schlesinger: No. I just want you to know I must take it out of procurement for operations and that has implications for ’76. I wanted to get your views on the supplemental versus transfer authority.

The President: How big a supplemental would it be?

Secretary Schlesinger: About $700 million.

The President: Which is best?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think it is best not to go for the supplemental.

The President: I would save up the good will for next year. I would not go the supplemental route. My inclination would be to go for bigger than Roy. His is $94 billion?

Secretary Schlesinger: It may have slipped to $93.

The President: Does the unemployment situation help the recruiting?

Secretary Schlesinger: It is making the All Volunteer Force. It will get harder as the war baby generation thins out.

The President: I lean to a higher figure, but don’t know how much higher at the moment.

Secretary Schlesinger: I think Roy is prepared to be reasonable.

On the base closings, we are thinking of closing Loring AFB. Muskie will be the head of the budget committee—they will be organized in one year. Muskie is not in a good position to complain.

The President: What was its mission?

Secretary Schlesinger: It’s marginal SAC base. We are moving them inland.

The President: How many SAC bases would you close?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think five. We would also close Frankford and Pueblo arsenals. We would close Rome, N.Y.

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The President: I want to reemphasize that no closing should result in a transfer which Congress could claim we are bowing to Hebert, etc. That can’t be done.

Secretary Schlesinger: One has to watch the Services on this. It will not happen.

The President: I will study up on SALT.

Secretary Schlesinger: They will size you up. Show them they can work with you.

47. Executive Summary Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (Sullivan)¹


I. Executive Summary

The United States emerged from World War II with the largest and most capable naval force the world has ever known, and with undisputed supremacy across the oceans and seas of the world. The British maintained the only other major ocean-going Navy, and even this was of only moderate size compared with U.S. forces. The U.S. naval monopoly, together with the historic concept of “freedom of the seas,” enabled the U.S. to adopt a “forward defense” strategy and to develop economic bonds and other forms of interdependence which are fundamentally predicated on free use of the high seas.

Immediately following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union embarked upon the construction of an oceanic naval force of its own,
following up on plans halted by the war. After seeing to coastal defense, the first Soviet initiative was the development of a large force capable of interdicting the sea lanes of communication. This assessment is based principally on production of a large diesel submarine force which posed a threat to U.S. reinforcement of Western Europe. In the mid-1950s, emphasis was shifted to the more rapid development of naval defense forces capable of denying U.S. carrier forces the ability to approach the Soviet land mass and threaten their homeland with nuclear weapons. The forces developed in support of this mission also contributed to the Soviets' capability for interdicting sea lines of communication. Primarily in response to the Cuban Crisis of 1962, in the 1960s this anti-carrier objective was augmented with a third goal—to develop a naval surface fleet capable of establishing peacetime force presence and projecting Soviet influence at substantial distances from its own homeland.

An appreciation for the economic, geographical, political, and historical considerations which impel differing U.S. and Soviet outlooks on maritime affairs is essential to understanding the asymmetry in their naval missions and where these missions may come into conflict. The U.S. must import essential raw materials and fuel by sea and is committed to reinforcing and resupplying its allies by sea in the event of a major conflict on land. On the other hand, the Soviets do not depend heavily on sea lines of communication. Historically, they treated their navy as the seaward extension of the Red Army; however, this strategy has now changed to include sea lane interdiction, crisis management, and other missions associated with first-rate naval powers.

Despite a significant commitment of resources to increased naval capability, the Soviet Union remains essentially a continental power, very little dependent upon the use of the seas to maintain its economic or political integrity with its European Allies. Their increased military capability has allowed the Soviet Union increasingly to become involved in international affairs and to attempt to exert a greater influence in the international forum. It exerts influence through diplomatic efforts, security assistance and military force presence in the Middle East, Africa, the southern littoral of the Mediterranean and in South Asia. These endeavors are facilitated by a sea-going navy for credible support.

U.S. maritime missions have been essentially constant since World War II, changing only slightly in response to the changing capabilities of the USSR. In contrast, Soviet maritime missions have changed markedly during this period. Their peacetime presence mission is essentially the same as that of the U.S. in concept, although not yet in magnitude. Their use of maritime forces for crisis reaction and potential unilateral intervention has been converging with the historical practices of the
U.S. and other maritime powers. In the context of large-scale sustained conflict in Europe, the maritime missions of the two sides are substantially different. In such a conflict, U.S. and Allied maritime forces are committed to maintaining control of those areas of the seas needed for essential military tasks whereas the central theme of Soviet naval policy and planning for nearly two decades has been the seaward defense of the homeland against the carrier threat. To the extent possible, the Soviets would extend anti-carrier operations into the sea approaches to the Eurasian continent. Currently, this longer range threat would predominately include submarines. In addition, the emergence of this formidable Soviet naval capability equates to significantly expanded offensive power. This offensive power is particularly evident in the surprise attack potential of their deployed combatants.

In the three decades since the end of World War II, the Soviets have succeeded in building up capable undersea, surface and air arms—naval forces which are now cause for substantial concern to the United States and her Allies. Nevertheless, although the free world has lost its monopoly at sea and must take Soviet naval forces seriously, the total free world’s navies retain an edge in aggregate capability. (The Navy believes the basic study substantiates only an edge in numbers and tonnage of combatant ships, not an edge in capability. The Navy further states that “What is of main concern, however, is the trend in the capabilities of the two sides, with Soviet capabilities steadily increasing relative to those of the U.S. Unless arrested, this trend could shift the maritime balance in a way which would provide the Soviets political and military opportunities clearly detrimental to U.S. interests.”)

The United States maintains a fleet of aircraft carriers with a capability which the Soviets could not duplicate for another 10 to 20 years. It would require more years for the USSR to build up the operating know-how accumulated by the U.S. Navy, in both routine peacetime deployments and in recent conflicts. The U.S. anti-submarine capability is substantially better than that of the Soviet Union. Our submarine force is a serious threat to the Soviet Navy in itself, and its superior technology would make it very difficult to neutralize even if Soviet ASW capabilities were equivalent to those of the U.S.

The U.S. Navy has demonstrated a greater ability to maintain presence forces in the world’s oceans primarily because the Soviet ships do not spend as much time at sea and because their underway replenishment forces are not as advanced as those available to the U.S. Navy. However, the Soviet underway replenishment capability has been increasing in the past few years and could in time support an increased tempo of operations.
The U.S. maintains a first-rate amphibious force and three active divisions of Marines; and while they do not enter this comparison of naval forces per se, they give the U.S. a unique capability. Finally, the U.S. has extensive air assets, as does the USSR, that can augment our naval forces, both for air defense, ocean surveillance, anti-ship missions, and the like in a NATO war, provided they could be spared from their primary missions. In other contingencies, short of a NATO war, restrictions on base and overflight privileges could hamper the use of these air assets to support U.S. maritime interests in some areas of the world.

The U.S. has made significant strides since World War II in naval capabilities. The Soviets, starting from far behind the U.S., have made even greater strides, relatively speaking. The USSR, with no attack carriers, has created an excellent, formidable anti-ship missile force with weapons launched from ships, submarines, and aircraft. In the past, the United States has relied primarily on carrier-based aircraft and submarines for attack of enemy surface ships; beginning in FY 76, however, U.S. sea-based air and submarine systems will be augmented by deployment of anti-ship missiles in large numbers aboard these systems and surface combatants and land-based patrol aircraft as well. The USSR has built a large submarine force which has an increasing capability to operate worldwide. While the size of the total submarine force is decreasing due to the retirement of the older, short range diesel-electric ships, a modern force of capable nuclear-powered ships is emerging. The USSR has begun the construction of aircraft carriers, and has an amphibious force which currently has a capability much less than ours, but is growing.

During the past 25 years, the USSR has built nearly three times as many new naval vessels as the U.S. (a third again as many as the combined output of the Free World). In terms of displacement tonnage, Soviet major warship construction has been two-thirds of that of the U.S. over the 25-year period and less than half of that of the combined Free World navies. In any event, the Soviets have created a substantial shipbuilding industry. U.S. capability is considerably greater but dedicated primarily to commercial work. Numbers and tonnage, however, are only crude indicators of capability. Other measures, both quantitative and qualitative, are also important in assessing the relative balance in each of the many scenarios in which maritime forces could be employed. Chief among these other measures are experience; the sensor, weapons, and countermeasures suites carried by individual units; and the surveillance, command and control facilities available to each side.

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2 Major warships (1,000 tons or greater). [Footnote in the original.]
The Soviets show increasing proficiency in naval operations although their forces spend considerably less time at sea than the U.S. forces. They have developed an excellent dedicated surface ocean surveillance system, which while quite different from ours, is at least as effective as our own. The USSR intelligence gathering naval forces far exceed the U.S. numerically, although the U.S. uses other techniques to achieve the same objectives. The U.S. anti-submarine surveillance remains far better than that of the Soviets, which has a negligible capability against U.S. nuclear-powered submarines on patrol.

In designing naval forces, as is true for all their armed forces, the Soviets appear to be less concerned than the U.S. with the physical comforts of their people. Thus, they spend less to maintain their manpower, and appear to devote a larger share of their national resources to military hardware.

Having discussed force comparisons, the paper then presents analytical data—principally from the Navy’s NARAC(G) and SEAMIX I studies—on the relative standing of the naval forces of the Soviet Union and of the Free World. The analyses indicate that the Free World can, after some period of time, prevail at sea in any major war with the Soviet Union, but may suffer substantial losses in the process. The magnitude of Allied losses would depend strongly on the degree to which it would be necessary to challenge the Soviets in their strong areas. North Atlantic convoys opposed by large numbers of pre-deployed Soviet submarines early in a war are likely to suffer heavy attrition. Similarly, aircraft carrier task groups could face massive submarine and SSM/ASM opposition should they attempt to fly strikes against the USSR from the Norwegian Sea or northwest Pacific areas. Establishment of sea control would be a prerequisite to projecting power ashore in such areas. Greatly expanded naval forces could improve our ability to challenge the USSR in their strong areas, but obviously would still face stiff resistance. A careful tailoring of NATO’s force posture in Europe to reduce the need for the U.S. to expose surface forces to submarine attack in the early months would be required to significantly reduce the risk of losses.

Given a sudden outbreak of large-scale hostilities, it is probable that some of our major combatants would be sunk by anti-ship missiles and/or torpedoes, and many more put out of commission for weeks or months. Such an attack could well be a logical Soviet first act of war and is a threat which U.S. plans and deployments should take into account. Soviet submarines would also be able to extract a substantial attrition (perhaps as high as 30%) of military and merchant tonnage during the

3 Not found.
early weeks of a NATO war if most or all were dedicated to this mission. It is uncertain whether surface ships of the U.S. Navy could continue to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean during the early phases of such a war without unacceptable losses. Clearly, this uncertainty is dependent on the availability of neighboring land bases for each side. It is also to be expected that some of our submarines would be found and sunk. With present force levels, the U.S. Navy may have to draw down on Pacific assets to such an extent that protection of resupply routes for U.S. Asian Allies could be very difficult. The Navy states that such protection would be impossible and that Indian Ocean oil routes would be left essentially uncovered. In summary, there is no question that the Soviet Navy has become a force to be reckoned with.

The potential of the Soviet Navy for operations in less than major war may be a more important aspect of its increased capabilities. It is capable of mining, quarantining, or blockading such places as the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Malacca, Japanese ports, the Suez Canal, and possibly the Straits of Gibraltar if it is in the Soviet interest to take such belligerent actions. It is clearly capable of interfering with normal seaworn commerce, and of threatening a variety of other naval acts of belligerence. In short, Admiral Gorshkov’s pronouncement in 1968 that “the U.S. will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas,” while perhaps an overstatement in 1968, will not be an overstatement in 1978. Complete mastery of all the seas was a luxury available to the Free World when it had the only large standing navy on the planet. As long as there are two—and now there are—neither side will be able to make such a claim, and both sides will be able to interfere with the “free flow of commerce.”

To the extent that the U.S. is economically dependent upon the seas, and the Soviets much less so, this gives the USSR leverage, both political and military—which will remain even if the U.S. succeeds in maintaining a superior fighting capability. The challenge will remain and certainly in some local areas, for intervals of time, the enemy can assemble a superior force.

In a non-NATO contingency, depending upon the geographical location, the Soviets may be able to mount a force that will thwart U.S. efforts to favorably influence the outcome. Inability to use many of our overseas bases in a non-NATO contingency could compound U.S. difficulties in such a situation.

In the tactical nuclear area, both sides are clearly capable of extracting a high level of destruction against the other. From the U.S. point of view, our relatively few high value naval task forces and convoys would become very much more vulnerable to nuclear attack than could be offset by the added U.S. nuclear firepower against Soviet
ships at sea. Thus, escalation to the use of nuclear weapons at sea should be avoided.

[Omitted here are Section II, “Maritime Missions;” Section III, “Comparative Maritime Forces;” and five annexes.] 4

In a January 7, 1975 memorandum to Kissinger, George Brown wrote that he was in “general agreement” with the paper. Brown endorsed Schlesinger’s view that the continued adequacy of U. S. naval forces, then at their lowest levels since 1939, depended upon ongoing modernization and shipbuilding programs scheduled to reverse the downward trend by FY 1977. (National Archives, RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Brown, 035 (NSC, 1 July 74–31 Aug. 77)) In a March 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Middendorf generally agreed with Brown, but expressed even stronger reservations about the Navy’s future capabilities unless modernization and shipbuilding plans were actually carried out. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–198, Study Memorandums, NSSM 177 [1 of 3]) According to a December 31, 1975 memorandum to Scowcroft from Stephen J. Hadley of the NSC Staff, the study “was never acted upon, and for this reason there has been no formal follow-up” to NSSM 177.” (Ibid.)

48. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to President Ford


SUBJECT

U.S. Strategic Forces

In light of the recent SALT agreements, 2 I believe it is important to inform you as to our future course in U.S. strategic forces, options for the future, and the costs of these forces and options.

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2 During the Vladivostok Summit, November 23–24, Ford and Brezhnev signed an agreement in principle to limit strategic weapons. The Vladivostok Accord, a key point in the SALT II negotiations, limited each side’s strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 2,400. It further stipulated that, of this total, only 1,320 delivery vehicles could be equipped with MIRVs. The text of the agreement is Document 91 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980.
I. Current Program Plans

Our current plans and five year budgets call for the following programs to be pursued:

- **Strategic Bombers.** We currently have a total of 533 B–52s of which 352 are in active status, 71 are in special storage at active bomber bases, and 110 are in mothball status at Davis Monthan AFB, Arizona. In view of the increasing number of strategic nuclear weapons going on day-to-day alert and the unlikely nature of a surprise attack, we are planning to reduce the day-to-day alert of our strategic bombers and tankers while maintaining a full capability to generate the force to an alert level appropriate to the intensity of the crisis. Commensurate with the bomber alert rate reduction and our total force concept, we are planning to transfer up to 128 KC–135 tankers from the active force to the Reserve Components.

  The B–1 \(^3\) is currently being developed to maintain bomber force effectiveness in the face of qualitative improvements in Soviet air defenses (not limited by the SALT agreements), to create uncertainty in Soviet attack and defense planning, and to force large air defense expenditures which could otherwise be diverted to other more worrisome Soviet programs. If the B–1 flight test is successful, we would plan to initiate production in November 1976 and obtain first delivery in 1979. We are planning for a total of 241 B–1s to be deployed by 1984.

- **Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).** We currently have a total of 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan II missiles and launchers. We currently plan to deploy 600 Minuteman III MIRVed missiles, maintain 400 Minuteman II (single RV) and 54 Titan II (single RV) missiles, and continue a Minuteman silo hardness upgrade program to increase the nuclear hardness of the current Minuteman silos. [3½ lines not declassified] Although increasing the flexibility of our Minuteman force, these improvements will not give the U.S. a disarming first-strike capability.

- **Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).** We currently have 41 strategic nuclear submarines with a total of 656 SLBM launchers, of which 10 submarines and 160 launchers are the older model Polaris systems. Our current plans call for commencing phase-out of these older submarines with the deployment of the first Trident submarines and missiles in 1979 and potential phase-out of the older Poseidon with Trident in the mid-1980s. Retaining 600 Minuteman IIIs will permit up to 720 SLBM MIRV launchers for our SLBM force. This level could be

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\(^3\) See Document 45.
obtained by a force of 10 Trident (240 missiles) and 30 Poseidon (480 missiles) by 1985.

- **Strategic Defense.** In strategic defense we are continuing an R&D program in ballistic missile defense technology within the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Consistent with new priorities and objectives, we are realigning and reducing our air defense force to attain primary missions of: (a) surveillance and peacetime control of U.S. airspace, and (b) providing warning of a bomber attack.

Our strategic offensive forces, when maintained and modernized according to our current plans, will permit us to achieve the limits of the SALT provisions in a manner shown in Figure 1.

Within the current strategic force plans, we would:

- exceed the limit of 2400 strategic weapon launchers by 1980 if we retain some of the older strategic weapon systems. However, we can stay within the limit by destroying the “mothballed” B–52s and phasing out some of the Polaris and Titan II missile launchers. These levels do not include 72 FB–111s deployed in the U.S. for strategic purposes but not included within the SALT limits.

- reach a level of 1320 MIRVed missile launchers by 1983 roughly the same time the Soviets could reach that level, based on the CIA “Best Estimate” threat.

**II. Future Options**

We have programs in research and development which will permit further strategic force improvements and modernization if we elect to deploy them in the future. These future options include:

- Deployment of an improved throw-weight missile (3 to 3½ times the throw-weight of Minuteman) in an existing Minuteman silo or a mobile configuration. This program is called M–X and is under consideration for 1985 deployment.

- Deployment of a follow-on Trident missile with greater range/throw-weight capability.

- Deployment of nuclear armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on some portion of our B–52 and B–1 force and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) on some portion of our nuclear submarine forces.

- Deployment of improved accuracy and/or higher nuclear yield warheads on some portion of our ICBM and/or SLBM force.

**III. Strategic Force Costs**

Our current funding plan for deployment of our strategic forces and maintenance of R&D options for the future are shown in the table below:
### Direct Costs ($ Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Forces</th>
<th>FY 75</th>
<th>FY 76</th>
<th>FY 77</th>
<th>FY 78</th>
<th>FY 79</th>
<th>FY 80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are other elements of our defense budget which can be attributed to strategic forces—training, base operating support, maintenance, command, intelligence and security, etc.—but which are not included in the above direct costs and which do not necessarily vary with direct costs. Depending upon how these costs are allocated to strategic forces, the total costs could increase to $14–20 billion in FY 75. The $18 billion figure about which you were questioned in your news conference of December 2, 1974 apparently is the $18.3 billion figure identified in a Brookings Institute critique of the FY 75 budget, which allocated all defense costs to only three types of forces: General Purpose, Strategic Nuclear, and Strategic Mobility.

### IV. Summary

In summary our current five year plan for strategic forces calls for small increases in total funding through FY 80 (excluding inflation on major procurement which accounts for about 50% of the increases for FY 76 to FY 80), aiming at modernization of our bomber and SLBM forces and options to modernize our ICBM forces (including mobility options) in the 1980s. These expenditures are consistent with, and the reasonable minimum associated with, the new strategic arms limitation agreements. In short, these new agreements result in virtually no change from an already constrained five-year plan. The only uncertainty lies in our ability to adequately fund for this modernization and maintaining an adequate force in light of unanticipated inflation or cost growth.

James R. Schlesinger

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4 These funds include inflation estimates for R&D and major procurement items. OMB direction prohibits inflation on minor procurement and Operations and Maintenance. [Footnote in the original.]

5 During the President's news conference of December 2, an unidentified reporter asked if $18 billion was the expected cost of reaching the strategic arms ceilings established in principle by the Vladivostok Agreement. "It is in that ballpark," Ford replied. (Public Papers: Ford, 1974, p. 687)


7 Printed from a copy with a confirmation that Schlesinger signed the original.
Enclosure

Chart Prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, undated.
49. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President for Management and Budget (Ash) to President Ford


SUBJECT

1976 Budget Decisions: Department of Defense

The anticipated agency request and some alternatives with respect to 1976 budget amounts for the Department of Defense are attached. Because the joint Defense/OMB review of the DOD budget is not yet completed, the anticipated agency request and the attached issue papers represent our best estimate of the final Defense submission.

I have requested a meeting with you, Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schlesinger on December 12 or 13 to review these issues and reach final decisions on the Defense budget. Eight key issues have been identified for your consideration.

I. Level of Defense Budget

The most important issue is the overall level of the Defense budget. Secretary Schlesinger has indicated that he will request $94.6 billion in outlays. However, on the basis of decisions already made, his final request will probably be closer to $95 billion, and we have used $95 billion in preparing the attached issue papers. This is an increase of $10 billion over our revised 1975 outlay estimate of $84.5 billion. It would provide for major increases (above last year) in procurement, R&D, and readiness levels, and would require no major force changes or significant reductions in personnel strengths and benefits.

Three lower alternatives have been prepared for your consideration:

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2 Papers discussing in detail each of the eight key issues identified below by Ash are attached, but not printed.

3 Ash, Kissinger, and Schlesinger met with Ford to discuss the FY 76 budget on December 13 and again on December 14. Although no record of those meetings has been found, a December 21 memorandum from Ash to Ford indicates that the President, during the latter meeting, approved a FY 76 Defense budget of $93.9 billion. Ash’s memorandum also requested Presidential decisions on several budgetary items totaling $1.1 billion subsequently added by Schlesinger, only $0.3 billion of which OMB supported. Ford approved $144 million of the $844 million of the additions in question, bringing the White House’s final FY 76 Defense budget to just over $94.3 billion. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Agency Files, 1974–1977, Box 6, Defense, Department of, (1)–(8)) On January 27, 1976, Congress approved a defense appropriations bill for FY 1976 totaling $90.5 billion. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 167–168)
$94 billion in outlays would cover estimated inflation and provide $1 billion in real program growth over 1975.

$93 billion in outlays would cover estimated inflation and maintain the 1975 real program level.

$92 billion in outlays represents a fiscally constrained budget. After inflation, it would require a real program reduction of about $1 billion below 1975.

All of the alternatives provide for substantial increases in budget authority over 1975. The Defense request is for budget authority of $106 billion, 20 percent above 1975. In each of the lower alternatives, budget authority is reduced from the Defense request by an increment of $2 billion. At the lowest level, budget authority would be $100 billion, an increase of $11.5 billion over 1975.

II. Pay and Benefits

Pay-related costs have been the fastest growing portion of the Defense budget in recent years. Defense recommends no substantial changes in military salaries or benefits.

The alternatives recognize that, while pay increases have brought military salaries in line with those of civilians in the public and private sectors, little has been done to scale back special military pay-related benefits which were initiated when military salaries were relatively low. Candidates for reduction or elimination include the commissary subsidy from appropriated funds, leave payments at reenlistment, travel entitlements for junior enlisted men and the annualization of reenlistment bonuses. The fiscal constraint alternative would also reduce the anticipated October 1975 pay raise.

III. Manpower

Military manpower is now about 20 percent below the 1964 pre-Vietnam level while civilian manpower has declined by four percent. The current 1976 Defense budget includes a one percent reduction in military manning and no reduction in civilian manpower from 1975 levels.

The alternatives propose further manpower reductions, particularly civilians, without adversely affecting forces or readiness levels. Specific candidates include a manpower drawdown at Pacific bases, an accelerated phasedown in Thailand, an anticipated 1.5 percent improvement in civilian productivity, and a reduction in the number of military officers enrolled fulltime in graduate schools. The fiscal constraint alternative imposes a larger civilian productivity reduction and further reductions in military manpower.

IV. Force Modernization

The largest increase in 1976 budget authority occurs in force modernization. The current Defense forecast for R&D and procurement
calls for an increase of about $10 billion in 1976 over last year. This increase recognizes the impact of inflation and includes over $4 billion in real program growth.

The alternatives address several areas which have a large impact on 1976 budget authority, including: the impact of shipyard capacity limitations and Congressional legislation stipulating nuclear propulsion for all major combatant ships; the Defense proposal in 1975 to suspend full funding procedures to finance higher shipbuilding costs; the level of program growth in other procurement programs; and the size of the 1976 R&D program. An Administration decision on whether to request initial production funds for the B–1 in 1976 is also required.4

V. Administrative Action

A range of administrative activities within the Department of Defense are proposed to be included in the budget at current or increased levels.

The alternatives propose that, while very large reductions in these programs would ultimately affect military readiness, minor reductions in travel, real property maintenance and selected inventory levels could be made with only limited adverse effects.

VI. Force Structure

The Department of Defense proposes to increase the number of Army Divisions from 14 to 16 in 1976 and to reduce the number of Navy aircraft carriers from 13 to 12 in 1977. No plans are included for any reductions in reserve forces.

The alternatives propose to slow down the plan to reach a level of 16 Army Divisions by 1978, accelerate the reduction to 12 aircraft carriers from 1977 into 1976; and eliminate 60,000 marginal reservists and reserve program add-ons which do not contribute to readiness.

VII. Intelligence

These issues will be presented for your review separately.

VIII. Naval Petroleum Reserves

The Department of Defense proposes to request appropriations of $270 million to increase fuel purchases so that all available fuel storage will be kept at full capacity to meet emergency requirements.

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4 Ash’s memorandum of December 21 requested Presidential guidance on the B–1 issue, noting that Schlesinger had since “decided to delete all production money for FY 1976, while continuing the R&D and flight test portions of the program.” Ford wrote on the memorandum: “I tend to favor long lead-time for B–1.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Agency Files, 1974–1977, Box 6, Defense, Department of, (1)–(8))
One alternative would seek authority to increase production from Naval Petroleum Reserve #1 to generate sufficient revenues to finance this additional Defense fuel requirement. The other alternative would seek authority to increase production to 160,000 barrels per day to generate sufficient resources to procure the additional fuel and further exploration and development of NPR #1 and NPR #4.

50. Memorandum From David D. Elliott of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Chemical Weapons

An SRG meeting on this subject is scheduled for January 27, 1975. The issues are:

—Should we improve our chemical weapons (CW) offensive capability by producing and stockpiling new binary chemical weapons (NSSM 192)?

—Should we seek some international agreement on CW restraints (even though none could be reliably verified), and what are our options for such restraints (discussed in the 1972–73 NSSM 157 and follow-on reports)?

—What joint initiatives are we prepared to consider with the USSR on limiting the most lethal CW agents (in light of the 1974 Summit statement on this subject)?

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 1/27/75—CW Policy (NSSM 192) (2). Top Secret. All brackets are in the original.

2 See footnote 2, Document 33.

3 In the Joint Communiqué signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the conclusion of the Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974, both the United States and the Soviet Union “reaffirmed their interest in an effective international agreement which would exclude from the arsenals of states such dangerous instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons.” As such, both sides “agreed to consider a joint initiative” in the CCD to conclude “an international Convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, p. 571)
Your purpose at the SRG is (1) to confirm agency views on the binary questions; (2) to agree that based on the binary decision the President can decide on which international CW limitations, if any, should be sought; and (3) to direct that an ad hoc interagency group prepare options for a position, encompassing these decisions and any verification objectives, for a meeting with the Soviets.

As a result of the interagency review, all agencies except the JCS believe we should not now pursue production and stockpiling of binary chemical weapons at this time. However, as noted below, OSD wishes to keep open the option for future binary production, whereas State and ACDA believe this option has little real utility and would preclude any meaningful international agreement banning lethal CW production—an agreement which would be in our interest. The JCS recommended a decision favoring acquisition of binaries and oppose any arms control measures which would prohibit this. (My analytical summary, agency positions, and the interagency report are at marked tabs.)

Also as a result of the interagency review, all agencies agree that our CW defensive posture needs to be improved regardless of the decision on our offensive posture.

The Binary Decision

Binary CW weapons would consist of two relatively safe, separate chemical components which would combine to form the standard lethal nerve agents while the munition is en route to target. Their storage and transportation would involve no special safety hazards, and they could provide a significantly improved CW offensive and deterrent capability if they alleviated political constraints on storage, transport, and peacetime forward deployment.

The binary issue has come to a head as Army development has reached the stage for a production decision on artillery shells. The issue was somewhat defused since Defense’s FY 75 budget request for $5.8 million to establish a binary production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, was knocked out on the floor of the House (by a vote of 218 to 186) after being favorably reported out of committee. The Senate agreed to the deletion. We need a decision on binaries, however, to provide guidance for Defense’s FY 76 budget and to help determine the more immediate question of what our position should be regarding options on CW limitations.

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4 Elliott’s analytical summary, August 31, 1974, is attached, but not printed.
**CW Rationale and Utility**

We are committed by the Geneva Protocol not to use CW except in retaliation (see marked tab).\(^5\) We maintain a lethal CW capability as a deterrent against and a response-in-kind to wartime use of CW by an adversary.

There is no CW threat to CONUS. Our primary concern today is the Soviet threat against US and Allied forces in Europe. We do not know the size or location of Soviet stocks or production facilities. We do know that their and some of their Allies’ chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) defensive measures and, therefore, their ability to operate in *any* toxic environment exceed our’s or NATO’s. (The very substantial Soviet capability is detailed in the NSSM 192 study, pp. 4–10.)\(^6\)

If the Soviets were to initiate use of CW on a significant scale in a conventional conflict, US/NATO forces would suffer a serious net disadvantage. This disadvantage could be redressed if (1) we had adequate CW defenses (equipment and training), and (2) retaliated effectively *either* with CW (to attempt to impose similar severe operational constraints attendant to warfare in a toxic environment) or with tactical nuclear weapons. The CW capability may not eliminate a need to move to tactical use of nuclear weapons to redress the conflict situation, but it would allow us to make that determination on its own merits—*if existing* CW defensive and offensive deficiencies were corrected by both our Allies and us.

**US Capability and Programs**

US policy (NSDM 35 of November 1969)\(^7\) calls for a deterrent/reparative CW posture. What the US CW posture should be has never been defined any further.

All our currently employable CW munitions (not including bulk agent) could provide full CW air and ground support for 13–15 US divisions in Europe for 30 days, plus some CW ground munitions sup-

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\(^5\) The Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of lethal and incapacitating chemical and bacteriological weapons was not in force in the United States until some 50 years after its completion on June 17, 1925. The Protocol, first submitted to the Senate in 1926 and again in 1970, received the Senate’s advice and consent for ratification on December 16, 1974. President Ford signed the Protocol’s ratifying instrument on January 22, 1975, but issued a statement of reservation: “Although it is our position that the Protocol does not cover riot control agents and chemical herbicides, I have decided that the United States shall renounce their use in war as a matter of national policy, except in a certain, very, very limited number of defense situation where lives can be saved.” Ford signed Executive Order 11850 detailing that policy on April 8, after which time the Protocol entered into force in the United States. (*Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, pp. 72–75)

\(^6\) See Document 39.

\(^7\) See footnote 14, Document 39.
port for about 30 allied divisions. We have more than sufficient tons of CW agents (bulk and in munitions) for about 25+ US divisions for 90 days.

Nonetheless, our actual CW offensive capability is limited and thereby considered inadequate from the military viewpoint mainly because (1) our CW defensive posture is inadequate; (2) about a third of the filled munitions capability consists of mustard agent, which is considerably less effective than nerve agent; (3) about half the stockpile (in bulk agent) could not be loaded into munitions today on a timely basis; (4) our limited forward deployed stocks (at one site in Germany) could at best support local tactical operations for 4–7 divisions for a week; and (5) no air munitions are prepositioned.

In addition, except for France's meager stocks, no NATO state has any CW and their CW defenses are no better than ours.

The stocks that we do have are quite durable. Agents in bulk stocks will remain unchanged virtually indefinitely. Almost all our useable filled ground munitions and bombs are not expected to have any significant problems of deterioration or obsolescence through the 1980's, though our filled spray tank capability could well become unserviceable sometime after 1978 and the military could prefer to phase-out some delivery systems.

**CW Posture Alternatives**

There are three basic posture alternatives. Each alternative envisions improvements in our CW defensive posture. As noted below, each alternative has different implications for the arms control options considered in the NSSM 157 and follow-on reports.

*Alternative 1. Acquisition of Binary Chemical Weapons.* Current military projections would include the acquisition of about 7,600 nerve agent tons in binary ground and air munitions, at a DOD estimated cost of $333 million over 5 or more years (not including any inflation factor, operation and maintenance, or substantial demilitarization costs for an equivalent portion of the existing stockpile). This, plus existing filled munitions, would still not meet estimated military requirements for all US forces.

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative would be compatible with Option 1 of the NSSM 157 study (limiting stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels and banning international transfer of CW), as supported by the JCS and OSD.

*Advantages.* Binaries would (1) provide a significantly improved CW retaliatory capability for US forces if coupled with an improved defensive posture and might provide a better CW deterrent; (2) facilitate
rapid deployment in war or crises;\(^8\) and (3) probably not be subject to the same political/legal constraints on peacetime storage and transport as are current stocks since binaries would involve essentially no special safety hazards.

**Disadvantages.** Acquisition of binaries (1) would at best be very controversial in Congress and indications are that Congress may well not support substantial CW budget increase;\(^9\) (2) might require limited open-air testing (otherwise we would be stocking up with a weapon not fully tested) which would also be very controversial; (3) if not accepted as a genuine effort to deter CW use, it would be criticized internationally and domestically as contrary to our declared interest in CW arms control; (4) might spur further Soviet programs in CW to counter our improvements; and (5) might lead to further proliferation of CW capabilities.

[The JCS support this choice. They believe that binaries are needed to provide a significant improvement in our CW offensive capability and thereby provide a credible and adequate CW deterrent. OSD wants to keep the binary option open for possible future production.]\(^{10}\)

**Alternate 2. Reliance on Existing CW Offensive Capability.** This would not entail new production of any CW agents (binary or non-binary). But it would not rule out filling munitions from existing bulk agent stocks to compensate for any phasing-out or deterioration of delivery systems in the late 1970’s or 1980’s. It also envisions maintenance of an adequate CW R&D program and would not rule out continuing R&D on binaries.

**Arms Control Interface.** This would be most compatible with Option 2 (prohibiting further production and international transfer of CW agents) of the NSSM 157 study, as supported by State and ACDA.

**Advantages.** This would (1) retain the existing CW deterrent/retaliatory capability (although limited); (2) be the least controversial and provocative posture, domestically and internationally; (3) be consistent with our declared interest in CW arms control and provide the most flexibility for arms control if a production ban were desired; and

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\(^8\) Binaries would also provide whatever possibility there might be for increased peacetime forward deployment in Europe, but this would not be achieved without incurring strong political opposition in Allied governments and publics. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^9\) The DOD FY 75 budget request of $5.8 million to establish a binary production facility was just knocked out on the floor of the House and the deletion was sustained in the Senate. Binary dollar costs, not to mention defensive improvements, would require sustaining far more substantial budget increases over the current funding level for several years. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^{10}\) On August 21, Clements sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him of the OSD’s and the JCS’s views. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-77-0063, 040, NSC, 1974)
(4) be less likely to encourage either an increase in the Soviet CW capability or proliferation of CW capabilities.

Disadvantages. Our current CW deterrent/retaliatory capability is admittedly limited and considered inadequate from the military standpoint. In addition, our existing CW munitions capability (not bulk) could begin to diminish sometime after 1978 (and perhaps significantly diminish sometime later if delivery systems are phased out or become unserviceable)—unless we acquire binaries or fill munitions from existing bulk stocks (which would also be controversial).

[State and ACDA strongly support this choice\(^{11}\) and believe we should seek a CW production ban \textit{inter alia} to forestall proliferation of CW capabilities. OSD supports reliance on existing CW stocks for now (largely because a “US only” CW capability without Allied CW capabilities and/or cooperation is inadequate with or without binaries) but OSD wishes to continue binary R&D and to keep options open for future binary production.]

Alternative 3. Reliance Only on Conventional and Nuclear Forces and much Improved CW Defensive Capability, with No Ready CW Stockpile. This envisions destruction of existing CW stocks within 10–15 years, with a Soviet commitment to do the same. The existing filled munitions capability would remain for the first 5–8 years.

Arms Control Interface. This alternative coincides with Option 3 (prohibiting stockpiles, production, and international transfer of CW agents and munitions) of the NSSM 157 study, which ACDA and State believe should be our ultimate objective.

Advantages. This would (1) be welcomed internationally and domestically by some; (2) avoid the political and financial costs of binary acquisition; (3) provide an opportunity to place some political and legal constraints on Soviet CW stockpiling and production through CW arms control; and (4) call for a much improved defensive posture which could reduce the overall advantages an adversary could gain through initiating the use of CW in a conventional conflict.

Disadvantages. This could be very controversial in Congress and with some Allies since we would not be able to determine what the Soviets are doing in this area. This absence of a ready US CW capability might tempt the Soviets to maintain a secret stockpile with a view to providing CW to states in a non-NATO conflict or to initiating use of CW in a conventional war. If they did the latter, it would probably be

\(^{11}\) On July 24, Springsteen sent Scowcroft a memorandum informing him of the Department’s position. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 80D212, NSSM 192) On July 10, Ikle sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him of ACDA’s position. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–202, Study Memoranda, NSSM 192)
necessary for us to use tactical nuclear weapons to redress the military situation.\textsuperscript{12}

[ACDA believes that this should be our ultimate objective and would not necessarily lower the nuclear threshold.]

Our View. It is unlikely we can attain a significant binary capability given congressional constraints (which reflect public attitudes toward CW) and budget priorities. Even if we could, binary acquisition would certainly be controversial here and abroad, appear contrary to our declared interest in CW restraints, might confront us with the issue of some open-air testing, and provide no real leeway for arms control negotiations (thereby showing our Summit declaration to be empty).

Moreover, as OSD has noted, a “US only” CW offensive capability, with or without binaries, is not an adequate CW posture against the Warsaw Pact. The CW option is a thin one indeed unless (1) we and our Allies improve CW defenses (which is likely to some degree but is not a priority endeavor), and (2) either we and our Allies improve CW offensive capabilities significantly (which our Allies are not likely to do and we are probably not able to do politically) or we stockpile sufficient CW for ourselves and our Allies (which would be more controversial here and even less likely to receive congressional support).

Destruction of our stocks (combined with much better CW defenses) and a ban on both production and stockpiles would probably be in our interest were reliable verification possible. But it is not and retention of our significant (even if limited) CW capability provides some relatively inexpensive insurance as a hedge. Moreover, a decision now to destroy existing stocks would also be controversial in Congress and with some Allies.

Given the above, we recommend that the decision be against binary production but for retaining a CW capability as a hedge.

INTERNATIONAL CW LIMITATIONS

CW limitations have been the major subject at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) for three years. The Soviets have privately and publicly pressed hard for US action on CW negotiations. We have maintained, in speeches and CCD working papers, that we are committed to seeking limitations but important problems of reasonable verification need to be resolved before negotiations.

\textsuperscript{12} These arguments are weakened, however, by the facts that (1) the Soviets would have to consider the likelihood of a tactical nuclear response by US/NATO forces in a major conflict whether or not the Warsaw Pact used CW; and (2) a tactical nuclear response may at any rate be the only way to redress the military situation caused by Soviet use of CW unless existing CW offensive and defensive deficiencies are corrected by the US and its Allies. [Footnote in the original.]
The 1974 US/USSR Moscow and Vladivostok summit communique\textsuperscript{13} indicates agreement to consider a joint initiative in the CCD dealing with international restraints on the most lethal means of chemical warfare. The Soviets wish to begin consultations soon and have informally given us a draft convention. Their draft proposal (which has been seen by some in State and ACDA but no one in DOD) gives us serious problems mainly because it envisages the destruction of existing lethal CW stocks (see marked tab).\textsuperscript{14}

A 1973 SRG on the NSSM 157 study\textsuperscript{15} considered our options for international CW limitations, but no action resulted since the basic question of whether or not we want to produce binaries needed to be answered. Since the binary issue is now ready for decision, we should, at the same time, be able to obtain a decision on acceptable international restraints. [NB. An affirmative binary decision would necessarily reduce our options for international restraints to only the one of agreed stockpile size, considered below as Option 1. A postponement of the binary decision (the OSD proposal) would not foreclose any international agreement option, but would give us no basis for reaching any actual agreement other than Option 1. A postponed binary decision conceivably might be used as a bargaining chip in any US–USSR CW negotiations.]

The basic question (studied in response to NSSM 157) is whether we should continue to oppose negotiations on chemical weapons limitations because any limitations would not be reliably verifiable, or should we seek some form of international agreement. Another unverifiable treaty is undesirable in principle. But our CW programs are in fact already severely constrained by congressional and public attitudes and by budget priorities. They are likely to remain so. Thus, it may be preferable to try to place constraints on the Soviets and others.

**Treaty Options**

Interagency consideration resulted in unanimous agreement that treaty limitations on R&D and defensive measures would be unacceptable. There are, therefore, three basic treaty proposals we might make on CW limitations. (Each includes a prohibition on CW proliferation and transfer to other nations and recognizes that reliable verification of any of the limitations is not possible.)

\textsuperscript{13} The Joint Communiqué, November 24, signed by Ford and Brezhnev following their meeting at Vladivostok noted that the United States and the Soviet Union had established “initial contacts” regarding “the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. It was agreed to continue an active search for mutually acceptable solutions” to this matter. *(Public Papers: Ford, 1974, pp. 658–662)*

\textsuperscript{14} The Soviet draft convention, summarized above, is attached, but not printed.

Option 1. Limit Stocks to Agreed Retaliatory Levels.

Advantages. This would (1) allow binary production and stockpiling to replace existing stocks and provide a better retaliatory capability, particularly if binaries eased political constraints on movement and deployment in Europe; and (2) involve little if any military risk to us, even if the Soviets did not comply, if we obtained an adequate stockpile.

Disadvantages. This would (1) be preserving an option for modernization and deployment which we may not be able to exercise given congressional and budget constraints here and attitudes toward CW stocks in Europe, while possibly stimulating more Soviet CW activity; (2) be criticized here and abroad as only justifying further CW production and, therefore, probably fail to ease pressures for broader constraints; (3) open us to criticism (e.g., by Germany) that we are discriminating since we could both stockpile and produce while asking non-chemical weapons States to forego both; (4) be the least likely treaty option to achieve international agreement; and (5) make it even more difficult to determine any non-compliance compared to the other options.

[The JCS and OSD support this option. They note that our forward deployed capability is very limited and that the percentage of our agents in filled munitions is unsatisfactory. They believe we should replace at least some of our existing stocks with binaries to provide a much more credible CW retaliatory capability.]

Option 2. Prohibit the Production of CW Agents.

(In negotiating a production ban we would have to decide if we should reserve a right to manufacture and fill CW munitions to replace existing munitions as needed or whether we should also ban these activities but limit a treaty to 10 or 12 years.)

Advantages. This would (1) place international treaty constraints on the Soviets in an area where our programs are already most constrained by Congress and budget priorities; (2) retain our existing retaliatory capability as a hedge against our inability to monitor compliance; (3) help channel pressures away from more comprehensive limitations; (4) avoid the political costs of binary production; and (5) make negotiation of a non-proliferation clause easier.

Disadvantages. This (1) would prohibit our producing and stockpiling binary agents to provide a better retaliatory capability; and (2) might still be criticized as discriminatory since we would retain stocks and the right to manufacture and fill CW munitions with existing agents while asking non-chemical weapons States not to acquire either.

[State and ACDA support this option.]

Option 3. Prohibit Both Stockpiles and Production of CW Agents and Munitions.

Advantages. This would (1) place maximum legal and political constraints on CW, an area where the Soviets have an advantage over us;
(2) appeal to the many countries which favor a comprehensive ban; and
(3) provide the most chance of discovering any non-compliance.

Disadvantages. This would phase out our option to respond in kind
if the Soviets failed to comply and used CW in a conventional war.

[ACDA sees merit in this option in the long-term since (1) our nu-
clear and conventional capabilities provide adequate deterrence
against or responsive CW attack; and (2) we should try to place the
greatest constraints on the Soviets since it is unlikely we or NATO will
develop a real CW retaliatory capability.]

Non-Treaty Options

As a follow-up to the NSSM 157 SRG, the working group consid-
ered non-treaty options for CW restraints, entailing unilateral US decla-
rations, parallel US-USSR declarations, or parallel declarations by a
number of countries including the US and USSR (see marked tab).16 All
agencies, however, recommend the treaty approach since it is more
binding and more likely to curb proliferation. State and ACDA support
a US declaration renouncing CW production, as we seek a treaty.

Elliott’s View. An unverifiable treaty is not desirable. But our own
CW programs are already very much constrained by congressional and
public attitudes and budget priorities and are likely to remain so. Thus,
it seems preferable to try to place some restraints on the Soviets, even if
they are not reliably verifiable.

We are being pressed internationally to make some treaty pro-
posal, and the 197217 and 1974 Moscow Joint Communique indicates
we will work toward agreement on CW restraints.

A ban on both stocks and production (Option 3) would be in our
interest if reliable verification were possible. But it is not; and reten-
tion of retaliatory capability provides some insurance and is not
destabilizing.

If we do forego binary production, a US declaration renouncing
any further CW production would probably get us some political
mileage in the CCD. However, if we find a production ban treaty diffi-
cult to negotiate (e.g., because the Soviets press for destruction of
stocks) we might be unilaterally restrained for years, or have to take the
visible step of withdrawing our declaration.

I therefore recommend seeking a treaty to prohibit the production
of CW agents and the proliferation and transfer to other nations of CW
agents and munitions. We would not include a prohibition on manu-
facture and filling of munitions in our proposal, thereby allowing us to
maintain a filled munitions capability indefinitely. However, we may

16 Not found attached.
17 For the text of the U.S.-Soviet joint communique issued on May 29, 1972, see
have to reconsider our position on munitions manufacture and filling later if this proved to be a barrier to reaching international agreement. We should also be prepared to continue international discussions directed at the verification problem, with a view to possibly finding acceptable conditions for a ban on stockpiles, as unlikely as this may be.

**Sonnenfeldt’s View.** My view is more or less along the lines of that expressed by Bill Hyland, although not quite as strongly held. This view reflects concern over committing ourselves to an unverifiable treaty which forecloses future CW production. There are future situations, such as a greatly increased Soviet defensive CW capability which might only be countered by a greater offensive CW capability on our part, where further US production would be highly desirable. Therefore, a reasonable strategy would be to unilaterally declare a production moratorium (or a bilateral moratorium if the Soviets are interested), followed by an approach to the Soviets on the basis of treaty Option 1 (agreed stockpile levels). We might have to fall back to Option 2 (a production ban), but this could be considered on its own merits after we have had the benefit of some bilateral negotiations.

**NEXT STEPS**

Your aim at this SRG meeting is to ensure that the issues are fully drawn and agency views expressed, such that the President can address the questions of binary acquisition, acceptable international CW limitations, and a US renunciatory declaration.

Based on his decisions, an ad hoc interagency group will:

1. Review detailed verification questions to provide a more substantial basis for considering whether or not on-site inspections and detailed information exchanges are worth pursuing in their own right (regardless of their “negotiability” for now) and could allow us to look at the implications for verifying open-air testing. (This can build on the verification analysis in the NSSM 157 study and the verification follow-on at the marked tab.)

2. To review the Soviet draft treaty.

3. To prepare and submit to you a US position for meeting with the Soviets to consider a joint initiative in the CCD.

Granger, Lodal, and Clift concur.

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18 Not found attached. Farley forwarded the NSSM 157 Ad Hoc Working Group’s follow-up verification study to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 26, 1973. The Working Group found “no new developments which would affect the general consideration stated in the NSSM 157 study that there is no dependable way to verify compliance with most prohibitions or limitations on chemical weapons.” As a means to enhance verification, however, the Group recommended the establishment of committees of CW experts to monitor compliance within their own countries and to exchange relevant data with committees representing other signatory countries. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, Study Memorandums, NSSM 157 [2 of 4])
51. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting

Washington, January 27, 1975, 10:50–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT
Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192)

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

State
Robert Ingersoll
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
William Hyland

Defense
William Clements
Robert Ellsworth
Dr. James P. Wade

JCS
Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the Working Group would prepare a paper showing the arguments for and against producing binary chemical weapons on a best-case basis. The paper would also include a deployment scheme and the costs of deployment and production of binaries.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m sorry I’m late. Do we need—have a briefing?

General Walters: I have one if you want. It’s short. (Began to brief from the attached.)

Secretary Kissinger: Did you say the Soviets have an antidote for nerve gas?

General Walters: Yes, they do.

Secretary Kissinger: How do they use it? What form is it in, pills?

[not declassified]: No, it’s injected by a syringe.

General Walters: (Continued to brief.)

Secretary Kissinger: Who’s this you’re talking about?

General Walters: Iraq. Iraq wants to develop an offensive chemical weapons (CW) capability. They have purchased and installed a nerve

agent production plant which may give them an agent capability by this Spring. They want it to use against the Kurds. (Finished his briefing.)

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, we have two issues before us. The first is what should U.S. policy be regarding the production of chemical weapons. The second is whether we should support some type of international agreement on the limitation of chemical weapons at Geneva. In respect to the first issue, we have three options as I understand it. The first is whether we should acquire binary chemical weapons. The second is whether we should rely instead on our existing CW offensive capability, and the third is, in effect, doing away with our capability and relying instead on conventional and nuclear forces. We don’t really have the first option because of congressional opposition, isn’t that right?

Mr. Clements: Well, I don’t know, Henry. Senator Stennis has indicated to me that he would help us if the President supports the acquisition of binary weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think such a thing would ever get through Congress?

Mr. Clements: I really don’t know, Henry. I, personally am not in favor of going to binaries. I’m just passing on what Stennis told me.

Dr. Ikle: It would be a big fight.

Secretary Kissinger: Can anybody make a good case for producing binaries?

General Pauly: The Joint Chiefs would prefer to produce binary weapons. We believe we are at the stage now where our stockpiles need to be improved in quality. Binaries would do this for us. They are safer, for one thing. Also, they would give us the ability to deploy further forward.

Secretary Kissinger: Why would they be easier to deploy further forward?

General Pauly: Well, for one thing, they are safer. They are easier to handle and you can move them around easier. Only two percent of our stockpile is now deployed overseas—in Germany.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have any in the Pacific?

General Pauly: Yes, six percent of our stockpile is on Johnson Island.

Mr. Clements: It’s a problem of getting them from Colorado to Germany.

Dr. Ikle: Isn’t the real question one of how widely they are deployed in Germany? The problem is the quantity there.

General Pauly: That’s true.
Secretary Kissinger: Then, as I understand it, our chemical weapons are currently deployed at only one base in Germany, and I would presume the Soviets know where that base is, am I right?

General Pauly: Yes. I think we can be pretty sure they know where they are stored.

Secretary Kissinger: And, if war breaks out we can be fairly sure that one of the first things they will do is knock out that base.

General Pauly: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Are there any plans—do we have any plans for CW deployment in the event of war?

General Pauly: I’m not sure, but there would be a distribution problem . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would not be unreasonable to assume that the probability of the U.S. being able to retaliate in the event the Soviets use CW would be very slight.

General Pauly: Yes, that’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: So we end up with a weapon we really can’t use because we can’t get it to where it needs to be used. Could we see (get a paper on) what difficulties we would encounter if we decide to go with the binaries? Could we see what kind of deployments you would have to make? I think that what we have now does not give the President a fair chance to make a decision. We ought to look at the whole deployment thing—and make it on a best-case basis.

Mr. Clements: I’m against producing binaries.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I want to bring all of the alternatives to his (the President’s) attention, and I think that we ought to make a better case for producing binaries. I don’t think we have it here.

Mr. Clements: Okay, we can do it.

Secretary Kissinger: I see that one of our new options is to maintain our present CW stockpiles. Do you support that?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Clements: So that we can retain some appearance of being able to retaliate.

Secretary Kissinger: What do we have, two percent of our stockpile in Germany and six percent at Johnson Island, and no where else? There is nothing that prevents us from moving it, is there?

Dr. Ikle: No, you can move it to an area of conflict, if you need to.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is, if there is a conflict in say, Korea, can you move it there if you have to? I would like to see a rational deployment plan for getting the stuff out of Johnson Island. Where’s the rest of it?
Mr. Clements: The rest—ninety percent or so—is in Colorado and Utah.

Dr. Ikle: One of the problems is that it costs an awful lot to get rid of. It’s cheaper to store than to destroy.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m not in favor of getting rid of what we already have. What bothers me is that we don’t have adequate studies that would show how we would get the stuff from Colorado to the place where it might be needed. It seems to me that we are in a de facto anti-CW position. How does one go about using chemical weapons? Can you move it by air?

Dr. Ikle: Yes, air is probably the best method.

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of aircraft, drones?

Mr. Davies: No, you use airplanes for safety reasons and because of the public image of moving them by other means.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but how do you move it from Colorado and Utah to some foreseeable war zone? Do you use C–150s?

Mr. Clements: Yes, that would probably be the aircraft you would use.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we take a look at how we would move the stuff in the event it would be needed?

General Pauly: Yes, we can. One of the imponderables, however, is how its movement would fit into other air priorities at the time of conflict. My estimate would be that you could get it to the area in four to five days.

Secretary Kissinger: Four to five days? I think it would be a reasonable assumption that any enemy that would use chemical warfare had crossed over the threshold, don’t you? I mean, that’s pretty extreme. It was not used in Vietnam.

General Walters: We have a study here that shows that 25 percent of your air capability . . .

Dr. Ikle: The real question is what is an adequate CW capability.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t see—I have no strong views on this question, but what I am trying to do is identify just what the President is going to have to decide. We have no real retaliatory capability in the Pacific. We do have some retaliatory capability in Germany. But what if the Soviets attack our stockpiles? The rest of it is in the U.S. and how many days would it take to get there? Ninety-two percent of our stockpiles are so positioned that unless there is an immediate high-point in a war we wouldn’t get it there in time.

General Pauly: That’s right. But, you might have information that they are moving the stuff up. Then you would make a conscious decision to deploy.
Secretary Kissinger: It’s hard to imagine that you would have a build-up period. Suppose the Soviets double their forces. Could you double your CW reserves in time? You wouldn’t move them until after you’re hit, would you?

General Pauly: That’s right. But, if you have information that they are moving their weapons up, you might want to begin to move yours.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all of you are against binaries except the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Is that right?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Is there any law against it being rationally deployed? It seems to me to make no sense to keep ninety-two percent of the stuff where it can’t be used.

Dr. Ikle: Domestic opposition to moving it around would be very strong.

Mr. Clements: Yes, but we’re not going to deploy it domestically.

Dr. Ikle: But you still have to move it within the country.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, could we see what a rational deployment would look like? Where is all this stuff kept?

Mr. Clements: Our biggest stockpile is in Denver, right at the end of the runway (Denver International Airport).

Secretary Kissinger: Do they (Denverites) know it’s there?

Mr. Clements: Oh yes, and they are worried about it. You know, that stuff is not easy to handle.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. I’m just trying to move this thing to the President for decision and I want to be sure he has all the rationale for his decision.

Dr. Ikle: We are all agreed that further deployment is politically impossible.

Secretary Kissinger: We now have the ability to wage chemical warfare, but it is deployed in such a way that it is not useable. I don’t understand that. How do you get it out of Johnson Island? Do you see any area that would be able to get these weapons in four to five days?

General Pauly: No, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would take four to five days before it would have any effect. What kind of weapon is it? Does it make you sick?

Dr. Ikle: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It just seems to me that our chemical weapons capability is irrelevant to the situation.

Mr. Ingersoll: Not unless you have an inadequate defensive capability.
Mr. Clements: That’s true, and an adequate defensive capability is a whole new story.

Secretary Kissinger: Can anybody make a case against stockpiling an anti-CW capability?

Dr. Ikle: No, but ours is very weak, and Congress has to support it—with money.

General Pauly: There is no real opposition on the Hill to storing a defensive capability. But, the problem is time. It would take until the early 1980s before we could build up an adequate defensive capability.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, do we have a Working Group?

Dr. Elliott: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Can the Working Group do a paper . . . I don’t think we need a separate NSC on this. We’ll just tack it on the end of one in the near future. We need a paper that defines the issues so the President can make his decision. Am I correct that nobody here favors the destruction of our current stocks and that nobody but the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor production of binaries? Do it (the paper) on a best-case basis, and also include arguments against producing binaries.

Mr. Clements: Do you want the costs included as well?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, include the costs.

Dr. Ikle: Is it fair to say that we would reduce our stockpiles if it doesn’t cost too much?

Secretary Kissinger: What are our agents? What do we use?

Mr. Clements: Nerve gas.

Secretary Kissinger: Why nerve gas? How do we store it?

Dr. Ikle: In tanks. It’s cheaper to store it that way.

General Pauly: You have a two-pronged problem with storing the stuff: one, it loses its potency after a certain period of time, and two, it becomes contaminated from the tanks—a chemical reaction.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that leads to the next set of issues—what do we want to propose at Geneva? As I understand it, the Joint Chiefs’ position is that they want to maintain current stockpiles at our present level as a retaliatory deterrent. Another option is a ban on all current production.

Dr. Ikle: A production ban on agents only.

Secretary Kissinger: The third option is to prohibit both stockpiles and production. My problem is that all of these alternatives are totally unverifiable. If we go for an agreement, it’s unverifiable. We can’t get a handle on their production, can we?

General Walters: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]
Dr. Ikle: That would be one advantage of an agreement—you may stop them from producing it.

Secretary Kissinger: For whom? The Eastern European countries?

Dr. Ikle: No, Iran and Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s the whole issue here. We can get an agreement, but we can’t verify it. What good does that do? Iran and Egypt could have it and we wouldn’t even know. I don’t even know where to look for it, do you?

General Walters: I believe we could find it.

Dr. Ikle: One thing you could do is soften an agreement—make it a ten year deal with the stipulation that the whole issue could be reopened.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the President just can’t make a decision based on what we have here. All these options are unverifiable. How would you handle the refilling problem if we chose Option II?

Mr. Ellsworth: That’s the problem, we’d have to build a new plant.

Secretary Kissinger: Would you refill the old equipment or the new?

Dr. Ikle: The old stuff.

Secretary Kissinger: What, with a new batch of the old stuff, or a new batch of the new stuff?

Dr. Ikle: No, the old stuff.

Secretary Kissinger: Are we going to run out of it?

Dr. Ikle: Not for a long time. We have quite a bit now.

Dr. Elliott: OST has just completed a study which shows that the gas stored in bulk has an indefinite lifetime, but that it tends to deteriorate in the filled.

Secretary Kissinger: I might as well get an education here. What is bulk? Does that mean tanks? Where is it stored? What is filled?

Dr. Elliott: Bulk means tanks. That’s where it is stored—in tanks. Filled means in weapons, like artillery shells.

Dr. Ikle: The problem is that the casings of artillery shells deteriorate over a period of time.

General Pauly: We’re finding that some of our weapons, particularly the filled variety, lose their purity over a period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: What does it do to the casings?

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2 The second alternative outlined in the NSSM 192 study called for the United States to rely on its existing CW offensive capability. See Document 39.

3 The study, summarized herein, was not found.
General Pauly: I’m not sure. It has something to do with aging.
Secretary Kissinger: Would I offend anybody too much if I said that the level of analysis in this group is not on the level of the SALT people? Well, let’s get this stuff together.

Attachment

Briefing Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency


BRIEFING FOR NSSM–192: CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY

The Intelligence Community’s contribution to NSSM–192 was in the form of CW threat assessments for the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact Countries (WPC); Middle East (Egypt, [less than 1 line not declassified] and Iraq); Peoples Republic of China; Republic of China (Taiwan); and NATO, [less than 1 line not declassified] A summary of these assessments follows:

USSR/WPC

The Soviet Union/WPC CW program continues to provide them with a capability, superior to that of NATO, to operate for a limited time in a toxic environment whether created by the enemy or their own forces. [2 lines not declassified] Chemical munitions include a wide variety of air and ground delivery systems. The Soviets possess the technological capability and materiel required to produce any of the known toxic CW weapons. [2½ lines not declassified] CBR defense equipment is far more widely distributed in the Soviet Union/WPC forces than in NATO/US forces. The continued training of Soviet/WPC forces with CBR equipment further enhances their capability to operate in the severe environment that we expect CBR conditions to impose on the battlefield.

Middle East

Egypt

Continuing reports over the past few years lead us to believe that Egypt possesses an offensive CW capability without Soviet participation. Defensively, Egypt is equipped with a wide variety of modern Soviet CBR defense equipment of good quality. Soviet CBR training and doctrine were incorporated into Egyptian training, and recent evidence

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4 Top Secret.
continues to reaffirm the Egyptian interest in CBR defense training. Good equipment, coupled with effective training, give Egypt a good capability to operate in a toxic environment.

[place not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified]

Iraq

According to recent reports, Iraq desires to develop an offensive CW capability for use against the Kurds. The Iraqis have purchased and installed a nerve agent production plant which may give them an agent capability by this spring without Soviet aid.

Peoples Republic of China

The PRC continues to show interest in defense CW aspects in training exercises of their infantry and armor forces.

Republic of China

The ROC has a high priority program to develop an offensive and defensive CW capability but is in an early stage in both areas.

NATO- [place not declassified]

Any NATO capability in CW is dependent on the US. [1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

52. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 6, 1975, 5:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator John Pastore (D–R.I.)
Senator Baker (R–Tenn.)
Representative Murphy ( )
Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to President
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 9, February 6, 1975—Ford, Senators Pastore and Baker. Secret; Nodis. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) All brackets, except those that indicate the omission of material, are in the original.

2 Representative John Michael Murphy (D–New York). His report, referenced below, is not further identified.
SUBJECT

Security of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Pastore: After Munich in ’72 we became alarmed. I sent George to look and he came back with a critical report. So we went over the same route and got the same result. As a result they transferred one location and closed down another. The defense against intruders is good, but not against terrorism. They did put more Marines on them.

[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]

Baker: When I read the Murphy report, it dawned on me that we had [number not declassified] weapons in Europe and security was sometimes lousy.

On each base I asked the security officer and they said how they could have penetrated. [1 line not declassified] It is a real problem and we need to deal with it.

Pastore: [1½ lines not declassified] What are we doing?

Baker: If someone asked me what our recommendations are, I would be hard pressed. But something has to be done.

President: I have read the report. [1 line not declassified]

We have looked at our weapons in Europe very carefully. Especially in connection with MBFR. We had an NSC meeting about two weeks ago to consider what we could do to move the negotiations forward. DOD recommended and we have told Resor that he could offer [less than 1 line not declassified] What we want from the Soviet Union is a tank army in return. Verification of units is easier than individuals.

We recognize that we don’t need these but are trying to get a quid pro quo for them.

Baker: Can we keep them safe while we negotiate? That might take three years.

President: We might get a first step by this summer. [1½ lines not declassified] But there is a psychological aspect to it and is it wise to take drastic action right now with the situation like it is?

Pastore: What we are saying is you should take a good hard look at it. We’re not asking for your answer.

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3 On April 16, 1973, Baker and Murphy met with then-Secretary of Defense Richardson to discuss the senators’ concerns about the security of U.S. nuclear weapons stationed abroad following their inspection of NATO nuclear storage sites. The record of the meeting is in the National Archives, RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer, 020 (OSD).


President: [pointing to map] What are these bases where they are stored? [Murphy gives a long briefing.]
Pastore: We have done our job—we have told you the problem. Now it is your job.

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53. National Security Study Memorandum 223\(^1\)


TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Review of U.S. Policy on Arms Transfers

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy on arms transfers for foreign nations.

The study should present a statistical study of the growth of U.S. transfers of both defense articles and services in the past four years, including both commercial and FMS sales cases and grant aid, and compare these transfers in monetary value, and types and quantities of equipment, with transfers by other nations. In making this comparison, the impact of inflation should be taken into account. An effort should also be made to estimate sales by the U.S. and other countries over the next four years.

The study should analyze long-term U.S. interests in the transfer of defense articles and services and propose alternative policies, in-

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 35, NSSM 223 (2). Confidential. A copy was sent to General Brown. MacDonald forwarded the NSDM to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, May 2, with the recommendation that he sign it. A study, MacDonald wrote, would “allow us to analyze our interests and options in an area which is increasingly threatened by crippling Congressional restrictions on the power of the Executive to sell or transfer weapons.” He continued, “A NSSM response which puts the growth of arms sales into perspective and sets out the foreign policy rationale for sales should assist our efforts to dilute or avert some Congressional restrictions.” MacDonald’s memorandum is ibid., NSSM 223 (1). The FY 1975 Foreign Assistance Act (S 3394—PL 93–559), as passed on December 18, 1974, included language requiring the President to notify Congress of any proposed government-to-government arms sales in excess of $25 million and giving Congress the authority to disapprove such sales. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 858–860, 874)
including limits which might be applied to U.S. arms transfers unilaterally or in concert with other suppliers. The study should also review existing and proposed USG mechanisms for controlling arms sales.

The study should be conducted by an NSC Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC Staff. The study should be completed by June 20, 1975 for submission to the Senior Review Group for review prior to consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

54. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll) to President Ford

NSC–U/DM–135


[Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 61, NSDM 312 (2). Top Secret; Limdis. Thirteen pages not declassified.]

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 5, 1975, 3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Paul O’Neill, OMB
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, August 5, 1975—Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, Paul O’Neill. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
The President: I want within a week a budget supplemental in the event SALT doesn’t work.

Schlesinger: How about right now?

The President: I want it through channels, ready to go through the Congress. I want also a five-year projection. I want the JCS to sign off. I want it to go through OMB and have everyone ready to testify on it. It is a contingency action, but I want to be prepared.

Schlesinger: This is in response to your request at the NSC. It would amount to $2–3 billion a year for R&D and procurement. This is the first for 1977. We would push all present programs.

The President: This program is an add-on in the event we don’t get SALT II.

Rumsfeld: What kind of assumption is it based on with respect to what the Soviets will do?

Schlesinger: Good question. It assumes they would accelerate their program.

Kissinger: You would probably have to go to the higher CIA curve.

Schlesinger: I am not sure. They are probably pushing the limits of their capacity now.

The President: I think we have to assume the worst because the best will take care of itself. The Congress should know what we face. It will have a big impact. We will be tough, but if we are tough and fail we have to be realistic about what we face. All these hardliners on the Hill have to know what it is they have to put up. It will go one of two ways: We want a good SALT agreement but if we don’t get one, they have to put out or it is their responsibility.

Kissinger: We may have to look at ABM also. Our SALT ABM agreement was predicated on our offensive agreement.

The President: We want a SALT agreement—with give on each side—but I don’t want there to be any doubt as to the costs of failure.

Rumsfeld: Would you anticipate briefing the Congressional leaders on this?

The President: Perhaps.

Schlesinger: It would have a good effect on the Soviets.

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2 On July 25, the NSC met to discuss SALT. The memorandum of conversation reads in part as follows: “Schlesinger: If there were no agreement, we would have to increase our capability. President Ford: I’ve asked [Kissinger] to get from DOD the figures on the options we would have to face, to get projections of your needs for the next five years in terms of money and hardware—what you would send to Congress.” (Ibid., NSC Meetings File, Box 1) The minutes of the NSC meeting are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 101.
The President: This is not psychological warfare; this is for real. I am fed up with people in Congress and around the country accusing me of being a soft liner.

Schlesinger: Maybe we should tell the Soviets, from an arms control standpoint, that we don’t want to get out in front of them and cause them to react, but that we will be watching their programs.

The President: That is a possibility. But I don’t want this Administration to be caught short. The other option is to just go all out on it.

O’Neill: As you know, Muskie got the conference report turned back. If we got it in right away as a budget amendment, it may not get as careful attention as it would as a supplemental. We must watch the timing.

Kissinger: We will have six weeks anyway.

Schlesinger: SALT II won’t fail. Maybe this year, but SALT I still has two years to run.

Kissinger: Brezhnev won’t likely be around that long. If he isn’t, there won’t be a SALT agreement.

The President: We shouldn’t talk about that, but I agree. We have big problems with cruise missiles and Backfire.

Kissinger: On cruise missiles, they claim that through them we could get 11,000 warheads for free. On the SLCM’s at 1,500, they claim we could hit Moscow from Murmansk. On Backfire, they claim it is not strategic and has only half the capability of the Bison.

The President: Brezhnev really hit me on this. I said our intelligence showed that Backfire had a comparable capability to the Bison. Brezhnev called his military guys over and then said no, only about half.

Kissinger: On cruise missiles, they said they thought it was all resolved at Vladivostok and now we come up with these new ideas. On Backfire they didn’t propose any ideas. I think they were first mad because they hadn’t planned it as a strategic bomber. They listened to the throw weight, and didn’t comment at all.

It is my impression that they are confused by the cruise missile complexity. I think if we came down on the range from 3,000/1,500 some and limited the numbers, we might get something.

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3 President Ford met with General Secretary Brezhnev in Helsinki, Finland on August 2, 1975. According to the minutes of their meeting, Brezhnev insisted that the Backfire “can’t do even half of what the Bison can do. Ask your experts. This is on the record, and I am responsible for what I say. So how can we include it?” The minutes of this meeting are printed in full as Document 173 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet Union, 1974–1976.
Schlesinger: Let us look at the numbers and the arguments and see what we can do.

The President: See what you can do. They aren’t going to buy 3,000/1,500 and won’t also buy the Backfire.

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56. National Security Study Memorandum 2281


TO

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT

Strategic and Critical Stockpile Planning Guidance

The President has directed a reassessment of the current Strategic and Critical Stockpile Planning Guidance (NSDM 203) in light of the strategic stockpile problem areas identified in response to NSSM 197/CIEPSM 33 (Critical Imported Commodities),2 and Congressional criticism that current objectives are inadequate. The study should develop alternatives to the current planning guidance which take account of the problem areas and the Congressional criticism. The study should analyze:

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, Box 2, NSSM 228. Secret. Copies were sent to General Brown, Colby, and CIEP Acting Executive Director John M. Dunn. Kissinger forwarded the NSDM to Ford under a covering memorandum, August 13, with the recommendation that he sign it. The issue needed resolution, Kissinger noted, because the U.S. government had accumulated “excesses” since NSDM 203 (Document 3) had ordered a reduction in the strategic stockpile. Congressional opposition, led by Representative Charles Bennett (D–Florida), prevented the administration from disposing of the excess, however, “on the ground that the stockpile should support more than one year of a defense economy.” (Ibid.)

—the impact on the US budget and on commodity markets of changes in sales, acquisition, and inventory maintenance which would result from each alternative;
— the adequacy and accuracy of the models employed to compute objectives;
— the effects of factors such as austerity, substitution, and production expansion in establishing the stockpile objectives for specific materials;
— shipping losses and reliability of suppliers;
— whether to hold stockpile materials in raw or upgraded forms;
— whether specific materials should be added to or deleted from the present list of stockpile materials.

The study should be prepared by representatives of the addressees and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and chaired by the representative of the Administrator of General Services. The study should be forwarded not later than September 4, 1975 for consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

57. **Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn) to President Ford**¹

Washington, undated.

**SUBJECT**

FY 1977 Defense Budget

**I. Background**

At our recent budget meeting,² we reviewed the large gap between current Defense plans and the OMB planning targets. I fully share your desire to develop a Defense budget which will in no way impair our military capability or signal a lack of resolve to the Soviets. With these concerns in mind, I have identified possible Defense budget reductions which will:

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¹ Source: Ford Library, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 18, Finance—Budget: Defense Department (5). No classification marking.
² No record of such a meeting has been found.
• Fully fund all of Jim Schlesinger’s major force proposals.
• Provide real program growth of $3 billion over 1976 and fully cover anticipated inflation.
• Affect only pay and support programs and have no appreciable impact on our military capability.
• Provide a substantial ($4 billion) cushion for Congressional cut insurance, and
• Signal our continued commitment to a strong national defense by showing a 12% increase over last year (compared to a 24% increase in Jim Schlesinger’s proposed budget).

These figures do not include an allowance for increased expenditures for strategic programs in the event of a breakdown in the SALT negotiations. The budget implications of a SALT amendment are discussed in the last section of this memorandum.

Program Growth in FY 1977

The Defense budget request for 1977 has increased by $5 billion since January. At the same time Congress has reduced 1976 funding by $7 billion, resulting in the following picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Total Obligational Authority (TOA) ($ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1975—President’s Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1975:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB Proposed Alternative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This $24 billion increase is double that envisioned in January, primarily because the Defense 1977 request was developed from a 1976 program base unadjusted for Congressional reductions. In fact, Defense proposes to add to their 1977 budget all of those items deleted by Congress in 1976. The OMB proposed alternative starts from the adjusted 1976 Congressional level.

In outlays, from a 1976 level of $91 billion, the Defense 1977 request would increase to $109 billion. The OMB proposal of $99 billion provides an $8 billion increase—which is about the same increase proposed in the 1976 Budget.

Further adjustments below this level are possible but would require substantial reductions in modernization and operating levels which would affect near and long-term capability. These reductions were included in our recent $25 billion overall budget reduction exercise.
Secretary Schlesinger’s proposed budget will hold military man-power levels of about 2,100,000 and will provide the following significant areas of real growth:

**Forces**
- Complete and equip three added Army divisions.
- Commence buildup of four additional Air Force tactical fighter wings.

**Readiness**
- Reduce maintenance backlogs and improve supplies availability.
- Improve capability and effectiveness of Army reserves.

**Modernization**
- Increase strategic modernization by $2 billion.
- Increase shipbuilding funding.
- Increase investment in all general purpose and support areas.

The OMB alternative proposal would support the same military manning level, all of the Schlesinger force-related objectives, and much of the funds to achieve his other identified needs. Existing capabilities and readiness would not be reduced. The OMB proposal—which would reduce the 1977 Defense total by $12 billion—would still include real program growth and an allowance for Congressional cuts.

These reductions are achieved by:

- A lower real growth increase for high priority strategic and other investment programs.
- More realistic estimates of inflation in investment programs.
- Lower pay raise assumptions.
- Economies resulting from eliminations or reductions of Defense frills and policies which do not affect capability.
- Holding existing backlogs and supply inventories to current levels.

**Signals our commitment with the 1977 Defense Budget**

Congressional budget reductions of about $7 billion in TOA and $2 billion in outlays will be reflected in the 1976 column of the 1977 Budget. The value of the 1977 Defense budget request in conveying a signal of our resolve will be directly related to the size of the year to year increase. The Congressionally-adjusted 1976 program should be the base for arriving at the 1977 program level.

As shown in the following table, I would propose adding to the Congressionally-adjusted 1976 level all that is required for inflation as well as sizable amounts of program growth and Congressional cut insurance. These increases would be offset partially by holding pay raises to 5% and by other minor pay related and budget scrub reductions to arrive at the desired 1977 budget level.
## Alternative 1977 Defense Budget

($ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>TOA</th>
<th>Outlays</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 request to Congress</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Congressional action</td>
<td>−7</td>
<td>−2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised 1976 program</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to arrive at desired 1977 Budget:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desirable program growth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional cut insurance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtract:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold pay raise to 5%</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>−2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate frills and improve</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed 1977 Budget level</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your Defense budget would then appear as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>($ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975 Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% changes from prior year  
| +10%   | +6%   | +12%  | +9%   |

These Defense increases over 1976 would signal our continued commitment to a strong national defense especially in the face of lesser increases, or even decreases, in other non-defense areas.

### Impact of a Possible Breakdown in SALT Negotiations

The OMB planned 1977 Defense budget includes over $12 billion for strategic programs, or an increase of more than $2 billion over 1976. This includes increases for research and development programs and for procurement of the TRIDENT missile and the B–1 aircraft which enters major production.

Failure to negotiate an acceptable SALT agreement may require additional increases. The SALT contingency budget amendment which you requested from Secretary Schlesinger would add an additional $2.8 billion in obligational authority to the Defense budget in 1976 and 1977.
The amendment would expand development and production of ongoing systems and would lay the basis for further acceleration in 1978 and later, if required by Soviet actions. In his analysis of this amendment, Secretary Kissinger has suggested that a breakdown of SALT negotiations could require even larger additions of up to $5 billion in 1976–77. Such additions would more rapidly accelerate ongoing programs and expand TRIDENT and B–1 production capacity. The rate of TRIDENT submarine construction would be doubled and B–1 production increased by 50%.

The Defense amendment is probably as much of an increase as Congress is likely to accept, unless the public is convinced that the Soviets intend an unrestrained expansion of their strategic forces. You approved my recommendation of September 15 that the Defense amendment should not be forwarded to Congress until necessary in the light of SALT negotiations. Any submission to Congress should be modified by excluding certain programs that fail to contribute visibly to our strategic capabilities. This modification would provide an amendment of about $2.1 billion in 1976–77.

II. OPTIONS

The current gap between Defense and OMB on the 1977 planning level is too great to be resolved between Jim Schlesinger and myself. Your guidance is requested as to the size of the Defense program to be included in your 1977 Budget. There are two options, exclusive of SALT considerations:

1. The Defense proposal of $122 billion in obligational authority and about $109 billion in outlays. This will be an extension of the 1976/77 program proposed last January with addbacks for Congressional reductions in 1976.

2. The OMB proposal of $110 billion in obligational authority and about $99 billion in outlays. This takes off from the Congressionally-adjusted 1976 program and provides allowances for inflation, real growth and Congressional cut insurance. At $99 billion, we are $5 billion above the level of Defense outlays in our exercise of last month which reduced the total budget deficit for 1977 by $25 billion. Thus, even at $99 billion we are adding to the difficulty of reducing the total Federal deficit.

III. RECOMMENDATION

I am convinced that you can achieve your objectives of retaining our military capability and sending appropriate signals of our determi-
nation to emphasize a strong military posture with Option 2. In the event that SALT negotiations are not successful, additional funds of about $2 billion could be requested.

Approve Option 1
Approve Option 2

4 Although Ford approved neither option, his attached handwritten memorandum, October 11, reads: “Reductions: 1) Military and admin/250,000 Industry—100,000 2) 20 base closures 3) 8% cut in R&D; 4) Stretch out of aircraft procurement 5) Reduction in shipbuilding 6) Aircraft carriers—13/10 7) Cutback tank production.”

58. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 15, 1975, 5–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Hon. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

President: Are you planning to reclaim on ALCM and MX?

Schlesinger: Yes. We will on both of them. Our problem on the Senate side is McClellan is running a little scared of Muskie and the budget committee.

President: I guess you want to talk about budget guidelines for ’77.

Schlesinger: Yes. First Jim Lynn’s paper. It is off by 5.9 billion. They have eliminated 2.5 billion of inflation. They used a 4% inflator—we think it is really 7.5%. The pay cap assumption is OK except for wage board and retired. They assume away a part of the MAP program. These add up to 5.9 billion.

They say 110. The Service request is 122. Both are TOA. Splitting the difference would give you what they say is their program—116.
had regionally [originally] had 116 TOA and 104 outlay. We can cut that to 102 in outlay in cuts already taken. Lynn wants 98. We can get 100 or 101 without tearing up the five-year plan.

Our concern is TOA; I understand yours is outlay. If you will give me the flexibility to stay around 116 TOA, we will try to control outlays—by prespending, etc.—to numbers you can live with.

President: It is going to be tough to get the 28 billion. As I recall Lynn’s figures, they go from 128 to 108. I want you to undertake an exercise at 107 and 97.

Schlesinger: We’ll have to tear up the five-year program.

President: Congress has already done a good job at that. 116 and 104 is completely unrealistic. Go through the exercise at 107 and 97 so I can see what the figures are. You can do one alternative at 110 and one at 99. We are deadly serious about this program, and I want to see what DOD can do.

Schlesinger: Are you concerned about TOA or outlay? I can do the outlay without tearing up the program.

President: Outlay is the chief one, but I am realistic enough to know that TOA turns into outlays in future years. So I want to see what you can give me.

Schlesinger: It is late in the year because service submissions are all in.

President: True. But it [is] the same in all departments.

Schlesinger: But they are not playing with 3 million men. The others’ problems are simpler.

President: The other departments all say the same thing. When I had you and Henry here the other day I gave you an indication of the problem. We’ve got a helluva job, but I am serious about making it. You show me what you would give up and what add-ons you would have if you went to 110 and 99.

Schlesinger: The program will shrink about 7% in real terms from last year.

President: But you have saved the Vietnam portion, so that isn’t accurate.

Schlesinger: Military assistance hasn’t gone down by the extent of Vietnam savings.

President: It’s got to be cut too. Everything will be hit.

Schlesinger: Shipbuilding will be especially hard hit. We will have to take down the force structure.

President: What is this I read about the Air Force taking over operations so we could cut down carrier forces?
Schlesinger: That is a John Finney invention based on the fact that the aircraft can fly longer.

President: Is there something to it, or just Finney?

Schlesinger: It is a Finney exaggeration. We have been looking at moving aircraft rapidly to different bases for employment, but it has not impacted the carrier force.

President: I also read something about smaller subs in place of Trident.

Schlesinger: We proposed a smaller sub with 16 tubes as an arms control matter if the Soviets would restrain throw weight. We would not do it now because we have had no response from the Soviet Union. We are going ahead with a 10 boat Trident program. After that, we don't save much by going to the Narwhal sub. We would have replaced Poseidon with it, not Trident. The 10 Trident are to replace Polaris.

President: If you went to the small boat, how soon could you produce?

Schlesinger: By the early 80's assuming we could overcome the Rickover problem.

3 Journalist John W. Finney reported that the USAF officials, including Jones, were “promoting a plan to send tactical air power into virtually any corner of the world from American bases, thus impinging on the traditional domain of the Navy’s aircraft carriers.” (Finney, “Air Force Risks a Rift with Navy,” New York Times, October 12, 1975, p. 8)

59. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 16, October 16, 1975—Ford, Kissinger. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. All brackets, except for those included by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original.
President: I thought I would fill Henry in on the talk with Schlesinger.2

Kissinger: I haven’t had a chance to talk to Brent about it.

President: He asked for the meeting, but I don’t know if we got to his subjects. We started on personnel. It looks like we will lose Ellsworth. I offered a couple of jobs to him but he wanted to stay where he was, but with a higher title. I said I couldn’t see making two deputies in Defense. He asked about an undersecretary rank. I said send me the papers.

Kissinger: I have no problem with that, but DOD should get out of foreign policy.

President: Then I hit him on the Détente article by Dr. Wynfred Joshua,3 a classified analytical paper, criticizing détente, which I said was amateurish and shouldn’t have been released. He agreed. Then I said he hadn’t done his work on the Hill on the Defense budget. He said no organic harm had been done, but I said it was not perceived that way. Then Brent came in and we discussed the budget cut I wanted him to take. Then Brent says he went back and talked to him for some time.

Scowcroft: [Described Schlesinger conversation with me]

Kissinger: There is something every day. Today it is Les Gelb.4 Vladivostok was a real achievement. They are after me but it is going to get to you.

President: That is correct.

Kissinger: When we were at Vladivostok they didn’t have us push on Backfire. On missiles, they just asked us to protect the SRAM, not cruise missiles: [See exchange of messages from Vladivostok, Tab A].5

2 See Document 58.
4 Citing “[s]everal authoritative Administration officials,” journalist Leslie H. Gelb reported that SALT was “in trouble,” an assessment that contrasted with Kissinger’s recent public remarks that “about 90 percent of the negotiation is substantially completed.” (Gelb, “Pact with Soviet on Missile Cubs Reported in Peril,” New York Times, October 16, 1975, p. 1)
5 The messages, found attached to another copy of the memorandum of conversation, included TOHAK 98, an undated draft cable from Kennedy to Scowcroft and Eagleburger, who were with Kissinger at the Vladivostok summit in October, 1974. Regarding cruise missiles and SRAMs, the message, which summarized Schlesinger’s preferred negotiating stance during a point in the SALT II talks, reads: “Short range cruise missile SRAM employs a semi-ballistic mode. If definition is precise so as to exclude SRAM, leaving no ambiguities later to be exploited, DOD can agree not to place ballistic missiles on the B–1.” DOD was also prepared to “accept a 1,500 mile limit on other missiles for the B-1.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, Oct. 1975)
Schlesinger is making it tough for you with the Reagan bunch, but if you move to the right, the liberals will kill you in the election for sabotaging détente.

President: Are we working up anything new on our SALT position?

Kissinger: I don’t think we should until the Soviets respond to us.

President: What does Haig think about cruise missiles?

Kissinger: He is not all that enamored with them. He thinks Schlesinger’s objective is to get all the tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. Except on SALT, Schlesinger is on the very liberal side.

If we don’t cap the cruise missiles, the Democrats will kill you with the claim there is a gap you can drive a truck through.

In Canada, he is saying we are falling behind in Defense with the Soviets. That is okay with a Congressional committee but not with foreigners. He also told them about using cruise missiles in response to an attack in northern Norway. That is dangerous—indicating we would not respond to an attack with the full force of NATO.

The Democrats will have a field day if you support his SALT position and there will be no agreement.

President: I want a SALT agreement. I want to let my conversation with Jim sink in and then talk to him next week.

Kissinger: I think you must tell him that what should be coming from the Pentagon is simply support for your position. I earlier did some talking points to that end, but you don’t really need them.

President: Give them to me. I want to pursue my talk with him in a more general sense.

Kissinger: Haig says he [Schlesinger] wants to be President. [There is discussion of whether or not Schlesinger will resign.]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

60. National Security Decision Memorandum 312

Washington, November 1, 1975.

[Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, Box 1, NSDM 312. Top Secret; Sensitive. Two pages not declassified.]
61. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: We are flooded with phone calls. I have instructed my senior staff to make no statement at all. Schlesinger has obviously been very active.

President: He or Laitin\(^2\) obviously called Jackson, McClellan, Goldwater, and Thurmond. It confirms the wisdom of my decision.\(^3\) I am comfortable with the decision and I am going ahead.

Kissinger: I think it important that the thing not be portrayed as a fight between me and Schlesinger or a victory by me.

President: I haven’t written anything out, but I planned to say from the outset I have been worried about intelligence, and so on.

Kissinger: How about Nelson? Is that happening?

President: He is coming in at 10:30 with a letter stating that he won’t stand for elective office. Elliot I asked to be Finance Chairman. He asked also to replace Morton eventually. He said no today but would think about it.

Kissinger: What a patriot. As you know, I have no use for him.

President: I agree, but with this Nelson thing\(^4\) I had to balance it out with something for the Liberals.

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 283, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, November 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. All brackets, except for those included by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original.

\(^2\) Joseph Laitin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

\(^3\) On November 3, Ford made several personnel changes in his administration, a shakeup known as the “Halloween Massacre”: Rumsfeld would be nominated to replace Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense; Scowcroft would replace Kissinger as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, leaving Kissinger to serve only as Secretary of State; Bush would replace Colby as DCI; and Richardson would be nominated to be the next Secretary of Commerce, replacing Rogers C.B. Morton, who had served in that capacity since May.

\(^4\) On the same day that President Ford announced the personnel changes in his administration, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller informed the President that he did not want to be chosen as President Ford’s 1976 running mate. (Philip Shabecoff, “Mutual Decision,” New York Times, November 4, 1974, p. 1)
But back to the announcement. I will say I have been concerned about intelligence procedures and I wanted my own team in the vital national security area.

Kissinger: I think it is important to stay out of personalities so he [Schlesinger] doesn’t look like a knight in shining armor.

President: I have no intention of allowing that. I will emphasize that this was all my decision. It was, as you know. I just couldn’t work with Jim [Schlesinger] any longer.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

62. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn) and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, November 11, 1975

SUBJECT

FY 1977 Defense Budget

This memo responds to your request for a joint OMB and NSC evaluation of the adjustments to reach your 1977 Budget target level suggested in the memo Secretary Schlesinger left with you on November 1. An alternate set of potential adjustments to reach the same target levels has been developed by OMB, and both lists have been reviewed by NSC for possible national security policy implications. We wish to emphasize the tentative nature of both plans since we are still reviewing the entire Defense budget. We will be ready to present firm recommendations to you in about two weeks.

1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Subject File, Box 18, Finance—Budget: Defense Department (5). No classification marking. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.”

2 Apparently a reference to an October 20 memorandum from Sullivan to Schlesinger. Sullivan’s memorandum, found attached, examined the effect of reductions to the DOD’s FY 1977 budget on U.S. defense posture. Sullivan concluded that a cut of “$3 billion in outlays would produce a very significant reduction of defense posture.” An additional cut of $2–3 billion “would provide an unmistakably clear signal to the World at large that the United States no longer intends to retain an evidence balance of force with the Soviet Union.” (Ibid.) On November 1, Ford and Schlesinger met in the Oval Office from 11:45 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. No record of the meeting was found. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)
There are several general points to be made about the Defense memo:

- The memo neglects to point out that the $110 billion level for 1977 will provide a $12 billion increase in total obligational authority over 1976. This increase covers inflation and includes significant real program growth.
- Due to the sharp decline in anticipated inflation levels since the 1976 Budget was forwarded to Congress in January, we are still estimating some real growth in the 1976 program even after Congressional reductions.
- The actions proposed in the Defense memo emphasize reductions in combat forces and numerous modernization programs. Many of these proposals would seriously degrade U.S. capability and would have adverse effects abroad. The OMB suggested adjustments would protect the existing force structure and would emphasize reductions in support areas and modernization.

The table below identifies the Defense and OMB adjustments required to move from a 1977 request level of $117 billion after an initial budget scrub to target levels of $110 or $107 billion:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOA ($ billions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Memo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB Proposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Revised Defense Department forecast | 117.0 | 117.0 |
| Tier I Reductions                  |       |
| Support                            | -1.1  | -2.9  |
| Modernization                      | -4.3  | -4.0  |
| Force reductions                   | -1.6  | -1.1  |
| Preliminary Guidance Level         | 110.0 | 110.0 |

| Tier II Reductions                 |       |
| Support                            | -0.4  | -1.1  |
| Modernization                      | -1.1  | -1.9  |
| Force reductions                   | -1.6  |       |
| Low Guidance Level                 | 107.0 | 107.0 |

Attachment A categorizes the reductions in greater detail. Two major differences in approach are noted:

- Defense proposes large force reductions while OMB proposes large support reductions in lieu of force reductions. The OMB support reductions will not hurt our defense capabilities but some will be difficult to achieve—witness the attempt to reduce the commissary subsidy in 1976.

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3 The table is attached, but not printed.
Both Defense and OMB propose sizable modernization reductions. Defense identifies cuts in the B–1 and Trident strategic programs. OMB proposes no strategic program adjustments, and recommends larger adjustments in conventional forces and intelligence modernization. Under both approaches, there will be sizable growth in modernization above the 1976 level. NSC stresses that in the intelligence area further study of specific issues is required before any firm recommendations can be made.

The following table compares the DOD and OMB programs for 1977 with the 1976 funds anticipated to be received from Congress: ($ billions—TOA)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forces</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant increases are provided in forces and modernization under both options. The Defense proposal produces a larger increase in support funding while the OMB proposal permits greater funds for forces. Both alternatives result in the same overall level of modernization funding.

While we have not completed our budget review and will not be prepared to present our firm recommendations on the Defense budget to you for another two weeks, we are confident that your proposed Defense budget target can be achieved without the drastic force reductions shown in the Defense memo.
63. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 11, 1975, 11:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Senate Steering Committee

Thurmond: I am getting very concerned about the Budget Committee's and their attitude on the Defense Budget. They are hitting defense in favor of social programs. It would help if we could get more White House and DOD help with the Republicans on the Budget Committee.

The President: I know Bellmon is strong on defense, but he has a strong conflict of interest. Who else is there?

McClure: Bell [Bellmon?] and I are the only ones who consistently support DOD. We usually get three Democrats, but we need the other Republicans.

Thurmond: If you could have the new Secretary of Defense to have them to dinner.

The President: The $7.5 billion cut was too deep. And if we don't get a SALT treaty, we will have to ask for more.

Thurmond: It is too bad that DOD entertainment can't be taken out of the Defense Budget.

Brock: There are a number of items like that. If we could have some of them out, it sure would help.

Thurmond: I think these setbacks on Defense will continue unless we make a concerted effort.

The President: Our people are doing all they can on the bill. When does it come to the floor?

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 16, November 11, 1975—Ford, Senate Republican Steering Committee. Confidential. The meeting, held in the White House Cabinet Room, ended at noon. Scowcroft, Lynn, Friedersdorf, Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs (Senate) Patrick E. O'Donnell and the following members of the Republican Senate Steering Committee—Edwin Jacob (Jake) Garn (Utah), Clifford P. Hansen (Wyoming), Jesse A. Helms (North Carolina), and Paul Laxalt (Nevada)—also attended. (Ibid., Staff Secretary's Office, President's Daily Diary)

2 Senator Henry Louis Bellmon (R–Oklahoma).

3 Probably a reference to the House Appropriations Committee’s recommendation, October 2, to appropriate $90.2 billion to fund the DOD in FY 1976, a figure that was approximately $7.6 billion below the administration’s request. In January 1976, Congress ultimately appropriated $90.5 billion. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 154, 168.)
Brock: Next week. I think we will lose, and that is why I think we should try to move some of these items out of the DOD budget.

McClure: I think if OMB would work with our people, we might get it moved out.

Scott: I think we must revise the military retirement system. It is just too big a burden. It is a long-term problem and we can’t move quickly, but we have to do something. To me it is a part of the military costs and should not be separated out.

The President: There is a bill to stop the GI Bill. That was originally predicated on combat and that situation no longer exists. The House passed it and I think it should be pushed.

64. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting

Washington, November 13, 1975, 8–9:10 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Secretary Kissinger: Bill.

Mr. Hyland: The intelligence agencies are meeting today on the strategic forces estimate, and this will be the final go-round. Colby is going to spend the entire day on it.

The main issue is what happens if SALT should fail. And there is a considerable split, as to what the Russians would do, with thus far all the agencies, except the State Department, saying that failure of SALT wouldn’t lead to much change in Soviet force planning. I find this incredible. I guess we will be in a minority, saying that the failure of SALT, if failure means complete and total no agreement between now and 1985—

Secretary Kissinger: You believe it will mean no agreement?

Mr. Hyland: No. Failure is not well defined—and that is a big problem. But as I read it, it means no further agreements—period. And they project forces to 1985. My feeling is that in that entire period, the

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, 1973–1977, Lot File 78D443, Box 9, Chronological File. Secret. According to an attached list, the following people attended the meeting: Ingersoll, Robinson, Maw, William D. Rogers, Habib, Hartman, Hyland, Lord, Enders, Buffum, McCloskey, Springsteen, Bremer, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Edward W. Mulcahy, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sidney Sober, and Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations Robert Anderson.
expansion and modernization of Soviet forces would be immense. There would be absolutely no incentive, after at least a year or so, of waiting to see whether negotiations might resume—there would be no incentive for the Russians to be very restrained.

Now, I cannot understand how DIA and all these hard-line agencies—I can understand it, but I mean intellectually it is a very difficult problem.

Secretary Kissinger: The hard-liners have to prove that a failure of SALT is no worse than SALT.

Mr. Hyland: But this is the kind of thing that kills us with the Congress. I mean—

Secretary Kissinger: It also killed their budget request.

Mr. Hyland: But this is the kind of thing that kills us with the Congress. I mean—

Secretary Kissinger: It also killed their budget request.

Mr. Hyland: When people talk about manipulating intelligence—two years ago, when this question was addressed, all of the agencies agreed that the Russians would go to 3500 strategic vehicles if SALT collapsed, and that is when we were talking about extending the interim agreement and so forth. Now all those same agencies say that just almost the opposite is the case.

Secretary Kissinger: Who are all these same agencies? DIA?

Mr. Hyland: DIA, CIA, NSA, and the three armed services, State Department is going to be in a minority. Of course we are going to be accused of just the opposite, of saying we are so worried about SALT that we say that the Russians—

Secretary Kissinger: But can’t you refer to the previous estimate? What happened to change the previous estimate?

Mr. Hyland: Exactly.

Secretary Kissinger: Why don’t we do it in terms of ranges of what could happen?

Mr. Hyland: There are alternate projections. And all of the agencies except State take the low, very modest change, as the Soviet program. I don’t like the alternate, because I didn’t construct it. It was constructed at the agency, and it is one of these almost impossible force goals.

Secretary Kissinger: What?

Mr. Hyland: Well, it has forced draft efforts to improve accuracy, which almost everyone agrees could not be achieved.

Secretary Kissinger: On our side or theirs?

Mr. Hyland: On the Soviet side. So I am just saying that this aspect is probably too much—this is the way the Soviets will go if there is no SALT at all.

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2 See Document 149.
Secretary Kissinger: You have to give your best judgment.

Mr. Hyland: I just wanted to inform you that it is going to be a badly split estimate, unless some people turn around.

Secretary Kissinger: You have to give your best judgment. I would do it in terms of ranges rather than flat predictions.

Mr. Hyland: I am just going to write a dissent explaining my view. But I really think the estimating process is deteriorating. Intellectually it is not very stimulating.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

[Secretary Kissinger]: Okay. Do you have anything?

Mr. Maw: The Foreign Assistance bill in the House is going into mark-up this morning with a version which they surfaced yesterday for the first time. Their main thrust is to cut off MAP in ’77, terminate all MAAG missions and put limitations probably on sales—they are considering it.

Mr. Habib: MAP grant altogether?

Mr. Maw: MAP grant. Not FMSA, but all MAP. And terminate MAAGs completely at the same time. And to limit the number of military attaches that can be had. And to restrict their activities.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s crazy.

Mr. Maw: It is. We have got people up there trying to do the best we can with them this morning, without having a chance even to get the administration position.

Mr. McCloskey: I appealed to them yesterday to hold up their mark-up, and had Broomfield contact Morgan, who didn’t return my call. And Morgan is hell-bent to just go ahead and do it. I explained to them this is unfair, they don’t give us an opportunity to present considered positions, and offered only the best I could do would be to have someone up there to answer technical questions.

Mr. Maw: We prepared some positions last night. We have two people up there sitting with them this morning.

Secretary Kissinger: But what is that going to result in?

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3 See Document 158.


5 Representative William S. Broomfield (R–Michigan)

6 Representative Thomas Ellsworth Morgan (D–Pennsylvania), Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations
Mr. Maw: It is going to result in chaos.
Secretary Kissinger: Are we going to sit with them and go along with this bill and make it tolerable, or are we going to oppose it?
Mr. Maw: We are going to oppose these—
Secretary Kissinger: There is no tolerable solution.
Mr. Habib: You have to go all over it again. You can’t—
Secretary Kissinger: We will not accept a bill like this. Is my impression correct, Bob [McCloskey], that we have lost control over what goes on here?
Mr. McCloskey: Just to complicate this problem further—
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t want the International Relations Committee to think that the Department of State will work with them to make an intolerable bill slightly less intolerable.
Mr. McCloskey: Mr. Secretary, that impression has not been given, I assure you.
Secretary Kissinger: If we have two guys up there working with them on the mark-up—
Mr. Maw: To oppose things.
Mr. McCloskey: To complicate this problem—Humphrey is going to introduce his own bill by announcing it today at a press conference.
Secretary Kissinger: We owe all this to the Israelis. This is their way of—
Mr. McCloskey: It is a result of a Washington problem with too many people trying to influence and stake out positions for themselves on a single issue.
Secretary Kissinger: Who are all these people?
Mr. McCloskey: You have all kinds of people in the Congress who are irritated at us for not having gotten our Security Assistance figures up there earlier on this year. There are people up there who have intellectual differences with the concepts under which the programs are conceived. There is and has been a drive to eliminate grant military assistance now for two years. There are people up there who want to separate out military assistance from the other forms of assistance, and force the administration into the two-bill concept each year.
So there are a variety of motives that lead to this mess that is called the legislative process for security assistance.
Mr. Habib: And the human rights argument comes in from the side and picks up support.
Mr. Ingersoll: We are going to get hit on this. Carl [Maw] sent you a note—as a fall-back.
Mr. Maw: I got saved by the bell, because they decided to terminate the hearings at four o’clock.
Secretary Kissinger: We are going to be hit by what?

Mr. Ingersoll: Fraser, Javits, Cranston, are all pressing for the promised report on human rights.

Mr. Maw: And they want to go into the specifics of country by country.

Secretary Kissinger: Not while I’m here.

Mr. Ingersoll: Can we go ahead with the general summary that Carl sent to you? Then we can go up and talk.

Mr. McCloskey: I think that is worth doing, because we have to produce something now.

Mr. Maw: This general thing is pretty pious.

Mr. Enders: There are also very serious restrictions on PL 480.

Secretary Kissinger: What are those?

Mr. Enders: Well, the 30–70 has gone to 20–80, and 20–80 makes it almost impossible to run any significant political program. And in addition to that, there is a rule, an amendment, which would make it impossible for the United States to settle any claims at less than full value, which is an absurdity, and would block a great many of our negotiations.

Mr. Ingersoll: There is another one on human rights that was tacked on also.

Mr. Maw: There is a whole thrust here which I think comes a little bit from the Department of Defense, of priorities. There has to be a certification before we make a sale—

Secretary Kissinger: A sale of what?

Mr. Maw: That our own forces don’t need the materiel. And the Joint Chiefs have been complaining extensively that we have diverted to different countries things that should have been retained in the armed services inventories.

Secretary Kissinger: It is an amazing phenomenon. We have a comparative advantage in food, we have a comparative advantage in weapons. They are depriving us of both as tools of foreign policy. When is all of this going to come to a head?

Mr. Maw: Within the next week.

Mr. Enders: I think we have some hope on the 20–80 thing.

Secretary Kissinger: To get it back to 70–30?

Mr. Enders: 70–30 we can live with, because Egypt is now a most seriously affected country.

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7 Representative Donald MacKay Fraser (D–Farm-Labor–Minnesota)

8 Not found.
Secretary Kissinger: So we have to hope that Egypt doesn’t recover economically, so that the penalty—

Mr. Enders: I think there is no danger.

Secretary Kissinger: The penalty they pay of a successful aid pro-
gram is that we will cut the PL 480.

Mr. Enders: In a way it is quite interesting you said that, because the Senate version has a cut-off of $250 per head as the outside income for most seriously affected countries. Egypt is just below it. So if that definition were adopted, Egypt would be above it next year and have to be cut out.

Secretary Kissinger: When am I going to the Finance Committee now?

Mr. Enders: Not until next year.

Mr. Maw: I was told yesterday McClellan and Inouye⁹ had made a deal that you would not go to McClellan, you would go to Inouye instead.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay.

(Whereupon at 9:10 a.m. the meeting was concluded.)

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⁹ Senator Daniel Ken Inouye (D–Hawaii)
65. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 2, 1976, 9:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Don Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Rumsfeld: First let's discuss Angola and the Christian Science Monitor article [claiming the USG was sending mercenaries].

The second item is the Budget. The Congressional budget procedure is so difficult, with the Budget resolutions, that this may be the biggest Congressional decision of the year—both as the Budget as a whole and the proportion going to DOD. We therefore ought to get together a massive campaign to bring our full weight to bear. Cabinet meetings, meetings with editors, leadership meetings, and maybe the budget committees to meet with you.

President: I agree, we can't afford that.

Rumsfeld: The fight will be between the 15th of April when the committees report and May 15 when it must be adopted.

President: I think we better set up a series of meetings beginning as soon as Congress gets back. Maybe a breakfast with the top DOD and State people with the top Budget committees and Defense subcommittees.

I finished the Budget with Lynn yesterday. You got $112.4 billion and $100.7 billion outlay. The budget looks like $394.3 billion.

I added the Transitional Quarter figures that State wanted to the FY 77, at the NSC recommended levels.

Rumsfeld: Inouye has asked me to testify on the Security Assistance Bill of '76. I don't see why I should.

There are briefings of candidates on national security matters. What should be done, and is DOD involved?

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 17, January 2, 1976—Ford, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 Brackets in the original. On January 2, a story in the Christian Science Monitor by David Anable reported that, despite congressional efforts to keep the United States out of Angola's civil war, the CIA was secretly "recruiting American ex-servicemen" and dispatching them to Angola to fight as mercenaries on behalf of the southern Angolan liberation movement UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). (David Anable, "U.S. Role in Angola Grows Despite Denials," Christian Science Monitor, January 2, 1976, p. 1)
On the Budget, we should get the message to the people. It should be in the State of the Union address so that the people know the importance of it.

President: We shouldn’t get into detail, but it will hit the importance of defense strength. It will come when Henry is in Moscow. We should take account of that.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

3 In his State of the Union Address, January 19, Ford spoke of the need to strike “a new balance between the spending on domestic programs and spending on defense—a balance that ensures we will fully meet our obligation to the needy while also protecting our security in a world that is still hostile to freedom.” As such, Ford announced that his FY 77 Defense budget would “show an essential increase over the current year. It provides for real growth in purchasing power over this year’s defense budget.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–1977, Vol. 1, pp. 32, 41)

4 Kissinger left the United States on January 19, traveling first to Copenhagen (January 19–20) and then to Moscow (January 21–23).

66. Memorandum From Richard T. Boverie of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT

Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC)

Our current defense strategy ostensibly is based upon the NSSM 3 study completed in 1969. Given that subsequent DPRC efforts to review strategy were abortive, the NSSM 3 study represents the last comprehensive Presidential review and determination of our military posture and defense strategy. Since the international, domestic, and economic environments were substantially different in 1969 than we

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Box 1, Meeting Series, Defense Review Panel Subseries, 1976 (2) [Establishment]. Secret. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum.


3 The DPRC, which met regularly during the first Nixon administration, last met on August 17, 1973. The record of that meeting is Document 23.
face today, I believe it is important that we do something to regenerate the Presidential review process and make sure our strategy is on track—or change it if it isn’t. (I do not count the annual budget review as a substantive examination of our strategy and policy. The current budget process deals largely with on-the-margin items, not the basic thrust of the defense program.)

We need a review process to answer hard questions concerning defense strategy and alternatives. In particular, if some of the alternatives being discussed in Congress and elsewhere have merit, then we should take the lead in adopting those which are preferable to current policies. On the other hand, if it is determined that our current policy is the preferred approach, we should know how to answer those who argue for the alternatives in a consistent and effective manner, based on facts and sound analysis.

In part because of its size and visibility, the defense program is a prime target for attack by outside critics. Critics are saying that new military budgets of record proportions are being prepared (and locked in) with minimal input from outside DOD; that skyrocketing costs of military programs, inflation, unemployment, shortages, and changed international circumstances make it necessary to cut back our defenses in favor of competing programs and priorities; that we are building unneeded, redundant weapon systems which we can no longer afford; and that many of our overseas commitments are really one-way commitments that contribute little to the defense of the US. At the same time, there are charges that we have cut the defense budget too deeply while the Soviets are rapidly increasing their spending; that we have moved from a position of superiority to parity and now to inferiority relative to the Soviets; and that we have pumped so much military equipment into Vietnam and Israel that our own arsenals are seriously depleted. A coherent Presidential review process would help us answer these criticisms.

Outside critics aren’t our only problem; we also find ourselves tangled in messy internal problems which could be headed off, at least to a degree, if we had a routine, rational review process. Typical of such problems are those caused this past year by largely unguided and uncontrolled DOD action on the Nunn Amendment reports; theater nuclear force deployments, drawdowns, and modernization; carrier drawdowns; nuclear acquisition policy (DOD has on its own simply decided not to complete NSSM 191); and out-year defense spending

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4 Document 32.
requirements. We can expect these same kinds of problems and others in the coming year, if we do not develop a workable interagency review process.

A Proposal for the Review Process—A Regenerated DPRC

I believe the best way to tackle the review problem is to regenerate the DPRC—to establish a DPRC process which is geared to the times and the current leadership, and which avoids the pitfalls of the past. To have a successful DPRC, I believe there are three essential preconditions:

—The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and yourself must agree to make the process work.

—The DPRC must focus on major strategy, force posture, and budgetary issues of Presidential concern, and stay away from details which are best left to internal DOD management.

—The structure must be streamlined and specifically designed to avoid massive working groups at the staff level (such as are normally associated with NSSMs) which could only bog the process down with quibbling over trivia and relentless advocacy of rigid institutional views.

Therefore, unless there would be a reclama to the decision to have the Sec Def chair the DPRC\(^5\) (an option you may wish to consider seriously), I believe that what is needed is a process somewhat analogous to the current Verification Panel process. The system would work like this:

—DPRC principals would meet under the Chairman’s auspices to determine what issues should be addressed.

—A small, informal, highly select working group would draft a paper on the issue(s). In recognition of the fact that the DPRC is an NSC mechanism, the working group would be chaired by an NSC staff member, who would be responsive to the DPRC Chairman through you.

—The draft paper would be circulated by the NSC Secretariat to DPRC principals (DepSec State, DepSec Def, CJCS, DCI, Director OMB, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) for comment.

—If necessary, the DPRC would then meet to discuss the issue(s).

—When appropriate, an NSC meeting would be held subsequent to the DPRC meeting.

Using an approach analogous to that of the VP would help maintain the integrity of the NSC system, fend off criticism that the “fox is in

\(^5\) No record of this decision was found.
the chicken coop”, and indicate consistency in the Administration’s review techniques. Thus, it could encourage understanding and acceptance of the process within and without the government. Additionally, it might generate the psychological atmosphere conducive to insuring that the DPRC Chairman recognizes he is working as an NSC member, not as an agency head and advocate.

Finally, to underscore the Verification Panel analogy, the DPRC could be renamed the Defense Program Review Panel (DPRP).

The DPRC (or DPRP) Work Agenda for FY 1976

The end objective of the DPRC (DPRP) for CY 1976 should be an overall review of the proposed FY 78 defense program and budget prior to consideration by the President (perhaps at an NSC meeting). In preparation for that final review, the DPRC (DPRP) should start by addressing selected individual issues of concern. Potentially the list could be very long, but it would be important to keep the number of topics to a minimum at the beginning. We would not want the process to sink at the outset under the weight of a multiplicity of projects. Therefore, I recommend that the initial work agenda include only the following central issues:

—Review of our conventional force structure. Our conventional forces are the most difficult to analyze objectively, are the highest cost element of our defense posture, and will be the primary determinant of out-year budget changes. They touch most directly upon our overseas deployments and commitments and, in an age of rough strategic parity, could most directly affect our ability to manage future crises. Two broad questions should be addressed:

- **What conventional ground and air force levels are needed?** Defense has made a major effort to increase the overall combat capability of our air and ground forces within existing manpower levels—moving toward a force structure of 16 army divisions and 26 tactical air wings. In the wake of our Southeast Asia experience, the lethality of any future European battlefield, and the questionable stability of the third world, we need to examine what kind of capabilities we will want from our air and ground forces over the next decade—both from the standpoint of sizing the overall force and insuring that it contains the proper mix of mission capabilities at the lowest possible cost.

- **What naval force levels are required?** The size and composition of the fleet are going to be major factors in Defense procurement budgets over the next few years. We need to look at alternative ways of performing naval missions, different mixes of ship types, overall force levels (e.g. should we have a 550–600 ship Navy?), and the associated costs and risks. We will have to decide soon on the extent to which we should rely on nuclear propulsion in our surface combatant fleet. We
are also going to have to look at the future of the carrier—its role, force size, and characteristics (e.g. Nimitz-size or mini-carrier?).

—Review of our theater nuclear force posture. Force acquisition and deployments have been made with little strategic basis. We are only just beginning to understand the role of these forces and to develop a doctrine for their use. We should continue to examine our concept for the employment of tactical nuclear forces and begin to evaluate our current delivery systems and warhead stockpiles, trying to identify alternative force postures and deployments that are more consistent with the emerging employment doctrine. Since most of the existing work has been limited to the NATO setting, we probably need to pay special attention to the role of tactical nuclear forces in other regions and contexts.

Additionally, we could begin undertaking a review of our strategic force posture, given the out-year implications of cruise missile, mobile ICBM, and B-1 development. However, this review need not initially be as intensive as the others because: (1) our strategic force posture is increasingly defined by SALT and is less subject to gross changes in the near term, and (2) the strategic posture would be addressed anyway in the overall wrap-up review of the defense program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I personally recommend that there be a reclama to the recent decision on the DPRC Chairmanship. If there is to be no reclama, or if you want to get things moving in any event, I also recommend that:

—The DPRC be regenerated using a Verification Panel analogy, and that the DPRC be renamed the Defense Program Review Panel.

—The CY 76 work agenda include an overall review of the FY 78 program and budget, preceded by preparatory reviews of our conventional force posture, theater nuclear posture, and possibly strategic force posture.

Your Decisions

_____ Prepare a reclama to the DPRC Chairmanship decision.

_____ Prepare a memo to the President which recommends chartering a revitalized DPRC (DPRP) along VP lines and tasking a CY 76 program.

_____ Prepare talking points for use with the President, Secretary Kissinger, or Secretary Rumsfeld on:

_____ Reclama possibility

_____ Restructuring DPRC along VP lines, plus tasking CY 76 work program
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______  Do nothing further at this time.
______  Other.6

6 There is no indication that Scowcroft approved any of the recommended options. However, the Defense Review Panel (DRP), which replaced the DPRC, first met on April 7. The record of that meeting is Document 76. NSDM 326, “Functions and Organizations of National Security Council Sub-Groups,” April 21, formally reconstituted the DPRC as the DRP. NSDM 326 is scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976.

67.  National Security Study Memorandum 2351


TO

    The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense
    The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

      Review of U.S. Interests and Security Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region—
      Issue: Military Bases Negotiations with the Philippines

The President has directed an assessment of U.S. security interests, objectives, and strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific area over the next three to five years, together with the role of U.S. bases in the Philippines in supporting these security interests and objectives.

1. The study should review U.S. interests and objectives in the region during the next three to five years in light of the following:

    a. The end of the Indochina conflict.
    b. US relations with ASEAN countries and the potential role of ASEAN in the security of the region.
    c. The phase-out of SEATO.
    d. Japan’s objectives and potential as a political and economic force in Asia.
    e. The policies, intentions, and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.
    f. Vietnamese capabilities and intentions.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 40, NSSM 235 (2 of 2) (10). Secret. A copy was sent to George Brown.
68. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Strategic Stockpile Issues

This memorandum is designed to bring you up to date on strategic stockpile issues.

Background

In August 1975 an interagency study (NSSM 228) was initiated to examine alternatives to the current Strategic Stockpile Planning Guidelines (NSDM 203) issued by President Nixon in February 1973. The study was prompted by congressional refusal to consider Administration bills for disposal of material from the strategic stockpile and by the findings of an earlier study (NSDM 197) that current stockpile objectives may be inadequate in a few commodities. At the same time, you
advised Chairman Charles Bennett (D–FLA) of the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that you were re-examining the stockpile planning assumptions. You also agreed to his request to meet with him to discuss stockpile issues. (Bennett’s committee has held up Administration stockpile disposal legislation since December 1973.) That meeting was scheduled last September but postponed at Bennett’s request pending completion of the Administration’s stockpile study.

The initial study report has been completed, but it is not yet a final product and lacks specific planning guidance alternatives. Chairman Bennett knows that the report has been completed and is aware of its contents. (He may now wish to reschedule his meeting with you.)

The Study Effort

The NSSM 228 study effort was chaired by Leslie Bray, Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA), and included representatives of State, Treasury, Defense (including JCS), Commerce, Interior, OMB, CIA, CIEP, ERDA, CEA, and the FRB. It is the most comprehensive and thorough study of the stockpile in ten years and, while further work is necessary, it will provide the basis for improved stockpile planning.

The most significant benefit of the study is the development of a new approach to planning which takes account of all significant factors which affect requirements. Current guidance specifies one set of assumptions which are applied across the board to all elements of the economy for a specified period of time. The new approach recognizes that different degrees of protection might be required for defense needs than for the needs of the civilian economy and that the degree of protection desired for early stages of a war might be different from that needed as a hedge against extended combat. This approach also provides a convenient means for setting priorities for disposals and acquisition programs.

The following table illustrates a three-year, three-tier stockpile planning alternative. It shows rough estimates of the stockpile values which would be associated with each tier-year combination if very conservative values were assigned to planning factors for defense needs in the first year and progressively less conservative values assigned to

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5 Ford’s August 28, 1975 letter to Bennett advising him thus is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 37, NSSM 228 (7).

6 Jack Eckerd, GSA Administrator, forwarded the initial study to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, December 10, 1975. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 37, NSSM 228 (8))

7 Figures based on recent market prices, not realizable cash values or costs of acquisition, which would vary greatly over time and be affected by stockpile activity. [Footnote in the original.]
successive combinations. The figures in parentheses illustrate how disposal and acquisition priorities might be set.

Approximate Total Values of Stockpile Objectives
($ Million, March 1975 Prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>2150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential Civilian</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>2730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Civilian</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>6050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For comparison, the market value at March 1975 prices of material currently held in the stockpile is roughly $7 billion. About $1 billion of this represents current objectives under the 1973 guidance; the other $6 billion is now termed “excess.”

All participating agencies agreed that the variable confidence level approach developed during the study is a considerable improvement over the current form of planning guidance and recommended that it be adopted as the basis for future stockpile planning. However, differing views emerged regarding the values to be assigned to specific planning factors and which tier-year sets should be covered.

The study team concluded, and the concerned agencies concurred, that follow-on work in several areas should be conducted within the NSSM 228 framework before specific recommendations are made to you. It was also agreed that the team should examine the feasibility of developing special sets of planning factor values for a few highly critical commodities, such as chromium ore, whose continued supply is subject to special circumstances.

One concept which will be examined closely in the follow-on study is an overall scheme for future stockpile planning. Based on long-term goals and priorities, annual acquisition/disposal programs would be developed and utilized in the budget planning cycle. The planning guidelines would be reassessed periodically by the NSC.

This approach would hopefully avoid the chaos and conflicts of the recent past and make the stockpile flexible and responsive to the Administration while building toward long-term objectives. It could also enhance our flexibility in commodity negotiations under way in various international forums.

I have asked the NSSM 228 study group to complete the necessary follow-on work this Spring, after which we will prepare specific guidance recommendations for your consideration.
Congressional and Budget Dimensions

Leslie Bray of FPA has kept Chairman Bennett informed about the study as it has progressed, and Bennett has expressed considerable interest in the new ideas developed. He has also indicated that he will no longer insist on a return to the pre-1973 guidelines and would be willing to consider disposal and acquisition bills based on new guidelines. Of course, he will reserve judgment until he sees the new guidelines and related stockpile objectives.

While the study has been going on, two stockpile-related bills have been introduced in the Congress. Bennett has proposed in the House that any receipts from stockpile disposals go into a special fund for financing stockpile acquisitions, so long as there are unfilled objectives. While not inconsistent with the new planning approach outlined above, this bill would effectively obviate any short-term budget benefits which could otherwise be derived from disposal of some of the current excesses. The other bill, introduced by Senators Dominici8 and McClure, would prohibit any disposals from the stockpile for a year after enactment. This bill responds to the GAO suggestion in its stockpile report of March 19759 that disposals be stopped until the nation’s critical resource requirements are clarified.

At present there are several Administration bills pending with Bennett’s committee, but he is unlikely to consider any of them since they call for sizeable disposals based generally on the NSDM 203 objectives. He has informed you by letter10 that he will not consider any disposal bills until the planning guidance is changed to call for higher objectives.

The FY 77 budget projects receipts from stockpile sales of $870 million, about $750 million of which requires new disposal authority. The remaining $120 million is expected receipts from sales already authorized. FPA will prepare a new disposal bill containing only those quantities of material which we can reasonably expect to sell during FY 77 and which are clearly excess to any feasible stockpile options. (FPA and OMB estimate that there may be about $3.5 billion of material for which there is clearly no need given current supply and demand conditions, and that $700–800 million of this could be disposed of in FY 77.) There is at least a chance that Bennett would give such a bill serious consideration as an interim measure before you decide on new long-term objectives at the completion of the studies.

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8 Senator Pete Vichi Domenici (R–New Mexico).

9 Not found.

10 Bennett’s April 16, 1975 letter to Ford is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 37, NSSM 228 (7).
69. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Secretary of State Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Rumsfeld: I have a subject. Today they decide on the Defense appropriation in the House. Mahon is still nervous about his committee. I can feel it. He wants to go the old route of cuts. I have told them it is difficult to make any more cuts this year—it’s a bare-bones budget. If he cuts it and the Budget Committee does, we are in trouble.

There are three areas of concern: any pay changes have to go on top; shipbuilding we are reviewing; SALT may need a supplemental. If they want to add on for any of these, it should go on top of the $112.7 billion. I just wanted you to know they may come in over your budget.

The President: That would be a miracle.

Kissinger: My only concern is the Democrats adding to the defense budget. They do it every 16 years.

Rumsfeld: We are protected on all these areas.

Will you meet with the committee leaders—or the full committee?

The President: I would stick to a small group.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 18, February 26, 1976—Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Rumsfeld: The Gallup Poll is showing an eight percent shift in people thinking Defense spending is too low.

The Defense subcommittee is cutting $100 million from the budget. I think with the leaders you should say you have tightened it as much as possible. Say: “We have got to stop the tradition of cutting $5–8 billion each year. The House is better this year and I don’t expect you to agree exactly, but I think the country will be served only if you come in at my level—or higher. If you want to disagree, do it on both sides—up and down.”

I think the Armed Services Committee will come in over your budget. So we would go to the Budget Committee with one committee over and one under.

President: We got to make the fight in the Budget Committee, not in November.

I met with David Lindsay of the Sarasota paper. He started talking about overcommitment to Israel on tanks. I explained the production situation to him. He said Schlesinger wasn’t a good Secretary—too much in the clouds. He wants to talk to you. He is a little pompous, but he is a serious guy.

Rumsfeld: Okay, I will.

Greener is running our best people out for press briefings. It is having a very good effect.

President: Schlesinger thought all he had to do is get McClellan and Mahon on board. The Chairmen can’t deliver any more.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]
71. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 2, 1976, 10:59–11:58 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Senator John L. McClellan, Arkansas
Senator John C. Stennis, Mississippi
Senator Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Senator Milton R. Young, North Dakota
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The following are not complete notes.]

The President: I submitted the largest defense budget in history. We have to reverse the trend of the past several years.

[There is extended discussion of the need for a bigger defense budget.]

I know you agree with me. What we have to do is convince the Congress that this is an essential program. Don, what do you think?

Rumsfeld: I think the American people will not accept anything less than rough equivalence. We can’t just keep riding from one year to the next, cutting $5–8 billion from defense.

The President: I think the mood around the country is changing. I know we have a new difficult procedure in the Congress with the Budget Committees. Once the budget resolution has been accepted, it will be hard for you all to change it.

I know you are all concerned about my shipbuilding program. We have had a program under way for a couple of years, but in the light of Soviet programs, I have asked Don for a new study. If we need more, I will ask for more.

McClellan: The stumbling block is the Budget Committee. I don’t know if you will have them down here. They are the problem.

The President: I will have the House Armed Services Committee and House Appropriations Committee this afternoon and I will get to the Budget Committees also.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 18, March 2, 1976—Ford, Rumsfeld, Senators re Defense Budget. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. All brackets are in the original.

2 Ford discussed defense appropriations with a bipartisan group of House members from 1:35 to 2:15 p.m. on March 2. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., March 2, 1976—Ford, Rumsfeld, Representatives re Defense Budget.
McClellan: Good. You will be okay with our committees, but the Budget Committee is leaning to make cuts. Our report from the Budget Subcommittees is the tentative recommendation and will run $16 billion over the Budget—HUD, 550 million and Agriculture 500 million, etc.

The President: How about foreign aid?
McClellan: It seems that defense and military procurements are at budget levels. That is how it is running now. My inclination is to cut a couple of billion off the defense budget, but with the Budget Committees increasing everything else and holding DOD, I don’t like it.

The President: I am glad to hear it.
Stennis: The manpower and procurement is the part which comes to me and I think it is at rock bottom. Revenue things like stockpile sales should be taken out—they just confuse things. If you are going to recommend more shipbuilding, you should do it as soon as possible.

The President: I want to be able to justify anything I send up.
Rumsfeld: I think your Committees, who are the experts, can be so helpful with the budget cuts.
Young: I heard George Brown. There is sentiment that the B–1 is not as important as other things, that we can do with the B–52.

The President: We have got to disabuse them of that.
Rumsfeld: In the past, the different services and different contractors have hit at each other’s procurement. That must stop.
Thurmond: The Budget Committees are the key.
Stennis: You can go over the heads of the Congress to the people on this.

Thurmond: How about going on nationwide television? Do it right away, so the pressure gets back to the Congress.

I think the defense budget should be maintained and even increased.
Stennis: Where will the cuts come in the DOD budget?
The President: In the House, Mahon has recommended cuts of $900 million. I don’t recall where.
Rumsfeld: They have, though, taken out the restraints on things like commissaries, so the cut in fighting capability is even worse.

AWACS was cut from six to three; they held intelligence to current levels; likewise CCC.

We can’t keep cutting investment and adding to the people part of the budget.
McClellan: Why should retirement come in the defense budget?
Stennis: Retired pay needs attention, but I wouldn’t take it on this year.
Thurmond: You should get all the committees down here.
McClellan: You won’t be able to turn Muskie. You will have to out-vote him.

[There is a discussion of general issues.]
The President: I will meet with the Budget Committees.

72. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 3, 1976, 8:10–9:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
Republican Congressional Leadership (list attached)2
Leslie A. Janka3 (note taker)

SUBJECT

Security Assistance

(The President opened the meeting with the discussion of the federal election commission legislation. At 8:40 he turned the discussion to the subject of security assistance legislation.)
The President: The other subject I want to discuss this morning is the security assistance legislation4 which I understand comes up in the House today. (to Congressman Broomfield) Bill, can you give us a rundown on where we stand in the House?

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 283, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, March 1976. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room.
2 According to the list—attached, but not printed—attendees included: Representatives Anderson, Broomfield, Conable, Devine, Edwards, Frenzel, Frey, Michel, Moore, Rhodes, Quillen, Vander Jagt, and Wiggins; Senators Case, Griffin, Hatfield, Scott, Stevens, and Tower; and numerous Ford administration members, Lynn among them.
3 Member of the NSC Staff, August 1974–April 1976.
4 S 2662, the FY 1976 security assistance bill passed by Congress in April, contained provisions granting Congress new authority over government and commercial arms sales, authority opposed by the Ford administration. The White House opposed the bill’s other features, including a $9 billion-a-year ceiling on total arms sales and a provision enabling Congress by concurrent resolution to terminate aid to nations found in violation of human rights standards. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 874–876)
Congressman Broomfield: We have a very bad bill, Mr. President, and I’m not sure that we can even hold where we are now in light of a number of additional amendments being proposed. For example, we had a good compromise agreement on lifting the embargo to Turkey. It was something we could have lived with. Now Brademas and Sarbanes have agreed to a technical amendment that would put the embargo back on in FY 77. That would mean just another slap at the Turks. It’s a concession to the Greeks.

I am also concerned about the many policy provisions in the bill for congressional intervention (Broomfield listed a number of bad points of the bill).

The bill is really a bad one and there is considerable opposition to it. Even Chairman Mahon told me this morning that he will most likely vote against it. Some of the objectionable provisions could be made even worse if we cannot hold off other amendments. I want to say, Mr. President, that your staffer, Les Janka, and Sam Goldberg in the State Department have been doing a superb job in helping us manage this bill. We will be watching very carefully developments and will do the best we can.

Congressman Rhodes: I think the bill will be passed because the Democrats will strongly support it on account of the restrictions it puts on the President and the appeal of the Israeli funding. Nevertheless, it is a terribly malicious piece of legislation.

Congressman Broomfield: We will have to watch out for amendments that would cut funds for Egypt and Jordan and thereby destroy the balance of the Middle East package. However, I think there is a limit of what people will support for Israel.

The President: The vote has always been close on this legislation.

Congressman Rhodes: I think the bill will get final approval regardless of its flaws.

The President: What figures did you finally put in for Israel?

Congressman Broomfield: (He listed the amounts for each country covered in the Middle East package.) And although I know you oppose this, we also provided for transition quarter funding for one-quarter the full year authorization level.

Congressman Edwards: But the Appropriations Committee did not give you any dollars for the transition quarter.

The President: When will the appropriations bill come up?

5 Democratic Representatives John Brademas (Indiana) and Paul Spyros Sarbanes (Maryland).
6 Samuel H. Goldberg, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Congressional Relations, Department of State.
Congressman Edwards: Tomorrow if we finish the authorization bill. I know that Congressman Obey\(^7\) will offer an amendment to cut back on Israel.

The President: I also understand there will be efforts to add an additional $500 million for Israel.

What’s happening on the Senate side?

Senator Case: We have passed the authorization bill. I think our dollar levels are just about the same as those in the House.

Congressman Broomfield: Mr. President, the Senate bill also contains many objectionable provisions and I think you will have to seriously consider vetoing it.

Senator Tower: I agree. I think we passed a very bad bill.

Senator Case: John Tower made a great effort to clean up our bill, but frankly there’s a great difference of philosophy on these programs. I don’t think the bill is too bad with respect to its antidiscrimination provisions and the legislative initiatives to control arms sales.

Lynn: Can we have an appropriation without an authorization?

Congressman Rhodes: It has been done in the past.

The President: From my reading of the House version, we will have many serious problems with this legislation, and I hope we can work to clean it up somehow.

Congressman Broomfield: Our strategy is to hold the line in the floor debate because any attempt to improve it by amendments would only result in the bill’s becoming worse. We would rather work through the conference process.

The President: What does the Senate bill provide on Turkish aid?

Senator Case: There is no grant aid or FMS credit. It provides cash sales only. This is about the best we could get from the Senate. In fact, even Eagleton\(^8\) accepted this provision.

The President: Doing something for Turkey will be very important. We are starting to get some movement in the negotiations and, as you know, Caramanlis and Caglayangil\(^9\) are coming here soon. With regard to Turkey, we will put great pressure on them despite the severe domestic problem the Turkish coalition government faces. The situation in Greece is not good either. The sooner we can get Cyprus off the agenda, the better it will be for all of us.

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\(^7\) Representative David Ross Obey (D–Wisconsin).

\(^8\) Senator Thomas Francis Eagleton (D–Missouri).

\(^9\) Greek Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis and Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Caglayangil. Ford met with Caglayangil on March 24.
Brent Scowcroft: Mr. President, the Senate bill allows only cash sales to Turkey. The House bill is better in that it allows FMS credit but it is still only marginally acceptable to the Turks. We must stand firm with the House language. As you know, the Turkish Foreign Minister cancelled his planned visit to Washington as a result of the Senate’s action.

The President: We certainly cannot tolerate any more “technical amendments” on the floor if we are to avoid a blow up with the Turks. If the bill gets worse on the floor, should it just be defeated?

Congressman Broomfield: No, we should try to pass it so we can clean it up in conference. The big crunch today will be the Turkey amendment.

Senator Scott: There must be some opening towards credit sales if we are going to make progress with the Turks.

Senator Tower: What is going on in Congress is a very callous subordination of the national interest to domestic politics. Congress simply wants to tie your hands. I just returned from Europe and it is very clear to me that the world sees the United States Government as very weak. However, they see you, Mr. President, as a strong leader. You cannot let the Congress tie your hands because the world is looking to you for leadership. The people abroad are very concerned about what is going on in this country.

The President: John, every report we see from our Ambassadors abroad tell us the same thing.

(At 9:00 a.m. the discussion changed to a brief discussion of the Florida campaign before the meeting adjourned.)
73. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 8, 1976, 4:40–5:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
House Budget Committee Members (list attached)2
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

SUBJECT

Defense Budget

The President: I’m very pleased that you came down here today. I want to discuss with you the imperatives of the Defense Department budget for FY 77. I recommended to the Congress a Defense budget of $112 billion with increases in several key categories. All of us, Democrats or Republicans, must be concerned with the security of this nation. I recognize that the jurisdictional committees must have their recommendations in to you by March 15 and that your committee must issue its report by April 15. I view these deadlines and this process as a very significant step in rationalizing the budget process and I’m pleased to meet with you today to discuss the Defense budget. I would like to turn now to Secretary Rumsfeld for any comments he may have.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I have already met with the subcommittee of the Budget Committee, and I would just like to make three brief points today.

—Notwithstanding the President’s general call for a restraint in the national budget, the review I undertook upon taking this job indicated that real increases in DOD spending would be essential this year.

—Today we do have a rough equivalence with the Soviet Union in major areas of defense capability.

—Our problem is that over a period of time, we have seen a massive power shift, with the USSR becoming a true superpower. It is clear

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 18, March 8, 1976—Ford, Rumsfeld, House Budget Committee Members. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room. On March 10, Ford and Rumsfeld also met with the Senate Budget Committee to discuss defense appropriations. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., March 10, 1976—Ford, Rumsfeld, Senate Budget Committee Members.

2 According to the list—attached, but not printed—the following Committee members attended: Adams, O’Neill, Wright, Ashley, Giaimo, Smith, Leggett, Mitchell, Burleson, Landrum, Gibbons, Mink, Stokes, Holtzman, Derrick, Clawson, Latta, Cederberg, Schneebeli, Broyhill, Holt, Shriver, and Conable.
that the Soviets now have a great momentum in defense spending. In contrast our momentum has been to take $33 billion out of the President’s budget requests over the past few years.

—The overall strategic balance means that our conventional deterrent must be maintained to restrain any adventurism below the nuclear threshold. We have recognized that the budget cuts taken don’t hurt the glamorous things, the big weapons systems. Instead, they hit spare parts, overhauls, training time, and so forth, and these things do seriously affect force readiness and our overall capability.

As we put this year’s defense budget together, the President built in three major caveats:

—There are $3 to $5 billion worth of restraints built in, such as the Pay-Cap, commissary subsidies, and so forth.

—There will be a need for strategic weapons increases if the SALT talks are not successful.

—Increased shipbuilding would be absolutely essential. We now have an NSC study underway on our shipbuilding needs.

In looking at this year’s Defense budget, we must look to the future as well as to the short run impact of our decisions. We cannot allow recent trends to continue and lose the rough equivalence we have. We must also counter our own inflationary increases and the strong increases in Soviet defense spending.

The President: In the FY 77 budget we have added $14 billion in budget authority which works out to about $8 to $9 billion in spending levels. These are big increases but as we look at the picture down the road, these expenditures are absolutely essential. This is not a generous budget. Initially, the JCS came in and asked for $122 billion in total obligational authority. We in turn gave DOD tight budget guidelines, but they appealed these guidelines and, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, I added back $2 billion to reach the level of $112 billion.

I know that the House Appropriations Committee has come in at a figure lower than my budget request. The Armed Services Committee, I understand, has come in about $1 billion over my requested levels. When I looked at the Defense budget, I looked at it from 13 years on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. When I started out the military retirement levels were less than a billion dollars, and now that figure has gone up to over $8 billion. The depressing fact is that the $8 billion doesn’t give us a dime of readiness or Defense strength.

In another area, we recognize that Congress would not buy the commissary phase out so we have retreated, and we are trying to do the same thing phased over three years. These are essential economies built into our budget request.
Representative Adams: A number of us who are known as liberals now recognize, Mr. President, that domestic programs can no longer be funded out of the DOD budget. On the other hand, we think there are substantial increases in the DOD budget this year that go far beyond the inflation factor. Other areas of the national budget will not get such increases this year. For example, we have had to cut education even below the inflationary levels. These kind of cuts will be necessary to reduce the budget deficit.

We have to recognize that there was about $2 billion of real growth in the FY 76 budget. I think a growth of $7 billion in this year’s budget is really too much to swallow, given all the other constraints. We hope we can avoid being locked in now on such items as the B–1, the Trident and shipbuilding. The commitments to future growth in the FY 77 budget are very great.

We also understand that the pay problem is very serious and we want to work with you to avoid it if we can. Nevertheless, we will have major problems giving real increases to DOD with everyone else getting cut this year.

Representative Giaimo: Mr. President, we recognize that this is a critical year which will determine expenditures for the next five years, and the levels we set will have an impact on Soviet and other countries’ perceptions of the United States. I have supported the requests for all major weapons systems. We need a new bomber and the B–1 is also very symbolic of our strategic intentions. However, there are a lot of non-weapons items that don’t affect our military strength. I believe we can find significant savings in this area without sending the wrong signal to the world.

Another question I have is do we have to do everything this year? We have to meet our needs but we still must find some savings somewhere. We also agree with you on the need for various restraints in the budget but, quite frankly, many cannot buy such cuts and I think you’re going to lose some of them.

The President: Well, for example, the Navy Reserve training program is totally unjustified. My brother is a Reservist and I can tell you it is a sorry operation. Those Reservists would be absolutely no help if war came. Nevertheless, I understand the lobbying pressure you are under.

Representative Giaimo: I think the public does not want to see big defense cuts this year, and in light of this, I suspect that we are seeing the Defense Department picking up in this year various categories of expenditures to ride this wave of interest.

The President: I remember how we always tried to cut maintenance and operation, but let me tell you that when you cut steaming
time and flying time, you inevitably cut into readiness. There comes a point where you just can’t trade away anything more.

Secretary Rumsfeld: That’s absolutely right. For example, this budget only provides for 25 percent of the needed ship overhauls. As I see it, the risk we run is cutting into our deterrence capability below the strategic level. These cuts in our readiness have the effect of lowering the nuclear threshold.

Representative Latta: I just came from a secret briefing by DIA on the Soviet defense spending momentum. It was both a very impressive briefing and it was very frightening. It is clear that now is the time we have to catch up. There’s very little we can do to cut much from this budget. I would say that the hearings we’ve held this year are the best ever. DOD and JCS have done a very fine job. It is my belief that we are now paying for letting DOD budgets take a backseat for too long.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We’ve offered that DIA briefing to every Member of Congress. It discusses only the Soviet effort, however, in showing the tremendous momentum of Soviet programs. There is also a briefing by Malcolm Currie on an out-year comparison of U.S.-Soviet capabilities based on current R&D expenditures.

Representative Gibbons: I support the restraints you have proposed, Mr. President. Have you seen the research done by Charles Schultz3 up at Brookings? He has some very interesting figures on GNP, which show how we have cut into DOD for domestic programs. Nevertheless, I am concerned about the vulnerability of such major weapons as the B–1 and aircraft carriers. It seems to me that we ought to develop some alternative like the cruise missile since flying the B–1 into the Soviet air defenses would simply be suicidal today.

The President: Let me say that in my view the B–1 is viable only with air-launched cruise missiles.

Representative Gibbons: I simply don’t see how our big carriers are going to survive in modern war. I am also very concerned about the high pay of federal employees. I believe that we’ve gone beyond the level of comparability. I also wish that we could delay buying the B–1 to further examine the cruise missile option.

The President: The cruise missile is a very important and impressive weapon but we have to recognize that it is only subsonic. It is not a replacement for the ballistic missile. The cruise missile would take 12 hours to reach the Soviet Union and cannot replace a ballistic missile which only takes 30 minutes. The cruise missile has many desirable aspects and we will continue to push it very actively.

3 Charles L. Schultz, economist.
Representative Leggett: I have been known as a liberal, a term which we are today calling progressive, but I think that we cannot any longer take from DOD to spend on domestic programs. In fact, Mr. President, your budget may represent the “dove” position this year. Frankly, however, we do have real reservations on the great escalation of R&D programs. It will be difficult to make reductions, but I think the votes are there to eliminate the B-1.

Representative Cederberg: What we have going on now is a process where all of the subcommittees are coming in with budget figures set very high to protect against the cuts they expect the budget committee to make.

The President: Do you set levels by programs or by lump sums?

Representative Adams: Basically, by the lump sum approach but we still do identify major issues within those sums. (Representative Adams explained to the President how the committee budget resolution is drafted in the committee to avoid line item budgeting.) After the current budget resolution is set, we then allocate to the various committees overall levels which they divide up into specific programs.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The budget restraints are very important this year because of their cost avoidance impact over the next few years. As you know, the President is also allowing us to move ahead on base realignments this year. We must do this in order to bring our base structure in line with our modern budget. The President did not put dollars or people into this year’s budget. So if we cannot carry out our base realignment, we will have to find the dollars in some other programs.

Representative O’Neill: I am confident the President will not cut Massachusetts facilities like his predecessor tried to do solely on the basis of philosophical grounds.

Mr. President, I believe we need our sophisticated weapons systems. We also need a structure to fight a conventional war, but the Reserves are just a big joke. Therefore, I tend to vote for sophisticated weapons as our best means of deterrence. Nevertheless, I am concerned because in your overall budget, Mr. President, you came in with far more than normal growth for DOD. This means that we will clearly have problems on the floor. Your budget of $395 billion is simply too low. It is sure to kick off a recession.

The President: What we really believe and what we want to do is to urge you to take a very hard look as it’s what the jurisdictional committees recommended to you. I hope you can accept their levels.

Representative Ashley: You can see, Mr. President, that most of us do not have an ax out for the DOD budget. Our concern is that a $395 billion budget can lead us back into recession. You are asking a lot of us to accept your DOD increases within your strict $395 billion budget ceiling.
The President: But don’t overlook that we did add growth to education and housing. The point of this meeting today is to make sure we get a fair shake on an increased DOD budget.

Representative Gibbons: I strongly feel that we ought to pull out the DOD retirement fund into a separate category since it distorts the true picture of DOD spending.

Representative Conable: One major problem is that this DOD budget requires a lot of explaining and you know the rule is that if you have to explain it, people won’t buy it. We need to maintain a strong dialogue on Defense issues to maintain public support for Defense. You cannot count on the Members of this House to do your explaining for you.

The President: We are scheduling a series of meetings where I will be speaking to Republicans and Democrats because I believe we are coming to a critical crossroads on our defense posture. The decisions we make this year carry great risks for whoever is President four or five years from now.

Representative Conable: We need to keep a flexible response capability in order to avoid a nuclear response on every issue. We can overlook this fact only to our detriment. Cutting conventional capabilities makes us only more and more dependent on a nuclear response.

The President: Let me give you an illustration although I cannot be very specific about the details of the incident. Not long ago we were faced with a decision to use a certain ship in a particular operation. Don Rumsfeld spoke up and said the cost of using the ship would be very great. I decided to do it anyway but when we have to consider the cost factors involved in doing something, it frankly scares me that we are getting awfully thin. It cannot be good for this country to make military decisions on the basis of the dollars involved.

Thank you all for coming. I think this discussion was very helpful to all of us. I will be looking for your support this year.
74. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 24, 1976, 11:10 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
Bipartisan Group of Senators (list attached)2
Leslie A. Janka (note taker)

SUBJECT

Defense-Related Issues

The President: It is good to see you all down here today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with you the Department of Defense appropriation and other matters of defense policy. I would like to say a few things to put the budget into perspective and then take whatever questions you have. I think the problem we are facing is very well illustrated by a news story I saw this morning to the effect that Brock Adams, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, has indicated that he contemplates a reduction of $7 billion or more in budget authority for DOD in FY 77.3

That is simply intolerable and we are going to fight it all the way. I would not rule out a veto should such a bill come to me that slashed the DOD budget that much. Over the past five years there has been too much of a cut each year. Last year’s cut was between $6 and $7 billion. Over the last six years Congress has cut some $38 to $39 billion out of our budget requests for DOD. The time has simply come for that kind of game to be over. If I’m presented with such cuts again, I will veto the bill and take the issue to the people. Are there any questions?

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 221, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Rumsfeld, Donald, 1975–76. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room.


3 On March 24, the New York Times reported that Adams sought to raise the overall FY 1977 federal budget as proposed by Ford but to cut $7 billion from funding earmarked for defense by the administration. The changes were necessary, in Adams’ words, to halt the President’s “drastic shifting of priorities from human resource programs to defense.” (Eileen Shanahan, “House Budget Chief Urges More Spending Than Ford,” New York Times, March 24, 1976, pp. 1, 68)
Senator Dole: The first hurdle you must face is that of convincing the budget committees on your levels.

The President: In that regard we have taken several steps down here. First, I invited the jurisdictional committees, both House and Senate, to meet with me.\textsuperscript{4} We then had meetings with the full House and Senate budget committees.\textsuperscript{5} At every meeting we’ve had I talked very frankly and very firmly, and I know Don Rumsfeld has spent a tremendous amount of time with Members of Congress. We are going to fight like hell for this budget.

I know that many pressure groups are up there on the Hill pushing to have you adding things to this budget that don’t add anything to our military capability. At the same time, very important items are being squeezed out.

Senator McClure: Are you referring to the increase in the shipbuilding account?

Secretary Rumsfeld: No, that’s not what the President meant. He was referring to the cost restraints he has requested. These restraints would save $2 to $5 billion from programs that don’t add any warfighting capability. We are right now studying the shipbuilding issue.

The President: If the study shows that we need more ships, I will send out a formal request. However, I recognize that the House Armed Services Committee has already added a number of ships beyond the DOD request for 16 new ones.

Senator McClure: Secretary Middendorf was with me out West last week, but he carefully did not go beyond your requested ship levels.

On another matter, a number of us sent a letter to you regarding the SALT negotiations. There is a lot of concern on some of the proposed limitations, especially a proposed trade-off of the cruise missile and the Backfire. Such a proposal goes against any attempt to counter the already heavy Soviet throw weight. We do not see much symmetry in such a proposal.

The President: I want to emphasize that any agreement we reach will be a total package. I agree with you that you just can’t trade cruise missiles for the Backfire. Those two weapons systems are quite different in their utilization. I think it is also important to recognize that the ALCM is not interchangeable with an intercontinental ballistic missile. A land-based cruise missile would take 12 hours to reach the Soviet Union, while an ICBM only takes 30 minutes. I know some people feel that an intercontinental cruise missile would be equal to an ICBM.

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 71.
\textsuperscript{5} See Document 73.
It is not and we have to be very careful what factors we use to make comparisons. We must look at the total package.

A big problem is what we do with the fact that the cruise missile is still in the development stage but the Backfire is actually being produced and deployed. We estimate that the Soviets plan to deploy 400 to 500 Backfires.

We have ALCMs and SLCMs as well as land-based cruise missiles under development but we do not anticipate deployment until 1979 or 1980.

We have put no time limitation or schedule on the SALT negotiations. We will make an agreement when we can get a good one. We must be realistic in recognizing that if we don’t get a SALT agreement in a reasonable time, I have the responsibility to come to the Congress for increased appropriation to meet the unrestrained momentum of the Soviets. As you know at the 2400 level agreed to in Vladivostok, the Soviets would have to cut back by about 200, while we don’t even plan to go up to the 2400 level. Therefore, that level is a big advantage to us. All of these things are interrelated and we must continue to look at the total context. I have no specific timetable but we cannot let the talks drag out. Without an agreement, we would have to spend $2 to $4 billion a year to keep our strategic lead.

Senator Stennis: The first Senate action will be taken on the DOD procurement. I want to state that this is the best constructed budget request I have seen in years, and I think your levels can be sustained. It is well within the limits of the budget committee. However, I don’t think we should start the process with big battles over commissary subsidies, reserve reductions, and so forth. I support the restraints you have requested but there will be trouble over them. We have to do what we can to get the votes for the bill and I believe we can get them but these restraints will not make it easier. I will not support the extra ships the House Armed Services Committee added unless you make a specific request. I hope that you can act on the ship study before the Senate has to act on the budget.

The President: We have got 16 ships in the budget now. Don, when will that study be done?\(^6\)

Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been meeting on that study every day. It will not be completed before late April, but I have told the Chairman that I am hopeful that we can give him some indication of the general thrust of the study somewhat earlier. The study will be completed by the time the Armed Services Committees go to conference on their bills.

\(^6\) See Document 110.
Let me also add that with regard to your comments on Backfire, we now have a revised estimate that the Soviets are producing two or three a month.

The President: With 80 Backfires deployed at this time.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba and Angola.]

Secretary Rumsfeld: We run a similar risk in defending the DOD budget. The facts are very clear about Soviet momentum. I hope all Senators will avail themselves of the DIA briefings which show clearly that we cannot wait one more year. The Soviets have a strong momentum, while we have a strong downward momentum and now we find Representative Adams is just recommending more such cuts. Mr. President, the Senators need to have the same facts you had in making your decisions. We are at a point where further defense cuts will inject great instability into the world. The budget committee has to be brought to realize that there will be a tremendous floor fight if they come to the floor with levels too low.

I have pointed out before that the world bases its judgments not only on what is now but what will be. Further defense cuts will weaken our future posture and make the world awfully wobbly.

The President: I have asked for increased money for strategic weapons, conventional forces and R&D. Adams took $5 billion out of operations and maintenance and R&D. Such cuts in operations and maintenance hurt our current readiness because they affect steaming time and flying time. The R&D cuts he is recommending will mean that a president five years from now will pay the penalty in the development of new weapons systems for the next 5 to 10 years.

Senator Dole: There is a mindset on the budget committee staff that they must cut the budget. The whole staff is oriented toward cutting DOD.

Secretary Rumsfeld: That’s because the staff believes they can impress their bosses by recommending cuts.

The President: I know that it is easy to take money out of O&M but if we don’t fly our planes and run our ships, they simply won’t be ready when needed.

Senator Stennis: Senator Nunn is on both committees and he may have some comments.

The President: Senator Nunn has fought very hard for us in past years.

Senator Nunn: I have repeatedly said that the budget committee must play a strong role in achieving the cut restraints you recommended. I am trying to get the budget committee to put an umbrella over both the Armed Services Committee and the Civil Service and
Post Office Committee in order to treat military and civilian employees alike.

My subcommittee will agree with most of your program. I can report progress on your budget restraints. In the full committee we have a one vote majority for a strong defense budget. The situation is just that close.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The important fact on the restraints is that these cost items escalate each year and those future costs eat into military capability.

Senator Nunn: These are very unpopular restraints, however.

The President: I recognize that but the escalation factor is just frightening. It simply doesn’t make sense.

Senator Bill Scott: One big problem we must face is the early retirement issue. You should consider enacting a one percent cut in retirement pay for each year a person is under 60. If you did that people wouldn’t retire so early.

Senator Nunn: Senator Scott is on our subcommittee. I do believe we will pass the one percent kicker. Senator Scott may want to comment further on that matter.

Senator Bill Scott: I believe everyone around this table supports you on the defense budget. We do have serious concerns, however, about SALT. I believe that we must achieve onsite inspection. I don’t trust the Russians at all and believe it is against the interest of our country to move on arms control without adequate verification. There is a great deal of concern among my colleagues on this.

The President: I recognize that concern but I am assured by many experts that our verification procedures are substantially effective.

Senator Bill Scott: But we have had some testimony that some missiles can be hidden. You should look into this factor.

Secretary Rumsfeld: If one takes all the people involved in the NSC process and goes through the verification issues, you will find there has been a high degree of unanimity and confidence about what we know and don’t know about the Russian forces. Most of the tough decisions revolve around questions of weighing the degree of certainty and risk involved. We spent a lot of time on this but you would be pleased at the high degree of agreement among NSC participants. But we must recognize that there are inevitably some areas of uncertainty.

Senator Domenici: We have four members of the budget committee here today. I commend you, Mr. President, for the budget you have submitted but you must recognize that we are facing serious problems with the cross-jurisdictional matter of the restraints you requested.
The President: I am impressed with how seriously you have addressed these issues. I also think the public is fed up with these abuses. That’s why I have recommended the commissary subsidy phase-out over four years. I simply don’t see how anyone could object to phasing out such a subsidy. The $8 billion of retirement pay don’t bring a dime of national security to this country.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The President has clearly stated the need for such restraints in proposing the levels this year.

Senator Domenici: But that puts us in a bind because the budget has been promoted at the lower levels which are realistic only if the restraints are achieved.

Senator Nunn: I am thinking of recommending that the pay restraints be handled as a separate bill but each one of these restraints ought to be added to the DOD budget as a package of items.

Senator Bartlett: Mr. President, I am bugged by much of the rhetoric going around by people saying we need a military second to none. I see this as a statement of weakness. We are either number one or we are not. We must face the fact that we are in fact in an arms race.

The President: I am of the personal belief that we are today fully prepared to meet our military obligations. What my defense budget tries to do is to maintain that full capability into the future to meet every contingency.

Regarding SALT we are faced with some very practical problems, but the 2400 Vladivostok level forces the Soviets to cut, while leaving us room to move upward if necessary. The only other option is to have no ceiling, and that would mean we would have to go to Congress immediately to start a buildup to match their unrestrained growth. I think it is much better to put a cap on these weapons.

Senator Domenici: When would be the latest that you would move to request such an increase?

The President: That’s hard to predict but I think we would move if we don’t have an agreement in several months, and by that I do not mean only two or three months.

Senator Bartlett: Would asking for such increases jeopardize SALT?

The President: Probably, because it would be a signal to the Russians that our momentum will start building up. We must recognize that SALT I expires in October 1977. We are in a very delicate situation right now. We are doing our best to get an agreement, but my strong conviction is that we cannot allow this situation to just drift.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Senator Stennis: Changing the subject. I want to say that as bad as the retirement pay situation is, the issue cannot be settled in this procurement bill. Let us not try to solve it all in one year on this bill.
Senator Thurmond: I agree with Senator Stennis. I think we need a study of the whole retirement system. I also hope you will not relent on R&D funding. The overall sentiment in Congress is better this year. But if the bill falters, I hope you are ready to go on TV to take the issue to the people.

The President: I came very close to vetoing the FY 76 Defense Bill last December. If Congress cuts the bill, there is the distinct possibility I will veto it and take it to the people.

Senator McClure: Senator Byrd,7 who could not be here today, wanted me to tell you that he supports your strong DOD posture.

Sometimes, however, I find that we send small signals which send the wrong message about how tough we will be with the Soviets. For example, I think we should have been very tough with them about the radiation they were directing against the Moscow Embassy. Another example would be very strong warnings to Castro8 but without any follow up of what we will do if he continues his aggressive movements. These conflicting signals hurt the overall view that you have a strong foreign policy. As you will remember, Truman9 was very popular because he was a very gutsy guy.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the meeting today and I pledge to you our continued strong support.

The President: Thank you all for coming. This was a very useful meeting.10

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7 Senator Robert Byrd (D–West Virginia).
8 Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
9 Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, 1945–1953.
75. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: If we say the trend is going against us, that is bad enough. The impression that we are slipping is creating a bad impression around the world.

Rumsfeld: But it’s true.

Kissinger: Then we have to define our goals. It is inevitable that our margin since ’60 has slipped. Are we trying to maintain the same margin as we had in 1960 or to maintain adequate forces?

Rumsfeld: But it is true. We have been slipping since the ’60s from superiority to equivalence, and if we don’t stop, we’ll be behind.

President: I don’t think the President should say we are slipping. I can say we need to redouble our efforts. I don’t want to say we are getting behind. I’ll say we have a challenge, we have rough equivalence and we’ve got to keep up.

Kissinger: I think the posture to take is that Reagan doesn’t know what he’s talking about and he’s irresponsible.

President: I set the tone in California and that I want to follow—to hit the Congress on Defense. It is a line which will pay off.

Kissinger: If the Cubans pull off another military adventure in Africa, no matter how just the cause, it will be perceived as such a power shift—that will really do it.

President: I notice that Kaunda denied permission for the Cubans to cross to Mozambique.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 18, March 29, 1976—Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except for those inserted by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 Ford made several references to defense during a campaign swing through California, March 26–27. On March 26, he told a group of political supporters in San Francisco that under his administration “the United States will never, never be other than at the very top. And when I say the top, I mean not only in military capability but economic capability, industrial might, agricultural production. This is what we have to look at as we talk about the United States being number one.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976, vol. I, pp. 817–818)

3 Kenneth David Kaunda, President of Zambia.
Rumsfeld: I think we will kill ourselves if we make threats and the Congress passes a resolution forbidding any action.

President: I don’t think we should say what we will do, but I think we should be prepared to take affirmative action. I don’t want the Communists to get the idea that we would not take drastic action.

Rumsfeld: I tried to follow your line yesterday, but I am Secretary of Defense and all these stories of invasion coming out of State . . .

Kissinger: Nothing is coming out of State.

[Small argument]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

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76. Minutes of Defense Review Panel Meeting

Washington, April 7, 1976, 3:56–5:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT Contingency Plan and US Naval Force Requirements Study

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

State
Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

DOD
William Clements
Dr. James P. Wade
E. C. Aldridge
Adm. M. Staser Holcomb

JCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith
Adm. James L. Holloway

CIA
George Bush
Col. Henson DeBruler

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 25, Meeting Minutes—Defense Review Panel. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
Secretary Rumsfeld: This is the first meeting of the Defense Review Panel. This is being held on a trial basis. The NSC memo chartering this group has not gone out yet.

General Scowcroft: It should go out in a few days. It has been held up by the lawyers.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The DRP will be used for important issues which may eventually require the President’s attention and which require internal coordination. There will be a working group which will staff such issues as the Navy shipbuilding study. The DRP principals will meet when needed and review issues which then may or may not go to the President. Today we will be reviewing the SALT contingency paper and looking at some budgetary issues that are before Congress. Specifically we will discuss the possibility of the Minuteman III production line shutdown. At the end of the meeting we will have a briefing on the shipbuilding question and the shape of our fleet 5, 10 and 15 years out.

The SALT contingency paper is designed in the form of building blocks and is ready for the President to review. There are no known substantive differences between the agencies but Secretary Kissinger asked to have a meeting of the principals. The paper discusses a number of alternatives presented in a building block format. In the paper there are no specific contingencies laid out which would force US action. There is no discussion of legislative tactics. There is no discussion of public and press questions. The paper presents some thinking about what we might want to do in the absence of a SALT agreement.

Dr. Ikle: As I see it the paper presents options without definite choices.

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2 See Document 110.
3 A reference to a draft OSD paper, “SALT Contingency Planning,” which Davis forwarded to DRP members under a covering memorandum, April 5, for review prior to the meeting. (National Archives, RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Brown, NSC) The final version of the paper is Document 77.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. I think it is satisfactory in its present form.

Dr. Ikle: There is no list.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The papers present a number of different kinds of things for the President’s consideration.

Mr. Clements: If Fred [Ikle] wants to add to the list he can. Is there something else?

Secretary Rumsfeld: It is too late for that.

Dr. Ikle: As I see alternative I it means more funds for the M–X program and for Minuteman III. The particular allocations are not discussed. Perhaps we don’t need to get into these technical decisions now.

Secretary Rumsfeld: No we don’t. The President asked for this paper some time ago. It is now ready and should go to the President.

Secretary Kissinger: I have a few questions. It seems to me that we need to increase our air defenses regardless of SALT and the resolution of the Backfire question. This is true even if we get our preferred position. Soviet acceptance of our strategic forces would consist of the Backfire. On the other hand an agreement excluding Backfire presents a real threat to our air defenses. We should not look at air defense as something to be put in only if there is no SALT agreement. We need something to counter Backfire.

General Scowcroft: That too is my point. We will need air defense in any event. There may be merit in putting that in the paper.

Secretary Rumsfeld: DoD is looking into this issue apart from the paper. We are looking at things that should be done regardless of SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not in favor of an accelerated strategic program. However neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is pursuing SALT with energy and we may not achieve an agreement this year. I don’t want to waste money but I don’t see how we can avoid improving our air defenses.

Dr. Ikle: Perhaps we should add money for ABM R&D.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We are not here to make decisions. We are here just to talk about this paper. There is no question that there are some things that we may want to do regardless of what decision the President makes on SALT.

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4 During a February 5 meeting in the Oval Office, Ford instructed Rumsfeld to “come up with what we need if we don’t have an agreement. What kind of additional funding will we need.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 221, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Rumsfeld, Donald, 1975–1976)
Secretary Kissinger: I urge full support of the regular defense budget. We can hold up on these other items except for air defense.

General Scowcroft: In the memo to the President we can put in a reference that we will be looking into the adequacy of our air defenses.

Dr. Ikle: This would affect the ABM Treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: We are talking about a defense against their bombers, not their missiles.

General Scowcroft: Forty percent of the throwweight is in the Backfire bomber. We must return to an air defense system and force them to fly low.

Secretary Kissinger: Regarding the Minuteman III, why was it thought that making 1,000 Minutemen IIIs would be helpful? There are other more effective counterforce weapons—for example, a single large warhead. In the absence of ABMs what do you gain by making more warheads?

General Scowcroft: I don’t know the answer.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Where is that?

Dr. Wade: Here on page 3.

Secretary Kissinger: Why do we need more warheads in the absence of an ABM Treaty?

Secretary Rumsfeld: It says here we would continue production of the Minuteman III up to a force of 1,000. That is assuming no SALT agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: In the absence of SALT we are better off increasing the number of our missiles rather than the number of warheads.

Secretary Rumsfeld: They are not mutually exclusive. This paper just presents a set of building blocks.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t have any fixed ideas on this subject. In the absence of a SALT agreement I definitely feel we should build up. We should look for something which gives a strategic effect and which would give the Soviets an incentive to come to a SALT agreement in the future. If we go above one thousand MM–IIIs we are busting the MIRV ceiling. If we accelerate the M–X program that would give the Russians some incentive to seriously negotiate down the road. We could also build more single warhead missiles.

Dr. Wade: There is the possibility of adding launchers and missiles right away. We could add to our Minuteman III production and to our other programs in stages. The question is when do we do it—what is the time frame?

General Scowcroft: What about silos?

Dr. Wade: We would not be adding to the numbers.
Dr. Ikle: This would mean we would have big expenditures if we increased MM–III production or accelerated the M–X program.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We have to go the next step. We have to weigh all these considerations and see if we can encourage the Soviets to come back and negotiate. We have to be prepared for a breakout.

Secretary Kissinger: At some point we must break out. If we stay within the Vladivostok understandings the Soviets have the best of everything.

Secretary Rumsfeld: That might not be true if we can get an agreement by January or February.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. There should be no breakout this year. But we owe ourselves one more major negotiating effort. Then if that effort fails we must break out.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Well we could ask the working group to go back and arrange things in different ways but I think we should send the paper in as is. Later on we can rearrange and look at what things would give the Soviets the greatest incentive to resume serious negotiating.

Now I would like to go into the second part of today’s meeting and take up five budgetary issues relating to actions taken by the House Appropriations Committee or the Authorization Committee in the Senate.

First they want to add funds for the B–1 bomber. $170 million more for research and development and $30 million more for procurement. DoD opposes this and would like to spend the money in other areas.

General Scowcroft: Why are they adding this money?

Secretary Kissinger: What does the Committee think it is buying with this $200 million?

Secretary Rumsfeld: It is a package of things.

General Scowcroft: What would $200 million do for the B–1?

Mr. Aldridge: In last year’s budget we had to take money out of our R&D accounts. This puts it back in. We can use it for more R&D testing. That’s all. It does nothing really for the program.

Secretary Kissinger: I have trouble understanding how $200 million worth of spending does nothing for the program.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I don’t think we should do it.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the purpose of this meeting?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Well the President has a budget which was drawn up with some care. Congress wants to make some changes in that budget affecting DoD. We believe it is good form for DoD to wash these proposed changes through the other Agencies to make sure we are all on the same wave length. We could do it on paper but that might
take a month. Instead we can accomplish it all at this meeting. It won’t take long.

The second one involves funds for the M–X missile. Congress wants to add on $80 million and the Armed Services Committee has deleted $4 million from that.

General Scowcroft: I have no real objections. Maybe the Committee should look at the M–X separately.

Secretary Kissinger: What is it supposed to do? I have never seen it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You have never asked.

Mr. Clements: It will go into the silos at first.

General Scowcroft: There is the possibility of it being mobile.

Mr. Clements: It will be able to use either multiple or single warheads.

Secretary Kissinger: What yield?

Mr. Clements: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Dr. Wade: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Aldridge: [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Scowcroft: We will have to consider the SALT MIRV counting rule.

Mr. Clements (to Kissinger): We will brief you at State and educate some of your associates at the same time.

Secretary Kissinger: You will scare them half to death.

General Scowcroft: What is the effect of the $80 million?

Dr. Wade: It would help achieve a 1983 IOC.

Mr. Hyland: What is the rationale for not accelerating it?

Secretary Rumsfeld: The President after a year’s work submits a budget to Congress. There are sufficient funds in that budget for an adequate Defense. We must ask ourselves—what has changed? Was our original budget proposal wrong? The answer is nothing has changed.

Dr. Ikle: What about alternate basing modes?

Secretary Rumsfeld: You are wandering around in other areas. We are caught in a bow wave on the need for added funds and we have to force ourselves to decide on launch modes.

Secretary Kissinger: The answer is that we want to see what happens with SALT.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We should see if the proposal makes sense in the first place without necessarily tying it to a SALT thermostat.

Secretary Kissinger: If there is a SALT deadlock the M–X could be speeded up. It would give us an additional card in our hands.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The third item is the MK 12A warheads. In the present budget $36 million is allocated in R&D funds. The House Appropriations Committee has added $25 million. In our view that ought to be in there. I think we should agree to it.

Mr. Lynn: Why wasn’t it originally put in? What has changed since the budget was made up? What signal are we trying to give to the Soviets?

Secretary Rumsfeld: We should not just focus on the $25 million. It is something we want and are ready to do. It was not in there originally because this is a political year and we wanted to avoid the possibility of a gratuitous debate and to wait until after the election. But now I think we should give up our opposition to going ahead and we should respond favorably to the Committee initiative. It will contribute to the counterforce dialogue.

Dr. Wade: One problem is that if we continue Minuteman III production for 12 months there is the possibility of our running out of RVs.

Mr. Lynn: We have had remarkable success so far this year with Congress in getting them to approve our defense budget. But enough is enough. This is the Genghis Kahn approach. What has changed? Our domestic programs are very stringent and we expect real pressures in our 78–79 budget and a real battle next year.

General Scowcroft: We have to keep the MM–III line open. However if we keep it open and there are no RVs we defeat the purpose.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Let’s talk about the two together. The fourth item is the MM–III production line.

The President recognized that this was a close call in his FY 77 budget decisions. The production line will start falling apart in April. It is even now happening. The House Appropriations Committee wants to add $300 million to continue production of the MM–III. The President said a few months ago that he wanted to review his decision on this later and put a note to that effect in the budget. One option is to go ahead and leave it out. Another option is to put funds in in order to keep the line open. If the funds were put in, we would not have to decide until December how to spend them if at all. There are a number of variables. In the decision we could decide to buy MM–IIIs for depots or storage or we could upgrade the MM–IIIs or we could close the production line in order to accelerate M–X production or we could keep it going as is until after September.

In our view the President would be placed in an untenable position if the MM–III production line were closed and we lost these options.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. We can’t close the production line while the SALT talks are going on.
General Scowcroft: I agree.

Mr. Lynn: By keeping the line open does that mean we make more of them?

Secretary Rumsfeld: The issue is whether or not to ask for money for the FY 77 budget. If we fail to do this the line closes.

Mr. Lynn: Do we already have enough MM-IIIIs?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, more than enough. We would put 50 in storage.

Secretary Kissinger: Don’t tell me that. I want to go to Moscow in good faith.

Mr. Lynn: What you are really saying is that we should preserve the option. You are saying that the only way to preserve the option is to keep making them. Can we pay the producers to keep the capacity of production without having them actually produced?

Mr. Clements: Not really.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We are asking for money in the ’77 budget. We won’t make a decision until September.

Secretary Kissinger: If there is no SALT agreement by September, and I doubt there will be, we can’t have one before February or March. We have to keep the line open. We must keep that option.

Mr. Lynn: The SALT talks keep going on. This decision is being forced.

Mr. Clements: The most important part is to retain the capability by keeping the line open. There are thousands of subcontractors involved.

Mr. Lynn: I suppose we have no choice but we may end up with egg over our faces.

Mr. Clements: It is not simple to understand.

Mr. Lynn: After you have worked with me, you will learn I won’t cut anything that makes sense.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Let’s go back to our discussion of the MK 12As.

General Scowcroft: The MK 12 RV is out of production. We would have no RVs for the missiles.

Mr. Lynn: There is reason to keep the capability open if you want to use it. There is a flashpoint in this country. The rationale of keeping the line open just to preserve it might not wash. We could be looking greedy.

Dr. Ikle: It might provoke a debate on counterforce inadvertently.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not a bad year in which to provoke a debate. We are living better than ever. Look at 1960 and 1961. You wait
until after the election. The Democrats will not be in the posture they are this year.

General Scowcroft: The environment is better this year.

Mr. Lynn: Why send a signal before knowing how SALT concludes?

Secretary Kissinger: We want counterforce anyway to force them out of their silos.

Secretary Rumsfeld: It fits in with the MM–III and keeps the line open.

Secretary Kissinger: We have put forward programs and now Congress has put forward programs. If we turn down Congress just for the sake of purity how can we ever convince the Soviets of our seriousness?

General Scowcroft: If we now say to Congress—stick with the budget—and then come back to them later on asking for more money it will seem a little strange.

Secretary Rumsfeld: It could be reprogrammed later in the year.

General Scowcroft: I vote for the Mark 12A, along with the Minuteman.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Me too.

Secretary Kissinger: Me too.

Mr. Lynn: No.\(^{5}\)

Secretary Rumsfeld: The last item is about civil defense. The President opposed the original DoD package. Now the House Armed Services Committee is recommending that we add $39 million.

Dr. Wade: The key is to provide increased funds for State and local Governments.

Mr. Lynn: It is a purely political program. It is stupid.

Dr. Ikle: It has no wide support.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think we need it.

(This portion of the meeting ended at 4:52 p.m.)

Naval Shipbuilding Briefing was then conducted by Mr. Aldridge.\(^{6}\)

The meeting ended at 5:25 p.m.

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\(^{5}\) On April 14, Lynn sent a memorandum to Ford requesting his decision on Rumsfeld’s request for a $322.4 million amendment to the FY 77 Defense budget to fund the production and deployment of 60 Minuteman III missiles and the initial production of the MK 12A reentry vehicle for the Minuteman missiles. Ford initialed his approval. (Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 18, Subject File, Finance—Budget: Defense Department (3))

\(^{6}\) No record of the briefing was found.
Washington, April 12, 1976.

SUBJECT
SALT Contingency Planning

A contingency plan has been prepared for our strategic forces to form the basis for a supplemental or amended budget request to the Congress if SALT would fail or became deadlocked, or if the Soviet Union should increase the pace of its strategic force modernization under a SALT agreement. This memorandum briefly summarizes the alternatives considered and how they would be influenced by Soviet actions, and recommends a course of action for the time being.

In planning for US strategic forces through 1985, we have taken a prudent course, taking into account all the knowledge we have at this time, yet preserving our options for the future. We assume that the Soviets will continue to modernize their strategic forces within the provisions of the Vladivostok accord and at a pace consistent with more likely projections of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). However, our planning provides for modest hedges against the failure of negotiations, abrogation of existing or future agreements, and/or Soviet force modernization which is within the SALT limits but exceeds the likely projections of the NIE. Our planning would make it possible to accelerate our modernization plans if the Soviets did indeed modernize their own forces more rapidly than we currently expect.

Failing to achieve a SALT agreement, our actions would be aimed at satisfying two key objectives:

1. Continuation of Negotiations. Our near-term objective would be to show the Soviets that the US could take actions more detrimental to Soviet interests than continuation of negotiations toward an agreement along the lines of the US proposal. Therefore, continuation of satisfactory negotiations would be in their best interest. Our near-term action would be to make program changes which would contribute toward this end.


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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 21, Defense Review Panel Meeting, 4/7/76—SALT (1). Top Secret.
2 Reference is to NIE 11–3/8–75 dated November 17, 1975. See Document 158.
be aimed at maintaining strategic stability and US security in the face of expanded Soviet modernization.

Specific US long-term actions, in large part, would be influenced by specific Soviet actions and our assessment of the success or likely prospects of Soviet efforts to augment strategic force capabilities through technological improvement. The development of Soviet strategic forces in the absence of a SALT TWO agreement could take one of several significantly different courses:

—maintain roughly their present strategic force levels, near but not reduced to Vladivostok limits, and succeed in modernizing them at the pace presently projected as likely (NIE 11–3/8–75, Force 2);
—significantly increase force levels but not achieve a higher pace of modernization than currently assessed as likely (NIE 11–3/8–75, Force 4 force levels, but Force 2 or lower qualitative improvements);
—maintain roughly present strategic force levels, but modernize them at a pace significantly higher than presently considered likely (NIE 11–3/8–75, Force 2 quantitative levels, but Force 4 qualitative improvements);
—significantly increase strategic force levels and achieve a high rate of force modernization (NIE 11–3/8–75, Force 4).

Even with a SALT TWO agreement, Soviet strategic capabilities could vary significantly. Qualitative improvements in Soviet forces limited by SALT could be achieved at the pace which we consider most likely, or at a more rapid pace, posing a more severe threat to the US (NIE 11–3/8–75, Force 3).

Alternative US contingency plans have been developed to respond to the more threatening among this range of possible Soviet force developments. These plans have been grouped in two alternative menus of possible US actions described in detail in the attachment.³ The actual selection, combination, timing, and extent of any set of US actions would, of course, depend on the circumstances assessed at the time of decision.

The actions we could take in the near-term could range across the following:

—Maintain our current course, recognizing the 20% growth in the FY 77 strategic forces budget for modernization, under the assumption reflected in the current NIE (or possible tacit understanding) that the Soviets will show restraint in modernization with or without a SALT agreement.
—Gradually increase strategic spending starting with an amendment in the FY 77 budget request of about $800 million. Such a program could increase our negotiating leverage in the near-term and at the

³ An undated DOD paper, “SALT Contingency Planning.” is attached, but not printed.
same time provide a basis for force expansion and modernization over a longer term to maintain rough equivalence with the Soviets. While such an increase might encourage the Soviets to continue or resume negotiations, it might also lead them to accelerate their own programs. Continuation of such a program over 5 years would require up to $7.6 billion for DoD and $400 million for ERDA.

—Accelerate strategic force modernization starting with a supplemental to the FY 76/77 budget of about $320 million and a $2.1 billion increase in the FY 77 budget. Such a program should provide greatly increased leverage for negotiation while at the same time providing a base for US force expansion and modernization to maintain a strategic balance with the Soviet Union under conditions of the highest level of the NIE. There would, however, be some risk that such a US action could trigger a counteraction by the Soviets making near-term negotiations more difficult and lead to more intensified arms competition. Continuation of such a program over the next five years, if necessary, would require $19.6 billion for DoD and $3.3 billion for ERDA.

In addition to these alternatives we have investigated possible program packages which might be implemented individually upon detected violation of the SALT ONE Agreements, and a program package involving augmentation of our conventional forces upon the failure of SALT. The details of these packages are also included in the attachment.

The actions proposed assume a breakdown of negotiations or cheating under existing SALT ONE Agreements. However, it should be recognized that even if a suitable SALT TWO agreement is reached, the pace and extent of Soviet force modernization under the provisions could be substantially greater than we might expect using more likely estimates of the NIE. Should this prove to be the case, it might be necessary to proceed with some of the US actions described herein even though negotiations were viewed as being successful.

The newly formed Defense Review Panel (DRP) has reviewed the alternatives and has made the following recommendations:

• Adequacy of the Contingency Plan

Use the contingency plan as presented as a point of departure for development of a specific US response if and when needed. Members of the DRP reserve judgments at this time on the specific actions to be taken since they would depend strongly on the circumstances surrounding a failure of SALT, as well as other factors, including the impact on stability, the effect on possible future negotiations, and the pace of Soviet programs.

In particular, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that recommendations concerning specific actions should fully recognize the necessity

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4 See Document 76.
for a balanced approach to Triad improvements and the more general but nevertheless important relationship between strategic and general purpose forces in achieving deterrence. Additionally, given the potential threat of BACKFIRE to the United States, regardless of whether the negotiations succeed or fail, the JCS believe that the United States should initiate actions to allow earlier deployment of AWACS for CONUS Air Defense from within the Air Force planned program of 34. In their view, this action, together with the introduction of the Follow-on Interceptor (FOI) and the collateral support of tactical fighters from the general purpose forces, could discourage the intercontinental employment of BACKFIRE.

The Department of Defense is continuing its current consideration of proposals appropriate to this end.

- Course of Action

Take no additional action now but continue to state that the US is prepared to take the necessary steps to maintain US security and strategic stability with or without a follow-on SAL agreement. It is important for the Congress and the public, as well as the Soviets, to recognize that we have been exercising restraint in our strategic force funding based on our hopes for SALT and that a failure of SALT would require an additional US response. Accordingly, the FY 77 Defense Report notes, and I have also stated in my testimony before Congress, that in the case of SALT failure we will need to take actions on our strategic forces that go beyond the current FY 77 Budget Request.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) and the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs (McCloskey) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, April 12, 1976.

Department of State Position on Fiscal Year 1976 Security Assistance Bill

Introduction:

The House/Senate Conference Committee has completed its resolution of the differences between the House and Senate versions of the FY 1976 security assistance bill (S. 2662). The House and Senate will each vote on the Conference Report within the next few days. If the Conference Report is approved by both bodies, the bill will be enrolled and transmitted to the President for his approval or veto. This memorandum describes the salient features of the legislation, analyzes its impact, identifies the most likely consequences of a veto, and outlines a Department of State position.

Summary of the Bill.

The legislation recommended by the Conference Committee is based primarily upon Senator Humphrey’s proposed International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act. It contains authorizations of appropriations for fiscal year 1976 security assistance programs and legislative authority necessary to carry out certain aspects of those programs. In addition, it expresses significant statements of policy and effects major changes in the organization, management and procedures for security assistance, with particular emphasis upon increased involvement by Congress in arms transfer decisions. The principal features of the bill are summarized below:

1. Authorizations.

The authorization levels recommended by the Conference Committee reflect a compromise between the lower Senate and the higher House figures, and a reduction of almost $300 million in the amounts requested by the Administration. The specific recommendations [in millions of dollars] are:

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2 See footnote 4, Document 72.
The amounts recommended in the Conference Report equal or exceed the levels contained for the above identified programs in the pending Foreign Assistance Appropriation Bill (H.R. 12203).

2. Military Assistance Program.

The bill’s provisions regarding the grant military assistance program reflect a policy that the program should be phased out, and terminated after FY 1977 except as specifically authorized for particular countries on an exceptional basis. The principal amendments to the military assistance chapter of the Foreign Assistance Act are:

a. Phaseout.

Military assistance advisory groups and Defense Attache’s performing security assistance functions will no longer be able to operate in foreign countries after September 30, 1977, except as specifically authorized by law. Instead, not to exceed three members of the Armed Forces may be assigned to any diplomatic mission to perform security assistance functions. Not more than 34 MAAGs are authorized for FY 1977. The grant military assistance program is also terminated after September 30, 1977, except as specifically authorized for particular countries, although delivery of items in the pipeline and other winding up activities may continue. The termination of MAP (except as specifi-
cally authorized) will not affect military training, which will continue under a new chapter in the Foreign Assistance Act as a separate program.

b. Stockpiles.

The prohibition in existing law on stockpiling for Allied forces is repealed, subject to an annual limitation on the value of the items that can be transported to overseas stockpiles.

c. Draw Down Authority.

The President’s emergency authority to draw upon Department of Defense stocks subject to subsequent reimbursement is retained, but reduced from $150 million to $67.5 million and made subject to more stringent criteria.

3. Foreign Military Sales Program.

The title of the Foreign Military Sales Act is changed to “Arms Export Control Act” and numerous policy and procedural changes are made in the basic legislation. Chief among these are:

a. Annual Ceiling.

An annual ceiling of $9 billion is established on foreign military sales contracts and commercial arms deliveries. The ceiling will become effective in FY 1977, contains an inflation factor so that it will be computed in constant 1975 dollars, and may be waived by the President if the national security so requires.

b. Third Country Transfers.

As a condition of eligibility, foreign governments will have to promise not to transfer without prior U.S. consent any training or other defense services furnished to them by the U.S. Government. Before consenting to any proposed third country transfer of materiel or services, the President must inform Congress and wait 30 calendar days, during which period Congress can disapprove the transfer by concurrent resolution. This review procedure may be waived by the President for national security reasons.

c. Arms Transfer Procedures.

The bill includes a definition of major defense equipment, identified as any significant combat equipment on the United States Muntions List having an R&D cost of more than $50 million or estimated production costs of more than $200 million. Sales of such major defense equipment valued at $25 million or more cannot be made through commercial channels except to NATO countries. Sales of major defense equipment valued at $7 million or more through either FMS or com-
commercial channels must be submitted to Congress for 30 days review and possible disapproval by concurrent resolution in connection with the foreign military sales contract or commercial export license.

4. Eligibility.

The law on loss of eligibility for misuse or unauthorized transfer of MAP or FMS items is revised. Under the bill, the President must report to Congress whenever a substantial violation of the recipient country’s agreement may have occurred, but need not immediately terminate military assistance or foreign military sales. Termination is required only if the President determines or Congress finds by concurrent resolution that a substantial violation has occurred. The President may waive ineligibility under this revised procedure with respect to items in the MAP pipeline and also with respect to FMS cash sales. However, the foreign military sales waiver is available only if ineligibility results from a Presidential determination rather than from a concurrent resolution by Congress. These changes do not affect Turkey, for which separate provision is made (Item 8 below).

5. Human Rights.\(^3\)

The bill declares that security assistance may not be provided to a country that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. It requires the inclusion of a human rights report for each proposed security assistance recipient in the annual Congressional presentation materials. In addition, the Department is required to submit a more detailed report on any particular country when requested by Congress. If the report reveals human rights violations, it must also set forth an explanation of the exceptional circumstances requiring the continuation of security assistance and describe efforts by the U.S. Government to discourage the practices and disassociate U.S. assistance from them. Congress may within 90 days of continuous session after receipt of such a report adopt a concurrent resolution terminating or restricting further security assistance to the country which is the subject of that report. Finally, the bill establishes as a statutory position within the Department of State a Coordinator for Human Rights to be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation. The Coordinator is to be responsible to the Secretary in carrying out reporting responsibilities, making recommendations and performing other functions which serve to promote increased observance of human rights.

\(^3\) On April 13, Maw detailed the bill’s human rights provisions in a memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760062–1700)

The bill enunciates U.S. policy not to furnish assistance or make sales to countries which discriminate against U.S. citizens on the basis of their race, sex, religion or national origin; prohibits the U.S. Government and its contractors from acquiescing in such discrimination in their assignment and employment practices; requires reports to Congress in the event of such discrimination; and requires termination of any assistance transaction, sale, or arms export license in the event of persistent discrimination by the recipient country. However, the termination requirement may be waived by the President if it would have a significant adverse impact on the security interests of the United States.

7. Angola.

The bill prohibits assistance to any person for military or paramilitary operations in Angola and requires periodic reports to Congress on efforts to terminate the hostilities which were extant at the time the provision was drafted.

8. Turkey.

The bill provides partial relief from the existing prohibition against foreign military sales for Turkey by allowing up to $125 million in sales to Turkey during FY 1976 and the transition quarter, any part of which may be financed by FMS credits or guaranties. This authority is conditioned upon Turkish observance of the ceasefire on Cyprus, refraining from transferring to Cyprus additional U.S. supplied arms and refraining from increasing its military forces or civilian population on Cyprus. Each FMS sale to Turkey must be the subject of a Presidential determination that the items to be sold are necessary for Turkey’s NATO responsibilities and the proposed sale must lie before Congress for 30 calendar days, although no provision is made for legislative veto.

9. Chile.

The bill prohibits grant or credit security assistance to Chile, but permits FMS cash sales and commercial exports of arms to that country.


The bill requires a report to Congress within 90 days and at least once a year thereafter, reviewing Korean progress in its modernization program and the prospects for a phased reduction of U.S. military forces in Korea.


The bill temporarily limits the President’s discretionary authority under existing law to control or prohibit trade and financial transfers
with North and South Vietnam by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The only restrictions that can be applied during the 180-day period following enactment are those which are also applicable to the Peoples’ Republic of China. However, this provision will lapse at the end of 180 days unless during that period the Vietnamese have accounted for a substantial number of POWs and MIAs and returned a substantial number of bodies.

12. Fees, Contributions, Gifts and Bribes.

The bill requires the Secretary of State to prescribe regulations requiring reports and record-keeping on political contributions, gifts and fees paid or offered in order to secure a foreign military sale or commercial arms sale. The regulations may specify the amounts and kinds of payments to be reported and the form and timing of the reports. The information thus acquired is to be made available to U.S. law enforcement agencies and to committees of Congress. Provision is made for regular reports to Congress on such payments. The bill allows the reports to Congress to identify any information considered confidential by the person who submitted it, but does not preclude Congress from disregarding that confidentiality.

Policy and Operational Effects of the Bill.

The foregoing summary shows that the principal effect of the legislation will be to provide a more active participation by Congress in decisions on the formulation and implementation of security assistance programs. This will considerably complicate the carrying out of these programs. On the other hand, it will more fully acquaint Congress with the complexity of the decisions that must be made.

The expanded requirement for submitting proposals for arms transfers to Congress with the possibility of a legislative veto by concurrent resolution is one of the more serious objections to the bill. This procedure will allow Congress to take action by simple majority vote which heretofore would have required legislation involving either Presidential approval or a two-thirds majority in both Houses. Moreover, the expanded scope of the transactions made subject to this procedure, i.e., all third country transfers, plus commercial and FMS transactions of $7 million or more, will cause the number of occasions for potential confrontation with the Legislative Branch to be increased from approximately seventy cases a year to as many as 200. In practice, only three of the cases submitted to Congress under the existing review procedures (FMS cases over $25 million) have proved to be controversial and only one, the Hawk sale to Jordan, has posed serious threat of disapproval. Accordingly, the distortion of the constitutional process through avoidance of Presidential veto and direct involvement by Congress in the performance of Executive functions, rather than opera-
tional considerations, seems the more serious aspect of this feature of the bill. The concurrent resolution of disapproval procedure is also applicable, as noted above, to questions of eligibility and human rights. The likelihood that the Congressional powers set out in these provisions will be exercised is difficult to assess. The President could preserve his constitutional position through a carefully and strongly worded signing statement, but would probably not be effective in discouraging the enactment of further such provisions.

The $9 billion annual ceiling on foreign military sales and commercial arms sales establishes a very troublesome precedent. Present estimates suggest that, given the inflation factor included in the proposed legislation, the fiscal year 1977 program can be accomplished within this ceiling. It is also possible that it may, as intended by the sponsors, be useful in facilitating efforts at conventional arms limitations. On the other hand, once the precedent of an annual ceiling is established, the opportunity will exist in subsequent years for a reduction in the amount of the ceiling, or the addition of subceilings for specific regions or countries. In any event, the ceiling may be very difficult to administer and may require difficult choices to be made with regard to giving preference to particular purchasers or commercial vendors.

The bill’s provisions on human rights and discrimination also seem likely to be a cause of further friction between the Legislative and Executive Branches. It is conceivable that members of Congress will argue that particular transactions involving countries with known human rights deficiencies are unlawful. While the discrimination section has been tempered with a Presidential waiver authority, allegations by individuals that they have been subjected to discrimination could give rise to charges that the continuance of programs of great policy significance would be contrary to law.

Less troublesome are the termination of grant military assistance and military assistance advisory groups, except as specifically authorized. The formulation finally adopted, while creating a presumption against continued grant programs, preserves the basic legislative authority for those assistance programs and MAAGs for which we can provide extraordinary justification. This proposed legislation would have no legal effect upon separate authorizations being sought to implement the Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation\(^4\) and Defense Cooperation Agreements with Turkey or other countries.

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On balance, the legislation will be difficult to administer, and alters the traditional roles of the Legislative and Executive Branches in the conduct of foreign affairs. At the same time, adequate funding is provided for the most essential of the Administration’s programs, particularly in the Middle East, and the operational difficulties do not appear to be unmanageable.

*Likely Consequences of a Veto.*

If the President were to veto the proposed legislation, he would protect the Executive Branch against incursions by the Congress into traditional areas of Presidential discretion. However, the authority that would be retained would probably be applicable to a diminished program. In addition, we could expect the most undesirable features of the bill to be repeated, perhaps in an even more objectionable form, in the fiscal year 1977 legislation. Thus, even assuming that a veto would be sustained, the problem would not be removed, but only deferred.

If the legislation is approved, a year’s experience may demonstrate the inutility and undesirability of a number of its provisions so that in the fiscal year 1978 legislation, some of the most objectionable features could be eliminated. However, the legislative veto procedure will probably not be capable of diminution through further Executive Branch legislative proposals. This pervasive issue, which is plaguing domestic as well as international programs, will probably have to be resolved in the courts.

*Conclusion:*

In view of the foregoing, we intend to take the following actions,

1. Tell interested members of Congress that we are not encouraging them to vote against the Conference Report.

2. Seek in the debate on the Conference Report to have Congressional leaders sympathetic to our reservations about the bill describe the bill’s shortcomings in order to create a legislative history that may facilitate corrective amendments at a later date.

3. If the Conference Report is approved by the House and Senate, recommend to the President that he approve the bill with a statement expressing strong reservations regarding the highly questionable constitutionality of the legislative veto provisions and the undesirability of the other objectionable features as described above.

Preliminary consultations with other concerned agencies indicate that the above position is generally supported within the Executive Branch. We are meeting with Defense, AID, Treasury, OMB and NSC early this week to ensure a coordinated Administration position prior to the vote on the Conference Report.
79. Editorial Note

On April 15, 1976, President Ford met with Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, and his Chief of Staff Cheney. The meeting, held in the Oval Office from 9:31 to 10:19 a.m., began as follows:

“President: I have decided to make a major defense and foreign policy speech before the DAR next Wednesday. Hartmann has done a redraft. It is tough—it takes on Reagan. Will you all look at it so I can have it in final from by Saturday? It is a little tough on the Soviet Union but says we will negotiate . . .

“Kissinger: The problem with the Soviet Union is that détente is really right. Second, you will have to do deal with them after November. It really isn’t so that they are being irresponsible—except in Angola. And politically, if it is Humphrey and they [the Soviets] decide that Humphrey is preferable, they can be troublesome.

“President: I don’t think it really does that. [He describes what is in the speech.]

“Kissinger: Schlesinger is now saying the way we play détente is like the cold war.

“President: Reagan, you notice, is not now saying that we are behind strategically. He is now emphasizing the conventional needs.

“Rumsfeld: We need to avoid wild swings from euphoria to an all-out cold war with the Soviet Union.”

The record of the meeting is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 19, April 15, 1976—Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld. Brackets are in the original.

Ford and Kissinger again discussed the upcoming speech during their Oval Office meeting, held on Wednesday, April 21, from 9:20 to 9:55 a.m.

“Kissinger: If the speech is the one you sent me. I think it is good. I don’t think a President can say we are second best.

“President: I agree. We had quite a battle over it, but Brent and I won.”

The record of the meeting is ibid., April 21, 1976—Ford, Kissinger.

Later that morning, Ford delivered his speech in Constitutional Hall to the 85th Continental Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Following some opening remarks, the President said, “Over the past several weeks, as the 1976 political campaigns have begun to heat up, more and more attention has focused on the issue of America’s military strength.” He went on, “recent charges that the United States is in a position of military inferiority, that we have ac-
cepted Soviet world domination are complete and utter nonsense. If there is any single standard which has guided my years in public service it has been this: The freedom and security of the United States of America must always be preserved.” Ford pledged “that as long as I hold this office I intend to see to it that the United States will never become second to anybody, period.”

As evidence, Ford recalled that “defense spending represented the lowest share of GNP since 1947” when he became president in August 1974. “There was cause to be concerned about the future security of the country, particularly if the Congress continued to hack away at our military budgets. If the Soviet Union continued to expand its capabilities and we continued to bleed our own defense forces, it was inevitable that the United States would eventually become a second-rate power. Clearly the adverse trend had to be reversed, and I set out to make that one of the foremost objectives of my administration.” The President recounted that, in January 1975, he submitted his first budget calling for a 10 percent increase in defense spending, a request subsequently reduced by the Congress. In January 1976, Ford submitted an even bigger defense budget calling for a 14 percent hike in spending. This time, he reported that Congress recently had acted favorably upon his request, having taken “the first steps toward committing us to the biggest single increase in defense spending since the Korean War.” His administration also had expanded the Army from 13 to 16 divisions and “laid the keel for the first of a new class of nuclear submarines to be armed with the most accurate submarine ballistic missiles in the world. The Trident missile fleet will be the foundation for a formidable, technologically superior force through the 1980s. We are now completing the final testing of the world’s most modern and capable strategic bomber, the B–1. We are also accelerating work on a new intercontinental ballistic missile for the 1980s. We are developing a new cruise missile for our air and naval forces.”

As a result, Ford said, the United States remained “unsurpassed in military capability,” making it “the single most powerful nation on Earth—indeed, in all history—and we are going to keep it that way.” For the full text of Ford’s speech, see Public Papers: Ford, 1976, vol. II, pp. 1139–1145.
Washington, April 26, 1976.

SUBJECT

Soviet Anti-Satellite Capability

The Soviet test of an anti-satellite interceptor last week, the second such test in the last two months, has emphasized the need to reexamine our posture in space and the vulnerability of our space assets.

For the last few months an NSC Panel of technical consultants has been reviewing the direction of the future U.S. military related space program—including the vulnerability of our space assets. The Panel has prepared an Interim Report (Tab A) assessing the capabilities and limitations of the Soviet anti-satellite program and possible near-term U.S. countermeasures. The Panel concluded that:

—The Soviets have undertaken a broad based, well supported program to achieve an anti-satellite capability which could prevent U.S. satellites from overflying the Soviet Union. The Soviets probably already have a limited operational capability with their non-nuclear interceptor against U.S. low altitude satellites. There is no evidence as yet of a Soviet capability against U.S. high altitude satellites.

—Even though the Soviet capability is limited, it is probably sufficient to completely deny U.S. satellite photo reconnaissance missions for periods up to years if the Soviets were willing to risk the serious repercussions such an attack in space would entail. They could also selectively deny several other critical U.S. low altitude missions, including the Navy ocean surveillance satellites and the submarine navigation satellites.

—The lack of a clearly articulated statement of national security policy relative to the use of space has delayed U.S. development of available countermeasures for years and has contributed to our current vulnerable posture in space.

—There are a number of near-term countermeasures the U.S. could employ to minimize the impact of the Soviet anti-satellite program. The technology is in hand to provide these capabilities as soon as a decision is made to give increased protection to our satellites.

—Development of a U.S. anti-satellite interceptor, while technically feasible, will not contribute to the survivability of U.S. space assets. Other U.S. responses are available to deter the Soviets from offensive actions in space.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 66, NSDM 333 (1). Top Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum.

2 The report, summarized below, was not found attached.
The Panel has properly highlighted the problem we face today. We are very dependent on a relatively small number of low altitude satellite missions and have done very little to protect them from Soviet attack. There are certain near-term actions we can take to enhance the survivability of our critical military and intelligence satellites—however, these actions have been delayed in the past, partly because of the lack of clear policy guidance in this area.

A draft NSDM is now being prepared to rectify the policy problem. This NSDM would direct: (1) the initiation of near-term survivability enhancement measures for the photo reconnaissance satellites and selected other critical space assets as soon as possible, and (2) the planning for longer-term survivability measures for all of our critical military and intelligence satellites. Coordination of this proposed NSDM with the major agencies involved will take another week or two, following which I will present it for your consideration.

The Panel of technical consultants is continuing its work and hopes to have a final report late this summer. The final report will expand consideration of U.S. space vulnerabilities and dependency, suggest a proper balance in the military use of space, analyze the need for a U.S. capability for offensive space operations, and review the implications of the space shuttle.

81. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 27, 1976, 8–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

President’s Meeting with the Republican Leadership

President: I want to discuss two items which involve possible vetoes. First, foreign aid. I have been a constant supporter of foreign
aid. I ran first for Congress against an isolationist.² Also, no one has been more supportive of Israel. While I did not put money in a Transition Quarter, I requested $4 billion over 1976–77. The 76 Authorization Bill contains some serious restrictions on Presidential authority.³ There were some cuts in MAP in the Appropriations Bill. There is little flexibility since both Houses used almost identical figures, but I think we need about 100 more in MAP. So, if the two bills come down here like they are now, I may have to veto. With this background, I’d be happy to hear your comments.

Case: There is a possibility of a supplemental. There isn’t much trouble working out the money; it is the authorization which is the problem.

President: Here are some of the restrictive provisions. [Reads]⁴

Broomfield: I would agree that the Bill should be vetoed and let us start all over again.

Scott: I agree. I would veto. You can’t run a program country by country by committees of the Congress.

Case: We are not trying to do that, just to have the right to terminate.

Scott: We are giving aid to Israel up to about half the Treasury. I am more worried about Korea and the chance that this Bill will be used as a vehicle to punish Korea.

President: I think the first time a country was mentioned specifically was Franco Spain by Rooney.⁵ If this is passed, you would have lobbying by each of the 20 countries. It would make the other lobbying look like child’s play.

Curtis: I think you should veto. You would be supported by the country because it is an improper infringement of your authority. If this passes, aid will be administered by politics, not the national interest.

President: Is there any way to send the Bills back, rather than veto?

Michel: I think you should handle the restrictions first rather than dealing with the money.

Case: I agree. I don’t think Transition Quarter money should be mixed in this.


³ See Document 78 for a detailed description of the FY 1976 security assistance bill (S 2662).

⁴ Brackets in the original.

⁵ The comments made by Representative Frederick Bernard Rooney (D–Pennsylvania) are not further identified.
Broomfield: I think it is too difficult parliamentarily. The clearest way is to veto. There is just too much politics involved. This is a matter of principle—who is going to run foreign policy, you or the Congress? I think the people will support you.

Griffin: You can certainly be sustained in a veto. The question is what kind of a bill will you then get. The fact that Israel needs money might help there.

President: Now that that has been brought up, I have asked for over $4 billion, so there is no doubt where I am on Israel, but under CRA, they only get $600 million.

Quillen: Isn’t it a possibility to get a rule and skip the authorization bill? But I recommend a veto, because it really does tie your hands.

President: Based on the observations here, plus my own feelings and those of my staff, there is a strong chance of a veto. Then we can figure out how to go.

Edwards: Shouldn’t we still try to recommit the bill first?

Broomfield: It wouldn’t work, but it is not a bad tactic. Shouldn’t we list all these heavy infringements on your authority?

President: I think a straight motion to recommit is best. Then you don’t get people reacting on the basis of narrow concerns they might have and offset each other. Anyway, I think you can anticipate a veto. That should slow up the appropriations bill so we can see where to go from here.6

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6 On April 28, the House and Senate approved S.2662. On May 7, Ford vetoed the bill, stating that it would seriously obstruct his “constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs” and would raise “fundamental constitutional problems.” Ford singled out the bill’s imposition of an “arbitrary arms sale ceiling,” its termination of most grant military assistance and MAAGs after FY 1977, and its removal of presidential restrictions on trade with North and South Vietnam. He also took issue with its human rights requirements. Finally, he objected to the fact that, under the bill, a simple majority of Congress could, by passing a concurrent resolution, later review, restrict, or even terminate aid. (Public Papers: Ford, 1976, Vol. II, pp. 1481–1485)
Memorandum From Richard T. Boverie of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT

DRP Meeting, 9:30 a.m., Thursday, April 29, 1976, on the Navy Study

The purpose of the DRP meeting is to review the second half of the Defense/NSC study on US strategy and Naval Force Requirements.² I understand that Secretary Rumsfeld would like to brief the study to the President at an NSC meeting later this week (possibly Saturday?). Rumsfeld is committed to meeting with Senator Stennis on Monday, May 3, to describe the Administration’s shipbuilding plans and to comment on the House Armed Services Committee’s shipbuilding program (which emphasized large nuclear-powered surface ships).

The Issue

For more than a decade the Soviet Union has been engaged in a major shipbuilding program which has transformed a limited coastal defense force into a major blue-water navy. At the same time, US naval force levels have declined significantly (50 percent since 1968) due to the retirement of ships built during World War II. But these adverse trends have been recognized for some time. It is for this reason that the President’s FY 77 budget includes $6.3 billion for 16 new ships, and the current Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) calls for building a total of 111 new ships at a cost of over $30 billion. Therefore, something significant is already being done about the adverse trends in the US/Soviet maritime balance. Thus, the questions now are:

—Should we be doing still more; and

—Should we take the approach of the House Armed Services Committee and favor larger, nuclear-powered surface ships.

The Role of Naval Forces in Our Overall Strategy

The review of the US military posture conducted in 1969 under the rubric of NSSM ³ resulted in an approved strategy for general purpose forces that required a total force structure capable of conducting an ini-

² An April 20 draft of the study is attached at Tab D, but not printed. A NSC summary of the final version of the study is Document 110.
³ See footnote 2, Document 66.
tional defense of NATO Europe or a joint defense with our regional Allies against a PRC attack in Asia (against either South Korea or Southeast Asia). The two defense efforts were mutually exclusive. To quote the description of this strategy in the NSSM 3 study:

The forces are designed so that major operations in one theater must be conducted at the expense of the major capability in the other, leaving a reduced capability in the non-war theater. For example, we could assist our Allies in Asia against a non-Chinese attack while simultaneously providing an initial defense of NATO, but we could not conduct an initial NATO defense and a joint defense of Asia [against the PRC] simultaneously. If initially engaged in Asia, by disengaging we would have the capability for an initial defense of NATO.

NATO was to have priority, and as the US became less concerned about an attack by the PRC, our military planning focused increasingly on NATO/Pact confrontation in Europe. (The operative NSDM and a summary of the NSSM 3 strategy alternative are at Tab C.)

The primary missions of the Navy under the NSSM 3 strategy are:
—Protection of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) to Europe so that the Central Front can be reinforced by sea;
—Control of the Mediterranean to protect the SLOCs to Greece and Turkey (and later to permit force projection operations); and
—Minimal essential protection of SLOCs in the Pacific to permit the economic support of our Pacific Allies like Japan (and to tie down Soviet Pacific assets so they could not be shifted to the central areas of the conflict).

Of these missions, the protection of the sea lanes to Europe is the most important under our current strategy. Europe is the center of conflict; it is where the war is won or lost. For this reason, US military plans call for some US naval assets stationed in the Pacific in peacetime (to facilitate our rotational deployments) to be shifted to the Atlantic in wartime. Our strategy assumes that after a relatively brief period (up to 90 days), the war in Europe will either be over or will have escalated to nuclear conflict. The Pacific area would not be a significant theater of combat, and the impact on our Pacific Allies such as Japan would be largely economic—and for a relatively limited period of time.

The Capability of Our Naval Forces to Carry Out the Strategy

The CNO has recently assessed the US fleet as having only a “slim margin of superiority” over the Soviets. He said:

In the event of a conflict, we would retain control of the North Atlantic sea lanes to Europe, but would suffer serious losses to both US

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4 See footnote 3, Document 21.
and Allied shipping in the early stages; our ability to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean at best would be uncertain. Our fleet in the Pacific could hold open the sea lanes to Hawaii and Alaska, but, by reason of the shortages of sea control and mobile logistics forces, we would have difficulty in projecting our lines of communication into the Western Pacific.

Without arguing over whether this is an overly pessimistic assessment of our current capability, the point is that under current plans we will improve significantly over the next decade in our ability to execute our naval strategy. We expect that the Soviets will continue to modernize their naval forces and make qualitative improvements. But because their newer units will be more expensive, the size of the Soviet fleet is projected by the intelligence community to decline over the next ten years (large surface combatants should decrease by about 15%). By contrast, even under the current FYDP US forces will not only increase qualitatively but also quantitatively—a net increase of 50 ships or 10% by 1985. So the capability of the US fleet should increase significantly vis-a-vis the Soviet navy.

**Issues Involved in Accelerating Our Naval Expansion Program**

At the present time, the size of the Navy is principally driven by the number of aircraft carriers, for each carrier requires a relatively constant number of additional ship types to complete the carrier task force—the basic unit of today’s Navy. (A carrier task force typically consists of two to four cruisers, four to six destroyers, and zero to two submarines, in addition to the carrier itself.) Not surprisingly, the alternatives that are developed in the Naval Requirements Study merely reflect a differing number of carrier task forces in the total force structure. There are significant problems in this approach to structuring our naval forces:

— **The future survivability of the aircraft carrier is an open question**, particularly when considering the advent of antiship missiles, the Backfire, stand-off precision guided weapons, nuclear weapons, and technological advances in areas such as ocean surveillance capability.

— **The aircraft carrier today is optimized for power projection, while the Navy’s primary mission is sea control.** The carrier makes a significant contribution to sea control, particularly in countering the Soviet air threat to the SLOCs. But other assets may do the job as well and more cheaply (surface ships with improved surface-to-air missile systems, and land-based aircraft). While effective in the power projection role, using its tactical aircraft in support of amphibious assaults or the land battle, this mission leads the carrier into high intensity combat areas where its vulnerability is most acute.
—Our planning does not take adequate account of the naval forces of our Allies. These forces could be significant; for example, an internal Navy study indicates that Allied ASW forces could account for one fifth or more of the enemy submarines sunk in a NATO/Pact conflict. Taking account of these forces may change the mix of ship types we should buy for ourselves.

—Our planning does not take adequate account of the assets of other military services. For example, F–4s and F–15s in Keflavik and Lossiemouth could provide air defense for the GIUK gap against the Soviet bomber threat. With AWACS and additional aircraft, forces such as these could make a significant contribution to defending the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and could ease the requirement for carrier-based aircraft in the air defense mode. And the Harpoon-equipped B–52 could shoulder a part of the anti-surface ship mission.

Minimum Carrier Requirements

The problem of carrier vulnerability and the potential for greater use of non-carrier assets make it unwise to size and structure naval forces simply by counting carrier task force requirements. These factors argue instead for a force structure which contains the smallest number of carriers consistent with minimum requirements and which maximizes flexibility in selecting the mix of remaining ships. In the discussion below, we try to identify the minimum carrier requirement of each naval theater.

—The Atlantic.

The submarine threat is handled primarily by area ASW forces (underwater surveillance systems, mines, attack submarines, and land-based patrol aircraft). Carriers are used principally for the Soviet air threat. The Navy agrees that four carriers would provide for air defense of the sea lanes, but would like a larger force for simultaneous strikes at land bases while providing continuous air cover in support of convoys. However, DOD analysis indicates that the contribution of even several more carriers to the land battle is very small when compared to the tactical air capability on the ground in Europe. While carrier air might be significant later in the war when NATO’s ground-based tactical aircraft and air bases have been attritted, by then the battle for sea control should have been won and one or more of the four sea control carriers could be diverted for this purpose—especially if the greater use of non-carrier assets has eased the burden of the carrier in the air defense

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5 Scowcroft highlighted this sentence and wrote, “Really?” in the margin.
6 Not further identified and not found.
7 References are to the U.S. Naval Air Station at Keflavik, Iceland and to the Royal Air Force Station at Lossiemouth, Scotland.
of the sea lanes. *My conclusion: Four carriers are sufficient for sea control and limited strikes in the Atlantic region.*

_The Mediterranean._

In the Mediterranean, the Soviets could launch coordinated attacks with surface ships, submarines, and bombers (Backfire, Badger) from the Caucasus equipped with anti-ship missiles. (The attack would be especially devastating if nuclear weapons were used.) The Navy studies indicate that a four carrier task force—in combination with ASW and anti-air forces—could defeat the threat, and the Navy would allocate four carriers to the Mediterranean naval theater. But vulnerability is a major problem in this high-threat environment—a surprise preemptive strike at the commencement of hostilities on the two carriers permanently forward deployed to the Mediterranean in peacetime would cut our carrier force in half and probably force US naval forces to stay in the Western Mediterranean or even the Atlantic until we had attrited Soviet forces (relying most probably on our attack submarines). The mission of our carrier forces in the Eastern Mediterranean is also unclear—are sea lanes to Greece and Turkey that crucial to winning the war in Europe? How badly will we want force projection in that area? *My conclusion: Until we can develop a better scenario for the Mediterranean naval battle, we should probably go along with four carriers._

_The Pacific._

This was the area of greatest concern at the NSC meeting last week. The CNO has expressed doubts about our ability to keep open the sea lanes between Hawaii and Japan, provoking fears that we would “lose” Japan in the early days of the war. These fears need to be put in perspective.

The Pacific is a relatively minor theater in the NATO/Pact confrontation for which our national strategy is geared. Most likely the Soviets would go after US SSBNs, carriers, and other combatant ships. Only then would they switch to interdicting the SLOC to Japan. In meeting this threat, there are several factors we ought to keep in mind:

- The US and its Allies would not be dependent on Pacific nations for wartime supplies; the shipping interdicted would be normal foreign commerce to Japan.
- This would have an impact on the Japanese economy, since it is very dependent on foreign sea-borne trade. But Japan could drastically curtail non-critical demand and rely in its stockpiles of oil and other

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8 The NSC met on April 22 to discuss the Navy study. No record of the meeting was found.
commodities—at least for the 90 days expected for a NATO/Pact contest.

- Even under pessimistic assumptions, the Soviets would not be able to completely stop the flow of goods to Japan. (Defense planning currently calls for protecting the “minimum essential” SLOCs to Japan.) The Soviet Pacific fleet is supported out of Vladivostok, located on the northwest corner of the Sea of Japan, and would have to pass through one of several choke points on its way to and from the open ocean. During this passage it could be vulnerable to US attack submarines and to US land based aircraft (from bases in Japan, Korea, Guam, Okinawa, and the Philippines). The US would dedicate two carrier task forces to the Pacific in wartime, and to this capability should be added the naval forces of the Japanese themselves, as well as our other Pacific Allies. *My conclusion: Two carriers would provide minimum austere sea control, which could be strengthened as naval forces were eventually deployed from the Atlantic to the Pacific.*

If NSC principals continue to be concerned about the adequacy of our Pacific forces to maintain the SLOCs to Japan, we may want to treat it in a separate study analyzing the threat, the shortfall in our current capability, and alternative assets for making up the shortfall other than carriers—attack submarines (we already plan to build about 30 more between now and 1985), land-based air, and non-carrier surface ships (we already plan a major net increase in surface ships by 1985). In addition, we might consider assigning three carriers to the Pacific in wartime, taking one away from the Mediterranean area where carrier survivability is most uncertain.

While important, the issue of improving the SLOC protection to Japan does not warrant the urgency of an FY 77 budget amendment and can be handled in the upcoming budget cycle. If the concern is not with SLOC interdiction by the Soviets but with our ability to handle something more—such as a major land conflict with the Soviets in Asia in conjunction with a NATO/Pact war—then our overall national strategy is called into question. While a reexamination of our overall strategy may be in order, it is beyond the scope of our current study on naval force requirements and would involve a good six months of effort. The results would affect a lot more than carrier levels or even naval forces.

*In brief then, for our current national strategy, our minimum carrier requirements would appear to be four in the Atlantic, four in the Mediterranean, and two in the Pacific. We then need to add two carriers to account for maintenance and overhaul, bringing us to a minimum carrier force of 12 for our current wartime strategy.*

The 12 carrier figure will also permit us to maintain four forward deployed carriers in peacetime, if at least one carrier is homeported either in Japan (as is now the case) or in Europe. Along this line, we could increase our capability within current force levels by providing for
homeporting in Europe. It might be useful for Defense and State to start thinking about the possibility of seeking homeporting in the UK, for example.

*Alternative Naval Force Structures*

Our current naval force structure contains the 12 carriers necessary to meet these minimum carrier requirements. The naval requirements study examined a carrier reduction option (to a force of ten) but rejected this alternative as providing too little capability. It also rejected major carrier build-up options (JSOP options calling for increases to a 17 to 20 carrier force) as involving too great an investment in an increasingly vulnerable asset. The study settled on the following set of force structure alternatives:

— **Option 1 (12–14 carriers):** This option proposes to reaffirm the present five year shipbuilding plan as presented to the Congress as part of the FY 77 Budget and would fund construction of 111 ships in FY 77 through FY 81. This would result in the force of approximately 530 ships by 1985, an increase from FY 76 force levels of about 50 ships. Under this option we would build two more new carriers and extend the life of our existing large deck carriers into the 1990s by a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The difference between 12 and 14 carriers is a function of whether the SLEP program is applied to only 10 or all 12 of our existing carriers.

— **Option 1A (12 carriers):** This is the same as Option 1 except that the large deck carriers would be deemphasized and the two carriers in the present plan would not be built. Instead, the money saved would be used to buy more anti-air warfare capability in DDG–47 and FFG–7 class ships, increasing our fleet size to 545 ships by 1985. The SLEP program would be applied to all twelve existing carriers.

— **Option 1B (13 carriers):** This is another variant of the first option which would deemphasize continued commitment to large deck carriers but still build one of the carriers now in the five year plan. The SLEP program would be applied to all 12 existing carriers. As in Option 1A, the money saved by dropping one carrier would be used to buy more anti-air capability in the form of DDG–47s and FFG–7s, giving us a fleet of 540 ships in 1985.

— **Option 2 (14 carriers):** This option SLEPs all existing carriers, builds the two carriers and the other ships in the current FYDP, and adds more anti-air capability. It would fund construction of 143 ships between FY 77 and FY 81, versus the 111 in the current plan, giving us a fleet of 540 ships in 1985. It would allow more projection capability with the 14 carrier force and would allow more flexibility and lower risk in carrying out the sea control functions. The added costs for FY 77
would be $2 billion; $12 billion for five years; and perhaps $30 billion for 15 years.

—**Option 3 (16 carriers):** Option 3 contains funds for 167 ships in the FY 77–81 period. It would add substantial anti-air capability, SLEP all 12 existing carriers, and build four new carriers between now and 1990. We would have a fleet of 571 ships by 1985. The added FY 77 cost would be $3 billion; the added five year cost would be $27 billion; and for 15 years it could be more than $80 billion.

(A tabular summary of these options is at Tab B.)

**Conclusions**

—There exists a widely recognized need to improve our naval forces, and our current Five Year Defense Plan already includes an ambitious program to raise both the quality of our ships and our overall force levels.

—A choice among the options gets down to a judgment about whether we should build more of our big strike carriers. In view of carrier vulnerability and the potential for increased reliance on non-carrier naval assets, Allied forces, and the forces of other military services, additional investment in carriers appears unwise. Extending the life of our existing 12 carriers will satisfy our minimum requirements through the 1990s.

—For this reason, Option 1A (the current FYDP but dropping funds for two new carriers) seems to make the most sense. Funds would be freed up for increased anti-air capability. We should also look at the need for additional support ships, mine countermeasure forces, and amphibious lift (to support the outcome of a study on the Marine Corps now underway in Defense).

—The FYDP program is probably a realistic limit on what the Navy can expect as its share of the DOD procurement budget. For FY 77 the Navy has almost half (48%), leaving the other two services with only about 25% of the procurement budget each. An increase in the programmed assets of the other services to help out in certain maritime missions (such as land-based aircraft in the anti-air role) might help to ease this problem.

—In the research and development area, Defense should examine new platform designs and improvements in weapons systems and sensors.

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9 Attached, but not printed.
10 Scowcroft highlighted this passage and wrote, “No trade off, but eight smaller carriers. Why?”
11 Attached, but not printed.
—In discussions with Senator Stennis, Secretary Rumsfeld should reaffirm the current five year shipbuilding plan submitted in the President’s budget. The House Armed Services Committee’s approach favoring large nuclear-powered surface ships will increase the cost of modernizing our Navy, will make it difficult to increase overall force levels, reduces the much needed improvement of anti-air capability in favor of marginal enhancement of ASW, and could require an additional $5.4 billion in FY 78.

—Rumsfeld should also signal to Senator Stennis our concern about increased investment in carriers and the possibility that we will drop the funding for two new carriers from the current FYDP.

—There appears to be no need for a shipbuilding budget amendment at this time. If broader considerations warrant such a move, it should include funds for critical near-term needs (FFGs for anti-air capability, perhaps additional support ships, and increased R&D). If Stennis wants to add to the shipbuilding budget on his own initiative, this is where the money should go.

[Omitted here is a list of the contents of Scowcroft’s briefing book.]

83. Minutes of Defense Review Panel Meeting

Washington, April 29, 1976, 9:36–11:48 a.m.

SUBJECT
Navy Shipbuilding Study

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
George Vest

Defense
William Clements
Dr. James P. Wade
Edward C. Aldridge

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 25, Meeting Minutes—Defense Review Panel. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. Also present at the meeting were James T. Lynn and Donald G. Ogilvie.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The purpose of this meeting is to move along in our review of the shipbuilding study.\(^2\) The House seems to possess a view of the world all its own. Senator Stennis has twice delayed the Senate Authorization Bill and expects me to testify on this. He has to have some guidance and wants our view. Clements is up there this morning talking with Stennis. Thus the purpose of this meeting is to review the working group’s work, to get the viewpoints of the different agencies, to discuss the options and see if we are close to a good paper. Then at the end of this meeting we should see if we need to have another NSC Meeting on this subject.

Mr. Aldridge: Reveals and explains chart I—*US Naval Missions to Satisfy our Objectives.*\(^3\)

Secretary Rumsfeld: The Chiefs, Clements and I met with the Vice President recently to discuss this subject.\(^4\) It struck me, coming out of the meeting, that this paper should include some basic guidance under the law, NSSMs, NSDMs as to what our policy is. Then the alternatives as to what we need and what we can do should be identified.

Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains chart #2—*Five Basic US Naval Missions* and chart #3 *The History of Navy Shipbuilding* in FY–77 constant dollars from 1962–1976. Because of rising costs the number of ships built per year has declined from 46 to 15 at the present time.

Presents and explains chart #4—*The Size of the Active Navy.* If there are no new ships authorized by 1985 we would then have a Navy of 433 ships. In the 1985–1990 period that would decline to 343 ships.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Does that include service life extensions?

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\(^2\) A draft Defense-NSC study, “U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements,” April 20, was the subject of discussion. A summary, prepared by the NSC Staff, of the final version of the study is Document 110.

\(^3\) None of the referenced charts were found.

\(^4\) No record of the meeting was found.
Mr. Aldridge: Yes, in the carriers but not in the other ships.
Gen. Brown: But that is an option we can consider.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The chart should have an asterisk.
Mr. Aldridge: Some of these ships are of relatively lower cost. It
would not be cost-productive to extend the life of some of them.
Mr. Lynn: If we continue building at the present rate, how many
ships would we end up with?
Mr. Aldridge: 539—The point of the chart is that we would have a
Navy of 433 ships if we do nothing more. Anything that is added to the
program increases that figure.
Mr. Lynn: The next time you do a chart like this it should take into
account the decisions made in the '77 budget.
Secretary Rumsfeld: That is one of the issues before us.
Gen. Scowcroft: The chart shows that the basic structure of the
Navy is fixed.
Secretary Rumsfeld: It shows there is little handle to work with;
85% of the Navy structure is already predetermined.
Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains chart #5—A Comparison of
US–USSR Current Maritime Capabilities.
Dr. Ikle: These things can change.
Mr. Lynn: That chart presents a snapshot of where we are right
now; it is not a prediction.
Mr. Aldridge: That’s right; it sets the base on which we are moving
from.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I don’t think the chart takes into account Soviet
activity in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are now able to keep their
ships at sea for an extended period of time.
Secretary Rumsfeld: If you go back to the Angola situation you had
a case of where the Soviets were able to put a surface combatant in the
area and we were not. This was an example of the advantage of being
an aggressor. The aggressor can move where and when he wants to
move.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The USSR has the ability of sustaining their forces
away from land for increasing periods of time.
Mr. Aldridge: Our capacity also is increasing.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Angola demonstrated the Soviets’ capacity to ro-
tate and sustain ships at sea.
Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains chart #6—Meeting the Soviet
Submarine Challenge and chart #7—US/Allied Anti Submarine Warfare
Capability.
Mr. Lynn: Are the Soviet submarines good in terms of radiation,
noise, maintenance, etc.?
Mr. Aldridge: That is hard to project.

Mr. Lynn: You are saying that by 1990 whatever problems there are would have been cured.

[name not declassified] The Soviets have a good sized investment in noisy submarines and missiles.

Mr. Aldridge: We are improving our technology across the board. Our ASW capabilities are also increasing.

Presents and explains Chart #8—US Nuclear Submarine Program and Chart #9—Minimum Surface Combatant Requirements.

Mr. Lynn: There is a basic assumption about the capacity of both sides to launch cruise missiles from say 250 miles out. I would like to know if by 1990 either side will have the capability to have submarine launched cruise missiles. In other words I am raising the very basic question of whether by 1990 surface combatants will mean a damn. We are now talking about 1990 or later. If either side has a good submarine launch cruise missile capability at that point it will totally revolutionize the idea of surface combat.


Mr. Aldridge: Our defensive technology is also progressing.

Mr. Lynn: I remember from your first chart that the Soviets are ahead in anti-ship missiles. I would like to see what happens if either side has those weapons.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I think this paper should end up with a section adding possible areas of interest apart from the budget. Such a question could be the one you just raised, Jim [Lynn], or the role of our Allies. It is difficult to talk about any of these subjects without getting off target. Each one of these subjects leads into other areas.

Gen. Brown: As I understand it, this current exercise is to discuss current Congressional actions. Jim’s point is worth looking into but it can’t be done before your testimony before Stennis. It is a long range thing and we don’t have the competency to discuss it in this room.

Mr. Lynn: The things the Hill is considering really won’t have much impact before the 1980’s or 1999 so you really can’t divorce the two.

Are the Soviets building any carriers?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Three have been started. Brent and I have discussed this study and we agreed that it should start with a discussion of what are our interests in the world and then go into options regarding the mix of ships and finally discuss budgetary and tactical questions. We should concentrate our energies in talking about things we can realistically deal with and get studies started on some of the other things. I hope that this paper, at least the beginning part of it, can be used as a base in doing other studies. Today our job is to make sure that the
paper is moving along so that the options can be presented in the NSC Meeting in a fair and conclusive manner.

Dr. Wade: I agree with Jim’s point about devising options to provide for the new technology.

Mr. Lynn: Yes, we don’t want to have a Maginot-Line Navy.

Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains Chart #10—“Meeting the Soviet Bomber Challenge (Possible Interceptor Capability—300/500NM ARCS).

Mr. Aldridge: There is no Backfire overflight of the continent in this chart.

Dr. Ikle: What if they came south from the Soviet Union? No, that would be a much further distance.

Mr. Lynn: We ought to use a map we are more used to seeing.

Gen. Scowcroft: You can use land-based air to protect the GIUK gap.

Mr. Lynn: I agree.

Mr. Aldridge: But there are a few places where the Backfire might slip through.

Mr. Ogilvie: Are our interceptors refueled?

Mr. Aldridge: No.

Mr. Ogilvie: Are Soviet aircraft refueled?

Mr. Aldridge: Yes.

Gen. Scowcroft: Looks like the Backfire can’t get through.

Mr. Aldridge: It is difficult. With AWACS, it becomes more difficult.

Mr. Hyland: Depends upon the bases he uses.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: And the situation. Convoys are not always at sea until later.

Dr. Wade: The Backfire threat shows why we must look at this problem as an all-Service role.

Mr. Lynn: I certainly agree. We need to look at sea-based versus land-based systems.

Gen. Brown: If you put F–14s at the same bases, it has very long legs.

Gen. Scowcroft: This is a fascinating chart.

Mr. Aldridge: The Navy thinks its terrible.

Mr. Lynn: You bet.

Secretary Rumsfeld: What’s the cost of putting a wing of F–15s in the UK?

Mr. Aldridge: Each F–15 costs about $15 million.

Gen. Brown: One of the things the Navy is looking at for ship defense is the high energy laser.
Mr. Lynn: The Soviets are busy tailing our carriers in the Mediterranean. What if all these Soviet ships suddenly get a signal to launch missiles at our ships. Do we have the capability to keep them away and to protect our own ships.

Gen. Brown: A lot of those Soviet ships don’t have offensive capabilities.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You are talking about a pre-emptive strike.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: In October 1973 we played out that scenario.

Gen. Brown: The ships are tightly defended and it would take a great number of missiles for even one to get through.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: In October 1973 we studied a worst-case scenario. Also during an exercise in 1973 one of our carriers took evasive action and slipped away from the Soviets for three days.

Mr. Hyland: The worst-case would be submarine-launched cruise missile attack.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This is much more difficult.

Mr. Aldridge: The only way to defend against this would be with improved systems such as the Aegis.

Adm. Holcomb: The Soviets have exercised 75 times in 8 years. We would not expect a worst-case attack. More likely, we would be in a defcon with air cover over our ships, rather than be surprised.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I would like to reiterate what the purpose of this group and this meeting is. If any of the members of the DRP would like a briefing on any of these issues they should request one and it can be arranged. There is no way given the statutory responsibilities of State, DOD, NSC and OMB, for everyone to get into everyone else’s business on everything. This group was constituted to assign itself specific tasks and proceed with them. Any of these subjects can be walked into every other aspect of everything.

Mr. Lynn: There is no way we can get current decisions without making collateral decisions regarding our vulnerabilities.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Your assumption is that there will be changes in technology reflecting increased offensive capabilities. We can also assume increased defensive technologies.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It is all very well to structure the Navy in terms of the Soviet threat but let’s not forget that the Navy has a large number of functions which are independent of the Soviet threat. Some of these functions are just as important as a confrontation with the Soviets.

Mr. Lynn: This may surprise you, but I agree totally. However, the question is: Given this five year plan is the Navy capable of performing these functions?

Dr. Wade: Well there is the second part of this whole question and that is the nuclear problem.
Mr. Lynn: That is assessed in the paper.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Shall we proceed with the briefing.
Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains Chart #11—“Allied Anti-Air-Warfare Capability”
Mr. Hyland: If there is a decision not to build new carriers, when would we fall below 12.
Mr. Aldridge: The year 2000. Presents and explains chart #12—Principal Force Issues
Secretary Rumsfeld: How important in the next 15 years will speed be?
Gen. Brown: It will continue to be important. There will be occasions when you want to get somewhere without shooting.
Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains Chart #13—Carrier Program Options, and Chart #14—Advantages/Disadvantages of Nuclear Powered Task Forces, and Chart #15—Implications of Title VIII (constant five year budget) and Chart #16—Aegis Ship Force Levels (Equal Cost Mix) and Chart #17—Summary of Present Capabilities and Chart #18—Alternatives Considered A-E.
Secretary Rumsfeld: We should be looking at these options with a view to determining what should go to the President. Do we need this many options? Are the options presented in a fair way?
Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains Chart #19—Capability in the Atlantic and Mediterranean (1985).
Secretary Rumsfeld: Does that include France?
Mr. Aldridge: Yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld: You should footnote that on the chart.
Mr. Lynn: I can see the purpose in peacetime in having ships in the Mediterranean. In a war situation would we need ships there—just how important would control of the Mediterranean be?
Gen. Brown: We would want to neutralize Soviet Naval power in the Mediterranean and keep them cooped up. There is a question of how much of this can be done from shore. The Turks and Greeks hopefully would be fighting and we could use shore-based installations there.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If we abdicate in the Mediterranean that would lead to Soviet domination there and the whole southern flank (Italy, Greece, Turkey) gets rolled up.
Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains Chart #20—Capability in the Pacific/Indian Ocean.
Gen. Brown: We should not get ourselves mixed up between the strategy in the Pacific which guides us now and the strategy we fought
under during World War II. We are not going to refight WWII out there. [I line not declassified]

Mr. Hyland: Can we buy changes in our carrier forces which would wipe out that possibility?

Mr. Lynn: What kind of an attack are we talking about. Is a carrier the best way to defend Japan? What can a carrier do against a nuclear attack sub?

Mr. Aldridge: There are barriers, SOSUS coverage, P–3s as well as surface combatants and our own submarines.

Mr. Lynn: But what does a carrier do for you in a situation like that?

Mr. Aldridge: It does carry ASW airplanes.

Mr. Sonnenfeld: Let's not let our images of WWII distort us. We are talking about two carriers in the Pacific, not ten. The carriers in the Pacific perform valuable functions in addition to protecting the sealanes to Japan. There would be a serious problem if the US Navy in the Pacific is seen to be without carriers. We need to have something more than ASW.

Gen. Brown: And this scenario we are talking about is only until the start of shooting.

Dr. Wade: Once we fix the level of our forces perhaps Japan could make a contribution.

Gen. Brown: This whole question of Japan can be addressed subsequently.

Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains Chart #21—Summary of Alternative Force Capability.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I would suggest that after this meeting all of the principals take this paper and go through it and edit it and get it back to Jim Wade. Let's get copies of the charts to everybody.

Mr. Aldridge: Okay.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Those figures do not include the cost of non-Navy expenditures?

Mr. Aldridge: Right. There is some additional cost on top.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The assumption one gets is that there is nothing the Army or Air Force could contribute that should be added in this context.

Gen. Scowcroft: That is a separate question getting into the whole subject of trade-offs.

Mr. Lynn: Do we have in the paper the question of projecting power? What is the relative importance of land based aircraft and carriers in projecting power?
Gen. Scowcroft: It is in the paper. The carrier projection of power in Europe is low.

Gen. Brown: That is true except in Northern Norway and in the Mediterranean. There carriers make a very significant contribution.

Mr. Aldridge: What we are now trying to do is to narrow the options. Option B is the five year defense plan as it currently stands. It seems like most of the interest centers in the option B, C, D area. What do we take to the President?

Secretary Rumsfeld: This should be discussed at the working group level. They should look at the study from the President’s standpoint. What does he need to have before him?

Mr. Aldridge: We should take these three options (B, C, and D) and look at them closely.

Gen. Brown: We have to take the CNO’s position (option D) to the President. I just got some more material this morning from the CNO.

Mr. Hyland: I don’t think anyone favors reducing the size of the Navy! We should drop this option.

Gen. Brown: I would drop the high option. (option E). It was not designed for this purpose. It is pure pie in the sky.

Mr. Hyland: We have to be careful when we talk about reductions. There is a difference between reducing our carriers and our total force.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The problem with dropping Option E is that it is a document which exists.

Mr. Aldridge: Presents and explains the last chart—#21—Department of the Navy Total Resource Requirements.

Secretary Rumsfeld: In considering the budget we have to focus on expenditures. If we agree on goals and missions then we have to look at various ways of accomplishing them in terms of the mixture of ships.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If it is a question of a mixture between carriers and other types, what are those other types?

Mr. Lynn: There is the strike cruiser. I would like to know what it does.

Mr. Aldridge: One carrier will buy 15 conventionally-powered surface ships.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I would like to know what the mix is.

Dr. Wade: If the decision is that we want 12 carriers—we have to do some homework on it.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This is an important piece of homework. The carrier has dual roles.

Gen. Brown: Only Holcomb can talk in specific terms about what specific components can and cannot do.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Lets focus on the NSC function. What does the President need to know so that he can make some kind of a judgement? How can the paper be best presented so that he can make this kind of a judgement.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We should agree on the role of the US Navy and then make our choices about hardware.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We need to have policy guidance from the President and the NSC. We are not meeting here to get into details and decide where widgets should be placed on frigates. We have to look at broad questions. You guys should look at these options and come back and tell us how to do it.

Mr. Hyland: I think some of the adjectives on the Pacific chart describing sea control (#19) should be added back. It provides information the President should know.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree. The working group should put themselves in the President’s shoes and ask themselves what does he need to know.

Gen. Scowcroft: We haven’t talked about ships in the House Bill.5

Mr. Lynn: None of these options match what the House is trying to do.

Gen. Scowcroft: We all intuitively think that what the House has proposed is cockeyed.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is a lot of momentum in the House Committee behind this bill. The mix of ships in the bill reduces our non-nuclear power at an additional cost. Stennis and other members want our help. We have to decide if we are in a position to push the President’s plan and not oppose any other plan. Stennis has to get the Appropriation Bill through. We must arm Stennis so that he can go to Conference with a reasonable shipbuilding approach. Where are we now with this project?

5 The Ford administration included in its original FY 1977 defense budget request $3.8 billion for 16 warships. The House Armed Services Committee, which supported a large nuclear-powered Navy based on relatively expensive multi-purpose ships, rejected the administration’s request as inadequate and recommended instead $5.3 billion for construction or conversion of 23 ships, including funding for a fourth attack submarine and a down payment on another nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Committee’s recommendation made its way into the House’s defense authorization bill (HR 12438), passed on April 9. The Senate Armed Service Committee, which sought cheaper single-purpose ships, recommended a shipbuilding plan similar to the administration’s original request, a recommendation included in the defense authorization bill passed by the Senate on May 26. The conference version of the measure, adopted by the House on June 20 and by the Senate on July 1, accepted the carrier down payment and the four attack submarines voted by the House. But it also included Senate proposals in authorizing eight frigates and four supply and repair auxiliaries. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 174, 176)
Gen. Brown: In two weeks we won’t be significantly further along than we are today. Maybe in two or six months we will have something. Maybe by Tuesday after Saturday’s discussion with the President we can give him some help.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I can at least tell him the way we want to go and the way we don’t want to go.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The working group should look at a single piece of paper—the issues raised by various Congressional Committees. It should make up an inventory of them and come up with some answers.

Mr. Hyland: We have to have information so that we can go down to the Hill and say—this is the budget we want. The only thing this paper provides is information about the number of carriers and strike cruisers. What about Trident?

Secretary Rumsfeld: I get several calls from the Hill every day saying that now is the time. You can get anything you want and you had better take it now because the situation may change. Both friends and foes call me and say this. I feel that we can roll the House back on some things if we do it right.

Gen. Scowcroft: We should come up with a page or something that we can give Stennis. Should there be an NSC Meeting on Saturday?

Secretary Rumsfeld: We have got to keep the ball rolling. The President should have a crack at this if I am to give a briefing on Tuesday. I need guidance but a firm decision won’t be necessary.

Gen. Scowcroft: I have some large questions about the study but see no reason not to brief the President on this.

Mr. Lynn: If you have to testify and give some signals other than sticking with the present budget, the President should participate in that decision. The linkage between technological assessments and the things we have talked about here should be discussed more carefully in the paper. The perception of the problems is important and so are the maneuvers but the question of what we would actually do under war conditions is also important. I still can’t get an answer about what the strike cruiser does.

Gen. Scowcroft: The areas of technology and tradeoffs have to be discussed in the paper.

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6 The NSC met on May 1 to discuss the Navy study. No record of the meeting has been found.
84. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to the Acting Secretary of State (Robinson)¹

Washington, undated.

National Security Council Meeting on US Naval Force Requirements

The Problem

The National Security Council will meet on Saturday morning, May 1 at 10:30 to discuss future naval force requirements. The briefing material to be used at the meeting presents five optional force structures of which only three are under serious consideration (attached at Tab 1).² These differ primarily in the number of carriers to be maintained by the US Navy over the next twenty-five years. Underlying the choice of options is an analysis of the Navy’s sea control and force projection functions, the Soviet threat, and the possibilities (rather undefined) offered by new technology. The purpose of the meeting will be to obtain Presidential approval for the position Mr. Rumsfeld will take with the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 4.

Background

PM has provided you with a detailed discussion of the background up to the meeting of the DRP on April 29.³ To review briefly, the following is the situation. Chairman Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee has asked the Administration to provide comments on the House action in approving the FY–77 Defense Authorization Bill to add funds for speeding up construction of large nuclear-powered Nimitz class carriers and strike cruisers. The House action would add more than $1 billion to the President’s original budget request.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Lot File 81D286, Box 11, DEF 1, Defense Budget. Secret. Drafted by Charles C. Flowerree (PM/ISP) and James E. Goodby, Deputy Director of PM, on April 30, 1976. Cleared by S/P. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Secretary Kissinger traveled to the UK, Africa, and France from April 23 to May 7. No record of the NSC meeting was found.

² According to the attached chart, not printed, the options were as follows: a reduced program of 12 large-deck carriers and 535 ships by 1990; Option 1, currently programmed forces consisting of 12 carriers and 568 ships by that date; Option 2, 13 carriers and 595 ships; Option 3, which differed from Option 2 only in that it provided for more strike cruisers and support ships; and an expanded alternative of 16 carriers and 638 ships. Markings on the chart indicate that the reduced and expanded options were not under serious consideration, leaving Options 1–3.

³ Document 83.
The Administration review of the question of future Navy construction requirements has been underway under the aegis of the DRP for about two weeks. We have provided your office with a copy of the latest draft of the Naval Force Requirements Study which formed the basis for the DRP review. At the April 29 meeting of the DRP principals a briefing was provided by the Department of Defense and the issues were discussed inconclusively. Defense and NSC staff met later to refine the briefing material for the President (attached at Tab 2).

**Strategic Issues**

The basic strategic issue is how can the US structure its Navy during the balance of the 20th Century in order to maintain the “freedom of the seas”, the term now favored by the Secretary of Defense as a short-hand description of our maritime interests. This translates into a naval force capable of establishing control of crucial sea lanes of communication, as well as maintaining a measure of additional flexibility for the projection of power in crises. From the point of view of the Department of State the latter point is especially important. If “sea control” were accepted as the only criterion for future ship construction, the Navy’s preoccupation with maintaining sea lines of communications could limit its use in crises and limited conflict situations, where some sort of land-sea interface is generally a factor. Also limited would be the Navy’s contribution to our overall deterrent posture. You should probably stress the Department of State’s interest in the Navy’s role in force projection, to assure that due weight is given to this aspect of the Navy’s missions.

There may also be discussion at the NSC meeting on US naval deployments in the Western Pacific. The Vice President, in particular, is concerned that the US emphasis on priority for a NATO contingency might jeopardize our ability to keep open the sea lines of communication to Japan. He, therefore, emphasized the need for a substantial naval presence in the area. On the other hand, OMB Director Lynn has questioned whether we need any carriers in the Western Pacific. From the Department of State’s standpoint, the present two carriers which are deployed in the Western Pacific serve as visible evidence of our commitment to Japan and Korea in particular; their presence serves an important political, as well as military, need.

The Department, of course, has no independent means of assessing US capabilities for sea control in the Western Pacific during a major war. We do hold the view, however, that to turn to the Japanese for more help is no solution, at least in the short term. Japan cannot be ex-

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4 See footnote 2, Document 83.
5 Not found attached.
pected to do more than it is now doing in the field of defense for some time to come. It is moving generally in the right direction, however, and to pressure Japan to do much more would cause serious domestic political problems in Japan and result in loss of momentum towards a more effective defense posture.

**Force Structure Issues**

The basic decision which the President faces is which of several force structure options for the US Navy should he recommend to Congress. These options are attached at Tab 1. The crux of the issue is whether to stop building large deck carriers, to defer that decision, or to build one more large carrier, which would probably be of the nuclear powered Nimitz-class. The argument for building no more carriers is that we could maintain the current level of 12 carriers through the 1990’s, provided these carriers were refurbished when it became necessary. The money thus saved by stopping carrier construction could be diverted to the construction of other types of surface ships and to investment in technology needed to modernize the next generation of Navy ships and weapons systems.

It is presently uncertain, however, how effective other advanced types of ships might be in providing sea control and forward projection and there is a strong sentiment in the government for deciding to build one more large carrier. This would still be one less carrier than the President’s original program and one less than is favored by the House. From the Department of State’s standpoint, our interest in forward projection of US power suggests that we should favor building one more carrier in order that the US will maintain the ability during peacetime to forward deploy four carriers, as we do at present. This position would conform to options 2 or 3 in the table shown at Tab 1.

The Navy, at least for the moment, appears willing to accept procuring only one more large carrier. (Option 3 is the Navy’s choice). The Navy would also like to have a commitment to go into a substantial strike cruiser and Vertical/Short Takeoff-Landing (V/STOL) support ship program. From the analysis available to us, it is not clear what the advantages of such a program would be as opposed to the somewhat less expensive alternative of procuring a mix of strike cruisers, V/STOL support ships and other types of surface ships, e.g., frigates and destroyers. From the standpoint of force projection, the present 12 carriers plus one more Nimitz-class carrier should be an adequate force structure.

**Budgetary Issues**

The budgetary question resolves itself largely into a political issue of whether to ask for a budget which corresponds to the level originally contained in the President’s program, whether to accept the additional
billion plus dollars provided by the House, or to ask for still more to fulfill the Navy’s preferred program. Thus the question of the budget is likely to be one on which the President will wish to reserve judgment, pending further consultation both within the Administration, and possibly with Senator Stennis. We believe that the White House is inclined to stand on its original budget figure. If so, the options presented at Tab 1 suggest that a decision to build one more carrier—the option which we think affords a prudent hedge against future uncertainties—may be precluded. There are many different ways to put together the Navy budget, however, and it is worth recalling that the President’s original shipbuilding program envisages building two more carriers.

The budgetary differences between the option of building no more large deck carriers (Option 1) and the option of building another Nimitz-class carrier plus a vigorous strike cruiser and V/STOL support ship program (Option 3) are not of great significance in terms of the overall Defense budget.

Agency Views

Attached at Tab 3 is a “non-paper” drafted by NSC staff in an effort to summarize their view of where OSD, OMB, and NSC are likely to come out. (Other principals may not have this paper). It provides for a deferral of a decision to construct a new carrier, a mix of conventionally and nuclear-powered strike cruisers, and no increase in the President’s original budget (page 5). State Department staff would favor a decision to build one more carrier as a prudent hedge against future contingencies. JCS appears to be split, with the Chairman, the Navy and the Marines favoring one more carrier plus a commitment to build strike cruisers; Army and Air Force would prefer no more carriers.

Your Talking Points

In addition to making a basic decision on the numbers and types of ships which the Navy will require during the next 15–25 years, there are certain fundamental questions which are of importance to the Department of State and which should be recorded at the NSC meeting as appropriate. We offer the following suggested talking points on these aspects:

Power Projection and US Presence

—We should not consider the US Navy structure of the future simply in terms of the Soviet threat or the necessity for maintaining lines of communications to theaters of operation or to important Allies.

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6 Tab 3, an undated draft paper recommending an approach to legislation regarding naval forces, is attached, but not printed.
It is equally important to bear in mind the functions which the Navy fulfills in a situation short of a major war involving the Soviet Union. In times of peace or in crisis situations we need a Navy which has the capacity and flexibility to maintain an adequate level of US presence in critical areas and to project power in crisis situations. We have seen the need for this capacity in the Mediterranean in recent years.

The Naval Tasks in the Pacific

—In considering how many carriers are needed in the Pacific, we should not refight World War II but rather we should keep in mind the importance of the presence of carriers as perceived by the Pacific countries and especially by Japan which relies on us to provide the umbrella of military protection.

—As for Japan’s taking on a greater role in protecting its own sea lines of communication, we should take into account the impact on Japanese perceptions of our decisions on our own naval force levels and we must be careful about the degree of pressure implied by our words and actions on the Japanese. Our view is that Japan is already moving, albeit gingerly, toward a somewhat more realistic defense policy. The US-Japan Security Treaty is getting greater acceptance as is the need for at least some Japanese military capacity. One of the surest ways to jeopardize this development and to create serious domestic political problems for the Government of Japan would be for the US to press Japan too hard on this issue.

Requirements for Ships Other than Carriers

—In proposing that we limit carriers and use the funds saved for other types of ships, we need to have a clear understanding of what other types we are talking about. In addition to the role which these ships will be required to fulfill in a major war with the Soviet Union, we should also consider their utility from a point of view of power projection in other crisis circumstances. We will need to do more study on the kinds of ships that will best fulfill both these requirements.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT
MAAG Requirement Study

The President has directed a study of the continuing U.S. requirement for Military Assistance Advisory Groups after FY 1977, with a view to requesting Congressional authorization for specific MAAGs in FY 1977 Security Assistance Legislation.

Taking into account, inter alia, the views of Chiefs of Mission abroad, the study should identify those countries in which the presence of MAAGs after FY 1977 is a high priority requirement in terms of U.S. interests, those in which such presence is desirable but of lesser priority, and those in which MAAGs will no longer be required. In the case of each MAAG it recommends be continued, the study should include full justification, estimated number of personnel needed and the cost to both the United States and the host government.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the study should present options and alternatives for MAAG presence abroad after FY 1977, with the advantages and drawbacks in each case.

The study will be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs, and should include, in addition to normal membership, a representative of the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

The study should be forwarded for review by the Senior Review Group as soon as possible, but no later than June 1, 1976.

Brent Scowcroft

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 44, NSSM 243 (1). Confidential. A copy was sent to George Brown.
86. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes, Richard H. Solomon, and Clinton E. Granger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, June 1, 1976.

SUBJECT

SRG Meeting: U.S. Interests and Security Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Area

Purpose of This Meeting:

—To review the regional assessment and the statement of U.S. interests and objectives in the Asia-Pacific area as set out in the response² to the first section of NSSM 235.

—To reach a consensus on this policy statement prior to putting it before the President in a proposed NSDM (Tab F),³ either at an NSC meeting or in a memorandum.

Background

Last August we recommended to Secretary Kissinger that prior to looking at our policy in the forthcoming Philippine base negotiations, we should have an inter-agency review of U.S. interests and security objectives in Southeast Asia. Secretary Kissinger recommended that the NSSM should cover the entire Asia-Pacific area.⁴ Subsequently, because of the expected early beginning of our negotiations with the Filipinos, you recommended that we combine the broad review of U.S. policy with the particular issue of our position in the Philippine base negotiations. With your approval, the NSC then issued NSSM 235, that


² Chairman of the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Group Habib submitted sections I and II of the group’s draft response to NSSM 235 (Document 67) to Scowcroft under separate covering memoranda, March 29 and April 6 respectively. Section I addressed general U.S. interests and security objectives in the Asia-Pacific area. Section II covered the specific issue of the manner in which these interests and objectives should apply to U.S. base negotiations with the Filipinos. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 39, NSSM 235, (1 of 2) (3–4)) Davis forwarded section I, discussed by the SRG during its June 4 meeting, for review to the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA under a covering memorandum, April 1. (Ibid., NSSM 235, (2 of 2) (6)) The final version of section I is printed as Document 107.

³ Attached, but not printed.

⁴ On September 2, 1975, Barnes sent a memorandum to Kissinger recommending the review. Scowcroft subsequently wrote on Barnes’ memorandum: “HAK wants to review in terms of our entire Pacific posture and interests—not just SEA.” (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 40, NSSM 235 (2 of 2) (11))
called for a review of developments in the Asia-Pacific region, an assessment of the intentions and capabilities of major nations in the region, and a statement of U.S. interests and objectives. We received the NSSM response (Tab C) at the end of March. The NSC then circulated separately Section I of the NSSM response to State, Defense, and CIA, informing them that the statement of U.S. interests and security objectives would serve as the framework for future consideration of specific area issues. (Future NSSMs, for example, will deal with the particular issues you raised regarding a larger defense role for Japan and future U.S. military presence in Korea.) State, Defense, and CIA accepted the NSSM response without change.5

Agency Views

State will endorse the paper as a timely and useful statement of U.S. policy within which future specific issues can be considered. Deputy Secretary Robinson will recommend Presidential approval of the NSSM study. CIA will probably concur in the study’s intelligence judgments, but, as a matter of principle, avoid comment on the policy aspects. Although DOD approved the NSSM response, we understand that it will now argue that we should not issue a NSDM on the subject. This attitude reflects DOD’s interest in maintaining as much flexibility as possible on its own deployment and strategic policies, and in some respects its penchant for making policy without reference to higher authority. The latest “Defense Policy and Planning Guidance” paper, dated November 1975, asserts, for example, that we will encourage Japan to improve its capabilities to contribute to protection of the Pacific Ocean lines of communication.6 This point involves a Japanese ASW capability to the Philippine Sea, 1000 miles beyond Kyushu, and runs counter to one of the study’s principal conclusions—avoiding a regional security role for Japan, an objective stated in the 1974 NSSM on Japan.7 Deputy Secretary Clements may point specifically to the listing

5 Abramowitz and Springsteen sent separate memoranda to Scowcroft on April 10 and April 12 conveying the views of their respective departments. (Ibid., NSSM 235 (2 of 2) (5))

6 The relevant portion of the DPPG, distributed by Schlesinger under a November 4, 1975 covering memorandum, read as follows: “Japan, because of its location, economic strength and close security relationship with the U.S., remains the keystone of our policy in Northeast Asia. For this reason we continue to encourage Japan to improve its capability to contribute to the protection of the Pacific Ocean LOCs and to maintain conventional military forces adequate to defend the Japanese Islands against air attack and seaborne invasions and to counter Soviet passage from the Sea of Japan.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Box 22, Action Memoranda, Oct.–Nov. 1975)

of the missions of U.S. forces in the Pacific on page 13 of the study (Tab C) as too specific or unnecessary. He may also state that the President’s speech in Honolulu last December provides sufficient policy direction.  

Need for Reassessment

As we noted in our April 12 memorandum to you, the NSSM response represents the first comprehensive national statement of U.S. interests and security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region in seven years. A serious review is in order because of the developments that have altered the fundamental dynamics of international politics in the area: the Sino-Soviet conflict, the marked changes in Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations, the fall of Indochina, and the U.S. military withdrawal from the mainland of Southeast Asia.

We support your inclination to issue a detailed elaboration of policy such as in the proposed NSDM. We believe that a meaningful but still flexible statement of U.S. policy in the region is sorely needed. We believe that the list of U.S. security objectives in the NSDM fills this function.

The study itself is overly long and often redundant. Some failing in this regard was almost inevitable because of the need to accommodate many views on wide-ranging subjects. The study is also more descriptive than analytical, but this is a natural characteristic of inter-agency assessments. Nevertheless, there was agreement on the trend of events, as well as on the capabilities and intentions of Japan, the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and the ASEAN states; and on the U.S. interests and objectives that flow from the new situation. We believe that the recommended objectives are realistic in terms of both U.S. interests and capabilities. We have extracted the major judgments of the inter-agency study to form Tab B.

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8 Ford gave an address at the University of Hawaii on December 7, 1975, near the end of a ten-day journey during which he traveled to the PRC, the Philippines, and Indonesia. He outlined a “new Pacific Doctrine” premised upon the application of American strength to achieve a stable balance of power in the Pacific, a strong partnership with Japan, the normalization of relations with the PRC, stability and security in Southeast Asia, the resolution of outstanding policy conflicts, and the creation of “a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspiration of all the peoples of the region.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, pp. 1950–1955)

9 Barnes’, Solomon’s, and Granger’s April 12 memorandum to Scowcroft reporting on the status of the NSSM 235 study is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 39, NSSM 235 (1 of 2) (3). The previous study was initiated by NSSM 38, “Post-Vietnam Asian Study,” issued on April 10, 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs—Nos. 1–42)

10 Attached, but not printed.
Your Approach at the Meeting

Talking points for the meeting are at Tab A.\textsuperscript{11}

We suggest that you open the meeting by establishing the importance of the paper as a major policy document. You should underscore that you believe a thorough reassessment of the situation in the Asia-Pacific area, and a statement of our interests and objectives, are timely. You should note that the statement of U.S. interests and objectives is intended to provide a broad policy framework within which other specific issues can be addressed. These issues include:

—Our position in the Philippine base negotiations.
—The U.S. security role in Korea over the next three to five years.
—Enhanced U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and encouragement of greater Japanese efforts in self-defense.
—Expansion of Japanese defense capabilities.
—Our negotiating posture with regard to the five districts of Micronesia whose political future remains undetermined.
—Future military drawdowns from Taiwan.
—Normalization of our relations with China.
—Our advanced weapons and technology transfer policies toward Taiwan, Korea, and the Peoples Republic of China.
—Our future security assistance to Thailand and other Southeast Asian states.
—Normalization of our relations with Vietnam.

You should indicate that the purpose of the meeting is to try to reach a general consensus on the basic judgments of the inter-agency study and on the statement of interests and objectives. In addition, you may wish to add that, as much as possible, the meeting should try to avoid getting bogged down in minor and editorial issues.

We suggest that you then proceed to review the major judgments (Tab B) of the inter-agency review and to inquire whether there are any basic disagreements. You may then ask if there are any fundamental differences with the statement of interests and objectives.

If Defense argues that we should not issue a NSDM, you may wish to state that you believe the President would like the record to show that this Administration has made an intelligent reassessment of policy in light of the fundamental changes that have taken place in East Asia in the past few years. The last overall assessment is seven years old, and obsolete. Moreover, while the Honolulu speech of last December represented a fine statement of the basic premises of U.S. policy, the Presi-

\textsuperscript{11} Attached, but not printed.
dent wants to be involved in setting policy guidelines that go beyond these generalities.

If Defense asserts that the listing of military missions on page 13 of the study is unnecessary, you should reply that: this section is an important aspect of the policy statement; such a definition of military missions is a political question that the President should determine; the wording on this subject is still broad and flexible; and we will consider any military deployment questions separately and in detail but within the NSSM 235 framework.

87. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting

Washington, June 4, 1976, 3:10–4:08 p.m.

SUBJECT
NSSM 235

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Brent Scowcroft
State
Charles Robinson
Philip Habib
James Goodby
DOD
William Clements
Amos Jordan
Morton Abramowitz
JCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith
CIA
Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
Evelyn Colbert
NSC Staff
Thomas Barnes
Richard Solomon
Michael Hornblow
Donald MacDonald

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 24, Meeting Minutes—Senior Review Group, June 1976. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

2 Document 67.
Lt. Gen. Walters gave intelligence briefing. (Attached)³

Gen. Scowcroft: Are there any questions? Well the NSSM 235 study was designed in the aftermath of Vietnam to serve as an umbrella for other Asian country studies we might wish to conduct. It does have the characteristics of an umbrella study and does contain a number of truisms. There were, though, a number of things which challenged me regarding substantive political changes and I thought it was important for us to get together and see where we want to go from here. Chuck do you have any comments?

Mr. Robinson: We think the study⁴ is a useful background document. It provides a good summary of problems in the light of current events. We think it could serve as a basis for decisions arising out of subsequent studies.

Gen. Scowcroft: It was not designed to be a decision-making document but as a policy document. We have had no policy document on East Asia since 1969.⁵

Mr. Robinson: We think it is a useful summary which will be helpful in producing more detailed studies leading to decisions.

Gen. Scowcroft: What do you think Bill?

Mr. Clements: I have not read the report and can’t really comment on it. Joe [Jordan?] may have some comments. Dick (to Gen. Walters) in your analysis there were two things which I missed. One concerns the growth of the Chinese Navy and the other is the Russian production facility on their Pacific Coast.

Lt. Gen. Walters: That is correct. There has been a substantial reinforcement of the Chinese fleet but they still only have [less than 1 line not declassified]

Ms. Colbert: The build up of their South seas fleet was done to correct serious deficiencies. They considered it important to build up their defensive capabilities because of the increased threat to their sealanes. However, as compared to the Soviet Fleet their Navy is very limited.

Lt. Gen. Walters: The one area not cut back by the Chinese is the Navy.

Mr. Clements: I would like to carry this one step further. I would like to know whether within the added naval effort submarines have received more attention? Is there some significance to this? For example, there have been extensive expansions of Soviet submarine production facilities.

³ Attached, but not printed.
⁴ See footnote 2, Document 86.
⁵ See footnote 9, Document 86.
Lt. Gen. Walters: Yes, but there has been only one new nuclear submarine launched.

Mr. Clements: Won’t both China and Russia have significant production capabilities in two to three years?

Lt. Gen. Walters: [less than 1 line not declassified] The Soviets can produce D-class submarines in the Far East which are nuclear powered and carry missiles. They can produce nothing beyond a D-class submarine in the Far East.

Mr. Solomon: Have they tested SLBM’S?

Lt. Gen. Walters: [less than 1 line not declassified] They have had some trouble with the nuclear submarines.

Mr. Jordan: We believe that this is a useful background study, but it has not sorted our priorities enough and should not lead to a NSDM.

Gen. Scowcroft: If the consensus is that this statement should not lead to a policy-making document, should it be turned into an umbrella guidance document?

Mr. Jordan: We think the study should be more precise about our military objectives and the probable threats to our military, and the importance of our military force in the area. The study is now too general. It is a catalogue and provides no real guidance.

Lt. Gen. Smith: The problem is it gives the appearance of guidance without providing guidance. For example, it says nothing specific about force deployments.

Mr. Habib: We would need a specific paper covering deployments. In this study we cannot get into that specific kind of requirement.

Mr. Abramowitz: The study does set forth force design objectives.

Mr. Jordan: It sets our priorities. The deployments would follow from the priorities.

Gen. Scowcroft: On what basis are our deployments decided now?

Mr. Jordan: It is hazy indeed.

Mr. Habib: We have no problem with this as providing general guidelines. After all it is derived from the President’s Honolulu speech.6 We feel we already have clear guidelines.

Lt. Gen. Smith: Since a policy has been enunciated in the President’s speech, what more is needed?

Gen. Scowcroft: We need something more than a Presidential speech.

Mr. Habib: If we get into deployments, that is a separate problem.

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6 See footnote 8, Document 86.
Mr. Clements: Is the study supposed to cover our basic general relations with Japan and the Philippines?

Mr. Habib: Yes.

Mr. Abramowitz: According to the study Japan would not have an important regional role. I question this conclusion.

Mr. Habib: This paper does not deny Japan a role in the area. But we do want to deny Japan a regional military role. I remind you this paper was cleared by Defense.

Gen. Scowcroft: We are now getting into specifics. In this meeting we have to decide what to do with the study. If we bless the study, should we have a NSDM? There is no point in getting into specific items in the study. The decisions we have to make is what we should do with the study.

Mr. Habib: Well, there is a real problem with Japan which has just been pointed out. This is the sort of problem that you get in with these kinds of general guidelines.

Gen. Scowcroft: Well, it does foreclose a Japanese regional security role based on the 1974 NSSM on Japan.7

Mr. Habib: That is what guided the Secretary of Defense in his last major go-around with the Japanese.

Mr. Abramowitz: That was only because of sensitivity to the Japanese political scene.

Mr. Habib: That raises the problem of how this was carried out. If what Brent says is true, it should not have been carried out.

Mr. Clements: The whole thing is fuzzy. In our government we have no clear policy of where we are regarding Japan.

Gen. Scowcroft: Are there any fundamental problems with the study? Can’t we scrub it down with a view to having an overall policy document?

Mr. Habib: I have one basic objection; what did we ask the working group for? Was it an options paper, or are we just going to take this and shred it? We won’t get the precision you want in an umbrella document.

Gen. Scowcroft: I am not talking about precision I am talking about broad guidelines, but there is a problem in the paper with Japan and Korea.

Mr. Habib: There should be separate documents on Korea and Japan.

Ms. Colbert: One of the problems in basing something else on this paper is its point of departure. This paper focuses on South East Asia.

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7 See footnote 7, Document 86.
This is where the serious analysis is. China and Korea, for example, are not discussed on the same level. If the principal problems are Korea and Japan then separate NSSMs on Japan and Korea are needed.

Mr. Habib: I think this is a hell of a good background paper.

Gen. Scowcroft: I am trying to reverse the proliferation of studies which just evaporate. These exercises must be useful to the people who work on them.

Mr. Habib: Producing the Philippine paper has raised two other questions. Should there be separate NSSMs on Japan and Korea?

Lt. Gen. Walters: Must everything be tied together?

Gen. Scowcroft: If you just put this study on the shelf it will have no status.

Mr. Habib: It has more status than you are giving it.

Gen. Scowcroft: Defense doesn’t want it to have status because they don’t agree with it.

Mr. Abramowitz: Right.

Mr. Robinson: Our challenge is to get it to say something we can all agree on.

Mr. Jordan: There are surface issues which are buried in the study such as the defensive role of Japanese forces outside of the home islands. There are also definite problems in Northeast Asia which are slighted.

Gen. Scowcroft: I have no objection to 95 percent of the paper. It was not designed to be a complete study of everything in the area. It was designed to have an overall Asian framework. I don’t like what the paper says regarding Japan. I recognize it as an issue which should be studied in depth.

Lt. Gen. Smith: It is hard to draw the line. There is a need for other studies. Substantive decisions should follow from such a paper.

Gen. Scowcroft: Yes—95 percent of this paper is okay. We need a general statement of our Asian policy. The last such statement dates back to 1969 when we had a different strategy.

Mr. Clements: Well, let’s work on that five percent.

Mr. Habib: The paper does provide good guidelines. If it just sat, people could refer to it and deal with the issues it discusses. I would like to see some debate over the Japanese security role.

Gen. Scowcroft: There are several alternatives to consider. On one extreme we can drop the study now and it would not have any status. On the other extreme, we could write a NSDM based on the study. There is an option in between in which we would draft something for my signature or Jeanne Davis’ signature to send out, saying that this
study has been considered and reflects the general guidelines of our Asian policy. This will give it some kind of legitimacy.

Mr. Jordan: We could ask a working group to flesh out the Northeast Asian topics which were slighted, and then make some assessments and surface the issues and meld them into a final paper.

Mr. Habib: What more needs to be said? The Northeast Asian issues are specifically dealt with in this paper.

Mr. Jordan: They are dealt with only in the most general terms. There is just a one sentence assertion.

Mr. Habib: It is not an assertion but a one sentence statement, which if you don’t agree with should be changed. Perhaps the China section could be beefed up?

Mr. Abramowitz: Yes, there is no talk of arms sales to the Chinese.

Mr. Clements: And there is no mention of technological transfer to the Japanese in relation to their military forces.

Mr. Habib: This is not the purpose of this paper.

Mr. Clements: I have now read the Japanese section of this paper. I don’t find that these general guidelines give me an understanding of Japan’s role.

Mr. Habib: Look at pages 13 and 14.

Mr. Abramowitz: Do we never want the Japanese to sell APC’s to Singapore?

Mr. Habib: No, I think we should sell APC’s to Singapore. However, this paper cannot deal with that kind of detail. If we take Joe’s suggestion the paper won’t serve a general umbrella purpose.

Lt. Gen. Smith: It can lead to that, but it doesn’t have to lead to that.

Mr. Abramowitz: I think that the President’s Pacific Doctrine speech offered us a good rubric. There were elements left out where we need some guidance, but they are not covered here. What you have here is motherhood. Do we want an evolving Japanese security role in the area or not?

Gen. Scowcroft: Just because this thing is motherhood doesn’t make it necessary for us to turn our backs on it. There is nothing wrong with motherhood, if it represents a document the Bureaucracy can use as a starting point.

Mr. Habib: Well, it does do that. If we take the middle role you suggested, it does do that.

Lt. Gen. Smith: After we make certain changes.

Mr. Habib: I don’t know why we couldn’t do that before. This is the first time I have heard any Defense Department objections.

Gen. Scowcroft: Would we get something out of it that would be worth the extra effort going into it?
Mr. Jordan: Why don’t we in Defense pull out that five percent and identify alternate approaches and then put it back into the hopper.

Gen. Scowcroft: That is all right. I do think there is a problem with the Japanese phraseology. We can deal or not deal with the issue.

Mr. Jordan: One-third or less of the NSSM deals with Northeast Asia.

Mr. Barnes: The heart of the problem is pages 12 and 13 and most of that relates to Northeast Asia.

Gen. Scowcroft: My problem with the Korean part of the paper is the use of the word “adjust” in describing what we will do with our forces over the next five years. It is not true that we will “adjust” in any respect to the level of Korean forces. The implication in this study is that we will pull out our forces as things quiet down. That just is not true. Our forces in Korea serve a number of purposes.

Mr. Habib: That is your interpretation. The word “adjustment” can mean a lot of different things.

Gen. Scowcroft: When was the last time we “adjusted” up?

Mr. Habib: A word change would take care of your problem.

Gen. Scowcroft: What we need is a memorandum ratifying this document, saying that it is a useful background document. I just don’t like things like this to go into limbo.

Mr. Habib: We could say that the study would form the basis for more detailed examinations.

Gen. Scowcroft: The working group should meet and make adjustments, and we should then circulate the paper.

Lt. Gen. Smith: Even though the paper contains a lot of motherhood, it also has a lot of good things in it.

Mr. Clements: [4 lines not declassified]

Mr. Habib: [6½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Abramowitz: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Habib: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Habib: [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Abramowitz: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Habib: [4 lines not declassified]

Mr. Abramowitz: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Habib: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Habib: [1 line not declassified]

Lt. Gen. Walters: [1½ lines not declassified]
Executive Summary of a Study Prepared by the National Security Study Memorandum 223 Ad Hoc Group


NSSM 223

REVIEW OF US POLICY ON ARMS TRANSFERS

Executive Summary

Arms transfers are not an end in themselves, but rather are a useful implement of foreign policy and national security. Since World War II, the US has followed a regulatory arms transfer policy as opposed to the extreme alternatives of laissez faire or total embargo. Moving from a regulatory policy towards either extreme alternative is not in the best interests of the US. The successful application of arms transfers in any given situation requires striking balances among competing US objectives. Thus no single decision can resolve “the arms transfer problem”; rather, a continuing policy management process must balance important competing national interests for specific arms transfer decisions in terms of the particular circumstances involved.

Three options exist for improving the regulatory policy management process:

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files, Lot File 80D212, NSSM 223. Secret; Noforn. Although no drafting information appears on the study, James M. Patton (S/P) forwarded a draft to Vest under a covering memorandum, June 1, in which he wrote that the NSSM had “exposed some very sensitive nerves in Defense and ACDA, as well as here in State. He continued, “The institutional momentum of the arms transfer program and the contrary momentum of ever more restrictive legislation registered on the draft response to the NSSM, ordaining it to be controversial.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 326, Department of State, Bureaus, Policy Planning, History Project, Selected Papers, Vol. 11) Vest forwarded the study to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, June 4. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files, Lot File 80D212, NSSM 223)

—Creating new arms transfer procedures
—Modifying existing procedures substantially
—“Tuning” existing procedures.

These options differ in internal impact, external image, and probable effectiveness.

In 1974 the US delivered $5.4 billion worth of defense-related articles and services and transacted orders and agreements for $12.8 billion worth, to be delivered over several years. US deliveries were approximately three times that of all other free world suppliers combined and nearly twice that of the Communist countries. US superiority in orders and agreements was even greater, indicating that our lead in deliveries will continue for several more years. However, less than half of US deliveries constitute actual weapons and ammunition; the remainder is made up of spare parts, support equipment, and supporting services.

It has been increasingly difficult to convince the Congress that all arms transfers are soundly justified. In an effort to force the Executive Branch to increase consultation, the Congress has moved in favor of more and more restrictive legislation, this deprives the Executive of needed flexibility in making foreign policy and raises the issue of constitutional prerogatives.

National interests which may be supported by arms transfers include, in addition to collective security: access to important overseas facilities, securing strategic and critical resources, supporting diplomatic initiatives to resolve local conflicts or establish regional stability, strengthening political ties with friendly nations, improving the US balance of payments, reducing unit costs of US weapons, and keeping essential defense industries operating.

National interests that are served by selected restraints on arms transfers include: dampening arms races and discouraging local hostilities that risk US involvement, inhibiting the spread of nuclear delivery capability, reducing the threat of terrorist acquisition of sophisticated portable weapons, preserving US technological leadership, maintaining US force readiness, and avoiding adverse political reactions.

US arms transfers are currently addressed in two essentially independent administrative management systems. Those involving appropriated funds (i.e., grants and credit sales) are programmed through the Security Assistance Program Review Committee (SAPRC); transfer decisions for individual countries or regions are addressed on an ad hoc basis by NSC/Interdepartmental Groups (IG) or by National Security Study Memoranda. The latter transfer decisions are handled with less standardized (and usually narrower) participation and dissemination of results. Clearance of specific transfers is highly fractionated; there is insufficient coordination among the various clearance mechanisms and little between the decision and operating levels.
The existing approach has been slow to resolve a number of policy issues, most relatively minor and administrative, but some of serious import. The latter include the relationship between the needs of US armed forces and the desires of foreign buyers for early delivery; potential erosion of US technological lead through transfers; conflicts between long-term and short-term foreign policy objectives, and the impact of transfers on our bilateral relations and on demand for US uniformed personnel.

Criteria for successful resolution of the existing problems are:

(1) a two-tier management system (a policy level advisory mechanism for exposing national interests, and an operating level coordinating mechanism to implement decisions and formulate new issues);
(2) regular channels for progressive consideration of policy questions;
(3) participation by all interested agencies; and
(4) centralized coverage of all transfers regardless of purpose or funding arrangements (with provision for exceptional treatment of highly sensitive policy issues).

Three action options are identified that would satisfy the above criteria but which would differ in impact and image:

**Option I**

—Creation of a regularly meeting inter-agency Policy Board and supporting Coordinating Group, including all interested agencies and overseeing all categories of transfers.

**Option II**

—Enlarging SAPRC responsibilities, regularizing its activities to cover all categories of transfers, and formalizing its Working Group accordingly;

**Option III**

—“Tuning” existing processes:

**Variant A:**

By broadening the SAPRC charter, increasing participation in studies and dissemination of results, and improving coordination of clearance procedures.

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3 ACDA would limit the role of the Policy Board to be strictly advisory. [Footnote in the original.]

4 Including not only the FMS, MAP and Security Supporting Assistance programs addressed here, but also commercial sales, co-production arrangements, ship transfers, excess defense articles, and third country transfers, all in a fully coordinated USG management system. [Footnote in the original.]
Variant B:

By providing a more active role for the Interdepartmental Groups in arms transfer decisions (leaving SAPRC unchanged), and by developing written guidelines under the auspices of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance in order to better identify potentially controversial or sensitive transfers, set forth more specifically the channels of responsibility for approving such transfers, and guarantee appropriate review of foreign requests for price and availability data in advance of US response.

Although there are substantial impediments to successful Executive consultation with the Congress at this time, there are various consultative efforts which the Executive Branch could pursue in order to reduce the sense of frustration in the Congress about being allowed insufficient participation in arms transfer decisions.

On the basis of this study:

—The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency recommend selection of Option I: Creation of a new Arms Transfer Policy Board\(^5\) and supporting Coordinating Group;

—The Department of Defense recommends selection of Option III B: “Tuning” existing arms transfer processes by providing a more active role for the Interdepartmental Groups and by developing written guidelines under the auspices of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.

[Omitted here is the entire 56-page paper, divided into five sections: The Central Issues—Different Views; Dimensions of U.S. Defense Transfers; The Case for Defense Transfers; The Congressional Challenge; Recommendation.]\(^6\)

\(^5\) ACDA would limit the role of the Policy Board to be strictly advisory. [Footnote in the original.]

\(^6\) On December 9, Scowcroft sent a memorandum to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Ikle, and Bush informing them that the NSSM 223 study had been reviewed. He noted, however, that the study had neither included a review of arms transfer policy nor had it addressed the issue of alternative arms transfer policies, as specified in the NSSM. Scowcroft therefore referred the study back to the Ad Hoc Group for revision. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 35, NSSM 223 (5)) No further action was taken for the remainder of the Ford administration.
Security Assistance

You may wish to draw on the following slightly expanded version of our earlier summary wrap-up on security assistance when you brief the President tomorrow morning. A completely detailed report must still await final language from the conference staffers, who are still at work tonight. On balance, we achieved major concessions on three of four items which we signaled as veto bait, and significant concessions on other controversial elements in the bill, including the Symington amendment on nuclear proliferation and the special package for Southern Africa. Final floor action on both houses is expected on Tuesday.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy File, P760096–0930. Confidential; Lindis. Drafted by Kempton B. Jenkins and Edward Black (both H) on June 16.
2 McCloskey sent Kissinger a briefer summary memorandum earlier on June 16. (Ibid., P760092–1381)
3 No record of Kissinger’s June 17 meeting with President Ford has been found.
4 After Ford’s veto of S 2662 (see footnote 5, Document 81), Congress revised the bill to meet many of the President’s objections. The result, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (HR 13680—PL 94–329), was signed by Ford on June 30. The act omitted lifting the U.S. trade embargo with North and South Vietnam, the proposed $9 billion ceiling on U.S. arms sales abroad, and Congress’ proposed ability to reject, by concurrent resolution, commercial weapons sales in excess of $7 million. The act authorized Congress to review commercial arms sales; required that sales in excess of $25 be made through government, rather than commercial, channels; and mandated reports to Congress on arms sales and security assistance. The act also terminated most grant military assistance programs and MAAGs effective September 30, 1977 and gave Congress the authority to curtail arms sales to nations that discriminated against U.S. citizens on the basis of race, religion, or sex. Finally, the act asserted that the promotion of human rights was a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy, that no security assistance go to countries that violated human rights, and that Congress had the authority to terminate military aid to countries declared in violation of international human rights standards by a joint resolution requiring presidential signature. The act created the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs as a presidential appointment subject to Senate confirmation. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 874–877)
5 The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 also prohibited economic assistance to countries that bought or transferred nuclear reprocessing equipment and materials without establishing international safeguards. Assistance was permitted, under the terms of the act, if the President determined that cutting it off would have an adverse effect on U.S. interests. Congress could reverse the President’s decision by approving a joint resolution. (Ibid., p. 876)
6 June 22.
The outcome of the major issues follows:

**Human Rights**

The Senate language was adopted, thus eliminating the concurrent resolution veto procedure with regard to human rights. The office of Coordinator of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the Department of State was legislatively established and appointment to that office will now require Senate confirmation.

**Review of Export Licenses**

Reports to Congress will be required for each commercial license for export of major defense equipment of $7 million or more as well as for other defense articles or services sold for $25 million or more. However, the concurrent resolution veto provision affecting licensing of major defense equipment of $7 million or more, as contained in the Senate bill, was eliminated.

**Discrimination**

The Senate language with regard to discrimination was modified to make the enforcement procedures compatible with the Senate human rights provisions. Thus, instead of a Presidential determination evaluating a situation, only a Presidential report of the facts of a matter would have to be submitted.

**$9 Billion Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales**

The ceiling was changed from a mandatory limit to a non-binding expression that the Administration should attempt to keep arms sales below a $9 billion level.

**Symington Amendment on Nuclear Transfers**

This was a major area of disagreement which the conferees had great difficulty resolving. The mandatory assistance cut-off language was retained. If the President, by Executive Order, determines that the termination of assistance would have a serious adverse effect on U.S. vital interests, he may waive the restriction. Each such determination must be reported to Congress, which may then pass legislation on the issue.

**Chile—Economic Assistance**

With regard to Chile, the absolute prohibition on arms transfers to Chile was modified to allow delivery of the pipeline. Effective on the date of enactment, no new FMS, cash or commercial sales, including spare parts, will be permitted. The two-tier system preferred by the Senate was adopted which limited economic assistance for FY–77 to $27.5 million with an additional $40.5 million if the President certifies to Congress that the government in Chile does not engage in a con-
sistent pattern of gross violation of international human rights, has per-
mitted investigations, and adequately communicated with prisoners’
families. In addition, the definition of economic assistance was nar-
rowed to exclude disaster assistance, Ex–Im non-concessionary assis-
tance, IAF, Peace Corps, and Title II, PL–480, thereby easing the effect of
the ceiling.

**Greece-Turkey**

Money was included in the bill for Greece and Turkey as provided
by the House, although the Cyprus-related limitation on assistance to
Turkey was retained.

**Security Supporting Assistance**

The House version had authorized $1,886.5 million in Security
Supporting Assistance for FY–77, which included the additional Af-
rican money. The Senate authorization was $1,826.5 million. The con-
ferees agreed to a total of $1,860 million with $785 million earmarked
for Israel, $750 million earmarked for Egypt, $27.5 million earmarked
for Zaire and $27.5 million earmarked for Zambia. All reference with
regard to Mozambique was deleted from the bill but language prohi-
biting funds from being used for military, guerrilla, or para-military
activities was retained.

**MAP**

MAP authorization for FY–77 includes $177.3 million for country
programs; $70 million for administration; and $30.2 million for IMET
(training). Total NOA is $277.5 million, with earmarkings as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Earmarked Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>$33 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>15 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>55 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>8.3 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>17 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>15 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>50 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FMS Authorization and Ceiling on Credits**

The conference bill authorizes $740 million and imposes a ceiling
of $2,022.1 million (with $1 billion reserved for Israel).

**Overall Funding**

The bill authorizes the appropriation of slightly over $6 billion for
international security assistance programs for fiscal years 1976 and
1977. While not all of our requests were met, very substantial conces-
sions were made by both House and Senate conferees, and, based on in-
formation currently available, it appears that we have obtained a reasonably good bill which is probably the best we can get. Clearly all the conferees believe that the bill is signable.

90. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Regional Staff Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, July 1, 1976.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this just can’t be bought off. We have to fight it. We cannot buy off. The question is whether human rights is the only objective of American foreign policy, and that’s what it’s rapidly coming down to.

Mr. Maw: And it’s almost the only objective under the new security assistance bill.\(^2\) It’s going to be terrible, the information that we have to pull together.

Mr. Habib: Well, in the past we’ve been able to argue in certain cases that there’s not a consistent pattern of gross violation.

Mr. Maw: That’s right.

Mr. Habib: The word “gross violation”—that means if they don’t give the guy a right to see his attorney six-eight months before the trial, it’s not a gross violation—as I understand it.

Mr. Leigh: That’s the way in Nicaragua. They never let them see an attorney.

Mr. Shlaudeman: That doesn’t merit attention: “without charge.” Every one of these countries can take them without charge and the

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Lot File 78D443, Box 10, Chronological File. Secret. According to an attached list, the following attended the meeting, which began at 8:07 a.m.: Kissinger, Robinson, Habib, Rogers, Maw, Sonnenfeldt, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Harry W. Shlaudeman, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert H. Miller, Hartman, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sober, Saunders, Lord, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Joseph A. Greenwald, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Spokesman of the Department Robert L. Funsefth, Vest, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Samuel W. Lewis, McCloskey, Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh, Borg, and Special Assistants to the Secretary David Passage and James P. Covey.

\(^2\) See footnote 4, Document 89.
whole people for lengthy periods. It’s an old custom down there. (Laughter.)

Mr. Habib: It’s a custom in a lot of places. But I mean in Indonesia they’ve held people for ten years without charge. But we managed to convince the Congress [by] dint of explaining the circumstances in the situation, that it is not a pattern of gross violation.

I don’t know how we did it, but we did it. You know, you point out to them what these guys are trying to do and how they keep them.

Secretary Kissinger: And Asians have no concept of time anyway. (Laughter.)

Mr. Habib: I’ve argued human rights up on the Hill probably as much as anybody.

Ambassador McCloskey: That’s why we are where we are. (Laughter.)

Mr. Habib: But they’ve never cut a program on the basis of the human rights argument, if you go up and give them the total nature of the situation.

Mr. Leigh: They don’t have to take the responsibility, you see. They direct the Executive Director of the World Bank to vote against. That’s the difference, you see. They’ve removed the responsibility.

Mr. Maw: We’ve passed the buck back again under the new security assistance bill because we don’t have to make the determination now to cut it off.

Secretary Kissinger: Every year when we sell a few pounds of flesh to them will lead to massive intrusion of the United States into the domestic policies of almost every country of the world. And it makes human rights the only objective of American foreign policy. And, in the process, it undermines every government in which we have a strategic interest.

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3 On June 16, Kissinger also discussed security assistance during his seminar with senior government officials, held on June 16 in the Secretary’s Conference Room. When asked about the relative viability of security assistance, Kissinger responded: “My honest opinion is that if you ask the American public, ‘security assistance’ is a hell of a lot more palatable to them than a ‘development’ assistance which they consider ‘long hair’ and ‘giveaway.’ And it is usually a lot easier to sell military programs than it is to sell economic programs.

“It is also true, regrettable as this might be, that usually you gain more influence in countries by military assistance than by economic assistance; because economic assistance can be replaced a lot easier than when you have the military forces of the country dependant on the spare parts.” He later added, “in terms of political influence you get more with military assistance than with economic assistance. But in terms of long term international stability you probably get more from economic assistance.” The minutes of the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Lot File 78D443, Box 10, Chronological File.
I can’t think of any government in the Western Hemisphere, after spending three years putting a Western Hemisphere policy together, that for the first time has a collaborative concept. We’re going to drive them all, and they’re strong enough now to do it without us.

Brazil doesn’t need us. I mean it needs us, but it can manage on its own and turn rapidly anti-American. And in Argentina we are organizing them on an anti-U.S. basis.

Mr. Habib: Generally speaking, the amount of money involved is very marginal.

Mr. Shlaudeman: It’s symbolic.

Mr. Habib: That’s right. I mean you’re only talking in many cases of a few million dollars.

Secretary Kissinger: We should not interfere with the domestic policies of every country. If we bring someone down, then we’re stuck with a successor and have to build him up.

Mr. Shlaudeman: That’s all.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

Secretary Kissinger: Carl, do you have anything?

Mr. Maw: Well, the President signed last night the new security assistance bill, and also the appropriation bill, so that we were able during the evening to—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that means—did we lose the Africa thing?

Mr. Schaufele: No, no.

Ambassador McCloskey: No, no. What he signed was two years of authorization, one year of appropriation. That was ’77.

Secretary Kissinger: I tried to get Brooke. 4

Ambassador McCloskey: Did you try to reach him?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Maw: We managed to get 1.2 billion in additional credits.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s a big achievement. How did you do it?

Ambassador McCloskey: I’m overwhelmed by that, I must say.

Mr. Maw: That’s the only reason we got the bill through in the shape it’s in; and it’s full of reporting problems, human rights problems.

Ambassador McCloskey: But you have to acknowledge it’s a better bill than what the President vetoed earlier on. It’s not good, but it’s better than it was.

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4 Senator Edward William Brooke, III (R–Massachusetts).
Mr. Maw: That’s true. We have 60 days in which to promulgate regulations concerning agents fees on arms sales, and we’re in the midst of trying to come up with proposed regulations. And of course it’s a hornet’s nest, but we’ll have something before the next week is out to start with.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K.

(whereupon, at 9:08 a.m., the Secretary’s Staff Meeting was concluded.)

91. National Security Decision Memorandum 333


TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Enhanced Survivability of Critical U.S. Military and Intelligence Space Systems

The President has expressed concern regarding the emerging Soviet anti-satellite capability and the possible threat to critical U.S. space missions this implies. He considers preserving the right to free use of space to be a matter of high national priority. The U.S. trend toward increasing exploitation of space for national security purposes such as strategic and tactical reconnaissance, warning, communications, and navigation—combined with the simultaneous trend toward a smaller number of larger, more sophisticated satellites—emphasizes the need for a reassessment of U.S. policy regarding survivability of critical military and intelligence space assets.

Policy for Survivability of Space Assets

The President has determined that the United States will continue to make use of international treaty obligations and political measures to

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 66, NSDM 333 (1). Top Secret. Copies were sent to Kissinger, General Brown, and Lynn. Scowcroft forwarded the draft NSDM to Ford under a covering memorandum, July 5, with the recommendation that the President approve Scowcroft’s signing the NSDM. Ford initialed his approval. (Ibid.) This is the NSDM discussed in Scowcroft’s April 26 memorandum to Ford (Document 80). The NSDM is also printed as Document 128 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976.
foster free use of space for U.S. satellite assets both during peacetime and in times of crisis. However, to further reduce potential degradation of critical space capabilities resulting from possible interference with U.S. military and intelligence space assets, the President also considers it necessary to implement improvements to their inherent technical survivability. Such survivability improvements should supplement and reinforce the political measures, as well as extend the survivability of critical space assets into higher level conflict scenarios.

The survivability improvements in critical military and intelligence space assets should be predicated on the following U.S. objectives:

(1) Provide unambiguous, high confidence, timely warning of any attack directed at U.S. satellites;

(2) Provide positive verification of any actual interference with critical U.S. military and intelligence satellite capabilities;

(3) Provide sufficient decision time for judicious evaluation and selection of other political or military responses after the initiation of an attempt to interfere and before the loss of a critical military or intelligence space capability;

(4) Provide a balanced level of survivability commensurate with mission needs against a range of possible threats, including non-nuclear co-orbital interceptor attacks, possible electronic interference, and possible laser attacks;

(5) Substantially increase the level of resources needed by an aggressor to successfully interfere with critical U.S. military and intelligence space capabilities;

(6) Deny the opportunity to [1 line not declassified] U.S. military and intelligence space systems.

Planning for Improved Survivability

The President directs that efforts be initiated jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive time-phased, prioritized action plan which will further develop and implement this policy framework. This plan should (1) place emphasis on short-term and intermediate-term measures to enhance the survivability of critical military and intelligence space capabilities against Soviet non-nuclear and laser threats at low altitudes and Soviet electronic threats at all altitudes, and (2) consider long-term measures which will provide all critical military and intelligence space systems with a balanced level of survivability commensurate with mission needs against all expected threats, including threats at higher altitudes.

Short/intermediate term measures for consideration in the plan should include, but not be limited to, the following capabilities:
(1) [6 lines not declassified]

(2) [4½ lines not declassified]

(3) Contingency procedures/capabilities [1½ lines not declassified] attempted non-nuclear co-orbital interceptor attack. This should include needed command/control/communications improvements, as well as procedures for delegation of authority, where appropriate, and for periodic exercises to verify timely operation of the system.

(4) Encryption protection for command links of critical military and intelligence satellites.

Longer-term measures should provide balanced survivability for critical space capabilities against the full range of credible threats. The plan should detail the military and intelligence utilization of specific systems at various levels of potential conflict and should select survivability measures and implementation schedules for each critical military or intelligence satellite in accord with their scenario-related mission needs. The threats to be considered include threats of physical attack against satellites, either by non-nuclear or laser techniques; [2½ lines not declassified] Continued consideration should be given to protection against nuclear effects from events other than direct attack, for those space assets which support nuclear scenarios. This portion of the plan should consider measures necessary to enhance the survivability of both ground and spaceborne elements and should consider proliferation or back-up alternatives where appropriate, as well as active and passive measures.

The plan should develop a range of implementation schedule/funding profiles for Presidential consideration. An initial version of this plan should be submitted to the President no later than November 30, 1976.

Brent Scowcroft
92. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
U. S. Civil Defense Policy

I believe it would be appropriate to initiate a review of U.S. civil defense policy. The last review of U.S. civil defense policy (NSSM 57) was completed in 1970, and the last decision (NSDM 184, at Tab B) was signed on August 11, 1972. There have been a number of developments since that time with important implications for structuring our civil defense program, including continued Soviet strategic and civil defense programs and our adoption of a flexible nuclear response strategy.

Our current civil defense program is essentially a posture of planning in peacetime for surging in a crisis. This program keeps peacetime civil defense costs relatively low (approximately $70 million annually in the Defense budget), but at the same time is extremely limited in terms of its capability to provide for urban evacuation, expanded capacity and stockpiling of shelters, training and education, and protection of the industrial base.

The very limited nature of the current program raises questions as to whether it should be retained in its current form, or whether it should even be retained at all. Some argue that civil defense efforts would be futile in saving lives in a major nuclear war, given the size and capability of Soviet strategic forces. Others disagree with that assessment, especially in light of Soviet civil defense efforts and our new flexible response strategy. Some recent studies indicate that in a major nuclear conflict, Soviet fatalities would be far fewer than U.S. fatalities, generating concern about the impact of civil defense on the strategic balance and deterrence. Also, there are those who contend that under the flexible response strategy with its concept of bargaining through gradual nuclear escalation, the Soviets could evacuate their cities and then issue an ultimatum, rather than bargain over the next step.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 44, NSSM 244 (1 of 3) (1). Secret.


3 Not found attached. In NSDM 184, issued on August 14, 1972, President Nixon decided that the United States should maintain its then-current “overall level of effort in its civil defense activities.” NSDM 184 is ibid., Document 223.
There is renewed Congressional interest in our civil defense policy. The Civil Defense Panel of the House Armed Services Investigating Sub-committee recently completed hearings (chaired by Congressman Leggett) on the U.S. civil defense program. Subcommittee Chairman Hebert has transmitted the Panel’s report to you (Tab C)\(^4\) with a request that you consider two recommendations in particular: (1) that the NSC conduct a study of the strategic significance of civil defense, and (2) that OMB look at the organizational base for civil defense activities. (Max Friedersdorf is responding to Hebert on your behalf, expressing appreciation for the report and indicating that policy matters such as these are under continual consideration within the Executive Branch.)

Also, the Joint Committee on Defense Production has been conducting hearings (chaired by Senator Proxmire)\(^5\) on U.S. preparedness and planning programs, including the U.S. civil defense program. As a result of these hearings, Senators Proxmire and Tower recently requested the Federal Preparedness Agency in GSA to provide a critical assessment of U.S. preparedness efforts.

In addition to the basic considerations regarding the strategic implications of civil defense, a factor underlying the Congressional interest is your decision in the FY 77 Defense budget that DOD civil defense activities should be devoted exclusively to nuclear attack preparedness. This involves reductions in matching funds assistance to state and local agencies for programs required primarily for natural rather than nuclear disaster preparedness. State and local agencies have complained about this cutback to Congressional committees.

It would be useful to review our civil defense policy and to weigh a number of questions concerning the proper structuring of our civil defense posture in the future. I recommend that you direct the preparation of a civil defense study and a NSSM which would do so is at Tab A.\(^6\) State, Defense, OMB, and the Federal Preparedness Agency in GSA concur.

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\(^4\) The panel’s report, April 1, and Hebert’s cover letter to Ford, May 18, are both attached, but not printed.


\(^6\) Tab A, as signed, is Document 95. In a July 20 memorandum to the President’s Staff Secretary Jim Connor, Friedersdorf wrote, “I concur with Scowcroft’s recommendation but would delay until after Kansas City [site of the Republican Party’s national convention, August 16–19]. This review could be seized upon as proof of alleged deficient military posture and indication U.S. civilian population is in danger of military balance shift to Soviet advantage.” (Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 30, Subject File, National Security—Civil Defense)
RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my signing the NSSM at Tab A calling for a re-
view of U.S. civil defense policy. 7

7 Ford initialed his approval.

93. Executive Summary of a Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc
National Security Study Memorandum 228 Interagency
Group


I. INTRODUCTION

In National Security Memorandum (NSSM) 228, 2 the National Se-
curity Council directed that a study be performed by representatives of
eight federal departments and agencies to reassess current stockpile
planning guidance.

Phase I of this study, which was completed in November 1975, ex-
amined the methodology of stockpile planning and identified and de-
defined a number of factors that have a significant effect on stockpile
goals. The report of Phase I suggested that additional study be under-
taken to assess the methodology and define planning factors in more
detail.

In its directive of February 13, 1976, 3 the National Security Council
asked that the study be continued in the following areas:
—Alternative values which might be assigned to each of the plan-
ing factors;
—The computational methodology and the validity of the input
data;
—Political reliability of foreign sources of supply;
—Market and budget impacts of acquisitions and disposals;

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 11, NSC Meeting,
8/9/76—Stockpile (1). Secret. Eckerd forwarded the study to Scowcroft under a covering
memorandum, July 19. (Ibid.)
2 Document 56.
3 See Document 68.
—Other strategic stockpile planning issues which may arise.

It directed that the complete stockpile planning process be analyzed and that these results be incorporated in a report of the study chaired by the representative of the Administrator of General Services.

The study was chaired by the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency as the representative of the Administrator of General Services. An Interagency Steering Committee (ISC), composed of representatives of the NSSM addressees, was convened to review and approve significant components of the study, such as study group reports.

There were four major actions associated with the conduct of the study. The first major action was the establishment of study and review groups to address planning factors and topics requiring refinement or redefinition. These groups prepared reports and submitted them to the ISC for approval. The stockpile planning factors represent key assumptions in determining the “imbalances,” i.e., the differences between estimated supplies and estimated requirements.

In addition to the planning factors, other investigations were conducted to define market and budget impacts affecting commodity activities in general, to evaluate the computational procedures and the validity of the data, and to reexamine the complete stockpile planning process.

The second major action was the establishment of a Planning Factors Review Group, interagency in composition and chaired by FPA. This group used the reports of Part I to prepare estimates of the assignments to be made to each of the planning factors. The report of this group also was approved by the ISC.

The third major action involved the development of five options based on issues that had carried over from Phase I or that had arisen during the Phase II study; these options embraced priorities regarding the four issues raised for decision and review.

The fourth major action was the development of a proposed stockpile planning process to replace present stockpile management procedures.

The major accomplishments of the study are:

—Alternative values have been assigned to each of the planning factors.
—The computational methodology and validity of the input data have been subjected to rigorous examination.
—A new procedure has been developed to estimate the political reliability of foreign supplier nations, merging statistical techniques with the judgment of experts at the Department of State to provide a basis for rapid re-evaluation of foreign developments.
—A number of effects accompanying potential acquisition and disposal activities have been identified for use in estimating market
and budget impacts. These effects include international commodity market structure and industrial structure.

—A major accomplishment of the study is the development of new defense expenditure patterns expressing recent rapid changes in weapons systems technology. These expenditure patterns give a more effective basis for planning. The category-by-category distribution of civilian expenditures into essential and general components, though less than perfect, also represents a step forward.

—A new stockpile planning process has been developed making it possible to perform stockpile planning in a systematic, manageable way.

II. SUMMARY OF REPORT

The report of the study has six chapters which are summarized below. The chapters are entitled: Chapter I, Introduction; Chapter II, The Stockpile Planning Process; Chapter III, Planning Factors and Assigned Values; Chapter IV, Major Issues for Decision; Chapter V, Priorities and Policy Options; and Chapter VI, Matters for Review and Decision.

A. Introduction

Chapter I summarizes Phase I of this study and gave an overview of the Phase II methodology.

B. The Stockpile Planning Process

Chapter II presents a proposed stockpile planning process designed to overcome the following undesirable characteristics of the previous stockpile planning system: 1) a static planning process, resulting in stockpile objectives which were quickly out of date because of changes in economic, national security, technological, or foreign conditions; 2) inadequate mechanisms to upgrade data used in planning; 3) cumbersome mechanisms for developing interrelationships among disposal and acquisition decisions; and 4) lack of scheduled policy review of planning assumptions.

The proposed stockpile planning process consists of three main elements:

1. Review of Presidential Planning Guidance

   The President will direct a review of stockpile planning policy guidance every four years and more often if the situation requires. This review will be conducted in an interagency framework.

2. Updating of Stockpile Goals

   The Federal Preparedness Agency will update stockpile goals on a continuing basis as part of their normal stockpile management function, using Presidential guidance, current data, and the methodology established in this interdepartmental study.
3. Preparation of Annual Material Plan

The annual plan will be developed by a formal interdepartmental process, chaired by the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency. It will address incremental acquisition and disposal actions for the ensuing fiscal year and will be forwarded for inclusion in the President’s Budget. Because the plan will be prepared each year, it will reflect current budgetary and political conditions. The plan will also employ the results of a detailed market impact analysis. This analysis will be conducted for each material by forecasting the following two events: market behavior without Government entry as a buyer or seller of a particular material; and market behavior with government entry. International ramifications of stockpile transactions will be analyzed with the help of the Department of State and other interested organizations.

C. Planning Factors and Assigned Values

Chapter III discusses the stockpile planning factors examined in the study, and the derivation of the values assigned to them.

The interagency study groups agreed that the econometric techniques used in examining planning factors comprised the most advanced methodology available today. The methodology involved a large number of variables relating to many complex issues, requiring the use of a detailed macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy. This sophisticated approach to stockpile planning provides a sound basis for determining what the nation’s stockpile of strategic and critical materials should contain.

A number of separate planning factors are discussed in Chapter III. Three of them are discussed below to illustrate the type of work that was done during Phase II.

1. Political Reliability

Phase II substantially refined the concept of political reliability and improved its measurement. The concept was broadened to include a wide range of quantitative and qualitative characteristics of countries which affect their political reliability as suppliers of imports to the United States. The measurement of the concept has been improved in three major ways: a) by introducing procedures to include or exclude the countries with respect to supplying specific needs, in keeping with the philosophy of the variable-confidence level approach; b) by statistically re-estimating the political reliability of countries incorporating quantitative data with the qualitative judgments of Desk Officers of the Department of State; and c) by developing a rating form to be used by experts as a basis for recurrent reassessments of country ratings. An Appendix to Chapter III contains a table comparing the values assigned to these stockpile planning factors in Phase I and Phase II.
2. Civilian Tiers and Economic Planning Factors

To analyze stockpile requirements for civilian needs, the study split civilian consumption into two tiers, resulting in a total of three tiers: Defense, Essential Civilian, and General Civilian. These tiers were used to calculate stockpile imbalances for up to three years. Imbalance was defined as the shortfall that occurs when requirements exceed supply.

A stockpile imbalance was estimated for each tier, Defense, Essential Civilian, and General Civilian, in that order, for each year of the assumed war. These partial imbalances were added to obtain the total stockpile goal.

The principal distinction between the Essential Civilian and General Civilian tiers is the degree of risk one is willing to assume that civilian needs will go unmet. For Essential Civilian needs, only a low risk is acceptable, while for General Civilian needs a higher risk may be accepted. Products in the Essential Civilian tier must be made without substantial reduction in their content of strategic and critical materials, and are more directly related to the war effort. Products in the General Civilian tier may be made in varying degrees from substitute materials and are less supportive of the war effort. The degree of substitution on nonstrategic and noncritical materials for strategic and critical materials which is feasible in the economy is a necessary planning factor in estimating stockpile requirements.

3. DOD Expenditure Patterns

Defense expenditure estimates assume that a balanced force structure will be maintained during wartime. The balanced force concept relates production to the manner in which a war will be fought, by appropriate force-level mixes, for example, armored divisions to infantry divisions. The ability of the economy to manufacture the appropriate mix of combat equipment and weapons systems in balance with combat forces sets the pace of expansion of the nation’s defense force. Estimating the required plant expansion and the associated increase in military manpower make it possible to estimate the funds required to procure weapons systems and to pay military personnel.

Substantial improvement in defense expenditure pattern data was made in the course of the study. Phase I used 1969 data on weapons technology and manpower utilization to depict defense expenditure patterns. Phase II used updated information incorporating the effects of rapid changes in weapons systems technology, the latest available information on equipment attrition rates, and developments in manpower utilization rates that have taken place since 1969.

Phase II included estimates for three non-nuclear scenarios based on a balanced force structure: a) a simultaneous European and Asian
conflict preceded by a one-year warning period; b) one-front war without prior warning with redeployment from other theaters; and c) a one-front war with prior warning and no redeployment from other theaters.

4. Other Factors

Other areas discussed in detail in Chapter III included transportation losses; substitution of non-critical materials, import and export levels; material consumption ratios, which relate an industry’s level of output to its physical consumption of a material; special materials; computational methodology and data validity; storage of upgraded forms (semi-processed materials); and market and budget impacts.

Participating agencies agreed on the adequacy of the econometric techniques adopted for use in estimating stockpile goals. The agencies also expressed consensus regarding the values to be assigned to planning factors, and agreed that this approach to stockpile planning incorporates the best techniques available. Although participants acknowledged that there are uncertainties associated with the modeling process, with the accuracy of input data, and with the setting of the values of the planning factors, it was generally agreed that the estimates of stockpile imbalances are adequate for the next five years.

D. Major Issues for Decision

The study defines four major issues needing resolution and illustrates the issues in five policy options. Selection of one of the five options, described below, would resolve the four issues.

1. What type of war should be assumed for stockpile planning?

Alternatives include a) a two-front war or a one-front war with redeployment from a different theater (designated Level 1 mobilization) and b) a one-front war with no redeployment from a different theater (designated Level 2 mobilization).

2. What amount of lead-time for industrial and military mobilization should be assumed for stockpile planning?

Alternatives include a) no warning (M-Day and D-Day coincide) and b) one year of warning for mobilization (M-Day precedes D-Day by one year).

3. How many of years of war should be assumed for stockpile planning?

Alternatives include stockpiling for a) the first year of a non-nuclear conflict, b) the first two years of a non-nuclear conflict c) three years of a non-nuclear conflict, and d) more than three years of a non-nuclear conflict.
4. What degree of protection of civilian requirements should be assumed for stockpile planning?

Alternatives include a) Essential and Civilian tiers and b) only the Essential Civilian tier.

E. Priorities and Policy Options

Chapter IV presents priorities in the form of four issues requiring resolution. Chapter V presents five policy options containing combinations of priorities related to the four issues. Alternative stockpile levels have been derived within the framework of a variable-confidence system which allows the development of total stockpile levels consistent with the type of conventional war for which the President decides to prepare.

Calculations of total stockpile requirements to support two alternative levels of mobilization (Level 1 and Level 2) are based on separate calculations for Defense, Essential Civilian, and General Civilian needs in each of three war years. Separate calculations make it possible to 1) group the requirements for all three years into three tiers permitting the selection of one, two, or all three tiers and 2) group requirements according to war year, permitting a selection of the first, the first two, or the first three years of the war effort for stockpile planning.

This nine-cell year-tier grouping permits flexibility in risk assignment in stockpile planning. As indicated in the Phase I report, the majority of participating agencies believe that any acceptable level of mobilization or other policy preference, such as the extent of stockpiling for civilian needs, can be represented in the year-tier matrix by the risks associated with removing one or more of the nine cells. Three agencies did not adopt this point of view and believe that a separate matrix is required for each level of mobilization. Six-cell options which exclude General Civilian requirements are presented for both levels of mobilization.

Chapter V presents estimates of the dollar values associated with each of the resulting five options. The dollar figures are useful as a reference for relative magnitude, but in no way reflect the actual dollar flows that would accompany any given option. Because of the way in which the stockpile planning process will work in practice, as will be explained later, comparison of the options by stated dollar value is of limited significance for fiscal purposes.

As discussed above, Phase II of the study introduces a new process requiring policy guidance review every four years. Planning should focus on a mid-term evaluation to be undertaken about every five years instead of trying to implement directly goals that might take 15 to 20 years or more to attain because of market disruption problems. This would be useful in accounting for change in relevant data, variations in
international conditions, and changes in economic and technological conditions. Keying planning to the mid-term permits tracking these data and events. This will also be consistent with policy review every four years. It also provides the flexibility to consider major programs in an incremental context through the use of the priorities accompanying the option selected. The mid-term evaluation will determine 1) progress to date on the planning, 2) new directions required because of changes in the environment in which the process must operate, and 3) the new guidance required to keep the system viable.

Additional flexibility is introduced in the decision and budgeting process through the annual plan. As priorities are applied to acquisitions, appropriate amounts of disposals also can be scheduled.

The five policy options presented for the President’s consideration, and the planning guidance associated with each one are below. A table following the discussion lists the five options and the planning guidance associated with each.

1. **Option A**

   Option A assumes a two-front war (Level 1 mobilization), with one year of lead-time or warning, with the stockpile meeting the requirements of the Essential and General Civilian tiers for the first three years of war.

   This option is supported by representatives of the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, State, and Defense (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and of the Federal Preparedness Agency, GSA. Twenty percent of the value of the option falls into the Defense tier, 26 percent in the Essential Civilian tier, and 54 percent in the General Civilian tier.

   The sponsors of this option believe that, of the options presented, it provides the most risk-free stockpile configuration with respect to national security because:

   a) it provides a stockpile with the flexibility to respond to a conventional war with more than one front (and, hence, any conventional war of smaller magnitude); and

   b) it incorporates acceptable assumptions regarding the degree of austerity imposed in the event of such a conflict.

   Opponents of Option A believe that it is unlikely that the United States will have to engage in a prolonged conventional two-front war of extended duration. They also believe that a greater degree of civilian austerity than that required by Option A is acceptable as a basis for stockpile planning.

2. **Option B**

   The major difference between Option B and Option A is that Option B assumes no year of warning or lead-time for military and indus-
trial mobilization prior to war. Option B assumes a one-front war with redeployment from the second theater (Level 1 mobilization) with no year of lead-time or warning, with the stockpile meeting the requirements of the Essential and General Civilian tiers for the first three years of war.

Not sponsored by any agency, this option is offered to highlight the issue of whether stockpile planning should assume that there will be a year of warning for mobilization prior to war.

The distribution of the Option B stockpile within tiers is similar to Option A, but there is relatively less in the Defense tier (18 percent of the stockpile versus 20 percent in Option A) and relatively more in the Essential Civilian tier (31 percent versus 26 percent for Option A). This reflects a lower starting level of U.S. industrial capability and preparedness when there is no warning period.

The argument for Option B is that the industrial base of the economy is so strong and adaptable that the nation does not need to plan on a year of warning before war.

The argument against Option B is that it imposes unacceptably high rates of capacity expansion on industry by assuming no lead-time for industrial mobilization.

3. **Option C**

The major difference between Option C and Option A is that Option C does not provide for General Civilian needs. It provides for the Defense and Essential Civilian tiers during the first three years of war and assumes a two-front war (Level 1 mobilization) with one year of warning. The Defense tier carries 44 percent and the Essential Civilian tier 56 percent of the Option C stockpile.

Representatives of OMB, Treasury, and CIEP endorse Option C. However, their support of this option is contingent on rejection of Option E, which they prefer.

Supporters of Option C argue that the nation should stockpile for a major two-front war, but that it is not essential for General Civilian needs to be covered because the level of austerity assumed in the option is acceptable. The argument against Option C is that it requires an unacceptable level of austerity in the civilian economy.

4. **Option D**

Option D assumes a one-front war (Level 2 mobilization) with one year of lead-time or warning, and no deployment of forces that might be available from another theater. The Option D stockpile provides for Defense, Essential Civilian, and General Civilian needs during the first three years of a war.
Those who argue against this option believe that it may not meet our minimal national security requirements, especially if a one-front war cannot be contained, or if the war evolves into one of extended duration. Nonsupporters believe that it is very risky to assume that containment to one front would be possible.

No particular agency sponsors Option D. It is offered to provide a comparison between the stockpile for a two-front war (Option A) and a one-front war (Option D). The argument for the option is that it is unlikely that the United States will be engaged in a war of sufficient size to require that forces be redeployed from a second theater.

5. Option E

Option E assumes a one-front war (Level 2 mobilization) with one year of lead-time or warning, and no redeployment of forces that might be available from another theater. The Option E stockpile provides for only Defense and Essential Civilian needs during the first three years of war.

Representatives of OMB, Treasury, and CIEP sponsor this option. Their argument for supporting it is that it is unlikely that the U.S. will be involved in a war requiring high levels of mobilization, and thus, there is no need either to stockpile for such levels or to provide for all civilian requirements.

The argument against Option E is that it is very risky to plan on the assumption that mobilization necessary to fight on a two-front basis will not be required. If the assumption about the level of mobilization proves to be invalid, a) national defense requirements cannot be met by providing for only a Level 2 mobilization, and b) civilian austerity levels envisioned will be intolerable.

The table, Policy Options and Associated Planning Guidance, summarizes the five options and the assumptions which they employ.4

6. Implementation of Goals

Stockpile goals associated with any option are unlikely to be implemented in their entirety, because: a) stockpile goals are continuously updated as new data become available; b) goals for some materials cannot be achieved (through acquisitions or disposals) in fewer than fifteen or twenty years without disrupting normal markets; and c) major reviews of stockpile policy are anticipated every four years.

In every option the stockpile goals for some materials are already met through the use of existing inventories. For other materials, acqui-

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4 Attached, but not printed.
sitions would be necessary if the goals were to be completely implemented. For a third set of materials which are stockpiled in a variety of forms, existing inventories do not match the “ideal” mix suggested by the stockpile goals. For example, in every option the existing inventory of ferro-tungsten falls short of the goals. In these cases, standard stockpile management procedures would be to hold the ore in the inventory until it could be upgraded or otherwise beneficiated to meet the ferro-tungsten goals. The table on the following page illustrates the estimated budgetary effects of implementing Options A through E for the first 5 years. For example, potential acquisitions during the first 5 years under Option A would include $1.5 billion. Potential disposals would include $2.4 billion for Option A during the initial five year period.

### Comparison of Options and Implementation of Goals

(\textit{In $ Billions, Based on December 1975 Market Prices})

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option A</th>
<th>Option B</th>
<th>Option C</th>
<th>Option D</th>
<th>Option E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value of Inventory</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Stockpile Goals</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Implemented Goals</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Acquisitions (5 Years, 6-cells)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Disposals (5 Years)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Implemented Goals (After 5 Years)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Inventory (After 5 Years)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Value of stockpile goals:} the value of the stockpile goals for each option is given in December 1975 market prices. These range from $10.2 billion to $2.5 billion.

\textit{Value of implemented goals:} the starting values represent the value of the existing inventories (including alternate forms) that can be credited towards the stockpile goal. The implemented goals after five years are derived by adding new acquisitions. After five years the implemented goals range from $4.9 billion for Option A to $2.3 billion for Option E.

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\textsuperscript{5} Definitions of terms are: \textit{Value of inventory:} the value of the stockpile inventory assumed December 1975 market prices. The starting value is $6.8 billion for all options. The value after five years, which is derived by adding intervening acquisitions and subtracting intervening disposals, ranges between $5.9 billion and $4.1 billion. [Footnote in the original.]
Potential acquisitions: the practicable acquisitions assume market constraints. Budgetary considerations could allow implementation of more or less than 6 priorities. These vary from $2.1 billion to $0.5 billion.

Potential disposals: these assume normal market conditions during the 5 year period and vary from $2.4 billion to $3.2 billion.

The table illustrates that although there are dramatic differences between the values of the goals associated with Options A and E, the differences over the short term (5 years) are much smaller. At the end of 4 years, the existing stockpile policy guidance will be re-assessed in light of the program actions of the prior years. If appropriate, new guidance will be issued for the ensuing 5 years.

F. Matters for Review and Decision

Chapter VI point out two subjects raised in the study that require NSC review and Presidential decision. These subjects are as follows.

1. A decision is needed regarding the acceptance of the stockpile planning process described in Chapter II.

2. To resolve the four issues raised in Chapter IV, selection of one of the options as soon as possible is needed. This will permit early implementation of the planning process as well as coordination with the President’s Fiscal Year 1978 budget.

III. SUMMARY OF AGENCY COMMENTS

Each of the NSSM 228 addressees formally and informally commented on the draft of this study report. All comments were reviewed, and those judged to be primarily of an editorial nature were incorporated (with the concurrence of the ISC) when preparing the final report. Each Agency’s formal response, along with an analysis of the response, is included in its entirety in an appendix to the main report. All the participating agencies agree that Phases I and II of the study represent a major advance in the technology of stockpile planning. The agencies concur that this technology has progressed to such a degree that meaningful stockpile policy guidance may be formulated within the context of the four major issues described in Section III and in Chapter IV of the main study. Each of these issues is resolved by selecting one of the options offered by the study. Furthermore, all participants believe the study can be forwarded to the NSC, so that they may develop alternate choices for the President’s decision. Finally, the participants believe that the study should not recommend a particular option, but that the recommendations of the individual participants be reported. The comments of a general or substantive nature by each study participant are summarized below.
A. Department of State

The Department of State in general concurs with the content and methodology of the Phase II Report and agrees that it should be forwarded to the National Security Council, including the various stockpiling options which are developed in the report. The Department of State favors a high-confidence stockpile, similar to Option A, and agrees with the priority ranking of the nine-cell Option A matrix. State feels that a high-confidence-level (Option A) stockpile more accurately reflects the spirit and intent of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act and takes into account the concept of balanced forces, together with the more material-intensive nature of preparedness and weaponry.

State recommends that consideration of market impacts, particularly the impact of acquisitions and disposals on international markets and on U.S. international economic relations, be included as a part of any process leading to the implementation of stockpile goals. The stockpile planning process, as summarized above and described in detail in Chapter II, provides for these concerns since a) an analysis of market impacts, both domestic and international for specific materials is an integral portion of the annual planning process, b) stockpile goals are updated as new data becomes available, and c) the planning process provides for a policy review every four years or sooner if changed conditions warrant.

B. Department of the Treasury

The Department of the Treasury considers the Phase II report an adequate basis for formulating issues for Presidential decision and recommends it be forwarded to the NSC. Treasury supports Option E: a stockpile for defense and essential civilian tier requirements for three years of a one-front war (Level 2 mobilization). This Option, in their opinion, represents the best balance between the likelihood of this occurrence and the needs of the civilian economy to support a war effort.

Treasury recognizes the need for the continuing improvement and refinement in many of the technical areas of stockpiling, but believes this can be best achieved at the staff level rather than through further interagency study.

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6 After the issuance of the NSSM 228 report, Robinson conveyed the Department's views, summarized below, in a July 24 memorandum to Scowcroft. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 12, NSC Meeting, 8/9/76—Stockpile (4))

7 Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Edwin H. Yeo, III conveyed his Department's views, summarized below, to Scowcroft in an undated memorandum. (Ibid.)
Treasury finds the proposed stockpile planning process appealing and believes that a more thorough review of the process be made before being implemented.

C. Department of Defense

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) views were expressed in separate comments from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).8 Both OSD and JCS state that the study is a major effort responsive to NSSM 228 and that meaningful stockpile policy guidance can be formulated within the context of the four major issues identified in Section III of this Executive Summary and in Chapter IV of the main report.

OSD and JCS request that certain aspects of the DOD expenditure patterns and levels employed during this study be highlighted. Specifically, the DOD expenditure patterns presented are constrained by an evaluation of present industrial expansion capability and present technology. They are not based on the total requirements to offset the perceived threat now or in the future.

In particular, the patterns associated with the limited mobilization options D and E do not represent any accepted DOD pattern. This scenario assumed a European conflict with no deployment to Europe of those forces that otherwise would fight in Asia, and thus is regarded as highly unrealistic because if Asia were quiescent, clearly, many of those forces would be deployed to fight in the NATO engagement.

OJCS strongly recommends pursuing the stockpile policy as contained in Option A of the study, since it is the most protective of the national security and most closely meets the criteria set forth in the legislation.

OSD did not specifically recommend a particular option in their comment, but let stand their association with Option A in the body of the report.

D. Office of Management and Budget9

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considers the range of issues for Presidential decisions to be clearly identified, and includes those important matters which should be presented to him. OMB also considers that the alternatives presented for his decision with regard to the stockpile size are representative of a sufficiently wide range of alter-

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8 After the issuance of the NSSM 228 report, Clements conveyed his Department’s view, summarized below, to Scowcroft in a memorandum, July 23. (Ibid.) Comments from the JCS were not found.

9 After the issuance of the NSSM 228 report, Lynn conveyed his Office’s views, summarized below, to Scowcroft in a July 23 memorandum. (Ibid.)
natives so that he will have a meaningful choice. In particular OMB supports Option E, believing that this option prudently balances risks and budgetary resources.

Further, they indicate that a one-front (Level II) mobilization option represents an adequate hedge against errors in present defense budgeting and the cost of covering the general civilian tier would be unacceptably high.

OMB notes that stockpile materials would help insure that the United States could assist allied nations, and the stockpile has the potential to act as a deterrent against commodity embargoes or cartels. While these may be beneficial aspects of stockpiling, OMB can find no existing statutory or policy rationale suggesting that the stockpile should be used for these purposes, and therefore suggests they should not be considered an argument when choosing an option.

E. Department of the Interior.\textsuperscript{10}

The Department of the Interior endorses the general methodology of stockpile calculations, and supports Option A.

Interior states that the legislative mandates contained in the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946, the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, and the Employment Act of 1946 require stockpiling for identified civilian as well as military requirements. They believe stockpiles adequate to ensure full utilization of our industrial productive capacity are essential to safeguard the welfare of the Nation.

F. Council on International Economic Policy.\textsuperscript{11}

The Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) recommends the report be forwarded to the NSC. CIEP has a preference for stockpile Option E, regarding Option E as a generous hedge against an extremely unlikely calamity.

Although the initial efforts (first five years) to implement any one stockpile option as opposed to another will entail only relatively small differential cost considerations from the standpoint of the budget, CIEP states that the discussion of this feature in the report tends to obfuscate certain key issues. CIEP believes that there should be further interagency discussion on the proposed stockpile planning process.

\textsuperscript{10} After the issuance of the NSSM 228 report, Assistant Secretary of the Interior William L. Fisher conveyed his Department’s views, summarized below, to Scowcroft in a memorandum, July 23. (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{11} After the issuance of the NSSM 228 report, Gorog conveyed the CIEP’s views, summarized below, in a July 23 memorandum to Scowcroft. (Ibid.)
G. Department of Commerce\(^\text{12}\)

The Department of Commerce prefers the stockpile policy guidance designated in the report as Option A. The Department notes that the constraints imposed on the development of military requirements by the Department of Defense result in an expansion of the military forces by the end of three years of war to only a little over four million persons. Commerce considers this to be a very modest force with which to prosecute a successful defense against a major land, sea and air war against a strong enemy. Commerce expressed the opinion that the assumptions made in the study of strict economic controls on the civilian economy could cause serious economic disruptions and result in the inability of the industrial base to support direct military requirements.

The Department of Commerce takes the position that Option A offers very moderate insurance against the risk of wartime materials shortages. At the same time, the goals of Option A can be attained only over an extended period of years, thus minimizing annual budgetary impacts.

[Omitted here is the table of contents and the body of the study.]

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\(^{12}\) After the issuances of the NSSM 228 report, Under Secretary of Commerce Edward O. Vetter conveyed his Department’s views, summarized below, to Scowcroft in a memorandum, July 22. (Ibid.)

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94. Memorandum From Richard T. Boverie of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Senior Review Group Meeting on Strategic Stockpile Policy—
Thursday, July 22, 1976

There will be a meeting of the Senior Review Group at 10:30 a.m., Thursday, July 22, 1976. The purpose of this meeting is to review the

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 17, Senior Review Group Meeting, 7/22/76—Strategic Stockpile (NSSM 228) (1). Secret. Sent for information.
final stockpile study (NSSM 228) report (Tab I)\(^2\) and reach agreement on a recommendation (or alternatively, limit the number of options) for Administration stockpile policy to be presented to the President.

**Background**

In August 1975, the President called for an interagency study to examine alternatives to the current Strategic Stockpile Planning Guidelines (NSDM 203)\(^3\) issued by President Nixon in February 1973. The study was prompted by Congressional refusal to consider Administration bills for disposal of material from the stockpile. Since December 1973, Congressman Charles Bennett (D-Florida), Chairman of the HASC Seapower Subcommittee, has held up all of our disposal requests. Additionally, the earlier NSDM 197 Critical Commodities study\(^4\) had indicated probable inadequacies in stockpile objectives for a few key materials.

An initial report was completed by the interagency group in January 1976, and provided a methodology for determining stockpile objectives. This methodology represents a truly major increase in the degree of sophistication in our approach to stockpile structuring and planning. It allows selection of the elements of the economy which are to be protected by the stockpile and the degree and length of protection for each element. Unlike current guidance, this new approach allows alternative entering assumptions regarding the size and intensity of postulated conflicts, the time period over which wartime demands would be made on the stockpile, and the extent of protection of both the military and civilian sectors of the economy. This “year-tier” matrix planning methodology was outlined for you in an earlier memo (Tab B) to the President.\(^5\)

The study effort just completed was chaired by General Leslie Bray, Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA), and included representatives of State, Treasury, Defense (including JCS), Interior, Commerce, OMB, and CIEP. All participating agencies agree that the methodology is a considerable improvement over the current form of planning guidance. The agencies have differing views, however, as to kinds of contingencies for which we should stockpile and the extent to which the stockpile should provide for certain aspects of civilian economic demand. A brief review of past policy may be useful in examining the relevant issues.

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\(^2\) Document 93.

\(^3\) Document 3.


\(^5\) Document 68.
FPA currently implements the 1946 Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. Using Presidential guidance, FPA determines what materials should be stockpiled, and in what quantities. FPA carries out acquisition, storage, and disposal of materials based upon an annual plan. In gross terms, the stockpile grew in the 1950’s and was subsequently reduced in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. In 1973, President Nixon changed the planning guidelines (NSDM 203, Tab E) with a resulting significant reduction in stockpile objectives, from $6.4 billion to $700 million.

Congressional concern that this new policy could harm national security was reinforced by the oil embargo and threat of cartel-like supply disruptions in other critical materials. Congressional refusal to consider Administration disposal requests meant that the existing stockpile, currently valued at approximately $6.8 billion, could not be reduced, even for materials deemed to be excess under the most conservative criteria.

Issues for Decision

In establishing a comprehensive stockpile policy, it is necessary to make choices and decisions in three general areas: (1) the roles or purposes of the stockpile; (2) the method of translating these purposes into specific stockpile requirements; and (3) a process whereby annual stockpile planning can be implemented and updated with changes in data and, if required, in the guiding policy itself.

1. Purpose of the Stockpile. The stockpile has traditionally been viewed as a hedge, an insurance policy, to protect against wartime shortages of critical materials caused by both increased consumption and interruption or loss of overseas sources of supply. Within our stockpile study, there is basic agreement that some degree of such insurance is necessary. There are differences, however, as the extent of protection which should be provided, and the options presented in the stockpile study reflect in part these differences. The differences are of three types: nature of assumed conflict, warning time and war duration, and extent of protection of the civilian sector of the economy.

A. Nature of Assumed Conflict. Traditional stockpile planning (i.e., prior to NSDM 203 in 1973) has postulated very large-scale worldwide conflicts and derived stockpile objectives based upon these World War II-type scenarios. Current military force structure planning utilizes different kinds of assumptions. The participating agencies support two options which assume contingencies which only partially mirror US strategy for force structure planning.

—Option A, supported by OSD, JCS, State, Commerce, Interior, and FPA, assumes a “two-front war” in Europe and Asia. This scenario falls somewhere between the “one and a half” war planning guidance
resulting from NSSM 3 (NSDMs 276 and 230)\(^7\) on the one hand and traditional World War II-type assumptions (10–15 million men under arms) on the other. OSD and JCS have had some difficulties with the fact that this difference exists, and OSD has argued in its formal study comments (Tab E, Appendix)\(^8\) that Presidential action on the stockpile be deferred pending a “NSSM 3” review.

—Option E, favored by OMB, Treasury, and CIEP, postulates a one-front war with no redeployment of forward-based forces from the other side of the world. In simplistic terms, this option yields a lower stockpile objective because attrition and resupply computations are applied to a smaller force structure base than in Option A. While this position’s proponents argue primarily on the basis of their assessment of the comparative likelihood of the two levels of conflict, they also argue that their “war” more closely reflects the strategy NSDMs than does the Option A scenario. Option E appears to be favored, too, in great part because of its very low costs compared to the other options.

B. Warning Time and War Duration. Both Options A and E assume a full year’s warning time in which to mobilize for war. This is again a traditional stockpile policy assumption, and differs significantly from current NSDM guidance and OSD planning for war-fighting which assume only 23 days (30-day pact mobilization with 7-day NATO warning lag).

Because of OSD/JCS concern about using a different mobilization assumption in stockpile planning than in other planning, General Bray inserted Option B, a “no warning” scenario consistent with current OSD policy. OSD and JCS have continued to support the larger Option A (larger because of the increased industrial capacity—and thus material consumption—associated with war years preceded by the one-year mobilization “running start”). However, this issue may be raised at the meeting.

The question of war duration and its relation to stockpile size presents a similar kind of issue. Both Options A and E provide three years of material supply for wartime consumption levels. Arguments have been voiced, particularly by Treasury, that the likelihood of large-scale wars remaining conventional for extended periods is not great, and that stockpile objectives for less than three years should be adequate. While Treasury has accepted a three-year package in Option E, they (and OMB and CIEP) may reopen the year issue should the meeting move toward consensus on Option A. Note that the three-year...
stockpile involves no tapering off, and is described as providing for the first three years of a war of unspecified duration.

C. Extent of Protection of the Civilian Sector of the Economy. This is undoubtedly the most difficult conceptual issue to be resolved, and will probably require some detailed explanation to the SRG by you or General Bray. A brief description of the stockpile study methodology in this area may clarify some points regarding civilian requirements.

In each of the five options, normal peacetime civilian economic requirements are altered rather significantly to impose conditions of wartime austerity. These alterations include reductions in: standard of living (up to 10 percent), housing construction (up to 75 percent), and durables consumption (up to 50 percent). After these adjustments are made, the remaining civilian requirements are split into two tiers, Essential and General Civilian. The term “Essential” is an unfortunate label, because it does not imply “essential” in terms of the functioning of the economy. Both categories, Essential and General, are defined as necessary to support the economy, even under austerity assumptions.

Instead, “Essential” and “General” involve two further levels of categorization. Within the Essential group are products “more directly relevant to the war effort” and requiring inputs of strategic materials for which there are no “non-strategic” substitutes. The “General” category may be made in varying degree from substitute materials and is “less supportive of the war effort.” The supporters of Option A (DOD, State, Commerce, Interior, FPA) believe that a stockpile should provide for both of these categories. The proponents of Option E (OMB, Treasury, CIEP) feel that the degree of austerity appropriate for general war is consistent with providing only for the “Essential” category. This latter position is influenced in no small way by the fact that, for any stockpile option using this methodology, fully half of the materials requirements are generated in the “General Civilian” category. It can be expected, then, that should the SRG move toward Option A, OMB, CIEP, and Treasury will raise this issue as a way of reducing that larger option’s ultimate pricetag from $10.2 billion to $4.7 billion (see page V–4 of the report for Option A’s year-tier breakdown).

2. Method of Translating Stockpile Purposes into Objectives. There is basic agency agreement that the study methodology provides a much improved tool for setting stockpile objectives based upon a set of agreed input assumptions. Because the study’s planning model does represent a sophisticated tool for deriving objectives, you should seek to reaffirm agency acceptance of the approach, subject to updating in the annual materials planning process. While we will not attempt to detail here some of the rather esoteric aspects of the model and agency staff level concerns about them, you should be aware that certain of these could be raised. If such issues are raised, it would be appropriate for
you to suggest that they be left to staff level resolution, rather than be addressed by the principals.

3. Annual Stockpile Planning. The important aspect of Chapter II of the study is that it is an FPA product inserted after initial agency comments on the final report. As such, it has received only cursory agency review, and has caused some working level consternation and cries of an “end run.” In fact, the planning process contains little in the way of surprises. It calls for interagency participation on an annual basis and recommends a Presidential review of the stockpile every four years. While you may hear procedural grumblings on Chapter II, there should not be any significant opposition to its substance.

Outcome of the Meeting

You should attempt to secure SRG acceptance of a single option, and this will most likely involve Option A or some variation thereof. If this is not possible, the arguments for and against Options A and E should be highlighted for Presidential consideration, perhaps at an NSC meeting.

Conduct of the Meeting

Les Bray will be prepared to review for the SRG the background, options, and major issues, and has prepared briefing charts (Tab H) along those lines. You should raise the following specific issues for discussion and decision:

—Type of War (Nature of Assumed Conflict)
—Warning Time and Duration (only if raised; study currently implies consensus on one-year warning, three-year stockpile objectives)
—Extent of Civilian Economy Coverage (this issue applies both between Options A and E and within the context of either individual option)
—Acceptance of the study’s methodology for determining stockpile objectives (reaffirm)
—Acceptance of the study’s recommended planning process (Chapter II)

RECOMMENDATIONS

We suggest that you take a position on the above decision issues as follows:

• Role of the Stockpile. The stockpile is a hedge, an insurance policy, against catastrophic failure of our military capability and wartime civilian economy under certain intensive war scenarios.

9 Attached, but not printed.
• **Type of War.** It seems prudent to base stockpile requirements on military contingencies at least as great as those used to plan force structure. As such, the “two-front war” assumption from Option A appears to represent an appropriate scale of warfare upon which to base a stockpile, approximating as it does the general level of conflict assumed for large-scale conventional war scenarios in current strategy guidance (the “two-front war” of Option A is of a similar magnitude to the somewhat ambiguous guidance in NSDMs 27 and 230).

• **Warning Time and War Duration.** The one-year mobilization and three-year stockpile objectives are also consistent with maintaining a hedge. It is important to view the kind of stockpile derived from these assumptions and the type of insurance which it provides for various contingencies rather than dwell on individual entering assumptions.

• **Extent of Civilian Economy Protection.** As to the extent of civilian economy protection, the disputed “General Civilian” category does include aspects of wartime economy which are “necessary” or “essential” to civilian needs, even under significant austerity assumptions.

• **The Methodology and Planning Process.** The methodology and planning process proposed in the study are significant improvements over the past, and provide a vehicle for continuous review and updating of both requirements and data. Such a planning approach is mandatory, given the nature of change regarding military equipment, materials technology, substitutability, and supply and costs for individual materials.

• **Decision Flexibility.** The chart on page 14 of the Executive Summary indicates that for the first five years of acquisitions and disposals, there are major similarities for the various options. Over this period, we foresee a measured pace of purchases and sales designed to avoid market disruptions. Additionally, there is agency agreement on the need to dispose of large amounts of current stocks not required for any of our contemplated options. The characteristics of this mid-term schedule give us a high degree of decision flexibility.

• **Opportunity for Future Review.** Even five years of acquisitions and disposals based upon one option do not lead us too far afield from the objectives of any other option. We can plan on a decision now knowing that subsequent review (the study suggests four year intervals) will allow us to modify our basic program if necessary, and we will have the advantage at that time of updated data and military information.

• **Congressional Aspects.** Congressional feelings on the issue appear to argue for a significant shift on our part from the NSDM 203 guidelines back toward “traditional” stockpile planning in order to secure legislative support for our backlog of disposal requests. The kind of assumptions about war in-

\[^{10}\text{See footnote 4, Document 93.}\]
tensity and duration and coverage of the civilian economy provided in Option A appear to constitute such a shift, while the Option E assumptions do not.

- **Compromise Considerations.** If we cannot reach agreement on Option A as the appropriate choice, we should attempt to modify that option without changing its assumptions regarding a two-front war and the civilian economy. This could take the form of a recommendation that we stockpile for the first two years of the Option (yielding a two-year $6.6 billion cost versus the three-year figure of $10.2 billion), or retain only two of the three years of the General Civilian (GC) tier (this yields an $8.4 billion total). Compromises such as this would maintain much of the Congressional appeal of this Option compared to current (NSDM 203) policy or to Option E.11

[Omitted here is a list of the contents of Scowcroft’s briefing book.]

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11 No record of the SRG meeting was found. However, Boverie briefly summarized its results in an August 5 memorandum to Scowcroft: “At the July 22 SRG meeting, the discussion indicated areas of agreement and of dispute, and helped to focus upon issues for Presidential decision.” (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 12, NSC Meeting, 8/9/76—Stockpile (5))

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95. **National Security Study Memorandum 244**


**TO**

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, General Services Administration

**SUBJECT**

U.S. Civil Defense Policy

The President has directed a review of U.S. civil defense policy as set forth in NSDM 184, dated August 14, 1972.2 The study should reflect

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Study and Decision Memoranda, Box 2, NSSM 244. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of HUD, the Director of ACDA, the Chairman of the JCS, and the DCI.

2 See footnote 3, Document 92.
the impact on civil defense policy of international political and military developments since NSDM 184 was issued and take into account the current status of U.S. and Soviet civil defense programs, their potential impact on the strategic nuclear balance, and their implications for our flexible nuclear options strategy (NSDM 242).3

The study should review our current civil defense program, its effectiveness and cost, and propose a range of alternative civil defense policies and accompanying programs, including their effectiveness and costs. In addition to the above considerations, the review should take into account, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

—Fallout shelters and emergency food and medical supplies.
—Civil defense warning and communications.
—Strategic evacuation of urban areas.
—Protection of key industrial installations.
—Education programs and materials
—The appropriate relationship between civil defense and natural disaster preparedness programs.
—The organizational structure for management of civil defense activities.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the recipients of this memorandum and chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the ad hoc group should draw upon other Departments and Agencies for assistance in those portions of the study dealing with substance in their areas of interest. The study report should be submitted by September 30, 1976, for review by the NSC Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.

Brent Scowcroft

3 Document 31.
96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
U.S. Anti-Satellite Capability

In approving the NSDM on protecting U.S. satellites, you requested further comments on the status and prospects for a U.S. anti-satellite capability.

The U.S. has not had an operational anti-satellite capability for several years and, under current plans, will not for some time in the future. The nuclear anti-satellite system we maintained on Johnson Island in the Pacific was phased out in 1974. Some limited R&D has been pursued on a non-nuclear anti-satellite interceptor; however, this effort has received little emphasis in the past. DOD now plans some increase in funding for this area, leading to an experimental test in the early 1980s and a possible limited operational capability in the mid-1980s.

The NSC technical consultants panel which had earlier submitted an interim report on satellite survivability issues has now provided a second Interim Report (Tab A) summarizing their preliminary findings with respect to a U.S. anti-satellite capability.

The Panel concluded that space assets are now playing a key role in determining the effectiveness and capabilities of important elements of the military forces of both the U.S. and the Soviets. The Panel believes that, as a matter of national policy, the U.S. should not allow the Soviets an exclusive sanctuary in space. The U.S. should acquire the option of selectively neutralizing militarily important Soviet space capabilities. The need for such a U.S. anti-satellite capability is related to its military value and is not directly related to the Soviet anti-satellite program. The Panel identified several technical options for achieving such a capability, including electronic attack as well as physical attack. These preliminary conclusions are discussed in more detail in the Interim Report at Tab A.

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2 NSDM 333 is Document 91.

3 A July 16 letter to Scowcroft from Solomon J. Buchsbaum, Chairman of the NSC Ad Hoc Panel on Technological Evolution and Vulnerability of Space Systems, conveying the panel’s findings, summarized herein, is attached, but not printed.
At present the U.S. anti-satellite program is not receiving emphasis because, in part, there is no national policy to develop an anti-satellite capability. The lack of a policy decision has been related to:

—Our perception (now seen as incorrect) that the Soviets were not aggressively pursuing an anti-satellite system;
—A concern that preparation for satellite interception would be contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the SALT protection of “national technical means,” and;
—[2½ lines not declassified]

The fact of the Soviet intercept tests alters these perceptions and the strategic and political policies connected with the possible development and deployment of a U.S. anti-satellite capability need to be reexamined.

The NSC consultants panel is accelerating its work and will have more specific recommendations in its Final Report, which I hope to have by September. I will forward specific recommendations for action at that time.

97. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting


SUBJECT
Strategic Stockpile

PRINCIPALS
The President
Acting Secretary of the State Philip C. Habib
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
Secretary of the Interior Thomas Kleppe
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James L. Holloway
The Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
The Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency Major General Leslie Bray

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting, August 9, 1976. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Brackets are in the original. No date appears on the minutes, which erroneously indicate that the meeting began at 11:00 a.m. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place on August 9, actually lasting from 2:15 until 3:30 p.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Files, President’s Daily Diary)
President Ford: Congratulations to those who put together the strategic stockpile study. It is well done, and lays out problems and choices for us here today. I see that there is some difference of opinion, and that is not unusual. We have got to come up with something better and we cannot just drift; it would not be good for the country. What we need is a solution that is justifiable before the Congress. Brent, you have overseen the stockpile study. Would you please lay out the background and issues for us?

General Scowcroft: For 30 years, the US has maintained a stockpile of certain strategic materials necessary for defense production and other economic needs and for which sources of supply might be cut off in wartime. The 1946 law concerning the stockpile gives us some leeway as to the overall size but does require that the stockpile protect basic national security and economic needs should supplies be disrupted. In 1973, President Nixon issued new guidance which reduced stockpile objectives from the then current $4.6 billion dollar inventory to approximately $700 million. A significant element of this guidance was the decision to base stockpile planning on only a one-year supply of wartime requirements. Key Congressmen, particularly Charlie Bennett, whose House Subcommittee handles stockpile legislation, felt that this policy could harm national security and has refused to act on any legislation for disposal from the stockpile. For three years, we have attempted to win interim approval from Congress to dispose of those portions of the stockpile that have been deemed surplus under even the

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2 Document 93.
3 See Document 10.
4 Representative Charles Edward Bennett (D-Florida).
most conservative criteria. In every instance, Bennett has refused to consider our bills pending some Presidential revision of stockpile guidance away from the 1973 guidelines and toward more traditional planning assumptions. Based upon this, Mr. President, you asked us last year to conduct a comprehensive interagency review of stockpile policy. That study effort has involved two parts: first, a review of our overall strategic stockpile policy requirements and assumptions; and secondly, procedures for the management of that stockpile to include the annual planning process for acquisitions and disposals of various materials. The 1946 stockpile law mandates that all acquisitions and disposals be made so as not to cause market disruptions. Our study’s review of the 93 commodities involved in current stockpile planning concludes that none is in such a critical state as to require disruption of the market in either acquisitions or disposals.

President Ford: Six or eight years ago a program was developed to get rid of aluminum phased over five years or so. Where is that now?

General Bray: That is completed now and we reached agreement with the producers as to appropriate stockpile levels.

President Ford: Do we have a surplus of aluminum now? I see deficits listed for a number of materials.

General Bray: We could need aluminum and/or bauxite ore, depending upon the options elected.

General Scowcroft: The participating agencies have split in their views on the kind of guidance which should frame a new strategic stockpile policy. There are three key assumptions which determine the general stockpile level: (1) the type and scope of war postulated; (2) the number of years worth of stockpile to be held; and (3) the extent which the stockpile provides for civilian economic needs in addition to military requirements. Additionally, we need to examine the impact of alternative assumptions for mobilization warning time because these influence stockpile levels. Agency differences on these assumptions have led to development of five options—three of which seem relevant for our further examination and discussion here.

As we review these options, we should keep two things in mind: First, we need to adopt realistic guidelines for a policy which provides for our national security at acceptable cost. Secondly, our new policy must abide by the statutes and at the same time, generate Congressional cooperation for action on our backlog of stockpile legislation. We need to get the Congress on board and proceed with implementing the new policy. I would like to ask General Leslie Bray to briefly review for us the assumptions, values, and costs associated with the various options.

General Bray: As the interagency group completed the stockpile study, there were two major agreed conclusions. First, that the current
stockpile does not meet our needs under any options or assumptions concerning future military and economic requirements. Over 95% of the stockpile was purchased prior to 1960 and since that time, we have been primarily in a disposal mode, selling off older materials as changing technology and requirements have made them obsolete. The second major conclusion is that the planning mechanism is too rigid. Since 1973, it is apparent that stockpile requirements have changed and that the objectives set at that time are in need of review and reassessment. In short, we need a more dynamic planning process.

In the study, such a planning process is recommended. It includes a Presidential review every four years or sooner, continual update of data, as new information becomes available, and an annual material plan in which all acquisitions and disposals will be developed based upon current economic factors, political requirements, national security inputs, market considerations, and other factors. These would be developed by an inter-agency review group and forwarded to the President for inclusion in the annual budget.

Let me now describe the three major issues and the alternatives developed for each issue which make up the options before us today. The major issue involves the type of war upon which planning assumptions are built. We postulated two major war scenarios. The first is a major two-front war in Europe and Asia or a major one-front war with significant forces redeployed from elsewhere in the world to support that effort. We have called this “Level I” mobilization. The second option involves a one-front war on a smaller scale with no redeployment, and we call this “Level II” mobilization. It is important to point out that neither of these options constitutes an all-out World War II-type conflict in which we would build everything we could produce in terms of military equipment.

For example, in both Level I and Level II mobilization, we plan to equip Army divisions in much the same way as current divisions are equipped; in other words, with a mix of infantry in armor rather than simply produce as many infantry divisions as possible. The total manpower involved for either of these two levels of warfare is not the five, ten, or fifteen million men under arms postulated in early stages of the stockpile study. The balanced force concept, i.e., the idea of equipping forces in the same mix of sophisticated support and armor equipment as found in the current force structure, limits us to 4.2 million men in Level I and 3.8 million for Level II.

The second major issue over which there was disagreement in the stockpile study and which significantly influences the nature of the stockpile, involves the amount of warning time assumed for various war scenarios. In other words, does M-Day—the day on which mobilization starts—occur simultaneously with the beginning of hostilities or
does warning allow mobilization to begin earlier. We used two cases—a zero warning and a one-year warning. The impact on stockpile levels works somewhat differently than one might imagine. The one-year warning assumption is the more conservative, as it increases the industrial base and stockpile requirements. The zero warning situation is less conservative and derives stockpile requirements based only upon the existing industrial capacity.

The third major issue involves the degree to which the stockpile provides for civilian economic requirements in addition to military ones. Within the stockpile model, we have already imposed certain austerity conditions. We have cut the basic standard of living by approximately 10%; we have reduced consumer durable production by 50% and housing construction by 75%; and have increased investments in industry by 20%. Having introduced this level of austerity on the economy, we have then calculated two categories of civilian economic requirements.

The first category, called the “Essential Civilian,” involves those materials and products which are more directly relevant to the war effort and which are less substitutable in their production by using non-strategic materials. The “General Civilian” category includes items which, while they are essential to the civilian economy, are less directly relevant to the war effort and which can in certain cases be produced with substitutable materials. These three factors significantly influence the nature of the options which we have developed.

A fourth factor, involving how long a war we ought to plan for, was considered at some length. Planning assumptions in this area have varied historically from five years to three years and now, under our 1973 stockpile guidance, one year. Each of the options presented in the study includes planning for a three-year supply of stockpile requirements.

[General Bray then presented a chart5 which displayed the options and assumptions and gave the values in dollar terms for Options A, B, C, D, and E. These range from a high of $10.2 billion dollars for Option A to a low $2.5 billion dollars for Option E.]

President Ford: What is the current value of the stockpile?

General Bray: We currently have an inventory of about $7 billion dollars. The increase from $4.6 billion dollars to $7 billion dollars from 1973 to today is simply the influence of inflation and increases in the value of various of materials.

President Ford: Are those other prices at current cost also?

5 The referenced charts were not found.
General Bray: Yes. The $10.2 billion, etc., equates to the current $7 billion. But it should be remembered that for any option, what we are talking about are long-term figures. For example, Option A would take over 15 years to acquire and all the variables, including cost, would change.

[General Bray then presented a chart on shorter range implications over the next five years for the various options.]

General Bray: This chart shows how portions of current inventories apply to the various options’ goals. It illustrates the potential acquisitions and disposals for five years, using only the criteria of market impact in deciding on these levels. In other words, this chart does not include any fiscal constraint on annual acquisitions. It indicates the potential inventory sizes and values which might be obtained after the first five years of policy implementation. For any of the options, it would be a better stockpile than what we have now—one which would be more responsive to national security needs.

For the first five years, you can see that there is not that much difference between the five options. There are other considerations which are worth noting and which we address indirectly in the stockpile study. The first involves use of the stockpile as a hedge against future changes or supply in requirements. We have not included assistance to our Allies in our planning, but it is apparent that the stockpile could be used for that purpose and can be useful against any peacetime economic embargos of materials contained in the stockpile. The presence of such supply could itself deter nations from attempting such embargos.

Let me add a note about the Congress. I have tried to keep the Congress abreast on the course of the study. I have briefed Congressman Bennett on this. He thought the study was extremely good and asked me to tell you, Mr. President, that he supported level I mobilization and the concept of supplying both Essential and General Civilian requirements. Since we have taken austerity steps, and since the law mandates that the basic health of the economy may be maintained, Bennett also indicated that he felt we needed three-years supply. Putting all of this together, Bennett concluded that he could go with either Option A or B.

Secretary Kleppe: In computing stockpile size, have you considered the domestic production?

General Bray: Yes, Sir.

Secretary Kleppe: For example, we are going to get our own nickel supplies, but now we import.

General Bray: Yes. As soon as we get new sources, we include changes to those objectives.
 Secretary Kleppe: Concerning Bennett’s insistence on both the Essential and General Civilian categories, is that basically necessary? Why?

 General Bray: I support that; it is not a pure guns and butter economy. For example, the 10% reduction in standard of living and 50% cut in consumer durables has a significant impact on automobiles. They would be reduced under these two cuts to 45% of current production. This 45% of current production falls in the General Civilian category, while trucks and heavy vehicles are in the Defense and Essential Civilian categories. Therefore, to cut General Civilian would include cutting out all commercial automobile production.

 Secretary Kleppe: But everything in the auto is produced domestically. Would these domestic things be affected by the Essential Civilian and General Civilian categories?

 General Bray: No. Only in the first—the austerity reductions. The stockpile is only for shortfalls due to foreign cutoffs of supply.

 Secretary Kleppe: I’m trying to figure how to judge between $7.3 billion and $4.5 billion.

 President Ford: Autos average 10 million per year; 10% off that gives 9; then a 50% shift from consumer military production would give you four and a half million. Where do you get your trucks and other vehicles?

 General Bray: These are all in the Essential Civilian category, while passenger cars are all in the General Civilian. Passenger cars would have much more substitution.

 Mr. Ogilvie: Did you take any case study like autos? Do we know how many autos we could produce?

 President Ford: If you went with Option A, how close are we to having the necessary legislation to go to the Congress?

 General Bray: We would convene immediately the first Annual Materiel Plan to go into the FY 1978 budget, and we would consider fiscal constraints, market impact, and other factors. This budget proposal would be submitted in time to be included in this year’s legislative process.

 President Ford: Both for 1976 and 1977, did we recommend disposals?

 General Bray: These were primarily disposals with only minor acquisitions. Bennett wants to be satisfied that we have a plan for new acquisitions before he agrees to disposals. Bennett will not dispose of any materials until he has our proposal for further acquisitions.

 Secretary Clements: My first experience goes back three years, when OMB and Fred Malik were involved. Bennett has not changed one bit, and that fundamental building block—our policy as to what to
do, where to go, and how to get there on the stockpile—must be changed. It is clear to Bennett that a three-year stockpile also means supply and resupply for that kind of war; that means ships. The basic premise of the three-year supply supports this, and the rest are almost details once the basic decision is made.

President Ford: What is now before the Congress?

General Bray: We cannot by law dispose of anything without Congressional approval.

President Ford: What items have we currently proposed?

General Bray: Tin, antimony, silver, and a few other minor items. Bennett agrees with this proposal but refuses to act without the new guidance cited by Mr. Clements.

Mr. Ogilvie: There were a series of options in last year’s budget which included the current disposal bill. Everyone felt that this was a fairly rational approach at the time.

Secretary Clements: Not me; we would have the same problems with something around Option E.

General Bray: He (Bennett) prefers A or B.

General Scowcroft: The basic agency differences involved assumptions about mobilization and the question of whether to include only the Essential Civilian category or the General Civilian category also. Most agencies support Option A or, perhaps, B while others support E.6

Secretary Clements: Brent is right. The options make a difference only in the long term. It just isn’t going to happen that quickly and over the first five years, the impact just isn’t that great. As you update as you should, the program will change. I really don’t attach that much difference between the options now.

General Scowcroft: I agree, and the Annual Matériel Plan lets us keep track each year and modify our objectives when necessary.

Mr. Cheney: What is the rationale for the one-year mobilization warning?

General Bray: In developing the stockpile model, we had to go beyond three or six months to actually change the industrial base.

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6 According to an August 6 briefing memorandum from Scowcroft to Ford, the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Interior, and the Federal Preparedness Agency supported Option A. The Department of Treasury and the CIEP supported Option E. “While no agency formally opted for Options B, C, or D, there was considerable interest in Option B,” Scowcroft continued, “on the grounds that a one-year mobilization warning simply was not realistic.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings Files, Box 2, NSC Meeting, August 9, 1976)
Secretary Clements: Remember that warning would also bear on indicators. We may have some general warning which would allow us to begin to mobilize.

Mr. Gorog: Stockpile planning ought to be compatible with our other defense planning. How close are they?

Secretary Clements: We are taking a new hard look at our overall DOD planning, and a serious issue within that relook is that of NATO warning time and mobilization.

Mr. Ogilvie: We have not looked at this issue since 1969 in NSSM 3. We are concerned in OMB that the new assumptions in the Stockpile Study go opposite of our new look—twelve months versus thirty days warning, three-year war versus one year or less. General Hollingsworth has recently argued that warning time will be much shorter. I see this stockpile issue taking our policy in two different ways.

General Scowcroft: Military planning and legislative realities have to come together. All the options have three years supply, in response to Bennett. He doesn’t understand the current one-year supply assumption. It is for the first year of a war; after that we can do other things.

President Ford: Superficially, would it be hard to explain why these are different? Admiral?

Admiral Holloway: The 23-day warning is so firm that you are moving troops, issuing ammunition, etc. This is operational warning. Warning for a year implies a deteriorating international situation, where things are coming apart. We start gearing up then, while the other shorter warning (23/30 days) is really active pre-fighting.

Secretary Clements: The three-year problem involves much more—scarcity, accessibility. Don (Ogilvie) is looking at the three years differently.

Mr. Ogilvie: But one year would let you do things regarding deployment, like airlift and sealift and Guard and Reserve enhancement, that we don’t now plan to do. It’s a problem of justification.

General Scowcroft: We don’t plan as to the length of time of a war. Also, remember the embargo.

7 See footnote 2, Document 66.
8 According to an August 10 memorandum from Boverie to Scowcroft, Weyand directed Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth to assess the U.S. Army’s relative war fighting capability in Central Europe. Hollingsworth’s main conclusion, according to Boverie, was “that the U.S. Army in Europe is not ready to fight on short notice, and that a surprise attack would find our forces unable to execute a forward defensive strategy, and thereby endanger our strategic reinforcement concept.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 1, Europe–General (1))
Secretary Kleppe: Another factor is that an error concerning the stockpile ought to be made on the side of a larger supply. While this could be costly for other kinds of purchases, the opposite is true for the stockpile—it is increasing in value. There is no inconsistency, and it is left up to DOD to show how these fit together.

President Ford: If we send A or B, would Bennett probably approve it this year?

General Bray: Yes, he does have a pet project, his stockpile revolving fund. He changed the bill last Friday to combine the four materials, and called for all these specific receipts to be applied to acquisitions. He wants to hold on to the aggregate value of the stockpile, to ensure that it works toward a goal and principles with which he agrees. Without agreement on the fundamentals, he will continue the impasse.

Secretary Clements: Bennett points out the increased threat to our sealanes, our lines of communication. This all makes the stockpile more critical.

General Bray: Our study has led us to use variable factors. We use differing assumptions about shipping losses for the three categories of Defense, Essential Civilian, and General Civilian needs. We used variable assumptions. [Shows chart on tiers and priorities associated with each of the options, and shows the similarity in short-term costs and transactions for the various options.]

Secretary Clements: That’s different from what you would need in a war if it started.

President Ford: How different would an Option A or B Annual Materiel Plan be from our current FY 1977 budget request?

General Bray: Both would involve significant new acquisitions and disposals for FY 1978, within market and budgetary constraints, but these would differ from current plans because those options involve moving toward new objectives.

President Ford: Could you also provide for FY 1977 supplemental acquisitions?

General Bray: Yes.

Secretary Clements: Exactly. Bennett and others would look favorably on that. A revolving fund would not help the budget problem.

President Ford: Without making a final decision, we ought to prepare a proposed supplemental acquisitions package for FY 1977. If we can talk him (Bennett) out of the trust fund . . .

Mr. Ogilvie: He is still on the trust fund, but only on a yearly basis.

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9 August 6.
General Bray: Bennett’s concern is that there is no linkage between acquisitions and disposals. The nature of the Appropriations Committee is that there won’t be support for acquisition appropriations, while he (Bennett) can dispose. He doesn’t want to fritter away the stockpile; that’s why he wants the fund, to tie the two. His staff sees possibilities to do it on a yearly basis, with a refund to the Treasury if not used for acquisitions. This would skirt the normal appropriations process.

President Ford: They wouldn’t like that in the Appropriations Committees. If we go with options A or B, then it doesn’t make any sense to wait for 1978. We would need to do it now for FY 1977, which hasn’t even started yet. Let’s concentrate on 1977 right now.

General Bray: Should you decide to go forward, we could get the agencies together this week, and could develop an FY 1977 acquisition supplemental within ten days to two weeks.

Secretary Habib: We continue to be concerned about possible market disruption, particularly internationally.

General Bray: We can look at this year’s disposals, add to them, and as a matter of priority, work the acquisition first and other disposals next.

President Ford: We need to get some action this year.

General Bray: We would have to look at it more closely on additional disposals.

President Ford: Let’s do the acquisition first and the disposals second and see if Bennett will cooperate.

General Bray: Bennett and the Senate staff will hold hearings soon.

Secretary Clements: This would be a good step forward.

President Ford: Thank you very much.
98. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

WASHINGTON, AUGUST 16, 1976.

SUBJECT
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile

Based upon discussions at the August 9, 1976 National Security Council meeting, I have prepared for your consideration alternative National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) incorporating the stockpile policy guidance associated with each of the principal options—Options A (projected ultimate value of $10.2 billion), B ($7.3 billion), and E ($2.5 billion).

There was a question raised at the NSC meeting as to how we would explain differences in planning assumptions between stockpile policy and other military planning. There are two distinct views on this matter.

—One view, held by Jim Lynn, is that establishing stockpile guidance based upon factors not intimately related to present military planning will be difficult to justify and could result in embarrassment to the Administration. Studies of military force requirements will clearly be influenced by assumptions on the length of war and the warning time for conflicts. Decisions on stockpile planning should more properly be deferred at this time until review of military force requirements is completed.

—The other view, shared by Bill Clements and myself, is that the stockpile should allow us to expand and support our existing forces during wartime and should provide a hedge against failures in force structure planning. Because of its “insurance policy” nature, the stockpile should use planning factors based upon larger and more extended conflicts than those used to determine present forces and their supplies. We believe this can be clearly explained to the Congress.

In choosing among the options, an appropriate focus would be the amount of “insurance” necessary or desired. Option B provides a stockpile to support defense and civilian needs during the first three years of a major two-front war (or one-front war with redeployment), assuming a “standing start” industrial expansion beginning at the outbreak of

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 67, NSDM 337 (1). Secret. A note at the top of the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. No drafting information appears on the document, but Boverie forwarded it to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, August 11, with the recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 97.
hostilities. Option A offers a somewhat greater hedge by providing for the same requirements plus extra materials for the expanded economy possible with a one-year mobilization “running start” should earlier strategic warning occur. Option E provides a much smaller stockpile based upon a more limited war scenario and less coverage of civilian economic needs. For all options, the Annual Materials Planning Process supported by all agencies provides numerous opportunities for review and revision of guidelines in the out-years.

In the event you desire further details on the options, I have attached at Tab IV the Executive Summary of the stockpile study. 3

Agency Positions

I have reconfirmed agency positions on the options, following the NSC meeting:

—OSD, JCS, State, Commerce, Interior, CIA, and the Federal Preparedness Agency favor Option A. All but Commerce indicate that Option B would also be acceptable, but less desirable than A because of its reduced size.

—CIEP (Bill Gorog) recommends Option B.

—Treasury favors Option E but would accept B or A, assuming that appropriate market disruption constraints are utilized in annual acquisitions and disposals. (Each draft NSDM satisfies this concern.)

—Of the three options discussed, OMB would prefer Option E but is concerned with possible difficulties in reconciling differences between stockpile and force structure planning assumptions, and recommends deferring any final new stockpile guidance pending further rationalization of these differences.

Congressional View

As noted at the NSC meeting, Congressman Bennett supports a conservative policy which maximizes the insurance value of the stockpile. For Bennett, the key considerations are the assumptions regarding type of war scenario, three-year coverage, and extent of civilian economy coverages. On these grounds, Option E would not be acceptable to him.

I believe that Option B represents a stockpile which provides for national security requirements at an acceptable cost. Option B can be expected to produce a favorable reaction in the Congress and thus facilitate movement on new stockpile legislation.

3 Tab IV is Document 93.
Your Decision

Approve my signing the NSDM for Option B ($7.3 billion) at Tab I\(^4\) (NSC, CIEP recommend; acceptable to OSD, JCS, State, Interior, CIA, FPA).

Alternatively, that you authorize me to sign the NSDM for Option A ($10.2 billion) at Tab II (OSD, JCS, State, Commerce, Interior, CIA).\(^5\)

Alternatively, that you authorize me to sign the NSDM for Option E ($2.5 billion) at Tab III\(^6\) (Treasury).

Defer new stockpile guidance pending further rationalization of differences in planning assumptions (OMB).

\(^4\) Tab I was not found attached.
\(^5\) Ford initialed his approval. Tab II as signed is Document 99.
\(^6\) Tab III was not found attached.

99. National Security Decision Memorandum 337\(^1\)


TO
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Director, Office of Management and Budget
- The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT
- Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile

The President has reviewed the results of the NSSM 228 study\(^2\) on the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile, and has decided that the quantitative levels and materials composition of stockpile inventories shall be based upon the following criteria:

1. The stockpile should provide a hedge against military and civilian production shortfalls resulting from disruption of foreign supplies of certain strategic and critical materials during wartime. The

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 67, NSDM 337 (1). Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, and Commerce; to the Directors of the CIA and CIEP; and to the Chairman of the JCS.
\(^2\) For the executive summary, see Document 93.
stockpile should provide materials for a level of potential military conflict greater than that postulated by U.S. force structure planning, to provide protection against the possibility of larger or more protracted wars.

2. Significant austerity measures will be taken as necessary within the national economy to sustain defense production. Within these conditions of wartime austerity, the stockpile should provide for certain civilian economic requirements necessary to ensure timely mobilization and overall strength of the wartime economy.

3. Determination of specific materials requirements should:
   a. Provide the materials necessary to support expanded U.S. military forces engaged in a major two-front war, or in a one-front war with redeployment of other forces to that front;
   b. Provide the materials needed for those forces at mobilization levels, replacement levels, and resupply levels equivalent to the first three years of such a war;
   c. Include provision for those aspects of the civilian economy central to the continued effectiveness of wartime industrial production and related non-military needs (Essential and General Civilian requirements); and
   d. Assume that industrial and military mobilization commence one year prior to the beginning of hostilities.

Specific acquisitions and disposals to meet these requirements should:

1. Reflect Department of Defense determinations as to specific materials required for military force expansion and replenishment in wartime;
2. Be scheduled so as to accord priority generally to Defense requirements, then Essential and General Civilian requirements;
3. Be submitted annually through an Annual Materials Plan, to be formulated by an interagency group which will consider, as a minimum, materials goals, fiscal constraints, and market impact in structuring specific acquisition and disposal proposals; and
4. In all cases be implemented to the extent practicable without avoidable disruption of the market.

The Administrator, General Services Administration, shall adjust the stockpile inventory requirements to reflect the revised guidelines outlined here, and shall implement a Stockpile Planning Process which includes timely updating of data on materials requirements, supplies, costs, reliability of foreign supply, and other factors relevant to the Stockpile Planning Process. The Administrator shall also advise the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on a semiannual basis as to changes in these data which affect significantly the implementation of U.S. Strategic Stockpile Policy.

Brent Scowcroft

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3 Hyland signed for Scowcroft.
100. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


[Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 61, NSDM 312 (1). Top Secret. Sent for action. Three pages not declassified.]

101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

NSSM on National Defense Policy and Military Posture

Our national defense strategy has not been reviewed comprehensively since 1969. The study conducted at that time (NSSM 3), resulted in an articulation of our overall military posture and defense strategy. The international, political, economic and military environment has changed substantially since that time: we have substantially altered our relationship with the Soviet Union; we have established a dialogue with the PRC; other centers of power have been strengthened; our relationship with developing countries has become more important; and economic issues are weighing more heavily in shaping the overall east-west balance. As a result, there is a general consensus that a thorough new analysis of our overall defense strategy should be undertaken.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 47, NSSM 246 (2 of 2) (1). Secret.
2 See footnote 2, Document 66.
3 In an August 13 memorandum, Vest informed Kissinger that Rumsfeld had proposed the review. According to Vest, “DOD top levels had decided that it would be important for the new administration to have this study in hand at the outset; beginning it in January would be too late. Also the next Defense posture statement, due to be submitted to Congress in January, would benefit from the policy review. The defense planning cycle and the domestic political schedule thus appear to be the forces driving this project.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760133–2370)
In a general sense, the proposed review would determine whether current U.S. policy, planning and capabilities are consistent with current national security objectives and available resources and recommend changes if and where necessary. In specific terms, the study would examine the security and foreign policy impact of a range of alternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces, taking into account the current and projected threat and foreign policy, arms control, and budgetary considerations and implications.

The review would be conducted by the NSC Defense Review Panel (DRP). The study group itself would include State, Defense, OMB, CIA, ACDA, and the NSC staff and would be chaired by a representative of the Defense Department. An interim report would be submitted for your consideration by November 30, 1976 (and thus be available for use in making decisions on major issues relating to the FY 78 Defense budget), and a final report by April 30, 1977. Attached at Tab A is a draft NSSM which would initiate the proposed study. If you decide this strategy review should be made, I recommend that you personally sign the NSSM in order to emphasize your personal interest in this important review.

Recommendation

That you sign the NSSM at Tab A.

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*Tab A, as signed, is Document 102.*

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102. **National Security Study Memorandum 246**


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 47, NSSM 246 (2 of 2) (1). Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the Selective Service System, and the Administrator of the GSA.
SUBJECT

National Defense Policy and Military Posture

I would like a thorough review and analysis of our national defense policy and military posture. This review should consider in detail the security and foreign policy impact of a range of alternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces.

The review should address but not necessarily be limited to the following:

—The current and projected threat to the United States, its Allies and U.S. security interest throughout the world.

—Foreign policy objectives and definable trends which influence these objectives.

—The overall defense posture necessary to assure U.S. security and foreign policy interests, including the desired balance between strategic and general purpose forces, manpower objectives, and preparedness.

—Arms control considerations and implications.

—Budgetary considerations and implications.

The study should be conducted under the aegis of the NSC Defense Review Panel. The study group should be composed of representatives of the recipients of this memorandum and chaired by a representative of the Chairman of the NSC Defense Review Panel.

An interim report should be submitted for my consideration not later than November 15, 1976, and a final report not later than December 1, 1976.

Gerald R. Ford
103. Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs

Washington, undated.

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 243
“MAAG REQUIREMENTS STUDY”

I. Introduction

National Security Study Memorandum 243, entitled “MAAG Requirements Study,” directed the preparation of a study to determine the continuing US requirement for Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) after FY 1977 with a view to requesting Congressional authorization, required by law, for continuation of specific MAAGs after FY 1977.

The term MAAG is used generically hereunder to describe a variety of DOD organizations in foreign countries whose common function is that of direct liaison and representation between the US Department of Defense and the foreign defense establishments in activities usually related directly to security assistance. The official titles of these organizations are several: Military Mission, Military Training Mission, Defense Liaison Group, Office of Defense Representative, Liaison Office, Military Group, and Military Assistance Team.

There are currently 33 MAAG organizations in operation. Security assistance functions are accomplished in 25 other countries by Defense Attache Offices, eight of which are augmented with security

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 44, NSSM 243 (1). Confidential. Holcomb forwarded the study to Scowcroft under an October covering memorandum, the date of which is illegible. According to Holcomb, the study was drafted by the IGPMA, which included representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, ACDA, JCS, CIA, and OMB. Davis then forwarded the study for comment under a covering memorandum, October 19, to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Bush, Ikle, and Lynn. (Ibid.)

2 Document 85.

3 On 30 June 1976, the President signed legislation which required disestablishment of ten MAAGs by 30 September 1976. After 30 September 1977 no MAAG may operate in any foreign country unless specifically authorized by Congress. Up to three US military personnel may, however, be assigned to the Ambassador’s staff to carry out security assistance functions in any country where there is no MAAG. In addition, no MAAG-type functions may be performed by any defense attaché, after 30 September 1977. [Footnote in the original. The legislation referenced above is the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. See footnote 4, Document 89.]

4 Until the disestablishment of 11 MAAGs, the number of MAAGs had remained about constant since the mid-1950s. Personnel authorizations, however, have been reduced sharply during the past 15 years. From a total strength authorization of 7,192 in 1960, MAAG authorization had declined to 1622 spaces as of 1 September 1976—a reduction of 77 percent. [Footnote in the original.]
assistance personnel. Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) have been established, as permitted by the law, in the eleven countries where MAAGs were disestablished on 30 September 1976. (Annex A, Estimated FY 1977 MAAG Authorizations and Funding Requirements.)\(^5\)

II. Study Objectives

1. To determine requirements for MAAG-type organizations.
2. To develop options and alternatives for MAAG presence abroad after FY 1977 with the advantages and drawbacks in each case.
3. To determine, for MAAG-type organizations that are to be continued, the estimated number of personnel needed and the costs.
4. To develop proposed legislation to support the MAAG-type organizations recommended in the Study.

III. Security Assistance and US Objectives

Security assistance has been a tool of US policy for nearly 30 years and has played an important role in furthering several important US foreign policy objectives. It has helped strengthen the defense of countries whose security has been important to the US. Over time, security assistance has become a major means of supporting bilateral security arrangements and strengthening our worldwide position vis-à-vis the USSR and PRC. Besides contributing to collective security, security assistance has also played an important, and at times an essential role in serving such diverse foreign policy objectives as contributing to regional balances and stability, facilitating the use of US bases and rights abroad, providing a symbol of US support and fostering closer relationships between the USG and recipient governments.

The national purpose remains that of preserving the US as a free and independent nation. Derivative military objectives are first, to deter conflict; failing that, to terminate conflict on terms advantageous to the US; to maintain sufficient military capabilities to prevent coercion; to assist the self-defense efforts of selected nations; and to maintain freedom of transit of the air and seas. It follows that the defense strategy requires a visible and credible military strength, and stresses collective security and combined actions.

The Soviet Union remains the dominant threat to the achievement of US objectives. Though Soviet military strength is the most visible facet of this threat, the Soviet Union has a growing and increasingly sophisticated capability to project power and influence worldwide; not only in pure military dimensions but in a subtle nature across the wide spectrum of political, economic, and social influences.

\(^5\) The annexes are not printed.
The US is faced with the enormous challenge of countering Soviet influences; this is particularly critical in strategically important regions of the world. Security assistance, as a facet of collective security, has proved to be an effective and efficient mechanism to achieve this objective.

IV. Security Assistance in a Changing World Environment

a. General

The situation today is radically different from that of the 1950s and 1960s. In this earlier period, most requests for US security assistance were for grant aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Over the years, however, grant aid has declined as more recipients have made the transition to foreign military sales, either credit or cash.

The expansion of our transfers since the early 1970s to higher dollar levels, and the change of geographical concentration to more controversial regions and countries, have fueled disagreement and debate about the US program in general. There is a concern, which is reflected by some in Congress, over the US role as a major arms supplier. This concern has been translated into legislative proposals for arms control measures.

b. Transfer of Criticism to MAAGs

Security assistance has become a highly visible and controversial aspect of our foreign policy. It has also become a major source of friction between the Legislative and Executive branches. As a result, Congress has placed several restraints on future MAAG-type organizations in an effort to influence and control the Executive Branch’s options.

MAAGs, as an historic adjunct of the security assistance program, are viewed by some as an anachronism. As the Security Assistance Program has become characterized by reduced grant assistance and increased Foreign Military Sales (FMS), MAAGs have been perceived as the overseas unregulated extension of security assistance and, as such, have come under close scrutiny for primarily two reasons:

—As members of the Uniformed Services, MAAG personnel are often viewed as tending to entice many foreign military establishments to seek excessive amounts of US defense articles.

—As more security assistance takes the form of FMS, there is a question of the propriety of active duty US military personnel continuing in the role of advising a country on the allocation of its resources.

V. Purpose of MAAGs

a. Functionally

The basic responsibilities of MAAGs with respect to security assistance are listed in DOD Directive 5132.3 (Annex B). While the
major functions of MAAGs vary from country to country, MAAG involvement can be divided into the following categories:

—Identification of security assistance requirements, development and implementation of the resulting grant aid programs and sales arrangements.

—Advising host country personnel to assure effective utilization of military materiel and training and assist in the ultimate disposal of materiel provided as grant aid.

—Providing assistance in force development planning, including planning and programming equipment acquisitions, logistics, supply, and training.

—Serve as liaison between the US and foreign military establishments with respect to the latter’s acquisition of US defense articles and services, in order to assist the foreign government in making the best possible decisions in this respect.

—Advise and assist the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission by serving on the country team as the Department of Defense representative and an integral part of the foreign policy apparatus of the US Government.

b. Regionally

Most individual security assistance programs are at some point of transition from MAP to FMS/commercial sales. Moreover, the MAAGs associated with these programs are moving from an advisory role to one of military liaison in order to assist in sales and transfers, DOD representation and equipment follow-on support. For the most part, the emphasis is appropriate to the situation confronting the MAAG and the requirements of the host country. For example, in the more highly developed regions and those capable of earning a favorable balance of foreign exchange, the emphasis is on sales and DOD liaison (Western Europe, North East Asia, and the Middle East), while the advisory function is still relatively important in those areas that have not yet attained self-sufficiency in defense capabilities (Africa, South Asia, and the nations of Latin America).

It should be noted that the continuous existence of military missions in Latin America dates from 1923 in some cases and, almost all, predates security assistance. The legal basis for the Latin American military missions originated under PL–247, 69th Congress, in 1926. Each Latin American mission operates under agreements executed by the host governments with the United States, and is tailored to specific requirements. In many cases, the host country reimburses the United States for various costs of maintaining the mission. Throughout the years, these military missions have become accepted by the Latin Americans as visible evidence of US concern and resolve to deter ag-
gression within the Western Hemisphere. The presence of US military advisors provides a continuing assurance of US resolve to honor its commitments under the Rio Treaty and Charter of the Organization of the American States.

c. Militarily

Where appropriate, MAAG elements contribute to military force interdependence and equipment standardization, and reduce US force requirements under the total force concept. They assist in development of compatible doctrine and, as justified, in acquisition of US materiel, equipment, and training, thereby improving the capability of the US and its Allies to conduct combined operations. MAAG organizations also help project US influence and power overseas, serving as evidence of US military interest and capability in countries with little or no other US military presence. From an arms control perspective, the MAAG can serve as an element of restraint, curbing appetites for equipment which, if acquired, would destabilize local military balances. The US military advisor seeks to focus host country attention on the budgetary and other national resources impacts of arms procurement decisions. Finally, the long-term personal relationships and American values fostered by CONUS training programs and liaison activities pay dividends as US-trained or influenced officers assume more important positions in host governments.

VI. MAAG Requirements Beyond FY 1977

For the past 30 years, US policy has included the provision of military advice, training, and equipment to Allies and other friendly nations to assist them in achieving internal stability and in resisting external threats, and to obtain beneficial bilateral and multilateral ties.

Over the next three to five years, basic US objectives relevant to security assistance, which is part of our effort to build a closer network of relationships with friendly nations, are unlikely to change dramatically. We will continue to need strong collective security, stable regional military balances, access to important overseas basing facilities, and to strengthen key recipient nations to bear the primary responsibility for defending themselves against attack or subversion. There will continue to be a large, perhaps growing number of nations concerned about their national security—internal, external or both—and many of these nations are or will be in a better position to buy what they need from whomever will supply it. Accordingly, security assistance will continue to have a role in furthering US objectives, and the overseas management of the security assistance program will continue to play a critical role in this regard. Indeed there will be a need, in most cases, for some form of MAAG organization, however small. However, depending on the host country’s capabilities and the size of the program,
requirements for a security assistance management office will differ. In Latin America, as noted above, MILGPs have an historic representational role with security assistance functions being a secondary consideration.

The legislative history associated with the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 indicates that Congress does not intend to disestablish all MAAGs, Military Groups (MILGPs), or similar organizations performing advisory functions. Instead, the approach adopted by Congress recognizes that United States foreign policy and national security interests militate against termination of all advisory and representative relationships; desires to be apprised more specifically than in the past of Executive Branch assessments of which bilateral relationships should be sustained and the reasons why; and, expects in this process that the Executive Branch will adjust MAAG organization and functions to fit existing circumstances.

VII. Alternatives Beyond FY 77

There are several methods by which security assistance can be provided beyond FY 77:\(^6\)

a. Alternative 1

—Description: Continue the operation of currently organized MAAGs, missions, military groups (MilGps) and similar organizations from FY 1978 through FY 1980.

—Concept of Operation: Security assistance organizations in operation during FY 1977 would continue to perform the full range of advisory, assistance and representational functions specified in existing Terms of Reference and DoD Dir 5132.3 (Annex B). Internal structure of the MAAGs would remain essentially unchanged while minor adjustments from FY 1977 manning levels would be made for FY 1978 and subsequent years.

—Projected Organizational, Manning and Funding Requirements (Annex C–1)

| Countries with MAAGs, Missions, Mil Gps | 33 |
| Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation | 11 |
| Countries with Augmentations of Security Assistance Personnel to Defense Attache Offices | 8 |
| Other Countries Where DAO’s perform security assistance functions | 17 |

\(^6\) In each alternative, reimbursement by the host country for US defense personnel, assigned or attached, should be sought; teams would be supported by funds made available through MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. [Footnote in the original.]
Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY 78) 1875
(U.S. Mil—1263; U.S. Civilian—173; and
Local Civilian—439)

MAP Funding (FY 78 Funding T-20) 54.4

—Requirements for Implementation
Congressional authorization to continue operation of 33 MAAGs
during the period FY 78–80.
Amendment to Sec 515, FAA of 1961, as amended, to permit De-
fense Attachés to continue security assistance mission beyond FY 1977.

—Advantages
—Less adverse impact on host country perception of U.S. interest
as there would be minimal change and continued substantive U.S. mili-
tary presence.
—Continues the security assistance program management func-
tion with minimal disruption.
—U.S. personnel in-country can develop detailed knowledge of
problems peculiar to that country.

—Disadvantages
—Requires two legislative actions—one, to authorize MAAGs and,
two, to allow DAOs to perform security assistance functions.
—Indicates an unwillingness to adjust MAAG organization and
functions in accordance with changing circumstances.
—Retains high profile MAAGs.
—Requires high number of U.S. personnel.

b. Alternative 2

—Description—Eliminate all Military Assistance Advisory Groups
and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where major
security assistance delivery programs are on-going. Representation to
Latin America countries is a special situation and will require the con-
tinued operation of Military Groups which will perform the traditional
role of representation and essential security assistance functions on an
as required basis. Offices of Defense Cooperation will be assigned to
American Embassies in countries having limited security assistance
functions.

—Concept of Operation: In developed countries where the major se-
curity assistance function is focused on acquisition of equipment and
services, the MAAG will be replaced with a DEFO that is specifically
structured to meet individual country needs. In these countries, the
new activity would not have advisory or training functions and would
be staffed with only the requisite numbers of contract, fiscal and lo-
gistics personnel. The primary function of the activity would be to
serve as a conduit for information on FMS actions to include technical matters, payment and follow-up actions. In developing countries, the DEFO will in addition, manage and monitor delivery programs and assist in the integration of equipment as required. All other advisory or training functions would be met by periodic survey/planning teams, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) when requested by the country concerned and the Department of State. These teams when available would be introduced for specific purposes and for a specified duration. The teams would be supported by funds made available through the MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. Military Groups for Latin American countries are categorized separately due to their special relationships with host countries.

In countries where there is a type of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) either in effect or under consideration by the Congress, the security assistance management organization has specific functions associated with the agreement of US forces in the host country. Approval should, therefore, be sought in legislation to have the DEFOs in these countries approved for the duration of the agreement.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements (Annex C–2)

—Developed countries with Defense Field Offices 2
—Developing countries with Defense Field Offices 14
—Countries with DCAs 4
—Countries with Military Groups 13
—Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation 23
—Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY 78) 1204
  (US Military—788 US Civilian—126 and Local Civilian—290)
—MAP Funding (FY 78 T–20) 50.6M

—Requirements for Implementation

Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of Defense Field Offices and to continue the operation of Latin American Military Groups during the period of FY 78–80.

—Advantages
—Provides a lower profile for security assistance personnel.
—Changes the name of MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed.
—Demonstrates a willingness to change MAAG organization and functions with no open ended commitments.
—Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs as required.

—Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel required to perform security assistance functions and enhances reimbursement possibilities.

—Provides for continuing Latin American military mission agreements.

—Retains organization, functions and procedures for assignment and control of DoD personnel in security assistance positions in foreign nations.

—**Disadvantages**

—Could have a short-term impact on host country perceptions of US interests.

—Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEFOs/Mil Gps.

—Fewer US military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries’ problems and military personnel.

*d. Alternative 3*

—**Description:** Eliminate all Offices of Defense Cooperation and Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where significant security assistance programs are ongoing and where traditional and essential advisory and training roles are important. Defense Attaché Offices will perform the security assistance functions in countries where these functions are on a smaller scale.

—**Concept of Operations:** In highly developed countries where the major security assistance function is focused on acquisition of equipment and services, the MAAG will be replaced with a DEFO that is specifically structured to meet individual country needs. In these countries, the new activity would not have advisory or training functions but would be staffed with the requisite numbers of contract, fiscal and logistics personnel. The primary function of the activity would be to serve as a conduit for information on FMS actions to include technical matters, payment and follow-up actions. In developing countries, the DEFO will in addition manage and monitor delivery programs and assist in the on-going advisory and training functions. Other advisory or training requirements would be met by periodic survey/planning teams, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) when requested.

*7 As in some of the Latin American countries. [Footnote in the original.]*
by the country concerned and the Department of State. These teams when available would be introduced for specific purposes and for a specified duration. The teams would be supported by funds made available through the MAP appropriation or by FMS procedures. DEFOs for Latin American countries are categorized separately due to their special relationships with host countries.

In countries where there is a type of Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) either in effect or under consideration by the Congress, the security assistance management organization has specific functions associated with the agreement on US forces in the host country. Approval should, therefore, be sought in legislation to have the DEFOs in these countries approved for the duration of the agreement.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements (Annex C–3)

—Developed countries with DEFOs 2
—Developing countries with DEFOs 14
—Latin American countries with DEFOs 14
—Countries with DAOs having Security Assistance responsibilities 35
—Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY 78) 1,182
  (US Military—779; US Civilian 120; and Local Civilian—283)
—MAP Funding (FY 78 T–20) $50.1M

—Requirements for Implementation
Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of DEFO and to void the prohibition against DAO involvement during the period FY 78–80.

—Advantages
—Provides a lower profile for security assistance personnel, in accordance with ambassadorial preferences, but maintains visible symbol to host nation of US military presence.
—Changes MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed, while restraining further proliferation of new types of organizations.
—Demonstrates willingness to change MAAG organization and functions.
—Avoids disruption/misunderstanding in 25 countries where security assistance is currently administered by DAOs.
—Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs.
—Maintains security assistance presence in countries not otherwise covered, through use of DAOs.
—Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel involved in performing security assistance functions.
—Establishes one standard organizational concept and simplifies operational channels.
—Maintains military chain of command for planning and implementation.

—**Disadvantages**
—Could have an adverse impact on host country perceptions of US interests.
—Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEFO and DAOs to administer security assistance.
—Fewer US military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries’ problems and military personnel.
—Will require increased use of TDY elements (MTT, TAT, TAFT, etc.) to assist DEFOs.

**e. Alternative 4.**

—**Description:** Eliminate all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and establish Defense Field Offices (DEFO) in countries where security assistance delivery programs require the presence of more than three military personnel. In countries where the security assistance function can be performed by three military personnel or less, a separate Office of Defense Cooperation will be established. In other countries where there is only a limited security assistance program or political sensitivities are paramount, we will ask Congress for authorization to allow the DAO to handle security assistance responsibilities. Foreign Service Officers will handle security assistance in countries with the very smallest programs.

—**Concept of Operation:** In each country the nature of the program and the level of staffing will be determined by the security assistance requirements of the particular country. To the extent possible, we will encourage the use of host-country or MAP-financed Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs) or Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) to supplement the skills of personnel assigned on a long-term basis. MTTs, TAFTs and TATs would be introduced for specific and limited purposes and for a specific duration.

—**Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements:** (Annex C–4)

| Defense Field Offices | 23 |
| Offices of Defense Cooperation | 24 |
DAOs with Security Assistance Functions 17
Posts with Foreign Service Officers Performing Security Assistance Functions 6
Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY78) 1252
(US Military—772, US Civilian—144, and Local Civilian—336)
MAP Funding (FY78 T–20) $51.3 million

—Requirement for Implementation: Congressional authorization to establish and sustain operation of Defense Field Offices and to permit designated DAOs to perform security assistance functions.

—Advantages
—Presents a simplified organizational structure worldwide.
—Provides a low profile for security assistance personnel.
—Changes the name of MAAGs to a title more in line with functions performed.
—Demonstrates a willingness to change MAAG organization and functions with no open-ended commitments.
—Provides both in-country and TDY flexibility by establishing a minimal essential base of personnel that can be augmented by MTTs and TAFTs as required.
—Reduces the number of uniformed service personnel required to perform security assistance functions and enhances reimbursement possibilities.
—Provides for continuing representation in Latin America in keeping with military mission agreements.
—Retains organization, functions and procedures for assignment and control of DOD personnel in security assistance positions in foreign nations.

—Disadvantages
—Could have a short-term impact on host-country perceptions of U.S. interests.
—Requires completely new legislation authorizing DEFOs/DAOs.
—Fewer U.S. military personnel with detailed knowledge of recipient countries’ problems and military personnel.

e. Alternative 5:

—Description: Inactivate all MAAGs by end FY 77 and establish Offices of Defense Cooperations (ODC) in countries where MAAGs are disestablished and in other selected countries now served by Defense Attaches.

—Concept of Operations: ODC will perform security assistance and representational functions in accord with constraints specified in Sec-
tion 515, FAA. All MAAGs, Missions, Military Groups and similar organizations will be disestablished and DAOs will relinquish security assistance missions by end FY 77. Unique advisory, instructional and assistance requirements will be met through the use of survey teams, Mobile Training Teams and Technical Assistance Field Teams on a fully reimbursable basis under MAP or FMS.

—Projected Organizational Manning and Funding Requirements: (Annex C–5)

Countries with Offices of Defense Cooperation 59
Personnel Requirements (Estimated FY ’78) 303
(US Military—168; US Civilian—53
Local Civilian—82)
MAP Funding (FY 78 T–20) 11.7M

—Requirements for Implementation
None, can be accomplished within provisions of Sec 515, FAA.
—Advantages
—Can be accommodated within existing legislation.
—Requires the lowest number of uniformed service personnel.
—An office exists so that personnel can be brought in on a TDY basis to deal with specific systems or problems.
—Permanently assigned US personnel in country can develop a knowledge of problems peculiar to that country.
—Disadvantages
—The small number of personnel would be unable to accomplish the mission in a number of countries.
—Such a drastic reduction on a worldwide basis could send the wrong signal to friends, allies, and enemies.
—Reduced flexibility in countries with large security assistance programs.
—Would violate bilateral military mission agreements in Latin America.

VIII. Choice of Alternatives

Based on the consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of each option and viewed from the perspective of a continuing need for MAAG-type organization of varying sizes with different primary functions which will be closely scrutinized by the Congress, Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 are worthy of consideration. These alternatives in addition to being innovative approaches to a changing international environment, provide sufficient military personnel to accommodate the security assistance program and are flexible enough to assure that func-
tional requirements will be met on a timely basis. The disadvantages associated with the alternatives can be minimized or eliminated through well-conceived implementing instructions and close liaison with security assistance recipients to ensure that their concerns are addressed.

The legislative history of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 demonstrated Congressional intent relative to MAAGs as indicated earlier; however, the President’s constitutional prerogatives in the area of foreign policy should not be sacrificed in an effort to be more forthcoming to the Congress than required by the law. The alternatives cited should satisfy the Congress as they demonstrate a willingness to forego continuation of MAAGs while they do not unnecessarily restrict the President’s options to meet current, realistic security and foreign policy requirements. Alternative 1 fails to recognize the realities associated with the legislative history of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976. On the other hand, alternative 5, which would be within current legislative restraints, does not provide sufficient personnel to effectively manage the security assistance program in many countries.

Being completely new concepts which closely follow the earlier termination of 11 MAAGs with a resultant changeover to ODCs, the details associated with implementation will require extensive coordination between the concerned Executive Department agencies in the Washington area and overseas US Government activities and missions. It is further recognized that the reductions in MAAG personnel proposed by the cited alternatives are likely to require DOD back-up to assure and coordinate functions currently being performed by MAAGs.

Historic usage of the terms mission, liaison office, etc. to refer to MAAGs may make the term DEFO or ODC unacceptable to host governments. Where this is the case, or where existing agreements establish a name or manpower minimums, every effort will be made to accommodate the Chief of Mission’s recommendations. In addition, new terms of reference (TOR) will have to be developed for each DEFO. Finally, host countries will have to be advised in detail on the background and rationale for the new approach to security assistance manning.

IX. Conclusions

1. Security Assistance will continue to have a role in furthering U.S. objectives.

2. Overseas security assistance management/liaison elements are a necessary adjunct of security assistance.

3. Overseas security assistance management/liaison elements requirements may increase.
4. The image and operation of overseas security assistance management/liaison elements can be improved.

5. Alternatives 2, 3 and 4 are the best courses of action as they allow for sufficient U.S. personnel and flexibility to accomplish the security assistance mission and to demonstrate the intent of the Executive Branch to adjust MAAG organizations and functions in accordance with current realities.

6. Detailed procedures associated with the implementation of the selected alternatives will be required.

7. The focus of the terms of reference for this study were on MAAG requirements, alternatives and costs. However, in responding to the NSSM, several major issues relative to future MAAG-type operations were raised. These included: alliances implicitly formed through FMS; third-country participation in MAAG-type organizations; roles of MAAGs beyond arms transfers, etc. These issues are worthy of a further study which should further refine the functions of security assistance management/liaison organizations.

8. A special manpower survey team should survey the larger missions to assure that their staffing is at an austere level.

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104. Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense¹

Washington, October 20, 1976.

B–1 Requirement, Production Readiness and Arms Limitation Implications

Throughout 1976, the Department of Defense, Air Force and special review groups have conducted an intensive review and evaluation of the B–1 program in preparation for the DSARC III procurement milestone. The requirement for strategic bomber force modernization as well as confirmation of previous B–1 cost effectiveness analyses, production readiness and arms limitation implications are areas which

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 8, Defense, Department of, 11/18/76. Secret. Davis forwarded the paper for review to Robinson, Bush, General Brown, and Lynn under a covering memorandum, November 10. Davis also sent a copy to Wade in his capacity as Chairman of the Defense Review Panel Working Group. (Ibid.)
have received special attention during the review process. The conclusions reached as a result of these critical reviews reaffirm the viability of the overall program and strongly support a decision to initiate production and deployment of the B–1 at this time.

The strategic bomber force is an integral and irreplaceable component of our strategic offensive forces and provides important and unique contributions not available with our ballistic missile forces. Soviet efforts to alter the strategic balance in their favor and the projected threat to the US bomber force in the post 1980 time frame fully support the requirement for bomber force modernization.

Our ability to economically and effectively offset future Soviet threats by continuously modifying the B–52 force is constrained by a physically and technologically aging airframe. By the time the B–1 initial operational capability (IOC) is attained, the average age of the B–52 force will be about 24 years old. Deployment of the B–1 is an essential step in US plans for modernization to offset the concerted Soviet attempts to gain nuclear superiority and reduce the threat posed to the Soviets by our strategic forces.

The current Soviet SLBM force trends and improved capabilities which threaten bomber force launch survival can be offset by the B–1’s faster escape speed, greater resistance to nuclear effects, and shorter take-off distance to permit dispersal to a larger number of airfields if required. The effectiveness of projected Soviet defenses will be seriously degraded by the B–1’s high penetration speed at very low altitude and low radar cross section in combination with high quality electronic counter-measures. The superior B–1 launch survival and penetration characteristics combined with its improved accuracy and larger payload capacity, compared to the B–52, will provide a highly effective contribution to the future US strategic deterrent posture.

Extensive investigations of alternatives for bomber force modernization identify the B–1 to be the most capable and cost-effective option. On 8 October 1976, following a review of the Joint Strategic Bomber Study (JSBS) conducted at the request of the Secretary of the Air Force, Honorable Edward E. David, Jr, Doctor Michael M. May and Honorable Paul H. Nitze concluded:

It is our opinion that aircraft which, together with their armaments, have an assured capability to penetrate Soviet defenses are an essential element of an adequate US strategic nuclear deterrent . . .

Given the size of the Soviet offensive and defensive forces, and, in particular, given the ability of the Soviets to respond to any US deployment decisions, we have come to the conclusion that the B–1 should be procured for inclusion in the force . . .
We believe that the speed at low altitude, ECM potential, low radar cross-section and hardness of the B–1 provide better assurance of flexibly meeting the range of possible threats than do any of the forces which do not include the B–1. Furthermore, we believe the B–1 can give us these superior capabilities at comparable cost and at an earlier date than any of the other systems suggested . . .

The B–1 has had the benefit of more careful preproduction planning and exhaustive component and vehicle testing than any previous military or civilian aircraft at the same procurement decision milestone. The test program has confirmed the accuracy of analytical predictions of performance.

The major structural components of the aircraft have been subjected to static tests at loads which exceeded by 50% those which would be experienced in flight. Fatigue tests to several lifetimes of expected aircraft service have been accomplished. Four lifetimes of fatigue testing on all major structural assemblies will be completed over two years before the first production B–1 is delivered. Currently, four of the six B–1 structural assemblies have completed four lifetimes, and the remaining two have completed two lifetimes. Testing on the last two structures is continuing. The successful static and fatigue testing already completed provides high confidence that the B–1 is structurally capable of performing its strategic mission.

The flight test program has now accumulated over 360 hours and has successfully explored all mission requirements. The operational modes of the aircraft have been demonstrated, and extensive high speed, low altitude, automatic and manual terrain following activities have been reliably and safely executed as well as supersonic flights to speeds above Mach 2.1. Routine refueling with KC–135 tankers has been accomplished on almost every flight.

The Air Force Test and Evaluation Center has reported that, based on their participation throughout the test program and the three Initial Operational Test and Evaluation flights conducted to date, operational effectiveness and suitability are good and that all deficiencies that have been identified are correctable and being worked. Based on data obtained from the flight test program, the Air Force concludes that the B–1 will provide the capability and operational flexibility necessary to effectively modernize the strategic bomber force.

At the request of the Secretary of the Air Force, an ad hoc Technical Assessment Committee, chaired by Professor Courtland Perkins, was formed to review the technical status of the B–1 program. The Committee was unanimous in its view that a production decision could be made with real confidence from the point of view of technical status.
Specifically, the report of the Committee, issued on 7 October 1976,\(^2\) contains these conclusions:

Many of the subsystems of the B–1, such as the engine and offensive avionics, can be viewed with confidence unusual for a weapon system of this complexity and at this stage of development.

There are no apparent technical problems that would prohibit the achievement of a successful production airplane on the proposed time scale.

This is a fine airplane of intrinsic versatility which can be exploited for many varied missions currently unidentified.

From a technical point of view, the Defense Department can make a production decision on the B–1 with confidence . . .

In base year dollars (1970), the B–1 program estimate at the time of the development decision was $9.9 billion. A number of program changes have occurred since that time and the current estimate in base year dollars has risen to $11.1 billion. In then year dollars, the program has grown from an estimate at the development decision of $11.2 billion to a current program estimate of $22.8 billion. This growth is primarily due to the effect of economic escalation and there has been no real cost growth since 1973.

The B–1 program, technically and managerially, has been based on deliberate and measured steps to insure production readiness. The necessary preparatory actions are now complete and the B–1 is ready for production.

Finally, a timely B–1 production decision considered in the context of national objectives in the arms limitation environment, is not only useful and complementary, but essential. The B–1 program:

- Provides a highly visible step in modernizing US forces, reflecting national resolve and determination to maintain a capable, balanced force as a precursor to effective Strategic Arms Limitation (SAL) negotiation.
- Allows the achievement of agreed force levels of effective Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) in the relevant time frame, and modernizes our force in the process.
- Keeps pressure on the Soviets to continue negotiations.
- Allows the US, if reduced force levels are negotiated, to retire older, less effective systems, phasing them out in a manner fully synchronized with the achievement of national SAL goals while retaining a more effective final force.

[Omitted here is the main text of the 19-page paper, marked Secret. The paper has three sections: B–1 Requirement, B–1 Production Readiness, B–1 Arms Control Implications.]

\(^2\) Not found.
Memorandum From Richard T. Boverie of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT
DRP Meeting to Review the Status of the NSSM 246 Study on National Defense Policy and Military Posture²—Friday, November 5, 1976, 10:00 A. M.

There will be a meeting of the Defense Review Panel Friday, at 10:00 a.m. The purpose will be to receive a status report on the NSSM 246 study on National Defense Policy and Military Posture and to review the draft summary report³ and its strategy alternatives.

Background
On September 2, 1976, the President directed through NSSM 246 (Tab A) a review and analysis of US national defense policy and military posture. The DRP Working Group, which was charged with conducting the study, organized six interagency task forces. These task forces (chairing agency in parentheses) are: Foreign Policy (State), Intelligence (DCI), Strategic Forces (OSD/DDR&E), General Purpose Forces (OSD/P&E), Fiscal/Economic (OMB), and Preparedness (NSC Staff). In addition, two other ad hoc groups were chartered late in the study to examine Technological Surprise (OSD/DDR&E) and the Evolution of Current Policy (NSC Staff) (Task Forces membership at Tab B).⁴

The Task Forces are preparing detailed reports on their respective areas of responsibility. The degree of interagency involvement in the drafting of these papers has varied, as has the extent of agreement among the agencies as to the thrust and content of the task force reports. Because of the DRPWG’s desire to be responsive to the President’s November 15 interim and December 1 final report dates, it was decided that the task force papers would remain as working papers, and would not be subjected to formal agency review and clearance.

² NSSM 246, attached, is Document 102.
³ A draft response, November 16, to NSSM 246 is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 22, Defense Review Panel Meeting, 11/24/76—Naval Study (NSSM 246). The final response is Document 113.
⁴ Attached, but not printed.
However, the summary document prepared for Presidential review will be formally coordinated with the DRP principals.

In mid-October, as draft reports from the various task forces became available to the DRPWG, that group designated an Integrating Group to prepare a paper on alternative strategies which summarized the major inputs from the various task forces. The Integrating Group is preparing a draft summary paper (a strawman draft is at Tab C) outlining a series of alternative notional strategies for strategic and general purpose forces. Contained within these strategies are alternative approaches to the issues identified by the task forces as those warranting NSC attention in the strategy review. These notional strategies have been grouped into illustrative “overall strategies” which represent combinations of strategic and general purpose force structures and employment policies. Tentative costs are being computed for each strategy, and an overall analysis of the federal budget has been included to provide a perspective for examining the “overall strategies” along side non-defense demands for budget resources.

The strawman summary paper has been circulated by the Integrating Group, and a formal “first draft” is scheduled to be available late next week. Jim Wade’s proposed briefing to you at the DRP meeting will include a brief review of the notional strategies as they have tentatively been structured. Draft briefing charts are at Tab D. We will provide final versions when they become available, but we do not anticipate any major changes.

Issues for Discussion

Discussions within the DRPWG and with the various agency staffs indicate that the following two issues are likely to receive significant attention in the DRP meeting:

—Fundamental to the NSSM 246 effort is the question of where we go from here. The intent of the summary paper as it is now conceived is to provide for the President and NSC a set of notional alternative strategies as illustrative indications of possible future directions for US defense policy. Opinion on the question of what action should be taken on these notional strategies ranges from the possibility of a NSDM being issued selecting one of the strategies to the view that it is premature to take any such options to the President in the absence of more detailed

5 The draft summary, November 1, is attached, but not printed.
6 Attached, but not printed.
analysis of associated force structures and costs. This latter view has been expressed by State and by some quarters in Defense.\^7

We believe that a middle ground is most appropriate in light of our desire to be fully responsive to the President’s timetable for the NSSM while at the same time not rushing to decision those aspects of our tentative strategy alternatives which could benefit significantly from further analysis. It would be particularly useful for the DRP to endorse the concept of asking for Presidential guidance on strategy directions; i.e., to highlight those aspects of strategy which the President wishes us to pursue further. Such an approach could provide an acceptable compromise between the two extremes noted above.

—The second issue which is likely to be raised at Friday’s meeting involves the relationship between the summary paper’s notional strategies and the major issues which form the basis for much of the individual task force analyses. There has been concern on the part of a number of the agencies that the strawman summary has not adequately highlighted the key issues identified by the DRPWG at the outset of the study, and has not reflected the degree to which these issues relate to (and to a significant degree define) the various notional strategies. This may be raised at your meeting. However, we believe that both the Integrating Group and the task forces have acknowledged this concern and are working to revise the draft to provide a more explicit treatment of the “key issues.” This revision should result in more precise definition of the strategies; e.g., it should be more apparent in the next draft of the summary paper as to the relationship between assumptions on issues such as NATO warning time and Warsaw Pact combat sustaining power and the alternative general purpose force strategies.

A more fundamental objection to the “strategies” approach has been voiced by State, and will likely be raised at the meeting. State sees some utility in the notional strategies as illustrative tools, but objects to any effort to ask for decisions based on such strategies. Instead, they would prefer an “issues paper” as the appropriate decision vehicle. It is our view, apparently shared by the majority of the DRPWG and Integrating Group, that the extreme approach of rejecting the strategies and focusing only on issues makes the intellectual problem of treating the subject matter quite difficult; i.e., it presents too many relatively discon-

\^7 According to Vest’s memorandum, November 3, briefing Robinson on the DRP meeting: “The best that can be expected of the NSSM 246 effort is that it will introduce the President to some major unresolved problems in our defense posture and suggest to him a reasonable range of choice for their resolution.” As such, Vest wrote, the Department and “some elements of Defense hold that the ‘strategies’” outlined in the draft NSSM response “are at best illustrative and should not be considered for adoption as national policy until they have been developed more fully.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files, Lot 80D212, NSSM 246)
nected variables simultaneously. More fundamentally, such an approach is not responsive to the President’s guidance in NSSM 246, which asks for “alternative strategies.”

A lesser issue which is scheduled to be raised for decision involves the selection of an appropriate budget base upon which to build costing data for the alternative strategies. OMB has used its spring update for the FY 1978 FYDP—basically a refined set of 1977 numbers. Defense has been using its significantly higher set of figures derived from the POM/PDM process for the FY 1978 budget process this summer. The issue is basically one of determining what the base case is, and this will set the size of the incremental cost associated with the alternative strategies.

Outcome of the Meeting. The fundamental outcome will be for the DRP to indicate what it believes to be the future direction of the study and to provide whatever guidance is appropriate, based upon our current approach and progress to date.

Conduct of the Meeting. Don Rumsfeld will open the meeting and will introduce Jim Wade’s briefing.

[Omitted here is the list of the contents of Scowcroft’s briefing book and a section summarizing the memorandum’s main points.]

106. Editorial Note

The Defense Review Panel (DRP) met on November 5, 1976 to review the response to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 246, which is printed as Document 102. Attendees included: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (the Panel’s Chairman), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General George S. Brown, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft, Director of the Office of Management and Budget James T. Lynn, Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency John F. Lehman, Jr., the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs William G. Hyland, the Counselor of the Department of State Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James P. Wade, Jr. Only a handwritten, largely illegible record of the meeting, held in the White House Situation Room from 10:04 to 10:53 a.m., was found in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 26, Meeting Materials—Defense Review Panel Meeting, 11/5/76 (1).
On November 19, George S. Vest, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, sent Robinson a memorandum that, in part, reviewed the results of the meeting. Vest wrote: "As you may recall, the question of whether or not the NSSM response should be a document for Presidential decision was discussed at the last DRP meeting on NSSM 246 on November 5. There was disagreement among the participants over this question, with Mr. Lynn taking the strongest line in favor of using the NSSM 246 study as a vehicle for Presidential decisions in the context of the FY 1978 budget. The question was left unresolved at that meeting. We know, however, that the JCS is adamantly opposed to the notion of using this study as a decision document, and know that many elements in OSD also share this view. However, we do not have any indication of Secretary Rumsfeld’s position.

"Finally, you may recall that at the November 5 DRP meeting on this subject, the question of whether or not the NSSM study should put forward alternative foreign policies was discussed, with Mr. Lynn and Secretary Rumsfeld arguing in favor of the idea, and yourself opposed. The issue was not resolved at that meeting, but in fact we consider it to be closed." A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Closed by Rumsfeld!" Vest continued, "The latest draft of the study does not include alternative foreign policies, and we do not believe it to be feasible to undertake such a major revision of the paper at this late stage."

Vest’s memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 59, Robinson Records, Lot File 77D117, Box 8, NSSM 246.

107. Study Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for East Asia

Washington, undated.

[Omitted here is the table of contents and sections A through C: Identification of U.S. Interests, U.S. Security Objectives, and Examination of Some Factors in the Current East Asian Environment.]

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 39, NSSM 235 (1 of 2) (1). Secret. The study was completed in response to NSSM 235 (Document 67). Scowcroft forwarded the study, revised following the June 4 SRG meeting (Document 87), to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, and Bush under a covering memorandum, November 5. (Ibid.)
D. A General Strategy for Pursuing U.S. Interests in East Asia in Light of Current Conditions and Restraints

Despite the communist victories in Indochina, the United States still possesses a number of advantages in pursuing its interests in East Asia. The environment is changed, however, not only because of Vietnam but as the result of a number of momentous developments, some sudden and some gradual, over the last decade or two. In general, we need to pursue our interests with greater subtlety, more reliance on riding the waves of existing trends in the area, greater use of our diplomatic and, hopefully, economic tools and greater flexibility in tactics. We will probably be less often called upon to employ military force in ambiguous situations. In any event, current domestic and international constraints drastically curtail our ability to do so. Nonetheless, it remains of vital importance that the U.S. retain a flexible and strong military posture in the Asia-Pacific area. In this regard, increases in military deployments, particularly to counter Soviet naval strength, must not be ruled out.

In Northeast Asia, we must sustain our alliances with Japan and Korea. In particular, we must build upon the foundation of our common approach with Japan over the coming years, including cooperation on international economic issues. We should also strengthen our security ties with Japan and explore ways in which Japan—through economic, political and diplomatic means—can complement more effectively our security efforts in the area.

We must be prepared to defend South Korea—although in the future we may adjust our on-the-spot presence as conditions permit. We must try to maintain a favorable balance of power involving ourselves, the USSR, the PRC, and Japan. We can, however, take actions in time to show the value of the U.S. connection to each of the parties, especially the Chinese. These policies require us to be aware of the forces at work in the internal debates of the other major powers as well as their international posture—and to do whatever we can to promote favorable trends.

In regard to noncommunist Southeast Asia, our overriding goal should be to support with sympathy and understanding the growth of stronger and more viable and independent societies, including the development of an effective economic structure. Where possible, and where they demonstrate a willingness to face their own problems, we should provide such security and economic assistance as we are able. All these countries, including Thailand, are capable of resisting communist expansion short of outright aggression and of overcoming or containing their insurgencies, particularly if they can provide stable and reasonably progressive government and reasonable progress in meeting the needs of their populations. What we do to help them eco-
nomically, politically and in backdrop security terms will be important. Of even more importance is what we do not do. We must not overly embrace them in ways that embarrass them before their Third World peers or which arouse tender national sensitivities. We must take heed of their sense of sovereignty and welcome an inevitable greater independence from us that is the corollary of greater strength and maturity.

The source of future tension in many parts of East Asia may spring more from communal and territorial conflicts than from communist or other insurgencies. The U.S. should avoid direct involvement in these conflicts and discourage intervention by other powers, while doing what it can diplomatically to help resolve such disputes peacefully. At the same time, we should seek to reduce tensions between middle level powers and to progressively reduce the major power stakes in these regional rivalries while discouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an alternative.

As for Indochina, we must try to promote a continued evolution toward independent attitudes and toward moderation. We should try to identify the interests and attitudes of each Indochina entity as well as the interplay between them and the major outside powers and seek to do those things that can lead toward a favorable evolution of events. We should reject excessive communist demands but remain available for improved relations if Hanoi and the others pursue reasonable and constructive policies toward us, particularly with regard to the full accounting for MIA’s, and toward their neighbors. The advantages of U.S. trade and technology as well as the U.S. as a potential political and military balance wheel, should be kept in view for the Indochina communists to consider as a quid pro quo for a more reasonable stance on their part.

In this environment the projection of U.S. military power in the Western Pacific is an important element of the triangular or quadrangular power balance in East Asia. While U.S. security objectives have changed, there is still a need for a strategic military presence that maintains a great power equilibrium in which our Allies and other non-hostile countries can have confidence. In addition, we need mobile and flexible forces which can deter aggression against Korea and Japan, assist in the defense of Allies under existing security agreements, counter Soviet forces in the event of a U.S.-Soviet war, provide surveillance and emergency reaction capabilities and protect communication lines in the Pacific.

Any changes in the deployment of U.S. forces should take place within the context of bilateral or multilateral arrangements aimed at promoting stable evolution. Changes in deployments could, however, seriously undermine the projection of U.S. power if they were seen to
be the result of weakness and indecision at home or of a hesitant and unsuccessful foreign policy.

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108. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Borg) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

B–1 Issues Paper

We have reviewed the B–1 issues paper distributed by the NSC Secretariat on 10 November\(^2\) to the Defense Review Panel principals. We understand that this paper is to be presented to the Congress as a B–1 “White Paper” and thus is intended to be an advocacy argument for a B–1 production decision by the next Administration. As such, it will probably be given a good deal of publicity and more than usual attention by supporters and critics of the B–1.

We have no objection to the publication of this paper but would suggest that it be reviewed again in Defense to ensure that it does not inadvertently add to the controversy already surrounding the B–1 program. There are a number of assertions and statements in the present draft that would tend to do just that and would be difficult to defend in public. For example, the Executive Summary asserts in the third paragraph that the Soviets are attempting to “gain nuclear superiority.” This is not a view unanimously held either within the intelligence or national security communities\(^3\) nor among the informed public and it is not really relevant to the question of buying B–1. There are other questionable statements elsewhere in the paper. On page iii of the Executive Summary, the claim is made that the doubling of the program costs

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 8, Defense, Department of, 11/18/76. Secret.

\(^2\) For the executive summary, see Document 104.

\(^3\) Acting DCI Knoche’s November 15 memorandum to Rumsfeld, which contained the CIA’s response to the B–1 issues paper, recommended that the paper, while generally “consistent with national intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities through the mid-1980s,” be amended to convey “uncertainties about the effectiveness of Soviet forces—particularly defenses against low-altitude cruise missiles—during the potential operational lifetime of the B–1 bomber.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 8, Defense, Department of, 11/18/76)
from $11.2 billion to $22.8 billion is not due to “real cost growth” but to the “effect of economic escalation.” The meaning of the phrase “economic escalation” and how it is distinguishable from cost growth is nowhere explained. Earlier, on the same page, there appears this statement: “This is a fine airplane of intrinsic versatility which can be exploited for many varied missions currently unidentified.” It does not seem to us helpful to suggest, as this statement does, that we cannot identify the missions for this expensive aircraft, no matter how varied they may be.

With careful editing to remove these and other statements of questionable merit, the draft could be issued in unclassified form as a B–1 White Paper.

C. Arthur Borg
Executive Secretary

109. Action Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Goodby) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger


DOD Strategic Force Program Decision—The M–X Missile

In the Briefing Memorandum sent to you on November 2 (Tab 3), we highlighted major strategic force programs which we understand will be included in the FY–78 Defense budget and the associated Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP)—both of which will be presented to Congress in January. We expressed special concern over the program for developing a large payload ICBM, the M–X. The FY–78 budget accelerates development of the M–X missile to provide for initial deployment in 1982, if the present FYDP recommendation on this system remains firm.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760191–0294. Secret. Drafted by Jerome H. Kahan (S/P), Louis V. Nosenzo (PM/NPO), and Goodby on November 10. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. “OBE” is written at the top of the memorandum as are the words, attributed to Kissinger: “Do not want to get involved now. This is a transition matter.”

2 Vest’s memorandum addressing strategic and general purpose force issues is attached, but not printed.
Inherent in this proposal are two departures from existing policy which deserve serious review.

First, accelerating development implies a decision to acquire a substantially improved hard-target kill capability against Soviet missile silos, since this is a key rationale for modernizing the present Minuteman ICBM with the more powerful M–X system. Advocates for improving US hard-target kill potential argue that such programs, which enable us to equal or exceed the USSR’s ability to destroy military targets, are necessary for deterrence and for maintaining an advantageous “warfighting capability.”

This decision raises important questions regarding US strategic policies. With M–X deployed, the Soviets could expect to lose nearly 90 percent of their total strategic warheads from a US first strike in the mid-1980s. This is a reasonably close approximation of a disarming first strike and flies in the face of several statements made by this Administration that it was not acquiring this capability. It is significant to note that our counterforce improvements can pose a potentially greater threat to the USSR than in the reverse situation, since Soviet ICBMs represent a much larger fraction of the USSR’s overall deterrent than is the case with US ICBMs. Indeed, even without M–X, planned improvements to Minuteman ICBMs will give the US a capability to destroy half of the USSR’s silo-based ICBM force, representing a loss of about 60% of the Soviet’s total strategic warhead capacity.

The second problem is that a decision to accelerate development of the M–X missile, with initial deployment in 1982, apparently requires that it be deployed in fixed silos. Development of alternative basing modes for survivability, notably land-mobile schemes, raise difficult cost, feasibility, and domestic issues which may be impossible to resolve in time to meet a 1982 operational date. The rationale for accelerated modernization of our ICBM force by installing M–X in silos largely stems from a belief by some that we must match the USSR rapidly, system-by-system, in order to satisfy “perceived equality” concerns.

However, to deploy a new ICBM in fixed silos, in the face of Soviet offensive improvements that call into question the survivability of fixed launchers, runs counter to the general policy of acquiring strategic forces which are survivable. Moreover, last year the Congress explicitly forbade the expenditure of any M–X monies to develop the silo-basing option, precisely because of its concern about survivability. Deploying M–X in silos could also create instabilities in crises as pressure mounts for one side pre-emptively to launch its vulnerable ICBM force, fearing that an attack from the other side is imminent.

To sum up, current strategic policy emphasizes forces which are survivable and which will not be seen as providing the US with a disarming first-strike potential. These two objectives are contravened by
M–X missiles with improved hard-target kill deployed in vulnerable silos. At the very least, this strategic environment runs counter to the basic stability objective of SALT, and movement by the US in this direction could send signals to Moscow that stability is no longer a central US concern.

We believe that major defense program decisions that reflect fundamental doctrinal judgments and can affect our foreign interests and negotiations (such as the M–X) should not be made by DOD on a business-as-usual basis in the course of developing its annual budget, especially in a time of transition to a new Administration.

Secretary Rumsfeld plans to present his Defense budget and program recommendations to the President in late November. There is apparently some last-minute review of the M–X issue underway, but we have no assurance that the plan to accelerate the program and use silo-basing will be reversed.

We suggest that you phone Secretary Rumsfeld, or send him the attached letter, with a view to determining whether he indeed plans to recommend the silo-based M–X system, conveying our concerns over such a decision, and suggesting that the two of you meet to discuss the matter. If the Secretary of Defense is willing to consider modifications before formal submission of the Defense budget to the President, we would prepare a brief analysis of this issue that you could then make available to him.

If DOD’s recommendations on M–X remain unaltered, we believe that you should raise the matter with the President and lay out for his consideration alternative program choices and their likely impact.

Recommendations

1. That you telephone Secretary Rumsfeld on the M–X issue, drawing upon the talking points in Tab 1.

2. Alternatively, that you send the attached letter to Secretary Rumsfeld (Tab 2).
110. Summary Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated.

Final Review of the Navy Study

Background

The NSC study on US Strategy and Naval Force Requirements was initiated early in 1976 and conducted within the DRP process. An interim report was made to the DRP on April 29² and to the NSC on May 2.³ Based on the NSC meeting, the President submitted a supplemental budget request to the Congress. The Congress failed to act on the majority of the items in the supplemental.

When the last formal review was conducted, the study was seen to be weak in several areas: there was intellectual concern with the notion that the size of the Navy is principally driven by the number of carriers; the implications of emerging technology were not addressed; Allied capabilities were not taken fully into account; and the capabilities of other services to aid in carrying out the Navy’s mission were not evaluated. All of these deficiencies have been satisfactorily addressed in the final report.

Fundamental Issues Involved in the Study

For more than a decade the military indicators which are used to evaluate maritime power have shown an adverse trend when the US Navy is compared with that of the USSR. These adverse trends have been recognized. The current Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) calls for building a total of 111 new ships to reach a fleet of 535 ships by 1985, an increase of 50 ships over current force levels. Something significant is already being done to reverse the adverse trends now in the US/Soviet maritime balance. Thus, the questions now are:

—Should we be doing still more?
—Should the force mix of ship types stress expensive, highly capable ships, or should we concentrate on numbers, building less expensive ships of lower individual capability?

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 22, Defense Review Panel Meeting, 11/24/76—Naval Study (NSSM 246) (2). Secret. This is a summary of a joint DOD–NSC study, U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements, the final version of which is dated November 16. Boverie forwarded the entire study, 78 pages plus an annex, and this summary to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, November 22, for review prior to the DRP meeting to be held on November 24. (Ibid.)

² See Document 83.

³ No minutes of the meeting have been found, but see Document 84.
—Should the program stress new construction or should it proceed in a more balanced manner, assuring the readiness of existing units while adding more slowly to the size and strength of the fleet?

Detailed discussions of these issues are included in the study on pages 54–64.4

Alternative Naval Force Structures

The study examined a range of alternative force structures bounded by a reduced force level and a major build-up of force levels to those contained in the JSOP. The reduced force (which dropped down to a ten-carrier fleet) was rejected as providing too little capability. The study also rejected major carrier build-up options as involving too great an investment in an increasingly vulnerable asset. The study settled on three force structure options. In the most basic terms, Option 1 deletes the additional large-deck carrier presently included in the FYDP and reprograms the FYDP funding level to build more low-mix ships; Option 2 includes the FYDP large-deck carrier and additional low-mix ships; and Option 3 includes the FYDP large-deck carrier and a mix of additional ships whose number approximates Option 2 but includes more high-mix ships. A more detailed discussion of the three options is included on pages 65–67 of the study. A graphical summary of the current FYDP and the three options is attached at Tab II–A.

Selection of an Option

Defense considers the President’s submission of a shipbuilding supplemental to be a decision that growth should be accelerated beyond the FYDP. More specifically, the inclusion of long-lead funds for the large-deck carrier in that package is viewed as an Administration commitment to the construction of that ship. Thus, they can be expected to argue that Option 1 is effectively ruled out. The President’s remarks at the November 16 initial budget review5 for FY 78 indicate that he disagrees with that interpretation and that all options remain viable. OMB clearly considers that the question of growth remains unresolved.

Option 3 is clearly the high road, further growth in numbers and a richer mix of ships. Options 1 and 2 look better to us since they provide additional force level growth, a commitment to R&D on advanced pro-

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4 The referenced portion of the paper discusses issues related to force levels and the composition of the Navy, specifically qualitative considerations, carriers and their cost, the nuclear/conventional power mix, the qualitative mix of other surface combatants, the future of sea-based air, and new technology.

5 No record of the meeting was found.
grams, and a mix of individual ship capabilities. The fundamental choice turns on whether or not we build one more large-deck carrier.

The principal study rationale for construction of an additional large-deck carrier is to sustain the active carrier force at twelve while the carrier SLEP conversations are being conducted, and to hedge against the failure of V/STOL technology to provide an alternative to the large-deck carrier. The final version of the study differs significantly from earlier drafts in moving away from dependence on the large-deck carrier. This is perhaps the most significant development in the course of the study—the strong implicit commitment to push V/STOL technology and to examine other alternatives to large-deck carriers such as improved surface combatant anti-air capability, the cruise missile, and the use of land-based air for sea control operations.

The choice between Option 2 and Option 3 concerns qualitative mix. Option 3 builds 4 VSS and 2 additional CSGNs at the high end and deletes 5 FFG–7 frigates at the low end. Our opinion is that VSS construction can be delayed until V/STOL technology is better developed and the expensive CSGN program can be stretched out to provide funds for low-mix ships. Option 2 provides growth in numbers of ships using proven technology, which is the most urgent need.

**Study Conclusions**

The study concludes that:

—There exists a widely recognized need to improve our naval forces, and our current Five-Year Defense Plan already includes an ambitious program to raise both the quality of our ships and our overall force levels.

—The options presented in the study provide a means to accelerate and expand the current Five-Year Defense Plan.

**Courses of Action**

There are essentially two courses of action available at this time:

—Call for an NSC meeting in the near future to submit the document to the President for decision.

—Delay Presidential review until NSSM 246 is completed.

We recommend that we wait until NSSM 246 is completed before taking the study to the President.

The study is sound and the rationale supporting the force options well developed. A copy of the study is attached at Tab II–B.

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6 Document 102.

7 Attached, but not printed. See footnote 1 above.
Distribution of the Study

A secondary issue is further distribution of the study. Although the study is an NSC document, Secretary Rumsfeld has committed himself to making it available to the Congress. An attempt to deny access to the study would probably be highly counterproductive, giving rise to charges of reneging on a commitment, withholding judgments of value to the legislative process, and excessive Executive Branch secrecy. There exists a general consensus that action is required in the shipbuilding area. Failure to provide access to the study will only serve to weaken existing Congressional support while strengthening the arguments of those who oppose a larger effort or would press for differing force mixes. An attitude of openness and cooperation seems likely to serve the nation’s best interests. This issue of distribution should be specifically addressed by the DRP to avoid future confusion and counterproductive Congressional pressure. The preferable “way out” of the “access to NSC documents” question would be a slightly revised document forwarded to the Congress by the President or Defense as a “report based on the NSC study.” Two courses of action are available, depending upon whether a Presidential decision on the options is made. If the President decides on an option, the “Program Options for a Decision” section (VI., B., pages 66–79) should be deleted and replaced with a section outlining the President’s decision and discussing the supporting rationale. Should the study be completed without a Presidential decision on an option, the report on the study would essentially follow its present form.

Outcome of the Meeting

The fundamental outcome of the meeting will be to recommend forwarding the study to the President for decision. The DRP should also resolve the question of further study distribution subsequent to Presidential decision.

[Omitted here is a list of the contents of Scowcroft’s briefing book for the November 24 DRP meeting.]
### Tab A

Table Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated.

**COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS IN 1990**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COMPARISON</th>
<th>CURRENT PLAN</th>
<th>OPTION 1</th>
<th>OPTION 2</th>
<th>OPTION 3</th>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUCLEAR CARRIERS</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>+1.4B</td>
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<sup>8</sup> Current plan: FYDP with repriced shipbuilding. [Footnote in the original.]
111. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Defense Review Panel Meeting, Wednesday, November 24, 1976–11:00 a.m.

PLACE
White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as Chairman of the NSC Defense Review Panel, Acting Secretary of State Charles Robinson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wm Clements, Director of Central Intelligence George Bush, Chairman, JCS General George Brown, Director of OMB James Lynn, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Holloway, Deputy Director ACDA John Lehman, Associate Director of OMB for National Security and International Affairs Donald Ogilvie, OSD/PE Peter Aldridge, NSC Staff Richard Boverie, Randy Jane, Howard Eldredge, Intelligence Community Staff Admiral Bergin, OSD/ISA/DASD James Wade, ACDA, Robert Behr, Deputy Director, FM James Goodby

ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION

(1) DRP Study on the Future of Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Program
(2) NSSM 246 US Strategy and Force Postures

Navy Study

Secretary Rumsfeld said he wanted views on three issues: (1) the relationship of the Navy Study to NSSM 246; should the President be briefed on the Navy study; how to handle the Congressional request for a study on the Navy shipbuilding program. Secretary Rumsfeld then asked Mr. Aldridge to present the briefing charts (see attached charts—Tab A). Referring to the second chart (which described present maritime capabilities in a NATO war), General Brown said that the JCS believed the claimed capabilities were somewhat overstated.

At the conclusion of the briefing, Secretary Rumsfeld said that there was an obligation to give Congress something on the Navy study but there was no specific time period for this. He noted that the paper

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Robinson Records, Lot File 77D117, Box 8, NSSM 246. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodby on November 26. This memorandum is a record of the DRP meeting held on November 24 from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Handwritten minutes of the meeting are in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 116, 11/24/76 DRP Meeting.

2 Document 110.

3 Document 102.

4 All the charts referenced herein are attached, but not printed.
would be useless to Congress in declassified form and that a SECRET version was being prepared by Defense. He asked Mr. Scowcroft for his opinion on briefing the President. Mr. Scowcroft replied that the President should definitely be briefed on the study and that it should be done in conjunction with a briefing on NSSM 246. Mr. Lynn thought that the Navy briefing must come after the briefing of NSSM 246 since the latter study had the broader focus; also some issues were surfaced in NSSM 246 which had not been identified in the Navy study. Secretary Rumsfeld said he had no problem in beginning with a briefing for the President on NSSM 246 and then following with the Navy study.

After a discussion about possible dates for briefing the President, Secretary Rumsfeld said he understood it was agreed that the Navy study would be briefed to the President sometime after NSSM 246 and that an early December date would be sought for briefing NSSM 246 to the President; the Defense Department would seek to produce a modified classified version of the Navy study, but no decision would be made about submitting the study to Congress until after the President has been briefed. Responding to Mr. Scowcroft’s reservations about providing Congress an NSC decision paper, Secretary Rumsfeld said that the paper would be called a Defense Department report to Congress.

Mr. Wade asked whether he could assume that the study was finished. Secretary Rumsfeld said that he could, although there were a lot of areas requiring further study since the paper was not the ultimate answer to the country’s future shipbuilding program.

Mr. Scowcroft said that he had one problem with the paper: it implicitly assumed that to improve the Navy you simply add more carrier task forces. Secretary Rumsfeld said that a lot of that material had been taken out of the report, but Mr. Lynn said that he didn’t think the report had been changed all that much. Admiral Holloway thought that the paper indeed had been changed to be more like what Mr. Scowcroft wanted. Secretary Rumsfeld said that this was true, but it could be argued that the paper still lacked a classic low-mix, non-big carrier option. There was something close to it, but it wasn’t there. If anyone wanted to offer a low-mix option, Secretary Rumsfeld added, he should provide it to Mr. Aldridge and it would be put in the briefing for the President.

NSSM 246—Briefing for the President

Secretary Rumsfeld said he wanted views on whether there should be another Defense Review Panel meeting to consider NSSM 246. This would be hard to do, given scheduling problems, but we could think about a meeting on November 30. He also wanted opinions on whether the report should be an informational or a decision paper; his own incli-
nation was to give a briefing to the President initially that was for decision purposes. Afterwards, Mr. Scowcroft could interact with the President on how he wanted to proceed. Mr. Scowcroft thought that the paper at least should be structured so that it could be the basis for decisions. Secretary Rumsfeld said that the paper already was cast in that form. It lacked only the boxes to be checked. However, Secretary Rumsfeld said that we should make sure that the first meeting with the President will not be a decision meeting. Mr. Lynn said that even if the President doesn’t consciously decide on some of the issues in NSSM 246, he will in fact be making decisions in the context of the budget and these will have some effect on overall strategy. Mr. Lynn said that in the preparation of the budget he had directed that where certain issues were discussed in NSSM 246, they should be held in abeyance; an example of this was what is our MX strategy. Secretary Rumsfeld said he had also been holding off on certain program decisions for the same reason. Mr. Lynn said that everyone will want to be heard and he would therefore suggest that as a separate effort we try to decide on what issues are ripe for decisions, or if certain issues are not ripe for decisions, what are the implications of various proposals.

NSSM 246—Budget Implications

Secretary Rumsfeld asked Mr. Wade to proceed with the briefing of NSSM 246. (See attached charts—Tab B.) Mr. Lynn pointed out that the budgetary figures used in the charts were based on DOD’s new Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). It was wrong to show only those figures in his opinion, and a range of numbers would be better. Mr. Aldridge said that the difficulty with using the previous Defense budget was that Defense would have to guess at what the five-year projection would be. Mr. Lynn said that if the study did not use OMB’s figures, it should at least use numbers consistent with what the President had previously approved. Mr. Wade said that the current program was consistent with current policy. Mr. Lynn said that his people had given him different advice. They had told him that there were new or accelerated programs in the budget beyond those previously approved by the President. This was specifically the case with respect to the M–X missile. Secretary Rumsfeld and Mr. Clements both interjected that that decision had not yet been made. Mr. Lynn said that while that might be so, NSSM 246 included in its budget estimates funds for that accelerated program. Mr. Scowcroft wanted to be sure he understood that the base used in the NSSM 246 was the Defense Department’s FY 78 budget submission. Mr. Lynn confirmed that that was the case. Secretary Rumsfeld said that perhaps a range of numbers would be the right answer. Mr. Lynn said that it would also be possible not to show any numbers but Mr. Scowcroft thought that a yardstick would be helpful. Secretary Rums-
feld asked Mr. Scowcroft, Mr. Lynn and Mr. Wade to get together to solve this problem.

**NSSM 246—Strategic Forces**

Mr. Lynn asked if it would be possible to beef up the description of the capabilities represented by the various strategic force options. For example, the description “no specific counter-silo capability” was too vague. Could the matter not be quantified more precisely? Secretary Rumsfeld said that one could trick oneself by being too precise. Mr. Lynn agreed but thought it would be possible to be more precise than the report had been about capabilities. Mr. Lynn also asked whether if the US moved towards an improved counter-silo capability, the Soviets would stand still for that or would they not begin to build missiles which would not be so vulnerable. Mr. Wade said that probably they would move toward mobile missiles, which the US should do also. Secretary Rumsfeld, commenting on current strategic policy, said that people are most important to save, but our whole strategic approach was different. We were aiming at destroying the Soviet recovery base by destroying factories on the theory that this would avoid killing populations while hindering national recovery. However, factories could be reconstructed relatively quickly if people were available to do it, while without the people to reconstruct the economic base it would take a country a generation to recover.

Speaking of civil defense, Mr. Lynn said that if the Soviets were not so far ahead of us as we thought, and we accelerated our civil defense preparations, the USSR would probably also accelerate its civil defense programs. Mr. Lynn asked whether it would not be possible to provide under each of the options a few lines suggesting what the response of the Soviet Union might be to the US proposed programs. Secretary Rumsfeld asked if that meant something on the order of an action-reaction description. Mr. Lynn said this was what he had in mind and said that something also might be said on SALT and Arms Control. To provide only a paragraph at the end of the whole discussion of options tended to blur the action-reaction cycle. Secretary Rumsfeld said that perhaps a little on action-reaction could be put in but he cautioned against discussing SALT implications in the report. Returning to the question of mobile missiles, Mr. Lynn asked whether it could be assumed that the Soviets would go for mobile missiles if the US did. He wondered if the Soviets might retain their silo-based missiles for the higher accuracy they provided and use mobile missiles for a second strike.

**NSSM 246—General Purpose Forces**

Secretary Rumsfeld said that he didn’t buy the terminology on the General Purpose chart. He said that US forces have to be prepared for
more than the short-warning type of attack. Mr. Lynn agreed, saying that in addition US forces should be prepared to meet a feint by the Soviets and find the real attack coming somewhere else. Acting Secretary Robinson asked whether the US might not inspire a particular kind of attack by preparing only for one scenario. Secretary Rumsfeld said he thought it likely that if the US prepared for only one scenario the Soviets would indeed pick another one. The US had to have a variety of capabilities to deal with a variety of attack scenarios.

Mr. Lynn asked whether it would be possible to have two or three sentences beefing up the commentary on US General Purpose Forces in other parts of the world (i.e., apart from Europe). Secretary Rumsfeld agreed.

Secretary Rumsfeld went on to say that he would not characterize the ninety-day supply criterion for US forces in NATO as our current strategy because in fact we are not yet up to a 30 day supply level for our own forces.

Mr. Lynn said that we should not fool the President that this report has told us what our force requirements are or that the cost figures for major programs are at all solid. Turning to Gen. Brown, he said “your people” could not possibly support them, they are so low. Secretary Rumsfeld agreed that the report could contain a range of figures.

NSSM 246—Overall Strategies

Mr. Wade commented that the differences between the present budget and that required by the alternative strategies were not large. Mr. Lynn and Mr. Ogilvie both commented that the base figures used in the study were 8 billion dollars higher than what OMB was talking about just to begin with. Mr. Lynn said that the figures were very rough. Gen. Brown agreed that they were “terribly” rough. Mr. Wade said what he was trying to point out was that the fiscal disparity between present programs and larger alternative programs did not represent a large percentage increase. Mr. Ogilvie disagreed. He said there was still six billion dollars difference between the lower options and the larger options, even using the DOD numbers. Mr. Wade agreed but said that he would have expected even bigger variations. He did not consider them large by comparison with a $120 billion defense budget. Secretary Rumsfeld said there was a difference in perspective because Wade was looking at the numbers in the light of what these forces would do in terms of policy and OMB was looking at it from the standpoint of what it would cost the taxpayers.

NSSM 246—Next DRP Meeting

Turning to the question of the next DRP meeting, Secretary Rumsfeld asked whether we should plan on a meeting on the 30th of November. Mr. Lynn said that we should tentatively schedule the
meeting, but hope not to have it. Mr. Robinson said that a meeting should be held if the report was to be in any way regarded as a decision document. (Note: This was in response to remarks that the report might become a decision document even though not so described). Mr. Scowcroft said this was a very important point because if the report were to be a decision paper then we should be thinking about it in that way. Secretary Rumsfeld said that the report would not be a decision paper when first presented to the President. Acting Secretary Robinson emphasized that he would want to know what specific issues might be put to the President for decision. Secretary Rumsfeld asked whether another DRP meeting was needed before the information meeting with the President. Acting Secretary Robinson said that if some issues were up for decision we ought to know what they are. Mr. Lynn agreed that these issues should be written up now so we would all know what they are. He asked whether there could not be a separate paper on this. Acting Secretary Robinson said it would be useful to have a DRP meeting because it might be necessary to argue about the issues in the paper. It was agreed to review schedules and propose a date for the next DRP meeting on NSSM 246.

The meeting adjourned at 12:30 p.m.

112. Memorandum From Robert B. Plowden, Jr. of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Senior Review Group Meeting on MAAG Requirements: Monday, November 29, 1976, 3:00 p.m.

Purpose of This Meeting

To determine what structure should be proposed to perform security assistance functions in Fiscal Year 1978.

The following issues are in contention and should be addressed:

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 17, Senior Review Group Meeting, 11/29/76—MAAG Requirements (NSSM 243). Secret. Sent for information.
1. What MAAG-type organizations should be proposed for retention in Latin America?

2. In countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey, where there is disagreement only as to the number of personnel to be assigned to the MAAG-type organization (Defense Field Office), what number of personnel should be proposed?

3. In what form should an amendment be proposed which would permit continued Defense Attaché Office participation in security assistance functions? Should a general repeal of the current restriction be requested, or should authorization be requested for specified countries?

4. Should the security assistance organization in Jordan be an augmentation to the Defense Attaché Office, or a separate Defense Field Office?

5. Should legislation be requested which would permit, without specific congressional approval, assignment to each U.S. diplomatic mission of up to six (instead of the current three) military personnel to perform security assistance functions?

Background

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAGs by September 30, 1976; in addition, the Act requires specific congressional authorization for MAAGs existing after September 30, 1977.² The reduction has been completed, and the study on MAAG requirements prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs in response to NSSM 243³ has resulted in four options for MAAG presence after September 30, 1977.

The agencies involved in this review were Defense, State, OMB, CIA, and ACDA, and their study comments are at Tabs B through F, respectively. Defense and State recommended specific options in their study comments, while CIA and ACDA comments were generally supportive of these options. In addition, the NSC Staff and OMB have recommended third and fourth options based on their evaluation of the study comment options. Before addressing the differences in the four options, some elements of commonality should be mentioned.

Common Positions

Each of the four options recommends that security assistance functions be performed by Foreign Service Officers in countries with the

² See footnote 3, Document 103.
³ NSSM 243 and the response to it are Documents 85 and 103, respectively.
⁴ None of the attached tabs are printed.
very smallest programs; by Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) in some countries; by the newly-established, three-person Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) in most countries (ODCs do not require specific congressional approval); and by congressionally-approved, MAAG-type organizations—Defense Field Offices (DEFOs)—with reduced staffing and functions in countries where U.S. foreign policy interests necessitate a group of more than three members of the U.S. Armed Forces.

There is also general agreement on three particular aspects of the MAAG issue:

- Three former MAAGs—Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—will be designated ODCs, with personnel in excess of those three funded under FMS contracts. These contracts have not yet been signed, so Defense has included those country figures in its alternative, while State and OMB, assuming the contracts will be signed, have not included the excess personnel or costs in their alternatives.

- It will be necessary to rely on temporary duty teams of experts to perform security assistance on one-time bases as manpower levels in MAAG-type organizations are reduced.

- The law (which now prohibits use of DAOs for security assistance functions) should be amended to allow DAOs to continue performing security assistance functions in countries where political sensitivities are paramount or manpower savings are effected by not establishing separate ODCs. (As discussed below, the NSC Staff option recommends that DAO augmentation be requested only in those countries where manpower savings are effected.) The provision of the law which prohibits DAO involvement resulted in part from the efforts of a House International Relations Committee staff member who had served in a DAO while on active duty, and who thought that security assistance functions he had to perform detracted from performance of his intelligence functions. While such an allegation may have been true in his case and isolated others, the proposed change to the law is supported by all agencies involved, including strong support from the CIA and JCS.

Aside from these broad areas of agreement, distinct positions have emerged on the number of MAAG-type organizations/DEFOs to be retained, the Manning levels needed in various countries, and the costs involved to support the recommended positions. A summary of the key features of the four options is at Tab G.

Defense Option

The Defense option recommends that 31 MAAG-type organizations be retained in FY 1978. While the Defense proposal substantially reduces manpower in many cases and represents some cost reduction
from the FY 1977 program cost, the proposal represents a reduction of only three MAAG-type organizations from the 34 authorized for FY 1977.

Fourteen of the 31 organizations proposed are the traditional Latin American military groups, which, quoting Defense, are recommended for continuation to “perform the traditional role of representation and essential security assistance functions on an as-required basis.” Because the clear intent of the law is to authorize only those personnel performing “essential security assistance functions,” the traditional representation argument will carry little weight absent more compelling evidence of need. To request approval of 31 MAAG-type organizations, therefore, even with some reductions in manpower, quite probably would be regarded as unresponsive by Congress and might lead to enactment of more restrictive legislation.

State Option

The State option proposes the retention of 20 DEFOs in FY 1978, although for reasons discussed below, the proposed cost and total number of personnel are virtually identical to the Defense proposal’s figures. State proposes retaining four of the 14 Latin American military groups as DEFOs, but offers somewhat more convincing reasons for the four than Defense did for the 14: Panama, because of the on-going negotiations leading to a new defense relationship; Brazil, because of its geo-political importance; Argentina, because of the need to not appear as unduly favoring Brazil; and Bolivia, through FY 1978 only, because of our undertaking for a military modernization there.

In some countries where State and Defense agree on the need for a DEFO, State has proposed a higher number of personnel, primarily military, to staff the DEFOs than has Defense: e.g., Ethiopia (59 as compared to 34); Spain (42 as compared to 30); and Turkey (127 as compared to 97). In each of these instances, Defense has requested the number of people it deems necessary to perform the essential security assistance functions, while State appears to be requesting additional personnel for “traditional representation” purposes. For this reason, the Defense position appears more acceptable because it better comports with legislative intent.

5 In an October 22 memorandum, Vest apprised Kissinger of the Department’s proposed position and recommended his approval. Kissinger, according to a handwritten note on the memorandum, “approved with [the] proviso that we seek legislation to amend the size of the ODCs from three to six.” Vest’s memorandum and Borg’s November 2 memorandum [also at Tab B] to Scowcroft officially conveying the Department’s position are in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files, Lot File 80D212, NSSM 243.
The State alternative also recommends that legislation be proposed which seeks the authority to assign up to six, rather than three, military personnel to ODCs without congressional approval. Because an amendment already will be required to allow DAOs to perform security assistance functions, there is small chance that Congress will accept two simultaneous revisions to its recently enacted law.

NSC Staff Option

The NSC Staff option recommends combining the best features of the Defense and State options. It proposes retention of the 20 DEFOs recommended by State, plus one DEFO in Jordan (where State has requested a DAO augmentation of 10 military members, a request which I believe would seriously harm chances for legislative relief from the current DAO restriction, because it was Congress’ intent to identify and specifically authorize large security assistance operations such as this). To disguise a DEFO by integrating it into a large DAO clearly would subvert the legislative intent. In addition, it proposes acceptance of the lower Defense figures for those DEFOs where Defense and State disagree only as to numbers. Essentially, this proposal accepts the State option insofar as Latin America is concerned, and the lower Defense personnel figures in countries such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey. The result of this combination is a proposal which provides for that number of missions and personnel needed to perform essential security assistance functions, a result totally consonant with legislative intent.

In addition, the NSC Staff option recommends that continued DAO participation in security assistance operations be requested only in those countries where personnel or cost savings are effected by not establishing separate ODCs. Defense, State, and OMB recommend continued DAO security assistance participation in some countries where personnel or cost savings are not effected, but where “political sensitivities are paramount.” The legislative history of the Act, however, is quite clear in its intent that security assistance organizations be used only for performance of essential security assistance functions, and not for “representative” or “politically sensitive” purposes. A proposed amendment requesting continued DAO security assistance participation in as few countries as possible, and then only where personnel and cost savings are effected, would appear to have the greatest chance of success in Congress.

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6 Scowcroft wrote, “Who knows about this?” in the margin next to this sentence.

7 Scowcroft highlighted this sentence and wrote, “Meaning?” in the margin next to it.

8 Scowcroft wrote, “Why?” in the margin next to this sentence.
OMB Option

The OMB option recommends retention of 14 DEFOs in FY 1978. From the list of 20 on which Defense, State, and the NSC Staff agree, it further recommends terminating MAAGs in Panama, Liberia, Tunisia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Japan. No reason for this recommendation is given, other than OMB’s unsupported conclusion that “programs and functions in those countries do not warrant more than three military personnel.” Considering the political sensitivities involved in our relationships with these countries and the fact that the NSC Staff option results in significant reductions from FY 1977 MAAG totals, I believe that the NSC Staff option will satisfy the congressional desire for phasing down the MAAG presence, while avoiding the repercussions which OMB’s precipitous cuts would occasion. In addition, keeping in mind that a proposal similar to this now must be made to Congress each year, the NSC Staff option leaves the most flexibility for future years.

Approach at the Meeting

Your talking points for the meeting are at Tab A. I suggest that you open the meeting by underscoring the fact that the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act marks a new day insofar as MAAGs are concerned, and attempts to maintain the status quo almost certainly will meet with congressional disapproval. Also, while there has been a considerable degree of agency agreement on this topic, a number of contentious issues require resolution prior to formulation and submission of the FY 1978 budget request for MAAG-type organizations.

Specifically, in view of the considerations and agency positions detailed above, you will want to:

—Determine which countries in Latin America should retain MAAG-type organizations.

—Determine what number of personnel should be proposed for assignment to Defense Field Offices in those countries (such as Ethiopia, Spain, and Turkey) where there is general agreement on the need for a DEFO, but differing views on the number of personnel needed to perform security assistance functions.

—Discuss the form in which an amendment should be proposed which would permit continued Defense Attaché Office participation in security assistance functions in FY 1978.

—Decide whether the security assistance organization in Jordan should be a DEFO or a DAO augmented by 10 members of the military.

—Discuss the desirability of requesting an increase from three to six in the number of military personnel which can be assigned, without
prior congressional approval, to the Chief of each U.S. diplomatic mission to perform security assistance functions.

—Indicate that you will discuss with the President these and other points raised at the meeting and that a Presidential decision memorandum will be forthcoming.9

9 A handwritten and mostly illegible record of the SRG meeting is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 30, Meeting Materials—Senior Review Group—MAAG Requirements, 11/29/76.

113. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to President Ford


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEFENSE REVIEW PANEL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT

Response to NSSM 246—US Defense Policy and Military Posture

Attached hereto is the National Security Council Defense Review Panel’s response to NSSM 246.2 It addresses the current and projected threat, arms control, and resource considerations associated with our military posture. It also highlights a number of critical unresolved issues which impact on present and projected strategies and require further studies and analysis. Changing military and political considerations identified during the study make it questionable that our current policies and programs will be fully consistent with our national security requirements during the 1980s.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 47, NSSM 246 (1 of 2) (8). Top Secret. NSSM 246 is Document 102.

2 The response was not found attached to Rumsfeld’s covering memorandum, but is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0050, 381 (1 of 3). It has been printed as an attachment. Holcomb forwarded the response to Scowcroft under a November 29 covering memorandum. Davis then forwarded it under a covering memorandum, also November 29, to Robinson, Clements, Lynn, Ikle, General Brown, and Bush for review prior to the DRP meeting scheduled for November 30. Holcomb’s and Davis’s memoranda are ibid.
We have therefore developed a range of options in the form of notional alternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces, some of which merit further refinement and detailed analysis. Additional analysis is particularly needed to reduce the current uncertainty in the elements of each major strategy alternative, along with the force structure requirements and cost implications of each. These cost estimates are extremely rough and the figures are not agreed among your advisers.

Donald Rumsfeld

Attachment

Response to National Security Study Memorandum 246
Prepared by the National Security Council Defense Review Panel


I. INTRODUCTION

The last comprehensive NSC review of national defense policy which articulated overall defense strategy and military posture (NSSM 3) took place in 1969. Since then, the international political, economic, and military environment has changed substantially. For example: the war in Indochina has ended; our relationship with the Soviet Union has broadened; the Soviets, through great effort, have achieved a rough equivalence in strategic forces; we have established a dialogue with the People's Republic of China; and the United States and its allies have become more dependent on higher-priced OPEC oil. Defense policy has evolved to keep pace with these changes; however, there has not been an interagency study addressing the full range of US strategy in the interim. As a result, on September 2, 1976, the President issued NSSM 246, directing a new comprehensive review of our national defense policy and military posture and the development of a range of alternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces, taking into account their security, foreign policy, arms control, and budgetary implications.

The NSSM 246 study has been conducted within the NSC Defense Review Panel process. The basic elements of the study were developed by seven interagency Task Forces and an interagency Integrating

3 See footnote 2, Document 66.
Group reporting to the Defense Review Panel Working Group. The Interagency Task Forces were as follows: (1) Foreign Policy, (2) Intelligence, (3) Fiscal/Economic, (4) Strategic Forces, (5) General Purpose Forces, (6) Preparedness, and (7) US Military Strategy Review.

This report addresses current US defense policy, the international situation (including the threat), preparedness policy, notional military strategy alternatives and rough cost estimates, and some national fiscal considerations.

During the course of the study, a number of areas were identified which require further analysis. Some of the more significant areas are summarized in Section VII.

II. CURRENT DEFENSE POLICY

Strategic Nuclear Forces

NSDM 16,4 issued in 1969 as a result of the NSSM 3 study, stated that US strategic forces would be planned to meet four criteria. In brief, they were: (1) maintain an assured retaliatory capability; (2) avoid encouraging a Soviet first-strike emphasis; (3) not permit the Soviets to cause significantly greater urban/industrial damage to the United States than they themselves would suffer; and (4) develop a light area ABM defense of the United States (overtaken in 1972 by the ABM treaty).

Issued in January 1974, NSDM 2425 (amplified by subsequent implementing Defense Guidance) provides the following strategic nuclear employment guidance:

—Should conflict occur, the most critical employment objective is early war termination on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies at the lowest level of conflict feasible. This would require a wide range of limited nuclear employment options for use in conjunction with supporting political and military measures (including conventional forces) to control escalation.

—Plans for limited employment options should enable the United States to conduct selected nuclear operations (in concert with conventional forces) which protect vital US interests, limit enemy capabilities to continue aggression, and demonstrate a desire to exercise restraint. The options would be designed to hold some vital enemy targets hostage to subsequent destruction by survivable nuclear forces and provide time to allow the enemy opportunities for reconsideration.

—Force employment guidance, in the event escalation could not be controlled, calls for maintenance of survivable strategic forces in re-
serve; continued emphasis on destruction of political, economic, and military resources critical to the enemy’s postwar power and recovery; and limitation of damage to those resources critical to the continued power and influence of the United State and its allies.

—The US nuclear force posture should deny an opponent a significant military advantage from a first strike, evidence the capability to counterbalance force posture changes that could alter the military balance, be structured so it cannot reasonably be interpreted by the USSR as threatening a disarming attack, and conform with provisions of arms control agreements.

These principles are reflected in the current Defense Guidance, which requires that strategic nuclear forces provide:

—An assured retaliatory capability across a full range of alert, survivability, and deployment postures, so that there would be no perception of significant USSR advantage in a first strike.

—A clear capability to conduct nuclear operations across a full range of conflict intensities.

—A visible capability to counter Soviet force improvement initiatives which alter the military balance and to induce Soviet adherence to current arms control agreements and negotiation of equitable follow-on agreements, while avoiding provocation of Soviet nuclear force deployments.

General Purpose Forces

NSSM 3 described four general purpose force alternative strategies for NATO and three for Asia. From this range, the President, in 1969, selected a strategy for NATO Initial Defense or Joint Defense in Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia) and designated it as US policy in NSDM 27.6

The forces for an initial defense of NATO under this strategy were predicated on the scenario (obviously only one of several possible) of a full-scale Warsaw Pact attack following a period of political crisis, mobilization, and military build-up on both sides. These forces were not planned for a Pact attack following concealed mobilization or for conventional defense beyond 90 days. Further, it was assumed that such deployed NATO forces could cope with a smaller or more slowly developing attack. In Asia, this strategy required planning for a full-scale PRC attack in either Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia but not both simultaneously. The possibility of war starting in Europe after US engagement in Asia was recognized, and the strategy called for giving priority to Europe and a disengagement in Asia.

To this strategy was added the requirement for meeting two minor contingencies (the so called “1/2” war). The Middle East and the Western Hemisphere were mentioned as areas in which contingencies might occur. In addition, this strategy included forces for a strategic reserve and for antisubmarine forces to protect shipping between the United States and its allies.

Evolution of defense strategy guidance since 1969 has resulted in the following changes:

— An increase in focus on the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO and away from a conflict with the PRC.

— Acknowledgement of the prospective worldwide aspects of conflict with the USSR and guidance to be able to fight for as long as the Soviets and their allies are capable.

— Force sizing based on the requirement to meet a worldwide conflict against the USSR/Warsaw Pact which follows a limited US commitment (no more than three divisions) elsewhere.

— Recognition (for force sizing only) that while US planning assumes an initial Warsaw Pact mobilization which lasts 30 days and a NATO mobilization of 23 days to meet a Pact attack of 86 divisions, a smaller-sized attack following a shorter mobilization time is possible.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHALLENGE TO US SECURITY

A. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

The central objective of US national security policy is to insure the physical security of the United States, its economic well-being, and the preservation of its institutions and values.

A major challenge to this objective has resulted from the policies of the Soviet Union. Since the end of World War II, the most significant development in the international security environment has been the USSR’s steady growth as a military power, posing the principal threat to the United States and the international system with which it is associated. After 30 years of developing its industrial, technological, and military capabilities, and maintaining consistently high levels of defense spending, the USSR has reached military superpower status, equivalent in many respects to the United States.

While the Soviet Union has been and will continue to be our paramount security problem, other elements of the international security environment, some new, some old, also bear on our defense policy and military posture: (1) the danger posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation, (2) the increasing dependence of the United States and its friends and allies, on each other and on the Third World for raw materials and energy, (3) continuing tension and disorder (including ter-
rorism) in much of the underdeveloped and parts of the developed world, (4) the rise of the PRC as a factor in the security balance between the industrialized democracies and the Soviet Union, the implications of which must be kept under constant assessment, and (5) the sometimes conflicting pressures in the Middle East brought on by the growing dependence of the United States and its allies on Middle East oil.

In this unsettled environment, the cornerstone of our security policy is—as it has been for a generation—our partnership with the industrial democracies of Europe and with Japan. The system of collective security created in the wake of World War II has been remarkably successful. For the indefinite future, it should continue to be the basic framework for our security policies. While we have important commitments and obligations elsewhere, notably in the Middle East and in Northeast Asia, it is the NATO Alliance which has the greatest influence on the sizing and disposition of all but our strategic nuclear forces.

The US–USSR Relationship

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a central feature of American foreign and defense policy for three decades. A significant favorable change in Soviet policies affecting US security interests is unlikely, even with changes in Soviet leadership. Soviet military budgets will remain high to insure security of the USSR, to enhance its international image, and to support its foreign policy. This effort will provide the USSR over the next few years with the military capabilities to exploit opportunities which may arise in distant areas.

US security objectives toward the USSR will be:

—To deter a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, its allies, and countries important to the United States, and to protect their territorial and political integrity should deterrence fail.

—To provide a strong base for resisting and thereby deterring attempts by the Soviets to coerce the United States, its allies, and other nations important to US interests.

—To prevent or to offset the expansion of Soviet power and influence in areas important to the United States.

—To reduce areas of tension that could give rise to US-Soviet conflict, while improving mechanisms for maintaining stability and control should a crisis develop.

—To seek to persuade the Soviet Union to limit, and if possible reduce, military forces through arms control negotiations.

—To seek to encourage constructive Soviet collaboration on such international problems as nuclear proliferation, arms control, and Law of the Sea that affect our mutual security interests.
Regional Factors

While some US security interests and objectives, such as strategic nuclear deterrence and strategic arms control, will be pursued in a bilateral US-Soviet context, all will involve at least consultation and, when appropriate, close interaction with allies and other friendly governments around the world.

The priority of regions and nations of the world in relation to US national security is determined by a combination of their strategic importance to the United States and the threat facing them. Under current circumstances, the first priority is the security of the United States and North America. The security of Western Europe is the second priority. Next is the security of Japan, to which is related the security of Korea, and US interests in the Middle East, South America, and the Pacific. Following these are US security interests in Africa and South Asia. There are in addition a number of security interests not related specifically to regions. These include security of lines of communication and space-based systems, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and Law of the Sea.

Hemispheric Defense. A conventional attack on the United States and its territories is not likely as long as US extrahemispheric commitments remain firm and no Soviet bases or staging areas are opened in the Western Hemisphere. US security objectives with regard to hemispheric defense include the continuation of close cooperation with Canada in defense matters; the maintenance or improvement of relations with other countries of the area, especially in the Caribbean Basin; and resolution of the issue of control of the Panama Canal in a manner consistent with US economic and security interests.

In Europe, where US political and economic interests are highest and the Soviet threat the most heavily concentrated, the focus of our security policies will continue to be the NATO Alliance. There are five important security issues that affect US strategy and forces for Europe:

—The nature of the basic US approach to the United States-European relationship and the relative emphasis given to: (a) the bilateral United States-FRG relationship and (b) European defense cooperation and the European share of the NATO defense burden vis-a-vis the United States.

—The degree of cooperation the United States should expect from its NATO allies in dealing with non-NATO contingencies.

—The impact of potential Communist participation in some governments in NATO.

—Whether the United States should plan forces and logistic reinforcement for the flanks.
—NATO’s theater nuclear posture and doctrine in the face of a rapidly changing Soviet posture and allied sensitivities to changes in theater nuclear forces.

Other important questions relate to the possibility of strengthening French military cooperation with NATO and possible NATO membership for Spain. In regard to France, the United States can encourage the French to continue their pattern of special arrangements in NATO defense planning and with the FRG, as well as help foster the symbolic cooperative measures which the French are willing to take themselves. With respect to Spain, it continues to be US policy to favor full Spanish membership in NATO. Until such time as the allies come around to this point of view (and assuming that the Spanish wish to join NATO), the United States will want to encourage the maximum coordination of US-Spanish and NATO defense arrangements.

In East Asia, our fundamental security interest is to maintain a balance which insures that the area will not be dominated by any country or combination of countries hostile to the United States. The principal elements which shape the current major power balance in Asia include the United States-Japan alliance and PRC-Soviet rivalry and tension. The current equilibrium is relatively favorable to the United States, but it depends to a considerable extent on maintaining effective American military power in the Pacific.

The PRC has now entered the period of post-Mao succession, which could eventually produce major changes in Chinese policy and orientation. While foreign policy does not appear to have been a major subject of dispute between the factions contending for power in China, our relations with the PRC are nevertheless subject to the influence of internal Chinese forces. The fundamental characteristics of Chinese foreign policy are likely to persist including at least deep suspicion of the USSR and some community of interest with the United States. While China’s basic policy objective—to counter or at least defuse the military threat it perceives from the USSR—will continue, Mao’s passing opens up the possibility of changes, both in the perception and the policies based on it.

There remain fundamental differences between the United States and China in policy, ideology, and outlook. In addition, China is developing a nuclear capability which represents a potential threat to our interests and those of our allies. A manifest inability of the United States to meet a direct PRC challenge in the Pacific would have serious effects on our alliance and other significant relationships there, and on the general credibility of US interest in Asian security.

All the Asian non-Communist powers, as well as China, look to the US as the only near-term counterweight to the Soviets’ nuclear capability and as a deterrent to any Soviet use of its military forces in the
area. US military presence in the Western Pacific will continue to be viewed by others as important for this reason. However, specific issues in our relations with the countries of East Asia will influence our peacetime force posture there. For example:

—With respect to Japanese military capabilities, while there is a case for a greater Japanese defense effort, inhibitions on Japanese rearmament will continue, and the acquisition by the Japanese of significantly larger offensive capabilities would pose greater uncertainty and risk to our bilateral relations and to Japan’s Asian neighbors. The Japanese have the inherent ability to strengthen greatly key elements of their self-defense forces. However, even were they to undertake an increased defense effort, it is unlikely that they could develop a self-sufficient defense capability in the next decade.

—With respect to US efforts to forge constructive ties with the PRC and US interest in a continuation of Chinese-Soviet political tension, several issues will have implications for US defense policy and posture in the Western Pacific: (a) the future US role with regard to Taiwan’s security, (b) whether to help improve the PRC’s military strength through such actions as the sale of military technology and equipment, and (c) whether to hedge against a deterioration in US relations with the PRC.

—With respect to Korea, the basic issue is whether the United States can deter conflict and at the same time reduce US military involvement there. Developments in Korea are of concern to other major Asian powers, notably Japan, not only for their direct impact on these countries but also because of the possible effects on their relations with the United States.

—Elsewhere in the Pacific region—Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and Oceania—US security interests, apart from the continuing need for access to the area and through it (including access to key bases and facilities), are relatively modest; there is less prospect of local events affecting the major power balance, and the potential threats to US interests are less immediate.

In the Middle East, US interests in insuring uninterrupted access to Middle East oil for the United States and its allies and the US commitment to Israeli security sometimes conflict. This area will remain one of tension and potential conflict that could severely threaten important US interests. For that reason, increasing attention should be given to contingency planning (taking into account such factors as force structure, access to basing, and staging and overflight rights) related to measures needed to:

—Deter or counter Soviet intervention.
—Intervene on behalf of a friendly state.
—Meet the possible demand on US defense resources of a formal security guarantee to Israel, or to Israel and its neighbors, as part of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In Latin America, US interests tend to be economic, and the prevailing conditions are such as to restrict the utility of US forces in dealing with most potential local threats to US interests. The United States has other political and economic instruments to be used in dealing with problems in Latin America. Roles for US forces in the area could include monitoring and, if necessary, defending key lines of communication, deterrence of hostile intervention in areas the United States deems important, and unilateral intervention with US combat forces. But requirements do not appear to be so demanding as to necessitate significant changes in US strategy and force posture.

In South Asia and Africa, US interests are also primarily economic, particularly in Africa, with its vast reserves of raw materials, notably in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area. US strategic concerns focus primarily on lines of communication. The immense social and economic problems of these areas will continue to create conditions of local disorder and tension, which will be both disruptive in themselves and may offer opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union and other countries hostile to the United States. The role and utility of US forces, however, is bounded by political constraints and by the nature of US interests in these areas.

The Danger of Nuclear Proliferation

Despite on-going efforts to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities, the possibility exists that several countries can achieve such a capability over the next 10–15 years. Possible candidates are: Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, The Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran. It is and will continue to be US policy to try to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The requirement for the United States to hedge against failure of this policy is mitigated by the fact that all of these countries now are friendly, or at least not hostile, to the United States; that US interests may not be directly threatened; and that their nuclear arms capacities would not pose strategic dangers to the United States itself. However, some of them are in positions of potential confrontation with each other or with third countries, which could create dangerous situations in which the United States could quickly become involved.

B. MILITARY THREATS TO US INTERESTS

Introduction

Impressive developments in Soviet strategic and general purpose capabilities signify the persistence with which the Soviets seek to de-
velop a military force sufficient to meet perceived threats and to exploit opportunities for advancing their interests. Major defense programs have been generously supported even in periods of economic setback, and the military sector continues to command the best of the USSR’s scarce high-quality resources. Soviet leaders believe that the growth of their military power, along with political and economic trends, has helped create a new “correlation of forces” more favorable to the USSR than at any other time in its history.

In their perception of the military balance, the Soviets would be especially concerned about the specter of a two-front war, with the fear that a heavy Soviet engagement in China could lead to aggressive moves by NATO. Conversely, barring a radical improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviets probably would feel compelled to maintain strong forces along the border even during a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

In the Third World, where the Soviets continue to support the spread of Communism, pragmatism and opportunism will be the Soviet guide in seeking new military relations. Threats to US interests may arise in third countries with no direct instigation by the Soviet Union. Such threats include military conflicts and shifts in relative economic power; they may occur in nations that are hostile to, neutral, or even allied with the United States. The Arab-Israeli and intra-Arab conflicts could affect US energy and trade policy, whether or not the Soviet Union sought to turn these disorders to its advantage. The Greek-Turkish conflict shows how historic distrust and current points of tension can outweigh formal alliances and normal assumptions of strategic national interests. The economic and military environment in which the United States pursues its goals also could be affected by major changes in policy on the part of the PRC, Japan, the larger Latin American nations, and any of the European allies.

**Intelligence Interpretations**

Although intelligence has developed a good insight into the nature of the Soviet threat, there are differing interpretations of information which could impact significantly on US decision-making. These derive principally from a lack of specific data on Soviet objectives and strategy. Of immediate concern to US force planners are:

— Whether the Soviets are seeking to develop a war-winning superiority over the United States.

— The future pace and extent of Soviet modernization of strategic and general purpose forces.

— The potential for technological breakthroughs in Soviet military-related research and development efforts.
—The manner in which the Warsaw Pact would initiate war, the amount of warning time NATO would have, and the length of war the Soviets could sustain.

These issues are of major concern to the intelligence community. Some are under active consideration, and others will be addressed during the coming year.

Trends in Soviet Military Programs

The rapid growth in quantity and quality of Soviet intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s effected a fundamental shift in the US–USSR strategic balance. From an earlier position of clear inferiority, the Soviets have achieved a rough equivalence in strategic offensive power when compared with US forces. The Soviets also have made vigorous and continuing efforts to improve their strategic defensive capabilities, but with less success than in the case of offensive capabilities.

During the past decade, the Bear and Bison Long-Range Aviation (LRA) bomber force has been virtually unchanged. In 1974, the Backfire bomber was introduced into LRA and Naval Aviation, representing the first modernization of bomber forces in over a decade. A versatile aircraft, the Backfire is well-suited for use in various theater and naval missions. It has capabilities for operations against the continental United States, but there are differing views concerning the nature of these capabilities and about Soviet intentions for using the aircraft in an intercontinental role.

Since the mid-1960s, the Soviets have carried out a major expansion and renovation of their general purpose ground and air forces. Soviet ground and tactical air force weapon systems have become increasingly sophisticated, although Soviet tactical aircraft still lag behind US aircraft in sophisticated weapon systems and avionics. One of the most important improvement trends has been toward greater mobility of ground forces’ air defense systems, which will adapt these weapons to the fluidity of modern battlefield operations and enable tactical air forces to direct more of their resources to offensive missions.

Over the past decade, there have been significant improvements in USSR naval capabilities. The Soviet Navy has evolved from a force oriented almost exclusively to the defense of Soviet coastal regions to a force with growing capabilities for combat in more distant areas, and it has been increasingly used to support Soviet foreign policy in peacetime. With the addition of the Kiev carrier in the summer of 1976, the Soviets for the first time took tactical aviation to sea.

Since its inception, the Soviet space program has had a military orientation, and the majority of space vehicles have had military missions. The Soviets have improved their reconnaissance and command and
control capabilities, including the dedication of major space resources to these areas. They have also demonstrated a nonnuclear capability to destroy a low-altitude satellite on the interceptor’s first revolution.

Soviet defense expenditures in rubles are estimated to have grown every year since 1970, and growth has been evident in all of the major resource categories—investment, operating, and RDT&E costs. It is estimated that the average annual rate of growth in ruble expenditures during 1970–1975 was some 4–5 percent. The annual growth rate in 1973–1975, however, was about 5–6 percent, reflecting primarily the deployment of a new generation of strategic missiles. There is a divergence of opinion in the intelligence community on the share of Soviet gross national product (GNP) going to defense. Some estimate that defense absorbs 11–13 percent of the Soviet GNP, while others believe that the percentage of GNP devoted to defense spending could be substantially higher.

*Strategic Forces*

Soviet expectations for the next 10 years evidently reach well beyond a capability for intercontinental conflict that merely assures retaliation sufficient to deter an all-out attack.

—Some in the intelligence community believe that the Soviets do not presently expect within the next decade to achieve a capability for intercontinental conflict which would enable them to devastate the United States, while preventing the United States from devastating the USSR. This belief reflects in part the high Soviet respect for US technological prowess and Soviet concern that recent developments in US strategy and weapons programs could affect their own strategic position adversely. However, the Soviets are probably striving for a war-fighting and war survival posture that would leave the USSR in a stronger position than the United States if war occurred. The Soviet leaders probably hope that their forces will give them more latitude than they have had in the past for the vigorous pursuit of foreign policy objectives and that they will discourage the United States and others from using force or the threat of force to influence Soviet actions.

—Others in the intelligence community believe the Soviets aim to achieve such a degree of military superiority over the West as to permit them to wage and win a nuclear war. Such a position would allow Moscow to exert military pressure to deter US initiatives, thereby advancing overall Soviet objectives of gaining a dominant position in the world. They also believe Soviet force developments over the past several years, and prospective programs for the next several years, indicate the Soviets see those objectives as practical and achievable.

—Still others believe that Soviet military objectives are not fully discerned and therefore are differently interpreted, while intelligence
estimates of current and projected Soviet capabilities are more clearly defined. As a consequence, assessments of Soviet military objectives should not be used as the primary basis for US force planning.

Current Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict include:

—An ICBM force of about 1500 deployed launchers, virtually all in hardened silos, and almost 800 SLBM launchers on about 60 nuclear submarines.

—About 850 bombers, missile carriers, reconnaissance aircraft, and tankers in Soviet Long-Range Aviation (LRA). This includes about 40 long-range Bison bombers plus 45 Bison tankers and about 100 long-range Bear bombers. (In addition, LRA has some 20 Backfire bombers; Soviet Naval Aviation has about 600 bomber-type aircraft, including about 25 Backfires.)

Despite Soviet capabilities for intercontinental attack, the problems the Soviets could face if they currently contemplated attacking the United States would remain formidable:

—They would be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on the United States, probably expecting a considerable number of ICBMs and bombers to survive, and they would almost certainly consider their ASW forces to be unable to destroy more than a few US ballistic missile submarines at sea.

—They would not have high confidence in their ability to defend against US bombers and short-range attack missiles, and their ABM defenses are severely limited.

—They have a large passive defense program, and they would probably expect their civil defenses to be able to preserve a political and economic cadre and to contribute to the survivability of the Soviet Union as a national entity, but they would have to expect heavy casualties, industrial destruction, and a breakdown of the economy.

During the next 10 years, current and prospective development could markedly increase Soviet strategic capabilities. Soviet R&D programs are held by some to be consistent with both a desire to avoid slipping behind the United States and a desire to gain the lead in the technology of strategic offensive and defensive weapons if US programs falter. An opposing view is that there is little reasonable doubt that the Soviets are striving for general strategic superiority over the United States and that, if the current massive Soviet R&D programs achieve the breakthroughs being sought, an important shift in the USSR's favor in the strategic balance could occur by 1985.

The Soviets are steadily deploying new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. In about 1980 they will have a total force of about 2,300 missiles, of which about 1,400 will be new missiles, with about 800–900 of these MIRVed. These systems will incorporate major qualitative im-
provements, including higher accuracies, and will probably pose a major threat to US Minuteman silos in the early 1980s. A more rapid increase in this threat is possible but unlikely.

The extensive Soviet strategic R&D program includes two new SLBMs and a possibly larger missile submarine. They also have the potential to improve bomber defense and ASW capability and will probably initiate efforts to develop a long-range bomber as well as improve their antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities.

New large phased-array radars oriented toward US ICBM fields are under construction in the northwestern USSR. If they have an ABM battle management capability and many such radars are deployed, and if development of the rapidly deployable ABM–X–3 system is carried to the point at which it is ready for deployment, then widespread ABM–X–3 deployment could be accomplished within several years. Such a deployment would abrogate the ABM treaty.

Directed by the Ministry of Defense, the ambitious Soviet civil defense program is intended to mitigate the damage which the United States could inflict on the Soviet economy and leadership. Soviet civil defense priorities appear to be construction of hardened and dispersed shelters for party and government leaders, industrial hardening and dispersal, and in-place protection for essential workers. However, there is currently insufficient information to assess the pace and effectiveness of future Soviet efforts.

General Purpose Forces

Out of a total of 4.4 million men under arms, the Soviet Union has about 2.3 million men in its general purpose forces, and its Warsaw Pact Allies have another 1.2 million. The Warsaw Pact has 225 divisions, highly mechanized and in varying states of readiness; 5,700 tactical aircraft; and a naval strength which includes some 230 major surface combatants and 260 general purpose submarines.

The Soviet Union’s 170 divisions have a total of some 45,000 tanks. Production of the new T–72 medium tank is expected to increase markedly in the next year or two, allowing the Soviets to deploy it widely. The most significant change in Soviet tactical aviation has been the introduction of a new generation of aircraft with substantially improved payload-range capabilities and more sophisticated avionics systems; however, the majority of aircraft in the tactical inventory are still older models.

Opposite NATO in Central Europe and the western USSR there are about 1.5 million men under arms—89 divisions at varying strengths with some 24,000 tanks, and 3,000 tactical aircraft. Elements of the Pact’s navies, as well as strategic attack and defense forces, would also be used in a European war.
Forty-nine Soviet divisions and some 1,400 Soviet tactical aircraft are in the Soviet military districts east of the Ural Mountains and in the Mongolian Peoples Republic. These forces are intended mainly for the contingency of war with China, and, barring a radical improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, most of them would probably be retained in the Far East even during a Soviet war with NATO.

The Soviets have a variety of systems capable of delivering lethal and incapacitating chemical agents, and there is good evidence that toxic chemical munitions are available to the Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe. In addition, Warsaw Pact forces emphasize chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) environment more than NATO and can operate more effectively under CBR conditions than can NATO Forces.

New weapon systems currently known to be under construction or development will add to general purpose force capabilities of the Soviet ground, naval, and air forces in the next decade.

A follow-on armored personnel carrier, a new large-caliber self-propelled gun, and new types of antitank missiles have been developed, and there is evidence that the Soviets probably have developed nuclear artillery rounds for their larger artillery pieces. Soviet capability to engage in tactical nuclear warfare will also be enhanced by deployment of new short-range ballistic missiles. In addition, there is good evidence that a considerable variety of new electronic countermeasures (ECM) and counter-countermeasures (ECCM) equipment has been introduced in recent years.

Improvements expected in Soviet ground forces by the mid-1980s include the development of a new small arms family, follow-on antitank missile systems (ground and helicopter launched), a follow-on tank, battlefield surveillance systems, and possibly a tactical ABM system.

Four classes of major surface combatants, including another Kiev-class carrier, are under construction, and a significant but limited program for construction of modern naval auxiliaries is underway. The combat units feature an emphasis on ASW and air defense systems. At least two new fighters are currently being tested, and a variety of air deliverable weapons are being developed.

Deployments by the Soviets of the mobile MIRVed SS–X–20 ICBM and Backfire bomber over the next few years will significantly enhance the survivability and accuracy of their forces for attacking European land targets and US naval forces in forward areas.

There are those who believe the momentum of the Soviet drive to maintain military superiority of theater forces in Europe seems likely to lead to a gradual expansion and further technological improvements in Soviet theater forces through the end of the 1970s. Another view is that
the Soviets are less confident about the balance and that their force improvements will be directed at specific deficiencies.

There are also obviously real questions as to whether the USSR would wish to hazard its security by initiating a European attack. If it did, a major uncertainty for the United States is the manner in which the Warsaw Pact might go to war with NATO. With respect to the NATO Central Region, options range from an attack with minimum preparation, attempting to achieve both tactical and strategic surprise, to one preceded by extensive mobilization and reinforcement. Although longer warning times are anticipated, some believe that at least 48 hours of warning time would be available to NATO, while others hold that certain unreinforced attack options would give little or no warning. Further, there are gaps in intelligence and continuing uncertainties as to how long the Pact could sustain a war in Europe and how much effort it might devote to the flanks.

Reliability of Soviet and US Allies

A question mark for Soviet military and political leaders would be the reliability of East European forces. While Soviet leaders may have doubts whether the Pact cohesiveness would withstand the strains of war, they have committed themselves to relying on East European forces to carry out wartime functions potentially critical to the Pact’s prospects of success in a war with NATO.

As to NATO allies, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), our principal ally in the critical Central Region, is militarily powerful and could be expected to put up a resolute defense of its territory. France probably will not, in the foreseeable future, reenter integrated military commands. However, based on France’s actions and statements since its withdrawal from the NATO command, it is probable that the French forces would participate with NATO forces against a Warsaw Pact attack on Europe, but the time it might take for them to become fully involved in the planning functions reduces their value.

Although their effectiveness does not match that of the FRG, the forces of the other NATO allies contribute in varying degrees to forward defense. They can be expected to defend to the limits of their capabilities against an attack which could threaten their security.

Soviet Military Policy for the Third World

The Soviets see the Third World as a promising arena for competition with the West and with China. They have assigned priority to areas of strategic importance such as the Middle East but have also taken advantage of opportunities in areas as far flung as Cuba and Angola. The Soviets are convinced that, despite major setbacks, their efforts in the Third World have significantly increased Moscow’s pres-
tige and influence in world affairs and have contributed to Soviet national security.

Military aid has been Moscow’s principal instrument in the Third World, and its use is likely to increase. In recent years the Soviets have been exporting increasingly sophisticated weapons which require Third World clients to rely more heavily on Moscow for spares, credits, and advisers to train local personnel. The Soviets also continue to regard insurgencies as instruments to advance their position.

Since the commencement of Soviet naval operations in distant areas in the mid-1960s, the USSR has established continuous peacetime warship deployments of varying size in a number of ocean areas adjacent to the Third World—the Mediterranean Sea, the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean, and West Africa waters. The USSR also conducts periodic deployments to the Caribbean. While the Mediterranean force is deployed in good part to oppose NATO should hostilities break out, Soviet naval presence in all distant areas generally serves to enhance the perception of the USSR as a superpower in the eyes of the Third World.

In addition, use of facilities in distant areas could enhance Soviet military capabilities. For example, air and naval bases in Berbera and Conakry give the Soviets a potential, in the event of hostilities, for interdicting oil lines of communication from the Middle East to Europe and the United States.

The Soviets have increasingly used Military Transport Aviation (VTA) to deliver high-priority items of military equipment and emergency resupplies to client forces. The VTA can also deploy limited combat forces overseas. The increase in numbers of aircraft comparable to the American C–141s will significantly enhance VTA’s capability to carry large cargoes and increased numbers of troops over long distances. The AN–22, the only Soviet aircraft which can carry outsized equipment such as medium tanks, is no longer in production. Soviet heavy airlift capacity will therefore be limited unless a follow-on is produced.

Soviet ground, airborne, and amphibious forces are designed to operate primarily in the contiguous areas of the Eurasian land mass. Although the Soviets have not developed combined arms assault forces comparable to a US Marine Amphibious Force, they do have a limited capacity to send forces to distant areas in crisis situations, and their capabilities are growing slowly. Any Soviet involvement in conflicts in the Third World is likely to take the form of interpositioning naval forces, providing advisers to combat units, and introducing air defense units to assist a client.

People’s Republic of China

PRC strategy will continue to focus on the Soviet threat, with deterrence its primary objective. In pursuing this strategy, China will try
to avoid direct confrontation with either the Soviet Union or the United States.

The Chinese have a small nuclear force of missiles and bombers which includes a limited-range ICBM possibly capable of reaching Moscow. This force provides a modest deterrent against attack and permits the employment of a countervalue strategy against several USSR cities and Asian nations, including several US allies.

An ICBM capable of attacking targets in the continental United States could be available for initial deployment in very small numbers by the early 1980s. An SLBM system capable of being used against targets in the Soviet Far East, US military installations in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and possibly against targets in Hawaii and the US west coast probably will be available for initial deployment in the early- to mid-1980s. Neither system is likely to have a capability to attack hard targets.

China will not become a naval power capable of opposing the United States or USSR on the high seas within this period; however, its general purpose submarine force and cruise-missile-equipped ships would be a significant threat to naval operations in contiguous waters. The armed forces, which consist of some 4.3 million men, will remain large, but for both the ground and air forces the technological gap with the United States and USSR will continue to widen.

North Korea

Although the current leadership in North Korea has proclaimed its intention to reunite Korea and will continue to develop a military option for its reunification policy, North Korea is currently deterred from attacking the ROK by a combination of: (1) lack of clear-cut superiority over US and ROK forces, (2) the United States-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and (3) uncertainties about Soviet and Chinese support. The impact on deterrence of a reduction or withdrawal of US forces is difficult to judge. If such a move were made by the United States, timing and collateral measures to reassure the ROK and discourage North Korean aggression would be crucial. Even if executed perfectly, unilateral US withdrawal without ROK improvements in their capabilities would likely be destabilizing.

C. PROSPECTS FOR SIGNIFICANT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Soviets view science and technology as an important, if not the decisive, element of military capability. Technological superiority in deployed weapons is the ultimate goal of a Soviet RDT&E program that is second in size to no other. For example, it is estimated that the dollar costs of the Soviet military RDT&E program have exceeded those of the
United States for every year since 1970 and were about two-thirds higher than the comparable US effort in 1975. In addition, the Soviets have devoted major resources to build up military industrial technology in support of R&D goals for defense and space programs. In their efforts to close the “technological gap” with the United States, the Soviets have consciously sought to reduce the closure time and cost by direct acquisition of advanced Western products and production technology.

In their approach to weapons development, the Soviets have traditionally emphasized long-term evolutionary development of existing system concepts or narrowly focused efforts to develop specific types of systems. While some of their programs have involved innovative concepts and some of their deployed systems are technically advanced, they have tended to concentrate on programs that have a clearly defined near-term product. In recent years, however, the Soviets have evidently embarked on a broader range of exploratory military R&D programs. This would give the Soviets increased flexibility in future weapons development, a better base for the evolutionary development of existing systems, and a better basis for assessing US threats. On the other hand, the pursuit of revolutionary technology introduces greater risks and chances for failure, as well.

Recent Soviet statements reflect special attention to the impact of technological developments on the strategic military balance. The Soviets apparently believe that only the appearance of new types of weapons is likely to alter the existing strategic balance. They are concerned by the potential US developments in this area and are themselves conducting R&D programs of broad scope and considerable vigor in fields in which significant and perhaps novel weapon systems may emerge.

Prime examples of Soviet interest in revolutionary technological concepts are in the areas of ASW sensors and directed-energy weapons. In both cases the Soviets have an extensive R&D effort in progress, even though the potential in terms of practical weapons development is uncertain. The ASW efforts involve investigation of a variety of techniques that seemingly have limited prospects for success—detection of submarine wakes with radar, infrared, and nuclear-trace detectors; extremely low-frequency electromagnetic sensors; and lasers. Efforts possibly related to the development of directed-energy weapons include extensive basic research in areas that would support the development of exotic weapons such as charged-particle beam weapons and nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse generators. The development of any of these systems for practical applications in the near term is considered unlikely, although one view within the US intelligence community holds that this judgment underestimates the impetus of Soviet directed-
energy programs and that these programs could have a major, if not decisive, impact on the strategic balance before 1985. Development of other types of directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, is being actively pursued by the Soviets and could result in even earlier successful weapons application.

On the other hand, even evolutionary improvements not involving “breakthroughs” could significantly affect force capabilities of both the United States and the USSR. Ballistic missile accuracy and reliability will improve to the point that any fixed target (except deep underground installations) will have an essentially zero probability of survival, and in time even SLBMs can become serious threats to hard targets. Air defenses can be improved with look-down shoot-down fighters and SAMs with low-altitude capability against subsonic targets. Perhaps ballistic missile defenses to protect all except massively attacked high-value targets can be evolved from SAM technology. In the area of conventional weapons, precision guided munitions will permit one-shot kill (with a launch and leave capability); precision emitter location of radars and communication sites will enhance the effectiveness of strikes; and electronic counter-countermeasures could overcome US advantages in tactical jamming. Individual capabilities of Soviet aircraft will match those of the United States. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Soviet exploration of cruise missile technology has lagged behind that of the United States despite their earlier recognition of the potential of such weapons and the deployment of early, short-range versions. In particular, cruise missiles are a formidable threat to carrier task forces.

Similarly, there are potential developments in US technology which at the extreme could dramatically affect our overall posture or which less extremely would affect individual programs, perhaps significantly. Examples of the former include breakthroughs in spaceborne laser weapons, sensors, and data processing which would make an effective ballistic missile defense both realizable and cost-effective. In the second category are such possibilities as airborne (or even space-borne) surveillance/strike systems to supplement aircraft carriers in their sea control role, hypersonic low-altitude cruise missiles to supplement penetrating bombers, or accuracy improvements in SLBMs which could decrease dependence on ICBMs for attacking hard targets. None of these appear imminent enough, however, to influence the next generation of force modernization.

In general, the underlying foundation of basic scientific knowledge on which the Soviet RDT&E program rests is considered equivalent to that of the United States, although many specific areas are characterized by substantial leads by one nation or the other. For example, the United States is considered more advanced in microelectronic cir-
circuit theory, while the Soviets are the acknowledged leader in high-pressure physics and magneto-hydrodynamic power generation. There appears to be either a general parity or an unclear picture in such basic areas as high-energy lasers and particle beam research.

A similar mixed, roughly equivalent overall condition exists in those R&D areas being explored with definite military applications in mind but not yet deployed as weapons. The United States leads in such areas as computer simulation of aerodynamic effects, composite materials, turbo-jet and turbo-fan design, and engines designed for use in tanks. The Soviets, on the other hand, are ahead in such areas as wing-in-ground effect vehicle design, storable liquid propellant technology, and high-frequency radio wave propagation.

Perhaps more important than the size and sophistication of a nation’s military R&D program is its ability to transfer its technology into deployed weapon systems. Despite the greater allocation of resources to R&D activities and an overall comparable scientific base, the Soviets have been less successful, at least until recently, than the United States in fielding technologically advanced weaponry. This shortcoming may be due, in part, to inferior production technology. More probably, however, it is due to governmental policies that limit the full exploitation of technological capability. For example, a reliance on a conscript army means that weapons must be designed so that maintenance and operation procedures are performable by minimally trained soldiers. In addition, a traditional emphasis on large quantities of deployed weapons reduces the sophistication feasible within realistic economic constraints. Moreover, this may be a manifestation of the compartmentation and secrecy that shroud the entirety of Soviet defense establishment, and in particular their military RDT&E, activities. It may well be that the opportunities for Soviet technological advancement in the long run rest as much in institutional, organizational, and managerial reform as in the continued allocation of massive amounts of resources to RDT&E.

The paucity of scientific information about military programs released by the Soviets obviously limits our vision and understanding of Soviet scientific achievements and the successor military capabilities. Given the current environment of an eroding US lead in overall technology and an expanding Soviet dedication to technology, the closed features of the Soviet society may provide the greatest opportunity for technological surprise.

IV. US DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY POSTURE

A. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR STRATEGIC FORCES

The build-up in Soviet strategic forces which began in the late 1960s has continued unabated through the mid-1970s even though
some limits on these programs have been established through SALT. Current Soviet modernization efforts will come to fruition by the mid-1980s but will continue the improvement in their total force effectiveness through the decade. The most recent Presidential guidance issued on force sizing was in 1969 (NSDM 16) and on employment policy in 1974 (NSDM 242). In the course of the current review of strategic force policy, a range of proposals has been considered for achieving US strategic deterrence objectives and maintaining the strategic balance with the Soviet Union through the modernization of US strategic capabilities. An effort has been made, however, not merely to reflect alternatives that would be logical, incremental extensions of current forces, but also to conduct a basic review of the criteria by which deterrence, escalation control, and postconflict security can be assured in the face of a growing Soviet strategic threat, a more dynamic balance of forces between the two superpowers, and the constraints and opportunities of SALT.

While the Soviet Union constitutes the principal strategic threat to US and allied interests, US strategic force policy must also consider PRC strategic capabilities and, eventually, a world in which considerable nuclear proliferation may have occurred. Current US policy is to assure a capability to attack strategically important targets in the PRC, either during or after a major nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. PRC strategic nuclear forces probably will grow increasingly capable of operations affecting US interests, particularly in Asia, but the likelihood of major Chinese aggression against US interests is small, so long as the PRC continues to see advantage in the continuation of a stable regional balance among the United States, USSR, PRC, and Japan. Accordingly, US day-to-day strategic alert forces include only limited capability to strike critical PRC targets, and any further requirements would be met by the additional US forces that would go on alert when generated during the crisis.

The central question regarding strategic forces is what capabilities are required for deterrence and to provide military options to fight a war should deterrence fail. A range of credible military options is important to maintaining deterrence, as well as to escalation control, satisfactory war termination, and postwar recovery. Seven aspects of this question are treated below, as separate issues. Two are particularly significant: Issue #1, on basic military deterrence criteria, and Issue #2, on political criteria for deterrence.

**Issue #1: Deterrence Criteria.** What criteria for US offensive and/or defensive forces will assure achievement of the fundamental objectives of deterring nuclear attack on the United States and its forces, and of contributing to the deterrence of conventional and nuclear attacks on
US allies? Views on which criteria to emphasize tend to fall into three categories:

*Postwar Recovery Retaliation.* One view holds that maintaining a highly survivable capability to inflict high levels of damage against political, economic, and certain military targets related to postwar recovery is sufficient to make the prospective consequences of a nuclear attack unacceptable to Soviet leaders. In this view, it is neither necessary nor desirable to base requirements on relative US-USSR capabilities. Presently programmed US forces have more than adequate population/industrial damage-inflicting capability and possess hard-target capability useful for limited-response options, but short of an effective countersilo capability. Seeking to assure a favorable military outcome or significantly to limit damage to the United States would cost too much, would hinder arms control, and is probably not attainable. Moreover, in this view, US strategic forces designed to “assure” a favorable war outcome through damage limitation would be destabilizing because they would give the Soviets incentives to preempt in a crisis.

*Military Gain Denial.* A second view holds that US forces capable of retaliating only against post-war recovery targets lack the credibility necessary to inhibit Soviet coercion, to deter attacks on US forces, or to back up conventional and theater forces in deterring attacks on or coercion of US allies. Limited options lack credibility if the outcome of an all-out exchange would be perceived to be militarily favorable to the Soviet Union. The US must have serious military targeting options, of a kind respected in Soviet military doctrine, in order to persuade Soviet leaders that no military advantage can be secured through counterforce attack or nuclear escalation. This implies offsetting Soviet capabilities for attacking military targets, and other hardened targets, including silos. Since the Soviets are believed to be planning for the possibility of an extended war in which nuclear weapons are used in conjunction with conventional military operations, the United States must confront them with highly survivable strategic reserves over and above essential retaliatory forces, which would preserve a satisfactory military balance during and after a nuclear conflict.

*Postwar Political-Military Advantage.* A third view holds that enhanced offensive targeting capability would assure a relatively superior US position at every stage of a nuclear exchange. Only such a posture, it is argued, can make retaliation truly credible, particularly for deterrence of attacks on US allies. This implies taking Soviet civil defense into account in planning US strategic offensive forces and in assessing alternative SALT proposals. It also implies developing a US defensive capability, including civil defense, to assure a mix of surviving
population, industries, and resources equal to or better than Soviet recovery capability.

**Issue #2: Political Perceptions of Sufficiency.** What force size and characteristics are necessary to avoid Soviet, US, or third-country perceptions of a strategic imbalance, perceptions which could result in greater Soviet risk-taking and coercive behavior and increased accommodation to Soviet pressures by allies and neutrals? Our declaratory policy can and does influence perceptions within limits. There are different views on those limits and the approach we should take to the balancing of asymmetries. The main alternatives are:

**Declaratory Policy.** One view is that a declaratory policy which explains our own reasons for regarding any aggregate asymmetries as militarily insignificant will meet basic political sufficiency requirements. Buying forces specifically to satisfy political requirements is costly and stimulates arms competition. Arms control agreements which provide equal aggregate deployment rights tend to reduce the political effect of asymmetries in actual forces.

**Offsetting Capabilities.** A second view holds that political requirements can be met through an overall strategic balance, in which Soviet advantages in some categories are offset by US advantages in others. Satisfactory new US advantages can be developed as current margins in ballistic missile accuracy and warhead numbers wane. This would be more cost-effective and more stable than matching Soviet strengths one for one and would exploit historic Soviet (and European) respect of US technological powers. This position requires that US capabilities offset Soviet advantages in fact and not merely in appearance.

**Match or Better Soviet Strengths.** A third view is that significant imbalances in major static indicators of strategic balance (e.g., missile throw-weight, numbers of warheads, hard-target kill capability, and civilian damage capability) would have serious adverse political consequences. Peculiar US advantages are not significant enough to offset Soviet advantages and do not carry sufficient weight in the Soviet’s own nuclear calculus. Soviet forces must be systematically matched or exceeded to avoid a perception that the balance is eroding.

**Issue #3: Force Diversity.** How much force diversity and redundancy is necessary to provide adequate confidence that US strategic forces can perform as required, even in the event of unexpected technological breakthroughs or catastrophic failures, and to complicate any Soviet plan for disarming attack? In examining this question, it has been found that in the postulated threat environment the cost of an additional weapon on target is substantially the same whether the delivery system is a bomber, ICBM, or SLBM. Thus, for a given basic level of capability the total cost of strategic forces (except for the nonrecurring development costs) is the same regardless of the degree of diver-
sity, so the incremental cost of achieving diversity is relatively small. Nonetheless, there are different views on hedging, as follows:

*Augmented Dyad.* One view is that a survivable Dyad of SLBMs and bombers, augmented in size and effectiveness as land-based ICBMs become vulnerable, would be adequate to provide the diversity and capability needed to maintain a credible deterrent in terms of assured retaliation, limited options, and, if necessary, countersilo capability. This structure would avoid the costs of developing and deploying a new survivable ICBM, would avoid SALT verification difficulties and possible domestic opposition that a mobile missile force could raise, and would avoid the potentially destabilizing countersilo potential of a new ICBM. Silo-based ICBMs could be retained or retired in favor of more SLBM and bomber capability; if retained, however, they would tend to contribute to crisis instability. A variant of this approach would be to modernize the ICBM and SLBM forces only.

*Triad.* A second view holds that the diversity of the present force, based on three different survivable components, should be maintained by developing a survivable ICBM force to replace some or all of the increasingly vulnerable fixed-silo ICBMs. A Triad is a cost-effective hedge against unexpected failure or vulnerability of any single component since such a failure would reduce the capability of a Triad by only one-third, whereas it would reduce a Dyad by one-half. A continued Triad would complicate Soviet strategic counterforce efforts; preserve the special flexibility, communications security, and time-urgent capability of ICBMs; avoid military or political disadvantages that might result from Soviet dominance in land-based ICBMs; and provide increased security against technological breakthrough affecting other legs of the Triad.7

**Issue #4: Countersilo Capability.** How much capability should the United States have for attacking Soviet hard targets, in particular Soviet missile silos? Although the assessment of the capabilities of current US strategic forces for countersilo attack is very scenario-dependent, in a first strike US forces could place at risk approximately one-third of Soviet ICBM missile throw-weight. There is a wide range of opinion on this crucial issue, but the main viewpoints are the following:

*No Specific Countersilo Emphasis.* One view holds that forces with the size and diversity to deter major war will automatically provide

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7 Another view holds that Soviet missile accuracy and hence US ICBM vulnerability are likely to increase more slowly than usually predicted. Therefore, the fixed-silo ICBM force may remain viable for some time and the US should modernize this force with a new heavier-payload missile. The support for this view is declining, however, and its principal argument now is that any new land-based ICBM might be temporarily deployed in silos while mobile basing is developed. This type of silo-based ICBM modernization would, however, tend to create preemptive instabilities in a crisis as Soviet accuracies increase. [Footnote in the original.]
sufficient numbers and adequate flexibility to respond to potential Soviet hard-target improvements and to deter limited attacks, including pure countersilo attacks. In this view, the United States will in the future continue to have the capability to destroy a portion of the Soviet ICBM force. Acquiring greater capability to attack Soviet strategic forces, particularly a capability based in fixed silos to match the USSR, would lead to instability by creating grave pressures for preemption in a crisis (including possibly the adoption of launch under attack doctrines) and could lead to arms race instability by forcing new Soviet deployments of mobile ICBMs. Proposals for limited countersilo capability do not avoid these dangers because the Soviets could not be sure the deployment would remain limited. In this view, increasing the survivability of US strategic forces, but not their counterforce potential, is the preferred offset to increased Soviet counterforce capabilities.

Limited Additional Countersilo. In this view, developing survivable US ICBM forces with some improved countersilo capability is necessary to prevent the Soviets from having war-fighting options not available to the United States and to impose penalties on them if they continue with fixed-silo ICBMs. In this view, the United States should be capable of confronting the Soviets with the prospect of a reliable, highly effective countersilo attack against their residual land-based ICBM force after a first strike against the US land-based ICBM force. Such US capability need not match Soviet preattack countersilo capability, since the more survivable US force will present less of a target to the USSR. Crisis stability would not be greatly endangered if this limited US countersilo force is clearly inadequate for a US first strike and is also very survivable. Giving the Soviets an incentive to move out of fixed ICBM silos would also enhance crisis stability, since their survivable mobile basing would present the United States with no incentive to strike first. Moreover, permitting the Soviets to enjoy a dominant position in fixed ICBMs, while the US is forced to move unilaterally to more costly mobile basing modes, would provide them significant political and economic advantage.

Full Countersilo. Another view is that the United States must have an efficient countersilo capability to match any Soviet counterforce attack with a response in kind. A capability to respond to an attack on our silos with only a partial attack on Soviet silos is inadequate to provide high confidence deterrence. Only a full countersilo capability can force the Soviets to choose between launching all their ICBM forces in a first strike or no attack at all. Thus, by denying them limited options and assuring ourselves of high confidence damage limitation, deterrence is strengthened.

Issue #5: Defensive Damage Limitation. What measures should the United States take in civil defense, industrial hardening and dispersal,
air defense, ABM defense, and counter-SSBN capability to limit damage in a nuclear exchange? (Illustrative civil defense programs which fit this definition are in the forthcoming NSSM 244 response.) Three basic positions are identifiable. There are, of course, other valid arguments for modest defensive deployments such as for peacetime air sovereignty. The current issue covers only significant deployments.

Nominal Defensive Damage Limitation. One view holds that any large effort at defensive damage limitation will be costly, ineffective, and destabilizing. It will encounter widespread public resistance, stimulate arms competition, and jeopardize the ABM Treaty. The appropriate response to Soviet damage limitation efforts is not to match them but to negate them as necessary with offensive programs. This might include highly survivable strategic reserve forces to offset evacuation programs. This view also holds that modest defensive improvements are unnecessary to provide hedges, that they waste money, and that they would be seen as leading to larger, destabilizing programs.

Enhanced Planning for Defensive Damage Limitation. A second view holds that present efforts at population protection with a modest expansion will provide contingency civil defense capabilities that could usefully save lives in case of a failure of deterrence, and could provide some basis for matching a rapid Soviet breakout of substantial civil defense capabilities. Similarly, in air and ABM defenses, planning and R&D could make available a rapid contingency breakout response to any major Soviet force build-up or ABM treaty abrogation. The basic US response to Soviet damage limitation efforts, however, should be improved US offensive capabilities, as necessary, with emphasis on survivability.

Major Defensive Damage Limitation. A third view holds that deterrence will be weakened unless the United States improves its capability for active and passive defense to limit damage, to reduce US casualties significantly in a limited nuclear attack, and to avoid suffering damage any greater than that which the United States can inflict on the Soviet population and economy. Offensive force improvements alone cannot compensate for an asymmetry in damage limitation.

Issue #6: Peripheral Attack Forces. Should the United States strengthen its forces for peripheral attack in response to the Soviet build-up in “gray area” systems? There are two basic positions on this issue:

No Enhancement Necessary. One view is that apart from doctrine and declaratory policy there is little necessity to make specific changes in force posture to counter Soviet peripheral attack systems. Threats posed by new Soviet systems to the survivability of theater forces do not significantly weaken strategic deterrence, since the linkage between strategic and theater nuclear forces is not strong. However,
making changes in nuclear force deployments in Europe, substituting
systems based outside the theater for ones based on allied soil, or
raising questions about the theater balance will only arouse old Euro-
pean fears that the United States plans to reduce its tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe substantially and weaken the theater deterrent.

Enhancement Required. The second view holds that the prospective
growth in Soviet peripheral attack capabilities (Backfire, SS–X–20, and
nuclear-capable tactical aircraft) threatens the survivability of US the-
ater nuclear forces and the political credibility of the coupling to the
strategic deterrent. Enhancing the survivability and augmenting the
numbers of peripheral attack forces would persuade the Soviet Union
of the continuing escalatory risk of a nonnuclear attack and reassure
our allies of the continuing US capability to provide a strategic nuclear
deterrent. This could be done through some combination of assigning
additional Poseidon RVs, and new theater-based systems such as
medium-range cruise missiles, longer-range Pershing, or intermediate-ange tactical aircraft (F–111 type).

Issue #7: Flexibility for Escalation Control (Limited Nuclear Options).
How much strategic force flexibility is necessary to deter counterforce
or other forms of limited nuclear attack and to control escalation?

It is generally assumed that forces with the size and diversity to
deter major war will provide sufficient numbers of weapons to deter
limited attacks other than counterforce attacks. However, this may not
be enough to provide special capabilities that may be important for es-
calation control through limited nuclear options (LNOs). These special
capabilities are dealt with elsewhere in the paper:

—Special command and control capabilities such as flexible retar-
targeting, secure communications, or manned reconnaissance (related to
diversity, Issue #3);
—Countersilo capability (Issue #4);
—Forces with special flexibility and recallability—bombers (Is-
sue #3);
—Defenses for limited conflict (Issue #5);
—Enhanced peripheral attack capabilities (Issue #6);
—Counter-SSBN capabilities (Issue #5).

While the capabilities which provide flexibility are derivatives of
decisions on other basic issues, alternatives can be varied to emphasize
or deemphasize this characteristic. Thus, in making decisions on other
key issues, attention should be paid to consequences for flexibility and
the relative importance of LNOs to the strategy.

In addition, some argue that improved combinations of high-
accuracy, low-yield nuclear delivery systems could improve our ability
to limit escalation and influence negotiations by controlling collateral
damage from nuclear strikes. Others argue, however, that high accuracy, once achieved, could be rapidly transferred from low- to high-yield weapons, thereby giving us a perceived, if not real, disarming first-strike capability. In this view, LNOs can be carried out using current systems and targeting selectively to reduce collateral damage.

**Alternative Strategies for Strategic Forces**

Decisions on most of these issues are not completely independent of one another. Some choices might be incompatible, while others automatically relate. For example, a decision that we should match the Soviets in all major areas for political sufficiency reasons tends to preclude a decision to procure only an augmented Dyad. At the same time, many compatible choices on issues can be formed, particularly in combining defensive and offensive issues, although there are differences over interpretation of issues and force implications. Accordingly, choices on particular issues do not necessarily translate into unique strategy or force posture alternatives.

To provide a range of options for policy review, choices on key issues have been combined in consistent and representative ways to form five notional alternative strategies which are indicative of the range of policy choices. Each of these describes a general illustrative posture which would have to be refined for actual force and budget decisions. Each of the alternatives would provide a basic capability, after withstanding a full-scale Soviet attack, to destroy those resources critical to the Soviet Union’s postwar recovery and influence as a major power. Each also has some capability for limited nuclear options. While the pace of force modernization becomes more rapid under the stronger options, some acceleration could also occur under the more modest options even though the overall force goal is lower.

While average costs over the next 5 years are identified for each alternative, the full impact of the proposed force changes in many options occurs in the mid- to late 1980s.

**Alternative S–1: No Reserve/Postwar Recovery Retaliation/Dyad**

This alternative would deter major attacks through a basic assured retaliation capability (day-to-day ability to attack recovery targets) and provide deterrence against limited attacks. However, it does not permit a response in kind to a major countersilo attack. Specific flexibility advantages of the survivable ICBM force would be given up, although inherent capability to execute limited nuclear options with all components would be developed as much as possible. Strategic reserve forces would not be specifically provided, but the basic force is postured on some conservative assumptions which could provide forces for extended conflict.
The US strategic force posture would be an Augmented Dyad rather than the current Triad. Bomber and SLBM forces would be modernized at a deliberate pace, but not the ICBM force. (A variant would be to modernize ICBM and SLBM forces only.) Low-cost fixes to MINUTEMAN survivability would be sought, and ICBMs, as they age or become vulnerable, would be replaced with additional bombers or SLBMs. Also, forces would not be bought specifically for counterforce or flexible response options, but forces procured for the basic assured retaliatory mission would possess some hard-target capability. Forces for damage limitation would not be bought.

This alternative reflects the view that being able to inflict high levels of damage is adequate for deterrence and that an augmented Dyad provides sufficient hedge against technological surprise and sufficient flexibility for reasonable limited options without the danger of creating instability with heavier, hard-target kill ICBMs. It also reflects a belief that political sufficiency can be provided by a declaratory policy which emphasizes the potency of this capability, US warhead and accuracy advantages for as long as they continue to exist, and the advantages of foregoing vulnerable silo-based forces. In this view, current strategic and theater nuclear forces provide sufficient flexibility for plausible limited options; counterforce and damage limiting are rejected as destabilizing.

A variant of this alternative would be to buy a larger Augmented Dyad sized against the targeting requirement of S–2 below. This would considerably increase the reliability of the coverage of the basic target systems plus provide a dedicated postattack reserve. As with the basic S–1, it would avoid the potential for crisis instability of a new hard-target ICBM, but it would also not provide the force diversity assurance or the flexibility for escalation control of S–2, and would probably cost as much.

The estimated average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $2 billion less than the current base program. A brief description of the methodology for deriving these cost estimates is included in Section VI.

**Alternative S–2: Reserve/Postwar Recovery Retaliation/Triad**

This alternative would provide, through the timing of force modernization, for a high-confidence assured retaliation capability in the mid-to-late 1980s. With additional hedging and a reserve, US forces would be able to execute limited nuclear employment options to deter limited nuclear attack and control the corollary escalation, while providing for war termination should such attacks occur. Hard-target capability would be limited so that the Soviets could not construe it as a first-strike countersilo force. If the US force suffered a Soviet first-strike
countersilo attack, the surviving ICBM force would have only a minor countersilo potential in response.

In this alternative, the Triad would be maintained and would be sized for day-to-day ability against recovery targets. Force modernization would continue across-the-board at a deliberate pace. The M–X would be developed for initial operational capability in a mobile mode in the mid 1980s, replacing Minuteman III. M–X characteristics and force size would be developed on survivability, not countersilo criteria. The B–1 and Trident II would go forward, but specific hard-target capability for the Trident II and counter-SSBN programs would be retained only in R&D as options. Damage limitation would be incidental, not a major goal.

This alternative reflects essentially the same choices as Alternative S–1 except on the critical point that it chooses to maintain a survivable Triad as the most cost effective hedge against technological surprise or catastrophic failures. As a consequence of developing a new land-based component, this option would also provide somewhat greater flexibility. This option also might provide greater hard-target kill capability, although this would not be a specific objective, and, in fact, efforts would be made to limit this capability (e.g., retain Trident II hard-target capability in R&D).

The estimated average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $1 billion less than the current Defense base program.

Alternative S–3: Offsetting USSR Strengths/Military Gain Denial

This alternative would be designed to enhance the credibility and war fighting capability of the US strategic deterrent in the face of growing Soviet strategic forces by assuring an outcome of overall military equality at all levels of nuclear conflict. The United States would offset rather than match Soviet advantages. It would strengthen the survivable force in reserve for protection and coercion during and after a major nuclear conflict. It could involve improved civil defense planning to limit damage to US population and industry.

This option would seek to neutralize any prospective Soviet advantages from war initiation by assuring the survivability of adequate nuclear forces throughout a series of possible nuclear exchanges and by acquiring capabilities adequate to execute a high-confidence attack on the Soviet silo-based force ICBM force and to attack special targets such as Soviet general purpose forces or hardened command and control facilities. In addition to providing continued diversity through a modernized Triad, including the B–1, this option would emphasize a survivable but limited countersilo capability. M–X would be developed for survivable basing modes; planning would continue for an accurate Tri-
dent II. This option would require development of new advantages in such areas as ICBM survivability, long-range conventional capabilities, or improved peripheral attack capabilities, including new systems such as cruise missiles to replace prior advantages in such areas as MIRVs and accuracy as they decline. An enhanced civil defense program to improve protection of population and industry would also help offset Soviet strategic strength, but no major attempt would be made to limit damage.

This alternative makes the same decision about diversity/survivability as Alternative S–2, but it reflects a belief that credible deterrence requires confronting Soviet planners with persuasive war fighting options and a belief that political sufficiency calls for some substantial offset to projected increases in Soviet strategic and theater capabilities. This offset could in part consist of capabilities for executing a wider range of limited attacks over the course of a longer conflict, including a limited capability to counterattack Soviet silos and improved peripheral attack capabilities.

The current Defense program moves in the direction of this alternative as a response to Soviet strategic force improvements. In funding terms, this alternative now corresponds essentially to the current Defense base program through FY 1982. Strategic spending would continue to increase after the Five-Year Defense Program period.

Alternative S–4: Matching Soviet Strengths/Military Advantage

This alternative would be designed to persuade the Soviets that they would lose any strategic war even by a strictly military standard. We would seek a balance with them in important areas of possible advantage, particularly hardtarget counterforce capability.

A mobile M–X would be developed as expeditiously as possible, replacing MM III with a new, larger throw weight missile to match Soviet hard-target kill capability. This alternative would also proceed with an accurate Trident II for countersilo capability and would develop rapidly deployable contingency ABM systems, a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) for penetration and a contingency air defense system using AWACS and tactical fighters; civil defense would be strengthened. Some forces would assume a counter-SSBN role. Peripheral attack forces would be upgraded and also augmented with CONUS- and sea-based nuclear forces to counter the Soviet Backfire and SS–X–20.

This alternative reflects similar assumptions as Alternative S–3 about the need for a Triad of forces and for a credible deterrent, but it calls for more clearcut demonstration of political sufficiency and war fighting capability by matching Soviet growth, particularly countersilo capability. The range of available limited options would be increased
by providing limited counter-SSBN and counter-bomber capabilities. This option assumes that the Soviets would have difficulty responding by increasing their current efforts or that if they did so, it would reduce their effort in conventional forces. This alternative would include improved civil defense.

The estimated average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $2–3 billion above the current base program, with substantial additional increase beyond 1982.

**Alternative S-5: Clear Military Advantage/Damage Limitation**

This alternative would be designed to assure that no matter what the circumstances, the United States would emerge from any strategic conflict with a clear military advantage and with losses sufficiently low to permit survival and recovery of the nation.

The Triad would be maintained and augmented with long-range cruise missiles. Modernization programs (e.g., B–1, M–X, Trident II) would be accelerated to protect against near-term imbalances and vulnerabilities resulting from the current Soviet force build-up. A dedicated air defense would be provided, as would a significant civil defense. Counter-SSBN programs would be improved and expanded. Without abrogating the ABM treaty a rapidly deployable ABM system would be developed. ABM Treaty modifications could also be considered to permit light area ABM defense. Maneuvering reentry vehicles would be deployed as a hedge against possible Soviet ABM Treaty abrogation. Peripheral attack forces would be modernized, given longer range and greater survivability, and augmented with CONUS- and sea-based nuclear forces.

This alternative reflects a belief that credible deterrence of attacks on ourselves and our allies requires serious capability to limit damage to the United States in the event of a Soviet retaliation and a belief that the United States can acquire such capabilities at acceptable cost. Substantial diversity and clear-cut political sufficiency result automatically from this choice. Arms race and crisis stability considerations are considered of secondary importance.

The estimated average annual cost of this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $8–10 billion above the current base program. Major additional cost increases would occur beyond 1982 as programs reach fruition.

*Foreign Reactions and Arms Control Implications*

There is a general agreement that Soviet reactions to US force posture initiatives cannot be specifically predicted or defined. The extent to which Soviet behavior and force posture decisions are substantially affected by US initiatives is not clear. Perhaps the most that can be said is
that US decisions leading to a diminished US strategic force capability, as might be perceived to be the case under Alternative S–1, could lead to Soviet attempts to exploit resultant asymmetries. US willingness to consider such initiatives may offer incentives for the Soviet Union to enter into meaningful arms control agreement. For example, US willingness under Alternative S–1 to reduce ICBMs and to modernize bomber and SLBMs at a moderate pace could be used to seek comparable constraints on Soviet systems. In a similar manner, US decisions to strengthen its strategic capabilities could bring positive pressure to bear on the Soviets to bargain more productively in SALT. On the other hand, too forceful a strengthening of US strategic force capabilities, as might be perceived under Alternative S–5, could cause the Soviets to forego arms control as a viable activity and lead them to attempt to match or outstrip US initiatives, resulting in continued strategic competition and perhaps, strategic instability. The general policy problem for the US is how to seek Soviet cooperation without diminishing national security or stimulating a Soviet strategic build-up.

US allies feel comfortable with current US strategic policies. They could be made uneasy, at least initially, by any significant departure from current US policy with respect to strategic forces. Any potential adverse effects could be mitigated by careful and timely consultations. To some extent, Allied perceptions of the adequacy of the US strategic posture are based on expressed US judgments on its own strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and resulting Allied perceptions of US resolve in crisis situations. An alternative such as S–1, which could be perceived as moving toward a less capable strategic posture, would probably be disturbing to the allies, who would fear that US security guarantees might become less reliable and Soviet influence greater. A credible declaratory policy, coupled with prior consultations in NATO and bilateral channels, could do much to reassure allied governments on this point. Alternatives such as S–5 could be viewed by the allies as likely to lead to increased US–USSR tensions, possibly complicating their efforts to normalize relations with Eastern Europe. The PRC in general seems to view a high level of US–USSR tension as in its own interest.

B. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

General purpose forces form the core of the Free World collective security system and also provide the United States with the capability for unilateral military action. Current US strategy governing general purpose forces focuses on the Soviet threat to US interests. While the major military threat is centered in Europe, military confrontation in other areas of the world could ultimately involve both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
While the size and structure of most US general purpose forces are determined by military requirements, the forces that result serve other than purely military ends. As in the case with strategic forces, general purpose forces convey an important political message to the world at large. They present an image of US interest and involvement in world affairs. They demonstrate the depth of US commitment to the alliance system and, more generally, to free world security. And they make clear the intention of the United States to play a responsible great power role in the world, its readiness and ability to respond to unexpected crises, and its willingness to maintain a balance of power with its major adversaries. The adequacy of general purpose forces in supporting US national objectives, therefore, cannot be measured solely in terms of their capabilities for dealing with specific conflicts.

Barring unforeseen developments, the United States will continue its collective security arrangements in Europe, and the requirements of this commitment will continue to be a major determinant of general purpose forces’ structure and posture. This is not to say that the structure of NATO, the nature of our commitment, or the nature and relative share of the European allies’ contribution to their own defense should not be altered. It is merely to recognize that the predominant US political and economic interests, aside from territorial security, reside in the industrial democracies of Europe; that the Soviet Union is certain to continue to pose an imminent political and military threat to these nations; and that the scale of this threat far exceeds all others presently identifiable.

Our political and military interests in, and mutual security commitments to, Japan and the related commitment to Korea will also continue. Although the USSR will remain the major threat to US and allied interests in Asia, the United States must consider Chinese capabilities and intentions. The likelihood of Chinese aggression against US interests is small, and, so long as overall relations among the four major powers in Asia do not alter significantly, the likelihood of coordinated Sino-Soviet aggression is even smaller.

The United States has significant interests and obligations in other areas of the world, but these interests and the possible threats to them are not as clearly defensible or as generally agreed upon as those in Europe and Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, much of the rest of the world is unstable, and there has been a significant increase in the military capabilities of Third World countries. It is reasonable to assume that future situations could arise in, for example, the Middle East or the Caribbean which would warrant the use of military force.

The discussion which follows will address factors influencing conventional military strategy. Possible conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies will be discussed first in terms of the Central Front in Europe.
and the Atlantic lines of communication, then the NATO flanks, and then possible related actions outside the European theater, including limited conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Other US military requirements are discussed, including the defense of Japan and Korea, possible minor or unilateral US military actions not involving the Soviet Union, and US peacetime military presence.

As it progresses, the discussion identifies the major issues with which the policymaker must deal and suggests different approaches to these issues. After the discussion, six strategies are posited which combine varying military capabilities deriving from alternative approaches to the issues.

**CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES**

The US choice of strategy in NATO is not a unilateral decision, since US allies have firm views of their own on this subject. While it cannot plan on a strategy greatly divergent from allies, the United States clearly is in a position of leadership in the Alliance, and therefore its views on strategy carry considerable weight.

Current US goals are to encourage NATO allies to improve their forces, increase the level of resources devoted to defense, standardize military equipment, adopt common doctrine, improve the interoperability of forces, and rationalize the allocation of resources in order to increase the effectiveness of the collective defense effort. Moreover, the United States encourages host nations to guarantee wartime support to US forces in order to allow more rapid build-up of US combat forces and seeks agreements for the establishment and expansion of the lines of communication in Europe required for the wartime support of NATO forces.

The currently agreed NATO strategy is a strategy of flexible response which includes three stages: forward conventional defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response. As rough strategic nuclear parity has developed, the United States has given increasing weight to NATO’s capability to execute the first option. Allied views on this matter have been ambivalent and vary somewhat among the various allies. Although reluctantly accepting the US lead in improving the conventional defense option, most of the allies continue to put principal reliance on nuclear deterrence, even though they recognize the altered nuclear equation. This view is in accord with allied interests in avoiding the costs of improving conventional forces and avoiding making Central Europe the battleground for any protracted conflict.

In the strategic alternatives for worldwide conflict with the USSR and its allies, there are four major interrelated considerations: (1) conflict in Europe and the North Atlantic, (2) conflict on NATO’s flanks,
The most important and complex area is a conflict on the NATO Central Front and in the North Atlantic. Three major factors influence the adequacy of NATO’s conventional posture in Europe: the size of both total and forward-deployed forces, response capability, and sustainability. These three factors are interrelated. For example, it generally takes fewer total forces and less sustaining capability to hold territory initially than to retake it, but to be successful, much of the total force must be in-place or rapidly deployable. Issues on each of these factors are discussed below.

Issue #1: Adequacy of Forward Force Deployment.

The question of the adequacy of the size of the US and NATO military forces is most clear-cut when applied to forces in Europe in peacetime. There is some concern that if the Soviets were successful in launching a very rapid, short-warning attack on NATO, Warsaw Pact forces which are stationed forward in larger numbers than those of NATO in peacetime could gain a significant military advantage before NATO could mobilize and deploy adequate forces to counter them. It is not at all clear what the Pact capability is to execute such a complex attack, and there is widespread agreement that the Soviet Union is unlikely to launch an attack in Europe unless an unstable political situation prompts it. Such a situation should, in itself, provide some warning. Therefore, the issue is whether the Warsaw Pact’s latent capability for unmobilized attack is sufficient to warrant a build-up in the size of NATO’s peacetime in-place and dual-based forces.

There are three basic alternatives for the size of US peacetime deployments in Europe:

**The Present Plan.** This will deploy 5 division equivalents and 24 tactical fighter squadrons in Europe, which includes a net increase of 2 brigades and 3 squadrons.

**Increased Forward Deployment.** This would deploy additional ground and air units to Europe. Such a change would require an increase in manpower in Europe with implications for MBFR. In order to provide an adequate rotation base, this plan could also require an increase in the total number of active Army divisions, which could necessitate return to a peacetime draft.

**Decreased Forward Deployment.** This would involve lower US force levels in Europe. Substantial US reductions would necessitate compensating allied increases and therefore would have major long-term foreign policy and arms control implications.

Issue #2: Response to Limited Warning. In the past, US planning focused on defense against a Warsaw Pact attack of about 85–90 divisions...
following about a month of mobilization and reinforcement of both sides (the so-called 23/30 scenario). The Pact now has the capability for military operations prior to major reinforcement. To hedge against unreinforced attack, recent defense guidance has recognized that a conflict might begin at any time after the Pact begins preparation, although an early attack would involve fewer Pact forces. There are serious uncertainties about the rate at which Pact forces would build up over time, NATO’s capability to detect this, and NATO’s capability to react to such warning, particularly in the political sphere. Pending clarification of these questions, some steps have been taken or are planned to improve our capability to respond to such attacks.

There are two basic alternatives for planning US response capability:

*Continue with Current Defense Guidance.* This would keep the focus of US force planning on a reinforced Pact attack following a period of warning, while continuing to hedge against earlier, smaller attacks.

*Adopt a More Rapid Response Capability.* This alternative would change the focus of defense guidance from a specific scenario toward the concept of insuring that forces and their reinforcements can move into battle at a rate roughly equivalent to that of the Pact forces under any scenario. This concept demands that the response capability of NATO forces in peacetime not be significantly less than that of the Pact and that the rate of mobilization and deployment of additional NATO forces also be comparable to that of the Pact. Implementing this concept could require further improvements in the rapid response capability of US forces in Europe and in the rate of reinforcement from the United States, including some mix of additional pre-positioned material and enhancement of mobility forces. If chosen, such a concept would have to be closely coordinated with our NATO allies.

**Issue #3: Sustainability.** The Soviets are clearly planning for a fast-moving war in which they would hope to achieve their objectives in a few days or weeks at most. However, their accumulation of a significant amount of older military equipment and ammunition and their maintenance of central reserve forces raise serious concerns that they may be able to sustain a major conventional conflict much longer than previously assessed and that failure of NATO to plan for a conflict of comparable duration could entail significant risk. While there are major uncertainties in the US estimate of Pact sustaining capability, particularly in areas such as equipment maintenance, the Pact appears to have adequate supplies for several months of combat.

US planning is complicated by widespread reluctance of non-US NATO countries to plan for supporting their own forces for more than about 30 days of intense conflict. In the event of Warsaw Pact attack
and failure of the allied defense, US forces would be compelled to withdraw from Central Europe. US sustaining capability would have to exceed that of its allies only long enough to permit successful evacuation. This raises questions concerning the gap between allied sustaining capability and the current US defense program to fund a 90-day sustaining capability for forces for Europe. Further, funding an industrial mobilization base in excess of that available as a result of routine peace-time military production is also at issue. One solution is US funding of sustaining munitions for NATO Allies, as we now do for the Republic of Korea. Another solution would be to encourage US allies to increase their own sustaining capabilities to 90 days. Resolution of the complex and long-standing NATO problem of standardization and interoperability of equipment and supplies would greatly facilitate adoption of alternatives for improving European sustainability.

There are four basic alternatives for funding US sustaining capability for conflict in Europe. US funding of munitions stockpiles for US allies so that they could fight as long as could US forces is a sub-option. This would be successful only if the allies funded stocks of equipment to replace losses and had the necessary manpower programs to maintain their force structures.

[2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified]

180 Days. Such a capability, if also adopted by our allies, would probably enable us to outlast the Pact.

Indefinite. [2 lines not declassified] Such a capability would insure that we could fight as long as necessary if the allies were to develop a similar capability.

Issue #4: Conflict on the NATO Flanks. How much combat capability and support should the United States provide for operations on NATO’s flanks?

The flanks of NATO overlook the means of Soviet access into the open ocean areas which constitute the internal lines of communication of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, Norway and Denmark overlook areas of direct military and economic significance to the Soviet Union, as well as a source of petroleum which will become increasingly significant to Western Europe.

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

[1½ lines not declassified] Further study is needed to determine how the United States might best participate in the collective defense of the flanks.

At present, the basic alternatives are:

Continue Present Planning. This alternative would continue current planning for US capabilities on NATO’s flanks.
Increase Capabilities. This alternative would provide additional US capability and would consider stockpiling munitions for sustaining support to flank allies.

Issue #5: Conflict Outside the NATO Area. How much combat capability should the United States possess for conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies outside the NATO area?

A NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict might spread outside the NATO area. US planning has long recognized the probability of worldwide naval conflict. The United States must consider potential Soviet efforts to interdict lines of communication to US overseas territories and allies or to impede the rapid transit of US ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic for the reinforcement of NATO.

US allies outside of NATO should also be expected to contribute to the defense of their own interests, including sea lines of communication. The relative future contribution of US allies to regional defense requires careful examination. [5 lines not declassified]

The most critical threat posed outside Europe by Soviet forces is to the free world’s oil supplies in the Persian Gulf region. Soviet interdiction of Middle Eastern oil would have a much more immediate and direct impact on Europe and Japan than on the United States. If conflict in Europe stalemated into protracted conflict, a Soviet attack in Iran to interdict NATO oil could significantly divert US resources. With US assistance, Iran has initiated a major build-up in its defense capabilities.

Moreover, the prospect of bilateral US–USSR conflict not involving NATO or the Warsaw Pact must also be considered. As the Soviet Union improves its abilities to project influence worldwide and demonstrates a willingness to exploit instabilities where its interests are served, the prospects for conflict with US interests increase. US economic well-being depends upon worldwide resources and commerce, and any Soviet action which seriously threatened these interests could necessitate a reaction. While such confrontations could remain isolated, they could also spread to a wider NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. The United States maintains multipurpose forces which can be employed either in this context or within the context of a worldwide conflict with the USSR.

The basic alternatives are:

Retain Present Capability. Continue current capabilities and planning emphasis.

Improve US Capability. Provide additional capability for US operations worldwide, including the Persian Gulf area.

Reduce US Capability. Alternatively, planning could emphasize the transfer of a greater share of the worldwide defense burden to US allies.
Issue #6: US/Allied Initiatives. What capability should the United States and its allies possess for initiatives subsequent to a Warsaw Pact attack?

The forces which confront the main Pact attack will be limited initially to defense. However, Pact resources are not infinite. Massing for attack on one front will require thinning capabilities in others, creating vulnerabilities which may be exploited. Early allied combat successes will strengthen allied resolve and contribute to insuring continued worldwide support and availability of resources. Allied initiatives against Soviet/Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities could: tie down Pact Forces; reduce Soviet ability to interdict reinforcement of Europe; seize Pact territory; and exploit Pact internal disaffections.

Capabilities for such initiatives would be inherent in an increased capability for conflict worldwide against the Soviet Union and its allies. However, the implications of such objectives for US defense planning have not been carefully studied. The specific question is therefore one of planning emphasis. The basic alternatives are:

1. **Continue Current Planning.** This course would continue only basic planning for the exploitation of opportunities which might present themselves.

2. **Increased Emphasis.** This alternative would place greater emphasis on planning possible US/allied initiatives which could contribute to termination of conflict under conditions favorable to the United States and its allies.

Other Military Requirements

While the focus of defense planning is on the defense of NATO, the current US military posture possesses an inherent flexibility for dealing with a diverse range of other military requirements. However, such flexibility must be balanced against the political and military need for overseas deployments and by the economies realized by specializing some forces. The major question encountered in this area concerns the risk we should be willing to take in our major war capability in order to cover a simultaneous or preceding conflict of a lesser nature. Given the large uncertainties in requirements for major conflict, it is difficult to distinguish between efforts which reduce risks relative to conflict with the Soviet Union and those which increase capabilities relative to possible additional small conflicts. There is a direct linkage between a broad or a narrow definition of the planned worldwide NATO/Pact conflict and the degree of risk associated with using these forces in non-Soviet conflicts.

The US commitment to the security of Japan and Korea is important because these nations serve as a barrier to the projection of Soviet influence into the Pacific Basin. Japan is especially significant economi-
ically. While the threat to Japan’s security is currently remote, the US-Japanese relationship will probably depend upon Japanese perceptions of US resolve—and capability—to provide a secure shield. At present, US naval and air forces based in Japan support the US commitment to the security of Japan and Korea as well as US presence in the Western Pacific. There is, however, the question of what Japan’s role in her own defense should be, particularly regarding air defense and the security of her long sea lines of communication, which was discussed under Issue #5.

Issue #7: US Forces/Support for the ROK. How much assistance should be provided to the ROK?

Korea is important to the United States because of its relationship to the security of Japan and the regional balance of power. The United States presently maintains forces in the ROK (an additive requirement) and plans to provide both additional air and naval forces and logistic support in the event of a NK/ROK conflict. While ROK improvements have in large measure eliminated the requirement for US ground combat forces, the ROK will probably depend on US air, naval, and logistic support for the foreseeable future. If the USSR or the PRC were to support a North Korean attack, the United States could expect a lengthy conflict. Significant reductions of US sustaining capability in Europe would probably make support of a lengthy war in Korea impossible, unless the US stockpiled specifically for that contingency.

The alternatives are:

No change: Continue US forces in, and support for, Korea at present levels.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

Issue #8. Unforeseen Contingencies. What additive contingency capability should be provided to hedge against minor conflict prior to or simultaneous with a major NATO/Pact war?

While the principal threat to US security is the Soviet Union, actual commitment of military force in the recent past has been for other reasons. Since World War II, the United States has required the exercise or show of force on more than 60 occasions throughout the world, varying from disaster relief and evacuation to subtheater conflict (e.g., Indochina).

Developing PRC capabilities could threaten US interests in Asia, and a real Sino-Soviet rapprochement could drastically alter the world balance of power. But so long as Sino-Soviet hostility persists and other major power relationships remain stable, the likelihood of PRC aggression is considered small, and the probability of coordinated Sino-Soviet aggression is even smaller. Consequently, no additional forces for action against the PRC are planned at this time.
The United States will retain interests worldwide in the years ahead. While the threat to these interests is at present uncertain, growing world population, mounting competition for resources, increasing socio-economic problems, proliferation of modern weaponry, emergence of increasingly independent regional powers, and Soviet willingness for opportunistic exploitation are all factors which will affect US security interests.

Military requirements for dealing with lesser powers are, of course, much smaller than those for conflict with the Soviet Union or PRC, although an increasing number of lesser powers are being equipped with high-quality equipment. For this reason, US planning primarily attempts to insure that the overall forces generated for major conflict have the inherent capability to engage in the full spectrum of plausible lesser conflicts. A price is paid for this by maintaining some forces which are not ideally suited for a major Europe-centered conflict of limited duration. Chief among these forces are some naval forces and those ground forces characterized by high mobility and versatility—largely USMC and Army airborne units. While such units could be used in the European theater in some situations, their main value lies in their ability to be moved relatively rapidly to locations of actual or potential conflict not needing heavily armored forces, and where prepositioning is not warranted. The same is true of some naval carrier task forces, the major attribute of which is the flexibility to concentrate tactical air power in littoral areas where maintenance of land bases is not warranted. However, as many of these forces are also required for prospective conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies, there is a question as to what additive requirement is necessary for other worldwide interests.

The alternatives are:

*Reduced Capability.* Provide for no additive capability. Insure that forces planned for the defense of NATO include forces sufficiently flexible for commitment to unforeseen contingencies worldwide, and plan on accepting increased risk in Europe whenever forces are actually engaged elsewhere.

*Current Capability.* Continue to provide roughly the current level of additive capability—limited ground, tactical air, sea-based projection, and mobility forces sized for force interposition in the Middle East.

*Increased Capability.* Provide increased strategic mobility, sea-based projection and multipurpose ground and tactical air forces.

*Peacetime Presence*

United States forward-deployed and afloat forces serve both military and political purposes. In the main, our peacetime presence capability is an inherent benefit derived from conventional forces structured
and justified on the basis of warfighting requirements. Moreover, US forces overseas may act as a deterrent to potential enemies by increasing their risk of direct involvement with the United States. However, changes to US peacetime deployments are widely viewed as signals of change in US foreign policy. Thus, forward deployments are occasionally continued (or changes deferred) for reasons which are more political than military. US Army forces in Korea and the continuing commitment of two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean area are cases in point. To the extent that such force presence is not justified in terms of military requirements, it creates an additive requirement for consideration in determining the total US force structure. However, the overall military implication of any changes in the US defense program which would change peacetime deployment patterns would need to be thoroughly understood by our major allies before such changes were implemented.

Options for changes in US peacetime presence in Europe and Korea are presented in Issue 1 and 7, respectively. Decisions on Issues 4 and 5 could require decreases or provide opportunities for increases in peacetime deployments, particularly in carrier and amphibious forces.

Other Considerations

Additional subjects which must be considered in the development of a comprehensive strategy include the role of tactical nuclear weapons, possible arms control measures, and security assistance. While the illustrative alternatives do not address explicit changes in these areas, some will have an impact. For example, reduction of US sustaining capability in Europe could imply an earlier reliance on nuclear weapons.

Alternative Strategies

Described herein are six notional strategy alternatives, each of which possesses a differing range of military capabilities related to the major issues identified earlier. They could be combined into a variety of other permutations. For example, “Europe-30 days” could be combined with worldwide initiatives against the Soviets, or presence in Korea could be deleted from “Increase NATO and Worldwide.” These notional strategies can, at best, portray only a general indication of budgetary impact, as supporting force structures have not been developed or analyzed in detail. In planning general purpose forces, two types of risks are incurred. One type is made explicit in the statement of the strategy. For example, if we bought supplies for only 90 days of combat, we would run the risk that the enemy has prepared for longer war. The second type results from uncertainty in the calculation of requirements for the strategy selected.
The alternatives reflected in the table address those capabilities required for conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies and those additive capabilities which are necessary for meeting US security requirements other than, but concurrent with, war with the USSR/Warsaw Pact.

*Alternative G–2: Current*

The current strategy is the starting point. For conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies, the current defense program, when completed, provides the capability (after about a month of mobilization and reinforcement for both sides) for an “initial defense” of NATO for about 90 days. Such a posture is now assessed as adequate to deter Pact attack. If the Pact does attack, it is assumed that beyond 90 days: (1) a political settlement will have been reached, (2) the Soviets will have reached the limit of their conventional offensive capability, or (3) the war will have escalated to nuclear conflict. The current strategy provides for worldwide attrition of Soviet submarines and limited reinforcement of the NATO flanks. The current defense program also provides for peacetime presence (e.g., in Korea and Japan and afloat forces in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Western Pacific) and limited additional forces for unilateral military action.

At present, NATO’s prospects for recovering initial territorial losses are limited. However, Soviet planners could not have high confidence of rapidly taking large amounts of important NATO territory. But, because of limited allied sustaining capability, it is possible that the Pact could now outlast NATO.

*Alternative G–1: Europe-30 days*

This alternative provides for a briefer but stronger initial defense of Europe. US Forces for Europe, strengthened by prepositioned equipment and rapid reinforcement to meet a minimum warming time criterion, would be provided approximately the same 30 days of sustaining capability as our allies, under the assumption that such a posture is adequate for deterrence and that an actual conflict would either terminate or escalate to nuclear war within that time. US capabilities to conduct unilateral military action elsewhere in the world would be diminished. US ground combat forces in Korea would be phased out while continuing to provide air, naval, and logistic support. Full implementation of a 30-day strategy would fundamentally change the current rationale for a significant fraction of US naval forces.

This option may encourage greater allied preparation for their own defense but provides little capability to recover NATO territorial

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8 The table, “Alternative Strategies for General Purpose Forces,” is not printed.
losses or to counter Soviet initiatives on the flanks or worldwide. Additionally, the NATO defense could require an earlier decision on the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, forces for unilateral action must be drawn from those planned for the defense of NATO, increasing risk in the event of concomitant requirements.

The average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $6–12 billion below the current base program.

*Alternative G–3: Increased Worldwide*

Alternative G–3 would continue the current approach in support of the defense of NATO but would give greater emphasis to US interests elsewhere. However, US ground combat forces in Korea would be phased out while continuing to provide air, naval, and logistic support. Naval, strategic mobility, and US-based forces would be increased.

While this alternative provides for an initial defense of Europe and increased flexibility for dealing with Soviet or other threats worldwide, the prospects for recovering initial territorial losses in Europe would be limited during the first 90 days, beyond which point it is assumed that conflict would terminate or escalate to nuclear war. US capabilities would be improved not only for responding to worldwide requirements but also for reinforcing NATO or conducting initiatives against the USSR/Warsaw Pact, unless forces were already committed to unilateral military action.

The average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $1–3 billion above the current program.

*Alternative G–4: Increased NATO, Reduced Worldwide*

Alternative G–4 would increase US contribution to the defense of continental Europe. This alternative would increase forward-deployed land-based forces and prepositioned equipment in Europe as well as mobility forces. US sustaining capability would be retained at current levels, and US sustaining support could increase allied sustainability. US capabilities to conduct unilateral military action elsewhere would be reduced, and US ground combat forces in Korea would be phased out, while continuing to provide air, naval, and logistic support.

This alternative provides a relatively high assurance of retaining defended NATO territory. However, it might be perceived as a build-up of NATO offensive capability and precipitate a build-up of Pact Forces. This option would increase vulnerabilities outside Europe and would require drawing forces for unilateral military action from those planned for the defense of NATO.

The average annual cost of this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $0–4 billion below the current program.
Alternative G–5: Increased NATO

This alternative would provide the same capabilities as the current strategy except that it would increase forward-deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and mobility forces for the conduct of a forward defense of NATO for 90 days. As a variant, US support could increase the allied sustaining capabilities to US levels. Presence, unilateral capability, and support to Korea would be continued at current levels.

As in Alternative G–4, a forward defense in Europe would provide a relatively high assurance of territorial integrity unless the Pact felt compelled also to increase their forward-deployed forces. US capability for response to worldwide requirements would be at today's levels, wherein forces for a significant unforeseen contingency may have to be drawn from those planned for the defense of NATO.

The average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $2 billion above the current program.

Alternative G–6: Increased NATO and Worldwide

Alternative G–6 would provide warfighting capability for 180 days or for indefinite conflict in Europe in addition to a stronger early response. It also would provide additional forces to strengthen defenses on the flanks or elsewhere or for US initiatives to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities worldwide. Presence, unilateral capabilities, and support to Korea would be continued at least at current levels.

This alternative provides the greatest range of capabilities and high assurance of retaining NATO's territorial integrity. However, it is costly and could require US support to increase allied sustainability to match US levels. There would be little encouragement for allies to increase their participation in their own defense. Moreover, unless implemented gradually over time, it could be politically destabilizing.

The average annual cost for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $14–21 billion above the current program.

Possible Longer-Term Strategy

For the longer term, it may be desirable to examine a strategy which would reduce force levels in Europe but would improve the US capability to reinforce after an attack began. Such a strategy would exploit military technology to provide greater flexibility for employment of forces from a CONUS-based strategic reserve against a Pact attack anywhere in Europe, or against threats to the interests of the United States and its allies any where in the world. In addition to requiring dramatically improved strategic mobility, such a strategy would, of necessity, require a greater contribution by the NATO Allies to their own defense. Evolution toward such a strategy would necessitate very closely coordinated foreign and defense policy.
Foreign Reactions and Arms Control Implications

General Observations

All alternatives except G–2 and G–3 would involve a departure from current NATO strategy and would require extensive consultation with NATO Allies before implementing. Alternatives G–4, G–5, and G–6 require accommodating additional forces and equipment on European soil. This would be of particular importance in the case of the FRG. Such consultations could also do much to alleviate allied concerns over the apparent changes in US policy and strategy.

Alternative G–1

This alternative would tend to limit the US ability to act as a global counterweight to Soviet power. The major impact of this strategy would be in Asia. It would probably have a significant impact on key US relationships with Japan, the ROK, and China, all of whom would likely view such developments as upsetting the major power equilibrium in Asia to the detriment of their security. In Europe, the increased ability to prevent loss of territory in Central Europe would bring our strategy more in line with European views, although the strategy might increase concerns in the flank countries due to diminished capabilities for US reinforcement there. However, this alternative could require the earlier use of tactical nuclear weapons.

It is likely that the Soviets would continue current programs in the expectation that US overall reduced capability would make it easier for them to project their influence worldwide.

The reduction of general purpose forces worldwide (other than NATO) would place a premium on arms control and stabilization measures which would enhance stability in the Third World, constrain Soviet power projection capabilities (e.g., “zones of peace” such as the Indian Ocean proposal), or limit the impact on theater nuclear forces needed to support this alternative in the NATO theater.

Alternative G–2

This alternative is essentially a continuation of current US strategy. It would do little to allay concern among US allies, primarily in Western Europe and to a lesser degree in Japan, about the adequacy of NATO forces to implement current strategy in the face of Soviet force improvements.

The Soviets would probably not reduce their current programs and would see themselves in a position of continuing to improve their relative war fighting potential. This strategy calls for a continuation of our present arms control policy.
Alternative G–3

In broad terms this strategy would provide increased support for a US policy of countering Soviet attempts to increase their influence on a global basis. There would be no fundamental impact on US relationships with the NATO allies, although increased forces for unilateral military actions, to the extent they were available for European contingencies, would tend to strengthen our Alliance relationships. In Asia, the adverse impact on our relations with the ROK and Japan could be mitigated by appropriate consultations and demonstrations of increased US capabilities in the areas of strategic mobility and sea-based force projection.

Withdrawal of forces from Korea before planned ROK force improvements are completed could be potentially destabilizing. The Soviets and the PRC could see this strategy as an opportunity to further their influence in East Asia, especially if they questioned the credibility of the United States to reinsert forces into Korea in a crisis.

Increased commitment to an ability to cope with global contingencies would allow the United States to deal from a position of strength in many areas. This could advantageously enhance US possibilities for regional arms control measures while continuing to pursue ongoing arms control negotiations.

Alternative G–4

As in Alternative G–1, this strategy would reduce our ability to act as a global counterweight to Soviet power. Strengthened US capabilities in Europe could be viewed as threatening Pact security. The effect on our Asian policy would be generally the same as in Alternative G–1.

The Soviets would recognize this alternative as an increased concern for European defense and could respond to improvements in US forces in Europe. This could lead to a further build-up in Pact forces, if Soviet resource constraints and priorities permit.

The build-up of US forces in Europe and the probability of a comparable Pact reaction could negate any possibility of an MBFR agreement. However, it might also motivate Pact nations to move forward on meaningful negotiations. The reduction of US forces worldwide other than NATO would place a premium on efforts to achieve arms control which would enhance stability in the Third World and constrain Soviet power projection capabilities.

Alternative G–5

This alternative would have a minimal effect on our global position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. In Europe, reactions would be similar to those under Alternative G–4. There would probably be no direct impact on US policy in Asia, although an increase in NATO strength
which did not result in decreased US capabilities in Asia would indirectly support the US relationship with the PRC.

The impact on MBFR would be essentially the same as in Alternative G–4. Maintaining our present worldwide capability should entail no change in our present arms control policies outside the US-USSR and NATO/Pact negotiating arenas.

*Alternative G–6*

This alternative could have a significant impact on US-Soviet relations signaling a US commitment to maximum flexibility in general purpose forces. Although reassuring to both our European and Asian allies, as well as to the PRC, this strategy would at the same time signal to them a major change in US perceptions of the Soviet threat.

This strategy could provide an incentive for motivating the Soviets to agree to substantial and meaningful arms control measures if the Soviets were not prepared to match US programs and force deployments.

**C. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE ISSUES**

Theater nuclear forces (TNF) complement the strategic deterrent and provide a powerful backup to the conventional deterrent. They serve as a hedge for theater defense should conventional defenses fail; deter Soviet theater nuclear attack; and provide a linkage to strategic forces, a particularly important element in our NATO posture. A credible TNF posture compels a potential enemy to consider the possibility of limited nuclear warfare and hence adds another element to his calculus of risks. The tangible presence of forward-deployed TNFs also serves to reassure those allies to whose defense we are committed.

In Asia the role of TNFs differs from their role in Europe. On the whole, Asian allies, especially Japan, rely on the US strategic umbrella for deterrence. But our theater nuclear forces in East Asia and the Western Pacific give a small extra margin of assurance to our allies and have a dampening effect on the incentive for potential proliferators such as the ROK or Taiwan to produce their own nuclear weapons. In Korea they constitute a part of the basic deterrent against attack on South Korea. Because of the difference in the nature of the threat in Asia and our commitments there, the TNF link to strategic forces is of lesser importance in planning forces for the Asian theater than in Europe. In recent years there has been considerable consolidation and reduction in the Asian forward-deployed posture.

In NATO, theater nuclear weapons must be able to contribute to deterrence by providing: (1) credible theater first-use options to deter Soviet conventional and nuclear attack, (2) a hedge against failure of conventional defense, (3) a viable link to the US strategic deterrent, and
(4) a visible presence to reassure the Alliance of US commitment to European defense.

In assessing the adequacy of the US and NATO posture to meet these objectives for the future, policymakers will have to confront a wide range of issues. The list below is not intended to be exhaustive.

—**Survivability of the NATO Nuclear Posture.** [7 lines not declassified]

—**Modernization/Reduction of the US Forward-Deployed Nuclear Stockpile in Europe.** An issue related to reduction of vulnerability is whether the United States in modernizing its current nuclear posture in Europe should at the same time reduce the total stockpile. The European allies are sensitive to any reduction in the current level of weapons for TNFs, believing that such reductions would be perceived by the Western public and possibly by the Soviets as evidence of a declining American nuclear commitment to Alliance defense. To be acceptable to the allies, any such reductions would have to be offset by the addition of survivable, efficient, and flexible systems which also meet European political and military requirements.

—**Significance of SS–X–20/BACKFIRE in Theater Nuclear Balance.** The Soviets are making a significant modernization and improvement in their survivable, long-range theater second-strike capability which may tend to further erode the credibility of NATO first-use options. The ambiguity of the SS–X–20/Backfire function may require a strong US reaffirmation of the coupling of the US strategic deterrent with NATO’s conventional and nuclear defense posture, as well as an examination of what might be required in US strategic forces to preserve this coupling. European concern for the implications of these systems also raises an issue as to whether there should be specific counterpart systems based in Europe.

—**Identification of Credible First-Use Options.** NATO requires a full range of limited first-use options for theater nuclear forces from effective battlefield support through longer-range interdiction requirements. Some progress is being made within NATO in planning such options, but the planning mechanisms and familiarization/consultation processes are still far from set. Moreover, for all of these potential options there are problems of command, control, and communications; intelligence; and political measures both within NATO and vis-a-vis the Soviets.

—**Identification of LNOs that Enhance the Perception of US Strategic Coupling.** This is an important issue at a time when the scope and pace of Soviet modernization programs for strategic and peripheral systems may tend to cause doubts among our European allies about the credibility of the American strategic nuclear umbrella. It is generally felt in the Alliance that the flexibility of US targeting doctrine has enhanced coupling and deterrence.
Within the framework of the current study, specific alternatives for theater nuclear forces in Europe have not been developed because the issues associated with TNFs must be resolved as part of a complete general purpose force strategy. For this reason, the alternative GPF strategies suggest only the relative importance of TNF as an element of each alternative. A GPF alternative with relatively limited sustainability in conventional capabilities implies greater emphasis on TNFs, but this does not necessarily mean greater investment in TNF capabilities. Greater or lesser emphasis on TNFs could mean simply giving current forces a higher or lower profile and/or adopting a stronger or more muted declaratory policy.

D. OVERALL STRATEGIES

The linkage between US nuclear forces and conventional forces is a critical aspect of our security policy. For example, although the United States places primary reliance on US and allied conventional capabilities to deter conventional aggression, US planning does not preclude the use of nuclear weapons against conventional attack. Both the US force posture and declaratory policy are designed to reflect this approach, thus enhancing the conventional deterrent.

Looking at the choices of broad strategies to deter, in a global context, both nuclear and nonnuclear war, it is apparent that a powerful conventional capability, even backed by substantial theater nuclear forces, does not provide an adequate deterrent if US strategic capabilities are uncertain. At the opposite end of the spectrum, given our security objectives and commitments, a strong strategic deterrent does not fulfill US requirements if we lack a credible conventional defense in critical areas. Between these extremes a variety of combinations of strategic and conventional force postures can be selected depending on national objectives with regard to military requirements, political perceptions, importance of different geographic areas, resource constraints, and the like. Furthermore, in influencing Soviet perceptions of the power balance, it is important to note that they consider an overall correlation of forces that includes the whole spectrum of nuclear and conventional forces. Finally, maintenance of a “rough equivalence” between the nuclear forces of the United States and USSR places increased emphasis on the importance of an adequate conventional force posture if the nuclear threshold is to remain high.

Six illustrative overall strategies, consistent with key US security objectives identified in Section IIIA and combining elements of the alternative strategies for strategic and general purpose options described earlier, are discussed below. Other combinations clearly are possible. Thus, the following should be considered as examples only and are not intended to constrain the range of choices.
Overall Strategy A (S–4, G–1)

This strategy assumes that the major build-up of strategic forces by the Soviets compels the United States to improve its strategic force posture substantially and rapidly, denying the Soviets the opportunity to use their strategic forces for coercion, and assuring a military advantage to the United States in the event deterrence fails. With respect to general purpose forces, this strategy accepts greater risks associated with the possibility of a long conventional war in Europe and elsewhere, but provides for a briefer but stronger initial defense of Europe. This frees resources for strengthening US strategic forces.

Therefore, in Overall Strategy A strategic forces are designed to match most USSR strengths, provide a full countersilo capability, and allow for a contingency deployment of ABM and large-scale air defenses if required. US general purpose forces would be postured for a short (30 days) war with minimum warning in Europe, reducing US sustaining capability to that of its NATO allies. Army combat forces would be withdrawn from Korea, and US capabilities elsewhere outside Europe would be reduced.

The estimated average annual cost in total obligational authority (TOA) for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $3–10 billion below the current base program.

Overall Strategy B (S–2, G–4)

This alternative assumes that the priority near-term problem confronting US security interests is the build-up of Soviet forces for possible attack in Europe. It also assumes that the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities can be met with acceptable risk by a slower rate of modernization in our strategic nuclear forces.

Therefore, this alternative increases general purpose force, logistic, and readiness levels in Europe to respond to either a surprise or mobilized Warsaw Pact attack, and also supports increased allied sustainability. It reduces other capabilities worldwide and withdraws Army combat forces from Korea. For strategic forces, it continues an emphasis on forces sized for retaliatory attack on Soviet postwar recovery targets plus a reserve, and modernizes the Triad at a deliberate pace leading to full modernization in the mid-to-late 1980s.

The estimated average annual cost (TOA) for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $0–5 billion below the current base program.

Overall Strategy C (S–3, G–2)

This alternative assumes, unlike Overall Strategy B, that the pace and timing of the Soviet strategic force build-up require more rapid achievement of key US strategic force capabilities to prevent the Soviets
from obtaining a significant advantage over the United States in the early to mid-1980s. This alternative judges that countering the build-up of Soviet forces in Europe is of a lower priority and that it is not necessary to increase NATO’s currently planned capability. The possibility of a surprise Warsaw Pact attack in Europe is an acceptable near-term risk in the current political environment.

In this alternative, strategic nuclear forces are sized to assure continued deterrence in the face of improved Soviet forces by early procurement of offsetting capabilities, particularly for countersilo attack against residual Soviet ICBMs. For general purpose forces, the alternative continues today’s policy and force posture for a 90-day defense of Europe with a limited capability for unilateral military action worldwide. It also continues the current US force presence in Korea.

The estimated average annual cost (TOA) for this alternative over the next 5 years is the current DOD base program.

Overall Strategy D (S–4, G–2)

This strategy assumes that the major build-up of strategic forces by the Soviets compels the United States to improve its strategic force posture substantially and rapidly, denying the Soviets the opportunity to use their strategic forces for coercion, and assuring a military advantage to the United States in the event deterrence fails. With respect to general purpose forces, this alternative judges that countering the build-up of Soviet forces in Europe is of a lower priority and that it is not necessary to increase NATO’s currently planned capability. The possibility of a surprise Warsaw Pact attack in Europe is an acceptable near-term risk in the current political environment.

Therefore, in this alternative, strategic forces are designed to match most USSR strengths, provide a full countersilo capability, and allow for a contingency breakout for ABM and large-scale air defenses. The alternative continues today’s policy and force posture for a 90-day defense of Europe with a limited capability for unilateral military action worldwide. It continues the current US force presence in Korea.

The estimated average annual cost (TOA) for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $2–3 billion above the current base program.

Overall Strategy E (S–3, G–3)

This alternative assumes that the pace and timing of the Soviet strategic force build-up require more rapid achievement of key strategic force capabilities to prevent the Soviets from obtaining a significant advantage over the United States in the early to mid-1980s. This alternative judges that the Soviet European force build-up does not require change from current US strategy for Europe but that growing
instability in other parts of the world requires the United States to enhance its capabilities worldwide, except for withdrawal of Army combat forces from Korea, which is considered an acceptable risk.

In this alternative, strategic forces are sized to assure continued deterrence in the face of improved Soviet strategic forces by early procurement of offsetting capabilities, particularly for countersilo attack against residual Soviet ICBMs. This alternative continues today's policy and force posture for Europe but improves US capability to meet worldwide contingencies. (Increased general purpose manpower requirements could necessitate a return to the draft.) Army combat forces are withdrawn from Korea.

The estimated average annual cost (TOA) for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $1–3 billion over the current base program.

**Overall Strategy F (S–4, G–5)**

This strategy assumes that the United States must respond vigorously to both the increasing Soviet strategic capabilities and the increasing Warsaw Pact capabilities in Europe.

This strategy, therefore, designs US strategic forces to match most USSR strengths, provides a full countersilo capability, and allows for contingency deployment of ABM and large-scale air defenses. It provides increased force, logistic, and readiness levels in Europe to meet any possible Warsaw Pact attack, and logistically supports increased allied sustainability. Other capabilities worldwide, including Korea, would remain unchanged. (Increased general purpose manpower requirements could necessitate a return to the draft.)

The estimated average annual cost (TOA) for this alternative over the next 5 years would be roughly $4–5 billion above the current base program.

V. PREPAREDNESS POLICY

There currently exist a number of manpower and industrial mobilization plans and programs designed to improve US responsiveness to major wartime requirements; they receive varying degrees of institutional and budgetary support and, for the most part, are not well integrated. In general, they do not focus adequately on possible manpower and materiel requirements in a variety of potential conflict scenarios.

Moreover, recent defense planning emphasis, in focusing on shorter intense conflicts, has led to a deemphasis of preparedness programs, which generally affect manpower and materiel levels only after the initial 3–6 months of mobilization. Recent changes in Selective Service, trends in Guard/Reserve retention, and the growing technical
complexity of US forces have further diminished our manpower and industrial mobilization responsiveness.

In view of the range of alternative strategies suggested in the previous section, there is a requirement for further study of US manpower and industrial mobilization preparedness—not only to support the anticipated requirements of future wars as currently visualized but also to identify the requirements for more protracted conflict. The following considerations apply:

—First, US capability to conduct and support sustained conventional warfare may be an important factor in deterring Soviet attack. In crisis situations, the ability to mobilize rapidly and demonstrate strong prospective combat sustainability could be an important element of deterrence. Beyond an initial conflict period of high consumption and attrition of resources, the nation possessing the superior capacity for regeneration of military capabilities will enjoy a strategic advantage.

—Second, there are plausible conventional war scenarios in which relative abilities to mobilize men and industry to sustain extended conflict (i.e., beyond 3–6 months) could be decisive. There may be some affordable hedges, beyond present levels of preparedness expenditures, which should be taken against the possibility of such protracted conflict.

—Third, US capacity to conduct standing-start all-out production of strategic offensive and defensive weapons depends on maintaining “warm” production capabilities. Projected US assembly line status is a key element here, as is Soviet capability for similar strategic mobilization.

—Fourth, the nation’s ability to recover from nuclear attack may be augmented by preparedness plans and programs, and such postwar reconstitution capability may act as a deterrent.

—Fifth, the nation may become involved in military operations following either a conventional war in Europe or a nuclear strike, which involve building or rebuilding a force structure larger than that presently programmed.

While current preparedness programs provide some capability for enhancing mobilization rates, the relative lack of emphasis on these programs by the United States and their somewhat unclear relationship to other aspects of current strategy imply that the United States will continue to have gaps in its mobilization capacity. A comprehensive review of overall preparedness requirements and alternative capabilities through the NSC process is necessary to complement our earlier analysis and decisions on a related issue, the Strategic and Critical Ma-
materials Stockpile (NSDM 337, August 1976). NSDM 337 provided policy guidance for stockpiling strategic raw materials for extended conflict scenarios. Complementary analysis of manpower and industrial mobilization should be accomplished to allow the development of alternative preparedness strategies.

VI. FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

The difficult choices on defense strategy must be considered in the context of Government-wide fiscal policy and the competing demands for tax policy reform and non-defense spending.

Fiscal Policy Assumptions

Anticipated economic performance critically affects the fiscal picture. The current Administration economic forecast for the 1978–82 period assumes a 5% average annual real growth rate in the economy. Inflation is assumed to remain at an average annual rate of 5% through 1979, declining to 2.5% in 1982. The unemployment rate is projected to drop to about 6.4% during FY 1979.

Two sensitivity checks were made on the current forecast:

—Private economic forecasts project a 4% average real growth rate and a 6% average inflation rate for 1977 and 1978. The net effect on receipts of the lower real growth and higher inflation compared to the current Administration forecast is minimal.

—The impact of a 6% average annual growth rate through 1979 with attendant higher inflation of 6% was also examined. The faster growth would increase 1979 receipts by over $30 billion, with little change in outlays.

Using the assumptions of “5% growth, 5% inflation” a 5-year Government fiscal projection was prepared which included current Presidential proposals to reduce taxes and non-defense programs and allowed for increases in real defense purchases from the 1977 program.

A summary of the projection follows:

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<td>472</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-66</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Document 99.
Defense, Non-Defense, Tax Receipts Options

Within the context of the President’s expressed intention to submit a balanced budget in 1979 and using the current economic forecast, a number of variants from the “base program” of outyear projections can be considered.

Defense Outlays

Cost Methodology. Within the compressed study schedule, inadequate time was available to develop detailed force changes and their cost implications fully supporting each alternative. All strategy cost estimates are based on notional force and modernization changes to the base program required to accomplish given general purpose and strategic force strategy alternatives. When uncertainty exists as to the specific force adjustments required to accomplish a given strategy, a range of force level changes were specified and cost estimates prepared for lower and upper bound totals. Funding was phased over the FY 1978–82 period based on the following ground rules: general purpose force reductions and increases were accomplished over this same time period; procurement adjustments were explicitly related to force changes and feasible production capabilities. Strategic force changes extend over a considerably longer time period. The principal impact of the funding changes associated with the general purpose force alternatives occurs in the 1978–82 period, while in the strategic force alternatives the maximum funding impact occurs in 1982.

DOD Baseline Program. A difference exists between DOD and OMB on the total 1978–82 resources required to fund the baseline DOD program. Both DOD and OMB agree on the major force levels included in the Five-Year Defense Program: 16 active divisions, 26 active Air Force wings, 3 active Marine division/wing teams, 12 carrier task groups, and strategic forces within current SALT limitations. The disagreement occurs in identifying the funding for modernization of these forces. The OMB outlay projection is essentially based on the approved 1977 budget after Congressional action plus 4% annual year growth on purchases in the outyears. The DOD outlay estimates, which are about $5 billion higher in FY 1978 and $10 billion higher in FY 1979 and the outyears, reflect recent 1976 Program Decision Memoranda changes in the rate of DOD modernization but do not include the effects of the ongoing budget review. Thus, the real differences between OMB and DOD funding projections are less than those cited above.

Assuming DOD/OMB baseline program differences will be resolved separately, the outlay impacts of the combined strategic and general purpose force (overall) strategies A through F can be consid-
tered as changes to this baseline. For funding purposes, Overall Strategy C is the baseline.

The incremental outlay impacts of the other notional strategies in 1979 and 1982 from the baseline program follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incremental Outlays ($ billions)</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Strategy A (S–4, G–1)</td>
<td>−8</td>
<td>−6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Strategy B (S–2, G–4)</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>−4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Strategy D (S–4, G–2)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Strategy E (S–3, G–3)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Strategy F (S–2, G–5)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Non-Defense Outlays**

The base program projection includes a series of proposed reforms and reductions to Federal domestic programs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incremental Outlays ($ billions)</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care programs</td>
<td>−8</td>
<td>−16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resource programs</td>
<td>−7</td>
<td>−6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans benefits programs</td>
<td>−3</td>
<td>−7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant programs</td>
<td>−4</td>
<td>−9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>−2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>−24</td>
<td>−40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These proposals would sharply reduce non-defense programs. Congress, in the past, has shown little enthusiasm for domestic program reductions, and legislative inaction has steadily eroded potential savings. The next Congress will also be reluctant to enact these proposals. Possible non-defense program reductions include:

—Restraints on programs providing benefits to individuals. Specific candidates include tighter limits on Medicare payments, a cap on future Social Security cost-of-living increases, elimination of the social services program, and assorted reductions in education, training, and veterans programs.

—Reductions in selected grant programs to state and local governments. Specific candidates include termination of the non-interstate highway programs, cutbacks in environmental protection and water
resource projects, and reductions in community development grant programs.

—Reductions in general Government operations. Specific candidates include elimination of the postal subsidy, Government-wide constraints on employment and pay increases, and cutbacks in foreign and domestic subsidy programs.

The dollar implications of these further non-defense reductions follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incremental Outlays</th>
<th>$ billions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit programs</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant programs</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government operations</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>-25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, within any given budget total, consideration could also be given to some increase in non-defense outlays above the base projection. If this approach were followed, the highest priority domestic spending increases would probably be to restore some of the base program reductions. Full restoration of these non-defense program reforms would increase 1979 outlays by $24 billion.

**Tax Receipts**

The base projection for receipts assumes that temporary provisions of the 1975 tax cut (which has already been extended four times and appears to be a well-established part of the tax structure) will become permanent and that deeper income tax reductions of $17 billion in 1979 proposed by the President will be enacted. If further tax reductions were considered desirable, total tax receipts could be held to the 1977 constant level of GNP, thereby reducing 1979 receipts by another $11 billion.

**1979 Fiscal Options**

Of the overall strategies identified in this paper only one, Overall Strategy A, has a significant impact on 1979 outlays. Overall Strategies B through F fall within a range of ±$1 billion in 1979 and minimally impact the anticipated 1979 deficit. Thus, two broad fiscal options can be identified to achieve the target of a 1979 balanced budget.

**Overall Strategy A**

Achieve the 1979 balance by an $8 billion reduction in defense plus a combination of tax increases and further reductions in non-defense
programs. Again, some or all of the $17 billion in “base program” tax reductions could be deferred. Further non-defense program reductions could range from $3–20 billion.

**Overall Strategies B Through F**

Achieve the 1979 balance by a combination of tax increases and further reductions in non-defense programs only. Some or all of the $17 billion in “base program” tax reductions could be deferred. Reductions in non-defense programs could range from $8–25 billion.

**VII. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY**

The study has identified a number of issues which require urgent attention. In certain of these areas, additional analysis should provide information of immediate utility in assessing in more detail this study’s notional strategies. Other issues identified are more subjective in nature, and continuing analysis is considered important. The following list is not exhaustive but does indicate major areas for follow-on work:

—Soviet objectives and intentions, including their concept of the interrelationship of strategic, theater nuclear, peripheral attack, and conventional forces.

—Relations with the Third World, focusing on the increasing US/allied dependence on overseas raw materials, particularly Persian Gulf oil, and the implications for military forces and strategic stockpiles.

—US and Soviet preparedness programs designed to increase combat staying power, enhance post-attack recovery, and facilitate capabilities for emergency expansion of strategic and general purpose forces.

—Determination of the force posture required to control escalation if deterrence fails.

—Target base growth, dispersal and hardening, and population targeting.


—Warsaw Pact sustaining capability and its impact on US/allied security planning.

—Requirements, including strategic mobility and power projection, for non-Soviet conflicts, presence, and crisis management.

—Role of our NATO and non-NATO allies in collective defense, including the role of security assistance.

—Theater nuclear policies and force posture for the 1980s.
114. Minutes of Defense Review Panel Meeting

Washington, November 30, 1976, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

NSSM 246

ATTENDANCE

OSD
Secretary Rumsfeld (Chairman)
Dr. James P. Wade

JCS
General Brown
General Smith

State
Under Secretary Robinson
Mr. Sonnenfeldt

CIA
Deputy Director Knoche
Admiral Bergin

ACDA
Deputy Director Lehman

NSC
General Scowcroft
General Boverie

OMB
Director Lynn

Major Jayne

Mr. Ogilvie

Rumsfeld: Brent, we should consider how the President would like to receive this report. I think we should try for an NSC meeting Thursday or Friday for the purpose only of briefing on 246 (not a decision meeting); Brent will get a time.2

Rumsfeld: We have to approve the study to go forth. Is there any objection to the paper as it now stands? Everyone is here but Jim Lynn.

Ogilvie: I have no objection myself, but I don’t know what Jim’s views are. Can we leave it open until he gets here?

Rumsfeld: Okay. Assuming no objections, we can transmit it today. I will give Brent the transmittal memo. Does anyone have any problem with the text of my cover memo? I, myself, am a little concerned about how poor the cost figures are. Maybe we need to emphasize that more.

Ogilvie: I agree. We need one more sentence on cost uncertainty.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 25, Meeting Minutes—Defense Review Panel. Secret. Brackets are in the original minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The meeting’s purpose, according to Boverie’s November 29 briefing memorandum to Scowcroft, was to review the NSSM 246 summary report (Document 113), which had been revised in light of comments made at the November 24 DRP meeting (Document 111) “The fundamental issue for the DRP” was if and how the revised paper was to be transmitted to the President, wrote Boverie, whose memorandum is ibid., Box 22, Defense Review Panel Meeting, 11/30/76—NSSM 246 (1).

2 An NSC meeting was held on December 2. See Document 115.
Brown: I think it needs one more sentence on cost uncertainty at the end.

Rumsfeld: We'll add a stronger sentence on the cost figures and how poor they are. The President should be cautioned as to what they are worth.

Scowcroft: [Referring to the “Issues for Decision” memo].³ There is not enough meat in the memo. It is insufficient—it doesn’t go far enough.

Rumsfeld: Why don’t you re-do it.

Scowcroft: Let’s just wait for now; we’ll get a reaction from the President.

Ogilvie: Trying to get agreement on issues now is impossible, but it doesn’t help the President. We know the implications of the alternatives (in the issues memo), but he doesn’t.

Rumsfeld: He (the President) can figure it out. We shouldn’t worry about it.

Brown: I think we should stop at the second paragraph; don’t list the options.

Rumsfeld: The President will have advice from all of us.

Robinson: I like the paper.

Rumsfeld: I think we’ve got some confusion between the cover memo and the issues memo. Let’s move now to the issues memo.

Scowcroft and Ogilvie: That’s the one we mean.

Rumsfeld: This is free play. Obviously, the President shouldn’t depend on 246 too heavily on some of those decisions regarding the budget, but 246 does have utility. I could go along with not having this memo.

Scowcroft: It is insufficient. I don’t know if we need it. The President will be briefed, and we will have two NSC meetings. I’m not sure those oral sessions won’t take the place of this issues memo. After that, we can gather these things together.

Lehman: Good idea.

Robinson: What are we really adding beyond a transmittal note?

Rumsfeld: The issues memo gives the President the range of his possible choices. It gives him perspective. That’s the value of this check list, an indication on how to think about utilizing the study. To get something more obviously wasn’t possible. I know the Working Group tried, but it just wasn’t there yet.

³ Attached to Boverie’s November 29 memorandum to Scowcroft, but not printed, is a decision memorandum drafted by the DRPWG. The DRPWG’s draft was not issued.
Scowcroft: I’d be inclined to wait.
Brown: I agree we should hold off on this.
Robinson: A better focused memo of this sort could come later.

[Lynn arrives]
Lynn: We do plan for an NSC meeting this week, don’t we? It is okay with me to forward the report now.

Rumsfeld: We’re discussing the issue of what kind of paper to attach—the consensus is that our draft is inadequate, so don’t send it.

Scowcroft: I suggested that for the second NSC, based on the President’s reactions at this week’s meeting, we could then, if appropriate, write a “pro and con” memo on issues for decision, giving agency positions.

Rumsfeld: I would envision a long memo, maybe 40 issues.
Scowcroft: Yes, maybe 15 pages, 40 issues.
Lynn: We need a helpful bridging document between 246\(^4\) and specific issues like M–X—a decision paper relating M–X to various alternative strategies, etc.

Scowcroft: You want a bridge to a budget. That’s different from what I see. I think there could be a number of other issues for decision too.

Lynn: He might as well address both strategy and budget issues together. Why doesn’t OMB do a draft of what we have in mind. It will link the budget to alternative strategies. We have not put into context the immediate implications of choosing a strategy.

Brown: Take M–X; what is the strategic implication of the 1978 budget level on that system? The real strategy issue involves the basing mode. You don’t get at that through the budget. You could foreclose an option through the budget, but you really leave many open.

Robinson: We at State see the budget issues as not really being critical to strategy.

Rumsfeld: Let’s have OMB do it; work with Aldridge and Wade on it.

Ogilvie: We could use some guidance from the DRP. We would see about four decisions: M–X, ships, civil defense, and sustainability, and reasonable people can argue on others.

Rumsfeld: The Navy shipbuilding issue should be decided on the basis of the Navy Study;\(^5\) after 246 has been briefed.
Lehman: I agree.

\(^4\) For NSSM 246, see Documents 102 and 113.
\(^5\) See Document 110.
Ogilvie: We can easily link 246 options to budget decisions. Do we want to go into other issues?

Lynn: The President may say that certain decisions are dependent on further studies.

Rumsfeld: But what else does he do beyond the budget? Some of the key issues are different, and are much harder than issues for further study.

Lynn: We’re really in the dark on the numbers, but the general guidance is clear. We need to know the President’s thinking, and ask him to work in some given direction, even if it’s tentative, so that we can keep our actions consistent with his general thrust.

Scowcroft: I don’t think those considerations require a firm decision on NSSM 246. The President doesn’t have to select a strategy to do that.

Lynn: But it’s tough to keep the broad stuff in mind as you go through specific issues. You need to pick a guide, a strategy.

Scowcroft: That still doesn’t require decision. We should not force him into an early decision on 246. He may not want to do anything.

Rumsfeld: I think we’ve covered everything. I’ll sign the transmittal memo, and Brent, you can just add a sentence at the bottom emphasizing the cost problem. Thank you all.

115. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Robinson) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

NSC Meeting Thursday, December 2—Review NSSM 246

An NSC meeting was held today, Thursday, December 2, to brief the President on the NSSM 246 study on our strategic and general pur-
pose force policies.\textsuperscript{2} DOD summarized the NSSM 246 report and the related report on Naval Force Requirements.\textsuperscript{3} Copies of these reports are attached.

Although the discussion was general in nature, Don Rumsfeld and Jim Lynn pushed for a presidential decision on the various strategy and force options. Rumsfeld made the point that this was important as a basis for the President to “articulate” a new defense posture even though it could only be implemented in part at this time.

I explained that the State Department viewed this as a worthwhile effort in defining some key issues and in the development of various alternatives; however, it should not serve as a basis for fundamental decisions on our defense posture. I also stressed that there had been no review of foreign policy issues as a basis for developing the strategic and force alternatives outlined in the NSSM 246 study. Furthermore, I indicated that if the President were to consider selection of strategy options and articulation of this decision as a new defense policy, it was essential that this should reflect prior consideration of the foreign policy implications of these options.

The President acknowledged the necessity for a prior analysis of foreign policy considerations but gave no indication as to whether he would opt for a new strategy decision as recommended by Rumsfeld and Lynn.

The question of Presidential choice of a strategy is tied also to four budget proposals that both Lynn and Rumsfeld, for different reasons, wish to settle in the context of a strategy change. The issues are: (1) the M–X missile; (2) civil defense; (3) sustaining capability in NATO forces; and (4) naval shipbuilding. Rumsfeld wants the President to articulate a more ambitious strategy as a way of defending his larger budget for the four programs; Lynn wants a strategy choice that permits cutting the budget back. Our own view is that the current strategy is consistent with a budget decision in either direction on these programs. The civil defense increase is only $30 million. The issue is not money, but what we say publicly about why we are spending it. The NATO sustaining capability (DOD wants to put more money into building up 90 days of supplies) reaffirms a long-standing NATO objective. The shipbuilding issue—whether we go ahead with another nuclear carrier—involves $4 billion, not a strategy departure. (It keeps the carrier inventory level for the next 20 years, but may restrict future choice on our naval posture.) Only the acceleration of M–X to a 1983 deployment date raises a potential strategic issue—how much and how fast do we build to a counter-

\textsuperscript{2} Document 113.
\textsuperscript{3} Document 110.
silo capability? But even here M–X is still an R&D program, not a firm commitment to procure and deploy.

Since the President will consider these programs on Saturday morning, perhaps with a strategy change in mind, it would be helpful if you could weigh in on both the budget (M–X is the most important) and on the wisdom of articulating a new strategy directly with the President. Talking Points are attached.4

4 Attached, but not printed. Ford held a lengthy meeting on Saturday, December 4 to discuss the FY 1978 budget. Kissinger, however, did not participate in the meeting, of which no record was found. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)

116. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger1


SUBJECT
NSSM 246

Chuck Robinson has already sent you a memo reporting the outcome of yesterday’s NSC meeting on NSSM 246 (Tab A).2 I supported the memo, but there are some additional points which need to be made.

As regards the NSSM itself, it has the trappings of analysis but is in fact a piece of advocacy for higher defense spending across-the-board, with the FYDP (which itself calls for increases) as a point of departure. Moreover, the competition between Lynn’s budgetary and Rumsfeld’s military concerns has been resolved in an unfortunate manner: (1) estimates of cost associated with particular options are, by all reports, unrealistically low; and (2) these estimates were used to drive the sizing of the force options associated with them, contrary to the usual procedure. For this reason, apparently, the JCS have resisted the NSSM, although they seem to have been mute at the NSC.3

2 Document 115.
3 CJCS Brown conveyed the Joint Chiefs’ position on the NSSM 246 report in a December 3 memorandum to Rumsfeld. The report “is responsive in broad terms to Presidential guidance and can be viewed as the basis for decisions of a broad, general nature.”
Discussion of the conceptual issues in the NSSM is of variable quality, starting from relatively good in the strategic section but dropping off sharply in other sections. There is, finally, a tendency for deficiencies of this sort to be carried forward and pyramided so that as one proceeds from the lower order issues and options up the scale to alternative concepts of basic national policy, the darkness increases.

As regards the MX issue, I think it is off the mark to worry about “signals” to the Soviet Union. As you know, I am comfortable with the existence of the program, precisely because it is a reminder to the Soviets of the prospects if they prove unwilling to address the problem of throw-weight disparity in SALT. I also have no ideological concerns about a limited acceleration of the MX program, provided it does not repeat history and allow engineering and budgetary considerations to get out in front of policy.

If you plan to talk to the President about this, I recommend that the focus of your argument not be on opposition to the MX as such, but on the need to ensure that a decision regarding the pace of the program not (1) prejudice the question of basing it in silos or on mobile launchers, and (2) not represent a de facto commitment to deploy the MX on a massive scale. The President should clearly understand that large scale deployment of the MX means that a relatively greater proportion of our throw-weight will be on ICBMs, and that if accelerating the MX leads to silo deployment for want of other methods, the result will be to greatly diminish the stability of strategic systems in both the United States and the Soviet Union during periods of crisis.

Brown wrote. However, “The section suggesting areas for follow-on study and the presence of unresolved issues and areas of uncertainty within the text of the response itself clearly indicate that significant additional effort is warranted before programming, budgeting, or policy decisions which affect current strategy, international agreements, or force posture are undertaken.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, 381)
117. **Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by the National Security Study Memorandum 244 Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group**


**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report responds to the NSSM 244 requirement to review US civil defense policy. It describes the current US civil defense program, offers alternative civil defense policies and programs, describes the Soviet civil defense program, and then assesses the potential impact on the strategic nuclear balance of the US and Soviet civil defense programs.

**Principal Issues**

The principal issues for decision addressed in the study are:

—What is the most appropriate US civil defense policy and what are the appropriate programs to support this policy?

—What should be the relationship between civil defense preparedness and natural disaster preparedness, including funding arrangements between the Federal Government and State and local governments?

Other major issues analyzed in the study are:

—What is the potential impact on the strategic balance of US and Soviet civil defense programs?

—What are the implications of US and Soviet civil defense programs for the concept of flexible response, as embodied in current US nuclear weapons employment policy (NSDM 242)?

—What should be the management arrangements within the US Government for civil defense programs and development of civil defense policy?

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1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, 384, 4 Dec. 76. Secret. Chairman of the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group Wade forwarded the summary to Holcomb under a covering memorandum, December 3. Holcomb forwarded it to Hyland under a covering memorandum, December 4, which noted that the group “was unable to reach consensus on interpretation of the strategic implications of civil defense and determination of the appropriate scope and level for the US civil defense program.” Wade’s and Holcomb’s memoranda are ibid. Under a December 7 covering memorandum, Davis forwarded the summary to SRG members for review prior to the group’s meeting on December 22. (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 45, NSSM 244 (1 of 3) (5))

2 Document 95.

3 Document 31.
Current U.S. Civil Defense Program

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 states that there shall be “a system of civil defense to protect life and property in the United States against attack”. However, the law does not specify the capability or level of readiness of that system.

The current US civil defense (CD) program focuses almost entirely on saving population in the event of nuclear attack. It does not include activities directed to the protection of industry, although authority for such activities is contained within the definition of “civil defense” as set forth in the Federal Civil Defense Act. (Nor does the current program include protection against chemical or biological attack.) The major elements of the current CD program are:

—Survey of fallout shelter spaces in existing buildings (buildings were marked with shelter signs until 1970);
—Plans for stocking of these shelter spaces with food and water (food stocks in current shelter spaces have become unfit for use);
—Maintenance of a national warning system;
—Development of local plans for use of best-available existing shelter;
—Development of State and local capabilities for conducting emergency operations (based on emergency plans for use of existing forces and resources, e.g., police and fire forces, physicians, hospitals, news media);
—Training and equipping of Radiological Defense Officers and Monitors to detect and analyze postattack radiation hazards; and
—Establishment of Emergency Operating Centers to:
  • Protect key State and local leaders and ensure the continuity of State and local government, and
  • Control civil defense operations.

There is incomplete coverage in virtually all of the above program areas, with consequent impact on program readiness. The program currently relies on crisis actions (“surging”) to develop or rebuild capabilities needed to protect the population. For example, if a large-scale attack occurred following an intense crisis of about one week, the current program could only add a few million survivors to the estimated 80 million who, because they would be outside the likely areas of attack, probably would survive a large-scale attack with no civil defense. It is estimated that at least one year of intensive effort (i.e., essentially one year of warning time) would be required for the current program to achieve its full potential of saving about 30 million additional people (about 110 million total survivors).

Efforts at developing the capability to relocate population from high risk areas during a crisis have recently begun; however, at the projected level of effort, nationwide planning is not expected to be completed until the mid-1980s, with an initial, low-confidence capability for crisis evacuation expected by about 1980.
Relationship of Civil Defense to National Survival and Recovery

The protection of population is only one element (albeit an important one) in a balanced program for enhancing national survival and recovery following a nuclear attack. Current US capabilities also include protection and dispersal of key Federal Government leaders (outside the formal CD program) and some State and local leaders. Other elements of a balanced program would include the protection of industry, and the protection of other economic operations that could contribute to postattack rehabilitation and eventual recovery.

In this context, the protection of industry may be important, but also may be very difficult to achieve. In order to better understand the requirements for and capability to protect industry, further studies are required. These studies should

—Determine various measures and definitions of national recovery;
—Provide a means of determining the effect which various population and industrial capability levels have on national recovery;
—Determine the content and cost of programs to achieve various national recovery goals and the Federal role in encouraging or supporting such programs.

Alternative Civil Defense Policies

Strategic Context. Under the current US strategic policy (as discussed in the Strategic Implications section on page 7), we rely on the capability of our strategic offensive forces to deter nuclear attack on the US and to assist in controlling escalation. As a consequence, the US civil defense program is essentially a hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation control.

The US could add to its current strategic objectives a requirement for defensive programs to provide an assured-level-of-US-survival. In the current situation, where the US has no ABM and minimal air defenses, the burden for meeting such a requirement would fall almost entirely on US civil defense. Alternatively, the US could change its strategic objectives to require both strategic offensive and defensive programs to provide an assured-level-of-US-survival, or comparable-to-Soviet recovery capability. Then force improvements could include improved counterforce capabilities as well as enhanced defensive measures, one of which could be civil defense. (The NSSM 246 study4 currently underway addresses these considerations.)

4 NSSM 246 and the study completed in response are Documents 102 and 113, respectively.
Alternative Policies. US civil defense should focus on what is most meaningful and effective for the United States, rather than reflecting the Soviet civil defense program:

—Major differences in roles and scope between the formal US and Soviet CD programs preclude a meaningful, simple comparison of the relative effort expended in these programs (such as the frequently cited comparison of the roughly $100 million US CD expenditure and the purported Soviet $1 billion CD expenditure, on an annual basis).
—The relative US and Soviet fatalities in any single scenario does not adequately reflect the vulnerability of the two populations to a nuclear attack because the number of casualties is scenario and demography dependent. Because of US concern for human life and because surviving population is an important dimension of post war recovery capability and national power, the number of US survivors added rather than a comparison with Soviet fatalities is the basis which should be used for measuring the effectiveness of US civil defense.

Viewed as a hedge or insurance policy against the possibility of nuclear war, the basic US civil defense policy issue is the extent to which the US should hedge against such a contingency. In this context, the inherent importance of population survival permits consideration of alternative civil defense policies for population protection, independent of overall US policy regarding national survival and post-attack recovery.

The important civil defense policy issues presented for decision relating to the protection of population are:

—Level of Survival: What level of US population survival should US civil defense seek to assure?
—Level of Readiness: Should US civil defense focus on in-being readiness or should it assume that there would be some period of time available (a week, a month, a year) for surging the civil defense system to full capacity?

Level of Survival. With respect to a decision on the level of US population survival, there are three representative approaches which could be taken:

1. Accept the level of survival (about one-third the US population, currently about 80 million people) which would result if there were essentially no Federal civil defense program. Under this approach, most of the Federal civil defense program would be discontinued; however, the ability to reconstitute the program, if required, would be maintained.
2. Maintain a moderate CD program for the protection of population (and continuity of State and local governments) as an insurance policy which enhances somewhat US population survival in the event of nuclear war. Under this approach, a comprehensive population protection program would be maintained, but the level of effort would only produce a moderate increase in total US survivors (e.g., to a level of about one-half the US population, currently about 110–120 million).
This would result from “in-place” protection of the population in the best available nearby shelter.

3. Seek to significantly enhance the overall level of US survivors (e.g., to a level of about three-fourths the US population, currently about 180–200 million) as part of a major effort to hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation control. This approach would presumably be part of a significant overall US effort to enhance national survival and postattack recovery.

**Level of Readiness.** In parallel with the decision on level of population survival, judgment is also required as to the warning time which will be assumed, since a particular level of population survival might be achieved through either:

—*In-being capability*, which could provide protection for in-place population given minutes of warning, using facilities and equipment bought in peacetime.

—*Surge capability*, which could provide crisis relocation, blast sheltering, or a combination of these, given adequate reaction time (a week, a month, a year), using plans made during peacetime. For these to be effective requires a decision early enough in the crisis to initiate CD buildup actions, and sufficient time to carry them out.

The appropriate programs which follow from the policy decisions outlined above are described below.

*Alternative Civil Defense Programs*

The study formulated alternative programs to respond to the policy decision with respect to level of population survival and warning time. The alternative programs and their respective costs are summarized in Table One on page 5a. Note that the program costs presented are only the costs to the Federal Government. The additional State and local costs would be in the range of $50–60 million for each of the options. It should also be noted that the costs and effectiveness associated with those options which seek to significantly enhance the level of US survivors through in-place blast shelter are particularly sensitive to uncertainties in projected Soviet strategic weapon programs and employment policies.

As Table One indicates, for any given level of population survival, programs which provide “in-being” capabilities ready to use with only minutes of warning are much more expensive than those which assume a week, a month, or a year of time in which to “surge” civil defense. On the other hand, the effectiveness of “surge” programs depends critically upon timely initiation of CD buildup actions (and acceptance of the political/economic impacts) and there being sufficient warning time prior to an attack to permit achieving planned capabilities.

The scenarios which were used for sizing the US CD program options were:
—Increased tension with threats (but no actual nuclear attack) in which at least days, to at most several months, of activity and political reaction time would be available for surging preplanned CD measures, followed by a full Soviet nuclear attack.
—Surprise full nuclear attack (i.e., only minutes of tactical warning in which only in-being capability would be effective.)

**ILLUSTRATIVE POPULATION PROTECTION PROGRAM OPTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF U.S. POPULATION SURVIVAL OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>OPTION THRUST</th>
<th>ANNUAL FEDERAL COST, IN $ MILLIONS (BASED ON A TEN-YEAR PERIOD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 1/3 Discontinue most Federal CD programs</td>
<td>Rely on capability of State and local governments</td>
<td>$ 10 M 10 10 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 1/2 Continue approximate current level of effort as a CD “Insurance Policy”</td>
<td>Mix of in-being fallout shelters and preparation for crisis surging</td>
<td>$375 M 135 100 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a 3/4 Significantly enhance CD capability</td>
<td>Above, plus crisis relocation planning</td>
<td>Not Possible 215 200 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b 3/4 Significantly enhance CD capability</td>
<td>Above, plus in-place blast shelters</td>
<td>$1800 M 435 425 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c 3/4+ Significantly enhance CD capability</td>
<td>Above, plus additional in-place blast shelters</td>
<td>$4500 M 500 485 400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scenario of a limited nuclear attack on the US (e.g., ICBM silos only, urban or military target demonstration, limited attack of selected industries such as petroleum or utilities) also was considered for use in sizing the US CD program elements. Formulating specific program elements tailored to such a limited attack scenario, however, appears to be unnecessary in that:
—Only a relatively modest incremental cost ($20M annually) would be required, above virtually any program for responding to a major Soviet attack, to enhance warning, evacuation capability and fallout protection in counterforce target areas.
—A program tailored to respond to Soviet limited nuclear options against selected military or industrial targets would have to be compa-
rable in scope to a nationwide program intended to respond to a major Soviet attack. The problem is that the Soviets can choose the location of the attack, and nuclear fallout resulting from such a limited attack would not be confined to the attack area.

The major use of the limited attack scenario would be in establishing priorities for completing CD planning efforts (e.g., crisis relocation planning) and in actually executing our CD measures in time of crisis, rather than in sizing the CD program elements.

*Soviet Union Civil Defense Program*

[2 lines not declassified]

The recent Interagency Intelligence Memorandum\(^5\) on Soviet civil defense upon which this response drew concluded that the Soviet program is more extensive and better developed than it appeared to be when the Intelligence Community last examined Soviet civil defense in 1971. While there were significant shifts in emphasis in the Soviet civil defense program during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the study did not reveal any major changes in direction since about 1971, nor did it suggest a crash program aimed toward any particular target date.

The formal Soviet CD is a broad program with preparations suggesting the following order of priority:

(1) assuring continuity of government and control by protecting the political and military leadership;
(2) providing for continuity of important economic operations by hardening facilities, protecting personnel, and other measures; and
(3) protecting nonessential personnel through sheltering or evacuation.

The Soviet CD program for the protection of population includes the following elements: a national warning system, plans for crisis evacuation of cities, blast and fallout shelters to protect government and military leaders, party cadre and essential workers, and fallout shelters for some unknown proportion of the general public. It also includes programs for industrial dispersal and hardening, and other measures more directly related to postattack recovery. While it is known that the Soviets are taking some actions with respect to all of these elements, evidence is currently lacking on the progress they are making in many of their preparations.

In the early 1970s, the Soviets consolidated the management of the entire civil defense program by placing it under military direction, with extensive military staffing. Furthermore, they have increased their efforts to provide hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership and they have modified to a degree their previous policy of

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\(^5\) Document 166.
mass evacuation of cities by placing somewhat greater emphasis on constructing hardened shelters within urban areas—a decision which they have attributed to concern that a nuclear attack could occur with little prior warning. Thus far the hardened shelter program for urban areas is primarily for the protection of personnel judged by the Soviets as essential, rather than for the protection of the general population.

The numbers of underground structures discovered in a partial survey of industrial facilities, and the wide range of locations and industries at which such structures have been found, indicate that preparations for industrial protection are more extensive than previously had been realized. However, the expansion of industries during the past 15 years into areas distant from previously existing urban centers has not significantly reduced the vulnerability of Soviet industry to nuclear attack. Although light industries are somewhat less concentrated, Soviet heavy industries remain for the most part in large urban areas.

The effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses would vary widely, depending on such circumstances as the size of the attack, weather conditions, and (most important) the period of warning prior to attack. Soviet planners would face major uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness of their civil defenses. [less than 1 line not declassified] the US Intelligence Community believes that under optimum conditions, which included a period of warning prior to an unrestrained US attack during which evacuation and other prescribed preparations were implemented, Soviet civil defense measures would: (1) assure survival of a large percentage of the leadership necessary to maintain control, (2) reduce prompt casualties among the urban population to a small percentage, and (3) give the Soviets a good chance of being able to distribute at least a subsistence level of supplies to the surviving population, although the economy as a whole probably would experience serious difficulties. Without adequate warning time to implement civil defense measures or in the event the Soviets chose not to implement civil defense measures, the Intelligence Community believes that a lesser number of Soviet leaders would survive and the Soviets would experience catastrophic human casualties and economic breakdown, and have difficulty in distributing subsistence level supplies to survivors.

Strategic Implications of Civil Defense

The US View. As indicated in the discussion of US civil defense policy alternatives, under current US strategic policy, the US civil defense program is essentially a hedge against the failure of deterrence and escalation control. As such, contrary to current declaratory policy, civil defense is not a significant factor in the current US deterrence posture.
Consistent with the above view, United States strategic policy is currently based on the premise that the Soviet Union will be deterred from attacking the US if the US maintains the capability to destroy those political, economic, and military resources critical to Soviet postwar power, influence and ability to recover at an early time as a major power. Inherent in our deterrence capability is the flexibility to respond to a wide spectrum of aggression with selected response options and the declaratory policy of the capability and willingness to do so. If deterrence fails, US strategy seeks to control escalation by flexible nuclear employment options. To the extent that escalation cannot be controlled, the US nuclear weapon employment policy (NUWEP) objective is to maximize the resultant political, economic, and military power of the United States in the postwar period, relative to the enemy. (Improved US survival capability could complement this employment objective.)

Under present US employment policy, enemy population is not targeted per se, and Soviet fatalities are not presently used by the US as a measure of our ability to deter Soviet attack. Thus, Soviet civil defense measures to protect the general population are not presently considered in assessing the viability of the US deterrent. Present employment policy appears to be adequate, since the manner in which it is implemented can be appropriately adjusted.

On the other hand, Soviet civil defense efforts with respect to the protection of industry and political leadership do impact on the US view of deterrence. On the basis of our present understanding, Soviet CD currently is believed to have little impact on the effectiveness of US retaliatory forces in accomplishing their mission. However, significant improvements to and expansion of the Soviet civil defense program could require changes in current US nuclear weapons employment and acquisition policy (e.g., increased numbers or yields of weapons or changes in targeting in order to maintain US destructive capability).

The purpose and effectiveness of Soviet civil defense efforts should not be addressed in isolation, but looked upon as one of several damage-limiting measures supporting a nuclear strategy which may be quite different from that of the US. On the one hand, the Soviet CD program is consistent with a damage-limiting doctrine. The extensive Soviet air defense efforts, size and extent of their counterforce strategic weapons programs and ABM research and development are also consistent with such a doctrine, and may point with their CD efforts toward a strong interest in a “war-winning” strategy (i.e., the assurance of a viable national society following a nuclear war, and rapid recovery to predominant power status). On the other hand, the Soviets did agree in 1972 to the ABM Treaty, which would appear to be inconsistent with a damage-limiting or war-winning strategy.
In consequence of the above, US policies should be continually assessed as we learn more about the actual Soviet civil defense program. Recently the public press has focused attention on the possibility of an imbalance in US-Soviet populations during a post-attack recovery period. At present, it is estimated that US casualties would be about 130 million and Soviet casualties about 80 million as a result of a bolt-out-of-the-blue-all-out exchange. An even greater imbalance would occur as a result of a protracted crisis situation wherein the Soviets were able to implement successfully their plans for evacuating and sheltering their urban population. If the US did not have a similar capability, then for the duration of the evacuation period, Soviet casualties could be limited to a small percent of their urban population whereas US casualties would be greater and the US might be placed at a strategic disadvantage. Upon termination of the city evacuation, however, Soviet vulnerability would go back to the previous level.

It has been suggested that the perception of a population imbalance in the post-attack recovery period might be employed by the Soviets as a lever in dealing with the US. A counter to this point of view is the argument that the Soviets cannot maximize surprise in an attack on the US as well as maximize their civil defense preparations. Evacuation of the Soviet urban population would undoubtedly cause all US strategic forces to be brought to full alert status, if they had not already been placed on full alert status as a result of the growing political crisis which might precede Soviet implementation of evacuation plans. If the US forces were surged for a few days, the number of strategic systems committed to US nuclear war plans would be substantially increased, thereby mitigating the effectiveness of Soviet CD efforts to limit damage from a US attack.

Nevertheless, perceptions of the likelihood of heavy casualties in the US could be politically significant, whether or not projections of Soviet losses were similar. The psychological impact of heavy losses could affect US decision-making at thresholds between non-use, limited employment, and full-scale employment of nuclear weapons. Further, surviving population is an important dimension of postwar recovery capability and national power.

The Soviet View. There remains a question as to how the Soviet leaders assess civil defense, in particular:

—The extent to which their own civil defense program will affect their willingness to attempt to coerce the US in time of crisis or initiate limited or major attacks against the US, particularly if the US has a considerably weaker CD program.

—How they would view various US civil defense programs.

A confident estimate cannot be made as to whether Soviet civil defense measures, together with other elements of Soviet military power,
would significantly affect Soviet willingness to attempt to coerce the US in time of crisis or otherwise take greater risks of confrontation.

The Soviets' overall assessment of their present civil defense against an unrestrained US nuclear attack probably is not highly optimistic. Even under the most favorable circumstances, the Soviets probably would have to expect a breakdown of the economy, and under the worst conditions, catastrophic human casualties as well. Nevertheless despite all the problems and uncertainties the Soviets probably believe that civil defense measures contribute to giving the USSR a chance to survive as a national entity and to be in a better position than the US following a nuclear exchange. They probably would expect their present civil defense to be able to protect some key civilian and military leaders and political and economic cadres, to reduce damage to economic facilities, to reduce casualties among the population, and to support the conduct of military operations.

There are differing interpretations of the purpose of Soviet CD efforts and the relationship of the Soviet CD program to the strategic balance. One view that the Soviet CD program should be considered as a Soviet hedge against nuclear war and will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange nor undermine the deterrent value of US strategic forces. An opposing view is that the Soviets are engaged in an effort to achieve a war fighting and war survival capability and that their intent is to erode US SIOP capabilities. This opinion holds that the Soviets will increasingly strive to enhance their international position by capitalizing on their war survival capabilities.

Those US CD alternatives which result in either no increase or a moderate increase in US population survival are unlikely to affect Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance. On the other hand, if US population protection is significantly enhanced through construction of blast shelters, US CD could contribute to Soviet perceptions of US development of a posture which could enhance a first-strike capability, although the nature of US strategic offensive programs would continue to dominate Soviet perceptions in this regard.

Management

The study addresses two major issues concerning civil defense management:

—Federal/State and local relationships (including funding), particularly as they pertain to the relationship of civil defense and natural disaster preparedness, and
—Federal organizational/functional arrangements.

**Federal/State and Local Relationships.** Current law specifies civil defense as a joint responsibility between the Federal Government and the States with their political subdivisions. Major elements of the program,
those which essentially have no use for other than attack preparedness, are fully Federally funded. The program management efforts of States and local government and some operational systems development features such as Emergency Operating Centers, local warning systems and limited emergency communications are supported by up to 50% Federal funding.

State and local governments determine the extent and nature of their involvement in civil defense programs. At present, they are primarily interested in natural disaster preparedness activities rather than in civil defense. As a consequence, a portion of civil defense resources have in recent years been used to support activities which are more related to natural as opposed to nuclear disaster preparedness. On the one hand, this tends to reduce civil defense effectiveness for any given level of funding. However, it also keeps the State and local governments interested in cooperating with the Federal Government on civil defense matters.

Analysis of the relationship between natural disaster preparedness and attack readiness is hampered by a lack of hard reliable data and a system capable of measuring civil defense output against alternative program inputs and the beneficial tradeoffs between various elements of the two programs. Based upon the best data available, however, the following generalizations can be made: There is a correlation between natural disaster and attack preparedness, to the extent that those States which have attained a higher level of natural disaster preparedness also tend to have attained a higher level of attack readiness. Nevertheless, natural disaster activities contribute to attack preparedness to only a limited extent. The latter requires a significantly more complex and comprehensive response potential than the former. Consequently, the expenditure of civil defense funds for natural disaster activities has limited objective utility for the achievement of attack readiness. Federal/State and local relationships in this environment essentially centers on determining how Federal civil defense resources can be managed to provide a maximum benefit for attack readiness while recognizing the conflicting priorities between the Federal Government on the one hand and State and local governments on the other.

Alternatives are:

1. Manage civil defense as an exclusively attack-oriented program entirely funded by the Federal Government. (Requires change in law.)
   - The principal advantage is that Federal priorities can be assured, both as to the program elements to be developed and the geographical location of their implementation.
   - The principal disadvantage is that it weakens State and local participation and involvement.
2. Manage civil defense as an exclusively attack-oriented program funded by a mix of 100% Federal funding and matching funds programs. (Conforms to current law and reaffirms FY 77 Presidential guidance.)

- The principal advantage is involvement of States and local governments, while maintaining Federal assurance of funding for certain high priority attack preparedness activities.
- The principal disadvantages are lack of assurance that the partially supported State and local effort will focus on high priority attack preparedness elements, and that voluntary participation will coincide with national priorities or requirements.

3. Manage civil defense as a predominantly attack-oriented program which permits Federal assistance to State and local natural disaster activities which benefit attack preparedness. (Relaxes FY 77 Presidential guidance to conform with FY 72–76 practice.)

- The principal advantages are a higher degree of participation and involvement by States and local governments.
- Disadvantages are a relatively lower degree of assurance of State and local focus on high priority attack preparedness elements, and pressures engendered for higher funding levels for elements with high natural disaster application but low attack preparedness value.

Selection from among these options will be highly dependent on the policy and program alternatives which are chosen. A high-cost, in-being civil defense capability tends to favor all Federal financing; while a limited cost, surge program tends to favor mixed Federal/State funding.

**Federal Organizational/Functional Arrangements.** Civil Defense program responsibilities are currently assigned to seven Federal departments and agencies. In addition, approximately 27 other Federal agencies are responsible for emergency preparedness functions which potentially impact upon the nation’s ability to sustain and survive an enemy attack. Despite this interrelationship, these programs are only loosely coordinated within the Federal Government. Furthermore, both DCPA and FDAA provide funds to State and/or local governments which are used for natural disaster preparedness activities.

These organizational/functional arrangements are perceived by some as constituting unnecessary fragmentation of essentially related functions because of:

—The lack of precision in and agreement concerning interpretation of Executive Orders which assign civil defense and other national emergency preparedness programs to various Federal departments and agencies;
—The assignment of policy guidance responsibilities to FPA and operational responsibilities to DCPA and
Centralized coordination of emergency responsibilities at the State and local level as compared to the essentially decentralized Federal approach.

Management action to improve integration of Federal preparedness programs, or at least clarify existing responsibilities and authorities, would potentially improve administration of civil defense as well as preparedness programs.

Management actions regarding the above have ramifications for programs beyond civil defense (such as industrial mobilization and resource management, continuity of government, post-attack recovery, and disaster relief) which have not been examined in detail in this study. Their impact on these areas should be determined before a final decision is made. There is general accord, however, that (as a minimum) there should be a thorough review and recodification of the Executive Orders concerning civil defense and other preparedness activities, to eliminate ambiguities and inconsistencies which exist in current documents.

Further Work

The ad hoc working group was unable to address some issues in detail, and believes that the following should be initiated:

—A comparative analysis study of the US and Soviet preparedness for survival and postwar recovery, to include the impact of CD on postwar recovery.

—Further analysis of the extent and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program, and sufficient support provided for the intelligence community to make Soviet civil defense a priority intelligence target.

—Review of Federal organizational/functional arrangements for the management and coordination of overall national preparedness programs.

—A review and recodification of Executive Orders concerning civil defense and other preparedness activities, to eliminate ambiguities and inconsistencies.
118. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Robinson)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

Request for Formal Agency Views on NSSM 244—US Civil Defense Policy\(^2\)

The NSC has requested formal State views on the recently completed US civil defense (CD) policy review study (NSSM 244) and the issues requiring decision addressed therein (Tab 1).\(^3\) An SRG meeting will be held in the near future to discuss the study.

**Background**

NSSM 244, issued 24 July 1976, directed a review of the civil defense policy established in 1972 by NSDM 184.\(^4\) NSDM 184 reflected a presidential decision to continue the CD program at roughly the same level of funding that then existed (approximately $80 million). Since 1973 the funding level has remained relatively constant, but in real terms has decreased by about 30%.

NSSM 244 called for a review of the cost and effectiveness of the existing program and development of a range of alternative policies and programs. Consideration was to be given to a variety of elements of CD, including the strategic evacuation of urban areas and the protection of key industrial installations.

**Current CD Program**

The existing US CD program is oriented toward population protection in the event of nuclear attack and relies on crisis actions, or surging, to provide the necessary facilities. It does not include protection of industry or other elements of the economy vital to post-war recovery, and the overall effectiveness of the program has declined in recent years (prepositioned food stocks are no longer fit for use, shelter marking has ceased, and evacuation plans are far from complete). It is estimated that with perhaps a week’s warning prior to a full-scale nu-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I Files, Lot File 80D212, NSSM 244. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Theodore E. Mathison (PM/IPS) on December 10. Cleared by PM/ISP and S/P. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. The date, December 13, is handwritten at the top of PM’s copy of the memorandum. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) NSSM 244 and the response to it are Documents 95 and 117, respectively.

\(^3\) Davis’ memorandum of December 7 is attached, but not printed. See footnote 1, Document 117.

\(^4\) See footnote 3, Document 92.
clear attack, the current program would add only a few million survivors to the 80 million expected to survive without any CD measures. A year of intensive effort (with increased funding and personnel) under the existing program would probably result in a maximum of about 110 million US survivors.

**Issues**

The key issues addressed by the NSSM are the level of protection desired for the US population and how this can best be obtained, the significance of Soviet CD programs and the relationship between Federal, State and local governments for CD.

Population protection can be achieved in one of two ways: the provision of in-being shelters and facilities; or by surging to identify and prepare the necessary facilities. The first approach, while requiring little or no warning time, is obviously more costly. The second method, surging, is less expensive but necessitates an adequate period of warning to be effective. At Tab 2 the five alternative approaches suggested by the study for protecting various levels of population. The tentative costs are shown for both in-being and surge options. The report does not recommend adoption of a specific alternative and notes that additional study is needed to determine post-war recovery requirements.

The significance of the Soviet CD program and its effect on the strategic balance was a subject of debate throughout the study. According to intelligence estimates, the Soviet CD program is somewhat more advanced than that of the US. It does not, however, appear to be a crash effort, but rather the result of decisions taken in the 1960’s and early 1970’s to upgrade the protection afforded to key leaders, industry and the general population.

Several agencies (the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) and the Service intelligence agencies) believe that the Soviets have embarked upon a program to achieve a war fighting and war survival capability that will erode the US strategic deterrent. They hold that this may require the US to change both its weapons procurement plans and its targeting policy (set forth in NSDM 242) which calls for targeting military and industrial targets but not population, per se.

The final report (Executive Summary), prepared by the Interagency Working Group, and subsequently revised by the NSSM 244 Ad Hoc Review Group, reflects the position that, while the Soviet CD effort may pose a problem in the future, it is not now destabilizing and that

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5 Attached, but not printed.

6 Document 31.
more information is needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn. The report also suggests that US CD policy and programs be based on what is best for the US rather than on what the Soviets are doing in civil defense. We support this view. However, several agencies are expected to push the position in the SRG meeting that Soviet CD efforts adversely affect the strategic balance and are destabilizing. 

Views on Decision Issues

Our view on the direction of US CD efforts is that we should not make a major shift in policy until more is known about the comparative capabilities of the US and Soviet Union for survival and post-war recovery. To this end, we believe it important that the analyses of survival and recovery capabilities, and of the extent and effectiveness of the Soviet CD program, as recommended by the study, be initiated without delay. In the interim, continuation of the US CD program at roughly the level of funding required for a modest surge capability (one month warning time; see Alternative 2, Tab 2) appears prudent. This would closely approximate the funding that DOD has indicated will be requested for FY 78.

In addition, we think it imperative that no attempt be made at this time to revise US nuclear targeting and weapons procurement policies lest we jeopardize US-Soviet stability.

We have not taken a position on the Federal-State and local management issue of CD, in that it is not of major concern to the Department.

Recommendation:

That you approve the transmission of the response at Tab 37 to the NSC.8

7 Borg’s December 13 memorandum to Scowcroft conveying the Department’s views is attached, but not printed.

8 Robinson initialed his approval on December 13.
SUBJECT

Military Assistance Advisory Groups

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAGs by September 30, 1976. In addition, the Act requires specific Congressional authorization for MAAGs existing after September 30, 1977. In response to this requirement, an NSC review of the worldwide requirement for the continuation of MAAGs was initiated. At this time, the required reduction for FY 1977 has been made, and the study on MAAG requirements has been completed. The study contains two options for MAAG presence after September 30, 1977.

Both options recommend that security assistance functions be performed:

—by Foreign Service Officers in countries with the very smallest programs;
—by Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) in countries where programs are small but require occasional in-country military expertise;
—by three-person Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs—which do not require specific Congressional approval) in countries with small programs which nonetheless require full-time attention;
—by Congressionally-approved, MAAG-type organizations (Defense Field Offices (DEFOs) or Military Groups) in countries with large programs and where U.S. foreign policy interests necessitate a group of more than three members of the U.S. armed forces.

In addition, both options recommend that the law (which now prohibits use of DAOs in a security assistance role) be amended to allow DAOs to perform this function.

Beyond these broad areas of agreement, there are differing positions on the number of MAAG-type organizations to be retained, the

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 68, NSDM 342. Secret. Sent for action. A note at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.” Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Robert B. Plowden, Jr. of the NSC Staff sent it to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, December 10, with the recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 3, Document 103.

3 NSSM 243 and the study completed in response to it are Documents 85 and 103, respectively.
manning levels needed in various countries, and the costs involved to support the recommended positions. A summary of the key features of the two options is at Tab C.

State/Defense Option

The State/Defense option recommends that 34 MAAG-type organizations be proposed to the Congress for FY 1978. Although this represents no reduction in the number of organizations from the FY 1977 level, the option does reflect significant manpower and cost savings. State and Defense believe the resulting structure permits efficient management of our security assistance programs, and retains sufficient flexibility to meet intelligence and diplomatic responsibilities.

Twenty of the organizations proposed for retention would be redesignated Defense Field Offices and both the size and function of each office would be reduced. The remaining 14 organizations are the traditional military groups in Latin America, many of them going back to World War II days. State and Defense propose that these offices continue to operate as they have, in a primarily representational capacity, with security assistance functions performed as a collateral duty. This traditional representative role has fostered interservice ties and closer relations between the host country military and the United States, and State and Defense believe the resulting relationship has made, and should continue to make, a significant contribution to U.S. policy interests in these countries. Therefore, they propose that specific legislation be sought to retain all 14 offices, although many would be reduced in size.

State and Defense also believe that the current ceiling of three military personnel who may be assigned to chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions for security assistance tasks without further congressional approval is too restrictive and inflexible. They propose that authority be sought to increase this number to six, where there is a clear need to do so. If accepted by Congress, this proposal would reduce the number of MAAGs requiring specific congressional approval by eight, leaving 26 MAAG-type organizations in FY 1978, six of which would be in Latin America.

OMB Option

OMB proposes to reduce the number of MAAG-type organizations to 20 in FY 1978, continuing them only where (1) major security assistance programs exist, (2) U.S. forces are present and a repre-
sentational function is required for the MAAGs, or (3) major U.S. foreign policy interests would be significantly damaged by elimination. The remainder of the countries would be served by Offices of Defense Cooperation with up to three military personnel, or existing DAO arrangements.

OMB's alternative is based on the following considerations:

- The original mission of the MAAGs was heavily oriented toward implementation of the grant materiel program and field level training and advisory functions, which have become less relevant, given the shift in our military assistance program from grants to sales.
- The need for a military-to-military representational function for MAAGs has decreased because foreign governments rely more on direct contacts with Washington concerning sales cases and training programs.
- Because of the congressional requirement to terminate MAAGs except where specifically authorized, requesting continuation of virtually all the existing MAAGs carries the risk that the Congress will take arbitrary actions restricting the Administration's flexibility and effective management of the security assistance and sales programs.

OMB's option would eliminate a number of small MAAGs and several Latin American MILGROUPs, which State and Defense propose to retain. OMB believes that ODCs of three military personnel, augmented where necessary by additional civilians and periodic visits by mobile training teams, can adequately perform the necessary in-country security assistance functions.

I believe the State/Defense option will satisfy the congressional desire to phase down the worldwide MAAG presence, while avoiding the repercussions which could result from OMB's sharper cuts. In addition, bearing in mind that a proposal similar to this must be made to Congress each year, the State/Defense option leaves considerably greater flexibility for subsequent years.

Recommendations

That you authorize me to issue the NSDM at Tab A,\(^5\) establishing organizations to perform security assistance functions according to the State/Defense option. (ACDA and CIA concur)\(^6\)

Alternatively, that you authorize me to issue the NSDM at Tab B,\(^7\) establishing organizations to perform security assistance functions according to the OMB option.\(^8\)

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\(^{5}\) Tab A, as signed, is Document 122.

\(^{6}\) Ford initialed his approval.

\(^{7}\) Attached but not printed.

\(^{8}\) Ford disapproved this option.
### PROPOSED MAAG PRESENCE—FY 1978

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<td>Number of MAAG-type Organizations Proposed for Retention</td>
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<td>34(^{10})</td>
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<td>Military Personnel Required</td>
<td>1455</td>
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<td>791</td>
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<td>Cost of Military Assistance Organizations (millions of dollars)</td>
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<td>56.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
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\(^{9}\) No classification markings appear on the tables.

\(^{10}\) This number would decrease to 26 if the proposed six-person security assistance organizations are accepted by Congress. [Footnote in the original.]
## MAAG-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS

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11 Will not require specific congressional authorization if proposed six-person security assistance organizations are approved. [Footnote in the original. The same footnote appeared in the “State/Defense” column next to the following countries: Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Iran, and Tunisia.]
Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Washington, December 15, 1976, 3–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSSM 246—U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture

PRINCIPALS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Director, Office of Management and Budget, James T. Lynn
Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Lehman
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Enno Knoche
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

OTHER ATTENDEES

White House
Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Defense
Deputy Secretary William Clements
Dr. James P. Wade (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs)

NSC Staff
Brig Gen Richard T. Boverie

President Ford: I’ve looked at the NSSM 246 study. It is obviously a very well done effort, particularly in view of the time pressures. It has been helpful to me, and should be helpful to the next Administration. I’ve looked at the various alternatives. Don, [Rumsfeld] should we start with the six overall strategies, or perhaps go first with strategic forces and then general purpose forces?

Secretary Rumsfeld: We have the strategies on the boards here today. We could start with the strategic forces and then discuss them; then turn to the general purpose forces. Or we could take them together at one time and then have our discussions.

President Ford: Let’s start with strategic forces, then see if we can turn to the general purpose forces.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 86, National Security Council, Meetings, NSC, Feb.–Dec. 1976. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room.

2 See Documents 105 and 113.
Mr. Hyland: The boards that are up there now show the overall strategies.

Secretary Rumsfeld: That presumes that we have worked our way through the strategic forces and general purpose forces issues and strategies.

Dr. Wade: (Briefing from the boards on overall strategies.) These overall strategies are notional in character. They are examples only, and they are not the only variations which are possible. (Typed copies of the charts are at Tab A of these minutes.)  

Option A assumes that the major buildup of strategic forces by the Soviets compels the U.S. to improve its strategic force posture substantially and rapidly. With respect to general purpose forces, this strategy accepts greater risks, and frees resources for strengthening U.S. strategic forces.

President Ford: Do the figures there mean that we would save from $3 billion to $10 billion?

Dr. Wade: Yes.

Director Lynn: Over what period of time?

Secretary Rumsfeld: These are average annual costs over a period of five to ten years, but they are inaccurate and soft, and they work off a higher base than that recently approved by the President.

Director Lynn: The only things we should really pay attention to are the plus and minus signs.

Secretary Kissinger: Is the base the same for all alternatives?

Director Lynn: Yes.

President Ford: But all are related dollar-wise to one another.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Right.

Dr. Wade: Alternative B assumes that the priority near-term problem confronting U.S. security interests is the buildup of Soviet forces for possible attack in Europe. It also assumes that the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities can be met with acceptable risk by a slower rate of modernization in our strategic forces.

Alternative C is basically the current DOD program as expressed in the latest FYDP (Five Year Defense Plan).

Secretary Kissinger: What is the theory behind each of these alternatives?

Dr. Wade: Alternative A assumes that priority must be given to countering the Soviet strategic buildup. It also assumes a short war in Europe.

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3 A chart entitled “Overall Strategies” is attached, but not printed.
Secretary Kissinger: What does it do that we are not doing now?

Secretary Rumsfeld: In this alternative, we would have to stop doing some things we are doing now.

Secretary Kissinger: What about in the strategic forces area?

Dr. Wade: It would accelerate the modernization program. It would bring M–X in in 1984. We would move faster on TRIDENT II. There would be a significant improvement in our counter-silo capability. And we would have improved civil defense and air defense.

General Scowcroft: And basically it would give us a full counter-silo capability.

Dr. Wade: You have some hand-outs in front of you which will help as we go through the strategies. (A copy of the hand-out is at Tab B1 of these minutes.)

Alternative D assumes that our conventional strategy is adequate, but that we have to do something about the Soviet strategic forces buildup.

President Ford: What about our supply of stocks in Europe for 90 days?

Dr. Wade: Our plan is for 90 days but we are not there yet. The Allies are around 30 days.

Secretary Kissinger: Under strategic strategy S–4, you talk about military advantage. What is this?

Dr. Wade: That at any level of determination, if war breaks out, we would insure that there would not be a Soviet military advantage.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Henry, each term is explained in the NSSM 246 report. This one is on page 24.5

Secretary Kissinger: I still don’t know what it means.

General Scowcroft: It is hard to say in realistic terms.

Secretary Kissinger: What about in terms of the SIOP?

General Brown: This was a hurried study, and there are no hard numbers.

President Ford: It assumes that if we have more, we are better off.

Secretary Kissinger: If we choose Alternative A, but this is certainly not the DOD preference, nor mine. Unless we can establish overwhelming military advantages in strategic forces, we are asking for it in Alternative A. Option A would magnify every problem we have.

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4 Not found attached.

5 Page 24 of the response to NSSM 246, Document 113, discusses three criteria for achieving deterrence: maintaining the capability for postwar recovery retaliation, for military gain denial, or for postwar political-military advantage.
Dr. Wade: In Option E, we would have a moderately increased strategic emphasis, today’s strategy for Europe, and increased worldwide capabilities.

For Option F, we have increased emphasis on strategic deterrence, increased capability in Europe, and today’s capabilities worldwide.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Just to refresh your memory, we first analyzed the strategic forces. We came up with about eight key issues, each of which could be addressed in two or three different ways. Then we combined these issues in various ways to give us alternative strategies for our strategic forces. Then we did the same thing with general purpose forces. The important thing is not whether we are talking about Option “S” or Option “G,” but the issues.

President Ford: On the chart for Option C, you refer to “current defense policy.” Please relate that to Option E, for example. What is the corresponding line for Option C? Is it consistent with the Navy ship building study?6

Secretary Rumsfeld: We looked at various alternatives for sustaining capability in Europe such as 30 days, 90 days, and so forth and we considered other such factors.

Secretary Kissinger: How was it computed? By German standards? When we say we have 90 days capability, they say we have 50 days. Conversely, using our standards for computation, their 30 days is really 60 days.

General Brown: We are a long way from solving that problem. It is a national problem.

Secretary Kissinger: But what way is it computed? Does Haig know what he has got?

General Brown: Yes.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Henry, I don’t care how we compute it. We simply don’t have it over there.

Secretary Rumsfeld: No. Plus the Middle East has changed our estimates for attrition rates.

Secretary Kissinger: This leaves us with other problems. We will be driven by the lowest days of the critical item.

Deputy Secretary Clements: There are several of those critical items, not just one.

General Brown: This is no secret. It is well known. We took it into account in the FY 78 budget for the first time.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Never before did we have a program to get well. This time we have such a program.

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6 Document 110.
Deputy Secretary Clements: At least now we are talking about it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: If we don’t get well, it lowers the nuclear threshold.

Dr. Lehman: The Soviet figures don’t look that good either. Their situation is not better.

General Brown: Our knowledge of their situation is limited. It relates to how we estimate they fill up their buildings. The estimates are pretty soft in many areas.

Secretary Rumsfeld: This forces the Services to continue to reassess the situation.

Secretary Kissinger: I am strongly in favor of that.

Vice President Rockefeller: Mr. President, let me ask two questions, please. Were these plans developed with a budgetary ceiling in mind?

President Ford: No.

Vice President Rockefeller: Then why don’t we have an Option G where all three areas (strategic, Europe, worldwide) are improved.

General Scowcroft: You are right. It stops at Option F.

Vice President Rockefeller: [less than 1 line not declassified] That is bad.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Not if you take Option E.

General Scowcroft: You have no option that improves strategic forces, Europe, and worldwide.

Vice President Rockefeller: That is why we need an Option G.

Secretary Rumsfeld: What we should do is look at the issues. Why don’t we take a look at the issues?

Vice President Rockefeller: I didn’t make up the charts.

Secretary Rumsfeld: An interagency group prepared the charts.

Vice President Rockefeller: Why don’t we have an option for improvements in all three areas?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Maybe there should be one. We don’t have to take any of these options that are shown on the chart. We can take a look at the issues, and then come up with the strategy we think is best.

Vice President Rockefeller: Then why are we doing it this way?

Secretary Rumsfeld: There are an infinite number of combinations possible. These are only illustrative.

Vice President Rockefeller: But none of them includes all three areas for improvements.

Director Lynn: With respect to today’s policy, I think we are moving from S–2 to S–3 for strategic forces. For general purpose forces,
this assumes we are trying to do better in Europe with our stockpile and the like.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The current general purpose forces strategy is G–2.

Director Lynn: That has the United States at 90 days sustainability and the Allies at 30 days.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the rationale for that?

Director Lynn: The Allies don’t get it up there.

Vice President Rockefeller: The plan today is inadequate, based on the analysis in the report.

President Ford: Nelson, we had a drawdown in Vietnam. We had a drawdown for the Yom Kippur War. We have had Congressional cuts in the budget over 10 years. It is very easy to say “let’s turn the switch on and get it right,” but where are we going to get the money? We have problems with inflation and taxes. It’s great to go for all of it, but god-damn it, we can’t do everything. We should show these charts to Mr. Carter, with all his talk.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The strategies are for illustration only. The way it ought to be done is as follows. Let’s take one of each of the strategic and general purpose options and modify them. Let’s keep the differences in mind. We have to think about what we have now, what policy we have in mind, and what budget plan is necessary for that guidance.

Vice President Rockefeller: But somebody thinks that each of these options is right.

General Scowcroft: But we didn’t put up the minimal option either.

Vice President Rockefeller: The poor President of the United States is responsible for the defense of the country.

Secretary Kissinger: The question isn’t what the human mind can conceive. First, the problem is with the Soviet strategic buildup. The second point is that it is unlikely for us to be able to develop a decisive military superiority in strategic forces, of the kind we had in the 1950s. Third, we should not permit perceptual discrepancies; we have to consider what drives the political and perceptual problems. These considerations could lead us to an unspecified increase in strategic forces.

Next, the overwhelming strategic problem we will face over the next 10 years is the Soviet capability for regional attack—in Europe and elsewhere. And we have to consider what the U.S. position would be with respect to peripheral attack.

Therefore, we should have a strategy to augment our strategic forces, plus what is needed for worldwide capability, plus we have
the special problem of Europe since it has a more explicit nuclear threshold.

For example, what if the Soviets put four divisions in Damascus in a Middle East war, or in Iran, or real forces in Africa. That is the real problem.

Secretary Rumsfeld: That is what the Pentagon has concluded and what the Vice President is saying. I think we should go with strategy S–3 with some elements of S–4, and strategy G–3 with elements of G–4 or G–5. This includes worldwide capabilities. We would not add troops to Europe, but we would put stocks in, and there would be increases in the strategic area.

Now the debate is about what pieces to add in. We have discussed most of the issues except for civil defense. For civil defense, I think we should go from something which is practically non-existent to some better planning. We have no base for civil defense plans, and I am not talking about going back to bomb shelters.

Vice President Rockefeller: There is nothing wrong with bomb shelters.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You’re for bomb shelters? (Laughter)

Vice President Rockefeller: I just built one at my home.

General Brown: We can pick and choose through the charts. As for the JCS, we come out somewhere between three and five in each case.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Then we have to determine what pace to do it.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we have the Vice President’s question. We have no budgetary figures for the Defense preference. If it’s from three to five, then the budget would go up.

Secretary Rumsfeld: This is not a budget exercise.

Vice President Rockefeller: And explain what the reasons are.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We have another question, Mr. President. Mechanically, given the electoral situation, we must determine physically how to handle the study. Would you want to speak to it? Hand it off? Pursue it further?
President Ford: I’m reminded of the first debate in the House I attended in 1950. The Administration was cutting back on defense following the post-war period. Carl Vincent\(^7\) took up the cudgel for DOD. But George Mahon gave a speech in which he used the following analogy. He said he was for defense. His record for 1950 was good on this. But then he took his son to the Smithsonian. He came to a man in armor surrounded by a coat of iron. His son bumped into it, and it toppled over. His son asked him why it toppled over. And George replied, “Because it had no bone and muscle inside.”

My point is this. The country can put a coat of iron around it, but if it has no economy and will, it is no good. Sometimes I think we want to put a coat of iron and steel around us, and let the economy go to hell. The country would not be worth a damn internally.

We must take a rational view to meet the challenge militarily. This has been a damn good exercise, but we must be realistic. I’m a little fed up when I see what we try to do but see what the next generation will be doing. We cannot go through an unrealistic exercise. Let’s see what is reasonable and go from there.

Vice President Rockefeller: Mr. Carter wants to spend $10 billion on public works; if we want to spend it on the military, I think it would be just as good.

President Ford: That is why I vetoed the public works program. I see none of his solutions aimed at military strength. Jobs, cities, public works—but not one penny for defense of the United States.

Secretary Rumsfeld: As Mr. Carter was leaving the Pentagon after his briefing, someone asked him whether he still intended to cut the Defense budget. He said yes.

General Brown: That’s not exactly what he said. He said: “I’ve seen something about the Soviet forces but I’ve not yet seen the U.S. forces.”

President Ford: He is as inaccurate as I know, but we must be realistic. If we do not have a healthy economy, we can’t do anything.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The Mahon analogy would fit if the case were that the present burden of defense on society is dangerous. But this is not the case. Defense is the lowest percentage of the federal budget and the gross national product in many years. This goes to macroeconomics. Does an incremental increase of defense spending of X percent do damage to the economy? No! I believe that. Of course, Mr. President, you could find some economist somewhere who takes the other side. But I say there is no danger of damaging the economy.

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\(^7\) Carl Vinson served as a Democratic Representative from Georgia from 1914 to 1965 and chaired the House Committee on Armed Services during the 81st, 82nd, and 84th through 88th Congresses.
President Ford: In keeping programs the way they are.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, sir. You must begin with the fact that the United States is not an economic enterprise. The first function of government is freedom and security of our people. Therefore, it is not a question of what spending level we should have, but what is the right policy or strategy.

I got in this debate in Europe with some of the people after the meeting. They say they can’t afford increased defense. But that is false. Look at Israel; look at the United States in World War II. It is a matter of priorities.

General Scowcroft: But we have to ask what is politically sustainable year after year after year. We either do that or we have to get into a frenzy with the threat.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Where are we in a frenzy with the threat?

General Scowcroft: Look at Vietnam.

General Brown: And in the late 50s when we talked about the missile threat.

Director Lynn: I don’t really see a lot of changes from the overall strategies vice what we determined in the study in 1969. We are looking at how many days we should provide for sustainability in Europe and issues such as this. These should be identified and we are doing this. We have to look closely at the idea of fighting for 90 days in light of attrition rates, prepositioning, and the like.

Secretary Kissinger: Particularly when we put our prepositioned stocks all in one depot to save money.

Secretary Rumsfeld: General Haig is working his can off to fix this.

Director Lynn: There are very few things we want to change. We must consider non-exclusive reliance on sea lanes, given the vulnerabilities of sea lanes. We are moving that way. If I can convince Congress to slow down domestic programs, we ought to also be able to make our case for defense.

The strategy should be, Mr. President: (1) Address the problem hard in the State of the Union Address. Put out a very strong signal. (2) We should address it in the Defense Posture Statement, that we are moving to strategy S–3. I wouldn’t go to S–4, though, if someone paid me.

President Ford: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Director Lynn: Third, we could prepare a draft NSDM. You would not have to sign it; just give it to Mr. Carter. He can then compare his

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References to the NSSM 3 study and the decision memorandum that resulted from it, NSDM 27. See footnote 2, Document 66 and footnote 3, Document 21, respectively.
ideas against that sheet. The turnaround you have made over the past two years has been remarkable. To keep it going, discipline on domestic programs must be imposed.

And then we can do some other things. For example, with Japan, there is some room for ASW and air defense improvements on their part.

Secretary Rumsfeld: And even economic aid in the region.

Director Lynn: This is confusing. Current defense policy has words such as “increased,” “improved.” We are now moving to S–3, now moving to counter-silo capability.

General Scowcroft: A partial counter-silo capability.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. A limited counter-silo capability.

Director Lynn: I am not that sure that Henry would want to signal this. I hope the M–X program we have is good enough for the signals we want this year.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I presume Henry’s views are in the study since the State Department has been involved throughout the entire process.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no quarrel with the study.

Secretary Rumsfeld: A draft NSDM is being prepared. I can give it to Brent.

General Scowcroft: I am not sure I wouldn’t sign it.

Vice President Rockefeller: When the General says sign, that is good. Also, you can give a strong signal and sign the NSDM. You can say these are the details. These are the essential things to say to the American people. If you, Mr. President, pull back, he’ll pull back from that. We should plant the flag on a field where it is sound and right.

Secretary Kissinger: The most important thing is to explain this to the American people. You can do this, Mr. President, in a valedictory occasion, such as the State of the Union Address. You can say that we have been focusing on the long-term problems over 15 years, so it doesn’t look like you’ve neglected anything.

Basically, in the 1960s we stopped all strategic programs, so we gave the Soviets an opportunity to get ahead. It wasn’t until SALT ONE that we did something about it. And about four years ago we got our force programs moving again. These programs are just now coming into the force.

Also, we can talk about Vietnam, how we had to draw down the stockpiles to support the war in Vietnam.

However, this has not been the result of a sudden Soviet buildup. They have been building up at a steady pace year after year.
Also, we should worry about the way we allocate our money. We spend a disproportionate large amount for personnel.

However, it has not been a sudden Soviet buildup, but a steady buildup. You were the first President who has had a chance to meet this. We would not just want to be sticking the new Administration, but making sure that there is not a chance that they could say that you failed.

In 15 or 20 minutes of your speech, you could say this, and how you would conduct our defense policy. There should be both some theory and some numbers in the speech.

President Ford: I think that is a good approach. My comments were aimed at trying to get well yesterday, and feeling we haven’t done the job. We have done the job! What worries me is that they say they will do a better job with less money. That simply is not possible.

Secretary Kissinger: We would want to put the necessity in terms of forces, not dollars. We could talk about the need for forces for intervention. Then, if stated conceptually, it would be much harder for him to cut.

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is an advantage in stating it that way. Then we could add the next comment: They can cut, but we will slip. This is exactly what happened in Vietnam, and with the Congressional budget cuts.

The President is left with the tools from his predecessors. If Carter makes the cuts of the kind he is talking about, he will compound the problem and we will not get well from the Vietnam and Congressional cuts.

Secretary Kissinger: You can put this before the American people. You can talk about the problems you see over the next 10 years. You have had a tremendous record over the past two years.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. And only if his record is sustained in the future will things be right.

President Ford: Let’s take a look at Strategy E. It talks about a moderately increased strategic emphasis. Haven’t we done that?

General Brown: Yes!

Secretary Rumsfeld: Except for civil defense.

President Ford: I don’t like the idea of bomb shelters in backyards. It reminds me of the time I was in Michigan and some shyster salesman tried to sell me one. It was a bunch of crap.

Vice President Rockefeller: The salesman must have been from New York. (Laughter)

President Ford: I am down on civil defense—not one penny for it. Forget it!
Secretary Rumsfeld: Then you are for S–3 minus civil defense, if I understand you correctly.

President Ford: Amen. Cross civil defense out. We are going ahead strongly with F–15s, F–16s, and A–10s. We are improving our capabilities.

Secretary Kissinger: If General Brown would like to give me a going away present, he can give the F–15 a nuclear capability.

President Ford: We are doing everything we can in Europe. We are going to fix up our stockpiles over a six year period. We are increasing our worldwide capability. Look what we are doing with the ship-building program.

General Scowcroft: And we need some airlift.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Right. We need some airlift.

President Ford: On the other issues: We are going to stay in Korea. We are augmenting our Navy shipbuilding. If Carter cuts Korea, he is cutting off from what I would do. We are going for a responsible worldwide capability that we have endorsed.

Secretary Kissinger: You can say that in your valedictory, plus you can look four to five years ahead. You can see the need for building up regional forces against an increasing danger; but this is a 10-year steady program. We can’t go through peaks and valleys. You can say that this is your best judgment.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We can emphasize the steadiness of the program.

Secretary Kissinger: You have supported many levels.

Vice President Rockefeller: Where do we go from here now?

Secretary Rumsfeld: We can come up with a paper. You can identify areas for further study and direct that these studies be taken. You can draft up the essence of what you have said. We can draft a NSDM. And you can take a draft of your statement from that NSDM. We can erect this in the defense report, and the State of the Union Address or some other valedictory. You can plant the flag down the road, so if they deviate from it, they must admit it.

President Ford: Or they can accept it, and the peril that goes with it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes.

President Ford: Let’s do this.

Obviously, I favor S–3. I favor today’s strategy for Europe. I favor the Navy shipbuilding program. I favor keeping forces in Korea. And I favor a regional capability.

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9 See Document 110.
Secretary Kissinger: That includes increased worldwide capability.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Are there any other issues we haven’t looked at?

Director Lynn: NATO.

General Scowcroft: G–3 is too general for NATO.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, as I understand it, you favor no increase in manpower for Europe but you do want to increase our stocks, keep our modernization program going, and have a war-fighting capability.

President Ford: Yes.

Secretary Rumsfeld: You favor, as I understand it, a more flexible response concerning warning time. That is, an ability to defend against an unreinforced attack with little warning, or reinforced attack with more warning.

President Ford: What about the 90 days sustainability?

General Scowcroft: We can increase our prepositioned supplies.

Deputy Secretary Clements: Definitely.

Secretary Rumsfeld: We would not give U.S. money to the Allies for sustainability, but rather prod them to do more. Also, we should look at the NATO flanks.

President Ford: I’m not clear on the flanks. What are we talking about? Troops? Materials?

General Brown: Basically, we’re doing better. You gave us sealift and airlift mobility.

President Ford: If we have the Navy shipbuilding and airlift, we should be able to handle that.

General Scowcroft: To increase our worldwide capability, we need strategic mobility.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, we need strategic mobility.

General Brown: Are we talking about G–3?

Director Lynn: We ought to put this in writing.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. President, where do you stand on civil defense? (Laughter)

President Ford: Mr. Carter can put his moleholes around here. (Laughter)

Vice President Rockefeller: Does the study address adequate training?

General Brown: We’re getting better in this, although the O&M dollars are still a little thin.

Vice President Rockefeller: Isn’t this the guts of the matter? It ought to be here. This is another illustration of the man-in-armor analogy.
President Ford: We are doing what we can to recover from Vietnam and the Yom Kippur War.

Vice President Rockefeller: How much money is involved?

General Brown: I don’t know.

President Ford: Approximately $2 billion in O&M. We are up to 18 percent growth in O&M, which is what you wanted. We are up to 14 percent on other accounts.

Vice President Rockefeller: This will fit into Henry’s projection for the future.

President Ford: These things are in the budget, not for five years, but over a six-year period.

Director Lynn: The reason it is hard to be that final, is that we disagree on attrition rates, strategies the East might use in an attack, and so forth. We can do our best at this time and when further facts are available, then we can always adjust.

Vice President Rockefeller: All the Services are way behind on training. But this is not my business.

General Brown: You are going in the right direction, but the problem is a little overstated.

Dr. Lehman: Israeli statistics show a direct relationship between flying hours and kills. If a pilot had ten times the flying hours, he had ten times the kills.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Henry said to me, jokingly, before the meeting that I was going to scare everybody about the Russians ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: I said that?

Secretary Rumsfeld: Jokingly. But this does affect the pace.

Vice President Rockefeller: I am concerned. I read the intelligence reports every day.

Secretary Kissinger: I am concerned by statements that the Soviets will engage in a Hitler-like attack. What they have done is the same thing they have done all along; that is, increase their budget about 8–10 percent a year for defense. As their economy increases, their military grows. We have to live with this.

Secretary Rumsfeld: What I don’t like is the impression that this is not that serious. The President’s paper must say that it is serious. Had the President not demonstrated his concern, we would be in an unstable situation.

President Ford: But I don’t think you can realistically say that they have all of a sudden done this. The problem is not what they have done, but what we haven’t done over a period of years.

General Scowcroft: We must do this on a sustaining basis.
Secretary Rumsfeld: We can’t run a war and drain off our supplies to somewhere else.

Deputy Secretary Clements: We need to be realistic in a simple way. We have to be steady with this. In the past some have talked about Cloud 9 plans that we can’t meet. We must project this in a simple, honest way. We must say that we can’t do it in NATO because of our stocks.

General Brown: We have talked about two things: our muscle and our will. But there is a third thing. This is our relationships with others. How can we talk about a contingency in the Middle East and have no base agreements in Turkey? This is true around the world.

General Scowcroft: One thing that we have overlooked is the depth of the study. It has been a very fine study, but we must consider its depth. Jim Lynn mentioned the coincidence with the 1969 study. There was nothing on 90 days versus 120 days. Also, we really haven’t addressed theater nuclear war. With regard to strategic forces, we have to consider what we mean by such things as parity. Don says casualties are important. We talk about people, but our last document said that we should not kill people. Maybe we need a people-targeting doctrine, to show the Soviets that they could not get away with anything if they attacked.

President Ford: How does this compare with the 1969 study in depth?

Secretary Rumsfeld: This one was done in 60 days. Henry, you ran the last study. How long did you have, six months?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But the strategic problem today is not all that different. In 1969, with Congress cutting the budget, we could only turn our doctrine around. However, we eventually went with MIRV, TRIDENT, B–1, and other programs but not until 1971 or 72. It is not that amazing that the doctrine is about the same. What is different is the Soviet forces’ buildup, as some predicted in the 1950s.

In 1961, I was a consultant on the Kennedy plan to send a battalion down the autobahn. It was a crazy plan, but we could think about it because we had a clear strategic superiority. We could take out whatever missiles they had very easily. But if the same situation faced us tomorrow, what would we do? Go to nuclear war? Execute the SIOP? Kill 120 million people? What will we send down the autobahn? This is no reflection on anybody.

What would we do in the next Middle East War if the Israelis decide to go to Damascus, and the Russians drop paratroops in Damascus?

Secretary Rumsfeld: They have improved their airlift and their tactical air.
Secretary Kissinger: With regard to the future, we are ahead in strategic forces and this may last from four to five years. But there is no way to deal with strategic superiority. This is why I want SALT. We could never have enough for an overwhelming capability in strategic forces. This is why we should build up our conventional capability.

General Brown: This is why the JCS are 100 percent for SALT.

Secretary Rumsfeld: But we are forgetting that strategic forces are not a big percentage of the budget.

Deputy Secretary Clements: People are the high cost item.

President Ford: Let’s prepare to go along these lines.

Vice President Rockefeller: I would hate to leave these options on the chart that cut the budget. Carter could say that President Ford gave serious consideration to cutting the budget.

President Ford: Thanks very much.

121. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT

Chemical Weapons (CW)

The Department of Army included in its FY 1978 request for appropriations funding in the amount of $15.3 million to support a stand-by binary CW production facility. These funds would provide $2.0 million for modernization of an existing facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal and some $13.3 million to purchase production-related equipment. This would be a long-range program requiring two years before the facility would be ready to produce. These funds have since been deleted at the White House.

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, 370.64, CBR, (June–Dec.) 1976. Confidential. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, McAuliffe forwarded it to Rumsfeld under his own December 15 memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it. A handwritten memorandum, December 15, addressed to Rumsfeld from Holcomb was found attached. It reads: “Brent [Scowcroft] wants an SRG meeting on this subject . . . tentatively scheduled for 12/16 in the afternoon. Hence the urgency.” (Ellipsis in the original.) McAuliffe’s and Holcomb’s memoranda are ibid. The meeting was held on December 29.
Over the years, U.S. ability to deter Soviet use of CW through the threat of retaliation in kind has steadily decreased. At the same time, intelligence reveals that the Soviets have continued to emphasize operations on a chemical battlefield. While their intentions concerning the first use of CW are not entirely clear, the fact that they are able to launch a chemical attack against NATO in depth presents a serious threat to Allied forces. U.S. forces require a credible CW retaliatory capability in order to deter the Soviets from using chemicals and possibly lowering the nuclear threshold as a result.

The Department of Defense is fully supportive of the principles behind the ongoing arms control negotiations in the area of CW. However, we are aware that there has been little positive movement toward achieving an effective agreement. In our view, a primary reason for Soviet intractability is the fact that they see no real advantage in giving up their superior capability. Thus, DOD sees two significant advantages accruing from the appropriation of funds for the long lead-time binary production items requested by the Army: (1) The appropriations would preserve our options concerning future modernization of the U.S. CW stockpile and (2) it would provide a strong, but by no means provocative, signal to the Soviets that the U.S. is prepared to rebuild its CW capability if an effective arms control agreement cannot be reached.

In this regard, DOD has prepared the attached position paper which outlines the essential elements of an agreement we consider would meet our security needs.\textsuperscript{2} It is provided for interagency consideration. The DOD is prepared to couple our request for FY 1978 funds for binary items to a DOD commitment to negotiate an acceptable agreement along these lines.

I urge that the Army’s request for these items be restored in the FY 1978 budget.

Donald Rumsfeld

\textsuperscript{2} The undated paper entitled “Proposed Chemical Weapons Arms Limitation” is attached, but not printed.
122. National Security Decision Memorandum 342


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Organizations to Perform Security Assistance Functions

The President has reviewed the study of the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs on MAAG Requirements and has noted agency views. The President has decided to establish or continue in the countries indicated the following organizations to perform security assistance functions in Fiscal Year 1978. Personnel and funding levels will be those established in the President’s Fiscal Year 1978 budget request.

Defense Field Offices

Ethiopia          Kuwait³          Saudi Arabia
Greece            Liberia          Spain
Indonesia         Morocco          Thailand
Iran⁴            Pakistan          Tunisia
Japan            Philippines        Turkey
Jordan            Portugal          Zaire
Korea            Republic of China

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 68, NSDM 342. Confidential. A copy was sent to George Brown.
² Document 103.
³ The Defense Field Office will be replaced by an Office of Defense Cooperation if an adequate level of reimbursement can be obtained from the host country. [Footnote in the original. This footnote appears next to the names of the following countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.]
⁴ Six or less members of the U.S. military will be assigned to the Defense Field Office or Military Group. [Footnote in the original. This footnote appears next to the names of the following countries: Iran, Tunisia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Chile, and Honduras.]
The Secretary of State, in close cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, should propose legislation which will:

- Authorize establishment of Defense Field Offices in the countries specified above.
- Provide for continued operation of the Latin American military groups based on their traditional role of representation.
- Permit, without specific congressional approval, the assignment to the chief of each U.S. diplomatic mission of up to six military personnel to perform security assistance functions.
- Allow Defense Attaché Offices to continue to perform security assistance functions in countries where either manpower and cost savings are effected or political sensitivities are paramount.

If these amendments to the existing law are not forthcoming, Office of Defense Cooperation will be established or Defense Field Offices will be proposed where necessary.

Brent Scowcroft

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5 Three or less members of the U.S. military will be assigned to the Military Group. [Footnote in the original. This footnote appears next to the names of the following countries: Paraguay, Uruguay, and Costa Rica.]
123. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities

As you know, an Ad Hoc Panel of NSC technical consultants has been studying a number of aspects of U.S. military use of space. An interim report on their study of U.S. anti-satellite capabilities was forwarded to you last July. They have now completed their final report on this subject. (Tab A)

Summary of Panel Views

The Panel concluded that there is an urgent need for a U.S. capability to destroy at least some militarily important low altitude Soviet space systems. The Panel is convinced that this Soviet trend will continue and that real-time space capabilities will become even more important to the effective use of military forces in the future.

If the U.S. had the capability to destroy the critical target-locating satellites, which are at low altitude and are few in number, In the opinion of the Panel, the capability to nullify this ocean surveillance threat alone provides sufficient motivation to undertake an anti-satellite development program. There are, however, other low altitude Soviet space systems such as the and possibly the photo-reconnaissance satellites, which are important to Soviet military operations and could also become targets for an anti-satellite. This list is expected to grow as the Soviets continue to expand their space capability in the future.

The Panel concluded that a limited anti-satellite capability sufficient to conduct six to ten low altitude intercepts within a week and to

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 66, NSDM 333 (3). Top Secret. Sent for information. A note at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.” Ford’s handwritten memorandum, undated, addressed to Scowcroft was found attached. It reads: “Very helpful report. I believe it important that the NSDM be issued as soon as possible otherwise the matter could be delayed. I believe it important to issue it before Jan. 20th.”

2 See footnote 3, Document 96.

3 Not found attached.
respond to a new Soviet launch inside one day, could be developed by the end of CY 1980 using available technology, if sufficient priority is applied. However, budgetary pressures, arms control considerations, and other international policy factors could impede progress in this area unless a clear statement of U.S. national policy is made emphasizing the need for anti-satellite development.

The Panel also concluded that there is a need for a parallel effort to achieve an even earlier capability to electronically nullify (jam) Soviet satellites. The Panel believes that the ability to negate a satellite electronically in local regions and for controlled time periods in a reversible, less provocative way would have a lower crisis threshold for use and would be a very valuable option. It may be possible to adapt existing ground and airborne assets for this purpose.

The Panel further concluded that space-based lasers as anti-satellite weapons will not be feasible as an operational anti-satellite capability before the late 1980’s or early 1990’s.

Next Steps

The Panel has highlighted the value of a U.S. anti-satellite system and has helped to clarify possible program objectives. One of the reasons for lack of progress in the past has been the absence of clear policy guidance on national objectives in this area. Recently DOD has moved more aggressively toward obtaining a limited near-term anti-satellite capability, and has budgeted substantially more funds for FY 1978 through FY 1982. A clear statement of national policy on U.S. anti-satellite capabilities would help to maintain this momentum.

Toward that end, a draft NSDM is now being prepared which would (1) clearly state the need for a limited near-term U.S. low-altitude anti-satellite capability, (2) clarify the objectives of such a capability, and (3) explore complementary arms control measures to restrain growth of anti-satellites to high altitudes. Following agency review and comments on the study effort, I will present the NSDM to you for consideration.
124. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

NSSM 244, U.S. Civil Defense Policy\(^2\)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed the Response to NSSM 244, U.S. Civil Defense Policy. We believe that the Response provides an adequate basis to address the key issues which affect the choice of a future U.S. civil defense policy and program. We believe, however, that it would be useful to hold an NSC meeting to discuss the NSSM Response, inasmuch as it addresses issues which should be considered in the evaluation of options for U.S. strategy in NSSM 246, and about which there are differing views among the agency participants in NSSM 244.

The Department of Defense concurs with the Response recommendation that “U.S. policies should be continually assessed as we learn more about the actual Soviet civil defense program.” In our opinion, although we currently lack sufficient intelligence to make confident assessments about the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense, Soviet CD potentially could have significant implications for the U.S. deterrent, and therefore should be a priority intelligence target.

The Department of Defense is concerned about the potential impact of Soviet civil defense measures on U.S. retaliatory capability and escalatory control capability in the future. We believe our current and projected weapons acquisition and employment policies and programs are adequate for SIOP execution through the mid-1980s. However, we are concerned that significant improvements to and expansion of those parts of the Soviet civil defense program concerned with dispersing and hardening industrial capacity and protecting political and military leadership could require changes in these policies and programs later on.

\(^1\) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–79–0049, 384, 17 Dec. 1976. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. McAuliffe and the Director of the Joint Staff, JCS, Lieutenant General Ray B. Sitton forwarded another version of it to Clements under an undated covering memorandum with the recommendation that Clements sign it. Clements, however, wrote on the covering memorandum: “Don [Rumsfeld] has been talking with the President on this subject—he should sign!” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) NSSM 244 and the response to it are Documents 95 and 117, respectively.
We believe that the Response fairly represents the differing interpretations of the purpose of Soviet civil defense efforts. It is our opinion that when viewed in conjunction with the Soviet counterforce efforts, active defense programs, and continuing ABM RDT&E efforts, the Soviet civil defense efforts suggest that the Soviets are pursuing a comprehensive damage-limiting strategy.

While strategic offensive forces are today the prime determinant of our ability to maintain deterrence, we believe the relative survival and recovery capabilities of the U.S. and USSR can also affect the strategic balance. As you know, the U.S. does not use Soviet fatalities as a measure of U.S. ability to deter attack, but rather depends upon its ability to destroy those political, economic, and selected military targets critical to Soviet post-attack power and early recovery as a major power. Although population fatalities are not a measure for judging the effectiveness of our NSDM 242 strategy, DOD believes that they are politically significant and that our ability (or lack of ability) to protect the U.S. population could affect U.S. decision-making at the thresholds between non-use, limited employment, and full-scale employment of nuclear weapons in situations short of retaliation against a full-scale attack on the U.S.

We are concerned that a significant Soviet advantage in crisis relocation capability could provide the Soviets with an effective crisis coercion capability against the U.S. We recognize that the U.S. could mitigate the effectiveness of a Soviet evacuation by bringing its strategic forces to full alert status and that the Soviets could not maintain an evacuated posture indefinitely. However, even if we were to bring U.S. forces to full alert status, we believe that U.S. population vulnerability would remain high without an effective U.S. crisis relocation capability. It is this vulnerability which could affect U.S. actions or Allied support of the U.S. Furthermore, the Soviets would only need to maintain an evacuated posture for a limited period of time if it provided an effective crisis advantage.

The Department of Defense believes that the Response adequately reflects the range of civil defense policy and program options for population protection, but believes that population protection by itself could be inadequate to assure a rapid post-attack recovery. We recommend as a priority item a follow-on study of the requirements for enhancing national recovery.

With respect to the civil defense policies outlined in the study, the Department of Defense recommends that the U.S. adopt enhancing post-attack survival and recovery as its CD objective. We recommend

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3 Document 31.
that the U.S. focus on developing a civil defense program which provides for a “one-week” surge capability for crisis relocation coupled with a nationwide fall-out protection capability. While further work is required and recommended by DOD to refine the costs and requirements for these capabilities, DOD believes that, if after review of this study, the U.S. should opt for a one-week surge capability, a modest increase in funding for CD above the currently projected FY 78 budget would be warranted so that the U.S. could progressively develop an effective crisis surge capability. As planning progresses and the requirements for a crisis surge capability become better understood, we would recommend full funding for the measures necessary to achieve this one-week surge capability (currently estimated at 215 million federal dollars annually).

We believe that programs which depend upon massive blast protection are likely to be economically and politically unacceptable in the U.S. Furthermore, we think they could be destabilizing to the strategic balance if the Soviets believed they were integral to a U.S. shift toward a first-strike strategy. Therefore, we recommend against such programs.

With respect to the relationship between CD preparedness and natural disaster preparedness, DOD believes that Option 3 (managing CD as a predominantly attack-oriented program which permits Federal assistance to State and local natural disaster activities which benefit attack preparedness) is the most politically practical approach.

Finally, DOD supports the Response recommendations for further study of Soviet civil defense and comparative U.S./Soviet recovery capability, review of federal management arrangements, and recodification of Executive Orders.

Donald Rumsfeld
125. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting


SUBJECT
NSSM 244

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman  
Brent Scowcroft  
Robert Howard  
Don Ogilvie

State  
Charles W. Robinson  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt  
HUD  
Thomas P. Dunn

Defense  
William Clements  
Dr. James P. Wade  
Sally Horn (briefer)  
ACDA  
Colonel Charles Estes  
Robert M. Behr  
FPA  
Leslie W. Bray  
JCS  
Lt. Gen. William Smith  
NSC Staff  
CIA  
Paul Walsh  
Roger Boverie  
Ray DeBruler  
Michael Hornblow

Meeting began at 3:14 p.m.

The meeting began with Ms. Sally Horn of DOD briefing from charts copies of which are attached to these minutes. 3

Mr. Hyland: How does Defense come out on the study? 4

Mr. Clements: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Walsh: [1 line not declassified] The CIA expects to have a new study on the Soviet CD installations concluded by the fall of ’77. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Hyland: The final report will be ready when?

Mr. DeBruler: The fall of ’77. [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Clements: A lot of people are talking about what the CIA knows of the status of the Russian effort. If you know something I don’t—I want to know it.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 24, Meeting Minutes—Senior Review Group, November–December 1976. Top Secret. The minutes are erroneously dated December 22. The meeting, held in the White House Situation Room, actually took place on December 21 according to Davis’ attached covering memorandum, January 7, 1977, to Scowcroft. (Ibid.)

2 Scowcroft did not attend. Hyland chaired the meeting in his absence.

3 Attached, but not printed.

4 The study submitted in response to NSSM 244 is Document 117.
Mr. DeBruler: [2½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Hyland: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. DeBruler: [4 lines not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. DeBruler: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. DeBruler: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Wade: What would be the additional cost of building something that large underground?

Mr. DeBruler: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Robinson: The Russians are spending a billion a year on CD, right?

Mr. DeBruler: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Howard: Are these fairly typical?

Mr. DeBruler: [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Ogilvie: What are the shelters for?

Mr. DeBruler: [2½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Hyland: What is the population of the Kiev Oblast?

Mr. Walsh: 2 million.

Mr. Hyland: What is the capacity of the shelters?

Mr. DeBruler: [2½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Wade: Are the facilities located near industries?

Mr. Clements: We are talking about three different requirements: one is a shelter for military command and control, one is for industry and the third is for civilians.

Mr. Hyland: What is the percentage breakdown in Kiev for civilian vs industrial shelters?

Mr. Walsh: [1½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Hyland: I would not expect to see shelters for the general population.

Mr. DeBruler: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Walsh: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Hyland: You are doing the [number not declassified] largest cities?

Mr. Walsh: Yes, but there is a difference between in depth analysis and routine intelligence reporting. [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Wade: The NSSM 244 study gave clear goals but it was neutral in its assessment of Soviet CD efforts. But I believe there is a strong warning signal coming out of the study.
Mr. Clements: I am a skeptic on civil defense and have been for a long time. The President at the last NSC Meeting went beyond being a skeptic.\(^5\) Yet there is an added dimension to CD. Proceeding down this track we are just touching the surface. We need to talk about the overall preparations and mobilizations which are applicable to the problem. Where are we regarding mobilization plans and the surge capabilities of our industrial base? It damn near doesn't exist. In considering civil defense we should do it in terms of our capability for post-attack command and control protection. We need to think of our ability to retaliate and to have a hardened capability in that field. Then what about protecting industries? And then in order of priorities how about the general population.

Mr. Hyland: There is a pressing nature to this problem. Now we have nothing. No direction and no objectives.

Mr. Clements: We have zilch. It is a political pork-barrel. All you have to do is to try to change this program thereby touching some sensitive boils and see the reactions to know that it is pure pork-barrel.

Mr. Hyland: The question is how to convert it from a pork-barrel to a pork-barrel which is somewhat effective.

Mr. Ogilvie: In the present budget there is $77 million to be used for CD. This study got started because of the President’s interest in the CD problem. I agree with Bill [Hyland] that the study needs to go further. The present situation is scandalous.

Mr. Hyland: Suppose we had a free hand in CD. What should we be doing? How do we decide between crisis-relocation and post attack retaliation?

Mr. Behr: Do we emphasize deterrence or damage minimization?

Mr. Hyland: A massive evacuation plan might constitute a deterrent of sorts but if you can’t implement it, it is no deterrent but becomes a ploy perhaps. What would this cost?

Mr. Wade: That is option 3A costing $200 million a year.

Mr. Hyland: How much?

Mr. Wade: $1 per head per year.

Mr. Hyland: Or $2 billion over ten years.

Mr. Robinson: What does the current CD money do?

Mr. Ogilvie: It supports its employees.

Mr. Clements: But there are matching funds from the states.

Mr. Robinson: That means $150 million.

Mr. Clements: Yes.

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\(^5\) See Document 120.
Mr. Ogilvie: But that is for all kinds of disasters, floods, earthquakes etc.

Mr. Hyland: Option 3 would protect 3/4 of the present population?

Mr. Ogilvie: Yes, 180 million people.

Mr. Wade: You can’t get there in one year.

Mr. Clements: I can’t speak for Defense but I don’t think the program should be increased by one extra dollar.

Mr. Hyland: According to the study it would increase protection from 1/3 of the population to 3/4. There is no discussion about protecting our industrial base or about transportation.

Gen. Smith: More study is needed.

Mr. Hyland: So we have produced this study so that we can do another study?

Mr. Wade: We can start with this.

Mr. Hyland: What about this year’s program?

Mr. Wade: It would add $20 million.

Mr. Ogilvie: I would prefer to see $20 million reprogrammed.

Mr. Clements: CD turns people off. There has to be a new movement, new impetus, new momentum.

Mr. Bray: Yes, we need to have a new type of CD, a changed concept.

Mr. Hyland: Well what are we going to advise the President, that pending further studies we would like to explore the possibility of going to a more efficient program by reprogramming or adding more money to the present one?

Mr. Clements: There is enough money there now. We just have to use that money efficiently.

Mr. Ogilvie: Right.

Mr. Hyland: Suppose that we say that 3A is the preferred option. How can we find out how much the added cost will be and about the efficiency of post attack recovery?

Gen. Smith: That takes time—months of study.

Mr. Hyland: There are trade offs. If 1/2 of the population survives that may be acceptable provided that 1/2 can run the country. We may be better off to lower our expectations of how many survive but make sure that the survivors can run the country. The real test, once the horror is over, is to see who can run the country.

Mr. Bray: To get to 1/2 or 3/4 of the population surviving you need fallout shelters and crisis relocation plans. We can take the first steps now and undertake mobilization studies.
Mr. Hyland: Have we decided to concentrate more on crisis relocation?

Mr. Clements: There are several other things that happen before crisis relocation. All sorts of things need to be studied.

Gen. Smith: Are we now talking about the non-civilian population?

Mr. Hyland: Is it the consensus of the group that the present CD effort should be tilted toward more planning for relocation and evacuations, and that there should be a new study on post-attack recovery and that we should bring together all these things in a year.

Mr. Wade: We are asking for more money.

Mr. Ogilvie: The issue is $88 million vs the $108 requested by DOD.

Mr. Hyland: But Clements thinks the money could be reoriented.

Mr. Clements: Yes, turn it around.

Gen. Smith: That will take time, at least six months.

Mr. Ogilvie: We now have an opportunity as an outgoing administration to say in our budget that there is a need to reorient the program. We are now spending $12 million a year just on inflation.

Mr. Wade: The first year you might get reorientation but then the following years would cost you more.

Mr. Bray: If you reorient you can get some efficiency. The problem is all the phone calls from the political side.

Mr. Clements: The President must take a hard line.

Mr. Howard: In the first year $15 million could be reoriented toward crisis relocation.

Mr. Bray: $15 million is better than nothing.

Mr. Hyland: Is a one year warning time realistic?

Mr. Clements: No, that is stupid.

Mr. Hyland: Let’s talk about the differences between one week and one month. Are we in favor of one week?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Gen. Smith: Yes.

Mr. Hyland: Okay, we will aim for one week surge capability. Now there are the technical questions about casualty levels after a mass attack and the fallout situation. How are the calculations arrived at?

Gen. Smith: There are varying assessments. Some studies will bring you to a higher level. It is complicated.

Mr. Hyland: These must be gone into. Any post-attack recovery study must have a detailed account of the effect of fallout. And if we go forward with the study we must reexamine our own strategies regarding the population killing option.
Mr. Wade: Those questions were not supposed to be part of this study.

Mr. Hyland: We will tell the President what we have done at this level. There has to be a budget decision soon. Should we meet him soon or do a memo on the budget.

Mr. Ogilvie: The President’s tentative decision was for $88 million. He is not absolutely firm on that number.

Mr. Hyland: Should there be more?

Mr. Wade: There could be a little more. Reprogramming is the first priority.

Mr. Bray: We have to reorient the program. That takes time and you need some money to start off with.

Mr. Ogilvie: I don’t agree with the philosophy of adding on to a bad base.

Gen. Smith: I think Brown would agree to a little more money.

Mr. Clements: You could add three million more for a blue ribbon panel.

Mr. Ogilvie: But how about that horrible pork-barrel at the base?

Mr. Clements: There will be a lot of flak coming up. To deflect it you need to have in hand a good report done by a panel of first class citizens. A blue ribbon panel would give it some visibility and credibility. Otherwise you will fall into the Strom Thurmond syndrome.

Mr. Ogilvie: Okay, we could agree on $2 million and a blue ribbon panel.

Mr. Clements: That will do it.

Mr. Hyland: How about an additional paper. Does the CIA need anything before it can go forward?

Mr. Walsh: No.

Mr. Hyland: We could leave behind a NSSM instituting a study of post attack recovery in all its aspects.

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Mr. Hyland: We will have to work a little on its terms of reference.

The meeting ended at 4:09 p.m.
BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE SRG ON 29 DECEMBER, 1976,
ON ACQUISITION OF A BINARY CW MUNITION FACILITY

Issue

Should the Administration approve the DOD recommendation, enclosure 1, that the Army request for establishment of a binary production facility as outlined below be restored in the FY 1978 budget?

Specifics of the Army Request

The Army request for $15.3 million provides for establishment of a government-owned and operated facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, to produce initially binary chemical (GB nerve agent) artillery projectiles. This project will provide for the rehabilitation of an existing building and the purchase and installation of equipment necessary for:

—The manufacture of one of the two binary chemical components (the other to be obtained commercially).
—Filling and sealing the manufactured chemical component into a canister.
—Loading, assembling and packing the projectile by inserting the filled canister and explosive charge into the projectile and placing a fibre-board spacer in place of the second chemical component which is to be stored separately.

The request does not presume a commitment to produce binary munitions. Approximately two years would be required to prepare the facility for production.

Present U.S. Policy

The U.S. has a no first-use obligation for lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons by virtue of being a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Current U.S. chemical warfare policy stems from NSDM 35,
dated 25 November 1969. This NSDM states, in part, that “the objective of the U.S. [chemical warfare] program will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails.” The DOD maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons for the purpose of implementing this policy.

The United States is firmly committed to the objective of complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons. This commitment has been reiterated on many occasions by the President and other senior officials.

Under Article IX of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States has an obligation “to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures” for the prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end, the United States has entered into both multilateral and bilateral U.S.–U.S.S.R. discussions of possible limitations.

Pending Policy Issues

The National Security Council has had under study two broad issues in the area of chemical warfare policy. NSSM 157 addressed possible treaty alternatives for achieving restraints on the possession of chemical weapons, and NSSM 192 examined alternatives for the U.S. chemical warfare posture, mainly aimed at the question of whether or not to proceed with the acquisition of binary CW munitions.

Two Senior Review Group meetings were held to consider the alternatives developed in these two NSSM studies, but no consensus emerged on the closely-linked issues of the military need for modernization of the U.S. CW stockpile and acceptable CW treaty restraints where the verification of compliance is incomplete. Rather than moving these issues to the President for resolution and decision, it was decided to wait the outcome of an internal DOD reassessment of its position on binary acquisition and acceptable arms control approaches. This reassessment has recently been concluded, and the results are reflected in

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5 The international Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was signed on April 10, 1972 and ratified by the U.S. Senate on March 26, 1975. On December 26, 1975, the United States declared that it had destroyed all of its biological weapons. (Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and James M. Smith (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2005), pp. 32–33)
6 See footnote 2, Document 33.
7 See Documents 39 and 51.
8 For the March 5, 1973 SRG meeting, see footnote 15, Document 50. The record of the January 27, 1975 SRG meeting is Document 51.
the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum at enclosure 1. That memorandum proposes:

—FY 78 funding of a standby binary production facility.
—Deferral for a reasonable time of binary production, pending the outcome of international negotiations on CW restraints.
—A specific approach for international CW restraints.

The first of these is the subject of the present SRG. The third would be the basis for another SRG in the near future, possibly leading to a consensus on a U.S. treaty proposal in our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union as well as in the CCD.

Military Considerations

The Defense Department’s evaluation indicates that a serious asymmetry exists between the chemical warfare capabilities of the US/NATO and USSR/Warsaw Pact forces, and this imbalance poses a significant threat to NATO.

—Available intelligence reveals that the chemical warfare posture of the USSR far outranks that of any other nation and that they are actively engaged in maintaining their superior capabilities. Warsaw Pact forces are well equipped to operate in a toxic environment, particularly one of their own choosing and training for CW operations receives high priority. The Soviets are known to have a variety of chemical munitions in significant quantity and recent evidence indicates that some chemical weapons are deployed at forward air bases. Soviet forces include over 200 chemical units and about 100,000 dedicated CBR personnel. They have conducted some 18 open air tests of chemical weapons during the past two years.

—In contrast U.S. and other NATO forces are deficient in both defensive and retaliatory (offensive) capabilities, particularly the latter. Some members of the Alliance possess the ability to conduct operations for a limited time on a chemical battlefield, others patently do not. With the exception of a limited French stockpile, only the U.S. has any chemical munitions in Europe and these are in short supply and consist only of artillery ammunition. Further, U.S. stocks in theater are all located in one supply facility and vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. Resupply to the theater is a tenuous proposition. Early warning of impending need would be required to mount an effective resupply mission without seriously crippling other logistic operations. Even given the ability to move efficiently the CW presently in CONUS, deficiencies in the retaliatory stockpile would still remain, e.g., limited variety, volume, and appropriate type of munitions. A status of the current U.S. CW retaliatory stockpile is shown in enclosure 2.

Although Soviet intentions concerning the first use of CW munitions are not clear, the fact that they are able to attack NATO targets in depth with CW presents a risk which causes serious concern. Cur-

9 A DOD paper, “DOD CW Stockpile Data,” is enclosed, but not printed.
rently, the funding priority for chemical warfare is devoted to improving our CW protective posture (see enclosure 3).\textsuperscript{10} This is consistent with expressed Congressional desires.

The proponents of the Army’s FY 78 request take the position that these improvements in U.S. CW defensive posture are not sufficient to offset the growing obsolescence and possible deterioration in the effectiveness of our current CW stockpile. If the U.S. is to have a credible deterrent consistent with our present national policy, it must demonstrate both a capability to protect itself against CW attack and to retaliate in kind. At the very least we must be prepared to modernize our retaliatory capability by constructing a binary munition facility. The request for funds to purchase long lead-time items required for a binary CW production facility does not presume a decision to produce, but it is necessary to our maintaining a credible CW deterrence since it would protect our options regarding possible modernization of the retaliatory stockpile. As indicated above, the proposed program requires two years to complete. Thus, even if funds are provided to begin the program in FY 1978, it will be 1979–80 before production could begin. Continued delay in starting the program will further aggravate an already serious readiness deficiency.

Those opposing the Army’s proposal to construct a binary production facility argue that it is unnecessary, at least at this time. The military CW situation is a relatively stable one. Whatever deficiencies are thought to exist in the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile—for example, virtually no deployment in Europe and a small fraction of total agent in a readily deliverable form—have been present for many years. This situation was considered sufficiently tolerable that no request for the binary facility was included in the budget request last year. A lack of urgency is also indicated by the fact that the Army’s testing program on possible lethality deterioration in filled munitions is scheduled to take four years. Since this information would be an important factor in deciding to produce binaries, the commitment to a production facility now would appear to be premature. Meanwhile, the overall military situation seems to be improving since major improvements are already under way in CW defense readiness, which provides an important deterrent to chemical attack.

The opponents also question whether the threat of retaliation in kind is the most effective or credible deterrent to a chemical attack. Approval of the production facility is not necessary to keep open the option of improving the U.S. CW stockpile until that basic issue is resolved. The option will continue to exist.

\textsuperscript{10} A DOD paper, “U.S. Protective Capabilities,” is enclosed, but not printed.
It should be noted that modernization of the CW stockpile could also be accomplished by filling new munitions from present bulk stocks of nerve agent. This method has severe shortcomings, however, when compared to the binary concept. Binaries provide significant advantages in manufacturing, storage, surveillance, transportation, and eventual disposal of chemical munitions. Thus, they not only serve to satisfy environmental concerns, but also allow flexibility in deployment. It is estimated that the time necessary to ready a facility for production and the over-all costs involved in the manufacture of sufficient munitions to satisfy stockpile deficiencies are roughly the same regardless of the method use.

Arms Control Considerations

Review of Negotiations

As noted above, the United States is engaged in bilateral U.S.-Soviet as well as multilateral discussions of possible chemical weapons limitations.

Since the U.S. has not yet reached a decision on the basic CW policy issues, U.S. participation in these discussions has been limited to examination of alternative approaches to CW arms control. The U.S. has not yet taken a definitive position on what would constitute an acceptable agreement.

Present U.S.-Soviet discussions of CW restraints stem from the July 1974 Summit in Moscow. In the communique, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. “agreed to consider a joint initiative in the conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion . . . of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.”11 Shortly thereafter, the Soviets presented a draft treaty which is deficient in that it limits only the most toxic chemicals and lacks effective verification measures.

The U.S. did not respond to the Soviet draft before the Vladivostok summit in November 1974. (Although no definitive response has been provided, the U.S. forwarded request for clarification on April 29, 1975.) That November 1974 meeting’s final statement “noted that in accordance with previous agreements, initial contacts were established between representatives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on . . . measures dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.”12

On a number of occasions since the Vladivostok summit, the Soviets proposed that bilateral consultations begin, but the U.S. did not

11 See footnote 3, Document 50.
12 For the joint communiqué issued at the close of the Vladivostok Summit, November 23–24, 1974, see footnote 13, Document 50.
accept until mid-1976. The first round of consultations was held in Geneva, in late August 1976. This session dealt with a variety of technical issues related to CW limitations, particularly in the areas of scope and verification. It was agreed that the consultations had been useful and that they would be continued at a time to be determined.

Since the August 1976 consultations, there has been no further substantive discussion of CW restraints with the Soviets. The Soviets submitted a memorandum to the UNGA suggesting that they may be willing to discuss provisions for limited forms of on-site inspection. This appears to some to be a reflection of a basic Soviet decision on on-site inspection made in connection with negotiation of the PNE Treaty. However, until further talks are held it will be difficult to judge how significant these statements actually are.

The multilateral discussions, which take place at the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), began in earnest in 1972. The United States has participated actively in the CCD’s discussions, which have focused on the study of technical issues related to scope and verification of various types of limitations. Draft conventions to prohibit chemical weapons have been proposed by the U.S.S.R., Japan, and the UK.

During the summer 1976 session of the CCD, discussions of CW issues were more active and constructive than previously. We believe that these discussions are likely to remain at least as active during the spring 1977 session and that they will focus on the proposal presented by the British in August 1976 for a phased prohibition of chemical weapons. Among other members of the CCD, including our Allies, there is a general expectation, in fact, that the CCD’s discussion of CW limitations will intensify during 1977.

The Arms Control Impact of Proceeding with a U.S. Binary CW Facility

Proponents of the Army’s request believe that early approval is necessary in order to provide a strong, but by no means provocative, signal to the Soviets of U.S. resolve to counter their CW superiority and thus provide a realistic basis for arms control negotiations. U.S.–U.S.S.R. discussions concerning a CW limitation have been under way for several years, although formal discussion has only taken place recently. The Soviets have consistently maintained that on-site verification of CW limitation is unacceptable. Recent Soviet statements on this

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13 The Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on May 28, 1976. The treaty, which did not enter into force until 1990, allows PNEs within certain prescribed limits. It also requires prior notification of explosions and on-site inspections. (Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament, p. 169)
matter do not indicate any significant change in their position. Soviet offers to “consider” on-site inspection have been limited to agent destruction only and, even here, they have been purposely vague concerning their intent. As the situation stands now, the prospect for an effective agreement appears dim. The Soviets cannot help but be aware of their advantages in CW and there is no reason to expect them to give them up. If we seriously expect the Soviets to negotiate away their warfighting capability, we may first have to convince them that we are willing to improve our stockpile should arms control efforts fall.

Those opposing the Army’s request believe that:

—Given the attitudes in Congress and among some of our NATO Allies, it is unrealistic to expect that the U.S. can remedy whatever offensive CW deficiencies exist in NATO. German opposition to increased peacetime forward deployment of CW is a critical factor, and one that is not based on environmental and safety concerns, and hence one that will not be overcome by U.S. production of the safer binary munitions. Our most promising strategy in attempting to moderate the Warsaw Pact CW capabilities is to seek treaty restraints on CW, even though the restraints may not be fully verifiable. Thus to the extent that the Army’s request would be perceived, both in the U.S. and abroad, as contrary to the U.S. commitment to attempt to achieve further limitations, it could work against our interest.

—Progress has been made recently, during a period in which the U.S. exercised restraint on the question of preparations for the production of binary chemical weapons. For example, U.S. views on the need to find solutions to verification issues have won increased support. At the same time the U.S.S.R. appears to be approaching the remaining problems involved in negotiation of effective CW restraints in a more serious and flexible manner than previously. A decision to construct a binary facility at this time might well send the wrong signal to the Soviet government, leading them to conclude that the U.S. is not serious about seeking CW limitations.

—A budget request for the binary chemical weapon production facility should not be viewed as a way to facilitate negotiations by increasing pressure on the U.S.S.R. Failure to reach agreement on CW limitations so far cannot be attributed to Soviet intransigence, since the U.S. has not yet presented a proposal. In fact, the U.S. representative at the August 1976 bilateral consultations reported that the Soviets appeared to be prepared to go farther once the U.S. put forward a concrete proposal.

—U.S. commitment to a binary CW facility may tend to encourage CW proliferation. It may well be taken by some smaller countries to indicate renewed importance for chemical weapons, leading them to consider acquiring CW stockpiles of their own.

Congressional Considerations

In the FY 1975 budget, $5.8 million was requested to procure the long lead time equipment items necessary to develop a production loading, assembling, and packaging (LAP) facility for the 155mm artillery projectile at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. After considerable de-
bate in the Congress, this budget item was deleted by a vote of 214–186 on the House floor.

In the FY 1976 budget $8.8 million for the same equipment was again requested, and Congress again deleted this request, because, in part, of concern over arms control implications. In recommending deletion, the House Appropriations Committee expressed its hope that genuine progress could be made during 1976 at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on a realistic and workable treaty to ban all means of chemical warfare, but noted that:

“If no real progress is made in negotiations at the time we are to consider the FY 1977 Defense budget, the Committee may have to reappraise its position on the overall matter.”

The only additional FY 1976 budgetary request related to production was $562,000 in Military Construction Authorization (MCA) for alterations to an existing facility to contain this (LAP) equipment. The House of Representatives deleted this MCA project on July 28, 1975.

Also in 1975 in response to a Congressional inquiry, the White House clarified its position on budget requests for binary chemical munitions: On July 17, Mr. Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, wrote Representative Melvin Price and Senator John Stennis:

“. . . The President would recommend approval of the R and D funds for binary chemical munitions and the modification of the building at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. With the approval of the foregoing items, the other budgetary request for this program for procurement production could be deferred to a later point in time.”

It was the sense of both the Senate and House Appropriation Committees that priority of effort should be given to improving U.S. CW defenses. Further, the House conferees agreed to provide statutory language prohibiting the production of lethal binary chemical munitions unless the President certifies that it would be in the national interest. This was codified in Section 818, Public Law 94–106, October 6, 1975, as follows:

“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the purpose of production of lethal binary chemical munitions unless the President certifies to Congress that the production of such munitions is essential to the national interest to do so and submits a full report to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as far in advance of the production of such munitions as possible.

14 Friedersdorf’s letter to Charles Melvin Price (D–Illinois) and Stennis was not found.
“(b) For the purpose of this section the terms ‘lethal binary chemical munitions’ means (1) any toxic chemical (solid, liquid, or gas) which, through its chemical properties, is intended to be used to produce injury or death to human beings, and (2) any unique device, instrument, apparatus, or contrivance, including any components or accessories thereof, intended to be used to disperse or otherwise disseminate any such toxic chemical.”

(Note: Although the above law is concerned specifically with production and, therefore, does not apply to the proposed FY 78 Army request, DOD believes that a practical consideration of past Congressional concerns dictates that the White House endorse that request in some manner if approval is to be obtained. If the President approves the inclusion of the binary production facility in the FY 78 budget, he would indicate to Congress that while pursuing vigorously international treaty restraints on CW, it would serve our national security purposes to have such a standby facility.)

127. Memorandum From David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland)


SUBJECT
SRG on Wednesday, December 29, 1976, at 3:00 p.m.

An SRG has been scheduled for Wednesday, December 29, 1976, at 3:00 p.m. to consider a DOD proposal to restore $15.3 million in the FY 78 budget for the purpose of establishing a facility in which binary chemical munitions can be produced. This proposal, according to DOD, is not intended to imply a decision to produce binaries, or to prejudge that future decision, but rather is to reduce the time between a possible affirmative decision to produce binaries and the actual production, by acquiring the pacing item—the production facility—in advance. DOD has also proposed the elements of an approach to international restraints on CW, and links the establishment of the binary production facility with the tabling of a U.S. position on restraints.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 18, Senior Review Group Meeting, 12/29/76—Chemical Munitions (1). Secret.
The President decided against including the binary production facility in the FY 78 budget. DOD was prepared to reclaim that decision as part of its overall budget appeal. Brent [Scowcroft] advised Rumsfeld that inasmuch as the binary issue was still under active interagency consideration within the NSC process, it would be appropriate for the SRG to address the production facility question rather than handling it strictly as a budget matter. Rumsfeld accepted this recommendation and followed up with a memorandum to Brent outlining the DOD proposal for the binary facility and also describing a new DOD position for our international discussions on CW arms control (Tab A).²

DOD believes it is [a] prudent military step to have a standby binary chemical weapons production facility, and that our action to acquire such a facility may also be useful in overcoming Soviet reluctance to negotiate a CW treaty having acceptable verification provisions.

The staff positions at State and ACDA are that the need for a binary production facility at this time has not been demonstrated; that it has been our inability to formulate our own position on CW treaty limitations which has impeded meaningful U.S.–USSR negotiations, and not Soviet recalcitrance; and that the signal implied in proceeding now with a binary production facility may be destructive to our bilateral and multilateral (CCD) discussions on possible CW restraints.

The CW working group prepared a background paper for the SRG (Tab B),³ which was circulated to the members on December 23. Because of the shortness of time, official agency views—other than DOD’s as expressed in their memorandum to Scowcroft—were not obtained in advance of the SRG.

Purpose of the SRG Meeting

In addition to State, Defense, ACDA, CIA, and the JCS, the SRG will include OMB since the issue involves an FY 78 budget item.

The purposes of the SRG are:

—To see if DOD wants to press for Presidential approval of a binary production facility in the face of the likely opposition from State, ACDA, and OMB, and in view of the awkwardness of obtaining Congressional support for a controversial proposal from an outgoing Administration.

—To give Robinson and Ikle an opportunity to express their views (which at least as far as Ikle is concerned, may not be as doctrinaire as the staff views).

—To see if there is any acceptable compromise (though none is apparent).

² Rumsfeld’s December 15 memorandum to Scowcroft (Document 121) is attached.
³ The paper (Document 126) is attached.
—To decide how to move the question to the President for resolution in time for inclusion in the budget. A somewhat expanded version of the paper at Tab B, plus agency views, could be forwarded to the President jointly by OMB and NSC during the week January 3–7. Rumsfeld, however, may want to have an NSC meeting to address the question.

Brief Background

The U.S. manufactured and stockpiled nerve agent munitions and bulk nerve agent to fill future munitions. This manufacturing ended in 1968. Since then, our offensive CW capability has gradually degraded as certain munitions became obsolescent and some chemical deterioration occurred inside filled munitions (extent of this deterioration is being assessed by the Army, but the results will not be fully known until 1980). Our munition filling facilities have not been maintained, and it would be expensive, time consuming, and objectionable to many in Congress to rebuild these facilities to permit replacement of obsolescent and deteriorated stocks. Public concern over the safety of chemical weapons has led to restriction that nearly preclude transporting these munitions unless a war crisis exists. Our prepositioned forward deployment of chemical weapons for NATO is limited to one German site. The Germans have not been willing to increase deployment, mainly for domestic political reasons.

The Army has developed another form of nerve agent chemical munition, the binary. Two non-lethal substances, maintained separately inside the munition, are mixed to form nerve agent only as the munition is in flight to the target. The Army wants to produce these new munitions to replace the older ones that are the wrong type for newer weapons, to replace those suffering agent deterioration, to overcome transportation restriction, and possibly to overcome German resistance to further deployment. Also, the Army hopes that a modernized CW offensive capability would be a greater deterrent to Soviet introduction of CW in a conventional European war.

For several years, the Army has requested funds to build a facility to produce binaries. Each year Congress has knocked the funds out because some Congressmen are not convinced (1) that the military need has been sufficiently demonstrated and (2) that the possibility of arms control initiatives have been adequately explored. Congressional language in the FY 76 DOD authorization made it clear that the President would have to certify a strong national interest exists before there would be any chance of obtaining Congressional approval for binary production. (Stennis made the same point privately.)

DOD wants to make another effort as part of the FY 78 budget to establish a standby binary production facility to permit production to proceed immediately if a decision were made in two years that our of-
fensive CW capability must be modernized. (DOD already has underway a major program to upgrade our defensive CW posture.) To overcome Congressional objections, DOD would propose that the President certify the need for a production decision and also commit the U.S. to vigorous international negotiations on CW restraints.

Over the past several years, the U.S. has had desultory discussions in the CCD, and even more limited talks with the Soviets, about possible treaty restraints on the possession and production of CW (first use of CW is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol). Attempts to define internally our position on acceptable CW restraints (NSSM 157, 192, and short follow-on papers) have faltered over the problem of verification, and the perception that the Soviets would not accept on-site inspection on challenge. Recently, however, the Soviets have given some indication that they may be prepared to accept some on-site inspection—such as verification of the destruction of declared stocks. This factor, plus DOD's new proposal for a possible treaty regime, opens the possibility for more productive CW talks than before. In DOD's view, construction of a binary production facility could pressure the Soviets to be forthcoming in CW negotiations, and would also permit us to proceed with the necessary modernization of our CW capability if the talks fail.

The contrary views, as developed in the NSSM studies, hold that:

—Real upgrading of NATO's offensive CW capability is a remote possibility, given our Allies' lack of that capability and no discernible inclination to acquire such, and German objection to greater forward deployment in the regions where chemical munitions would be needed quickly to retaliate against Soviet use.

—Retaliation in kind to a CW attack is unlikely to be effective. Tactical nuclear weapons would probably be required to redress the military advantage the Soviets would obtain by introducing CW.

—Our best hope to neutralize the Soviet CW offensive capability is to improve greatly NATO's CW defensive capacity, and to achieve the maximum possible CW treaty restraints. Soviet cheating on any CW treaty cannot be ruled out, but given their political concern over being exposed, any illegal retention of chemical weapons or production facilities would give them a capability that would be considerably reduced and constrained in comparison to the situation today.

—It is doubtful that proceeding with a binary production facility will help in our negotiations, and could, in fact, send the wrong signal. The obstacle to negotiations has been the lack of our own position.

[Omitted here is a list of the tabs containing Scowcroft's briefing materials.]
128. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting

Washington, December 29, 1976, 3:07–4:03 p.m.

SUBJECT
Binary Weapons Chemical Facility

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman OMB
William G. Hyland
Don Ogilvie
Robert Howard

State
Charles Robinson
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

ACDA
Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Thomas D. Davies

Defense
Col. Don Mahlberg
Dr. James P. Wade

NSC
William G. Hyland
Dr. David Elliott
Michael Hornblow

JCS
Gen. George S. Brown

CIA
Enno Knocke
Carl Weber

Hyland: The problem as I understand it is that the DOD proposal for $15 million in the budget for a binary CW production facility was turned down. Don Rumsfeld reclaimed and it was agreed to have this meeting. I think we all know the DOD position. My question is: What is the relationship between the budget proposal and DOD’s draft CW treaty. What happens if you don’t get the funds?

Wade: We are trying to move to improve our CW posture. This is now more important and has a higher priority because we have taken no action in the last couple of years. The binary facility is a long-lead item and an important element in our CW posture.

Hyland: But how do you handle Congress. Is this just a bargaining chip?

Wade: If we brief Congress frankly about what we know regarding the Russian CW program, I think we could get Congressional support.

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2 The copy of the minutes located in the Kissinger Papers (see footnote 1 above) is missing the first page. This portion of the published conversation is based upon a transcription, prepared by the editor, of a draft version of the minutes found in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 24, Meeting Minutes—Senior Review Group, November–December 1976.
Hyland: You wish to begin modernization and start preparing to produce binaries in two years, and at the same time we would begin to negotiate. We would also continue R&D in the CW area.

Wade: The possibility of an acceptable international agreement limiting CW is not high.

Brown: We are trying to keep the binary option open.

Hyland: Suppose we put the money in the budget. Then maybe Congress would say to hell with it. What does that do to our leverage at the negotiating table?

Wade: The two should be linked. Frank discussions with Congress would help bring them around. We can’t maintain a balance in Europe using only our mechanized forces. We have to increase the pressure against Soviet use of CW. We have been stalemated for the last couple of years and the problem needs to be faced up to.

Ikley: We don’t have a U.S. negotiating position on CW. In a year’s time we could probably get an agreement, but without verification.

Hyland: The U.S. could not accept an agreement without verification.

Robinson: There is some give on the Soviets’ part in that area.3

Dr. Ikley: Even if we started to produce binaries, it is doubtful that it would give us much leverage in verification negotiations. There would not be much leverage coming out of a small production facility. The leverage would have to result from political factors. The problem is that we have been sitting on the fence for so long. I don’t think we should go ahead at this time with a production facility. It does not require all that much lead time.

Dr. Wade: This is a long lead item which requires two years.

Dr. Ikley: But in a real emergency, it might not take that long.

Mr. Robinson: I am comparing the $15.8 million under question vs. the $8.8 million in the FY 76 budget for ordering long delivery items. Are we talking about two different things?

Dr. Wade: $2 million is for rehabilitation and $13 million is for equipment.

Mr. Robinson: So that figure includes the equipment and the installation.

Dr. Wade: It could be a significant half step forward and might be useful in the negotiations. I cannot say definitely what effect it might have.

Dr. Ikley: If there were an impasse, it might help.

3 The remainder of the minutes is in the Kissinger Papers.
Mr. Davies: But we have never made a negotiating proposal.
Mr. Hyland: What is in the Soviet draft treaty, a total ban?
Mr. Davies: Yes, eventually.
Gen. Brown: It is for new production: They won’t destroy the facilities they have.

Dr. Ikle: It presents us with massive verification problems. We can, though, observe the destruction of facilities. Once the negotiations start, there may be some give on the Soviet side.

Mr. Robinson: I have some technical questions. One question is about the efficiency of the binary artillery shell vis-a-vis the present one.

Dr. Wade: There is no degradation. They are the same.
Mr. Davies: There is slight degradation on a per pound basis.
Col. Mahlberg: It is not militarily significant.

Mr. Robinson: My second question is that effective use of CW requires lots of shells concentrated in one area. Given the limitation on tubes, wouldn’t you have to cut back on some conventional artillery support?

Dr. Wade: It depends on your objectives. There are different scenarios.

Mr. Davies: We are short of artillery today.
Gen. Brown: Haig is more concerned now about a CW attack than a conventional attack.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Are binaries the answer?
Gen. Brown: They would be [of] some use. We have none today.
Mr. Hyland: Why is our proposed response an offensive one? Why not have a substantial increase in our defensive capabilities?

Dr. Wade: If we go into a completely defensive posture that gives the Soviets the option to attack at a time and place of their choosing.
Gen. Brown: We are only talking about $15 million.

Mr. Hyland: But there is the possibility of much larger expenses in the future. Don’t the Soviets have an active program of protective measures?

Gen. Brown: Yes, at present they could fight in an environment they create.

Dr. Wade: Both sides would be affected and would have to wear masks.

Mr. Davies: Both sides would be slowed down.
Mr. Hyland: Don’t we have some capability in West Germany?
Dr. Ikle: Yes, but it is all in one place. In case of a war you could ship more over if there were time. Binaries would give you some advantage.

Gen. Brown: We can easily sit here and quick-talk ourselves out of this decision.

Dr. Ikle: I was explaining your side of the story and saying that one of the reasons for going to binaries is that it would be easier to ship.


Mr. Robinson: My understanding is that if a decision is made to go ahead that in ten years the cost would add up to $1 billion. A long lead time of two years is required. The State Department feeling generally is that we haven’t really explored the possibility of an agreement with the Soviets. We have not made a counter offer. If we fail in an effort to get the Congress to spend the $15 million, it would weaken our bargaining position. Then there is the problem of West Germany. They would not be impressed by our assurances on safety. For the Germans there are more important psychological and political concerns. We would have a problem in determining what we could store in a forward position. State feels we should not go ahead at the present time.

Dr. Ikle: The German position is fundamental. Perhaps we should see if we can get the Germans to agree to store binaries.

Dr. Wade: We are talking about FY–78 money.

Mr. Hyland: Congress has turned it down the last two years. The two main problems are how to get it in the budget and how to get it through Congress.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We need to make some sort of answer to the Russians. It has been a year and a half.

Mr. Hyland: I am worried about a full blown proposal being killed in Congress. Many of the people up there say lets try first to negotiate. We should have talks with the Russians about verification. These could be technical talks about how to verify without saying to them what we propose. We could tell Congress that on the basis of these technical talks we plan to develop a negotiating position next fall.

Dr. Wade: It might be a viable way to start. Congress might accept it.

Mr. Hyland: We could put it in the budget and tell Congress that we are going ahead to have serious talks with the Russians.

Dr. Ikle: We should have a larger reexamination of our position in light of verification problems. The present stockpile in the Soviet Union is a key problem. We could probably agree to cut down on new production and verify that. We can verify the visible things but there is no way to verify the stockpiles. There is some disingenuousness in our position.
Mr. Robinson: (to Mr. Hyland) Your compromise seems palatable to me personally but I don’t know about the Department. If you could give me a draft of your proposal I could take it back so that we could reconsider our position. Basically we are opposed to the $15 million expenditure. However your suggestion might cause us to reconsider.

Mr. Hyland: My proposal is that we would put the $15 million in the budget. Simultaneously we would propose to the Russians and also inform Congress that we are prepared to hold technical talks with the Russians on verification and the limitation of chemical weapons and on the basis of these talks we could make a proposal. We would use that decision with Congress and go along on a parallel track. If the arms control discussions succeed then the binaries are irrelevant. If they don’t work then we will have to face up to a major threat.

Mr. Ogilvie: You are talking about a bargaining chip?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It’s keeping your options open.

Gen. Brown: The Hill might react that way—that it is a bargaining chip—but we should stand behind it.

Mr. Ogilvie: Look. It is a long time before FY ’78 starts. Not until September 1977. No commitment could be made for at least a year. We have the option of telling the Soviets of our intentions and to start negotiating with them now. We would so advise Congress. We could use this as a bargaining chip with the Soviets and see if we can or cannot get an agreement.

Dr. Ikle: That is illusory. You could not get an agreement in that time providing for verification.

Mr. Ogilvie: There is a year to find out.

Dr. Ikle: There are two ways of having an agreement. One would be without verification. The second would be a partial agreement limiting new production.

Mr. Ogilvie: I have real worries about the Hill. If the Hill says no for a fourth time then we have lost a lot of leverage.

Dr. Ikle: The USSR would be willing to sign an agreement without verification. Maybe after one or two years there could be some progress on the verification issue.

Mr. Ogilvie: With regard to the budget there is a technical problem. Even if we acted today it would be extremely difficult to get the numbers changed. We could do it today or possibly as late as Monday. The budget is in page proof now and we expect to lock it in final very shortly. In order to get a change in the budget we would have to go to the President and we would need a memo for the President. This would be very difficult in such a short time. The other option is to keep the budget as is and have the President submit a supplemental.
Mr. Hyland: Would there have to be a Presidential determination that it is in the national interest?

Dr. Wade: Only for actual binary production.

Mr. Ogilvie: There are legal differences of interpretation. It would be interpreted as a production decision and would require a Presidential determination.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It is not a production decision, it is just a decision to keep our options open.

Mr. Ogilvie: That would not reflect the intent of Congress. They would view this as a production decision requiring a determination.

Gen. Brown: Well if the President approves the $15 million, there should not be any problem in getting a determination.

Mr. Hyland: So there is no consensus in this group.

Mr. Robinson: Right. We would like to reserve our vote until we can review the paper to the President outlining the alternatives.

Dr. Ikle: Our view is that it should not be put in the budget. Although the $15 million is a small amount it would be a red flag and cause a great deal of commotion on the Hill and among the public. It is already flagged as an important issue in the Defense Posture statement. A new negotiating position is not for us to develop but for the new Administration. We should become more honest in our position.

Gen. Brown: What could really be done in negotiations?

Dr. Ikle: We could have an agreement in a year without verification provisions and some progress toward verifying stockpile destruction.

Dr. Wade: But as long as our posture is zero the possibility of an accord is zero.

Gen. Brown: Why would the Russians want to negotiate?

Dr. Ikle: We still have our old stock.

Gen. Brown: We could get a telegram out to Vail4 tonight.

Mr. Hyland: All we could say is that we had a meeting and there was no agreement.

Dr. Ikle: There should be some explanation in it as to why we have not made a counter proposal in Geneva. The reason is verification problems.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If the President were to advocate this, he could say that we have been unable to make a responsible statement on the subject because of verification problems, and, secondly, he could men-

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4 Ford vacationed in Vail, Colorado from December 19 to January 2, 1977. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)
tion the cumulative effect of Soviet forces in the area. The other possibility is that we need to use more imagination to see if there is some way to negotiate. There is nothing lost by waiting another year to update the facility and resolve our problems with our Allies. We could make one more major effort.

Mr. Ogilvie: That is up to the next Administration.

Mr. Hyland: If it is not in the budget then it is not an issue.

Mr. Ogilvie: If it is not in then we have until September to ask for a supplement.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: In the memo to the President it should be pointed out that if we put the money in and Congress then takes it out, we loose leverage.

Mr. Hyland: The variable is to what extent the Russians will let us inspect. If they agree to inspection it is a new ball game. We should explore that and see how they feel about it. We could make a proposal that both sides destroy X tons and no more. Something like that could be verified.

Mr. Davies: Is the remainder of military consequence?

Mr. Robinson: $15.3 does not bother me. I am concerned with the rationale. What can be achieved is the important thing.

Gen. Brown: What if you assume that Congress will go along with having the $15 million. Would that give you leverage?

Dr. Ikle: It might give you some leverage.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We would loose leverage if it squeaks by Congress. The opposition would then become more vociferous. There could be an outcry and controversy and Congress might then reverse itself.

Dr. Wade: The timing of the presentation is important. We could advise Congress we are starting technical talks but that we would not spend money for a year.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That would get you leverage but it is risky.

Dr. Ikle: If this scenario leads you to residual stocks, then it is better to have these stocks in binaries.

Gen. Brown: Your worry about Congress might be true. But on the other hand there is growing concern in the country regarding the fundamental imbalance of power between us and the Russians. I have just been going through our posture statement. It is depressing. It is awful. I think we are going to start getting a reaction in this country. In the next year the new team, the general public and Congress will all be educated.

Dr. Ikle: First we should have a position on negotiations. In light of that perhaps a production facility would be in order.
Mr. Hyland: You are still opposed to the $15 million now?
Dr. Ikle: Yes, it is putting things in reverse order.
Mr. Ogilvie: If you take this to the President it is important that Jack Marsh have some input. He was involved originally when the President expressed his concern about the public reaction. This is more than a meeting of the SRG. It is a budget decision that Marsh was originally involved with.
Mr. Hyland: There is no agreement to recommend that the budget be reversed. That split should be reported to the President. DOD through Don Rumsfeld has the right to reclama. I will report to Brent Scowcroft that there was no agreement. It was 2 vs. 2. DOD will reclama through Lynn.

129. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Civil Defense—NSSM 244

In July 1976, you directed a comprehensive review of US civil defense policy. During your recent review of the FY 1978 Defense budget, you deferred decision on the civil defense program pending completion of the NSSM 244 study. That effort is now completed and was reviewed by the NSC Senior Review Group on December 21.

The Senior Review Group reached a consensus on the following points:

—Our present civil defense efforts are relatively ineffective.
—We should begin focusing on feasible survival options and consider reorienting our current program.
The U.S. civil defense program should consider the order of priorities in the wider context of attack preparedness and post-attack recovery. Industrial protection in particular may be important to post-attack recovery and needs to be studied.

A significant beginning toward a more effective, reoriented program can be achieved without any significant funding increase at this time.

A 1978 funding level of $90 million, $6 million more than 1977, was recommended by the NSC Senior Review Group (you tentatively approved the $88 million recommended by OMB; Defense had originally requested $108 million). This level will include $15 million for improved planning which is directed toward possible reorientation and selection of priorities. Although the Senior Review Group did not explicitly address management options, it was implicit in their discussion that the civil defense program should move away from supporting natural disaster-related activities and concentrate on nuclear attack preparedness.

Follow-On Studies

NSSM 244 also identified a number of priority items for additional emphasis and examination. A follow-on study is recommended to review post-attack recovery requirements. In addition, the Intelligence Community should be directed to give increased attention to additional and more definitive examination of Soviet civil defense efforts. A draft NSSM is being prepared for your consideration which would direct these further efforts.

Recommendations

Based upon the NSSM 244 reports and the interagency consensus reached in the Senior Review Group meeting, we recommend that you now:

a. Direct that the civil defense program be reoriented to practical survival options.

b. Approve a 1978 funding level of $90 million for civil defense to include $15 million for improved planning which emphasizes needed reorientation and prioritization.

c. Reaffirm your decision that the civil defense program exclusively support nuclear attack oriented programs.

Decision

Ford initialed his approval.
130. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) and the President’s Assistant for Management and Budget (Lynn) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Binary Chemical Weapons Production Facility

Secretary Rumsfeld has appealed your decision to deny funding of $15 million in the FY 1978 Defense budget to establish and equip a facility to produce binary chemical artillery projectiles. This facility would be a first step toward a possible modernization of chemical munitions at a total cost of about $1 billion.

In your review of this issue, the following arguments were pointed out in favor of the Defense request:

—U.S. offensive chemical warfare capability is poor relative to the Soviet’s and is slowly deteriorating. We have no present ability to replace obsolescent chemical munitions.
—Binary munitions are safer to manufacture, transport and store than current munitions.
—Existing stocks of chemical munitions will need eventual replacement if we are to maintain an offensive capability.

The following considerations argued against approval of the facility:

—There is no urgency for production of binaries. Some chemical munitions are already forward deployed in Europe.
—Though Defense believes that a modernized CW capability would be a greater deterrent against Soviet employment of chemical weapons, more emphasis on our defensive capability may be sufficient response to the Soviet CW threat.
—Strong Congressional opposition exists to production of binaries (funds were denied by Congressional action on the FY 1975 budget; the FY 1976 Defense Authorization Bill forbids production of binaries unless explicitly authorized by the President).
—Approval of the facility may be premature until arms control initiatives can be better explored.

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1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 30, Subject File, National Security—Chemical Warfare. Secret. Sent for action. A memorandum, January 3, from Connor to Ford was found attached that reads: “OMB and NSC would very much like your decision on this matter by early tomorrow morning in order for it to be reflected in the Budget.”

2 See Document 121.
Secretary Rumsfeld has appealed your decision on the grounds that funding of the facility would:

1. Preserve our options concerning future modernization of the stockpile.

2. Provide a strong, but not provocative signal to the Soviets that we are prepared to rebuild our chemical warfare capability if an effective arms control agreement cannot be reached.

3. Reverse the growing imbalance in U.S.–USSR offensive CW capabilities, while continued inaction would result in increased risk to NATO and possibly lower the nuclear threshold in Europe.

Because the possible production of binary offensive weapons raises fundamental policy matters, the question of the Defense appeal was considered at a meeting of the NSC Senior Review Group.3 No consensus was reached at this meeting.

Defense reaffirmed the need to provide an option for binary production. Funding of the facility would not presume a commitment to produce binary munitions. Approximately two years would be required to prepare the facility for production. Defense believes that the following rationale could be used in presenting this matter to Congress: (1) The U.S. has not yet presented a CW arms control proposal because we have not been able to solve the verification problem and (2) the cumulative effect of the Soviet CW effort is such that we have determined it necessary to take action now to preserve our options and are requesting the minimum amount needed to do this.

ACDA does not favor funding the binary weapons facility in the 1978 budget and argues that initiation of a program to produce binaries is premature, prior to a decision on the U.S. negotiating position on chemical weapons limitations. It engenders unnecessary controversy domestically and internationally without significant gains in national security. This would detract from the President’s broader and more important message on his defense budget.

State sees no urgency in the construction of this facility and argues that we should first proceed with a response to the Soviet proposal for a CW treaty in an effort to determine the possibility of a CW agreement. State points out that while a visible step toward modernizing our offensive chemical capabilities might possibly provide some negotiating leverage, possible Congressional denial of the request could leave us in a weakened negotiating position. Insofar as the case for binaries assumes increased peacetime forward deployment, it should be noted that we have not yet determined whether the FRG would oppose further deployment of additional chemical weapons, including binary weapons,

3 See Document 128.
on their territory. Current information suggests that such additional deployments would be opposed.

**Recommendation**

That you reaffirm your decision to deny 1978 funding of the binary facility. (State, ACDA and OMB recommend)

Alternatively, that you

—Allocate $15 million within current totals for the binary facility in the FY 1978 defense budget. (NSC recommends)

—Include $15 million for the binary facility in the FY 1978 defense budget. (Defense and Jack Marsh recommend)

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4 Ford initialed his approval.

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131. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford**


[Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 61, NSDM 312 (1). Top Secret. Sent for action. Three pages not declassified.]

132. **Editorial Note**

On January 12, 1977, President Ford delivered his final State of the Union Address before a joint session of Congress. Following a review of his administration’s domestic and foreign policies, a substantial portion of Ford’s address, broadcast nationally live via radio and television, was devoted to national defense:

“America’s first goal is and always will be peace with honor. America must remain first in keeping peace in the world. We can remain first in peace only if we are never second in defense.
"In presenting the state of the Union to the Congress and to the American people, I have a special obligation as Commander in Chief to report on our national defense. Our survival as a free and independent people requires, above all, strong military forces that are well equipped and highly trained to perform their assigned mission.

"I am particularly gratified to report that over the past 2½ years, we have been able to reverse the dangerous decline of the previous decade in real resources this country was devoting to national defense. This was an immediate problem I faced in 1974. The evidence was unmistakable that the Soviet Union had been steadily increasing the resources it applied to building its military strength. During this same period the United States real defense spending declined. In my three budgets we not only arrested that dangerous decline, but we have established the positive trend which is essential to our ability to contribute to peace and stability in the world.

"The Vietnam War, both materially and psychologically, affected our overall defense posture. The dangerous antimilitary sentiment discouraged defense spending and unfairly disparaged the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces.

"The challenge that now confronts this country is whether we have the national will and determination to continue this essential defense effort over the long term, as it must be continued. We can no longer afford to oscillate from year to year in so vital a matter; indeed, we have a duty to look beyond the immediate question of budgets and to examine the nature of the problem we will face over the next generation.

"I am the first recent President able to address long-term, basic issues without the burden of Vietnam. The war in Indochina consumed enormous resources at the very time that the overwhelming strategic superiority we once enjoyed was disappearing. In past years, as a result of decisions by the United States, our strategic forces leveled off, yet the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant buildup of its own forces, committing a high percentage of its national economic effort to defense.

"The United States can never tolerate a shift in strategic balance against us or even a situation where the American people or our allies believe the balance is shifting against us. The United States would risk the most serious political consequences if the world came to believe that our adversaries have a decisive margin of superiority.

"To maintain a strategic balance we must look ahead to the 1980s and beyond. The sophistication of modern weapons requires that we make decisions now if we are to ensure our security 10 years from now. Therefore, I have consistently advocated and strongly urged that we pursue three critical strategic programs: the Trident missile launching submarine; the B–1 bomber, with its superior capability to penetrate modern air defenses; and a more advanced intercontinental ballistic
missile that will be better able to survive nuclear attack and deliver a devastating retaliatory strike.

“In an era where the strategic nuclear forces are in rough equilibrium, the risks of conflict below the nuclear threshold may grow more perilous. A major, long-term objective, therefore, is to maintain capabilities to deal with, and thereby deter, conventional challenges and crises, particularly in Europe.

“We cannot rely solely on strategic forces to guarantee our security or to deter all types of aggression. We must have superior naval and marine forces to maintain freedom of the seas, strong multipurpose tactical air forces, and mobile, modern ground forces. Accordingly, I have directed a long-term effort to improve our worldwide capabilities to deal with regional crises.

“I have submitted a five-year naval building program indispensable to the Nation’s maritime strategy. Because the security of Europe and the integrity of NATO remain the cornerstone of American defense policy, I have initiated a special, long-term program to ensure the capacity of the Alliance to deter or defeat aggression in Europe.

“As I leave office I can report that our national defense is effectively deterring conflict today. Our Armed Forces are capable of carrying out the variety of missions assigned to them. Programs are underway which will assure we can deter war in the years ahead. But I also must warn that it will require a sustained effort over a period of years to maintain these capabilities. We must have the wisdom, the stamina, and the courage to prepare today for the perils of tomorrow, and I believe we will.”

SUBJECT
Navy Shipbuilding Program

The President has reviewed the results of the National Security Council Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements, and has decided that the United States and its Allies must in combination maintain a superiority in maritime capability that can deter or defeat the Soviet threat in a timely manner. The United States must also maintain maritime forces capable of carrying out other U.S. military requirements. The shipbuilding plan which will assure the accomplishment of these goals should:

—Provide for steady growth in active ship force levels to attain and maintain an active force of about 600 ships in the mid-1990s.
—Maintain a balanced force of ships which includes a mix of units with high individual capability and a larger proportion of ships with lower individual capability.
—Proceed at a pace which provides both real growth in funding and industrial capability to maintain existing fleet units at high levels of readiness while the shipbuilding program is being carried out.
—Cancel procurement of the previously requested NIMITZ-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN–71) and proceed as rapidly as practical to construct a new class of V–STOL aircraft carriers.

Accordingly, the President has decided on a shipbuilding plan which is derived from Option 1 in the study, with modifications. The following table shows the approved five-year shipbuilding plan:

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 68, NSDM 344. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of the OMB. Scowcroft forwarded the draft NSDM to Ford under a covering memorandum, January 13, with the recommendation that the President approve it. Scowcroft’s memorandum noted that Ford had reviewed the NSC study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements (Document 110) during the NSC meeting held on December 2, 1976, records of which are Documents 115 and 116. Scowcroft also wrote: “The attached draft NSDM describes the fundamental rationale and content of your five-year shipbuilding program. The issuance of a NSDM is appropriate because it completes the NSC review of the Navy shipbuilding program and provides a decision document to establish formally your five-year program.” (Ibid.)
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<sup>2</sup> Service Life Extension Program. [Footnote in the original.]
134. National Security Decision Memorandum 345


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT
U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities

The President is concerned about the increasing use by the USSR of space-based assets for direct support of their military forces. This trend, which can be expected to continue and which is typified by the Soviet use of ocean surveillance satellites to provide real-time targeting data for long-range anti-ship missiles, is substantially increasing the effectiveness of Soviet forces. It represents a direct military threat to the combat forces of the United States. In light of these developments, the President has reassessed U.S. policy regarding acquisition of an anti-satellite capability and has decided that the Soviets should not be allowed an exclusive sanctuary in space for critical military supporting satellites.

Policy with Respect to U.S. Anti-Satellite Capability

The President wishes to emphasize that the United States will continue to stress international treaty obligations in space, including free use of outer space and non-interference with national technical means. However, to counter the direct military threat posed by certain Soviet space assets not covered by the terms of current treaty obligations, as well as to protect against higher level conflict situations in which the Soviets might abrogate current agreements, the President has decided that the United States should acquire a non-nuclear anti-satellite capability which could selectively nullify certain militarily important Soviet space systems, should that become necessary. In order to be able to use such an anti-satellite capability in a reversible, less provocative way at lower crisis thresholds, as well as to accomplish more permanent kill in high level crises and conflicts, means for both electronic nullification and physical destruction should be pursued.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 68, NSDM 345. Top Secret. Copies were sent to General Brown and to Bush. Scowcroft forwarded the NSDM to Ford as an attachment to a memorandum, January 14, in which he recommended that Ford approve it. Ford initialed his approval of Scowcroft’s recommendation. (Ibid.) This is the NSDM referenced in Scowcroft’s memorandum to Ford, December 16, 1976, which is Document 123.
U.S. Anti-Satellite Capability

The President directs that the Secretary of Defense take immediate steps toward the acquisition of non-nuclear anti-satellite capability, including means for electronic nullification as well as physical destruction.

An anti-satellite interceptor should be acquired on an expedited basis. It should be capable of destroying low altitude satellites and of nullifying a small number (6–10) of important Soviet military satellites within a period of one week.

A separate capability to electronically nullify critical Soviet military satellites at all altitudes up to synchronous should also be acquired on an urgent basis.

In order to avoid stimulating Soviet actions to counter electronically U.S. high altitude COMINT and ELINT collectors, the “fact of” a U.S. electronic anti-satellite capability should be classified and special compartmented security procedures should be used to protect the confidentiality of the existence and detailed characteristics of the program. Special procedures should also be established to review and authorize tests of electronic techniques. The “fact of” a U.S. low altitude anti-satellite interceptor should be treated as unclassified and normal security procedures applied to the program details.

Arms Control Initiatives

The President further directs the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to identify and assess arms control initiatives that would complement development of a limited anti-satellite capability in an overall policy toward military space activities by:

1. Restricting development of high altitude anti-satellite interceptor capabilities.

2. Raising the crisis threshold for use of an anti-satellite.

3. Clarifying acts which constitute interference with space systems.

This effort should be coordinated with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence. It should not delay the acquisition actions called for in this memorandum.

Brent Scowcroft

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture

I have completed my review of the NSSM 246 report on U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture and have reached the following conclusions with respect to the policies and strategies which are necessary to preserve our security.

To ensure the credibility and strength of our military deterrent across the full spectrum of potential conflict, our overriding aims must be to maintain:

—A strategic balance with the Soviet Union that guarantees the United States will never be in an inferior position.
—An adequate American contribution to the defense of the NATO area.
—A global capability designed to meet those challenges outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact area that threaten vital U.S. interests.

1. Strategic Forces

To be credible to the Soviets, the U.S. strategic deterrent must be adequate both for a massive retaliatory strike against any Soviet attack as well as capable of launching varied effective responses to less-than-all-out Soviet first strike. A range of credible options is thus critical to maintaining deterrence, as well as to escalation control, satisfactory war termination, and postwar recovery. Therefore, the nuclear employment policy directed by NSDM 242 is reaffirmed, as amplified below.

U.S. strategic nuclear force planning should be guided by the following general principles:

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 69, NSDM 348. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Directors of OMB and ACDA, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Administrator of ERDA. Scowcroft forwarded the NSDM to Ford under a covering memorandum, January 19, with the recommendation that he sign it. Scowcroft, who reminded Ford that the NSDM would be the last NSC directive of his administration, wrote: “As you requested, after the NSC meeting [of December 15, 1976, the record of which is Document 120] I have drafted a NSDM related to the NSSM 246 study on strategic and conventional forces.” (Ibid.)

2 See Documents 105 and 113.
—The United States must continue to maintain a Triad composed of land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. Specific programs to modernize each of the Triad elements are indispensable in light of the projected military balance in the next decade. A modernized Triad will constitute our principal strategic deterrent for the foreseeable future. It will continue to provide the force diversity necessary to assure that U.S. strategic forces can perform as required across the full spectrum of possible conflict, complicate any Soviet plan for disarming attack, and hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs or catastrophic failures.

—Our strategic nuclear forces should be capable of meeting targeting requirements against political, economic, and military targets related to postwar recovery; permit flexible response options; and provide a strategic reserve.

—Our strategic nuclear forces should also be capable of denying Soviet military advantages by providing an unqualified assurance of a second strike against Soviet strategic and peripheral nuclear attack forces and other military targets, after a Soviet first strike against U.S. strategic forces. In particular, the United States should move toward an effective counter-silo capability against residual Soviet ICBMs.

—Our strategic nuclear forces should not, however, in fact or appearance be such as to persuade the Soviets that we have, or are seeking, a disarming first strike capability, if we perceive that this is not an objective of Soviet policy.

—Because stability in times of crisis is critical to deterrence, measures must be developed to assure the future survivability of the U.S. ICBM force.

—Strengthening of our strategic nuclear force posture to accomplish these objectives can be compatible with the Vladivostok SALT limitations on strategic forces, and should provide a strong incentive to permit negotiated reductions in total numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

2. General Purpose Forces

The security of Western Europe and the integrity of the NATO alliance must remain a foundation stone of U.S. policy for the foreseeable future. The modernization and growth in capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces which NATO would confront in conflict can be met with appropriate modernization and posture adjustments by the U.S. and its NATO allies without need to fundamentally alter the agreed NATO strategy. The following principles should guide U.S. planning:

—The responsiveness of U.S. and Allied conventional forces to potential attack should be designed to cope with both a short warning time as well as attacks with larger and better prepared forces after
lengthier periods of warning. To meet these objectives, increases in U.S. prepositioned equipment and supplies in Europe should be made as warranted.

—The current program to provide U.S. sustaining capability for 90 days of conflict should be continued. In addition, U.S. Allies should be encouraged to increase their own sustaining capabilities to 90 days. Achievement of the complex and long standing NATO objectives of standardization and interoperability of equipment, and capacity for mutual support, may well be the critical ingredients in improving European ability to sustain a conflict. This effort should be encouraged.

—Pending further assessment as to how the United States might best participate in the collective defense of the flanks, current planning for U.S. capabilities on NATO’s flanks should be continued.

—Planning for European defense should continue to include the aim of achieving a better overall balance through negotiated reductions in the MBFR context.

The United States should continue to maintain a strong theater nuclear capability. Our theater nuclear forces serve as a hedge for theater defense should conventional defense fail; deter Soviet theater nuclear attacks; and provide a linkage to strategic forces, a particularly important element in our NATO posture.

There will be a considerable, and perhaps growing, potential for crises outside of Europe. The United States must have as one of its objectives to strengthen its worldwide capabilities. This calls for careful attention to the planning of U.S. general purpose forces for non-NATO contingencies, focusing on the potential force requirements for a wide variety of possible conflicts, the strategic mobility requirements to move force elements to crisis areas, and the overseas base structure and access rights necessary to support such force commitments.

3. Arms Control

The foregoing guidelines are dictated by national security. It is equally important to our security that we make a genuine effort in arms control negotiations on both the strategic and regional levels, seeking a more stable balance through a series of agreements. Such agreements on an equitable and verifiable basis could provide a reduction in the demand on defense resources, with no diminution in national security, while enhancing overall stability and advancing world peace.

Gerald R. Ford
Intelligence and the Experiment in Competitive Analysis

136. National Security Study Memorandum 178


MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Program for National Net Assessment

In furtherance of his memorandum of November 5, 1971 concerning the organization and management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, the President has directed the initiation of a program for the preparation of a series of national net assessments.

As a first step in this process, the President has directed that a paper be prepared which would:

—Define the national net assessment process, and discuss the range and types of topics that would be addressed.
—Discuss methodology appropriate for use in preparing net assessments.
—Establish reporting and coordination procedures for the program.

The President has directed that this paper be prepared by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and chaired by the Director, Net Assessment Group, of the National Security Council staff.

The report of the Ad Hoc Group should be completed by May 15, 1973, and forwarded for consideration by the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 365, NSSMs—Nos. 104–206. Secret.


3 Marshall, the group’s Chairman, sent Kissinger a memorandum, undated, in response to the NSSM. Marshall’s memorandum discusses net assessment methodology and the range and type of topics that net assessments might address. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–199, Study Memoranda, NSSM 178 [1 of 2])
137. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 13–8–73


CHINA’S STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS

PRÉCIS

China has arrived as a nuclear power. Over the past several years China has deployed on the order of a hundred strategic delivery vehicles—half missiles and half bombers—and stockpiled nuclear weapons to go with them. These weapon systems have the range to hit US forces and bases in Asia as well as targets in the eastern USSR, but cannot attack the continental US. With optimum success in its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) development program, China might gain a capability against the continental US [5 lines not declassified] missiles probably could survive a Soviet disarming attack even if it employed nuclear weapons. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Chinese have now acquired at least the beginnings of a credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR.

There is no doubt that the Chinese intend to become a major nuclear power. In addition to the large ICBM now under development, they are working on an SSBN system and there is a very extensive program for the development and production of solid-propellant rocket motors for strategic missiles.

The total Chinese effort is an ambitious one relative to the resources available, but in relation to US and Soviet programs it remains a small effort and its pace is such that after 15 years of work China does not appear to be catching up to the superpowers.

THE ESTIMATE

1. The Chinese have developed a significant capability for strategic nuclear strike by bombers, and by missiles all around the periphery of China. They are estimated to have operational:

[9 lines not declassified]
—some 60 Tu–16 Badger bombers, with a radius of action of 1,650 nm, deployed at four airfields.

[5 lines not declassified]

2. The deployment pattern of these forces is aimed at a capability to strike around the entire periphery of China. The launch sites of both the CSS–1 and the CSS–2 are dispersed in a way to insure coverage of US bases and installations to the east and south of China as well as of targets in India and the USSR east of the Urals. The Tu–16 bomber could cover all these areas.

3. This regional coverage will be extended, possibly starting as early as 1974, by the deployment in silos of the CSS–X–3. [1½ lines not declassified] While the upper end of this range would be sufficient to reach Moscow [1½ lines not declassified] the CSS–X–3 could not reach any part of the US except a small part of Alaska.

4. Chinese programs for developing weapons that could hit the continental US are moving forward, but not, as yet, with a great deal of apparent success.

—The Titan II class CSS–X–4 ICBM has the potential to cover all of the US [5 lines not declassified]
—A program for a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) system is under way, but the lead unit will not become operational until [less than 1 line not declassified]
—There is no evidence of Chinese development of an intercontinental bomber; even if one were now being designed, it probably would not be operational before [less than 1 line not declassified]

Chinese Strategic Capabilities

... against United States Forces and Bases in Asia

5. Launch sites for the CSS–1 and the CSS–2 are grouped opposite South Korea and Japan, opposite Taiwan and Okinawa, and opposite the Philippines and Southeast Asia. While the CSS–1 covers only targets or approaches to China in the immediate area, CSS–2s are located so that the ones opposite Korea and Indochina can cover Taiwan, and those opposite Taiwan can cover Korea and much of Southeast Asia. The Tu–16 bomber could cover all these areas, as well as reconnoitering and attacking US naval forces in the western Pacific. Thus any US base or force in the Far East is within range of a substantial number of missiles and bombers.

6. [3 lines not declassified] they have deployed some CSS–1s in locations where they could be used to cover possible invasion routes from Korea, Taiwan, or Indochina.

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3 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy believes that the first SSBN and its missile system could reach IOC by [date not declassified] [Footnote in the source text.]
7. The Chinese have shown that they consider survivability to be the key to their strategic missile deployment. From the beginning of CSS–1 deployment in 1966, some units were deployed in the semimobile mode. [17 lines not declassified]

... against the USSR

8. Many of these forces are also within range of the USSR. A few CSS–1s in Manchuria can hit the Soviet maritime province. All the CSS–2s, except a half dozen in southern China, can hit some part of southern Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The Tu–16s have the range to penetrate the USSR as far as the Urals from forward bases in China. Despite this ability and the apparent Chinese concern with the Soviet threat, the deployment has shown no marked anti-Soviet bias. The Chinese retaliatory capability against the USSR will grow over the next few years as more CSS–2s are deployed and as the CSS–X–3 reaches initial operational capability (IOC).

9. [12 lines not declassified] Consequently, the Chinese probably believe they now have acquired the beginnings of a credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR.

10. But the Chinese no doubt feel that their deterrent force remains vulnerable and marginal in several respects:

—[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]
—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]
—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

... against the Continental United States

11. While the USSR has been within range of Chinese nuclear attack for several years, it will be several more before the continental US is vulnerable. The CSS–X–3, if fitted with a payload weighing about 2,000 pounds and deployed in northern China, could reach a number of important targets in the northern US. [7 lines not declassified] the only CSS–X–3 silos observed under construction are beyond the range of the continental US, even with a 2,000 pound payload. [6 lines not declassified]

12. The CSS–X–4 ICBM program has been plagued by delays and mishaps. This very large missile dates back at least to 1967, when work began on the launch pad at the test center. Construction of the test pad proceeded at a deliberate pace, [12 lines not declassified]

13. [17 lines not declassified]

14. [12 lines not declassified]

15. Like the CSS–X–4, China’s program to develop a SSBN system is both a measure of China’s determination to achieve a credible deterrent and an illustration of the hazards of forecasting rates of progress
toward that goal. It is probable that China’s modern high-speed attack submarine is nuclear-powered. But this submarine is now back at a shipyard [6 lines not declassified]

16. If a missile were ready for the submarine by late 1976, the entire system could be operational by [less than 1 line not declassified] allowing a minimum time for testing the integrated system and achieving readiness for operations. If missile flight testing does not begin soon, or if serious difficulties are encountered, the IOC of the entire system would be delayed [29 lines not declassified] Thus it appears that the Chinese are committed to a substantial solid-propellant program, and could start flight tests at any time.

The Chinese Approach to Their Strategic Programs

18. Chinese strategic attack programs represent, in sum, an attempt to build the strategic capability befitting a major power. These programs are generally well-conceived and include all the elements of a balanced strategic force. When considered in relation to Chinese technical resources, they represent a rather ambitious effort, even building on the substantial know-how and material aid furnished initially by the USSR and the great amount of technical information in the public domain. When considered in relation to US and Soviet programs, however, Chinese strategic programs represent a small effort and slow progress. After 15 years, China is still a considerable distance from an intercontinental capability, and does not appear to be catching up to the superpowers.

19. Even so, the programs generally show no great sense of urgency. They are carried out systematically and at a deliberate pace. The R&D programs often show the results of the comparatively small numbers of people working on them. If successful, test results are not confirmed by a large number of follow-up tests. If unsuccessful, correction of the failures sometimes takes a long time. The Chinese do not always do things the way the US or the USSR would do it, but they show they understand the principles and are working steadily at the job.

20. Reflecting limited Chinese resources, R&D and deployment is carried out with an economy of means. Many fewer missiles or nuclear devices have been tested than is US or Soviet practice to arrive at similar products. The CSS–2 development program, for example, was characterized by relatively few test firings by US and Soviet standards, and was spread over a period of 4–5 years. [5½ lines not declassified].

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4 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy believes that the first SSBN and its missile system could reach IOC by [date not declassified] [Footnote in the original.]
Economy of means was also evident in the design of the CSS–X–3. It consists essentially of the proven CSS–2 as the first stage plus a smaller liquid-propellant second stage. The CSS–X–3, in turn, was used as China’s first space-launch vehicle with the addition of a fairly small third stage. And the CSS–X–4 probably will be used to orbit photoreconnaissance or communications satellites before it is operational as an ICBM.

Considerations with Regard to Future Forces

21. Judgments as to whether China will emphasize capabilities against the USSR or the US in the future, and at what rate strategic programs will move toward their objectives, are obscured by a marked slowdown [2½ lines not declassified] production of Tu–16s was cut in half in 1972; and there have been no space shots for two years. [1 line not declassified]. This lack of activity can be explained in part on technical or programmatic grounds, but it is possible that a more general explanation also applies.

22. The slowdown may reflect fallout from the death of Lin Piao and the subsequent purge within the military leadership. Any diversion of resources from military programs could have been the result of the reduced role and influence of military leaders. It may also be that China’s leaders have re-evaluated defense priorities and policies and decided that China’s strength would be greater in the long run if a larger portion of their limited resources were devoted to building up the economic base of the country, rather than to immediate military use. It could be that no decision has been made on these issues, and that the slowdown reflects indecision arising from a continuing power struggle in the leadership. And, finally, it may be that with the reconciliation of China to the world, the US withdrawal from Vietnam, and the de-escalation of the Sino-Soviet disputes from military to diplomatic confrontation, Chinese leaders do not feel impelled to push as hard as in the years of crisis.

23. But whatever the cause, it seems likely the present policy disputes will be resolved and technical problems overcome, so that military programs again will move ahead, more rapidly than in the past year and a half, but with greater regard for the achievement of a more balanced economic growth.

24. As for the question of disarmament, Peking has stated its willingness to engage in discussions aimed at total nuclear disarmament.

5 Lin Piao (Lin Biao), PRC Minister of Defense from 1959 to September 1971; Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee (Politburo) from August 1966 to September 1971. Lin died in September 1971 when his plane crashed in Mongolia, following what appeared to be a failed coup to oust Mao. Following Lin’s death, he was officially condemned as a traitor by the Communist Party of China.
This is, of course, a propaganda stance, and does not necessarily mean that the Chinese always would oppose discussions on arms limitation short of total nuclear disarmament. They are determined, however, to have no part of any agreement which might freeze China in a state of marked inferiority.

25. While these are reasonable estimates of how things may go, Mao’s past record of leading the nation abruptly and unpredictably into sweeping changes of policy—such as the Great Leap Forward, the split with the Soviets, and the Cultural Revolution—makes projections of Chinese national policy especially hazardous. These uncertainties are compounded by the probability that Mao and Chou and other veteran leaders will pass from the scene before long and be succeeded by a new generation of leaders of whom almost nothing is known.

26. Despite the potential uncertainties of policy, the constraints on and momentum of weapons development and production can at least be used to set limits on what can reasonably be accomplished in the growth of the Chinese strategic forces. Thus, given the long lead times and technological difficulties of intercontinental systems, regional forces capable of attacking only Eurasian areas will predominate over the next several years.

27. Force projections under alternative assumptions might be as follows:

—If the Chinese show little more urgency and no greater rate of development progress over the next several years than in the past year or so, they may have by mid-1978 some 140 missiles and an equal number of Tu–16 bombers for use against peripheral targets, including those in the USSR, but only some 15 ICBMs and one or two SSBNs for use against the US.

—If the Chinese develop new missiles more rapidly and allocate more resources to both regional and intercontinental forces, they could have by mid-1978 some 200 missiles and an equal number of Tu–16s for use against peripheral areas, and some 30 ICBMs and a few SSBNs which could attack the US.

—With optimum success in developing missile systems, and some shift in resources to hasten their deployment, the Chinese might by 1978 have a peripheral force of about the same size as the first case above, but qualitatively improved, and some 40 ICBMs and several SSBNs capable of attacking the US.

6 The alternative force developments presented here represent possible directions that Chinese strategic attack forces could take. It should be emphasized that no one of them is to be considered an estimate that Chinese attack forces will be composed of the particular weapon systems in the precise numbers listed. They are intended only to be illustrative models of possible trends and differing emphases, and are developed primarily for broad policy use at the national level. They are not intended for defense planning purposes; projections developed for planning in the Department of Defense are included in the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP). [Footnote in the source text.]
28. Whatever the composition of the force, it is certain that the Chinese will have no more than a deterrent capability vis-à-vis the US and the USSR (considerably greater vis-à-vis the USSR) throughout the 1970s. Small in relative numbers, deficient in necessary accuracy, and lacking sophisticated penetration aids and multiple re-entry vehicles, China’s missile force will have no counterforce capability. An early warning system to cover only the approaches from the USSR may be operational within three or four years, but even in this case warning times will be minimal because of the short distance from Soviet missile bases to Chinese targets, and China will probably have to continue to rely on the survivability of its force and the deterrent value of a retaliatory capability.

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

138. National Security Decision Memorandum 224


TO

The Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

National Net Assessment Process, NSSM 178

The President, upon review of the paper prepared and submitted in compliance with NSSM 178\(^2\) and the comments of the NSCIC Principals thereon, has approved the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group and wishes to proceed with a program of national net assessment. To this end:

—A permanent Net Assessment Standing Committee is established, having representation from the Departments of State and Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and chaired by a representative of the National Security Council Staff.

—Requests for net assessments will be issued as National Security Study Memoranda.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs Nos. 145–264. Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer.

\(^2\) Document 136.
—Net assessments prepared in accordance with these NSSMs will
be forwarded to the Chairman of the NSCIC for review by that
Committee.

Addressees should forward to me the names of their repre-
sentatives to the Net Assessment Standing Committee.

Henry A. Kissinger

139. National Security Study Memorandum 186


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
National Net Assessment of the Comparative Costs and Capabilities of U.S. and
Soviet Military Establishments

The President has directed the preparation of a series of national
net assessments under the guidelines approved in NSDM 224.2 The first
national net assessment will evaluate the comparative costs to the U.S.
and the USSR to produce, maintain, and operate comparable military
forces. It will assess the status of the competition between the U.S. and
USSR in maintaining such forces, trends in the competition, significant
areas of comparative advantage or disadvantage to the U.S., and the
nature of opportunities and problems implied.

The President has directed that the analyses and comparisons re-
cquired by this net assessment be prepared by the Department of De-
fense, in consultation with the Net Assessment Group/NSC, and with
the assistance of the Department of State and the Director of Central
Intelligence.

The complete assessment will cover all aspects of U.S. and Soviet
military forces, and will take place over a long period of time. The ini-
tial part of the net assessment will focus specifically on the ground

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Sub-
ject Files, NSSMs—Nos. 104–206. Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer.
2 Document 138.
forces on each side. Comparisons of interests will include the costs and performance of comparable military units. The analysis should highlight the major determining factors in costs and performance on each side, and any evident trends.

A first report on the net assessment of U.S. and Soviet ground forces should be forwarded to the Chairman, NSCIC, by 1 November 1973.\footnote{NSDM 239, November 27, transferred responsibility for the net assessment process from the NSC to the Department of Defense, thereby rescinding this NSSM. However, NSDM 239 specified that “the study required by NSSM 186 should be completed under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs Nos. 145–264)}

Henry A. Kissinger

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140. Special National Intelligence Estimate\footnote{Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files, SNIE 11–4–73. Top Secret. [Handling restriction not declassified] The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the Treasury participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except for the FBI’s representative, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.}


[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS PROGRAMS AND DÉTENTE: WHAT ARE THEY UP TO?

NOTE

On 9 July 1973, Soviet authorities signed to press an editorial in the CPSU journal \textit{KOMMUNIST}—that may well rank as the most optimistic assessment of the prospects for US-Soviet relations printed in the USSR in the last decade. The editorial reiterates that peaceful coexistence does not mean “a weakening of the class struggle in the international arena” but actually promotes such Soviet interests as the “national liberation movement” and the fight against “bourgeois ideology.” It struck a new note, however, in asserting that US-Soviet relations have passed a historic and fundamental turning point for the
better, that “considerable obstacles” already exist to prevent a reversion to Cold War relations, and that political détente involves military détente in “organic” combination.

On the same day, the Soviets conducted [less than 1 line not declassified] flight test of a true MIRV system on board the SS–X–17 ICBM.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to understand the intentions and motivations behind Soviet policy evidenced by recent events: on the one hand, the foreign policy apparently aimed at a far-reaching détente with the US and its Allies; and, on the other hand, the vigorous pursuit of weapons development programs that portend substantial improvements in Soviet strategic capability.

PRÉCIS

In the months since the strategic arms accords were signed in May 1972,2 the Soviet government has increasingly stressed its commitment to a policy of détente with the US and the West. Certainly a number of Soviet political interests ride on this policy, Brezhnev’s own prestige is heavily tied to it, and its collapse would be very unsettling to Soviet leaders. At the same time, the Soviets have been conducting a vigorous and wide-ranging program of strategic weapons development clearly aimed at a major modernization of their strategic forces.

This Estimate assesses the relationship between these two strains of Soviet policy. Its principal judgments are:

—Current Soviet development programs for ICBM force modernization were well underway in May 1972 and do not appear to have been altered by the Interim Agreement. The Soviets do not feel they are constrained from proceeding with extensive modernization of their deployed ICBM force.

—However, the Soviets have undertaken activities that raise serious questions for the US about the verifiability of the Interim Agreement and about Soviet willingness to respect US unilateral declarations. These activities include: possible development of the SS–X–16 as a mobile ICBM; continuation of concealment practices for this development; and construction of new large silos, beyond the numerical limit established by the Interim Agreement, which are probably intended as launch control facilities yet whose purpose cannot now be verified. The activities in question, although they certainly originated in normal Soviet planning, imply de facto tests of US resolve on the rules of SALT compliance. Whether these tests are intentional and how determined they prove to be must await evidence on Soviet responses to whatever protests the US makes.

—We doubt that the leadership has made a determination either to settle for strategic parity with the US or to strike out for superiority. The former would require abandonment of aspirations too firmly lodged in the Soviet system and pressed by Soviet military institutions to be entirely suppressed; the latter would require more optimism about a de-

2 See footnote 3, Document 2.
clining US vitality and more faith in Soviet prowess than the leaders could confidently hold.

—We believe the Soviet leadership is currently pursuing a strategic policy it regards as simultaneously prudent and opportunistic, aimed at assuring no less than the continued maintenance of comprehensive equality with the US while at the same time seeking the attainment of some degree of strategic advantage if US behavior permits. The Soviets probably believe that unilateral restraints imposed on the US by its internal problems and skillful Soviet diplomacy offer some prospect that a military advantage can be acquired. To this end, they can be expected to exploit opportunities permitted them under the terms of SALT. At the same time, since they cannot be fully confident of such an outcome even as they probe its possibilities, they are probably also disposed to explore in SALT the terms on which stabilization of the strategic competition could be achieved.

—It is quite likely that the Soviet leaders see no basic contradiction between their détente and arms policies. Indeed they have publicly said as much on numerous occasions. Even if they do recognize a potential for conflict, they are probably uncertain about how far the US is prepared to insist on linking the two, and hence are probably inclined to test what the traffic will bear.

—This view of the Soviets’ stance implies that they cannot be persuaded to moderate their current weapons programs except on two conditions: (1) they are persuaded that the unrestrained progress of those programs will provoke US reactions that jeopardize both their opportunistic and their minimum or prudential objectives; and (2) at the same time, they can conclude that, if their programs are restrained, reciprocal restraints will be placed on US strategic programs sufficient to assure attainment of Soviet prudential objectives.

—The question is whether they will come to the view that they cannot have both substantially improving strategic capabilities and continuing benefits of détente—simultaneously and indefinitely. The US is unlikely to obtain answers without further direct exploration and negotiation. The US will not get the Soviets to respond to specific concerns on SALT compliance without frankly stating them. And we have estimated above that they are not likely to curb new programs unless they are persuaded both that US reactions to such programs would jeopardize their minimum objectives and that Soviet restraint would be reciprocated. But precisely what price, in terms of strategic limitations, the Soviets will prove willing to pay for détente remains to be tested. 3

[Omitted here is the estimate, a postscript, and an annex.]

3 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believed this Estimate stops short of answering the original question, “What are the Soviets up to?” The available evidence suggests a strong Soviet commitment to achieving both numerical and qualitative strategic superiority over the US. They probably view détente as a tactic to that end. Whatever its other advantages, the Soviets need détente to bring about a slowdown in US technology. They need to gain access to US guidance and computer technology, to buy time to redress their current technology imbalance and to exploit what they consider to be a favorable opportunity to attain a technological lead during the next 10 to 15 years. The Soviets are no doubt aware of the impact détente is already having on NATO and US defense outlays and in gaining easier access to US technology. Accordingly they must view détente as a principle means of forestalling access to US advances in defense technology while enhancing their own relative power position. [Footnote in the original.]
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Soviets are now well into a broad range of programs to augment, modernize, and improve their forces for intercontinental attack. This round of programs—which follows hard on a large-scale, sustained deployment effort that left the USSR considerably ahead of the US in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and in process of taking the lead in submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers—was conceived long before the Interim Agreement was signed in May 1972, and most of the programs involved were already evident or foreseeable at that time. Nevertheless, they represent a breadth and concurrency of effort which is unprecedented, particularly in the field of ICBM development. Questions thus arise concerning Soviet willingness to accept additional limitations on their intercontinental attack forces and the potential effect on the strategic balance if such limitations are not imposed.

The Soviets are presently testing four new ICBMs—one as a follow-on to the SS–13 and probably also as a mobile missile, one as a follow-on to the SS–9, and two as replacements for the SS–11. All four incorporate new guidance and reentry systems, and two of them a new launch technique. Three have been tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), though two of these three

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 455, NIE 11–8–73. Top Secret. [Handling restriction not declassified] The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB, except for the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.

2 This Estimate is concerned with the major elements of Soviet strategic attack forces specifically intended for intercontinental attack—ICBMs, certain SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The present size and composition of these forces are summarized in paragraphs 3 (and accompanying table), 49 and 58 of the Estimate. Other Estimates, e.g., NIE 11–10–73, “Soviet Military Posture and Policies in the Third World,” and the NIE 11–13 and 11–14 series dealing with Warsaw Pact forces for operations in Eurasia, discuss other forces with some strategic and tactical intercontinental capabilities. [Footnote in the original.]

3 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the new missile systems now under test which use the cold launch technique will be likely to have a refire capability. See his footnote to paragraph 48 of the Estimate for further discussion. [Footnote in the original.]
have also been tested with single RVs. The other employs a post-boost vehicle (PBV) which could be used to dispense MIRVs, but all tests to date have been with a single reentry vehicle (RV). If testing proceeds smoothly, all could be ready to begin deployment as early as 1975 or soon thereafter.

Meanwhile the Soviets have begun introducing a new version of the widely deployed SS–11, with three non-independently targetable reentry vehicles (MRVs), at three complexes in eastern Siberia and two in the Ukraine. At the latter complexes, existing SS–11 silos are now being converted, either for the SS–11 variant or for one of the follow-on missiles. Conversion of existing SS–9 silos to accommodate the SS–9 follow-on has also begun at one complex.

Production of the 12-tube D-class submarine, with its 4,200 nm missile, is continuing apace, with construction of a stretched version large enough to carry 16–18 tubes now under way. In addition, the Soviets are well along with the development of a longer range (1,600 nm) missile with MRVs for the widely deployed Y-class submarine and are preparing to test a follow-on to the larger missile carried by the D-class.

The new swing-wing strategic bomber we call Backfire is being introduced into Long Range Aviation (LRA). All Agencies but Army and Air Force believe it best suited for peripheral missions, and CIA and Navy believe it is primarily intended for this role. Army and Air Force believe that Backfire is suitable for a variety of missions including intercontinental attack, but that it would be prudent to await additional evidence before making a judgment on its primary role.

The present Soviet activity doubtless reflects in part internal bureaucratic and technological drives and the concerns of a country which still sees itself in a dynamic strategic competition with the US and also has concerns about China and other potential foes. However, the present Soviet effort involves more than can readily be explained as merely trying to keep up with the competition.

On the one hand:

—The Soviets have long indicated a need to catch up in MIRVs and other aspects of technology if they are to continue to be accepted as strategic equals of the US. They appear genuinely concerned about such US programs as Trident, B–1, and SRAM.

—Increased concern for survivability is reflected in development of harder silos and launch control facilities for the new Soviet ICBMs and probably figured in the apparent Soviet interest in land mobile ICBMs, in the desire to expand the SLBM force, and in introduction of the long-range missile for the D-class submarine.

—The Soviet emphasis on MIRVs and the apparent interest in greater targeting flexibility for ICBMs probably reflect an expectation of a growing requirement to plan for various contingencies, increasingly involving China and perhaps other peripheral targets as well as the US.
—In this connection, analysis completed within the last year indicates that though all Soviet ICBMs can be directed against the US, over 300 standard SS–11 silos—roughly the last third of the force to be deployed—were specifically oriented so as also to provide full coverage of China or more extensive coverage of other peripheral areas. The broad targeting flexibility of the SS–11 which makes this possible has been further extended with the new SS–11 variant now being deployed—and presumably also with the new ICBMs.

On the other hand, Soviet actions almost certainly reflect a hope that vigorous pursuit of their opportunities under the Interim Agreement and any subsequent accords that may be achieved will enable them to improve their relative position vis-à-vis the US. Though they have probably not decided whether they could get away with it, their objectives probably include an opportunistic desire to press ahead and achieve a margin of superiority if they can. Thus:

—The MIRVing of the large SS–9 follow-on, the SS–X–18, and evident Soviet interest in greater accuracy for ICBMs almost certainly reflects a desire for improved ability to strike at US strategic forces—a factor long stressed in Soviet strategic doctrine.

—The Soviets must recognize that extensive MIRVing of their ICBMs would threaten to leave the US behind in independently targetable weapons, as well as in delivery vehicles.

—Each of the new ICBMs has substantially more throw weight than the missile it is evidently designed to replace. Deployment of the new systems in large numbers would thus provide the USSR with an even greater advantage in missile throw weight than now exists.

In sum, the Soviets have been laying the groundwork for very substantial improvements in already large and formidable intercontinental attack forces. This process is not yet irreversible, and the Soviets may prove willing to accept some curbs on it within the broader context of their détente policy. Nevertheless, they have shown little disposition to exercise voluntary restraint.

How far the Soviets will go in carrying out current programs will depend in the first instance on the outcome of SALT II and, in particular, on how successful the US is in persuading them that they cannot have both substantially improving strategic capabilities and the benefits of détente, simultaneously and indefinitely; that unrestrained pursuit of present programs will provoke offsetting US reactions which could jeopardize their competitive position; and that restraint on their part would be reciprocated.5

4 See footnote 3, Document 2.
5 See SNIE 11–4–73: “Soviet Strategic Arms Programs and Détente: What Are They Up To?” dated 10 September 1973, Top Secret, All Source, for a further discussion of Soviet strategic policies and programs in the present context of SALT negotiations and détente. [Footnote in the original.]
In absence of a new agreement constraining the Soviet strategic buildup, the Soviets will presumably continue most of the broad array of programs now under way. Moreover, they are continuing to expand their large research and development facilities. Early development is probably already under way for new or improved follow-ons for the new missile systems now in flight test.

Our examination of various ways in which such a buildup might proceed leads us to believe that under no foreseeable circumstances in the next 10 years are the Soviets likely to develop the ability to reduce damage to themselves to acceptable levels by a first strike against US strategic forces. The Soviets would have to calculate that the US would be able to make a devastating reply to any Soviet surprise attack.

Except with a minimal effort, however, the Soviets, if unconstrained, are likely by the early 1980s to surpass programmed US forces in numbers of missile RVs and increase their considerable superiority in missile throw weight, while retaining their advantage in numbers of delivery vehicles. These static measures of strategic power would convey an image of a margin of Soviet superiority to those who ascribe high significance to these measures.

In addition, the Soviet strategic forces now being developed—whatever their specific makeup—will probably have better counterforce capabilities than the present ones. How much better will probably remain a matter of considerable uncertainty.

—Unless Soviet ICBMs obtain better accuracies than [2 lines not declassified] they would have to assign more than one weapon to each target to disable a large portion of the US ICBM forces.
—However, we will probably be unable to determine the accuracies of the new Soviet ICBMs with confidence. And we will probably remain uncertain about both the feasibility of attacking targets with more than one weapon, which involves some technical problems, and about Soviet willingness to rely on this tactic.
—All in all, the strategic relationship over the next decade is likely to be much more sensitive to uncertainties like these than to more readily measurable factors such as launcher or weapon numbers. More than ever, the strategic, and especially the political impact of the Soviet buildup will probably depend a great deal on how it is perceived abroad, in the US and elsewhere.

[Omitted here is the estimate.]
142. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 8, 1974, 2:37–3:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
PFIAB
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Maj. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Adm. Anderson: You gave us a chance to report on energy. Two days before the Middle East crisis. We did a post mortem on the intelligence failure. It was a failure of interpretation. Leo Cherne did a paper on the economic intelligence problem and is using it intelligently. We worked on the Navy problem. We sent you a preliminary report saying it was worse than you thought. We think this is a very serious situation.

First, we must have a response to the NSSM. Then come up with a plan to make the Navy well. There are problems of policy and bureaucracy which need correcting.

We had a briefing today on NRO. It’s very well run. You need to eliminate the layers and echelons which delay progress. This is true of all the Services.

The Soviet Union is turning out 10 new subs—we are turning out one. They turn out more scientists at a rate of 15 to 1. We spend 5% on personnel; the Soviet Union spends 20%. They conscript; our recruiting is not getting the caliber of people required. It will take your leadership to give us a Navy second to none. So we can engage our Navy in most areas of the world.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1028, Memcons—HAK & Presidential, January 1–February 28, 1974 [1 of 3]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room.
2 At the time, PFIAB members included: Anderson (Chairman), Foster, Baker, Cherne, Rockefeller, Teller, Galvin, Luce, Land, Gray, and Byers (Executive Secretary).
3 PFIAB last met with the President on October 4, two days before Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israel, sparking the Arab-Israeli War. No record of that meeting was found.
5 Not found.
6 PFIAB’s “Report to the President Regarding His Objective of a U.S. Navy ‘Second to None,’” February 8, is summarized in Document 143.
7 A reference to NSSM 177, printed as Document 12.
In the Middle East crisis in October, they had 23 subs in the Mediterranean.  

Dr. Teller: There is too much emphasis on big ships. There is no emphasis on small ships, which mean many targets.

President: Have you included the Allied navies?

Adm. Anderson: They can contribute in local areas, but their capability is limited. In the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Japan, the Eastern Mediterranean, they are not much use. In a crunch, there is doubt they would really be with us or give their bases.

The Soviet Union has redundant communication and we have a ponderous system.

Our command organization should be looked at. These don’t cost money, but to correct the forces will cost money and that will come from other services or an increased budget.

President: An interesting footnote—Stalin emphasized near the end of World War II a naval build-up. It started then. Part of the Soviets’ problem is that a navy can’t survive without discipline. They can’t have commissars in the navy. Our navy is old. As you know, I increased the DOD budget. That flies in the face of popular will, particularly with the end of Vietnam, etc. What concerns me is whether the increase is a result of the services dividing up the pie rather than having a strategy.

We have to come down on Schlesinger on Command and Control. In getting orders carried out—perhaps civilian control. We didn’t really unify the services. Schlesinger has to get control of Command and Control.

But what sort of navy is bigger than the Department of Defense? The NSC must do it. We must have a strategic plan—what we will and won’t do. We need DOD’s ideas, but we need an input from everyone.

What do we need the navy for? Where?

The navy wants it for showboats. The navy would just say: give us more dough for the best navy. That is not the answer. What do we need a navy for?

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8 In a December 19 memorandum to Nixon, Anderson wrote, “The recent scenario played out in the Middle East brings into sharper focus the fact that the issue of superiority of our naval power is in tenuous, very uncertain, balance.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–198, Study Memorandums, NSSM 177 [1 of 3])
Like the Air Force, which couldn’t fight a guerrilla war. We are a disaster in tactical air. Give the Navy more money and they will just add to what they have. We’ve got to know what we are after.

Schlesinger is a good man and a good manager. We had the best Navy, not just the biggest.

In Europe we have 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons but don’t know what to do with them.

On the quality of men—we must look at that also. Baldwin has a devastating article in the Saturday Evening Post that the Navy is in bad shape in manpower, morale, etc. Didn’t the Navy get a big chunk of the supplemental?10

Kissinger: Yes, but it is not a matter of how much they get but how they spend it. The Services are logistic procurers, not strategists. Most of our ships can’t go through the Suez and Panama Canals.

Our submarines are designed around power plants.

Rockefeller: Zumwalt said no one wants to tell the people the shape the Navy is in. If he were asked to make such a plan, they are so bureaucraticized they couldn’t think big enough. He said they need a strategic study group.

Dr. Gray: I am an old Army man. But the issue is not whether we have a Navy as good as the Soviet Union’s, but whether we have a Navy which can protect commerce of the world. This is our #1 strategic problem.

Adm. Anderson: Suppose someone put pressure on Japan. We couldn’t protect our lines to Japan or the U.S.-Japan shipping lanes.

Rockefeller: We are talking about maybe $100–200 billion to put the Navy back into shape.

President: This relates to our negotiations. We will probably have some kind of standoff. They may be looking for massive conventional superiority. Not that they plan to use them, but for bluff. In the Middle East, we had a few cards; but we started an airlift and called an alert.12

Rockefeller: You played the cards well.

President: When the two great powers are engaged, a game of chicken isn’t very good. We have to have strength they will respect.

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10 See Document 27.
11 See footnote 9, Document 28.
We took a big bite for the DOD budget increase, but I think we will get it. We may need more, but if it is a big increase, what will the Soviet Union do? Match us or negotiate?

Schlesinger must get to work immediately.

Kissinger: We’ll have to do it in the NSC process.

President: They are all good men, but they are part of a system. When I leave office I don’t want to leave us weaker with respect to our opponents.

Rockefeller: Maybe it is time for a reorganization study of the Department of Defense.

Kissinger: We had one at the beginning of your first term.

President: The answer is yes. We have run into this Command and Control thing time and time again.

Dr. Galvin: If a study shows there is a Navy gap, can we tell the public?

President: Sure. The problem is our weak-kneed Allies and the Soviet Union. If we start the program, everyone will say why? The Allies will be scared, and the Soviet Union will be emboldened.

It could be sold to our people, though.

Mrs. Luce: The public will support the Navy if it’s put in terms of protecting the right of the world to trade. How does one get that going?

President: That’s well stated. Let’s compare Army strength. They (the Soviets) are much bigger, but they need more. In numbers, we each need the same. But in the Navy, we need more because we are a two-ocean power. They don’t have the need or the responsibility. We have to do this without scaring our Allies and the neutrals or encouraging the Soviet Union to adventure or to match us. But we need bigger defense and we will get it.

I got your R&D report13 and Ash—you know we have internal fights here too—points out that private enterprise will spend $200 billion a year. If the price is right, private enterprise will do it, and the government has to get out of the way. We must do what is economically impossible. Another point—what are the potential shortages of raw materials?

In the Soviet Union and China, we have old leadership. What will come after they go? What we must get across to our people is that the only hope for peace is for the U.S. to stay strong—but we have to pursue the diplomatic path also.

13 Not further identified.
A Navy study has to be done by the NSC. But Schlesinger has guts and I’d like to see him take a crack at it.

Adm. Anderson: The German Navy showed us how difficult it is to defend in the North.

Rockefeller: Could we add on economic strategy to this?

President: Sure.

Mrs. Luce: Aren’t we talking about an interdependent world? That gives us a reason for a big Navy to protect commerce for an interdependent world.

But what kind of Navy do we need to protect the sea lanes? The same kind as we need to beat the Soviet Navy?

President: We have a lot of bright guys out of the Service academies, but in time of peace they stagnate. We got to get them involved.

Rockefeller: We’ve got to focus on our national problems and not on each other.

President: Some of that is inevitable. But maybe this is a time to go after it.

The thing we must realize is that the world has been changing dramatically.

Look at Europe today. None of them plays a significant role in the world. They are leftist and weak: the only people with governments are maybe the Spanish, Greeks and Turks.

Latin America doesn’t matter, nor does Africa. Japan could become a great force again—if there is doubt about the will of the U.S. Japan must make a deal with the U.S. or go on their own. In the whole world there is a shrinking from responsibility. Maybe the U.S. doesn’t even have the guts. This would be safe if it weren’t for the Soviet Union and China.

Rockefeller: We are very grateful that you met with us.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Report on the U.S. Navy by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has submitted a report to you entitled “A Report to the President Regarding His Objective of a U.S. Navy ‘Second to None’ (Tab B).”

Background

At a meeting with the PFIAB on October 4, 1973, you directed the Board to assess the adequacy of U.S. naval forces, emphasizing the importance of maintaining our Navy “second to none.” On February 8, 1974, you again met with the PFIAB. At that meeting, Admiral George W. Anderson, Chairman of the PFIAB, indicated that the Board had completed its assessment of the Navy, and he summarized principal conclusions of the review.

The PFIAB report portrays a highly negative picture of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance, which it characterizes as tenuous and uncertain. It indicates that the Soviets, in situations of their choice, could effectively oppose U.S. naval forces, and thereby diminish the utility of the U.S. Navy as an instrument of foreign policy. The PFIAB report recommends a national commitment under your leadership to recoup U.S. naval preeminence, and it recommends substantial increases in funds for the Navy. The report specifically recommends that National Security Memorandum (NSSM) 177—entitled “Military Missions Involving Naval Forces”—be completed as a matter of urgency, and that you direct the Secretary of Defense to submit a comprehensive cost analysis and time-phased plan to achieve the goal of naval superiority.

Comments

Clearly, we all share Admiral Anderson’s concern that we maintain a strong and adequate Navy. However, as Admiral Anderson has
indicated, a clear perception of the threat, what is expected of the Navy, and an integral assessment of naval requirements in conjunction with other strategic priorities are prerequisites to any national commitment. The study we have underway in the NSC system—NSSM 177—is intended to provide that perception. Before undertaking any major new commitment, or providing substantially increased resources, we should first acquire the more definitive understanding which should result from the current NSC study.

The results of the on-going NSC study, combined with those of the PFIAB review, will further illuminate the relative capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet navies, and will assist in the delineation of the practicable options available to maintain our naval strength.

I have prepared a letter to Admiral Anderson, citing the value of the PFIAB report to future decisions concerning U.S. naval forces and expressing appreciation to the PFIAB members and staff for their efforts.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Admiral Anderson at Tab A.6 [Dave Gergen concurs in the text of the letter.]

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6 The President’s signed letter, March 18, is attached, but not printed.
7 Special Assistant to the President, January 1973–August 1974.
Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to the charge you gave your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on March 14, 1969, our April meeting was devoted to a comprehensive examination of the strategic threat. We met with principals in the Defense and Intelligence communities and carefully considered the latest estimates of present and future Soviet capabilities and the US strategic force structure.

The consensus of the Board is that the strategic forces of the USSR are continuing to grow, in quantity and quality, essentially unabated by the interim Strategic Arms Limitation agreement; further, that the Soviets may soon have within their grasp the capability to achieve nuclear weapon superiority over the US and its Allies. We make this judgment notwithstanding the fact that the People’s Republic of China temporarily represents a net strategic gain to the US since it poses no direct threat to us and causes the USSR to divide its forces. France’s medium-range ballistic missile capability also contributes to a diversion of some Soviet strategic weapons. Nevertheless, the sum of what Russia already possesses and the anticipated results of their research and development (R&D) programs are serious cause for special national concern. We believe the Soviets perceive themselves as approaching the threshold of strategic superiority and that this is a situation of unique significance—unparalleled in Russian history—which will give rise to even greater uncertainties regarding their conduct of foreign affairs.

The Board readily acknowledges the historic importance of SALT I, yet notes no diminution of Soviet strategic programs, as evidenced by their:

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 278, Agency Files, PFIAB, Vol. 8 (1973). Secret. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Colby. Byers forwarded the letter to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum of April 30, which noted that Rockefeller and Kissinger had reviewed a draft of the letter on April 24. (Ibid.)

2 In his statement, March 14, 1969, announcing the deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, Nixon also announced that he had directed PFIAB “to make a yearly assessment of the threat which will supplement our regular intelligence assessment.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 218) EO 11460, March 20, 1969, which reestablished the board, directed it to review foreign intelligence and to report its findings to the President. The EO is Document 188 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972.

3 No record of the meeting was found.
• sustained efforts to improve existing weapons systems;
• extraordinary commitment to R&D; and
• continuing development of widespread civil defense measures.

With regard to the intelligence required to support your foreign policy initiatives in this area, Mr. President, we observe that:

• The Intelligence Community continues to refine its ability to evaluate those Soviet weapons systems being tested and those which are operational. [13 lines not declassified]

• The latest National Intelligence Estimate, “Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack” (NIE 11–8–73),4 states that “under no foreseeable circumstances in the next ten years are the Soviets likely to develop the ability to reduce damage to themselves to acceptable levels by a first strike against US strategic forces.” We believe the statement pays insufficient tribute to the potential for rapid technological advances in general or to Soviet achievements in particular, and have asked the Director of Central Intelligence to personally reassess the basis for this judgment.

• In a similar context, the possibilities are rated poor that the USSR will achieve a major scientific breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology in the next ten years. We acknowledge the technical difficulties involved, but given the magnitude of overall Soviet R&D efforts and the clear strategic advantage the Soviets would achieve if they were able to detect US submarines, we believe the Intelligence Community must place greater emphasis on those Soviet programs which appear to have ASW applications, for example—Soviet laser technology, which receives high priority in the USSR.

• The SIOP (Single Integrated Operations Plan), prepared by the Defense Department, assigns US strategic forces to Soviet targets. Periodically, the SIOP is war-gamed against an assumed Soviet war plan known as the “RISOP” (Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan). Both reflect intelligence assessments provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The outcome of the SIOP and RISOP significantly influences not only strategic force planning, but national defense strategy as well. [3½ lines not declassified] Although your Board’s principal effort was directed at a strategic threat assessment, the members feel impelled to include some observations on the implications of the Soviet threat for the US:

• Critics inaccurately label US strategic force improvements as a subterfuge for the US to achieve a first-strike capability. This is a diversionary argument which inhibits the upgrading of our strategic defense and must not be allowed to stand. We believe that your own clear percep-

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4 Document 141.
tion that the Soviets can be successfully negotiated with only from a position of strength and resolve needs your repeated public affirmation to counter defense critics in Congress and the media.

- Similar misunderstandings contribute to under-emphasis of those R&D areas requiring greatest effort if the US is to maintain a technological edge over the Soviets. In particular, we believe laser weapon technology should be given higher priority, and that a breakthrough in ASW should be sought by enlisting the very best scientific talent the nation has available.

- Perhaps of greatest underlying significance is the absence of a national strategic plan which clearly spells out, for all Government departments, US policy towards the Soviet Union, the means by which this policy is to be pursued, and the priority for the objectives sought. Too often we find various echelons of the US Government interpreting “détente” for themselves and the public in terms which do not take adequate cognizance of larger economic, political or security implications. There is no yardstick against which policy interpretations can be measured, nor is there a comprehensive statement of objectives to resolve the evident conflict between the desire to expand US export markets and the desire to restrict the flow of materials contributing to the refinement of Soviet strategic capabilities. We urge that a comprehensive national strategic plan be promulgated as a matter of priority under National Security Council auspices.

As a final note, Mr. President, we observe that intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic forces require both the keenest possible technical evaluation as well as sophisticated value judgments of Soviet perceptions—of themselves as well as of other nuclear powers. In evaluating Soviet missile system capabilities, the possible range of performance characteristics is enormously extended by minute technical variations in the manipulation of available raw data. Value judgments of Soviet intentions are, in turn, also influenced by our perception of Soviet capabilities. We believe that the users of intelligence—principally US negotiators—must continually bear in mind the uncertainties which prevail in these areas and the ambiguities they portend.

Respectfully yours,

George W. Anderson, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Chairman
145. Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Report on the Strategic Threat by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

1. Admiral Anderson has made available to me a copy of his letter to you dated April 30, 1974, containing PFIAB’s annual assessment of the strategic threat. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on the Board’s recommendations about U.S. strategic policy and the public presentation of it, or about the priority which should be accorded to certain U.S. R&D programs. I would, however, like to comment on three other aspects of the Board’s conclusions—the prospects for Soviet strategic superiority, intelligence requirements to support U.S. strategic policy, and the uncertainties in intelligence estimates.

2. In the estimate of “Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack” (NIE 11–8–73) which I submitted with the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board in January of this year, a distinction was drawn between two different measures of strategic power. One involves equality or superiority in quantitative terms. The second considers deterrent and war-fighting capabilities. The message of NIE 11–8–73 is that:

—The U.S. faces very substantial improvements in the USSR’s strategic attack forces.
—By the early 1980’s these improvements are likely to convey an image of superiority to those who ascribe significance to quantitative measures.
—While through these improvements the Soviets will increase their counterforce capabilities—notably against the U.S. Minuteman force—they are not likely to be able to negate the U.S. deterrent under any circumstances we can foresee over the next ten years.

A corollary of this forecast is that the Soviet Union could be perceived as having a superiority of forces and a political advantage in the calculations of other nations, despite the continued ultimate effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 84R01033R: Speeches/Lectures/Briefings Files, Box 1, Briefing to PFIAB, 7 June 1974. Secret. Copies were sent to Anderson, Kissinger, and Schlesinger.
2 Document 144.
3 Document 141.
3. The forecast in the NIE assumed the future development of U.S. forces along the lines now programmed and assumed no SALT constraints other than those of the existing agreements. These agreements placed a ceiling on certain largely quantitative aspects of the growth of the strategic forces of the two sides. The qualitative improvement of strategic forces, unconstrained by SALT I, has proceeded unabated. This is an area in which the U.S. retains a substantial lead. While some elements of the Intelligence Community differ in certain respects, I believe that Soviet actions since the signing of the SALT agreements reflect, not only an attempt to keep up with the competition—out of concern for such U.S. programs as B–1, Trident and Minuteman improvement—but also an opportunistic desire to press ahead and achieve a margin of superiority if they can. In my view, the Soviets perceive themselves as essentially equal in overall strategic power today. However, I do not believe (as does the PFIAB) that the Soviets perceive themselves as approaching the threshold of overall superiority in strategic power. How far they will press any attempt to achieve superiority will depend to a considerable degree on U.S. negotiating and defense policies, in particular on our ability to persuade the Soviets that:

—they cannot continue indefinitely to have both substantially improving strategic capabilities and the benefits of détente;
—non-restraint on their part will produce offsetting U.S. reactions;
—restraint on their part will be reciprocated.

4. I have re-examined the possible impact of Soviet strategic developments on the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. I continue to believe, as indicated in NIE 11–8–73, that under no foreseeable circumstances in the next ten years are the Soviets likely to develop and deploy forces of the magnitude and quality necessary to reduce damage to themselves to acceptable levels by a first strike against U.S. strategic forces. I believe the Soviets would have to calculate that the U.S. would be able to make a devastating reply to any Soviet surprise attack. In reaching these conclusions in the NIE and in my re-examination of them, I have considered possible damage levels on the two sides as revealed by engagement analyses between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, including all three elements of the U.S. strategic triad and their programmed improvements. There are obvious uncertainties in such analyses, but in reaching my judgment I have taken account of:

—the low levels to which Soviet ABM defenses are limited by Treaty;
—the great difficulties the Soviets face in the development of effective ASW capabilities against missile submarines in the open oceans;
—and to a lesser extent, the unlikelihood that Soviet air defenses, despite their massiveness, can overcome the limitations in their ability to prevent penetration by bombers.
5. I agree fully with PFIAB’s concern over the need to improve the substantive intelligence required to support U.S. policy objectives, especially in areas of significant Soviet R&D effort or potential. In the three critical areas the Board mentioned—accuracies of Soviet missiles, prospects for detection of U.S. missile submarines and the strategic implications of Soviet laser developments—we currently have intensive interagency study efforts underway in order to provide policy officials with as definitive an understanding as possible of Soviet programs and capabilities. These three subjects are listed among the Key Intelligence Questions toward which I have directed the entire Intelligence Community to focus its attention.

6. I appreciate and will pursue the Board’s suggestion that CIA participate in the preparation of the “RISOP” (Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan) used in war-gaming the SIOP. DIA participates now and uses Intelligence Community estimates, but as the gaming becomes more complex with more SIOP options, CIA may be able to contribute more than hitherto to development of the RISOP. I will undertake to explore with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff how CIA can best contribute to this aspect of operational planning for our strategic forces.

7. Finally, I agree with the PFIAB findings that intelligence estimates require the keenest possible technical evaluations. To that end we are experimenting on ways to communicate more precisely the degree of confidence we have in our judgments, particularly on technical data. One of our interagency studies is addressing the prospects for determining the accuracies of Soviet ICBMs in the period about five years from now, in an effort to narrow the uncertainties as well as to alert users of intelligence to them. The strategic relationship over the next decade is likely to be increasingly sensitive to uncertainties in such qualitative factors as missile accuracies, which are unquestionably more difficult to measure than quantitative elements such as the numbers of launchers or weapons.4

W. E. Colby5

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4 Anderson replied to Colby’s memorandum in a June 13 letter to Nixon. Despite Colby’s assurances to the contrary, Anderson wrote, PFIAB “members remain unanimous in their judgment that ten-year projections of what the Soviets are likely to do cannot be made with the degree of confidence which these national security issues require.” Given the uncertainties involved, the board remained “concerned” that such projections “unduly encourage a sense of complacency detrimental to the continuing development of adequate US strategic forces.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-282, Intelligence Files, PFIAB (1) [1971–1975] [2 of 3])

5 The memorandum is a copy that bears Colby’s typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS

KEY JUDGMENTS

China’s programs to develop and deploy nuclear weapons have slowed since 1971, probably reflecting:

— a shifting of national economic priorities to emphasize agriculture and basic industry coinciding with diminished influence of the military in policy circles since the fall of Lin Piao;

— a changed perception of the strategic environment resulting from some combination of: a) China’s acquisition of a modest but credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR, b) improved relations with the US, and c) perceived constraints on the USSR due to Soviet détente with the US.

China now has a force of about 130 nuclear delivery vehicles—half missiles and half bombers. Its stockpile of nuclear weapons is probably sufficient for all the missiles, though perhaps not for all the bombers. These systems have the range to hit US forces and bases in Asia as well as targets in the eastern USSR but cannot attack the continental US. China’s force suffers from a number of vulnerabilities, but has achieved a measure of survivability through concealment, mobility, and hardening.

China’s present objective probably is to obtain a token nuclear capability to strike the USSR west of the Urals and the continental US.

— It will gain a token capability to strike European Russia when its limited-range ICBM becomes operational, possibly late this year or, more likely, in 1975. [1 line not declassified]

— It is developing two missile systems that could strike the continental US: a) a full-range ICBM that will not be operational before 1977, and, given the present pace of development, probably not until 1979 or later; b) a submarine-launched ballistic missile system that will not be operational before 1978 at the earliest, and probably will be later.3

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 480, Folder 4, SNIE 13–8–74 Final with Distribution List. Top Secret; [Handling restriction not declassified] The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. The intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also participated. The Director of the CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except for the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained.

2 See footnote 5, Document 137.

3 For the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence see the footnote on page 6. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 5 below.]
Over the longer term, Peking almost certainly will seek to deploy a stronger deterrent force against the US and the USSR. It is also reasonable to expect China to strengthen its regional deterrent and to increase its options for responding to limited nuclear attack.

Assuming a continuation of present trends, which appears likely, China by 1980 may have some 120 missiles and well over 100 bombers for delivery of nuclear weapons against peripheral targets, including those in the USSR, and a few, say six, ICBMs and one or two nuclear missile submarines for use against the US as well as the USSR. Such a force would confer on China a somewhat improved capability to deter nuclear attack by the USSR and, for the first time, an ability to strike the continental US.

In the less likely event that China makes accelerated progress, it might have some 30 ICBMs and four nuclear missile submarines by 1980. Such a force would significantly improve China’s deterrent posture against both the US and USSR.4

**SUMMARY**

China’s nuclear weapon programs have slowed markedly since 1971. It now seems likely that China will only moderately improve its regional nuclear strike capability over the next few years and probably will not deploy full-range ICBMs or a ballistic missile submarine before the late 1970s.

*Force Development Policy.* The general nature of the slowdown suggests the influence of national-level policy decisions, and not solely technical problems with individual programs. Beginning in 1971, and roughly coinciding with the purge of Lin Piao and the subsequent reduction of the role and influence of the military in the government, China’s national economic priorities began shifting to agriculture and basic industry and away from military procurement. China’s present leadership may believe that devoting a greater share of resources to basic industry and perhaps to research and development would contribute more to China’s national power over the long run than pouring large resources into the production of obsolescent aircraft and first-generation missiles.

Certain programs which could yield significant improvements in China’s strategic capabilities several years hence are still moving ahead, although for the most part slowly—for example, the programs to develop solid-propellant missiles and a ballistic missile submarine and the construction of facilities for the production of nuclear materials and for R&D work on airframes and aircraft engines. On the other

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4 For the position of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, see the footnote on page 7. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 6 below.]
hand, programs which could yield quick but limited improvements in China’s nuclear weapons posture are languishing—the programs for the limited-range (3,000–3,500 nm) CSS–X–3 ICBM and the TU–16 bomber, for example.

The decisions to move ahead more slowly with programs for nuclear forces probably reflect a change in the Chinese perception of the strategic environment, resulting from some combination of: (a) China’s acquisition of a modest but credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR, (b) improved relations with the US, and (c) perceived constraints on the USSR due to Soviet détente with the US.

Present Forces. China’s nuclear strike force has grown slightly over the past two to three years but its composition remains unchanged. Then and now the Chinese have a capability for nuclear strike by missiles and bombers all around the periphery of China at distances up to 1,650 nm. While most of this capability has a strategic orientation, some of it is intended for a theater support role within China’s borders. At the present time, the Chinese are estimated to have operational:

[3 paragraphs (20½ lines) not declassified]

—about 60 TU–16 jet medium bombers, capable of delivering nuclear bombs, with an operating radius of 1,650 nm and deployed at four airfields.
—possibly a few nuclear-armed IL–28 jet light bombers, with an operating radius of 570 nm.

China’s present stockpile of nuclear weapons is probably sufficient for all its operational missiles, though perhaps for only a portion of the bombers.

Presently deployed Chinese missiles have a capability to strike all US bases and Allies on the periphery of China, and most of them can strike Soviet targets east of the Urals. The TU-16s can reach somewhat beyond the same areas, though their capabilities to penetrate to heavily defended Soviet targets are limited. The IL–28s could attack Soviet targets close to the border, and could also reach Korea and Taiwan and, with staging from points close to the border, northern Luzon in the Philippines and nearly half of South Vietnam.

Survivability. The Chinese have attempted to achieve survivability of their nuclear deterrent through a combination of concealment, mobility, and hardening. Missile units are deployed either in a semimobile mode, moving from garrisons to temporarily occupied, inconspicuous field sites, or at fixed soft sites with tunnels to protect missiles and essential equipment but with unprotected launch pads. Camouflage and other means are used extensively to conceal the locations of these launch areas. There are indications that some further deployment of the CSS–2 IRBM may be in the semimobile mode. Provisions for the surviv-
ability of Chinese bombers are not as extensive as those for the missile force.

[1 paragraph (18½ lines) not declassified]

Chinese View of Their Deterrent. The Chinese probably believe that they have acquired a modest but nonetheless credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR. At the same time, it is clear that they realize that their force remains vulnerable in important respects.

—They are working on a phased-array radar northwest of Peking, but presently have no effective means of detecting the approach of hostile ballistic missiles.
—Redundant, hardened strategic communications for the missile force are under construction, but are not complete as a nationwide system.
—Reaction time for present missile forces is several hours. The Chinese may be looking to future systems to give them faster reaction time.

China must also be aware that its present ability to deter nuclear attack through the threat of nuclear retaliation would be marginal if the stakes were high.

—In the case of the Soviet Union, it depends on Soviet fears for the security of some few cities in Siberia and the Soviet Far East, and perhaps on Soviet uncertainty about IRBM deployment in western China which might be within range of some cities in the Urals.
—In the case of the US, it rests on US fears for the security of a few US bases and cities of allies in the Far East.

Chinese Goals. The scale and variety of the nuclear and missile development and production facilities that China has established indicate that Peking’s ultimate objective is to build a strategic nuclear capability befitting a major power. There is no reason to believe, however, that Peking aspires to match the capabilities of US and Soviet nuclear forces. When considered in relation to US and Soviet programs, Chinese strategic programs represent a small effort. The pace of the Chinese effort, moreover, is slow and deliberate, and programs are undertaken with an economy of means, reflecting limited Chinese resources.

China’s present objective probably is to obtain a token nuclear capability to strike the USSR west of the Urals and the continental US. Over the longer term, Peking almost certainly will seek to build a force of nuclear delivery vehicles that will be a stronger deterrent to nuclear attack by either the US or the USSR. It is also reasonable to expect that China will attempt to improve and somewhat expand its regional and theater nuclear capability, both to strengthen its regional deterrent and to increase its options for responding to limited nuclear attack.

Prospects for Major Systems. The Chinese may acquire a limited capability to strike Soviet targets west of the Urals, possibly starting in
late 1974 but more likely in 1975. By then, they may have completed two of the three silos in the field now being built for the CSS–X–3. An initial operational capability (IOC) for the CCS–X–3 in late 1974 or 1975 would also require either an early resumption of flight testing or that the Chinese be satisfied with the very limited flight test program accomplished before 1971. While the missile could possibly reach Moscow [less than 1 line not declassified] it could not reach US targets except for a portion of Alaska and several US bases in the mid-Pacific, including Guam. There is no evidence of preparations for further CSS–X–3 deployment.

The Chinese have no capability to attack the continental US directly and are unlikely to attain one for several years. The full-range (7,000 nm) CSS–X–4 ICBM now under development could not be operational until 1977 at the earliest [3 lines not declassified]. In their most recent test of the CSS–X–4, the Chinese attempted to use it to orbit a satellite, which could mean that the current priority of the CSS–X–4 program is its application as a large space booster.

The other system under development by China that could directly threaten the continental US is the ballistic missile submarine. Construction of one or more such units is probably under way, and the lead hull might be launched this year or next. The missile for the system probably will be a two-stage solid-propellant SLBM, comparable in size to the early US Polaris and probably capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a range of some 1,500 to 2,000 nm. Flight testing of such a missile has not yet begun, and probably will take at least three years. Therefore, even if test firings begin soon, the missile is unlikely to be ready for system integration with the first operational SSBN before mid-1977. Allowing for a minimum of six months for full integration of the system, the earliest IOC date would be 1978. But in view of China’s lack of experience in the flight testing of solid-propellant systems, IOC might be considerably later.5

Prospects for Future Forces. Under alternative assumptions, Chinese prospects are assessed as follows:

—If the Chinese show little more urgency and no greater rate of development and deployment progress over the next several years than in the past few years, they may have by 1980 some 120 missiles

5 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that China’s submarine-launched ballistic missile program appears to have made significant progress during the past year. Testing of an ejection or launch-assist device installed in the PRC G-class submarine apparently has been conducted. Some land-based testing of a SLBM could have occurred [1½ lines not declassified] If submarine firings begin soon and proceed smoothly and the SSBN is launched this year as expected, the SLBM/SSBN system could reach IOC in late 1976. A more likely IOC would be by mid-1977. [Footnote in the original.]
and well over 100 bombers for use against peripheral targets, including those in the USSR, but only a few, say 6, ICBMs and one or two SSBNs capable of attacking the US.

—If the Chinese make accelerated progress in the development of intercontinental systems and second-generation regional systems, and shift resources to hasten their deployment, by 1980 they might have a regional force of about the same size as above, but qualitatively improved, and some 30 ICBMs and about four SSBNs capable of attacking the US.

The first projection is a better reflection of Chinese performance to date and we have no present basis for predicting any marked improvement. It would mean that by 1980 China would have somewhat improved its capability to deter nuclear attack by the USSR by virtue of:

—an enlarged and improved regional strike force;
—an emergency strike capability against targets in the Far East by one or two relatively invulnerable SSBNs;
—a token and vulnerable capability to strike targets in European Russia with a handful of ICBMs in silos.

The intercontinental strike element of this force would have conferred on China for the first time the ability to strike the continental US. This would have considerable political and psychological value. But the ICBM force would be small and vulnerable and only the SLBMs would represent a survivable retaliatory force, and then only for short periods.

In the less likely event that China makes accelerated progress in the development of intercontinental systems and second-generation regional missile systems, the Chinese by 1980 could have a significant capability to deter nuclear attack by the USSR—a capability that the Chinese could feel fairly confident would deter Soviet nuclear attack unless the stakes were very high. This improved deterrent posture would be based principally on China’s expanded ICBM force—some 30 ICBMs in silos, a force probably large enough for assured retaliation against large populated areas in European Russia.

This number of ICBMs would also improve China’s deterrent position versus the US. Moreover, with four nuclear submarines, during periods of tension China might be able to keep one or two nuclear missile submarines on patrol in the North Pacific from where they could strike targets in the US.6

6 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that a third case, reflecting a lesser effort, should also be included. A third force mix would concentrate on a more limited force, and intercontinental ballistic missile systems would be sacrificed at the expense of expanding other budgetary sectors. [Footnote in the original.]
Projections of China’s Strategic Nuclear Delivery Force
(NIE 13–8–74 compared with NIE 13–8–73)\(^7\)

Key Milestones

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7 Document 137.
8 For the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence see footnote on page 6. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 5 above.]
147. Memorandum From the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger


SUBJECT

Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Ground Forces

Background

Attached is the Executive Summary of the Project 186 net assessment of U.S. and Soviet ground forces. Project 186 began life as NSSM 186. The original idea was to get an idea of the relative efficiency of the U.S. and USSR in producing, maintaining and operating ground forces. A first step would be to produce a complete, full, rich comparison of the two forces, including the qualitative factors often overlooked in most studies. The attached study is only a partial success in taking this first step. It is worth your reading, particularly the first twelve pages. It has generally been well received, except in the intelligence community. But it is not nearly the advance we hoped it would be.

There are several reasons why the study was not more successful. We foresaw many of the data problems and intelligence gaps, but we had little appreciation of how bad the problem was. Nor did anybody else. At the first steering committee meeting, we requested the JCS representative, a Rear Admiral, to provide data on the organization, manning, equipment, etc. of the U.S. ground forces, 1960 thru 1980. He promised the data in two weeks. It took over two months to produce, and was not nearly as complete as we expected. He was as surprised as we were. The JCS and services made a reasonable attempt to produce the data, and failed.

Similarly, on the Soviet side, we found that many things we thought we knew were the product of legend or speculation. For example, the community has very little idea how many men are in the Soviet ground forces. The ± 15% confidence interval applied only to divisional forces in GSFG. Even there the basis of the estimate is suspect.

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2 Document 139.
3 On June 6, Colby sent a memorandum to Marshall criticizing the study’s treatment of cost data and its inadequate “consideration [of] recent information on changes that are taking place in Soviet weapons and forces.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–200, Study Memoranda, NSSM 186)
outside the community. Another example is medium tanks. The community presently puts the Soviet inventory at about 43,000. They acknowledge that the Soviets have produced over 70,000 medium tanks in the last 20–25 years, but cannot reconcile the two figures. [3 lines not declassified.]

With regard to less quantitative aspects of Soviet forces the picture is even worse. DIA could not supply an estimate of how much the readiness of Soviet ground forces divisions is degraded by the semi-annual influx of new recruits that make up 25% of the division. Most of the new recruits have essentially no training. When pressed on this subject, they asserted that it would be unwise to assume any degradation in readiness. Similarly when asked about the effectiveness of the Soviet pre [word illegible] training (140 hours spread out over two years), DIA replied that this was not known, but that prudence dictated the assumption that it was roughly the same as the U.S. eight week basic training course.

Thus in the course of the study we confirmed two problem areas:

—Serious intelligence gaps, particularly with respect to the qualitative aspects of Soviet forces.
—A strong tendency for the community to fill the gaps with worst-case estimates.

It is worth noting that both the JCS and the Army liked the study. Indeed the Army would have considered withdrawing its concurrence had we watered down the conclusions further as requested by DIA and CIA.

Observations Drawn from the Study

1. Tooth to Tail. The study makes it clear that we don’t understand the question of appropriate support ratios. In Central Europe we have about twice as many men behind each weapon as the Soviets. We can’t say whether that’s good, bad, or indifferent. On the other hand, the Soviet mix may cause them problems in a war of any length. The annual transfer of troops from the USSR to East Germany causes quite a disruption of rail service in Eastern Europe. Reinforcement and resupply under wartime conditions cannot seem to them a trivial problem. In any event, the U.S. support tail probably gives our forces balance that the Soviets do not have.

2. Readiness. This is second only to “tooth/tail” in potential for arousing parochial passions. Here it appears that we really do derive some advantage from our readiness and training activity. By contrast Soviet forces must have semi annual cycles in their readiness levels. However, we do not know how to take credit for this yet in our comparisons.
3. Mobilization. There must be some way out of the dilemma that our reserves cannot be made ready before the war is over, but their reserves are effective in a week or two. Why do we have any reserves at all, and why do they have active forces? The question is only partly facetious.

4. Divisional Structure. Except for their seven airborne divisions the Soviets seem to have nothing but heavy divisions best for ground combat in Europe. Our mix contains a number and variety of light divisions, clearly intended for use other than on the Central Front. Is this the mix we want? Is it consistent with our notion that only the active forces will be available for combat in a war with the USSR?

5. New Soviet Systems. Some of the new Soviet equipment looks complex and sophisticated compared to their older stuff. The BMP and ZSU 23–4 are examples. Indeed it is alleged that all new Soviet ground force weapon systems show a discontinuity with past practices of simplicity of design, etc. It may be that these new designs are responding to some technical imperatives of their own. I intend to explore the hypothesis that this represents a trend to more expensive and capable equipment, and what the consequences might be for Soviet resource cost and maintenance requirements.

Further Work

Clearly we cannot leave this subject in this state. I have several efforts going which may help clarify some of the issues raised here. The Army will undertake studies comparing U.S. and Soviet ground force training and maintenance. A potentially useful study of Soviet combat support is being done at General Research Corporation. We are concluding studies of anti-tank warfare and air defense over the battlefield, which will be briefed to you when done. I have Rand working on comparative U.S. and Soviet design philosophies for armored vehicles.

Andrew W. Marshall
Attachment

Executive Summary of a Net Assessment Prepared in the Office of the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense


PROJECT 186
NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT
U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES
PHASE I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

This paper describes and compares the ground forces of the US and the Soviet Union. It forms the first phase of the National Net Assessment directed by NSSM–186 and NSDM–239. This phase was essentially descriptive. Its purpose is to provide the reader with an understanding of how US and Soviet ground forces compare, and to diagnose potential problems and opportunities for the US. Asymmetries between US and Soviet Ground Forces are identified, but no conclusions have been drawn as to whether the Soviets are doing things right and the US wrong, or vice versa. Follow-on work will address specific issues that have been identified in this report.

Because Phase I covers only ground forces, conclusions which require consideration of other parts of the military establishment must be

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4 Secret. On September 25, Graham sent a memorandum to Schlesinger raising questions about the summary study’s measurement of costs, readiness, and manpower procurement. On Graham’s memorandum, Wickham addressed a note to Schlesinger that read: “I’ve arranged a special JCS-Sec Def meeting for this to be discussed, including DIA’s views and where we go from here.” A note, dated October 17, on Graham’s memorandum reads: “Sec Def Has Seen.” No record of the referenced meeting was found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Action Memoranda, October–November 1974)

5 See footnote 3, Document 139. In an October 15 letter to Ford, Anderson reported that PFIAB, following consideration of the issue at its meeting of October 3–4, “continue[d] to believe a ‘National Net Assessment’ is required.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H—282, Intelligence Files, PFIAB (1) [1971–1975] [1 of 3])
deferred. For example, evaluation of readiness/force size trade-offs requires assessment of strategic mobility forces. An evaluation of the overall military balance is beyond the scope of this study, requiring assessment of the forces of Allies and potential enemies of the US and Soviet Union.

B. Definition of Ground Forces

Ground forces in this paper include ground combat forces with all the command and support structure behind them. For the US, the entire Army less strategic defense forces are included, together with the US Marines less fixed wing aviation and its share of support. For the Soviet Union ground forces includes the Soviet Army with its share of command and general support, plus naval infantry and helicopter forces.

This definition is needed to make a meaningful comparison, since Soviet general purpose ground forces (e.g., divisions) are more involved than US forces in performing general support mission such as individual training and reserve component support.

C. Uncertainties

The depth of our knowledge of Soviet ground forces is variable. We know certain things in fine detail: We have in our possession modern Russian tanks and personnel carriers, and we have good photography of many Russian military installations. Much of the Russian military establishment, however, is much less visible to us.

We have no direct information about Russian military manpower totals. Our estimates of manpower start [less than 1 line not declassified] with the smallest units, and are built up for larger units from estimates based for the most part on US practices. A large part of the Soviet total is estimated to be in units whose existence we know of but whose size we do not, and to this we add estimates for units that we do not see at all but which the US intelligence community feels must be present. DIA has made estimates of Soviet command and general support manpower, but they have a very low level of confidence in these estimates. A great deal of work is required to explain the uncertainties in manpower estimating and to distinguish between what is known and what is guessed at. Much additional collection and analysis will be required before we are confident in our estimates of Soviet military manpower.

The uncertainty increases when we talk about costs. The Soviets publish only one cost statistic—the single line entry for defense in the annual state budget. We do not know what this figure includes (it clearly excludes some military research and development financed from the “science” appropriation; many believe it excludes much more). Not only is there uncertainty regarding the inclusiveness of the
announced figure, but because it clearly serves a political function, its basic reliability is questionable. [2 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (16 lines) not declassified]

II. KEY CONCLUSIONS

A. Size

Since 1964 the number of Soviet divisions has increased by about 15% (from 147 to 169), and US active divisions\textsuperscript{6} have decreased by 15% (from 21\% to 18\%). Manning and equipping of US reserve forces have increased during this time. The Soviet increase and US decrease roughly follow China’s movement from alliance to hostility toward the USSR, and a reduction in its hostility to the US. Most of the Soviet buildup has been opposite China, while the US reductions have been spread among the Pacific, Europe and North America. At the present time Soviet ground forces manpower is about 2.1 million, compared to 940,000 for the US.

B. Readiness

US active forces are maintained in a higher state of readiness than most of the Soviet forces. Our tactical units have better trained men entering them, are generally manned much closer to their wartime authorization, operate their equipment more, and shoot their weapons more than their Soviet counterparts. The price of our readiness edge and the contribution to readiness of these US practices have not yet been evaluated in detail, but they involve over 200,000 men and several billion dollars per year above what would be required to maintain the active force by Soviet standards. Even Soviet forces in Germany, which are considered to be among their most combat ready ground forces, spend time every six months on training of new recruits, and the Soviets spend less on the readiness of these forces than they would have to spend to maintain them at US standards.

C. Quality of Soviet Manpower Estimates

Estimates of Soviet manpower are very rough. DIA and CIA believe the uncertainty about the number of Soviet troops now in Eastern Europe is about \( \pm 15\% \). However, the basis for this confidence is unclear outside the intelligence community. [3½ lines not declassified]

D. Support

Comparing forces in West and East Germany, the US has twice as many men as the Soviets behind each weapon. The implications of this

\textsuperscript{6} US separate brigades and cavalry regiments are roughly comparable in size to one third of a division, and are so counted throughout this paper. [Footnote in the original.]
are not clear. This asymmetry has been cited as indicative of a US edge in sustaining capability (e.g., because of more ammunition suppliers and mechanics), a US edge in fighting (e.g., more target acquisition people supporting artillery fire), or alternatively as indicative of excessive overhead. All three explanations probably have some degree of validity.

E. Manpower Procurement

The US has a volunteer force, while the Soviet Union has nearly universal conscription. This probably limits the number of people in the US military to roughly the present or possibly a reduced level. It keeps pressure on the US to use men more efficiently, to recruit women into the force, and to use civilians. The pressures on the Soviet Union are less clear. The estimated ruble costs of their conscript force are quite small, but the real costs to the Soviet economy in terms of opportunities foregone are unclear. While the military uses large quantities of scarce manpower, it also turns out some skilled workers and may thus serve an educational function performed in the civilian sector in the US. One clear result of this asymmetry (volunteer vice conscription) is that the US has more reenlistments and lower turnover in its force. As a result US ground forces have a much larger number of experienced enlisted men: over 50% of the US enlisted force has more than two years of service, while only 10% of the Soviets do. A second result is that the Soviets have about 800,000 men with military experience entering the reserves each year, whereas the US does not.

F. Mix of Divisions

Almost all Soviet divisions are tank and motorized rifle, oriented toward a war on the Eurasian land mass. Only half of US active divisions and one-third of US reserve divisions are armored and mechanized. The rest are amphibious (Marine), airmobile, airborne, and infantry, which provide us worldwide capability to fight lightly armored (largely infantry) forces and/or to fight in terrain which is not conducive to armored warfare.

G. Mix of Weapons

The US places a higher fraction of its major caliber antitank weapons and indirect fire weapons in the hands of infantry. Thus the US will have a higher ratio of antitank guided missile launchers to tanks, and has more mortars per cannon, than the Soviets.

H. Weapon Characteristics

Generally US weapons are more complicated, more expensive, more capable and incorporate more human engineering factors than Soviet weapons. For example, all our tanks have range-finders, com-
puters, automatic transmissions, and plenty of working space; the Soviet tanks have none of these. US anti-tank guided missiles are much more accurate and easier to use than Soviet missiles. Several recent Soviet weapons (e.g., BMP, ZSU-23-4) do not fit this generalization, and may represent a trend reversal.

I. Costs

Considerable work has been done to analyze Soviet defense costs and compare them to those of the US. The current state of costing methodology and data limitations preclude our obtaining an accurate estimate of the cost of Soviet defense, its "value" in dollars, the relative "burden" of defense, or relative efficiency. CIA has estimated a dollar valuation of Soviet defense expenditures which, while probably overstating the value of Soviet activities relative to those of the US, are useful indicators of spending trends. They show that the valuation of the Soviet ground forces program in constant dollars has increased by one third since 1964. The cost of the US program in constant dollars has decreased by one quarter in the same time.

J. Asymmetries

Completion of a net assessment requires comparisons in detail of the way the US and Soviet Union operate. Where there are asymmetries in the two nations' way of doing business several possible explanations can exist:

—We're right and they're wrong. We should continue business as usual or find ways to increase our advantage accruing from the asymmetry.
—They're right and we're wrong. We should change our system to look more like the Soviet.
—We're both right, and have gone off in different directions because of different resource constraints, geography or national strategic objectives.
—We're both wrong.

Deciding what the proper implications of the asymmetries are requires a study of the total force. Work to date has focused exclusively on the US and Soviet ground forces. Final judgments require a comparison of overall capabilities, including forces of Allied nations and forces other than ground forces. There is no way to settle, for example, whether our ground forces are appropriate without considering the contribution of US mobility and tactical air forces and the forces of our Allies.

A number of the study conclusions taken together suggest that a major asymmetry exists between how the U.S. and the USSR expect a war in Central Europe to be fought. The Soviets appear to expect a short war, (on the order of weeks). The U.S. and our Allies appear to ex-
pect a somewhat longer war, perhaps several months or longer. Successful conclusion of the war, in the Soviet view, is to be achieved by overrunning most of Western Europe and destroying all NATO military forces there. The U.S. hopes to “win” the war by preventing a Soviet breakthrough, and by stabilizing the conflict along static lines of defense as close to present boundaries as possible.

This apparent asymmetry in view as to the nature of the war, if true, has strong impact on force structure planning, support, weapons mix, and tactical doctrine. As Project 186 continues it will be important to refine the concept of this asymmetry, and clarify its implications.

While no final conclusions have been drawn, major asymmetries have been cataloged and resultant advantages to each side have been listed on Table 1.

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148. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby)

Washington, November 2, 1974.

SUBJECT
Comparing the Size of U.S. and Soviet Defense Efforts

I am increasingly concerned about present trends in the relative military positions of the U.S. and the USSR. It seems clear that the USSR is steadily adding to its overall military capabilities, while budgetary constraints are forcing us to cut back, delay and stretch out our modernization programs. I am convinced that these trends cannot continue very long before the U.S. may be widely perceived as risking its present position of leadership in the world.

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A few days ago Andy Marshall and I met\footnote{No record of the meeting was found. Schlesinger also discussed the problems involved in estimating Soviet defense expenditures with Proctor and other members of the intelligence community on January 3. The January 13 record of that meeting is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A: Subject Files, Box 8, Soviet.} with George Carver, Robert Slighton and CIA officers to discuss how military economic reporting on the USSR can best be responsive to these concerns. I believe that appropriate comparison of U.S. defense spending with the estimated dollar costs of the Soviet defense program can be part of an effective effort to convey an understanding of the relative sizes of U.S. and Soviet forces and programs. There are, however, some important comparability problems that are not adequately reflected in current available studies. These were discussed at the meeting. They include questions of comparability of U.S. and Soviet programs in the areas of training, health, reserves, intelligence, and other areas.

There are deeper problems in these comparisons. It is often assumed that if the total U.S. defense budget and the total dollar costs of Soviet programs are roughly equal in a given year, then both countries are making equal contributions to military capabilities. This is not necessarily so. A fairly large chunk of the U.S. defense budget is used to support activities which make only a limited and indirect contribution to our military capabilities. Military pensions, educational programs and medical programs are good examples. The U.S. investment in these is a heavy one, the Soviet effort devoted to them is much smaller, so that a larger share of total Soviet spending contributes directly to military capabilities.

An effort should be made to further improve the comparability of overall size of the U.S. and Soviet defense programs. However, whatever improvements are made in comparability of the dollar estimates of the U.S. and Soviet defense efforts problems will remain. I believe that it would be useful to have available two additional kinds of comparative analysis:

—Measures of the physical size of the U.S. and Soviet efforts. For example: comparisons of the manpower involved, service personnel, direct civilian employment, and defense industry employment; broad set of yearly production rates for major items of equipment; comprehensive physical index of military production.

—Building block studies of major functional or program areas. For example, procurement, reserve forces, training, O&M, etc. In each of these the differences in the programs of the U.S. and Soviets should be described, a cost estimate prepared, and all the comparability problems discussed.

In all cases presentation of comparative trends would be essential.
The above I trust describes my concerns and shows the importance that I attach to this matter. I suggest that your people discuss further details with Andy Marshall, and that they develop a broad set of comparative measures of the size of U.S. and Soviet military programs. I assure you of the cooperation of the Defense Department in providing appropriate U.S. data.\(^3\)

James R. Schlesinger

\(^3\) In a December 2 letter to Schlesinger, Colby responded that the CIA was currently at work on several studies comparing U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures. The agency was also considering “[w]holly new approaches aimed specifically at your concern about incomparabilities,” wrote Colby, who accepted Schlesinger’s “offer of help from the Department of Defense in our attempt to break new ground.” Wickham’s handwritten memorandum to Marshall, December 17, was found attached to Colby’s letter. Wickham wrote: “JRS [Schlesinger] views the CIA memo [sic] with some disdain. Their methodology is part of the problem.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, 320.2, Strategic (Sep.–Dec. 1974))

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149. National Intelligence Estimate\(^1\)


[Omitted here is the table of contents and an introductory note.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Soviets are pressing ahead with a broad range of programs for the near-term deployment of much improved offensive systems for intercontinental conflict, are gradually improving their deployed strategic defenses, and are vigorously pursuing the development of advanced technology applicable to strategic forces.

In strategic offensive forces:

—Four new ICBMs are being tested. Three have MIRVs and a mobile version of the other is probably being developed.

—New silos which were started prior to the Interim Agreement are being completed and a program is under way to convert a major portion of the existing Soviet silos for the new missiles.

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 476, NIE 11–3/8–74. Top Secret. [Handling restriction not declassified] The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the NSA, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI issued this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained.
More ballistic missile submarines with long-range missiles are being constructed.

A new multipurpose bomber is being introduced into operational service.

Additional new ICBMs and SLBMs are in the preflight stages of research and development.

Through these programs the Soviets will increase the number of their ICBM and SLBM warheads and improve the accuracy, survivability, and flexibility of their strategic offensive forces. The programs will add to Soviet capabilities for deterrence and for engaging in nuclear war.

In strategic defensive forces:

The Soviets are gradually improving the capabilities of forces currently deployed.

They are developing a new antiballistic missile system which can be deployed much more rapidly than the one currently operational, possibly as a hedge against abrogation of the ABM Treaty.2

In antisubmarine warfare they are developing new sensors, weapons, and techniques, and are attempting to augment their skills in the use of aircraft, surface ships, and submarines in coordinated operations.

They are investigating the application of lasers to air defense, ABM, and antisatellite uses.

We believe that the Soviet leaders are united on both the broad outlines of détente policy and the high value of strategic programs, although it is reasonable to assume that they differ on priorities. As the need to make new strategic decisions arises, more clear-cut divergence within the leadership may become evident. For the short term, they appear to have forged a working consensus to move forward with major force improvements. The Soviet leaders probably hope through the SALT process to constrain future US strategic programs, or at least reduce the chances of major new US arms initiatives. But they probably do not expect détente or SALT to face them with pressures sufficient to alter their near-term deployment plans in any major way. They evidently see no contradiction between their current strategic programs and their détente policies.

We doubt that the Soviets have firmly settled on acceptance of strategic parity or have decided to seek clear-cut strategic superiority.3 The concept of superiority in Soviet military doctrine is ill defined and is

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2 See footnote 3, Document 2.

3 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe that the USSR is fully committed to a policy of achieving strategic superiority over the United States and its allies in the years ahead. [Footnote in the original.]
probably contested. In making the practical choices they confront, however, we believe that the Soviet leadership is pursuing a strategic policy which is both prudent and opportunistic—a policy aimed at assuring no less than comprehensive equality with the US and at the same time seeking to attain a margin of strategic advantage if US behavior permits.

Considering the history of Soviet strategic policy and force improvements, we believe that the motives underlying present Soviet strategic programs are to provide the USSR with:

—A counterbalance to the strategic strength of the US, plus its Allies, and China;
—A narrowing of the gap with the US in important strategic weapon technologies;
—Hedges against future US force improvements and possible deterioration of US-Soviet relations;
—Opportunities to gain strategic advantages should US behavior permit.

Inherent in present Soviet force improvement programs is an increasing capability to conduct selective or limited nuclear operations. In view of Soviet doctrinal aversion to limited nuclear warfare, however, it is unlikely that the USSR will adopt limited-use concepts at the intercontinental level during the 1970s.

Our best estimate of Soviet strategic force improvements over the next ten years—assuming that present SALT limitations continue and that US strategic programs develop as currently programmed—would provide to the USSR:

—By about 1980, with the present new systems, a lead over the US in most quantitative measures of offensive forces;
—In the 1980s, with improved or follow-on systems, a potential capability to destroy a large percentage of US Minuteman silos;
—An appearance of overcoming the US lead in such qualitative aspects of strategic forces as MIRV technology.

Despite expected improvements in Soviet forces, it is extremely unlikely that during the next ten years the Soviets will conclude that they could launch an attack which would prevent devastating US retaliation.

—The Soviets will be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos and would probably expect a considerable number to survive.
—Their ASW forces will be unable to locate and destroy the US ballistic missile submarine force at sea.
—There will continue to be weaknesses in Soviet defenses against low-altitude bomber attack.
—ABM defenses will be limited by treaty to insignificant levels.
—Soviet civil defense will be unable to prevent massive casualties and breakdown of the economy.

We do not foresee technological advances which would sharply alter the strategic balance in the USSR’s favor during the next ten years. Nevertheless, the scope and vigor of Soviet research and development, particularly in strategic defensive systems, bear especially close watching in the years ahead.

Although deterrence will be maintained and no overall strategic advantage obtained, the political impact of future Soviet forces will depend to a great extent on how they are perceived by the Soviets, the US, and other nations. The question of whether the Soviets could obtain a psychological edge in a time of crisis, for example, will depend heavily on the degree to which those involved focus on the basic strategic relationship or on appearances, and on how perceptions of strategic forces affect views about the total capabilities and resolve of both sides.

As Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict improve, acute problems of perceived strategic imbalances, threats to security, and distrust of motives are likely to arise.

—Ideology and strategic doctrine make it difficult for the Soviets to embrace concepts of long-term strategic stability that take into account US security interests as well as their own.
—Soviet strategic doctrine puts a high premium on war-fighting capabilities as the best deterrent and on counterforce operations as the best way to employ Soviet forces should deterrence fail.
—The Soviets do not readily recognize that programs they deem important to their security can easily be read by the US as threatening its strategic position.
—The Soviets are likely to perceive countervailing US responses, as well as some features of present US programs, as deliberately threatening to them.

In the coming years, uncertainties faced by each side in assessing the capabilities of the other’s future forces, particularly their qualitative characteristics, will tend to magnify more fundamental uncertainties and fears about the other side’s strategic objectives. Unless such a strategic environment is significantly changed by arms limitation agreements, it is likely that the Soviet leaders will continue to believe that the acquisition of more and better strategic armaments is their best course.

[Omitted here are the 29-page Summary, the 88-plus-page Estimate, and the Annexes.]
150. **National Intelligence Estimate**


[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

**SOVIET NAVAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS**

**PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS**

—A primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to furnish a deterrent to
attack through the presence of a credible and survivable SSBN force,
and, in time of general war, to participate in the nuclear exchange and
strike at soft targets such as military installations, industries and gov-
ernment centers.

—The Soviets routinely maintain five of their operational SSBNs
on station. The Soviets also appear to keep [number not declassified]
SSBNs ready for deployment [less than 1 line not declassified] the majority
of these—the Y-class SSBNs—will take about a week to ten days to
reach station after notice. This will change appreciably during the next
decade since increasing numbers of D-class submarines will be within
missile range upon leaving home port.

—Under conditions of sufficient warning to get additional forces
to firing stations, the Soviets might currently expect as many as 400
sea-based missiles to reach their targets in an initial strike. Under con-
ditions of no warning, successful NATO damage limiting operations,
delays in command and control procedures, or deliberate Soviet deci-
sions, the Soviets might be able to launch only a few score missiles from
the Y-class and D-class SSBNs.

—The Soviets are attempting to increase the survivability of their
SSBN force in several ways. They are constructing tunnels near SSBN
bases suitable for concealment and protection of the submarines and
have built dummy SSBNs probably to conceal deployment levels
during crises or to mislead NATO targeting.

—We expect the Soviet SSBN force to expand to 62 modern units
by the late 1970s. The 62nd unit is probably already under construction,
and we believe all of them will be completed. If the proposed SAL
Agreement covering the 1977–1985 period is successfully concluded,

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job
79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 477, NIE 11–15–74, Soviet Naval policy
and Programs. Top Secret. [Handling restriction not declassified] The CIA and the intelli-
gence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the
Air Force participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI issued this estimate
with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives
of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained.
the Soviets will be limited to a total of 2,400 delivery vehicles—ICBMs, SLBMs, and intercontinental bombers—with no sublimit on SLBMs. This would require some reductions in the numbers and probably some changes in the mix of Soviet strategic forces. We believe the Soviets will retain a force at the level of 62 modern SSBNs until about 1980. But pressures will mount for change in the mix of strategic forces in the 1980s and we are uncertain how these will affect the SSBN force.2

—An extensive program to refit new and probably MIRVed missiles to the force is expected to start in the late 1970s, and to continue through the mid-1980s.

—The Soviets continue to believe that a war with the West will probably evolve into a short nuclear conflict, but they also see some increasing likelihood that a war could begin, and perhaps even remain, at a conventional level. Soviet doctrine calls for the earliest possible destruction of enemy nuclear capabilities, including naval, in the early phases of a conventional conflict. Because the Soviets think it unlikely that a war with the West would remain conventional, we believe that they would seek to destroy SSBNs in the early stages of a conflict. However, it is possible, if the Soviets saw the opportunity to contain the conflict at conventional levels and given the low probability that they could actually destroy an SSBN, that the Soviet leadership would direct the Navy to refrain from attacking SSBNs in order to reduce the chances of escalation.

—We do not believe that the Soviets would choose to engage in a war conducted only at sea between the major powers. Soviet wartime naval operations are seen as closely related to war developments on the Eurasian landmass.

—Soviet capabilities for combating Western carrier strike forces—to them a first priority task—include forces for the surveillance of NATO carrier task forces in peacetime, and a combination of air, submarine and surface forces for the destruction of those NATO carrier task forces in war.

—We believe that, given time to coordinate all of their surveillance assets, the Soviets would probably be able to locate and track most US aircraft carriers in the northeastern Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, northwestern Pacific Ocean and the eastern Mediterranean. We believe that coordinated strikes against Western carriers in these areas would be at least partially successful.

—The degree of success would depend upon the location of the carriers, whether the Soviets use conventional or nuclear weapons, and

2 The Defense Intelligence Agency calls attention to its footnote 10 on page 34. [Footnote in the original.]
whether surprise were achieved. If nuclear weapons were used in a surprise attack, most of the carriers in these areas could be destroyed. On the other hand, timely warning of a Soviet attack would allow the carriers to take action which would probably assure the survival of some carriers, especially against a conventional attack.

—We expect the Soviets to maintain the high priority on combating enemy aircraft carrier task forces. Cruise-missile submarines will continue to be built throughout the 1970s, as will major surface ships with antiship missiles. The SS–NX–13 antiship nuclear ballistic missile will most likely enter the force in the next year or two. [3 lines not declassified]

—The strike capability of the Soviet Navy against Western surface forces will be significantly improved by the deployment with Soviet Naval Aviation of the BACKFIRE ASM strike aircraft. The BACKFIRE’s increased range capability will give it coverage over all the major sea lanes leading to Europe and extend Pacific Ocean coverage to Hawaii—areas that were formerly out of range of the strike aircraft of the Soviet Navy. Equally important, BACKFIRE’s capability for high-subsonic, low-level flight will also give it a better chance than the BADGER of successfully crossing potentially hostile land areas such as Turkey and Greece in order to operate over the Mediterranean, an area over which, in practical terms, the Soviets could not now operate their naval strike aircraft. The BACKFIRE’s variable-flight profile and high-speed capabilities—Mach 2 at high altitudes—will give it a higher probability of penetrating carrier defenses in the open ocean than is the case with the BADGER aircraft.

—Soviet capabilities for antisubmarine warfare—countering Western SSBNs and defending against attacks from Western general purpose submarines—are inadequate:

—We expect the Soviets to continue to pursue various approaches to antisubmarine warfare, with emphasis on the anti-SSBN problem. Improved ASW sensors and supporting systems and stand-off weapons will be more extensively deployed. The construction rate of ASW submarines probably will increase.

—Although we believe the Soviets in wartime would attempt to attack Western SSBNs, they have no effective capability to do so in the open ocean and will probably not acquire such a capability during the next decade. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the So-

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3 The Defense Intelligence Agency [less than 1 line not declassified] believes that several of the nonacoustic methods currently known to be under investigation by the Soviets offer potential for improving their detection of nuclear submarines and thus could provide them with a capability to threaten the survivability of a portion of the US SSBN force deployed in the open ocean. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, share this view. [Footnote in the original.]
viets might be able to detect a few SSBNs in limited areas such as the western approach to the Barents Sea or in strategic choke points such as the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap.

—We do not expect that Soviet forces will have systems for the reliable detection of Western attack submarines beyond the range of the latter’s weapon systems during the period of this Estimate.

—The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact navies have concentrated large numbers of small coastal patrol, ASW, and minewarfare ships, short-range submarines, and ASW aircraft in the Black, Baltic and Barents Seas and the Sea of Japan to secure their sea frontiers in time of war. These forces continue to receive the latest Soviet equipment and have some significant capabilities against Western forces. The Soviets and other Warsaw Pact navies could probably establish control over the Baltic and Black Seas early in a conflict, and plant mines to prevent penetrations by Western naval forces. In the Sea of Japan and in the Barents Sea, enemy surface units could be destroyed quickly, but Western nuclear submarines would pose a more difficult problem and the Soviets probably could not protect their ships from this threat.

—The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies maintain amphibious forces in the Barents Sea area, in the Baltic and Black Seas, and in the Sea of Japan. The effectiveness of operations of these forces would probably vary widely. The North Cape of Norway could probably be taken fairly readily if the Norwegian brigade normally deployed there were not reinforced. In the Baltic, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces could probably capture the Danish islands, if the Danish air and ground forces on Zealand were not reinforced, and link up with land forces attacking Jutland. In the Black Sea area, strong Turkish defenses and difficult terrain would make a coordinated land and sea assault on the Turkish straits more difficult. The Soviets probably could not seize these Straits quickly using conventional weapons. Soviet Naval Infantry capabilities in the Pacific are insufficient for conducting amphibious assaults on the Japanese home islands to secure exits from the Sea of Japan.

—We believe that, if a conventional war in Europe were to continue for some time, the Soviets would probably mount an interdiction campaign against Western sea lines of communications. The Soviets would have major problems in doing so. They do not have forward bases for resupply, and attempts to operate their small number of resupply ships beyond Soviet-controlled waters could be easily countered. Thus their submarines would almost certainly have to return through choke points to an uncertain resupply situation. Moreover, the North Atlantic sea lanes are basically beyond the range of all but BEAR and BACKFIRE aircraft. In a prolonged conventional conflict, therefore, the Soviets could effect attrition on NATO shipping, but could not
disrupt it completely. We believe it unlikely that, outside of direct involvement in a war with the West, the USSR would attack Western sea lines of communication, however vulnerable.

—We do not believe the Soviets are building naval forces for intervention in distant areas against substantial opposition nor do we believe they have much capability for such intervention now.

—Soviet ability to sustain combat at sea for long periods would be severely circumscribed by logistics-related weaknesses. Most of the new larger Soviet surface combatants have no reloads for their major offensive weapons systems, and the ships’ limited underway replenishment capability constrain Soviet abilities for sustained combat at sea. The current forward posture of the Soviet Navy depends upon the support of auxiliaries and merchant ships in anchorages and in Third World ports, and presumes a non-hostile environment.

—Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy has diversified its areas of operation. However, the rapid growth rate in naval activity away from home waters that characterized the late 1960s has slowed in the 1970s. Virtually the only increase in the last four years has been related to unusual circumstances such as minesweeping operations in 1974 in the Gulf of Suez and the Bangladesh harbor-clearing operations in 1971. We believe that the majority of the Soviet out-of-area operations, especially those in the Norwegian Sea and the Pacific Ocean, have been related primarily to training for operations against Western navies. But we also believe that many of the Soviet out-of-area operations reflect a Soviet decision to use naval forces more extensively in furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives in peacetime.

—Through their naval operations in peacetime the Soviet leadership has sought to influence US actions at some cost and risk while at the same time keeping to a minimum the chances of actual US-Soviet conflict. We expect this approach to continue.

—We believe that the level of Soviet naval out-of-area activity is approaching practical limits, given the USSR’s current priorities. Over the longer term, as newer more capable ships enter the force, there will be a moderate but steady increase in the number of ships available for distant operations. Any rapid increase in sustained distant deployment probably would require a more intensive ship-building effort, not only of surface combatants, but also of logistic support ships.

—Naval activity and port visits, particularly in the Third World, probably have improved the Soviet Union’s position with some foreign political leaders, but it has irritated others. Still others—perhaps a majority of Third World leaders—show little outward concern about Soviet naval deployments. Nevertheless, in many countries, especially developed countries with a maritime tradition, naval activity is perceived as an important element in the international political balance. As
long as this view continues to be prominent, the Soviet Navy’s peacetime operations will have significant political impact.

—We believe that future Soviet naval developments will bear a strong resemblance to the current trends. Given the bureaucratic continuities in Soviet naval efforts and the Navy’s apparently integral place in Soviet policies with regard to the US, NATO, and the Third World, there is not much chance for the Navy to lose its position. However, given the general resource problems in the USSR, we do not expect substantial gains for the Navy at the expense of others. We thus expect basic changes to the current line to come about slowly, if at all.

—The Soviet Navy has been widely perceived as equal to or even superior to the US Navy, despite the many asymmetries in the two forces. This perception has given the Soviet Navy a degree of credibility which, while not always fully supported by its combat capabilities, has made it an important element in calculations of international political power.

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

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151. Intelligence Report


Key Findings

Total Defense Costs

The estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense programs have exceeded US defense outlays in every year since 1971 and, at over 93 billion dollars (1973 prices), are about one-fifth higher than US outlays in 1974. If the costs of pensions and reserves are removed from both sides, 1974 Soviet costs exceed the US total by about one-fourth.

Total defense costs, expressed in current US prices, have grown in both countries over the 1964–1974 period. In constant US prices, which measure efforts in real terms, the costs of Soviet programs have grown

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at a more modest rate while US outlays have declined steadily from a peak in the late Sixties. In 1974, US outlays in constant dollars are lower than they were in 1964.

Military Mission Comparisons

Strategic Attack Forces. Estimated dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental attack programs have exceeded US outlays every year since 1966 and are some 60 percent higher than those of the US in 1974.

—Soviet ICBM programs cost about three times as much as US ICBM programs over the period as a whole. Soviet costs will reach almost four and one-half times the US level in 1974, reflecting the new wave of ICBM procurements.
—The costs of Soviet SLBM programs have exceeded US SLBM costs since 1969 and are almost 30 percent greater than US costs in 1974.
—US intercontinental bomber programs have amounted to about five times the estimated costs of Soviet intercontinental bomber programs over the period as a whole.

General Purpose Forces. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forces increased steadily over the 1964–1974 period, passing the level of US outlays in 1971 and exceeding it by 20 percent in 1974. The costs of Soviet ground forces are now more than twice US spending, reflecting the much higher levels of Soviet manpower. The costs of naval forces are about the same in both countries. The costs of Soviet tactical air forces have been growing rapidly since 1969 but are still only about half the US level.

Strategic Defense Forces. The USSR has traditionally maintained much larger strategic defense forces than the US. The cumulative dollar costs of Soviet programs over the 1964–1974 period were more than four times US spending, the biggest difference being in SAM and fighter-interceptor programs.

Resource Category Comparisons

Military Investment and RDT&E. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet weapons acquisition programs have exceeded US outlays for comparable programs since 1970 and in 1974 were about one-fourth larger than US programs.

—Initial procurement for the new generation of Soviet ICBMs and the costs of deploying modern tactical aircraft have caused missiles and aircraft to be the fastest growing elements of Soviet procurement in recent years. As the estimated dollar costs of Soviet procurement have increased, US expenditures have declined, and in 1974 the costs of Soviet aircraft and missile procurements are about one-fourth greater than US outlays.
—The costs of Soviet ships and boats procurements have exceeded US outlays by one-half over the 1964–1974 period. They are about one-third greater than US expenditures in 1974.
—Soviet land armaments procurements have amounted to over three times US expenditures for the 1964–1974 period.

**Operating Costs.** The largest component of operating costs for both the USSR and the US is the cost of military personnel. Estimated dollar costs for Soviet military personnel rose steadily over the 1964–1974 period, whereas military force reductions have lowered total US expenditures for active military personnel since 1968. In 1974 total dollar costs for Soviet military personnel are almost 50 percent higher than corresponding US costs, reflecting the much larger base of Soviet military manpower. If pensions and the costs of reserves are set aside, estimated Soviet costs, in dollar terms, for active military personnel are almost 80 percent higher than comparable US costs.

[Omitted here is the table of contents, the body of the report, and annexes.]

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152. **Memorandum of Conversation**


PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

[1½ lines not declassified]

Admiral Anderson: The NIE\(^2\) is overly optimistic and possibly slanted. Especially in ASW. These estimates tend to give the President what they think he would like to hear.

Foster: The capacity is present. It is a question of whether they want to pursue it. The data indicate that the present generation of missiles under test could have the capacity by 1980 of the post ‘85 systems. By 1985, if there are a number of new missiles (SS–18’s and 19’s) with

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, June 5, 1975—Kissinger, Rockefeller, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets in the original. At the time of the meeting, PFIAB members included: Anderson (Chairman), Baker, Cherne, Foster, Galvin, Gray, Land, Luce, Shultz, Teller, and Byers (Executive Secretary).

\(^2\) NIE 11–3/8–74 is Document 149. On June 6, Kissinger informed Ford of PFIAB’s “concern that NIEs are too optimistic. I asked [PFIAB] to prepare a paper on it and then you could meet with them.” This led to discussion of replacing Colby as DCI, who Kissinger called “a disaster.” Ford replied, “We have to make a change.” “I think the whole top echelon of CIA needs to be cleaned out,” Kissinger said. The record of the meeting is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, June 6, 1975—Ford, Kissinger.
the present warheads, the Minutemen will be more vulnerable than we now estimate.

I am also concerned about ASW. Indications are that they may be able to—with systems they are developing—to trace submarines 90 percent of the time from port to port.

Shultz: This possibility is excluded in the NIE.

Kissinger: I think the problem is the system. We do not get sharp alternative views. Each agency is under pressure not to estimate anything which would put its systems at risk.

The President needs an explicit paper setting out what the report says on particular systems and what the Board’s concerns are.

Vice President: I would give this Committee oversight over urgent matters and wrongdoing.

Cherne: [1½ lines not declassified]

Teller: But it was encouraging to hear how we have found out about it.

Kissinger: For us to put this out will cause a storm against the USSR which will jeopardize our larger interests with the Soviet Union.³

Galvin: But we may have a Catch 22 thing. [2 lines not declassified]

Teller: I don’t think we should do anything to exclude mobile missiles.

Kissinger: What kind of mobile missiles do you recommend?

Teller: I tend to favor air mobility but I would not ban any.

Kissinger: I agree.

Foster: What is key is that we maintain our deterrent capability.

Kissinger: If our submarines can be tracked, we may want to change the kind of submarines.

Foster: [1½ lines not declassified]

Vice President: When the public finds out, they will want to know why it wasn’t stopped and why people weren’t warned.

Why shouldn’t we jam the Soviet reception?

Baker: That would take bathing them.

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³ Ford and Kissinger also discussed this issue during their June 6 meeting: “I spoke to Mahon about the Soviet [less than 1 line not declassified] problem. We have made it innocuous enough,” Kissinger told the President. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, June 6, 1975—Ford, Kissinger)
153. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 7, 1975, 1:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Members (see attached list) 

[Omitted here is discussion of Portugal and SALT.]

Anderson: For two years we have disagreed with the strategic NIE.3

Kissinger: The most useful thing you can tell the President is what is wrong with the NIE and how it can be remedied. How to remedy the process and the situation which exists.

Anderson: We also want to talk about Baker’s concern on [less than 1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: Where is the hang-up?
Baker: DOD is pushing it around bureaucratically.
Kissinger: Why don’t we force them?
Baker: It’s not so simple. [1½ lines not declassified]

[Discussion about grain]

Baker: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Kissinger: [1½ lines not declassified]

We now have a corner on the grain market, if we control it. We have the Soviets right where we want them, if we use it.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, August 7—Rockefeller, Kissinger, PFIAB. Top Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except for those included by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original. The luncheon meeting was held at the Department of State.

2 Not found attached.

3 On August 6, Foster and Teller discussed Document 149, with Stoertz and De-Brulé. According to the record of the meeting, Foster and Teller “expressed disagreement with key judgments in NIE 11–3/8–74 and made suggestions concerning the preparation and content of the NIE.” In particular, they disagreed with the estimate’s net assessment that the Soviet Union was “extremely unlikely” to conclude during the next ten years that it could launch a disarming first strike against the United States. Foster also recommended that an organization should be established “to prepare analyses of the most critical intelligence issues to compete with analyses currently performed.” (CIA, NIC Files, Job 85B00134R, Box 1, Competitive Analysis, Part 1, Background on the A Team—B Experiment)
Foster: [less than 1 line not declassified]
Baker: It’s not that easy, though we are developing a plan.

154. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 8, 1975, 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Members of President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (see attached list)²
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Adm. Anderson: The unofficial job of the Board is to comment on intelligence estimates. [1½ lines not declassified] We had problems with the ’74 strategic estimate.³ Here is a paper,⁴ Mr. President, that is unanimously approved by the Board.

Foster: I would like to make a claim about the estimate, support that claim, and make a recommendation about what can be done.

We read it last November and were struck by statements on almost every page. [He reads a paragraph on long judgments about Soviet unlikelihood of first strike.] In our view this is misleading. It gives the reader an unwarranted complacency. It may be right, but it overstates a single point of view. It makes judgments based on damn few facts. The data is frequently flimsy, conflicting, or nonexistent.

People make decisions on force levels. The Congress makes decisions on the budget. When this document doesn’t agree with the Secretary of Defense’s testimony, it’s like shooting ourselves in the foot.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, August 8, 1975—Ford, Kissinger, PFIAB. Top Secret. All brackets, except for those included by the editor to indicate omissions in the text, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. During a meeting held the morning of August 8, Kissinger briefed Ford about his upcoming afternoon meeting with PFIAB: “The topics will be the weakness of strategic estimates, [less than 1 line not declassified] and more emphasis on economic intelligence. They are overdoing the strategic estimate a bit, but they could be improved. [1 line not declassified].” (Ibid., August 8, 1975—Ford, Kissinger)

² According to the list of attendees, attached, but not printed, PFIAB members Anderson (Chairman), Baker, Cherne, Foster, Galvin, Gray, Land, Shultz, Teller, and Byers (Executive Secretary) were present. Luce did not attend. Rumsfeld was also present.

³ NIE 11–3/8–74 is Document 149.

⁴ See Document 155.
I can give three examples which make one suspicious: (1) On the SS–18 and 19, there are no facts on accuracy. There are some data indicating reentry vehicles going astray like Poseidon did. [2 lines not declassified] There are two ways to do it: average the data, or the data could come from instruments that are deliberately offset.

Second, we hadn’t worried too much about Minuteman vulnerability because of Polaris and our feeling is that it’s invulnerable. Last summer the Soviets had exercises in the Philippine Sea. They are now using a combination of techniques. One is to take advantage of the fact that a submarine has to loiter in home port. They practiced some sort of tracking techniques. And when one of our subs transited the area, they picked it up also. [less than 1 line not declassified] The Soviets have staffed a lab with people who were new to the field.

I think the sub is getting hemmed in. We don’t think it is fair to say there is no way for them to get hold of the Polaris force for 10 years.

Third, on bombers, the estimate doesn’t deal with the fact that the bombers are on bases that are subject to interdiction by subs. It is nip and tuck whether the bombers would get off, and if they used cruise missiles we might not ever see them. The estimate also doesn’t deal with the bomber problem as they transit the oceans and can be picked up. On penetration, the average number of Soviet exercises against low level bomber attacks are about 3%, after ’74, 30% were below 1500 feet. We have to deal with a variety of air defense systems, including mobile ones which can be moved in to fill gaps. They appear still to be trying hard to ensure high attrition—and it may be even worse in 10 years.

What are the difficulties? First, they do it on the basis of not much evidence, and second, pressure to say what the analyst knows leads him to insert judgments where facts are lacking. Mostly they are very good, but as they get carried forward, it gradually gains the status of fact.

What the decision maker needs from intelligence is what is fact and what is judgment and what is the range of uncertainty.

Kissinger: To what extent are the judgments the product of service bias?

Foster: Strongly. The Navy has especially a problem. It doesn’t want ASW information to get to the intelligence community.

We have complained about the estimate and can’t seem to get through. They are not honestly trying to distort.

I have some suggestions: On important questions, the community should have two teams doing independent, competitive analysis. The DIA and CIA are not competitors.

President: But 10 years ago we put all of them together to get a single viewpoint.
Foster: Yes, but this would apply just to key issues.

Next, we need closer interaction between intelligence and user. Perhaps the user needs to ask questions differently so that the information is focused on his decision. The intelligence community should be asked to build the best case both for and against the decision.

Third, how to avoid the appearance of a net assessment, which is what this tends to include.

The right process maybe is to do an NIE, with the improvements of the kind we suggest, then a net assessment, then conduct a critique. When we have done net assessments in the past, we have never critiqued them.

We have tried to persuade the intelligence community to accept these critiques, but they don’t see anything wrong with what they do now. They think their judgments are right.

Kissinger: We have found it very difficult to get the intelligence community to put forth competing views. The tendency is to waffle over disputes rather than sharpen them. Second, it is very hard to overcome Service bias. Third, they have a vested interest to support their previous judgments.

Land: Maybe we should institutionalize the process and have competing analyses presented as a matter of course.

Kissinger: If you ask for two views, that will become stylized and compound the problem. For 85% of the issues, nothing difficult is necessary. But for the few cases where they start with different points of view, those should be amplified and fully presented.

Teller: How do you get alternate evaluations? I don’t know, but one way would be to get an experienced man—like Foster—to do it. He would have to have access to all the material.

Foster: Maybe you just have to try it—just tell the intelligence community you want a competitive estimate.

President: I doubt you can get that kind of competitive judgment in-house.

Kissinger: But no one outside has the knowledge to make the judgments.

Land: There are people outside who have had access over the years.

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5 On July 21, Teller gave Sonnenfeldt a paper outlining a proposed “alternative NIE” to the intelligence community’s existing estimates of Soviet strategic forces, which Teller claimed underestimated Soviet capabilities and intentions. Sonnenfeldt forwarded Teller’s proposal to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, July 22. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Box 25, Subject Series, PFIAB/NIES, 1975–76 (5))
Kissinger: I have great sympathy for the problem. The solution is not so obvious.

Anderson: I would favor a directive to the DCI making it clear this is the kind of change which has to be made in this area. It should come directly from the National Security Council. They can do it for this year’s estimate.

Kissinger: Why don’t you draft one?

Anderson: We must make the intelligence community work the way it should.

President: Draft a directive.

Baker: I want very briefly to review the status of Soviet electronic telephone surveillance. Our interim actions have been effective, but we are very worried about the longer-term actions. [5 lines not declassified] We think we need to establish communication facilities which will be invulnerable—principally by encryption. We think a new directive is needed to establish clear responsibility for getting the job done. We have such a memo prepared for you. It includes a supervisory group under Ed David. Some are domestic and some overseas; [1 line not declassified]

Cherne: Let me add on the economic side that it’s only since June that we are trying to find what they are doing [3½ lines not declassified] On a different matter, the most recent poll around New York showed strong feeling that the U.S. had to have a strong national intelligence system. While the citizen likes to read about the CIA, he wants a strong one but under your control.

Foster: One ironic point. There has been publicity about American citizens being spied on, and that others are doing it. Why not just tell them to take out all their equipment?

Baker: It might work for a year or two.

President: Would we not be able to detect whether or not they were putting it back?

Baker: They could probably circumvent it.

Teller: You could at least say we would be doing our best.

Baker: We believe you should put out a directive to take steps to minimize our exposure to the Soviets.

President: I thank you very much. We have some tough decisions to make and you are very helpful.
Dear Mr. President:

The National Intelligence Estimates should be among the most important documents issued by the intelligence community. They are the natural backdrop to guide the Department of Defense in formulating force levels and R&D programs, and should serve Congress in their authorization and appropriation hearings. Certain of them also serve as the foundations from which to derive arms limitation negotiating positions. Underlying each of these objectives is the presumption that the NIE will substantially influence the thought processes of key Government decision-makers regarding Soviet military capabilities.

In our view, NIE 11–3/8–74 (“Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985”) is seriously misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence, it is deficient for the purposes it should serve.

This NIE assesses that for the next ten years it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets will conclude they could launch an attack which would prevent devastating U. S. retaliation. This judgment is presented confidently, with the force of fact, although the cumulative evidence on which it is based is conflicting, often flimsy, and in certain cases does not exist:

—With respect to Soviet ICBM accuracy and the survivability of the U. S. MINUTEMAN force, the data is inconclusive and has been very differently interpreted by the experts. A number of uncertainties which have puzzled analysts for six years have been accommodated in the NIE by averaging the worst and best cases when the data could readily support either interpretation;

—With regard to Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, it assumes our POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines will remain invulnerable through 1985; yet about three months before issuance of the NIE, we observed Soviet experiments in submarine detection and trailing which are not yet understood by the U.S. intelligence community and which give very serious pause to this optimistic judgment;

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Box 25, Subject Series, PFIAB/NIEs, 1975–76 (5). Top Secret; [Handling restriction not declassified]. Anderson handed this letter to Ford during the President’s August 8 meeting with PFIAB, the record of which is printed as Document 154.

2 Document 149.
—with regard to Soviet capabilities against our bombers, it ignores the vulnerability of SAC bases to cruise and ballistic missiles from submarines operating off U. S. shores, vulnerability of the aircraft to mid-course intercept, and does not take adequate account of emerging data which may indicate an improving Soviet low altitude air defense capability;

—the NIE gives the appearance of a net assessment and thus the added weight of “operational” consideration, when in substance it is not. (For example, it assumes without detailed examination the survivability of the U. S. command and control apparatus, and accepts optimistic and unproven data regarding U. S. silo hardness.)

These general criticisms may be best illustrated by a brief review of available evidence which contrasts with NIE judgments in three critical areas: Soviet ICBM accuracy, POLARIS vulnerability, and U. S. bomber penetrability.

**Soviet ICBM Accuracy**

The hard data on both the presently deployed Soviet ICBM force and the new Soviet ICBMs does not allow any confident, precise determination of accuracy. The SS–9 accelerometer data collected over the last ten years can be interpreted as to give either a relatively good accuracy or the rather poor accuracy stated in the usual assessments. The choice of the poor number has been made by a set of judgments which has been questioned by informed and reasonable analysts. These analysts can support the view that the data indicates a significantly better accuracy than that assessed by the community.

Concerning the new Soviet ICBMs—the SS–18 and SS–19—there is no hard information indicating the basic guidance and control accuracy of these vehicles, but only the telemetry information that both the re-entry vehicle (RV) deployment and RV reentry behavior of the systems are malfunctioning in a fashion very similar to the malfunctions exhibited in the early flight tests of the U.S. POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III MIRV’d systems. One would expect, as in the case of the U.S. systems, that these difficulties would be worked out in the next few years, probably before the systems are deployed in large numbers.

Under these circumstances the systems could be quite accurate in the near future with circular error of probabilities (CEPs) comparable to that of MINUTEMAN II (about 1/6 of a nautical mile). There appears to be no hard information which would negate the possibility of the systems being even somewhat better than MINUTEMAN.

In the case of the smaller payload SS–17, there is some information concerning the quality of the inertial equipment. If this data is interpreted in a straightforward manner, one would conclude that the system’s accuracy is rather poor (about 1/3 of a nautical mile). How-
ever, the telemetry from early flights of this system showed what was apparently a bias in the data, perhaps deliberately inserted by Soviet technicians to assist them in separating out their information, which puts the whole question of the straightforward interpretation in doubt.

The above is in contrast with the unusually confident position of the NIE that the accuracies of the new Soviet ICBMs lie between 1/4 and 1/2 of a nautical mile and that improvements below 1/6 of a nautical mile would require a new generation of ICBMs. The difference between the NIE assessment and the possible greater accuracy suggested herein is equivalent to an almost 10-fold increase in explosive effect on target.

**SLBM Survivability**

The NIE asserts that there should be little worry as to the survivability of the SLBM force now or in the next 10 years. This conclusion is based partially upon U.S. superiority in “classical” ASW techniques, and partially on judgments that nonconventional techniques are unlikely to be highly successful. It is known, however, that the Soviets are conducting experiments in detecting and trailing their nuclear submarines, using nonconventional techniques; these techniques are not understood by the U.S. technical community. Photographs of some Soviet equipment, and data from subsequent experiments suggest that the Soviets have the ability to detect a submarine at substantial distances. It now appears that the Soviets are practicing the integration of this technique into ASW activities involving warships. In addition, there appear to be one or more other nonconventional systems being tested in submarines on which we have no data regarding operational capabilities.

The Soviets are pursuing at least twenty different ASW programs in a very aggressive fashion. It is very possible that this technological area will yield capabilities not yet realized by the U.S. R&D community.

Since we cannot plan on always getting solid intelligence, it may be a very long time before we are able to determine the nature of these new threats. Under these circumstances, it is imprudent to make judgmental conclusions that minimize the potential for a technological breakthrough for the next ten years and thus future Soviet capabilities in this vital area.

**Bomber Penetration**

The conclusion that the Soviet air defenses today are relatively ineffective against the planned U.S. low-altitude bomber strikes is based on a large amount of intelligence information which suggests two deficiencies. First, it is assumed that the most heavily deployed Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM), the SA–2, which carries the burden of defense against low altitude penetrators, primarily carries a high-explosive
(non-nuclear) warhead; second, that the ground-controlled intercept (GCI) system which must direct the aircraft interceptors to their targets is relatively inaccurate against low-flying aircraft.

While both of these conclusions may be justified by information collected in the past, data is beginning to emerge which suggests a potential for marked change within the period of the estimate. Specifically, Soviet homeland air defense practice altered significantly about 1972. Prior to that time, fewer than 3% of the target aircraft were at altitudes below 500 meters. After that time the percentage began to rise; it is now about 30% and seems to be growing. This might relate to the growing ability of the SA–2 to cope with low altitude threats through the use of a nuclear warhead option—an option which recent intelligence indicates has spread to perhaps one-half of the SA–2 deployments.

The above change may also reflect an improving capability against low altitude penetrators in a number of other areas where there are intelligence gaps, such as: (1) improved GCI vectoring accuracy through better site-to-site and site-to-aircraft data links; (2) employment of the mobile low-altitude SAMs of Ground Army Forces; (3) tactics such as radiation homing on interceptor aircraft and SAMs, and a nuclear warhead on the SA–2, to negate or degrade U.S. electronic countermeasures; (4) emergence of at least a partial look-down-shoot-down capability on the MIG–23, which is now operational with Ground Army Forces.

For the longer term, many Soviet activities seen at their R&D facilities are not fully understood. A pole-mounted, mobile radar has been observed which could extend the low altitude coverage of existing SAMs or could form the basis for a new SAM system. A high-performance SAM and SAM radar is being tested, probably for the ground forces, but which could have dual capability for homeland defense. A variety of other types of air defense radars, some elevated, are undergoing unknown tests.

Taken as a whole, the uncertainties inherent in a comprehensive assessment of Soviet air defense capabilities do not support the NIE view that “... it is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to cope with sophisticated low altitude attacks during the next 10 years.”

Having identified what we believe to be serious deficiencies in this NIE, there follows a series of observations examining the nature of the problems and some suggestions for their resolution.

Observations on the Intelligence Estimating Process

The root cause of the problems experienced both by the intelligence community and the users of intelligence is the lack of factual evidence and the difficulty of forecasting ten years into the future. Because
of the importance attached to some intelligence subjects, there is an understand-able desire to fill some of the intelligence holes with judgments. These judgments can then gain an acceptance approaching fact, and can then lead both the intelligence community and the users of intelligence into a single viewpoint which rejects alternatives, and can persist too long. Only when some surprise arises, totally contrary to the intelligence trend, is the pattern broken and another “review” ordered of the intelligence effort.

When decisions must be made, they are almost always based on incomplete information. When they involve intelligence information, the decision-maker should wish to know not only the facts but also the best judgments of the intelligence community and have some feeling for the uncertainties connected with these conclusions, including other possible situations consistent with the data. These uncertainties should lead the decision-maker to consider whether he should hedge his bets or to be prepared for possible reverses connected with failures of actions (or inactions) based on these assessments.

This is not an easy process; no one knows how to weigh judgmental uncertainties. For this reason we look upon the process of attempting to analyze and communicate uncertainties in the area of national assessment as a process with which we must continue to experiment, trying various modes in an attempt to find a more satisfactory procedure. This leads us to the following suggestions:

Suggestions for Resolving Observed Deficiencies

I. Those aspects of intelligence which are considered critical by key decision-makers should be subject to separate and competitive analyses and such alternate views as are developed should be presented to the President and other users. In our view, this suggestion deserves the highest priority for consideration and implementation.

II. To avoid the tendency of decision-makers to force the intelligence community to come up with positions when the data is too meager, the following suggestion may be helpful. The user should formulate his alternative choices of action in such a way as to permit the intelligence community to marshal its evidence around each alternative. Thus, the community would be asked to make its best case that we face a serious problem, and its best case that we do not.

The purpose of this suggestion is to try to maintain an awareness of the limitations in the intelligence information. In addition, it stimulates the user to provide important feedback to the intelligence community on his interests and problems which, in turn, can motivate the intelligence community to provide a more complete and useful product to the user.
III. NIE 11–3/8–74 has the tendency to phrase the estimate as a *net* assessment, that is, to include an assessment of U. S. capabilities in the face of the threat in question. We suggest that the National Security Council adopt a three-step process. The first step is the generation of a purely intelligence document, the NIE, which carefully avoids the impression that a net assessment has been performed. The second step would involve a genuine net assessment, requiring participation by both the intelligence community and other agencies (Department of Defense, State, etc.), under the aegis of the NSC. The third and final step would involve a thorough critique of the net assessment document for the NSC by an entity which is enabled to function with an appropriate degree of independence.

*Summary*

We believe that the policy-maker would be better served by an NIE which clearly identifies that which is fact and that which is judgment, and which identifies the intelligence gaps prevailing at various stages in the analytic process. The product would also be more useful if the decision-makers provided more specific guidance regarding the relevant, contemporary issues with which they are confronted, and on the most useful format for presentation of the intelligence.

Finally, Mr. President, we recommend that you direct the NSC to implement these suggestions, insofar as possible, with respect to formulation of this year’s NIE on Soviet Strategic Forces which is now in progress and, as appropriate, to the national intelligence estimating process.

Respectfully,

*George W. Anderson, Jr.*

*Admiral, USN (Ret.)*

*Chairman*
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby)\(^1\)

Washington, September 8, 1975.

SUBJECT
Possible Revisions in the NIE Process

The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has recommended\(^2\) that the current NIE process be converted to a new three-step process:
—Production of a purely intelligence document which avoids net assessments.
—A detailed net assessment.
—A thorough critique of the net assessment by an independent entity.

A possible Presidential directive for implementation of this revision on a trial basis for two strategic issues is at Tab A. The President would like your comments on the PFIAB recommendations and the proposed trial run.

Henry A. Kissinger\(^3\)

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Box 25, Subject Series, PFIAB/NIEs, 1975–76 (5). Top Secret; Sensitive.
2 See Documents 154 and 155.
3 Scowcroft signed for Kissinger.
Tab A

Draft Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll), and the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby)

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Trial Modification to the NIE Process

In an effort to evaluate possible modifications to the national intelligence estimating process the President has directed that:

—The Director of Central Intelligence establish an independent analysis group composed of Intelligence Community and non-government representatives which would produce an experimental estimate on the capability of Soviet strategic forces, independent of NIE 11–3/8–75, in the following two strategic areas:
  • Anti-Submarine Warfare
  • Accuracy of ICBMs

This estimate should, in those instances when factual data is limited or not available, present a complete spectrum of opposing views and alternative interpretations. In addition, gaps in knowledge critical to the assessment should be highlighted and the degree of uncertainty in key judgments described in detail.

—The Interdepartmental Political-Military Group establish an ad hoc net assessment working group which will prepare a net assessment in the two strategic areas described above and submit its product to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee;

—The Under Secretaries Committee undertake a comparison and critique of (1) the estimate and net assessment described above; and (2) NIE 11–3/8–75 treatment of the same three areas.
157. Minutes of United States Intelligence Board Meeting

USIB–M–707 Washington, November 13, 1975, 10:30 a.m.–4:35 p.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, acting for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF, Director, National Security Agency

Mr. William N. Morell, Jr., Department of Treasury Representative to USIB

Colonel Fred I. Chanatry, USAF, acting for Energy Research and Development Administration Representative to USIB

Mr. William O. Cregar, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation Representative to USIB

SERVICE OBSERVERS PRESENT

Major General Harold R. Aaron, USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army

Rear Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Director of Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force

Mr. Colby noted that completion of the Board’s consideration of this estimate would conclude Mr. Hyland’s participation as the State Member of USIB. He said that the Board had been stimulated by Mr. Hyland’s views and hoped that the USIB would be serving him well in the future in his new position as the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s (NIE 11–3/8–75)

Mr. Colby introduced discussion on the subject estimate by noting that the meeting had been convened in this larger room in order to afford an opportunity for more of the participants to be present. He said

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–282, Intelligence Files, PFIAB (1) [1971–1975] [3 of 3]. Secret; [Handling restriction not declassified]. Colby chaired the meeting, held at CIA headquarters. According to a note on the minutes, the meeting reconvened on November 17. Attached, but not printed, is a list of attendees indicating that Chanatry and Aaron were not present at the November 17 session, held from 3:00 until 5:24 p.m. ERDA’s USIB representative Major General Edward B. Giller and Herbert W. Taylor did attend, the latter acting on Aaron’s behalf. Lawrence Finch was also in attendance, acting on the behalf of Hyland, who was present for only a portion of the meeting.

2 Part of meeting. [Footnote in the original.]
that a series of briefings had been set up on the more important subject areas of the estimate, some of which were at issue.

Mr. Colby observed that this estimate is the result of an enormous amount of analytical effort on the part of the community. He wished to commend the team that prepared the estimate, noting that the National Security Council Staff and other customers were anxious to receive the document.

Mr. Stoertz, the NIO for Strategic Programs, introduced [name not declassified] who was the overall chairman of the paper. [name not declassified] pointed out that one of the basic principles applied in preparing the estimate was to expose the analysis and evidence in support of conclusions as well as reflecting dissenting opinions. He advised the Board that there would be seven presentations at this first meeting prior to final Board consideration at a later date. The seven briefings were as follows:

a. The question of the capabilities of Soviet ICBMs to attack Minuteman silos. [name not declassified]

b. The differences over the range and mission of the Backfire. [2 names not declassified] Lt. Commander William Lawless, Navy)

c. Future Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities and the potential threat to U.S. bombers [2 names not declassified]

d. The question of Soviet progress in direct-energy systems—particularly lasers—and whether the strategic balance may be sharply altered within the period of the estimate by such systems. [2 names not declassified]

e. The question of the likely trends in Soviet strategic forces in the absence of a SALT TWO agreement. [name not declassified]

f. The question of Soviet strategic objectives and perception particularly in regard to their views of the U.S. as a strategic competitor and the possibility that they are seeking some form of strategic superiority over the U.S. [name not declassified]

g. Future Soviet ASW capabilities and the potential threat to the U.S. SSBN force. [name not declassified] Mr. Richard Haver, Navy)

At the conclusion of the first session of the Board’s consideration of the subject estimate, Mr. Colby said he wished to compliment and express the appreciation of the Board to the team of briefers. He said that the briefings primed the Board well for the follow-on discussions scheduled for Monday, 17 November.

When the meeting was reconvened on 17 November, Mr. Colby introduced the discussion and again complimented the splendid job by those involved in the preparation of the estimate.

Mr. Stoertz commented on the level of sophistication reached by this NIE which reflected improvements in both collection and analyt-
ical quality. He noted that 15 years ago the community was struggling to count numbers and to make a single “best guess” forecast of numbers for the next few years, whereas in the present estimate the community was projecting alternative capabilities which policy makers should consider for the next ten years. Mr. Stoertz said that there were several specific improvements since last year including:

—Better balance between offensive and defensive aspects.
—Even-handed exploration of alternatives with and without SALT TWO agreement.
—Stress on Soviet awareness that quality of forces is more important to future balance than quantity, and on the scope and vigor of Soviet R&D.

He stated that, despite some problem areas, he believed that the community presently has a more realistic picture of the future strategic environment than before.

[Omitted here is recognition of those responsible for drafting the NIE.]

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

The Board then approved NIE 11–3/8–75 as amended.

Executive Session

At the request of the Chairman the Board was convened in executive session at 1654 hours to discuss correspondence originating in the PFIAB regarding NIE 11–3/8–74.

[Name not declassified]

Executive Secretary

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3 No record of the executive session was found.
4 See Document 155.
158. National Intelligence Estimate¹


[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

In this Estimate, we call particular attention to current and prospective developments which could markedly increase Soviet strategic capabilities during the next ten years:

—The Soviets are steadily deploying new types of ICBMs. In about 1980 they will have a force of up to 900 missiles of these types, most of them with MIRVs. They are also moving ahead with the development of several ICBMs beyond those now being deployed.

—The capability of the Soviet ICBM force to destroy US Minuteman silos is growing. It will probably pose a major threat in the early 1980s. A more rapid increase in this threat is possible but unlikely.

—The Soviets have the potential to make the task of penetration by bombers to targets in the USSR considerably more difficult by 1985 than it is today.

—The Soviets are pursuing extensive research and development in such areas as submarine detection and defensive lasers.

We also call attention to the large uncertainties about some aspects of Soviet strategic policy and forces, especially about the quality of key weapons and supporting systems in the future. Forecasts of the strategic environment over the next ten years must therefore be made with varying degrees of uncertainty:

—It is almost certain that, despite prospective improvements in Soviet forces, the USSR will not acquire deployed forces capable of launching a nuclear attack so effective that the US could not cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation.

—It is probable that US and Soviet strategic capabilities will remain in roughly equal balance, although the long-standing US qualitative su-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files, NIE 11–3/8–75. Top Secret. [Handling restriction not declassified] The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State and Defense, the NSA, and ERDA participated in the preparation of the estimate. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, also participated. The DCI issued the estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except for the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained. Colby forwarded the NIE to Ford under a covering memorandum, November 21, which read in part as follows: “In our current estimate we have been more explicit than before about the basis for our judgments and about our uncertainties.” Relative to previous Soviet estimates, Colby wrote, this one “conveys our estimates more precisely.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 33, USSR, NIE 11–3/8–75)
periority in strategic weapons and supporting technology will come under increasing challenge.\(^2\)

—It is possible but unlikely that the Soviets will acquire capabilities that would be perceived as providing them with more strategic power to back up their policies than that available to the U.S.

**Recent Developments**

In strategic offensive forces, the Soviets continue their broad program of major improvements. The trends are about as we had forecast in last year’s Estimate, but the diversity of the ballistic missile submarine program and the potential hard-target capabilities of ICBM systems are somewhat greater than we had expected. The main things we have learned during this past year are:

—The new ICBMs are being deployed at a moderate pace. About 100 of the new ICBMs, most of them with MIRVs, are now operational in new and converted hard silos. In accordance with the Interim Agreement, the Soviets have started to deactivate older, soft ICBM launchers in exchange for new SLBM launchers.

—Despite some continuing developmental problems, the new ICBMs are estimated to have better accuracies and higher yields than we had expected, implying somewhat better capabilities to destroy hard targets like Minuteman silos.

—Development of a land-mobile ICBM could now be complete, but there is as yet no sign of its deployment.

—Two and possibly three models of ballistic missile submarines capable of carrying long-range SLBMs are believed to be in production. A new and large type of ballistic missile submarine may have started construction. A new small SLBM and a new or modified large SLBM have begun flight testing; a MIRV payload has recently been identified on the latter.

—The Soviets continue to maintain only a few ballistic missile submarines on patrol stations. Limited probes near North American coasts were conducted this year, possibly portending changes in patrol patterns. There is also an increasing number of SSBNs with missiles of sufficient range to reach targets in the US at any given time, even without leaving port.

—The Backfire bomber has been deployed in small numbers this year, both in Naval Aviation and in Long Range Aviation at bases occupied by intermediate-range bombers. The Backfire has extensive capability for use in various missions in Eurasia and for naval missions over the open seas. We continue to believe it has capabilities for operation against the continental US. There are differing views within the Intelligence Community about Soviet intentions to use it for this purpose.

—We have obtained no confirmation of Soviet hints that a new heavy bomber is being developed.

\(^2\) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes there is little reasonable doubt that the Soviets are striving for general strategic superiority over the US by the end of the next decade. If the current massive Soviet R&D programs achieve the breakthroughs being sought, an important shift in the USSR’s favor in the strategic balance could occur by 1985. [Footnote in the original.]
—There is no firm evidence that the Soviets are developing long-range cruise missiles, but they have the design and development experience to be able to do so.

The Soviets continue to devote more resources to strategic defense than they do to forces for intercontinental attack. In addition to routine improvements in what is by far the largest air defense system in the world, the following are the main developments in Soviet strategic defenses we have noted during the past year:

—The Soviets continue to construct ballistic missile detection and tracking systems to close small gaps in existing coverage, to increase their assurance of reliable warning, and perhaps to provide some additional warning time.
—They are placing additional emphasis on surveillance systems and training for defense against aircraft at low altitudes, though there are no indications of major improvements in performance.
—We have obtained additional evidence supporting earlier indications that nuclear warheads are available for a significant number of Soviet surface-to-air missiles.
—The Soviets continue their research and development on ABM systems (at a pace not significantly reduced from that which existed prior to the ABM Treaty), on radars, on SAMs designed for low-altitude air defense, and on directed-energy systems which probably include lasers with capabilities against low-orbiting satellites.
—They have continued their extensive investigation of techniques for overcoming their deficiencies in detecting and tracking SSBNs at sea. Soviet attempts to trail US SSBNs near our operating bases have resulted in no known successes.

Soviet Objectives

Our judgments about the strategic objectives of the Soviet leaders are based on what they say (in public and sometimes in private), on what we observe of their programs, and on our appreciation of the internal and external forces operating on them in the present period of risky opportunities. It is apparent that they see no contradiction between their policies of détente and arms-limitation negotiations and their continuing buildup of strategic forces. Much that we observe in their present posture and programs can be attributed to a combination of traditional defensive prudence, a military doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities, and a variety of internal political and institutional factors. But the scope and vigor of these programs, at a time when the USSR has achieved a powerful deterrent as well as recognition as the strategic equal of the US, raise the elusive question of whether the Soviet leaders embrace as an objective some form of strategic nuclear superiority over the US.

Deeply held ideological and doctrinal convictions impel the Soviet leaders to pose as an ultimate goal the attainment of a dominant posi-
tion over the West, particularly the US, in terms of political, economic, social, and military strength. We do not doubt that if they thought they could achieve it, the Soviets would try to attain the capability to launch a nuclear attack so effective that the US could not cause devastating damage to the USSR in retaliation. Although the Soviet leaders may now entertain some hope—and, in the view of some agencies, already believe—that US resolve as a strategic competitor is weakening, they know realistically that the US need not concede the USSR a superior position in the next ten years. Nevertheless, they are probably striving for a strategic posture which has some visible and therefore politically useful advantages over the US and which would give the USSR better capabilities than the US to fight a nuclear war.

The Soviets probably view SALT as having the potential for limiting the costs and risks of the strategic arms competition. Their objectives for the SALT process probably include constraining US options (especially in areas where they fear they may be less able to compete) and leaving open their own options to the extent possible. Considering the history of Soviet strategic policy and force improvement programs, we believe that under a SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accord,\(^3\) the Soviets would probably seek in their strategic programs:

— to ensure deterrence of all forms of nuclear attack on the USSR;
— to improve war-fighting capabilities, aimed at the survival of the USSR as a national entity should deterrence fail;
— to counterbalance, with both peripheral and intercontinental forces, the combined nuclear strengths of the US and its Allies and of China;
— to narrow or close the gap between the US and the USSR in important weapon technologies and to hedge against future US force improvements; and
— to acquire strategic advantages, real or perceived, should US behavior permit.

If a SALT TWO agreement is not achieved, we believe that the Soviet leaders’ objectives for their strategic forces would be much the same. But they would be free of SALT TWO restrictions, which would have forced them in 1977 to make a small reduction in the number of their intercontinental delivery vehicles, and thereafter to have confronted the difficult choices involved in trading old weapons for new to stay within the 2,400 aggregate ceiling. In the absence of such restrictions, we would expect the Soviets to build and retain strategic offensive forces larger than the limits proposed at Vladivostok and considerably larger than US programmed forces. Increases in force levels would

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 48.
be especially likely if US-Soviet relations significantly worsened. In any case, the Soviets would not expect quantitative competition to alter the strategic balance. Implicit in the Vladivostok accord was a Soviet judgment that the USSR could not achieve significant advantages over the US by continued competition in numbers of strategic weapons. The Soviets have evidently come to recognize that the strategic environment in the 1980s will be affected most importantly by the qualitative aspects of the forces of the two sides. Their progress in this area will be largely independent of SALT TWO.

Dramatic near-term changes in Soviet strategic policy would not be likely under a post-Brezhnev regime. The policies now being pursued have emerged from the interplay of many factors which would remain unaltered. To the extent that Brezhnev as an individual may be a moderating influence, any changes would likely be in the direction of increases in strategic capabilities, especially if SALT TWO fails to produce an agreement. Other adjustments in Soviet policy for strategic forces could result from the USSR’s own technological advances or from US-Soviet confrontations over the next ten years. Finally, changes could emerge in response to US force developments such as improvements in hard-target kill capabilities; deployment of small, accurate long-range cruise missiles; and concepts and options for the selective use of nuclear weapons in limited intercontinental warfare.

**Future Capabilities**

Varying degrees of uncertainty characterize our estimates of Soviet strategic policy and of the quantity and quality of Soviet forces. Forecasts for the next few years can be made with relatively high confidence by extrapolating from current evidence. For the period of primary concern, five to ten years hence, estimates of system characteristics and force composition must be based on very limited evidence and indirect considerations. A SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accord would considerably reduce quantitative uncertainties about forces for intercontinental attack. We warn, however, that uncertainties about the quality of strategic weapons and forces—which exist now and will persist in the future—are in some areas large enough to affect judgments about important aspects of the future strategic balance.

Our best estimate of Soviet offensive force development over the next ten years, assuming a SALT TWO agreement, is that deployment of new systems will continue at about the pace now demonstrated, that ICBM accuracy will continue to improve, and that force survivability and flexibility also will improve. Soviet ICBM forces will probably pose a major threat to US Minuteman silos in the early 1980s, assuming that the Soviets can perfect techniques for precisely timed two-RV attacks on a single target. This is somewhat earlier than forecast last year.
Moreover, by the early 1980s Soviet offensive forces will lead programmed US forces in numbers of missile RVs, though the US will retain a large lead in the total number of missile and bomber weapons combined.

We have examined a number of other alternatives for future Soviet forces, which are all plausible but not equally consistent with past trends and current evidence. These range from (a) a force the Soviets might regard as meeting minimum requirements for strategic parity and military effectiveness against currently programmed US forces under a SALT TWO agreement, to (b) a force the Soviets might build if the SALT process failed, US-Soviet relations worsened, and the Soviets achieved high rates of deployment and technological advance. The principal differences in the countersilo capabilities of these alternative forces are encompassed by the large range of uncertainty in our estimates of such key weapon characteristics as ICBM accuracy. At the more threatening but highly unlikely extreme of this range of uncertainty, Soviet ICBMs would pose a major threat to Minuteman silos by the end of the 1970s.

The Soviets could increase the threat against US bombers on alert by deploying some of their SSBNs closer to the US coastline to reduce the potential warning time of an attack. In assessing the military advantages of adopting this more threatening posture, the Soviets would have to consider planned introduction of the B–1 bomber and countermeasures available for existing bombers. We believe the Soviets would conclude that the US could preserve the survivability of most of its alert bombers against attacks by SLBMs throughout the next ten years.

In the field of strategic defense, it is unlikely that the Soviets will significantly improve their low-altitude air defenses before 1980. The most likely improvements we foresee in their air surveillance and control, interceptors, and SAM systems would have the potential for overcoming most of the technical deficiencies in their capabilities to counter low-altitude bombers by 1985, but it might be possible for them to do so earlier with a very high level of effort. Assuming rapid and widespread deployment of such systems, low-altitude penetration of Soviet air defenses by bombers will be considerably more difficult by 1985 than it is today. The actual effectiveness of Soviet air defenses, however, would continue to depend heavily on the degree of degradation resulting from ballistic missile strikes and on the performance of US electronic countermeasures and bomber penetration aids and tactics. Neither we nor the Soviets would likely be able to predict these effects with confidence.

The future effectiveness of Soviet defenses against ballistic missile submarines on patrol will depend in large part on how successful the
Soviets are in detecting and tracking SSBNs in broad ocean areas. From our understanding of the technologies involved and research and development programs in the US and the USSR, we conclude that the Soviets have little potential for achieving success in either of these areas in the next ten years. Moreover, improvements in US SSBNs and expansion of their operating areas will compound the Soviet problem of finding, tracking, and attacking them. These judgments must be qualified, however, by gaps in our knowledge [less than 1 line not declassified] of possible future Soviet developments. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to develop their strategy and capability for detection of SSBNs, and we expect improvements in their capabilities to detect and destroy SSBNs in confined water areas. We conclude, however, that these improvements will not overcome deficiencies in open-ocean detection and submarine tracking, and that Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US submarines on station from launching their missiles.

Despite prospective improvements in their forces, the problems and uncertainties which the Soviets would face if they contemplated attacking the US would remain formidable for the next ten years:

—The Soviets would be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos and would probably expect a considerable number to survive.

—They would almost certainly consider their ASW forces to be unable to locate and simultaneously destroy more than a few US ballistic missile submarines at sea.

—Under the ABM Treaty their ABM defenses would be insignificant.

—They would still not have high confidence in their ability to defend against US bombers.

—They would probably expect their civil defenses to be able to preserve a political and economic cadre and to contribute to the survivability of the Soviet Union as a national entity, but they would have to expect massive casualties, industrial destruction, and a breakdown of the economy.

Under these circumstances, with the forces and weapons we can foresee, it is extremely unlikely that during the next ten years the Soviet leaders would come to believe that either side could launch an attack which would prevent devastating retaliation. During the period, however, Soviet offensive forces will gain considerably relative to the US in such quantitative measures as missile throw weight and missile RVs, although SALT TWO limits would establish and preserve symmetry in total delivery vehicles and MIRVed missile launchers. Furthermore, the long-standing US qualitative superiority in strategic weaponry and supporting technologies will come under increasing challenge. Under the most threatening but unlikely circumstance of very rapid Soviet technological advance, especially if combined with a large Soviet buildup in the absence of a SALT TWO agreement, the USSR could
achieve capabilities that might be perceived as giving it more strategic power to back up its policies than that available to the US. Foreseeable Soviet strategic forces, however, would not eliminate the USSR’s vulnerability to retaliation. A crisis resolution, therefore, probably would not rest on the strategic weapons balance, but rather would depend on other factors, such as the comparative strengths and dispositions of US and Soviet conventional forces.

We have reexamined Soviet R&D programs and prospects for major advances in fields having strategic offensive and defensive applications that might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities. We have given particular attention to lasers for use in air and missile defense and to systems for detecting and trailing US ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets are working actively in both fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this work. The available evidence, together with our appreciation of the physical, engineering, and operational hurdles which must be overcome, leads us to rate as small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter the strategic balance through technological advance in the next ten years. Nevertheless, the scope and progress of Soviet R&D, particularly in strategic air defense and ASW, bear especially close watching in the years ahead.

[Omitted here are the remainder of Volume I, Key Judgments and Summary, and Volumes II and III, containing the Estimate and Annexes, respectively.]

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4 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the USSR is embarked on a directed-energy weapons research program of such magnitude that it could have a major if not decisive impact on the strategic balance before 1985. [Footnote in the original.]
159. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby) to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

In early September, I received a memorandum from your Assistant for National Security Affairs summarizing certain recommendations submitted to you by your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board regarding the production of National Intelligence Estimates. Attached to that memorandum was a draft Presidential directive for undertaking and evaluating an experimental modification of the present process for developing estimates in two specific strategic areas: anti-submarine warfare and the accuracy of ICBMs. I was asked to give you my comments on the PFIAB recommendations and on the proposed experiment. This letter constitutes my response. In addition to my own views, it also reflects the views of my colleagues in CIA and in other components of the Intelligence Community responsible for contributing to our strategic assessments of Soviet capabilities. The draft text of this letter was reviewed, discussed and unanimously endorsed by the United States Intelligence Board.

As summarized in the memorandum and the accompanying draft directive, the new procedure would involve:

a. The development of an estimate of Soviet capabilities in these two key areas by “an independent analysis group composed of Intelligence Community and non-government representatives.” This experimental estimate would be a “purely intelligence document which avoids net assessments.” It would be something independent of, and prepared separately from, the National Intelligence Estimate in which Soviet capabilities in these areas are already considered: NIE 11–3/8–75.

b. A subsequent detailed net assessment of Soviet and U.S. capabilities. In the two experimental areas, the draft directive suggested that the net assessments be prepared by an ad hoc working group established under the auspices of the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group.

c. A thorough critique of the net assessment by an independent entity. In the experiment, as suggested in the draft directive, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee would make a comparison and critique of the independently prepared estimates and the net assessments de-

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files, Box 7, Competitive Analysis Background, 1975. Secret. Colby forwarded the letter to Scowcroft under a November 24 covering memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–282, Intelligence Files, PFIAB (1) [1971–1975] [3 of 3])

2 Document 156.
scribed above, and compare both with the treatment of the same subjects in NIE 11–3/8–75.

Through subsequent discussions with the NSC Staff and the PFIAB Secretariat, we learned that:

a. The NSC Staff’s summary recommendations were intended to implement those contained in the PFIAB’s memorandum to you of 8 August 1975.3

b. The recommendations for change were not intended to apply to all National Intelligence Estimates but only to estimates in the NIE 11–3/8 series (Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict).

c. In suggesting the above-described experimental procedure, neither the NSC Staff nor the PFIAB intended to disrupt or delay the preparation of this year’s NIE 11–3/8–75, which was then in its final stages of preparation. It has now been approved by the United States Intelligence Board and is being published.

I would like to comment on some of the points raised by the PFIAB in its 8 August memorandum to you, which served as the stimulus for these recommendations. That memorandum expressed the PFIAB’s view that last year’s National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic capabilities—NIE 11–3/8–74: Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985—“is seriously misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence it is deficient for the purposes it should serve.” This view appears to be based on a belief that:

a. NIE 11–3/8–74 was not sufficiently explicit on important uncertainties underlying our intelligence judgments, particularly on a few vital technical issues such as the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs and the progress of Soviet research on anti-submarine warfare.

b. NIE 11–3/8–74 contained what appeared to be “net assessments” of U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities, when detailed operational analysis of strategic conflict required for genuine net assessment was lacking.

I certainly share the PFIAB’s view that “National Intelligence Estimates should be among the most important documents issued by the Intelligence Community.” NIE 11–3/8–74 was the product of a still-continuing evolutionary process through which the Intelligence Community is endeavoring to make each of these major annual assessments of Soviet strategic capabilities better than those of preceding years. While I would not contend that NIE 11–3/8–74 was a perfect document, I cannot agree with the PFIAB’s contention that it errs by “projecting a sense of complacency” or, for that matter, in offering any judgments “unsupported by the facts.”

3 Document 155.
There are clearly specific issues on which individual members of the PFIAB differ with the Intelligence Community’s conclusions. But the estimate as a whole depicted Soviet strategic capabilities that are steadily improving in many areas and will continue to improve, even in a climate of détente and even if a SALT Two agreement is successfully negotiated. I hardly consider this judgment any valid basis for complacency, even though NIE 11–3/8–74 also concluded—on the basis of rigorous analysis of all available evidence—that the Soviets are unlikely within the next decade to have deployed operational weapons systems enabling them to launch an attack that would prevent devastating U.S. retaliation.

With respect to the specific proposals of the NSC Staff, my comments are as follows:

a. I welcome the evaluation, by consumers, of the utility of our intelligence products and any suggestions on how those products can be made more informative and enlightening to the policy officials for whom they are written.

b. I also welcome any improvements in the U.S. Government’s procedures for developing net assessments of U.S. capabilities with respect to those of potential or putative adversaries. This task goes well beyond the scope of intelligence estimates—which, by definition, are focused on the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers. It is a task, however, to which a sound intelligence input is essential. As you know, at various times over the past several years, the net assessment function has oscillated between the NSC Staff and the Department of Defense. The responsibility for net assessments needs to be more clearly assigned and a better mechanism needs to be developed for producing them on a regular, systematic basis—drawing on intelligence inputs plus the details of U.S. capabilities and operational plans. The Intelligence Community will, of course, provide any support or assistance it can to new procedures, or experiments with new procedures, designed to improve the quality of U.S. net assessments.

c. The intelligence estimating experiment proposed by the NSC Staff, however, gives me some trouble. Our annual estimates on Soviet strategic capabilities—the NIE 11–3/8 series—utilize all the information known by and the best analysis available to the U.S. Government. Undergirding the production of the actual estimate itself—e.g., NIE 11–3/8–75—is an extensive research program examining specific aspects of Soviet capabilities in considerable detail, a research program involving not only all concerned elements of the Intelligence Community but also drawing on the views and talents of knowledgeable experts in specific fields outside the government. It is hard for me to envisage how an ad hoc “independent” group of government and non-government analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities even in two specific areas—than the Intelligence Community can prepare.

An “independent” group could, of course, produce a sharply drawn set of scenarios, outlining various capabilities the Soviets might be able to develop. Such alternative scenarios or hypotheses were in-
deed discussed, and carefully weighed, in and during the process through which NIE 11–3/8–75 was prepared. The actual estimate, however, reflects my strong belief that intelligence has a dual set of responsibilities to those for whom it is produced. It clearly has the responsibility of warning its consumers of risks and potential problems, of various things the Soviets might do. What some miss or ignore is that intelligence also has a responsibility for making an assessment of the relative likelihood of such unpleasant contingencies, of saying what capabilities—in its best judgment—the Soviets are not likely to develop in given time frames. Our present process for producing national estimates is designed to discharge both sets of responsibilities, not just the first.

All of us in the Intelligence Community are constantly seeking ways in which we might improve the quality and utility of our estimates. This year’s NIE 11–3/8–75, in fact, has incorporated several innovations, including the discussion and assessment of developments of low probability but of great potential significance, should they occur. Two separate sessions of the United States Intelligence Board were devoted to this estimate before it was issued. On 14 November, the Board spent the entire day on a thorough presentation, which included adversary debate, of the evidence and alternative judgmental conclusions in seven critical areas, including both ASW and ICBM accuracy. On 17 November, the Board addressed the actual text of the estimate, and its Key Judgments, page by page.

The published version of 11–3/8–75 will be in the hands of concerned consumers, including the PFIAB, within the next few days. I would suggest that the best, most efficient way to proceed would be for those consumers—especially the PFIAB—to scrutinize NIE 11–3/8–75 and ascertain the extent to which it overcomes or rectifies what they may have perceived as deficiencies in NIE 11–3/8–74. After this process of review has been completed, my representatives or those of my successor—can then sit down with members of the PFIAB and the NSC Staff to discuss specific courses of action most likely to be of value in our joint, continuing quest for a better national intelligence product.

W. E. Colby

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5 See footnote 1, Document 157.
160. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby) to the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Anderson)¹


Dear George:

In your letter of August 8, 1975, to the President² you made some criticisms of last year’s National Intelligence Estimate 11–3/8–74, “Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict Through 1985.” The letter is, of course, a fine example of your independent assessment of our intelligence product and advice to the President with respect to it.

Stemming from that letter, Brent Scowcroft requested my comments on certain recommendations for change in the current National Intelligence Estimate process.³ I responded to this in my letter to the President of 21 November 1975,⁴ a copy of which I made available to you. In this letter, I took some issue with the conclusions in your August 8, 1975, letter with respect to last year’s National Intelligence Estimate. I pointed out that I had received the August letter only on 9 September, too far along in this year’s NIE 11–3/8 process to divert the talents from that priority Estimate to respond to your August comments in detail. I suggested also that an examination of the 1975 Estimate⁵ might lead you to a different conclusion than you reached with respect to the 1974 Estimate.

At the same time, I believe that the statements in your August letter were so sweeping that they deserved a very specific response from our experts. I consequently requested them to develop the attached comments reflecting the statements about specific Soviet technical developments made in your August letter. I am sure we will have a chance to discuss these at our forthcoming meeting, and I believe these comments might help us to fix on specific matters at issue.

I am sending a copy of this to Brent Scowcroft, as I am concerned that the President might otherwise suffer under a very erroneous im-

¹ Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, Box I-013, NIE Evaluation by PFIAB. Confidential. A copy was sent to Scowcroft.
² Document 155.
³ Kissinger’s memorandum, signed by Scowcroft, requesting commentary from Colby is Document 156.
⁴ Document 159.
⁵ NIE 11–3/8–75 is Document 158.
pression of the accuracy and seriousness of both the 1974 and the 1975 Estimates on this important subject.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

Attachment

Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

COMMENTS PRIMARILY ON SPECIFIC SOVIET TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS MENTIONED IN THE PFIAB LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

PFIAB

This NIE assesses that for the next ten years it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets will conclude they could launch an attack which would prevent devastating US retaliation. This judgment is presented confidently, with the force of fact, although the cumulative evidence on which it is based is conflicting, often flimsy, and in certain cases does not exist.

With respect to Soviet ICBM accuracy and the survivability of the US Minuteman force, the data is inconclusive and has been very differently interpreted by the experts. A number of uncertainties which have

COMMENT

This finding in the NIE is labeled a key judgment and followed by five supporting judgments. The estimative words “extremely unlikely” are not intended to mean it is fact. It is our estimate supported by the evidence and discussion in the body of the NIE.

Virtually all but one expert have come to essentially the same conclusion. We readily admit there are uncertainties. The NIE refers the reader to an Interagency Report which delineates those uncertainties

6 Top Secret.
puzzled analysts for six years have been accommodated in the NIE by averaging the worst and best cases when the data could really support either interpretation.

—the NIE gives the appearance of a net assessment and thus the added weight of “operational” consideration, when in substance it is not.

and their effect on Soviet hard-target capabilities. In no case has any “averaging of worst and best cases” taken place; the uncertainties were in fact used in constructing the alternative forces analyzed in the estimate.

The presentation of the results of interaction or engagement analyses are intended to show the implications of Soviet force developments and are not intended to be “net assessments” of the effectiveness of US forces. Assessment of Soviet military capabilities, present and future, result from perceptions by intelligence of the interaction of opposing forces. Given the complexities of strategic nuclear forces, interaction analyses employing advanced analytical techniques are the only means we know of to assess Soviet capabilities. Interaction analyses are necessary if Soviet capabilities are to be described in terms that are relevant to the concerns of defense planners. Furthermore, without considering such interactions, items of intelligence might not be recognized as having important implications, and the proper focus in answering key intelligence questions might be lost.

—the NIE ... accepts optimistic and unproven data regarding US silo hardness.

The data used were provided by the CINCSAC—the operational commander of the Minuteman force—a source we would expect to be best informed on this subject.
Soviet ICBM Accuracy

The hard data on both the presently deployed Soviet ICBM force and the new Soviet ICBMs does not allow any confident, precise determination of accuracy. [7½ lines not declassified]

We readily admit there are uncertainties. The “non-community” view has been questioned by informed and reasonable analysts in the community as involving hypothetical suppositions. In particular, the non-community view implies [13 lines not declassified.]

Concerning the new Soviet ICBMs—the SS–18 and SS–19 [20 lines not declassified]

We point out in NIE 11–3/8–75 that the SS–18 and SS–19 do have problems, but we believe they can be solved. Accuracy figures for these missiles take into account anticipated Soviet correction of the malfunctions mentioned.

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]  [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (21½ lines) not declassified]  [1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

SLBM Survivability

The NIE asserts there should be little worry as to the survivability of the (US) SLBM force now or in the next 10 years. The basis for the conclusion is spelled out in some detail in the body of the Estimate, so it is something more than an assertion. Treating the issues of current and future capabilities separately the reasoning behind this conclusion can be summarized: there is strong positive evidence of a current lack of Soviet ASW capability against the US SSBN force. [8½ lines not declassified] The Estimate also addresses Soviet capability
This conclusion is based partially upon US superiority in “classical” ASW techniques, and partially on judgments that nonconventional techniques are unlikely to be highly successful. True, the conclusion is a judgment and not demonstrated fact, but the reasons for the judgments are stated, and the full analytical backup is contained in the Interagency.

It is very possible that this technological area will yield capabilities not yet realized by the US R&D community . . . it may be a very long time before we are able to determine the nature of these new threats . . . it is imprudent to make judgmental conclusions that minimize the potential for a technological breakthrough . . .

Bomber Penetration

The conclusion that Soviet air defenses today are relatively ineffective against the planned US low altitude bomber strikes is based on a large amount of intelligence information which to impair the effectiveness of the SSBN force in the next ten years. Implicit in this formulation of the problem is destruction of a large fraction of the force and the accomplishment of this destruction in a time-critical fashion. [15½ lines not declassified]
suggests two deficiencies. . . . it is assumed that the most heavily deployed Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM), the SA–2, which carries the burden of defense against low altitude penetrators, primarily carries a high-explosive (non-nuclear) warhead; second that the ground-controlled intercept (GCI) system which must direct the aircraft interceptors to their targets is relatively inaccurate against low-flying aircraft.

[5 paragraphs (56½ lines) not declassified]

For the longer term, many Soviet activities seen at their R&D facilities are not fully understood. A pole-mounted, mobile radar has been observed which could extend the low altitude coverage of existing SAMs or could form the basis for a new SAM system. [8 lines not declassified]

Taken as a whole, the uncertainties inherent in a comprehensive assessment of Soviet air defense capabilities do not support the NIE view that “. . . it is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to cope with sophisticated low altitude attacks during the next 10 years.

US SRAMS in flight; the lack of a lookdown/shootdown interceptor; [12 lines not declassified]

All of these activities were discussed in the NIE, and they are, in fact, not fully understood. But the best analysis available did not indicate that any of the systems which appeared to be under active R&D would, alone or in combination, constitute a major breakthrough in low altitude defense.

The quoted judgment appears in Volume I; the analyses supporting this judgment are not fully laid out in Volume II. Despite the lengthy discussion which would have been required, perhaps they should have been. In any case, Volume II supports this statement for about five years—but not for ten. (The ten year picture is analyzed more fully in the NIE 11–3/8–75, and its conclusion is indeed more pessimistic.)
161. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Meeting with the PFIAB to Discuss NIE 11–3/8

REFERENCES

a. Ltr to President fr Chairman, PFIAB, dtd 8 Aug 75
b. Memo to DCI fr Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) dtd 8 Sept 75, SUBJ: Possible Revisions in the NIE Process

c. Ltr to President fr DCI, dtd 21 Nov 75

d. Ltr to Chairman, PFIAB and Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) fr DCI, dtd 2 Dec 75


f. Memo to Chairman, PFIAB fr Deputy Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs (Hyland) for General Scowcroft, dtd 4 Dec 75, SUBJ: PFIAB Recommendations for Revision of the NIE Process (attached)

1. On 4 December 1975, George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO, Howard Stoertz, NIO/SP, Ray De Bruler, ANIO/SP, met with the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to discuss the Key Judgments of NIE 11–3/8–75 and the Board’s recommendations to the President for changing the process for preparation of NIEs on Soviet strategic forces. Board members attending were:

   Adm. George W. Anderson, Chairman   Mr. Leo Cherne
   Dr. Edward Teller   Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce
   Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.   Mr. Gordon Gray
   Mr. Robert W. Galvin   Dr. William D. Baker

   Also attending were Wheaton Byers, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB and his assistant, Commander Lionel Olmer.

2. Admiral Anderson referred to the Board’s letter to the President concerning NIE 11–3/8–74. Mr. Carver stated that, with the Board’s agreement, we planned to spend about 30 minutes explaining the prin-
principal findings of NIE 11–3/8–74 and use the remainder of the time to
discuss the Board’s recommendations and our reactions to them.

3. Mr. Stoertz’s briefing was planned on the basis of our under-
standing that the Board would not have had an opportunity to read the
advanced copy of Volume One of the estimate. In fact, more of the
members had read it than we had expected. Mr. Stoertz began his
briefing of the key findings of NIE 11–3/8–75 and got to the subject of
ICBM accuracies, when he was interrupted by Drs. Foster and Teller.
(Mr. Stoertz never did get a chance to finish his prepared text.) The re-
mainder of the session consisted of a wider ranging discussion, mainly
about (a) purposes of an estimate like NIE 11–3/8; (b) the overall im-
pressions conveyed by Volume One of NIE 11–3/8–75; and (c) estima-
tive methodology as exemplified by the ICBM accuracy issue.

Anderson: Noted his impression that each year we are reporting
greater Soviet progress on strategic force developments than we said in
the preceding year.

Stoertz: Did not wholly agree that Admiral Anderson’s impression
was correct. This year we reported Soviet ICBMs to be somewhat more
accurate than we estimated last year, and their ballistic missile subma-
rine programs somewhat more diverse. The pace of their ICBM deploy-
ment was a little slower, but we did not think it important enough to
highlight this difference.

Foster: Referred to a finding of the NIE that it was possible but un-
likely that the Soviet ICBM force would pose a major threat to Min-
utean before 1980; Dr. Foster wanted to know why such a threat was
unlikely.

Stoertz: Asked to defer an answer to this question, since he in-
tended to address the subject in a moment.

Teller: Referred to the finding that Soviet ICBMs will have better
hard target capabilities than forecast last year. Asked if there was any
place in NIE 11–3/8–75 where we concluded the Soviets were making
less progress than we estimated last year. He noted that if there were
any such instances, we apparently didn’t believe they had important
enough implications to mention them in the Key Judgments.

Stoertz: There were some instances in which the pace of Soviet
progress was somewhat less than we had forecast, as in ICBM deploy-
ment. In ICBM deployment we believe the Soviets are trying to balance
the pace of force improvement with considerations about the number
of ICBMs which should remain operational. But Dr. Teller was correct
in that we did not think these changes important enough to include in
the Key Judgments.

Teller: Noted that estimated future Soviet capabilities ought not to
be based simply on what we observe in photography, but on many fu-
ture technical possibilities. The US has made major advances in technologies appropriate to missile accuracy. In these technologies the Draper Laboratories are probably the best qualified. Dr. Teller asked whether Dr. Draper\(^8\) had been asked to give his guesses about Soviet ICBM accuracies.

Stoertz: He did not know whether contacts by intelligence analysts included the Draper Laboratories, though specialists in CIA and elsewhere are in regular touch with the US scientific community.

Teller: Asked that the Board be furnished a statement as to whether Dr. Draper or anyone in the Draper Laboratories was consulted by intelligence on this subject.

Foster: Affirmed that intelligence has consulted Draper Laboratories concerning Soviet ICBM accuracies, but not Dr. Draper himself. He observed that there were experts on developing missile guidance systems and experts on analyzing intelligence information. In his view, our judgments on ICBM accuracies are primarily the product of the latter type of experts.

Stoertz: Believed our analysis was the product of both kinds of experts. Intelligence analysts are in regular contact with the US scientific community, but he could not say just which elements they had contacted on the particular subject of ICBM accuracy.

Foster: During the 1960s we judged Soviet ICBM accuracies lagged behind the US, and this was not surprising. Intelligence now says that it will take until 1982 before the Soviets have accuracies comparable to the Minuteman II. What have the Soviets been doing? Why have the Soviets not made more progress?

Stoertz: Intelligence must use the data we have on Soviet ICBM test programs in assessing these accuracies. Furthermore, with the large-yield warheads the Soviets have on their ICBMs, the accuracies we have forecast give them the capability to pose a major threat to Minuteman silos in the coming years. The strategically significant question is how much accuracy is enough rather than how much difference is there between US and Soviet accuracies?

Cherne: Cited and discussed passages of the Key Judgments, noting that to his eye, this year’s NIE conveyed a perceptibly greater sense of anxiety than did last year’s Estimate.

Stoertz: Concluded from Mr. Cherne’s comments that we had achieved our purpose better in this year’s Estimate.

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\(^8\) Charles Stark Draper, engineer, physicist, pioneer in the field of inertial guidance, and founder of Draper Laboratory.
Teller: The sentence at the top of page 3 made him uneasy. *(It is possible but unlikely* that the Soviets will acquire capabilities that would be perceived as providing them with more strategic power to back up their policies than that available to the US.) This judgment conveys an insufficient degree of anxiety.

Cherne: Standing alone, the quoted sentence might be so characterized, but he noted that the sentence in combination with the two preceding sentences was a responsible conclusion.

Teller: He (Teller) had been too limited in his comment. He should have cited all three of the sentences as objectionable. None, in his view, conveyed the proper sense of anxiety.

Cherne: Could not believe that this document (NIE 11–3/8–75) would convey to any reader a tranquil view of the Soviet threat.

Foster: The pertinent question is what kind of accuracy do the Soviets need for a high kill probability against the Minuteman. Page 9 of the Key Judgments says that the Soviets would be uncertain about the outcome of an attack on US Minuteman silos. He did not believe this is correct and noted that intelligence has no evidential basis on which to make that conclusion. The evidence cited about Soviet ICBM accuracies supports two conclusions—“we have a serious problem or we don’t have a problem.” Intelligence should draw conclusions that can be supported by the data.

Cherne: He believed the Soviets would face problems and uncertainties in attacking Minuteman silos. He wanted to note that he agreed with the conclusion, also on page 9, that crisis resolutions would probably not rest on the strategic weapons balance, but would depend on other factors, such as the comparative strengths and dispositions of US and Soviet conventional forces.

Foster: We don’t know about the problems and uncertainties the Soviets would face in attacking the US. In his view:

—The Soviets would have high confidence in attacking Minuteman. The evidence does not permit a conclusion that they would be uncertain.
—The Soviets have demonstrated the ability to trail US submarines.
—Soviet ABM defenses would admittedly be insignificant, provided they adhere to the Treaty.
—All they need is an AWACS and they would have high confidence in their air defenses. What is the evidence about Soviet confidence in their air defenses?
—The significance of Soviet civil defense is that it would mean the leaders could survive if they decided to sacrifice a few million people.

Teller: What will actually happen we don’t know.
Luce: Noted that the paper explained the implications of Soviet civil defenses.

Foster: The statements about Soviet problems and uncertainties in attacking the US are misleading because they are not based on evidence.

Stoertz: Noted that we have made judgments which we believe are “US conservative,” and (as in the paragraph on page 9) have also made judgments which the Soviets are likely to make, judgments which are Soviet conservative.

Foster: History shows that intelligence has always been conservative in estimating (meaning that we had underestimated) Soviet capabilities. What we must worry about is the possibility that the US won’t be able to deter. Dr. Foster does not get the same degree of concern from reading the NIEs as he would if intelligence told him the worst case the data will support and the best case.

Carver: Noted in Dr. Foster’s statement a fundamental difference in concept with the intelligence approach. We can’t give the policymaker two extremes and stop there. We are called on to assess the most likely Soviet capabilities, and to judge how the Soviets themselves probably view their capabilities.

Cherne: On this matter, he would swing to Dr. Teller’s side. In the matter of strategic nuclear developments, the consequences of error is so great, that the policymaker requires best and worst cases. We cannot afford to make an “optimistic” error.

Carver: Not being an expert on the intricacies of Soviet strategic developments, he can read the NIE objectively. To him it expresses what we know and don’t know as well as our uncertainties. To him the communication in the estimate is disturbing; it flags dangers. It contains no polyanna point of view. He noted also that neither he nor the policymaker can pass judgment on highly technical differences about such things as missile accelerometer quality. Moreover, in the key judgments and summary prepared for the policymaker, we cannot say everything about every subject, particularly highly technical subjects.

Teller: He compared the 1974 and 1975 NIEs, and found almost identical passages about the Soviets’ lack of capability during the next ten years to prevent the US from a retaliatory strike.

Cherne: While that is probably a correct judgment, the sense of this year’s estimate, as he reads it, is different.

Carver: Noted that we were not saying that the Soviets will make no progress or that they will not make important technical advances.

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9 Not further identified and not found.
On the contrary, we said they will. But we are saying that, based on the lead times required to translate technology into a weapon system and to produce and operationally deploy it, what we see in the evidence indicates that the Soviets will not be able to prevent the US from launching a devastating retaliatory strike during the period of the next ten years.

Galvin: He regarded NIE 11–3/8–75 as eminently better than last year’s estimate. As he sees the utility of the estimate, and he hoped his view in this regard was the same as the President’s, the conclusions of the NIE should not be the basis for specific policy decisions. They are a frame of reference from which to ask questions, to pursue policy deliberations. Even opposite points of view expressed in the estimate should serve the same purpose. The summary of this estimate is only the starting point for a line of policy consideration. If the President reads only the first 9 pages, only the Key Judgments, we should stop sending him the whole document. We should find out whether he reads every page, highlighting key passages as the Board members have done. We must teach him to study the document, not gain impressions from only the Key Judgments. If he reads the entire volume he will have a library of reference, a point of inquiry. From this estimate the President should get the impression that he need not worry tonight, but the estimate will have done its job if he perceives the areas for policy attention. The minority positions, such as the Air Force position in paragraph 123, should cause him to inquire further. He should be satisfied if the estimate spells out the possibilities he may confront regardless of what is judged as most likely. In his view the President will not be brainwashed into reaching conclusions based on a sense of confidence as a result of this document.

Stoertz: He believed Mr. Galvin’s comments were very constructive. He would note, not out of any sense of being defensive, that the NIE is redone annually. The stream of information on Soviet programs changes and we have large uncertainties about the most likely developments ten years into the future. Things happen slowly, but each year we summarize new Soviet developments and update the judgments conveyed to the President.

Anderson: Read to the Board a memorandum from Mr. Hyland concerning the PFIAB recommendations for revision of the NIE process. (Attached.) He then returned to the earlier discussion. To summarize, we know what they have now through satellite photography and what they will have during the next two years. Also we know what they are testing.

Stoertz: Noted that in some cases the evidence gives us confidence about what they will have a little more than two years in the future.
Foster: He believed Admiral Anderson was not pursuing the important issue. It is not the size of the forces. The numbers are not at issue. Qualitative characteristics of the weapons are the important aspects of Soviet capabilities. For example, we don’t even know the accuracy of the SS–9. Dr. Latter’s alternative method for deriving that accuracy is not acknowledged as an alternative in the NIEs. He asked what the accuracy of the SS–9 was.

Stoertz: We know the accuracy within a range—[less than 1 line not declassified]—as it appears in the estimate. He asked to return to issue of the conservativism in intelligence nature of estimating, and cited several aspects of our methodology about Soviet ICBM accuracy and performance which he submitted were not conservative: the use of 90 percent confidence intervals, the assumption that successful 2–RV attack tactics were as likely as not, the assumption that present MIRV mechanization problems would be corrected, the assumption that operational forces would in a few years achieve performance approaching system potential. We probably credited them with more capability than they would probably have. He then turned to the matter of Dr. Latter’s thesis about the accuracy of the SS–9, pointing out that Dr. Latter’s methodology had been weighed by the most knowledgeable analysts in the intelligence community, who found it open to serious challenge and unpersuasive. He described three points which were the basis for the rejection of Dr. Latter’s methodology by the Intelligence Community.

Foster: Dr. Latter’s methodology had not been disputed by anyone.

Stoertz: He believed Dr. Foster meant to say “refuted,” because Dr. Latter’s method had been not only disputed but rejected by the Intelligence Community. The prospects are near zero that based on information from remote intelligence sensors we would be able to refute Dr. Latter’s hypothesis.

Teller: He objected to the use of language in the NIE which approximates that of rigorous scientific discussion, where in fact no scientific discussion could be based on the evidence that is available on such matters as ICBM accuracies. He would like for intelligence to state its conclusions without claims to scientific rigor. The judgment of one group of experts can come out one way, another group can arrive at a different conclusion. If the “evidence” for intelligence conclusions is the technical analysis of experts then the very thorough analysis of one expert should not be set aside.

Carver: The Intelligence Community does not function in a monolithic way. The mechanism permits surfacing of differences for deliberation and its products contain divergent views. The process does not involve a bureaucratic monolith on the one side of an issue and the rest of the world on the other.

Teller: He believed this was an exaggeration of the problem he was stating and he did not mean to place it in those terms.

Stoertz: Referring back to Dr. Teller’s comments about the use of differing conclusions of experts, he pointed out that in the analytical process by which ICBM accuracies are derived it was not possible to use differing methodologies, such as Dr. Latter’s in a building block approach. Each method stood alone and implied a different final conclusion. He repeated that for the reasons he had mentioned earlier, Dr. Latter’s method had been rejected.

Teller: He explained for the benefit of the Board the impact of the differences in ICBM accuracy which we had been discussing. Insofar as hard target capabilities were concerned, he explained that the accuracy differences had effects comparable to an increase in missile warhead yield by a factor of eight. He regarded it improper to completely set aside a technical judgment (Latter’s conclusions) having such a significant impact.

Stoertz: Explained the charts from the NIE showing the countersilo capabilities of the alternative Soviet forces we had projected, noting that with the missile characteristics in our high No-SAL force (Force 4) the Soviets could pose a major threat to Minuteman silos about 1977, and with the “best estimate” force in the early 1980s. He also pointed out that this range of threats was encompassed by the range of our uncertainties in our best estimates of Soviet ICBM accuracies and warhead yields. Mr. Stoertz thought that in effect we had presented the more threatening possibilities.

Teller: He believed the chart shown by Mr. Stoertz was interesting, saying that it did indeed show the full range of possibilities.

Stoertz: He showed charts from the NIE depicting some of the quantitative comparisons of alternative Soviet force projections with US programmed forces, and discussed their implications for perceptions of the strategic balance and Soviet strategic power. He said that these more proximate concerns, expressed in words and charts in the NIE, should not be lost sight of.

Carver and Anderson: Discussed carrying out the instructions in the memorandum from Mr. Hyland previously read to the Board. Mr. Carver proposed that after review of the estimate representatives of the Board and the NIOs should meet, with NSC Staff representatives as observers, to discuss whether further accommodations in the estimating
process were needed to accommodate the recommendations of the PFIAB.

3. Following the meeting:
   a. Dr. Teller arranged with Mr. Carver to meet on Friday\textsuperscript{11} with NIO and CIA representatives to discuss his concerns about the NIE.
   b. Mr. Galvin told Ray DeBruler privately he thought NIE 11–3/8–75 was an excellent job.

Henson R. BeBruler

*Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs*

\textsuperscript{11} On December 5, Teller met with Carver, Stoertz, DeBruler, and other CIA personnel to discuss intelligence regarding Soviet ICBM accuracy, air defense, and ASW capabilities. The record of the meeting is in the Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files, Box 7, Competitive Analysis, Background, 1975.

### 162. Intelligence Report\textsuperscript{1}

SR 76–10053


A Dollar Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities

1965–1975

*Problems in Comparing US and Soviet Programs*

The military establishments of the Soviet Union and the US are difficult to compare because they differ so much in missions, structure, and characteristics. Any common denominator used for comparative sizing is inevitably imperfect, and its limitations must be understood in interpreting such comparisons.

*Dollar Cost Comparisons.* The common denominator used in this report is dollar cost. The approach is to estimate how much it would cost in dollars to reproduce individual Soviet military programs in the US,

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OSR Files, Job 79T00962A, Box 13, SR 76–10053, Feb. 1976. No classification marking.
and then to compare these estimates with expenditure data of the Department of Defense.²

The utility of this approach is that it provides a general appreciation of the overall sizes of defense programs in the two countries. It also reveals trends and relationships between the two defense establishments that are difficult to discern and measure in other ways.

Whatever conclusions are drawn from this dollar cost analysis, however, must be tempered by an appreciation of what it does not do. It does not, for example, measure actual Soviet defense expenditures or their burden on the Soviet economy. These questions are addressed by totally different analytical techniques yielding estimates of the ruble costs of Soviet military programs. Neither can the dollar cost analysis alone be used to draw inferences about the relative military effectiveness or capabilities of US and Soviet forces.

Some activities funded by defense budgets contribute only indirectly to military capabilities—for example, pensions, medical care for dependents, and commissaries—and such activities are likely to be larger in the US than in the Soviet Union. Even those comparisons that focus on costs that contribute directly to capabilities—for example, procurement of weapons—are not necessarily indexes of relative military capabilities. Data on the size and technical characteristics of the forces must also be considered for such judgments.

Finally, dollar cost calculations tend to overstate Soviet programs relative to the US because of a basic measurement problem common to all international economic comparisons and known to economists as the index number problem. If Soviet decision makers were confronted with the US dollar price structure that is used for our dollar cost analysis, rather than the ruble prices they in fact have to pay, they undoubtedly would choose a different and cheaper (in dollar terms) mix of manpower and equipment inputs. While it is not possible to quantify the degree of overstatement that this consideration introduces, it is clearly not large enough to alter the basic conclusion that the Soviet military program overall is currently significantly larger than that of the US.

**Price Basis and Structure of Comparisons**

The dollar cost data presented here for the years 1965–1975 are expressed in constant prices so that all changes in monetary levels from ² The basis for the US financial data presented in this report is the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) series in the January 1976 *The Five-Year Defense Program*. [Footnote in the original.]
year to year reflect changes in forces and programs rather than the effects of price fluctuations. The base year used is 1974.

The US data have been adjusted to achieve comparable accounting coverage with the dollar estimates made for the USSR as well as converted to constant prices, and therefore do not match actual budget authorizations or appropriations.

—DoD authorizations for military aid and civil defense are excluded and those for military research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) have been aggregated into one account.

—Energy Research Development Administration authorizations related to nuclear weapons are included.

**Total Defense Costs**

The estimated total dollar costs of Soviet defense programs exceed US defense authorizations in every year since 1970. At about 114 billion dollars (1974 prices), they are more than 40 percent higher than comparable US authorizations of 80 billion dollars in 1975. (See Figure 1.) If the costs of pensions are subtracted from both sides, the dollar costs of Soviet programs in 1975 exceed those of the US by 50 percent.

When expressed in *constant US prices*, which measure growth in real terms, the trend in the dollar costs of Soviet defense programs is one of continuous growth throughout the period averaging about 3 percent per year. This growth is evident in nearly all the major components of the Soviet defense establishment. Quite a different picture is seen for the US. Despite increases in the *current dollar costs* of US defense programs, defense authorizations expressed in *constant dollar terms* have declined continuously since the peak of 1968, and since 1973 have been below the 1965 level. This decline reflects reductions in nearly every major US force component in the Seventies, in contrast to the Vietnam buildup of the late Sixties. For the 1965–1975 period as a whole the estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs are not significantly different from cumulative US authorizations. In the Seventies the Soviet total exceeds that of the US by 20 percent.

In Figure 1, the costs of RDT&E are segregated from those of other programs. This is because the analytical problems involved in estimating the dollar costs of Soviet RDT&E are much more difficult than for the other elements of the Soviet defense establishment and the uncertainty in these estimates is substantially higher. If the dollar costs for RDT&E are subtracted from both sides for the year 1975, the estimated Soviet figure is 40 percent higher than that of the US.

**Manpower**

The estimated level of Soviet military manpower exceeds that of the US in every year from 1965 to 1975. Soviet military manpower
NOTE: The dollar figures for the USSR are estimates of what the Soviet forces and programs would cost if developed, purchased and operated in the US. For operational forces the figures are obtained by costing directly individual Soviet forces and programs. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet RDT&E are derived in the aggregate using a less certain methodology and should be viewed only as rough measures. For this reason they are shown separate from the dollar costs of operational forces. The US defense expenditure series is based on Total Obligational Authority (TOA) data from *The Five-Year Defense Program*, January 1976 (Department of Defense). The US data are in fiscal year terms and the estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs are in calendar year terms.

NOTE: The manpower series for the USSR includes border guards, internal security troops, and construction troops, for which the US Armed Forces have no counterpart.
grows by about one million men during the period. Most of this increase is in the ground forces, although there are some increases in strategic forces as well. On the other hand, US manpower in 1975 was less than its 1965 level.

The Soviets have historically maintained a large military force which has a broader range of responsibilities than the military does in the US. The Soviet manpower series includes border guards, internal security troops, and construction troops, forces for which the US has no counterparts. Even without these forces, however, the Soviet manpower total is higher than that of the US throughout the period.

**Dollar Comparisons of Military Missions**

*Intercontinental Attack Forces.* Estimated dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental attack programs, excluding RDT&E, exceed the US figures for every year beginning in 1966, when most of the currently deployed US systems were operational. (See Figure 2.) For the 1965–1975 period as a whole, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs are 50 percent greater than the US level. In the Seventies they are 70 percent greater and in 1975 they exceed the US level by 100 percent.

—Expressed in dollar terms, the costs of Soviet ICBM programs are more than four times the US level for the 1965–1975 period as a whole. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet programs in 1975 are seven times the US level, a result of the large Soviet procurement programs for new ICBMs.

—The estimated dollar costs of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) programs exceed US levels for every year beginning in 1968 and are 30 percent greater than those for the US in 1975.

—US authorizations for intercontinental bomber programs are about five times the estimated dollar costs of Soviet intercontinental bomber programs for the period as a whole.

If the estimated dollar costs of Soviet peripheral attack forces intended for use on the Eurasian continent are counted, the cumulative dollar costs of Soviet strategic attack programs for the 1965–1975 period are more than twice the cumulative US level. The US has no counterpart for the Soviet peripheral attack forces, which include large numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and medium bombers.

*Strategic Defense Forces.* The USSR has traditionally maintained much larger strategic defense forces than the US. The cumulative dollar costs of Soviet programs over the 1965–1975 period are four times the US figure, the biggest difference being in surface-to-air missile (SAM) and fighter-interceptor programs. US authorizations for the Safeguard ABM system narrow the gap somewhat in the early Seventies. Recent reductions in US air defense programs account for the widening gap since that time. In 1975, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet strategic de-
Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority data have been adjusted to attain comparability with the Soviet data.
fense programs amount to nine times the US authorizations for strategic defense.

**General Purpose Forces.** The estimate of dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forces increases continuously from 1965 through 1975. The US level, in contrast, grew rapidly during the Vietnam involvement but had returned to the 1965 level by 1971. As a result, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet general purpose forces surpass the level of the US in 1970, and for the Seventies as a whole, they are 40 percent greater than the US total. In 1975 they exceed the US level by 70 percent.

The estimate of dollar costs of Soviet ground forces in 1975 is more than three times the US figure, reflecting primarily the much higher level of Soviet manpower. The dollar costs of Soviet general purpose naval forces are about 25 percent higher in 1975 than the US. The estimate of dollar costs of Soviet tactical air forces grows rapidly beginning in 1970 but in 1975 is still less than three-quarters of the US level.

**Command, Support, and Other.** This mission covers activities involved in command and general support, as well as all other activities—except RDT&E—which cannot be assigned to the combat missions. It also includes nuclear weapons programs. The trends in dollar costs for this mission parallel those of the combat missions, and in 1975 the dollar costs for Soviet programs are slightly higher than the US.

**Resource Category Comparisons**

Dollar costs of military forces can also be compared in terms of investment and operating costs.

**Military Investment.** The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military investment programs (excluding RDT&E) exceed the US level for comparable programs beginning in 1970. The dollar costs of Soviet investment rise sharply beginning in 1973. US authorizations have declined sharply in the wake of the Vietnam buildup. The estimated costs of Soviet investment programs in 1975 exceed the 1972 level by 15 percent, while US authorizations in 1975 are nearly 25 percent less than in 1972. In 1975, the estimated investment costs of Soviet programs are 85 percent greater than those of the US.

—The upturn in estimated dollar costs of Soviet investment beginning in 1973 reflects the procurement of the new generation of Soviet ICBMs. US procurement of missiles declined during the same period. The estimated dollar procurement costs in 1975 for Soviet missiles are about three and one-half times those of the US.

—During the last few years the dollar procurement costs of Soviet aircraft have remained high while those of the US have declined. In 1975 the Soviet figure is some 30 percent higher.

—The cumulative estimated dollar costs of Soviet procurement for naval ships and boats exceed the US figure by 70 percent over the 1965–1975 period and are about 90 percent greater than the US in 1975.
**Operating Costs.** The largest component of operating costs is the cost of military personnel. Soviet military manpower rises steadily over the 1965–1975 period, whereas US military manpower has decreased.

**Comparisons With Previous Estimates**

Estimates of the dollar costs of Soviet defense programs are revised each year to take into account new information on and new assessments of the size, composition, and technical characteristics of the Soviet forces and to put them on a more current dollar price base. The dollar cost comparisons presented in this report show the costs of Soviet programs to be higher relative to the US than previous estimates.

The last published CIA estimate—disseminated in January 1975—extended through 1974. It showed the dollar costs of Soviet programs exceeding US authorizations in 1974 by about 20 percent (about 25 percent when pensions are excluded from both sides). In this report the dollar costs of Soviet programs for 1974 exceed the US level by about 30 percent (about 35 percent when pensions are excluded).

In an unpublished preliminary study prepared in October 1975, the estimated Soviet level exceeded that of the US by about 35 percent (about 45 percent when pensions are excluded) for the year 1975. These relationships have been cited publicly by Government officials and quoted widely in the press. The estimate in this report is that the dollar costs of Soviet programs for 1975 exceed those of the US by about 40 percent (about 50 percent when pensions are excluded).

These changes for 1974 and 1975 occurred for a number of reasons. One factor was a downward revision in US authorizations for both years in the January 1976 edition of *The Five Year Defense Program* reflecting more recent information. On the Soviet side, the estimates presented in this report differ from those of the earlier studies principally because of changes in the estimated costs of some weapons and activities. Changes in the Intelligence Community’s estimates of the number of deployed weapon systems—particularly in the later years—also contributed to the increase, but to a lesser extent. The Intelligence Community also increased its estimate of Soviet military manpower since the last comparative cost analysis. This increase was nearly offset, however, by a decrease in the estimated number of civilians working for the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

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3 See Document 151.
A Review of
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
on
SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL CONFLICT
(NIE 11–3/8 series)
and of
THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATING PROCESS

A. Background

1. Since its establishment in 1956, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has been vitally concerned with the adequacy of strategic intelligence. This traditional concern was given sharpened focus when President Nixon, in March of 1969, assigned to it the task of providing a yearly threat assessment in order to supplement the regular intelligence assessment.

2. The key observations in previous assessments which the Board has made of the strategic threat include:

   a. Expressions of confidence in short-term (two-year) force predictions, while noting concern with the inadequacies of longer range projections, and caution regarding pessimistic estimates of Soviet low altitude air defense capabilities and Soviet antisubmarine warfare potential.

   b. A consistent underscoring of the number of wide gaps in US intelligence capabilities that continue to leave major uncertainties as regards missile accuracies, doctrine and tactics, and nuclear weapons targeting policies of the Soviet Union.

   c. A repeatedly declared conviction as to the “... imperative need for an interdepartmental mechanism to conduct net evaluations of...”

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Box I-013, NIE Evaluation by PFIAB. Secret. Galvin, the committee’s chairman, forwarded the report to Carver under a covering memorandum of April 29. (CIA, NIC Files, Job 91M00696R, Box 7, Competitive Analysis, Background, 1976.)
the strategic capabilities and vulnerabilities of the US and USSR." The term most commonly used to describe this kind of analysis is "net assessment."

3. In early August 1975, the PFIAB met with President Ford and supplied him with a letter of record dated 8 August, attached as Appendix A, which advised him of the PFIAB’s perception of deficiencies in NIE 11–3/8–74 and which suggested certain improvements. These were:

   a. Perceived Deficiencies

      (1) NIE 11–3/8–74 is seriously misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts; as a consequence, it is deficient for the purposes it should serve.

      (2) Judgments in critical areas are made with the force of fact although the cumulative evidence is conflicting, often flimsy and in certain cases, does not exist. These critical areas include estimates of Soviet ICBM accuracy; Soviet developments in antisubmarine warfare; and Soviet capabilities against US bombers.

      (3) The NIE gives the appearance of a net assessment and thus the added weight of "operational" consideration when in substance it is not. For example, it assumes the survivability of the US command and control apparatus and accepts unproven data regarding US silo hardness.

   b. Suggestions for Improving the NIE Process:

      (1) Selected aspects of intelligence considered critical by key decisionmakers should be subjected to analysis which is conducted separate from and competitive with the analysis performed by the intelligence community; the alternate views developed should be presented to the President and other key users. The competitive analysis function should be directed by the DCI using governmental and private sector expertise.

      (2) The NIE should avoid to the extent possible the appearance of being a "net assessment." Indeed, the intelligence community should generate a "purely intelligence document" following which and together with the Departments of State and Defense, and under the aegis of the National Security Council, a genuine net assessment should be produced. Ultimately, the net assessment should be critiqued by an independent entity.

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2 Document 154.
3 Document 155.
4. At the conclusion of the briefing to the President, he asked that specific proposals for implementing the suggestions be submitted as soon as possible.

5. Pursuant to the President’s request, on 15 August, the Board staff developed proposals based on the 8 August letter to implement the aforementioned suggestions on a trial basis using the mechanism of a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM). However, as a consequence of DCI Colby’s strong exceptions, implementation of the test was not pursued.

6. In a letter to Admiral Anderson of December 2, 1975, DCI Colby stated that the Board’s letter “... might cause the President to suffer an erroneous impression of the accuracy and seriousness of the 1974–75 strategic forces NIEs.” Accordingly, DCI Colby prepared a refutation of the major findings which was provided to the President and to his Assistant for National Security Affairs. The DCI’s rebuttal, attached as Appendix B to this report, is factually incorrect in a number of areas. However, more important in the Committee’s view, is that it misses the central thrust of the Board’s efforts and intentions: whether or not a particular technical judgment in the NIE is correct or incorrect is less significant than whether the document illuminates for a busy decision-maker the range of threat possibilities and their implications relative to his special responsibilities. The Board had concluded that the NIE did not adequately perform this function and that the NIE process was not structured to encourage it; our suggestions to cultivate competition in analysis and in judgment formulation with respect to a few key intelligence issues were aimed at fulfilling this purpose.

B. The Assignment of the NIE Evaluation Committee

7. Stimulated by DCI Colby’s exceptions to the Board’s letter of 8 August, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (General Scowcroft), by memorandum of 4 December, asked the Chairman of the PFIAB to comment on the suggestion that the Board review NIE 11–3/8–75 (Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict through the mid-1980s) and ascertain the extent to which this NIE overcomes deficiencies which the Board perceived in NIE 11–3/8–74, the estimate on the same subject for the preceding year. The Board was re-
quested to report its findings to the DCI and to the NSC staff, and to discuss specific courses of action.

8. The Board staff responded to General Scowcroft’s 4 December memorandum and advised that Admiral Anderson had appointed an ad hoc committee composed of Mr. Robert W. Galvin as chairman, and Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. and Dr. Edward Teller as members to review and report on the subject.

C. Modus Operandi

9. The NIE Evaluation Committee has devoted the past four months to an intensive review of the NIEs regarding Soviet strategic forces, and more generally, to the process of intelligence estimating. This review has encompassed:

a. Individual discussions with approximately 40 authorities including:

   (1) Intelligence analysts and senior level managers from most entities within the intelligence community;

   (2) Users of intelligence estimates; such as those involved in US force planning and in arms limitation and disarmament negotiations; and

   (3) Private citizens, well informed regarding US-Soviet strategic relationships.

b. A study, which was commissioned by Mr. Galvin and performed by representatives of the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers (Mr. George Carver), to address the intelligence community’s 10-year track record in strategic estimating. This study was briefed to the full Board during the February meeting and written copies were provided for detailed examination. Important elements in this study are commented on in paragraph 30 below; the conclusions of the study have been extracted and are attached as Appendix C to this report.

c. Several discussions between the Committee members themselves, involving a review of what the Board has had to say about NIEs in the past and a careful reconsideration of what the Board proposed to the President on 8 August.

10. This report contains a number of observations made to the Committee by a variety of people interviewed. In documenting these comments, care has been taken to be as accurate as possible, without regard as to whether the views expressed are agreed with. The Committee believes that certain views have great significance irrespective of their objective validity, but simply because of the stature or position of the person espousing them and the sincerity and conviction with which they were stated.
D. Note of Appreciation

11. Special mention is deserving of the cooperative and forthright attitude of intelligence community personnel who quickly and unfailingly responded to all Committee requests and greatly aided its efforts. Clearly, the people involved in the NIE process are talented, dedicated, loyal Americans who sincerely desire to produce the best intelligence estimate possible. The Committee’s judgments, however critical they may appear, are in no way intended to impugn the motivations and overall competence of these extremely hard-working professionals.

E. Comparison of NIE 11–3/8–75 with NIE 11–3/8–74

12. Both NIEs are very professional documents in their organization, presentation of data and readability. They demonstrate tremendous effort and coordination by and among many departments. As a work product which reflects the consequences of careful planning in the employment of sophisticated collection and analysis systems and the use of multiple disciplines in a coherent way, the NIEs are, as one authority put it, a “tour de force.”

13. There is evidence in the 1975 NIE of responsiveness to certain of the intentions in the Board’s 8 August letter. However, it should be noted that the production of the Strategic Forces NIE is a year-long endeavor with a November publication deadline. The 1975 edition was well along in August with little opportunity then to effect major changes, even if the authors had been persuaded as to the merits of the Board’s recommendations.

14. Some changes that were evident are:

a. Acknowledgment of improvements in Soviet ICBM accuracies; expanded discussion of the difficulties inherent in antisubmarine warfare; narrowing of the time period within which the Soviets might achieve an effective low altitude air defense system.

b. Expansion and more prominent positioning of dissenting views.

c. An enlarged key judgments section which attempts to clarify the degrees of uncertainty regarding various issues.

d. The term “interactive analysis” is used in lieu of “net assessment,” and a statement is included which clarifies the meaning of interactive analysis and which says it is not a net assessment.

15. These changes are noted and appreciated but the improvements are considered to be minor, relative to the overall significance and impact of the NIE. The Board’s primary concerns are not yet accommodated. A summary of changes as relates to deficiencies noted in the Board’s letter appears in a chart attached as Appendix D.

F. Questions Put to the Authorities Surveyed

16. In the Committee’s discussions with the authorities, we pursued answers to the following kinds of questions:
a. What purposes does the NIE serve?
b. How do principal users view its adequacy?
c. What is their level of confidence in it?
d. Are the major threat issues illuminated?
e. What are the major criticisms of the NIE?
f. Is the level of effort involved in producing an annual NIE the most effective investment of intelligence community resources?
g. Could efforts at improving the process be attempted concurrent with, and so as not to disrupt, the normal production cycle?

G. Responses to the Survey

17. Responses to the question, "What purposes does the NIE Serve?" are worth singling out; in the Board's 8 August letter we had identified four purposes:
   a. Guide the formulation of Defense force levels and R&D.
   b. Support Congressional authorization and appropriation proceedings.
   c. Underpin arms limitation negotiations.
   d. Shape the thought processes of policymakers regarding strategic relationships.
   
   DCI Colby's letter of 2 December, 1975, emphasized two additional purposes:
   e. To provide warning of various things the Soviets might do; and
   f. To provide warning of various things the Soviets are not likely to do within given time-frames.

   Finally, during the course of our inquiry, we heard such purposes as:
   g. To keep the lid on defense spending by minimizing the threat.
   h. To help rationalize an Administration’s foreign and domestic policies.
   i. To project US perceptions of Soviet capabilities to our allies.

   Regrettably, because of cited purposes such as the last three, many of the authorities look upon the NIE process as corrupt and upon the product as less than believable. (It is notable that among those who volunteered the above opinion, several complimented DCI Colby for greatly encouraging the inclusion of dissenting views in the estimating process and thereby contributing to a significant improvement in the product.)

18. Most users do not find the information in the NIE timely and those who require current information do not rely upon it. Indeed, some in this category do not read the document because they know that it does not reflect the latest intelligence. Depending upon the reader's
particular interest area, the contents are considered either too technical or insufficiently detailed. A number of readers who said the NIE was useful, when pressed for specifics, said that while they did not rely on “judgments” they did find the graphics to be very helpful as ready references to details of weapon systems characteristics. In striving to satisfy multiple purposes, the net effect seems to be that the document masters none completely.

19. Some readers in very important policy formulation positions indicated a belief in the validity of certain technical judgments—on the assumption that the raw data must have been carefully evaluated by independent, objective standards which were agreed to by the “experts.” A few, sophisticated readers expressed confidence in the technical analysis at the lowest levels, but believe that summaries thereof—the process of hammering out compromises, accommodating divergent views, etc.—result in generalized “mushy” statements devoid of meaning in a technical sense. These remarks suggest that the concept of “technical uncertainty” is not adequately conveyed.

20. Many readers acknowledged that NIE judgments are biased by agency or service prejudices—but shrugged this off as an inevitable consequence of bureaucratic life. Thus, many key judgments in the NIE are not only not accepted, but are viewed cynically. These readers believe the NIE cannot express judgments which would be considered “too far from an acceptable climate of opinion.” The dissents were viewed as exercises in polemics and the “high-low-best” estimates are seen as merely additives of a given number in order to accommodate divergence (e.g., the controversy over the Backfire bomber).

21. Many readers expressed the belief that a good deal of intelligence data as well as information on US forces is not made available to the analysts or has not been accurately addressed, and is therefore not factored into the estimate (e.g., results of high-level negotiations between US–USSR personnel; sensitive intelligence regarding Soviet anti-submarine warfare developments; information regarding US submarine operations; vulnerabilities in US command and control; accurate data on Minuteman silo hardness).

22. Several readers, including people who have been exposed to NIEs over a period of years, as analysts and as members of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which approves the final product, expressed the belief that most USIB principals are not competent to evaluate the highly technical data which is essential to the formulation of key judgments in the estimate. USIB principals were described as “…managers of organizations who have neither the time, training or experience in the variety of disciplines incorporated to do more than superficially review some of the available evidence.”
23. A number of readers expressed the belief that information and judgments which do not fit comfortable patterns, or which are contrary to an agency’s inherent biases, are usually rejected from the final product. The recent CIA intelligence estimate which nearly doubled the agency’s previous estimates of Soviet defense expenditures despite several years of substantial evidence and argument to the contrary, was cited as one example.\(^9\) (More than one “insider” observed that any estimate which in effect judged that US Minuteman or Polaris ICBM forces were vulnerable, would never be made by the intelligence community without prior clearance from the Pentagon.)

24. Some readers in policymaking positions expressed the view that they ascribe less value to a “pure” intelligence judgment than they would to an assessment of “consequences” of the intelligence. This would require extensive data regarding US forces and thus there was near uniform agreement that it cannot be performed by the intelligence community.

25. While most readers expressed agreement with the desirability of having net assessments, one senior official opined that this function, particularly with respect to strategic relationships, is so complex as to be beyond the competence of any group in existence or which might be formed. He suggested that university-level scholarship be encouraged and funded—but not controlled—by the government in disciplines relating to the USSR and PRC. One element of governmental assistance would be the provision of raw intelligence data collected over the years but never analyzed.

26. A senior analyst acknowledged that because of ad hoc pressures there are enormous “opportunity costs” that limit thoughtful analysis. This person estimated that as a result, perhaps only 5% of the analysts are forced to carry the major responsibilities. An example cited was the annual Strategic Forces NIE and the National Intelligence Daily, two documents requiring enormous effort, much of which is focused on “cosmetics,” or non-substantive matters because these are highly visible products of the intelligence community.

27. An individual in a senior key position indicated that a most welcome kind of analysis—not presently being received—would be for 2–3 experts to present their views as to the . . .

Consequences to Soviet society flowing from a Brezhnev decision to rapidly develop a strategic counterforce capability. What indicators would appear to alert US decisionmakers that such a decision had been reached?

\(^9\) See Document 162.
28. The response to questions regarding user confidence in the NIE did not vary greatly: the high mark was a 75% level of confidence over the next two years in the accuracy of weapons systems characteristics; this declined to 50% confidence beyond that time-frame, a rating which was admittedly achievable by flipping a coin.

29. A former senior government official said that especially in the strategic arms limitations area the NIE 11–3/8 series is viewed as the “par” or standard of judgments regarding US–USSR strategic relationships, against which any differing views must be rationalized. In this sense, the “power of the first draft” is valued very highly since judgments are difficult to change. Moreover, during Congressional hearings, the NIE may present serious problems to Defense officials whose programs are based on different threat appraisals.

H. Ten-Year Track Record in Strategic Estimating

30. Certain observers hold the strong belief that the NIEs over the years have been required to avoid the appearance of overstating any threats which could be used to justify higher military spending. The Board itself has perceived that the NIE 11–3/8 series minimizes the Soviet threat and strategic potential of the USSR. As noted in paragraph 9.b. above, the Committee asked the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers for a 10-year track record study in strategic estimating; the 9-page summary of conclusions has been extracted, highlighted and is attached as Appendix C. The Board’s perception of consistent underestimation in the NIEs is supported by a number of the points in this study, which are paraphrased below:

a. Estimates in the mid-1960s “...failed to foresee the degree to which the Soviets would not only catch up to the US in number of ICBMs but keep right on going. The 1966 five-year estimate projected that the Soviets would have between 805 and 1079 ICBMs. The actual count for 1971 was 1475. There was a similar failure to recognize that the Soviets would want—and demand in negotiating the Interim Agreement in 1972—more than the 35–50 modern ballistic missile submarines which the estimates took to represent rough parity with the US.”

b. “The NIEs overestimated Soviet concern about provoking new US deployments or force improvements and were overimpressed with the problem the Soviets faced in achieving and retaining full equality with the US.”

c. “The estimates failed to warn of a number of qualitative improvements such as missile accuracy, throwweight and modernization of launch control facilities.”

d. “The estimates of the mid and late 1960s failed to convey an adequate sense of the determination of the Soviets to build up sizable force and war fighting capabilities.”
e. The 1972 estimate \(^{10}\) \(\ldots\) gives the impression that Soviet acceptance of the 1972 SALT accords involved greater Soviet interest in a stabilized strategic relationship and a greater concern to avoid action which might jeopardize détente than proved to be the case.\)

f. On the other hand, the NIEs overestimated: (1) Soviet willingness to deploy antiballistic missile defenses beyond Moscow; (2) surface to air missile force goals; and (3) force goals of two classes of interceptor aircraft.

Our view is that these categories of overestimation are far below the magnitudes of importance of the categories in which underestimation prevailed.

I. Conclusions/Recommendations

31. The Committee has been struck by how frequently important judgments in the NIE (often labelled “best”) are based on very incomplete or partial information and by the fact that most users are not conscious of the often flimsy basis on which these judgments are based. We note that policymakers are not normally aware that a key judgment (as, for example, survivability of the US Minuteman force) may in large measure be based on incredibly complex analysis which only a very few people are competent to understand, and regarding which serious disagreement may exist. Extrapolation of the technical analysis to the level of “key judgment” and the uncertainties extant throughout this process are obscured in the NIE and are unknown to the policymaker.

32. Despite the NIE’s disclaimer of intention to perform a net assessment, many of the key judgments cannot help but leave a reader with a sense that some degree of net evaluation has been performed. For example, Soviet ASW is estimated to be inadequate for the next 10 years to threaten our deployed Polaris submarines. This judgment is in part predicated on assumptions regarding US submarine capabilities and operational procedures. Additionally, Soviet ICBMs are estimated as being highly unlikely to threaten US Minuteman ICBMs by the end of the 1970s. This judgment is in part predicated on assumptions regarding US silo hardness. In neither instance is the intelligence community authorized to challenge the assumptions regarding US capabilities. Moreover, both judgments should involve—but within the NIE do not involve—a serious appraisal of the effectiveness of US command, control and communications systems. The Committee does not fault the intelligence community, but again notes the essentiality to the decisionmaker of having net evaluations performed on these critical issues.

33. There are common threads which run through the remarks made by the variety of people interviewed: the NIE 11–3/8 series in particular and the estimating process in general are not highly respected for their power to authoritatively and conclusively appraise threats; although the collection of data and the presentation of facts are admirable, the NIEs themselves are regarded as composites of consensus judgments achieved through a process of arbitration and conciliation; external observers as well as members of the intelligence community believe that institutional pressures shape the purposes of the NIE, and the interpretation of data and formulation of judgments therein. NIEs breed degrees of disbelief. An unbelieved estimate is ignored, misused and challenged for political as well as technical reasons.

34. The generally negative receptivity regarding the NIE 11–3/8 series which the Committee encountered is serious, regrettable and alarming. NIEs should indeed signify the very best that our system of intelligence can offer. They should be eagerly awaited (and thoroughly read) by policymakers. There should be absolutely no question regarding their purposes, utility or relevance. Attitudes of key people in government on complex issues should be significantly influenced by intelligence estimates. The NIEs should command uniform respect as major contributors to the conduct of national security affairs. Their success should be measured by whether they stimulate policymakers to face up to hard decisions in sufficient time to make a difference and by the thoroughness with which threats, uncertainties and alternatives have been illuminated.

35. An analysis of why the NIE 11–3/8 series does not meet the above criteria should begin with the intelligence consumer. The essential question is: “What does the consumer want?” The Committee observed that there are many different needs among a wide variety of consumers; these may range from short, concise statements of factual data (e.g., photographic intelligence which counts missile silos), to the best judgment of a group of analysts who comment on Soviet strategic objectives, to detailed appraisals of what is known and what is not known regarding weapon system capabilities. In certain cases, and with particular reference to the task of evaluating Soviet capabilities for intercontinental conflict, we judge that the user frequently demands one answer or one best judgment, or is so perceived by the intelligence community. The intelligence community responds with its “best effort,” even in those cases where the data available does not permit a single answer or judgment or where the user actually needs alternate interpretations; thus unrealistic user demands (sometimes expressed and sometimes assumed) and a compliant intelligence community result in a product that ultimately does not satisfy and which cannot
withstand serious challenge. The following chart depicts that relationship—among many—where the consumer demands “an answer.”

36. Clearly, an effort should be made to improve the system by which truly critical issues are analyzed and reported to decision-makers. Accordingly, the Board’s proposal of last August, that the DCI create an experimental competitive analysis group, should be pursued. This holds attraction for its modesty and potential. The Committee’s belief is that a competitive environment would make the most of situations where the intelligence community only has incomplete or partial information, because a range of judgments would be derived rather than a single judgment labelled “best.” In this structure, perhaps there would be two or three judgments with the choice of what to accept (or which mixture of each) left to the decisionmaker. We do not believe competition of this character can be fostered wholly within the intelligence community (as, for example, by encouraging DIA and CIA to compete with each other) and that to expose weaknesses in the estimating process, “outsiders” who are given access to current information are necessary. The competitive process would hopefully sharpen the use of language, illuminate differences, uncertainties and consequences. We propose that the Board again suggest the implementation of an experiment in competitive analysis and net evaluation which was proposed to the President last August.

37. Recognizing that the exchange of correspondence initiated by the Board’s 8 August letter contributed to a resentment of the views expressed therein rather than to an acceptance of the helpful spirit in which it was tendered, no additional formal correspondence is recommended at this time. In particular, this report should not be circulated outside of Board channels.

38. We recommend the Chairman advise General Scowcroft that the efforts of the NIE Evaluation Committee in response to his letter of 4 December, have been completed; that such views were presented to
the full Board at its April meeting\(^11\) during which a consensus was expressed that the Committee discuss its observations with the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) at the earliest practicable date. (The CFI was created by President Ford in his “omnibus” Executive Order of 18 February 1976,\(^12\) for the purpose, inter alia, of establishing policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence. The membership is: The Director of Central Intelligence (George Bush), who serves as Chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Robert Ellsworth); and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (William Hyland). Although the CFI is not responsible for the production of substantive intelligence, the cooperation of its principals must be secured if the Board’s recommendations are to be implemented.) A memorandum for the Chairman’s signature which proposes such a meeting is attached as Appendix E.\(^13\)

39. Assuming the CFI is receptive to the Board’s views, a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) to implement the suggestions should be considered. A draft is attached as Appendix F.\(^14\)

40. In addition to the above conclusions and recommendations which are of primary relevance to our task, the following collateral items were adduced during the interviews and committee discussions, and are offered for consideration:

a. The subject of Soviet intentions, objectives and tactics in the broadest sense is deserving of more comprehensive treatment than it now receives in NIE 11–3/8. Perhaps a separate NIE on this central topic should be commissioned.

b. Consideration should be given to establishing a small (no more than six), part-time group of “elder statesmen” who, under the DCI’s aegis, would review and comment on selected NIEs or on other crucial intelligence products—prior to publication and after being given full access to all of the evidence used by the analysts in formulating their appraisals.

c. A thorough study should be made to determine whether the intelligence community has an affirmative obligation to declassify and provide information to the public. As a related matter, whether the intelligence community should be required, upon the publication of each annual strategic forces estimate, to specify in the document which of the key judgments it is willing to be held publically accountable for five years hence, should also be considered.

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\(^11\) No record of the meeting was found.

\(^12\) E.O. 11905 reorganized the intelligence community, the first major such reorganization since 1947. The order, among numerous other reforms, created the CFI as an intelligence management body. (*Public Papers: Ford, 1976*, pp. 348–350, 362–366)

\(^13\) Chene’s April 1 letter to Scowcroft, as signed, is attached, but not printed.

\(^14\) The draft NSDM, summarized herein, is attached, but not printed.
d. The question of the time period to be covered by the NIE 11–3/8 series should be reconsidered in light of the consumer’s desire for timely information and in view of the limitations of the intelligence community with regard to accurate, long-term predictions.

e. The Board should consider encouraging policymakers and decisionmakers to schedule oral intelligence briefings on topics of interest as principal means of receiving intelligence. The purpose would be to develop a direct relationship with the knowledgeable intelligence officer, and cultivate a better understanding between the user and the producer.

f. The intelligence community should reassess the function of the NIE, the variety of readership that must be served, and the kinds of topics that are most important to each. For example, in lieu of a single NIE on Soviet offensive and defensive forces for intercontinental conflict, it may be preferable to place greater analytic emphasis on addressing narrower topics in varying degrees of detail, depending upon the principal audience of interest.

g. Awareness of the efforts of this Committee served as a stimulus for a number of activities by the intelligence community with regard to observations in the Board’s letter of 8 August 1975. The full Board should consider establishing an “NIE Evaluation Committee” as a permanent body of the PFIAB and, to aid in the maintenance of “fresh ideas,” the membership should be rotated periodically.
Appendix C

Summary Conclusions of a Study Prepared by the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers\textsuperscript{15}


THE TRACK RECORD IN STRATEGIC ESTIMATING


CONCLUSIONS

1. The intelligence community, as judged by the findings in its national estimates, has a good record of detecting and determining major characteristics and missions of new weapons systems soon after testing begins and usually well before IOC.

a. This capability has improved since 1966 with the development of higher resolution photography \[less than 1 line not declassified\] capabilities.

b. However, the community was not always right from the outset:

—The SS–N–8 was considered to have a 3,100 nm range (3,500 nm maximum) until it demonstrated 4,200 nm in November and December 1972 (IOC was in April 1974). Lacking firm data, the analysts misjudged how close to 100 percent to propellant capacity was being used.

—There was initial confusion about the size and functions of some of the new hardened missile silos introduced in the early 1970s.

—Not until the early 1970s was it determined that some SS–11 silos which began deployment in 1967 were oriented to provide previously lacking coverage of China and that others were oriented to cover Europe, the Mediterranean and South Asia. All, however, can be used against the US and are so counted.

c. \[1 \text{ paragraph (5 lines) not declassified}\]

2. The intelligence community has also been generally successful in monitoring the deployment of new weapon systems and the introduction of major modifications in existing ones, despite some initial difficulties in determining the scope and pace of deployment. There have been recurring minor uncertainties and disagreements about how many silos are under construction, how many submarines are in the

\textsuperscript{15} Top Secret.
building shed, and the like. These uncertainties have been reduced but not eliminated with the advent of better, more precise sensors.

a. The principal problems arose during the mid-1960s, before the full scope of the ICBM buildup and the pace of Y-class submarine production were clear.

3. The community’s record is spottier on predicting likely Soviet force goals over the longer run, on which direct evidence was usually lacking.

a. The most obvious shortcoming was the failure of the earlier estimates to foresee the degree to which Soviets would not only catch up to the US in number of ICBMs but keep right on going. There was a similar early failure to recognize that the Soviets would want—and demand in negotiating the Interim Agreement in 1972—more than the 35–50 modern ballistic missile submarines which the estimates took to represent rough parity with the US.

—The estimators appear to have been overimpressed with the magnitude of the problems and uncertainties the Soviets faced in achieving and then retaining full equality with the US and to have overestimated Soviet concern about provoking new US deployments or force improvements. At the same time, they evidently underestimated the strength and persistence of the political, institutional, and probably most of all military pressures for continuation of the buildup—probably in part because of doubt that a push much past equality would be of real military value.

b. [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

c. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

d. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

7. The estimative record in foreseeing qualitative improvements in Soviet strategic systems is mixed. For the most part, they appear to have been successful in identifying major requirements the Soviets would probably seek to satisfy through new or improved weapon systems, though not exactly when or in what form the improvement would appear. In particular, they foresaw the development by the early or mid-1970s of MIRVed ICBMs with improved accuracy and hard target kill capability. They also foresaw the introduction of longer range SLBMs than those of the Y-class. In the various fields of strategic defense, they appear to have identified correctly the problems the Soviets faced are the most promising lines of development.

a. However, there have been some surprises. While anticipating greater Soviet emphasis on the survivability of their ICBMs, they did

16 See footnote 3, Document 2.
not foresee—before construction actually began—that the Soviets would undertake the very extensive remodeling of silos and construction of new launch control facilities now going on. More important, they failed to foresee that the Soviets would greatly increase the throwweight of their new missiles and introduce new launch techniques with some. Although the throwweight issue was examined in the context of possible SALT constraints, no one anticipated that the Soviets might greatly increase missile volume without increasing silo diameter.

b. In addition, the Soviets have thus far failed to make a number of advances which analysis in the estimates indicated would be necessary or desirable—e.g., the development of quieter submarines with a capability for covert trail of US submarines.

8. In terms of the threat to the Triad, the record can be summarized as follows:

a. The threat to Minuteman from Soviet hard target MIRVs has been overestimated in terms of how soon high accuracy would be obtained, if the current estimates are correct, but was underestimated in terms of throw weight and number of RVs. Although the key consideration remains accuracy, the early availability of additional RVs will move up the date when there will be enough to threaten Minuteman survivability.

b. The threat to US bombers and ASMs penetrating Soviet territory has grown about as the estimates indicated, with the Soviets continuing to make incremental improvements in virtually all phases of air defense, but not the drastic improvements in low level intercept capabilities that were required. Although it is now judged that the Soviets may be able to overcome current deficiencies by the early 1980s, it remains uncertain whether this will provide an effective operational capability under actual combat conditions. There is no indication that the Soviets are developing a depressed trajectory mode of operation for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, so that they could be used against US bomber bases with reduced warning time.

c. Soviet ABM capabilities did not develop as expected; improved systems have been slower to develop, additional deployment at Moscow or elsewhere failed to take place and deployment is now severely limited by treaty.

d. Soviet ASW capabilities against US SSBNs have remained very low as was estimated, despite vigorous Soviet ASW programs.

9. With respect to the effectiveness of the NIEs in depicting Soviet motivations, goals, and expectations over the past decade, it is probably impossible to provide an evaluation that will satisfy everyone. However, in terms of the intelligence community’s present perceptions and judgments, the only particular shortcomings we would note are the following:
a. In retrospect, it is evident that the estimates of the mid and late 1960s failed to convey an adequate sense of the determination of the Soviets to build up sizable force and warfighting capabilities, however long it took. Perhaps there was temporary uncertainty in Moscow about what courses of action to follow and how the US might respond, as those estimates suggest. It now looks as though the Soviets adopted ambitious strategic force goals and moved steadily forward without much concern that the US might feel it necessary to step up its own programs in turn.

b. NIE 11–8–72 gives the impression that Soviet acceptance of the 1972 SALT accords involved greater Soviet interest in a stabilized strategic relationship with the US and a greater concern to avoid actions which might jeopardize détente than proved to be the case—although it estimated that new weapon programs would be “vigorously and demanding,” and presented force projections comparable to or in some cases more ambitious than the modernization programs now in progress.

b. In fact the Soviets have taken a highly competitive view of the strategic relationship with the US, have evidently considered a high level of force development activity as quite consistent with détente, and appear to have looked on arms control primarily as a means of constraining US force development rather than as a means of curtailing the overall competition and thus achieving greater stability.

10. One final point is that, just as the strategic situation has changed greatly over the past decade, so have the scope and contents of the estimates. The estimates of the mid and late 1960s were relatively short and general in nature, with details about how future Soviet forces might develop relegated to supplementing documents like the NIPP. More recently they have included greatly expanded and more explicit treatments of the evidence and analysis underlying key judgments and more on the organizational aspects and operational implications of the capabilities being built up. The content and focus of the estimates have since varied in some degree from year to year, depending on the observed progress of Soviet programs, on what topics were considered most pertinent and important, and on the availability of new analytical studies. Beginning in 1974 the NIE 11–3 and NIE 11–8 series have been combined in a single document, so that all aspects of Soviet strategic policy and activities are considered together.

11. How effective these changes have been in improving the usefulness of the estimates is for the customer to say. With respect to the estimative track record, however, it is pertinent to note that the analysts whose work is reflected in the estimates have had to address increasingly complex questions and in answering them have been under heavy pressure to be explicit about the nature and extent of their evi-
idence, how their conclusions were arrived at, and how much confidence can be placed in them. Moreover, while there remain important limits on how much can be learned about Soviet strategic weapons and about Soviet strategic plans and policies, there have been important improvements in both the quality and quantity of information available to US intelligence.

Key Judgments

NOTE: This report—the latest in a series of publications on Soviet ruble outlays for defense programs—presents a major revision of past estimates. Our new estimates incorporate an unusually large body of new information, much of which is still being evaluated. Therefore, the new estimates should be viewed as interim and subject to change as the work progresses.

Analysis of new evidence has resulted in a major upward revision in the estimate of the level and trend of Soviet ruble outlays for defense. The new estimate is about twice the previous estimate of total ruble spending for defense in 1975.

—We now estimate that Soviet spending for defense—as defined in US budgetary accounts—grew from about 40–45 billion rubles in 1970 to about 50–55 billion rubles in 1975, measured in constant 1970 prices.

—Under a broader definition—as the Soviets might account for their defense effort—we estimate defense spending at about 45–50 billion rubles for 1970 and about 55–60 billion rubles for 1975.

—Defense spending in rubles is now estimated to have increased at an average annual rate of 4–5 percent over the period rather than 3 percent as previously believed. During 1973–1975 it grew about 5–6 percent per year, reflecting largely the deployment phase of the new generation of strategic missile programs.

Several factors have contributed to the increase in our estimate of total spending for defense. About 90 percent of the increase results from changes in our understanding of ruble prices and costs. Changes in national intelligence estimates of the size of Soviet forces, and the ad-

1 Source: Ford Library, Marsh Papers, Intelligence Subject File, Box 45, CIA—Mis-Estimate of Soviet Defense Spending. No classification marking. On May 18, Rumsfeld opened his Oval Office meeting with President Ford by discussing the CIA’s report. “Rumsfeld: The ruble expenditure paper comes out today. We have not interfered with the timing of it. What this tells us is that we underestimated their expenditure effort, overestimated their efficiency, and it makes no difference in their force strength.” According to the memorandum of conversation, “[s]ome discussion of pros and cons” followed. Rumsfeld then added, “I will have a backgrounder for the wires and nets just to put the right spin on it.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 19, May 18, 1976—Ford, Kissinger, Rumsfeld) On May 19, the New York Times reported that while the CIA had doubled its previous estimate of Soviet defense spending, the new figures did not alter its estimate of actual Soviet military hardware. (“CIA Says It Has Underestimated Soviet Defense Cost,” New York Times, May 19, 1976, p. 4)
dition of costs of some activities which previously were not included explicitly in our estimates—for example, preinduction military training and outlays for utilities—account for the remaining 10 percent of the increase.

The revised estimate of the ruble costs of Soviet defense has had a major effect on some important intelligence judgments, but not on others. Specifically, because the changes are largely the result of estimates of higher ruble prices rather than discovery of larger programs, the revised estimate:

—Does not affect our appraisal of the size or capabilities of Soviet military forces. Such estimates are based mainly on direct evidence.
—Does not have an important effect on our estimates of the dollar cost of reproducing Soviet defense programs in the US. We estimate the cost of reproducing 1975 Soviet defense programs in the US at about 114 billion dollars (1974 prices), some 40 percent higher than comparable US authorization in 1975.2

The new estimates do alter significantly our perceptions about the economic implications of Soviet defense programs:

—Since 1970, defense requirements have been absorbing some 11–13 percent of Soviet gross national product (GNP), depending on the definition of defense that is employed. Previously, we had estimated that defense took some 6–8 percent of GNP.
—The Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed.
—The defense effort now takes about one-third of the annual output of the machinery sector of the Soviet economy.

Because the resource impact of the defense effort on the Soviet economy has been considerably greater than we previously recognized, we now realize that Soviet leaders have been more willing than we thought to forgo economic growth and consumer satisfaction in favor of military capabilities. Nevertheless, we see no evidence that economic considerations are deterring the Soviets from continuing the present pace and magnitude of their defense effort. Much work remains to be done, however, in assessing the implications of our new estimates for future Soviet policy decisions.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

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165. **Letter From the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Cherne) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Bush)**

*Washington, June 8, 1976.*

Dear George:

As you know, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has long been concerned with the quality of National Intelligence Estimates, especially those dealing with the strategic capabilities of the USSR. These Estimates are perhaps the most important products of the Intelligence Community. Every possible step should be taken to continually improve their comprehensiveness, soundness and utility to the President and his senior advisors.

Over the past year, the Board’s continuing concern with this subject has been a matter of special interest and resulted in the establishment of an Intelligence Estimates Evaluation Committee chaired by Robert W. Galvin, assisted by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Dr. Edward Teller and recently Mr. William Casey. The full Board has discussed its perceptions with the President and Mr. Colby and the Committee has advanced this dialogue with members of your staff responsible for the production of strategic force estimates. We think these discussions have been productive and look forward to sustaining them as we work together toward the common goal of better NIEs.

One recommendation the Board has made, and which its NIE Evaluation Committee has refined, is that an experiment in competitive analysis be undertaken in connection with the production of this year’s estimate on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict: NIE 11–3/8–76. The purpose of the experiment is to generate, from the fragmentary evidence which is available, possible alternative descriptions, explanations and judgments of Soviet activities, capabilities and objectives. We

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 85B00134R: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 1, Competitive Analysis, Part II, Background on the A Team—B Experiment. Secret. Carver sent Galvin a draft of this letter under a cover letter, May 26, suggesting that either he (Galvin) or Cherne could sign it as a means to establish the ground rules of the competitive analysis experiment. Before doing so, Carver sent a note, also dated May 26, to Bush requesting his permission to send the draft letter to Galvin establishing “[t]he PFIAB Treaty.” That day, Bush wrote on the note: “[L]et her fly!! OK.” This exchange of correspondence regarding the experiment’s ground rules stemmed from Carver and Galvin’s May 12 meeting, held in Galvin’s office in Chicago. Carver’s letter to Galvin, his note to Bush, and his memorandum for the record following his meeting with Galvin are all ibid., Job 91M00696R, Box 7, Competitive Analysis, Background, 1976.

2 The record of PFIAB’s August 8, 1975 meeting with Ford is Document 154.

3 For the record of one such meeting, see Document 161.
have discussed this experiment with your Deputy for National Intelligence Officers and, in light of those discussions, we jointly propose the following ground rules to guide this experiment.

(1) NIE 11–3/8–76 itself will be prepared by the Intelligence Community in accordance with the work plan developed by the NIO for Strategic Programs. For the purposes of this letter, those working on NIE 11–3/8–76 will be referred to as the “A Team.”

(2) In the preparation of this NIE, key uncertainties identified by, and divergent opinions arising within the Intelligence Community will be clearly presented, using techniques of presentation familiar to readers of the Estimate as well as any new techniques the Intelligence Community may find desirable.

(3) In addition, with respect to certain key issues, an experiment in the technique of competitive analysis will be conducted. Candidate issues for this experimental treatment include Soviet ICBM accuracy, low-altitude air defense capabilities, Soviet strategic objectives, etc. Three such issues will be selected by the DCI in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

(4) On each of the three issues selected for the experiment, the DCI, in consultation with the NIE Evaluation Committee, will select a “B Team” of appropriate size. The members of the three “B Teams” will be persons inside or outside the Intelligence Community and the Government, who have expert knowledge in the subjects in question, who have (or can be granted) the necessary clearances, but who are not themselves engaged in the production of the NIE.

(5) In their respective areas, each of the three B Teams will work independently of the NIE 11–3/8–76 A Team. Each B Team, however, will be given access to all of the information on its area of concern available to the US Government, i.e., it will have access to the same body of information and data on the issue which it is to address as is available to the A Team. Also, each B Team will adhere to the A Team’s production schedule so that the three B Teams’ drafts of their respective independent assessments are completed at the same time that the basic estimate (A Team) draft is finished.

(6) Once all drafts are completed, the A Team and the overall managers of the Estimate will be given access to the three B Teams’ drafts, and each B Team will be given access to all portions of the basic Estimate draft relating to that B Team’s area of concentration.

(7) Each B Team will then meet with members of the A Team to discuss their respective findings and conclusions. These discussions will not—repeat not—be aimed at striking compromises or reaching consensus judgments. Their purpose, instead, will be to ensure that both the A Team and the B Teams are, having been motivated to construct alternatives, compelled to defend their assertions and their use of
evidence and analysis before peers equally well versed in the technical details of their respective subjects.

(8) After these discussions, both the A Team and the B Teams will have an opportunity to revise their drafts to the extent that they care to make such revisions.

(9) The three B Teams will then prepare written comments on the portions of the revised basic Estimate draft dealing with their respective areas of concern. Similarly, the A Team will prepare written comments on the three revised B Team drafts.

(10) The entire package—basic Estimate draft, the three B Team drafts, and the comments of A and B Teams—will then be studied by, briefed in detail to, and discussed by the National Foreign Intelligence Board, chaired by the DCI. Once again, the purpose of this discussion will not—repeat not—be that of effecting compromises or reaching consensus judgments. Instead, it will be to ensure that the evidence and the possible alternatives and analyses of all parties are on the table and open to challenge.

(11) The final Estimate will be issued, as usual, by the DCI. The three B Team submissions will be forwarded with it to selected recipients including the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the PFIAB. The separate, experimental volume containing these submissions will also reproduce for ready reference the A Team analyses of the same subjects and will contain as well the comments of the A and B Teams on each others’ submissions.

(12) After NIE 11–3/8–76, along with the experimental volume, is forwarded, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the DCI and the PFIAB, will select a panel of senior consumers, civilian and military, to review the experiment and critique its results.

The cooperation of your principal assistants in this area has been exceptional. The entire Board is impressed with the intensity of their motivation to seek and try out new ways of improving the estimating process and thus the intelligence product which is provided to the national leadership.

Sincerely,

Leo Cherne
Chairman
166. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum


[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

A review of the Soviet civil defense program leads us to conclude that:

—The program is more extensive and better developed than we had previously believed.

—The measures the Soviets are taking to protect their leadership, industry, and population could have a significant impact on both US and Soviet perceptions of the likely outcome of a nuclear exchange.²

—We cannot, at this time, make a confident estimate of the actual effectiveness of the Soviet program.

Thus, one of the most important findings of this study is that the civil defense problem demands priority attention by the Intelligence Community. Our current understanding of the Soviet program reflects a six-month survey of the available evidence, in the first detailed review of this subject since 1970. A more extensive and systematic collection and analysis effort will be required to resolve some of our uncertainties about the objectives and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense effort.

Significant shifts in emphasis in the Soviet civil defense program occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s. During that period the Soviets subordinated the entire civil defense program to military direction. They also increased their efforts to provide hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership. At the same time, they modified to a degree their previous policy of mass evacuation of cities by placing somewhat greater emphasis on constructing hardened shelters within urban areas, a decision which they have attributed to concern that a nuclear attack could occur with little prior warning. Our study of Soviet civil defense has not revealed any major changes in the Soviet program since about 1971, nor does it suggest a crash program.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91R00884R: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 13, NIO IIM 76–041. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

² For the views of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, concerning the significance of Soviet civil defense measures, see the penultimate paragraph of the Summary and Conclusions. [Footnote in the original.]
Rather, the Soviets have been proceeding gradually but steadily to implement decisions evidently taken previously.\(^3\)

In reviewing what we know about the subject for purposes of this memorandum, we have acquired new appreciation of several aspects of Soviet civil defense:

—The subordination of the entire civil defense structure to military direction has resulted in a more effective organization for carrying out civil defense plans and operations. Civil defense training efforts concentrate on the personnel responsible for carrying out civil defense operations, rather than on extensive training of the general population.

—We have reconfirmed our previous judgment that hardened shelters and command posts are available for the top political and military leadership, and for military and civilian leaders at a number of capitals and military headquarters below the national level.

—Thus far, the hardened shelter program for urban areas is primarily for the protection of personnel judged by the Soviets as essential, rather than for protection of the general population.

—The expansion of industries during the past 15 years into areas distant from previously existing urban centers has not significantly reduced the vulnerability of Soviet industry to nuclear attack. Although light industries are somewhat less concentrated, Soviet heavy industries remain for the most part in large urban areas. The vulnerability of some industry has been reduced somewhat as a result of expansion of some industries into suburbs or “satellite towns.”

—The numbers of underground structures discovered in a partial survey of industrial facilities, and the wide range of locations and industries at which such structures have been found, indicate that preparations for industrial protection are more extensive than we had previously realized.

—We have determined that the Soviets have reserves of food supplies and fuel located outside urban areas which could be used to support the urban population following a nuclear attack on cities, provided it could be distributed effectively. We do not know the actual size of these reserves or how long the available supplies would last. The most difficult problem for the Soviets would probably be to assure the survival of supply personnel, equipment, and communications, and to manage the complex distribution of supplies under chaotic conditions.

Despite our extensive review, major gaps remain in our knowledge of Soviet civil defense. From unclassified materials and intelligence sources, we know that the Soviets have an ambitious program and we have a good understanding of their overall civil defense planning and organization. But we lack important details about specific classified plans. While we know that the Soviets are taking some ac-

\(^3\) For the views of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, about the significance of the Soviet civil defense effort, see the final paragraph of the Summary and Conclusions. [Footnote in the original.]
tions with respect to all aspects of civil defense, we lack evidence on the progress they are making in many of their preparations.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Organization

Beginning in 1971, military and civilian elements responsible for civil defense were integrated into a single nationwide organization, headed by a Deputy Minister of Defense at the national level and by commanders of military districts in the field. The leadership consists of at least 60 general officers, some of them at civil defense staffs as low as city level. The organization comprises at least 50,000 full-time personnel organized into staffs, civil defense troop units, civilian services, cadres, formations, and teams. They operate at various levels extending from the Ministry of Defense through military districts, republic capitals, oblasts, and cities down to small districts (rayons) and economic installations. This organizational structure is supported by dedicated nationwide communications systems. The number of part-time participants in the civil defense organization is probably in the tens of millions.

Mission and Objectives

Civil defense is an integral part of Soviet military planning for nuclear war. In Soviet military doctrine, it is one aspect of that part of military science concerned with "protection of the rear," which in nuclear war the Soviets consider to be the entire nation. They regard civil defense as a task vital to successful operations of the armed forces. It is part of a broader Soviet concept which we have characterized as "war survival," encompassing all the military and nonmilitary measures by which the Soviets seek to ensure the survival of Soviet society and the continuity of the Soviet state.

The mission of the Soviet civil defense organization is to carry out three basic objectives through peacetime preparation and wartime action. Soviet writings are not clear about the relative priorities of these objectives, but our evidence on actual preparations suggests that they fall in the following order:

— to assure the continuity of government and control by protecting the leadership through hardened urban shelters and relocation sites with supporting communications facilities;

4 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the estimated minimum of 50,000 full-time civil defense personnel is too low and should include an additional 15,000 for manning civil defense communications systems at all levels. [Footnote in the original.]
to provide continuity of operations of important economic facilities\(^5\) by hardening and relocating these facilities, maintaining reserves of supplies and materials, and protecting essential personnel through sheltering in urban areas and at dispersal sites; and

—to protect the nonessential part of the population through sheltering in urban and rural areas, evacuation of urban residents beyond the area of initial casualty-producing effects of nuclear strikes on cities, and at least minimal training and indoctrination in civil defense.

**Protection of the Leadership**

We have identified hardened urban shelters, alternate command posts, and supporting communications for protection of the military and civilian leadership in and near Moscow and at some capitals and military headquarters below the national level. The program to build such shelters is far from complete, but it appears intended eventually to provide hardened shelters and communications for Soviet military and civilian leaders at all levels.

—We have confirmed [less than 1 line not declassified] bunkered command posts in the USSR, not counting control centers of the Strategic Rocket Forces and numerous smaller bunkers for communications facilities. [5 lines not declassified]

—The characteristic pattern of such facilities includes hardened bunkers adjacent to military and civilian headquarters within urban areas and hardened relocation sites in suburban or rural areas, together with supporting communications systems, some with hardened antennas.

—While bunkers which have been identified for the leadership vary somewhat in design and structure, they appear in general to be hard enough to afford a good chance of surviving a nuclear attack unless targeted with accurate high-yield weapons.

**Protection of Economic Facilities**

The extent of Soviet preparations for the protection of economic facilities from the effects of a nuclear attack is greater than we previously realized. We have not yet been able to assess the effects of these measures on the vulnerability of important economic facilities to nuclear attack.

**Dispersal.** Soviet civil defense planning calls for redistributing industries outside urban areas, taking advantage of industrial dispersal brought about by economic requirements. The Soviets have created

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\(^5\) Important economic facilities include industries, public utilities, transportation, and other facilities important to the war effort and postwar reconstruction. Essential personnel are those individuals who will be assigned under mobilization and civil defense planning to such facilities or services or will participate in emergency repair and restoration operations. Dispersal sites are predesignated locations outside urban areas which are close enough to the city to permit personnel of key economic facilities to commute daily to their place of work. [Footnote in the original.]
new towns near sources of raw materials and have established industries in many smaller cities in the course of their industrial expansion. We have determined, however, that the expansion of industries during the past 15 years into areas distant from previously existing urban centers has not significantly reduced the vulnerability of Soviet industry to nuclear attack. Despite their growth, Soviet heavy industries remain concentrated in large urban areas, although light industries are somewhat less concentrated.

The vulnerability of industry has been reduced somewhat by re-siting facilities within large urban centers and by the expansion of some industries into suburbs or “satellite towns.” Also, some reduction in vulnerability has resulted from producing certain items of military equipment at more than one facility.

**Hardening.** Soviet planning also calls for hardening measures to reduce the vulnerability of economic facilities and equipment to nuclear attack. These range from underground facilities and protective engineering techniques to expedient measures for the protection of equipment. We have information on several hundred underground structures at a wide range of industrial facilities in various geographic areas. From the sample we have surveyed, first priority appears to be on defense industries, but performance in the defense industries is uneven. Some underground structures were evident at other industries as well. We have very little information on the extent to which other hardening techniques are being applied. Some defense industries are required to have plans for relocation just prior to a nuclear attack, but we do not know the number or type of plants involved in such planning.

**Protection of Essential Personnel.** It is clear that the emphasis in the Soviet urban shelter program since the late 1960s has been to protect essential personnel. We believe there are large numbers of hardened shelters available for this purpose but we have no estimate of the total or what percentage of the essential personnel could be accommodated. Workers would also be protected by movement to dispersal sites at pre-designated locations outside urban areas which are close enough to the city to permit personnel to commute daily to their place of work. Emigrés have reported that advance preparations—prestocked supplies, shelters, and other facilities—to receive essential personnel have been made at some dispersal sites outside urban areas.

**Civil Defense Units.** Civil defense services and formations have been established at economic facilities to repair damage and restore operations. These units practice frequently and appear to be well trained.

**Reserves.** The Soviets maintain state reserves of critical supplies of industrial materials, equipment, fuel and food supplies, which have been reported as “large” by emigré sources. We have not determined, however, the location and size of the state reserves. If the normal flow
of supplies to industries were halted, we believe they could continue production for only a few weeks without drawing on reserves. There are also reports of “strategic reserves” of supplies—presumably a level below which state reserves would not be drawn down during peacetime. Thus far we have identified 36 bunkerized grain storage sites, confirming other indications that the Soviets have dispersed and protected some such strategic reserves. The capacity of the identified bunkers, however, represents only a small percentage of the capacity of the aboveground grain storage facilities located outside urban areas.

Protection of the Nonessential Population

Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have given more emphasis in their policy statements and in their construction programs to shelters in cities. They attribute this shift in emphasis to a concern that a nuclear exchange could occur with little prior warning. In their shelter construction program first priority appears to be on hardened shelters for essential personnel. In most cities hardened shelters could accommodate only a small percentage of the nonessential population. Fallout shelters in cities could probably provide some protection from radiation. However, within cities the primary casualty-producing effects of nuclear detonations would probably be blast and fire, rather than radiation from fallout.

Therefore, the Soviets still rely heavily on evacuation to protect the nonessential urban population. Given a period of warning prior to a nuclear attack, Soviet planning calls for movement of the nonessential urban population to evacuation sites up to 300 kilometers (186 miles) from likely urban target areas (farther from the urban center than the dispersal sites from which essential personnel would commute to the city). On the basis of our study of 12 representative Soviet cities, we conclude that, under most favorable conditions, movement of the nonessential population to evacuation sites and the improvisation of shelters for them could probably be completed within less than a week from a decision to evacuate. In this case, as the Soviets claim, evacuation of cities could reduce prompt casualties to a few percent of the urban population. We are not sure about longer-term protection—that is, the degree of protection from radioactive fallout that would be attained for large numbers of people at evacuation sites.

Although we are aware that large stocks of essential supplies—food, water, fuel, and medicine—are located outside urban target areas, we are unable to estimate with confidence how long such stocks would satisfy the needs of the population or how soon after the attack supplies could start to move from producers. There is no evidence that evacuation areas are being prestocked with essential supplies.

We have, however, a general appreciation of total supplies likely to be available (based on such things as overall geographic distribution
of industry, population, and normal distributive storage), and we have made rough calculations of normal consumption rates of some categories of supplies. Such evidence as we have suggests that following a nuclear attack on cities which was preceded by a period of warning to make final preparations, supply levels would be sufficient to satisfy the minimum subsistence needs of the population for weeks and perhaps months. Distribution of supplies to the relocated urban population would probably be a more serious problem than stock levels.

Major portions of the Soviets’ transportation equipment are normally located outside cities, and would probably not be destroyed by an attack on urban areas. If an attack were preceded by a period of warning, Soviet planning calls for the dispersal of transportation equipment from urban areas to predesignated sites outside cities. Nevertheless, important fixed transportation facilities and equipment in cities, including control centers, would be damaged and power for some segments of the electrified railroads would be disrupted. The most difficult problem for the Soviets would probably be to assure the survival of supply personnel, equipment, and communications, and to manage the complex distribution of supplies under chaotic conditions.

In the past several years, the emphasis in Soviet civil defense training, practices, and exercises has been on full-time and part-time personnel in civil defense staffs and organizations. The Soviets are relying primarily on programs at educational institutions and other organizations to indoctrinate the general population. This is a realistic approach to developing an effective civil defense capability, according to the findings of US civil defense experts.

Effectiveness of Soviet Civil Defenses

While it seems clear that civil defense preparations in the USSR are more extensive than we have been able to confirm, the status of preparations implied by our evidence is consistent with the Soviets’ own acknowledgement that the objectives of their civil defense programs have not been fully achieved. They are concentrating, however, on those preparations which we believe are most valuable for recovery operations: an extensive well-defined organization at all levels of government; a training program focused on the primary implementing organizations; detailed planning to mobilize and control military and civilian resources; measures to reduce damage to economic facilities; and a leadership familiar with civil defense plans and having available to it both protection and facilities to control operations.

The effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses, including evacuation and recovery, in the event of an unrestrained US nuclear attack on urban areas would vary widely, depending on such circumstances as the size of the attack, weather, time of day, and season of year, but the
period of warning prior to the attack would be a critical factor. Thus an evaluation of Soviet civil defense effectiveness must take into account the following circumstances:

— The most severe test for Soviet civil defenses would be a situation in which the first warning of a nuclear exchange would come after strategic nuclear attacks were in progress, regardless of which side initiated the conflict.

— The more likely situation would be one in which a nuclear exchange followed a period of tension in which both sides were aware of a heightened risk of nuclear war, providing time for at least some final civil defense preparations.

— Regardless of how the nuclear exchange eventuated, the US could launch an unrestrained nuclear attack designed to prevent the early reconstitution of the Soviet Union as a major power, in accordance with one of the US nuclear weapon employment options in NSDM–242.6

We can draw only tentative conclusions about the effectiveness of Soviet civil defenses because of the large gaps in our knowledge of the program and the unknowables about its operation under stress. It is our tentative conclusion that, under optimum conditions, which included a period of warning prior to an unrestrained US attack during which evacuation and other prescribed preparations were implemented, Soviet civil defenses would: (1) assure survival of a large percentage of the leadership necessary to maintain control, (2) reduce prompt casualties among the urban population to a small percentage, and (3) give the Soviets a good chance of being able to distribute at least a subsistence level of supplies to the surviving population.

With minimal warning, some key leaders would probably survive, but the urban population would suffer very high casualties and the chances would be poor that the Soviets could distribute supplies effectively to the surviving population.

Our conclusions about the effectiveness of measures to protect economic facilities must be even more tentative. Our impression is that the protective measures we know about would be effective in reducing collateral damage to economic facilities which were not the primary targets of attack. We believe that, without warning of an attack, casualties among essential personnel would be very high. Warning may be less critical to the survival of economic facilities and equipment.

In spite of the potential contribution of Soviet civil defenses to survival of the leadership and to reducing casualties and damage to economic facilities, Soviet planners too would have major uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness of their civil defenses. Among the most important would be uncertainties about:

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6 Document 31.
—the time available for implementing prescribed preparations prior to the nuclear strikes;
— the timing and size of initial and subsequent nuclear strikes and the extent to which urban areas would be targeted;
— the aggregate effects, both prompt and longer term, of an attack involving several thousand nuclear weapons; and
— the magnitude of human and material casualties and the effect of their occurrence in a short period.

The Soviets’ overall assessment of their present civil defenses against an unrestrained US nuclear attack probably is not a highly optimistic one. Indeed, the usually conservative Soviet planners may attribute lower capabilities to their civil defenses than we do, given the magnitude of the problems they face and the large uncertainties about the circumstances, scale, and effects of the nuclear attacks they would have to cope with. Even under the most favorable circumstances, they probably would have to expect a breakdown of the economy, and under the worst conditions they would have to anticipate catastrophic human casualties as well.

Despite all the problems and uncertainties, however, the Soviets probably believe that civil defense measures contribute to giving the USSR a chance to survive as a national entity and to be in a better position than the US following a nuclear exchange. They probably would expect their present civil defenses to be able to protect some key civilian and military leaders and political and economic cadres, to reduce damage to economic facilities, to reduce casualties among the population, and to support the conduct of military operations.

More threatening interpretations of the Soviets’ motives and expectations for their civil defense programs are possible, but the evidence available to us does not suggest that Soviet civil defense preparations are being carried out on any crash basis or that they are peaking toward any particular target date. In any event, we have no doubt that the Soviets will continue their efforts to improve their civil defenses. They have long emphasized defense of the homeland in their military policy and believe that civil defense is a significant factor in the military balance. They are convinced that “protection of the rear” is vital to deterrence, to military success in war, and to national survival in the event of nuclear war. Whatever the nature of their specific current motivations, the Soviets would expect their civil defense efforts to contribute to their overall strategic posture and to enhance their prospects in nuclear war.

_The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the Soviet civil defense program is seen by the Soviet leadership primarily as a prudent hedge against the possibility of attack by a nuclear-armed adversary. Moreover, INR believes that these Soviet civil defense efforts will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange and will not_
undermine the deterrent value of US strategic attack forces. While fully agreeing that this is an important area of activity which deserves closer attention by the US Intelligence Community, INR believes that at the present time the scope of the civil defense program does not indicate Soviet strategic objectives beyond maintenance of rough strategic equivalence with the US.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, consider that this memorandum accurately summarizes our present information on Soviet efforts to improve the war survival potential inherent in the Soviet civil defense effort. However, they judge the impact of this war survival effort upon the US–USSR strategic balance to be greater than that implied by these Principal Findings and Conclusions. They believe that the Soviet civil defense effort will have a definite and increasing impact on the US–USSR strategic balance. Moreover, they stress their belief that the Soviets are engaged in an effort to achieve a war-fighting and war-survival capability and that the civil defense program is an essential element in this effort. They are convinced that Soviet civil defense efforts are intended to contribute to the USSR’s strategic posture by eroding US SIOP capabilities. Finally, they believe that the Soviets will increasingly strive to enhance their international position by capitalizing on their war-survival capabilities in order to manipulate policy decisions in the Third World and NATO.

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the memorandum.]

167. Intelligence Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence


US–USSR Offensive Strategic Force Balance:

Key Findings

The period since 1965 has been one of dramatic change in the strategic balance between the US and USSR and in the perception of that balance. It was widely recognized in the mid-1960s that the strategic

balance was clearly in favor of the US because it led by such a wide margin in every simple numerical measure of strategic offensive power. Seeking to redress the imbalance, the Soviets began to improve and enlarge their forces, and by the mid-1970s they had achieved a rough strategic parity.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s many important technological innovations incorporated into both the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals complicated the perceptions of the strategic balance. Simple measures, such as the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, were no longer as accurate a reflection of the strategic balance as they had been when one side had a clear margin in each category. Improvements in accuracy, throw weight, multiple warheads, and the capability to destroy hard targets required the introduction of a variety of more complex measures.

The Soviets, because of the dramatic growth in their intercontinental attack forces since 1965, now lead the US in several single measures of strategic power:

—number of delivery vehicles
—on-line equivalent megatonnage
—on-line missile throw weight
—lethal area for soft targets—i.e., the area that could be subjected to an overpressure of 103.4 kilopascals (15 pounds per square inch) or more by their on-line force.

The US, on the other hand, continues to lead in:

—number of on-line missile RVs
—number of on-line missile RVs combined with bomber weapons
—on-line missile K factor, a measure of a missile’s capability against a hard target.

Since the early 1970s it has become increasingly difficult to determine which country holds a strategic advantage.

[Omitted here is the Report, which addresses factors determining evolution of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, measuring the strategic balance, and future considerations.]
168. National Intelligence Estimate


[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

PRC DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMED FORCES

NOTE

[1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

SCOPE

This paper examines Chinese defense policy, strategy, and armed forces in the 1970s and makes some broad predictions for the early 1980s. Separate Annexes provide details on the economy and technology, PLA involvement in politics and the succession, trends in the armed forces, the conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities of the military, and civil defense.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Peking considers the United States to be less of a direct military threat than the Soviet Union. The Chinese also view the US as a weakened power, gradually withdrawing from Asia, but nonetheless one of great strategic strength and a long-term ideological adversary (Para 8).3

—The main danger, from the Chinese vantage point, is that the US, lacking the political will to pursue its national interests vigorously and allowing itself to be put in a position of inferiority in conventional and strategic arms, will compromise with the USSR on disadvantageous terms, leaving China to face Soviet power alone (Para 8).

B. The Chinese will continue to see it in their best interests not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, either at the strategic or tactical level. The Chinese aim clearly must be to confine the conflict to the conventional level, where they feel they can make maximum use of advan-

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91R00884R: Intelligence Publications Files, Box 4, NIE 13–76, PRC Defense Policy and Armed Forces Secret Version. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of NFIB.


3 A cross-reference to paragraph 8 as it appears in the estimate’s discussion section, which is not printed.
tages in manpower, knowledge of terrain, and defensive complexes (Para 44).

—The Chinese probably hope that their extensive dispersal and passive defense measures will help them ride out a strategic nuclear attack preserving enough force to deter or eventually defeat a follow-on invasion (Para 45).

—At the theater level, the Chinese would not initiate, but apparently envision retaliatory, employment of theater nuclear forces against an invading force (Para 46).

C. Contrary to the last NIE (13–3–72), we do not believe that the Chinese would rely on a “luring deep” strategy for defense against Soviet invasion, or exclusively employ a “positional defense” against an attack in coastal areas (Para 43).

—Judging from force developments and dispositions, we now believe that a combination of tactics would be used, with much depending upon the nature and location of the attacks as well as upon the kind of invading forces (Para 43).

—Current levels of manpower (4.3 million), weapons and equipment, and training suggest the forces are now generally in a high state of readiness (Annex D, Para 3).

D. The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is not organized, equipped, or trained to conduct operations successfully in a nuclear war environment (Annex D, Para 18).

—China’s minimal capability for strategic and theater nuclear war does, however, offer a modest deterrent to nuclear attack (Annex D, Para 18).

—If deterrence fails, China’s nuclear warfighting capability would be no match for that of the USSR and could not block a Soviet invasion (Annex D, Para 18).

E. Conversely, the PLA is best organized, equipped, and trained to fight a nonnuclear defensive war against the Soviet Union. It would have an even chance of stalemating a Soviet conventional offensive before it reached Peking and the North China Plain. Any attempt to occupy large areas of China would be unfeasible (Annex D, Paras 9 and 27).

F. China could not conduct major offensive military operations much beyond its Soviet border.

—Consequently it is highly unlikely that Peking would initiate such operations (Annex D, Para 8).

—Against Taiwan, the PLA probably would not have the capability to mount a successful nonnuclear invasion much before the 1980s without unacceptable losses (Annex D, Para 28).

—If the Chinese were to intervene in Korea, they could apply sufficient strength in a nonnuclear situation to overwhelm the forces presently there (Annex D, Para 23).
—Against India, the PLA force in Tibet is suited to denial operations and for punitive expeditions against Indian incursions (Annex D, Para 30).
—The PRC probably could seize and occupy the Spratly Islands even against such opposition as Vietnam, the Philippines, or the Republic of China could mount at this time (Annex D, Para 28).

G. The PLA remains at once an instrument of party policy and a shaper of that policy (Annex B, Para 7).
—China’s overall military posture has not been weakened by the preoccupation of some political generals with the succession (Annex B, Para 9).
—[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

H. Peking’s material support for insurgency is modest, continuing, and confined to a handful of groups, primarily in Southeast Asia, as potential pressure points and as a means of precluding Soviet and limiting Vietnamese involvement with insurgency in the area (Para 21 and Annex B, Paras 22–23).

I. Chinese foreign military assistance will probably remain small in amount, limited in variety, and unsophisticated in nature (Para 22 and Annex B, Paras 24–28).

J. Economic and technical considerations appear to preclude any dramatic improvement in conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities over the next five years (Para 58).
—Development of the PLA into a fighting force comparable in sophistication to that of the USSR or the US today will take at least 10 to 20 more years and would require the acquisition of more expensive and advanced technology than China now has (Annex C, Para 3).
—The Chinese will continue to be highly selective in weapons choice, and they are unlikely to come up with technological “surprises” in military weaponry (Paras 16–17).

K. The modernization of the armed forces will continue to be uneven and slow (Para 50).
—The army is in far better shape than it has ever been and will remain the backbone of the defense of the nation (Paras 50–51 and Annex C, Paras 4–12).
—The navy will remain principally an effective coastal defense force. It will, however, operate at greater distances from the coast over the next five years (Para 52 and Annex C, Paras 13–24).
—The air force will remain a limited air defense force with some ground attack capability, but its overall capabilities will improve over the next five years (Para 52 and Annex C, Paras 25–41).

L. There has been little change in the massive paramilitary program (Para 53 and Annex C, Paras 42–49).

M. The Chinese have a small nuclear force of missiles and bombers (Annex C, Paras 50–65).
—A limited-range ICBM, possibly capable of reaching Moscow, is now operational (Para 54).
—More advanced missiles, such as an SLBM system and the first ICBM capable of reaching the United States, are now under development but will not be available for several years (Annex C, Paras 55–57).

N. If, as we believe, a “moderate” leadership is emerging from the overall succession process, these new Chinese leaders would continue to strengthen their military posture against the Soviets, even though there could well be some attempts to reduce the abrasiveness of the Sino-Soviet relationship. They would push ahead with the creation of their intercontinental nuclear forces (Paras 59–61).

O. Certain ongoing trends and defense policies have an enduring quality and will consequently survive the post-Mao transition period into the early 1980s (Para 63).

—The Soviets will remain the main threat (Para 63).
—The Chinese will not align themselves with other powers but pursue an independent stance (Para 63).
—Peking will prefer to use political and diplomatic means rather than military pressures to gain its ends (Para 63).
—The PLA will continue as a huge military force—but one more operationally competent than now. It will remain involved in a great variety of political and economic duties (Para 63).
—Though the PRC will probably begin to deploy a small force of ICBMs and SLBMs in the early 1980s, it could not successfully engage a superpower in a nuclear exchange (Para 63).
—The large discrepancy between strategic nuclear weapons available to the Chinese compared to those of the US and the USSR will continue to seriously constrain the development of any flexible Chinese strategy for responding to an enemy first strike (Para 49).
—China poses no direct military threat to the United States. It is a potential threat to US forces and Allies in Asia (Para 49).

P. In sum, we see a large conventional force being slowly modernized, supported by a massive paramilitary organization—all under the cover of a small nuclear force which is developing an intercontinental capability (Para 49).

[Omitted here is a map of the PRC, the discussion section of the estimate, and five annexes. For the full text of the estimate, see the companion CD-ROM to the National Intelligence Council’s Tracking the Dragon.]

169. Editorial Note

President Ford met with the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) for the final time on December 3, 1976. The Presi-
dent’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs William G. Hyland also attended the meeting, held in the White House Cabinet Room from 2:10 until 3:25 p.m., as did the following PFIAB members: Stephen Ailes, Admiral George W. Anderson, Leslie C. Arends, William O. Baker, William J. Casey, Leo Cherne, John S. Foster, Jr., Robert W. Galvin, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Clare Booth Luce, Robert D. Murphy, Edward Teller, and Edward Bennett Williams. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)

Although no record of the meeting has been found, Scowcroft advised Ford beforehand that the meeting was being held to give the PFIAB an opportunity to present its customary annual report to the President. According to Scowcroft’s briefing memorandum, December 3, Board members were expected to discuss the following specific issues during the course of their report: “They will inform you of their concern about certain new restrictions imposed on foreign intelligence collection activities, problems associated with economic intelligence collection and analysis, difficulties in the counterintelligence field and an experiment in competitive estimating on strategic topics. The Board will also present the results of a special study it has done for you concerning intelligence requirements for the future.” Scowcroft’s memorandum is ibid., National Security Adviser, Kissinger—Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 20, General Subject File, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting, 12/3/76.

Cherne, the Board’s Chairman, presented Ford with a written report of the PFIAB’s yearly activities at the meeting. The report, dated December 3, discussed the Board’s activities relative to the Soviet Union’s intercept of U.S. telecommunication links, economic intelligence, legal and constitutional issues, counterintelligence, and the competitive analysis experiment. The portion of the report dealing with the experiment in competitive analysis reads as follows:

“Since its establishment in 1956, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has been concerned with the adequacy of strategic intelligence. This focus was sharpened in 1969 when President Nixon assigned the Board the task of annually reviewing the intelligence community estimates of Soviet forces for intercontinental warfare (NIE 11–3/8). The Board’s assessment of the strategic estimate for 1974 was conveyed to you in a letter dated 8 August 1975 [Document 155], in which we noted the following deficiencies:

—the estimate is seriously misleading in the presentation of a number of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency unsupported by the facts;
“—the estimate contains judgments in critical areas which are made with the force of fact, although the cumulative evidence is conflicting, often flimsy, and in certain cases does not exist; and

“—the NIE gives the appearance of a net assessment by encompassing judgments on the survivability of U.S. forces; yet such judgments have not been subjected to critical analysis in the estimating process. The letter also included proposals for correcting the deficiencies we had observed.

“At our meeting with you in August 1975 [Document 153], you requested us to follow up with specific proposals for implementing the suggestions outlined in our letter. These proposals were subsequently submitted to your Assistant for National Security Affairs and, through him, to the DCI, who rejected them [See Documents 156 and 159]. As a result, a subcommittee of the Board was established which undertook an intensive four-month review of the intelligence estimating process. This review sought to evaluate the purposes of National Intelligence Estimates; the extent to which these purposes are served; and the adequacy of the estimates as seen by principal users and their level of confidence in them. Further, at the committee’s request, the DCI’s National Intelligence Officer undertook a study of the intelligence community’s 10-year track record in strategic estimating. In the course of its review, the committee held discussions with approximately 40 authorities ranging from intelligence analysts and managers to intelligence consumers and private citizens well informed on U.S./Soviet strategic relationships. A detailed analysis of the committee’s findings was submitted to the full Board in April 1976. [Document 163] This report established that opinions of the NIE’s purpose, utility, and accuracy vary greatly, but were generally negative, thus underscoring the concerns expressed in the Board’s letter to you of 8 August 1975. The full Board endorsed the report and transmitted it to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with the notation that the members believed it could make an important contribution towards improving the NIE process, and urging that it be shared with the Committee on Foreign Intelligence at the earliest opportunity. Recognizing that the exchange of correspondence initiated by the Board’s 8 August 1975 letter contributed to a resentment of the views expressed rather than an acceptance of the helpful spirit in which they were tendered, the Board worked directly with the DCI’s chief National Intelligence Officer to implement the competitive assessment experiment—a principal recommendation in the report. This recommendation, in summary, is as follows:

“—With respect to certain key issues—Soviet ICBM accuracy, Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities, and Soviet strategic policy and objectives—a competitive analysis should be conducted by
persons inside or outside the intelligence community and the Government who have expert knowledge of the subjects in question, but who themselves are not engaged in the production of the NIE.

The experiment will not be completed before January 1977, at which time it will be evaluated by a senior review panel composed of people selected by your Assistant for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the DCI and the Board. At our meeting on 2 December 1976 we were briefed on the key issues by the three “A” Teams representing the intelligence community and, alternatively, by the three “B” Teams of outside experts; the DCI attended the presentations on Soviet strategic policy and objectives. While several steps in the experiment remain to be completed, the stimulative and beneficial effects of the extensive interaction between the teams were very evident. Although we would not wish to prejudge the final evaluation, the presentations confirm the Board’s judgment that the development of alternative and/or substantiating views by experts outside the intelligence agencies should continue in the production of National Intelligence Estimates.

Mr. President, we believe that the Board’s work with the National Intelligence Estimates will enhance their value to decision-makers, and that it is critically important that the work which we have begun be carried on.” PFIAB’s report is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger—Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 20, General Subject File, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting, 12/3/76. It is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVIII, Foundations and Organization of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976.

170. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Bush) to Recipients of National Intelligence Estimate 11–3/8–76

Washington, undated.

1. The attached National Intelligence Estimate is the official appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence. This Estimate, including its italicized statements of differing views by members of The National For-
eign Intelligence Board, was drafted and coordinated by professional intelligence officers of the US Intelligence Community and was approved by me with the advice of the Board.

2. The judgments arrived at in this Estimate were made after all parties to the Estimate had the benefit of alternative views from the various elements of the Community and from panels of experts from outside government on a few selected subjects. The assembling of the panels of outside experts, and the consideration of their views, was agreed upon by me and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an experiment, the purpose of which was to determine whether those known for their more somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could present the evidence in a sufficiently convincing way to alter the analytical judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached document. The views of these experts did have some effect. But to the extent that this Estimate presents a starker appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs in the strategic offensive and defensive fields.

3. The experiment in competitive analysis that was begun with this Estimate has not been completed, and any final judgment on its utility cannot be rendered. Nevertheless, there is a negative aspect that is already clear and which concerns me deeply; namely, the selective leaks regarding the details of the process and, worse, the substantive conclusions developed by the “Team B” panel that was concerned with Soviet strategic objectives. Inspired by these selective leaks, allegations have appeared in the press that the judgments appearing in this official Estimate were shaped by pressure from the “Team B.”

4. There is no truth to such allegations. The judgments in the attached Estimate are the best that can be made on the basis of the analysis of the available evidence.

5. Although these leaks may appear to discredit what I continue to regard as a worthwhile experiment, they have not diminished the integrity of the Estimate itself, nor the integrity of the Intelligence Community.

George Bush

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2 A reference to Team B, whose report is Document 171.

Attachment

National Intelligence Estimate


[Omitted here are the table of contents and the foreword.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

Current Developments in Soviet Programs

In offensive forces for intercontinental conflict, the Soviets are continuing their long-term effort to acquire more powerful, flexible, and survivable weapon systems.

—New intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are being deployed at a moderate pace. About 200 now are operational, most of them with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and there will probably be more than 900 in 1980. These missiles have better accuracy, greater throw weight, and more survivable silos than their predecessors. Deployment of a land-mobile ICBM is apparently still deferred.

—Several units of a new version of the Soviets’ latest class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) have been launched. They will probably carry the first Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to be equipped with MIRVs. A new, large ballistic missile submarine may be under construction. If so, it could be operational by about 1980.

—Improvements in ICBMs and SLBMs will not stop with the current missiles. The Soviets are developing a number of new and modified ICBMs and SLBMs [1 line not declassified] These systems will incorporate qualitative improvements, probably including still better accuracy.

—The Backfire bomber continues to be deployed. There are uncertainties and differences of view within the Intelligence Community about the extent of the Backfire’s capability for intercontinental operations and about Soviet intentions to employ it in this role. We have additional evidence this year pointing to Soviet development of a new long-range bomber and a new aerial tanker.

4 Top Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and ERDA participated in the preparation of the estimate. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, also participated. The DCI issued the estimate with the concurrence of all USIA members except for the abstaining representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury. This is first, summary volume of the three-volume estimate. The other volumes, compromising the estimate and annexes, respectively, are ibid.
The Soviets are also pressing ahead with efforts to improve their strategic defenses.

—Large new radars under construction in the northwestern USSR will improve and extend Soviet ballistic missile early warning capabilities when they become operational in about 1979. There are uncertainties and differences of view in the Intelligence Community about whether these radars will also be given capabilities to direct and manage antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses. The Soviets continue their research and development on ABM systems.

—A number of programs are aimed at remedying the critical deficiencies in Soviet defenses against low-altitude air attack. The Soviets have been deploying data-handling systems and are introducing an improved fighter into strategic air defense forces. New air defense radars, a new low-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, and a new fighter with better low-altitude intercept capabilities are under development and could be operational by about 1980.

—Soviet forces for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) are improving but are not now an effective counter to US SSBNs. The Soviets continue to investigate both acoustic and nonacoustic techniques in an effort to solve their fundamental problem of detecting and tracking SSBNs at sea.

—The Soviets have this year demonstrated a capability to attack satellites at low to medium altitudes in a more timely manner.

—Soviet civil defense preparations are steadily improving. This program is more extensive and better developed than we had previously understood. The Soviets also continue to harden facilities associated with strategic forces.

—The Soviets are conducting research and development which could lead to directed-energy weapons having important applications in strategic defense. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that this effort includes a large and well-funded program to develop a charged-particle-beam weapon.

Soviet Objectives and Expectations

The growth of Soviet capabilities for intercontinental conflict over the past decade has provided the USSR with a powerful deterrent and has contributed to its recognition as a superpower equal to the US. An assessment of the perceptions and objectives underlying present Soviet programs is a matter of interpretation and considerable uncertainty. Much that we observe can be attributed to a combination of defensive prudence, superpower competitiveness, worst-case assumptions about US capabilities, a military doctrine which stresses war-fighting capabilities, and a variety of internal political and institutional factors. But the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs give rise to the question of whether the Soviet leaders now hold as an operative, practical objective the achievement of clear strategic superiority over the US during the period of this Estimate.

The Soviets’ belief in the eventual supremacy of their system is strong. They see their forces for intercontinental conflict as contributing
to their ultimate goal of achieving a dominant position over the West, particularly the United States, in terms of political, economic, social, and military strength. Having come this far in strategic arms competition with the US, the Soviets may be optimistic about their long-term prospects in this competition. But they cannot be certain about future US behavior or about their own future strategic capabilities relative to those of the US. They have seen US technology and industry mobilized to great effect in the past and are concerned about current US force modernization programs. Thus, they probably cannot today set practical policy objectives in terms of some specific relationship between their intercontinental capabilities and those of the US, to be achieved in a specific period of time.

We do not believe that the Soviet leaders presently count on a combination of actions by the USSR and lack of action by the US which would give them, in the next 10 years, a capability for intercontinental conflict so effective that the USSR could devastate the US while preventing the US from devastating the USSR. Soviet expectations, however, clearly reach well beyond a capability that merely continues to be sufficient to deter an all-out attack.

In our view, the Soviets are striving to achieve war-fighting and war-survival capabilities which would leave the USSR in a better position than the US if war occurred. The Soviets also aim for intercontinental forces which have visible and therefore politically useful advantages over the US. They hope that their capabilities for intercontinental conflict will give them more latitude than they have had in the past for the vigorous pursuit of foreign policy objectives, and that these capabilities will discourage the US and others from using force or the threat of force to influence Soviet actions.

The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, agrees with the statement above on the ultimate Soviet goal but believes the Soviet leaders have more modest expectations for their strategic programs. He would emphasize that the Soviet leaders

—know that the US need not concede the USSR any meaningful strategic advantage and do not expect the US to do so, whatever their assessment of present US resolve might be; and

—do not entertain, as a practical objective in the foreseeable future, the achievement of what could reasonably be characterized as a “war-winning” or “war-survival” posture.

Rather, in his view, Soviet strategic weapon programs are pragmatic in nature and are guided by more proximate foreign policy goals. He sees the Soviets undertaking vigorous strategic force improvements with a view to achieving incremental advantages where possible but, above all, to avoid falling behind the US in a strategic environment increasingly characterized by qualitative competition—and thus losing the position of rough equivalence
with the US which they have achieved in recent years through great effort. Moreover, he believes it unlikely that the Soviet leaders anticipate any improvement in the USSR’s strategic situation vis-à-vis the US over the next 10 years which would substantially influence their behavior—especially their inclination for risk taking—during periods of crisis or confrontation with the West.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe that the Soviets do, in fact, see as attainable their objective of achieving the capability to wage an intercontinental nuclear war, should such a war occur, and survive it with resources sufficient to dominate the postwar period. Further, these agencies believe that this objective serves as a practical guideline for Soviet strategic force development even though the Soviets have not necessarily set a specific date for its achievement. In their view:

—Soviet programs for improving forces for intercontinental conflict (including those for strategic hardening and civil defense), their extensive research on advanced weapons technology, and their resource allocation priorities are in keeping with this objective and illustrate its practical effect.

—In combination with other military and nonmilitary developments, the buildup of intercontinental nuclear capabilities is integral to a programmed Soviet effort to achieve the ultimate goal of a dominant position in the world.

—While it cannot be said with confidence when the Soviets believe they will achieve this goal, they expect to move closer to it over the next 10 years and, as a result, to be able increasingly to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that this Estimate understates, as have previous NIEs, the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. The lines of Soviet strategic policy, objectives, and doctrines enunciated in a large body of authoritative literature are viewed within the context of differing US perceptions and aspirations rather than in the larger context of Soviet history, ideology, and military investment.

The Soviets have made great strides toward achieving general military superiority over all perceived constellations of enemies and for attaining a war-winning capability at all levels of conflict. War survival and civil defense efforts to date have already placed the US in a position of serious strategic disadvantage by neutralizing much of its capability to destroy or damage effectively those elements of the Soviet leadership, command, military, and urban-industrial structure required for maintaining a credible deterrent balance. A realistic calculation of nuclear fatality exchange ratios in a war today would probably show the USSR emerging with considerably more than a twenty-to-one advantage.

There now is a substantial basis for judging that the Soviets’ negotiations at SALT and their détente, economic, and arms-control diplomacy have thus
far been exploited by them for strategic advantage: by slowing down US defense investment and by permitting easy access to high US technology. The net effect of improved Soviet and East European access to loans, goods, and services from many Western countries is that inefficient sectors of the Soviet economy are in effect being subsidized, thus encouraging uninterrupted investment in strategic forces. A degree of hostage control is being acquired over elements of the West European banking structure by Moscow and its East European allies—in the form of extensive loans (now approaching allowable limits for many banks)—which has serious economic warfare implications. Additionally, the extraordinary advances being made by the Soviets in ASW and high-energy particle-beam technology could place the Free World’s offensive ballistic missile capability at serious risk well before the terminal date of this Estimate.

While the present NIE is much improved over some of its predecessor documents, it falls far short of grasping the essential realities of Soviet conflict purpose and evolving capability, the latter clearly constituting the most extensive peacetime war preparations in recorded history—a situation not unlike that of the mid-1930s, when the entire Free World failed to appreciate the true nature of Nazi Germany’s readily discernible preparations for war and conflict. The dissenting judgments of the past five years regarding Soviet defense expenditures, Soviet strategic objectives and policy, ICBM refire capability, predictions in 1973 that some 10 to 15 major new or modified offensive ballistic missile systems were under development, Soviet war-survival and civil-defense measures, Backfire bomber capability, and directed-energy weapons development have often served as the principal means of alerting the national leadership to trends which now are clearly evidenced. Failure now to anticipate the implications of such trends will impact adversely on lead times essential for the alteration of policy and redirection of technology programs.

Such lead-time impacts are illustrated dramatically in judgments of the late 1960s and 1970 which implied that Soviet goals entailed no more than strategic parity and did not involve commitment to a major civil defense program. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the former was the basis for US arms control policy in 1969, while the latter influenced the ABM Treaty of 1972. He is concerned that the present perceptions of Soviet goals and evolving capability provide an inadequate basis for the pursuit of further negotiations at SALT or the reformulation of national defense and foreign security policy. At issue is whether present intelligence perceptions provide an adequate basis for averting global conflict in the decades ahead.

Trends in Forces and Capabilities

Varying degrees of uncertainty characterize our estimates of Soviet strategic programs and of the quantity and quality of Soviet forces. Forecasts for the next few years can be made with relatively high confidence on the basis of direct evidence. For the period of primary con-
cern—five to 10 years hence—estimates of system characteristics and force composition must be based on very limited evidence and indirect considerations. In this connection, it should be noted that uncertainties about the quality of strategic weapons and forces—at present and particularly for the future—are in some areas large enough to affect judgments about important aspects of the strategic balance.

Our forecast for the next 10 years assumes that the ABM Treaty remains in effect and that US forces will evolve as currently programmed. We employ commonly used measures of force capability but cannot take full account of operational factors which would affect the actual outcome of an intercontinental conflict. Examples of such factors are the efficiency and vulnerability of US and Soviet command and control systems, and the effectiveness of US air attacks and Soviet air defenses in an electronic warfare environment.

**Offensive Capabilities**

The bulk of Soviet intercontinental striking power will remain in ICBM forces. The striking power and survivability of SLBM forces will continue to grow. A relatively small intercontinental bomber force will be retained to complement the ballistic missile forces.

—*In the early 1980s*, the number of Soviet missile reentry vehicles (RVs) will probably approximate and possibly exceed that of the US. The large Soviet advantage in missile throw weight will be much greater than it is today, and the Soviet advantage in total equivalent megatonnage (EMT) will be somewhat greater. Soviet ICBMs will pose an increased threat to US missile silos; this threat could become a major one in the next year or so if Soviet ICBM capabilities are at the more threatening but highly unlikely extremes of our range of uncertainty. Soviet silo-based ICBMs, however, will not be very much more vulnerable than at present. Despite the probability that the US will continue to have more varied offensive forces with a larger total number of weapons, increasing Soviet missile throw weight and numbers of RVs, and the increased threat to US silo-based ICBMs, will add to perceptions of Soviet strategic power.

—*After the early 1980s*, the raw power of Soviet offensive forces will continue to increase. Soviet ICBMs will pose a major threat to US missile silos, although the Soviets themselves would remain uncertain about the results of countersilo attacks. If US forces develop as now programmed and Soviet forces continue to develop along present lines, some of the earlier Soviet gains in relative offensive capabilities will be eroded. With the deployment of new US systems, Soviet forces would be likely to fall behind in numbers of missile RVs and farther behind in total weapons. In any event, the chances that the Soviets could achieve a large lead in missile RVs would be reduced. Their advantage in total EMT would be likely to drop back to about today’s level, but their advantage in missile throw weight would remain very large. The Soviets could judge that their own silo-based missile forces had become very vulnerable.
In the next few years, SLBMs will become a larger percentage of the total Soviet ICBM and SLBM force, thus increasing the proportion of launchers which can achieve better survivability through mobility. Although the Soviets have evidently deferred deployment of a land-mobile ICBM, they will probably continue R & D on such systems and might deploy one to counter a perceived danger to their silo-based ICBMs. A land-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) now about to be deployed will be difficult for US intelligence to distinguish from a similar land-mobile ICBM and might be convertible to an ICBM fairly rapidly.

The Soviets could at any time increase the threat to US bombers on alert by deploying SSBNs close to US coastlines to reduce the potential warning times available to bomber bases. In deciding whether to rely on SLBMs for this purpose, the Soviets would have to consider US ASW capabilities, US options to reduce the vulnerability of existing bombers, and the US B-1 program. We believe the Soviets would conclude that, throughout the next 10 years, most US alert bombers would survive a surprise SLBM attack.

We believe the Soviets have no compelling military reasons to deploy long-range cruise missile systems in the present strategic environment. They evidently believe the US has a technological advantage in such systems, but if they cannot prevent US deployment through SALT, they may follow suit. They could modify any one of several existing air- and sea-launched cruise missiles for long-range use or could develop large, new ones for deployment by the end of the 1970s. Small, long-range cruise missiles accurate enough to destroy hard targets probably could not be flight-tested before the early to mid-1980s.

Soviet intercontinental striking power would be increased if Backfire bombers were employed against the US. The Backfire is well suited to operations against land and sea targets on the Eurasian periphery using a variety of flight profiles, and it has some capability for operations against the US on high-altitude subsonic profiles. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, estimate that the Backfire has significant capabilities for operations against the US without air-to-air refueling. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State estimate that it has marginal capabilities against the US under the same conditions. With air-to-air refueling, the Backfire would have considerably increased capability for intercontinental operations, even in the case of the lowest performance estimate. In addition, the Backfire could be modified in various ways to improve its range.

We believe it is likely that Backfires will continue to be assigned to theater and naval missions and—with the exception of DIA, ERDA,
Army, and Air Force—we believe it is correspondingly unlikely that they will be assigned to intercontinental missions. If the Soviets decided to assign any substantial number of Backfires to missions against the US, they almost certainly would upgrade the performance of the aircraft or deploy a force of compatible new tankers for their support. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe the available evidence on Backfire employment indicates only that peripheral and naval attack are its current primary missions. Since the Soviets could use the Backfire’s intercontinental capabilities at their initiative, these agencies believe that the Backfire clearly poses a threat to the US, even without the deployment of a compatible tanker force or the upgrading of the aircraft’s performance. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that a portion of the Backfire force will have missions against the contiguous US.

**Defensive Capabilities**

The Soviets are continuing to improve their ballistic missile detection and tracking systems to close gaps in existing coverage, to make warning information more precise, and to provide additional warning time. We believe that two large phased-array radars now under construction in the northern USSR will be used for ballistic missile warning. Radars such as these, however, could also be given the capability for ABM battle management—that is, to provide tracking and prediction data to support ABM defenses. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State, basing their judgment on analysis of the individual characteristics, locations, and orientation of these two radars and on the status of the Soviet ABM research and development program, believe that both radars are intended only for ballistic missile early warning. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, however, believe the available evidence regarding these radars does not permit a confident judgment about whether they may also be intended for ABM battle management. Concern about the possible use of the large phased-array radars for ABM battle management would increase if the Soviets started to construct more such radars in locations appropriate for ABM support and if the Soviets pursued ABM research and development vigorously. The Department of State believes that the extent to which construction of additional such radars would be cause for concern would also depend on the assessment at the time of the likelihood of Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty. This assessment, in turn, would depend in large part on the extent to which the circumstances which led the Soviets to negotiate this treaty—and thus avoid an ABM competition with the US—had changed. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes the
two radars alone might be able to support significant deployment of ABM defenses in the western and central USSR.

An ABM system which the Soviets have been developing since 1967 is more rapidly deployable than the current system at Moscow. The pace of flight testing has been slow over the past two years, but recently the interceptor missile was fired against a live target for the first time. With this interceptor, the system appears to have at best a limited capability. Recent construction at the test range suggests development of a high-acceleration interceptor, which could greatly enhance the system's capability. If development proceeds vigorously, the system could be ready for deployment in one to three years or so, depending on whether it includes the high-acceleration interceptor. This ABM research and development activity probably is a hedge against uncertainties about the future strategic situation. We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets now plan to deploy ABM defenses beyond Moscow.

The USSR will probably not have significantly better defenses against low-altitude air attack before 1980. For the period beyond that time, we estimate that:

—For defense against low-altitude bombers, improvements in Soviet air defenses will have the potential for overcoming many existing technical deficiencies by the mid-1980s. It might be possible for the Soviets to overcome these deficiencies somewhat earlier with a very high level of effort. If Soviet deployments are at the rates we think probable, bomber penetration of Soviet defenses would be considerably more difficult in the mid-1980s than it would be today.

—For defense against short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) in flight, one Soviet SAM system now under development might have some capability. While there are uncertainties about the characteristics of this system, we believe that, if it has any capability against SRAMs, engagements would be at short ranges with low reliability. We believe that the Soviets will not have an effective defense against the SRAM by the mid-1980s.

—For defense against low-altitude cruise missiles in flight, current Soviet low-altitude SAMs and future air defense systems would have some capabilities. Their effectiveness will depend on their specific characteristics, their numbers, and their deployment patterns. We are uncertain about the degree of protection that could be achieved against low-altitude cruise missiles in the mid-1980s, but we believe it would be low. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes, however, that the Soviet SAM system under development might have capabilities permitting deployment to provide some limited terminal defense against cruise missiles for approximately half the estimated target groupings in the USSR in the mid-1980s.

The combination of US air attack forces will continue to be more difficult to defend against than any one of its elements alone. The air defense problems which the Soviets now face would be complicated
even further by US deployment of advanced bombers and cruise missiles. US penetration tactics and the degradation of defenses by ballistic missile strikes would continue to weigh heavily against the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses. We cannot, however, assess the full effects of these and other operational factors.

Recent developments point to modest but steady improvement in Soviet ASW systems and continued growth in their numbers. The future effectiveness of Soviet defenses against SSBNs on patrol will depend in large part on how successful the Soviets are in detecting and tracking SSBNs at sea. Improved US SSBNs and greatly expanded SSBN operating areas will further compound the Soviet problem. From our understanding of the technologies involved and of the R & D programs in the US and the USSR, we believe that the Soviets have little potential for overcoming SSBN detection and tracking problems in broad ocean areas. This judgment must be qualified, however, because of gaps in our knowledge of some technical aspects of potential sensor developments. On the basis of evidence now available, we believe that Soviet capabilities against SSBNs in confined waters will improve during the period of this Estimate, but that Soviet ASW capabilities will fall short of being able to prevent most US SSBNs on station from launching their missiles.

Soviet civil defense preparations could have a significant impact on both Soviet and US assessments of the likely outcome of a nuclear conflict. The Soviets probably believe that civil defense measures contribute to giving the USSR a chance to survive as a national entity and to be in a better position than the US after a nuclear exchange. The priorities of the Soviet program evidently are: first, to assure the continuity of government by protecting the leadership; second, to provide for the continuity of important economic functions and the protection of essential workers; and, last, to protect the nonessential part of the population.

There are gaps in our knowledge of the civil defense program. Our tentative judgment is that, under optimum conditions which included an adequate period of warning and evacuation, Soviet civil defenses would assure survival of a large percentage of the leadership, reduce urban casualties to a small percentage, and give the Soviets a good chance of sustaining the population with essential supplies. With minimal warning, some key leaders would probably survive, but the urban population would suffer high casualties and the chances of adequately supplying survivors would be poor. The Soviets probably do not have a highly optimistic view about the effectiveness of their present civil defenses. Even under the most favorable conditions, they probably would expect a breakdown of the economy and, under the worst conditions, catastrophic human casualties as well.
Our evidence of Soviet civil defense preparation indicates a continuing, steady program rather than a crash effort. Because of the gaps in our knowledge, however, we cannot make a confident estimate of its pace and future effectiveness.

The Department of State believes that the Soviet civil defense program is seen by the Soviet leadership primarily as a prudent hedge against the possibility of attack by a nuclear-armed adversary. The Department believes that these Soviet civil defense efforts will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange and will not undermine the deterrent value of US strategic attack forces. It further believes that, at the present time, the scope of the civil defense program does not indicate Soviet strategic objectives beyond maintenance of rough equivalence with the US.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe that the impact of Soviet war-survival efforts upon the US–USSR strategic balance is greater than can be inferred from the foregoing discussion of the Soviet civil defense program. In their view, the Soviets see their civil and passive defense program as an essential element in the achievement of the capability to wage intercontinental nuclear war, should one occur, and survive with resources sufficient to dominate the postwar period. These agencies believe that this program will have a definite and increasing impact on US–USSR strategic balance assessments in the years ahead. Further, they believe the Soviets will attempt to enhance their influence, particularly in the Third World and Europe, by capitalizing on real and perceived improvements in their war-waging capabilities. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that the strategic balance already has been altered in a major way by civil defense and other measures the Soviets have carried out thus far.

Other Considerations

Some of the Soviets’ present programs reflect concerns that US programs would affect their own strategic position adversely. Examples are ICBM silo hardening and the deployment of long-range SLBMs. We are uncertain about the implications of others. The mobile IRBM and ICBM programs, for example, would enable the Soviets to place more of their missiles on launchers less vulnerable to attack. By their continuing efforts to improve ABM technology, the Soviets could put themselves in a position to deploy additional ABM defenses if the ABM Treaty were abrogated. Such programs probably represent Soviet hedges against future US threats as well as deterrents to US withdrawal from strategic arms limitation agreements. They could also represent efforts to give the Soviet leaders the future option to break out of such limitations if they concluded that the situation warranted.
A SALT TWO agreement based on the Vladivostok accord would confront the Soviets with difficult choices and trade-offs between new and existing systems within an aggregate ceiling on delivery vehicles. It would limit the more extreme possibilities for growth in Soviet missile throw weight and number of missile RVs. In the absence of a SALT TWO agreement, the Soviets would probably increase their intercontinental delivery forces moderately; it is possible that they would increase them considerably. They would not, however, expect quantitative competition alone to alter the strategic balance significantly. They have evidently come to recognize that the strategic environment in the 1980s will be most significantly affected by the quality of the forces deployed by the two sides. Their progress in this area will be largely independent of SALT TWO.

Soviet R&D programs are consistent with a desire both to avoid slipping behind the US and to gain the lead in the technology of strategic offensive and defensive forces, particularly if US programs falter. We continue to examine closely Soviet R&D programs and prospects for major advances that might seriously erode US deterrent capabilities. We give particular attention to R&D applicable to directed-energy weapons for use in air and missile defense and to the detection and tracking of US ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets are working actively in both fields, and there are gaps in our knowledge of this work. The available evidence, together with our appreciation of the physical, engineering, and operational hurdles which must be overcome, leads us to rate as small the chances that the Soviets can sharply alter the strategic balance through such technological advances in the next 10 years. But Soviet efforts in these fields merit very close watching.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believes that the Soviets are significantly ahead of the West in the technologies applicable to particle-beam-weapons research, and that the Soviets could be operating a prototype charged-particle-beam system by 1985.

Prospects for the Strategic Environment

The long time period of this Estimate and the gaps in our understanding and information about aspects of Soviet capabilities require that judgments about the future strategic environment be made with varying degrees of certainty. We conclude that:

—The strength of Soviet offensive forces for intercontinental attack will continue to increase. It may be at its greatest relative to US programmed forces in the early 1980s. In subsequent years, some of the earlier Soviet gains will be eroded, assuming that US forces develop as

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now programmed and Soviet forces continue to develop along present lines.
—Soviet ICBMs will pose an increasing threat to US missile silos, but Soviet forces will almost certainly remain unable to prevent most US alert bombers and SLBMs at sea from being launched. Soviet defenses will almost certainly remain penetrable by missile and bomber weapons.
—Soviet forces will be able to inflict massive damage on the US in either initial or retaliatory attacks. It is extremely unlikely that Soviet forces will be able to prevent massive damage to the USSR from initial or retaliatory US attacks.
—There are critical uncertainties, however, about the degree to which the Soviets in the 1980s would be able to reduce human casualties and limit damage to those functions and facilities which the leadership would consider essential to the survival of their society.

[Omitted here is the summary estimate.]

171. Intelligence Report of Team B


SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
REPORT OF TEAM B

NOTE

This document is one part of an experiment in competitive analysis undertaken by the DCI on behalf of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent either coordinated National Intelligence or the views of the Director of Central Intelligence.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The mandate of Team “B” was to take an independent look at the data that go into the preparation of NIE 11–3/8, and on that basis determine whether a good case could be made that Soviet strategic objec-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency File, Box 17, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Chronological File. Top Secret. This is the first of the three Team B reports. The other two—“Soviet ICBM Accuracy: An Alternative View” and “Soviet Low Altitude Air Defense: An Alternative View,” respectively—are ibid.
atives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore implicitly more threatening to U.S. security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs. If the answer to this question was positive, they were further to indicate what accounts for the NIEs unsatisfactory assessments. Members of Team “B” were deliberately selected from among experienced political and military analysts of Soviet affairs known to take a more somber view of the Soviet strategic threat than that accepted as the intelligence community’s consensus. However, the Team made every endeavor to look objectively at the available evidence and to provide a responsible, non-partisan evaluation.

No attempt has been made in this Report to arrive at anything like a net assessment: U.S. capabilities are not touched upon except to give perspective to certain Soviet programs. The Report concentrates on what it is that the Russians are striving for, without trying to assess their chances of success. Nor has Team “B” sought to produce a full-fledged counterpart to NIE 11–3/8, covering the same range of topics: its contents are selective, as befits the experimental nature of the Team’s assignment. Failure of the Team to address itself to any given subject should not be taken to mean that it necessarily concurs with the NIEs’ treatment of it.

A certain amount of attention is given to the “track record” of the NIEs’ in dealing with Soviet strategic objectives, in some cases going back to the early 1960’s. The purpose of these historical analyses is not recrimination, which, given the Team’s advantage of hindsight, would be pointless as well as unfair; rather, Team “B” found certain persistent flaws in the NIEs that do not disappear with the change of the teams responsible for drafting them. It concluded, therefore, that only by tracking over a period of time NIE assessments on any given subject is it possible fully and convincingly to determine what methodological misconceptions cause their most serious errors of judgment.

The Report consists of Three parts. Part One seeks to clarify the assumptions and judgments that underpin NIE evaluations of Soviet strategic objectives. Part Two is a collection of ten papers which analyze critically specific Soviet efforts in the field of offensive and defensive forces covered in NIE 11–3/8. Part Three is a summary overview of current Soviet strategic objectives, as perceived by Team “B”. An Annex traces the NIE treatments between 1962 and 1975 of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Report is preceded by a Summary.

It needs stressing that the present Report was prepared in some haste, members of Team “B” being allotted twelve weeks (and in the case of some of them, less than that) in which to digest a vast amount of material and prepare a finished draft. Given the complexity of the subject, this time clearly was insufficient and the resultant product suffers from flaws. Even so, Team “B” feels confident that its criticisms,
analyses, and recommendations ought to contribute to the improve-
ment of the treatment of Soviet strategic objectives in future National
Intelligence Estimates.

In the preparation of this Report, Team “B” heard briefings by the
following experts to whom it wishes to express its gratitude: Mr. Fritz
Ermarth, Mr. Richard B. Foster, Maj. General George Keegan, Dr.
Sherman Kent, Dr. Andrew Marshall, and Mr. Gordon Negus. Capt.
John P. Prisley (USN, Ret.) contributed to the preparation of the
analysis of Soviet ASW efforts in Part Two.

Team leader : Professor Richard Pipes
Associates : Professor William Van Cleave
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, (Ret.)
Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation
General John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.)
Advisory Panel : Ambassador Foy Kohler
The Honorable Paul Nitze
Ambassador Seymour Weiss
Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF
Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and Disarma-
mment Agency

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SUMMARY

Team “B” found that the NIE 11–3/8 series through 1975 has substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope, and implicit threat.

This misperception has been due in considerable measure to concentration on the so-called hard data, that is data collected by technical means, and the resultant tendency to interpret these data in a manner reflecting basic U.S. concepts while slighting or misinterpreting the large body of “soft” data concerning Soviet strategic concepts. The failure to take into account or accurately to assess such soft data sources has resulted in the NIEs not addressing themselves systematically to the broader political purposes which underlie and explain Soviet strategic objectives. Since, however, the political context cannot be altogether avoided, the drafters of the NIEs have fallen into the habit of injecting into key judgments of the executive summaries impressionistic assessments based on “mirror-imaging,” i.e., the attribution to Soviet decision-makers of such forms of behavior as might be expected from their U.S. counterparts under analogous circumstances. This conceptual flaw is perhaps the single gravest cause of the misunderstanding of Soviet strategic objectives found in past and current NIEs.

A fundamental methodological flaw is the imposition on Soviet strategic thinking of a framework of conflicting dichotomies which may make sense in the U.S. context but does not correspond to either Russian doctrine or Russian practice: for example, war vs. peace, confrontations vs. détente, offense vs. defense, strategic vs. peripheral, nuclear vs. conventional, arms limitations vs. arms buildup, and so on. In Soviet thinking, these are complementary or mutually supporting concepts, and they by no means exclude one another.
One effect of “mirror-imaging” is that the NIEs have ignored the fact that Soviet thinking is Clausewitzian in character, that is, that it conceives in terms of “grand strategy” for which military weapons, strategic ones included, represent only one element in a varied arsenal of means of persuasion and coercion, many of them non-military in nature.

Another effect of “mirror-imaging” has been the tendency to misconstrue the manner in which Soviet leaders perceive the utility of those strategic weapons (i.e., strategic nuclear forces) to which the NIEs do specifically address themselves. The drafters of NIE 11–3/8 seem to believe that the Soviet leaders view strategic nuclear weapons much as do their U.S. analogues. Since in the United States nuclear war is generally regarded as an act of mutual suicide that can be rational only as a deterrent threat, it is assumed that the USSR looks at the matter in the same way. The primary concern of Soviet leaders is seen to be the securing of an effective deterrent to protect the Soviet Union from U.S. attack and in accord with the Western concept of deterrence. The NIEs focus on the threat of massive nuclear war with the attendant destruction and ignore the political utility of nuclear forces in assuring compliance with Soviet will; they ignore the fact that by eliminating the political credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, the Soviets seek to create an environment in which other instruments of their grand strategy, including overwhelming regional dominance in conventional arms, can better be brought to bear; they fail to acknowledge that the Soviets believe that the best way to paralyze U.S. strategic capabilities is by assuring that the outcome of any nuclear exchange will be as favorable to the Soviet Union as possible; and, finally they ignore the possibility that the Russians seriously believe that if, for whatever reason, deterrence were to fail, they could resort to the use of nuclear weapons to fight and win a war. The NIEs tendency to view deterrence as an alternative to a warfighting capability rather than as complementary to it, is in the opinion of Team “B”, a grave and dangerous flaw in their evaluations of Soviet strategic objectives.

Other manifestations of “mirror-imaging” are the belief that the Russians are anxious to shift the competition with the United States to other than military arenas so as to be able to transfer more resources to the civilian sector; that they entertain only defensive not offensive plans; that their prudence and concern over U.S. reactions are overriding; that their military programs are essentially a reaction to U.S. programs and not self-generated. The NIEs concede that strategic superiority is something the Soviet Union would not spurn if it were attainable; but they also feel (without providing evidence for this critical conclusion) that Russia’s leaders regard such superiority as an unrealistic goal and do not actively pursue it.
Analysis of Soviet past and present behavior, combined with what is known of Soviet political and military doctrines, indicates that these judgments are seriously flawed. The evidence suggests that the Soviet leaders are first and foremost offensively rather than defensively minded. They think not in terms of nuclear stability, mutual assured destruction, or strategic sufficiency, but of an effective nuclear war-fighting capability. They believe that the probability of a general nuclear war can be reduced by building up one’s own strategic forces, but that it cannot be altogether eliminated, and that therefore one has to be prepared for such a war as if it were unavoidable and be ready to strike first if it appears imminent. There is no evidence that the Soviet leadership is ready, let alone eager, to reduce the military budget in order to raise the country’s standard of living. Soviet Russia’s habitual caution and sensitivity to U.S. reactions are due less to an inherent prudence than to a realistic assessment of the existing global “correlation of forces;” should this correlation (or the Soviet leaders’ perception of it) change in their favor, they could be expected to act with greater confidence and less concern for U.S. sensitivities. In fact, there are disturbing signs that the latter development is already taking place. Recent evidence of a Soviet willingness to take increased risks (e.g., by threatening unilateral military intervention in the Middle East in October 1973, and supporting the Angola adventure) may well represent harbingers of what lies ahead.

Soviet doctrine, confirmed by the actions of its leadership over many decades has emphasized—and continues to emphasize—two important points: the first is unflagging persistence and patience in using the available means favorably to mold all aspects of the correlation of forces (social, psychological, political, economic and military) so as to strengthen themselves and to weaken any prospective challengers to their power; the second is closely to evaluate the evolving correlation of forces and to act in accordance with that evaluation. When the correlation is unfavorable, the Party should act with great caution and confuse the enemy in order to gain time to take actions necessary to reverse trends in the correlation of forces. When the correlation of forces is favorable, the Party is under positive obligation to take those actions necessary to realize and nail down potential gains, lest the correlation of

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2 In response to Israel’s violations of the United Nations ceasefire resolution ending the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Brezhnev, on October 24, 1973, sent Nixon a letter threatening unilateral Soviet intervention into the conflict to enforce the ceasefire provisions. “I’ll say it straight,” he told Nixon, “If you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” Brezhnev’s letter to Nixon is Document 267 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973.

forces subsequently change to a less favorable position. (It is noteworthy that in recent months one of the major themes emphasized in statements by the Soviet leadership to internal audiences urges the “realization” of the advances brought about by the favorable evolution of forces resulting from détente and the positive shift in the military balance.)

We are impressed by the scope and intensity of Soviet military and related programs (e.g., proliferation and hardening of its command, control and communications network and civil defense). The size and nature of the Soviet effort which involves considerable economic and political costs and risks, if long continued in the face of frustrated economic expectations within their own bloc and the possibility that the West may come to perceive the necessity of reversing current trends before they become irreversible, lead to the possibility of a relatively short term threat cresting, say, in 1980 to 1983, as well as the more obvious long range threat.

The draft NIE’s do not appear to take any such shorter range threat seriously and do not indicate that the threat itself, or its possible timing, have been examined with the care which we believe the subject deserves.

Although in the past two years the NIEs have taken a more realistic view of the Soviet military buildup, and even conceded the possibility that its ultimate objective may well exceed the requirements of deterrence, they still incline to play down the Soviet commitment to a war-winning capability. Three additional factors (beside those mentioned above) may account for this attitude:

1. Political pressures and considerations. On some occasions the drafters of NIE display an evident inclination to minimize the Soviet strategic buildup because of its implications for détente, SAL negotiations, congressional sentiments as well as for certain U.S. forces. This is not to say that any of the judgments which seem to reflect policy support are demonstrably directed judgments: rather they appear to derive mainly from a strong and understandable awareness on the part of the NIE authors of the policy issues at stake.

2. Inter-agency rivalry. Some members of Team “B” feel that the inclination of the NIEs to downplay military threats is in significant measure due to bureaucratic rivalry between the military and civilian intelligence agencies; the latter, being in control of the NIE language, have a reputation for tempering the pessimistic views of military intelligence with more optimistic judgments.

3. The habit of viewing each Soviet weapons’ program, or other development, in isolation from the others. The NIEs tend to assess each Soviet development as in and of itself, even when it is evident that the Russians are pursuing a variety of means to attain the same objective. As a result, with each individual development minimized or dismissed as being in itself of no decisive importance, the cumulative effect of the buildup is missed.
Analyses carried out by members of Team “B” (and presented in Part Two of this Report) of NIE treatments of certain key features of the Soviet strategic effort indicate the extent to which faulty method and biases of an institutional nature affect its evaluations. This holds true of the NIE treatment of Soviet strategic offensive forces (ICBMs and SLBMs); of its views of the alleged economic constraints on Soviet strategic forces; of its assessment of Soviet civil defense and military hardening programs; of its interpretation of the strategic implications of Soviet mobile missiles and the Backfire bomber; of its evaluation of Soviet R&D in the fields of anti-submarine, anti-satellite, and anti-ballistic missile defenses; and of its perception of Soviet non-central nuclear systems. In each instance it was found that through NIE 11–3/8–75, the NIEs have tended (though not in the same degree) to minimize the seriousness and success of the respective Soviet efforts, and (by the injection of de facto net assessments) to downgrade the threat which they pose to U.S. security.

In formulating its own estimate of Soviet strategic objectives, Team “B” divided it into two aspects: objectives in the broad, “grand strategic” sense, as they are perceived by the Soviet leadership; and objectives in the more narrow, military sense, as defined by NIE 11–3/8.

As concerns the first, Team “B” agreed that all the evidence points to an undeviating Soviet commitment to what is euphemistically called “the worldwide triumph of socialism” but in fact connotes global Soviet hegemony. Soviet actions give no grounds on which to dismiss this objective as rhetorical exhortation, devoid of operative meaning. The risks consequent to the existence of strategic nuclear weapons have not altered this ultimate objective, although they have influenced the strategy employed to pursue it. “Peaceful coexistence” (better known in the West as détente) is a grand strategy adapted to the age of nuclear weapons. It entails a twin thrust: (1) stress on all sorts of political, economic, ideological, and other non-military instrumentalities to penetrate and weaken the “capitalist” zone, while at the same time strengthening Russia’s hold on the “socialist” camp; and (2) an intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces of all sorts, not moderated either by the West’s self-imposed restraints or by SALT.

In its relations with the United States, which it views as the central bastion of the enemy camp, the Soviet leadership has had as its main intermediate goals America’s isolation from its allies as well as the separation of the OECD nations from the Third World, which, it believes, will severely undermine “capitalism’s” political, economic, and ultimately, military might.

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4 Document 158.
With regard to China, while the spectre of a two-front war and intense ideological competition have to an important degree limited the Soviet Union’s freedom of action in pursuance of their goals against the West, it has not proved an unlimited or insuperable limitation. Further, given current trends in the growth of Soviet military power, the U.S. cannot confidently anticipate that concern with China will deter the USSR from increasingly aggressive policies toward the West.

As concerns the more narrowly defined military strategic objectives, Team "B" feels the USSR strives for effective strategic superiority in all the branches of the military, nuclear forces included. For historic reasons, as well as for reasons inherent in the Soviet system, the Soviet leadership places unusual reliance on coercion as a regular instrument of policy at home as well as abroad. It likes to have a great deal of coercive capability at its disposal at all times, and it likes for it to come in a rich mix so that it can be optimally structured for any contingency that may arise. After some apparent division of opinion intermittently in the 1960’s, the Soviet leadership seems to have concluded that nuclear war could be fought and won. The scope and vigor of Soviet strategic programs leave little reasonable doubt that Soviet leaders are indeed determined to achieve the maximum possible measure of strategic superiority over the U.S. Their military doctrine is measured not in Western terms of assured destruction but in those of a war-fighting and war-winning capability, it also posits a clear and substantial Soviet predominance following a general nuclear conflict. We believe that the Russians place a high priority on the attainment of such a capability and that they may feel that it is within their grasp. If, however, that capability should not prove attainable, they intend to secure so substantial a nuclear war-fighting advantage that, as a last resort, they would be less deterred than we from initiating the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, both détente and SALT are seen by Soviet leaders not as cooperative efforts to ensure global peace, but as means more effectively to compete with the United States.

[Omitted here are Parts One through Three and the Annex.]
172. Minutes of National Security Council Meeting

Washington, January 13, 1977, 10:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Semiannual Review of the Intelligence Community

PRINCIPALS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Chief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway (Acting for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

OTHER ATTENDEES
White House
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

NSC Staff
Samuel M. Hoskinson, Director for Intelligence Coordination

DOD
William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Intelligence Community Staff
Fritz Ermarth, Office of Performance, Evaluation & Improvement

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to national security policy.]

President Ford: I have read the NIE and Team B assessment. George would you comment for us.

Director Bush: The competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time and I certainly did not think it would go public. But now I feel I


2 NIE 11–3/8–76 is the attachment to Document 170.

3 See Document 171. Ford briefly discussed competitive analysis during his January 4 meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft: "The President: I am concerned about what is happening. What is this NIE fracas about? [Scowcroft described how it had gotten started. The President and Secretary Kissinger were both critical of the way Team B had been set up.]" Brackets in the original memorandum of conversation, which is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 21, January 4, 1977—Ford, Kissinger.
have been had. A former general officer has gone public, even before
the experiment is finished. I have to recommend that the approach not
be institutionalized. The Estimate itself presents certain dissents of the
Air Force and others whose views parallel those of Team B.

Basically this was an experiment to see if one viewpoint could
stand up factually and it worked well in some areas like ICBM accu-
rracy. There was no question of intelligence analysts knuckling under to
Team B. The estimators stood their ground. In short the original con-
cept was valid but failed in practice.

President Ford: I understand that Allen Dulles\(^4\) made a similar
process work. But now the climate has changed and you get credit for
leaks. This is damned discouraging to me. I endorsed the PFIAB experi-
ment. The leaks are a disparagement of the quality of those people in-
volved and are unforgivable.

Vice President Rockefeller: The good side is that the American
people have been educated.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no real problems with the estimate.
However, I think an across the board alternatives approach is very
risky. I could find a board of Nobel Prize winners to construct any alter-
native analysis conceivable. Unless you construct both the hard and
soft lines it can be used by someone for their own self-benefit. The real
problem in the future is not the hardliners, it’s the others.

Director Bush: I am against institutionalizing the alternative
analysis approach. The issue has been caught up in a lot of polemics—
some of which I don’t understand—but I recommend that the NSC not
institutionalize.

President Ford: The most discouraging aspect is the character of
the people who leaked. Unforgivable.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Bush’s idea of presenting differing views was
good but like Henry says the scope must be more narrow. On some
subjects it is useful to have differing views. The leaks must stop. They
inhibit the whole intelligence process.

President Ford: In the present atmosphere leakers become martyrs.
There isn’t much you can do.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The NIE is a good one. The only question I
have is how we tie it to policy judgments or make it a basis for policy
rather than using it as policy. There are some net assessment judgments
involved and they should drive decisions. There should be a very seri-
ous live review of these matters in the future.

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\(^4\) Allen Welsh Dulles, DCI from 1953 to 1961.
General Scowcroft: We have done a quick comparison with the 1972 estimate\(^5\) and it has turned out to be very accurate.

President Ford: Are there any other comments?

Vice President Rockefeller: Only to say again that you did a superb job last night . . .\(^6\)

Secretary Kissinger: The average person doesn’t understand the turmoil you faced in the world when you took over. Now we have total tranquility in the world and peace!


\(^6\) A reference to Ford’s State of the Union Message, see Document 132.

173. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Bush) to Recipients of National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–77\(^1\)


1. The production of NIE 11–3/8–76\(^2\) has disclosed a wide range of views within the Intelligence Community on the question of Soviet objectives for strategic forces, a question on which very little hard evidence is available. NIE 11–4–77, forwarded herewith, examines the broader question of Soviet strategic objectives overall, and is not intended to supersede NIE 11–3/8. NIE 11–4 uses a presentational technique different from that of 11–3/8. It is intended to help the reader understand the argument, rather than to resolve it.

2. For this reason NIE 11–4–77 is an unusual estimate. It presents two general lines of argument without requiring the NFIB principals to define their positions. Obviously, within these two general positions there are differences of emphasis among the individual agencies, but I believe that to state these would be more likely to hamper the reader’s basic understanding of this important issue than to assist it.

George Bush

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R00603A: O/DDI Policy Files, Box 7, NIE 11–4–77: Final with Distribution List. Secret. Bush’s memorandum and the estimate’s Key Judgments section are also published in the CIA’s Intentions and Capabilities, pp. 391–395.

\(^2\) The attachment to Document 170.
Attachment

National Intelligence Estimate


[Omitted here are the Table of Contents and the Foreword.]

SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

KEY JUDGMENTS

A. This Estimate addresses two closely related questions:

—Do the Soviet leaders now base policy—and the programs and activities which flow therefrom—on a belief that the USSR will continue to make substantial gains toward a position of overall dominance in the world? Do they now expect to achieve such a position in the next ten years?

—Have they come to believe—or will they soon—that aggressive actions on their part carry lower risks than earlier, and that these risks have become low enough to be acceptable to prudent yet ambitious men?

B. There is in the Intelligence Community agreement on some matters relevant to these questions and disagreement on others. Among the areas of agreement:

—The aims of Soviet global policy are far-reaching. The Soviet leaders’ basic perception of the world still posits a struggle of two great systems, in which theirs will ultimately prevail. This outlook is reinforced by both defensive and expansionist impulses derived from Russia’s history and boosted by the remarkable growth of Soviet power and prestige since World War II. Neither in its foreign policy nor its military policy does the USSR aim at long-term equilibrium between the two systems; instead it seeks a continual enhancement of its own power and influence.

—In prosecuting the struggle on multiple fronts, the Soviets see military power as a key instrument which can be used to attain strategic objectives without war.

—The Soviets have never accepted the concept of mutual assured destruction, with its connotation that some finite level of force is suffi-

3 Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the NSA, ERDA, and the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury participated in the preparation of this estimate. The DCI submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the NFIB except the representatives of the FBI and the Department of the Treasury, who abstained.

4 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force believes the frequent use of such words as fear, anxiety, worry, caution, and concern to describe the state of mind of the Soviet leadership is overdone. He warns the reader that he should not let this excessive use of these words distract from the obvious determination and drive of the Soviet leadership to achieve strategic military superiority. [Footnote in the original.]
cient for deterrence, although they recognize mutual deterrence as a present reality that will be very difficult to alter. Moreover, trying to forge ahead of the US and at the same time fearful of falling behind it, they are little disposed to adjust their military programs unilaterally so as to foster strategic stability, or to moderate them lest they provoke US program reactions.

—The Soviets aim at advantage in their military forces. They continue to press forward with a broad and vigorous program for improving their military capabilities to support their political objectives.

—The striking thing about these programs is not that they have accelerated in the last few years but that they have grown at a more or less steady pace for two decades. We expect this growth to continue. Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent nor the achievement of acknowledged strategic parity has caused the effort to falter. Soviet military doctrine calls for capabilities to fight, survive, and win a nuclear war.

—At the same time, the Soviets worry that they may fall behind in the qualitative military competition, and this further reinforces the priority of their research and development effort.

—In the struggle, they are conscious of weaknesses on their own side, particularly those arising from economic and technological deficiencies and conflict with China. They are working to overcome these weaknesses, but they do not presently expect to remove them in the next decade.

—On the other hand, beyond their obvious military strength, they credit themselves with other important assets: disciplined policymaking, social cohesion, and perseverance.

C. Among our major disagreements:

—Some judge that the Soviets are persuaded that the US and the West, despite periodic rebounds, are in a long-term decline that will be reflected in a flagging of political resolve, military efforts, and economic growth. Others think the Soviets hope for this but do not count on it, and indeed may think that US and Western military effort is again on the rise.

—Some believe that, in improving their military forces, the Soviets pursue the acquisition of a war-winning capability as a realistic objective. Others believe that the Soviets have no realistic expectation of attaining such a capability.

These disagreements lead to conclusions that, while not diametrically opposed, present significant differences of emphasis.

D. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet view, the global correlation of forces has in the 1970s shifted in the USSR’s favor and that this trend is likely to continue. The US and its Allies have entered upon a new stage in the “general crisis of capitalism” that will prove irreversible even if there are periodic recoveries. The problems of the Soviet economy and the dispute with China are serious but, on the plane of international competition, not debilitating. In this situation, the Soviets aim to achieve the degree of military superiority over the West needed to permit them to wage, survive as a national entity, and win a
conventional or nuclear war. The Soviets see their improvements in survivability and in counterforce capabilities, air defense and ABM development, and broad hardening and civil defense programs in particular, and their improvements in conventional forces in general, as all contributing to this objective. While it is uncertain when the Soviets expect to gain such a decisive strategic superiority, they view this objective as practical and attainable in a programmed fashion. They expect to move closer to this goal over the next ten years. This trend, they believe, will increasingly enable them to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives, thereby advancing the Soviet objective of gaining a position of overall dominance in the world.

E. Another line of argument holds that, in Soviet thinking, the question is much more open. It too perceives an increased Soviet confidence, stemming much more from the achievement of parity in strategic forces than from other, nonmilitary trends. But this analysis holds that the Soviet leaders give greater weight than the preceding argument allows to the handicaps represented by the USSR’s economic and technological weaknesses and its conflict with China. It believes that they attribute greater resilience to the capitalist economies and do not discount the recent turnaround in US defense spending as a short-term phenomenon. In this view, Soviet military programming and research is bent upon keeping pace with that of its adversaries as well as seeking margins of advantage wherever feasible. But Moscow does not have a realistic expectation of achieving a war-winning capability, particularly in the next decade. Expecting Soviet foreign policy to be assertive, this analysis nonetheless holds that Moscow’s experience with the complexities of the external world does not at this point lead the Soviets to expect a series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will cumulate into a finally decisive shift in the struggle. In short, this analysis attributes to the Soviets not a programmatic design for military superiority but a more pragmatic effort to achieve advantages where they can, and thus a more patient approach to continuing tough competition together with a dedication to high and steady levels of effort in the elements of power. Moscow’s calculus of the risks attending forward action may decline, but this has not yet happened and, if it does, the process will be slow and subject to cautious testing.

F. This Estimate is obviously not a net assessment, nor our judgment of the likely outcome in East-West competition. It is a summary of the range of Community perceptions of Soviet objectives and Soviet views of the prospects for significant gains in this competition. We agree on a wide range of Soviet objectives short of decisive military superiority over the West. Our differences are over the Soviet leaders’ perception of the feasibility of achieving such superiority. Finally, we agree that Soviet risk-taking abroad in any specific situation will con-
continue to be governed by Moscow’s perception of interests and power at the particular time and place.

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the strategic objectives underlying Soviet military and foreign policy, with particular attention to the next ten years.

THE ESTIMATE

I. Introduction

1. The aims of Soviet global policy are far-reaching. The Soviet leaders’ basic perception of the world still posits a struggle of two great systems, in which theirs will ultimately prevail. This ideological outlook is reinforced by both defensive and expansionist impulses derived from Russia’s history and boosted by the remarkable growth of Soviet power and prestige since World War II. Neither in its foreign policy nor its military policy does the USSR aim at long-term equilibrium between the two systems; instead it seeks a continual enhancement of its own power and influence.

2. If there is disagreement in the Intelligence Community, it is not over this basic judgment. Nor is there real dispute over the important corollary that the Soviet leaders are prudent men, prone to minimize risks and to seek to advance only when they judge the chance of success to be high. Current disagreements focus instead on two sets of questions:

—Has the last decade, to the Soviet leaders, been a watershed, a period of decisive change in the competition of systems? Do they believe that their programs and activities will lead in a systematic fashion to the achievement of military-strategic superiority and a position of overall dominance in the world? Do they expect to achieve this position within the next ten years?5

—Translating this problem into the sphere of international behavior, do the Soviets judge—or will they soon—that the USSR can push its interests harder without facing higher risks? Granting their prudence, have they come to believe—or will they soon—that aggressive actions on their part carry less risk than earlier, and in fact now have become low enough to be acceptable to prudent yet ambitious men?

3. In this Estimate, we consider the major factors that enter into Soviet calculations of these matters, touching on the Soviet appraisal of the elements of what they habitually refer to as the “correlation of forces,” mainly military and economic strength, political organization

5 The Senior Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Development Administration believes that the crucial issue is not whether the Soviets “succeed” or “fail” to achieve their objectives within then years, but rather whether they make substantial gains toward their longer-range strategic objectives. [Footnote in the original.]
and will, and social cohesion and morale. A final section seeks to define, in the light of this analysis, Soviet strategic objectives and to illuminate differences of judgment on this question.

II. Major Factors Entering into Soviet Calculations

The Soviet View of the USSR’s Internal Situation

4. As they survey their own country, the Soviets see certain strengths and weaknesses. These factors gain meaning for their external outlook and objectives largely as they relate to Western strengths and weaknesses.

—The Soviet leaders regard their political system as strong and stable. They view political dissidence as an embarrassment to their foreign policy, not a challenge to their rule. They see nationalist sentiments among the minorities as a more serious problem, but are confident of their ability to cope with it. Succession politics may come to preoccupy them, but they do not expect succession to pose a crisis for the system.

—Beneath this genuine feeling of confidence there seems to lie an abiding worry that the Soviet system, while strong, may also be brittle. Such matters as the harping on the legitimacy of party rule, the very pervasiveness of control mechanisms, and the lively fears about the penetration of Western influence suggests a continuing anxiety about how the system might stand up to crisis. As they contemplate Eastern Europe, Soviet fears of this sort are doubtless much stronger. These concerns might be an inhibiting factor in any Soviet decision about initiating major war.6

6 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior intelligence officers of the Military Departments, and the Senior Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Development Administration believe that this formulation overstates Soviet concerns about the brittleness of their system and the extent to which fear of East European instability might inhibit the USSR in initiating a major war. They believe that the Soviet leaders recognize that their system, while strong, is also faced with internal differences and difficulties, and that stress could weaken the system. Therefore, over the years, these leaders have evolved a number of control mechanisms—including party discipline and regulations circumscribing Western influence—to ensure that these potentially debilitating elements do not become major hindrances to the USSR in the pursuit of its objectives. As the Soviets contemplate Eastern Europe, their concerns are doubtless much stronger—they have on occasion resorted to drastic measures to maintain control and are pushing economic, political, and military measures to tie the East European states closer to the USSR. All these factors would be reviewed carefully to ensure full control prior to a Soviet decision on any major action that could lead to war.

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence believes that problems of dissent and disaffection are regarded as extremely important by the Soviets, affecting as they do not only the party leadership’s political control, but Soviet relations with the West and with fraternal Communist parties as well. He believes, however, that in comparison to other inhibitions which would have to be overcome before taking so cataclysmic a step as initiating a major war, concerns about internal dissent would not have major significance. Indeed, he questions to what extent dissent in any form would survive if the USSR were placed on a war footing. He agrees that the Soviets would be more affected by misgivings about the reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies than by concerns about their own population. [Footnote in the original.]
The Soviets regard their system as giving them a substantial competitive advantage. Its rigorous centralization permits little debate and altogether excludes challenge from outside a small political elite. This, they believe, makes for steady, purposeful decisionmaking and discipline and coordination in the execution of policy. In particular, they regard their system as able to sustain the priority of defense at present and perhaps even higher levels of effort.

The Soviet leaders do not discount their economic problems. They know that their agriculture is backward and that industrial productivity is low. They acknowledge a general lag in the application of advanced technology in the economic sector and fear that it may be growing. The Soviets see these problems as becoming more complex and more difficult to solve and, while they expect a moderate rate of growth, they no longer speak of overtaking the leading capitalist economies in a stated period of time.

5. Particular importance attaches to the question of whether the Soviet economy can sustain current or higher rates of growth in military spending in coming years. In addition to the general economic problems mentioned above, modern military spending is increasingly driven by the technological complexity and quality requirements of advanced weapons, and these are, in general, areas in which the Soviet economy does not enjoy an advantage over the US. The Soviet leaders worry about this problem. But it seems clear from their present military programming, and from the research and development efforts that herald production and deployment of future systems, that they do not now feel compelled to reduce the priority of defense for the sake of other economic goals. Their concentration upon military power is so strong that only severe and prolonged economic stringencies could force them to relax this priority. On this matter, the shared background and values of Soviet political and military leaders leave little room for internal dispute.

The Soviet View of Military Power and War

6. For the Soviet leaders, ideology legitimizes all means, including military means, in the prosecution of the political struggle; it also posits the danger of imperialist attack. Force plays a central role in Soviet thinking, and military power bulks large in Soviet policy. The Soviets explicitly state that their military doctrine—which they define as “official views and positions determining the direction of military development and the preparation of the nation and its armed forces for war”—is premised upon the notion that war is an instrument of policy, and

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7 The Central Intelligence Agency’s recently revised estimates show that the USSR has been devoting about one eighth of its gross national product to defense during the 1970s; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the senior intelligence officers of the Military Departments think the share probably is higher. Research in underway to determine the corresponding ration in the 1960s. [Footnote in the original.]
success in war, even a nuclear war, is attainable. While there is disagreement over the extent to which military doctrine determines political decisions on military matters, we do not believe that the Soviets aim at war. In fact, they aim to avoid not only general nuclear war, but also direct armed conflict with the US that risks escalation to nuclear war. They recognize that, even if they enjoyed military advantages that seemed to constitute, in their perceptions and those of others, a general strategic superiority, nuclear attack on the USSR would put at risk all their achievements and prospects.

7. But the Soviets strongly believe that the implied or actual threat of the use of force is a way to influence the attitudes and decisions of states and to attain strategic objectives without war. Moreover, they see military power as a means of ensuring that their gains in the world will not be reversed. They intend their military might to secure their homeland and their position in Eastern Europe and to deter their opponents from interfering against those processes of political change, particularly in the Third World, that they are promoting, in part with their own military resources. With regard to North America, Western Europe, and Japan, they see their military strength as having political utility in enforcing respect for Soviet power and receptiveness to Soviet policies.

8. In a world characterized by struggle, the Soviets expect conflict, most probably arising out of local disputes but often involving the superpowers and, at least implicitly, their total military strength. In this context, Soviet military doctrine sets a goal of creating war-winning capabilities and then defines this posture as the best deterrent. The Soviets have never accepted the concept of mutual assured destruction, with its connotation that some finite level of force is sufficient for deterrence, although they recognize mutual deterrence as a present reality that will be very difficult to alter. Moreover, trying to forge ahead of the US and at the same time fearful of falling behind it, they are little disposed to adjust their military programs unilaterally so as to foster strategic stability, or to moderate them lest they provoke US program reactions. Beyond these points, however, there are differences of view in the Intelligence Community as to whether the Soviets see as an achievable objective a strategic relationship in which they escape the constraints of mutual deterrence. These differences are discussed in paragraphs 56 and 57.

9. Finally, it is difficult, and in the end perhaps not fruitful, to try to separate offensive and defensive elements and purposes in the Soviet approach to military power, as Soviet military doctrine looks at them in an integral fashion. For example, the Soviets see nuclear weapons and the long-range means of delivering them as both offensive and defen-
sive, in that they can attack the enemy’s military forces, thereby reducing his capability to attack the USSR.

The Soviet View of the US

10. On this subject there are within the Intelligence Community points of agreement and divergence.

11. There is agreement that the Soviets admire and fear American economic capacity and technological prowess. Further, they have a respectful appreciation of US military strength, current and potential. The Soviets see the US as having considerable advantage over the USSR in the economic and military potential of the NATO Alliance in comparison with the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, they see weaknesses in US society that they attribute to the factors of individualism and materialism in American culture: a reluctance to make sacrifices for state goals and an inconstancy in policy deriving from the play of plural interests. They are scornful of what they see as a public appetite for sensation and a general disrespect for authority.

12. In foreign affairs, the Soviets see the US as enjoying great influence by virtue of its economic and military power, and they lay special stress on US ability to impose its views on its Allies because of that power. In the Third World the Soviets see the US as enjoying stronger economic and political ties than they do, as well as having substantially greater potential for projection of military power. But they also clearly perceive differences between the US and its Allies. And they are eager to discover how much—in the wake of Vietnam and Angola—the US is determined to uphold its interests and commitments abroad when these are challenged.

13. The divergencies within the Intelligence Community arise from different emphasis upon these themes.

14. One line of analysis holds that the Soviets have probably concluded that the US has already passed its zenith as a competitor and that, given skillful Soviet policies, the chances are that this trend can be made irreversible. While acknowledging countervailing factors, the Soviets believe that in the long run the US will be forced by inherent defects in the American and international economy to be a progressively less effective competitor. They believe they are gradually overcoming the US advantage in technology. They expect continued long-run erosion, relative to their side, in the Western military, political, economic, social, and moral spheres. They think they will be able to plan their programs and conduct their policies in the expectation of greater opportunities resulting from this continued slow improvement in the global “correlation of forces.” In particular, they see US vulnerabilities—to the denial of oil and other raw materials, among others—growing in the Third World, and they expect increasingly to be able to exploit these
vulnerabilities. A final element of this interpretation of their view is, however, that the Soviets fear that as the US sees its position weakening, it may strike out to redress the balance. In this period, therefore, the Soviets require superior military forces and a careful weighing of risks.

15. Another line of analysis holds that, even when these factors are taken into account, the Soviet view of these matters is much less optimistic. It notes that nothing in the Soviet outlook posits a weakening of US advantages in the area of science and technology. Recognizing the vigor and scope of Soviet military programming, this analysis adds that, in Moscow’s eyes, the US is a formidable military competitor that is seeking to improve its counterforce capabilities, and even thinking about strategic superiority, considering such US programs as the B–1, Trident, M–X ICBM, and strategic cruise missiles. It argues that the Soviets perceive indications of US recovery from the disillusionments of recent years, are impressed by the recuperative powers of the US and the world economies, and appear genuinely concerned that the current defense budget and political discourse in the US augur a more than temporary increase in competitiveness vis-à-vis the USSR. By this reading, the Soviets may hope for a continued slow improvement in their relative position, but not at a pace that justifies new global calculations or substantial new departures in their own behavior.

The Soviet View of China

16. On this subject, the Intelligence Community shares some uncertainties but has no major disagreements.

17. The aims of the USSR’s China policy are clear enough:

— to combat and reduce Chinese influence both among nations and within the international Communist movement;
— to limit Sino-US rapprochement;
— to exert military pressure designed to deter Chinese jabs along the border while impressing upon Chinese leaders the folly of making the Soviet Union their enemy;
— meanwhile to maintain a public posture of readiness to normalize relations against the time when Mao’s successors might unfreeze China’s implacable hostility.

18. The schism with China has severely heightened the Soviet sense of insecurity and undercut its ideological position. We have considerable evidence indicating that Moscow sees no prospect of a complete restoration of the relationship of the 1950s; this is our analysis as well. As for the possibility of an early amelioration of active competition, the Soviets appear to be more glum than hopeful.

19. Nevertheless, this will be the aim of Soviet policy, and indeed their tactical moves in the weeks after Mao’s death have been intended to begin this process. The roots of the dispute are deep, and the USSR in
its conciliatory approach is not prepared to give up the option of military pressure. But if we try to look a decade ahead, there is a good chance of some normalization, probably at the level of state relations, which would make the conflict less burdensome to Soviet global policy.

20. In military-strategic terms, however, we doubt that the Soviets during this period will judge that they can afford to reduce the forces devoted to the Chinese problem, or to exempt them from the normal pace of modernization. We feel confident that, at least, that is their own present outlook. And depending upon China’s post-Mao course, it is entirely possible that fears of Chinese collusion with the West, or even of a stab in the back in the event of war elsewhere, will continue to burden Moscow’s policy as heavily as they do today.

The Soviet View of Europe

21. Ultimately the Soviets would like to become the dominant power in Europe through the breakup of the NATO Alliance and the elimination of US influence and forces in Western Europe. Viewed in the light of what is achievable in the next decade, however, they intend to work to reduce US power and influence and to undermine the cohesion of NATO, thereby creating more room for the expansion of their own influence. The Soviets hope to manage this process in a way that avoids the emergence of West Germany or a united Europe as a strong, independent rival to their policies. Moscow’s détente posture has particular application to this region, and to the related Soviet objectives of acquiring technology and credits from the developed industrial states and encouraging reduced defense efforts. The Soviets meanwhile seek military forces that will increasingly influence Western European attitudes through the reality and proximity of Soviet power.

22. While the Soviets applaud the growing strength of Communist parties in Western Europe, they are concerned about their increasing independence. They tolerate the anti-Soviet gestures of these parties only with great difficulty; they are concerned that power-sharing between Communists and non-Communists would undermine orthodoxy in Eastern Europe; they worry about a rightist backlash if the process moves too fast. On balance, however, they see more gains than losses for themselves in this trend, realize that it is not within their control, and will assist it cautiously. As for Yugoslavia, they would like to bring that country closer to their own camp after Tito’s death but are also concerned to ensure that it not move westward. They may apply military pressure to this problem, but they probably see major local dangers and international risks in the actual use of force.

The Soviet View of Détente

23. In its broadest aspect, détente is looked upon as a framework for nurturing changes favorable to Soviet interests while avoiding di-
rect challenges to the US and its Allies that would provoke them into concerted and effective countermeasures. Détente provides for limited spheres of cooperation and relaxation of tensions within a larger context of continued competition. It is meant to facilitate more specific policies designed:

— to give the West, and particularly the US, a stake in fruitful relations with the USSR as a means of limiting Western interest in collaboration with China against Soviet interests;
— to develop precedents and mechanisms for consulting with the US during crises and influencing its behavior, thereby reducing the likelihood of nuclear war;
— to develop an atmosphere that would serve to reduce public and parliamentary support for Western defense efforts;
— to create a political climate in which economic relations, and particularly a flow of Western credits and technology, can improve the Soviet economic base and provide militarily useful technologies;
— to sustain formal Western acknowledgement of the USSR’s postwar gains in Eastern Europe, to extend Soviet influence in Western Europe, and to weaken alliance cohesion.

At the same time, the Soviets have stated from the outset—and emphasized recently in response to Western criticism—that détente, like “peaceful coexistence,” in no way involves a renunciation of Soviet support and assistance to “progressive forces,” including those engaging in armed struggle in the Third World, but in fact creates a political climate that enhances the prospects for these forces.

24. Since this is a fairly durable set of Soviet interests, we expect Moscow to continue to adhere to the détente line. They regard the improvement of their position, and particularly their gains in strategic weaponry, as having forced the West to accept the détente framework and enter into negotiations with the USSR. Specific policies are another matter; Moscow has been reluctant to accept Western prescriptions about the proper content of a détente relationship. The Soviets have suffered their own disappointments with it, particularly in US trade legislation and Middle Eastern diplomacy. They are sensitive to increasing Western skepticism about détente, and evidently would like to see this trend reversed. But their diplomacy is extremely patient, and if they do eventually make concessions to Western demands, these will usually be forthcoming only after prolonged bargaining, during which the Soviets will have thoroughly tested the Western position and discovered the response needed on their part to sustain momentum.

Arms Control Policy

25. The Soviets have both strategic and political objectives in pursuing arms control negotiations. On the political side, the USSR is assiduous in initiating proposals in this area in order to appear as the champion of disarmament and to determine as much as possible the
subjects chosen for negotiations. Moscow has at times seen Soviet security objectives served simply by propaganda on possible arms control arrangements. The Soviets, for example, evidently calculate that proposals to ban use or first use of nuclear weapons might appeal to public opinion and affect Western policy and strategy even in the absence of negotiations. The very process of negotiations, the USSR believes, strengthens its image as a superpower equal to the US and increases the chances that the West will reduce the vigor of its military programs.

26. In disarmament negotiations the Soviets are zealous in protecting their military and security interests, and have a proven record of being very hard bargainers. They view SALT as a means through which the USSR may be able further to improve its strategic position vis-à-vis the US, particularly if they succeed in limiting US weapon systems now in development. In negotiating on ABM, Moscow evidently judged that, in view of the US technological lead and potential, severe limits on deployment would be to its military benefit. The Soviets have sought to use MBFR largely as a vehicle for constraining German as well as US force levels, and encouraging a decrease in defense spending in NATO. They probably hope thereby ultimately to affect NATO strategy and to obstruct possible future European defense cooperation. Security concerns have also accounted for the seriousness of the Soviet approach to nuclear proliferation.

27. Nevertheless, the Soviets recognize that the process of arms control negotiations is continuous, that periodic agreements are needed to sustain it, that they cannot always count on a favorable outcome at each stage, and that partial agreements can often advance their interests. And while they are prepared for prolonged bargaining, they would be highly dismayed at the prospect of a breakdown in the negotiating process, not only for its military consequences but also for its implications for détente and for Western concerns about Soviet military programs. These considerations played an important part in Moscow’s agreement to the Vladivostok understanding,\(^8\) they proved willing to accept equal quantitative ceilings, requiring a slight reduction in their own forces, and to defer the question of forward-based systems, largely in order to sustain the momentum of SALT and détente after the US changed presidents in mid-1974. It is possible that such considerations also might lead the Soviets to be more forthcoming on SALT II after the new US administration comes into office.\(^9\)

\(^8\) See footnote 2, Document 48.

\(^9\) The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior officers of the Military Departments, and the Senior Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Development Administration believe that, in sum, the Soviets are unlikely to make concessions in either SALT or MBFR unless, after extensive probing, they are convinced that concessions are required on their part to continue the détente process, keep the West from expanding its military capabilities, or score gains which they consider more important. [Footnote in the original.]
28. The Soviets will seek in coming years to draw the US and others into specific negotiations on some of the broad array of arms control proposals that they regularly purvey. These efforts will be meant to pursue the same political and military ends that SALT and MBFR now serve for them, plus broadening the agenda as insurance against the consequences of failure in any single forum.

III. The Pace and Objectives of Current Soviet Military Programming

29. In this section we examine Soviet military programming to see what definable objectives emerge from the evidence and whether the pace in recent years has increased, slowed down, or remained constant. We do not attempt a thorough description of these programs, which is available in other Estimates. From this standpoint we examine strategic offensive and defensive forces, ground and air forces facing NATO and China, naval forces, forces for distant intervention, and research and development activities.

Strategic Forces

30. The USSR, having succeeded over the past decade in overcoming a marked inferiority, continues to press forward with a broad and vigorous program for improving its strategic capabilities. In offensive forces:

—The ICBM force is becoming more survivable and flexible and better able to attack hard targets through deployment of a new generation of ICBMs (many with MIRVs) and through modifications to deployed systems and development of yet newer ones.
—The introduction of successive new models with longer-range missiles has increased the capability and survivability as well as the size of the SSBN force. Soviet SSBNs will, in the near future, acquire MIRVed missiles, and a new, large ballistic missile submarine may be under construction.
—In bomber aviation, older aircraft are being retained in service, the Backfire is being deployed, and there is evidence of the development of a new long-range bomber.

On the defensive side, the USSR continues:

—to expand capabilities for obtaining early warning of missile attack;
—pursue developmental work on ABM systems;
—to improve capabilities against air attack, especially low-altitude attack;
—to search for ways to solve the antisubmarine warfare problem, including those based on novel possibilities;
—to improve, by hardening and other means, the protection of command and control facilities;
—to carry forward a civil defense program that is more extensive and better developed than was previously believed and that includes measures that, if effectively carried out, would have a significant im-
pact on both US and Soviet perceptions of the likely outcome of a nu-
uclear exchange;\(^{10}\)
— to acquire capabilities to interfere with US space systems.

31. The striking thing about these programs is not that they have
accelerated in the last few years but that they have grown at a more or
less steady pace for two decades. We expect this growth to continue.
Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent nor the achievement
of acknowledged strategic parity has caused the effort to falter. Soviet
military doctrine calls for capabilities to fight, survive, and win a nu-
clear war. There is disagreement regarding the extent to which Soviet
strategic policy and force developments are determined by this doc-
trine, but these programs are compatible with efforts to achieve these
objectives. Soviet positions at SALT, in turn, do not rule out these same
doctrinal objectives.\(^ {11}\) But at the same time it must be recognized that,
from the USSR’s point of view, US military technology is so dynamic
that constant Soviet efforts are needed even to keep pace, that US SALT
positions do not constrain that dynamism, and that arms control meas-
ures to limit many qualitative advances appear in any event infeasible.
Thus the Soviet stress has shifted considerably from quantity to quality.

32. We are divided in our views as to what objectives the Soviets
have set for themselves in adding to their strategic capabilities.

33. In one view, Soviet strategic programs are fundamentally the
result of decisions in support of Soviet strategic doctrine and objectives
of obtaining a war-winning capability, and are not merely reactions to
individual US weapon programs. These programs are extensive, em-
bracing improvements in survivability and in counterforce capabilities,
air defense and ABM development programs, and a broad hardening
and civil defense effort, and each complements the others. The Soviets
see their extensive and growing research and development effort as
supporting these programs in an increasingly effective fashion, and as
enhancing the chances of technological breakthroughs.

34. In this view, Soviet strategic programs represent a serious So-
viet commitment to obtain a strategic posture vis-à-vis the United
States sufficient to win a nuclear war should it occur and to survive as a
viable national entity. While it is uncertain when the Soviets expect to

\(^{10}\) The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State believes
this statement exaggerates the likely impact of Soviet civil defense efforts. He believes
that these efforts will not materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange
and will not undermine the deterrent value of US strategic attack forces. [Footnote in the
original.]

\(^{11}\) The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State believes
this sentence could be misleading since Soviet positions at SALT are consistent with a
broad range of possible objectives, including maintenance of rough equivalence with the
US. [Footnote in the original.]
gain such strategic superiority, they now view this objective as practical and attainable in a programmed fashion. They expect to move closer to this goal over the next ten years.\(^\text{12}\)

35. Another view holds that the Soviet leadership does not at present regard the achievement of decisive strategic superiority as a feasible objective, particularly over the next decade. This view puts more stress on Soviet respect for present and potential US strategic strength as an ingredient in Moscow’s projections. It also notes that failure thus far to solve such key problems as strategic missile defense and antisubmarine warfare are bound to have a discouraging effect on Soviet expectations.

36. Those who hold this view believe that the Soviets will be active, driving competitors in the strategic arms race, and will aim at such margins of superiority as are available. Their programs aim at the development of capabilities to fight and to survive nuclear war. But despite the comprehensive and vigorous character of these programs, the Soviet leaders know that the US need not concede the USSR a meaningful overall advantage, and they probably do not now count on gains that would be substantial enough to give them confidence about their ability to survive and win an all-out nuclear war. Nor can they now confidently expect to move substantially closer to these goals over the next ten years.

37. Beyond differing views about goals for strategic forces, there are differences about the broader goals of the USSR in the global balancing of forces in which strategic forces are only one factor—albeit probably the most important one. We consider these broader issues further in the final section of this Estimate.

*Forces Facing NATO*

38. In the European theater, the Soviets aim at a capability that will enable them, should war occur, to prevail quickly at either the conventional or theater nuclear level. They see themselves as having superiority in conventional forces in Central Europe, but they are aware of the complexities and uncertainties that tactical air power and nuclear weapons introduce into such assessments. They are substantially improving forces for defending the seaward approaches to the Soviet Union and conducting offensive operations against NATO’s northern and southern flanks and against the North Atlantic lines of communications. They are preparing for the possibility that, in the event of war,

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\(^{12}\) The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force believes that the Soviets have additionally made great strides toward achieving general military superiority over all perceived constellations of enemies and for attaining a war-winning capability at all levels of conflict. [Footnote in the original.]
the Warsaw Pact would conduct major offensive operations without
prior reinforcement from the USSR—and therefore with a minimum of
warning; a forthcoming Estimate will examine this problem in detail.\textsuperscript{13}
But, mindful of the unpredictability of nuclear conflict in particular and
of the uncertainties about expansion to a broad European or interconti-
nental scale, they are inclined to be very cautious in considering the use
of military force in Europe.

39. Enjoying a substantial quantitative advantage over NATO in
such elements as divisions, tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft, the
USSR conceives of future competition between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO primarily in qualitative terms. In this regard, the Soviets are im-
pressed by NATO’s strengths and potential in such areas as antitank
weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and combat aircraft. Their own
modernization programs cover a broad spectrum and feature greatly
improved air defense systems, self-propelled artillery, and tactical air-
craft with greater range and payload. The Soviets also have substan-
tially increased the nuclear strike capabilities of their theater forces,
providing them with new options for limited nuclear warfare at the
theater level and reducing their dependence on USSR-based nuclear
forces.

40. We assess the overall pace of Pact programs for improvement
of conventional forces as steady and high. We doubt that the Soviets
now expect a marked change in the present complex balance in the next
decade. Their hopes for any such change rest primarily on political
factors, such as a flagging of West European efforts or a weakening of
the US commitment to NATO.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Forces Facing China}

41. The main Soviet objectives in this region are:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State believes
that this paragraph exaggerates the USSR’s confidence in its theater forces against
NATO. While the Soviet forces are formidable, there is a body of evidence that the Soviets
are extremely conservative in their reckoning of the balance and that they believe they
have reason to doubt whether their forces could succeed in carrying out the kind of mas-
sive offensive which Soviet strategy for a war in Europe requires.

He takes a different view of the significance of exercise scenarios in which rein-
forcement does not precede initiation of hostilities. In his view, the exercise evidence
seems to fit better with the hypothesis that the West struck before the Soviets could rein-
force than with the conclusion that the East chose to attack before reinforcement. [Foot-
note in the original.]

\item \textsuperscript{14} The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior intelligence officers of the
Military Departments, and the Senior Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration believe that the Soviets are striving for a marked change in their
favor in the complex balance in Europe in the next decade by continued improvements in
their current programs in nuclear, chemical, night fighting, mobility, electronic warfare,
and mass fire capabilities. They believe Soviet expectation of political movement rein-
forces their hopes for such a change. [Footnote in the original.]
\end{itemize}
— to deter the Chinese from provoking armed incidents or incursions in a region where Soviet cities and railroads are close to the border;
— to be capable of making a major ground thrust across the border, although not of occupying all China;
— to maintain a large lead in tactical and strategic nuclear capabilities;
— to maintain military pressure on Peking for a change in its hostile policies.

42. The buildup that began in the 1960s has evidently met these requirements, and the growth of Soviet forces in the Far East has slackened. The Soviets are, however, continuing to improve their Far Eastern naval forces capable of operations against Chinese domestic and foreign sea lines of communication. Throughout its course, this buildup was not allowed to affect significantly the development of forces facing NATO. Given their concerns over China, we doubt that the Soviets feel themselves able to plan to draw on these forces in the event of a European war, or vice versa; they seem instead to regard it as necessary to be able to fight on either front—or both together—with the forces already there. The future growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities will reinforce Soviet motivations to maintain and modernize their forces facing China.

General Purpose Naval Forces

43. In the decade following World War II, the Soviets’ main objective in developing their general purpose naval forces was to acquire capabilities to defend Soviet coastal waters and key approaches from the open oceans against any naval force threatening the Soviet Union. Since the early 1960s, however, a pronounced shift in emphasis has taken place. The Soviets are now also developing forces capable of offensive action throughout the world oceans, maintaining a continuous long-term presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and increasing the range of their overseas involvements. These developments strongly suggest that the Soviets hold, as a continuing objective, the development of an open-ocean force capable of performing, to varying degrees, the traditional functions of major naval powers. The pace of this expansion has been measured and evolutionary, and is expected to continue unabated over the next decade, with somewhat greater emphasis on correction of their present deficiencies in logistic support forces to permit more flexible employment of their growing global capability. The result will be a broader range of options available to Soviet policymakers to use or threaten to use naval forces in pursuing their global interests.

Forces for Distant Operations

44. Soviet military objectives in this category derive from the USSR’s view of the Third World as an arena of East-West struggle. The
Soviets are convinced that, despite setbacks, these regions are shifting from the capitalist to the socialist camp, and that this process is contributing to Soviet national security. Two decades’ experience of successes and failures, however, have given them a realistic view of the complexities of the Third World, and their behavior is pragmatic and alert to opportunities to exploit Western vulnerabilities.

45. Among the means for expanding Soviet influence in this arena, military instruments have proven by far the most effective.

—Military assistance programs have built ties with a number of important states and political movements, resulting in dependence upon the USSR that has often, though not always, provided political leverage.
—Naval deployments into new waters have manifested the global scope of Soviet might and affected regional calculations of power.
—The USSR is able to airlift and sealift military aid to clients at war.
—It has some potential—as yet only marginally utilized—for intervening with its own forces in distant conflicts.

46. The Soviets have used these military instruments to provide assistance to its clients in Third World crises and have even intervened abroad with their own military forces. The Soviets have also endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and to provide a visible symbol of Soviet support by interposing naval forces. They have been concerned, however, not to confront Western interests in the Third World directly; thus they are working for change by providing military aid to legitimate governments and a number of guerrilla movements throughout the world.

47. The Soviets will continue to strongly support the process of change in the Third World and will expand their military instruments at a steady but moderate pace. Over the next decade, force improvements will continue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist clients by supplementing local defenses. The USSR will be able to make more credible demonstrations of force and the Soviet navy will have better capabilities for interposition. The Soviets will also improve their capabilities for direct assault. But beyond the range of land-based air support, Soviet capabilities will still be deficient to carry out a direct assault against determined opposition by sizable armed forces.15

15 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy notes that Soviet success and failure in any such intervention would be heavily affected by a number of other variables—particularly the stance of regional states and the disposition of the forces of the other major power. [Footnote in the original.]
Research and Development

48. The inherent limitations of evidence present us with more uncertainty about the scope and progress of Soviet military research and development than about programs that have reached the stages of testing and deployment. It is nevertheless clear that R&D enjoys a particularly high priority.

49. The Soviets are well aware of the importance of basic scientific research, and they support it generously. They also have devoted major resources to building up industrial technology in support of R&D goals for the military and in space. They have decreased, but not eliminated, their dependence on foreign technology in such key areas as instrumentation and computers. Recent Soviet statements reflect special attention to the impact of technological developments on the strategic military balance.

50. In their approach to weapons development, the Soviets have traditionally emphasized long-term evolutionary development of existing system concepts or narrowly focused efforts to develop specific types of systems. While some of their programs in the past have involved innovative concepts and some of their deployed systems are technically advanced, until the mid-1960s they tended to concentrate on programs that had direct weapon system applications.

51. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets have in addition embarked on a broader range of exploratory military R&D programs. This approach, while it runs the risk of a lower percentage of successful applications, offers the Soviets a better basis for evaluating Western technological efforts, a better base for the evolutionary development of existing systems, and improved chances for technological breakthroughs.

52. Prime examples of Soviet interest in revolutionary technological concepts are in the areas of ASW sensors and directed-energy weapons. In both ASW and high-energy lasers (HEL), the Soviets have an extensive R&D effort in progress, even though the potential in terms of practical weapons development is uncertain. The ASW efforts involve investigation of a variety of techniques that seemingly have limited prospects for success—[3 lines not declassified] The Soviets are also conducting basic research in technologies relevant to the nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse and particle beam weapon concepts. Although there is a large body of evidence for the existence of a Soviet HEL weapons program, there is no such body of evidence on the other directed-energy concepts. Some of the laser work is being done under sponsorship of the air defense forces, but the development of HEL for practical applications is not likely before the 1980s.

53. There is little doubt that both their own ambitions and their fears of US advances will sustain a high-priority Soviet effort in mili-
tary R&D during this period. The Soviets know a great deal more about the direction and progress of our military R&D than we do about theirs. Even so, the scientific and technological uncertainties that abound in this area almost certainly prevent them from reaching any confident judgment now as to whether, over the next ten years, either side will achieve breakthroughs that will be perceived as altering the strategic balance.

IV. Synthesis

54. What, then, of the questions with which we began?

—Do the Soviet leaders now base policy—and the programs and activities which flow therefrom—on a belief that the USSR will become the world’s strongest single power? Within the next ten years?

—Have they come to believe—or will they soon—that aggressive actions on their part carry lower risks than earlier, and that these risks have become low enough to be acceptable to prudent, yet ambitious men?

There is disagreement on some matters and agreement on others. In the latter category:

—The Soviet approach to the external world remains one of struggle between two systems, in which Moscow believes it will ultimately prevail.

—In prosecuting the struggle on multiple fronts, the Soviets see military power as a key instrument which can be used to attain strategic objectives without war.

—The Soviets aim at advantage in their military forces. However, they worry that they may fall behind in the qualitative military competition, and this further reinforces the priority of their research and development effort.

—In the struggle, they are conscious of weaknesses on their own side, particularly those arising from economic and technological deficiencies and conflict with China. They are working to overcome these weaknesses, but they do not presently expect to remove them in the next decade.

—On the other hand, beyond their obvious military strength, they credit themselves with other important assets: disciplined policymaking, social cohesion, and perseverance.

—Since the Soviet strategies are not the same as those of the US, they do not seek to build forces corresponding to those of the US across the entire spectrum. For example, they place much higher priority on strategic forces and forces opposite NATO than on forces for distant military intervention.

Among our disagreements:

—Some judge that the Soviets are persuaded that the US and the West, despite periodic rebounds, are in a long-term decline that will be reflected in a flagging of political resolve, military efforts, and economic growth. Others think the Soviets hope for this but do not count
on it, and indeed may think the US and Western military effort is again on the rise.

—Some believe that, in improving their military forces, the Soviets pursue the acquisition of a war-winning capability as a realistic objective. Others believe that the Soviets have no realistic expectation of attaining such a capability.

55. These disagreements lead to conclusions that, while not diametrically opposed, present significant differences of emphasis. The following discussion simplifies these differences by grouping them into two syntheses.

56. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet view, the global correlation of forces has in the 1970s shifted in the USSR’s favor and that this trend is likely to continue. The US and its Allies have entered upon a new stage in the “general crisis of capitalism” that will prove irreversible even if there are periodic recoveries. The problems of the Soviet economy and the dispute with China are serious but, on the plane of international competition, not debilitating. In this situation, the Soviets aim to achieve the degree of military superiority over the West needed to permit them to wage and win a conventional or nuclear war. The Soviets see their improvements in survivability and in counterforce capabilities, air defense and ABM development, and broad hardening and civil defense programs in particular, and their improvements in conventional forces in general, as all contributing to this objective. While it is uncertain when the Soviets expect to gain such a decisive strategic superiority, they view this objective as practical and attainable in a programmed fashion. They expect to move closer to this goal over the next ten years. Although Soviet capabilities for the projection of military power will continue to have significant shortcomings within the foreseeable future, Moscow not only is prepared to employ its present naval, merchant, and air forces in seeking objectives in areas of high Soviet interest but also is developing additional forces more capable of influencing events in distant areas. This growing propensity to use military forces as instruments of foreign policy, coupled with the perceived favorable trend in the strategic balance, will, in the Soviets’ view, increasingly enable them to deter US initiatives and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives, thereby advancing the overall Soviet strategic objective of gaining a dominant position in the world.

57. Another line of argument holds that, in Soviet thinking, the question is much more open. It too perceives an increased Soviet confidence, stemming much more from the achievement of parity in strategic forces than from other, nonmilitary trends. But this analysis holds that the Soviet leaders give greater weight than the preceding argument allows to the handicaps represented by the USSR’s economic and technological weaknesses and its conflict with China. It believes that they attribute greater resilience to the capitalist economies and do not
discount the recent turnaround in US defense spending as a short-term phenomenon. In this view, Soviet military programming and research are bent upon keeping pace with that of its adversaries as well as seeking margins of advantage wherever feasible. But Moscow does not have a realistic expectation of achieving a war-winning capability, particularly in the next decade. Expecting Soviet foreign policy to be assertive, this analysis nonetheless holds that Moscow’s experience with the complexities of the external world—and particularly with the intractable force of nationalism—does not at this point lead the Soviets to expect a series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will cumulate into a finally decisive shift in the struggle. In short, this analysis attributes to the Soviets not a programmatic design for military superiority but a more pragmatic effort to achieve advantages where they can, and thus a more patient approach to continuing tough competition together with a dedication to high and steady levels of effort in the elements of power. Moscow’s calculus of the risks attending forward action may decline, but this has not yet happened and, if it does, the process will be slow and subject to cautious testing.

58. This Estimate is obviously not a net assessment, not our judgment of the likely outcome in East-West competition. It is a summary of the range of Community perceptions of Soviet objectives and Soviet views of the prospects for significant gains in this competition. We agree on a wide range of Soviet objectives short of decisive military superiority over the West. Our differences are over the Soviet leaders’ perception of the feasibility of achieving such superiority. Finally, we agree that Soviet risk-taking abroad in any specific situation will continue to be governed by Moscow’s perception of interests and power at the particular time and place.
174. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Bush) to the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Cherne)


SUBJECT
Recommendations of Team B—Soviet Strategic Objectives

1. I am forwarding to you the attached series of B Team recommendations on how national intelligence estimates should be produced, as we agreed in a previous discussion. We must, obviously, always examine suggestions such as these from experienced observers of the process with the aim of improving the process further. Few of this B Team’s observations are, however, entirely new to us, and the problems they address are under scrutiny. The Team’s recommendations appear, moreover, insensitive to the costs and penalties of implementing them.

2. In considering the attached recommendations, it is useful for us to remember that the methods for producing national intelligence estimates have evolved over the past 25 years in response to the changing interests and styles of administrations, the organizational methods of a number of Directors of Central Intelligence, and the international situation itself. At present, national estimates on Soviet strategic programs and capabilities are produced by a method which centralizes the supervisory responsibilities in a National Intelligence Officer on the DCI’s staff, but decentralizes the analytical and drafting responsibilities to teams of analysts from the various intelligence agencies. This method is designed to ensure that significant analyses and judgments from all elements of the Intelligence Community are reflected at all stages in the process and that no single staff or agency determines the results. The process encourages the exposure of divergent views. NIO management is charged with ensuring that significant differences are illuminated and that consensus judgments due to bureaucratic pressures are avoided.

3. The present production method is consistent with certain principles which have guided the preparation of the NIEs throughout their history, regardless of organizational adjustments:

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files, Box 7, Competitive Analysis, 1977. Secret. Team A also later commented on Team B’s reports. Stoertz forwarded Team A’s comments to Acting DCI Knoche under a February 23 covering memorandum. (Ibid., Job 85B00134R, Box 2, Competitive Analysis, Part V (2), Commentary on the A Team B Team Experiment, Dec. 1976 through Completion)
a. A national intelligence estimate is the DCI’s responsibility in accordance with his statutory duties. The main text represents his best judgment.

b. A national estimate involves the participation of the agencies of the Intelligence Community, whose representatives on the National Foreign Intelligence Board have the right and duty to introduce into the estimate abstentions or opinions which diverge substantially from those expressed in the main text.

c. A national estimate is designed to address major topics of concern to US planners and policymakers, and hence its content and its producers cannot be isolated from the process it is designed to support; at the same time, it is not a mechanism for critiquing or recommending policy.

4. The current method of producing drafts is only one of a number of methods which could be employed. Any change, however, should be consistent with the style and needs of a particular administration and a particular DCI, while preserving the principles above.

5. Turning to the specific points in the B Team’s recommendations, I believe a number of observations need to be recorded:

a. Mirror Imaging. The B Team’s charge that “soft” factors affecting Soviet motivation do not receive “thorough” analytical attention is simply not true. What is obviously true is that the B Team’s analysis of these “soft” factors differs from that of at least some in the Intelligence Community. For example, along with much evidence of the Soviet drive to acquire military preponderance, there is voluminous evidence that the Soviets have a high respect for the technical and industrial might behind US military programs. As for the need to perceive Soviet objectives in terms of Soviet concepts, an effort has been made to judge Soviet policy on the basis of a large number of factors and influences, of which doctrine is one. In this year’s NIE 11–3/8, partly stimulated by the competitive analysis experiment, a special effort was made to describe Soviet objectives and military doctrine in Soviet terms so as not to leave any impression that the USSR had been judged only in US terms. This practice should be continued, but not to the extent that every specific estimate need be prefaced by a long exposition of the Soviets’ doctrine and ultimate objectives.

b. Net Assessments. I agree that those net assessments which are the result of a quantitative analytical process should be so identified. In NIE 11–3/8–76, we have largely eliminated net assessments which are

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2 NIE 11–3/8–76 is the attachment to Document 170.
not a result of such a process, partly because new evidence has given rise to greater uncertainty and partly because the significance of operational factors was well illustrated by the B Team on Soviet air defense. The NIE calls attention to the fact that a full net assessment would be required to take adequate account of such factors and that the estimate is not such a net assessment.

i. While accepting the B Team's recommendation, we would not agree that net judgments can never be delivered; some judgments in this complex world remain important and susceptible to experienced analysis. Most predictive analyses or interpretations of the policies and expectations of foreign leaders require an analytical model which includes US policies and forces among the influences affecting those leaders. Even estimates of the technical capabilities of a potential adversary’s weapon systems require an “interaction analysis,” one part of which is the US force which the foreign system was designed to engage.

ii. As for comprehensive net assessments, we have all recognized for some time that there is no national level organization responsible for such assessments on a regular basis. I hope my successor will encourage officials of the new administration to identify such an organization—perhaps at the NSC staff level—and pledge the Intelligence Community to cooperate by providing the intelligence data and insights necessary for its operation. For my part, I would object to assigning the responsibility for such full net assessments of the US–USSR strategic balance, or the balance in other situations involving US and foreign forces, to the Intelligence Community. Such an arrangement would give excessive responsibility to the Intelligence Community and would be unlikely to promote the cooperation of policymaking departments whose participation would be essential.

c. An Integrated View of Soviet Weapons and Force Developments. The packaging of national intelligence on Soviet military forces into several operational categories resulted initially from consumers’ requests in the 1960s to organize the presentation of intelligence according to the way the US plans its forces—strategic offensive, strategic defensive, and general purpose forces. The US defense planning process continues to require this type of presentation.

i. In 1974, the separate estimates of Soviet offensive and defense forces for intercontinental conflict were combined, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, into a single estimate in response to consumer requirements for intelligence on the strategic nuclear balance—that is, the balance as the US measures it.

ii. Our present estimative program acknowledges the further requirement, suggested by other groups as well as the B Team, for national intelligence on overall Soviet military and foreign policy objec-
tives (as in NIE 11–4) and on overall trends in Soviet military forces and capabilities (as in an interagency intelligence memorandum issued in October 1976). These integrated assessments could not be done without the more detailed assessments of individual aspects of Soviet power and probably need not be done routinely on an annual basis. We will investigate with key users the advisability of further integration of NIEs. We would, however, strongly resist drawing the impractical conclusion from the B Team recommendation that one should never estimate about a part of the Soviet strategic effort unless one appraises the entire Soviet effort.

d. Policy Pressures and Considerations. I certainly would not quarrel with minimizing any possible policy pressure on NIE judgments and preventing the abdication by the intelligence apparatus of its responsibility to provide objective answers. I would note, however, that the estimative process, as carried out by the DCI under the principles cited at the beginning of these remarks, is designed to do just that. The NFIB participants bring to the estimating process differing experiences and professional backgrounds. If some representatives have convictions about US policy that correspond closely to the advocacy of the bureaucracies they represent, the variety of points of view introduces checks and balances into the system. The professional integrity of the participants, moreover, should not be lightly dismissed. In any case, the DCI, the National Intelligence Officers who support him in supervising the estimative process, and the CIA analysts who have a major role in the drafting process, do not represent any department of government involved in the policymaking process. Their independent bureaucratic positions minimize the susceptibility of the DCI, NIOs, and CIA analysts to policy pressures and allow them to serve as an important check on the objectivity of the process.

e. Disciplined Presentation of Conclusions. I have some difficulty grasping what Team B has in mind. I would not prescribe a format for the conclusions and key judgments in NIEs so rigorous that we could not adjust to the nature of the intelligence available and the needs of the policymakers being supported. I would, on the other hand, agree that consistency is desirable; that we should accurately convey uncertainty and alternatives; and that when important changes occur in the judgments of estimates, the fact of and the reasons for these changes should be called to the attention of readers. A periodic track record of key judgments in an NIE has occasionally been useful. Where and how

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3 A series of NIEs treating broad trends and issues in Soviet strategic policy. The series was published annually until 1968 and then irregularly until 1977, when it was again published annually. See the attachment to Document 173.

4 IIM 76–039J, Trends in Soviet Military Programs, October 1976, was not found.
often one is done should be a matter for intelligence managers and consumers to decide on the basis of practical considerations.

f. Procedures. This section contains a curious discussion of institutional bias. Many people imagine they understand the nature and sources of State’s and Defense’s biases; it would have been interesting if the report had discussed the nature and sources of the bias attributed to CIA. In its argument, Team B appears to adopt the following approach: all past errors are the fault of CIA, even when everyone else was in agreement; the reason for this is CIA’s major role in the preparation of estimates; therefore, take the estimates out of CIA’s, and possibly even out of the DCI’s, hands.

i. The possibility is raised of a chief estimative officer and staff within the Executive Office of the President. If this chief estimative officer were not the DCI, the arrangement would circumvent the statutory responsibilities of the DCI. If the officer the B Team has in mind is, in fact, the DCI, the question of the location of his estimative function and staff would have to be considered as part of the broader question of the role of CIA in the Community. My judgment is that physical and institutional separation of the DCI from CIA would sharply limit his ability to reach responsible judgments because it would cut him off from his independent analytical base.

ii. This organizational recommendation fails to take into account the checks and balances built into the system. The preparation of the NIE 11–3/8 estimates, for example, involves a program of production by analysts within the military services, CIA, and DIA, their various contractors, DCI Committees, and analytical teams drawn from the several agencies. This specific recommendation reveals naivete about the interactions of policy and intelligence that, in my opinion, tends to undercut the credibility of other observations.

iii. The recommendation is silent on all the big questions—how would the NIEs be drafted; how would the draft contributions be pulled into a single document; how would coordination be achieved; how would the rules of dissent and alternative statement be enforced; and how would final power of approval of the text be exercised? Would the B Team have us reintroduce a monopoly on the drafting of estimative intelligence, one of the weaknesses perceived in the former ONE staff system? And would not the location of the estimative process in the Executive Office of the President in fact subject that process to additional policy pressures without the checks and balances of the current national intelligence production mechanism?

iv. The B Team recommendation concerning the use of a panel of outside specialists to review NIEs is sensible. Such panels have been used at various times in the past. Some months ago, I approved in principle a plan to establish an Estimates Advisory Panel that would in-
clude a broad range of outside experts with a variety of viewpoints. Because of the impending change of administrations, however, I delayed the formation of this panel, but commend it to my successor.

v. The recommendation that adversarial procedures similar to the B Team experiment be continued, perhaps every other year, is one I oppose. It is not that the experiment was a total failure; to the contrary, the B Team on low altitude air defense made a particular contribution. Rather, it is that, when one sets out to establish an adversarial B Team, one sets in motion a process that lends itself to manipulation for purposes other than estimative accuracy. I am already, incidentally, getting recommendations that, should the process ever be repeated, a C Team of a persuasion opposed to the B Team should be established to review the estimate at the same time. I would prefer to convene panels of experts with a mix of views. Indeed, I would expect that my successor might very well wish to do so. Individual agencies and DCI Committees should also continue the practice of using panels of experts such as those convened by the CIA and the OSD to review technical analysis of Backfire performance and the panel of US experts in the field of directed energy convened by the DCI’s Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee to review evidence of Soviet research applicable to particle beam weapons.

6. The essence of national intelligence production is that it marshals the full resources of the Intelligence Community to address the most important analytical and estimative problems, that it provides the base which allows the DCI to fulfill his mandate as an independent advisor to the President, and that it displays for policymakers such differing analyses as exist on important issues. The challenge is to produce these results; doing so depends first of all on the quantity and quality of the resources and talent devoted to it. Equally critical at this highest level of need is the willingness of policymakers to help the Intelligence Community concentrate on the issues of most concern and, then, to support the Community when it accomplishes its mission. Both these factors are far more important for the production of national intelligence than the changeable procedures that may be used.

George Bush
Attachment

**Paper Prepared by Team B**\(^5\)

Washington, undated.

**Team “B” Recommendations**

1. **Concerning methodology**

   A. *Mirror Imaging.* To overcome the bias toward viewing Soviet motives and intentions in U.S. terms, it is urged that:

   1) In dealing with Soviet intentions, the NIEs should integrate observed and projected Soviet weapons’ programs and force deployments derived from the “hard” physical data with more thorough analysis of historical, political, institutional, and other “soft” factors shaping Soviet motives and intentions. The search should be for a consistent elucidation of both sets of factors and their interaction. In this connection considerably more attention should be paid to relevant open and clandestinely acquired Soviet pronouncements and writings (especially those directed to internal audiences) than has been the case in the past. In this regard it should be understood that expert analysis of the open material can reveal a great deal, insofar as the Soviet political system often compels the Party to issue to its cadres authoritative guidance on policy matters through unclassified sources;

   2) Soviet objectives should be perceived in terms of Soviet concepts: this rule applies especially to the treatment of concepts like “strategy”, “strategic threat” and “strategic objectives”, all of which should be understood in the Soviet context of “grand strategy.” When, for reasons of convenience to U.S. consumers, the NIEs address Soviet military programs in the U.S. rather than the Soviet strategic context, this fact should be made clearly evident to the reader.

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\(^5\) Secret. Team B members—Richard Pipes (Team leader), William R. Van Cleave, General Daniel O. Graham, Paul Nitze, Seymour Weiss, and Paul Wolfowitz—forwarded the paper through Bush to Cherne under an undated covering memorandum, which reads as follows: “In our critique [see Document 171] of current and previous National Intelligence Estimates, we made a concerted effort to identify those aspects of methodology, procedure, and institutional structure which we believe have contributed to unsound estimative judgments. In the attached paper we proffer our recommendations to PFIAB concerning improvements in methodology, procedure and structure aimed at correcting the perceived deficiencies. Evidence for our conclusion that the cited shortcomings, do, in fact, exist in the NIEs is to be found in the main body of our report.” (Ibid.)
B. Net assessing. Whatever their intentions, the drafters of the NIEs do engage in implicit net assessments of sorts, particularly when advancing major judgments in the executive summaries. These assessments are usually so rough, so poorly documented, and essentially so speculative that they invite—indeed, cannot be immune from—the injection of the authors’ general biases. Where NIE judgments demand net assessment, the netting should be done explicitly, analytically, and thoroughly, not implicitly or perfunctorily. The interface between NIE judgment and net assessment should be identifiable.

C. An integrated view of Soviet weapons and force developments. The NIEs tend to an excessive extent to analyze each Soviet weapon system in isolation from the totality of the Soviet military effort (and indeed from other relevant non-military factors as well), with the result that the overall Soviet military effort appears as less significant than it actually is. Team “B” urges that in the future weapons systems and force developments be examined in a more integrated manner to yield “combined evaluations” more indicative of Soviet total military capabilities and overall intentions.

D. Policy pressures and considerations. In the opinion of Team “B”, total avoidance of policy pressure on the intelligence estimating process is an impossible goal. The normal and proper function of policy makers in raising questions which are to be addressed by the intelligence estimators in and of itself influences the answers the latter provide. Some awareness on the part of the estimator of the impact of intelligence judgments in support of or in opposition to policy is unavoidable. Nonetheless, improved methods and procedures adopted for the preparation of the NIEs should be able to minimize the policy pressure on judgments and prevent the abdication by the intelligence apparatus of its responsibility to provide objective answers.

E. Disciplined presentation of conclusions. Key judgments of NIEs are presented in various styles and formats. This on the one hand permits statements to be made with a certainty that is not warranted by the available evidence, and on the other hand permits statements, better supported by the evidence, to be degraded in the reader’s mind through the insertion of a clause or sentence that have the effect of dismissing their impact. A more disciplined (though not necessarily rigid) format for NIE key judgments, summaries, and conclusions should be constructed. The format and style should ensure that the various rea-

6 What we mean by net assessment in this context is a judgment on the balance between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities based on the relevant static indicators extant or projected, or based on a dynamic analysis of the balance assuming that those capabilities actually are to be called into use. The latter type of net assessment assumes a scenario, but may or may not assume actual warfare. [Footnote in the original.]
sonable interpretations of the available evidence are laid out without semantic embellishment; that the pros and cons of evidence supporting each are discussed briefly; that the likelihood of occurrence of each is assessed; and that the requirements for additional data to resolve remaining uncertainties are identified. Further, each major intelligence estimate should contain as an annex a review of the past 2 to 10 years’ “track record” of U.S. estimates on the major aspects of the relevant subject matter. Such an annex would be best prepared by a body of analysts not responsible for the estimates critiqued. The purpose of such an annex would not be to criticize or chastise but rather to throw light on possible trends of misanalysis or mistaken judgments so that a compounding of error by continuation into future intelligence estimates can be avoided.

2. Concerning procedures.

A. Some, though undoubtedly not all of the methodological shortcomings which Team “B” found in the National Intelligence Estimates can be overcome by improving the process of their preparation and review. The authors of the NIEs will always remain in some measure prone to perceive the USSR in U.S. terms and to allow political considerations to affect their judgments. Nevertheless by minimizing inherent institutional biases and broadening the range of judgments brought to bear on the NIEs it should be possible to weaken considerably the impact of factors which have accounted in the past for NIE misperceptions.

B. Team “B” considers the organizational position of the NIE function within the national defense-security-foreign policy complex less than optimal for guarding against both policy and institutional biases. Current and previous organizational entities charged with preparation and processing of NIEs have been subordinate to the Director, CIA, and staffed almost exclusively with CIA officials. This arrangement was intended to compensate for the real or alleged biases of the Departments of Defense and State, but it can over-compensate by encouraging the institutional biases of the Central Intelligence Agency itself.

C. Team “B” recommends that some combination of the following three steps be considered:

1) The first involves building as much immunity to institutional pressures as possible into that entity which is charged with preparing NIEs on Soviet strategic objectives. There are various ways to accomplish this end. One attractive possibility is to identify an official in the Executive Office of the President who would be charged with assuring such immunity and who would report directly to the President. His staff would be small and guarded against acquiring an institutional life of its own. Members of the staff would be drawn from the various intel-
ligence organizations and serve relatively short tenures (3–4 years). The official charged with this function would be genuinely removed from and independent of the operating membership of the NFIB by the devices of a separate budget, a separate staff, and a separate physical location. He should have the authority to subpoena substantive intelligence officers from any agency and to require of pertinent departments and agencies such net assessments as may be necessary to the NIE process;

2) The second step involves the marshalling of expertise in and out of government to offset the temptation to mirror-image. The official charged with assuring the objectivity of the NIEs (as specified above) should enlist the part-time services of a panel of prominent outside specialists for the purpose of reviewing estimates so as to identify judgments that are based on questionable assumptions concerning Soviet strategic doctrine and behavior. Such reviews should be carried out immediately post facto, but they should not form a part of the NIE preparation process itself.

3) The third step involves periodic independent checks on both the process and the substance of the NIEs by employing procedures similar to the PFIAB-conceived Team “B” approach. Intermittently, perhaps initially every second year, a team of outside experts who owe no formal responsibility to the existing governmental intelligence agencies would be assembled to play the adversary role. The composition of the Team would vary every time. Team members would have available all the pertinent information from all the sources. The effort would be reasonably time constrained. The report of the Team would be subject neither to review nor to revision but would be made available directly to the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. (After the Team had made its report, it would become available to other governmental agencies for criticism but not for revision). While this step would not eliminate the particular views and biases which the non-governmental experts would bring to their study, it would be free of the bureaucratic pressures or biases of the existing governmental intelligence—or indeed policy—agencies.

D. Team “B” has not addressed itself to substantive national intelligence issues other than Soviet strategic objectives. Should similarly critical issues arise—e.g., with regard to China or the Middle East—the above recommended processes could help to ensure objective intelligence support to top policy makers.
Telecommunications Security

175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Improved Security of Telecommunications

It is very probable that the Soviets are intercepting out-of-city telephone conversations of key Washington officials, since such calls are usually on radio links which can be intercepted with rather simple and commercially available equipment. [1½ lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

In briefly exploring possible approaches to solving this problem, AT&T has indicated that some limited measures are technically feasible and reasonably inexpensive. Although this would work only for outgoing calls from certain telephones, it may be the best interim solution.

For the longer term, however, we should examine the costs and effectiveness of more comprehensive solutions. I have discussed the matter with Secretary Schlesinger and we have agreed that the National Security Agency and the Defense Communications Agency could be asked through Secretary Schlesinger to (a) implement appropriate interim solutions and (b) to develop alternative programs for longer term solutions for your consideration. I would also establish a small NSC Panel of consultants to assist us in monitoring and guiding the development of these programs. A directive to initiate both interim and longer term actions is at Tab A.²

Admiral Anderson, Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, has written you to express the concern of the Board regarding Soviet interception of telecommunications (Tab C).³ If you ap-

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 54, NSDM 266. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Elliott and Ober forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, August 7, with the recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.)

² Tab A, as signed, is Document 176.

³ Anderson’s August 5 letter to the President is attached, but not printed. In it, he advised the President that PFIAB, during its June meeting, had “received a briefing by the [NSA] on the vulnerability of U.S. communications, both domestic and foreign, to Soviet intercept.” The “corrective action” overseen by William O. Baker, PFIAB member and President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, “will be expensive but it is vital to our national security,” Anderson wrote.
prove the actions proposed above, I will relay this information to the Board and keep them informed of our progress.

Recommendation:

That you approve the National Security Decision Memorandum at Tab A.4

4 The recommendation was checked approved.

176. National Security Decision Memorandum 266\(^1\)


TO

The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Improved Security of Telecommunications

The President has been informed of the opportunities for Soviet interception of critical unencrypted Government telephone conversations which may be carried on Washington area microwave links. He has directed that immediate defensive steps be taken to counter this situation.

In that connection, he has directed that you develop, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, a specific program designed to reduce significantly the opportunities for such interception.

The program should include near term interim measures including steps to route critical Government communications on cables or wire lines until well out of the Washington area. It also should propose more comprehensive long term measures including but not limited to expansion of the availability of secure telephones useable over standard telephone lines, and alternative programs for securing the microwave links in the Washington area. Program definition for both near

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 54, NSDM 266. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Ingersoll, Ash, Colby, and the Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy Clay T. Whitehead.
term and longer term proposals should include technical descriptions, costs, and scheduling information assuring highest priorities.

Details as to specific near term interim measures which can be or are being instituted and the specific dates on which they will become effective should be submitted to the President for his consideration not later than October 1, 1974.\(^2\) Details of longer term measures for this program should be submitted for the President’s consideration not later than January 1, 1975.

Henry A. Kissinger

\(^2\) Clements submitted a report on the initial measures taken to secure government communications in the Washington area to Ford under a covering memorandum, October 8. (Ibid.) Kissinger summarized the report in a memorandum to Ford, December 17. The report, he wrote, “identified 10,000 leased government circuits terminating in the Washington area for which protection seemed prudent. About 4,000 of these circuits are now on microwave and exploitable, and the remaining 6,000 are already on cable but must be tagged to see that they remain there.

“We have already initiated action to move the radio circuits to cable beginning in December. Initial estimates are that the entire moving/tagging process will be complete by next August, but we are working closely with AT&T management to accelerate this schedule. A much earlier completion date should be possible. Work on longer term measures to more thoroughly eliminate significant Soviet intercept opportunities is continuing and seems to be on schedule,” Kissinger concluded. (Ibid.)
177. National Security Decision Memorandum 296


TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT

Improved Communications Security

The President has reviewed the status of near term actions DOD has taken in response to NSDM 266\(^2\) and the alternative longer term solutions proposed. The President concurs in the near term actions already underway to move critical Washington area government circuits to cable and encourages continued efforts to accelerate these steps to completion.

It is recognized that an award may have to be made in GSA’s ongoing competitive procurement of 166 microwave circuits between New York and Washington. If the Administrator, GSA, concludes that an award should be made, the President desires that the risk of disclosure of the Soviet intercept problem be minimized. Therefore, NSA and OTP should develop criteria permitting maximum utilization of such circuits, while still protecting sensitive information, and GSA should be prepared to cover the cost of any unused circuits.

Prior to making decisions regarding implementation of long term measures, the President has requested additional studies and information. Specifically, a DOD plan for implementing the Washington Protected Communications Zone (PCZ) should be submitted by October 1, 1975. Since broad Soviet intercept of major private firm communications is also a matter of concern, the plan should include costs and schedules of alternatives for securing (a) all commercial links in the

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 59, NSDM 296 (2). Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Lynn, Colby, and Allen. Kissinger sent the NSDM to Ford under a covering memorandum, May 21, with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger explained that PCZs would be established to “envelop all Soviet/Bloc installations of concern in major cities and within which all communications would be confined to cable or encrypted microwave. The concept would minimize opportunities for intercept of both government and major private firm communications. While not of concern individually, bulk communications by major defense, financial, and legal firms, for example, could reveal information damaging to U.S. national security if collected and analyzed in the aggregate.” Ford initialed his approval. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) Document 176.
PCZ, as well as (b) only the portion of commercial links likely to be leased by the government. A preliminary analysis of the boundaries, structure, and priority of PCZs in other major cities of potential concern should also be completed by this date. DOD should also submit a detailed implementation plan for an Executive Secure Voice Network by September 1, 1975. The plan should include a costs schedule for accelerated introduction of this service, and should propose alternatives for expanding the service both in and beyond the Washington area and for achieving interoperability with other secure voice systems. Pending completion of these studies and plans, and the issuance of further guidance, the President directs that there be no increase in the level of exposure of sensitive traffic to microwave interception in those cities which are candidates for future designation as PCZs.

The DOD should immediately undertake development of Protected Radio Modulation technology to support the PCZ concept, and should accelerate development of narrow band secure voice terminals and compatible key distribution technology to facilitate implementation of an interim operational ESVN capability as early as mid-1977.

Single channel radio circuits in the Washington PCZ should be secured at the earliest possible time, and DOD should submit an implementation plan for securing single channel satellite links terminating in the Washington PCZ by October 1, 1975.

If it is decided to implement the Washington Microwave Interconnect, the system should be designed to be fully secured at the outset, whether it is government owned or leased.

Approval is deferred on proposed long term measures and developments not addressed in this decision memorandum pending completion of the PCZ and Executive Secure Voice Network implementation plans. However, FY 1976/1977 DOD budget allocation/planning should reflect the possible need for support of concept implementation and additional supporting R&D.

The State Department is requested to review potential political implications of implementing the PCZ concept, and OTP is requested to develop proposals to permit expanded implementation of the PCZ concept with minimal risk of public disclosure of the Soviet intercept problem.

Henry A. Kissinger

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3 Scowcroft signed for Kissinger.
Dear Mr. President:

Your Board has reviewed National Security Decision Memorandum 296 and is impressed with the sustained high-level concern it reflects for the serious communications insecurities which prevail at the seat of government and environs. We believe that NSDM 296 points toward many of the factors which make resolution of this problem exceptionally difficult:

[6 lines not declassified]

Nonetheless, Mr. President, given the scope, complexity, and severity of this problem, we believe that the corrective actions contemplated by NSDM 296 must promptly be extended.

[4 lines not declassified]

As a consequence of the foregoing, the problem has been demonstrated to be of far greater magnitude than we estimated one year ago. We now see that the Soviets are:

—[1½ lines not declassified]
—[3 lines not declassified]
—[3 lines not declassified]

We believe that foremost among the measures which should be taken quickly are definitive assignments of the responsibility for policy direction on the one hand, and for implementing actions on the other. In our judgment, and as is suggested in NSDM 296, policy direction must emanate from the White House. In this connection, we urge that you appoint a small (three- or four-person) consultative body of government and industry representatives to evaluate and to keep you advised of progress.

The action element for this program should be the [less than 1 line not declassified] To fulfill such a mandate, and to the end that ordinary bureaucratic impediments not unduly delay accomplishment of agreed objectives, it will be necessary to delegate an unprecedented degree of autonomy to the [less than 1 line not declassified] This will be required both for the purpose of cooperating directly with industry in the develop-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–282, Intelligence Files, PFIAB (2) [1 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger forwarded the letter to Ford under a covering memorandum, June 30, which bears Ford’s initials. (Ibid.)

2 Document 177.
opment of equipment and operations and for dealing securely with the extraordinary variety of government agencies involved.

Finally, Mr. President, we note that there is as yet no comprehensive program to assess the intelligence losses resulting from communications insecurities, nor plans to develop and maintain a sense of communications discipline in order to reduce Soviet intelligence gains. We propose that, under NSC guidance, [less than 1 line not declassified] be charged with instituting such a program.\(^3\)

Respectfully yours,

George W. Anderson, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Chairman

Addendum\(^4\)

Although the immediate and near-term budgetary impact of this program is nominal [less than 1 line not declassified] long-term costs will be substantial [less than 1 line not declassified] It is important to bear in mind that by any meaningful yardstick, these figures are miniscule: the information transfer to the Soviets will almost certainly necessitate expensive compensating actions by this Government as well as by commercial entities dealing with the USSR; and further, the cost of acquiring intelligence is so great [less than 1 line not declassified] we believe it would be ‘pound foolish’ to neglect the opportunity for maximum efforts at preventing intelligence losses.

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\(^3\) In a July 18 memorandum, Elliott and Ober advised Scowcroft “that the PFIAB idea of instituting a comprehensive program to assess the intelligence losses resulting from communications insecurities is a difficult proposal to implement.” As such, they recommended that Scowcroft, before proceeding, “consider the ramification of such action.” Elliott and Ober’s memorandum is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 59, NSDM 296 (1). In an August 9, 1976 memorandum to Bush, Scowcroft directed the CIA to prepare a damage assessment of “the known information content of Soviet intercept operations against key government and private sector organizations.” Scowcroft’s memorandum is ibid. No such assessment was found.

\(^4\) A note on the bottom of the addendum indicates that it was attached to Anderson’s letter.
179. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Soviet Intercept of Domestic Telephone Communications

Summary
As you know, the Soviets are to intercept U.S. private line telephone conversations carried on microwave radio links. Though this activity has been mentioned in U.S. Government documents and by Government officials, and there have been several news items over the past year dealing with this problem, the fact and scope of the Soviet listening has not yet become a public issue.

To protect the most sensitive information, all government communications in the above areas are being moved from microwave to non-interceptable cable. This movement is completed in Washington and progressing in New York and San Francisco.

In the meantime it is not technically or economically feasible to provide broad protection. For this interim period, it is recommended that:

—Protection be given to sensitive government contractor communications by moving them from microwave to cable.
—Some non-provocative masking be permitted of the most vulnerable microwave link in the Washington area.
—A contingency capability to jam the Soviet intercept sites be acquired.
—Detailed plans for broader implementation of advanced microwave protection techniques be prepared in anticipation of the time when they are available.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 67, NSDM 338 (1). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A note at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.”

2 Cherne opened PFIAB’s June 9 meeting with President Ford by mentioning the problem: “The Board has been concerned with the Soviet microwave intercept problem for two years. We stimulated the NSC to convene the David panel. We understand a NSDM will be forthcoming shortly.” Later, Cherne closed the meeting with the following comment: “We don’t know when the Soviet intercept issue might blow. We need a damage assessment to see if what we are getting and what the Soviets are getting here are equal. We really need a net assessment made.” Ford responded: “We will take this up. Please keep on watching this sort of thing for us and we will be in touch with you on this issue.” The record of the meeting, held in the Oval Office, is ibid., National Security Advisor, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 4. It is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976.
A small White House task force examine the organizational questions connected with securing the national telecommunication network.

Eventual implementation of large-scale protection of the public sector telecommunications will require public explanation. This explanation could be based either on the need to defeat Soviet telephone interception or on broader concerns over the inherent vulnerability of microwave telephone circuits to relatively easy interception by anyone. Both these explanation scenarios are now being analyzed and this issue will be the subject of a subsequent memorandum. Although extensive disclosure at this time of the Soviet intercept problem could put on-going government actions in a more positive perspective, it could also trigger an anti-Soviet reaction as well as demands for immediate remedial actions which are beyond current technical capabilities.

For the past several months, a special NSC Panel has been studying aspects of the problem of Soviet intercept of U.S. telephone communications. The first report of the Panel is at Tab B.\textsuperscript{3} Basically the report addresses defensive measures (to protect our circuits—government and private—from interception) and offensive measures (jamming) to neutralize Soviet efforts.

**Defensive Measures**

As mentioned above, all government circuits are being shifted from microwave to non-interceptable cable. The Panel has highlighted in particular, however, the need to protect defense contractor communications as soon as possible. For the next few years the only feasible measure is to move defense contractor circuits from microwave to cable, as was done to protect government circuits. By far the greatest part of the defense contractor private line communications are carried by AT&T and can be moved to alternate cable routing without disclosure or explanation. The other common carriers, unlike AT&T, have no alternate cable routing to offer. Should the small number of defense contractor circuits now carried on the microwave links of these carriers be moved as well, these carriers could be expected to protest publicly since a substantial part of their current and future business would be denied by government action. We propose to move only the AT&T circuits. Pending a detailed circuit analysis, the cost of this action is estimated to be about $10 million, and is accommodated within the current DOD budget. Approximately one year will be needed to complete moving these circuits.

\textsuperscript{3} Tab B, a June 1 letter to Ford from David summarizing the panel’s findings is attached, but not printed.
There are no practicable measures to secure the telephone communications of other key institutions in the private sector at this time. Protected Radio Modulation (PRM) technology is being developed to protect all circuits on microwave links; however, this technology will not be ready for initial application in the Washington, D.C. area for about two years. In the intervening time, further planning is needed to define necessary government actions in the areas of policy, regulation, and standards; to describe the role of government in developing technology and providing oversight of the program; and to determine what facts will be disclosed to the communications industry and to the public, and at what time.

The Panel has pointed out that some government role will be necessary in a program to protect the private sector, since NSA is currently the only repository of the essential cryptographic technology. Government mandated standards and regulations will also be needed to define the degree of protection and to assure that a fully integrated public telephone system, that is, one where any user can speak to any other user, is retained. However, a highly intrusive government role is not envisioned. Instead, the commercial communications carriers would be encouraged to provide secure communication service with the costs of protection borne by the users.

The basis for undertaking such a program is the principle that U.S. citizens and institutions have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the public telephone system. We need to develop further the rationale for privacy, including its ramifications with respect to communications policy and regulatory and legislative actions. A detailed strategy for public disclosure will also be necessary, both to explain government actions in extending communications security to the private sector and to encourage private sector utilization of secure communications services. The attached NSDM (Tab A) would direct the Office of Telecommunications Policy, in conjunction with DOD and NSA, to prepare a plan encompassing these elements for your consideration prior to further decision on implementation of communications security.

Offensive Measures

Jamming of the Soviet intercept sites is not judged to be an appropriate measure at this time. Such an action would be provocative, would be only partially effective for the existing intercept sites, and would not prevent the Soviets from establishing new intercept sites at unknown locations. Jamming could also escalate into a "jamming war" where we might have more to lose worldwide than the Soviets. On the

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4 Tab A, as signed, is Document 180.
other hand, a capability to initiate jamming as a contingency measure in the event of a crisis or other need to react quickly to Soviet intercept operations could be useful and relatively inexpensive.

The proposed NSDM directs the Secretary of Defense to develop contingency plans and acquire necessary equipment to initiate jamming operations at [4½ lines not declassified]

[6 lines not declassified] FCC approval is required; however, these approvals are normally granted on a routine basis. While this approach may be only moderately effective, it can be implemented quickly, is unlikely to draw an undesirable reaction from the Soviets, and would not be likely to result in further public disclosure.

I believe the actions contained in the proposed NSDM go as far toward securing private sector communications as is prudent and technically feasible at this time. These actions will protect critical defense contractor communications and will provide a contingency capability to jam the Soviet sites if desired. The planning actions, in conjunction with the ongoing technology program, will provide the additional information needed to make future decisions on broader protection of the private sector.

DOD, NSA and OTP actively participated in the Telecommunications Panel deliberations, coordinated on the Interim Report, and concur in the actions in the attached NSDM. OMB has reviewed the NSDM, as well as the Panel Report, and also concurs.

One other point will eventually require your decision if protection is extended to the private sector—that is the question of the government agency which should take the lead in providing oversight to a program which straddles government and private interests. The Office of Telecommunications Policy can appropriately initiate the planning function—and is so tasked in the draft NSDM—but neither it nor any other agency is now structured and chartered to carry out the management, funding, and regulation that will be required to implement those plans.

This organizational question will be considered further in an NSC-chaired ad hoc group within the Executive Office, including representatives of OMB, the Domestic Council, OTP, and the White House Counsel’s office.

Recommendations

That you authorize me to sign the NSDM at Tab A.⁵

⁵ Ford initialed his approval.
850 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV

180. National Security Decision Memorandum 338

Washington, September 1, 1976.

TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy

SUBJECT
Further Improvements in Telecommunications Security

The President has reviewed the status of measures to protect government telephone communications in the Washington, D.C., New York City, and San Francisco areas taken in response to NSDM 266, NSDM 296, and other directives. He directs that actions now underway to move critical circuits from microwave to cable in the New York City and San Francisco locations be given high priority and that development of Protected Radio Modulation (PRM) techniques for earliest possible application in known threat areas be expedited.

The President is concerned about possible damage to the national security and the economy from continuing Soviet intercept of critical non-government communications, including government defense contractors and certain other key institutions in the private sector. The President further recognizes that U.S. citizens and institutions should have a reasonable expectation of privacy from foreign or domestic intercept when using the public telephone system. The President has therefore decided that communication security should be extended to government defense contractors dealing in classified or sensitive information at the earliest possible time. He has also directed that planning be undertaken to meet the longer-term need to protect other key institutions in the private sector, and, ultimately, to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy for all users of public telecommunications. Implementation of these longer-term plans will be dependent upon further Presidential review.

Toward these objectives, the President desires that action be taken by the Secretary of Defense to accomplish the following:

1. Immediate steps should be taken to reduce vulnerability to Soviet intercept of private line communications of government contractors dealing in classified or sensitive information. Action should be

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 67, NSDM 338 (1). Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Bush, and Allen.
2 NSDM 266 is Document 176.
3 NSDM 296 is Document 177.
taken as soon as possible to move circuits of critical government defense contractors from microwave to cable in confirmed threat areas. This action should be accomplished without further disclosure of Soviet intercept operations. Procedures for moving circuits should be modeled after procedures used to implement NSDM 266. The Department of Defense shall cover the cost of moving and securing these circuits. Only those circuits on carriers offering alternate cable routing shall be moved. Selection and priority of circuits to be moved shall be established by DOD based on sensitivity of classified contracts and intelligence information on Soviet intercept operations.

2. In order to preserve an option to initiate jamming quickly, action should be taken to develop contingency plans, procure necessary equipment and acquire necessary real estate locations to allow jamming on short notice of [3½ lines not declassified]

The President further directs the Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, with the participation and assistance of DOD and NSA, to prepare a detailed Action Plan setting forth the actions and schedule milestones necessary to achieve a wide degree of protection for private sector microwave communications. The Plan should identify needed policy and regulatory decisions, describe in detail the roles of industry and government, including management and funding considerations, and integrate the schedule for these actions with the technical development milestones.

This Plan should be divided into two distinct phases. Phase I shall at the earliest possible date provide for protection of those microwave radio links in Washington, D.C., New York City, and San Francisco which are most vulnerable to exploitation by the Soviet Union, with extension to the complete Washington, New York, and San Francisco Protected Communications Zones (PCZs) as soon thereafter as feasible. Phase II shall provide for longer-term protection of domestic microwave communications on a nationwide basis. Protection shall be accomplished without excessive government intrusion into the private sector. The approach to securing microwave communications against interception in Phase II should be to encourage the commercial telecommunications carriers to provide protected service offerings with

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4 On November 2, Bush sent a memorandum to Scowcroft expressing concern that “jamming or other electronic retaliation against Soviet installations in the United States” could “cause an escalation of Soviet reaction which would severely impact on U.S. intelligence operations both in the Soviet Union and perhaps elsewhere in the world. Because of this potential impact, I request that any decision to undertake any of the considered options be made only after full consultation with the Intelligence Community.” Scowcroft responded in a November 6 memorandum to Bush: “no decision will be made in this area without consultation with those concerned with the problem.” Bush’s and Scowcroft’s memoranda are ibid., NSDM 338 (2).
the costs of protection borne by the users. The government role should be oriented towards establishing policy, regulations, and standards, as well as developing basic technology as a stimulant to the commercial sector. The approach to securing the PCZ microwave links in Phase I shall be consistent with a smooth transition to broader application in Phase II. The Plan should consider all of the technical solutions for reducing foreign or domestic microwave intercept defined by the Washington, D.C., PCZ Implementation Plan being prepared by the Department of Defense.

The Action Plan should be based on the fundamental objective of protecting the privacy of all users of public telecommunications, as well as satisfying specific needs of the government. It should include a full statement of the legal, political, economic and social basis for this objective and should present in detail the related policy, regulatory and legislative actions which must be taken by various government agencies to achieve the desired protection. The Action Plan should also provide a strategy and detailed plan for public explanation of government actions for both Phases I and II. The Action Plan should be submitted for consideration by the President no later than 30 November 1976.

Brent Scowcroft
181. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) and the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Director of the Domestic Council (Cannon) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Securing U.S. Telecommunications

Background

Your earlier decision on securing U.S. telecommunications included immediate steps to reduce the opportunities for Soviet communications intercept by moving government and defense contractor circuits from microwave to less vulnerable cable. However, the limited availability of cable and its exclusive control by a single common carrier impose the need for other means in achieving wider protection. These earlier decisions also directed development of technologies for wide-scale protection of microwave circuits, as well as preparation of implementation plans to achieve broad protection of both government and private sector communications.

The next major step is to decide whether or not to proceed at this time with wide-scale protection of the domestic telecommunications system. A decision to do so would require public explanation of the vulnerability of our communications network. In reaching a decision on total protection, two recently completed studies—an intelligence community damage assessment and a review of our technical readiness to proceed—provide valuable background data.

Damage Assessment

The intelligence community assessment of the damage resulting from Soviet intercept options (Tab A) confirms our earlier concerns

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 69, NSDM 346 (2). Top Secret. Sent for action. A note at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.” Brackets are in the original. According to Connor’s January 12 memorandum to Ford, Counsel to the President Philip W. Buchen reviewed this memorandum and offered the following advice: “We concur in the NSC and Domestic Council recommendations and wish to stress the importance, in the Counsel’s office view, of the need to carefully explain the program to the Congress and the American public so that it will not be seen as a threat by military-intelligence communities to the privacy of the public’s communications network.” (Ibid., President’s Handwriting File, Box 32, Subject File, National Security—Intelligence (18))

2 NSDM 338 is Document 180.

3 The report, “An Assessment of Soviet Interception of Communications in the United States,” October 21, is attached, but not printed.
and provides specific examples of damage to national interests resulting from Soviet intercept of private sector as well as defense contractor communications. [8½ lines not declassified] the circumstantial evidence makes a convincing case for extending protection to private sector communications on a broad scale.

Technology Assessment

An NSC technical advisory panel recently reviewed the status of the technology to determine if there were any major technical uncertainties or risks in proceeding with wide-scale protection of the domestic telecommunications network (Tab B). The Panel concluded that the technology program is sufficiently broad and the technical risks are sufficiently manageable that there is no technical reason to defer a decision to proceed. The Panel further pointed out that no single technology will provide a permanent solution to the telecommunications security problem. An evolutionary approach, involving successive application of a number of technologies, will be required, with the pace being set by Soviet advances in breaking our protection system and by the evolution of our domestic telecommunications system.

Decisions

There are two basic decisions that can be made at this time: whether to proceed with the protection of the private sector telecommunications, and whether to explain publicly the vulnerability of our telecommunications system and the need for protection.

Protection of the Private Sector

There are several advantages in moving ahead now with communications protection in the private sector:

- Such action would place further emphasis on the communications security problem, helping to assure that it receives continuing and timely attention by the next Administration.
- The damage to the national interests resulting from continuing intercept of private sector communications is great. Broad-scale remedial actions need to be implemented as soon as possible.
- The possibility of public disclosure of the problem without corresponding government action would likely result in disorganized responses by the telecommunications carriers and private sector users which could be disruptive to the domestic communications network and may not, in fact, substantially improve communications security.

The main problem, from a foreign intelligence perspective, in moving ahead with communications protection is that it may stimulate

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4 David’s December 17 letter to Scowcroft summarizing the report of the NSC’s Special Panel on Telecommunications Security is attached, but not printed.
the Soviets to take even greater protective measures for their own telecommunications and thereby deny us a valuable and possibly irreplaceable source of information. However, a Presidential decision to knowingly permit the Soviets to listen to private telecommunications in the U.S.—when there is a technical means to halt it—in order to possibly preserve an external intelligence source would be highly criticized if such a decision became known. In addition there is an alternate view that the pace of the Soviet program to protect their communications is set by their recognition of the vulnerability of those communications and is relatively unaffected by U.S. communications security actions.

A secondary disadvantage of proceeding with the protection of the private sector is that some of the smaller common carriers, which depend almost entirely on microwave transmission, are currently suffering cash flow and capital problems. The cost of adding protective equipment, though not a major outlay and recoverable at least in part from user charges, could put these carriers at a competitive disadvantage relative to the larger common carriers.

Public Explanation

There are several reasons for making a public explanation of the vulnerability of the domestic telecommunications network and (possibly) the Soviet intercept problem at this time:

- Public explanation will alert private sector institutions to the potential damage from uncontrolled use of the telephone, allowing implementation of administrative procedures to reduce losses.
- Public explanation would place the actions of this Administration in the proper perspective. It is particularly important for the Government to create a favorable climate for public acceptance of communications security so that it is correctly perceived as a means to increased privacy and not as a threat to individual civil rights. Ongoing GAO investigations of the vulnerability of the telephone system to intercept and wiretap, the continuing activities of the House Government Information and Individual Rights Sub-committee staff in investigation of alleged government invasion of privacy, and possible inadvertent disclosure during transition might distort government actions, making them appear as an extension of the military/intelligence organizations.
- Even though some of the technologies will not be ready for application for a year or more, it will be necessary for many more people in both government and the private sector to become aware of the vulnerability problem within the next few months if planning and implementation of approved protection measures are to proceed without delay. For example, in the memorandum at Tab C, the Secretary of Defense proposes to inform all defense contractors of the intercept threat. Public explanation would facilitate dealing with the defense commu-

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5 Rumsfeld’s December 11 memorandum to Ford is attached, but not printed.
nity, the commercial telecommunications carriers and the critical private sector institutions on this problem.

- Public explanation will place emphasis on this important problem and will assure that it receives continuing attention by the next Administration.

The disadvantages of public explanation are:

- It forewarns the Soviets, possibly increasing the sophistication of their efforts and making it more difficult to successfully counter their operations.
- It could be an additional stimulus for Soviet countermeasures against our own monitoring of their communications.
- It could trigger a strong, public anti-Soviet reaction.
- It could create demands for immediate remedial actions which are beyond current technical capabilities.

In the event of an affirmative decision, a public explanation could make the following points:

- The growth of microwave radio in our long-distance telephone system has greatly increased its vulnerability to foreign or domestic intercept.
- Microwaves are open and anyone with the proper equipment in the right location can intercept and record communications.
- Inexpensive and unobtrusive means for intercept are readily available on the commercial market and can be used by other foreign countries, organized crime, industrial espionage agents, or other unscrupulous domestic elements to eavesdrop on telephone conversations. [As an additional option, it could be stated that a foreign power is conducting telephone interception in certain localities.]
- Such actions are an invasion of individual privacy, are detrimental to national interests, and are a threat to national security.
- This has been a problem of real concern to your Administration, which has undertaken a major program to improve the security of communications:
  - Special technologies are being developed for long-term, wide-scale, low-cost protection of the domestic communications network.
  - In the interim, short-term steps have been taken to protect critical government and national security information.
- Continuing attention to improvement in telecommunications security will be an important problem for the new Administration. In the interim, care should be exercised in uses of these communications.

**Implementation Alternatives**

A long-range plan has been prepared for wide-scale application of communications protection in the domestic communications network, first in Washington, New York, and San Francisco areas, and eventually nationwide. This plan (a summary is at Tab D) provides for pro-
tection of all communications in these areas, both private and government, including protection of satellite communications as well as the terrestrial microwave network. Two major alternatives for the government/industry role are considered:

- The first alternative would minimize the government role through a cooperative government/industry effort. Required use of approved commercially-provided, secure communication services by government agencies and defense contractors would be expected to create a market demand for secure communications as well as providing needed improvements in security. These market forces, working in conjunction with a government-sponsored educational campaign to increase public awareness of the intercept threat, would be expected to provide the incentive for broad application of communications security. The drawback to this alternative is the lack of certainty that such broad protection would in fact materialize.

- The second alternative is surer but would require stronger government action to meet the threat through a Federally-mandated program directing implementation of approved protection techniques throughout the national microwave network. This approach would require implementing legislation and might well require the government to make sensitive choices as to which sectors of the private sector would be protected and which would not.

In either alternative, the government would need to establish policy, standards and regulations, would assist the private sector by making government-developed cryptographic technology available for commercial application, and would promote public acceptance of the need for communications security by making the private sector aware of the nature and scope of the threat. Industry would apply bulk protection techniques to the communications networks and would pass the added costs to the users. The total cost of protecting the Washington, New York and San Francisco areas is estimated to be $200–300 million, corresponding to less than a one percent increase in the telephone rate base. The cost of nationwide protection is estimated to be $1.0–2.0 billion.

The decision on which of the two alternative approaches to implementing protection cannot appropriately be made at this time. Consultations need to be carried out with the communications industry, key members of Congress, and the FCC before making a final decision.

Organizational Considerations

Since telecommunications security for the United States is a problem without precedent, no existing government entity is structured to deal with it on a permanent basis. This will be an important organizational issue for the new Administration. If you wish to move forward with the program now, a directive could be issued to establish a new organization on telecommunications security, possibly chaired by the Vice President.
A study has been recently completed by the NSC, Domestic Council, OMB, and OTP which considered a number of options for continuing oversight of the communication security problem (Tab E).\(^7\) Basically, the options are two-fold: either to vest a single agency with the mandate to implement a national telecommunication security program, or to deal with the problem on an interagency basis involving a continuing White House management role.

- The first alternative has the advantage of avoiding management by committee, and could be effective if the agency head accepted this program as a priority matter. The main disadvantage of selecting a single agency is that the obvious agency—the one with the expertise in encryption—is the Defense Department. It might be difficult to obtain Congressional support for having DOD involved in private sector telecommunications, both from the point of view that the defense/intelligence community does not belong in this area, and that DOD would not be sensitive to the business/commercial problems of the common carriers.
- A White House committee would assure continuing high priority to the implementation of the protection of private sector telecommunications, and by involving the domestic as well as national security interests, the objections mentioned above would be mitigated. Much of the programmatic work would still be carried out by DOD, but the interfaces with the communications industry, Congress, and the FCC would be through the committee.

Our discussions with the Vice President, who has been personally concerned for some time about the interception of U.S. telecommunications, support the concept of a joint committee being established by the National Security Council and the Domestic Council to take the lead in protecting telecommunications.

**Recommendations**

1. That you approve proceeding with a program to protect the private sector as well as government communications.
   
   a. Approve ______ \(^8\)
   
   b. Disapprove (defer the decision) ______

2. That you approve the public explanation of the vulnerability of U.S. telecommunications, possibly as part of the State of the Union address.

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\(^7\) The report of the Special Task Group on Telecommunication Organization, December 1, is attached, but not printed.

\(^8\) Ford initialed his approval.
a. Approve ______
b. No public announcement at this time ______

3. That you approve the establishment of a joint National Security Council/Domestic Council Committee on Telecommunications Security to oversee this effort.

a. Approve ______
b. Approve, and chaired by the Vice President ______
c. Alternatively, direct the Secretary of Defense to take the responsibility ______
d. Disapprove (defer the organizational decision) ______

9 Ford disapproved, initialing option B.
10 Ford initialed his approval.
11 Ford initialed his approval.

182. National Security Decision Memorandum 346


TO
The Vice President of the United States
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
Counsel to the President
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 69, NSDM 346 (1). Top Secret. A copy was sent to Allen.
SUBJECT
Security of U.S. Telecommunications

The rapid growth in the use of microwave radio in our long distance telephone system has greatly increased the vulnerability of our telephone communications to foreign or domestic intercept. These microwave links are open and can be intercepted and recorded with relative ease using comparatively inexpensive, small, and unobtrusive equipment. It is possible, therefore, that intercept operations in the US could be conducted either by foreign countries or criminal elements. The President is concerned about this threat and has directed the following actions to deal with it.

—Government communications in the Washington area have been rerouted from microwave to cable, and government communications in New York and San Francisco are in the process of being moved to cable.
—The lines of sensitive government contractors are similarly being shifted to cable.
—The Department of Defense has developed electronic bulk scrambling techniques that can protect microwave links on a comprehensive basis at relatively low cost. A system will be installed and tested on a major link in Washington during the course of this year.
—The Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) has prepared an implementation plan for use of these electronic scrambling techniques on all microwave links in the three areas of Soviet interception activity, and a second phase to introduce this protection nationwide.

After reviewing the status of these actions and the recent recommendations of the National Security Council (NSC), the Domestic Council, and the White House Counsel, the President has decided that the program to protect US telecommunications should proceed as an urgent matter.

New Oversight Committee

To assure continued priority attention to this important matter throughout the executive branch, the President has directed the establishment of a joint NSC/Domestic Council Committee on the Security of US Telecommunications, to be chaired by the Vice President. The membership will include the addressees and such additional members as the Vice President may consider appropriate. The Committee, inter alia, will:

—Provide oversight and coordination of measures in implementation of this policy.
—Report periodically to the President on the implementation of the protection program.

2 See Document 181.
—Serve as the point of contact for interchanges with the Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, the common carriers and communication industry, and others as appropriate.

**Next Steps**

The OTP implementation plan for wide scale application of communication protection is predicated on the selection of one of two major alternatives for the government/industry role.

—The first alternative would minimize the government role through a cooperative government/industry effort. The government would require government agencies and sensitive government contractors to use approved commercially provided secure communication services. This would create a substantial market demand for secure communications as well as provide needed improvement in security of government communications. It would be anticipated that, once established, market forces combined with greater public awareness would work to assure broad application of telephone security. The advantage of this alternative is the minimal governmental role, but a significant drawback is the lack of certainty that such broad protection would in fact materialize.

—The second alternative provides for government action through a Federally-mandated program directing implementation of approved protection techniques throughout the national microwave network. This approach would require implementing legislation and could require the government to make choices as to which sectors of the private sector would be protected.

In both these alternatives, the government would establish policy, standards and regulations, would assist the private sector by making government-developed cryptographic technology available for commercial application, and would promote public acceptance of the need for communications security by making the private sector aware of the nature and scope of the threat as well as the commercial availability of government-approved secure communications. Industry would apply bulk protection techniques to the communications networks and would pass the added costs on to the users.

As a first order of business, the Committee is requested to evaluate these options and to make recommendations to the President by March 1, 1977. This report should include drafts of any proposed legislation and a plan for public disclosure and the elicitation of public support.

*Brent Scowcroft*
The *Hughes Glomar Explorer*’s Secret Mission to Recover a Sunken Soviet Submarine

183. Editorial Note

In March 1968, a Soviet Golf II submarine carrying nuclear ballistic missiles tipped with four-megaton warheads, cryptographic materials, and a seventy-person crew suffered an internal explosion on a routine patrol mission and sank in the Pacific Ocean some 1900 nautical miles northwest of Hawaii. The Soviet Navy subsequently conducted an extensive but unsuccessful search for the wreckage. Alerted by this unusual Soviet activity, the United States began its own search for the sunken submarine, which was located in August 1968.

In August 1970, Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), Richard Helms, established recovery of the sunken Soviet submarine as the Board’s “highest priority” and established its targets to include the submarine’s cryptographic equipment, nuclear warheads, missiles, navigation and fire control systems, sonar and anti-submarine warfare technologies, and related documentation. In September 1972, Helms, in his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), reviewed the project and recommended to the 40 Committee that it be continued.

The 40 Committee charged the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the mission to recover the submarine. It took the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, led by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Carl E. Duckett, several years to develop the hardware necessary to carry out the technologically sophisticated mission. The operation required the development of a ship to serve as a platform designed to grab the submarine and raise it to the surface. The recovery ship was accompanied by an enormous barge that prevented Soviet reconnaissance satellites from photographing the operation. Summa Corporation, a subsidiary of Hughes Tool Company owned by billionaire industrialist Howard Hughes, was chosen to be the project’s ostensible sponsor and source of funding. Hughes Global Marine, Inc., built the barge and recovery ship, called the *Hughes Glomar Explorer* (HGE).

The cover story developed was that the *HGE*, construction on which began in 1971, was being built for Hughes’s private commercial venture to mine manganese nodules located on the ocean floor. In May 1974, as construction of the *HGE* neared completion, William Colby, Helms’s successor as DCI and USIB chairman, reviewed the proposal and recommended that the 40 Committee approve recovery of the Soviet submarine. The submarine, Colby argued, contained “information which can be obtained from no other source, on subjects of great impor-
tance to the national defense.” The 40 Committee met to discuss the proposal and recommended its approval. On June 7, President Richard M. Nixon authorized the plan to raise the Soviet submarine.

The recovery mission began on or about June 15, 1974; however, it was only partially successful. In November 1974, an Ad Hoc Committee of the USIB and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements each recommended another mission. On January 22, 1975, the 40 Committee met and proposed that a second mission be undertaken, and on February 6, President Gerald R. Ford approved the operation.

As preparations for the second mission were underway, the operation’s cover story was blown when syndicated columnist Jack Anderson and several major newspapers—including the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and the Washington Post—reported that the HGE was actually an undercover operation led by the CIA to recover the sunken Soviet submarine. Previously, Colby had held meetings with journalists, including Seymour Hersh, during which he persuaded them to delay publishing stories about the secret operation. Once Anderson had broken the informal silence, Hersh published an article in the March 19, 1975, edition of the New York Times reporting several significant details about the clandestine operation—including its actual purpose, cost (estimated at more than $250 million), technology, and results.

As a result of the media exposure, the Soviet Union became aware of the HGE’s actual purpose. On March 28, 1975, Colby argued that it was “inadvisable to undertake a second mission” due to the operation’s exposure. On June 5, the 40 Committee met and concluded that the program should be terminated, and President Ford approved the Committee’s recommendation on June 16. On August 30, 1976, the Hughes Glomar Explorer was mothballed.
184. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the Chairman of the 40 Committee (Kissinger) 


SUBJECT
Project AZORIAN

1. On balance, I am in favor of continuing Project AZORIAN.

2. I have examined the documentation prepared by the [less than 1 line not declassified] and feel that it presents a fair and objective description. I also have reviewed the re-assessment of the intelligence value of the AZORIAN target by the United States Intelligence Board on 10 August 1972. That assessment is in my opinion an accurate, national evaluation of the intelligence potential of the target.

3. The technical risks have been exhaustively studied by [less than 1 line not declassified] and they are, in my opinion, acceptable in view of the intelligence value of the target. The political judgements can only be made satisfactorily at the time the actual mission would be scheduled. With regard to costs, the bulk of the money has already been spent, the ship is nearing launch, and I think that the risk of significant additional cost increases is low. It is also worth noting that even if AZORIAN were cancelled now, the FY 73 funds planned for the program would probably be deleted by the Congress and not be available for transfer to other programs.

4. I have appended a paper which discusses the intelligence issues that have been questioned by those who now doubt the desirability of proceeding with Project AZORIAN. I agree that all these issues lead to very close judgements and it is reasonable that we should have some disagreement about them. Indeed, a year ago we debated them all and, on balance, decided to proceed with the program. However, I think the following points argue that it is now no longer sensible for us to reverse that judgement:

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A: E[xecutive] R[egistry] Subject Files, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975 JENNIFER. Top Secret; JENNIFER.

2 AZORIAN was the codename for the first mission by the Hughes Glomar Explorer to recover the sunken Soviet submarine. In 2010, the CIA declassified a 50-page article from the fall 1978 edition of its journal Studies in Intelligence entitled “Project AZORIAN: The Story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer” that described the origins and execution of the mission. (“Project AZORIAN: The Story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer,” Studies in Intelligence 22, No. 3 (Fall 1978), pp. 1–50)

3 Not found.

4 No record of such a decision has been found.
a. All the new information that has been accumulated since our last decision goes in favor of continuing the program.

b. Costs that would be recovered are small and, in any event, may not be available for transfer to other programs.

c. On behalf of our cover story, our primary contractors have committed themselves publicly to a large ocean mining endeavor. Although there is sincere commercial interest along these lines, they would not have made a commitment to such a large expenditure at this time, and could not follow through on it, without the Government’s current involvement. I am concerned that we would have justifiable difficulties with these contractors over a termination.

d. Finally, I think we should be concerned about the Government’s reputation. To the contractors, a termination decision at this late date would, I believe, seem capricious. This is a serious matter in intelligence programs where security and cover problems require a closer relationship between the Government and its contractors than is customary in other contractual areas. Our reputation for stability within the contractor community is therefore an important matter, and I am concerned that in the wake of such a termination it would become more difficult to find corporations willing to participate with us in such a cooperative way.

Richard Helms

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M010066A: E[xecutive] R[egistry] Subject Files, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975 JENNIFER/[codewords not declassified]; AZORIAN; [codewords not declassified]. 4 pages not declassified.]

5 Printed from a copy that bears a typed signature with an indication that Helms signed the original.
185. Memorandum From the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (Colby) to the Chairman of the 40 Committee (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Intelligence Value of Project AZORIAN

1. The United States Intelligence Board has reviewed and updated its intelligence assessment of Project AZORIAN (attached). On the basis of this review, the Board concludes that there have been no significant developments since the last Board assessment which would detract from the unique intelligence value of this target.

2. Successful recovery and exploitation of the cryptographic materials expected to be on board would represent a major milestone for the U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] effort against Soviet naval forces. [1½ lines not declassified] Acquisition of the nuclear warhead and the SS–N–5 missile system, together with related documents, would provide a much improved baseline for estimates of the current and future Soviet strategic threat. The Board also expects that recovered documents would provide important insights [1½ lines not declassified]

3. In its evaluation the Board assumed a successful mission. On this basis the Board continues to believe that recovery of the AZORIAN submarine would provide information [less than 1 line not declassified] on subjects of great importance to the national defense.

W. E. Colby
Chairman

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\(^1\) Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, AZORIAN Project. Top Secret; JENNIFER; [codeword not declassified]; AZORIAN.
Attachment

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (John T. Hughes) to the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (Colby)²


SUBJECT
Intelligence Value of Project AZORIAN

REFERENCE
JEN–0009/72(U) dated 7 August 1972³

1. The Ad Hoc Committee has reviewed and updated the assessment of intelligence value of Project AZORIAN. In the conduct of its review, the Committee found that there have been no significant intelligence developments since the last Board assessment which would detract from the unique potential of the AZORIAN target, particularly with respect to cryptographic materials, the nuclear warhead, and SS–N–5 missile components. A recommendation for Board consideration is set forth in paragraph 4.

2. In conducting this review, the Committee did not address the technical or political feasibility of AZORIAN. Its conclusions assume successful recovery and physical possession of certain weapons components, cryptographic materials, and sensitive documentation in a condition adequate to permit detailed technical examination.

3. The Committee examined the five major categories of equipment which are believed to represent the more significant acquisitions potentially derivable from the AZORIAN target. Committee conclusions are summarized below:

   a. Cryptographic Machines and Materials (Annex A). A major justification for Project AZORIAN is the intelligence value of the cryptographic materials. [5½ lines not declassified]. Such equipment and related material would be of very high value to the U.S. intelligence effort against Soviet naval forces. It could also be an important factor in our overall [less than 1 line not declassified] of the Soviet Union.

   b. Nuclear Warheads and Related Documents (Annex B). Acquisition of data in this category, particularly on nuclear weapon design, would be extremely valuable. [2 lines not declassified] Recovery of nuclear warheads

² Top Secret; JENNIFER/[codeword not declassified]; AZORIAN; [codeword not declassified]; RESTRICTED DATA.
³ Not found.
and related documents from the AZORIAN target would provide important new insight into Soviet nuclear technology, weapon design concepts, and related operational procedures.

c. The SS–N–5 Missile (Annex C). The SS–N–5 missile, although not in itself the major SLBM threat, would provide important information on technologies relevant to the SS–N–6, and possibly to some aspects of the SS–N–8. [4 lines not declassified] Acquisition of the SS–N–5 would represent an important milestone and be of high intelligence value.

d. Navigation and Fire Control Systems (Annex D). Most navigation equipment probably would be relatively unsophisticated in terms of more recent systems and would provide little data pertinent to them. On the other hand, equipment and documentation in the missile fire control category are considered to be of high value. Instruction books, internal circuit diagrams, spare parts, and related documentation probably would add significantly to our technical understanding of the GOLF–II strategic weapon system.

e. Sonar and Other Naval Equipment (Annex E). Sonar and ASW equipment is generally expected to be of modest value, due to obsolescence, but would provide evidence of Soviet progress in areas [less than 1 line not declassified] Sonar communications systems, self-noise data, and ASW decoys would be of higher value.

4. Recommendation: It is recommended that USIB approve the major conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee as summarized in paragraph 3 and supported in detail in Annexes A through E.

John T. Hughes
Chairman
Ad Hoc Committee
Memorandum to the Chairman of the 40 Committee (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Project AZORIAN Mission Proposal

1. This is an operational mission of [less than 1 line not declassified], planned for the period June–October 1974. The mission has been assigned [less than 1 line not declassified] code name of Project AZORIAN. The objective is the recovery of a major portion of the Soviet GOLF II CLASS submarine #722 from the ocean bottom in the North Central Pacific.

2. Situation:

The AZORIAN Program recovery platform, HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER, ostensibly a deep ocean mining vessel, completed a series of extensive system tests and crew training off the west coast of California on 12 May 1974. Several difficulties, now resolved, were encountered during the test program. These tests have disclosed no technical deficiencies which would indicate that the mission cannot be successfully performed. The Mission Director—the senior U.S. Government officer on board, who heads the Mission Team—stated in his summary message following the completion of these tests:

“All tests at 2,800 feet have been completed. In spite of the fact that we have had to work through many problems, all systems have worked satisfactorily. The crew has performed extremely well. I am convinced that they are qualified to begin the mission . . . It is my recommendation that following the upcoming refit and crew rest period we begin the mission (on or about 15 June).”

The ship is now in Long Beach, California undergoing final system preparations for mission readiness. If approval to depart in mid-June is received, the ship would depart Long Beach, and at normal cruising speed arrive in the vicinity of the target in fourteen days, following which the recovery operation could commence. (See Tab A.) It is mandatory that recovery operation be initiated as early as possible in the “annual weather window”—the period between 15 June and 13 August\(^2\)—when there is the highest probability for sea conditions in that area of the North Pacific within which the recovery system can be successfully operated. Nominally, the on-site recovery operation would require approximately three weeks. However, if an

\(^1\) Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, AZORIAN Project. Top Secret; JENNIFER/[codewords not declassified]; AZORIAN. Ellipses in the original.

\(^2\) Three week operation—no major technical delays. [Footnote in the original.]
allowance is included for holds caused by extreme weather or other contingencies, this period could be as long as six weeks.

As noted above, the time used to effect resolution of technical problems encountered in sea trials has required a curtailment of the deep water test as well as the simulated mining legs which were intended to further condition the USSR to the operation of the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER. While simulated mining legs in the Hawaiian area would have generated additional publicity and would have provided the Soviets with further opportunities to observe the vessel, there was no assurance that that would occur. Deletion of these legs will not unravel the cover nor reduce the import of the considerable publicity in the media and trade journals developed over the past four years. Ostensibly the rationale for proceeding directly to the retrieval site is to determine “weather constraints on the mining system”. Analysis of these changes indicates that this new scenario remains compatible with a commercial mining hardware test and evaluation program. To the public, all time at sea since departing Chester, Pennsylvania, has been related to mining system tests. These activities have received considerable publicity. Conduct of tests to determine “weather constraints on the mining system” in an area where data exists on the sea floor terrain and where manganese nodules exist is consistent with the logic of the deep ocean mining cover. It is reasonably certain that the Soviets are cognizant of the existence of the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER and its purported deep ocean mining role by virtue of the extensive publicity, Soviet overhead reconnaissance, and the observational opportunities Soviet vessels have had at Long Beach.

3. Background

The Soviet GOLF II CLASS submarine #722 was lost in the North Central Pacific, in March 1968, following which there was an extensive, but unsuccessful, search for the wreckage by the USSR.

[2½ lines not declassified] the Chairman, United States Intelligence Board (USIB) established the G #722 as the highest priority target [less than 1 line not declassified] in August 1970. On 23 May 1974 the Chairman, USIB revalidated the requirement and indicated that “recovery of the AZORIAN submarine would provide information which can be obtained from no other source, on subjects of great importance to the national defense.” (See Tab B.)

In October 1970, the AZORIAN Program was authorized [less than 1 line not declassified] to proceed with hardware acquisition and planning for recovery of the G #722. This decision was made recognizing that there was no other asset capable of satisfying at that time or in the fore-
seeable future, this USIB requirement. The major categories of equipment and related documents expected to be acquired include:

- **Cryptographic Equipments**
- **Nuclear Warhead**
- **SS–N–5 Missile**
- **Navigation and Fire Control System**
- **Sonar and ASW Countermeasures Equipments**

4. Command and Control:

[2½ lines not declassified] The authority for direction and control of the mission operations is delegated to the Director, Program B (DPB). The Mission Director is the senior U.S. Government command authority embarked in HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER and is in tactical command of operations.

[3 lines not declassified] There is provision for reliable and secure communications between the Control Center and the ship. In the remote possibility that the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER is subjected to severe hostile reaction by the USSR, plans have been developed to shift the ashore command and control [less than 1 line not declassified] to CINCPACFLT, in concert with higher authority. If the mission is compromised or at any other time, higher authority has the option of initiating a bilateral dialogue with the Soviet Union via the “hot line” or by other means in order to defuse the situation thus reducing the possibility of military confrontation at sea. However, mission success is predicated on the commercial mining cover withstanding the closest scrutiny, short of a complete compromise of the program mission. An evaluation of cover adequacy is noted in paragraph 6 below.

5. Schedule:

Recovery mission evolutions are planned to be accomplished against the following schedule subsequent to the departure of the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER from Long Beach, California:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transit from Long Beach to Target Site</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>15 June – 29 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Recovery Operation</td>
<td>21–42 days</td>
<td>30 June to 20 July–10 Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[less than 1 line not declassified]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enroute to Midway Island</td>
<td>21 days</td>
<td>10–31 Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midway Island [less than 1 line not declassified]</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>13 Aug.–3 Sept.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Deep Ocean Mining Cover Evaluation:

From the outset it has been recognized that there could be no overt U.S. Government involvement in AZORIAN without attracting close Soviet scrutiny, and possible realization of the actual purpose for the program. The alternative was to structure the program as a commercial venture. The determination reached was that deep ocean mining would be particularly suitable. The industry was in its infancy, potentially quite profitable, with no one apparently committed to a hardware development phase and thereby possessing a yardstick by which credibility could be measured. Hughes Tool Company’s (later Summa Corporation) participation as the sponsor and sole source of funding was a logical selection. Mr. Howard Hughes is the only stockholder; he is recognized as a pioneering entrepreneur with a wide variety of business interests; he has the necessary financial resources; he habitually operates in secrecy; and, his personal eccentricities are such that news media reporting and speculation about his activities frequently range from the truth to utter fiction. The contractor team was chosen in light of their considerable experience and competence in the deep ocean arena: Global Marine, Inc.—ship construction and system operation; Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.—capture vehicle (ostensibly the mining machine); and Honeywell, Inc.—automatic station keeping and data processing.

After more than three years of carefully managed ocean mining cover planning, development and evaluation, certain conclusions concerning cover credibility and continued viability are considered reasonable:

a. The Summa Corporation Deep Ocean Mining Project (DOMP) is recognized and accepted by the media, both news and technical, for that which it purports to be. The DOMP has been the subject of attention in a variety of technical and trade journals.

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A marginal note written in an unknown hand calculated that, assuming a June 15 departure, the mission would conclude sometime between October 1 and October 22.
b. There is substantive evidence that the Summa project is accepted in the commercial world, both domestic and foreign, as a legitimate prototype mining enterprise. (See Tab C.)

c. There is no evidence that the Soviets consider the deep ocean mining program to be anything but a mining venture. USSR scientific and academic institutions rely heavily on U.S. scientific and technical publications for knowledge of our activities in those arenas.

d. The classified elements of the AZORIAN recovery system hardware and mission scenario have been explained in terms of a deep ocean mining program.

7. Security:

Security is recognized as critical in maintaining the commercial cover of the operation. Though judged to be particularly effective through the present, security is known to be affected by the number of persons involved and by the passage of time. A minimal amount of speculation departing from the cover facade is known to have occurred and is discussed more fully under Tab D.

8. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

9. Crew Remains:

Provisions for handling and disposition of the target crew remains are generally in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention. [less than 1 line not declassified] They will be handled with due respect and returned to the ocean bottom [less than 1 line not declassified] This approach was agreed to by the Interagency Contingency Review Committee (ICRC) on 8 May 1974. (See Tab E.)

10. Mission Assessment:

Certain conditions precedent and conclusions combine to support the assessment that the AZORIAN mission can be accomplished without incident:

a. The recovery site is in international waters about 1,200 nm from the Soviet land mass, removed from commercial shipping lanes, and not in proximity to normal USSR or U.S. naval operating areas, except that the site does lie within the 500 nm wide USSR submarine transit lane.

b. There is no evidence that the Soviets are sensitive to the mission site because of the G-722 loss. All indications point to their unawareness of the G-722 wreckage location. The search effort mounted by the USSR (at least 53 aircraft and 37 ships) during a two-month period, March–May 1968 proved unsuccessful. Since that time, no further Soviet search or operational activity related to that loss has been noted. This is in marked contrast to the frequent Soviet presence at the site of their NOVEMBER class submarine lost in the Atlantic. Because of the massive Soviet

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5 Tabs C through H are attached, but not printed.
search effort, we can assume they are aware the U.S. knows of the G–722 loss, but they have shown no awareness of U.S. knowledge of the location. Furthermore, there has been no undue Soviet apprehension of the presence of U.S. hydrographic or survey ships in the loss area on numerous occasions since 1968. [less than 1 line not declassified] programmed surface surveys of the target site and general area were conducted to collect site data, enhance mining cover, and to test Soviet sensitivity to the site. The first (Project AXMINSTER), conducted by GLOMAR II during September 1970 to January 1971, received close USSR surveillance. This was attributed not to any Soviet sensitivity to the site, per se, but because the ship had intruded into the transit lane of the initial deployment of a USSR Y Class submarine to the East Pacific. The Soviet reactions to the AXMINSTER operation were subsequently analyzed by a panel [less than 1 line not declassified] (Details of the operation and the panel’s findings are contained in Tab F.) The second survey, ostensibly for future mining sites, was conducted by R.V. SEASCOPE during January-to-July 1972. The SEASCOPE operated within 45 miles of the target location and no Soviet reaction to this operation was noted.

c. As stated above, there has been no indication that the Soviets question the authenticity of the Summa Deep Ocean Mining Program. In this regard, it is believed that any USSR requirements for information relating to the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER would lie within their scientific and economic (not the military) communities and can largely be satisfied through open U.S. sources. The only requirement expected from the military would be as part of an assessment of the activity of all ships approaching within 1,500 nm of the Soviet land mass. As the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER offers no military threat, chances of surveillance are problematic, yet may occur due to the site being in a Soviet submarine transit lane or due to curiosity of the technical/economic aspects of the program.

d. Soviet opportunity to see the vessel thus far has been in satellite photography or by crews of Soviet commercial vessels visiting Long Beach or Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

e. A thorough and systematic examination of the threat to the AZORIAN platform by Soviet surveillance throughout all phases of its deployment has produced only a limited number of vulnerabilities. Each exists in the very near field around the ship and can be exploited only by the Soviets using highly specialized collection equipment and techniques not considered to be deployed or available to the most probable group of potential surveillance platforms. An exception to this finding is possible leakage of residual plutonium (if present) from the target into the ship wake during its final preparation for entry into the ship’s center well. During this period any surface ship could collect a water sample and return it to shore for analysis at a later date. The entire AZORIAN recovery system has been designed to deny from
even close and continuous surveillance the true purpose of AZORIAN mission operations.

f. Operational planning is reflected in the AZORIAN Mission Operations Plan, the Contingency Operations Plan (Tab G), and Cover Contingency Plan (Tab H) (as reviewed by ICRC), and the CINCPACFLT Support Plan.

11. AZORIAN Program Phaseout:

Ancillary to the aforementioned comprehensive preparations essential to successful mission execution are adequate provisions for an orderly and constructive AZORIAN Program phaseout. Those provisions must afford a logical evolution in the “cover rationale” to protect the value of the AZORIAN intelligence product, and minimize the possibility of U.S. Government and contractor embarrassment. Among the options available is use of AZORIAN hardware (the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER, heavy lift pipe and electromagnetic cable) for several months following the mission in an actual commercial deep ocean mining development program. This involvement of contractors would provide needed cover reinforcement and transition to ultimate disposition of AZORIAN assets.

12. Conclusions:

I have carefully reviewed the technical aspects of the AZORIAN program and have reached the following conclusions:

a. The AZORIAN system has the capability to recover the target section of the G–722.

b. Additional testing would add to my confidence level. However, such testing would cause a significant time loss of the early part of the favorable weather window. Much delay would have an adverse effect on the probability of success of the mission. It should be noted that certain tests (bottom sitting and full load) were never planned. Extensive sub-system testing and the redundancy capabilities designed in the system provide the maximum probability of success for those untested operations.

c. The mission team is technically trained and psychologically ready for the mission. I am particularly impressed with the capabilities that the mission team has shown in working around problems which occurred during sea test activities.

d. I further believe that the commercial mining cover program has been successful. There has been no indication of a serious breach in that cover. However, I must remain concerned that some exposure might occur if the program were delayed for a year. Such exposure could eliminate the possibility of conducting the operation in 1975.

13. Recommendation:

In view of the above, I believe that we would have the maximum probability of success by initiating the mission as soon as the ship is ready; that is, on
or about 15 June. Therefore, it is recommended that the AZORIAN Recovery Mission be authorized to proceed as defined herein and in accordance with the attachments to this memorandum.

Tab A

Map

Washington, undated.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, AZORIAN Project. Top Secret; JENNIFER/[codewords not declassified]; AZORIAN. One page not declassified.]

187. Memorandum From Rob Roy Ratliff of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Project AZORIAN—40 Committee Meeting

Culminating six years of effort, the AZORIAN Project is ready to attempt to recover a Soviet ballistic missile submarine from 16,500 feet of water in the Pacific.

The recovery ship would depart the west coast 15 June and arrive at the target site 29 June. Recovery operations will take 21–42 days (30 June to 20 July–10 August). The time element is critical because of a narrow “good weather window” (15 June–13 August) after which recovery efforts probably would have to be abandoned since it is doubtful security could be maintained until next year’s “good weather window.”

The innovative recovery system has been tested and project officials believe it will work. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) reviewed the potential intelligence gain at your request and has reaffirmed the “unique intelligence value” of the target.

Now the 40 Committee must decide whether to go ahead. As part of the Committee’s assessment of political risks, special attention must be given to the President’s Moscow visit\(^2\) which is to begin two days before our recovery ship is to arrive at the target site.

The attached AZORIAN Mission Proposal\(^3\) was prepared [less than 1 line not declassified] and has been sent to other 40 Committee principals in anticipation of a meeting. I have attached to this memorandum a brief background statement\(^4\) comment on the main issues, and questions\(^5\) you may wish to ask at the 40 Committee meeting.

Where do other 40 Committee principals stand? My preliminary reading suggests that the major (and perhaps single) negative position may come from State (Hyland and INR to date; Sisco has yet to be briefed). At a briefing last week Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Clements, Admiral Moorer and DCI Colby all reportedly favored moving ahead.

Following precedent, and because of the significance of the undertaking, you may wish to submit the 40 Committee’s recommendation to higher authority for approval.

In summary: The key question before the 40 Committee is whether the mission should proceed as scheduled, departing 15 June, arriving on site 29 June, and attempting recovery of the Soviet submarine from 30 June to 20 July–10 August. Because of the narrow “good weather window” a prompt decision is imperative to afford maximum time in which to accomplish the mission.

Conduct of the Meeting:

[less than 1 line not declassified] will be at the meeting prepared to brief on the status of the project and to address any questions you or the principals may have.

I recommend you open the meeting by asking for the briefing (it will take no more than 10 minutes) and then proceed to examine each of the major issues with the principals—your talking points are designed in this way.

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\(^2\) Nixon traveled to the Soviet Union from June 27 to July 3.

\(^3\) Document 186.

\(^4\) Attached, but not printed.

\(^5\) Attached, but not printed.
Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

ISSUES

Will the system work? Fully integrated systems tests have been completed satisfactorily at a depth of 2800 feet. Additional tests in deeper waters have been abandoned because of the critical time element. While additional tests would increase confidence in the system, project officials believe it is capable of recovering the target.

What are the chances of success? Because it is admittedly a high-risk, innovative endeavor the estimates seldom go beyond 50%. At the low end of the scale some estimated 20%; at our last review in late 1972 an estimate of 30–40% was considered sufficient to go ahead with the project. Now that the system has been completed and tested, I understand project officials go with a higher than 40% estimate.

Is a six-year-old target worth it? The USIB reaffirms the “unique intelligence value” of the target (see TAB B). Recovery and exploitation of Soviet cryptographic materials “would represent a major milestone.” Acquisition of a nuclear warhead, the SS–N–5 missile system and related documents “would provide a much improved baseline for estimates of the current and future Soviet strategic threat.” The USIB “continues to believe that recovery of the AZORIAN submarine would provide information which can be obtained from no other source, on subjects of great importance to the national defense.”

There could be “negative” gains, too. We’ve never had a Soviet cryptographic machine and if one is recovered from the target we might learn that we are wasting large sums of money trying to break Soviet codes. We might find that the base for estimates of the Soviet strategic threat is faulty, since some of our information is based upon nearly 25 years of conjecture and hard data that is at least 10 years old.

Will the Soviets know what we are doing? There is no evidence to suggest that they will associate the mission with an attempt to recover their submarine—they don’t know where their submarine is for sure, the deep ocean mining cover has been widely publicized and accepted, there have been no significant security breaches. The target is located outside normal commercial or military ship areas, however it is in a

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6 Top Secret; JENNIFER.
7 Document 185.
500-mile-wide Soviet submarine transit corridor. Mainly because of the latter and the fact that Soviets were making the initial deployment of a YANKEE-class submarine to the eastern Pacific, our first ship monitoring the area was subject to considerable Soviet surveillance; a second survey mission received none (see TAB F).8

Will Soviet reaction be hostile? Our recovery system is designed to appear to be part of a deep ocean mining operation and is capable of continuing to operate even under close and continuous Soviet surveillance. Any Soviet surveillance is likely to stem from non-military interest in the scientific/technical/economic aspects of an ostensible deep ocean mining experiment or due to the site being in a Soviet submarine transit line.

Unless the Soviets were to become aware of the real purpose of the mission, there is little reason to expect that they would react with hostility. In case of security problems while the operation is in process, the mission could be modified or suspended; if the Soviets learned of the recovery, the target could be replaced. Contingency plans have been made to meet a variety of Soviet reactions (see TABs G and H).9

What are the political risks? The Soviet submarine remains the property of the USSR, and our efforts to recover and exploit it are illegal (which was one of the opposing arguments raised by State in our late 1972 review; see TAB E, page 15 for legal aspects).10 If the Soviets were to discover our attempt, it could be exploited for propaganda and political purposes if the USSR desired. If we were successful and the Soviets did not learn of it until after the fact, Soviet embarrassment and concern over what we may have gained from our acquisition might moderate their reaction.

As Hal Sonnenfeldt pointed out in the 1972 review, détente is not going to terminate mutual intelligence operations which the target country will consider obnoxious and the collecting country vital. Either country which wished to exploit a reconnaissance operation could cite airborne, underwater and overhead programs now being conducted.

In our 1972 review State raised questions about handling of Soviet crew remains. Plans are to abide insofar as possible by the Geneva Convention (see TAB E). Remains will be returned to the sea, but the personal effects of the crew will be retained for possible future delivery to

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8 Tab F, an undated paper entitled “[name not declassified] Operation,” is attached, but not printed.
9 Tabs G and H are attached, but not printed. Tab G is a paper, September 22, 1973, outlining the contingency operations plan for Project AZORIÁN. Tab H is an undated paper, entitled “Mission Cover Contingency Plan.”
10 Tab E, an undated paper, “AZORIÁN Target Object Crew Remains,” is attached, but not printed.
the USSR in an effort to soften any reactions should they learn of the success of the mission.

On the domestic scene, note should be taken of the fact that Howard Hughes has played a prominent role in the cover for AZORIAN. While this cover has held up well, recent publicity revealed that Hughes was anxious to become a “front” for the CIA in an attempt to erect a shield to protect him from government regulatory and investigative agencies. Given the current domestic political climate, exploitation of potential severe embarrassment to the Administration could result from any public knowledge of Hughes’ role in AZORIAN.

188. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 1, 1974.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 5 June 1974

The 40 Committee met in the White House Situation Room on 5 June 1974 to discuss Project AZORIAN.

Members present were: The Chairman, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr.; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer; and Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also attending were: Albert C. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) [less than 1 line not declassified] David S. Potter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D) [less than 1 line not declassified] Carl Duckett, Deputy Director of CIA for Science and Technology; William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Richard T. Kennedy, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Planning.

1 Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Aerial Recon. Papers, 1974. Top Secret; JENNIFER. No copies were distributed. Drafted by Ratliff.
The Chairman arrived at 1632 and the meeting began with a briefing by [name not declassified] Questions about the operation were asked by the Chairman and answered [name not declassified] Mr. Colby and Mr. Clements.

The Chairman said that he must know what is going on at all times; that if Soviet ships were in the target area he wanted to know about it.

He was assured that communication systems had been devised to insure this and that he would be kept informed. Mr. Duckett described how apparently clear messages sent by the ship actually would contain coded information.

The Chairman asked what could go wrong with this operation.

Mr. Colby and Mr. Clements responded, “Lots of things.” They described some of the mechanical, security and other problems.

Mr. Clements said that there were serious political problems that the Chairman and higher authority must consider. A “flap” could be horrendous; successful completion of the operation could be a plus. In any event the operation cannot be kept secret.

Mr. Colby said he was not so sure it couldn’t be kept quiet. He said we could tell 1700 of the 1800 who know about the project that it failed and nothing was accomplished.

Mr. Sisco doubted that this would work.

Mr. Clements said he was not sure that we had anything to gain by recovering the six-year-old target. He said that he had talked with Dr. Edward Teller “who has been up to his eyeballs” in this endeavor and that Dr. Teller has doubts.

Mr. Duckett disputed that Dr. Teller had been involved “up to his eyeballs,” or held negative views.

Mr. Clements called on Mr. Hall to comment on what value the target would be. Mr. Hall said we do not know how the Soviet missile system works, that we’ve never had one of their warheads and that recovery might well lead to information which would provide a firm base from which to estimate for intelligence purposes. On the other hand, the Soviets are now two generations beyond the target missile so recovery won’t help us to know much about the current Soviet capabilities.

Admiral Moorer said that crypto equipment was really the most significant—more so than any nuclear material. He thought that the Soviets were not likely to interfere in the operations, but he was concerned about leaks in the U.S.
Mr. Colby said we could thank the wisdom of Dick Helms that Robert Maheu\(^2\) did not know anything about Howard Hughes' connection with this project because if Maheu did, it would be all out now.

Mr. Sisco doubted that the project could move ahead without a leak; the chances were 100 to 1. Political repercussions would far outweigh any intelligence gain. He said he was not an expert, but he doubted the intelligence gain and he was certain it would leak. Relations with the Soviets would be affected, and there would be domestic repercussions as well and the President would have to take the heat.

Mr. Clements thought the domestic impact of a leak could go either way—pride that we had screwed the Soviets, or blasts of the President for allowing such a foolish thing to happen.

The Chairman asked if the Soviets found out about the project wouldn’t they say “boys will be boys,” or would they say “You dirty SOBs”? He said a memorandum to the President would be necessary. He summarized: On the plus side there is the value of intelligence to be gained, crypto missile, missile design, etc.

Mr. Hall interrupted to say that the crypto is line of sight, ship to ship, not high level strategic so it is not going to be of much value.

Mr. Duckett said that was not known for sure, that the ship had been modernized and had been on station off our west coast just before it sank, so that it was reasonable to expect that it had higher quality communications and crypto equipment.

The Chairman asked if there was a leak what would the impact be publicly, and what would be the consequences with the Soviets.

Mr. Hyland said he thought that the Soviet reaction would be nil. The Chairman agreed, adding the Soviets would likely view it as an intelligence coup which we got away with.

Mr. Clements warned not to leave out the Howard Hughes involvement.

Mr. Duckett said not to forget that we have been deep into this problem for four years without a serious leak, and that he was proud of that.

Mr. Colby said he did not think that the risk of a leak was 1000 to 1.

The Chairman said that in any event, there are two reactions to consider—public and Soviet.

Mr. Sisco thought that the public reaction could be positive—pride over the successful undertaking and accomplishment.

Mr. Clements declared that if it were up to him, his judgment would be to go ahead.

\(^2\) Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, was a Hughes aide until 1970.
Admiral Moorer dismissed the argument that the Soviets would be a problem; the public problem would be domestic.

The Chairman said that the domestic problem was for the President to decide. The U.S. public will support it if it is in the national interest.

Mr. Hyland said if the project were called off, we would be asked what was the justification for halting.

The Chairman said “Morality.”

Mr. Potter said there was the same chance of a leak whether we went ahead with the project or not.

The Chairman, discussing the domestic implications, said that if the project were stopped we would be asked why it was cancelled, why we went ahead with this when we knew four years ago that it was immoral. And if we go ahead now we will be asked why we did when we knew it was immoral. The President is faced with political considerations—public and Soviet; Howard Hughes’ involvement; and a possible direct confrontation with the Soviets.

Mr. Colby said he was prepared to take the domestic heat.

Mr. Clements said we should not forget the spirit of détente.

The Chairman asked the principals where they stood.

Mr. Clements was for.

Mr. Colby was for.

Admiral Moorer was for.

Mr. Sisco said he had doubts about going ahead.

The Chairman said that he would present the subject to the President for decision.

As the meeting was breaking up, Admiral Moorer said he had to talk about the scheduled [less than 1 line not declassified] mission. The Chairman said he did not want the ship to do anything until after 3 July, and Mr. Colby said we would see to that.\

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3 Ratliff prepared a memorandum for the record, June 10, which read as follows: “Following the 40 Committee meeting on 5 June 1974, the Chairman of the Committee prepared a memorandum for higher authority incorporating the essential points of the Committee discussion of Project AZORIAN.

“On 7 June higher authority approved the Project AZORIAN mission with the provision that the actual recovery operations not be initiated until after his departure from the USSR.” (Ibid.) Kissinger’s memorandum to Nixon was not found. Nixon traveled to the Soviet Union from June 27 through July 3.
189. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, August 8, 1974, 11:20–11:45 a.m.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A: E[xecutive] R[egistry] Subject Files, Box 3, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975 JENNIFER. Top Secret; JENNIFER. Three pages not declassified.]

190. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, August 10, 1974, 11:15–11:35 a.m.

SUBJECT
Presidential Transition

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—The President
State
Henry A. Kissinger
Robert S. Ingersoll
Defense
James R. Schlesinger
William P. Clements, Jr.
JCS
Gen. George S. Brown
White House Staff
Jack Marsh
Donald Rumsfeld
Alexander M. Haig
Robert Hartman
CIA
William Colby
NSC
L/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Richard T. Kennedy

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Hughes Glomar Explorer.]

The President: Yes, I would like to do that, but I think we can do it directly as you suggest, Henry. Bill (to Mr. Colby), what is the latest on our ship project in the Pacific?

Mr. Colby: Well sir, as you know, the tines were damaged when we picked up the sub and we lost [less than 1 line not declassified] However, we have the rest of it inside the recovery ship and the ship has now steamed away from the area. The Soviet tug, which was in the

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area, has left the area. We are confident that it was only there in connection with its normal servicing of Soviet submarines. Our ship is now steaming on the way to Hawaii. It is very hard to tell what they have, but they have detected some radioactivity. It is possible that material inside the sub was forced forward [less than 1 line not declassified] when the sub broke up. It will probably be as long as 30 days before they really know what they have. [6½ lines not declassified] We think that at least one of the missiles was loose and it may have fallen free, but it will be some time before we know just what the situation is. It is too bad that, with the whole mission having gone so very well, we lost [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, on this AZORIAN project, I note that a number of staff are here and it will be necessary that they all be briefed on the extreme security precautions that must be taken.

Mr. Colby: We have a [less than 1 line not declassified] project which is also underway of which you should be aware. At the present, we have a [1½ lines not declassified]

The President: Is this a [less than 1 line not declassified]?

Mr. Colby: It is a [less than 1 line not declassified] but it has been especially configured for this task. Actually, it is a [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Brown: I would emphasize, however, sir, that although it is a [less than 1 line not declassified] it is a very special operation.

The President: If it’s an old one, I wonder if it could be [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Brown: No sir, it is a [less than 1 line not declassified]

The President: Well, I just wondered because it occurred to me that if they thought we were doing it direct like this [less than 1 line not declassified], [less than 1 line not declassified] I wonder how they would view it. They would really think we are up to something. I am glad it is not [less than 1 line not declassified]

Gentlemen, if there is nothing else, I suggest we adjourn and I thank you all very much. 2

2 Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft again discussed the Glomar Explorer during their 9:30 a.m. meeting in the Oval Office on September 25. According to the memorandum of conversation, the relevant discussion went as follows:

“[Kissinger:] One problem with the AZORIAN. I want to [less than 1 line not declassified], as a 40 Committee action. State disagrees. They always have. I haven’t overruled at State. You might want to hear the arguments.

President: Maybe I should.

Scowcroft: This is just to take pictures and see the situation.

President: [less than 1 line not declassified] and we will review the arguments before we authorize a follow-on.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6, September 25, 1974—Ford, Kissinger)
191. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (Hughes) to the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board (Colby)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Intelligence Value of Project MATADOR\(^2\)

REFERENCE
USIB–D–72.1/13\(^3\)

1. The Ad Hoc Committee has reviewed the intelligence justification for Project MATADOR. This review was conducted in light of the recovery attempt made in August 1974 and the consequent disposition of G–722 hull segments in the new debris field. The review also considered [5 lines not declassified]

2. The Committee found that there have been no significant intelligence developments since the last Board assessment in May 1974\(^4\) which would detract from the unique intelligence potential of equipment believed to be aboard the original MATADOR target. Although the recognized value of all items will have decreased slightly by summer 1975, our basic priorities and estimate of overall gain from acquisition of equipment and documents have not changed measurably.

3. The Committee conclusions as to the relative value and condition of G–722 components in the new debris field are based on the following:
   a. The target is now broken [3 lines not declassified]
   b. Some equipment and documents, apparently spilled from the target vehicle during the recovery attempt, are dispersed throughout the debris field. None is specifically identifiable at this time.

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\(^1\) Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, MATADOR, 1975. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]; MATADOR; [codeword not declassified]. Under a covering memorandum, November 11, Lowe forwarded the memorandum to USIB members “for Board review of the intelligence value which would warrant consideration of another MATADOR mission based on the conclusions in paragraph 5 of Mr. Hughes’ memorandum.” Lowe continued, “The DCI wishes by close of business on 11 November Board concurrence in, or other views on, another MATADOR mission, specifically from the viewpoint of intelligence requirements.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) MATADOR was the codename for the second mission by the Hughes Glomar Explorer to recover the sunken Soviet submarine.

\(^3\) Not found.

\(^4\) See Document 185.
c. The current location and condition [less than 1 line not declassified] are unknown. [2 lines not declassified]

4. In light of these new developments, the Committee re-examined the five major categories which were believed to represent the more significant acquisitions potentially derivable from the original MATADOR target.

a. Cryptographic machines and related documents: This category was one of the primary justifications for the original MATADOR project. [21 lines not declassified]

b. Nuclear warheads and related documents: [8 lines not declassified]

c. The SS–N–5 missile: [8 lines not declassified]

d. Navigation and fire control systems: [11½ lines not declassified]

e. Sonar and other naval equipment: [5½ lines not declassified]

5. On the basis of the foregoing, the Committee concludes:

a. There are items of high intelligence value in the new debris field that are potentially recoverable.

b. The [less than 1 line not declassified] is more likely to contain items of highest intelligence value [1½ lines not declassified]

The Committee recommends that this section be accorded priority if recovery of either hull section is attempted.

John T. Hughes
Chairman
Ad Hoc Committee

Printed from a copy that bears Hughes’ typed signature and an indication that he signed the original.
192. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the United States Intelligence Board (Lowe) to Holders of USIB–D–72.1/17


SUBJECT
Intelligence Value of Project MATADOR

REFERENCE
USIB–D–72.1/17, 11 November 1974,2 special limited distribution

On 11 November, the CIA, DIA, [less than 1 line not declassified] and AEC members of USIB concurred in the reference report, and the Treasury and FBI members abstained. The State member non-concurred with the following comment:

“The Director, INR/State, believes that this assessment (and therefore the recommendation) is too optimistic and positive. It is misleading to estimate that our ‘basic priorities and estimate of overall gain from the acquisition of equipment and documents have not changed measurably.’ (Paragraph 2 of reference) [6½ lines not declassified] Thus, the overall gain from a second mission is almost certainly to be of much less value than the original estimate. [3 lines not declassified]

Bruce A. Lowe
Executive Secretary

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, MATADOR, 1975. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]; MATADOR/[codeword not declassified]. Special limited distribution.

2 Document 191.
193. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Clements) to the Chairman of the 40 Committee (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Project MATADOR

General

The MATADOR recovery mission, conducted from June to August
1974 was partially successful, resulting in retrieval of a [less than 1 line not declassified] section of the original target—a Soviet G–II class bal-
listic missile submarine lost in March 1968. The remainder of the target fell away from the capture vehicle following a failure of the grabber mechanism. The recovery ship has since returned to Long Beach, Cali-
fornia, and the capture vehicle has been transferred to the construction barge and delivered to Redwood City, California. Extensive analyses of the grabber failures have resulted in conclusions that new grabbers must be fabricated that incorporate a less brittle material and improved design techniques. All necessary actions are now being taken to reconfig-
figure the capture vehicle and refurbish the recovery ship for a second mission during the next optimum weather period; i.e., July and August 1975. The MATADOR operational schedule projects a departure from the West Coast for the mission on 15 July 1975. The schedule to refurb-
ish the ship, carry out the essential testing, and make the weather window is very tight and requires close monitoring and supervision.

[1 paragraph (11½ lines) not declassified]

Intelligence Value

On 11 November 1974 the Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board informed\(^2\) the Chairman of that Board that the [less than 1 line not declassified] likely to contain items of highest intelligence value [1 line not declassified] The Committee then recommended that this section be accorded priority if recovery of either hull section is at-
ttempted. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in the assess-
ment and recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee with the excep-

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01009A: Subject Files, Box 16, MATADOR. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Clements signed it on November 14. Colby received the memorandum on November 15, according to an attached correspondence profile. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See Document 191.
tion of the member from the Department of State.3 Further the Director DIA informed the Chairman USIB that while stated intelligence requirements remain valid, the possible gain from acquisition [1 line not declassified] is not commensurate with the sharply increased risks of Soviet discovery nor with the resource expenditures incurred.

Cover and Security

The deep ocean mining cover which has protected the MATADOR Program since its inception is today credible and viable. However, the program and its phaseout must be extended for another year, which means that cover and security must be maintained for at least an additional year. While cover is a manageable problem, security is problematical—particularly, in the present Washington environment. The operational schedule of the program is extremely tight and does not provide for “deep ocean mining operations” prior to returning to the recovery site. To ameliorate this, it is planned that appropriate publicity for the program will be generated to buttress the mining cover. For instance, certain sea trials for the ship will appear to be deep ocean mining equipment testing. In addition, the projected cover scenario, built around the operational schedule of the ship, will continue to logically support the cover story and return to the North Pacific and the “test mining site”. To protect security and through it the viability of the cover, every effort will be made to maintain and reinforce the rigid security standards that have been in effect through the history of the MATADOR Program.

Soviet Sensitivity

It is generally agreed by those agencies involved in support of the previous operation that the Soviets did not suspect its true purpose although there was considerable Soviet interest. Since the recovery site is near present Soviet submarine transit lanes, surveillance during the proposed operation can again be expected. It is possible that a second visit to the same site will sharpen Soviet interest.

Fiscal

Fiscal year 1975 estimates to accomplish a second MATADOR mission (including recovery system refurbishment, capture vehicle reconfiguration and operational costs) are $46,753,000. Fiscal year 1976 operational costs extending through October 1975 are estimated to be $9,601,000. To date some $12 million has been obligated in order to maintain the possibility of a second mission if directed. It is prudent to expect that contingencies may require some additional funding. Approximately $250 million has been expended on this project to date.

3 See Document 192.
Summary and Recommendations

In view of the extensive changes required in the ship, it is essential that the present schedule of repair be accelerated to allow adequate testing prior to the deployment of the ship. This test period could be critical to the success of the mission. The inadequate period of testing before deployment could have contributed to the failure of the previous operation.

Due to the complexity of the operation and the unknowns involved in what may be in the target submarine, I find that there are mixed opinions in the community as to whether or not we should proceed with the second mission. The views of the principals as to whether or not we should proceed are summarized below:

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<td>[less than 1 line not declassified]</td>
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<td>ASD(I)</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
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After thorough consideration and discussion of the above, my recommendation is that we proceed with the preparation for the second MATADOR mission. The 40 Committee will be asked for final approval of the mission just prior to actual deployment of the ship.4

W. P. Clements, Jr.

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4 On November 23, Colby sent a memorandum to Kissinger expressing concurrence with Clements’ memorandum. Colby wrote: “After careful review it is my opinion that the costs, cover/security and technical considerations are acceptable when considered on balance with the significant value of the potential intelligence material expected to be in the section which would be recovered. In particular, [less than 1 line not declassified] would be of highest value.” (Ibid.)
194. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 22 January 1975, 11:00 AM

Members Present:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger,
Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs George
Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present:

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, William G. Hyland, Albert Hall (Item 1 only),
William Nelson (Item 2 only), and William Wells (Item 2 only).

Item 1—Matador

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Colby to summarize the status of MATADOR.

Mr. Colby reviewed the earlier operation, the preparation for a second, and the fact that since [less than 1 line not declassified] the primary target becomes [less than 1 line not declassified] Since an additional $20 million has been spent, and $5 million will be spent this month, we are talking about an expenditure of only about $25 million more to complete the job. He indicated that there was some dispute over whether a deep water test should be conducted before attempting a second operation, and that he was against such a test because there would be too little of a “weather window” left in which to complete the operation before it would have to be carried over for another year.

Mr. Clements said he favored the test because it was designed to prove the system which failed.

Mr. Colby said the test would leave only about two weeks of “weather window.”

Dr. Kissinger said that we have to decide two things: One, whether to do a second operation or not, and two, whether to risk failure or schedule deep water tests. What we find in the tests won’t help next year.

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR. Drafted by Ratliff.
Mr. Clements said that if the test revealed things that need correction, the corrections could be made and then we could go on with a better chance for success.

General Brown said that another consideration is that if we go to the area for a second time and have a failure we will attract more Soviet attention.

Mr. Clements declared that we can’t go another year; security risks will be too great.

Mr. Colby said another matter was that he had to go to the Vice President and his Commission on CIA because of the Howard Hughes connection.

Dr. Kissinger protested that there was no connection with domestic spying—that this was clearly a foreign intelligence operation. He said he would clear this with the Vice President. The Commission’s charter is to determine whether the CIA spied on Americans.

Mr. Colby said the Commission’s charter covered CIA activities in the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger said Mr. Colby could not go before the Commission.

Mr. Colby said he would go to the Vice President and ask for an exemption. He is familiar with this pattern. He asked for a list of addresses of our domestic installations and I asked permission to leave a couple out.

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Colby to make sure that General Scowcroft knew of his discussions with the Vice President. He foresaw no problems there. Some of the Commission’s staff members insist that they want to write books; they’ll have to fire them, of course. But you can’t put stuff like MATADOR before them.

General Brown said that Mr. Colby was expendable, but the system was not.

Mr. Colby said he recognized that, and he thought that he would have to resign sometime—simply declare that he could not continue to perform as DCI and maintain his obligations to preserve security if he had to reveal everything.

Dr. Kissinger said the deep water test question would mean that a second operation would have to wait another year if there was a major equipment failure. But am I correct that everyone here is in favor of a second attempt except State?

Mr. Hall said DIA was against it because the intelligence gain was minimal and going back again to the same area would trigger Soviet interest.

Mr. Sisco said he thought that risks were greater, the costs do not justify the marginal return, and he is more against going ahead now than he was before.
General Brown opined that the Soviets would probably think we were unprofessional if we did not go after this target.

Dr. Kissinger said he could understand the risks if the target were in the middle of Murmansk Harbor, but it is in the middle of the Pacific, the open sea.

Mr. Hyland said the Soviets would seize upon any incident.

Dr. Kissinger said if the Soviets wanted an incident they would react, but would they want an incident?

Mr. Sisco repeated that he thought the risks were greater and very exploitable—that the Soviets would really explode. Also, the expense is simply not defensible.

Mr. Clements said that if we were being asked to approve $250 million now, the gain couldn’t be justified, but most of the money has already been spent and we are talking about $25 or $30 million to complete the job and therefore we ought to go ahead.

Dr. Kissinger said he thought the original approval was unanimous.

General Scowcroft said the $250 million wasn’t all lost, was it?—couldn’t the ship be used for another target or some other use?

Mr. Colby said it might be used for mining and there was the hope that after we were through the ship could be sold for $40 or $50 million.

Dr. Kissinger said he foresaw no problem in justifying to the American public this attempt to obtain Soviet [less than 1 line not declassified] and that warranted taking some Soviet risks.

Mr. Hyland said we wouldn’t spend $60 million for Soviet [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Colby said we were only talking about $30 million and that he would gladly give that [less than 1 line not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger asked what the alternative was.

Dr. Hall said that he had originally opposed the operation but so much had been done that he was in favor of finishing the job.

Dr. Kissinger said he also supported it and asked Mr. Sisco to furnish a succinct statement of his objections so that the matter could be put before the President for decision. He added that the President’s decision was likely to be affirmative.²

²President Ford and Kissinger discussed the 40 Committee meeting during their meeting in the Oval Office the following morning (January 23).

"[Kissinger:] We had a 40 Committee meeting. We can’t conduct covert operations. Colby is a disaster and really should be replaced. Colby is shellshocked—he wanted to testify on AZORIAN because it was a domestic operation. He said he would work it out with the VP—I said it was none of the VP’s business.

"The President: That’s stupid."
“Kissinger: There are so many people who have to be briefed on covert operations, it is bound to leak.

“There is no one with guts left. All of yesterday they were making a record to protect themselves about AZORIAN. It was a discouraging meeting. I wonder if we shouldn’t get the leadership in and discuss it. Maybe there should be a Joint Committee.

“The President: I have always fought that, but maybe we have to. It would have to be a tight group, not a big broad one.

“Kissinger: I am really worried. We are paralyzed.”

(Memorandum of Conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Box 8, January 23, 1975—Ford, Kissinger)

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195. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Project MATADOR

With justifiable pride the intelligence community climaxed a six-year effort last year by lifting from the ocean floor in the Pacific a Soviet submarine which sank there in 1968. This unique accomplishment was marred when a [less than 1 line not declassified] portion of the target broke away and fell to the ocean floor.

Because the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) rated the intelligence potential so highly, and because of the sizeable investment ($250 million to date), a review of whether to make a second recovery attempt during the next weather window in July–August 1975 was ordered. [less than 1 line not declassified] and a portion of the hull [1 line not declassified] has been identified as a priority target.

The USIB has reaffirmed its view that the equipment aboard the target is of “unique intelligence potential” and its estimate of the overall gain from a successful recovery has not “measurably” changed. Cover and security for this operation have been remarkably maintained, but there are obvious risks in extending the operation for sev-
eral more months. The Soviets showed routine interest in the first recovery operation, but gave no indication of any suspicion of our real purpose.

Preparations for a second operation are under way. The equipment that broke during the lifting of the heavy target is being redesigned. An estimated $25,576,000 has been committed, and $36,424,000 more will be required to complete a second operation. These funds are available through reprogramming; no new funds are necessary.

The 40 Committee met on 22 January\(^2\) to review plans for the second recovery attempt. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Mr. Joseph Sisco raised several objections to continuing the operation. He questions whether recovery of [less than 1 line not declassified] offers sufficient return to warrant the expenditure; he believes risks are greater and that a return to the exact spot of ocean will feed Soviet suspicion; and that new uncertainties in U.S.-Soviet relations add to the substantial political risks should there be a Soviet reaction.

All the other 40 Committee members (and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger) favor making a second recovery attempt. The USIB has confirmed the intelligence value [less than 1 line not declassified] and we’ve already spent nearly half of what the second recovery attempt will cost. All admit that it will be a challenge to maintain security and cover, but our success in doing so augers well. The deep ocean mining cover story has been accepted widely and the Soviets did not show any undue suspicion during the first operation, therefore it is reasonable to expect that they will accept a return to the site as what it will appear to be—a second deep ocean mining trial.

The consensus is that the potential intelligence return from a successful second mission would be significant enough to accept the cost, cover/security and other risks.

Recommendation:

That you approve preparations for a second MATADOR mission.\(^3\)

\(^2\) See Document 194.

\(^3\) Ford initialed his approval on February 6.
Memorandum From Rob Roy Ratliff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Reconstruction of “Hughes Affair” Events

Per our conversation this morning, I have reconstructed events as follows:

5 June 1974:

- The 40 Committee approved the operation at a meeting\(^2\) which included Mr. Sisco and Admiral Moorer. The subject was referred to higher authority, who approved the operation on 7 June.\(^3\)
- A burglary took place at Hughes’ headquarters in Los Angeles.\(^4\)

2 July 1974:

- It was learned for the first time that a memorandum referring to our project might have been among the papers taken in the burglary. A Hughes employee remembers seeing the paper in Los Angeles (but he also had access to it in 1970 when it was written). An inventory of papers after the burglary did not include the memorandum on our project. However, it may have been destroyed prior to the burglary.
- A Hughes official had been contacted and an attempt made to obtain money for the return of papers taken in the burglary. No men-

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\(^2\) See Document 188.

\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 188.

\(^4\) On June 5, 1974, the same day that the 40 Committee approved the mission, the Los Angeles headquarters of the Hughes-owned Summa Corporation were burgled. The burglars made off with cash and four containers of documents, perhaps including a memorandum from Hughes Tool’s Chairman of the Board Raymond Holliday to Howard Hughes, detailing the CIA’s secret plan to have Hughes Tool salvage the sunken Soviet submarine under the cover of conducting deep sea mining. The burglars subsequently tried to extort $500,000 from company officials in exchange for the stolen documents. The investigation into the burglary and the attempted extortion—involving the FBI, the CIA, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Los Angeles District Attorney—ultimately led to the project’s cover being blown on February 7, 1975, when the Los Angeles Times published a story about it. (William Farr and Jerry Cohen, “U.S. Reported after Russ Sub,” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1975, p. 1) A copy of Holliday’s memorandum, written prior to July 24, 1970 and reconstructed with the help of CIA agents following the burglary, is in the CIA, Executive Registry, Colby Files, Job 80M01009A, Box 16, MATADOR.
tion was made of the memorandum referring to our project. The extor-
tioner abandoned his efforts.

10 July 1974:

- I was briefed on the above developments and briefed you on the same date. Mr. McAfee\(^5\) of INR at State was also briefed, and he subse-
quently briefed Mr. Sisco and Mr. Hyland.
- [1 line not declassified] “thinks” that he briefed Mr. Clements on the above developments, but is less certain in view of Mr. Clements’ lack of any recollection that he had been briefed. He did not brief Gen-
eral Brown, who had become C/JCS a few days before.

Late July 1974:

- I was briefed on additional information and relayed this informa-
tion to you; however, it consisted only of elaborating details and did not confirm the whereabouts of the memorandum on our project.

September 1974:

- The Los Angeles police reported contact with an intermediary for an individual who claimed to have the papers from the Hughes burg-
ultery. The papers were described as dealing with Hughes’ relations with the Atomic Energy Commission, ITT in Chile, TWA, Air West, Hubert Humphrey, Teddy Kennedy, etc. No mention was made of CIA or our project memorandum.
- CIA informed the FBI of the Los Angeles police report and the fact that the papers being offered for sale might include a sensitive paper dealing with our project.
- Subsequent developments point to these conclusions:
  - The FBI told the Los Angeles police about our memorandum.
  - The Los Angeles police told the intermediary.
  - When under cover, FBI contact was made with the interme-
diary and the extortioner, the latter identified the contact as an FBI agent and told him that if the Government was so inter-
ested in getting the papers, then the Government should guar-
antee him immunity.

7 February 1975:

- The intermediary and the extortioner were advised that they were being brought before a grand jury to investigate involvement in an extortion attempt.

\(^5\) William McAfee, Deputy Director of INR.
8 February 1975:

- The Los Angeles Times article appeared, attributed to “reports circulating among local law enforcement officers.” The article said “reportedly” the extortioner “claimed one of the stolen documents revealed the Hughes’ organization involvement in the submarine retrieval at the request of the CIA.”

Late February 1975:

- CIA obtained a statement of the grand jury statement of the intermediary. He described how the extortioner claimed that he had spent three hours culling the Hughes papers for items which might be sold to the media and had selected papers dealing with the subjects cited above. He did not include any reference to the memorandum dealing with our project.

In Summary

While we have taken prudent steps to consider all possibilities and to monitor developments, there is no confirmation that the memorandum which the Hughes official wrote in 1970 after his first contact with CIA still exists or that it was among those papers taken during the burglary.

From what we know now, it appears that the Los Angeles Times story does indeed stem from “local law enforcement officers” and can be traced to the CIA-to-FBI-to-Los Angeles police-to-the-intermediary revelations that CIA was interested in a memorandum which the extortioner might have which revealed CIA-Hughes discussions about recovery of a Soviet submarine.
197. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 19, 1975, 11:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Matador Meeting

Schlesinger: This episode has been a major American accomplishment. The operation is a marvel—technically, and with maintaining secrecy.

President: I agree. Now where do we go?

Schlesinger: If we don’t confirm the mission details—acknowledge the bare facts. It has been confirmed privately by Colby. There is no plausible denial story, so “no comment” will be taken as a confirmation. If we move now we can take the high ground—if not we will be pilloried.

Marsh: Who would put it out?

Schlesinger: Probably me, rather than Colby—unless the President wants to. It is a Navy role also. We should go public so it doesn’t look like they are part of a covert operation.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 10, March 19, 1975—Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Buchen, Marsh, Rumsfeld. Secret; Nodis. The meeting, held in the White House Cabinet Room, lasted until 12:25 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Brief)

2 In conversations on February 1, 1974 and February 10, 1975, Colby urged journalist Seymour Hersh, who had been investigating the story since as early as January 1974, to delay publication. (CIA, Executive Registry, Job 80M0104BA, Box 7, Seymour Hersh, and ibid., Job 80M01009A, Box 16, MATADOR) On March 18, 1975, syndicated columnist Jack Anderson mentioned the Glomar Explorer on his national radio show, and declared his intention to reveal more details about the operation. The next day, several major newspapers—including the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, and the New York Times—published front-page stories revealing that Hughes’ Glomar Explorer, in an operation led by the CIA, had recovered a portion of the sunken Soviet submarine during its mission in the Summer of 1974.

3 No record of a statement by Schlesinger or Ford was found. The press reported that the administration refused to comment upon the matter. Colby, who cancelled an interview scheduled for March 19, was quoted as saying “at this point I have to stop
President: Bill, what do you think?

Colby: I go back to the U–2.\(^4\) I think we should not put the Soviet Union under such pressure to respond.

President: CBS reported from Moscow there was no official comment but that they were aware.

talking. Honestly, we can have international problems and I have to be careful.” (Jack Nelson, “Administration Won’t Talk About Sub Raised by CIA,” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1975, pp. A1, A14–A16)

\(^4\) Reference is to the U–2 spy plane that was shot down over Soviet airspace on May 1, 1960. As a result of the incident, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev cancelled his summit meetings in Paris with President Eisenhower.

198. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Colby) to the Chairman of the 40 Committee (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Project MATADOR—Second Mission

1. In view of recent media exposure,\(^2\) I feel it may be appropriate to arrange for a thorough airing in the 40 Committee of the question whether a second MATADOR mission should take place. The paragraphs below are offered as a point of departure for consideration.

2. The following arguments would weigh in favor of a second mission:

a. The target is still of value.

b. Relatively little more money is required to proceed—i.e., $24M beyond $260M already expended (termination costs and potential offsets not included).

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01009A: Subject Files, Box 16, MATADOR. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR. Brackets in the original memorandum. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Colby presented it to the USIB Ad Hoc Committee Meeting on May 30, of which no record was found.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 197.
c. Recovery system can be ready to proceed in June 1975 although timing of summit meeting between President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev may delay departure.3
d. We retain the option to back off at any time prior to target acquisition if the Soviets oppose.
e. Precedent—1928 Soviet salvage of a British submarine lost off Kronstadt in Baltic Sea in 1919.
f. Absence of formal Soviet protest in response to media exposure.
g. U.S. has not formally confirmed media exposure.
h. Loss of submarine still not admitted by Soviets.
i. Media has pinpointed wrong site—mission may be seen as diversionary, cover maneuver.
j. Intelligence assessment is that:
  —Despite extensive search, Soviets failed to locate wreckage in 1968.
  —Despite surveillance, Soviets failed to see our first mission for what it was.

As a consequence, Soviet bureaucracy may be loath to admit above failures, prefer to claim site of loss is somewhere else—or that media exposure is part of elaborate attempt to cover some other application of ship.
k. Boldness of decision to proceed will catch Soviets off balance—we may be able to complete mission before they get organized.
l. Official confrontation is not likely, since such confrontation would mean admission of loss of submarine and admission of U.S. technological superiority. This view is supported by the failure of Soviet press, to best of our knowledge, to repeat revelations in U.S. press.

3. The following arguments weigh against the second mission:
a. Target value may be diminished by Soviet knowledge of first mission.
b. Technical risk remains.
c. Legality is not entirely clear.
d. U.S. press will monitor and flag movements of HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER, thus little chance of surprise remains.
e. Project and Administration will be target for claims of money waste, brinkmanship, and strong arming.

f. Continuation will back Soviets into corner publicly; responses may be:

(1) Formal protest, international furor—as in U–2 incident.
(2) Informal (hot-line) protest.
(3) Attempt to thwart the operation, possibly using force.

[Responses (1) and (3) are to U.S. disadvantage in foreign and domestic relations.]

g. Erroneous and conflicting information reported by media may have confused Soviets on first mission success; such uncertainty may already be enough to force counterexpenditures.

h. Although media has been inaccurate as to target site, Soviets may have identified the site from surveillance during first mission.

i. Secrecy has been viewed in the past as essential to the operation. Abandonment of that philosophy will be noted and proclaimed by press. This will become a political football, with renewed cries to curb the intelligence establishment and possibly generate an avalanche of leaks.


k. Cover/security breakdown will increase crew anxiety and perhaps decrease effectiveness.

l. Intensified investigation into union, insurance, tax, Midway arrangements—substrata of sources and methods.

4. The conclusion of my own weighing of the above arguments is, I regret to say, that it is inadvisable to undertake a second mission.4

W. E. Colby
Director

4 Graham also opposed continuation of Project MATADOR in his February 21 memorandum to Colby. (Ibid.)
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Soviet Query on Submarine Salvage

Dobrynin gave me March 29 the note at Tab A which complains about the activities of the Glomar Explorer, and specifically about the disposition of the bodies of the Soviet sailors. The note, however, refers only to press reports.

We could offer a quasi-confirmation and supply the names of the three bodies that were identified. This, however, would be extremely risky; any official, written confirmation by me would challenge the Soviets. Even if they did not react at present, they would have it in reserve and could spring it at any time. Moreover, there is no explanation that would assuage them. In particular, we cannot argue the legality or legitimacy of the operation without starting a polemic, and the Soviets cannot possibly concede its legality as their note indicates.

Therefore, I intend to make orally to Dobrynin the points at Tab B which indicate that we do not confirm, deny or otherwise comment on alleged intelligence activities and that there will be no official U.S. position on this matter. This conforms to your standing instruction not to comment.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Staff Assistants: Peter W. Rodman Files, 1974–1977, Box 1, Subject File, Glomar Explorer. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. An attached memorandum, unsigned and undated, from Scowcroft to Rumsfeld indicates that Kissinger’s memorandum was to be delivered “to the President in a red folder.”

2 Attached, but not printed.

3 Not found attached. No record of Kissinger’s oral comments to Dobrynin was found.
200. Memorandum for the Record\(^1\)

Washington, April 3, 1975, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1030 to 1230, 3 April 1975

PARTICIPANTS
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), Chairman
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce
Mr. Leo Cherne
Mr. Robert W. Galvin
Dr. Edward Teller
Mr. George P. Shultz
Dr. Edwin H. Land
Dr. William O. Baker
Mr. Wheaton B. Byers
Cmdr. Lionel Olmer
Cmdr. Maurice D. Fitzgerald
Mr. William E. Colby
Mr. John M. Clarke

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Project MATADOR.]

5. The Director then shifted the discussion to the MATADOR project. He gave the Board a full report on the background of the newspaper exposure,\(^2\) the break-ins, et cetera. Mr. Gray inquired whether the Director felt that the Soviets knew about the first attempt. The Director indicated he did not believe so. Mr. Shultz made an indirect comment on the fate of the Captain of the tugboat. Mrs. Luce asked numerous questions about the Hughes break-in incident, and the Director responded with an observation attributed to Mr. Duckett as to its being an inside job. Mrs. Luce observed that the circumstances were not ordinary, and the Director cited the blackmail scenario and the leak to the Los Angeles Times from the police department. The Director observed to the Chairman that the Board might want to think about whether we should go back for the remaining portions. He reported that the 40 Committee had decided to continue to prepare but to make no decisions on a go—no-go basis. Mr. Teller supported the idea that the Board

\(^{1}\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A: E[xecutive] R[egistry] Subject Files, Box 3, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975 Glomar Explorer—[codeword not declassified], Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]/BYEMAN. Drafted by John M. Clarke of the CIA.

\(^{2}\) See footnote 4, Document 196 and footnote 2, Document 197.
should reserve its judgment on a return since the risk is high. He voiced
the opinion that its importance is in contrast to our wish which is to
keep a low profile. Mr. Foster asked whether the Soviets have ap-
proached the US, and the Director responded in the negative, pointing
out that there had been some discussion on the edges but not officially.
The Director opined that as long as we officially do not comment it is
not likely that the Soviets would comment. Mr. Cherne observed that
the Board would need an altogether fresh presentation in what the cur-
cent risks are before it could independently judge whether there should
be a return trip. Mr. Shultz observed that unless there were overpow-
ering reasons not to go to get what is of value, there should be no need
for the Board to comment on a decision to go by the 40 Committee. The
Chairman registered concern over other aspects while Dr. Teller in-
quired that if there is a return will it be done in full light of publicity.
The Director explained some of the administrative changes and move-
ments being considered [1 line not declassified] Gordon Gray observed
that the Congressional investigations would probably get into this mat-
ter. He reported that he had understood that Congressman Dellums3 had
been on to the under-water programs earlier and that Congressman Daniels4 had
been asked to turn him off. Mr. Gray was not certain whether the under-water activities Dellums had run across
were related to MATADOR or other Navy programs. Neither the Di-
rector nor the undersigned was able to recall. (This matter is being pur-
sued.) The Chairman asked whether there had been other precedents.
The Director cited the Soviet raising of the British submarine from
shallow water, and the recommissioning of it to the Soviet fleet. The
Chairman concluded that the Board should take no action at all until
after the 40 Committee deliberations. Mr. Land asked what the current
view on recovery is now. The Director observed that he did not feel [less
than 1 line not declassified] but that possibly some of the [less than 1 line
not declassified] could be valuable. Mr. Shultz asked whether the Di-
rector felt that the Soviets would not tamper with any future recovery
effort. The Director observed that this would not be easy short of
war-like action. Both Dr. Land and Mrs. Luce exchanged views with re-
spect to the potential political hazard of failure at this time with intelli-
gence under investigation. Mr. Land, particularly, believed that the
Board would need to know exactly how important and likely recovery
of the items were, and what the risk of success or failure was. He ob-
served that the exercise would mortgage world perceptions of US tech-
nological leadership if failure occurred. He questioned how valuable
[less than 1 line not declassified] would be in this context. The Director re-

3 Ronald Dellums (D–California).
4 Dominick V. Daniels (D–New Jersey).
sponded to the various questions, reporting that he had supported the first attempt at recovery of the submarine. The content of the DCI’s response on a second trip reflected uncertainty about the validity of a return effort, although no specific position on the matter was taken. The Director then reported in some detail on what had been acquired in the initial exploitation. Documented reports were circulated in response to questions from Dr. Teller and Dr. Foster. Dr. Teller asked that a general advocate for a return trip should come before the Board and give details on both what had been acquired, and what value and risk there was to a return effort. The Director, in response to the Chairman, promised to make his recommendations on the matter to the 40 Committee available to the Board.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Project MATADOR.]

201. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Ad Hoc 40 Committee Meeting on MATADOR

On Friday, 28 March 1975, an ad hoc meeting of the 40 Committee was held following a meeting of the National Security Council. General Scowcroft reported that Director Colby distributed a paper on MATADOR reflecting his reluctant conclusion that “it is advisable to undertake a second mission” [less than 1 line not declassified]–0253/75). It was decided to continue preparations for a second mission.

Mr. Colby reported that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Clements, Mr. Sisco, General Brown, and General Scowcroft joined him at the meeting of the Committee. Secretary Schlesinger thought it possible to attempt a second mission, depending upon assessment of Soviet reactions, and therefore no decision on whether to

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR. No distribution. Drafted by Ratliff.


3 Document 198.
try a second operation should be made yet. Mr. Colby said Secretary
Schlesinger’s views were persuasive.

Rob Roy Ratliff

202. Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency


SUBJECT

Soviet Reaction to MATADOR Mission

1. This memorandum discusses the possible and potential Soviet reactions to the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER undertaking a second mission attempt. Soviet attitude towards détente with the U.S. and other political considerations which may influence their actions are also assessed.

2. Soviet reaction thus far to media publicity about MATADOR (Appendix A) tends to confirm the view that they regard the attempted recovery of their submarine as a serious affront and a sharp embarrassment.

3. Soviet restraint in refraining from public response probably stems from the following factors:

a. Precludes embarrassment at home and abroad in having to admit for the first time the loss in 1968 of the Golf submarine.

b. Avoids public acknowledgement of Soviet inability to locate the lost submarine vis-à-vis the obviously superior technical capabilities of the U.S. to not only locate but recover their submarine.

c. Hides chagrin at the failure of Soviet intelligence services being unable to uncover the true purpose of the Hughes deep ocean mining project during its five year development.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A: [executive] registry] Subject Files, Box 3, Executive Registry Subject File—1975 [codeword not declassified]. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR. Colby forwarded the memorandum to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, May 1, which reads as follows: “I have had the attached paper prepared here which discusses possible Soviet reactions to a second MATADOR mission attempt.” Ratliff forwarded the CIA’s memorandum to 40 Committee members under a covering memorandum, May 8, “in anticipation of Committee deliberations on the subject.” Colby’s and Ratliff’s memoranda are ibid. In a May 1 memorandum to Scowcroft, Ratliff asked, in light of the CIA’s assessment, “Can we continue to do something, or should we cut bait now and recover what we can?” (National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, MATADOR, 1975)
d. Avoids public acknowledgment that the Soviet submarine was recovered under the watchful eyes of two Soviet surveillance ships at the site.

4. The Soviets appear to convey the desire that the United States cooperate in holding down publicity and, equally important, that there be no official U.S. Government acknowledgment of MATADOR; in addition, they show a willingness to maintain the posture of détente. In these circumstances, and anticipating widespread media exposure, a second recovery attempt will inevitably come to Moscow's attention as preparations proceed. Such activity includes remating the Capture Vehicle with the ship in early May, followed by Integrated Systems Tests and later departure for the mission. This situation, an intent to proceed with a second mission, should register dramatically on them. The Soviets will recognize that sensational publicity is bound to occur if the U.S. is allowed to proceed. They would conclude that the U.S. was not only determined to compromise their security, but that it was willing, if not anxious, to humiliate them.

5. Apart from a desire to preserve their secrecy and to avoid outright humiliation, the Soviets would have to calculate how a second mission—and their own reactions to it—would affect bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations. The fact that Moscow's détente approach is loaded with self-serving elements would not alter the biased reactions to be expected from those in the Soviet structure who either support or are critical of the détente.

6. It seems beyond doubt that the Soviets would go to great lengths to frustrate or disrupt a second mission. At the same time, they likely, though not certainly, would hope to maintain a general détente posture toward the U.S. This total reaction would be calculated to hold the best chance of preserving a relationship in which the Soviets have considerable at stake, while communicating to the U.S. that it must act within certain restraints or bear the onus of destroying détente.

7. The most likely means Moscow might seek to halt a second mission attempt is through a private diplomatic approach as the initial move. Simultaneously, the Soviets would have at least one ship, probably an auxiliary type, on station at the target site. Depending on the prevailing situation at the time the ship departs for the mission, including the nature and extent of media coverage and U.S. response to their diplomatic overture, the Soviets might resort to dispatching a combatant vessel to threaten or intimidate the HGE at the site. As the ship departs Long Beach, a Soviet submarine possibly may track her passage to the site reporting activities en route.

8. The Soviets also could, on short notice, declare the area surrounding the target site as closed under the pretense that ICBM test firings are being conducted into the area. This closing action is consist-
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ent with past Soviet practice in adjacent missile testing areas and could support a wide variety of Soviet response contingencies.

9. The more subtle methods the Soviets might employ to harass or interfere with operations and thereby accomplish their objective of preventing target recovery are discussed below. The capability of the HGE to counter these possible Soviet actions is also evaluated.

**Situation 1: HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER Encounters Soviet Naval Non-Combatant(s) (Unarmed) Stationed at the Recovery Site**

The modus operandi of a Soviet naval non-combatant(s) stationed at the recovery site may be expected to parallel observed Soviet surveillance of other civilian vessels involved in U.S. Government-sponsored at-sea activities. In these instances, the Soviets have typically employed naval auxiliary units under naval command and control to discourage, by harassment, activity which they know or suspect has a covert mission.

With respect to the HGE, these smaller vessels can maneuver safely at very close ranges (less than 100 yards) and are suited to employing harassment tactics ranging from close passes at the ship, to fouling of the ship’s screw and/or positioning thrusters, to physically engaging and pushing the HGE sideways. At most stages of Capture Vehicle deployment, the recovery system will not be able to accept any degree of rapid physical displacement without risking permanent damage to the pipestring or heavy lift system. This includes twisting movement over 2 degrees a minute or lateral movement of 1/2 a knot. If pushing tactics were employed, the HGE would have to cease operations and were the recovery system to become damaged, the ship would be rendered virtually immobile until the Capture Vehicle and/or pipestring could be explosively detached from the HGE.

Therefore, while employment of unprecedented harassment such as mine emplacement by divers or other tactics discussed in Appendix B cannot be discounted, an aggressive Soviet auxiliary ship could interrupt and probably completely frustrate MATADOR operations using the more fundamental harassment tactics.

Larger non-combatant vessels, such as an AGM (range instrumentation ship), have been employed for surveillance (e.g., CHAZHMA during 1974 mission) but their inability to maneuver safely in close situations (less than 100 yards) limits their utility to that of conducting photographic and electronic surveillance and to providing command and control communications.

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2 Most common examples: AGI (Intelligence Collection Vessel), AGS (Hydrographic Survey Vessel), ATA/R (Seagoing Auxiliary/Rescue Tug). [Footnote in the original.]
Situation 2: HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER En Route to or at Recovery Site, Soviets Deploy a Submarine or Combatant Surface Ship(s) (Armed)

The HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER will continue to operate under the somewhat strained cover of a commercial ship engaged in systems testing of deep ocean mining equipment. The Soviets should be fully aware that the HGE has no visible naval escort. Soviet deployment of overt combatant forces against an ostensible U.S. civilian vessel is unprecedented and believed unlikely in this situation, but it cannot be ruled out if an unsuccessful Soviet diplomatic overture has taken place. U.S. ability to detect such deployments ranges from very good for surface ships to poor for submarines. Also, detection could vary with Soviet desire to conceal or to display an armed military response and could provide evidence or reinforcement of the adopted Soviet policy.

Covert deployment of a submarine by the Soviets is more likely. During AXMINISTER and the summer 1974 mission, a Soviet submarine was dispatched to the North Pacific apparently in response to the U.S. presence and bottom operations near the Soviet ballistic missile submarine transit lane. A Soviet submarine could easily operate in the vicinity of the HGE, even intercept it outside Long Beach and track it to the recovery site, without U.S. knowledge. Also, it is recognized that a Soviet submarine is capable of resorting to the use of a variety of underwater weapons against the ship at any time without ever being identified. However, a submarine would be unable to employ harassment tactics described in Situation 1. Its design is not suited to any form of physical encounter with a surface ship so that close underwater approaches either to the HGE or the pipestring would be extremely hazardous for a submarine.

The Soviets could direct a covertly deployed submarine to surface at the recovery site in full view of the HGE either to passively confuse and frighten the crew or to test for the presence of a prepositioned U.S. submarine. While such action could lead to an unpredictable U.S. military response, it might be worth the risk if the crew were frightened into abandoning the mission.

Situation 3: HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER En Route to the Recovery Site, Soviet Naval Combatant(s) Operating Near or Stationed at the Recovery Site

With the exception of YANKEE ballistic missile submarines which transit to and from patrol stations in a lane north of the recovery site, no Soviet naval combatants have been observed operating in North-Central Pacific in years. Therefore, the visible presence of a Soviet naval combatant at or near the recovery site prior to HGE arrival would
signal clearly the high level of Soviet concern and probably their intent to discourage or prevent any further bottom operations in that area.

10. In the unusual circumstances that the Soviets assigned a combatant ship at the site, they might calculate that the U.S. would be forced to give way or escalate the matter in some fashion which would make Washington bear the responsibility for what evolves thereafter.

Appendix A

Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

APPENDIX A

Soviet Response to MATADOR Disclosures

1. On 7 February 1975, a front page Los Angeles Times article\(^4\) alleged a CIA contract with Howard Hughes to raise one of two sunken Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic and identified MV HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER as the ship involved. Although the story was picked up by other publications and received wide circulation, no Soviet response was noted.

2. On 18 March 1975, columnist Jack Anderson declared\(^5\) his intention to reveal the details of the Soviet submarine recovery. This action prompted immediate publication by the cooperating newspapers previously holding the story. Significant, accurate details of the recovery available to the news media have received wide national and limited international news coverage to date. The following paragraphs list the known Soviet reactions to this publicity.

   a. Official Response: None
   b. Unofficial Response:

   (1) 20 March 1975: Oleg Yermishkin, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, in an interview with Strobe Talbott of TIME, said that the Embassy charge had sent a cable to Moscow urging that a strong protest be lodged with the White House over the affair. While he viewed the event as a “setback to détente,” hinted at effects on the Ford-Brezhnev summit and viewed the humanitarian problem of secret burial as a conspiracy, Yermishkin stressed that the opinions expressed were solely his own.

\(^3\) Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR.
\(^4\) See footnote 4, Document 196.
\(^5\) See footnote 2, Document 197.
(2) 24 March 1975: During a luncheon meeting with Mr. Kamenev,\(^6\) Chief Press Officer at the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Daniel Gilmore, UPI, posed a question regarding Soviet intentions to request memorabilia of the men or the burial film. Kamenev was thought to say that it was being considered higher up.

(3) 29 March 1975: Prior to a committee meeting at the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva, Soviet Representative Valentin A. Romanov asked U.S. Committee Representative Leigh Ratiner (Director of National Ocean Mining Administration) what the U.S. planned to say if the submarine issue were raised in the meeting. The incident had been widely discussed off the record by foreign delegates but had not been raised in public forum. Mr. Ratiner replied that the U.S. would have nothing to say and would indicate no comment. Mr. Romanov replied, “Good, we do not want to say anything either.”

c. Operational Response:

(1) 21 March 1975: A pair of TU–95 Soviet naval long-range reconnaissance aircraft flew east into the North Pacific bracketing a submarine transit lane probably in support of a YANKEE submarine returning from routine patrol. The pair turned south at the International Date Line and lingered within 200 nautical miles of the recovery site for 2½ hours before returning to home base. Such a pattern has not been observed in recent years.

(2) On 21 March 1975 Soviet seagoing Tug ATA MB–11 concluded surveillance of the joint operation RIMEX 75 in the Hawaiian Islands, proceeded first to an area about 750 nautical miles northwest of Oahu (identified recovery site in all media coverage), then proceeded directly to the recovery site, arriving about 28 March.

(3) [4 lines not declassified]

(4) 31 March 1975: Intelligence Collection Vessel, AGI LINZA, took station over the site of the lost Soviet “N” submarine in the Atlantic and has remained there to date. This station was monitored continuously by Soviet hydrographic vessels from April 1970 until August 1974 and then vacated.

(5) 7 April 1975: Fleet Tug ATF MB–26 relieved ATA MB–11 at the Pacific recovery site and continues to hold station in the area.

(6) 20 April 1975: An unidentified submarine was located by the USS GRAY about 100 nautical miles southwest of Point Sur, California. The submarine was tracked north for two days before contact was lost. A periscope was sighted [1 line not declassified] In addition, the submarine appeared to be operating with two Soviet fishing trawlers located south of San Francisco. No information on this submarine exists from either the U.S. SOSUS [less than 1 line not declassified] networks. The unit has been classified non-U.S., non-friendly, but is probably Soviet. While no direct evidence exists to tie this contact with MATADOR, the appearance of a Soviet submarine near the coast of California is highly unusual.

\(^6\) Valentin M. Kamenev, Press Counselor of the Soviet Embassy.
Appendix B

Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency 7

Washington, undated.

APPENDIX B

Vulnerability of HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER to Physical Harassment

1. The HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER would be extremely vulnerable to physical harassment by another ship. It is designed and configured wholly as a commercial vessel, having no arms or armor, with many of its vital operating systems exposed above the main deck and shielded only from the weather by paint, rubber and plastic. In addition, the ship contains several specialized systems for maintaining accurate positioning and stability during heavy-lift operations, each of which is vulnerable.

2. Following is a broad list of ship’s systems and their corresponding vulnerability:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship System</th>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High pressure air and hydraulic systems</td>
<td>High powered, armor piercing rifle fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air bottles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High pressure lines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy lift system</td>
<td>Pushing during CV deployment causing motion of ship in twist 2°/minute, lateral motion 1/2 knot. (Probability of system damage increases the closer CV is to the surface).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gimbals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable platform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipestring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well, gates open, well flooded</td>
<td>Wing wall heavily stressed, vulnerable to ramming amid ships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship’s screw</td>
<td>Susceptible to fouling by divers or with lines and cables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station keeping thrusters</td>
<td>Susceptible to fouling by lines or cables.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR.
Wave rider buoy Antenna destroyed or buoy picked up deprives station keeping system of wave stability data.

Ship hull Susceptible to diver/mine/charge/other implantation by divers during heavy lift operations.

Work boat Harassment by surveillance unit when deployed.

Ship’s communications Jamming by surveillance unit.

3. This harassment activity may be conducted by a small, easily maneuverable Soviet naval non-combatant with a minimum of prepositioned special equipment. There is virtually nothing the ship may do to counter this harassment, and each Soviet action above has the potential of badly frightening at least some members of the crew.

203. Memorandum to the 40 Committee


SUBJECT
PROJECT MATADOR

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the Committee with information on the status and planning of Project MATADOR to assist the Committee in making a decision regarding continued preparations for a second mission and the scenario to be followed.

2. Successful sea trials to test modifications to the ship’s systems were completed on 27 April 1975. The capture vehicle was transferred to the ship on 8 May 1975. The HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER (HGE) is presently at Long Beach Pier where work is under way to prepare the capture vehicle and the ship for integrated systems tests (IST) scheduled to commence 30 May 1975. Upon successful completion of IST about 13 June, the ship will

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, MATADOR, 1975. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; MATADOR. Copies were sent to Kissinger, Clements, Colby, Sisco, and George Brown.
return to port and be readied for a second mission. A departure date of 4 July 1975 is planned pending approval of the mission. (See Attachment (1) for a detailed program schedule.) Crew training and readiness for a second mission is proceeding satisfactorily.

3. Following the compromise of the MATADOR operation in the news media, the guidance received from the Committee was to keep open the option of a second mission this summer and adhere to a “no comment” posture regarding this issue. In consonance with this guidance, preparations and planning for a second mission are continuing using a deep ocean mining scenario. Despite widespread publicity since 18 March which identified the HGE’s involvement in the recovery operation last summer, the U.S. Government’s “no comment” posture has achieved the objective of not forcing an official Soviet comment on this subject. Additionally, there remains sufficient credibility within the deep ocean mining community to support the continuation of this cover. It must be assumed, however, that the Soviets have correctly deduced the true purpose of the HGE when operating at the target site. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that a Soviet tug has been stationed at the target site continuously since 28 March 1975.

4. In addition to the commercial deep ocean mining scenario, other operational scenarios have been considered for a second mission in light of potential Soviet reactions (See Attachment 2.) Most of the alternatives considered involved in one form or another and were deemed inconsistent with the “no comment” position in that such presence would tend to highlight and possibly escalate U.S. Government involvement. Therefore, these alternative scenarios were not further developed. There is provision in the MATADOR Contingency Operations Plan (as was the case during the first mission) for CINCPACFLT to respond in the event that the HGE requires assistance. The rationale for the deep ocean mining scenario is summarized in Attachment (3). The pros and cons of conducting a mission are compared in Attachment (4).

5. Unless directed otherwise, preparations for a second mission are continuing.
204. Memorandum to the Chairman of the 40 Committee


SUBJECT

Project MATADOR

REFERENCE

-0188/75(R), Same Subject dated 19 May 1975

1. This memorandum requests 40 Committee direction on initiation of the Project MATADOR mission as stated below. It amplifies the information provided in the reference.

2. Mission Readiness. The HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER (HGE) should be ready to depart Long Beach, California, on or about 4 July 1975. Based on this departure date, arrival at the mission site would be about 18 July. On site duration is estimated to be about 30 days. Schedule details and mission track are shown in Tab I.

3. Intelligence Value. The target of Project MATADOR is the section of the G–722 submarine hull. Assessment by the Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board is contained in Tab II. The Committee’s conclusions, dated 11 November 1974, are as follows:

   “a. There are items of high intelligence value in the new debris field that are potentially recoverable.”

   “b. likely to contain items of highest intelligence value including

   “The Committee recommends that this section be accorded priority if recovery of either hull section is attempted.”

   A non-concurring comment by the State Department member, questioning the overall gain from a second mission, is included in Tab II.

4. Mission. Salient aspects of the planning include:

   a. Command and Control. As during the first mission, with authority for specific control of mission operations delegated to the Director, Program B of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). The Mission Director is the senior U. S. Government command authority embarked in tactical command of operations. Avoidance of a confrontation with the Soviets is a basic instruction to the Mission Director. Secure communications exist between the MATADOR Command and Control Center [1 line not declassified] and the ship.

b. Contingencies. Contingency plans provide for a shift of ashore command and control to Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), in concert with higher authority, should the situation warrant. Throughout the mission the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Reconnaissance Center, in addition to CINCPACFLT, will be following mission progress closely. Contingency plans are set forth in Tabs III–A and III–B.6

c. Crew Remains. Handling and disposition of any crew remains found in the target will be dignified and generally as provided for in the 1949 Geneva Convention, following procedures similar to those of the first mission (see Tab IV).

d. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]
e. Selections from the Mission Operations Plan are in Tab V.

5. Cover Status. Media disclosures7 have detailed the previous mission, rendering the deep ocean mining cover transparent (Tab VI). The U. S. Government position of “no comment” on these disclosures has achieved the objective of not forcing an official Soviet reaction on this subject. Known unofficial responses are included in Tab VI, paragraph 3.b. Based on the lack of an official Soviet public protest to date, it is believed that maintenance of the DOMP facade is the most effective course of action for a second mission. Therefore, the mission is arranged to proceed again under the guise of tests of ocean mining equipment, with communications between ship and shore programmed accordingly. While the true nature of MATADOR recovery operations will not be physically obvious under normal surveillance, it must be recognized that the Soviets will no longer view the ship merely as an ocean mining vessel, but as a U.S. asset involved in covert salvage or diversionary operations. A Soviet tug has been on station in the recovery area since late March 1975. See Tab VI, paragraph 3.c.

6. Soviet Reaction to MATADOR. Analysis of potential reactions is given in Tab VII–A. It is believed probable the Soviets would go to great lengths to prevent a second mission, with reactions ranging from a private diplomatic approach to physical interference. Possible countermoves, including U.S. Navy presence, are also addressed.

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6 Tabs III–V are attached, but not printed. Tabs VI and VII are printed as Document 202.

7 See footnote 2, Document 197.
The HGE is vulnerable to physical harassment by another ship (Tab VII–B).

Since the MATADOR Project continues to be under press scrutiny, further provocative world-wide publicity could occur vis-à-vis a second mission attempt. This in itself may tend to harden Soviet resolve to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent recovery.

7. Since the MATADOR mission is expected to evoke Soviet protest or physical harassment, a decision is required on whether or not the mission should be undertaken.

8. Although the 1975 weather window would allow departure from Long Beach as late as 30 July, experience with weather holds suggests the prudence of getting as early a start as possible. If the Committee approves the MATADOR mission, departure on or about 4 July is a strong preference.

205. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 5, 1975, 10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 5 June 1975, 10:00 a.m.

Members Present:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman; Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George S. Brown; and Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present:

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Lt. General John Pauly, William G. Hyland, Captain Joseph Gleason (USN), and Carl Duckett

Item 1—MATADOR

Mr. Duckett said the ship is 67 miles off the coast of California, the technical tests have shown no problems and demonstrate that the system is in first-rate condition. There were no Soviet reactions to the
sea trials, and there was a surprising lack of publicity. However, a Soviet tug is in place at the target site on a full-time basis. From a technical standpoint, there is a very high probability of our success if a second mission is authorized.

Mr. Clements noted that the first attempt was rated a 50–50 probability of success, and that technically the chances of success are much improved this time. Our first operation was actually an expensive R & D activity on the site.

Dr. Kissinger said that was not the question—that we had to look at what the Soviets would do.

Mr. Clements said that he would have to vote No.

Mr. Colby said he thought the risk of Soviet reaction was too great.

Dr. Kissinger said that in private Presidential channels the Soviets have inquired about our intentions and have asked about the number of dead.

General Brown said it should be understood that when the Soviets rotated the watch at the target site, one ship was relieved by another on station, not by passing each other in transit some distance away from the site.

Dr. Kissinger observed that this means that the Soviets intend to maintain their surveillance at the target site.

Mr. Hyland said he thought a second mission would be too risky.

Dr. Kissinger said we would have to see what the President decides.

Mr. Colby said an important question is how we are to handle this publicly. He thought that the best course would be to allow the ship to feed off into deep ocean mining.

Mr. Clements said he understood that the Hughes company had first refusal on the ship if it is decided to make it available, and he personally supported that idea and the plan to let it go into deep ocean mining operation. However, the Department of Defense—including the JCS and the Navy—had not yet had an opportunity to decide whether we should let the ship go or not, and Defense would like to develop a position on this before any decision is made.

Dr. Kissinger agreed and asked Mr. Clements to give the Committee the Defense position.

Mr. Duckett said there was a mixed Congressional reaction—some wanted to go ahead, others thought we should stop. He agreed with Mr. Colby’s interjection that the majority wanted us to stop, but said he wanted the Committee to be aware of this mixture of views and that

2 See Document 199.
CIA had been instructed to report back to several chairmen of congressional committees.

Dr. Kissinger said that he saw no way we could go back when there is a Soviet ship right at the site and what we propose to do is clearly illegal.

Mr. Colby said he was not so sure that it was illegal, that the Soviets raised a British submarine and incorporated it into their own fleet.

Dr. Kissinger replied that this did not necessarily make it legal; it simply established that the Soviets got away with it.

Mr. Colby declared that many observers are waiting to see what our answer is and then there will be a wave of publicity.

Dr. Kissinger said that it appears that the Soviets will block a second attempt and that it would really take very little to disrupt our efforts. Why get into an argument with them on this? He asked Mr. Clements to get the Defense report to the Committee soon. He asked about the newspaper reports of tax assessments levied by California.³

Mr. Duckett said that the assessor appeared to want to get his name in the papers and has been very successful in doing so. He said this man had been briefed and had helped to outline the steps to take to avoid just what is happening, but appears to want personal publicity now. We may be forced to declare that ownership belongs to the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger demurred, and Mr. Colby said he believed that we could present a classified statement to Governor Brown⁴ and stop any further action. The California Attorney General has been helpful and outlined steps to be taken to settle this issue. In any event, Hughes won’t pay anything, it would be U.S. money, and we are not going to pay anything.

Mr. Colby said what was needed was guidance on how to handle the publicity. He recommended advising a few key people of the decision and then sitting back and let it gradually leak.

Dr. Kissinger said we should not have any leaks.

At the suggestion that some of the crew would leak information about the project, Mr. Duckett described efforts made by the media to purchase information from crewmembers and declared that not one had done so. Mr. Colby confirmed that the record had been remarkable.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Project MATADOR.]

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³ The Los Angeles Times reported on May 1, 1975 that Los Angeles County would place at least a $40 million value on the hull and undersea mining equipment of the Hughes Glomar Explorer, resulting in a tax levy of over $1.2 million. (Ray Zeman, “Hughes’ Glomar Explorer Faces Tax of $1.2 Million,” Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1975).

⁴ Gerald “Jerry” Brown, Jr., Governor of California, 1975–1983.
206. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Project MATADOR

You will recall that our attempt last year to recover a large portion of a Soviet submarine from the Pacific was only partially successful—that a [less than 1 line not declassified] part of the target broke away and fell to the ocean floor. Our intelligence exploitation of the part that was recovered was of such significance, and the prospects of what we might obtain if we were to recover more of the submarine were so promising, that plans were made for a second mission. You approved these preparations on 6 February.2

The day following your approval, the Los Angeles Times reported3 a CIA contract with Howard Hughes to use the HUGHES GLOMAR EXPLORER to raise a sunken Soviet submarine in the Atlantic. Efforts were made to enlist the cooperation of newsmen and publishers to refrain from publishing additional material in the interests of national security. Many cooperated but when columnist Jack Anderson declared that on 18 March he was going to reveal details of the first MATADOR mission, the agreed embargo “dam” collapsed and we were inundated by authoritative publicity.4

Preparations for a possible second MATADOR mission continued because we wanted to avoid any official confirmation of the press revelations by abruptly terminating the operation, and because we were not sure of Soviet reactions and therefore entertained the hope that we still might have an opportunity to recover a valuable intelligence target.

There have been several Soviet acknowledgments5 of the press accounts, but they were low key and official public positions were avoided. Through your private channels you know that the Soviets

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, MATADOR, 1975. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]: MATADOR. Outside the system. Sent for action. Ratliff forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, June 11, with the recommendation that he forward it to the President for decision. (Ibid.)
2 See Document 195.
3 See footnote 4, Document 196.
4 See footnote 2, Document 197.
5 See Appendix A attached to Document 202.
have expressed their concern about our intentions and have inquired about the dead bodies we recovered.

It is now clear that the Soviets have no intention of allowing us to conduct a second mission without interference. A Soviet ocean-going tug has been on station at the target site since 28 March, and there is every indication that the Soviets intend to maintain a watch there. Our recovery system is vulnerable to damage and incapacitation by the most innocent and frequent occurrences at sea—another boat coming too close or “inadvertently” bumping our ship. The threat of a more aggressive and hostile reaction would also be present, including a direct confrontation with Soviet navy vessels.

The 40 Committee reviewed the status of MATADOR on 5 June. It was the reluctant, but unanimous, conclusion of the Committee that the risk of a Soviet reaction was too great to warrant a second recovery attempt. Postponement was considered, but any change in the Soviet position was deemed unlikely. Therefore, it was agreed that the Committee recommend that Project MATADOR be terminated.

It will take months to disengage completely from this complicated operation. Additional publicity can be expected. The question of disposal of assets is being explored and various disposition alternatives will be developed for your consideration.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve the termination of Project MATADOR. 

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6 See Document 199.
7 See Document 205.
8 Ford initialed his approval on June 16.
Washington, August 8, 1975, 11:00 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, 8 August 1975, 11:00 a.m.

Members Present:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger;
Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George Brown; Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby.

Also Present:

Director of INR William Hyland; Deputy Director of CIA William Nelson;
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General John W. Pauly; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lt. General Brent Scowcroft. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Edward W. Muleahy and Chief, Africa Division, CIA, James M. Potts were present for Item No. 1; Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman and Chief, Europe Division, CIA, [name not declassified] were present for Item No. 2; CIA General Counsel John S. Warner was present for Item No. 3.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Project MATADOR.]

3. MATADOR

Colby: (Briefed on his MATADOR paper.)

There are three alternatives: pay the taxes; admit that property belongs to the U.S.; admit that it belongs to CIA.

Kissinger: What is the problem?

Colby: Whether we identify as U.S. property only, or specifically identify as CIA which would reveal an intelligence connection. Justice wants to go the CIA route; we want to identify the U.S. Government as owner.

Scowcroft: Buchen opts for the U.S. route, too.

Colby: Right.
Kissinger: We do not want to identify it as CIA property. Go the U.S. route.

Clements: Henry, we’re still working on this plan of what to do with the equipment. We may want to turn it over to the Navy. Maybe we could identify it as Navy property.

Colby: That won’t be possible. We have to go to court on Monday and we will have to file an affidavit on ownership, and we couldn’t say that it was Navy property.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Project MATADOR.]

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208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Disposal of the GLOMAR EXPLORER

You will recall that in June 1975 you approved that a 40 Committee recommendation that the special activity for which the GLOMAR EXPLORER was developed be terminated. We noted at that time that disengagement and disposal would be a lengthy process. In fact, we are still involved in it.

It was the 40 Committee assessment that not only did publicity prevent continuation of the special activity in which the GLOMAR EXPLORER was engaged, but also ruled against the ship’s future use in a similar manner. We next turned to the Department of Defense to determine its need for the vessel. We subsequently turned to other Government agencies. Many expressed an interest, but they lacked an approved program and financial resources to acquire and operate the ship.

We were then confronted with a Congressional appropriation action which directed that CIA’s funding for this vessel be terminated by

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1 Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, MATADOR, 1976. Secret. Sent for action. Ratliff forwarded the memorandum to Scowcroft under a covering memorandum, August 23, with the recommendation that he forward it to Ford. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 206.

3 See Document 205.
the end of Fiscal Year 1976. An extension was obtained to permit CIA funding through the transition quarter. There is wide agreement that the GLOMAR EXPLORER is a unique vessel and should be retained as a national asset, if possible. Lacking an alternate Government owner and faced with a deadline on expenditure of funds, the vessel was declared surplus and turned over to the GSA for disposal, but with provisions that would permit Government recall in any lease or sale arrangement GSA might make.

At this point the laws pertaining to surplus Government property went into effect. GSA again made the rounds of other Government agencies and some parts of the project complex were claimed, but no agency was able to claim and operate the vessel. Eventually, the ship was advertised for lease, bidding time was extended, but there were no satisfactory bids. GSA opined that an effort to sell the GLOMAR would not generate sufficient return to be acceptable and that it might be bought for scrap which would be even less satisfactory. The Administrator of GSA joined others in recommending that it be retained as a national asset. Mothballing the ship in the reserve fleet was cited as the most feasible and economical option for retention.

The Operations Advisory Group (OAG) has discussed this situation on several occasions. At its meeting on 16 August it was advised that following earlier OAG consideration, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements and Director of Central Intelligence Bush had made a joint approach to the chairmen of the Appropriations Committees of the Congress to discuss this problem. It was explained that there is Government interest in the ship but that programs to utilize it by civilian agencies are several years down the road; that to sell the vessel for scrap would not only lose it as an asset, but be subject to severe criticism because of so little return in comparison with its costs. An alternative supported by the OAG was that the ship be put into a mothball status as part of the reserve fleet of the Navy, and Clements and Bush suggested this to the Appropriations Committee chairmen. It was proposed that Defense and CIA share the mothballing cost, which was estimated at between $4 and $6 million, and that the Navy acquire title to it. The two chairmen sanctioned this proposal and agreed to support reprogramming and the use of funds from the CIA Reserve for this purpose.

Details are being negotiated between CIA and Defense, but it appears that this proposal is viable and will satisfy the major points endorsed by the OAG without dissent—that the ship not fall into foreign hands, that it be available for future Government use, that CIA’s rela-

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4 The record of the meeting is in the National Security Council Files, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee/OAG Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1976.
tionship with it be terminated. It is contemplated that CIA and Defense will share the initial mothballing cost, and that CIA will advance funds for up to five years’ caretaking expenses. There are different degrees of mothballing, so a precise total cost figure is not yet available, but is expected to be within a range of $5 to $7 million.

Recommendation

That you approve this OAG-recommended plan to transfer the GLOMAR EXPLORER to the Navy for mothballing with initial expenses shared between CIA and Defense and CIA to provide caretaking funds for up to five years.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Ford initialed his approval on August 30.
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