Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume XXXIX

European Security 1969–1976

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

*Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the administrations of Presidents Nixon and Ford. This specific volume documents U.S. efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements with its Western European allies and the Soviet Bloc that would allow for
greater European security, 1969–1976. While this volume, aided by extracts from other volumes, footnotes, and editorial notes, can be read on its own, Foreign Relations is an integrated series. Other volumes from the subseries that can be consulted on this topic are Volumes XII–XVI, all on the Soviet Union; Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972; Volume XLI, Western Europe and European Region, 1969–1972; and, to a lesser extent, Volume E–15, Western and Eastern Europe.


This volume focuses on the topic of European Security, a key foreign policy concern for both the Nixon and Ford administrations. It is centered around the basic questions the U.S. Government faced: how best to achieve security and cooperation in Europe, and how to reduce both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. This volume has a broader scope than most, and covers the entire span of both the Nixon and Ford administrations, 1969–1976. While the general focus is European security, the specific focus is on two overriding issues that faced the Nixon and Ford administrations: 1) whether to hold a conference on European security attended by the United States and its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies; and 2) whether the United States and its European allies would negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union and its East European allies on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe. Both President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and after September 1973, Secretary of State) were skeptical that a conference on European security would achieve very much—they believed that the Europeans were overestimating its potential impact. There were also related issues, such as whether to combine the security conference with negotiations on force reductions. In addition, the question of negotiations with the NATO allies looms large in the volume, which includes many memoranda of conversation between U.S. officials and their NATO counterparts. Kissinger carried on parallel negotiations with Soviet officials on both a European Security conference and MBFR. After the Moscow Summit in May 1972, at which President Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev discussed mutual and balance force reductions and a conference on security in Europe (CES), the two leaders agreed to conferences on both security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and MBFR.

The Soviet Union and the United States agreed to open the formal CSCE talks on June 30, 1973, and to begin the MBFR talks one month after the conclusion of the CSCE conference, which was expected to end in September 1973. As the volume makes clear, this timetable was impossible to follow.

The volume then focuses on the slow march to a formal CSCE conference in Helsinki in July and August 1975, and the problems atten-
dant with this process. The last chapter on MBFR picks up that issue from July 1973, and carries the negotiations forward to the end of the Ford administration, which left office without achieving success on mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe.

**Editorial Methodology**

The documents are presented chronologically—with the exception of the final tenth chapter—according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). All ellipses are in the original documents unless otherwise noted. The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. With the exception of Presidential recordings transcribed in the Office of the Historian by the editor(s) of the volume, all ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.
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Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.
Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2005 and was completed in 2007, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 1 document, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 12 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that notwithstanding the number of denied and excised documents, the record presented in this volume presented here provides an accurate and comprehensive account of U.S. foreign policy towards European security.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to express gratitude to the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access.

Douglas E. Selvage collected the documentation, made the selections, and annotated the documents under the supervision of the General Editor, Edward C. Keefer. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Carl E. Ashley and Aaron W. Marrs performed the copy and technical editing. Breffni Whelan prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
January 2008

Marc J. Susser
The Historian
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. U.S. foreign policy agencies and Departments—the Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of the Treasury, the Nixon Presidential Materials at College Park Maryland, and the Gerald Ford Presidential Library—have complied fully with this law and provided complete access to their relevant records. In addition, Henry Kissinger has approved access to his private papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIX

The fact that both the European security conference (CSCE) and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) constituted multilateral negotiations means that in addition to materials filed under these specific topics in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, many relevant documents can be found in files dealing with bilateral relations.

For the Nixon years, the most important materials on CSCE and MBFR are in the National Security Council (NSC) Files at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. For both CSCE and MBFR, the following sub-collections within the NSC Files were particularly useful: Agency Files (ACDA, Department of Defense, MBFR and CSCE, NSC, NATO, and Department of State); Subject Files (East-West Relations, USSR, Memcons, USSR, Soviet Affairs, NSSM’s and NSDM’s, Backchannel—Paris, Europe, USSR); the President’s Trip Files, especially those related to visits to Europe and the USSR; Presidential Correspondence, especially with the USSR but also with France, Germany, and UK; VIP Visits (by Brezhnev and European leaders); Presidential/HAK Memcons; and NSC Unfiled Material. In the sub-series, Country Files—Europe, the collections on Europe, European Security Issues, Austria (location of the MBFR talks in Vienna), Finland, France, Germany, Switzerland (location of CSCE Phase II in Geneva), USSR, and United Kingdom hold the most important bilateral documents related to CSCE.
and MBFR. The Kissinger Office Files also contain a wealth of key materials, especially the Country Files on Europe (General and USSR) and Kissinger’s Trip Files for visits to Europe and the Soviet Union. The NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) provide some documentation on CSCE, but much more on MBFR. In the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Meeting Files of the Verification Panel, the Senior Review Group, and the National Security Council related to MBFR and CSCE are particularly relevant, along with the original minutes of meetings of the three groups. Files on individual NSSM’s (83, 89, 92, 138, 164, 168), as well as files on individual NSDM’s (116, 134, 142, 153, 163) under Policy Papers (1969–1974) contain key documentation on decision-making. The Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversations and Presidential Tape Recordings at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project provide key, first-hand data on decisions regarding CSCE and MBFR, although it is difficult to locate relevant material. The same is true for the Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations from his years as Secretary of State, available online from the Department of State’s Electronic Reading Room.

A number of collections at the National Archives in Record Group 59, the General Records of the Department of State, hold key documents on CSCE and MBFR. The most important collections for such research are the Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–77, Entry 5177; the Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, especially the bilateral memoranda of conversation with European and Soviet officials; and the Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, which are the records of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, with key files on CSCE, MBFR, and bilateral meetings with European leaders. Less important, but also containing relevant material, are the S/S Conference Files, 1966–72, Entry 5415, and the Rogers Office Files, Entry 5439. Despite the title, Lot 80 D 188, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political Military Affairs, Records Relating to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, contains mainly low-level materials of little significance. The Central Files, 1967–69 and 1970–73, contain much important material, along with minutiae about the negotiations within NATO, between the U.S. and its Allies, and in Geneva and Vienna on CSCE and MBFR. The most relevant subject-numeric designations for CSCE are DEF EUR, DEF 1 EUR, DEF 1 NATO, POL EUR, and POL EUR E–EUR W. The most relevant subject-numeric designations for MBFR are DEF EUR, DEF 4 EUR, DEF 4 NATO, DEF 4 WARSAW PACT, DEF 6 EUR, and DEF 6 NATO. The following subject-numeric designations include important materials on bilateral discussions on MBFR: POL GER W–US, POL US–USSR, POL 1 US–USSR, and POL 7 USSR. The State Archiving System, which constitutes the Central Files after 1973, can be searched by keyword for documents relating to CSCE and MBFR.

A valuable resource for both the Nixon and Ford years with regard to CSCE and MBFR are the Henry Kissinger Papers, held at the
Manuscript Division in the Library of Congress. Particularly fruitful for research on CSCE and MBFR are the files under the sub-headings: Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File (bilateral talks with European and Soviet leaders); Geopolitical Files (especially those relating to the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the Year of Europe); the Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation; and under Department of State, Memoranda of Conversation with Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

For the Ford years, the records at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library are invaluable. Many key materials on CSCE and MBFR can be found in the files of the National Security Adviser. Particularly valuable on both CSCE and MBFR are the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, especially the General Subject Files on the USSR (“D” File, Dobrynin, and the Gromyko Files) and West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence. Also of value are the Memoranda of Conversation (bilateral talks with European and Soviet officials); the NSC Meetings Files; the Presidential Agency File (ACDA, Department of Defense, and NATO); the President’s Trip Files (November 1974, Japan, Korea and USSR; and July 9–12, 1975, Europe—the trip to the CSCE summit); Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–76, especially from Kissinger’s trips to Europe and the USSR; Presidential Trip Files (Ford’s summit with Brezhnev in Vladivostok in November 1974 and his subsequent trips to Europe); the Presidential Subject Files on CSCE and MBFR; the Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–76, USSR Memcons and Reports; the Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77, especially the Country Files on Europe (General), Germany, and the USSR; and Backchannel Messages, Europe. The Convenience Files of the NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, 1974–77, also contains valuable material on CSCE and MBFR, but it is somewhat duplicative. Relevant materials in the Convenience Files can be found under the subheadings General Subject Files (CSCE, Europe, HAK European Trip, MBFR, NSSMs, and NATO), the Ford Trips File (Vladivostok Summit, 1974; European Trip: NATO, May–June 1975; and European Trip: CSCE); and Visits by Foreign Leaders. On MBFR, the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) and the papers of the NSC Program Analysis Staff are particularly important, especially the MBFR/Measures Agreement Subseries, the Verification Panel Subseries, the Jan Lodal Convenience Files, and the Steve Hadley MBFR Files. The Melvin Laird Papers at the Ford Library contain relevant documentation on CSCE and especially MBFR for both the Nixon and Ford Administrations.

Valuable for more-detailed study of MBFR is Record Group 330, Records of the Department of Defense, at the National Archives in Suitland, Maryland. FRC 330–77–003, MBFR Files, 1973–74, provides some of the daily communication between DOD officials working on MBFR and the U.S. delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna. The secret and top
XIV Sources

secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1976 provide useful documentation in the form of bilateral memoranda of conversation between DOD officials, including the Secretary of Defense, and Ministers of Defense of the NATO allies regarding MBFR and occasionally CSCE. The secret and top secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs also contain material relating to MBFR.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Electronic Reading Room (http://foia.state.gov)

Transcripts of Telephone Conversations of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

ORG 7 S, visits of the Secretary of State
DEF EUR, defense of Europe
DEF 1 EUR, policy plans, readiness, defense of Europe
DEF 1 NATO, policy plans, readiness, defense of NATO
DEF 4 EUR, collective defense and alliances, Europe
DEF 4 NATO, collective defense and alliances, NATO
DEF 4 WARSAW PACT, collective defense and alliance, Warsaw Pact
DEF 6 EUR, armed forces, Europe
DEF 6 NATO, armed forces, NATO
NATO 3 BEL, NATO organization, headquarters
POL EUR, political
POL EUR E–EUR W, general policy. Eastern Europe-Western Europe
POL GER W–US, U.S.-German political relations
POL US–USSR, U.S.-Soviet
POL 1 US–USSR, U.S.-Soviet, general policy
POL 7 USSR, visits and meeting with Soviet officials

Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1976

Part of the on-line Access to Archive Databases (http://aad.archives.gov): Electronic Telegrams, P-Reel Index, P-Reel microfilm

Lot Files

Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177
Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s staff meetings

Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339
Files of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 1957–1977
Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403
   Nodis memoranda of conversation of Secretary Kissinger and related documents,
   September 1973–January 1977

S/S-Files, Lot 72 D 170
   Briefing books, fact books, visit and conference books, press conferences, and
   testimony of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, 1969-1972

S/S Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 5415
   Files of International Conferences

S/S-Files, Lot 80 D 307
   Files of Walter J. Stossel, Deputy Secretary of State, 1968–1982

S/S-Files, Lot 83 D 305
   National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), 1969–1977

Bureau of European Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political Military Affairs,
Records Relating to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lot 80 D 188

Rogers Office Files, Entry 5439
   Official Files of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, 1969–1973

**Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland**

National Security Council Files
   Agency Files
      ACDA, Department of Defense, MBFR and CSCE, NSC, NATO, Department of
      State
   Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files
      Haig Telcons
   Country Files—Europe
      Berlin and European Security, Europe, European Security Issues, Austria,
      Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, NAC Summit Brussels—
      June 1974—The President; Netherlands, MBFR Background Book; Poland,
      Romania, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom
   Country Files—Europe—USSR
      Map Room, Map Room—D, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Gromyko, US-Soviet Bilateral
      Issues, Dr. Kissinger Moscow Trip, May 1973
   Kissinger Office Files
      Administrative and Staff Files; Europe, West
   Kissinger Trip Files
      HAK’s Secret Moscow Trip, April 1972; HAK European Trip, September 1972,
      FRG Memcons, Brandt, Strauss; HAK Secret Paris Trip; HAK’s Germany,
      Moscow; London, Paris Trip; HAK Moscow, London Trip; HAK Moscow Trip;
      Secretary’s File, TOHAK/HAKTO; HAK Trip, Bonn, Moscow, London, Mar.
      24–28, 1974

NSC Unfiled Material
   NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Memoranda; NSC Unfiled Material, 1969–
   1972; NSC Unfiled Material, 1973–74
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President’s Trip Files
Nixon’s European Trip (1969); Presidential European Trip, 1970; Azores Meeting with Pompidou; Heath Visit, Dec. 1971; President’s Moscow Trip; MBFR/CSCE Backup Book; President’s Issues Papers, USSR; Bilateral Agreements, US–USSR; Dobrynin/Kissinger; Top Secret/Sensitive MBFR-CSCE Backup Book; For the President’s Personal Briefcase, May 1972; The President’s Conversations in Salzburg, Moscow, Tehran and Warsaw, May 1972

Presidential Correspondence
France, Germany, UK, USSR

Presidential/HAK Memcons

Subject Files
East-West Relations; President’s Annual Review of US Foreign Policy; USSR Memcons; HAK/President Memos, 1969–71; NSSM’s and NSDM’s; Soviet Affairs; USSR; USSR Briefing Book, Apr. 1974, Foreign Minister Gromyko Visit;

Backchannel
Paris; Backchannel: Europe; Backchannel: USSR; Backchannel

VIP Visits
Brandt Visit, Dec. 1971, Key Biscayne; Brezhnev’s US Visit; Presidential Trip (USSR and Europe, June 1974)

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
Meeting Files, Verification Panel Meetings
MBFR, 9/1/70; MBFR, 4/23/71, MBFR, 6/11/71; MBFR, 9/21/71; MBFR, 9/30/71; MBFR, 11/19/71; MBFR, 3/15/73; MBFR, 3/29/73; MBFR, 7/11/73; MBFR Cancelled, 12-27-73; MBFR, 1/7/74; MBFR, 3/14/74

National Security Council Meetings
NSC Meeting 1/28/70, Europe; NSC Meeting, NATO and MBFR, 11/19/70; NSC Meeting, MBFR, 6/17/71; NSC Meeting, CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial) 12/1/71; NSC Meeting, MBFR, 4/12/73

Senior Review Group Meetings
Review Group, NATO Policy, 3/24/69; Review Group, Issues of European Security, 4/16/70; Senior Review Group, US Strategies and Forces for NATO, 8/31/70; Senior Review Group, European Security, 8/31/70; Senior Review Group/VP Meeting, NATO Strategies and Forces; (NSSM 84–92) 10/28/70; Senior Review Group, MBFR, 11/23/70; SRG Meeting, European Security Confl., MBFR, 3/29/72; SRG Meeting, European Security Conference, 11/23/71; SRG Meeting/ Joint VP, MBFR/CSCE, 6/29/72; Verification P/SRG Meeting, MBFR/CSCE, 9/20/72; VP/SRG Meeting, MBFR, 10/17/72

Defense Program Review Committee Meetings
DPRC Meeting, NSDM 95, Forces for NATO, 5-19-71; DPRC Meeting, NSDM 95, 5-24-71

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Verification Panel Minutes—Originals; NSC Minutes—Originals; SRG Minutes—Originals

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National Security Decision Memoranda: NSDM 116, NSDM 134, NSDM 142, NSDM 153, NSDM 163
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Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversations

White House Central Files
  President’s Daily Diary

White House Special Files
  President’s Office File

Presidential Tape Recordings

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

NSC Institutional Files (H-Files)
  NSDM/NSSM Originals

National Security Adviser
  NSC Meetings Files
  Presidential Agency File, 1974–77
    ACDA, Department of Defense, NATO
  President’s Trip Files
    November 1974, Japan, Korea, and USSR; July 9–12, 1975, Europe
  Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–76
    Europe, South Asia, and Middle East (10/20–11/9/74); Brussels (12/10–13/74)
    London and Middle East, March 5–22, 1975; Europe and Middle East, May
    18–23; Europe, May 26–June 3, 1975; Europe, July 9–12, 1975; Ottawa, October
    14–15, 1975; Europe, December 10–17, 1975; Moscow, Brussels, Madrid, January
    20–25, 1976
  Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974–76
    Presidential Trip Files
    November 1974; Vladivostok;
    May 28–June 3, 1975: Europe;
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  NSC Staff for Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, 1974–77
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    CSCE; Europe, 1974–76; HAK European Trip; MBFR; NSSMS, 1974, 1976; NATO
    1975), European Trip: CSCE, Visits by Foreign Leaders
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  Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–77
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  USSR Memcons and Reports
  Backchannel Messages: Europe
  Memoranda of Conversation
  Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–77
    General Subject File: USSR—“D” File (Dobrynin); USSR—Gromyko Files;
    Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons; West Germany, Egon Bahr; Correspondence
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NSC Program Analysis Staff
  MBFR/Measures Agreement Subseries, Verification Panel Subseries, Jan Lodal
  Convenience Files, Steve Hadley MBFR Files

Melvin Laird Papers

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger
  Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule
  Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File
  Geopolitical Files: Soviet Union; Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Background Papers (Talkers);
  France, Chronological File; Great Britain, Chronological File; Year of Europe,
  Memoranda of Conversation
  Department of State: Eagleburger, Lawrence S.; Memoranda of Conversation
  Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation

Central Intelligence Agency

National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01012A

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: FRC 330–77–003
  MBFR Files, 1973–74

OSD Files: FRC 330–75–103
  Top Secret files from the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense, 1969

OSD Files: FRC 330–75–089
  Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1969

OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067
  Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1970

OSD Files: FRC 330–76–076
  Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1970

OSD Files: FRC 330–76–207
  Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
  Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1971

OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197
  Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
  Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1971

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  Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
  Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1972
OSD Files: FRC 330–77–0095
Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1972

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001
Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1973

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0002
Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1973

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Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1974

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0010
Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1974

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0058
Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1975

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0059
Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1975

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Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1976

OSD Files: FRC 330–77–050
Top Secret files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1976

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Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1969

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OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1975
Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1970

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–083
Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1971

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–115
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Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1972

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Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1972

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–0117
Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1973

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–0187
Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1973

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054
Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1974

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0063
Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1974

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–78–0038
Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1975

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–78–0092
Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1975

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–79–037
Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1976

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http://www.nato.int/docu/comm.htm


Abbreviations and Terms

AAA, anti-aircraft artillery
AAPD, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
ABM, antishort missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AD 70, “Allied Defense Problems in the Seventies” (a NATO study)
Adm, Admiral
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AEF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AP, Associated Press
ASAP, as soon as possible
Asst, assistant
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ATSD (AE), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy

backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department of State.
Benelux, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
BFR, balanced force reductions

C, Office of the Counselor, Department of State
CBM, confidence-building measure
CDSP, Current Digest of the Soviet Press
CDU, Christian Democratic Union (Federal Republic of Germany)
CES, Conference on European Security
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CMEA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPusa, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Co-operation (i.e., CSCE)
CSCE, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSU, Christian Social Union of Bavaria (Federal Republic of Germany)
CTB, comprehensive test ban

D, Deputy Secretary, Department of State
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DEFMIN, Defense Minister
del, delegation
deloff, delegation official
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DPC, Defense Planning Committee
DPG, Defense Planning Group
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee

XXIII
XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E, EA</td>
<td>Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC, ECE</td>
<td>European Community; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDIP</td>
<td>European Defense Improvement Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE, EEC</td>
<td>Eastern Europe; Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emb, Emboff, Embtel</td>
<td>Embassy, Embassy official, Embassy telegram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU, ESC</td>
<td>European Parliamentary Union; European Security Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR, EUR/CE, EUR/EE, EUR/GER, EUR/IG, EUR/RPM, EUR/SOV, EUR/WE</td>
<td>Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Office of the Country Director for Germany, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; European Interdepartmental Group; Office of the Director for NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exdis</td>
<td>exclusive distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI, FBS</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation; forward-based systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party (Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedrep</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM, Fonmin</td>
<td>Foreign Minister; Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONOFFS</td>
<td>Foreign Offices</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG, FY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYI</td>
<td>For Your Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR, GNP</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (East Germany); Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOR</td>
<td>Government of Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAK, HAKTO</td>
<td>Henry A. Kissinger; White House series indicator for messages from Kissinger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H, He, HK</td>
<td>Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State; His Excellency; Henry Kissinger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG, IO</td>
<td>interagency (interdepartmental) group; Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations and Terms  XXV

IG/EUR, Interdepartmental Group for European Affairs
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRS, James R. Schlesinger

KGB, Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (State Security Committee), Soviet Union

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/EUR, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State
LDC, Less Developed Country
Limdis, limited distribution

M, Under Secretary for Management, Department of State
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC, memorandum of conversation
Mech, mechanized
Med, Mediterranean
Memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN, Most Favored Nation
MIRV, multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle
Misc., miscellaneous
MOD, Minister of Defense
MPT, Multilateral Preparatory Talks (for CSCE)
MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA, national command authority
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
n.d., no date
NGA, NATO guidelines area
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
Nodis, no distribution (to other than persons indicated)
NOFORN, no foreign distribution
Notal, not to all
NPC, Nuclear Planning Committee, NATO
NPG, Nuclear Planning Group, NATO
NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
nucs, nuclear weapons

NYT, New York Times

OBE, overtaken by events
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OST, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD, Office of Science and Technology, the White House
XXVI Abbreviations and Terms

P, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State
para, paragraph
Permrep, permanent representative
PL, Public Law
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also Prime Minister
PM/DCA, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
POLAD, Political Advisor
Pt., part
QA, Quadripartite Agreement
QRR, quadripartite rights and responsibilities
REDCOSTE, reduction of costs in Europe
rep, representative
Reforger, return of force to Germany
Reftel, reference telegram
rg, representative
RG, Review Group or Record Group
RN, Richard Nixon
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecDel, Secretary’s Delegation
SECTO, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State
Septel, separate telegram
SG, Secretary General
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SLCM, submarine-launched cruise missile
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOV, Office of Eastern Soviet Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
SPC, Senior Political Committee, NATO
SPD, German Social Democratic Party of Germany (West Germany)
SRG, Senior Review Group
SYG, Secretary General
TAC, Tactical Air Command
tac, tactical
tac-nuc, tactical nuclear weapon
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovetskovo Sovyuza (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union, Soviet news agency)
Telcon, telephone conversation
TOHAK, series indicator for White House messages to Kissinger
Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
TOSEC, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
UK, United Kingdom
Abbreviations and Terms  XXVII

UN, United Nations  
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly 
UNSYG, United Nations Secretary General 
US, United States  
USA, United States of America or United States Army 
USAF, United States Air Force 
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe 
USLOSACLANT, United States Liaison Office to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
USCOSACLANT, United States Commander, Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic 
USDEL, United States delegation 
USDOCOSOUTH, United States Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe 
USG, United States government 
USIA, United States Information Agency 
USNATO, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 
USNMR, United States National Military Representative, SHAPE 
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations 

VIP, very important person  
Vol., volume 
VP, Verification Panel 
VPWG, Verification Panel Working Group 

WEU, Western European Union 
WG, Working Group 
WH, White House 
WHY, White House Years 
WP, Warsaw Pact 

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Aaron, David, United States Delegation to SALT from 1969 to 1972; member of the National Security Council staff from 1972 to 1974
Abrasimov, Pyotr A., Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic until 1971; Ambassador to France from September 1971 to May 3, 1973
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1969 to October 10, 1973
Akalovsky, Alexander, Special Assistant, United States Mission to NATO until May 1970; Political Officer, U.S. Mission in Berlin, Department of State from July 1970 to March 1974
Aldrich, George H., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State from October 1969
Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andrei M., National Security Advisor to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev from 1970
Andreani, Jacques, Chief of the Bureau of Eastern European and Soviet Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France until 1970; Assistant Government Representative to NATO from 1970 to 1972; Head of the French delegation to the CSCE from 1972 to 1975
Andreotti, Giulio, Prime Minister of Italy from January 1972 to June 1973
Annenberg, Walter, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1969 to 1974
Armitage, John A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 1973
Bahr, Egon, (SPD) Special Ambassador and Chief of the Planning Staff in the West German Foreign Office until October 21, 1969; State Secretary, Foreign, Defense, and German Policy, in the Federal Chancellery and Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany for Special Tasks from December 15, 1972
Baraz, Robert, Deputy Director, Office of Strategic and General Research, Department of State from October 1973
Barnes, Harry G., Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Romania from January 1974
Barnum, James, National Security Council Staff
Bartholomew, Reginald, Director of the Department of Defense MBFR Task Force from 1972 to 1974; Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of Defense from 1973 to 1974; Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from 1974 to 1977
Beam, Jacob D., U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia until March 1969; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 18, 1969 to January 24, 1973
Biesheuvel, Barend Willeim, Prime Minister of the Netherlands from July 1971 to May 1973
Bogdan, Corneliu, Romanian Ambassador to the United States from July 27, 1967 to July 9, 1976
Boster, Davis, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and Chief of the United States Delegation to the CSCE from October 1973 to March 1974
Bremer, L. Paul III, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from May 1973
Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Brimelow, Thomas, British Ambassador to Poland until 1969; Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, from 1969 to November 1973; Permanent Under-Secretary of State from 1973
Brosio, Manlio G., General Secretary of NATO until October 1, 1971
XXX Persons

Brown, Gen. George S., USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff from 1973 to 1974; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1, 1974
Bruce, David K.E., U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO from December 1974 to February 1976
Butterfield, Alexander, Deputy Assistant to the President from January 1969 to January 1973
Butz, Earl L., Secretary of Agriculture from December 1971

Callaghan, James, Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom, from March 5, 1974 to April 8, 1976
Campbell, Alan, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Ministry, United Kingdom
Cargo, William L., Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State from August 1969 to July 1973; Ambassador to Nepal from July 1973
Carrington, Lord Peter, Minister of Defense, United Kingdom June 1970 to 1974
Ceausescu, Nicolae, First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party; President of Romania
Chaban-Delmas, Jacques, Prime Minister of France from June 1969 to July 1972
Chnoupek, Bohuslav, Director of the Czechoslovak State Radio from 1969 to 1970; Ambassador from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union from 1970 to 1971; Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia from December 1971
Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai), PRC Premier; member, Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Bureau from 1969 to January 8, 1976
Clarke, Bruce C., Jr., Secretary of Defense’s Representative for MBFR
Clements, William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 30, 1973
Clift, A. Denis, National Security Council Staff member from 1971 to 1976
Colby, William, Director of Central Intelligence from May 1973 to November 2, 1975
Crittenberger, Major General Willis D., Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Headquarters, Europe from 1969 to 1971; Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative for MBFR, Deputy Director for International Negotiations, Directorate for Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1971
Cromer, Earl of, Ambassador from the United Kingdom to the United States from February 8, 1971 to March 13, 1974
Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1969 to December 1971; Commandant of the USMC from 1972

David, Edward, Jr., Science Advisor to the President from September 1970 to January 1973
Davies, Richard T., U.S. Ambassador to Poland from December 1972
Davignon, Etienne Viscount, Director General for Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Belgium from 1969 to 1976; Commissioner of the EEC from December 1976
Davis, Jeanne, Director of the National Security Council Secretariat from 1969 to 1970; National Security Council Staff Secretary from 1970 to 1971
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France until April 1969
Debre, Michel, Foreign Minister of France until June 1969; Minister of Defense of France from 1969 to 1973
Dean, Jonathan, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for MBFR and Chairman of the Interagency MBFR Coordinating Committee from July 1972 to January 1973; US representative to the MBFR Preparatory Negotiations, Vienna from January to June 1973; Special Assistant from June to October 1973; Deputy U.S. representative to the MBFR Negotiations from October 1973
Demirel, Suleyman, Prime Minister of Turkey until March 1971 and from August 1974
Denktash, Rauf, Head of the Cyprus Turkish Federated State from June 20, 1976
Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from November 1973
De Rose, F. de Tricornot, Permanent Representative of France to NATO from 1970 to 1975
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States; member, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1971
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom, from June 1970 to 1974
Dubcek, Alexander, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia until April 1969
Dubynin, Yuri, Chief of the European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from 1971; Deputy Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the CSCE from 1973 to 1975
Dubs, Adolph, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, from September 1972; Charge d’Affaires ad interim, Moscow from January 1973 to March 1974

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., National Security Council Staff until September 1969; Chief, Political Section, US Mission to NATO from 1969 to August 1971; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1971 to June 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Operations from 1973 to 1975; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from 1975
Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 10, 1969 to November 1973
Ellsworth, Robert F., Assistant to the President from January to May 1969; Permanent Representative to NATO from May 1969 to June 1971; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1974 to 1975; Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1975

Farley, Philip J., Deputy Director, ACDA from 1969 to 1973
Fiss, Colonel Robert, USA, Special Assistant for Arms Control, Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1971; Delegate to NATO from 1973
Floyd, Arva Colbert, Office of Political-Military Affairs, the Department of State from July 1969 to October 1973; Deputy Director of the Office of NATO-Atlantic Political-Military Affairs from October 1973
Fokin, Yuriy E., Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from 1966 to 1976
Ford, Gerald R., Vice President from December 6, 1973 to August 9, 1974; President of the United States from August 9, 1974
Freeman, John, British Ambassador to the United States from March 1969 to January 1971
Frowick, Robert H., Office of Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from August 1973
Furnas, Howard, Special Assistant to the Director of ACDA from 1969 to 1971

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and Vice Chancellor from 1974
Gierek, Edward, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from December 1970
Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs of France from 1969 to May 27, 1974; President of France from May 27, 1974
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party until December 1970
Goody, James, member of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until August 1971; Political Officer, U.S. Mission to NATO, from August 1971 to July 1974; Deputy Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs from July 1974
Goodpaster, General Andrew, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe from July 1969 to 1974
Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
XXXII  Persons

Haig, General Alexander M., Jr., USA, Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969 to June 1970; Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970 to 1972; Army
Vice-Chief of Staff from 1972 to May 1973; White House Chief of Staff from May 4,
1973 to September 1974; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from December 15,
1974
Haldeman, H. Robert, Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President from January 1969
to April 30, 1973
Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 1974
Hattersley, Roy, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United
Kingdom from 1974 to 1975; appointed Privy Councilor from 1975
Heath, Edward, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from June 1970 to 1974
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 2, 1973
Higgins, Michael, member, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff
Hill, Robert C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from
May 10, 1973 to January 4, 1974
Hillenbrand, Martin J., U.S. Ambassador to Hungary until February 15, 1969; Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 20, 1969 to April 30, 1972; Am-
bassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from June 27, 1972
Hirschfeld, Thomas J., Foreign Affairs Officer, ACDA from August 1969
Honecker, Erich, Head of the Socialist Unity Party and Leader of the German Demo-
cratic Republic from 1971
Hušak, Gustav, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from April
1969
Hyland, William G., member of National Security Council staff from 1969; Director of
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 1974 to
November 1975; President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from No-
vember 1975
Ikle, Fred C., Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from
July 10, 1973
Ingersoll, Robert S., Ambassador to Japan from April 1972 to January 1974; Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for East Asian-Pacific Affairs from January to July 1974; Deputy
Secretary of State from July 1974
Irwin, John N. II, Special Emissary to the President of Peru from 1969 to 1970; Deputy
Under Secretary of State from September 1970 to July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State
from July 1972 to February 1973; Ambassador to France from February 1973 to Oc-
tober 1974
Jablonski, Henryk, Chairman, Polish Council of State from 1971
Jackson, Henry M. “Scoop,” Senator (D–Washington)
Jaroszewicz, Piotr, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Poland, from 1970
Jennings, Colonel Richard M., USA, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from 1971 to
1972
Jobert, Michel, Secretary General of the French Presidency until April 1973; Foreign Min-
ister of France from April 1973 to May 1974
Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States until January 20, 1969
Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969
to February 1973; Ambassador at Large from February 1973; U.S. Negotiator at SALT
in 1973
Jordan, Amos A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Se-
curity Affairs from 1974 to 1976
Jurich, Anthony J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury for National Security
Affairs from 1970 to 1972
Kadar, Janos, First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party
Karamanlis, Constantine, Prime Minister of Greece from August 1974
Karjalainen, Ahti, Foreign Minister of Finland from 1972 to 1975
Kekkonen, Urho, President of Finland
Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury from 1969 to 1971; Ambassador at Large, member of the President’s Cabinet, and Permanent Representative to NATO from 1971 to 1973
Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., USA, senior member of the National Security Council staff from 1969 to 1971; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council planning from 1973 to 1975
KhruShchev, Nikita Sergeievich, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union until October 14, 1964
Kingswell, Joseph Attard, Maltese Representative to the CSCE
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969 to November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973 to January 21, 1977
Knowles, Lieutenant General Richard T., USA, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 to 1972
Korniyenko, Georgi M., member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Chief of the USA Division until 1975; Deputy Assistant to Gromyko from 1975
Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
Kovalyev, Anatoly G., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the Soviet Delegation to the CSCE from 1973 to 1975
Kreisky, Bruno, Chancellor of Austria from March 1970

Laboulaye, Francois de, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France from 1974
Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense from January 22, 1969 to January 29, 1973
Lake, W. Anthony, staff member of the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and National Security Council from 1969 to April 1970
Leber, Georg, Minister of Defense of the German Democratic Republic from July 7, 1972
LeBieu, Kennneth, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations until 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for Senate Relations from 1970
Lee, Vice Admiral John M., USN, Assistant Director, Bureau of Weapons Evaluation and Control, ACDA from 1970
Lehman, John F. Jr., National Security Council staff from 1969 to 1971; National Security Council Special Counsel from 1971 to 1974; member of U.S. Delegation to MBFR from 1974 to 1975; Deputy Director of ACDA from 1975
Lemnitzer, General Lyman, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until July 1969
Lincoln, George A., Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness from 1969
Lindjord, Haakon, Assistant Director, Office for Emergency Preparedness from 1971 to 1973
Linebaugh, John David, ACDA until September 1973; Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA from 1973
Lipatti, Valentin, Romanian Ambassador to CSCE from 1972 to 1975
Lobdell, Brigadier General Harrison, Jr., USAF, Regional Director for European Affairs, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense from February 1971 to September 1, 1976
Lodal, Jan, Director of NATO and General Purpose Force Analysis Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1970; Director of Program Analysis for the National Security Council from 1973 to 1975
XXXIV Persons

Lord, Winston, member of Policy Planning staff, Office of International Security Affairs until 1969; National Security Council planning staff in 1969; Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1970 to 1973; Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from 1973

Lowenstein, James G., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State, from April 1974

Lucet, Charles, Ambassador from France to the United States until April 1972

Luns, Joseph, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands until July 6, 1971; NATO Secretary General from October 1, 1971

Macovescu, Gheorghe, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania until 1972; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania from October 1972

Makarios III, Archbishop of Cypriot Orthodox Church; Cypriot President from 1960 to July 15, 1974, and July 23, 1974 to August 1977

Makarov, Vasily G., Chief of the Cabinet to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Makins, Christopher, First Secretary, UK Embassy until 1975

Manescu, Corneliu, Foreign Minister of Romania until October 1972

Mansfield, Michael, Senator (D–Montana), Majority Leader of the Senate

Maresca, John J., Deputy Head of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE from 1973 to 1975

Matlock, Jack E., Jr., Country Director for Soviet Affairs from June 1971 to January 1973; Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs from January 1973

Maurer, Ion Gheorghe, Prime Minister of Romania until March 29, 1974

McAuliffe, Eugene, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to NATO, from October 1972

McClellan, John L., Senator (D–Arkansas), Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee

McGinnis, John J., Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury for National Security Affairs from 1971 to 1972

McGovern, George, Senator (D–South Dakota), Democratic Party nominee for President, 1972

McGuire, Ralph, Director, NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until December 1973; Ambassador to Mali from December 1973

McManaway, Clayton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Programs, Bureau of System Analysis, Department of Defense from 1971 to 1973

Mendelevich, Lev, Soviet Ambassador to CSCE; Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN until 1970

Michael, Colonel Louis G., Director, MBFR Task Force from 1976

Miller, Robert H., Assistant Director of ACDA from November 1973

Mintoff, Dominic, Maltese Labor Party leader and Prime Minister of Malta from 1971

Mitchell, John, Attorney General from January 1969 to February 1972

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1970 to July 1974

Morse, John H., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Affairs, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense from 1971 to 1973

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969 to August 9, 1974

Nunn, Samuel, Senator (D–Georgia)


Odeen, Philip A., Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council from November 1971

Olszowski, Stefan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland from December 22, 1971 to December 2, 1976
Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1969 to December 13, 1971
Palme, Olaf, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 14, 1969 to October 8, 1976
Pastore, John, Senator (D–Rhode Island)
Pauls, Rolf, Ambassador from the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States until March 1973
Perez, Frank, Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic and General Research, Department of State until April 1970; Director of the Office of Strategic and General Research, Department of State from February 1970 to 1971
Peterson, Frederick V.E. “Val,” Ambassador to Finland from May 1, 1969 to March 23, 1973
Pickering, Thomas R., Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State from September 1969; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1973 to February 1974
Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union until 1977
Pompidou, Georges, President of France from June 15, 1969 to April 2, 1974
Proctor, Edward W., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency until May 1971; Deputy Director for Intelligence from May 1971
Pungan, Vasile, Romanian Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1969; Counselor to the President of Romania

Ramsbotham, Peter, UK Ambassador to the United States from 1974
Resor, Stanley R., Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the MBFR Negotiations from October 1973
Roberts, Brigadier General Francis J., European Division, Office for National Security Council Affairs, Directorate of Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1971 to 1972
Rodman, Peter W., member of the Planning Group, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 to 1970; Staff member of the Office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1970
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State until September 3, 1973
Roth, Helmut, Directory of Subdivision B, General Disarmament and European Security, the Second Political Division and Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for Questions of Disarmament and Arms Control from August 1969; Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control from November 3, 1969
Rumor, Mariano, Prime Minister of Italy until July 1970
Rumsfeld, Donald Henry, U.S. Permanent Representative to the NATO Council from February 1973 to December 1974; Director, White House Office of Operations from 1974 to 1975; Secretary of Defense from November 20, 1975
Rush, Kenneth, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from July 22, 1969 to February 20, 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 1972 to February 1973; Deputy Secretary of State from February 1973 to May 1974; Counselor to the President for Economic Policy from May to September 1974; Ambassador to France from September 1974
Ryan, General John D., USAF, Air Force Cargo Coordination Support System, Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 1969

Saunders, Harold H., member of the National Security Council Operations staff for Near East and South Asia from January 1969
Sauvagnargues, Jean, Foreign Minister of France from 1974 to 1976
XXXVI Persons

Scheel, Walter, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany from October 1969 to 1974; President of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1974

Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget from January 1969 to June 1970; Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 to August 1971; Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from February to July 1973; Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975

Schmidt, Helmut, Chairman of the SPD Bundestag Faction until October 1969; Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany from October 1969 to July 1972; Minister for Economic Affairs from July to December 1972; Minister of Finance from December 1972 to May 1974; Chancellor from May 16, 1974

Scowcroft, Lieutenant General Brent, USAF, Military Assistant to the President from 1972 to 1974; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1974 to 1975; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 3, 1975

Selden, Armistead I, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1970 to 1972

Sherer, Albert William, Jr., “Bud,” Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1972; Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE negotiations from February 1974

Shinn, William, Counselor’s Office, Department of State from 1974 to 1976.

Shultz, George, Secretary of Labor from January 1969 to June 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 to May 1972; Secretary of the Treasury from 1972

Sisco, Joseph, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from February 1969 to February 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political and Economic Affairs from February to May 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1974

Smith, Gerard C., Director, ACDA from February 7, 1969 to January 4, 1973

Smith, K. Wayne, Director of the National Security Council’s Program Analysis Staff from 1970 to 1971

Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, Russian author and recipient of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1970; arrested and expelled from the Soviet Union to the Federal Republic of Germany in February 1974; moved to the United States in 1975

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, member of the National Security Council Operations Staff for Europe from January 1969 to January 1974; Counselor of the Department of State from January 1974

Spasowski, Romuald, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland

Spierenburg, Dirk P., Permanent Representative from the Netherlands to NATO from 1970 to 1973

Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from August to September 1969; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from September 1969 to August 1973

Springsteen, George, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to June 1972 and from August 1973 to January 1974; Acting Assistant Secretary of European Affairs from June 1972 to August 1973; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from January 1974

Stabler, Wells, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 1973; Acting Assistant Secretary from January to March 1974; then Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs from March 1974

Staden, Berndt von, Director of Subdivision A in the First Political Division of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany until June 1970; Head of the First
Political Division of the Foreign Office from June 1970 to April 1973; Ambassador to the United States from April 1973

Stewart, Michael, British Foreign Secretary until June 1970

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Poland until August 5, 1972; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from August 9, 1972 to January 1974; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 1974

Strausz-Hupe, Robert, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium from February 1972 to May 1974

Streator, Edward, Deputy Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from February 1969 to December 1973; Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs from December 1973

Sukhodrev, Viktor M., Counselor, Second European Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sykes, Richard, Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

Theis, Paul, Executive Editor, White House Editorial Office from 1974 to 1975

Thomson, John, Representative of the head of the British Permanent Mission to NATO and head of the British Delegation to the MBFR Preparatory Talks in Vienna from October 1973; Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office

Thorn, Gaston, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg until May 26, 1974; Prime Minister from May 1974

Tickell, Crispin, Head of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s NATO Department

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia

Trampczynski, Witold, Ambassador from Poland to the United States from March 1972

Trend, Sir Burke, British Cabinet Secretary until 1973

Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott, Prime Minister of Canada

Unger, General Ferdinand T., USA, Plans and Policy Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1970

Van den Uyl, Joop, Prime Minister of the Netherlands from May 1973

Van der Stoel, Max, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands from May 1973

Van Elslande, Renaat, Foreign Minister of Belgium from January 1973

Van Lynden, Rijnhard, Ambassador from the Netherlands to the United States until August 1974

Van Well, Guenther, Ministerial Director and Head of the Political Division of the Federal Republic of Germany Foreign Office until March 1973; thereafter, Director of the Political Division

Vavilov, Andrei, Official of the USA Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vest, George S., Deputy Chief, U.S. Mission to NATO from August 1969 to October 1972; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for CSCE and Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE from October 1972 to October 1973; Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations from October 1973 to April 1974; Director of the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs, Department of State from April 1974

Vine, Richard D., Director, Office of West European Affairs, Department of State, from August 1972

Vorontsov, Yuli, Minister of the Soviet Embassy to the United States from 1970

Wagner, Jean, Ambassador from Luxembourg to the United States from October 2, 1969 to November 29, 1974

Walters, Lieutenant General Vernon A., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 1972


Watts, William, National Security Council Staff Secretary from 1969 to April 1970
XXXVIII  Persons

Weinel, Vice Admiral John P., USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1969

Weiss, Seymour, member of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State from August 1969 to August 1972; Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff from August 1972; Director of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs from August 1973 to January 1974; member of the Policy Coordination Staff from January 1974

Welander, Rear Admiral Robert O., USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Affairs

Wickham, Major General John, Jr., USA, Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger from 1973 to 1976

Wilberforce, John, Counselor, Embassy of the United Kingdom in the United States

Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister until 1970 and from 1974 to 1976

Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary from January 1969 to 1974

Zorin, Valerian, Soviet Ambassador to France until 1971; Special Missions of Ambassador for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to CSCE Negotiations from 1971
European Security,
1969–1976


1. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 4, 1969, 2:30–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
European Security Conference

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Under Secretary Richardson
Morton Abramowitz, Special Assistant, U
Adolph Dubs, Acting Country Director, EUR/SOV

Ambassador Dobrynin said he was calling on the instructions of his Government to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the Appeal on European Security issued by the Warsaw Pact countries at Budapest on March 17. The Warsaw Pact countries attach great importance to a conference on European security. They believe that the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Memcon’s, Dobrynin/Richardson, April 1969. Confidential. Part I of II. Drafted by Dubs. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s office. The day before, Dobrynin initially raised the issue of a European security conference in a meeting with Kissinger at 3:30 p.m. Kissinger wrote in a memorandum to the President on April 3:

“Dobrynin began the conversation by saying that he had been instructed by the highest level of the politburo to give me an advance indication of a note that was going to be presented at the State Department tomorrow morning. This note in effect presents the Budapest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact nations, and asks for a European Security Conference. (I am sending you a separate memorandum on this.) Dobrynin asked me for my views. I told him a European Security Conference which excluded the United States would meet with strong opposition. Dobrynin said that Moscow has no intention of prescribing the membership; if one of our allies proposed United States participation, Moscow would agree. (This represents a major change in Soviet policy.)”

The full text of the memorandum is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Document 32. For Kissinger’s memorandum to the President, see Document 2.

2 The Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Pact to all European Countries is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 106–108.
Appeal represents a serious attempt to facilitate security in Europe and cooperation among European States in the economic, technological and scientific fields. No conditions are being attached to the holding of such a conference. The Soviet Union and its allies are prepared to discuss any issues. The views of these countries about a security conference are spelled out in the Appeal. This is not a propaganda exercise but a serious approach to an important matter. It was visualized that a preparatory committee should meet to discuss the time, place and agenda for such a conference.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he knew that the question of U.S. participation would arise. This would be a matter for the European countries to consider and to decide. If all European states believe that U.S. participation is necessary or desirable, then the Soviet Union would have no objection. Dobrynin indicated that the Appeal was being delivered to various governments by the Hungarian Government since the Appeal originated at the Budapest meeting. Soviet ambassadors were under instructions to present the Appeal to governments in Western Europe.

Mr. Richardson commented that Ambassador Dobrynin had anticipated several questions. He noted that the Soviet Union visualized that the conference would be held without any preconditions. He couldn’t help but note that the Appeal had stated that fundamental preconditions for Europe’s security included such things as confirmation of existing European borders, recognition of the existence of the GDR, etc. Ambassador Dobrynin interjected that these were not preconditions and that all countries could propose any questions which they thought relevant. Participants could also make any statements they wished. All questions raised could be considered by the preparatory group.

Mr. Richardson asked whether U.S. participation would take place only if there were unanimous agreement among European states. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he did not know whether there would be voting or not on such issues. He had no authorization to speak for European governments. In any event, there would be no objection from the Soviet side to U.S. participation. Mr. Richardson asked about possible Canadian participation. Ambassador Dobrynin answered that he was not sure whether this would be a main concern of the participants or whether the Canadians themselves wished to take part in a security conference. At this point he could only say that he frankly didn’t know whether Canada would be included or excluded from such a meeting.

Mr. Richardson asked whether the Soviet Union was prepared to consider arrangements for Europe other than those specified as prerequisites to European security in the Budapest Appeal. Specifically, would the Soviets consider arrangements regarding the FRG and the GDR other than those spelled out in the Appeal? Furthermore, would the Soviets be willing to consider such questions as access to Berlin?
Dobrynin noted again that any questions could be raised and that the agenda would no doubt be broad-ranging. The main objectives would be to work toward the security and tranquility of Europe. The Soviet Union feels strongly that recognition of the present borders would be a stabilizing factor. Great importance is attached to this point. He added that at some point in the future, various issues could be discussed in large forums while other matters could be discussed in smaller groupings. Dobrynin suggested that the US and the USSR might even have some preliminary exchanges of views on issues that might be discussed. The Soviet Union recognizes that all objectives cannot be achieved overnight. Perhaps the first security conference might be just a beginning and a prelude to future meetings.

Mr. Richardson concluded by noting that the Appeal no doubt would be discussed at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting and that the Appeal would also be discussed between our Western allies themselves. It was useful to have the Ambassador’s views on questions that were raised.

3 Scheduled for April 10-11 in Washington.

2. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 4, 1969.

SUBJECT
Soviet Initiative for a European Security Conference

The Soviets and East Europeans are currently pushing, diplomatically and through propaganda, an “appeal” adopted by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on March 17 which proposes an early conference on European security. Ambassador Dobrynin today delivered a copy to Elliot Richardson. (You will recall that Prime Minister Rumor raised the subject with you on April 1.)

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 392, Subject Files, Soviet Affairs. Secret. Sent for information.
2 See Document 1.
3 Mariano Rumor, Prime Minister of Italy.
The appeal has aroused interest in the West because it almost completely is devoid of the polemical attacks on the US and the Federal Republic which normally appear in Communist declarations of this sort. There are no really significant new substantive proposals on how to go about getting a European settlement in this document—its main concrete proposition is that officials from interested European states should meet to arrange a conference and its agenda. Its main theme is that if the present status quo is recognized in Europe, especially by the Federal Republic, there could then be extensive east-west cooperation on economic and technical matters and military alliances could be abolished.

On the face of it, the appeal excludes the United States from participation in the proposed conference. But in the past when this criticism was levelled against their European security proposals, the Soviets have indicated that they are prepared to see a US role. They have maintained this line privately in the present instance, too.

Soviet Objectives

There has been speculation about the reasons why this appeal should have been issued at this time. The timing may be connected with the impending NATO meeting: the Soviets may hope that the trend toward better cohesion in NATO after Czechoslovakia and as a result of your European visit can be halted or reversed by a conciliatory proposition from them. Beyond this tactical motivation, the Soviets may in fact be interested in restoring some of the east-west contacts, including economic ones, that were disrupted by their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Since the document makes a number of demands on the FRG—including recognition of East Germany, the Oder-Neisse Line and the “special status” of West Berlin, as well as renunciation of nuclear weapons—the Soviets may have wanted to lay the groundwork for renewed political contacts with Bonn. The obverse side of that coin is, as it always has been, an effort to isolate the Federal Republic by picturing it as the main obstacle to a European settlement if it fails to meet Communist demands.

Another motivation that may have played a role relates to Soviet efforts to consolidate the Warsaw Pact: this is the first major document in some time that all the East Europeans, including Romania, have been willing to sign.

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4 At the Potsdam Conference, the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed on August 1, 1945, that “pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of the Oder and western Neisse Rivers would “be under the administration of the Polish State.” See Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 63. Based on the decisions at Potsdam, Poland declared that its border with Germany, the Oder-Neisse line, was permanent. In contrast, the United States, concurring with the FRG, argued that the final delimitation of the Polish-German border would have to await a German peace treaty.
Our Attitude

Although I do not believe that in and of itself this “appeal” does anything to advance the prospects of a European settlement, I believe we should not give it a negative response. Rather, we might use it in our effort to impress on the Soviets the need to talk concretely about the issues that exist between us.

What we have said about the inutility and, indeed, dangers of holding grandiose conferences at this stage should hold true in this case also; but we need not rule out eventual meetings, after the necessary spadework has been done to ensure that they get somewhere.

I do not believe that we should make an issue of our attendance at such meetings. Anyone who is serious about making progress on European problems knows that we must be a party; we should not make the Soviets think that they are doing us a favor if they agree to such an obvious fact of life.

I do believe that in the context of a constructive response we should make clear that

(1) in our view a real settlement in Europe is incompatible with gross intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and

(2) cannot be based on discrimination against Germany, since this would undermine any settlement from the beginning.

All of this, of course, looks very far into the future. But I think it would be desirable for us to be in a positive if cautious posture on this range of issues. This, judging from discussions at NATO, is also the position of our allies in Europe.

3. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 8, 1969.

SUBJECT

The Recent Warsaw Pact Proposal for a European Security Conference

It now appears that the so-called Budapest Appeal of March 17, in which the Warsaw Pact countries proposed holding a conference on

European security, is going to be an item of major interest at the NATO Ministerial meeting. Most of the allies feel that NATO should make a positive response, although all of them would agree that an early conference would be undesirable.

I believe that we could accept the principle of an eventual conference on European problems but that the actual convening of such a meeting must await signs of progress on concrete European issues. Without such progress, a conference would probably find the East European countries closely aligned with a rigid Soviet position, while the western participants would be competing with each other to find ways to “break the deadlock.” The net result might well be frustration and western disunity, both of which would tend to set back prospects for an eventual resolution of European issues.

Consequently, our emphasis should be on the need for talks on concrete issues and for consultations within NATO designed to develop coherent western positions on such issues.3

Recommendation

If you approve of the above approach to the question of a European security conference, I would like to provide it to the Secretary of State for his guidance in the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting.4

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2 The NSC discussed the upcoming NATO meeting, including the U.S. stance on a European security conference, at a meeting on April 8. According to Haig’s handwritten notes from the meeting, Hillenbrand characterized the European security conference as “a tactical ploy by Warsaw Pact—but also perhaps effort to improve.” Haig noted that “HAK favors para. 2—issue is degree to which we accept Warsaw’s.” Nixon asked, “Aren’t Italians pushing détente language?” Kissinger responded: “Problem w/security conference is there are few items for agenda.” Nixon stated: “Our purpose is to help with language—probably will never be a conference.” Hillenbrand suggested, “Italians will probably push some economic or cultural multilateral conference as a first step—we’ll listen. Para. 44 on force levels is also contentious—reductions—unilateral w/a phased mutual [withdrawal]—unilateral is effort to tie down U.S. in State’s view. HAK (according to Hillenbrand) favors other language. Kind of paper is easy w/only minor contentions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes 1969, Originals)

3 On April 7, Rogers wrote the President that at the upcoming Washington NATO Ministerial meeting “euphoria, as a complement to the prospect of East-West negotiations, is threatening” and that the Warsaw Pact appeal for an ESC “is adversely affecting our Allies’ determination to maintain defense contributions.” Rogers recommended an allied response that was “cautious and conditioned by a call for concrete evidence of sincerity. The Allies also should stress, we believe, the need to maintain military strength as a pre-condition to negotiation.” (Ibid., RG 59, S/S Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 3051B, Box 66, CF–354)

4 The President initialed his approval. In an April 9 memorandum, Kissinger informed Rogers that “the President has considered our attitude toward the recent Warsaw Pact proposal for a conference on European security. He asks that all concerned be guided by the following:” At this point, Kissinger inserted verbatim the second and third paragraphs of his memorandum to Nixon. (Ibid., Rogers Office Files, Entry No. 5439, Box 3, Chronological Files, 1969–1973)
4. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 4, 1969, 11:25 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Rolf Pauls
Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
William A. K. Lake

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

European Security Conference

Ambassador Pauls said that in his view the decisive point is not whether or not to hold a European Security Conference, but whether diplomatic political approaches could be taken which would improve the prospects for a meaningful conference. Mr. Kissinger stated that the U.S. would not try to veto the holding of such a conference if the Europeans desired it, but warned that he personally thought the Germans could live to regret it since they would often be a minority of one. He asked what specifically might be discussed at such a conference. Ambassador Pauls suggested mutual troop withdrawals. Mr. Kissinger pointed out the difficulties involved in such withdrawals, since U.S. troops must be withdrawn thousands of miles while the Russian troops would fall back only a few hundred. In addition, negotiating troop reductions simultaneously with SALT would be complicated. If the German Foreign Office talks about troop withdrawals, Mr. Kissinger continued, U.S. public opinion—and the U.S. Senate—will be encouraged to call for them. Europeans should remember that when they make proposals, we may accept them. Ambassador Pauls hurriedly said that he was not proposing mutual withdrawals but simply thought that they could be discussed at a conference.

The Ambassador mentioned in passing the possibility of talking about Berlin and the German problem in preparing for a conference. He agreed, however, that as of now, a conference would make no sense. Such a conference might make sense later if there were diplomatic movement in the meantime. Mr. Kissinger said that he thought this would be an interesting subject to discuss during the Chancellor’s visit; we could consider what might come out of a conference.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III. Secret. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.
Washington, October 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

European Security and Forthcoming NATO Meetings—The Bureaucratic Steamroller Pushes Irresistibly Forward

The Brussels machinery with heavy US prodding has been grinding out huge quantities of paper on European Security issues. Based on Ministerial decisions at Reykjavik the year before, a vastly elaborate study of mutual force cuts in Europe has also been proceeding.

With the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting scheduled for November (Elliot Richardson is going from here) and the full Ministerial the month after, State is now moving to take the lead in pushing into the next phase of crystallizing issues and a public Western position favoring an eventual conference.

For some reason, the view at State seems to be that we must either take the lead (as we also did on the Berlin “probe”) or end up being isolated. I find it hard to believe that our diplomacy cannot be skillful enough to operate in the middle ground between these extremes.

I have tried at various times to urge a little less activism and to impress on State the Presidential interest in this whole range of effort. But the flood-tide continues to roll.

In the attached Tabs, I have tried to give you a feel for what has been happening and for what State is planning to do next. I urge you to plow through these materials, at your earliest convenience.

Then I would strongly urge that we get together with Richardson and Hillenbrand to go over this entire subject matter so that we can decide on a US posture consistent with other things in play. Certainly, you and Elliot should have a meeting of minds before he goes off to

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2 The text of the communiqué of the June 25, 1968, North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, along with a Declaration on Mutual Force Reductions adopted by the countries participating in the NATO Defense Program, are in the Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75-78.


4 In an October 10 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger raise with Richardson “your interest in the preparations for the NATO deputy foreign ministers and foreign ministers meetings. You are particularly interested in the preparations
Recommendation

1. That you promptly look over the attached materials.
2. That your office set up an early meeting including Richardson, Hillenbrand, plus one other State officer of their choosing, you and me.

Approve

LCDR Howe set up meeting

Disapprove

Other

Tab A

EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES

State has initiated an exchange with Bob Ellsworth outlining a position it proposes to take in the forthcoming NATO meetings. (Summary and cables attached).6

The essence of the proposed position is that the Deputy Foreign Ministers would recommend a large step forward on European Security: we would endorse the idea of a Conference, and single out two issues for further study and eventually for a formal proposal to the USSR. The two issues are:

(1) Balanced force reductions in Central Europe, and
(2) a declaration of principles underlying European security.

By June 1970 the Ministers would approve a negotiating position.

Balanced force reduction is an old, old issue, which has been reworked by a study group. The result is a guidelines paper establishing the basis for further study of negotiating positions (outline at Tab B).

There are several other items on the extensive list of European Security issues (Tab C). Though they are not very inspiring, they should be given further consideration, especially if there is a disposition among the Europeans to put them forward for possible negotiations.
It is worth recalling that the basic position stated in the April communiqué was that a list should be compiled of issues that “lend themselves to fruitful and early resolution.” It is difficult to see how balanced force reductions would qualify as an issue for “early” resolution.

The declaration of principles also raises some problems. On the one hand, it is relatively harmless and might serve to test the Soviet interest in negotiating. On the other hand, it is not very meaningful, even if the Soviets signed immediately. They would interpret it as a ratification of their actions in Czechoslovakia. Or, they would attach their own “principles”—recognition of existing boundaries, the two Germanys etc.

The European Security issues are complicated by efforts currently launched: the three-power approach to the Soviets on Berlin, and the Soviet-FRG bilateral on renunciation of force. Apparently both initiatives would proceed. Since they were regarded as somewhat of a test of Soviet attitudes, the results some months hence might not justify forward movement on either balanced force reductions or a general declaration.

Finally, we will have to face possible French resistance to a bloc-to-bloc approach on European Security, which our proposed position implies if adopted by the Ministers.

**Tactical Considerations**

—Most Ministers will want the Alliance to stake out a forthcoming approach on European Security;

—if we are the only hold-out, we could be isolated;

—we prefer to proceed with multilateral and bilateral discussion with Eastern states to test the negotiating climate, to offer prospects of reduced tensions, and to improve the atmosphere for a European Security Conference;

—we could: participate in negotiations on individual items drawn from the agreed list; continue Berlin contacts; and examine economic, scientific, and technological cooperation in bilateral East-West contacts;

—encouraging this general approach should avoid intra-alliance strains and maintain cohesion during an active period of East-West diplomacy;

—West European opinion will welcome a more forthcoming attitude, we will have solid tactical position, and if the Soviets refuse to bargain they will bear the onus for failure to make progress.

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7 The final NAC communiqué also stated “that any negotiations must be well prepared in advance, and that all Governments whose participation would be necessary to achieve a political settlement in Europe should take part,” and that “the Allies will also pursue their efforts and studies in the field of disarmament and practical arms control, including balanced force reductions and the initiatives already undertaken for the renunciation of the use of force.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1969, pp. 354–356)
December Ministerial Communiqué

The Ministers would:


b. Indicate belief that progress in negotiations on some concrete issues can move East and West closer to an eventual conference.

c. Publicly indicate those specific areas which are being developed for initial exploration with the East:
   —Balanced force reductions; and
   —joint declaration of principles underlying European Security.

Balanced Force Reductions

Presented as opening step toward future negotiation on fundamental questions, such as issues related to Germany/Berlin:

—Would have domestic political advantages;
—studies are sufficiently advanced for formulating one or two illustrative proposals;
—Deputy Foreign Ministers in November would recommend studies of, say, 10, 20, and 30 percent staged reductions.

Joint Declaration of Principles

—For exploratory purposes, a declaration might contain the following elements:

(a) non-intervention in internal affairs;
(b) abstention from the use of threat of force;
(c) respect for independence and territorial integrity;
(d) agreement to settle differences through peaceful means.

—The declaration would:

(a) test willingness of the Soviets to improve the East-West climate;
(b) help increase flexibility of East European states in their dealings with West;
(c) put Soviets on defensive;
(d) appeal to Eastern and Western public opinion.

Other Issues

1. Germany-Berlin

—Depending on the state of the tripartite soundings already launched, Ministers express continued support for improved intra-German relations;
—should leave it to Germans to determine the rate of progress on Germany and Berlin issues.

2. Confidence-Building Measures

—Not sufficiently important or tactically advantageous to warrant inclusion in basic Western position.
3. Economic, Technological and Cultural

—Best left to bilateral effort or other multilateral approaches and not included as specific elements of NATO response.

Scenario

—September/October Political Advisors and disarmament experts in NATO will shape East-West issue study to spotlight the proposals outlined above;
—October 15 Permanent Representatives receive final report and begin to prepare package for Ministers;
—November 5–6 Foreign Ministers consider report and prepare recommendations to take action on balanced force reductions and joint declaration of principles;
—December Ministerial Meeting, adopt communiqué to

(a) “prepare a possible negotiating position on balanced force reductions which the Ministers could consider at their next meeting in June 1970 and might thereafter serve as a realistic basis for active exploration of means of achieving mutual and balanced force reductions;”

(b) “in their contacts with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe to examine the possibility of a joint declaration of those principles which should form the foundation of a meaningful and lasting security in Europe” (followed by list of principles, non-intervention, etc.).

Tab B

GUIDELINES FOR BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION
(Draft Council Report Accepted ad referendum, September 25)

The main points in the guidelines are:
—to apply to indigenous and stationed forces in Central Europe, Germany, Benelux, E. Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia;
—to exclude study of buffer or demilitarized zones;
—to include all conventional, nuclear and dual capable forces but not naval forces;
—ground forces to be considered primary element;
—to measure reductions primarily in terms of manpower;
—to vary timing of reduction in relation to size of cut; e.g. a ten percent reduction in one period, a 30 percent over several defined periods;
—personnel to be demobilized or placed in reserves, equipment could be reused to bring units up to strength;
—minimum extent of reduction about 10 percent, maximum 30 percent;
—as a matter for negotiation there could be asymmetrical reductions i.e., trading nuclear forces for conventional, balancing different types of conventional, etc.;
—need to be adequate verification, (further study needed).

**Tab C**

**LIST OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES**

Without trying to duplicate the entire list, the following gives the flavor of the exercise.

*There are three different categories of issues:*

1. Issues which warrant consideration for early negotiation.
2. Issues which appear to require further examination prior to consideration for further negotiation.
3. Issues already under negotiation.

Early in the proceedings, the Berlin-Germany issue was referred to the Bonn group.

*Some, but not all, of the items hashed over (some for the Nth time in recent years) include:*

- Renunciation of the use of force
- A code of good conduct (sic)
- Military observation at maneuvers
- Observation posts
- Elimination of restrictions on Allied Military Missions
- East-West study on techniques and methods of disarmament inspection
- Study of measures to prevent outbreak of a nuclear attack through surprise or error
- Mutual freeze of nuclear weapons
- Nuclear-free zones
- Cut-off of production of fissionable materials
- Ban on biological and chemical warfare
- Strengthening East-West cooperation (technological, health, environment)
- Expansion of tourism
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Elliot Richardson, Thursday, October 23, 4:30 p.m.—NATO Issues

This meeting is for the purpose of getting you briefed on the state of play on the issues associated with the European Security Conference and of assuring that our policy is coherent and has Presidential approval.

Background

Last April you issued an instruction in the President’s name to the effect that we could approve a European Security conference (ESC) in principle but that we should concentrate on making progress on concrete issues (Tab A).³ The NATO Ministerial communiqué at that time was in general conformity with this approach, although several Ministers wanted a more positive endorsement of the ESC (Tab B).⁴

In the period since then, NATO has been busy compiling a list of issues for possible negotiation. These have been grouped under three categories: (1) issues which warrant consideration for early negotiation; (2) issues for further examination; and (3) issues already under negotiation. The items on this list (Tab C) would be pursued by allies in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with the East, with a full-scale Conference occurring when concrete results on fundamental issues dividing East and West might be expected.

In preparation for the December ministerial meeting, State wants to work up a draft communiqué which endorses an eventual Security Conference and narrows down the subjects for negotiations with the East in the period leading up to such a conference to (1) balanced force reductions and (2) a joint declaration on principles underlying European security. (Other negotiations, such as SALT, Berlin, non-use of force, would be pursued in various forums by the allies concerned.) The two negotiating items cited above would be given further study after the Decem-


² No record of Kissinger’s meeting with Richardson has been found.

³ See footnote 4, Document 3.

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 5.
ber meeting so that they could then be formally offered as topics to the East after the June 1970 ministerial meeting (Tabs D⁵ and E).

As you know, I have held up an instruction to Ellsworth pending your review of these matters with Elliot Richardson.⁶

You may wish to take up the following issues:

1. **European Security Conference.** Why should we take the lead in endorsing it, even in the presently contemplated cautious formulation (“eventual...properly prepared...including US and Canadian participation.”)?

2. **Balanced Force Reductions.** There has been an extensive study underway since the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in the spring of 1968.

   The last Administration took the view that a forthcoming position on negotiations with the Soviets for mutual force cuts was needed to meet Senator Mansfield’s pressure for unilateral cuts. It is still widely argued that if we are going to cut anyway, why not get something from the Soviets in return. These propositions are open to question and in any case they have never been put to the President. We are now beginning a NSSM on alternate strategies and force postures in Europe. Until we are well along in that we will have no criteria, comparable to those we have for SALT, for evaluating possible arrangements with the Soviets.

   Moreover, even under the best of circumstances it is hard to see how this problem can qualify as one susceptible of early resolution. There is indeed a question whether it is advisable to deal with military questions in Europe without progress on political ones.

   *The question therefore is whether we should be in a position to promote this as the first item for concrete negotiation with the East, as State’s instructions propose.*

3. **Declaration of Principles.** The question is whether this qualifies as a concrete issue and whether we should promote early negotiations on it. A good deal of work has been done on possible language and

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⁵ Tab D is telegram 165553 to USNATO, September 30. For a summary, see Tab A, Document 5.

⁶ Hillenbrand reported to Richardson in an October 21 memorandum: “The NSC Staff is unable to clear on our instructions to Ambassador Ellsworth with regard to European security.” Hillenbrand stated: “The Staff contends that ‘a generally forthcoming attitude’ is not consistent with the President’s policy on an ESC and that we should revise the language to more fully indicate the President’s skepticism and say that ‘we plan to impose no objection to an eventual ESC.’” With regard to the Department’s principal suggestions, balanced force reductions and a Joint Declaration on Principles, Hillenbrand reported that “the Staff feels that we should confine our efforts on BFR to ‘further studies’ and merely reiterate language along the lines of the Reykjavik and Washington Communiqués with regard to BFR.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 44, 4/19/69, US Positions for NATO Nuclear Planning Group)
State favors inclusion of such elements as (1) non-intervention in internal affairs, including among members of an alliance, (2) abstention from threat or use of force, (3) respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states, and (4) agreement to settle differences through peaceful means.

Offhand it would seem that if the Russians accept something like this it will be branded as hollow from the outset since they would obviously assert that what they did in Czechoslovakia was compatible with it. If the Russians do not accept it, there will be endless wrangling with no benefit to East-West relations.7

Perhaps the alliance should consider issuing such a statement unilaterally as the basis on which it conducts itself and invite adherence by the East.

But as a negotiating issue this would hardly seem to be suited.8

7 In his October 21 memorandum, Hillenbrand wrote that “the NSC Staff appears to feel that the White House believes that such declarations [Joint Declaration on Principles] have little credibility. They recognize, however, that the ‘principles’ idea may have support amongst the Europeans. Therefore, they feel that the current language in the earlier instruction [telegram 165553 to USNATO] is not clear as to whether or not the Allies are to prepare a joint declaration for ‘negotiating’ with the East or merely a document to which the East could adhere if it so wished but which the Allies would use as a basic guide in their day-to-day conduct of relations with the East. (This we can clarify.) The problem, according to the Staff, is that they feel that the White House does not believe that anything we did in this field would preclude the Soviets from pulling another Czechoslovakia or regarding it in any way as impeding their freedom.”

8 Hillenbrand explained to Richardson in his October 21 memorandum: “While a certain amount of tinkering with language is possible on these various issues, the fact remains that we are far apart on substance. Where we feel that BFR and the Joint Declaration are examples of ‘concrete issues which might lend themselves to fruitful negotiation’ and would, therefore, be something the Allies could, after proper preparation, discuss with the East, the NSC Staff feels that the White House does not wish to move beyond, regarding them as potential concrete issues which require further detailed study. In short, there is a fundamental difference of view.”

7. Editorial Note

In the wake of the National Security Council staff’s intervention (see Document 6), the Department of State revised its draft instructions to Ambassador Robert Ellsworth regarding a European security conference. The Department cabled the revised instructions, cleared by President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, in telegram 181393 to USNATO on October 25, 1969. It contained instructions that were “supplementary” to telegram 165553, September 30 (for a summary of the telegram, see Tab A, Document 5). With regard
to “US views of eventual ESC and how to get there,” the revised instructions read:

“A) We assume majority of Allies will wish to adopt in December a more forthcoming attitude toward an eventual ESC than in April communiqué. In that likely event, we would wish to avoid a negative posture, and thus would be willing to go along with a consensus favoring mention in the communiqué of willingness to look toward an eventual ESC. We would of course insist that any ESC be properly prepared, and include US and Canadian participation from the outset.

“B) To further clarify our views, you also should indicate that we share the concern expressed by some Allies at October 1 NAC meeting that current NATO activity on East-West list may be creating public impression that East-West issues exercise, based on para 5 of April Ministerial communiqué, represents preparation for a European Security conference. You should make clear that we do not see the current issues exercise as directly related to preparations for an eventual ESC—that ‘vision of the future’ so aptly phrased by UK PermRep Burrows—or to write an agenda for such a conference. Rather, pending the time when such a conference promises concrete results, we prefer that Allies proceed with multilateral and bilateral discussions with the Eastern states on specific issues that might (a) test the negotiating climate; (b) offer the prospect of reducing tensions; and (c) contribute toward improving the atmosphere for eventual ESC.”

With regard to the communiqué for the December NATO Ministerial meeting, the instructions read: “You might wish to state that we are, of course, most interested in the views of our European Allies on the question of referring to an ESC in the December Ministerial communiqué. We also believe that communiqué should contain firm statement about maintenance of Allied defense capability and cohesion.”

On the subject of balanced force reductions (BFR), the cable noted that recent messages from the Mission to NATO suggested “that we face problem of how best to moderate a possible rush towards BFR by our Allies which would carry us farther than we want to go, without at same time appearing obstructive and foot-dragging on steps to reduce East-West tension. We believe following position on BFR most appropriate for these circumstances: (a) support moderate signal in December communiqué [. . .]; (b) support preparations, with participation of NMAS, of illustrative negotiating proposals to be considered at June Ministerial; (c) indicate that we will be better prepared to assess desirability and timeliness of more active gesture toward the Pact at June Ministerial when we will have had the opportunity to consider illustrative negotiating proposals.”

With regard to the preparation of a Joint Declaration of Principles on European Security, the cable reads: “After giving further thought to
Joint Declaration, we have concluded that scenario for preparation, consideration and public presentation of Joint Declaration would entail: (a) development by PermReps following December Ministerial meeting of draft of Joint Declaration of Principles on European Security [...]; (b) adoption and publication thereafter by NAC of Joint Declaration of Principles guiding Allies in the conduct of their international relations; and (c) NAC consideration of invitation to USSR and its allies to publicly adhere to these principles.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. IV)

8. Editorial Note

On October 28, 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls met with President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to discuss issues relating to defense and European security. In preparation for the meeting, National Security Council staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt submitted a memorandum to Kissinger on October 27. Sonnenfeldt wrote the following with regard to a European security conference:

“Elliot Richardson has twice talked with Pauls along the lines of the original State cable—before you talked with him and State changed the message. Since in the past you have hit Pauls rather hard on this subject, he may be confused or think there has been a major change in our policy. You may want to say that

“—we remain skeptical about a conference but won’t resist a groundswell if the Europeans generate it;
“—we are prepared to continue studying the question of mutual troop cuts in Europe but have made no decision on whether to pursue this with the Soviets;
“—we are prepared to participate in drafting principles of East-West relations at NATO; but the question of whether to seek to negotiate this with the Soviets is not decided. In this connection, we will be interested in how the Germans fare in their negotiations on renunciation of force.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III)

At the October 28 meeting, Pauls brought up both a European security conference and balanced force reductions in his discussion with Kissinger. According to the memorandum of conversation, prepared by Sonnenfeldt on October 28:

“[Pauls] then asked what we expected from the forthcoming Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Brussels. Mr. Kissinger said that
we would not take any initiatives in the European security field, but if the Europeans wanted to move in that area, and in particular if they were interested in a European Security Conference, we would go along. Mr. Kissinger noted that items had been suggested for possible exploration with the East and had been under discussion among the Allies. But he stressed again that the US would not take the initiative and that the whole subject was not a major point in the foreign policy of the United States. The Ambassador pointed out that German issues were central to the question of European security and should be explored before proceeding to any conference. Moreover, Germany probably should not be on the agenda of any large European conference. Mr. Kissinger noted that the Germans had not made these views known officially and that perhaps they should do so.

“The Ambassador finally raised the question of balanced force reductions in Europe. Mr. Kissinger, noting that there had been discussion of this subject in Brussels, said that we had begun to take a look at this problem here and probably would be less pressing from now on. Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that there was an argument that it might be possible to meet pressures for unilateral force reductions by proposing mutual cuts with the Russians. The Ambassador asserted that ‘the worst mutual reduction is better than the best unilateral reduction.’ Mr. Kissinger noted that this might not necessarily be the case. What was needed was an agreed strategic concept among the Allies.” (Ibid.)

9. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT
State Again Pushes the “Groundswell” on European Security

Literally within a day of our getting State to tone down its basic instruction to Ellsworth on European security2 (so that we would be


2 See Document 7.
responding to European support for a conference rather than taking an initiative ourselves), Elliot Richardson signed out a message that again puts us ahead of the pack. The reason for doing this was fear that as the result of the impending Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting the other side will get the initiative on this subject. Ellsworth is now instructed to suggest to Brosio a public affairs guideline in which the principle of an eventual ESC would be said to be acceptable (Tab A).³

The point here is that while this may well be the case, why should we be the ones to run to Brosio with the suggestion.

Moreover, as a matter of substance, why must we assume that we cannot get at least as much “initiative” out of our eminently sensible insistence on “negotiation of concrete issues,” as the East gets out of their phony slogan for a European security conference. If our whole diplomatic and public posture in the six months since the President’s April directive⁴ had been oriented around our preferred approach, instead of being concerned with handling “groundswells”—which we ourselves keep adding to—we would be in a far stronger position today.

You told Pauls recently that “European security” is not a major element in our foreign policy at present.⁵ You (and I) are alone in expressing this view. Unless the President himself says so—perhaps in response to the State memo that you and Elliot agreed would be sent over—we will never get this situation under control.

³ Attached but not printed at Tab A is telegram 182080 to USNATO, October 28, which reads: “Objective at the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting or in council discussion thereafter would be early agreement on public affairs ‘guidelines’ along following lines: that the principle is acceptable of an eventual European security conference, properly prepared and with U.S. participation; that the problem of European security is complicated and must be approached through dealing with concrete issues and not propaganda measures; that the allies are examining such issues for consideration in December to determine those on which progress might be made in bilateral and multilateral discussions with the Soviet Union and its allies.”

⁴ See Document 3 and footnote 4 thereto.

⁵ See Document 8.
10. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT

United States and Allied Approaches to the Current Issues of European Security

The problem of how the Alliance should respond to the appeal for a European Security Conference issued by the Warsaw Pact at Budapest last March will be the major item of business during the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in November and the Ministerial meeting in December.

We must hold the Allies together in fashioning a coherent, convincing and collective response to the Budapest appeal that will demonstrate to public opinion Western willingness to negotiate in a constructive spirit the real issues of European security.

We believe, moreover, that we should aim to enter into a process of negotiation with the Soviets from a solid tactical position. The Alliance should find it possible to make reasonable and attractive proposals that would permit us to deal confidently with the Soviets if they wish to negotiate. If the Soviets refuse to negotiate on this basis, there is good reason to hope that Moscow could be made to bear most of the public blame for the resulting impasse.

The Present European Security Equation

We do not believe that basic East-West differences—such as the continuing division of Germany and the future of Berlin—are subject to easy or early resolution, or that a European Security Conference is likely to accomplish much in the period immediately ahead. Successful negotiations on European security can only result from a lengthy process, not from a single climactic event.

We also know that the ultimate Soviet aim in putting this proposal in play with the West is to place a seal of legitimacy upon the division of Germany and Europe, while we would hope for the opposite result from any process of European security negotiations. Moreover, the

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. IV. Secret. On November 5, Sonnenfeldt forwarded Rogers’s memorandum to Kissinger. In a covering memorandum he wrote that it “raises again the major problem of holding State back from over-commitment to the idea of such a conference simply in order to appear to respond positively to the Warsaw Pact overtures, so that we ‘demonstrate to public opinion’ our willingness to negotiate European security issues constructively with the Soviets.” (Ibid.)
mere convening of a European Security Conference with East German participation would, of itself, go far toward achieving this Soviet goal—which means that West German views on the matter will merit particular attention.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Warsaw Pact’s European Security Conference proposal has a certain resonance in Western European public opinion. Last April, as you will recall, several Allied governments urged that a direct and generally favorable response to the Warsaw Pact proposal be included in the communiqué of the Washington Ministerial meeting. Their ardor was dampened largely—and at the last minute—by a Tass release issued just before the meeting that attacked NATO in typical Cold War language. The communiqué of the Washington meeting thus avoided mention of a European Security Conference and went no further than a commitment “to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution.” The Ministers instructed the Council in Permanent Session to study the matter, and the result has been a full-dress substantive review by the Allies of the issues on which East-West discussions might be held. This List of Issues (a copy is enclosed) will be the main substantive underpinning for the November and December meetings of the Council at higher levels.

Since April, the Soviets and their Allies have given renewed signs of interest in a European Security Conference, and we have reports that the Warsaw Pact will meet to draw up a proposed “agenda” in the near future. The November and December NATO meetings thus will have to decide whether the Alliance should respond directly to this Warsaw Pact proposal, and if so, how.

In making the essentially tactical judgment about the appropriate US attitude toward the issue of a European Security Conference, we begin with the assessment that the majority of our Allies will wish to adopt a generally favorable posture toward such a conference.

In that likely event, it is also our belief that we should not take a negative stance and oppose, in principle, an Allied statement that, at the end of a long preparatory path, a European Security Conference could be convened, with United States and Canadian participation from the outset. Many West Europeans look upon European security negotiations as their equivalent to SALT—as the vehicle by which Western European governments can engage visibly in negotiations with the East on issues relating to their security. Thus Western European pres-

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2 Not attached. NATO Document C–M(69)46, “List of Issues for Possible Negotiation with the East,” October 2, is ibid. It is summarized in Tab C to Document 5.
sures for a European Security Conference may well grow as SALT gets underway, and it would hardly be appropriate for us to appear to stand in the way.

We also believe that the Alliance has no need to react in purely defensive fashion to the Warsaw Pact’s European Security Conference gambit. Rather it should put forward in December substantive proposals that would meet Alliance interests if they could be negotiated with the East, that appeal to Western public opinion, and that—where possible—have divisive effects on the Warsaw Pact or put the Soviets on the defensive. The probability that some proposals are non-negotiable with the Soviets is thus not necessarily a bar to advancing them.

**Issues for Possible Negotiation**

The opinion amongst most NATO countries now is that an offer to negotiate balanced force reductions in Central Europe with the Eastern European countries should be one of the central elements in the Allied position. We share their view of the balanced force reductions approach because:

— The Alliance had publicly registered agreement in principle to balanced force reductions in June 1968 and again in April 1969.  
— The preparatory studies are well-advanced and could be converted fairly soon into proposals for consideration as possible negotiating positions.  
— Balanced force reductions proposal would be useful in the internal political debates of member countries, including the United States, as an argument against unilateral force reductions.  
— It would appeal to a Western public opinion anxious for tangible signs of progress toward disarmament. In the likely event that the Soviets refuse to discuss this question seriously, we would presumably be better placed to maintain the position that unilateral force reductions would be self-defeating.

While the German question remains, of course, central to the problem of European security, we did not think it appropriate in the present political context for the United States to take the initiative on a matter of the most direct and immediate interest to the Federal Republic and concerning which German diplomacy has itself been very active in the last few years. The new German Government also will undoubtedly have an active Eastern policy and consult with us about it.

Hence, for the purposes of the present exercise, on Germany and Berlin, we would limit ourselves to an effort to build Allied support

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3 See footnotes 2 and 7, Document 5.  
4 Parliamentary elections in West Germany on September 28 resulted in the formation of a new coalition government with Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as Chancellor and Walter Scheel of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) as Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister.
for the tripartite efforts to ease pressures on Berlin and for the Eastern policy initiatives which the Brandt government will be pursuing.

However, we feel balanced force reductions—a proposal long in play—is not enough by itself for us to propose in November and December as the American suggestion for the collective Allied response to the Warsaw Pact initiative.

Thus, we also believe that we should endorse a Joint Declaration on the Principles of European Security as a proposal of tactical utility. It could be advanced as a means of placing an additional restraint—however slight—upon the Soviet Union’s use of force to discipline its Allies. It could be designed to remind Western public opinion of the past transgressions of the Soviet Union and to have divisive effects within the Warsaw Pact. The declaration should encompass such principles as non-intervention in internal affairs, including among members of an Alliance, abstention from the use or threat of force; respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states; and agreement to settle differences by peaceful means—all points now extant in the United Nations Charter but packaged in a declaration of applicability to the European area.

You may recall that the British advanced an East-West Code of Good Conduct proposal before the Czech crisis, but have left it dormant since. The French also have suggested East-West agreement on a Declaration of Non-Intervention that would be designed, implicitly at least, to inhibit a repetition of the Czech affair. Foreign Minister Schumann floated it in Moscow recently\(^5\) and—not surprisingly—found the Soviets reticent. We have reports that the Warsaw Pact may advance a Code of Good Conduct proposal of its own.

In summary, as we now see it, the total Western response in December to the Warsaw Pact initiative will comprise five main points:

1. Balanced force reductions—a renewed and stronger signal of Allied willingness to negotiate.
2. Reference to a Joint Declaration on the Principles of European Security.
3. Berlin-Germany—support for the tripartite probe\(^6\) and the Federal Republic of Germany’s initiatives on inner-German relations.
4. Hortatory statements on enhanced East-West economic, technical and cultural exchanges, which some of the Allies—notably the Italians—will insist upon.

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\(^5\) Schumann visited Moscow October 9–14. The joint Franco-Soviet communiqué envisioned a “properly prepared European conference” that “could constitute an effective means of developing co-operation between all the European States” and end “the division of Europe into blocs.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1969–1970, p. 23864A)

\(^6\) See footnote 3, Document 5.
5. Statement of willingness to consider an eventual European Security Conference, provided it is properly prepared in advance and includes the United States and Canada from the outset.

State telegram number 181393 (enclosed) to USNATO,7 which was cleared by Dr. Kissinger, sets forth our preliminary guidance on the foregoing points.

We believe this cautious but positive approach is consonant with your policy toward Europe and plan to proceed along the above lines.

WPR

7 See Document 7.

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization1

Washington, November 20, 1969, 0016Z.

195006. USNATO deliver Eagleburger 0830 Thursday, November 20. FYI and Noforn (except as noted in para 4 below). Subj: Soviet Approach on European Security Conference. Memorandum below is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.

1. Ambassador Dobrynin asked for an appointment with Secretary on November 18. They met at 9 a.m. on November 19. Dobrynin then proceeded to summarize lengthy “informal oral statement,” text of which he later handed to Secretary. Full text of statement follows:

“(1) Soviet Government proceeds from assumption that possibilities for holding all-European conference are now increasing. During time that passed since Bucharest Declaration by socialist countries, and especially since Budapest Appeal, the intentions of countries which sponsored proposals for all-European conference have become more clearly understood by other European countries. A number of wrong interpretations have been dropped which did not correspond to real
2 position of socialist countries. Discussion of proposal for an all-European conference has become businesslike and is being focused on its agenda, possible results and body of participants. The well known initiative of Finland played positive role in this respect. Thus the question of preparation and convocation of all-European conference will now arise on a more practical plane.

Socialist countries which proposed all-European conference have carefully analyzed existing points of view, considered the opinions expressed in course of bilateral contacts and have taken into account positions of interested states. In particular, they paid due attention to opinions regarding the necessity of thorough preparation for all-European conference, its possible participants and desirability to select for the discussion at the all-European conference such questions which would allow for a broad consensus in the present conditions in Europe, and regarding which all possible participants in the all-European conference would have sufficient degree of confidence as to their productive consideration at the conference itself.

Having taken into account all above mentioned points, countries-signatories to Budapest Appeal found it useful and timely to come out with new initiative to detail further steps for convening all-European conference and to provide answers to questions, which arose in the course of discussion with various countries of the proposal to convene the conference.

(2) The Soviet Government is convinced that convening of all-European conference in near future would serve interests of strengthening peace and security in Europe as well as interests of all European and not only European states. It stands to reason that preparatory work must be aimed at practical fulfillment of proposal for convening conference instead of being used as pretext for its delay or for raising various preliminary conditions. In opinion of countries-participants in Prague meeting, the all-European conference could take place in first half of 1970.2

As for place of conference, the states-signatories of the Prague statement hold the opinion that it could take place in Helsinki in view of the role played by Government of Finland in this matter.

(3) Soviet Government fully shares view of states which believe that all-European conference must end in success—all the more so that it would be the first meeting of all European countries in the post-war years.

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2 On October 30–31, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries met in Prague, where they adopted a declaration calling for an All-European Conference to be held in Helsinki in the first half of 1970.
In our opinion, two items suggested by Prague statement for inclusion in agenda of an all-European conference—‘on the assurance of European security and on the renunciation of use of force or threat of its use in mutual relations among states in Europe’ and ‘on expansion of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties on equal terms aimed at developing political cooperation among European states’—can become subjects on which broad agreement can be reached, given sufficient good will of the parties. (Comment: Dobrynin handed the Secretary the text of these draft documents.)

Discussion of first question mentioned above could, it is believed, result in signing of final document that would proclaim principle of renunciation of use of force or threat of its use in mutual relations among states in Europe. Adoption of such document would actually mean proclamation of principle of renunciation of war in Europe which is of special significance in view of fact that it is on the European continent that the two most powerful military-political groupings confront each other with their military forces concentrated there in immediate proximity of each other. Establishment on regional basis of principle to renounce use of force or threat of its use is in keeping with provisions of UN Charter and serves their further development. Besides it should be borne in mind that not all of states concerned—future participants in the all-European conference—are members of the UN. It goes without saying that adoption of document on non-use of force by all-European conference would by no means affect commitments assumed by states-participants in all-European conference through existing multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements.

Discussion of second question on agenda which could also result in adoption of appropriate document, would allow movement forward toward normalization of relations among European states, prepare ground for consideration of concrete questions of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation among all European states and for removal of obstacles in the mentioned fields.

An accord achieved on both mentioned questions would contribute to improvement of general political atmosphere in Europe and to growth of trust, would secure principles of peaceful coexistence and would pave way for future consideration of other problems of interest to European states, the solution of which would contribute to strengthening of European security and development of broad cooperation among all European states.

We would like to make clear, that at all-European conference, as we see it, every state-participant will be given an opportunity to set forth its viewpoint on questions regarding the situation in Europe and means of strengthening peace and security on the European continent,
as well as to give suggestions and considerations for development of peaceful cooperation among European countries. In other words, we have in mind that there will take place a free discussion at the conference, and that decisions will be taken on the two proposed concrete questions at the conclusion of the conference. We would like to emphasize the idea that working out agreed drafts of the possible final documents in consultations even before convocation of an all-European conference would guarantee the success of conference to a considerable extent.

(4) As it follows from Prague statement, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are prepared to consider any other proposals aimed at practical preparation for and ensuring the success of all-European conference.

Sometimes an opinion is voiced to effect that questions advanced by socialist countries are allegedly not of major scale and that cardinal problems such as German problem should be introduced at all-European conference. We do not agree with such statements at all. Suggestions to effect that German problem or other problems be included in the agenda—and such problems are understood by the West in a specific way which is clearly unacceptable to the socialist countries—would only serve to complicate if not downright torpedo convocation or, at any rate, fruitful work of the conference. One cannot but take into consideration also that as far as German problem goes there is special responsibility of victorious powers in World War II who signed the Potsdam agreement.3

Nor do we agree with attempts to raise the question of West Berlin since this is a special question and it does not belong to the all-European conference.

(5) Referring to questions which have been raised with me by U.S. officials as to attitude of Soviet Union toward U.S. participation in an all-European conference, we would like to make the following clarification.

All-European conference is of a regional nature, open for participation by all interested European states, including, of course, the GDR on an equal footing with the FRG and on equal terms with other participants.4 With this qualification as to the body of participants the Soviet Government believes that the United States, if there is a wish on her part, can also take part in all-European conference, since it bears

3 After this sentence, Sonnenfeldt wrote, “n.b., France did not sign.”
4 Sonnenfeldt underlined “on an equal footing with the FRG and on equal terms with other participants.” He placed quotation marks around “footing” and “terms” and wrote in the margin, “quid pro quo.”
definite responsibility ensuing from Potsdam and other Allied agreements in force for peaceful settlement in Europe. In setting forth our position as to agenda for the conference we took into account previous contacts with U.S. representatives and, in particular, the view expressed here to the effect that acute questions, especially those within the responsibility of the participants in the Potsdam conference, be considered outside of the framework of the all-European conference. The items we propose to include in the agenda also correspond to suggestions by the American side that such questions be taken up at the conference which could productively be discussed and acted upon. We expect that further contacts will enable us together and for the benefit of the cause (sic) to discuss problems related to preparation and holding of an all-European conference.

(6) We would like to express hope that U.S. Government will give its due attention to proposals advanced by states which signed Prague statement, and to considerations of USSR Government on this score, and on its part will make efforts toward preparation of convening and successful holding of all-European conference. Soviet Government would appreciate considerations and suggestions which U.S. Government may think useful to express in this connection.”

2. After Dobrynin finished his summary of oral statement, the Secretary asked how long the Soviet Government would envisage duration of proposed ESC. Ambassador replied conference need not be long at all if agreement can be reached on draft documents beforehand through bilateral discussions. Obviously if conference were to discuss substance of controversial issues it could last very long time. It would be Soviet hope, however, that agreement could be reached on draft documents prepared at Prague conference before ESC convenes. The USSR assumed, Dobrynin said, that NATO countries might have two or three other issues which they would like to raise at ESC; these could also be discussed through diplomatic channels ahead of time.

3. Draft documents handed Secretary noted in para (3) above are identical with texts transmitted in London’s 9176. (Text being repeated to addressees who did not receive London Embtel.)

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5 Sonnenfeldt circled Potsdam, underlined “and other Allied agreements in force,” and wrote a question mark in the margin.
6 Sonnenfeldt underlined part of the previous sentence, beginning with “would.” In the margin he wrote, “requests reply.”
7 Sonnenfeldt underlined “how long the Soviet Government would envisage duration of proposed ESC” and wrote an exclamation point in the margin.
4. For USNATO—at November 20 Polads discussion of Eastern European follow-up to Prague declaration, you may inform Allies of Dobrynin call on Secretary. You may also make oral summary of principal points which Dobrynin made.

Rogers

12. National Security Study Memorandum 83


TO
   The Secretary of State
   The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
   U.S. Approach to Current Issues of European Security

In connection with developments in the field of European security, the President wishes to have a meeting of the National Security Council early in the New Year. At that time he wishes to consider the status of our own and NATO actions on this subject and the range of options open to us in the light of East-West diplomatic exchanges and of pertinent strategic issues. As a result of the identification and discussion of the major issues involved, the President will provide guidance for further U.S. actions.

A paper providing the basis for this NSC meeting should be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Europe and should be submitted for consideration by the NSC Review Group by January 15, 1970.2

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–166, NSSM 83, 3 of 4. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Sonnenfeldt, who drafted the NSSM, wrote in the covering memorandum to Haig: “At Henry’s request, I have re-done the memorandum to Secretary Rogers on European Security issues as a NSSM.” Sonnenfeldt noted Kissinger was “very anxious to have this go out today.” Haig wrote in the margin, “So am I!!!” At the bottom of the covering memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “Send out signed NSSM.”

In the interim, the President’s approach to the proposal for a European Security Conference remains as stated in the directive of April 9, 1969. Pending the NSC meeting, the President wishes to have specific U.S. negotiating proposals in this area held in abeyance.

Henry A. Kissinger

3 See footnote 4, Document 3.
4 In a November 25 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger: “NSSM 83 notwithstanding, Ambassador Ellsworth has now been furnished a ‘Declaration on European Security’ by the Department of State (Tab A), which, inter alia, commits us to establishing criteria for mutual force reductions, the preparation of a model (it used to be ‘models’) for such reductions, and willingness to begin explorations at an early date with the Eastern countries. State has not so far sent the basic papers relating to the NATO Ministerial Meeting for which the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury are departing early next week.” Tab A to Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum was telegram 196793 to USNATO, November 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 667, Country Files, Europe, Europe General)

13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Scope and Objectives of Secretary Rogers’ European Trip

On November 29, a memorandum was received from the Secretary of State setting forth the general scope and objectives of the visit he begins early this week to Brussels, Bonn and Paris (Tab B). The Secretary, together with Secretaries Laird and Kennedy, will attend the semi-annual NATO Ministerial meetings in Brussels and he will then proceed to Germany and France for bilateral talks with the leaders of those countries.

2 Tab B, a memorandum from Rogers to the President, November 28, is not attached. In it Rogers stated that on European security problems “we are proceeding on the basis outlined in my October 31 memorandum to you [Document 10].” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 BEL)
1. As regards the NATO meetings, the Secretary plans
   —to issue our undertaking for firm force commitments to NATO through 1970 (this will involve certain reductions in forces, particularly naval, committed to NATO, but not stationed in Europe, resulting from our Defense budget cuts);
   —to support a five-point response to recent Warsaw Pact initiatives on European security, as follows:
     a. a new “signal” to the East, that NATO is prepared to consider the possibility of balanced East-West force reductions in Europe;
     b. a further probe by the US, UK and France of the possibilities for improving the situation in Berlin and NATO support for the Federal Republic’s Eastern policy;
     c. reference to a possible Joint Declaration on the Principles Governing Relations between States (this would essentially be the Western counter to the Brezhnev Doctrine);
     d. references to increased East-West cultural, technical and economic exchanges; and
     e. in response to majority sentiment in the Alliance, a reference to the Warsaw Pact-proposed European Security conference but stipulating that it be properly prepared, offers prospects of concrete progress and includes the US and Canada.

   The Secretary states in his memorandum that he does not believe he requires additional guidance for the NATO meetings but will seek it if required.

2. With regard to his stop in Bonn, the Secretary plans
   —to establish close working relations with the new German leadership and to dispel German suspicions that we favor the CDU over the SPD;
   —to urge the Germans not to base their policy on the assumption that US troop withdrawals are inevitable;
   —to support German efforts to improve relations with the East provided this does not impair Western security;
   —to tell Brandt that he will be welcome in Washington whenever a convenient time can be arranged.

3. In Paris, the Secretary plans
   —to confer with our delegation to the Vietnam talks;
   —establish personal contact with President Pompidou and assure him of the importance you attach to his forthcoming visit; and

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3 Reference is to Soviet claims to a right to intervene in the internal affairs of Bloc states. The Brezhnev Doctrine was originally set out by Soviet Communist Party spokesman Sergei Kovalyev in a September 26, 1968, Pravda article, “Sovereignty and International Responsibility in Socialist Countries.” A translation is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 16, 1968.
January 1969–November 1970

—to elicit Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas’ views on French domestic affairs.

I believe following the Secretary’s return, a review of the state of play on European security by the NSC will be desirable so that you will be able to consider the range of options open to us in the light of sentiment in the Alliance (the French, for example, have reservations about a NATO initiative on East-West force cuts), Warsaw Pact initiatives and our own interests. A study of pertinent issues will be prepared through the NSC machinery for a possible NSC meeting before the Wilson and Pompidou visits early next year.

If you agree, I will send the attached acknowledgment of the Secretary’s memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State (Tab A).

Recommendation

That you approve my sending the attached memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State (Tab A).

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5 Not attached.

6 Nixon initialed his approval on December 15. The word “changed” was written in the margin, and “Acting Secretary” was struck out and replaced with “Secretary” since Rogers returned from his European trip on December 8 and Richardson was no longer Acting Secretary. Kissinger sent the revised memorandum to Rogers on December 16. He wrote: “The President has noted your memorandum concerning the scope and objectives of your participation in the recently concluded NATO meetings and of your talks in Bonn and Paris. A National Security Council review of the range of options open to us on the issues involved is to be scheduled for early next year.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 258, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VII)

14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers’ European Trip

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Dept of State, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the first page reads: “The President has seen.” In a handwritten comment at the top of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote on December 29, “I don’t have to get Pres. to approve notes to Rogers.”
Secretary Rogers has sent you the attached memorandum summarizing the accomplishments of his recent European trip (Tab B).²

The Secretary feels that the NATO meeting was useful in containing the eagerness of some European leaders for the Warsaw Pact-proposed European security conference by advancing a sound Allied position on relations and negotiations with the East. The Secretary also notes that ten allied countries agreed to increase their military efforts while we assured the allies that we would maintain our troop levels at essentially present levels through FY 1971.

With respect to his conversations with German leaders, both in Brussels and in Bonn, the Secretary reports Brandt’s assurances that the Germans would not be adventurous in their Eastern policy. The Secretary expressed our support and stressed that recent reports of US suspiciousness of German policy were incorrect. Chancellor Brandt indicated a preference for April or May for his visit to Washington. (We will pick up this matter again with the German Embassy here.)

In France, the Secretary found our relations improving although differences remain especially on the Middle East and Vietnam. (A separate memorandum on the latter subject is being forwarded to you.)³

I agree with the Secretary that the NATO meeting put forward a reasonable Western position on relations with the East. It is not yet clear, however, whether the pressures for a European security conference have been contained for good. In addition, of course, the Alliance is now committed to specific concrete negotiations with the East, particularly on Berlin and possible mutual East-West troop reductions. An NSC meeting is being tentatively scheduled for mid-January to enable you to review our NATO and European policy and to give guidance for future policy, both short-term and longer-range. This will also help to prepare for the visits of Prime Minister Wilson later in January and of President Pompidou in late February.

If you agree, I will send the attached memorandum (Tab A) to the Secretary of State, acknowledging his report to you.

² Tab B is attached but not printed. Rogers wrote in his memorandum to the President, December 8: “On the European Security Conference and East-West relations, we achieved a realistic and cautious NATO stand which stressed the need for further explorations and better prospects for significant results before we agreed to go to a Conference. We also obtained Alliance agreement on NATO initiatives vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, including preparation of a negotiating position for mutual and balanced force reductions, support for initiatives on Germany and Berlin, and support for some moves in economic, social and cultural fields. The Declaration accompanying the Communiqué contains a strong reference to principles which should guide relations of States, stressing non-intervention in the affairs of any state by any other state ‘whatever its social or political system.’ Euphoria for a conference for a conference’s sake was contained, and the result is a sound Alliance position on this issue.”

³ Not found.
Recommendation

That you approve the memorandum at Tab A to Secretary Rogers.4

The draft memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers is attached but not printed. Nixon crossed out the “Approve” and “Disapprove” options and wrote: “I covered orally by phone—Set up N.S.C. meeting as planned—to cover NATO generally—with particular emphasis on Germany, Italy, France, Britain (in that order). Also—a look at Greece.” Below the handwritten note is the date, “Dec 29, 1969.”

15. Editorial Note

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin for dinner on the evening of December 22, 1969. In preparation for the meeting, Kissinger forwarded a memorandum to President Richard Nixon for his approval regarding the points that he proposed to make to Dobrynin that evening. With regard to Europe and a European security conference, Kissinger wrote:

“The Soviets are continuing their pressure for a European security conference; they assert that the West Europeans are showing interest in the proposal but that we are spearheading the effort to prevent the conference. I will say that:

“—we have no interest in a conference at this time since we know of no concrete European issue that could be resolved through a mass conference; if the Europeans want to have a conference, we will not stand in their way but we will reserve the decision as to whether we have any interest in attending;

“—what we are interested in are substantive negotiations on the concrete issues among the parties directly concerned;

“—we will watch with interest how the various negotiations on which the Germans are now embarking with the Eastern countries are going to progress, and we will watch whether the USSR is interested in improving the Berlin situation so that it is not a source of constant crisis;

“—if some new forms of cultural, technical and economic cooperation can be worked out between East and West in Europe we have no objection; but the past has shown that such arrangements are highly vulnerable to political tensions; so we hope no one will have the illusion that they are doing something about security as long as crucial political problems are unresolved.”
Nixon initialed and approved Kissinger’s proposed talking points. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969, Pt. 1)

At their meeting that evening, Dobrynin brought up a European security conference. Kissinger wrote in his summary for the President that Dobrynin charged that the United States “managed to convey the idea that we are making everything conditional on something else. For example, we were asking them to show their good intentions in Berlin before we agreed to a European security conference.” Kissinger continued: “I told Dobrynin that we remained interested in good relations with the Soviet Union. We were the two great powers, and we had to avoid conflict; we should speak while we were still in a position to make definitive decisions. At the same time, as the President had repeatedly pointed out, we wanted to have concrete, detailed negotiations. Until he told me just what he [Dobrynin] was aiming at, it was very hard for me to comment on his points, since I did not know what he understood by progress. For example, we had heard a great deal about the European Security Conference, but I did not know just exactly what the Soviet Union hoped to achieve there. Dobrynin said, ‘Well, why don’t you ask us. We would be glad to tell you at any level.’ I said, ‘Well, maybe we should ask you, but why don’t you tell me now.’ Dobrynin said, ‘We want existing frontiers recognized.’ I said, ‘No one is challenging the existing frontiers.’ Dobrynin said that he had the impression we were challenging the status quo in Germany. I told him we were not challenging the status quo in Germany, but there was a big difference between challenging it and giving juridical recognition to East Germany.”

Later in the conversation, Dobrynin returned to the issue of a European security conference. “One result of the distrust between Washington and Moscow, Dobrynin said, was that a number of other countries could attempt to maneuver between us. For example, the British were always going to the Soviet Union and telling them that the United States was preventing a European Security Conference, but the Soviet Union knew the British game. The British thought they had to keep the Soviet Union and the United States apart so that they could maneuver—that if the United States and the Soviet Union were together, Britain was nothing.” Kissinger responded that he “did not know to which statements” Dobrynin was referring, but that the British and the United States “were in rather close accord.” (Ibid.) For the full text of the December 24 memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 110.
16. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 30, 1969, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
Balanced Force Reductions in Europe

PARTICIPANTS
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Acting Secretary Richardson
Mr. James F. Leonard, ACDA
Mr. Lewis W. Bowden, EUR/SOV

The Acting Secretary said he would like to mention one other matter. He said he assumed the Ambassador was aware of a reference in the recent NATO declaration to balanced forces reduction (BFR). We think this subject offers the possibility of fruitful negotiation and that, among other things, it would supplement our efforts in the strategic arms field and make a real contribution to the reduction of tensions in Europe.

Dobrynin asked whether we were linking the two matters in any way and Mr. Richardson assured him we were not, but we did see one action could be complementary to the other.

Dobrynin said that the Soviets had had nothing in the way of a reply from us to their démarche of November 19 on European Security except the recent NATO declaration and communiqué. Mr. Richardson observed that the military people in NATO are now working on possible packages of balanced forces reductions which are to be considered in June by the Defense Ministers. The earliest time, therefore, that we could make a formal proposal to the Soviets on this subject would be after the June meeting.

Dobrynin queried as to why we had raised the matter now in the absence of a concrete proposal. He agreed that in general the idea of force reductions in Europe was a good one, pointing out that both the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 711, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. Part II of V. Drafted by Bowden, concurred in by Leonard, and approved by Morton Abramowitz (U) on December 31. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s office. At the top of the first page is a handwritten notation, “Sonnenfeld—FYI.”


3 See Document 11.
Soviets and the Poles have made proposals in this field for many years. He said that if we would give them a concrete and reasonable proposal they would give it the most serious consideration. The Acting Secretary replied that we had raised the matter at this time to indicate to the Soviets the great seriousness we attach to it and thought that they might want to give some thought to what their approach would be before any formal proposals were made.

Dobrynin stated that the Soviets would be prepared to give us an opinion on any specific proposals. They did not accept the raising of BFR in the NATO declaration as a counter-proposal to their proposals on a European Security Conference. The Ambassador indicated the Soviets considered the mention of BFR at Brussels as essentially a propaganda response to their moves on European Security, observing that we are now apparently putting off an answer to their proposals until after June.

Once again Mr. Richardson repeated that we were indeed serious about this subject. As the Ambassador knew, the subject was very complicated and the formulation of specific proposals was extremely difficult. Dobrynin said he had told Secretary Rogers how the Soviets felt about European security and had asked for our comments. At the time we had replied that the State Department would need to examine his proposals before replying. Then came the NATO communiqué but the Soviets had gotten no official reply from us on their European security démarche. Dobrynin said he could not understand why we now raised only one particular issue related to the European context, and he thought the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would find it difficult to put our approach up to the Soviet Government unless it were somehow more closely related to the larger concept of European security.

The Acting Secretary said that he did not necessarily connect BFR and a European Security Conference. Dobrynin quickly agreed, saying that the Soviets were not anxious either to combine these two issues. They had, however, got the impression from the NATO communiqué that we were attempting to do exactly that.

Dobrynin said he found another aspect of this problem difficult to understand. He pointed out that the Pentagon and others have announced US plans to keep our forces in Europe at their present strength until 1971. If we had therefore already decided on our deployment what would we negotiate about? Mr. Richardson acknowledged that Administration policy was to maintain US force levels in Europe but indicated that plans can be changed through successful negotiation. The reductions must be on both sides, however, and it is obvious that if we both pull troops out of Europe the Soviets have a shorter line of return than we do. Our great problem is how to work out reasonable standards of comparability. That is essentially what the negotiations would be about.
Dobrynin repeated that if we come forth with serious proposals they will give them the most serious consideration. He thought perhaps we could reach an agreement privately about parallel actions, but did not specify further.

Ambassador Leonard explained that studies were going forward at the present time in ACDA on this problem and that it was very complex. He assured Dobrynin that we had studied carefully previous Soviet and Polish ideas on force reductions, but that a complete new review was called for because so much time had passed since those proposals. He also mentioned that the verification aspect of any troop reduction agreement would pose many problems.

Dobrynin cautioned that one should not over-emphasize the distance factor in talking about withdrawal of forces from Central Europe because dimensions are quite different now with our new transport system from what they used to be. Ambassador Leonard acknowledged that may be true but said that was only one factor, there being other problems of comparability that arose at every step.

Dobrynin said finally that they would be waiting for our proposals after the June meeting and that if we had any interim thoughts on this subject he would send them on to Moscow and be prepared to discuss them with us. He observed that heretofore this subject has been “mixed up” with political matters when it should stand on its own merits.

17. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

US-Soviet Diplomacy on European Security

Our dealings with the USSR on European issues, at least in recent years, are not strictly speaking analogous to our talks with them on the Middle East or arms control questions. On these latter matters we have

had sustained negotiations either culminating in an agreed document (arms control) or revolving around such a document (Middle East). Since 1959, we have not really had this type of negotiation on European matters.

Rather there have been a series of long-range artillery duels via public declarations (usually, though not exclusively, issued by our respective alliance groupings), interspersed with occasional, random and disjointed bilateral conversations at various levels.

We have, by and large, been scrupulous in not making ourselves the Western negotiating agent on Europe; even if we had wanted it otherwise, it is not now likely that our allies would let us. If, on the other hand, we wanted to begin dealing with the Soviets on European questions, without the blessing of the allies, the effect on NATO would almost certainly be chaotic. In this connection, it is of interest that Gromyko has now come forward with the suggestion to Ambassador Beam that there should be bilateral US-Soviet talks on a European security conference. Dobrynin’s strongly reiterated insistence on a direct US reply to the Soviet démarche of November 19 is undoubtedly also related to this.

Diplomacy in this area has also been complicated by numerous side-shows—not unnaturally, since the interests of a great number of states, East and West, are involved. A review of US and Soviet exchanges therefore does not provide a complete picture—although it does provide the essence. The present paper does not attempt to include the mass of exchanges, public and private, among individual European states, nor our own occasional exchanges, notably with the Poles and Romanians who, while supporting Soviet and Warsaw Pact positions, do so for reasons and with accents of their own.

It should also be noted that some US-Soviet negotiations, while ostensibly or mainly on matters other than regional European ones, have profound impact on Europe. This was true of the test ban negotiations.

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2 In telegram 88 from Moscow, January 7, Beam reported: “According to Gromyko, question of US and Canadian participation was ‘clear’ and provided both German states would also participate in conference. US Government on the other hand seems to be trying to convince others that conference not a good idea, that agenda should be broader and that questions such as balanced reduction of forces, which has been in dispute for 25 years, should be considered. Gromyko said that although his information comes from reliable sources, he cannot say precisely that US is against conference, but if so, he would like to know why. US says it advocates improvement of general relations and therefore should take broad approach.” Beam stated that in concluding, Gromyko offered bilateral consultations regarding “the conference, its agenda, etc., in order to ascertain the real attitude of our government.” (Ibid.)

3 See Document 16.

4 Attached but not printed.

5 Reference is to the negotiations that culminated in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
in several different ways, profoundly true of the NPT negotiations and will be even more true of SALT. We have not tried in the present paper to analyze these interrelationships.

Finally, European security, broadly construed, includes economic and technical matters, in addition to political and military ones. While these have not recently figured in US-Soviet exchanges, they have done so at various times in the past and they remain very prominent in intra-European contacts on East-West issues. (Eastern Europe’s relationship to the European Communities is a problem complex of increasing weight if and as the Communities develop and may in the middle run outweigh most if not all the other East-West issues in Europe.) In any case, we do not get into this entire area in the present paper.

Basically, despite the huge volume of documents and the smaller, though considerable volume of private talk, the fact is that European issues have not been ripe for concrete negotiation between ourselves and the Soviets. Even today, with the volume of private talk picking up, the issues have been largely procedural: do we or do we not have a conference; how should it be prepared, etc. (For the Soviets, admittedly, this has substantive interest since the mere convening of a conference is of advantage to them.)

The one real substantive subject, that of our and Soviet troops, has not been talked about seriously since Khrushchev and LBJ exchanged pen-pal letters in 19646 (Note: this is not generally known), when we rejected the idea of mutual cuts. While Dobrynin has now responded to Elliot Richardson’s prodding by indicating that the Soviets would give serious consideration to a NATO proposal, it is far from clear that serious US-Soviet negotiations on this matter will (or should) be undertaken.

Other potential negotiating issues relate to Germany. You will recall that the President in his letter to Kosygin last April7 offered bilateral soundings on Berlin, and the Soviets have shown some interest. But we are probably well out of the bilateral channel on this one since (a) the subject hardly promises to be productive for us and (b) we should do nothing to undermine allied cohesion on this subject.

In sum, when all is said and done, direct US-Soviet negotiations on Europe which would in any sense be directed at changing the status quo would at present be either (a) artificial and contrived, or (b) not in our interest, or (c) not in the Soviet interest. At the same time, while the status quo is not all that bad right now for us, at least when compared to other status quos, it is not desirable, or feasible, to seek

US-Soviet negotiations which would sanctify it. Of all the Western powers we should be the last one to underwrite Moscow’s free hand in Eastern Europe (especially since we are in process of developing a special relationship with Romania); and we certainly have no interest in negotiating the disruption of the Western alliance with Moscow.

This would not rule out conversations with the Soviets to see what if anything of substance they want to talk to us about on Europe; but we should do so with the utmost caution and take meticulous care that the Allies are kept informed.

This paper includes the following parts:

Part I—A résumé of the issues that have figured in US-Soviet exchanges, public and private (Tab I)
Part II—A chronology of major statements by both sides (Tab II)
Part II—A comprehensive selection of documents (Tab III)

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8 All three tabs are attached but not printed.
9 “Held in Washington” is handwritten in the margin.

18. Editorial Note

On January 19, 1970, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs G. Warren Nutter wrote in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird: “There seems to be a decided difference of view between State and DoD with regard to BFR; most particularly in the speed and vigor with which it should be pressed by the U.S. at this time.” Nutter, citing Acting Secretary of State Elliot Richardson’s meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin (see Document 16) as evidence, wrote: “During the course of that meeting Mr. Richardson brought up the subject of BFR and expressed his interpretations of U.S. and NATO enthusiasms for early movement in that direction, implying NATO readiness to present concrete proposals after the May Ministerial.” After suggesting Laird read the memorandum of conversation, Nutter stated that Richardson’s interpretations “run counter to our impressions of USG agreed policy, which we understand to be that of moving cautiously toward BFR by stages, with active negotiations only after careful evaluation of NATO studies now in process and impossible to complete by, or even soon after, the May Ministerial. We consider this to be a sound approach, and that pressing for early negotiations is both unsound and dangerous.” (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 2, NATO, Vol. III)
In a follow-up memorandum to Laird on January 30, Nutter wrote: “In addition to Under Secretary Richardson’s approach to Ambassador Dobrynin, two developments last week have further emphasized the need for clarifying this issue with State. In a speech in Chicago, Mr. Richardson stated that, ‘One of the most promising areas of potential progress with the Eastern European nations lies, we believe, in reaching agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions.’ Ambassador Ellsworth during his visit to the Pentagon revealed that he believes he had been the ‘dynamo’ on MBFR in NATO, a role which would appear inconsistent with State-Defense agreed guidance on moderating any rush toward MBFR.” (Attachment to letter from Laird to Rogers, February 8; ibid.) A memorandum of Ambassador Ellsworth’s January 20 conversation with Laird at the Pentagon, dated February 2, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO.

On February 8, Laird sent Secretary of State William Rogers a letter drafted by Nutter: “With NATO now embarked on the development of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) models and the question of further movement likely to loom large in the May ministerials, I think it would be useful to make sure that Defense and State share a common understanding of our policy on the question.” Laird suggested that U.S. policy, as stated in telegram 165553 to USNATO (see Document 7), “called for a moderate signal on MBFR in the December NATO communiqué” and that the ongoing U.S. examination of MBFR had to be completed before assessing the “desirability and timeliness of further movement on the issue.” Laird wrote: “I must say that I am not convinced that we can complete this examination in time to permit a considered decision to move ahead on MBFR at the May Ministerial. I think that in keeping with the agreed policy sketched above, our basic stance on MBFR is one of caution and reserve.” (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 2, NATO, Vol. III)

On February 23, Acting Secretary of State Richardson replied in a letter drafted by James Goodby of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs: “After reading your letter of February 8 regarding mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, I think I can safely say that our two Departments are in general agreement on this question. If there are any differences, I would judge that these lie in the area of tactics rather than substance. Certainly the Department of State has reached no conclusions with respect to the desirability of any specific MBFR arrangement.” Richardson continued: “We have made it clear to all concerned that the United States has made no decisions on these matters. I believe, therefore, that our future decisions have not been prejudiced by our past actions, except for the effect produced by three separate NATO declarations expressing an interest in MBFR. These declarations have put the Alliance on record as at least predisposed in favor of mutual and balanced force reductions, provided an acceptable
arrangement can be devised and can be negotiated. This does not mean that we are committed to negotiations or to advancing any proposals for consideration by the USSR or anyone else. It does mean, in our view, that we can take a positive attitude towards the principle of mutual and balanced force reductions, while reserving judgment on the desirability of any specific MBFR arrangement.” Richardson concluded: “I understand that the NATO Military Authorities have started the studies which we have asked them to undertake in this field. Nevertheless, I also can well anticipate, as you suggest, that these studies may not be as far advanced by May as I think we all would like. In that case, I can assure you that the Department of State would not expect the Allies to move into an immediate negotiation on any specific MBFR model.” After offering to expand further on “any areas of difference or imprecision,” Richardson reminded Laird “that there also will be NSC discussions on NSSM 83 and subsequent decisions by the President that will further clarify the matter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)

19. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting


MINUTES OF NSC MEETING ON EUROPE

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Attorney General Mitchell
General Lincoln, Director, OEP
Admiral Moorer, Acting Chairman, JCS

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret. The full text of the minutes of the meeting is scheduled for publication Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. On January 27, Kissinger discussed the meeting in a telephone conversation with Richardson: “We are having an NSC meeting tomorrow with Wilson attending. We will talk about some European issues, and I will begin with 5 or 10 minutes of outline of the issues. The President wanted to call the Secretary [Rogers] now, but I know he can’t be reached. Could he talk about the European Security Conference for 5–10 minutes? Do you think that can be done?” Richardson replied, “I think so.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 4, Chronological File)
President: What about European security matters?

Rogers: The problem concerning disengagement as a policy is that the USSR is seeking to create the impression that we have in fact opted for alternative #3. The fact is that we are going from alternative #1 to alternative #2 at a sensible pace. We must reinforce this impression.

We are a strong supporter of the present Alliance—for example, the President’s trip to Europe, my stand at the NATO conference, and Elliot Richardson’s speech on the European security situation.

We must encourage cohesion and give economic aid.

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2 Rogers was referring to the response to National Security Study Memoranda 60, 65, 79, 83, and 84, January 26, which listed “three patterns of relationship (or systems or models) which are sufficiently within the realm of the possible and have enough advocates to be worth examining.” Alternative 3 reads: “Disengagement: a formal European military and political settlement involving the disengagement of American and Soviet forces from at least Central Europe.” Text of the response is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

3 Alternative 1 in the response to NSSMs 60, 65, 79, 83, and 84 reads: “The present structure: The continuation of, essentially, the present relationships, i.e., basically a bipolar structure of power in which the USSR dominates Eastern Europe and the US is the preponderant military and political power in Western Europe; Western Europe is loosely organized economically and politically (although the Common Market has brought its six members partly along the road to economic union) and heavily dependent on the US militarily; Germany remains divided.”

4 Alternative 2 in the response to NSSMs 60, 65, 79, 83, and 84 reads in part: “Enhanced Western Europe: a modified bipolar structure in which a more highly organized Western Europe becomes a significant independent power complex still linked to the US in a defense treaty and relying, ultimately, on a US nuclear guarantee, but which has an increased defense capability of its own. Germany remains formally divided, but the Western European complex consciously expands its trade and other relationships with the smaller Eastern European countries, including the GDR. In this situation, even though the East European countries would doubtless remain linked in defense arrangements with the Soviet Union, they might become more independent in their domestic and foreign economic and social policies.”

5 Nixon visited Europe February 23–March 2, 1969.

6 See Document 14.

We must also understand what the USSR is up to. We want to negotiate; we will not just be belligerent.

On SALT, we are convinced that they are interested in serious discussions. Concerning our own troop strength, we will maintain it at present levels through 1971. In short, the foundationstone of our own security is NATO.

Concerning the European Security Conference, the Soviets do not give the intention of getting into serious discussions. First of all, they don’t even talk to us; rather for 6 to 8 months they discussed as to whether or not to invite us into the party. If they don’t talk to all interested parties at the same time, the offer would not have been made in good faith.

Beyond that, the Soviet approach does not deal with real security questions. The issues they have raised—trade and renunciation of forces—for example, have already been covered.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Wilson: I find this discussion fascinating as a form of governmental process. Even the inclusion of a third option for “intellectual symmetry” is most important.

And I agree that this third option is pretty well dead, although we must quiet the critics from time to time. The trouble is that the main danger to NATO is that it can be taken for granted. Czechoslovakia jerked everybody up, but there is a continuing need for external vigilance and more unity.

If we look at the Brezhnev Doctrine, it is interesting to note that the USSR has never chosen a country in the NATO Alliance. Actually Brezhnev has shown a high degree of military efficiency in imposing colonial policies.

As far as the European Security Conference is concerned, it was never really in doubt that the U.S. and Canada would be invited in. The Soviets never meant to be exclusive on this.

The question is just who is taking who for a ride. The right way to respond is not just to say no. But we must be properly prepared and deal with meaningful issues. Perhaps we should show a bit of rigidity, and crowd them a bit. It is my impression that Brandt is doing a bit of this. He is getting away from the old metaphors and pushing Ulbricht around. But he would never sacrifice security.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Stewart: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] It is important to remember that NATO is not just a defensive alliance. I am worried about the opposition to the Alliance. “Is the damsel dead or only sleepeth?”
We must try to avoid growth on that strand of opinion which attacks NATO as a waste. NATO is not just an armed camp; its existence does, in fact, relax tension and further relaxation may be attainable.

I would like to make four points:

(1) We must not underwrite the Brezhnev Doctrine.

(2) We must not just approve a limited agenda.

(3) We must present the Soviets with real questions on such things as mutual force reductions and the German question, and

(4) We must not be too showy. We must get some relaxation.

Wilson: I think we must avoid any big buildup about a European Security Conference—there would be too much hope for nothing.

Rogers: There is no problem here with public opinion. People are amazed at how ready we are to negotiate. We do not want to have some kind of big agreement in public on the agenda. But we do want to show ourselves as forthcoming.

RN: How would some kind of standing committee work? 8

Stewart: It would have to do some preparatory bilateral discussion. Prime Minister Wilson is going to Moscow, and he may be able to find out if the Soviets are serious. Trade questions can go to existing organizations. As far as mutual force reductions are concerned, the neutrals are not interested. From time to time, certainly, we may want to bring the ministers together.

Wilson: It would be a good idea to have a heavy dose of safe subjects, such as cultural exchange and trade. We can compare notes on these, and give the standing committee a context, not exclusively related to difficult questions.

RN: It would be a good idea to keep the pressure on them, but I have one fundamental understanding concerning any conference. A conference in and of itself helps them; a conference in and of itself does not help us.

Look at Glassboro—there was just an appearance of détente and euphoria.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

RN: The Soviets themselves have serious internal economic problems and problems with East Europe. East Europe will move increasingly toward Western Europe.

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8 In a speech to Parliament on December 9, 1969, Stewart proposed the idea of a standing committee on East-West relations consisting of representatives from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was an idea, he said, that “NATO should most carefully consider.” See Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Vol. 1, p. 199, fn. 8.
Wilson: Don’t under-rate the effect of the top Soviet leaders with contacts in the outside world. Soviet businessmen with whom we have considerable contact are increasingly questioning the rigidity of the system.

RN: That’s right; Kosygin is manager.

Wilson: There will be no Rapallo from Brandt; but the USSR is looking for a new Rapallo.

The French approaches under DeGaulle were mischievous more than fundamental.

RN: Let me add one thing. I have great confidence in European politicians. But as far as dealing with the managers in the Soviet Union is concerned, I wouldn’t want to leave the impression that the future of Europe should be left in the hands of the German, French and Italian businessmen.

Wilson: Yes, especially the Italians.

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9 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, which opened the way for economic cooperation and German rearmament on Soviet soil. The implication of “Rapallo” was a German-Soviet deal behind the West’s back.

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20. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

NSSM-83, European Security—May NATO Ministerial Meeting

Though the Review Group on this study is, unfortunately, several weeks away, I thought you might want to familiarize yourself with this
study. The attached package includes an analytical summary (Tab A), the study and its summary (Tab B), a box score done by State of the various Western ideas that have been floating around (Tab C), plus a copy of an earlier memo on German views which are becoming of special importance (Tab D).³

As a basic examination of policy options, the paper itself suffers from several defects. It does not present an in-depth discussion of the broad concepts of European Security and how they might be achieved. Nor does it take up the German and Berlin issues. It also does not go into the problems of conducting a strategy review, on the one hand, and conducting an active (or passive) European Security policy, on the other.

Thus, the study is largely a tactical-procedural paper. Nevertheless, the tactical issues have become quite important. This study is probably the only way to get an NSC framework for and some Presidential control over the decisions that will be made in NATO in May on a European conference and a proposal on balanced force reductions. You will recall that Brosio mentioned to you how important it was for the other Allies to know the US position well before May.⁴

As it now stands, the schedule does not permit an NSC before early May. Thus, some policy will again be made by cables. Since Secretary Rogers will be personally involved in the Rome meeting, an NSC meeting would be the proper vehicle to involve the President. If it slips beyond the first week in May, I see no way to intervene in the dialogue between Brussels and the Department, which by then will be fairly frantic in any case.

One alternative might be to squeeze in a Review Group meeting and send an agreed memo to the President concentrating on the question of a conference and balanced force reductions, with some expanded argumentation and background.

³ Tabs B–D are attached but not printed. Tab B is the draft response to NSSM 83, prepared by the Interagency Working Group on Europe, on February 24; it apparently updated the January 26 response (see footnote 2, Document 12).

⁴ A memorandum of a conversation between Kissinger and Brosio, March 20, reads in part: “On East-West relations, Brosio noted the growing sentiment in favor of a conference. He pointed out that the German position was crucial. Brandt seemed to feel that he could facilitate his Eastern negotiations by supporting a conference, specifically one that would take up force reductions.” According to the memorandum: “Brosio urged that the US make known its position on an East-West conference well before the May Ministerial meeting, rather than at the last minute. The other Allies would be influenced by the position we took. Brosio noted the Belgian idea for exploratory East-West talks and felt that this might be an acceptable fallback. He did not think that the British idea of a commission was a good one.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VIII)
Whatever you decide, it seems to me that these will be the issues to lift out of the paper and present to the NSC or the President:

1. Do we still want to try to impose certain preconditions to any multilateral conference:
   —if so, on what issues should we insist on progress: Berlin, Bonn’s negotiations?
   —is there any action on our part called for?

2. Is it in our interest to allow balanced force reductions to become the central negotiating issue, assuming the Soviets can be brought around?
   —if not, how do we defuse it without causing a great conflict with the Allies?
   —if we do want to move forward, is it for psychological reasons (i.e., to provide excuses not to make unilateral cuts) or for serious purposes; the difference would matter in developing a negotiating stance.

We will be in a somewhat better position after the military analysis of balanced force reduction models by the Military Committee is finished on April 20. But it seems likely that we will face a State-Defense split with State wanting to move ahead for political reasons and Defense rejecting any BFR proposals that might be negotiable. This is another, and perhaps the most important reason for putting the issues under Presidential aegis.

**Recommendations:**

1. That you consider speeding up RG consideration of this paper.
2. That you consider requesting State to forward promptly a supplementary paper on the issues to be resolved before the May NATO Ministerial meeting.

**Tab A**

NSSM 83—CURRENT ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

*Analytical Summary*

**Introduction**

—There are as yet few hard indications the Soviets would agree to proposals acceptably settling the central issues of European Security.

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5 Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations.
6 Jeanne Davis wrote in the margin next to Recommendation 2: “State Jim Carson, EUR/IG uniformed, 3/31—JWD.”
7 Drafted by the NSC staff.
—We and our Allies do not want to ratify the present bisection of
the continent or permanent Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

—Relations today are at an uncertain half way point.

—Negotiations for the near future are likely to center on discreet,
and well-defined subjects that are essentially peripheral to the basic
political and security problems of Europe.

Comment:

By setting the stage in this manner, the paper, as will be seen, is re-
duced to essentially tactical-procedural issues. There is an opportunity if
not a real need, to discuss at some length differing concepts of European
Security. The study states we have no interest in ratifying the “bisection”
of Europe. If so, then it would be worth exploring the supporting argu-
ments, including the German view that the only road to rapprochement
between East and West Europe is through acknowledgement of the “re-
alities.” After such exploration, conclusions could be drawn.

The statement that negotiations are likely to center on discreet and
well defined peripheral subjects has no supporting foundation. Is it be-
cause we do not want to take up more central issues (if so, why not),
or because they are being dealt with by the Germans, or because the
Soviets are resisting an expansion of an agenda, or, finally, because the
objective situation makes any other approach unfeasible?

These are the real issues of any European Security paper.

I. The Setting

A. Antecedents to Today’s Negotiating Situation.

B. Current Soviet/Eastern European Approaches to European
Security.

Comment: These are standard and present no great problems. At
the same time they are so superficial as to be of no value.

C. Current Western Approaches to European Security.

1. US Goals.

—A stable and peaceful situation effectively guaranteeing the in-
dependence and sovereignty of all European states, based on a mili-
tary equilibrium sufficient to ensure that this settlement is on terms
satisfactory to the US and its Allies;

—strengthened prosperous Western Europe;

—resolution of the German question;

—peaceful and constructive relations with the USSR and Eastern
Europe;

—diminution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and gradual lib-
eralization of regimes.

Comment: If our prime goal is stability, then some of the other goals
are obviously in conflict: guaranteeing the “sovereignty” of all European
states is not necessarily compatible with stability, nor is a resolution of the German question. Diminution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and peaceful constructive relations with the USSR would be quite a trick.

In short these goals (taken from the Summary paper used at the NSC meeting with Wilson) are too vague to be of any particular meaning for this study.

2. Tripartite and FRG Approaches to the Problems of Germany and Berlin.

“The German question and the status of Berlin lies at the heart of European security.”

Comment: This is the last you will read of Germany-Berlin issues. They are not discussed any further in the paper. “This German policy (of Brandt’s) contains few risks for the West and even the achievement of limited successes would be in our own interest. The danger of substantial weakening of FRG ties with the West as it seeks to improve its relations with the East seems remote.”

Comment: These statements are open to serious challenge. If, as the study acknowledges, German-Berlin issues are at the heart of European security, then one would assume that a discussion of possible options would be warranted—especially if limited success is in our interest. If the Western position is to insist on progress on concrete issues, there should be a discussion of what constitutes such progress: would a Soviet-German agreement qualify? the settlement of the Oder-Neisse? If so, should we have a position other than watchful waiting?

The risks in Brandt’s policies are well known to you. Yet State adamantly refuses to acknowledge any. You will recall that when we prepared a paper on European issues, they criticized it for being “anti-German.” Yet the same points are being made forcefully by the French. In any case, relations between the two Germanys are changing, and this should be a major consideration in any discussion of European security.

3. Other Western and Neutral Initiatives.

4. NATO Initiative.

8 In February 1970, the FRG entered into negotiations with Poland on renunciation of force with regard to the Oder-Neisse line.

9 Reference is to a draft version of the response to NSSMs 60, 65, 79, 83, and 84, which originally included a section on Bonn’s Ostpolitik. At a meeting of the NSC Review Group on January 23, Hillenbrand criticized the draft, prepared by the NSC staff, for being “loaded with anti-German assumptions.” At the end of the meeting, Kissinger decided to drop Germany from the subjects to be discussed by the NSC on January 28. For information on the paper and the Review Group meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 49.
January 1969–November 1970 53

Comment: A factual recitation. This would be the place for more elaboration of European attitudes, which are frequently cited as one of the motivating forces behind Allied interest in a conference of some kind.

II. The Issues

This section summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the specific Options as related to issues to be considered at the May 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting.

Comment: In other words, only the tactical or procedural issues are covered. While these should be sorted out for the President before the Ministerial Meeting there should also be organizing concepts for discussion.

A. Basic US Approaches to Resolution of East-West Issues

Options:

1. Negotiate settlement directly with the USSR, not in consultation with our Allies.

Comment: It is difficult to treat this one seriously as written. If reformulated as an emphasis on US-Soviet stability, it might deserve more serious consideration.

2. Conserve the present balance and territorial division, not seeking a resolution, eventually agreeing to a new Locarno type treaty.10

—Conceding the status quo reduces friction, but would nourish a tendency toward neutralism, encourage Warsaw Pact adventurism, and reduce our security by reducing our influence in Europe.

Comment: One faintly suspects that the authors of the study do not like this Option very much. Yet, it touches on a major subject: should the status quo be accepted and formalized in some treaty or understanding, or otherwise institutionalized. There are some in Europe who believe that this is now the only realistic approach. Moreover, the Locarno idea should probably not be dismissed so airily.

Moreover, in the Berlin negotiations it would seem that we are considering “conserving” the status quo; indeed, the Germans are prepared to trade an acknowledgement of their ties to West Berlin for virtual recognition of the incorporation of East Berlin into the GDR. Similarly, for an improvement in humanitarian concerns, we presumably

10 In the Treaty of Locarno of October 16, 1925, Germany, France, and Belgium recognized their mutual borders resulting from the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which had ended World War I. Great Britain and Italy offered a security guarantee to the three main signatories. Presumably, Sonnenfeldt is referring to this arrangement, rather than the fact that the treaty left open the issue of Germany’s eastern borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
will not challenge the political status quo. This is not necessarily wrong, but it points up that the Option cannot be readily thrown out, especially with specious arguments about increasing Warsaw Pact “adventurism.” One would suspect that the Warsaw Pact would be well satisfied and would hardly become more aggressive in the military sense.

3. **Adopt a leading role in resolving issues looking toward a comprehensive plan** (similar to the Herter Plan of 1959)\(^{11}\) with appropriate consultations in NATO and among the four powers.

—Would strengthen NATO as an instrument of cooperation, put pressures on the USSR to make progress to reduce East-West tension.

—Allies would view as premature, and negotiations on plan acceptable to the US would not succeed.

4. **Continue pragmatic efforts along present lines to make bilateral and multilateral progress on concrete issues where and when possible.**

—Dealing individually and flexibly with issues allows them to be used to probe Soviet intentions, advance our interests in Eastern Europe, take advantage of openings for genuine if perhaps unspectacular progress without necessarily linking negotiation or involving euphoria.

—Thus far this approach has had limited appeal to European public opinion.

**Comment:** Obviously this is the Option preferred by the study, and its description and the supposed advantages are clearly slanted. The main fault is that it has no real meaning; translated from NATO communiqué-style language, this Option means to do very little and leave it largely to the Germans, as things now stand.

**B. Basic Approaches to a European Security Conference**

We would favor a carefully prepared ESC which deals with meaningful issues; benefits would depend on price Soviets willing to pay to convene a conference and on the outcome in terms of real gains in resolving issues.

**Comment:** This too is baffling, since we are not proposing to consider major “problems of security” nor do we seem very clear what the price is that the Soviets are expected to pay.

**Options:**

1. Continue present policy, retaining ESC as long term objective.

\(^{11}\) Popular name for the Western Peace Plan submitted to the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting on May 14, 1959. The plan, named after Secretary of State Christian Herter, provided for the unification of Germany by stages, parallel to disarmament measures in Central Europe. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal. For the text of the proposal, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 624–629.
2. Accept view that some progress in East-West negotiations and inscription of one or more “concrete” security issues on the agenda represents a sufficient precondition for convening a meeting.

3. Agree to an early conference to discuss issues not central to European security.

4. Indicate to our Allies that we do not object to early ESC, but will not participate ourselves.

Comment: Support for Option 1 among the Allies is waning, and their approach is now Option 2. No one is supporting Option 3 though it has some attractive advantages in terms of adding something from East Europeans. After insisting on our participation as a major condition, it would be difficult for us to back off now though this could combine with Option 3, i.e., a conference on trade, exchanges, etc., limited to Europeans.

The problem is that there is not much analysis to support a choice, but merely whether to move ahead, stand still, or pedal backward.

C. Basic Approach to Negotiating Modalities other than a European Security Conference

Options:

1. Standing Commission on East-West Relations (SCEWR) the UK plan,\(^{12}\) composed of NATO, Warsaw Pact reps, and neutrals:
   —would receive public support, provide private forum for continuing discussion;
   —GDR participation creates difficulties; not enough progress on issues to give meaningful work to such a commission.

2. Encourage greater use of Group of Ten;
   —nobody really cares about this Group.

3. Continue present ad hoc utilization of various appropriate forums;
   —avoids an ESC and its risks;
   —does not provide adequate psychological counter to the “public appeal” of the Warsaw Pact proposal; gives impression NATO is dragging its feet.

Comment: It does not seem that these are three separate Options; one could adopt No. 3, and encompass the other two. The issue here is whether we want to move toward some institutionalization, as the British propose, or stay loose.

\(^{12}\) See footnote 8, Document 19.
D. Issues for Possible East-West Negotiations

The following have been identified by the Allies.

1. Mutual East-West Force Reductions Balanced in Scope and Timing

   Decision on the future direction of MBFR should await the outcome of the NATO studies currently underway.

   Two generalizations are possible:
   —BFR would be preferable to unilateral cuts;
   —advantages and disadvantages would vary with the terms of an agreement:

   a. Asymmetrical reductions, larger cuts for Warsaw Pact would be advantageous in ensuring security, but probably not negotiable.
   b. Large, equal percentage cuts (30 percent) could reduce confrontation, but NATO area probably could not be defended with forces remaining.
   c. Small cuts could make the military disadvantages less severe and allow some savings in costs, but would be difficult to verify and there would still be some military disadvantages.

Outline of Possible NATO Proposals

   Illustrative basic elements:

   —geographic area involved would be West Germany and Benelux, GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia;
   —all indigenous and stationed (foreign) forces involved;
   —conventional, nuclear and dual capable forces involved;
   —air reductions proportionately less than ground;
   —agreed limitations as a first step, but conditional on a reduction agreement;
   —verification needs to be adequate to detect breaches.

Background Note: The NATO Working Group has developed one symmetrical model and four asymmetrical models, which have now been submitted to the Military Committee; the MC will issue a report to the Senior Polads on April 20, they, in turn, will provide political comments, and prepare recommendations for the Ministers to consider in late May in Rome.

   Symmetrical model is 30 percent reduction of ground force and 10 percent air force in geographical area noted above.

   Four asymmetrical models break down along the following lines:

   —same area, all NATO reductions are 5, 8, 10 percent, Warsaw Pact either 15, 30, 40 percent, or 10, 20, 30 with special emphasis on reduction in tanks; air force cuts of Warsaw Pact only 15 percent;
   —area covered expanded to include Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian military districts of USSR, NATO cuts the same, but Pact reductions 10, 20, 30, or 10, 15, 20 with special emphasis on tanks; air force cuts of 20 percent for Warsaw Pact in former case, or 15 percent in latter.
In sum, all asymmetrical models call for minimum five percent NATO reductions against minimum 10–15 percent Warsaw Pact reductions, plus Pact air force reduction only, with area covered varying. The central dilemma is that these asymmetrical models are probably non-negotiable, while symmetrical ones might jeopardize NATO security.

In this light these are Options presented in the study:
1. Kill the MBFR project by studying it to death.
2. Attempt to develop a consensus to kill it.
3. Continue studies, analyses, etc., with objective of explorations with USSR/Warsaw Pact after May meeting in order to provide a basis for assessment of desirability and timeliness of negotiations.
4. Press forward with study to decide in May on negotiating proposals.
5. If NATO study aborts, consider other approaches to balanced force reductions (i.e. mutual example, US-Soviet cuts only).

Comment: As you can see these are strictly tactical options. No discussion, evaluation of the concept, our interests, the positions of the Allies, etc., relationship to other issues. There are no criteria for deciding whether to press forward, slow down, kill, etc.

The fact is that we are fairly close to being committed to make some concrete proposals to the USSR, as a result of conversations with Dobrynin and the past record. The chances are, however, that the Military Committee will only endorse those studies which confer major advantage to us. This will not provide any basis for an exploration of Soviet intentions.

In any case, as you know, this entire scheme creates problems. If the Soviets turn around and move toward a BFR conference or negotiations, we are probably in major trouble.

2. Lesser Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures

NATO has endorsed several for discussion: exchange of observers at maneuvers, advance notification of military movements and maneuvers, observation posts and joint study of methods of inspection.

The issue seems to be whether to develop negotiating proposals together with or separate from balanced force reductions.

13 See Document 16. Secretary Rogers also spoke briefly with Dobrynin about an ESC during a conversation on January 30. Telegram 16128 to Moscow, February 3, contains a record of the conversation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)
Options:
1. Unilaterally frustrate a conclusion of NATO studies.
2. Keep work in phase with MBFR.
3. Independently work on BFR, press forward with studies on confidence building measures.

Comment: It is difficult to know whether to press forward or backward if there is no discussion of the merits of any of these issues in some pattern. The pros and cons are in terms of whether we make BFR more or less complicated.

3. **Joint East-West Declaration of Principles**
   (This is not a very live issue at present.)

Options:
1. Not pursue it further.
2. Ask Eastern countries to subscribe to our principles without negotiations.
3. Seek Allied agreement to negotiate with East on joint statement.
   —Not pressing would please most of Allies, but would “deny West” issues for possible negotiations.
   —*Unilateral* declaration would provide evidence of Allied willingness to seek East-West accords (*sic*), but East might respond by proposing European security conference to discuss it.
   —Negotiating joint statement would have same advantage, but negotiations could create false impression of greater security.

Comment: The critique of this is self-evident.

4. **Stimulating Trade and Other Cooperation**

NATO is on record for freer movement of peoples, goods and ideas. Central issue is how far to go in pressing trade issues in view of tight controls over our exports.

A. **US Bilateral**

Options:
1. Maintain present permissive but not promotional attitude toward trade with the East.
2. Stimulate contacts with the East to maximum extent feasible within bounds of current legislation.
3. Attempt to obtain Congressional approval for further loosening of selective restrictions on trade.

Comment: All of this would seem out of place in this paper, which is not the place to decide major trade policy.

B. **Multilateral Efforts**

Option: Stimulate enhanced East-West trade through ECE and greater use of OECD and GATT.
5. Environment

Option: To pursue actively East-West cooperation in environmental studies through ECE; through proposals put forward by OECD, and eventually through NATO CCMS.

—Would provide opportunities for joint endeavor but could politicize environmental issue.

21. National Security Study Memorandum 92


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, ACDA

SUBJECT
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (MBFR)

The President has directed that a comprehensive study be prepared on the subject of mutual and balanced force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.2

The study should develop the analysis and supporting evidence related to all the major issues. In particular, alternative approaches to the problem should be examined, and an analysis made of such factors as the extent of reductions, forces and equipment involved, timing, geographic areas covered, verification aspects, problem of negotiability,

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VIII. Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2 In an attached covering memorandum to the same addressees, April 14, Kissinger wrote: “The President has requested the study called for in the enclosed NSSM in light of his conversation with Chancellor Brandt.” Kissinger was apparently referring to a one-on-one conversation between Nixon and Brandt on April 10, in which they discussed MBFR. No U.S. record of the conversation has been found. For a German record, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 591–595. For discussion of European security and balanced force reductions arising from Brandt’s visit to the United States April 10–11, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 78 and 79.
Allied viewpoints, potential cost savings for the US, and any other factors deemed pertinent. On the basis of the foregoing analysis various Options should be developed to illustrate the differing concepts and variations for each Option. There should also be an assessment of the strategic effect on NATO defense, as well as on Warsaw Pact capabilities.

The study should take into account the work already completed or underway in NATO but should not be bound by it. The overall responsibility for the study is assigned to the Verification Panel established for SALT; the Verification Panel Working Group will undertake the basic work, in the same manner as the SALT studies.3

In view of the work proceeding in NATO, it is desirable that the study be completed on July 15, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

3 In a telephone conversation with Nixon on April 9 at 8:05 p.m., Kissinger mentioned that one of the topics Brandt was planning to raise during his visit was mutual balanced force reductions. Nixon replied, “Handle like SALT with careful preparation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 4, Chronological File)

22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, April 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Guidance for the May NATO Ministerial Meeting

In order to meet the needs of Ambassador Ellsworth in his consultation with the Allies as we prepare for the NATO meeting in May, State and Defense have agreed on some tentative guidance. It deals with tactical and procedural handling of European security questions.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–043, SRG Meetings, Issues of European Security, 4/16/70. Secret. Sent for action. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the memorandum to Kissinger on April 16. (Ibid.)
The main points are:

— to hold to the present position that any European Security Conference must be carefully prepared and deal with concrete issues, based on prior progress on such issues;

— on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions we would propose to establish a NATO Commission to coordinate further explorations with the Soviets;

— on non-security issues, such as trade, and cultural and technical exchanges, we would propose the establishment of a special Committee to study the issues and possibly hold some ad hoc conferences.

We discussed this approach in the Review Group meeting on April 16, and there was no opposition. We also agreed it would be worthwhile to hold an NSC meeting before the NATO session, to discuss some of the more basic long-term issues relating to European security questions.

If you approve I will ask that such a study be completed for early NSC consideration.

Recommendations

1. That you authorize me to concur in the instruction to Brussels as outlined above, with the proviso that substantive positions on the question of balanced force reductions will be derived from the internal study authorized in NSSM 92.

2. That we prepare a more basic study of European security issues for an early NSC meeting.
23. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Ambassador Ellsworth’s Report on NATO Communiqué Debate—You Should Talk to Elliot Richardson

The Ambassador has sent you a back channel message\(^2\) reporting on the status of the maneuvering in NATO over the communiqué for the Rome Ministerial meeting. He covers the same ground as our status report (Log #10237). (Tab A)\(^3\)

On MBFR, he reports we have agreed to the idea of a separate declaration, based on a Canadian compromise, which would commit us to further explorations (bilateral) but no commitment to actual negotiations. While all the Allies want a strong signal, only the UK, Belgium and the Scandinavians want to go much further.

On a European Security Conference, there is a much wider split. The British-Belgium approach, supported by Scandinavians, would be only one step short of agreeing to a conference, since it would involve “multilateral exploratory talks.” If accepted, it would be almost impossible to avoid getting into substance in such explorations; the talks would be viewed as preparatory talks, thus conceding a major point to the Soviets, with nothing in return, and would in effect put great pressures on the Germans to complete their bilateral talks with the Soviets, Poles and GDR, before the general questions involved were introduced into a multilateral forum.

In short, what the UK wants out of the Rome meeting is a multilateral European conference with no limitation on the number of participants and they want it now. The UK also wants a broad and undefined agenda.

The Ambassador reports that in the last few days many of the Allies have really come to understand just how broad—and dangerous—the total package is.

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2 Attached but not printed. Ellsworth sent the backchannel message, 654 from Brussels, to Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt on May 17.
3 The memorandum from Hyland to Kissinger, May 13, is not attached. A copy is in Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 290, Memoranda to the President.
The French, of course, are opposed to MBFR because it presumes a bloc-to-bloc approach and are unprepared to agree to multilateral exploratory talks.

The FRG is wavering. Schmidt wants something on MBFR. The Germans were aligned with the British at first. Now they have moved back toward our position, mainly because they are concerned with the impact of a call for multilateral exploratory talks on renunciation of force might have on their Ostpolitik.

Our three objectives, Ellsworth believes, should be (1) to maintain a position of strategic and political leadership within the Alliance; (2) prevent our Allies from being pushed into folly by their own internal political problems; (3) gain some propaganda advantage to show that NATO is not a stumbling block to sensible dialogue with the East. He rates our chances of holding the line as better than 50–50.

Since this cable to you, Brosio has had a composite draft prepared with alternative language, etc., and the British have circulated a non-paper, explaining their ideas. It may be that the issues will finally go to the Ministers without resolution. Though Ellsworth did not ask for your intervention, and State has not touched base on this whole sorry affair, the question is do you want to intervene? At a minimum, you may want to take this up with Richardson, and indicate your opposition to the British approach, and emphasize that the Canadian compromise which we support is the furthest we can go. In addition you could stress that we cannot buy any specific criteria on MBFR that would limit the substance of our position, which is under review in the Verification Panel working group.

Recommendation

That you take the question up with Elliot Richardson and indicate your support for Ellsworth’s approach and your opposition to the British-Belgian position.

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4 In a May 8 covering memorandum to a letter from Schmidt, April 22, Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger, “He [Schmidt] has sent you a letter urging understanding for the German position on Balanced Force Reductions.” Sonnenfeldt stated: “The main points in their position are that NATO should formulate a ‘specific offer’ of talks to the Warsaw Pact, and that the NATO communiqué should list several criteria of mutual force reductions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V)


6 At the bottom of the page, there is a handwritten notation by David R. Young of the NSC staff, dated May 21: “HAK ‘discussed with Richardson; will go with Canadian.’”
The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session from May 26 to 27, 1970, in Rome. On May 28, Secretary of State Rogers reported on the meeting to President Nixon in telegram Secto 28/2149 from Madrid: “At the NATO Ministerial meeting concluded today, I think we achieved a good deal, although there are signs of increasing European desire to move toward a security conference.” Rogers reported: “Everybody went away with a good feeling about the meeting and the results. The UK, Belgium, and the Scandinavians were pleased with the tone of initiative on MBFR and European security. Germany, Italy, the UK, and France, as well as Greece, Turkey, and Portugal, were satisfied (though not necessarily for the same reasons) that in being positive no commitment was made to a European security conference. We were able to avoid any early multilateral meetings that might lead toward a conference.” Rogers then reviewed the sessions: “At the start of the meeting Stewart (UK) pressed hard for immediate ‘multilateral’ contacts with Eastern Europe to explore the prospects for later multilateral ‘negotiations.’ Concerned that early ‘multilateral’ contacts would quickly become converted to a preparatory meeting for a conference, I urged we continue on a bilateral basis. We finally reached a satisfactory consensus on language calling for bilateral contacts until the next NATO meeting in December. We will then examine whether there has been enough progress on Germany and Berlin to proceed to ‘multilateral exploratory’ contacts. Even with modest success in the current talks on Germany and Berlin, or on SALT, however, I see increased pressures at that time. Our European allies were also interested, as we were, in a positive approach to Eastern European mutual and balanced force reductions. I think the declaration we agreed on will demonstrate seriousness both to Eastern Europe and Western Europe while leaving open the specific negotiating positions we might want to take.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VIII) The communiqué from the Rome NATO Ministerial meeting, along with a declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, are in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974 pages 233–238.
25. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Ellsworth) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Brussels, May 29, 1970, 1541Z.

713. I have little to add to the Secretary’s report to the President on the Rome ministerial. What we came out with was a communiqué which has given the Alliance some propaganda mileage, without moving very much closer to an ESC.

The way the French and Germans played the meeting was interesting. The French were active, and were almost indispensable in finding a compromise position on multilateral explorations which all could accept. The FRG, on the other hand, did its best to avoid taking a position on anything.

We can hardly say that France has decided to play a more active role in NATO, but Schumann’s actions at Rome, coming on the heels of a more cooperative French attitude here over the past few months, may give us some reason to think this could be the case.

German silence was probably a short-term tactical device aimed at maintaining domestic and international flexibility until it is clearer how their Ostpolitik will go. But it is also possible that the FRG is feeling its way toward a new relationship with the West—a relationship which will be both less solid and less stolid.

The U.S. will face some tough decisions between now and the December NATO meeting. Our allies are almost certain to be pushing hard for some formal system of multilateral negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. The degree of pressure will to some degree depend on what we decide to do about troop levels, how the Soviets respond to NATO’s MBFR proposal, how Ostpolitik and the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin progress, and SALT. But pressure there will be—particularly if troop cuts look likely.

We will need to keep in mind the relationship between what comes from SALT and the U.S. position in Europe. One impact of an agreement would almost certainly be to encourage our European allies toward a more active role in East-West negotiations. At the same

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VIII. Secret; Eyes Only.
2 Sonnenfeldt underlined “Secretary’s report to the President on the Rome” and wrote a question mark in the margin. For the Secretary’s report, see Document 24.
time, the longer SALT continues the more we will be squeezed between Soviet demands that we include forward based aircraft and exclude MR/IRBMS, and West European demands to the contrary.

In any event, our problems in December will be sufficiently complex, and the decisions taken at the December meeting sufficiently important to longer-term U.S. interests that the USG should begin now to examine the range of issues that are likely to arise, the options open to us, and the limits to which we would be prepared to go.

Warm regards.³

³ A notation at the end of the message reads, “OBE per Sonnenfeldt.”

26. Memorandum of Conversation¹


SUBJECT
MBFR

PARTICIPANTS
Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson
Ambassador Dobrynin

After preliminary remarks, I handed Dobrynin the MBFR guidelines.² He then asked me a serious of questions which I answered in substance as follows: The NATO allies have no fixed views as to the composition of the group of countries which should participate in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Richardson on June 10. The conversation took place during lunch at the Soviet Embassy. On June 16, Hillenbrand forwarded a copy to Ellsworth. In an attached letter, Hillenbrand wrote: “Our telegraphic summary of that conversation was somewhat abridged because—as you will see from the full memcon enclosed—the Under Secretary’s remarks, while illustrative in nature, do break new ground and go somewhat beyond what has thus far been agreed among the Allies. I am not sure how you would wish to handle those elements of the Richardson–Dobrynin exchange which we left out of the telegraphic summary. The best course might be to wait and see whether the Soviets play them back to the Allies. If they do, you could then confirm, if appropriate, that the ideas in question were put forward on an illustrative basis but not as the formal position of the US government.” (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO)

² See Document 28.
MBFR negotiations. I illustrated a possible grouping on our side as comprising the countries having forces in Central Europe and including the UK, France, FRG, US, plus, say, one country from each of the NATO flanks, e.g., Norway and Italy. Two or more neutrals might perhaps be included as observers. With respect to the forces and weapons systems included, I said that this might depend in part on the definition of “strategic weapons” agreed to in SALT: if this definition were ultimately to exclude forward-based aircraft, IR/MBRMs and SLCMs, then the latter could be covered in the MBFR talks. In any case, reductions could optimally embrace a total combat slice from forward ground troops back to supporting aircraft and tactical nuclear forces. Alternatively, initial negotiations might focus on troop strength per se.

In response to my remark that the subject is, in many respects, at least as complex as SALT, Dobrynin pointed out that, in the case of SALT, we are dealing merely on a bilateral basis, whereas here much greater additional complications would be introduced by the necessity for each of us to get our allies’ agreement.

Dobrynin asked how we could propose that there be no political preconditions on MBFR when, as he understood it, we had been putting preconditions on a possible Conference on European Security. I explained that in the case of the CES we have wanted to assess progress in the Quadripartite talks, the bilateral talks between the FRG and the USSR, GDR and Poland, SALT, etc., in order to assure that the CES was not held simply for propaganda effect but rested rather on a basis of genuine progress toward détente. In the case of MBFR, however, we consider the subject as one meriting negotiation on its own terms without reference to progress or the lack of it in any other context.

To the question why we made a distinction between the “forum” and the “participants,” I said that both words were used in order to reflect our awareness of such possible alternatives as dealing with the matter through a specially convened ad hoc body or, conceivably, through a commission or subcommittee established at a CES. (I had previously identified useful progress in exploratory talks on MBFR as one of the things which, in some combination with the others mentioned above, could help to justify holding a CES.) In response to a crack by Dobrynin that our military representatives must be pretty lazy because they’ve had all the time since Reykjavik and still haven’t produced an MBFR model, I said that nothing would speed them up so much as to have a full-dress conference set for next October 15. Dobrynin said that this would be a little too soon even for the USSR. In general, however, his questions were straightforwardly directed toward eliciting information and in no sense reflected a negative attitude.
27. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 10, 1970, 7:30 p.m.–1 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Europe

We then turned to Europe. Dobrynin said that we were the chief obstacle to the European Security Conference idea that they had put forward. I said that they had never explained satisfactorily why it was necessary to have a big conference simply to settle cultural and trade matters. Dobrynin said that it was impossible to please the United States. When they had proposed to Johnson to have a European Security Conference, they had been accused of wanting to settle too much. In this Administration, they were accused of trying to settle too little. He said we were oscillating between being too specific and being too vague.

For example, he simply did not know what we meant by mutual balanced force reductions and, frankly, he had the impression that we didn’t know ourselves what we meant by the term. As an example of how impossible it was to deal with us, he mentioned the luncheon conversation he had had with Elliot Richardson. He said Richardson had handed him a State Department working paper on mutual balanced force reductions and had asked him to comment on it. Dobrynin replied it was very unusual for a foreign diplomat to comment on a working paper of another foreign office. When he had called this to the attention of Richardson, the latter replied that he needed Dobrynin’s comments in order to bring the military around in our country. I told Dobrynin that I would be ready to talk in concrete details about mutual balanced force reductions later this summer, after we had worked out our own thinking a little more fully.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]


3 The paper consisted of the text of the guidelines printed in full in Document 28.
28. Editorial Note

In telegram 92834 to USNATO, June 13, 1970, the Department summarized conversations with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on European security and balanced force reductions in the wake of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Rome. On June 5, Dobrynin discussed the communiqué from the meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand. Citing the communiqué, Dobrynin inquired about the Allies’ stated readiness to enter into multilateral contacts. He asked “what the definition of ‘progress’ would be. Hillenbrand responded that this would obviously be a matter for NATO FonMins to determine. They will meet again in Brussels in December, by which time it might be possible to determine prospects for success in the various ‘on-going talks.’

“3. On the MBFR declaration, Dobrynin asked whether we saw this as the subject of a separate conference or as CES agenda item. Hillenbrand said that thrust of declaration was to treat MBFR as separate subject procedurally since it was regarded as riper for progress at this point. However, forward movement on MBFR might be one of the criteria which could influence NATO Ministers to decide time had come for the multilateral exploratory talks mentioned in the communiqué itself.”

The telegram then summarized Dobrynin’s conversation with Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson on June 9; see Document 26. The cable included the text of the U.S. guidelines or “illustrative points” regarding MBFR that Richardson had handed to Dobrynin:

“A. The objective of mutual and balanced force reductions would be to reduce the level of military confrontation in Central Europe while maintaining the security interest of both sides.

“B. There should be no political preconditions to a mutual and balanced force reductions discussion or agreement.

“C. Reductions would be reciprocal and in agreed quantities over agreed periods of time with the fulfillment of one step as a precondition for the next.

“D. Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the area concerned.

“E. Withdrawals on both sides would be a matter for negotiation on the basis of specific proposals.

“F. Adequate and mutually acceptable verification of mutual and balanced force reductions corresponding to the nature and extent of reductions would be essential.

“Negotiation would take place in a forum and with participants to be mutually agreed.” (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 2, NATO, Vol. IV, June–August 1970, June)
29. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird


SUBJECT

Discussion on MBFR Between Elliot Richardson and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

On 9 June Elliott Richardson lunched with Ambassador Dobrynin and discussed MBFR among other matters (Memcon at Tab B). Mr. Richardson gave Dobrynin a paper on MBFR objectives and guidelines (Tab C), which differ significantly from those agreed to in the 28 May NATO Ministerial Declaration on MBFR (Tab D). He also made substantive remarks concerning the participants in MBFR negotiations, the forces and weapons systems which might be included, and whether there are preconditions to a Conference on European Security and MBFR. Furthermore, he inferred that the definition of “strategic weapons” agreed to in SALT might ultimately exclude forward-based aircraft, IR/MRBMs and SLCMs, and that these subjects might be covered in MBFR talks.

Mr. Richardson’s presentation represents a significant departure from agreed U.S. policy and could harm our position with respect to our Allies and the Soviets on both MBFR and SALT. This presentation was not coordinated with DOD, and, despite our objections, the substance of the conversation was transmitted to USNATO and NATO capitals without any restriction on disclosure of the contents to our Allies (Tab E). (We did not have the full text of the memorandum of conversation when we argued with State against sending out the cable.) Additionally, ACDA and State plan to transmit the substance of the conversation to our Mission in Geneva for guidance or background.

Attached for your signature is a letter to Secretary Rogers (Tab A) registering the concern of DOD and suggesting that no useful purpose would be served by continuing along the lines laid down by Mr. Richardson.

G. Warren Nutter

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1 Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 2, NATO, Vol. IV. Secret.
3 Attached but not printed. Document 28 contains a list of the guidelines.
4 See Document 24.
6 Attached but not printed. Laird did not sign the letter. A note attached to the memorandum reads: “As you’ll note, attached is OBE . . . Gen P’s [?] note states ‘Sec Def covered verbally’ . . . Return to ISA.”
30. **Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon**


**SUBJECT**

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers’ Reply to NATO Ministerial Communiqué

The Hungarian Foreign Ministry handed to Embassy Budapest June 26 four documents\(^2\) that constitute an official response prepared by Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers to the Communiqué of the May 26–27 NATO Ministerial Meeting.\(^3\)

In summary, the Pact documents reinforce 1969 appeals for a Conference on European Security (CES) and reiterate proposals for a CES agenda covering (a) renunciation of the use of force, and (b) expansion of East-West commercial, economic, scientific and technical relations. Additionally, however, the response includes new aspects deriving in part from the NATO Communiqué:

— an additional proposed agenda item would cover establishment by CES of “an organ” to deal with questions of security and cooperation in Europe;

— “reduction of foreign armed forces on the territories of European states” is indicated as an issue that “might” be taken up by “an organ” to be established by CES, or “in any other form acceptable to interested states.”

— cultural relations and environmental issues are indicated to be appropriate for East-West discussion;

— the US and Canada are formally acknowledged, with the GDR, as appropriate CES participants;

— Helsinki is said to have been agreed as the CES site.

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\(^2\) The four documents have not been found. The Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states met in Budapest June 21–22, and approved a memorandum regarding a European security conference. For a summary of the relevant excerpts of the memorandum, see *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1969–1970, p. 24075.

\(^3\) See Document 24.
Initial Appraisal

While attempting to appear forthcoming and devoid of polemics, the Pact response reflects little real advance toward Allied positions:

— the Pact rejects the NATO-agreed position that there must be recorded progress on security issues before multilateral explorations for a conference can be considered;

— Allied willingness to consider under certain conditions establishing a permanent East-West body as a means of embarking upon multilateral negotiations is warped into a proposal for a permanent body or bodies to be set up at CES;

— NATO proposals for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) are echoed for the first time on the Pact record, but there is no assurance that the Pact would seriously pursue such discussions at or after a CES on terms acceptable to the Allies;

— The Allied call for the free movement of people and ideas is ignored;

— Pact proposals for economic and scientific-technical exchanges are designed to commit NATO to steps now to free-up restraints on exchanges.

Next Steps

We propose to consult in NATO with our Allies before responding to the Warsaw Pact proposals. In Allied consultations many may prefer to defer further steps until NATO's December Ministerial Meeting. However, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and probably to a lesser extent the UK and the Netherlands, will likely favor an early and positive NATO reaction, particularly in the light of the indications the Pact is prepared to broach at least the issues related to MBFR. Thus, we likely will face increasing pressures for further movement toward a preparatory conference for a CES earlier rather than later, regardless of progress in other East-West discussions.

William P. Rogers

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
31. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 20, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

European Security

Dobrynin then turned to the subject at hand. He read me a Note Verbale which his government had asked him to transmit to us. The text is as follows:

“In continuation of our exchange of views on the questions touched upon at our meeting of June 10 I would like to say the following to be transmitted to President Nixon.

“The affirmations made in the course of the above meeting by President Nixon and, on his instructions, by you, Dr. Kissinger, concerning the interest of the US in maintaining the territorial status quo in Europe and the absence of intentions on the part of the US to act counter to this or in general to take any steps in the direction of aggravation of the situation in Europe, have been noted in Moscow. Likewise noted in Moscow was President Nixon’s statement to the effect that the US Government recognizes special interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and has no intention to ignore or undermine them due to the unrealistic nature of such a course. Those are, without doubt, realistic judgments.

“Likewise, the Soviet Union is convinced that recognition of the realities that have come into being in Europe, constitute that necessary foundation upon which a stable peace on the continent as well as in the world at large can and must be built.

“An important step on the way to strengthening peace in Europe would be speedy preparation and convocation of an all-European conference on problems of security and cooperation in Europe as proposed by the Soviet Union and other European Socialist countries.

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2 See ibid., Document 168.
“It should be emphasized that the Memorandum adopted by the Governments of European Socialist countries in Budapest on June 22\(^3\) takes into account also the wishes of other possible participants in such a conference expressed in the course of bilateral and multilateral consultations. Taken into account, too, are the wishes expressed by the American side both with regard to participation of the US in the all-European conference and regarding questions to be discussed at the conference or in connection with it.

“Taking into consideration, in particular, the wishes of the US Government the Soviet Government together with the other Governments which adopted the said Memorandum, have come to the conclusion that consideration of the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states would serve the interests of détente and security in Europe.

“In our view, this question could be discussed in a body on questions of security and cooperation in Europe which is proposed to be established at the all-European conference. At the same time we are prepared to discuss this question also in another manner acceptable to interested states, outside of the framework of the conference. Such an approach opens wide possibilities in selecting appropriate methods of discussing this question and takes into account the experience that has already been accumulated in considering outstanding problems of such kind, in particular between the USSR and the US.

“The questions of man’s environment, which the American side is interested in, could be, in our opinion, discussed within item 2 of the proposed agenda for the all-European conference.\(^4\)

“We proceed from the assumption that in view of these clarifications the United States should have no reason for delaying further the convocation of the all-European conference by way of presenting various preconditions. We hope that the US Government will adopt a more constructive position and will thereby contribute to making the preparation of the all-European conference a more practical business.”

I asked what the phrase meant that in connection with a mutual balanced force reduction, an approach “opens wide possibilities in selecting appropriate methods of discussing this question” on a bilateral
basis. He responded that the choice of appropriate forums could be determined after we had agreed in principle. He said he recognized that he owed me some answers to other questions, and they would be forthcoming within the next few weeks. I told him, of course, that I had to check my answer with the President, and I wanted to remind him that I had listed European Security as one of the three topics at our last conversation. I thought the tone of his note was constructive, and we would try to handle our reply in a constructive manner. I would let him know what the response would be.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

32. Minutes of a Combined Senior Review Group and Verification Panel Meeting

San Clemente, California, August 31, 1970, 11:08–11:40 a.m.

SUBJECT
US Strategies and Forces for NATO (NSSM 84)  
MBFR (NSSM 92)

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger  
State  
U. Alexis Johnson  
Martin Hillenbrand  
Leon Sloss  
Defense  
David Packard  
Reginald Bartholomew  
John Morse  
Attorney General John N. Mitchell  
ACDA  
Vice Adm. John M. Lee  
Thomas J. Hirschfeld  
Treasury  
Anthony Jurich

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1970. Top Secret. Printed from a copy with handwritten corrections, which have been incorporated into the text printed here. The minutes are dated September 1, but according to Kissinger’s record of schedule, the meeting took place on August 31. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) The full text of the minutes is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.

2 NSSM 84 is scheduled for publication ibid.

3 Document 21.
Reference is to an ongoing series of studies on MBFR being prepared by an interagency working group. On July 30, Kissinger met with the Verification Panel to discuss progress on the various papers. According to notes from the meeting, Kissinger said: “Today, we will go over in a preliminary way the work done on NSSM 92 and see if we can develop an analytic framework for BFR like for SALT. Idea is building blocks, so we can move from option to option, as with SALT. BFR is more complex. We are not so far advanced in our thinking. The paper work has been done. The Working Group efforts are in two categories: 11 options for balanced force reductions—set aside for time being until get some other considerations; and a series of studies on conceptual problems.” (Ford Library, Records of the National Security Adviser, Program Analysis, Box 6, Verification Panel Subseries)

Reference to a 57-page evaluation report on MBFR, August 26, prepared by the interagency working group on MBFR. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 1969–3/8/72)

See footnotes 2–4, Document 19.

NSSM 92

It was agreed that the Verification Panel Working Group should develop and analyze specific “building blocks” with a view to dealing with individual parts of the problem which might be put together in various options packages. These topics should include:

... tanks,
... tactical aircraft,
... mobilization and reinforcement (including prepositioning of supplies and equipment),
... tactical nuclear weapons, and
... manpower reductions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions—NSSM 92

Dr. Kissinger: We deeply appreciate what the departments and working groups have done on these papers. We recognize that the deadlines have been very short and hope all will agree that the results are worthwhile. The difficulty with the MBFR paper was that it was done in isolation and that some of the concerns were answered in terms of the NSSM 84 study. We could conclude that there should not...
be any discussion of MBFR. It is necessary, however, in view of present political pressures in many countries, and since SALT and Ostpolitik will both have mutual balanced force reductions as their logical conclusions. Also, it is better than unilateral force reductions. It is hard to have realistic schemes without knowing precisely how the military situation is being affected. We have not yet done the type of analysis we did in SALT, in which we took various elements of an agreement and analyzed their implications for our strategic situation. After that analysis had been completed, we put together various packages. In the case of MBFR, we have put together the packages before we have produced the building blocks through careful analyses. As a result, we have a package in which some say this and others say that. We cannot go to the President until we have more carefully defined these positions and have narrowed these disagreements to the smallest amount. We must have a more rigorous and systematic analysis of the various components—tanks, reinforcement problems, warning problems, etc.

Mr. Johnson: An important element is the political context in which this takes place. If there is a reduction in tensions, MBFR assumes a different aspect than in a Berlin crisis. If the political situation develops along positive lines in the next year or two, MBFR will be one thing; if not, it will be another.

Adm. Moorer: Perhaps we should wait for other things to jell before proceeding with MBFR.

Mr. Johnson: We should not wait, but should do the work now to enable us to move ahead on various assumptions.

Dr. Kissinger: We will need a position in time for the December NATO Ministerial meeting. An arbitrary percentage cut is, of course, easiest but we might use the MBFR exercise to assert intellectual leadership and approach the NATO strategy problems in that way.

Mr. Packard: The problems do not relate only to the level of forces—there are other factors. We could negotiate lower force levels, could fix up certain things that need fixing, and have as good a conventional capability as we have today.

Dr. Kissinger: In the SALT analysis we attempted to determine what worried us most. In the present situation, tanks and reinforcement capability worry us most. Could we undertake a separate study—for example, if we limit tanks, how should we do it. We may find that we wish to place some ceiling on tanks when we put a package together. So far we have not done enough homework to do this.

Mr. Packard: I agree the papers are awfully general.

Adm. Lee: We haven’t a sufficient basis for measurement. The options packages are too gross.

Dr. Kissinger: If our tactical air in Europe is highly vulnerable, but if it can also be moved quickly, why is it necessary to keep tactical
aircraft in Europe. If we pull a division out, it would have tremendous political significance. If we pull an air wing out, we might sell it on strategic grounds. A promise to put the air wing back, if necessary, has credibility since it would be for the purpose of protecting our own forces. Since the Europeans are most concerned about ground forces, the withdrawal of an air wing with a promise to return it could be placed in a different political context.

Adm. Lee: These are the kinds of things which should be analyzed with a view to working out tradeoffs.

Adm. Moorer: This could be done, but it would be most important to retain our bases even if we withdrew some aircraft.

Mr. Johnson: We would have to retain bases to make it credible.

Mr. Kissinger: We might want to have more bases in Europe. What could we offer in a tradeoff? Is the high mobility of our aircraft overseas a trade for some things we want them to move out? We need some indication of how we might package asymmetrical cuts. With regard to manpower cuts, we have a good general analysis of the relative advantages and disadvantages of stationed forces and local forces. We need the same kinds of numbers as in the NSSM 84 study. The U.S. and USSR aside, are Western European NATO forces superior to Warsaw Pact forces? The political symbolism is a factor too. We will need more systematic analysis along the lines of SALT, weapons system by weapons system, under asymmetrical cuts. We need to see about tradeoffs. The Europeans cannot object to our doing our homework on what is, in fact, their proposal. Without this analysis, we will be in danger of being driven into one gimmick after another by the pressure of negotiations and will wind up in unilateral reductions. (To Wayne Smith) Is it possible to get that sort of analysis?

Mr. Smith: Yes. We will get agreement on some basic numbers.

Mr. Packard: We should limit this to a few elements and not try for this kind of analysis across the board.

Dr. Kissinger: Agreed. We should focus on tanks and tactical air. The general proposals are there, and the agencies should work together in the working groups to spell them out in more detail.

The reinforcement problem also requires more concrete analysis. Prepositioning of supplies is an important consideration. Who would suffer more from a limitation on the prepositioning of supplies? Do we wish to require that supplies and equipment leave also when troops are withdrawn?

Adm. Lee: It would be easier for them than for us.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this true? Can we come back at all in any meaningful way without prepositioning supplies? Where are we relatively if we move out without leaving supplies and equipment behind?
Adm. Moorer: At a disadvantage. They would reinforce through friendly territory while we would reinforce through hostile territory—waters predominantly occupied by some 350 submarines.

Mr. Packard: We could reinforce for only a few days using C-5A’s and would then have to go to sea deliveries.

Dr. Kissinger: On the assumption that prepositioning of equipment is permitted, how real are manpower cuts?

Mr. Johnson: They would be important in symmetrical cuts.

Dr. Kissinger: I am more attracted to asymmetrical cuts.

Mr. Johnson: So am I.

Gen. Cushman: They will be more difficult to negotiate.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree but, as in SALT, the Soviets may be ready to listen to serious proposals.

Adm. Lee: The situation is more confusing than SALT.

Dr. Kissinger: At least we do not understand it as well.

Adm. Moorer: We understand it, but there is an infinite number of variables.

Dr. Kissinger: We need to get an assessment of: (1) what the reinforcement problem is with regard to prepositioning of supplies and equipment; and (2) how to get on top of the problem through verification means. We should assume that we would get some warning. Have we ever done anything with regard to mobilization in response to Soviet moves—at the time of the Berlin crisis, for example?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, we moved one battalion temporarily for training purposes.

Dr. Kissinger: We did not move anything with the battalion, however.

Mr. Johnson: We may well be reluctant to take measures that might increase tension.

Mr. Clark: We have had some success in determining the degree of Soviet mobilization.

Dr. Kissinger: If the system is extremely sensitive to our reaction to a detection of Soviet mobilization, then such reaction may magnify tensions. However, the record of our reaction to mobilization isn’t very good.

Adm. Lee: We can’t tell whether the mobilization of one division makes that much difference.

Adm. Moorer: It is a symbol of intent, however.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We did build up at the time of the Berlin crisis.

Mr. Kissinger: That was in response to a political situation and was not necessarily a reaction to Soviet mobilization.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It also reflected a change in military doctrine.
Dr. Kissinger: We need an analysis of the countermeasures that would be required to react to whatever we pick up on Soviet mobilization. In SALT the amount of the violation would be so large and it would take so long, that we could react. If the violation were small, however, and it would require a massive U.S. movement to offset it, we should know it. If the tanks go out and then come back in, and we learn about it, what do we do with the information. I believe this is the direction in which the study should go. Does anyone else have any ideas.

Mr. Johnson: I think this is a good approach.
All agreed.
(The meeting adjourned at 11:40 PDT)

33. Editorial Note

On August 31, 1970, after the morning meeting on NSSMs 84 and 92 (see Document 32), the Senior Review Group (SRG) met again in the afternoon in San Clemente to discuss NSSM 83 on European security. The meeting focused exclusively on Berlin and West German Ostpolitik; there was no substantive discussion of a European security conference or mutual and balanced force reductions. For the minutes of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 111.

At the meeting the SRG discussed a paper prepared by the Department of State, “A Longer Term Perspective on Key Issues of European Security,” which dealt mainly with Ostpolitik and Berlin. For excerpts, see ibid., Document 110. The full text of the paper is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), SRG Meeting Files, Senior Review Group, 8-31-70, European Security.
34. Memorandum of Conversation


PRESENT WERE

The President
Secretary General Manlio Brosio
Dr. Kissinger
Ambassador Ellsworth

I. Brosio opened the conversation by stating that the Alliance’s main problem at the moment is the problem of U.S. force levels. A unilateral cut, other than in an MBFR context, would be disastrous. The President interjected that he appreciated that and agreed with it.

Brosio went on to say that there were three points he would like to make in connection with the question of US force levels:

a. First, he thought it was important to stress, politically and publicy, the possibility of serious discussions on MBFR—quite apart from any tie or link with the possible Conference on European Security—as a way to hold force levels against unilateral cuts.

b. Second, Brosio felt that the AD–70 exercise, which he had instituted in response to the President’s foreign policy report of last February, would provide a rationale for the Europeans to maintain and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 467, President’s Trip Files, Presidential European Trip, MemCons, September 27–October 5, 1970. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. In a backchannel message to Kissinger, September 19, Ellsworth wrote: “For more than a year now, the Alliance has been in the throes of trying to decide how to handle Warsaw Pact proposals for a CES. Throughout the debate we have taken an extremely reserved position, arguing that the proposals, if accepted, would strengthen the international position of the GDR and split the alliance.” Ellsworth noted he had prevented an “unseemly rush to an early and unstructured conference, but pressure from our more détente-minded allies (particularly the Scandinavians and Benelux) has pushed NATO ever closer to agreement to begin ‘exploring’ the possibilities of a CES with the East.” Ellsworth noted: “Brosio is personally opposed to a CES, and has done what he can to slow things down.” (Ibid., Box 466, President’s Trip Files, Presidential European Trip, Vol. I)

2 The Defense Planning Committee of NATO commissioned a study in May 1970, “Alliance Defense Problems for the 1970’s,” known as AD–70, to discuss the problems the Alliance would face in the next decade, determine priorities for the Alliance, and propose solutions.

3 On February 18, in his First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, Nixon stated: “In choosing a strategy for our general purpose forces for the 1970’s, we decided to continue our support for the present NATO strategy. And the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense announced at the NATO Council meeting in December that we would maintain current U.S. troop levels in Europe at least through mid-1971. At the same time, we recognized that we must use this time to conduct a thorough study of our strategy for the defense of Western Europe, including a full and candid exchange of views with our allies.” See Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, p. 129.
even possibly increase their military support and readiness for the Alliance strategy, which would also provide a modern rationalization for keeping forces at an appropriate level of strength; and

c. Third, Brosio felt that the Europeans should be pushed, and pushed hard, to do their best, not only in terms of picking up some of the financial burden as far as US forces were concerned, but also and primarily, to improve their own military efforts—and Brosio hoped this would help the President keep U.S. forces strong in Europe.

II. In response, the President said that we would welcome MBFR—that is what we have to say politically, especially in Europe. With regard to a possible Conference on European Security, such a Conference would not be useful for us, although we have to agree to hold it. Pending the development of MBFR, however, there can be no reduction of NATO forces, the President added, because that would leave us with nothing to bargain. Meanwhile, the Soviets keep increasing and improving their strength in Europe, so we cannot cut. Any force reductions in Europe must be mutual.

III. On burden sharing, the President said that we would welcome budgetary sharing but of course it could not be put on a mercenary basis. Actually, it would be better for the Europeans to increase the readiness of their own forces. In the final analysis there would have to be a combination of effort from the Europeans, with primary emphasis on increases in European military efforts—although, of course, as both he and Brosio know, the Germans represent a special case for a variety of reasons.

The President said that, as far as actual cost sharing is concerned, the main significance of that would be political not military.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
35. **Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff**

Washington, undated.

**European Security Conference**

*Current Situation*

The Soviets have long proposed a conference designed to ratify the status quo in Europe, including the permanent division of Germany and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Until recently, however, their proposed agenda has avoided all concrete issues and dealt with such matters as economic cooperation and renunciation of force.

We and the NATO allies have taken the view that a conference at some point may have a role but that it is pointless and dangerous if it is held and results in failure. NATO in Brussels with our participation has been attempting to identify concrete issues that might be dealt with. The problem is that the real issues between East and West in Europe relate to Germany and these are being negotiated separately. Lately, the idea has gained ground that the question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) might be a subject to be discussed and the Soviets in their latest proposals suggested that a conference might set up a commission which could negotiate the reduction or withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe (an old Soviet staple). Our own studies are still in process and it is proving extremely complex to come up with options or packages that would be (1) realistic given Soviet geographic proximity and our remoteness, (2) negotiable, and (3) leave NATO with forces with which to conduct a rational strategy.

(Note: The idea of a conference has also been advocated by Romania which believes that the mere existence of an ongoing negotiating forum would afford it additional protection against Soviet pressure or attack; the Romanians also have the idea that somehow the conference could be used to vitiate the Brezhnev Doctrine. Tito, as you recall, was rather cool to the idea [though Yugoslav diplomats have also...)

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 71, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko 1970. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Kissinger sent the paper to the President as an attachment (Tab C) to an October 19 memorandum preparing the President for his upcoming meeting with Gromyko.

2 Nixon underlined the sentence, beginning with the words “the real issues.”

3 Nixon underlined “question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).”

4 Nixon underlined “extremely complex to come up with” and the three points.
advocated it strongly) unless there was careful preparation and a very concrete agenda.)

Gromyko may

— start by accusing us of dragging our feet;
— note that the Soviets of course would have no objection if we and Canada participated;
— claim that the very holding of a conference would improve the atmosphere;
— note that the Soviets have no objection to eventual talks about mutual reductions in foreign forces.

You may wish to say that

— you have no objection in principle to a conference and we have not made special efforts to prevent it;
— you do believe that conferences of this kind should not be held for their own sake but deal with concrete issues and have some promise of success;
— simply to talk about more trade and exchanges seems unnecessary because other forums already exist for that;
— each of us should take a careful look at the question of mutual force reductions and then determine whether some negotiating effort is worthwhile.

(You may wish to refer to Tito’s comments to you.)

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5 Nixon visited Yugoslavia September 30–October 2. Tito apparently spoke with Nixon about a European security conference on the night of September 30; no record of this conversation has been found. For documentation on Nixon’s visit to Yugoslavia, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Documents 220–221. Brackets are in the original.

6 Nixon underlined “accusing us of dragging our feet.”

7 Nixon underlined “Soviets of course would have no objection.”

8 Nixon underlined “the very holding of a conference would improve the atmosphere.”

9 Nixon underlined “objection in principle to a conference.”

10 Nixon underlined “kind should not be held.”

11 Nixon underlined “but deal with concrete issues and have some promise of success.”

12 Nixon underlined “seems” and “other forums already exist.”

13 Nixon underlined “mutual force” and “and then determine whether some negotiating effort is worthwhile.”
36. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 22, 1970, 11 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State

USSR:
A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

European Security Conference

Mr. Gromyko inquired about the attitude of the United States Government toward the idea of convening a European Security Conference. He did not know whether the President had had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Soviet proposal to call such a conference. The substance of that proposal was to call a conference of all European states, as well as Canada and the United States, in order to see if there was a chance of improving the relations between various states in Europe in the interests of a political détente. The United States had said that it favored such a détente, and so had the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he had the impression that the U.S. was somewhat apprehensive in regard to the ESC. It should be clear that any decisions adopted at such a conference would be joint decisions, taken in the interests of all the states concerned. There was no question of trying to impose a one-sided solution on any state during this conference. For this reason, he believed the U.S. apprehensiveness was quite unfounded. According to information he had received, the United States seemed to be bringing its influence to bear on some other countries, to discourage them from taking a positive attitude toward the ESC. He wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union had no intention of trying to claim the major credit for calling such a conference, that it was the position of the Soviet Government that a détente in Europe, which

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could result from the ESC, would benefit all interested parties and the world as a whole.

The President wanted to tell Mr. Gromyko quite directly that in our view the success of such a conference would depend primarily on the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko’s impression that we were trying to discourage the convening of the conference was incorrect. We took the position that for the successful conduct of a conference it would be necessary to sit down and explore an appropriate agenda. By saying that the success would depend on our two countries primarily, he did not mean to speak of a condominium of the two powers in Europe.

Secretary Rogers remarked that there was no point in having a conference unless we could foresee what results would likely be achieved. In this respect, our Berlin negotiations could serve as a good indicator. If we could make progress on the question of Berlin, the prospects for a European conference would improve. But, if no progress was achieved on Berlin, what would be the purpose of holding another conference?

Secondly, we were not too sure that the Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Powers\(^2\) had indicated a willingness to discuss reduction of military forces in Europe. Was the Soviet Union suggesting that this question be included on the agenda of a European Conference? With respect to reduction of forces, what did the Soviet Union mean by foreign troops? Did this include Russian troops in Eastern Europe? Mr. Gromyko replied that in the Soviet view, it would be better not to consider military questions at the European Conference. We could agree, however, that if some kind of a body—perhaps even permanent—were created at the European Conference, this body could discuss the question of troops. The Soviet Union would be agreeable to such a procedure. As for the term “foreign troops,” it had been meant to include Soviet troops as well.

President Nixon remarked that a Soviet-American understanding on primary issues, such as SALT and Berlin, would have a beneficial influence upon any possible conference of European states.

Secretary Rogers said that if complex questions were to be excluded from discussion at a European Conference, it was difficult to see what could be accomplished. In brief, if we could foresee the achievement of positive results, we would be interested. If not, we would have doubts about the usefulness of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko said we could not ignore the fact that for 25 years the Soviet Union had discussed disarmament questions in the United Nations with the United States, and with other countries, without

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\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 30.
being able to find any solutions. For this reason, the question of disarmament and force reduction was not perhaps quite suitable for discussion at an ESC. Should a body be created by that conference, however, he would have no objection to force reduction being discussed in that body. The President said that in principle we were not opposed to the conference. We would be in favor of it if preliminary discussions showed that it would be helpful.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

37. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, November 19, 1970, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense
George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
George P. Shultz, Director, Office of Management and Budget
Amb. Robert F. Ellsworth, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
John N. Irwin II, Under Secretary of State
Philip J. Farley, Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. Edward David, Science Advisor to the President
Col. Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Dr. K. Wayne Smith, NSC Staff
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting: NATO & MBFR

\[1\] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals 1970, 1 of 3. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:09 a.m. to 12:12 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
[The meeting began with a briefing by Director Helms on the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance in Europe.]

President Nixon: The assumption used to be that any war in the NATO area would escalate automatically into general nuclear war. That was the view in the old McNamara period. Is there an estimate now in the NATO area that there is less chance of escalation to nuclear war?

General Goodpaster: The estimates are much more qualified now.

President Nixon: I really don’t see why. It seems more likely that they might use nuclear weapons now.

General Goodpaster: Our capability for assured destruction against the Soviets is very high.

President Nixon: But what about the risks we would take if we do that?

General Goodpaster: The Soviet attitude seems to be this. Since the Cuban missile crisis, they have a much more sobered view of the risks to them of a high-intensity provocation of the U.S. The same is true in Europe; they have shown more inhibition than before. The Europeans are convinced of this; they see the U.S. assured destruction capability as inhibiting the Soviet use of their MRBM’s or IRBM’s against Europe.

President Nixon: But Americans are more afraid than previously.

[Director Helms resumes his briefing with a discussion of MBFR.]

President Nixon: Are there any questions of Director Helms?

Director Lincoln: What is the view of the NATO countries on the results of a nuclear exchange?

General Goodpaster: They haven’t any positive views. They are sensitive to the location of our nuclear weapons in our forward bases, particularly those countries where our forward-based Tac Air are located.

Acting Director Farley: The Soviets are concerned in SALT about our forward-based aircraft. They want to limit them in the agreement.

Secretary Laird: Only a few of them can reach the Soviet Union. The F–111’s will increase the number, however.

Admiral Moorer: The Soviets don’t distinguish between tac-nucs and strategic weapons if they are landing in the USSR.

President Nixon: Henry? Could you review the issues?
Dr. Kissinger: I want to emphasize two basic points:

First, at the height of the period of American nuclear superiority, the Europeans always asked us for a tangible guarantee of our commitment. They wanted U.S. forces to be stationed in areas we considered vital. Thus even during the period of the massive retaliation doctrine, we had large American conventional forces in areas where a nuclear thrust was most plausible. Thus, secondly, we were trying to give our forces a military role and our allies wanted them to have a political role—for them it was not so much a military role as a role in eliminating the threat of general nuclear war.

The problem now is to work out what objectives we seek and can achieve with these forces. We want to avoid any actions which would lead our allies in the direction of neutralism but we also want to avoid a situation in which our forces exist there but without any viable strategy.

Thus we did a comprehensive study and we found the following:

—NATO is within reach of a capability to defend against large-scale Soviet conventional attacks.
—They—the Soviets—have a faster capability for mobilization than NATO.
—There is a serious supply imbalance.
—An important consideration is our intelligence capability and our ability to make quick political decisions. If they get a two-week jump, they have a big advantage.
—Whether NATO wants to close the gap is a question.
—There is also the fact that we know more about what goes on in East Germany than in Western Russia, and that is a problem.
—If we can get warning and can react quickly, we can do reasonably well.
—The best-equipped of our forces are deployed in the Southern NATO area, whereas this is not the likely major attack route. That is also the location of our major supply backup.
—If the President wants the Alliance to have a substantial conventional capability in Europe, it is within reach. The Allies can and should move. If the gaps are not closed, then we should look at other alternatives which would make the forces we have there relevant.
—We have large tactical nuclear weapons storage in Europe. How would they be used? Would it help in defense? Would it be an irrevocable move toward strategic war? We have improved our command and control procedures. But the study we did could not develop a clear picture of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
—Against this background we looked at MBFR. Tactical nuclear forces have an important bearing in this area.

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The tentative conclusions of the MBFR study are the following:

—Symmetrical reductions favor the Warsaw Pact, unless they are so small as to be purely symbolic.
—Ideally, reductions should favor the defense over the offense in order to reduce the incentive for attack.
—Thus we should look at asymmetrical reductions. We are now doing so, in order to develop trade-off packages. These analyses are not yet sufficiently advanced to make recommendations.

The basic guidance needed is what strategy you wish to pursue.\footnote{The study was discussed at a combined Senior Review Group and Verification Panel meeting, October 28. The minutes of the meeting list the following summary of decisions: “It was agreed to: 1. Get an estimate of what needs to be done to remedy the supply situation so as to bring our NATO allies up to the level required to permit an indefinite conventional war, how long it would take and how much it would cost; 2. Get an analysis of the meaning of a 60-day supply concept for us and for our allies in terms of number of forces, combat capability, cost, and the nature of the deterrent; 3. Study the various ways of looking at the problems of use of nuclear weapons in Europe; 4. Get an analysis of the ways in which the situation would be affected by a 10 percent symmetrical reduction, a 30 percent symmetrical reduction and asymmetrical reductions, including the military costs and benefits, if any; 5. Get an analysis of the various elements of an MBFR agreement, similar to the SALT analysis, and their verifiability.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1970) The full text of the meeting minutes is scheduled for publication in \textit{Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.}}

If we depend on our strategic nuclear forces, then the question of American forces in Europe is not so relevant. But if our forces are geared to an intermediate objective, we need a doctrine for the use of theater nuclear weapons. If we think the nuclear threat is diminishing or if we want our forces on the continent for political reasons, we still need a strategy which makes them militarily relevant if their continued deployment is to be supported by the American people, the Congress and our allies. We need then to make the improvements that we have discussed.

Our approach to MBFR is then cast in the light of our decisions.

Secretary Rogers: The word “balanced” in MBFR means they have to be balanced. That is the key. Balanced does not mean symmetrical. Secondly we must not negotiate under time pressure. It is clear that the Soviets are not thinking about negotiations. It’s a convenient way to delay a European Security Conference which we don’t want. And we should not move to unilateral reductions. We have to decide whether we want to reduce unilaterally—I am against it. Our policy of keeping them there is sound. Our forces are essential to the security arrangements in Europe and to the credibility of our policy. Unilateral reductions would concern our allies and lead them to seek deals with the USSR that would be harmful to our security.

We should not decide anything on MBFR now. We should continue to study it. But we should give a clear signal to our allies that we
intend to keep our forces there and will not unilaterally reduce them. But we should make clear that they need to do more; that is important for our Congressional attitudes.

Secretary Laird: The primary objective of our military strategy is to give the President a choice other than between losing Western Europe and going to an all-out strategic exchange. Our strategy has to give us more than a few days of conventional defense. We need a conventional force which is a major deterrent—and that involves a tactical nuclear capability.

We have to depend more on our allies’ contribution if we are going to have this posture. The allies don’t want to recognize this. Their assumption is that the U.S. has a sufficient deterrent so that any conventional attack means an inevitable strategic exchange. This idea has permeated allied thinking. We must get the allies to see that things have changed. They can afford it and so can we. Their GNP is a third greater than the Pact’s; their manpower is equal to that of the Pact and the USSR. We have to provide for sufficient forces to assure a conventional deterrent.

I don’t think the paper faces up to the manpower, fiscal and political problems that we face in the United States. NATO problems are fortunately handled by the right Congressional Committees; we have these commitments before the Armed Services Committees which are favorable to the Administration.

It is important to talk about capabilities, not specific numbers. We should talk not about specific numbers of personnel or items of equipment—we should talk about capabilities. The allies have the ball in their court; they are for the first time discussing ways in which they can share the burden and increase their own forces. They admit they are not sharing the burden properly. Schmidt is discussing in the UK now; Carrington will be here next week. They are pressing each other. Our contribution has increased annually over the last ten years, and this is not the case for most of the allies.

Ambassador Ellsworth: The trend of the thinking in the NAC ministers’ meeting is this: There is increased awareness by the allies of the changed nature of the strategic balance. There is increased awareness of the need for a local conventional balance. The Allied study (AD–70)\(^6\) has got them thinking of the need for improved and increased efforts in specific areas to make meaningful a viable conventional strategy. The trend of their thinking, therefore, is toward a real conventional defense strategy, and the defense ministries want to support this.

\(^{6}\) See footnote 2, Document 34.
There must be follow-up both in NATO and in governments. We need a shift of focus in the NATO organizations and in governments toward conventional forces and the related budgets. This should be the glamour side now, not the nuclear side.

Our presentation must be that US force levels are tied to our strategy. I hope all of us will relate to the basic questions of our strategic objective and to the political facts, rather than to our own budget process.

President Nixon: Are you selling the Senators? [to Ambassador Ellsworth]

Ambassador Ellsworth: I’m not sure they’ve been sold but I’m making strong efforts.

Secretary Laird: There have been many statements by the Parliamentarians. They unanimously favored financial assistance to ease the US burden of keeping our forces there. Rivers brought them along. Vinson has been pressing Armed Services on the grounds that because the Germans are agreeing with the USSR, we should make substantial reductions.

President Nixon: The key to what we do is what effect does it have on Germany. Isn’t it possible that reductions could result in the opposite reaction by the Germans? Some Europeans would think to move toward the Russians because they are uneasy about more US reductions. Will we reassure them if we retain our forces, or will we shock them into doing more by reducing ourselves?

Ambassador Ellsworth: I agree that reductions would push them toward the Russians.

Secretary Rogers: I agree with Ellsworth.

General Goodpaster: Brandt will accelerate his policy if we reduce. If the other party comes in, it would be unpredictable.

Secretary Rogers: Some in the German government would want to move more toward the USSR, and a move on our part to reduce our forces would play into their hands. If we stay firm we can keep Brandt firm; otherwise we can’t.

Can we set up a group like the NPG for conventional forces?

Secretary Laird: It’s being discussed by the DPC.

Secretary Rogers: Can we move faster?

Ambassador Ellsworth: We need to set up machinery to follow up on the AD–70 study.

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7 Representative L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

8 Former House Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
Secretary Laird: We will do this at the next meeting.
Secretary Rogers: Unilateral reductions would be wrong.

Secretary Laird: The manpower problem has a serious effect on our strategy. The FRG has a short-term draft and is moving in the direction of a shorter term of service. This has a bad effect on readiness.

President Nixon: Andy, how do you see the problem?

General Goodpaster: Mr. President, the work we have done is substantial. It’s ten years since we have had a real NATO policy. There is promise now that the Europeans see they need to take on more of the burden and improve their own forces. This has gotten to the political levels now.

Much of the ammunition and POL is common. They know we have stocks and they have planned to use them. We should press them to increase their own stocks. Given our assumptions about the length of a war, it would be unsound to make the decision not to provide uninterrupted support for our forces. Reserve stocks of Soviets remains a major question. We don’t know what they have beyond 30 days even though their facilities exist far beyond this. 60 days is not a finite limit. You would ration to extend this on both sides in practice, but this means the forces are less than fully effective.

We shouldn’t forget that there is a normal process of adjustment of forces. New systems come in and make some forces redundant and permit some reductions.

Let me say something about the strategy question we’ve been discussing and the role of nuclear weapons. Our strategy is more concrete than just a doctrine of flexible response. It is based primarily on the deterrent but it cannot be divorced from our actual defense capability. It is a strong deterrent based on a limited defense capability, at medium risk and medium cost. A full conventional defense capability would be a low-risk/high-cost strategy. A high-risk/low-cost strategy would be the tripwire approach.

A limited defense capability means the following: At present, we have a high prospect of success against small-scale or limited attacks. That is important.

Against a full-scale sustained attack, we have a limited capability in time. We just can’t say how long we could hold exactly but we expect we could hold for a significant period but not indefinitely. But we are not even certain of that. The crucial factors are not assessable—like leadership, the direction of attack, etc.

What about the tactical nuclear option? We have a near full capability, probably superior to the Pact’s. But the outcomes are rather murky; our requirements are based on the premise of destroying the enemy order of battle. Escalation is always possible but perhaps unlikely
because of the strategic deterrent. Soviet officers have an acute sense of the importance of protection of the homeland. Assured destruction is always the back-up which supports the other elements of the strategy.

We have some problems. One is redeployments. A change of boundaries to the north would probably result in having fewer Belgians forward. On tactical nuclear weapons, there are divisive problems here. The Europeans want to see nuclears used but on the Green Belt theory, i.e., on territory that is not their own. On the question of theater use of nuclear weapons, the first concept is selective use to meet the local situation with the maximum possible constraint. Many of the above aspects of this strategy would be the subject of debate if we wanted to make them more explicit.

We need to hold firm.

The consensus seems to be that we must keep our conventional forces in SACEUR. The fact that the Russians are looking both ways—they have even more divisions on the Chinese border—adds validity to this imperative.

Director Lincoln: We would have less of a danger of having to use tactical nuclear weapons if our conventional force are stronger.

President Nixon: It is clear from the discussion that any strategy without a credible deterrent would mean the Soviet domination of Europe. In the 1950s massive retaliation and the tripwire approach were valid. When in the 1960s we accepted nuclear parity, it became no longer credible that a conventional force attack would result in a tactical or strategic nuclear attack—but at the same time it is not now credible that a conventional attack could be met with a purely conventional response. Under these circumstances, if the deterrent is credible we must have nuclear parity and also a significant conventional capability in which we are an important part. If we are without that capability, the Soviets could move.

This discussion must center on the effect on the Germans of what we do. Their response will not necessarily be rational; probably it will be emotional. They are a vigorous people, denied the use of their own weapons, who will make a deal with whoever is Number One. If they reach the conclusion that the U.S. is withdrawing, they will go into a psychological frenzy.

It is not insignificant that the Russians always emphasize that they think they are superior to the US in nuclear forces. They say this to get France, the UK, Germany and Japan to have doubts about the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and also to show who is Number One. We lose leverage as Number Two. We know the facts but we want to emphasize them to those who don’t know them. So no one should concede that the USSR is ahead. We should point out, as we do, that they are moving ahead with SS-9s and nuclear subs—but we should stress
that our overall strength is sufficient. Otherwise we are in a dangerous position with the Japanese and the NATO allies, particularly the FRG.

We need to rethink our whole NATO strategy. We never will use the tactical nuclears, but we let the USSR see them there. Without a credible conventional force that can hold for 90 days or more, the Russians could be tempted.

General Goodpaster: This is why we should press on making improvements and not debate about reductions. Confidence and standing firm is the keynote. The note of readiness to act and to act affirmatively is important to our allies.

Mr. Packard: We can’t do this with lower budgets.

President Nixon: I know that.

[The meeting adjourned.]

38. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
MBFR and the NATO Ministerial

The Current Commitment

At the Rome meeting in May we took a fairly large step forward in issuing a separate statement on MBFR. This statement invited interested states to hold exploratory talks on MBFR in Europe, with special reference to the Central Region. Further, we agreed that in such talks we would put forward the following considerations:

—MBFR should be compatible with vital security interests, should not operate to the disadvantage of either side.
—Reductions should be based on reciprocity, and a balance in scope and timing.  
—Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems.
—There must be adequate verification and controls etc.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-049, SRG Meeting, MBFR, 11–23–70. Confidential. Sent for information.
Following the “exploratory” bilateral talks, the Alliance would then determine what further individual or joint exploration might be useful. The overall exercise was directed toward “developing in detail the criteria and objectives” for substantive negotiations to follow “at an appropriate stage” and “in a forum to be determined.”

The Pact Response and the Exploratory Talks

On June 24, the Warsaw Pact responded by finally picking up MBFR in the context of their proposal for a European Security Conference. But they did so only by including on the Conference agenda a discussion of the question of establishing an “organ to deal with question of security and cooperation.” In this context, they proposed a discussion of “reduction of foreign armed forces in the territories of European States,” but this item would be taken up by the organ proposed to be established at the ESC.

After some preliminary sparring, the Soviets confirmed that “foreign” meant non-indigenous, rather than non-European (e.g., American, Canadian). But the Soviets in all the bilateral conversations have continued to resist strongly MBFR as a separate and distinct negotiating issue and forum.

It must be noted, however, that the Soviets, over the summer and fall, have made some progress in softening up opposition to the European Conference, not only by this formal proposal on MBFR (which is especially attractive to the British who dreamed up the permanent organ) but also to the French, when Pompidou was in Moscow, to the Germans in connection with the Moscow treaty negotiations, and most recently when Gromyko was in Rome. Moreover, the Soviets have pressed hard for “preparatory” talks on CES, including the Finnish proposal for an Ambassadorial tea party.

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3 See footnote 2, Document 30.
4 Gromyko visited Rome November 10–12.
5 In a November 18 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt summarized for Kissinger a conversation that he had held with Ralph Enckell, Finland’s Roving Ambassador on European Security: “He [Enckell] explained the latest Finnish idea, which is to hold a ‘gathering’ of Ambassadors in Helsinki to talk about a conference. The theory is that this might serve as a catalyst, and only in this way could one really know if there was any prospect for a more formal meeting that might have a chance of success. He reports growing enthusiasm, except for British coolness, and, he implied, American skepticism. He stressed that his effort was not at Soviet behest, and in fact, reported that the Finns during Kokkonen’s visit to Moscow had to warn the Soviets off of embracing the Finnish idea lest Soviet endorsement turn it into a Warsaw Pact proposal. He said the Finns would soon send formal notes with their proposal to all interested states.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 673, Country Files, Europe, Finland, Vol. I)
A related development that will be important at the Ministerial in December, is the shift in the German position on both CES and MBFR. The Germans now have formally informed us and NATO collectively that they want to see progress not only in Berlin but on the inner German modus vivendi as well before moving ahead with any multilateral preparations for a European Conference. They have also said that while there should be no strict preconditions for MBFR, they now want only to continue bilateral contacts on MBFR, and should multilateral contacts later seem to be worthwhile, to decide on the basis of the political atmosphere prevailing at the time whether progress on the Berlin talks, the inner German talks, and the SALT discussions revealed a genuine preparedness by the East for negotiation.

This in effect, puts some major conditions on moving ahead on MBFR; if this is your inclination, it is manna from heaven.

—There are some hookers, however.
—The Germans also want to endorse the specific idea of cuts in stationed forces, provided the reductions are linked to reductions in indigenous forces in a later phase.
—Most of the Allies are going to be favorable in this last proposition (indeed many want to go much further because they want to appear responsive to the Warsaw Pact).

The Issues

In light of the post-Rome developments we seem to face the following issues:

1. **Do we want to maintain MBFR as an issue distinct and separate from a European Security Conference?**

—The overwhelming sentiment in NATO is to maintain the separation; but we should recognize that sentiment for a European Conference is gaining ground little by little, and if there is no MBFR because of Soviet resistance for another 6–12 months or because of our lack of preparations, there could be a shift in favor of putting MBFR squarely on the CES agenda and going to a conference on this condition only.

2. **If we maintain a separate MBFR, do we want to remain general in our commitments and endorsements, or move to a more specific and defined approach, such as emphasizing a negotiating position on stationed forces?**

—This issue, of course, is related directly to the work we have done in NSSM–92. If we want to opt for a strictly political approach, we could have it with no trouble in the Alliance; indeed if we do not want it one task will be to stonewall against the easy political gesture.

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If we want to study further the corrective approaches, it follows that we do not want to go beyond the commitments in the Rome meeting. We must face up to the fact that in so stalling MBFR, we will have to be willing to obligate ourselves to take the lead in NATO studies, and this means turning over to the NATO Working Group a major input from what we have done so far (in a sanitized version) and making another input later in the early spring before the May Ministerial. By then we will have to have a negotiating proposal.

3. Assuming we decide to remain general in our approach and to continue studies, do we, nevertheless, want to move from bilateral to multilateral contacts:

—At first glance the answer would seem, clearly, no; moving to multilateral “contacts” is close to beginning substantive negotiations and we are not ready.
—On the other hand, willingness to move in this direction might pacify many of the smaller NATO members and give them a role; it might force the Soviets to respond, if that is really what we want.
—On balance it would seem imprudent to open the door to multilaterals.

In sum, I assume your game plan would be along the lines that follow:

—MBFR as a separate issue, mainly to counter pressures within and outside the Alliance for the Grand Conference.
—A general commitment to continue with our studies, but no new definition of principles or new specific MBFR proposals. The Germans are now pressing for a “building block” approach in the internal NATO studies, and we could join them in this approach as the opening wedge to a corrective proposal. On the other hand, many of the smaller NATO allies want to dump all asymmetrical studies, while the British have put in a tentative paper on reduction of foreign (stationed) forces.

In short, the NATO model building exercise has all but collapsed as it should have.

—On this basis, continuing bilateral explorations, but no multilaterals, perhaps considering the German formula which poses further conditions to multilateralization.

The bureaucratic problem is that State and ACDA will argue that we must be forthcoming. They will say there is a rising tide for more active movements, that we have been footdragging, that the Europeans want a political approach, that we should also, since asymmetrical is non-negotiable. All of this is justified by détente.

Frankly, I doubt that MBFR is all that urgent (that also seemed to be the view at the NSC on November 19). Most Europeans will be so

7 See Document 37.
pleased and dazed by our NSSM–84 posture\(^8\) that MBFR will recede into the background for a time. I suspect that the real problem will come when the Soviets, learning the outcome of our NSC deliberations, will finally wake up to MBFR and begin making their European Conference a prime forum for MBFR.


### 39. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

Military [\textit{Mutual}] Balanced Force Reductions

**PARTICIPATION**

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

\textit{State}

John N. Irwin

George Springsteen

Leon Sloss

Seymour Weiss

\textit{Defense}

David Packard

G. Warren Nutter

John H. Morse

Philip A. Odeen

\textit{CIA}

Richard Helms

Bruce C. Clarke

\textit{JCS}

Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles

Col. Robert E. Fiss

\textit{ACDA}

Philip J. Farley

David Linebaugh

\textit{NSC Staff}

Mr. Sonnenfeldt

Dr. Smith

Mr. Hamilton

Col. Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals 1970. Top Secret; Codeword. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. In a memorandum for the record, November 25, Nutter and Morse summarized the meeting. They concluded: “The meeting was relatively short and seemed designed primarily to convey the message that we should go very slow on MBFR, for the time being at least.” (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 16, NATO, Vol. VI)
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. to form a Working Group, with CIA chairing and representation from DIA, to analyze our ability to monitor an MBFR agreement and whether and how our intelligence capabilities should be strengthened for this purpose; this group would compile our sources of information, the kind of information we get and the kind we need;

2. to develop an illustrative plan, or the elements of a plan, for asymmetrical cuts;

3. that, at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting, we would approach the question of MBFR informally on an exploratory basis, express our interest in the matter, stress the need for clarification but avoid being too specific or taking any substantive position;

4. to examine the political procedures for mobilization in various countries to determine how quickly our allies could be expected to act on receipt of warning of mobilization by the other side.

Mr. Kissinger: This will be a brief meeting to review where we stand on MBFR and agree where we go from here. We have identified a number of approaches: 1) an approach that is basically political; 2) an arms control approach which attempts to preserve or enhance our military position through asymmetrical cuts. I have the impression from our work on NSSM 84 and the NSC meeting that there is a general consensus that symmetrical cuts of any significant size are not very desirable from the security point of view. The only symmetrical cuts that would not be undesirable would be so small as to be symbolic, and even these might run counter to attempts to improve our posture. This leaves us with an attempt to develop an asymmetrical approach. Conceptually an asymmetrical approach represents a tough problem. Contrary to the SALT exercise, we have developed no criteria for comparison—we have no yardsticks. Nor have we worked out questions of collateral restraints, either symmetrical or asymmetrical. Our biggest problem is related to the mobilization date. Ideally, we should develop constraints designed to give maximum warning or to impede mobilization and reinforcement. We haven’t yet worked out what specific constraints would be most effective. (to Mr. Helms) We haven’t had a systematic analysis of how our intelligence capabilities could be strengthened to help us monitor an agreement. This is a tough problem.

Mr. Helms: I agree that this should be done for MBFR in the same way as it was for SALT, but I don’t know how long it would take us. We have only taken a swat at it in big chunks as I indicated in my NSC briefing—we have determined that we can do this better than that with current resources.

Mr. Kissinger: I have an NSC staff paper which discusses our intelligence capability in East Germany and in Western Russia. We seem
to be fairly well off in East Germany, but very poorly off in Western Russia.

Mr. Helms: I agree.

Mr. Kissinger: At what point could we relate the situation in Western Russia to movements in East Germany, particularly if they restrict the travel of foreigners so we do not have reports of troop trains moving, etc?

Mr. Helms: We did an exhaustive study of the intelligence aspects of the move into Czechoslovakia. That would help some.

Mr. Kissinger: Did they restrict the travel of foreigners at that time?

Mr. Helms: I think not but I'm not sure.

Mr. Springsteen: They put some restrictions on in East Germany.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Wayne Smith) Let's get a working panel to work on this, chaired by CIA with DIA representation.

Mr. Packard: That's a good idea. Also, we have some new capability which we are looking at as an independent matter.

Mr. Kissinger: [2 lines not declassified]

General Knowles: It gives us a general idea.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a compilation of all the sources of our information, what sort of information we get and what sort we need. For example, I noticed a reference to the fact that if the Soviet forces were returned to the Moscow and Kiev Military Districts this wouldn't help us. Why would it not help us somewhat to have Soviet forces moved 1000 miles back? Why would it be necessary for them to go beyond the Urals? I can see the relationship of a move 1000 miles back by the Soviets to a 3000 mile move by the U.S., but it should help some. (to Wayne Smith) Let's get this compilation.

Mr. Irwin: At least we would get an idea of the time span of our uncoverage.

Mr. Helms: The idea of a task force is first class.

Dr. Smith: Has anyone done any work on the recent Warsaw Pact exercises in this regard? We could learn something from it.

Mr. Packard: We have done some work but nothing very detailed.

Mr. Kissinger: We must try to be as concrete as possible. For example, we speak of troops being disbanded. Do we mean that these troops would go into reserve status; would their weapons be destroyed; if not, where would their weapons be moved? We must know what we are talking about. We can't hold our allies together if we start down this road on the basis of abstract discussions.

Mr. Packard: We can't get this done before the NATO Ministerial Meeting.

Mr. Irwin: No we can't. There are two important considerations in that connection: 1) the Secretary would like to go the Ministerial with
some flexibility in the sense of being able to take a positive position but not indicating either a symmetrical or asymmetrical approach; he would like to take the third position (in the State Department paper on specific issues for the NATO Ministerial Meeting)\(^2\) in which he would refer to the June Budapest Memorandum and indicate our willingness to discuss reductions but not their kind or extent; and 2) he would like to be able to exchange studies with our allies.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we should go further with our own studies before we start exchanging them. In SALT we knew what we were talking about. It would not have been wise to exchange some of our preliminary drafts.

Mr. Irwin: I agree. We can say we will exchange information with our allies but give no indication as to the timing.

Mr. Packard: I think we could take a very informal approach in the initial stages. We could exchange ideas but not get to specific proposals. We need time to develop anything we could feel secure about.

Mr. Irwin: I have some question as to whether we would be better off with symmetrical or asymmetrical cuts depending on whether asymmetrical cuts were negotiable.

Mr. Kissinger: Everything depends on what is negotiable.

Mr. Irwin: I am talking only about the elements of the packages. We have no packages.

Mr. Kissinger: I haven’t seen any asymmetrical plan so I don’t know how we would do it. I think the agencies should come up with an illustrative scheme or at least the various elements of a plan and see how they might be put together. They would not be committed to anything. Some studies indicate that a fixed percentage cut favors the offense and those with more rapid mobilization capability. This, of course, is the USSR. We have two problems: 1) symmetrical cuts of any significance don’t appear too promising for us; and 2) cuts so small as to be meaningless might inhibit real improvements that might be within reach. I haven’t seen enough on asymmetrical cuts to make any judgment.

\(^2\) The paper, “Outline of MBFR Issues,” forwarded to Kissinger by Eliot on November 23, stated: “There are four hypothetical alternative policies the US could adopt with respect to treatment of MBFR in the NATO Communiqué: 1. Retreat from previous Communiqué language which had put NATO on record as favoring MBFR in principle; 2. Reaffirm previous NATO positions on MBFR without advancing beyond them; 3. Refer to the June Budapest Memorandum and indicate Allied willingness to discuss reductions in stationed forces as a first step in MBFR, to be followed by reductions in indigenous forces; 4. Put the Allies on record as favoring MBFR entailing, say, a small, perhaps 10%, cut in stationed ground forces in a specified area.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)
Mr. Irwin: If it should develop that asymmetrical cuts are non-negotiable, we could be better off with straight percentage cuts.

Mr. Kissinger: We might be better off with no cuts in these circumstances.

Mr. Irwin: There is some difference between no cuts and the political advantage of symmetrical cuts. State tends to feel that symmetrical cuts might be advantageous politically.

Mr. Kissinger: The Secretary denied State was thinking of symmetrical cuts.

Mr. Irwin: State is leaning toward that possibility.

Mr. Kissinger: We would have to define what our political position is.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Secretary may have taken that line as a way to defend against the European Security Conference idea. The Russians say that MBFR has to come after ESC.

Mr. Kissinger: But that doesn’t mean we have to have symmetrical cuts.

Mr. Farley: There is an important difference between preparations for MBFR and for SALT. SALT was a bilateral exercise, and MBFR involves our allies. NATO has been studying MBFR for a year or more. Some of these studies aren’t bad, but I think they need some input from us to keep them more realistic. Some people say MBFR undercuts any move to get force improvements.

Mr. Kissinger: I am only talking now of various proposals on purely political grounds, saying we should weigh the political gains against the political losses. On grounds of security, we must make sure we know what we are talking about. I agree that it is much harder to do militarily than was SALT.

Mr. Farley: If we wait until our studies are perfect we will be in trouble with our NATO allies.

Mr. Irwin: I think we should proceed along the lines Mr. Packard suggests. We could be responsive to any suggestion for discussion of reductions, initially on an exploratory basis.

Mr. Packard: We could approach it informally without being too specific. We could sound out our allies.

Mr. Kissinger: I have observed that all European leaders who have visited us have been worried about Ostpolitik but no one was willing to say so. I don’t want to get ourselves in a position where everyone is worried about MBFR but no one will say so. Someone has to say what he thinks. Let’s be sure we don’t lock ourselves in on something we don’t understand. It’s all right to explore ideas, but there is a tendency to create a degree of momentum which gets us locked in. Why
could we not stick with the Rome position? Why should we go beyond it?

Mr. Springsteen: A head of steam has been built up, primarily by the Germans who floated a specific proposal in NATO which they said had been cleared by their Federal Council. Basically it took our third position (in the State Department paper) of responding to the Budapest declaration. We would be willing to explore bilateral reduction of stationed forces, but the Germans say that such discussions would be linked to subsequent reductions in indigenous forces. They had hoped to hold off their proposal until they knew our views, but had decided to surface it so it could be considered at the December Ministerial.

Mr. Kissinger: What would happen if we stuck with the Rome language? Who else wants the German proposal. Do the French?

Mr. Springsteen: The French are ambivalent about it. They might associate themselves with it if it were strictly bilateral. It is the smaller countries, with the exception of the Netherlands, who support it. The Germans are pushing this because they believe if we want to hold the Rome position on ESC we should be prepared to give on MBFR.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Springsteen: To keep the allies in hand. We can expect increased pressure at the Ministerial.

Mr. Kissinger: And we could keep them in hand by being forthcoming on MBFR? I have a summary of attitudes of the NATO countries: two countries—France and Greece—are not interested in MBFR; five countries—Belgium, Portugal, UK, Turkey, Netherlands—will stick with the Rome position; three countries—Canada, Denmark, Germany—welcome the third position—reference to the Budapest Memorandum and indicate willingness to discuss reductions in stationed forces, followed by reductions in indigenous forces; and three countries—Iceland, Luxembourg, Italy—have no position. I don’t consider that this is a steamroller to force us beyond the Rome position which was, in itself, an advance.

Mr. Packard: We shouldn’t go much beyond the Rome position. We can express interest, stress the need for clarification, avoid being too specific too soon, and keep the issue open in a constructive way.

Mr. Weiss: Why can’t we let the Europeans take the lead in this?

Mr. Irwin: I agree. We can leave the issue open and see what happens. The Secretary doesn’t think this will become a real issue for a long time.
Mr. Packard: Let’s not make it an issue.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s be sure we don’t create a record that will let the other side say we are committed to anything. We would live to regret it if we should do it to keep a few countries happy.

Mr. Irwin: We have to be prepared, though. We may find more pressure in the meeting for ESC or for some indication that we are not rejecting the Budapest position.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We could say the Budapest Memorandum is in response to the Rome communiqué and that we need more clarification of its meaning.

Mr. Kissinger: We need to develop some of these packages. Also, we have always assumed that if we had one week’s warning of mobilization by the other side we would know what to do. We shouldn’t take this for granted, but should look at the political procedures for mobilization in various countries and determine how quickly our allies could be expected to act.

Mr. Irwin: I agree. The problem is not our intelligence indicators but what happens after we have the information.

40. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to President Nixon 1


SUBJECT

Positions to be Taken at December Ministerial Meetings

We were informed in NSDM 95 of November 25 2 that you wish to review positions to be taken by the United States at the December 1970

2 NSDM 95, “U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO,” November 25, stated with regard to MBFR: “The President also has decided that the United States should continue to give general support to the concept of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. Further studies of MBFR, both within the U.S. Government and in NATO, will be necessary to provide a realistic evaluation of approaches (particularly asymmetrical force package approaches) to MBFR which would operate to maintain or enhance NATO’s military security relative to the Warsaw Pact. Until these studies have been completed by the Verification Panel and reviewed by the President, the U.S. shall assume no commitments as to specific elements of a formal MBFR proposals or agreement.” The full text of NSDM 95 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
NATO Ministerial meetings with respect to US strategy and forces for NATO, and mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).

By separate memorandum (copy enclosed), the Secretary has sent to you for approval a personal message from you to the NATO Allies for use during the forthcoming Ministerial meeting in stating the US position on future US force levels in Europe and on the Alliance’s study on defense problems for the 1970’s.

Concerning MBFR, the Secretary plans to take the following approach, looking toward further probes by the Allies of Soviet interest in moving toward meaningful relaxation of tensions by again urging the Warsaw Pact in the Ministerial Communiqué to join early East-West exploration of possibilities for MBFR:

—note that the Warsaw Pact has finally responded to NATO MBFR Proposals by saying they were prepared to discuss the reduction of “foreign armed forces” on the territories of the European states, but that they are insisting such talks come only after a CES.
—affirm US concern that CES would prove an unwieldy forum for any eventual negotiations on MBFR, which is why we have preferred to envisage discussions prior to CES in a more limited framework, while not ruling out eventual broader discussions.
—call for rejection by the Allies of the idea of discussing MBFR only after a European Security Conference and state that we should again urge Pact members to agree to engage in exploratory MBFR talks next year.
—if others favor this, concur that in the MBFR exploratory talks NATO members should indicate a willingness for MBFR negotiations initially to cover stationed forces, and later embrace indigenous forces.

U. Alexis Johnson

3 Attached but not printed.
4 On November 30, Kissinger responded in a memorandum to Johnson: “The positions set forth in your memorandum of November 27 relating to MBFR and CES have been reviewed in accordance with NSDM 95, and have been approved for use at the Ministerial meeting.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 260, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IX)

41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, December 5, 1970.

SUBJECT
NATO Ministerial Meeting

The December 2–4 NATO Ministerial meetings were characterized by a new degree of Allied unity, a realistic reading of East-West détente possibilities, and a re-affirmation of the need to maintain and improve Allied conventional defense capabilities.

There was universal appreciation for your statement affirming U.S. intent to maintain forces in Europe at current levels in the absence of reciprocal reductions and given a similar approach by our Allies. The decision by most European members of the Alliance on a long-term burden-sharing program reflected a recognition by our European allies of their responsibility to do more. Indeed, I sensed at the meeting an enhanced degree of understanding with us, based at least in part on Europe’s rising confidence in itself and in NATO’s prudent policies of the past two years.

The meeting concluded with a strong communiqué which is compatible with our policies and objectives in the European area. For the immediate future there is unanimity that the touchstone of future progress toward détente is the Berlin negotiations. Should these reach

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2 Held in Brussels.
3 The Ministers of the North Atlantic Council stated in their final communiqué of December 4: “The Council received a statement from President Nixon which pledged that, given a similar approach by the other Allies, the United States would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and would not reduce them except in the context of reciprocal East-West action. Ministers expressed their profound satisfaction at the reaffirmation of Alliance solidarity expressed in this statement.” See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974, p. 245.
4 The final communiqué reads in part: “They affirmed the readiness of their governments as soon as the talks on Berlin have reached a satisfactory conclusion and in so far as the other ongoing talks are proceeding favorably, to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments to explore when it would be possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences, on security and cooperation in Europe. In this event, the Council would give immediate attention to this question.”
a satisfactory agreement, there will be increased pressure to move towards a European Security Conference.

On mutual and balanced force reductions we are agreed to continue to seek exchanges with Eastern Europe. The NATO proposal is to discuss a balanced reduction of “stationed” forces as an integral program including indigenous forces and to do so through bilateral “exploratory talks” now. (The Warsaw Pact had talked about “foreign” forces, had not referred to any balance, and had sought to defer discussions until after a security conference.)

Mediterranean security was discussed by both Foreign and Defense Ministers, and there was general recognition of the need to improve NATO’s presence there.

Many Ministers spoke highly of the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society. It is now solidly launched, and its action on oil-spills marks a tangible achievement widely praised in Europe.

The meeting also provided me opportunities to talk to the Greeks and the Turks. I urged the former to impress on the Prime Minister the need to move more quickly to return to constitutionalism. The Turk indicated that his Prime Minister had postponed visiting Washington until he secures legislation on controlling opium production.

My German, British and French colleagues joined me in a constructive discussion of Germany’s Eastern Policy and on Berlin. We all affirmed that it was up to the Soviets to be forthcoming if agreement on Berlin were to be achieved.

William P. Rogers

5 In the communiqué, the NATO Ministers “reemphasized the importance” of “mutual and balanced force reductions as a means of reducing tensions and lessening the military confrontation in Europe.” They noted that the Warsaw Pact countries “did not directly respond” to the Reykjavik (1968) and Rome (1970) Declarations of the NAC; instead, the Eastern countries “mentioned the possibility of a discussion at some future time of the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European states.” The NATO Ministers “renewed their invitation to interested states to hold exploratory talks on the basis of their Rome Declaration, and also indicated their readiness within this framework to examine different possibilities in the field of force reductions in the Central Region of Europe, including the possible mutual and balanced reduction of stationed forces, as part of an integral program for the reduction of both stationed and indigenous forces.”
42. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Soviet Reaction Against December NATO Meeting

As reported in the attached memorandum from Secretary Rogers (Tab A), Ambassador Dobrynin handed us a Soviet aide-mémoire on December 28, criticizing NATO, and especially the US, for impeding détente in Europe. Specifically, the Soviets are complaining about measures taken at the recent Ministerial meeting to strengthen NATO militarily. More important, they come down hard against NATO’s linking progress toward a European security conference with a Berlin agreement, and other ongoing East-West talks. In familiar fashion, the Soviets present their anti-linkage position, terming insistence on “preconditions” as “unsound method of conducting international affairs.” They contend they are ready to proceed now, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, with preparations for a European conference, citing again the Finnish proposal for preliminary consultations in Helsinki. Finally, Moscow tries to single out the US from other NATO allies and implies that, contrary to the spirit of your recent conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko, we are preventing progress on European security.

Undoubtedly meant to express general Soviet displeasure with what they see as a US brake on Ostpolitik and pressure on them to be forthcoming in SALT and in the Berlin negotiations, the Soviet paper seems mainly directed at influencing the policies of our European allies. As the Secretary observes, the Soviets want to establish a case against us. During the past week, Soviet ambassadors have delivered similar representation—either orally or in writing—in five other NATO capitals. The North Atlantic Council has already taken note of the various Soviet approaches and will be coordinating allied responses. The British have already replied in terms close to our own. We expect our other allies will do likewise, adhering to the terms of the NATO communiqué.

The Secretary gave an oral response to Dobrynin when he delivered the Soviet note, reaffirming our interest in a Berlin agreement and

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2 Rogers’s January 5 memorandum is attached but not printed.
3 See Document 36.
arguing that the Soviets have not been very forthcoming in the negotiations. He also took exception to the Soviet portrayal of our attitude toward a European conference, and your interest in making progress on European security. In a subsequent talk with Dobrynin, Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand also took a firm line. State is planning to draft a formal written reply to the Soviet démarche.

4 In telegram 21169 to Moscow, December 30, the Department summarized the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin on December 28: “Secretary took exception to statement’s portrayal of U.S. attitude toward a CES. Secretary noted we and our allies place great emphasis on satisfactory negotiation of talks on Berlin and progress in ongoing negotiations in evaluating prospects for productive East-West contacts. USG’s interest in promoting European security found full expression in President’s special message to NATO Council meeting. Among other things, President noted that there must be reciprocal East-West action in measures taken to advance mutual security. Secretary also emphasized our continued interest in mutual and balanced force reductions as a means of lessening military confrontation in Europe.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 261, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. X, Part 3)

5 In telegram 3105 to Moscow, January 8, the Department reported that Hillenbrand told Dobrynin that the “decision taken at Brussels NATO ministerial meeting on East-West relations was unanimous” and that “draft language setting forth linkage between a possible CES and progress on Berlin and other ongoing negotiations was basically formulated by two NATO countries known for their independent policies. U.S. accepted proposed draft and did not participate in any arm-twisting exercise, literally or figuratively.” Dobrynin then “queried Hillenbrand on U.S. reaction to Finnish proposal calling for multilateralization of contacts in Helsinki. Hillenbrand said that Finnish proposal was only one variant of a formula for proceeding with multilateral contacts. When and if time comes to proceed into this phase, Finnish formula may prove to be best available, but no decision has been taken on this matter as yet.” (Ibid.) Regarding the Finnish proposal, see footnote 5, Document 38.

43. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Memorandum from Secretary Rogers to the President Reporting USSR Démarche on European Security

Secretary Rogers has sent the President a memorandum reporting on Dobrynin’s oral statement of March 17 on a European Security Conference.²

—The statement called for immediate preparatory steps: agreement on an agenda and a date.³

—It argues strongly against linkage, and accuses us of blocking a European conference.⁴

The State memorandum notes that this is the most specific Soviet proposal we have had for beginning preparations for the conference. The aim is to keep the notion of a conference alive to demonstrate Soviet initiative at the Party Congress, and to play on continuing European interest in a conference.

This current note, however, does not seem to be much more than a pro forma exercise, which the Soviets are more or less obliged to engage in as a follow up to the Warsaw Pact meeting of mid-February.⁵

If the Soviets were really interested in a conference, their most effective tactic would be to respond on MBFR, which would have a great appeal in NATO. The fact that they have not even alluded to it since last June,⁶ suggests that despite their protestations they in fact accept the Berlin linkage as the precondition to the conference. Indeed, they may prefer to see Berlin settled and the German treaties on the way to ratification in order to keep German issues entirely separate from an atmospheric conference.

In any case, with the NATO Ministerial two months away, discussion in NATO of a conference is picking up again. I have just cleared

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² Attached to Rogers’s March 23 memorandum is an oral statement on a European security conference that Dobrynin gave to Hillenbrand on March 17; both attached but not printed.

³ Rogers wrote in his attached memorandum to the President: “The Soviet statement proposes movement forthwith to meetings leading to the convening of CES. The Soviets claim that several matters are not disputed (relaxation of tension as the aim of CES, Helsinki as the site, the attendance of all European states plus the US and Canada) and could be agreed on immediately; then agreement on an agenda and on a date could be negotiated. Or, they say, all of these questions could be decided simultaneously.”

⁴ Rogers wrote in his attached memorandum to the President: “On the polemical side, the statement’s main thrust is against the West’s linkage of CES with an agreement in the Berlin talks. All sorts of linkages are possible, the Soviets say—for example, ratification of the FRG-Soviet and FRG-Polish Treaties would help the Berlin talks—but making linkages merely hinders progress towards détente.” Rogers stated: “We find the Soviet statement a logical but heavy-handed development of their argument for a Conference and their attempt to portray the US as blocking movement in that direction.”

⁵ The Warsaw Pact’s Foreign Ministers met from February 18 to 19 in Bucharest. A brief summary and analysis of the communiqué from their meeting is in telegram 30094 to USNATO, February 22, in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 4 WARSAW PACT.

⁶ See Document 30.
a long State instruction for Ellsworth’s use,7 which gives him something to say on how we might go about the exploratory and preparatory processes for a conference after there is a Berlin settlement. (As you recall, Berlin was put up as a pre-condition for a conference at last December’s Rome [Brussels] NATO Ministerial Meeting.) This is all rather academic as of now but the allies all want to be busy and we can only exercise control over the internal NATO studies by saying something ourselves. At the Lisbon Ministerial in June the communiqué will stand essentially on the same formula, even though some of the smaller countries would like to dilute the pre-condition from “satisfactory solution” to “progress.” Our paper outlines extended careful exploratory and preparatory phases, with enough flexibility to back away should the project look distinctly to our disadvantage. I will send you a copy of the State instruction as soon as we get a clean copy of it.

Recommendation

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President at Tab A.8

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7 Telegram 49306 to USNATO, March 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 261, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. X)
8 Document 44.

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44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1


SUBJECT

New Soviet Pressures for a European Security Conference

While calling on the Under Secretary of State on another matter recently, Ambassador Dobrynin presented an oral statement on the need for further movement toward a European Security Conference (Tab A).2

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2 Attached but not printed. See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 43.
The main points were:
—sufficient agreement exists on such broad issues as the need to relax tension in Europe that preparatory discussion for a conference should begin immediately;
—an agenda and date could be negotiated, or all of these questions relating to preliminary steps and preparations could be agreed simultaneously.

This is the most specific proposition from the Soviets for early talks which would be clearly identified as preparatory to a general conference. Much of their presentation, however, is in the form of arguments against NATO’s current policy of linking any movement toward a conference to a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin negotiations. The Soviets argue strongly against such pre-conditions, and accuse us of opposing a conference.

It seems that this is a rather routine Soviet effort to keep alive the notion of a conference and keep some pressure on the Europeans (who received similar notes) to reduce pre-conditions to a conference. In fact, the Europeans are uneasy about sticking to the agreement that Berlin must be settled first of all. Some now talk of “progress” on Berlin as a sufficient prerequisite for a conference.

The next NATO Ministerial Meeting in June will have to deal with some problems of the conference issues if Berlin is settled. We are engaging the Allies in more discussion to point up the many problems that have to be dealt with not only in terms of procedures, but also in terms of substance. We will also discuss in the Senior Review Group some of the issues that we foresee arising following a Berlin agreement.

45. National Security Study Memorandum 121


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT

June NATO Ministerial Meeting

The President wishes to have a meeting of the National Security Council before the Lisbon NATO Ministerial meeting to review the major issues that are to be considered. The President desires, in particular, to examine the status of work on East-West relations in progress within the NATO framework, as well as developments in the area of NATO defense since the last Ministerial meeting. U.S. strategy and force guidance for NATO remain as set forth in NSDM 95.2

In the preparation for the NSC meeting, a paper should be submitted setting forth (1) the major issues expected to arise at Lisbon, and (2) problems requiring decision, including recommendations or choices, where appropriate. The paper should discuss our objectives and highlight any important Allied differences. It should also outline the problems that will have to be dealt with after the Lisbon meeting.

The NSC IG/EUR, constituted appropriately in the discretion of the Chairman, should submit the paper to the Assistant to the President for preliminary consideration in the Senior Review Group by May 1.

Henry A. Kissinger


46. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT

Verification Panel Meeting on MBFR: Tactical Issues

In your discussion at the Verification Panel meeting you should not be diverted to the tactical issues of the relations of MBFR to CES and Berlin,

though State is actively interested in this issue. We will handle these
questions in the study of issues arising at the June NATO Meeting;
NSSM 121\textsuperscript{2} is scheduled for the SRG on May 13.

To clarify the state of play, the following is where we stand on
MBFR and CES:

—Our position, previously supported in the Alliance, is that MBFR
is a separate issue, worthy of being pursued independently of a CES
and Berlin. This has been the Alliance position.

—However, there is growing feeling in the Alliance that MBFR
should also be included on CES agenda, in order to give a conference
some real substance. This is the German position, and they have gath-
ered near unanimous support in NATO.

—We have not fallen in with this position, though State feels that
we will probably have to at some point.\textsuperscript{3}

—All of this, however, has so far not weakened NATO’s precon-
dition of a “Berlin settlement” prior to CES. (The definition of a “Berlin
settlement” may erode.)

—The danger may be that if Berlin is hopelessly deadlocked or
drags on, or is only marginally improved, the Soviets will use Alliance
interest in MBFR to overcome the Berlin precondition to a CES.\textsuperscript{4}
Recent Soviet statements point in this direction.

\textsuperscript{2} Document 45.

\textsuperscript{3} In a letter to Laird, April 12, Rogers wrote that at the Lisbon NATO Ministerial
meeting, June 3–4, “we should agree with the current FRG suggestion that the Allies pro-
pose that MBFR be included on any CES agenda. As you know, the Allies have main-
tained MBFR on a track separate but parallel to CES, in anticipation of the possibility
that MBFR might be discussed before a CES was convened. So far the Warsaw Pact has
disnoted to our willingness to explore MBFR. With a satisfactory resolution in the
Berlin talks we are likely to be under strong pressure to proceed to early multilateral
East-West exploratory talks, looking toward CES. At that time the two tracks of CES and
MBFR will cross. We believe most Allies would wish to address MBFR in general terms
at CES, looking toward negotiations later in a more suitable forum.” (Ford Library, Laird
Papers, Box 4, NATO, Vol. VII)

\textsuperscript{4} On April 21, Laird replied to Rogers’s letter of April 12: “I have serious reserva-
tions about whether a United States proposal to link MBFR and CES in the manner sug-
gested is necessary to accomplish these ends. It is not clear to me that the CES and MBFR
tracks will inevitably cross with the conclusion of a Berlin agreement. It is conceivable
that we could discuss MBFR before we reach agreement on Berlin. Even after a Berlin
agreement, it is still not clear that the tracks will cross, and I think it is desirable to work
to keep discussion of these issues in separate forums.” Laird suggested that “given the
Alliance position on the Berlin precondition to CES, it seems to me that a CES–MBFR
nexus could make it more difficult for us to resist pressures for undesirable concessions
on a Berlin agreement from those Allies favoring MBFR. If we did stand firm in such a
case, we would then be seen to be resisting progress on MBFR as well as on CES.” (Ibid.)
47. Editorial Note

On April 21, 1971, Wayne Smith of the National Security Council staff wrote President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger: “A Verification Panel meeting on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe is scheduled for Friday, April 23, 1971, at 3:00 p.m. The meeting will focus on two broad problems:

—The desirability of choosing now a basic approach to MBFR for further development and, if so, either the ‘military’ approach sponsored by DOD or the ‘political’ approach advanced by State;

—The position on MBFR to be taken by the U.S. in NATO and the probable NATO consensus with the Warsaw Pact. The basic issue here is whether or not the U.S. wants to go along with a ‘political’ approach to MBFR (see below) and, if not, what steps need to be taken to protect our options.”

Smith wrote that the new evaluation report on MBFR “represents a substantial extension and refinement of our earlier work arising out of the November 23 Verification Panel meeting.” He continued: “Given these improvements in our analytical approach, I believe that this report represents a comprehensive and basically sound evaluation of the full spectrum of possible MBFR agreements including both the asymmetrical and mixed package options that you found interesting. As you would suspect, however, there are some strong bureaucratic differences on the MBFR approaches outlined and their evaluation.” He noted: “State/ACDA are wholeheartedly committed to a ‘political’ approach involving small symmetrical reductions designed for ease of negotiability. They probably will press at the meeting for a decision on an approach. DOD, particularly the JCS, are more interested in ‘military’ approaches emphasizing assistance [asymmetrical?] or mixed reduction packages.” Smith summarized: “Thus, there are very strong and well-established differences of views within the bureaucracy on MBFR that will, I believe, be surfaced at the meeting. Given the strong momentum in NATO for proceeding with a ‘political’ approach to MBFR, similar to that sponsored by State, I think that there is a real danger that we will be locked into an MBFR position in NATO that may not be consistent with the President’s wishes unless some action is taken. Your choices are:

—To let State and our Allies proceed but be prepared to act forcefully if and when action becomes necessary, i.e., after a Berlin agreement or initiation of CES.

—To attempt to exercise leadership over the NATO MBFR effort to maintain Alliance flexibility. Since our evaluation of the security problems involved is better than the Alliance’s, its transmission to NATO could reopen the issue along the substantive lines we support.
“Clearly, the first alternative—continued State leadership—should be avoided, and both Hal Sonnenfeldt and I feel it may be desirable to go further than in the past in exercising active leadership over the NATO MBFR effort while preparing a more detailed formulation of 3–5 most reasonable MBFR packages.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–008, Verification Panel Meeting, MBFR, 4/23/71)

The minutes of the Verification Panel meeting, April 23, include the following “summary of conclusions”:

“The Working Group would make a new analysis of the comparative impact of reductions, assuming a lag [less than 1 line not declassified] in NATO mobilization;

“The Working Group will try to answer some of the questions raised in this meeting in terms of some specific options: e.g., two types of symmetrical reductions; two types of asymmetrical reductions, including common ceilings; and one or two mixed packages. These options should include the collateral restraints that would be required to overcome disadvantages to the NATO forces. They should also include consideration of our nuclear weapons.

Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting


SUBJECT

June NATO Ministerial Meeting

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

CIA

Richard Helms

Peter Dixon Davis

ACDA

Philip Farley

State

U. Alexis Johnson

George Springsteen

Ronald Spiers

Defense

Armistead I. Selden

Brig. Gen. Harrison Lobdell

Lt. Col. Edward O’Connor

JCS

Vice Adm. J.P. Weinel

Capt. R.A. Kamorowski

NSC Staff

Col. R.T. Kennedy

William Hyland

Wilfred Kohl

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

John Court

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

1. the IG for Europe will prepare a paper on what strategy we want to follow with regard to a Conference on European Security, including the question of permanent machinery;

2. the IG will do a paper on a negotiating scenario for MBFR;

3. an NSC meeting on the NATO issues will not be necessary; they will be dealt with in a memorandum to the President.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. In a briefing memorandum of May 10, Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger: “The main issues are: (1) Can we continue to hold the position that a ‘satisfactory’ Berlin settlement is the precondition to a Conference on European Security? (2) Assuming our conditions are met, what are our objectives in a CES, or in any other East-West negotiations such as MBFR. (3) What steps are needed now and after the Lisbon meeting to move toward the kind of negotiations that would be most in our interest. (4) In light of the preceding considerations how do we handle current tactical issues, of which the main ones are (a) how specific a signal to give on MBFR negotiations, (b) the linkage, if any, between negotiations on MBFR and multilateral exploratory talks leading to CES; (c) whether to press the concept of establishing East-West machinery as one result of a CES; and (d) how to handle issues on the current putative CES agenda.” (Ibid., Box H–057, SRG Meeting on NSSM 121, NATO, 5/14/71)
Mr. Kissinger: The principal purpose of this meeting is to go over the issues which will come up at the NATO meeting and to decide whether an NSC meeting is necessary.

Mr. Johnson: We have no differences on the issues.

Mr. Kissinger: I see no major issues. I originally thought we would need an NSC meeting but it now appears we can handle it in a memo to the President.

Mr. Helms: The issue is pretty thin for an NSC meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: We also have Brezhnev’s statement on MBFR. Are our allies reasonably content with our position that a satisfactory Berlin agreement is a precondition for a Conference on European Security? Is there any pressure to break the linkage, particularly since there has been no obvious progress on Berlin? When are they meeting next?

Mr. Springsteen: They are meeting in London Monday and Tuesday.

Mr. Kissinger: And our position will be to maintain the linkage between Berlin and CES. Do we expect any challenge?

Mr. Springsteen: No. The only cloud on the horizon is the confusion over what went on with regard to CES when Schumann went to Moscow. We do not have a full reading on his conversations, but we do have two conflicting press versions—one saying he maintained the linkage and another indicating that he did not. It’s probable that Schumann said more to the press than he did to Gromyko. We think the linkage will prevail, however.

Mr. Kissinger: There would be a problem if an agreement were reached on Berlin and the eastern treaties should fail in the German Parliament. Barzel has told me he would vote against a treaty. What about the other condition—that “other on-going talks” were proceeding favorably? I’m not sure what that means.

Mr. Springsteen: Before the NATO Ministerial meeting last December the Germans said there could be no CES without a satisfactory outcome on Berlin and in the inter-German talks. Harmel added “other

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2 See Document 49.

3 In his memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt stated: “NATO’s position is that a ‘satisfactory conclusion’ of the Berlin talks is a precondition to moving into multilateral exploratory talks on CES. All of the Allies are currently content with this linkage, but there is some restiveness over the possibility of prolonged Berlin negotiations or failure.” Sonnenfeldt added: “It would seem to be clearly in our interest to strengthen or at least hold the line, since we gain some leverage in the Berlin talks from the apparent Soviet desire for a CES.”

4 May 17–18.

5 Schumann visited Moscow on May 7.

6 Rainer Barzel, chairman of the opposition CDU/CSU faction in the West German Parliament, the Bundestag.
on-going talks” to the Berlin condition to head off a more specific condition from the Germans. There is a split within NATO on this. Some people want to get rid of the condition, or convert it to language on the “general atmosphere.” We think there is some merit to keeping the present wording, since removing or changing it could be interpreted as a signal of some sort. We won’t take the lead on this, though.

Mr. Johnson: Could they think it refers to SALT?

Mr. Springsteen: We have clearly indicated that it is not SALT.

Mr. Helms: Then it’s a mystery as to what it does refer to.

Mr. Kissinger: If it’s not SALT and if the internal German issue is wrapped up, who else is negotiating?

Mr. Johnson: It has no meaning.

Mr. Kissinger: It may have some advantage in keeping the Russians on their toes. Am I correct in saying that we don’t know to what it refers, but if someone proposes that we drop it, we won’t oppose it?

Gen. Lobdell: By leaving Berlin as the only precondition, are we putting pressure on the quadripartite powers to bring Berlin to a conclusion?

Mr. Kissinger: The biggest pressure on this comes from the Germans, not the allies. Would we apply this to the preliminary discussions of the Ambassadors in Helsinki—that there would be no discussion of CES before a Berlin agreement?

Mr. Springsteen: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming Berlin is out of the way and we are moving toward a CES, do we know what we want to accomplish? There are two issues: (reading from Mr. Sonnenfeldt’s memo)

—“the principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of forces;

—the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment.”

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7 Sonnenfeldt wrote in his May 10 memorandum: “There is widespread Allied acceptance of a ‘hortatory’ CES that will be largely devoid of substance. If we wish to shift to a more substantive concept and approach, we probably have to begin to do so at the Lisbon meeting and continue hereafter. Otherwise, we will continue drifting to a Conference that will yield high dividends to the Soviets and produce almost meaningless atmospherics for us. —The Allied attitude is that a conference is ‘inevitable,’ depends only on a Berlin settlement, would serve a useful purpose in domestic terms, would be useful in reducing tensions, and consequently, the range of issues will necessarily be narrow.”
Since we won’t go to a conference such as this to attack the Soviets, isn’t it a meaningless psychological exercise?\(^8\) Won’t it make it harder to make progress in NATO?

Mr. Springsteen: There is a risk that it might create a state of euphoria which would make holding the allies together that much more difficult.

Mr. Kissinger: There are a number of things we could do. We could make it a damage limiting operation; we could try for a series of conferences on specific items; or we could take it more seriously and wrap it up with MBFR, which is the only real issue.\(^9\)

Mr. Johnson: The Soviet concept is that the Ministers get together, say nice nothings and appoint sub-groups to do any work.

Mr. Springsteen: That’s the French position on procedure. The Soviet desires are clear. They want a renunciation of force agreement, recognition of the status quo in Europe, an opening wedge for increasing economic and cultural contacts with the West, and creation of a sense of euphoria for what divisive effect it can have.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t see this as a major issue now, but we need to know what strategy we want to pursue on CES. Let’s ask the IG to do a paper taking another look at CES in the light of the Soviet Party Congress.

\(^8\) In his May 10 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger regarding the two potential issues at a CES: “As you can see this approach would probably be a disaster. Principles governing state relations can either be an affirmation of the political/territorial status quo, or, as currently viewed in some NATO quarters, as means of belaboring the Soviets for Czechoslovakia. Almost certainly the Allies will not go to a conference to assail the Soviets, so we will end up with the slightly disguised non-aggression type declaration. As for the other issues—economic, cultural, environment, freer movement—they are only marginally related to European Security. We, of course, cannot oppose them; indeed, we are the leaders in promoting the ‘freer movement’ idea. But these questions simply conceal the fact that there is no substance to a CES.”

\(^9\) Sonnenfeldt listed three “broad choices” for CES in his May 10 memorandum. The first choice, he wrote, was “A damage limiting operation: Largely proceeding on the present path, recognizing the vapid content of a CES, and trying to avoid further meetings or concessions to the Soviets. It may be that this is all that we can reasonably expect or hope for, given the European mood. An attempt to add more hard substance could cause major problems, if interpreted in the Alliance as a US effort to block the actual conference.” He continued: “2. Alternatively, we could try to narrow any conference or series of conferences to specific items such as cultural exchanges, or a conference solely on economic relations, or a conference only to launch MBFR, etc.” As a third option, he wrote: “Finally, we could take the position that in any such conference it had to deal with the issues of military security. This would mean linking the MBFR issue to CES, perhaps as the initial order of business (more on this below). It would also mean that the declaration of ‘principles,’ etc., should include some concrete measures, perhaps in the field of constraints on troop movements, maneuvers, observers—in this way using the declaration as part of the move to MBFR.”
Mr. Johnson: Okay.

Mr. Kissinger: How about MBFR?

Mr. Johnson: We will have to take account of the Brezhnev statement. It will obviously be a subject of discussion at Lisbon. How do we handle it? We should do some probing—send our Ambassador in to find out what the statement means.

Mr. Springsteen: A possible scenario would be to discuss it with the allies in Brussels, while we probe bilaterally with the Russians to see what the statement means. Then we can develop a position that the Ministers can agree on as to how to handle the issue in the post-Lisbon period. The Russians are no more prepared than we are to negotiate on MBFR. Whatever emerges from Lisbon, we should probably intensify our efforts to find out what the Russians have in mind.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Farley) Weren’t we going to brief NATO on MBFR?

Mr. Farley: The paper is being sanitized now for that purpose.

Mr. Kissinger: I think this is essential. We are light-years ahead of the Europeans in our thinking on this. How quickly can we do this?

Mr. Court: In about two weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s push our own discussions so when the Soviets start pressing we’ll be ready. Let’s get a paper on what strategy we want to follow. Should that be done by the IG or by ACDA? Who would handle the negotiations? Let’s ask the IG to do a paper on a negotiating scenario. We can’t have all of Europe in the room. Who will do the negotiating. Would we negotiate simultaneously with SALT? What would the first meeting look like—would it be a meeting of principals?

Mr. Farley: We might consider a phased approach. Brezhnev is out ahead of us on this. He was much more pointed as to negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger: There would be no condition to an MBFR agreement?

Mr. Johnson: No.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There might be a problem with the GDR.

Mr. Springsteen: That would not be unmanageable. NATO will probably try to avoid the term “negotiations” and use “exploratory discussions.”

Mr. Johnson: We have to get ourselves in position for this.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a position next week in connection with the Mansfield resolution. We have to answer those Senators—tell them we are ready to negotiate.

Mr. Helms: Damn right!!

Mr. Johnson: We can’t appear any less ready than the Soviets.
Mr. Kissinger: How about the question of permanent East-West machinery?10

Mr. Johnson: We can make this part of the CES study.

Mr. Springsteen: The question has already come up. The British proposed permanent machinery as a substitute for CES. The Russians are talking in the context of CES. This could be one of the alternatives we might consider.

Mr. Kissinger: On the defense issues, these won’t be coming up at this NATO meeting, will they? Are we agreed that we don’t need an NSC meeting? If so, we will produce a memorandum for the President.

Gen. Lobdell: Could we consider this matter of “on-going talks” a little more?

Mr. Springsteen: That is not our phrase.

Mr. Kissinger: How can you give up something you can’t define?

Capt. Kamorowski: That’s the basis of many a love story.

Mr. Kissinger: What Department are you from?


Mr. Johnson: That sounds like “make love, not war”!

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10 Sonnenfeldt wrote in his May 10 memorandum the establishment of some permanent machinery “is an idea worth some US consideration (State has been opposed) to understand more thoroughly whether there is some advantage to it. Our main interest might be in using some organ to inhibit Soviet actions in East Europe. Admittedly, it would be a weak reed, but added to some arms control, collateral measures or MBFR, it could add some substance to the atmospherics of European security. In short, should the US link into it more thoroughly? If not, we can probably scuttle it either at Lisbon or later. If we are interested, however, we could push it slightly at this meeting, and take it up inside our government and NATO in the next six months.”
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT: Brezhnev on Mutual Troop Reductions in Europe: Help in our fight against Mansfield Amendment, but Problems Later

In a major speech in Soviet Georgia, Brezhnev went out of his way to emphasize Soviet readiness to begin negotiations over mutual troop reductions in Europe. This is a logical follow up to his Party Congress speech, which also mentioned mutual reductions of troops and armaments in Central Europe, but without specifying the previous Soviet condition that the issue had to be tied to the European Security Conference. Brezhnev’s more forthright offer also seems to bear out my earlier speculation that after the Congress he would want to demonstrate some tangible results of his “peace program.”

In noting speculation in the West about his Party Congress speech, Brezhnev said that Western spokesmen were asking “whose armed force—foreign or national—what armaments, nuclear or conventional, are to be reduced.” He compared such speculation to a man who tries to judge the flavor of wine by its appearance without imbibing it.

Brezhnev’s answer to this rather playful recitation was: “you have to muster the resolve to try the proposals you are interested in according to its taste. Translated into diplomatic language this means—to start negotiations.”
While such a flat offer to negotiate is a windfall in terms of the debate in this country over the Mansfield Amendment, Brezhnev’s main target may well be the NATO meeting in Lisbon. One of the issues at that meeting is how the Alliance should respond to Brezhnev’s previous remarks. This new speech will no doubt strengthen sentiment in Europe for a positive move toward early negotiations for mutual reductions.

The major question is why, after considerable stalling on this issue, the Soviets seem ready to negotiate.

—It may be that there are genuine economic pressures resulting from the continuing buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East, which recent intelligence indicates is continuing.

—It could also be related to Czechoslovakia, and a Soviet desire to lower their profile there. In this regard the Soviet greetings to the Czech Party Congress noted that the situation has been “normalized”; such a claim could be a justification for some withdrawal of some Soviet forces there. Brezhnev may try to trade in any such withdrawal for Western cutbacks.

—The Soviets may be coming to see negotiations on force reductions as a way to get to their goal of a European Security Conference. The West has made progress on Berlin a precondition for such a conference but not for troop negotiations. Any such negotiations would almost certainly have to involve the GDR, a major Soviet goal in the European security conference proposal.

—Finally, the Soviets may be convinced that this is a serious Western offer, and see some advantage in exploiting the desire among all Europeans for reductions in military spending. As we move into the more intensive phase of improving the quality of NATO forces through the plans worked out last year, the prospect of negotiations on troop reductions with the Soviets could slow down or undermine the effort. This risk has always been inherent in the Alliance’s dual approach to mutual force reductions, negotiations and improvement of forces.

In short, Brezhnev’s offer “to start negotiations” can be turned to our advantage in the next few days. At the same time, it means that we may be entering the path of new negotiations, which our studies have shown could be turned against the Alliance, if not handled properly and with prudence.

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5 Nixon underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin, “Probably a major factor in his move.”
50. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary of Defense Laird, Acting Secretary of State Johnson, and the Republican Congressional Leadership

Washington, May 18, 1971, 8:02–9:02 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Nixon: So important to our negotiations on Mutual Force Reductions of course, which everybody’s been talking about.

Johnson: Yeah.

Nixon: So that’s another thing, which is down the road, the European Security Conference. Eventually there will be one. Eventually. We don’t know when. Not in the immediate future, but we all assume that something will happen.

Johnson: And, it’s all part of that. I think that’s—

Nixon: Yes.

Johnson: You all know about Brezhnev’s speech last Thursday. Ambassador Beam went in to see Gromyko yesterday and questioned Gromyko about what was the meaning of that speech, and whether or not the Soviets were serious in wanting to go, move ahead with negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions that would involve not just Soviet [unclear] troops but troops on both sides.

Nixon: The whole of Eastern Europe.

Johnson: The whole Eastern Europe.

Nixon: Right.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 58-1. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. Attending the meeting from Congress were Robert Griffin (R-MI), Norris Cotton (R-NH), Peter Dominick (R-CO), Gerald Ford (R-MI), Leslie Arends (R-IL), John Anderson (R-CA), Barber Conable (R-NY), Richard Poff (R-VA), Bob Wilson (R-CA), John Rhodes (R-AZ), Robert Stafford (R-VT), H. Allen Smith (R-CA), and Robert Dole (R-KS). Also attending were Peter Peterson, Shultz, Ehrlichman, MacGregor, Timmons, Dent, Ziegler, Harlow, and LeBieu. The conversation took place in the Cabinet Room.

2 See Document 49.

3 Telegram 3243 from Moscow, May 17, contains an account of the discussion. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII) For a summary of the discussion, see Document 54.
Johnson: And Gromyko’s answer was affirmative, that they’re prepared to do so. And, they’re prepared to do so outside of, the interesting thing, outside of the conference on European security.\(^4\)

Nixon: Hmm.

Johnson: They’re prepared to do so—

Nixon: Bilaterally?

Johnson: Bilaterally between NATO and Warsaw. Presumably they, we didn’t get into specifics.

Nixon: I see.

Johnson: But he confirmed that they were looking to do so outside of a conference on European security and before a conference on European security. This is a very significant lift, I think. And—

Nixon: Before taking up the whole complex of issues—

Johnson: The whole complex of issues.

Nixon: Take this particular issue and they’ll sort it out.

Johnson: He seemed to indicate this. Like most public statements, it’s, there’re ambiguities of course and, but this—

Nixon: —is quite normal with ours, too. [laughter]

Johnson: And, so we made the statement last night on this. Just to summarize the facts. I didn’t see the *New York Times* this morning. Chalmers Roberts at the *Post* has a bit of summary of this for those of you who are interested.\(^5\) The next step of course, we will be talking to our, in the NATO Council on this during the course of this weekend. And then Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird will be taking this up at the Lisbon meeting next month, in the early part of June. So, now of all times, we’ve got the Soviets moving towards talking about a mutual reduction. It’s, in our view, clearly not the time to do anything unilaterally.

\(^4\) Telegram 3243 from Moscow reported that Gromyko said “the question of force reductions deserved serious attention. With respect to the Rome proposals [of NATO], Moscow proceeded from the assumption that the West had once posed the question in the context of a CES. While the USSR deemed it a positive fact that NATO had referred favorably to a CES, Gromyko said they had expressed the view that discussion of this question at a CES, at least at the first meeting, would complicate the situation and put too heavy a burden on the conference. Therefore, the Soviets posed the question in terms of the possible reduction of foreign forces in Europe. This is simpler way. It could be done by a special body of the CES or in any other forum. If the Western powers agree that the question should be examined outside a CES, this would be much simpler and more productive.”

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[Unknown participant]: Mr. President, what’s the significance of the Brezhnev statement that seems incredible to me and, as I see it, he made it and the timing was completely amazing.

Laird: Well, it was really a follow up of his March 30th statement before the Party Congress.\(^6\) He merely enlarged on that statement in the Georgia speech. Because, that statement that he made on March 30th was really the first indication of a response to the NATO Council’s statement of last December.

Johnson: We’ve been, for three years we have been pushing. We, ourselves, the United States, and NATO have been trying to, been pushing on the discussions of what we call MBFR—Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. And this March 30 speech of Brezhnev was the first breakthrough I’d say we’ve had. And this Georgia speech last Thursday was, as Mel says, it was an enlargement on this. Now, why, don’t ask me why, the Soviets do things. I understand that there’s some who are tending to give us a little credit for that speech. We could take some—[laughter]

Nixon: Yeah.

Laird: All right. Well, I think—I think it’d be very helpful. I think it may be helpful now but we have to be careful about what it means too because it could be an effort to stampede us into this thing. And I think we want to be very careful about how we interpret it. It may help us campaign up at the Congress.

[Unknown participant]: Yes.

Laird: So we can look at it squarely on that basis.

Nixon: Well, it could be a, first burst of the idea. I know something, I mean, Mike [Mansfield] said that we pulled that just at the right time. [laughter] We got influences some places but I’m afraid not in that one at the moment. But, what I think is, what I think, I think Mel is, with his usual, waiting to see what’s going on. To me, [unclear]. It isn’t just a, I don’t think Brezhnev’s speech was really directed towards what’s going on in the Senate.

[Unknown participant]: No.

Nixon: They actually follow this and so forth. It’s like the, despite Stu Symington’s, Bill Fulbright’s suggestion that it’s really the Congress that brought all this about. He didn’t agree, but he didn’t seem to totally [unclear] the situation. But nevertheless, what is also quite right, see, Brezhnev’s speech moved in this direction. With the NATO meeting coming up in a couple of weeks, it could well have been that it was sort of directed toward that, if it was directed toward anything.

\(^6\) See footnote 4, Document 49.
The idea being that we, that they fake it. We get the impression that, well, if they’re going to do down, why don’t we.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Nixon: Now here with this one, I think that really they are trying to upset, I do not, let me put, putting it all in its fairest context, I think we could say, and I think Alex would agree, I think we could say that the Soviet, at this time, very well may want, in previous years they may have used: “Well, let’s reduce our forces and so forth,” for the purpose simply of disintegrating in Europe the Alliance. But at the present time, they may well want to reduce the burden that they have with their danger to the West, because if they look, if they see from the East. It may be that there are other reasons that they want to. They may also have budget problems as we see, but they do have a problem with regard to their flat economy over the past four or five years. But whatever the race, reason may be, all based on the track record, there has never been an instance where the Soviet actually asked to either reduce its force levels or reduce a weapons system or not go forward with a weapons system, lacking a direct reciprocal deal. That’s really what it gets down to. And so, in our case, here, I think we should take the Brezhnev speech on face value. I think there may be, we don’t know [unclear]. But he has come out and in his speech, to the Party Congress, it [unclear] use the term “conciliatory.” At least was, well, it was not conciliatory, if you read what it was really saying in terms of some of the demands and so forth. It was one that was the least inflammatory by far of any speech ever made by a Soviet leader, including even Khrushchev’s speech on peaceful competition. Now, what does that mean? What it may mean to us, and only time will tell, is that the Soviet, for reasons that have nothing to do with their believing that we in good faith want to do this or that, or that the Europeans no longer threaten, or this or that. They aren’t worried about that. And they don’t think that we threaten. It may be that the Soviet, because of their internal problems on their economy, because of the problems they have in Eastern Europe which are quite significant. We don’t know how much. You remember the German riots and so forth and so on, and over a period of time. And because of their problems in the East vis-à-vis the Chinese, they may look at their situation in the West and say this is the time when we can, on a reciprocal basis, perhaps reduce the level of tension here. Reduce the level of forces. Reduce the cost to us. And, now, if for their reasons, they want to do that, and we want to for our reasons, then we’re in a very, it seems to me, strategic position at this point. But we must not, we must not assume, I mean the

7 Nixon is apparently referring to the June 1953 uprising in East Germany.
greatest danger would be to assume that the way to get that, to recip-
rocate, would be for us to prove our good faith by going first. The mo-
ment we do that, then forget it. That means it’s over.

Johnson: Yeah. We have no basis for negotiation.

Dole: Mr. President, in addition to the Mansfield Amendment
there’re about three or four substitutes floating around which may be
as harmful as the Mansfield Amendment. I’ve been out of town the last
few days but I read about it in the paper. [laughter] And—

Nixon: We weren’t referring to you a moment ago. [laughter]

Dole: But, I understand that, I assume we’re opposed to any of the
substitutes. Is that right, Mel?

Laird: Absolutely.

Dole: [unclear] says we don’t, if they don’t [unclear].

[Unknown participant]: Probably the one that may be the most dif-

ficult is the new Mathias Amendment as of yesterday which is cospon-

sored by [Jacob] Javits, [Hubert] Humphrey, and [unclear]. It just says

that, “The Congress renews its support for the North Atlantic Alliance,
reaffirms the policy of the United States with full partnership in de-
fense of Europe, and the President’s request to enter in the negotia-
tions within the NATO framework to achieve Mutual and Balanced Force

Reductions in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The
President requests, in addition to regular consultations, to negotiate
within NATO on the reduction of U.S. forces while financial arrange-
ments, which remain in Europe, consist of a balance of payment situ-
ation in the United States. And then he’ll report to the Congress on
September 5, 1971, nearly six months hereafter, on the project’s suc-
cess.” That one of course is—

Nixon: [unclear].

[Unknown participant]: [unclear].

Laird: Well, that’s the Humphrey—

[Unknown participant]: This is a side Humphrey has.

[Unknown participant]: Humphrey may not put his name on it

much.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-
curity conference or MBFR.]

Nixon: As far as Europe is concerned, what we are doing there is
to, we already prevailed upon the Europeans to take a far greater re-
ponsibility in terms of their own defense. Upgrading their forces and
so forth, which is very important in terms of getting a good bargain-
ing position for the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. Now let’s look
at the Soviet thing. The, it’s rather interesting to me that the Senate has
finally discovered that for the past two years, ever since we’ve been
in, we’ve been talking to the Soviets about this. We’ve been talking to
them through State Department channels, through other channels and so forth. We are ready. The Europeans certainly are going to be ready. You can be sure that every possible effort is going to be made, one, in conjunction with our NATO allies to get them to assume more of the burden for their own defense. And second, every possible effort, having done that with our NATO allies, is being made to, from that position of strength, to develop the modalities of the possible negotiation with the Soviet. And it will come. I’m convinced it’s going to come. The question is, is it in the national interest to have on our part, on the part of our government [unclear]. We won’t be keeping any of this secret. We won’t. Nothing is secret when going to the NATO conference. It all leaks out. Very little is secret when you talk with the Russians. But on the other hand, is it really in our interest to come back every six months to the Senate of the United States and to report that the Soviet says nothing? You report about, when you talk to our NATO allies and they fail to do this and they tell you what we’ve done. Is that really in our interest? The way to do it? In other words, the real question: Do you want it done or do you want to have it talked about? Henry, you want to say about—

Kissinger: Actually, the Mathias Amendment asked us to do that and in defense of MBFR, to negotiate with the Europeans to reduce our forces and then to report every six months about that. Anyone who has worked with the Europeans knows that the most important way we can get them to do more and maintain our relationship is to give them some sense of stability. If they are told that it is the policy of the United States to reduce its forces and to negotiate them in front of it and to report back to the Congress every six months on unilateral reduction, which is the second part of this, any possibility for a stable NATO policy is down the drain. And therefore, the difference between that and Mansfield is really only the difference in numbers. It’s that they don’t give a number. It’s a [unclear] with apparently additional disadvantages but there’s one, some turmoil because we’re under the gun every six months to report about unilateral reductions. What we have been trying to do in this administration is to get away with talking with the Europeans. When you were over there, you said, we don’t want these forces there just for political and symbolic reasons. We want them to make sense. We’ve got them to put more money into it. If now we have the charter, not what makes sense but how can we reduce unilaterally, I think that whole policy will be in severe jeopardy. That is the part of the Mathias resolution that’s going to give us even more trouble than the one of reporting every six months about the negotiations with the Russians, which is also—

[unclear]
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[Unknown participant]: Do you want to put yourself in the position, Mr. President, if the Senate then adopts the Mathias substitute, of having it be interpreted as a defeat for the administration? Seems to me it could be a victory for the administration. And then, in conference taken out. Take out the report requirement.

Nixon: No they, it would be if it were, except for the interpretation I think we have to put on it in terms of the Mathias Amendment. Apart from it, it’d be a victory for the administration, it would raise havoc in our relations with the Europeans, and would be, in my opinion, it would be seriously detrimental to our long range objective of getting a mutual force reduction with the Russians. Now if that’s what the Senate wants, let them [unclear] the Mathias Amendment. But it’s cold turkey. As far as we’re concerned, we’re against it. We have to be against it. I can understand individual senators reaching different conclusions but we can’t. We can’t. But we could talk about this [unclear]. If you get down to the tactics of what is it that we, what is a victory for the administration, I agree. Well, we got Mathias and that isn’t as bad as Mansfield. But you look at Mathias and what it does in terms of our overall bargaining position. Our bargaining position within NATO. Our bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet. And however we interpret it here, in the day-to-day battle of confidence and all the rest, the Mathias Amendment would have a very detrimental effect in our relations within NATO and also looking down the road in the bigger game, the bigger game further down the road, the dealing with the Soviet. I don’t know. What’s your—?

[Unknown participant]: Oh, I entirely agree Mr. President. Entirely agree. Yes. Yes.
51. **Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**

Washington, May 19, 1971, 2:10–2:56 p.m.

Laird: There are several things that I did want to bring up [unclear]. I’m going to be meeting, as I told Henry, on Saturday for the Defense Planning Committee meeting—

Nixon: NATO.

Laird: —NATO, with all the Defense Ministers, and also the Nuclear Planning Group. And those will be going on for four days, two at each. Two at Brussels and two in Germany. Saturday, I’m coming back to meet with a group of cabinet administrators from all over Europe. But it’s a personal sort of a thing. They’re all former parliamentarians who were friends over a long period of time. And we had a prayer group—

Nixon: —Where will that be?

Laird: And that will be in France. It’s going to be out in the country in France, it’s just a day meeting. People like Harmel and Helmut Schmidt. And one of the subjects we’re talking about is what we can do in the field of curtailing violence, and there are other topics. It doesn’t have anything to do—

Nixon: —Good. Excellent.

Laird: But it’s just a talk sort of a thing. So I’ll be there one day, and that will be next Saturday, and then I will be home next Saturday night. But there are, this is a rather important time to be meeting with all these people, with what’s been going on in the last week or so over here. And I think we can give them certain assurances [unclear] a great deal of turbulence as far as—

Nixon: —I think so.

Laird: —And they will want to go forward with discussions on how you will proceed with the Mutual and Balanced Forced Reduction,
especially. And they want to take a position to recommend to the Council meeting, which comes the next week. Make a recommendation. And I think we can lead that to the point, take these models that they’re using and they’re in NATO and the fact that we have a better study going on here,\(^3\) which we will share with them and we will be ready to share with them, maybe by the first of July.

Kissinger: That’s really essential, Mr. President, because what they’ve got is so superficial.

Laird: Right.

Kissinger: And also, our experience in SALT really shows that when we do it on a well-prepared basis, we didn’t stampede into those talks after a lot of pressure. And we’ve got a really first-class study. A lot of it was done by Mel’s shop, which we’re now sanitizing. And it’s, that would be the basis of the Alliance position, which we’d be a hell of a lot better off than the superficial work they’ve done.

Nixon: Sure.

Laird: And that’s my point here, Henry, that I make to you, that I want to stress the idea of not stampeding ahead on this thing, because some of them really want a [unclear].

Nixon: Brezhnev is clever, clever. Kosygin [unclear] the other side [unclear]. You go first, boys, the hell with their issues, it would be very different. We can get some sort of agreement at some time with the Soviet, Warsaw Pact, but only on the basis of, well, we both have our forces and we intend to continue them until we get an agreement. You’re not going to do it by either side going first with some half-assed, either unilateral action or some jackass statement. Either one, right? We’ve got to control the game, in other words. That’s what it really gets down to. The Soviet will control their game, that’s for sure.

Laird: Well, and I think it’s important not to get tied up in the context of the European security conference. And I think that, Henry and I have talked about that.

Nixon: What about that? I noticed that briefing paper this morning\(^4\) we should, what do the Europeans want? Are they trying to tie it up or separate it?

Laird: Some of them will want to tie it up with it. But I think that we can—

Nixon: —What should we want?

\(^3\) Reference is to the evaluation report, “Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” April 12. For discussion of the evaluation report and the decision to sanitize it for presentation to NATO, see Document 47.

\(^4\) Reference is to Kissinger’s daily briefing memorandum for the President of May 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 33, President’s Daily Briefs, May 17–31, 1971)
Kissinger: Mr. President, it’s strongly in our interest not to tie it up with the European security conference. The Soviets are eager to get a European security conference, we can sell it to them separately. A European security conference also is going to have the most vapid sort of generalities, which will then be used to undercut the whole NATO effort. And it’s in our interest to get the Russians to negotiate something concretely, like force reductions rather than trade and cultural things and that sort of—

Nixon: —Good point.

Laird: It really is important—

Nixon: —In another word, you have in mind that the, what would be the format of such negotiations we’re talking about? How would it, how would it be done? How do we see the picture? You’ve got to have a conference in order to negotiate.

Kissinger: Well, I think we ought to do it the way we did it on SALT. We ought to express a general readiness, then we ought to find a negotiating forum. I don’t think we’ll be ready to talk much before fall. Then we also have—

Nixon: Do you agree, Mel?

Kissinger: Then we ought to have a—

Laird: —We won’t be ready.

Nixon: The thing is, though, let’s be sure that both Mel and Bill5 take that position with these people when they go to Europe, because I think the Europeans, particularly after this announcement tomorrow,6 they’re all going to say, “Well now, what the hell?” Let’s get—

Kissinger: —Well, I’m not so sure, Mr. President.

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5 Secretary of State Rogers.

6 On May 20, Nixon announced an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union to work to conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT) by the end of the year. For the text of Nixon’s remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 648. Nixon expressed his concern again about the European reaction to the SALT announcement in the context of MBFR in a conversation later in the evening on May 19 with Kissinger, Scali, and Haldeman: Kissinger: “In the first press conference, I won’t use the word ‘linkage,’ but I’ll say, ‘The President has consistently taken the position that success and progress in one negotiation is bound to improve prospects in other negotiations. This is particularly true when the fields are so related as they are with Mutual Force Reductions and SALT, both of which are in the arms control field. So if we can make progress in that field, we think that this will create a good basis.’” Nixon: “What does that do now, Henry, to NATO?” Nixon continued: “Does that shake the hell out of them?” Kissinger: “What, the agreement? If you don’t make it sound as if a condominium is starting between the Soviets and us.” Nixon: “Right.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 501–29)
Nixon: They may panic.

Kissinger: I’m not so sure because the Europeans were for this force reduction idea as a way of keeping our forces there, figuring that the negotiations wouldn’t get anywhere. That’s why they, many of them came around to it.

Nixon: Negotiation of what?

Kissinger: The Euro—

Laird: —The force reduction. They—

Nixon: —No, no. I am talking about after the announcement on SALT tomorrow.

Kissinger: Oh.

Nixon: Now anything is possible with the Russians, get my point?

Kissinger: The Russians, I don’t read the Gromyko thing as if they’re ready to negotiate.

Nixon: The Kosygin?

Kissinger: The Gromyko–Beam conversation.7

Nixon: Well—

Kissinger: So, let, all they’re left at is let’s both review our positions.

Nixon: Well, Kosygin made some statement with—

Kissinger: —Well—

Nixon: —that asshole Trudeau.8

Kissinger: But my guess is if we meet in September and have the first session the way we did it on SALT, on principle, and then—

Nixon: —Now when you say, “We’d be,” who’s “we”? 

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: The Europeans meet first for a private meeting?

Laird: Well I think there should be meetings between the U.S. and the Russians first before you go to a Warsaw Pact–NATO meeting.

7 See Document 54.

8 Kosygin visited Canada October 17–26; at the end of his visit, he and Prime Minister Trudeau issued a joint communique that Canada and the Soviet Union “declared themselves in favor of a properly-prepared conference on security and cooperation in Europe with the participation of all European states, Canada, and the United States.” With regard to balanced force reductions, the statement reads: “Since the military confrontation in central Europe is particularly dangerous, it was agreed that early steps should be taken to seek a general agreement on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in that area without detriment to the participating states.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 24948–24949)
Nixon: I see.
Laird: That meeting will be to carry on the same kind of consultations—
Kissinger: We need June to work out before, there’s a trip before.
Because we’ve got every ally there.
Laird: Yeah.
Kissinger: You’re going to have the damnedest gap—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: [unclear] is what do we do? What are you going to say?
Laird: Well, I’m going to say that we have this study going—
Nixon: I think you ought to say it, you and Bill, you both should use the same line.
Laird: It’s most important that we’ll share this study with them in July.
Kissinger: In June. In July—yes.
Laird: Well, I’d like to put it out in July—
Kissinger: In July. July, no you’re right.
Nixon: The more you can put off anything the better.
Laird: Yeah [unclear]. This study will be in July.
Nixon: Cause also, I think you need that much time.
Laird: Sure. Then we can lay that before them at that time, and that’s the only thing that will take place, we’ll share any discussions we have at this point. We can work out our [unclear] and our negotiating position at that time. They’ve got to see the study. They’ve got to see the study. The problem is that they’re going to run into this thing. They’re going to, some people will try to stampede at you in Lisbon. If we can get the Defense Ministers to stand pat [unclear] just to stampede [unclear] Lisbon.
Kissinger: I’ll talk to Bill also.
Laird: I just felt—
Nixon: —When do you leave? When do you leave?
Laird: I’m going to leave Saturday. See, I don’t have much time.
Nixon: When does the, yeah.
Laird: And Bill will leave the day that I get back.
Nixon: Oh.
Laird: I’m not going to go to Lisbon. I don’t believe I should be gone, see. I told Bill that I could not go to Lisbon because—
Nixon: When does Bill go? And I think we better get, I better talk to Bill before—
Laird: This Sunday?
Kissinger: A week from Sunday.
Nixon: Oh, yeah.
Kissinger: So we have the whole week next week.
Laird: We’ve got all next week, but he’s in Toronto [unclear].
Kissinger: But luckily, however, [unclear] Bill.
Laird: But I can see no reason for my going to Lisbon, because that’s another weekend with all these [unclear].
Nixon: It seems to me you ought to go [unclear] talk to Bill as to what you’re constantly talking about, so that he’ll know. Next week, we’ll be sure that we’re all on the same wavelength. You feel that we ought to wait till July, right?
Laird: Well, I’ll talk to him before I go.
Nixon: Right. And the line you’ll take is July is the, that you’ll try to keep the Europeans from going off or anything weird. [unclear] right, and that’s the way to get a deal, too.
Laird: And I don’t think it should come down to, for sure, as to the method of the kind of negotiations, whether it should be strictly Warsaw–NATO context. We shouldn’t agree on that now.
Kissinger: We should decide that in June.
Laird: Right.
Nixon: Yeah, but if they raise the European security conference between [unclear] that should be recommended for everything.
Kissinger: And the Russians are not all that eager to link the two for some—
Laird: They weren’t for a while.
Kissinger: But now they are.
Laird: They’ve backed away from it now.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to the European security conference or MBFR.]
Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
U.S. Position on MBFR: Proposed NSDM

The events of the past two weeks undoubtedly have created the expectation within the U.S. bureaucracy, the Congress and NATO that we will now take a vigorous lead in moving the alliance into “Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions” in Europe. The Soviets (and Mansfield) have put the ball squarely in our court.

The problem is that we have no agreement within the U.S. Government—much less with our allies—concerning either what kinds of possible elements of a “MBFR” we are most interested in pursuing nor the procedural approach to be taken leading up to or in negotiations.

The Substantive Problem

As you know, the variables—and the possible focus of an eventual MBFR—are far more numerous than the ones which we faced in SALT. Among them are:

—The geographical areas for MBFR;
—The participants (e.g., all NATO, all Pact members, or selected countries);
—The question of whether to reduce both “foreign” or “stationed” forces or only one of them;
—The variety of force components, including ban on conventional and nuclear forces, both manpower and equipment, and both active and reserve or cadre units;
—How deep to cut, and the phasing of reductions;
—The formality of the agreement and its post reduction features.

In order to surface the substantive strategic arms control and verification issues, both we and NATO have concentrated our analysis on fairly comprehensive MBFR approaches, involving detailed reduction models which:

—Imply formal bloc to bloc agreements;
—Involve most or all of the nations with forces in the European Central Region;
—Involve detailed verification.

However, it is also possible to envision (although not necessarily desirable to negotiate) an MBFR which was limited to Soviet and U.S. forces at least as the first step. This could be negotiated formally by the two countries alone and reduced to paper, or could be achieved by “mutual example” parallel steps. Of course, we would be obliged to obtain the consent of our allies for such an approach.

The point is that we and our allies need to narrow the range of variables considerably before we get into negotiations with the other side. The progress report you requested on our MBFR preparations is enclosed at Tab C.²

The Operational Problem

The most immediate operational problem which we face is that State and Defense may be converging on a “game plan” for the NATO Ministerials which would unduly restrict the President’s choices. At Tab B³ is a draft of a Defense Department paper, prepared for Secretary Laird, after seeing the President, which recommends that he:

—“Interject” MBFR into the discussion at the Defense Planning Council in Brussels on May 28 (it is now only on the agenda of the NAC in Lisbon the following week); (This procedure would scrub the French who are not in the DPC).
—Declare that the U.S. “would be agreeable to multilateral exploratory talks on MBFR in the near future if the allies felt this was in the best interests of NATO.”

Meanwhile, State is preparing an IG–EUR paper for the President outlining several optional ways of handling MBFR at the Ministerial and thereafter. Although the paper is not yet available, it apparently will also stress early multilateralization of MBFR exploratory talks with the Warsaw Pact.

There are two dangers inherent in this approach:

1. It focuses on procedures, ignoring substantive issues which should be decided, before even exploratory talks are started. Some of these issues may best be decided after further bilateral and/or multi-

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² In Tab C, an attached memorandum from Smith to Kissinger, May 21, Smith noted that the agencies had “prepared a ‘sanitized’ version of our analysis and evaluation of MBFR approaches for presentation to the North Atlantic Council”; “further developed the military analysis of MBFR to include non-simultaneous mobilization scenarios”; and “prepared a detailed formulation of six options embodying the symmetrical, asymmetrical and mixed package approaches to MBFR.” The JCS, Smith noted, was “balky” about presenting the sanitized analysis to NATO and was engaging in “a stalling tactic.” “I strongly urge,” Smith wrote, “that the available paper be sent to NATO when the time comes, any JCS objections notwithstanding.”

³ Tab B, an undated memorandum received on May 19 in the White House Situation Room, is attached but not printed.
lateral talks with the Warsaw Pact but it is essential that the issues be surfaced and examined within the U.S. Government before an intensive round of talks (bilateral or multilateral) is launched.

2. It involves substantive issues but does not face up to them. For example, multilateral MBFR talks would raise the problem of East German participation. The effect would be to undermine our position in the Berlin talks.

[There may be ways around this problem—e.g., a conference of MBFR “experts” or designation of one individual or nation, such as the British, as the agent of the alliance. But the issue needs to be squarely faced.]^4

These issues should have been aired before the principals depart for the NATO Ministerials. Unfortunately, the first available forum already on the NSC schedule is the DPRC meeting set for Tuesday, May 25. At that time, Secretary Laird will already be in Europe for the NPG meeting which precedes the DPC. The only way to slow down this process is either: (a) unilaterally issue a NSDM; or (b) wait for the State paper and issue guidance. The latter, however, will probably leave the field to Secretary Laird for the next week.

Given the extreme difficulties that may be unnecessarily created by these agency activities and the real need to deal with the Brezhnev initiative and protect our Congressional flank, we recommend that you issue a NSDM stating the present U.S. position on MBFR and setting the stage for Presidential consideration of the issues prior to any further commitment by the agencies.

The NSDM at Tab A^5 directs that:

—The U.S. supports accelerated substantive preparations within NATO and will make a contribution (the sanitized NSSM–92).^6
—We will encourage bilateral, but not multilateral contacts on MBFR; such contacts will deal with the modalities of negotiations but not their substance.
—We will support, as the President indicated in his Foreign Policy Report, a first phase of MBFR devoted to an examination of principles, rather than exchange of concrete proposals.
—The Agencies will complete for the Verification Panel a study of options and related substantive issues by June 21.
—We prefer to separate MBFR from CES.

Recommendation

That you sign the NSDM at Tab A.

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^4 Brackets are in the original.
^5 Tab A as signed is Document 53.
^6 Document 21.
TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

After studying the proposed “game plan” for MBFR submitted by the Secretary of Defense, the President has directed that the following guidance will be used for dealing with issues related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

We should urge the Allies to accelerate substantive preparations with particular attention at this stage to the full range of possible elements of a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction proposal or proposals. The United States will contribute to this work and will provide the Allies shortly with the detailed results of our own analysis.

The United States is prepared to enter into formal negotiations with the USSR or the Warsaw Pact only after comprehensive consultations with the Allies and the development of an Allied consensus on the major substantive issues and the procedures to be used in the negotiations. The Department of State will submit a scenario for this consultative process by June 1.

We should clearly distinguish between (1) diplomatic explorations, which can be pursued at this time; and (2) the first phase of formal negotiations, which we will not begin until further preparations are accomplished.

Our position concerning the content and purpose of diplomatic explorations is that they should be concerned with a clearer identification of Soviet objectives and positions, and the modalities for eventual formal negotiations. The Department of State will submit a proposal for these exploratory talks by June 1.

Our position concerning the first phase of actual negotiations is that they should concentrate, as in SALT, on examining broad issues

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), Nos. 97–144. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2 Summarized in Document 52, to which the paper is attached as Tab B.
to discover whether a substantive foundation for concrete proposals could be developed. In both respects, we will consult fully with the Allies and ensure that all of them, including France, will participate in the Alliance effort on MBFR.

The United States position is that the MBFR negotiations should remain separated from negotiations and contacts, exploratory or otherwise, related to a Conference on European Security. A precondition to a Conference on European Security continues to be a satisfactory outcome of the current Four Power negotiations on Berlin. On the other aspects of a European Security Conference, current instructions issued to USNATO by the Secretary of State remain in force.

In preparation for further Presidential consideration of the U.S. position on MBFR, the Verification Panel shall prepare an evaluation of the substantive and procedural issues involved for consideration by the National Security Council. Drawing upon earlier interagency preparations, the paper should address the elements of MBFR which could form the basis of any U.S. position in consultation with our allies, giving the major alternatives and the pros and cons. The paper should also propose plans for further consultations with our allies. This paper should be completed and received by the Verification Panel no later than June 15, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger
Subject

Gromyko–Beam Conversation on MBFR

Ambassador Beam’s conversations with Gromyko concerning Brezhnev’s remarks on mutual force reductions, confirms the apparently complete reversal the Soviets have now made on the link between a Conference on European Security and MBFR. Gromyko alluded to their former position, linking the two issues, but continued that “if the Western powers agree that the question (MBFR) should be examined outside a CES, this would be much simpler and more productive.” Since questions such as scale of reductions of foreign or national troops as well as other questions arise, Gromyko said, “a non CES forum would be better.”

Beyond this, however, nothing much was clarified. Gromyko was given NATO’s broad criteria for MBFR. He was obviously prepared to deal with them because he fixed on one point, the use of the term “balanced” reductions. Apparently the Soviets suspect that balanced may mean asymmetrical or unequal, and Gromyko noted that this concept could prevent reductions. He said the Soviet view was that there should be no “preconditions” set up for the very idea of discussion.

No particular urgency was conveyed by Gromyko. He suggested both sides review each other’s position and should feel free to discuss the question further, “between us,” i.e. bilaterally.

It may be that the reversal of the Soviet position is related to SALT. The prospect of MBFR talks in Europe could be a justification for the
Soviets circumventing the forward-based systems issues in SALT, as they may now be doing.

Also the Soviets may have felt that the inclination in NATO to accept the former Soviet position and add MBFR into the CES (thereby making it subject to the Berlin precondition of a satisfactory Berlin settlement) conflicted with the kind of simple declaratory CES that the Soviets want. Thus this move gives the Soviets good leverage for a separate MBFR negotiation whenever they are so disposed—with such a negotiation inevitably upgrading the GDR. The Soviets appear to be wising up to the fact that MBFR negotiations, whatever their concrete outcome, could give them most of what they want out of a CES.

As a result of this publicized meeting between Beam and Gromyko we are rapidly being cast in the role of the leading champions of MBFR, though our major Allies (Paris, London and Bonn) are cooling to the project and our own studies give ample reason for being skeptical on the substance.

In short, after the Mansfield furor is over, we will have to decide how specific an offer we and our Allies should make to start negotiations. We must bear in mind that in light of the new Soviet position Moscow can force early negotiations, and we have been put on notice by Gromyko that intricate, asymmetrical approaches will certainly be resisted.

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55. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, June 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

Guidance for Lisbon Meeting and Follow-On Work on MBFR

State has sent two documents: (1) a memorandum from Secretary Rogers to the President, laying out the Secretary’s position at the NATO meeting (Tab B);\(^2\) and (2) a telegram for clearance, giving instructions

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\(^2\) Tab B is attached but not printed.
for follow-on work on MBFR, also cleared by Secretary Rogers and by Defense (Tab C).³

1. Secretary Rogers’ Position Paper

This follows fairly closely the guidance in NSDM 108,⁴ and presents no major problems.

—On MBFR it does state, however, that the Lisbon communiqué should indicate (a) Allied intention to move as soon as practical to negotiations, (b) Allied readiness to consult promptly with the Warsaw Pact on substantive and procedural approaches to negotiations, and (c) to convene NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers to review the “results of discussions” (this last point takes care of Secretary Laird’s problems).⁵

—The Secretary’s talking points call for him to note that “early and visible” movement toward MBFR will assist the US in maintaining force levels.

—The “proposal” for prompt discussion, followed by Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting, would retain NATO’s initiative and leave time for further consultation.

—Allies are urged to accelerate substantive preparations, to which we will contribute.

(On other issues, CES, Berlin, the paper is orthodox and presents no problems.)

This seems to move roughly in the direction indicated in NSDM 108, but emphasizes more the “promptness” of explorations on “substance.” Since there is no agreement on substance beyond the criteria agreed in Rome last year, it is difficult to understand how these explorations will proceed. Some of these problems are taken care of, however, in the telegram (see below).

2. Further Guidance on Follow-On Work on MBFR

This instructs the NATO delegation to indicate the nature of the follow-on work and our contributions.

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³ Tab C is attached but not printed.
⁴ Document 53.
⁵ On May 30, Laird wrote to Rogers about an earlier draft of the instructions at Tab C: “A careful reading of the US proposed language on MBFR procedure which has been circulated to our Allies for inclusion in the Lisbon Communiqué (State 092077) could indicate that we expect the special meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers to determine NATO’s negotiating procedure at an early date. This proposed language would build up expectation for the specifics of negotiations, such as the time, place and proposed agenda.” Laird continued: “If we allow ourselves to be forced into announcing specific negotiating parameters this early, I fear that we will find ourselves ill prepared and prematurely committed to positions that could work to the disadvantage of the US and NATO.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)
(a) **Guidelines for Exploratory Work**

Allies can immediately *intensify bilateral explorations* on the basis of the Rome declaration;⁶ but, if desired by the Allies, the US will participate in revision of the Rome criteria.

(b) **Approach to Negotiations**

The telegram supports the SALT approach to the first phase of negotiations: that is, exploration of “building blocks.” To this end the US *will support drafting by NATO of a building blocks paper, which could be used in discussions with the Pact*. The paper would be a vehicle for seeking Pact agreement on such issues as alternative areas of reduction, types of forces, relationship between stationed and indigenous, etc.

(c) **Negotiating Fora**

NATO should *turn “as soon as possible” after Lisbon to an examination of possible fora for ultimate negotiations* with the Pact. Allied views are to be solicited in view of special problems for the Germans.

(d) **Development of Substantive Positions**

The US anticipates tabling in the next few weeks a further paper drawing on US analysis of MBFR. Later we will table papers to help in developing an agreed NATO position.

**Recommendation**

In view of the time problem, and the need for the real work at Lisbon to proceed in the corridors before the meeting, you should:

1. Authorize clearance of the telegram (*I will clear it by COB today if you have no specific problems.*) (Tab C)⁷

2. Sign the memo to State indicating that the paper submitted by Secretary Rogers on his position has been approved (Tab A).⁸ (I see no virtue in sending this to the President since it is all tactics and agrees with the previous guidance.)

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⁶ See Document 41.
⁷ Kissinger initialed his approval, but added a handwritten notation: “but let’s take out some of the more urgent language.”
⁸ Kissinger signed the attached undated memorandum, addressed to the Acting Secretary of State, but its text was crossed out, and the memorandum was apparently not sent. The text reads: “Secretary Rogers’ memorandum to the President of May 29, 1971, concerning the Lisbon Ministerial Meeting has been approved. With regard to MBFR, however, it should be made clear that negotiations are dependent on (1) the results of further bilateral explorations and (2) the completion of comprehensive substantive preparations by the Alliance.”
Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Ambassador Pauls–Mr. Kissinger Conversation

The Ambassador wanted to know what the President might expect Chancellor Brandt to tell him during their forthcoming meeting on June 15, and vice versa. Mr. Kissinger said that problems connected with NATO and the Mansfield amendment would presumably be high on the agenda. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Next, Mr. Kissinger said East-West relations and Berlin would presumably figure in the conversation. He said that he could detect no disagreement between the two governments but it was important to synchronize approaches. MBFR would also figure under this heading. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Switching to MBFR, Pauls commented that there was a problem of moving ahead on this subject without having made progress on Berlin. Mr. Kissinger wondered whether the Soviets would accept a percentage cut as balanced. In any event, we were still working on our position although we would shortly have some of our analytical work available for submission to the Allies. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Pauls asked about Soviet motives in regard to MBFR. Mr. Kissinger conjectured that the Soviets might want to pull out some of their troops in Czechoslovakia and trade them in for US troops in Germany. Beyond this, the Soviets have apparently recognized that they could not have a separate détente with the Europeans alone. At the very least such a policy was not a feasible one in terms of German domestic politics. In addition, the Soviets could not make progress on Berlin under conditions of hostility with the United States. Additional factors in the Soviets’ motivations may be China, domestic Soviet considerations and the hope of weakening Western cohesion. Pauls added that the Sovi-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. IX. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted on June 3 by Sonnenfeldt. A notation at the end of the memorandum indicates that it went to Kissinger.
ets may want to switch the discussion of FBS to the MBFR forum. He also thought that economic considerations figured in the Soviet motivation. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

57. Editorial Note

In telegram 1859 from Lisbon, June 4, 1971, Secretary of State Rogers reported to President Nixon on the outcome of the NATO Ministerial meeting in Lisbon, including the discussions on a European security conference and mutual and balanced force reductions. Rogers wrote: “This was the most constructive and least contentious NATO meeting I have yet attended. When we finished our work today, we did so in complete agreement on the procedural steps NATO should take towards force reduction talks and on the necessity of a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin negotiations before multilateral consultations on a European Security Conference are undertaken. I also had several good bilateral talks. Your active leadership in defeating the Mansfield amendment made a deep impression on our allies and contributed to a sense of confidence in us which helped pull the Alliance together in spite of diverse opinions on details of the force reduction issue.”

Turning to the European security conference, Rogers wrote: “Based on statements from Gromyko that the Soviet Union recognized in fact that a European Security Conference could not precede a Berlin settlement, Schumann tried at some length to alter the communiqué language so that it no longer would clearly state that a satisfactory conclusion was a precondition. With the support of Scheel and Sir Alec I insisted that the language must be as clear as last year, though its tone could be more positive. Schumann finally conceded. The communiqué expressed the hope that before our next meeting negotiations ‘will have reached a successful conclusion’ and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and cooperation ‘may then be undertaken.’”

With regard to MBFR, Rogers wrote: “Real opinion on MBFR ranges from the French, who again refrained from participation; to the British, who have some doubts that reductions can be brought about without some security disadvantage; to the Germans, who favor the idea but do not want it to get ahead of Berlin; to the Scandinavians, Canada and Belgium, who want to push forward promptly, mainly for
domestic public opinion reasons. But in the light of Brezhnev’s recent remarks and of our own political battle over unilateral reductions everyone agreed NATO needed to maintain the initiative. Our proposals for (a) bilateral contacts to probe Soviet intentions more fully over the next few months, accompanied by the preparation of NATO negotiating position, (b) a deputy foreign minister or comparable level meeting in the fall to assess results and to take necessary further decisions hit just the right balance between prompt action and prudence. Several other countries suggested that we might appoint a single representative to consult for us now. I added this to our suggestion as a step that might ensue from the deputy meeting. This produced full agreement. The course of MBFR talks as now agreed will be:

“(a) Transmission of the communiqué to the Soviet Union and others by Moro.
(b) Bilateral explorations with the Soviet Union and preparation of our negotiating views.
(c) A deputy foreign minister or ‘high official’ level meeting at an early date (in the fall) to consult on ‘substantive and procedural approaches to MBFR.’
(d) Willingness to appoint ‘at the appropriate time,’ a representative or representatives responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks, and a willingness eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations.”

Kissinger forwarded Rogers’s telegram to Nixon on June 10 as an attachment to a summary memorandum. Kissinger wrote with regard to a European security conference: “A satisfactory Berlin solution as a condition to movement toward the Soviet-proposed European Security Conference was maintained, despite French efforts to weaken the linkage.”

With regard to MBFR, he wrote: “The outcome of the discussion struck a balance between some forward movement toward negotiations and a pace that will allow us to take soundings of the Soviets and complete internal NATO preparations. After exploratory contacts this summer, NATO will convene in the early fall at a Deputy Foreign Ministers level to review the bidding. As for actual negotiations the decision was left open whether the Alliance might appoint a single representative.”

During a meeting with Senator John Sherman Cooper (R–KY) in the Oval Office on June 11, Nixon summarized the outcome of the NATO meeting. Also present were President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Counsel to the President on Congressional Relations Clark MacGregor. Nixon, citing Rogers’s report on the NATO meeting, said with regard to MBFR: “The Europeans want to move just like we do here. They don’t want to move too fast. You see, if we move too fast, and you ought to tell your colleagues down there, and it may surprise you—I think it surprised Bill as a matter of fact—

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but it was very comforting to me. The Europeans realize that they have an awful lot.” Nixon continued: “I can tell you that we’ve been working on the mutual balanced force reduction thing for over a year. As a matter, we started 20 months ago as far as our own position is concerned. We’ve been working with the Allies since that time. We’re in the position now to make movement. Now, this does not mean that you’re going to have something. Doesn’t mean you’re going to have something two months from now, three months from now, five months from now, six months from now. You will note that the Europeans, however, not with regard to MBFR but with regard to the Security Conference, everybody thought, ‘Well, the United States ought to be the [unclear].’ They conditioned it on Berlin.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 517–6) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

58. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting

Washington, June 11, 1971, 3:35–4:55 p.m.

SUBJECT
MBFR

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Mr. John N. Irwin
Mr. Raymond L. Garthoff
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand
Defense
Mr. Warren Nutter
Mr. Robert Pranger
Mr. Philip Odeen
CIA
Mr. Bruce Clarke
Mr. Carl Duckett

OST
Dr. Hubert Heffner
OMB
Mr. James Schlesinger
NSC Staff
Col. Richard Kennedy
Mr. Wayne Smith
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Mr. William G. Hyland
Mr. John C. Court
Mr. Wilfrid L. Kohl
Mr. Mark Wandler

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 1969 through 3/8/72. Top Secret; Sensitive.
It was agreed that:
—Exploratory conversations on MBFR should be kept on a procedural level and should not get into substantive matters until the U.S. and NATO Allies have formed a position.
—A reduction of indigenous troops only would be unacceptable to the U.S. from political and intelligence points of view.
—A sanitized version of the Evaluation Report\(^2\) will be given to the North Atlantic Council, with the Department of Defense expressing its reservations in the covering letter.
—The State Department and ACDA should prepare a paper for the upcoming NSC meeting on how the MBFR negotiations should be conducted.
—The Working Group should provide an analysis of the effect of including the three Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union in the area of force reductions, if nuclear weapons are to be considered in the reductions. The analysis should include discussion of forward-based and nuclear delivery systems on the Allied side and IRBMs on the Soviet side.
—The Working Group should prepare a sensitivity analysis of the safety margin built into the present NATO situation. The analysis should discuss the consequences of 10 and 30% symmetrical reductions. It should also discuss asymmetrical reductions and mixed packages.
—The Working Group should prepare an analysis of their [the?] effect of on-site observers on verification.
—The Working Group should prepare an analysis of the reductions of indigenous forces. The analysis should specifically deal with the equipment aspect.
—The President should be made aware of our desire to have the Deputy Defense Ministers of NATO attend the Deputy Foreign Minister meeting this Fall.

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\(^2\) See footnote 4, Document 65.
ACDA should review the force reduction work it did in 1957, with the thought that this experience might be relevant to the current issue.

[Omitted here is the Verification Panel’s discussion of MBFR.]


59. Conversation Between President Nixon and West German Chancellor Brandt

Washington, June 15, 1971, 11:02 a.m.–12:34 p.m.

[Nixon: We’ve had the Mansfield Amendment since we talked to you. Beat that.
Brandt: Yes.

Nixon: We’ve got the restraining permit. I’d like to get your, your report on, your reactions to that, to the whole business of, you know, the MBFR [unclear] economic point.

Brandt: Yes.

Nixon: We’ve got the restraining permit. I’d like to get your, your report on, your reactions to that, to the whole business of, you know, the MBFR [unclear] economic point.

Brandt: Yes, yes. Well, Mr. President, again as far as the Lisbon meeting was concerned, I think it was of great importance that we could agree on how to handle the MBFR. This meeting of the deputy ministers in September will be held. The [unclear], which you mentioned, might be asked to find out what the Russians really think. There’s one thing I would like to mention in that connection. Secretary Laird said that the United States will table their paper on MBFR in the NATO Council talks at the end of July. If it were possible before it is

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Willy Brandt, Oval Office, Conversation 520–6. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. Also present for the conversation were Kissinger and Bahr. For portions of the conversation dealing specifically with Germany, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 254.

2 See Document 57.
tabled formally, to have some kind of consultation with some of the main partners in Europe, this might help, because otherwise things might get rather, you know how things are, if they—

Nixon: What is the, what is the procedure?

Kissinger: Well, the formal procedure is that we table it in Brussels. But if the Chancellor wanted to send somebody over here for some informal discussions, we could certainly do that.

Brandt: This would, I would appreciate that.

Kissinger: It wouldn’t have to be announced, would it?

Brandt: No. No.

Nixon: It would be in private.

Brandt: Of course.

Nixon: Let’s set that up then. A private discussion—

Brandt: Yes.

Nixon: Where we could do it, so we could keep it under the hat. But we would like to be helpful, to do that before we [unclear].

Kissinger: [unclear]

Brandt: Especially, Mr. President, since some of these things, like I said, these middle range missiles thing, which has [unclear] would come in under the new cover of MBFR. Especially interested so that we could have private discussion for expert service.

Nixon: All right.

Kissinger: Egon\(^3\) could be in touch with me through our channel.

Nixon: All right. All right. Fine.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to MBFR.]

Nixon: With regard to the problem of, we mentioned in passing, the problem of [unclear], we have to recognize, as I said earlier, that there is a growing disenchantment in this country with more expenditures [unclear]. There is a feeling that other parts of the world should pay more of the burden. Now, we fought this Mansfield Amendment out and won only because we gave assurances, one, that we would do our best to get others to, you know, bear their fair share of the burden; and second, that, of course, we did, we were working on MBFR, but it had to be done in an orderly way, and a neutral way. However, it has to be recognized that to the extent that you can [unclear] reassure leaders and opinion makers, Senators, etc., etc., reassure them of the [unclear] without getting into the specifics of offset and all the rest, that’s a matter to be negotiated. The main thing is the spirit. The main

\(^{3}\) Egon Bahr.
thing is the extreme criticism of those who believe that we in this
government are not doing enough [unclear]. On MBFR, it seems to me
there that this must be, and I emphasize again, I take into account this
[unclear] we will have some private consultation, the process must be
orderly.

    Brandt: Yes.
    Nixon: It must be orderly. And we must not rush in with some
half-baked scheme that [unclear] the whole texture of the alliance.
That’s really what we have in mind, [unclear] what we face here. How
do you feel about MBFR? What is your procedure?

    Brandt: [unclear] Plainly, we need that period of bilateral explo-
rations, and we have to make here a decision together if and when it
should move into the period of multilateral talks. I think we both agree
that this could not be for a longer time a thing between the United
States and the Soviet Union [unclear] it will be in practice. It must be
[unclear].

    Nixon: Right.
    Brandt: Which does not necessarily mean that everyone has to be
engaged.

    Nixon: Yeah.
    Brandt: [unclear] the greater negotiate on behalf of the lesser
[unclear].
    Kissinger: It almost has to be done that way.
    Brandt: Yes.
    Kissinger: Because we couldn’t have all 15.
    Nixon: Oh, no way. No way. And well, actually those with the
biggest stakes have to have the biggest voices. Now we can talk all we
want about the United Nations. That’s why it’s ridiculous to suggest
that the General Assembly, where a country of 25,000 has the same vote
and the same voice as a country of 200 or 400 million. It’s interesting,
it’s a nice debating society, but it isn’t going to work in terms of [uncle-

    Kissinger: I think it’s safe to tell the Chancellor that we’ve worked
out various schemes in these negotiations that work, but not one of
them is purely bilateral US-Soviet.

    Nixon: No, sir.
    Kissinger: The big problem is that if everybody negotiates it’s go-
ing to be a disaster.
    Brandt: Yeah.
    Kissinger: We’ll have to find a group that can make contributions
and still have a good negotiation. We will have some suggestions when
[unclear].
Brandt: For us, of course, it’s very important also, what should be the territory or territories, which will be covered by the MBFR negotiation, and two, how should one start? I saw the other day that the Secretary of State had made a remark that we’d be starting with the symbolic, which is so badly needed. And this man⁴ was in Moscow last year, negotiated our treaty⁵ he raised the question of MBFR with Gromyko. And his first reaction was that they had not made enough progress. And [unclear] made the remark that he could believe that one could agree upon some symbolic [unclear].

Nixon: [unclear]

Brandt: When I discussed this with Helmut Schmidt, my Minister of Defense, who has worked on the problem, he said this would not be so bad because it would be something which would occur [unclear] while still apart from more serious discussions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to MBFR.]

⁴ Egon Bahr.  
⁵ The Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, signed at Moscow on August 12, 1970, is in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 1105–1106.

60. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹


SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on Mutual Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR)

A NSC meeting on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe is scheduled for 3:30 pm, June 17, 1971.

The issues for discussion are:

—What substantive position should the United States take on the basic framework of an MBFR? We need to resolve such questions as

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-031, NSC Meeting Folders, NSC Meeting on MBFR, 6/17/71. Top Secret. The memorandum was drafted by K. Wayne Smith of the NSC staff and forwarded to Kissinger on June 15.
the area for reductions, the size of reductions, whether to reduce “stationed” forces only (mainly U.S. and Soviet) or both “indigenous” and “stationed” forces, and the related verification questions.

—How should the United States proceed in coming months to explore and eventually negotiate with the Soviet Union on MBFR? A related question for consultations with our allies to develop an alliance consensus on the substance and procedure of negotiations?

The Verification Panel has reviewed the substantive work performed over the past year and agrees that we are now ready to establish the basic framework of a U.S. position on MBFR.2

The Substantive U.S. Position

The principal issues to be resolved involve:

—The geographic area to serve as a base for reductions. While we should not rule out wider areas, the principal area for MBFR is Central Europe. Our work indicates that either the NATO Guidelines or Rapacki areas3 should be used initially for consultations.

—The size of reductions. All symmetrical reductions of ground forces slightly enhance NATO’s position before mobilization, and thus reduce the Pact’s capability to launch a successful attack if they do not have time to mobilize. However, MBFR degrades NATO’s relative position following a short period of mobilization. Thus, the risk of a Pact attack after a fast, full mobilization may be somewhat larger after MBFR.

—The nationality of forces to be reduced. In the past, we have supported the inclusion of both stationed and indigenous forces in a reduction program. However, the reduction of stationed forces would probably be to NATO’s military advantage as well as presenting fewer problems of negotiation and verification than reduction of indigenous forces. On the other hand, our allies, particularly the FRG, might be unwilling to accept this position since they want to reduce their forces for domestic reasons.

—The verification provisions to be included. We cannot verify reductions of less than 10 percent in stationed forces or reductions taken in units of less than regimental size even in East Germany. The issue is whether we want to consider reductions which cannot be verified by national means and, if so, what provisions for on-site inspection we wish to make.

2 See Document 58.

3 The “Rapacki Plan” refers to the 1957 proposal of the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe embracing Poland, East Germany, West Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
In general, the agencies seem to be converging on a U.S. approach toward MBFR involving fairly substantial (say 20 percent) reduction in the stationed and indigenous ground forces of the NATO Guidelines Area with heavier weight given, if possible, to stationed forces. Nevertheless, there are significant differences among the agencies that should be discussed at the NSC meeting.

Operational Issues

We are now approaching our own internal evaluation of MBFR with a sound two-phased approach:

—First, consideration of the basic framework of possible MBFR agreements. This corresponds to the “building block” stage we went through for SALT.

—Second, development of a range of specific options within this basic framework. Based on past guidance, detailed MBFR options have now been formulated and are being assessed. They will be revised on the basis of your decisions on our basic position for MBFR.

In principle, our approach toward consultations with our NATO allies and eventual negotiations with the Warsaw Pact should be designed to follow the same general approach as our internal preparations. This would involve:

—In NATO, an immediate effort this summer to focus on substantive discussions with our allies to determine the basic elements to be considered as part of MBFR. With a large infusion of U.S. substantive help, this process could hopefully lead to an allied consensus on an MBFR framework by late summer. At the moment, we are light years ahead of our allies.

—With the Soviets, we should continuously explore their understanding about what MBFR involves. Neither we nor our allies should, however, get very deep into substantive exploration with the Pact until a NATO position has emerged. The problem is how to hold back on substantive discussions without appearing to be less than serious about MBFR.

The Conduct of the Meeting

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss:

—The issues involved in formulating a basic substantive framework for the U.S. position on MBFR.

—The substantive and procedural issues that will arise in consultation with our allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Helms has prepared a brief on the Soviet proposals and the present comparative force postures of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

I am prepared then to present the principal issues and alternatives involved in the substantive U.S. position on MBFR.
Your Red Book Contains
—Talking points;\(^4\)
—A summary of the issues and alternatives.

Attachment\(^5\)

The President’s Summary

Since Brezhnev’s speech last month, the prospects for negotiations on mutual force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe have become more serious.

The Diplomatic Background

The Soviets were finally responding to repeated NATO offers to discuss MBFR. The NATO Rome Declaration of May 1970 (joined by all Alliance members except France) invited “all interested parties” to join in exploratory talks on MBFR of stationed and indigenous forces and their weapon systems in the European Central Region. This position was repeated in December, 1970. The Lisbon (June, 1971) communiqué replied to the Soviets by stating NATO’s intention “to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations.” An early meeting of NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers to consult on substantive and procedural approaches to MBFR was agreed.

Last week, the Soviets were critical of NATO’s stalling while expressing a readiness to discuss reductions of both “foreign” and “national” armed forces in Europe to possibly include a limitation on naval deployments.

The Issues

In preparing to explore and clarify the Soviet position, and prepare for eventual negotiation, the United States and its NATO Allies now must begin active consultations to develop a common negotiating framework. The issues which must be decided at this time are:

—The substantive position which the United States should take in the forthcoming consultations with NATO.

—The operational procedure we and our Allies should follow in exploratory talks and eventual negotiation with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

\(^4\) Attached but not printed.
\(^5\) No classification marking.
A. The Geographic Area of Reductions

MBFR is most clearly related to NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces in Central Europe. This has been acknowledged by both NATO and the Soviet Union. However, reducing forces in this area might be unappealing to other Allies, such as Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Greece, Portugal and possibly Italy:

—Nevertheless, the Central Region is the main area of confrontation between the ground forces and tactical air forces of both sides and, if MBFR is to be a serious arms control measure, it must focus there. This area contains large numbers of both stationed and indigenous forces—over one million men on each side, depending on the precise region specified.

—In the NATO flank regions, MBFR would involve mainly indigenous forces (including Soviet), and could greatly complicate the problems of negotiating and verifying an agreement. This is particularly true for U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean and their nuclear delivery systems.

Within Central Europe, the choice of an area depends in part on the type and nationality of forces to be reduced or limited, and in part on the comprehensiveness of an agreement, including its verification provisions.

1. The first question is the choice of a specific area for reduction within Central Europe. The main alternatives are:

   (a) For MBFR involving either stationed forces or stationed and indigenous forces in Central Europe only, the "Rapacki Plan Area" is the most advantageous to NATO of the areas which exclude Soviet territory. The Rapacki Plan Area covers the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It includes all Soviet forces in Europe stationed beyond Soviet borders except for Soviet troops in Hungary. It also includes all NATO stationed forces except 1–2,000 men in Belgium and the Netherlands.

   (b) There may be pressures within NATO or from the Soviets for inclusion of some additional NATO territory. The "NATO Guidelines Area," favored in some NATO studies, adds the territory of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux). There is a rough balance of ground forces manpower in this area (Warsaw Pact 818,000 men; NATO 744,000 men).

   For reductions of stationed forces only, the Guidelines Area produces military effects similar to the Rapacki Area. However, for reductions of both stationed and indigenous forces, the Guidelines Area is less advantageous to NATO.

   (Including portions of France or the United Kingdom would be highly disadvantageous to NATO without restrictions on Soviet territory.)
(c) Limiting reductions to East and West Germany only would be disadvantageous to NATO in view of the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and in Poland though the stationed forces in the Germanies are roughly in balance in this area and our initial offer to reduce stationed forces only might focus on this area.

(d) Whereas the two Germanies offer the narrowest base for reductions, the most comprehensive base would be the NATO Guidelines area plus the European portions of the Soviet Union itself. If reduced Soviet forces are simply redeployed to the Western sectors of the Soviet Union, they could return far more quickly, and in greater numbers, than U.S. forces redeployed to the United States. Thus, MBFR in which redeployed Soviet forces are not disbanded or transferred beyond easy reinforcing distance (e.g., East of the Urals) could be relatively disadvantageous to NATO in terms of the military balance following a short period of mobilization. On military grounds, therefore, it would be desirable for an MBFR agreement to cover forces inside the Soviet Union itself.

However, the Soviets may be unwilling to agree to limitations or reductions of Soviet ground forces in part or all of the Soviet Union without compensating restrictions on the territory of France, the United Kingdom and probably the United States. In addition, existing national collection means are inadequate for verification of ground force limitations or reductions in the Soviet Union. To achieve any on-site inspection—let alone a system adequate to detect a rapid Soviet build-up opposite Central Europe in the early stages of mobilization—could pose severe negotiating difficulties. For these reasons, limitation and reduction of Soviet ground forces in the Soviet Union should only be considered for inclusion in comprehensive MBFR options, particularly those entailing very substantial reductions in NATO’s forces. It might be possible, however, to include USSR territory if U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe were demobilized, along with the Soviet forces.

2. The next choice is the size of force reductions to be considered.

For a given geographical area, a range in the size of reduction could be postulated, such as

—A freeze of forces at present levels. While a reasonable first step in an agreement, a freeze would not satisfy unilateral pressures by Congress for reduction.

—A mutual reduction at a minimum level. Our verification studies indicate that this should be at least 10%.

—A mutual reduction of a greater size. Our studies of mobilization and reinforcement indicate that 30% may be a dangerous cut unless the Pact mobilization and reinforcement disadvantage can be overcome through restrictions on Soviet ground forces with the USSR or substantial improvements in the mobilization base of our Allies. [We have found that the Pact’s advantage in mobilization and
reinforcement during the first month of mobilization is increased in proportion to the size of the reduction in stationed forces (U.S., Canadian, Belgian or Dutch) unless reduced Pact forces are disbanded and their equipment destroyed.\footnote{All brackets are in the original.}

—A common ceiling at a given level, or other asymmetrical reductions in which the Pact reduces more than NATO. Our studies indicate this approach is advantageous only when NATO’s reductions are minimal (less than 10%) and when the ceiling is based on active tank forces (which would require a major restructuring of Soviet forces in Central Europe).

In sum, 

—No MBFR improves the military situation for NATO if the Pact is able to mobilize reduced forces and reinforce the Center Region. On the other hand, it is very important to note that most MBFR agreements considered do improve NATO’s relative capabilities prior to reinforcement by either side. This could be an important advantage in a crisis leading to a sudden attack by the Pact in which they had not reinforced.

—After a 10% MBFR restricted to the NATO Guidelines Area, NATO is 4–6% worse off at M+21 days compared to the present, in terms of the ratio of opposing forces.

—After 30% MBFR restricted to the NATO Guidelines Area at M+21 NATO is 10–17% worse off.

These figures show adverse trends, but do not tell us whether NATO will still retain an initial conventional defense capability after MBFR of 10% or 30%. While we believe that NATO’s conventional option would not be lost with small mutual reductions, we are still working on a precise answer to this question.

Clearly, at this stage we should consider large reductions on the order of 30% in connection with comprehensive agreements which restrict the Soviet reinforcement capability or compensate NATO in some tangible way (e.g., unequal tank reductions). Smaller reductions might be considered with few, if any, restrictions on Soviet reinforcement.

3. The choice of the nationality and type of forces for reduction.

Military forces in Europe are either “indigenous” to the country where they are garrisoned, or they are “stationed” beyond their national borders. In Central Europe, on the NATO side, the principal stationed force include Belgian, British, Canadian, Dutch, French, and U.S. forces in West Germany. On the Warsaw Pact side, Soviet forces are stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.
MBFR could include either stationed forces only, or both stationed and indigenous forces. [To reduce indigenous forces only would be illogical and politically unacceptable to the United States.]

—Important qualitative differences aside, it makes little difference in the resulting force ratios whether reductions are taken in stationed forces only or in both stationed and indigenous forces.

—However, stationed force redeployments are verifiable by national means, while verification of indigenous force reductions may require enhanced on-site inspections in Central Europe. (A minimum degree of on-site inspection in East Germany is allowed by the Potsdam agreement.) Elimination of indigenous force equipment poses a particularly thorny verification problem.

Thus, the most advantageous form of an MBFR agreement would appear to be one limited to or heavily weighted toward redeployment of stationed forces in Central Europe though political considerations may dictate that indigenous forces also be included. In addition, it would be to NATO's advantage to:

—Seek reduction of both conventional and nuclear Pact capabilities in exchange for NATO dual-capable weapon systems.
—Reduce only equipment in active units, since NATO, unlike the Pact, has substantial war reserves of combat equipment, such as tanks, in Central Europe.

However, both these approaches involve very complex problems that need further study.

4. Verification and warning.

The immediate issue is whether to consider agreements that cannot be verified by unilateral U.S. means, and if so, the degree of on-site inspection we would insist upon, if any. It is generally agreed that some on-site inspection will be required to verify that reductions are being carried out. The question is the degree of verification we will require in the post reduction phase.

—We cannot verify the reduction of ground force units of less than regimental size (3–5,000 men) anywhere in Central Europe.
—Outside East Germany we would have difficulty verifying the reduction of even division size forces with any reliability unless NATO military attachés and military liaison personnel were increased in numbers and restrictions on their movements were cancelled.

—However, improved technical collection systems may increase the frequency and detail of our coverage of Central Europe, enhancing our verification capability, although we would probably not be able to detect changes in individual unit strengths and equipment levels unless these were larger than 10%.

Given these limitations on the verifiability of either unit or manning reductions at the 10% level, we have to consider whether or not we are willing
to consider reductions of this size. This problem is particularly significant because our Allies, at this point, all favor a NATO position that would call for reductions of this unverifiable size. If MBFR is to be a serious arms control effort, it must involve reductions that are large enough to be verifiable even in the initial stage.

Options for Negotiation

Within the foregoing framework, we could consider a range of options of increasing comprehensiveness for discussion with our allies and exploratory talks with the Soviet Union.

(a) A limited option involving an immediate 15% reduction of stationed ground and air forces in Central Europe, with national means of verification. This could reduce U.S. force levels by 25,000–30,000 men.

(b) A more comprehensive option involving both a further 10% reduction of stationed forces and a 10–20% reduction of indigenous forces. This agreement should include on-site inspection in Central Europe, other constraining measures such as restrictions on the size of maneuvers, and limitations on theater nuclear forces.

(c) Finally, we could propose a comprehensive option involving deeper cuts in stationed and indigenous forces or stationed forces only, provided redeployed Soviet and U.S. forces were disbanded, their equipment was destroyed and on-site inspection was adequate. (Accepting such constraints on U.S. forces in the United States would not necessarily be disadvantageous. Meanwhile, proposing the option could help constrain further congressional pairing of the defense establishment.)

61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, June 17, 1971, 1647Z.

107924. Subj: Secretary–Dobrynin Conversation, June 16: MBFR. 2

1. Secretary called in Dobrynin June 16 to sound out Soviet position regarding force reductions in Europe. After pointing out that NATO is prepared to have negotiations as soon as practical, he posed series of specific questions:
   (A) In what time frame do Soviets place MBFR negotiations?
   (B) Do Soviets agree that MBFR negotiations can be conducted without connection with CES?
   (C) Do Soviets agree that both stationed and indigenous forces will be included in negotiations?
   (D) Are Soviets prepared to discuss not only numbers of personnel but also weapons systems?

2. Dobrynin replied (A) Soviet Government wishes to negotiate force reductions as soon as possible;
   (B) In regard to CES, Soviets are prepared to discuss force reduction either in committee established by CES, or in entirely separate forum, without convening CES in advance;
   (C) Soviet Government prepared to discuss both stationed and indigenous forces; and
   (D) He assumed that negotiations would cover both personnel and weapons systems, but has no specific instructions on this point.

3. Dobrynin professed to believe that NATO Lisbon Communiqué linked negotiations on force reduction with Berlin settlement, and said that his government would consider that an unacceptable precondition.

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2 In a conversation in the Oval Office with Nixon, Haig, and Ziegler on the afternoon of June 14, Rogers announced his intention to see Dobrynin to discuss MBFR: “We told, with NATO we said we’re going to consult with them bilaterally. And [Jonathan] Dean is not back there so I thought I’d get Dobrynin in and talk to him about it, and see what he has in mind. I think I’ll have to say that we’re, just what I said before we went to NATO, and that is, ‘Obviously we’re in such negotiations. We’ve been in since 1968.’ And as, we’ve so indicated. And now they’re finally indicating that they’re interested. Fine, we’ll talk to them about it. See what they have in mind.” (Ibid., White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 519–7) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.
Secretary replied that our position is that CES should not be convened until after Berlin settlement reached, but that MBFR negotiations are not linked to Berlin settlement. Dobrynin also expressed concern that holding up negotiations for exploratory talks and meeting of NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers could delay negotiations until 1972. Secretary assured him that this is not the case and that if exploratory talks satisfactory, negotiations might be possible as early as October or November.

4. Discussion turned to the Rome principles, with Dobrynin observing that Soviets had taken cautious approach because they not sure of definition of some of terms used. He asked specifically about the meaning of “balanced” force reduction. Secretary explained that “balanced” reduction simply recognizes the fact that symmetrical reduction could in many instances be disadvantageous to one side or the other. The term is not meant to be deceptive, but merely to signal that reductions must be scaled and timed so as not to operate to the military disadvantage of either side. In any case, Secretary stressed, Rome principles should not be considered preconditions to negotiation, but rather indication of an approach which we consider most likely to be fruitful. We would welcome Soviet counter-proposals. Dobrynin observed that Soviets could not accept Rome principles without further definition, but have no objection to their being presented for discussion in negotiations.

5. After Dobrynin asked why a person could not be appointed to begin serious talks, Secretary asked whether Soviets had in mind one person negotiating for each side. Dobrynin said that he would have to refer this question to his government, and requested suggestions from us. Secretary said that one possibility would be for each side (i.e. NATO and Warsaw Pact) to appoint a representative or a small group to conduct preliminary talks. Dobrynin asked when such a representative or representatives could be named and Secretary replied that it would be easier to do so following the meeting of the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers, but that it possible to do so sooner. Dobrynin also inquired whether representatives could come from U.S. and USSR. Secretary said we open minded about identity of representatives: U.S. and Soviet nationals could presumably participate in team of representatives if so designated. Important point is that negotiations be on behalf of Alliance and not bilateral between U.S. and Soviets. Dobrynin also asked whether we preferred one representative or a small group. Secretary said that we have some preference for single representative from each side, whereupon Dobrynin observed that NATO, with SecGen and Secretariat, is in better position to appoint representative than Warsaw Pact. Secretary stressed again that appointment of representatives is merely idea, and that we would welcome Soviet suggestions on the subject.

6. Dobrynin was unable to provide any details regarding Soviet thoughts on how force reduction would operate. He also was unable
to confirm that Soviet Government prepared to accept principle of negotiations between Warsaw Pact and NATO. He indicated, however, that he expected prompt reply from Soviet Government and appeared eager to pursue subject further in near future.

Rogers

62. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 17, 1971, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
MBFR

PARTICIPANTS

German
Egon Bahr—State Secretary, Chancellor’s Office
Guenther van Well—Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office

American
Henry A. Kissinger—Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmuth Sonnenfeldt—Senior Member, National Security Council
James S. Sutterlin—Director, Office of German Affairs

State Secretary Bahr opened the conversation by telling Mr. Kissinger that he had discussed MBFR with Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand the day before. He was sure that a memorandum on that conversation would be circulated. To recapitulate, the Federal Republic was of the opinion that any balanced force reduction must include indigenous as well as stationed forces.

Mr. Kissinger asked why the Federal Government held this view. Bahr replied that if balanced force reductions are carried out between East and West a balance must also be maintained among the forces in

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2 Telegram 109971 to Bonn, June 19, contains a summary of Hillenbrand’s conversation with Bahr. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US) Earlier, Rogers discussed MBFR with Brandt and Bahr. (Memorandum of conversation, June 15; ibid., POL 7 GER W)
the Western side. Aside from the United States and possibly Canada, the Federal Republic’s allies would not like to see the Bundeswehr left in a position after the withdrawal of some U.S. forces where its size would be out of proportion to other European forces.

Mr. Kissinger said that no conclusions have been reached on this question yet in Washington. He could understand the argument which Bahr had advanced. He noted, however, that there were also the following arguments in favor of reductions only in stationed forces. First, the verification problem for indigenous forces would be monumental. Secondly, it is the Soviet forces in the central European area which are best equipped for offensive action. Therefore, it is by reducing Soviet forces that one reduces the offensive capacity of the Communist side. Thirdly—and this, Mr. Kissinger noted, might not be so attractive to the German side—it would be attractive domestically if the size of the U.S. deployment in Europe could be reduced while the force strength of our European allies remained unchanged, since this would signify some equalization of the defense burden. Mr. Kissinger noted that there would be a meeting of the NSC at 3:30 p.m. to consider all of these questions. Decisions would not be made at the meeting, but conclusions would be reached for presentation to the President.

Bahr said that he could understand the domestic American interest in concentrating reductions on stationed forces. In this German and U.S. interests might diverge a bit. Perhaps one could bridge this over through the timing of the various stages in a troop reduction plan. If one began with only a small first step which would really be symbolic in nature, then the U.S. domestic argument would be persuasive.

Bahr said he could also see the point concerning the offensive capacity of Soviet forces. Here, of course, the question arose as to which territory would be included in a plan. From the German point of view it was desirable that the reductions not be limited solely to the territory of the FRG and the GDR. Mr. Kissinger replied that various options were included in the NSC study, one of which was such a restricted territorial approach. He considered this most unlikely, however, indeed unthinkable. Bahr then made the point that even a small first step could, by its nature, strongly influence the character of further stages in a mutual reduction plan. For this reason it would be unfortunate if the plan began on the basis of too small an area. Mr. Kissinger agreed and said again that he did not think it likely that any plan would be limited to German territory. He added that, as the President had emphasized the previous day to the Chancellor, the United States will not move unilaterally on any of these points.

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3 See Document 63.
4 See Document 59.
Bahr felt that the Soviets would probably argue for the inclusion of indigenous forces since the Bundeswehr is considerably larger than the East German Army. He added that for home consumption in the Federal Republic it would be good if the Bundeswehr could be reduced. All of the Western Europeans would be inclined to say if the U.S. is reducing its burden why shouldn’t they do likewise? Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that such a reaction would be natural but pointed out that from the American point of view we would consider this the kind of more equitable sharing of the defense burden which has long been desirable. Bahr thought that nonetheless this reaction should be expected.

Bahr digressed at this point to state that he had found in conversing with Senator Mansfield that only two arguments had any impact. First, U.S. forces in Europe could not be replaced by European forces because of their nuclear capacity. Secondly, the U.S. is a super power and therefore simply cannot run away.

Returning to MBFR, Bahr commented that we must be careful lest a kind of euphoria arise precisely at a time when, because of the reductions, the security situation may actually deteriorate somewhat. Mr. Kissinger agreed that this was a valid point which could be even more relevant if the size of the reductions were substantial. The studies which we have made, he said, show that a relatively small reduction would not affect the Western defense capacity adversely. Beyond ten percent, however, reductions would have a progressively more negative effect on our defense capacity. If 30 percent reductions were carried out our defense situation would be substantially inferior until M-Day + 60, a time which Mr. Kissinger doubted we would ever reach. Bahr said that German experts had come to the same conclusion. Their studies showed, however, that if the figure went above 40 percent the situation might reverse itself somewhat in favor of the Western side. Mr. Kissinger pointed out that the defensive forces must cover the whole area of their responsibility while offensive forces can concentrate their strength in a selected area.
Notes of a National Security Council Meeting


RN [Richard Nixon]: Subj. today old but timely. Have been dis. tangentially with Brandt. Purpose is to get position understood on basis of interagency group work. Not agree on position to take but see how we should move in conversations within alliance + with SU. Should know where we want to come out.

Helms: Briefing. BR [balanced reductions] prog. has both milit. and polit. implications.

Forces: 52 Sov divs. 29 EE [Eastern Europe]. (Text from CIA.)

Verification: Tasks: (1) assessment of forces before red. (2) reduction. (3) reduction adhered to . . . Problems; limitations. Collection means.


Military advantage. Bulk of forces for def. ag. NATO; hence, if NATO reduces, so can Sovs. Redeploy to China; economic strains.

Put NATO on defensive with simple proposals, say 30% cut. But will keep options open till they see what happens. May just manipulate.

NATO reactions.

(1) Mansfield caught them off balance.
(2) Want initiative.
(3) But cautious; Germany worried about Berlin; also worried might become bilateral like SALT.
(4) Pleased by Lisbon formula.
(5) France still cautious and did not join in Lisbon communiqué.
(6) Awaiting further U.S. work.

Rogers: Briefing reflects views of individuals but not of Fonmins. Scheel quite willing to have negots as long as not in ESC.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1971 through 6/20/74. No classification marking. The notes were handwritten by Wayne Smith. According to the President's Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting: the President, Rogers, Laird, Connally, Lincoln, Mitchell, Packard, Helms, Moore, Gerard Smith, Farley, Irwin, Hillebrand, Kissinger, Wayne Smith, and Sonnenfeldt. The time of the meeting is also from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

See Document 59.

The notes for Helms's briefing are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–031, NSC Meeting, MBFR, 6/17/71.
Schumann had little to say. Wanted to be helpful to us. U.S. had done more than it should. The others should do more; but not opposition to us. Pompidou pointed this out. Meeting generally most successful. Canadians proposed immediate negs. But we wanted to wait. We left everything flexible, including on timing. Emissary “when appropriate.” We have positive communiqué but very flexible can wait as long as we want. Brandt satisfied.

RN: What is effect of reductions of Sov forces on EG [East Germans], Poles, Czechs, Hungarians; realize talking about 10%–20%. To what extent do present forces maintain regimes in power?

RH [Richard Helms]: All want Sovs [illegible] down occupation forces. Question about reliability of EE. But would want [illegible] own forces down to get Sovs down. Accept, except in GDR. Situation here very foggy.

RN: Sov forces drain on GDR economy?

RH: Yes.

HAK: Sev. mtgs of VP [Verification Panel] to lay out positions prior to Allied decisions + our own.

Following issues: p. 2 talking pts. 4

(1) Size. (p. 3 TP’s [talking points]). 5

Table passed out. Explains figures (Tab A). 6 My M+60 effects erased because of replenishments.

M-Day: more favorable for NATO; decrease chance of surprise attack.

No MBFR improves NATO sit. after mobilization. Page 4 of TP’s. 7 pp. 5–6.

On asymmetry: Shouldn’t encumber negotiations since no effect.
Tentative conclusion: Between 10–30% (see p. 6).  
(2) Geographic Area. Table handed out. Tab B.  
 p 6, Talking points.  
p. 7.  
p. 8.  

If area too wide, verification very poor + Sovs would ask for UK, France + perhaps parts of U.S.  
If cuts exceed 30%, should include Sov. territ + we should have inspection dec. of reinforcement. Two Germany’s alone politically unacceptable.  
(3) Nationality + Type (p. 9)  
Reduction of indigenous forces extremely complex.  
Concentrate on stationed forces.  
Pro:  
(1) reduce Sov forces.  
(2) meet Cong. press.  
(3) improve proportionate share of allies.  
WR [William Rogers]: NATO ministers did not feel indigenous forces necess., but want to talk about so won’t be left out.  
Con:  
(1) First step of U.S. withdrawal (the best of circumstances).  
(2) Enhance German weight.  
RN: How many US in Europe?  
ML [Melvin Laird]: 304,000.  
RN: Sov?  
Adm. Moorer: 370,000.  
RN: We talking about Sov-Amer. reductions?  
HAK: In our interest: our Germans better than their Poles + Czechs.
RN: Recalls Polish troops, honor guard in 1959,\textsuperscript{11} cheering at RN. Wouldn’t rely on Poles.

WR: 30–90,000 US.

RN: We may talk about NATO, WP, but we mean US–SU. Reduction of Sov forces much greater blow to Sovs. Indigenous forces unreliable. They must know this; hence negots will be tough.

WR: Only France would be against bec. of fear of Germany.

RN: That’s too bad.

HAK: Could do stationed first; indigenous later; or different magnitudes. \textit{But primary principle is that cut in stationed forces is in our interest.}

4. Verification (p. 12, T.P.).\textsuperscript{12}

Smith has pointed out Sov’s have been less rigid re inspection in Europe.

Study of verif. has driven us to recommend cuts of at least 10%; less not monitorable + turn into \textit{unilateral cuts}.

Defers discussion of models.

Trying to get answers to composition of various cuts (see p. 15).

Preparations with Allies (see pp. 15–16).\textsuperscript{13}

RN: Deputy For Ministers in Sept?

WR: Or October.

RN: \textit{We stay where we are as far as talking to Sovs concerned. Quiet in Public.}

WR: No problem. Saw Dob. yesterday.\textsuperscript{14} He wanted to get into substance. \textit{WR talked about procedure.} Forum, participants, etc. He said he would get answers.

\textsuperscript{11} Regarding Nixon’s 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President, see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190–225.

\textsuperscript{12} The discussion of verification in Kissinger’s talking points reads in part as follows: “The issue here is whether we want to consider agreements that cannot be verified by \textit{unilateral U.S. means, and if so, the degree of on-site inspection we would insist upon, if any.}” The points continued: “We cannot verify manpower reductions by national means unless the reductions are taken in identifiable units, with their equipment.”

\textsuperscript{13} Pages 15–16 of Kissinger’s talking points reads in part: “We have organized our ongoing work in the Verification Panel so that we will be prepared for intensive consultations with our allies on the substance of an MBFR position or positions which can form the basis for the initial stage of negotiations with the Soviet Union. We will send a ‘sanitized’ version of a thorough evaluation of MBFR approaches to NATO before the end of the month for presentation to the North Atlantic Council. By July 1, we should give our allies our position on the elements which form the basic framework of our MBFR position, with detailed rationales drawn from the Evaluation Report and other previous work submitted to NATO.” The points continued: “In the coming weeks, we will review the ongoing interagency work on MBFR options in the light of decisions which emerge from this meeting, and speed up the assessment of options.”

\textsuperscript{14} See Document 61.
ML: Problem with Allies. Found with Def Mins. they don’t know what to do with Def. Planning. They face budget cuts. Should discuss proposals with military + Def Ministers since it won’t mean reduction for them in contrib to defense of Europe. Never had to hold hands, so much before. Russians shot rug out from under them.

RN: Only involves US–Sov. They won’t be able to cut.

Irwin: Would involve UK + France, if phrased as “stationed.”

RN: 10% not much.

HAK: French would only withdraw across Rhine.

WR: Didn’t find what M.L. found. Fonmins very encouraged.

Moorer: Found Brits + Germans discouraged. AD–70\textsuperscript{15} being discouraged by MBFR. Real problem of losing momentum.

WR: Fonmins said they had to keep up improvements.

Moorer: Fouquet said Europeans would not improve.

ML: Have to keep pressure on Europeans. Bring Goodpaster in to make sure he keeps pressure.

WR: Fonmins feel that MBFR will prevent US from making unilateral cuts, especially if successful.

RN: Excellent preparations. Sovs not prepared (as WR said).

ML: Brits have done good work.

[Gerard] Smith: (1) Need better focus on main purpose:

(a) Some say improve NATO position
(b) Some say détente
(c) Some think just ag. Mansfield.

Need clarity.


(3) Should not go too far in saying we can do with unilateral verification. Should have a good deal of o-s [onsite] inspection. Sovs have made proposals on this since 1957.

ML: Sovs might throw in other issues: aircraft, navies. We need to do additional work.

HAK: FBS may be drawn in. Nuclear issue.

\textsuperscript{15} See footnote 2, Document 34. The NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1970 approved an annex to the main communiqué on AD–70; it noted that ten of the European members of NATO had agreed to adopt a European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP), providing for additional European outlays for NATO’s defense. EDIP became an ongoing topic of discussion within NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974, pp. 249–252.
ML: The longer talks last, the worse we are off. Bargaining chip gets lost.
HAK: If nuclear MBFR, we may need different geographic area bec. Sov threat is in W SU.
WR: Should start with simple, conventional cuts.
Lincoln: People will say we will cut 10–30% anyway even if we say MBFR. Hard to hold line if negots last; long time, as Sov negot history shows.
RN: Very useful exercise. We have to press forward; despite victory over Mansfield, support in country declining. We have to give American people hope.

[Omitted here is discussion of leaks of classified material to the press.]

64. Editorial Note

United States Embassies in Europe reported on the reaction of the European allies to Secretary Rogers’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on June 16, 1971, with regard to MBFR (see Document 61). On June 21, the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reported the reaction of the NATO Political Advisers to the conversation: “Canadian rep requested (and was given) assurance that Rogers–Dobrynin exchange was bilateral sounding only and that Secretary Rogers was not speaking for the alliance.” The report continued: “Dutch also asked whether we felt US-Soviet exchanges on MBFR were developing into the principal bilateral channel on the subject, to the exclusion of the other NATO allies. We replied that we did not consider this the case, that US and Soviets were simply discussing matters in context of normal bilateral soundings which other allies were presumably also undertaking.” (Telegram 2640 from USNATO, June 21; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 261, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. X)

On June 24, the Embassy in London reported on the British reaction to Rogers’s conversation: “British officials have uniformly expressed concern that NATO may be drifting too rapidly and without adequate preparation into MBFR negotiations. They are perplexed by lack of U.S. contribution to NATO studies and papers. They are concerned about U.S. intentions in light of Rogers–Dobrynin conversation of 16 June and reports of U.S. interest in ‘small’ but symmetrical force
reductions via MBFR. British believe that serious damage to NATO’s security can only be prevented by a slower pace, a clearer understanding of our objectives, and agreement prior to negotiations both among allies and with other side on basic principles.” (Telegram 5892 from London, June 24; ibid., Box 728, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI)

On June 28, the Embassy in Bonn reported: “Senior FRG officials continue highly concerned about the possibility of U.S. bilateral negotiations with the USSR on aspects of MBFR. FRG DefMin Schmidt has made a strong appeal to the Ambassador to avoid all bilateralism. FRG Disarmament Commissioner Roth is also concerned by this possibility, particularly in light of what he considers to be strong internal pressures in the U.S. to achieve quick initial results on MBFR.” (Telegram 7900 from Bonn, June 28; ibid, Box 685, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VIII)

On July 8, the Embassy in Bonn reported on the French and German reaction to United States interest in MBFR as expressed at a Franco-German summit meeting:

“A responsible Foreign Office disarmament official has informed us in the strictest confidence concerning the MBFR–defense aspects of the Franco-German summit consultations July 5–6 in Bonn. Reading from a memorandum covering the conversations on MBFR, our source said that French President Pompidou, Defense Minister Debre and Foreign Minister Schumann had told Chancellor Brandt, Defense Minister Schmidt and Foreign Minister Scheel that the USG had ‘definitively decided’ to reduce American troop levels in Europe. The French said that this was a profound change in US policy since the December 1970 NATO Ministerial, that the Soviet Union was aware of this decision and would use it to reinforce tendencies toward neutralism in small European countries and in the Central European area likely to be affected by such US troop reductions. France was gravely concerned, and thought such troop reductions, whether unilateral or under the umbrella of an MBFR agreement, would lead inevitably, whatever the US intention, to American political disengagement in Europe.” (Telegram 8368 from Bonn, July 8; ibid.)
65. National Security Decision Memorandum 116


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT
The U.S. Policy on Mutual Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR)

Following the June 17 NSC meeting the President has decided that U.S. explorations with the Soviet Union and consultations with our Allies in NATO on the subject of mutual force reductions shall be based on the following approach.

In general, the U.S. objective is to develop a consensus within the NATO Alliance governing the substantive elements of its position on mutual reductions of forces in Europe. Regarding specific elements, the Verification Panel will prepare a formulation and assessment of alternative options for MBFR for consideration by the National Security Council based on the following policy:

—Reductions should cover both stationed and indigenous forces, either simultaneously or in succeeding phases. The primary U.S. objective, however, is to maximize the reduction of Soviet forces, and, for this reason, proportionately large Soviet and American (or stationed force) reductions should be emphasized rather than balanced stationed and indigenous reductions. A reduction of indigenous forces only should be excluded.

—Another important U.S. objective in reductions should be to establish constraints on the reintroduction of stationed (Soviet) forces or equipment into the zone of reductions. Such constraints should be correspondingly comprehensive, possibly to include Soviet territory, as the size of reductions is increased. On the other hand, it is not essential that the area for reductions include the territory of the USSR.

—The area of reductions should not be confined to the Germanies alone; it is preferable that the area include Czechoslovakia and Poland, especially insofar as Soviet ground forces are concerned. While not de-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDMs), Nos. 97–144. Top Secret.
2 See Document 63.
sirable, the inclusion of the Benelux countries is acceptable. The inclusion of other NATO countries could be considered with an appropriate expansion of the area for Warsaw Pact reductions.

—A full range of symmetrical and asymmetrical reductions should be considered based on various degrees of severity, the requirements for adequate verification and their effects upon the conventional balance.

In developing a consensus within the NATO Alliance on this policy, the U.S. shall prepare for future transmission to the NAC:

—The “sanitized” April 12 Evaluation Report with an appropriate covering memorandum indicating that its conclusions are still tentative. This study should be completed no later than July 2, 1971.

—A revised version of the June 1971 Elements of MBFR study modified to indicate the decisions in this memorandum. This study should be completed by July 6, 1971.

—A range of specific MBFR options and a thorough assessment of their implications. These options should range from limited symmetrical reductions to more comprehensive reductions possibly involving a wider area and a variety of reductions as well as verification provisions and collateral constraints. This study should be completed by August 1, 1971.

These preparations for consultations should be made by the agencies responsible under the overall direction of the Verification Panel. Prior to the development and consideration by the President of specific mutual force reduction options, it is understood that the substance of our consultations with our NATO allies shall not go beyond existing Presidential guidance. In no instance will reductions figures be discussed with our allies. Regarding the procedure, forum, and timing of exploratory or preparatory talks with the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. should give full weight to the views of the allies.

Henry A. Kissinger

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3 See Document 47.
4 Telegram 130817 to USNATO, July 20, instructed the Mission “to circulate the sanitized version of the April 12 MBFR evaluation report, entitled ‘ MBFR—Some Assumptions, Models, and Implications’ in the NAC and other NATO fora you deem advisable at the earliest appropriate time following receipt. The paper should be covered by an appropriate memorandum indicating that its conclusions are still tentative.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 261, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. X)
On July 12, Wayne Smith reported in a memorandum to Kissinger that transmission of the sanitized report had been delayed owing to objections from Goodpaster. Smith’s memorandum is scheduled for publication in see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
5 Not found.
66. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 28, 1971, 1635Z.

5366. Subject: Gromyko on force reductions. Ref: State 135527.2

1. Summary: Gromyko indicated July 28 that Soviets are prepared to discuss force reductions in all of Europe and not just central Europe. He opposed discussion on bloc to bloc basis, noting this position shared by certain other governments. He stated that first order of business was clear statement by governments concerned as to whether or not they accept Soviet proposal for discussions. He emphasized that Soviets do not consider that USG has made such response, since US statements on subject have been hedged with reservations. End summary.

2. During general survey with me July 28 (septel) Gromyko briefly referred to question of force reductions in Europe (he corrected his interpreter who had used term central Europe and said he did not just have central Europe in mind). He noted that there had been discussions on this subject before and he hoped there would soon be opportunity for further discussions, including bilateral ones. He claimed to see substantial possibilities for the future in this area.

3. I returned to subject later, noting I wanted to be sure both sides understood where we stand now in discussion this question. Secretary had raised certain questions with Dobrynin in their conversation June 16 and Dobrynin had said he would endeavor get replies. Subsequent informal discussions between Korniyenko and Klossen were useful but naturally did not lead to specific replies since this is complex question and both sides need time for study. I said our present understanding is that Dobrynin will reply to Secretary in due course. For our part, we are willing to continue and expedite preparations for substantive discussions. I asked whether Gromyko viewed present situation as we do.

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2 Telegram 135527 to Moscow, July 27, provided Beam instructions on MBFR for his meeting with Gromyko. It stated that “you may wish to reiterate our interest in moving forward as rapidly as is feasible on this complex question involving so many governments. As reflected in the Lisbon communiqué, the question of MBFR will be the subject of intensive discussion for the next few months within NATO.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XIV)
3 Telegram 5367 from Moscow, July 28. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)
4 See Document 61.
5 Telegram 4351 from Moscow, June 23, reported on the conversation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)
4. In reply, Gromyko said he was acquainted with the Secretary’s talk with Dobrynin in June. In this connection he wished to emphasize that Soviet Government is against approaching problem on bloc to bloc basis. This view is shared by other governments. Although on first glance this appeared to be procedural or organizational question, in reality it was political one. Secretary had referred to meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives. Some countries would give a failing grade to this approach. Matters did not need to be complicated by being put in this form. Problem already very complex, and he did not exclude need for further bilateral exchanges. He hoped this would not be last time we discussed problem on bilateral basis.

5. Gromyko repeatedly emphasized that the Soviets want a clear answer from potential participants in force reduction discussions as to whether or not they accept the Soviet proposal. He claimed the position of USG and other governments was not clear on this point. The USG had made a statement but it had been hedged with various reservations. From Soviet standpoint, it was not clear whether positive elements in US statement or the reservations were the main thing. USG should clarify its position, either publicly or in written form. He said Soviets are still in process considering various other questions related to this subject, but these could be introduced at later stage after Soviets learn how many and which countries accept Soviet proposal.

6. I noted in response that force reduction concept was not new. It had been advanced several years before. In terms Soviets had proposed it, we obviously accepted it as topic for negotiation and as a desirable agreed goal, but procedural issues were now one of main problems. Soviets had made one proposal, which we were considering together with NATO colleagues. We would welcome Soviet ideas as to where we go from here and how we should push forward with exchanges. In meantime, I said that Washington was under the impression that Dobrynin would be giving a fuller response to the Secretary’s questions.

7. Gromyko would not go beyond saying that Soviets would think about questions posed by Secretary and might return to them in the future. In response my observation that there might be meeting of NATO deputy foreign ministers in several weeks during which force reduction question would be considered, Gromyko said (half-seriously by his own admission) that he did not understand how such wise men as NATO ministers could meet without reaching decision on force reduction discussions devoid of any reservations.

8. Department pass as desired.
67. Editorial Note

On August 3, 1971, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff sent President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger a briefing memorandum for the latter’s upcoming meeting with French Ambassador Charles Lucet later that same day. Sonnenfeldt wrote:

“During his other pre-departure calls, Lucet has been stressing MBFR. He has indicated that France does not wish to reduce its own forces, is in favor of ‘global’ rather than regional disarmament, and is against the concept of a NATO ‘explorer’ such as Brosio which infers bloc to bloc negotiations opposed by the French.

“You may wish to indicate that
“—we are willing to consider other approaches than just a single explorer, since we would welcome French participation if there are resulting negotiations;
“—we recognize the security risks involved in MBFR, and for that reason we have urged NATO to continue to study the issues, such as those raised in the US paper recently submitted to the Council;
“—finally, we feel ourselves under no particular time pressure for MBFR.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files, Europe, France, Vol. VIII)

At the meeting on August 3, Lucet raised the subject of MBFR with Kissinger. According to a memorandum prepared by Sonnenfeldt:

“Lucet then turned to MBFR and recited long standing French reasons for opposing it. He stressed that France cannot be committed by NATO decisions. Dr. Kissinger referred to the US domestic situation. He noted that we were somewhat better off in this regard at the moment and MBFR was not the most burning issue with us. As long as the domestic situation remains relatively quiet, we have time to move deliberately on MBFR. Lucet said that the French would not participate in the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting, although they might send an observer. Dr. Kissinger said we would not protest and this would not become an issue between our two Presidents.” (Memorandum for the Record, August 4; ibid.)
West German Chancellor Willy Brandt visited the Soviet Union for two days of talks with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev September 17–18, 1971. Among the topics they discussed were a European security conference and mutual force reductions. On September 20, the State Secretary in the Chancellor’s Office, Egon Bahr, provided Ambassador to Germany Kenneth Rush with an account of the talks. Rush summarized Bahr’s comments in telegram 11676 from Bonn the same day: “Brezhnev indicated that he was interested in MBFR negotiations but not sure of what criteria should be applied to force reductions. He said the Soviet Government was studying the subject seriously and was willing to negotiate on all aspects of it. At no point did he mention the word ‘balanced,’ but did on several occasions state that reductions should be ‘of the same quality.’ He mentioned reductions of troops but not of military equipment. Both Brandt and Brezhnev agreed that neither side should profit from a MBFR agreement at the expense of the other. They agreed that MBFR negotiations should not be a topic reserved solely to the great powers, should not solely involve stationed forces, but should cover all forces in the area of application of an agreement and should not cover Germany alone, but a broader area. It was agreed that the MBFR topic could be broached in the framework of a Conference on European Security, but should not be a substitute for the latter. Brezhnev should [said] he realized that the parties in the CES would not be identical as those involved in the MBFR and that MBFR negotiations would probably take longer than a successful CES would take. Bahr said Brandt was pleased that the joint FRG-Soviet communiqué explicitly mentioned participation in a CES by the United States and Canada; he believed it was the first explicit mention in a formal Soviet communiqué of this point. Brezhnev urged Brandt to take the same positive attitude towards the CES as the French Government. Brandt responded that his position on this topic was closer to that of the United States. There should be cautious progress and full advance preparation. Brezhnev said the CES project should be pushed vigorously after December, thus indicating clearly his expectation that the inner-German talks would be concluded by mid-December prior to the NATO ministerial meeting.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 686, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. X)

The same day, September 20, Chancellor Brandt sent his own summary of his meeting with Brezhnev in a letter to President Nixon. He discussed his conversations with Brezhnev on European security and MBFR: “The discussion with Secretary General Brezhnev left me with the impression that he is anxious to emphasize his interest in further détente in Europe. This is expressed in Soviet readiness to discuss com-
plicated questions such as troop reductions and that in concrete terms and with the qualification that they must not lead to disadvantages for any of the parties concerned. The Soviet side obviously has not yet developed a perfect concept, not even for the criteria to be followed. This could put our alliance into a favorable position to influence Soviet thinking. I attach particular importance to the conference to be held on this issue in the framework of NATO in early October. At least Mr. Brezhnev has commented in a positive sense on our view that a troop reduction should include also national forces, that it should not be limited to the territory of the two states in Germany, and that it should be balanced. According to my impression the Soviet Union continues to attach great importance to convening a conference on security and cooperation in Europe; it has realized that the actual questions of security cannot be left aside, and it is also aware that careful preparations are necessary. My host was interested to learn whether the Federal Republic would raise special objections during the preparation of such a conference. I have, of course, based my answer on what has been agreed in the Alliance.” Brandt continued: “You will be interested, dear Mr. President, that Mr. Brezhnev addressed himself on several occasions to the American policy, and that in a different sense than he did a year ago. Certainly, at that time he also underlined that he did not wish to drive a wedge between us and our allies, especially our principal ally. This time, however, he expressed, at least by his words, his interest in the best possible relations, especially with the United States. He mentioned this both in discussing MBFR and in general.” For the full text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 330.

National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt forwarded Brandt’s letter to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger the same day. In a covering memorandum, Sonnenfeldt characterized the letter as “a highly euphoric and, I feel, a misleading account.” Sonnenfeldt explained: “I have done a brief memorandum to the President, gisting Brandt’s main points, which include favorable Brezhnev references to the US and to the President. I have not tried to critique the Soviet visit for the President, but from our point of view it is pretty bad. Brandt clearly accepted the Soviet scenario of a CES (the communiqué says ‘accelerate preparations’) before MBFR. And on MBFR he enlisted Brezhnev’s support for the position the Germans are pressing for in NATO—definite inclusion of national, i.e., German forces, an area not limited to Germany, and some vague acknowledgment that reductions should be of the ‘same quality’ or without disadvantage to either side. In his press conference, Brandt refers to equality of reductions—a phrase that will haunt us. All of this merely confirms that Brandt has mortgaged his policies to Brezhnev and in each succeeding phase he will have to pay an installment.” In the margin of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote
back to Sonnenfeldt with regard to Brandt’s Soviet visit: “You should critique it—along these lines soonest.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 686, Country Files, Germany (Bonn), Vol. X)

On September 28, Kissinger forwarded to the President the translation of Brandt’s letter. In a covering memorandum, drafted by Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger wrote: “Chancellor Brandt spent some 16 hours in conversation with Brezhnev during their recent meeting.” He then characterized the problem: “Brandt’s report of his conversations borders on the euphoric. In fact, however, on most of the issues—mutual force reductions (MBFR) and a European security conference (CES)—Brandt seems to have largely gone along with Soviet views. In response to Brezhnev’s pressure for an early CES, [less than 1 line not declassified] Brandt agreed that there should be a preliminary conference (which is a Soviet view). He told Brezhnev that this was in accord with a discussion he had had with you on this subject. On MBFR prospects Brandt seems to have implied that MBFR could await the convocation of a CES. This contrasts with the US position that the issue of force level reduction is independent of a CES and should proceed as soon as possible without regard to the possibilities for convening a CES. Brandt also seems to have secured Brezhnev’s support for the position the Germans have been pressing within NATO that national forces (German) should be reduced in addition to stationed (US) forces, and that the area of reductions should be wider than both Germanies.” For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 331.

69. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

MBFR and CES

In addition to the MBFR issues in Wayne Smith’s briefing book for the Tuesday’s Verification Panel, you may wish to take up the relationship of MBFR to CES.

The State Department paper recommends that our position
—stress that Berlin agreement be completed before beginning multilateral CES discussion (no problem);
—indicate that eventual CES would include some reference to MBFR (ambiguous; a new departure);
—support “vigorous Allied pursuit of studies currently in progress looking toward common negotiating positions and possible forms of agreement” (i.e., not the issues, but the procedure).

The NAC study on MBFR also includes some language on linkage:
—that MBFR negotiations, if they start before (CES) should be held in such a way as to allow the possibility of incorporation in the general framework of CES.
—If CES takes place first, the Alliance should support MBFR as an agenda item.

As you can see, this is more of linkage than we have ever established in any White House guidance. Heretofore, our position has been that MBFR should be separate from CES and should clearly come first—on the grounds that MBFR dealt with a real security concern, while CES would be most likely to deal in atmospherics.

The Soviets naturally have maintained the linkage, though more ambiguously in recent months. In the follow up to Brezhnev’s Tbilisi speech, which seemed to separate MBFR and CES, Gromyko confirmed to Beam that it should be taken up separately. More recently, however, especially in the wake of the Berlin agreement, the Soviets are back tracking.

—Kosygin pushed for CES with Harold Wilson mentioning the start of active preparations after the first of the year.

—Brezhnev also mentioned as his timetable a “vigorous” effort after December. The Brandt–Brezhnev communiqué states that “the situation now shaping Europe facilitates the convocation of the all-European Conference. The Soviet and the Federal Republic intend to hold consultations shortly with each other, with their allies and with other European states in order to accelerate the holding of the conference.”

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2 Memorandum from Smith to Kissinger, September 21. (Ibid.)
3 Memorandum from Acting Secretary Irwin to Kissinger, September 17. (Ibid.)
4 Not found.
5 See Document 49.
6 See Document 66.
7 See Document 68.
Moreover, according to Bahr’s briefing Brandt and Brezhnev agreed that the MBFR topic could be broached in the framework of a conference on European security, but should not be a substitute for the latter.

Finally, the UK in NATO suggests that a “procedural” linkage be established between CES and MBFR. Their motive, however, is their concern over MBFR and the possibility of postponing it or submerging it in CES. In addition, if Wilson now pushes a CES, the Conservatives will have to show themselves more active.

The French, of course, support CES.

In sum, we need to sort out the linkage problem, especially if we intend to oppose drawing the two problems together. If we do not, the current drift is such that the Soviets will be in a position to have their own program: a CES first, then a MBFR under the aegis of the CES.

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70. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting

Washington, September 21, 1971, 3:08–4:04 p.m.

SUBJECT
MBFR

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger  
State
John N. Irwin  
Martin J. Hillenbrand  
Ronald L.Spiers  
Ralph J. McGuire  
Defense
David Packard  
G. Warren Nutter  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
Clayton E. McManaway  
ACDA
Philip J. Farley  
Thomas Hirschfeld  
OST
Dr. Edward David  
OMB
Kenneth Dam  
Justice
John Mitchell

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Minutes Originals, 1969–3/8/72. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Davis forwarded the minutes to Kissinger, Smith, Sonnenfeldt, and Kennedy on October 2 under a covering memorandum. A notation on the covering memorandum dated November 6 reads, “HAK has seen.”
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—A preferred U.S. position cannot be ready in time for the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting in early October, but we must present something at that meeting. We require a clear elaboration of the options open to us and a specific statement of the mandate the Explorer is to be given. The Working Group will prepare a paper along these lines.

—The U.S. proposal must be reasonable, realistic, attainable and must represent a serious effort.

—The Allies cannot be permitted to use MBFR reductions as a rationale for further cuts of their national forces or defense budgets.

—The Rapacki Plan Area is our first choice of area, but we could accept either the NATO Guidelines Area plus Hungary or the NATO Guidelines Area alone as fallback choices.

—The Explorer should not present alternatives to the Russians. His visit is intended merely to feel them out and ascertain their thinking on MBFR.²

—The Explorer should visit Moscow first, report back to the NATO Foreign Ministers and then go to Eastern Europe only if his Moscow visit showed signs of promise. There appears to be no compelling reason for the Explorer to visit neutral nations and this should not be encouraged.

—Another meeting of the Verification Panel will be held on September 30 to discuss the options to be presented to the Explorer.

Dr. Kissinger: We seem to have three matters to review today in preparation for Jack Irwin’s trip to the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting at which MBFR approaches to the Soviets will be discussed. The three issues are: (a) the substance of the Alliance position on MBFR that will later be provided as guidance for the MBFR Explorer, (b) the approach Jack is to take at the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting and (c) the future actions we should take within the U.S. Government to insure that we and the Alliance are fully prepared to deal with whatever develops.

² The NATO Council appointed Brosio as NATO’s “explorer” for talks with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states on MBFR.
The NATO guidelines appear to be pretty unexceptionable. There is no disagreement within the Alliance that reductions are to be mutual and balanced, that they are to be substantial, that they are to be adequately verified and concerned with a specified area and specified type of forces. There is no agreement on what the area is to consist of, what types of forces and what numbers or percentages of them are to be reduced and the relative weight to be given stationed and indigenous forces. I have a personal problem with the idea of an explorer. The Communists are not bashful about letting us know what they think. However, it’s a good way to get the ball rolling. Is there anything we don’t know about this?

Mr. Irwin: Well, an important factor in these discussions is the domestic situation in this country. We have real pressures in the Congress and in the country for a reduction of forces in Europe, and since we won’t be sitting down with the Soviets for some time, this NATO approach provides an important interim step which may help to lessen some of our domestic political pressures. We get something out of it, and it’s a good idea even if we can’t get much.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that we should do it, but, as an aside, I’m not in favor of getting into discussions with the Soviets to try to placate Congress. You can win a two week respite from Congressional criticism and end up paying the Soviets for years. When the Communists have a position they will let you know it; they hit you over the head with a baseball bat.

Mr. Packard: I agree we’re probably not likely to turn up anything. We should have a position, though. We should know what we want before getting out on a limb.

Mr. Irwin: That’s right. We have the problem, though, that our NATO Allies think we haven’t been sufficiently forthcoming. They are skeptical that we may see this as a means of unilateral withdrawal and we should be able to present a proposal as soon as possible that will allay some of their fears.

Mr. Packard: We shouldn’t get too far out in front.

Adm. Moorer: It’s just too early for us to come up with decisions on some of these questions. We need more time to consider all the ramifications and all the possibilities before deciding on the exact area and the exact items to be reduced and on the problem of verification.

Dr. Kissinger: The U.S. role is complicated. On the one hand, our Allies think we’re not being candid. On the other, if we press too hard, they may feel we are trying to get out of Europe and are willing to pay any price to do so. They are already suspicious of our financial activities, which they consider a subterfuge to get our troops out. Is anyone from Treasury here?

Mrs. Davis: No one from Treasury is at the meeting.
Mr. Irwin: We should be prepared to discuss alternative options with our allies and to be flexible in our discussions with them.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The NATO countries have been suspicious of our intentions all along. We promised last July to have elements and options papers for their consideration prior to the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting, but we have not been able to get them ready in time.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not? (to Wayne Smith) Aren’t you working on these papers?

Mr. Smith: We are working on an options paper and I expect to have it ready soon.

Dr. Kissinger: In a couple of weeks?

Mr. Smith: I hope so, but it hasn’t been gamed in DOD and I suspect it’s weeks away.

Mr. Irwin: Whether or not we have it for the meeting, what I say must be agreed and accurate and we must be willing to live up to it.

Dr. Kissinger: So we have one basic choice to make: do we present them at this meeting with a preferred US position, or would it be better to go one more round, keeping our options open. We might be better off to complete our paper, review it in this group, and then give it to them—even if it hasn’t been completely gamed.

Mr. Packard: Maybe not before the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting but before the December Ministerial.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we have another meeting of this group before the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting to review options so we can give them some idea of our thinking, and then give them a detailed paper about three weeks after the meeting?

Mr. Smith: I’d be reluctant to promise the paper before mid-November.

Mr. Packard: I don’t think we should put anything out until we are on more solid ground. We might give them an idea of the range of things we are considering.

Dr. Kissinger: I think they are entitled to be told about the options. It will make them very insecure to say we’re studying things but won’t tell them what we are studying.

Mr. Nutter: They know what we have been thinking about; we have had consultations with them for some time on these questions.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Ambassador (Robert) Ellsworth promised the NATO Allies a paper by July which would contain (a) the elements of an agreement and (b) the specific MBFR options open to us with their implications. We have not delivered to date and it looks as though there will be further delays.
Mr. Smith: We gave them an elements paper last April. 3

Mr. Nutter: And we discussed it with them at the end of August.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it’s premature to give them our position, but we have to arm Jack (Irwin) with something more than just the comment that we are thinking about the problem. We should be able to give our Allies at least a little clue of what we have been considering and where our explorations have led us, and then follow up with a more complete paper on our position in November.

Mr. Packard: These questions of area and items are very involved. There are some 632 permutations of the ten positions listed in the draft paper. We have to check them out carefully.

Dr. Kissinger: But dammit, we need something that can be understood by more than just six systems analysts.

Mr. Irwin: Our position must be reasonable and realistic. It is important that we present a position that will convince our Congress and the people that we are making a serious effort. I asked about a model the other day and was told our options envisaged cutting 8,000 Pact tanks and 300 NATO tanks.

Adm. Moorer: That’s the common ceiling option. It’s a good place to start.

Mr. Irwin: We can make a good case for the common ceiling, but the numbers are unrealistic even to the Congress.

Adm. Moorer: It just highlights how much more they have than we do.

Mr. Packard: But we don’t want to start with what we want to end with.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that we must be serious.

Mr. Packard: I don’t think we are ready to set out a specific position as the preferred U.S. position. We have to study the complexities of the proposed reductions more carefully.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) Are you willing to go in without a preferred position?

Mr. Irwin: Yes, if I can say what we are studying.

Mr. Packard: We can work out a range of things.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) Can we have another session before your departure to go over the options to be discussed with the Allies. If ours is absurd or unrealistic . . .

Mr. Irwin: Unattainable.

3 See Document 47.
Dr. Kissinger: Or unattainable, we can drop it. As I understand it the consensus of this group is not to come down on one preferred position but to put before our Allies the content of our thinking and give them an opportunity to participate in the elaboration of that thinking, within a time schedule. Is that fair?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our allies are looking for leadership.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) When are you leaving?

Mr. Irwin: A week from Sunday.

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll have another meeting next Thursday.

Now I would like to discuss some of the specific points under consideration. On the question of reduction of stationed versus indigenous forces, as I understand it State views a ratio of two stationed to one indigenous as desirable.

Mr. Irwin: The Allies will insist on indigenous cuts, but I think there should be as wide disparity as possible between those and the cuts in stationed forces. I would rather see U.S. and Soviet forces cut than those of the other countries. It would help our balance of payments and get Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: This makes sense for two reasons, first the most effective Pact forces are the Soviet forces, and second, it pulls the teeth of the burden-sharing argument.

Mr. Irwin: We will probably have to agree to a 10% reduction in indigenous forces but we would try to hold down anything over 10% as much as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) But you are not going to discuss specific percentages except in terms of options. These are preliminary discussions and we can get into specifics later. The Allies must understand two things: 1) we’re not using MBFR as a way to bug out of Europe; and 2) they can help us by letting us use MBFR to show our critics that they are willing to assume a slightly larger burden with slightly increased defense budgets.

Mr. Irwin: That’s exactly right.

Dr. Kissinger: They have to understand that a percentage cut cannot be used as a rationale for further cuts in their national forces or budgets. They can’t keep playing domestic politics in their countries with NATO force reductions. Our Congress will start cutting our forces.

Mr. Packard: They also have to put a little more emphasis on force improvements. We have to convince them that force improvements would be helpful in this regard.

Mr. Irwin: We should make them maintain the force improvements they’ve already agreed to.

Mr. Packard: It’s not necessary to be quite that restrictive.
Dr. Kissinger: The President has approved the conclusions of the DPRC meeting last August. We are going to issue a directive which will state that force improvements will be a high priority objective, and that they have been made more necessary by the MBFR discussions.

Adm. Moorer: I’m not sure all of NATO will be included in the 10% cut. We have substantial NATO forces in Turkey, which will be outside the scope of the cut.

Dr. Kissinger: They would be excluded anyway.

Mr. Irwin: We plan to concentrate on Central Europe, although we will not exclude other areas or non-ground forces.

Dr. Kissinger: Without tying it to a particular percentage, we should make a strong point that force improvement packages will be given great weight. Some disparity between cuts in indigenous and stationed forces is essential, and it would seem best to do it on substantive grounds. Would this be a good occasion?

Mr. Irwin: Yes.

Adm. Moorer: We should do as little as possible that might encourage our allies to cut their forces. They will still use improvements as an argument to cut the size of their forces; they do it every time.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree; by logic, they should increase their forces. To use the US cut or force improvements as an excuse to cut their own forces is insanity. It is their defense we are talking about.

Mr. Irwin: I agree, but we’re locked in. Our allies feel strongly that if we cut our forces, they have to cut theirs for internal political reasons.

Adm. Moorer: Most of them cut their forces six or seven years ago.

Dr. Kissinger: I’ve seen an intelligence report recently which said that the Germans are planning more cuts.

Adm. Moorer: The Germans are having manpower problems.

Dr. Kissinger: The next question is that of area. It does not have to be settled now, but I would say that the NATO Guidelines plus Hungary would be the best area from our point of view. It contains the largest number of Soviets forces, therefore would mean the largest cut if it were on a percentage basis. Do the Europeans have any views on this?

Mr. Irwin: My preference would be the Rapacki Plan Area (East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia). We could then drop back to the NATO Guidelines (East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Benelux) plus Hungary, or NATO Guidelines without Belgium. The Belgian position is that we should either add Hungary or drop Belgium.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have a position on this question? Do we have to take one?

Mr. Irwin: It would be helpful to take a position. If we go to the NATO Guidelines, it would be better to add Hungary.

Mr. Packard: Your position is fine.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Brosio wants as much specific guidance as he can get—he will be pleading for specificity on various points. We can trot out the two possible positions.

Adm. Moorer: There’s another—including three districts in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hillenbrand: NATO isn’t thinking in that area now. Why not take a position in favor of the Rapacki Plan area, but indicate we could accept the NATO Guidelines area?

Dr. Kissinger: Why do we like the Rapacki Area?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Mainly because it includes Eastern European countries and only one Western European country.

Dr. Kissinger: This is all assuming symmetrical reductions. We mustn’t give the impression that we are limiting our thinking to symmetrical reductions.

Mr. Packard: What about some collateral restraints.

Mr. Irwin: If you include nuclear devices, you would have to add part of the Western USSR.

Adm. Moorer: We can’t go one by one; they are all interrelated. We could give Brosio several “for instances” for the Russians, and have the Russians give him some “for instances.”

Dr. Kissinger: The trouble with that is that they will pick the wrong one as they did in SALT.

Adm. Moorer: Why not give them one we don’t want.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Brosio won’t buy an obvious fake.

Dr. Kissinger: When is Brosio starting his tour—in November? The Soviet leaders will all be travelling until then.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Soon after the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers (October 5–6).

Attorney General: Does he want to start negotiations then?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He wants to get an idea of how the Soviets react to the Allied alternatives.

Dr. Kissinger: If you give the Soviets the alternatives, they will pick the wrong one and we may not be able to deliver.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Having the Explorer in motion will be a good counter-thrust to a new Mansfield proposal in the fall. If it’s a phony operation that falls flat, we won’t have much to argue with.
Dr. Kissinger: Our experience indicates that when you do something to make your life easier in the Senate for four weeks, you pay for it later. You’re better off to take the Senate on head on.

Mr. Irwin: I think what Marty (Hillenbrand) is saying is that whatever we do should be seen as being on a serious and rational basis.

Dr. Kissinger: We haven’t done our homework on the options. On what basis could Brosio talk options? Why not have him talk principles for negotiation? The Soviets used to like that.

Mr. Packard: Brosio doesn’t have to have specifics in his pocket.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Brosio can’t make the trip if we give him only the original guidelines and tell him to try to re-sell them.

Dr. Kissinger: What should he have? Could we have a “for instance” as to what he should talk about?

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have ten or so points still at issue. He could talk about as many as we can settle before he goes.

Dr. Kissinger: Such as the area to be considered?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: He had better tell them what we want rather than ask them what they want.

Mr. Hillenbrand: To the extent we know what we want.

Dr. Kissinger: If we don’t know what we want, why ask them?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The purpose of the Explorer is not to freeze positions but to get an idea of their thinking. He would report back to the December Ministerial meeting on the outcome of his discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: What if the outcome of his discussions proves to be unacceptable?

Mr. Hillenbrand: NATO could reject them. Brandt has already explored Soviet thinking. If we don’t do it through Brosio, the countries will start to do it bilaterally.

Dr. Kissinger: They’ll do it anyhow. If we can get agreement within the Alliance on the area, I have no objection to his raising it. If the Allies disagree and we ask the Russians for a proposal, we are inviting them to play one country off against another. Brosio’s explorations should start only where the Allies agree. Why make the Russians a participant in our internal debates?

Mr. Irwin: He can talk principles or a specific area.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we decide at our meeting next week which countries we want to include in our position? If we can live with any area, I don’t mind his putting forth options.

Mr. Packard: We should have some flexibility to permit our allies to participate in the decision.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Do I understand correctly that we prefer the Ra-packi Plan Area but can live with any of the three possibilities we have discussed?

Mr. Irwin: I think some people may prefer the NATO Guidelines area, or NATO plus Hungary. Tom (Moorer), what are your reasons for wanting to include the Western USSR. Could you give us your rationalization for that next week?

Adm. Moorer: If you can get more Soviet forces out of the Pact countries, they will have a better chance to attain greater independence. Also, the further eastward we can get Soviet forces to move, the better off we are. They want us to move 3,000 miles.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the relative weight to give to cuts in stationed vs. indigenous forces. What Brosio is to explore should emerge as the consensus from the Deputy Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Irwin: We start from the proposition that any reduction is not helpful to the military situation. We are primarily responding to political pressures.

Dr. Kissinger: For the next meeting, I think we need a clearer elaboration of the options and the issues on which we are prepared to arm the Explorer with a mandate or range of mandates we would be willing to accept.

Mr. Farley: Before we let Brosio talk about stationed and indigenous forces, it might be good to know how he feels about the issue.

Dr. Kissinger: The secret dream of the Europeans is to reverse the proportion.

Mr. Farley: We are giving him pretty thin stuff to go on.

Dr. Kissinger: Is Brosio going to a lot of capitals or just to Moscow?

Mr. Irwin: We need our own ideas on this. Possibly just to Moscow; possibly to the countries where there would be reductions; possibly plus the flank countries; possibly plus some neutrals.

Dr. Kissinger: What neutrals? Like Yugoslavia?

Mr. Irwin: Sweden has been mentioned.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do we give a damn what Sweden thinks about MBFR? Why are we interested in whether the Swedes reduce their forces? Why go there? They’re not very friendly to us anyway. I’m worried that we are going to run around and generate so much activity it will be counter-productive. What can the neutrals contribute—Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia?

Mr. Irwin: I don’t see the purpose of going to the neutrals.

Attorney General: We should remember the old adage that you shouldn’t ask for advice unless you are willing to take it.

Dr. Kissinger: Brosio may have some views, and the negotiator may become the determining force.
Attorney General: The best way to avoid that is to give Brosio as clear instructions as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: He should first consult the Allies at the DFM meeting; then go to the countries on the other side.

Mr. Irwin: If the Soviets wish to, they might designate one person to meet with Brosio for a bilateral discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: We should consider whether we want to validate the Brezhnev doctrine that the Soviets can speak for all of Eastern Europe.

Mr. Irwin: It would be better for Brosio to go to all the countries.

Mr. Nutter: Including East Germany?

Mr. Irwin: He would have to.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We can live with that if he goes to Moscow first. Then he can come back to the Council and receive his instructions on approaches to the other countries. If the Moscow visit is a bust, there’s no point in going anywhere else.

Dr. Kissinger: We can live with that.

Mr. Nutter: We have been talking as though Brosio is to be the Explorer. He doesn’t have to be the Explorer, we are just assuming that. We want an Explorer who will follow instructions; if Brosio won’t, we should get someone else.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Brosio is an excellent choice, he knows the situation thoroughly.

Dr. Kissinger: We should try to settle these issues at our meeting next week. Can we have an input from State and Defense on what we should consider for decision at the next meeting and what we can hold in suspense. We will meet on Thursday morning, September 30.

Attorney General: We should have a paper on guidelines for Brosio.

Mr. Irwin: We will. No Explorer wants to be used as a ploy. Brosio will do anything we ask if it is reasonably based.

Dr. Kissinger: His attitude is very constructive. He’s not eager to give anything away. He’s a good friend of ours—we couldn’t get a better man.

SUBJECT

President Nixon’s Meeting with USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 29, 1971 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:40 p.m. in the Oval Office of the White House (List of participants is attached)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

European Security Conference

On the subject of the situation in Europe, Mr. Gromyko said that he could speak a great deal and at great length. Above all he wanted to emphasize the utmost importance his government attached to the situation in Europe. The Soviet Union wanted conditions there to improve rather than deteriorate and wanted tensions reduced rather than increased. He believed that the agreement on Berlin signed recently created better conditions for such improvement. He stressed the need to convene an all-European conference on security. He recalled that last year when he and the President had exchanged views on this subject, the President’s attitude had not been negative; however, he also recalled that the President and some other people had taken the point of view that progress on the West Berlin problem was what was needed as a first step. In this connection he had taken note of Secretary Rogers’ remarks the other day that more favorable conditions had now appeared for convening an all-European security conference. He hoped that the Government of the United States would now take a more definite stand in favor of this conference, and just as he had done last year, he would like to emphasize again that in calling for such an all-European conference the Soviet Union was not looking for any unilateral advantage. His government believes that a conference of that type


2 Attached but not printed. The participants included Nixon, Rogers, Kissinger, and William Krimer (interpreter) from the U.S. side and Gromyko, Dobrynin, and Sukhodrev (interpreter) from the Soviet side.

3 See Document 68.

4 Telegram 2877 from USUN, September 25, contains a record of Rogers’s conversation with Gromyko on September 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)
would be useful for all European countries as well as for the United States and Canada as prospective participants in this conference. He was saying this because the President, also, had repeatedly said that he advocated a relaxation of tensions throughout the world in general and in Europe in particular. He would like to hear the President’s views on this score.

The President said that the Foreign Minister had been correct in indicating that now that we had made progress on the Berlin problem, we could look more favorably upon consideration of other European questions on which we might make some progress. He believed that once the Berlin situation had been completely resolved, and he understood that there were still some actions that needed to be taken for that purpose, then exploration of a conference could proceed. He felt that on this subject it would be very important for the two major powers to have preliminary discussions before conferring with our respective friends in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact. By this he did not mean that we would not consult with our friends, but for the two powers to participate in a conference without knowing how we would come out of it would not be realistic. He believed that after the Berlin matter had been settled completely we should on a very confidential basis discuss between us what such a conference would mean and what we expected to come out of it. Of course, neither one of us should act without consulting and agreeing with our friends, but if we were simply to proceed to hold a big conference, it might turn out to be something like a United Nations gathering.

Secretary Rogers said that Mr. Gromyko had the other day suggested convening a preliminary meeting for the purpose of planning a conference on European security. The Secretary had replied that such a preliminary meeting was likely itself to take on the character of a conference. If we were to do any preliminary preparatory work, it would have to be done on a private basis between our two countries. As the President had said, we needed to have some idea of the possible outcome of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether he had understood correctly that what the President had in mind were bilateral consultations on a bloc basis between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. The Soviet Union was ready to enter upon consultations of some aspects of this conference, its preparation and its possible outcome. He asked whether upon his return to Moscow he could report to his government that the U.S. Government was, in principle, in favor of convening a European conference. If so, the Soviet Union would be ready to proceed to discuss the questions of procedures, agenda, place and time, and this could be done without any further delay. He had in mind that preliminary consultations would be held for these purposes in the immediate future and that the conference would be convened next year. He asked
whether he could report this as being the President’s view when he re-

turned to Moscow or whether the President would care to clarify the
U.S. position further.

The President said that he would prefer for the Foreign Minister
to report the following: The United States would be willing to discuss
the setting up of a European security conference provided that our dis-
cussions would indicate that such a conference would serve a useful
purpose which we would proceed to implement. When he had spoken
of bilateral consultations, he was not referring to anything formal—he
had had in mind some private conversations between our two coun-
tries that would answer some questions in our mind and some in the
mind of the Soviet side. He believed Mr. Gromyko could report to
Moscow that now that we had moved on Berlin, we should begin some
preliminary discussions of this matter with the purpose of holding a
conference that both sides would agree would serve a useful purpose.
He was certain that neither side wanted to hold a conference just for
the sake of the conference itself.

Secretary Rogers remarked that the discussions between the two
Germanies were not as yet complete. The President noted that he had
intended to qualify his remarks by saying “When the Berlin thing was
wrapped up.” Secretary Rogers expressed the hope that the German
negotiations would proceed without difficulty.

Mr. Gromyko said that, in principle, he believed that the fewer
conditions were set for convening the conference, the better. It was his
feeling that if everything was lumped into one knot, this would com-
plicate matters and lead us astray. Was he correct in understanding
that the President had said that the United States would be ready to
proceed to preliminary consultations without publicity and in the near
future?

The President believed that in terms of preliminary private talks
that was something we could do. However, he believed it important
that in no circumstances any indication be given of a fait accompli. He
did not want to create the impression that today, at this meeting, we
had decided that such a conference would be convened. We should
rather confine ourselves to saying that discussions could take place
that would lead to a conference. As Secretary Rogers had said, getting
the rest of the German question out of the way was most important
before anything surfaced. It was this surfacing problem that was
predominant. Mr. Gromyko inquired again whether the U.S. would
be ready for a private exchange of views in the near future. The
President said that would not concern him. After all, we had already
had some private exchanges on this subject. He would emphasize that
we were not trying to pressure the Soviet Union in regard to the Ger-
man treaty. We did have a problem while the German talks were in
progress, but if preliminary talks were kept strictly private, this might be possible.5

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

5 On the evening of September 30, Gromyko followed up on his discussion with Nixon on European security in a conversation with Kissinger at the Soviet Embassy. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Gromyko then turned to European security and said the Soviet Union was prepared for preliminary exchanges. He was a little puzzled by the fact that the President had told him the day before, when they were alone, that I would handle the discussions, while Rogers had told him at lunch that he would handle the preliminary discussions. I said that the best way to conduct it would be to have technical matters handled between Dobrynin and Rogers and major substantive issues between Dobrynin and me. But it was essential for these divisions to be carried through without an attempt at playing them off. Gromyko said, ‘Exactly our view.’” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7, Pt. 1) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

72. Draft Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting


Dr. Kissinger: I think we should go through the issues before us both for the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting and to develop guidance for the Explorer.

Mr. Irwin: Before we get into specific issues, I’d like to express a few thoughts. We have been partly motivated in talking about symmetrical reductions by two needs.

Dr. Kissinger: Who is “we”? The State Department?

Mr. Irwin: That’s right. We—the State Department—see first the matter of Congressional pressure and the need for some forward movement to withstand the next Mansfield attack. We have been inclined to make a domestic political judgment on this question. Now we may be wrong in that estimate, and if so, it may not be necessary to move so quickly. If our estimate of the importance of heading off Mansfield is wrong, that would put a different cast on the situation. The second

1 Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Meeting Minutes (Originals), Verification Panel, 1971–75. No classification marking. Drafted by Commander Jonathan T. Howe, USN, of the NSC staff. Handwritten corrections have been incorporated into the text printed here.
need, we believe, is to show our NATO allies some leadership from our side. If we don’t do so, the NATO countries will drag their feet. The British are not enthusiastic about MBFR, nor are the French. The tempo of the scenario will come from our efforts. No, I don’t say that we must present a preferred position. But if we do go in with a preferred position, the pace will be up to us. If we want to move slower, we can go in with options. I see no problem in just going to the meeting and speaking to the issues before us, but I would like some guidance on the overall tenor I am to take. Without getting into specifics, what are our general views on the basic points?

Dr. Kissinger: When Gromyko met with the President yesterday,\(^2\) I don’t recall that he mentioned MBFR at all. I don’t think the Russians will be pushing MBFR hard, if at all. When I saw (Manlio) Brosio the other day,\(^3\) he told me that he did not feel that he needed a preferred position or that we needed one, but that he wanted some general guidance. Of course, you all have equal access to Brosio and you may have more to add to that. We are not under enormous pressure from Brosio. He doesn’t need a preferred U.S. position to validate our claim to leadership. I think the best way to lead NATO is to tell them what we think is right. They will have their own ideas, but we should tell them what we think and then ought to go as fast as our analysis permits.

Mr. Irwin: I agree with your interpretation of Brosio’s views. He does not feel that he needs a decision on the options, only on the specific issues that are outlined in the issues paper.\(^4\) It comes down to the question of where we want to go. Perhaps this comes back to a reading of the motivation of Congress, that we need a reduction of forces in Europe. If that pressure is not too great, perhaps we don’t have to move so fast.

Dr. Kissinger: My instinct is that the President has pretty well decided to do what he thinks is right and will do things as fast as he can. If Congress wants to take the responsibility for going faster, fine. Mansfield won’t be satisfied by a 10% reduction.

Mr. Nutter: We have known all along that we were going to face one thing after another from Mansfield, but Secretary Laird feels that we can fight Mansfield on this issue and are in a good position to beat it.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we give NATO more of our studies and let them know what we are thinking?

\(^2\) See Document 71.

\(^3\) No memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Brosio has been found.

\(^4\) Not found.
Mr. Irwin: We are way behind on the studies; we don’t have them to give to our allies.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we have some information; can we give them an interim report? Why can’t we let them know as much as this panel knows? If it leaks to the Russians, it will take them years to understand it.

Mr. Irwin: My third point is a desire to clarify what we consider negotiable from our point of view. Some of the asymmetrical ideas that have been considered are not necessarily negative. Why don’t we discuss the specifics of some of these points?

Dr. Kissinger: We should be able to present some kind of paper to our allies. They will get nervous if we don’t give them anything.

Mr. Irwin: Well, we are held up because we haven’t been able to give them the papers we hoped to have ready. Shall we consider a symmetrical reduction of 10% as a starting point?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t detect a consensus. People talk about 10% only because it is an easy figure to fasten on. We really don’t know what is in our best interests and we won’t know until the studies are complete. We did the same thing on SALT. We all sat in this room and agreed on NCA and I still don’t understand the rationale that led us to that decision.

Mr. Nutter: We asked Brosio if the Europeans were really itching to have a preferred position and he indicated that they were not.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Corr) Weren’t we going to have a paper completed in October?

Mr. Corr: We did hope to have a paper ready by mid-October, but I think we will need another two weeks. We should have something by early November.

Dr. Kissinger: Then what is it the allies want now?

Mr. Eagleburger: They would like a finished paper.

Mr. Irwin: I would like to have a list of everything we promised them with our best estimate of when each paper will be ready. Can I have that before I leave?

Mr. Eagleburger: Fine.

Dr. Kissinger: They want us to lead, whatever that means in their own minds, and at the same time they are concerned that we are moving toward unilateral disarmament in Europe. Can’t we reassure them that we are not going to withdraw unilaterally?

Mr. Irwin: I’m not at all sure that they really want us to “lead.”

Mr. Springsteen: We have to demonstrate some initiative. If we don’t lead, no one will. The Europeans are not going to take the initiative themselves.
Dr. Kissinger: That’s the problem.

Mr. Irwin: Brosio told me he thought that all of the allies would agree to the reduction of stationed forces while retaining their indigenous forces.

Mr. Eagleburger: That’s not exactly the way he stated it to us. Brosio told us the Europeans would want to reduce stationed forces first but that they would not rule out the subsequent reduction of indigenous forces.

Mr. Springsteen: Yes, that’s the way we understood it. (Helmut) Schmidt told us recently that he would like to cut some of his own forces.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that Schmidt would like to cut his own forces. Germany is not noted for its foresight in such matters.

Mr. Irwin: We should avoid that if we can.

Dr. Kissinger: We should stop fooling around and tell the Europeans that the force improvement package is as important as any cuts we can arrange through MBFR.

Mr. Nutter: It would be terribly naive if the Germans were to cut their national forces, using MBFR reductions as an excuse.

Dr. Kissinger: It would not be the first time the Germans have taken shortsighted actions.

Mr. Irwin: We should move ahead with our studies as rapidly as possible and show our good faith to our allies. We ought to demonstrate to them that we are not backing away from MBFR. Now I know that there is one voice in State that disagrees with this position. Sy (Weiss) feels that any cut at all would be damaging to us—(to Weiss) would you like to explain your views?

Mr. Weiss: Well, in the first place, we have been talking about reductions of 20%, not 10%, and 20% would resound like a bombshell in Europe. It would be hard for us to justify a reduction of that level on either political or military grounds. If we don’t press an emphasis on stationed troops, the Europeans could buy a slow approach to MBFR.

Gen. Westmoreland: I share that view.

Dr. Kissinger: I have six points here that we should consider. 1. the geographic area of reductions, 2. the type of forces to be cut, 3. nationality of forces, stationed versus indigenous, 4. the type of reduction, symmetrical or asymmetrical, 5. verification, with or without inspection, and 6. phasing, a sequential approach such as that favored by the Germans, or not.

Now on the geographic area, I understand that State prefers the Rapacki plan area while the Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer the NATO guidelines area. Is that right?
Gen. Westmoreland: That’s right, we prefer the guidelines area as a starting position.

Dr. Kissinger: State would prefer the addition of Hungary to the guidelines area.

Mr. Irwin: I have no strong preference for the Rapacki area but I think the Germans would not agree to it and that it may not be a negotiable position for us to adopt.

Dr. Kissinger: Can’t we agree among ourselves on what is intellectually best from our point of view, regardless of whether or not it is negotiable? Let’s leave the question of negotiability aside for the moment. Why is the guidelines area preferable to the Rapacki plan area?

Mr. Irwin: I think what is negotiable is very important.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly what does the guidelines area include?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Benelux. It is the Rapacki area plus Benelux.

Mr. Nutter: The Rapacki area provides a better ratio of their forces to ours, but if you ask for too much they (the Russians) may lose interest right at the beginning of the discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: I am surprised that the JCS did not ask for the Rapacki area and the three western provinces of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Irwin: The Explorer is not to go into specifics such as these.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do the Belgians want Hungary included?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I don’t know that the Belgians are pressing for it. It is just that the inclusion of Hungary would balance the numbers of forces. It would be a better trade-off.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there a consensus that we can live with either the guidelines and Hungary or with just the guidelines?

Mr. Irwin: We can live with any of them.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t this a good position for us to be in? We think the Rapacki plan provides the best ratio, but we can live with any of them. I don’t think Brosio would go to the Russians and talk about the three western provinces of the USSR. What do the Europeans think?

Mr. Weiss: The Netherlands favors the Rapacki area, all the others favor the guidelines.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn’t it better for us to take the position that we consider best? Then if the allies protest we can go to the guidelines. I don’t understand what the Germans get out of the guidelines that would make them prefer it to the Rapacki area.

Mr. Nutter: They don’t want to be the only Western country to have reductions take place on their soil. Our reading is that several countries favor the Rapacki area, including Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, in addition to us. Benelux and the British favor the guidelines.
Mr. Irwin: If we go outside the guidelines area, we may open the door to other countries being added.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, if Brosio tosses out Italy as a talking point and the Russians say O.K. to Italy, he doesn’t have to agree to it.

Dr. Kissinger: Now on the type of forces, as I understand it the question is whether naval forces are to be included.

Mr. Irwin: I don’t think the navy represents much of a problem. The big question is nuclear. As I understand our positions, there is not much difference between State and Defense on this point. We (State) would like to go to the meeting and say that nuclear items are not excluded from consideration. The Department of Defense would be more negative and say nothing at all about them, but then what do you say if the question is raised?

Dr. Kissinger: If we want to keep open the possibility of asymmetrical reductions, we must keep open a number of options that we have not seriously considered. Tactical nukes for example. [1½ lines not declassified] so if the possibility of including them in an asymmetrical reduction arises, we should be prepared to keep it open.

Mr. Nutter: [1½ lines not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: We should tell the allies that we don’t rule out other options.

Mr. Irwin: I would rather say that they would not necessarily be excluded.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not interested in the semantics, say it any way you wish.

Gen. Westmoreland: If nuclear weapons are discussed, I consider it essential that we also discuss the western districts of the USSR.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if we get into tactical nukes we should discuss the western districts of Russia. Didn’t we have an SRG meeting that considered nuclear reductions?5

Mr. Corr: Yes, the question was discussed at an SRG meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: What happened to that study?

Mr. Corr: It’s one of the options in our paper.

Mr. Weiss: If we get into tactical nukes we have to differentiate between weapons in the theater and those which may be brought in with outside units.

Mr. Irwin: I’m sorry, but I have to go up to Congress in a few minutes to talk about my trip.

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5 Not further identified.
Dr. Kissinger: We’ll move along. On the question of the size and type of reductions to be considered, we are not going to be specific and must inform the Europeans that we are not negotiating under pressure from Senator Mansfield. We don’t need a specific position. We have seen enough changes of Russian positions to know that they are flexible. Now what about phasing?

Mr. Irwin: I think we want to begin in a phased manner.

Mr. Nutter: We are studying this point but are not ready to discuss it yet.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we agree that we are not to exclude inspection? Do we all agree that inspection by national means is acceptable?

Gen. Cushman: We should try to get on-site inspection.

Mr. Irwin: I agree it is something we should try to get.

Gen. Cushman: It may be extremely hard to verify force reductions by national means. I would urge a major effort to get on-site inspection.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s discuss a possible link between MBFR and CES. We will be issuing a NSSM shortly for a study of CES. The President is very uneasy to get involved in discussions about a European security agreement until we have carefully studied the whole question and know where we are going. He does not want MBFR and CES linked. He is concerned about the disproportion between Soviet eagerness to push a European security agreement and what they talk about wanting to get out of it. There must be something else they want and until we have a clearer idea what it is, the President wants to avoid it. (to Mr. Irwin) The President has already presented his thoughts on this to the Secretary (of State). Gromyko raised this yesterday at his meeting with the President and the President said he wanted to keep CES and MBFR separate.

Mr. Irwin: OSD wants to keep them on separate tracks, but for how long, forever?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t know about forever, but we want to keep them separate for now. I don’t care if it is for all time or not, so long as they are not linked now.

Mr. Irwin: So if CES is raised I should pass?

Dr. Kissinger: It is better to keep aloof on this matter. For one thing, the German treaties have to be concluded before we can get into this.

Mr. Springsteen: Are we to avoid multi-lateral discussions on this subject too?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: At least until the Berlin agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Gromyko was so interested in CES that we want a NSSM on it. Multi-lateral talks are not necessarily excluded but the President does not want to push forward on a European Security Treaty.
(to Mr. Sonnenfeldt) We ought to get moving on that NSSM. (to Mr. Irwin) Jack, we want to have our options paper ready for the ministerial meeting, when is it to be held?

Mr. Springsteen: It will be in Brussels on December 8, 9 and 10. What about the elements paper, when can we expect it?

Mr. Eagleburger: That’s already done. You have the elements paper.  

Dr. Kissinger: We need something on the nuclear options as well as a paper to cover general questions. We should have an NSC meeting on it before December.

Gen. Westmoreland: If we take a reduction as small as 10% it will be disadvantageous to us. That would, in effect, wipe out our reserves. The Warsaw Pact countries can move their reserves on line in 16 days, with a 10% reduction it will take us 60 to 90 days, and will hurt our position. I would like to see us get a fixed numerical reduction and avoid the percentages.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no dispute that any reduction will reduce our military effectiveness, but I agree that we don’t necessarily have to go along with a percentage reduction.

Mr. Irwin: Well, this is something we can explore. A firm position isn’t necessary at this point.

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73. National Security Decision Memorandum 134\(^1\)


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Policy Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), Nos. 97–144. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of the Treasury.
The President has reviewed the results of the Verification Panel meeting of September 30, 1971, and the memoranda prepared by the Under Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. He wishes the following guidance to be followed at the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Brussels and in all other consultations and discussions with our NATO on the subject of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

1. General Approach to MBFR

We seriously seek to achieve a more stable military balance in Europe at lower levels of forces. Therefore, the U.S. endorses the Alliance’s exploration with the Warsaw Pact of the framework for possible mutual force limitations and reductions. In this regard it is critical that our Allies understand that further improvements in NATO’s conventional forces are integral to successful MBFR negotiations as well as the U.S. commitment to maintain its forces in Europe.

The U.S. has not yet arrived at a preferred approach to mutual reductions. For this reason, our approach shall be to hold open for consideration alternative approaches ranging from limited symmetrical reductions to more elaborate verification provisions and collateral constraints. Our objective shall be for an Alliance consensus on negotiations to arise out of a careful and systematic consideration of the full range of possible approaches to MBFR.

2. The U.S. Position for Explorations

The U.S. position on the specific framework for explorations shall be as follows:

—At this time, the United States has the following order of preference with respect to the area of reductions: (1) the Rapacki Area, (2) the NATO Guidelines Area plus Hungary, and (3) the NATO Guidelines Area. These preferences are without prejudice to possible force reductions or limitations that may involve other areas.

—The United States favors initial emphasis on the reduction of Soviet and American (or stationed forces) in size and timing. Indigenous force reductions should, however, not be excluded from reduction.

—The United States would prefer not to exclude particular types of forces from consideration, though it recognizes that as long as the focus is on the Center Region, naval forces should not be considered.

2 See Document 72.


4 Laird’s memorandum to Kissinger, September 29, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-009, Verification Panel Meeting MBFR 9/30/71.
—We are unable at this time to indicate preferences on the size and type of reductions; the broad categories of options being considered within the U.S. government, however, may be described to our Allies to illustrate the direction and scope of our current preparations. It should be made clear, however, that our considerations shall not be limited to these options nor should they be interpreted as representing the preferred U.S. approach to MBFR.

—At this time, we cannot exclude the need for inspection, since this decision would depend on the type and size of reductions.

—We should indicate to our Allies our interest in a more thorough evaluation of the German phased approach to MBFR, and our disposition to consider this general concept favorably.

On the issue of the relationship of mutual force reductions to a European Security Conference, U.S. officials should indicate that we believe these two issues should not be linked at this time, especially in any exploratory discussion of MBFR with Warsaw Pact countries. Moreover, we cannot agree to any preliminary or exploratory multilateral talks on a European Conference, at least until the Berlin agreements come into force and until we have gained a better understanding of what a Conference might achieve in terms of U.S. interests.

3. Further Preparations

In preparation for further consultations, it will be necessary to accelerate our formulation of specific MBFR options and a thorough assessment of their implications. In particular,

—The formulation of a full range of specific options shall be completed by October 8, 1971. In this regard, it will be necessary to consider again the design of appropriate asymmetrical and/or mixed package options.

—The assessments of the military implications of these nuclear and conventional options shall be completed by October 15, 1971. In regard to nuclear options, a special effort will have to be made to assess a variety of nuclear doctrines, the forces required in Europe, and the MBFR options consistent with them.

—The general assessments of collateral constraints and the verification measures required as well as their application to specific options should be completed by October 22, 1971.

These preparations shall be carried out by the agencies responsible under the overall direction of the Verification Panel. Following their completion, an overall assessment of the options shall be completed by early November prior to its consideration by the President in a NSC meeting in preparation for the December Ministerial meetings in NATO.

Henry A. Kissinger

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

European Security Conference

The President has directed that an interagency study be prepared to examine all the issues related to a Conference on European Security. Taking account of studies submitted to NATO as well as known Soviet proposals, the study should discuss differing concepts of such a conference and what US objectives might be under alternative concepts.

The study should address such specific issues as

—various methods for preparing a conference;
—possible agenda items, including possible US initiatives;
—the possible modalities of a conference;
—possible outcomes of a conference and follow-up actions to it (e.g., the question of “permanent machinery”).

In discussing the issues associated with a conference, the study should not be limited to matters already agreed within NATO in its preparations to date.

The study should include consideration of the views of our NATO allies and of other European states and it should discuss the probable aims of the USSR and of other Warsaw Pact members.

The study should examine how the US posture toward a conference might be affected by developments in such related areas as the Berlin agreement, the status of the Soviet-German treaty, MBFR and SALT.

The study should be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Europe and be submitted for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group by November 1, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger
Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Secretary Laird’s Memorandum to the President on MBFR, CES (Tab B)\(^2\)
(Urgent: he is leaving this weekend.)

Secretary Laird has expressed his fear that MBFR may become subsumed in a CES, as many Europeans prefer. If so, he believes the entire MBFR project will become wholly unmanageable. Therefore he asks the President to approve his intended statement to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group next week, that “under present and foreseeable circumstances the US will not agree to negotiate MBFR at a CES.”

This memorandum presents some problems. It is an obvious effort to freeze positions, without reference to State, even though the President has publicly given Secretary Rogers the mandate for CES consultations. Moreover, it ignores the fact that we have asked for a NSSM on CES\(^3\) including the very issue of linkage between MBFR and CES. Finally, it advocates a rigid position, which, in fact, we may want to change in light of the summit and whatever comes out of private discussions.

Therefore, I have prepared a memorandum from Mr. Kissinger\(^4\) to Secretary Laird approving his proposed position, but asking him not to make any statement that would preclude some MBFR–CES linkage if that should become unavoidable.

(Frankly, I am inclined to think that by putting MBFR into a CES context we might, if we want to, be able to postpone a negotiation that is going to be extremely difficult and dangerous, and I will send Mr. Kissinger a memo on this issue.)

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 17, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent action.

\(^2\) Laird’s October 19 memorandum to the President is attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Document 73.

\(^4\) Sonnenfeldt wrote in by hand the phrase, “or you.”

\(^5\) Attached but not printed. Haig did not sign the draft memorandum to the President, but checked the approval line and wrote, “Done—Defense told to send copy of summary to State.”
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(Note: Laird’s memo did not go to Rogers. State people will be on Laird’s delegation and they may see our response. Hence you should get Laird to send a copy of his memo to Rogers and also send our response to the latter.)

6 On October 22, Haig sent Laird a memorandum, copied to Rogers: “The President has reviewed your memorandum on these subjects, and the position you propose to take at the Nuclear Planning Group meeting. He approves the points you intend to make, but wishes that you not make any statements that would deny us the option of having some linkage between MBFR and a European Conference, should this be unavoidable or desirable later. These issues will be considered further in connection with the NSC study requested in NSSM 138.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 17, Chronological File)

76. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

NSSM 138
A CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY
(ANALYTICAL SUMMARY)

I. Assumptions, Objectives: CES Perspective

Following is a capsule summary of the present state of play:
—We and the Allies have a commitment to begin multilateral phase of preparations for a Conference “as soon as feasible” after completion of the Berlin agreements (all phases);
—Acceleration of Berlin talks makes CES a live issue; decisions at this NATO session and in the next 2–3 months will determine the direction of Allied policy.
—Almost all West Europeans favor CES in some degree; French are willing to begin preparations now; Germans committed to “accelerate” preparations, but will not do so until Berlin is wrapped up, and preferably until their treaties are ratified; British inclined to believe CES is an unavoidable evil, to be disposed of as quickly as possible.

2 Document 74.
As it now stands, the Soviets will make some clear gains in such a Conference: ratification of political and territorial status quo in East Europe, greater influence in West Europe, possible deepening of trends toward American withdrawal, etc.

—On the other hand, East Europeans—Romania, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Poland—want a conference to create psychological barriers to the Brezhnev doctrine.

Our objectives: (assuming a Conference is inevitable)

—To avoid allowing issues of a Conference to split US from Allies;
—Minimize damage to Alliance that flows from atmospherics of détente;
—Institutionalize US role as European power and participant in the East-West dialogue;
—Provide some help for East Europeans.

II. Alternative Approaches to CES

Assuming the US could delay, but not arrest, movement toward CES, there follow three illustrative approaches:

1. CES as Now Envisaged
   a. A Conference for the sake of détente;
   b. A Conference making some concessions but protecting Western interests.

2. A Conference on European Cooperation (i.e., without security issues).

3. A New Approach—designed mainly to emphasize security issues and follow on machinery.

A. CES as Now Envisaged

1. The Agenda

   Warsaw Pact
   1. Force renunciation and respect for existing borders;
   2. Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;
   3. A permanent “organ” for questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

   NATO
   1. Principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force;
   2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;
      (b) Freer movement of people, ideas and information;
   3. Possible establishment of a permanent body (though publicly stated to date only as a means of embarking on multilateral negotiations).
Pact and Allied positions on these items are:

a. **Principles Governing Relations Between States.** The core of the conference, from the Soviet viewpoint, is the first Warsaw Pact agenda item which would pledge respect for existing frontiers in Europe and force renunciation. To broaden the scope of this item, NATO Ministers proposed that CES discussions should treat, in addition to force renunciation, general principles governing interstate relations, such as sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity, non-interference and non-intervention in internal affairs. Allied Ministers have affirmed that these principles would apply “regardless of political and social systems.”

A declaration that reaffirmed such principles in a conference where the GDR was a full participant could have adverse implications for Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Germany as a whole and Berlin, as could a declaration on frontiers. There would have to be disclaimer about non-recognition of the GDR and about non-recognition of frontiers by US, UK and France.

b. **Cooperation.** None expect that CES could negotiate specific agreements on economic, technical and scientific exchanges or environmental cooperation, though some believe discussions in CES, and also in a permanent body established by CES, might stimulate bilateral and multilateral efforts, as in ECE.

c. **Freer Movements of People, Ideas and Information.** The Soviets would resist any concrete concessions in this area, though there are tactical and propaganda advantages in keeping the issue in play, and there might be some significant Soviet concessions, if the Allies press firmly. We have suggested that the Allies, at CES and preliminaries, urge the Warsaw Pact states to:

—end radio jamming;
—relax exit restrictions on their nationals;
—permit freer circulation of books, magazines and periodicals; and
—allow foreign journalists normal working conditions.

Many Allies, however, would prefer to treat only easier issues, seeking initially little more than minor improvements in the closely controlled programs of East-West cultural exchanges, and hoping reduced tensions following CES would abet further progress.

d. **Permanent Machinery.** The Pact in June 1970 proposed that CES create a permanent “organ” to discuss questions of security and cooperation.\(^3\)

\(^3\) See Document 30.
An illustrative US proposal (Annex I), tabled but not yet discussed in NATO, suggested that either a permanent secretariat, or a negotiating forum with procedures roughly similar to those of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD) might be considered. A permanent body could not assume meaningful responsibility for maintenance of European security, but could open the way toward a continuing East-West dialogue.

2. Procedural Approaches

We prefer careful explorations followed, if appropriate, by more structured preparatory talks, at official level, that would draft agreed texts, leaving a minimum of disputed points for resolution at a short Ministerial conference.

The French favor shorter preparatory talks mainly on procedure and not on draft texts of possible agreement, leading to an initial meeting where Foreign Ministers would discuss the issues and establish official-level working groups. Thereafter, Foreign Ministers would reconvene to negotiate themselves the questions unresolved by the working groups. The French have gained more Allied support for this approach, which is consistent with France’s general preference to enhance the appearance of an independent status in relations with the East.

3. Possible Results of CES as Now Conceived: Two Variants:

a. A Conference for the Sake of Détente. After extensive discussions touching only marginally on fundamental East-West differences, Ministers would agree on declaratory texts on general themes that do not bind participants to specific actions, and that

—affirm generally accepted principles governing relations between states, including force renunciation and respect for existing frontiers;
—declare the intent of participants to promote cooperation in all fields; and
—establish a permanent body.

Participants might also express their views on regional disarmament questions, including MBFR.

Assessment. This approach, in effect, accepts the Soviet concept. The likely results would meet immediate political goals of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europeans, and corresponds to the current aims of France, most neutrals, and the smaller, more détente-oriented Allies states. Once an inter-German modus vivendi is reached, the FRG, too,

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4 Not attached. The reference is apparently to a proposal transmitted in telegram 160785 to USNATO, September 1, on possible post-CES machinery. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–063, SRG Meeting, European Security Conference 11/23/71)
will likely seek to enhance the détente climate by avoiding confrontation with the East.

b. A Conference Making Some Concessions but Protecting Western Interests. In this damage-limiting approach, the Allies would decline to meet major Soviet aims, including a declaration of respect for existing frontiers, unless the Soviets also make significant concessions, agreeing, for example, to freer movement. Preparatory sessions would be prolonged and probably marked by heated discussions, reflected in media reporting. Substantively, the conference might result in

—a compromise, in which the Soviets make some concrete concessions on freer movement and accept a declaration on principles that would apply regardless of political or social systems, while the Allies agree to a formulation pledging “respect” for existing European frontiers;
—modest Soviet concessions on freer movement;
—agreement to pursue issues of economic and technical cooperation; and
—establishment of permanent machinery.

Assessment. Some minimum goals of major participants would be met as a result of public reports of East-West debates in the course of CES, and the results of the conference would be portrayed as Western acceptance of the territorial situation in Eastern Europe, but not Soviet political domination.

B. A Conference on Cooperation in Europe

An alternative CES approach could entail limiting the agenda of the meeting to issues of cooperation in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental spheres. Issues of security, including renunciation of the use of force and principles governing interstate relations would be specifically excluded, and the title of the conference changed.

The conference would result in declarations of intent to promote cooperation, leaving detailed agreements to subsequent bilateral and multilateral negotiations in other fora.

Assessment. The Soviets would probably resist an Allied proposal to change the terms of reference and to make such a change publicly clear. They might charge the Allies with bad faith, noting repeated public statements in NATO Ministerial communiqués of willingness to begin preparations for a “conference on security and cooperation in Europe” under proper circumstances. Most Allied governments might also oppose such a change, fearing charges from important sectors of domestic opinion that NATO was reneging on a commitment at the very moment when fulfillment of the precondition (a satisfactory Berlin agreement) seemed in sight.

Comment: The idea that we can limit damage by introducing contentious issues such as freer movement of peoples, etc., is probably an illusion. Once Soviets pocket concessions about frontiers, non-use of
force, etc., they have achieved their purpose and will probably be able to resist any major change in intra European cooperation. Damage-limiting strategy which is in effect our current policy is a weak rationale.

If a conference is inevitable (this is not necessarily so) and Allies really want it for the atmospherics of détente, there are stronger arguments for playing along rather than putting up weak and ineffective rear guard action. In this case, the French approach seems sound: move to a Conference without long wrangling session and close it out as soon as feasible.

The main tactical problem is that the heart of the Conference will be a declaration on non-use of force and respect for current borders; some of the Allies have already made this concession: in the Soviet and Polish treaties,\(^5\) the French Declaration of Principles,\(^6\) the Canadian-Soviet communiqué;\(^7\) and in effect, the Berlin treaties which include non-use of force. The main Soviet aim is to gain American signature. Present Allied position more or less concedes this Soviet position.

C. A New Approach: CES as a Step Toward Maintaining a US Role in Europe.

This new concept of CES departs from the damage-limiting approach we are now pursuing. It would entail a new US initiative in NATO and international CES planning aimed at:

—increased emphasis on permanent machinery to provide an institutional framework involving the US intimately in a long-term process of East-West negotiation of issues of security and cooperation, while maintaining and improving present Western security; and

—added weight to issues of security—MBFR, and other arms control and disarmament matters.

Under this concept, moreover,

—the US would exert leadership in approaching CES;

—we could help offset Allied fears that the US is on the verge of massive disengagement, at a time when their doubts are reinforced by current international economic difficulties;


\(^7\) See footnote 8, Document 51.
—CES would be considered a positive step in the longer process of strengthening the transatlantic community, and maintaining its defenses, while the US and our Allies seek further relaxation of East-West tensions designed to enhance European stability on a basis that accords with Allied objectives by making clear the importance they attach to issues of security, and to progress in East-West cooperation in non-security matters, such as freer movement of people, ideas, and information, and economic and technical exchanges.

1. Agenda. To meet these objectives, the Allies could propose in the December 1971 Ministerial Communiqué the following CES agenda as an alternative to that advanced by the Pact:

a. Issues of East-West Security

(1) continuing arms control and disarmament efforts and renunciation of the use of force and universal respect for principles governing relations between states, regardless of political or social systems. It is possible that any consensus that emerged might be embodied in an East-West declaration, which might be pursued in permanent machinery established by CES (See Part II C1C, below).

(2) associated with the foregoing, or separately, statements of support for MBFR. If MBFR negotiations had begun prior to CES, reference could be made in CES to progress to date, based upon reports by participating MBFR states. Otherwise, CES could encourage states directly involved in MBFR to negotiate. Although MBFR could also operate under the “umbrella” of a CES (see Part III), the conference would have no authority to direct or approve the form or substance of MBFR negotiations.

b. Issues of East-West Cooperation

(1) freer movement of people, ideas, and information, stressing the importance the Allies attach to this issue;

(2) economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental cooperation. Economic issues for discussion could include a range of improvements on both sides to encourage increased trade and possible ties to Western international economic institutions. In the environmental sphere, support could be sought for strengthening ECE efforts. Beyond this, enhanced bilateral contacts in the other areas could be encouraged, as well as efforts in UN and other appropriate fora.

c. Permanent Machinery Established by CES

(1) Possible Functions

The US has tabled in NATO illustrative views on permanent machinery (Annex I). We proposed that such machinery might discuss problems of security, cooperation and arms control and disarmament, along the following lines:

(a) Security

—as a framework for quiet diplomacy to resolve disputes endangering European security; and

—for dealing with grievances, permitting states to raise actual or potential violations of a possible CES declaration on principles that should govern interstate relations.
(b) Cooperation

— for discussion of policy issues that impede East-West cooperation in various fields, leaving detailed implementation to the ECE or other appropriate fora.

(c) Regional Disarmament

—in connection with MBFR, while this issue undoubtedly would be referred to in CES, actual negotiations have been envisaged in a body comprising states directly concerned. Results of MBFR negotiations, however, could be reported by the states directly involved in MBFR negotiations to CES for noting, as appropriate; and

—if agreed among the Allies, for discussion of complaints of non-compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements; and for examination and dissemination of reports produced under any arrangements that may eventually be developed on verification and collateral constraints.

Beyond the foregoing, it is possible that permanent machinery could evolve further, embracing additional functions in a continuing East-West dialogue. However, the USSR and others should not be allowed to manipulate or characterize CES permanent machinery as a substitute for NATO, or as superceding Western security arrangements generally.

2. Assessment.

US adoption of a positive approach to CES could entail the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages

— would conform to the realities of the situation in Europe by giving at least equal attention to security issues;
— because it would explicitly assert the continuing US role in the evolution of Europe, it would deny the Soviets their basic objective of getting the US out of Europe;
— by emphasizing the continuing character of East-West negotiations, Allied defense expenditures might be more easily sustained;
— the basic situation of the East European states would not be altered, but their desire for a more independent voice in discussions surrounding a conference would be met;

Disadvantages

— there likely would be no immediate concrete results beyond those possible under other suggested approaches to CES;
— a possible CES declaration on arms control and disarmament might strengthen public reluctance, in Allied countries, to support the substantial force improvements we seek; and
— other disadvantages at worst could approximate those flowing from a conference making some concessions but protecting Western interests, but would be far less than from a conference for the sake of détente or a conference on cooperation.
3. Developing Allied Consensus.

A positive approach to a CES conforms more closely with the majority Allied view than our present approach. Therefore, we anticipate no difficulty in gaining Allied concurrence. Discussion of arms control and disarmament at CES conforms to current Allied thinking, and therefore poses no problem. Reference in CES to MBFR will be welcomed by most Allies.

The following illustrative steps would facilitate building an Allied consensus around a US preference:

—the US could underline the Berlin precondition, and clarify its attitude toward CES, and perhaps toward economic and defense aims generally, in a major address on European affairs by the Secretary sometime in November;

—the US position would be conveyed to the Allies in time to allow for consultations at NATO in advance of the December Ministerial meeting;

—the US would introduce into the Council draft formulations for the December Ministerial communiqué;

—depending on the status of the Berlin agreement, NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers could meet in April 1972 to assess prospects for opening multilateral East-West talks and to discuss the substance and procedures for multilateral East-West talks; and

—after conclusion of the Berlin accord, and following the President’s visit to Moscow, East-West multilateral talks could open.

Comment: The basic issue here seems to be along the following lines: If we must go to CES, is there any conceivable way it can be turned to our marginal advantage, recognizing that in the short turn, at least, the Soviets will score major gains?

This “new” approach is, of course, an old idea favored by many observers. Its essence is that we use the inevitable Soviet “principles” as a bridge to some more practical measures; i.e., if the Soviets claim non-use of force, we propose restraint on force movements, possibly European observer teams, pre-announcement of maneuvers—in short, many of the MBFR collateral measures. In this way, we at least give some substance to the vacuous declarations of a Conference.

Second, we establish an institution which will have little real power, but will have some psychological benefit for the East Europeans in that they can invoke the permanent machinery in times of tensions or crisis.

If there is anything in this proposal for a change in attitude, it is mainly in the possible longer term gains that would tend to blur the sharp divisions in Europe. Why the Soviets would agree to such potential danger is another issue, but it is, after all, their conference, and this “new” approach puts them on the tactical defensive. If introduced
early in the preparations, it would certainly protract the preliminary discussion—another possible advantage.

As reported in the study, the concept is still too vague; it lacks precision in what the Conference would produce in terms of arms control statements, practical implementation measures and the authority of the permanent machinery. If adopted, this would have to be clarified in some detail.

The disadvantages are understated, presumably because this is the favored option. The real disadvantages are

—First, our Allies may well misconstrue our new enthusiasm as another form of superpower collaboration; they might be rather unimpressed by the claims that we would gain some concrete security measures; they would still think in terms of atmospherics, and conclude we were only looking for a rationalization of the same objectives.

—If it became clear that we meant business, and really wanted some practical achievements, the Allies might retreat since the last thing they want is that CES become a contentious meeting.

—The second disadvantage is that regardless of our aspirations we must deal with the Soviets who are not about to allow their pet project to be turned against them. Their interest is still in the fact of the Conference, rather than its concrete measures. We will still have to go through a first phase of declarations and pledges to get to the second stage of applications of arms control measures or a permanent institution. The Soviets will see to it that nothing effective happens.

In short, this is a gamble. But we would be no worse off for having made the attempt than if we supinely drift into the Soviet type conference that now appears unavoidable.

In many ways, this approach to a CES is less damaging than the current prospects for two losers: MBFR and then a meaningless CES. If we were to move in this new direction on CES, logic would suggest that MBFR be deferred, and the CES would endorse it, though not control it. MBFR would thus be a tangible result of CES, and, if it dealt with principles of force reductions, these might be taken over by all Europe.

Operationally,

—CES would not begin until after the Moscow summit: then preliminaries would take a few months and the actual conference would meet in, say, late 1972 or early 1973.

—MBFR might begin before that, but if we chose to, we could use the CES as a means to defer MBFR.

III. CES and MBFR

Most Allies and non-aligned states wish to establish a connection now between MBFR and CES. At the same time, most recognize that
CES would be too unwieldy a forum for negotiation of so complex and sensitive a subject as MBFR, and that actual negotiations should be restricted to the states directly concerned.

The US has preferred to keep the two issues on separate tracks, in effect assuming that the tracks might cross at some point, but leaving open the option of separately initiating either CES or MBFR discussions. Our approach to MBFR, moreover, has recognized that—MBFR addresses the military confrontation of major powers whose forces and territory are directly involved; other states, though interested, have less at stake in such negotiations, and many would likely mount pressures for reductions without necessarily insisting on essential safeguards; and—involved of non-aligned countries would complicate and delay MBFR negotiations, causing inter alia possible Congressional pressures for unilateral reductions.

Given the general preference expressed over past weeks by our Allies, however, for including MBFR in some fashion on a CES agenda—based largely on their view that MBFR would provide a concrete issue of security for CES in discussion and evidence of movement toward détente—we are virtually isolated on this issue, and will likely need to deal with it at Ministerial level in December.

Since we cannot prevent participants in CES from referring to MBFR, the alternatives are: (a) to strive for agreement among the Allies (and perhaps with the Soviets) for procedural arrangements to be made in the initial phase of CES that would avoid more than general reference in CES to MBFR; or (b) to deal with the substance of MBFR in CES.

Comment: Clearly, the latter is a non-starter and a potential disaster.

IV. CES and SALT

Provided there is a satisfactory resolution on Berlin, the issue arises of the relationship between CES and SALT. The possibilities lie between the following alternatives:

—linkage between achieving success in SALT and proceeding with CES; and—considering SALT along with other issues as part of the complex of US/Soviet relations which needs to be taken into account in assessing Soviet intentions in regard to CES.

Linkage would have the following implications:

—while it may be argued that Soviet interest in CES could provide additional leverage in SALT, it is unlikely that this interest would affect the Soviet position on SALT issues, since they deal with fundamental matters of state security;
—such linkage would run a considerable risk of damaging SALT at a stage in which the negotiations are both delicate and nearing fruition. Since we have consistently eschewed linking SALT with extraneous issues, a reversal on our part would cause the Soviets to question our basic objectives in SALT, thus delaying and diverting the talks—precisely the opposite of what would be intended.

Comment: This part of the discussion is badly rigged by State and ACDA who are deathly afraid that SALT will be endangered. Yet, it makes absolutely no sense to think about European security in any real sense if the US and the USSR cannot make even a limited arrangement on strategic arms control. The original idea of including this discussion in the study was to emphasize this point, so that the US could at least tell the Allies of our reluctance to proceed with the actual CES if SALT had not reached some agreement. In fact, this is not a revolutionary position. Until the last NATO meeting, our preconditions for CES were the Berlin agreement and “progress” on other East-West issues, which was specifically defined to mean SALT. This latter condition was dropped under French pressures. All that would be involved in reviving it would be rather clear warnings that CES could not be expected to achieve anything if SALT was stalemated.

8 See Document 57.

77. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Report on My Trip to Europe

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 229, Agency Files, Defense, Vol. XIV. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “The President has seen.” Nixon wrote several notes to Kissinger on the memorandum, including the following with regard to MBFR: “We need a better game plan—with ball control on MBFR,” and “K—how about a ltr [letter] to Brosio from RN on MBFR—and also touching on other fears (reassure them)—which he could make public?” On an attached routing memorandum, Hyland wrote on December 17: “I understand this was seen by Pres already and no action required.”
MBFR

In my talks with Schmidt and Carrington, it was made quite clear that neither were in any hurry to negotiate any force reductions in Europe. MOD Tanassi of Italy also favored a go-slow approach to MBFR. From recent talks Schmidt had with French authorities, it is clear that France continues to oppose MBFR at this time. This attitude of caution—particularly on the part of Schmidt—is a complete turn-around from a year ago when he, for one, was pressing me to take the initiative in negotiating troop reductions with the USSR. I believe their main concern today is that the US will move too fast toward troop reductions in Europe in order to placate the well-publicized views of some prominent Members of Congress like Senator Mansfield. Once troop reductions start, they believe NATO will gradually fade away and that all this will take place before Western Europe has had an opportunity to resolve its political problems. I am sure that Schmidt would like more time for Ostpolitik to succeed, and feels that troop reductions now might lessen the Soviet Union’s ardent for German political initiatives.

As far as a Conference on European Security (CES) and MBFR are concerned, Schmidt now feels that there is an advantage to combining the two. More than likely his real reason is to slow down movement toward negotiations on MBFR which he senses might bear fruit. But his expressed reason to me was that combining CES and MBFR would be the only way to get the French to participate in MBFR, since they have already said that they would attend the CES. Schmidt feels that it is very important to have France involved in any final MBFR decisions. On this same subject, Carrington differed with his own Foreign Office which favors combining these negotiations; he personally prefers to keep them separate.

I took the opportunity to stress the point that in considering preparations for MBFR negotiations the primary factor must be the security of Europe and that we must not look on MBFR as a tool to solve political problems. Regardless of any enticing overtures from the Soviet

\footnote{Nixon underlined “neither were in any hurry to negotiate any force reductions in Europe” and wrote in the margin, “I agree.” A memorandum of Laird’s conversation with Schmidt, October 26, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US. A memorandum of Laird’s conversation with Carrington, October 25, is in the Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 18, Document No. 358.}

\footnote{Nixon bracketed the entire paragraph up to this point and underlined the phrase, “combining CES and MBFR would be the only way to get the French to participate in MBFR, since they have already said that they would attend the CES.” Nixon wrote in the margin, “K—an interesting idea.”}
Union to reduce forces, we still had to press for force improvements and additions that were agreed to in the AD-70 study and EDIP.

In discussing the kind of organization needed to conduct the actual MBFR negotiations after the Explorer’s (Ambassador Brosio) work is finished, it was quite evident that no one had an acceptable plan. SYG Luns figured that Brosio would “fade away” after his exploring mission but offered no substitute solution. Carrington had a scheme which would, for all practical purposes, put a British officer in charge. I believe the US should move quickly to lay a workable plan before our NATO Allies. Therefore, in the next week, I plan to circulate a proposal which would include:

—A prospective main negotiator (Brosio is a possibility)\(^4\)
—A limitation on participating countries
—The establishment of a NATO back-stopping group dominated by US and including countries whose forces would be reduced
—A method to keep the rest of NATO informed
—Emphasis on the importance of adequate Defense Department representation and participation in both preparations for and conduct of these negotiations.

I am convinced that all of NATO is waiting for the US to take the lead in MBFR and that they are most anxious to learn which of the options under consideration we prefer.\(^5\) I am also convinced that we would encounter a strong opposition to a US proposal which limits cuts to stationed forces only. Our proposals, therefore, should take these feelings into account and provide for some adjustments in indigenous forces in the long run. I recently sent Henry Kissinger a paper on MBFR which suggests approaches which would take these considerations into account.\(^6\)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\(^4\) Nixon underlined this point and wrote in the margin, “Good.”
\(^5\) Nixon underlined the sentence, beginning with the word “all,” and wrote in the margin, “I agree.”
\(^6\) See footnote 4, Document 73.

78. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting


SUBJECT

European Security Conference

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. George Springsteen
Mr. Ralph J. McGuire
Mr. Herbert Spiro

NSC Staff

Mr. William Hyland
R/Adm. Robert O. Welander
Mr. Mark Wandler

DOD

Mr. Armistead Selden
B/Gen. Harrison Lobdell, Jr.
Mr. Peter Smith

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
B/Gen. Francis J. Roberts

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
Mr. James P. Hanrahan

Treasury

Mr. John J. McGinnis

ACDA

Mr. Philip Farley

It was agreed that:

—Short of a Presidential approval, we will not agree to a preparatory meeting on CES. If a further meeting is necessary, we should encourage a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting after the President’s trip to Moscow.

—The State Department will circulate its draft paper on “Possible Post-CES Machinery.”

—Using the State Department’s outlines as a point of departure, further study should be done on such substantive aspects of a CES as trade and cultural exchange, permanent machinery and the use of collateral constraints developed for MBFR.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original.

2 Not found. See footnote 4, Document 76.
Dr. Kissinger: All our meetings seem to be about losers. I’m talking about subjects, not personnel.

Adm. Moorer: We’ve got two dillies here.

Dr. Kissinger: I’ve read all the papers. I would like somebody to explain to me what we would get out of a conference on European Security. What advantage would a conference be to the United States?

Mr. Springsteen: In a static sense, there really would be none.

Dr. Kissinger: What about in a dynamic sense?

Mr. Springsteen: In a way, we are stuck with the conference. The question is how do we operate so that we maximize our gains and minimize our losses. This project has been in the works for a long time, and we have been negative on it. Now we are being pushed by our Allies. We think the time has come for us to fish or cut bait.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do our Allies want the conference?

Mr. Springsteen: I think a good part of it has to do with détente fever. The French, for example, think the conference may open some windows to the west for the Eastern European countries with such things as an increased flow of people. Of course, the implicit idea is that the Eastern European countries will get out from under the Russian thumb. The French are the leading exponents of this view.

Dr. Kissinger: If that’s the case, it seems strange that the Russians are such strong advocates of the conference.

Mr. Springsteen: There is of course an element of risk in this for the Russians. Nevertheless, they feel a conference will be a great help to their image in the West.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the Russians facing such great obstacles in their bilateral dealings with the West that they are being forced to take this route [the conference]?

Mr. Springsteen: No. I don’t share the French thesis, either. I was just expressing their point of view.

Dr. Kissinger: The French, among others, are not interested in MBFR. They may be pushing CES in order to prevent MBFR. And if that continues, we will be in a never-never land.

Mr. Springsteen: Isn’t that where we are now?

Dr. Kissinger: At what point do we draw the line? When do we say the party’s over? As usual, I’m just trying to be the devil’s advocate. As you know, no agreement on MBFR will improve our position. I agree with your [Springsteen’s] characterization that we should cut our losses and maximize the pluses. But I don’t understand why the Russians are so eager for the conference. Do they see something in it that we don’t see?
Adm. Moorer: Their basic objective is to break up NATO. West Eu-

erope has not taken a united stance, and the Russians feel that a secu-

rity conference would be a good way of publicizing this disagreement.

Mr. Springsteen: They [the Russians] also want a conference to put

a seal of approval on the territorial status quo and on the Bonn-Moscow

and Bonn-Warsaw treaties.\(^3\)

Adm. Moorer: The only military problem the Russians see is with

NATO. As I said before, their basic objective is to weaken NATO. Then

they can go on with their other activities in the Middle East, China and

in other areas.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the plan for the upcoming NATO meeting?

Mr. Springsteen: At the moment, Germany, Great Britain and

France are saying that the status of the Berlin arrangements is far

even though Phase III is being delayed until the treaties

are ratified—for multilateral preparatory talks to begin. Our position

is that ratification of the treaties and the signing of the final protocol

come first and that we shouldn’t move on to multilateral discussions

until we have those things. The other countries say we should move

now. They say they are certain the treaties will be ratified and the pro-

tocol will be signed in due course.

Dr. Kissinger: Would they still want to move even if we say we

are not eager to go along with them?

Mr. Springsteen: I am trying to get something out on this subject

right now.

Dr. Kissinger: Who’s stopping you?

Mr. Springsteen: No one—yet. The Secretary, as you know, is strong

on this precondition.

Dr. Kissinger: I admit the precondition could be seen as somewhat

phony. The main point, though, is that we want to delay the confer-

ence. If this precondition is no good, we will help you find a better

one. We are not eager to have a conference before the summit meeting,

and I’m not sure we will be eager for one after the meeting. I’m inter-

ested in someone telling me what the hell can come out of this

conference.

Mr. Springsteen: Do you mean if it drags on?

Dr. Kissinger: It won’t drag on. The Berlin negotiations stretched

out for two years. How could the trade issue be dragged out, if it’s on

the agenda.

\(^3\) See footnote 5, Document 76.
Mr. Springsteen: You can negotiate ad nauseum. The problem for better or worse, is how do we go through the process. The French, for one, want to leapfrog.

Dr. Kissinger: We want to delay as long as possible. We want to delay the preparatory process. If our Allies in NATO come up with an unreasonable proposal, why do we have to rush in? (to Mr. Springsteen) Are you sure they will have one?

Mr. Springsteen: The senior advisors have been meeting in Berlin, and Bahr says the meetings will be concluded by December 3. Great Britain, Germany and France say we should move now to the multilateral preparation. Hillenbrand said, though, that we will not move until the final protocol is signed. He cited what I thought was a very good example. Suppose we go very far down the conference road, he pointed out, and the Bundestag doesn’t ratify the treaties. Then the Russians wouldn’t sign the treaties. Where would we be then?

Dr. Kissinger: That wouldn’t break Brandt’s heart. In fact, it would give him another argument for early preparatory talks for a conference.

Mr. Springsteen: Hillenbrand was looking at it from our point of view.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn’t we have a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting first, before we begin the multilateral preparatory discussions? Would that be unreasonable?

Mr. Springsteen: That, in fact, is what we envisioned.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose we tell the Allies that we want a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting first, but they don’t want to wait. What happens?

Mr. Springsteen: We would like to swing them [the Allies] around and get them to agree to having the final protocol signed first, followed by a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting where we can all try to see where we are going. We would encourage a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting this spring. This scenario also calls for no multilateral exploratory talks.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we all agree with that? (to Mr. Selden) What is Defense’s position?

Mr. Selden: We agree with State that we should cut our losses. The longer we delay, the better off we are.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Farley) Phil, what do you think?

Mr. Farley: We would like very much to keep disarmament out of the conference, if it ever takes place.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do you want to do that? Because you think it would screw up the SALT talks? Or are you afraid that you will have the only substantive topic at the conference?
Mr. Farley: There would be no substance to discussions unless the conference did not deal with MBFR, and CES is simply the wrong place to get involved in that.

Mr. Selden: How would we keep it out of the conference?

Dr. Kissinger: The Russians wouldn’t want to discuss MBFR at the conference. They want a renunciation of forces agreement and other things which will prove that military blocs are not necessary.

Mr. Springsteen: The Russians have suggested that MBFR can be discussed at the conference, but not negotiated.

Mr. Farley: It would be hard not to do that.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s not that MBFR is such a winner, either, judging from the paper I read. At what point do we concentrate on substance, or do we go on in this never-never land? We keep getting high level letters from Soviet leaders to the President, urging a conference to discuss such things as cultural exchange and trade. All of this is done bilaterally now.

Mr. Springsteen: The agenda the Soviets are proposing stresses force renunciation and respect for existing borders.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s in the UN charter, isn’t it?

Mr. Springsteen: That’s right. NATO, nevertheless, has been doing some homework on this. In fact, there is a NATO draft agreement, but it hasn’t got government clearances.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this a U.S. draft?

Mr. Springsteen: It’s not a draft from one country. It’s just a staff operation.

Dr. Kissinger: What happens if the Allies say this is a brilliant draft?

Mr. Springsteen: I don’t think that will happen. There are actually three drafts—from us, the Germans and someone else.

Dr. Kissinger: Are these individual products? Is our paper a U.S. Government draft? Are we behind it?

Mr. Springsteen: No. None of you are signed on.

Dr. Kissinger: This is the first I have ever heard of such a draft. (to Mr. Selden) Do you know about it?

Mr. Selden: No.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer) Do you?

Adm. Moorer: No.

Mr. Springsteen: The draft is more or less a product of an EUR graduate seminar. The U.S. Government is not committed to it in any way. We simply tried to point out some of the pitfalls involved in these discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Allies like the paper, why would we not be committed?
Mr. Springsteen: We have made it very plain to them that this paper was done on the staff level.

Dr. Kissinger: We are now negotiating in the mid-East on the basis of a paper prepared by the head of our U.S. Interests Section.

Mr. Springsteen: I can assure you that this is not at all the situation with our paper.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we see the paper?

Mr. Springsteen: Surely. In fact, big chunks of it were cleared here, if I recall correctly.

Dr. Kissinger: That is not inconceivable to me. Can we get some coherence into this whole process? If not, we run the risk of eroding everything that has been built up over 25 years. Governments that are weak or dependent on elections very often like to pretend that something is happening when in fact nothing is happening. We should not be feeding that process. Ideally, we should have a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting first, and our role in that meeting should be as concrete as possible. Second, when there is a proposal we should all look at it and drive to make it as concrete as possible. Otherwise, there is too much incoherence. (to Mr. Springsteen) I’m sure this is your view, too.

Mr. Springsteen: It is. We have seen the monster coming down the road for some time now, and consequently we have done a good deal of work.

Dr. Kissinger: Have you worked with the agencies here?

Mr. Springsteen: Yes. With Defense and Treasury.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the title of this draft paper you prepared?

Mr. Springsteen: “Possible Post-CES Machinery.”

Gen. Lobdell: We worked on certain sections of it.

Dr. Kissinger: We need a systematic review of all the concrete proposals that are surfaced, and we need to have meetings on these proposals, when appropriate.

Mr. Springsteen: We welcome that.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we all agree then that we will not agree—short of Presidential approval—to a preparatory meeting? If a further meeting is necessary, it should be a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting after the summit.

All agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: As far as the basic approach to the conference is concerned, we have broad choices: the Soviet approach and the “new” State approach. Both deal in some degree with security considerations.

Mr. Springsteen: It’s true that they deal with security considerations, but we also would hope to achieve something concrete. In order to do that, we would have to step in and take an active role. We don’t
want the conference as an end to itself, the way the Soviets do. Instead, we want to institutionalize the continuing role of the United States in the future of West Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: How would we go about doing that?

Mr. Springsteen: By giving strong leadership. We could tell our Allies what we are working on and win them to our positions.

Dr. Kissinger: We are an activist government. Once we adopt a policy of activism on CES, two things will happen: (a) we will all become very active, which is no crime in itself; and (b) when the Europeans say that something we want doesn’t meet with their favor, we will end up with the Soviet position under American leadership. Let the Soviets drive the process. We should drive the substance.

Mr. Springsteen: The Allies already think we are dragging our feet on the conference. We can tell them we are prepared to have a conference. We can say that the Soviets can drive the process if they want but that we think we should try to figure out how to turn the conference to our advantage. For example, there might be an advantage for us in establishing permanent machinery.

Dr. Kissinger: We should look at that carefully. I have no views on it, and I am pretty sure that the President has not addressed it. Just off the top of my head, though, I would say that anything the Soviets can exhibit as a substitute for NATO would be a disadvantage for us.

Mr. Springsteen: We have not rejected the idea of permanent machinery.

Dr. Kissinger: We should have another meeting after the NATO Ministerial to discuss force renunciation and other things we have been studying at the staff level.

Mr. Springsteen: We’ve already given you an outline of our thinking on the subject.

Dr. Kissinger: You should use this outline as a point of departure for further study. Take the topics we consider useful and flesh them out. For example: What would we say about trade and cultural exchange? What would we say about permanent machinery? What, if Phil [Farley] permits, would we say about CES using some of the collateral constraints we developed for MBFR?

Mr. Springsteen: All of this is fine, but we have a more immediate problem, too. The Secretary will be expected to say something about CES at the NATO Ministerial. The line he has used the last two years has been pretty stubborn and negative. Does he parrot that line again, or does he indicate to the Allies that we are prepared to approach various alternatives?

Dr. Kissinger: Why does he have to say more than we are willing to discuss concrete issues after the final protocol has been signed?
Mr. Springsteen: The Allies will counter by saying that this is what we have all been doing.

Dr. Kissinger: The Secretary can then say that the issues are not concrete enough.

Mr. Farley: They [the Allies] can’t point to a consensus in the Alliance.

Mr. Hyland: Our line is that we are not yet ready on substance, especially on security considerations.

Mr. Springsteen: I hadn’t realized Phil [Farley] was so adamant on disarmament.

Mr. Farley: I have several practical concerns. Suppose, for example, that CES borrows the MBFR collateral constraints and creates some kind of compliance machinery. Then, if we are relying on national means to detect violations, I would hate to rely on CES as a court of appeals. Also, if we give CES a heavy security cast, we could be left with only a regional security organization. I don’t mean to be negative, but the papers we have done so far don’t show how we move on to the next steps.

Dr. Kissinger: If that’s the case, then we don’t go on to the next steps.

Mr. Springsteen: But we haven’t even taken the first step.

Dr. Kissinger: If we want to avoid going 1000 miles, we should not take the first step.

79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

NSC Consideration of NATO Issues:
(1) Mutual Force Reductions
(2) European Security Conference

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-032, NSC Meeting CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial) 12/1/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the first page indicates that the President saw the memorandum.
The meetings of NATO Ministers next week (December 8–10) will be dominated by two issues: the question of a Western position on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and preparations for a European Conference on Security and Cooperation. On both subjects our Allies will be looking to the U.S. for an indication of how we wish to deal with them.

—Both of these issues bear importantly on Western security interests. If not handled properly, the results could be highly dangerous. It is important that we maintain our focus on the implications for the military balance of any force reductions and on the substance of European security, rather than drift into ill-defined negotiations that will only work to the Soviet advantage.

—On neither of these issues is the Western Alliance in a position to move ahead; there is no consensus on the aims of either mutual force reductions or a European conference.

—We need more time to develop concrete proposals.

—Finally, multilateral negotiations of this sort on European issues should come after, not before your meeting in Moscow. Moreover, we should have some greater assurance of a satisfactory outcome in SALT.

Background

MBFR: The Western initiative, dating back to 1968, for negotiations on the reduction of forces in Central Europe was largely academic until last spring when Brezhnev offered to begin negotiations. As a consequence of the Soviet response, we have intensified our study of the issues. Within the Alliance there has been a sharp revival of interest in negotiations because of: (1) the Soviet response on MBFR; (2) the ongoing U.S. and FRG negotiations with the Soviets; and, (3) the Mansfield proposals for unilateral reductions.

Our own studies have shown that almost every model for reductions that would be negotiable with the Soviets would damage the Western military position. Small reductions that minimize the adverse consequences are almost impossible to verify, whereas larger reductions do major damage mainly because the Soviets withdraw only to Western Russia while we withdraw across the Atlantic.

Though these conclusions are not surprising, they are being submerged in other considerations. For various reasons MBFR negotiations have become a highly political issue in Europe.

—Many Allies (and some in our own government) believe that our Congressional critics can be placated by MBFR negotiations.

—Others believe that MBFR is an instrument for European détente, and should be pursued for this purpose.

—In addition, some of our Allies suspect that we want to arrange a bilateral reduction with the USSR and wish to forestall this through early negotiations.
Our objective, therefore, must be to impress the Allies that we are not interested in reductions for the sake of a better atmosphere and to assure them that no bilateral bargain will be made with the USSR. We want to force our Allies to recognize the problems and implications of MBFR and to focus on the security consequences to the Alliance’s military posture. Unless maintenance of a military balance is the principal criteria for judging MBFR, we will be engaged in the impossible task of trading military security for some vague and undefinable degree of détente.

A Conference on European Security and Cooperation. This issue has been pressed with varying degrees of urgency by the Soviets since 1954, and for good reason. As they define it, such a Conference would issue declarations of non-aggression, recognize existing borders, and agree on increased economic cooperation. Their aim is to solidify the status quo in Eastern Europe, while extending their own influence in the Western Alliance.

On this issue there is growing Allied pressure simply to move to negotiations. The Alliance consideration of the subjects to be discussed and what the Western position would be has been limited and without consensus. Negotiations at this point would almost certainly result in a Soviet-style conference agreeing on broad generalities.

We need to redirect the work of the Allies so that principles of security are translated into specific measures. If we can do this, a negotiation later may actually enhance the Western position.

Priorities and Timing

We have set no precondition for MBFR, but the Soviets are clearly dragging their feet by refusing thus far to accept Brosio as the NATO “explorer” of MBFR principles. Until they do agree to receive Brosio we need make no further effort to open negotiations; we should use the time for the Alliance to digest the analytical result of our studies. We have just completed a major study and transmitted it to NATO. One approach which deserves further discussion involves phased negotiations, with extensive discussion of principles in the early stages and prior to negotiations on reductions.

On a European conference we are committed to begin the preparations once the Berlin issue is completed. Some Allies, notably Britain and France, and perhaps West Germany, would be willing to move toward a conference as soon as the current phase of the Berlin talks, between East and West Germany, is completed (perhaps late this week). We want to stick to the condition of completely wrapping up Berlin. The Soviets appear to be insisting that Berlin will be held open until their German treaty is ratified in Bonn. If so, preparations of a European conference will be put over until the spring and, thus, should be held up until your meeting in Moscow. In this case, agreement to begin a European conference might be a summit decision.
Proposed Conduct of the Meeting

Since we can anticipate pressure from the Allies to show “movement” at the Ministerial meeting, it will be important for you to impress on the NSC meeting that we will not move until we are assured that in both issues (MBFR and a conference) we can develop a common Western position that insures that our security interests will be maintained intact.

(You may wish to say that both issues should be delayed until after the summit.)

I suggest that you conduct the meeting as follows:

—Call on Director Helms to brief on the outcome of the November 30 Warsaw Pact meeting on MBFR and the European conference.
—Call on me to outline the issues and alternatives.
—Make clear that you do not want a substantive movement on these issues now.
—Discuss the conclusions we draw from the MBFR options analysis and Allied reactions, calling first on Secretary Rogers.
—Discuss the sequence of MBFR negotiations, once started.
—Discuss the preconditions (Berlin) for a Conference.
—Discuss the character of the Conference we want.

Your Talking Points\(^2\) are written in the above fashion.

\(^2\) Not attached, but the talking points are ibid.

80. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting\(^1\)


NSC MEETING ON MBFR AND CES

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Secretary of State William Rogers
Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Philip Farley, ACDA Director

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 through 6–20–74. Secret; Sensitive. Tabs A–C are attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 10:10 to 11 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
December 1970–December 1971

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General
General George Lincoln, OEP Director
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense
David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for NSA
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Philip Odeen, NSC Staff
William Hyland, NSC Staff

President: We have two issues for discussion today, MBFR and the European Security Conference. Dick [Helms], will you start off?

[Director Helms gave his briefing.]²

President: Henry, will you discuss the issues?

Kissinger: I will sum up briefly the issues as they have emerged from the work of the Senior Review Group.

First, MBFR. The idea goes back to the 1950s, when it was called “disengagement.” It has been taken up in recent years for a variety of reasons, which have consequences for determining the strategy for dealing with the issues. It was initiated by the previous administration as an argument against pressures from the Congress for force reductions. Secretary General Brosio then picked it up as a means of forestalling unilateral reductions by the U.S. The Soviets, for some reason not entirely clear, became interested.

But until your administration, Mr. President, there was no systematic analysis done. There was no idea of the impact of mutual reductions on the military balance. In the interagency group we have done several studies in depth. We reviewed 15 cases of possible combinations of reductions, with such elements as limits on stationed forces, limits on indigenous forces, and various combinations.

We have studied four categories:

—First, small symmetrical reductions, of say 10 percent.
—Second, larger symmetrical reductions of 30 percent.
—Third, a common ceiling.
—Fourth, a mixed package, though in this case we have not done as much work as in the others.

The following conclusions have emerged from our analysis: Though there is considerable debate over methodology, the conclusions do not differ. A reduction on the order of 10 percent or less cannot be verified. We would not know if the other side had actually reduced. This size of reductions would minimize the deleterious military effects.

² The text of Helms’s briefing is ibid.
There would still be a deleterious effect, but not a major one. Any other percentage reductions will make the situation worse; the larger the cut the worse the effects.

Dr. Kissinger asked that several charts be distributed. [See Tab A.]

These charts show how the deterioration in the time for Soviet forces would reach the Weser and then the Rhine rivers. The other charts show how the ratios of the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces before and after reductions would deteriorate. [Tab B.]

The option of a mixed package is probably not negotiable. And the common ceiling—where we would reduce by 10,000 and the other side by 100,000—is probably not negotiable. Secretary Laird submitted a paper combining the different packages, and it is being staffed.³

It is not necessary to come down on one solution. As Dick Helms said, there is no progress on the Soviets’ side. We have sent to NATO the results of our study.⁴ Have they received them, Bill [Rogers]?

Rogers: Yes, they have gone this morning, but six months late.

Laird: These are only examples, not conclusions.

Kissinger: The major point to stress to the Allies is to analyze what the effect is on security. If the work is driven by a desire for negotiations, there will be a consensus for a percentage reduction, but this is the most deleterious. The danger is that MBFR will become a political debate. We have done serious work in analyzing the effects, but the others want MBFR for détente, for a bargaining chip, or because of their own internal domestic opinion. It is in our interest to force the European Allies to focus on security in order to have an understanding of the military consequences; otherwise we are in a never-never land. At the NATO meetings, Secretary Rogers could say that we will follow up our studies with more presentations, including models submitted by Secretary Laird.

Let me turn now to the European Security Conference.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ On November 19, the Verification Panel met and discussed how to handle giving NATO the results of the Verification Panel’s completed MBFR analysis. According to a memorandum for the record, November 26, “Dr. Kissinger said that continuing Allied uncertainty about our MBFR proposals is doing more harm than any conclusions drawn from the analysis conceivably could. Their knowledge of the subject is ‘abysmal’; if we don’t get something to them soon, it is likely they will end up ‘doing the wrong things’ out of ignorance.” The memorandum continued: “Mr. Irwin said that we should proceed immediately to sanitize the Evaluation Report and try to get it to NATO by Monday, November 29. Dr. Kissinger said that it seemed to be the consensus that we should go ahead on Mr. Irwin’s schedule, caveat ing the report as necessary.” (Memorandum I–29441/71; Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 5, NATO, Vol. X) No minutes from the meeting have been found.
This is a nightmare. First, it was started with the idea of including all security issues. Then Berlin was broken out; then MBFR. Now the Soviets want an agenda with three issues: (1) renunciation of force and respect for frontiers, (2) expansion of economic, cultural and other contacts, and (3) establishment of some permanent machinery. On our side we are proposing similarly vague general principles. [See Tab C] The good paper developed by State\(^5\) opens the way to addressing the security issues, to give concreteness to a conference.

If we look at the enormous effort the Soviets have been making for a conference—including Gromyko’s talks with you, Mr. President,\(^6\)—and compare their effort with the conceivable results, there must be some objective beyond trade and cultural relations. They will use a climate of détente to argue that NATO is unnecessary. A permanent security organ would be offered as a substitute for the alliances. Now, Brandt is already in hock to the Soviets, to show progress in Ostpolitik. The French have two motives: first to outmaneuver the Germans in Moscow, and second to take the steam out of MBFR. The danger is that we will get both CES and MBFR.

The problem of the substance of a Conference is whether in addition to the general topics we can incorporate security issues. The pro is that it makes the conference more concrete; the con is that a conference is probably not the forum to deal with issues of monitoring force movements, for example.

Because dealing with an agenda, however, we have the question of how rapidly to move. The French and Germans are committed. The Soviets are pressing for preparatory talks. Normally, preparatory talks could be used to delay, but the issues do not lend themselves to delay. Up to now we have said that a Berlin agreement is a precondition for preparatory talks. But once the inner-German talks are finished, this may be a tough position to hold. But we can say Berlin must be completed. There will be enormous pressures if we say this, because this will bring pressure on the Bundestag to ratify the treaties.

In summary, we can use Berlin to delay further preparations, and we can use the argument that we need a unified Western position and should have a Western Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Third, we can delay in the preparatory talks, but there are divided views on how to string out these talks.

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\(^5\) Apparent reference to the undated response to NSSM 138, prepared by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Europe (IG/EUR), which is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–063, SRG Meeting European Security Conference 11/23/71. For an analytical summary of the paper prepared by the NSC staff, see Document 76.

\(^6\) See Document 71.
It is premature to debate what would be in a conference until we decide how to string out the timing.

President: How long before the Berlin talks are wrapped up?

Rogers: I talked with State Secretary Frank and he said it will take 2–3 months for the Bundestag to take up the treaty. We can figure out ways to delay. I have told the Russians that it was unrealistic to think of a conference in 1972. There are pressures for preparatory talks, but we can fend these off over Berlin.

Kissinger: The Soviets are playing into our hands in linking Berlin and the treaty.

Rogers: Second, MBFR is related to a conference, but no one is sure how they relate. But since the Soviets are not inviting Brosio, the blame is on them. Third, you will be meeting with Pompidou, Brandt and Heath, and there should be no decision before that. Fourth, you are going to Moscow. If you agree, we could show interest in holding talks, but hold a Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting some time after signing the Final Quadripartite protocol. We will try to be forthcoming, but dilatory.

President: We will do nothing?

Rogers: Brosio should go to Moscow.

President: But there will be no formal meetings. I have read recently somewhere that we may be setting up meetings with the Soviets.

Rogers: Well, we need to clarify the agenda. They proposed the conference, it is their proposal. But when we ask them, they talk in vague terms, but they have no items of security. I am putting emphasis on cooperation rather than security, but all the Allies favor a conference. We can probably stick, but a conference might be turned to our advantage. The Eastern Europeans want it. Romania and Yugoslavia favor it to undercut the Brezhnev doctrine. There was a statement in the Brezhnev–Tito communiqué that we might use.

President: But can we delay beyond, to 1973?

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7 Telegram 214288 to Moscow, November 26, reported on Rogers’s conversation with Dobrynin the same day: “As to timing of a security conference, the Secretary pointed out that it was unrealistic to expect the U.S. to participate next year. However, a date in 1973—it would take that long to prepare properly for such a meeting—might be a real possibility if some progress could be made in other areas and in the planning phase. They agreed to talk about this issue when Dobrynin returned to Washington at the end of December.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)

8 At the December NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, the Ministers “noted with regret” the Soviet refusal to receive Brosio. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974*, p. 269)
Rogers: Yes, I have said there can be no conference in 1972. Maybe it should be at a lower level. We would not call it preparatory. We will get word out that there will be no conference in 1972, but we have to be sure we are not accused of dragging our feet.

President: Mel, have you some thoughts? I have the impression that the defense ministers are concerned about MBFR.

Laird: The U.S. can give leadership, and they will go along with our suggestions. Carrington will give me a British study. The British and Germans have an input but are willing and ready to follow our leadership. The question in their minds is our unilateral reductions. I reassured them. It is important for us to work out, and develop in the very near future, a position. My paper has two alternative approaches. We do not need a position before a ministerial meeting, but we need to develop one and give leadership. But we don’t want an approach to solve our own political problems. We can get votes to support us. But it is urgent to give leadership. I agree with Secretary Rogers that we should not get into a debate with thirty nations. That would be a mistake. Decisions need to be made on security considerations. All the departments are now addressing the issues. We are in a better position than two years ago.

Rogers: I doubt that the Soviets are really interested in MBFR; their real interest is in a conference. They are putting a great deal of diplomatic pressure on every Eastern European I talk to, to put on the pressures. The Soviet position on MBFR is ancillary. They are proposing to put it on the agenda, but to set up the machinery to handle it after the conference. This is a device for getting a conference. There is no pressure on MBFR but real pressures from our allies on the conference.

Kissinger: In my judgment, everyone is moving to anticipate everyone else. The French move to delay MBFR for a CES; the others to delay CES for MBFR. No one really wants a conference but no one wants to be in a position of turning it down.

Rogers: The Scandinavians and Italians want it, and the British came up with the idea of permanent machinery.

Kissinger: That was the Labour Government.

Rogers: Most of the allies favor the conference for reasons of internal domestic political support.

Laird: Sooner or later Brosio will be received in Moscow, but it puts the other side on the defensive.

Moorer: Some of the allies are suspicious that we will use MBFR to justify our reductions unilaterally. Also there is the problem of not allowing force improvements to fall by the wayside. We are working so closely with the allies to take a forthcoming position. The British and Germans have made studies that by and large reach our conclusion...
that reduction will not contribute to security of NATO. The Soviets object to balance; they really object to the common ceiling. In the case of MBFR and CES, the key Soviet objective is to divide the US from NATO.

Kissinger: There is also the allied fear of unilateral withdrawals on the one hand, and a bilateral Soviet-American reduction on the other. We should do what we can to reassure them.

Laird: The Soviets are planting stories around Europe that they will make a unilateral cut in their own forces just before the summit. This would be tough politically.

Rogers: Mel, could you say something about burden-sharing? This is a tough one. Until recently we meant force improvements, but now . . .

Laird: There are four ways of burden-sharing. The President’s statement in Ireland\(^9\) and in Naples\(^10\) is what we should stay with: The allies should be taking over more of our functions in NATO. They should be modernizing their forces. It is not just a question of paying dollars to the U.S. I am for being tough on things like offset, but it should not be made the primary effort.

Rogers: The offset deal can be worked out. But when we talk, our allies are convinced we are talking about direct contributions. But the President said they did not need to pay for us, but to help improve the forces.

Laird: We cannot let the allies back away from their five-year commitment to the AD–70 program. In the next 6–7 years, we will see that this is to our advantage.

Rogers: How are the allies doing on improving their forces?

Moorer: They are building some aircraft shelters. The Germans are improving their logistics. The UK is building some new ships.

Laird: It is not as much as we want them to do. The Germans have increased their budget by 13 percent. There is also some increase in the UK, but the others’ share is decreasing. Both the Germans and the British should be encouraged. Norway and Belgium are not doing their share. We must try to get the burden shared, not get dollars. Of course, we should get as much for our forces, like rents and barracks, but not only in the dollar context. We should keep going in the Naples context.

President: What about the readiness of the Warsaw Pact forces?

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\(^10\) President Nixon’s remarks upon his arrival at NATO Southern Command in Naples, September 30, 1970, are ibid., pp. 786–787.
Helms: You will recall I briefed on this last June. There has been no change since then. It’s the same number of divisions. There are rumors of Soviet reductions in Germany, but I think these are to soften us up on the MBFR thing.

Laird: Our forces in Europe are in the best shape than any time since the Vietnam war began. We will have problems with the Congressional amendment on reducing 50,000 man-years. We have to do it in two quarters. We will be about 10,000 short in Europe in March, but we can bring it up by early in the fiscal year. This is not bad. When we took office we were short about 30,000 spaces.

President: So we delay without getting caught.

[The meeting ended.]

81. National Security Decision Memorandum 142


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT
Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European Conference

As a result of the discussion at the December 1 NSC Meeting the President has directed that the following guidance be followed in consultations with our Allies on the issues related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and preparations for a European Conference.

After considering the discussions at the meeting, the President has concluded that we are not prepared for definitive decisions with respect to MBFR or CES and that our general approach should be to

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM’s), Nos. 97–144. Top Secret.
2 See Document 80.
proceed slowly while developing consensus within the Alliance on positions which clearly maintain our security.

It should be stressed to our Allies that the principal criterion for judging any MBFR proposals must be maintenance of Western military security. This will be the U.S. position in Alliance consultations on preferred MBFR models that would serve as the basis for negotiation. U.S. representatives should develop a maximum consensus on this principle.

At this time, the U.S. cannot support any single approach to reductions. We should urge the Allies to continue analysis of possible reduction models. Meanwhile, we should complete ongoing analysis and undertake further studies of asymmetrical models that emphasize limitations and reductions on Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities. We should also complete a study on options dealing with nuclear weapons and pursue further work on collateral constraints.

Our Allies should be told that the U.S. supports the concept of a sequential approach to negotiation similar to that proposed by the FRG. This approach should be applied to further analysis of MBFR models.

In Allied consultations, U.S. representatives should provide reassurance that we will not negotiate bilateral reductions with the USSR.

Until the Brosio mission to Moscow has been completed, the U.S. cannot support other efforts towards MBFR negotiations. While we would consider alternatives to the Brosio mission, if it proves unacceptable to the USSR, it remains essential that an exploratory phase similar to that authorized for Mr. Brosio be undertaken before any multilateral negotiations.

**European Conference**

We should insist that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed before agreeing to any multilateral preparations for a European Conference. Following the signing of the Berlin Protocol, the U.S. should urge a meeting of NATO countries at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to coordinate a common approach to the issues that may be raised by the other side before going into preparatory talks.

At present, Western preparations on substantive issues are insufficiently developed to enter into multilateral East-West contacts. The U.S. will be prepared to contribute to the work of the Alliance on substantive points by submitting more concrete proposals for Western consideration. In particular, security issues (other than MBFR) that might be topics in a Conference will be given more emphasis.

The U.S. has no interest in a conference in 1972 and all preparatory work within the Alliance and with Eastern and other European countries should be geared to this consideration.
The U.S. does not wish to alter its current position of keeping MBFR and a European Conference separate.

**Burdensharing**

The U.S. should continue to stress to its Allies the importance of additional European force improvements meeting the objectives set by NSDM 133. MBFR should in no way conflict with the force improvements developed under the AD–70 programs; these two concepts must be complementary.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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82. Editorial Note

Moscow Summit, December 1971–May 1972

83. Memorandum of Conversation

Terceira, Azores, December 13, 1971, 9 a.m.

PRESENT

The President
President Pompidou
Mr. Andronikof
Major General Walters

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[President Nixon:] Militarily it was vital to the U.S. to preserve Europe and to remain and not to reduce its forces unless on a very clear multilateral basis such as a reduction vis-à-vis the Communist bloc would be disastrous. MBFR had begun in 1968 before he was elected. U.S. policy was that it must be pursued on a multilateral basis. We had yet to find any formula by which such a reduction would not downgrade our interests in relation to the Soviet bloc. We could continue the Brosio discussions and consult to the extent that President Pompidou desired. Personally the President was very skeptical. His concern was that MBFR be used simply to obtain a U.S. withdrawal. Only with a visible U.S. presence could we maintain our interest. The Soviets know this and that is why they want us out as soon as possible.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Pompidou then said that he had three remarks to make about what the President had said. Brezhnev had spoken a great deal about MBFR. He drew an idyllic picture of almost no soldiers in Europe in 10 years. In any case, France will not diminish her military

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Beginning December 12, 1971. Top Secret. The meeting took place at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroismo. A more complete transcript of the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. In preparation for the summit meeting between Nixon and Pompidou, December 13–14 in the Azores, Kissinger sent Nixon a briefing memorandum on December 10 that advised: “On East-West questions (MBFR, European Conference), the differences are relatively minor and, in any case, greater between the two foreign offices than between yourself and Pompidou.” Nixon wrote back in the margin of the memorandum: “MBFR—(1) We go forward—(2) Consult with CES.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 473, President’s Trip Files, Azores Visit—Meeting with President Pompidou, 12/13–14/71)
effort. She will pursue it whatever happens. The President commented that this was “good.”

President Pompidou said that he had told Chancellor Brandt about what the President had said of the danger that negotiations might be a pretext for U.S. opinion to demand the departure from Europe of the U.S. Forces. The Chancellor had replied that the U.S. Forces should not leave unless the Russians went too. President Pompidou said he must admit that he did not understand the German attitude on this point. They should be the most hostile to the reductions envisaged in MBFR. After all, they would be the first to be endangered. He must say that Brandt had told him that he was hostile to the neutralization or “Finlandization” of Germany. But the day the U.S. leaves Germany, the U.K. and France will not be far behind and then Germany would not be far from neutralization.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Pompidou said that the U.S. view of things was more world wide than that of France because of our means. This was why he considered the time favorable to commit Europe in a procedure of détente which could backfire but that Soviets could reverse only by a theatrical or forceful move. They are very concerned by Asia, China and their discussions with the U.S. on nuclear matters. They want peace in Europe. He believed that the Soviets harbored the illusion that the French, Germans, Italians and other countries could give them considerable economic aid. These are illusions and he had said so publicly. One could only sell to the Russians in exchange for what one buys and this was not much. No one could give unlimited credit. The European picture was very favorable except on MBFR on which he had already given the President his views. The French were not disposed to reduce their arms effort. One word about the problem of a European Security Conference. This point is evident. A security conference is beginning to be discussed seriously. He believed that all European countries were agreed on holding such a conference but felt that if the U.S. preferred a later date they would be agreeable to keeping the U.S. happy. Until, however, the U.S. agreed, there could be no real serious preparation of such a conference. Why did the French believe that such a conference could be of interest? They felt that communism as such represented by communist regimes was false from the economic and social point of view in many so called Socialist nations. Poles, Romanians and especially the Czechs and Hungarians wanted to shake off the tutelage. They believe that with the Western bloc divided and the Eastern bloc united that they lost. He felt that on one side there were the free countries who were independent and France felt that she was. On the other side there were countries who wanted to take steps towards freedom
and independence. If the superpowers or the West (that is, the U.S.) feel that this liberty and independence is bad, then harm is done. The Russians feel it is bad but cannot stop it.

President Pompidou had been struck in his last talks with the Romanian President and Foreign Minister by their anguish at the idea that multilateral preparations and meetings on this conference might be delayed. They believe that when all are seated around a table they will be protected and not until then. The U.S. and France did not have exactly the same view. The problem is one of interpretation of the situation rather than that of a disagreement on goals.

President Nixon replied that, first of all, as to the matter of whether there would be a European Security Conference the question as President Pompidou had implied was one of timing and tactics. As President Pompidou had indicated, we believed that until the German treaties are finished plans for a European Security Conference cannot be implemented. We also believed that it was vitally important that extensive discussions among ourselves be held with regard to the agenda. He agreed with the French President that there was some possibility that this conference might not be an unmixed blessing for the Soviets although they very much wanted it. The extent to which it opens up to the West the Eastern countries to whom President Pompidou referred can be a leavening factor in the attitude of those countries. We have in each case to distinguish between the leadership and the countries. The people of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had demonstrated on several occasions that there was nothing that they would like better than to get rid of Soviet influence and leadership. Certainly a country like Romania where Ceaucescu is a devoted Stalinist is also devotedly a Romanian and to the extent that he can safely do so he takes an independent line from time to time. The President’s views long term were the same as President Pompidou’s. There are risks for the Soviets in such a conference just as they think it contains risks for us. They feel it will have the effect all over Western Europe of creating a false atmosphere of security and will lead to the letting down of our guard and the belief that real peace is just around the corner and that the cold war is finished. His own view in summary was that in a deliberate way we should move towards such a conference but have in mind the fact that we should harbor no illusions as to the Soviet aims in holding it. Our planning should be such as to serve our purposes while they will attempt to serve theirs.

Overhanging the whole area of Soviet-U.S. relations is the sober, sombre fact that if the Soviet leader decided to risk nuclear war and the U.S. was involved, he knew that he had the power to kill 70 million Americans and we had the power to kill 70 million Russians. The U.S. President knows this too. There are limitations on power and a
restraining influence not because of love but because of fear. It was essential that the two nations pursue the negotiating track rather than the confrontation track. We have impressed this on the Soviets with regard to Southern Asia in the last 24 hours. The President wished to add in regard to the desire for détente that he totally agreed with President Pompidou. The people of the U.S. and Europe wanted it, at least a majority of them did. In Europe perhaps for different reasons. The Germans want it because the Soviets can give them East Germany; U.K., France and Italy because they are convinced that we live in a dangerous world. The danger presently represented by nuclear war, not the loss of 3,000 men as at Pearl Harbor. The whole place would be turned into a graveyard. No one wanted that. It was very important to look at the two attitudes on détente. Some sought a European Conference on the naive assumption that the Soviet aims have changed and that their designs in Europe and in the rest of the world are basically peaceful. On the other hand, some who seek détente on our side have no illusions and recognize that a different relationship and good relations between Europe and the USSR and the U.S. and the USSR are a practical necessity, that there are dangers in a policy of confrontation. But we must have no illusions about the basic aims of the Communist States. They are quite different from one another. Even if they wanted it would be impossible for European or U.S. leaders to take an intransigent stand and refuse to talk. Ten years ago this was possible in the U.S. It is no longer. On the other hand, it is important that the leaders recognize that naive public opinion often demands talks that will make the whole world peaceful. We should seek such negotiations but for the right reason. By the facts of Soviet power, the risks of confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere are unacceptable. Therefore, we should seek to lessen the risk of war and seek, as President Pompidou had indicated, to make Europe a more viable area and to open Eastern Europe whose peoples’ hearts are with the West.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

84. Editorial Note

President Nixon met with British Prime Minister Edward Heath for a summit in Bermuda from December 20 to 21, 1971. On the first day of the summit, they discussed CSCE and MBFR in a closed session from 1:30 to 5 p.m. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Secretary to the Cabinet Burke Trend were also present.
“Prime Minister Heath asked whether Pompidou had raised the defense problem. ‘Not directly,’ the President replied. ‘I indicated bearishness towards MBFR. He shared that view. I reassured him with regard to our withdrawal; the U.S. was not going to withdraw from Europe. With respect to a European Security Conference, he took quite well our view that (1) Berlin has to be wrapped up first, and (2) we had to be concrete in the subjects being discussed. We don’t want a conference in 1972, an election year. We allies should discuss the matter first. Pompidou stressed that a Conference could have a salutary effect on the countries of Eastern Europe, leavening their policies.’ [Then why do the Soviets press for it?—HK] Dr. Kissinger then explained the U.S. philosophy on MBFR and the European Security Conference in greater detail.

“Will you be under enormous pressure to yield on MBFR in Moscow?’ the Prime Minister wanted to know. The President said no, we will just have discussions on it between Dr. Kissinger and Dobrynin. They have excluded MBFR from the agenda of a Security Conference. ‘Why do they want a Conference then?’ the Prime Minister asked. ‘Because it is a meaningless exercise and can also lead to the disintegration of the West’s alliances,’ Dr. Kissinger suggested. The President noted that it was a public-relations problem: ‘We will have to give as much rhetoric as we can without yielding anything real. The Romanians may be wrong; a Conference may strengthen Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Maybe the Soviets want it as a way of bringing pressure on the Chinese; the Soviets are paranoid about the Chinese. It may also be related to the German problem.’ The Prime Minister noted that it might be a way of looking for European confirmation of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. ‘The Soviets now accuse us of being an obstacle to détente,’ he added. The President asked how this affected the Heath Government’s public support. The Prime Minister replied that 80 percent of the British public supported his position. ‘Then what about Pompidou’s argument that public opinion demands it?’ the President wondered. The Prime Minister asked if the President would be in a position to agree to such a Conference in 1973. The President said we would have to look at it seriously then.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, 1971)

On December 21, the U.S. and British delegations met in plenary session with Heath and Nixon. British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home raised the issues of a European conference and MBFR in the context of discussions that he had held with Secretary of State Rogers the previous day: “Turning to Europe, Sir Alec said he and the Secretary had agreed that the beginning of 1973 was the most realistic time to think about the convening of a conference on European security and cooperation. The Secretary added that, under this timetable, the multilateral preparations need not take place until the fall of 1972.
Sir Alec observed that the Soviets might not like the agenda the West would propose and perhaps were beginning to appreciate that they were not going to get everything out of the conference they wanted. Perhaps it would be a good thing if such a conference created some sort of permanent machinery, the function of which would be to try to improve the situation between East and West. The Secretary said there would be ample opportunity to give attention to the multilateral preparatory conference at the next NATO Ministerial meeting on May 30–31. As far as the MBFR is concerned, Sir Alec said, the more we look at the subject the less margin for safety there seems to be. The President commented that we are on exactly the same track. For us the subject is essentially a holding action to avoid Congressional action that would unilaterally reduce our military presence in Europe. Therefore we must make supporting statements. The Secretary said it was hard to conclude that the Soviets were really serious about MBFR. For them it seemed to be essentially a way to get the security conference. We did not think we were under pressure as to timing.

“The President noted that, if the Soviets reduced their troops in Eastern Europe, their influence would go down. In the conversation which he had had with Gromyko last fall, the latter had talked ad infinitum on the security conference, but included only one sentence on MBFR. Dr. Kissinger commented that even balanced reductions would leave us a very thin margin. The first ten percent of any reductions were essentially free because they could not be verified. The President said that, to the extent the United Kingdom can take a harder line on MBFR than we, this is helpful. The program for an additional billion dollars of European defense expenditures for 1972 was also helpful, since it indicates that the Europeans are not hell-bent to reduce their forces. We must maintain our strength as we seek peace and détente.”


85. Editorial Note

West German Chancellor Brandt met with President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida, December 28–29, 1971. Among the topics they discussed were a European security conference and MBFR.
In preparation for the meeting, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger wrote Nixon on December 24 that he should emphasize to Brandt that “in our dealings with the USSR, we will make no arrangements at the expense of the Allies and intend to continue the closest consultations on such matters as a European Conference and troop reductions, which will not be resolved bilaterally with the USSR.” In a section entitled “Soviet Relations and European Security,” Kissinger proposed that Nixon stress the following points in his conversations with Brandt:

“You are working for a genuine détente with the USSR, and the Chancellor’s policies have been in a parallel direction.

“—There are elements in Soviet conduct that suggest they may want a better relationship with the US (and with Germany), but there are also aspects of their policies—especially outside of Europe—that are sobering;

“—There is the dangerous tendency to seek marginal, tactical advantage even though this sort of policy cannot help but jeopardize any longer term relationship;

“—What concerns you now is that having achieved some solid results, as in the Berlin agreements, we not allow the Soviets to begin to play the Allies off against each other;

“—There are some tactical differences in the Alliance—on such issues as the timing of a European conference, or the precise approaches to negotiating troop reductions; these are of no great consequence unless we allow the Soviets to enlarge on our small differences and inflate them into major issues;

“—On European Security, you believe a Conference with the Warsaw Pact must be deferred, while the West concentrates on its own preparations. The Conference must not become a substitute security arrangement for NATO, which is what the Soviets want;

“—Similarly, improved East-West trade and economic arrangements must not dilute the unity of the EEC, or our Atlantic partnership;

“—Germany is the primary object and potential victim of hasty or ill-conceived agreements, whether on European security or mutual troop reductions;

“—On the latter—negotiated troop reductions—we rule out any bilateral bargain with the USSR; any agreement must come through the Allied consensus.” The President underlined portions of the advice.


Brandt met privately with Nixon at the latter’s residence in Key Biscayne on December 28 at 1:30 p.m., accompanied only by President’s
Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig and Ulrich Sahm of the West German Chancellery. A memorandum of conversation prepared by Haig reads with regard to CSCE and MBFR as follows: “President Nixon stated that he would like to discuss first the Soviet summit meeting scheduled for May. This meeting had been most carefully prepared and followed specific and concrete achievements on issues of concern to the United States and the Soviets. The President recalled that he had at the previous meeting told Chancellor Brandt at the time of that meeting that the moment was not propitious for such a meeting with the Soviet leadership, but events over the past year had now crystallized in a way which offered some promise for a constructive meeting in Moscow. The President reassured Chancellor Brandt that the discussions in Moscow would in no sense result in agreements arrived at the expense of old friends. He stated that both the summit in Peking and the summit in Moscow had been undertaken with a firm commitment to that underlying philosophy. The issue of MBFR was a topic which could only be pursued within such a philosophy. No discussions should be held with the Soviets on this issue until the most careful consultation and preparation had been completed by the Western powers and only then could the topic be discussed by them with the Soviets.”

Haig’s account continues: “President Nixon stated that the issue of MBFR must also be approached with the greatest caution and care. He noted that Prime Minister Heath expressed this same concept as had the French. General Haig noted that no U.S. studies had come up with formulas which would not hurt Western European security, and for this reason discussion of balanced force reductions should be in terms of principles and most carefully approached. Chancellor Brandt stated that he agreed fully with this appraisal. Nevertheless, ultimately the subject will have to be looked at most carefully. President Nixon stated that it is a topic on which hope must be held out but reductions would only make sense if they did not hurt the alliance. In this regard, the increase of a billion dollars in force improvements by the Allies had been most helpful in the U.S. ability to hold the line on its own force levels. President Nixon stated that he sensed that even the Soviets are beginning to have doubts about the MBFR. Chancellor Brandt’s reply was that it is probable that the Soviets have not even really studied the subject.” For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 335.

At a second private meeting on December 29 at 9:30 a.m., Nixon and Brandt discussed a European security conference and mutual and balanced force reductions. Again, Haig prepared a record of the meeting, which reads in part:

“At this point, President Nixon, Chancellor Brandt, General Haig, and Mr. Sahm were joined by Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign
Minister Scheel. Secretary Rogers stated that concerning the European Security Conference, there should be no firm schedule on such a meeting, and it should not be considered until after the Protocol in May or June, and also until after the Ministerial Meeting on May 30–31. He stated that the initial meetings could occur as early as perhaps September or October, with further discussions in the Spring of 1973. Foreign Minister Scheel agreed that it would be difficult to fix a schedule for the actual convening of a European Security Conference at this point.

“President Nixon stated that the best he could assess at this point was that the Conference would focus on political and economic issues.

“Chancellor Brandt stated that there would have to be some improvement in political coordination and organization before a Conference could be convened. Foreign Minister Scheel stated that it was essential that a summit be held with the new European Economic Community and that the role of the United States be defined with respect to the European Community on economic matters. Secretary Rogers stated that maybe this could occur in August or September. Chancellor Brandt stated that that was too soon, since the Olympic Games would be hosted in Munich in August.

“President Nixon stated that he would like to see the Games, but that in any event, it is essential that the European Security Conference be kept in clear focus. It is obvious that the Soviets want such a Conference, but within the United States—especially within the Congress—there is a great tendency to assume that the Conference itself would be tantamount for justification for mutual balanced force reductions, noting that many seek to give this impression. It also tends to build expectations for unilateral U.S. reductions. For this reason, it is essential that the planning prior to the Security Conference be complete and detailed, and that no hopes be raised that it can be a substitute for continued essential defense sacrifices. In essence, the European Security Conference is a misnomer. The United States does not believe that hardware can be given for software. Therefore, all of the allies must move in the most deliberate fashion, express a willingness to discuss the issue with the Soviets, but, above all, achieve complete alignment of views among the Western allies before entering into any kind of a Conference.

“Secretary Rogers stated that the Soviets now do not seem particularly interested in mutual balanced force reductions. German Foreign Minister Scheel agreed, but stated that perhaps Soviet intentions to link force reductions with the European Security Conference and to have such a Conference serve as a substitute vehicle for achieving their end.

“Chancellor Brandt said that all the governments must have a forum to express their concerns and their hopes. The European countries wish to raise the Brezhnev Doctrine, the issues of sovereignty, etc.
“The Romanian said he would feel safer if such a Conference were held. Thus, many of the eastern European states hope to achieve additional security from it by obtaining a principle for the renunciation of force or some other type of reassurance not in terms of pure military security but rather in terms of political assurances which would lead to additional security for the eastern states.

“President Nixon stated that it is obvious that the Romanians would wish to see a European Security Conference.

“Secretary Rogers added that the Scandinavians, Belgium and Netherlands are also interested.

“Foreign Minister Scheel stated that even France was somewhat interested since they wished to ease the independence movement in eastern Europe.

“Secretary Rogers stated that this is what the United States would seek out of such a Conference.

“Chancellor Brandt stated that the mutual balanced force reduction issue in his view is a matter which the Soviets are interested in but haven’t had sufficient time to study. The Soviets are also aware that the French are strongly opposed to balanced force reductions but he wondered about the status of the Brosio visit to Moscow.

“Foreign Minister Scheel stated that the Soviets have not replied to the Brosio initiative. He knows that when he asked about it in Moscow the Soviets had stated that this was not a problem, especially with respect to Brosio’s known views, but rather the Soviets were delaying because they were not sure themselves what their own views would be on MBFR. Secretary Rogers stated that the U.S. had been unable to get a commitment from the Soviets on the issue. Foreign Minister Scheel stated that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had raised the issue of MBFR with him over a year ago and even referred to asymmetrical reductions. At that time, Gromyko was interested in getting MBFR discussions started if only in a symbolic sense. Secretary Rogers replied that since that time, however, the Soviets had said nothing. Secretary Rogers stated, in any event, it is not a problem that has to be faced for a while. Foreign Minister Scheel stated that MBFR is a long-time political problem which will continue after his retirement.” For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 336.

Rogers and Scheel also discussed MBFR and a conference on European security in a separate meeting on December 28. A memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with MBFR is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO. A memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with a European security conference is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 686, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. X.
86. Editorial Note

At the beginning of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into an exchange of opinions regarding topics of discussion at the planned summit meeting in Moscow between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, scheduled for May 1972. Among the topics discussed by the two sides were a Europe security conference and mutual and balanced force reductions. In a letter dated January 17, Brezhnev wrote Nixon: “We consider it important, proceeding from the favorable situation, to undertake further concrete steps that would consolidate the détente and safeguard security in Europe, and we count on a constructive approach to those questions on the part of the U.S. A confidential exchange of views, suggested by you, regarding the Conference on European security and cooperation would, I believe, be useful indeed.”

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presented Brezhnev’s letter to Kissinger during a private meeting at the Soviet Embassy on the evening of January 21. According to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger’s memorandum of the conversation: “We then discussed the European security conference. Dobrynin asked whom on our side he should be in touch with; I had told Gromyko that I was in charge, but Rogers had told him the opposite. I told him I would have to check with the President, but in any event issues of principle should be checked with me. He said that they are now prepared not to force the pace of the European Security Conference, but they hoped that some direction could be indicated at the summit.” For the full text of both the memorandum of conversation and Brezhnev’s letter, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 39.

After Secretary of State Rogers informed Nixon on February 1 that he was planning to meet with Dobrynin, Nixon sent him guidelines for the meeting in a memorandum dated February 3: “On European security, as you know, my views are to move as slowly and cautiously as feasible. In fact, since meeting with Gromyko, I have told Luns, Heath, Brandt and Pompidou in discussing this subject that there can be no conference this year and that while we do not reject the idea, we cannot agree to it even in principle until we have had an opportunity to evaluate with our allies and later with the Soviet what the substance of such a conference would be. In other words, discussion of the European Security Conference—but without commitment—should be our line at this point.” For the full text of Nixon’s memorandum, see ibid., Document 44.
When Rogers met with Dobrynin on February 4, both a European security conference and MBFR were topics of discussion. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part:

“CSCE. Dobrynin said that his government is eager to discuss convening a European Conference with us. The Secretary indicated that we may have something to say at a later date, but made no commitment to discuss the subject.

“MBFR. The Secretary asked why the Soviets objected to our term ‘balanced’ force reductions. Dobrynin asked for a definition of the word, and when the Secretary remarked that ‘balanced’ meant essentially that reductions should not result in a net advantage to either side, Dobrynin said that this was close to the position taken by the recent Warsaw Pact statement.

“The Secretary asked particularly about the Brosio mission. Dobrynin said several times that there had been no decision, either to receive or not to receive Brosio. When the Secretary pressed him about when he expected an answer, he said, ‘I do not expect an answer.’

“During this discussion Dobrynin referred to the ‘bloc-to-bloc’ implications of the Brosio mission. The Secretary pointed out that the nature of MBFR was such that the subject was inevitably of primary concern to the members of the two alliances. Dobrynin conceded that the major involvement in negotiations would be by the two alliances, but said that non-members—he named the Scandinavians, Spain and Yugoslavia—had a clear interest and we must avoid any impression of trying to decide the fate of others. In an allusion to France, Dobrynin also noted that not all NATO members agreed on the ‘bloc-to-bloc’ approach.”

For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see ibid., Document 45.

On February 15, Nixon replied to Brezhnev’s letter of January 17. He wrote the Soviet leader:

“As preparatory discussions between our two governments intensify in the remaining weeks preceding our meeting, I believe that it might be helpful to outline for you my views on the topics which should be reserved for discussion within the existing confidential channel and those which would be better left to normal negotiations between the representatives of our governments. In my view, the topics best suited for the existing confidential channel would include: discussion of the future developments in the Middle East, the situation in Southeast Asia, and those broad policy questions dealing with arms control, especially the outcome of the crucial talks on the limitation of strategic arms and perhaps some preliminary exchanges on Mutual Force Reduction.”

Nixon’s letter continued:

“Finally, I have previously set forth my views concerning the European question. It is my hope that the Berlin agreement which is now
complete in its essential parts will soon be brought into force. This is precisely the kind of concrete step to which you refer in your letter. I continue to believe that in Europe, as elsewhere, a true détente can best be achieved by precise and concrete understanding. That is why I suggested in my last letter that informal and private exchanges to clarify the concrete objectives of a possible multilateral conference would be helpful. Preliminary discussions on this topic would also be best confined to the existing confidential channel. I will, of course, be prepared to discuss these matters during our meetings in Moscow in the expectation that such a discussion would make subsequent discussions in regular channels and eventual negotiations between all the interested governments fruitful.” For the full text of the letter, see ibid., Document 51.

87. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Committee Meeting

Washington, March 29, 1972, 3:06–4:02 p.m.

SUBJECT
Issues in European Security Conference and MBFR

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Martin Hillenbrand
Joseph McGuire
Herbert Spiro
Ronald Spiers
Defense
Kenneth Rush
Larry Eagleburger
Warren Nutter
John Morse
JCS
Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles
Major Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger
CIA
Richard Helms
James P. Hanrahan
ACDA
Philip Farley
John [James?] Leonard
Olaf Grobel
NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Philip Odeen
William Hyland
Lt. Col. Jack Merritt
Lt. Michael Power
Mark Wandler

It was agreed that:

Three questions concerning MBFR and CSCE would be put before the President for decision:

(1) Should MBFR be linked with CSCE?
(2) If so, what kind of linkage do we want—one which controls phasing of MBFR and CSCE, or one which controls the organizations?
(3) Should discussion of MBFR principles and stabilizing measures be split off from the special group and be put into the CSCE forum?

Dr. Kissinger: This looks like it’s going to be another one of those talmudic topics. As I understand it, we have two major issues. The first is how much of a record do we want to create on the exploratory talks. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Marty, am I correct in thinking that the Brosio mission is not going to get off the ground?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That’s right.

Dr. Kissinger: The issue, then, is how much of a record do we want to make before the Summit. The second issue is how to relate MBFR to the Security Conference. There are many variations of this relationship. We also have to see if we want to move the exploratory talks into the framework of the Conference. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) What is your view, Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our view is that we should keep the Brosio exercise in a state of potential being at least until the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers on May 30 and 31. The Foreign Ministers may consider appointing another representative—such as Harmel, or the British Ambassador to Moscow—or they may consider transferring the exploratory talks to another body. If the latter were done, it would very likely be a special body which would work in tandem with the CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think the Allies would want to make another formal request to the Soviets?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Some countries would want to do that. We have been stalling on this because we don’t think it is needed right now. We

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2 See Document 86. In a meeting on February 29, Raymond Garthoff, Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs, asked Vorontsov about receiving Brosio, NATO’s “explorer” for MBFR talks. “Vorontsov replied that there was no need for ‘exploration’; the Soviet policy was not a Dark Continent requiring Stanley and Livingston ‘explorers.’ Why, he asked, should the Soviet Government let someone who was not competent to negotiate come and subject them to a battery of questions?” Vorontsov said the Soviet Union “was ready to discuss MBFR on an equal basis at any time” and that “his authorities had suggested US–USSR talks; surely our Allies trust us.” Vorontsov said that the Soviets “were convinced that the US Government did not wish to go forward with MBFR negotiations at this time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)
want to wait for the May meeting. Bilaterally, we—and the Allies—can tell the Soviets that Brosio is still there and still available. There are a lot of bilateral contacts between the NATO countries and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) Ken, what do you think?

Mr. Rush: In my view, there are two main aspects we have to take into consideration. First, for domestic reasons, I think it is important that we continue to push for MBFR. Second, given the procedural and substantive aspects of MBFR, I think we should keep the Brosio initiative alive until the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think we should make another formal démarche?

Mr. Rush: No, I don’t. I do think, though, that we can make some political hay here when the President is in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: In what way? With an agreement, for example, to begin preparatory discussions on MBFR?

Mr. Rush: Yes. Or perhaps an agreement to receive Brosio.

Dr. Kissinger: They won’t do that [receive Brosio].

Mr. Hillenbrand: They have already refused to receive him.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps they would receive Harmel.

Mr. Rush: What I am really saying is that anything in the Moscow communiqué which gives MBFR a pat on the back is in our interest.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the Allies feel if we negotiated MBFR as a bilateral issue with the Soviets?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Allies are relying on assurances given them by the President. MBFR can come up, of course, at the Summit, but the President is not going to be negotiating on behalf of the Allies. To the degree that we can get a NATO position before the Summit, they will let the President conduct some exploratory discussions. I think it is urgent, therefore, that we feed our thinking into NATO within the next six to eight weeks—so that we can get a consensus on something for the President to say, other than just the U.S. ideas.

Mr. Rush: It may also be possible to do some substantive work on MBFR in Moscow. Perhaps the communiqué can give the MBFR concept a pat on the back.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There isn’t enough time to get a substantive position ready for Presidential consideration.

Dr. Kissinger: We could try to give MBFR a pat on the back and try to devise some method of advancing negotiations by an exploratory group, but we could not begin substantive discussions. Suppose we

3 All brackets are in the original.
gave MBFR a pat on the back and reached some sort of an agreement on procedures. If so, would that go beyond the NATO framework?

Mr. Hillenbrand: No, a pat on the back would not. So far, though, we have no common view on procedures. That’s why we should get Presidential decisions and put them before NATO. Then the President can say something to the Soviets, feeling that he has Alliance support.

Dr. Kissinger: Unless the treaties are ratified, we may not wish to probe any deeper on a Security Conference.

Mr. Rush: Let me say a word about the treaties, if I may. Bahr called me yesterday, Henry, before he saw you, and he expressed some optimism about the outcome of the voting. I had also investigated the vote problem before I left Germany. The Bundestag votes on May 4, and if there are 249 votes for ratification the whole thing is just about over. Then, of course, the Bundesrat votes. If the Bundesrat sends the treaties back, there will probably be another vote in the Bundestag in June. In any case, we should know in early May if there is a problem in Germany. My prognosis is that the treaties will be ratified.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s take a look at the second problem now. As I understand it, we will not make a new appeal on the Brosio mission. As the occasion arises, we will call attention to the fact that Brosio is still available. At the Summit, we will consider discussion of MBFR at the Security Conference, and we will see if we can try to push MBFR.

All of our papers assume, and I suppose this seems reasonable enough, that we want MBFR. But is that really so? One weird aspect of this whole situation is that we seem to be sliding into a Security Conference which we don’t want. Is the same thing true about MBFR? As I understand it, the Europeans want MBFR because it won’t hurt them and because it will keep us in Europe. Do they want MBFR for its own sake?

Mr. Hillenbrand: They want it mainly as a weapon to use against Mansfield-type threats.

Dr. Kissinger: Does anybody here want MBFR on its merits? (to Mr. Farley) Phil?

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4 See footnote 5, Document 76.
5 Kissinger discussed MBFR with Laird in a telephone conversation on January 22. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: “Kissinger: The only trouble I am having is with the MBFR. Laird: I am not sure that we want to get wetted [sic] on that. Kissinger: Why not? Laird: Well, I will talk to you about it. Kissinger: But how can we recommend something if it is bad? Laird: I don’t think our studies have come far enough to make that judgment. They are still really in the preparatory state. Kissinger: Well, no one has raised that point before. Laird: Well, you know that I have put Larry Eagleburger in charge of that.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 12, Chronological File)
Mr. Farley: We are proceeding on the same basis that Ken (Mr. Rush) is—showing activity. Otherwise, the situation will be worse if we are forced to make unilateral reductions.

Dr. Kissinger: On its merits, then, nobody here—and none of the allies—comes to the conclusion that MBFR is desirable in its own right. In all the options we have studied, I have not found anything that would not worsen our situation, if only slightly.

Mr. Rush: I’m not so sure that we shouldn’t have MBFR. It can be used to prevent unilateral reductions of forces on our part. It might be possible to stretch the exercise out over ten years or so, and include various types of constraints. Perhaps we could avoid making other types of reductions which would be even less advantageous to us than MBFR. I say we should have MBFR and stretch it out over a period of eight or ten years—with minimum reductions and perhaps certain limitations.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our view is that MBFR is a tactical necessity. Things could be even worse without it.

Mr. Helms: Anybody who attended the meetings we have had during the last year knows that it is almost impossible to work out any scenario which is remotely advantageous to us.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. Not one of the fifteen options we studied was advantageous to the West. The best we could say was that some of them would not leave us in a much weaker position.

Gen. Knowles: That’s true if certain constraints are not negotiated.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We should not underestimate the fact that MBFR influences Congressional attitudes. This may even be the single most important consideration about MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: The President is in a much better position than I am to judge the political necessities. It may very well be that the case for MBFR is overwhelming—if we would be forced to make unilateral cuts without it. However, the President should know that negotiations will not improve our position. At best, the negotiations will only cut our losses. In addition, if some of the assumptions in the studies—on reinforcement capabilities, for example, or the ability to react—are wrong, then our situation will be even worse. Some of these assumptions may very well be wrong.

Let’s assume, however, that we want to push for MBFR. The State paper gives five options. Within those five, there are, I think, three fundamental options. The first is to maintain total separation of MBFR and CSCE. This is our present position. The second is to establish some

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6 Attached; printed below.
sort of linkage between MBFR and the Conference. This could be done in two ways: (1) by maintaining procedural separation but trying to move both issues by conditioning progress in preparing the Conference with progress toward MBFR and (2) by creating a special MBFR group to deal with MBFR in tandem with preparations for the Conference. The third fundamental option is to discuss MBFR in the Conference. We could discuss “stabilizing” measures—that is, collateral constraints—in the preparatory phase of the Conference, or we could put MBFR on the agenda.

These are the key concepts, I think, although I realize there are some variations to them. (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Do you agree, Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes. You outlined the basic options, but there are some nuances you didn’t mention.

Dr. Kissinger: As I recall, we first separated MBFR and CSCE because the Soviets wanted them separated and because we didn’t think the CSCE was a good forum in which to discuss MBFR. We thought the Conference would have too many non-NATO countries which would not have a great interest in strict constraints.

Mr. Rush: I think we should still keep the two completely separate. MBFR might drag on for eight or ten years, with perhaps a little step here and a little step there during that time. If we tie MBFR in with the CES, its timing will become that of CES, and we will lose the freedom of movement we now have with MBFR. If the two are linked together, the thirty countries involved in CES, even if some are loosely allied, will insist on participating in the MBFR discussions—and they will give an overall push to the negotiations. We will start bargaining on topics which are not advantageous to us. And this will suit the Russians, whose primary purpose in the Conference is to bring about division within the Alliance. They can do this better on MBFR than on any other issue.

Dr. Kissinger: But that will also be true even if the two issues are kept on separate tracks.

Mr. Rush: Only those countries which are actually concerned should participate in MBFR. I feel that the substantive issues of MBFR are so complex and so important that we should not allow thirty nations to get involved in the negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly how many nations will be there?

Mr. Hillenbrand: There will be 34 participants—countries and organizations. The Common Market, for example, will take part in the discussions on economic cooperation. Some people also say the Vatican may participate in some discussions. At most, there will be 34 participants.

Dr. Kissinger: Will Malta be there?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we can throw Mintoff at them.
Mr. Hillenbrand: He can be the negotiator.

Mr. Rush: Let me repeat again that I don’t think such things as troop limitations or area limitations are proper subjects for the CES to get involved in.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Rush) I want to see if I understand your position. Suppose we set up a special group of the Conference to undertake preparatory discussions of MBFR. When the Conference convenes, it gives its blessing to this special group, and then the group conducts autonomous negotiations, using the CSCE blessing as a trigger. Do you still have objections to that?

Mr. Rush: Yes. Once the two are linked, the 34 nations in the CES will try to assert control of the MBFR talks. The MBFR talks are likely to go slow, while the CES will go much faster. If there is success in CES, there will be pressure to achieve something in MBFR. There may also very well be an attempt to introduce the subject of arms limitations at MBFR. The net result will be timing, subject and party participant links which we don’t want.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it correct to say that you don’t even want a tenuous linkage? What if the Conference is merely used to trigger MBFR, much the same way we linked CES to the German treaties?

Mr. Rush: That kind of linkage has its pluses and minuses, like the other options. We have had so many linkages, though, that I think it’s rather late to bring in another one now.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Hillenbrand) Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Our view is somewhat different. If our primary motivation for MBFR is to counter Mansfield-type threats, keeping it on a separate track means that no progress will be made and that our ability to use it will eventually disappear. However, if we link MBFR with the Conference, which will get a lot of publicity and be a major East-West event, MBFR will also get some of this publicity and appeal. We think we can safeguard the MBFR talks by detaching them from the main Conference body and by getting an advance agreement that only those nations concerned with MBFR—either by troops or territory—will take part in the negotiations. The Soviets have already said they would discuss MBFR in a body created by the CSCE or in another suitable forum. This suitable forum could be a special body working in tandem with CSCE.

Another factor is that there is pressure in NATO for linking MBFR and the Conference. The pressure is coming from Germany, and from a few other countries, too. I doubt that we can hold out indefinitely for complete separation. Incidentally, this pressure for linkage will be reflected here. The line may be that the U.S. is killing MBFR by keeping it separate from the CSCE.
Dr. Kissinger: If we push MBFR, the Europeans may push the CSCE because they really want to kill MBFR.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is one element of their reasoning. Each course has its advantages and disadvantages. We support Option 3: linking MBFR to CSCE via a special MBFR group to discuss MBFR in tandem with a preparation for CSCE. [See attached paper]

Mr. Rush: I think the consensus is that we are not anxious to push MBFR or the CES. If that is so, we should keep the two on separate tracks. Then, if there are pressures, we can yield a bit on MBFR, perhaps after a year or so. In any case, we will have postponed both MBFR and CES. Right now, though, I'm reluctant to give up on MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: We may be better able to achieve delay if we link them.

Mr. Rush: I think linkage will cause an acceleration. The Russians want a CES, and they see linkage as a good way of bringing it about.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Russian view is in many ways similar to our own. We both say that the Conference is not a suitable forum in which to negotiate MBFR. We both say a suitable forum would be a special group consisting of those nations directly concerned with MBFR. We would propose, therefore, to take them at their word and create a special group to work in tandem with the group preparing CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Would this be a group of the CSCE?

Mr. Hillenbrand: It would be set up prior to CSCE. We would tell the Soviets it would be a six or seven-nation body working in tandem with the Conference. At the most, the Conference would give the group a general blessing, and it would let the group's work continue after the Conference.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Farley) Phil, what do you think?

Mr. Farley: In general, I am sympathetic to Marty's view. We can exercise better control of the talks if they are conducted within a small group. Marty's device takes advantage of the preparatory phase of the CSCE to make a breakthrough on MBFR. If we want to use the Conference to bless MBFR, this should be decided in NATO, and preparations should get underway so that we will have a position ready for the meeting in Helsinki [preparatory meeting for CSCE].

Dr. Kissinger: We have been hurt on this linkage issue. For the first three years, we were told that linkage would thwart the CSCE. Now we're told that failure to link will thwart it.

Mr. Rush: As I see it, we have two courses of action. The first is to have two separate bodies discussing MBFR and CSCE. The second is to create some kind of a link between the two bodies.

Dr. Kissinger: It's also possible to have the two bodies linked conceptually. For example, we could say that unless there is progress in A, we will not go forward with B.
Mr. Rush: Yes. That’s possible. However, I think 1 and 3 are the preferred options.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you object to the Conference monitoring the MBFR talks?

Mr. Rush: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What if the MBFR group is linked to the Conference in terms of progress, not organization?

Mr. Hillenbrand: It was never the intention to have the larger group monitor the smaller. Whether we want to make setting up of the MBFR group dependent on progress in the CSCE is another matter. I doubt that it could be done now. The momentum of the Conference being linked to the ratification of the German treaties can’t be turned around. NATO, in general, would prefer to see no link between MBFR and CSCE, although some countries would like to see some aspects of MBFR discussed in the Conference. We don’t think that is a good idea.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. It would be the lousiest way of proceeding—and we would have all the disadvantages of the huge forum.

Mr. Farley: You are right. I think I am less doctrinaire, though, than others about insisting that the CSCE not discuss matters relating to MBFR.

Gen. Knowles: The trick of handling MBFR in the Conference is to control the discussion of the principles and to use these discussions as an educational tool. The JCS favors a modification of Option 3A. The Conference would discuss MBFR in a broad context, and the real work would be done by a special group.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) Dick?

Mr. Helms: We can fiddle around with Option 3. Judging from the paper, this option gives us the most flexibility. I think we can start with it.

Dr. Kissinger: If the President made his decisions within the next two weeks, should we take them up with NATO before the Summit?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That depends on what the President decides. If he chooses Option 3, it would be good to take it up with NATO before the Summit. That way we would have a NATO consensus for the President to use in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me try to sum up the NATO position, as I understand it. If we drop MBFR, they will be unhappy because they think we will make unilateral withdrawals. If we set up a special body to conduct MBFR negotiations, they won’t like that either—although I really don’t know why.

Mr. Hillenbrand: They won’t like it if we say we want MBFR, but in a separate track from CSCE.

Dr. Kissinger: Would NATO object to the view Ken [Rush] expressed?
Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, if it means Option 1.

Dr. Kissinger: If MBFR and CSCE are separate, then, NATO will be unhappy.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes, and there will be pressure to go the CSCE route.

Dr. Kissinger: If MBFR and CSCE are separate—but linked—bodies, we will still get objections because some of the countries in the Conference will want more of a voice in the MBFR negotiations.

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think most of the countries would accept Option 3 as the middle ground.

Dr. Kissinger: Will the countries that want the Conference to assert control over MBFR be satisfied with just a formal role for the Conference and separate institutions? What is the difference between Options 1 and 3, unless the Conference exercises control over MBFR?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Option 1 implies no linkage at all. Option 3 implies linkage, but not CSCE control over the linkage.

Mr. Helms: CSCE would in effect be sprinkling holy water over MBFR.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That’s right. The Conference would simply give its blessing.

Dr. Kissinger: Would most countries settle for that?

Mr. Hillenbrand: If the U.S. goes for Option 3, I think most countries would support it.

Dr. Kissinger: Would the same thing be true if we go for Option 1?

Mr. Hillenbrand: No. There are already pressures in NATO for Option 3A.

Dr. Kissinger: Is anybody in favor of discussing principles of MBFR and stabilizing measures in the Conference, while conducting the actual negotiations in a special body?

Gen. Knowles: The Germans feel military security must be considered at the Conference.

Mr. Rush: I think they can be brought around. I have talked to Brandt and Scheel about this.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Hillenbrand) You need decisions in the next two weeks, don’t you, so that we can have discussions within the Alliance?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Mr. Rush: The Germans are basically afraid that we will use MBFR as a cover for troop withdrawals. As you know, they are floundering around.

Dr. Kissinger: The President has to decide whether or not to establish a link between MBFR and CSCE. If he decides on linkage, he
can choose one which controls the phasing or one which controls the organizations. Finally, the President has to decide if he wants to split off discussion of principles and stabilizing measures from the separate forum and put it into the CSCE. I will try to get the answers to these questions within two weeks.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Good. There are two other ancillary points I would like to bring up, however. The first is the need for agreement on the Presidential decisions in NATO. Our approach to this is pragmatic. If we see dangers developing in NATO, for example, we can review our approach. This will be an on-going process. The second is the Brosio mission. There is pressure in NATO for issuing a statement telling the Soviets and the world that Brosio is still alive. I don’t see any great objection to such a statement.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sonnenfeldt) Hal, what do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It might create a problem if the statement is so worded that it generates a categorical Soviet rejection.

Dr. Kissinger: Who in NATO is creating this pressure?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The British—and others—have said that we should do something about Brosio before May.

Dr. Kissinger: I see the British, and they tell me they are horrified by MBFR.

Mr. Hillenbrand: They have an inner inconsistency, but they do want to help us.

Attachment

Interagency Paper

Washington, undated.

MBFR/CSCE OPTIONS

Option 1:

Maintain total separation between CSCE and MBFR—current policy.

Option 2:

Maintain current procedural separation but condition progress in preparation for CSCE on progress towards MBFR.

Option 3:

Link MBFR to CSCE via a special MBFR group to discuss MBFR “in tandem” with preparation for CSCE. CSCE might establish a follow-on MBFR group.
Option 3a:
Discuss stabilizing measures in CSCE preparation and remand to MBFR body for drawing up separate agreement which would be open to all states for accession.

Option 4:
Deal with MBFR in CSCE Plenary. Either reach broad agreement on or negotiate Principles and/or stabilizing measures.

Option 5:
Advocate establishment by CSCE Ministerial of machinery for MBFR negotiations.

88. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 4, 1972, 10:45 a.m.

R: This is not the subject of most importance at the moment. I read the memorandum of your meeting on the European Security Conference and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

K: Did I have one?
R: Yes, the SRG.
K: Oh yes, I thought you meant something else.
R: I hope the President doesn’t decide this in a new and specific way. I think up to now it’s been just right. I am well aware of the problems of the different departments and agencies, but I think the way we have played it in the past is just right. Suppose for instance the President said no linkage—we would be in an impossible position in NATO.

K: I’ll talk to you before we send the memo. He wants some linkage, but he’ll leave it loose how to do it.

R: The Russians [omission in original transcript] with the European Security Conference—they don’t want it.

K: I think Defense is wrong in this.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 13, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 See Document 87.
R: I do too. So leave it loose.
K: Let me check. He may not want it completely loose, but not as rigid as Defense wants it.
R: Not to say that no direct linkage discussions will take place, but say that before any decisions are made it ought to come back to me.
K: Before he sends out a directive, why don’t I read it to you and see if you can live with it.
R: Fine.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

89. National Security Decision Memorandum 162

Washington, undated.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe

The following guidance has been approved by the President.
The contents of NSDM 142 remain valid, except as affected by the directives in this memorandum.

Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE)
The United States’ position should be to proceed in preparing an Allied position for CSCE that reflects a maximum consensus. It would be preferable, however, that the East-West multilateral preparatory phase not begin until after the US Presidential elections. The possibility of a high level Allied meeting prior to the beginning of the multilateral preparatory talks should be kept open, though such a meeting is not a condition for US participation in CSCE.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 482, President’s Trip Files, MBFR–CSCE Backup Book, Part 1. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Dis­claimer Agency.
2 Document 81.
In dealing with both CSCE issues and procedures, Allied unity should take precedence. US policy is that a careful multilateral exploration should precede the opening of a Conference. These preparatory explorations should be substantive rather than purely procedural. Allied interest in curtailing the multilateral preparatory phase may be taken into account, provided there is an understanding in the Alliance that during this phase some substantive discussions will be conducted on each of the agenda items proposed by the Alliance.

As noted above the US would not object to a general discussion on Military Security Issues in CSCE, but it would not be acceptable to aim for agreements that limited or reduced forces in Europe. Rather, the US would prefer to limit discussion to some general measures of constraint that might be suitable for adoption by European states. Such constraints might be related, in CSCE, to a declaration of principles governing relations between states.

**MBFR**

The US continues to support separate and distinct negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe; an exploratory discussion as the first step toward such negotiations continues to be US policy. In the period between now and the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 30–31, the US will continue to support the Allied proposal for an exploratory mission led by Mr. Brosio. After the President’s meetings in the USSR, the US would be willing to consider a review of alternatives to the Brosio mission.

**MBFR and CSCE**

Concerning the relationship between MBFR and CSCE, the US position is that the former is not an issue that should be negotiated by the CSCE. Should the preparatory discussions of CSCE begin before any exploration of MBFR with the USSR or other Warsaw Pact countries, the US objective in these circumstances would be to use the fact of CSCE preparations to establish contacts for the simultaneous exploration of MBFR. The establishment of a special group of states directly involved in MBFR in Central Europe would be an acceptable procedure for exchanging views on MBFR. Alternatively, or in addition, the US would be willing to consider a general discussion in CSCE of Military Security Issues, including some general aspects of MBFR, in this context, however, the main objective would be to reach an understanding that MBFR negotiations will be initiated in a separate forum by a specified date.

In general, the relationship between MBFR and CSCE should be minimal. No authority should be established by CSCE over the course or content of MBFR negotiations. The overall objective of the US is to obtain a commitment from the USSR to begin discussion of MBFR before the CSCE has concluded its work.
Allied Consultations

The reaction of the NATO Allies to this approach should be sought promptly. The goal of consultations should be to develop a consensus in advance of the NATO Ministerial meeting.

An interagency paper on collateral constraints that might be appropriate for discussion at a CSCE should be developed and forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. A separate paper on constraints suitable to MBFR should also be prepared for submission to NATO.

Henry A. Kissinger

90. Editorial Note

On April 17, 1972, National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt sent President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger a memorandum on “issues for Presidential decision” before Kissinger’s departure for Moscow for his April 19–25 secret trip. The goal of Kissinger’s trip was to preview with the Soviets potential topics of discussion at Nixon’s planned summit with Brezhnev in Moscow. With regard to European security and mutual and balanced force reductions, Sonnenfeldt wrote Kissinger:

“The decision here is, first, for authority to talk bilaterally to the Soviets. This follows logically from previous confidential exchanges, though these related to Europe generally (ESC) rather than to MBFR. This is a delicate problem because of European sensitivities. Moreover, we are committed not to talk specifically about ESC until after the Berlin agreement takes effect. No such restriction exists on MBFR.

“The major current hangup relates to the interrelationship between ESC and MBFR. We have always wanted to keep them separate, largely for Congressional reasons but also because it makes no sense to have large numbers of European governments involved in MBFR negotiations that affect only a few countries.

“If the German treaties are ratified and Berlin is settled, ESC preparations should begin next fall. The old imperative (Congressional) of holding open the possibility of MBFR while hanging back on ESC will no longer be valid then. We already have a USG decision to establish a tenuous link between MBFR and ESC, that is, to use the occasion of ESC preparations to try to get MBFR talks started also. This is worth trying out on the Soviets.

“We also have a set of MBFR principles developed by the Verification Panel and generally consistent with what NATO has been do-
ing. Brosio would have made an effort to probe the Soviets on some of these.

“On balance, it seems wisest to confine preparatory work with the Soviets to the procedural issues.

“ESC is a Soviet desideratum. We should stick to the NATO approach on timing. A Presidential decision might be made (1) that we can assure the Soviets we will cooperate with ESC preparations after Berlin, and (2) that we are prepared to maintain contact with them to help structure the conference most usefully.”

On April 19, Kissinger wrote in a memorandum to President Nixon with regard to European security:

“The next major subject—of particular interest to the Soviets—is Europe. As you know, they have been eager to engage us in bilateral talks about their conference proposal but so far they have not shown much interest in MBFR. Our own interest in MBFR has been largely the result of our need to counter Senator Mansfield with a positive position. While at the moment our domestic pressures for troop reductions are manageable they could of course arise again, and we would probably be in a stronger position to meet them if we had some sort of MBFR negotiation in prospect with the Soviets.

“We have already in various ways agreed in principle to preparations for a European conference once the Berlin agreement takes effect. Although the conference idea remains nebulous, we could try to use our agreement to proceed with conference preparations as a means to get the Russians to agree to MBFR preparations. As part of this latter process we could attempt to develop certain principles. As you know, however, we have had little success in coming up with any substantive MBFR position that is both negotiable and in our security interest. Consequently, our main interest will continue to be to use MBFR talks to prevent the unraveling of NATO through unilateral troop cuts.”

At the end of the memorandum, Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendations, but added the handwritten notation: “OK—as modified by RN’s oral instructions.” For the complete text of both Sonnenfeldt’s and Kissinger’s memoranda, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 125.

Nixon instructed Kissinger regarding the latter’s trip in the course of a private conversation in the Oval Office on April 19. Among the topics Nixon discussed with Kissinger were a European security conference and MBFR. A transcript of their conversation reads in part:

“Nixon: [turning pages] European security concerns me. I think we’re getting sucked in there.

“Kissinger: But there we’re pretty well sucked in.

“Nixon: Now, what are you going to do? Have European security without any linkage with MBFR?”
“Kissinger: Well, that’s what most of our allies want. And that’s what—

“Nixon: I know. Let me tell you, when you have European security you can damn near forget NATO. It’s going to be very—

“Kissinger: That I’m convinced of too.

“Nixon: But I am also rather convinced that NATO is done anyway so that’s—just between you and me. That’s nothing to—

“Kissinger: I think European security won’t hurt it as much as MF—MBFR will.

“Nixon: Well, maybe then we’ll just take European security and talk about peace and good will and exchange. Is that what you mean?

“Kissinger: That would have a slight advantage. But that is not a decision which we now need to take.

“Nixon: No, I know.

“Kissinger: Because—

“Nixon: On the other hand, they’ll want to announce a European security conference.

“Kissinger: At the summit.

“Nixon: That’s right. But you’ve got to be ready to tell them we’re willing. Bilateral issues—just don’t give anything, you know, we won’t [unclear] a goddamn thing—unless we get something on Vietnam. It’s cold turkey. And I mean not a goddamn thing. [unclear] They know that—they know that Vietnam is an indispensable ingredient of anything we do in the other area. Don’t you agree?

“Kissinger: That’s right.” For a more complete transcript of the conversation, see ibid., Document 126. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.
91. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, April 22, 1972, 11 a.m.–4:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Mr. Samoteykin, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Mr. John Negroponte, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Basic Principles; Vietnam; SALT; European Security; Bilateral Relations;
Announcement of Visit; Summit Arrangements; China

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have invested so much in the
Berlin agreement that we are in favor of ratification of these agree-
ments. In light of these discussions, we will see what additional steps
we can take to assist ratification.

Brezhnev: We know that, and that is why we said we value Pres-
ident Nixon’s position regarding European matters very highly. I have
said so publicly, too, in our Central Committee. My feeling is that Eu-
ropean problems will be discussed in a favorable spirit.

Kissinger: We expect it too.

Brezhnev: We feel sure that when President Nixon hears what we
have to say he will see that we are not trying to inject any “underwa-
ter rocks” in our European policy. We are not self-centered.

Kissinger: Will you be introducing new European matters at the
Summit?

Brezhnev: We would like perhaps to have something to say on
the European Conference. The general position and attitude of the U.S.

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1 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files,
Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons. Top
Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Guest House on Vorobyevskii
Road. For the full text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations,
Administration is known to us, that is to say, agreement in principle. What is needed is just a few specifics. By that time we may have ready in written form how to conclude a European Conference, that is to say the basic principles for a European Conference. Possibly even before the May meeting, we could agree on or discuss certain additional points bilaterally.

Kissinger: You will find it easier to discuss with President if there have been prior exchanges, so he’s not confronted with entirely new matters when he gets here.

Brezhnev: We will follow the channel.

Kissinger: May I raise in this connection the problem of mutual force reductions? In your considerations regarding the European Security Conference, has your thinking reached the point where you would be willing to have parallel discussions on force reductions?

Brezhnev: Just to return to European affairs generally, there will be discussed the ratification of the treaties, the Berlin agreement, agreement on principles of convening a conference, and the relation of the GDR to the FRG. Then on a purely confidential basis we would certainly like to know the answers to such questions as when the U.S. would support the admissions of both Germanies to the U.N.

With respect to force reductions, that question is one that we do not intend to withdraw from the agenda, but perhaps it is one that should not be linked too closely to the Summit so as not to impede matters of top priority. But at some stage we would be ready in the future to discuss it on a confidential basis bilaterally. Of course, the general portent of our proposals on this score is to have the least possible number of troops in Europe, reducing to a minimum the risk of war in Europe. At some stage, we will certainly start to talk to you on this. Even if at first there is only a very slight reduction, the mere fact of a reduction will have a tremendous significance. It will be a token of our desire for a reduction of tensions and a token of goodwill and spirit of confidence. No one is implying that we will have 3 million and you will have 600. There can be no unacceptable proposals made in this field. Mutually acceptable principles will have to be found. There can be no unilateral advantage.

Kissinger: How about if side by side with preparations for a European Security Conference we begin discussions on reductions, directed at basic principles?

Brezhnev: In general, that would be a very good thing. But what we both have to bear in mind is that the merging of these 2 issues would divert attention from the main issues. Because it is to be foreseen that with respect to a European Security Conference hundreds of questions will come up. Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark can all raise questions.

Kissinger: You like chaos.

Brezhnev: On the contrary. So let’s get this question out of the way first.
Kissinger: We do not think force reductions should be discussed at a European Security Conference, because a European Security Conference is a much larger forum. We think a force reduction should be discussed in a parallel body among the countries whose forces would be reduced.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, of course it is certainly possible that the Conference itself could say something favorable on approaching it. Perhaps the Conference could set up a special body or another organization with the necessary diplomatic and military personnel—naturally with the participation of countries concerned. On this question, we could use our bilateral channel to conduct quiet and steady discussions on this. But at the forthcoming meeting, we should register our general attitude and desire to advance to a European Security Conference.²

Kissinger: Assuming that ratification goes through, which we expect, we are prepared to do this. But our attitude is that side by side, we would have discussions on this subject in a separate forum.

Brezhnev: We are certainly in agreement to start in the confidential channel. As soon as we feel we have come to a common approach, we can then involve more openly the others who are concerned. Because of course attitudes and positions of states in this are different. Brandt at the Crimea asked me, should we also discuss Luxembourg and its 94 policemen? Should this be covered?

Kissinger: That is consistent with his practice of always getting to the fundamentals of an issue.³

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² In a subsequent meeting on April 24 from 11:15 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., Brezhnev made a similar appeal to Kissinger: "Also, we [the United States and the Soviet Union] should, we feel, take the necessary steps for the preparation and convening of a European Security Conference. I am sure you understand well and can convey this to the President.” (Memorandum of conversation, April 24; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons) For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 159.

³ On April 24, Kissinger sent Nixon a message regarding his trip to Moscow. With regard to a European security conference and MBFR he wrote: "Brezhnev at least agreed to consider our concept of separate explorations on MBFR in parallel with those on a European Security Conference. We have no assurance he will actually carry this out, however.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Moscow Trip—April 1972, Memcons) For the full text of the message, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 161.
Secretary of State Rogers visited Europe from May 2 to 10, 1972, for consultations with the NATO allies about the Moscow summit. He visited Iceland (May 2–3), the United Kingdom (May 3–4), Belgium (May 4–5), Luxembourg (May 5–6), and the Federal Republic of Germany (May 6–7). On May 17, Rogers reported in a memorandum to President Nixon: “Although European interest in the Moscow discussions is very great, we did not detect any serious concern that you would be arriving at agreements with the Soviets behind the backs of our Allies—a fear which, as you know, has periodically arisen during the post-World War II period. Government leaders and the public media appear to have taken you at your word that you will not be negotiating bilaterally on matters of broad European interest, such as the Conference on European Security and Cooperation and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.” Rogers continued: “It is only fair to note that there are still a number of differences in the West between various approaches to certain aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, but none of these seem to be of such a fundamental nature as to make ultimate agreement unlikely. Further work will have to be done in NATO on this, and the Europeans are hoping that your bilateral exchanges with the Soviets will draw from them a clearer description of their own thinking than has yet been obtained. This should then prove valuable as we move towards an alliance consensus in the next phase of NATO discussion.” (National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 5415, Box 524, S’s 5/72 Pre-Summit Consultation Follow-Up)

In the wake of Rogers’s trip, Ralph J. McGuire, Director of the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, wrote a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand on May 19 about the “relationship of the Moscow Communiqué and US positions on CSCE and MBFR.” McGuire wrote: “Recalling our discussion with the Secretary in Luxembourg on CSCE issues, and his desire to press the Soviets hard on the Brezhnev Doctrine and to take a strong stand on freer movement, it occurs to me that both of these positions could be undermined by formulations that might be agreed in the Moscow communiqué.” McGuire noted: “The passage on principles, in the draft communiqué which the Secretary sent the President before his European trip, probably should be strengthened somewhat in the light of the Luxembourg conversation.” McGuire attached a memorandum “enumerating the possible interrelationships between the Moscow Communiqué and CSCE.” (Ibid., Bureau of European Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Records Relating to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lot 80 D 188, NN3–059–00–017, Box 1, European Security, May 1972)
On May 19, Rogers forwarded to Nixon suggested language for the final communiqué for the Moscow summit. An attachment to Rogers’s memorandum, “Sensitive Areas,” reads in part as follows: “In the specific areas listed below, we should avoid the following:

“CSCE. 1. Any general statement of principles that omits reference to freer movement or refers to it only obliquely; 2. Recognition or respect for existing frontiers or their inviolability; 3. Emphasis on respect for treaty obligations (because of the Soviet-Czech treaty and the Brezhnev Doctrine); 4. Any reference to ‘peaceful coexistence.’

“MBFR. 1. Listing or defining states that should participate in MBFR explorations or negotiations, or the specific countries involved in the area of possible reductions; 2. The mention of specific dates for explorations or talks; 3. The term ‘equal security’ (which the Soviets related to FBS; the NATO formula is ‘undiminished security’).” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 475, President’s Trip Files, President’s Moscow Trip, May 1972, Pt. 3)

On the same day, May 19, Rogers sent the President the Second Interim Report of the Interagency Task Force on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The report, he told Nixon in a covering memorandum, “summarizes the current status of issues related to CSCE and recommends positions we should take during future NATO consultations.” The task force report, along with Rogers’s memorandum, is ibid., Box 286, Agency Files, State, Vol. 16. A revised version of the report, Tab L of the White House’s MBFR–CSCE Backup Book used at the Moscow summit, is ibid., Box 482, President’s Trip Files, MBFR–CSCE Backup Book, Part 2.
Salzburg, Austria, May 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Moscow Discussions Tuesday, May 23, 1972

This memorandum summarizes the issues that will come up in the first set of your discussions on Tuesday and provides talking points.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]


This is Brezhnev’s major European initiative and he intends to get your commitment to prompt beginning of preparations and to the holding of the actual conference as early as this year.

We have long been on record as agreeing to a properly prepared and substantive conference (though, in fact, the problems of getting a mutually agreed agenda for a substantive conference are considerable). Our reservations have stemmed from our concern that the conference will be a propaganda circus, produce false euphoria and open up differences among NATO allies. We and the NATO allies have been working intensively on more substantive positions to present at a conference, especially proposals that would stimulate freedom of movement and undercut Soviet pretensions to hegemony in Eastern Europe (Brezhnev Doctrine).

Although Brezhnev has frequently suggested through the private channel that we jointly develop a position, and you have indicated a willingness to explore the objectives of a meaningful conference, little of substance has in fact occurred.

We and the Allies are committed to begin “multilateral” explorations on a conference once the Berlin agreement is in effect. Nevertheless you should use our agreement on the timing of these preparatory explorations to get Brezhnev’s agreement to early explorations on

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European troop reductions (MBFR), in which we are interested. You should also take into account the sensitivities of our Allies to anything that smacks of US-Soviet collusion against them.

Key Points to Emphasize

In respect to Brezhnev’s urgings for early preparations and a conference this year, you should:

—Agree to the beginning of multilateral preparations later this year, subject to agreement among all countries concerned;

—Note that you cannot visualize preparations for a truly meaningful conference to be completed rapidly and you believe that it would be soundest to consider holding a conference some time in 1973.

As regards substance, you should indicate that:

—We would agree that a conference should deal with the principles of relations among European states; such principles would include:

• sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity;

• non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs;

• the right of people in each country to shape their own destiny.

—There could be certain agreed measures to improve physical security, such as restraints on movements of armed forces, exchanges of observers, notification of maneuvers. (Note: We want to keep MBFR as such out of a conference because we would only want countries concerned to be involved in negotiations.)

—There should be expanded cultural exchange and concrete arrangements for increased economic and technological cooperation.

The Soviets advocate some sort of permanent machinery to come out of the conference. You should:

—Stress that if new institutions are to be created they should have carefully worked out terms of reference;

—Note that military questions are highly complex and delicate and could best be dealt with directly by the countries concerned.

Finally, if Brezhnev stalls on MBFR and suggests that this subject should only be dealt with after a conference has met, you should:

—Press our desire to move ahead in parallel on a conference and MBFR.

5. MBFR. Your discussion of this topic, on which the Soviets have remained reluctant, should be largely procedural. We have a need, for Congressional reasons, to have a process of negotiations underway; but we are less certain that early positive results are achievable. The Soviets, apart from showing reluctance to begin talks (e.g. their refusal to receive Brosio, the NATO explorer), have so far given little evidence that they have done any substantive homework comparable to the massive studies undertaken by NATO and ourselves.
The Soviets are aware that geography confers advantages on them. On the other hand, their forces in Eastern Europe have internal security functions. Consequently, while the Soviets might be interested in reductions that would enable them to shift forces eastward, they have displayed much hesitation. They may of course hope that they will be spared “mutual” cuts by growing pressures in the West for unilateral ones. In addition, the Soviets have shown great sensitivity to the term “balanced,” the B in MBFR, because they see in it a Western effort to obtain larger Soviet reductions as a compensation for our geographic disadvantage.

It is possible that in Moscow, as a “concession,” Brezhnev might propose quick and symbolic equal reductions and try to get a joint US-Soviet agreement to this effect. Our studies have shown this to be of questionable desirability (it would not be verifiable and would tend to accentuate present Soviet military advantages); moreover, a US-Soviet fait accompli on this subject would damage our Alliance relationship.

Key Points to Emphasize

In these circumstances you should:

— Seek Brezhnev’s agreement to MBFR explorations by countries concerned in parallel with the preparatory work on the CSCE.

— Agree that there can be private US-Soviet contact on this, but that the specific exploratory work should not be purely bilateral.

On substance, you should indicate that:

— Reductions should involve both foreign and local forces in Central Europe, although an initial phase could concentrate on foreign (ie. US and Soviet) forces;

— It would be best to concentrate in the first instance on ground forces;

— Nuclear weapons may present too complex a problem in the first stage of talks.

— There should be verification so that an agreement will not lead to misunderstandings and bickering (this could involve inspection, or, as in SALT, measures that are arranged in a way that each side can observe them by its unilateral means).

Note: As regards the European questions you could refer to the fact that the final communiqué on which there has already been considerable work by both sides will, of course, deal at some length with European questions.

One matter, not covered above, relates to frontiers in Europe. The Soviets are anxious to have us recognize their “inviolability.” But since they interpret this word as meaning “unchangeable” even by negotiation there is a problem for us in accepting it. We have no intention our-
selves to see frontiers changed but because we maintain that the ultimate frontiers of a united Germany should be set in a peace treaty we have to maintain flexibility. Consequently, when Brezhnev raises this matter, you should:

—State that we are quite willing to recognize the principle of “territorial integrity,” but do not wish to infringe on the right of sovereign states to seek peaceful arrangements concerning their frontiers.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

94. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, May 22, 1972, 6:15–8:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
The President
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Interpreter (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

General Secretary Brezhnev: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I should like further to say a few words about Europe. I would very much like you to be very clear in your mind, Mr. President, that the Europe policy of the Soviet Union pursues the most honest and constructive goals and is devoid of any subterfuges—even though there is certainly no lack in the wide world of people who want to muddy the water and propound all sorts of pernicious fabrications. The Russian people and all the other peoples of the Soviet Union have suffered quite enough from wars that have originated on the European soil. We do not want this to be repeated anew. We want to rule out such a possibility. That is the objective of our Europe policy. I believe that the

United States too cannot be interested in a repetition of all that has happened in the past. We believe that the United States is in sympathy with the achievement of détente in Europe and the strengthening of European peace. If that is so then you and we have before us a vast scope for cooperation to these ends. And we are hoping that it will be carried into effect under the hallmark of good will and a constructive approach. This hope of ours rests on a certain degree of practical experience. We do genuinely value the cooperation that we had with you at the time of the preparation of the agreement on West Berlin. We also value the steps taken by the American side to promote the ratification of the treaties signed by the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland. Permit me to express the hope that you and we will continue that good practice in matters including the preparation of the all-Europe conference.

As regards that conference I should like to say the following. This question too we seek to approach as realists. It is obvious that it will not prove possible to solve all the complex problems existing in Europe at one go. But we would think that such a conference if it passes successfully can lay a good foundation for cooperation between all European states.

I believe there is nothing in this that could be opposed by the United States or Canada.

We have on many occasions spoken publicly on this matter and I should not like to take up your time with a repetition of what has already been said. I believe we could discuss this matter in greater detail later and find mutual understanding.

I believe it would be a good thing to register our common positive attitude to the conference in the joint communiqué which will reflect the results of our talks. Such mutual understanding would have great meaning and significance.

The President: This is more a matter of form than substance. I was discussing this question on my way to Moscow with Kissinger and Rogers. I think we could reach understanding and that includes the question of timing. The other European countries will certainly be expecting us to mention this subject in our communiqué so we have to find a way of doing it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe they will certainly be expecting us to do so. I also feel that we could agree without any public announcement to begin consultations on matters relating to the all-Europe conference on a bilateral basis.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
95. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, May 24, 1972, 11:40 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Leonid Zamyatin, Director of TASS

The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

SUBJECTS

Economic Relations; Europe

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Europe

General Secretary Brezhnev: Shall we now turn to the subject that has been suggested we discuss this morning, Europe? If you have no objections, I would like to make a few opening remarks on that question. A discussion of the problems relating to Europe is a very important one indeed, and I believe the reasons for that are understood perfectly well on both sides. Europe is indeed an area which is one of the most densely populated ones in the world. It is an area of enormous economic potential; an area of ancient culture and science. All of these are important matters.

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On the other hand, it is also an area where in the past many large-
scale wars originated. I need only to mention two world wars and es-
pecially the last one which the U.S. was dragged into also. And those
wars, particularly the last one, involved very much human suffering
and sacrifice. It had a very bad aftermath and had a long term effect
on the situation in Europe generally.

The question therefore is how to make this area an area of peace
and tranquility so that all the peoples of Europe can live in conditions
of security, so that we too, and both of us, can be confident that the sit-
uation in Europe would not deteriorate. This is certainly not an easy
thing to achieve, but it is something that should be the focus of our
attention.

In Europe, we have sufficient and quite rich experience of coop-
eration on various matters. There has been the fighting cooperation of
our two nations during the Second World War. There was the fruitful
cooperation at the time of the Potsdam Agreement. There has been
comparable experience in the post-war period. We regard particularly
highly the cooperation of our two nations in the talks on the Berlin
agreement and in the matters of the Soviet Union–Federal Republic of
Germany and Poland–Federal Republic of Germany Treaties.

However much we value the cooperation in the past, we should
not belittle the importance of our role in ensuring the future of Europe,
because there are still in Europe the unresolved problems. Very much
in the policies of the United States and Soviet Union about Europe
would favor not only the interests of Europeans, but also the interests
of your country and ours. I should like to say quite frankly that if the
U.S. is prepared to take measures to remove the survivals of the past
policies of the cold war, the outcome would be an improvement of re-
lations between the Soviet Union and the United States. That, too, is a
very important aspect of this problem.

And I would like at this point to emphasize again the significance
of the concerted policies we both pursued with regard to the problems
of West Berlin and the ratification of the treaty. At the same time I wish
to state firmly that our line with regard to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many would not be anti-American in character. This is something we
said in all frankness to Chancellor Brandt, and this is something we
will abide by very strictly. And as a practical step let me say that on
May 31 our Supreme Soviet will be ratifying the treaty with the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. As we pointed out in the past, immediately
after that we will sign the final protocol on West Berlin so that can be
put into effect too. In our view that will not only serve to improve the
legal relations between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German
Democratic Republic and Poland. It will also have a beneficial effect
on the general atmosphere in Europe.
Secretary Rogers: I suggested to Mr. Gromyko that we make the signing on June 3.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think that seems to be a very acceptable date. We have promised to sign it immediately after ratifying; that is something expected by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Secretary Rogers: There is some suggestion that we delay until June 16, but June 3 is better for us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We feel the sooner the better. We promised they would come into force at the same time, so it seems logical to do it on June 3.

Secretary Rogers: We will try to work it out with the others.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Good, the British and the French.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That would be a very good thing indeed. In our common policy in Europe it will also be most important to continue to pursue a firm line and not even conceive of the possibility of the violation of boundaries of Europe as they have taken shape in the post-war period. That also is one of the paramount tasks of current foreign policies.

And I would now like to tell you frankly, Mr. President, there have been erroneous, fallacious interpretations of our policy with respect to Europe. Sometimes this is a lack of true knowledge, but more frequently it is deliberate rumors spread to the effect that the goal of our policies is to break the ties that the U.S. has developed with European states. We wish to state in these negotiations that this is very far from the truth. The initiatives that we are taking in Europe, and particularly on the question of European security, pursue a goal that is totally different. We pursue our objective in the interest of not only the European states; we pursue it also with the goal of maintaining and protecting the interest of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, if of course, like ourselves, the United States seeks to make Europe tranquil and secure.

In confirmation with what I have said with regard to the goal of the Soviet policy in Europe, we will take into account the role played by the U.S. and and U.S.-Soviet cooperation both during World War II and the post-war period, particularly in the earlier talks on the problem of West Berlin and the matter of the ratification of the treaties. We believe it quite normal that in all matters relating to the European Conference and the solution of all serious problems relating to Europe, the United States should participate on an equal footing, even though the United States is not an European nation. This review is confirmation of our views and attitude to the U.S. and to the U.S. being able to defend its own interests in Europe.

Another question to which we attach great importance is the question of preparing and convening an all-European Security Conference.
The reason why we attach importance to this is as follows: We do not see the Conference as an aim in itself. We regard it as one of the possible means that can help bring to fruition the turn that has been discernible toward the normalization of the situation and strengthening of the prospects of securing lasting peace in the continent.

I should like to add the following. Despite the different approaches taken by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to several matters affecting European politics, the strengthening of security in Europe does in our view correspond to the long-term interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. And if we both act in that direction—in a direction of building up the guarantee of security of European states—that will insure that there will be no more nuclear war and there will be tranquility in Europe to a far greater extent than attempts to insure that tranquility through the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

We believe that a turn for the better has become discernible in Europe today, and it will be in our view useful if we could take advantage of that fact in order to strengthen that feeling of security and begin a joint effort to prepare for the convening of a European Security Conference. We should therefore endeavor to begin preliminary bilateral consultations on those matters and in a preliminary way we might say a few words about that at this meeting. And we are counting on the positive attitude of the United States toward this matter. We have expressed our views publicly on this question on many occasions and so have quite a few other European states.

As you know, we have spoken in favor of convening this conference even as early as the end of this year. It is quite clear that in one blow it may certainly not prove possible to resolve all the complex problems of Europe, but the important thing is to launch the conference, to get the conference going. It might prove expedient to prolong its work. The important thing is to begin the work, to begin the preparations for the conference.

As in any question such preparations can assume a different form, but as a first suggestion perhaps we could discuss the following: we first begin multilateral consultations in Helsinki. Then, in the first stage of the conference itself the Foreign Ministers of the European states and the United States and Canada could meet to work out an agenda of the conference, to create the necessary bodies, commissions, secretariat and so forth. And then those bodies could get to work in order to elaborate and submit various specific proposals for the consideration of the governments of the European states and the United States and Canada.

Certainly this is not the one and only possible form of addressing ourselves to this problem. Other forms can also be discussed. We are just submitting our own view. This form has in it nothing that can be
construed as running against any participants in the conference. Whatever conversations we have on this topic, we should certainly like to emphasize the significance for future developments of our two sides publicly saying something in principle on the problem relating to the European Conference at the conclusion of our meetings here. And you have in principle given your consent to that first meeting. I wish to emphasize that it would be very important indeed to say something at the conclusion on these subjects because if we don’t there might be all sorts of wrong opinions and misunderstandings in Europe. People would start saying that the U.S. or the Soviet Union was changing their policy. Even if so, by making public reference we would be doing a very good thing and therefore justify the hopes the people in Europe have placed in these talks and in the people of our countries.

And now we have through joint cooperation settled the matter of the ratification of the treaties and the question of West Berlin, another important matter arises and that is a simultaneous admission of the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, to the United Nations. The possible solution to this question would certainly remove much tension in Europe and the sources of friction between us on those grounds. This is a major issue, and we feel we should be entitled to count on the positive attitude of your part on this also. Although it is an international problem, it also relates to bilateral relations between our two countries. It would help to create a better climate for the relations between us. And that is something to which you made frequent reference during this visit, Mr. President.

Another major issue which concerns not only improving the general climate and relations between our two countries and the relations of our two countries with the states of Europe, but also in line with the interest of generally improving the situation in the world, is the question of the military/political groupings in Europe. You are, I trust, familiar with our position on these matters. We are prepared, together with our allies, to disband military/political groupings in Europe towards a first step to really disbanding military organizations, and we are prepared to initiate consultations with you on this subject.

Those, Mr. President, are in our view just the basic issues we could discuss and talk about with relation to Europe.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, you correctly pointed out our position of agreeing in principle to the European Security Conference, or a European Security and Cooperation Conference. As you know, we have, and you have, the problem of not deciding at this meeting the future of Europe. It is very important, while we agree in principle, that we consult with our allies, you with yours and we with ours. Therefore it is very important that whatever we state here, we will follow through with consultations with our allies.
General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s quite natural.
Chairman Kosygin: Do you think the time will come when there are no allies on your part or on ours, that we are common allies?
The President: Surely. It will take time.
Chairman Kosygin: That’s what we want to achieve. As long as you have your allies and we ours, we are at loggerheads.
The President: It is very important we recognize that smaller nations are very sensitive about the relations between the two great powers. Small nations object to having their fate decided by larger ones.
General Secretary Brezhnev: It should not offend them.
Chairman Kosygin: That in fact is why we are so categorically opposed to allegations, these Chinese allegations, about the two superpowers combining to settle all the questions of the world, the affairs of smaller countries. We, for our part, have the immutable position that we respect other countries. And that is our attitude.

[There was a brief discussion about Kosygin and a Deputy Prime Minister for Science.]

The President: He is making a private deal with Mr. Kosygin. As the first nation to send a manned mission to Mars, I will go along.
Chairman Kosygin: I can stand it, can you?
The President: It will take nine months. We will get to know each other very well.
Chairman Kosygin: We will take cognac.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: How could you go without the Foreign Ministers?
Chairman Podgorny: This is not a private deal. We have to give honest thought to who flies.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps first there should be a preliminary flight of foreign ministers.
The President: If the foreign ministers don’t come back, we won’t go.
General Secretary Brezhnev: We call Dr. Kissinger to order—keep him away from submarines.
Chairman Kosygin: If we don’t come back, everything will be clear.
The President: Getting to the practical points, as I know the General Secretary likes to do, stated frankly, I see these problems. First to have a meeting this year, 1972, the first meeting of the European Security Conference, would not be possible. It poses for us rather considerable problems. We have elections and the aftermath, and it also

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2 These and all subsequent brackets are in the original.
poses the problem of participation. We can talk in terms of a meeting in 1973. We can have preliminary discussions take place in the fall of this year. That is realistic. One of the reasons that this meeting we are having now is producing such solid results is because it was well prepared. In a meeting involving all the countries of Europe, the preparations, of course, would be very important. Whereas we two might agree on an agenda, smaller nations have various ideas, and it will take time. 1973 is the time for the meeting to aim for rather than trying to compress it and get it done in 1972.

Secretary Rogers: Our allies agree with this. Some of them have elections this fall, like Canada.

The President: You have to know whether you are dealing with a government that will survive or one that’s gone. Preliminary discussions at the proper level, the exploratory discussions, could go forward at the times the European nations and all of us agree.

It’s your thought that these should take place at Helsinki?

General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s where the idea of a conference came to life. Some work has already begun. Since Finland was the initiator we feel that Helsinki should be the city. That seems the general trend of public opinion, that it should be held in Helsinki.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In fact practically all the countries concerned have indicated their preference for Helsinki, and the U.S. has not in fact registered a negative attitude.

Secretary Rogers: We are talking about preliminary talks, not the conference itself.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s exactly our understanding.

The President: The second point, with regard to UN representation of East Germany, this is a problem where we, of course, will have to be guided by the attitude of the Federal Republic. And when the Federal Republic has discussed this matter and indicated it is ready to move forward, we will, of course, cooperate. We will be prepared to discuss it with the British and the French. There is the very sensitive problem of four-power rights that might be affected by this action.

The situation with regard to what the General Secretary was referring to concerning military forces and military blocs is of course much more difficult and is going to require a great deal of time. As the General Secretary and all the representatives here of the Soviet Government are aware, there have been considerable discussions in the NATO community in regard to the possibility of mutual balanced force reductions. This is naturally a matter that cannot be decided in a large conference involving a number of nations that do not have forces. That is why we are suggesting, I know this is a matter of previous discussion....
General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, there are such states as Luxembourg, with 90 policemen.

The President: . . . we have suggested that there should be parallel discussions on the problem of force reductions, parallel discussions at the time going forward with discussions on the European Conference.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, how do you visualize that in practice? Let us assume that we have the procedure on the conference that I have suggested, the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Helsinki to discuss matters on the agenda, working bodies, the secretariat, etc. In your view they would also discuss the question of force reductions in parallel? Is that your thinking generally?

The President: No. That was the point I was making. We thought that is too large a body for that. Let the countries involved, with forces involved, have discussions; that is the point Dr. Kissinger made in discussions with the General Secretary before.

Chairman Kosygin: But they should proceed in parallel.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In parallel, but different bodies discussing the two different subjects.

Secretary Rogers: We might have the subjects on the agenda and agree to discuss maybe simultaneously, maybe shortly thereafter.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Or perhaps we really need not have them in parallel, perhaps first agree to getting the question of the European Conference out of the way, and then force reductions. But if we discuss the two very important matters of the European Security Conference and force reductions in parallel, perhaps they would get in the way of each other.

The President: If we wait until a multilateral conference, we may never get to parallel discussions.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That matter could be dealt with in parallel but different bodies altogether. We support the earliest possible discussion of that but without hinging these questions together. The crux lies in not tying up these two problems as far as substance is concerned.

Secretary Rogers: I think that as a matter of logic if you are going to have a conference dealing with security certainly one of the most important aspects is forces. Certainly any conference that didn’t cover forces would be lacking something.

The President: Let me suggest, Mr. General Secretary, a procedure for your consideration. I would like to do some thinking on how we do this tactically, the date and so forth. If we could have Rogers and Gromyko have a discussion also and then report back to us, maybe Friday, and by Friday then we can consider this question. They could give us some options.
[General Secretary Brezhnev stands up.]
Chairman Kosygin/General Secretary Brezhnev: Okay.
Chairman Kosygin: Because indeed it would be a very good thing if Secretary Rogers and Gromyko could work on this for our consideration, a kind of program for both of us working toward a European Conference. This would indeed help us remove many questions that otherwise would take months of time.

The President: This is too big a group for technical matters.
Chairman Kosygin: Although certainly there are many people in Europe who live under the impression, perhaps false, that we are holding back preparations for the Conference. If we come to an agreement on this, it would be very useful to remove this impression.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Many people in Europe think you oppose the Conference.

The President: Let me emphasize again that although we come to agreement, we must be careful not to irritate our friends—all our friends, we consider all Europe our friends. For example, we wouldn’t want to anger Albania. (laughter) We don’t want to anger them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is a very noble intention.
Secretary Rogers: We don’t want to make Luxembourg mad.
Chairman Kosygin: We heed the words of Luxembourg too.
If, for example, we tell Albania that you regard them as best friend, they will be very glad.
Chairman Podgorny: We are prepared to heed the voice of Luxembourg but Albania takes a different view.
Chairman Kosygin: No exceptions. If they don’t want to take part, what can we do?

The President: Take a country like Austria. It is very important. It is small but in the heart of Europe. We should heed its voice.
General Secretary Brezhnev: The voice of every country should be heeded.
I think we can accept as a basis the view by the President to make Secretary Rogers and Comrade Gromyko get to work, perhaps throughout the night. While we enjoy our sleep they will do work. We have to cherish our time.

The President: They will not see the ballet.
General Secretary Brezhnev: I am sure he’s seen “Swan Lake.”
Secretary Rogers: Not here. I am looking forward to it.
General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Mr. President, that I feel completes the discussion.

The President: I think we have a direction set. Also on the trade side there will be further discussions with Flanigan and Kosygin.
General Secretary Brezhnev: At nighttime too.

Chairman Kosygin: How shall we divide it? Half the time for me and half the time for Gromyko?

[The Soviet side then suggested that an announcement for both sides be made concerning this meeting. It contained the facts of the date of the meeting, the participants, the atmosphere and that there were signatures of the space and science and technology agreements. President Nixon suggested that the topic for discussion for the meeting be termed “European matters” rather than “European security.” The Soviet side accepted this, and the text of the announcement was agreed to. The meeting then concluded.]

96. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Moscow, May 27, 1972, 1106Z.

Secto 40/5041. Subject: Memorandum of conversation.

1. Following is cleared memorandum of conversation between Secretary Rogers and Gromyko May 25.

2. Begin text:

SUBJECT
European Issues

PARTICIPANTS
U.S. side
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Matlock

Soviet side
Andrei Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR in U.S.
G.M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, MFA
Eduard Zaitsev, Interpreter

Date: May 25, 1972, 4:15–4:55 P. M.
Place: St. Catherine’s Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 475, President’s Trip Files, Moscow Trip, May 1972, Pt. 4. Secret; Nodis.
CSCE

Gromyko opened by requesting the Secretary’s views on means of proceeding with preliminary consultations for the “Conference on European Security.” The Secretary said that we feel the CSCE must be prepared carefully and we cannot take part in it until 1973 in view of our elections. We can, however, participate in a multilateral preliminary conference in late November. We have no objection to increased bilateral talks in the interim but believe that there is no point in trying to hold the preliminary conference before the latter part of November because of upcoming elections in several countries involved, including our own.

Subsequently in the conversation, Gromyko asked whether we have in mind early 1973 for the European Conference. The Secretary said that it is preferable to wait to see how the preliminary conference goes and that in any case the timing is something for all participants to decide.

Gromyko inquired at what level the Secretary envisages the conference. The Secretary replied that the CSCE itself would presumably be at the foreign minister level. Gromyko asked whether we have in mind a higher level meeting following the conference of foreign ministers. The Secretary informed him we had not been thinking in those terms. Gromyko then asked about the British view on the format of the conference and was told that the British are flexible and apparently would accept either the U.S. position (a single meeting of foreign ministers) or the French position (two meetings of foreign ministers). Gromyko pressed as to whether the U.S. would support a heads of state meeting. The Secretary replied that this is not ruled out, but he feels we would probably not support it. This is one of the subjects we can talk about in Helsinki. He asked whether the Soviets are thinking in these terms. Gromyko answered that his government is weighing all possibilities. A heads of state meeting is not excluded—it could be a good idea.

The Secretary gave Gromyko our draft communiqué language on CSCE (attached). Gromyko read it without comment, then returned to his earlier question as to whether we can have a preliminary exchange of views on the CSCE. The Secretary agreed that we can, but pointed out the necessity of obtaining the views of other participants, since we must not make it look as if we are imposing a decision on the others.

The Secretary requested Gromyko’s views on the topics to be dealt with in a CSCE. Gromyko said that any questions could be discussed, then listed the following which the Soviet Government considers desirable:
—general improvement of relations (political, economic and other) among the European countries.
—territorial integrity (i.e., status quo), the inviolability of borders (e.g., as in the FRG–USSR treaty).
—non-application of force in relations among European countries.
—improvement of economic relations.
—technical and scientific cooperation.
—cultural relations.

The Secretary commented that, as the President had said, it is important for the conference to have concrete results. It should not aim just at creating an atmosphere, although that has some value. He agreed that there should be principles governing relations between states, so long as these apply uniformly. We consider the freer movement of people, ideas and information important. He noted the reference to mutually advantageous contacts in the Warsaw Pact statement and said he assumed that it referred to such movement. Environment is another important topic.

Gromyko observed that environment should be included and asked how we feel about a permanent organ established by the CSCE. The Secretary said we need time to think about this. Gromyko explained that he was not proposing an organization with a large permanent apparatus, but merely a consultative organ. The Secretary said we have not excluded this possibility, but we have questions about it. New organizations tend to grow like the UN and result in much talk and little action.

Gromyko then asked about the territorial question and renunciation of force. The Secretary observed that renunciation of force is fine, but if one talks about borders, one must ask which borders, since we do not consider it appropriate to be involved in territorial disputes. Gromyko said they are thinking of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders as a principle, not with specific application to border disputes.

Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary meant in his earlier comments that there is nothing to talk about until November. The Secretary replied that we are prepared to have bilateral conversations, but for the reason he had stated, we felt multilateral consultations should not begin until late November.

The Secretary referred to the President’s request the previous day for options as to how we might proceed with MBFR. He said we regretted that the Soviet Government had not seen fit to receive Brosio
and wondered if we could not start exploratory talks by designating someone to conduct them. Gromyko asked who would designate the representative, and the Secretary replied that, so far as our side is concerned, NATO would. Gromyko said that in that case the situation would be the same as with Brosio: the Soviet Government was opposed to Brosio because he represented a group. The same would be the case with any other NATO representative. The Secretary observed that the only way to avoid having a representative of groups is to use the entire interested group, that is hold a conference.

Gromyko asked whether the United States could designate a representative who could speak for our group. It is difficult for the Soviet Government to deal with a representative who represents a bloc or an alliance. Mentioning France, he noted that some other countries have the same opinion. He realizes that developments may occur in the negotiation of force reductions in such a way that groups may form. But the Soviet Union remains opposed to bloc-to-bloc negotiation in the juridical sense.

The Secretary said he sees no other way to approach the question since the United States cannot leave the impression that it is making plans for other countries. Gromyko said that Brezhnev told the President yesterday that we can perhaps exchange views on a bilateral basis.

The Secretary then returned to the President’s request for options and presented to Gromyko the following draft list of four options:

1. Exploratory talks on MBFR between relevant states to begin prior to multilateral preparatory talks for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

2. Exploratory talks on MBFR between relevant states to begin in parallel but in different bodies at Helsinki at same time as the multilateral preparatory talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

3. Exploratory talks on MBFR between relevant states to begin in separate body and after commencement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

4. Multilateral talks on MBFR take place in a special body created by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Gromyko read the list and, in regard to the second, asked whether “relevant states” meant all possible participants in the European conference. The Secretary explained that this is not the meaning.

Regarding the relationship of MBFR and the CSCE, Gromyko said that he understood it had been agreed at the meeting with the President the day before that force reductions would not be discussed at the European conference. The Secretary said that MBFR would not be negotiated at the CSCE but said that it could be discussed in a general way. Gromyko then observed that in the Soviet view force reductions could be handled
parallel to the European conference, after the conference, or perhaps in an organ of the conference, but not at the conference itself. The Secretary agreed it should not be negotiated at the conference itself.

Gromyko inquired whether the options the Secretary has presented represented the State Department view. The Secretary explained that the options were merely suggestive, in order to meet the President’s request to present options. We will appreciate Soviet comments or suggestions.

The Secretary presented draft language on MBFR for the communique (attached). Gromyko read it and observed that force reduction should be mentioned, but he doubted that it needed to be treated at such length. The Secretary told him we are flexible on that point.

**Berlin Protocol**

The possibility of signing the Berlin Protocol on June 3 was discussed. Gromyko said that June 3 is acceptable in principle, but that the Soviets will not sign the protocol until the ratification instruments of the Moscow Treaty are deposited and the treaty is in force. He said that the Supreme Soviet would meet May 31 to ratify the treaty, and that the Soviet Government is attempting to arrange for deposit of the ratification on June 2. He hoped to hear from the Germans the next day as to whether this would be possible.

Attachments: Communiqué Language on CSCE and MBFR.

**Attachment No. 1.**

**Communiqué Language for CSCE**

(Preliminary draft)

The U.S. and the USSR are in accord that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin at a date to be agreed by the countries concerned after the signature of the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may deal in a concrete way with specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe.

**Attachment No. 2.**

**Communiqué Language for MBFR**

(Preliminary draft)

Recognizing that the military situation in Europe has been relatively stable for the past several years, and that this situation has favored the development of relations between East and West, the two sides addressed current aspects of military security in Europe. Partic-
ularly, they discussed further contributions to stability and security that could be achieved through the reciprocal reductions of forces in Central Europe. Any agreement must be consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all parties.

They agreed that, subject to the concurrence of their allies, explorations looking toward negotiations should begin as soon as practicable. If they are not initiated sooner, explorations could open concurrently with initial multilateral talks preparatory to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Discussions on force reductions could initially clarify the views of both sides on key issues, including a work program for negotiations covering such matters as general guidelines and collateral constraints, as well as aspects of reductions.

Rogers

97. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, May 27, 1972, 2:10–4:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgi M. Korniienko, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Leonid M. Shevchenko, Aide to Chairman Podgorny
Mr. Bratchikov, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff Member
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

SUBJECT
Communiqué; SALT (briefly at beginning and end)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger’s Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Mr. Kissinger’s Conversations in Moscow, May 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. All brackets, with the exception of those indicating omitted material, are in the original. The meeting took place in St. Catherine’s Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace. For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 288.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It would not affect our text.\(^2\) Health. In the last phrase, instead of “Soviet leaders and the President of the U.S.,” let us use my favorite word “sides.”

Dr. Kissinger: “The two sides pledge full support”? O.K.


Dr. Kissinger: I don’t like “hotbed.”

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Suppose we say “Where both world wars began.”

[Mr. Lord and Dr. Kissinger confer.]

Dr. Kissinger: My colleague says you don’t do justice to the Napoleonic wars if you say only world wars. How about the Schleswig–Holstein question? O.K.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: In the last phrase of the paragraph, why not say “inviolability”?\(^2\)

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we could slip it out without your noticing. Our problem is that “inviolability” implies not even the possibility of raising a territorial question in peaceful terms.

Is that right, Marty?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We prefer to stay with this phrase.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: [Thinks for a moment.] Maybe there is another English phrase.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you phrase this “inviolability” point? Give me a sentence.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: I would say like this: “They consider that the inviolability of borders of the states of Europe must be observed.”

Dr. Kissinger: How about “They agree that the territorial integrity of all states must be inviolable.”

Fon. Min. Gromyko: It omits borders. Your previous governments—Johnson, Kennedy—always said borders should be inviolable. There was no difference between us. The previous U.S. Government was far ahead of the German Government in this respect.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have the exact [German-Soviet] treaty? What is the exact phrase the Germans use?

[Gromyko tells Bratchikov to go out to get it.]

Dr. Kissinger: [Points jokingly to the chandelier over the table]: There is a camera in it. Ivan the Terrible invented it.

\(^2\) Reference is to the draft text of the communiqué for the summit. See Document 98.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: No, Ivan the Terrible invented the air conditioning in this room!

Mr. Bratchikov: [Enters with the Treaty language, and reads]: “The sides consider as inviolable now and in the future the borders between all states in Europe.” There is another clause, “The sides confirm the obligation to unswervingly observe the territorial integrity of all the states of Europe in their present borders.”

Fon. Min. Gromyko: We quoted the Treaty language.
[There followed a long conference on the U.S. side.]
Dr. Kissinger: We will let you know this evening. We will try to find some way of accommodating your thinking.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: Good, it will be very good.

Dr. Kissinger: No previous Administration has put it into a joint document with the Soviet Union. It is one thing to do it this way, and another thing to do it in private statements. And not at the highest level.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: President Kennedy told me . . . .
Dr. Kissinger: We are not contesting the inviolability of frontiers. Our concern is that we don’t want to get involved in the debate. You know, in the German Bundestag, the debate over the permanence of the borders. Hillenbrand will check at the Hotel the English text of the Soviet-German treaty. We will try to find a paraphrase.

We are also checking the Berlin treaty to see how Berlin is mentioned.
[There was a short break.]
Mr. Korniyenko: And on the reduction of forces, you still don’t want “foreign and national”?
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Mr. Korniyenko: Why not?
Dr. Kissinger: Because we want to leave open which forces will be reduced.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: You are against the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic into the UN?
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: At the appropriate time?
Dr. Kissinger: It isn’t in here.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: It is in our text.
Dr. Kissinger: Our position is that we will not oppose it if the Germans propose it. But we don’t want to get ahead of the Germans. You will have no difficulty with us if the Federal Republic of Germany proposes it.

Fon. Min. Gromyko: About Berlin, we will do it the same.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: [On CSCE]: “Concrete preparations should begin.”
Dr. Kissinger: We would prefer to omit “in the near future.” Just, “after the signature.”
Dr. Kissinger: I know what you are saying. As the President said in the meeting, we don’t think these conversations can begin until the fall.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: Can’t we mention “national and foreign” forces?
Dr. Kissinger: No, we took it out.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: And just “armed forces,” not armaments?
Dr. Kissinger: Armaments is OK.
Fon. Min. Gromyko: What does “reciprocal” mean?
Dr. Kissinger: Both sides. Would you prefer “mutual and balanced”?! Fon. Min. Gromyko: Reciprocal means “by agreement.” All right, keep this word.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

98. Editorial Note

At the conclusion of the summit meeting in Moscow on May 29, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union released a final joint communiqué. The section of the communiqué devoted to Europe discussed both European security and MBFR. It reads in part: “Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts. They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.”

The communiqué continues: “The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine détente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference
in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of
the use or threat of force. The US and the USSR are in accord that mul-
tilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadri-
partite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two gov-
ernments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order
that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and coopera-
tion and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying
causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time
to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay. Both
sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe
would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and arma-
ments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question
should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agree-
ment should be reached as soon as practicable between the states con-
cerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special
forum.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pages 901–902)

President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev also
signed a joint statement entitled “Basic Principles of Relations Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics.” The statement as it relates to Europe reads that the United
States and Soviet Union agreed as follows:

“First. They will proceed from the common determination that in
the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual rela-
tions on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and
in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the
bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of
sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual
advantage.

“[Omitted here is the second point.]

“Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do
other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or
situations will not arise which would serve to increase international
tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which
all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to
outside interference in their internal affairs.

“Fourth. The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical ba-
sis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that
bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral
treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully
implemented.

“[Omitted here are the fifth through tenth points.]
“Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states. The development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

“Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.” (Ibid., pages 898–899)
Prelude to Negotiations, June 1972–November 1972

99. Minutes of a Joint Senior Review Group and Verification Panel Meeting


SUBJECT
MBFR

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin
George Springsteen
Edward Streator
Ray Garthoff
Seymour Weiss
Defense
Kenneth Rush
G. Warren Nutter
Lawrence Eagleburger
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Vice Adm. John P. Weinert
CIA
Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters
Bruce Clarke
Treasury
John McGinnis
ACDA
James Leonard
David Linebaugh
NSC
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Philip Odeen
William Hyland
Col. Jack Merritt
James Hackett
Lt. Michael Power

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
—The JCS will war-game some of the proposals to be considered and the working group will do a systematic analysis of the options. The SRG will meet again no later than mid-August to review and refine the working group’s analysis.
—The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons will be included among the options to be considered.
—Only those countries in which forces are stationed should be involved in the MBFR negotiations.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–113, SRG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1972–73. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
—We will propose launching the talks through multiple bilateral contacts.

—The working group will do the preparatory work, but it will be phased out in favor of the negotiating team once the negotiations get underway. Backstopping will be handled here, as in the SALT talks.

—The SACEUR communications channel will be used to keep the other Allies informed of the progress of the talks.

Mr. Kissinger: Sorry I’m late, the President grabbed me for a press conference problem. What I want to do today is get ready for some preparatory MBFR work, since we may have some meetings on it this fall. I would like to discuss a few procedural questions first and then consider briefly the substance of our explorations. Procedurally, we must consider who should participate in the MBFR explorations. Our position is that only those countries in which forces are stationed should be involved. Is there any disagreement on that? (None was voiced). So the next question is how do we handle it? Should we just tell the Europeans that this is our position?

Mr. Irwin: We should take a strong position on this point. We don’t want to get bogged down with the Greeks and Italians, or get involved in a long argument about it.

Mr. Rush: I agree.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the location? Personally, I don’t give a damn where it is held. What do you think?

Mr. Rush: Geneva is preferable to Helsinki, and it’s also much more pleasant.

Mr. Irwin: The Allies prefer Helsinki. They feel strongly about it and we may have difficulty on this point.

Mr. Kissinger: This raises a problem. How do we keep it a more restrictive group if the countries without stationed troops already have their people there? I was indifferent before, but now I realize it will be hard to exclude the people we will want to. How do we launch the talks? There are three possibilities: 1. through our bilateral channels with the Soviets, 2. through coordinated multilateral contacts or, 3. by using a small Allied team. Do you have any preferences?

Mr. Irwin: I prefer the first, but the Allies won’t agree.

Mr. Rush: No, they’ll never agree to that.

Mr. Kissinger: So how do we handle it?

Mr. Springsteen: We have worked out a scenario that consists of multiple bilateral contacts with the prospective participants. We would send notes to all of the Allies on our side and all of the participants on their side, too.

Mr. Kissinger: What date are you thinking of?
Mr. Springsteen: November 20th is the illustrative date we have been using in our planning for the CSCE.

Mr. Rush: Number two has the advantage of avoiding the German problem. If we make bilateral contacts, there will be pressure for us to deal with Pankow.

Gen. Walters: Would the French be included?

Mr. Kissinger: No, they’re not interested.

Mr. Springsteen: We all agree that the countries involved should only be those with troops, but there is no reason why we can’t keep the others informed about what is going on. That would take the edge off the complaints of the Italians and Greeks.

Mr. Irwin: The plan is that we would inform the others through the CSCE.

Mr. Kissinger: It’s important that we get organized fairly quickly within NATO. We have to be sure that we are approaching MBFR on the same level intellectually, or we can get badly disorganized. Are we satisfied with the NATO consultations?

Mr. Springsteen: Well, we agree that what the Allies do is directly related to our inputs. I assume that we will set up a work program and do the initial position papers, then consult with our Allies and try to get a position coordinated first for the explorations and then for the negotiations. We would like to phase out the MBFR working group once negotiations get underway and have the negotiating team handle things from that point on.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. I’d like to handle these negotiations in the same manner as SALT, with the negotiating team the focal point and backstopping handled here.

Adm. Moorer: I would like to point out that we have an established channel of communication through SACEUR. We can use that channel to communicate with the military commanders of the NATO countries, to keep them informed about what’s going on and to gain their support for the negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Springsteen) How do you plan to handle this?

Mr. Springsteen: We can do it in a number of ways. We could use the two tier approach through NATO, we could use a completely separate channel or we could go through SACEUR.

Mr. Kissinger: Can you work that out?

Mr. Springsteen: There is no problem. We have worked through SACEUR before.

Mr. Kissinger: What we want to do now is to develop some reasonable asymmetrical options. The Soviets proposed a token cut at the
Summit and we rejected the bilateral approach they favored. We want to be sure to consider NATO security as the principal criterion of these discussions. As I recall, all of the asymmetrical proposals I have seen are not plausible. One of these would have us reduce 24 F-4’s for 500 Soviet tanks. How you do compare an F-4 to a tank? For one thing, we would run out of F-4’s before they ran out of tanks. That type of asymmetrical reduction is ridiculous. They would laugh at us if we proposed something like that.

Mr. Irwin: We must be realistic.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right, we must be realistic and avoid these ridiculous proposals. What we need now is a systematic analysis, as we did in SALT, of the various options open to us, of their verifiability, of how quickly we can react and how these reductions would affect our mobilization schedules. We should have this analysis done now and have a meeting in early August to review and refine it.

Mr. Irwin: We have to work quickly to get prepared for the meetings this fall. There will be a Foreign Ministers meeting in early October.

Mr. Kissinger: Tom (Moorer), can you get to work quickly and war-game some of these possibilities?

Adm. Moorer: Sure, we can set up some models right away.

Adm. Weinel: The models for most of these ideas can be set up quickly, except for the ones on planes versus tanks. They will be difficult.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s not a realistic option, anyway. We want to set up some common ceiling models, but can we do that without a clear definition of the mobilization base of NATO? Do we know what the NATO mobilization is? Have we ever solved those sticky questions of European stock levels? There must be a way of reducing them to a common denominator. A lot of models have been rejected in the past because they didn’t consider these factors fully.

Adm. Moorer: U.S. figures are based on the assumption that it will take ninety days to replace equipment, not on a ninety day war.

Mr. Kissinger: But if we are figuring stocks for M plus 90 while other data shows that we will be out of the war in M plus 45, we will have to refigure the M plus 90 assumption.

Adm. Moorer: The NATO countries use a high rate of expenditure in their estimates, but in a real combat situation the commander who thinks he is going to run out of supplies will limit his rate of expenditure, so I think the NATO figures are too high. There is also a pretty wide variation. You will have good estimates for the UK and Germany, and not very good ones for Italy, for example.

Mr. Kissinger: If we want to improve our position in Europe and not worsen it by these negotiations we must get some meaningful figures to work from.
Mr. Leonard: Another option that hasn’t been mentioned is the possibility of including tactical nukes in the discussions. For example, we might consider an option of reduction of tanks versus nukes.

Mr. Kissinger: Nukes are not in any of these options, but I would like to know why we need 7,000 tactical nukes in Europe. I have never seen any explanation of why we need so many.

Adm. Moorer: You can’t just consider the total number of weapons without breaking them down as to function. You have to consider how many are for use in AAA, tactical artillery, rockets, tactical air, etc. The problem is that we must have the right kinds of warheads in the places where they will be needed. You can’t just reduce them without looking at the overall placement of the different types.

Mr. Kissinger: What about doing a model that shows some nuke cuts on our side for similar cuts on theirs?

Adm. Moorer: As I say, we would have to study the mix carefully.

Mr. Kissinger: Why don’t we have the working group look at this? We can have plenty of inputs from JCS and SACEUR.

Mr. Rush: I agree that 7,000 is probably too many. The most important factor, though, is the psychological feeling of safety that the tactical nukes give the Europeans. They’re going to get awfully uneasy if we start talking about reducing them.

Mr. Kissinger: Of course, that would have to be considered.

Mr. Nutter: This question was considered last fall.

Adm. Moorer: It will be important that we get SACEUR’s input for any new consideration of this.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, that about covers it. Shall we plan for a meeting of this group no later than the middle of August? (There was no objection)

Adm. Moorer: We have to keep in mind that the Soviets would like to drive a wedge between us and the Europeans. That will probably be their main goal.

Mr. Kissinger: For that very reason, the more concrete and technical we can make these discussions, the better it will be for us.

Mr. Hackett: Sir, the President would like to see you right now.
100. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

European Question on Soviet-American Principles\(^2\)

Several European diplomats have raised questions about the Soviet-American statement of principles. Their main points have been (1) whether we did not undercut the Allied position in a CSCE by not mentioning freer movement of people, information and ideas; (2) whether we have not undermined Allied bargaining leverage in any CSCE on principles on non-use of force, etc., and (3) whether acceptance of “peaceful coexistence” was a wise idea, especially without some effort to refute the Brezhnev doctrine.\(^3\)

Several of these inquiries have been reported: from Brussels, from The Hague,\(^4\) and from London.\(^5\) After some probable soul-searching,

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\(^2\) See Document 98.

\(^3\) Kissinger recalled this issue in his memoirs: “For over three years, at every meeting with every European leader, they had pressed us toward negotiation with the Soviets. They had been lukewarm about linkage, far ahead of us in East-West trade, eager for the European Security Conference, increasingly impatient to start negotiations with respect to mutual and balanced force reductions. . . . Suddenly, now that we had followed their advice, the Europeans revealed their schizophrenia. We heard that some Europeans complained about the ‘Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations’ because of the use of the phrase ‘peaceful coexistence’—an astonishing criticism considering that the similar declaration signed by France and in the German treaties went far beyond our formulations. There was disquiet that some of our principles of restraint preempted the European Security Conference—that is, that we had agreed to what our allies wanted to give away in their own name.” (White House Years, p. 1273)

\(^4\) In telegram 2517 from USNATO, June 9, the Mission reported a statement by Ambassador de Staercke of Belgium on June 6 complaining that the Statement on Basic Principles prejudged the Allied position in a CSCE declaration of principles. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 262, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. 12)

\(^5\) Telegram 6104 from London, June 30, reported: “Tickell of FCO’s NATO Dept has told us that there was adverse comment about the declaration among the 10 during recent political consultations and concern that Soviets would try to apply these principles to a CSCE declaration. In fact, Tickell told us that British Embassy in Moscow reported that the Russians had suggested that the US-Soviet declaration would be useful model for CSCE declaration. Tickell singled out in particular the phrase in the first principle, ‘peaceful coexistence,’ as being particularly worrisome to the British. He went on to say that the British would not consider themselves bound by the US-Soviet declaration when the time came to draft a declaration of the principles governing relations between states at a CSCE.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)
State has replied on each of the points without clearing with the White House. On balance, it is probably just as well that State has accepted some responsibility for the summit agreements, rather than trying to pass them off as White House matters, and distancing the Department from the documents.

Attached (Tab A) is State’s outgoing; it makes several good points, though it is rather defensive in implying that “peaceful coexistence” was accepted only because other points tend to give it a favorable interpretation.

In general State argues that point 3, “non-interference,” and point 11, renunciation of “special rights” limits the Brezhnev doctrine, and would also be a basis for a CSCE statement of principles. As far as freer movement is concerned, State argues that point 4, the commitment to widening the juridical basis of US-Soviet relations, embraces freer movement of peoples.

You may wish to read State’s interpretation at Tab A.

6 Telegram 118634 to USNATO, June 30, is attached but not printed.

101. Memorandum for the Record

San Clemente, California, July 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between French Minister of Defense Michel Debre and Dr. Kissinger, Friday, July 7, 1972, 9:50 a.m. at the Western White House. (Also present were French Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Political Advisor to Minister Debre, Serge Boidevaix, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Debre said he next wanted to share his preoccupation—MBFR. His first question was what, practically, is involved? Secondly, he has sensed for over a year the feeling among Europeans that all U.S. forces
were going. He had seen Defense Ministers all over Europe. Nolens
volens, this will bring reductions everywhere. Dr. Kissinger asked if
this was true of the FRG. Debre said that the FRG was a special prob-
lem. In any case, defense budgets everywhere were under the pressure
of personnel cuts. And there was a drop in this “spirit of defense” which
MBFR merely reinforced. Debre asked Dr. Kissinger how he saw all
this. The French saw it with great misgivings.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-
curity conference or MBFR.]

As regards MBFR, Dr. Kissinger asked whether it would contribute
to a lowering of defense attitudes? He said that to some extent it would,
although this trend was taking place anyway. But it was contributed
to more by the European Security Conference than by MBFR and, with
respect, the French were pushing the former more than we were. We
have always been dubious about it. Dr. Kissinger said we have no il-
lusions about the world today. We fully recognize that one possible So-
viet goal is to use détente for offensive purposes and to achieve the
Finlandization of Europe and, as all of us do, we also have a tough do-
monic situation. We have to maneuver and by participating in the
process move it in a constructive direction. Dr. Kissinger asked Debre
to look at the history of MBFR. The Europeans invented MBFR to stop
unilateral US reductions. When we picked it up the Europeans invented
the European Security Conference to kill MBFR. No one told the truth
to anyone and we were stuck in a miasma.

On the practical side, we had, in this Administration, conducted
many studies. We concluded that we have to go about the subject in a
technically meaningful way, otherwise there would merely be a uni-
lateral reduction, except perhaps in France. We are trying to trade some-
thing that will happen anyway for something that is technically com-
petent and that doesn’t diminish security.

Some people who are opposed to defense are now advocating
“simple cuts”—10%, 20%, 30%. As in SALT, we have been doing very
detailed work and concluded that a straight percentage cut is bad. A
cut of less than 10% is unverifiable and one of more than 10% is dis-
advantageous, although of course the Europeans might drive us into
it. We need the French intellectual contribution. We want to put to-
gether a package that is more complex and that will not weaken de-
fense. Once the subject gets technical, it will become boring to the pub-
lic, although it would still of course have symbolic importance. This,
Dr. Kissinger said, was our strategy and after November it would be-
come even more effective. (After November, Dr. Kissinger said we will
have our cultural revolution.)

Debre said that he was struck by the point that MBFR had been
invented by the Europeans to stop Mansfield. Dr. Kissinger said that
this had been right as an effort to prevent unilateral cuts, but then it took on a life of its own. Debre asked how far we were going to go on MBFR. Dr. Kissinger said that he had told many Europeans that they should be careful about what they proposed because one day we will accept it. The old luxury was gone where Europeans could make proposals and rely on the US to be tough and take the heat. How far would we go on MBFR? If McGovern were elected, of course, all would be changed. But as far as this Administration was concerned, we would go as far as we think security permits. We will not cut unilaterally or use MBFR for condominium. We want negotiations in which we can talk realistically to the Europeans.

Dr. Kissinger then referred to the utter confusion in NATO military policy. Some of it is a nightmare. There were supposed to be stocks for 90 days but in fact this was not so. No ally had the same stocking pattern and there were different expenditure rates. (Debre interjected that the French had three weeks.) The conclusion to be drawn from this was nightmarish and if Mansfield got ahold of it he would prove that we are hostages to the Europeans, or maybe could not even fight ourselves. Mansfield could kill us. We have to get a credible defense that people believe in. We will not reduce unless the threats to us are reduced. The only problem was whether the Europeans are going to be realistic. Dr. Kissinger said that he was speaking frankly and assumed Debre was reporting only to President Pompidou. Debre confirmed this, adding that the Ambassador was a close friend of Pompidou’s. Dr. Kissinger said he knew this and hoped soon to have a talk with the Ambassador. Debre said the French were interested in bilateral exchanges with us on this subject. Dr. Kissinger said we were prepared to discuss it with the French bilaterally and wanted to get their opinions, but until November it was best not to get it into the bureaucracy. Debre said he understood.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The Ambassador said he wanted to comment about the European Conference and détente. It was true the French pushed it but not as a way to cut defenses. On the contrary, the French want strength. Dr. Kissinger said he worried about it because the Conference involved such vagueness and so many pressures. How could one measure success? But MBFR was so technical that nothing would happen for two years and people would forget about it. Debre said that the European Conference should really be thought of as appealing to the nations of the East. Dr. Kissinger said that that aspect was all right. But the danger that the French saw in MBFR, we saw in the Conference. Debre repeated that the Conference should not be seen as a pretext for diminishing defense. Dr. Kissinger referred to our experience with SALT. For
years we had published figures regarding the adverse trend in strategic weapons. The New York Times said we were using them to scare people. Now that the figures were enshrined in the SALT agreement and an international fact of life, people finally took them seriously. Senator Stennis was an example. We need the same thing with MBFR if the Europeans cooperate. Think for example of the impact of the fact that the Soviets have 13,000 tanks in Europe. The Ambassador said that in strategic weapons there was a balance but in Europe the Soviets already have an overwhelming superiority. How could this be handled? Dr. Kissinger said we have to make serious proposals that deal with this and have a serious defense posture, if the Europeans cooperate.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

HS

102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Washington, July 28, 1972, 1515Z.


In anticipation of East-West MBFR discussions, US envisages active efforts over next months to develop, in common with Allies, approach to be taken in course of East-West talks. Accordingly, USNATO should circulate following text to Allies, looking toward consultation in NATO on aspects of MBFR, leading up to Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting, preferably during week of October 9:

Begin text:

In the Ministerial communiqué of May 31, 1972, the Allies envisaged multilateral MBFR negotiations preceded by suitable explorations, and proposed that multilateral explorations be undertaken as soon as practicable either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks

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on CSCE. In order to prepare for explorations and negotiations the US believes that the Allies should initiate early consideration of the basic approach to MBFR that should be pursued in such multilateral talks. Accordingly, there follows an outline of current US thinking.

The US believes that above all MBFR should be consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all parties. We continue to subscribe to the Allied view recorded in CM(71)49 that MBFR could be envisaged as an integral program in which reductions should be phased in their scope and timing, where appropriate, and adequately verified. Any reductions should also be preceded and/or accompanied by appropriate constraints.

It is not certain that the Soviet Union and its allies are prepared to negotiate agreements that adequately meet Allied requirements. Accordingly, we believe that MBFR should be pursued cautiously and patiently.

The substantive task at this stage is to reach a consensus on the overall objectives for MBFR and the substantive basis for an Allied position which can advance these objectives.

MBFR objectives. The Allies initially could agree on the following objectives to guide their approach to the MBFR process:

—contribute to a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces while maintaining military security undiminished;
—limit military capabilities which we perceive as threatening or destabilizing;
—reduce the risk of misunderstanding through miscalculation, ambiguous military activity, and surprise attack; and
—thereby reduce East-West tension, and enhance political stability.

In order to achieve these objectives, MBFR should deal with the basic asymmetries that characterize the military balance in Europe. These are:

—disparities in the number of military personnel and certain types of equipment in the prospective reduction area;
—disparities in the potential for reinforcement;
—the offensive orientation of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe, at least as we perceive them; and
—the Western disadvantage in verification and warning because of the greater openness of Western society.

\(^2\) Not found.
We believe that it is essential to raise these issues with the Soviets in order to make clear our determination that an MBFR agreement take them into account to achieve undiminished security. The Soviet response can give us an important indication whether there is a possibility of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement or not.

Illustrative reduction options. The US is currently broadening its studies of illustrative reductions to include, in addition to equal percentage reductions, options which focus on these particular asymmetries and not simply on reductions per se. In particular, we are examining a variety of common ceiling options based on:

—reductions in the 10–20 range on the NATO side;
—reductions in both stationed and indigenous forces;
—reductions which involved a thin-out of stationed forces on the NATO side, but the removal of units and equipment on the Warsaw Pact side.

A common ceiling option focuses on the positive objective of creating a more secure military balance at a lower level. It corrects the numerical disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces in the reduction area. It is simple in concept. It reflects an application of the principle agreed to by the Soviets in the Moscow communiqué of May 29 following President Nixon’s visit—“the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality.” It avoids the problem of attempting to equate in some way the disparate force structures facing each other in the central region.

The thin-out in stationed forces on the NATO side and the removal of units on the Warsaw Pact side focuses on the problem of reinforcement asymmetry between the US/UK/Canada and USSR. It also takes into account the disparity in the verification capabilities of the two sides.

We are also considering special limitations on Warsaw Pact tanks because that aspect of the Warsaw Pact force structure is most threatening and destabilizing to NATO.

The US is now in the process of drawing up and analyzing options based on these elements looking toward a presentation of the results of our studies as soon as practicable.

Collateral constraints and verification. As we go forward in this effort we are giving the fullest attention to the views of the Allies on MBFR elements and phasing. We continue to regard collateral constraints and verification provisions as essential elements to a comprehensive MBFR process.

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3 See Document 98.
We should seek agreement on appropriate collateral constraints which would enhance stability and reduce the danger of either side miscalculating the intentions of the other and also reduce the risk of surprise attack. Such constraints could provide a yardstick for more confident, more timely interpretation by each side of military activities by the other. These constraints would be valuable in themselves and would also increase confidence that a reduction agreement was being observed.

With regard to verification, there should be agreement on non-interference with national technical means, as embodied in the SALT agreements. At the same time, the question of on-site inspection should be left open, making it clear that verification measures required would depend on the reduction measures agreed upon.

We are hopeful that this approach will provide the basis for an Allied position on MBFR that will meet the following considerations:

—fully protect Allied interests, including military security;
—demonstrate both to Allied domestic opinion and the Soviets that we are serious in seeking an agreement that provides undiminished security for all parties; and
—establish a strong bargaining position to protect a wide variety of possible negotiating postures.

As soon as the US thinking is further refined we would envision a phase of intense Alliance consultations. In the meantime we would welcome the views of the Allies on this preliminary outline of the direction of US thinking on MBFR.

On the specific question of the approach to be taken in the opening exploratory phase of MBFR talks, we intend to provide our views separately. End text.

Rogers

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4 In telegram 136858 to USNATO, July 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, Verification P/SRG Group Meeting MBFR/CSCE 9/20/72)
Washington, July 28, 1972, 10:20 a.m.–4:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
Lord Cromer, British Ambassador
Brian Norbury, Private Secretary to Trend
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Trend: Then on the European Security Conference, I told the President that our only anxiety is that your wise and very proper concern for getting into preparations for it first could slip imperceptibly into being the conference itself.² This is what worries the people in Whitehall. He said he would welcome very private Prime Minister to President talks between you and us on this thing.

Trend: Without the French and Germans.
Kissinger: And our bureaucracy.
Frankly, our only reason for a preparatory conference is to delay the substantive one. We frankly don’t want a European Security Conference but we couldn’t fight it in the face of our European allies. So we paid what had already been given.
Trend: It is very fair to point out that we had pressed for it.
Kissinger: You have.
Trend: He made two other points. One, he wants to see the Prime Minister. And second, he said, we are not going back on our European policy. We are not going back on NATO. He is not in favor of unilateral détente.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 62, Memcons, Chronological Files, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The first part of the conversation (10:20 a.m.–2:30 p.m.) took place in the British Embassy Residence, and the second part (2:30–4:50 p.m.) took place at Kissinger’s office at the White House.

² Trend called on the President from 2 to 2:20 p.m., along with Kissinger and Cromer, in the Oval Office. Trend told the President that he had come to Washington to hear U.S. views on SALT, the European Security Conference, and MBFR. Trend said: “The only British anxiety on the Security Conference was that our wise and very proper concern for having preparatory discussions for it could slip imperceptibly into being the conference itself.” (Memorandum for the President’s File by Kissinger, July 28; ibid.) The full text of the memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972.
Cromer: He touched on MBFR.

Kissinger: What he said on the European Conference applies to that too.3

Cromer: Also the monetary area.

Kissinger: If you’re talking interest rates, then talk to Shultz. If you’re talking system, then I have to know about it. There’s no problem; there’s no problem between Shultz and me.

Trend: What does what he said about NATO imply for the future?

Kissinger: We won’t withdraw troops for the sake of withdrawing troops. I can’t say the number is sacred—but we have no plans in fact to do it.

If we get reelected the authority of this government will be much greater than it is today. So many of the pressures will be lessened. But nevertheless we have to have a rational defense policy we can justify. Frankly I have to tell you if we don’t do this there will be unilateral pressures to withdraw. NATO’s policy is an amorphous mess. We will work with you for several years to develop something that makes sense. We have no deadline. We have every incentive to do this cooperatively.

What I have gone through just in looking at MBFR. Our work was resented as interference in NATO prerogatives. On 90 days’ supplies, it turns out we don’t have 90 days across the board. The Germans have 37 days’ supply. The Belgians have a different number. Then they say they have different accounting methods. This is what I come up against whenever I try to get an intellectual grip on it.

Our strategy tells us that in the current strategic balance it is insanity to rely on nuclear weapons alone. We are only now looking at our targeting, after three years of pressure from this building.

Trend: What do we mean by Europe? What will it mean for the UK to have an impact? We have to know what Europe will be like. Certainly Europeans will not always do things the way you like.

Kissinger: On defense, it is easy. On the commercial side it is different.

Cromer: On the procurement side, it is somewhat competitive. Your salesmen are somewhat aggressive.

Kissinger: I wouldn’t be surprised!

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3 Kissinger’s memorandum for the President’s file reads in part: “After opening greetings and pleasantries, the President pledged to Sir Burke and Ambassador Cromer that the United States would not go off bilaterally with the Soviets on any issues which concerned our allies, for example a European Security Conference. That could be a dangerous gimmick, the President said. We and the British had to cooperate not only on substance but also on the propaganda.”
Trend: If we can get it across to the Europeans that you have no intent to withdraw unless forced to by their inability to agree . . .
Kissinger: That’s exactly our policy.
Trend: The problem is how to get it into people’s minds.
Kissinger: We have to try to work together, you and we, on MBFR. And also on the European Security Conference. I’m even more worried about MBFR.
Trend: Will the two be caught up together?
Kissinger: The Russians won’t want it. I’m afraid with respect to the European Security Conference that with so many participants who don’t know anything, it will be hard to take reasonable positions.
Trend: MBFR will have a smaller number of participants?
Kissinger: Hopefully with participants who know about the issues.
Trend: When will you be ready for MBFR?
Kissinger: On the general principles, where we should begin, we will be ready by next spring. For preparatory discussions.
The Russians before the Summit asked us for a bilateral understanding on an equal percentage cut. We rejected it.
Trend: You still believe a cut smaller than ten percent is unverifiable and useless, and that cuts greater than that are increasingly dangerous?
Kissinger: Yes. What we’re now looking at is a percentage cut on our side and a ceiling on their side.
Trend: You would have absolute numerical equality on both sides.
Kissinger: Yes.
Cromer: It is a fairly pious hope, isn’t it?
Kissinger: The main thing is to have a proposition we can believe in. I don’t care if the Soviets accept it or not. If they don’t, we will at least have a position we can analyze, so we know what to move off of.
Trend: You’re talking of a percentage cut in your forces?
Kissinger: In NATO forces. Then we can talk about indigenous versus stationed forces. This we can talk of among ourselves.
If we took a 20 percent NATO cut, we would want a 29 percent cut in Warsaw Pact Forces to achieve symmetry.
In theory all forces would be cut.
Trend: But the balance would be affected by forces outside the covered area.
Kissinger: That’s right.
Trend: You say you are ready to talk procedures by next spring. How do you want to go about discussing this with us?
Kissinger: We should have an intellectual meeting, not a policy meeting, soon.
Trend: You want to talk to us before it goes to the NATO Council?
Kissinger: We would be very happy to.
Trend: Let’s set it up.
Kissinger: We would be very happy to.
Cromer: We probably should elevate it to a higher level than the talks going on already.
Kissinger: In principle we agree to it, and we want your help. [Omitted here is discussion of matters others than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Where do we stand on the MBFR studies, Phil?4
Odeen: We are just going over the main papers today. The papers are a mess. The JCS did a lousy job.
Kissinger: Then we should talk at the end of August, and discuss SALT and MBFR together.
Trend: Good.
Kissinger: We will want to go to NATO with MBFR after we talk to you. We may send the study papers earlier, which just lay out options. What we and you should do is agree on what we prefer.
We will not fall for any strategy that isolates us from the Europeans.5
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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4 Philip Odeen of the NSC staff.
5 The following day, July 29, Kissinger had a telephone conversation at 12:35 p.m. with Trend, who was still in Washington. According to a transcript, Kissinger told Trend: “On MBFR and SALT and European Security Conferences, the President—I talked to him this morning—I just read to him what you had taken as your understanding of what he had said and he confirmed that you had understood him correctly.” Kissinger continued: “on MBFR, we will be in some sort of shape by the end of next week and say the week after, [if] you wanted to send somebody, you would probably get one round ahead of NATO.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 15, Chronological File)
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104. Minutes of a Joint Verification Panel and Senior Review Group Meeting

Washington, August 3, 1972, 3:14–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

MBFR

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson
George Springsteen
Ralph McGuire
John P. Shaw
Seymour Weiss

Defense

Armistead Selden
Lawrence Eagleburger
Clay McManaway

JCS

Vice Adm. John Weinel
Maj. Gen. R. H. Dettre

CIA

Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters
Bruce Clarke

Treasury

John McGinnis
Edward Cohen

ACDA

Gerard Smith
David Linebaugh

OST

Dr. Edward David

NSC

Philip Odeen
William Hyland
David Aaron
Lt. Michael Power
James Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:
—State will seek European approval for us to approach the Russians to see if they are ready to accept an invitation for a specific date for MBFR discussions to begin.
—The CIA will prepare a paper for submission to the Working Group within the next week on the problem of verification of force reductions.
—CIA will prepare a book for the negotiators providing information on what can and what cannot be monitored.
—The Working Group should coordinate the development of a common data base for MBFR.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–73. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
—The JCS will re-do an analysis of an asymmetrical cut to a common ceiling. This analysis and all others will be based on common figures and will assume that Pact forces are larger than ours.

—The CIA will do a study of the ability of the Pact forces to reinforce.

—CIA/DIA will make an effort to reduce the margin of error in their estimates of the size and readiness of Pact forces.

—The question of whether to propose reducing units or people is a key issue and should be resolved as soon as possible.

—JCS will provide a briefing before the end of August on the situation concerning stocks in NATO and the ability of the allies to re-supply themselves.

—The Verification Panel will meet before the end of August to review the various studies\(^2\) to decide how to approach the NATO allies in September.

[Omitted here is the Verification Panel/Senior Review Group’s discussion of MBFR.]

\(^2\) On July 30, Odeen forwarded Kissinger two analytical papers on balanced force reductions in preparation for the meeting, one from the JCS, the other from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Odeen wrote in an attached memorandum: “For a variety of reasons, not all of which are the fault of the JCS, the JCS analysis is virtually worthless. As you know, we have been sharply critical of the JCS analysis in the past.” Odeen continued, “Until now it has not been particularly important since we have not been serious about MBFR. Moreover, the JCS analysis tended to strengthen our hand against other elements of the bureaucracy who were pushing for a quick and easy politically-oriented reduction.” Odeen commented that “the JCS, in spite of your exhortation to Tom Moorer, simply could not do a complete new set of analyses in the time allotted.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-064, Verification P/SRG Group Meeting MBFR 8/5/72)

105. Editorial Note

On August 16, 1972, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev wrote in a letter to President Nixon with regard to a European security conference and mutual and balanced force reductions: “In the European affairs the questions of preparing and convening the All-European Conference are now moving to the forefront and demand practical solution. We believe the time has come to fix a concrete date for beginning the multilateral preparatory consultations. This would give more purposefulness to the preparatory work. With due account also of the
considerations of the American side, it appears to be possible to take up such consultations in any case not later than November 1972 with a view that a meeting itself, as we have agreed with you, should be convened without undue delay. Now, a few words on the question of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. We together with our allies have always attached importance to this problem, have undertaken appropriate initiatives and at the present time continue to contemplate the most appropriate ways of its solution. However, the questions of reduction of armaments in Europe should in no way—and as we believe, this is the essence of the understanding reached between us in Moscow on this question—be used for delaying and complicating the multilateral consultations on preparing and carrying out the All-European Conference.” (Memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, August 17; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)


106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 21, 1972, 1253Z.

8334. Subj: Approach to Soviets on MBFR/CSCE parallelism. Ref: State 149897.2

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2 Telegram 149897 to Moscow, August 17, instructed Beam to seek an appointment with Gromyko to ask whether the Soviets were ready to accept an invitation for balanced force reduction talks. The cable reads in part: “We have therefore proposed to the Allies, and they have agreed, that we should undertake a bilateral approach to the Soviets which would clarify the Soviet attitude toward that understanding that we consider was reached in Moscow, and determine Soviet receptivity to invitations to begin exploratory talks [on force reductions] on or about November 22 at a site to be agreed.” (Ibid.)
1. **Summary.** Preliminary Soviet reaction to approach on MBFR/CSCE parallelism rejects any linkage of preparatory discussions and disputes our interpretation of parallelism. End summary.

2. I called on Acting FonMin Kuznetsov (Gromyko is on leave) on August 21 and made presentation on MBFR/CSCE parallelism as instructed para 5(a) and (b) reftel, giving him informal paper containing this portion of my talking points. I referred to “force reductions in Europe” rather than MBFR.

3. Although Kuznetsov promised to study the matter, his preliminary comments were entirely negative. He stated flatly that in his government’s view there must be no attempts to bind CSCE and force reductions as regards either preparatory discussions or negotiation of substance. He disputed our interpretation of summit understanding that parallel means about the same time, and asserted that our approach can only be interpreted as making preparatory talks on CSCE conditional on beginning exploratory talks on force reductions, a linkage which Soviet side decisively rejects.

4. In course of forty minute conversation, Kuznetsov (and Chief USA Section Korniyenko who was also present), in response my attempts to draw him out, repeated his position in variety of ways which are worth summarizing in order to provide flavor and nuances. He began by stating that in discussions before, at and after summit it was understood that exploratory talks on CSCE and force reductions should not be connected. There was no mention in communiqué that talks should start simultaneously or at same time. We agree that force reductions can contribute to ensuring security in Europe, but discussions on subject should not be advanced as condition for European conference or for preparations for conference. If we tie up several problems in one knot, it will be more difficult to solve any one of them.

5. I recalled pertinent portions of May 24 and 25 discussions of subject in Moscow. Kuznetsov responded that communiqué recorded Soviet willingness to start talks on force reductions, but did not change firmly held Soviet position against making CSCE preparatory talks conditional on beginning exploratory talks on force reductions. We (Soviets) are against tying them in one knot. Perhaps it would be possible that exploratory talks on force reductions could take place in parallel with preparatory talks for CSCE, but they cannot be made a condition for preparatory talks. Your words seem to hide some other reasons; we know that some NATO countries have opinion that two

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3 See Document 105.
4 See Document 98.
5 See Documents 95 and 96.
matters should be directly linked, but as Gromyko explained during his visit to Benelux countries, we are against making parallel discussion of force reductions a condition for starting preparatory session on CSCE.

6. I acknowledged that we agree they are separate issues as far as substance is concerned, and once talks are started progress in one will not be linked to progress in the other. Our main concern is to get started as soon as possible. I read portions of the communiqué on CSCE and force reductions, noting their juxtaposition and the expressed desire of both sides to agree as soon as practicable on procedures for negotiating. He interjected that communiqué does not say they should go forward at same time or that they are linked. I said communiqué does not exclude proceeding on the two questions at same time, nor did Gromyko exclude it. He said this does not reflect interpretation of Soviet Government, which has repeatedly stressed that CSCE should not be bound to anything else, including force reductions; our leaders at summit indicated that they were worried that NATO might wish to bind the two questions. When you propose opening discussions on force reductions precisely the same day as CSCE preparatory talks, and link CSCE and force reductions in same paragraph of your presentation, it is quite clear that you are linking the two questions.

7. I noted that my presentation did not say the same day, but offered as an example “on or about” November 22. He replied that this amounts to the same thing, and said our approach should have merely proposed to start talking about force reductions and should not have mentioned CSCE in same breath. I asked whether, since they did not seem to like November 22, they might specify another date but an early one as envisaged in US-Soviet communiqué. He would not respond.

8. Once again I reiterated that we have not attempted to bind the two questions either as regards preparation or substance. There is no dispute our countries would profit by success in both. Was it not logical to agree on date to get started on both at about same time? After further repetition of positions on both sides, I pointed out that we have asked Soviets opinion on whether they would like, together with certain other Warsaw Pact countries, to receive a diplomatic note on the subject; we hope to hear from them, and still think it opportune time to get talks started. Kuznetsov closed by once more stating Soviet position: We are against making one conditional on the other.

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6 Gromyko visited Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg from July 5 to 8.
107. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, August 22, 1972, 1:13 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

HK: Anatol, two things about our discussions this morning. First on the MBFR Conference, we might be prepared to have just an exploratory meeting by ambassadors somewhere say in Geneva—with some experts from the Capitol so as to keep this imagery between it and the European Security Conference, but if you totally refuse anything, it will create major problems with our allies, whom we have told as a result of the summit there was a certain parallelism.

AD: What about the conference—this was a multilateral [omission in original transcript] conference.

HK: Well, frankly, you know we are not going on the conference—we are in no insane hurry about that.

AD: I understand. May I put it this way, if it is as it is now in November all right, but then you would like to have let’s say January or February involved the multilateral.

HK: Don’t you pull any of these Brezhnev tricks on me. I didn’t say February.

AD: It was my words.

HK: I said January—it was a major concession.

AD: It doesn’t matter—January or February really. In this case—but the question is the second conference you would like to have let’s say within the next two months.

HK: Something like that.

AD: Yeah, nothing specifically. This is exactly what you meant—so what is new?

HK: Well, what is new is that we are willing to do it in a parallel way with the exploratory talks. I mean, as by the same procedures.

AD: Yeah, but this was my understanding in the one you said it will be practically the same. The one I think I mentioned to you that

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 27, Anatoli Dobrynin File. No classification marking.

time that there was no agreement about a conference of troop reductions in Moscow that we discussed—or rather that the President discussed with the leadership. There was no—it was understanding parallel, yes; it was a certain kind of body, yes; but there was nothing said about a conference. So that was new when we discussed today.

HK: To us the difference between a body and a conference is not self-evident.

AD: No, but it is because it was a body used in a sense of certain kind of preliminary consultative but not really conference. When we discussed this body, it was just one impression and then to decide about a conference which was our understanding.

HK: Yeah, but that’s right. That’s what we want a preliminary group to do.

AD: Yes, but now you put restriction that within two months it should be conference on the troop reductions.

HK: No, no; within two months there should be a preliminary meeting to discuss about a conference on troop reductions.

AD: Just a minute—what will you want to discuss in January?

HK: No, I’m not saying that the conference will take place two months after the preliminary discussions.

AD: No. Well, you said, the preliminary discussions will be according to your plans to go there January, yes?

HK: Yes.

AD: What sort of development will be?

HK: Well, they will discuss when there should be a conference and how it should be organized.

AD: Yes, but do you already prejudge now when this conference will be.

HK: No, we will not push it.

AD: This will be happening about 2 months after?

HK: Oh, no, no; not two months after that.

AD: Yes.

HK: I would have thought maybe by the fall.

AD: By the fall, I understand.

HK: My idea is that these MBFR discussions will take 2 or 3 years.

AD: Yeah, I understand. But the conference—but if you presume on your idea the conference will be in the middle of the year so this will be in the fall.

HK: That’s right.

AD: I’m roughly speaking I mean.

HK: That’s right.
AD: So it will be between 3 or 4 months.
HK: Something like that.
AD: Or something like that. I don’t want to pin down you precisely but just understand what your way of thinking is.
HK: Exactly.
AD: So it will be really exactly exercised as a [omission in original transcript] on your [omission in original transcript] but within 2 or 3 months, yes?
HK: Yes.
AD: I mean this difference of timing.
HK: Right.
AD: Otherwise it will be the same. I mean from the way of handling—
HK: That is essentially right.
AD: Essentially probably but different than some of the [omission in original transcript] and then this conference will give [omission in original transcript] will organize committee and they will discuss for several years.
HK: That would be my expectation.
AD: Yeah. No, what I mean—
HK: Of course if you unilaterally withdraw your troops, there doesn’t have to be a conference.
AD: But you see I am afraid it won’t be happening.
HK: No, we will accept it. Try us.
AD: But really I am afraid you will not. (laughter) You said it as a trick behind us.
HK: The Chinese will protest.
AD: This is so, they will and you will make a statement—if not you, but maybe some other person will tell it—it’s a dirty trick. (laughter)
HK: Well, try us. We may fool you.
AD: I don’t want to interfere in your domestic affairs.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than a European security conference or MBFR.]
On September 5, 1972, at 10:35 a.m., President Nixon telephoned President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig and in the course of their conversation, the President raised the issue of a European security conference:

“P[resident]: [O]ne thing on the Rogers thing—Will you speak to Haldeman before he sees him in the morning.

“H[aig]: Yes, sir.

“P: The European Security Council [sic] as you know I’m not a damned bit interested in. A meeting to discuss here as Haldeman pointed out that’s his [Rogers’s] bag; understand that and at the proper time we will talk a little about it. Purpose of this meeting is something else.

“H: I think so. Think we ought to say that he is going to have a lead role in that.

“P: That’s right.

“H: Not going to get into that.

“P: The purpose of this meeting is not that. We will look it over.”

(Memorandum of telephone conversation, September 5; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 998, Haig Chron Files, Haig Telcons, 1972, 1 of 2)

The same day, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for dinner at the Soviet Embassy at 8 p.m. to discuss Kissinger’s forthcoming visit to Moscow. Kissinger’s memorandum of the conversation reads in part: “MBFR/CSCE. We then turned to MBFR and CSCE. Dobrynin said he was somewhat baffled. On the same day that I had told him that the MBFR discussions would not have to start on the same date as the European Security Conference, Beam had come in and had made exactly the opposite point. I said that by now Dobrynin should know who represented American policy. Dobrynin said he did, but Gromyko was not yet used to Ambassadors who didn’t exactly know their government’s views. At any rate, if we were prepared to agree to a European Security Conference on November 22, they would be prepared for MBFR exploratory discussions by the end of January. And if then the European Security Conference would take place during the summer of 1973, the MBFR Conference could take place in the fall of 1973. I told him that this looked like a realistic procedure.” (Ibid., Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 13)
109. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, September 6, 1972, 2:42 p.m.

K: Hello.
R: Henry.
K: Yes, Bill.
R: I noticed we got a telegram from Kennedy in NATO\textsuperscript{2} saying that our allies are somewhat concerned about the Ziegler briefing\textsuperscript{3} saying that you are going to talk about European Security Conference . . .
K: He didn’t say that. I looked at the text; we’re not going to talk about the European Security Conference. There’s no way it could be discussed.
R: What did he mean by European security? Just general?
K: Well he said all the topics that were covered at the summit but in a general way be covered.
R: But he also mentioned European security.
K: I thought all he said was European problems.
R: No, he said European security.
K: Well at any rate it will not be discussed.
R: What about Mutual Balanced Force Reductions?
K: Unless they raise it we’re in no position to discuss it. We’ve just had an exchange there.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 15, Chronological File. No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{2} In telegram 3570 from USNATO, September 6, Ambassador Kennedy reported: “I am seriously concerned about the impact of the Kissinger visit [to Moscow] on our European allies. We need to deal with them seriously and quickly if we are to avoid suspicions and the likelihood of unpleasant repercussions in the pre-electoral period. News reports in Europe are already widely citing White House sources to the effect that he will talk with the Russians about matters of immediate concern to the Allies, including CSCE, MBFR, and SALT.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, Trip Files, HAK’s Germany, Moscow, London and Paris Trip, Sept. 9–15, 1972, Misc. Cables and Documents)

\textsuperscript{3} The \textit{New York Times} reported on September 6: “Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said at a briefing that Mr. Kissinger would confer with West German leaders on his way to Moscow. . . . Mr. Ziegler said that one of the primary topics on Mr. Kissinger’s agenda in Moscow would be the war in Vietnam. . . . It was also assumed here that Mr. Kissinger would discuss a variety of East-West matters in both West Germany and in Moscow, including tentative plans for a conference on European security and the question of mutual and balanced force reductions.” (\textit{New York Times}, September 6, 1972, p. 3)
R: Well what I would like to just say is that it’s not going to be discussed and if you could just—if the subject comes up—say we’re not ready to discuss it yet, that would make it easier because then we could just tell our NATO allies that these subjects were not going to be discussed. On SALT we could say that we’re going to continue to have the briefings that we’ve had in the past so that if you talked about SALT we could just say anything that’s discussed about SALT you’ll be briefed on by Gerry Smith just the way you have been in the past.

K: Well, if they mentioned—if they had another thought for example about this approach and raised that issue with us that we’ve already approached them on, there will be no discussion on the substance on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. That you can certainly tell them. We don’t have a position.

R: And on the Conference on European Security we just say we’re not prepared to discuss it yet, are we?

K: That’s right.

R: Even if they raised it?

K: You mean the substance?

R: Yeh.

K: I don’t—we don’t have a substantive position.

R: No, but what they’re worried about in NATO is that you’ll—it’s not so much who raises it as whether you’ll talk about it or not. If we’re in a position to tell them that this is a subject that you’re not going to talk about then we wouldn’t . . .

K: Hold on a second the President is calling.

(Kissinger takes the President’s call.)

R: OK. I think it is important to do that because they were upset the last time on it. They claimed that you’d said that we negotiated a communiqué for three or four months and so they felt that we had sort of misled them. When I told them we hadn’t agreed on anything yet . . .

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4 See Document 100.

5 On May 5, Rogers briefed the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on the upcoming summit meeting in Moscow. In telegram Secto 31 from Brussels, May 5, the Mission summarized the ensuing discussion by the NAC members: “They emphasized importance of maintaining alliance solidarity and reaching as much substantive agreement as possible before summit. At close of meeting, the Secretary said that he very much appreciated receiving points of view of the Allies, and that they will be taken fully into account in making final plans for the President’s visit.” (National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–72, Entry 3051B, Box 102, CF 488) The text of Rogers’s statement to the NAC on Nixon’s Moscow visit is in telegram 2010 from USNATO, May 5; ibid.
K: My briefings were on the public record and I never said three or four months.

R: Well whatever it was. All I’m saying is that they were concerned. They had a couple of meetings and talked about it and so forth and I sent them a telegram saying there was nothing for them to worry about. I just want to reassure them that’s all.

K: Well, let me see the cable and I’ll . . .

[Omitted here is discussion of the Olympics and Kissinger’s schedule.]

110. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
(CSCE) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

This memorandum includes a review of CSCE, a talking paper for your use in Moscow (Tab A), and a longer analytical summary (Tab B).²

I. Where We Stand

The Conference will begin its preparations about November 22 in Helsinki. More than thirty nations will appear. The time, place and agenda for the actual conference will be agreed. In the Soviet scenario the Foreign Ministers will then convene the actual conference, make speeches, commission working groups, and go home. The working groups will work out some sort of agreed statement on each topic, the heads of State will then convene, make more speeches, and ratify the results. They will go home, and perhaps some hapless committee will remain in permanent session until another conference is held.

The results are almost foreordained:

—There will be a declaration of principles of European security and cooperation; it will be an amalgam of platitudes, but will confirm

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR. Secret; Sensitive.

² Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
that no European state is going to challenge the status quo. It will imply, but certainly no more than imply, that the Brezhnev doctrine is illegitimate. It will renounce force, confirm territorial integrity, promise arms control, and greater contacts among people.

—Some minimal restraints may be adopted on military movement, e.g. advance notification of maneuvers.
—The West will press for freer movement of people and information. The East will parry with a general promise not to interfere with movement of people and information. This will be hailed as an important beginning. Nothing much will change.
—Highly technical debates will occur in the economic subcommittees. All will pledge a greater effort to facilitate trade. Some practical improvements for Western businessmen may result.
—A grab bag of other issues—cultural exchange, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, will be discussed and declarations issued. Nothing much will change.

This is by way of saying that the fact of the gathering probably far exceeds its substance.

From the Soviet viewpoint, a long cherished objective will finally be realized when the conference convenes.

—There will be an immediate upgrading of East Germany.
—Boundaries in Europe will be confirmed, force renounced, and the spirit of détente advanced.

From the Western point of view some debating points may be scored; the Eastern bloc will be exposed as a closed society; the Brezhnev doctrine will be indirectly challenged, and, hopefully, a feckless exercise will be finished without serious splits in the Western camp or significant damage to real security.

II. The Issues

Some years ago a European Security Conference might have been a serious East-West debate or confrontation. Now, the key aspects of European security are being or have been handled independently through bilateral arrangements (Germany) or specialized forums (SALT, MBFR). The conference has been reduced to a symbolic act, more important for its psychological atmospherics than its content.

As a reflection of this change in the conference character, the West has no grand strategic options—our approach is almost purely damage limiting, with some marginal positive goals in the realm of “freer movement.” Moreover, we, the United States, do not have great tactical flexibility. The conference is of more immediate importance to our Allies than to us. In a coalition of 14, we can only lead so far, without dictating on issues that are of secondary importance to us.
The main issue for the United States, therefore, is one of Alliance management rather than East-West bargaining or debating:

—We must come out of this exercise with a minimum of illusions and a maximum of Allied unity.

—This means being willing to defer to a European consensus in NATO.

—It also means carefully resisting the natural temptation to cook the results of the conference with the Soviet Union, privately behind the backs of our friends. On some matters this might be justified but certainly not the miserable European Conference.

This perspective is justified if we consider what the Soviets see in the conference.

—It may be that the Soviets have lost some of their original enthusiasm for this project—since much of its substance is already subsumed in their bilateral dealing with us and with the Germans. But it is still important to their general European strategy.

—They still want an atmosphere of political relaxation in the West that will erode any collective sense of concern over the predominant Soviet power position. They want to spin a web of overlapping interests in maintaining this relaxation for their own national aims: to prevent a growth of a strong, unified Western camp that can challenge the USSR in Eastern Europe, and to gain the time and political freedom to deal with the threat of communist China.

—The European Conference, played out on a grand stage of foreign ministers conferences and meetings of heads of State will evoke images of the great 19th Century Congress of the concert of Europe, détente, and so forth. This imagery is irresistible to the Russian leaders, and if only for this reason they will pursue the conference with tenacity.

There are four main areas of substance in the conference:

—Principles Governing European States
—Military Confidence Building
—Freer Movement
—Economic Cooperation
—Post-conference Machinery

A. Principles

As the longer paper (Tab B) indicates there is considerable common ground in so far as the language of a declaration of principles is concerned.

The real issue is one of conflicting political objectives. At the risk of overworking an old cliché, the Soviet objective is to confirm the results of WW II—the inviolability of frontiers, the renunciation of force,
territorial integrity—in a document that has a binding legal status. Over the years, and especially in the last three years, the West has conceded most of the Soviet formula, mainly because West Germany, the potential revisionist power has adopted a strategy that builds on rather than challenges the status quo.

All that remains to be settled, and it is by no means an insignificant aspect, is the validity of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, which the Soviets consider part of the status quo. In other words, the West is asked to concede spheres of influence by the device of agreeing to principles that do not in specific terms challenge the limited sovereignty doctrine.

It is the Western notion, however, that the declaration can lay some inhibitions on the practice of the doctrine. The tactical issue is how far the West can press this without jeopardizing the conference itself, which almost certainly the Western Europeans do not want to do.

—for the US, the issue is whether, in light of our relations with the USSR, we want to appear as the leading advocate and champion of the anti-Brezhnev doctrine thrust, or begin now to retreat from any untenable positions.

B. Confidence Building—Stabilizing Measures

Everyone agrees that a Conference on Security ought to deal with military problems. But in practice none of the major powers want to subject their military dispositions to the whims of 30 nations. Therefore, there is a sort of tacit understanding that military issues will be given an optical polish, but will not be negotiated.

The result is a Western scheme that calls for all countries to adopt certain very limited obligations (a) to announce in advance their maneuvers, and (b) to permit some observers at the maneuvers. The theory is that if all states renounce force they should take these measures as an earnest of good intentions.

The issue is whether the Soviet agree. Our intelligence suggest they may be willing to adopt something along the lines of confidence building measures. Certainly the East Europeans have an interest.

The tactical issue for the US is not to allow this slight opening to be enlarged into a full scale negotiation on MBFR principles, which some Allies still want and which may appeal to neutrals as well.

C. Freer Movement

This may be the crunch. The underlying Western philosophy which we have subscribed to and promoted is that “liberalization” of the Eastern bloc is the only road to the reconciliation of Europe and that liberalization flourishes when exposed to the nourishing influence of Western societies. There is something to this theory. But we are not
likely to trick the USSR into opening its doors to a free flow of people, in or out, or to an inundation of Western literature and broadcasts.

In fact, the Western approach is cynical. No one expects to achieve much, but in pursuing the issues the East is to be exposed as the obstacle to European “cooperation.”

In sum, this takes on the character of psychological warfare and the issue, therefore, is whether the state of East-West relations justifies such an approach.

—Do we really want to “expose” the USSR, or one of its allies?
—Do we want to drive wedges between Romania and the USSR?
—Do we want to lay out broad schemes and ambitious projects, and then abandon them while pointing the finger of blame on the other side?

Our Allies are becoming very skeptical of this exercise and are leaning on us to scale down the terms. (We are the main supporters; through bureaucratic inertia we have not really re-examined this since 1969, when it might have been tactically justified as a measure to badger the Soviets.)

In short, we can achieve some very limited practical improvement in freer movement—which might be feasible in light of the loosening up in Eastern Europe—but not if our aim is polemics.

D. Economic Cooperation

The subject matter is too technical to develop any real basic issues but this is what is lacking—an agreed Western philosophy. At this stage no one knows what would be the outcome of the economic issues. There is a justified suspicion that the Europeans want to use the conference to “legimatize” the EC and the CEMA interlocutor and perhaps to make some concessions to the East, out of fear of new US competition in Eastern Europe and the USSR. In practice, the conference will be the first channel for some sort of dialogue (since the USSR is excluded or passive in all other European economic institutions).

Our interests are difficult to define. In NATO’s preparatory work, we have taken the lead in a fairly tough position. However, we cannot oppose some cross fertilization between East and West institutions. We cannot oppose some reduction of barriers to trade. What we might oppose, should it develop, is a Europeanization of the issue that discriminates against the non-EC countries. In practice, however, we may be stimulating this trend by dealing bilaterally with Poland and Romania, and above all, by our prospective deals with the USSR.

What is needed now is a bureaucratic scrubbing down of the economic aspects of the CSCE so that some concept of our interests will emerge; nevertheless there does seem to be little chance that CSCE will make much progress.
E. Permanent Machinery

In their various European security proposals, the Soviets have always included some notion of a permanent body that would be established by the Conference and remain as a bridge to the next conference in “two or three years.” They have blown hot and cold on their interest. Gromyko told the UK that the USSR had no “special interest” in such a body but one ought to be established. Some Eastern Europeans, however, have said that it is a prime objective.

Whatever the Soviet view of what or how the machinery would function, it seems clear that we and the Western Alliance have no interest in it. Once we thought it might have some value as another inhibition on the Brezhnev doctrine—a sort of European Security Council, but this is far too ambitious. Now we hope to head off any such institution but the outlook is not at all clear—many neutrals may join the Soviets on this one.

Our main concern is that we not participate in the creation of an illusory “system” of security which would be developed through periodic European Conferences and permanent machinery. The net result would be to dilute the value of the Alliance, and tempt some of our Allies and neutrals to build up the new mechanisms as an alternative to NATO.

Procedures

There are two scenarios: ours and the Soviets.

—We assume “careful preparations,” and by this we mean that the substantive issues for the agenda be resolved beforehand at the preparatory level. The French and Soviets disagree and view the preparations as mostly procedural. The British are not enthusiastic about our approach on the grounds that they cannot preempt the position of their foreign minister!

—Nevertheless, we do have Soviet agreement, in the US-Soviet communiqué, that the conference should be “carefully prepared.”

—After “careful preparations,” the next step should be to convene the actual conference at the Foreign Minister level. Our concept is that this would be the last step that the Ministers would agree to the outcome of the conference. The French foresee two Ministerial level meetings, and the Soviet variation is for the last meeting to be at the heads of state level.

—We are isolated on restricting the CSCE to one Ministerial level meeting: our choice is between another foreign minister meeting, or a summit gathering.

—Finally, we have to decide, fairly soon, how to respond to the Finnish invitation for November 22, but we cannot accept the date until we have a firmer commitment to MBFR.
111. Editorial Note

On September 9, 1972, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger left the United States for four days of talks in the Soviet Union from September 10 to 14. En route, he stopped in Munich for consultations with West German Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel on September 10. Among the topics they discussed were a European Security Conference and mutual balanced force reductions. A record of Kissinger’s conversation with Brandt reads in part: “In response to the Chancellor’s question about US views on the relationship between CSCE and MBFR, Dr. Kissinger said he would discuss this subject in Moscow but that the American attitude would remain unchanged. The language on parallelism in the Moscow communiqué expressed our policies. MBFR is the main concrete subject pertaining to security still to be discussed, and we wanted to hold to the parallelism approach. In his Moscow talks he would not go beyond NATO-agreed positions. We were not negotiating bilaterally on this subject with the Soviets. As a matter of fact, we had not yet arrived at a final US position and our own internal planning continued. We hoped to present a paper to NATO within four to six weeks containing a preferred proposal to be made to the Soviets. Brandt said he supported the principle of parallelism but not, in the final analysis, to the point of making MBFR talks an absolute prerequisite for the opening of multilateral preparations in Helsinki. Parallelism to him meant beginning at approximately the same time, not necessarily the same date.” (Telegram 1583 from Berlin, September 12; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 24, HAK European Trip, September 1972, FRG Memcons, Brandt, Strauss)

In a separate conversation, “Scheel likewise queried Dr. Kissinger about the American understanding of parallelism in connection with CSCE and MBFR, adding that while the Germans could support the concept of a link (Verbindung), they did not think of it as constituting an absolute prerequisite (Junktim). Dr. Kissinger responded that he would discuss this question with Chairman Brezhnev during his forthcoming talks in Moscow. To us, parallelism means an agreement in advance to have MBFR preparatory talks begin at about the same time as the CSCE preparatory talks. We would appreciate continuing German support for this concept of parallelism. State Secretary Frank observed that, if the inner-German talks proceeded to an agreement this fall, the FRG would be under heavy pressure to move rapidly to the multilateral preparatory talks for CSCE in Helsinki. Alluding to the difficulties being experienced in NATO in formulating the freedom of movement item for a CSCE agenda, Frank expressed the hope these
could be resolved expeditiously since the problem appeared to be essentially one of presentation. The German objective was not to lose the substance but to avoid formulation of the agenda item in such a way as to make it ipso facto unacceptable to the Eastern side.” (Telegram 1584 from Berlin, September 12; ibid.)

112. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, September 12, 1972, 9–10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Georgi M. Kornienko, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Ministry
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
William G. Hyland, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: On the European Security Conference, there is a certain measure of agreement reached: Interim consultations on the timing of multilateral consultations are to start on November 22 in Helsinki. We can register general agreement in Helsinki on an understanding that we will make every effort to achieve productive results, and then continue bilateral consultations.

So, if Dr. Kissinger has no objections we will register agreement on this basis and make every effort to insure that the Conference is held in the first half of 1973. And naturally we will continue contacts through our channel. Does Dr. Kissinger agree with this?

\footnote{Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 74, Country Files, Europe, USSR, HAK Trip to Moscow, Sept. 1972, Memocons. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Council of Ministers Building in the Kremlin.}
Dr. Kissinger: Not completely.

[Dobrynin and Gromyko begin explaining to Brezhnev that there is more involved and he should read the rest of his notes. Brezhnev understands and continues.]²

Brezhnev: So, there is a second half. We agree that about three months after the start of the consultations (for CSCE) consultations could begin on procedural matters on reducing forces and armaments in Europe. We are prepared to enter into these consultations with a view to holding a conference after the completion of the European Security Conference. But there is no linkage between the timing, the venue and participants.

Dr. Kissinger: We can agree with this in principle. Let me be specific: We do not think it a good idea that these two consultations take place in the same place. We accept, and prefer, that they not be physically together. Indeed, to prevent the issues of MBFR from being introduced into CSCE, we want the procedural meeting on MBFR before the actual CSCE. We want a preparatory meeting on force reductions before CSCE, but three months may be a little long. It would be most expedient to have them at the end of January, 1973; for the preparatory talks on MBFR, the last week in January might be appropriate. The actual conference should be after the completion of CSCE if it starts at the end of June, the MBFR Conference could be about the end of September—somewhere in September–October. If these principles are agreeable we will then agree to the November 22 starting date for CSCE preparations. We can tell you later how to manage this bureaucratically.

Brezhnev: Let us agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I will need a proposal from your side while we are here, and an unsigned proposal to take up with our allies. After consultations we could then announce our agreement at the beginning of October.

Brezhnev: I agree, that it is all on this.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than a European security conference or MBFR.]

² Brackets are in the original.
113. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, September 18, 1972.

Initial Allied Reactions to the Kissinger–Brezhnev Talks on CSCE and MBFR—September 10–14, 1972

General

In initial and highly preliminary reactions to our reports to them of Dr. Kissinger’s discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev, the Allies have characterized the talks on MBFR generally, and specifically the Soviet note given to Dr. Kissinger on September 13, as a step forward.

Some Allies are prepared to believe that there would be sufficient parallelism in time between CSCE preparatory talks beginning November 22 and MBFR exploratory talks beginning in late January; and no strong criticism has yet been voiced of the Soviet proposal that the MBFR talks be held outside Helsinki. Questions have been raised concerning the omission of a reference to substantive MBFR discussions by the Soviets in describing MBFR talks.

Several Allies—primarily the Belgians and those on the Southern flank of NATO who have pressed for inclusion in MBFR talks (Italy, Turkey, etc.)—have stressed in particular the importance of Allied cohesion in treating MBFR and CSCE issues. Some have also indicated that they would have preferred more thorough Allied consultations before the visit enabling Dr. Kissinger to voice an Alliance position on MBFR participation. (The Turks and Italians have not reacted in de-
tail to the Kissinger visit, and we can expect strong criticism from them on the issue of participation.)

None of the Allies have opposed beginning CSCE preparatory talks in Helsinki on November 22, but a number have argued against accepting a specific date for CSCE itself (the Soviet proposal is for late June 1973) on the grounds that this would deprive the preparatory talks of their significance.

There has been little reaction so far to the Soviet proposal that CSCE itself take place in Helsinki.

All the Allies look forward to detailed consultations—on the basis of instructions from capitals—in the North Atlantic Council this week.

The North Atlantic Council

Ambassador Kennedy (with Mr. Sonnenfeldt) briefed the Council on Friday, September 15. Commenting on a personal basis, other Council members

—congratulated the U.S. team on the results of the talks;
—expressed general satisfaction with the degree of parallelism laid down in the Soviet note;
—cautioned (except for the French) that any date for a CSCE itself should be regarded only as a target date, dependent on results in the preparatory talks;
—hoped that MBFR exploratory talks would include exploration of substance as well as of procedural and organizational matters;
—repeated earlier arguments that the essential next decision among the Allies is that on participation of NATO members in MBFR explorations.

The Canadian Permanent Representative thought his authorities would accept a procedure whereby the U.S. would reply to the Soviet note after Allied consultations; several others, in stressing the importance of Allied cohesion, seemed to imply that this procedural question will be important to them.

Reactions in Capitals

The text of the Soviet note was also delivered by our Embassies in Allied Capitals on September 15, and Embassies were authorized to draw on the talking points provided by the White House. Initial reactions, while appreciative of the U.S. effort in Moscow, were sketchy and very preliminary.

UK—Speaking personally, the Foreign Office’s NATO Department head called attention to the British view that MBFR negotiations should

He thought personally that the most important consideration in this was the maintenance of solidarity of the alliance.
only take place if exploratory talks establish that negotiations would not risk Allied security. He thought the British would not have trouble with the Soviet proposal that a CSCE itself be held in Helsinki; the British would go along with a NATO consensus.\(^5\)

**FRG**—Foreign Ministry officials found the parallelism concept adequately served in the Soviet note, but opposed setting a firm CSCE date at this time. They also warned that the U.S. position on MBFR participation could cause serious strain in the Alliance. The FRG would go along with a NATO consensus favoring separate sites for MBFR and CSCE preliminaries.\(^6\)

**France**—The Quai also argued against accepting a precise CSCE date, but noted with satisfaction the separation in the Soviet note of CSCE and MBFR both in time and place.

**Italy**—The Italians rehearsed their interest in participation of NATO flank countries in MBFR talks.\(^7\)

**Other**—The Belgians came down particularly hard on the importance of close Allied consultations.\(^8\) The Dutch, inter alia, voiced a lack of enthusiasm for holding a CSCE itself in Helsinki. Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn asked whether the Soviet note was solely a Soviet initiative or was requested by Dr. Kissinger.

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\(^5\) As reported in telegram 8723 from London, September 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII)

\(^6\) As reported in telegram 12637 from Bonn, September 15. (Ibid., Box 687, Country Files, Germany (Bonn), Vol. XII)

\(^7\) As reported in telegram 5290 from Rome, September 15. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)

\(^8\) As reported in telegram 3469 from Brussels, September 15. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 669, Country Files, Europe, Belgium, Vol. II)

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114. Minutes of a Joint Verification Panel and Senior Review Group Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, September 20, 1972, 4:10–5:13 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

MBFR/CSCE

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1972–73. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin II
Walter J. Stoessel
Jonathan Dean
Raymond Garthoff

Defense
Kenneth Rush
Armistead Selden
Lawrence Eagleburger
Clayton McManaway

JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Vice Adm. John P. Weinert

CIA
Richard Helms
Ben Rutherford

ACDA
Gerard Smith
David Linebaugh

OST
Dr. Edward David (Observer)

NSC
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Philip Odeen
William G. Hyland

Lt. J. Michael Power
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:
— the State Department would consider the desirability of another approach to the French on participation in the talks and come back with a recommendation;
— the Working Group should get an agreed sanitized version of the Evaluation Report for transmission to our allies;
— CIA will do further work on the verification problems;
— the Working Group will put together some concrete packages of what each side would be asked to do under various kinds of cuts.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) I have your draft cable here (a draft response to the Soviet note) and I’ll talk to you about the details later.

Mr. Irwin: Do we want to refer to a specific date?

Mr. Kissinger: All the Soviets have asked for is the end of January.

Mr. Irwin: I mean for the actual conference.

Mr. Kissinger: The date for the conference will emerge from the preparations. Don’t give them a date now.

Mr. Irwin: The NSC staff has wanted dates.

Mr. Kissinger: We don’t want a date for the actual meeting of the European Security Conference. A date for the MBFR meetings would be helpful for Congressional reasons.

2 Reference is to a draft cable prepared by Shaw and Streator on September 19 for discussion at the meeting; it was forwarded to Kissinger on September 20. The draft cable, along with a covering memorandum prepared by Odeen and Sonnenfeldt, are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 27, Chronological File.
We have four basic questions today: 1) a response to the Soviet note; we will get a new draft and circulate it; 2) NATO participation in the MBFR talks; 3) how we prepare for the talks within NATO; and 4) some general substantive discussion on the directions in which we wish to go. We have plenty of time to prepare substantively for these talks. Based on my discussions in Europe, I think it is important that we get our European friends read into our thinking. We can start the education process before we have our own positions in great detail.

On the question of participation, I think we’re all agreed that we have to yield to the pressure from the flank countries in some way. Have we ever explained the facts of life to them? Have we pointed out that the Russians may want to trade Bulgarian forces for those of Greece and Turkey? The Soviets would be delighted to expand the number of countries involved but I’m not sure that would be so much in our interest. It could be messy.

Mr. Irwin: The attitude of our allies has favored flank participation or at least observer status for the flank countries. We have stuck to the “no participation” line.

Mr. Kissinger: In practical terms is there any difference between participation and observer status? Does observer mean they can’t talk? I have no reason to oppose flank participation but I wonder what we would really be getting into. If we are absolutely firm in linking MBFR with CES, I think we can get the Soviets to go along with a conference on force reductions in Central Europe. But if we give them any opening, they will try to expand the number of countries, including, even the neutrals perhaps. I think we should go into the January talks with a firm, rigid position. I don’t know which of the proposals is best. The Turks are proposing membership in the talks by a directly concerned state. If we leave this open to discussion we may be giving the Russians an opportunity to play around. Gerry (Smith), what do you think?

3 In a briefing memorandum to Kissinger, September 18, Odeen and Sonnenfeldt wrote: “All the agencies are prepared to cave in on the issue of participation and allow a representative of each ‘flank’ to attend the explorations as an advisor to delegations of directly interested Allied states. This approach may not satisfy the Turks, Italians, and others who want a flank representative to participate fully with a right to speak in both explorations and negotiations.” Odeen and Sonnenfeldt suggested three options: “Agree to the Turkish proposal, which has near unanimous support in NATO,” “allow a representative from each flank to attend explorations as a member of a delegation of a directly interested state,” or “propose to the Allies that the question of participation will be taken up at the January MBFR meeting with a view to including flank participants in the negotiations if this does not cause the Soviets to expand the area of reductions.” They recommended “the latter alternative with a fallback to the second alternative if necessary.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–065, Verification Panel/SRG Group Meeting, MBFR, 9/20/72, 1 of 3)
Mr. Smith: If the Russians what to play games they can. The Turkish presence won’t interfere with that. I think we should just put the risks frankly to the Italians and leave it to them.

Mr. Irwin: We could still have them as observers, not participants.

Mr. Kissinger: Do you mean the Turks or the Italians?

Mr. Irwin: It has been suggested that we have one country, representing each flank on a rotating basis.

Mr. Kissinger: Then we’d get Portugal.

Mr. Stoessel: They’re not that interested.

Mr. Helms: Why not have all the flank countries represented? Why only one?

Mr. Stoessel: The Turks are the most vocal. They claim that anything in Europe affects their security.

Mr. Helms: Would the Greeks represent the Turks and the Italians?

Mr. Rush: No one wants them there.

Mr. Irwin: We don’t, but the Europeans are more favorably disposed. We have to decide here whether to try to get them to agree to observer status since we’re prepared to agree to that much.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Soviets are hell-bent on it they will do it. But they may not be hell-bent—they may just think they owe themselves a good run at it. I think we can get the Soviets to go along with a Central European scheme but not without their exercising their mischief-making potential.

Mr. Irwin: (to Sonnenfeldt) Did you get any feeling from the NATO countries of their attitude?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The NATO countries haven’t confronted the real situation involved. Neither we nor Luns has made the case.

Mr. Irwin: We thought we could do it in the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meetings on the 11th and 12th. But now it looks as though there will be no meeting. The Europeans say there is no need for a meeting; that the Kissinger trip settled some things and that we don’t need to settle others right now. They want to wait for the December Ministerial meeting.

Mr. Stoessel: They’re hoping to have the participation question settled before then.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll have to yield if there is real pressure. Let’s find out whether this is what the principals in Brussels are thinking or what their governments are thinking. I don’t know how to get the governments focussed on this.

Mr. Garthoff: The Turkish Foreign Minister has already weighed in strongly—he sees it as a quid pro quo for letting destroyers into the Black Sea.
Mr. Kissinger: If they’re determined, there’s no way to keep them out, but I don’t think we’ve made our case. Are any of them coming to the UN?

Mr. Irwin: I don’t know—we’ll check.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t care about the outcome, but we should make the case.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have to settle this before September. The Russians will be preparing for the CSCE meeting and they’ll whiplash us on MBFR.

Mr. Stoessel: The allies may drag their feet on a response to the Soviet note until we come forward on the matter of participation. This may create trouble in the alliance for something that’s not really that important.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll have to work quietly and quickly.

Mr. Irwin: We’ll have to go to the countries through our Embassies to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Kissinger: Can it be done without making too many waves?

Mr. Stoessel: It can be, but we know the Turks and Italians want it. The situation won’t change.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t like the idea of leaving the question of participation to the January meeting. It gives the Russians a chance to play around with the allies.

Mr. Irwin: No one wants to wait until January. It can and should be done quickly.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It we start loading this with our friends, they will load it with theirs. We’ll then have a bloc to bloc confrontation and the whole thing will sink.

Mr. Helms: Great!

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Except for the reaction in Congress.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the French reaction?

Mr. Stoessel: They are holding themselves apart from the whole exercise. They didn’t speak on the question of participation.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the French reaction on the whole thing? Do they plan to stay out of the conference?

Mr. Stoessel: On MBFR, yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any sense in going back to them to discuss it again?

Mr. Stoessel: They’re dug in.

Mr. Rush: Debre said no.

Mr. Kissinger: When I talked to Pompidou he didn’t say they would participate but he didn’t say under no circumstances would they
participate. If they think we are approaching this as a security issue I'm not sure they won't participate.

Mr. Stoessel: Five-to-one they won’t.

Mr. Rush: There’s a difference in trying to block something and in having an on-going MBFR. They might change their minds.

Mr. Smith: It would mean a complete change in French policy.

Mr. Irwin: They might support non-participation by the flanks.

Mr. Kissinger: It would seem desirable to get them involved in the preparatory work. The French approach to the security issue is similar to ours. I’ve not yet given up on their participation in the conference. We should try to talk to them again.

Mr. Irwin: Let us think about the French and participation and come back to you with a recommendation. We’ll see if another approach is really worth trying. What would be the purpose of having the French participate?

Mr. Kissinger: They’re defense-oriented. We’ll need a tough-minded analysis of what is possible and not possible, and they can be helpful in this. Also, if the French do not participate, I can see the games the Soviets will play.

(Admiral Moorer joined the meeting)

Mr. Selden: Jack Irwin can talk to the Italians and Turkish Foreign Ministers and see if they will change their attitude. He can point out all the difficulties.

Mr. Kissinger: State will come up with a recommendation on this. Some of these people may be coming down to see the President from New York.

Can we now turn to the method of proceeding with NATO. It had been my understanding that we would send a sanitized version of our Evaluation Report to NATO.4

Mr. Irwin: We agree.

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4 In their briefing memorandum of September 18, Odeen and Sonnenfeldt wrote: “OSD opposes sending any version of the Evaluation Report to NATO on the grounds that all the Allies want and need is a statement of U.S. preferences, not more analysis. Privately, OSD representatives are candid enough to admit that their real concern is that sending the Report to NATO will make it more difficult to get a U.S. decision along the lines they prefer (step-by-step negotiations starting with a force ceiling plus collateral constraints and leading to small, probably symmetrical, initial reductions).” Odeen and Sonnenfeldt added: “OJCS has been pressured by OSD into opposing sending the Report to NATO on the grounds that it might ‘confuse’ the Allies. However, we have been informed privately that JCS opposition is pro forma, and if a decision is made to send it, they will say the sanitized version is a good one.”
Mr. Rush: But it should be sanitized more than it is now. It would just confuse them. We shouldn’t give the various points of view to our allies. We should wait until we have a position.

Mr. Kissinger: But we won’t have a position for several months.

Mr. Irwin: We can sanitize it more, but we should get it over there quickly.

Mr. Kissinger: We should at least get them the categories. If they don’t get at least that they’ll be off in never-never land.

Mr. Rush: If we give them the options we’ll just get them started off in different directions. We should give them a paper setting forth our objectives and needs.

Mr. Kissinger: There are not that many avenues open to us. We have three chief roads. This will force them to come to grips with the intelligence problem—the real dangers they face. If we give them only one package, they’ll start nit-picking the details of the package. The Evaluation Report leads only in one direction—symmetrical cuts leading to a common ceiling appear to be the best approach, subject to massive verification problems which we want to talk about.

Mr. Irwin: There’s some disagreement between the NSC staff, State and Defense on the common ceiling approach or some reductions from us and as much as we can get on the other side.

Mr. Kissinger: If we’re agreed that something should go to NATO, I can’t judge the degree to which it should be sanitized. Let’s get the Working Group to agree on what should be sanitized.

Mr. Irwin: We think it should go. The Working Group should look at the whole report and at the degree of our support for one approach. These are two separate things. There may well be differences on the latter. Defense wants small cuts, hopes to get more in return, but would settle on the same. I prefer the common ceiling.

Mr. Kissinger: We can use the forward-based argument against them on that.

Mr. Irwin: I have one semantic suggestion. We should stop talking about asymmetry and start talking about equality. The word “asymmetrical” implies we admit it’s not equal.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s a good point.

Mr. Irwin: We want equality—an equal ceiling for both sides.

Mr. Smith: The largest asymmetry is that we are in Western Europe legitimately and the Soviets are in Eastern Europe on a different basis. I can see a reduction of troops on a tacit basis. But if we agree formally that it is legitimate for both sides to have an equal number of troops, we are starting down a slippery slope. The Soviets want anything that will legitimize the presence of their forces in Eastern Europe.
Mr. Kissinger: What is the alternative? To drop the negotiations?

Mr. Smith: We should continue the negotiations but keep in the back of our minds that we are not making a formal agreement.

Mr. Irwin: If we drop the geographic limitations, theoretically we could have more troops than they could because they could reinforce more quickly. But we know that’s not negotiable.

Mr. Smith: This whole notional structure has borrowed too heavily from SALT where both sides have fielded legitimate forces. In Europe, NATO is positioned for defense and the Soviets for offense. We can stabilize the situation by getting equality. But do we want an agreement registering that they have as much right to be where they are as we do? I should think we would want to keep this as low key as possible.

Mr. Kissinger: What other outcome can there be of a negotiation but an agreement?

Mr. Smith: A tacit understanding.

Mr. Kissinger: Then why negotiate?

Mr. Smith: To find out where agreement is possible.

Mr. Kissinger: We won’t have the problem of how to register the agreement in the near future. I agree that the trend of Soviet policy is to get their position in Europe legitimized. We’ve been saying what a great man Willy Brandt is for two years. It would be tough to reverse this.

Mr. Smith: I’m not suggesting that. I’m suggesting that it might be better if the issue of force withdrawals were not the subject of a solemn treaty.

Mr. Kissinger: We don’t have to face that issue now. Whatever figure we settle on has the effect of producing some legitimacy—whether by asymmetrical or symmetrical cuts.

Mr. Rush: An agreement won’t result in the recognition of our right to keep troops in Western Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Smith) Are there some practical consequences to be considered now before the negotiations start or is this just something we should be thinking about?

Mr. Smith: We might possibly act slightly differently in the interim.

Mr. Kissinger: Nothing can happen until next fall.

Mr. Rush: Unless we have a clear outline of what we want, I’m frightened about moving out troops on the basis of a tacit understanding. The Russians may not understand the same thing tomorrow.

Mr. Kissinger: What they sign today they don’t understand tomorrow. We are agreed, then, to get a better sanitized version of the Evaluation Report and proceed to make it available to our allies. Can
we turn now to the substance of our proposal. There are amazing uncertainties in our intelligence. Page 16 of the Evaluation Report indicates a 20% uncertainty.

Mr. Odeen: It could be as much as 15% higher or 20% smaller. Our best guess is about in the middle.

Mr. Irwin: The indigenous forces are just as uncertain.

Mr. Kissinger: They’re more uncertain. I’m trying to understand with [what] the uncertainty factor is. What does a 10% cut mean? If we’re talking about division manning with a 20% uncertainty, a 10% cut doesn’t mean a goddamned thing.

Mr. Eagleburger: We can’t really say—it would be lost in the noise level.

Mr. Kissinger: We would have no base with which to compare a cut. We couldn’t just clock 10% moving out. They could be moving some out and some in. How could we manage a treaty unless there was some definition of the point at which we start destroying equipment and withdrawing forces and how. I’m trying to understand it.

Mr. Garthoff: I would suggest putting it in terms of units. We know what 30% of a division is.

Mr. Kissinger: We know what a division headquarters is.

Mr. Garthoff: This would be within a reasonable range of verification.

Mr. Kissinger: We won’t know about the indigenous forces.

Mr. Garthoff: There are some uncertainties on our own side. We don’t know exactly how many troops we have there.

Mr. Odeen: If we operate at division levels, we have some verification means through communications. They could, of course, feed back individuals into other units which would be beyond our capabilities to detect.

Mr. Smith: This would argue for some joint committee to develop ways to demonstrate fulfillment of the agreement. The Soviets apparently acquiesced in some on-site inspection in connection with the satellites. There may be some sort of device for this.

Mr. Kissinger: We should get a more precise definition from the Working Group of what exactly we are asking them to do. Suppose we want to make our cuts by individuals and theirs by units? What argu-

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5 The evaluation report, “MBFR Issues and Approaches to Reductions,” September 1972, prepared by the interagency working group on MBFR, is in the Ford Library. NSC Program Analysis Staff, Steve Hadley MBFR Files, Box 58, MBFR Evaluation Report (Aug. 72). An analytical summary of the report prepared by the NSC staff is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–065, Verification Panel/SRG Group Meeting, MBFR, 9/20/72, 1 of 3.
ments would we use? The probable outcome would be symmetrical in that sense. Does anyone think that kind of agreement is obtainable?

Mr. Stoessel: We would leave the equipment for our units.

Mr. Kissinger: What if we asked for compensation in return for geography?

Mr. Odeen: If we pull out people, we can get them back in the same time as units. Also it would be more verifiable.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s get the Working Group looking at what we would ask them to do if we want to move units out.

Mr. Odeen: We’ll do some more work with CIA.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we do anything to improve verifiability?

Mr. Helms: It depends on how well we have penetrated the Warsaw Pact forces.

Mr. Smith: I wonder if the Soviet attitude on inspection will be the same in this kind of deal. Before they were worried about penetration of the Soviet Union proper.

Mr. Kissinger: That would be a very good thing to do.

Mr. Helms: The Military Mission in Berlin worked quite well in this area. But when you come to saying someone has violated something, secret agents make bad witnesses.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any way we can improve our knowledge? On equipment, 20% uncertainty; on artillery, 40%; on aircraft, 20%.

Mr. Helms: We can improve on that with a little time. The major categories are a common ceiling, symmetrical reductions, very close to each other, and mixed packages. I haven’t seen any package which knew how to handle air forces.

Adm. Moorer: They can move in hours.

Mr. Kissinger: The problem won’t get any easier once we start talking.

Adm. Moorer: I don’t know that that’s the place to start.

Mr. Kissinger: I’m not saying it’s the place to start, but we need to have a position by the time the talks start. Would a 10% cut include air forces? If it did, would it include planes? personnel?

Adm. Moorer: We should start with the ground forces. The basis of our approach should be as simple as possible. It will be hard enough to verify. Trade-offs can get very complicated.

Mr. Kissinger: We need some analytical basis for knowing how to respond to a Russian proposal—what it would do to us. Also whether an x% cut has the same connotation. The difference is what they would do. These could be analyzed together. Are we talking about only manpower? Equipment? What equipment? Is equipment a difficult problem for them?
Mr. Helms: It's even more difficult for us than for them. We have 3000 miles of water to get across. I think we have to decide where we stick our flag and then stay with it.

Mr. Smith: We might adjust the focus of our verification. 18,000 troops can't affect the balance in Europe. It's not the same as dealing with strategic forces which could upset world balance. The Soviets could bring in troops without our knowing it. Maybe they already have and we've been living with it. We shouldn't apply a stiffer standard under an agreement. Our intelligence limitations won't let us. We would know if something serious were going on.

Mr. Helms: Has anyone ever determined a margin of safety?

Mr. Kissinger: We have tables of how long it would take to various river lines. If this means that we need stricter inspection than we would be willing to live with under unilateral means then we should talk about it.

Mr. Smith: If the Soviets cheated we would resume our freedom of action.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we get our own thinking further advanced? I have no sense of any dynamic purpose. We are sliding into this conference and our only chance of success depends on our knowing what we're doing. Dick (Helms), can you do some more work on the verification problems. Try to do it in categories with greater precision. The Working Group will put together some concrete packages of what we are asking them to do—who can do what under various kinds of cuts. Let's meet again in two or three weeks. Then the whole thing will go before the President in an NSC meeting.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: On the question of on-site inspection, we have a massive history of discussions with the Russians going back to May 10, 1955.6

Mr. Irwin: What about CSCE? Do we want two Foreign Ministers' meetings?

Mr. Kissinger: Before or in lieu of Heads of Government meetings?

Mr. Irwin: We say one Foreign Ministers meeting. The Russians want one Foreign Ministers meeting and one Heads of Government meeting. The Europeans want two Foreign Ministers meetings.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's leave this question open until we see what happens at the first meeting.

Mr. Irwin: Is anyone pushing on this?

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6 An apparent reference to President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal of July 21, 1955, in which he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union open their skies for aerial inspections by the other side. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal.
Mr. Stoessel: No one’s pushing. It would be a good idea to discuss this at the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting but we need a clearer idea of what we want.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s take a holding position.

Mr. Rush: It would be a mistake to have two Foreign Ministers meetings.

Mr. Kissinger: It would be a mistake to lock ourselves in now.

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115. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 22, 1972, 8:15–9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

French Foreign Minister Schumann
French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet
Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I saw a report that you had doubts about our Moscow talks on the European Conference and MBFR.2

Schumann: Well it looks like you agreed not only on preliminary talks but on the full conference. Don’t you think that is a problem?

Kissinger: Well that was a Soviet note and those were target dates.3 They are not agreed. In the White House we have no overwhelming

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 679, Country Files, Europe, France, Vol. X. Secret; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the French Ambassador’s Residence.

2 Document 113.

3 Regarding the Soviet note, see footnote 3, Document 113. Kissinger made a similar comment in a backchannel message to Bahr: “You already know through other channels about CSCE/MBFR. The Chancellor should understand that the document the Russians gave me is open to consultation among the allies before we make a response. In particular, while on the whole the time schedule envisaged by the Russians seems all right, we will not automatically agree to the full CSCE unless the preparatory talks in Helsinki warrant it. You understand of course that we do have an interest in the Soviet commitment to talk about MBFR because this is of great help to us in dealing with the pressures for unilateral reductions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe 1972)
urge to have a conference but we were driven to it by the Allies including you.

Schumann: Guilty.

Kissinger: For us the dates on MBFR are very useful with the Congress. They buy a year or even two and take us through a whole Congressional session. To get that we are willing to talk about June for the European Security Conference. But if you or others at Helsinki say that the conference is not warranted I can assure you you will not have a US-Soviet condominium. But my impression is that since the business of the agenda will not be too tough there probably will be a conference. But you won’t be confronted by us with a decision.

Schumann: Abrasimov said about the dates that there was no agreement but there was an understanding.

Kissinger: That just isn’t true. You recall the conversation our Ambassador Beam had with Kuznetsov.4 After that conversation we faced the problem that we didn’t want a European Conference without MBFR. So we wanted some parallel phrasing in the communiqué and the question was how to break the deadlock. So I told them that they should make us a proposal for what would happen next year so we could take it up with our allies and they did. We told them how we would interpret the question of the force reduction area but that this was subject to the views of the allies. If the Helsinki preparatory talks do not go well we are ready not to have a conference. But I think the Soviets won’t let it fail. So we should go with the attitude of what is it we want, since the Soviets will probably meet it rather than with the idea that a US/Soviet agreement already exists. What I am afraid about is that we will end up with the European Conference but not get MBFR.

Now in regard to MBFR. I sympathize with the French views. In fact, we have assisted you to be an independent military power. And maybe we can do even more after the election. I have always been, as you know, sympathetic to you on this. I also understand your worry about MBFR being a cover for unilateral troop reductions. Of course, if McGovern is elected all bets are off anyway. But assuming the President is reelected, which is now probable, we want the conference on MBFR mainly to prevent unilateral cuts. Secondly, it is an educational device for the Europeans about the real military balance and what changes might be tolerable. I’ll tell you, it has been the best educational device for us. We discovered that the threat may be a little less than we thought but also that NATO is much weaker than we thought. The idea to get at is not what’s negotiable but what’s best for security. For that reason we resisted on proposals for quick small cuts, for a 10%
cut. We want painstaking work, detailed concrete work, and not the psychoterapeutic approach of the Scandinavians or the Belgians. And we want you in this because you take defense seriously—you are the only ones, and Britain. What we want is the basis for a middle term US commitment without having it challenged every year. How France associates itself with this is up to you. I told President Pompidou we will give you all our data and our thinking. So send someone over and we will give them to him and talk to him. A 10 to 15 percent cut is very dangerous but we don’t want to say it publicly. But if you say “cut 10% by individuals” you are actually saying nothing because of the margins of error in the intelligence. The basic point is that we want to have detailed careful technical negotiations. Your position would be closer to ours than that of anyone else—if you took a position. We would like to see you mitigate your opposition without giving up your anti bloc-to-bloc approach. Your forces might not even be involved if the cuts turn out to be in the 10 to 15 percent area. But even if you don’t associate yourself with MBFR you should not have reservations, because our whole purpose is to strengthen the alliance.

Schumann: This is very important. I must discuss it with Debre. You know, he is very anxious to improve relations with you. But he is afraid of any neutralization of a special area in Central Europe.

Sonnenfeldt: This could only happen if the reductions were drastic.

Kissinger: We should use the next four years to put our relations on a basis that cannot be shaken by a change in Administrations. The Soviets obviously want to create a mood of détente to undercut defense efforts, but we should find a solid basis for working together.

Schumann: You know I am not sure Debre is right about neutralization. That reminds me of Malraux who has always said that the Russians want to swallow Europe.

Kissinger: That is just what the Chinese say.

Schumann: Well, I am not so sure. The question is whether they want to have a secure Western Europe because of China or whether they want a neutralized Western Europe. The discussion on FBS in SALT may give some kind of a clue.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
MEMORANDUM

From: The Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
US Reply to Soviet Note on MBFR/CSCE

Agreement has been reached within the Alliance on the attached text of the US note of reply to the Soviet note of September 12 on MBFR/CSCE and on attached oral points to be made by the US in handing over the note. The Secretary plans to call in Ambassador Dobrynin this week to convey the US note of reply and to make the agreed oral points.

Also attached is a paper outlining the main issues involved in reaching agreement among the Allies on the US note of reply, particularly the question of participation by flank countries in MBFR talks and our proposed approach to dealing with this issue when the US note of reply is handed to the Soviets and thereafter.

Theordore L. Eliot, Jr.

Attachment 1

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and has the honor to provide the following response to the note of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics handed to Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant

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1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 247, Agency Files, MBFR and CSCE, 1972. Secret. On October 26, Sonnenfeldt forwarded Eliot’s memorandum to Kissinger. In the covering memorandum, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Having at long last solved the flank participation issue, we plan to answer the Soviet note given to you in Moscow.” Sonnenfeldt predicted: “Delivery of our note and its content will undoubtedly leak. Since virtually the entire scenario will then have appeared in the press, a joint Soviet-American announcement strikes me as an anti-climax.” Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger concur in the Department of State scenario and “approve a unilateral U.S. announcement” that it was “accepting the Finnish invitation for November 22” and was planning “to attend the first MBFR talks in January.” Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations.

2. Attachment 2, the text of the Soviet note, is attached but not printed. See footnote 3, Document 113. Attachment 3, oral points to be made, is not printed.

3. No classification marking.
to the President for National Security Affairs, during the latter’s visit to Moscow last month:

1. The United States agrees in principle with the program of events suggested by the Soviet Union.4

2. It is envisaged that the5 multilateral consultations to prepare a conference on security and cooperation in Europe will start on November 22.

3. The date for convening the conference itself should be decided by all the participants, when they are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made during the multilateral consultations to justify convening a conference. On this basis, June 1973 would appear to be a reasonable date for the conference.

4. Exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe will begin on January 31, 1973. In addition to matters of procedure and organization, the participants will raise matters of substance relevant to setting an agenda.6

5. The date for opening negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe would be decided by participants in the exploratory talks when they are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made, but would be no later than September–October 1973.7

6. Upon confirmation by the Soviet Union that the foregoing is consistent with its understanding of the problem, the United States would agree to take part in the preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on November 22, and would so inform the Finnish Government.8

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4 On September 27, the Department of State sent a draft reply to the Soviet note for consultation with the NATO allies in telegram 176210 USNATO. In the U.S. draft reply, paragraph 1 reads: “The United States agrees in principle with the sequence of events suggested by the Soviet Union.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 EUR)

5 Paragraph 2 of the U.S. draft reply does not include the phrase “it is envisaged that the.”

6 Paragraph 4 of the U.S. draft reply reads: “Preparatory talks on the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe will begin on January 31, 1973, in Geneva. In addition to matters of procedure and organization, the participants will be free to raise matters of substance relevant to setting an agenda. It is understood that the question of participation in the initial talks, as well as the subsequent negotiations on this problem, will be settled through diplomatic channels between now and January.”

7 Paragraph 5 of the U.S. draft reply reads: “The date for opening negotiations on the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe would be decided by participants in the preparatory talks when they are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made, but would be no later than September–October 1973.”

8 The U.S. draft reply includes a seventh paragraph: “The U.S. has consulted with those of its allies concerned with these issues and understands that they concur in this sequence of events.”
Main Issues

The Soviet Note. During Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow last month, the Soviets handed to him on September 12 an outline of the sequence envisaged for MBFR and CSCE initial talks and subsequent discussions (Tab C). In sum, the Soviet note envisages

1972
November 22  Multilateral preparatory talks for CSCE at Helsinki.

1973
Late January Preliminary consultations on questions of procedure and organization relating to the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments first of all in Central Europe.

Late June The CSCE conference will begin its work in Helsinki.

September or October A conference on the problems of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe will start.

Thenote marked the first Soviet acceptance of firm dates for MBFR talks, though it (a) clearly seeks to limit the extent of discussion at the first MBFR session to matters of organization and procedure and (b) proposes a firm date for the CSCE meeting at Ministerial level to begin.

The Participation Issue. The general Allied reaction to the Soviet note was favorable, and they are prepared to agree with the scenario outlined, as currently reflected in the US draft reply. The flank states—Turkey particularly—insisted, however, that they be represented at the talks. The Turks proposed that there be rotating participants from each flank, with advisers from the other flank states present. This conflicted with the US preference that the talks be limited to states with forces and territories involved. A US attempt to achieve consensus against flank participation failed, but the Turks accepted a US proposal entailing two rotating flank representatives present at the talks who would

—be designated, like other participants, as “representatives”;
—not sign possible agreements emerging from MBFR talks;
—not participate directly in formal decisions reached in those talks;
—have the right to speak on issues of direct concern upon the invitation of one or more participants;

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9 Secret.
—have the right to circulate papers; and
—have the right to have present advisers of the same nationality.

Handling the Flank Participation Issue with the Soviets. While the Turks would have preferred to have the US address the flank participation issue in its reply to the Soviet note, they agreed with a strong majority, led by the US, that the issue be deferred until the Soviets reply to the US note and each of the Western participants issues similar formal notes of invitation to participate in MBFR talks to each of the prospective Eastern participants (USSR, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). These notes indicate the special arrangements governing the flank representatives, and would be delivered in about two weeks, following Allied agreement on the wording. We favor informing the Soviets about Western participation in this manner in order to
—avoid raising a possibly contentious issue with the Soviets that could delay a Soviet reply to the US response;
—have the Western participants signal their participation preference on a joint basis, which would (a) enhance its weight and (b) deflect from the US flank recriminations in the event the Soviets objected to expanding Western participation beyond those states with forces in the FRG, Benelux, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the area outlined to the Soviets by Mr. Kissinger as the US preference.

In deference to Allied wishes, we have agreed that we should state orally in delivering the US reply that Allied views would be communicated later. The Turks, nonetheless, reserved the right to press bilaterally with the Soviets their preference for having advisers of other flank countries present at the talks behind the rotating flank participants.

Particularly in light of recent stories, the Soviets may choose to make an issue of the participation question, going so far as to make confirmation of the US reply contingent on a satisfactory clarification on Western participation. However, if they should do so, they would risk forfeiting US and Allied agreement to the November 22 date for initial CSCE talks.

In the event that, after CSCE talks begin in November, the Soviets seize upon the flank participation issue as a reason to defer the January 1973 MBFR talks, we could make clear to the Soviets that our agreement to their note was based on the understanding that an overall program was envisaged, and that their refusal to proceed with MBFR talks in January could call into question the June date they proposed for the CSCE meeting at Ministerial level. In practice, the Allies will be in a position to slow the pace of multilateral preparatory talks if the Soviets prove intransigent.

In light of the tangled and sensitive history of this issue, we believe that, in presenting the US reply and in dealing with the participation issue, the US should not go beyond the statement that, following Mr.
Kissinger’s discussions in Moscow, we and our Allies have consulted at length on the matter of their participation in MBFR talks, and that the resulting Allied consensus of Allied views on this subject will be communicated later. If pressed, we believe that the US should indicate only that we are not prepared to go further in dealing with this question at this time.

Other Aspects of the US Reply and Oral Points. The following are other salient aspects of the US reply agreed by the Allies:

—We purposely omit reference to Helsinki as the site for CSCE itself, since the venue should be agreed by all participants during preparatory talks at Helsinki.

—The Soviets proposed that the initial MBFR talks address only procedures and organization; by contrast, a majority of Allies feel strongly that it must embrace substantive questions. An Allied consensus, however, has emerged that the subsequent negotiations require some exchange of views on substantive issues relevant to setting an agenda during the initial talks. However, we believe that the Soviets will resist strongly any detailed substantive discussion, and Allied positions for the initial talks will have to be tailored carefully with this in mind.

—We use the date January 31, 1973 for initial MBFR talks, since it is the latest date in January, and thus allows us maximum time after the Inauguration to complete preparations.

—We use the phrase, “mutual and balanced force reductions,” rather than the Soviet phrase, “the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments,” because of MBFR’s history since 1968 as the Allied description of their objective.

—The Soviet note indicated that MBFR talks would be conducted in a place other than Helsinki. The US reply does not suggest a venue, since the Allies have not yet reached agreement, though Geneva remains a majority preference. There is also general Allied agreement that the talks should not take place in Helsinki.
117. Telegram From the Department of State to all North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals

Washington, October 28, 1972, 0004Z.

196451. Subj: Secretary–Dobrynin conversation on CSCE and MBFR preparations.

1. The Secretary called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin October 27 to deliver note in reply to Soviet proposal given Mr. Kissinger in Moscow September 12. (Text of note transmitted in USNATO 4339.)

2. Dobrynin read note carefully and said it looked fine and appeared to be exactly as discussed in Moscow but commented as follows on the numbered paragraphs:

   Para 1 and 2: Dobrynin said these seem to coincide with Soviet position.

   Para 3: Dobrynin said it was understood that the MPT would formally decide on the date and place for the conference, but said that Soviets would like an agreement with the U.S. in advance for Helsinki in June. He took note of the formulation that “June 1973 would appear to be a reasonable date for the conference,” and indicated that this may be acceptable to the Soviet Government.

   Para 4: Dobrynin said that Soviet Government had proposed “late January” for the preparatory conference on force reductions, therefore he assumed January 31 would present no problem. He pointed out, however, that Soviet Government opposed discussion of “matters of substance” at exploratory talks. He was reminded that the phrase in the note was “matters of substance relevant to setting an agenda,” and he said that he believed the agenda could be discussed, but not matters of substance as such.

   Para 5: Dobrynin said it was his view that this was consistent with the proposal to Mr. Kissinger in Moscow, and therefore should be acceptable to the Soviet Government.

   Para 6: Dobrynin asked if we wished a formal reply to the note, and was told that we do. He said he would endeavor to obtain one as soon as possible.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Matlock, cleared by Springsteen, and approved by Eliot. Also sent to Moscow. Repeated to USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USCSACLANT, and USDOSOUTH.

2 Telegram 4339 from USNATO, October 24, sent the “revised text of the U.S. response to the Soviet note of September 12 on MBFR and CSCE reflecting all changes agreed in the Council.” (Ibid., DEF 6 EUR) For the revised text of the note, see Document 116.
3. The Secretary then made the following points regarding our position:

   A. The venue of the CSCE itself should be agreed during the multilateral preparatory consultations at Helsinki.

   B. Initial talks on MBFR should not be confined solely to procedures and organization. Preparations of subsequent negotiations require some exchange of views on substantive issues relevant to setting up an agenda.

   C. Agreed allied views on participation in MBFR talks will be communicated later.

   D. There is general agreement among the prospective allied participants that the talks (on MBFR) should take place at a location other than Helsinki.

4. Dobrynin said he foresaw no particular problems here, except that the Soviet attitude toward point B will depend on how far we wish to involve substantive discussions in the initial talks on force reductions. He assumed his government would agree to discuss agenda questions but would not go further into matters of substance. He made no comment on point C. In regard to point A Dobrynin indicated Soviets sought agreement on venue in advance but Secretary said this not possible now. When asked if question still open, he was told “yes.”

5. It was decided to agree upon detailed press handling when the Soviet reply to our note is received. For press handling of Dobrynin call see septel.3

6. For all NATO capitals: you may inform FonOffs of foregoing.

7. For USNATO: You may inform SYG Luns and other dels of foregoing.

8. For Moscow: You may inform allied colleagues of foregoing.

9. Foregoing is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.4

3 Not found.

4 Printed from an unsigned copy.
118. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 1, 1972.

SUBJECT

MBFR

I am deeply concerned over the almost universal sense of disquiet and suspicion my counterparts at the NPG have expressed to me with regard to our MBFR motives. If these attitudes are representative of a broad allied consensus (and I believe they are), we may well be witnessing a fragmentation of the Alliance which will bode ill for us as we proceed down the MBFR road.

In my discussions with several of the Defense Ministers, they have, to one degree or another, emphasized the following points:

—bilateral US–USSR understandings on MBFR would be intolerable;

—your most recent visit to Moscow, and the way in which the US Government has performed in NATO since then, has created an impression that bilateral agreements with the Soviets were, in fact, reached;

—a clear statement from the USG on how it views the MBFR process, and what it hopes to achieve from that process, is absolutely essential if Alliance cohesion is to be maintained;

—until the allies have some comprehensive statement of our MBFR views, distrust and suspicion will continue and grow;

—thus, relatively minor issues, such as the recent participation problem, will continue to be the focus for expressions of allied discontent, and could set the stage for long-lasting Alliance discord.

I did my best to allay these fears. I emphasized that we have no intention of negotiating MBFR bilaterally with the Soviets; I described the detailed analyses we have done and are doing on various options; and I expressed my absolute conviction that we will make no agreements

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 247, Agency Files, MBFR and CSCE, 1972. Secret. Sonnenfeldt forwarded Laird’s memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum of November 10. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Certainly the Secretary is reflecting some of the disquiet in Europe that undoubtedly exists and has indeed grown since the Moscow summit. It is also true that we are encountering more and more tactical problems with MBFR. There is a certain needling to this memorandum, and it is also part of the Secretary’s protracted campaign to force the US to take a clear stand on MBFR, presumably along the line he has proposed for well over a year.”
which would undermine NATO military security. I have, I believe, reassured most of my colleagues, but I must tell you in all candor that I very much fear that an unraveling process is beginning which, if not halted soon, could have extremely serious consequences for us.

Thus, I strongly recommend that the USG move quickly—preferably in advance of entering into explorations with the Pact—to put before the Alliance a general statement of our MBFR approach and objectives. To delay much longer will only make our ultimate task more difficult.2

Mel Laird

2 On November 17, Kissinger replied to Laird in a memorandum drafted by Sonnenfeldt: “You were quite right to reassure your European counterparts that there is no bilateral understanding or agreement with the USSR about MBFR. I recognize that as the initial talks draw nearer, there will be growing concerns, and whatever you can do to dispel this disquiet will be invaluable. Our Allies must understand that their problems will not be solved if we stake out a comprehensive position in Washington for their adoption. We need to go through a systematic review of the security implications with them so that the consensus that finally emerges is one they can support because it serves their interests. This is one reason that the initial talks with the Soviets should not go into issues of substance that can only reveal the differences within the Alliance.” (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 19, Document 466)

119. Editorial Note

On November 8, 1972, the North Atlantic Council approved a common text for invitations to the Warsaw Pact states to exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, including a note of invitation from the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The approved U.S. note to the Soviet Government reads in part: “Recognizing the importance of the question of mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe, the Government of the United States proposes that exploratory talks on this subject begin on 31st January, 1973, in a place to be agreed through diplomatic channels. Based on the fact that Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States maintain forces in Central Europe, the Government of the United States proposes that representatives of these countries participate in the exploratory talks with a view to discussing matters of procedure and organization, as well as matters of substance relevant
to setting an agenda for negotiations. The participation of these coun-
tries in talks on MBFR is without prejudice to future agreements that
may be reached. Further, it is the view of the Government of the United
States that representatives of Denmark, Italy, Norway, and Turkey
should be present at these talks, on a rotating basis, at any given time.
As distinct from representatives from states with forces or territories
in Central Europe, the representatives of these states would not par-
ticipate directly in formal decisions reached in the talks, but would
have the right to speak on issues of direct concern to them upon the
invitation of one or more participants in the talks, and would also have
the right to circulate papers.” (Telegram 4701 from USNATO, Novem-
ber 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

On November 15, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jacob Beam de-
ivered the note of invitation to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Niko-
lai Firyubin in Moscow. Telegram 11650 from Moscow, November 15,
reported Firyubin’s reaction: “Firyubin commented that date had al-
ready been agreed, but as regards participation he and his colleagues
would study our note and be back in touch with us. He added that ‘it
is clear to us from understanding with Kissinger that these talks should
be conducted on a non-bloc basis,’ and that ‘any attempt to discrimi-
nate against any of participants should be avoided.’” (Ibid.)
Opening Negotiations, December 1972–July 1973

120. Editorial Note

On December 2, 1972, Secretary of State Rogers sent a memorandum to President Nixon regarding the Secretary’s objectives at the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting, December 7–8, in Brussels. With regard to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) he wrote:

“On MBFR I will urge our Allies to support us in confining January’s preparatory meeting to agreements on a firm date early next fall for convening the conference, on the agenda, and on procedures, avoiding discussion of the substantive issues which some of our Allies have wanted to open up. On CSCE, finally, I hope to generate a positive attitude about what the conference may be able to accomplish in opening up relations with eastern Europe. To that end I will stress the importance of maintaining a separate agenda item covering freedom of movement of people and ideas. I will also support the objective, already generally agreed among our Allies, of ensuring that any conference statement of principles will include a specific provision making it applicable to states within the same social system as well as among states in different systems. As you have probably noted, the Romanians have themselves already raised this issue in Helsinki. The nature of the opening and closing sessions of the conference—in particular whether it should open with a Ministerial session and close with a Ministerial or other high level session—will probably also be a matter of discussion; my objective will be to defer any decisions until we can make a better judgment as to how well our objectives are likely to progress in the conference.” On December 5, President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig communicated the President’s approval of Rogers’s proposed objectives in a memorandum to Eliot. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 262, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XII)

In the final communiqué of the NAC Ministerial meeting, December 8, the NATO Ministers stated with regard to CSCE “that their Governments would work constructively to establish necessary agreements in the multilateral preparatory talks” and “confirmed that it is the goal of their Governments to increase the security of all Europe through negotiations concerning such questions as principles guiding relations between the participants and through appropriate measures, including military ones, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability so as to contribute to the process of reducing the dangers of military confrontation; to improve cooperation in all fields; to
bring about closer, more open and freer relationships between all people in Europe; and to stimulate a wider flow of information and ideas.

With regard to MBFR, the final communiqué reads: “The Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO’s integrated defense program noted with approval that the Governments of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey have proposed that the Governments of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union join them in exploratory talks on 31st January, 1973, on the question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe... Ministers hoped that these talks would make it possible to commence negotiations on this subject in the autumn of 1973. ... Recalling the Declaration of the Council in Rome in May 1970, these Ministers confirmed their position that Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe should not operate to the military disadvantage of any side and should enhance stability and security in Europe as a whole. Their position is based on the conviction that the security of the Alliance is indivisible and that reductions in Central Europe should not diminish security in other areas.” With regard to the relationship between CSCE and MBFR, the communiqué reads: “While considering it inappropriate to establish formal and specific links, these Ministers reaffirmed their view that progress in each set of the different negotiations would have a favorable effect on the others.” The full text of the communiqué is in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO: Final Communiqués, 1949–1974, pages 282–287.

121. Editorial Note

On December 18, 1972, President Nixon suggested in a letter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin’s return to Moscow was an opportunity for a “full and frank exchange of views in the private channel.” Nixon wrote: “In European affairs, as you have pointed out, there are now new prospects for dealing with matters of security and cooperation and the reduction of armed forces. The initial contacts in Helsinki suggest that we can accelerate the preparations and define an agenda that will allow a full conference to be convened in June. We are also preparing for the initial talks on mutual reductions of armed forces. While the talks in January, as we have agreed, will be preliminary, we hope that some discussions can take place that will point up the issues that will be negotiated next autumn. Our Allies, as well as countries allied to the Soviet Union are deeply
involved in both of these negotiations, and I am not suggesting that the
United States and the Soviet Union can or should arrange the outcome
without their participation or against their interests. Nevertheless, our
two countries can facilitate the course of these talks and help ensure their
success, and to this end we are prepared to remain in contact through
this channel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC
Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14) The
full text of the letter is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations,

On December 21, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security
Council staff wrote in a memorandum to President’s Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs Kissinger: “While the Helsinki CSCE prepara-
tory talks are in recess (until January 15), the Soviets are badgering our
representative about their concern that we will not honor our com-
mitment to convene the Conference in June and restrict the prepara-
tory talks to procedure.” Sonnenfeldt assured Kissinger that “the Pres-
ident’s letter to Brezhnev will take care of this. It mentioned June as
the date and stated we could accelerate preparations for defining an
agenda. The Soviets are going too far, however, in claiming that we
agreed to discuss procedures only. And we should not abandon the ef-
fort to define more precisely what each committee will take up under
main agenda headings when the talks resume. If this matter of our
commitment to a date arises in normal channels, we will have to stick
with our official line in our note of reply to the note given you last Sep-
tember, i.e., that June is a ‘reasonable target’ for convening the confer-
ence, if preparations justify it. If we don’t, we will have a major prob-
lem with the Allies.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,
NSC Files, Box 247, Agency Files, MBFR and CSCE, 1972)

122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to
President Nixon


SUBJECT
CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248,
Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Confidential. Hyland wrote on an attached correspond-
ence profile: “No action necessary.”
Initial preparatory talks for CSCE, which opened November 22 at Helsinki, adjourned December 15. Progress was limited largely to procedural questions. The central issue of current East-West disagreement—the extent to which substantive issues will be tackled in the preparatory phase—will be addressed when talks resume January 15. The atmosphere of the talks thus far has been cordial and devoid of acrimony.

The representatives of the 34 participating states have proceeded at a deliberate pace, reaching agreement prior to the December 15 recess only on rules of procedure for the talks and—as a working hypothesis—on a three-stage format for CSCE (initial meeting of foreign ministers; detailed preparations in committees; concluding high-level meeting).

The Soviets pressed unsuccessfully for rapid agreement on “practical matters” like the agenda, organization, date and venue of the conference. However, a majority, including all the NATO Allies, held that CSCE must be carefully prepared through consideration of substantive questions at the Helsinki talks. Similarly, the Soviet preference for no holiday recess, or only a very short one, found no support outside the Warsaw Pact delegations.

In conformity with our positive approach to CSCE, I have instructed our delegation to make every effort to avoid polemical exchanges at Helsinki. It has developed good working relations with the Soviet delegation, while side-stepping several Soviet suggestions for stage-managing the proceedings through private understandings with us.

I am encouraged that the NATO Allies have approached the issues in a firm, businesslike manner, while holding frequent informal consultations in which the French usually participated. These inter-Allied discussions at Helsinki have meshed smoothly with the parallel consultations among the EC Nine. On the Warsaw Pact side, the Romanians boldly established an independent position from the outset, while the others have marched in lock-step with the Soviets.

When the talks resume in January, they will return to the disputed issue of the work program. Most delegations, despite Soviet objections, have insisted that it include the elaboration of terms of reference for the various preparatory committees that are likely to begin their work in phase two of CSCE itself, following the initial meeting of foreign ministers. When the work program for the preparatory talks is agreed upon, discussions will then likely turn to the CSCE agenda, where I expect two difficult issues to arise: the NATO proposal for discussion of the freer movement issue as a separate agenda topic; and Warsaw Pact insistence upon an agenda heading permitting consideration of the establishment of a permanent organization for European security and cooperation.
At that point, I would expect renewed press interest in the talks, stimulated by the prospect of controversy. Our delegation will continue its restrained approach in briefing media representatives, but experience suggests that others will speak more freely. We also will continue to work with our Allies to avoid exaggerated media emphasis upon the East-West differences that will inevitably come into the open as the talks proceed.

William P. Rogers

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123. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Your Discussion with Dobrynin on CSCE

You asked for a paper that you might give Dobrynin. Bill and I have constructed a paper that addresses those issues that will probably trouble the Soviets once they digest the agenda, the committee structure, and the mandates that the West will table this week. (I sent you the Western document and comments on it while you were in Paris.) It assumes that we want to cooperate with the Soviets to the extent that cooperation does not pit us against the Allies.

1. Date. We are committed to convene the conference in June, and most of the CSCE participants go along with this date. The problem is that some of our Allies condition this date on adequate progress in the preparatory talks, which could be defined in fairly stringent terms—such as full agreement on mandates for committees.

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2 William Hyland.

3 According to a memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January 11, he forwarded a copy of telegram 160 from USNATO, January 10, which discussed these issues, to Kissinger as telegram Tohak 85. Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum of January 11, along with telegram 160 (attached), is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR.
The Soviets will want to pin down the date (and the Helsinki site) without conditions. The obvious compromise path is to move simultaneously in Helsinki by fixing a tentative date while pursuing the agenda discussions.

There are some indications that the Soviets might want an earlier date than June. The French have mentioned April, and the Franco-Soviet communiqué\(^4\) refers to the “nearest months to come.” You might ask Dobrynin if they are considering another date. While we would not oppose it in principle, there are some practical problems if there is to be a Brezhnev visit in May, or Presidential travel to Europe in April.

2. Mandates. The origin of the mandates for the working committees is the EC Nine, under active French leadership (you should not accept Dobrynin’s accusation of US blame for this approach). While the EC countries set considerable store by these mandates, there is no consensus on their disposition. The Western countries would prefer to negotiate agreed mandates, but realize the Soviets may not be willing. The USSR may decide, however, to table its own mandates or declarations so as not to be confined to Western texts. A viable compromise is to settle for a thorough discussion of the Western mandates and any Soviet or other proposals and agree that they will be considered by the relevant committees, but do not require prior agreement.

3. Military Security Issues. As reported to you in the earlier memorandum, the Western “confidence building measures” are minimal and have been supported by US in an effort to head off broader issues. Some of our Allies—Belgium and the Dutch—will probably break ranks, and Yugoslavia and Romania will almost certainly make some proposals on force movements and on MBFR. The real problem for the Soviets, therefore, is that this agenda item opens the door to a military-security debate. This is also a problem for us.

We can probably hold the line on our present proposals and develop an agreement on announcing major maneuvers and inviting observers which would represent a statement of intention, but not a legal or political commitment.

Our ability to work this out with the Soviets and the Allies would be facilitated by a smooth MBFR preparatory meeting, which may placate some of the Allies. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia and Romania will try to force more military issues into the discussion.

\(^4\) Pompidou met with Brezhnev in the Soviet Union January 11–12. A joint communiqué issued after the meeting reads in part: “The USSR and France attached great importance to the all-European conference on security and cooperation, and confirmed their determination to do all they could to ensure that the multilateral preparatory consultations in Helsinki brought about an early mutual agreement, and also to ensure that the conference itself was convened as soon as possible in the coming months.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1973, p. 25740B)
4. Permanent Machinery. This is a Soviet desideratum that will be countered in the first instance by our concept of subsuming the issue within the mandates of the committees and using existing institutions. These committees might create some limited ad hoc groups to work beyond the Conference’s termination. In other words, there might, for example, be an ad hoc economic group established to complete some specified work.

What the Soviets want, however, is some kind of pseudo political organ or secretariat that could serve as a bridge to the next conference, and perhaps allow some Soviet interference in Western affairs.

The current status is that the EC Nine have suggested to the NATO Allies a fallback position to inscribe on the agenda a separate item called “Follow-On to Recommendations and Results of the Conference.” This would be undefined for now and negotiated after other work had been completed, and the participants could judge whether some follow-on machinery was necessary. Given the commitment of most Europeans to a successful Conference, it is likely that they will fall into some compromise scheme with the Soviets on permanent machinery.

This allows us some room to appear cooperative with the Soviets: (a) we can avoid opposing inscription on the agenda, (b) discuss the purposes and functions of the machinery before the ministers adopt the agenda.

In the attached paper (Tab A), which you may wish to give Dobrynin, each of the foregoing compromises is set forth as a position on which the US could cooperate with the USSR in the Conference.

If you give this to Dobrynin, it will be important that when you come to some understanding with Dobrynin that arrangements will be made on this staff to permit the required monitoring and steering of the daily work in Helsinki to move to whatever agreements you have accepted.

At Tab A is the paper for Dobrynin.

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5 Kissinger handed the paper to Dobrynin on January 17. No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 17 has been found, but see Document 143.
The United States will continue to support the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in June, 1973. It would facilitate agreement on this date by all participants, if there is progress in establishing an agenda.

We should aim for agreement on an agenda in as much detail as possible, and a general understanding of which committees would be established by the Foreign Ministers when they meet in June. It would also be desirable to discuss the terms of reference or mandates for these committees and to consider proposals by all the participants including any documents the USSR might submit. Committee mandates need not be finally agreed at this time, if it is understood that the proposals made in this phase would be promptly considered by the working committees once these committees were established.

In light of the known views of many participants, it is unavoidable that the Conference should consider certain military security measures that will be useful in creating confidence in Europe. The US supports two limited measures: announcement in advance of major military maneuvers and invitations for observers to attend these maneuvers. In our view both measures could be voluntary and it would be left to each party to determine their implementation. Although a number of countries hold strong views on military security measures, the US is prepared to work to limit the military security measures to these items.

The US has considered the idea of establishing an institution to follow the work of the Conference after its formal adjournment. It would be preferable to handle as much as possible of the post-conference work through existing institutions or through temporary organs that might be required under each agenda heading. The US will not oppose inscription on the provisional agenda of items related to the establishment of a permanent organ. Before consideration of this by the Foreign Ministers and the opening of work by the Committees, there should be further discussions in this channel on the purposes and functions of a permanent institution. In any case, detailed discussion of this issue at Helsinki should logically come after discussion of other agenda items.

The US is willing to work with the Soviet side on the foregoing questions.

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6 No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Dobrynin’s Papers on MBFR and CSCE; Other Topics for Talk with Dobrynin: SALT, Science Commission

MBFR
Dobrynin gave you an advance copy of the Soviet reply to our note. It contains the following points and problems.

1. Site:
The Soviets will propose Vienna, while we proposed Geneva. While Vienna poses no particular problem, this is calculated to serve two aims: it precludes Vienna as the future site of any CSCE work. Second, the Soviets propose that Austria issue the invitations to the initial MBFR talks, which means that they will be willing to fall in with the Soviet scheme of inviting “all Europeans” (see below).

—We can go along with Vienna, but this is almost certain to set off a wrangle in NATO.

2. Participation
There are two aspects: 1) who participates in the initial talks, and 2) who participates in the reductions.

—The Soviets accept our list of participants, including the “rotating observers” for the initial talks.
—They advocate that “all Europeans” should have the right to participate in the initial talks on an equal basis.

—Dobrynin’s talking points⁴ state that they should be invited to express their views for “tactical reasons” presumably to placate Romania, Yugoslavia, etc.

—On the actual negotiations, the Soviets argue, as we do, that participation should not prejudge which countries will be involved in reductions.

—Dobrynin, therefore, proposes a “working body” of states (Benelux, FRG, Canada, US and UK; and the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and USSR) that would be the states whose forces would be reduced. This excludes Hungary.

In short, the Soviets want us to agree that the Austrians can invite all European states to the initial talks, and to agree in private that the actual reduction areas exclude Hungary.

3. Agenda, Procedures at Initial Talks

The note states that the purpose of the initial talks is to discuss matters of organization, procedures, determination of participants, time and site, and working out of proposals regarding the agenda.

This is acceptable to us.

4. French Participation:

The talking points, but not the note, state that the possibility of French participation in the “working body” should be foreseen.⁵ This implies that French forces would be reduced, since the working body is composed of those states whose forces are to be considered for reduction.

Your Response

You should raise some hell for their delay in replying especially since they have raised some thorny procedural problems.

⁴ Dobrynin’s attached talking points “on reduction of armed forces” read in part: “In our opinion, all European countries which would so desire should be also invited for tactical reasons to the negotiations themselves. These countries could be given an opportunity to express their views on major directions of solving the problem of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. However, the decisions with regard to the substance of that problem should be taken only by those states which themselves will carry out the reductions.”

⁵ Dobrynin’s talking points read in part: “Though France, as is known, does not express a desire at the present stage to reduce its armed forces in the FRG, nevertheless, in our opinion, the possibility for its membership in the working body should be foreseen, since France is a party to the Potsdam Agreements and its troops are stationed on the territory of the FRG.”
—We are opposed to a blanket invitation of all European states. That is why at the summit and in September we held out for “Central Europe.”

—While Vienna may be alright, we had reasons to believe from the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact States that Geneva posed no problems; it is far more convenient for all concerned.

—Possible compromise: to drop the idea of inviting all European states to the initial talks, and to work out some formula that will allow them to make an appearance at the actual negotiations.

—If the Soviets start a long squabble over participation, we will have to slow down the Helsinki CSCE talks, since it was your understanding in Moscow that we would start in Helsinki last November if we had a guarantee of MBFR starting on January 31.

—Since it appears from the Soviet documents that Moscow is seeking to exclude Hungary from a possible agreement, we could compromise by 1) including Hungary in the working body of the negotiations, but 2) that this would not mean that we prejudge whether or not Hungary would be included in reductions. We want the eventual negotiations to consider a variety of possible reduction schemes and not prejudge the geographical area now.

(HAK Note: The formal Soviet note, as distinct from D’s “talking points,” does not engage the issue of Hungary directly. But it clearly will be an issue in the preparatory talks if the Soviets insist on excluding Hungary from the working body that their note says they want to agree on in the preliminary talks.)

MBFR Agenda

Depending on how you judge the tactical situation you may want to give Dobrynin the paper at Tab A which lists the topics that we think should be considered by the main MBFR negotiating body next fall, i.e., the agenda. You should point out that the topics are phrased in a neutral manner and are designed to facilitate systematic discussions of all the issues. You should caution Dobrynin that not all Western countries see the eventual outcome of negotiations the same way and the Soviets should therefore be prepared for speeches in the preparatory talks that may not be wholly consistent with each other.

(HAK Note: The list of topics is taken directly from the “guidelines and agenda paper” developed laboriously in NATO.)

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2. CSCE

Dobrynin gave you a document on the agenda, and a draft of a declaration.

Agenda

The Soviets have re-formulated two agenda items in an apparent attempt to take into account our positions. As a result their formulation and the Western position have come fairly close.

A. Security

"On ensuring European Security and on principles of relations between states in Europe, including certain measures of strengthening stability and confidence." (Soviet)

"Questions of Security, including principles guiding relations between the participants and appropriate measures aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability with a view to reducing the dangers of military confrontation." (Western proposal)

On this item, the Soviets have apparently accepted our two confidence building measures: advance notification of maneuvers and invitational exchanges of observers at maneuvers.

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7 Reference is to Dobrynin’s “talking points with Dr. Kissinger (all-European conference).”

8 On January 15, a Soviet Embassy official hand-delivered to Kissinger’s office the Soviet draft “General Declaration on Foundations of European Security and Principles of Relations Between States in Europe.” The Soviet draft declaration is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE. Dobrynin informed Kennedy of the NSC staff in a telephone conversation at 8:10 p.m. on January 15 about the document’s forthcoming delivery: “This is a draft of the final document we would like to have adopted on the final stage of the European Security Conference. This was reintroduce [sic] Mr. Brezhnev to the President on a basis of confidential discussion in Moscow and then after Henry discussed with Mr. Brezhnev too this issue. So this is on a very confidential basis. We didn’t give it to the foreign office so don’t give it to the State Department.” Dobrynin reiterated, “It’s for Henry and the President.” (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversations (Telcons), Box 17, Chronological File)

9 Dobrynin’s attached talking points on an “all-European conference” read in part: “With due regard for Dr. Kissinger’s observations, we would be prepared to consider, within the framework of the first point on the agenda, certain measures aimed at strengthening stability and confidence in Europe. By those measures we mean mutual notification of major military maneuvers in stipulated areas and of the exchange, by invitation, of observers at the maneuvers of that kind. The first point of the agenda of the all-European conference that we propose could be formulated as follows: ‘On ensuring European security and on principles of relations between states in Europe, including certain measures of strengthening stability and confidence.’”
3. Human Contacts

“On the expansion of cultural cooperation, contacts between organizations and people and on dissemination of information.” (Soviet)

“Development of human contacts, broadening of cultural and educational exchanges and wider flow of information.” (Western)

You should say

*We are quite close on these two agenda items. We also are close on the economic cooperation item.*

—It is only a matter of some drafting changes, which could be accomplished by the delegation in Helsinki.

—We will work for an acceptable statement of both agenda items.

CSCE Declaration

The Soviet draft is fairly mild and poses no insurmountable problems for us. It bears down heavily on recognition of borders, and, most important, includes the establishment of periodic conferences and a “Consultative Committee” to prepare future conferences and for political consultations.

A major issue will be the European desire, including some of the Warsaw Pact, to strengthen this document to refute the Brezhnev doctrine. Also, they will want some statement on human contacts (i.e., freer movement).

*From our standpoint, we could probably live with much of this Soviet draft as the eventual outcome of the CSCE—and it bears some resemblance to a French draft already tabled for discussion in NATO.*

You should say

*We need to study this in some detail, and talk to our Allies.*

—We assume the French have this. Do the Soviets intend to table this in Helsinki or to work with us privately (we would prefer that they table it)?

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10 Dobrynin’s attached talking points on an “all-European conference” read in part: “We agree to single out questions of cultural cooperation, contacts among people, and of increased information as a separate point of the agenda of the all-European conference and we suggest the following language: ‘On the expansion of cultural cooperation, contacts between organizations and people and on dissemination of information.’ It goes without saying that all that should be conditioned by strict respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country.”

11 Not further identified.

12 Dobrynin’s attached talking points on an “all-European conference” read in part: “We talked with President Pompidou along the same lines during the recent meeting with him and we intend to forward our considerations on the questions of preparing the
—Are they going to work with the French on this document?
—Ask him whether they expect us to give them in your channel a counterdraft.
—Is this the Soviet equivalent to our “mandates,” or will they table their versions of these as well?

(Note: It is important to determine the disposition of this document so we can make some plans on how to work in the Alliance.

You should give Dobrynin the paper we drafted on CSCE which lays out the issues we can work on with the Soviets (Tab B).13

I believe this paper remains valid even though we have received the Soviet texts in the meantime. In particular, you should note the way in which we are trying to compromise the issue of post-conference machinery (included as paragraphs XI a. and b., in the Soviet “General Declaration”). Incidentally, Dobrynin’s “talking points” do not raise this issue, presumably because you had not had a chance to discuss it yourself with Dobrynin.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Tab A14

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

Items for Inclusion on the Agenda for Negotiations

1. Area or Areas: Delineation of Geographic Aspects of Negotiations.
2. Phasing: Timing and Stages in which Measures Might be Agreed and/or Carried Out.

5. **Forces**: Determination of Forces to be Addressed.

6. **Size and Methods of Reductions**.

7. **Verification**: Means of Providing Assurances of Compliance with Obligations Assumed under an Agreement.

*Date and Venue*: Agreement on a site and on a date in the period between mid-September and October 9, for the start of negotiations.

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125. **Editorial Note**

During the second half of January 1973, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger held a series of confidential exchanges with West German Minister for Special Tasks Bahr and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin regarding the Soviet draft declaration on European security (see Document 124), draft mandates for a European security conference, and the opening of mutual and balanced force reduction talks.

On January 17, Bahr wrote in a confidential message to Kissinger in German: “Moscow informed the Chancellor [Brandt] about the draft resolution for the Helsinki Conference and also expressed a willingness to accept an exchange of observers [for military maneuvers] as a confidence-building measure and a minimum of cultural exchange and human contacts. This led the Chancellor to state that he considers substantial progress to be possible. I would be glad if we could agree to a substantive response to the Soviet ideas within the next two to three weeks.” Bahr’s message to Kissinger was attached to a memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January 18. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Bahr also informed you that the Soviets had given the Germans the text of their CSCE resolution (which you already knew, I think) and had told them of their readiness to accept the idea of confidence-building measures, including observers at maneuvers, and a separate item on cultural and human contacts. This corresponds to Dobrynin’s talking points given you the other day. The Soviets, incidentally, also gave the French a similar preview, with the additional point that they could accept advance notification of maneuvers as far east as the Western USSR. Curiously, Bahr does not say that the Soviets gave them a preview of their MBFR note. Bahr suggests to you that in the next two to three weeks we conform our responses to the Soviet suggestions on CSCE.”
Sonnenfeldt attached a draft response to Bahr from Kissinger, dated January 18, which Kissinger initialed. The special-channel message to Bahr reads in part: “As regards CSCE, I would be interested in your comments on the substantive points in the Soviet draft declaration. I agree that we should discuss it in order to develop a common response.” (Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence, #115–119; translated from the German by the editor)

On January 18, 1973, the Soviet Foreign Ministry presented the Embassy in Moscow with a note in response to the U.S. invitation of November 15, 1972, to the Soviet Union to attend talks on force reductions in Europe. The note reads in part: “The Soviet Government states its willingness to begin preparatory consultations toward negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe on January 31, 1973. As far as the place for conducting consultations is concerned, we propose that they take place in Vienna (Austria).” The note continues: “The Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that reducing armed forces and armaments will involve in the first instance Central Europe. We have no objections to the proposal of the U.S. Government, contained in its note of November 15, 1972, concerning participation in the preparatory consultations by Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, USSR, USA, Turkey, Federal Republic of Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Soviet Government considers that also other European states who indicate an appropriate interest should have the right to participate in such consultations on an equal basis. If some NATO countries prefer to participate in the consultations as observers and in rotation, as follows from the proposals of November 15, 1972, there is no objection to this.” (Telegram 627 from Moscow, January 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

The following day, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed the Soviet note. A transcript of their telephone conversation on January 19 at 9:22 a.m. reads in part: “K[issinger]: Oh, one other suggestion I had for your consideration about that conference, the MBFR preliminary agenda conference. I was wondering, you have accepted the list of participants we have, but you said we should also invite all the others. D[obrynin]: Well, there was . . . K: I understand. Let me make this compromise suggestion to you. Supposing we stick, we have the original conference that will be composed of the countries that we’ve proposed. And then we will agree at the conference to invite anybody else who wants to be heard. D: In this way original conference will be invited. K: They will say any other European country which wants to express its views should come to the meeting. D: No, no, I would like to understand. Because now . . . K: That was in our original letter. D: Yes, and when they
come in after some deliberations. K: Well, we could decide that. For example, after they come to Vienna they could do it. D: After they come to Vienna. And then proceed [omission in transcript] organ of conference which will handle it. K: That’s right. D: The only difference is between . . . K: The original group and the working group. D: So the only real difference between your proposal and our proposal is that at the very beginning whether it should be invited all who want to participate, but when they arrive, then there will be a committee which will handle all the things. Your other proposal begins with . . . K: Who will then invite other countries. D: Okay, you make it as preliminary remarks. K: Right, and on Vienna as a site, I can tell you informally we are quite favorable, but we don’t want to spend an enormous amount of capital with our allies to force them to do it. D: Yeah, I understand. K: But frankly, I mean this is between you and me, the British have been especially difficult, and we have now told them that they should be a little more quiet. This is strictly between you and me. D: My feeling is this proposal you mentioned, this is now so to speak in our confidential channel . . . K: That’s right, but we haven’t told the State Department yet. D: No, I understand. But this is [omission in transcript] because I will mention to Moscow that I talked to you . . . K: We’ll support that. D: So in this case we still have now a proposal. K: That’s correct.” Dobrynin called again at 2:25 p.m. to clarify Kissinger’s remarks. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, Chronological File)

On January 24, the North Atlantic Council announced in a press release that the Allied countries had replied to the notes from the five Warsaw Pact states inviting them to exploratory talks on MBFR, including the Soviet note to the United States of January 18, and had accepted January 31, 1973, as the opening date for consultations. On the venue of the talks, the press release noted that although “full advantage should be taken of the preparations that have already been made in Geneva,” “Vienna is not ruled out if satisfactory arrangements can be made there in time.” With regard to participants, the press release cautioned that although the Warsaw Pact states had accepted the list of participants proposed by NATO countries for the preparatory talks, the “question of participation” in the MBFR talks would exercise “a significant influence upon the development and results of the proposed talks.” The issue of participation in the actual talks, however, could be “further discussed at the exploratory talks themselves.” (Telegram 392 from USNATO, January 24; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

On January 24 at 5:49 p.m., Dobrynin phoned Kissinger to discuss the European security conference and MBFR. With regard to the European security conference, a transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: “D: I have just two paragraphs from Gromyko. One is about the European Conference. K: Yeah. D: You remember, you sug-
gested there was a little bit of distress with you that as a preliminary you suggested consultations, to make two or three phrases expressing what is in each point. K: Yeah. D: [omission in transcript] a mandate protocol or explanation of . . . K: Right. D: So, they discussed [omission in transcript] about it, and they thought this idea, and they gave me the letter to give to you and to the President our draft of [omission in transcript]. There are two or three phrases, maybe, no more. Points of the agenda. K: Can you send them over? D: Yes. I will send it to you.” Dobrynin informed Kissinger that he would also be sending over a document on MBFR. “D: OK. The only thing in the second point is [omission in transcript] on about one point of Hungary, I would like to tell you orally when you read it. You remember the question, one, why we need Hungary. K: Yeah. D: Well, we give serious relation [consideration?] to this one. But it is a remark only for your consideration. Please do not tell anyone in State Department or to your allies. If you or some other countries make a real and feel that Hungary should be included not only as participant but then as negotiators the reduction troops from their territories, too. [sic] We could agree only under the provisions that they are prepared to do it, but then we will invite Italy to do the same. (Laughter) This is not impudent but [omission in transcript] because really the number of states which you propose includes all the members of the Warsaw Treaty [omission in transcript]. At the same time the socialist countries, you know, are easily stored [sic]. K: I understand. D: So even [omission in transcript], but if you read it, you will soon be agreed on the condition of Italy’s [omission in transcript]. K: Well, now may I . . . you know that joke where Ribbentrop before the war went to a dinner party and met Churchill. D: What about? K: And Ribbentrop said, the next war will be different. We have Italy on our side. And Churchill said, that’s only fair, we had them last time. D: (laughs).” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, Chronological File)

Later that day, Dobrynin’s talking points on the “all-European conference” and on “reduction of troops to Europe” were delivered to Kissinger. The talking points on the European security conference listed “draft assignments for committees” at the conference, including “the first point of the agenda (European security),” “the second point of the agenda (economic cooperation),” “the third point of the agenda (cultural cooperation),” and “the fourth point of the agenda (regarding the creation of the Committee).” Both sets of talking points are ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE.

On January 25, Kissinger wrote in a special-channel message to Bahr: “Dobrynin has given me the texts of mandates for the Committees of the CSCE based on the four point agenda which the Soviets have already tabled in Helsinki. The mandates proposed by the Soviets are
much briefer than those tabled by the West, exclude any reference to confidence-building measures but include a mandate for the consultative committee which the Soviets want to have created by the CSCE. I have not so far informed our own agencies about this Soviet document and want to withhold comment to Dobrynin until I have a reaction from you. Dobrynin says the Soviets have provided the same texts to you and the French. Given the great interest which the European Nine have taken in the Western mandates tabled in Helsinki, I would greatly appreciate your judgment on how we might best proceed in the situation that now exists. There seem to be two basic choices: (1) attempt to work out a compromise between the Western and Soviet texts, a task that presumably will take a considerable amount of time and work, or (2) take the position that all suggestions for mandates should be given to the CSCE Committees when they begin their work. At Helsinki we would, under this choice, simply settle on the agenda headings. We are prepared to take the first course together with you. Your reaction would be extremely helpful.” Bahr replied in a message to Kissinger in German on January 26: “I held out the prospect to the Soviets of a response for next week at the earliest because we will be able to determine our preference on the matter only this weekend. I will let you know for certain on Monday at the latest through this channel.” (Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence, #115–119; translated from the German by the editor)

On January 25, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed the latter’s talking points on MBFR during a telephone conversation at 6:30 p.m. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: “K: All right. On MBFR, let me tell you what we will do. First, in your reply, you insist on Vienna. You know, in a nice way. D: Yeah. K: The United States will support you. D: Yes. K: Secondly, on membership. We think the easiest solution would be the following, although that’s essentially what I already told you at lunch. If you would accept our participants and if you would propose Romania and Bulgaria as observers, then we would agree at the Conference. If you want to exclude Hungary from the working group, we will agree with you. D: No, no; it’s not quite clear. Because as of now, it’s not really a question about—really we don’t specifically worry about Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. Really, it is not a problem for us. Because we discussed it with our allies and we could handle it in one way or another. So the question really I would like a more clearer [statement?] of your position. Well, there was a proposal originally— K: You see, the problem with us is if we exclude these southern countries now, I just can’t imagine how we’re going to handle it. D: This was a proposal you can invite all of them. K: But we don’t want to invite the neutrals. D: Oh, this is a problem.” Dobrynin then raised Moscow’s concern that MBFR not become a bloc-to-bloc negotiation:
“D: One is proposing otherwise your very clear position bloc to bloc, Henry. It is so clear, bloc to bloc. There is no other way to do this. Because you’re just proposing exactly bloc to bloc. K: Well, is that bad? D: You know when you discuss in Moscow—at least in my presence—Gromyko tried to explain and in the presence of Brezhnev, and you just shake hands and said: Well, all right, though you don’t quite understand what does it mean, what you said (laughter) all right to. This I do remember. More than that, this is in a communiqué—or rather the paper you receive from us. You asked us to give you, and we give you paper. That is, everything you asked. That was in written form, and one phrase which is—and this would be on non-bloc, bloc [basis?]. So now you coming back to bloc basis.”

Kissinger subsequently phoned Sonnenfeldt to discuss Dobrynin’s remarks. A transcript of their telephone conversation at 6:30 p.m. reads in part: “K: Hal, I just talked to Dobrynin. And he says they can’t accept this. S[onnenfeldt]: They cannot? K: Now what he proposes is that we take this working group; that we confine the meeting to the working group, the preliminary meeting. And then say the working group has the right to invite others. And that we can propose the southern flank, and they’ll propose anyone else, including neutrals.” After briefly discussing the Soviet position, Kissinger asked, “Do you want to talk to Stoessel and see what he thinks?” Sonnenfeldt replied, “Yeah, if I can locate him someplace.”

The following morning, January 26, Kissinger and Stoessel discussed the Soviet proposal over the phone. “S[toessel]: On that MBFR business—I reflected on it, accounted [sic] with Hal also, and the way I come out is probably best to go for this restricted list. K: OK, and then have them come back in their note with a restricted list minus Hungary. S: Yeah. K: With the right then to invite others whose views should be hard. S: That’s right. Now they might want to say something to the effect that Hungary has informed them that it does not wish to participate. It’ll be a bit transparent, but that might help a bit. K: OK. S: Then we’ll take a lot of flak from the flag [flank?] countries, but I think we can handle it. K: OK. Good.”

In a phone conversation, apparently on January 26, Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed once again the convocation of troop reduction talks. A transcript of their telephone conversation, marked “done before 27 Jan 1973,” reads in part: “D: Well, Henry, I received from Gromyko answer on this troop reduction business. Well, we agreed really what you suggest. In a sense just let them arrive, and we consider that it will be this way, that they will arrive—the Committee comes to Vienna because on the others we agreed upon. K: Right. D: And the idea is that they will arrive before the 31st of January, and ideas will begin effect on the date that was agreed upon in Moscow between you
and Brezhnev—the 31st as you suggested. At the same time there will be representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Germany and [omission in transcript], practically all from our side. And we assume all yours will be there at the beginning. Then they will discuss—I mean, about those who will compose this body for making decision along those lines we discussed upon. K: All right. D: And during this consultation we reserve the right to raise when it will be [omission in transcript] necessary about this neutral countries just as the right to raise during this preliminary consultation. K: Right. D: As you I understand reserve your right to exercise it. K: Right. D: [laughing] This is my impression, yes? K: That is correct. D: So this is answer just for you. K: But you will give us a formal answer?" At this point, Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviet Union would give a formal response to the Western notes of January 24 on January 27. He then read to Kissinger the text of the Soviet response before its official delivery. The telephone conversation continued: “K: Well, Anatol, you tell Gromyko that he has made a big effort and we will make a big effort. D: [omission in transcript] So, now, Henry, I hope by the way on both points—on European Conference, you remember, you sent to me your position? K: Yes, I have been in touch with Bahr. And he promised me an answer by Monday. D: Yeah, it will be very soon. K: And as soon as I—We are not the obstacle on that. D: I know. K: We can concert with the Europeans. And I will get in touch with the French after Rogers is out of there because they get too confused about our channels of communication." Dobrynin then discussed the Soviet draft agenda (mandates) and draft declaration for the European security conference (see Document 124). “D: But the only clear position I would like to make—please make sure that your Delegation in Helsinki—I am not thinking about the final document because they don’t know about it—but I think about the so-to-speak mandate. K: Yeah. But I have to get some agreement from the Europeans first, Anatol. D: I know but— K: As soon as I have heard from Bahr, I will— D: I understand, but I think still a certain kind is up to you what kind of a preliminary they have to actually—on a working level they will— K: Yeah, I will— D: They shouldn’t necessarily know that we are already involved on a high level but— K: No, no, I will calm them down. D: Yes, because otherwise in a little bit they will say some suggestions or objections and our people, without knowing it, they will report to Moscow Americans making fuss. So you see. K: No, I will calm them down.” (All of the transcripts of telephone conversations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 18, Chronological File)

On January 27, Bahr wrote to Kissinger in a confidential message in German: “We will decide at the end of the week about the reply to
the Soviets. Your opinion regarding the following thoughts would be very important to me. I will propose to say the following to the Soviets: ‘We will limit ourselves in Helsinki to determining the agenda headlines and designating the commissions, whose task will be to work out resolutions in the second phase of the conference. In doing this, they can make use of the various proposed mandates as working material.’ If the Soviets accept the proposal, we will save time in Helsinki and avoid the risk of having to reach a compromise between the different conceptions of mandates, which would leave both sides dissatisfied, which could prove later to be an obstruction in working out the resolutions, and which in any case would not yet resolve the basic problems with regard to the resolutions. If the Soviets do not accept the proposal, our tactical position will then improve for the then necessary working out of compromise formulas for the mandates. I do not fail to recognize the difficulties of achieving the agreement of all the Allies to this proposal. In this regard, I would be interested in knowing how the French will react to the Soviet papers. We have not discussed it with them.”

On January 29, Kissinger replied in a special-channel message to Bahr: “Your proposed reply to the Soviets corresponds to our own present thinking. If you should decide to proceed along that line, I think we could support it. It would be important to have your judgment how other Western governments would react, especially since the Nine took the lead in developing the detailed mandates tabled by the West. Would you be able to take a major role in persuading the European Allies that this is the wisest course to take? Should the Soviets refuse to accept the compromise solution of postponing the use of the various mandate proposals until the second phase, we do, as you indicate, face the problem of working out agreed mandate formulations. In this regard, what is your judgment as to the acceptability of the short Soviet version given to you and us? Incidentally, we have not talked to the French about the Soviet papers and have no private information regarding their attitude due to the absence of their Ambassador, who is our channel to Pompidou. In both contingencies, we have the problem of the Soviet proposal for some post-conference machinery. I would be interested in your view of this problem.” (Both in Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Correspondence, Unindexed [1]; translated from the German by the editor)

On January 27, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered to the Embassy in Moscow its reply to the Western notes of January 24 on MBFR preparatory talks. The note reads in part: “The Soviet Government is sending to Vienna, Austria, by January 31, 1973, its representatives to conduct with representatives of other European States, the USA and Canada preparatory consultations on the question of mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The Soviet side pro-
ceeds from the premise that there will be determined already in the course of the preparatory consultations—through exchange of opinions both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis between representatives of the interested states assembled in Vienna—the composition of participants in a possible agreement or agreements concerning reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, on which in essence there are no disagreements. . . In this, it stands to reason that those countries which will be reducing their own armed forces and armaments, as well as countries on whose territory forces subject to reduction are located, should participate in examining and deciding the substance of questions.” (Telegram 976 from Moscow, January 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR) On January 31, representatives of Eastern and Western states gathered in Vienna to discuss preparations for talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.

On February 9, Bahr replied to Kissinger’s message of January 29. In his confidential message, Bahr wrote: “Due to developments in Helsinki, I consider it no longer possible to pursue at this time my proposal of January 27. The Soviets have tabled in the meantime a part of their draft mandates. The discussion is in full swing. The other Western governments and the neutral states would not understand it if we now speak out in favor of breaking off the discussion and agree only to agenda headlines. If the negotiations in Helsinki come to a standstill, it will have to be decided whether to return to the earlier thoughts. Until then, we will work toward reaching an agreement on the basis of the Western proposals regarding the mandates for commissions and sub-commissions. I am positively inclined with regard to the question of follow-on organs because I see in them the possibility to secure for the United States an additional, institutionally-anchored right to participation in Europe. However, we have not yet discussed this question with the other Western governments. I am quite clear that there will be difficulties within the Alliance in reaching a common position. We must reach an understanding in the near future regarding how internal agreements can be reached for the shaping of opinion in the West. It can already be seen in Helsinki and Vienna that these multilateral events are much more difficult to navigate than something like the Berlin negotiations. Internally, the MBFR enterprise will be relatively easier for me than the enterprise of CSCE.” (Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 35, West Germany, Egon Bahr, Unindexed [1]; translated from the German by the editor)
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126. Memorandum for the President’s Files by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Camp David, Maryland, February 2, 1973.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Prime Minister Heath and Sir Burke Trend, Friday, February 2, 1973, 4:00 p.m. Camp David

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The President saw the East-West situation in the following light: The Western heads of government would be meeting at a time when the Soviets had achieved strategic parity and had no public opinion to worry about. The Chinese were gaining ground in the world. There was a great isolationist current proceeding in the world, and the spreading fashionable view of détente at any price. This put the West at a serious bargaining disadvantage. On the plus side, there was the Sino-Soviet split. It was hard to understand the reasons for the Soviet view, given their style; the Chinese view of the situation was easier to comprehend. The President thought that this major split was likely to last. The Russians could never be too sure of Eastern Europe. Just as we in the West had the problem of a race to Moscow, in the East there was a race towards the West. At the Security Conference they wanted to talk about exchanges in contacts; this was for them running a risk of disintegration. That was our opportunity. There was a problem of Europe becoming inward-looking. We could stall on the European Conference, but public opinion would not permit it. People needed hope without giving up anything substantial.

The United States would play the Sino-Soviet game to the hilt. Their rivalry was desirable. We would reassure the Chinese in the case of Soviet attack.

The President then turned the discussion to the defense issues. As to forward-based systems, the problem was how to relate them to central systems which were the most important. On MBFR, the President emphasized that NATO needed substantial conventional forces. We had to be sure not to weaken this conventional strength through

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 27, Geopolitical File, Great Britain, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 4:15 to 6:45 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
MBFR. The President also stressed the need for a strategy to take care of alliance concerns about SALT I and SALT II. The United States would not be trapped by the Soviets. Yet if we looked at reality we had to understand that we were limited in raising defense budgets. Dr. Kissinger explained that we were using SALT II and the MBFR negotiations partly as a way of getting the Europeans to address defense issues seriously, and focus on the real question of security. Hopefully we could use these negotiations in the same way at home and head off or postpone Congressional pressures for unilateral cuts in our forces.

The President emphasized that we had to get a common US/UK position. We should have joint study groups. Military men, of course, didn’t think anything can change. But we would have to address these issues. The Prime Minister raised the question of briefing the Europeans on trends in Soviet missiles. The President said that this would be done in the context of US/UK cooperation. With regard to SALT, MBFR and so forth, we had good communications.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

In preparation for the meeting, Kissinger included in a briefing memorandum to the President on January 30 a talking point on MBFR: “On Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, [your objective is] to reassure the Prime Minister that we will not seek a quick reduction with the USSR, but need the appearance of progress in the negotiations to satisfy our critics at home and to move the Soviets toward concrete issues of actual troop cuts; US-Soviet reductions will be the least damaging, but the UK and the Europeans will have to sponsor it.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1336, Unfiled Material, 1973, 10 of 12)

127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT
CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT): Round II Ends

During round II of the Helsinki talks, January 15 to February 9, participants established the outer limits of their positions on which actual negotiations will begin, presumably shortly after the opening of round III on February 26. The Soviets offered some notable concessions during round II—acceptance of a separate CSCE agenda item on human contacts and cultural relations (freer movement); inclusion of confidence-building measures under the agenda topic on security; and agreement that the MPT should draft language describing the general tasks (“mandates” in NATO terminology) of the committees to be established to deal with each agenda topic during the second phase of CSCE itself.

Differences emerged during round II on five issues likely to dominate the discussions during round III:

— the specific principles of interstate relations that should appear in the mandate of the CSCE committee on this topic;
— the text of the mandate under the human contacts agenda topic;
— military aspects of security, especially the question of MBFR/CSCE linkage;
— the Warsaw Pact proposal for a post-CSCE consultative committee;
— the procedural question of whether to reach agreement, during MPT, on CSCE phase II subcommittees and their mandates.

On all of these topics, the plenary debates during round II were led by the Soviets, on one side, and by various combinations of middle and smaller NATO Allies, plus neutrals, on the other.

We gave moderately-worded support to Western positions on some of these issues, and remained silent on others. Relations between the US and Soviet delegations were friendly, despite differences on substance, and the two consulted periodically. The US delegation has reported that some Allied and Western-oriented neutrals were alert for signs of US-Soviet efforts to dominate the talks but that those delegations found no basis for genuine concern.

The Soviets, during round III, will have to decide how to balance their desire for an early conclusion of MPT against their disinclination to make easy concessions to the Western participants. Most Allied and neutral delegations at Helsinki seemed fully aware of Moscow’s problem and to expect that the Soviets would move still closer to Western positions during round III.

Nevertheless, most Allies also appear to understand the need, at some point after the discussions resume, to fall back from some of the detail in the various mandates tabled at Helsinki by the NATO countries. We will be actively discussing this topic in NATO prior to the resumption of the talks on February 26, seeking Allied agreement on a compromise approach to allow MPT to end in time for a conference to be convened in the last week in June at the earliest.
The US delegation at Helsinki should, I believe, also try to help avoid unnecessary delay during round III by supporting more efficient work methods—for example, the establishment of working groups on various topics in lieu of exclusive reliance on plenary sessions. On most of the important issues of substance, however, we and our Allies are fairly close, and I believe we should not break ranks with them. While all of the other Allies, except France, favor some tie between CSCE and MBFR, we will continue to oppose any linkage.

William P. Rogers

128. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

MBFR Status

As a result of the NATO meeting on Monday, the Alliance has inched forward on the question of Hungarian-Italian participation.²

It is agreed that within the next day or two the Allies will put forward a proposal to lay aside the Hungarian question, but press for a private Soviet commitment that Hungary will in fact be included in the reduction zone without Italy. This will almost certainly be rejected, but the way will then be open for the US to gain support for its compromise: namely that Hungary’s status be specifically designated as unresolved, but the status of all other participants will be defined.³ (For us this compromise will be a way station to Hungary’s exclusion. For

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¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 214, Geopolitical Files, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Background Papers (“Talkers”). Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Urgent; sent for information.

² Telegram 906 from USNATO, February 20, reported on the North Atlantic Council meeting on February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR) The Soviets and Hungarians refused to permit Hungary to become a full-fledged participant in MBFR talks unless the Western participants agreed to Italy’s full-fledged participation. (Intelligence Note RESN–61.10, March 1; ibid.)

³ Telegram 26959 to Vienna, February 13, repeated to USNATO and all NATO capitals, instructed U.S. negotiators to seek such a “procedural compromise.” It also stated: “US would prefer inclusion Hungary as one of twelve full participants, with Hungary one of countries in putative reductions area. If we cannot obtain Eastern agreement to its inclusion, as appears likely, omission of Hungary from status direct full participant
many Allies, thus far, it will still remain a step toward its eventual inclusion. So we obviously won’t be out of the woods.)

—If the Soviets want to get on with MBFR business, they should accommodate us on this.

—If they want to be tough, they can insist on designating Italy as undefined, or insist that Hungary be dropped. In this latter case, the Alliance will have to face the consequences of the exclusion of Hungary—which all of the Allies are reluctant to do.

We have had extraordinary difficulty in persuading the Allies to the flexible on the Hungarian question.

—The Allies strenuously object to being “stampeded.”

—None of them believe the Soviets are determined, and all of them believe there is give in the Soviet position.

—The Benelux do not want to be committed to full participation if Hungary’s status is undefined, but in the end they will not leave the Germans alone.

—The UK has been the toughest in all the discussions: they refuse to take the Soviets seriously, and are insistent that the Allies not start the entire exercise by making a substantive concession. (Rush’s efforts have not convinced them otherwise though he made a very effective presentation.4 I can’t tell whether this is again just Foreign Office working level or all of Whitehall. Cromer told me he would make sure Downing St. understood our position.)

—None understand why we are in a hurry.

While complaining to you about our bad faith in not supporting the Soviet position as agreed privately,5 the Soviet representatives in MBFR would clearly be preferable to alternative outcomes: (a) collapse or prolonged stalemate of MBFR negotiation; (b) inclusion in full status and in reductions area also of Italy or other Allied flank countries; or (c) dropping Benelux states along with Hungary from full MBFR participation—any of which would not be in our interests.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)

4 Telegram 29670 to all NATO capitals reported on Rush’s conversation with Cromer on February 15. (Ibid.)

5 On February 13, Vorontsov handed a note to Scowcroft for Kissinger. It reads in part: “As the White House was earlier informed, Hungary could give its consent to be included among the participants of a prospective agreement on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe on condition that Italy is also included in that number.” The note recalled that at that time, the United States did not object to such an approach, but now “the American representatives in Vienna together with representatives of other Western countries firmly insist on including Hungary among the participants of prospective agreement and at the same time do not suggest to include Italy among those participants. We expect that the US representatives at the Vienna consultations with get appropriate instructions in this respect—that is, either they should not insist on including Hungary in the area of reductions, or should go in direction of additional inclusion of Italy into that area.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 38, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoly, Background Papers)
Vienna as well as others in the Soviet bloc are going out of their way to convince our Allies that they will bargain about Hungary. For example, they have suggested to Dean various compromises, such as including Denmark or dropping Luxembourg. Only a few days ago, the Soviet representative told the Belgians (of all people) that the West should be “patient” since Moscow takes a while to make up its mind. The Hungarians have made it clear that they are outraged about the Soviet position and have even urged the West to be tough. Similar noises have come from the Poles and even the East Germans.

All of this suggests that the Soviets are deliberately prolonging the Hungarian affair and driving wedges between us and our Allies. Indeed, by raising the Hungarian-Italian issues so early they have made it impossible even to open the conference—which was not my understanding of how they would play the question.

It may also be that the actual Soviet aim is to include Italy. Gromyko has just emphasized this in Moscow to the departing Italian Ambassador, and as I pointed out in my message to you in Peking there is some suggestion in Vorontsov’s complaint that you agreed to include Italy, rather than drop Hungary. This could explain the strange Soviet behavior on whether Hungary should be in or not.

Since Italian inclusion is clearly not in our interest and the Allies are even more adamantly opposed to Italian inclusion than Hungarian exclusion, you may want to remind Vorontsov that we have not agreed to make an effort to have Italy included, but only to drop Hungary.

Finally, whatever we agree on, the Allies will not agree to exclude Hungarian territory entirely. They (and we) will want to have some constraints on Soviet forces in Hungary. But this can wait till the negotiations really start next fall.

Attached at Tab A is a telegram from Strausz-Hupe which gives you the flavor of the problem we have with the Allies.

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6 Not found.

7 Telegram 827 from Brussels, February 16, is attached but not printed. It reported that the Belgians “are again disquieted by what they perceive as US disregard of their interests or, more accurately, of their equality of status within the Alliance. This feeling is intensified by vague suspicions that the US has some understanding with the USSR that take precedence over Allied consultations. The Soviet decision to withdraw Hungary from full participation, apparently made over the heads of the Hungarians (and other WP members) themselves, is, we suspect, seen by the Belgians not only as a forewarning of Soviet unpredictability but also as an instance of superpower manipulation.”
129. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 21, 1973, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Gaston Thorn, Luxembourg Foreign Minister
Henry A. Kissinger
Jean Wagner, Luxembourg Ambassador
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Thorn: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I appreciate this opportunity to talk about our relations—European-American relations; there is a malaise at the moment.

Kissinger: Yes. The European ability to produce theological debates amazes me. I really sometimes wonder what can be done. If the pattern in MBFR does not change, I don’t know what will happen. The Europeans keep trying to tie us down with legalisms. But the point is that we cannot be tied down with legalisms but only with substance. For two years we have been conducting the most intensive and meticulous technical studies. We have no preconceived notions. But the best way to keep us in Europe is to get a theory that will keep us there. Otherwise you can be sure that the Congress will drive us out. I keep hearing about US-Soviet deals. If we wanted to get out it would be the easiest thing for us to stimulate a resolution in the Congress.

Now as regards Hungary, we think it would be better to keep them out rather than putting Italy in. But this has become a religious issue now. In fact the troops do not threaten Western Europe. By now Hungary is a religious issue.

Thorn: Some people were thinking of Yugoslavia. There is a fear of a Soviet invasion.

Kissinger: But the cuts would only be 5–10% anyway. So there would be no difference.

Thorn: I have talked to the Dutch Foreign Minister and urged him to be flexible on the Hungary issue. But you know I have to tell you that there is widespread fear of a pre-agreement between you and the Soviets.

Kissinger: I can tell you that the only pre-agreement was to get a deal on a date that was far enough ahead to enable us to prepare the

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 271, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. Confidential. Outside the system. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office.
talks properly. So the only pre-agreement was to get dates for CSCE and MBFR. As I told you, if we want to get a deal we can get Mansfield to put in a resolution. We would not need to negotiate with the Russians on MBFR. Now let me tell you another serious thing. The European reaction to our Vietnam bombing deeply offended the President. For him the Alliance is now more a matter of the head than the heart. We stayed in Vietnam for four years to demonstrate the validity of an alliance in the U.S. The only real issue in Vietnam was whether the US could be driven from disadvantage to disadvantage. If that had happened, it would have damaged the Alliance. That is why we did what we did. About the bombing—go to Hanoi. There is no street that is damaged in the city but only in the suburbs. I was frankly astounded by the accuracy of the bombing. We did not even see villages that were destroyed, at least on the route that we took. And there are the casualty figures: 1,000 killed. These are their own figures. That is certainly different from Europe in World War II. So you have to understand how deeply offended the President was by the reaction from the very Allies for whom he was safeguarding the US commitment.

But all of this is behind us now and the question is: how do we start talking? Take CSCE. We never believed in it. We want to get it over with. Otherwise people will think something really important is going on—though no one understands what. Why should there be a long debate about mandates. The best thing is to get nothing or just something banal. Moreover, you know that the Europeans drove us into the Conference. Now they are engaging in some sort of Wagnerian struggle about long or short mandates.

Thorn: So you are saying “not so much detail.”

Kissinger: Well, if it goes on a long time the people will think something is going on. It is better to get it over with.

Thorn: Do you object to “freedom of movement?” I mean, shouldn’t we take the offensive on this?

Kissinger: No, I don’t object. And I think it is all right to take the offensive but I think we should get relatively short mandates.

Thorn: Well it was always your representatives who used to talk about “careful preparation.” This is really a change in position.

Kissinger: Well, I think we are better off with relatively short mandates and with getting the Conference over with or just getting a banal result.

Thorn: What is your position about a follow-on organ?

Kissinger: Well we could consider something low key; something like a clearing house, but no important functions.

Thorn: I see.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Dear Walt:

Last week I had a chance to “see ourselves as others see us.” Henry Kissinger not too long ago talked with Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Thorn in Washington. Thorn’s cable was repeated among other places to his representative at CSCE. He shared it with the other members of the 9 here where it created a stir, to put it gently. He kindly let me read it as well, a fact which obviously should be protected.

Thorn reported an atmosphere of impatience, uninterest in Western European concerns, and a disposition to brush them aside casually—in short an autocratic heedlessness. The details were as follows:

a. MBFR—He bluntly told Thorn the Soviets were right to exclude Hungary so the Allies should accept the fact and get on with it. When Thorn protested that this was not simply an issue of political-military geography but was a fundamental question of how to treat with the Soviets, Kissinger made it clear that he knew best how to handle them.

b. He urged that Quarles should be sacked because he was really not working out well in the MBFR situation in Vienna. (This was not

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 82 D 307, Box 1, Correspondence, 1973. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation at the top by Stoessel to Springsteen reads: “Still more on the HAK–Thorn conversation.” Vest’s letter is attached to a reply from Stoessel, March 16, in which Stoessel wrote: “There is no doubt that Henry’s remarks have caused a stir. While he may have taken the line he did quite deliberately in the hopes of producing some results through shock treatment, I fear that he may have gone too far. In particular, his reference to dealing with the Soviets can only add fuel to the fire about US-Soviet conniving. I shared your letter with Ken Rush, who is also concerned and will do what he can to see that this sort of thing is not repeated. However, as you well know, this is a realm in which we in this building do not have much control.”

2 See Document 129.

3 The British delegation at the Helsinki talks reported that the Luxembourgers had briefed the EC–Nine representatives about Kissinger’s comments at a working dinner on March 1. According to the British report of the Luxembourgers’ comments, Kissinger said that the Europeans were being “thoroughly unhelpful” with regard to CSCE and MBFR; that the West “should let the Russians, as sponsors, have what they wanted, a short snappy Conference with little substance”; and that “freer movement had tactical uses but would lead to nothing.” (Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume II, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975, p. 103, fn 6)

4 Bryan Edward Quarles van Ufford, head of the Netherlands delegation at the MBFR exploratory talks in Vienna.
a happy comment to Thorn who is a close personal friend of Quarles’
dating from the times when the latter was Dutch Ambassador in Lux-
embourgh. I suspect the starchy small Dutch Establishment will not for-
get this quickly, and my Luxembourg colleague reported the Dutch
general reaction that the U.S. was acting like the Soviets who had com-
plained to Bonn about Brunner5 in CSCE.)

c. He denied that there was any US-Soviet collusion other than
the original MBFR/CSCE timetable of last September which had been
worked out with the Soviets and endorsed by the Allies. (Luxem-
burgers found this not too convincing in the light of US
conduct of MBFR and Kissinger’s conviction that he could handle the
Soviets.)

d. He added that CSCE was of no importance to the US but MBFR
was such a key internal political necessity that the Western Europeans
should not ruffle the Soviets in any way in connection with CSCE,
should dispose of the mandates as quickly as possible since they were
of little importance anyway (the French will like that), and should also
wind up the conference quickly before public expectations built up
which could not be met.

e. Conclusion. Although U.S. has been more polite in diplomatic
channels, this was Kissinger speaking and the EEC countries should
look after their own interests very carefully since in the period ahead
it seemed possible that the primary drive of U.S. policy would be
accommodation to Soviet preferences rather than to those of its
Allies.

You may well ask, so what’s new. It has been clear to me, since
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary, that we value MBFR
much more highly than CSCE. The geographical place of Hungary in
MBFR has been argued for some years in NATO. However, the impact
of the Thorn telegram bears watching. He is a respected politician in
the European scene and as a Luxemburger is less suspect of special
pleading than Foreign Ministers from one of the larger EEC countries.
This will probably percolate through most of the Western European
capitals and perhaps even reach the press. It will be fuel to the fairly
large blaze of suspicion which already exists.

Meanwhile I stick to my last in Helsinki and urge that we work
our way prudently through the CSCE mandates, meet the timetable for
a late June conference opening date, point out that my position is based

5 Eduard Brunner, head of the Swiss delegation to the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
on NATO discussion and agreement, and do not propose to jump the NATO caucus to join the Soviets.\(^6\)  

Sincerely,

George

\(^6\) On March 8, B.J.P. Fall of the Eastern European and Soviet Department of the British Foreign Office reported on a conversation with Vest to Tickell. According to Fall, Vest had called Thorn’s report of his conversation with Kissinger “basically accurate,” but that he did not think that Kissinger had “given very deep thought to the question,” and that “the President would want the American delegation to remain committed to the line agreed in NATO.” (Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume II, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975, p. 103, fn. 6)

131. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, March 5, 1973, 8:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Sir Thomas Brimelow, The Foreign Office  
Earl of Cromer, UK Ambassador to the United States  
Richard Sykes, Minister, UK Embassy  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Senior Staff Member, NSC  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Currency Crisis; Nuclear Understanding; MBFR; NATO

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brimelow: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On MBFR, every model of MBFR that we have studied is advantageous to the Russians. So the question is, why do they show so little interest in it? Our judgment is that it is because it would be disadvantageous to them in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the Security Conference serves their purpose much better. But if they can get the Eastern Europeans reconciled

\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 27, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Tabs A–D, regarding matters other than the European Security Conference or MBFR, are attached but not printed. The meeting took place at the British Embassy.
to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, I have always thought that they might then show more interest in MBFR. This is why they want a short sharp Conference.

In this draft treaty of theirs, there is still this unqualified American commitment not to use nuclear weapons. That would remove the American nuclear umbrella.

Kissinger: That we will never accept.

Brimelow: That is cardinal.

Kissinger: There is no chance of our accepting that clause or anything like it. Actually they have added clauses, like Article III, that legally do not remove the American nuclear umbrella. The areas left exposed are now China and the Middle East.

Brimelow: Removing the American nuclear umbrella, plus their conventional advantage, would increase their political influence around the world.

Kissinger: No question.

Brimelow: I do not think they are contemplating major military moves against anybody, but they are concerned with the balance of force.

We have taken out the unqualified commitment.

You say your tactic is to engage the Russians in discussions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

MBFR

Kissinger: Let’s talk about MBFR.

Brimelow: I want to make one remark first about the Hungary question. Mr. Thorn, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, has been going around Europe saying you were somewhat irritated by the way the question of Hungary was treated. Let me explain our position. We in

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2 Brimelow is referring to the Soviet draft treaty with the United States on the prevention of nuclear war, Tab D, which is not printed.

3 See Document 129. Kissinger subsequently discussed the British role in the Hungarian issue in a meeting with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other former Department officials in a meeting on November 28: “Last fall, the U.K. led the charge against us in NATO on MBFR. They made a big fuss about the fact that we had set a date to begin MBFR talks with the Soviets. This is something all the Foreign Ministers had wanted to fix and it is true that when the Secretary was in Moscow he talked with the Soviets and we agreed on a date. This episode left some feeling of acrimony. What really hurt was the argument about Hungary being in the MBFR talks. We were accused of sacrificing the security of Central Europe by dropping Hungary as a direct participant.” Kissinger suggested “that this was not really a policy issue,” but “the British raised it twice at the Presidential level and several times to the Secretary of State.” Kissinger believed that such action “can only be ascribed to a British desire to be a spokesman in NATO against the U.S.” (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential)
the UK feel no particular attachment toward Hungary’s being a full participant. We can see some advantage in it because of Hungary’s strategic position. But this is not decisive. But we were approached by the Federal Republic who said, “It is important to us that we shall not be the only country in Western Europe covered by MBFR.” When the Benelux expressed interest in participating and then rejected it, the Federal Republic became concerned. I am told by Berndt von Staden that there was a formal decision before the election by the German cabinet that the Federal Republic should not be the only Western country; if the Benelux fell out, the Federal Republic would not be a full participant. So it depends on the Benelux, who say they will not if Hungary will not. I am not sure the Benelux are firm on this, but we felt it prudent to play it along.

We are not convinced that the attitude of the Warsaw Pact won’t evolve, because the East Europeans have certain views and might have a certain influence. We certainly do not go along with the Soviet view that Italy be on the same par with Hungary. But the primary reason has been the attitude of the Federal Republic and the importance it attached to the question.

Kissinger: Let me explain our position. When Rowley⁴ expressed your views on the tactics, we agreed immediately.

Brimelow: Yes.

Kissinger: Though it took us a time to restrain our more impetuous colleagues.

If Thorn understood me to say I was irritated by the Hungarian problem as such, he misunderstood my point. Because what irritated me was the deeper question—the constant accusations that we have made bilateral deals with the Soviets, and the attempt to engage us by procedures that (a) miss the point and (b) could not restrain us if we did not want to be restrained.

We want to use MBFR for the alliance and for defense. We could not have gotten ABM or MIRV if it had not been for SALT. There was no way we can come up with a serious position on MBFR without having a serious review of defense, and therefore we want an unemotional discussion of defense. The Europeans think we want MBFR as an excuse to get out of European defense. It is just the opposite.

Everyone knows Mansfield will hang his amendment on the first available bill. The fact that it is quiet now is irrelevant. We should be using this time for serious review.

The irritating thing about the Hungary debate is that—if people think Hungary might be used as a backup area to evade MBFR, that’s

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⁴ “Rowley” was Ambassador Cromer’s nickname.
a serious point—but this attempt to enmesh us in endless procedural
discussion—that’s what I was trying to tell the Foreign Minister.

Now, what was the so-called “deal” with the Soviets in September? We thought it clearly advantageous to commit the Soviets to an
MBFR discussion and to begin with procedural discussions in effect a
year in advance of the substance. We thought it was self-evidently to
our common advantage. The Soviets were pressing us to make a sub-
stantive proposal—any proposal—and we refused.

On the Benelux: we think it obviously essential not to have Ger-
many the focus of the control provisions. Why should the Benelux tie
their policy to Hungary? I think it is to their advantage not to isolate
Germany in MBFR.

Brimelow: That’s why I think they will change.

Kissinger: That’s why I saw their Foreign Minister, whom I like.
Maybe we have been too impetuous. We agreed with you.

If this continues, we will be unprepared in MBFR and will get hit
by all our critics. Right now our critics are demoralized by the Vietnam
experience and are looking around for a foreign policy issue. On this
one, everything will be going for them: the balance of payments crisis,
the economic question, Vietnamization. The only way to pull the teeth
of it is to have an intellectual framework for a defense position. What if
the Russians propose a 20 percent cut after the European security con-
ference? Which they might well do if your analysis is correct.

Remember at the beginning of SALT: there was great pressure
against MIRV and against ABM. We fought it by keeping the debate so
esoteric that Congress was effectively excluded. This is why it’s so frus-
trating to see the Europeans attacking the President, who alone is pre-
erving NATO. The whole bureaucracy is for cuts. Laird was sneaking
troops out by the tens of thousands, and we made him put them back.

We want to get into a substantive discussion.

Brimelow: With the Russians or with the West Europeans?

Kissinger: No, with the West Europeans. If we do it with the Rus-
sians now they will beat us to death, given the state of disarray in
NATO.

Brimelow: What is your time frame?

Kissinger: We will be having a meeting soon on MBFR of the high-
est priority. I would be delighted to have your people see the papers.
If you want to give your views before our meetings, that is even bet-
ner. But above all, you have to understand our strategy.

Brimelow: Without arguing against you, there has been a delay
since 1968 when MBFR was first proposed, and there have been no
substantive talks. And we have entered talks without any agreed sub-
stantive position.
Kissinger: Exactly. That’s why we started it as only procedural. The situation is incredible. Whenever I analyze something, everything I touch turns to mush. We say we have 90 days’ supplies, but when I look at it there are some things we have a 40 day supply of and some things we have a 110 days’ supply of, so that the Defense Department has averaged it. This is idiocy. Obviously, the real length of time will be determined by the shortest critical items. And we and the Germans have entirely different ways of computing the consumption rates. It should not be beyond our capacity to standardize consumption rates in an allied army. And nuclear weapons—we have thousands of them and [less than 1 line not declassified]

In the name of what can we resist cuts? We need something defensible. It is an odd alliance with the Europeans saying that unless it is guaranteed that the United States will be destroyed, the Europeans will do nothing.

The Europeans must face reality. If we waste this year in internal debates, we will be whipsawed by the Congress and the Soviets. If the Soviets start feeding stuff into Mansfield and the New York Times, we will lose the base for our policy.

The Hungarian thing is a sideshow. What bothers us is that it is symptomatic. They accuse us of private deals but don’t say what the private deal is.

Cromer: There is not so much of this now. The only people doing their homework on MBFR are we and the Germans.

Kissinger: The Germans are not doing anything that I have seen.

Brimelow: The French are not authorized to do anything but they may start.

Kissinger: With the talks starting in the fall, they will start.

Brimelow: Too many people are talking to the Russians bilaterally. There has been no secrecy whatever.

Kissinger: Where does it happen, in the Secretariats?

Sonnenfeldt: Part of it is the insecurity of communications.

Cromer: And cocktail party talk.

Kissinger: If we expose ourselves as we have on Hungary, we are dead. If there are divisions, legitimized by the governments, the Congress will take the softest.

Brimelow: Let me read you a report we received from Helsinki of what Thorn is saying of his talk with you: “Kissinger said we should let the Russians have what they want on the European Security Conference, a short, snappy conference without substance. He also thought the Europeans were illogical if they oppose a consultative commission. But the United States was not supporting a consultative commission.”
Kissinger: I did not say a word about the consultative commission. All I said was if we have to have a Conference it should be short and banal so that it does not do any harm. I had nothing to convince him of. I was told he was helpful and that he was insisting on seeing me. My basic point was that we should not play the Russian game and have a monumental debate on procedures so that it would look like the Conference was significant. We should make it short and snappy so that we can down-play it. I thought this was your appreciation.

Brimelow: In Bonn on the second of March we had a plenary meeting, and [FRG State Secretary]\(^5\) Frank made a brief statement about the Conference on European Security, and expressed doubts about this permanent organ, which could be conceived as a vehicle for intervention based on the declaration, which, if the Russians have their way, would come out of this Conference. I said that since the Russians are now only proposing a conference of Ambassadors based on consensus, it might not amount to much. At this point Bahr said “Without opposing you, I have been turning over the idea in my mind that there might be some advantage of having a permanent organ if it were established in West Berlin.” This was new to us, and it seemed to be new to some officials there.

Kissinger: It’s new to me. Have you heard this? [To Sonnenfeldt]\(^6\)

Sonnenfeldt: I have heard the argument that a permanent organ has the advantage of keeping the U.S. involved in Europe, but not this.

Brimelow: I have heard that argument, but the new thing is West Berlin. We were very careful not to commit ourselves.

Kissinger: Incidentally, it’s a total absurdity to think I would use the Luxembourg Foreign Minister to advocate a permanent organ when I do not think a permanent organ is a good idea.

Brimelow: We have been very reserved on this until we see what the final declaration looks like. If the Germans are going to want a permanent organ of some kind—and history shows that Bahr is a persistent man when he has an idea in his head—we shall want the declaration to be very carefully considered. And at the commission stage, because only there can you be tough and play hard against Russian ideas. And at this stage we must be very careful not to get exposed to time pressures. And this is our major qualification against the idea of a short and snappy conference.

Kissinger: You must understand my meeting was only ten or 15 minutes. But again, it’s symptomatic. My only point was to convey to him that we wanted to get it over with in order to make it meaning-

\(^5\) Brackets are in the original.

\(^6\) Brackets are in the original.
less. If he had replied as you just did, that would fit into our strategy. Our objective is to prevent the Conference from being used against NATO; an organ would be used as a substitute for existing alliances. What you say is true; the declaration is important. But Thorn misunderstood me completely. I had been told he was the most pro-NATO of the Benelux foreign ministers, so I tried to use him to convey to the Benelux (a) the President’s feeling about the Vietnam thing, and secondly, what I told you—our irritation at these constant accusations of bilateral dealings, and what I told you of our strategy of wanting to make the Conference as meaningless as possible.

Sonnenfeldt: Is his English not very good?

Brimelow: It’s all right. He’s a good foreign minister. He’s anxious to keep NATO going; after all, Luxembourg is the weakest country. But he is also a tired and overworked man. At a Western European Union defense committee meeting last week he got everything wrong.

Kissinger: He got my conversation totally wrong.

Cromer: You ought to consult me in the future about your future chosen instruments!

Sonnenfeldt: You think he was taken aback by the full extent of the President’s feelings on Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: I was trying to convey that the key was to have a common strategy and to get on with it, and not have this endless nitpicking.

Brimelow: Okay. We can probably get this straightened out.

Kissinger: That would be extremely helpful.

Brimelow: And on the MBFR we should agree on a common position.

Sonnenfeldt: And button down the procedures so that we can get into the substance.

Dr. Kissinger: And as quickly as possible. Though we can slip a few months.

NATO

I want to say a few words about NATO in general. We have started a massive governmental effort. What it will produce, God only knows. What we want is, we envisage a process which this year would elaborate some common views on the nature of the political evolution, the military and economic. We should stop pretending we will agree on all categories. But we should agree on those areas where we should have a common position, we should agree on those areas where we have parallel positions, and we should agree on those areas where we can act independently—but we should discuss the limits of that independent action. If everything is ad hoc, there will be no framework.
We would also like discussions with you on whether we should have preliminary discussions among the allies and then a summit meeting, or whether we should have a series of bilateral meetings. We would like your ideas. We want to give it some intellectual framework. The Prime Minister and the President were eager to do this together in the first instance. The President wants to do this first closely with you.

If MBFR goes the way we want, the defense side should get a lot of that work done through MBFR. The next thing is to get the economic part of it out of the hands of the trade people.

Hopefully, we can avoid this malaise of every time we have contact with the Soviets . . .

I may use some excuse in May such as the Bilderberg Conference to go to Europe and to go around discussing with the Europeans.

Brimelow: You say we can see the MBFR papers. When will they be ready?

Kissinger: April 1st for some, May 1st for others. Some things you do so much better than we—this is not just flattery—because you have fewer people, and perhaps better people.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

132. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
US-Soviet Conversations on CSCE

As the cable at Tab A² indicates, members of the Soviet delegation in Helsinki at the CSCE have told our people that the United States has the Soviet draft of the final conference document. They have asked what the US delegation in Helsinki thinks of it and our delegation of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside System. Sent for action. Scowcroft wrote at the top of the page: “Action taken. BS.”

² Telegram 649 from Helsinki, March 13, is attached but not printed.
course replied they had not seen it. In addition, our delegation reports
that the Romanians in Helsinki also have asked what the US delega-
tion thought of the Soviet draft and expressed disbelief when told that
the US delegation had not seen it.

This reporting cable of course is now circulating all over the State
Department and I was called by the NATO desk. They asked of course
if the White House knew anything about this document. You will re-
call that Dobrynin gave you this draft of the final Soviet document
(Tab B) in mid-January and he said they had also given it to Pompi-
dou and Brandt.3 My recollection is that Bahr asked what we intended
to do about it and was told by you we would take no action for the
present.

The problem of course is how we explain to the Department of
State the Soviet inquiry in Helsinki. I suggest that you should send to
Rush the Soviet draft with a note that it was given to the President on
the understanding that it would be closely held because it had been
given to the French and German governments. In other words, we
might claim that we had left it to Paris and Bonn to determine whether
they wanted to make the existence of this known in the alliance, which
they have not done. You might want to fuzz the date of actual receipt
in order to obscure the question of how long we have held this.

Alternatively, we could claim that the Russians are talking about
their mandates which were given to you at the same time they were
published in Helsinki.

It is difficult to believe that the Soviet diplomats are so undisci-
plined or sloppy as to break the confidential channel. On the other
hand, there is no adequate explanation of why they should embarrass
you and the President by these revelations. One is led to believe that
this is deliberate unless you accept the theory that after a month or two
the Soviets do inform their own working level of the existence of con-
fidential communications.

Please advise if you wish us to do anything about this.

3 Tab B is not printed. See footnote 8, Document 124.

SUBJECT
Wrap Up of CSCE

The preparatory talks are now in recess until April 25. In this last round a fair amount of progress was made in negotiating mandates, and the issues are probably sufficiently narrow that they can be resolved in the next round, provided the Allies do not become too intrigued with pressing the Soviets to the wall on minor issues.

The Soviets ended the round with a burst of impatience and some harsh language about stalling tactics. Apparently, they do not hold us responsible, (at least not in official contacts); we have in fact tried to prod the Allies to step up the pace. Nevertheless, it is likely that the Soviets are becoming disquieted by the drift of CSCE, and will toughen up in the next round.

The main issues seem to be the following.

1. Security—Principles

The Soviets have insisted that one clear, unqualified principle is the “inviolability of existing borders in Europe.” This is anathema to Bonn, and all of the Allies (with some French hesitation) have pressed for a link between renunciation of force and inviolability of boundaries—thus circumventing the de jure confirmation of existing borders.

The Germans, realizing that the Soviets are becoming tougher, have moved to a compromise that would maintain some tenuous linkage, but want to trade this concession for something on human contacts, or some expression on the principle of self-determination and human rights.

We should not have to do anything on this; the Germans can be expected to make their concession, probably in advance of, or during the Brezhnev visit.2

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2 Brezhnev visited West Germany for a summit meeting with Brandt May 18-21.
2. Military Security—Confidence Building

There are two issues: (1) a linkage between CSCE and MBFR, and (2) whether confidence building measures should include “restraints” on major “movements” rather than on maneuvers.

—We, the French and the Soviets are holding out against any direct link between CSCE and MBFR that might be made in a declaration. Almost all the other participants, in one way or another, want to emphasize military security.

—The probable outcome is some rhetorical reference to European military security, and some patronizing but affirmative references to the value of arms control, including MBFR. This would be satisfactory to us. The Soviets will probably find a way to live with it, but the French may balk at a blanket approval of various negotiations that they are boycotting or oppose.

The “movements” question is exceedingly pedantic. Our ritual formula includes maneuvers, exercise and major military movements that should be pre-announced. The Soviets resisted “movements,” partly because they did not know what exactly was involved. Upon examination we are not so sure of what the phrase really means, but some Allies, abetted by the Romanians and Yugoslavs, see a further restraint on the Soviets.

Presumably, we will end up with a definition of “movements” that refers to “across national boundaries,” but we may have to take a softer position with the Soviets, since there are all kinds of “movements” that we have no intention of announcing.

3. Human Contacts

As expected, the more we go into detail, the more the Soviets resist. Their tactic seems to be to cover whatever is agreed on “freer movement” with a general qualification limiting “European programs” to those that do not interfere with sovereignty, or internal legislation, or have as their purpose stimulating war propaganda, etc.3

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3 On March 29, the Soviet representative to the Working Group on human contacts, Valerian Zorin, tabled a Soviet draft mandate in committee. According to a draft translation provided in telegram 833 from Helsinki, March 29, it reads in part: “The committee is entrusted with preparing a draft final document on the question of expanding cultural cooperation and contacts among organizations and people and the dissemination of information.” The translation continued: “Such cooperation should be implemented with respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country and facilitate the strengthening of peace and mutual understanding among peoples in Europe. It should not be utilized for propaganda or war, enmity and hatred among peoples, racial and national superiority.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
The Soviets apparently are making their own tactical linkage between “inviolable” frontiers and human contacts, hinting that if they get their point on frontiers they will make concessions on human contacts.  

The outcome seems to be a compromise that includes the Western language on freer movement, but does not commit the Soviets to adopt all the measures.

4. Economic Cooperation

The contentious issue is the Eastern insistence that among the principles for European economic cooperation there be a principle of extending MFN and non-discrimination. The West opposes this, though the reasons are not quite clear. It may be that the EC wants to emphasize regional principles rather than bilateral concessions such as MFN. (We probably should shift to MFN as a principle in CSCE. It might be a face-saving way for the Soviets to revoke their emigration tax; if there is a declaration that includes freer movement of people and the MFN principle, the Soviets might have a plausible pretext for dropping their [emigration?] tax.)

5. Permanent Machinery

This has been surprisingly quiescent. The Soviets apparently accept that it cannot be reasonably discussed until later. The Allies are, however, divided on the tactics. The French want to make a gesture toward some sort of coordinating committee that will have in its mandate future arrangements including another CSCE. The other Allies are thinking of a similar committee but do not want to concede on another CSCE, at least not yet. Our position has been that we cannot keep the idea of permanent machinery off the agenda, but should reduce its substance to an ad hoc sort of arrangement without any authority in the security area.

—We are somewhat hobbled on this issue. The State bureaucracy, especially USNATO, taking an earlier lead from the White House, has treated permanent machinery as anathema. Turning to a more conciliatory position—which we have already conceded to the Soviets—is proving difficult.

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4. Telegram 943 from Helsinki, April 7, reported that in a conversation with Vest, “Mendelevich confirmed that hard-line Soviet stance on human contacts during final week was tactical response to apparent desire certain Western delegations to establish trade-off between Baskets I and III.” (Ibid.) At the talks in Helsinki, the topics of discussion were divided into three “baskets”: Basket I (security); Basket II (economics, science and technology, and environment), and Basket III (human rights, cultural and informational exchange).
6. Soviet-US

Despite what the Soviets may be saying in your channel, as far as we can tell our Delegation has managed to steer carefully between the Soviets and the Allies. We have supported the Allied position, but tried to move the process toward a completion by June. We have supported the Soviets on excluding military security and on some form of permanent machinery.

You will recall that the Soviets badly undercut us by surfacing the fact that a draft declaration was given to you privately. This is particularly touchy because both the Germans and French have the same draft as the British now have from us; each seems to be waiting to see who makes the first effort to move toward the Soviet draft.

I will do a separate memorandum incorporating the comments from State and the UK on the Soviet draft.

7. Dates

We have been operating on the sequence given you in Moscow: namely, starting CSCE at the Ministerial level in late June. This could be a conflict with the Brezhnev visit, and you may wish to raise this problem of a target date with the Soviets. We are planning on about 7–10 days of speeches, and the endorsement of the agenda and mandates.

At Tab A is a brief State wrap up of CSCE.

At Tab B is a reporting telegram from the Delegation.

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5 See Document 132.
6 Not further identified.
7 The April 9 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger is attached but not printed.
8 Telegram 940 from Helsinki, April 6, is attached but not printed.

134. Editorial Note

On April 10, 1973, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at 8:40 a.m. in the Map Room of the White House. Among the topics they discussed was the European security conference. Kissinger’s memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Dobrynin then handed me a communication about the European Security Conference [Tab C], the gist of which was that progress had been disappointingly slow even though the Soviet Union had made major concessions. He wondered whether a more effective procedure might not be for him to meet with Rush
periodically on European Security Conference matters. I told him that it would be better for Stoessel to meet with Vorontsov and then they could pass their problems on to Dobrynin and me.” The Soviet note complained that “the sluggishness and even, one may say, slackness with which the things are proceeding in Helsinki causes certain concern on our part.” It asserted “that there should be no problems when principles of relations between states, which have already been expressed in many recent multilateral and bilateral documents, including Soviet-American ones, are being agreed.” The note continued: “The Soviet side holds the position which facilitates agreement on the questions of the preparation of the conference, and it has repeatedly demonstrated that. We consented, for example, to include into the agenda the question of certain measures strengthening confidence and stability in Europe, and we worded it as it had been confidentially agreed between us through the talks between Dr. Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador. We expect that we will work together with you so that the measures on strengthening confidence and stability, as it was agreed between us, should be limited to a provision on mutual notifications about major military maneuvers in stipulated areas and by a provision about the possibility to exchange upon invitation observers at the maneuvers of such kind.” The note concluded: “L.I. Brezhnev hopes that President Nixon would find it possible to keep the question of Helsinki consultations within the scope of his attention in order to promote by joint efforts their speedy completion.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/ Kissinger, Vol. 16, Pt. 2)

Dobrynin and Kissinger also discussed the European security conference in a telephone conversation the same day at 12:54 p.m. The two confirmed that Soviet Minister Counselor Yuli Vorontsov would meet with Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Stoessel to discuss matters relating to the conference. Kissinger told Dobrynin that “I talked to the President, and he will take what you said very seriously.” Their conversation continued: “D[obrynin]: [omission in transcript] about this European Conference, you know, because many of them, I mean your President, Brezhnev, Pompidou and Brandt, involved in their many international activities, so we’ve got to have some sort of schedule for consideration of President, Brandt, and [omission in transcript]. I tell you this for your guidance. Let’s put it on the calendar of our bosses, so to speak, the following. The first stage—the foreign ministers level. June 27 or 28. For a meeting period of ten days—what do you think? K[issinger]: Right. D: Second stage: This is [omission in transcript] work. The middle of July. K: Right. I understand. D: And work until the end of September. K: Right. D: So it’s July, August, September. And the third stage we come to is of the highest level. Around October or November, this would be schedule for governments to par-
ticipate. Roughly speaking. K: Okay. D: I tell you this right now for your own—but this is what Brezhnev would like to tell directly to Pres-
ident. K: I’d appreciate that, we’ll appreciate that, and [it is?] not in-
consistent with our own thinking. D: Just to put their mind into some kind of—because maybe they have some changes to make in the ap-
proximate—” (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Tel-
cons), Box 19, Chronological File)

Following up the same day, the Soviet Embassy delivered a sec-
ond message to Kissinger at 1:45 p.m. It proposed a timetable for the security conference: a first stage at the foreign minister level beginning on June 27 or 28, which would last “10–14 days”; a second stage for “committee work” beginning in the middle of July; and a third stage “at the highest level” to be held in October or November 1973. Dobrynin wrote to Kissinger in a note attached to the message: “As I told you, this message from L.I. Brezhnev goes also to President Pompidou and to Mr. Brandt.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 496, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 16, Pt. 2)

135. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 12, 1973, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
James Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, US Ambassador to NATO
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, NSC Minutes Originals 1971 through 6/20/74, 2 of 5. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. In preparation for this NSC meeting, the Verification Panel met on March 29. In the meeting minutes, the Panel approved the following “summary of conclusions”: “It was agreed that: 1) Two issues will be put to the President at the NSC meeting on April 12: a) whether we should or should not link force improvements to MBFR; b) whether we should present only our preferred position or two or three options to our NATO allies for discussion. 2) The Working Group will de-
velop an illustrative model of the elements from the nuclear option that might be in-
corporated into the other options. 3) Following the President’s decision, we will go to NATO with our approach during the last ten days of April.” (Ibid., Box H–108, Verifi-
cation Panel Minutes Originals 3–15–72 to 6–4–74, 4 of 5)
SUBJECT
NSC Meeting on MBFR

The President: We are faced with a situation where any reduction is probably to our detriment. If we don’t show some movement, the structure of NATO will come apart because of the lack of U.S. support.

We will have a hell of a time maintaining the military budget against Mansfield and the others.

We are keeping one step ahead of the sheriff. We can’t say any agreement is better than none, though.

We have got to show movement; we have got to have something come of it.

SALT is somewhat like that. It may be good on its own—although there are lots of problems, like cheating, military cutback, etc. But the mood of the country is such that if we don’t move in this context, we will cut unilaterally.

We still have some hawks; the polls are good. I talk hawkish, but let’s face it.

Let’s analyze the realities coldly, then see what it is we can live with.

Jim?

Schlesinger: (Briefs)
The President: Elliot?

Richardson: With Congress, we have devoted a lot of effort to show that NATO forces are capable.

The President: On the trip wire thing, say that if there is a confrontation, it will be nuclear. That is the best argument for a conventional capability.

Henry?

Kissinger: This is a superficial analysis. The Germans were inferior in two wars and nearly won. We should not kid ourselves that we have a balance.

Richardson: The Soviets have the same sort of interest in stability in Europe that we do. But we have to show that we don’t have to depend on the trip wire.

Rogers: Henry’s analysis, if you believe it, would indicate that our leadership is worse than the Warsaw Pact.

Kissinger: Elliot is correct about the Congressional presentation of the situation. But as things stand, we do not have a cohesive alliance. We have the dilemma of MBFR versus force improvements.
Rush: Europe is afraid we are leaving NATO. NATO is making force improvements and we should push for more, but not tied to MBFR.

Rogers: NATO is afraid we have already made a deal with the Soviet Union.

The President: I don’t think the Soviet Union is too keen on MBFR.

Rogers: There is agreement in the government on how we should proceed.

The President: Henry?

Kissinger: (Begins his briefing at 10:33 a.m.)

The President: Let’s have no illusion—the whole thing fails if we don’t keep our contribution level. We must show that if we keep strong, we can reduce later; and Europe must do its share.

Richardson: Arends has a study that is favorable to NATO and against unilateral reductions.

Kissinger: (Resumes his briefing, which is completed at 10:58 a.m.)

Rogers: I think we are generally agreed. We want to get going, show seriousness, and show that we haven’t made a deal.

I like the two proposals, plus implicit linkage and the force improvements.

Richardson: I think we should present both, but express a preference for reduction of stationed forces at as high a percentage as is negotiable.

We can also introduce the nuclear component, as an illustrative approach.

The President: Tom?

Moorer: We should have in our minds how we want to come out.

On the Soviet side, all the stationed forces are Soviet; on ours they are British, Canadian, and U.S.

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2 Kissinger’s talking points are ibid., Box H–033, NSC Meeting MBFR 4/12/73.

3 Kissinger’s talking points presented two main options. The first was “a common manpower ceiling to be reached in two phases: first, a reduction of stationed forces, then indigenous forces; NATO would reduce its force levels by ten percent and the Pact would come down to a common manpower ceiling with NATO.” The second option was a “bilateral U.S. and Soviet reduction of ground forces stationed in the NATO Guidelines Area reducing U.S. by 32,000 and the USSR by 64,000—in effect, a one-sixth reduction on both sides. The net result would be an approximate manpower parity in overall NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in the reduction area.” (Ibid.)

4 Kissinger’s talking points presented a third option: “a reduction of dissimilar threatening forces, called a mixed package, in which approximately 20 percent of U.S. theater nuclear capability in West Germany and [less than 1 line not declassified] would be withdrawn in return for removal of approximately 20 percent of the Soviets’ forward armored capability.” (Ibid.)
The first step should be a U.S. cut of ten percent and a Soviet cut of eighteen percent. We shouldn’t get into the structure of the forces to be withdrawn.

Richardson: Collateral constraints could be important, like stationing of observers.

Farley: There will be lots of discussion.

Rumsfeld: We should say we may have a preference, but our final preference will depend on the final alliance consensus.

The President: Good point.

Kissinger: Agreed.

The President: We must recognize we must take the lead, without appearing to sell our position.

Rumsfeld: It should include the nuclear option, and collateral constraints.

Kissinger: With Hungary in, you can’t have a common ceiling cut, only a percentage. A percentage cut is detrimental to NATO.

The President: We have no illusion but that improvement of forces must go along with MBFR. It is essential for support here at home. We have a tough selling job here. I have yet to talk to a NATO leader who talks in terms of selling to his people a strong NATO. There is no guts in the European elite.

Heath has problems. He wants to be strong, but has economic problems.

Brandt has problems. Look at their attitude toward our troops. Brandt is a muddle head anyway.

In Europe we have a bunch of ward heelers, not international leadership. They would want to be but their public won’t allow it.

The old bipartisan leadership has gone. It’s lost its guts. Unless we step up to the problem, no one will.

Rumsfeld: The argument that cuts leave us only with a nuclear option should be persuasive. Even peaceniks shouldn’t want to be on that side of the argument.

The President: Kennedy had an overwhelming superiority. He didn’t need other options. Now we have parity—so now we need an option other than all or nothing.
136. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 13, 1973, 10:05–11:03 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary General Luns of NATO
Van Campen
a secretary
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Donald Rumsfeld, US Ambassador to NATO
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sec. General Luns: Can we talk a little about the non-circumvention clause? You know my private opinion. The advisability that when we come to some sort of agreement with the Soviets that you could keep the option of having a non-circumvention clause. That you keep the option open . . .

Dr. Kissinger: There is no issue about that. There are two issues; should Hungary be part of the discussions and second, should there be a non-circumvention clause in the agreement. I think if you study the logistics, it is easier to move troops from Germany to Russia than from Germany to Hungary.

Should Hungary be part, and what is the substance of the negotiation. The participants have no way of knowing the subjects or proposals of the United States. Within the next two or three weeks we will present two or three possible ways of approaching the subject. We have never discussed it with the Soviets. There will be no question that we will have a non-circumvention clause in any agreement.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office.

2 Telegram 1998 from Vienna, March 13, reported that the Belgian representative to the MBFR talks, Andreanessen, told Yuri Dubynin during the latter’s visit to Brussels in February “that the main Allied interest in Hungary was not in Hungarian direct participation or in reductions of either Hungarian or Soviet forces, but in a non-circumvention agreement which would prevent the Soviets from introducing new forces into Hungary after an MBFR agreement was signed. According to the Belgian rep, Dubynin professed interest in this proposal and stated he thought it should not be too difficult to meet the Belgian interests.” The telegram commented: “The Belgian rep, as with recent statements by the Netherlands rep, has unfortunately undercut the Allied tactical position in Vienna by putting to the Soviets a position which in its essence might be acceptable to Belgium and also to the US but which, being based on the premise that Hungary would be a special participant, goes beyond what the NAC has approved as an alliance position.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 EUR)
Sec. General Luns: We will run into trouble if there is a general non-circumvention clause, because some of the countries, like Turkey, refuse to have it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are willing to have a non-circumvention clause that applies to Hungary. Our objective concerns the fact that European leaders, I am talking frankly, especially from the Low Countries, are saying that Kissinger made a private deal with the Russians. Some Belgian will say ‘ah ha’ no deal with Hungary because that is the best way to frustrate the Americans.

Sec. General Luns: That is no issue. NATO is unique, all is frank.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly since Rumsfeld has been there. (laugh)

Sec. General Luns: My deep conviction is that discussion is a good thing. There is no thought of being unpleasant to the United States, rather there is a general wish to conform to the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not saying in the NATO Council. There is this general feeling in Europe, I think the British do it in the discussions, and I have said this to them. What is the situation in respect to MBFR?

First, take the case of SALT, I am talking about our problem with SALT. We have been harassed by the leftists and peace groups. So we made it an issue, but a technical one. Thus we were better able to argue with them, as we were better informed. And in three and a half years we came up with an agreement. This is an example of what we want to do with MBFR. The only thing that is helping us now is that the Russians have not used their press and pushed us to reduce our forces.

Sec. General Luns: We say no.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Russians say reduce by 20% . . . Are we going to talk for another year about Hungary?

Sec. General Luns: Not in the preliminaries, is that going to place a deadlock in NATO?

Dr. Kissinger: We are willing to present our ideas on a substantive position. It is not in our interest to have Hungary in. What we want to propose is a common ceiling, which means we have to reduce less. They cut 80,000 and we cut 30,000 and add Hungary, they cut 150,000 and we cut 30,000. I doubt if that can be negotiated. Then we will be driven to a straight percentage cut. Say 10–15%.

Sec. General Luns: The Hungary question is settled. The non-circumvention clause of Hungary is acceptable to all. What is unacceptable is to have Italy dragged in with regard to the non-circumvention clause.

Dr. Kissinger: We have always said that you have every right to insist on that as part of the substantive position. I am in favor of a non-circumvention clause, especially applicable to Hungary.
Sec. General Luns: You will find NATO can be easy.

Amb. Rumsfeld: This is what I have been saying all along: that the United States agrees that if MBFR is successful, the US does not want a way to circumvent what has been agreed to.

Dr. Kissinger: All we want is that they should want it. I will give you a paper analyzing it.

Sec. General Luns: What makes the negotiations in NATO not so easy is, for one reason, you came up with your projections a little late. We have already done two studies.

Dr. Kissinger: Our government is run with a collection of sovereign departments, thus we have to get some consensus.

Sonnenfeldt: He is just a Secretary General here.

Dr. Kissinger: We made some very serious studies, which did not satisfy everyone and which were to the disadvantage of NATO. We have now come up with an approach—we believe that MBFR can be used as a device to have a serious discussion with NATO.

Sec. General: Then there are two things: NATO, and the hope that the US will have its study very soon.

Dr. Kissinger: You will have it by the first of May.

Sonnenfeldt: We should get out of Vienna as soon as possible so all of us can concentrate on substance.

Dr. Kissinger: How does one do this before agreeing on a position?

Sec. General Luns: There is the problem of the Turks, who feel very exposed. They are militarily weak. They feel there will be some sort of agreement that will not give them any advantages, but rather will be to their disadvantage.

Sonnenfeldt: You can’t make any agreements with debating points.

Dr. Kissinger: If you could help us convince the Allies that we are really serious. We have every intention of coming up with a position that is satisfactory to every country.

We have consistently wanted to exclude the flank countries.

Sec. General Luns: Next Thursday at our luncheon I will make the point.

De Staercke has been around for the last 28 years, 5 years before NATO was founded.

In the discussion, Monsieur Van Campen, wouldn’t you agree there is an understanding of the American position. Therefore, I don’t think I would be wrong if I said that I understand things at the back of your mind. Your ultimate aim is to go to Congress and say that we have now arrived at an agreement where we can withdraw. Am I right?

Dr. Kissinger: No. We don’t want to go to Congress just with that. We want to show that there is a rational defense policy. First, we have
to put the whole Atlantic relations on a fresh basis, in order to gain a substantive agreement we need new American elite support. The supporters of the present policy are men of the 50s and 60s. We don’t have the sort of broad based support we want. We would like broad based economic negotiations. What we want to do is remove the malaise where it is said here that Europe is taking advantage of us. This can’t be handled on a purely economic basis.

Second, we need some considerations; every Ally is conducting some kind of relations with the Russians. People are thinking of a condominium. Europe used to say “you are causing a war!” And Harold Wilson used to be here three times a year on how to conduct a European Security Conference. We didn’t invent this trend.

Third, the security conference cannot change the fact that we are now approaching nuclear parity. What we need is a strategic agreement among the Allies. It is essential to show conventional forces are more important. Then you can go to the countries and ask do you want general nuclear war? We are in a very curious position. Force reductions have to be related to the need to maintain the defense of Europe. If our troops leave Europe they will most definitely be demobilized.

We are most prepared to have serious discussions with the Europeans. What I would like to tell you as an old personal friend—the Europeans can no longer behave like spoiled children. For the Europeans to attack the President is nonsense, total nonsense.

Sec. General Luns: I agree. You have shown great restraint.

Dr. Kissinger: Europe nearly destroyed the alliance: what was an affair of the heart is now an affair of the head.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sec. General Luns: I had a long conversation with Bahr, and I talked to the Chancellor. I had an excellent talk with Leber.

Bahr talked and gave me an insight which frightened me. He said, “It is obvious.” I said, “What is obvious?” “Could you be a little more precise? Will they leave Europe this year?” Bahr said, “No, not this year.” I said that the United States will remain in Europe if we do our part. I then said that it was not very wise to say the things he was saying. He then talked about other possibilities; the dissolution of NATO, that there would no longer be two military blocs in Europe, and some arrangement to make this possible.3

3 Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum of April 12 about a “plan” that Bahr had allegedly discussed in an interview with West German journalist Otto Hahn in January
I then saw Leber, a great man. I know that Bahr made some remarks during the plane flight. He thinks that Germany is about to make deals with the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: They always have romantic ideas. 4

Sec. General Luns: They have the option to become another Finland. I am rather comforted because the German Chancellor is a decent man. So is Schmidt.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he is alright.

Sec. General Luns: I agree, and Leber too. The ideas of Mr. Bahr are not the ideas of the German government.

Dr. Kissinger: Will his ideas become the ideas of the government?

Sec. General Luns: I don’t know, I was all day with Leber. We talked about military and general matters.

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans are really insane. They have nothing to offer the Russians. The only thing they have left to offer the Russians is to wreck NATO. After that is done they will have nothing to offer them. The Russians will never permit a powerful bloc in Central Europe led by Germany. Only if Bonn becomes like Helsinki . . .

Sec. General Luns: Norway, France and the northern Benelux countries.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not worried.

Van Campen: But he is now insistent. Bahr said these things three years ago.

Sec. General Luns: He finally said, “You may be right and I am a little over optimistic.”

1969: “Bahr allegedly outlined a four-step Ostpolitik scenario consisting of: (1) Recognition of the GDR; (2) Nonviolence agreements and diplomatic relations with the East European countries; (3) Warsaw Pact–NATO negotiation on cutting American and Soviet forces in the two Germanies; (4) Creation of a Pan-European security system of the non-nuclear countries of Central Europe, whose territorial integrity the nuclear powers would guarantee. In response to a Hahn question about the last step, Bahr thought that the two alliances would have to be dissolved, being replaced by bilateral relationships between the two superpowers and between the remaining countries outside the security system. The opposition and right-wing press in the Federal Republic have hopped onto this answer to say that Bahr wants to dissolve NATO.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 263, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XII)

4 Sonnenfeldt wrote in his memorandum of April 12: “Hahn goes on in his article to note at length the supposed consistency of German Ostpolitik since 1969 with Bahr’s plan. He speculates about the possibility of a prior understanding with eastern partners, about Bahr’s larger national reunification objectives implicit in it, and about similarities between Bahr’s conceptions and Bismarck’s definition of Germany balancing between East and West, German romantic nationalism, and German propensities to overestimate their ability to control events in Europe.”
Dr. Kissinger: To get to our original problem again, if the Germans go that route they will be crushed. If there is one basis to unify Western Europe, it is on an anti-German basis.

We want to achieve what you and I have discussed in some way for the last several years. We want some conspicuous achievement in US-European relations, some new declaration of friendship, not endless arguments.

Sec. General Luns: What about some sort of summitry?

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe, I don’t want 500 cables running around the embassies.

Sec. General Luns: Tomorrow I see the Dutch press. I will be very general. I am concerned about the state of mind of American lawmakers that Europe is not pulling its weight, and American resentment that they are being attacked.

Dr. Kissinger: Don’t give any concrete ideas. I am sorry but I have to give a speech tonight, and we will have to break off.

Sec. General Luns: I want to show you what I got from the Russian government. “Tab A”

Sonnenfeldt: MBFR and military policy, we want to show we are reducing our troops with a credible defense policy for Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have troop reductions, they are not an objective in themselves. Our objective is the defense of Europe. It is essential and the context should be at the minimum level.

Sonnenfeldt: We don’t want to simply defeat the Mansfield resolution, which we can do—but to have a concept.

Dr. Kissinger: You take it up with Richardson. Or you can get in touch with Don, who is an old associate of ours and absolutely discreet.

Sec. General Luns: I will do that.

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5 Not attached and not found.

6 Luns also met with President Nixon in the Oval Office at 11:30 a.m.; they discussed MBFR, along with other topics. According to a memorandum of their conversation for the President’s files, Nixon told Luns that “there would be no deal with the Soviets at the expense of our Allies. The Soviets would like to use MBFR to undermine the alliance, but the United States would oppose this.” The memorandum continued: “Secretary General Luns agreed that MBFR must not be used to undermine confidence in America. He cited the tactical difficulties in Vienna, where there was a passionate discussion about MBFR.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 280, Presidential File, Memcons)
National Security Decision Memorandum 211


TO
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

The President has approved the attached paper setting forth the approach of the United States to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe. It should be provided to the Allies before the end of this month. The supporting annexes called for in the paper should also be made available to the Allies by that time.

The objective of our consultations with the Allies should be to get them to focus on the outcome the Alliance should seek for MBFR before turning to the tactical problem of developing an Allied position for the negotiations in the fall. U.S. representatives should bear in mind that our analysis makes clear that indigenous reductions are disadvantageous to NATO and that stationed reductions including U.S./Soviet reductions are more advantageous.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM’s), Nos. 145–264. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Acting Director of ACDA. The NSDM was sent to USNATO in telegram 79255 on April 27; it was addressed eyes only for Rumsfeld. (Ibid., Box 263, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XIII)

2 The attached paper, “U.S. Approach to MBFR,” April 13, is not printed. The paper put forward the three alternative reduction concepts presented by Kissinger to the NSC meeting on April 12 (see footnotes 3 and 4, Document 135): phased ten percent reductions in NATO stationed and then indigenous ground forces together with Soviet and [Warsaw] Pact indigenous reductions, respectively, to common ceilings for both sides; reduction to parity in overall NATO/Pact ground force levels in the Center Region by means of U.S. and Soviet reductions of one-sixth of their forces; [and/or] a mixed package illustrating an approximate 20 percent reduction of U.S. nuclear systems for 20 percent reduction in Soviet armor attack capability resulting in more defensively-oriented postures and approximate stationed ground force parity on both sides.” “Each of these alternatives,” the paper continues, “have been examined as possible outcomes of the negotiation. As such they would yield an outcome for MBFR that would be acceptable to the United States.”

3 The paper proposed that a series of annexes be attached and sent along with the paper: an annex with details of each of the three proposed reduction options; a separate annex discussing nuclear aspects of MBFR; and three additional annexes discussing “elements which would need to be considered in connection with our overall negotiating strategy but which are not of themselves functionally related to the specifics of the reduction approach we select,” that is, “force limitation agreements, possible pre-reduction collateral constraints,” and “verification measures.”
Once the views of the Allies are available on the outcomes that would be acceptable, we will consider these views and provide the Allies with our preferences regarding the initial approach to be taken in the negotiations, including concrete proposals on reductions that should be developed jointly by the Allies.

United States representatives should make clear to the Allies the importance of reaching agreement on concrete reduction proposals before the negotiations begin in the fall. This does not necessarily imply that such proposals would be made at an early point in the negotiations. However, it is necessary in order to ensure that Allied negotiating tactics and presentations on substantive MBFR issues are consistent with the proposals the Allies will eventually advance.

The President wishes to emphasize the importance of an Allied commitment to further improvements in Allied forces in connection with MBFR. The Secretary of Defense should prepare a presentation on a program for U.S. and Allied force improvements to be delivered at the upcoming NATO Defense Ministers meeting. A draft of this presentation should be made available for review by May 15, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger

138. Editorial Note

Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti visited the United States April 17–18, 1973, for talks with U.S. officials, including President Nixon. Among the topics he discussed with Nixon were the European security conference and MBFR. A memorandum of Nixon’s conversation with Andreotti in the Oval Office on the morning of April 17 reads in part: “The President stated that the European Security Conference is a prospect that Italy has supported. This Conference can be very helpful in reducing tensions between East and West. However, for the Communists it could be used as a device to lull the West into losing its sense of concern for maintaining adequate defenses. MBFR can become the basis of reducing the burden of maintaining the defense of Western Europe, but at the same time if we allow the fact that this Conference is to take place to lead us to lower our guard and relax on matters of our own defense, the Atlantic Alliance could practically come apart at the seams, which would be a happy result for the Soviet Union.” Later in the conversation, the President returned to the topic:

“The President said that (1) it is essential to maintain the defense of the Atlantic Alliance, and therefore reductions could not be made under
any circumstances without a similar move on the other side; (2) secondly, the President said that the West could not afford to allow speeches and bland communiqués that might come out of the European Security Conference to lead to a dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance or to a moral weakening of the Alliance. No piece of paper would have any meaning without a moral commitment in our hearts and a determination to maintain our adherence and loyalty to that commitment, this is the strength of the Atlantic Alliance. If this is allowed to wither away, the Atlantic Alliance will be worth nothing, no matter what is written on the paper. There are of course forces in Europe as well as in the United States who would welcome dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance. There are many elements within the media of both our countries which are characterized by a new isolationist disease. Therefore it is for the leaders of all of our countries, particularly the big countries, to exert strong leadership in order to maintain the strength of the Alliance, because the Soviet Union could only be interested in negotiating these questions with a strong Atlantic Alliance and a strong United States. This is why there has been success in such negotiations heretofore. When you are playing a good game, you don’t change your plays. The President went on to say that in his view it would not be an overstatement to say that the future of peace in Europe and in the world is founded upon the strength of the Atlantic Alliance, through the kind of cooperation we have seen over the past 25 years. In this respect, all of the leaders of Europe and also of Canada are important. But the future lies in one hand, a hand with five fingers—five men: Heath, Andreotti, Pompidou, Brandt, Nixon—all leading with a firm determination that despite the lack of support on the part of some of the media in their countries, we cannot countenance the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, if these countries were to be parochial, each going its separate way, then all of our hopes for building a structure of peace and achieving a genuine détente will crumble. It is up to us, the President repeated . . . five men.”

During a second meeting in the Oval Office on the morning of April 18, “President Nixon asked Premier Andreotti what his feelings were with regard to MBFR. He asked if in his view the present consultations were progressing on a correct course. In this regard, the President reported to Premier Andreotti that several of the Senators with whom the Prime Minister had met the previous day told him that the Prime Minister had been very firm in his discussion of this matter with the members of the Senate Committee. President Nixon said that he was grateful to him for that.

“Prime Minister Andreotti expressed the view that the USSR in order to accede to a reduction of forces must act firmly vis-à-vis the military leadership in the Soviet Union, which requires something in
return from our side. So in the first place there must be a linkage be-
tween the European Security Conference, perhaps not legal but at least
from the standpoint of timing, with the initial stage of MBFR. This of
course could be fraught with dangers. Still it would be very useful for
the West, and if properly managed within the NATO framework, as
matters are being handled in Helsinki, it should be workable. There-
fore as a first point, the Russians must be encouraged to see that in or-
der to obtain the desired results on the European Security Conference,
they will have to move forward on MBFR. Secondly, MBFR involves a
value from a technical standpoint but is also symbolic as regards the
direction in which we wish to move. Therefore it would be essential—
and this in large measure would be a problem for the United States to
consider—to set forth the timing for the achievement of a Euro-
peanization of the defense of Europe [including burden sharing], and
work toward linking this process to MBFR.

“President Nixon assured Prime Minister Andreotti that the
United States would make every effort to maintain our strength and
our commitment until there is a mutual reduction in forces. The Pres-
ident went on to say that the Prime Minister’s words regarding bur-
den sharing would be music to the ears of many members of Congress.
We are aware of the problems that this involves for the European coun-
tries. However, we also have to face a problem here, of which Prime
Minister Andreotti would probably be aware as the result of his con-
versation with some of our Senators, for example, who think that be-
cause we have met with the Soviets, the world is now a safer place,
and that we can reduce our forces unilaterally.

“Premier Andreotti commented at this point that the fall of Rome
came about when Rome began to see its enemies as they wished to see
them, and not as they actually were. It seems that all of the opposition
elements in the world came to adopt a philosophy based on which they
are more inclined to yield up their position, which in reality often is a
matter of cowardice, convincing themselves that their adversaries have
become good, and there is no more evil in the world. Had not Presi-
dent Nixon been able to count upon the armed might of the United
States and of NATO to back him he could not have pursued the poli-
cies he has developed. Therefore it is in this direction that our com-
mitment and responsibility lie. It is doubtful that Kosygin himself
would have been able to accept the President’s policies had they not
been backed with strength.

“President Nixon said that he could not agree more fully. Without
this strength the Big Five could hardly be effective in bringing public
opinion to see reality. This, the President said, was his and the Prime
Minister’s responsibility.” (Memorandum for the President’s Files,
April 18; ibid.) The brackets are in the original.
Washington, April 18, 1973, 4:45 p.m.

WS: Hello Henry. I saw Vorontsov yesterday about CSCE.²
HK: Right.
WS: And he was complaining [about] slow progress and so on. I told him about our concern about their stand on human contact issue and that this has bothered our allies and this is stiffening them about the inviolability issue.
HK: Right.
WS: And ah—well, he took this all down and asked, well, you don’t have anything specific to suggest? And I said no—you should talk to the allies. Now Dobrynin called me this afternoon, saying he had heard what I had told Vorontsov and he was very surprised and he asked had I heard from you? I said no, all I knew was that Ken Rush had talked to you and told me that Vorontsov would be seeing me about this CSCE meeting—that’s all I knew. And Dobrynin said “Oh, I have to call Henry because what we want is a very confidential exchange,” and I gather, you know, he wants to agree on some language. I said well, I don’t know anything about that.
HK: Well, that is what they have in mind—they do want a very confidential exchange—now I am not sure I would agree to agree on some language—
WS: I’m afraid of that because we’ll get into a nutcracker again with the allies.
HK: But if you can call them along a bit.
WS: Yeah, well that is what I was trying to do—I complained about this Orin (sp?) statement about human contact. I said I felt we were really on the verge of working on—
HK: But the intention was that there would be some preliminary talks between you and them.
WS: Uh huh.
HK: To see whether we could narrow the differences a bit—
WS: Yeah, yeah. Well, I can see him again. As I say I am reluctant to get into actual language because of a—

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 19, Chronological File. No classification marking.
² No other record of this meeting has been found.
HK: They have a central committee meeting next Monday—I wonder whether you can’t stall them through that.

WS: Sure. Yeah. You mean hold off any further contact—

HK: No, tell him you have since talked to me and you are willing to have, you know, some exchange, but I wouldn’t agree to anything final—and you can tell him that it was agreed that the final decision, if any, would be made by Dobrynin and me.

WS: Yeah. Should we suggest illustrative language or—

HK: Well, if you think you can sell it.

WS: Yeah, or maybe we can be a little more specific on the points that bother us.

HK: Yeah, I think that would be my first step.

WS: Yeah, because I really think it is for the allies, mainly the French and the Italians, they are very concerned; they think something can be worked out in Helsinki, but the Soviets have got to give a little. And then on this inviolability of frontiers, it is not ourselves that are holding the thing up, I think it is the Germans, and they are prepared to move, but they want some give from the Soviets on the human contacts.

HK: Well why don’t you explain that problem to them and say we are willing—but it is also partly between them and the allies—but show you have had some instructions to be helpful. Can you do that?

WS: Sure, sure, sure.

HK: Good, thank you.
Patrick Nairne  
Charles Powell, First Secretary  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff  
William Hyland, NSC Staff  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sir Trend: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] What about the military thing and MBFR?

Dr. Kissinger: We do feel agreed about MBFR.

Our grievance is that we simply do not accept the proposal that Hungary is a major consideration of the West. We agree that Hungary should be protected by a non-circumvention clause.\(^2\) I don’t agree with the view of Luns that Hungary will be a repository for the Soviets.\(^3\)

There is no dispute on our side that Hungary should be covered by a non-circumvention clause. You have seen the options that we have developed. You will see that we are aiming not for a big cut, but we want a common ceiling established. I have seen that we need a general approach, and I think that a common ceiling is the best approach. The common ceiling requires a disproportionate cut by the Soviets of 1½ to 1 or 2 to 1. If you include Hungary and insist on a common ceiling, you have 5 to 1. You are, therefore, driven to percentage cuts. Then you will not get into very dangerous levels of cuts. We believe the maximum cut would be around 15% and we prefer around 10%. This would affect 7–8,000 troops in Hungary. Nobody can tell us that these troops affect the security of Western Europe. The insistence [inclusion] of Hungary makes it difficult to insist on a common ceiling, and forces us to make percentage cuts, which are not in our interest.

We have made a serious attempt to deal with MBFR as a security problem. We will not use it as the European vehicle of Vietnamization. We will use it for a security debate and to quiet down our domestic situation. I do so at the minimum level we consider realistic. We realize that at the precise time when it most important, all our governments are under pressure to dismantle. We think it is imperative to address the security debate.

Amb. Cromer: We think it was you who introduced Hungary anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be.

\(^2\) A non-circumvention clause would prevent the re-stationing of forces withdrawn by the Warsaw Pact and NATO as part of an MBFR agreement in other NATO or Warsaw Pact countries outside the reductions area.

\(^3\) See Document 136.
Sir Brimelow: I have here the reply of Sir Alec (Douglas-Home). He reads . . . (re Hungary in MBFR) 4

Dr. Kissinger: We will accept this.

Sir Brimelow: This is terribly important.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never questioned that. We have never had the view that Hungary should be excluded.

Sir Brimelow: This is a matter in which our Ministers are interested. They do attach much importance to bringing Hungary into MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: They don’t have to be at the table to have the area covered by a non-circumvention clause. This would certainly be a legitimate subject of discussion.

Sir Brimelow: Would you like to keep that? (refers to reply of Sir Alec Douglas-Home—[Tab A]) 5

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Sir Brimelow: I think that letter calls for a reply from Secretary Rogers, not Kissinger.

Sonnenfeldt: Your people certainly stonewalled in Brussels.

Sir Brimelow: Yes, as you say, they have stonewalled. Ted Peck 6 wrote “as foreseen, we are in the minority of one,” and we will have to consider how to reply to Luns’ appeal.

Dr. Kissinger: If you can’t give way gracefully . . .

Sonnenfeldt: How much can we put ourselves formally on paper? We have to give some assurance that we are serious.

Dr. Kissinger: We will develop a common position before the negotiations.

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4 Douglas-Home’s note, addressed to Rogers, is not attached. The text of the note was sent to London in telegram 76685, April 24, and reads in part: “I hope that you do not think that we have been unreasonable about Hungary, but the issue seems to us of real importance.” Douglas-Home voiced the opinion “that the outcome of the discussions in Vienna pre-judges the Hungarian issue in favor of the Warsaw Pact” and that “the ground lost will be very difficult to recover later on.” “Hungarian exclusion from any MBFR agreements,” he added, “could have considerable impact on the Balkans, and in particular Yugoslavia.” He continued: “I think it very important that we should as a minimum objective stick to the decision taken in the Council on 12 March that the Warsaw Pact countries should not be free to circumvent MBFR agreements, for instance by building up Soviet forces in Hungary, and that the question of Hungary’s inclusion in a constraints area should be kept open.” Douglas-Home wrote that “in this case I would be ready to accept in the interests of Alliance solidarity the recommendation of the Allied negotiators in Vienna. I would do so with some misgiving.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 730, Country Files, United Kingdom, Vol. 8)

5 Brackets are in the original.

Sir Trend: We are disposed to reconsider our attitudes.

Sir Brimelow: Sir Alec will reply to Secretary General Luns unless you want a further discussion.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s get an answer to Sir Alec.⁷

Sir Trend: When we reach substantial negotiations, you will insure that Hungary will be covered by the non-circumvention clause?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we accept what Sir Alec has said. What we want to do now is to debate on how to phrase the non-circumvention clause.

Amb. Cromer: You can use my good office.

Sonnenfeldt: We are half way there with the unilateral Western statements made in Vienna.

Sir Brimelow: We are not happy with the unilateral statements made in Vienna.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never questioned that the substance of the issues relating to Hungary should be part of the actual negotiating position, which I assure you will be a common one.

Sir Brimelow: Sir Alec has said that he would be ready to accept it, but would do so with some misgivings.

Dr. Kissinger: Someday tell me what you are trying to achieve. What is it you are giving up with misgivings?

Sir Brimelow: “The attitude which we have hitherto adopted.” (laughter)

Sir Trend: Now, MBFR.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to MBFR, we will put before the NATO Council a paper boiled down,⁸ but what your people saw. There are two options for third countries in a separate status. We should use the nuclear option as a building block. We do not believe that this can be presented as the only Western option. I don’t think the Soviets would accept it. Therefore, we have two options; do we want to operate in two stages by the usual U.S. cut in regard to Soviet forces. Or do we want simply a cut of U.S. to Soviet forces where percentage equilibrium leads to a common ceiling on both sides.

Sir Trend: What do you favor?

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⁷ Rogers’s reply to Douglas-Home, sent to London in telegram 76685, April 24, reads: “I agree entirely that the Soviets should not be free to circumvent or undermine MBFR agreements by augmenting their forces in Hungary. To this end, we will join fully in Allied efforts to achieve agreement with the Warsaw Pact participants in the negotiations themselves on provisions designed to preclude circumvention of MBFR agreements reached. With regard to Hungary’s inclusion in the constraints area, I agree that this issue should continue to be kept open.”

⁸ See Document 137.
Dr. Kissinger: In the first option you have 10 and 10. I favor the second option where the number of forces cut is slightly less. Option one is a 38,000 cut. We don’t like indigenous force cuts. Look at what would happen in the countries concerned, we would be trading good German divisions for second rate Czech divisions. We would on the whole prefer the second option, but we are not going to press it.

Sir Trend: How will the Russians react?

Dr. Kissinger: I have no feeling for this. Prior to the Summit they offered a 5% US-Soviet cut. We refused to discuss it and we have never had a serious discussion on MBFR. My impression is that they are very badly organized in this and find it difficult to find a bureaucrat to propose anything.

On the nuclear package, which is not a separable package, one can make arguments for both. We have many more than can possibly be ever used. We have 5,000 in the Central Front. They can be used as a compensation for some inequality of number.

Amb. Cromer: These are ten times more than the last time we have discussed it.

Dr. Kissinger: Ten is the number that NATO has agreed on. I have my futile task to get the President to understand this. We are not going to press that at all. What is your view?

Mr. Nairne: We like the common ceiling approach and the great emphasis on European security. Where is the starting point? How do you see this beginning?

Dr. Kissinger: You mean the starting date of negotiations?

Mr. Nairne: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: If I were to conduct a negotiation I wouldn’t say anything about nuclear war first. Then you make options, and they
will scream at inequality. After a deadlock we could introduce nuclear elements.

Mr. Nairne: The percentage element would be quite low to begin with?

Dr. Kissinger: Not just to begin with, this is the only negotiation. We would pick a draft that would result in a common ceiling.

Sonnenfeldt: What preliminary proposals do you start with?

Dr. Kissinger: I hate to give up the common ceiling, I might start at that and stick at that. If you say ten, then you have yielded a principle that is dangerous.

Amb. Cromer: A common ceiling means sixteen.

Sonnenfeldt: It happens to be the only way you can get it.

Dr. Kissinger: You have the advantage of an equal cut and an equal outcome.

Amb. Cromer: But you are really in a heading position.

Dr. Kissinger: But if you start yelling about inequality where we get rid of a little more than they in the specialized weapons . . .

Mr. Nairne: We want something from them.

Sonnenfeldt: Obviously.

Dr. Kissinger: Our military had one option which was 40 Pershings and 60 RF–4s for 140,000 Russians. Unfortunately, we don’t have the personnel to be able to negotiate this.

Mr. Nairne: The whole way that Europe looks upon tactical nuclear weapons is part of the strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but what we would do with them and their number might inhibit the President from using them at all.

Mr. Nairne: I think 15% would be a high figure.

Sir Trend: Have you contemplated what would happen if no agreement is made with the Russians?

Dr. Kissinger: If we have used it to put before our people as a policy that makes sense, and we can put this before the Soviets . . . We will fight for it. If we can put before Congress and the public a rational plan, elaborate what our defense strategy is and the reason the Soviets won’t accept it, we will be o.k.

I believe the tide is going to turn, again if it weren’t for Watergate . . .

Sir Trend: There isn’t much sign of this in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Look at the POWs. This is not a defeatist country. Unfortunately our intellectuals are out of whack.

Sir Trend: Is there, then, a rational defense policy?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and this we want more than a rational MBFR policy.
Mr. Nairne: This raises a dilemma.
Dr. Kissinger: In this country we believe we can do both. I don’t know if the European Allies can do both.
Mr. Nairne: We would like to, but the prospect of MBFR makes one believe that one will have a tremendous task.
Dr. Kissinger: The great danger will be if the whole détente policy makes people think they don’t need defense at all.
(There is general agreement among all present.)
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

141. Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)¹


SUBJECT
US-Soviet Views on CSCE Preparatory Negotiations

I saw the Soviet DCM, Yuly Vorontsov, this afternoon to discuss with him our respective views on various issues concerning the preparatory talks in Helsinki for a CSCE.²

I went over with Vorontsov the main points I had made in my talk with him April 17:³ (1) the Western side at Helsinki had been taken aback by the harshness of Zorin’s statements toward the end of Phase III in Helsinki concerning Basket III on Human Contacts; (2) this, in turn, had stiffened the stance of the Allies concerning the issue of Inviolability of Frontiers in Basket I; and (3) if progress were to be

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE. Secret; Eyes Only.
² A summary of the conversation was sent to USNATO in telegram 76683, April 24, which is attached but not printed. The same day, the Mission replied in telegram 2025: “As authorized, US rep drew on refel in briefing POLADs. To avoid sparking Allied concerns, US rep did not mention Vorontsov reference in para 1 to collaboration of US and Soviet MPT delegations and his statement at end of para 3 concerning position allegedly taken by US MPT del on non-use of force/frontier inviolability issue and Gromyko’s hope for more ‘active’ US posture. We also felt it better not to mention Asst Secretary Stoessel’s point that US MPT del had in fact encouraged other Allied dels to move more rapidly (para 5) and not to draw direct trade-off between human contacts and frontier inviolability (para 6).” Another copy of the telegram is ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.
³ See Document 139.
achieved on the Inviolability of Frontiers issue, it was essential for the Soviets to display flexibility on Human Contacts and to do so in bilateral contacts with the members of the European Community.

Vorontsov said the points I had made were understood and he knew that the authorities in Moscow were taking a careful look at the question of Human Contacts. He thought that Zorin probably had been too “literal” in his statement and he was sure that some flexibility was possible. He thought it would be desirable if work in Helsinki on the resumption of the preparatory talks in Phase IV could concentrate on Basket III—Human Contacts. With progress there, he hoped there could be progress in other areas. In general, he deplored the linkage between various items and said this caused a bad reaction in Moscow. At the same time, he agreed with me that all delegations approached the negotiations from the standpoint of what the over-all results would be in terms of the whole package.

Human Contacts

At Vorontsov’s request, I reviewed with him in some detail the various drafts which have been proposed in Helsinki for Basket III and made certain suggestions in that connection. Concerning the Soviet draft “Chapeau,” I said that the reference to “laws and customs” was objectionable and probably would not be accepted by the West. I thought this point could be covered by reference to “sovereignty and non-interference.” I thought that such reference probably could be introduced into the Austrian “Chapeau” draft.4

I noted the last sentence of the first paragraph of the Soviet “Chapeau” draft about non-utilization of cultural contacts and information for propaganda of war, etc. I said we had difficulty with this sentence since it seemed to imply that countries would utilize contacts for these purposes. Vorontsov said he understood, but still felt that something was needed to indicate that contacts for dissemination of information should not be used to the detriment of good relations between states.

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4 At an April 2 working group meeting on human contacts in Helsinki, an Austrian representative tabled the following proposed “chapeau” for the human contacts mandate: “With the aim of contributing to the strengthening of peace and understanding among the peoples of Europe, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and irrespective of differences in their political, social, and economic systems, the committee/sub-committee shall be charged with examining and summarizing in a final document all opportunities of cooperation aimed at creating better conditions for personal meetings between people and solving humanitarian problems, as well as the creation of improved facilities for the provision of information and deeper cultural relations. In this connection, it shall draw upon not only ready existing forms of cooperation but also new forms that are appropriate to these aims. The committee shall also consider the extent to which already existing institutions can be involved in the achievement of these aims.” (Telegram 882 from Helsinki, April 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
I agreed that it might be possible to work out some generalized language to make this point.

In connection with the Danish points (1) (A) (B) and (C) on Marriage, Family Reunification, and Travel, I made the following comments. I said that the first two points on Marriage and Family Reunification were of particular interest to the FRG and Canada. I thought that it should be possible to work out some general language which by implication could cover these points, perhaps along the lines of the Austrian “Chapeau” which speaks of “better conditions for personal meetings between people and solving humanitarian problems.” I said that the U.S. was particularly interested in the travel item although I did not feel we would insist on the exact language of Danish paragraph (1) (C).

So far as the remainder of the mandate on Basket III—culture, education, and information—I said this should present no major problem. I noted, however, that we were interested in the point on dissemination of and access to foreign books and periodicals, while the Italians seemed particularly attached to the point on distribution of films. Vorontsov wondered whether it was necessary to go into the cultural and educational questions in such detail, but I pointed out that some of the Warsaw Pact countries, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, seemed especially interested in spelling these matters out in some detail. As a general point, I noted that we felt the Eastern drafts tended to stress too much contacts between organizations and pay insufficient attention to contacts between people.

Concluding the discussion on Human Contacts, I said I thought there was a basis on the background of work already done for a common approach; however, this would require some “give” on the Soviet part. Vorontsov seemed to feel that the points I had made were not unacceptable and he agreed that the elements of a common approach were present.

Frontier Inviolability

Vorontsov then raised the question of Frontier Inviolability and said he hoped we could agree that this principle could be cited in the text of principles guiding relations between states in a way which would not link it or subordinate it to other principles and which would be similar to the form in which it appeared in the US-Soviet Moscow Declaration.

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5 Telegram 849 from Helsinki, April 2, reported that the Danish representative to the working group on human contacts tabled a draft mandate that included provisions on marriage and family reunification. (Ibid.)
In reply, I said I was informed that Ambassador Brunner, Chief of the FRG delegation in Helsinki, had outlined orally to Ambassador Mendelevich a compromise approach on Frontier Inviolability which we understood would meet the Soviet needs. I was not in a position to give him the detailed language of the FRG proposal, although I understood that it cited the principle of Frontier Inviolability in the same way it was cited in the Soviet-FRG Treaty. This formulation would be acceptable to us and, I thought, to most of our Allies.

I emphasized that this question of Frontier Inviolability was of primary concern to the FRG, which had in mind the undesirability of making the CSCE document a substitute for a final peace treaty. We were not as deeply concerned with the precise formulation of the frontier issue as the FRG, but we understood the FRG concerns and supported the FRG fully. I thought that, if the Soviets could consult bilaterally with the FRG delegation, they would find that there would be a willingness to compromise on a common approach. However, I stressed again that this could only come about if the Soviets demonstrated flexibility concerning Human Contacts.

Vorontsov seemed pleased with my comments on this issue and said he saw some light ahead.

Other Issues

I referred briefly to Basket II on economic cooperation and to the phrase “military movements” in the mandate on Confidence Building Measures, saying that I did not feel the differences between us on these points would be difficult to overcome. Vorontsov agreed and showed no desire to get into a discussion of details.

Concluding our conversation, I said I would report to my superiors on our discussion and Vorontsov said that he would do likewise. He thought we had made good progress and he hoped we could continue to be in touch if there were further problems. He noted that it was sometimes easier to work these things out on a “quiet, discreet”
bilateral basis rather than in a multilateral framework as in Helsinki. I cautioned against efforts to arrive at detailed agreements on a bilateral basis, particularly in Washington. I thought the contacts in Helsinki between the U.S. and Soviet delegations had been very useful and frank and said that it was important that our representatives have the maximum flexibility to work out formulations on the spot in the light of developments in Helsinki. Vorontsov agreed and said that the Soviet delegation would have flexibility. He emphasized that Ambassador Mendelevich should be our primary contact in Helsinki in the Soviet delegation.

**142. Memorandum of Conversation¹**

Washington, April 21, 1973, 11:50 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Vasile Pungan, Counselor to the President of Romania
Ambassador Bogdan of Romania
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

V. Pungan: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] This is an oral message.²

Dr. Kissinger: For the sake of my stenographer may we have a copy of that?

V. Pungan: No, this is an oral message.

Dr. Kissinger: After you finish may she go over it with you?


V. Pungan: (continues reading) [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Map Room at the White House.

² The text is of an oral message from President Ceausescu to President Nixon; a copy of the complete transcribed message is ibid.
2) Taking as a starting point the strengthening of the process of détente in the world, I would like to present a few considerations relating to some of the pending issues. First of all in connection with European Security, as it is known Romania attaches great significance to that achievement in Europe of a cooperation based on principles of full equality, to the creation of an environment apt to guarantee the security and independence of every nation, and to assure the non-interference into domestic affairs. With that in view Romania is firmly acting for the preparation and the actual taking place of the European Security Conference on security and cooperation.

The progress of the Helsinki talks is well known, and I don’t want to refer to it again. It is our evaluation that important steps have been taken toward solutions, and that conditions for convening the Conference have been created. However, I could not avoid mentioning that from the development of the preparatory talks in Helsinki and from the exchanges of views I had with representatives of other states, the impression emerged that the United States has reservations and showed somewhat less diminished interest in the taking place of the Conference. We would be only glad to see such assessments and impressions disproved by reality. Romania attaches a great significance to the participation of the United States in process, preparation and holding of the Conference, aware that the position of the United States can have an important role in the works of the Conference and in the favorable solution of European matters. For these reasons we would be interested to see the United States showing a greater interest and contributing more actively to the achievement of understanding, taking into account the interests of all nations and leading to strengthening the peace and security of Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have anything specific in mind?
V. Pungan: To help [hold?] the conference as soon as possible and to have on the agenda the real problems of security.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what?
V. Pungan: I have questions that are really important for security like disarmament and force reduction.

Dr. Kissinger: You want force reduction?
V. Pungan: In a separate part.

Dr. Kissinger: Go ahead and finish your letter.
V. Pungan: The second aspect is represented by the talks taking place in Vienna—your reduction of armed forces.

Dr. Kissinger: Balanced?
V. Pungan: Yes, and some other term.
Amb. Bogdan: Ours in original.
Dr. Kissinger: You have a Romanian term?
Amb. Bogdan: Measures of [omission in original text] and military disengagement.

V. Pungan: (continues reading) B) A second aspect relating to the situation in Europe is represented by the talks taking place in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces. As you are well aware, Mr. President, Romania has been constantly preoccupied and vitally interested in the reduction of forces in Central Europe, eventually in the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the reduction of national troops under appropriate conditions. Although in Vienna the subject matter is going to be the reduction of troops in Central Europe, Romania is vitally interested to participate in these talks, both in the preparatory and in the substantive stages, to express her views on all problems. It is understandable that the problem of reduction and withdrawal of troops is of equal concern for Romania as well as for other states because it is an essential part of European security as a whole and of the security of every single European state.

Of course we want to make it clear that our participation in the preparatory and substantive negotiations does not mean any desire from our part to become a signatory of the agreements to be concluded. These agreements should be signed by the states directly concerned. However, it would be necessary in our view, that the United States agree with the participation of Romania and other interested states in these negotiations under the conditions I have mentioned before.

At the same time Romania would like to see reduction of troops arrived at in other zones. We are particularly interested in the Balkans area. We would welcome with satisfaction any manifestation of the United States' understanding and interest in a meeting among the Balkan countries leading to peace and cooperation in the area.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there an agreed upon definition of Balkan area? Does that include Greece?
Sonnenfeldt: And Hungary?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Hungary?
V. Pungan: Of course Greece is included. Hungary would have to be discussed.

Dr. Kissinger: And Turkey?
V. Pungan: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: The Ukraine?
V. Pungan: No.

Amb. Bogdan: Prior to this Cyprus was not an independent state.
Dr. Kissinger: That is not a security factor. Then it would include Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Albania. Why did you leave out Hungary?
V. Pungan: For historical reasons.
Amb. Bogdan: Exactly, that was the Balkan entente\textsuperscript{3} before the war.

Sonnenfeldt: But they are all your friends?

V. Pungan: (finishes the message) In so far as she is concerned, Romania considers that in addition to the Balkan countries other interested countries could take part in such a meeting. We have in mind, in this context, in the first place the USSR as well as the United States.

C) Based on the interest of Romania in all these questions we would highly appreciate if the United States showed a more active interest in their solutions. I am raising this aspect because the impression has been created in Romania and not only in Romania, that the United States is preoccupied by her bilateral relations with other states. In so far as Europe is concerned, she would prefer not to commit herself actively in favor of a positive settlement in the interest of all states of the European problems. We attach a particular importance to the beginning of normalization of the relations between the United States and China. In our view this event is of historical significance for the normalization of the international life. We attach an equal importance to agreements and the understandings reached between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We look upon them as contributions to the building of a better world, a world of peace. At the same time we would not like the implementation of these arrangements becoming in any way detrimental to the European security, to the interests of other states including the interests of Romania.

I have brought this to your attention, Mr. President, a few thoughts preoccupying me in connection with the evolution and perspectives of today’s international life, with the hope that they will be properly understood. They are inspired by the desire motivating Romania’s policy of developing friendly relations with all the states of the world, and of placing as the basis of these relations the principles of full equality, independence and sovereignty. Obviously Romania, within limits of her possibilities, is determined to act for détente and cooperation. We would like to see our relations with the United States taking a more active role within the context of the present atmosphere of détente and cooperation. Such a development would be in the interests of our two peoples and at the same time in the interest of peace and understanding of the world at large.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\textsuperscript{3} The Balkan Entente was an informal defensive alliance formed among Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece in 1934 to protect each state’s territorial integrity.
Dr. Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] In regard to the European Security Conference, we have never held any objections to the Security Conference. It is not as clear to us what the advantages are, but we have agreed to participation and cooperation. There you have a forum with every Foreign Minister in Europe using it as a field of exercising his ingenuity. And every department head has an opportunity to draft his own proposal. We would like limited agenda items. We would be willing to speed up procedures for short term agreements, especially with our allies in Europe. We are in a positive position. We will not be obstacles and are willing to move rapidly to a conclusion.

V. Pungan: We have discussed this with our people in Europe. We want the United States to understand what Romania expects from security. We want the United States to play a more active role.

Dr. Kissinger: Your objectives are clear. We don’t quarrel; it is also conceivable that the European Security Conference will degenerate into a morass of platitudes. What you say may come about naturally.

V. Pungan: We expect other states to go along with us.

Dr. Kissinger: What you are attempting to do is absolutely clear. What others are trying to do is also clear, and the two are not necessarily compatible.

Amb. Bogdan: You spoke about the passivity of the United States and the brilliance of the Foreign Deputies. We want to be more active. I believe we share the same concern that it might lead to the consecrated division in Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We should certainly be willing to discuss with you on a private basis some understanding of outcomes, get your views, and talk seriously. In the present state of discussion, it is not easy for us to know in which direction to exert pressure.

V. Pungan: I think it is important to start proposals, create conditions, and to expect an outcome.

Dr. Kissinger: Our view is to be fairly general and have brief agenda items. Western Europe wants detailed items.

Amb. Bogdan: It is not the length that is important, but the subject. We want to refine. There is always the problem of the subject. Of course the military issues should be discussed.

Dr. Kissinger: Force reduction, that is a different thing. Of course, let me know what exclusions you want.

V. Pungan: It is necessary to agree. It is necessary to keep in contact and to follow objectives.

Dr. Kissinger: To complicate intervention of outside forces in Europe is our policy. We are interested in what concretely should be done. I can’t guarantee how much pressure we will put on our allies.
On force reduction—it is a complex issue because we want to avoid force reduction becoming as general and confused as the European Security Conference. We don’t want to open up a host of issues that will make it insoluble.

We thought not to include the Balkans, but only the Central Front. As I understand the discussions don’t exclude the various countries listening in. But we do think that the actual negotiations should be conducted in a more restricted form. We are prepared to exchange ideas on a bilateral basis and to have your reaction. We would talk seriously.

V. Pungan: We would like the possibility to tell you what we have in mind. The results of these negotiations are important for the security of the whole of Europe. Of course, the agreements should be signed by the countries involved in them, but we think it is important for us to be there.

Amb. Bogdan: I think it a good idea to present a more detailed agenda.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we have your ideas independent of participation in the discussion?

Amb. Bogdan: We have had some at the level of the State Department.

V. Pungan: It is a good idea to talk in principle.

Dr. Kissinger: On the issue of Balkan security, I have never studied that problem. My studies stopped in 1914. Those talks about the negotiation of a little sliver of land, whose name I don’t remember, do you? I have not studied the problem. I don’t think the United States has studied it in great detail. I will look into it to find out what the implications are, since every Romanian project is more complicated than it looks. We will look on it with interest. We are not directly involved. We are not as involved there as in Western Europe. Let me study it. I won’t be able to give you a formal answer before you leave.

V. Pungan: We are also studying it.

Amb. Bogdan: We have repeated it so many times that we are coming to understand it ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: (laughing) That is the great problem of diplomacy. People think once you have proposed something you understand it completely.

V. Pungan: If we have new elements, I will keep you informed.

Dr. Kissinger: Big power diplomacy, I take it for an axiom that we cannot let it be used to undermine the interests of other countries. I think some parts of big power diplomacy might even strengthen the position of smaller countries. Smaller countries have the potential of weakening it. Our discussions in Peking and Moscow are in the same order. We will not knowingly make an agreement that sacrifices the
interests of other countries. Sometimes we don’t know what the other’s interests are. We expect Brezhnev to be here this summer, if there are any points that might come up to which you are especially sensitive . . . You can be certain we will talk very seriously. With Peking we have never discussed Eastern Europe in concrete terms. My impression is that the leaders there wish you well. Our settled policy is not to support newer relations at the expense of the older ones. But, some tendencies can develop. Is there any other subject?

We attach importance to staying in close touch. My life is so busy that I cannot always participate in the discussion, but Sonnenfeldt has my total confidence.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger: We are dedicated and believe for many reasons that it (the ESC) should be a success and in what we started in 1969 we shall make a major effort.4

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4 In a subsequent meeting on April 27, Kissinger informed Pungan that Nixon had read the oral note from Ceausescu. The memorandum of conversation reads in part: “Dr. Kissinger: In respect to the European Security Conference we don’t disagree with the general tone of your President’s observations. We will be no obstacle to the constructive outcome. Our difficulty is that there are so many ideas floating around in Helsinki. We usually let these ideas run around for a while until they crystallize. Otherwise we would have constant problems with every country from Luxembourg to Liechtenstein. Is Liechtenstein there? Sonnenfeldt: Yes. Amb. Bogdan: Even San Marino. Dr. Kissinger: We can’t negotiate bilaterally with every participant in the European Security Conference. But we are always ready to hear your ideas put to us bilaterally. On any other matters go to Sonnenfeldt, and after he has left either Hyland or Eagleburger. Regarding MBFR, we are less sympathetic to procedural than to substantive matters. Mr. Ambassador, why do you look so crushed? Amb. Bogdan: Substantive rather than procedural, no, I am not. Dr. Kissinger: We would like to keep the number of participants of Romania [sic] at a manageable level.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 5 of 5)
Confidence building measures at the All-European conference on Security and Cooperation

The question of confidence building measures has been already agreed upon through this confidential channel.

On January 17 Dr. Kissinger stated the following position of the US which, as he said at that time, was approved by the President for transmitting to Moscow:

“The US supports two limited measures: announcement in advance of major military maneuvers and invitations for observers to attend these maneuvers. In our view both measures could be voluntary and it would be left to each party to determine their implementation”.

Precisely in such terms we formulated our proposal to include in the agenda of the All-European conference the question on some measures for strengthening stability and trust in Europe.

That is why we have naturally counted upon cooperation between our delegations at the multinational consultations in Helsinki towards limiting the measures for strengthening trust and stability by the two provisions which were named to us by the White House and accepted by the Soviet leadership.

Meanwhile in Helsinki the US delegation stands for also including among the measures aimed at strengthening trust and stability of a provision, concerning prior notification about large movements of forces.

Maybe there is a misunderstanding here, and we hope that the position of the US delegation in Helsinki will be brought to conformity with our confidential agreement.
Washington, April 26, 1973, 3:24 p.m.

WS: Henry, on this question of movement, I checked with our fellows here and I gather the problem is primarily an ally one—some of the allies have been pressing for mention of movement, in additional to maneuvers.

HK: Yeah, but can we stick on maneuvers?
WS: Well, I think we can, what we are in the process of doing now is—
HK: Because I have now told Dobrynin after our talk.  
WS: Uh huh. Uh huh.
HK: I tell you our allies are getting totally obnoxious.
WS: Oh I know, they are very difficult. They are concerned that there may be major deployment—
HK: Yeah, but major deployments we have every capability of catching.
WS: Yeah. The idea is to suggest language which wouldn’t mention movement, but which would describe what we are concerned about.
HK: Well, the problem is that they do have a point that last January we did tell them maneuvers.
WS: Yes. Right. Well this has come up since, now George Bastin (sp?) the last phase there had a talk with Mendelevich and described our concern—allly concern.  
HK: Yeah, but the trouble with Gromyko is raising and now we are going to try to fix some of this with your talks with Vorontsov is—we make an understanding with him and then our guys in Helsinki act as though there is no relationship at all. And they did come to its opposition when they accepted it.
WS: Yeah. George could be in touch there and would be in touch, anyway bilaterally to explain the problem.

HK: Well, we understand the problem.

WS: It would certainly help with the allies if we could have another go at it. Maybe not mentioning movement and then if the Soviets simply can’t buy it, then we just fall off.

HK: Okay, let me try that.

WS: All right. For us to go now and then try to drop it would cause great problems, I’m afraid.

HK: Right. Okay. Good.

WS: Bye.5

5 Telegram 83486 to Helsinki, May 3, instructed Vest to meet “as soon as possible” with Mendelevich “to discuss inclusion of term ‘major military movements’ in CBM’s.” The telegram continued: “Begin FYI: Based on indications we have received, Soviets will not accept ‘movements.’ However, we believe it is essential that you make a strong case to Mendelevich on this issue in order to provide a basis for proposing to Allies that they put forward a compromise formulation designed to work toward agreement.” Telegram 1157 from Helsinki, May 3, replied that Vest had met with Mendelevich that day to “present case for ‘major military movements.’” Mendelevich, it reported, “as anticipated, was resolutely negative and had no alternative formula.” The telegram continued: “Recommend that Vest be authorized to inform Allied dels here as soon as possible of Soviet attitude.” (Both ibid.)

145. Editorial Note

On May 1–2, 1973, West German Chancellor Brandt visited Washington for talks with President Nixon. Among the topics for discussion were the European security conference and mutual balanced force reductions. In an undated memorandum to Nixon regarding the visit, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger wrote: “Bilateral Ostpolitik is at the end of the beginning. The Chancellor is talking more about multilateralizing it, by which he means the Federal Republic’s participating influentially in the MBFR and CSCE negotiations with the East. The strategic target of his Eastern policy has always been the GDR. This policy has aimed at creating circumstances which will enable the two Germanies to reunify or confederate some day in some way. For all the apparent Eastern policy success, however, progress toward this ultimate goal has been slow. Indeed, by signing a ‘Basic Treaty’ with the GDR late last fall, accepting it as a state, and agreeing to its membership in the UN, Brandt may have defeated his long-term purpose. The East Germans are steadfastly resisting a closer relationship. The West Germans count on Brezhnev to put pressure on his GDR
ally. This is a familiar situation, and it must tempt Brandt to offer concessions to Moscow—perhaps in the CSCE context. Brezhnev will see these and probably others in the economic field. You may wish to caution Brandt against breaking Western ranks in East-West negotiations, even on an issue as vital to German national aspirations as the GDR. The Chancellor’s imminent meeting with Brezhnev will heighten his interest in our policies toward the Soviets. He is mistrustful of their aims in Europe, but he has engaged them for his own ends. He is concerned about our SALT negotiations, our MBFR positions, and the continuing post-Moscow Summit momentum in US-Soviet relations generally. You will want to explain to him how you relate our bilateral relations with the Soviets in SALT and on other issues to the wider East-West negotiating in MBFR and the CSCE.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 297, Memoranda to the President, 1973, May, Folder 1)

Brandt and Nixon discussed the CSCE and MBFR during a meeting in the Oval Office on May 1 at 10:45 a.m. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Brandt then described his agenda for the summit meeting with Brezhnev. It would deal mostly with bilateral technical matters, and would call for more political consultation. Brezhnev also had sent a note calling for a meeting of heads of state for the finale of the European Security Conference. Chancellor Brandt was dubious about the desirability of this. The President remarked that he was dubious about the Security Conference. The Chancellor said he believed they had proceeded not too badly. The Conference had an integrating effect in bringing Europeans together.” The memorandum reported Brandt’s further comments: “The objective of Brezhnev, the Chancellor continued, may be to divide the US and Europe. But the alliance was our top priority. We should not allow our summits to undo it. NATO was a guarantee for the stability of the Warsaw Pact, however, because ending NATO would also mean the end of the Warsaw Pact. Minister Bahr commented that the Soviets now accept the US role in Europe. They have now accepted the US as an organic part of the European Security Conference, and in MBFR, etc. The President asked for the Chancellor’s views on MBFR. The Chancellor said he didn’t know too much about it, but he favored cutting some indigenous forces along with stationed forces.” (Memorandum for the President’s Files, May 1; ibid., Box CL 138, Geopolitical File, Europe, Year of Europe, Memoranda of Conversation)

In advance of Brandt’s arrival, West German Minister for Special Tasks Bahr met with Kissinger and National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt on April 30 to discuss CSCE, MBFR, and other topics. No record of their conversation has been found. For a German record of the conversation, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1973, Volume I, pages 610–614.
146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, May 4, 1973, 1451Z.

84507. For Mr. Kissinger from Ted Eliot. Moscow Code Room—Secretary Rogers requests that this message be delivered directly to Mr. Kissinger.

Subject: Inviolability of borders in connection with CSCE.

1. The Secretary has asked that I bring to your attention his particular interest in the way the question of the inviolability of borders is dealt with in the CSCE discussions. During the Brandt visit Foreign Minister Scheel strongly emphasized the German view that any provision in a principles declaration reached at a conference on cooperation and security in Europe dealing with this question must be coupled directly with the principle of the non-use of force.2

2. There had been some indications prior to the visit that the Germans were moving away from insistence on this point. Scheel, strongly supported by Minister Egon Bahr and Ambassador Brunner, the German representative at Helsinki, very forcefully expressed the reasons why they feel the Federal Republic must continue to insist that the two concepts be connected. In the German view, the acceptance of a separate principle of inviolability of frontiers would mean a territorial freeze in Europe which could be changed, if at all, only with the participation and permission of the USSR. Thus, the eventual elimination of frontiers within a united Western Europe would not be possible. Similarly, in the specific case of Germany the eventual goal of the elimination of the division between the GDR and the FRG would be defeated. Bahr pointed out in addition that to accept without qualification the inviolability of frontiers in the case of Germany would be contrary to the principle of the continuing rights and responsibilities of the four powers for Germany as a whole (presumably on the theory that this could be construed as a final settlement of the German question).

3. Scheel argued that while the communiqué agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow did not link in sequence the inviolability of frontiers to the non-use of force, the Germans had

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2 Telegram 85775 to Bonn, May 5, summarized the comments of Scheel and Brunner during Brandt’s visit at a luncheon with Rogers on May 1, particularly their views on the inviolability of frontiers in the context of the CSCE. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
succeeded in doing this in their Moscow treaty. They wish to avoid los-
ing at CSCE what they were able to maintain in Moscow. They are con-
vinced that if a territorial freeze is established which is subject to change
only through the permission of the Soviet Union the Soviets will not
only have gained a major objective in Helsinki but also an enhanced
potential for influence in Western Europe.

4. The Secretary considers that these are important points which
the US side must bear in mind as the CSCE discussions progress. The
Germans have shown some willingness to find compromise language
in an effort to bridge drafting problems with the Soviets. It is clear,
however, that they are not prepared to drop a linkage between the in-
vviolability of frontiers and the non-use of force. The Secretary consid-
ers that this position has intrinsic merit from the US point of view quite
apart from the support which we would be well advised in any event
to render the Germans on this subject.

Rogers

147. Memorandum of Conversation

Zavidovo, May 6, 1973, 12:15–2:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Victor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff
Richard Campbell, NSC Staff

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-
fice Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Kissinger’s Conversations at Zavidovo,
May 5–8, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in
the Winter Garden at the Politburo Villa. All brackets, with the exception of those that
indicate omitted material, are in the original. Kissinger visited Moscow May 4–9. The
full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Re-
Gromyko: As I said as you came in, I suggest we talk about European affairs. That is how we agreed with the General Secretary, and if we have time we might pass on to other matters.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: I would like to put forward the general idea that we might start off by talking about the all-European Security Conference. Here, strokes all that consider preparatory work, but the consultations seem to be lacking the necessary dynamism, if I may use that word, and considering the understanding we reached to begin the Conference in June. That seems to be the general view.

Several days ago your representative at Helsinki suggested to our representative, that perhaps it would be wise at this time to officially inform the Finns in the nearest future that we have in view convening the actual Conference at the end of June, so they could start the necessary preparations. That suggestion made by your representative is certainly in line with our wishes. And if that is the case perhaps we can reach an understanding among our two delegations to exert their efforts with allies and friends to give it that dynamism which I said the consultations lack.

Kissinger: Who handles the Swedes?

When we were here in September, we agreed in principle to the convening of the Security Conference at the end of June. We maintain our position. There is no reason to delay the opening of the Conference. We believe it is possible to open then. We have already talked with Brandt in Washington in that sense; we expressed our view. We see no obstacle on his side.

The difficulty on the Security Conference is not between you and us. The difficulty is that the Foreign Ministries in almost every country that have been inactive before, now have been given something to do. There are endless papers and preparations. There is no issue between you and us. The problem is in other countries.

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2 Kissinger wrote to Nixon about his trip in a memorandum on May 11: “There was not much to discuss on Europe, since most of the issues are tactical, and Brezhnev left them to Gromyko. Their main interest is that the European Security Conference start in late June. On MBFR, they offered to begin some discreet bilateral talks during the summer. They seemed unprepared to discuss the substance of MBFR and frankly, I think they are quite unsure of how to proceed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 17) The full text of the memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

3 No record of this conversation has been found.
We believe the schedule we agreed upon with the General Secretary will be kept.

There is another question of whether the final meeting will be at the Head of State level or the Foreign Minister level. It will in any event be at the Politburo level. [Gromyko and Dobrynin smile]

Gromyko: We are certainly pleased with your confirming the time limits we agreed upon last year, to hold the Conference at the end of June. We believe we should on both sides continue our efforts to stick to that time limit and to act accordingly with allies and other participants to the Conference. So if there are any waverers, we can bring influence to bear.

As regards the suggestion to have the Conference in three stages, Comrade Dobrynin informed me that just before his departure you informed him of the idea of the first two stages—the Foreign Ministers and then the Commission. You have reservations with the third stage—but are giving it sympathetic consideration.

Kissinger: If the first two go well, it will be all right for the heads to meet. If not, the Foreign Ministers.

Gromyko: We think to hold the final stage at the highest level would be in the interest of all sides. No one could deny that a meeting at the highest level would be significant. The very fact of a meeting of the highest statesmen would be of paramount importance. Therefore I wish to say on behalf of the General Secretary, we are earnestly hoping that the President and you as the closest assistant will have that goal.

We appreciate your remark that it will be—at least in the Soviet Union—at the Politburo level.

Kissinger: I told your Ambassador the American equivalent of the Politburo, but I doubt he reported it.

Gromyko: He didn’t. It is the most confidential part of the confidential channel!

Kissinger: We won’t be the obstacle to such a meeting, I believe, if matters take a reasonable course. This is one subject that the President and the General Secretary might discuss in the United States. It is not a matter of principle for us.

Gromyko: We don’t think that a meeting at the highest level will be protracted. It should be well prepared.

Kissinger: How many heads are there?

Sonnenfeldt: Thirty-one.
Kissinger: I insist that Princess Grace be included. I already consulted her preliminarily in Washington. Her attitude was positive.

Gromyko: Thirty-four heads.

Kissinger: Including Liechtenstein and the Vatican.

Sonnenfeldt: The Vatican can give an invocation.

Kissinger: All thirty-four will want to speak. They are not usually selected for their retiring natures.

Gromyko: Who will represent Spain?

Kissinger: Franco. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Maybe we should stop there and not go deeper!

Kissinger: San Marino will be there too.

Dobrynin: Yes.

Kissinger: Did you know that San Marino’s Foreign Minister was in China?

Gromyko: Really? Did they conclude a Treaty against us?

Kissinger: I don’t know, but the Chinese Foreign Minister was going to go there on his European tour. I don’t know why.

We will give it sympathetic consideration. If all goes well, there won’t be any problem.

Gromyko: As for representation at the highest level, there can be cases where a country can choose who it wishes to represent it. As for the United States and the Soviet Union, it is clear who will represent them.

Kissinger: We will give it sympathetic consideration. It is not a question of principle for us. It won’t be a problem.

Gromyko: We could briefly discuss certain other matters—I list them not in order of importance. I recall you had a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin on the possibility of exchange of information on military maneuvers, and the possible exchange of observers at those maneuvers, with the aim of lessening tensions. Also we mentioned an exchange of observers on a voluntary basis. The suggestion was then made by others at Helsinki, not by the United States and the Soviet Union, on the exchange of information on large scale troop movements, within borders or without, regardless of maneuvers. This goes beyond the understanding between us, and we accepted your idea. It would lead us into a jungle which we could not escape. The problem of what is considered a large-scale movement. Where is the criterion by which to judge? So we think the suggestion is an unconvincing one, and we should abide by our previous understanding.

We want to raise this because we think the U.S. representative at Helsinki doesn’t always stick to the understanding we reached.

Dobrynin tells me instructions have been sent to your representative at Helsinki, but we don’t know what the instructions are.
Kissinger: Let me explain. We have discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin the scenario we plan to follow. Our difficulties arise from the fact that our own allies are taking extremely strong positions. It is difficult for us not to support our allies in the discussions. Our instructions are for our representative to talk to your representative on the suggestion of maneuvers. We expect you will reject our proposal. If our intelligence is correct, you won’t accept—though we don’t tell you how to run your Foreign Office. Our representative will then tell our allies that we made a major effort.

Gromyko: Thank you for that clarification, which concerns your tactical approach. I appreciate your understanding of our situation.

Kissinger: But our Ambassador doesn’t yet know this. After he reports your negative reaction, we will send him new instructions.

Gromyko: It is clear, clear. I trust you will agree that regarding the question of large-scale maneuvers, there will be as many views as there are states in the world. It is not in our interest to engage in a dispute on this.

Kissinger: If there are any difficulties, your Ambassador will let me know and I will straighten it out.

Gromyko: I trust most probably your attention has been drawn to the question of the principle of inviolability of borders in the list of major political principles. You know one of the Commissions at work in Helsinki is at work on political principles. In our view, the principle of inviolability of boundaries should occupy the principal place, and we are operating from the assumption that our two sides have an understanding on that.

Kissinger: When did we do that?

Gromyko: There is no need to go into the positions of previous U.S. Presidents, but suffice it to say it was in the Communiqué last May. Suffice it to say, we expect the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed from the joint line as expressed in the Communiqué and that it will be reflected in the principles and will occupy the first priority place it deserves.

Kissinger: In the Communiqué we had both the inviolability of frontiers and the renunciation of force. The German position is to accept the inviolability of frontiers in the context of renunciation of force, but in a sense that preserves the possibility of German reunification or European unification. The Germans are prepared to have the same language as in the Moscow Treaty.

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5 See Document 98.
Gromyko: Nothing in the Moscow Treaty has that language about the context.

Kissinger: Basically this is a matter between you and the Germans, whom you will be seeing soon. We are not urging the Germans in any particular direction.

As the Germans explained to us in Washington,\(^6\) their concern is that they want inviolability linked sequentially with renunciation and we of course agree. But this is a matter for you to discuss with them.

Gromyko: The notion that the principle of inviolability of boundaries should be reflected in context with the question of the non-use of force is a false and artificial invention. It suffices to read the Soviet-Federal Republic of Germany treaty to see they are listed as two separate points. In fact we drew West Germany’s attention to this fact, and they agreed with us there were no grounds for the view. This is what they said to us, and they have abided by this understanding. But they have said since that non-use of force should be in the first position and inviolability should be in the second. You can’t have it that one principle absorbs or swallows the others; they should be equal. The West Germans corrected their position—at least they say they understand our position. But they still say they want non-use first and inviolability second—not in the sense of interdependability but by enumeration.

[Kissinger:] You know how wars begin. We think inviolability should be first. But in the Soviet-German Treaty you listed non-use first and non-violability second.

Gromyko: They are not listed in that way to show any interdependability—but because that Treaty was written in ascending order. [laughter]

Kissinger: [Showing Gromyko the final page of the Soviet-FRG Treaty, on which his signature is the last] I must point out that your ego is rising to my level: The signatures rise to Gromyko! [Laughter]

If I may quote the Foreign Minister, it would help us with Bonn. Because they pointed out that in the Moscow Communiqué we listed the non-use of force last. We neglected to point out that it was written in rising order and that your Treaty had it first.

Gromyko: We are not suggesting in any way that in listing principles we should explain that the first one is of the first importance and that the others are in declining scale. But surely as politicians we must realize what the situation is. When I referred to the Soviet-German Treaty, I did so only as . . .

\(^6\) See Document 145.
Kissinger: It is an almost Talmudic point. I think that if non-viability is second and renunciation is first it could be solved. But it is between you and the Germans. I must tell you the Germans made an extremely strong case to us, and you can expect very strong representations from them in Bonn.

Gromyko: In what sense?

Kissinger: The Germans claim that the implication of Articles 2 and 3 [of the Soviet-German Treaty] is that they have agreed to inviolability only in the context of nonuse—“in accordance with the foregoing purposes.” That is their view. They can’t agree to something which prevents changes of frontiers by peaceful means. It also would rule out the unification of Europe. They haven’t explained to me how they can achieve both the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe. But I can’t solve all problems.

Gromyko: Let me give you the precise explanation on this score. That is their unilateral interpretation. It is not a bilateral one. In the negotiations, we did not set that as an objective. That is my first point. My second point is that when the Treaty was already drafted and in the final stage and Foreign Minister Scheel came to Moscow and raised it in conversation with me whether it might be possible to make even some slight and weak linkage—not even in the sense of interdependence or subordination, but just some weak linking—to that I said there is no question, and we will not accept any moving of any comma or anything in this Treaty. That was the only time this came up.

Third, it is sometimes asked, what is the situation? Does the Soviet Union categorically rule out completely the possibility of any voluntary corrections or rectification of borders? This was something that the West German representatives raised during the negotiations with them on the Treaty. We said that wasn’t the issue at stake; we didn’t want the Treaty to include any clause which could in any way justify a revanchist political struggle in favor of a change of boundaries. We could not give our blessing to a struggle for a change of boundaries. This was what we wanted. They are trying to substitute one question for another.

You say this is primarily between the Soviet Union and West Germany. We are in contact with them on this point. What they say is, let’s list that principle [inviolability] but as a separate and independent principle. But recognizing it as separate and independent they are taking a realistic stand. But we think it should be first and we want to support our stand. This reflects the view of President Nixon, because it is in the US-Soviet Communiqué. I keep showing you the document but you don’t want to look.

Kissinger: I understand it. I am following the theory of the Foreign Minister who said that in the Soviet-German Treaty it was rising.
Kornienko: It doesn’t mean every document is in that form!
Kissinger: Don’t you have a standard form?

I won’t play any games. We don’t think any one is more important than others. [In the US-Soviet Communique] they are also related because they are in the same sentence.

In our nuclear document we try to link Article I and II with the language “in accordance with the purposes of Article I.” 7 I would be disconcerted to hear that these are not interrelated, since the Foreign Minister says Article 2 and 3 of the German Treaty are not interrelated.

Gromyko: All the principles are interrelated. All principles of international relationships are, and one can’t say that some are for the short term and the others last for 150 years. We would have complete chaos.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] Back to the Germans. You get in touch with us after your consultation with Bonn. We have no fixed view on the order of clauses and principles. We will certainly place no obstacles to the Germans and you. Let us know through your Ambassador.

Gromyko: We will certainly inform you after our visit on how matters stand.

So we can end our discussion of this.

Now another question that arises is one that concerns the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the context of the European Conference. 8 We proceed from the fact that it would not be in either your or our interest to make the subject of the Middle East a subject of the discussion of the Conference or reflected in the document in any way. We have enough business on Europe. Otherwise we would have to invite representatives of the Middle East, North Africa and Israel. We would have to stop up our ears because they would all be willing to swear.

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7 Kissinger was in Moscow mainly to discuss a draft U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. For Kissinger’s account of the conversations and the final agreement, signed on June 22, see White House Years, pp. 282–285.

8 Telegram 836 from Helsinki, March 30, reported: “Turkish MPT del is pressing for language which would lay heavy emphasis on link between European and Mediterranean security and is suggesting that specific reference to Mediterranean appear in each mandate.” The telegram noted that several Allied representatives “reacted adversely” to this approach. The telegram continued: “Canada and US cautioned that such an open-ended approach could ‘lay a trail of powder’ right to the Middle East tinder box, and Norwegian rep was not enthusiastic about even mentioning Mediterranean aspect. UK noted strong reservation of the Nine towards any far-reaching formulas concerning the Med.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Kissinger: We basically agree with you. It may be that Cyprus or Greece may want some reference, but we basically don’t want to get into the Mediterranean.

Gromyko: We are pleased to hear your attitude. If a country like Greece wants to say something in its statement, that is okay. But no discussion of the issue or inclusion in the final document.

Kissinger: We see it the same way — no wide-ranging discussion. But if when we meet, we find some countries won’t sign the document without some reference in the document, then you and we should have reference. We can leave it to the Conference. I notice that some Africans are invited to submit written views.

We won’t encourage that.

Gromyko: The important thing is not to discuss that question. Princess Grace might want to circulate a document and we can’t prevent her.

Kissinger: I must confess that I am more interested from the point of view of personality than in her documents.

I would have to go to Monaco to explain the intractability of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It is a long subject.

Dobrynin: Two weeks it would take!

Gromyko: Then we would have to go to explain our position.

Kissinger: Peaceful competition! We don’t claim exclusive rights!

Gromyko: Another question relative to the European Conference, which will probably come under item 3 of the agenda as it is today — exchange of people and cultural ties. We want you to know we are in no way afraid of the cultural exchange of people. But the sole point is — here, no one should try to grab someone by the throat and claim that one has forced that. The sole point is, this should take place on the basis of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are not the only one. There are many other countries who feel the same way. If this is the view of our two countries then there will be no difficulty at the Conference. We should rule out being bogged down in detailed discussions and trying to trip up someone.

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9 An undated briefing paper prepared by the NSC staff for Kissinger’s trip to Moscow, entitled “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” reads in part: “It appears that the Allies will be successful in heading off pressures by some MPT participants for active discussion of Mediterranean issues at CSCE, and for representation of interested North African states, by: supporting the inclusion of very general references in the mandates on agenda items I and II, along the lines proposed by the Swiss (‘the committee should not lose sight of the close connection between security on the continent of Europe and in the Mediterranean region’); and by proposing a formula for certain North African states to make their views known (short of direct participation as observers) in the second stage of CSCE, e.g., the right to have written views circulated, as has been done at MPT.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE)
There have never been any difficulties in negotiating cultural exchanges with the United States. We are doing it right now.

Kissinger: I can assure the Foreign Minister we are not approaching human contacts particularly with the aim of embarrassing the Soviet Union. We approach it concretely, not as a means to accomplish something abstract. We will treat it as embodying and reflecting the principles we have agreed upon.

Gromyko: I listen to that with satisfaction. That is exactly how we see it.

Kissinger: On many of these, after we have stated our general principles, we should stay in contact as specific issues come up.

Gromyko: There is another matter: we gave you our draft of the possible final draft of the document on political issues [Tab A]. I am sure you have reviewed it. We did it with the aim of setting up on common ground.

Kissinger: We have studied your proposition and we have many comments and amendments and suggestions.

There are two problems: the evolution of the preliminary Conference has affected some of your draft.

We have not informed the French and the Germans. Have you?

Gromyko: Not concretely.

Kissinger: Not to the French at all. Some to the Germans. I was talking about it with Bahr in September. But I didn’t show a draft.

Gromyko: You have studied it completely?

Kissinger: What we would like to do is do a counterdraft, after consultation with our allies. We would like your authorization to do it in a formal way. We will talk to the three and we will let you have our views by the end of the month.

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10 On January 15, a Soviet Embassy official hand-delivered to Kennedy of the NSC staff the Soviet draft “General Declaration on Foundations of European Security and Principles of Relations Between States in Europe.” The Soviet draft declaration is ibid. For a summary of relevant portions, see Document 124.

11 See Document 125.

12 The briefing paper on CSCE prepared by the NSC staff for Kissinger’s trip reads with regard to the “Soviet draft declaration”: “The draft Dobrynin gave you remains dormant, and to some extent has been overtaken by the changes in the Soviet position and the work of the Conference since the Soviets submitted it to us in January.” The paper continued: “The main problem is that within NATO we have a parallel document, which will eventually be tabled, and is substantially different from the Soviet draft. When this comes up, you might say: —We have treated this confidentially, even though some of our Allies also seem to have a Soviet draft; —To make any progress, we need permission from the Soviets to discuss it with the French, Germans and British; —In reviewing the text, it would seem that some of it is outdated by developments in Helsinki, where there has been a convergence on a number of principles; —If the Soviet side agrees, we could prepare a draft in the West and submit it to the Soviet side. All of this seems premature, however, since the Conference is in an early stage and the working group will begin developing texts this summer.”
Gromyko: All right.

The draft we handed you dealt with preliminary matters. It is not a principal question whether it would be one or two. You are free not to wait until our new draft. Let’s leave it open, whether it will be an all-embracing document or two documents—on political matters and then on economic and cultural matters. Maybe one, maybe two.

As to the agenda, now we should look about the possibility of establishing some kind of organ—a committee, or commission. I would like to say a few words.

As I said at Camp David, we have no special interest in an organ. The Soviet Union will continue to exist even if it is not set up—but nevertheless, we feel it could be useful linkage between the Conference and a later meeting on troop reduction. Just a consultative, purely consultative organ for preparation for consultation by governments. This would be all right. We think at least there is nothing bad in it.

Kissinger: How do you visualize the consultative organ?

Gromyko: Since it will function between the first Conference and the second, in idea it will be permanent. It is a matter of convenience and open for consideration. We are open minded. One thing more: it should be written that it will be consultative.

Kissinger: We will reserve our judgment. We had thought of some kind of administrative organ for distributing papers—as a sort of a clearing house.

Gromyko: All right. In Vienna, it looks like the Hungary question has been solved. What is going on?

Kissinger: It took three months. It nearly broke up the NATO alliance. Our debates with our allies are more serious than with you.

Gromyko: If you ever need advice on allies, let us know.

Kissinger: We will help you.

Gromyko: By September–October, the all-European Conference will be over. I hope, in view of the mountain of paper. Last fall we agreed on September–October.

Dobrynin: Can we at least agree on a time interval between the end of the CSCE and the beginning of MBFR?

Gromyko: And you suggest?

Kissinger: Say one month?

Gromyko: I think it would be acceptable. I will tell the General Secretary.

Kissinger: Good.

Gromyko: Do you have any bright ideas for this?

Kissinger: It would be constructive if you pulled your forces out of East Germany. It would create a good atmosphere.
You are asking me in what direction the Conference should go and what it should accomplish?

Gromyko: Yes. It is a sort of goal.

Kissinger: We submitted our analyses to our allies. Do you have it? My understanding is that whenever we distribute something to our allies you get in it in 48 hours. Is it true?

Gromyko: Why 48?

Dobrynin: Sometimes we get a distorted view from the allies and want to hear it from the horse’s mouth!

Gromyko: You can wait until you are ready.

Kissinger: No, we are ready. We want to treat this as seriously as SALT. We are genuinely trying to examine what proposals we can make which both sides can feel improves their security or at least doesn’t hurt it. One question is whether the reductions should include only stationed or also national forces. The difficulty with national forces is it is hard to monitor reductions. And national forces are not of the quality of stationed forces. I am thinking of the Polish Army band.

The second point, what I said about maneuvers in connection with the CSCE—if it is not addressed in the CSCE it will at least have to be addressed in MBFR.

Another issue is whether we speak in terms of units or in terms of numbers. Do you say three regiments, or 50 men from each regiment? If we say 50 men it is harder to verify whether they have left. This will have to be addressed—for both sides.

Then ceilings. I joke about all Soviet forces. We won’t reject it. But probably they will be smaller margins.

In the President’s Foreign Policy Report we discuss this quite openly. In the Arms Control section. 13 It discusses our philosophy, though not the numbers.

We are genuinely interested in achieving some common ceiling.

Then the countries in the area should not be used to circumvent the agreement. Some allies fear you might put into Budapest what you take from Central Europe. I asked why would they do it in Budapest if they can put them in Brest, which is closer to Central Europe.

Dobrynin: When?

Kissinger: June, July. When the General Secretary comes we can begin discussion.

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13 For the relevant section of the President’s Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, May 3, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 498–500.
Of course, we look at it from our point of view. And certainly we are approaching it without giving ourselves the benefit of the doubt. But we also consider your point of view. So we are not making insolent proposals.

Once we know the views of our allies—by June or July—we can begin to exchange ideas. 14

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

14 In a letter dated May 13, which Dobrynin handed Kissinger on May 15, Brezhnev wrote Nixon with regard to Kissinger’s visit and the European security conference: “No special difficulties appeared in the exchange of opinion with Dr. Kissinger on European questions, including those related to the preparation and the holding of the all-European conference. Apparently, our representatives have to continue to maintain regular contacts on these matters. There will be, of course, enough here for you and me to talk about—in a wider and more long-term perspective.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 72, Brezhnev–Nixon Exchanges, 1973) The full text of the letter is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

148. Editorial Note

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger contacted West German officials in the wake of his visit to Moscow to inform them about his discussions in Moscow on the European security conference and MBFR. On May 7, 1973, he sent President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft a message that reads in part: “Please send message in special channel to Minister Egon Bahr in Bonn from me as follows: ‘Soviets have raised with me inviolability of frontiers question in connection with CSCE mandate. They have insisted that this issue must be listed separately and first, before renunciation of force. I have pointed out that we will only accept what you accept on this matter. I explained your position that the frontier issue should be dealt with in the context of non-use of force, as it was in your treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviets insisted that this is an incorrect unilateral interpretation of your treaty and that, although listed in Article 3, after non-use of force, inviolability of frontiers stands alone and paramount. I told Soviets we have no independent interpretation of this matter, nor an independent position in the CSCE and that we would be guided by whatever they and you work out. I repeated this position when Soviets specifically asked us to support their position. The matter was left that they would talk to you during Brezhnev’s visit and we would see where things
stood.’” (Telegram Hakto 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 32, HAK Moscow, London Trip, May 4–11, 1973, Hakto & Misc)

On May 12, National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt sent a memorandum to Kissinger about the latter’s upcoming meeting with West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden later the same day: “CSCE Declaration: Von Staden and the Foreign Ministry may not know that Germans have a Soviet text. You probably should notify Bahr of agreement with the Soviets that the Four can now consult so that Bahr can feed it into the German bureaucracy, rather than you.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 271, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File) The same day, Kissinger sent a backchannel message to Bahr: “During my talks in Zavidovo, the Soviets agreed that the US, Federal Republic, Britain and France can consult on the draft text of a declaration for the European Security Conference which the Soviets gave to you, us and the French several weeks ago. We would like to have the State Department proceed with the respective allied foreign offices to develop a Western response to the Soviet draft and would like to begin early the week of May 14. Could you send me confirmation that you have no objection to the State Department’s raising this with your foreign office?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1973)

149. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 12, 1973, 12:40–1:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Berndt von Staden of the Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Kathleen Anne Ryan, NSC Staff

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, Europe, Year of Europe, Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. All brackets, with the exception of those that indicate omitted material, are in the original.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the timing of MBFR, they [the Soviets] proposed that it should take place one month after the completion of the European Security Conference.\(^2\) We said that was all right, as long as it was no later than October 30. They said that is academic. I don’t think this is true. Thus we will have to say that this point is disagreed.

von Staden: That means they want the third stage to end 30 days before, and they still want a Summit.

Kissinger: Yes, we didn’t commit ourselves. We took the position that you did.

von Staden: In the Soviet’s view, the second stage will start immediately after the Foreign Ministers’ meeting?

Kissinger: Yes. The European attitude on the Security Conference is beyond my comprehension. What the advantage to any State is of dragging the process out, I don’t understand.

von Staden: We don’t want to, but we are under the time pressure of the second phase.

Kissinger: It won’t be from us.

von Staden: The Soviets are trying to put us under pressure.

Kissinger: They never rejected it.

von Staden: They are making the link. This is their attitude.

Kissinger: Their interest is that the change be settled before MBFR. That is their definition of linkage.

von Staden: The United States’ interests are to have MBFR begin before October 30?

Kissinger: By the end of October.

von Staden: What is the particular meaning?

Kissinger: None, just to have a date. It should be before Congress adjourns.

Now, this is really all that happened on the subjects in Moscow.

von Staden: May I add some more questions? The Berlin question didn’t come up at all?

Kissinger: No.

von Staden: That is pretty much the center of our concern. Then there are two other points. The CSCE—the continuing organizational

\(^2\) See Document 147.
institutions of the conference and the other third basket cultural exchanges, etc.

Kissinger: On culture they are very much for it. They want to avoid that which is a means of undermining their system.

In regard to continuing organizations, they want something that has no vote, that does act by a majority vote. That is a continuing clearing house for contact. They use Bahr’s view that it is a continuing way of being related there.

von Staden: There is in my country and in Europe a school of thought which assumes that the Soviets are interested in an American presence. I have never been sure to what extent this is true, but some people feel that way.

Your attitude is unchanged?

Kissinger: Our attitude is... I didn’t make any comment to him, I just listened to him. I just listened to what he had to say. So I made no comment to him at all. Our attitude is that we are willing to consider some sort of a purely administrative security type of thing, but we have not reached that point in any NATO discussion, much less than with them.

von Staden: It is something we like very much and are always pressing. [Do] you have any suggestions as to what we might raise with the Soviets in Berlin?

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Do you Hal? I don’t have any. I would try to avoid giving them the impression that you are very nationalistic and semi-neutralistic, which I know you won’t.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] We don’t agree on everything. If we approach it with the attitude there is a meeting of minds... Take the MBFR debates if there is anything more stupid... it shows a total lack of analysis.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

von Staden: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] As far as Hungary is concerned, I find it very interesting what you say. I don’t consider this a great success for the West.

Kissinger: The European attitude is ridiculous. If we have a common ceiling, we need a reduction of 6 to 1 in our favor. The maximum

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3 Gromyko.
4 The United States and Europe.
study is 15 percent, about 8,000 troops in Hungary. Do these 8,000 troops upset the total?  

von Staden: I have never seen that argument in all my reading.

Kissinger: If you have a common ceiling without Hungary you have a one and one-half to one ratio. If you introduce Hungary you have 60,000 to 90,000 more troops. This transforms the ratio to five and one-half to one. That they will never accept. You will get fewer troops out of Europe and you prevent the most sensible approach.

Sonnenfeldt: You keep Hungary in the area, and if you keep Hungary out you can have a non-circumvention clause.

Kissinger: Our assessment is based on military not political considerations.

von Staden: I was never quite convinced that the Hungary case was of wide importance. My considerations were not on these data.

Kissinger: The idea of a private deal to exclude Hungary is ridiculous. Our analysis was what we really needed was a non-circumvention clause and to have Hungary and Italy out. We were better off without Hungary than with it.

von Staden: Ambassador Roth and his aide are both fine.

Kissinger: Roth is a first-class man. I am using it as an example. This sort of debate should be about how to improve. We are trying to reduce by our approach.

I wish you the best success for the Brezhnev visit. You will let us know?

150. Editorial Note

On May 16, 1973, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council Donald Rumsfeld sent a backchannel message to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger. “The NAC,” Rumsfeld wrote, “is pressing for a briefing on your meeting with Brezhnev. In addition we are now getting press questions as to whether U.S. has briefed NAC on the meeting.” On May 21, Rumsfeld addressed the NAC about Kissinger’s trip on the basis of talking points prepared by Sonnenfeldt. Telegram 2489 from USNATO, May 21, reported that at the NAC session, “some allies expressed concern at report of discussion between Brezhnev and Dr. Kissinger on CSCE–MBFR timetable.” The telegram continued: “Spierenburg (Netherlands) asked if US was ready to accept June 30 date for ministerial CSCE without knowing
definitely date of MBFR conference. Does US go along with idea that CSCE should be completed before MBFR gets underway, even though no one believes that CSCE will be over by October? He asserted that Allies again coming under severe pressure to make premature concessions to the Soviets. If Allies agree that MBFR beginning depends upon completion of CSCE, then they are in the worst of all possible positions. They should not accept June 30 date without having fixed MBFR date.” Rumsfeld told the NAC (reported in telegram 2491 from USNATO) with regard to Kissinger’s Moscow conversations: “Neither the preparatory talks at Vienna nor any point of substance was discussed. The Soviets did however put forward the proposition that actual negotiations should begin one month after the conclusion of the CSCE. Upon questioning by Dr. Kissinger they indicated that while that might or might not occur before October, he wanted it understood that the MBFR negotiations must in any event begin no later than the end of October. The Soviets indicated that in their view they expected the CSCE to be completed by September. They did not, however, specifically accept Dr. Kissinger’s position and this is therefore a matter that remains open and subject to negotiations and agreement between the Allies and the other side.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 263, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XIII)

151. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Michel Jobert, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador John Irwin II
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Foreign Minister’s office in the Quai d’Orsay.
Kissinger: I have told your Ambassador in substance about our talks with Brezhnev, but if you have any questions.

Jobert: You saw a lot of him.

Kissinger: Yes, 25 hours of talks, and 4 days in isolation at this hunting lodge.

Jobert: He is a jolly good fellow.

Kissinger: Not of great precision of mind. He is a nice man.

Jobert: Relatively open.

Kissinger: Yes, and probably committed to the improvement of relations, for whatever reason. We had a theoretical discussion about inviolability of borders and renunciation of force. We support the German position but saw no point in arguing with the Russians. It is basically between them and the Germans. They want a heads-of-government meeting at the end of the Security Conference. What is your view?

Jobert: We will wait and see.

Kissinger: That is our position.

Jobert: Brezhnev told us the last stage could be at Paris!

Kissinger: The Soviets gave us a draft declaration of the final outcome of the Conference.

Jobert: I have not seen it.

Kissinger: You have one. With the permission of the Soviets, we gave it to the British. We would like to take it out of our channel and put it into regular channels.

Jobert: Are you empassioned with this Conference?

Kissinger: No! Our only difference with the Europeans is we want to get it over with quickly. Our feeling is that the more time we invest in it, the more significance it will seem to have. Our aim is to limit the damage, not to see some positive good from it.

Jobert: You want to see it happen in June?

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2 Kissinger briefed Kosciuszko-Morizet on his Moscow talks on May 14: “The other matter we discussed [in Moscow] was the European Security Conference. It is mostly a German-Soviet problem. The issue is the inviolability of frontiers.” Kissinger stated: “this is not an issue where we have bilateral problems. With respect to MBFR, the only thing discussed of substance was the opening of the negotiations. We agree that it should be no later than thirty days after the ending of the European Security Conference. We said it should begin by October 30. The Soviets said this was stupid because the Conference will have been finished a month before then. They said this was a moot question. I happen to believe they are wrong. We have to say the date is disagreed. I don’t think Brezhnev will break relations if we don’t start the conference on October 30.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 14; ibid.)

3 See Document 124.
Kissinger: Only because of our general strategy to get it behind us. They want some permanent machinery. We are not very happy with this.

Jobert: We neither.

Kissinger: The maximum we could foresee is some secretariat that would pass papers around.

On MBFR—I know you won’t consider your career unfulfilled here if it never happens. The Soviets said it can be a month after CSCE. I said that was OK as long as it was no later than October 31. Gromyko said that was academic, because the CSCE will be over by September. I don’t believe him. So it is unresolved.

They are pressing us for a concrete MBFR proposal, but we have held off until consultation with our allies.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

152. Editorial Note

Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev visited Bonn for four days of talks with West German Chancellor Brandt May 18–22, 1973. Among the topics they discussed were the European security conference and MBFR. At the end of the visit on May 22, Brandt invited Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand to Palais Schaumburg to discuss his talks with Brezhnev. The same day, Hillenbrand reported Brandt’s comments in telegram 7381 from Bonn:

“CSCE. Brezhnev pressed for rapid movement on the security conference, asking why it would not be possible, after the conclusion of Phase I, for the experts simply to stay on and begin their work right away. This would make it possible to hold the final session of the conference (which Brezhnev wanted held at the level of heads of government) before the end of the year. Brezhnev did not insist that the first phase begin before the end of June; on the contrary, he indicated that a slight delay might be desirable from the Soviet standpoint since Gromyko would just have returned from the visit to the U.S. and would need a little time to organize himself. In view of this, he suggested that the 3rd of July might be a reasonable opening date. Brandt said he tried to calm Brezhnev’s eagerness for rapid movement by pointing out that it would make sense to begin the committee phase only after summer vacation, say, in September. Brezhnev showed no understanding for this, arguing that summer vacations should not be allowed to interfere
when truly great things are afoot. Brandt also made clear to the General Secretary that the FRG preferred to remain flexible as to the level at which the final act of the conference should take place. Ascribing these views to Foreign Minister Scheel, Brandt told Brezhnev that the level should perhaps depend on the success of the first two phases: if the results were excellent, they should perhaps indeed receive the imprimatur of heads of government; but if they were only mediocre, attendance of the foreign ministers at the final session might have to do. As for the site of the final conference, Brezhnev appeared to have no strong preferences. He mentioned Paris but said he was open to many alternatives including even Bonn or Moscow. However, he was opposed to Helsinki. Brandt said the FRG had a certain preference for Vienna for the final stage and thought that Geneva would be suitable for the committee phase. However, these were not strong preferences. In pressing for greater urgency on CSCE, Brezhnev told Brandt that the U.S. had agreed that it was important to get this conference behind us. Brandt said his reply to this was that the FRG would not put itself in the position of being responsible for a failure to complete the CSCE process this year.

“MBFR. Brandt said Brezhnev had made clear that, although preparations in Vienna could continue, genuine negotiations on MBFR could only begin after all phases of CSCE had been concluded. In discussing the substance of MBFR, Brandt said, Brezhnev was extremely specific about confidence-building measures and rather vague about reductions as such. He obviously attributed great importance to the former and went into considerable detail in talking about the value of having observers at maneuvers and exchanging information on troop movements of any significant size. (In this connection, Brandt mentioned that Defense Minister Leber had been pointed out to Brezhnev on the first evening of the visit as the man who had claimed that the Soviet Union was introducing large numbers of new military units into the Central European area. Brezhnev said that this illustrated why it was important for the two sides to keep each other mutually informed.) As for reductions proper, Brandt said that Brezhnev had taken a very cautious approach—even more cautious than the one the Germans understood he had taken in his recent talks with Mr. Kissinger, as reported to Allies by USDel NATO. He said that initial reductions had to be regarded as symbolic in character, and that further reductions could only be made in stages over a long period. It was important to preserve the existing balance between stationed troops and indigenous troops. Brezhnev pointed out that one area, that of strategic weapons, had to be discussed bilaterally between the USSR and the U.S.; he also made clear, however, that he did not mean to include tactical nuclear weapons under this heading. In response to a question from me, Brandt said that Brezhnev had not touched at all on the subject of forward based systems (FBS).”

(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Bahr also reported on the discussion of CSCE and MBFR during the Brezhnev visit in a backchannel message to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, received in Washington on May 22: “The Russians aroused the impression that they are fairly united with the USA that the third phase of the CSCE should take place still in this year. The Chancellor was very reserved; he is of the opinion that this is impossible on practical grounds, but he nevertheless said: This will not fail on our account if the others reach an understanding on it.” Kissinger thanked Bahr for the update in an undated backchannel message and stated: “We have no agreement with the Russians to complete CSCE this year. As you know, however, the White House has never viewed CSCE with great enthusiasm and therefore would just as soon see it over with. We will of course be guided by the consensus of the Allies on this question. Meanwhile, we will continue to stick to the position that MBFR must begin no later than the end of October, whatever the status of CSCE at that time.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1973)

On May 26, Brezhnev wrote a letter to President Nixon on his visit to Bonn; the Soviet Embassy delivered the letter, along with a cover memorandum from Ambassador Dobrynin, to President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft on May 28. In the letter, Brezhnev informed Nixon about his Bonn discussions on CSCE and MBFR:

“Considerable attention was paid at the Bonn negotiations to the discussion of the issues, related to strengthening European security and specifically to the preparation of the forthcoming all-European conference.

“Our side expressed its firm conviction that the Conference should not only be started but also completed this year. Otherwise the interest of the peoples in the most important problem of securing lasting peace in Europe may decrease and the whole work in that direction will be regarded as a bureaucratic long-drawn-out procedure of small importance. Such turn of affairs, as we think, should not be permitted. We also talked about the desirability to start the second stage of the all-European conference (committees work) immediately after the Ministers’ meeting in order to complete it within one month or one month and a half. Chancellor Brandt assured me that the FRG Government will not object to the speediest holding of the Conference with the view of completing all its stages already this year. The West-German side also agreed in principle that the third stage of the Conference be held at the highest level and that at the outcome of the Conference there will be created a consultative organ which could become a link with consequent all-European forums. The FRG representatives noted, however, that both those questions should be more precisely determined with the results of the second stage taken into account.
“In the talks we exchanged also certain general considerations with regard to a possible reduction of armed forces and armaments in the area of Central Europe. Chancellor Brandt reaffirmed his opinion, expressed earlier, that such a reduction should cover both foreign and national troops of appropriate states. Our side expressed conviction that the reduction can be successful only when it does not actually cause damage to the interests of either side and does not change the existing alignment of forces. We told the Chancellor that for the beginning we could agree to a small symbolical reduction of armed forces and armaments. The specific sizes and forms are yet to be agreed. It is important that the peoples receive confidence in the seriousness of our intentions and feel that certain results have already been achieved.

“Chancellor Brandt expressed the opinion that, though this question was complex and the talks might be quite prolonged, there was still a prospect for reducing the general level of armaments in Europe so that none of the affected states would have a diminished sense of security.”

(Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 17)

153. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Soviet Draft of a CSCE Final Declaration

In response to your request to Assistant Secretary Stoessel, he called in separately FRG Ambassador von Staden and the UK and French Ministers (Sykes and de La Gorce) on May 21, to invite the views of their Governments on both the substance of the January Soviet draft of a final CSCE declaration and the tactics for dealing with it. All three undertook to be back in touch with us soon.

This was the first occasion on which the Department has mentioned the Soviet draft to other Governments. In passing on to the three

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Secret; Limdis.
Embassies copies of the attached annotated text containing the Department’s comments on various passages, Mr. Stoessel:

—underlined the confidentiality of this consultation;
—referred to the circumstances under which the draft was received by all four of the Allies, noting that, for our part, we had taken no other action than an internal study of the draft;²
—reported that the Soviets had asked you, during your recent visit to the USSR, for reactions, and had expressed understanding for your response that you wished first to consult with our Allies;
—noted that the draft, while clearly contrary in various respects to Allied positions, seemed to have been somewhat overtaken by events at the preparatory talks in Helsinki; nevertheless, we would wish to be prepared to deal with the possibility that the Soviets may table this draft or something like it as early as the initial CSCE meeting of foreign ministers anticipated in late June; and
—invited their views on the substance of the draft, the advisability and method of proceeding with possible broader Alliance consultations, what response might be given the Soviets should they again raise this matter during Brezhnev’s visit to Washington in June, and how the Allies should treat this or other similar documents placed on the table at the initial CSCE ministerial.

Von Staden was quite familiar with the Soviet draft, which he confirmed was received from the Soviets in Bonn. The Germans had not consulted with other Allied Governments, and had replied simply that many points in the draft were unacceptable. To his knowledge, the matter was left at that.

Von Staden expressed concern at this evidence of a Soviet effort to bypass the essentially inductive approach to CSCE discussions devised with some effort at MPT and, speaking personally, cautioned that a quadripartite response to the Soviets would be adversely received not only by our other Allies but also by the wider circle of Western and non-aligned CSCE states.

British Minister Sykes noted that preliminary British comments on the draft had been given earlier to Mr. Sonnenfeldt,³ but undertook to bring these up to date. Speaking personally, he saw no objection to an initial discussion of the Soviet draft in the NATO Council, which he thought should probably be followed rather quickly by broader Western consultations in Helsinki.

² An undated, annotated version of the Soviet draft with comments by the NSC staff is ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Europe, USSR, Moscow Trip, CSCE.
³ Not found.
French Minister de La Gorce was apparently not familiar with the Soviet draft, nor any French-Soviet consultations concerning it, but undertook to obtain reactions from Paris.

The attached copy of the Soviet draft containing Departmental annotations has been updated to take into account recent developments in the Helsinki talks. Also attached is the latest version of the Allied draft of a CSCE declaration of principles of inter-state relations, which is still rather heavily bracketed. Without a significantly greater effort of will in Allied capitals, this draft is not likely to be in shape for presentation to the Soviets by the time of the Brezhnev visit to Washington.

Further, we would also anticipate objections from at least some Allies to our providing this Allied text to the Soviets prior to the conference. Most of the Allies appear to favor a minimum of substantive discussions at the initial meeting of foreign ministers and the employment in the second phase of the conference of the “bottom up” or inductive approach employed successfully at MPT. Thus, we believe most would prefer not to table Allied texts at the outset, particularly if the Soviets could be persuaded to exercise similar restraint.

Kenneth Rush

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4 Attached but not printed.
5 Attached but not printed.

154. Memorandum of Conversation

Reykjavik, May 31, 1973, 10:15 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Pompidou
Mr. Andronikoff (Notetaker)

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Alec Toumayan (Notetaker)

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in the Kjarvalsstadir. Nixon and Pompidou met for a two-day summit in Reykjavik May 31–June 1.
SUBJECT

The Year of Europe

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Pompidou: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I do not think the U.S. can afford to leave Europe. You can pull out 10,000 or 20,000 GIs; this will not matter. It will be a token. It will impress some and worry some. Either the Soviet Union pushes its pawns and it can do so militarily or half militarily, half politically. Will the U.S. accept this or seek a loophole or consider that its interests are at stake? If the U.S. chooses a loophole, the figures are there to show that Europe cannot defend itself. If the U.S. decides that it is vital to act, then it will not shirk its responsibility regardless of their weight. In 1940, a French politician wrote that the French didn’t want to die for Danzig.2 No doubt many Americans are ready to say now that Americans must not die for either Paris or London. The result of not wanting to die for Danzig is that we died altogether at the time.

Dr. Kissinger: This attitude provoked the death of many countries even though it is illogical. The President has said he does not want to withdraw more than 10,000 to 20,000, but unless we make an enormous effort, Congress will want to legislate the withdrawal of 75,000 to 100,000 men by September or October. This may be illogical but it is a fact. That is why the President seeks a political basis on which he can stand against what would not be in our interests.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Nixon: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] Let me give you an example, on MBFR where you feel as I do. I keep dangling this in front of Congress to keep them from cutting funds. Yet I have seen no plan that is satisfactory. It will be very difficult for any country to sit down and negotiate when the Soviet Union speaks for the entire Warsaw Pact. So it is important that you, Heath, Brandt and I talk of these things. With the Italians also, if we only knew who he is.

President Pompidou: Leone told me he will come even if there is a crisis, and there will be a crisis. On MBFR we are outside but we have an opinion. We found many good things in the latest information given

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2 Reference to the Free City of Danzig, placed under League of Nations mandate at the end of World War I. The Baltic port sat atop the strip of German lands ceded to Poland at the end of World War I, dubbed the “Polish corridor,” because they divided East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Poland’s refusal in 1939 to accede to Nazi Germany’s demands to return this territory, along with Danzig, to Germany led to the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and sparked World War II.
to us by U.S. representatives. We think one must not touch national forces, for this is the beginning of a neutralization of Europe.

President Nixon: We are happy that this is the French view because this places a new restraint on some of our allies.

President Pompidou: We thought we had persuaded Brandt but recently he spoke of national forces again, and he is an independent man who does not speak lightly.

Dr. Kissinger: Not only that, but it means swapping good German divisions for bad Polish and Czech divisions.

President Pompidou: I speak of Brandt. He came from the U.S. with a good impression that he had convinced you. 3

President Nixon: Of what?

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

3 See Document 145.

155. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel)1

Washington, June 2, 1973, 1:45 p.m.

HK: Hello, Walt?

AS: Hello, Henry.

K: Dobrynin complains to me that our guy in Helsinki is leading the charge on the troop movement,2 now I promised Dobrynin, I prom-
ised Gromyko and I promised Brezhnev that we would get off troop movements and stick to maneuvers.

AS: Henry, we have and I just saw him this morning—indicated they have reached agreement there on a formulation which is satisfactory to the Soviets.

K: Oh really?

AS: Yeah, so I think we are okay, just a second, Henry, let me check this. Henry, I’m sure that is true.

K: Okay, I’ll tell him Monday.

AS: Yeah, really it shouldn’t be a problem. They agreed to have the second phase study this question and make reports on it.

K: Now, look there is another idea—first of all can I get your comments on our draft communiqué soon?

AS: Yeah, we are working on that right now, we’ll get that over this afternoon.

K: Good, if I could have it this afternoon, I would appreciate it, because I may have a meeting on it tomorrow.

K: Now, here is another idea that I discussed with Dobrynin this morning—has to do with the MBFR thing. They would consider setting a fixed date for the MBFR if we put into the communiqué a phrase saying that Brezhnev and the President agreed on the desirability of concluding the European Security Conference this year.

AS: Yeah, all phases.

K: On the desirability, you know. But I won’t see him until next week—can you think about that?

AS: Yeah, I think still this would cause some problems—we could just say on desirability concluding the CSCE as soon as possible.

K: That of course—

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3 At 1:50 p.m. on June 2, Kissinger phoned Dobrynin. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: “HK [Kissinger]: First on troop movements, I am told you don’t know what the hell you are talking about. They’ve already settled it. AD [Dobrynin]: In what way? I just received a telegram on Friday signed by Gromyko that I need to approach you, but you were in Iceland. HK: Our people tell me that on Saturday morning that they got a tele—they seemed to have settled it today. AD: You are just telling me what I am telling you but I am telling you what exactly what was yesterday or even today, so in what way is it settled? HK: I haven’t looked at it, but that they say they and you agreed on a formulation that’s acceptable.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 20, Chronological File)

4 Kissinger is referring to the draft communiqué for Brezhnev’s forthcoming visit to the United States. Regarding the final communiqué, see Document 163.

5 No record of this conversation has been found.
AS: They were worried they were going to string this thing out and use MBFR to weigh the thing. Then we’ll think about that one.

K: Do you want to see if we can come up with something?

AS: Yeah.

K: Okay.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

156. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet
Earl of Cromer, UK Ambassador
Richard Sykes, Minister
Charles Powell, First Secretary
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
William Hyland, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Trend: On MBFR, are we back in your good books?

Kissinger: I haven’t heard any complaints lately.

Trend: You were so unhappy last time we met.2

Kissinger: You should be aware of one thing the Russians have proposed to us, on MBFR and CSCE. I am beginning to think I understand the Asian mind better than the European mind! Last year the Europeans were complaining we had to set a date for the opening of MBFR; now they are complaining we are trying to delay it.

As I told you, at Zavidovo Gromyko said it was academic because CSCE would be over by the end of September. Now they said if we

1 Source: Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 23, United Kingdom (5). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the United Kingdom Embassy Chancery.

2 See Document 140.
agree to end CSCE this year, they will agree to fix a date for the MBFR opening even if it is prior to the closing of CSCE. This is the proposition they put to me.\textsuperscript{3} I understand Brandt is willing to end CSCE this year.

Sykes: Three to four months may be needed, on the commissions. But we really can not fix a date because we don’t know how it will go.

Kissinger: What would you say if we had a vague phrase in our Communiqué\textsuperscript{4} that we don’t oppose ending CSCE this year, or something like that?

Sykes: I don’t think you should do that; you will become a hostage.

Kissinger: We don’t care about CSCE. But would it be worth some small price in order to get MBFR?

Cromer: If it is just set as an objective, there is no price.

Kissinger: But CSCE now need not be over first. We have to have MBFR discussions going on when Congress reconvenes next January. You know this.

Sykes: Yes.

Cromer: The question is whether the Russians want a definitive date of before the end of this year.

Kissinger: A definitive date would be impossible to deliver.

Sykes: I don’t see how London would object to setting a date as an objective, if MBFR can begin before.

Kissinger: Could you get me an answer?

Sykes: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\textsuperscript{3} See Document 155.

\textsuperscript{4} Apparent reference to the joint communiqué for Brezhnev’s upcoming visit; see Document 163.

157. Editorial Note

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded in Helsinki on June 8, 1973. In a memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, June 11, Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Wells Stabler stated: “MPT was successfully concluded on June 8, with ad referendum agreement
among representatives on a ‘final’ MPT document (no bracketed language remains) and on a procedure whereby participating states will advise the Government of Finland by June 25 of their intention to attend the initial CSCE Meeting of Foreign Ministers on July 3. This notification will signify acceptance of the final MPT document as the basis of CSCE, thus obviating the need for any further gathering prior to CSCE itself. In the absence of an agreed date for the opening of MBFR negotiations, most of our Allies prefer that notifications to the Finns on CSCE attendance be delayed until the question of linkage can be discussed further at the NAC Ministerial in Copenhagen on June 14–15. Consistent with our view that withholding agreement to open CSCE on schedule is not the course most likely to bring the Soviets to agree to open MBFR negotiations by October 30, it is our present intention—subject to the views of the Secretary, following his discussions with Allied foreign ministers in Copenhagen—to notify the Finns, soon after the Copenhagen meeting, of our intention to participate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 EUR) For the Final Recommendations from the Multilateral Preparatory Talks on CSCE, approved in Helsinki on June 8, see Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1973, pages 181–188.

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed CSCE with French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert during his trip to Paris, June 6–10, for talks with the North Vietnamese on the ceasefire in Vietnam. On the morning of June 8, in response to Jobert’s question whether Kissinger was “following what is happening at Helsinki,” Kissinger replied: “No. But apparently Gromyko follows it, and every once in a while comes to appeal to me for help. Then I have to study the problem. I have intervened only once.” Kissinger confided: “Frankly, our attitude toward the [European Security] Conference is one of great indifference, that it doesn’t do too much damage.” The conversation continued: “Jobert: How long will you stay at Helsinki? Dr. Kissinger: I luckily don’t have to go there. The Secretary of State goes. Shall we agree we will make an effort to keep our participation as brief as possible? We have no interest in a long drawn-out meeting.” Jobert then stated: “I don’t think the ESC Summit is such a good idea.” Kissinger replied: “We are not for it. We will cooperate with you to prevent it.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 26, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File)
158. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, June 9, 1973, 8:30–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council Operations
Mr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General, NATO

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Our MBFR experiences in Vienna are indicative of the general problem. Now there is a general attempt to down-play the role of the NAC in MBFR, while emphasizing the role of the ad hoc group in Vienna. The Belgians have warned us that if they cannot have a plenary meeting of the ad hoc group in Vienna to state their position, they are likely to pull out altogether.

Something is going on that we are not all aware of. Ministers agreed last year to link CSCE and MBFR. Now we have a date on CSCE, but nothing on MBFR. There is some concern that this represents a bargain you may have made in Moscow.

Dr. Kissinger: What bargain?

Mr. Luns: An agreement with the Soviets on the beginning date for MBFR. The impression is that the U.S. is prepared to drop insisting that MBFR begin this fall, while agreeing to go ahead with the CSCE. I would hope that any decision in this regard could await Ministerial discussion at Copenhagen.

Dr. Kissinger: I have made no deals with the Soviets on MBFR.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I was concerned recently to see a newspaper report which mentioned the 16 percent figure for MBFR force reductions. This led some in NATO, I know, once again to be concerned about a U.S.–USSR MBFR deal.

Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you flatly that there has been no discussion on the substance of MBFR with the Soviets. I have never talked to them about the subject, except in terms of a starting date. Dobrynin has sought on several occasions to get me to give him some indication

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 335, Department of State, Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Memoranda of Conversation, Vol. 1. Secret; Sensitive.
of the size reduction we are thinking about. I have never given him any figure; I have refused any discussion about a figure. If there had been any discussion with the Soviets about the size of reductions, it would have been in my channel. I can state flatly that no figures have been exchanged with the Soviets.

I can tell you, however, that while I am agnostic about the issue, I am inclined to think that the option containing the 16 percent reduction is the best of the three.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

159. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
European Issues

Note: Our NATO Allies are particularly sensitive about US-Soviet discussions on the European Security Conference and on MBFR. The material below is consistent with agreed Allied positions. In your comments to Brezhnev you should find occasion to state that these are issues on which we must take account of the views of Allies, and maintain close consultations with them.

1. Timing of MBFR–CSCE

Last fall, we negotiated with the Soviet Union a schedule in which the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) would start formally in June/July and the actual negotiations on mutual force reductions (MBFR) would start in September/October of this year. We want to keep to this schedule so that the start of MBFR negotiations will have an impact on a probable Congressional debate expected this fall over reducing U.S. troops in Europe. Our position therefore is that MBFR must start no later than October 30, 1973.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Discussions with Brezhnev. Secret; Sensitive.
—The Soviets have taken the position that MBFR should start only after CSCE is completed. We cannot accept such a tight linkage since CSCE may last until sometime in 1974.

—Our Allies are looking to us to solve this problem.

—We have told the Soviets that while we are prepared to honor the timetable and proceed with the CSCE in early July, the Conference cannot be expected to make progress until a date is set for MBFR and that this date can be no later than October 30.

—The Soviets have indicated that they might be prepared to set a date for MBFR before the end of the year if we agree to get CSCE concluded by the end of the year. While we could accept the end of CSCE by year’s end as a goal to work toward, this would be highly divisive with the Allies, especially the French and British who do not want to be under time pressure. They also feel that the Soviets had already accepted September/October for MBFR and we would thus buy the same horse twice. This option is therefore probably not feasible for us.2

—Dobrynin now hints that they will accept our date, if, in turn, you agree to take part in the final phase of the Conference as a summit level gathering. In your discussion you could say, while we cannot offer a firm guarantee on such a summit, given Allied resistance to it, we could agree to consider the idea if Brezhnev confirms the MBFR date for October 30.

2 In a telephone conversation on June 10, Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger of a disagreement on CSCE and MBFR in the draft communiqué for Nixon’s forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. A transcript of the conversation reads in part: “HAK: Look, my judgment is that they agreed to an MBFR start anytime this year; that’s good enough. Don’t you? [Sonnenfeldt]: Well, it may be good enough for us. I think we have an alliance problem. HAK: Why should the Allies object whether it starts December 31 or November 17? S: Well, who knows. The Allies are on their high horse. They take the position we sold this once back in September, and the Russians are making us sell it the second time and their linkage with the CSCE. Everybody is reluctant to accept the terminal date with the CSCE because they somehow think that puts us under time pressure. HAK: That I can understand, but what if the Russians unconditionally accept it? S: If the Russians unconditionally accept some date this year, I think that’s all right, but if they accept it with a matrix (?), then I think we have a problem.” (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 20, Chronological)

2. Substantive Issues

As far as the substance of the Conference is concerned, we have no major disagreements with the Soviets. There are four main divisions for the future work (1) principles of relations among the participating states; e.g., respect for territorial integrity, non-use of force, etc.; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; (3) human contacts; and (4) establishing some institutions to follow the Conference. After the
first Foreign Ministers meeting, which is set for July 3 in Helsinki, there will be committees and subcommittees established to work out final agreements. The final product will be a series of declarations and some agreements in the cultural and economic field.

Your Main Points

A. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The preparations have been careful, as we both agreed last May that they should be; even though somewhat protracted this will guarantee smoother work in the next phase.

—We have now met the timetable that we worked out last September in Moscow.
—We can continue to work with the Soviet delegations on the substance, and to blend this with exchanges in the private channels.
—There is a limit on how far we can go in prearranging a conference with so many involved; in any case, we should be satisfied with a modest outcome.
—On the timing, we cannot guarantee when it will be finished, but as far as we are concerned around the turn of the year is a reasonable target. Certainly by the late winter the talks should be winding up.
—We should both be careful to respect the interests of other countries involved and not seem to be dictating either substance or procedures.3
—Whether or not CSCE should be completed with a summit meeting of all the leaders is worth considering, if the results justify it. You do not rule it out, provided we can foresee the beginning of talks on mutual force reductions.

B. On MBFR:

—Your view is that the net result must be to increase the confidence in the military balance, so that neither side seems to have an offensive advantage.
—This means that US forces cannot be treated as all others, because we withdraw 3,000 miles, while Soviet forces could be on the Polish border.
—Therefore, the objective should be at a balance of equal in numbers; this means that US-Soviet reductions would be about two Soviet for one American, so that there is a resultant parity. The size of the initial cut could be negotiated, but you agree that in the beginning it should be moderate (do not quote a percentage, lest Brezhnev claim that you have reached agreement).
—We are prepared to begin talks this fall, as agreed last year. (If the Soviets have not agreed on a specific date, you should press Brezhnev to accept October 30.)

3 Nixon highlighted this paragraph.
Meanwhile, some very discreet exchanges could begin in the private channel.

—in any case, whatever the right proportion of reductions, it will be necessary to work out measures that build confidence, such as limiting maneuvers in the area of reduction and possibly stationing observers at key crossing points.

—Finally, there has to be some guarantee that the agreement will not be circumvented through other countries such as Hungary.

160. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 14, 1973, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Your Meetings with Brezhnev

This is your basic memorandum. It contains a review of all the major issues that are likely to arise in your discussions, and provides talking points on each.

More detailed papers on the major subjects for your background and use are also enclosed in this book.²

Additional background material is in a separate briefing book.³ Also in the separate books are your conversations at the last summit,⁴ and my conversations in Zavidovo.⁵

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Meetings with Brezhnev, Memoranda from Kissinger. Secret; Sensitive. A notation at the top of the first page indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

² Other portions of the briefing book are ibid. For the briefing paper on European issues, see Document 159.

³ Additional background material is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Meetings with Brezhnev, Memoranda from Kissinger.

⁴ See Documents 94–98.

⁵ See Document 147.
3. International Questions

A. Europe

Brezhnev was not particularly interested in the details of the European Security Conference, or of Mutual Force Reductions and asked that I take them up with Gromyko, who of course was extremely well informed.

Brezhnev’s main objectives seem to be:

—That the European Security Conference become a symbol of a new era of relaxed tension in Europe, flowing from the agreements with West Germany.

—He will press you for agreement to a timetable, that would complete the conference by the end of the year, and have the final stage as a massive summit meeting of 34 leaders.6

—As for the substance the Soviets have been driven by pressure from all sides to agree to an increase in contacts and freer movement of people and dissemination of information.

—In return, they have nailed down some general principles on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders that shore up the status quo.

On MBFR, Brezhnev has not said much. A year ago he said that the best approach was a symbolic reduction, of about 10 percent, in order to build confidence.

—He took the same position with Brandt when he visited Bonn7 and added that it would be worth adding some measures such as exchange of observers and limits on maneuvers (a position the West has long espoused).

—Gromyko probed me for our position on the substance, even though it probably has been available through Soviet intelligence since we presented it to NATO. Gromyko did propose, however, that we begin some very private discussions on MBFR over the summer; and I told him we would consider it.

Our Position

Of course we must be very sensitive to the Allied reaction on MBFR. We cannot seem to be negotiating any substance on their behalf.8 Moreover, the Alliance is just beginning to pull themselves together to take a long, hard look at the substance.

In general we see three possible outcomes:

1. A 10 percent cut in NATO stationed (“foreign”) forces, and a reciprocal Soviet cut of numbers that would bring their total down to

6 Nixon highlighted this paragraph.
7 See Document 152.
8 Nixon underlined the entire sentence, along with “MBFR” at the end of the previous sentence.
a common ceiling in the area. (West Germany, the Benelux, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.) The second phase would be a cut of ten percent for the national or indigenous NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

2. The second approach would be a mixed package in which the Soviets would reduce their tank forces—that is about one Soviet tank army of ten divisions—and we would reduce about 1,000 nuclear warheads.

3. The third approach would limit the reductions only to the US and Soviet forces; we would cut by about 15 percent and the Soviets by some numbers sufficient to create parity (about a 2 to 1 reduction) in the zone of reductions.

The NATO inclination is for the first approach, mainly because the Germans feel under domestic political pressure to make a reduction if others do so.

—As you told Pompidou,⁹ for sound military-security reasons we oppose cutting national forces, and trading good NATO forces for second rate Polish and Czech divisions.

_Therefore, we favor a Soviet-American cut, as long as the result can be rationalized as creating a parity in the area._

_On the European Conference on Security and Cooperation:_

We have no vital interest at stake; indeed, our main aim was to concede some of the atmospherics to the Soviets while protecting the substance. Since the Soviets want to dilute the NATO system by suggesting that a new system of “collective security” is emerging, we want to keep the outcome very general.

As far as the substance of the Conference is concerned, we have no major disagreements with the Soviets. There are four main divisions for the future work (1) principles of relations among the participating states; e.g. respect for territorial integrity, non-use of force, etc.; (2) economic, scientific and technical cooperation; (3) human contacts; and (4) establishing some institutions to follow the Conference. After the first Foreign Ministers meeting, which is set for July 3 in Helsinki, there will be committees and subcommittees established to work out final agreements.

Presumably, they will start working in the committees in Geneva by early September, and could conceivably finish by the end of the year, but this is doubtful, given the record of the preparatory talks that began in November and are just now winding up.

⁹ See Document 154.
The final product will be a series of declarations and some agreements in the cultural and economic field. The Soviets want the final meeting to be a summit. The Soviets have given us privately a draft of the final document, and we have discussed it with the UK, the French and Germans. It is out of date, but I imagine Brezhnev or Gromyko will press us to react. The Allies want to stay loose on this, and we should accommodate them.

Your Main Points

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The preparations have been careful, as we both agreed last May that they should be; even though somewhat protracted this will guarantee smoother work in the next phase.

—We have now met the timetable that we worked out last September in Moscow.
—We can continue to work with the Soviet delegations on the substance, and to blend this with exchanges in the private channels.
—There is a limit on how far we can go in prearranging a conference with so many involved; in any case, we should be satisfied with a modest outcome.
—On the timing, we cannot guarantee when it will be finished, but around the turn of the year is a reasonable target. Certainly by the late winter the talks will be winding up.¹⁰
—Whether or not they should be completed with a summit meeting of all the leaders is worth considering, if the results justify it. You do not rule it out.

On MBFR:

—Your view is that the net result must be to increase the confidence in the military balance, so that neither side seems to have an offensive advantage.
—This means that US forces cannot be treated as all others, because we withdraw 3,000 miles, while Soviet forces could be on the Polish border.¹¹
—Therefore, the balance should be at least equal in numbers which means that US-Soviet reductions would be about two Soviet for one American, so that there is a resultant parity. The size of the initial cut could be negotiated, but you agree that in the beginning it should be moderate (do not quote a percentage, lest Brezhnev claim that you have reached agreement).
—We are prepared to begin talks this fall, as agreed last year. (If the Soviets have not agreed on a specific date, you should press Brezhnev to accept October 30.)¹²

¹⁰ Nixon highlighted this paragraph.
¹¹ Nixon highlighted this and the previous paragraph.
¹² Nixon underlined “accept October 30.”
Meanwhile, some very discreet exchanges could begin in the private channel.

—in any case, whatever the right proportion of reductions, it will be necessary to work out measures that build confidence, such as limiting maneuvers in the area of reduction and possibly stationing observers at key crossing points.

—Finally, there has to be some guarantee that the agreement will not be circumvented through other countries such as Hungary.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

161. Editorial Note

On June 19, 1973, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger sent President Nixon a memorandum updating him on the negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet delegations on the final communiqué for Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev’s visit. With regard to the European security conference and MBFR, Kissinger’s memorandum reads:

“The Soviets want the communiqué to say that the final stage of the European Security Conference should be held at the summit level. Several of our Allies object to any such commitment at this time, as do we. The possibility of a concluding summit meeting might provide the West with some leverage during the earlier stages of the Conference. For the communiqué, we have tentatively proposed to say that if progress in the Conference warrants it, the idea of a summit level final stage may be considered.

“We have, however, tied this possible concession to the Soviets to their accepting a date certain for the beginning of MBFR talks—October 30. Thus far the Soviets have refused to set this date, although they had earlier agreed to the start of MBFR in September/October. It is important for Congressional reasons that we should get a fixed starting date. Consequently, we are holding out, in the communiqué negotiations, for a trade-off between our vague commitment to the possibility of a summit-level final stage of CSCE and the setting of October 30 as the start of MBFR.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 18)
162. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, June 20, 1973.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Mr. A.M. Alexandrov
Mr. G.M. Tsukanov
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] The other point at issue is with regard to CSCE and the starting date of MBFR. The positions vary in that your side definitely wants a summit committed for CSCE but the allies do not want it. We are in a tough spot there. Regarding MBFR, we consider it important to state the date for starting—October 30th. You have indicated you want to leave it open; it is very important to us because of the allies and because Congress wants progress. If you could come with us on the October 30th date we could take language “considering” a summit. It would cause some problems for us with the allies but we would be prepared to do it. Those, Mr. General Secretary, are the only issues left. If we could reach agreement we would have the communiqué all set and of course the SALT agreement tomorrow would then be in order.

Brezhnev: Has your position on MBFR since the meeting in Moscow undergone any changes?

President: We consulted with our allies, though I don’t think we can say now what the details are. But we can have constructive and very concrete negotiations. There is no change in principle from last year.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 75, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Brezhnev Visit, June 18–25, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 1:37 to 3:07 p.m. in Laurel Lodge. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) All brackets, with the exception of those that indicate omitted material, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974.
[At this point photographers entered the room to take pictures.]

Brezhnev: You remember Mr. President, when the idea was first advanced to have the CSCE in Paris. We discussed it in Moscow and also in Oreand with Brandt and we were proposing 1972. But then there were many consultations and discussions. We can now note with gratification that all parties favor the conference and that July 3rd has been chosen for starting at the Foreign Minister’s level. Then there will be commissions. And then the third stage. What do you say to this? It should end this year so that it does not drag on and people will lose interest. So we should agree to 1973 for the ending. It we can agree on this, the other problems will be easier.

President: It is difficult to set the end before the conference begins. There are a great number of nations involved and it would not be realistic. We, ourselves, have no objection but we cannot speak for our allies and you would have similar problems with yours. All I can say is that we can press forward to get a conclusion as soon as possible. You and I can agree to that as a goal.

Brezhnev: I did not mean that I wanted to select a definite date, a month or a day for the end. I merely was talking about the end of 1973. It could be anytime in December, say. It would have a great significance in Europe and the world. The matter was first raised during 1972. Pompidou first took the initiative when I was in Paris and he supported it. It was set out in the communiqué at the time. Several others felt the conference would be held in 1972, certainly France did. Then it transpired that it was not held. Now it seems that even 1973 will pass without result. We should try to do something definite. The word allies has a relative sense. After all the two of us are allies in working out things. Any way, our allies support the end of 1973. We favor saying that we should end all stages, including the last one at the summit by the end of 1973. If we could do that, then we can set the start of mutual force reduction negotiations, since you say you have a problem with your allies on this.

It seemed to me that from the previous discussions with Brandt, Pompidou and you we could say in a gentlemanly fashion that this has been solved. Sometime ago I met Pompidou at Zaslavl. I met him half way by saying that the commissions should meet one and one-half months after the Foreign Ministers. Pompidou did not raise any questions about ending the conference in 1973. So the French don’t oppose it and in Bonn we also discussed this with Brandt—and I informed you in detail—and he also did not object. I don’t see anyone who opposes this except perhaps the British. Certainly the others don’t. I don’t see any significant objection. Anyway, our joint voice is generally heeded in the world. If we don’t speak out it won’t be taken seriously. So if we could agree, then we could agree on the points you raised.
So, I believe if we could get full understanding on all these questions we would just have one. I agree that it is very knotty.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: Keep in mind that in regard to the Salt principles, if they are to be signed tomorrow, it is very important to set the 1974 date. Because Friday’s agreement has to be coupled with specific things on strategic arms. So the date, not just the vague 1974–1975, is very important. The same applies to the starting date for MBFR in relation to Friday. We have to put meat on the bones. It is very important.

CSCE is a different problem. The starting date has been set for July 3. We both are not dragging our feet. But from contacts with the allies, we know they don’t want a commitment to a concluding date. When you say that Pompidou and Brandt don’t oppose, it is quite different from what you are saying, which is to settle between us a precise date. Perhaps we could try to give this to our colleagues for drafting: “And therefore they are of the view that it should proceed as expeditiously as possible.” That is on page 9 [of the draft communiqué]. That way we would not be committing our allies. This would come in the sentence: “The USA and the USSR proceed from the assumption . . .”

Brezhnev: If we take that form of words it might seem that we are creating haste and are afraid of something. We should get an acceptable form of words but not a specific date, just this year. This would give the allies greater assurance. This would not be diktat, it would just be that we favor it and it would mean that we still have six months to complete the work. If this were done, I could then think over the date for the start of the mutual troop reductions.

President: Let me suggest a procedure. This item, MBFR, and the Middle East will not be decided today because they are in the communiqué. If we could make progress it would be fine but it could be finished later. On the other hand, the SALT principles have to be decided today. The note that was just handed to Dr. Kissinger was whether the two press secretaries can announce today that we can have a SALT Agreement. I feel very strongly that the SALT principles will be a shattering disappointment if we fail to put in 1974. Also it would be consistent with our meeting in Moscow in 1974. For example, we would never have had an agreement in Moscow last year if we had not set a goal for ourselves. I

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3 The draft communiqué is in the briefing book prepared for the President; see Document 161 and footnote 2 thereto. See also Document 162.
would suggest that if we could get that item settled, which is separate from CSCE, then the experts could work on CSCE and MBFR.

Brezhnev: I certainly cannot object that these two are interrelated and of great importance to us and the world but I would like you to agree that settling a time limit for CSCE is also very important. I would like a private talk before we reach final decisions on all these questions. I have a feeling, a sixth sense, that a little discussion between us could lead to a settlement including all those questions in the communiqué. Certainly I am guided by an earnest desire to reach mutually satisfactory solutions on all these questions. I suggest we adjourn and have a discussion while our colleagues have a discussion on other matters. I am sure we can agree today and then have an easier day tomorrow.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

163. Editorial Note

On June 24, 1973, President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev signed a final communiqué at the end of Brezhnev’s visit to the United States; it reads in part: “The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire, guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint USA–USSR Communiqué adopted in Moscow in May 1972, to continue their separate and joint contributions to strengthening peaceful relations in Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies. In this connection satisfaction was expressed with the fact that as a result of common efforts by many States, including the USA and the USSR, the preparatory work has been successfully completed for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. [...] Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward the Conference, both Sides will make efforts to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the assumption that progress in the work of the Conference will produce possibilities for completing it at the highest level. [...] [The United States and the USSR] attach great importance to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both Sides state their readiness to make, along with other States, their contribution to the achievement of mutually acceptable decisions on the substance of this problem, based on the strict observance of the principle of the undiminished security of any of the parties.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1973, page 132)

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with the NATO Permanent Representatives

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

3. MBFR–CSCE

There has been a reasonably good discussion in the Alliance about MBFR, and before the summer vacation the Allies would hope to hear our preferences among the three general alternatives: (I) stationed and indigenous cuts of 10 percent to a common ceiling; (II) a mixed package tanks for nuclear weapons, and (III) US-Soviet cut of about 15–16 percent for a common ceiling.

All, save the FRG, prefer the US-Soviet cut, but they are now more concerned to be involved in the negotiating process, and to create a wide system of constraints.

(Incidentally, this is the group that created the Hungarian nightmare.)

Your Talking Points

—You are pleased that NATO is grappling with the substantive options and has recovered [received] our input in a good and constructive spirit.

—You are aware that all want to hear our preferences among the various options; we should stop quibbling about words like “balanced”; substance is what counts, not words.

—Our view is that if MBFR is not to be destructive of Western unity, the outcome must be a consensus, in which all the allies play a full role.

—We have deliberately not taken a stand, lest we be thought to have already arranged the outcome with the Soviets.
—In fact, for very sound military reasons, we believe a Soviet-American reduction is the most advantageous, and that reducing national forces can be dangerous; trading good allied divisions for second-rate Czech and Polish divisions is unwise.

—Nevertheless, we recognize that each ally has a domestic problem, as we do, and that cutting national forces may be unavoidable; in any case, this stage should be deferred for as long as possible.

—We agree that constraints are important, and that there must be a tight non-circumvention clause; this has always been our position and the debate about Hungary struck us as needless.

CSCE

They will all be wondering what bargain we may have reached with the Soviets, and what we expect from CSCE. You should not be defensive on the communiqué, but take the offensive in explaining why some symbolism may be to our advantage.

Your Talking Points

—We have always been skeptical about this Conference, and have engaged in it, first to force the pace on the Berlin negotiations, and then to commit the Soviets on MBFR.

—We should not expect to drive the Soviets out of Eastern Europe through declarations; the more we turn this into a confrontation, the more difficult it will be to explain why we compromised, as will be inevitable.

—Our view is to terminate the Conference with the least damage; thus we can accelerate the pace; in fact, we get more from the Soviets under deadlines than they do from us.

—As for a final summit, our view is that it may be unavoidable; all of the Eastern side will attend at the summit level and so will the neutrals, the West will isolate themselves, so it should not be turned into a confrontation.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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2 See Document 163.
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT
US Position at the CSCE Ministerial Meeting, July, 1973

In connection with the forthcoming CSCE ministerial meeting to be held at Helsinki beginning on July 3, the attached general briefing paper and objectives and issues paper have been prepared for my use. I intend, at Helsinki, to proceed generally along the lines suggested in these papers, which are fully consonant with our approach to CSCE.

While at Helsinki, I will also be opening the Azores base negotiations in conversations with the Portuguese Foreign Minister.

William P. Rogers

Attachment


CSCE MINISTERIAL
OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES PAPER

I. Objectives
US participation in successive stages of CSCE will:
—constitute a further demonstration to our Allies and to other European governments of our determination to remain actively and con-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 264, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XVI. Confidential. On July 4, Kissinger sent this memorandum to the President and informed him that the Ministerial meeting of the CSCE would open at Helsinki on July 3 and was not expected to last more than a week to 10 days. Its main purpose, Kissinger stated, was “to endorse the recommendations of the earlier CSCE preparatory talks for the procedures to be followed in the detailed, stage II, expert-level CSCE negotiations which will follow, as well as to decide on the opening date for the stage II negotiations. The question as to whether the final, stage III phase of CSCE should be at the summit level will not be decided during the Ministerial meeting. At this point, most Western participants prefer to leave the issue open; the US position is that the level of participation for the final phase of the conference should be decided during phase II of the negotiations.” (Ibid.)

2 The Department of State briefing paper, dated June 1973, is attached but not printed.
structively involved in discussions and negotiations relating to Euro-

ean security and cooperation, on a broadly multilateral as well as on a bilateral basis;

—provide an opportunity to seek to lower the barriers to East-

West communications and exchanges in various fields, thereby con-

tributing to a more stable European order. At the same time, we wish to avoid exaggerated public expectations that could erode NATO defense efforts and Alliance solidarity.

II. Issues

A. Security Issues—Principles Guiding Relations Among States

The Warsaw Pact states will regard an agreed CSCE document on principles as a major contribution to European security because it will convey, in their view, a measure of recognition of the territorial and political status quo in Eastern Europe, and thus of the permanent di-

vision of Germany. To some extent, Moscow and its Allies will see this text as the functional equivalent of a World War II peace treaty.

Most Western participants believe, in contrast, that the major value of such a document would derive from the added inhibitions it might place upon coercive Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. The FRG holds that a CSCE declaration on this subject should not be seen as confirming the division of Germany.

US Position. The text of a CSCE declaration should make clear that the principles are to be applied unreservedly by all participants in their relations with all others and thus be incompatible, on its face, with the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty within the “Socialist common-

wealth.” However, the document will enhance only marginally, if at all, the security of Western participants, which will continue to rest on the Atlantic Alliance. It is important, therefore, that Western public opinion avoid the erroneous conclusion that agreement at CSCE on principles of relations will permit the Allies to reduce their defense efforts.

We envisage a declaration of intent, not a legally binding text. The document thus could not be a surrogate World War II peace treaty, and the special rights and responsibilities in Germany of the quadripartite powers would remain unaffected.

B. Security Issues—Military Aspects

At issue here is whether the conference should have broad lati-

tude to address general military security issues, including MBFR (as some Allies, most neutrals, and Romania will urge), or whether there should be no substantive MBFR/CSCE linkage, with CSCE negotia-

tions limited to confidence-building measures (exchanges of observers at maneuvers; advance notification of maneuvers; and consideration of advance notification of major troop movements).
US Position. MBFR can be most effectively negotiated by those states whose forces or territory are directly involved, and CSCE agreement on MBFR principles would only complicate the already difficult MBFR negotiations.

C. Cooperation Issues in the Economic, Scientific/Technological and Environmental Fields

Few contentious issues engaging our interest are likely to arise at the Ministerial under this rubric. The Warsaw Pact states, however, will lay propaganda emphasis on “pan-European” projects, thus implying a marginal North American role in East-West cooperation in Europe.

US Position. We intend to participate actively in East-West cooperation in these fields.

D. Issues of Human Contacts, Dissemination of Information, and Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Most Western participants believe that some lowering of the barriers in this field is essential to enhanced European security and cooperation. Western European governments, moreover, feel under public opinion and parliamentary pressures to use Soviet interest in détente to achieve progress in this area. The Warsaw Pact states, however, will resist any implied commitment to significant changes and will assert the primacy of the state in all aspects of these matters.

US Position. The conference should find practical ways to reduce some of the obstacles to contacts between people and to the freer flow of information and ideas. Better understanding among peoples will allay suspicions and make a positive contribution to European security. However, we do not seek to undermine existing political and social systems and recognize that progress in this area can only be gradual.

E. Issue of Follow-up to the Conference

The Warsaw Pact states and some neutrals will stress the need to set up a “consultative committee” to continue multilateral discussions on European security and cooperation and to prepare for further high-level conferences.

US Position. We have joined our Allies in taking a reserved view of follow-on-machinery, which we believe in any case should not have a political or security role.

F. Organizational and Procedural Issues

1. Open or Closed Ministerial Working Sessions

While the inaugural and closing sessions will be open to the media, working sessions will be closed unless Ministers decide otherwise by consensus. While we would prefer closed sessions in the interest of efficiency, a large majority of your colleagues have indicated a preference for open sessions so that their own statements will be fully reported to domestic audiences.
US Position. We should join the majority in favor of open working sessions.

2. Opening Date of CSCE Stage II

Warsaw Pact states will likely propose opening stage II in July, as soon as possible after the Ministerial, and working through the summer to permit the third and final stage to convene in the fall. All Western European participants, in contrast, will prefer to begin stage II in September.

US Position. We are flexible on the opening date and are prepared to support the majority viewpoint.

3. Level of Participation at Stage III of CSCE

Although not a matter for decision at the meeting, Warsaw Pact foreign ministers will undoubtedly urge that stage III be convened at the highest level. Most Western participants would prefer to leave the issue open.

US Position. The level of participation at stage III should be decided during stage II.

4. The Role of Nonparticipant States

The Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff may insist—as did the Maltese representative during the MPT—that representatives of the Arab states bordering the Mediterranean be allowed to appear before the conference and to state their views—despite the likely opposition of all other participants.

US Position. We do not wish representatives of nonparticipant states to appear personally before the meeting, but would let others take the lead in opposing any such proposal. We could agree, however, to permitting interested states to circulate their views in writing.

G. Final Communiqué

Most Allies would prefer a short text which does not address CSCE substantive issues. The Soviets, however, may prefer a more pretentious document that tends to prejudge, indirectly at least, some of the substantive issues to be dealt with in succeeding stages. (The drafting mechanisms will likely resemble the communiqué drafting process at NATO Ministerials.)

US Position. A short non-substantive communiqué, to which would be attached the MPT report, is suitable to mark the closing of the initial stage of a three-stage conference.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
NATO Ambassadors (See Attached List)

Secretary General Luns opened the meeting by asking Dr. Kissinger if he would care to make a statement.

Dr. Kissinger: With this group it might be better for me to answer questions rather than make a formal presentation. I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you. I have been talking with the Secretary General from time to time and he suggested that I meet with the Council. I am pleased that we are meeting earlier than I had anticipated.

Let me make a few observations on some key problems. I have read the cables about the discussion in this group on the agreements we concluded with the Soviet Union and the discussions on MBFR. Incidentally, the discussion on the participation of Hungary in MBFR nearly destroyed my sanity. Let me make some fundamental points.

First, there is an underlying feeling in Europe that perhaps the U.S. is working toward a condominium with the Soviet Union and attaching less importance to the Alliance and that, conditions having changed, we are reassessing our alliance. Conditions have in fact changed, and I want to state the position of this Administration in regard to NATO, to Europe, to the Soviet Union. From the first day of this Administration we have considered relations with Europe central to American foreign policy. That is why the President’s first trip was to Europe and to
the North Atlantic Council. We also have had to consider that we are conducting foreign policy under extremely difficult circumstances. We did not invent the new strategic balance. We inherited a changed strategic relationship. Whereas the Kennedy Administration dealt with the Soviet Union when the Soviets had 80 ICBMs that were liquid fueled and took ten minutes to prepare, we face over 1,000 ICBMs that can be fired immediately. This is a fact of life.

Second, you are all aware from our domestic press of the growth of isolationist sentiment in this country. The very group that carried out our post-war foreign policy, and the very people who founded NATO, are now neo-isolationists. It is not this Administration that wants to reduce our forces in Europe. It is absurd to think that we would use MBFR to obtain a bilateral deal to get us out of Europe. If we wanted to do this we could simply wait and let ourselves be raped by the Congress. We have trouble enough getting our legislation through the Congress without complicating it by deals with the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

As for MBFR there has been a lot of talk about the title and what happened to the word “balance.”\(^4\) I want to put this to you bluntly. The future of the negotiation will not be determined by whether “balance” appears in the title, but by what elements of security lie behind our proposals. We must be sure that we do not weaken security in these negotiations. We say that American forces must be kept in Europe, so when you criticize us on MBFR you are fighting the wrong enemy. At the same time, the only way to deal with the pressures from our Congress is to transform these negotiations from an abstract dispute into a concrete discussion of security issues. Then we can tell the Congress we are in the midst of serious negotiations on security and we can also handle on this basis any Soviet proposals.

When this Administration came into office people wanted us to move fast on SALT. In fact, everything that was being said about SALT at that time one can now read about MBFR, e.g., that we should move

\(^4\) Telegram 126546 to all NATO capitals, June 28, reported on Rogers’s briefing to the NAC on Brezhnev’s visit to the United States. It reads in part: “MBFR: The question was raised whether the Soviets had explained why they object to the word ‘balanced’ in the phrase ‘mutual and balanced force reductions.’ The Secretary said that the Soviets have avoided accepting the word for some time because they claim they do not understand precisely what it means. The important issue is not the word itself, but the concept, which is that reductions should not be to the advantage of either side. The title for the talks used in the communiqué is the one worked out in Vienna: ‘negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
faster, we should limit our forces, etc. We resisted on SALT because we said it was a technical issue and once the debate was transferred to technical grounds we could handle our critics because we knew what we were talking about.

We were troubled by the Hungarian issue. There were only 5,000 troops, more or less, involved but we were concerned because what we wanted to do was to concentrate on security issues, to become very concrete so that we would get on a level that we could negotiate with the Soviet Union. I can tell you we have made no private deals with the Soviet Union on troop levels. Indeed, we would not need to make such a deal. We must define a concrete security position and be able to defend it so if the Soviet Union makes what appears to be a reasonable offer we will be in a position to preempt it and to defend our position in public. In the forthcoming discussions with you we will be urging very concrete agreements.

On the European Conference, we had not wanted it. We were driven into it and we have been willing to participate. Our aim is to keep it from becoming a cosmic confrontation so that people will not think something of major substance has been achieved. However, you will not be under any pressures from us. All we want is to keep the Conference from becoming a massive affair so people will not believe something of great importance has been achieved.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary General Luns: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I agree that it is not the letter “B” that is important, but the contents. I read in your communiqué with the Soviets the stress on undiminished security. You say the U.S. had no interest in the CSCE, so that it will not lead to a success and euphoria. But there are countries in Europe that believe it can achieve meaningful results. The danger of euphoria, of course, is present. Finally, I want to stress that the timely information to the Council and consultations in the Council remain of great value to our security, meaning the feeling of security on the part of the Allies.

Dr. Kissinger: One word on the CSCE. You correctly stated our attitude, though it is hard to separate our views from the concrete issues before the Conference. We do not believe, however, that the USSR will be pried out of Eastern Europe by inadvertence or by declarations. If we sometimes do not push an issue it is because we do not want a cosmic confrontation. We are in favor of ending the Conference sooner rather than later and avoiding deadlocks whose resolution would be considered a great success but not warranted by the substance.

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5 See Document 163.
Menzies: I would like for you to comment on the MBFR negotiations. In light of your discussion with the Soviet Union, what incentives do you believe there are for Soviet reductions and what approach should we take to the negotiations?

Dr. Kissinger: On the substance, we gave the Soviets no encouragement that they could discuss substance with us until NATO was prepared to negotiate. They have indicated in various places that they wanted bilateral discussions. But we have not done so. The only clue we have is that Brezhnev said he was thinking of rather small initial cuts, but he did not get into numbers or percentage, and the question was dropped on the negotiations. We think they must be on a multilateral basis. But there must be a better way of resolving NATO differences more expeditiously and less legalistic debate. The practical issue is if in multilateral negotiations we show the Soviets a concrete position, they will try to split us. Our purpose is to preserve our commitments and not allow the Soviets to drive a wedge.

Dr. Kissinger: I would doubt they would bargain about troops and trade. In any case, the amount of troops involved is fairly small as far as savings are concerned. One factor may be, however, to use MBFR to bring pressure on China.

At the summit meeting, if you carefully read every agreement made, you will find no agreement last year or this year that did not take in account the preeminence of our Alliance. They were not at the expense of others—whether in SALT, MBFR or the European Conference. This was clearly understood, and rather vigorously discussed last week, but in the context of negotiation rather than confrontation. Brezhnev knows, and I know that we can take no action at the Soviet-American level, at the expense of others; or take action without consulting our allies. Your concerns are expressed at the MBFR date, which we got, or at the CSCE which was difficult. These were all decided together with you.
On July 2, 1973, President Nixon sent a backchannel message to Secretary of State Rogers, who was in Helsinki for the Ministerial meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, July 3–8. Nixon’s message reads in part: “Here are some views I wanted to pass on to you relating to the Helsinki conference. I am somewhat concerned that the press treatment of the conference may be raising excessive hopes in people’s minds concerning the eventual accomplishments of the CSCE. I am sure you have this in mind, but I want to be certain that all members of our delegation maintain a positive but low-key posture at Helsinki. This is not an exercise that we started, and we have no interest in generating more euphoria than already exists. In your private and public comments, therefore, I think it would be best to stay away from references to past historical events like the Congress of Vienna and from suggestions that this conference in and of itself will produce peace and cooperation between East and West in Europe. I would also like to be sure that the possibility of a final summit at this conference is not promoted by any of our people since as you know I have considerable doubt about getting involved in such an operation.”

(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Backchannel Messages, Europe, 1973)

In an undated memorandum attached to a copy of Rogers’s June 28 memorandum to the President (Document 165) President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft wrote President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger: “Henry—We did not know what Rogers was going to say at the CSCE. The only thing we got was the attached memo to the President with general proposed U.S. positions and nothing about a speech.” At the bottom of the routing memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “That’s what I thought.” (Ibid., Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR) The text of Secretary Rogers’s speech to the Ministerial conference of the CSCE is in Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1973, pages 177–181.
168. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Prague, July 8, 1973, 1758Z.


1. Summary: Bilateral luncheon July 7 provided occasion for Secretary and Gromyko to review various matters relating to second stage of CSCE. Gromyko stressed Soviet view that conference should produce binding results and that all other issues before conference should be considered secondary to security aspect. Secretary noted that principles of relations to be agreed on by conference would be general in nature and therefore would not take the form of a treaty but of course the US would fully respect any agreements entered into. On security issue, Secretary pointed to diversity of viewpoints represented at conference and underlined US view that progress on cooperation issues in humanitarian area would also enhance security and constituted important goal of conference which could be attained within framework of respect for national sovereignty. Gromyko urged continued US-Soviet cooperation on conference matters and suggested possibility of bilateral consultations on MBFR. Secretary pointed out US still in process of developing position for MBFR negotiations and Gromyko replied the same was true for his government. End summary.

2. Gromyko hosted luncheon at Soviet Embassy for Secretary July 7 immediately following final session of CSCE first stage. Mood was cordial with Soviets clearly gratified at success their last ditch leadership in working out compromise on Maltese-Arab issue which prevented Ministerial from ending on sour note induced by impasse over communiqué (septel).2 Discussion following luncheon provided occasion for serious exchange of views on issues facing second stage of conference.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Map Room, D, 2 of 2. Secret. Repeated to Moscow and USNATO. Rogers visited Czechoslovakia July 8–9 to sign a consular convention.

2 Not identified. Telegram 1815 from Helsinki, July 4, reported that the afternoon session of the CSCE Ministerial meeting “opened with Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff calling attention to his proposal that Algerian and Tunisian FonMins be invited to address meeting. Spain supported Malta but Bulgarian rep proposed remand matter to official level working group. Greek, Swiss, and other ministers endorsed Bulgarian suggestion. Mintoff said working group must reach prompt decision.” Telegram 1586 from Ottawa reported: “Towards end of [CSCE Ministerial] session, when it appeared no communiqué might be issued, [Canadian CSCE Coordinator] Hooper reports Soviet del took up cudgels with Maltese and ‘persuaded’ Mintoff to accept final language. Hooper describes Gromyko as furious, and quotes him as calling Mintoff unbalanced and untrustworthy.” (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
3. Proposals on agenda items. Gromyko asked whether US intended to submit concrete proposals during second stage. Secretary responded affirmatively but indicated we did not yet know precise form proposals would take. Gromyko noted that proposals submitted by Soviets and other socialist countries on various agenda items represented effort to get ball rolling.

4. Pace of stage II. Gromyko expressed concern that second stage of CSCE might become unduly prolonged and expressed hope this could be avoided. Secretary observed that US had agreed in joint communiqué during Brezhnev visit that conference should move forward as expeditiously as possible. He said we fully intended to live up to this understanding but that pace of proceedings would also depend on positions adopted by others.

5. Binding nature of undertakings. Gromyko reiterated standard Soviet view that any documents or undertakings resulting from conference should have maximum binding force so that Europe would not have to “live with triggers cocked” but could have genuine peace. Secretary emphasized that US would not enter into undertakings we did not intend to respect. He noted, however, that any “principles” that would be agreed on by conference would necessarily be general in form. Accordingly, while we are prepared to give them our full support this would not carry the same operational obligation which more specific agreements would carry. As for other agreements that might result from conference, Secretary drew distinction between agreements requiring Congressional approval and those that did not require Congressional approval to enter into force. He expressed the view that agreements likely to result from CSCE would probably, but not necessarily, be of latter type. In any event the US was prepared to support any agreements reached fully and without reservation.

6. Representation of stage II. Secretary asked Gromyko for Soviet views on nature and level at which participants should be represented during stage II discussions. Gromyko said representation should be at high level commensurate with increased importance of stage II over MPT, although experts would again be present. In Soviet case, he assumed Deputy Foreign Minister would be appointed to attend stage II who would represent USSR on coordinating committee and possibly also on one or another of the special committees. He emphasized that representatives must be at responsible level and empowered to speak with full authority of their government in order to keep matters moving.

7. Relative importance of CSCE issues. Gromyko made special point of stressing primacy of security issue over all others at conference. He claimed this in no way implied any under-estimation by USSR of other matters before conference, such as cultural cooperation, family ties (which he noted seemed to be particular concern of FRG Foreign Min-
ister Scheel), exchanges of people and information, and other humanitarian issues. Gromyko said there can and should be agreement on certain principles relating to these other issues: Soviets “were not afraid of them,” but history and common sense showed that main issue before conference was to make Europe a continent of peace. Accordingly, issues other than security necessarily had to be secondary, and conference should not try to get into field of bilateral agreements between states. In addition, such matters as marriages between citizens of different states, taxes for visas, and information questions should only be considered on the basis of respect for the laws of each individual state and with regard to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Only thus could mutual understanding be assured. Otherwise, the conference could become a modern-day Tower of Babel.

8. Secretary replied that US fully intended to deal realistically with issues before conference. Fact remained that there were 35 participants each of which had its own viewpoint. US agreed that security was key issue but we viewed cooperation in humanitarian area as complementary factor which made realization of genuine security more likely. Purpose of conference was obviously not to interfere in internal affairs of other states, but guidelines established by MPT suggested that the conference should, without abandoning principle of sovereignty, give serious consideration to how progress could be achieved on such matters as improving exchanges of people and information. These goals did not need to be seen as inconsistent with principle of sovereignty. Important thing was to carry on the work begun by MPT guided by spirit of seeing what could be done to improve conditions contributing to greater security and cooperation. Secretary said he felt progress achieved thus far was exceptional, and leaders of both Soviet and US delegations to preparatory talks deserve to be congratulated.

9. Gromyko expressed satisfaction that US and Soviet linking seemed to be moving along parallel lines and agreed that results of [garble] were “very good.” He expressed hope that US and Soviets could continue to cooperate on conference matters and should be alert to attempts that might be made by “some quarters” to impede mutual understanding. He urged that US and USSR not lose sight of main objective and depart from track we had taken together, which was source of “great satisfaction” to both our countries and to Europeans in general.

10. MBFR. In brief closing remark on MBFR talks to begin Oct. 30, Gromyko suggested possibility of bilateral discussions after US and Soviets had had chance to review their respective positions. Secretary noted that this was matter for future since we were still working on position for the negotiations. Gromyko said Soviet position likewise not fully developed.

Rogers
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Secretary Rogers’ Report on the European Security Conference

The Secretary has cabled you a summary of the results of the Foreign Ministers session that opened the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (Tab A) The Conference endorsed an agenda and agreed that working groups would take up the agenda on September 18 in Geneva. The main subjects will be (1) general principles governing relations among the participating states, including certain military restraints such as the pre-announcement of maneuvers; (2) cooperation in economic relations; and (3) increased contacts, including freer movement of peoples, ideas and information. In addition, a special working group will consider what permanent institutions might be created to carry on after the Conference ends.

The Secretary reports that the Soviets emphasized the inviolability of existing boundaries in Europe, and the necessity to reconcile any freer movement of people, etc., with national sovereignty and laws. The Secretary believes that the united front presented by the Western Allies will make it difficult for the Soviets to achieve their objective of affirming the immutability of borders. Both he and many of the Western ministers went on record favoring peaceful change of boundaries, mainly to conciliate the German position, which holds that the FRG–GDR boundary can be changed through peaceful unification. The Secretary also believes that the Soviets will be under considerable pressure to modify their present restrictive practices in the areas of human contacts and the flow of information and ideas.

The Secretary was struck by the realistic attitude of the allies’ ministers; while all of them share the hope for progress, none believes that the Conference will be a panacea, nor will the allies feed public euph-
ria. Indeed, they are trying to convey to public opinion that the CSCE is only a limited step and that NATO’s defense must be maintained.

On the final phase—which the Soviets want to be at the summit and before the end of the year—the Secretary comments that he found considerable reserve on a final summit, and that the amount of work remaining suggests a much later terminal date.

Comment: This first phase was essentially procedural. It has been agreed in advance that no real substance would be taken up, and after a round of speeches a bland communiqué would be issued.4 Despite the Western solidarity on the border question and on greater human contacts the long preparatory session suggests that, in fact, it is an illusion to expect the Soviets to change their internal system as a result of a declaration in Helsinki, and none of the participants has been willing to risk the failure of the Conference on this point.

As for holding the last phase at the summit, it is quite likely that as the conference proceeds there will be a growing desire on the part of many countries to attend a final summit. Though much work remains there is so little of substantive value involved in this conference it could be completed within 2–3 months, except for the interminable squabbling that is produced by trying to draft a declaration with the participation of 35 representatives, who are each pressing some particular national point of view. In any case, the first phase seems to have passed without any damage to the Western position, which is about all we can realistically expect from this exercise.

The Secretary now departs for Czechoslovakia.5

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4 For the text of the communiqué, adopted July 7, see ibid., p. 181.
5 Rogers visited Prague July 8–9 to sign a consular convention.
Washington, July 12, 1973, 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT
Conversation between FRG Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger

PARTICIPANTS

FRG
Walter Scheel
Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister
Berndt von Staden
Ambassador to the United States
Helmut Roth (for part of conversation)
Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Foreign Office
Guido Brunner
Head of Planning Office, Foreign Office
Heinz Henry Weber
Counselor, Foreign Office (Interpreter)

United States
Dr. Kissinger
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Hyland
Mr. Stoessel

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Scheel noted that de Gaulle had initiated the détente policy with the East. The FRG had been one of the last to take this up, but it had done its duty and had removed obstacles to relations with the GDR. Now we have moved into the multilateral phase of détente with CSCE and MBFR. Both are test cases. NATO will have to prove that it can pursue a coherent détente policy. This had been most successful at Helsinki. It will be more difficult with regard to MBFR, where there is a tendency toward a legalistic approach. Mr. Scheel did not like this.2

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2 In a meeting on July 16, Kissinger discussed MBFR with Italian Foreign Ministry officials Secretary General Roberto Gaja, Director of Political Affairs Roberto Ducci, and Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "On force reductions, Mr. Ducci said the Italians share with the French a fear of the creation of a special zone in Central Europe which could come about through reduction of national forces and the imposition of special constraints. He asked if Dr. Kissinger had discussed this with Mr. Scheel. Dr. Kissinger said he had talked with Mr. Scheel about
Dr. Kissinger agreed, saying that the formalistic approach to problems diverts energy to peripheral issues.

Mr. Scheel said that NATO can prove its worth. The negotiations will be a test for both sides. We shall see if only declarations are possible or whether concrete steps can be taken. The difficulties must be clearly stated, since détente can be jeopardized if the issues are not understood.

On CSCE, Mr. Scheel commented that he knew Dr. Kissinger was not very partial to it. However, he had to say that nothing had encouraged the political development of the European Community so much as the CSCE. As a result of the CSCE, decisions will have to be taken in connection with security matters and about contacts between people. Mr. Scheel said that he wanted to see the U.S. as a partner in these matters from the beginning. Dr. Kissinger said he agreed that this was a good approach.

Mr. Scheel said that it was also of great internal importance for the European countries. The CSCE was an instrument which could be used against the Brezhnev doctrine. He recalled that just after the Helsinki meeting there had been a shooting at the Berlin wall; countries everywhere had said that this was against the CSCE. Now, all actions will be measured against the CSCE, and this could have an influence on the Brezhnev doctrine.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger commented with regard to the CSCE that he had assumed it probably would result in a series of platitudes. Maybe he had been wrong. He had felt that, if platitudes were to be the only result, it was better to accomplish this with a minimum of effort and without great confrontations which would result in meaningless decisions. We did not wish to contribute to what might be the Soviet strategy of submerging existing institutions by creating new ones and by issuing meaningless declarations. We will not work against substantive results if it seems possible to achieve them. Dr. Kissinger mentioned that he had liked Mr. Scheel’s speech in Helsinki.

Mr. Scheel said he shared Dr. Kissinger’s views. The CSCE should not camouflage differences between the two sides. At the same time, he thought there was some hope that the Soviet Union, in an effort to
achieve results in the area of security and economic contacts, might be prepared to make concessions in the field of greater communications and human contacts. Like the U.S., the FRG was absolutely against the creation of European institutions which would substitute for existing ones. In particular, the FRG did not support a permanent organization to follow the CSCE. The FRG would like to transfer CSCE decisions to existing organizations like the ECE. If it turns out that there is no appropriate organization for a task to be done, then one might think of establishing a new one, such as in the field of youth exchanges.

Mr. Scheel said that the FRG did not want a European court of appeal, which could be an organ for permanent interference in the political development of Europe. This is just what the Soviets would like. This would be fatal. This is why we need to make clear in a declaration that there are priorities, with Atlantic cooperation first and then East-West cooperation.

Dr. Kissinger said he had no disagreement with what Mr. Scheel had said. We also want to avoid European institutions—even including the U.S.—which would replace existing institutions. However, we would not object to establishing something if the need exists, such as in the area of youth exchanges.

So far as human contacts are concerned, Dr. Kissinger said, we will support this concept. We may have to decide how far we want to push on it. He felt it was not inconceivable that the Soviets might move in this area during the second phase. He had seen Ambassador Dobrynin two days ago, who had indicated that the Soviets at least are thinking about the question of human contacts.  

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

So far as force reductions are concerned, Dr. Kissinger said we felt we could avoid Congressional action this year, but we can’t give a guarantee beyond that. We need MBFR and a clear statement of strategy. Military people in general do not like to change anything.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Dr. Kissinger said we want to keep as many forces in Europe as we can. If MBFR is used skillfully and if the talks with our Allies about a declaration go well, then this will be helpful. However, if there is nothing but haggling, then it will make the task very difficult.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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3 No record of this conversation has been found. See Document 171.
Dr. Kissinger said we should give serious consideration to a heads of government meeting when the President is in Europe. It would be inexplicable if the CSCE ends with a summit meeting (and he felt that the odds were better than even that this would be the case, even though all of us are reserved about such a meeting) and if the leaders of Western Europe could not agree on meeting with President Nixon. If this were to happen, then we would refuse to attend a CSCE summit.

Mr. Scheel said he fully agreed. We cannot prepare for a CSCE summit without making preparations for it through a West European summit with President Nixon.

Mr. Scheel recalled that the last summit had been in Paris. Dr. Kissinger said this would be satisfactory; it would thus be an ad hoc meeting, which we would slightly prefer in any case. Dr. Kissinger suggested that we might think of a formulation by which the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers would meet with the President in NATO. Then there could be a meeting with the European Community Foreign Ministers, following which there would be an ad hoc summit meeting in Paris. Mr. Scheel felt this would be satisfactory.

With regard to the NATO meeting, Dr. Kissinger said we do not want it organized the way it was the last time, with the European members asking questions and the U.S. answering. Rather, the meeting should consider common questions and the discussion should be on a common basis.

Mr. Scheel agreed and said this was something which should be taken up in NATO and in the EC. He thought that this approach and the series of meetings envisaged by Dr. Kissinger should make it easier for the French to agree. The meeting in Paris could be looked upon as a preparation for the CSCE summit.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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4 The issue of a CSCE summit also arose in Kissinger’s conversation with Italian Foreign Ministry officials on July 16: “Dr. Kissinger said that in the first place we do not favor a CSCE summit, but that we know no European leader—with the possible exception of the British—who might refuse a summit meeting. He assumed, therefore, that, with some progress in Phase II, there would be a summit sometime in the early spring. He could assure Mr. Ducci that there would be no tie-in between this summit meeting and the President’s visit to the Soviet Union.”
171. Editorial Note

On July 13, 1973, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin asked President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger about the outcome of West German Foreign Minister Scheel’s visit to Washington (see Document 170). A transcript of Kissinger’s telephone conversation with Dobrynin at 4:37 p.m. reads in part: “K[issinger]: One thing I could tell you is I think that if you proceeded along the line that you and I discussed on human contacts [at CSCE]— D[obrynin]: Yeah. K: We could then help you to speed things up. D: And just how do you mean? K: Well, if you came forward—you know, if you made a forthcoming suggestion at the opening of the Commission, then I think we could use that to convince our European allies that we are making progress and that it’s now necessary to speed things up. You see what I mean? D: Yeah, I understand. And Scheel is of the same opinion? K: Well, Scheel is of the opinion—I didn’t put it to Scheel that way because I wanted it to look spontaneous. D: I understand. K: But I talked to Scheel in a sense that will make it easy for us to take the initiative—you know, to support you. D: I understand. K: I told Scheel that in our view if he showed some—you know, if you showed some response, that we then had an obligation to be flexible. D: Yeah, I understand. K: And he agreed. D: I see. It’s along the lines. Okay. I already send yesterday to Gromyko change what you mentioned to me. Of course in a general way.” The conversation continued: “K: You can now tell him that I talked to Scheel in a way that prepared the ground for that without, of course, mentioning my conversations with you. D: No, I understand. This is clear.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 28, Anatoli Dobrynin File)
172. Editorial Note

Throughout the month of September 1973, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger followed the pace of the second phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which began in Geneva on September 18. A transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Deputy Secretary of State Rush on September 12 reads in part: “K[issinger]: Now, one other matter. I keep reading in the newspapers that the Europeans complain that we are forcing the pace on the European Security Conference. That can’t be right. R[ush]: That cannot be right, and we are not doing it. I will see that that is squared in this department. K: And I think we ought to let the Europeans know that they should stop—you know, not make a démarche, but, as they come in—that we really take these constant stories rather ill. R: OK. We’re in complete accord. I think that’s right. K: Good.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 22, Chronological File)

Kissinger had a similar conversation the same day with George Vest, the Representative to the CSCE. Also present for the conversation was Lawrence Eagleburger of the NSC staff. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Dr. Kissinger: Let’s see, you’re in charge of the CSCE operation, aren’t you? Where did the idea of our pushing for a hasty conclusion come from? Mr. Vest: I have no idea. Probably it came from the Eastern Europeans to the Western Europeans. So far, however, the Western Europeans have viewed the whole thing in proportion. I’ve talked with the press and with the Western Europeans and nobody yet has the thing out of proportion. There are some danger when we were in Helsinki with the Foreign Ministers that too much would be made of the conference. But even there the Europeans took the lead and punctured that danger. Dr. Kissinger: There are two points. First, our friends have to learn that kicking us is no longer free. We’re not going to protest forever our love for them. I see that the Luxembourg Foreign Minister has been going around Europe accusing us of duplicity. After all, it was they that got us into that conference in the first place. Second, we want a business-like conclusion. Of course we want it to end reasonably rapidly, but we want to do that without blackjacking the Europeans. Mr. Vest: This is understood in the delegations. Dr. Kissinger: How has the UK behaved? Mr. Vest: Excellently.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 335; Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Memcons, Books, Vol. I)
On September 19, Kissinger received Dutch Foreign Minister Max Van der Stoel in his capacity as Secretary of State-designate. Telegram 187324 to all NATO capitals, September 20, reported on the meeting. It reads in part: “In brief discussion of CSCE, Dr. Kissinger stated that we have no fixed date in mind for termination of CSCE, nor do we have any understanding with Soviets about summit meeting. We doubt that great deal of significance will come out of CSCE and therefore would like to see its work proceed as quickly as possible, avoiding impression that major issues are likely to be resolved by CSCE. Dr. Kissinger said that in our view a CSCE third phase at the summit is unlikely to be justified, but we have not noted that any Western European countries have flatly rejected idea of summit, and we do not wish to be isolated on this issue. If others oppose summit, we would have no difficulty in joining them.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 264, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XV, Part 1)

173. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Springsteen) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CSCE: Developments in Geneva Stage II

Discussions since September 18

Discussions to date have overcome initial procedural disagreements, but have not yet addressed substantive issues in detail. Soviet nervousness about the freer movement issue has not been fully reflected in Geneva, where the atmosphere is amicable. The US and Soviet delegates (Vest and Kovalev) met September 21 for a full and friendly exchange of views, and agreed to stay in close touch.2

Procedural Issues

The Soviets wanted an immediate start on drafting final texts, but the EC countries preferred to begin with a detailed substantive discussion. The US and some neutral delegations, in corridor conversa-

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2 Telegram 5044 from Geneva, September 24, which contains an account of the meeting, is ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.
tions, urged compromise, and a solution was reached September 25, involving initial point-by-point discussion, to be followed by drafting after substantive issues have been aired.

Humanitarian Issues

In their general statements, Warsaw Pact delegations have stiffened their position somewhat on freer movement questions, in the wake of growing Western criticism of Moscow’s campaign against intellectual dissidents and Brezhnev’s Sofia speech of September 19.3 They emphasized their willingness to make progress, but only if discussions were conducted on the basis of respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs—a line stressed repeatedly in recent Soviet press commentaries, by Kovalev in his meeting with Vest, and by the Czech Ambassador in a call on me earlier this week.4

Security Issues

Principles of Relations between States. While the talks have not yet dealt with specifics, we expect—as at Helsinki—some difficulties between the Soviets, who will wish to proclaim the inviolability of frontiers as a separate principle of relations, and the FRG, which will insist on at least indirect linkage of frontier inviolability with non-use of force.

Military Security Aspects. All NATO allies except the US support including advance notification of movements and advocate joint study of maneuvers, observers and movements before attempting to draw up specific proposals. The Soviets, however, have firmly reiterated their minimalist position on this issue, signalling their resistance to inclusion of prior notification of military movements (as distinct from maneuvers) among agreed CSCE confidence-building measures. The Soviet spokesman has pointed out that the mandate approved at Helsinki called on the committees to “submit” proposals on maneuvers and exchange of observers and to “study” movements.

3 In his speech, Brezhnev said: “The second stage of the conference on European security and cooperation has now started in Geneva. . . . The purpose of the work ahead, as we see it, is to prepare, without unnecessary delay, the drafts of documents for the final stage of the conference, which, in our view, it would be quite possible and desirable to hold this year. . . . We and our allies are firmly convinced that there are opportunities for a radical and stable improvement in the international climate. We believe that a new system of international relations can and must be built by honest and consistent observance of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and by unswerving implementation of signed treaties and agreements without playing games or engaging in ambiguous maneuvers.” (New York Times, September 20, 1973, p. 11)

4 No record of this meeting has been found.
Other Issues

There has been no significant discussion of the substance of other agenda items: economic cooperation and conference follow-on. The question of presentation of views by non-European Mediterranean states—i.e., Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Israel—has been resolved in a satisfactory fashion.\footnote{Telegram 4727 from Geneva, September 4, reported: “CSCE Coordinating Committee September 3 adopted compromise formula for receiving contributions by non-participating Mediterranean states. Formula accepts in principle oral presentation of written contributions by Algeria and Tunisia, and states that the same arrangements will be applied equally to any other interested Mediterranean country.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)}

174. Editorial Note

On September 28, 1973, after visiting New York for the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called on President Nixon in the Oval Office. Earlier the same day, Secretary of State Kissinger forwarded Nixon a memorandum prepared by the NSC staff to prepare him for the meeting. The memorandum reads in part:


“\textit{Gromyko’s Position} will be that if there is to be an agreement that does not damage either side’s security, the most reasonable approach would be to reduce by \textit{equal percentages}. Moreover, he may say that both foreign and national troops should be reduced, though this could be done by stages, and that Moscow does not rule out some initial cuts for symbolic purposes.

\textit{The Western Position}, now being debated in NATO, is that the goal of these talks should be to reach numerical parity in Central Europe by setting a common ceiling (at about 700,000). This will mean far greater cuts for the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact than for NATO, in view of their advantage of about 100,000; in the initial stage US and Soviet forces could be cut by about 15 percent (29,000 for the US and 69,000 for the Soviets).

“—You may wish to say that the US and Soviet positions are not that far apart on an initial stage of reductions—that is, a reduction of our respective ground forces by the same percentage up to 15 percent

“—but that this must be done within the context of an overall goal of equality by moving to a common ceiling for both sides.
“—The virtue of numerical parity is that offensive potential is thereby reduced if there is no immediate numerical advantage in the area.

3. European Security Conference.

“Gromyko may revert to the summit discussion on completing the Conference (now in its committee phase in Geneva) as soon as possible, preferably by year’s end. He may also bring up the possibility of a summit level meeting at the end of the Conference. Finally, he may complain that we are not taking a position that would advance the work, but are trying to put pressure on the USSR through the Western proposal for an agreement to facilitate freer movement of people and information.

“Your position:

“—The pace and the form of the final meeting of the Conference depends on the substance. You have told the General Secretary that we will not be the obstacle to progress or to a summit meeting if others agree.

“—Your impression, however, is that the Europeans feel very strongly about the idea of reducing barriers to contacts among the people of Europe, and improving the flow of information.

“—Judging from recent speeches by the General Secretary, he is agreeable to something along this line as long as sovereignty is protected.

“—We can support this position.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Gromyko, 1973)

At the meeting on September 28 in the Oval Office, Nixon and Gromyko, accompanied by Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobyinin, discussed the European security conference and mutual force reductions:

“Gromyko: Now with your permission, may I briefly turn to other matters, having in view the forthcoming summit. We would like very much to have the arrangements and understandings reached on European affairs to be carried into effect as they were talked about at the summit. We appreciate your efforts toward securing positive results for the CSCE. We believe there exists every opportunity for the Conference to achieve good and positive results. It all boils down to the policy of the countries concerned. They could, of course, just sit endlessly and talk. It follows from your discussions with the General Secretary that we have no intentions to prejudice your position in Europe and we feel it will be in both countries’ interests to have a positive outcome in the Conference. We should not pay too much attention to talk about US-Soviet deals. We must be above that and we should not be distracted from our policies, because the outcome will be in the interests of all countries regardless of what the shouters may say. After you took office, you yourself pointed to the importance of relations between our two countries.
“Another European question is the agreement to reduce armed forces and armaments. We would like to see a positive outcome. There was a general discussion during the General Secretary’s visit and he advanced certain views. I have nothing in particular to add now, but it would be in the best interests of all concerned to make progress on this and the prospects are favorable.”

Later in the conversation the President responded.

“The President: On MBFR, I am pleased to say we are not too far apart.

“On CSCE, as I told the General Secretary, we would be pleased to finish by the end of the year and, if others agree, to have a summit for the conclusion, but it is not easy to get a conglomerate of nations together to agree. I happened to be reading a biography of Wellington last night. There were only four countries at the Congress of Vienna, Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain, and four at the Congress of Paris after the defeat at Waterloo. But it was very difficult. On CSCE, there are very many views but you and we have no particular problems.

“Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, we now have to get down to concrete issues on this.

“The President: We must agree where we want to come out—I don’t mean condominium—otherwise it will be a shambles. I will leave it to the Secretary of State to work out. I made that commitment.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 28; ibid.)
PARTICIPANTS

Belgium
Renaat van Elslande, Foreign Minister
Walter Loridan, Ambassador to the U.S.
Viscomte Etienne Davignon, Director General for Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Paul Noterdaeme, Chef de Cabinet

U.S.
The Secretary
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Richard D. Vine

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. van Elslande: We have conceived of CSCE as a success from the Western viewpoint only if there were a certain balance among all three baskets. We believe that there will be real détente only if the economic and inter-human contacts follow the military and security measures. Progress on the third basket would be a step forward. We have the impression at times that the only interest of the U.S. is in the first basket, not in the second or the third.

The Secretary: (reviews with his colleagues the terminology of the three baskets) Up to now I have conducted foreign policy in a more restricted circle. I am not used to having my words passed to over 122 foreign chanceries and circulated among 850 civil servants. European-American relations would be in great danger if my remarks were to be widely circulated or put out in public. I am therefore a little reluctant to speak frankly.

Nevertheless, I will go ahead. As an historian, in connection with the third basket I have serious doubts about the proposition that the proliferation of human contacts will produce peace. It is like the premise that the working class throughout the world is peaceful. Even before the First World War people traveled freely without passports. And, nevertheless, we managed to get a good war started. I am not against human contacts, but I think that the idea has become an intellectual fashion and I want to see it put into perspective.

The American position on human rights will be to state our respect for human rights and advocate their furtherance where possible. The question is how far to push for them? Our foreign policy will be to attain what is attainable.

We have an amazing group in the United States who argue that by withdrawing our troops from Europe and by abolishing missiles we will produce a new era with trade. They argue that a couple of hundred million dollars’ worth of trade will produce all these marvelous
results. I believe that a system which has successfully resisted for more than fifty years will not be bought off. We have to avoid a situation in America where we talk ourselves into the psychosis that talks with the Soviet Union become a precondition for the flourishing of human freedoms in the U.S.S.R.

We think there are realistic restrictions on what we can count on and expect from these talks. We want a minimum of drama, since we feel that nothing great can come of it. Perhaps that indicates a lack of imagination on my part. We need to avoid a great confrontation.

Our concerns in a CSCE are that it not become too dramatic and that it not undermine NATO. Those are our sole goals and they are modest. We are restricting our third basket ambitions. If we can get over that problem, then our hope is that the conference will end with a meeting of the foreign ministers, not a summit.

I suspect, however, that if we refuse a summit meeting the Europeans will agree to one. We will not be pressing for a summit. I want you to know that if you do not press for a summit you will have our heartfelt support.

I have just been advised that luncheon is ready any time we are. That is very courteous—what it means, however, is that luncheon is ready whether we are or not.

To finish up, it is true that political and military matters permit more concrete agreement than agreements on human rights. I believe, however, that we should take what is obtainable. I do not believe that the Soviets will be prepared to concede much on human rights.

Mr. van Elslande: We had the impression that you favored a summit.

The Secretary: My view has always been that the level of a final conference should be commensurate with the results achieved by the conference. It is a painful fact that in 1969 everybody in Europe was beating us over the head to agree to a CSCE. We reluctantly agreed to the views of our European friends and allies and now everyone appears to reason that it was we who were pushing for CSCE in the first place. I plead agnosticism. We are neither for or against a summit. We want to avoid a drama, but if there is a Wagnerian spectacle in the negotiations and then a resolution of the problem, a summit will be hard to avoid.
176. Editorial Note

On October 19, 1973, the French delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe tabled a draft declaration of principles for the first part or "Basket I" of a potential agreement on security and cooperation in Europe. Point 1 of the French draft reads in part: "1. The participating states recognize each other's sovereign equality with all the rights deriving therefrom." The draft continues: "2. Each of the participating states will refrain from the threat or use of force, whether against the territorial integrity or political independence of another participating state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and those of this declaration. No participating state will carry out movements or maneuvers of its armed forces for the purpose of inducing another state to renounce the full exercise of any of its sovereign rights. 3. The participating states regard one another's frontiers, in their existing form and irrespective of the legal status which in their opinion they possess, as inviolable. The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed only in accordance with international law, through peaceful means and by agreement, with due regard for the right of peoples to self-determination. 4. The participating states will mutually respect one another's territorial integrity." Point 6 states that "each of the participating states will abstain from any intervention or threat of intervention, direct or indirect, in matters falling within the national competence of any other participating state, whatever their particular relations may be," and Point 7 that "the participating states consider that, as the charter of the United Nations indicates, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and without discrimination is also one of the bases of international cooperation and of the development of friendly relations among the nations. They accordingly proclaim their determination to respect and promote those rights and freedoms, especially freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief." Point 9 reads in part: "The participating states will cooperate with one another in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, commercial and other fields and with a view to promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They will encourage cooperation and contacts among individuals and groups in all these spheres of activity and generally foster the development of contacts and exchanges, both individual and collective, private and official, among their nationals." Point 10 reads in part: "The participating states recognize that the obligations they have assumed towards one another in conformity with international law are binding on them and must be fulfilled in good faith. They note that this declaration cannot affect bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements previously signed by the participating states." Point 11 reads in part:
The participating states declare that the development of their relations and the progress of their cooperation in all fields depend on the strict observance of the principles set forth above. They recognize that these principles have equal value and that each of them must be interpreted in the context of the others.” (Telegram 5646 from Geneva, October 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

177. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, October 29, 1973, 3:15 p.m.

PRESENT

The Secretary of State: Henry A. Kissinger
Kenneth Rush
William J. Porter
Curtis W. Tarr
Jack B. Kubisch
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
George S. Springsteen
David D. Newsom
Robert J. McCloskey
Alfred L. Atherton
George Aldrich
Thomas R. Pickering
Winston Lord
Lawrence S. Eagleburger

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Springsteen: Sir, we have been hewing very rigorously to the instructions that with the heightened Middle East crisis we slow down on our progress and talks with the Russians on CSCE.2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177: Lot 78 D 443, Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret.

2 In telegram 203680 to Geneva, October 14, the Department advised Boster that given the Middle East crisis and war and U.S. concern about Soviet attitudes and actions, “we wish to adopt posture in CSCE meetings this coming week which will be passive and which to extent possible will ensure that no positive action or forward movement is taken regarding the various items up for consideration. We should not refrain from attending meetings and we should not be actively negative in discussing various issues. At same time, we should delay or postpone wherever possible in handling of
Secretary Kissinger: I think we can let that go again.

Mr. Springsteen: Because I have a delegation going off to Moscow next week on the implementation of the Joint Commission.

Secretary Kissinger: No—we can go on that again. Now, the Soviets have told me repeatedly what they are interested in is that they can make concrete proposals in that human rights thing—if we can agree to a statement that nothing will affect the domestic legislation of countries concerned. Now, I know we are in a madness where the intellectuals around the world are not content with messing up foreign policy and now have to get involved in the domestic policy of other countries. But how can we take the position as a country that we are making treaties that affect the domestic legislation of other countries? Since when has that been an accepted American position?

In other words, why can’t we give them that?

I take it for granted that if they didn’t want human contact there is not going to be human contact. They are not going to be like shy lawyer. If one can establish quotas for exchanges of periodicals and students, why can’t we give them the phrase that none of this interferes with their domestic legislation?

Mr. Springsteen: As far as I understand it, we are prepared to say we will not interfere in their internal affairs, but we went to the point of saying that nothing we would do would be in conflict with their internal legislation. This would give them an out in the future for walking away from any agreements they might make now—

Secretary Kissinger: You suppose they can’t do that anyway?

Mr. Springsteen: I think they probably can. But I think that the atmosphere in the Helsinki talks and again now in Geneva is that that provides them a big escape.

Secretary Kissinger: But the question is if they are willing to do something and they need a face-saving thing, why can one not have a compromise whereby they agree to certain specifics and we agree to saying that these specifics are then achieved in effect in consonance with their domestic legislation. Obviously they can then introduce a law banning or barring what they have just agreed to. This wouldn’t change the fact that they are in violation of that agreement.

Mr. Springsteen: I think stated that way, whenever any country does anything it has to be in consonance with its own domestic legislation.

issues.” On October 16, Boster replied in telegram 5471 from Geneva: “It has been difficult for us to begin implementing ref tel instructions as it appears unlikely that any issue would have advanced this week beyond debating stage in normal course of events. In this situation, it is even possible that our passive posture may escape largely unnoticed.” (Both ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. II)
Secretary Kissinger: Why can’t we give them that clause? What is it that suddenly possesses the West to believe that it can affect the domestic structure of the Soviet Union through a treaty signed in Geneva of peripheral significance?

Mr. Springsteen: Well, I think some language can be worked out—if they have certain specifics they are prepared to give—

Secretary Kissinger: Gromyko tells me they are willing to give specifics if we are willing to give them the theory of non-interference in their domestic affairs. You think we could have some informal consultation with our allies—

Mr. Springsteen: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: —on that subject without being accused of selling our freedom and liberty?

Mr. Springsteen: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Could we try that?

Mr. Springsteen: There is a difference, sir, between interference in domestic affairs and the question of the legislation. This is where he is constantly putting his finger on—the legislation.

Secretary Kissinger: Who is putting his finger on?

Mr. Springsteen: Gromyko.

Secretary Kissinger: If I understand the Soviet proposition, it is that they are willing to agree to concrete improvements in what we call human contacts—if we are willing to agree to a statement that says that we are not interfering with their domestic legislation. Now, that is a perfectly clear measuring rod. Either these changes and human contacts are going to come about or they are not. If they are not going to come about, they don’t need an excuse—they just won’t come about. I have the impression that at this stage at least they need it for face-saving purposes.

Mr. Springsteen: I think that is probably right, particularly in light of the emigration visa and exit tax problem.

Secretary Kissinger: They want to be able to say what they did they did as an exercise of their own sovereignty rather than foreigners telling them what their domestic legislation should be. That is my reading of Gromyko. Because I don’t believe that a bunch of revolutionaries who manage to cling to power for fifty years are going to be eurchred out of it by the sort of people we have got negotiating at the European Security Conference through an oversight.

So the question is how we are going to get a formulation that everybody can accept.

Mr. Springsteen: Well, Boster is here tomorrow and the rest of this week, and I think we will talk to him about how we can handle this within the NATO caucus in Geneva.
Secretary Kissinger: You want to do that?
Mr. Springsteen: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

178. Editorial Note

In telegram 224321 to Geneva, November 14, 1973, the Department instructed the Chief of the Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Davis Boster, regarding a “possible compromise over principles language:” “Dept believes that some gesture will have to be made soon toward accommodating growing Soviet concerns underlying their insistence on a reference to domestic law and customs in preamble to Basket III.” The instructions continued: “We would suggest approaching the problem by undertaking detailed study of non-intervention language in Basket I when this subject comes up for discussion in next few days. Since Basket I principles can and probably will be incorporated by general reference into some preamble or chapeau for Basket III, progress in the non-intervention language could be presented to the Soviets as the most appropriate and promising way of meeting their concerns, without plunging the conference into a very complicated additional drafting job for Basket III. In this connection, we are prepared, if necessary, to work from the language contained in the French draft declaration of principles on which, heretofore, we have been somewhat reserved.”

Boster replied in telegram 6103 from Geneva on November 16: “We appreciate suggested compromise in reftel [telegram 224321] and have discussed this idea informally with interested NATO allies. We believe Department’s suggestion may prove useful at later stage, but we feel it is not appropriate to the current negotiating situation, would not now receive any support from our allies, and would align us openly with Soviets against substantive positions and strategy being pursued by our allies. However, Soviets’ larger objective of including preambular language in Basket III (‘laws and customs’ is only one of the sets of principles Soviet seek to include in this preamble) is being partially met in another way.” Boster noted that with regard to Basket III, “the allies have held strongly to position that no preamble whatsoever is needed to precede concrete agreements. Strategy of allies is not to agree to have a preamble until Soviets have entered meaningful discussions of concrete proposals.” He continued: “French have been working carefully for a month to find a compromise (‘mini-basket’) solution under
which synoptic presentations of all concrete proposals would be tabled in Basket II subcommittees. To satisfy Eastern bloc, formula has been found to apply this device also to preamble of Basket III, thus providing Soviets with tacit admission of possibility of a preamble to Basket III (which is where they want to include point on ‘laws and customs’), as well as discussion of this preamble in parallel with discussions of concrete Western proposals.” The telegram concluded: “Suggested action. If Department’s concern is to show responsiveness to Soviet interest in this question, I am having lunch with Kovalev and Mendelevich on November 20 and could say that we are giving careful attention to Soviet concern on point of preamble and that, as one way of trying to be helpful, we have given behind-the-scenes support to French proposal. I doubt that we should go further at this time in trying to reassure Kovalev about the ‘laws and customs’ aspect of the preamble as long as the NATO stand against it remains as strong as it is now.”

On November 20, the Department of State replied to Boster in telegram 228527: it concurred in his proposal “to indicate to Kovalev and Mendelevich that you are fully aware of Soviet concern on point of preamble to Basket 3, and that we have supported French proposal for structuring Basket 3 subcommittee’s discussion around mini-baskets as a way to keep question of preambular language for Basket 3 in play. At the same time, however, you should convey to Soviets your reading of strength of Western opposition to including ‘laws and customs’ in preamble to Basket 3 and inquire whether they have given thought to alternative approaches which might lend themselves to overcoming this difficulty. Beyond this, you may wish to inquire whether strengthening of language on non-interference in Basket 1 might not open way to possible compromise entailing specific reference in preambular language of Basket 3 to strengthened Basket 1 formulation, a possibility which had occurred to us as means to bridge important differences that persist.” The telegram continued: “Begin FYI: We believe that we should not delay further in reassuring Soviets that we are giving close attention to this issue, and therefore you should begin now to seek to soften their position, looking forward to a compromise that will permit problem of Basket 3 preamble from becoming a major stumbling block in CSCE. At the same time, you should continue your discussions with the allies, urging them to give consideration to possible compromises.”

On November 21, Boster replied in telegram 6208 from Geneva: “At luncheon given by Boster November 20, Soviet Delegation head, Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev, took generally positive attitude toward current status CSCE work and for first time tacitly acknowledged—without complaint—that conference would not be over this year. He reiterated Soviet interest in principle of inviolability of frontiers and need for statement of non-interference principles in pream-
ble to specific humanitarian cooperation agreements. He responded only in very general terms to our suggestion that some new approach to ‘laws and customs’ aspect of preamble be considered in light of strong Western opposition to this principle.” The telegram continued: “Inviolability of frontiers. Commenting on Boster’s statement of our concern that treatment of this subject include a provision for peaceful change of frontiers, Kovalev said he would like to clarify Soviet position. In Soviet view, principle of inviolability of frontiers was quite different and separate from idea of peaceful change. Soviets accepted that rectifications of borders can always take place in exercise of sovereign rights of states concerned, but principle of inviolability of frontiers should be crystal clear and stand by itself; it should not have any ‘cracks’ which might serve to undermine it. Boster said we fully understood Soviet concern about this principle; nevertheless, since we all acknowledged possibility of peaceful change, we did not consider that this should be regarded as a ‘crack’ in the inviolability principle.” The telegram concluded: “Comment. Kovalev’s posture was somewhat more optimistic and relaxed than it has been in previous meetings. Apart from his implicit acknowledgment that CSCE would not be finished this year as Soviets had always hoped, his emphasis on quality of results and prediction of difficult drafting stage also implied acceptance of a longer phase II than originally foreseen. Kovalev showed no signs of flexibility on either issue of inviolability of frontiers or ‘laws and customs’ aspect of Basket III, but this is not surprising at this early stage of the negotiations. At the same time, Soviets are obviously building a basis on which to argue that conference progress now justifies beginning discussion of post-CSCE follow-on activity, a question which will arise for coordinating committee Nov. 29.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. II)
Geneva, November 23, 1973, 1300Z.


1. Boster took opportunity of NATO delegation heads caucus Nov 22 to express belief that we should be giving consideration to possible compromise solutions to satisfy strong Soviet desire for non-interference caveats in preamble to specific humanitarian cooperation agreements. He informed allies that he had stressed to Kovalev strong Western opposition to a preamble with reference to “national laws and customs,” and gave allies gist of Soviet reaction (ref D). Boster told NATO delegation heads that he had suggested to Soviets that they think about possible compromise solutions, as we were doing. He outlined solution we were considering (refs A and C), stressing that this was for possible future use and that he had not discussed any specific ideas with Kovalev.

2. Immediate allied reaction was negative, as foreshadowed ref B. French rep warned that principle of non-intervention means different things to East and West. Any “tampering” with this principle might weaken, not strengthen it. We should be very clear on broader effects of changes to this principle.

3. UK rep pointed out that principle of non-intervention (even as tabled by Soviets) applies only to actions by states, whereas much of specific content of Basket III (humanitarian cooperation) relates to activities of private individuals, companies and organizations. We should not allow Soviets, he said, to obtain language in preamble or principles which implies a measure of governmental control over private individuals and organizations. Such a result would be contrary to most fundamental allied objectives in Basket III.

4. UK rep added that, in any event, Soviets had not tabled any texts including the phrase “laws and customs,” and although this phrase is used in introduction to Bulgarian draft which constitutes formal Eastern position on Basket III preamble, the draft text itself does not include it, nor does Soviet draft of principle of non-intervention.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow and USNATO.

2 For relevant excerpts from all four telegrams, see Document 178.
5. Danish rep stressed Soviets should not get anything in return for dropping “laws and customs” phrase, as he anticipated they would seek to do, since they had already been forced to drop it in Helsinki. In Danish view, Gromyko exhibited bad faith in referring back to this phrase “before the ink was dry” on Helsinki recommendations,\(^3\) which already represented a hard-fought compromise. To raise an issue on which compromise agreement had already been reached went against whole spirit of Helsinki recommendations.

6. Netherlands rep suggested that a better way to satisfy Soviet need would be to draft language of specific humanitarian agreements in such a way as to identify role of governments without actually mentioning “laws and customs.” Such language should obviate need for preambular caveats. Canadian, French, Danish, UK, and Norwegian reps agreed with this approach.

7. Comment. Netherlands delegation head has told us privately that he does not think Soviets will accept his idea (outlined in para 6 above), but that this will show Eastern countries strength of Western opposition to preambular caveats in Basket III. When Soviets reject this approach, Dutch and other allies would prefer to fall back to innocuous preamble along lines of Helsinki recommendations, with unilateral Soviet explanatory statement. Dutch feel Soviets will accept this solution, basically the same compromise reached in Helsinki, but that they will only do so if Western opposition to their desires is firm.

8. Initial positions taken by our allies on this issue have been predictably firm. Nevertheless, ground has now been prepared for later recourse to our compromise ideas when negotiating process in drafting stage brings need for more flexibility on both sides.

Miller

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\(^3\) For the Final Recommendations of the Consultations Preceding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, June 8, see Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1973, pp. 181–188.
Washington, December 5, 1973, 11:30 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
   Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
   George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
   Sergiu Celac, Interpreter
   President Nixon
   Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
   Harry G. Barnes, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President Ceausescu: I might touch now upon some international issues beginning with Europe, since that’s closer to us. We would like to have the United States show a still greater concern for the successful conclusion of agreements which would contribute to real security in Europe. In addition to any eventual documents, a matter of great importance is the question of measures of military disengagement and also the matter of establishing a permanent body. We hope, therefore, that the United States would favor steps in these directions.

Connected with these questions is the matter of the conference at Vienna on force reductions. In our opinion, things are not going all that well. First of all, not even all of Central Europe is being discussed. Discussions for that matter of some symbolic reductions have actually only a symbolic importance and in fact very little practical significance. It is a real question when you get right down to it whether the troops in question are going to be shifted to some other country’s territory in Europe or withdrawn to their own countries or reduced in numbers as far as national forces are concerned. These are some of the problems which concern not only us, but many other states in Europe.

President Nixon: First of all, with respect to MBFR, the discussions are going to be very difficult. We will have in mind the concerns of Ro-
mania and other countries which are not directly involved in our dis-
cussions with the Soviet Union.

So far as CSCE is concerned, there is considerable difference of
opinion in Europe, both in Eastern and Western Europe, as well as
among small and large states, as to how the conference should even-
tually come out. But for our part, we are particularly sensitive to the
interests of Romania and other countries which have supported the
conference and which should have a major voice in bringing about
whatever agreement is eventually reached.

Dr. Kissinger will see that the closest consultations take place with
Romania on both subjects.

Secretary Kissinger: On the question of mutual force reductions, I
understand President Ceausescu to be saying that Central Europe is
not adequately covered because of the lack of Hungarian participation.
Our interest is in getting rid of Soviet troops and even if Hungary had
been included reductions would have amounted to only 3 or 4,000.
Therefore we did not consider it a question of principle to insist on
Hungary’s inclusion at that stage. Of course, one doesn’t know where
the Soviet troops would go. That is a question which concerns Roma-
nia and also China for they might go somewhere in Siberia. Perhaps
you would prefer that. In addition, there is the problem of our own
troops whom we now have in Europe and whom we might want to
have available to use elsewhere.

President Ceausescu: So far as the matter of troops in Hungary
and Northern Italy is concerned, this does not represent a question of
great importance for us because there are some troops still on our other
frontiers. But where the troops go still has an importance which is con-
nect ed with other countries, and I am sure you understand that I am
referring to the implications for Yugoslavia. That is the reason why I
should like to have these problems noted. Incidentally, we will plan to
raise this sort of question in Vienna, but of course not in the same way
as I have raised it here.

President Nixon: It is difficult enough when there are just two par-
ties to reach an agreement. When you have a dozen or so, it is almost
impossible. It is important, however, to try to make some progress.
Other meetings at Vienna such as the one that took place a century or
so ago have succeeded. There have also been ones which have failed,
both at Vienna and Geneva as well. I think it is a good step that we
have both the conference in Geneva as well as the MBFR meeting in
Vienna, but we realize the difficulties.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-
curity conference or MBFR.]
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181. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Foreign Ministry (Interpreter)
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Middle East; US–GDR relations; Summit preparations; SALT; CSCE; MBFR; Trade; Brezhnev visit to Cuba; Pompidou and Brandt visits to USSR

.Minister Gromyko: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Now on European problems.

Your representatives and ours at CSCE are in contact with each other, but we believe your representatives, even if they take a position favorable to success, should be nevertheless a little more active in bringing that success about. Particularly in view of the Summit. Because we should approach this Summit with more progress in this area.

Secretary Kissinger: I will call our representative back and talk to him personally.

Minister Gromyko: We would appreciate it. We should do our very best, both sides, to bring this to a conclusion before March. Even the pessimists thought it could not end before March.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not the problem. The Europeans are crazy on the subject of human contact. I’ve told you I believe you are serious people and won’t be undermined by the introduction of newspapers in the Soviet Union. I’ll speak to our representative personally. He’s not in Washington now, but I’ll bring him back and speak with him. There should not be slow progress.

Minister Gromyko: Just in brief on the subject of the negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe, we can in a sense understand why some pose the question in this way: “Let’s

just set a ceiling and both go down to that ceiling and just cut off every-
thing above that.” We’re convinced that kind of approach will yield no
positive results; we need a more realistic approach. We need to keep
the present alignment—preserving that correlation of forces, and non-
harming each other, we can find some success.

You have said it will be a long journey; we agree it will be long. We
for our part have patience.

Secretary Kissinger: If the correlation is the same but at a lower
level, this gives a certain advantage for the offensive side. One ap-
proach is agreement in principle on a common ceiling and in the first
step have a symmetrical cut, say 10–15 percent each.

Minister Gromyko: I should want to ask you to take another look
at that entire area and at the positions made known by countries in Vi-
enna. We were surprised by the oversimplicity of some Western na-
tions in the talks. Perhaps you are not familiar with all the details.

Secretary Kissinger: Did I make that obvious?
Minister Gromyko: I said “perhaps.”

So probably some of the countries are proceeding from the fact
that this road will be a long one. If so, neither of us should regard that
as a tragedy, even if it is long.

Secretary Kissinger: I’ve scheduled a review meeting when I get
back. Then I’ll have a more considered view.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-
curity conference or MBFR.]

182. Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to
President Nixon

Moscow, undated.

L.I. Brezhnev would like to frankly express to the President cer-
tain considerations on one of the major international questions which
is constantly within his attention.

In our contacts with the President the essential positive changes,
that occurred in the last years in European affairs, were noted more than
once. And that is really so; the détente and cooperation in Europe are beneficial to all. They correspond to the interests both of the US and of the Soviet Union, helping in many respects to establish new relations between our countries while each of them continues to maintain their traditional ties with European states. And, vice versa, if anything happens in Europe, which would threaten to violate the stability, to hamper the process of détente, that would, as is clear, have a negative impact on the Soviet-American relations as well.

It would be advisable, from this point of view, to look attentively at what is the present situation at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Unfortunately, it has to be said, that the course of the second stage of the Conference is unjustifiably being delayed. The question arises as to what is behind all this. Is it simply an intention to protract as much as possible the work of the Conference or is it generally an unwillingness to achieve constructive results? Or, maybe, it is done with the aim of bargaining out some unilateral benefits at the expense of other participants of the Conference, of the Soviet Union in particular? Whatever is the reason, the important business, on which people both within and outside Europe place their not small expectations and hopes, will only lose from all this. The all-European conference was thoroughly prepared during many years. How then can be solved other major international problems which have not been so thoroughly worked at? The President will, probably, agree that it would not be an easy task since there would be no certainty as to the results of the initiatives planned for the future. If the all-European conference did not come through then unwittingly one would look with no optimism at other important international questions.

As the President knows, one of the key questions which is to be precisely and clearly reflected in the final documents of the conference is the principle of inviolability of borders in Europe. We note with satisfaction that the US Government in general adheres to a consistent line in this question and we appreciate the position taken by the United States in connection with the treaties between the FRG and the Socialist countries.

Yet now some of the participants of the all-European conference are trying to water down the principle of inviolability of the borders by stressing the possibility of their peaceful change. The meaning of these innocent looking suggestions is quite transparent. Obviously some people would like to weaken—in a round-about way—the basic principle of the European security and to leave a loophole for the revanchist forces. And such forces do exist. True, they are weaker than before, but they did not lay down their arms and under the banner of “peaceful change” of the borders would like to return to the previous
dangerous policy. Of course, this cannot be allowed. It is not difficult to visualize where it could lead to.

It is necessary to untie in the spirit of realism also a knot artificially created in connection with the third item of agenda of the all-European conference—on the exchanges in the field of culture and education, contacts and information. Sometimes this item is called the “third basket.” The impression is gained that people of certain type like to be endlessly busying themselves in that basket, throwing into it more and more questions. All this is done to the detriment of the solution of the basic tasks of the all-European conference. But statesmen, understandably, adhere to a wider and more responsible approach.

We proceed from the premise—and we have repeatedly stated this—that we believe it natural under the conditions of détente to expand cultural ties between states, contacts between people, exchange of information. We are for the widest possible ties in those areas under the present conditions. But if someone wants to use cultural and other exchanges for unfriendly purposes, for interference into internal affairs, then we have but one reply: no. If there is a wish for real and serious development of ties and contacts in all those areas, then the way out is in strict observance of the principle of non-interference into internal affairs, in respect for the sovereignty, laws and customs of each country. Time has come to proceed at the Conference from the vocal recognition of those principles to writing them clearly and plainly down into the final document on the third item of the agenda of the Conference.

Outlining all these considerations, L.I. Brezhnev expresses hope that the President will review with due attention the situation at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in order to bring it by joint efforts to the successful outcome within reasonably short period of time.

We hope that the President is also for crowning the all-European conference with tangible results, which would be of historic significance for the present and for the future of Europe and would be countersigned by the state leaders at the highest level.

PARTICIPANTS

**Soviet:**
- Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to US
- Yuly Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
- Georgiy M. Kornienko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry
- Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Soviet interpreter
- Vasily G. Makarov, Senior Assistant to Mr. Gromyko

**State:**
- The Secretary
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
- Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
- Ambassador Walter Stoessel, American Ambassador-designate to the USSR

(There was an exchange of greetings, a discussion of art in the Secretary’s office and an exchange on how the Secretary was feeling.)

The Secretary: We are very pleased to have you here and to have a general discussion of some of the issues we face. After our general discussion, I would like to meet with you alone.

Mr. Gromyko: I wish to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your kind invitation. You must have noticed that I replied at once.

The Secretary: Yes and I thank you for that. This is a good time for us to meet.

Mr. Gromyko: What sort of matters do you want to discuss?

The Secretary: I think we should touch on our general bilateral relations, SALT, force reductions in Europe, and European security. We can cover the rest in private.

Mr. Gromyko: Do you want to begin or should I?

The Secretary: You’re more disciplined than I am. Why don’t you start?

Mr. Gromyko: I am not sure what that means in this case but since you have mentioned European security, I would like to make some observations. First, let me emphasize our appreciation of the extensive work that was done in the first phase and at Helsinki. There was in

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fact no small amount of work undertaken in the second stage, but I must say that we are not pleased by the current state of the conference.

The Secretary: I agree with you.

Mr. Gromyko: I would like to discuss several specific issues but also I would like to talk about the broader question which has an impact on our relations in the future.

The Secretary (As cookies were passed): I had always been told that there were cookie-pushers in the Department but I never saw the cookies before today that they are supposed to push.

Mr. Gromyko: The reason that we are not pleased by the progress in the All European Conference—and I will not express myself in diplomatic terms—is that I feel that all these representatives are beating the air without achieving any concrete advancement toward the aim of resolving the real issues. They are going around in circles. This could go on endlessly. It seems to me that issues are being invented out of virtually nothing. This is the impression I have. It seems to me that there are a series of artificial measures which are being put forward with the intent of preventing a solution.

The Secretary: Not by us.

Mr. Gromyko: I would not like to try to gauge how to share the blame among each of the Western Powers but the raising of these artificial issues is enough indication of the fact that some are misbehaving. It is a fact that these actions contradict the often-stated solemn, high-level declarations that we have agreed with most of these States on the necessity of achieving détente and peace. I question whether some of the political forces have forgotten or want to ignore what happened in World War II.

I ask myself is this a negligent attitude? All of us agreed after the conclusion of World War II that we must avoid the possibility of war. We had fought together as allies against a common enemy and we agreed that we must weed out the possibility of war. Can it have been forgotten?

I don’t want to specifically accuse the US of taking this position. As we see and assess the situation, however, we note that the US Representative displays a knowledge of our position and an understanding of our general agreements. Our representatives have numerous contacts and, I must say, that these are highly appreciated. What also strikes the eye, however, is the passivity with which you approach this conference. We appreciate the words but where is the US voice for all to hear? This is not being done. Perhaps this is strategy or tactics. What we can do is voice our own desires and to recall that our common agreements were made at the highest level during the visit of Mr. Brezhnev last year and the visit of the President to the Soviet Union. We hope that the US will accord greater weight and interest in more firmly
setting out the position which has the aim of carrying out our agree-
ments. It should not be beyond the means of the US to express its strong
views. When the US wants to act is does so and in a loud voice.

We hope that your view will come out in the open in the most ap-
propriate way.

The Secretary: Mr. Foreign Minister, first of all, let me make a gen-
eral remark and then address the details. We attach enormous impor-
tance to maintaining the peace of the world. We do this because it is
in the interest of the well-being of all peoples. Since it makes sense for
us to do that, it underlies all of our actions.

In Europe, there seems to be a desire to treat most issues in a to-
tally frivolous fashion. People who have maintained their power in a
country such as the Soviet Union for fifty years are not going to be un-
seated by a declaration. Therefore, I want you to know that I don’t at-
tach much importance to the question of declarations as a solution to
these problems. Leave aside any ulterior motives. There is just no way
that one can proceed to undermine what exists in the Soviet Union.

On the question of the inviolability of frontiers, that is a question of
German domestic politics. On human contacts—and I refer specifically
to the letter to the President—we favor a maximum increase in these con-
tacts consistent with the domestic laws of the parties. The Allies go far-
ther. They don’t like the reference, not only to “domestic laws,” but also
to “customs.” This is a question of domestic politics among our Allies. I
I don’t want to say whether it is right or wrong. What we have to decide
now is what price to pay to get the Allies to change their minds. I think
that you overestimate our influence with the Allies. In our negotiations
of the bilateral declarations we are faced with a series of idiotic, juridical
positions. In other words, they don’t reserve their tactics for you. For one
year, we have been engaged in trying to find a formula to describe our
relations.\footnote{On April 23, 1973, Kissinger proposed the conclusion of a “new Atlantic Charter”
between the United States and its European allies as part of the Nixon administration’s
“Year of Europe” initiative. Negotiations about the Atlantic Charter were ongoing.} It is not easy for us to get them to agree.

We would like to conclude the Conference. We recognize it will
not have a world-shaking result. We will not support measures which
go beyond our common understandings (at this point the Secretary
said he wished to be sure that he sees Ambassador Sherer before he
departs). What do you think Art? Is it possible to make some progress?

Mr. Hartman: We have already tried out several formulae for deal-
ing with the question of encouraging human contact and yet making
reference to the non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States party
to the Agreement. We have not yet had success in convincing the Al-
lies that there is a means to handle this point.
The Secretary: I have stated and I will state again that we are in favor of an improved situation with respect to human contacts. But I will also say, as I have with many Congressional Committees, that we have trouble enough agreeing on our foreign policy problems without getting ourselves involved in each other’s domestic affairs. We have not after all demonstrated we can handle our own affairs much less those of others. This is our view.

Mr. Gromyko: I would now like to try to turn to the specific issues.

The Secretary: But before you do, let me just say that our representatives should remain in very close contact.

Mr. Gromyko: I certainly share fully and associate myself with the desire for close contact. Now, very briefly on the specific issues, with due regard to the general principles. The first issue has to do with the inviolability of frontiers. There has never been any doubt in our mind that the US position is consistent with our views. We feel, however, that the US should use its influence to prevent certain other countries from burdening this conference with issues and propositions which are unacceptable and, indeed, absurd. Second, we see that the same countries are attempting to raise unacceptable questions with respect to maneuvers, large-scale troop movements, and the exchange of observers. We have the question of what is large and what is small. As to observers, we ought to be able to find some mutual way to solve this problem by invitation. You have discussed this problem with Dobrynin.3 You have made certain statements with respect to maneuvers and large-scale movements. I understand those statements. But what we can see is that the appetites of the Europeans are growing. I can qualify some of their proposals as nothing short of ridiculous. I won’t even discuss these matters. For example, that all of the Soviet Union should be taken into account with respect to maneuvers taking place. We can’t agree. We can’t accept.

The Secretary: Who proposed this?

Mr. Gromyko: It was submitted by the FRG Delegation in the name of the Nine.4

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3 See Documents 123 and 143.
4 In telegram 651 from Geneva, February 1, the Mission reported: “Warsaw Pact delegations’ criticism of the FRG working paper on CBM’s culminated in a long statement on Jan 30 by Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich, who charged that the measures proposed by the FRG would break the balance of security in Europe.” The telegram noted that “his remarks were ably countered in pointed statement by FRG rep. Discussion of FRG paper now seems to have ended, leaving Soviets in noticeably glum mood, and making complaints about West’s lack of ‘realism’ and its failure to take Soviet positions into account.” The telegram concluded: “In corridor conversations with U.S. DelOffs, Soviets stressed their concern over the extent of Soviet territory to be included in the area for notification of maneuvers and attempted to probe us on our attitude towards exempting all but some band of territory along USSR’s western border. Soviets have implied that West is trying to obtain some military advantage by including all of USSR’s European territory.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)
The Secretary: That is becoming my favorite group of nations. However, I should say that we won’t reject that idea if you want to agree to it.

Mr. Gromyko: We recall that at the outset there was no mention of this question. When the matter was raised by you, we agreed to consider it. We then made some agreements on how to handle maneuvers and observers. All those things have now been put aside and people are suggesting unacceptable solutions but I can tell you that, if anyone thinks that they can attempt to talk us into this position, they should know that it will fail. I hope for more realism. I hope you will try to persuade the others that it is groundless for them to pursue these unrealistic proposals. I have no doubt that your people are familiar with this problem in Geneva. Now my third point.

The Secretary: Let me say on troop movements that you have received a correct report of my conversation with Dobrynin. Your response was forthcoming but the proposals that were made in Geneva were not made at our instigation. They go well beyond our own intention. We will talk internally about how to approach this problem. The trouble is that you have a bunch of bureaucrats in Geneva who are trying to impress each other with their toughness. No one wants to admit that he is any less strong than the next fellow. On the other hand, I don’t want to discourage you from accepting it but you are right that the Ambassador reported our conversation correctly. We must find a way to end this sterile debate.

Mr. Gromyko: The third point for us is the very crux of the problem. How to reach agreement on the rule or principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

If that principle can be met, we can inscribe in the declaration that all States favor maximum ties of cultural, scientific and other kinds. We will do our utmost to promote human contact. We are not afraid of this. Physically we cannot receive as many tourists as you can in the West. What with the war and the subsequent housing problem, we cannot give priority to hotels over housing.

The main point is that we must rule out entirely outside interference in domestic affairs. We have enough to do in the international area without meddling in each other’s domestic affairs. This is a watershed that we must overcome. The crux of the problem is what solution can be found to deal with the third basket. I hope that the obstacles will be overcome and a common agreement found. We sometimes think that some circles underestimate the strength of our position. No one can hope that we will retreat from this principle and fling it to the floor so that others may meddle in our affairs.

The Secretary: The least dangerous people in the West are the intellectuals.
Mr. Gromyko: You have expressed your sober thoughts in the past. I recognize that you have no interest in attempting to interfere in our domestic affairs. I would say this that if anyone tries, while they might not be medically certifiable, they are politically not normal. These people are divorced from reality. Perhaps you are right that bureaucrats are competing to see who is toughest but they should remember the strength of the diamond because that is how tough we feel on this issue. In short, we must get rid of these artificial problems and get on with the conference.

The Secretary: First, there is merit in this position. The US is in favor of maximum contacts but without the ability to interfere. We recognize that your system will not be transformed by negotiation but that is the limit of the progress we would like to see. Second, how do we move ahead from here. Everyone agrees that there should be contact. There is a question about the use of the phrase “not inconsistent with the laws and customs.” It is much harder to deal with this because it is a domestic political issue in each of our countries. I assume that the Soviets can prevent any contacts they don’t want regardless of what a declaration might say.

Mr. Gromyko: But we don’t want to be in violation of an agreement we have made.

The Secretary: I wonder if it is possible to find some phraseology.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The difficulty is that it is not in the mandate.

Mr. Gromyko: We must find a formula.

The Secretary: Art, can you get this thing going? What are the chances?

Mr. Hartman: We have already suggested several formulations to our Allies but they have been rejected. We have talked in terms of a preamble to Basket Three which would refer back to the principles in Basket One. Perhaps we could beef this one up.

The Secretary: This is all about words.

Mr. Gromyko: There is a principle behind the words (at this point the Secretary referred to Sonnenfeldt and Sisco—saying that if they ever got together he, the Secretary would be evicted from his office.)

Mr. Gromyko: It all boils down to whether there will be an opening of the door or whether the principle of non-interference will be left intact. This is after all the basis of all our post-war agreements, including the charter of the United Nations. That is the basic issue. All the rest are words. To sum up, we have the question of frontiers, of maneuvers and what is meant by non-interference.

See Documents 178 and 179.
The Secretary: Can we build on the principle of non-interference as agreed at Helsinki and drop the reference to laws and customs? Then we might have something concrete. Which of the countries have guts enough to push us on this?

Mr. Gromyko: Let us try jointly in the next few days to work out an agreed formula. Then it can be brought to the conference. I think it would be better if you introduced it at the conference or are you overawed by the Nine?

The Secretary: You certainly know how to raise my ire on one of my favorite subjects. We should try to work out a formula but I think tactically it might be wiser if you introduced it. Otherwise, we will be accused of collusion.

Mr. Gromyko: But we ought to agree between us.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It might be better for you to introduce it. It would help psychologically.

The Secretary: I am not so sure. I would like to think about who introduces it. The Ambassador has the best idea. We will introduce it and the Soviets will oppose it and then everyone will agree. Why don’t Vorontsov, Art and Walt work on the problem this week and see if we can’t get a formula on non-interference.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

184. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 4, 1974, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the USSR

Mr. Gromyko: On European affairs, I would like to recall the understanding reached in the relevant US-Soviet documents, and also in talks between you and Mr. Brezhnev on the theme of Europe and the CSCE.

I went into more detail about this with the Secretary this morning, but, briefly, I would like to say that we are not completely satisfied with the progress in Geneva. We feel that some countries are artificially dragging their heels. We don't know the reason for this. Perhaps some countries want to find ways to interfere with the internal affairs of the Soviet Union—or perhaps it would be better to say of the Socialist countries in general and the Soviet Union especially. I don't know how to explain this. Perhaps there are some naive people who think they could divert the Soviet Union from its course, or perhaps there are other reasons.

I would like to underline that we feel that there are unjustified delays in the conference and we are not happy about it. We hope that the US can find ways of exerting its influence in Geneva on those who are dragging things out. We think you are able to do this, so as to achieve a positive outcome. We think this would be in the best interests of everyone and it would benefit US-Soviet relations. There is no need to go into detail.

Lastly, I would say that we hope that the possibility mentioned by you and Mr. Brezhnev regarding the holding of the final stage of the conference at the highest level could be realized. This would have enormous international significance. Secretary Brezhnev wanted me to underline this especially. We believe it would be a good thing to complete the agreements of the Conference at the highest level. This would be of historical importance for the world at large and especially for the US and the Soviet Union. I would appreciate your comment on SALT and the conference.

The President: I have already commented on SALT. As I said, our intentions are to reach agreement at the summit and this will have my personal attention.

About dragging feet at Geneva, this does not apply to the US. We are not doing this. I remember when Mr. Brezhnev pressed me at Camp David to agree to conclude the conference by the end of the year and I said this could be our goal but we can't commit others. That is still true.

2 See Document 183.
As at Camp David, I would say that we want agreement at the Conference and, if they merit it, they could be signed at the highest level. We remain committed to that.

Dr. Kissinger will look into the question of who is dragging feet at Geneva, and see what can be done.

I know there are language problems at Geneva. If you could be flexible, we would have a better chance of influencing our allies. However, our two countries are together in their approach at Geneva; the problem lies with some of the allies.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. As I explained, some of the allies want to use the Conference to reform the domestic system of the Soviet Union, which is unrealistic since they failed to do so in several wars.

We agreed this morning on a procedure and we will try to work out some language. Then it will be a question of tactics as to how this should be presented at Geneva. Stoessel, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman will work with Vorontsov and someone else from the Soviet Embassy. They should find a formula this week.

The President: We are not dragging our feet. You want us not to drag our feet but rather to kick someone else in the tail.

Mr. Gromyko: We just want you to nudge them.

The President: When I think of the language worked out by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt on world problems, it should be possible for us to get together on this matter.

Of course, we have our own ideas about your system and you have your ideas about ours, but we are not trying to change yours.

It is a question of how honest a person like Jackson\(^3\) is who seems to want to change the Soviet system—and here I speak as an old cold warrior myself.

Mr. Gromyko: If there are such people—and there must be, judging by the obstructions in Geneva—either they have lost all feeling of realism and are unable to see what is possible and what is not possible, or they are real opponents of détente. I was asking Secretary Kissinger can there really exist people who are oblivious to the results of WW II?

\(^3\) Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson. In October 1972, Jackson first proposed an amendment to an East-West trade bill that would have made the granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to the Soviet Union dependent upon Moscow’s ending its restrictive emigration policies, which discriminated against Soviet Jews. Although the amendment failed, Jackson demanded that the Nixon administration make improved relations with the Soviet Union dependent on changes in its human rights policies, especially with regard to Jewish emigration. He also continued to introduce legislation in Congress linking MFN status with the emigration of Soviet Jews.
I agree with most of what you have said and I see you are against procrastinating. We need a little more coordination and we will work with Dr. Kissinger to see what can be done to speed things up.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

185. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CSCE: Meeting with Vorontsov on Issue of Respect for National Laws and Customs

Pursuant to the agreement you made with Gromyko in your recent conversation, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Walt Stoessel and I met with Soviet Embassy Minister Vorontsov on February 15 to present our proposal for dealing with the Soviet desire to include a reference to “respect for national laws and customs” in the documents emerging from CSCE as they relate to human contacts.

We told Vorontsov that we had earlier tried with the Allies to introduce such a reference into the declaration of principles. However, the Allies were unreceptive and, in consequence, we did not underestimate the difficulties of finding a compromise. In our view, we said, a possible way to agreement was to build into the declaration on principles governing interstate relations more precise wording with regard to sovereignty. It will be easier for us to bring the Allies along, we said, if in the period immediately ahead the Soviets indicate willingness to agree to some specific measures in the third basket on humanitarian cooperation, particularly increased human contacts. If the Allies are in a position to point publicly to Soviet movement on those issues, the Soviets, for their part, could point to the strengthened language on sovereignty in the declaration of principles.


2 See Document 183.
We handed to Vorontsov the following language, which you had approved, building on the sovereignty paragraph in the French draft declaration of principles:

“The participating States recognize each other’s sovereign equality with all the rights deriving therefrom. Each of them will respect the rights inherent in sovereignty in the case of each of the others. They will respect the right of each of them freely to determine its political, social, economic, (and) cultural, legislative and regulatory system and to define as it wishes its relations with other States. In particular, they will respect the right of each of them to belong to an alliance.”

We pointed out that the phrase, “legislative and regulatory system” was more concrete than “customs.” Virtually any practice can be referred to as customary, whereas rules or regulations were more than customs but less than laws, and therefore may be less objectionable than “customs.”

After a quick reading of the text, Vorontsov said that it may cover the point, but he would need authoritative guidance from Moscow.

We underlined that it was very important that the fact of our discussions be kept completely private, and we concluded by agreeing that there would be no contact between our delegations at Geneva on this subject, but only in Washington or with Walt Stoessel in Moscow.

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3 See Document 176.

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186. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 28, 1974, 1517Z.

2909. For Sonnenfeldt and Hartman. Subject: Soviet suggestions for CSCE—Basket III.

1. Korniyenko asked me to call this morning Feb 28 to continue U.S.-Soviet discussion of language pertaining to Basket III at CSCE. I was alone; Korniyenko accompanied by Sokolov.

2. Korniyenko began by noting his understanding that present discussion was strictly confidential as between U.S. and USSR in respective

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 723, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XXX. Secret; Immediate; Immediate; Nodis.
capitals and that nothing has been said or will be said (pending mutual agreement) about talks to our delegations in Geneva or to representatives of other countries. I confirmed this also our understanding.

3. Korniyenko then asked clarification of Hartman’s remarks in discussion with Vorontsov February 15\(^2\) relating to actions Soviets should take re substance of Basket III if two of us could agree on language concerning principle of non-interference. I observed that Soviets at Geneva to date have given primary emphasis to non-interference point and have been extremely vague in regard to what they might be prepared to accept on substance of Basket III. We felt it would be helpful in convincing other delegations at Geneva of desirability accepting strengthened language on non-interference if Soviets could spell out in more detail their views on substance, which we hoped would give indication of flexibility and would be forthcoming. I thought this was one point which Hartman had wished to stress in talk with Vorontsov. Korniyenko said he understood.

4. Korniyenko noted that language we had proposed was intended to be part of statement of principles at beginning of overall document. Soviet side did not object to addition of phrase “legislative and regulatory” in this paragraph and in fact thought it would be quite useful. However, Soviets would prefer to have language spelling out meaning of non-interference included specifically in preamble to Chapter III rather than have preamble refer back to statement of principles at beginning. With this in mind, Soviets proposed following language (unofficial Soviet translation from Russian) for preamble to Chapter III.

“Co-operation in the fields of culture and education, contacts and exchanges of information will take place with due regard for the differences in the social systems of participating states, with respect for their legal systems and with full observance of the principles governing relations among participating states, as defined in the general declaration, including the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.”

5. I said I assumed, in event we could accept language along these lines in preamble to Basket III, Soviets would not require strengthened language of type we had suggested be included in paragraph on principles. Korniyenko said Soviets would not insist on such language in principles; as he had commented earlier, he thought our suggested addition was useful, but it would not be necessary from their standpoint to include it if preamble to Basket III could be agreed on basis his proposal. He suggested jocularly that something might be worked out tactically so that at Geneva we could propose new language for principles

\(^2\) See Document 185.
and they could propose new language for preamble to Chapter III; thereafter, negotiation could develop so that we would concede and final agreement could be reached on Soviet language. However, he seemed realize this could cut both ways and did not press point.

6. I told Korniyenko I would report his suggestion and would be back in touch after I had received Department’s views.

7. Comment: Soviet suggestion represents slight modification in revised Bulgarian draft preamble3 and appears to be improvement in that it drops objectionable phrase “laws and customs.” However, given widespread Western objections at Geneva to detailed preamble to Chapter III, it may be harder to sell to allies than our proposal.

Stoessel

3 The Bulgarian preamble was transmitted with comments in telegram 5439 from Geneva, October 13, 1973. According to the telegram, the Bulgarians stressed that the committee should pay “particular attention to principles of sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs, and observance of laws and customs of participating states.” Western delegations and neutrals countered “that it is premature to consider draft preamble and related general principles until we have clear picture of specific proposals which will emerge from subcommittees. Soviets stressed need to concentrate on ‘what is possible’ in this delicate area and to proceed with discussion of basic principles and specifics simultaneously.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

187. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, March 5, 1974, 4:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, The White House
Harold Saunders, The White House

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Secretary: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] But what about CSCE?

Sonnenfeldt: I sent you a memo suggesting we try one more time with our compromise language on Basket III and then fall back.²

Secretary: On CSCE we can give the Russians something. We can give them a text and we can give them a summit.

Sonnenfeldt: You will want to swallow a couple of times before you do that.

Scowcroft: What does it cost?

Sonnenfeldt: It costs something in Europe if we have a summit with the Russians and none with the Allies.

Hyland: You could give Brezhnev a target date in July for CSCE and hold open the question of level of participation.

Secretary: Nothing can happen at a CSCE summit. I wouldn’t go until we have everything agreed. It would only be to make speeches and sign documents.

Hartman: I think we can be relaxed about the summit and follow-on machinery. But what will Pompidou say when he goes to Moscow?

Secretary: When does he go?

Hartman: March 12.

Secretary: Brandt told me that Pompidou is going to give CSCE away in Moscow and said he wants to give it away too. Why shouldn’t we give it away?

Sonnenfeldt: I think we should graciously support the French and Germans giving it away.

Secretary: Just a moment. We can’t be sons-of-bitches everywhere. We have to show the Russians they are getting something out of détente. I am looking for things to give them that don’t cost us anything. We have screwed them at every turn. Can you imagine what the Jacksons are saying in the Soviet Union about Vietnam, the Middle East, the wheat deal, MBFR. We have not been softening up the West for the Soviets and they have discovered that it is possible for Western public opinion to be both for peace and anti-communist. The Soviets are totally stymied everywhere and I am afraid if we can’t give them something, there is going to be an explosion.

Hyland: If we are going to give them a CSCE summit, let’s do it before Pompidou goes to Moscow.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² Not found.
Secretary: I would like a paper by tomorrow afternoon on long-range strategy with the Soviets, assuming we can do nothing for them in the Middle East.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.] But if we can give them nothing in the Middle East, how can we be responsive in CSCE, the summit and Berlin?

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Scowcroft: MBFR.

Secretary: I must say the present German position on MBFR baffles me. They tried to explain it to me in Bonn\(^3\) but it was over my head.

Hartman: They are willing to reduce, but they don’t want to be singled out as the only Western country doing so in the second phase.

Sonnenfeldt: There is a new wrinkle. The Russians want to make sure that there is a freeze on Allied forces after the first phase so that the Allies cannot make up US reductions between the first and second phases. It is very logical, but it is not yet the US position.

Secretary: Could I have a paper by tomorrow afternoon that lays all these possibilities out?

Hyland: Why are you having an MBFR meeting this week?

Secretary: To educate myself.

Sonnenfeldt: The next operational MBFR issue is nuclear consultations with the British and Germans, and the British also want to talk about SALT.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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\(^3\) Kissinger visited Bonn March 3–4; he discussed MBFR with Scheel on March 3. A memorandum of their conversation is in National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 7, Nodis Memcons, Mar. 1974, Folder 6.
Washington, March 9, 1974, 0146Z.

47937. Subject: CSCE: Soviet suggestions for Basket III. Ref: Moscow 2909.1

1. We have considered Korniyenko’s suggestions for language to be inserted in the preamble to Basket III agreements and believe it would be helpful if you could follow up soon with him on this matter, making the points indicated below.

2. You could say we have given careful thought to Korniyenko’s suggestions. In all candor, however, we do not believe it would be in the Soviets’ own interest to table in Geneva the preambular language which Korniyenko showed you. We base this judgment upon the lengthy discussion of this issue during the Helsinki MPT and believe that the reaction of many Western participants at Geneva would conform closely to the approach they followed at Helsinki. Thus they would certainly attempt: (a) to balance the reference to the non-intervention principle with a reference to the principle of respect for human rights, etc., and (b) very likely to balance “with due regard for the differences in social systems of participating states” with language conveying the opposite thought, to the effect that differences in social systems should not be an obstacle to freer exchanges.

3. This in effect would reopen the long argument that was finally settled, toward the end of the Helsinki talks—as Korniyenko will doubtless recall—by agreement on a general reference, in the Basket III preamble, to the list of principles of interstate relations agreed to in Basket I. The likely effect of tabling the language Korniyenko proposed would thus be to open an extended ideological debate in Geneva which thus far has been avoided.

4. We continue to believe our approach presented to Vorontsov2 would meet substantive Soviet objectives and avoid a long wrangle over the Basket III preamble that would slow CSCE progress. Moreover, if the Soviets proceed as Korniyenko suggests, the tabling by the East of such language would confirm fears on the part of Western governments that the Soviets intend to vitiate contents of Basket III provisions on enhanced contacts. This doubtless would leak to the

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2 Document 186.

3 See Document 185.
Western press, and public pressures would mount on Western governments, allied and neutral, to resist such restrictive formulations.

5. Thus, we hope the Soviets will give careful further attention to our earlier proposed reformulation of the sovereignty paragraph in the principles declaration, given the consequences we expect at CSCE if the Soviets follow the tack proposed by Korniyenko.

Kissinger

189. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, March 15, 1974, 1611Z.


1. I invite your attention to reftel report of my conversation with Soviet CSCE delegation March 13 that suggests Soviets may be prepared to resolve problem of preambular language of CSCE Basket III on basis of Helsinki formula. This, as you recall, entailed a cross reference in Basket III preamble to principles in Basket I. I would underline, however, that my Soviet respondent said that they could not now accept such a formula, though he thought they eventually could.

2. I believe this is a significant development, reflecting an evolution in Soviet thinking along lines we have long favored.

3. You should also be aware that at March 15 meeting of committee on Basket III, Finns advanced portions of a text, provided to us on a confidential basis, that would explicitly propose Helsinki formula as a compromise. Finns have told us that they checked with Soviet delegation and others in course of developing this approach, and we doubt they would be prepared to advance it without assurance of eventual Soviet acceptance.

4. All of this appears to augur possible progress on the Basket III preambular issue in the period immediately ahead.

Dale


2 Telegram 1705 from Geneva, March 15, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.
190. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 18, 1974, 11:40 a.m.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Visit to the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William Hyland, Director for Intelligence and Research
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, White House
Jan Lodal, White House
Denis Clift, White House

(Sonnenfeldt, Hartman, Hyland, Scowcroft enter Secretary’s office.)
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: Let’s go through the agenda for the Moscow trip. Hal, the President is yelling for that letter—to Brezhnev. I promised it to him this morning. Where is it?

Sonnenfeldt: I have it but I want to take one last look at it to make sure it is what we want.

Secretary: I thought maybe you hadn’t started it yet.

Sonnenfeldt: Bill, give me my copy of the letter. I am going to show it to you, Henry, but you can’t read it.

Secretary: I don’t want to see it. Let me have it when you have taken another look.

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 66, Memcons and Summaries of Discussion. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in Secretary Kissinger’s office.

2 On March 18, Kissinger forwarded to Nixon the final version of a letter to Brezhnev, a response to Brezhnev’s message (Document 182), and Nixon signed it. The letter reads in part: “As for other aspects of European security, I agree with you that the conversations concerning the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have proceeded at a slow pace. You are aware that the US has been prepared to move rapidly, and there are no disagreements of principle between our two sides. Yet, for this Conference to be successful, it is necessary that we take fully into account the interests of all the participants, so that the final result will be a truly significant contribution to international peace and security. We have in fact made some progress since Minister Gromyko’s visit to Washington, and during your discussion with Secretary Kissinger we can make additional progress. As you know, the US will not stand in the way of concluding this Conference by a meeting at the highest level, but this decision will depend on the views of others.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22)
Bill, what did you think of the *Pravda* article?[^3]

Hyland: It was a low-level account of second-rate journalists and if you read it closely, you will notice it quotes US press and not themselves.

Sonnenfeldt: It is getting a big play because it is the first comment of this kind, but it is unimportant.

Secretary: Let’s leave SALT until Lodal comes in. What about MBFR? What can I say in Moscow about MBFR?

Sonnenfeldt: You have a good analytical memo Ikle did coming to you at the end of the day.[^4]

Secretary: But what can I achieve?


Secretary: Hal, did you hear about the MBFR VP meeting?[^5] The God damned Defense Department is becoming as cynical about MBFR as about SALT. We cut 29,000 men with no equipment and they cut 68,000 with their equipment. Then we put a ceiling on equipment so we are not penalized and they are. And to top it off, since Reforger is independent of MBFR, we have the right to send 50,000 troops into Europe each year for four months, so we withdraw 29,000 and have the capability to put in that 29,000 plus 31,000 more during the non-winter months when combat is most likely. Do you really think that position can be negotiated? I am willing to try it but I don’t think it has much of a chance.

Hartman: The important thing is to link US-Soviet reductions in the first phase with a second phase.

Sonnenfeldt: In the first phase we get US-Soviet reductions, a commitment to the principle of general equality and ceilings on other than US and Soviet forces.

Secretary: Wait a minute. Let me get this straight. Ten to fifteen percent cut in the first phase of US-Soviet forces; a ceiling on the rest of the participants; and a commitment to a common ceiling in the second phase. But what do we do about the God damned Russian tank army?

Sonnenfeldt: That is probably a non-starter. Unless we are willing to negotiate nuclear weapons, the Russians are going to refuse to talk about pulling back a tank army. So you keep the nuclear option in

[^3]: It is unclear to which article Kissinger is referring.
[^4]: The paper, which Ikle forwarded to Kissinger with a covering memorandum on March 16, is attached to a memorandum from Ikle to Kissinger, March 21. (Ford Library, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 15, MBFR Issues)
[^5]: Regarding the Verification Panel meeting on MBFR on March 14, see Document 347.
abeyance until you can buy something in SALT with it. Do you agree, Bill?

Hyland: Yes.

Secretary: What will be the Allied reaction?

Hyland: They have agreed. One of our strengths in MBFR is that we have carefully developed an Allied consensus so they don’t have any room to bitch.

Secretary: Not until we get an agreement with the Soviets. I want you and Hartman to go to NATO after we go to Moscow. You may want to go to London first but I definitely want you to go to NATO.

Sonnenfeld: Who were you looking at?

Secretary: You and Hartman. I have read the CSCE memo, unless there is a new one.

Sonnenfeld: There is a new one.6

Secretary: Then I haven’t read it.

Sonnenfeld: We have to be very careful on negotiating a CSCE summit with the Russians.

Secretary: I agree.

Hartman: I discussed this with the British in London last weekend and suggested we don’t tie ourselves down firmly against a CSCE summit. Our political leadership may decide that they want one at the last minute.

Sonnenfeld: And we may be able to use it as a sweetener for SALT.

Secretary: But Brandt will probably recommend it himself.7

Sonnenfeld: That depends on what happens in Basket III. They are now doing a minuet in Geneva on the subject of Human Contacts. All the Europeans who drove us into the conference are now saying, and they repeated it when I was at NATO, that they have to have something on Human Contacts for their parliaments so they are getting themselves in the position of demanding exactly what the Russians cannot give. But the issue on Basket III is being narrowed to some extent.

Hartman: Our proposal . . .

Secretary: What is our proposal?

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6 Hartman’s memorandum to Kissinger on CSCE for his discussions in Moscow is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 231, Geopolitical Files, Soviet Union, Trips, 1974, Mar., Background Books: CSCE, 1973–74.

7 In a meeting with Schlesinger on March 6, after they discussed the Middle East, Kissinger said: “What can we do to keep the Soviet Union happy? We have MBFR, but that may be premature. CSCE is cheap. The Germans or French will probably give it away anyway and we should beat them.” (Memorandum of conversation, March 6; ibid., TS 90, Subject File, Schlesinger, James R., Memoranda of Conversation, 1973–75)
Hartman: To make some reference in the principles to laws and regulations, to avoid reference to customs, and to insert a cross reference in the preamble to Basket III linking it to the principles.

Sonnenfeldt: But as Brezhnev said to Stoessel, Basket III is chicken feed. What really matters to the Russians is the principle of inviolability of frontiers. But I think we are going to have to let the Europeans bleed themselves on that one.

Secretary: Who is siding with the Germans against the Russians on that issue?

Hartman: All the Europeans are backing the Germans.

Hyland: I think the Russians will buy some reference to peaceful change as long as it isn’t juxtaposed with language on borders.

Sonnenfeldt: This is really the Germans’ problem. We shouldn’t get out in front of them.

Secretary: Hal, can we do a back channel to Bahr saying that in view of my trip we would like a rundown of his talks in Moscow and at the same time can we ask Von Staden officially if the German position is the same as Scheel outlined to me at dinner.

Sonnenfeldt: We have got some debriefing of the Bahr visit to Moscow but it hasn’t been very specific nor helpful.

Secretary: (Looking at CSCE memo) Shouldn’t we ask for a Soviet draft? Both of us should submit drafts.

Sonnenfeldt: That’s right.

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8 Telegram 3185 from Moscow, March 5, reported on Stoessel’s meeting with Brezhnev: “Brezhnev dealt with Middle East and CSCE in routine fashion, except for thinking out loud that it might be necessary to elevate CSCE to Foreign Minister level to get the necessary documents ready for signing. He said he would talk this over with Pompidou and the Secretary. He dismissed Basket III issues as chicken feed compared to Basket I principles of inviolability of frontiers, etc. After noting that Basket III issues were a part of détente and attracted broad public interest, I mentioned the discussion of this topic with Gromyko in Washington and my own talks with the Foreign Office here and I hoped language could be found to meet the needs of everyone for Basket III. Brezhnev stressed the need to abide by national laws and customs in exchange of information and people, recalling his December 1972 speech language on this question. He asserted that a foreign tourist in the U.S. could surely not walk down the street naked, which was illegal, nor could he put his feet up on the table, which was not the custom. He drew the analogy that a foreign tourist in the USSR could not hand out anti-government propaganda, which was illegal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 723, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XXX)

9 Telegram 3947 from Bonn, March 12, reported: “Bahr told US, UK and French Ambassadors March 12 of his discussions of CSCE with Soviet leaders during his recent 10-day visit to Moscow. Bahr said he was impressed by how much attention Brezhnev, Gromyko and others focused on the conference. He had the impression that they considered its success of importance. As Embassy Moscow has reported, Brezhnev complained about the slow progress being made in Geneva. Other Soviet officials raised more specific complaints. The FRG came in for heavy criticism for its positions on Basket One, especially the non-viability of borders, on confidence-building measures, which the
191. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 20, 1974, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Visit to Moscow

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brent Scowcroft, The White House
Denis Clift, The White House
Jan Lodal, The White House
Robert Blackwill, Notetaker

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I am still bemused by our MBFR proposal to the Russians. They take out 68,000 with their equipment, we take out 29,000 without our equipment and Reforger allows us to put in 50,000 for four months each year. It’s preposterous.

Hyland: But if the Soviets push and . . .

Sonnenfeldt: Bill, I didn’t have a chance to mention to you Dobrynin’s proposition of 30,000 yesterday.2

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, Secretary’s Trip, March. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s office.

2 No record of this conversation has been found.
Sonnenfeldt: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] But MBFR is a problem.

Secretary: Dobrynin’s proposal was that we consider a 30,000 man cut for each side, fifty percent to be made by the US and USSR, fifty percent by the NATO and Warsaw Pact.

Sonnenfeldt: In the paper Lodal and I did,³ we gave you three options. Option 3 is the closest to what Dobrynin told you. That would be a token US-Soviet cut of 20,000 each, which is about two percent of NATO/Pact ground-air manpower, plus a framework for the next phase. The problem is it is unacceptable to the Allies.

Secretary: What did they propose in Vienna?

Sonnenfeldt: Basically in November a symbolic 20,000 man cut by each side, involving all participants and made across the board.

Lodal: That is a more interesting suggestion than the one Dobrynin gave you yesterday. Token cuts by everyone and a manpower freeze between phases.

Sonnenfeldt: The next paper you have there⁴ gives you the three options and the third is the 20,000 US-Soviet cut and the framework for the next phase.

Secretary: If I say to the Soviets that we propose a 20,000 US-Soviet cut, will they accept it? That is not an equal percentage is it?

Lodal: Not exactly. An equal percentage would be about 19,000 for us and 24,000 for the Soviets.

Secretary: So you are giving me two proposals. We either suggest a 29,000 cut for us without equipment and a 68,000 cut for them plus tanks; or a 19,000 cut for us and a 24,000 cut for them without any equipment. That’s certainly splendid analytical work. I wonder which they will choose.

Hyland: But the 29,000 vs. 68,000 cut is an equal percentage cut of US-Soviet forces and is caused by the immense numerical advantage the Soviets have in Central Europe.

Secretary: Isn’t the 19,000 and 24,000 an equal percentage cut of US/Soviet forces?

Hyland: No, that’s two percent of the Warsaw Pact/NATO forces in the area.

Sonnenfeldt: Did Dobrynin say anything about armaments?

Secretary: I only talked with him about 15 minutes and during 14 of them he berated me for deliberately humiliating Gromyko in Damascus.

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³ Not found.
⁴ It is unclear to which paper Sonnenfeldt is referring.
Sonnenfeldt: He doesn’t know what a tight schedule you keep.

Hyland: I think the Soviets will eventually accept something like an equal percentage cut, though it may not be 29,000 on our side and 68,000 on theirs, but they may suggest . . .

Secretary: You really think they will accept those numbers or anything near them?

Hyland: They may suggest something like a five percent cut.

Secretary: What would those numbers look like?

Lodal: About 10,000 for us and something like 20,000 for them. But they’re interested in the subsequent phase and what happens to the German army.

Secretary: Do we make these cuts contingent on the next phase?

Hyland: That’s what the Russians will want; they will want it all spread out.

Secretary: So we cut five percent of US-Soviet forces and try to get them committed to a common ceiling framework. Will NATO accept that?

Hyland: That’s what NATO wants. A link between that and what is in the last phase in some detail.

Secretary: What kind of detail?

Hyland: The Russians want to make sure that the Germans reduce in the second phase.

Secretary: But doesn’t everyone accept that there will be indigenous reductions in the second phase. If there are indigenous reductions the Germans, being indigenous, will reduce.

Sonnenfeldt: The Russians will want your specific assurance of that.

Scowcroft: They don’t want an independent German army.

Secretary: These God-damn jesuitical arguments. Obviously if the second phase cut includes indigenous cuts, the Bundeswehr will be included and without it the German Government will cut their army anyway.

Lodal: Of course the Russians realize we may also get cuts through the Mansfield amendment.

Secretary: So we get the Soviets to agree to a common ceiling, 3–1 against them in this stage, 10–1 against them in the second stage. I keep thinking there must be a limit to our cynicism.

Hyland: What hangs us up in dealing with the Russians is that tight procedural format we have in NATO and the Allies’ insistence on staged negotiations eventually leading to a common ceiling approach. The Russians keep saying two stages are not necessary, that we should reduce everyone in one stage.
Secretary: Why don’t we?
Sonnenfeldt: Because the Europeans don’t want to.
Secretary: But if the Russians were willing to accept a common ceiling . . .
Sonnenfeldt: If that happens the whole picture changes. The Russians are going to want a clear indication of where the other Allied cuts are going to be. You are going to have national sub-ceilings no matter what you call them and you can bet that under the terms of Dobrynin’s proposal to you yesterday the Russians are going to want definite word of where the other 15,000 is coming from.
Secretary: We will have to give him something on this issue since he gave me a fur hat yesterday.
What happened to it? Are you staffing it? Which reminds me of when we were hunting. The Russians brought out all these sows and piglets—they called them wild boars—and Sonnenfeldt started blasting away. You should have seen it.
Sonnenfeldt: That was a day to remember. Two shots and two carcasses.
Secretary: Hell, they had some guys hidden down in the trees who heard your shots and then threw out the carcasses.
Sonnenfeldt: It will be better in the snow than in the spring. Think of the beautiful sight of all that blood on the snow.
Secretary: I find it revolting.
What is Ikle’s point on MBFR?
Sonnenfeldt: No point. I think you asked him to do an issues paper.5
Scowcroft: That’s right. After last week’s VP meeting.6
Secretary: I haven’t read it yet. And on SALT, will Alex Johnson be there?
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Secretary: What about CSCE? Art, can you give me five minutes on where we stand?
Sonnenfeldt: You have a memo.
Hartman: I am a little hampered by not knowing what memo you have got there.
Sonnenfeldt: It’s your memo.
Secretary: Never mind about the God-damned memo. Can someone tell me where we stand?

5 See footnote 4, Document 190.
6 See Document 347.
Hartman: The Soviet position in Geneva seems to be softening somewhat, although Korniyenko took a hard line with Walt Stoessel on our suggested changes in language. You remember we want to take reference to customs out and use a reference to laws and regulations in the principles, which would then be referred to in a vague way in the preamble to Basket III to meet Soviet wishes. That's basically the way this argument was settled in the original Helsinki compromise. They are also very serious about the question of inviolability of frontiers. And they regard peaceful change very much in the context of the indivisibility of their own sovereignty.

Secretary: But what do I tell Gromyko? Does Stoessel know he can sit in on all our talks?

Sonnenfeldt: I am sure he assumes he can but we can tell him definitely. Will he stay out there?

Secretary: No, for Christ sake, he can commute. He has got to understand there are limited facilities.

Hyland: I think the Russians will accept a reference to peaceful change in the principles portion, just so long as it is not juxtaposed with language on frontiers.

Hartman: But the Russian position doesn’t make any sense. If we recognize their complete sovereignty . . .

Sonnenfeldt: Though the logic on our side may be impeccable, the Russians are not going to accept changing borders on any terms except their own. They are so sensitive about this, of course, because of their problems with the Chinese and language on peaceful change would simply highlight their difficulties. We should have no illusion that they are going to accept anything meaningful.

Secretary: Should our role be that we will accept anything the Europeans accept?

Sonnenfeldt: That's basically true—especially on Basket III.

Secretary: So we put language on laws and regulations into the general principles and refer to them in the preamble to Basket III.

Sonnenfeldt: Of course the Russians are claiming that you agreed to put language on this question into the preamble itself.8

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7 See Document 186.

8 On March 19, Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger: “The Soviets have insisted to Stoessel that they would prefer that the idea of respect for laws and customs be reflected in the preamble to Basket III, a procedure which would undo the Helsinki compromise and provoke the Allies into counterdrafts that would only exacerbate differences. Further, they alleged that you and Gromyko had agreed to place such compromise wording in the preamble (there was no such agreement).” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 49, Trip Files, Mar. 25–28, 1974, Misc. Papers)
Secretary: That’s ridiculous. You were there. You know I didn’t.

Sonnenfeldt: We can also give them something on confidence-building measures.

Secretary: That’s right. The Europeans want to be told about every God-darn Soviet troop movement, but we accept some general formulation on maneuvers.

What about a summit?

Sonnenfeldt: There is no enthusiasm among the Allies now for a summit. Even the French seem to be backing away.

Hartman: Pompidou did leave a slight opening in Moscow. And I believe that the political leaders of all the Western countries may come around at the last moment.

Sonnenfeldt: The French have suggested a Foreign Ministers meeting at the end of Phase II.

Secretary: But what do I tell Gromyko?

Hyland: I think we simply repeat for the Russians next week the San Clemente formulation, that we support progress in CSCE which will result in holding a meeting at the highest level. That is in effect what Pompidou said.

Secretary: But what results are we asking for?

Sonnenfeldt: To remove all the crappy problems in the document.

Secretary: But am I right that no one is asking for anything that will last two weeks beyond the final meeting. And so, no matter what the Europeans are saying now, there will be a summit. I am just trying to understand how this is going to work out.

Hyland: The Europeans say that if there is a disaster, they will walk away from CSCE. But I think that is just a tactic . . .

Secretary: They don’t have any tactics; they just want to hang it on us.

Hartman: I think we will get help on this from the current British Government.

Secretary: Let me understand. There are no serious problems in Geneva. What about borders?

Hartman: The Germans are serious about it.

Hyland: It is a real issue in Germany.

Secretary: I thought [less than 1 line not declassified] Scheel said he settled the problems in the first document.

Hyland: The Germans are trying to get through CSCE what they didn’t get from the Russians.

Secretary: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Sonnenfeldt: That was Bahr.
Secretary: At least Bahr is a deliberate disaster. I really don’t think Scheel means to do any harm. The only problem is that we can’t get stuck with the decision about the summit. There will be a summit and we shouldn’t be the last to agree to it. But we want to prevent the Russians from running around Europe blabbing.

Sonnenfeldt: We shouldn’t go too far . . .

Secretary: You were wrong about me seeing Gromyko in Geneva—we can’t drive them against the wall every time—with all due respect. What are we giving if we tell the Soviets we agree to a summit.

Scowcroft: That . . .

Secretary: But if Korniyenko accepts this telegram and some compromise on frontiers and then says what about a summit. What do I say?

Hartman: Say we are relaxed.

Secretary: That is fine, Brezhnev asks me what I think about a summit and I say I am relaxed.

Sonnenfeldt: We also have the problem of follow-on machinery.

Secretary: What is our policy on that?

Sonnenfeldt: We do not want any special political machinery.

Hyland: We want a small staff secretariat which receives messages but has no political or executive responsibility.

Sonnenfeldt: On the summit we are just talking about nuance. The question is whether you will give the Russians the ability to go all over Europe saying the US agrees to a summit and is pushing it. Or are you more cautious saying that if the issues are resolved, if there is a consensus in Geneva, then our position remains the same, that the conference should close at the highest level; but we should never doubt for a moment that the Russians will use whatever you say against us.

Hyland: We should just give them our existing position.

Sonnenfeldt: That we will go to the summit if progress in Geneva warrants it.

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9 Reference is to a draft telegram to Moscow, attached to Sonnenfeldt’s March 19 memorandum, which reads in part: “It would appear that Korniyenko is deliberately distorting informal understanding reached between Secretary and Gromyko on this topic. Secretary did not agree to develop jointly with Soviets Basket III preambular language covering respect for national laws and customs and other points Soviets wish to make in that context. Secretary did agree that we would work to develop with the Soviets compromise language which could bridge differences between Soviets and our allies. As indicated in previous instructions, we feel this can most effectively be done not through developing the preamble but in keeping with the Helsinki understanding.” It is unclear whether the draft telegram was sent; no final copy has been found.
Hartman: We can say movement on the issues will define the final level.

Hyland: Of course, the neutrals will send who they want.

Sonnenfeldt: Prince Rainier?

Secretary: As long as his wife comes along. I agree, we are talking about nuances. We want to prevent Brezhnev from saying we have already agreed to come. We say instead that if the document is satisfactory, we will support a summit. We have a couple of loose declarations floating around; maybe we could put some paragraphs at their disposal.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

192. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 22, 1974, 7 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Moscow Trip and Other Topics

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy to Advisor for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant
Jan Lodal, National Security Council
Denis Clift, National Security Council

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] (Turns to Hartman) Can you bear it if we talk about MBFR? That’s something you know about. How did you like my trilaterals remark yesterday?

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, Secretary’s Trip, March. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s office.

2 Kissinger, responding to a question at a March 21 press conference about the potential impact of U.S.-European differences on his upcoming discussions in Moscow, stated: “Under no circumstances will we sacrifice European interests in negotiations with
Hartman: It was great, especially if you put it together with the Vice President’s statement today.3

Secretary: I wonder what he meant. Anyway, he has more than restored the President’s youth. Let me look through the SALT book. (To Lodal and Sonnenfeldt) Will you guys be here tomorrow? Now let’s move on to MBFR.

Sonnenfeldt: The talking points are being typed.

Secretary: That’s OK, I want to focus on concepts. (To McCloskey). Bob, I think you will like our position. We want to withdraw 15 percent of US and Soviet forces, moving then to a common ceiling achieved through a reduction of indigenous forces. You should really appreciate this, Bob, especially its fairness. We would reduce 29,000 men without their equipment in exchange for a Soviet tank army of 68,000 men along with their tanks. We would also put a tank ceiling on them without any for ourselves. And then we could rotate 50,000 people for up to four months a year back to Europe. This is a fair proposal; why haven’t the Soviets accepted it yet? For four months a year we would be allowed to have more troops in Europe under MBFR than without MBFR.

Hyland: Yeah, and in addition they should give us free emigration out of the Soviet Union.

Secretary: Right, and we can throw in 36 F–4’s.

Sonnenfeldt: We sure could.

Secretary: It’s a good basis for negotiating.

Hyland: Grechko will be away in Iraq during your visit.

Secretary: Then they can’t make any decisions.

Hyland: They have already made them.

the Soviet Union, no matter what our disagreements may be with the Europeans. With respect to troop reductions—with the negotiations of troop reductions—they are continuing on the course that has been agreed to in NATO. We have had a trilateral conversation that has been foreseen with the U.S. and the Federal Republic this week. These conversations went well, and there is an agreed allied position which we will continue to pursue.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 8, 1974, p. 353) On the trilateral discussions on MBFR, see footnote 13, Document 355.

3 In an interview with Reuters on March 22, Vice President Ford said with regard to the force reduction talks in Vienna that “some of our allies are saying that we won’t negotiate, we won’t have any compromises.” Ford continued: “They seem to be saying that predicated on the basis that the United States is going to keep its present force there ad infinitum. With the sentiment that is in the United States for a reduction, it may mean there will be a unilateral reduction unless we can get a mutual agreement with the Soviet Union. Some of our allies have to be realistic—that we should get an agreement; otherwise, there could be a unilateral reduction.” (John Heffernan, “Ford Renews Warning to Europeans,” Washington Post, March 23, 1974, p. A1)
Secretary: Well, they would be in a position to float only one position.

Hyland: They have already floated it to us.

Secretary: When we were in Moscow discussing SALT, Brezhnev was having Politburo meetings every day. Where can I go from here on this subject, how do we break out from here?

Sonnenfeldt: Any straight percentage cut involves a disparity.

Secretary: I think we could get a five percent cut if I limited it with a second phase.

Lodal: Five percent of what, US-Soviet or NATO-Warsaw Pact? Five percent of US troops is only about 10,000.

Hyland: Five percent would give us some 9,600 vs. 23,000 Soviets.

Secretary: What about five percent of the totals of both sides?

Lodal: About 38,000 vs. 46,000.

Sonnenfeldt: That would be a large number.

Lodal: Yes, and it doesn’t include air forces.

Secretary: What is NATO’s total force in Central Europe?

Lodal: 777,000.

Secretary: Well, that type of a move would shock the Allies—this would be falling back from our current proposal of 29,000 for 68,000 to 38 for 45. And it won’t look like great progress to anybody.

Sonnenfeldt: Right, but I think it is useful for you to look at it as one different concept.

Hyland: They might swallow 10,000 US for some 20,000 Soviets.

Secretary: Would this work in terms of verification?

Hyland: Our capabilities for units are not too bad.

Lodal: Or you could try eight percent.

Hyland: 10,000 in return for 20,000 is something they could probably accept.

Secretary: The advantage of this tack is that Brezhnev proposed it to the President last year. It would be hard for him to get off this concept now. If we included air forces, it might be better from their point of view. If we made reductions including air forces in the base, would each side be able to determine the forces it withdraws?

Hyland: You would have to negotiate this. For us it would be better to specify at least a certain amount of ground force that must be reduced. Soviet ground forces are obviously more important for us.

Secretary: We must have ground force reductions but the question is whether we should have air force reductions. We would need in effect a form of ceiling for ground force reductions indicating that they should be not less than 5,000. But could we allow them to take more than that in ground forces?
Hyland: It is hard to verify reductions of air manpower if no aircraft are involved.

Secretary: The Joint Chiefs are going to be interested in all this. They are marvelous at screwing up disarmament.

The only advantage of including air forces is to change the trading ratio somewhat, but we would still want to push for ground force reductions.

How would we link this with the last phase?

Hyland: We would negotiate that.

Secretary: The Soviets want a second phase link which includes specific reference to national forces.

Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets still haven’t accepted the idea of a US-Soviet phase. You will probably have to accept some form of freeze on national forces.

Secretary: If we pull out less than 10,000 people after two years of negotiating, we would spur on Mansfield. After all, Laird took out 25,000 men from Europe to put them elsewhere. Haig and I had to stop that from the White House.

Sonnenfeldt: The only way to combat Mansfield in this context is to show him we are in a process, and not merely in a set of simplistic reductions. That involves a freeze and movement toward a second phase.

Secretary: Yes, gentlemen, but we will need a figure greater than 10,000.

Sonnenfeldt: What about three percent of NATO and Warsaw Pact totals?

Lodal: There is really no asymmetry involved in that.

Sonnenfeldt: I am talking of alternative concepts.

Secretary: I must say, I am coming to like the concept of withdrawing a Soviet tank army less and less. The problem here is that if we go through with it, we are logically signed up with a freeze on our tank forces as well. This will get us into the same situation of being criticized for codifying inferiority as in SALT, given all the demagoguery in this country. We will be accused of creating a tank gap. That’s the problem. So I have come off the tank cut.

Lodal: A European freeze hurts us.

Sonnenfeldt: Jan’s concept is to get the Soviet tanks to stay in Germany so that the Soviets will have to walk back to Russia.

Secretary: Why don’t we base our withdrawals on how many forces we would be allowed to rotate back? That would be great. They could then bring back more than 100,000 for months at a time. In fact, both sides could have more forces in Central Europe as a result of MBFR.
Scowcroft: The exceptions allowing reintroduction of forces that you are talking about are there to help the Europeans feel better.

Secretary: We have less to gain from it than they do. Each August both sides would be free to go back to their old levels. In terms of working with NATO, can we negotiate a five percent US-Soviet cut without equipment, with the proviso that there would be a second phase and a common ceiling?

Sonnenfeldt: Probably.

Secretary: We would have three months to get this through NATO.

Lodal: It’s when you move to having percentage cuts based on NATO and Warsaw Pact totals that you start having problems with the Allies.

Secretary: Yes, but we could have done it that way if we had started this way from the beginning.

We could justify that we were dropping nukes from the equation after the nuclear trilaterals, and thus also dropping our demands for Soviet equipment.

Lodal: The problem is with the common ceiling. As it now stands, they have to take out three for our one to get to the common ceiling.

Secretary: The Soviets do?

Lodal: The Pact does. You can change this disparity by lowering the common ceiling but never getting all that was there, and through phasing. For example, you could set a common ceiling at 600,000 but only go down to 700,000.

Sonnenfeldt: Yes, but think of who would be doing all this. For the FRG, these reductions mean demobilization.

Lodal: One could thus bring the ratio down to two to one.

Secretary: Let’s not worry about this concept—it won’t be very active.

Lodal: They have talked about movement to parity if air forces were included.

Secretary: Couldn’t we jazz up the figures? If we add air forces, we may have to concede something on the commitment to the common ceiling. We could say that we continued to want it without requiring the Soviets to say the same.

Sonnenfeldt: All this amounts to one-tenth of an agreement. Questions of language, equipment, freeze, etc., would all remain.

Secretary: Another issue is how to handle the subject at the summit.

Hyland: The Soviets could agree to talk in terms of US-Soviet reductions at the summit.

Secretary: Well, that’s that for MBFR. Now, Art, what about CSCE?

Hartman: OK.

Secretary: What can I tell them about European security?
Sonnenfeldt: The French version that you got just before this meeting about the Pompidou–Brezhnev summit is different from the other version you got.4

Secretary: I am inclined to believe the Soviets. (To Hartman) Is that information now circulating all through EUR?

Sonnenfeldt: I don’t think the ambassador understood what was going on on the subject of concluding documents in CSCE.

Secretary: But it stands to reason in CSCE that if the documents are concluded, there must be a summit; this is simply so by definition.

(To Hartman) What do we tell the Soviets about the summit?

Hartman: We say if the work goes on and is completed, we think there could be a summit.

Secretary: OK.

Sonnenfeldt: No, we could say that we would like a summit to take place and won’t stand in the way of it.

Secretary: Right.

Now, can you explain this Basket III crap to me.

What is Basket III in the paper? Let’s look through it. (Leaves to take phone call; returns)

What’s in Basket III? (Reads portion of Helsinki final document)

Hyland: They haven’t started writing on it.

Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets said they could be flexible if they got their view in Basket III.

Secretary: What’s happening?

Hyland: The group in Geneva wants to add various portions on Human Contacts.

Secretary: This, as well as a link between Basket III and the general principles.

Where is the inviolability of frontiers issue? In the basic principles?

Hartman: Yes.

Secretary: And here our solution is to sneak in a reference to peaceful change in some other place in a way acceptable to the Germans. And the problem is that horse’s ass Scheel now wants to get more out of CSCE than he got in his treaty with the Soviets.

What’s that other abstruse point of Gromyko’s on principles?

Hyland: Oh, the ascending order of principles for the non-use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, etc.—and the concept of borders comes first.

Secretary: Where is inviolability in this paper in my book?

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Hartman: Here (Takes out separate spread sheet).
Hyland: The Soviet document is at Tab G.
Secretary: (To notetaker) Are you looking through the briefing books or taking notes?
Sonnenfeldt: He’s taking notes.
Secretary: Where is the frontier language? What do I tell Gromyko?
Sonnenfeldt: In keeping with what the Soviets told Sherer about their willingness to see reference to peaceful change put on a separate sheet and inserted later somewhere in the principles, you can tell them that we could live with it being on a separate sheet and inserted later.
Secretary: What other problems in CSCE?
Sonnenfeldt: CBMs, follow-on machinery.
Secretary: That’s it for CSCE. What else?
Sonnenfeldt: Test ban.
Secretary: We don’t want one. What do we get out of it for détente? On MBFR, why should the Soviets agree to our formulas for mutual cuts? They would have had 25,000 out of Europe if Haig and I hadn’t caught Laird.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

193. Memorandum of Conversation

Bonn, March 24, 1974, 12:15–2:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Walter Scheel, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenter Van Well, Foreign Ministry
Paul Frank, Foreign Ministry
Peter Hermes, Foreign Ministry
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Martin Hillenbrand, Ambassador to FRG

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in Schloss Gymnich. Attached but not printed are a letter given to Kissinger by Scheel on the establishment of FRG Federal agencies in Berlin and a copy of Kissinger’s public remarks after the meeting.
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Middle East; Declarations; MBFR; CSCE; Energy and UNGA; Hungary; Yugoslavia; European Unity; Consultation Procedures; Berlin; SALT; XXIV (6)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

MBFR

Secretary Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Then I must say my view on MBFR and the Vice President’s view are not the same.2

Dobrynin has now proposed to me a 30,000 troop cut, 15,000 Americans and 15,000 Europeans with a guarantee that MBFR will include the Germans.3 We have already rejected this.

Minister Scheel: It seems to be the main policy of the Soviets to cut the Bundeswehr.

Secretary Kissinger: We will not accept the singling out of the Federal Republic in these negotiations.

Minister Scheel: It should be the US and Soviets in the first stage.

Secretary Kissinger: If we can reduce that number, on both sides, and still keep it to the US and Soviets, that is no problem. There is no great compulsion to get US troops out of there. We have the sense that the Europeans would not object to a smaller US reduction even if it means a smaller Soviet reduction.

Minister Scheel: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It has to be linked to the second phase.

Minister Scheel: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: And we are not prepared to give up a common ceiling.

Minister Scheel: Yes.

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2 See footnote 3, Document 192.
3 Dobrynin apparently made the proposal to Kissinger on March 19. Sonnenfeldt wrote Kissinger on March 20: “Dobrynin’s proposal [of March 19] that we consider a 30,000 man cut by each side, fifty percent to be made by the US and USSR, fifty percent by other Allies of each, is in fact a step back, from our viewpoint, from proposals already made by the East in the Vienna talks.” Sonnenfeldt suggested that a formula for equal numerical reductions by the two sides, or by the United States and Soviet Union, was unrealistic: “It does not take account of the fact that the US is an ocean away from Europe while the Soviets are not, and that there are more than twice as many Soviet as American forces in Central Europe, or of disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5405, Box 5, Nodis Memcons, 1974, Folder 3)
Secretary Kissinger: The basic principle of our position is that we will not accept a definition of the second phase that singles out the Federal Republic.

Minister Scheel: We should say that the next phase should “include all Conference partners.”

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We will go no further than that.

Minister Scheel: It is not possible to accept a treaty that singles out the Bundeswehr.

Secretary Kissinger: That could begin a process of neutralization, or at least a special regime.

Minister Scheel: And supervisory rights.

Mr. Van Well: A treaty would probably be signed. In the Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Our present view—and I wanted to discuss this with Walter—is that we can accept just the US and Soviets in the first phase if it is linked to a second phase with a common ceiling, and we are prepared to say it should include stationed and also indigenous forces. We will not accept “German forces.”

Minister Scheel: What we want is that it should include “all Conference participants who are full Conference members.”

Secretary Kissinger: We have no problem with that.

Mr. Van Well: We would very much like to have this as an arrangement between the alliance systems.

Secretary Kissinger: We would be prepared to have it as an arrangement between alliance systems that says it’s only the US and Soviets in the first phase, but between alliance systems.

They may try to make it bilateral.

We won’t conclude anything in Moscow, in any case. Sonnenfeldt and Hartman will brief NATO afterwards, and may come to Bonn.

We will stick to the common ceiling and to the principle that if there is any reference to the Europeans, it will be to the “states participating in the Conference,” rather than to the Federal Republic.

Chancellor Brandt: We must now give you something to eat.

Secretary Kissinger: How nice of you to come.

[The group moved to the doorway. The conversation turned to CSCE.]

CSCE

Chancellor Brandt: We are open to one road or the other—I do not know how the others feel.

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4 Brackets are in the original.
Secretary Kissinger: If we agree among ourselves that the present document, plus some changes, is all right, should we go to the summit or not?

If we go to the summit, we can sell it for a better document.

Chancellor Brandt: I am worried about the President coming to an understanding with Brezhnev before coming to an understanding with the allies.

Secretary Kissinger: I have been talking about it for a year.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-Designate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
SALT; Other Arms Control; CSCE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European Security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

General Secretary Brezhnev: Perhaps we could have a brief survey of the European Conference.
Secretary Kissinger: Good idea.

General Secretary Brezhnev: If we delve a little into the past, we both recall in our meetings we agreed to consult with each other and coordinate actions regarding the basic objective of both of us, that is, to assure the success of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was the policy principle we agreed upon and set in communiqus in Washington and Moscow. It would be correct if in this present meeting we carried out a brief survey, with a view to bringing the Conference to a successful conclusion in the nearest future. I would go even further and say that if we can bring about the completion of the European Conference before President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union, this fact would give still greater significance and weight to the President’s visit, and would be a greater political asset. It would lessen tensions and be in the interests of the United States and its allies and ourselves and our friends in the socialist countries. It would resound very well around the world. We have had occasion to speak of the significance of Europe and the importance of cooperation and peace in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: We have spoken a lot of Europe unilaterally lately.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But, you will also recall, there was a time when we did our best to secure a successful end to the Conference by 1972. Then we decided to end it by 1973. Now we’re in 1974 and the Conference has not yet ended. And a situation has developed where some people have tried to inject into the Conference elements which are alien to the principles the Conference is trying to establish—principles of cooperation and good-neighbor relations. I won’t recall who they are; they are either opponents of the Conference, or people who want it to drag its heels, or who don’t want anything to result. Surely that was counter to what our two countries have agreed upon.
Lately there are rumors that the United States and the Soviet Union lost interest in the Conference. I can’t speak for the United States, but it’s not the case for the Soviet Union. We are making every effort to conclude the Conference successfully and making preparations for its conclusion at the highest level.

Several days ago I met President Pompidou of France, and I criticized those who are submitting proposals at the Conference that can only impede the work of the Conference. As a matter of fact, I read to him a proposal submitted by his own delegation—it suggested the right to open a company or a theatre in the Soviet Union, not subject to control of the Soviet Union. Surely that was counter to the first principle, that is, noninterference in the affairs of other countries. He was surprised at this and didn’t know it had been submitted.

If it is allowed to drag on for years and years, people will lose interest, and people will speak of it like the old League of Nations, where so many words were spoken. President Pompidou listened to my words; he agreed on the need to sweep aside all obstacles to its rapid success. In my earlier meetings with Pompidou, he was reluctant to agree to a meeting of heads of state. This time he agreed that the leaders could sign the document provided the document was good enough. To this I replied, if the document were not good, I wouldn’t allow the Foreign Minister to sign it either. [Laughter]

Regarding the United States delegation, it’s not impeding the work of the Conference, but neither is it showing any great activity in the work of the Conference. That is something we could perhaps talk about.

Another thing I talked about with Pompidou: In the past, in increasing confidence in Europe, I suggested the possibility of foreign delegations being invited to observe various maneuvers of troops. But no sooner did we come out with that than we were presented with demands to give out information about all, even insignificant, troop movements, even in the Soviet Union, down to the regimental level. But that would require a Pentagon-like apparatus to observe.

Another matter: What if the states in Europe wish to bring about a change in frontiers? How do we reconcile this with the principle of inviolability of frontiers? Surely France has no intention to give up territory, or Belgium. We’ve heard rumors the United States is eager to give up Florida or California.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Florida is gone already!
Secretary Kissinger: To Cuba. [Laughter]

General Secretary Brezhnev: Who will support that reference to change in frontiers? The only country interested in that is the FRG,

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because they are nervous about the GDR. But that question is already resolved, because there is a treaty between the FRG and the USSR, and Poland and the FRG, and the GDR and the FRG—both of which are now members of the UN.

What we could do is agree on something like voluntary change in frontiers by the consent of the states concerned. But reference to that should not be in the part of the final document regarding inviolability of frontiers, but in some other part of the final document, so there will be no intimation of one state imposing its will on others. So that’s how we see the solution to this question.

If Bonn and France act as has been promised, and if the United States acts in the same spirit, we think it would be a good thing to bring the European Conference to a close before President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union. This would be a good and significant thing, because it is a fact that the United States is present in Europe. That is a fact.

We feel the All-Europe Conference has at present reached a stage where it is possible, given the mutual consent of all the parties, to end its work as quickly as possible, and then the Conference would yield its result as a contribution to the lessening of tension. That’s my first point.

The second point is the United States has been pursuing a consistent line. The task is to find a way to prepare the final document. We are adding no controversial issues and we are adding no new legal considerations to the guarantees of existing frontiers in Europe. That is a very important fact.

On the basis of consultations between us, we agreed to introduce this element of confidence, that is, that of military observations. But that has now been turned into God knows what. We should eliminate those accretions and retain what is really useful. That is the task we now face. And I trust you realize the need today is to remove all these unnecessary and trumped-up elements and leave in only those elements which are truly necessary and useful.

Finally, there are the questions regarding Item III, regarding culture, information, human contacts, and so forth. I have already had occasion to speak publicly on this subject, but I want to repeat here in our official conversation. I want to emphasize we are in favor of human contact and increase of tourism, etc., but on condition of basic respect for the traditions and customs of every country and respect for whatever social order exists in that individual country. And if anyone is counting on being able to interfere in our internal affairs through the Conference, those hopes are to no avail, I can assure them. I will not conceal my satisfaction that after Comrade Gromyko’s last visit to Washington, an understanding was achieved to act in that spirit, and
in accord. That would indeed display yet again the desire of both governments to strive for true understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, in a matter of political importance.

I could speak at greater length on this, but I trust this exposition would be sufficient—unless Comrade Gromyko has anything to add.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I would say Comrade Brezhnev has been very exact on this.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we agree with much of what you have said. Above all, we agree a major effort should be made to bring the Conference to a conclusion this year, and within this year as soon as possible. We also share your evaluation that the objective conditions exist for bringing it to a conclusion. Finally, we also agree our two representatives in Geneva, working together tactfully, can speed up the work of the Conference.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is exactly what I am calling for.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me talk first about various items you mentioned, Mr. General Secretary, and then we can talk about the level at which the Conference can be concluded.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Please.

Secretary Kissinger: Incidentally, I think the consultations between our representatives in Geneva should be handled with the same care we used at the time of the Berlin agreement. But I will work that out with your Foreign Minister and your Ambassador. And, of course, Ambassador Stoessel and Korniyenko have also been in active contact to work out the basic approach. [Korniyenko beams.]

Korniyenko is pleased I can say something positive about him. They’ve had useful talks.

On the individual items: On so-called confidence-building measures. You’re quite right; they were introduced after an initial exchange between our two governments. We share your evaluation that too many items have been introduced that aren’t really central to the main subject. So we believe we should concentrate on the question of maneuvers on which we started—maneuvers of a substantial size, for example, of units of 15–20,000 men. We think a practical means of achieving it would be by means of the British proposal at Geneva, which would be appropriately amended. Not the exact proposal, but . . .

Ambassador Dobrynin: Division or strengthened division.

Secretary Kissinger: Sixty days’ notice. We would be prepared to amend it.

We’ve not incidentally, discussed any of this with our allies. This is what we are prepared to do on our own.

On the issue of inviolability of frontiers, we find that idea of the General Secretary has considerable merit. That is, we could put the
phrase about peaceful change in, for example, the section on sovereignty, or some other section than the frontier section. And I think the proposal . . .

[Brezhnev reads an article in Izvestiya about Secretary Kissinger.]
Secretary Kissinger: Is it friendly?
General Secretary Brezhnev: No. We knew you would reject all our proposals. This is Izvestiya, our evening paper.
Secretary Kissinger: It is a good picture. It makes me look thinner. That was before I came here this afternoon.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: It can be corrected.
Secretary Kissinger: The article, or the picture?
Foreign Minister Gromyko: The picture.
Secretary Kissinger: So tactically—I don’t know whether it is worth talking about—I like the proposal of your delegate in Geneva, to write that sentence on a separate piece of paper, with the understanding that it will not be in that paragraph on frontiers. And we could cooperate in that effort.
General Secretary Brezhnev: Let me say we feel the most convenient thing would be to write it in that section on sovereignty.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: Where sovereignty is mentioned. Sovereignty extends to frontiers.
Secretary Kissinger: The United States and Libya. Your intelligence is too good. You found it out. We wanted to make it a surprise.
I have not studied the exact formulation. We agree that the concept of peaceful change should not—need not—be in the section on frontiers. We agree it could be in the section on sovereignty. And it has to have some specific reference to peaceful change and not simply be related to the concept of sovereignty. But it is not primarily an American problem, let me say. Anything the Germans accept, we will accept.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: Why must one country hold the key to the problem?
Secretary Kissinger: We will use our influence to move that sentence. This we promise you. What that sentence is, we will discuss. I think we will find a reasonable solution.
General Secretary Brezhnev: What’s your view on ending the Conference before President Nixon’s visit?
Secretary Kissinger: It will be difficult, for technical reasons. But we won’t exclude doing it shortly afterward. For example, at the end of July. I am talking about the signature.
General Secretary Brezhnev: I take it you are agreeable to signing the document at the highest level?
Secretary Kissinger: This raises the following problem, about which I will be quite candid.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Please.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t want to be accused of giving up the position of our allies. So let me separate our formal position from what you can expect—if you do not use it with other countries . . .

General Secretary Brezhnev: That goes without saying. Unless we stand on that assumption, then there is no possibility of confidential communications between us.

Secretary Kissinger: Our formal position is, like President Pompidou’s, that the formal document could be signed at the Summit if it is an adequate document. Let me say that if the document, which we are now working on, is finished in the sense we are now discussing, we will consider it a satisfactory document. This is to explain, on a private basis, the thinking of President Nixon to the General Secretary. And we would work in that direction.

That gets us to the part on cultural exchange. I have said on many occasions to your Foreign Minister that a social system that was established with so many hardships and that has overcome so many obstacles is not going to be changed through cultural exchange.

So for us it is the problem of how to bring it to a conclusion. We think the best solution is the one discussed between Ambassador Stoessel and Mr. Korniyenko. I mean the solution proposed by Ambassador Stoessel, not the one proposed by Mr. Korniyenko! That is, to have the reference to national laws in the basic principles, and then refer back to it at the beginning of Basket III. And we would urge our allies to accept such an approach. We would still have to give some content to the whole basket, but we don’t think that is an insoluble problem.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Let me just say, the solution as you explained is a possible one, that is, in the principles to make reference to national legislation and then to have a reference back to those principles, including the principle on domestic legislation, in the section on so-called human contacts. But since we are not dealing with a work of fiction, the link should have meaning. Namely, in the section dealing with cultural exchange, etc. there should be reference to the fact that these ties proceed on the basis of the principles set out at the beginning.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We had no doubt of your understanding. But we were more than surprised that the representative of Holland came up with a proposal that included reference to the principles but the two are separated and there is a link between the two. And we were even more surprised when the other delegations—and yours was no exception—came out in support of that of Holland. What you just said is in accord with our thinking.
Another observation on another matter, that is to add to what Comrade Brezhnev has correctly pointed out, that other delegations have brought out of all proportion the so-called “confidence military measures.” You mentioned the British proposal. The first aspect is volume, that is the figures, the question of the size or figures starting from which information would start. We are told it starts from a division, or a reinforced division, though no one seems to know what a reinforced division means. If we take that approach, as Comrade Brezhnev said, we would have to have an enormous bookkeeping apparatus. The second aspect is geographic—the regions where this would operate. It is one thing to refer to a strip of land adjacent to borders; it is another thing if it includes the whole of European Russia. That is nonsense.

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly everything west of Vladivostok.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Some even include Vladivostok! Fortunately, the Urals are the limit of Europe.

You seem to take a realistic approach.

Secretary Kissinger: We want to be constructive, in the spirit of the agreement reached between the President and the General Secretary. Our preliminary view is that some distance from the frontier is more realistic than the whole of European Russia.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When I discussed this with the President, we talked only about foreign observers coming to maneuvers on a voluntary basis. But what is discussed now has a different aspect. In form, what Dr. Kissinger says makes sense, in the spirit of what was agreed upon. But in substance, Dr. Kissinger introduced a certain element of vagueness.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I’m trying to be constructive. I’m saying that what the Foreign Minister says, about a certain distance from frontiers, is what we will support as opposed to all of European Russia. I think the Foreign Minister will recognize it is an attempt to take into account the Soviet point of view, and it is not identical with the view of other delegations. And I believe on that basis a solution can be found.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I spoke about the basis for agreement; the question now is to find a concrete formula. And I certainly don’t want Holland to dictate its terms to the Soviet Union. I will never accept that. Holland should be grateful for our attitude toward it.

Secretary Kissinger: I was not familiar with this particular action of Holland. I think a solution is possible.

If I may make a concrete suggestion, Mr. General Secretary . . .

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think my meeting with President Pompidou at Pitsunda showed that Pompidou himself recognizes the absurdity of some of these ideas. And President Pompidou himself said: “Of course I realize the proposal now is that information be given about
all of the European part of the Soviet Union, but I realize the territory of the USSR is not limited to Europe but extends to Vladivostok.”

Secretary Kissinger: That is an ambiguous statement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: He said it in a concrete context.

Secretary Kissinger: May I suggest—if Ambassador Stoessel and Korniyenko can work out concrete formulas on these questions and agree on the tactics. Otherwise all Europe will act as Holland did. But if we can agree, we can manage it like the Berlin negotiations.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I agree completely.

Secretary Kissinger: We may need a little time to convince our allies, but if Stoessel and Korniyenko agree, we have a very good chance. In fact, if Korniyenko agrees to anything, it will be a historic event.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Korniyenko always agrees with correct positions.

Secretary Kissinger: He is a very good man. We admire his work very much.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Stoessel too.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not your fault that Korniyenko always gets the better of Sonnenfeldt.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I’ve never seen an instance of that.

Secretary Kissinger: We think we can meet that Dutch problem in the framework we described.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: You hope.

Secretary Kissinger: We think.

General Secretary Brezhnev: What kind of proposal is it if they want to arrogate to themselves the right to open theaters in the Soviet Union without any control by the Soviet administration? It is not a matter of our being budged from our positions; there is no danger of that. It’s just wrong to have ideas like that.

Secretary Kissinger: As we discussed, it can be solved with a reference to national laws in the basic principles and then refer back to it in Basket III.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Good. I certainly agree. Let Stoessel and Korniyenko talk about it.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we can find a solution.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I think so too.

Secretary Kissinger: Then the problem of the level will also be satisfactorily solved.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The question of the level is, to a certain extent, also an important problem. If the document is signed by the Foreign Ministers, that is one thing. On no account do I want to belittle the importance of our Foreign Ministers; they are empowered
to sign anything. But for the nations of Europe, Canada, United States, I believe signatures of the leaders will be of more significance.

Secretary Kissinger: We have understood your view, and if the document is finished as we discussed, it can be solved in that spirit and at that level.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We certainly wouldn’t empower Gromyko to sign a bad document.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we all know what the document looks like.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We can’t have two policies in this country, one that is the Foreign Minister’s policy and the other that is official policy.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had that on occasion. We have recently united them!

We will consider it a satisfactory document.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That is the way I look at it.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think you and President Nixon will disagree.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t think so.

I think we have had a useful exchange of views today. It has been useful because what Dr. Kissinger has been doing is to advance proposals that are to the advantage of the United States and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. But it is not difficult because we now know you better. It is now our sixth meeting.

Secretary Kissinger: I didn’t have the impression that the proposals of the General Secretary threatened the security of the Soviet Union.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Whatever I put forward, I had one underlying motive, that is, strengthening peace.

Secretary Kissinger: That is in both of our interests. We will think over our discussions in that spirit.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
195. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, March 26, 1974, 10:35 a.m.–1:53 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of MFA; Chief of USA Dept.
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of MFA; Chief of the Near East Dept.
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, USA Dept. (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, USA Dept.
Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Dept.
Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Adviser
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-designate for Near Eastern & S. Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
CSCE; Middle East

Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I got home late last night. I certainly can’t say I was satisfied in the way things went [on SALT]. We spent all day talking yesterday but we decided on nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think that is correct. I think we decided on the European Security Conference very successfully.

Brezhnev: That may be true, but nonetheless I still have many reservations on that, and I like precision. When I say I was displeased, that’s of course a unilateral statement. There are two sides.

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Dr. Kissinger: My assessment is, on the European Security Conference, we’ll be able to bring it to an early conclusion along the lines and at the level we discussed yesterday.

Brezhnev: If we really wanted to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion, we could have done it long ago. As it is, we’ve had communiqué after communiqué. It was always said, “There is a possibility of doing it in 1972, and in 1973.” Now it’s 1974 and we’re saying, “There is a possibility.” What kind of a way is this to do business? Holland and Belgium are playing around. But who are we? [angrily:] We are nations too and we have our views on this. Also there is the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria—they’re playing in the Conference and not being capricious—but others are saying they want to establish theaters in the USSR and another wants to know everything that’s going on in the USSR as far as the Urals. If they don’t want any positive results to come out of the European Conference, why don’t they say so? Then there will be, instead of security, insecurity.

Here we are, the second year passing, and no results. The United States in this time managed to fit out all its missiles with MIRV’s and we still haven’t managed to sign even a piece of paper. We’ve offered a straightforward proposal, and someone asks for a kind of freedom in someone else’s country! What kind of freedom is this? We’re not interested in other people’s affairs, in Belgium and Holland.

That is just in addition, Dr. Kissinger, to what we agreed upon yesterday. We and you can sign it.

Dr. Kissinger: As you know, we haven’t had success in achieving unanimity from our allies. And Senator Jackson yesterday made a speech accusing me of treating the Soviet Union better than our European allies. I know how pleased the General Secretary is to receive reports from Senator Jackson.

Brezhnev: Very happy indeed.

Dr. Kissinger: So as a practical matter, Mr. General Secretary, we are faced with the reality of a Conference of 35 nations. You yourself said we’ve put no obstacles to progress.

Brezhnev: That’s true.

Dr. Kissinger: I think what we agreed on yesterday will bring results in the next few months.

Brezhnev: I didn’t mean you to take my irritability to mean that all I said applied to the United States. I was simply saying I don’t understand why they’re taking all that time. They gathered in Helsinki, and the Ministers were charged with drawing up documents, and now they are sitting there drawing their per diems and doing sweet nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we now have a procedure which should speed up the process.
Brezhnev: Then I’ll proceed from the assumption our two sides will act more vigorously. After all, we’re not the last fiddles in the Conference. But if delegations from Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg put forward proposals, we’ll never get anywhere. I admire those people, but if they put forward proposals in a businesslike way, not if they make absurd proposals.

I’m not trying artificially to hasten the work of the Conference. But they’ve been dragging their feet three years now. I would like the Conference to end before President Nixon’s visit, because it would be a solid foundation for the visit. We would then truly demonstrate to the whole world that our two major powers have shown the world an example of cooperation in bringing the Conference to an end. That is my main design.

Dr. Kissinger: I propose Ambassador Stoessel and Mr. Korniyenko work together as we discussed yesterday, both as to tactics and as to substance, as we agreed. And I think we can operate jointly as we did during the Berlin negotiations.

Brezhnev: Yes indeed, but trouble is some delegations there are putting forward things that have no bearing on the substance whatever. France says: “We hold no military maneuvers whatever. What are we supposed to do? Stop all our soldiers? Put them in their barracks?” We always carry out maneuvers—now as 20 years before. It’s a war game of sorts, playing it out. Now they start addressing humiliating demands—giving notice three months in advance, and so on.

Dr. Kissinger: I said yesterday that the unit to be controlled should be of substantial size; second, that the territory should not include the whole of European Russia, and third, that notice should be reduced from that British proposal. And we’d be prepared to work with you in that sense.

Gromyko: One of the problems is the term “substantial size,” because a country like Holland says a division is already a unit of substantial size and we have to inform them. For Belgium or Luxembourg, the movement of one division is a momentous development, but for us it’s nothing.

Brezhnev: Look at it this way: in the final document of the Conference that we will sign, we are reaffirming such all-important principles as inviolability of frontiers, respect for sovereignty, non-use of force. Now someone comes up with a demand that we inform them of every military movement. Does it mean people don’t believe us? We’re signing it in seriousness. And can’t individual movements be detected with earth satellites?

I discussed this subject with President Pompidou and I said we would be prepared to invite foreign observers to observe them. Say, around Kiev, we have one, two, or three divisions playing out
maneuvers, and we can give a few months’ notice. It was something I
proposed. But now they’re putting forward impossible demands. It’s
not that we’re not willing. Let them come watch them. I’m sure sol-
diers in Belgium go on maneuvers; I’m sure they don’t just sit around
in their barracks.

As to free movement, just by way of a joke, in addition to Solzhen-
itsyn, we can give you a few more Solzhenitsyns. That’s free move-
ment! [Gromyko and Brezhnev laugh]

Dr. Kissinger: If Solzhenitsyn gives a few more interviews, the New
York Times will withdraw its recognition of him.

Brezhnev: Well, Dr. Kissinger, I accept what you say regarding this
matter. I hope we’ll be able to bring our useful influence to bear on the
outcome of the Conference. If so, it will do credit to us, and everyone
will be grateful. The true importance and significance of a major effort
and major achievement can usually be discerned the further you are re-
moved from the time. If Jackson accuses you of something, it doesn’t
mean the American people do.

Dr. Kissinger: I think improvement of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union has the support of the American people,
and it is the fixed and determined course of this Administration. And
it is our intention to fix it so firmly that it is an irreversible course.

Brezhnev: As I’ve said, our people and our party and its leader-
ship value that very highly if that is the case.

Shall we now turn to the Middle East?

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European se-
curity conference or MBFR.]
196. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, March 26, 1974, 5:09–9:43 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the US
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgi M. Korniienko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Chief, USA Department
Mikhaiil D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief, Near East Department
Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Advisor, State Department
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-designate for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Other Arms Control; CSCE; MBFR; Economic Relations

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Brezhnev: On the European Security Conference, we seem to have reached an understanding on our joint mode of action.

Kissinger: My impression is, on the European Security Conference we have reached an understanding both on substance and on procedure. That is my impression.
Gromyko: The important thing, however, is to implement that understanding in practice.

Kissinger: Of course. But we have implemented understandings in the past; it is not the first time we have carried out an understanding.

Brezhnev: But the Conference has been dragging out three years. There is no end to the Conference.

Kissinger: Up to now the issues have not been reduced to such a small number, with such a precise understanding.

Gromyko: You mentioned the possibility of the Conference ending some time in July. Do you see any way we can have it end before President Nixon’s visit?

Kissinger: I think it would be very difficult.

Gromyko: What if we tried to prepare all the documents and have them initialed, and leave until afterwards only the signing? That is, have the documents prepared in substance?

Kissinger: I knew the Foreign Minister for years before I discovered his passion for initialing.

Gromyko: It is a very good thing.

Kissinger: That is more nearly conceivable. That I do not exclude.

Gromyko: Because of the substance of our opinion, and the General Secretary’s opinion too, if President Nixon’s visit is on and the substance of the Conference is still in mid-air, our public opinion won’t understand that.

Kissinger: Of course, the visit of President Nixon has to be seen as in the mutual interest, and we can’t accept it as being conditional on anything.

Gromyko: Yes, but it is a matter of atmosphere.

I have fresh information. During the lunch interval, I heard from our delegation at Geneva on the first item, inviolability of frontiers. This refers to the study they are undertaking, that we mentioned, on peaceful change of frontiers. You and we reached a fundamental understanding that the mention of this should not be in the context of the clause on inviolability of frontiers.

Kissinger: That is right.

Gromyko: What they are discussing now is a bare reference.

Kissinger: Right.

Gromyko: The question of where to put it is not yet decided. If you could give your delegation instructions in line with what we agreed. You know best how to work with your allies.

Kissinger: I’ve not exactly proven I know best how to work with our allies! Nevertheless, you correctly understood our discussion yesterday, and we will work in that sense. We already had a preliminary
discussion with the Germans in that sense before I came here, and we will work with others after I leave. You can count on that.

Gromyko: Good. Incidentally, the French are better in Geneva yesterday than today. It seems our discussion with Pompidou had an effect.

Kissinger: I was going to claim credit for it. It was the result of our discussions last night. We immediately used all our influence with Jobert.

Gromyko: This gives you a chance to show your abilities.

Kissinger: One country at a time. Last night it was France.

In seriousness, we have agreed on this question, and we will proceed along the lines of our understanding.

Gromyko: Good. And during the interval I again looked into the situation regarding so-called “military détente.” The situation is confused to the utmost, and it has been confused deliberately.

When it came to light that some of the Western countries were putting forward impossible proposals, suddenly they put forward new ones putting the whole of the European USSR under control. This proposal is not yet withdrawn. Belgium, Holland, are putting out these ideas.

Kissinger: I have told you we will not support that proposal.

Gromyko: We appreciate that, but could we have an understanding to act more vigorously to eliminate all these?

Kissinger: Yes; this issue will take a little more time, but you have our assurance. I will discuss it in London on my way through.


Kissinger: This may be a good way of proceeding.

Gromyko: Because it is the British who are acting as the motive force behind all this.

Kissinger: That is why I suggest it.

Gromyko: We thought the new Labour Government would see it differently, but the law of inertia was applying.

Generally speaking we like your attitude to this question of military détente and these measures. As you know, the matter has three elements: One is the exchange of observers—that is no problem. Second is presentation of information about maneuvers. The third is the presentation of information about troop movements. We share your view of the third, that is, to send it back for further study.

Kissinger: That is correct. We can weaken these proposals substantially. Basically we should talk about large units or substantial units on maneuvers, not about movement of all military units.

\[2\] See Document 193.
Gromyko: That would certainly facilitate the situation, because one of the complicated elements would be eliminated.

Kissinger: We will talk about this in London in that spirit and see if we can reach a common position. But it will be better if your Ambassador does not go there tomorrow and support the position we were taking on Thursday!

Gromyko: It will be impossible because he is not in London.

Kissinger: But you should not be active in London until we tell you how it came out.

Gromyko: We will do nothing. We can let one secret out: We believe perhaps the Labour leaders could take a more realistic stance; at least that is what our intuition prompts.

Kissinger: That is my impression. The Conservatives were more difficult for you and for us.

Gromyko: That is a page in British history that has been turned over. On Basket III, I don’t know whether you have seen the pile of documents they have piled on. If you take this pile here [shows stack of documents] you can multiply it by 10, most of it wastepaper.

Kissinger: I’ve never examined those papers. Because I don’t think the Soviet system will be changed by the opening of a Dutch cabaret in Moscow. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Cabaret! I made myself go through the whole basket. If you clear away the rubbish, the real sense boils down to three items: borders; respect for sovereignty, noninterference; and the third is what we just discussed—matters of military détente. In fact, the third one, until recently, wasn’t there at all. At Helsinki, it was decided merely to give some thought to it. I think it would be a good thing if you could look into this, because you will see a lot of those matters don’t relate at all to the problem of security.

Kissinger: I understand your point about Basket III. It has two aspects: One is to relate it to the principles, and the second is to give it some content. Some of the Europeans think that for domestic reasons they have to give some content to Basket III. You and I discussed once that if we can establish a relationship to domestic legislation, you could consider some content for Basket III. I think that with good will on both sides, this is a soluble problem. The United States will use its influence not to embarrass the Soviet Union or raise provocative issues.

I have not seen any of the papers. I must be frank. I have not studied them. The United States has not put forward one concrete idea.

I will put forward one—compulsory visits by the United States Secretary of State to Leningrad.
Gromyko: We will be agreeable, if not in the document, but at least in a footnote. It should be bilateral, because I don’t think the French would sign it.

Kissinger: We should initial it. But we should be able to solve it and you will have no difficulty with the United States.

Gromyko: The others have, though you haven’t. But we agree the crux of the matter is something about domestic legislation. But as for what you say about us being prepared to insert substance into Basket III, it has been said on many occasions, as in the statement by Comrade Brezhnev that we are in favor of a broad expansion of cultural ties provided they are consistent with domestic legislation. We are in favor of a wide range of humane questions provided they are consistent with respect for domestic legislation.

Kissinger: We are prepared for substance. But I haven’t studied any of the papers on substance. Because I have assumed we would work it out in practice.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I have derived great pleasure hearing the two Foreign Ministers talk at length with each other, and I keep thinking “How are they able to do this?” My conclusion is that I can never be a Foreign Minister. I would have to set aside a couple of years to study the most complicated words from every encyclopedia in the world and insert them one after the other in each phrase. I will set aside a couple of years and maybe then I will be up to it.

My second conclusion is that Foreign Ministers speak in such an interesting way but resolve nothing.

Kissinger: That gives them job security.

Brezhnev: I am really thinking of volunteering for one of these commissions in Vienna. It will be a school of practical study.

Gromyko: But not on Basket III.

Brezhnev: The other day I phoned Comrade Gromyko and I said “My deeply respected Andrey Andreyevich—”

Kissinger: The President never says that to me—but then I am not in office as long as he.

Brezhnev: And I said, “I was quite convinced that as soon as I telephoned, you would raise your phone and reciprocate. And I was so impressed I ventured never to forget that. I was impressed by your gesture for me, and you can be assured of my feelings for you for many years. And availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to know how you feel and at the same time inquire about the health of Lydia Dmitrievna, your spouse, and please pass on to her my best wishes, and please let me express my hope that the forthcoming telephone conversation will give you the greatest pleasure and bring forth no problems. Because my many years of experience give me every confidence
you are directing every effort toward these goals that I and my col-
leagues are seeking, and I am sure our conversation will be a success.
Now I will say a few words—but I forget one thing.” But he then broke
into conversation saying, “I entirely reciprocate your feelings.” And
I said, “Andrey Andreyevich, if I were not assured of your feelings I
would not have called.”

Kissinger: He would say to me, “I essentially reciprocate your
feelings.”

Brezhnev: My call was to find out when your plane was coming.
[Laughter] He said, “It is coming one hour late.” We talked twenty-
two minutes. But I wanted to hear the two Foreign Ministers talk to
each other.

Kissinger: But I am a new Foreign Ministe r . . .

Brezhnev: I have one shortcoming: I like a precise discussion. But
we talked for twenty minutes about our mutual respect and admira-
tion, and we concentrate on the last word. So I listened to you most at-
tenatively. You agreed to inform each other. I will inform President
Nixon, Korniyenko, Sonnenfeldt.

Kissinger: I knew Sonnenfeldt was communicating with some-
body, because he is not communicating with me.

Brezhnev: I haven’t ever been able to suspect Sonnenfeldt of
ever engaging in clandestine activity. The only thing I can guess is
that he writes you notes and tells you “Don’t agree to anything they
say.”

Kissinger: What really happens is, I move my lips and he speaks.
When I speak to your Foreign Minister, he never says, “I entirely
agree.” The most I get is, “I essentially agree with you.”

Brezhnev: As I see it, that is again a case of his reciprocating your
words.

“Thank you, Mr. Kissinger, for thanking me for my gratitude. I am
deepl y indebted to you. Thank you for my hearing of these words so
pleasant to my soul.”

That is what is called a respite or disengagement.

Kissinger: I don’t think I would achieve this felicity of phrase . . .

Brezhnev: [referring to Rodman] What is he writing this for?

Kissinger: We need this for our diplomatic language training.

Gromyko: I don’t know what he is writing.

Kissinger: We will initial it. We will introduce it into our Foreign
Service charm course.

Brezhnev: I’m quite sure you and all your assistants, and Presi-
dent Nixon, understand full well the significance and meaning of the
All-European Conference and are familiar with all the details to date.
I know your so-called allies regularly inform you of all the details of what they are going to do. We don’t refer to our East European colleagues as allies but we get reports from them.

We would now like to hear precise firm words, not on details but on the principle. We want to know whether we can bring the Conference to an end in the next one or two months or whether it goes on and on. It is left a bit vague. I am a practical man and I wanted to know the facts. I have to report back to the members of the Politburo on what is going to happen. We hear about “efforts will be made with allies.”

The situation is like this: Countries like Belgium want to set up a theatre here under their own control without the Soviet administration. You say your allies have put forward this or that proposal; that is just to let it go on endlessly. We can speak our mind. We can say the subject matter is European security, not a matter of organizing restaurants in each other’s country. If the United States isn’t interested in that, then I will take that into account, and that is another question.

When there is a question of who should participate, whether it is just the nuclear powers or others, I said, “No, it should be all European countries.” This was the correct view. Luxembourg, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, should all participate.

This is why we are against all attempts to give evasive answers, which only creates unpleasantness in our minds.

We are not putting forward the question of the [withdrawal of] United States forces from Europe. That is a separate question altogether. Nor do we link it with your “allied commitments.” But in spite of our straightforward approach, others are putting obstacles in the way and trying to gain certain advantages over the Soviet Union.

You know the United States publishes a magazine, “America,” in this country, and we reciprocally publish, “Soviet Union” in the United States. [Brezhnev gets up and fetches a copy of “Soviet Union” and shows it to Dr. Kissinger.] I personally read “America” in my house, and my wife reads it too. So there is no problem about that publication in this country. But now there is a new demand, to set up a printing house in the USSR. Surely that would contradict the principle of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respect for sovereignty.

So all references to alliances are nothing but attempts to evade the question. What alliance can there be with a country like Holland on setting up restaurants in the USSR? Tell them straight out that it runs counter to the spirit of the Conference. You keep saying you have to consult with your allies.

But I want to be completely objective, Dr. Kissinger, and I appreciate the fact that you’ve made two serious statements. One is that you have the intention to make a serious effort to complete the documents and effect the signing as soon as possible, and second, that you will do
everything in your power to ensure the signing of those documents at the highest level. If that is your intention, I certainly welcome it and we can end the conversation on that note.

What is your view on those last words?

Kissinger: My opinion is, we have agreed to use our efforts to bring about an acceptable document, and that in that case conditions will be considered right for signing it on the highest level, as far as the United States is concerned.

Brezhnev: I agree. And I trust you agree in principle that if it were at all possible to achieve it before President Nixon’s visit, that would be very good. Politically it would confirm the ideas President Nixon set out in his last letter to me. You will naturally recall the words in that letter—“that we have gone through difficulties but we remain true to the policy we have set, and that there is indeed no alternative to coexistence.” Surely the final document of the European Security Conference would be very important in that respect.

Kissinger: I have said we will act in that direction and I am sure we will achieve it. But I have pointed out that I don’t believe it will be completed before the President’s trip. But we have no fixed view on that subject; it is my estimate. But we can certainly finish it, if not before, then shortly afterward. But you have our assurance we will act in the sense that I have described.

MBFR

Brezhnev: I would like to say a couple of words on this question.

Kissinger: Please.

Brezhnev: On the question of reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.

We are gratified at the start of the negotiations in Vienna on the substance of this important problem. And we discerned in them the joint desire of our countries, together with the other European states concerned, to continue the process of strengthening European security and to complement political détente in that continent with measures of military détente. It is only too natural that negotiations should be conducted not for the sake of the negotiations themselves, but to achieve concrete practical results. We have to note, however, that so far there have been no such results. And in fact, people now are speaking of the deadlock that has taken form at the Vienna talks.
And it is becoming obvious that our Western partners have come to Vienna with clearly exaggerated demands. The approach they are suggesting means nothing short of a desire to alter or amend in their favor the correlation of forces in Central Europe that has taken shape over many years. They start talking about some kind of ceiling or of reduction only of the Soviet and American forces, and also they are calling for a reduction of Soviet forces in a proportion of two-to-one, or even more, compared to American forces. They speak only about the reduction of infantry forces without talking of other types of forces and armaments.

You will realize that if that approach is taken, the talks are bound to end in deadlock. And it is quite obvious that no reasonable or acceptable solution can result from such an approach.

So, therefore, if there is a genuine desire to reach agreement on this problem, it is necessary to take a more realistic view of the situation. I don’t believe you and I can here and now finally resolve this problem, and I have merely described in principle what is happening, emphasizing those things that cannot lead to real results, and I would be happy to hear from you some observations on this score. And then, depending on how you see things, we could decide either to issue our delegations with new instructions or to discuss the matter at a higher level, or take other appropriate steps.

Kissinger: The negotiations on MBFR have, as you pointed out, Mr. General Secretary, many complexities. One is the geographic disparity of the location of the United States as opposed to the Soviet Union. Any Soviet forces would withdraw a few hundred miles, while American forces would withdraw a few thousand miles. Secondly, we start from a base which is disparate: According to our estimates, the forces of the Warsaw Pact are larger than those of NATO, and the forces of the Soviet Union are larger than those of the United States. And there are some disparities also in individual equipment.

On the other hand, we understand the Soviet concern that as a result of this effort there not just be a substitution of other forces for those of the United States—in other words, that if we withdraw a certain percentage of our forces, the other allies not just increase theirs by the same percentage. And we also understand there should not be a change in the relative weight of the various allies as a result of these negotiations.

So we understand the Soviet desire to have some clarity about the process that would be started.

[Food is brought in.]

Kissinger: It’s about time. I was getting hungry.

Brezhnev: When I got home last night, my wife showed me a picture in Izvestia. She said, Dr. Kissinger has lost weight. I said no, it is something in the photograph.

Kissinger: Your wife is a great diplomat.
Brezhnev: She usually takes no interest in the talks.

Gromyko: Did you tell her Dr. Kissinger was bringing great pressure to bear? [Laughter]

Kissinger: So, we understand that the discussions that have taken place in Vienna may have had some of the attributes that the General Secretary pointed out.

We wonder, therefore, what the General Secretary thinks now of the idea he discussed with President Nixon—of, for example, a cut of 5% of U.S. and Soviet forces, without equipment. In other words, this is a change in our position. With a ceiling to be put on allied forces so they cannot be increased to compensate for this. And with an agreement to move within a specified period to further discussions which would involve also forces of other countries, of all of the participants of the Conference.

Brezhnev: I did talk about this with President Nixon, and I spoke of it to Chancellor Brandt and to President Pompidou. I did indeed suggest that we agree on certain reductions in size of forces, perhaps in the initial stage symbolic reductions, and then let us wait and see several years, with talks continuing in the meantime, and then everybody concerned—the United States, the peoples of Europe, everybody—will see it is possible to live in Europe with a smaller number of armed forces. That would be just one first step.

But some time has elapsed since then, and here I have to use the language of diplomats. First Brandt told me he favored reduction of both national and foreign forces. Now I see there is a certain hesitation in this regard. Pompidou tells me he takes no part in these talks, and he says France is not going to cry over reductions of Soviet and American forces. That is what he told me in the last meetings. That prompts us to think about it.

Kissinger: I think the French army has a long way to go before it strikes terror in the Soviet Army. You can withdraw many forces before that point is reached.

Brezhnev: But I feel at this time we can limit ourselves to just an exchange of views.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Without, however, losing interest in this activity.

Gromyko: And let the talks in Vienna continue.

Brezhnev: And perhaps after we both thought things over, we could agree to both give our delegations new directives. I’ve been hearing it said that the EEC, which is of course not only a commercial but also a political union, feels one could contemplate a Western Europe without boundaries. This was said to me by certain politicians. I said
to Pompidou I didn’t agree it would happen, but if it did, every one of them would have to learn German.

Kissinger: That might be one result of the current tendencies.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: So perhaps, returning to the subject of troop reductions in Central Europe, we could then agree the conference itself should continue to work. And in the meantime, say at the Ministerial level or other level, we could think of ways to give new impetus to the work and bring rapid results.

Kissinger: So as I understand it, the ideas you discussed with President Nixon last year are in abeyance?

Brezhnev: No, why? But for the time being, no practical solution has been found to that problem.

Kissinger: Including that idea advanced by the General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Yes. Because the suggestion is that only a certain percentage of land forces be withdrawn, which would violate the balance, a balance which has been in existence for 30 years. So obviously there is a need to dig a little deeper into this whole matter.

Gromyko: When Douglas-Home, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, was in Moscow discussing this subject, he said it was best to reduce land forces first, especially the number of tanks. When we asked why, he said, “Because the Warsaw Pact has more tanks.” That is not a good reason.

Kissinger: I have never heard a NATO Minister who disagreed. That is very convincing to NATO people!

The question is how serious we are in promoting these negotiations. If each side wants to freeze the superiority it has, there will never be an agreement.

Gromyko: Then let the other participants take a more objective view instead of saying, “Reduce tanks because the other side has more tanks.” Because all forces and armaments should be reduced. It should be a cross-section of all forces in Europe, including nuclear forces. So it is certainly expedient to give further study, but it is also necessary for the Western powers to take an objective view.

Kissinger: So you think at the Summit no understanding can be reached.

Gromyko: Perhaps as a result of further thought, something could be agreed. Let us agree to think this over. You may want to exchange views with your allies. This is certainly one of the topics we list as for the Summit.
Kissinger: But our experience is that unless there is a preliminary agreement before the Summit, it is very hard to reach an agreement at the Summit.

Gromyko: True, but surely there can be an additional exchange of views between now and the Summit.

Kissinger: I just told Sonnenfeldt I don’t have the impression we will achieve a breakthrough on this subject tonight. But I don’t want to be hasty; that is why I asked Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: A breakthrough today, maybe not. But between now and the Summit . . .

Kissinger: Because I would have offered to split the difference, if I knew what your position is.

Gromyko: Could you tell your position?

Kissinger: I already told you. A cut of 5% in U.S. and Soviet forces, to be followed by further reductions of other forces.

Gromyko: Yes, but we said that involved additional forces. What about air forces and other arms? We can’t do as Home said.

Kissinger: But in that stage tanks would not be included, only personnel.

Gromyko: But that is not our proposal. When Comrade Brezhnev put his proposal, he said armed forces, not just personnel. Otherwise it is just counting heads.

Kissinger: By air forces, do you mean personnel, or aircraft too?

Gromyko: Those too.

Brezhnev: Because air forces include arms and not just personnel.

Gromyko: The question now in the discussion in Vienna is the question of reductions of armed forces and armaments.

Brezhnev: I am sure Dr. Kissinger is aware that that kind of approach is groundless.

Kissinger: Can I also, just for my education, Mr. Foreign Minister, ask about the content of your 20,000 symbolic cut put forward at Vienna? Is that personnel or equipment?

Gromyko: We named that as an example but we have never divorced the question of personnel from that of arms, and we have always said cuts should include air forces and nuclear weapons.

Brezhnev: That is what we wrote.

Kissinger: My quick impression is reinforced; I don’t think we will find a solution this evening.

Brezhnev: I agree with you. But we should give thought to today’s discussion. [Kissinger nods yes.] So let the Conference go on working, and we should give whatever help we can. [Kissinger nods yes.]
Gromyko: [Picks up a briefing paper] This is our proposal: “The Soviet Union and other participants in the talks suggest a reduction of 20,000 with appropriate materiel and equipment.” That is in paragraph 2. This is something that applies to both of us.

And in fact, in the past, Western countries themselves never attempted to disunite personnel and arms. Only very recently this question cropped up. It seems they switch positions whenever it is to their advantage.

Kissinger: We are prepared to discuss cuts that move in the direction of equality. But we should consider the consequences if we fail to make progress in any of the fields of limitation of armaments. If armaments on both sides continue to grow while we declare we are in a period of détente . . . So this is not a question to be settled tonight, but it will have a serious influence.

Gromyko: We are in favor of continuing to give thought to this. Certainly it is quite possible we will have opportunities to make progress.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

197. Editorial Note

On March 29, 1974, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman and Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt briefed the North Atlantic Council on Secretary of State Kissinger’s visit to Moscow. Telegram 1747 from USNATO, March 30, summarized the briefing: “Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary Hartman consulted with Allies in restricted NAC session March 29 about Secretary Kissinger’s discussion with Soviet leaders in Moscow. Reviewing substantive discussions item by item, U.S. reps reported that General Secretary Brezhnev discussed CSCE at some length, expressing desire to complete all three stages of CSCE by early summer and to complete third stage of CSCE at summit level. U.S. had pointed out that pace of work could probably not match Soviet timetable. Allies asked whether evident Soviet desire for rapid conclusion of CSCE would be reflected in positive Soviet moves in Geneva. U.S. reps replied that some signs of movement had already occurred in Geneva talks and that NAC should now promptly consider in each basket what a reasonable and acceptable outcome would be for the West. Responding to further Allied questions, U.S. reps said U.S. had not committed itself to Soviets on level of participation in CSCE Stage III and would reserve judgement until
contents of final agreement became more clear.” The telegram continued: “Hartman said Brezhnev had brought CSCE up in his introductory remarks, and he had come back to it several times. He commented on the length of time that conference was taking, and referred to ‘trivialities’ being pressed by others for Basket III. Brezhnev referred to domestic legislation each time he harked back to Basket III items. Brezhnev was also quite concerned about confidence-building measures, in particular the view of others that they should apply to all of the European USSR, and there would have to be ‘a little Pentagon’ if advance notification were expected to apply to military movements. He did say, however, that if there were a maneuver around Kiev, perhaps that could be notified. The Soviets had asked what a reinforced division was, with reference to the UK draft CBM text. They were rather negative on troop movements, as opposed to maneuvers. Soviets had also stressed importance of principle of inviolability of frontiers. They were willing to accept ‘peaceful,’ or ‘voluntary’ change, but not coupled with inviolability. They suggested that this principle might instead be linked with text on sovereignty. On Basket III issues, the Soviets had said they were interested in enhancing East-West contacts. Soviets had referred to exchanges of publications, tourism and cultural exchanges. They had referred once to easing the plight of separated families. There was always a reference in speaking of such matters to domestic laws. Only in his opening remarks had Brezhnev also mentioned limitations of customs and traditions in connection with Basket III issues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

198. Editorial Note

On April 4, 1974, President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft forwarded to Secretary of State Kissinger a memorandum prepared by Jan Lodal of the National Security Council staff and Counselor Sonnenfeldt on “preparation for the summit.” The memorandum reads in part: “CSCE. With Art Hartman we are drafting instructions to our delegation and to Stoessel on CSCE aimed at keeping it ticking along slowly, so it can provide us some leverage at the summit. MBFR. We propose to let the MBFR bureaucracy and delegation proceed with the negotiations with no view toward an MBFR ‘deal’ at the summit.” (Telegram Tohak 36, April 4; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 49, Trip Files, HAK Trip, Mar. 24–28, Bonn, Moscow, London, Memos, Misc. & State Cables)
On April 9, Sonnenfeldt sent a memorandum to Kissinger further updating him on developments since the visit to Moscow. With regard to the European security conference, the memorandum reads:

“Frontiers. Since your Moscow trip, a breakthrough in Geneva on the principle of inviolability of frontiers and progress in Moscow on Basket III make it increasingly difficult to control the pace of work on other Conference issues. We may soon be faced with a choice of being less forthcoming with the Russians or accepting the end of Phase II before the President’s trip to Moscow. On the principle of inviolability of frontiers, the FRG and USSR have agreed to a text which says that participating States will ‘regard as inviolable’ each other’s frontiers and refrain ‘from assaulting these frontiers.’ The ‘assault’ language in effect renounced use of force in the English text, although the Russian equivalent of ‘assault’ does not have this connotation. A related principle on peaceful change will be dealt with elsewhere in the text.

“Basket III. Following your visit, Korniyenko proposed to Stoessel that the wording of the principle on sovereign equality should mention the right of each State to determine its ‘legislative and regulatory system’ (we had earlier agreed with the Soviets on this wording) and that this be linked with Basket III by a preambular phrase indicating that cooperation in the fields of culture, information, etc., should take place with full respect for principles ‘as defined in the general declaration.’ This preambular phrase would serve to make the principles in Basket I a separate and more important document than the other Baskets, which our Allies would not accept. The Soviets also suggested that we jointly instruct our Delegations to work in concert to gain acceptance of this proposal in Geneva. In your absence, we instructed Stoessel to go back to Korniyenko and propose Basket III preambular language drawing upon the Helsinki final document (‘full respect for the principles defined in the declaration on the principles guiding relations among participating States’). Stoessel also countered the Soviet proposal on tactics by suggesting that the Soviet Delegation or one of its Warsaw Pact Allies table the revised principles paragraph and the preambular language to Basket III, while we would make a ‘major effort’ to persuade our Allies to accept a compromise along these lines.”

(Ibid., RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union)

On April 10, Hartman sent Kissinger a memorandum in preparation for the Secretary’s upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 12. The memorandum reads in part:

“Your discussion of CSCE with Gromyko will continue the dialogue in Moscow of last month. While our tactical objective will be to assure that Stage II talks in Geneva do not end before the President’s visit to Moscow in late June, we assume you do not wish to signal to Gromyko any shifts in our current approaches to the issues.”
Hartman then discussed timing:

“With regard to the timing for the conclusion of Stage II, Gromyko’s pitch will likely be that the agreement reached with the FRG last week at Geneva on inviolability of frontiers—which gives the Soviets a ‘crystal clear’ statement on frontier inviolability in return for their agreement to the inclusion of a reference to peaceful change of frontiers in connection with one of the other principles, such as sovereignty—opens the way for Soviet proposals in connection with Basket III on human contacts when the talks resume April 23. He will likely point to these developments as opening, in turn, the way to the conclusion of Stage II by mid-June.

“Gromyko may fear, however, that a target of late June for completion of Stage II could slip a week or so, given the unwieldy CSCE process, thereby carrying Stage II into early July. The Finns have announced that they need four weeks of advance notice to prepare for Stage III. Delegations interpret this generally to mean that Stage II must be completed at least four weeks prior to Stage III, which all anticipate will last at least three days. An August date for Stage III is out of the question because of Western European vacation habits, and Gromyko will thus react adversely to any indication that the Stage II could not be concluded in late June, or that Stage III might take place in the autumn.

“For our purposes, we will wish to underline to Gromyko that we do not believe it realistic to assume that Stage II could end before the last week in June or, at the latest, the first week in July. At the same time, you could meet Gromyko’s concerns on this score to some extent by suggesting that all agree to a target date for beginning the Stage III meeting—say July 15—subject only to prior satisfactory conclusion of Stage II. This would give the Finns a date for planning purposes, and thus permit Stage III to begin a week or two after the conclusion of the Geneva talks. However, we could not assure Gromyko that all of the Western European participants would agree to such a target date. Many of them might feel that this would weaken their bargaining leverage on substantive issues by virtually guaranteeing that Stage III would take place.

“Substantive Issues

“At this point, it is difficult to judge the adjustments in Allied positions which would be required to assure that Stage II talks were spun out until late June. Much bargaining and drafting remains. Current expectations, however, that the talks must end by mid-June will put the delegations under pressure to work for compromise and ways of speeding the drafting process when talks resume. Based on our Helsinki experience, time pressures could create a bandwagon effect beginning about mid-May.

“Initially we could encourage those Allies that have taken the stiffest line toward the Soviets to pursue their approach on issues like
human contacts, freer flow of information and confidence-building measures (CBM’s), though the Allies would expect us to be as tough in plenary as in private. Otherwise, it will be difficult to disguise our hand for long. Moreover, we can encourage reticence on post-conference permanent machinery, though we might find ourselves the only maverick in the herd. Given our position to date on the level of Stage III, we probably should not use this issue as a bargaining chip unless essential.

“We will thus have to reassess periodically the approach to each of the issues that we will need to take with the Allies and others to insure that the talks extend into late June.

“Gromyko will likely solicit further US cooperation in speeding compromises on Basket III and CBM’s. In this connection, he may wish to draw you into detailed discussion of various aspects of these and other issues. To serve our timing objective, we recommend that, while indicating our readiness to continue efforts to stimulate compromises between Eastern and Western positions, you underscore that the many issues remaining to be debated do not lend themselves to swift resolution, on the basis of positions advanced to date. Moreover, in order to further brake momentum on substantive issues, we recommend, if feasible, that you respond to proposals for detailed discussions of these issues by indicating that these could best be addressed later at staff and official level, once the Geneva talks resume and positions are clearer.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 404, Subject Files, USSR (Briefing Book), Foreign Minister Gromyko Visit)

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 11, 1974, 11:05 a.m.–12:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted on April 15 by Sonnenfeldt. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: I would like to say a few words on Europe, especially on the all European Security Conference. In this area, we are happy to see the US taking a more constructive position. We said so to Dr. Kissinger in Moscow and also to you previously. In Moscow, Dr. Kissinger had certain interesting ideas. We told him we hoped the US Delegation would play a more vigorous role in Geneva. We are pleased to see that in recent days this has happened. We hope you and Dr. Kissinger will do everything to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion and to conduct the third stage at the highest level. You see, I have something pleasant to say.

President: Yes, we have made great progress. If the conferees can agree to important matters, then we will come to the summit. It is the same with you—you don’t want to come if there is no agreement. Of course, there are also the Europeans and they also have ideas. So it is not all that easy to get agreement.

Kissinger: We have worked with the Allies and you will have seen that there has been progress.

President: I have talked with the Italians, with Wilson and Brandt and they are all on track. Also with the Dane. We are using our influence; I am.

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2 See Documents 194–196.
3 During an April 4–7 trip to Paris to attend the funeral of President Pompidou, Nixon conferred with interim French President Alain Poher, Wilson, Brandt, and Prime Minister Poul Hartling of Denmark. According to a memorandum of conversation, April 6, between Brandt and Nixon: “Brandt pointed out that the USSR wanted a CSCE summit and observed that he was not specially interested in it—the Foreign Minister level would do just as well. The value in a summit signing was it would be one additional commitment by the United States to Europe—beyond the NATO framework. He added that it would not be good if the President met only in a CSCE meeting and not beforehand with his European colleagues/allies. He had no fixed ideas on the forum, but perhaps NATO—anything we and the French could agree on. The President said that, in principle, it was, of course, good for the West to meet before any CSCE summit, if there was to be one, but we had made no commitment on a CSCE summit—the level should depend on a satisfactory outcome of the negotiations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1028, MemCons—HAK & Presidential.

4 A record of Nixon’s conversation with Prime Minister Hartling in Paris on April 7 was sent the same day to Kissinger in telegram Tohak 63. (Ibid., Kissinger Trip Files, Box 49, March 30–April 9, HAK Trip, Acapulco, Mexico, Tohak/Hakto)
Kissinger: We have to do a little more with the British in regard to one item—confidence-building measures in the spirit we discussed in Moscow. These are the military things, Mr. President.

Gromyko: Well, thank you very much. Thank you for this conversation. I certainly appreciate it. It has been a very frank exchange of views. I express the hope that all that relates to the closeness of our positions will be brought to fruition. On those matters on which I had to say things are not so pleasant for you to hear, I hope they can be worked out too. I would like you to instruct your Secretary of State that when he addresses the General Assembly he should not fire too many arrows at us. Because in my own speech I had to do some “fighting,” you know against whom.

President: I would like you to discuss one question that you didn’t make much progress on—MBFR.

Gromyko: What is the question?

Dobrynin: Reduction of forces in Central Europe.

Gromyko: Yes.

President: I would like you to discuss it with Henry at lunch. It is very important for certain reasons here.

Gromyko: That is indeed a very important matter, as was said by General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. But the Western position in Vienna is not objective. No agreement can be reached on that basis. And what is more, we think they think so too.

President: Well, we discussed with Mr. Brezhnev a five percent cut by both sides.

Gromyko: Well, thank you very much Mr. President.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

200. Editorial Note

On April 23, 1974, Counselor Sonnenfeldt forwarded to Secretary of State Kissinger a paper containing talking points for an upcoming meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. With regard to “CSCE: Basket III Compromise,” the paper reads: “We have proposed preambular language for Basket III to the Soviets which is consistent with earlier agreed language emerging from Helsinki, and which would make reference to respect for ‘legislative and regulatory’ systems in the Basket I declaration of principles. The Soviets appear to have accepted...
our noninflammatory wording in lieu of their preference for preambular language which would give Basket I a special and higher status than the rest of the final CSCE document. Last week, Korniynenko again urged Stoessel to engage the US in handling a major share of the tactical burden of tabling this compromise in Geneva, specifically suggesting that the US either table or arrange with our Allies or the neutrals to table both the preambular and ‘legislative and regulatory’ language. We have resisted this in the past on the grounds that our tabling of the compromise or parts thereof would surprise and annoy our Allies, and would be more productively done by the Soviet side as a substantial gesture which would facilitate overall CSCE drafting. In addition, we are, of course, reluctant to get out in front on this subject so as not to accelerate the pace of the conference prior to the US–USSR summit. Consequently, we have assured the Soviets that if they table or arrange for the tabling of the compromise, we will then make a major effort with our Allies to ensure its acceptance.” Sonnenfeldt recommended that Kissinger “continue to resist drawing the US into taking the lead in tabling this compromise.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union) No record of the meeting with Dobrynin has been found.

201. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, April 28, 1974, 10–11:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo, Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgi M. Korniynenko, Member of the Collegium, Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, MFA (Interpreter)
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK and Presidential, Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place at the Soviet Mission in Geneva. Kissinger was in Geneva to discuss bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated discussion, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.
September 1973–May 1974 611

Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William A. Hyland, Director, INR
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador-at-Large
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
CSCE; ABM Limitation; Threshold Test Ban; Environmental Warfare; Bilateral Agreements; Jackson Amendment

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Kissinger: Let’s talk about Europe.

Gromyko: Good. The fact that we are not fully satisfied with the way things are going at the All-European Conference is well known. I said so in my meetings with you and the President in Washington; General Secretary Brezhnev said so to you in Moscow. We think it is time to end the All-European Conference.

Kissinger: I have made an appointment tomorrow, after our discussions, with our Ambassador to the All-European Conference so I can talk to him personally about the direction we will go.

Gromyko: Good. That, I feel sure, would be useful. It is certainly high time to end it. The end of the second stage should be in the nearest possible future—to be more definite, in May. That depends only on the governments and peoples actually at the Conference.

Further, understanding should be reached on holding the third and final stage at the summit level and as soon as possible. It is best of all to hold it before the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting.

Kissinger: First, on the Conference. I agree the work now depends on the efforts governments are prepared to make. We could perhaps run over some of the topics while we are here.

As for the level, our position is the one we discussed in Moscow, and has not changed.

As for timing, as a practical matter, looking at the President’s calendar and my calendar, there is no possibility of doing it in June. But I said this to you in Moscow.

Gromyko: What about the first half of July?

Kissinger: As far as we are concerned . . . the President will be in the Soviet Union from the 24th of June to the 1st of July. I think he should return to the United States. So closer to the middle of July would be better. But it would depend on the course of events at the summit and on the decision, of course, of many other governments.

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2 See Document 199.
Gromyko: What is the general mood of your European friends on that? This is the first time we have gone into concrete dates.

Kissinger: My impression is, I wouldn’t be surprised if you told me Brandt has already told you he wants a summit.

Gromyko: With regard to Chancellor Brandt, even previously he spoke in general terms about holding it at the summit, though he always mentioned minor reservations.

Kissinger: I don’t say it as a criticism.

Gromyko: Very minor, minor [reservations]. He was sympathetic.

Kissinger: To tell you candidly our problem: We don’t want to be in the position of being accused of having forced our allies to go to the summit if they don’t want to go. If they want it, we won’t be the obstacle, to put it mildly.

Gromyko: You have now worsened your position—a little bit worse. Before, you spoke lucidly; now you say it is only if your allies agree. We think United States should have a say in this and not just follow, just follow.

Kissinger: “Just follow” is not my style.

Up to now, the West European governments have used the formula that they will go to the summit “if the results of the Conference warrant”—even while it is perfectly clear what the outcome will be. We believe the probable outcome is sufficiently clear so that we will next week take formal soundings of what their view is. Then we will inform you, when we know concretely what their attitude is.

Gromyko: Good.

Kissinger: Because I suspect we will see each other before too long.

Gromyko: Very good.

I recently had discussions with the representatives of a difficult country at the European Security Conference. Guess which.

Kissinger: Romania, or France. [Laughter]

Gromyko: No. The Netherlands.

Kissinger: Oh, the cabaret! [Laughter] Will you try to get a cabaret in Moscow?

Gromyko: He said to me: “I believe the complications which existed until now will be overcome in the very near future.” He spoke of there being certain forward movement at the Conference in the recent period. Regarding the level of the third and final stage, he didn’t express himself definitely.

Kissinger: We didn’t want to take a formal sounding until the results would be more clear. My impression is the Europeans are a little more negative. There is no sense speculating, because in a week we will know. We are not bound by them.
Incidentally, our impression is also that things are moving forward at the Conference.

Gromyko: Let’s agree then that if, for example, one, two, three small countries—maybe the Netherlands—decide not to send their Head of Government or Head of State to the third stage, all right; every country will be free to decide whom to send at the highest level. But if the major countries decide to send their highest officials, we are free to do so. Why be slaves to our procedural structures? The President I know is accustomed to think in terms of big categories.

Kissinger: It is true that one or two or three won’t be able to veto, especially if they are the smaller ones. I agree with this general observation.

Gromyko: We are sympathetic with that idea. Brandt is. And even France.

Kissinger: That would be hard to verify.

Sonnenfeldt: By national means.

Gromyko: Pompidou was, and whoever wins will not go backward. And thank God China is not represented. Thank any God.

Kissinger: As I said in Moscow, I would think the chances are very good. Actually we have not taken concrete steps with our allies, but it is time to proceed.

Gromyko: Good. Now I think the time is more appropriate than before for you to do that—to get in touch with others. And not simply to compare yours with theirs.

Kissinger: But let us do it before your people ask them.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: My reaction is that West European judgments on the level will depend on their assessment of Basket III. Our view doesn’t depend on that to that degree. But I told you that in Moscow.

Gromyko: With the greatest of pleasure I would simply cut the bottom out of that third Basket, not because it is bad as such but because the questions in it have been inflated 100 times bigger than their real merits. The purpose of the Conference is to strengthen peace and security in Europe.

But I am sure there has been progress. In short, if all of these matters are tied in with the relevant principles and if it is indicated that the Basket doesn’t represent an attempt to interfere with the sovereignty, then the problem is solved. I think the main difficulty will be in the area of so-called military détente—as regards troop maneuvering, and so on.

Kissinger: On Basket III, on the issue of domestic legislation, we are making good progress and it seems to be reaching a solution. I mentioned it not because we won’t agree, but because for some West Europeans to go to the summit, the decision depends on what they can say is in Basket III. What are the issues? Art?
Hartman: We haven’t really started on the details yet.

Kissinger: But something short of the Dutch cabaret would help. But we will be constructive.

Gromyko: What we should do now is take up specific forms of words. We are not far from you on this. We have looked at your formula, the one you gave through Stoessel.3

Kissinger: That is the preamble. That I think we can bring to a close reasonably quickly. Then we should do the content. We should have Stoessel get together with Korniyenko.

Gromyko: It would be better not to waste time and to decide the matter between our two representatives here. Ours came with me and you say you are meeting with yours. We have our Deputy Prime Minister, and you have your man.

Kissinger: I agree. Art, why don’t you and Hal meet tomorrow morning with . . .

Sukhodrev: Kovalev.

Kissinger: When we are talking about the Middle East tomorrow. I agree.

Gromyko: I would like to ask you to look into the question of military détente once again. I recall what you said previously; it seemed reasonable. But there are some states in the Conference who are putting forth unreasonable proposals. Why don’t they just say they are out to wreck the Conference?

Kissinger: Tomorrow, on the preamble, our people should resolve how it is to be introduced.4

On military détente, I told you I would talk to the British about modifying their proposal.

Gromyko: What was their reaction?

Kissinger: Their reaction was not negative. They said at the time they needed time to study. We urged that they not insist on all of western Russia and not insist on the smallest types of units, but something like a division. And there is the issue of the number of days.

Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going through London Tuesday morning, and if you think this is a positive step, they can do it.

Gromyko: [referring to Sonnenfeldt] We shall certainly be expecting major results to come from his discussions with the British. All our eyes will be upon him.

Sonnenfeldt: You should talk to the neutrals, who are really the problem.

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3 See Document 185.
4 See Document 200.
Kissinger: Who? Sweden?
Hartman: Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: What is Monaco’s position? If you can assure me that the Princess is coming . . .

Gromyko: Your influence on the ladies is more limited now.
Kissinger: More covert.

Are there any other issues in the Security Conference of any major consequence?

Gromyko: The main issues with respect to military détente are the zones and the definition of large-scale troop movements. Because the tendency now is to define as large scale something that is negligible. We cannot adopt the scale of Monaco or Luxembourg.

Kissinger: We agree that on the zones, the definition proposed by some is too sweeping, and on the scale, a battalion is too small.

Gromyko: All right. Look into the matter and see what you can do. We certainly believe you can do much.

Kissinger: We will keep in touch, and we believe we can move in the direction we have indicated.

Gromyko: It would certainly be good if this entire question of the European Security Conference would be something we could see behind us. You can tell this to the President. Our cooperation since the beginning of the Conference has been on a rising scale, and this fact, that we could complete the Conference in that spirit, would give even further reliability.

Kissinger: What length of time do you foresee for Stage Three?

Gromyko: It should be short. We are open-minded. Brezhnev discussed it but never in terms of days.

Kissinger: Could we keep it to two days?

Gromyko: Two to three days.

Kissinger: Does everyone have to speak?

Gromyko: Two to three days.

Kissinger: It is not important, but psychologically. That is procedurally manageable. We can exchange ideas on this but I wanted to get your impression.

Gromyko: So you know our way of thinking.

Kissinger: And we will be in close touch with you.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Tohak 85. Deliver to Bremer/Rodman for the Secretary. Sonnenfeldt asked me to send you the following in this channel.

This is in regard to Secto 144\(^2\) and your caution not to get the confidence building issue resolved before the President’s trip. The CSCE situation is such that on several issues there seems little if any prospect that they will get resolved in the next several weeks.

On the Basket Three preamble we are getting close to a substantive resolution in our bilateral talks but there remains a total deadlock over the tactics of getting the compromise floated. In my talks with Soviet CSCE delegation head Kovalyev in Geneva\(^3\) he was rigid in rejecting any Soviet initiative in finding a “country X” that might be persuaded to introduce the compromise. We on the other hand simply must not risk having our own hand detected in this, at least in my judgment. Once a compromise is floated we should then of course expert our influence with the Allies to move toward it. The Soviets, incidentally told me in Geneva, that their plan once the compromise is on the table is to move toward it only very gradually, by first tabling a slight modification of their current position and slowly receding from it toward the compromise. Even assuming you can persuade Gromyko to find “country X” this whole process is likely to take time.

Secondly, there is the substance of Basket Three itself. The Soviets have yet to show their hand on precisely what content they are prepared to accept. This is bound to be less than what the Nine want. Hence there will be further haggling on this.

Third, as regards the CBMs the British will almost certainly move very slowly and the Soviets at the moment have a very rigid position, i.e. limited frontier zones for the notification areas, six days advance notice and only corps or army-size maneuvers to be notified. We will of course implement your instruction in Secto 144, but our problem with the British is that they interpreted your general endorsement of

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 216, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoly. Secret. Bremer forwarded the message, along with other briefing materials, to Kissinger on May 7.

\(^2\) Not found.

\(^3\) No record of this conversation has been found.
their approach on March 28 as constituting full backing for it. In fact, you only told them that their approach is a good basis once the geographic area and unit size issues has been settled.

Fourth, the whole question of follow-on machinery has not even been broached yet in Geneva and it will undoubtedly take some time to resolve.

In sum, our problem is almost certainly not that of getting issues solved too fast but rather that of having a number of them still open when the President goes to Moscow and his being put under pressure from Brezhnev to get them solved.

Our whole position on CSCE has become rather ironic. We were always the most skeptical and yet today we seem to have become the key to success in both Soviet and West European eyes. The Soviets, evidently calculating that the President is eager for a successful summit finale, constantly badger us to get matters moving and we have to some extent encouraged this. The Nine meanwhile, having discovered that their earlier enthusiasm for this conference was misplaced and being increasingly subjected to domestic criticism about it, want us to use our clout with the Soviets to obtain results that will look good in European parliaments. Failing that, they are trying to position themselves in a way that a disappointing result, especially if consecrated at the summit level, can be attributed to US-Soviet connivance and the President’s “success.” Yet the stark fact is that now as before there is nothing of consequence in this exercise for us except to the degree that we can use the maneuvering about it for other purposes with the Soviets.

My own judgment would be that we ought not to extend ourselves much further beyond our efforts to get a tolerable Basket Three arrangement and to bring the CBM positions closer, and that we should do nothing further that might result in our being out ahead on the summit issue. The main point remains to get this operation over with as soon as feasible, if necessary with essentially minimal results and at Foreign Ministers level. I see little to commend the Brimelow view that since the Soviets are eager to get the summit we should use this to extort major Soviet concessions. We will not get such concessions—especially if the Soviets think that they can get a summit anyway—and even if we did they would merely be the source of subsequent disputes. Moreover, I see no reason why we should do the extorting, as

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4 A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Callaghan and Brimelow on March 28 is in National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 7; Nodis Memcons, Mar. 1974, Folder 5.
the Europeans seem to think we should. Finally, the sooner this conference ends the quicker we will remove a source of increasing irritation with the Allies for essentially a worthless cause. And on top of that, Hyland and I are both persuaded that we will not get the Soviets to move on MBFR until the CSCE is out of the way.

What all this argues for is that we proceed as we are doing until the President’s Moscow trip; that on the occasion we avoid as much as we can further commitments to move the Europeans; and that after the summit we let matters take their course toward a fairly prompt and substantively modest conclusion.

I apologize for the length of this message but I wanted to give you my perspective on this matter before your next meeting with Gromyko. Art and I are sending you a front channel message with talking points and other pertinent material.5

5 Telegram Tosec 296/92763 to Jerusalem, May 6, is in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 216, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy.

203. Memorandum of Conversation1

Nicosia, May 7, 1974, 12:30–3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo, Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Mikhail D. Sytenco, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Minister Gromyko
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Sergei T. Astavin, Soviet Ambassador to Cyprus
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador at Large

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 71, Gromyko 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place at the Presidential Palace. Kissinger was in Nicosia to discuss the Middle East and U.S.-Soviet relations with Gromyko.
September 1973–May 1974 619

Ambassador Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Middle East; CSCE; SALT; ABM and Test Ban; Bilateral Agreements

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Gromyko: All right. On European matter, anything new?
Kissinger: On European matters? First, let’s talk about the European Security Conference. As I understand it, what is holding up agreement on Basket III is the notion of what country should advance it.\(^2\) I understand it will be Country X, say Finland. We will accept whatever solution Country X proposes but we do not want to propose it.

Gromyko: Do you have any idea?
Kissinger: We think perhaps Finland. We have no later reports?
Sisco: No.
Gromyko: Maybe Finland.
Kissinger: Maybe the German situation will affect it. I do not know whether Brandt will not change his mind.

Gromyko: All I have is factual information.
Kissinger: Yes. I have information that he sent in his resignation.\(^3\)
Gromyko: And it was accepted.
Kissinger: They have to designate someone by the 15th.
Gromyko: All right, maybe Finland, maybe Finland. Somebody should approach them.

You think in your and my absence from Geneva, our people did something?
Kissinger: No. Why don’t we have Sonnenfeldt and Hartman work out the tactics of who will approach them? Maybe the Netherlands.

Gromyko: I had a conversation with their Foreign Minister. I had the impression that the weakest part of his position is the Third Basket and the level of the third stage—especially the level. I do not know why; he did not give any reason. He said “Difficult, difficult.” I know other countries have difficulties, but he did not develop this idea. At the end, he told me at the airport that he would look into the matter we discussed and it probably would be resolved. In this general form, he described it.

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\(^3\) On May 7, Brandt resigned as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Kissinger: We have one other tactical problem with Basket III, Mr. Foreign Minister. When Kovalev talked with Sonnenfeldt and Hartman, he adopted the tactic somewhat borrowed from our Geneva discussion—to start with a proposal somewhat less favorable than the position we agreed on, and then the Soviet Union would make concessions. But if we choose Country X, we would have to give them more or less the same language.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union were to do it, we would play it like the Berlin negotiations, and move slowly towards it.

Gromyko: We would prefer the third—Country X.

Kissinger: We would prefer the third. How shall we do it?

Gromyko: What do you think?

Kissinger: Our idea is maybe you should approach Finland. But let me check in Washington how to proceed. It is a bureaucratic problem. I will let you know by the end of the week. Through Dobrynin.

Gromyko: Or your Ambassador.

Kissinger: But Sonnenfeldt knows the details. Let me sum up our understanding: that Country X will be Finland, that you will approach it, and we will support it. We may not come right out and say we support it, but you will understand. We do not want to appear to be pressuring our allies.

Korniyenko: It is not just the preamble, but some of the details in administration.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Gromyko: Please look at the matter of military détente.

Kissinger: That is what I wanted to tell you next. Sonnenfeldt saw Callaghan. They were rather difficult. I will see Callaghan either on the way back to Washington, or on the 21st in Washington when he comes for the CENTO Conference. Not later than 21st will I see Callaghan; not later than the 23rd I will get in touch with you.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: On this I think I can be helpful.

On the substance of Basket III, there is one other matter. On the basis of our discussion at Geneva, we began consulting with our allies on the level of stage three.

Gromyko: You consulted?

Kissinger: We began the process. As you may know, it seems that

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4 No record of this conversation has been found.
most Europeans are now opposed to a summit; they say it depends on the substance of Basket III. But on my personal judgment, Brandt was, of all European leaders, the most favorable to a summit. My instinct is Schmidt will be less favorable. What Giscard’s view is, I have no way of knowing—I haven’t even studied it.

As far as the substance of Basket III, the United States has never pressed you on it. I would not even know what it would look like. We have never even submitted a paper on it, have we, Korniyenko?

Korniyenko: No.

Kissinger: So this is a purely tactical question. Our position is not to oppose it, and to create a climate for it.

Gromyko: I do not see why Schmidt or Giscard would oppose it.

Kissinger: It is not a question of opposing it. Brandt I felt was inclined towards it and at an appropriate moment would have moved in that direction.

Gromyko: You have not finished the process?

Kissinger: No, we only began. With Britain, and Holland.

Gromyko: What is Britain’s view?

Kissinger: Reserved. But dependent on Basket III. \(^5\) I do not know what good substance would be. I have never studied it. I do not think there is a United States view. I know the substance of Basket III has never been discussed.

Korniyenko: A great number of papers have been submitted.

Kissinger: But there has been no negotiation on it.

Korniyenko: Not yet.

Kissinger: I am in no position to be helpful here. I will immediately ask my associates what in their judgment good substance would be to make the Europeans more cooperative.

Gromyko: Just 5–6 pages.

Kissinger: It is not going to be a formal U.S. proposal just our judgment. I will make it a formal U.S. proposal, if you . . . I will send it to you for your comment.

Gromyko: It is not needed to be a U.S. proposal.

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\(^5\) During a meeting between Kissinger and Callaghan in London on March 28, Brimelow said: “On the subject of the level of the III CSCE stage. We have been saying that the level should depend on the progress made in the II stage. As Dr. Kissinger points out, there is no agreement on the level of progress. There is only one set of papers on the table. The question is whether the USSR will hold the line firmly on Basket III. We have doubted whether they will make sufficient concessions.” (Memorandum of conversation, March 28; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 7, Nodis Memcons, Mar. 1974, Folder 5)
Kissinger: I am in the embarrassing position that if you now asked me what we wanted, I couldn’t tell you. But in my judgment, that is the key to the European view of the summit, the substance of the third point. You know my view on it, several times.

Gromyko: The question of peace and war is reduced to: “Mr. Smith should marry Mrs. Brown and should be allowed to meet and complete it in a specified period of time.” The question of war and peace!

Kissinger: You have proved your ability to stay in control of your country for sixty years.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Basket III, May–December 1974

204. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State
Kissinger in Jerusalem

Washington, May 18, 1974, 0032Z.

Tosec 764/104436. Subject: CSCE: Discussion with Dobrynin
on Basket 3. Ref: Jerusalem 897 (Secto 446). From Sonnenfeldt and
Hartman.

1. In response to your request, this message gives our reading of
an acceptable outcome under Basket 3. It provides suggested talking
points for your use with Dobrynin, and inventories for your back-
ground Allied and Eastern positions on the most sensitive topics.

2. With regard to our approach, we think it would be prudent to
make clear to Dobrynin that we are not in a position to “deliver” our
Allies with respect to the content of Basket 3 texts, but will do our best
to facilitate compromise.

3. Suggested talking points for your use with Dobrynin:
—Our “thoughts” on the content of Basket 3 are necessarily col-
cored by what we feel our Allies will find acceptable. In advancing our
thoughts, we do so with the caution that they may have to be adjusted
to the views of our Allies, although we will seek to be helpful in as-
sisting in the emergence of compromise formulations.

—Against that background, we believe the final package under
Basket 3 must include liberally worded declaratory texts pledging par-
ticipants to (a) facilitate family reunification and visits, and (b) improve
dissemination of and access to foreign books and publications. These
will be indispensable to overall success of CSCE.

—Moreover, we believe that agreement on three or four of the fol-
lowing matters should be reflected in Basket 3:

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Of-

fice Files, Box 69, Country Files, Soviet Union, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 21. Secret; Im-
mediate; Nodis. Drafted by Streator, cleared by Hartman and Deputy Executive Secretary
William H. Luers, and approved by Sonnenfeldt.

2 In telegram Secto 446/897 from Jerusalem, May 15, Kissinger wrote to Sonnen-
feldt and Hartman: “The understanding Dobrynin has of my talks on Basket III is es-
sentially correct. I did agree that we would try to work out some ‘top of our head’ type
ideas on Basket III. You should work up some thoughts along these lines and forward
them to me for my consideration. Tell Dobrynin that I will discuss our thoughts with
him after my return.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box
Cl 216, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological File)
—A code of conduct pledging improved working conditions for journalists;
—Acceptance in principle of freer contacts for religious purposes;
—Some indication of willingness to permit opening of foreign libraries and reading rooms in several cities in all CSCE participant states;
—General language on stimulating freer travel, including statements on giving to citizens of all participating states facilities allowing them to travel more freely and on the general principle of freer movement;
—Indication of willingness to reduce internal travel controls, along lines of extending the recent relaxation of controls on foreign diplomatic travel in the USSR to journalists, businessmen, and others;
—Language on cessation of radio jamming, which could be interpreted as an assurance that jamming of official broadcasts in vernacular languages (VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle) would not be resumed.

—On all of the above issues, we believe the texts should be generally worded, establishing a political and moral obligation on participants, but not entailing binding commitments to specific and detailed courses of action.

End talking points.

4. Background: An “acceptable” outcome under Basket 3 will depend upon what Western governments believe they can successfully portray to their parliaments and public opinion as constituting, or foreshadowing some tangible improvement over present Eastern practices. A judgment now of how Western European political leaders will gauge the temper of public attitudes on this issue is necessarily tentative. Undoubtedly the Western Europeans will press for language in Basket 3 texts that implies an element of automaticity, while the Warsaw Pact countries will insist on formulas that would leave everything in the hands of national authorities. In the US, Basket 3 issues have so far attracted little attention. However, we can anticipate considerable congressional and public interest in the CSCE text on family reunification.

5. In addition to the key Basket 3 issues, set out below, we expect voluminous further drafting on less controversial matters, particularly cultural and educational exchanges, which will have little impact on Western public opinion. However, the sheer bulk of the texts on topics of secondary importance will slow drafting work and add to Moscow’s sense of frustration.

6. Key issues: Allied and Eastern positions. The following are the likely key topics, which are discussed in more detail below:

A. Human contacts:
—family visits;
—reunification of families;
—relaxation of other travel controls (e.g. lowering of restrictions on exit visas and reduction of closed zones).
B. Freer flow of information and ideas:

—better working conditions for journalists;
—freer dissemination of foreign books and publications;
—cessation of radio jamming;
—contacts for religious purposes (a Vatican proposal on this subject cuts across both areas of human contacts and freer flow of information and ideas).

7. Family visits—we expect a generally satisfactory outcome here. The Soviets have already acquiesced in provisional registration of a text that would pledge governments to relax restrictions on temporary family visits. Ultimate agreement on the remaining bracketed portions should not prove too difficult.

8. Family reunification—the FRG and Canada have shown the greatest interest in this issue, which has not yet been squarely joined in the Geneva discussions. The FRG and others will urge agreement on a liberally phrased code of conduct on this issue. This is a major issue for the West, and the Soviets will need to make some concessions.

9. Relaxation of exit controls—a UK proposal on tourism would have participants undertake to give “their citizens all the necessary facilities to travel freely...,” and the Danes have tabled a paper with introductory language for measures aimed at stimulating freer travel containing a straightforward statement on the general principle of freer movement. This issue has less political appeal in the West than the question of family-related travel, but some Soviet give will be needed, and clearly the current Western positions will need to be watered down.

10. Relaxation of internal travel controls—a Belgian proposal calls for a reduction of closed zones, without prejudice to the right to forbid access to security areas. However, the Western countries have not yet pressed the point forcefully. The Soviets recently eased restrictions on travel by foreign officials in the USSR and may make a comparable gesture for non-official travelers, but they will resist explicit CSCE undertakings on this.

11. Dissemination of foreign books and publications—the Italians, Dutch and Swiss have tabled texts calling for relaxation of censorship and controls on books and periodicals. A French proposal would have participants pledge “to encourage the creation of sales outlets for foreign books” in major cities and the opening within their territory of libraries and reading rooms by other participant governments. The Soviets will resist these proposals.

12. Working conditions for journalists—the FRG and Switzerland have tabled texts in Geneva that would have the participants accept a liberally-phrased code of conduct on this subject. Moscow may eventually agree to mildly positive language and perhaps make small adjustments in actual practices. It will be difficult, however, to get
Soviet agreement to anything that the Western press corps would consider very significant. But we should try.

13. Freedom of assembly for religious purposes—a Vatican proposal cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and calls for individual and collective religious contacts within and among participant countries. Vatican representatives are enrolling co-sponsors, and we should seek some Soviet concessions here.

14. Cessation of radio jamming—the Swiss proposal already cited also calls on participants to “guarantee unhindered reception of radio and television programs originating in other participating states.” It would now apply only to the jamming of RL and RFE since the Soviets, last September, unilaterally stopped the jamming of broadcasts in vernacular languages by VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle. Further significant progress in this area is unlikely, although several Western countries may press for language like that in the Swiss text as a hedge against a later resumption of Eastern jamming of official broadcasts.

15. Even though Soviets have indicated they wish to deal with substance of Basket III in Geneva (Tosec 667),3 we assume it would still be useful for you to convey to Dobrynin “our thoughts” after your return.4

Rush

3 Not found.
4 No record of Kissinger’s meeting with Dobrynin has been found.

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205. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State

Kissinger in Jerusalem

Washington, May 23, 1974, 0054Z.

Tosec 936/107929. Subject: CSCE: Confidence-building measures (CBM’s). From Sonnenfeldt and Hartman.

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1. Our Allies and the Soviets are still firmly dug in on this issue, which is thus stalemates at CSCE. Both sides want us to help break the impasse, and we need your guidance on next steps.

2. You will recall that, after your conversation with Gromyko in Geneva, we told Ramsbotham here in low key on May 2 (Tosec 224) of the need for the UK to show more flexibility on the criteria for pre-announcement of maneuvers. In our discussion, Ramsbotham mentioned your conversation with Callaghan March 28 and claimed that you had given a general blessing to the UK approach to CBM’s. He added that Callaghan has reviewed the UK position and wanted US support for a meaningful CBM on maneuvers. He asked explicitly that we be less taciturn on this issue at Geneva. The British are still willing ultimately to drop prior notification of major troop movements, as a tradeoff against some Soviet give on maneuvers.

3. On May 22, Von Staden approached us here under instructions and made a strong request for a substantive CBM on maneuvers, leaving a lengthy paper which in summary made the following points:

Begin summary of FRG paper: For the FRG, a satisfactory solution of the CBM issue is essential for an overall satisfactory result of stage II. The extent of Soviet territory included within the zone of prior notification of maneuvers remains the essential criterion. Other aspects of the measure are of less importance. The starting point for negotiations on area should remain “in Europe.” However, the FRG would ultimately accept a wide band of Soviet territory, extending 700–500 kilometers from the western frontier of the USSR.

The German position on the area of application of CBMs relates above all to the likely application of stabilizing and other collateral measures in MBFR. These will apply exclusively to states in the NATO guideline area and will therefore focus on the FRG. Bonn wishes to avoid the creation of zones in Europe with a special political status. If CSCE CBMs apply to a considerable portion of Soviet territory, this would counterbalance, in its political effect, the narrower application of MBFR stabilizing measures. FRG willingness to accept commitments

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2 Tosec 224, March 1, deals with an unrelated matter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.) No record of the conversation with Ramsbotham has been found. For the record of Kissinger’s meeting with Gromyko in Geneva, see Document 201.


4 Telegram 107909 to Vienna for the Delegation to MBFR, May 24, contains a record of Von Staden’s conversation with Sonnenfeldt and Hartman, along with the complete text of the FRG’s paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)
to MBFR stabilizing and other measures “which subject the NATO guideline area and by this the FRG territory to special political obligations will not fail to be influenced by a satisfactory solution of the CBM problem in Geneva.” Moreover, preannouncement of maneuvers should be given, not only to neighboring states, but to all CSCE participants.

FRG is aware that the US will continue to oppose advance notification of troop movements. FRG could eventually agree to drop CBM on movements if geographical area of maneuver CBM could be established according to German interests. We realize that these interests can hardly be accomplished without active American support in Geneva. We therefore emphatically request that the American Government support this CBM position. *End summary.*

4. Meanwhile, on May 15, Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich made a long statement in Geneva reiterating the minimalist Soviet position on the maneuver CBM, emphasizing that CSCE agreements in this area should not undermine the military balance in Europe. This reflects, our delegation believes, an underlying fear that the Western side is seeking, through CBMs, intelligence information on Soviet military activities. Mendelevich added that, if détente flourishes over the next 5–7 years, the content of the maneuver CBM could be strengthened.

5. Specifically, Mendelevich said that preannouncement should be limited to army or army corps maneuvers in border zones, the width of which could be negotiated. Five days advance notification would be given to neighboring states in most cases, but to all CSCE participants in the case of multilateral maneuvers.

6. In this chicken-egg situation, if we do nothing the issue will remain deadlocked in Geneva, and we can expect continuing and conflicting pressures from the Soviets on one side and the British on the other. While you have told us you do not wish this resolved before the Moscow summit, we will have need to continue to try to work out with Callaghan an approach that comes to grips with the problem. But, we believe that to prime the pump we need to play a more active role now entailing essentially the following scenario:

A. Instruct our delegation in Geneva to give more positive support to the UK/FRG position on maneuvers repeat maneuvers.

B. Meanwhile, reassure the Soviets privately that our higher profile in Geneva on this issue is the indispensable prerequisite to per-

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5 Telegram 3060 from Geneva, May 16, which reported on Mendelevich’s statement and the Western delegations’ reaction, is ibid.
suading the British and Germans to lower their sights somewhat on the specific points of contention.

C. Reiterate to the Soviets, at the same time, that they too must make concessions if the CBM issue is to be resolved.

7. If you approve the foregoing scenario, we would propose to make the following points to Dobrynin here (alternatively, Stoessel could make them to Korniyenko in Moscow or Sherer to Kovalyev in Geneva).

A. Following your discussion with Gromyko in Geneva, we approached the British and suggested they should be more flexible and realistic with respect to the criteria governing preannouncements of maneuvers.

B. Our impression, however, is that the British are reviewing their position, but are unlikely to make significant concessions until they are persuaded that the Soviets will meet them part way.

C. We believe our other Allies will continue to support the British on this: specifically, the FRG is opposed to limiting the area for preannouncements to narrow bands along frontiers and also believes preannouncements should be made to all CSCE participants.

D. Ambassador Mendelevich’s firm reiteration of the minimalist Soviet position in Geneva on May 15 has probably stiffened the Allied attitudes.

E. Meanwhile, our major Allies are urging us to be more outspoken in Geneva in support of the UK proposal on preannouncements of maneuvers.

F. We, therefore, will instruct our delegation to make a statement in Geneva giving general support to the UK proposal on preannouncements of maneuvers, a step we believe is indispensable if we are ultimately to persuade the British, Germans and others to move toward compromise.

G. After our delegation has spoken in Geneva, we will continue our attempts to bring our Allies to accept reasonable compromises on the outstanding issues. However, we are not confident of success unless the Soviets also show willingness to compromise.

H. If asked for our views about the shape of a possible compromise we would propose to tell Soviets that we think the following criteria for preannouncements of maneuvers would be ultimately acceptable: thirty days advance notice, given to all CSCE participants, of maneuvers at level of reinforced division or higher on territory of all European participants in CSCE, including USSR, though announcements of maneuvers in USSR would cover only those taking place within, say, 700 kilometers of the western frontier of the USSR.
8. You will also have seen Geneva 3226, which we just received. It reflects the deep pessimism among the delegations of the Nine at Geneva, who may recommend a joint démarche by the Nine to the Soviets indicating that unless progress can be made soon on Basket III and CBMs the Nine would be prepared to adjourn CSCE phase II, possibly in July, either sine die or until some specified time (no date given) in the future. This kind of sentiment, which doubtless is widely shared in Western European capitals, will incline the Allies to further dig in, unless the Soviets shortly take some forthcoming steps with regard to Basket III and CBMs. While we have made our concern clear to the Soviets about the likely result of their continued foot dragging, we believe it would be timely for us to reiterate to the Soviets that Western and neutral dissatisfaction with their recent behavior at CSCE could result in a serious setback at CSCE, which is likely to be portrayed, particularly by the Western European press, as a major failure of East-West diplomacy. If you agree, we would plan to inform Dobrynin of our concern soonest, reporting to him the current mood of the Nine as reflected in Geneva 3226.

Rush

6 Telegram 3226 from Geneva, May 22, reported: “EC-Nine delegation heads here are in process of drafting report to political directors, for consideration at EC-Nine political committee meeting in Bonn May 27–28. Soviet intransigence over past weeks has led Nine delegations to a deeply pessimistic appraisal of the current state of CSCE negotiations. We now understand Nine delegation heads may recommend to political directors that they be authorized to make joint démarche to Soviets, indicating that unless progress can be made soon on Basket III and military subjects, the Nine would be prepared simply to adjourn CSCE phase two, possibly in July. This adjournment could be either sine die, or until some unspecified time in the future. While the Nine delegation heads have not yet put their ideas on paper and are still considering a broad spectrum of ideas on presentation and emphasis, they appear to be unanimous in favoring a strong démarche of some kind.” (Ibid.)
206. Memorandum of Conversation

Damascus, May 28/29, 1974, midnight–12:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief of USA Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

SUBJECTS
Syrian-Israeli Disengagement; Palestinians; CSCE; SALT

CSCE
Secretary Kissinger: How about our bilateral relationships? I see the Finns have introduced the proposal that we talked about in Cyprus.2

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I don’t know whether they have introduced it.

Secretary Kissinger: I gather the tactics were worked out in Washington.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I do not believe it has been introduced yet.
Secretary Kissinger: We will help manage it. We are having a lot of trouble with the Europeans regarding the Summit. I have sent a letter recently.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Personalities in Europe have changed. I hope you will do something.

Secretary Kissinger: We will move it along as I told you we would when we spoke in Geneva.3

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We have not approached either the French or the new Chancellor of Germany.

Secretary Kissinger: We approached Scheel, Callaghan,4 and a number of others individually. So far we have not had a very positive response.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I can’t say that the French took a negative stance. We haven’t approached them. I think this new government will be more flexible.

Secretary Kissinger: So was Brandt.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Definitely. I don’t see how Schmidt and Giscard can take a more negative stance.

Secretary Kissinger: I have exchanged personal letters with them. They are good friends.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

3 See Document 201.
4 Kissinger’s letter to Scheel is in telegram Secto 21/2643 from Geneva, April 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850071–2338) Kissinger’s letter to Callaghan is in telegram Secto 22/2644 from Geneva, April 29. (Ibid., P850071–2340)
SUBJECT

Report on Secretary Kissinger’s Middle East Trip and President’s Forthcoming Trips to the Middle East and USSR

Kissinger: On SALT, maybe an agreement in principle is possible.

On MBFR...

President: Which would have enormous domestic impact.

Kissinger: ... a 5% US-Soviet cut is conceivable.

President: We should lay the groundwork with the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: That could give minor problems with the Europeans. The Soviet Union is waiting to see how CSCE works out. We are holding up CSCE until you get to Moscow.

Maybe you can get something in MBFR for CSCE.

President: We want to show new progress on MBFR to avert unilateral cuts here.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

208. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stabler) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CSCE: “The Laws and Customs” Issue in Basket 3

_The Finns tabled in Geneva on June 5 two proposals which broadly conform with the prior US-Soviet understanding for dealing with this issue. However, contrary to Dobrynin’s earlier suggestion that further contacts take place only in Washington or Moscow, the second-ranking Soviet delegate in Geneva, Dubinin, approached Sherer directly, saying_

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet-Summit-1974. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Streator and sent through Sonnenfeldt. In a covering note, Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger: “For your meeting with Dobrynin, I am attaching revised materials on CSCE to reflect late developments, as well as updates on bilateral matters.”
that the operation had been set in motion and that it was now up to
the US delegation to ensure its success. Dubinin added that “the scale
of the means used to achieve the objective should match the scale on
which the agreement had been reached.” (Geneva 3582 at Tab B)²

Sherer, who is not fully privy to our talks with the Soviets on this mat-
ter, needs instructions on next steps, and we propose sending him the
guidance at Tab A.³

Discussion

The two Finnish proposals tabled in Geneva on June 5 are the
following:

—An amendment to the paragraph on the principle of non-
intervention which provides that participants will “respect the political,
economic and cultural foundations of other participating states as well
as their right to determine their own legislative and regulatory systems.”

—An amendment to the Finnish draft basket 3 preamble reading as
follows: “Convinced that cooperation conducive to creating better
conditions for increased cultural and educational exchanges, for
broader dissemination of information, for contacts between people, and
for the solution of humanitarian problems should take place in full re-
spect for the principles defined in the document on the principles guiding re-
lations among the participating states.” (This replaces a similar but less
satisfactory Finnish formulation earlier tabled in CSCE that we cabled
to you in Jerusalem; we do not know why the Finns revised it.)⁴

These texts follow the general lines of our understanding with the So-
viets, but with the following points of difference:

—We told the Soviets we could support language on respect for
“legislative and regulatory systems,” provided it appeared in the sover-
eignty and not the non-intervention paragraph of the principles declara-
tion. We pointed out that we proposed to the Allies last November in
Geneva a comparable approach in the non-intervention paragraph but
they rejected it. Therefore, we preferred to try it out in the sovereignty
paragraph this time.

—We did not agree to support the formula, “respect the political,
economic and cultural foundations of other participating states.”

The Soviets may have deliberately added some negotiating fat to the
proposal which they may agree to trim off later. Possibly, too, they may
themselves propose shifting the “legislative and regulatory systems” lan-
guage from the non-intervention to the sovereignty paragraph.

EC Nine delegations at Geneva caucused after the Finnish proposal was
tabled and decided that the language on “legislative and regulatory systems”

² Telegram 3582 from Geneva, June 6, is attached but not printed.
³ The attachment is a draft version of Document 210.
⁴ Not found.
was absolutely out of the question," a position echoed by some neutral delegations. While we had expected an adverse reaction, Western European irritation has been compounded by several weeks of Soviet stalling on basket 3. They see the Soviet hand behind the Finnish move and interpret it as another sign of Moscow’s obstinacy in basket 3.

The Agreed Scenario

After lengthy discussions in Moscow and Washington, you approved and we conveyed to Dobrynin here on May 13 our agreement to a scenario, outlined below. Dobrynin later told us Moscow agreed to our scenario, entailing the following steps:

1. The Finns tabled the proposal in Geneva.
2. The Soviet side indicates its reaction in CSCE. (The Soviets have not yet reacted to the Finnish package.)
3. US delegation initially remains silent or noncommittal on the Finnish package.
4. At an early meeting of the NATO caucus the US argues in favor of the Finnish compromise. (We told Dobrynin that our success at this point will depend heavily on the progress being made on basket 3 substance and that the Allies, despite our best efforts, will bracket the Finnish language on baskets 1 and 3 pending agreement on specific substantive issues in basket 3).
5. If appropriate, US supports the compromise in NAC discussions. (We originally had in mind possible discussions in the NAC in permanent session. Because of the delay in getting the Finnish proposal on the table, the first occasion for NAC discussion is likely to arise at the Ottawa Ministerial.)
6. Pause for reflection. (We pointed out that the Allies will want to give the Finnish proposal careful consideration in capitals and will need a reasonable amount of time to digest the issue.)
7. Next steps. (If, as is possible, Allied CSCE delegations remain opposed, we would be prepared to pursue further steps to obtain acceptance of the compromise, including bilateral approaches if appropriate.)
8. At a later stage, we would speak in favor of the Finnish proposal in CSCE. (We would also, if appropriate, point to the need for concrete results in basket 3 to balance our support for the Finnish proposal.)

5 Telegram 3582 from Geneva (attached) reported that “Swiss delegate said he saw no possibility that phrase on ‘legislative and regulatory systems’ would be accepted by EC-Nine or some neutrals.” The telegram continued: “NATO caucus on principles discussed Finnish initiative afternoon of June 5, following EC-Nine caucus on same subject. Nine had decided that Finnish proposal for language on ‘legislative and regulatory systems’ was ‘absolutely out of the question.’ ”
We added to Dobrynin, pursuant to your instructions, that we will carry out fully our part of the understanding to achieve Allied agreement.

Based on the scenario, above, the next move is up to the Soviets; they should indicate in Geneva their reaction to the Finnish proposal. We should also disabuse them of the idea, which Dubinin reflected in his conversation with Sherer, that it is now up to the US to bring this matter to a successful conclusion. As we pointed out on several occasions to Dobrynin during the May 13 conversation, our success in gaining Allied acceptance of this compromise approach will depend on the progress being made in Geneva on basket 3 substance, and this will entail Soviet concessions.

If our delegation jumps into the fray too quickly in Geneva, the Allies will suspect a prior US-Soviet understanding and stiffen their opposition to the Finnish proposal. Moreover, given the current Geneva atmosphere of smoldering Western resentment at Soviet tactics on basket three, we believe Sherer’s initial approach to this issue in the NATO caucus should be in very low key.

Finally, we doubt that we can make much progress with the Allies on this, in the immediate future, at delegation level in Geneva. However, the issue will very likely arise at the Ottawa Ministerial, giving you an opportunity to urge your colleagues to reflect on the possibilities for a reasonable compromise based on the Finnish proposal, and entailing Soviet concessions on issues in basket 3. We anticipate that your persuasive efforts would then be reflected in instructions from Allied capitals to NATO delegation heads in Geneva, leading to more realistic attitudes there.

Recommendation

That you approve the instructions at Tab A.6

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6 There is no indication of Kissinger’s approval or disapproval, but he did approve the instructions; see Document 210. Also see Document 209.
209. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt)\(^1\)

Washington, June 7, 1974, 6:35 p.m.

K: Hal, one other thing on that CSCE matter. Sheerer (phonetic) [Sherer] claimed he had no instructions. Which may be true. Now I’ve cleared the instructions you’ve given me here,\(^2\) out I wanted to make it a little clearer that he can talk to the NATO caucus and support it, but he also ought to suppose [oppose?\(] it at the conference.

S: Well, he’ll be alone.

K: First, he has to talk to the NATO caucus.

S: Well, that’s what we promised to do and that’s what he’ll be instructed to go ahead and do now.

K: Good. But in the sense of producing an agreement.

S: Yes. As soon as that goes out, he’ll do that. He wasn’t instructed because . . .

K: Yes, but he [was?] supposed to take an active role in getting agreement.

S: Yes, he wasn’t instructed because . . .

K: And he will do that within a day or two of getting his instructions.

S: In the NATO caucus?

K: Yes.

S: He’ll start doing it there.

K: And he will inform then the Soviet person there of where we stand.

S: He’ll keep them informed.

K: OK, good, thank you.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 26, Chronological File. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Kissinger is apparently referring to a draft version of Document 210.
Washington, June 8, 1974, 1536Z.

121749. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 preamble. Geneva eyes only for Ambassador Sherer. Ref: Geneva 3582. 2

1. You should take no action on the Finnish proposals in Baskets 1 and 3 until the Soviets have commented on them in appropriate CSCE committees. You may tell Soviet delegation that you have firm instructions on this point, which are in precise conformity with understanding reached between our two governments. You should add that, after the Soviets have reacted, you plan to argue in favor of the Finnish proposal at an early NATO caucus meeting. In that connection, you should reiterate that our ultimate success in persuading the Allies to accept this approach will depend heavily on progress with respect to specific issues in Basket 3, thus contesting Dubinin’s suggestion to you that success of this undertaking now depends entirely on US efforts. You should say that need for progress on specific Basket 3 issues was made very clear to Soviet representatives when we conveyed to them our proposals for dealing with this issue.

2. After Soviet delegation has taken position on Finnish proposal in CSCE, you should give it very general and low-key support in a NATO caucus meeting, and in private discussions with chiefs of key NATO delegations, where you could make following general points:

—We understand and support the Allied wish for progress in the Basket 3 area, although realistically we must not set our sights too high;

—This is obviously a sensitive ideological issue for Moscow, and it may turn out that the Soviets will be somewhat more generous on Basket 3 issues if they can point to language that protects their doctrinal position;

—Thus it is possible that the Finnish proposal can help move us toward Basket 3 solution acceptable to all sides;

—At the same time, we agree that the Soviets, for their part, should begin to move toward Western positions on Basket 3 specifics, and have been pressing them on this point.


2 See footnote 2, Document 208.
3. You should then report fully on Allied reactions and the general state of play in Geneva and await further instructions.

4. **FYI only.** We conveyed to Dobrynin here on May 13 a suggested scenario for handling this issue in CSCE, and Dobrynin later indicated Moscow’s agreement. Dobrynin also expressed preference for continuing US-Soviet contacts on this issue either in Moscow or in Washington. Soviet delegation in Geneva therefore may not be fully informed on understanding reached.

5. Agreed scenario provided that, after Finns table proposals in Geneva, following initial steps would be taken in sequence:
   A. Soviet side would comment, in CSCE, on Finnish texts. (We indicated our understanding that the USSR might wish to register initial opposition to Finnish proposal before agreeing to fall back to it.)
   B. US delegation initially would remain silent or noncommittal on the Finnish proposal, to avoid arousing suspicions of a prior US-Soviet understanding.
   C. Later, at a meeting of the NATO caucus, we would argue in favor of the Finnish compromise. (We told Dobrynin that we expected initial Allied resistance and that the success of the operation at this point will probably depend on progress being made in discussions on Basket 3.)

5. Regarding the substance of the Finnish proposal, we agreed with the Soviets that the specific language on respect for “legislative and regulatory systems” should go in the sovereignty, not the nonintervention, paragraph of the principles declaration. Furthermore, we did not agree to support the formula in the Finnish text referring to respect for “the political, economic and cultural foundations of other participating states.” In contrast, the Finnish Basket 3 preambular language is in conformity with the US-Soviet understanding. **End FYI.**

Kissinger
Moscow, undated.

I would like to express to you, dear Mr. President, some considerations regarding the situation that is shaping up at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We shall certainly touch on this theme during our forthcoming talks in Moscow. However, in view of the urgency of this issue it is useful even now, in our opinion, to exchange views on it.

The completion of the Conference has been unjustifiedly delayed. The deliberations in Geneva have been going on extremely slow, sometimes the proceedings are being bogged down in trivia. It looks like the trivia overshadows the principal mission of the Conference, i.e. to consolidate the relaxation of tensions in Europe and beyond, to provide for peace and reliable security, which are the only conditions that can make a wide-range cooperation between the states in various fields possible. Sometimes we are confronted with proposals—I would like to note at once that they come not from the US—which are either plainly unacceptable or are not yet ripe for a decision, while the discussions on them result in unproductive waste of efforts and time. Some people start talking to the effect that the work of the Conference should be suspended for the summer or even for a longer period of time.

The Conference has been going on already for almost a year. Practically all the questions under discussion have been thoroughly reviewed, many of them several times over. On a number of aspects, including some major and important ones, agreement has been reached among all the participants with the balance of interests of the sides being found, and those interests are of course far from being homogeneous. We view that as an encouraging basis for the final success of the Conference.

As for the still unresolved questions, it appeared here with adequate certainty as well what was common in the positions of the participants and where they differ. Actually it is clear to everyone which proposals can be accepted and which cannot.
If to remain on the realistic grounds, then it is possible to reach relatively soon mutually acceptable decisions on the pending questions related to all items on the agenda. In other words it is quite possible to secure in a document agreements which would correspond to the degree of the relaxation of tensions achieved at present in Europe and in the world as a whole, to the level of mutual understanding, being established between the states after a long period of tensions and mistrust.

In future, with the deepening of present positive processes in the world, the results of the Conference, this first international forum in the modern history of Europe, could be expanded and enriched along the line of relaxation and confidence.

With such an approach the assets accumulated at the Conference allow, so to say, to enter the final lap, to make the final thrust towards the completion of the work of the Conference within the shortest period of time, and mainly, with solid achievements which would reflect the coincidence of interests of all the participants, above all in the cardinal question of strengthening peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

I hope you will agree with me that to put the Conference in a top gear a strong political impetus is needed, and first of all the one coming from the top leaders of the countries, interested in its success. The Soviet-American mutual understanding on the issues of the Conference has always been of prime importance for moving the Conference ahead. It pertains also to the known understanding reached between A.A. Gromyko and H. Kissinger which, we hope, will make it possible to untangle the questions of item 3 of the Agenda discussed at this time in Geneva.

We would like to hope that now too at this turning phase of a sort in the work of the Conference, both our countries will act in the spirit of the established mutual understanding and will jointly facilitate the speediest conclusion of this major international undertaking.

There is one more point to which I would like to draw your attention. We believe that one of the possibilities to make the work of the Conference more active is for the countries, which of course would desire to do so, to send to the conclusive part of the second stage of the Conference in Geneva the representatives of a sufficiently high rank who would be authorized to make appropriate decisions there.

We are convinced as before that the results of the Conference would have historical importance for all the future course of events in Europe in the direction of peace, relaxation of tensions and cooperation and they deserve to be sealed by the authority of the supreme leaders of the participating states. There are objective possibilities for bringing the Conference within a short period of time to a successful conclusion. We believe that they should be used to the fullest extent.
212. Memorandum of Conversation

Bad Reichenhall, June 11, 1974, 3:15–5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister of Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Gunther Van Well, Political Director
Mr. Dannenbring, Chief, North American Desk
Mr. Kinkel, Personal Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Miss Siebourg (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Genscher: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the Geneva Conference [CSCE].
Kissinger: Yes.

Genscher: First, there is one special problem: the declaration on the Mediterranean.2

Kissinger: Our idea is not to have one Mediterranean declaration but to have it split up in its various elements.3 If that is done, we would not be so worried about substance.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The conversation took place in Grand Hotel Axelmannstein in Bad Reichenhall, Bavaria. The brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.

2 Telegram 1725 from Geneva, March 15, reported: “At NATO delegation heads’ caucus March 14, Italian rep said EC-Nine had taken ‘political decision’ to support Italian idea of a ‘general declaration’ on the Mediterranean, to be included in final CSCE document. Italian rep said such a declaration would be best way to handle Mediterranean in final document, since it would demonstrate importance to Europe of Mediterranean area and give satisfaction to non-participating Mediterranean states which have made contributions to CSCE. Declaration would be unilateral and would not be negotiated with non-participating states. It could be added as separate part of final document at end of section on agenda item I (security).” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

3 Telegram 2919 from Geneva, May 10, reported: “As foreseen ref, we circulated to interested NATO delegations May 9 a paper giving ‘illustrative examples’ of how references to the Mediterranean could be introduced under existing CSCE agenda items. We explained that we had drawn language from existing documents such as Helsinki recommendations and Dutch draft framework paper, but that our suggestions were purely illustrative, and that we were not necessarily wedded to the language. We stressed that we hoped some solution could be found along these lines, since we remained firmly
Genscher: We don’t really differ with you. It would be less than a special declaration; it would be an intention to extend the field of the Continent geographically. While flying over I defined it this way: We don’t want to extend the European house but to make a declaration out of our window. So it is not an institutionalization.

There is a certain time pressure. We must inform some of our partners very soon. Within the next 24–48 hours.

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister I will talk with my colleagues tonight and let him know tomorrow.

Van Well: If the declaration of the Nine is dead, that means there will be more declarations—with Spain, with Malta, etc.

Kissinger: Will they be worse? What if we oppose them?

Van Well: There will be some in the Nine who will want them.

Kissinger: But what if the Nine want them and we oppose?

Van Well: It will be a messy situation.

Kissinger: Yes.

Van Well: Israel wants it.

Kissinger: Our objection has nothing to do with Israel.

We will let you know in the course of tomorrow. In the course of tomorrow.

Genscher: The other matter; I suppose you know yesterday’s declaration.

Kissinger: Is it public?

Genscher: Yes. [Reads] “The Foreign Ministers of the Nine talked about CSCE; they confirmed their intention of following the policy of détente. . . . It is not the principle of peaceful relations that is important, but cooperation in public, economic, and measures for human contact. That is why the meetings of the Conference are being supported by a large measure of public opinion.

“Ministers recall the particular endeavors which the Nine have made to meet the concerns of other participant states, in particular, where the declaration of principles is concerned. However, they wish to explain their disillusion at the lack of progress achieved at Geneva, in particular on measures so important as human contacts, the flow of information, admittance to cultural achievements, as well as confidence-building opposed to the idea of a separate CSCE declaration on the Mediterranean. Our illustrative paper, coupled with our arguments and firm resistance to a separate declaration, seems to have swayed several interested NATO delegations, and we drew support from Turkey, Greece and Portugal. Netherlands, Belgium and UK urged compromise along lines we had suggested, and only French and Italians defended separate declaration.” (Ibid.)
measures in the field of security. They regret also that in certain parts of
the declaration of principles there is not yet agreement.

“Ministers reaffirm their determination to continue their efforts to
contribute constructively to the work of the conference. They hope their
continuing will for conciliation and progress will be shared by all and
that the Geneva talks, in all areas covered by the Helsinki mandate,
will achieve the material results that alone will set the stage for the fi-
nal phase.”

Not mentioned in this declaration is the important question of
peaceful changes of frontiers. This is a point which, as everyone un-
derstands—we don’t insist on this—but there was full agreement on
this. The French side sees this very much from the angle of the rights
of the four powers. It is only natural we should attach a high price to
the idea that this should be clarified. In the field of human contacts.

Kissinger: Should we bring this to a conclusion? Or should we let
it go along?

Genscher: As said here and as we believe, we should continue to
work, but policies should not be dictated by time pressure.

Kissinger: I agree.

Genscher: First, there shouldn’t be any negative result. If we had
a formula that everything was put to question, it would be a negative
aspect.

Kissinger: We have not yet seen your proposal on peaceful change.

Van Well: Now the Nine have a position on it. A fortnight ago we
submitted it to NATO. Our point was that in making this position
clear.

Kissinger: But you have never given us a text.

Hillenbrand: Not in the Bonn Group.

Van Well: We have been in touch on this—the Nine with the 15.
Now there is a discussion just opened on the Four, on the question of

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4 On May 28, the EC Political Committee approved a report on CSCE. According
to telegram 3085 from USNATO, the EC-Nine’s report reads in part: “The German del-
egation has illustrated the possible linkage of the text on peaceful change of frontiers to
the first principle [i.e., inviolability of frontiers] in case a considerably modified and pos-
tive formula were inserted in this new context. As a temporary measure, it proposed
the following text, which could be inserted after the 27 lines of the text already regis-
tered: ‘The sovereignty of the participating states includes, in accordance with interna-
tional law, the right to modify their frontiers through peaceful means and by agreement
and nothing in the present declaration will affect this right.’ However, the linkage of
peaceful change to the first principle is not acceptable to all the delegations among the
Nine. Moreover, the [EC-Nine’s CSCE] subcommittee is of the opinion that there are few
chances of obtaining the formula mentioned above.” (Ibid.)

5 Telegram 9153 from Bonn, June 7, which reported on the discussions in Bonn on
quadripartite rights in Germany in the context of CSCE, is ibid.
quadripartite rights, to make clear that the new discussion doesn’t qualify the quadripartite rights. It is being prepared now for Ottawa.

Kissinger: In principle we are in favor of what you are trying to do. We will discuss this at Ottawa.

Genscher: We will discuss.

Kissinger: It would help us. In principle we have no difficulties.

Genscher: We also see consequences about European Union if we don’t adopt this policy of peaceful change. Next we have fields of human contacts.

Kissinger: We need a Talmudic student to know what is going on. We have been studying the Finnish proposal these last weeks. In principle it looks like it may be possible. Referring back to the preamble. . . .

Van Well: There is the question of family reunions.

Kissinger: We shouldn’t discuss until. . . . In the Finnish ideas, in the general preamble there is some reference to human contacts in the preamble.

I think we have to discuss the preamble. Whatever the Soviets want—before going on to substance.

We don’t notice any great progress on the substance in the cause of Basket III.

Van Well: Complete stagnation.

Genscher: This is why we talked about deception in this field.

[A message is brought in for General Scowcroft.]

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister about my press conference.6

Genscher: I heard it with great interest.

Kissinger: My staff is encouraged because they think they see a terminal point to their suffering!

My problem with the European Security Conference is, if it had never been invented, my life wouldn’t be unfulfilled. Second, the substance bores me to death. I have studied none of it. If Gromyko would get off my back complaining every two weeks about the lack of American cooperation—which is true.

Why don’t we use the Finnish proposal as a bridge to a common position on substance?

Van Well: The problem is the Soviets of course want to emphasize non-intervention. In the declaration of principles we have the principle of human rights, the principle of self-determination, the principle

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6 For the text of Secretary Kissinger’s news conference on June 6, see Department of State Bulletin, June 24, 1974, pp. 708–709.
of cooperation—which is detailed. If they only want to pick up in Basket III the principle of non-intervention, that gives that principle a particular role.

Kissinger: But the Finnish proposal only refers to the preamble, not to that principle.

Van Well: They refer to that principle.

Kissinger: The Preambular language of Basket III refers to all the principles of Basket I. In Basket I there is a reference to non-intervention.

Van Well: Yes.

Kissinger: But it doesn’t single out that principle.

Genscher: What is the Soviet view?

Kissinger: I have no way of knowing.

Genscher: That is the point.

Kissinger: If we could settle this we could get to the substance of Basket III. There are some questions we have about the language in the Finnish proposal.

We have no information on the Soviet view. Do you have any information?

Van Well: No, but we assume the Finns would not stick their necks out without ...

... Kissinger: That is our instinct. But I have given instructions to our Ambassador to be generally favorable to the Finnish proposal provided our NATO allies don’t disagree.7

Van Well: That is very helpful. We will give instructions tomorrow.

Genscher: I have practically finished what I have been told to tell you.

Kissinger: Let me ask. We are going to Moscow. We will be harassed about the level at which the conference should end. I wrote you a letter once—or to your predecessor—about the level.8

There are two problems. I know everyone’s formal position is that the level depends on the substance.

Genscher: Yes.

Kissinger: But we know what the substance is. Given the substance, what is the Federal Republic’s view on the level?

Genscher: The Chancellor discussed this with the Soviet Ambassador and said we don’t exclude the highest level, but it depends on the conclusion.

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8 See footnote 4, Document 206.
Kissinger: But we pretty well know what the conclusion is. We have no interest—we just don’t want the allies to take different views. I know Brandt told us once that he wanted to do it at the summit. I don’t know Schmidt’s view.

Genscher: We don’t want to push, but I said at the press conference that the quality is more important than the time pressure. But at this stage, I think it would go too far to meet the points of the other side and that it would exclude all interests of the other side in the direction of new movement.

Kissinger: But it keeps going in circles. Including what we see, what substance do we want?

Van Well: Scheel wrote you about four concrete points, and we have told the Russians those and the Nine agreed with our four points. The question is whether we get to the last phase. Progress so far is not satisfactory.

Kissinger: We didn’t want a conference in the first place, so we won’t spend sleepless nights over it.

But do we want to sell a summit in return for Soviet concessions? Or do we not want a summit? We have to be clear. With Brandt, we had the feeling he wanted one and therefore we had the feeling it probably would be held.

Van Well: It is spelled out in the letter. We were prepared to go to the summit if there is satisfaction on the four points.

Kissinger: All right. Now I understand. Can you sum up what they mean concretely?

Van Well: The first is the wording and placement of peaceful change. The Soviets have bagged the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Second is the equal quality of all principles. They are moving on that. They also agreed in principle on peaceful change. The third point is confidence-building measures. We want to get out of this limit to Central Europe. All participants should take part. The fourth is some concrete points in Basket III; family reunions, family contacts, and marriages.

Kissinger: So confidence-building measures is the hard one.

Van Well: Yes.

Kissinger: Basket III may become unlocked if the Finnish proposal works. And peaceful change we will see, on the basis of the Bonn Group.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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9 Not found.
213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva

Washington, June 13, 1974, 0046Z.


1. Taking into account the views of the Nine conveyed in the May 30 call on Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary Hartman by FRG Ambassador Von Staden\(^2\) and to Ambassador Hillenbrand by Van Well (Bonn 8578),\(^3\) and based upon the Secretary’s June 11 discussion with FRG FonMin Genscher at Salzburg,\(^4\) the Secretary indicated to Genscher that the US would drop our objection to tabling by the Nine of a separate declaration on the Mediterranean.

2. Accordingly, in NATO caucus June 13 you should draw on the following talking points:

—We have carefully considered the views expressed in the North Atlantic Council and to the United States by the EC Nine and others on the proposal of Italy for a separate CSCE Mediterranean declaration.

—In the course of Secretary Kissinger’s meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher on June 11, the Secretary indicated to him as chairman of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine that the United States is prepared to join in agreement to the tabling in CSCE of the Italian draft as a basis for further discussion among the CSCE participants.

—The United States welcomed the opportunities to consult with the Allies on the proposed Mediterranean declaration, both in the North Atlantic Council and with the Nine members of the EC.

—We are prepared to join a consensus of the Allies on this matter and would hope that a decision could be reached at today’s meetings to table the Italian proposal.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Streator and cleared by Sonnenfeldt, Lowenstein, and Luers (S/S); approved by Hartman. Repeated to all NATO capitals, Moscow, Dublin, and the Mission to the EC in Brussels.

2 Von Staden met with Sonnenfeldt and the Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Wells Stabler on May 30. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron.

3 Not found.

4 See Document 212. Kissinger’s meeting with Genscher took place in Bad Reichenhall, not Salzburg.
3. For USNATO, USEC, NATO capitals and Dublin: you may draw on paragraph 2, above, in informing Allies and Irish on US position concerning Mediterranean declaration.5

Sisco

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5 Telegram 3353 from USNATO, June 13, reported: “U.S. rep informed Senior Pol-lads on June 13 of U.S. decision to support Italy and EC-Nine on tabling of Mediterranean declaration. Decision was heartily welcomed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

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214. Memorandum of Conversation1

Ottawa, June 18, 1974, 10:20 p.m.

SUBJECT
June 18 Quadripartite Dinner in Ottawa

MAJOR PARTICIPANTS

French (host)
Jacques Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Francois Puaux, Director of Political Affairs
Emanuel de Margerie, Director of European Section

United States
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfiedt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

German
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther van Well, Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Office

British
James Callaghan, Foreign Secretary
Sir John Killick, Deputy Undersecretary
Charles Wiggins, Assistant Undersecretary

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Scott George, Director of the Office of Central European Affairs, and cleared by Hartman.
II. CSCE

Sauvagnargues. Now let us turn to the next subject, which is CSCE. Here we have two problems: that of the possibility of modifying borders and that of quadripartite rights and responsibilities. I personally have strong views. After having read the Bonn Group papers\(^2\) I see no method of achieving a way out given the Soviet attitude. The only sure protection is to say that existing agreements which have been subscribed to by States or which concern them are not affected. The FRG position is quite understandable, but these objections are not really valid. Nobody can really invoke the Potsdam agreement\(^3\) now. Of course the GDR can argue that a new CSCE agreement invalidates everything agreed before, but my own opinion is that such an allegation is of no significance. Now as to a simple disclaimer, I don’t think this is appropriate and we could not get a Four Power disclaimer.

The Secretary. Why couldn’t we?

Sauvagnargues. Because the Soviets won’t agree.

The Secretary. How would you handle the question?

Sauvagnargues. I would add language to the effect that treaties subscribed to by States or which concern them are not affected. I don’t see any better solution.

The Secretary. Does this mean you don’t care where peaceful change language is placed?

Sauvagnargues. We don’t care and we have told the Germans this. There is no good place; they all have drawbacks.

Genscher. Well, there can be places where it would be of overwhelming importance but it is important to decide soon.

Sauvagnargues. Normally it should be placed in the principle of inviolability of frontiers, but the Soviets strongly oppose this.

Callaghan. Not having any language makes it difficult to say where it should be placed. Shouldn’t they work on this in Geneva? In other words figure out what we want to do and where to put it?

The Secretary. Just what is the wording that you want?

Van Well. Partly it is a matter of commas, but also the Soviets put in something about international law which we find objectionable.

\(^2\) Telegram 9467 from Bonn, June 14, contained the draft text of a Bonn Group study on CSCE and Germany and Berlin-related questions for use as the basis of discussion at the meeting on June 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)

\(^3\) For relevant excerpts of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, which established four-power rights in occupied Germany, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 54–65.
Sauvagnargues. The whole thing is negative in tone and should be changed so as to be positive. That is, the positive approach is to say borders can be changed by peaceful agreement. The present language reads the other way around, i.e. can be changed only by peaceful agreement, making it sound restrictive and negative.

Genscher. Since this point is disputed, this shows the Soviets don’t want to admit the possibility of peaceful change. This doesn’t affect only Germany but all of Europe.

Sauvagnargues. The only good formula is that sovereignty includes the power to change borders when there is peaceful agreement to do so.

Callaghan. We ourselves are not draftsmen. Let us tell our people to work out language, try it out and come back for further instructions.

The Secretary. We have three problems. First, the wording of the peaceful change language; second, placement of it; third, protection of the rights we already have. We mustn’t get those confused. We will accept any placement acceptable to the FRG and our Allies. We will still have to put it up to the Soviets. Now, with respect to protecting existing rights, I am attracted to what Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues says, rather than having a separate formal disclaimer.

Van Well. The point is that before we enter the second reading, we will have to decide where to place the language. We think under the inviolability of frontiers is all right but if the Soviets say “no,” put it under the sovereignty principle, we must re-phrase it and turn it from negative to positive.

The Secretary. I have difficulty understanding why a sentence which would be acceptable in one place would be unacceptable in another.

Sauvagnargues. The Soviets want inviolability to be “pure;” that is—no possibility of change. So if one includes in the inviolability principle something about change—of any sort—this runs counter to the

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4 The draft Bonn Group study reads in part: “The text on the peaceful change of frontiers provisionally registered with reservations on 5 April in Geneva runs as follows: ‘The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed only in accordance with international law through peaceful means and by agreement.’ The study continues: ‘The formula quoted is insufficient. The reference to conformity with international law creates the impression that the admissibility of peaceful change of frontiers is not an inherent consequence of international law but is subject to additional specific conditions besides those concerning peaceful means and agreement. According to the Soviet interpretation of the inviolability of frontiers and of territorial integrity this could then amount to the exclusion of a change of frontiers in Germany through peaceful means and by agreement in realization of the option of German unity. The minimum, therefore, that must be assured is that the reference to international law should appear in the sentence in a manner which avoids that risk.’” (Telegram 9467 from Bonn, June 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.)
concept of pure inviolability which the Soviets seem so strongly attached to.

The Secretary. I can’t understand why this is important. In fact, I will be surprised if there are ten human beings who remain to understand the document 30 minutes after it is signed.

Sauvagnargues. Let me see if I can sum up. (The Secretary. I am glad you have the nerve to try.) We must have inviolability of frontiers but put in a positive way. The most likely way is with sovereignty and peaceful change.

The Secretary. But this would call for us to ask the Soviets to change a text which is already registered.

Van Well. Yes, but it was registered subject to placement and to all principles being equal in value, also the text can be adjusted depending on placement.

Sauvagnargues. Let me try to sum up again. We do try again to get the best possible formula on peaceful change, making no reference to international law. Also we try in the Bonn Group to work further on the quadripartite rights problem.

The Secretary. On the second point there is no problem with us. But on the first, it is very difficult to re-open agreed language, because that means in effect that we are withdrawing a registered text.

Van Well. We can accept the text if it is registered in the inviolability principle. If the Soviets object, it is up to them to make proposals.

Genscher. I think it is understandable that this reservation was entered only by the FRG. We will not be able to sign unless the problem of peaceful change is settled. If they keep bothering us about this they must have some motive.

Sauvagnargues. Summing up again, we must put the principle in a positive way.

Callaghan. It should be put in the inviolability principle. The idea would be that frontiers can’t be violated, but they can be changed by agreement. Let’s have our experts work this out, negotiate it with the Russians, and God help them!

The Secretary. I’m in agreement it should be in the inviolability principle, but the problem of changing an already-agreed text is very difficult. As to the disclaimer problem, I like the idea of the French Foreign Minister about putting this in the Tenth Principle. Why don’t we just wait and see what happens. We never wanted CSCE in the first place.

Callaghan. I detected this in what you said earlier.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
215. Editorial Note

In a meeting with Department of State officers and National Security Council staff members on June 21, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed ongoing negotiations with the Soviets in the context of the upcoming summit meeting between President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. A memorandum of the conversation of the meeting reads in part:

“Sonnenfeldt: In CSCE, we will just have to wait until Moscow, where we can be sure that Brezhnev will unload on the President.

“Secretary: They say the present text [of the draft U.S.-Soviet communiqué] is less than last year. And you know that CSCE is going to end in a summit.

“Sonnenfeldt: But we are saying more this year. We are really giving them more than in the past.

“Secretary: Then let’s stick for awhile. I wonder what makes them think that in the communiqué they can make us change our well-thought-out positions.”

Later, discussion turned to MBFR:

“Sonnenfeldt: What about MBFR?

“Secretary: Dobrynin said they would continue to stick with their present position.

“Sonnenfeldt: And we should stick to ours. Did you give him any indication we would compromise?

“Secretary: No. The President wants it, but any deal in Moscow would get us into a terrible mess with the Allies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet-Summit, 1974)
216. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, June 21, 1974, 0940Z.


1. Kovalev came to see me evening of June 20 with his two principal lieutenants, Dubinin (Basket III) and Mendelevich (Basket I). He said he was very interested in completing the Basket III preamble operation quickly, before it got out of control, and proposed trying to register the fourth Finnish para for the Basket III preamble at next Wednesday’s meeting of Committee III, with registration of the Finnish language on “legislative and regulatory systems” the following day.

2. We explained the complex and interlocking issues which, in the Western view, were raised by this matter, and told Kovalev that many Western and neutral countries were trying to build an elaborate negotiating package for trade-off when the two Finnish proposals are accepted. We said we did not think it would be possible to register quickly the Finnish language for the Basket III preamble in the present CSCE atmosphere, without some dramatic move on the part of the Soviets, since a CSCE agreement dating from last February stipulates that progress on Basket III preamble and specifics will move ahead in parallel. On the other hand, we suggested that, if the two texts on access to printed information and reunification of families, which are presently holding up progress in Basket III, could be registered before next Wednesday’s meeting, the situation would appear quite different, and we would be able to support immediate registration of the Finnish preambular paragraph.

3. We also explained that movement of this kind by the Soviets might undercut efforts to build a negotiating package, but pointed out that there were, in fact, several related issues which would clearly have to be settled at the same time. These appear to us to be: (1) full texts of the principles on sovereign equality and non-intervention; (2) full text of Basket III preamble; (3) commitment by Soviets not to try to reintroduce “laws and customs” type of language in Basket III “mini-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2 Telegram 3946 from Geneva, June 20, is ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850095–2182.
3 Regarding the Finnish proposals, see Document 208.
preambles” (preceding each sub-section of Basket III document), and (4) progress on Basket III specifics.

4. Kovalev and his lieutenants seemed to think much of this would be possible. They agreed to make every effort to register the text on access to printed information by Monday or Tuesday of next week, although if they insist on their present phraseology for this item such registration may prove difficult. On family reunification they appeared to be flexible on most points, except transfer of savings of persons who emigrate (see Geneva 3009),4 and promised to make a major effort also to register this text next week. They said they had received instructions to allow Finnish para for non-intervention principle to be transferred to principle of sovereign equality, although they would insist on agreed US-Soviet language on determining legislative and regulatory systems. They said they were prepared, as a final compromise, to accept full Basket III preamble proposed as compromise by Finns, and would not try to reintroduce their “laws and customs” language in “mini-preambles” unless Western countries tried to insert unacceptable language.

5. I told Kovalev I would use June 21 NATO caucus to try to encourage Western flexibility to allow early registration of texts on access to printed information and family reunification. If one or preferably both of these texts could be registered by next Wednesday, we would support in Committee III meeting compromise acceptance and immediate registration of Finnish version of Basket III preamble, or at least paragraph 4 including general reference to the principles. Nevertheless, we cautioned Soviets that this was extremely complex operation, and while we would do our best, they should not be upset if there was some slippage. They agreed.

6. Would appreciate Department’s approval of this course of action and any additional guidance which may seem appropriate.

Dale

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4 Telegram 3009 from Geneva, May 14, is ibid.
217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva

Washington, June 22, 1974, 0039Z.


1. Concur in general approach your proposed para 5 ref tel, entailing efforts to encourage early registration of texts on access to printed information and family reunification, followed by registration of at least para 4 of Finnish Basket 3 preamble.

2. Per para 4 ref tel, you should encourage Soviets to allow Finnish para for non-intervention principle to be transferred to sovereign equality (bearing in mind, per State 132019,3 that we are not committed to support “foundations” language). You should also encourage Soviets not to try to reintroduce “laws and customs” language in “mini-preambles” within Basket 3.

Kissinger

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Streator; cleared by Hartman and Miller; and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel.

2 Document 216.

3 Telegram 132019 to Geneva, June 22, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840172–2114.

218. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, June 22, 1974, 1400Z.

3986. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Dept pass Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel. Sub: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: State 1345432 and previous.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Streator; cleared by Hartman and Miller; and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel.

2 Document 217.
1. Subsequent to conversation reported Geneva 3950,3 we have had three long and detailed discussions with Soviets concerning Basket III preamble operation, culminating in Saturday morning meeting with Kovalev, Dubinin and Mendelevich. Soviets are pressing hard for simultaneous registration of Finnish language for principle of non-intervention and Basket III preamble by Wednesday,4 which we think may be overly ambitious, but which we will try our best to help along.

2. We informed Soviets of our impression that Western group was drifting toward an attitude of treating this whole issue as a key conference item which should not be settled until much later, when Soviets have shown what they are willing to concede in terms of Basket III specifics. We said that if they hope to conclude this operation quickly, some dramatic breakthrough was required which would improve conference atmosphere and make Western and neutral delegations more receptive to the Finnish solution.

3. The Soviets recognize the need for something dramatic and are apparently prepared to make an effort to register the text on access to printed information by Tuesday in order to provide this element. But they insist that the two parts of the Finnish solution must be approved simultaneously, and of course this makes the whole project much more difficult. We suggested a step-by-step operation: (1) register text on access to printed information; (2) register fourth Finnish para of Basket III preamble; (3) register Finnish language on legislative and regulatory systems in principle of sovereign equality. Soviets said they could not accept this approach without a guarantee that the language in the principles would be accepted. We suggested they accept Finnish para 4 for Basket III preamble with specific proviso that this was on condition that satisfactory language would be agreed in the principles. They refused and said they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by getting this language introduced by the Finns; now it was up to us to fulfill our part of the bargain by getting it approved. They were willing to be helpful in this, but it was basically a US problem and if it was necessary, perhaps an effort in capitals was required.

4. We indicated that real problem was not eventual satisfactory solution to this issue, but trying to achieve it all simultaneously, in a very short time, in a conference where atmosphere has been getting more and more negative ever since the Easter break, primarily because of Soviet resistance to progress on Basket III specifics. We were willing to try whatever looked possible, but in the circumstances we thought this would be most difficult to accomplish by Wednesday.

3 Document 216.
4 June 26.
5. At this point Kovalev brought out the text of a new Finnish proposal which he said had been conveyed to Soviets and to the FRG Basket I representative last night. Text of Finnish proposal is as follows.

Components of a “deal” to be made between the heads of delegations:

(1) the fourth sentence of the Finnish proposal to be redrafted as follows: Therefore each of them will not intervene against the political, economic and cultural elements of other participating states and will respect the right to determine their laws and regulations.

(2) The above mentioned sentence to be located under the first principle (sovereign equality).

(3) The fourth paragraph of the Finnish proposal in the preamble of item III to be accepted.

(4) Assurance by all parties that no safeguard clauses nor any reference to the principles or to laws and regulations will be included in the so-called mini-preambles of the Basket III.

We have no indication yet of FRG or Nine opinion of above proposal.

6. Kovalev asked for our views on this, and we told him that it looked like a useful contribution. Language of para (1) would have to be altered to fit context of sovereign equality principle, but otherwise it looked promising. We cautioned him however, that even with this Finnish proposal it would be difficult to complete this whole operation by Wednesday. We said that phrase “laws and regulations” might be more acceptable to some Western delegations than “legislative and regulatory systems” and suggested that Soviets consider this language as a possible fallback position, in case legislative and regulatory systems proved totally unacceptable. Soviets said they would convey this suggestion to Moscow, and would reflect on this possibility. With regard to the paper as a whole, they planned to meet with Finns this evening to discuss it more fully. Main problem they foresaw was that of finding a mechanism, such as an informal meeting of delegation heads, at which such a package deal could be agreed, in order to have the whole thing approved at once. They said they would be back in touch with us, and we arranged a further meeting for Sunday, June 23.

7. As for Basket III specifics, Soviets still realized need to improve conference atmosphere, and would try to register the text on access to printed information by Tuesday of next week. To assist in this process, we arranged a meeting between US and Soviet Basket III reps for Saturday afternoon. We plan to advise Soviets on what may be acceptable so Soviets can put forward a workable text on Monday.

8. FYI: Soviets here appear to be unaware that need for progress on Basket III specifics was ever mentioned to them when original agreement on this problem was reached, as indicated in para 1 of State
This has made our dealings with them considerably more difficult, since they take the view that getting the Finnish solution accepted is our sole responsibility. *End FYI.*

Dale

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219. **Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State**

Geneva, June 24, 1974, 0924Z.

3988. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Department pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel. Subj: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: Geneva 3986.2

1. Subsequent to transmission of reftel, we have been informed that acting head of FRG delegation (Von Groll) briefed EC-Nine caucus June 21 on the Secretary’s discussion with Genscher3 about Finnish proposals for Basket III preamble and related language for insertion in principles. Von Groll’s briefing may well have fueled suspicions of a US-Soviet deal on this subject. Since EC-Nine caucus included experts from Baskets I and III, we assume this information will be known throughout the conference within a few days.

2. We have taken position thus far that there is no US-Soviet understanding, and that Bad Reichenhall meeting took place several days after we had reported the Finnish proposals to Washington. We have also pointed out that our opposition to Finnish-proposed language on “foundations” shows that we are not a party to any “deal,” but of course our support for the general concept of the Finnish solution is well known, and Von Groll’s briefing has contributed to the rumors which are circulating here on this subject. In these circumstances, we are reviewing the actions we had planned in support of the Finnish solution, and will certainly be forced to take a less active role, at least for

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 708, Country Files, Europe, Switzerland, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Document 218.

3 See Document 212.
the time being. It must also be recognized that resentment toward pos-
sible US-Soviet collusion may strengthen resistance to the Finnish so-
lution, and render full achievement more difficult. The Soviets, who
are pressing hard for immediate adoption of the Finnish solution, will
undoubtedly be unhappy with any obvious reluctance on our part to
move quickly.

3. Additionally, we believe that growing press interest in CSCE,
coupled with West European apprehension about leakage of this story
to the press a reasonable possibility. The Department should be pre-
pared to deal with this situation, should it arise.

4. We believe West European suspicions of a US-Soviet under-
standing on this issue make it all the more important that the Moscow
summit meeting be used to press the Soviets for reasonable con-
cessions on Basket III and military issues. Such concessions will be
essential if we are to be able to justify to our European Allies our sup-
port for a compromise on the Basket III preamble issue at this time.

5. In these somewhat altered circumstances, we would appreciate
any further guidance the Department may wish to provide, especially
as to how we should respond to Soviet pressures for quick action. We
would also be grateful for the Department’s guidance on how we
should react to queries from our Allies, and possibly also from the
press, on this matter.

Dale

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in
Geneva¹

Washington, June 25, 1974, 0133Z.

135958. Subject: CSCE: Basket 3 preamble. Ref: Geneva 3988.²
Geneva eyes only for Amb Sherer.

1. In further conversations with Soviet delegation on this issue,
you should remind them that, while we undertook to try to persuade
Western participants to accept Finnish compromise package for handling this issue, we repeatedly pointed out that we expected Western resistance. You should add that we will continue our quiet persuasive efforts with Western delegations but that, given current Allied attitudes, strong pressure from US would prejudice chances of eventual Western acceptance of Finnish package.

2. In responding to any questions from Allies, you could make following points:

—We support Finnish compromise package as reasonable solution to a difficult issue involving highly sensitive ideological considerations on Eastern and Western sides;

—We have also discussed this issue bilaterally with other delegations at Geneva and we assume many other Allied delegations have had similar bilateral contacts;

—As others may also have found, we found that, while the Soviets initially preferred the explicit reference to “laws and customs” in draft Basket 3 preamble tabled by Bulgarians, they later apparently began to see merit in indirect compromise approach embodied in Finnish package;

—As Hartman told NAC on March 29, after Secretary’s visit to Moscow, Brezhnev mentioned “customs” in connection with Basket 3 only in his introductory remarks, but he repeatedly mentioned domestic laws;

—This may have presaged Soviet willingness to drop “customs,” which of course does not figure in Finnish package;

—We agree that progress in Basket 3 specifics is indispensable, have repeatedly made this point to Soviets, and will continue to make it;

—We hope Allies will continue to see Finnish proposal, plus satisfactory texts on Basket 3 specifics, as constituting acceptable outcome under third agenda item.

3. If questioned by journalists on Finnish proposal, you should decline comment on grounds that this is subject currently under negotiation.

Kissinger

3 See Document 197.
221. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, June 25, 1974, 1230Z.

4020. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Dept pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Sherer. Subj CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref State 135958.2

1. Kovalev, accompanied by Dubinin and Mendelevich, called on me June 25 to exchange views on status of Basket III preamble operation. I gave them our latest information on package deal being promoted by neutrals (Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Cyprus, Malta, and Yugoslavia). This currently consists of the following elements: (1) inclusion in list of principles of some wording on “laws and regulations,” not yet drafted; (2) this language to be moved to principle of sovereign equality; (3) agreement on all four paragraphs of Basket III preamble using Finnish model; (4) agreement on so-called “mini preambles” preceding each section of Basket III document; (5) agreement on specific texts currently under discussion in Basket III (probably those on reunification of families and access to printed information); (6) simultaneous registration of all above texts; (7) agreement to move on to discussion of principle of human rights during period of 7–10 days required to work out the package deal.

2. Kovalev expressed “disappointment” on receiving this news. He said it was important to move quickly to finish this operation, which cold become “dangerous” if discussion moved on to principle of human rights. Instead, the proposed package deal was expanding. He clearly did not believe USDel had acted forcefully enough during last few days, and claimed Soviets had done everything they could to advance the operation. Kovalev recalled that this operation was only part of a broader US-Soviet understanding, and indicated he would report to Moscow his conclusion that we have not made enough effort on this issue.

3. In reply to Kovalev, I drew on para 1 of reftel, and stressed that our primary objective is eventual successful completion of the operation; too much pressure for early completion may well prejudice chances of eventual Western acceptance. I also repeated that we have said clearly and for many weeks that significant progress on Basket III

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850095–2190. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 Document 220.
specifics is required if there is to be any chance of success; up to now, the Soviets have not produced formulations with which the Nine can agree. In view of present situation, we had concluded it would be a mistake for US to support Finnish version of Basket III preamble at June 26 meeting of Committee III, as we had earlier thought possible if some specific Basket III text could be registered in advance. Since Soviets insist on simultaneous registration of Finnish language for the principles, such an initiative by US at this time could not succeed. I emphasized that the only apparent disagreement between us was on tactics and timing; the Soviets want quick action, while we believe gentle persuasion has better chance of success.

4. Kovalev reiterated his unhappiness, but said Soviets would continue their efforts to register text on access to printed information. They would also try to discourage neutral package-building, and would oppose discussion of human rights principle at this time. He asked for our cooperation in this effort, and we agreed to be in close contact.

5. Kovalev expressed more disappointment at this meeting than he has previously. He was apparently under instruction to complete our compromise agreement before the Moscow summit and has not produced. If the Soviets make a fuss about this in Moscow we should not hesitate to put the blame at their door. Had they come forward with Basket III specifics immediately after the Easter break the whole mood of the conference would have been different and the Finnish compromise proposals, when finally tabled on June 5, would have received a more enthusiastic reception. There simply has not been time between June 5 and today to work out language on Basket III specifics that is agreeable to all.

Dale
Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Mission in Geneva

Brussels, June 26, 1974, 2351Z.


On assumption Allies are aware of Finnish proposal in Geneva 4072, in consultation with Allied colleagues prior to coordinating committee meeting June 27, or thereafter as appropriate, you should inform them that you believe Allies should state in response to Finnish proposal that, providing Stage II work could be completed by July 20, Allies would in principle not object to beginning Stage III then; however, this does not appear to be a realistic option in light of progress to date in Stage II. You should also tell Allied reps that you would be prepared to support this position in coordinating committee. Should the issue arise in discussion with the Allies, you should make clear we are not attempting to set a target date for conclusion of Stage II or opening of Stage III.

Kissinger
223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, June 27, 1974, 1750Z.

4100. Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer. Department pass to Moscow eyes only for Ambassador Stoessel—Moscow hold for the Secretary’s party. Subj: CSCE: Basket III preamble. Ref: Geneva 4076. ¹

1. Following friendly lunch (reported septel) ³ given by Kovalev to honor President Nixon’s arrival Moscow, NATO delegation chiefs caucused at American Mission. Despite my strong support for some type of package deal which would enable conference to get off dead center it was almost unanimous opinion that any deal would have to be very carefully studied and should not be entered into at this time. Even the efforts by neutrals which have been reported previously were rejected and several delegations including French, Canadian and Dutch advocated avoiding encouraging of further efforts by neutrals.

2. Though many dels appealed to acknowledge that some form of “escape clause” to afford Soviets minimal Basket III protection would eventually have to be inserted in the principles, there was substantial disagreement as to the timing or language for such a concession. French del made the point that Soviet renunciation of insistence upon reference to “laws and customs” in Basket III preamble was not a concession by Soviets but that the inclusion of the Finnish 4th para would be a concession by the West which wanted no paragraph of any kind in Basket III preamble. Consequently, he concluded that there could be no trade-off between Basket I “legislative and regulatory systems” reference and Finnish para 4 of Basket III preamble since both items represent Western concessions.

Abrams


² Telegram 4076 from Geneva, June 26, reported that “neutrals are in process of refining their ‘package deal’ on Basket III preamble, and have today informed us that it would consist of the following elements: (1) inclusion of language on ‘right of each participating state to determine its own laws and regulations’ in principle of sovereign equality; (2) agreement on all paragraphs of Basket III preamble according to new draft prepared by neutrals, which contains same general reference to the principles as did Finnish draft; (3) agreement on texts of ‘mini-preambles’ to precede each section of Basket III document, according to new neutral drafts; (4) simultaneous registration of all above texts.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850095–2192)

³ Not further identified.
Brussels, June 27, 1974.

SUBJECT
Your Talks with Brezhnev on the European Security Conference

A major conflict has developed between our Western European Allies and the Soviets over the content and procedures of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The issue is that the Europeans want to demonstrate that the Conference has yielded significant results in terms of reducing the barriers to exchange of information, the movement of people and related humanitarian and cultural issues. As indicated in your meeting with the heads of government in Brussels until the Europeans receive satisfaction from the Soviets they will not agree to a timetable for completing the present work of the Conference or to a final summit.

The Soviets recognize that they will have to make concessions, but they are determined to do so only if they have an assurance that any such agreements to freer exchanges are covered by a blanket provision that all such questions are subject to the internal regulatory and legal systems of the parties involved.

A compromise to this effect (called the Finnish compromise) is on the table in the negotiations. It has been met with Western scepticism; as agreed with Gromyko, we are supporting it but not putting pressure on for its adoption.

Brezhnev will:

— complain bitterly that the Conference is encountering unreasonable obstacles by so called cold warriors.
— claim that a summit had been agreed to in principle by Pompidou and Brandt, and was reflected in the communiqué of his last meeting with you.
— protest that the USSR will not be opened up to hostile propaganda and degenerate culture.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 76, Country Files, Europe, USSR, President’s Talks with Brezhnev on SALT. Secret; Sensitive.
2 President Nixon met with the NATO Heads of Government in a plenary session of the North Atlantic Council on June 26. Telegram 4584 from Brussels, June 26, contains a summary of the leaders’ speeches. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
3 See Document 208.
—say that if the final results do not justify it, he would not even
send his foreign minister let alone go himself.

Your strategy:

You can agree that the talks have been extraordinarily slow, but at
the same time you should play on his avowed interest in significant
results to emphasize that many in Europe feel very strongly about
showing that the rigid barriers and division of the cold war period are
being gradually reduced.

—You could cite your talks with Wilson, Schmidt and Rumor⁴ to
this effect.

—You could say that in light of the present situation, it would be
best to pick a future target date in September and attempt to use the
intervening period for settling the remaining issues—and we will work
closely with the Soviets’ delegation; cite the “Finnish compromise” as
an example of how we can make some headway.

—You should reiterate that there are real life issues:

—such as reunification of divided families, better conditions for
journalists, exchange of magazines, etc.—on which the USSR needs to
show some willingness to accommodate the position of others; this is
the real meaning of a Conference on “Cooperation.”

On the summit:

You agree with him that neither you nor he would not want to at-
tend a conference that accomplished little.

—thus the summit, which you will not oppose—is tied to good
results.

—you and he should not try to dictate this but let matters take
their course—once others see that the Conference is succeeding they
will want to attend.

⁴ No record of Nixon’s conversations with Wilson or Schmidt have been found. A
memorandum of Nixon’s conversation with Rumor in Brussels on June 26 reads in part:
“[The President:] There is one major problem on which I want the Prime Minister’s ad-
vice, and that is CSCE. Many European governments oppose having a summit unless there
is more substance, for example, on confidence-building measures and freedom of move-
ment. Should we hang tough for more substance before agreeing to a summit? Or should
we agree without their making all the concessions some of our countries want? Rumor: I
agree with Belgium. I don’t wish a summit for its own sake; it would give the impression
we are settling just for the status quo. On the other hand, if there are Soviet concessions,
then we can only judge when we know what the concessions are. We can’t get everything,
but we should get most of what we started out for. The President: I agree. There should
be no agreement for its own sake or at the expense of our allies.” (National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential)
Military Security

—We want to have major military maneuvers announced about 50 days in advance; the Soviets want only 5–10 days preannouncement.
—We want all maneuvers above a threshold of 10,000–12,000 men included; the Soviets say an Army Corps—40,000.
—We want the preannouncement and exchange of observers to apply to “Europe”; the Soviets want it to apply only to border zones— with a zone of 100 km along their Western frontiers.
—The West (but not the US) want also to include all “major military movements,” the Soviets oppose it outright.

You may want to make the following points:
— the Conference must give all peoples confidence that military tensions are being lowered.
— preannouncement of maneuvers and an exchange of observers are agreed by all, the only issues are ones of definition and application.
— there is room for compromise.
— we can cooperate with the Soviets’ delegation, if we know what the Soviets will settle for on this issue.

225. Editorial Note

President Nixon and his party arrived in Moscow on June 27, 1974, for a summit meeting with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. During the first session on the morning of June 28 at 10:45 a.m., Nixon discussed the European security conference and MBFR in his opening statement. According to a memorandum of conversation, the President stated: “In a third area, the two strongest nations can and must work to find ways to work together in what might be called crisis areas in other parts of the world. Here we have the European Security Conference. We can discuss where problems are arising, which we are familiar with. Related to this is the reduction of forces in Europe. On our part we desire to have very frank discussions because Europe is a critical area of the world, and our two great nations should reduce to a very minimum conflicts between themselves in this area. We have a problem here which the General Secretary and his colleagues are very familiar with. It is more difficult for us to speak for our allies than for the General Secretary to speak for his. For example, I made a commitment to conclude the CSCE by the end of 1973. We have done as well as we can, and we are continuing to try, and perhaps with the Finnish
compromise, which the General Secretary is familiar with, and other working level compromises, we can break the logjam at the Conference. I emphasize here that just as with MFN, where we made a commitment, we will not drag our feet, but will show goodwill and make progress, though there are problems—(1) political problems in the US, with which the General Secretary is familiar, and (2) problems of political influence in the Atlantic Community.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 77, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Memcons, Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974.

226. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, June 29, 1974, 11:12 a.m.–1:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary

Major General Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Test Ban; Mediterranean Nuclear Ban; CSCE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Brezhnev: Well, could we then turn to the European Conference?
Nixon: All right.

Brezhnev: We have already had several consultations on this matter. Now, when we are sitting across the table, we should try and gain a clear idea as to our joint actions and aims in this matter.

Nixon: Before the General Secretary raises European matters, I want to reiterate what I said to the Foreign Minister. We made a commitment to try to get our European allies on track so there is sufficient substance to get a summit. That is our goal. We have had a problem, quite candidly, getting our European allies to agree on the substance. We could discuss among ourselves what can be done to get the substance straight. We can agree on certain things as on supporting the Finnish proposal, which has been a very constructive development.

The various items which are in question, I would like for Dr. Kissinger to run over briefly, and I will state positions as we go. Movements and maneuvers, for example, where our positions are more in tandem than with extreme positions, and so forth.

Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, we have been discussing with the Soviet Union how to move the European Security Conference forward. First, on specific issues and then on the level of Phase III. On specific issues, there are three major ones.

What is generally called confidence-building measures—maneuvers and so forth, and notification. On the so-called confidence-building measures, we have stated our view to the Soviet leaders, and as you correctly said, we have tried to move matters into a more reasonable framework, that is, to limit the area in which notification is necessary, to increase the size of the unit about whose movement notifi-
cation is required. We have worked primarily with the British on this, when we were in Brussels with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.3

The second issue is what is generally called Basket III. This has two aspects. How to relate the general principles of Basket III to specific clauses. [Gromyko and Brezhnev confer behind Podgorny’s back.] The Foreign Minister and we worked out a compromise solution, the so-called Finnish solution, that on the basis of close coordination was tabled. We are supporting the Finnish position. But we are having massive difficulties with our European allies. I think the only way to solve this deadlock is to agree on the content of Basket III and link it to the Finnish position.

The third issue is: Germans have raised the issue of peaceful change. They would like it in the same paragraph as inviolability of frontiers; or if it goes into another paragraph, on sovereignty, then they would like to change the sentence. We have taken the position with our allies, Mr. President, that if these changes can be achieved, then we would approve a high-level meeting for Phase III.

At the NATO meeting we agreed we should reach an agreement concretely on the content of Basket III.

This is where we stand on the issue of the European Security Conference.

Gromyko: Here I must say this area, CSCE, is really one where we should invent an artificial heart, because the pulse is really not there.

Nixon: And brain too.

Gromyko: The trouble is, each participant in the Conference thinks his brain is the best one too. But that can be handled.

I would like to explain our position. With respect to the so-called Basket III, which includes social, humanitarian, information, culture, etc., the situation briefly is as follows: Some of the participants in the conference are advancing dozens and I would even say hundreds of second-rate proposals. Literally piles of proposals: Reuniting families, cultural ties. Some go so far as to say we have the right to open a movie theatre, a club, in another country.

Kissinger: A cabaret.

Gromyko: Or the right to sell newspapers at news stands whether they like it or not. Some of them have such an obsession with this that they have completely forgotten the objective of reducing the war danger in concentrating on these second-rate matters.

How do we react to these innumerable proposals? We say in response that we are in favor of development of scientific and cultural and all other ties. We are in favor of solving all humanitarian issues;

3 See footnote 4, Document 224.
we are in favor, within reasonable limits, of lower fees for visas; we are in favor of Mr. Smith being allowed to marry Miss Jones.

We are not against measures. But we believe it is necessary in all this to respect national laws and regulations. This is the principle of the UN Charter. If this principle is embodied in a document, this will take care of the matter. Because whether a large country or a small country, its laws must be respected. [Brezhnev gets up and goes out.]

Therefore if this question is resolved, the question of respect for the laws of each country concerned, all the problems that relate to Basket III will be solved and no country that participates in the Conference will have anything to fear. This is the subject of many discussions with the United States, and we worked out a formula ensuring respect for laws and administrative regulations in each country. We found a third country to introduce a compromise; the Finns volunteered. I can't say we were completely happy with what the Finns proposed, but it could provide some degree of understanding. [Brezhnev returns.]

There were some who reacted positively immediately. There were others who, as Dr. Kissinger correctly said, without directly rejecting the Finnish proposal, try to link it to other things not related to it. How? For example, the West Germans advanced a new idea with respect to a question that had been resolved. It had been resolved that the question of peaceful change of frontiers should be included in the document. Now the West Germans say “Let’s review the situation,” and they try to connect the formula on peaceful change with the formula on inviolability. The purpose obviously is to try to weaken the principle of inviolability.

We had the impression the United States would promptly take a firm line in this matter. Unfortunately this is not so. As I said, West Germany has taken a stand aimed at weakening the principle and trying to link it to the Third Basket with which it has no relation.

We think we should stand on the basis of our previous understanding. If we do that, we can achieve progress on Basket III. It is a question of the influence the United States can exert on its allies. Your possibilities are greater than the concrete manifestations. We would like you to work a little more actively. We believe it is a matter of honor for the United States and the Soviet Union and others who came out in favor of this formulation to stick with it in its undiluted form.

I have therefore covered two of the questions mentioned by Dr. Kissinger, Basket III and inviolability of frontiers, which has now been raised again although it had been agreed upon. The phrase on peaceful change we continue to think should be linked with sovereignty.
[Brezhnev gets up and confers with Dobrynin and Korniyenko; Hartman confers with Dr. Kissinger, while Gromyko talks.]

As regards the question of confidence-building measures, including such items as maneuvers, sizeable troop movements—although even there, some define it in a certain way—security zones, etc. This question has been inflated so much by some that unrealistic decisions are made.

How can you expect the Soviet Union to do nothing else but write out accounts of all its troop movements in the European part of its territory? I am sure you understand this, but there are many who believe it. The United States I know takes a skeptical view. But we would appreciate the United States to use more of its influence with its allies. We have made a technical approach in Geneva.

And the last question, with respect to the level of the third and final phase of the Conference: The West European countries through their representatives at Geneva said they are not opposed to a summit but it depends on the work of the second phase. From what the President has said today and several occasions previously, the statements repeatedly made by Dr. Kissinger, it will be obvious you are taking a more positive view of the work of the third [second] stage. Nonetheless, certain reservations are evident in your voice.

If we base ourselves on the standard arguments marshalled by some participants, that is, that the highest level for the third stage is justified only if the second stage gives positive results, then any step can be seen as inadequate. Nobody has succeeded in giving actual criteria on whether it would be justified, no letter or agreement. Therefore any outcome of Stage Two can be used as a pretext against the summit level. So we would like the United States to come out more definitely on holding a summit.

Generally speaking, most European participants are in favor of holding a summit, but this general situation that I have outlined is standing in the way of it.

Finally, we believe the United States, Mr. President, could say its weighty word in favor of a time limit for ending the Conference. There are many time limits in the past that didn’t come off. This left a negative impression. If this one would stick, this would give the entire affair a more positive aspect.

Brezhnev: We have always understood that your need to see a successful outcome is a joint desire of both of us. And we continue to hope this is so. On the other hand, we cannot but agree with the remarks by Comrade Gromyko that our joint role at the Conference is very great. We could do more than we did before. Indeed, that Basket is really being inflated to such an extent.
Let me just cite one fact in this connection. In our last meeting at Pitsunda with Pompidou, he too spoke out in favor of proceeding with the European Security Conference as soon as possible and he had unfavorable remarks about some of the tactics used to prolong it. It was a bit inconvenient, but I just had to show him one of the proposals that had been made just before by the French delegation. The proposal was that any country, France for example, should be entitled to open a movie theatre in the Soviet Union, governed by French administration, governed by French rules. He was very surprised and said he would immediately give instructions to have it removed.

All this is by way of confirming what Comrade Gromyko just said. Since you and I, Mr. President, are agreed to follow the line of détente, the line of developing good relations between our two peoples, we should agree to take more vigorous action at the European Security Conference and to register our stand along these lines in our final communiqué.

Nixon: I think no useful purpose is served by going into more detail on the enormous number of proposals which are in the Conference. Dr. Kissinger at NATO was alone, with the British and French on the other side, on the German proposal to link the principle of inviolability of frontiers with peaceful change. We are trying to bring our allies along but we can’t dictate to them. Now, I suggest, in addition to having some positive language in the communiqué, that we ask our people at the Foreign Office level, whoever is designated by you on your side and whoever is designated by Kissinger on our side, to see if they can sort out how we can get through the details.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Nixon: I would expect this, Mr. General Secretary .

Brezhnev: We have got to get this matter off dead center.

Nixon: I would respectfully suggest, Mr. General Secretary, that we should not haggle too much with dotting i’s and crossing the t’s. In other words, if we want a meeting at the highest level, we ought to be prepared, to the greatest extent possible, to adjust the language of various provisions in a way that will soothe the sensitivities of our allies. The language isn’t going to change the fact.

I recall, for example, 15 years ago, Premier Khrushchev and I had a rather extended discussion about a resolution that had just passed our Congress about “liberation of captive peoples.” The language there wasn’t operative; we were really talking about theory, not a fact.

The Lithuanians I saw dancing last night didn’t seem to be captives.

But to return to the point, I propose we get our experts working. Where there is possible “give” on language to see to the sensitivities

of the Western allies, if it isn’t going to have any great significance . . . It would not be, in other words, to have the Conference fail to take place because of a quibble over language. That would be unfortunate.

All they insist on is that it be substantive enough to justify a meeting at the highest level.

Brezhnev: That is true, but there are some things that concern matters of principle and are not minor matters.

Nixon: I understand. That is why I suggest the experts get together. I know language can sometimes be enormously important.

Kissinger: Maybe Hartman and Sonnenfeldt on our side, and Korniyenko, could go over it, and your man in Geneva, and that way we could have an agreed content.

Brezhnev: We will agree to that.

Nixon: I agree.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

227. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Moscow, June 30, 1974.

SUBJECT

The Basket III Case

In my discussion with Korniyenko today I led him through the whole problem of Basket III in Geneva. We reviewed together what had been agreed at Helsinki, namely that proposals would be prepared in Stage II on:

1. Human Contacts—to facilitate freer movement including reunification of families, travel for personal or professional reasons, etc.

2. Information—to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information; improving conditions for journalists, etc.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 229, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Summits, 1974, June–July, Chronological File. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt wrote a note at the top of the first page: "HAK: I think you should agree with Gromyko on giving instructions to Sherer and Kovalyev in Geneva to carry on where we left off with Korniyenko."
3. Cooperation in the field of culture—to facilitate cooperation and exchanges in this area.

4. Cooperation in the field of education—to promote greater interchange.

I said that the Europeans felt a deal had been struck in Helsinki that, in return for agreement to write detailed principles (Basket I) which the Soviets wanted, the Soviets agreed to write proposals on human contacts (Basket III). The Europeans are now reluctant to consider further compromise (the Finnish proposal) until they see some evidence that the Soviets are making good on their part of the bargain.

Korniyenko made the usual disparaging remarks about “hundreds of proposals about minor matters that could not possibly be the subject of major international undertakings to compare with the grand declaration of principles.” I advised him that the first step on the road to positive thinking on this subject was to stop making the problem more massive than it is. The Finnish text will eventually protect their position and the job now was to agree to a selection of texts that in effect were largely hortatory. I then gave him, as an example, the two attached texts. The first is an old Canadian text (Tab A) on family reunification. The second is a revised text which we helped guide through the NATO caucus (Tab B). Our delegation had made every effort to get a text the Soviets could accept. At a meeting on June 26 between the Soviet delegation and a small group of NATO representatives, the Soviet delegation paid virtually no attention to this effort. I asked Korniyenko to examine the text carefully and tell me why they could not accept it.

I also gave Korniyenko the titles of a few proposals—I stressed that I did not know if these were the latest ones—on:

- contacts and travel (Belgian);
- working conditions for journalists (FRG);
- printed information (Italy);
- freer flow of information (Swiss); and
- cultural cooperation (France).

I stressed that progress in registering these texts would make progress on the Finnish compromise possible and indeed might even get us through Stage II.

Korniyenko agreed to get detailed information and texts from his staff in Moscow. He ended by saying that his representative hesitated to give
on Basket III for fear of being pushed to do more and more. I advised him to get some frank advice from Ambassador Sherer who would give him his best advice on how to make progress.

I frankly think that this is as far as we should go in Moscow. We do not have the latest texts or the arcane expertise to give very good advice from here. If you want to go further, in addition to advising close contact with Sherer, the attached paper (Tab C) could be given to Gromyko.\footnote{There is no indication that the paper at Tab C was given to Gromyko.} It lists areas where proposals should be agreed.

**Tab C**

**Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs\footnote{No classification marking.}**

*Substance of Basket III*

While we cannot give an agreed Western view on an acceptable substantive outcome in Basket III, we can offer our best assessment of the areas that must be covered. We would of course seek to be helpful in seeking compromise formulations.

We believe the final package under basket 3 must include liberally worded declaratory texts pledging participants to (a) facilitate family reunification, and (b) improve access to information of various forms. These will be indispensable, our Allies believe, to overall success of CSCE.

Moreover, we believe that agreement on most of the following matters should be reflected in basket 3:

- A code of conduct pledging improved working conditions for journalists;
- Acceptance in principle of freer contacts for religious purposes;
- Some indication of willingness to permit opening of foreign libraries and reading rooms in several cities in all CSCE participant states;
- General language on stimulating freer travel, including statements on giving to citizens of all participating states facilities allowing them to travel more freely and on the general principle of freer movement;
- Indication of willingness to reduce internal travel controls, along lines of extending the recent relaxation of controls on foreign diplomatic travel in the USSR to journalists, businessmen, and others;
—Language on cessation of radio jamming, which could be interpreted as an assurance that jamming of official broadcasts in vernacular languages (VOA, BBC, and Deutsche Welle) would not be resumed. On all of the above issues, we believe the texts should be generally worded, establishing a political and moral obligation on participants, but not entailing binding commitments to specific and detailed courses of action.

### 228. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, July 2, 1974, 4:25–6:10 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA
Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director General of TASS
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoeessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. USA (ret), Assistant to the President
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
M. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor to the Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

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May 1974–December 1974

SUBJECTS

Tour d’horizon (Middle East, SALT, CSCE, MBFR, Southeast Asia)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I also would like to mention we did briefly touch upon the question of the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe. But that, I say, was only briefly touched upon without any detailed discussion. In fact, it was only mentioned, without any elaboration.²

This morning we discussed how to exchange between us in terms of the general situation in Europe. We know in the talks in Vienna there are some who want to include the reduction of national forces, and others who are opposed to the reduction of national forces. We know you don’t want these talks to relate to air forces. There are various points of view. So proceeding from our general belief that one cannot do all things in just two years time—that is too small a period—maybe we could all agree that without renouncing our attempts, we continue our efforts but conclude that this question is not yet ripe for a solution.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Nixon: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the question of troops in Europe, we touched upon it only briefly, the General Secretary and I. Here, of course, the proper forum is Vienna because the interests of European allies and the Warsaw Pact—both our allies—are involved. I would hope in the communiqué we could have a strong statement to the effect that we didn’t just push this aside lightly and that we are continuing to have intensive and balanced discussions. For example, the General Secretary’s suggestion—made only as a preliminary matter, which is not on the table for negotiation—of a 5% reduction on both sides, is one approach. And I would hope we could preserve our efforts to get a more forthcoming discussion on this issue. Because I think while the European Security Conference is not directly connected with MBFR the two questions will inevitably have to be considered together at some point.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: Just one more question, which we need not go into in any detail again. I mention it because we are here in our full delegations. We have agreed to act together and jointly in the European Security Conference so as to make relations between us irreversible, in that as other areas. So one confirmation of that will confirm our efforts.

² See Document 225.
Nixon: I made a commitment to the General Secretary in Camp David, on the porch overlooking Shangri-la, on that subject. We did not reach the goal we set at the end of the year. But we have sincerely tried. And as we indicated in our meeting the other day, we will give renewed impetus as a result of our discussions here to what we agreed to so as to achieve the objectives we set at Camp David.

Brezhnev: Good.

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the European Security Conference, we have completed discussions on the paragraph that explains our common objective, and our associates have worked out a means of working out Basket III.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

3 No record of this conversation has been found. Regarding the summit meeting at Camp David, see Documents 162 and 163.

4 Kissinger is referring to the final joint communiqué; see Document 229.

5 See Document 227.

229. Editorial Note

At the conclusion of President Nixon’s summit meeting with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow, the two sides issued a joint communiqué on July 3, 1974. Among the matters included in the joint communiqué were the European security conference and balanced force reductions:

“Both Sides welcome the major contribution which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is making to this beneficial process. They consider that substantial progress has already been achieved at the Conference on many significant questions. They believe that this progress indicates that the present stage of the Conference will produce agreed documents of great international significance expressing the determination of the participating states to build their mutual relations on a solid jointly elaborated basis. The US and USSR will make every effort, in cooperation with the other participants, to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems.

“Both Sides expressed their conviction that successful completion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be an
outstanding event in the interests of establishing a lasting peace. Proceeding from this assumption the USA and the USSR expressed themselves in favor of the final stage of the Conference taking place at an early date. Both Sides also proceed from the assumption that the results of the negotiations will permit the Conference to be concluded at the highest level, which would correspond to the historic significance of the Conference for the future of Europe and lend greater authority to the importance of the Conference’s decisions.”

The communiqué continues: “The USA and the USSR believe that, in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe, the relaxation of political tension on this continent should be accompanied by measures to reduce military tensions.

“They therefore attach great importance to the current negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, in which they are participating. The two Sides expressed the hope that these negotiations will result in concrete decisions ensuring the undiminished security of any of the parties and preventing unilateral military advantages.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, page 188)

230. Memorandum of Conversation

Dusseldorf, July 3, 1974, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher
Dr. Walter Gehlhof, State Secretary, Foreign Office
The Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Genscher: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] What about the CSCE?

Secretary: We had a long talk about the CSCE. We said that Basket III had to have real content so that we could consider the issue of

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1653, Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman and approved by J. Covey (S). The meeting took place at the airport in Dusseldorf.
whether or not there should be a Summit. I made clear that we were not opposed or in favor of a Summit as a matter of principle. I think we must now address the questions that I posed in Ottawa.2

I also raised the question of “peaceful change.” They rejected putting this language into the inviolability principle. Brezhnev didn’t give the impression that he had a detailed understanding of this question. They are willing to have the reference to peaceful change in the sovereignty principle but they say that the text of the peaceful change language is already agreed. I said that if a reference to peaceful change were to be put in a principle other than inviolability the words would have to be changed for it to make any sense. They asked how? I said that I had no fixed Western position but I thought that if the “only” could be taken out and the reference to “international law” put at the beginning, we might find an acceptable formula. Gromyko didn’t say “no” but on the other hand he never raised it again either. I said either they should take the sentence as agreed and put it in the inviolability principle or accept the changed sentence and put it in the sovereignty principle. If you agree on the wording of the sentence to be put in the sovereignty principle, I could tell Dobrynin in Washington.

Genscher: That may be better than my doing it with Falin. Okay.

Secretary: I urged that there be greater content in Basket III in order to get acceptance of the Finnish formula which we favor. Our discussion of that was inconclusive however.

Genscher: I think that the Basket IIIa which deals with information is very difficult for the Russians. But IIIb on humanitarian concerns is much more important for our people. We’ll review the peaceful change language and talk again in Munich.

Secretary: There was very little discussion in Moscow on MBFR. They really do want a CSCE Summit but they didn’t press it obnoxiously. Could we split Basket III into two—humanitarian and information—and then make a real effort on the first?

Genscher: Yes, I have talked to the Belgians about it and the Canadians and they both seem to feel that way.

Secretary: Can’t the West agree on a unified list of things instead of everyone’s pet schemes? Then the Soviets would know the dimensions of the problem.

Gehlhoff: Do you think that they really worry about that?

Secretary: Yes. It is also good for us to have this idea so that we can make some decision about a Summit question. Why don’t we get a consolidated list among ourselves?

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2 See Document 214.
Genscher: Good idea. We are ready to do this.
Secretary: If you want, you could send von Well to see us.
Genscher: We could.
Secretary: Maybe we could agree on eight or nine points.

231. Editorial Note

After accompanying President Nixon to Moscow, Secretary of State Kissinger visited Brussels (July 3–4, 1974), Paris (July 4–5), Rome (July 5–6), Munich (July 6–8), London (July 8–9), and Madrid (July 9). During his stop in Brussels, he briefed the North Atlantic Council on July 4 regarding the results of the summit meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. Telegram 3764 from USNATO, July 5, reported on the Secretary’s address and the ensuing discussion with NATO representatives. It reads in part:

“Regarding Europe, the Secretary said that first, it was his impression that the Soviet Union is not prepared to make any significant progress right now on MBFR. On CSCE, Mr. Kissinger said the Soviets pressed us very hard for conclusion of the present phase as soon as possible, and for a CSCE summit. He said the U.S. view is as related to the allies previously. Essentially there are two questions: a) does any result now foreseeable justify a summit? and b) if the answer to (a) is affirmative, what would be that result? The Secretary wished to emphasize two things: First, the United States has no agreement with the Soviet Union to produce a CSCE summit. Secondly, the United States would like to remove the whole debate with its allies about approach to CSCE from the level of theology. To do so, he said, we should seek answers together to the two questions he outlined above. He said the U.S. is prepared to work with its allies. The question is, can we together set down a list of eight or ten things we can agree upon which would amount to a successful outcome of the conference? He said that the U.S. was ready to work with its allies. The U.S. would not press its allies either on the substance of the outcome or on the level at which the outcome should be reached. In turn the U.S. did not want to be pressed either. In sum, he said, it is now up to the allies to clarify their own position in consultation with each other. He intended to raise this subject in further detail with the allies he will be seeing bilaterally later during his present European trip.”

The telegram continued: “Van Elslande (Belgian Foreign Minister) thanked the Secretary for his complete presentation which contained
a number of interesting details. He further thanked the Secretary for consulting with the allies so promptly after conclusion of the Moscow summit. Van Elslande said he was thankful for the Secretary’s clarification on CSCE since, at the time he read the summit communiqué, he had the ‘not entirely happy’ impression that the U.S. and USSR felt that a conclusion to CSCE might be possible immediately. He noted that the Secretary had now put CSCE back in the context of the Ottawa discussions. He noted that problems remained to be solved before there could be a conclusion to Stage II. Van Elslande asked the Secretary if he thought it possible for the Geneva negotiations to be held up during a period this summer while the allies undertake consultations prior to a resumption, next September. In recent consultations with the Germans, Van Elslande had learned of possible new Soviet MBFR proposals. He asked if the Secretary knew of these and what they might mean for the future.”

The telegram noted Kissinger’s reply: “Responding to Van Elslande’s question on CSCE, the Secretary said that the U.S. position was as he had outlined it before, and remained as outlined, regardless of possible interpretations of the Moscow communiqué. The Secretary urged that the allies consult immediately on what would be a satisfactory conclusion to the CSCE. He did not exclude allied consultations continuing after July, and did not foresee that an agreement in CSCE could be reached by the end of this month. He advised, however, that any recess be undertaken with the greatest discretion in a non-provocative way and in the context of the holiday which is normal for August. With regard to CSCE negotiating tactics, the Secretary urged that the allies move from the present ‘bureaucratic’ approach, in which every country has a ‘shopping list’ of what it wants out of Basket III, and into discussion of the 6, 8 or 12 items which can be agreed upon as essential. He suggested that the definition of these essential items be undertaken now in consultations in NATO, in Geneva or in both places. The Secretary said it was important not to turn the Geneva negotiations into a drafting exercise. It was also important not to give the Soviets the impression that the West was engaged in a deliberate campaign of obstructionism. The allies should define what they are after and stick to it. The United States would not push beyond the allied consensus on CSCE, just as it hoped not to be pushed on CSCE outcomes.”

The telegraphic account continued: “With regard to MBFR, the Secretary said that nothing had been said in Moscow which went beyond known Soviet positions previously expressed in Vienna, and he noted the Soviets seemed reluctant to be drawn beyond that point. There had been a verbatim repetition of what the Soviets had said in Vienna and they could not be drawn into further discussion. The Secretary’s impression is that the Soviets will not move until they know what CSCE
does.” The telegram continued: “On MBFR, Krapf asked if the Soviets had given the impression that they were interested only in small symbolic reductions as a prelude to forgetting MBFR, or were they prepared to consider non-U.S. forces. The Secretary repeated that nothing new had emerged from MBFR discussions at the summit. The Soviets had recognized differences with NATO over air and rocket reductions but did not make a special issue of indigenous forces. The Secretary said his impression was that the Soviets wanted to avoid having to make decisions on MBFR. Moreover, they seemed to want to avoid having discussions that might indicate the possibility of an agreement. They therefore seemed afraid to give any affirmative answers that might put them in the need of making firm decisions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

On July 5, Kissinger reported in a message to the President, sent through President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, on the results of his ongoing consultations with the allies: “My discussions in Western Europe thus far have shown substantial support for the results of your Moscow visit. The Europeans have also been highly complimentary about our briefings and consultations before and since the Moscow visit. As a result of the Brussels summit, your bilateral talks there and the earlier Ottawa meeting, European leaders felt they were on the inside. The only potentially troublesome issue is that of the conclusion of the European security conference where the Europeans continue to suspect some sort of U.S.-Soviet deal. I have taken a very strong line, pointing out that it was Western Europe that got us into this conference in the first place, over our own skepticism, that the idea of transforming the Soviet system through ‘Basket Three’ is absurd and that it was absolutely essential for the West to get a common line on how we want the conference to end. The Germans have been most receptive to these points and Foreign Minister Genscher indicated the other night that they would like to coordinate positions with us. I have also stressed to the French in particular that we are not committed to a summit conclusion but will not be maneuvered into a position where they and others signal a willingness to go to the summit—as Brandt and Pompidou did last year—and we are left alone in opposition. I think the upshot of the discussions will be an effort to harmonize Western positions.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 140, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File)
232. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, July 4, 1974, 8:30–11:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
   Conversation following Dinner hosted by French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues

PARTICIPANTS
   (See Guest List attached)  

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: How do you see the CSCE Conference developing? Are you pressing for a summit? The Soviets seem keen to have one.

Secretary: We are not particularly interested in a summit. We are not pressing anyone on this. If we wanted to press anyone on it, we would do it in a straightforward way.

Sauvagnargues: This whole debate seems to be useless. We probably should support the détente forces in the Soviet Union.

Secretary: What I am saying is this. Every Western leader has been saying that he is willing to go to the summit if the results of this conference warrant it. What we have to determine is what results would warrant a summit. No country knows what it wants. We should do two things: 1) We should decide among ourselves if there is any result that we could imagine that would justify a summit; and 2) we should write down what it is we want so that we can discuss it sensibly with the Soviets. We are willing to say that no outcome justifies a summit, but we ought to take into consideration that there may be broader collateral benefits to having a summit. But no European government has been asked by us to go to a summit.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting took place in the Quai d’Orsay.

2 Attached but not printed. The dinner guests from the French side included Sauvagnargues, Geoffroy de Courcel, Secretary General of the Quai d’Orsay; Claude-Pierre Brosselette, Secretary General of the Elysée; Serge Boidevaix, Chef de Cabinet for the Prime Minister; Maurice Ulrich, Director de Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Raoul Delay, Director of Information and Press Services at the Quai d’Orsay. The dinner guests from the American side included Kissinger, Irwin, Sonnenfeldt, Hartman, and Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.
Sauvagnargues: I can’t see that there is anything in Baskets I or III which would make it worth having such a meeting but perhaps it is unavoidable.

Secretary: But we should speak with some clarity in Moscow.
Sauvagnargues: Perhaps we can’t prevent it.
Secretary: We have not decided to go to a summit.
Sauvagnargues: Whether we pass on to Stage III we should agree to define the results. There has been some small progress and the whole exercise is not completely in deficit. We should define the minimum results obtainable, but my staff doesn’t like to do this and give it to the Soviets in advance.

Puaux: The danger is putting it in writing. We may lose from that tactic.
Secretary: Why should we keep our objectives from the Soviets? Why don’t we give a piece of paper to them?
Puaux: They know very well what we want.
Secretary: There is the trouble. We need to put down point by point what we want. So that the Soviets can see what we are asking. What the totality of our position is.

De Courcel: I don’t think there is any result that justifies a summit.
Secretary: Why don’t we write the 10, 15 or 6 major things that we want to come out of the conference and give it to the Soviets. I see two possibilities which could come out of this: a suspicious atmosphere if you think we have already agreed to a summit and I can see a deterioration in our relations with the Soviets.

Sauvagnargues: I think the whole thing is a mistake.
Secretary: If your President tells us that he does not wish to see a summit meeting, we would accept that and then consider how to conclude this whole exercise.

Sauvagnargues: We must avoid a permanent organization.
Secretary: As you know, we opposed this whole conference from the beginning. I believe that we should decide now if we don’t want a summit and then we should decide how to conclude below the summit level. The worst situation I foresee is one of total stalemate. So you should just tell us what you want.

Sauvagnargues: We should finish this up as soon as possible and treat détente as a continuing process.

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3 Francois Puaux, Director of Political Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay, was among the after-dinner guests.
Secretary: The question is how to conclude. We have to exercise some leadership. No Foreign Minister has ever read the papers that have to do with Basket III, certainly I have not.

Sauvagnargues: I have not.

Secretary: Frankly we opposed this conference and we certainly never liked the idea of a summit but we have the feeling that others have already given this away. I don’t know if President Pompidou made a commitment but I am pretty sure Brandt did.

Sauvagnargues: I think that’s true.

Secretary: We have never asked anyone to go to the summit. What we need is a common strategy; the worst outcome would be a stalemate.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: I told the Germans that we should find some way to finish this exercise in the CSCE. It would be dangerous and senseless to have a stalemate. If we don’t want a Summit we should tell the Soviets so.

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233. Memorandum of Conversation

Miesbach, July 6, 1974, 12:20–3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther Van Well, Political Director
Amb. Berndt von Staden, Ambassador to U.S.A.
Mr. Dannenbring, Chief, North American Desk
Mr. von Pachelbel, Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman
Mr. Weber, Foreign Ministry
Dr. Kinkel, Chef de Cabinet of Minister Genscher
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, Ambassador to FRG
Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1974. Secret. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at Gut Vogelsang in Miesbach, Bavaria.
(Secretary Kissinger and Minister Genscher walked in the garden before the group convened for lunch. After social conversation, the following exchange took place at luncheon between Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Van Well:)

Kissinger: We will not drive Europe to the Summit.

Van Well: It may not be realistic not to go.

Kissinger: Then we should sell the Summit for better texts.

I have the impression from Moscow that the Russians will not agree to the substance of Basket III until they know the nature of the overall program. Because they’re afraid they’ll be continually asked for more. I think if we promise them a summit we can get nine tenths of what we ask for.

Van Well: We should be careful not to break apart, in the West. The problem is if we then see the result and it is bad.

Kissinger: But we can’t afford not to have a conclusion.

You’ll be under no time pressure from us.

Von Staden: We have to see what the time of it is.

Kissinger: What I’m afraid of also is: We’ll start out being very tough and then we’ll end up selling it for nothing. If your view is the dominant one, we should sell the summit for concessions. The worst situation is to have a deadlock and get exhausted and the governments will give in.

Van Well: They’ll certainly come to the third phase with their top people. We’ll be in the embarrassing situation of accepting something we don’t regard as sufficient.

Kissinger: If you ask my frank opinion, the Russians can force a summit. Because if the East Europeans all go there with their heads of government, the West will look ridiculous.

Van Well: Yes.

Sonnenfeldt: Did the Pope say he will go?

Kissinger: He spoke well of the European Security Conference, really.²

Van Well: We’ll speak to the French in this direction. We don’t want to have divergence among the Nine and NATO.

Kissinger: You shouldn’t.

Van Well: In addition, there is lots of drafting to be done.

Kissinger: And CBM’s. I don’t think we should have it until fall.

² A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Pope Paul VI on July 5 is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860119–0589.
Van Well: We need a few weeks for drafting anyway. We can conclude the big setup in Geneva by the end of July.

Sonnenfeldt: That may make it easier for the Russians, to keep the coordination group continuing.

Kissinger: You’ll hear the peculiar argument from the French that it will be difficult to keep the 10 points secret from the Russians once we agree on them. We should tell them the purpose is to present them to the Russians.

Van Well: This is the classic French style. The apparat continues with the old policy until it is reversed by the political level. The first sign of a change of position never comes from the apparat.

Sonnenfeldt: As opposed to our system, where the ideas all come from the apparat.

Kissinger: In our system the apparat never pays attention to the political level either before or after.

We also have Basket II and CBM’s to do.

Let me ask you, Mr. Van Well, since you are so dominating this discussion: Have you read all the documents?

Van Well: That will teach me to keep quiet. (Laughter)

Kissinger: Have you, Arthur?

Hartman: Yes! I’ve even redrafted some of them.

Genscher: (stands) I have permission from the Bavarian Government to welcome you here. So I can give you our warm welcome here. I’m hoping for the best for our talks and also for the football game. (All drink a toast.)

Hartman: The Dutch Foreign Minister will be watching!

Kissinger: (rises) On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to thank you for the welcome. And we are all glad that our consultation can be so extensive. (Laughter)

Seriously, in the short period we have known each other, a spirit of friendship has developed between us. Tomorrow I have to maintain our formal neutrality. But here, in the absence of the Dutch Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, I can show my true feeling. (Laughter)

(After lunch, out on the patio, the group sat around the table for coffee.)

Genscher: I would like Van Well to report on the subject we briefly discussed in Duesseldorf, with the wording we drafted.

Van Well: The formula you discussed in Moscow is a great step forward and would be quite acceptable to us. There is only one point—the formula we advanced had one point: “Nothing in the declaration works against this principle,” so that the other principles wouldn’t be seen as lex specialis with respect to the first principle. We would like
to maintain the formula in the French draft. All the principles are of equal value and would be read in light of the others. So the first principle isn’t being relativiert⁴ by the other principles. If that could be maintained—and it’s being discussed already in Geneva and the Soviets are receptive—it would be a great advance. To put “international law” in front and delete “only.”

Kissinger: I’d prefer not to have to go back to the Russians with another change. We would be glad to support what you want in the tenth principle.

Sauvagnargues—he’s going to Moscow—asked me if I can give him the content of what I discussed with Gromyko. May I give him this?

Van Well: Yes.

Genscher: We’ll see him Monday.

Kissinger: So we’ll both give it to him. I’ll answer his cable.⁴

Genscher: Do you think it is possible to take this line that Van Well suggested?

Kissinger: I discussed this with Van Well at lunch. If we give them the summit we can get what we want. The worst thing is to have a deadlock and then get pushed to it. It’s hard to say a document agreed by 35 nations isn’t worth a summit. Especially if the East Europeans all go.

Sonnenfeldt: I think this formula has a chance. The addition to the tenth principle is another matter.

Van Well: In the reservation we put down on the fourth of April, it was there.

Kissinger: What is this point that Sauvagnargues mentioned?

Van Well: It is not a German point but a tripartite point. He says the principle of sovereignty might be invoked by the GDR against your

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³ “Revitalized” in English.
⁴ The cable containing Sauvagnargues’ request has not been found. Telegram Secto 203/1037 from Munich to Paris, July 6, contained Kissinger’s reply: “You may tell Foreign Minister [Sauvagnargues] that Secretary has informed Genscher of his discussion in Moscow on CSCE ‘peaceful change’ as follows: —Secretary told Soviets that Germans still preferred ‘peaceful change’ language to be attached to ‘inviolability’ principle. If Soviets objected to that, then ‘peaceful change’ language itself would have to be altered to make it appropriate for use in another principle, for example, sovereignty. —Brezhnev said but this question already agreed. But language in sovereignty principle as accepted in Geneva. —After Secretary said again language could be changed, they said how. Secretary suggested ‘in accordance with international law, the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.’ Soviets didn’t say ‘no’ but didn’t raise again either. Secretary agreed with Genscher to mention it again to Dobrynin in Washington.” The account continued: “At meeting today, Genscher confirmed language quoted in para 1 and said he would also discuss it with French Foreign Minister on Monday.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
right of access to Berlin. So far our idea is that it is not a legal document but a declaration of principles. But the Soviets will certainly use it as an “important document.” So what we need is in Article 10–2: “This does not affect existing documents signed by participating states or states concerned by them.” This means the Quadripartite Agreement and also us, because we’re “concerned.”

Kissinger: (to Sonnenfeldt and Hartman:) Do we have any problem with this?

Sonnenfeldt: It is all right with us.

Genscher: If we can get this other point, and this way preserve an agreed position, we can live with it. It is not very pleasant for us for domestic reasons, but we can live with it.

Kissinger: Is it better to have it or not to have it?

Genscher: I think it is better to have it, frankly. Better to have it.

Since we are speaking about these rights and responsibilities, we have a question about the Moscow communiqué portion about the Quadripartite Treaty. At the end of the communiqué, there is a statement about “strict and consistent...”

Sonnenfeldt: ...implementation.5

Genscher: In the GDR text they say it means “fulfillment.” People wonder why you didn’t use the wording of “strict application and observance.”

Kissinger: There was no reason. Absolutely no reason. It was wording that was not offensive to us.

Genscher: I told the new French Ambassador that “strict” was what the Russians wanted and “fulfillment” was what we wanted, to fill it in.

Sonnenfeldt: Absolutely.

Kissinger: Absolutely. It was not a political decision. We didn’t even discuss it.

Genscher: We didn’t make a fuss. We noticed it was referred to as the “Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.”6 (?) It used to be West Berlin.

Kissinger: The communiqué should have been signed by Sonnenfeldt and Korniyenko.

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5 The joint U.S.-Soviet communiqué issued at the conclusion of President Nixon’s visit to Moscow on July 3 included a passage on Berlin: “Both Sides also stressed that the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, must continue to play a key role in ensuring stability and détente in Europe. The US and USSR consider that the strict and consistent implementation of this Agreement by all parties concerned is an essential condition for the maintenance and strengthening of mutual confidence and stability in the center of Europe.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, p. 188)

6 It is unclear to which passage of the U.S.-Soviet communiqué Genscher is referring; none of the passages uses the phrase “Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.”
Van Well: We wanted “full application” meaning “maintenance and development of ties.” The German press hasn’t taken it up.

Kissinger: If the German press does take it up, it would help if you take our position. We don’t need another story about European disappointment with the communiqué. All the people who will be most isolationist are now on this.

There is no significance to it. We would not accept any such interpretation.

Genscher: We will take the opportunity to invite the American correspondents in Bonn on background to state our position.

Kissinger: That’s the best. To us, the most significant thing in Moscow was that they didn’t press us to take positions contrary to you. Compared to last year.

Sonnenfeldt: Could you avoid saying that you brought us around to your point of view, and say instead there was never any difference of view?

Genscher: Yes.

Sonnenfeldt: The American press will immediately say we went out ahead of the Europeans and the Europeans pulled us back. They are already saying this about CSCE.

Van Well: This came out of Ottawa. They said this before.

Kissinger: Our press is looking for things to attack the President with. We are going to have a merry month.

Genscher: We have no more on CSCE.

Van Well: We will talk further Monday and Tuesday.7

Kissinger: We are for that.

Van Well: Then the political discussion on Wednesday, and we would very much like to have a discussion in NATO. We would like to have unanimity in NATO.

Kissinger: That is fine.

Van Well: The question is who should sound out the Soviets once we have the 10 points.

Kissinger: We can decide on that. We can do it or we can designate someone. We have no fixed idea. What is your idea? If the French want to do it, we have no objection.

Hartman: A small group of countries met in Geneva; they might be a good group to do it.

Kissinger: We haven’t thought about who should do it. We don’t want, in order to bring the French back, to lean over backward so they

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7 July 8 and 9.
are rewarded for a year of impossible behavior. Just because they are doing what all the others were doing normally.

Van Well: It might be a good occasion to let Sauvagnargues do it.
Kissinger: He goes next week (to Moscow).
Van Well: Too quick.
Kissinger: I don’t mind him presenting peaceful change. I presented it as our idea, not endorsed by the allied position.
Van Well: You could do it with Dobrynin.
Kissinger: I will do it on Wednesday. We are dropping “only.”
Van Well: On CBM’s, there is a question as to whether we should agree only to the so-called “border zones.”
Kissinger: I think the Soviets will agree to some distance beyond the borders, but not 900 kilometers.
Van Well: They already agreed to 100 kilometers. It is impractical that each country have border zones. It is only a Soviet problem; all other countries accepted the whole country.
Genscher: Practically the result is the same, if you include wide border areas. If you say 200 kilometers, it would mean practically all of France, or us, or Austria. So I feel this idea circulated by the Russians, namely a coastal strip to be included—but how could we get Italy or us?
Kissinger: If they are accepting the whole country, why be so complicated? I think they might agree to 200, 250.
Van Well: They have already talked about 300.
Kissinger: Then we have to agree on the size of the unit.
Van Well: These are not central points with us.
Genscher: This should be on a voluntary basis. Should it include military districts?
Kissinger: You would prefer having 200–300 kilometers in the Soviet Union and all of the territory of the rest of the European states?
Van Well: Yes.
Kissinger: I think it is no problem. I think they will accept that.
How should we do it? Geneva?
Van Well: It should be according to the rules of the Geneva group.
Kissinger: All right. Give your delegation your instructions. (to Hartman:) Make sure Sherer knows of this conversation.
Van Well: Ask for 500; otherwise we will get 200 if you ask for 300.
Genscher: You think 300 is possible?
Kissinger: Let’s stick to 500 and agree we will settle for 300. And we will not do less than 300.
Van Well: There is another point. All these things are interconnected. Basket III depends very much on the Preamble. We agree that
the Finnish draft is very good with respect to the general declaration of principles. The Soviets accept the general declaration of principles only if there is reference to the "political, economic, and cultural foundation of states" and "respect for laws and regulations."

Kissinger: I don't believe that; I think they will drop it out. That is my instinct. Every time I spoke with Gromyko I heard him say he needs something on laws and regulations; I never heard him insist on political institutions.

Hartman: They don’t like mini-preambles but I don’t think we do either.

Van Well: The problem now is in Basket I, not in Basket III. If we could drop “each State respects the political order of the others.”

Kissinger: I agree.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

234. Memorandum of Conversation

London, July 7, 1974, 2:45–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Sir Thomas Brimelow, Permanent Under Secretary and Head of Diplomatic Service
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, Ambassador to U.S.A.
Sir John Killick, Deputy Under Secretary
Sir Donald Maitland, Deputy Under Secretary
Tom McNally, Political Secretary to Callaghan
John Thomson, Assistant Under Secretary
Lord Nicholas Gordon-Lennox, Head of North American Department
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter Annenberg, Ambassador to Court of St. James’s
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, United Kingdom (17). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.
Secretary Callaghan: [He picks up his briefing paper on CSCE, which he gives Kissinger, Tab A.] 2 “General objectives.” They list five things. We don’t have time for all five now.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets were predictable, pressing for a rapid conclusion, but not as obnoxiously as last year. My impression is: we have 23 papers and the Soviets may fear that if they give in once, they will be asked for continual concessions. My impression is, if we can agree on concrete things, they tell me the substance won’t be all that difficult.

On peaceful change, I gave them that text Van Well did in Ottawa. I frankly can’t tell the difference. They reject totally the idea that the text, once registered, can be reopened. They totally reject putting it into the inviolability principle. With respect to the sovereignty principle, I gave them my recollection of what Van Well had done. I have since confirmed it with Van Well.3 Gromyko told me he would have experts study it; he usually doesn’t need experts on matters dealing with Germany. So maybe they will absorb it if they know it is the last concession. But Genscher is happy with it if the Russians will accept it.

Secretary Callaghan [Reads from paragraph 3 of his paper at Tab A:]4 “We should work for a sizeable area.” Isn’t that reasonable?

Secretary Kissinger: Can we agree on what it means?

Secretary Callaghan: The Europeans?

Secretary Kissinger: The Europeans and Americans. My impression, based on nothing, is that they would accept 250–300 kilometers.

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2 The undated paper, “CSCE: General Objectives,” is attached but not printed.

3 Telegram Tosec 440/147348, July 9, reported on Ambassador Cash’s conversation earlier the same day with Van Well in Bonn: “Van Well stated that everything will be carried out exactly as agreed in Munich.” It continued: “With regard to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Van Well expressed the hope that the USG would proceed on the basis of what the Secretary and Genscher had agreed in Munich.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

4 Point 3 of the British paper at Tab A, “Confidence-building measures,” reads as follows: “We want a text covering notification of maneuvers which would in practice involve all major participants in notifying the more important maneuvers which took place on their territory to all interested parties (in the case of the Soviet Union, only a part of its territory would be involved; but we should work for a sizeable area).”
Mr. Thomson: As long as we hold tight now.
Secretary Callaghan: I am sure we can agree. Dr. Kissinger keeps

telling us to get a position. [He picks up his paper again.] On economic
questions—this is only words.5

Sir Killick: No problem there.
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think this is a problem.
Secretary Callaghan: Human contacts—I think we should stick
with that one.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree.
Secretary Callaghan: 5(B)—information.6

Secretary Kissinger: Genscher says he doesn’t give a damn. I think
we can get what we want if we just sit down and write it down.

Sir Killick: It is like a chicken-and-egg problem—we can’t say we
are satisfied until we see it.

Secretary Kissinger: The French have ingenious theories—that
there can’t be an agreement because then there will be a summit.
[Laughter] But having gone this far, we can’t stymie an important So-

viet policy without paying a price.

Secretary Callaghan: If we get these, I will go to the summit.

Secretary Kissinger: The Germans—whom I didn’t press or even
express an opinion to—seemed to be willing to go to the summit if
there is agreement at Geneva. If 35 nations agree on something, it is
hard to keep out of a summit, especially if all the Europeans come.

We will support 5(a) [on human contacts].7

Secretary Callaghan: Who drafts it?
Secretary Kissinger: We will instruct our people to work with yours
in Geneva, or elsewhere.

Sir Killick: We may have to resort to a highest common denomi-
nator—the Germans are most interested in families, the French in
information . . .

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5 Point 4 of the British paper, “Economic questions,” reads as follows: “We want
texts which will encourage a practical approach to the development of co-operation with-
out prejudging questions (such as most favored nation treatment), which should be dealt
with in negotiations designed to secure effective reciprocity.”

6 Point 5(b) of the British paper, “Information,” reads as follows: “This is perhaps
the most sensitive area. We should be able to get agreement to a gradual improvement
of present practices, particularly over access to information; and we should keep up the
pressure for better working conditions for journalists.”

7 Point 5(a) of the British paper, “Human contacts,” reads as follows: “We should
be able to get a degree of endorsement of the general objective of freer movement, and
some helpful specific provisions on the humanitarian issues: marriages and family
reunification.”
Secretary Kissinger: Let’s write it down.
Secretary Callaghan: Let’s start doing this so the Russians will see we are in earnest.
Secretary Kissinger: If we are seen to be deliberately obstructing, we will pay an enormous price.
All we have now is a multiplication of Western desiderata.
The French have a theory that it’s a problem how to keep from the Russians the five things once we have an agreed text. [Laughter] I thought we wanted to give it to the Russians.
Secretary Callaghan: How do we handle it?
Secretary Kissinger: We should get together in NATO, or Geneva, or both, and work out these texts. We should put down our real position—on paragraphs 3 and 5—and present it to the Russians as a package and say, “If you give us this, we will go to the summit.” We’ll get 95 percent. They are such chiselers.
Secretary Callaghan: If we ask for 105 percent, we will get 100 percent!
You have to go to the Prime Minister’s now.
[There was a brief discussion of what to say to the press. Secretary Kissinger and Mr. Hartman then departed on foot to No. 10 Downing Street.]

235. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, July 12, 1974, 10:09 a.m.

D: Hello.
K: Anatoly.
D: Hello, Henry. I am really glad to hear your voice.
K: I am so busy doing your work in the European Security Conference and elsewhere that we’re not in contact anymore.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Transcripts (Telcons), Box 28, Anatoli Dobrynin File. No classification marking.
D: Well, for a change I think it is useful. Really. To do something . . . well, Henry have to thank you for the opportunity to meet on Monday because I go for a rather long vacation on Tuesday.

K: Ok, can we have lunch on Monday.²

D: Yes, that is very good. Yes, and if you don’t mind to look through on those agreements which have an understanding on what we are going to do from an organizational point of view. When we will begin it and . . .

K: Absolutely. And also I want to tell you what we have done on the European Security Conference, because I think we have got it in a very positive direction now, if you cooperate a little bit on Basket III.

D: Well, do you have any concrete suggestions? This is important.

K: I think we have broken the back on the Summit idea.

D: Already.

K: I think we are well on the way. But don’t go around saying this.

D: No, no, no.

K: No, you won’t, but sometimes your people in the lower regions are not as subtle as you are.

D: On this only Gromyko and myself are looking, otherwise he will keep this close to his heart. It is a project he likes very much.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² No record of this lunch meeting on July 15 has been found.
CSCE: Allied Study of Minimum Desired Results

We face, as you are aware, an uphill effort in achieving Allied agreement to pursue a study of minimum CSCE results that would justify a summit. The Nine paper presented in NAC\(^2\) is hardly more than a checklist of issues before CSCE, and the Nine apparently have no intention now of moving toward (a) narrowing the contentious issues in Basket 3 by excluding some Western desiderata now on the table in Geneva; or (b) defining more precisely their desiderata on various topics. The Nine position doubtless stems from recognition that they would be in domestic trouble, if the press and opposition parties got wind that the Allies were backing-off on Basket 3 issues which have not really been discussed yet with the Soviets. Nor do they feel under any time pressure to define satisfactory results before the autumn after the East-West debate resumes. In fact, the more we emphasize time pressures, the more their suspicions are aroused.

The issue then is how to nudge the Allies along toward a more precise and realistic definition of objectives in Basket 3 and toward an agreed fallback position on CBM’s, without pressing them so hard we would risk a new US-European confrontation, but in a way that this autumn we would be in a position to show the Soviets that we have made a strong effort to bring CSCE to a conclusion.

We need not expend much effort on other CSCE issues, for the outline of satisfactory results on principles is in hand, Basket 2 issues are out of the woods, and conference follow-up will not be ripe for debate until the first three agenda items are largely cleared away.

But on CBM’s, we will need to keep pressing the Allies, and especially the EC members, to come to an explicit understanding on the fall-
back positions that the British and Germans have signaled to us bilaterally. We informed the NAC on July 10, and instructed Rumsfeld to reiterate on July 17 and July 19, what we think the fallback should be:

—On maneuvers, thirty days prior notification for reinforced division and above (about 20,000 men) taking place on the land mass of Europe, but in the European USSR, including only a broad band of territory on its Western border.

—Drop prior notification of troop movements.

We will also need to press the Allies to have a serious discussion on Basket 3 over the next weeks, and to get the results of the discussion recorded in a document that is more than a checklist of issues.

The Secretary should raise this problem with Genscher, and we will provide a paper and talking points for their forthcoming meeting. We may also want to move bilaterally with the British and French, depending on progress in NAC and at Geneva, where the study will be prepared for NAC review.

Beyond this, we need to give Bud Sherer detailed guidance on the Basket 3 issues for his use in priming the study pump at Geneva.

To refresh your memory, here is a list of the 12 Basket 3 issues which the EC Nine believe should be the subject of CSCE texts:

A. Human Contacts
   1. Family Visits (Registered Text)
   2. Family Reunification
   3. Marriages
   4. Right to Travel

B. Information
   5. Written Information
   6. Radio/TV
   7. Working Conditions for Journalists

C. Culture
   8. Access to Literary Works, etc.
   9. Exchanges
   10. Contacts among Artists

D. Education
   11. Contacts between Educators and Scientists (Registered Text)
   12. Access to Educational and Scientific Institutions (Registered Text)

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3 Telegram Secto 229/4339 from Madrid to USNATO, July 9, provided an outline for Rumsfeld’s opening remarks to the North Atlantic Council on July 10. (Ibid.)

4 Telegrams 153816, July 16, and 156180, July 18, transmitted the instructions to Rumsfeld. (Ibid.)
Three of these texts (family visits; contacts between educators and scientists; and access to educational and scientific institutions—at Tab E) have already been registered in Geneva and are not likely to be seriously controversial. A fourth document (written information) has been under active discussion in Geneva for some time and may soon be registered; the current version of this paper on access to information, complementing an already registered text on dissemination of information, is at Tab F. As for the sensitive family reunification issue, the NATO caucus at Geneva produced a text on this in June and presented it informally to the Soviets (Tab G). Given the intense FRG interest in it, we believe it is too hot to handle in the NATO caucus and we should not propose tampering with it. Eventually, we might ask the Secretary to discuss the matter bilaterally with Genscher, if the Soviets find the text too much to swallow.

On the marriage issue, the Norwegian draft (Tab H) should not be too hard for the Soviets to digest, except for the passage that would require issuance of exit permits for the children of married couples (the defector problem). We believe we should leave it to the Soviets to eliminate children.

Our delegation in Geneva believes the two remaining topics under the cultural subheading (exchanges and contacts) are not key issues and should not provoke serious controversy.

The EC Nine have not listed two texts tabled by the Vatican, one on religious contacts and the other on access to religious information, although several of their delegations have expressed general support for them. Our judgment is that the Vatican, which has greatly strengthened its relations with Eastern European countries in recent years, is astute enough not to insist on the impossible and that the Soviets will make a few symbolic concessions. In any event, I do not think we should put ourselves in the middle of this issue.

That leaves four texts that we believe the Allies should now discuss in detail with a view toward cutting out some non-negotiable fat. We have developed guidance to Sherer on each in the draft telegram at the tabs shown, and have also included the corresponding Western text(s), as well as spread sheets comparing the specific substantive aspects of the texts in play.

---Working Conditions for Journalists (Tab A)\(^5\)
---Right to Travel (Tab B)\(^6\)

\(^5\) Tab A is the draft text of Document 237.
\(^6\) Tab B is the draft text of telegram 157019 to Geneva, July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Overall guidance to Sherer on the approach he should take to the review of Basket 3 issues is included in the draft telegram at Tab A. In summary, our proposed revisions would blunt the cutting edge of all four texts, especially those on journalists, radio broadcasts and access to literary works.

The Allies will not be pleased with our suggested changes to texts they have sponsored, and some of their disgruntlement is certain to leak to the media. But if we do not begin to move on these texts now, we will not have put the Allies on early notice that we are serious about searching for middle ground, and we will not be in a position to argue with the Soviets that we tried to meet some of their concerns. We come closest in these telegrams to having it both ways, that is neither antagonizing the Soviets or seeming to sell-out the Allies. If we push any harder, however, we may find ourselves isolated.

Recommendation

That you approve the telegrams at Tabs A–D.

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7 Tab C is the draft text of telegram 157020 to Geneva, July 19. (Ibid.)
8 Tab D is the draft text of telegram 157018 to Geneva, July 19. (Ibid.)

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva

Washington, July 19, 1974, 2103Z.


1. NAC discussions and other reports of Nine views indicate that we confront an uphill effort to reach Allied agreement on minimum

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Streator and cleared by Hartman, Lowenstein, Humphrey (EUR/sov), Small (L), Robert Anderson (S/FRS), Wozniak (USIA), and Fry (S/S). Approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to USNATO, Moscow, and NATO capitals.
satisfactory CSCE results. Nonetheless, we wish to pursue this exercise, for we believe that only through intra-Allied debate on the issues at play can we begin to bring the Allies to consider the choices they will need to make, especially with regard to Basket 3 and CBM’s. Thus, you should take a strong lead in the work of the NATO caucus in Geneva, pressing for the development of the text of a study which clearly identifies the issues in Basket 3, and that fleshes out in reasonable detail principal Allied objectives in these areas.

2. For the purposes of this exercise, we are prepared generally to accept the Nine paper as it relates to Baskets 1 and 2, though we may have editorial changes to suggest. The portion of Basket 1 on CBM’s can be left to be worked out in NATO. (For USNATO: we assume SPC will develop contribution on CBM’s, and you should base your approach on previous guidance, including Madrid 4339.)

3. With regard to Basket 3, your objective should be to stimulate a discussion of each of the texts, including anticipated Eastern attitudes toward each. Based on the discussion, the operative elements of each text should be set out succinctly so that in the ensuing NAC review PermReps will be in a position also to discuss them. Where there are differences in Allied views, bracketed texts should be included, together with an indication of respective national positions, as a further aid to NAC review. Finally, you should strive to elicit a rough order of priority among the texts, looking toward a narrowing of the number to, say, six to eight. While we may not be able to get agreement at this stage to paring the number down, prioritization now would help with this later in NAC discussion.

4. As a contribution to this exercise, we will provide you with suggested drafts on selected issues, drawing on the helpful suggestions in Geneva 4464. The first of these texts, on working conditions for jour-
nalists, is provided below. Others will follow by septels on broadcast information, travel, access to literary works. As you will note, we have moderated some of the texts to render them more realistic in terms of negotiability with the Soviets.

5. Consistent with the approach outlined above, our drafts, too, will cover what we regard as the key operative passages.

6. We do not intend to provide a text on the family reunification issue because of its sensitivity for the FRG. We also note that an Allied paper on this issue has been largely agreed in the NATO caucus and has been discussed with the Soviets. On the marriage issue, we can support the Norwegian paper as a succinct statement of Allied desiderata. Nor do we plan at this time to provide you with texts on secondary, and probably non-controversial, issues of cultural exchanges and cultural contacts.

7. There follows the text covering working conditions for journalists:

\textit{Begin text.} That visas and residence permits for journalists and their technical staffs be granted as expeditiously as possible. That steps be taken to grant journalists greater freedom of travel within participating states in pursuit of their professional activities and that the necessary travel permits be granted within a reasonable period of time.

That journalists not be subject to expulsion for normal professional activities.

That steps will be taken to facilitate journalists’ contacts, in pursuit of their professional activities, with officials of the participating states, as well as with private individuals.

That journalists be allowed to carry with them equipment and materials necessary for the exercise of their profession.

That journalists be allowed to transmit, fully and without delay, the materials which are the results of their professional activity. \textit{End text.}

Ingersoll

\footnote{See footnotes 6–8, Document 236.}
238. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, July 23, 1974, 1800Z.


1. US rep (Sherer) presented US views on further Allied consultations on essentials at NATO delegation heads’ caucus July 23. Drawing fully on reftels, Sherer proposed work program for remainder of this week to come to agreed document prior to CSCE recess.

2. Immediate unanimous reaction of Allied delegation heads was bitter and resentful. Noting there had been no agreement in NAC on timing or nature of this exercise, delegation heads expressed “surprise” and “shock” that US should make what they considered such an unreasonable and imprudent proposal. As foreshadowed by our earlier cables on this subject, delegation heads questioned utility and wisdom of exercise proposed by US and recalled fact that Basket III texts already exist which were drafted through long consultation process in EC–9 and NATO, based in large part on US inputs. New texts could only be written after these texts had been fully discussed in the CSCE drafting process.

3. Allied delegation heads further suggested that US presentation indicated “extreme under-estimation of the importance of CSCE,” and recalled that in NAC discussions all delegations except US were unanimous in agreeing that this exercise cannot and should not be done at this time.

4. In view of informal CSCE meeting to discuss neutral package deal for Basket III preamble (see septel), NATO delegation heads’ caucus was

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2 Document 237.
3 See footnotes 6–8, Document 236.
4 Telegram 158622 to Geneva, July 23, reads as follows: “Further to State 157032, it may help you to keep feet of Allied reps to the fire as you press for definition of minimum acceptable CSCE outcomes to indicate that we envisage exchanges at ministerial level as the exercise proceeds. We have recommended, for example, that the Secretary raise it this week with Foreign Minister Genscher during the latter’s visit to the US. You may also state that we are prepared to take the issues to appropriately high political levels in other governments as necessary to resolve them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
5 Not further identified.
cut short, and it was agreed to resume this discussion afternoon of July 24. With delegates due to begin departing from Geneva on July 25, this will leave very little time for drafting of any NATO caucus paper before the recess. Nevertheless, some NATO delegations are looking for a way to make a gesture toward US position this week. In these circumstances our objective at next NATO caucus will be to put together some kind of paper, hopefully including US suggested texts, even if these have to be annexed or bracketed to make the arrangement acceptable.

5. We are not optimistic that any paper can be agreed before the recess, but whatever can be managed will certainly fall far short of what we have proposed.

**Abrams**

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### 239. Editorial Note

On July 26, 1974, the Department of State sent to the Mission in Geneva telegram 161424, cleared by Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman and approved in its substance by Secretary of State Kissinger. The telegram instructed the United States delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: “You should table as soon as possible the following language for inclusion in principle one on sovereign equality: ‘In accordance with international law, the participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed through peaceful means and by agreement.’” For the origins of this language on “peaceful change,” see Document 233. Telegram 4839 from Geneva, July 26, reported that the delegation tabled the formulation on peaceful change the same morning. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Telegram 161424 was sent in direct response to a request from the West German Foreign Office. In telegram 11610 from Bonn, July 23, the Embassy reported that “the FRG is asking the U.S. CSCE delegation to table the agreed language on ‘peaceful change’ and Bonn thinks it must be done yet this week before the recess.” The West German Foreign Office had said “U.S. introduction would be natural since the Secretary had raised this matter with the Soviets.” (Ibid.)
240. Memorandum of Conversation

San Clemente, California, July 26, 1974, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
  US Side
  The President
  Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
  Martin Hillenbrand, Ambassador to Bonn

  German Side
  Hans Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
  Gunther Van Well, Political Director
  Berndt Von Staden, Ambassador to US
  Dr. Weber, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] With respect to the CSCE, which I discussed with the Chancellor in Brussels,2 we understand your position on peaceful change and its importance to you. It is a difficult subject to discuss with the Soviets but we are trying our best to get the Soviets to accept our position. We have taken note of recent disturbances on the autobahn,3 and we will drag our feet on the East German thing, having in mind that this sort of harassment must not be allowed to plague our relations.

Genscher: Our two governments are in agreement on CSCE. If satisfactory solutions can be found, we should be prepared to move ahead, perhaps ending in a summit. The possibility of a summit should be integrated into our negotiating position. The issue of peaceful change is not only important to Germany, but also to Europe. An absolute freeze of borders could also be contrary to European unity. We have been grateful for your support in this matter. With reference to the autobahn, our general line should be that if the Soviets do not accept the impor-

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, June 1–August 8, 1974, 1 of 3. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the President's office.
2 No record of Nixon's conversation with Schmidt on June 26 has been found.
3 In telegram 1256 from Berlin, July 26, the Mission reported: "East Germans appear to have initiated some harassment of transit traffic in wake of establishment of Federal Environmental Agency in West Berlin. Mission has learned so far of five cases, starting morning July 26, in which private autos were stopped at crossing points (Hirschberg, Drewitz, Marienborn and Staaken) and passenger either asked if they worked for the FEA or were simply told that reason for delay was because of establishment of FEA. Delays varied from ten minutes to hour, after which all travelers were permitted to proceed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
tance of Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement, they will endanger détente policy. I am grateful you are prepared to drag your feet on GDR relations until the situation is clarified. The Eastern side must recognize that they cannot have their cake and eat it too. What we want is that the Four Power Agreement be maintained, and this is not an unreasonable position.

President: You can be sure that, as far as the peaceful change issue is concerned, I fully agree that this is not only a sensitive matter for Germany, but also for a divided Europe. Our Russian friends cannot take the position that they can simply draw a line down the middle of Europe, on one side of which nothing can change but the other side of which is a happy hunting ground for them. If change is tolerable in Western Europe then the same should also apply to Eastern Europe. The question is not only how to get language, but also how actually to bring about peaceful change in Eastern Europe. Anyone who has visited Eastern Europe as I have cannot help but feel the tragedy of the millions of people under communist governments. The Eastern European countries have a long background of standing up for their independence; they do not like foreign domination. I am therefore totally in agreement on the principle, but you and Secretary Kissinger will still have to work out the language. We should not at this point in history ratify the Iron Curtain, as the Soviets want us to do.

Genscher: We must look to the internal dynamics of development. We can see this operating in the GDR, to large portions of which West German TV is available. I went to the GDR recently in a private capacity for the first time since I left it in 1952. I was astonished at the hearty welcome I received and at the fact that I was widely recognized. This was entirely due to people having seen my face on TV. This confirms the importance of Basket III in the CSCE negotiations. But more important than making newspapers and magazines available is the possibility of travelling into these areas. It is, for example, more important that a man in Kiev be able to receive his sister from New York on a visit than that he have access to daily editions of the \textit{New York Times}.

President: I agree that it is communication that matters. TV is indeed important.

Genscher: If one could agree on exchange of TV broadcasts, this would be great progress.

Secretary: The President would be glad to give up Walter Cronkite\textsuperscript{5} and a few others.

\textsuperscript{4} The United States did not establish an Embassy in the German Democratic Republic until December 9, 1974.

\textsuperscript{5} Chief editor and anchorman for the Columbia Broadcasting System's evening news.
Genscher: I have a few commentators also whom we would gladly exchange.

President: The important thing to convey to Chancellor Schmidt and to your colleagues is that the unity of the Big Four is indispensable at this juncture. The instability of the whole southern tier would only be given greater impetus if there is disunity in the northern tier. Therefore, there must be close consultations and communications between the Federal Republic, the United States, Britain and France—and also Italy. We will do our best in this connection. We must not permit economic issues to divide us. We must maintain and strengthen NATO and not reduce its strength except in the context of mutual reductions.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

241. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 1, 1974.

SUBJECT
Farewell Call; CSCE; Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
Netherlands
Ambassador Rijnhard van Lynden
Maxime de Jonge, Counselor, Netherlands Embassy

US
The Secretary
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Katherine Shirley, EUR/WE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Van Lynden: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Foreign Minister van der Stoel did ask me to bring up one point. He asked me to stress the importance he attaches to CSCE and especially to the question of Basket III. He has the feeling we ought to be more difficult, not to be giving in.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1029, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, June 1–August 8, 1974, 1 of 3. Confidential. Drafted by Shirley and approved by Hartman.
The Secretary: Are we giving in? I have some difficulty understanding European thinking. On the one hand, they want to take a strong position. On the other they don’t want to write it down. We don’t care about CSCE. We were against the conference in the first place. Our only concern now is that it not do any damage. We want to discuss the substance of a Basket III. I count myself among the large group of foreign ministers who has not read the papers on Basket III. I don’t think any of them have. I don’t think Hartman even has.

Mr. Hartman: Yes, I have. I even changed some of the language of the text.

Van Lynden: I have not read them either.

The Secretary: Let’s stop theoretical debate then and start drafting. When we have a draft, then you can object and we’ll talk about it.

Van Lynden: I believe there is an EC-Nine draft, but yours is more elastic.

Mr. Hartman: When you read the texts, you will find the operative paragraphs of our texts don’t differ much. We’ve taken out some of the abrasive language but the operative paragraphs are much the same.

The Secretary: (to Mr. Hartman) Will you do a wrap-up on CSCE for me?

Mr. Hartman: We just did one.

The Secretary: Where is it?

Mr. Hartman: You must still have it.

The Secretary: This building is one big conspiracy to keep me from exercising control over foreign policy. First they don’t show me the papers. Then they send them to me too late. And then they schedule me so that I don’t have time to read them. It’s a three part effort.

Van Lynden: The details of the CSCE escape me.

The Secretary: I don’t have the impression there is a big debate going on.

Mr. Hartman: What we want is a discussion of the texts before September. But this didn’t work out in Geneva because it conflicted with the European vacation.

The Secretary: Can’t it be done in NATO?

Mr. Hartman: Yes and with the participation of the representatives to Geneva. (to Ambassador van Lynden) We’d like to hear your Government’s comments.

The Secretary: There’s not going to be a quarrel over CSCE.

Mr. Hartman: I just wish the Dutch would do one thing. Please find the reference in the documents to the cabaret in Moscow. The Soviets are always getting excited about it, and we can’t find the reference.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
242. Editorial Note

On August 8, 1974, Richard M. Nixon announced his resignation as President of the United States. Vice President Gerald R. Ford assumed the Presidency at noon on August 9.

On August 9, Secretary of State Kissinger wrote in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko: “Regardless of what you may hear or read in the next few weeks, I can assure you personally that President Ford intends to continue and develop further the policies that have guided our relations with the USSR under President Nixon. He has asked me to remain in office and to devote special attention to Soviet affairs.” Kissinger continued: “The change in the Presidency will not end the criticism that our policy toward the Soviet Union has been subjected to over this past year. I will soon make a major speech on this subject, which will commit the new Administration to the process of improving Soviet-American relations. But I hope that in Moscow the most serious thought will be given to the substantive issues facing us—in CSCE, MBFR, and SALT—so that there will be no loss of momentum when these negotiations resume.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 27, USSR, The “D” File)

Kissinger also met with the Ambassadors of the NATO Allies at 2 p.m. on August 9. In preparation for the meeting, Counselor Sonnenfeldt sent Kissinger a memorandum on August 8. With regard to the European security conference and MBFR, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “As you know, it has become fashionable in some NATO circles to howl with the wolves on détente; the standard points are that we are being soft on CSCE, too eager on MBFR, and sacrificing European economic interests (in the Trade Bill) to our Soviet interests. Although on this occasion you should not raise these matters yourself, it is possible that one of the representatives will do so. In that event, you should be firm and crisp.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official) A memorandum for the President’s file about Kissinger’s meeting with the NATO Ambassadors on August 9 reads in part: “Looking at the current items on the US-European agenda, Secretary Kissinger said with regard to CSCE that our consultations are proceeding satisfactorily. On MBFR, we should soon have occasion to discuss the Allies’ position.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 13, NATO)
May 1974–December 1974 713

243. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 15, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On CSCE—we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans. It includes some basic principles, something on human contacts, no change of frontiers, and what they call “confidence-building measures.”

The Soviet Union wants it as a substitute for a peace treaty. They more or less have that. The big hang-up is on freedom of movement. It is meaningless—it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it.

What you will face is whether to conclude it at the summit level or foreign minister level. My guess is the Europeans will decide on a summit. We have positioned with the Soviet Union, so we look like we are ahead of the Europeans.

The President: What is the timetable?

Kissinger: Maybe next March. The Soviet Union wants it this year, but that is not possible. If you meet Brezhnev in December, they won’t want it before that.

There are no decisions to make now.

When you meet Gromyko the end of September you should give him the impression we are trying to be helpful.

There is no implementation in the treaty.

On MBFR—we made an absurd proposal which couldn’t fly. Now we are modifying it. The Soviets should cut more than us, but not so much. Then we should add the nuclear package—32 Pershings, 54 F–4, 1,000 nuclear warheads. It is strategically insignificant, but it does have the consequence of establishing some ceiling on our nuclear forces.

[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

[1 line not declassified] If we could get the Soviets to do it in MBFR, it would satisfy our allies and give the Soviet Union a facesaving way out.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
Your coming into office will give a big boost. They will be looking for a success, especially if you make a meeting in December conditional.

The President: I have told Brent MBFR is more popular here than SALT.

Kissinger: At the VFW, you might give a tough Defense-oriented speech. It would be good for the Soviets.

The President: I have been doing that, and with no apologies.

Kissinger: We can probably get a 15–20,000 cut in MBFR. Maybe in December. We will have to manage with the allies so it doesn’t look like bilateralism.

I will focus with Dobrynin on SALT and MBFR.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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244. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 26, 1974, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT
US-Romanian Relations; CSCE; Cyprus; Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Romania
Vasile Pungan, Counselor to President Ceausescu
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador

United States
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Nicholas G. Andrews, Director, EUR/EE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] On the specific issues which you discussed—first, the European Security Conference, as I remember. As you know, the European Security Conference was not our invention. We do not feel overwhelmed with responsibility as a result of our attendance. We are not an obstacle to the resolution of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097–1296. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Andrews.
Basket 3 issues which reflect the views of the Western Europeans. Communist countries specialize in the holding of power; they will not allow themselves to be outmaneuvered and lose power. An international transaction to undermine that power is an absurdity. When their power is threatened, they will take means to protect themselves.

I do not attach as much importance to these matters. Bucharest will survive. The major impetus does not come from us. We are not against it. We are willing to settle issues if others are willing. We are for confidence-building measures and other standards of international relations. I have a political science department in this building which follows these things. We will cooperate in bringing it to a conclusion. We are working toward common agreement with the Western Europeans. We are not willing to spend capital on these matters. We do not want a Dutch cabaret in Moscow. We will not fall on our swords. We will be restrained. We want to finish it but we won’t weaken our relations with our Allies on these issues. If you have any influence on the Western Europeans, exercise it. It is getting late to finish it this year. When do they meet?

Sonnenfeldt: The first week in September.

Pungan: It is not a problem how many remain to be solved. But some are difficult.

Secretary: Have you read all the papers involved in Basket 3?

Pungan: No.

Secretary: I have not met any Foreign Minister who has read them all. Our positions are similar. We urged the Western Europeans to adopt a position. But they argued: if we have a position, it will become known to the Soviets. That is the point of the entire Conference—to let the Soviets know our position.

Sonnenfeldt: We do have a difference with Romania on follow-on machinery.

Pungan: Some countries like Romania need follow-on machinery more, they need security machinery. Really you can help us here.

Bogdan: Especially on follow-on machinery.

Secretary: We are not so eager. For exactly the same reason that you want it. In your case you want it so that powerful neighboring powers will exercise restraint. In ours, we don’t want those powers becoming involved in Western European affairs who are not there already.

Pungan: You would have power in an area where you did not have it before. Except in frontier areas where it would not be very good.

Secretary: Follow-on machinery will not help us in Belgrade.

Pungan: Perhaps . . .

Secretary: Follow-on machinery will not do anything for us in Eastern European countries—in non-market economies, as Senator Jackson
puts it. We are willing to say something but not as elaborate as you would like.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Bogdan: If you would agree to follow-on machinery . . .
Secretary: You seize Bessarabia and then ask for mediation. I’ve heard folk songs performed by Russian singers and I must say the Moldavian ones sound more Central European. I think we saw a group perform in Moscow.
Sonnenfeldt: There was a Moldavian folk dance group.
Bogdan: The group toured Canada a few years ago.
Secretary: In general, when you look at your list, on the European Security Conference, we don’t differ very much. We will use our influence to bring about a more rapid conclusion to the Conference short of undermining our relations with our Western European Allies who, as you know, are subject to a slight personality complex.2

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

2 A memorandum of Pungan’s conversation with President Ford on August 27, which covered the same points as his meeting with Kissinger, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5.

245. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 28, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Let me spend five minutes on CSCE.

The original proposal by the Soviet Union in the early 1960’s excluded the United States. Its purpose was to present a substitute for a peace treaty and to create the mood that NATO was no longer necessary. We originally opposed it but gradually changed because all the European leaders pleaded for it and Brandt cut the ground out from under us by recognizing East Germany. Brandt is a good example of a flashy guy with no substance behind it.

Your tactical problem with the CSCE Summit is the Europeans say they don’t want a Summit but if you oppose it, they will come out for it and drag you into it. So you have got to stay a half step ahead. But with the Soviets, don’t commit yourself so the Soviets can use it against us with the Europeans.

The document has four major parts, including the statement of principles, then the three baskets. One is conference [confidence]-building (military) measures, economic matters, and human contacts.

The document is meaningless. The big issue is the question of the inviolability of frontiers as against peaceful change—where the peaceful change will be. Now the big issue is peaceful contacts. The Europeans are trying to work on the Communist parties so they are pushing this. The Communists have gone along with much of it. We have asked the Europeans to put down all their demands in writing so we can put it to the Soviets, and they don’t want to.

We are now at Stage II. The Soviets want to have a Summit before the end of the year. I think it would be better in the Spring.

The President: I think it is mandatory to come after the first of the year.

Kissinger: I think you have to make the trip through Europe first. I would go to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. We haven’t been invited there, but there is some merit in the Soviets seeing a welcome in even a loyal satellite—no President has ever been there [Hungary]. 2

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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2 Brackets are in the original.
246. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State

Brussels, September 13, 1974, 2325Z.

4974. Subj: CSCE: NAC consultations on satisfactory outcome.
Dept please pass info Geneva for USDel CSCE. For Sonnenfeldt and Hartman from Sherer.

1. The NAC agreed that there should be further discussions of CSCE in Brussels, but we got no support in the Council for our suggestion that the Allies, in Geneva, should draft more realistic texts on central Basket III issues. French del (Andreani), in response to my question, said the Nine wanted to tidy up their Basket III texts already tabled in Geneva and make them more compact. However, they do not propose at this stage to modify them substantively. UK (Peck) doubted wisdom of drawing up next new texts which represented minimum Western requirements plus some negotiating fat. British believed, Peck said, it would be better tactics to stick with present Western positions. FRG (Brunner) did not speak to this issue at all. Canadians (Shenstone) endorsed position of Nine and said Allies should be prepared for a long haul in Geneva.

2. Everybody else who spoke also supported Nine’s position, as it was set out by Andreani, that a first reading of all Basket III texts is essential and that only thereafter, when Allies have had the Soviet reaction to all Western proposals, would it be possible to prepare for final trade-offs. Norwegians and Danes urged that Allies, for internal purposes, should set mid-December as a target date for the completion of Stage II, but nobody supported them.

3. Andreani said four U.S. Basket III texts provided last July were useful and would help the Nine and the Allies as they reflect upon the shape of the likely final compromise. No one else spoke to our papers except the Canadians who said (erroneously) that the U.S. text on reading rooms was no different from the Western proposals tabled in Geneva.

4. Allied statements in the NAC conflicted with indications earlier gleaned by our Geneva delegation that the Nine intend both to streamline their Basket III texts editorially and to make them more realistic substantively. While the NAC session was thus frankly disappointing, I do not believe we should take it as the last word of our Allies on the sub-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 16, NATO, State Department Telegrams, Tosec State, Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See Documents 236 and 237.
3 Telegram 157018 to Geneva, July 19, transmitted the U.S. draft text for access to literary works. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
ject. Most who spoke were still objecting to the idea of preparing agreed fallback positions (their interpretation of “minimum requirements”) which should be conveyed to the Soviets. They and their governments have not yet had time, of course, to digest the suggestion in my statement\(^4\) that we attempt agreement on more realistic Basket III texts which—while less ambitious than the “wish lists” now on the table—would still give Western delegations some negotiating room.

5. In next week’s caucus of NATO delegation heads in Geneva, we will press our position again. I propose to suggest that Allies take the list of essential Basket III elements drawn up by the EC–9 (para 25 of their paper)\(^5\) and attempt to draft, in the Basket III caucus, specific language under each of the points listed, working both from new EC texts and from the four papers we put forward in July.

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\(^4\) Telegram 4977 from USNATO, September 14, contains the text of Sherer’s statement before the NAC on September 13. (Ibid.)

\(^5\) Telegram 4443 from Geneva, July 12, contained portions of the EC–9’s approved paper on minimum essential requirements for Basket III. Paragraph 29 listed as major topics “freer movement and contacts” between East and West, “larger and freer distribution” and “improvement of access” to information, “more complete access” to culture and cultural “exchanges and contacts,” and “direct contacts” in education. (Ibid.) See also footnote 2, Document 237.

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247. **Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)**

Washington, September 20, 1974, 11:10 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Call on President Ford

**PARTICIPANTS**

*Soviet Side*

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File (19). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.
U.S. Side
The President
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Stoessel

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: Now I would like to touch on European affairs, including European security. Much has been done by the US and the Soviet Union acting together with regard to policy concerning Europe.

The President: I agree. I also feel there are areas where we could make more progress, but please proceed.

Gromyko: There was a time in the history of our relations when we were partners in a joint struggle against the aggressor and we shed blood for a common cause. This is embedded in human memory and always will be. Now, we have reached a level which shows the advantage of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the US in connection with European security in our own interest and in the general interest of other countries. This should not be weakened in any way and nothing should be allowed to disturb this. We feel that together we can do much more which would entirely meet the interests of strengthening European security and improving our own relations.

First, about the conference on European security and the successful completion of its work with positive results. As you know, the second stage is now in progress in Geneva. I would like to say, for the Soviet leadership and for Leonid Brezhnev personally, that we attach great importance to finishing the conference with positive results.

However, we see some artificial and unjustified delays in the conference. We feel that the completion of the conference, and especially holding the third phase at the highest level, would give a new impulse to security in Europe as well as to US-Soviet relations.

We know that some say that the US and the Soviets are acting together in unison. Even if people do say this, we don’t feel we should give up our cooperation or sacrifice the advantages which could accrue from such cooperation.

Secretary Kissinger can confirm that when we have reached an agreement and find a common language, then things move forward as a rule. But when we don’t have agreement, then there is no progress, and we go in circles.

Lately, there have been some hitches in our cooperation in Geneva. We ask ourselves whether this means a change in US policy about what has been agreed or whether this is a chance occurrence. We would like to work for a successful completion of the conference with good results. We would like to urge you to cooperate with the Soviet Union
to bring the conference to a successful conclusion. We have many other
tings to do after the conference and we want to get to them.

The Secretary: I think Ambassador Dobrynin has a microphone in
our office!

The President: When I said that we could do more, I had in mind
the security conference and also the force reduction talks. I feel we can
work together even better than we did in the war. I am not familiar
with the difficulties you mentioned at Geneva, although I know there
are some problems about Basket III.

The Secretary: I will talk at lunch with the Foreign Minister about
this. The trouble, Mr. President, is with our European allies. Speaking
very frankly, every country wants to extract something from the Soviet
Union. I’ve told all of them that the Soviet Union won’t be overthrown
without noticing it, and certainly not because of things like increased
circulation of newspapers and so on. I don’t know how many projects
have been submitted in Basket III, but there is a big pile. We’ve tried
to reduce that and to explain to our allies that the Soviet Union has
difficulty in making concessions on one issue when it doesn’t know
what else it may be asked to concede on.

We’ve had enormous difficulties with our friends to get one doc-
ument; now they are going through all of the projects and reading them.
There is no deliberate policy on our part to slow down the conference.
We remain on the course as we discussed it at the summit.

This whole thing is one of the weirdest negotiations I have ever
seen. I talked with one foreign minister in Europe and said we needed
one position. I didn’t care what it was, but we needed one position. He
objected that the Russians would find out about it. But, of course, that’s
the point—we want them to!

We do need more flexibility from the Soviet side, but I also see the
Foreign Minister’s problem. He has to know what he is dealing with.

Gromyko: Two or three issues at Geneva have become barriers
which have not yet been surmounted.

First is the inviolability of frontiers. We have been in agreement with
the US on this going back to the time of Kennedy. Of course, Roosevelt’s
position on this was known. At the conference in Geneva, everyone
agreed on one formula. But lately, we have heard that some don’t like
this formula and we have heard that the US wanted to change it.

The Secretary: That’s not true!

Gromyko: We should talk further about this matter.

Second is the question of military movements. Some countries
want us to build a great accounting house and to devote all of our ef-
forts to this so that when one division moves from one place to an-
other we can report on it, as if we had nothing else to do. What does
this have to do with security in the present day—what does this contribute to confidence? Initially, we knew Secretary Kissinger’s position on this, but at Geneva, unfortunately, the voice of the US has not been heard. I repeat, that the movement of one or two divisions from one point to another does not affect the real security of a country.

I think the US is under pressure from Luxembourg on this.

The Secretary: We see you are being pressed by Bulgaria!

Gromyko: A country like West Germany, for obvious reasons, is cautious on this and other similar questions. However, they say that we might solve this question with a voluntary exchange of observers on the basis of reciprocity. The Germans mentioned this to me in Bonn in passing.

To conclude on this point, we hope we can work more closely together and achieve greater mutual understanding at the conference.

The Secretary: On the security conference, I would say, first, that you have to be a Talmudic student to understand it. On the question of the inviolability of frontiers, this is a German issue and not a problem for the US. Following the change of government in Germany—in which Eastern Europe was not totally uninvolved—they asked for a change. We gave two versions to you but didn’t get an answer.

On troop movements, the issue is the size of the unit and the area. It is no secret that our means of information are better than those of our allies.

Gromyko: We proceed from that assumption.

The Secretary: This is primarily a European problem. We don’t know what the Germans said to you. If they come to us there will be no problem. I have had instructions from the President to work on the basis of our previous understanding.

The President: That is right. There is no change in our policy. The lack of progress on Basket III seems to be holding things up.

The Secretary: If we could get something on these other points, it might help on Basket III.

Gromyko: On Basket III, I have always favored shaking some things out of the basket, but I believe the issues essentially have been resolved.

The Secretary: Some of our allies have to show that they have extorted from you what you already have agreed to.

Gromyko: Now about the reduction of forces and the Vienna talks. This is a very important issue. You agree that it is complicated and we feel it is, too. Its solution obviously requires time and I feel our efforts should continue. But we believe the Western participants must give up the idea of some kind of a common ceiling for forces on both sides.
Some say they don’t like Soviet tanks in Europe. They say there are too many of them and that we should withdraw a full tank division. We should take 1700 out.

The Secretary: I’m for it!

Gromyko: The Western participants say we should reduce our forces twice as much as reductions on the Western side. But they refuse to reduce their air force, nuclear arms and bases in Western Europe. We could demand that these be removed, but we don’t take that approach.

We should scrupulously observe the principle of no harm to the security of either side and we should preserve the co-relation of forces in Western Europe today.

We favor a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We should go in this direction. We should make the best effort we can.

The Western participants say that only the US and Soviets should reduce and the others should be left as they are. Reductions for them would come in the indefinite future in a second phase. There is nothing precise about this and no figures are given. Everything will be subject to negotiations.

We should think more about all of this. Perhaps in the next meeting with Secretary Kissinger we could try to find a new approach to the whole problem which would serve our common interests.

The President: As I recall, we offered to take out 29,000; you should take out 68,000.2 I also recall that the Soviet Union talked in terms of a 5% reduction.

The Secretary: The Soviet Union has gone through an evolution on this point. In the Brezhnev–Nixon meeting in 1973, Brezhnev proposed a rapid 5% reduction to get things started.3 Since then, the Soviet position has evolved in a more complicated way.

Gromyko: Brezhnev’s suggestion did not constitute a broad program of action. It covered only a partial aspect. It was an illustration of the possible dimension of a first step involving US and Soviet forces.

If the US and Soviet sides reduce, it won’t help if the others increase their forces.

The Secretary: But the Foreign Minister knows that if we reduce, there must be a ceiling on the forces of the others. Whatever either of us reduces cannot be replaced by increases by the others.

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2 See footnote 2, Document 345.
3 See Documents 162 and 163.
Gromyko: It is not enough to talk about US-Soviet reductions and a concurrent freeze of the others. We should agree on a definite stage for the reduction of the forces of the other countries.

Also, a first step reduction of US-Soviet forces with concurrent conditions poses very complicated problems. In subsequent meetings we should discuss this.

The Secretary: The President met with Stanley Resor on Saturday and you can also read what I said in my testimony yesterday. It is hard to attest to the success of détente if armed forces are always going up.

All of this really doesn’t make much difference in practical terms. However, we are looking at new approaches.

Gromyko: Your argument works both ways.

The President: I am glad you brought this question up. We are interested in new approaches and this is something we should discuss later.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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4 See Document 350.

5 In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19, Kissinger said that in the coming months the United States would strive, among other things, “to complete the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, so that security will be enhanced for all the countries of Europe” and “to conclude the conference on European security and cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human aspirations.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1974, p. 519)
248. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 20, 1974, 3–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Soviets:
H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S.:
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Walter Stoessel, American Ambassador to USSR
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Secretary: We certainly described all the nuances of CSCE to the President but I think he was a little confused by Basket III.

Gromyko: Yes, I’d like to cut the bottom out of that Basket.

Secretary: Seriously, on CSCE, can we discuss that a little further? I was a little confused by something you said when we were talking to the President. You said that the Germans mentioned something about voluntary observers.

Gromyko: Yes, they said that the observers would be invited by the country in which the maneuver is taking place. Then there is the question of troop movements. Can’t we agree that that matter can be postponed for later discussion and study?

Secretary: We’re relaxed about that problem. We know what you’re doing anyway. We think that the size of the force which should be notified for maneuvers should be a reinforced division of, say, 40,000.

Hartman: I think you mean 20,000. A division is about 15,000 and a reinforced division would be roughly 20,000.

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2 Sonnenfeldt struck out “expressed” and wrote in “described” by hand.
3 See Document 247.
Gromyko: That is an artificial number. It would be impossible. We would have so many clerical problems.

Secretary: Do you move a division that often?

Gromyko: What importance does this have to Luxembourg? This is like using a microscope.

Secretary: How can we proceed in CSCE?

Gromyko: We have to agree on the question of maneuvers and troop movements. On the latter we should put it off for further study. Maybe we should examine this question of voluntary observers. This would be a moral obligation and would be much more flexible.

Secretary: Are you saying that a moral obligation is heavier than a legal one or are you saying if it’s moral you don’t have to carry it out?

Gromyko: As a rule it will be carried out.

Secretary: Just when you maneuver with nuclear weapons and we want to observe, you will not want us to.

Gromyko: As a rule it will be carried out. I have a feeling that the Basket III problem is behind us.

Secretary: Why?

Gromyko: Because we agreed on the Finnish compromise which makes it easier. Then we have the question of the relations among the principles. We think that the formulation should be “the principles should be equally strictly observed.”

Hartman: We have been talking about the equal validity of the principles.

Gromyko: Equal validity is nonsense. How can you say that the question of frontier inviolability and giving visas are equally important. Some of the principles are fundamental.

Secretary: All of the principles are equal but you are saying equally strictly observed. The thing that concerns us is that they be observed. I would be willing to examine your formulation. What did Genscher say?

Gromyko: Genscher’s attitude was positive.

Secretary: I am not intelligent enough to understand all these matters. To me it sounds all right. I will take it up with Callaghan and Genscher.

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4 Sonnenfeldt struck out “numbers” and wrote in “movements” by hand.

5 Sonnenfeldt struck out “between” and wrote in “among” by hand.

6 Reference is to point 11 of the French draft declaration of principles for the CSCE; see Document 176.
Gromyko: On the peaceful change formula you have now tabled a new text which seems to imply that the most important purpose of international law is to change frontiers. That is the current U.S. draft.

Secretary: Where did you get that this was a U.S. draft? What did Genscher say?

Gromyko: He said that it was an American proposal.

Secretary: You can see that Hartman has a lot to learn about diplomacy. Historically, let me say that we pointed out that it would be difficult to change the language we had originally agreed. This change is a German proposal. They are the ones who have the main concern. On maneuvers we will look at the problem again and I will talk to you on Tuesday. On the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, you made the observation which implied to the President that if we include air and nuclear forces you would be willing to include a tank army. Is that correct?

Gromyko: Other countries must be prepared to reduce their forces.

Secretary: In the first stage?

Gromyko: If not in the first stage, then we should define the second stage and specify what will happen.

Secretary: You mean that we should decide what is the end result of the second stage? For example, we could agree that the first stage has a certain numerical reduction or are we just talking about the principle of the second stage?

Gromyko: No, we would have to have numbers and precise times.

Secretary: Then we are talking about negotiating both the first and the second stage.

Gromyko: If numbers are not mentioned, then when will we reach agreement on this? My idea is to agree to reduce X and then X should be multiplied by 10.

Secretary: In practice you would then be negotiating both stages but there would be a difference of timing.

Gromyko: What we would be doing is leaving some details for later decision, for example, the kinds of forces and armaments.

Secretary: What you are saying is that following the reduction of this first stage, there would be a second stage. The only difference is timing.

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7 See Document 239.
8 September 24; see Document 250.
9 Sonnenfeldt added “and nuclear” by hand.
10 Sonnenfeldt added “and precise times” by hand.
11 Sonnenfeldt bracketed and struck out “and the time of fulfillment” at the end of this sentence.
Gromyko: It will be a question of fulfillment and the degree of specificity.

Secretary: If you are worried about escaping obligations, you want to specify what happens in the second stage.

Gromyko: Yes. Otherwise we are talking generalities. There should be a general obligation to reduce by all countries.

Secretary: I don’t believe we are going to finish this year. We haven’t even begun to look at the second stage.

Gromyko: It would be helpful in getting through the CSCE to be able to have progress in Vienna. Politically, it would help us. Why is that difficult?

Secretary: Are you prepared to accept a common ceiling at the end of the second stage?

Gromyko: At the end? That would depend on the ceiling. I do not reject it.

Secretary: If you can accept that we can discuss this in greater detail, we are prepared to include tactical air if that would help.

Gromyko: What kind of ceiling are you talking about? Is it possible to avoid a ceiling? You could have American and Soviet cuts and then other countries could reduce numbers as well. After that, it would be much easier to discuss a ceiling.

Secretary: I am talking about a common ceiling.

Korniyenko: What the Secretary means by a common ceiling are equal forces on both sides.

Gromyko: No, that is not what I mean.

Secretary: But then you are offering me nothing. Obviously if you agree to a cut there is a ceiling but you cannot argue in the strategic field that we have more warheads than you do and therefore must cut greater numbers, while at the same time you argue that you cannot cut...
your forces more when you have greater numbers. We are prepared to be realistic and specific in the categories where we have an advantage. If we are ahead, we make a greater cut. For example, in air forces and nuclear forces we would cut more in such a program—that would not be excluded. This is not a proposal but I am just citing an example.

Gromyko: The general idea of an equal ceiling I do not like.
Secretary: But as I said that is no concession. You are just talking about an agreed ceiling.
Gromyko: Yes, an agreed ceiling.
Secretary: It is not clear to me how we can consider both stages if at the end of the second stage we don’t reach agreement on a common-equal-ceiling.
Gromyko: That is impossible. Maybe after five stages. Why, after the second stage?
Secretary: We could have a first stage only or we can have a first stage plus agreement to a second stage whose ultimate objective is a common ceiling.
Gromyko: At the end of the second stage? How long would that take?
Secretary: We are open-minded.
Gromyko: I do not see the possibility. This would be against our security interests because we will reduce more than you.
Secretary: This is not just a common ceiling of U.S. and Soviet forces. This would be the whole NATO area versus the Warsaw Pact.
Gromyko: You would have all of the advantages. You tell us we have more tanks.
Secretary: We do not insist on an equal ceiling in all parts including equipment. What we are talking about are equal numbers of personnel. Maybe you have a tank for every three men and maybe we have a tank for every ten men. It is up to each side.
Gromyko: I do not think this will facilitate an agreement.
Secretary: Maybe we shouldn’t agree on a second stage but agree on a first stage and no principles and say that the negotiation of the second stage would begin in three to six months.
Gromyko: What if it doesn’t come about?
Sonnenfeldt: We have no interest in stopping because we are interested in moving toward a common ceiling.
Gromyko: With a common ceiling we go down more.
Secretary: How can you maintain the principle of equality in the strategic area and not here. I remember your General Secretary telling us that we have 10,000 warheads and you only have 3,000 warheads. He insisted that we move toward a common level.
Gromyko: We like equality but we mean equal security.

Secretary: In the strategic field you tell us that we are ahead in a ratio of three to one and that we should move to an equal level.

Gromyko: No, we wish to take in many factors. What we must do is to define the correlation of the numbers. We want equal security, not equal numbers of personnel.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

14 At this point, Sonnenfeldt struck out “in” and replaced it with a comma and “not.”

249. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 24, 1974, 1:45–3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher

PARTICIPANTS

German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Mr. Guenther Van Well, Political Director, FRG Foreign Ministry
Ambassador to US Berndt Von Staden
Guenther Verheugen, Counselor (Special Assistant to Foreign Minister)
Otto Von Der Gablentz, Counselor (European Policy Questions)

American
The Secretary
Under Secretary Joseph Sisco
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman
Mr. Scott George, EUR/CE Director (Notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097–2023. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by George. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Towers.
Genscher: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] What did Gromyko say when you saw him?²

The Secretary: A number of things. One was that you, or the German side in Bonn, had told him that the CSCE peaceful change language was a US draft and that you did not care much about it one way or another.

Genscher: That really tops everything. This is not at all what was said.

The Secretary: It seemed inconceivable to me, knowing your views and knowing that this is a domestic issue in the Federal Republic.

Van Well: The record is quite clear. This was an EC–9 formulation which was put forward by the US.

The Secretary: I questioned Gromyko. He told me the Germans said this is absolutely US language; we are not too much interested in it. He also said to me, and to the President, that the Soviets and FRG have more or less agreed on CSCE, Basket III is no longer a problem, and CSCE can probably conclude with a Summit meeting.

Genscher: This is not at all the case.

Van Well: Gromyko did say that the only important thing to us Soviets is non-intervention. The Foreign Minister said that we never intended to use Basket III as a means of intervention. That is all that was said on this subject. Perhaps Gromyko misunderstood this in some way.

The Secretary: Gromyko was not interested in talking specifics to us. He said that everything is settled on Basket III, or at least he left that very strong impression. Since we had heard nothing from you indicating any change in your position since June or July, we could not understand what Gromyko meant. But he certainly left us with the impression that everything had been settled with you in Bonn. Was this subject raised at the Schmidt–Gromyko meeting?³

Genscher: It was only discussed marginally at the meeting.

The Secretary: Gromyko brought up the question of equal application of the various principles instead of equal validity of principles. We said that since this was a new formulation we wanted to study it. The only language formulation we discussed was the peaceful change formulation which Gromyko rejected because of the implication that international law not only permits peaceful change but requires it.

² See Documents 247 and 248.
³ Gromyko visited Bonn on September 16. At a news conference following a meeting with Gromyko, Schmidt said that he anticipated that the European security conference would be completed by the end of the year and that he would support a summit meeting for the final stage of the CSCE. (Craig R. Whitney, "West German Chief for Summit Meeting at European Parley," New York Times, September 17, 1974, p. 4)
Other than discussing this language he mentioned only the question of CBM observers, on which I believe he accurately stated your position, and indicated that Basket III is all settled.

Genscher: In our discussion with Gromyko he said that some proposals must be more important than others. But he said there is no use to talk about which is dominant. All should be fully respected and should constitute a whole.

The Secretary: That he didn’t tell us. I don’t mind your telling him exactly what we are telling you. We said that we would have to talk with you before talking with him further.

Genscher: I told him that our position is that there should be no dominant or less dominant, no major or minor principles. I want to reiterate very strongly, Mr. Secretary, that we have not changed our position from what it was at Ottawa or Meisbach (sic). 4

The Secretary: Let’s not worry about this, but if you want to change back to your original view on peaceful change this will be OK with us.

Genscher: You and I know that the Soviet Union is really interested in only one principle. I made it very clear to Gromyko that we believe all of them should have equal value.

The Secretary: We can stick to the original text if it is put in the inviolability section or we can put the new one in the sovereignty section. I told Gromyko we would stick with the FRG on this question.

Hartman: Let’s not kid ourselves. The new formulation does change the meaning somewhat.

The Secretary: Yes, the implication is that international law requires peaceful change of frontiers. I didn’t even suggest putting your language in the inviolability section because they have already rejected this. Gromyko talked to me about substance saying that since the FRG didn’t care we might as well settle the matter between us.

Van Well: Gromyko went back to our Moscow negotiations and said that borders can be changed peacefully. Our Foreign Minister said that we are not talking about minor border adjustments but the possibility of total elimination of borders and the creation of new entities, such as the European Union. Incidentally, I think we are smart to have our own interpreter for these meetings because we have our own record to point to and don’t have to depend on what they said, according to their interpreter.

The Secretary: I would not want to have talks with them when their records are the only ones.

4 As in the original. Regarding the meeting in Miesbach, see Document 233.
Genscher: Can you give me any idea of what the President would like to talk about when I meet with him?5

The Secretary: This is entirely up to you but one possibility would be to give your views about Bonn–Washington ties, also the energy meeting, perhaps force reductions. But the President will not be intimately familiar with CSCE.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

5 Genscher met with President Ford and Kissinger in the Oval Office on September 26 from 5:35 to 6:05 p.m. No record of the conversation has been found.

250. Editorial Note

On September 24, 1974, after the session of the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary of State Kissinger met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko before a dinner banquet at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. They had a brief conversation about the issue of peaceful change of borders at the European security conference. The relevant portion of the memorandum of conversation reads:

“Secretary: I spoke to Genscher about the problem of the peaceful change language. His view was that if we agreed on the old phrase it should go in the principle on the inviolability of frontiers, but if we change the placing of this item to the sovereignty principle, then the language would have to be adjusted and it was this new language which we tabled in Geneva in July at the German request. Genscher said he would talk to you further about this.

“Gromyko: What is your preference?

“Secretary: We can support the old or the new language.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860140–1333)
251. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 27, 1974, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting between the Secretary and French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Wells Stabler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Richard D. Vine, Director, EUR/WE, notetaker

France
Jean Sauvagnargues, French Minister for Foreign Affairs
Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, French Ambassador
François Puaux, Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Constantin Andronikoff, Minister-Counselor, Interpreter

Sauvagnargues: On the conference on European security, there doesn’t appear to be much to say except for the formula on peaceful change. This is something on which we could have major difficulties with the Soviets. I talked to Gromyko about this, but we have to support the Germans in this matter.

The Secretary: Where did we get that new German formula? There is a new formula. 2 Apparently Genscher and Dobrynin met here and Dobrynin put forth new language.

Puaux: I’m happy about that, but I don’t know the details.

Sonnenfeldt: It is still based on the American version, but removes the word “only” from its present place and puts it so that it only modifies “peaceful change” and not “international law.”

The Secretary: That might meet one of the German concerns if it qualifies “peaceful means.”

Sauvagnargues: What a good solution! Do the Russians agree?

The Secretary: It’s a Russian formulation.

Sonnenfeldt: The Germans have not yet agreed to the formula, they are still examining it.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 140, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s office.
2 See Document 252.
The Secretary: We can talk to Genscher about it at Camp David. Excuse me, I should take this telephone call. (Discussion of the formula during the Secretary’s absence. Sonnenfeldt gives the formula to Puaux, making clear that this formula does not have Genscher’s final approval. Secretary returns after an absence of a minute or so.)

Sauvagnargues: As far as Basket Three items are concerned, we are proceeding to a first reading in Geneva.

The Secretary: The only question in my mind is which European will be the first formally to agree to a summit. I suspect that Schmidt will do so in Moscow. I find the subject boring. We won’t be the first. It will be some European. My impression is that Schmidt has already agreed to a summit, although I don’t know that. The longer we prolong the negotiations, the more significance will be attached to the outcome. We should best end this with decency as soon as we can.

Sauvagnargues: But you have no objection to our proceeding with a first reading?

Sonnenfeldt: The Russians object violently.

The Secretary: Our view is that we should have a common position to present. Even if the Soviets were prepared to make concessions, they would have to make them to one country which would use the concessions for domestic purposes and evoke similar demands from other countries. It would be a never-ending process. We must have a common view, before or after the first reading, of the limits beyond which we will not push. Are they meeting now?

Sonnenfeldt: The meeting is set for Thursday.

The Secretary: So there has been no first meeting?

Sonnenfeldt: The Russians are still opposed and we must decide.

Puaux: We are all agreed in the Nine and so are the neutrals. If the U.S. takes a stand in the Coordinating Group we can proceed.

The Secretary: There’s been a lot of speculation that we had an arrangement with the Soviets on this. But there are no longer any Nixon interests. You would agree, Mr. Ambassador, (to Kosciusko-Morizet) that the CSCE can do nothing for us domestically. If anything, it’s a slight liability. It is not a major issue. As I see it, the outcome is clear and we should not try to prolong beyond a reasonable period.

Sauvagnargues: But we’ll need something in Basket Three.

The Secretary: Can we agree on a common position after a first reading?

Sauvagnargues: I agree with your basic position. I think we have still to agree on how to present that position, and that is something we must discuss.

The Secretary: The Russians are not going to make any concessions until they know that they will mean something in terms of
getting a final agreement. That is the biggest technical problem for them at the moment.

Puaux: If we go through the first meeting with brackets, the Soviets will probably insist on their own language and formulations in the brackets. For them that will be a big bargain.

The Secretary: We are not opposed to that.

Puaux: Yes, but you don’t seem prepared to say that publicly.

The Secretary: Why hasn’t that been done?

Sonnenfeldt: I thought it had been agreed. We had better get out new instructions to our delegation to make that point clear.

Sauvagnargues: We should make a determined effort to hold the Soviets to normal negotiating procedures. They seem to think they are exempt. If they don’t agree, then we shall have to think of something else.

The Secretary: I have the impression that the Russians were prepared to come and go through this exercise.

Sonnenfeldt: We’ll get some new instructions out to our delegation.

The Secretary: I admit that I spend no sleepless nights over this.

Sauvagnargues: I don’t either. But in the public mind, the Russians appear to be getting some assurances and we have to make sure that there is an appropriate balance.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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252. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Mr. Secretary:

I asked Art Hartman to tell the Germans that they should pursue this issue, which is principally of concern to them, directly with the Soviets. Art has done this. I think it is pointless for us to act as middlemen.

If you agree, I will also tell Vorontsov that as far as you are concerned this is chiefly a matter between the FRG and the USSR and that we will review it only after we have indication that Bonn and Moscow are able to come to terms on it.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official. Confidential.
The confusion on the texts is really incomprehensible since Gromyko is steeped in the subject and would hardly hand personally to Genscher a text with a typographical error going directly to the heart of the dispute. All the more reason for us to stay clear of this whole issue for a while.

Approve line to Vorontsov

Other

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CSCE: Soviet “Peaceful Changes” Formulation

Soviet Minister-Counselor Vorontsov Friday evening brought me the Russian-language text of the “new formulation” on peaceful change. He explained that in order to cut down confusion and misunderstanding, Gromyko had decided henceforth to provide only Russian texts on this question. Gromyko gave the text to Genscher yesterday, and asked that Vorontsov bring in the text to be given to you.

One further round of confusion occurred when we discovered that the Russian text given us was not identical to the text given Genscher.

As given to us, the translated formulation reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can change only in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.

As given to the Germans, it reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law only by peaceful means and by agreement.

2 Kissinger initialed his approval. Sonnenfeldt spoke with Vorontsov on September 30 and informed him accordingly. Vorontsov replied, “that is fair enough,” and said he would cable the U.S. stance to Moscow. (Memorandum for the record, September 30; ibid.)

3 Drafted by the Deputy Director for Soviet Union Affairs Mark J. Garrison and cleared by Streator. Sent through Sonnenfeldt.
Thus in the formulation given us, “only” has been moved to apply to “in accordance with international law” as well as to “by peaceful means and by agreement.”

In addition, there is a distinction between “can change” (using a reflexive verb) and “can be changed” (using a participle).

The confusion between the two versions has now been cleared up. Vorontsov checked with the Gromyko delegation in New York and confirmed that the version given us is the correct one. The wrong text was given to Genscher due to a “typing error” (which will be “investigated”). Vorontsov asked if we could inform the Germans now, which we are doing. He said his side would make its apologies to the Germans later.

4 Hartman highlighted this sentence and wrote in the margin: “We have also told the Germans that they should pursue this with the Soviets.”

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253. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1974, 7:30–8:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France
Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, Ambassador of France

[Sauvagnargues: Omitted here are unrelated comments. Gromyko has warmed up a bit. He used to be quite blank-faced.

Kissinger: I think he is the most reliable—or I did until last night. They gave us a formulation for CSCE. They said it was the same as they gave the Germans, but in fact they gave us an old one.]

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 4, France, 1974. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place during breakfast in the First Floor Family Dining Room at the White House.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: MBFR is going nowhere, yes?
President: Not so far.
Kissinger: We could get something if we linked it to CSCE. But that gives you a problem.
Sauvagnargues: We are critical of MBFR, so a link with CSCE would bring us problems. I know it is useful to you domestically.
President: We have a problem with Congress every year on the troops in Europe. Each year it gets closer. Who knows what will happen next year? We are trying to hold out for mutual withdrawal.
Kosciusko-Morizet: The pressure in Congress this year doesn’t seem so high.
President: That is true. But if we get a more liberal Congress in January, our margin would evaporate.
Kissinger: And before the ’76 elections, they will try to develop some foreign policy issues. Our European troops are a likely candidate.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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254. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Mr. Secretary,

I have prepared an up-date for your luncheon with Dobrynin on the following:2

Tab A—The Trade Bill
Tab B—Moscow talks on nuclear issues
Tab C—CSCE
Tab D—MBFR
Tab E—Chemical Weapons

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union, October 1974. Secret; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the first page, “List of participants.”
2 Tabs A–B and E–I are attached but not printed. No record of Kissinger’s luncheon meeting with Dobrynin has been found.
CSCE continues at a snail’s pace. We informed the Allies October 2 that we will support the Nine in calling for a first reading of the Basket III texts. But the Soviets may not ever agree to a first reading of texts which they say are propagandistic, and the Europeans probably do not have the stomach to face a prolonged deadlock in the Conference. So the Nine in Geneva are already looking for ways to fall back gracefully, perhaps to a compromise package deal on human contacts like the one that broke the Basket III preamble impasse in July.

For your amusement, Van Well talked to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn a few days ago and was told that the Soviet formulation on peaceful change given by Gromyko to Genscher was the official one. You remember Vorontsov assured us that he had checked with Gromyko and that the version given to us was the correct one. And to compound the mischief, the Soviets have added commas to what they gave Genscher here. To recapitulate:

As given to us, the translated formulation reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can change only in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.

As given to the Germans here, it reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law only by peaceful means and by agreement.

As given to Van Well in Bonn, it reads:

The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, only by peaceful means, and by agreement.

3 Confidential; Exdis.
In any event, the Western delegations in Geneva are fully aware of the differences in the texts and Sherer is telling the Germans that we expect them and the Soviets to sort out the confusion. I told Vorontsov the same thing.

*I don't see any point in your pushing Dobrynin on CSCE until you decide how we want to play the issue of linkage with MBFR. As you asked, we have initiated a discussion of linkage at NATO and should soon begin to get instructed responses from the Allies.*

Tab D

**MBFR**

There has been no movement in Vienna since the talks resumed September 16. Meanwhile we are working with our Allies in NATO on the introduction of air manpower into the talks (in accordance with the NSDM). In view of your recent go-around with Gromyko on MBFR, there seems little more that can usefully be said to Dobrynin before you leave for Moscow.

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4 Secret; Eyes Only.
5 Document 351.
6 See Document 248.

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255. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 5, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister: Cyprus, CSCE, and the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
Romania
George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the US

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Andrews. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s office.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Macovescu: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I would like to come back to another subject, European security. We think the United States must play their own role in international affairs.

Kissinger: Separate from whom? Concretely, what role should we play in European security?

Macovescu: For a long time we have been involved in this problem. For a long time, I have the impression about American policy that the Department of State is not interested in the security conference in Europe. For what reason?

Kissinger: I can tell you why. We are not uninterested in a European security conference even if we see it as nothing spectacular. I can understand your interest in it. You want to be able to avoid great power pressures on your country. If I were the Romanian Foreign Minister, I would pursue the same policies.

Macovescu: At the same time, the United States should be interested in this matter. There is movement in Europe at this time, things are happening. The United States is absent.

Kissinger: We are present.

Macovescu: We would like to see you more active. We would like to see more specific movement than is going on now. Two years ago I was surprised—you were not here then as chief of this department—here in the Department they didn’t know exactly the problems of security.

Kissinger: Do they know now?

Sonnenfeldt: The State Department was more favorable to European security than the National Security Council staff. Your Ambassador can get out his dispatches.

Bogdan: It is more complex than that.

Kissinger: There are two separate problems. One is European security. The other is what contribution the conference will make to European security.

Macovescu: Yes, but taking into consideration the role the United States is playing in the world, I would like to see a bigger role.

Kissinger: We are not against it. But what can we concretely do to foster . . .
Macovescu: You must pay attention to what is going on.

Kissinger: I am paying attention although the effort is taxing my limited brain power to follow everything that is going on in Geneva. I learn a position and then our European friends produce variations on it and I have to learn it all over again. We are actively involved and we are prepared to do our part. But we are not prepared to jeopardize the interests of our allies to get the conference concluded. Our allies, whose bureaucracy constantly grows, come up with complicated problems that no one can understand. We are not willing to spend much capital with our allies to force them to a conclusion.

Macovescu: No. I know the Third Committee problems on human contacts. I know there are some reasonable demands and some not so desirable. Security should not deal with the question of a movie theatre in Moscow. You know you have an American library in Bucharest and we have a Romanian library in New York. I understand that our Soviet friends are not interested in this today, but perhaps they will be tomorrow.

Kissinger: I know the Basket 3 problem. A distinctive feature of the Communist system is that it specializes in the ability to hold power. The elite which brought it to power will not lose it without noticing it. Therefore, while we are for the free exchange of peoples, it will not make any difference to communist political control. No one has accused President Ceausescu of an absence of political control. We may have USIS officers in Bucharest, and New York Times correspondents, but they will not affect your political control. I am all for Basket 3, therefore we supported it. We are under no illusion as to what it will produce.

Macovescu: We are for Basket 3. We will have two million tourists in Romania this year.

Kissinger: Without the slightest effect on your political control. You can have five million tourists, and nothing would change.

Sonnenfeldt: Not simultaneously.

Bogdan: It depends what brings them.

Datcu: Coming in cars.

Bogdan: There is also the institutional concept at the conference.

Kissinger: On the institutional concept, your and our attitudes are apt to be different. You want an institutional concept in order to protect yourselves from the Soviets. I am speaking frankly. We are not eager for that because we do not want the Soviets to extend their institutional influence in Western Europe. It would affect our allies and we don’t want such a precedent.

Macovescu: If we close our discussions of European security, then security is one conference. It is not enough. Security is a long process. We believe we have to have all countries participate, including the United States.
Kissinger: We won’t join anything that includes Sweden.
Bogdan: If you weigh the risk involved, you will find there is a gain.
Kissinger: We can find a solution to this.
Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets meanwhile have cooled down on follow-on steps.
Bogdan: That is not a reason for the United States to oppose follow-on steps.
Sonnenfeldt: Because they think it would interfere with their interests.
Macovescu: Because it would carry on a continuous process.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

256. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 8, 1974, 1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Polish:
Edward Gierek, First Secretary of Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party
Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Vice Premier and Chairman of State Planning Commission
Stefan Olszowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Richard Frelek, Member of Secretariat of Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party
Dr. Witold Trampczynski, Polish Ambassador
Jerzy Waszczuk, Director, First Secretary’s Office, Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party
Marian Kruczkowski, First Deputy Director of the Press, Propaganda and Publications, Department of the Central Committee
Romuald Spasowski, Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S.:
The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Richard T. Davies
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff, Box 72, October 1974, Poland, First Secretary Gierek (12). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s dining room.
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Senator H. H. Humphrey
Senator Charles Percy
Representative Clement Zablocki²

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gierek: For us in Poland the prime importance is given to a successful conclusion of the CSCE conference. This establishment of a new relationship in Europe is of historic importance.

Secretary: By the way, I am doing a sociological survey to determine which Foreign Minister has read all of the CSCE documents. Let me hasten to add that I have not.

Olszowski: You are putting me in a difficult position.

Secretary: To my knowledge Gromyko is the only one that claims he’s read all the documents.

Olszowski: In fact, we are studying very seriously the Helsinki communiqué.

Secretary: We have too. We are interested in bringing the conference to an early end and we will cooperate to do this. Speaking very frankly, we are not prepared, however, to jeopardize our relationship with our Western European allies in order to achieve agreement. Even when we might personally be inclined to go along with the position, we will not urge our European allies to do this. But even with that qualification I believe that the conference can be concluded the first part of next year.

Gierek: This would be an achievement for peace in this part of the world but it would also have good effects in other parts as well.

Secretary: The major issues seem to be in connection with the principles on the specific language dealing with “peaceful change.” This is primarily a problem between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.

Gierek: And us.

Secretary: We have no frontiers we want to change.

Gierek: We don’t either.

Secretary: It is not our impression that this problem will be difficult to solve. There is also the question of CBMs and Basket III. Here the difficulty seems to be that the documents are accumulating. We are trying to reduce the 13 or 14 proposals to one document that can be negotiated. Our allies, however, want to go through the process of a

² Humphrey was a Democrat from Minnesota; Percy, a Republican from Illinois; and Zablocki, a Democrat from Illinois.
first reading. We support a first reading and when it is concluded we will attempt to get a single position that can be negotiated. Personally, I believe that the Communists will not change their regimes without noticing it. It’s a good idea to have these exchanges of persons and ideas. But that does not seem to us a major area of difficulty. My impression is that the conference can be successfully concluded early in 1975.

Olszowski: One matter of concern is that the fall session in Geneva seemed to start smoothly but quickly came to a standstill.

Secretary: That couldn’t have been a very smooth beginning then.

Olszowski: I agree, but there are too many problems and they must be reduced. We must seek to elaborate what is on the table. In Basket I the key is the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and that seems to be on the way to agreement. Basket II also seems near completion. On Basket III we think it would be worthwhile to take a realistic look at what is acceptable. As far as Polish practice is concerned, there are no serious obstacles for us. Looking realistically there should be proposals that both sides can accept if we select the proposals carefully. In fact, this brings us to the last question which is the post-conference body. Perhaps we could select some formulas to agree on now and leave others for the continuing machinery to work out later.

Gierek: As far as Basket III is concerned there are 13 to 15 million people who visit Poland each year (sic).3 Sixty to eighty percent are from the West—Scandinavia, Germany, France, etc. We will have several tens of thousands of Americans. We have no objection to that. In addition, 8 million (sic)4 Poles visit outside Poland—in Czechoslovakia, France, Scandinavia and even Spain.

Secretary: I don’t think Poland will have difficulty with this area but what about the Soviets?

Gierek: It is true there may be some difficulties for them.

Secretary: We approach this whole matter in a constructive spirit. We don’t wish to push these matters in a way that will humiliate the Soviet Union. After the first reading we will try to find some compromises. The authors of these proposals need a first reading to satisfy their pride. As far as the United States is concerned, we could do it either way. This is a procedural issue and once we have settled it we can then move toward a conclusion. On the inviolability issue, if you want my honest view, only the lawyers understand the differences between the various formulations on peaceful change. No one is going to be able to change a frontier by pointing to a paragraph in the CSCE Dec-

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3 As in the original.
4 As in the original.
laration. The main issue now seems to be over the placement of the word “only.” The West Germans have a difficult domestic policy issue. We have told the FRG and the Soviets to work it out. We have no quarrel with the old registered text or with the new text. The problem, Chuck (turning to Senator Percy), is that the German lawyers feel that the phrase “only under international law can frontiers be changed peacefully” means nothing because international law has nothing to say about changing frontiers and, therefore, they want a phrase “according to international law frontiers can only be changed peacefully and by agreement.”

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Olszowski: That is a very interesting subject but may I go back to the other subject for a moment. On the CSCE it is not only the Soviets who have difficulty with Basket III. There are others as well. For example, the Turks are not happy with some of the proposals for exchange of information.

Secretary: You mean the Turks want to oppose Basket III because they don’t want newspapers to come in?

Olszowski: That seems to be the problem.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary: I am not informed but does Albania participate in the CSCE?

Gierek: No.

Olszowski: They have made speeches and public statements saying that they consider the conference disgusting.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
Moscow, October 24, 1974, 11 a.m.–2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member CPSU Politburo
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT
Secretary Kissinger’s Visit to USSR, October 1974

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Brezhnev: One last matter affecting us is that of the All European Conference. If you have any reproaches regarding our position I’m sure you will make them. There are no hidden dangers in the USSR position, no one-sided advantages. The Conference must serve the interests of all the participants. But, how is the United States acting?

I don’t want to criticize your President. But, in practice, we don’t feel that at Geneva the United States is acting vigorously with the So-

viet Union to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. I am sure that if the United States and the President wanted to act, agreement would be achieved rapidly. The United States and Soviet Union would not be showing hegemony, but would be safeguarding peace in Europe. If the United States took a stand, your friends would act. Now we have new delays, another interval. Then they will say it is too cold, then too hot. It is being dragged out. We feel the United States is far too passive. In words, the United States says it wants to act. At the conference, the United States sits in silence. France takes one position. The FRG has its position. We think the United States should take a resolute position. The Netherlands, Turkey and others are dragging it out. But, when questions regarding our territory to the Urals are raised, then European Security is really not the subject.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

258. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 6–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)
Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Kissinger: Let me turn to the European Security Conference.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: The General Secretary stated we were insufficiently cooperative.

Brezhnev: That’s not right; I said “not enough activity [aktivnost’].” There is cooperation; “activity” is another question.

Kissinger: One of the difficulties, quite frankly, on the European Security Conference, is that some of the issues are so absurd that it’s very hard to apply political influence to them. On some issues there are only three people in the world—in whom the Foreign Minister belongs—who understand what they’re all about. I frankly, even after a night’s reflection, Mr. Foreign Minister, don’t understand the difference between “each principle has equal validity” and “each principle should be equally observed.” I tell you now I will accept either formulation if the other participants agree, whichever it is.

Gromyko: That is only part of the general formula being suggested. Because there is also “equally valid and interdependent,” which the Germans want.

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Why do the nutty Germans want “interdependent?”

Sonnenfeldt: [To Kissinger] It’s a French point.

Gromyko: Actually we understand the line pursued by proponents of that formula. When they say the principles should be interdependent—actually it’s “each principle should be equally valid and interdependent”—they mean that if someone says, say, that a humane principle isn’t being observed, for example, means that the others should not be observed.

Kissinger: But it works both ways.

Gromyko: It’s like little wheels in a watch. If one stops revolving, the others do.

Kissinger: If you claim one isn’t being observed, you can also say the others aren’t applicable. It’s much more dangerous to the Germans than to you.

Gromyko: Our point of view is different. We believe that even if somebody doesn’t observe one principle, it doesn’t mean an end should
be put to observance of all the rest. Let’s say some shouter, say in West Germany—but let’s not name any countries—says because some principle, say a humane principle—someone is refused an exit visa—then all the other principles, like inviolability of frontiers, shouldn’t be observed either. The objective position would be to say that all principles, from A to Z—10 or 11 or what have you—should be equally strictly observed.

Kissinger: My difficulty is I don’t understand half of the issues being argued about. I understand this one, but let me be perfectly frank. If you have a concrete negotiation, you can go and use influence. But when the issue is where to place one phrase, whether to put it before or after another one, it’s extremely difficult to use the prestige of the United States to put pressure and be accused of betraying an ally. What’s happened with the European Security Conference is that every government is using it for purely domestic purposes, proving how tough it can be because it’s running no risk. In Ottawa I told them what the result would be. But it’s impossible to put pressure on a stupid point.

Gromyko: Tell them more energetically.

Kissinger: I don’t want to go through all this before the General Secretary. Let me give you my own prediction. I believe it must be wound up. It’s impossible to keep it going on these issues. It’s an affront to logic. Probably the end of March is a reasonable time it should be wound up. Thirdly, what are the issues? On the principles, it’s “peaceful change” and this point about “equally observed” and “equal validity.”

Gromyko: That’s two separate questions.

Kissinger: That’s two separate questions. These are essentially German questions. No one else is interested in them. Then there is Basket III, and there is Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence-Building Measures will be settled, whatever the proposals are, because the difference between 50 and 100 kilometers, and between 20,000 and 40,000, can be compromised. So we’re talking about Basket III and peaceful change.

With respect to Basket III, after the first reading, we have the approval of our allies to develop a common position. Until there is a common position, we understand your reluctance to compromise.

Regarding the two German points, Mr. Sonnenfeldt is leaving to see Schmidt before Schmidt comes here. He will express my personal view.

Gromyko: [To Sonnenfeldt] We will look at you!

Kissinger: And he may even be on time for Schmidt.

And you’ll see President Ford, and he will see Schmidt in Washington. We think it has to be brought to a conclusion. And it’s between you, us, and Schmidt. Maybe also Giscard, whom we’ll also see on the 15th. December will be a good time to work this out.
I wonder whether the Foreign Minister’s fertile mind, aided by Korniyenko, can come up with an idea on peaceful change—even if it’s only to move the word “only” around in the center. So Genscher can say he’s got a victory on something. I frankly don’t believe that at the level of the Foreign Offices this can be settled, so when President Ford and Schmidt and Giscard meet, it can probably be settled.

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we shouldn’t now endeavor to go into every detail on this. Perhaps you and Gromyko and Korniyenko can spend some time on it before you leave.

Kissinger: [To Sukhodrev] Did you translate what I said about the end of March?

Sukhodrev: Yes. The conclusion of the Conference.

Kissinger: All I can do is repeat: The President and you will discuss it at Vladivostok, and by the end of December we can bring it to a concrete point.

Brezhnev: Since the United States is also a participant in the European Security Conference, we have a very earnest desire to write into the European Security Conference that the United States should notify us about all movements of its Navy and all movements of its troops in the United States all the way to California.

Kissinger: Dobrynin knows it anyway.

Brezhnev: Dobrynin hasn’t told me about it. Because otherwise you say it doesn’t concern the United States; that it’s a German question, a French question. Let’s all build confidence.

Kissinger: But the summer house where Dobrynin spends all his time has more electronic equipment... It goes out to the Atlantic. You want to cover California too?

Brezhnev: All the way to California.

Kissinger: I think the question of military maneuvers will be settled.

Brezhnev: You know, the unfortunate thing is, I turned out to be the author of this proposal about notification of troop movements. It sometimes happens that a man proceeds from the best of intentions and makes a mistake in not predicting what form it takes in someone else’s eyes. I am admitting it very frankly. We had a discussion with the late President Pompidou at Zaslavoye, and the question didn’t even exist then. I said to him, “Let’s do something to strengthen confidence. After all, any army doesn’t just live in barracks and go out to mess room. They conduct maneuvers; they move tanks and planes. Let’s invite your representatives, and anyone’s representatives, to attend these maneuvers to observe them, and that would strengthen confidence.”

No sooner did I say this than it was turned into an idea of opening up the whole Soviet Union, to the Urals. The question didn’t exist before I mentioned it.
Aleksandrov: You let the genie out of the bottle!

Brezhnev: I let the genie out of the bottle, and now every country is coming back at me—the Greeks, the Turks, the Dutch, Belgium.

Kissinger: Anyone who can get the Greeks and Turks to agree on anything has already accomplished something.

Brezhnev: If that is so, we have to report to you and Canada about any troop movement.

Aleksandrov: Let you and Canada report!

Kissinger: We already know what you’re doing.

Brezhnev: Of course.

Kissinger: Not every company, but every substantial movement.

Brezhnev: In the last ten years, we’ve had no more than two major military exercises, “Dniepr” and “Dvina.” One was “Dniepr,” when the Kiev Military District was supposed to mount an offensive against the Belorussian Military District. Who won, I can’t say, because there was no real firing. But all the general officers there watched the Air Force come in with correct precision, and other movements. So if Grechko favors the Kiev Military District, he just announces Kiev has won. If for some reason he supports Belorussia, he announces they won. Thank God I wasn’t present; I’d have said they both won.

The only extenuating factor for me is that I came out for that proposal guided by the noblest of intentions. But now others have turned it into a principle.

Kissinger: I’m aware of the differences of opinion that exist.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I raise the point by way of suggesting voluntary observers—that is, if we want to invite them, we do, and if we don’t, we don’t. In short, I think we should at some point discuss it in greater detail, especially taking into account your view of reaching a solution.

One thing that troubles me is that you seem to agree with those who emphasize the great difficulty of reaching agreement on peaceful change of frontiers.

The second point is I’m sick and tired of endless delays in bringing the Conference to a close. It was once to be ended in 1972. Then it was supposed to be in 1973, then in 1974. Now we hear it’s March 1975.

Kissinger: I myself think March 1975 is realistic. Don’t you?

Gromyko: If that is so, it’s only because there are some who artificially cling to that time limit, who try artificially to hold back on it.

Kissinger: There is no issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. If I had a major concern here, I’d insist on it. The General Secretary knows I’m not exactly bashful about stating my views. So it’s a question of how between the two of us we can manage the ending of the Conference. It’s now practically impossible to do it in November.
May I make a concrete proposal, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: We will make an effort in the next two months to move our allies to a conclusion. You will see Schmidt and Giscard, and you let us know what you discussed with them with respect to this Conference. We will see Schmidt and Giscard, and we’ll let you know what we discussed. So as to avoid confusion. Then early in January, you may wish to send Korniyenko, or maybe you’d send Gromyko, to America, and we could after all these discussions see where we are.

Gromyko: The important thing is that in our contacts with Schmidt and Giscard we should act from one and the same position and not in different positions.

Kissinger: I agree. But I think we should do it in parallel, but not give the impression we have an agreement.

Gromyko: The French would be overenthusiastic if they felt we were acting jointly with you.

Kissinger: They would be delighted.

Brezhnev: I certainly agree we don’t need to use virtually the same words in expounding our position with Giscard and Schmidt, but we should act in parallel and in one and the same direction.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Perhaps you could have a word or two with the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: The basic thing is to talk in parallel.

Kissinger: Our basic talk with Schmidt is not when Sonnenfeldt is there, but when the President meets with Schmidt in Washington. But I’ll send a message to Schmidt through Sonnenfeldt that we believe the Conference should be brought to a conclusion.

Brezhnev: When I say we should act along the same line, I mean while you are here in Moscow, you and Gromyko should agree on the main principles. Because if those basic principles are agreed on between us, Sonnenfeldt can be given more explicit instructions.

Kissinger: We can have a talk, but in our view the realistic time to make progress is when the President sees Schmidt.

Brezhnev: It’s certainly true that more concrete results can be achieved in a summit, but at the lower level some preliminary work can be done.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And I certainly could not conceive of this question not being touched upon when I meet President Ford.

Kissinger: No question. We are prepared to discuss it.

Are we finished with this question?
Gromyko: In effect, you were replying to the observations made by the General Secretary this morning.

Kissinger: That’s correct.

Gromyko: Because the questions we did mention regarding the European Security Conference are the issues that are now holding up the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And my point is that your basic problem is not the United States.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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259. Editorial Note

On the evening of October 26, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger met with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev for a final session of talks before departing Moscow for India the following day. A memorandum of conversation of the meeting reads in part: “Brezhnev: Those very small minor amendments to the overall communiqué we’ve made in the belief that it might be useful in terms of Vladivostok. Kissinger: I agree. You can understand our problem on MBFR. Brezhnev: We can accept it. Kissinger: And we accept. If you make many more concessions like this you’ll have Alaska by next year. (Sukhodrev translates; Gromyko translates again and Brezhnev and Soviet side laugh.)” The memorandum continues: “Kissinger: Now, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going to talk to Schmidt; then, we will talk to Schmidt when he comes to Washington. If we keep each other informed on how that concerns CSCE we can make some progress. Brezhnev: I agree. Kissinger: We’ll keep you informed.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President’s Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974, Japan, Korea, and USSR, General [19]) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.

The final joint communiqué issued at the end of Kissinger’s visit, October 27, reads in part: “Noting the progress achieved by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the two sides will continue to work actively for its successful conclusion at an early date. They also believe that it is possible to achieve progress at the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 25, 1974, page 704)

On October 28, Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman met with West German Chancellor
Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher in Bonn to brief them on Kissinger’s conversations in Moscow. Sonnenfeldt and Hartman reported to Kissinger the same day on their meetings in Bonn: “We next reviewed the CSCE discussion, noting that the Soviets were mostly concerned with the ‘peaceful change’ principle and with the question of ‘equal validity’ and ‘interdependence’ of principles. We said that we had told the Soviets that we would accept whatever they might work out with the Germans who were principally interested in these points. We told Schmidt that it was our feeling that the Geneva conference ought to be brought to a fairly quick end since it was becoming increasingly counter-productive. We noted that following his own visit to Moscow and the President’s talks in Vladivostok there will be a series of intra-Western meetings which will provide an opportunity of reviewing the status of the conference. After that we ought to be able to reach a conclusion on how best to bring the conference to an end. We stressed that it was important that all the Western nations were united in their strategy and tactics in this regard and urged him not to take any steps of his own in Moscow beyond possibly getting some agreement on the two outstanding principles. Schmidt commented that it had been his impression that the U.S. wanted a quick conclusion at the summit level. We pointed out that this was incorrect and that on the contrary we had had reason to believe that both Pompidou and Brandt had earlier committed themselves to a summit conclusion. In any event, we stressed, it was now important that we should all be together on this matter. Schmidt indicated that his only interest was in the ‘peaceful change’ principle.” (Telegram 16889 from Bonn, October 27; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 3, Nodis Letters, HAK 1973–74, Folder 7)

After Moscow, Kissinger traveled to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. On November 3, he visited Romania, where he held talks with President Ceausescu. Kissinger summarized his conversations in a message to the President (Hakto 107) on November 4. With regard to the European security conference, the message reads: “We [Kissinger and Ceausescu] then turned to Europe, which we agreed was problem number one. Ceausescu raised anew Romanian desires for some sort of follow-up mechanism after CSCE as a way to inhibit Soviet intervention. I had earlier agreed with the foreign minister [Macovescu] that our representatives in Geneva would meet soon on this question. Ceausescu also stressed Romanian concern over the potential latitude that certain language in the UN Charter could offer the Soviets for interference in former enemy states like Romania. Throughout this part of the talk ran the old Romanian refrain of worry
about our working out deals with the Soviets at their expense, but I assured him flatly that we would seek no condominium with the USSR.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President’s Trip Files, Box 4, November 1974, Japan, Korea, and USSR, Hakto [7]) A memorandum of Kissinger’s earlier conversation the same day with Foreign Minister Macovescu is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Chron, Official.

260. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 12, 1974, 11:15 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria
Hannes Androsch, Minister of Finance
President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kreisky: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I think we can get something at the Conference in Helsinki, if he [Brezhnev] understands we need to get something so it is not just a show.

President: Basket III.

Kissinger: The problem is not us but Western Europe. Each European leader wants to show a success to its Parliament. If we could get a consolidated European position, we could get some Soviet concessions. If you would help on this . . .

Kreisky: Yes. Sweden is with us. To establish an energy agency of the west is very significant. Like the EPU in its time. It is important not only for Europe, but also eventually the Soviet Union and Poland. There will be a network of pipelines from the East. This should be discussed in CSCE. It will be important for the follow-on conference. Energy cooperation is going on now.

¹Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.
The next question is: some small results should come from the Vienna MBFR talks. There should be results because of opinion, not only in Europe, but also in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev too needs results. He is not in trouble but he has been trying for four years. We shouldn’t just say us all the time.

Kissinger: I agree. This generation has a four-year stake in these negotiations. They also have the fear of war in their bones. Our problem in every multilateral negotiation—we have Jackson, but also the Europeans, who pleaded with us in ’69 for concessions and now accuse us of selling out. Any way you can help . . .

Kreisky: Yes. The next generation nobody knows. Also the Chinese attitude. Chou tried to tell us not to believe in the Soviet Union, détente, etc. But they are Communists too, so there is some strategy there too.

I am glad you are going to meet Brezhnev in Vladivostok. Brezhnev is very serious—that is his real weakness. Khrushchev was not. Kosygin is the most honest and brightest. He is running the country economically. Brezhnev doesn’t know that. Kosygin was against Czechoslovakia.

Kissinger: Kosygin is by far the most intelligent. Brezhnev is very emotional.

Kreisky: He is very Russian.

President: I am looking forward to meeting him. We are hoping for meaningful progress which will lead to something next summer. You know Resor who is there on MBFR. It is our allies that are creating the problem. Every time we try to formulate something, they block us . . .

Kissinger: Basically the Europeans aren’t scared, so they feel free to be tough. They make Talmudic arguments. Some of them have made a proposal which might have a chance, but by the time the Europeans get through with it . . . On SALT we have a good chance.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
261. Memorandum of Conversation

Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, 2:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR
General Secretary Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

SUBJECT

Middle East, CSCE, Trade Bill

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] I suggest, Mr. General Secretary, that perhaps we should now turn to the question of the European Security Conference, a subject in which we both are very interested.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let’s do that.

The President: We hope that there can be some real movement in this area. I believe we have to work between ourselves to reach possible solutions, and I think we can do it. What is your view as to what should be done to move the Conference to its final successful conclusion?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I would like to turn this question back to you. There are a lot of artificial, invented issues in Geneva. All issues regarding security have been practically solved, but what is braking progress is the so-called Basket III. Let’s clean up that basket and everything will be solved. What is the United States concern in this area?

The Secretary: I would like to see that Dutch cabaret opened in Moscow so that I can visit it.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 4, Nodis Memcons, Jan. 1974, Folder 2. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Okeanskaya Sanatorium near Vladivostok. President Ford visited Vladivostok for a summit meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev from November 23 to 27. The complete text of the memorandum of this conversation, along with other documentation on the Vladivostok summit, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.
General Secretary Brezhnev: Give us time to build it.

The Secretary: May I ask what you discussed with Schmidt, since he will be visiting the President in a couple of weeks. As I told you in October, we would be prepared to talk with Schmidt and Giscard to expedite matters. But in order not to work at cross purposes, it would be useful to know what you discussed with Schmidt.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Generally speaking, Schmidt did not object to concluding the conference. In essence, what the Germans are concerned about is the question of reunification. (Gromyko corrected Brezhnev’s terminology by saying that the issue in question was that of peaceful change of boundaries.) So the question is where to place this point in the document. The basic principle is that borders should be inviolable and that states are to remain independent. A reference to peaceful change of boundaries could be placed somewhere, but the Germans came up with language the effect of which is to suggest that the primary purpose of international law is change of boundaries.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I fully agree with comrade Brezhnev’s comments. I must also say that as of late the United States influence on the conference has diminished and that somehow the United States has become passive in Geneva. We regard this as part of United States policy. When the United States wanted to give a push to the conference, it did it rather well. Dr. Kissinger will remember that when the question of principles was discussed, more specifically that of non-interference, the United States acted together with us and we succeeded in persuading others. But recently the situation has deteriorated. To turn to specific issues, I want to point out that neither in joint Soviet-American nor in separate United States documents is there specific reference to the United States endorsing the holding of the third stage of the conference at the highest level. Even in today’s communiqué there’s no such reference. This is my first point. My second point is that United States representatives in Geneva either don’t have or, if they do, are concealing and not implementing instructions to bring the conference to an end as soon as possible. All delegations should be instructed to conclude the conference by say January 1 or 15, or some other specific date. Many delegations are looking to you for taking the lead.

The Secretary: Here’s another complaint in addition to several others. Never before did I hear praise for our cooperation, but at least today, several months later, we heard that we had done something.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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2 Schmidt visited Moscow from October 28 to 31.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: To continue, all delegations in Geneva should be instructed to finish the conference by a certain definite date. It would be good if we here could agree to act in such a way as to end Stage II by January 1 and have Stage III take place at the highest level sometime in January. As regards Basket III, the United States has demonstrated some sober judgment. But why do certain countries insist on imposing on others foreign institutions, even organizations managed by foreigners? Why would someone come as guest if he is not invited? We will have a cabaret if we want it. That's my third point. My fourth point is regarding the question of borders. The main aspect of this problem, that is inviolability, has been agreed upon and there are no difficulties. As to peaceful change, one question is where to place that point. But then a new formulation appeared and the Germans told us that it was the United States who had proposed it. In his conversations with us, Dr. Kissinger was indignant and said that this was an FRG and not a United States proposal. Nevertheless, this new language has been floating around ever since, and its thrust is that the main purpose of international law is change of borders. Let us jointly convince the FRG not to drag out this issue. Now let me turn to my fifth point. It relates to the issue of the significance of principles. Some maintain that all principles, be they on cabarets or on inviolability of borders, are of equal significance. Of course, one cannot agree to this proposition. But this is exactly what some are trying to impose on us. In our view, all principles should be strictly observed, so let us both pursue this line, not only in the corridors but at the negotiating table as well. Now to my sixth point. In Geneva, certain measures relating to military détente have been under discussion. They pertain to such things as maneuvers and movement of troops. As regards movement of troops, it seems that this issue is being left for the future, but on maneuvers some people want us to give information about everything that goes on in the area up to the Urals, even as regards the activities of small units. In our view, a solution of this problem should be such as would lessen tensions and suspicions. But the approach I just referred to would have the contrary result. Long ago, we agreed on exchanging observers at maneuvers, but now this issue threatens to become an obstacle, because it is artificially exaggerated. So efforts should be made to resolve all these issues. Otherwise, the conference will not be concluded.

The Secretary: I will not give a six-point answer, partly because some of the issues are so complicated that I have a hard time understanding them. In fact, I believe that Mr. Gromyko is the only Foreign Minister who understands all the issues. My comments will relate to three points: first, principles; second, Basket III; and third, movement of troops. The problem of principles is essentially a German problem. The issue of equal validity or placement is a mystery to me, it is one
that required Kantian education to understand. We do not believe that it can have any effect on the real situation, because no one will change the borders merely because the word “only” appears at the end of a CSCE document. As the President said, he will raise this question with Schmidt and try to convince the Germans to review their position. Then we will inform you.

The President: I will meet with Schmidt and Giscard and will discuss these CSCE issues with them in order to try to develop a method for solving all the points raised by the Foreign Minister.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I’ll make only a few brief comments, since comrade Gromyko has made a full presentation on this problem. I was pleased to see in one of your letters, Mr. President, the statement that you will seek the earliest conclusion of the Geneva conference and then sign the documents at the highest level. I’m a businesslike man and I believe you. I hope, therefore, that every effort will be made to this end. Do you think that the conference could be concluded by January 1, with the final stage at the highest level taking place in January?

The Secretary: Absolutely impossible.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Why?

The Secretary: Let’s be realistic. The second reading of Basket III has not yet been completed. In fact, you still owe us some formulations regarding that Basket. So, realistically, the conference could be concluded by the end of March, with Stage II terminating by the end of February and Stage III taking place in March or April.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can we agree that Stage II should end in the second half of February?

The Secretary: With a major effort, perhaps that might be possible, but we will be able to give you an honest estimate after our discussions with Schmidt and Giscard. To be perfectly frank, there is not one United States objective for which we would want to prolong the conference but, on the other hand, we don’t want to antagonize our allies. We believe the conference has been dragging too long and that by now no one really understands the issues, except perhaps Gromyko.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can we have at least a tentative date?

The Secretary: Perhaps March or April.

The President: I will talk with Schmidt and Giscard and attempt to get them to move in this area.

(At this point, Assistant Secretary Hartman left the room.)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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3 No such letter has been found.
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262. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, December 5, 1974, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger (presiding as Chairman)
D  Mr. Ingersoll
P  Mr. Sisco
T  Mr. Maw
C  Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF Mr. Blake
ARA Mr. Rogers
EA Mr. Hummel (Acting)
EUR Mr. Hartman
NEA Mr. Sober (Acting)
INR Mr. Hyland
S/P Mr. Lord
EB Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/PRS Mr. Anderson
PM Mr. Stern
IO Mr. Buffum
H  Mr. Holton
L  Mr. Aldrich (Acting)
S/S Mr. Springsteen
S  Mr. Bremer

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Hartman: On the CSCE matters that we’ll be discussing on the side in today’s meetings, while you’re talking to Schmidt and to Genscher, Schmidt has brought with him four state secretaries on the economic side and some of the political people from the Foreign Office. So what we’ve arranged is that Tom Enders\(^2\) and Jack Bennet\(^3\) will be talking to them in the Cabinet Room.

Secretary Kissinger: Can you explain to them the difference between “equally observed” and “equal validity”?\(^4\) It passes my understanding. What is the intellectual difference?

Mr. Hartman: The intellectual difference is that if you say that all the principles have equal validity—

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternatives.

\(^2\) Assistant Secretary of State for Economic-Business Affairs.

\(^3\) Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs.

\(^4\) The word “identity” was crossed out by an unknown hand and replaced with “validity” here and in Hartman’s response.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Hartman: —then you’re saying that the Soviet Union cannot say that the inviolability of frontiers is the most important principle. And that’s the one that has to be applied above all.

Secretary Kissinger: If you say they must be equally observed, how can they say it then?

Mr. Hartman: Well, you see, if you observe the inviolability principle strictly—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Hartman: —it makes it less likely that you can persuade people that there is a case for peaceful change, because the Soviet Union will interpret that as saying that really inviolability means no change.

Secretary Kissinger: I mean, you guys are of course professionals, having worked in this field for so many years and having seen amateurs come and go.

Does anyone here understand that difference? If it’s equal validity, then you cannot say one is more important than the other. But if they’re equally observed, then you can say it’s more important than the other?

It’s beyond my comprehension.

Mr. Hartman: Well, it’s a political issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Does anyone understand it intellectually? I mean, at least, the peaceful-change argument is nuts, but understandable. (Laughter.)

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The difference is between subjective observation and objective observation—regardless of whether you observe them or not.

Secretary Kissinger: And they must be equally observed?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It depends on how you act with respect to them, which is why the Germans don’t like that.

Secretary Kissinger: But, in other words, as long as they have equal validity, observation doesn’t make any difference.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You have a legal and metaphysical case for arguing they’re all equal. (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: Until there is some failure to observe.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Like the difference between a traffic law and laws against murder.

Secretary Kissinger: You might want to reconsider that! (Laughter.)

Mr. Maw: I understand the physics of this, but not the law.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember an intelligence report at the end of the war that said the the secret dream of every German is to be hit by a car, with a light in the street in his favor. (Laughter.)
I don't know—my problem is I do not know how to resolve these issues. The one on peaceful change is only absurd, but at least I can grasp it intellectually. The absurdity of that is the placement of the word "only" will not determine whether there is a change in frontiers in Europe. In fact, there isn't going to be a goddamn thing written in these principles. It isn't going to make the damndest difference as to whether there is peaceful change or not.

No one is going to point to a clause of principles and say only because it qualifies international law it prohibits peaceful change, while it only qualifies peaceful change. It permits it.

I think this is childish. This is German domestic politics.

Mr. Hartman: Exactly. So let's forget the substance.

Secretary Kissinger: It's absurd. I must say in Vladivostok the President turned to me and said, "What's going on here?" (Laughter.)

Mr. Ingersoll: You couldn't explain it, heh?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can explain.

Speaking of "equal validity," as I understand the German position, they will accept a sentence on peaceful change if it is in the section on inviolability of frontiers—although if you're a metaphysicist, it doesn't make a damn bit of difference where it appears if it's "equal validity."

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It doesn't have any equal validity, in the first place. It has psychological and [omission in original minutes] validity. You are modifying the inviolability principle, but if you put it there—if you put it someplace else—

Secretary Kissinger: As long as you change the frontier.

Mr. Hartman: Only if you put in the French sentence, which says the principle should be interpreted in terms of the other principles. In other words, there's a connection between the other principles.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, come on; the whole thing is totally ridiculous!

Mr. Hartman: It is. I think the Germans are coming around to the view that the longer they stick on these questions dealing with the principles, the more the finger is going to be pointed at them for holding up this conference.

Now, if we can get an early agreement on a minimum package in the humanitarian third basket—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But we can't get there until we get a common position.

Mr. Hartman: Well, there are indications now that the French are now saying the conference ought to be brought to an early conclusion.

Secretary Kissinger: There's only one issue: Who's going to sell out whom?
And I think Giscard is selling out us.

Mr. Hartman: Fine.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless Schmidt has already sold out in Moscow.

Mr. Hartman: Well, if he has, he doesn’t seem to have gotten anything for it in terms of his own concerns.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think the Europeans are all taking a position—I think with two exceptions: Norway and Denmark—that we must no longer hurry.

Secretary Kissinger: Because we’ve gotten so much up to now? What have we gotten; what exactly have we gotten? (Laughter.)

I heard Trudeau on this subject. He said—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He’s got a real domestic issue.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The family issue. And that’s an issue for him. He and the Germans there are the only ones that have an issue on Basket 3. Everyone else is pursuing—

Mr. Hartman: But if over this period someone from the Western side—and it doesn’t necessarily have to be us; if we can keep the French out, it would be fine—he could come to the Soviet Union and say, “Here is what you’ve got to accept in Basket 3, but to really wind up this conference you have to show some sensitivity to these ridiculous issues that the Germans are raising. Make that the trade. This is how you can end that conference early. Otherwise you drag it out.”

We may not want to, but that seems to be the position, it seems to me.

Secretary Kissinger: I just want someone else to get blamed for ending it late. What do we get for ending it early?

Mr. Hartman: Except to get rid of it.

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn’t mind extending it beyond the next extension. They may not want to blow up the Middle East before the European Security Conference.

Mr. Hartman: They’ve got every other linkage; you might as well have that one! (Laughter.)

Mr. Hyland: Keep it open until after Brezhnev’s visit to the Middle East.

5 After the staff meeting, Kissinger met with President Ford in the Oval Office from 9:20 to 10:15 a.m. (Ford Library, President’s Daily Diary) Kissinger told Ford: “On CSCE, no deal with Brezhnev. We don’t want it done before early February, but then we should work together to get it settled.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 5; ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7)
Secretary Kissinger: That for sure.
Mr. Hyland: Then we shouldn’t try to straighten out that language. We should let that stalemate continue.
Secretary Kissinger: But we can discuss that with Schmidt and tell him we shouldn’t settle it before early February. But isn’t it true that after it’s all settled that it would still take months?
Mr. Hartman: I think the Finns said that it would take six weeks for them to get ready for a final meeting.
Secretary Kissinger: That’s going to be the most unbelievable circus. You have how many heads of state there?
Mr. Hartman: No—but someone was suggesting that we ought to get a cruise ship and send it up to Helsinki with the number of people.
Mr. Hyland: 34.
Secretary Kissinger: Why are we going to have so many people?
Mr. Hartman: Because if the President goes there, we have a lot of people.
Secretary Kissinger: But they’re all going to speak, aren’t they?
Mr. Hartman: Oh, yes.
Secretary Kissinger: There’s no way of terminating a conference like this without having every head of state having spoken at least once. Is the Pope coming too?
Mr. Hartman: It could be. I just want to make sure whether we should bring Butz! (Laughter.)
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

263. Editorial Note

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Washington from December 5 to 6, 1974, primarily to discuss economic matters with President Ford. On December 3, Kissinger briefed Ford about Schmidt’s upcoming visit: “On CSCE, it is time to bring it to a close, but don’t do it in any way that looks like collusion. Schmidt is a better guy to deal with than Brandt.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 3; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 6)
When Ford met with Schmidt on December 6, Kissinger raised CSCE: “We [Kissinger and Genscher] talked about CSCE. We thought
after February we should push for a conclusion. The trade-off could be a compromise on Basket III in return for movement on the two principles of major interest to you [the Germans]. A move on Basket III must be done with a unified Western position.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1974)

264. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 5, 1974, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT
US Briefing on Vladivostok Meeting

PARTICIPANTS
German
Mr. Guenther van Well, Assistant Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Klaus Blech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Helmut Roth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Georg Massion, Counselor, Federal Chancellery
Mr. Guenter Verheugen, Head of the Working Group “Analysis and Information,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Fredo Dannenbring, Counselor and Head of the North American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Hans Guenter Sulimma, Counselor, Deputy Head of the Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Carl Lahusen, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

US
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. Scott George, Director, EUR/CE
Mr. Jan Lodal, NSC
Mr. D. Clift, NSC
Mr. Gerald Helman, Deputy Director, EUR/RPM
Mr. Herbert E. Wilgis, EUR/CE
Mr. Steven E. Steiner, EUR/CE

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Soviet Union, November–December 1974, Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wilgis and Steiner with concurrence by George. Approved by Robert Blackwill (C) on December 23. The conversation took place in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. The Foreign Office officials were accompanying Schmidt on his visit to Washington from December 5 to 6.
Part II—MBFR

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There was almost no discussion of MBFR at Vladivostok. What discussion there was was in informal sessions. Brezhnev complained that Secretary Schlesinger had announced that two additional combat brigades would be stationed in Europe. The President replied that this move would not be necessary if we had an MBFR agreement.² The Soviets gave us no advance notice of the freeze proposal they made in Vienna.³ The reason there was no more discussion of MBFR in Vladivostok was because of our concentration on SALT.

Ambassador Roth: Was there any discussion of CSCE/MBFR linkage?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We do not think that Gromyko’s remark about this linkage is very significant.⁴ We should discuss our tactics and strategy.

Mr. van Well: We should discuss what our reaction should be to the Soviet freeze proposal. We think they made this proposal because the NATO Ministerial meeting is coming up. The Soviets always make proposals just before a NATO Ministerial. When we were in Moscow Brezhnev said that CSCE should provide the political groundwork. After this groundwork is laid we can then go on to discuss troop and weapons reductions. Now the Soviet proposal is unacceptable to us. The question is whether we should reject it out of hand or make a counter proposal. The German suggestion is that we make a counter proposal. It would be good for NATO’s public image.


³ Telegram 453 from the delegation to the MBFR talks, November 27, reported that in an informal session between Eastern and Western representatives at the MBFR talks the previous day, “Soviet rep Khlestov presented in writing a proposal to freeze all manpower in the area of reductions for the duration of the negotiations. In their preliminary response, Allied reps said this proposal was impractical because there was no East-West agreement on the numerical force totals of either side and undesirable because it would nonetheless contractualize the present East-West force relationship and create national ceilings on the forces of individual direct participants.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

⁴ See Document 248.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have not yet reached a firm conclusion. Obviously the Soviet proposal is not acceptable. We think the question is how to convey this feeling without appearing totally obstructionist.

Mr. Lodal: Our tentative feeling is that we are close to the end of the present negotiating session. The Soviets know the elements of our proposal. They also know we need time to consider their proposal. So we do not have to reject it. But we can tell them that it does not help much. We will see if we can work it in in some way. We should then wrap up this session and do some serious work during the break.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have no time to table a counter proposal in this session.

Ambassador Roth: The question is what do we do with the British [Soviet?] proposal. We do not think that we can prepare a detailed counter proposal for delivery in this session. The NAC should discuss various scenarios.

Mr. Hartman: NATO’s basic position is known to the Soviets. We should take the recess and then prepare separate scenarios.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We are still sorting out our ideas. We will make some suggestions in Brussels in a few days. We have noticed some speculation in the German press that we made a deal in SALT on dropping FBS in favor of putting the nuclear package into MBFR. This speculation is totally wrong.

Mr. van Well: We are concerned over the public effect of the Soviet proposal before the NATO Ministerial. There could be criticism in the German press if the Soviet freeze is contrasted to NATO’s putting in two new brigades. The strongest argument against the Soviet proposal is that we need some agreement on data before we can agree to freeze.

Mr. Hartman: Do you think MBFR should be discussed in the NATO communiqué?

Mr. van Well: Yes, and we should prepare contingency language in case the Soviets leak their freeze proposal.

Mr. Lodal: I agree.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: And we can do this without disclosing the Soviet proposal?

Ambassador Roth: Perhaps we can use the Soviet proposal to get the data question on the table.

Mr. van Well: The Soviet representatives tell us that the West has responded to all the Soviet points except one. That is the inclusion of nuclear elements. They are waiting for our response on this point. What are the US thoughts? Should NATO take this up after the recess?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We are thinking about this but we have reached no conclusions. If we do make a decision we will then consult with you.
Mr. van Well: The recent Brookings study has provoked much discussion in the German press. We do not comment on this.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Neither do we.

Ambassador Roth: We have just received the US paper on the inclusion of air manpower. We are concerned that you are making this proposal at this time. This is a very sensitive question for Germany. We want to protect against the possibility of future reductions of German air manpower. Our Minister of Defense is very concerned about this possibility.

Mr. Lodal: The US suggestion is that reductions of air manpower can be permitted up to 15% of total reductions. Permitted not required. This is the US intention, to reduce our air manpower 15%. In addition we want to set a ceiling of 15% for the Soviets.

As you know, air manpower can be reintroduced quickly so we do not want the Soviets to reduce more than 15%. We still want reductions in Soviet ground forces.

Ambassador Roth: We are concerned that the US proposal prejudices the final outcome.

Mr. Lodal: It is a touchy question. What is German thinking on Option III?

Mr. van Well: We are cautious. Let the Soviets show their interest. In principle we do not oppose its introduction. However, the figures used in the Brookings report were a shock. The psychological implications on Option III are important.

(Mr. Lodal left the meeting at this point.)

Part III—CSCE

Mr. Hartman: We would like to begin our discussion of CSCE by ascertaining the results of your Moscow trip. For our part, it came up only in a side conversation in Vladivostok during the SALT discussions. Gromyko listed five or six areas where he thought progress had been made in CSCE, and he asked whether we could wind up the conference by January 1. The Secretary replied that this was impossible.
The Soviets then asked whether the conference could conclude in February. The U.S. side replied that perhaps with good will and the necessary compromises this could be done. However, there would be need for further progress in Basket III.

Mr. van Well: I would like to begin with some general remarks about CSCE. First, we consider that we should continue on the present course and complete the first reading in Geneva.

Mr. Hartman: When could this be completed?

Ambassador Blech: It is hard to say. We have just heard that some progress has been made on Principle VIII (self-determination), which had been a major hurdle. The problems here were created by other Western Europeans who wanted a “balancing sentence” to the effect that self-determination should not be used from the outside to dismember another country. Such a “balancing sentence” could be paralyzing. Principle IX, on the other hand, is not too much of a problem, but non-discrimination remains a difficult question. In addition, there are major problems on peaceful change and Principle X, namely the question of equal validity and interpreting each of the principles in the context of all the others.

Mr. van Well: This (equal validity) is the only detail which the Chancellor raised with Brezhnev in Moscow.

Mr. Hartman: It strikes us as a theological question.

Ambassador Blech: This question is not theological for us. I have the impression that the Soviets have the wrong notion of German aims and that they assume that equal validity builds a position to allow the FRG to say at some future point that without peaceful change and self-determination, we do not have to respect the other principles. We have tried to explain to the Soviets that this is not the FRG goal and that we do not contest the validity of the other principles. Our question deals with the matter of interpretation, not the validity, of the other principles—namely, that no principle should be subordinate or undercut another. When peaceful change was moved out of Principle III and put into Principle I, we have the problem of someone saying that Principle III (inviolability) derogates the possibility of peaceful change in regard to Central Europe. We must make it clear therefore that the concept of peaceful change in Principle I is not qualified by the inviolability precept. We could do this by saying in Principle I that nothing in the over-all declaration qualifies it. However, this formulation was dropped at Geneva.

We are prepared to discuss suitable formulations and to try to find one to satisfy both FRG needs and Soviet and Eastern European concerns. I want to emphasize, however, that this does not deal only with the German problem, but should be considered a general principle. The principle of self-determination should not be used to dismember a
country in violation of Principles I and IV. We have not offered a formulation on this, as the French have a draft which they think adequately expresses our view. As in the Helsinki declaration, all principles should be respected and applied equally.

There is also a problem of interpretation in this regard. The French formula is satisfactory, but there are misunderstandings on the Soviet side. Sauvagnargues in Moscow unintentionally referred to a “lien entre les principes,” which the Soviets took to mean that all of the principles are tied together. The FRG has been avoiding discussion of the interdependence of the principles, and we still think we can sell the French formula to the Soviets.

Mr. van Well: As I said, we need to complete the first reading. This can’t be done, however, until there is an agreement on CBM’s. We therefore need a CBM’s text at the first reading, as this can’t be put off until the last minute. Then there is the question of whether we should wait to resolve peaceful change and equal validity until the beginning of the second reading. Neither we nor the Soviets like leaving this issue open. But how can we resolve it? The Soviets are trying to isolate us on this issue and they succeeded in doing so on April 5.9 They tried this again, when in September and October they handed out three different versions of their proposal. Gromyko said in Moscow (October 28–30) “you are responsible”, and he pointed his finger at Foreign Minister Genscher. The Soviets consider that we are backtracking and that the April 5 text is the only valid one. This could be a disruptive issue, and we must be careful.

Peaceful change has a key role in our parliamentary debates and has important domestic political implications. The formula worked out by the U.S. in July10 is known to the Soviets. If it is the FRG which must reach a compromise with the Soviets, we would come out with less than the U.S. formula. We then would take the blame for diminishing the Secretary of State’s formula.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets are adamantly opposed to the July formula.

Mr. van Well: I would like to say something about our tactics in CSCE, and the Foreign Minister agrees with what I am about to say.

9 Telegram 5891 from Bonn, April 11, reported that West German Foreign Minister Frank had “expressed distaste for ‘premature compromise’ of this issue [i.e., inviolability of frontiers at CSCE]. He voiced displeasure that pressure for solution coming from Western (i.e., US and France) as well as Eastern countries and that Allies had left FRG in isolation on point of major significance to Bonn.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) The Soviet and West German delegations to the CSCE in Geneva reached a compromise on April 5; for a summary of the compromise, see Document 198.

10 See footnote 4, Document 233.
First, the FRG prefers that the U.S. now pursue this with the Soviets. We have not discussed this recently with the other members of the EC-Nine, but the Nine Foreign Ministers earlier gave their approval to the text developed by the Secretary of State and agreed that the U.S. should table this text at Geneva. We consider that it is best for this to be pursued now in Washington by the Secretary of State as it was he who discussed it in Moscow.

The Soviets say that the U.S. formula looks like an appeal to change frontiers. This is ridiculous. The FRG is not wedded to any particular formulation, but is wary of the Soviet claim that peaceful change must be based on “international law.” The Soviets have their own definition of “international law.” We are not unhappy with the formula Gromyko gave us in New York, and we would like to pursue this.11

We also have a question concerning the interdependence of the principles. The U.S. made an interesting breakthrough in the communiqué on the Gierek visit in stating that all of the principles are interrelated.12 This is good as a start, as it indicates that all of the principles form one whole. The French are very interested in this and will be firm. They wish to take the initiative. The FRG does not want to be out in front alone vis-à-vis the Soviets. The Soviets want to discuss this bilaterally with us, but we are opposed to this.

Another point is that we do not want to end up with an imbalance of Western vis-à-vis Eastern bracketing after the first reading. We therefore need a presentable text on CBM’s. Our leverage here is that the Soviets want an early conclusion to the conference. Time pressures are mounting on them, as they would like to have a conclusion in time for their May 8 celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the German capitulation and the East Berlin meeting of Communist parties scheduled for the same date. The Soviets are also very interested in the follow-up, but we don’t have much room for maneuver there.

Mr. Hartman: The Romanians pressed us hard on the question of follow-up and said that the Western position does not take account of the changed situation. They consider the follow-up essential to keep the West involved in the East. They claim they have some neutral support, possibly including Yugoslavia.13

Ambassador Blech: We don’t deny that Romanian interests may coincide with ours, but when they conflict with Soviet interests the Ro-

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11 See Document 252.
12 For the text of the “Joint Statement on Principles of United States-Polish relations,” signed by President Ford and First Secretary Gierek on October 9, see Department of State Bulletin, November 4, 1974, pp. 603–604.
13 See Document 259.
manians fall flat. If, on the other hand, their proposals don’t elicit Soviet pressure, we must be even more alert.

Mr. Hartman: What is necessary on CBM’s?

Ambassador Roth: There is some possibility of reaching agreement on the size of forces, but we must avoid the Soviets’ zone proposal14 and define the area to be included within the Soviet Union. The question of who should be informed should not be too difficult to settle.

Mr. Hartman: But not until the Soviets give up their zone proposal.

Mr. van Well: The British are carrying the ball on that point.

Mr. Hartman: Yes, but they (the British) are still pushing us hard on movements.

Mr. van Well: Callaghan raised the follow-up question with us in Bonn on November 10. Foreign Minister Genscher said that regularization of meetings on the ambassadorial level could be discussed in the first review. We envision this as being in 1977, as we will need two years to evaluate the situation following the conclusion of the conference.

Ambassador Blech: Ambassador Kovalev recently tried to push me back to the April 5 formula, and I tried to push him back to the Soviet formula presented in New York. Kovalev replied that he “didn’t know” anything about that. Kovalev emphasized that the third condition, namely the formulation “in accordance with international law,” is necessary. But I asked how could there be a peaceful change of borders which is not in accordance with international law. Kovalev gave the Munich Agreement as an example. I replied that this is not a good example, as Czechoslovakia was not consulted and the agreement was reached under the threat of force, which violates the other principles involved in CSCE. I think the Soviets could fall back to the two-condition formula (presented in New York) if they conclude that they have no hope of achieving the three conditions by dividing the West.

Mr. Hartman: What is the relationship of Basket III to our final bargaining tactics? How much push will be necessary and how does Basket III interconnect with the other issues?

Ambassador Blech: We have no indication that the Soviets connect them. Some Basket III questions are on the way to resolution, for example, family reunification and mixed marriages. The Soviets have been surprisingly generous here because they want to move things.

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14 With regard to confidence-building measures, the Soviets were taking the position at the CSCE in Geneva that any requirement for prior notification of military maneuvers should apply only to border zones. (Telegram 2804 from Geneva, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Mr. van Well: We don’t feel ourselves to be under pressure from the other Western Europeans. To the contrary, they told us to be firm. I personally think the Soviets link German flexibility in CSCE to the Berlin situation, and I agree with Mr. Hartman that the Soviets are under GDR pressure on this. Gromyko told us in Gymnich that “some,” rather than “we,” have difficulties with this. The Soviets then saw confusion in the West, and they became more rigid.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They are very rigid now.

Mr. Hartman: We predicted in Ottawa that this would be difficult.

Ambassador Blech: My GDR colleague said it would be a tremendous problem for them and that the CSCE declaration cannot have one millimeter more than our bilateral treaties. I replied that it cannot have a millimeter less. However, it is impossible to transfer the bilateral setting to the multilateral.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I personally feel that the more we fuss over one issue in CSCE, the more difficulties we will have on others. The mere reference to peaceful change has significant political and psychological impact to the Soviets. We therefore should not be too juridical on this, and we should not lose sight of our other goals.

Ambassador Blech: We realize that the final conference document would not be legally binding, but the East would nonetheless consider it as such. The West therefore would not be in a position to defend itself by saying it is not legally binding.

Mr. Hartman: We might want to have an Allied meeting on CSCE before the NATO consultation in order to give us more focus. I do not know how our principals would react to this, however, as this is my personal idea. Such a meeting would give us a public context to clarify our efforts.

Mr. van Well: This is a good idea.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We must nonetheless keep the political character of the CSCE talks in mind. Over-emphasizing one issue could remove the political basis for resolving the others.
265. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, December 9, 1974, 8 a.m.

PRESENT

The Secretary of State—Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Ingersoll
Mr. Maw
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Mulcahy
Mr. Bowdler
Mr. Hummel
Mr. Stabler
Mr. Atherton
Mr. Hyland
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Enders
Mr. Anderson
Ambassador McCloskey
Mr. Stern
Governor Holton
Ambassador Buffum
Mr. Eagleburger
Mr. Springsteen

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Kissinger: I want to hear first about this French communiqué with the Soviets. I have yet to read the text.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 5, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. An attached summary of the meeting reads in part: “The Franco-Soviet summit and CSCE. The Secretary directed EUR to draft a telegram of protest to Paris, info NATO capitals. The French return to Jéobert’s style of operations.” Telegram 270186 to Paris, December 10, contained the text of the U.S. démarche. Because Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues was too busy with preparations for an upcoming EC–9 summit, Secretary General de Courcel of the French Foreign Ministry received Rush the same day. Rush reported de Courcel’s reaction in telegram 29642 from Paris, December 10: “De Courcel responded that our interpretation of the French-Soviet summit communiqué is completely unfounded, and there is no cause for concern with respect to France’s continued adherence to the precondition that Stage II results must be considered satisfactory before any commitment to a summit can be made.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

2 The communiqué signed by Brezhnev and Giscard d’Estaing at the end of Brezhnev’s visit to Paris, December 4–7, reads in part: “The two parties noted that in the course of the second phase of the Geneva conference, substantial progress has been made, notably in recent weeks, in preparing the final drafts of the definitive documents. France and the Soviet Union declare themselves resolved to intensify their efforts to resolve the suspended questions within the framework imposed by the schedule agreed at Helsinki and by the conclusion of the second phase of the conference. They note that favorable conditions have been created for the conclusion of the conference within a brief time and for holding its third phase and for the signature of the final documents at the highest level.” (Telegram 29497 from Paris, December 7; ibid.)
Mr. Stabler: On the summit, you mean. Well, on that, it is quite true that they have gone much further than anybody else. They have indicated—

Secretary Kissinger: Can I hear the text? Incidentally, where is Hartman?

Mr. Stabler: He left last night for London. He had a commitment there today.

Secretary Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Stabler: Well, apparently he is speaking to a group of bankers, financial people. I think it was arranged some time ago. It says the two sides pointed out considerable progress was made during the second stage of the Geneva Conference particularly in the last week, in preparing the drafts of the final documents. “The Soviet Union and France declared their determination to step up efforts in considering questions which are not yet agreed upon within the framework of the agenda adopted in Helsinki, so as to conclude the second stage of the conference. They state that good prerequisites have been created for the conclusion of the conference at an early date, for holding its third stage, and for signing its final documents at summit level.”

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know damned well if we had said this, the Europeans would be climbing the walls.

Mr. Stabler: And that is particularly so—

Secretary Kissinger: If you remember that dinner—I forget when it was—we had at the Quai D’Orsay, when the French would not let us say privately that the efforts had to be speeded up.3 In July.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Even in Ottawa.

Secretary Kissinger: I know. But in July. They would not even let us put down a desirable position on paper, lest it leak to the Soviets.

Mr. Stabler: It is also quite true that as far as the Schmidt visit in Moscow4 is concerned, that that was absolutely just completely devoid of anything: discussed questions relating to the Conference on Security Cooperation, they would agree to its successful conclusion as soon as possible. And there is absolutely total refusal on the part of the Germans to agree to any reference to the level at all. So they sidestepped it neatly.

Secretary Kissinger: We could have at successive summit meetings gone quite far in that direction. And time and again we have been dis-

3 See Document 232.
suaded by the Europeans, and time and again the Europeans have told us that this would be handled on a united basis. I don’t think we should take it. I have always known—as you know, I have always said the only question is which European will sell out first. In fact, I said it to Schmidt last week. I said if he didn’t do it, then Giscard would certainly do it, and if he doesn’t do it, Wilson will do it. But somebody is going to do it. It is no great loss to us.

Mr. Stabler: There is one press report, which I have no way of checking at the moment. It said that he agreed to this in exchange for concessions by the Soviets to Basket Three.

Secretary Kissinger: That too is not acceptable. Supposing we came back from a summit meeting and said we had bought the following concessions.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have known for ten days that the Soviets and the French are working out a basket—one portion of the Basket Three.

Secretary Kissinger: What is Basket One?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Basket One is the Declaration of Principles. On one of the humanitarian paragraphs in Basket Three they have been—I think the Germans told us, didn’t they—or maybe even the French themselves, in Geneva.

Secretary Kissinger: But the basic point is—I couldn’t care less what they do in the European Security Conference. They can write it in Swahili for all I care. But that isn’t the point to me at all. The Conference can never end up with a meaningful document. And I think precisely because it wasn’t meaningful, it seems to me totally undermining confidence. Or am I wrong? What do you think, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You know, I think everybody has been talking to the Russians on their own. And we have been, I think, the most meticulous in telling everybody what we have been talking about, when it has come to points of substance. And the French, if they are dickering with the Soviets on Basket Three—

Secretary Kissinger: Both on substance and procedure, we have stuck meticulously to the agreements. I mean we have even privately never gone beyond saying we won’t be an obstacle, but it depends on our allies—and it is not an issue on which we are going to fight our allies—which is fair enough.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think that the French are undoubtedly further along than anybody else in talking privately to the Soviets.

Secretary Kissinger: Shall we make a point to some of the other countries?

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5 No record of this conversation has been found. Regarding Schmidt’s Washington visit, see Document 263.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I would imagine that Giscard will make it.

Secretary Kissinger: Giscard is not yet the United States.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes—I think we ought to make a point that we can all run this thing on our own, or we can do it together.

Secretary Kissinger: And that sort of procedure has rather profound consequences in our perception of how far we can go in allied cooperation. I don’t give a damn about the conference. But precisely because nothing big was involved—the procedures are—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, the point is that we have always had the strongest reservations about multilateral dealings with the Soviets. And precisely—

Secretary Kissinger: Bilateral dealings.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I mean about going into this multilateral congress type of diplomacy—in part because it is so tempting for individuals to make deals.

Secretary Kissinger: But the fact is that you know we could have gotten something from the Soviets on a number of occasions, if we had been willing to go as far as this. You know that we desisted. We went through that whole second reading exercise, which is a fraud.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That was the point I was going to make.

Secretary Kissinger: We let four months go by, because the Europeans said they didn’t even want to put down their optimum position on paper, much less what they may have settled for here. And then to be confronted by a communiqué, without warning, that gives it all away, that seems to me impossible.

Mr. Hyland: But the French will say this is pretty close to what was in the U.S.-Soviet communiqué over a year ago. 6

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There we said we are proceeding from the premise, rather than the premise has been created.

Mr. Hyland: The French will say that broke the ice on the summit.

Secretary Kissinger: Nonsense. They never said that to us for a year. We didn’t have it in this year’s summit, we didn’t have it in Vladivostok.

Mr. Hyland: We had it in San Clemente.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have had the same formula. But the main point—

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is that we never made a move on substance, and that we never made a move towards the summit—and that we never said that the premise has been fulfilled.

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6 See Document 163.
Mr. Hyland: But we don’t know what Brezhnev told Giscard, either. Knowing Brezhnev, he probably said “The Americans will agree to this. In fact, they want it.”

Secretary Kissinger: There is always a telegraph or telephone.

Mr. Hyland: He did this to Pompidou a year ago.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He has done it to everybody at various times. But I think we can fairly make the point to the Europeans that this is going to be even more important than MBFR, where you actually move troops around; if this is going to be the pattern.

Mr. Stabler: For instance, do you make the point directly to the Europeans, or do we start first by asking the French what precisely this means. It seems to me just on the eve of the Martinique meeting—

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t give a damn about the eve of the Martinique meeting. I think it is ridiculous for Giscard to be a great hero with Brezhnev, and then to go next week and meet the President and be a great hero with the President. I mean that is the tawdriest kind of politics.

Mr. Stabler: I wonder whether we ought to go there first, rather than going round to the Europeans at this moment. I mean we may get to that point. But I wonder if we ought not to try first—indicate what we are surprised on this point, and see what they have to say.

Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be like the producers’ conference. By the time the French get through explaining it, they were carrying out our proposals, they were doing us a favor. What can this mean? Did we tell the French about what was discussed at Vladivostok?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I had the Ambassador in. 7

Secretary Kissinger: So they can be under no misapprehension.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes—we talked to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Was it clear to them that we had not agreed to anything?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We were specifically asked by the Ambassador whether this passage on CSC in the communiqué meant any advance, and we specifically told them that it did not. [Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

7 Telegram Tosec 468/260370 to Paris, November 26, reported on Sonnenfeldt and Hartman’s conversation with the French Ambassador. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 140, Geopolitical File, France, Chronological File)
PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] The French—you will have a difficult time in Martinique. Giscard will be charming and go all out to have a visible success. But look at what he did on CSCE with Brezhnev. They said things on the Middle East without consultation; they agreed to all the things on Cyprus we knocked out of our communiqué.

We must show Europe that we can’t be at the mercy of any European who sells us out at will. Tell Giscard he can be an ally or neutral but not both. I would be noticeably cooler to Giscard than to Schmidt. I thought I would be tough at NATO. The others don’t want to have to choose between France and us. I think we have to make them choose. I think the problem is endemic—three French Presidents have now done the same—and we have to show the Europeans they can’t get away with it.

President: Will Schmidt raise hell about CSCE?

Kissinger: The German nightmare is to have to choose between France and us.

[Discussed the internal French political system.]°

The French have either been governed by kings or anarchy since the French Revolution. Giscard’s inherent political position is weak.

For 15 years the French have systematically undermined us.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place from 9:20 to 10:20 a.m. in the Oval Office. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s File, President’s Daily Diary)

2 See Document 265.

3 Brackets are in the original.
267. Memorandum of Conversation

Martinique, December 15, 1974, 4:30–6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Valery Giscard d’Estaing, President of the French Republic
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Pierre Fourcade, Minister of Economy and Finance (Second Half)
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury (Second Half)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Defense Cooperation; CSCE; F–104 Replacement; Monetary Issues

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

CSCE

Giscard: Let me turn to CSCE for a moment. I had a long talk with Brezhnev on this. I studied it before, and was not confident about our claims that the Basket III problems—education, information—I am not sure the thing can be solved this way. The same practical technical solution can be made without having to have the principle of free access. What irritates Brezhnev is the linking of inviolability of borders with peaceful change.

Kissinger: As I understand the German position, the sentence as written is okay if it follows the inviolability of frontiers. If it is in the section on security, then they want a change. I think it is absurd. No frontier will change on the basis of a sentence in a document.

Giscard: We did not commit ourselves to a summit meeting, but I said we would try to find a solution to the several problems. I don’t know why Brezhnev would like a summit in April . . .

Kissinger: He wants it before the anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

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President: We had a 45-minute presentation by Gromyko on CSCE. We feel strongly about SALT. He went into great detail. On CSCE we think we must move in conjunction with our allies. We told them June–July.

Kissinger: We would prefer after the anniversary; they want a joint celebration. They want to reenact the meeting of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe. We have refused a celebration on German soil.

On the whole, we think it is better to end in May or June rather than April, but not to say that—just to conduct the negotiation so it works out that way.

Giscard: They think this is the final price of the war, and that is why they want it before May. It is for him the last price of détente also.

Kissinger: We could finish Phase II in April and announce it for June.

Giscard: We need to work it out with the allies . . .

Sauvagnargues: We did not enter into specific drafting on peaceful change.

Kissinger: The Soviets say you did. This is a case where consultation would help.

Sauvagnargues: We will give you the notes of the meeting.

Kissinger: If we just move so that Phase II ends in April.

Giscard: Yes, it would take at least a month to set it up. I asked Brezhnev how he envisaged the signature. He said he would speak five minutes. He is afraid of reopening the negotiations so he wants just a formal meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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2 See Document 247.

3 In a meeting with Ambassador von Staden on December 18, Hartman summarized the outcome of the Franco-U.S. summit with regard to CSCE. He said that the “discussion of CSCE at Martinique had been brief and quite general. We had not proposed to the French the holding of a summit of the Western countries as we had suggested to German Foreign Minister Genscher. Mr. Hartman added that prior to the Martinique meeting, the Secretary had held a more detailed discussion about CSCE matters with French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 18; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1974) A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Sauvagnargues on December 12 is ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P860133–2636.
Concluding CSCE, January 1975–July 1975

268. Editorial Note

On January 9, 1975, President Ford wrote in a letter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that “it will remain the clear policy of my Administration to work with you for the settlement of remaining international disputes, the elimination of crisis situations and building of a peaceful and cooperative world order. Such important efforts as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which we are jointly engaged along with many other countries, must in my view be brought to a successful conclusion, and we will certainly work energetically to that end. I well recall our discussions on this subject at Vladivostok, and we will proceed firmly on the basis we agreed to at that time.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 28, USSR, the “D” File)

On January 27, Brezhnev replied: “There is also no doubt that the common actions of our countries in the completion of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe should be made active to the maximum extent in the forthcoming weeks. A successful completion of this major event with the signing of the final documents at the highest level could also be an important contribution to Soviet-American relations. Therefore, we expect that the American side in the spirit of the assurances given in your letter and in the spirit of our understanding on this question reached in Vladivostok will make every effort to facilitate achieving exactly such an outcome. Yet even today, Mr. President, not everything is going smoothly in this respect.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 217, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological)
269. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 30, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
CSCE, EC-Arab Dialogue, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS
UK
Foreign Secretary Callaghan
Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham
Sir Donald Maitland, FCO Deputy Under Secretary handling Economic Affairs
Thomas McNally, FCO Political Advisor to Callaghan
Anthony Ackland, Callaghan’s Private Secretary
T. D. McCaffrey, Press Spokesman
John Thomson, Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for FM matters
Michael Weir, Assistant Under Secretary responsible for Middle East and UN
C. C. C. Tickell, NATO and other Western Organization Affairs
Leonard Williams, Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy
Richard A. Sykes, Minister, British Embassy

US
The Secretary
Elliot Richardson, Ambassador-Nominee to the UK
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
William A. Buell, Jr., Director, Office of Northern European Affairs, Department of State

The Secretary: How do you propose to conduct this?
Secretary Callaghan: Well, I suggest we get down to business. Let’s start with CSCE.

The Secretary: Is the CSCE business?
Secretary Callaghan: I know you might not consider it business, but I am going to Moscow, and we would like to be as close as we can with your people to see just where we should aim. Before we came here, we had an approach from Ambassador Dubinin in Geneva, which was a follow-up of what I had said to the Soviet Ambassador in London; namely, that we get on with it. Dubinin said he had been authorized to approach us for bilateral talks, which were to be secret.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 10, POL 2 United Kingdom. Secret, Exdis. Drafted by Buell. Approved by Hartman and Adams (S) on February 8. The conversation took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room.
The Secretary: The unmitigated bastards! They offer secret bilateral discussions to everyone, which they are supposed to keep secret from their allies.

Secretary Callaghan: In fact, we welcomed the approach but we will not run out ahead of our allies. We want to respond positively and will say that we will attempt to persuade our allies to accept anything which makes sense. We will only talk about CSCE. We will not get into the peaceful change of frontiers because we know that you are handling the “floating sentence.” But we could talk about Basket III and CBMs.

The Secretary: (to Hartman). Are the Russians talking to us?

Mr. Hartman: Just on peaceful change.

The Secretary: (to Callaghan). It is good to have you come here so I can learn something.

Secretary Callaghan: Hartman and Sonnenfeldt are the worst briefers I know. Now I see it is really a good technique. (laughter). (Resuming line of thought.) The Russians, in talking to us, have been tough. The tone is conciliatory but on substance they are tough.

The Secretary: They try out each ally in turn, to get one to move another. Once this has been exhausted, they will move toward the Summit they are so anxious to have this year. In my view, basically nothing in the Conference is going to be improved by a long negotiating process. The question is when to have the Summit in order to achieve what the Western countries want. We want to see moderate Soviet behavior for the greater part of this year, so if the Summit is in September and not in June, the American political purpose will not be defeated. But I am recommending that we let nature take its course.

Secretary Callaghan: Isn’t there a danger that the Russians might become irritable over a delay?

The Secretary: No, not so long as it is before the Party Congress.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That would be some time between September 1975 and the spring of 1976.

Secretary Callaghan: What shall we do on confidence-building measures? These movements and maneuvers. I know you are not interested in movements. Do you not want to try to get something on maneuvers?

The Secretary: Do you mean on the size of the units or the area of territory?

Secretary Callaghan: Yes, and the size of the units about which notification must be made, the number of days in advance, and the depth of territory. I suppose our people in Geneva know your views.

Mr. Tickell: Yes, we know them but it helps us to know how you propose we move towards a solution. We have two possibilities: (1) we
can change the obligations to make them not so binding, and (2) change
the parameters on size and territory.

The Secretary: The Soviets would like the former. I am inclined to
the latter. What’s the point of this if it is not binding?

Mr. Hartman: We have been discussing this at Geneva; that is, vol-
untary notification.

Mr. Tickell: The Germans want to keep the idea of voluntary no-
tification for all of Europe.

Secretary Callaghan: Would this really cover all of Europe?

Mr. Tickell: Yes, all participants, plus 500 kilometers of Soviet
territory.

Secretary Callaghan: The real point, Henry, is that we are going to
Moscow, so do you think we can carry this a stage further with
Gromyko?

The Secretary: No, I don’t think so. We talked about this over a
year ago.

Secretary Callaghan: We will be closely in touch. We won’t get out
of line with you. We will see if there is any give in Gromyko’s posi-
tion. We have got to get on with this. I am getting fed up with it hang-
ing around.

The Secretary: Don’t worry, they will want to move by June. The
question is, with whom are they going to move.

Secretary Callaghan: I imagine they would prefer to move with
you.

The Secretary: A year ago I would have said yes, but now I don’t
think this is necessarily the case.

Secretary Callaghan: We could only bring something back to talk
over with the Alliance. We can’t really talk turkey with Gromyko.

The Secretary: We have always thought there could be some
progress in this area. I have no fixed ideas. They have not accepted the
proposal of 100 kilometers along the Soviet border.

Mr. Hartman: We must decide on the zonal concept. The question
is how much into the Soviet Union. They once told us they would con-
sider to Kiev.

Secretary Callaghan: I wouldn’t be raising this unless Dubinin said
they wanted to talk. Peaceful change we shall leave in your hands.

The Secretary: Don’t believe them if they present our position as
more forthcoming than we have told you. Once they said that Gen-
scher told them that the Germans refused to accept a formula on peace-
ful change only because we were unhappy with the text. I couldn’t
have cared less about the text on peaceful change.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: In Berlin they said we were the only obstacle.
The Secretary: Their negotiating tactics are tawdry in the extreme.
Secretary Callaghan: I have never talked to Gromyko.
The Secretary: He is the world’s greatest expert on CSCE.
Secretary Callaghan: I must say you are putting me off him.
The Secretary: He was insisting to me each principle must be equally applied and each equally valid. When he said that in Vladivostok, the President asked me what the hell he meant. I said I never understood the difference. In my view, he will want to settle with you in Moscow and not do it with your people and your fellow (Dubinin) in Geneva.
Secretary Callaghan: About the level of Stage III and the on-going. We agree that there can be a Summit but we don’t want to give it away yet.
The Secretary: We have given it all away already. Why not use the French formula? I told Genscher the only issue was which European country would give away the Summit. My present view is that the Summit is inevitable. The margin of negotiation left is so small that a Summit really makes no difference. We give away nothing by implying that a Summit is probable. We should only keep for ourselves an escape route in case they turn bloody-minded in the next few months.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Their dream is to have it coincide with VE Day.
Secretary Callaghan: I must say this is the first time I have heard September mentioned.
The Secretary: It would be a guarantee of their good behavior, at least until then. But we are not delaying this. July would be fine with us.
Secretary Callaghan: We have nothing against September but people seem to be focusing on June or July.
Mr. Tickell: We agreed in Dublin, among the Nine, to a target date of June or July for Stage III.
The Secretary: Six weeks would make no historical difference.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We should finish Stage II six weeks before a Summit.
The Secretary: We have a Summit with them too, which will make them behave until June. We don’t intend to make any concessions on CSCE at that Summit.
Secretary Callaghan: I know you don’t have much interest in the future of these arrangements, but I think you underestimate the interest of the Europeans. The smaller countries want a resumption of the dialogue at some later stage.
The Secretary: I know that your view is that this might be 18 months later. This is a fairly reasonable proposal, but I think we should keep them as the demandeur. Your proposal is one we could live with.
Secretary Callaghan: The beginning of 1977 would be 18 months, but we won’t talk about that in Moscow.

The Secretary: We need to keep something in our pocket. My view would be sympathetic to your approach. Do we have anything more on CSCE? On principles and equal validity, I don’t understand the difference between equally valid and equally applied.

Mr. Tickell: The Russians want principles badly. If the Germans want to work on peaceful change we shouldn’t need to tear our hearts out over that.

The Secretary: Nobody but the Germans understand the difference on this issue. I have no interest in getting this settled. Changes in Europe won’t depend on the placement of a sentence or the use of the word “only.” But all the pressures will be on the Germans, and the Russian aim is to have the Germans the obstacle to agreement.

Mr. Tickell: At our meeting of the Nine, we said no to the July 26 formula and are back to the April 5 formula. But we must look at other formulas. The French are keen on that, and the Germans are more flexible.

The Secretary: We had it in the Sovereignty Section, but I don’t give a damn.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We are in the crazy position of being asked to feed unacceptable texts to the Russians.

The Secretary: We could get an agreement on texts we don’t believe in on behalf of the Germans? I said from the beginning there is no chance of changing the registered texts.

Secretary Callaghan: Why don’t we let Arthur (Hartman) move ahead with the Germans. If in the Nine we don’t agree on one route, we can agree on another. Anything agreeable to the Germans is okay with us.

The Secretary: Gromyko will raise that, and he will try to get a date nailed down for the Summit. I suggest we agree on the Summit 98 percent, leaving us just enough for an escape, and gear the date to progress in the Conference. He will give you an excruciatingly detailed account of his idea of principles. On CBMs you can give him satisfaction. On Basket III there is not much to discuss.

Mr. Tickell: In Basket III we still have working conditions for journalists, jamming, and a mini-preamble to human rights—the French formula—but we can handle this better in Geneva than in Moscow.

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2 See Document 239.

3 On April 5, 1974, the FRG agreed to a revised Soviet text on inviolability of frontiers in return for the inclusion of language on peaceful change somewhere else in the declaration of principles (Basket I). See Document 198.
The Secretary: He will give you a 25-minute speech on the immorality of interference in Soviet domestic affairs. You had better shift that to Geneva.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

270. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, February 16, 1975, 8:15–11:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Andrey Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE; Cyprus; China and Japan; Germany and Berlin; Emigration; SALT II

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: Could we discuss the European Security Conference over the blini?

Kissinger: Could I tell one story about Vladivostok?

Kovalev: It seems that the texts at the European Security Conference are being done much more slowly than the blini.

Kissinger: Could I tell one story about Vladivostok? The Foreign Minister was explaining the difference between “equal applicability of principles” and “equal validity of principles,” and the President turned to me and said, “What the hell is he talking about?” [Laughter. Gromyko looks slightly embarrassed.] My trouble was I couldn’t

Gromyko: The Americans at the highest level decided they’re above principles!

Kissinger: We’re going to enter a reservation that they don’t apply to the U.S.

Sonnenfeldt: Good idea.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Kissinger: What about the European Security Conference? We can settle it over the sturgeon.

Gromyko: If we speak seriously about this subject of the European Security Conference, I would say that after a certain rise in activity there, which was not sufficient, and happened before the last interval, a certain tranquility has set in.

Kissinger: [Interrupts the translation] Especially in the Russian delegation, I’m told.2

Gromyko: Of course, we think this is connected with the policy of certain countries. And this is not by accident. The European Security Conference reflects the state of mind of certain capitals. And we can conclude that not all possibilities are being utilized. Perhaps I’m being too frank.

Kissinger: Since I know the Foreign Minister isn’t talking about Washington, I wonder what capitals he is talking about.

Gromyko: After a year, it’s being relegated to next year, and then a third year, and then a fourth year, and then a fifth year. This cannot but reflect on policies in other areas.

Kissinger: Let’s be concrete—what capitals?

Gromyko: I’ll give an answer to that. We have a definite view that the FRG in certain questions is playing a negative role, and certain negative impulses proceed from her representatives. We’ve said the same

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2 A February 10 briefing item for President Ford, based on telegram 830 from Geneva, February 8, reads in part: “CSCE registered no new agreed text last week for the first time in many months as the Soviet dug in their heels on all Conference subjects. They are assuming widespread acceptance in principle of a summit conclusion in June–July and appear confident this will force Western and neutral delegations to give up their more ambitious proposals and agree to the minimal positions advanced by the East. The Soviets thus have refused any flexibility of their own and added to the frustration that once again dominates the Conference.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe)
thing as we say to you to representatives of the FRG at the highest level—to Chancellor Schmidt and Minister Genscher. And the same thing we said to the British, at a high level—to Prime Minister Mr. Wilson and Foreign Secretary Mr. Callaghan. I do not know how the British Government will conduct itself in the future, but up until now on many questions, I would like to say their attitude was negative. We thought for quite a long time about the differences between the line of the Labour Government and the Conservative Government on questions of European security and in particular the European Security Conference, and up to now not noticed the great difference. However, I should make a reservation—we have detected signs of perhaps a greater degree of interest in the talks in Moscow on some matters which are of general interest to countries and on certain matters signs of interest in a positive outcome of the Conference. And we hope certain practical steps will come out in the future. And we have told this to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Of course, we said this to them to a greater extent than to you now.

And I would like to mention about one more capital: Washington. I’ve spoken to the leader of our delegation, Comrade Kovalev, who is my Deputy. And so we feel the pulse of the European Security Conference. On certain questions there are good contacts between our representatives. Our representatives feel that when there is desire on the part of the American representatives to help promote progress on certain questions, this makes results. We do not always feel this desire. And sometimes we feel that the attitude of your representatives is somewhat like the attitude of observers, people who look at things happen and wait and see how things proceed.

In a nutshell, we think not all possibilities and opportunities are being utilized, and it’s not by chance. The reasons are not clear but we think it has reasons. Perhaps you can answer. We think you can give more help. Sometimes there are impulses to help but the impulses go down and weaken until the next cycle.

Kissinger: No, Mr. Foreign Minister, sometimes toward the conclusion of a negotiation which is where we are now, the questions left to the end are the most difficult ones, and this is what is happening. Secondly, I’d be interested to hear what specific issues you’re talking about, because there is no directive from Washington to slow down cooperation. On the contrary, our intention is unchanged to speed up cooperation. So I would appreciate hearing what issues you refer to.

Gromyko: I can answer that. We believe today there are a number of questions which are blocking further movement. Three. Or four perhaps. The first is formulations which pertain to the right of states to change frontiers peacefully only by agreement and in accordance with international law: Second is the measure of military détente or
Third is the question of the correlation of principles. That problem, by the way, is the one that created liveliness on the part of certain of the Vladivostok participants. In a good mood.

Kissinger: It was deliberately designed to undermine my prestige.

Gromyko: I can’t question the intentions of the President. That is not my responsibility. [Laughter.]

Then there is the Third Basket. There are certain remnant questions in this Third Basket, not all of the same character, but they are blocking progress. Some countries probably are trying to show strong character, but it blocks progress.

Kissinger: Can I give you my impression of these issues? On peaceful change, we can give you another formulation tonight—or tomorrow. But it is a matter of principal interest to other countries, as you know, and connected to their domestic politics. So it’s not an issue on which the U.S. is the principal agent.

Second, on the equal validity of principles, I frankly thought this was on the way to being solved. And there was the IPU Conference in Belgrade which had yet another formulation.3 So I thought it was moving toward a solution.

Gromyko: Not yet.

Kissinger: Isn’t the Belgrade formulation acceptable?

Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] What is the Belgrade formulation?

Kissinger: We had the impression perhaps that that formula . . .

Gromyko: We can’t negotiate it in Belgrade.

Kissinger: No. Tomorrow we’ll give you the two formulas that we thought will lead to a solution.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: We’ll give them to you. In our internal discussions we genuinely thought those would solve it. We’ll have it for you tomorrow at 10:00. Our Ambassadors will discuss it. Ours will be handicapped by the fact that I genuinely don’t understand it.

Gromyko: Even after Vladivostok.

Kissinger: You expressed it, didn’t explain it.

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3 Telegram 553 from Belgrade, February 6, reported that the International Parliamentary Union conference was closing with “substantial degree of Soviet/EE acceptance of Western formulations on several key issues” with regard to CSCE, “e.g., equality of principles and Basket III proposals.” The telegram continued: “After initial hesitation, Soviets accepted language referring to these 10 principles [of European security from the multilateral preparatory talks] which are of equal importance and each of which should be applied unreservedly by all countries, regardless of their social system, and interpreted in the context of each other.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] What is the Belgrade formulation?
Dobrynin: [To Kissinger:] No one on our side is familiar with it.
Kissinger: We’ll give it to you.
Hartman: There was another one which was discussed at the Conference.
Kissinger: [To Hartman:] What made you think it was acceptable?
Hartman: Because their delegation was there and accepted it, and it was advised by their Foreign Office.
Kissinger: Maybe it was an honest misunderstanding. Our people genuinely thought, when the IPU accepted it and your delegation was there....
Gromyko: We weren’t interested in this matter at Belgrade at all.
Kissinger: There is no point debating it; why don’t our Ambassadors give you the two formulas on which we genuinely thought a convergence of views was developing? We’ll do it tonight. And you look at it, and see.
Gromyko: Of course.
Kissinger: On Confidence-Building Measures, didn’t the British discuss this with you in Moscow?
Gromyko: Callaghan said that maybe information about maneuvers can be exchanged on a voluntary basis.
Kissinger: Movements?
Hartman: No, both.
Gromyko: Maneuvers too. We didn’t think it was against your line of thinking. We discussed it once.
Kissinger: I know.
Gromyko: He wasn’t specific but it was worthy of consideration. Then, what is the point from which states should proceed when they exchange information?
Kissinger: The number of days?
Gromyko: The number of troops.
Kissinger: Number of troops and....
Gromyko: For Luxembourg, maybe one regiment is a terrible force. For us, if five divisions are going from their winter to their summer quarters, we don’t notice them.
Kissinger: We don’t notice them either, as long as they don’t come West.
On this issue, if we’re willing to show some flexibility on both sides....
Gromyko: This is not an important general matter. We think this was introduced rather artificially. In the long run it can be considered.
It’s possible to consider other problems. In a sense it’s a symbolic one, they said. But if symbolic steps should be considered, reasonable ones should be done.

Kissinger: What do you think?

Gromyko: We think it should apply to all countries equally and 100 kilometers from the borders. 100 kilometers. All this fantastic part about the European part of the Soviet Union and 500 kilometers, is fantastic. This is supposed to be about confidence but all this undermines confidence.

Regarding the number of troops, we think a corps. Do Americans have a corps?

Dobrynin: A corps or Army.

Gromyko: In the neighborhood of 30,000–35,000. This is not a terrible force. Otherwise you and probably you and we can report every day. And you should build skyscrapers to accommodate the staff who shall be engaged in such unproductive business.

Kissinger: Well, we have no agreement on this point. But I have always believed it was a point on which a solution should be possible. And I think if we both look again at the figures we gave to each other and try to find a compromise between the two positions, we’d be willing to cooperate. And if you want to instruct your Ambassador to be flexible, we’ll instruct ours.

But these talks should be kept quiet.

Gromyko: Naturally they should be quiet, but it seems we’re remaining at the same old positions.

Kissinger: No, if your Ambassador is instructed to show some flexibility, ours will, and we should find a compromise between the numbers and the distances. And if we agree, we can use our influence with other delegations.

Gromyko: Why not report to them tomorrow?

Kissinger: [To Hartman] Is Sherer here in Geneva?

Hartman: Yes.

Kissinger: All right, we’ll do it tomorrow.

Gromyko: Do not discount this idea of voluntary.

Kissinger: They’ll meet tomorrow.

Gromyko: The remaining two principles: On borders—we’ll comment when we receive the text.

Kissinger: Then Basket III—it’s too intellectual for me. There is a French text and there is a Russian text, so it’s between you and the French. As for the rest, our people aren’t causing any trouble, are they? Seriously, our people aren’t causing any delay. We’re staying out of it.
Gromyko: It’s true. And we don’t reproach you with creating difficulties. And it seems you have a more realistic approach to the problems than some others. But you seem to act as observers.

Kovalev: Sometimes they give help and sometimes they’re passive.

Kissinger: It’s a difficult problem for reasons with which you’re familiar. We can’t block the proposals of others in that area. Our impression is your delegation perhaps hasn’t made all the efforts it could make in that area.

Gromyko: I think we have exerted so many efforts that if you read a memorandum of our concessions in the field of cultural contacts, information contacts, no one should wait for concessions only from the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries. Other countries may have a less flexible attitude than you, and we agree, but compromise should be the prevailing factor. We don’t think you will worsen your relations when you pronounce your authoritative word. Because we have stated our view. And I can quote certain examples. There was a whole constellation of islands in the Pacific and there was a moment when the Soviet Union after the Second World War actively supported trusteeship by the U.S.—the Marshalls, the Marianas and the Carolines. I remember; I voted for this in the UN. But it was not an easy matter to explain, and public opinion was opposed. But it was a matter of allied relations and both of us were speaking on peaceful cooperation in the world. This was a striking example. In comparison with this, the questions being discussed now are extremely small.

Kissinger: As the Foreign Minister said himself, we have supported the Soviet view on several issues in Basket III and we have not opposed it on any issue in Basket III. And we’ll be genuinely cooperative. But it is a difficult situation for us, given our domestic situation, to be too visibly active.

Gromyko: What can I say to that? We would like to express the hope that the U.S. will be more active than before on questions relating to culture, information and humanitarian contacts. It is up to you whether it should be tied to domestic considerations and to what extent. In a word—and we have a record of exchanges with you—we think you operate lower than your possibilities.

Kissinger: Frankly, our people think the same of you.

Gromyko: Read the list of what we’ve done and what others have done.

Kissinger: Let me review the subject. It eludes me from time to time. I read it before, and I will see what can be done.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What other issues are there?

Gromyko: It would be good to clear up these European matters.
Regarding the timing of the final stage of the Conference at the highest level, it doesn’t seem that people are sticking to the dates discussed. There was agreement, and two months have passed and there is no agreement. This doesn’t bring benefit to anybody when they are not complied with. The agreements bring some tranquility to public opinion, but the reaction is sharp when they are not complied with. Not much time has passed since Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I don’t understand. Not much time has passed?

Gromyko: Only two months—and now we see the agreement is going to be broken.

Kissinger: That was a sarcastic remark.

Gromyko: Perhaps we’ll sit together in the next room with notetakers and discuss this question.

Kissinger: About the Security Conference.

Gromyko: It is unlocked. They will not bind us.

Dobrynin: He’s a flexible man.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I would like to tell you, Henry, we are very unhappy with the progress at the European Security Conference. This is a great contrast with the Vladivostok meeting which, you are aware, was of very great significance.

Look how many years this has been going on now. As we see the situation, the procrastination being done is artificial and this doesn’t correspond to the interest of the whole cause. We think there are some political calculations, and it is happening not by chance. Maybe I am being too straightforward.

Kissinger: No, I appreciate it.

Gromyko: If you think it isn’t right, maybe it’s London, Bonn, but we don’t understand why this is being done.

This is the personal feeling of our leadership and the personal view of General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whom I saw yesterday before I left.

Kissinger: Tell him my personal regards. I admire him for his courage.

Gromyko: Even now it is not known when the Conference will end. Let us settle the date of the final ending at the highest level.

Kissinger: I want to say first of all that when I saw the toast of Leonid Brezhnev when he referred to the European Security Conference I was somewhat surprised, because I thought things were going normally—not quickly but normally. Because with so many countries there, I thought it was progressing toward a conclusion this year.
Perhaps one mistake we made was to give deadlines which are too short, given the procedures and readings that are required. Let’s discuss a realistic date. Look, we agree there will be a summit, without clauses. Let’s find a date—say, late July or early September—a firm commitment. Or what is your idea?

Gromyko: I must say what you said about dates puts us on our guard. You remember the dates we discussed some time ago. Now you want July, September. I must say the Soviet leadership is discouraged with the situation—for want of a stronger word; I won’t mention it. We think there is a possibility to finish the conclusion of the European Security Conference two months earlier. Look at—it’s now half of February, so June or July means five months. Should we continue it five months? We don’t understand this.

Kissinger: Your idea is June?

Gromyko: We think it is better in April, or at least May. It is better in April. This is possible. This is possible. Work remains for two weeks that is all.

Kissinger: It is not possible. I mean the third stage.

Gromyko: To complete the second stage, a couple of weeks are needed. Of course we are talking about the third stage. To conclude the second stage, we only need a couple of weeks. Maybe there is no wish. The orchestra is too large. Some countries do one thing; some do another.

Kissinger: Our people thought the second stage, with all the readings, couldn’t be done until mid-April.

Gromyko: Today, one country inserts one comma, tomorrow another country inserts another comma.

Kissinger: Can we do this? I’ve noted what you say. We have no interest in a delay. Why should we create suspicion in the minds of the Soviet leadership? It is not a substantive issue. We agree there will be a summit.

Gromyko: I appreciate what you say.

Kissinger: So the only issue is the time. I’m seeing Giscard and Wilson in the next three days. Let me be in touch with you no later than a week from today with a proposal.

Gromyko: By the way, Giscard considered April.

Kissinger: May I be in touch with them? I’ll give it to Vorontsov and it stays in our channel. But we will make a firm commitment for a realistic date.

Gromyko: I’m glad you say there are no calculations. We were guessing. We thought for basic reasons, Washington should not delay.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: But we thought there were some reasons we do not see from Moscow.
Kissinger: What do we gain?
Gromyko: Within a week?
Kissinger: Next Monday I’ll give a proposal. Then you can reply to me.
Gromyko: I spoke on this with Callaghan.
Kissinger: What do they say?
Gromyko: They are having a Common Market referendum in June, and so they say they will be busy April and May. I said it’s only two or three days; he didn’t have another date. He said he would think over the matter. We have the impression—not the only impression—that if Washington gave the word for April, it would be accepted by London and Paris and the FRG—and Italy.
Kissinger: Let me get their views.
Gromyko: All right. All right.
Regarding the question we discussed in the dining room, on frontiers. One can look at the matter and say: “Let Bonn and Moscow settle this.” You are saying this and Britain is saying this and not only they. But the question of borders is a very important one. Remember World War II started over the question of frontiers. It is not right to say that countries should settle the issue among themselves. World War I too started on the sorrowful question of frontiers. It is not accidental that the Kennedy Government and the Johnson Government and the Nixon Government took a stand on this very positively. The Ford Government hasn’t made any clear presentation on this matter, but we believe it should have some interest in the matter.
Kissinger: It is only neglect. We stand by the statements of our predecessors. We will mention it in the next letter. Within the next two to three weeks, he will write again.
Gromyko: Good. I’ll be waiting for a reply from you. I only wanted to express our deep anxiety and to underline the huge importance of the matter—the date of the ending of the second stage and of the third stage at the highest level, and in particular the resolution of the questions of frontiers and Confidence-Building Measures and measures that pertain to it. So we will be able to come back to these questions tomorrow when I see your formulas on the peaceful change of frontiers and Confidence-Building Measures.
Kissinger: Confidence-Building Measures . . . well, yes.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
271. **Memorandum of Conversation**

Geneva, February 17, 1975, 10:15 a.m.–3 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Amb. Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division

Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Near East Division

Amb. Sergei Vinogradov, Chief of Soviet Delegation to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East

Vasili Makarov, Aide to Minister Gromyko

Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter

Oleg Krokhalev, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Amb. Walter Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR


Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

**SUBJECTS**

CSCE; Middle East

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

*Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*

Kissinger: We believe we made progress last night. We are prepared to speed up the work of the European Security Conference and already gave instruction to our Ambassador to stay in close touch, and who will today meet with your people.

I know we will start with the Middle East, but I wanted to make these few points.

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Gromyko: I have listened with interest to your remarks and would like to say the following: With regard to the general trend of our relations, I would like to say on behalf of the Soviet leadership that we reaffirm the trend of U.S.-Soviet relations and will continue to pursue this course.

And this is why I note with satisfaction that you have the same opinion.

We should look into the future and we should exert efforts to find on the basis of cooperation a resolution of outstanding problems. Some of these problems pertain to the situation in Europe and the European Security Conference. I agree our exchange yesterday was beneficial, but we should bring the exchange to a final end. All questions pertaining to normalization of the European Security Conference should be finalized. I believe it would be good to have another look at these formulas. After lunch.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[At 1:15 the group breaks up. Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko sit down again and discuss a new formula for the “peaceful change” provision for CSCE. Then everyone leaves the room and proceeds down the corridor to the Secretary’s suite for drinks. There was intermittent discussion of the CSCE formulas and the final communiqué. At 2:00 p.m., the party returned to the meeting room for luncheon. Excerpts from the conversation follow.]

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

272. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, February 17, 1975, 3:07–3:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
CSCE; Cyprus; Middle East; Economic and Energy Consultations; Europe; MBFR

CSCE

Gromyko: I would like to summarize some things, and on what questions we would be awaiting your considerations or replies. Questions that have been opened.

First, the question of Confidence-Building Measures. You promised you would give a certain formulation.

Kissinger: I told Hartman to meet with Kovalev this afternoon and see if you can work it out.

Gromyko: You promised to give formulations and to consult with allies. When you are ready, you can use the appropriate channel. When can we expect them?

Kissinger: After I talk to Hartman. Within the next two weeks.

Gromyko: Fine. Then you understand the sooner the better.

The second question is peaceful change of frontiers. You said you would be talking with Schmidt. But you are going to Paris, not Bonn.

Kissinger: I will write to him.

Let me sum up: You are prepared to put the phrase either in the section on sovereignty or on inviolability of frontiers.

Gromyko: We will consider it. When approximately can you do this?

Kissinger: Within ten days. I hope. It will give the Germans a sense that they accomplished something.

Gromyko: This question is not agreed on at all, and we want a definite answer and we will consider it. If some frictions remain, we will go back to our previous position.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gromyko: With respect to the date of the ending of the European Security Conference, I have put forward our views on the dates but I expressed a negative attitude on June and July. You promised to consult and reply next Monday.

Kissinger: By the end of next Monday.²

Gromyko: The third question is the question of correlation of principles. You promised to think it over and express your views to us.

² February 24.
Kissinger: On the Vienna negotiations on force reductions, we are now considering some reduction of new nuclear weapons and aircraft, but which has the positive side of not only a reduction but of a ceiling. And I wondered if it is of interest.

Gromyko: Of course, certainly. It is one of our ideas.

Kissinger: If the principle interests you, we will then proceed to inform our allies.

Gromyko: We are interested.

Kissinger: Then we will present it to our allies.

Gromyko: It depends on the nature of the proposal and the relation to other elements.

Kissinger: Of course. But we are considering it in addition to other elements.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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3 See Document 357.

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273. Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kovalev the afternoon of February 17, 1975, at the Soviet Mission in Geneva to discuss possible compromise language at the European security conference on the peaceful change of borders. They also discussed confidence-building measures and Basket III. (Telegram 345 from Prague, February 19; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 217, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological)

After the conversation, Kovalev called on Ambassador Albert Sherer the same evening to confirm that “Gromyko could accept the peaceful change text discussed with Secretary Kissinger,” but “without the word ‘only.’” Sherer reported in telegram 1057 from the Mission in Geneva, February 18: “Kovalev handed us a Russian text which he described as an exact translation of the peaceful change sentence
‘agreed between Secretary Kissinger and Minister Gromyko.’ Kovalev’s interpreter translated this Russian text back into English as follows: ‘The participating states consider, that their frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.’ Kovalev said this text was the same, in both English and Russian, as text given to Secretary Kissinger by Gromyko last September in New York, except that the word ‘only’ has been deleted. We noted that the commas did not appear to be in the same places, but Kovalev insisted that the commas were exactly where they should be.” The telegram continued: “With regard to placement, Kovalev said emphatically that he could not expand on what ‘had been agreed’ on this point between Secretary Kissinger and Gromyko. When we pressed for a more precise explanation of what he meant by this, Kovalev would say only that this was a positive formulation and that the Western allies should be pleased to place it in the sovereign equality principle.” The telegram concluded: “Comment: Soviet acceptance of an English language text without the word ‘only’ is obviously an important step, since it appears to meet the principal FRG objection to the floating sentence on peaceful change which was provisionally registered last April 5. Sentence is now stated positively and thus should, prima facie, be acceptable to FRG in context of sovereign equality principle, where other aspects of sovereignty are all stated positively. Nevertheless, FRG reps have in the past made the separate point that peaceful change should not appear to be subject to all three conditions: international law, peaceful means, and agreement. Placement of commas before and after phrase ‘in accordance with international law’ would help to alleviate this problem, and FRG might still be sticky on this point. With regard to placement, we believe Kovalev’s comment is an allusion to the fact that the FRG might be unwilling to accept placement in sovereign equality if they believe it is Soviet preference. Soviets evidently prefer to let FRG themselves seek placement in sovereign equality principle.” (Ibid.)

In telegram 2850 from Bonn, February 20, Ambassador Hillenbrand reported his meeting with Political Director Van Well of the West German Foreign Office the preceding day “to inform him of the latest developments on the peaceful change problem.” The telegram continued: “Van Well expressed his appreciation for the report and the ‘interesting movement’ on the peaceful change issue. He indicated his satisfaction that the Russians had dropped the ‘only’ from their latest draft text and said the FRG would study the new text very carefully before reacting. I stressed to Van Well our interest in minimizing Geneva chatter on the issue. He agreed that it would be best to confine further exchanges of views to Bonn or Washington.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 7, Germany, State Department Telegrams, Tosec State, Nodis [2])
On February 19, Secretary of State Kissinger summarized his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a meeting with President Ford: “We gave a little on CSCE and they merchandized it in their tawdry way. We have hooks to keep them on the reservation with CSCE and the summit, but the Europeans are going to move to pal up with them. Wilson was floating on air—he is a pal. They are giving the Soviets $2.5 billion in credits; the French are too. And none of it is tied to projects.” Kissinger continued: “On Vladivostok, we are still okay. I also gave him [Gromyko] Option III. He liked that very much. I pointed out that the effect would be a ceiling even if only one plane is removed. I thought maybe we should avoid two meetings close together and have CSCE in July and the summit in September.” Ford replied, “That may give us more time on MBFR.” Kissinger stated, “We can work that out as things develop.” (Memorandum of conversation, February 19; ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9)

274. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 24, 1975, 3–3:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns
NATO Assistant Secretary General Jorg Kastl

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Amb. David Bruce, Permanent Representative to NATO
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: Do you have any thoughts on MBFR?

Luns: The Soviet Union has proposed equal reductions, which is not reasonable.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House.

2 See footnote 5, Document 345.
The tactical nuclear force issue\(^3\) is linked. Several of us are nervous that you will weaken the shield. Your efforts seem to be strategic weapons, but the problem in NATO is tactical.

I don’t think the Soviet Union will plan a war in NATO. The outcome is too uncertain. I think the Soviet Union will wait to see the outcome of SALT and CSCE. I think we are in the position that CSCE will be a summit.

Kissinger: Thanks to the Europeans.

Luns: We must think about the possible euphoria and guard against it.

President: How about a Western Summit beforehand?

Luns: I think it is a good idea. The French were cool to the idea.

Kissinger: It is ridiculous to think the East and West can meet and [as?] consumer and producer, but not the NATO allies.

On the nuclear package, we won’t press it as our solution. It is up to the Alliance whether it is to be presented to the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\(^3\) See Document 357.

275. Editorial Note

In late February and March 1975, the Department of State continued its efforts to find a compromise formula on the peaceful change of frontiers, acceptable to both West Germany and the Soviet Union, for inclusion in the CSCE final document. In telegram 3086 from Bonn, February 24, the Embassy sent a German position paper, approved by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on peaceful change. It reads in part: “We welcome the efforts of Secretary Kissinger to try to reach a compromise with the Soviet Union on the question of ‘peaceful change.’ We also see a desire to cooperation on the part of the Soviets by the deletion of the word ‘only.’ Nevertheless, we are obliged to state that a dangerous element lies in the revised order of ‘in accordance with international law,’ ‘by peaceful change,’ and ‘by agreement.’” The German paper continued: “Our clearly preferred formula is: ‘The participating states consider, that, in accordance with international law, their frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement.’ Should the American side consider it necessary, in view of the discussion with
Gromyko in Geneva, we could also agree that a comma be inserted in the sentence concerning peaceful change between the words ‘changed’ and ‘in accordance with international law.’ It appears to us to be essential to attain as a goal the insertion of the comma.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850081–2083)

On February 26, the participants in Secretary of State Kissinger’s morning staff meeting discussed the German response on peaceful change: “Mr. Hartman: CSCE, I talked to Vorontsov—I am going to go very easy on this German reply—because we now have further evidence that the Germans have told the French that they are prepared to cave and have that language go down in the lower part of the formulation, and just settle for a comma, as you [Kissinger] say. We have to tell him [Vorontsov] they still have not bought that formulation. In other words, give him a status report, rather than press him to accept this formula. Secretary Kissinger: But why don’t you try that comma? Mr. Hartman: Yes. We will tell him about that. I don’t think he will be surprised, because I really think the Germans fixed this up with the Russians. Secretary Kissinger: And making us the sucker? Mr. Hartman: No—it is not a sucker. I think from their own political point of view, they would like to be able to say this is what their allies felt they could say. And that is something I think we can serve their purpose with. Secretary Kissinger: Except if they told us that, we would do it. I don’t like the duplicitous maneuvering. Because if we take their instructions literally, we are going to get into trouble with the Russians.”

An attached summary of the minutes of the staff meeting reads in part: “CSCE: Mr. Hartman will see Vorontsov about CSCE.” (Ibid., Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary’s Staff Meetings)

The same day, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman met with Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov to discuss the formula on peaceful change. Telegram 45297 to Bonn, February 28, reported on the meeting: Hartman pointed out to Vorontsov that “following recent discussions among US officials, Gromyko and Kovalev in Geneva, US and FRG had discussed possible approaches to a compromise on the peaceful change issue. He said that if the text were placed in the sovereign equality principle, US would support clear FRG preference to include the phrase ‘in accordance with international law’ before the phrase ‘can be changed.’ Vorontsov asserted, echoing earlier Soviet view, that Moscow was strongly opposed to this approach, and could not accept placement of ‘in accordance with international law’ apart from ‘by peaceful means and agreement.’” Hartman then quoted to Vorontsov another formulation, “stating that if it were acceptable to Moscow, US would be prepared to encourage its acceptance by Bonn. He then handed to Vorontsov full text of proposed peaceful change formulation as follows: ‘The participating states consider
that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.’ Vorontsov said he would refer the new text to his authorities and report their reactions as soon as possible.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Telegrams for Europe and Canada, Box 6, Germany, State Department Telegrams, From SecState, Nodis [2])

On February 28, Vorontsov phoned Kissinger. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: “V[orontsov]: I have got a piece of news about the Old European Conference.” Vorontsov continued: “I got a cable from Gromyko. The phrase about the peaceful change of border—he says to tell you directly that the formula suggested by Mr. Hartman is acceptable to the Soviet Union. K[issinger]: Good. V: The participating states consider their frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement—this is acceptable and we would not mind that this phrase will be put in the text of the principles of sovereignty as the Germans have agreed to do. K: That is my impression. Should we notify the Germans? V: Since Mr. Hartman told me that is your compromise language— K: Why don’t we notify the Germans, and we’ll get it to Geneva.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000BBB3.pdf)

Telegram 46561 to Bonn, March 1, reported that the Soviets had accepted the revised formulation “for placement in the sovereign equality principle.” “With regard to placement,” it continued, “you should inform FRG that we have not discussed with Soviets specific details of placement suggested by FRG” because “we believed issue of formulation should be resolved prior to dealing with placement question which might well be handled in framework of CSCE discussions rather than in bilateral channels.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 6, Germany, State Department Telegrams, From SecState, Nodis [2]) Telegram 3454 from Bonn, March 1, reported that the FRG had accepted the United States’ tabling of the revised formula prior to a decision on its exact placement in the sovereign equality principle. (Ibid., Box 7, Germany, State Department Telegrams, To SecState, Nodis [3])

Telegram 56434 to Geneva, March 13, instructed the U.S. delegation to CSCE as follows: “After appropriate consultations with allies and others, you should move promptly to table, for placement in the sovereign equality principle, the English-language version of peaceful change text: ‘The participating states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.’” The telegram continued: “In tabling peaceful change formulation, you should point out that we consider its precise placement in the sovereign equality principle remains to be determined in ongoing negotiations of the principles subcommittee.”
1835 from Geneva, March 17, reported: “USDel tabled peaceful change text at outset of subcommittee’s March 17 meeting, proposed its early registration in first principle on sovereign equality, and suggested that subcommittee return to question on March 20. However, we added that consideration of exact placement of sentence within first principle could be deferred for time being. FRG and Soviets led in warm expressions of support on both the text and its placement in the first principle, and France, GDR, Italy, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Portugal, Ireland, Bulgaria, UK, and Belgium spoke in same vein. France, although favoring text and placement in first principle, demurred on early registration and asserted that a linkage exists between the peaceful change text, quadripartite rights formulation, and language on the interrelationship of principles.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

276. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

As you have pointed out, the work in another area of negotiation—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—has been slower than anticipated. In part this is because so far the most difficult issues have been left open. But as a result of the recent discussions between Secretary Kissinger and your Foreign Minister, we have already made some substantial progress on one of the most difficult of the remaining issues—the question of peaceful change of frontiers.

As I see it, the Conference will still require some weeks to complete all the details, and then the results can be referred to governments for final consideration. I anticipate no difficulties, and the United States will raise no problems during this interval. Then, as agreed with you,

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the final stage can be convened at the highest level of participation for the closing ceremonies. This leaves only the problem of when, precisely, the final stage of the Conference should be convened. After some discussion with our friends and allies, it seems that with good will on all sides the most realistic date would be sometime in July. If this is an acceptable target date, we should commit ourselves to an appropriate work schedule.

In any case, the successful conclusion of this Conference, occurring during the year of the 30th anniversary of the end of the Second World War will be a signal accomplishment for which you, Mr. General Secretary, will deserve great credit. Unlike the situation that led up to both World Wars, we have within our grasp the means for building cooperation and ensuring security in Europe. The inviolability of frontiers, in particular, will be among the key elements of a solemn document. As you know, the United States has long since accepted the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European states, and I reaffirm this position without qualification.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

277. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Moscow, March 8, 1975.

Dear Mr. President:

Replying to your letter of March 1, I would like at this moment to touch upon one question that was contained in the letter.

I have in mind the issue that we have discussed already many times and exchanged opinion upon, i.e. the question of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe, and to be more precise—of the date of completing the Conference. We discussed in detail this question at the meeting in Vladivostok and came to mutual agreement. We believe as before that the Conference could have been completed quite...
within the nearest future, i.e. within the period of time we have agreed upon with you.

Now you name a new date—July. Frankly, the very fact that achieved agreements have repeatedly been changed does produce an impression which is far from being positive.

I repeat, we stand for upholding the agreed time-table and for moving ahead in accordance with it. This is even more important having in mind that the completion of the Conference has been in general delayed without any justification. Now, in our view, it is important to establish at last the final date of the completion of the Conference and then not to depart from it. Otherwise we would ourselves devaluate the meaning of agreements which we achieve.

Therefore we would like to firmly agree to start the final stage of the Conference on the summit level in Helsinki in the last days of next June, say, June 30. I am sure that agreement on that is possible right now, moreover due to the fact that the situation at the Conference has improved after the known understanding.

In your letter you justly state that inviolability of frontiers is the key element in ensuring security and cooperation in Europe. It is with satisfaction that we received the clear reaffirmation by you that the US accepts without qualification the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European states. Your statement is highly appreciated by us.

There is no doubt that successful conclusion of the Conference on security and cooperation in Europe will constitute an important contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and stability on that continent. Its weight and importance will especially grow—and we share your opinion on that—in connection with the 30th Anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which will be marked soon by both European and all other peoples. It is necessary to do everything possible to complete the Conference with good results without further delay.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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3 Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since receiving your letter of 8 March, in which you suggested that the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe begin on June 30, I have been in consultation with our Allies, some of whom I learned received a similar proposal from you. As I mentioned in my letter of March 1, on the basis of my previous discussions with our Allies, we had concluded that some time in July would be a realistic target date for planning the final stage of the Conference. This still seems to be the consensus among our Allies, and in any case I would find the proposed date of June 30 personally inconvenient.

Thus, we could proceed on the basis that the second half of July would prove an acceptable date to the majority of participants, assuming, of course, that the work in Geneva proceeds at the present pace and that the final results are acceptable to all the governments concerned.

As I have written previously, I believe there is now a general agreement that the Conference can be brought to a successful conclusion at the highest level and, for my part, I will continue to do whatever is necessary to achieve such an outcome.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 8, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. A note at the top of the letter by Scowcroft reads: “Delivered Vorontsov, 8:35 p.m., 3–18–75.” The letter was based on a draft prepared by Sonnenfeldt on March 17. (Ibid.)

2 Document 277. Scowcroft wrote in a transmittal memorandum to Ford on March 18: “Brezhnev also sent similar letters to Prime Minister Wilson, Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d’Estaing. Although not all issues have been resolved, we remain confident that agreement can be reached on the terms of an agreement that would justify a concluding session of the CSCE at the Summit level. Because the remaining negotiations will be difficult, and in view of other commitments on your schedule, we believe it would be wise to remain firm on your original proposal for a mid-July conclusion to the Conference. We have consulted with the European allies at a restricted meeting of the North Atlantic Council yesterday. They have agreed with our position and will respond to Moscow accordingly.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 28, USSR, “D” File)
279. Editorial Note

During April 1975, the Ford administration debated the domestic political implications of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. On April 9, Secretary of State Kissinger met with President Ford in the Oval Office to discuss foreign policy issues, including the European security conference. According to the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger stated: “On the Baltic States, I have signed a memorandum. Technically, it is true that the CSCE doesn’t add much to the legal status. Practically that is not true—that is why the Soviet Union wants it. It has numerous references to the sanctity of frontiers. President: Will that raise hell with our Baltic friends? Kissinger: There is a clause about peaceful change of borders. They may not like it. President: We need to find a way to reassure them. Kissinger: I would go to Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade after Helsinki. Maybe even Budapest.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation)

A similar meeting took place between Ford and Kissinger on April 25. According to a memorandum of conversation, the President asked: “Did you see the criticism of CSCE? Kissinger: Yes, in the Post. It is popular for the soft line to be tough on the Soviet Union. The Jews do it also because polarization helps them make the Arabs look like Soviet stooges. When we came in, all the Europeans and American press pushed us hard for a Conference, and we didn’t care about it. There is nothing in it for us. I think you must go if there is a Summit. Then go to Berlin. I would also recommend Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade.” (Ibid.) On April 25, the Washington Post ran an editorial, “Dubcek and European Security,” which reads in part: “[T]he European status quo which the West is being asked to sanctify [at the European Security Conference] allows the Kremlin to crack the whip as it will in East Europe even while it freely exploits the openness in West Europe for its own end. . . . Is there any non-Communist in the West who can give a good reason why the West should, at a European summit, formalize this unequal and even insecure state of affairs?” (Washington Post, April 25, 1975, page A26)

On April 25, Counselor Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger: “I joined Hartman and EUR staff in a session on CSCE with American Jewish Committee officers who feel we have not adequately bargained on human rights issues. I explained the history of the conference, noted what has been accomplished, pointed out our doubts about the wisdom of this exercise in the first place and cautioned them not to invest it with legal or definitive significance either in its accomplishments or its shortfalls. It is clear that CSCE is becoming the next issue on which an ethnic coalition plus others will belabor the Administration.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 12, Daily Activity Reports, 1975)
280. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Status Report on CSCE

Summary

As the pressures of the final negotiating phase of CSCE start to build, the Soviets have tried to advance in certain subject areas, but have continued to probe Western positions and to remain firm on issues which they consider sensitive, such as individual contacts. Thus, there has been no rush of Soviet concessions and, partly as a result of this, many Western and neutral delegations are sticking to the ideas they consider important. The Soviets may have begun to feel time pressure, but thus far have been unwilling to make concessions to meet their own schedule. Nevertheless, our delegation in Geneva believes that if the Soviets make at least some key concessions, it is still possible to finish Stage II negotiations in time for a Stage III in early to mid-July.

The Current Situation

As Stage II of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resumes following an Easter recess, earlier expectations of visible progress by Easter have proved unfounded. The optimism and compromising spirit of two months ago have been tempered by the dawning realization that the Soviets will not produce a rush of concessions—\textit{at least not yet}. The lack of Soviet willingness to find reasonable compromises has produced a similar attitude among Western and neutral participants, who believe that if they simply accept Soviet terms, even on minor issues, the Soviets will be encouraged to insist on their way on issues of more fundamental importance.

The Soviets have reacted in this situation by beginning to use pressure tactics, coming down particularly hard on the French and the FRG. It seems likely that they have perceived the negotiating box now closing in around them: a deadline for completion of the Conference set by Brezhnev himself, and a limited number of concessions to offer in

\footnote{Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 2, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Confidential. Sent for information. Clift drafted the memorandum on April 2 and forwarded it to Kissinger. Ford initialed the memorandum.}
order to meet it. These trends are expected to continue to develop in this post-Easter period, which will compound the difficulty of trying to meet the timetable envisaged by most participants—completion of Stage II about the end of May or mid-June and a Stage III in early to mid-July.

**Summary of Remaining Issues**

The key remaining substantive issues at the Conference are as follows:

— **Principles (Basket I):** Agreement is blocked by a knot of interlocking issues related to Germany and the Brezhnev doctrine. The United States has tabled a draft on peaceful changes of borders\(^2\) which is widely accepted. The French, however, have linked their agreement to this text to acceptance of language which would protect Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Berlin and which would assert the equal value of all the principles. Romania objects to the U.S. peaceful change text and, with the neutrals, strongly rejects the French position on Quadripartite rights as too general and as reinforcing the Brezhnev doctrine.

— **Confidence Building Measures/Maneuvers:** The Soviets have announced that they would be flexible on the geographic area and size of forces subject to prior notification of maneuvers if the Conference can agree “in principle” that such notification will be voluntary. The NATO countries and neutrals generally see no objection in principle to a voluntary approach to prior notification, if the Soviets will give a clearer idea of parameters acceptable to them. The Romanians have rejected the voluntary approach, with support from the Dutch.

— **Freer Movement (Basket III):** Several separate questions relating to the overall issue of freer movement remain unresolved: introductory language for the human contacts and information sections of Basket III (human contacts), language on travel, audio-visual information (broadcasting), working conditions for journalists, libraries/reading rooms, and direct contacts among creative artists. Four out of the five remaining subjects under human contacts and information are presently stalled, due entirely or in part to US-Soviet differences. Our efforts to achieve better texts on the introduction on human contacts, travel, journalists and broadcasting have run up against the Soviets on matters they consider quite sensitive.

— **Final Documents (Basket IV):** The EC–9, NATO and most neutrals support a Dutch proposal to include all CSCE resolutions in one overall signed document called “The Final Act” of the Conference. The So-

\(^2\) See Document 275.
viets indicate that they prefer four separate signed documents, one for each Basket. The Western participants believe that one overall document is the only way to ensure that each Basket has equal status. This promises to be a difficult issue.

—Peripheral Issues: There are several political issues which, while not central to the CSCE negotiations, could make it difficult to conclude the Conference at an early date. These include Cyprus (with the Greeks and Cypriots stating they will not join a consensus on the results of the Conference unless there is clear progress toward resolution of the Cyprus situation, and the Turks threatening to question the credentials of the Cypriot delegation and refusing to accept the presence of Makarios at Stage III) and Mediterranean representation (the Maltese and Yugoslavs might hold out for some role for non-participating Mediterranean states in Stage III). Other international events, in the Middle East for example, or internal developments in participating states (such as Portugal) could also affect the timing of a summit conclusion.

Conclusion

Soviet reluctance to reach reasonable agreements on sensitive subjects, and the general unwillingness to give up important points has slowed Conference progress and will add to negotiating pressures in the weeks to come. However, it is still mechanically feasible for Stage II to be completed about the end of May or mid-June, provided the Soviets make some key concessions and peripheral problems can be kept under control.

This status report is for your information. As the Conference works toward a conclusion of Stage II during the next several weeks, I will keep you informed of the substantive developments and the timing of the Stage III summit in Helsinki.

281. Editorial Note

In the course of two meetings with President Ford on May 5 and May 16, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed the European security conference in the context of an upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ford on May 5 reads in part:

“Kissinger: We have another problem with the Soviets. I was going to meet with Gromyko. I was planning to announce the CSCE
summit date at the end of the meeting. That is crazy. My advisers generally think I should go ahead since I had cancelled a meeting in March.

“President: I think you could go ahead.

“Kissinger: If we meet, they will press me for agreement to a CSCE summit. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to CSCE.] Jackson and the others will start to hit you about the CSCE summit as a fraud that isn’t worthy of a summit. They will mobilize the Baltics and the East European emigrants. It doesn’t change the situation of the Baltic States.

“President: We must do what we can to explain to them. Can we baby them along? If I or you could talk to them and undercut Scoop.

“Kissinger: It is a cause celebre if you meet with them, or even if I do. Let me see what we can do. We could delay the summit, but I doubt we could cancel it.

“President: I think if we didn’t participate, it would appear we were sulking and going back to the Cold War. I don’t think the American people would understand.

“Kissinger: The public and the Congress want to be tranquilized about the results of Vietnam. But if you don’t point out the consequences, in a year we will have real problems. As the speeches come up, we should see if we can get statements in about future challenges—not the dissensions in the past.”

A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Ford on May 16 reads in part:

“Kissinger: The major problem will be Gromyko. He will have three things: CSCE, SALT, and the Middle East. CSCE is out of our hands; we are staying a step behind the Europeans. The only question is the date. The Soviet Union and France want 13 July. I would not spend more than three days. For everyone to give a speech would take 4–5 days. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to CSCE.] I’ll agree to the last week of July with Gromyko, if nothing happens. You would come to the last two days and the signing ceremony.

“President: Can I put in my speech that this doesn’t involve territorial matters?

“Kissinger: No, it does not affect the Baltic States. We can brief the press on that, but Jackson and the like will hit us on that.” (Both in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 281, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation)
Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Gromyko: Soviet Impatience at CSCE Growing

In a two hour conversation with Ambassador Sherer on May 15, Soviet CSCE delegation head Kovalev focused on problems of concern to the Soviet delegation and asked what steps were necessary to bring Stage II to a quick conclusion. Kovalev alluded several times to the need to have a clear idea of U.S. positions on CSCE issues before Foreign Minister Gromyko’s meeting with you in Vienna. Several of the substantive issues raised specifically by Kovalev included:

—Working conditions for journalists: the Soviets are annoyed by what they view as a tougher U.S. position on this Basket III text; Kovalev even accused the U.S. of trying to unite the NATO Allies on this subject. Ambassador Sherer reports that the Allies are indeed now united in pursuing the main points in this text—travel, individuals as news sources and no expulsion for pursuit of professional activity.

—CBM’s: Kovalev asked what the Soviets should do to reach early agreement on this item and Sherer urged him to come forward soon with maximum moves toward Western positions on numerical parameters.

—Timing: Kovalev said the Soviets are now prepared to do everything possible to move forward. He asked for U.S. view of the key issues which would bring an early conclusion to Stage II and was told travel, journalists and CBM’s.

Kovalev’s démarche to Ambassador Sherer is the latest indication of growing Soviet impatience at their inability to wrap up Stage II quickly and without major concessions. In fact, their obvious need to fulfill Brezhnev’s timetable of a Stage III conclusion this summer has the Soviets in a corner and, so far, their pressures and bluster aimed at the allied and neutral participants have not produced agreement on the unbalanced pro-East texts they are seeking.


2 Telegram 3572 from Geneva, May 15, reported on Kovalev’s conversation with Sherer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
It therefore would seem very much in our interests to impress upon Gromyko the need for the USSR to take a more reasonable position on issues of importance to the West, and, at the same time, for us to encourage the Allies to stay together and hold their ground in the coming weeks. The Soviets should be forced either to make important concessions or face a major political reverse—and will probably opt for the former.

283. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, May 16, 1975, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger—Chairman
D Mr. Ingersoll
P Mr. Sisco
E Mr. Robinson
T Mr. Maw
M Mr. Eagleburger
AF Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
ARA Mr. Rogers
EA Mr. Habib
EUR Mr. Hartman
NEA Mr. Atherton
INR Mr. Hyland
S/P Mr. Lord
EB Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/P RS Mr. Anderson
PM Mr. Vest
IO Mr. Buffum
H Mr. McCloskey
L Mr. Leigh
S/S Mr. Springsteen
S Mr. Bremer
S Mr. Adams

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Hartman: On the CSCE, I think both in your conversations with Schmidt and with Gromyko the date is going to loom large. The Soviets are coming in now from all sides saying they definitely want to nail us down and they want to have a meeting in July. They’re very

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret.
concerned about any efforts—either consciously or not through design—to postpone it into the fall. I think, also, the European leadership is going in the same direction.

We know a little bit of that from the Germans. They want to fix the schedule. They want to fix their calendars, and Schmidt particularly—he’s thinking of the third week in July—so that will come up at that time.

The Europeans have come up with a minimum package now to really wind up that Conference, and we’re supporting it. It has everything in it that one could expect, and there are some concessions the Soviets are going to have to make.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know what I expect. What does it have in it?

Mr. Hartman: It has the minimum acceptable texts on all of the humanitarian affairs. You’ve got family reunification, marriage texts—what are the others?

Mr. Hyland: Travel.

Mr. Hartman: Travel.

Mr. Hyland: Radio broadcasting, exchange of information—radio broadcasting where there will not be a commitment.

Secretary Kissinger: Will I get a memo?

Mr. Hartman: You will have a memo which should be with you now, which gives you a status report.

Secretary Kissinger: Where is it, Jerry? Where are any of these memos?

Mr. Adams: I think they’re in your action folders.

Secretary Kissinger: This I have to read before I go to Europe.

Mr. Hartman: On dates, I’d like to be able to tell people—for example, on the President’s schedule in Brussels—give them the exact hour.

Secretary Kissinger: You can not, until I have shown it to the President.

Mr. Hartman: I wondered whether you had done that.

Secretary Kissinger: I can’t show that to the President until my friends here put it in my folder to take to the President.

O.K. As soon as that’s done, I’ll take it to the President, along with his statement. Where is that?

Mr. Adams: It’s in a special folder.

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2 Telegram 3570 from Geneva, May 15, contains the complete text of the West’s “global initiative for human contacts and information,” presented to the Eastern delegations to CSCE the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Secretary Kissinger: If you want me to take it up with the President, you might put it in the folder with the papers that I’m taking to the President. That isn’t an unreasonable request, is it? (Laughter.) It doesn’t mean I’m harassing you.

Mr. Hyland: According to what Art said, my figures say there will be 175 hours in speeches at the CSC (laughter)—if the present plan prevails.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?

Mr. Hartman: 20 minutes a head at that.

Mr. Hyland: 20 minutes a head. But this is—

Secretary Kissinger: How can that be?

Mr. Lord: That with 50 countries? (Laughter.)

Mr. Hyland: I’m just kidding. This is an issue that has to be taken up—how long it’s going to last.

Mr. Hartman: Schmidt would like to have five days in order to allow for good long bilaterals with people.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s absolutely out of the question. Our press will kill us. It will be an unbelievable nightmare to have five days.

Mr. Hyland: Most Europeans want at least four.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

284. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 19, 1975, 6:15–8:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in the Gobelin Saal of the Hotel Imperial. All brackets, with the exception of those noting errors in the text, are in the original. The night before, Kissinger had met with his staff at the hotel to discuss the upcoming meeting with Gromyko. Lodal’s handwritten notes from the meeting read in part: “We met to go over CSCE, SALT, ME [Middle East]. CSCE—he yells at Hartman because Hartman can’t give him the substance of what the issues are (example in travel).” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 6, Memcons and Summaries of Discussion)
SUBJECT

CSCE

Gromyko: [points to portrait on wall, next to tapestry] There is a good view of a hunter there. It’s good for Sonnenfeldt. We need a wild boar.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt will shoot it.

Gromyko: Perhaps, as we agreed, we could start by having an exchange on European affairs and the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And Mr. Foreign Minister, since we’re technically on our ground, I’d like to take this opportunity to reaffirm what I told you privately:

The basic line of United States policy remains intact and we are determined to overcome problems where differences exist. I want to say this in front of my colleagues, and I was asked specifically by President Ford to say this.

Gromyko: Let me say briefly what I’ve just had occasion to tell the Secretary of State personally, that the line of the Soviet Union towards the United States is the same as the line that has taken shape in recent years mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summits and the documents signed by the two countries. We, for our part, are rigorously following that line and we believe both sides should pursue it. We feel we should not allow events or any countries or combination of countries to cause any harm to that policy or the principles underlying that policy. In other words, we should follow the line to strengthen détente and Soviet-American relations and strengthen peace.

That is something that reflects the thinking of the entire Soviet leadership and of General Secretary Brezhnev personally.

Kissinger: Should we turn to European matters?

Gromyko: Yes, I think we should turn to European matters and take up the European Security Conference first.
Kissinger: As one of the world’s great experts on the European Security Conference and as the only Foreign Minister who has read the documents, why don’t you start.

Gromyko: I don’t know.

Kissinger: Did I tell you the story about Vladivostok, how you undermined the President’s confidence in me?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: He [the President] turned to me and asked “What is he talking about?” and I said I didn’t know. [Laughter]. That problem is settled—between “equal validity” and “equal applicability.” I had two difficulties—I couldn’t tell the difference between the two positions, and what is more embarrassing for a Foreign Minister, I didn’t know which side had which position. [Laughter].

Gromyko: Your mind must have been on more significant matters than the European Security Conference.

Kissinger: It’s now solved, isn’t it?

Gromyko: Let us then turn to those matters, and I trust our discussion will be both serious and productive.

Kissinger: That is our intention.

Gromyko: I may have to say some words on this subject that may not be very pleasant for you to hear. Maybe pleasant, but not very pleasant.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister is a disciple of Maréchal Foch, always on the attack.

Gromyko: Of late we have formed the impression that the American position at the Conference has become harsher and tougher on several matters related to the European Security Conference and the questions in that forum. In the past the Soviet Union and the United States have in several examples shown they can cooperate quite well. In this context, I’d like to refer to the understanding you and I reached in Geneva on peaceful change of frontiers, and there are other examples of such cooperation. But of late—I say this just half in jest—I say it’s as if someone had switched somebody else for the American delegation at Geneva, though it’s the same good people. Someone has done this.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: I hope the line pursued by the United States will be a line aimed at removing differences and reaching agreement. Of course, only you can give clarity to this situation. I say this by way of introductory remarks and I’m sure you’ll have something to say in reply.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I’m aware of your view that the United States has perhaps not proceeded as rapidly as desirable. I do not believe this is the case. I believe perhaps it’s the Soviet Union that
has not made all the moves it could. Be that as it may, I have reviewed the European Security Conference and we believe it’s possible to conclude the European Security Conference in substantially the time frame we’ve discussed, and concluded at the summit level, and have it all concluded by the end of July.

So perhaps we could most usefully spend our time on what needs to be done.

The principles are done. Quadripartite rights and responsibilities. We have the problem of Basket III, of confidence-building machinery, and while we are here we should say something about how it [the summit] should be conducted—the length of time, speeches, if you’re ready.

Gromyko: I am ready.

Kissinger: So that’s how we think we should spend the time.

Gromyko: I certainly agree to that approach. Let’s direct our gaze into the future and see how we can do away with the remaining complexities and difficulties and see how we can conclude in the period we have agreed upon.

Kissinger: On confidence-building measures, the differences concern the number of days of prior notification, the depth of the zone to be covered, and the size of forces that would be concerned. Those are the three issues.

Regarding the length of time, the Soviet view is 14 days and the Western view is 40 days.

Hartman: 49 days.

Kissinger: [to Hartman]: How did we arrive at that?

Hartman: Seven weeks.

Gromyko: Ours is 12 days.

Kissinger: Well, we won’t accept 12.

On the depth of the area, we have said 500 kilometers, and you had said 100 kilometers. On the size of forces, you had said 30–35,000, informally. What is the formal position.

Hartman: 40,000.

Kissinger: And we had said 20–25,000.

We are prepared to find a compromise on all of these points, and not to insist on our position, if you don’t insist on yours. And we could instruct our delegations accordingly to find a compromise.

Gromyko: Let’s take up point by point. Depth.

Kissinger: On depth, we’d be prepared to settle in the middle, say 300 kilometers, we had said 500 and you had said 100.

Gromyko: [Thinks] That is not the basis. Even now, 100, when you say it takes all the territory, when compared to Western Europe, our
territory is larger, and the whole line, from north to the south. Try to compare it—all the territory, a stripe down.

Kissinger: There is more territory because the Soviet Union is larger?

Gromyko: Eastern Europe is covered. But this is not taken into account by your and the Western European delegations.

You mentioned formal and informal positions.

Sonnenfeldt: On numbers.

Gromyko: No, on depth.

Kissinger: We gave you no informal position on that.

Gromyko: On numbers.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

150. I think 150 is much larger if you compare the territory.

Dobrynin: In square miles.

Kissinger: Our problem is some of our allies—I don’t want to mention names because we don’t want to be in the position of negotiating separately—say that 300 is their minimum. So we want to agree on something that has a chance to be implemented. I really think the lowest number we could get without difficulty or checking with our allies is 250 kilometers. This is not bargaining because I’ve taken no interest, but we think that’s the lowest.

Gromyko: 150 is our position. This is on depth.

On numbers . . .

Kissinger: The official allied figure is 12,000. Our personal compromise is 20–25,000. Your position is 30–35,000.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: If we would get everything else worked out, we’d recommend to our allies something between 25–30,000 and that would bring us very close to each other.

[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]

Gromyko: On 30,000, that’s good. We would be prepared to agree on that, but without being conditioned on another condition. 30,000, that we could agree on, because that represents the maximum you are prepared to agree to and it’s the minimum we are prepared to accept, but we cannot accept the other figure regarding depth. But the area of the Soviet Union that would be subject to notification would be greater than all of the area in Western Europe.

As regards the third element, that is, the time of notification, frankly speaking we believe this question is raised especially artifically. Why should we be expected to give two months’ notice in advance?

Kissinger: Seven weeks. So we can mobilize to go to war.
Gromyko: Let us reason coolly on this. Maybe for one country, one regiment or two or an entire division is a great force which, when it starts moving, really causes the whole world to shake, and maybe they take three or four months to plan. It may take three months for them to get boots and uniforms fitted. But for us a division is nothing.

Kissinger: You’re talking about number.

Gromyko: I’m talking about preparation.

Kissinger: My view is, when we need the warning we won’t get it, and when we get the warning we won’t need it. If one is going to attack, one can violate the agreement.

So I’m not going to insist on seven weeks. I was supporting you. Because I was prepared to settle for six and one-half weeks.

Gromyko: I was just about to come out in solidarity with you when you said the same thing about me.

Two weeks.

Sonnenfeldt: From twelve to fourteen days.

Gromyko: Two weeks ahead of time we notify you that 30,000 troops are about to move.

Kissinger: In two weeks that information couldn’t possibly get from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They couldn’t put it on the agenda of a NATO meeting in two weeks.

Gromyko: Maybe we should put an effort to rectify matters where it is really needed.

Two weeks.

Kissinger: I gave up four days; you gave up two days. How about 30 days?

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, I can’t give an agreement to that because we think, especially after what you said about the real importance of such matters, that someone is just giving vent to psychology matters.

Kissinger: The whole thing is psychological.

Gromyko: The whole thing is being lauded to the skies.

Kissinger: But you want it to be, because that gives the European Security Conference its importance.

Gromyko: You think it’s that that will give it importance.

Kissinger: No, it’s “equal applicability” compared to “equal validity.”

Gromyko: Is that Mintoff’s view?

Kissinger: Mintoff got a tremendous reception in the People’s Republic of China and hasn’t been the same since.

Gromyko: We read about that.

Kissinger: The minimum we could convince our friends to do is 25 days.
Gromyko: In that case we will have to leave that question open.

Kissinger: All right. Then we have depth and warning. . .

Gromyko: We cannot accept that figure.

Far more important than this question of number of days are the questions of depth and warning. On numbers, like Apollo, we’ve managed a docking.

Kissinger: If it’s too short a time and too narrow [an area], it has no significance.

Dobrynin: Here, you can pick up the telephone and call anywhere in two minutes.

Gromyko: Mintoff must have frightened everybody.

Kissinger: A very persuasive man.

Gromyko: He must be virtually terrorizing everyone at the Conference.

Kissinger: He’s threatening to join Libya.

Gromyko: Let me add to that, that those who want agreement on a different time should give earnest thinking to our latest proposal. And generally speaking, a strange phenomenon is visible at the Conference, that it’s only the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries that should retreat and retreat and retreat and then we’ll come to an agreement.

You know our delegation at the Conference has told the Conference that the Soviet Union is prepared to send notification to all participating countries and not only to those bordering on the Soviet Union.

Then when we mention a depth of 100 kilometers, that depth will apply also to Turkey.

Kissinger: What do you mean?

Hyland: Turkey has to notify countries of movements 100 kilometers from its borders.

Gromyko: Turkey won’t have to notify everyone of movements, but only those 100 kilometers from its borders.

Kissinger: Not on Bulgaria and Greece. [to Sonnenfeldt:] Well, what’s your answer?

Gromyko: I’m sure your advisers are advising you to accept that proposal.

Dobrynin: They’re all making notes urging you to agree.

Makarov: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Gromyko: Even Sonnenfeldt.

Try measuring in terms of square mileage the size of the zone about which we intend to give notification.

Kissinger: Yes, but that’s not the problem. It cannot be done on the basis of territory, but it has to be done in terms relevant to the problem people are concerned about.
Dobrynin: It’s on the whole border, north to south.

Kissinger: Let me say this: that the problem of voluntary notification raises this problem. When we testify to Congress we will say that though it’s voluntary, we will expect it to be done, and if it is done and not notified, it will be inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty.

Sonnenfeldt: Agreement.

Kissinger: Agreement. If it is not voluntary, since we will hold you to it anyway, we could be more flexible on other elements.

Gromyko: When we mention the figures we are prepared to accept, we can accept them only on the condition that the principle of the voluntary notification is recognized. This is the principle we discussed with you at Geneva. All we accept is conditioned on that.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And we discussed it with France and England, and they accepted. So we consider that’s accepted.

Kissinger: Yes, but . . .

Gromyko: We received the suggestion of the form of words from Britain or NATO; we are not entirely satisfied with those, but we have some amendments. Not big ones, but some amendments.

Let me also say, if the voluntary principle is accepted, the mechanism of notification would operate more effectively in fact than if some other principle will be agreed upon. It’s a less sharply worded formula, and would affect the scheme of things less than the other formula. It would be more acceptable politically and legally, and would in fact be more effective. I want to emphasize, more effective.

Kissinger: But in fact that means there would be notification.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: And we would testify to that effect to Congress.

Dobrynin: Yes, Henry.

Gromyko: If you are prepared to look into this British formula, we are prepared to discuss an amendment to it.

Kissinger: May I see it?

Sukhodrev: This is in Russian, sir.

Gromyko: But we are prepared to lend it to you in Russian. At a very low interest rate.

[Hartman looks for it]

[Attached but not printed is the a British text on confidence-building measures with headings in Russian.]
Korniyenko: The top part, Mr. Secretary.
Sukhodrev: The top part is the British.
Kissinger: What’s the second part?
Korniyenko: Some neutral countries.
Gromyko: Don’t pay attention to that.
Korniyenko: The Minister would like to suggest some changes in the British text.
Gromyko: My suggestion is the following:
Sukhodrev: Here is the amendment.
Kissinger: We’ll agree to take it out if you add 50 kilometers.
Gromyko: We already added 50 kilometers. [laughter]
Kissinger: 50 more. We have both learned that in some parts of the world that you never get paid anything for services already rendered.
[There is a conference on the Soviet side.]
Gromyko: The preamble does not cause enthusiasm.
Kissinger: I have no particular recollection of this preamble. If this is the agreed text, I have no problem with deleting “therefore” from the preamble. Let us check it. If this is correct text, we agreed to drop “therefore.”
Gromyko: This is the original English.
Kissinger: We’ll agree to drop the word “therefore.” If the British disavow this, then we’re in a new situation. But on the assumption that this is the agreed text, we agree to drop the word “therefore.”
Gromyko: Check with your delegation and verify it.
Kissinger: We will do it tonight. By the end of the meeting tomorrow, we’ll have it.
Gromyko: What I’ve told you is my tentative concern. Tentative.
Kissinger: We just want to check. If they confirm it, we agree to drop the word “therefore.”
Gromyko: The Third Basket.
Kissinger: We’ll leave this then. I just want to check. We have not settled the issues of depth . . .
Dobrynin: And timing.
Kissinger: And length of notification.
Can I have a 3-minute break?
[There was a break from 7:25 to 7:34 p.m. The meeting then reconvened.]
Makarov: [Shows a bottle of mineral water on the table labeled Güssinger.] Kussinger.
Kissinger: I saw it. I had the same idea.
Gromyko: Cult of personality. [Laughter]
[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer]

Kissinger: Shall we leave the confidence-building measures now and go to Basket III. Have we finished?

Gromyko: Let’s take up Basket III.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: Let me ask you: Is it your intention to set up a state within a state? Because that’s a new one in international practice. Up until now we have spoken in terms of—and this is something you have spoken of on several occasions—that domestic legislation must be respected. Now it appears—and I repeat you have spoken of it on several occasions—that newsmen are to set up a state within a state?

Kissinger: That’s already the case in the United States.

Gromyko: On that we can only sympathize with you, but here we are dealing with an international agreement.

Kissinger: We have made a major effort to get our allies to make a global proposal on Basket III, where in turn, we have made a major effort to meet your concerns. If this is acceptable as the basic approach, in Geneva we could instruct our delegation to be flexible in dealing with yours and make an effort to meet your concerns. But we have made a major effort.

As for journalists, no one has suffered more from journalists than I have, so I have no particular affection for them. But in the United States how it will be received will depend very much on how the press presents it, so to be hard on all the press points would be counterproductive.

Gromyko: To accept it as the basis for discussion wouldn’t solve the problem. We would be prepared to discuss the text, but only after we get clarification on what we regard as the most thorny, the most prickly. So let’s take those points up one by one.

You, in that text, try to put forward the point of view—even though not in those literal words—that journalists should enjoy absolute freedom. If we accept the point of view that both journalists and the practices of the states concerned would take into consideration the laws operating in the country concerned, that would help us overcome that difficulty.

Kissinger: Don’t we already have that in there?

Gromyko: But, secondly, there is the question of sources of information and accessibility of those sources.

We see one provision, one clause, which says in effect that there must be free access to information including individuals. Now we see that as a sally against us, and we don’t think any state could sign such a clause. We don’t have any laws that state that journalists cannot have access to individuals. There are no such laws. So if the present situation continues in being, that should suit everybody
concerned. But to demand that we give our stamp of approval to an idea which for some reasons — and you know best for what reasons — is aimed against us, is at best an insult.

And there is the clause calling for equality in terms of treatment between journalists and so-called technical personnel. I’m sure there are people who come in your office every couple of months to check on maintenance and so on; it’s as if we called them diplomats. Just because they work in the same roof.

Kissinger: Are you sending people into my office to check my telephones?

Gromyko: It is the same with journalists and technical people—why should we extend the same rights to them on the same footing? That’s not in your interest. That’s another one that has thorns in it. Even from a purely technical standpoint, if a certain apparatus is used unlawfully, whatever such persons are called — whether journalist, technician or an angel—he’ll get slapped down.

Kissinger: There is no question about doing something unlawful. There is no question here of sending TV crews onto your strategic missile bases.

I have to go back to the original question. If we could reach an agreement on this as the basic approach, we could take a look at some of the concerns you raise. We are not saying every point here is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I can say now, several of the points you raise here are reasonable — without going into language.

Gromyko: Let’s take out the parts of it that are objectionable, and we will not be against taking it as a basis for discussion.

Then there is another question, and that is the freedom of broadcasting. Where did that question spring from? Let me quite frankly say, do you expect us to sign a document whereby we would be sanctioning the creation of radio stations directed against us and other Socialist countries? Do you expect us to accept that?

Kissinger: We can always try. I didn’t think you would notice it. I understand your point on this one. There are two aspects to this. So that we get to the key issues. I have innumerable times expressed my view on Basket III. I don’t think you’ll change your system as a result of Basket III.

Gromyko: I think there are grounds for doubts.

Kissinger: This paragraph has to do, to put it crudely, with jamming. I think it’s poor drafting. It shouldn’t be put in terms of sanctioning broadcasting into the Soviet Union. We’d be prepared to put it into better language.

Gromyko: The problem here doesn’t simply boil down to polishing the text. Because you yourself would never accept calling for broadcasting of all forms of propaganda for friendship, peace, détente...
Kissinger: I wouldn’t accept it?

No, it’s not a question of polishing the text. It’s a question of encouraging information flow and not interfering with legitimate broadcasting. One is a positive concept; one is a negative concept.

Gromyko: The word “legitimate” wouldn’t solve anything because immediately we’d come to polarization along ideological lines. You know we’d never accept broadcasting that undermined our system or offended public morality. There are some countries that permit publication of pornography or other materials.

Kissinger: Your objection is to access to individuals as laid down in this document, second to treating technicians as journalists, and to this text. Those are your objections.

Gromyko: No. It’s not just freedom of journalists. What about questions of security?

Kissinger: What do you mean by freedom of journalists?

Gromyko: If a journalist drove up to a missile installation, I don’t think he’d be comfortable there after a while.

Kissinger: Where is it in the text?

[Hartman indicates for the Secretary the place in the text, in his briefing paper.]

But this makes a specific reference to areas closed for security reasons.

Gromyko: You submitted many versions.

Kissinger: The version we submitted on May 18 refers to “regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons.”

Gromyko: We have areas closed for security reasons, but we would have to open up some.

Kissinger: [reading from briefing paper] The text says “to ease on a reciprocal basis, the procedures for arranging journeys by foreign journalists, thereby facilitating wider travel by them within the country in which they are exercising their profession subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons.”

Gromyko: It says “wider” in comparison to the existing situation. It means we would have to get rid of some areas.

Dobrynin: We want the status quo.

Kissinger: My impression is that it’s not easy for journalists to travel in the Soviet Union. It would have to be somewhat wider, yes.

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3 Not found.

4 See footnote 2, Document 283.
Is security the only reason?
Gromyko: Yes. Only security.
Kissinger: Can a journalist just buy a ticket and go to Khabarousk?
Stoessel: He would have to get permission.
Dobrynin: It is the same in your country.
Kissinger: But we would abolish some too. It would be reciprocal.
Gromyko: I don’t think this can be done.
Kissinger: Let me say a word on some other matters, I see your concerns. On this one, all we want is that in areas permitted for travel, that it be facilitated on a wider basis than before.
Gromyko: I’m sure travel in open areas and assistance given to such travel is greater than in many countries, even the United States.
Dobrynin: In six years, I don’t remember a single case where the State Department arranged a tour for Russian journalists.
Kissinger: It’s a different system. We don’t organize trips, but we approve them.
Gromyko: We pay attention more to “facilitate” in this country.
Kissinger: You can also keep an eye on them better that way.
Dobrynin: You can too.
Kissinger: We suggested this to take account of the concerns of the journalists. Do you have any other concerns?
Gromyko: Let me make just one general comment. The media and journalistic people generally should be concerned with one basic task—to strengthen friendship among peoples, and they should do nothing hostile to the social system of the country of their stay.
Kissinger: Can we apply that to American journalists in America?
Gromyko: It would be an interference in your domestic affairs!
But when formulated proposals are placed before us, it turns out they amount to absolute freedom. When someone walks down Park Avenue and insults someone or knifes someone, the police can’t do anything?
Kissinger: It happens every day on Park Avenue. We had Human Kindness Day in Washington last week—we had five people killed. I went to a meeting of the Organization of American States last week and I noticed my security had increased. I asked why? They say, “they’re celebrating Human Kindness Day across the street.” One senior official lost an eye.
Gromyko: You have efficient writers on your staff. You can change it.
Kissinger: This is something we worked out with our allies, and we made a major effort to meet your concerns. This was not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Gromyko: You said that.
Kissinger: There are some of your points we could take into account.

Gromyko: If you take them into account, I would like to see what text you come up with.

Kissinger: I suggest our Ambassador meet with yours in Geneva, rather than my negotiating it here where I can’t consult with other countries.

Gromyko: If that is your suggestion, there is nothing we can do about it. That’s an expression of a perfectly good desire. But even when we make certain understandings with you, it is very hard to get it across to Geneva.

So what I want to emphasize here is the question of time.

Kissinger: I agree with you. If we work with your characteristic precision, Mr. Foreign Minister, I think we are going to have trouble meeting the deadline. If you can tell us tomorrow which of these paragraphs you can accept, if we give you a new text on three paragraphs, after which the negotiation only begins—as the entrance price to a negotiation . . .

Gromyko: Which do you want? Who can do it? We or you? We, ourselves, could sit down and look.

Kissinger: That’s a good idea. We’ll take Korniyenko. It’s nine paragraphs.

Gromyko: Do you swear by that? Only nine paragraphs?

Kissinger: Ours has nine.

Gromyko: This is a human text.

We’ll give you a text with our corrections.

Kissinger: Ours begins with human contacts.

Korniyenko: There are two separate things, contacts and information.

Kissinger: Yes, but we’ve given you both and we’d like a reaction to both.

I think this would be a good way to proceed.

Gromyko: I haven’t yet read the text on contacts.

Kissinger: This is an historic occasion. Never have we had an occasion when my friend Gromyko hadn’t read every document.

Korniyenko: We just got it from Moscow.

Kissinger: When did we [you] present it?

Korniyenko: Today in Geneva.5

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5 Telegram 3772 from Geneva, May 22, reported that the Soviets presented their response to the West’s global initiative on human contacts and information informally in meetings with the U.K., U.S., Irish, and Danish delegations on May 21 and 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) See Document 290.
Kissinger: If you keep in mind that the fewer changes you have, the easier it will be to meet your concerns on the key paragraphs.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What else?

Gromyko: You mentioned certain organizational matters with the third stage in Helsinki.

Kissinger: Yes. One of our concerns, Mr. Foreign Minister, is the length of the Conference. If we give every speaker a half hour, it would take four and a half hours. The most our President can give is two and a half days, and we would prefer two days. The symbolic importance is not in the speeches made, but in the documents that will be signed. The newspapers will have to report every day. It will devalue the conference. We should focus on a few key speeches.

Gromyko: I spoke also to the General Secretary on this. He, too, would prefer three days, two and a half.

Kissinger: We think it should be two days for speeches and a half day for ceremony.

Gromyko: We’re thinking in the same categories.

Kissinger: So, shall we work in the same direction?

I’ll tell you, the President won’t come for more than two and a half days, so if they want more, it will have to be at a lower level.

Gromyko: How can we work it out as far as length of time is concerned?

Kissinger: It will be tough.

Gromyko: Mintoff the Terrible.

Kissinger: Mintoff the Terrible will want a half hour. The Greeks and Turks will want a half hour.

Gromyko: We’re thinking in the same terms.

Kissinger: The alternative is to begin at the lower level and have the heads of state arrive later.

Gromyko: That will not be good.

Kissinger: If necessary, we’ll agree to 10 minutes for everybody.

Gromyko: I think it’s better what you said—five key countries.

Kissinger: If 35 heads of state each speak a half hour, that’s 17 hours. No head of state can leave while another head of state is speaking.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: It’s mind-boggling.

Gromyko: You convinced us.

Kissinger: Let’s work together on it.

Gromyko: Let’s work together on it.
Kissinger: I have to tell you, the President just can’t come for five days. I think two days of speeches and one day of ceremony.
Gromyko: You convinced us.
Kissinger: Reluctantly.
Gromyko: So, the other way: We convinced you.
Kissinger: Let’s discuss post-Conference machinery.
Gromyko: What’s your thinking?
Kissinger: We would support the Danish proposal,6 that a group of deputies meet two years from now to discuss . . .
Gromyko: Foreign Ministers?
Kissinger: Deputy Foreign Ministers, senior officials.
Gromyko: What will be the terms of reference?
Kissinger: To see how best to implement the agreement, and to see what steps should be considered.
Gromyko: Some kind of conference?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: In two years, such a group would be convened?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: To see how it’s going?
Kissinger: And to see what could be done to strengthen the terms of the agreement and to consider possibly what permanent institutions there might be.
Gromyko: You are not in favor of consultative machinery?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: The terms of reference should be simple: to consider the terms and possible institutions.
Kissinger: I would add: to review the progress in implementation, and number two, your formula.
Gromyko: Let us think this over.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: Will your European friends go along with this?
Kissinger: I think we could convince them.
Gromyko: What about the neutrals?

6 According to telegram 2806 from Geneva, May 5, the Danish delegation to the CSCE tabled an EC-Nine proposal for “follow-up based on an interim period followed by a meeting of high-level officials in 1977 to review the results of CSCE.” The telegram reported, “The Danish proposal drew predictably mixed comments, with Western delegations, including US, supporting it, and Eastern and neutral countries critical.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Kissinger: The neutrals are more difficult.
Gromyko: What about Mintoff?
Kissinger: Yes. We could discuss shortening the interval, if this helps anybody—to 18 months.
Gromyko: Three to four years.
Kissinger: No, shorten it.
Gromyko: So we would have more experience.
Kissinger: This would not help us with the neutrals.
Gromyko: Fine. Let us think it over.
Kissinger: All right.
Should we have something to eat?
Gromyko: Probably. For the time being. [Laughter]
Kissinger: For the time being? That’s all we wanted you to do. We don’t expect you to eat all night.
Gromyko: We’re in a plot with the Secretary of State to have the dinner last only 30 minutes flat.
Kissinger: We can’t do it with dinner, but we’d appreciate it if we could do it with lunch tomorrow. Seriously. A working session. All my colleagues would appreciate it—a very light lunch.
[The meeting ended]

285. Editorial Note

On May 20, 1975, President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft sent a memorandum to President Ford containing a summary by Secretary of State Kissinger of his ongoing talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The summary reads in part: “In formal meeting with Gromyko, we spent virtually the entire time on CSCE. Gromyko remains an inveterate haggler and we were not able to make enough progress on the so-called confidence building measures (advance notification of maneuvers) or ‘basket three’—human contacts and improvements in operation of news media—to meet allied positions or our own requirements. At one point I threw in the point that at this rate it is unlikely that the July deadline for the summit finale can be met. Gromyko agreed to review the latest allied compromise on basket three overnight and to provide me with amendments in the morning. On the whole I am confident that we shall more or less stay on schedule but in the usual ungenerous haggling Soviet way. We did
make some progress on the matter of follow-up to CSCE, where a compromise seems likely; it will be some kind of review conference of deputies after a year or two to review progress and make recommendations for possible next steps. The Russians, after first proposing elaborate follow-on machinery, have now become very cautious since they fear we will use such machinery to police their performance on basket three. Gromyko also agreed that the summit finale should be no more than three days with speeches as brief as possible.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File)

286. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 20, 1975, 9:50–10:17 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (Interpreter)

SUBJECTS
CSCE Summit; India-Pakistan

Gromyko: Your press is very ingenious.
Kissinger: But we are going to beat them down. I am going across the country and speaking.
Gromyko: Of the newspapers, which ones do you recommend I read?
Kissinger: In Washington, the Washington Post and New York Times are the most influential because everyone reads them. In the country, in St. Louis, no one reads the New York Times and the Post.
Gromyko: Well, Mr. Secretary, what do you think we should discuss, just the two of us?

Kissinger: I leave it up to you.

Gromyko: After all, in which direction are you and your friends conducting matters at the All-European Conference? Can I tell General Secretary Brezhnev and my colleagues the thing is in good hands, that Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have things firmly in hand and are working toward an early conclusion?

Kissinger: We are working toward a summit the last week of July. What is the Monday?

Sukhodrev: [Checks calendar] The 28th.

Kissinger: No.

Sukhodrev: The 21st.

Kissinger: Yes. We are planning on that week.

Gromyko: Regarding the length of time to be set aside, I have had several occasions to talk this over with the General Secretary, and his opinion is not in discord from President Ford—that is, two, two and a half, three days. That too is acceptable to us. It should be conducted in a businesslike style. Who needs those speeches?

Kissinger: I talked to Kreisky and he agrees. I'll talk to Schmidt tomorrow.

Gromyko: I heard he wants four–five days.

Kissinger: So have I.

Gromyko: But I don't think he will be very strong on it.

Kissinger: If we can get Schmidt, I think the French and British will go along.

May I tell him this is agreeable to you?

Gromyko: You may. You may.

Another question I have is this: Yesterday you and I discussed certain specific matters regarding the European Security Conference. You said you would continue to be in touch with your West European friends—this is our understanding.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Gromyko: Are you sure they won't cast reproaches on you for being in some kind of collusion? Am I correct you were speaking with their knowledge?

Kissinger: No. It was my best estimate.

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2 A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Kreisky is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820125–0443.

3 See Document 284.
Take the confidence-building measures: If we say 30,000, 21 days and 250 kilometers, that I am sure we can get them to accept. If we said less, I can only say we will try. I am not saying it is impossible. It is our best estimate.

Gromyko: I was now asking really about the broad fact. In your estimate, will no one reproach us for collusion?

Kissinger: On what?

Gromyko: On CSCE generally. The French will say, “we are not bound”? I am just asking; because in the past it has happened.

Kissinger: Yes. Look, it is a problem, and it depends how it is handled. If we come to an understanding here and you let us handle it first with them before you approach them . . .

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: I think it is better we deal with it.

Gromyko: All right. Let me say quite frankly what we would be prepared to accept on these CBM’s. I was quite frank in my opinion yesterday on the depth of the zone. I would like you to understand our situation. And the same with the numbers.

Kissinger: Thirty.

Gromyko: But as regards the time limit of notification, we would be prepared to agree to 18 days. Our private position was twelve. We would be willing to do 18.

Kissinger: Why don’t we talk urgently to our allies, and let you know by next Monday, or Tuesday. We want to move it to a conclusion. There is no sense arguing about two days and 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: All right. Do that.

Kissinger: I think they will find 50 kilometers too little. But why don’t we talk to them and make counterproposals if we have to?

Gromyko: Up ‘til now we have felt that whenever the U.S. really had the desire, problems were solved to mutual advantage. It happened in many cases, and we feel it will happen in the future.

Kissinger: We will talk to them.

Gromyko: As regards journalists, we have revised your text4 and made amendments. Korniyenko is supposed to give it to Hartman. But as regards the first part, human contacts, that is for the delegations to go into because I haven’t had time.

Kissinger: Except we should discuss them together. Our delegations can do it. Journalists and contacts together. Let them do it at Geneva. But they will move it.

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4 Not found.
Gromyko: Yes, but please don’t forget to give your delegation instructions at Geneva. In earlier cases when we reached agreement, sometimes we had the impression they didn’t get instructions.

Kissinger: Sometimes we had the impression your delegation didn’t get instructions. [Laughter] Maybe our delegations are both very cautious. We will do it, in the meeting. It depends really on what instructions you give. We have made a major effort; we would like to see some Soviet move.

Gromyko: Please don’t demand of us the impossible. Surely you don’t want to topple the Soviet system with that document.

Kissinger: I had great expectations. [Laughter]

Gromyko: We don’t try to topple the capitalist system.

Kissinger: If the Soviet system toppled, which I don’t expect by this document or otherwise, I am not sure the successor wouldn’t be more of a problem. The government Solzhenitsyn would establish would be more aggressive.

Gromyko: To us, Solzhenitsyn is a zero within a zero.

Kissinger: On Basket III, we have met several of your points, and made a major effort. On several points of yours yesterday, I told you your positions were reasonable.

Gromyko: On “appropriate” points.

Kissinger: But also it depends on whether you accept some of the other points.

Gromyko: Then on those several points, Korniyenko probably already has given you our final communiqué. He has probably already done it.

Kissinger: It should not be significantly shorter than on the earlier occasion. It can be somewhat shorter.

Gromyko: This is a little bit shorter. It might be hard to go into detail, and not good to repeat formulas.

Kissinger: Let’s look at it.5

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

5 The final joint statement, issued on May 20, reads in part: “Also discussed were a number of international problems of mutual interest—the progress of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its speedy conclusion; the situation with regard to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, . . . and other matters. In these discussions both sides proceeded from the agreements and understandings reached as a result of the U.S.-Soviet Summit meetings held in Moscow, Washington, and Vladivostok. The conversations, which proceeded in a constructive spirit were, in the opinion of both sides, useful.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 16, 1975, p. 811)
On May 20, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko held their final day of talks in Vienna. During a conversation at the Soviet Embassy from 3:10 to 3:40 p.m., they briefly discussed the European security conference. A memorandum of conversation reads in part: “Gromyko: On European security, we believe that when it is finally resolved, we will rise one step higher in our own relationships. But what we don’t like is when somebody tries to tread on our feet. Kissinger: But we have really made an effort in Basket III. We’ll make an effort to meet the deadline. We have already reserved the week of the 21st on the President’s calendar. Gromyko: So on CSCE we will be expecting to hear from you in the very near future, and we expect it will be positive. Kissinger: On Basket III, we’ll instruct our delegations to begin immediately. On the military, we’ll let you know by Tuesday of next week. Gromyko: Good.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File [25])

On May 21, Kissinger sent a report to President Ford on the second day of talks in the form of a message to President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft. The message, which Scowcroft forwarded to the President as a memorandum, reads in part: “I spent some six hours with Gromyko today, including two private sessions. The meeting took place in the garish Soviet Embassy built along Stalinist architectural lines. We skipped lunch to allow more time for talks. He continued to be genial in tone and manner and anxious that our meeting should be portrayed positively in public. In the plenary sessions, however, Gromyko was almost completely unyielding on SALT issues.” The memorandum continues: “I pointed out that in conjunction with unhelpful Soviet positions on CSCE, impact could be quite negative on whole détente outlook. I deliberately overdrew negativism of Soviet positions to see if this would smoke out any flexibility. Gromyko himself merely urged that we not overlook helpful elements in Soviet positions (in fact, there were none in his formal presentation which closely followed a set of handwritten notes).” The memorandum notes with regard to CSCE: “Gromyko produced amendments to the Western compromise proposal on the rights of journalists. These are extremely restrictive and will require a good deal of further haggling. I agreed that these issues can be reviewed by our representatives in Geneva on condition that Soviets provide comments on the whole Western counterproposal and that all outstanding texts on journalists, broadcasting and human contacts be examined. As I indicated yesterday, I think these matters will eventually be settled, but only after a miserable series of haggles. There also was some slight give
on maneuver notification. Gromyko agreed to 18 days advance notice instead of 12—and here too I think after some horse trading there will be a resolution.” Gromyko, the memorandum further notes, “indicated that Brezhnev now firmly intends to come to the U.S. in October. This is probably realistic in view of the great amount of work remaining on SALT and the fact that the CSCE finale may well not be feasible by late July. Brezhnev’s health is also a factor that was not clear.” (Ibid.)

On May 22, Scowcroft replied to Kissinger in telegram Tohak 45: “The President said that he had been thinking about Gromyko’s stonewall positions on SALT. He said that if they were a reflection of Soviet attitudes at this point, perhaps we should think about using the leverage of the convening of the CSCE summit conference. I pointed out to him that Gromyko had never been a principal SALT negotiator and that Dobrynin had substantially softened Gromyko’s positions. The President concurred, but said we ought to keep this possibility in mind, because CSCE was for us a minus, not a plus, and there is no reason we should give it away for nothing. I think this reflects the unease which the President has discussed several times with you about CSCE, stemming obviously from the Baltic-American pressure groups.” (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–76, Kissinger Trip Files, Box 9, May 18–23, 1975, Europe and Middle East, Tohak [5])

288. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Mission in Geneva

Bonn, May 20, 1975, 2030Z.

Secto 1053. Subject: CSCE discussion with Gromyko. For Sherer from Secretary.

1. Hartman gave you an account of yesterday’s discussion. Today I told Gromyko that our delegations should be in touch in Geneva to discuss the whole package. I said that our delegation would not ne-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Washington. Kissinger was in Bonn for talks with Schmidt.
2 See Document 284.
3 See Document 287.
gotiate until the Soviets had commented on both human contacts and information aspects. (They gave us Soviet redraft on journalists but I requested that this be presented in Geneva along with comments on other parts of proposal.) I stressed that speed depended on the Soviets showing maximum flexibility since Allies had made major effort to meet Soviet concerns.

2. In fact the text on journalists as re-drafted completely guts the proposal as presented by the Allies. The text drops the wider definition of “journalists,” paragraph 5 drops wider travel and limits provisions to those journalists in country of residence; paragraph 6 drops implied positive response; paragraph 7 limits direct contact to organizations and official institutions; paragraph 8 drops specificity on imports; paragraph 9 waters down free transmission and further restricts it by providing that it must be done through official channels; paragraph 10 as you predicted calls only for telling a journalist why he has been expelled.

3. You should send us the full translation of the Soviet comments and suggested changes when received and give us your analysis of these and recommendations for next steps in the negotiation.

4. You should inform your British colleague that the Soviets will be commenting on the whole of the “global initiative,” that we do not wish to become the negotiators but will try to play a helpful behind-the-scenes role. When the comments have been received, we should have a full discussion in the NATO caucus.

5. For your information only, I indicated to Gromyko that we would be prepared to foresee summit in the week of July 21st but that this could only be achieved if the Soviets showed sufficient flexibility to enable a balanced result to be agreed. You should see that your Soviet colleagues understand this.

6. On CBMs, Gromyko came up to 18 days, but remained at 150 KMs and 30,000 men. We said that we would try this out on Allies and neutrals but that depth looked thin and numbers of men, fairly high. After discussing with British and others, I want your assessment of whether this is adequate and, if not, what alternative we should try to push for.

Kissinger

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4 Not found. Regarding the revised Soviet proposal at CSCE on journalists, see Document 290.
289. Memorandum of Conversation

Bonn, May 21, 1975, 8:10–9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor, FRG
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor, FRG
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: Why don’t we start with MBFR? We have been talking
to you and the British about this but we really don’t want to go to
NATO without knowing your real view. If the problems are technical,
it is one thing; but if they are real or fundamental reservations then it
is another matter.

Genscher: It is alright if you introduce the new proposal but it
has to be without prejudice to the future.

Kissinger: We don’t want a big debate in NATO.

Genscher: You will not get it from us.

Kissinger: I want to be sure that you realize there will be ceilings.

Genscher: Yes, we know that but that does not bother us as long
as they are not specifically applicable to us.

Schmidt: Shouldn’t we want the CSCE to end?

Kissinger: Yes, that’s right. But we need NATO consultation on the
MBFR proposal before that. We would not give it to the Russians un-
til after CSCE is over. But we really don’t want a big NATO debate.

Schmidt: There are a good many views on MBFR in Bonn. Gen-
scher here is rather hard and rigid. Leber and his ministry take a very
military position. I myself don’t necessarily have a particular view.

Kissinger: We need MBFR mostly because of Congress.

Schmidt: I know that very well because I convinced you of it 5
years ago.

Genscher: What the Chancellor means by a “hard” position is our
opposition to special treatment for the Federal Republic.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box
23, External Classified Memcons, May–December 1975, Folder 1. Secret. The conversa-
tion took place in the Chancellor’s Bungalow.

2 See Document 357.
Kissinger: I agree. But we need ceilings because we cannot reduce 54 aircraft without having a ceiling on the remaining ones.

Genscher: But we agree with that.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: We have somewhat the same impression. They3 are being very pedantic on CSCE and Berlin and they are still haggling on CSCE as though they were at the beginning of negotiations rather than at the end. SALT is different because there Grechko is in charge. Gromyko was very tough on this and so was I.

Schmidt: It all seems very uncertain.

Kissinger: We know very little about the succession.4

Schmidt: Do you still want CSCE this summer?

Kissinger: We will do it but we don’t insist. We will not make any further concessions. The Soviet counter proposal on Basket III as far as I can tell is worthless and it is also foolish. It is bound to cause domestic problems.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] Gromyko complained to me about my Berlin trip but I laughed. President Ford is thinking of stopping in Bonn on the way to the CSCE.

Schmidt: That would be very good.

Kissinger: Just one more thing. They would like as short of a CSCE Summit as possible. I don’t think the President could stay more than two and one half days. If it takes any longer the Secretary of State should represent him.

Schmidt: I am not so sure. People want to talk to each other. Friends have begun the only opportunity for this now. I for instance want to talk to Brezhnev and to the Pole5 and to the GDR man.6 I have to do that. And then I need to balance them with others. Two and one half days would be too short. What we need is Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday to allow for bilaterals. And we should have a western meeting on the Monday night. There will be 35 leaders and each should talk 20 minutes.

3 The Soviets.

4 An apparent reference to the uncertain state of Brezhnev’s health; see Document 290.

5 Gierek.

6 Honecker.
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Kissinger: We prefer short speeches.
Schmidt: But there is Tito, Palme, Kreisky—you can’t walk out on them and there is also the Dutch Prime Minister.
Kissinger: Van der uyl.
Schmidt: No, not Van der uyl. den Uyl.
Kissinger: Okay, Den Uyl.7
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

7 On May 21, Scowcroft sent Ford a memorandum containing a report from Kissinger on his talks with Schmidt. It reads in part: “On other matters, Schmidt and Genscher agreed to be helpful on MBFR in NATO; Schmidt, in contrast to Kreisky and Gromyko, seems to favor a somewhat longer CSCE summit to allow for bilateral meetings and a possible Western caucus as well as speeches.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-6, Kissinger Trip Files, Box 8)

290. Editorial Note

In telegram 3772 from Geneva, May 22, 1975, forwarded to Secretary of State Kissinger’s party in Ankara, the delegation reported: “Soviets gave their response to Western global initiative on human contacts and information at May 21 and 22 informal meetings with US, UK, Irish and Danish dels, in form of oral indications of modifications they wish to make to Western paper, or in some cases in form of general statements of the type of text they have in mind. Western dels made no comments on substance during meetings. At conclusion UK rep indicated Western dels would give serious consideration to Eastern suggestions. Eastern dels took great pains to characterize their response as a serious attempt to reply to the Western initiative in a constructive way, which they hoped would make it possible to wind up these subjects quickly. However, the substance of their reply belied their words, contained few meaningful concessions, and proposed a whole shopping list of amendments, many of which were matters of detail, style or translation.

“NATO caucus discussed Soviet response afternoon of May 22, and was unanimous in finding it most disappointing. Not only have Soviets stuck to virtually all their substantive points, they have also proposed many minor changes on issues which global approach was devised to avoid, such as organization, translations, and brackets, and on which West had already attempted to strike a 50-50 balance with Soviet positions. Allies noted that Soviets apparently realize they have
made a serious blunder in mixing major substantive points with minor details, and that Soviet reps are now saying in corridors that only about 10 of their list of almost fifty changes are really important. Thus far they have not told anyone which points are the important ones or whether this means other points could be dropped. Allies also believe Soviets are now under considerable pressure, both because of approaching NATO summit where Stage III timing may be discussed, and because of their evident interest in keeping the global initiative alive. Some Allies are convinced that Soviet response was written on the basis of instructions they had received prior to global initiative, and that more flexible instructions may be forthcoming from Moscow when global initiative has been studied there. For all these reasons, NATO caucus concluded that Soviets should be made to understand that negotiating ball is still in their court, that their long list of changes would take months to negotiate, and that they should identify the real points for negotiation and drop the rest.

"NATO caucus reached consensus on following tactics for the next few days: (a) take no precipitate action, either to enter negotiations on substance or to withdraw global initiative; (b) maintain Allied unity on all aspects of global initiative; (c) in contacts with Soviets, Eastern dels and neutrals express disappointment with Soviet response, and convey message that serious consideration will now have to be given as to whether global initiative should be withdrawn; (d) seek to get Eastern reps to identify the really important points which need to be negotiated, and to indicate whether other points can be dropped; (e) wait for Soviets to give further signals of flexibility; (f) exchange information and review situation again in caucus on Tuesday, May 27.

"In view of disappointing Soviet response, we believe it would be a mistake to enter negotiations on substance at this time, since this would lead Soviets to believe agreement can be obtained on basis of their present demands. On the other hand, we would prefer to keep the global initiative alive, since it forms a good basis for reasonable conclusion of negotiations on these subjects. In these circumstances we believe tactics agreed in NATO caucus are only reasonable course of action for the next few days. Should Soviets cut down their list of changes, or offer a few more serious concessions, we would recommend moving with our Allies to enter serious negotiations on remaining points at issue, pressing firmly for the reasonable substantive results we want.

"Highlights of changes proposed by Soviets are as follows:
[Omitted here are paragraphs a–c.]
"(d) Soviets suggested complete deletion of our paragraph on radio broadcasting.

"(e) In paragraph 5 of journalists text Soviets made woefully inadequate move in direction of facilitating wider travel by suggesting ‘gradually facilitating journeys,’ with no attempt to deal with our concept of
providing wider opportunities for travel. In sixth para on early response to requests for travel they wished to eliminate alleged automaticity by inserting 'as far as possible.' In para seven on access to sources, they could only accept Swiss formulation which makes no reference to individuals. In the eighth and ninth paras on admission of technical equipment and on transmission of journalists work Soviets proposed amendments which would make these texts more restrictive than those they had informally agreed to in principle last fall and which are substantially reflected in Swiss text. In last para on expulsion they could only accept the Swiss formulation, which omits any mention that a journalist is not liable to expulsion for legitimate professional activity. They rejected any mention of technical staff, either in the text or in a footnote definition of journalists as in the Western proposal.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

291. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: On your trip we didn’t get to discuss CSCE.

On CBM’s, the issue left is what territory should be included for notice of maneuvers. The Europeans wanted 500 kilometers inside the Soviet Union, maneuvers involving 12,000 troops, and notice 96 days ahead. The Soviet Union proposes 30,000 troops, 18 days ahead, 150 kilometers. The Soviet proposals are inadequate.

On human contacts, it is a total fraud. Only Gromyko can understand the language. The language is very abstract, but even this the Soviet Union won’t accept.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

2 It is unclear to which trip Kissinger is referring.
As for post-conference machinery, the Soviets previously wanted a permanent Secretariat. We wanted an assessment in two years. Now the Soviet Union is on our side; but they want to delay four to five years since they now are afraid Yugoslavia and Romania will use the machinery against them.

I think your position must be hard-line. No more concessions to the Soviet Union. If they want a conference, let them concede.

The President: Did you see the New York Times editorial?3

Kissinger: It was unconscionable. You should see the editorials they had in ’69 and ’70. But the Jews are trying to get the maximum polarization with the Soviet Union.

But on CSCE, I would listen and not get engaged. Say if we can get a decent settlement, fine; if not, wait a few months.

The President: If the Soviets are so eager to get a CSCE, can we use that for SALT leverage?

Kissinger: It would be difficult; it could have been done a year ago maybe, but the Europeans would leave you. We should, three years ago, have linked it with MBFR. But if it isn’t finished but early June, there can’t be a meeting in July. Our negotiation can drag just a bit behind the Europeans and slow it up as much as possible.

The President: I think we should hang back. Will the Europeans care?

Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev said he wouldn’t come here before the CSCE. I told him that is OK; we are better off domestically on our anti-Soviet line.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

3 On May 26, the New York Times published an editorial entitled, “What Price Security?” It reads in part: “The agreement [on European security] is something the Soviet Union has sought for two decades and, especially, since 1966. There is not much the West expects to get out of it except some pious phrases, which are more likely to be honored in the breach, although it would be an error to yield on the minimum points the West is now down to defending. The real issue is whether the President of the United States, the President of France, the Chancellor of West Germany, the Prime Minister of Britain and virtually all the other heads of government of West Europe should take part in a Helsinki gala with Mr. Brezhnev and his East European satellites that might create a false euphoria over ‘peace in the world.’ ” (New York Times, May 26, 1975, p. 14)
Washington, May 27, 1975, 2023Z.

Tosec 20020/122749. Subject: CSCE: Reply to Soviets on CBM’s.

Ref: Geneva 3837.2

You should contact Kovalev and indicate that Secretary has asked you to convey following points growing out of your soundings of allies following conversations with Gromyko in Vienna re CBM’s parameters.

—Our discussions with allies in last few days indicate that new Soviet proposal on parameters could be expected to elicit a generally favorable response.

—At the same time, however, Soviets should understand that none of the allies is prepared to accept Soviet proposal—18 days, 30,000 troops, 150 km—as a final solution to parameters problem. Soviets have not yet moved far enough in direction of allies.

—As to priorities among different parameters, the allies continue to attach particular importance to (a) area of USSR to be covered and (b) threshold for size of exercises of be notified. Therefore we believe Soviets will have to show further flexibility on both of these parameters to make progress. However, the area of the USSR to be covered remains the most basic problem, and the Soviets should focus their major attention on this. 150 km coverage of USSR would not be an acceptable outcome. Deeper zone is required.


2 In telegram 3837 from Geneva, May 24, Sherer informed Hartman that the U.S. delegation at CSCE had “contacted reps of UK, FRG, and France and several smaller nations?” individually for reactions to parameters set forth by Gromyko. These allies all believe Soviet offer is insufficient, and that more satisfactory results can realistically be obtained with sustained pressure on Soviets. Of the three numerical parameters, these allies also agree that timing is least important, but are evenly split on whether they should exert maximum effort to lower threshold or increase depth of area. On threshold, some now believe that most practical outcome would be a numerical range on the order of 20–25,000 vice a single set figure. On area, allies not only wish Soviets to increase width of band of territory along their land borders, but also to measure band from sea frontiers in Baltic and Black Seas. However, allies have limited leverage to exact these further concessions without using movements issue, and we would appreciate authorization requested in ref b to join allies in developing appropriate tactics.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
—In our view next step should be for Soviets to table more ample parameters which will take into account allied views.
—We would be prepared to work actively with allies to develop a forthcoming response to a Soviet proposal which in itself gives evidence of flexibility and realism on the important matters we have indicated.

Ingersoll

293. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, May 28, 1975, 8 a.m.

SUBJECT
Quadripartite Breakfast on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
Foreign
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs James Callaghan
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Sauvagnargues
US
The Secretary
Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Assistant Secretary Arthur A. Hartman
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations
Mr. David Anderson, Director, EUR/CE

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Sauvagnargues: I think at this point I should mention my recent discussion with the Yugoslavs about QRRS in the CSCE. I gave them an amended text of the original language which we had prepared and presented in Geneva. I suggested, "The participating states note that the present (title of document) cannot and will not affect their rights,
obligations or responsibilities specifically defined and recognized or the corresponding treaties, agreements or arrangements.” I think this will be acceptable to the Yugoslavs2 although it may be difficult for the Russians to accept. I would like to have your views on this new text today or tomorrow. Perhaps the Bonn Group could consider the new text. Once we have your views, I would then be prepared to try to convince the Russians.

Callaghan: I agree that we should let the Bonn Group look at this.

The Secretary: Thinking about Soviet policy generally, I have to say that I have the impression that the Soviets are simply marking time. They are keeping various negotiations alive but just barely. Even the preparations for the Brezhnev meeting with President Ford are just tick- ing over. I suppose that Brezhnev’s physical condition is presenting a problem in this area. My meeting with Gromyko in Vienna went well. He went out of his way to be friendly in the meetings and with the press. But I have difficulty understanding the Soviet tactics in the CSCE, where they were apparently interested in reaching a speedy conclusion. On SALT, they made some impossible proposals in Vienna but Gromyko’s informal remarks to me afterwards suggested that an agreement this year was very probable. But all in all it is a curious performance.

Callaghan: I would like to clear up CSCE by mid-summer. This is not a matter of policy, it is simply a matter of order. What are the outstanding issues that we need to consider? CBMs and Basket III?

Sauvagnargues: Yes, I would be interested in knowing how the FRG views the progress on Basket III.

Genscher: We have no problem now with Basket III. For us the question of CBMs is most important.

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2 Telegram 3640 from Geneva, May 17, contains information on the Yugoslav position on quadrupartite rights and responsibilities. (Ibid.) Telegram Secto 2054 from Brussels, May 30, reported that the French subsequently modified Sauvagnargues’s original text to read: “The participating states note that the present (title of document) cannot and will not affect their rights, obligations or specifically defined and recognized responsibilities nor the corresponding treaties, agreements and arrangements.” (Ibid.) Telegram 8710 from Bonn, May 30, reported that the French had presented the revised text to the Yugoslav delegation at CSCE. The same telegram reported that while the U.K. representative to the Bonn Group was willing to accept the French formulation, as long as the English language version made it clear that only “‘responsibilities’ are modified by specifically ‘defined and recognized.’” The US and FRG reps expressed reservations on text. (Ibid.)
The Secretary: As you all know, I have had the greatest doubts about CSCE. Soviet practices will not change in any respect simply because of the wording in Basket III of the Security Conference documents. However, having presented our global initiative to the Soviets, it would be a mistake now to fall back from it. After all there is nothing in our proposal that involves any action. I think we should try to hold out. This has become a domestic political problem in the U.S., where we now have to explain what we are getting in Basket III. I think we are in a good position to defend ourselves publicly. It is therefore difficult to see why the Soviets won't settle. If they don’t show signs of concessions in the next two weeks, I don’t see how we can have a summit by the end of July.

Sauvagnargues: I think that we could have a summit at that time if we wind up the present negotiations in Geneva by the middle of June.

Callaghan: I think we should stick with our position on CBMs and on Basket III and let the Soviets come to us.

The Secretary: You are aware of the CBM proposal which Gromyko made to me in Vienna, i.e. 30,000 troops, 18-day pre-notification and a distance of 150 kilometers. I told him that I would have to discuss this proposal with our Allies but that I did not think it would be acceptable.

Genscher: We could accept the proposal except for the 150 kilometer provision. We would want to stick with 300 kilometers.

Callaghan: I think that seems reasonable. Why don’t we all agree to take this approach?

Sauvagnargues: All right, and if the neutrals want to push for Soviet concessions on the other aspects of CBMs, then they can do so without our support.

The Secretary: Agreed.

Genscher: One further matter. I would like us to agree to refer to the Bonn Group for study the question of the extent to which Berlin is affected by CSCE documents. This will be an important issue domestically in the FRG.

Sauvagnargues: I think that the Bonn Group could study this problem, but I want to make one point: I do not believe that we should try to insert a sentence in the CSCE documents which would cover Berlin’s interests. This would be very difficult and would involve us in very long discussions. I think the point can be made by getting a common sentence covering Berlin’s interests into the speeches of the three Allied chiefs of state.

Genscher: That would be fine. That is basically our objective.
Callaghan: Can we all agree on the proposed sentence on Berlin for inclusion in the NATO Declaration?  
Sauvagnargues: I think the sentence is a good one and unless I hear objections, I think we should accept it.

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3 The North Atlantic Council met in Brussels May 29–30 with the participation of heads of states and government, including President Ford. The text of the final communiqué reads in part: “The security afforded by the Treaty enables the Allies to pursue policies reflecting their desire that understanding and cooperation should prevail over confrontation. An advance along this road would be made if the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were concluded on satisfactory terms and its words translated into deeds. The Allies hope that progress in the negotiations will permit such a conclusion in the near future. They reaffirm that there is an essential connection between détente in Europe and the situation relating to Berlin. The Allies participating in the negotiations in Vienna emphasize that the development of understanding and cooperation also requires mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe in a manner which would contribute to a more stable relationship and enhanced security for all.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1975, p. 890)

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294. Memorandum of Conversation

Brussels, May 30, 1975, 8:35–9:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Prime Minister Harold Wilson
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Residence of the American Ambassador. Ford and Kissinger were in Brussels for a NATO summit. On May 29, they met with Schmidt. The memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “The President: We are prepared to go to the summit for the CSCE, but there is not much movement. Kissinger: There were some concessions in Basket III. If there are more in CBM, there may be a chance. If they extend the territory to about 300 kilometers . . . Schmidt: That is the only real issue. Because of the relation to MBFR. Kissinger: Now I think the chances of a summit in July are slightly better than 50-50.” (Ibid.; ellipsis is in the original)
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: What do you think are the prospects for CSCE?

Wilson: What do you think?

Kissinger: The Soviets are moving on Basket III. The only real sticking point is CBMs—the question of the depth of the zone. I think we could settle on 250 kilometers. On follow-on, I had an exchange with Gromyko in Vienna. I said we supported the Danish proposal, but I said that perhaps there could be meetings after a year or 18 months, but Gromyko said no, it should be after three to four years.

Callaghan: The Romanians want a much shorter time.

Kissinger: The East Europeans want permanent machinery because they want to be able to monitor the Soviets.

Callaghan: One of the results of CSCE is that it has brought the East Europeans into equal status with other countries.

President: Is a summit likely to be in July?

Kissinger: Yes. I think the chances are two out of three that it will be unless the Soviets change their tactics. They are dribbling out concessions.

Callaghan: Stage II should really be settled in two weeks if the summit is to be in July.

Wilson: It really would kill the Geneva industry. We will need a public works program for all the diplomats who have been so busy with CSCE.

President: How long should we allow for the CSCE summit? Five days is very long. There will be 35 speeches.

Wilson: The more time you allow, the longer the speeches will be. Maybe we should plan to arrive on Monday in the afternoon or evening, and then work Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and into Friday.

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2 In an undated memorandum to Kissinger prepared on May 29, Hartman wrote that “on May 28, the Soviets offered some significant concessions on Basket 3 issues in the Allied ‘global initiative’ on human rights and information.” Hartman noted that “while this demonstration of Soviet flexibility will help accelerate the search for a Basket 3 final compromise, the NATO caucus at Geneva expects further hard bargaining.” Hartman continued: “At a May 28 luncheon in Geneva, Kovalev told the US, UK, and French delegation heads that Moscow offered these concessions as a ‘gesture of good will’ aimed at speeding up efforts to overcome differences on the 30 points still to be resolved in the human contacts and information area. A NATO caucus meeting immediately following the luncheon produced agreement that the Soviet moves included at least two significant concessions—on travel and journalists—and that the remaining list of Soviet-proposed changes form an adequate basis for opening global negotiations.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 WH [3])**
Callaghan: At the OECD meeting in Paris, I got rid of 20 speeches in one morning. Your’s was long though, Henry.

President: It will lose luster if the speeches are too long.

Wilson: Yes, like at the UN.

Callaghan: So maybe it would be arriving on Monday, and then Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.

Wilson: Will it all be wrapped up at that point or will there still have to be negotiations?

Callaghan: No. There would be valedictory speeches only.

Kissinger: You know that the Turks don’t want Makarios to be there, but Denktash. 3

Callaghan: Yes, I gather. Mintoff will make trouble on relations with the Arabs 4 and he may hold that until we all get there.

Kissinger: The conference could end on Thursday and we could then stay on Friday for bilaterals. The press in the United States would get very impatient if it drags on. They are already saying there has been no accomplishment.

Callaghan: There is very little in Basket III.

Kissinger: And it is unenforceable.

Callaghan: We should go for a short conference.

Wilson: I would like to miss question time in the House for once.

Callaghan: And Cabinet.

President: You don’t enact bills when you are not there?

Wilson: No, no, it goes right on.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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3 Telegram 2113 from Geneva, March 26, reported that “Turkish delegation head (Benler) has written to all CSCE delegation heads, except Cypriot, recalling allusions he made earlier to possibility that he might question Cypriot credentials at some stage in CSCE.” It noted that “in private conversations Benler has hinted that real problem for Turks is possibility of presence of Makarios at Stage III.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

4 Telegram 3830 from Geneva, May 23, reported that the Maltese delegation had introduced at CSCE an amendment to the conference’s draft declaration on the Mediterranean calling for the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet forces from the Mediterranean. (Ibid.)
295. Editorial Note

On June 4, 1975, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin telephoned Secretary of State Kissinger to discuss the European security conference. According to the memorandum of their phone conversation, Kissinger asked, “Do you want to finish it up in Geneva or not? D[obrynin]: What in Geneva? K[issinger]: The Security Conference. D: I don’t understand. K: I see no obstacles to clearing it. D: I would like to discuss this with you. K: O.K. Let us discuss it. You come by tomorrow, or I will call you no later than tomorrow, and you can come the day after.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000BFFE.pdf)

In preparation for his meeting with Dobrynin, Kissinger held several telephone conversations with Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman on June 5. During a conversation at 4:24 p.m., Kissinger asked Hartman, “What is Dobrynin likely to raise about the Security Conference?” Hartman replied: “I think he will probably say that they have begun to move in Geneva and that they need our help. They are moving there, we have gotten reports on it. I would stress that speed is essential. The Finns say they need four weeks for translations and things like that.” (Ibid., http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C009.pdf) At 4:45 p.m., Kissinger spoke with Hartman about confidence-building measures and a final summit conference for CSCE. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads: “K[issinger]: If the Soviets went to 250 kilometers, do you think we could get the allies to accept the 30,000? H[artman]: I think so. K: And what was the other? 18 days? H: I think it is the depth that concerns them. K: I wanted to make sure. Could we sell 250? H: I think so. K: I know they are insisting on 300, but could we make it 300? H: We would have a selling job. K: We would? Could we in good conscience get behind it? H: Yes. K: O.K. What is their view of the date? The week of the 21st or the 28th? H: The Finns say they need four weeks. If we could finish by the 20th of June that would give them until July. They need the flexibility for translation and such. K: The 20th of June. O.K. Good. H: They really have made a lot of concessions. H: Good, thank you.” (Ibid., http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C00B.pdf) At 4:50 p.m., Kissinger spoke with Hartman again. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads: “K: Can I agree with Dobrynin that the confidence building measures are the only ones remaining? H: Right. There are still other issues like the desire for the Mediterranean [Declaration?], but that is not between us and the Soviet Union. K: Suppose the Soviet Union agrees to 250 kilometers, could we take a common stand with them? Then we could work together to get the other measures developed. It is the only issue
outstanding between them and us. H: Right. The French are still try-
ning to negotiate the quadripartite, but that is not between them and us.
K: Good, and then their delegate and ours can work together on the
translation. H: And also on calming down the other high flown propo-
sitions. K: Then our Ambassador and theirs will work together to get
the thing finished if we can agree on the kilometers. H: Right. K: O.K.
Thank you.” (Ibid., http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/
0000C00D.pdf)

No memorandum of conversation of Kissinger’s meeting with Do-
brynin on June 5 has been found. Kissinger reported on the meeting in
a conversation with President Ford on the morning of June 6: “Do-
brynin said they would make the remaining concessions on CSCE. They
will give on Basket I and on the depth of CBM’s.” Kissinger later added:
“We can probably plan on CSCE the week of 21 July. I think you should
not go to Berlin—but you could visit the troops.” (Ford Library, Na-
tional Security Adviser, Memcons, Box 12) Kissinger also discussed his
meeting with Dobrynin in a telephone conversation with Hartman at
6:35 p.m. on June 6. The transcript of their telephone conversation reads
as follows: “K: The Russians are willing to accept the 250 kilometers if
we assure them about the other two parameters. H: I think we should
go to work on it. The British, French, and Germans will buy it. K: We
should say we will support them if they are willing to do it. We should
assure them of our support. H: The major countries will also join us.
K: Right. H: Do you want me to get the message to them? K: Well, no.
I will call them. H: Alright.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading
state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C019.pdf)

296. Briefing Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of European
Affairs for Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, undated.

CSCE: Soviets Moving to Wrap Up the Conference

The Soviets have clearly been moving vigorously to wrap-up remaining
CSCE issues so that they can have a summit at the end of July. Tentative

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry
5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Confidential. Sonnenfeldt sent this memorandum to Kissinger
under cover of a June 5 memorandum.
agreement was reached June 4 on the text dealing with working conditions for journalists, a significant breakthrough which leaves radio broadcasting in basket 3 and CBMs as the only major substantive items to be completed and which could give impetus to a completion of stage II in late June or early July.

The journalists text which the Soviets have accepted parallels very closely the West’s proposals in the “global approach” (see Tab 1). The one remaining obstacle to full agreement on the journalists text is the Romanians, who have indicated that they will have difficulty accepting the language on expulsion.

The Soviets have also recently accepted the text on travel as proposed in the Western global approach, and are now negotiating earnestly on the broadcasting text. Here the Soviets have agreed to accept a formulation expressing hope that the “broadening of dissemination of broadcast information will continue” (a euphemism for cessation of jamming), but they wish to see accompanying language implying responsibility for broadcast content, a point about which the FRG is acutely sensitive.

Assuming that the Soviets will soon start pursuing CBMs with equal intensity, there is a good chance that both basket 3 and the military aspects could be wrapped up within the next few weeks. Accordingly, even with many of the secondary issues like follow-up, translation problems, and the scenario for stage III unsettled, we can expect a strong upsurge of interest from the Soviets and others in setting a precise date for stage III. Ambassador Sherer believes that the Soviets will attempt before June 20 to get a firm Allied commitment to a summit meeting opening July 21 (see Tab 2).

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2 Attached but not printed.
3 Tab 2, telegram 4167 from Geneva, June 4, reads in part: “Western delegations continue to believe strongly that no firm commitment on level or timing of Stage III should be given until key substantive issues (e.g., CBM’s, human contacts and information) of interest to the West are resolved. However, current Soviet attitude toward the negotiations, and their evident haste to complete Stage II, poses the possibility that they may make enough concessions during this week and next week to substantially fulfill this condition and make it necessary for Western dels to take decision on timing and level during week of June 16–20.”
Moscow, undated.

We are ready to consider the possibility of enlargement of the depth of notifications up to 250 kilometers. However can we be sure that in this case two other parameters (number of troops—30 thousand and time of notification—18 days) with the depth of 250 kilometers will be finally accepted and thus the whole question of military measures will be closed at the Conference?

We proceed from the fact that the formulation on the voluntary basis of notifications concerning major military exercises, agreed upon with you, Mr. Secretary, in Vienna, will keep in force and will not be subject to any changes. Only on this basis we are ready to consider the question of depth in the abovementioned direction.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs, Box 44, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1975 WH (3). No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the letter reads: “Handed to Gen. Scowcroft by Mikoyan, Soviet Embassy, 6:00 p.m., June 6, 1975.”

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298. Editorial Note

On June 9, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed the Soviet letter of June 6 (Document 297) with President Ford. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “President: I see the Soviets have made concessions in CSCE. Kissinger: They did on Basket I and earlier they gave us 250 kilometers, up from 180 kilometers. I have let Genscher and Callaghan know this. If it works, we could have a summit conference about the 23rd. I have said 2-1/2 days of formal meetings; to have it longer than that without any accomplishments would be bad. We will get a press beating here anyway. You should see Brezhnev—maybe you can wrap up SALT.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 12)

On June 7, Kissinger sent letters appraising the Soviet offer to Foreign Ministers Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher. The letters read in part: “At our quadripartite meeting in Paris we reviewed the negotiating status of the confidence-building measure on advance notification of military maneuvers. In addressing which aspect of the meas-
ure is most important to Western interests, we reached a general consensus that it would be most important to have depth of territory increased and that the number of troops involved and the number of days’ notice would be by comparison of secondary importance. Since returning to Washington, I have learned from the Soviets that they are now prepared to consider a zone of 250 kilometers in depth providing that the other parameters remain at 18 days and 30,000 men. It is my impression that this represents an important concession and adequately meets Allied requirements. I would appreciate your reaction to the Soviet proposal, and if you agree with me that it provides a basis for satisfactory compromise on this issue that you will so notify your representative in Geneva.” The letters to Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher were sent on June 7 in telegrams 133604 to London, 133605 to Paris, and 133606 to Bonn, respectively. Kissinger also informed Ambassador Sherer at CSCE about the Soviet proposal in telegram 133597 to Geneva, June 7. The telegram reads in part: “I told Dobrynin that you will get together with Kovalev to work out the tactics and manner of presentation of this proposal, and that we will support it with the Allies as meeting essential Western requirements.” (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

On June 11, Counselor Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger as part of his daily activities report: “Hartman and I were in touch throughout the day in regard to CSCE. All the Allies, except France, consider most recent Soviet moves on CBM’s inadequate and we need to convey this fact to the Soviets promptly.” (Ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 12, Daily Activities Reports, 1975)

299. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 11, 1975, 3–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania
George Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House. Brackets, with the exception of those indicting omission of unrelated material, are in the original. Ceausescu visited the United States on June 11 for one day of discussions with President Ford.
President: I know you are concerned about the European Security Conference and about the problems that held up the agreement. We of course have had some reservations about Baskets I and III. I would appreciate hearing your own appreciation about the prospects and what you anticipate.

Kissinger: Macovescu and Gromyko are the only ones who have read all the documents.

President: Mr. President, I appreciate your personally delivering the invitation to come to Romania. There is a distinct possibility and I would like to do it. If there is a European Security Conference Meeting in July or August it might be possible to stop for a visit in Romania after the conference in Helsinki.

Ceausescu: Following the European Security Conference?

President: Yes.

Ceausescu: As far as European Security is concerned, we are concerned not so much by the fact of delay as by the content and expected results of the Conference. For us, it is not a problem of the dates, but of the results of this Conference. Of course, if it can take place in July, that is fine, or if it is in August or even September, that is fine. The principal thing is to get results which will contribute to the strengthening of confidence and will enhance détente. Therefore, it is not Basket III which is essential, the question of how many journalists or artists travel. That is for the experts. This isn’t what is so essential. As far as we are concerned, let as many as want travel around. The essential problems are in the first Basket. On this hangs the movement toward détente and for that matter the conditions of things like cultural exchanges.
In connection with this we see some problems which must be solved if the Conference is going to wind up with good results. First of all there should be firm engagements of states on the renunciation of force and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. Secondly, there is the problem of certain military aspects. Granted it is not a question of resolving basic problems, but we have sought nonetheless to make sure that there will not be interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is a question for example, of these engagements regarding military maneuvers. And even here it is not so much whether it will be 250 or 180 kilometers or 10 to 20 thousand men, but the very fact that the content of these measures should be obligatory and not something voluntary. Therefore if all these problems are going to be reduced to something voluntary, it no longer makes any sense to waste time and energy over 100 kilometers of distance here and there. But what we are doing is introducing into international law certain rules which have existed up to now. When a group of states arrives at certain understandings, these would be mandatory and not voluntary. That is important.

Macovescu: One of the other principal problems is that connected with continuity of the Conference, the follow-up.

Ceausescu: I don’t know what your opinion is but we believe the most dangerous situation is still in Europe where there are the two military blocs with modern armaments, huge concentrations of troops, atomic weapons as well. Therefore we would want to have the summit meeting represent not the conclusion but rather the beginning of European security. For this reason we are in favor of an organism, a process for assuring the continuity of this conference.

President: How often do you see it meeting? Every year, every two years?

Ceausescu: Once a year, once in two years, any time when it is necessary. If there should appear some tense situation, if something should happen, then it could discuss what might be done to prevent things getting worse.

Kissinger: What do you think of the idea of a review conference in 18 months or two years?

Ceausescu: In our opinion that is a good idea. We think as a matter of fact that this sort of permanent organism could have the role of preparing such a conference. I don’t have in mind something that would be set up with a lot of bureaucracy, but rather something that would meet periodically once a year or every six months. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of one of the countries would have the role of coordinator, and this could be on a rotational basis.

Kissinger: For example, rotating?

Ceausescu: United States, Soviet Union, Romania.
President: [Smiling] Romania.

Kissinger: We have explained to Romania\(^2\) and we have been in close touch with the Romanian delegation to the Conference, that the very reason Romania wants this is why we are not agreeable. We are not eager to grant to countries the right of permanent interference in the West. Quite frankly, this is the problem with a permanent mechanism. I understand why you want something to which you could appeal, but we do not want established structures in the West to be exploited. We are sympathetic, though, to your concerns.

Ceausescu: We don’t think of this organism as having any sort of right to do this, and in order to avoid this problem we could regulate the basis on which it would act to exclude such possible intervention. We see it as preparing for new conferences and for solving such problems as will appear. We don’t want any Eastern intervention in the West or Western intervention in the East or Western intervention in the West or Eastern intervention in the East. I would ask you to reflect some more on this problem and to review your position.

[Both Presidents and the Secretary nod agreement.]

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\(^2\) See Document 259.

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300. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger\(^1\)

Washington, June 12, 1975.

SUBJECT

CSCE: The Maneuvers CBM

I called in Vorontsov at 5:30 to tell him we had tried our best all week with the allies at Geneva to sell Dobrynin’s suggested parameters of 250 kilometers, 30,000 men and 18 days for the CBM on notification of military maneuvers. I noted that Art Hartman had told

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Exdis.
Dobrynin earlier today that we were having difficulty with the allies on this issue, and that we had just received word from Geneva that it was not acceptable to either the allies or the neutrals.

I then gave Vorontsov our estimate that it would probably be possible quickly to wrap up this CBM, if Moscow could accept final parameters of 300 kilometers, 25,000 men and 21 days. I emphasized that this was not a formal proposal on our part, but simply an estimate of what others would require. I repeated that, for our part, we could accept the figures put forward by Dobrynin.

Vorontsov reacted with some theatrics to emphasize what he assumed would be a “very bad” feeling in Moscow about this turn of events. He said Gromyko would doubtless be very unhappy since he had thought that “agreement” had been reached with you on two parameters: a threshold of 30,000 men and notification time of 18 days.

I suggested that Moscow might want to consider shifting its position somewhat further just on the area involved but could not predict how this would be received by others in Geneva. I wanted to get this to you quickly since Dobrynin may be calling you about it at any time.

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2 No record of this conversation has been found.

3 Telegram 4410 from Geneva, June 12, noted that “Austrian neutral caucus leader confirmed to us June 12 that neutrals are continuing to hold back proposed compromise on parameters for fear that they will be undercut by Western deal with Soviets on basis of ‘Washington parameters’ and that ‘neutrals will probably not move until reassured by Allies, in particular US, that no deal will be made on the basis of ‘Washington parameters.’” The telegram continued: “Since all progress on CBM’s is now held up pending Allied response to Soviets on Washington parameters, we would strongly recommend earliest possible reply to Soviets to effect that they will have to accept neutral package (300 km/25,000 troops/21 days) within next few days (preferably by close of business on Friday, June 13) if they still hope to have Stage III in July.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Washington, June 12, 1975, 6:23 p.m.

D: I just came back from the meeting with Sonnenfeldt. He told us the bad news—300 kilometers and 25 level. Also 21 days.

K: I can only tell you . . .

D: You really meant this answer. We were thinking about 250 and now back to Vienna.

K: I have written a letter to every foreign minister personally. It was telling them that it is our proposition. I have had replies from the British, French and Germans, in fact, I will let you see my letter some time. I don’t think you have to meet all three points in my judgment.

D: The question is whether we can meet the basic ones.

K: That is what I thought.

D: For the first time I am debating whether to telegram Brezhnev because he will be mad at you.

K: In this case he has no reason to be mad.

D: Now Sonnenfeldt has proposed that we come to Vienna, and look where we [are with?] the proposal—the same place it was originally.

K: If he did want to go to 21 and if he wanted to compromise with 275 and 20,000 as a last offer so that they could say they have exacted something from you, I think it would work.

D: Already we gave 50. It is worse than the previous one.

K: This is an issue on which we have no American interest.

D: If you would like it would be even better if I don’t say anything. He really did believe in you—all the other things you have done. But now coming back again—I don’t know what the reaction will be.

K: I don’t know how Sonnenfeldt presented it.

D: He presented it very well. He said that we failed and nothing else could be done unless we went to 250 and 21.

K: Let me call Hartman and call you back.

D: O.K.

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C042.pdf. No classification marking.

2 Dobrynin met with Hartman; see Document 300.

3 See Document 298.
Washington, June 12, 1975, 6:35 p.m.

K: Anatol, I have had our people check. We have been active there, your man should know. It is not only our allies it is the neutrals. We would really like to help bring this to a conclusion. What interests do we have if it is 50 kilometers more or less.

D: As far as the U.S. is concerned, what we discussed with you is acceptable? Unless the Germans, French or British come to our delegation, our channel sounds ridiculous.

K: I will suggest that the head of the delegation inform your delegation.

D: If you suggest that the British and French come to our delegation, Gromyko asked me to tell you the same thing.

K: Don’t report it and we will have to deal with Kovspeloff.

D: It is your position that it is acceptable. I could report to him that your position is agreed upon by [but?] the allies are not.

K: We can’t make a joint initiative on this with you and the allies.

D: As far as you are concerned, you don’t mind if we use it.

K: I would rather they don’t use it. Can you wait till tomorrow morning? I haven’t found Hartman, but I will talk to him. Wait until tomorrow morning.

D: I will wait. Gromyko said that the 21st and 22nd are o.k. with Brezhnev.

K: O.K. Fine. I have seen somewhere that the Finns prefer it a week later. We are prepared to start the 22nd, we have no reason to change. As far as you and we are concerned, the 22nd is fine.

D: You will call me tomorrow?

K: Yes.

D: I will do nothing.

K: I think it is better. If I send something, I will tell you what I am sending.

D: It is helpful to both of us.

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2 Telegram 4282 from Geneva, June 9, reported: “Finnish delegation head (Iloniemi) told us June 6 that current Finnish preference for timing of stage III is week of July 28, and that several Western European governments had expressed a similar preference.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
K: You are absolutely right. Our people recommended that we do it that way—I over-ruled them—I was wrong.

D: We should talk.

K: Let's wait a day.

D: If you confirm your position, our delegation will work separately with them.

K: I think it is an excellent suggestion and I will let you know what we are doing. I will check it before we do it.

D: O.K.

303. Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Washington, undated.

I would like once again to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the question of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation having in mind today's, to be frank, rather strange state of things in Geneva.

On one hand, there is not just a simple movement forward at the Conference especially lately, but a major breakthrough. Now practically the whole set of issues put on the agenda of the Conference has been resolved on the basis of the balance of interests of the sides.

We think you would agree that to a great extent it was possible to achieve due to the goodwill shown by the Soviet Union. Given a desire to complete final agreement on the Conference documents, it would be literally a matter of days to clear fully the way to holding its final stage at a summit level in Helsinki. A similar view, as we have noted with satisfaction, was recently expressed in public also by you at a press conference.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. No classification marking. Sent to Kissinger by Dobrynin on June 16 under cover of a letter that stated: “Taking into account the urgency of the matter, I decided to send it to you by messenger. I will appreciate early comments to this message.”

2 President Ford said during a press conference on June 9: “While I was in Europe, I discussed with many European leaders the status of the European Security Conference, their views. It appears that there are some compromises being made on both sides between the Warsaw Pact nations and European nations, including ourselves, that will
However, we cannot help getting the impression that some new pretexts are being constantly sought, some artificially created and worthless issues are being tossed in with the aim to delay the conclusion of the work in Geneva. Over several weeks in a row the attempts are being made to conduct the matters in such a way that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would make unilateral concessions. It is clear that this is not the way that could lead to a successful conclusion of the common cause which this Conference in fact represents. We have conceded all that might have been conceded, and what, by the way, the U.S. side had requested in confidence that this would be followed by complete agreement. It is difficult for us to judge who is behind all this and what goals are pursued by this. But if someone conscientiously takes up the course of delaying the Conference then we at least should have been told about it straightforwardly.

We talk about all this with frankness since we believe that reservations and lack of clarity on this account could damage the mutual understanding that exists between our countries on the questions of the European Conference.

It may be hardly contested that by now there exist all objective prerequisites to bring the Conference to a conclusion within the shortest period of time. Only one thing is needed—the political decision on the part of the governments of all the countries represented at the Conference.

I would like to express the hope, that you personally, Mr. President, and your Government will proceed, including your contacts with other Western countries, in such a way as to contribute in a maximum degree to the conclusion of the second stage of the Conference and to hold its final phase starting on July 22, which has been agreed upon between us.
IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger—Chairman
P     Mr. Sisco
E     Mr. Robinson
T     Mr. Maw
M     Mr. Eagleburger
C     Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF    Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
ARA   Mr. Rogers
EA    Mr. Habib
EUR   Mr. Hartman
NEA   Mr. Atherton
INR   Mr. Hyland
S/P   Mr. Lord
EB    Mr. Boeker (Acting)
S/PRS  Mr. Anderson
PM    Mr. Stern (Acting)
IO    Mr. Blake (Acting)
H     Mr. McCloskey
L     Mr. Leigh
S/S   Mr. Springsteen
S     Mr. Bremer

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Kissinger: Art?

Mr. Hartman: Our position in the CSC conference this week is one of appearing helpful but not pressing and not trying to round up a lot of people to get the thing over with, because I think otherwise we're going to get in the middle here. Our allies will accuse us of having made a deal, of trying to end it in July, and trying to get everybody pushed to make a position. And our Delegation understands that. And, as of now, I would say it's not going to happen.

Secretary Kissinger: End of July?

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: How do you interpret the Brezhnev speech Saturday on foreign policy?  

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 7, Secretary's Staff Meetings. Secret.

2 Telegram 8264 from Moscow, June 13, reported on Brezhnev’s election speech of the same day: “He [Brezhnev] made passing reference to CSCE, noting that
Mr. Hyland: I thought that speech, plus all the leadership speeches that preceded it, revealed a fairly conciliatory line on general foreign policy. But he was a little careful on specific relations with the U.S., as were all of his leaders. But then in his informal remarks yesterday, he said he’s coming to the United States after the CSC. So he’s still got, I think, in the back of his mind a linkage to that and SALT.

In fact, we got a CIA report saying that after Gromyko met you, he prepared a report for the Politburo saying we were toughening our line on SALT and linking it to the CSC, and the tactics were to get SALT concessions. And Gromyko recommended that the Russians stand tough themselves and be prepared for some deterioration of relations. But I thought the speeches that were conveyed were in an optimistic mood.

Secretary Kissinger: That Gromyko is a menace, an absolute menace. He doesn’t understand a damn thing about it, and he turns it into one of these negotiating ploys.

Mr. Hyland: Brezhnev talked as if he didn’t really expect a CSC in July. He said this year—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It was going out of his guidance because I had correspondence from him last week on this CBM business. He said that “Everybody is trying to blackmail us on CSC, and we’re just not going to accept it. And maybe we should wait until next year with CSC.”

Mr. Hyland: There was one interesting speech in all this. The whole leadership spoke, you know, in the last two weeks. Andropov, as the head of the KGB, made a pretty vicious attack without relating them to CSC. But he took up freedom of information, freedom of movement, and freedom of ideas and so forth—gave each one of them very hard, which is presumably his job. It stood out like a sore thumb. I don’t think he would have made such a speech unless—

Secretary Kissinger: What is the situation, Art—that if they don’t settle by the end of this week we can’t do it any more?

Mr. Hartman: 20 is roughly the last day. It can go on to maybe the 24th. But there are just so many little loose ends that I really don’t think it’s possible.

conclusion is almost at hand. On MBFR, he said that progress can be made if both sides approach talks ‘honestly and objectively’ without attempts to achieve unilateral advantage.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

3 Not found.

4 It is unclear to what correspondence Sonnenfeldt is referring.

5 In a speech on June 9, Soviet KGB chief Yuri Andropov said that “unnamed adversaries in the West were attempting ‘ideological sabotage’ against the Soviet Union under the guise of calling for democratic reforms there.” (Christopher Wren, “K.G.B. Chief Says Foreign Foes Lie,” New York Times, June 9, 1975, p. 11)
Secretary Kissinger: Then the Europeans will cave over the summer. They’ll accept 250 kilometers. Of course they’ll accept it. It’s one of these grandstand plays.

I wanted the Conference in the fall, to begin with, so it doesn’t bother me particularly.

Mr. Hartman: We should tell Genscher today the position that we’ve taken with Sauvagnargues on the rights, because the Germans have been told by the French that we have been appealed to again to change our position and the Germans have continued to maintain their objections to what Sauvagnargues is trying to do.6

Secretary Kissinger: Well, our position is basically to do what the Germans want.

Mr. Hartman: Yes. And also to point out to them what our concerns are.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, why don’t you show him the letter?7 That’s the easiest.

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Will you have it there for me?

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K.

(Whereupon, at 9:00 a.m., the Secretary’s Staff Meeting was adjourned.)

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6 As reported in telegram 9593 from Bonn, June 14, the West Germans still saw some difficulties with the Belgrade formula and did not like it because “they did not want to ‘relativate’ responsibilities.” When the Embassy pointed out that the only thing in the formula that was restricted was “responsibilities,” the Germans said their fear was that the Soviets would argue that only those QRR’s that were recognized in the QA would be in effect and not the tripartite allied responsibilities concerning Germany as a whole (since the Soviets did not recognize that there is such a thing as responsibilities for Germany as a whole). The Embassy also reported that Sauvagnargues told Genscher he had asked the United States to reconsider its opposition to the French-Yugoslav formulation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Sauvagnargues’s letter to Kissinger, June 12, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 3, France (5).

7 Kissinger was apparently referring to a draft version of his letter to Sauvagnargues, transmitted in telegram 139951 to Paris, June 16. It reads in part: “In response to your question, the difficulties we expressed with your formula stemmed, in part, from a different appreciation of the quadripartite agreement and the quadripartite declaration. We view neither document as providing a comprehensive definition of our responsibilities.” The letter goes on to propose possible revisions to the Belgrade formula: eliminating the word “responsibilities” altogether, qualifying the word “responsibilities” differently, or possibly substituting another formula, such as the CSCE agreement “cannot and will not affect their rights, obligations and specifically defined or recognized responsibilities, or the corresponding treaties, agreements and arrangements.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
305. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 16, 1975, 11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG
Ambassador Berndt von Staden, FRG Ambassador to the U.S.
Paul Frank, State Secretary, Director of President’s Office
Dr. Heinz Weber, Foreign Ministry (interpreter)
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, U.S. Ambassador to the FRG
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: What do you foresee about CSCE? Are the compromises going to permit progress, Mr. Foreign Minister?
Genscher: I hear from Kissinger there is a good prospect of agreement on the 300-kilometer line in CBM’s.

Kissinger: No, I said we would support it. I don’t know about the Soviet Union.

Genscher: That is the most important thing for us. Then there is the question of reserved rights and how the French will stand. That is important to me for Berlin.

President: Will the Russians hold fast for follow-on machinery?
Kissinger: Ceausescu argued here for it. We are not interested and neither are the Soviets.

Genscher: I don’t think the Russians will make much of it. They will probably agree to consultations in 1977.

Kissinger: The Soviets are now going in the other direction—Gromyko even suggested four years.

Scheel: If not July, then will it meet in September?
Kissinger: Probably October if not July—the elections are in September.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.
2 A reference to quadripartite rights and responsibilities; see Document 304.
3 See Document 299.
Genscher: The Finns require four weeks to prepare.
Kissinger: We are trying to stay a half step behind Europe. We are not pushing for July.
Scheel: I didn’t see any real push from the Soviet Union.
Kissinger: I have the impression they want it in July. Their planning seems geared to that. Since 300 kilometers are the only issue, they could resolve it tomorrow if they wanted.
Genscher: I think they have one fixed date—the Party Conference in early ’76. Three months after CSCE they want a summit meeting of Communist leaders to prepare for the Party Congress.
Scheel: Isn’t it in our interest to facilitate their Congress, because this is a basic policy determination for them—whether or not to continue détente?
Kissinger: Yes. I think that is why a successful CSCE and SALT have symbolic importance.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

306. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 16, 1975, 3:30–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary’s Tour d’Horizon with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher

PARTICIPANTS
FRG
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Dr. Juergen Ruhfus, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Niels Hansen, Minister, FRG Embassy
Dr. Klaus Terfloth, Press Counselor, Foreign Office
Juergen Chrobog, Personal Assistant to the Foreign Minister

US
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–1320. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson and cleared by Hartman. Approved by James Covey (S) on July 22.
The Secretary: We have just received an irate communication from the Soviets accusing us of delaying the CSCE. We are in our usual happy position of being accused by our Western allies of speeding the negotiations up and by the Soviets of slowing them down. The fact is that we are doing neither.

Genscher: We are in no particular hurry to conclude the talks. The summit could take place in the fall if necessary. What is important is to have a constructive Stage II. There are of course still some open questions. For example, what about the language on quadripartite rights?

The Secretary: I have just had an exchange of correspondence with Sauvagnargues on this subject. He wrote me complaining about our not supporting him on this subject. I have written him back and explained our position and I believe it is one that is close to your own. Let me give you a copy of my letter.3

Genscher: I spoke in Paris with Sauvagnargues on Friday about this problem.4 The French are aware of our German reservations concerning the present text, and I have the feeling that the French will be making further efforts to find a solution.

The Secretary: What about the question of CBMs? If the Soviets agree to a zone of 300 kilometers, can you accept the other two parts of their proposal, i.e., the 18-day pre-notification and the 25,000 troop level?

Genscher: Only the depth of the zone is a question for us. On that we remain firm. The other parts of the proposal pose no problem for us.

The Secretary: Fine. Then let us now see what happens in Geneva. My preference all along was for a summit in September but I had to be careful: if some European wished to make the inevitable last minute concessions, I did not want the US to be too far behind.

2 Document 303.
3 See footnote 7, Document 304. On June 18, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman wrote Sherer in telegram 142540 to Geneva: “The Secretary has discussed the QRR problem this week with Genscher, who can support either of first two changes suggested in our letter to Sauvagnargues. Genscher dislikes, however, the minor modifications of French formula put forth in our fallback position because he thinks it does not provide sufficient protection of allied rights. The Secretary has assured Genscher that we would support German desires in moving toward a final compromise on this issue. You should pursue search for a final compromise on QRR text with other representatives of Bonn Group at Geneva, bearing in mind our desire to support German wishes while leaving initiative primarily to the French.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
4 See footnote 6, Document 304.
Genscher: What is the exact state of play right now on the CBMs? Do we expect a new Soviet proposal?

The Secretary: I think we have put our position to them on the non-acceptability of the latest proposal made in Vienna. A counter-proposal was to have been put forward by the Western side.

Hartman: I think the UK or one of the other neutrals is to put the new Western position to the Soviets today. Perhaps this irate Soviet reaction was an answer to that new proposal.

The Secretary: No, I don’t think so. We instructed Ambassador Sherer to tell the Soviets that the 250 kilometer proposal was not sufficient, and I think the Soviets may be reacting to that statement.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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5 In telegram 138400 to Geneva, June 13, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman told Sherer to contact Kovalev and inform him that “we tried our best but were unable to persuade our allies to accept the Soviet proposal of 250 kilometers, 30,000 men and 18 days for the CBM on maneuvers, despite our strong emphasis that these figures were acceptable to us.” The telegram continued: “You should not suggest alternative parameters of 300 kilometers, 25,000 men, and 21 days to Kovalev. Instead, you should get in touch immediately with your UK colleague, in his capacity as NATO caucus leader on CBM’s, and ask him either to suggest to Kovalev what it takes to nail down a final compromise or have him ask the Austrian neutral caucus leader to do so.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
K: Now, I think frankly—I talked to the Germans yesterday.\(^3\) We
don’t say it that explicitly. If you could accept 300 kilometers, we can
take care of the other two items—of the size of the forces and the days—
and I really don’t see how 50 kilometers can make any real difference.

D: No, you see the question is, quite frankly and off-the-record—
the question is not a difference or no difference, the question rather is
as Gromyko shall say himself—feels a little bit in a rather awkward sit-
uation. And I know what I’m telling you because he was so sure really
that when—

K: Well, I was pretty sure. And frankly, I’ll tell you this—let me
tell you this, if you want to wait—if you want to have the conference
delayed til September, I think you can get 250. If you wait long enough,
they’re going to give ground.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: So it is really a question of—I don’t think they’re going to hold
out beyond the end of the summer, but if you want rapid progress,
then I think that’s the answer.

D: Well, I may put this as your remark as thinking aloud, but not
as a recommendation, all right?

K: That is my—you know, that is my advice as a friend.

D: I understand.

K: From our point of view, there is nothing to be gained. I mean,
the basic thing—

D: [What I speak about, not too highly] because I’m just telling
you quite frankly, Henry—this is rather a matter now—maybe he could
[not comment ?]; I’m sure he could be as of now, it stands exactly,
because I know what I’m telling you. Because he himself convinced Brez-
nev and all the other leaders that now he has the word of Henry so
everything is all right. And then if it turns out not to be the case, it
doesn’t matter who will really hear ... Unintentionally. No, I’m just
telling you.

K: What I think we can—so look, my judgment turned out to be
right. What turned out to be wrong was the speed with which I could
get it implemented.

D: Yeah. So if you say they could wait until September, then it will
be all right. Do you think that it’s possible then to have this agreement
or would you have it with you? I mean—

K: I think there is a better than 50/50 chance that we can over-
come the objections if you wait long enough.

\(^3\) See Document 306.
D: Yes, until September.

K: If you wait until September. But I don’t think we can do it without going—you know, then we go through 3 weeks of stalemate, and then we can say look here, we’ve now done our best and now we think you ought to move.

D: I understand your point. Well, I could mention to Gromyko that you are just thinking aloud of the situation.

K: Conversely if he wants to move fast, we will support 30,000 and 18 days, so you get two out of three.

D: But it’s most important that other—this is exactly one.

K: Oh, none of them are important.

D: Out of three. No, I understand. It is not whether the matter is of his personal thing. It’s not really a question of more importance, I agree with you. But it’s a question of how he—I don’t know how he is handling now.

K: I don’t even know how they are going to count the 30,000. And how that’s going to be considered.

D: Yeah, I understand. So as of now, I mention to you that you think it’s another pretty good [omission in original transcript] but rather a question of as your own thinking.

K: That’s right. And I’m sending over a formal note.4

D: You send already, yeah?

K: I am sending it now. I am giving it to General Scowcroft.

D: Okay. So he will send it to me.

K: Okay. I’ve got to run. I’ve got to see the German.5

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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4 Document 308.

5 Gerscher: No record of this meeting has been found.
308. Note From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated.

The President has carefully considered the oral message from General Secretary Brezhnev delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 16. The President agrees that there has been major progress in recent weeks at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and he fully appreciates the constructive role of the Soviet Union in bringing this about. From a review of events at the conference, it can be said that there is now a strong movement to bring it to a successful conclusion in the very near future. We are not aware of any deliberate efforts to delay the conference; in any case, the United States will continue, as it has in the past, to use the influence at its disposal to bring about compromise solutions on issues where differences still exist.

As the General Secretary will have been informed, we moved immediately following the very positive Soviet proposals concerning the advance notification of maneuvers—and we agree that these were indeed a breakthrough—to have this problem solved on the basis of the Soviet parameters. While we regret that it did not prove possible, despite our efforts, to persuade others to go along with the solution proposed, it is our strong conviction that a compromise can be achieved in the very near future. If the depth of territory subject to notification were set at 300 km, the United States believes it can persuade its allies to accept the other parameters as proposed by the Soviet side.

The President would like the General Secretary to know that we have been in the most intensive contact with our Allies in recent days in an effort to bring matters to a rapid conclusion and we will continue these contacts. We remain prepared to set the beginning of the final stage during the week of July 21 or, at any rate, before the end of July. Once the question of maneuver notification has been settled, our representatives should be in immediate contact to determine how best to bring about conference acceptance of this time frame, bearing in mind the fact that more than 30 sovereign states are involved.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: "Delivered to Amb. Dobrynin 1:45 p.m., Tues., June 17, 1975." The note was drafted by Sonnenfeldt and forwarded to the President by Kissinger. (Ibid.)

2 Document 303.
309. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, June 18, 1975, 9:12 a.m.

D: In connection with this parameter. What he [Gromyko?] is verifying is before taking a final position, he said all of this mentioned about parameters was clear misunderstanding. He said you discussed it with him in Vienna.

K: That is correct. I know there are some of our Western allies that are changing their minds on that but we will not support them.

D: I will tell him you will support it.

K: I will firmly support it.

D: I mentioned this to him yesterday.

K: Also tell him I made this clear to the Germans yesterday.\(^2\)

D: I will say on behalf of NATO. . . .

K: I think we can hold that together. I think the Dutch or one or two others will object but we will not go along with it. I am quite confident that we can hold this.

D: This is one question he was asking me urgently to give him a reply.

K: Right.

D: If you could see me today about our meeting.

K: It may be better on Monday.\(^3\)

D: O.K. with me.

K: We will do it on Monday.

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 3, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (3). No classification marking.

\(^2\) No record of this June 17 meeting has been found. For Genscher’s meetings with Kissinger on June 16, see Documents 305 and 306.

\(^3\) June 23.
310. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 19, 1975, 4:05–5:02 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns
NATO Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Policy Colin Humphreys
Ambassador Andre de Staercke, Belgium
Ambassador Arthur Menzies, Canada
Ambassador Ankar Svart, Denmark
Ambassador Francois de Rose, France
Ambassador Franz Krapf, Germany
Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, Greece
Ambassador Tomas Tomasson, Iceland
Ambassador Felice Catalano, Italy
Ambassador Marcel Fischback, Luxembourg
Ambassador A. K. F. (Karel) Hartogh, Netherlands
Ambassador Rolf Busch, Norway
Ambassador Joao de Freitas Cruz, Portugal
Ambassador Orhan Eralp, Turkey
Ambassador Sir Edward Peck, United Kingdom
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, United States

The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Goldwin, Special Consultant to the President
H. Allan Holmes, Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Department of State
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

President: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] I also think that we, the United States, should continue détente with the Soviet Union. This can be helpful in areas of importance to the Alliance. We are extending our negotiations in SALT II; there is no resolution as yet but we are building on the Vladivostok meeting of last December. The MBFR negotiations, the negotiations in Geneva—without consideration of Phase III—have shown progress in Phase I. What are the numbers, Henry?

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chron. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Clift. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Luns and the NATO Permanent Representatives visited the United States June 18–20 to meet the President and to participate in a symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.
Secretary Kissinger: In MBFR or CSCE—in MBFR there are some 28 to 32 thousand on our side to 68 thousand on their side, together with equipment. 2

President: The point I am making is that in Phase I we are on dead center. I know that consultations have gone forward on the nuclear element and that we are now looking at the question of including Pershings and some of our aircraft. 3 Is it the F–104s?

Secretary Schlesinger: F–4s, sir.

President: We are also interested in the European security negotiations. I understand that there is now some movement, and if there is an acceptable compromise I would assume there will be something in Helsinki in the latter part of July. These are among the principal issues that we see of interest to the Alliance, together with standardization, rationalization, and other matters of present concern.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary General Luns: On one other matter, Mr. President, until the day before yesterday my impression was that the Helsinki meeting would not be held in the near future because of the lack of progress in the Conference and because the Finns need a month to prepare for the meeting. This morning I heard that the Soviet Union had been in touch with several governments—I don’t know if the United States was one—concerning a July 22 starting date for the meeting. I was surprised since it was my impression that the feeling is in Geneva that it wouldn’t be held earlier than the end of September. How do you view this?

President: We haven’t been pushing this. We have continued to feel that our Western Alliance partners should be the main parties involved in directing the pace of the negotiations. I must admit that I have been concentrating so heavily on other matters—the Greek-Turkish question with the Congress, for example—that I haven’t taken a fresh look at this with Henry. Henry?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have proposed a July 22 date. Our position continues to be that we are prepared to meet whenever the second stage is completed satisfactorily. We haven’t accepted or rejected the Soviet proposal, and we won’t agree to a date before the second stage of the Conference is finished. You should all know this so that we won’t be whipsawed by the Soviet Government contacting each of our governments and saying that one or the other of us has agreed to

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2 See footnote 2, Document 345.
3 See Document 357.
this or that. Our instructions, to be completely frank to you, to our Ambassador in Geneva are to stay a half a step behind the Europeans—and to let you drag us into the Conference. We aren’t pressing, and we aren’t holding back.\(^4\) Until the Soviet Union makes a concession on the question of three hundred kilometers, Basket I will not be completed.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\(^4\) On June 28, Hartman updated Kissinger on progress toward setting a date for the final conference in Helsinki. A transcript of their telephone conversation reads in part: “K[issinger]: When is it most likely to be—the 28th or the 22nd [of July]? H[artman]: Bud’s guess is that people are moving toward the 28th. The Soviets have insisted on the 22nd. K: They’ll yield on that. H: I think they will. K: Well, let us stay out of it.” Kissinger continued, “just let the Russians fight it out with the Europeans. It’s a matter of total indifference to me.” “Bud” was Sherer’s nickname. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C07D.pdf)

### 311. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, July 7, 1975, 8 a.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary of State Kissinger—Chairman
D Mr. Ingersoll
P Mr. Sisco
E Mr. Robinson
T Mr. Maw
M Mr. Eagleburger
AF Mr. Davis
ARA Mr. Rogers
EA Mr. Habib
EUR Mr. Hartman
NEA Mr. Atherton
INR Mr. Hyland
S/P Mr. Lord

\(^1\)Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 7, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. An attached summary of the meeting’s outcome reads in part: “CSCE developments. Secretary wants it understood that we absolutely could not attend European Security Conference in August.”
Secretary Kissinger: How is the European Security Conference?

Mr. Hartman: Do you think that’s foreign policy? (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: That’s at least foreign.

Mr. Hartman: Well, the only thing that I think can actually bring a conclusion to that conference is the cooperation that now seems to be under way between the Soviets and the Germans.

Now, it will take the Soviets to hold the Finns. The Finns want to say, “Sorry, you can’t have this conference in July because you didn’t give us the go-ahead at the time.” The Soviets, I’m sure, are going to try to hold the Finns to keep open the possibility of a July conference because I think that there are a number of countries that can have—

Secretary Kissinger: But this isn’t the sort of problem—

Mr. Hartman: The Germans are fine. We’re now at the point where the Romanians are holding up one piece, and that’s the key piece for the Germans. In other words, until the Germans agree on a fundamental language—

Secretary Kissinger: What’s their complaint?

Mr. Hartman: Their complaint is it doesn’t talk enough about the sovereignty of states—that, somehow or other, it affects the Romanian claims on its borders. And the Soviets have been talking to them, trying to talk them out of their objection. But they are the last ones to—

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2 Telegram 2622 from Geneva, April 16, reported that the Romanian representative to the CSCE, Lipatti, informed the U.S. delegation that the language on peaceful change of March 17 was “unacceptable to Bucharest.” Lipatti said that “as now drafted it was an invitation to border changes, not an exception to rule of border inviolability.” The Romanian fear, the telegram noted, “was that Soviets would interpret ‘inviolability’ as applying to themselves and ‘change’ as applying to their allies.” The telegram continued that the “primary problem, according to Lipatti, was to reinstate the word ‘only,’ so that text again looked like an exception, not an invitation.” The Romanians suggested “that this could be done in various ways, e.g., inserting it between ‘changed’ and ‘in accordance with’; inserting it between ‘international law’ and ‘by peaceful means’; or by re-ordering the text to read: ‘can be changed by peaceful means and by agreement, only in accordance with international law.’” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
Secretary Kissinger: But why? Is it the affirmation of the sovereignty of states that makes it harder to change borders?

Mr. Hartman: That’s right. And you’d think with their Bessarabian and other claims\(^3\)—

Secretary Kissinger: They might be worried about them.

Mr. Hartman: —they may be worried about them. There are a lot of Hungarians leaving Romania now going back to Hungary. That is the fundamental issue for the Germans. Unless that clause is agreed to, they cannot go ahead with what is now the French plan—which would be to agree on the 28th in principle, subject to all the conference documents being finished up by the 14th.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is: Delaying it till August, there’s no substantive position on which the issues will improve.

Mr. Hartman: That’s right.

There’s another issue—that is, to extend all the provisions of the conference, declarations and so forth. Berlin and the Soviets have accepted this.

Secretary Kissinger: But who doesn’t?

Mr. Hartman: Well, the Turks have a difficulty. They want to take an exception on the maneuver provision because they don’t want it to apply to areas out of Cyprus.\(^4\) You know, there’s just a whole bunch of very small issues. And no one, other than the Germans, is taking a firm leadership.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s now 250 kilometers.

Mr. Hartman: It’s 250, 25,000 men.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s certainly stupid that the Germans would agree to 275.

Mr. Hartman: Well, they didn’t want to be accused of holding up the conference.

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\(^3\) Telegram 2004 from Bucharest, May 9, reported the reaction of the Romanian Government and Romanian historians to various assertions made by Soviet historians in a publication commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. Ceausescu, it reported, “was attacking particularly Soviet claims that tsarist empire ‘liberated’ Bessarabia (part of historic Romanian lands since Dark Ages) from Turks in 1812 in ‘progressive’ move and that a separate ‘Moldavian language and people’ had formed within USSR.” The telegram noted that “most ominous to Romanian historians was fact that a few Soviet colleagues seemed to be hinting that Soviet ‘Moldavia’ did not necessarily end at Prut River” and that historical nucleus of this Soviet republic “might be due for more expansion in future if GOR did not come to heel.” (Ibid.) Romania ceded Bessarabia to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II.

\(^4\) Telegram 4318 from Geneva, June 10, reported Turkey’s position on applying CSCE’s proposed confidence-building measures to Cyprus. (Ibid.)
Secretary Kissinger: I think we could have got 300, but we could certainly have got 275.

It makes no difference. It makes absolutely no difference to it.

Mr. Hartman: I think we ought to have our fellow say a little more clearly today that August is absolutely out.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s right. Just tell them August is out.

Mr. Hartman: That might, in fact, bring some of the others around, because I think many of them are counting on August as a fallback.

Secretary Kissinger: Just tell them August is out for us.  

5 Kissinger and Hartman further discussed the issue in a telephone conversation on July 8. A transcript of their discussion reads in part: “K: On the European Security Conference, I don’t see that we can let it slip beyond July 29, or if worse comes to worse, the very end of August. H: The last few days. K: Yes. H: OK. I got the word around yesterday about all of August. I think the Finns are getting angry with everybody. They say they’re going to slip a day every day they miss getting an agreement in Geneva. I called the Romanian Ambassador and said they could not change the [omission in transcript] in my judgment. They’re still trying to make all kinds of changes in Geneva. K: Yes. H: We’ll be in touch. K: Just make sure it doesn’t slip back to that week. H: How about it on Wednesday or Friday? Is that too late? That would leave practically no time at the other end. K: Yes, it makes it tough. H: The end of August is better. That would allow more time to make sure all documents are in order. K: Let’s say the 28th. H: OK.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C093.pdf)

312. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


CSCE

Your meeting with Gromyko takes place during what may be the last full week of negotiations at Geneva. There are no significant differences between US and Soviet positions on remaining CSCE issues which in-
volve mainly EC-Soviet disputes over details or last minute haggling by the smaller powers, especially the Dutch and Romanians.

If Gromyko attacks us for not effectively lining up Allied support for compromised texts, you might point to Romanian obstructionism on the Warsaw Pact side.

This paper briefly outlines issues and offers suggested talking points.

Timing of Stage III

The CSCE Coordinating Committee is holding intensive discussions aimed at setting a date for commencement of stage III, and it is not possible to predict where this issue will stand on July 11, when you meet Gromyko. The French formally proposed on July 7\(^2\) that the Helsinki finale take place before the end of July, provided all remaining texts are registered by mid-month, and over half of the CSCE delegations reportedly now favor a July summit. But the Finns adamantly insist they must have three weeks advance notification from Geneva in order to make arrangements.

Your Talking Points

—We are impressed with the substantial progress achieved in Geneva in recent weeks and, for our part, would consider a late July stage III meeting both desirable and feasible.

—However, there are those among our allies, your allies and the neutrals who insist that key unresolved issues be settled before a flat commitment is made to any specific date.

Basket 1—Principles

The Allies are supporting Genscher’s efforts to register final texts on quadripartite rights, peaceful change, and a “Europe clause” extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe (including Berlin), before declaring their willingness to attend the Helsinki finale on a precise date. Virtually all other questions related to the declaration of principles are now settled.

QRR. On July 5, the following revised text was agreed, ad referendum to governments:

“The participating states, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of (the tenth principle), note that the present (title of document) does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.”\(^3\)

\(^2\) Telegram 5256 from Geneva, July 7, reported on the French proposal. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

\(^3\) Telegram 5243 from Geneva, July 7, reported on the registration of the text. (Ibid.)
We support this text and continue to follow the lead of France on QRR matters.

Your Talking Points

—We support the recently revised text on quadripartite rights and responsibilities and hope that it will provide the basis for a final compromise.

—We have supported the French initiatives and appreciate Soviet flexibility on QRR matters.

Peaceful Change. The Four Powers plus both Germanies are ready to register the peaceful change formulation, which we negotiated with the Soviets. However, the Romanians have asked that the text be revised, mainly by linking it specifically to sovereign equality language in the first principle. We have emphasized to the Romanians our strong hope that they drop efforts to change this hard-won compromise formulation.

Your Talking Point

—We believe it would be in everyone’s interest to persuade Romania to drop its request that the peaceful change text be modified; Soviet help in this regard would be welcome.

“Europe Clause.” On July 5, the Soviets and FRG worked out a compromise text extending CSCE benefits to all of Europe, implicitly including Berlin. Subsequently, the FRG has sought to steer this text toward rapid provisional registration.

Your Talking Point

—We welcome the Soviet and FRG success in developing a “Europe clause” and believe it only proper that results of this Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be extended to all Europeans.

Basket 1—CBMs

Since your last meeting with Gromyko, the Soviets have come around to acceptance of realistic parameters for the maneuvers CBM—250 kilometers, 25,000 troops, and 21 days—and are ready to accept compromise texts on maneuvers as well as movements, provided Ankara drops its demands for notification within only a limited zone of 100 kilometers inland from the Turkish sea coast. The Turks, however, are stub-

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4 Telegram 5273 from Geneva, July 8, reported on Romania’s position. (Ibid.)
5 Telegram 5257 from Geneva, July 7, reported on the Soviet-West German compromise. (Ibid.)
6 Telegram 5186 from Geneva, July 3, reported on the Soviet position. (Ibid.)
bornly pressing their insistence on exceptions and show little predilec-
tion as yet to give way to a compromise acceptable to all parties. At last
report, Turkey indicated it would take its case to the NATO Council on
July 9. The Soviets recently accepted a CBM on movements based on “vol-
untary” notification, and Gromyko may emphasize the need for un-
equivocal NATO acceptance of the “voluntary basis” concept. In NATO,
the Dutch continue to balk at voluntary notification, and in the Warsaw
Pact, the Romanians also object to this concept.

Your Talking Points

—We welcome Moscow’s acceptance of realistic parameters for the
CBM on notification of maneuvers.

—It is now necessary for both of us to press our Allies to accept
final compromises that will permit swift registration of voluntary
CBMs on maneuvers and movements.

Basket 2

The last remaining substantive hurdle to concluding Basket 2 ne-
gotiations is development of a text ensuring reciprocity in reduction of
trade barriers. We are following the lead of the Nine in their attempt
to work out with the Soviets a balanced formulation taking account of
MFN, EC quantitative restrictions, and COMECON trading practices.

Your Talking Point

—We hope all parties will display realism in the search for a final
compromise on the question of reciprocity in the reduction of trade
barriers.

Basket 3

—Since their positive reaction, on the eve of the NATO summit,
to the Western “global initiative” on basket 3 texts concerning human
contacts and information, the Soviets have shown great flexibility on
all basket 3 questions, and all texts in this area are now provisionally
registered.7

Your Talking Points

—We warmly welcome Moscow’s flexibility in recent weeks in per-
mitting a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations in basket 3.

—We had long argued for realism on basket 3 issues with our Al-
lies, and we are pleased that the Soviet Union ultimately reciprocated
with realistic positions of its own.

7 Telegram 5205 from Geneva, July 6, reported that all the texts for Basket III had
been provisionally registered. (Ibid.)
Basket 4—Follow-up

With the Swedes chairing a Special Working Group on follow-up, negotiations are nearly complete on a satisfactory compromise text which will probably provide for: a preparatory meeting 18 months after completion of stage III; a meeting of senior officials about 24 months after stage III; decisions in follow-up to be taken by consensus; future meetings to be rotated among CSCE capitals; and acceptance, in principle, of a new Conference at some time in the future. The Soviets have displayed flexibility in the Working Group, while trying to enhance the political content of follow-up arrangements.

Your Talking Point

—We are following with interest the negotiations on a final compromise on post-CSCE follow-up arrangements, and are prepared to join a consensus on this issue.

Final Document

The Soviets have accepted inclusion of a disclaimer in the CSCE final document making clear its politically, but not legally, binding character and the submission of a letter to the UN Secretary General, the effect of which is to draw a distinction between international treaties and/or legally binding agreements, on one side, and the CSCE declarations of intent, on the other.

Your Talking Point

—We appreciate Soviet flexibility in negotiations on CSCE final document, which appears to be taking shape in a manner acceptable to all sides.

Helsinki Summit and Public Opinion

We suggest that you consider discussing with Gromyko the US and Soviet approaches to characterization of CSCE results. You could get across that if Brezhnev takes an extreme position in propagandizing CSCE as, for example, a quasi World War II peace conference, the Allies will inevitably have to react sharply.

Your Talking Point

—We believe it is in the interest of all sides to display moderation in characterizing the results of CSCE as a useful, if limited, step forward in the continuing process of East-West détente.8

8 Kissinger subsequently discussed the status of CSCE in a meeting with President Ford on July 9. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “President: What about CSCE? Kissinger: It is hung up on things that are out of our hands. The Finns are getting mad. It may have to be postponed until the end of August.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 13)
313. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 10, 1975, 5:15–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniienko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Staff
Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

CSCE

[Large bottles of Coca-Cola were on the table]

Kissinger: This is the biggest Coca-Cola I’ve ever seen.

Gromyko: Our Pepsi Cola, when you pour it into a glass, it’s full and it remains full after two minutes. Your Pepsi, after you pour it, it’s half gone.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union, Secret, Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission in Geneva. All brackets are in the original. Lodal wrote in his daily log about the meeting and the arrival of Kissinger and his staff in Geneva: “We arrived in Geneva about 4:00, checked into the hotel (which was not air conditioned and very uncomfortable on a hot, sunny day), and then headed to the Soviet mission for our first meeting with Gromyko at about 5:00. Kissinger and Gromyko had a very brief (5 minute) private meeting, and then we went into the main meeting. We held talks about CSCE for about two hours. Most of the discussions centered on how to handle Malta (Mintoff), which had hung up the conference at the last minute. Kissinger was trying to be cooperative with Gromyko, while realizing we had a little bit more at stake in Malta than do the Soviets.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70, Daily Log)
Kissinger: Ours—you pay for it all, and don’t get it.

Gromyko: That’s why you are so rich. Why do we have Pepsi Cola and not Coca-Cola?

Dobrynin: Because their chairman is more energetic.

Kissinger: And he was a friend.

Gromyko: May I greet the Secretary of State and all other gentlemen who are here with him.

We are indeed pleased to have this new opportunity to exchange views on several important problems. These matters we are to discuss relate both to our bilateral relations and to broad international concerns. I would submit—and we had a brief exchange on this a minute or two ago—that we start by having a word on European affairs and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Those were my brief opening remarks and our proposal.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, let me say I am glad we are meeting again, and given the responsibility of our two countries, the increasing regularity of our discussions is important to the stability of the world and we should meet even if we have no urgent matters to discuss.

In spite of the public notices you may hear from America, the President and I are committed to the course we have pursued since 1972 and we believe it is of great importance to peace and security of the world.

As for the agenda, I am in agreement.

Gromyko: Then let us begin to exchange views on the European situation and, first and foremost, the European Security Conference. Would you like to say a few words first?

Kissinger: In my experience no one understands the European Security Conference as the Foreign Minister does. As I understand it, the only thing holding up agreement on the date is Malta, and all the issues are settled. They are getting ready to register all the rest. As I said

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2 Telegram Tosec 60025/161676 to Geneva, July 10, contained Hartman’s assessment of the status of the CSCE negotiations: “Agreement on a late-July CSCE summit remains blocked by actions of smaller states—especially Malta and Romania—which refuse to join consensus on certain issues until they receive satisfaction on questions of primary interest to them.” The telegram continued: “The Maltese indicated that Dom Mintoff would send a special envoy to Geneva to pin down a compromise Mediterranean declaration and that until this was accomplished, Malta would prevent agreement on follow-up. This action prompted Romanians to block registration of QRR text. Failure to register QRR as well as ‘peaceful change’ formulation (also blocked by Romania) caused FRG delegation to oppose any explicit target date for stage III.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
to the press in Paris, our government favors the most rapid possible conclusion, preferably at the end of this month. I understand the date they’re now talking about is July 30th.

Gromyko: I would say the following: The situation at the European Security Conference as of today is this. In substance, practically all questions have been agreed upon. If perhaps there are some third-rate nuances, we believe, given the desire, it would require hours—literally hours—to clear away all those nuances, and would take a matter of days to prepare all the texts for signing. There is a question which is of particular interest to Turkey and they have not given final agreement, and that relates to the depth of the zone on one’s territory for giving notice of troop maneuvers. But the basic question is setting a definite date for the final stage of the European Security Conference. Everyone seems to be in agreement with the Canadian proposal to begin the final stage on July 30th, although we have not given our formal approval because we believe more suitable is the proposal you and I discussed, and in fact no one in the Conference objected to it.

Kissinger: To meet on the 22nd.

Gromyko: And no one objected.

Kissinger: It’s a little late now.

Gromyko: If we don’t agree on an earlier date, we’ll probably agree to July 30.

It is true we are now faced with a most formidable force—Malta—and there does seem to be the real possibility that Malta will twist all the others into a ram’s horn. But let us see whether all the European states can talk Malta into July 30th as a real possibility. I think it is a possibility.

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3 Kissinger visited Paris from July 9 to 10 for talks with Sauvagnargues and Giscard d’Estaing. On July 10, he and Sauvagnargues held a press conference. Kissinger responded to a question on the European security conference as follows: “With respect to the European Security Conference, I believe that both our countries are of the view that it should be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible and that both our delegations are working in that sense at Geneva.” (Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1975, p. 186)

4 Hartman wrote in telegram Tosec 60025 that “Canadians today spearheaded attempt to work out a compromise on timing, when they formally tabled a proposal calling for: (a) coordinating committee action to declare July 30 as a target date for opening of stage III; (b) intensification of efforts by all parties to complete substantive negotiations on all outstanding issues by July 15, when stage III target date would be confirmed, and (c) flexibility by Finland in holding to July 30 target date on understanding that financial and other obligations accruing to Finland as a result of summit preparations would be shared pro rata by all CSCE participant states. US delegation is supporting Canadian proposal while avoiding flat commitment to precise date and thereby remaining in step with EC-Nine on timing question.”
Kissinger: We are prepared to meet on the 22nd, and we would also accept the 30th. We think there are no issues remaining and we think we can do it. That’s really the latest we can do. If we do not have it then, we will have to move to the end of August, because we have other visitors.

Gromyko: Well, let us on both sides make an effort to get that date accepted. Let us then really act in that direction to assure it’s accepted. Let us agree that this is not a formal agreement to this, because usually it happens that as soon as the United States and Soviet Union agree on something, someone else comes up with reproaches and says, “Aha, the United States and Soviet Union reached a separate agreement again. And we must have our own view.” Let us act so as to insure success. If you want to refer to this agreement for any purpose, you’re free to do so. The important thing is to do it de facto.

Kissinger: Let’s get Kovalev and Sherer to both come here. I’m prepared to instruct him to work together with you. They know the tactical situation.

Gromyko: What about on the duration?

Kissinger: Two and a half days. On this proposal, we would arrive the evening of July 30.

Sonnenfeldt: The end of the day on Wednesday ...

Kissinger: The end of the day in Finland in July is … [Laughter]

What about 5:00 p.m.?

We’ll talk to our representative.

I spoke to the French President today. He’d prefer to have it in July. Otherwise, August.

Gromyko: July would be best.

Kissinger: He’d prefer July. I see no problem. When I left his office I told the press we wanted it to conclude as rapidly as possible. The Germans I don’t know. I’ll see Schmidt tomorrow.

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5 No record of Kissinger’s meeting with Giscard d’Estaing has been found but he sent a summary of the meeting to President Ford in telegram Hakto 2, July 11. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President’s Trip Files, Box 11, July 9–12, 1975, Europe, General)
But how do you move Malta?
Gromyko: 2–3–4 days—what do you mean two and a half?
[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland confer.]
Kissinger: Well, we’ll just . . . Let’s talk to our two representatives. It’s a purely practical problem.
I have no idea how to move Malta. Maybe we could sell it to Libya.
Gromyko: The whole island?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: As a last resort. As a last resort. But we should first have the meetings. As a precondition.
Kissinger: How to move Malta I don’t know. We’ll certainly agree to make a joint representation.
Gromyko: Let’s set the date and go to Finland, and Mintoff will go to Finland. If he doesn’t, well . . .
Kissinger: He got a big reception in China. They had four people on the street who had lived in Malta.
The problem is countries that agreed to the 30th may not agree to this procedure, where everybody just accepts and Malta is just left out.
Gromyko: But there is a consensus.
Kissinger: We will agree with you to begin on the 30th. You will hear my instructions to Sherer: to work with you and consult with the Germans, French, and British, but to bring it to a rapid conclusion. We will work it out.

What is old Garrison doing? Is he calling Hartman for authority?

[Laughter]
Did the one who went out for you come back yet?
Makarov: Not yet.
Kissinger: All I want is to make sure the speeches are kept to 15 minutes at the European Security Conference.
Ours is on the way. Yours is coming.
Gromyko: Let me say a few words about our cooperation, while we’re waiting. There was businesslike cooperation, but there were times when cooperation was uneven. There were times when the American side preferred to remain on the sidelines. But in recent days it has been smoother.
Kissinger: In the cases when we remained on the sidelines, we were working to the same result, as on the 250 kilometers.

[Garrison and Fokin return.]
He’s on the way?
Fokin: Yes.
Kissinger: [To Garrison] Is Sherer on the way, or is he checking with Hartman?
Garrison: He’s on the way.
Kissinger: When I was in Hanoi, I stayed at a palace in the center of town. I went for a walk. They wouldn’t let me back in, because I had no pass.
Gromyko: You told me that last time.
Kissinger: Now they’re yours.
Gromyko: What’s happening?
Kissinger: I understand they’re making English a compulsory subject, but they won’t have much of an opportunity to practice it.
Gromyko: By two and one-half days, you mean no business on the day of arrival.
Kissinger: I’m told by Sonnenfeldt that the French President is willing to stay only two nights. So we arrive the afternoon of the 30th, stay a full day the 1st and 2nd. That would be our definition.
Gromyko: Three full days.
Kissinger: This gives us two and one-half days. What Schmidt wants to do is to see some people. He can come right before and see them in the morning.
Gromyko: It’s really three days.
Kissinger: Probably many delegations will arrive before.
I’ve talked to Anatol about the possibility of the President meeting Brezhnev while we’re there.
Gromyko: All right. I tell you, all right.
Kissinger: Two meetings?
Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: The morning after the Conference closes.
Gromyko: Yes.
They’ll probably be arriving any minute now, so we can wait. Let’s not switch to other subjects yet.
Kissinger: I agree.
Gromyko: Soon mothers will start frightening their children by saying, “Malta will come get you.” Mintoff. If they said, “Mintoff will get you,” that would be the cult of personality. [Laughter]
Did you see Mintoff?
Kissinger: I’ve never seen him. He’s often asked me.
I already have half the madmen of the world as my clients. I have to leave some for after.
That’s our strategy: We want him to join the Warsaw Pact; we’d never have a conclusion.
He was voted in by a one vote majority. They must be due for another election.

Gromyko: I saw him at Helsinki. He was at the meeting.
Kissinger: Why? Was it a Foreign Ministers’ meeting?
Sukhodrev: He’s both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
Gromyko: It will be speech after speech after speech.
Kissinger: I don’t know how I am going to live through two and a half days of speeches.
Gromyko: Suppose they are 20 minutes. Suppose. It would take two and a half days. Two working days, six [hours] plus six.
Kissinger: Plus the closing ceremony.
Gromyko: For signing.
Kissinger: Can’t we make it 15 minutes?
Gromyko: For us, 15 and 20 are the same.
Kissinger: They will take more time anyway.
[Kovalev comes in. The Secretary greets him.]
Gromyko: Here is a victim of Malta.
Kissinger: Where is Sherer? [Garrison goes out.]
Gromyko: Do you think Malta is melting? Maybe Malta is inclined to declare merci. He refused to answer his phone for 24 hours.
Sukhodrev: He is holed up somewhere where there is no phone.
[Lodal goes out.]
Gromyko: Malta wants the unconditional surrender of the United States.
Kissinger: We are prepared to surrender to Malta. As long as we do it in startling fashion.
Where is Lodal? This is all a Soviet trick to cut down our delegation. Will someone go out to get Lodal? [Lodal comes in.]
Gromyko: He [Kovalev] wanted to go to attend NATO. They rejected our proposal. How narrow-minded.
[Sherer and Fokin come in.]
Kissinger: We wondered how you two fellows managed to prolong this negotiation.
Gromyko: Malta intercepted him.
Sherer: They are doing their best.
Kissinger: Could you describe the situation?
Sherer: I will try to, but it’s a fast breaking situation. When I last spoke to Minister Kovalev, before meeting the Secretary’s plane, we were faced with a very hard, very hard position by Malta with respect to the situation in the Mediterranean. Even though 34 countries favored
the Canadian proposal to go to Helsinki on July 30th. But Malta, it looks like, is going to interfere with that.

While I was meeting with the Secretary, the Soviet Union came forward with two very good initiatives, in my view. The first was to ask the Romanians to talk to Malta to try to soften their position.

Kissinger: That is very clever.

Kovalev: And the Yugoslavs too.

Sherer: I don’t know whether it was the Yugoslavs and Romanians who brought about this possible compromise.

Kissinger: When the United States and the Soviet Union have to use intermediaries to talk to Malta!

Sherer: The compromise is that we will ask the Maltese to accept in toto the follow-up paper, which they have also tried to monkey with, fool around with. We will also ask them to accept Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities by 7:30 tonight, no changes. We will also ask them to accept the Canadian proposal as is. We have to give them something.

Kissinger: Sicily.

Sherer: Two points on the Mediterranean paper that are boring but might be of interest. There are two phrases, that concern not only “contributing to peace and strengthening security in the area” but also “lessening tension.” There was concern by someone that this could be used to remove the fleets. But that is arguable. It could be argued that the fleets contribute to stability.

Kissinger: Could you read me the sentence?

Sherer: “In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace, strengthening security, lessening tensions in the area, and widening the scope of cooperation, ends in which all share a common interest, as well as with the purpose of defining further common objectives.”

Kissinger: Is all of this new?

Sherer: Only “lessening tensions.” All the rest of the paragraph is agreed to. Only this sentence.

Kissinger: That is all right. We accept it. Is that all right, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Should I refer it to Washington? [Laughter] I will accept it as Assistant to the President.

We have no reason to add it but we have no objection.

6 See footnote 4, Document 294.
My colleagues tell me if I hold out a few minutes, I will get an additional concession.

Sherer: The second one is a compromise worked out by Romania, Yugoslavia and Malta: “The Participating States would seek, in the framework of their multilateral efforts, to encourage progress and appropriate initiatives and to proceed to an exchange of views on the attainment of the above purposes.”

Kissinger: What are “the above purposes?”
Sherer: The Mediterranean paragraph.
Kissinger: Could you read it again?
Sherer [Reads the whole paragraph again.]
Gromyko: Without enthusiasm, we will accept it.
Kissinger: This means that all members of the European Security Conference agree to discuss a Mediterranean solution, right?
Gromyko: You see, “the Participating States would seek in the framework of their multilateral efforts”—it doesn’t say what kind,—“and would encourage . . .”
Kissinger: “Encourage” doesn’t bother me. It’s “to proceed to negotiations . . .”
Gromyko: The substance of the matter is in the first paragraph.
Kissinger: [To Sherer] What do our allies think?
Sherer: When I left the Center, there was no problem.
Kissinger: [To Kovalev] Do you know?
Kovalev: According to our information, all the Western Europeans are in favor of this. That is what the French told me. I don’t know what the NATO meeting did.
Sherer: There is not time for a NATO caucus.
Kissinger: Let me say that unless there is some objection by our NATO allies, which I don’t know about, I will accept. We accept, with that one proviso.
Sonnenfeldt: Malta has not accepted.
Sherer: Mr. Mintoff has been out on the beach, or out riding.
Gromyko: Or on a mountain.
Sherer: Possibly, Mr. Minister. But their representative, Mr. Kingswell, is possibly high enough to accept for the President.
Kissinger: We will accept these two paragraphs. We will support the July 30 date.
[To Sherer] Our allies have no objection to the July 30 date?
Sherer: There is a consensus on July 30.
Kissinger: The only problem is these two paragraphs and to get Malta to agree to the date.
Sherer: It may be hard for Mintoff to swallow.
Kissinger: What happens if they don’t yield?
Sherer: We have several alternatives. There is one which is proposed by the head of the Soviet delegation.
Kissinger: Just issue the invitations.
Sherer: To go on a bilateral basis with the Finns.
Kissinger: Can we get our people to go along?
Sherer: No. The Dutch and others will dig in their heels.
Kissinger: What other alternatives do we have?
Sherer: That is hard to say. We are dealing with a man who is just unreasonable.
Kissinger: [Whispers] Assassination. [Laughter]
What do you think, Mr. Foreign Minister?
Gromyko: I think we must be serious about this. We are doing a serious piece of business and we can’t let it turn into a children’s game. If one or two don’t go along, we can’t drag them there. If all the others go, Mintoff will probably go. If he doesn’t . . . it will be a precedent of how to go about a serious job.
Kissinger: Our problem is the Dutch won’t go, and many neutrals. [To Sherer:] Any others?
Sherer: The Italians.
Kissinger: And some nonaligned.
Gromyko: It’s not serious.
Kissinger: The problem will be that some will say it establishes a precedent about treating small countries.
We will know by 7:30.
Gromyko: It’s not a matter of principle, it’s a matter of meeting the absurd.
Kissinger: We will know by 7:30 if Malta accepts, true?
Sherer: I can’t say.
Kissinger: Why don’t we do the following: Let’s see by 7:30 whether the allies will accept these two paragraphs. Maybe Malta will accept them. Maybe it’s not a good idea to go around about these; Malta will hear about it.
Gromyko: Let me make one correction: We should not start asking other countries their views before 7:30.
Kissinger: I agree. I modified my instruction. Why don’t we ask both of them to come back as soon as they know.
Sherer: We should know by the end of the dinner. 9:30.
Kissinger: Does the Maltese Ambassador think he can get through?
[Kissinger and Sherer confer.]
Mr. Foreign Minister, I have no objection to stating—at the end of this evening, if there is no agreement—that we and you are prepared to meet on July 30.

Gromyko: Perhaps we could couch it in this form: We have come to an understanding and we agree with those states who agree to July 30.

Kissinger: We agree with those states who accept July 30.

Gromyko: Yes, and to inform the Finns that our heads of government and heads of state are prepared to go to Helsinki.

Kissinger: That will be more difficult. Why don’t we wait until 9:30?

Gromyko: All right.
Could we have a 15-minute break?
Kissinger: All right.
[Kissinger and Sherer confer briefly.]
Gromyko: And then we will go to another subject. We will meet in 15 minutes.

[The meeting broke at 6:35 p.m. It was agreed that Ambassador Sherer would speak to the Maltese representative in the name of the Secretary of State. Kovalev had done it in the name of the Foreign Minister. At 6:40 p.m. the meeting convened in a small group in the anteroom to discuss SALT.]
314. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 10, 1975, 10:15 p.m.–midnight.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE (at end)
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasili G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Yuri E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Vladimir Ya. Plechkov, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Leonid S. Chernenkov, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE (at end)
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodalski, NSC Staff
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mark Garrison, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place during and after dinner at the Soviet Mission in Geneva. Brackets, except those indicating omission of unrelated discussion, are in the original. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976. Telegram 168188 to all NATO capitals, July 17, provided a summary of the meeting for presentation to the North Atlantic Council. It reads in part: “In general the meetings proceeded in quite a friendly manner. In fact, Gromyko seemed more mellow than on other occasions, possibly because he was eager to get CSCE settled. The Soviets might also be concerned about public attitudes in the US and elsewhere reflecting skepticism about Soviet intentions with regard to détente. We expect that the President will meet bilaterally with Brezhnev during the Helsinki meeting, principally to continue discussion of SALT issues. We still expect a Brezhnev visit in the fall, but no precise date has been fixed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
[Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Mr. Garrison go out to take a phone call from Ambassador Sherer at the CSCE Conference. They return. Mr. Sonnenfeldt gives a report as follows:]

Sonnenfeldt: At 7:00 p.m. the Finnish Foreign Minister called Mintoff. He said he would make no problem.

Fifteen minutes ago the Maltese delegate Kingswell announced that there would be no answer from Mintoff until 11:00 a.m. tomorrow, and that Malta would probably seek amendments, that would be substantive.

The Soviet head of delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev, pointed out that we are being subjected to blackmail and “humiliated.” This represents an attempt by Malta to blackmail the other 34 countries.

The Romanian delegation has been urging Maltese reconsideration. It is ridiculous for the rest to sit around awaiting unacceptable amendments.

Mintoff is reported to have said the time element is not important. One more day is not important after the two years we have spent negotiating this.

Kissinger: [to Sonnenfeldt] What should we do?
Sonnenfeldt: I have dictated a message2 which you can look at.
Garrison: I’d get a message ready.
Kissinger: I’m afraid it would inflate his ego.
Sonnenfeldt: Previously he’s gone to the edge and then veered off.
Kissinger: It’s purely a practical question. We’re not dealing with exactly a rational man. It’s not a substantive question.

Sonnenfeldt: We could talk to his representative here, who was impressed with your message earlier.
Kissinger: Really?
Sonnenfeldt: I could have Sherer talk to the Italian here.
Kissinger: That would get more countries involved. Do that. Tell him I think it would be a good idea to have the Italians talk to Mintoff.

[Mr. Garrison goes out.]

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

[Mr. Garrison returns.]

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2 Not found.
Garrison: The two Ambassadors will come here and report.
Kissinger: Is that all right with you?
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: Is there any indication?
Garrison: The Soviets have floated a consensus-minus-one proposal, but the Italians have rejected it.
Kissinger: That’s what I thought.

[Minister Kovalev and Ambassador Sherer arrive at 11:15 p.m.]

Kovalev: The situation at the Conference in the last several hours has become very acute. At first, the Maltese said they’d give a reply in an hour, then they said another hour. They recently said they’d get a reply from Mintoff tomorrow, but not until 11:00 a.m. Valletta does not like the text that was reported to you earlier today, and thought that new amendments would be required and would be more or less substantive. The Maltese are not giving a favorable reply to the Canadian proposal and for tonight are blocking.

Immediately after the Maltese interim response, there was a meeting of the heads of the more influential delegations—including the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, and others. The Finns regard Malta’s action as an attempt to torpedo the holding of the third stage and that seems to be a justified assessment. All the delegations that took part in this meeting have taken note of two facts. First, indignation at the actions of the Maltese, regarded it as blackmail and completely irresponsible, as an attempt to humiliate all the 34 other participating countries. That was stated by all the delegations—neutral, Western, and Socialist. And the second fact is that the 34 delegations are in favor of the Canadian proposal with one minor amendment, which is acceptable to all—that is, they support convening the third stage on July 30 and all the other provisions of the Canadian proposal.

Reference to a Soviet proposal at CSCE to amend the consensus rule to permit the approval of portions of a CSCE agreement by all participants except one. Telegram 168188 summarized Kissinger’s reaction to the Soviet proposal: “During the evening of July 10, the Soviets sought to enlist the Secretary’s support for breaking the impasse by the ‘consensus-minus-one’ approach. The Secretary declined to do so then and there, in part because such an approach would have had to have the endorsement of our allies. More basically, however, the Secretary felt that however deplorable and dismaying the tactics of the Maltese, any decision to circumvent the basic consensus rule of the conference would have to be considered with utmost care. It raised not only the question of style but also an issue of principle with serious precedential implications. The Secretary thus informed Gromyko that he could not go along with ‘extra-parliamentary’ tactics to break the deadlock.”
There was discussion of possible modes of action in this situation. The first suggestion was that at the next meeting of the Coordinating Committee, at 11:55 tonight, we will start to gain the maximum possible support for the Canadian proposal, including the July 30 date. The Finns are earnestly requesting this be done because they feel that every lost hour eventually tends to destroy the chances of convening on July 30.

The second mode of action, which doesn’t rule out the first, but adds to it—and in this the Finns are interested—is that after the meeting of the Coordinating Committee, if a consensus can’t be reached because of the opposition of the Maltese, outside the hall of the Coordinating Committee, all 34 representatives hand over to the chairman of the Finnish delegation the Canadian draft proposal on a bilateral basis, thus symbolizing their agreement to it. That would not be a violation of the consensus rule because outside the meeting hall the countries are free to meet bilaterally. But that would be symbolic of their goodwill, and the Finnish delegation would gain assurance that the 34 delegations would arrive in Finland on July 30. It would make it easier for Finland to begin immediate preparations for July 30.

That in brief is the situation in the conference, and Mr. Sherer may probably want to add to it.

Kissinger: [To Sherer] What is your view of the Western side?

Sherer: This is where I would reluctantly disagree with the Minister. He’s absolutely right; all the delegations feel we are being humiliated. They all feel shabbily treated by the Maltese; it’s a purposeful third-country maneuver. But some of them feel they did have communications problems—Mintoff was off on the beach or riding somewhere. I doubt we could get a consensus... isolate Malta as we proposed. I was at a pickup meeting of 12–15 delegations; I was called out twice for long telephone conversations. But I doubt we can do it because there will be a natural tendency of some of the small countries to support Malta against what seems to be big power pressure.

Kissinger: Did you ask the Italian Ambassador to make a representation to Malta?

Sherer: I did not, sir, because the Italians here were among the most reluctant to put pressure on Malta.

I drafted a letter for your consideration.

Kissinger: A letter?

Sherer: To Malta. I think a letter from you would have a good effect.

Kissinger: It might also have the opposite effect. [To Sonnenfeldt] Let’s go out a minute.

[Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt, and Sherer leave the room to confer, then return.]
Kissinger: On the procedure, Mr. Foreign Minister, we’ll be glad to join this 11:55 meeting and to join with any resolution that’s agreed. I’m not inclined to go along with handing over the Canadian proposal to the Finns, because it would be treated as an issue of principle by many Western delegations. I’d be prepared to issue a joint statement that we’re prepared to go July 30.

Gromyko: I’m worried about how the others would react to our joint declaration, saying, “Here’s collusion again.”

Kissinger: I’d be prepared to say it as a unilateral statement.

Gromyko: That sounds more positive.

Kissinger: I’ll be prepared to do that.

Gromyko: Because otherwise there may be people here who’ll say you can’t tread on Mintoff. But after all, you can’t sacrifice the conference for this because this principle was designed to buttress the success of the conference. Principle should serve policy, not policy serve principle.

Kissinger: I’m worried about sending a letter to Mintoff because it would give him a tremendous ego trip.

Gromyko: It is really hard for one to talk you out of it or into it [sending a letter] because if you think it will have the opposite effect. . . . Maybe you could try getting in touch with the Italians.

Kissinger: That I’ll be glad to do.

Gromyko: Because it’s not substance but a real pathology.

Kissinger: I’ll be glad to send a message to Rome.

Gromyko: There’s this Malta that gets the idea it can hold up all the others. A real travesty. That’s democracy?

Kissinger: I can say nothing in defense of Malta because we should be concluding stage two today.

[Sonnenfeldt goes around the table to confer with Kissinger to show him a draft of proposed statement.]

As I said, I’ll be glad to make a statement—when I go into the hotel, there will undoubtedly be press there—that we support the Canadian proposal.

Stoessel: You’ll be asked if this is the Foreign Minister’s view.

Kissinger: I’ll have to say, “ask him.”

What is going to happen at five to twelve?

Sherer: There will be another meeting of the Coordinating Committee. I suppose the chair will ask if there is support for the Canadian proposal, and if Malta is there, I’d expect Malta to say, “we don’t accept.” Others will say we have to have 35 yes. Malta will say, “Our Prime Minister will be in touch with us at 11:00 tomorrow.”
Kissinger: When was the Canadian proposal submitted? Yesterday?
Sherer: Yes, sir.

Gromyko: Can you talk to your allies about acting outside of the conference on a bilateral basis to support the Canadian proposal?
Kissinger: I think it would be counterproductive. [To Sherer:] Don’t you?
Sherer: I agree.

Kissinger: I think many countries—Italy, the Dutch and others—would see it as a matter of principle. When I go to the hotel I’ll say we’re prepared to join with the others in support of the Canadian proposal, and that I spoke to the French President. I said this today in Paris and I’ll say it again. I’ll also get in touch with the Italians. This will show them we have an interest.

When will we hear from Mintoff? Noon?
Sherer: He said 11:00, but today he said an hour and it dragged on.
Kissinger: Did you talk to the Maltese Ambassador? What did he say?
Sherer: I did. I think he took it very seriously and was very impressed with it. He then said he had changes to make in the compromise proposal that I submitted on your behalf, and these would be substantive.

Kissinger: [To Gromyko] I think they’ll cave tomorrow, don’t you?
Kovalev: What do the Maltese want?
Gromyko: It is impossible to give an analysis of their proposal. What do they want? To declare war on the US? The Soviet Union?
Kovalev: First of all, they want to humiliate all the participants. Second, for Mintoff to be in the world’s limelight.
Gromyko: If that is so, he must be doing that with the blessing of someone else, because this Mintoff couldn’t do it alone.
Kissinger: I don’t know who else would be giving their blessing. I think his strength is that he’s doing it on his own. If someone else were doing it, it would be easy to do.
He’s a good friend of the Chinese. I don’t know if they’re doing it. [Confers with Sonnenfeldt.]
I’m having Sherer talk to all the Western delegations today, so tomorrow we’ll know better.

Gromyko: Can you add one sentence to your statement, that the United States is ready to go on the 30th?
Kissinger: Oh, yes. That is what it says. [Reading the draft statement:] “The United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the Conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada and I have instructed our Ambassador to join this consensus.”
Gromyko: Would it be possible to say, “The United States is prepared for a resumption on the 30th?”
Kissinger: Oh, yes, that’s easy. And I’ll say we believe the decision should be made as soon as possible so the Finns can begin preparations.
Gromyko: Good.
Kissinger: So, 10:30 tomorrow.
I think the less attention we pay to him the better. If he doesn’t tomorrow, I’ll be seeing the Germans and the English. It would be better to do something joint. Rather than a frantic letter tonight.
Sonnenfeldt: We couldn’t get it delivered.
Kissinger: So by Monday morning we’ll know.
What we discussed tonight: I’ll get in touch with the Italians; I’ll make a statement, and tell our Ambassador to get in touch with the allied delegates by 10:30 tomorrow.
And to the press we’ll say we discussed SALT and Europe and the results were constructive and the atmosphere was cordial.
If asked if progress was made, we can say, yes.
Gromyko: Just a general formula.
[The meeting ended. The Foreign Minister escorted the Secretary and his party down to the front door.]
[The Secretary’s remarks to the press, made in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel on his return, are attached.]

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4 Attached but not printed. The full text of Kissinger’s remarks are in Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1975, p. 188. Kissinger said with regard to CSCE: “With respect to the European Security Conference, the United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a conclusion as possible in order to permit the Finnish hosts to make their preparations.”

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315. Editorial Note

On July 11, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger summarized his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for President Ford in telegram Hakto 2. With regard to the European security conference, he wrote: “I spent over seven hours with Gromyko this evening in very intensive talks on CSCE and SALT. On the former, the main problem is now the obstruction of Malta in reaching the decision to convene the summit on July 30. The Soviets tried to enlist our support for some strong-arm
tactics to isolate Malta and move to Helsinki without them if necessary. This would be a violation of the consensus rule prevailing in the conference and would be rejected by many of our smaller allies, as well as neutrals. It would also have broader implications for other international groups which we might come to regret. We did, however, assure Soviets that we support a consensus to move to Helsinki on July 30, and I so stated to the press later. Mintoff is supposed to be heard from around 11 a.m. Friday our time, and we will have to review the bidding at that time. Our CSCE ambassador is keeping closest touch with our allies to assure we remain in step. On the whole, the Soviets seem pleased with our efforts, which is one of the objects of our tactics in order to keep them generally quiet in the Middle East. I obtained Gromyko’s agreement to a two-and-a-half day Helsinki summit, if it takes place, beginning around 3 p.m., Wednesday, July 30, and ending around 6 p.m., Friday, August 1. This will also allow time for two meetings between you and Brezhnev as well as for other travel before the Japanese come.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, President’s Trip File, Box 11, July 9–12, 1975, Europe, General) Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan was scheduled to visit the United States from August 2 to 10 to meet with President Ford and other government officials on August 5 and 6.

316. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 11, 1975, 10:45 a.m.–1:07 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in the Carnival Bar at the Intercontinental Hotel. Brackets, except those indicating omission of unrelated discussion, are in the original. Kissinger and Gromyko subsequently met for a luncheon at 2:15. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Gromyko: The conference should be settled. It is important. Kissinger: It's inconceivable it won't be solved. Sonnenfeldt: It's conceivable, but if it will be solved. Kissinger: All right, Sonnenfeldt can conceive that it fails, but he joins my prediction.” (Ibid.) The full text of both memoranda of conversation are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
CSCE; Middle East

[Photographers and press came in to photograph.]

CSCE

Kissinger: Twice I’ve given briefings in bars in Moscow in the Intourist Hotel.

Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me welcome you to—I can’t say our place. Could we have our Ambassador here? I see Ambassador Kovalev. Where is Sherer?

[He looks over draft of joint statement.]^2

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, you are the chairman. You didn’t know you were elected?

Kissinger: Oh. I thought Mr. Kovalev would give us a report.

Kovalev: We’ve just received a reply from the Maltese. They are prepared to accept the entire text of yesterday of the Canadian proposal, including the date of July 30, to register all the understandings except the one on the Mediterranean which was the subject of discussion yesterday between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Kissinger. Let me read the text.

Kissinger: To whom did they communicate this?

Kovalev: We received it just now from Mintoff’s special representative, Kingswell.

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^2 The final text of the joint statement is in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1975, pp. 188–189.
Kissinger: Did we get it too?
Kovalev: It was virtually two minutes ago.
Sherer: I was probably at the hotel.
Kovalev: “In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the non-participating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace”—the amendment is “reducing armed forces in the region”—“strengthening security,” and so on.
Kissinger: The only amendment is “reducing armed forces in the region?”
Kovalev: Right.
Kissinger: Do you have any problem with this?
Gromyko: Why don’t we talk for a minute?
[Kissinger and Gromyko get up and go to corner of the room to confer alone, from 10:57–10:59. Kissinger then confers with Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel, Sisco and Sherer to 11:02.]
Kissinger: I assume if we now accept this, you will not be calling for a nuclear-free zone or disarmament.
Kissinger: I will instruct Ambassador Sherer to call the NATO caucus and discuss it. I foresee no problem. If there is, we can discuss it.
Sherer: There will be no problem.
Kissinger: We should know, say, within an hour. Then we can conclude it today.
[Sherer leaves. Kovalev gets up and talks to Gromyko.]
Gromyko: I’m telling him [Kovalev] to grab Sherer by the coattails.
Kissinger: He’s joining the NATO caucus?
Gromyko: He will be active among our friends and the neutrals.
Kissinger: I think it will be settled in the next hour.
Kissinger: Goodbye. Thank you.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
[Kovalev and Sherer return at 12:19 p.m.]
Kissinger: Should we hear from our Ambassadors first?
Gromyko: Can we guess what they have? Augurs used to guess from looking at them.
Kissinger: I think it is now humanly impossible to make the European Security Conference fail. [Laughter].
Sherer: It took a little time to assemble the NATO chiefs of delegation. They were aware of the Maltese amendments. I polled the room to find out how people felt and I think without exception the major powers have to seek instructions before giving any opinion at all.

Kissinger: You should have said that too.

Sherer: And the countries almost all took a generally negative view.

Kissinger: Which? Italy?

Sherer: Italy, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Kissinger: Does Germany have forces in the Mediterranean?

Sherer: They all spoke in a generally skeptical way.

Kissinger: Let me talk to Mr. Sherer for a minute.

[Kissinger, Sherer, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer in the corner until 12:37 p.m. and then return to the table.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on the European Security Conference first, as I understand it from Mr. Sherer, all the NATO delegations are asking for instructions and the answer is expected to be negative. I am asking Sherer to ask the delegations to hold an answer until I have a chance to confer with Schmidt and Callaghan, and I can get in touch with the French.

I think the Conference will take place on July 30. It is only a question of tactics. It’s a stupid... We are only committed to maintain contacts and dialogue on these questions.

Sisco: It is not operative.

Kissinger: We are not committed to do anything. I will recommend to them that we stay in low gear on this. [To Sherer] Tell them we construe this only as a commitment to a dialogue, that we don’t construe it as calling for a reduction, and we have no intention on our part to reduce our forces. And I don’t detect a burning desire by my Soviet colleagues to reduce. No, you speak for yourself.

[The Secretary confers with Sherer]

Sherer will proceed as I indicated. I am seeing Genschaper tonight3 and Schmidt tomorrow and Callaghan. I will call Sauvagnargues tonight or tomorrow. I think the Finns should proceed as if it will go forward on the 30th. It is inconceivable to me that it should fail at this late date.

I’m told the Finns are proceeding anyway on the assumption that it will go forward.

3 See Document 317.
And our two Ambassadors will stay in touch and we will let you know everything we are doing. We will let Vorontsov know Saturday night or Sunday morning what the results are.

Gromyko: All right. I think evidently somebody somewhere seems to be not too aware of the consequences of what is going on.

Kissinger: You are talking about the European Security Conference?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it has become an industry in each Foreign Office working on the European Security Conference. No one asks himself what the purpose is.

I think of all the countries, Turkey is the most difficult one on this question of reducing forces.¹

[Gromyko confers with Kovalev]

Gromyko: Yesterday they agreed with the Canadian proposal.

Kissinger: Yes. But on the Maltese addition.

Gromyko: We don’t know, since the NATO countries discussed it.

Sherer: The Turks here will consult their government, but the delegation here had a generally negative attitude.

Kissinger: We could cut off arms to them.

[To Sherer] Will they be able to get instructions by this afternoon?

Sherer: The Turks will take a while.

Sherr: All of them.

Sherer: They are all phoning now.

Kissinger: Let me know the lineup before I leave.

Sherer: All right.

[Exeunt Sherer and Kovalev].

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Gromyko: The next step in Helsinki?

¹ Telegram 5480 from Geneva, July 12, reads in part: “Area exception for maneuver CBM—Turks want a frontier zone of 100 km (150 km for fallback) for area of notification for maneuver CBM. They also want exemption for frontiers with non-participating states (Iran, Syria, Iraq), and for ports facing Cyprus. Latter demands have been met, but 100 km border zone is particularly difficult because Soviets say they will insist on an equal zone, thus undercutting Allied efforts to get present 250 km commitment from Soviets.” The telegram continued: “Subthreshold for amphibious and airborne maneuvers—Turks proposed on July 8 a special lower threshold (two brigades, which they define as 4,000 troops) for amphibious and airborne maneuvers, based on their fear that a two-brigade amphibious attack could gain control of the Bosporus straits. This provoked angry reaction from Soviets, and NATO allies believe Turkish proposal is non-negotiable.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
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Kissinger: The next stage of discussion should be at Helsinki. And you and I could meet, if necessary, while the meetings are going on. While Mintoff is speaking. Our Chiefs have to stay there but we don’t.

I fell asleep at the NATO meeting. Did you see those photos? The thing is, I knew the cameras were on me and I knew I was falling asleep, but I couldn’t do anything about it.

[The meeting ended. The Joint Statement later released is at Tab A].

317. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Kissinger visited Bonn, July 11–12, 1975, for talks with Foreign Minister Genscher and Chancellor Schmidt. On the night of July 11, Counselor Sonnenfeldt informed Ambassador Sherer and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hartman about Kissinger’s discussion of the Maltese issue with Genscher in telegram Secto 6042: “The Secretary and Genscher discussed Maltese problem. Germans are supporting what they say is firm French opposition to Maltese amendment. They also report that British are with the French. Germans indicated to the Secretary that on the basis of their conversations with Mintoff during latter’s recent visit to Bonn, they believe they can influence him to withdraw amendment. Germans will accordingly make direct approach to Mintoff, probably via Brandt. They will inform Secretary of result and in the meantime, you should do nothing further.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) A memorandum of conversation of the meeting is ibid., P820123–1675.

Sonnenfeldt followed up the following afternoon in telegram Secto 6061 for Sherer and Hartman: “As indicated in telecon earlier today, Germans informed us today that French were softening in their opposition to Maltese amendment because of fear they might damage their relations with the Arabs, who are praising Mintoff. As a result, Germans decided they would not use their own capital with Mintoff and would not make previously-arranged phone call to him. Germans also indicated that NATO caucus in Geneva was working on softer version of Maltese formula, and that French had indicated they would take the lead in this effort. Germans also indicated that as soon as a softer version has been agreed upon in NATO caucus, Romanian Foreign Minister would then contact Mintoff directly to urge his support for it. Germans have also indicated that they would thereupon make their own phone call to Mintoff. Secretary agreed with Genscher that above procedure should be followed. You may join efforts to find compromise formula, but should not lead. You may join consensus. Please stay in
close touch with your German colleague and keep us promptly informed.” (Ibid.)

On July 12, Kissinger discussed the Maltese amendment during his stop in London at Heathrow Airport, where he met with British Foreign Secretary Callaghan. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Callaghan: Will the CSCE meet? Kissinger: I don’t understand the phrase that the Maltese want. All it does is commit us to continue contacts on a range of questions in multilateral forums, that doesn’t mean anything. My view is it’s ridiculous to hold up the Conference on that paragraph. Callaghan: That’s my view. [He reads the text of the Maltese amendment to the Mediterranean Declaration.] When you look at that paragraph, Mintoff will make something of it, but it means nothing. Kissinger: If Macovescu can produce a compromise, we’ll go along. I don’t know what a compromise to ‘reduce armed forces’ is. Killick: The Finns are more relaxed now, but we have something to work with. The Turks have to be brought along on the Confidence Building Measures. They have to put it to the Cabinet. Kissinger: They also have problems with the Maltese. Callaghan: Let me tell you a story about the Commonwealth Conference. When Mintoff made a long speech and went all around the world, Seretse Khama—of Botswana—said to me, ‘You know what Dom means in Afrikaans? Stupid!’ [Laughter]” (Ibid., Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 4, Britain)

Later the same day, telegram 5479 from Geneva, passed to the Secretary’s party, reported that the NATO caucus had “agreed to accept Maltese amendment as it stands.” The telegram continued: “NATO delegations all regretted circumstances of the situation, and several will probably express their views on Maltese negotiating techniques at first appropriate occasion. US del took low profile and sought views of NATO dels as element in reaching final USG decision. Neutrals and Warsaw Pact countries are expected to accept Maltese amendment as soon as NATO acceptance is made known.” Telegram 5501 from Geneva, July 14, summarized the results of the NATO caucus’ efforts: “Hectic negotiations on July 10 and 11 resulted in two not entirely innocuous new paragraphs for the Mediterranean Declaration announcing the intention of CSCE participants to continue the contacts on Mediterranean security begun in CSCE and specifying the purposes which such contacts should serve. These paragraphs were included in a package deal leading to acceptance of the Canadian proposal on stage III date. After considerable delay, Mintoff’s special envoy, Ambassador Kingswell, said the package deal would be accepted if participants agreed to an additional phrase making ‘reduction of armed forces in the region’ one of the purposes of continued contacts on the Mediterranean. Expected acceptance of the Maltese phrase on July 14 will mark completion of work on the Mediterranean Declaration.” (Both ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
318. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, July 21, 1975, 1530Z.

5767. For EUR/RPM. Subject: CSCE: Stage II highlights—July 14–21.

1. Summary. A cliff-hanger to the end, CSCE confirmed July 30 opening date for Stage III summit, completed all its substantive and procedural work, reached consensus on the final documents of the conference, and closed Stage II at 4:00 a.m. on July 21. Belgrade was accepted as the site for the two follow-up meetings set for 1977. End summary.

2. Stage III—coordinating committee confirmed July 30 date for Stage III in early morning hours of July 19, after key remaining substantive questions had been settled.

3. Final act—By July 18 completion of final act had become question of whether or not to accede to Soviet desire to include reference to irreversibility of détente. As Soviet pressure increased, resistance of NATO and neutral participants to inclusion of concept stiffened. By the late evening of July 18, the question revolved around finding a suitable compromise which would allow the Soviets to back off without losing face. Problem remained critical because Soviets tied approval of Europe clause covering Berlin to satisfaction of their desires on “irreversibility.” Shortly after midnight on July 19, Soviet delegation chief Kovalev apparently telephoned Moscow for agreement to fall back. When instructions were received, the Soviets proposed substitution of the formulation “make continuing and lasting” for irreversible. Other participants agreed immediately and negotiation of final act was completed. Package of statements and documents accompanying final act also includes letter which Government of Finland will transmit to UN Secretary General notifying him that the final act “is not eligible, in whole or in part, for registration with the Secretariat under article 102.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to all CSCE capitals, Cairo, Lisbon, Nicosia, Oslo, Sofia, USNMR SHAPE, USCENTUR, UNCOCOSOUTH, USLO SACLANT at Norfolk, CINCLANT, USDEL SALT Two at Geneva, Ankara, Luxembourg, Rabat, and Tunis.


3 Telegram 5501 from Geneva, July 14, reads in part: “The Soviets wish paragraph 1 of the Final Act to refer to the ‘irreversibility’ of détente, a concept which Western participants have succeeded after difficult negotiations to remove from the language of the principles and their preamble.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
of the Charter of the United Nations, as would be in the case were it a matter of a treaty or international agreement. . . .” This statement, combined with a reference to “non-registerability” and a so-called “disclaimer” paragraph in the final act itself, provide sound legal backing for the position that CSCE commitments are not legally binding. A further element in final act package is entry into official journal of statement by executive secretary of conference calling for participants to notify Secretariat of exact titles they wish to have inscribed under signature of their representative. This procedure was arranged to establish the principle that each participant may supply any title or titles he wishes to have placed under his name. The arrangement was worked out between the USSR and EC participants as a means of providing for inscription of EC presidency title under the name of Italian Prime Minister Moro. By making submission of titles a general principle, the EC relieved the Soviets of the need to give approval to inclusion of Moro’s EC function. Since the Secretariat statement was entered into the journal with a comment that the coordinating committee had “taken note” of the request the EC has a certain guarantee that the procedure will be honored.

4. Principles and their implementation—during intensive informal sessions, principles subcommittee gradually narrowed the outstanding questions down to a series of interrelated issues the key to which was the manner in which the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force was to be qualified, an issue on which Cypriots and Turks were bitterly divided. Breakthrough became possible when Turkish del received flexible instructions allowing him to accept a compromise package from the chair with only minor changes. After this decision, principles declaration quickly fell into line and final stylistic review was completed. Subcommittee registered the text on July 19 and committee I registered it on July 20 as a number of delegations filed interpretive statements on various issues. Following Romanian-Soviet agreement on voluntary basis issue in CBMs, special working body on implementation sent texts of Romanian and Swiss proposals to committee I which registered texts on July 20.

5. Military security—in order to appease Turks and overcome last major stumbling block on area of application of maneuver CBM, Soviets and Warsaw Pact allies early in week reluctantly accepted last-minute addition of sentence to effect that notification of combined maneuvers should be considered even below threshold of 25,000 troops, if there were “significant” numbers of amphibious or airborne troops involved. Neutrals expressed gratification with this step, which enabled them to abandon idea of a separate threshold for independent amphibious and airborne maneuvers, and with US agreement to clarification of threshold, so that there is no misunderstanding that all maneuvers in Europe involving over 25,000 troops are to be notified,
whether the troops are land forces, airborne or amphibious, or combinations thereof. Concurrently Soviets, Romanians, and Dutch reached agreement on compromise text for preamble expressing “voluntary basis” for prior notification of maneuvers. Despite these moves by others, Turkish delegation held fast until final hours of Stage II on its original area text, and real negotiations on a substitute began only on July 18. Substitute text was introduced by Turkish delegation which accepted principle of equal application of CBM measure in USSR and Turkey and thus met requirements of most participants, but exception for areas close to Iran, Iraq and Syria was initially expressed in a manner unacceptable to Cyprus. After marathon mediation by allies, with assistance from Soviets and others, an awkward text mutually acceptable to Turkey and Cyprus was agreed in the early morning of July 19, enabling conference to confirm consensus on July 30 summit date. Subcommittee completed work on smaller remaining points and inserted numerical parameters on July 19, and registered text on July 20.

6. Economics—last remaining issue in Basket II was resolved when Soviets accepted a phrase linking reciprocity and MFN.

7. Humanitarian cooperation—questions of title for Basket III document and link phrase between overall preamble and substantive texts were settled and full document was registered by coordinating committee.

8. Mediterranean—Maltese compromise phrase making “reduction of armed forces” in the Mediterranean region one of the purposes of continued contacts on the Mediterranean was accepted and Mediterranean Declaration agreed.

9. Follow-up—site for 1977 follow-up meetings was not agreed until final hours of the conference. Belgrade and Helsinki were both offered as possibilities, but Yugoslavs refused on principle to compromise by splitting the meetings between the two capitals, and insisted that both should take place in the same location. Yugoslavs and Romanians felt strongly that a further meeting in Helsinki would undercut the concept of rotation and could be the beginning of a permanent site. Since Finns have hosted preparatory talks, and Stages I and III, and since Yugoslav candidacy for hosting follow-up meetings had been presented first, pressure built for Finns to withdraw, which they did in early morning hours of July 21. Coordinating committee immediately agreed that both 1977 follow-up meetings should take place in Belgrade.

10. Comment: This is the last highlights cable which USDel CSCE will send. We hope these cables have served to keep addressees informed of the development of the Geneva negotiations, and that they have been useful to those who have followed CSCE from a distance.

Dale
Helsinki Summit, July 20–August 8, 1975

319. Editorial Note

Throughout July 1975, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger discussed preparations for the President’s trip to Helsinki for the final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which would include meetings with individual European leaders in Helsinki and stops in Europe before and after the conference.

During their conversations, the issue arose of whether Ford should meet with Soviet dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom the Soviets had permitted to emigrate to the United States, before the Helsinki conference. Kissinger wrote in his memoirs: “Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Soviet Union on February 13, 1974, and came to the United States some months later. The AFL–CIO, under the leadership of its strongly anti-Communist president, George Meany, invited him to address a dinner in Washington on June 30, 1975, not long before Ford’s departure to sign the Final Act of the European Security Conference. The date had been carefully chosen; if Solzhenitsyn expressed anything like his well-known views, he would supply plenty of material for the opponents of CSCE. Solzhenitsyn did not disappoint his sponsors. […] Solzhenitsyn urged the United States to lead a crusade against Communism even inside the Soviet Union and disdained the argument that such a course represented interference in Soviet domestic affairs: ‘Interfere more and more,’ Solzhenitsyn implored. ‘Interfere as much as you can. We beg you to come and interfere.’ […] On July 2, Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond contacted Ford’s counselor, Jack Marsh, to request an appointment for Solzhenitsyn with the President before July 5, when Solzhenitsyn was scheduled to leave Washington. […] Ford decided not to receive Solzhenitsyn and had Marsh cite scheduling difficulties as the reason. […] I was on vacation in St. John in the Virgin Islands when all this occurred. Scowcroft knew my views and informed me after the decision had been made. I concurred.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, page 650) For the text of Solzhenitsyn’s speech, see Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976), page 48.

On July 13, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed the President’s schedule before and after the conference in Helsinki, along with whether he should meet with Solzhenitsyn. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Kissinger: You [President Ford] should really stop in London on the way back. Schmidt wants you to spend one day, but he wants you to see the troops also. He wants a dinner that night. You could spend 1½ days in Warsaw and get to Helsinki on
the evening of the 29th. See Brezhnev the morning of the 30th, and the 2nd. That would give the 2nd and 3rd for Bucharest, and 3rd–4th in Belgrade. On the 4th and 5th you could see Asad, go through London on the 6th. The Poles want you to go to another city—Gdansk—but the Germans would be violently opposed. But you could go to Krakow. ford: Okay. It would be good to go to one city, outside the city of Warsaw. Kissinger: I hope you won’t see Solzhenitsyn before you see Brezhnev. President: He was pretty good on television. Kissinger: What would our guys say if he entertained someone trying to overthrow you? President: I think the worst is over. We took a lot of flak.” On July 21, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed Ford’s planned visit to Poland before the Helsinki conference. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Kissinger: Now Auschwitz. It is sort of bad taste to go to someplace which commemorates not an outrage basically against Poles, but against Jews. President: Your judgment is better than mine on this. Kissinger: I shouldn’t have asked Schmidt about Gdansk. Scowcroft: I think we can separate the wreath-laying [at Auschwitz] from the museums, etc. President: I don’t want to go to the horror parts.” (Both in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1975 July, Folder 1)

On the morning of July 24, Kissinger, Ford, and Scowcroft discussed the participation of Department of Defense representatives in the various meetings in Helsinki. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Kissinger: If you bring someone from Defense in the Brezhnev meetings, it will be taken. . . President: It must be clearly understood that no Defense representative will be in the meetings. They can go to Helsinki but not to the meetings. Kissinger: Will you tell the Department of Defense that the meetings are usually restricted to the President, me, the NSC staff and a notetaker? Scowcroft: Yes.” The same afternoon, Ford and Scowcroft met with Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in the Oval Office. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Schlesinger: Helsinki. Ellsworth will go along on the understanding that if it’s more people than you and Kissinger, he will sit in. President: I have decided on Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Stoessel. If there are expanded meetings, that is a different matter. But usually it has been just that. Schlesinger: Ellsworth is touchy. If he weren’t sure he would be in the meetings, I think I would just as soon send Bergold. President: I think I can only say it will be the four I have mentioned. Schlesinger: I think I should send Jim Wade (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA) as a resource, then.” (Both in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14; ellipsis in the original transcript)
320. Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Legal Disclaimers in CSCE Final Document

In accordance with the request at Tab II, I have drafted the memorandum at Tab I for your signature to the President reviewing the language in the CSCE documents which makes clear that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are not legally binding.

Recommendation
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Tab I

SUBJECT
Legal Disclaimers in CSCE Final Document

The following paragraphs identify the measures taken in negotiating the CSCE final document to make clear that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are not legally binding.

The United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany, have insisted throughout the CSCE negotiations that language be included in the final document establishing that the obligations undertaken by the signatories are not legally binding. Two elements of the final document and a letter transmitting it to the UN collectively ensure that it will not be legally binding:

—Within the document, there is a reference to the fact that it will not be registered with the United Nations. Article 102 of the UN Charter states that every treaty and international agreement will be


2 Tab II, a memorandum from Clift to Scowcroft, July 2, which contained a status report on the CSCE legal disclaimer, is attached but not printed. Scowcroft wrote at the bottom of the memorandum on July 19: “Denis—Will you update this urgently for the President? Thanks.”

3 This draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President, sent for information, was neither signed nor dated.

4 For the text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August 1, 1975, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 323-350.
registered; by implication, therefore, the unregistered document is neither a treaty nor an agreement.

—A letter will be sent to the UN Secretary General asking him not to register the document but only to circulate it to the member states. The letter is to be formally adopted by the CSCE Stage III participants and transmitted to the UN Secretary General by the Government of Finland. The letter text includes the following: “... permit me to draw your attention to the fact that neither the final act nor any of the documents referred to in it are treaties or international agreements, and therefore they are not to be registered in whole or in part with the Secretariat of the United Nations...” This statement would clearly indicate that the document is not legally binding.

—Finally, there is an indirect disclaimer near the end of the final document. It reads as follows:

“Wherefore the undersigned high representatives of the participating states, conscious of the high political importance they attach to the results of the conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the above texts have subscribed their signatures below.”

This language serves to emphasize that the participating states are undertaking political commitments rather than legally binding obligations.

321. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

Meeting With Americans of Eastern European Background To Discuss European Security Conference

Friday, July 25, 1975
11:00 a.m. (30 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

I. Purpose

You are having this meeting to review the results to be expected from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit you will be attending in Helsinki on July 30–August 1, 1975.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Box 13, Presidential Trip Files, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (13). Administratively Confidential. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “The President has seen.”
Your purpose will be to:

—explain CSCE as part of the East-West process of reducing tensions and increasing cooperation and stability, noting that this process, and in particular US–USSR efforts to build a more constructive relationship are central to efforts for peace in this nuclear era;

—state that CSCE does not represent the culmination of détente, that all participants will have to implement the provisions of the CSCE declarations if there is to be real progress; and

—emphasize that CSCE is not a peace treaty, it does not adversely affect the interests of Baltic-Americans; that, in fact, the language of the CSCE declarations supports peaceful change of frontiers and promises greater contacts between East and West.

II. Background, Participants & Press Arrangements

A. Background: American citizens of ethnic Eastern European background, particularly those of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian extraction, have expressed serious concern about implications of CSCE results for territorial questions in Eastern Europe.

In recent months, groups of Baltic-Americans have launched a major campaign to elicit reassurances that our policy of non-recognition of the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states is not affected by CSCE. The Department of State has repeatedly noted in answer to Congressional inquiries that U.S. policy toward the Baltic states is unchanged, but the Baltic-American campaign continues.

Congressman Derwinski² has advised that if you will make an unequivocal statement that CSCE has no effect on United States non-recognition of the Soviets’ incorporation of the Baltic states, this issue could be defused.

This meeting will provide you with the useful opportunity to place the CSCE results in proper perspective and to assure the Baltic-American and other Eastern European-American representatives that your going to Helsinki is in the best interests of the United States and does not adversely affect their interests.

B. Participants: List at Tab B.³

C. Press Arrangements: Meeting to be announced. White House photographer.

² Edward J. Derwinski (R-IL).
³ Attached but not printed. See Document 322.
III. Talking Points

Suggested remarks for the meeting, cleared with Paul Theis, are at Tab A.4

4 Attached but not printed. For the final text of President Ford’s remarks at the meeting, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, pp. 1030–1033.

322. Memorandum of Conversation1


PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kazys Bobelis, President, Lithuanian-American Council
Dr. Lev Dobriansky, President, Ukrainian-American Congress
Aloysius Mazewski, President, Polish National Alliance
Joseph L. Osajda, President, Polish Roman Catholic Union
Dr. Andras Pogany, President, Hungarian Freedom Fighters Association
Frank J. Vodrazka, President, Czechoslovakian Society of America
Henry J. Scheib, President, Aid Association of Lutherans
Albert Bosch, National Chairman, Steuben Society of America
Joseph Lesawyer, President, Ukrainian National Association
Dr. Mikulas Ferjencik, Director, Czechoslovak National Council of America
Uldis I. Grava, President, Latvian World Organization
Paul P. Dargis, President, Lithuanian American Alliance
Heikki A. Leesment, Member, Board of Directors of the American Estonian Organization
Edward Behuncik, Slovak League of America
Stephen P. Mugar, Chairman, Board of Directors of the Armenian Assembly
Mike Bachar, Vice Chairman, Byelo Russian Congress Committee
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Max L. Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs
Representative Edward J. Derwinski
Representative Thomas E. Morgan
Representative Clement J. Zablocki
Representative Lucien N. Nedzi
Representative Dan Rostenkowski

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Administratively Confidential. Drafted by Clift. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.
Representative Daniel J. Flood
Representative Jack F. Kemp
A. Denis Clift, National Security Council Staff (Notetaker)

President: Please sit down everybody. It is nice to see you all (the press photographers were admitted for photographs and then departed). Again, let me welcome you; this is an important subject, and I have a prepared statement that I’d like to read—I’ll see that you all get copies—and then I’ll be very happy to take your questions. I would note that the Secretary of State will be here until about 11:20 and then he will have to leave for a press conference.

(The President then read the statement at Tab B, and upon conclusion there was applause. The President then opened the floor to questions.)

Dr. Ferjencik: Mr. President you understand our position. We don’t trust the Communists; we don’t trust the Soviet Union. Many of us have had personal experiences and so have our people. Mr. President, would it be possible for you to make a short brief statement to the people behind the Iron Curtain that we are not abandoning them?

President: I am not sure that I have understood every word of your question. However, I do think that the statement that I have just read does that. It will be a public statement.

Mr. Dargis: Mr. President, on behalf of the Baltic-American community, we greatly appreciate the disclaimer you have made on the Baltic States. Is there a possibility of your reading this in Finlandia Hall or in a press conference or in a meeting with the Baltic States delegation which will be there?

President: I’ll take that suggestion under advisement. I do have a copy of my proposed remarks for Helsinki in my office, however because of other business I have not had a chance to go over it. I will take your suggestions into consideration.

Mr. Vodrazka: Mr. President, if you could issue a statement to the people behind the Iron Curtain it would be most important. Your remarks do this generally, however you do not address the people behind the Iron Curtain; what can we tell them through our press.

President: I think the countries that will be represented there are identified and the people who live in those countries will know that I have just read this statement.

Mr. Vodrazka: But you don’t address them specifically.

President: But you can take this statement that I have just read and quite properly you can interpret it.

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2 Not attached. For the text of the President’s address, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, pp. 1030–1033.
Mr. Lesawyer: Mr. President we are concerned about the dissidents in the Soviet Union. When you went to Vladivostok we asked you to raise the case of Valentyn Moroz, the Ukrainian who is imprisoned. I know you have discussed the question of Soviet Jewish emigrants, but we would like you to raise the case of others. We would request and appreciate your bringing up the case of Moroz.

General Scowcroft: You have already done so, Mr. President.

President: Gentlemen, this is General Scowcroft of the National Security Council. As he says, we have done this and we will follow up.

Dr. Pogany: Mr. President we are going to give the Soviets propaganda that they will use. Your fine statement will not get behind the Iron Curtain. You expect us to do this for you; maybe we will, but our efforts won’t get through the Iron Curtain. Even if we do get this through, your going to Helsinki is a disappointment to us and we are Republicans. This is a setback over here.

Mr. Mazewski: Mr. President, the Polish National Alliance has prepared a memorandum supporting your attendance at Helsinki with reservations. If at the time of signing the Helsinki documents you could issue some kind of statement—a conditional statement on the freedom of movement and the ultimate government of self-determination for all peoples—it would be helpful. The gentleman [Dr. Pogany] is right, the people over here are upset. But we recognize that your not going would be a greater catastrophe. We need some kind of assurance. We are not alone. The press doesn’t understand it. The New York Times, U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek don’t understand it. The writer said that seven Presidents have tried détente and failed. We feel that the State Department is bending backwards rather than forwards in dealing with the Russians. It is necessary to have a statement by you prior to signing the Helsinki documents. This should get into Radio Free Europe and the European press. I think this will make them think twice. Our people read more now. They know more, we need some kind of statement they can read.

President: We are in the process of preparing my statement for Helsinki and I welcome your suggestions. I haven’t looked at your statement yet but we will see if it can fit in.

Rep. Derwinski: Mr. President, this statement that you have just delivered will be released to the press. It will be picked up by the VOA and RFE.

Mr. Mazewski: Can we be assured that VOA will carry it?

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3 Moroz, an imprisoned Ukrainian historian, went on a hunger strike in the fall of 1974 to protest conditions at the prison in Vladimir.

4 Brackets in the original.
President: What I have just read you is an official statement by the President of the United States of America. I would think they could carry it.

Rep. Derwinski: Mr. President, I think VOA will undoubtedly report this.

Rep. Zablocki: We are assuming a great deal. We will have to follow through. Those here in 1948 and 1966 still don’t believe as they still have reservations; they are fearful that they are giving up the rights of millions who are struggling to make sure they have their freedom. We should make sure that RFE and VOA carry this statement, and we should tell the press that we have met with you and that all are in accord with you.

Mr. Bachar: I want to make an appeal that VOA broadcasts reports in Byelo Russian; we have been told that Byelo Russians understand Russian, and that for this reason it is not necessary. They have to understand Russian! But, it is insulting, it deprives them of hope and the feeling that we care. We hope it will be possible to include a full hour of broadcasts in Byelo Russian.

Rep. Flood: Mr. President, I’ve been around a long time. This is the first time in 30 years that I’ve seen a meeting like this! If there could be a press release that these people are here, that the names of those organizations and the names of those speaking for them, if this could be known, this could make an impression behind the Iron Curtain.

President: I believe this is the first time that a President has met with a group of this kind.

Rep. Rostenkowski: Mr. President, I can only echo what Dan Flood has said, this is a courageous step on your part to bring these people together. I know there are reports of people not being happy about your making this trip but the fact that you have brought us together and have pointed out that you are President and working in search of peace and that you will not be closing the door by going there is important.

I was your emissary recently in Poland5 and every government official I talked to as well as people walking in the street are excited by the fact that you are going there. It gives them hope, the fact that you are going.

5 Rostenkowski visited Poland June 6–11 as the President’s representative for the opening of the U.S. exhibition USATECH '75. Telegram 3931 from Warsaw, June 23, reads in part: “Treatment extended by the Polish authorities to Presidential representative Congressman Dan Rostenkowski and to the entire US participation in the Poznan Fair this year was particularly cordial. The Polish hosts went out of their way to show that they were pleased with the present state of US-Polish relations and were hopeful that our ties would continue to grow at the current pace. With no prodding from the Embassy, the Poles arranged an appointment for Congressman Rostenkowski with First Secretary Gierek, who received the Congressman even though he was so bothered by a cold that he did not attend the opening of the Poznan Fair.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Dr. Bobelis: I join with Rostenkowski in expressing my appreciation for this meeting. However, we have tremendous apprehensions the Soviet Union is interfering in Portugal. The Russians are pouring money into Portugal to obtain a Communist government. We are happy with the statement you have made; we believe in you. You are a champion of freedom and human rights.

Dr. Dobriansky: Mr. President, I support what Dan Flood has said. This is an unprecedented meeting. I second the framework and thrust of your statement. I am overwhelmed by your statement!

Moscow is going to make Helsinki a prime propaganda tool—they are going to make use of it. What do we do with your statement? There should be follow up. People in Eastern and Western Europe will be looking for guidelines of interpretation. The RFE and Radio Liberty should carry this in full.

Rep. Flood: And what about MBFR?

Dr. Dobriansky: CSCE was predicated on MBFR.

President: Yes.

Dr. Dobriansky: If those guidelines could be reemphasized and you could make a similar statement at Andrews Air Force Base and in Bonn it would be good.

President: Thanks Lev, I’ll take one more comment and then I have to go to another meeting. For sometime now in a number of communities—Atlanta, Miami, Dallas, eight all together—we have been bringing together a cross section of the community, labor, management and others for a meeting with spokesmen of the Executive Branch for talks about energy or some other aspect of policy. Usually we have about 600 to 800 people and I have normally spoken. This program is under Bill Baroody on the White House staff. We are going to continue this. I’ll make sure we broaden the base. It is my intention to bring someone on the staff when we hold such a meeting who will be representing ethnic groups and making sure that they are included and have the opportunity to participate. We haven’t selected the man on the White Staff yet who will do this.

Jack Kemp, you haven’t spoken yet.

Rep. Kemp: With an ethnic name like Kemp? Seriously Mr. President, I agree with Dan Rostenkowski. We have much appreciated Ed Derwinski organizing this meeting. It’s a real manifestation of your desire on this issue and the people of Buffalo will appreciate it.

Mr. Vodrazka: Mr. President, I have a request; would you make an appeal to the Soviets to withdraw their army from Czechoslovakia? It is a police force and it should be removed.

President: I will take that into consideration.

Thank you all for the meeting.
323. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Wednesday, July 30–Friday, August 1, 1975

Finlandia Hall

Helsinki, Finland

I. Purpose

The United States, Canada and 33 European states will participate in the third and concluding summit phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. You and each of the other political heads of state or government will sign the CSCE’s final act, and each leader will address the Conference.

Through your presence at the Conference, you will demonstrate that the United States retains a vital interest in Europe, and that the security of the United States is tied through our participation in the Atlantic Alliance, to the stability of the European continent.

Your address to the Conference is scheduled for the morning of August 1, 1975. (Speaking order for the 35 participants was drawn by lot: Prime Minister Wilson is first, General Secretary Brezhnev 13th and you are 26th.) Your speech, which will command worldwide attention, and your bilateral meetings during the conference will provide you with the very valuable opportunity to place the CSCE results in correct perspective.

Your purpose will be to:

—evaluate the results of CSCE by stating that its declarations are not legally binding but, instead, represent political and moral commitments to lessen East-West tensions and increase contacts and cooperation;

—stress that while CSCE is a step forward, it is not the culmination of the process of détente, that large standing armies still oppose each other and that major differences between East and West remain to be resolved;

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 13, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe, General (15). Secret. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “The President has seen.” According to an attached covering memorandum, Clift drafted the memorandum and forwarded it to Kissinger on July 22.
—urge concrete implementation of the promises contained in the declarations, noting the importance the United States attaches to the humanitarian provisions and stating that Europe’s military security problems still must be dealt with in MBFR and that SALT II must still be concluded.

II. Background, Participants and Press Arrangements

A. Background: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is the product of a long-standing Soviet proposal first raised in 1954 and resurrected in the aftermath of the Czech invasion in 1968. The Western governments recognized the proposal for what it was—a vehicle by which the Soviet Union hoped first to freeze the political map of Europe and then to extend its political influence westward. The strong Soviet interest in the Conference led the West to exploit it in three ways:

—to gain Soviet concessions in East-West political issues. The successful conclusion of the Berlin agreement in 1971, the agreement between East and West Germany, and the initiation of MBFR talks all were to some degree related to the linkage established by the West between progress on these political questions and the West’s gradual acceptance of a CSCE.

—to allow governments of Western Europe, both neutrals and members of NATO, to participate in the détente process. Western governments were thus able to respond to a strongly held public feeling that relations between East and West were changing, that the process should be encouraged and that the management of the process should not be left to the US and USSR alone.

—to introduce into the CSCE, as a condition for its successful conclusion, the issue of human rights—the so-called “freer movement” questions.

The United States has participated in the CSCE with restraint, wishing neither to block the efforts of its Allies nor to have the CSCE seen as a source of contention between the US and the Soviet Union. Our objectives have been to maintain Alliance cohesion; to insist that the CSCE’s declarations are political, not legal; and to seek such possibilities of easing tension between East and West as might be possible.

After two years of difficult negotiation, a CSCE balance sheet shows that:

—the Soviets have achieved a CSCE. It will be concluded at the summit, in a historically unique event. The final declarations will give the Soviets some basis to claim that Europe’s frontiers have been confirmed along their present configurations, and that the political consequences of World War II have been digested and are universally accepted.

—the CSCE results are not wholly what the Soviets wanted. The documents are not legally binding. The statement of principles, even if the
Soviets seek to lend it the color of law, by its language falls short of supporting the Soviet objective of freezing Europe’s political configuration. Peaceful change of borders is allowed; the right to self-determination is stated in sweeping terms. Our rights in Berlin have been preserved. The Soviets did not get agreement to a post-CSCE European security arrangement designed to undermine NATO.

—beyond that, the philosophy which permeates most of the CSCE’s declarations is that of the West’s open societies. The thrust implicit in the declarations is toward greater human rights, the freer movement of peoples and wider access to information. In response, Warsaw Pact members have tightened internal discipline.

Final judgment on the results of CSCE will depend

—initially on which side is able most persuasively to propagate its version of the CSCE and its version of future European security. The solemnity of the occasion will favor the Soviet Union, as will the simplicity of the Soviet message—that peace has arrived. The West has a more complex story to tell: that CSCE achievements are modest, that the proof of the CSCE’s success lies in the future, and that a strong Allied defense posture is a precondition for security and future détente.

The Conference Documents. CSCE work has covered four major substantive areas, known as “baskets,” concerning: political and military questions; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; cooperation in strengthening human contacts, the exchange of information, and cultural and educational relations; and post-conference follow-up arrangements.

Basket 1

Under the first agenda item, conference negotiators have produced a declaration of the following ten principles of interstate relations:

—Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
—Refraining from the threat or use of force.
—Inviolability of frontiers.
—Territorial integrity of states.
—Peaceful settlement of disputes.
—Non-intervention in internal affairs.
—Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
—Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
—Cooperation among states.
—Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations.

The Soviets were especially anxious to gain Western acceptance of an unambiguous principle on inviolability of frontiers by force. Western participants made absolutely clear, however, that their agreement to this precept would in no sense constitute formal recognition of existing European frontiers or imply that present borders are immutable. The Federal Republic of Germany, with the firm support of its NATO
Allies, insisted on a reference in the Declaration of Principles to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The United States took an active role in negotiation of this key text on peaceful border changes, which is included in the principle of sovereign equality.

Also under agenda item 1, CSCE participants have negotiated limited military security measures designed to strengthen mutual trust and confidence. Specific texts were produced on two modest but significant “confidence-building measures”: prior notification of military maneuvers, and exchange of observers at those maneuvers.

Basket 2

Under agenda item 2, the Geneva talks have produced a series of declarations or resolutions concerned with economic, scientific and technological, and environmental cooperation. These declarations should help broaden East-West industrial cooperation, reduce barriers to trade, increase scientific exchanges, and cooperation in the environment.

Basket 3

The third agenda item—Basket 3—deals with increased human contacts, flow of information, and cooperation in cultural and educational relations. This item was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the United States, our Allies, and the neutral states. Here we have negotiated especially sensitive issues for both East and West, partly because they deal with “ideological coexistence,” which has always been anathema to Moscow. At Geneva, agreement was reached on basket 3 texts dealing with such issues as: family reunification, family visits, marriages between nationals of different states, the right to travel, access to printed, as well as broadcast, information, improved working conditions for journalists, and stepped-up cultural and educational cooperation.

Basket 4

Under the fourth agenda item, the conference produced a text on post-CSCE “follow-up” arrangements. The debate here turned on the degree of institutionalization and continuity to be accorded post-conference activities. The final compromise text provides for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions designed to carry forward the work of the conference and monitor the implementation of agreed texts. A meeting of experts will be convened in the first half of 1977 to prepare for a gathering of senior officials, later the same year, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible additional meetings in the future.

The CSCE Signing Ceremony. The concluding ceremony at which the CSCE Final Document will be signed will take place immediately after the last plenary session at approximately 5:00 p.m. August 1, on the stage of Finlandia Hall. The 35 heads of state or government will
be seated around a horseshoe-shaped table in French alphabetical order. You will sit between FRG Chancellor Schmidt and Austrian President Kirchschlaeger, and will be third to sign. The participants will each sign once after the last item of the CSCE document.

B. Participants: The principal CSCE participants are listed alphabetically by country at Tab A.2

C. Press Arrangements: The CSCE summit will receive full press coverage.

III. Talking Points

1. The current working draft of your address to the CSCE summit is at Tab B.3 The text is being cleared with Paul Theis.

2. Talking points for your bilateral meetings during the course of the summit are being staffed in separate memoranda.

The accompanying Department of State briefing books4 contain:
—additional CSCE background.
—biograpic sketches of the CSCE participants.

324. Memorandum of Conversation1

Bonn, July 28, 1975, 8:35–9:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Deputy Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. The conversation took place during breakfast at Schloss Gymnich. President Ford visited the Federal Republic of Germany (July 26–28) and Poland (July 28–29) en route to the CSCE summit in Helsinki (July 30–August 1). Memoranda of Ford’s conversations with Schmidt on matters other than CSCE or MBFR on July 27 and 28 are ibid.
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS
Portugal; Energy; MBFR

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

The President: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] With Helsinki off the agenda, can we make progress on MBFR?

Chancellor Schmidt: The dust must settle first, but it will eventually become the next item on the agenda.

Secretary Kissinger: We are now discussing Option III,2 without a complete agreement.

The President: What are the problems?

Secretary Kissinger: There are some who object to discussion of nuclear matters. Then there is also implicitly a ceiling when forces are withdrawn.

Chancellor Schmidt: I think I was one of the inventors of MBFR—in the latter part of the ’50s. Once one starts to discuss reductions mutually, it is easier to tell the Congress that you can’t reduce unilaterally. This is what led the U.S. to agree to try MBFR. Things have not gone too energetically, and I am content to have it that way. As long as we can hold the Congress off, what is the hurry?

Secretary Kissinger: But the Congress one day will say that since they can’t be negotiated, they must be done unilaterally.

The President: I think it will come sooner than later. Vietnam held it off, but I think it will not last long.

Chancellor Schmidt: Could we tailor progress to your domestic necessities?

The President: That would be helpful.

Chancellor Schmidt: On the substance, I can’t say anything.

Secretary Kissinger: On the substance, we need a serious review. It is a ridiculous position. We have put forth Option III. Perhaps some serious people should get together to decide what a serious proposal might be.

Chancellor Schmidt: Then we will do it to suit your pace. We are under no pressure.

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2 See Document 357.
The President: I think now that CSCE is out of the way, the Congress may push again. The Congress can be most difficult. Vietnam kept it out of the debate last year, but we could have a bad year if it looks like stalling.

Chancellor Schmidt: We don’t want to stall, but we have no reason to push. There are some pushing in my party but that I can handle.

325. Memorandum of Conversation

Warsaw, July 28, 1975, 4:30–5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Poland
Foreign Minister Olszowski
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Spasowski
Director, America Department—Jan Kinst
Director, Foreign Department, Central Committee—Ryszard Frelek

U.S.
The Secretary of State
Lt. General Scowcroft
Ambassador Davies
Counselor Sonnenfeldt
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Olszowski: I think the words of the First Secretary inspired all of us and what I would like to do in our meeting this afternoon is to get right down to cases and I have ten points to present to you.

The Secretary: Why not? That’s what God did.

Olszowski: I will try to concentrate this in a very short period. The first point is that I wish to welcome you most heartily. The second point is that I would like to present to you the state of our relations. I think that they are good, that they are growing better and developing. I think that we are generally moving to a higher stage. I would like to emphasize the important role which I believe Ambassador Davies has played.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 273, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. Approved by James Covey (S). The meeting took place in the Polish Foreign Ministry.
The Secretary: I am delighted to hear that. He is one of our very best Ambassadors and I have complete confidence in him.

Olszowski: That is our feeling too. On the economic side of our relations the joint US-Polish commissions and institutions are exploring means of cooperation. For example, on the coal side the Koppers Company has been doing good work. In industrial cooperation we have been talking to General Motors about a truck plant and, similarly, we have worked out an arrangement to build color television screens in this country. Our cultural exchanges are also very important. It seems to me that in our bilateral relations we are ahead of most of the obligations and demands that are made in the Helsinki documents. We are doing more already. We want to make the U.S. society more aware of our culture and vice-versa.

In political contacts they have been very close between our Foreign Ministry and the State Department. There are two special arrangements that I would like to mention. The first is on civil aviation where we would like to expand our bilateral cooperation. We have requested support from you to increase the frequency of our civil air exchanges. We also would like to see a new route developed to Chicago. The second is in the area of fishing. We express appreciation for the two agreements we have reached. We request consideration for Polish fishing vessels to call at the West coast.

Beyond the CSCE Conference we have a chance to develop positive relations in European cooperation by implementing the decisions of the Conference and we wish you to know that we are ready to implement those decisions. In general, on détente, we think cooperation in Europe is good. Both East and West seem to desire this. Our relations are excellent with all countries.

We still have some problems with the Federal Republic which I referred to in the car. Very briefly to evaluate these we have had several months of confidential negotiations. Both sides are trying to overcome the difficulties, but there are three issues that remain. First, the settlement of Poles in the Federal Republic. This is not a substantive disagreement but we differ over numbers. We think that the FRG figures are too high. There are not that many applications. We think a realistic figure is 110,000 with ten thousand more or less on each side of that figure. Second, there is the question of compensation for victims of Nazi acts. The Federal Republic does not wish to see this matter linked directly to compensation but searches for another way. They, for example, have talked about a social security payment and we think that it is possible to reach a conclusion on this if the Federal Republic shows sufficient imagination. We would like to sign such an agreement at Helsinki. That would be our contribution to a furthering of détente.
On the UN question, Ambassador Davies has given us the text of an oral note. We have read with great interest your Milwaukee speech and we are ready to cooperate. We'll consider any proposal you wish to make. We share your view that there should not be confrontation but rather negotiation. We are already very attached to the principle of universality and, therefore, we are very negative toward the expulsion of any member of the United Nations.

There is one further UN issue and that is the question of the succession to Waldheim and the new Secretary General. We would like to see that problem settled without too much difficulty. Now I believe that is nine of my points. The tenth is that I would like you to visit us for a longer period of time, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary: I very much appreciate the points you have made and I particularly accept your tenth point with pleasure. My wife was sad that she was not able to be with me and she is very interested in coming to visit in Poland.

Olszowski: We are looking forward very much to such a visit.

The Secretary: First, let me say on our basic relations that I think they are good and that they are improving. We are prepared to continue such improvement on the understanding that there will be differences due to our different geography and ideology and we are prepared to be understanding of the effects of geography and ideology on your policies. We think that improvement can take place and that these things can be reconciled with our other objectives. We are sympathetic to many Polish ideas.

Second, on the fish problem I think we are making progress and I hope that we will be able to be helpful.

Third, on air routes there is a general difficulty in our air situation these days, but it certainly ought to be possible for you to fly between two Polish cities like Warsaw and Chicago. I will look into this further.

Fourth, on the European situation and the implementation of principles of Helsinki we will cooperate and we look forward particularly to some progress in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. Despite the present tendencies in the United States, we think that détente will be irreversible. After next year and the elections things should be quieter in the United States.

Fifth, we very much appreciate the ideas expressed by the First Secretary at lunch on the UN et cetera. We should not have any confrontations. The developed countries including Poland have nothing to gain by conflicts in the UN. We want to encourage the LDCs to think about

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2 For Kissinger’s news conference in Milwaukee on July 16, see Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1975, pp. 179–184.
their problems in a positive sense. We want to make a number of technical proposals to deal with LDC problems and not have an ideological debate. That is what we look forward to doing in the Seventh Special UN Session. We certainly appreciate your support for the principle of universality which we share. If there is an attempt to exclude Israel, we would have to reconsider our whole attitude toward the UN and I may say that we include suspension as well as exclusion in this attitude.

Sixth, on the Secretary General we will stay in touch. I think we see eye to eye on this matter.

Seventh, with respect to the FRG negotiations in our talks with them they mentioned to us that there were some 300,000 ethnic Germans who wished to emigrate from Poland. They feel that the minimum number they need in the negotiations with you is 130,000 over a period of three or four years but I am sure they are prepared to look at the question closely. They need, however, to have some provision that the matter can receive continuing consideration in the future.

Olszowski: We are prepared to accept such a clause and we should therefore be able to reach agreement on that. We do not think, however, that 300,000 is a real figure.

The Secretary: I think the 130,000 is the key. If you can accept that then there would not be a problem. They explained the complications particularly due to the fact that they need Bundesrat approval for part of the deal.

Olszowski: Yes, specifically, they have offered 1.3 billion Deutsch marks in social security payments and 1 billion in a straight payment to the Polish Government. Your mention of the Bundesrat is a new element and we hope that this will not delay a settlement.

The Secretary: No, I believe that they are very eager to have a settlement. We would like to see it also. Genscher is confident that there will be an agreement but he did not wish to sign it at Helsinki although he is prepared to see it concluded there. He would like it to be signed instead in Warsaw or Bonn.

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3 No record of this conversation has been found. Sonnenfeldt wrote to Ambassador Hillenbrand in telegram Secto 8038 from Warsaw, July 28: “You should see FonMin Genscher and tell him that the Secretary has spoken to FonMin Olszowski on the subject of the repatriation of ethnic Germans. He took the matter up precisely as agreed between the Secretary and Genscher. Olszowski indicated he could accept an open-ended clause about the future. He also indicated he could go up to 120,000 in the present agreement. The Secretary made it clear that the West Germans were very firm about the figure of 130,000. He wants Genscher to know that he took the first opportunity of raising the subject.” Hillenbrand replied in telegram 12162 from Bonn that he conveyed Kissinger’s message to Genscher, who “expressed his gratitude.” Genscher said that “the Germans would now carry on the negotiation in Helsinki.” (Both in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Olszowski: Thank you very much for this information. We want
to have good relations with the FRG and good relations between our
two peoples.

The Secretary: The FRG wishes to have the same and achieve it
for all of Europe.

Olszowski: We want to conclude by thanking you very much.

The Secretary: I want to say that as far as the number of points is
concerned I will recall a story of negotiating with Israel where they
told me they had seven points to make. They then said that the first
seven points would depend on an eighth point. After two hours of
hearing their points, I said I would like to comment on their seven
points. They were immediately outraged because they said I had for-
gotten their eighth point and was already trying to cheat them out of
one point.

326. Memorandum of Conversation

Warsaw, July 28, 1975, 5:15–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
US-Polish Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Poland
Edward Gierek—First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United
Workers Party
Henryk Jablonski—Chairman of the Council of State
Piotr Jaroszewicz—Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Stefan Olszowski—Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ryszard Frelek—Member of the Secretariat and Director of the Foreign
Department of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party
Jerzy Waszczuk—Director of the Chancellery of the CC of the Polish United
Workers Party
Kazimierz Secomski—First Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of
the Council of Ministers
Romuald Spasowski—Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wlodzimierz Janiurek—Undersecretary of State in the Office of the Council of
Ministers and Press Spokesman

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box
14. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Andrews and approved by Hartman. The conversation took
place in the Sejm (the Polish Parliament).
The President: Is it permissible to smoke?

Gierek: Yes, I think so. This is a painting by Matejko.² It depicts a meeting of the Polish parliament on May 3, 1791. That was the date on which the Constitution was adopted. This painting is the story of that event.

The President: That is about the same time our Congress first met.

(The press leaves.)

Gierek: There was a period when any Polish leader who wished to veto a proposal raised his hand and the proposal was finished. People speak of that period of Polish history as a period when true democracy flourished. But the question is: Was that really democracy or anarchy?

Mr. President, I would like once again on behalf of myself and the Polish Government and State to express my heartfelt satisfaction with your visit to Poland. I am convinced that you can feel the sympathy and respect which the Polish people have for the people of the United States and for you personally. Also, I would like to say again that my wife and I recall with great pleasure our visit to the United States.³ I recall my talks with you and your collaborators and I saw evidence in the United States of friendship for the Polish people. Your visit takes place at a time of particularly intensive development of United States-Polish relations and this makes me very happy. Our exchange of views will provide a new stimulus for the future development of relations as well as for peaceful cooperation on an international plane. For many important reasons, your visit, Mr. President, is of paramount importance. It seems to me that it comes about at the proper time. My col-

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² Jan Matejko, a late 19th century Polish painter.
³ See Document 256.
leagues and I regret that it is such a short visit. I would like to have acquainted you with more of our achievements and with all that the Polish people have accomplished. With your permission, Mr. President, I propose, before we discuss Soviet-Polish-American relations, that I inform you briefly about developments in Poland.

The President: I would be very glad to hear you make that presentation.

Gierek: Your visit, Mr. President, is taking place in a year in which we are finishing our five-year program of economic development. We are now preparing a new program, 1976–1980. The balance sheet of the five-year plan which we are finishing is tremendous. During this period, we are achieving production growth of 70%. Growth in agriculture is more than 20%. We are increasing national income by about 60%. We are making a great investment effort. We are making very great efforts for the expansion of modern branches of industry, including raw materials, electrical engineering, ship building, food industry and light industry. As a result of these accomplishments we are achieving important social results. The growth of employment in the national economy will be increased by 1,800,000 people. During the current five-year plan, we have as salaried employees more than 11 million people in industries and services. Real wages will have grown by 40%. Equally high is the growth of the incomes of the rural population. I want to tell you that along with these achievements, during this five-year plan we are maintaining the same prices for basic foodstuffs. This is not easy for us. There are some problems, in the first place, concerning meat supplies. Consumption during this five-year plan has grown by 17 kilograms (more than 34 pounds) per capita. In other words, we are reaching our target of 70 kilograms per capita. Naturally, this is not the American standard, but if we consider that we have achieved in one five-year plan a growth of 17 kilograms, this points to the great effort which our State has taken and is still taking. On the subject of difficulties, the growth of wages and other incomes accounts for much greater demands for all kinds of market products. This we are trying to solve. These efforts of ours are not without difficulties. Our people have had a long period of hard work and sacrifices. They have had to build Poland up after tremendous war damage. Naturally, there are possibilities for us to improve the situation. We do it and strive for it but not without difficulties.

Our present speedy development is linked with the dynamic growth of foreign trade. This is true of all directions of our foreign trade. It is true of trade with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and economic exchanges with the West. The growth of oil prices, chemical semi-production and other raw materials, machinery and other equipment, result in quite definite difficulties faced by our economy.
We can also feel the effects of increases in prices in the West which accounts for nearly half of our foreign trade. I believe the situation will improve due to some advances in the relationships of certain goods which we export. We are now working on the main directions of our new five-year plan which in the fall we will present to all our people for a national discussion. Then, we will present the draft to the Seventh Session of the Party Congress in November.

In social policy, we are building during this five-year plan more than 100,000 apartments per year. During the next five-year plan, we estimate we shall build 1,500,000 apartments. These figures are not too high at all given our housing needs. The housing problem in Poland is extremely important, if you know what Poland was like after World War II. The first World War also resulted in certain damages and some of those damages have been preserved to this day. We try to devote much attention to housing. It is linked to the dynamic growth of the country in general and linked to a considerable birth rate. Poland has over 34,000,000 population and this trend still continues to be quite high. But houses have to be given to the people.

In the economy we now put much stress on the full utilization of raw materials including energy, the modernization of other branches of industry, and the acceleration of growth of food production. We have prepared a special program which we are now implementing. Poland has conditions for even more rapid development. We are one of the ten most highly industrialized countries in the world. We have an energy base, including not only coal (deposits of which are sufficient for 200 years), but also big deposits of copper, sulphur, salt and other raw materials. Naturally, we have a strong excavating industry and a scientific base. There are good natural conditions for an increase in food production which in a short period of time should make us self-sufficient. Our optimism and accelerated production make this possible. Poland has an exceptionally good structure of population. In 1971–80 about 6,500,000 young people start their work and they represent an active and very well educated cadre. I could mention also the conditions which assure us supplies of iron ore from the Soviet Union as well as conditions which provide opportunities for sale of our products in the Soviet Union. The most important factor on which we base ourselves is the active support of our people for a rapid socio-economic development of the country. The present development strategy should bring Poland a two-fold growth in income per capita. We shall, therefore, bring about a new quality in the living standards of our people. Naturally, Mr. President, the successful implementation of our strategy is based on the process of development of international détente. This favors the development of relations between the East and West and favors the easing of defense burdens which the country has to bear. Let
me not say anything more about social development. I shall pass to relations between our respective countries.

Poland is a socialist country linked by an unbreakable alliance with the Soviet Union. We are linked by the convergence of the basic interests of the socialist states. All our alliances strengthen the development of national identity and broad relations with our partners. This is true for reasons of development and it is particularly true with the United States. There are a number of objective factors which favor cooperation between Poland and the United States. They pertain to the role of the United States in the world, in Europe, and relations between our nations. The multi-million group of Americans of Polish descent, we consider, enrich and consolidate our relations. Today this is what détente means for the development of our cooperation. The key element in détente is cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of our contacts in the economic, scientific, cultural and political areas and the contacts between our peoples, we can say that our relations have become less sensitive to inadvisable moments in the international session. This allows us to hope for further lasting cooperation between our two countries. We note with great satisfaction that we have made considerable progress both in the content of our relations and in the strengthening of the political climate. These are our feelings. It is your contribution and the contribution of your close collaborators whose support we very highly value. At this juncture let me thank Ambassador Davies for his personal share in the contribution to the development of our relations. He reminds us both of many issues from the position he occupies, and I should say that the process is reciprocal.

Before you came, we reviewed the implementation of all the agreements and decisions reached in the United States. We noted that they were being favorably implemented. We are convinced that these decisions and agreements will be implemented in the same way as thus far. It is our intention to expand Polish-American cooperation. We would like to ask you to sponsor this as you have done so far. During my visit to the United States, we concentrated on economic cooperation. I would like to call on the Prime Minister, but before I do so, let me touch upon some other questions. The present developments call for more frequent political contacts on different levels. I believe these contacts have proved useful and there is nothing against having topics developed, discussed and agreed in separate conversations.

As far as cultural cooperation and exchanges of information are concerned, we are aware of the position of the United States in CSCE on cultural exchanges and exchanges of persons, seeing in them a contribution to rapprochement among nations. Our people are eager to learn about the achievements of other peoples including the United States. The achievements of the United States in science and culture are
very widely known in Poland. We would like greater reciprocity. We see progress in that field. As for humanitarian relations, they do not have the character of a serious problem. Most cases are individual ones and we generally take care of them in a positive way.

We know that the United States is approaching its 200th anniversary. This was symbolized by the exhibit “The World of Franklin and Jefferson” which you were kind enough to speak about. The Bicentennial in the United States will be noted in a dignified way in Poland. We have been getting ready for a long time in Poland and will show all that which testifies to the greatness of the United States, the greatness of the American people.

Finally, Mr. President, we want to assure you that the people of Poland wish the great American people further development and further progress. Allow me to introduce the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who would like to talk to you of specific economic problems.

Jaroszewicz: Mr. President, as we look at Polish-American economic relations, let me touch upon five questions. In 1974 trade exceeded $770 million, an increase of 55 percent above 1973. In the balance sheet, this is accounted for by the growth of both imports and exports with an increase in Poland’s disfavor from $150 to $250 million. This negative balance of trade was also affected by the growth in prices of agricultural products which we import.

First, in 1975 we have fixed a target of $900 million. There are certain difficulties—passing difficulties—and we are taking a number of courses of action. What is particularly disquieting is the lack of new co-production agreements, as for instance the good cooperation with International Harvester.

Second, in agriculture, we note considerable possibilities for further exchanges, for agricultural exchanges. Poland is interested in long-term purchases of grain and fodder on the American market at a level of 1–1 1/2 million tons annually within the framework of CCC credits. We are also interested in concluding a long-term agreement for the importation of grain and fodder. After the Soviet Union, the United States is the biggest partner for the improvement of the standard of living of the Polish people. We have had difficulties because the meteorological conditions have not been too satisfactory. We are able to count on the favorable attitude of the Soviet Union in this important question for us. We can offer long-term deliveries of our sugar to the United States. Deliveries of sugar would stabilize our trade and allow us to expand our sugar industry accordingly.

Third, concerning technology, present conversations which give hope for successful conclusion concern purchases of big investment projects. These negotiations in many cases are nearing conclusion. They include installation of coal gasification technology by Koppers; an
agreement on cooperation with General Motors on a plant to produce delivery trucks of 1\frac{1}{2}–2\frac{1}{2} ton capacity at the rate of 100,000 per year; the purchase of technology and know-how from RCA for the production of TV screens for color TV; equipment for the production of glass and other parts for TV screens from Corning Glass; the purchase of forges from Swindell-Dressler; and the expansion of cooperation in construction machinery with International Harvester. What is significant is that these contracts would amount to $1 billion and some are of particular importance, for example, the purchase of production and technology for TV screens to produce color TV.

Gierek: It would be great propaganda because of the number of pieces involved.

Jaroszewicz: And the motor car industry. These transactions also provide for co-production and for export, including to the U.S. market. All of this would depend on the availability of favorable credits to finance them. This means that we ask for the support of all those transactions by the U.S. Government and the greatest possible support from Ex-Im Bank.

Fourth, cooperation by means of the facilities of the mixed commission on trade (Joint U.S.-Polish Trade Commission). We would like to request you to agree that at the next meeting we would discuss ways and means to accelerate the dynamic growth of mutual cooperation by implementing the decisions taken during the talks in Washington. We should also take up the question of certain limitations in new agreements. We would be grateful to you, Mr. President, if you could lend these questions favorable consideration and if you could accept the conclusions of the Commission following its meeting next October.

Fifth, scientific and technical cooperation. We link our great expectation for progress on coal research which we have discussed many times. We would like to expand our relations in agriculture by exchanges of experience and by means of the conversations which our Minister of Agriculture will have next fall in Washington. We are willing to consider a long-term contract which would open up good prospects. Among other questions, it is important for the development of tourist and personal traffic to have further air connections. These are a few of the things which we believe offer great possibilities for the development of economic relations. As I said, there is great significance to these fields and we would like to have your favorable support. Thank you.

The President: Mr. Secretary, let me thank you and your colleague for this very broad and detailed presentation of our relations. But I should at the outset say that this visit and this occasion brings back three memories. The first is the memory of meeting in Washington last October. The establishment of personal relations gave us the opportunity to discuss in detail the relations between our countries and how to
broaden and improve these relations. The second came 16 years ago in Warsaw—my first experience in public life to meet with the Parliamentarians from many, many countries. And we met for ten days in this building with 100 Parliamentarians. The third memory is the warmth of that reception by the Polish people today which is a symbol of the close relations we have with Poland. It is not only based on the feelings of millions of Americans of Polish background but also the feelings we have for many, many reasons.

If I might, let me say a few words about relations between Poland and the United States. We feel that in a number of areas considerable progress has been made. In the cultural field, artists who have come from Poland to America make a magnificent impression. They are loved in the United States and we would like to see more of them. And ours who have come here know how warmly they have been received here.

In trade, the figures cited indicate a great increase in the purchases by Poland of commodities. We hope trade can increase on a reciprocal basis. The companies cited by your colleague—General Motors, Corning Glass—I know would like to expand trade with Poland. I know the commission working on such matters will work out details and Eximbank will be as helpful as possible. Private banking can also help. My understanding is that David Rockefeller and his bank are interested in expanding trade through the private sector.

In the area of agricultural sales, let me say that the United States is very fortunate that, with only 6% of our people involved in agriculture out of a total of 214 million people, they do a tremendous job. They have tremendous productive capacity and make it possible not only to feed our people but provide food to people in Europe, in other countries and throughout the world. As you know, agriculture is not the most consistent industry and we cannot be sure of a certain harvest. Last year, the harvest in grains and corn was not at the level anticipated. It was big but not as big as expected. This year, we anticipate a favorable wheat harvest, the largest in our history. If the weather is good during the next month, we will have the largest corn crop in the history of the United States. We have noticed that other areas of the world have far less favorable conditions for agricultural production. The United States to the maximum degree possible will seek to help countries in need. We have had good relations with Poland in the past in feedgrains. This year, too, I would hope to have good relations in feedgrains.

We are interested in your suggestion that your sugar production capability might help us. Last year, we had a shortage and prices were very high throughout the world. The situation has been mitigated to some extent but we are interested. If your Minister of Agriculture is coming to the United States in the near future, he might discuss this with Mr. Butz, the Secretary of Agriculture.
I was very interested in your comments on energy and coal. The United States and Poland have ample supplies of coal. You said you have anticipated supplies for 365 years. The United States has anticipated supplies for 300 years. Both of us have a mutual interest in the production of coal. You have mining techniques, first-hand, and we have technology and equipment which can be used on a reciprocal basis.

In the field of science and technology in certain areas, we have made great progress. In space we have done extremely well. The many byproducts of space technology can be made available to peoples throughout the world. In medicine, we feel benefits can be made available. These benefits can be exchanged with the advances made in your country.

There are, of course, a number of cases of people with relatives who want to be reunited with their families. I was very interested in your statement that most cases can and will be resolved. That would be beneficial to our relations.

I met with Congressman Rostenkowski, my representative at the Poznan Fair. He met with you. He gave me a full report. He was very complimentary about how he had been treated and explained how you wanted to establish close relations with the United States.

Let me turn now to détente and the many ramifications which come from it. I have long been, am now, and continue to expect to be an advocate of détente. I am aware that détente cannot solve all problems, but that concept is and has been very useful in relieving tensions. Détente in the future will be a useful tool for the betterment of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as the associates of the Soviet Union and the allies of the United States.

There are people in the United States who raise questions about the advisability of détente. Some raise questions on the basis that the United States got less than the Soviet Union. Others have a strong dislike of the political system in the Soviet Union and believe that somehow détente perpetuates that system. My feeling is that we have our system and the Soviets have their system. Détente is not aimed at changing the system but at problems which can be resolved. On the other hand, it has to be understood, particularly in our system, that in order to maintain détente and in order to defuse political criticism in the United States certain statements both oral as well as written have to be made to soften the criticisms of some of our people. Otherwise, some people in authority face internal political problems. There must be a sophisticated understanding of our political system. Those in the

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4 See footnote 5, Document 322.
Soviet Union must understand that our system works differently, that a person must be judged by his actions, not his words. As I meet with Brezhnev in Helsinki and, hopefully, in the United States, I can assure you, as I will him, that détente has been of great benefit to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the world as a whole. And we must continue détente for the benefits which we have had in the past and which we hope to achieve in the future. It requires understanding and sophistication. We very sincerely want to build better cooperation and a bridge for better relations between us and the world. You, I and Dr. Kissinger are going to Helsinki. There has been some criticism in the United States that I should not go—criticism from the extreme right and some liberals and left-inclined. I believe Helsinki is a step in the right direction. Much will depend on execution and implementation. It is our obligation to see to it that it is implemented in the right fashion. If it achieves what I think, criticism in the United States will be eliminated and I am optimistic enough to believe that it will be accomplished.

With the USSR, we have made significant progress in SALT I. While in Helsinki, we expect to discuss the outgrowth of very successful talks in Vladivostok. If the talks bring us closer, then it will be another giant step forward in limiting strategic arms and lifting the arms burden and increasing opportunities for peace throughout the world.

In closing, I feel our discussion this afternoon and earlier today broadened the foundations for much better relations between both our peoples. I pledge to you, we will make a maximum effort so that Poland and the United States have an opportunity to feel closer in the years ahead.

Gierek: Thank you heartily, Mr. President, for what you said. (Looks up and down the table.)

I don’t know if anyone wants to say anything, Mr. President, let me refer to one subject. This is our attitude to matters of détente and all that is linked to Helsinki. I want to speak here not as a Pole alone because if I were to approach this as a Pole from a narrow point of view, I would have to emphasize the need for understanding. I would like to speak as one whose country ranks second in our socialist group after the Soviet Union, both in economic and in military terms. We are grown up. We are a country which is a member of the Warsaw Treaty with all the consequences which ensue from that fact. As the second largest in the Warsaw Treaty, we, like the Soviets, are not interested in Helsinki only for the merely spectacular phenomenon but in all that will follow from it. We realize there are some forces in the world against détente. You speak of a very narrow group in the United States. We would note there are broader groups. We should make no less effort
after Helsinki than the effort that we have made up to now. I say this for Poland, the second socialist country. I am not aware of what Brezhnev is going to talk to you about—I am not curious but one day I will learn. But I am convinced that Leonid Brezhnev will say what he feels, and he feels the need for consistent consolidation of the process of détente. This is not only his feeling but the feeling of Soviet leaders, of the Soviet people. I base all this on something—the willingness and readiness to strengthen détente is because of the means of destruction, which are sufficient to destroy everything many, many times. The problem is to seek ways and means to freeze the situation and bring about such a degree of mutual trust that we could rest assured that the world would not be changed into a place of danger. Naturally, the world has all kinds of dangerous situations. But all these are not as dangerous as if you and the Russians enter the path to war. We shall use all our possibilities—and we have quite a lot of them—not only to smoke a peace pipe but also to see that all the consequences of the peace pipe are implemented. We are going to Helsinki to sign the documents and to implement them.

The President: This has been a very fruitful and beneficial discussion. Thank you and your colleagues for the opportunity to be with you this afternoon. We shall see you this evening.5

5 No record of this meeting has been found.

327. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Warsaw, July 29, 1975.

SUBJECT
Meetings with Brezhnev

Your Purposes and Basic Line

This is a crucial encounter for two reasons; first, it will largely determine the future course of the SALT talks, and, therefore, the

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 14, July 26–August 4, 1975, Europe–General (16). Secret; Sensitive.
prospects for Brezhnev’s visit; second, and equally important, it will be the opportunity to reestablish a mutual commitment, at the highest level, to improve Soviet-American relations as the basic policy of both sides. The latter is not a question of atmospherics, but a substantive problem in light of growing criticism of détente on both sides.

—Your aim is not so much to reassure Brezhnev about your policies, but to explain frankly and candidly that the relationship has reached the point where problems are emerging, as they inevitably would in any such attempt to alter the basic character of Soviet-American relations as they were shaped for over two decades of bitter hostility.

—Your main point is that détente must, in fact, be reciprocal, a two-way street, that you are committed to this course, but must defend it against a strong residue of suspicion that détente is being exploited; thus Soviet-American relations must be given new momentum; this means progress in SALT and MBFR, a real effort to implement CSCE, and a reaffirmation of the principles contained in the 1972 and 1973 summit agreements.

—You should stress that Soviet leaders should not be dismayed or surprised that certain segments in the US are skeptical, indeed, hostile to better relations with the USSR; after all, a complete turnaround in public and political opinion, whether in the US or USSR, cannot be expected in two or three years; the key is to demonstrate by deeds that the new course of relations is grounded in specific accomplishments benefitting not only the American and Soviet people, but international stability in general.

—This means that détente cannot be a cover for aggravating tensions, for regional advantage, or for applying differing criteria to various aspects of relations.

At these meetings with the General Secretary you want to accomplish three objectives; (1) to review the course of Soviet-American relations, both bilateral aspects and their impact on international issues; (2) to break the back of the SALT issues, if possible, by referring to the Geneva negotiations a number of issues where positions coincide or are quite close, and by discussing frankly those issues, like cruise missiles, where important differences remain; (3) to discuss the General Secretary’s visit to the US and the accomplishments that can be achieved by the time of, or during that visit.

—On this last point of the General Secretary’s visit, you will want to emphasize the critical importance of tying it to substantive accomplishments, particularly in the arms control, so that it will be clear in

2 Ford highlighted the paragraph up to this point.
both countries that the regular summits are a stimulus for reach [real?] achievements.

Brezhnev’s Position

Brezhnev will probably be in a somewhat buoyant mood, whatever the criticism abroad, CSCE in his eyes must seem a successful achievement denied all his more illustrious predecessors. Being center stage with a host of his European colleagues cannot fail to appeal to his innate vanity and his pretentions to world statesmanship.

But, at the same time, and more basically, he knows that the Conference has become a contentious issue in the West and that this is symptomatic of a disenchantment with détente. He can only add the controversy over CSCE to a series of events that cause him and his colleagues to question the future potential for the so-called “peace program” which he initiated at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971.4

In his view the setbacks to the trade bill last December, following so closely an unexpected criticism in the US of the Vladivostok agreement initiated a trend which he probably regards as ominous. He may point to such occurrences as Secretary Schlesinger’s remarks on a preemptive strike and first use of tactical nuclear weapons,5 the intelligence activities of the US that have received a great deal of publicity, the outcry against Soviet grain purchases, the anti-Soviet campaign that he cannot fail to see in the publicity to the Soviet base in Somalia,6 the reception given Solzhenitsyn, the debate over alleged Soviet SALT violations, the attacks on CSCE, our recent statements on the Baltic states, and our policy in the Middle East which seems aimed at the exclusion of the USSR.

In short, Brezhnev must wonder whether the support for détente in the US is weakening to the point that either you will abandon it, or be replaced with a more militant successor.

From his standpoint, however, you are his best bet, and he cannot afford to gamble that other events will weaken the US to the point

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3 Ford underlined “buoyant mood.”
4 See footnote 4, Document 49.
5 During a breakfast meeting with reporters on July 1, Schlesinger said that the United States had not disavowed the first use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, if it was facing defeat in a conventional war. He said: “If one accepts the no-first-use doctrine, one is accepting a self-denying ordinance that weakens deterrence.” (John W. Finney, “Schlesinger Says U.S. Is Willing to Use Nuclear Weapons First,” New York Times, July 2, 1975, p. 8)
6 Telegram 81064 to Mogadishu, April 9, reads in part: “Articles appeared in New York Times (April 7) and Washington Post (April 8), attributed to ‘Defense Department officials’ and ‘Pentagon spokesman,’ respectively, concerning Soviet cruise missile storage facility at Berbera.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
where he can resume a forward, offensive policy if we back away from
détente. Brezhnev’s problem is that he must, in effect, face his con-
stituency in February at the 25th Party Congress; he must defend a for-
eign policy record that is tied to détente in Europe and with the US,
that promises benefits in the encirclement of China, and the strength-
ening of Soviet influence in Asia and the Middle East.

—In defending his policies, Brezhnev must also recognize that he
will almost certainly be making a farewell appearance before his party;
he may retire of his own volition, or be asked at some point to step
aside, or simply be thrown out. With his ingrained sense of historical
perspective, he wants to bind his successor, and define Soviet policy
for the next period, and preserve his own positive image in the history
books.

—He cannot do this, if his policy is in a shambles; thus SALT, the
US visit, the impact on China, the Middle East outcome, US-Soviet eco-
nomic relations, all assume an importance in the perspective of his
Party Congress.

All of this means that you have a strong bargaining position;
Brezhnev needs to restore the momentum to détente, he cannot afford
to abort his visit or leave SALT stalemated, unless he is also prepared
to inaugurate a wholesale shift in policy next spring.

This does not mean, of course, that he can readily make a series
of concessions; he must face his colleagues, and his position—for rea-
sons of health and because he is in effect a lame duck—is more cir-
cumscribed than in previous summit meetings.

—He is still in charge and can make decisions on the spot, but he
must be more solicitous of the collective in Moscow, lest he risk the
fate of Khrushchev.

Nor can he fail to see elements of strength and opportunity for the
USSR in the fact that there is a weakening of the western coalition, espe-
cially the southern perimeter, that the industrial west is in some disarray,
that Europe is shifting to the left, that there is a debate in the US over the
control of foreign policy, and that there continue to be openings in the
Middle East and Southeast Asia for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, in a broad sense, your objectives and Brezhnev’s co-
incide: he wants to make progress on SALT, though not at any price,
he hopes for a successful visit to the US (though he may be very wary
of his public reception), he wants to demonstrate that détente is recip-
rocal and that it brings gains to the USSR.

In sum, Brezhnev may be apprehensive, even somewhat truculent
about the course of relations since you met him at Vladivostok; but ob-
jectively, he has no major options, other than to pursue this course, but
he will do so in a more sober manner, looking for weaknesses that can
be exploited.
Substantive Issues

A. CSCE/MBFR

The issue here is not so much the wording of documents or who won or lost, but what happens in the future: the Soviets no doubt have a different appreciation of CSCE and a different interpretation of it than we do. For them it is, in fact, a general postwar settlement recodifying the status quo politically and territorially. We can expect Brezhnev to make these points, however subtly, in his address to the conference though no doubt he will clothe his remarks in high-sounding phrases about peace and progress.

—You will want to explain that CSCE should be a guide to future relations, and in this sense a yardstick for measuring conduct.

—We expect to be attacked for signing what appears to many to be a meaningless document, and, as the General Secretary knows, we cannot constitutionally treat these documents as solemn treaty commitments.

—Nevertheless, you will stand behind the results and defend their value in the US, but you will do so in the sense that they establish standards for behavior that should be translated into practice through implementation of bilateral agreements.

—You should remind Brezhnev that we have no territorial issues in dispute and that we long ago accepted the existing borders, subject to our special rights and obligations for Germany and Berlin.

—We have played a key role in this conference, and sought to cooperate with both the Soviet Union and our allies.

—Now that it is completed, it is time to look to the other key negotiations—on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). You may wish to say that we recognize Soviet motives for not proceeding in the MBFR talks until CSCE was completed, but that if MBFR now remains deadlocked, it will only increase the skepticism in the US about the value of European security negotiation. 7

—You are prepared to initiate some changes in our position, in the direction of meeting Soviet complaints about reduction in nuclear systems, but this must be reciprocal—the Soviets must be prepared to respond to your initiative.

—In particular, the goal of these talks must be one of rough parity, rather than codifying existing imbalances.8 Moreover, the US and

7 Ford highlighted this paragraph.
8 Ford underlined "rough parity" and "codifying existing imbalances" in this sentence.
USSR must assume a special responsibility by making reductions first in the first phase.

—You and the General Secretary ought to take this occasion to emphasize the necessity for progress on what he calls “military détente” to provide the substance of the political détente of CSCE.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

328. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 8:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

UK
Harold Wilson, Prime Minister
James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

US
Gerald R. Ford, President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Callaghan: What do you think of Gierek?
Ford: He was very impressive. We received a great reception, crowds were good and I liked the look in their faces.

Callaghan: I like Gierek too. Also Kadar. The Polish Foreign Minister2 is a fat fellow but pleasant.
Kissinger: Like me.
Ford: We have to watch Henry’s weight.
Kissinger: What is the reaction to CSCE in the UK?

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 13, Misc. Docs, Tels, Etc., 1975, Folder 2. Secret; Nodis. A note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Draft prepared from notes taken by Mr. Sonnenfeldt but not yet reviewed by him.”

2 Olszowski.
Wilson: Not much in the press. If there were a Conservative Prime Minister it would be a great success. There has been some serious comment.

Ford: We have had some criticism.

Kissinger: *Time* has a very good cover story.

Wilson: Thatcher\(^3\) suddenly burst forth.

Ford: We started concerted efforts to explain it.

Callaghan: I read it and I liked it.

Kissinger: Gierek made a good comment. He said implementation was critical now.

Wilson: He said that publicly?

Kissinger: In a toast.

Callaghan: Kadar told us yesterday that they regarded it as a moral and political commitment.

Kissinger: Even inviolability of frontiers has proved more helpful to others than to the Soviet Union.

Callaghan: No Soviet government can ever justify invasion again.

Kissinger: CSCE will not prevent it, but it can never be explained again.

Callaghan: Now we must turn to MBFR.

Ford: We should make a major effort on it.

Wilson: We’ll say so today.

Kissinger: You and the Pope are in control. San Marino, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg are the last speakers.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

\(^3\) Margaret Thatcher, Leader of the Conservative Party.
Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 9:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

**USSR**
- Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
- Georgi M. Kornienko, Director of the USA Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
- Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
- Andrei Vavilov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**US**
- President Ford
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the USSR
- Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
- William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

US-Soviet Relations; Middle East; Emigration; Nuclear War

[The President greeted the Soviet party at the front door. As they entered the Residence, the General Secretary called out “Where is Sonnenfeldt?” The President laughed. The group was seated at the table. The press entered for photographs.]

Brezhnev: You’ve lost weight.
Ford: You look like you have too.
Brezhnev: I’ve been stabilized.
Ford: You look excellent.
Brezhnev: I’m about 78 kilograms. I’m 78.9, 80 at times, but within that limit. That’s my stable weight nowadays. I’ve been stable the last six months or so.
Kissinger: I’m stable within a 10-kilogram range. (Laughter).
Gromyko: You’re old acquaintances.

US-Soviet Relations
Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, I was saying to the President that we’ve done a very good job in space.\(^2\)
Kissinger: Yes.
Ford: The handshake was indicative of the progress we have been making.
Brezhnev: Your boys came down at 1:00 a.m. in our country, and our TV was still working.
Kissinger: You saw it.
Brezhnev: We saw it live.
Ford: In our country it was after dinner.
Brezhnev: It is really fantastic when you come to think of it. They go up; they meet somewhere in the limitless vastness of space.
Ford: It’s wonderful to know that the technicians and scientists have that capability—to link up hundreds of miles away.
Brezhnev: [fiddles with his pocket]. I’ve been thinking—I know Kissinger’s mind works that way—I’ll take a little bomb, put it in my pocket, and . . .
Kissinger: As long as it’s a little one.
Brezhnev: It’s a long-range one.
Ford: I’m glad they were up there, and not you and I.
Gromyko: Those are the MIRVs.
Brezhnev: Of course, that is a very complicated issue, seriously.
[The last of the photographers departed.]
Frankly speaking, Mr. President, the latest proposals we received on the night of our departure for Helsinki. We can’t go into details today. I was just informed of them, and you can’t get to the bottom of them right after getting out of the plane.
Kissinger: You mean on strategic arms?

\(^2\) Reference is to the docking of the U.S. spacecraft, Apollo, with the Soviet spacecraft, Soyuz, in outer space from July 18 to 20, 1975.
Brezhnev: Yes. Maybe while we are here we can look them over and discuss them the next time we meet.

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, I’d like to make some comments first about détente.

Brezhnev: Please.

Ford: In the United States, there is a very encouraging overall attitude as to the progress we have made, the Soviet Union and the United States, in moving in the right direction on détente. On the other hand, I think it is fair—and I want to be frank: we have those on the right as well as on the left, who for various reasons, political and otherwise, would like to undermine what we have tried to implement and to destroy détente.

[Mr. Hyland comes in to join the meeting.]

And critics of détente are Democrats as well as Republicans. They would like to slow down or destroy the benefits that come from détente. But I can tell you very forcefully I am committed to détente, and the American people agree with me. I strongly feel our negotiations and our agreements in Vladivostok were pluses, were very successful. I believe the CSCE negotiations, the documents we will sign here, are pluses, and I am confident as we talk about SALT II, we can achieve success in this area. Perhaps as in our country, you have some critics in your own government who don’t believe that Vladivostok, CSCE, and SALT II are in the best interests of your country. But I can tell you in my term of office—and I expect that to be the next 5½ years—my aim, objective and total effort on my part will be to narrow our differences and achieve the benefits for your people, for our people, and I believe for the world as a whole.

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to critics of détente:]

The only two people who are against détente are Kissinger and Gromyko. [Laughter].

Kissinger: Because as long as there is no détente, we can keep meeting. [Laughter].

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to 5½ years:] Why do you say only five years in office? Why not eight years?

[Mr. Akalovsky joins the meeting.]

Ford: Mr. Secretary, of course we have these critics of Vladivostok, the European Security Conference, and SALT, who would like me to have a term of office for 1½ years. But I am convinced beyond any doubt, if we can move the Vladivostok agreement beyond SALT and implement the atmosphere in which CSCE took place, I believe the critics will be pushed aside and the American people will support what you and I want to achieve. If we can make the kind of progress [we seek] on SALT, today and Saturday, it would be a great delight for me.
to have you visit the United States this fall. I was up in Camp David
two weeks ago and Mrs. Ford and I were discussing what a beautiful
place it was. I know you enjoyed your visit there before. But the main
point is to make headway that will result in a fruitful agreement, that
will be of benefit to your country and mine, and will make possible a
meeting in the United States between us some time in 1975.

Brezhnev: [interrupts Sukhodrev’s translation at reference to
Camp David:] I did like Camp David.

Ford: It is beautiful in the fall.

Brezhnev: Quiet and relaxing.

Ford: With those general observations, Mr. Secretary, I’d be very
pleased to have your reactions and any suggestions or comments you
would like to make, sir.

Brezhnev: I, too, want to be perfectly honest—and I trust you will
have the opportunity to see that this is so—let me say once again that we
received your latest proposals on SALT some time at night, practically
before I was due to leave. They need a thorough working on. Let me say
a new agreement on that is something you and we need equally. We had
no less difficulties working out the earlier agreement, but we worked
them out and solved them. I believe this time, too, it should be possible
to work out an agreement that would be advantageous to both sides.

Gromyko: Difficulties ought to be worked out and we will solve
them.

Brezhnev: Perhaps during the next few days we will have a respite
and see things more clearly. Yesterday after I arrived I met with Presi-
dent Kekkonen, leaders of the GDR and Tito, and got back very late
at night. These matters are complicated, serious and do not lend them-
selves to a cursory glance. As for our objectives, they remain the same—
Vladivostok determines those objectives. Of course, there are some de-
tails to be solved.

I would like in this meeting to turn to other matters of interest to
the two sides.

I was a bit surprised to learn that in the United States there were
some people who were against the Apollo-Soyuz project, arguing that
“their technology is weaker” or something. In the United States, every-
thing is criticized. The only person who is never criticized is Dr.
Kissinger, but they sometimes criticize even him for the fun of it.
[Laughter].

Kissinger: I was going to say it’s reached the point where even I
am criticized. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: I saw a day or two ago some piece in the press that—
every paper has certain errors, typographical or letters missing—and
every day they print a little note correcting it.
Ford: Always on the back page.

Brezhnev: I often ask, why do they publish this note? They say “it’s for the pleasure of our readers.”

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we could talk about this: We complete the European Security Conference. But we should not stop at that. We should make further headway. Relaxation of tensions doesn’t stop with Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

We should extend further. Maybe we should talk about that. I think it was you who said détente is useful not only for Europe but for all the world, and I certainly associate myself fully with those words.

Ford: I agree. In this connection, I want to note that the United States Senators who met with you in Moscow came back with very favorable reactions to the discussions they had with you, Mr. Secretary. And the Senators join with me in the view that détente is the way our two countries should proceed. They were impressed with the very frank discussions they had with you on energy, economy, trade and other areas. Their impression was that there are distinct possibilities for cooperation in these areas. And I was greatly impressed by the hospitality extended by you and your associates during that visit and the frankness and spirit of cooperation with which these were discussed at the time of their visit.

Brezhnev: In Washington, Mr. President, when I met with a large group of Senators and Congressmen and answered some of their questions, there was one man who sat in the back and asked a question about something. He asked the question in a delicate way, and I said “You are not bold enough. You are obviously referring to the Jewish population in the Soviet Union.” When they were in the Soviet Union, he admitted: “It was me.” It was Senator Javits, and we then had an interesting discussion with him.

Ford: Javits sitting in the back of the room? [Laughter]

Gromyko: He admitted it was him. He was sitting to one side.

Brezhnev: [To Kissinger] Were you present in Washington during the meeting?

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3 A delegation of 14 U.S. Senators visited Moscow from June 30 to July 2 for meetings with Soviet officials.

4 No record of this meeting has been found. For documentation on Brezhnev’s visit to the United States, June 18–25, 1973, see Documents 160–163.

5 Jacob Javits, R-NY.
Kissinger: No. I knew about your meeting. You presented some figures to the Senators in that meeting.

Brezhnev: I have some figures on that for this meeting too. It is soon going to be a veritable tragedy!

Ford: Let me say on that point, Mr. General Secretary, I have indicated to you that I intend to submit legislation as to trade and also as to credits. The handling of Congress is a very delicate problem. As you know, it is dominated in our system by the opposition party, so I have influence but not necessarily control. So the matter of timing when to submit legislation on trade and credits is very important. It is my hope this fall to submit remedial amendments so that we can have trade relations as initially contemplated. I think it was very unfortunate that you were forced to cancel the trade agreement, although I understand the action in Congress might have compelled you to do this. Perhaps by some appropriate action you could help me convince the Congress to approve the changes we will recommend. That would be a very important step, so détente can proceed and we can move in trade relations forward as we anticipated in a constructive way.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, on the whole let me say, there has been no change in our policy. We want as before to have good relations with the United States.

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, a few moments ago you said you had some figures in mind to discuss. I would be most interested.

Brezhnev: I will look. I do have somewhere a brief on this question. We have already added Solzhenitsyn to the list! [Laughter]

Gromyko: What we won’t do for the sake of friendship!

Ford: I have heard the name before.

Brezhnev: [Reads over his talking paper and confers with Gromyko] Here are some data. In 1972—the first figures are the number of requests for exit permits—in 1972, there were 26,800 requests. In 1973, there were approximately 26,000. In 1974, there were 14,000. In the first six months of 1975, there were 5,000 requests. As regards the number of people who actually left for Israel—actually some went elsewhere—in 1972, there were 29,000. In 1973, 33,000. In 1974, 19,000. And in the first six months of 1975, 6,000. Some were carry-overs from the past year; there were only 5,000 requests.

I have another figure. From the start of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, which dates back to 1945, until July 1, 1975, a total

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6 On January 14, Kissinger announced that the Soviet Union had decided to cancel the 1972 U.S.–USSR trade agreement in response to passage of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment. (Department of State Bulletin, February 3, 1975, pp. 139–143)
of 116,000 persons left the Soviet Union. This amounts to 98.4 percent of all requests submitted, 98.4 percent were met. You see, at present there is a process of falling off of requests, and probably it will continue. In your country, there are some to whom you don’t give permission on security grounds; we also have such people.

[Secretary Kissinger gets up to leave briefly.]

Ford: I must say Mr. General Secretary, Mr. Solzhenitsyn has aligned himself—

Kissinger: I am not leaving because you mentioned that name.

[Laughter]

Ford: Mr. Solzhenitsyn aligned himself with those who are very severe critics of the policy I and you believe in, détente. Senator Jackson, Mr. George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor, have spoken out critically. Meany has embraced Mr. Solzhenitsyn. Some of these critics encouraged Mr. Solzhenitsyn to continue his criticism of détente. As I said before, it is my firm belief that détente must continue and become irreversible if we want to achieve that kind of world which is essential for peace. The figures you mentioned, of course, are very disappointing to those who criticize détente. And any improvement there—in the requests or the figures of those who get permission to leave—would undercut some of the criticism and enhance our ability to proceed with détente as we want to do. But I repeat: détente can and will work and can be made irreversible—particularly if this Saturday we can make headway on SALT.

Brezhnev: I mentioned Solzhenitsyn just in passing. There was some information that he wanted to change his way of life and become a monk or something. Reportedly there was some priest going around with him at some point. He is nothing more than a zero for the Soviet Union. But why do you feel these figures will be disappointing to the people you mentioned?

Ford: In the case of Senator Javits, and Senator Ribicoff, they want to be helpful in Congress to approve the legislation I want to recommend, legislation that will permit trade, to extend credits, that will be very beneficial. If the figures were more encouraging, Mr. General Secretary, they would provide them with arguments for revising legislation that was so harmful to the continuation of détente.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, maybe you didn’t understand me correctly. I said we are reaching the point where there will be a tragedy. But what are we to do? Start talking people into leaving? I merely made a factual statement: The number of applications has been decreasing. The number of applications we have been receiving since I was in

7 Abraham Ribicoff, D–CT.
Washington has been declining. I am sure you and Dr. Kissinger realize this is so. I know virtually dozens of people of Jewish origin. Am I to go to Dymshits, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and say “You’ve got to leave?” And Leibman of the Moscow Soviet—should I grab him by the hand and tell him to go?

Ford: Certainly the figure of 98 percent is a good record.

Gromyko: Ninety-eight point four percent.

Ford: That is certainly a good batting average, as we say in the United States. I am not suggesting ways for increasing the number of applications. All I want to say is that Ribicoff, Javits and others must be made to understand that if the revised legislation is adopted, there will be the possibility, if not the certainty—that the figures will be like those of 1974 or 1973. I understand you can’t take people by the hand and tell them to leave, but the perception, the appearance, makes a difference.

Brezhnev: I really can’t understand what I can do in this regard.

Ford: Let me summarize the situation as I see it from the point of view of détente. I came here, Mr. General Secretary, despite the criticism in the United States, because I believe in détente. The portions I have been connected with—Vladivostok and here—have been concrete forward steps, meaningful progress. As I said, the criticism at home has come from elements in America that can be, as I said, brushed aside. Coming here will contribute to détente despite the détente critics. I hope we will achieve in Helsinki what we talked about in Vladivostok. Thinking people in the U.S. know that Vladivostok was a success which serves the interests of both sides. The American people, the majority of the population, hopes for more progress. The majority feels the same way about this conference, and the implementation of the document we sign will be the most conclusive proof that we are on the right track. So I hope we can make progress in SALT. This will be a good preliminary discussion for what we discuss on Saturday. But I repeat with quiet emphasis, détente must be made irreversible. It was my conviction at Vladivostok. I hope we can leave Helsinki with the same feeling, leading hopefully to a visit by you to the United States this fall.

Brezhnev: [Interrupts the translation] And I appreciate very highly the fact that you came here despite the criticism in the U.S.

[Interrupts the translation at statement that détente is beneficial:] And I agree with you on that.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened its third stage on July 30, 1975. From July 30 to August 1, the leaders of the 35 assembled nations addressed the assembly. Jan Lodal of the National Security Council staff described the first day of the gathering in his daily log:

“I met Hyland, Bremer, and Stoessel at 8:45 to go to the President’s Residence. We arrived while Wilson was still there. Wilson left about 9:15. We stood around in the Ambassador’s Library while Kissinger huddled with Ford and bustled about. Brezhnev arrived at 9:30. After picture taking, the meeting started. It went on for the appointed two hours until 11:30. Brezhnev was accompanied by the usual crew—except that Vavilov wasn’t along. Nothing at all happened on SALT. Brezhnev said that he simply had not had time to study our note, and perhaps we would discuss it on Saturday.

“I went in the President’s motorcade to the opening session of the CSCE Conference. It was really quite a surreal experience—all of these heads of state milling about in this huge hall, attending a function which was run something like a Shriner’s Convention. All of the great men seemed to blend in with the crowd and, except for a few well known faces such as Brezhnev, Wilson, and Ford, many of the others were simply anonymous.

“After lunch with Scowcroft, Hyland, and Sonnenfeldt, I returned to hear the afternoon speeches. Wilson gave the first speech—a brilliant performance. It was excellent substantively, as well as rhetorically. It was fascinating to read the distributed texts as he gave the speech. He would make minor changes as he went along—always to the improvement of the text. He simply never misspoke a word. I guess this is one of the skills you learn by speaking in the House of Commons daily for many years.

“Trudeau’s speech was well delivered—half in French and half in English. Schmidt finished up with a somewhat lackluster performance.

“The seats Bill Hyland and I occupied were near the Soviet Delegation. We had a good view of Brezhnev. At one point, he took what appeared to be a piece of paper out of his pocket wrapped around a pill which he took with some water. He put the piece of paper in his ashtray in front of him. It would be interesting to know what kind of medicine he is taking.

“During the break, I was chatting with Crispin Tickell when Prime Minister Wilson returned. Tickell introduced me to the Prime Minister as the man in the National Security Council who handles MBFR. We chatted briefly. He said that perhaps this would push things along somewhat in MBFR now. I asked him how he felt Brezhnev looked. He
said he wasn’t a doctor, but he thought Brezhnev should be pretty happy—he got what he wanted here. I mentioned that he didn’t have a SALT agreement yet. Wilson seemed surprised. I told him there had not been much discussion that morning. He then said it was all business, was it—not just pleasantries? I said it was supposed to have been business, but it ended up being more pleasantries. We really didn’t do much on SALT. Wilson was quite surprising in his personal appearance—a rumpled suit with dandruff all over it.

“The whole experience really was quite unbelievable—all of these great men wandering around this conference hall. Brezhnev and Gromyko sat through it all—it was their idea so apparently felt compelled to avoid bilaterals and other interferences.

“I went to dinner at a sister Russian Restaurant with Peter Rodman and some of the SS people. I had tried to go to the Prime Minister’s dinner, but got my invitations mixed up. As usual, the State Department functionaries who arrange these things totally mess up the NSC people on the trip.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70)

On August 1, President Ford addressed the Conference. For the text of his speech, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 304–308.

331. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 1:25–3:25 p.m.

SUBJECTS
   President Kekkonen’s Dinner
   Reaction to Brezhnev’s Speech at CSCE Summit
   Brezhnev’s Health
   The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS
   UK
   Prime Minister Wilson
   Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Callaghan

France
President Giscard d’Estaing
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sauvagnargues

FRG
Chancellor Schmidt
Foreign Minister Genscher
Gisela Anders, Interpreter

US
President Ford
Secretary of State Kissinger
Harry Obst, interpreter

(These excerpts refer only to the first hour of conversation at the lunch table. The remainder of the conversation, held in the garden, discussing the pre-agreed agenda was held by the eight participants only without the presence of interpreters or notetakers.)

President Kekkonen’s Dinner

Both the President and Chancellor Schmidt complained about the unfortunate seating arrangement at the dinner and in the plenary of the CSCE. President Ford remarked that he spent virtually all his time talking to Erich Honecker and Archbishop Makarios. Chancellor Schmidt also complained about his delegation being seated next to the GDR which left him no choice but to converse with Mr. Honecker. Secretary Kissinger commented that the long talk Makarios had with the President was ironic inasmuch as the United States Government had not previously agreed to a meeting between the two.

Reaction to Brezhnev’s Speech at CSCE Summit

President Giscard asked the participants about their reaction to today’s (July 31) speech of Leonid Brezhnev. President Ford commented that he had found it very interesting inasmuch as it had been restrained and very moderate in its statements. At any rate, it definitely had been quite different from what it could have been. Chancellor Schmidt agreed. He said that there had been no “stings” in the speech and that it had been more moderate than that of Gierek. Prime Minister Wilson said that he was surprised that the speech actually contained some reference to actions based on the Helsinki documents. Secretary Kissinger said that Brezhnev’s statements on “no interference” had been read by some as meaning that he was ready to bury the Brezhnev Doctrine.

\footnote{2 For the text of Brezhnev’s speech, see \textit{Current Digest of the Soviet Press}, Vol. XXVII:22 (August 27, 1975), pp. 6-7.}
Brezhnev’s Health

When the question of Brezhnev’s health was raised, President Ford commented that Brezhnev had clearly seemed very tired at the end of the very long sessions he had had with him in Vladivostok. Prime Minister Wilson said that he definitely thought that Brezhnev was looking much better than when he had seen him in Moscow in February.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

332. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, July 31, 1975, 9:50–11:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry Bradsher (Washington Star-News)
John Wallach (Hearst Newspapers)
Bruce Van Voorst (Newsweek)
Henry Trewhitt (Baltimore Sun)
Richard Growald (UPI)
Kenneth Freed (A/P)
Stanley Carter (N.Y. Daily News)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary proposed that this be off-the-record, but it was agreed that it be deep background. The correspondents could use what was discussed but without attribution to any U.S. official.]

Kissinger: What the hell has got into the press corps that 20 years later they are back to the John Foster Dulles policy? [Laughter] If they are against recognizing frontiers, what frontiers are they for changing?

When the President can visit Eastern Europe and I can have bilateral meetings with Eastern European leaders, the case can be made that we are giving them more flexibility. I am not saying this is the greatest conference in the history of mankind.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CI 273, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File. Confidential. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Suite at the Hesperia Hotel. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original.
Van Voorst: Isn’t this the result of a new look at détente, with the Solzhenitsyn thing?
Wallach: It’s a rebound from Solzhenitsyn.
Growald: It’s a chance to beat you over the head on.
Kissinger: Me, or the Administration?
Growald: Both.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Bradsher: I’d like to change the subject. Everybody says now they are for MBFR. You said we need a political decision. Is it really ready?
Kissinger: It needs a political decision to move forward. Everyone starts with an absurd position to satisfy their own hardliners. We start with a position just to start it. We have no problem on our side, in the United States. The problem is the allies.
Wallach: Will the Germans want it?
Kissinger: Bill Safire says we’ve been screwed because we didn’t get MBFR.² I’m not so certain MBFR is unambiguously good for us. All we get is a ceiling on all forces in Germany. The Russians get a limitation only in Europe.
Bradsher: The Germans are against it.
Kissinger: The Germans will hold their noses but what they want is to keep the remaining American forces there.
Freed: Where is the momentum for it?
Kissinger: In Congress.
Wallach: It was a response to the Mansfield Amendment.
Kissinger: A response to the Mansfield Amendment.
MBFR isn’t something to which we needed to link CSCE.
Trewhitt: It would put the U.S. at an enormous disadvantage.
Kissinger: What the cold warriors have to realize is that if they want to do it, they’ll have to double the defense budget. It would start with great glory, but then it would be like Vietnam.

² Safire wrote in an editorial entitled “Super Yalta”: “The criterion that Mr. Kissinger most wants to get away from is the actual quid pro quo promised us by the Soviets in return for holding a supersummit so valuable to their interests. Its name is ‘MBFR’—mutual and balanced force reduction—and it is the forgotten topic at Helsinki. Two years ago, we agreed to begin meeting the Soviets in preparation for the conference they wanted in return for an agreement to prepare for a deal we wanted: the actual reduction of Soviet and American troops in Europe. The security-conference talks led to this week’s glorious conclusion; the troop reduction talks led nowhere. We were had. Now, of course, our Secretary of State insists that while the two subjects started together, progress on the one was not connected to progress on the other. In other words, bad faith on their part was to be matched by good faith on our own.” (New York Times, July 28, 1975, p. 21)
Wallach: Is there any concern on Berlin? It seems to have gotten great emphasis.

Kissinger: There is concern that after CSCE, there might be pressure. But there is no evidence.

Growald: It has been said you opposed going to Auschwitz, because it would offend the Germans.3

Kissinger: I’m going to throw up. I have personal reasons to go. On Solzhenitsyn, I never spoke to the President about Solzhenitsyn except to give him the Gulag Archipelago when he came into office. On this trip I checked a box when it came around to give my approval or disapproval.4 I never spoke to him.

Growald: That’s why I asked the question. It’s the same old stories.

Van Voorst: Add Berlin to that. They say you didn’t want the President to go.

Kissinger: The Germans didn’t want him to go. There was fear of the Baader Meinhof gang. We wanted to go. But with sharpshooters there . . .

Freed: Why did the President go to Auschwitz?5

Kissinger: How can he go to Krakow without going to Auschwitz?

Freed: They said it was public relations, which offended me.

Kissinger: To lay a wreath on the memorial was the only thing he could do.

Freed: They said it was to pick up support at home. That sickened me.

Kissinger: Why shouldn’t he go? There was discussion of whether to go to the museum—the question was whether he had to go see the teeth and the ghoul.

I had a reason to be moved. I think he did it right. To do more would have been like PR.

It was not a foreign policy question.

Bradsher: You are aware that the Poles never mentioned the Jews in their presentation?

Growald: That is a standard policy with the Poles.

Kissinger: I didn’t know that.

3 See Document 319.
4 The memorandum to which Kissinger refers was not found.
5 On July 29, Ford visited the Nazi death camp, Auschwitz, in Oswiecim, Poland, where he laid a wreath at the International Monument and signed the Memorial Book.
Bradsher: It’s domestic politics in Poland.
Carter: Why go to East Europe?
Kissinger: To show that we do not recognize, within the military realities, Soviet predominance in East Europe. By the time we leave, the President and I will have seen every East European leader.
Wallach: The Yugoslavs say the last time you discussed spare parts and T-28’s. But they can’t get it.
Kissinger: I’ve read that New York Times story. It must be true. I’m going to look into it.
Wallach: Is Schlesinger opposed to it?
Kissinger: No. If he is, he hasn’t told me.
Growald: Why do you want the President to go to Yugoslavia? Because Tito is coming to an end?
Kissinger: You say, “Why do you want the President to go?” It is conceivable that the President does something on his own.
Growald: You approved it.
Kissinger: Because Tito is coming to an end. It is important for the U.S. to stake something on the independence of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period.
Bradsher: You didn’t see all of them here?
Kissinger: Because we want to make a distinction between certain East European countries.
Bradsher: The President won’t see Husak.
Kissinger: But I saw his Foreign Minister.
Bradsher: That is one of the distinctions.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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8 Telegram Secto 8089 from Helsinki to Prague, July 31, reported on the meeting: “In half-hour meeting on July 31, Secretary told Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chhoupek that we are in favor of improving our relations both within and outside the trade areas. He expressed regret for the provisions of the trade act affecting Czechoslovakia and said we have to see if we can negotiate a package with Congress and then present it to Czechoslovakia. Chhoupek expressed appreciation for President’s and Secretary’s personal attitude in calling on Congress to reevaluate aspects of the trade act.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Helsinki, August 1, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

Luxembourg
Prime Minister Thorn
Ambassador Georges Heisbourg (to Finland)
Paul Helminger, Chef du Cabinet of the Prime Minister

US
The Secretary
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
John J. Maresca

SUBJECT

The Secretary’s Bilateral Meeting with Thorn

The Secretary: The President seems to want to stop to have lunch in Luxembourg on his next trip to Europe.

Thorn: We certainly hope he will be able to. I hope to see you in New York in September. Do you have any advice for me?

The Secretary: The best thing is to conduct the whole thing in the fairest and most impartial way. If every group tried to rig it for their own purposes it would be very unfortunate. What do you think of the Conference?

Thorn: It is going very well. It was a good thing Wilson was the first speaker. The tone of the communist speeches has been quite moderate. President Ford gave a very good speech.2

The Secretary: It was a good speech. The West has really dominated the Conference. Even some of the Eastern European speeches seemed to be aimed at the Soviets. Kadar talked about having lost some territory.

Thorn: Some journalists are now asking themselves if this is not really a Western conference.

The Secretary: There is no question that intellectually the Conference has been dominated by the West. If a man from the moon were to walk into the Hall, he would think it was a Western conference. Brezhnev has played a very minor role.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Maresca and approved by Hartman. The meeting took place in Finlandia Hall.

2 For the President’s speech before the CSCE on August 1, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 304–308.
Thorn: It is up to us now to see that the results of the Conference are not forgotten, and to do something with them.

The Secretary: I don’t think there is much danger that they will be forgotten.

Thorn: Do you expect progress in Vienna now?

The Secretary: Speaking personally, and not as Secretary of State, I think we may live to regret starting MBFR. If we can get them to withdraw 300 miles, we will have to withdraw 3000 miles. But I say this as a professor. There are many who would have liked us to link CSCE and MBFR, but I am just as happy that we did not.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

334. Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the Department of State

Helsinki, August 2, 1975, 0640Z.

Secto 8109. Department pass to all CSCE capitals. Subject: CSCE III: Final day.

1. Summary. CSCE closed at 6:00 pm on August 1, following signing of Final Act by thirty-five heads of state or government. Highlights of final day were President Ford’s speech, which was considered by many conference delegates as most forceful expression of Western view during three days of speeches, delayed appearance of Portuguese President Costa Gomes, apology by Maltese for their behavior during last days of the negotiations, and circulation by Cyprus of a statement in reply to Turkish reservation on Cypriot representation. Full verbatim records will be pouched to Department (EUR/RPM) when available. End summary.

2. Portugal: Portuguese President Costa Gomes, who had postponed his appearance from July 31 for reasons of “force majeur,” gave standard review of conference results, but stressed Portugal’s “new path,” and stated that Portuguese foreign policy was now based on full

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

2 For text of the CSCE Final Act, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

3 General Francisco da Costa Gomes.
respect for the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention in the internal affairs of others, and the recognition of the right of all peoples freely to dispose of themselves.

3. US: President Ford’s speech, which was considered by many to be strongest statement of Western view of CSCE heard during Stage III, emphasized that both sides have to benefit from détente, and that CSCE results would be a yardstick by which performance will be measured. The President stressed the deep devotion of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and said the US intends to participate fully in turning the results of the conference into a living reality. Like Wilson, Schmidt, and Giscard, he noted that CSCE results are also applicable to Berlin. The President closed by stating that history will judge the conference not by what is said but what is done to carry out the promises of CSCE.

4. Malta: In absence of Mintoff, who was reportedly ill, Deputy Prime Minister Buttigieg concentrated on Mediterranean aspects of CSCE and Maltese role in ensuring that Mediterranean interest in the conference was fully reflected. Buttigieg apologized to all present “for any offense we may have given during the exciting days in Geneva.” All that Maltese did, he said, was “in a good cause,” and any animosity was due more to “our inexperience than to any bad intention.”

5. Netherlands: Prime Minister Van Den Uyl was somewhat reserved but expressed hope that Basket III results would promote better understanding among peoples, and admitted that “some optimism” might be justified. He underlined that results of CSCE would have to be implemented if conference was to have any meaning, and looked for progress now in MBFR negotiations.


7. Norway: Prime Minister Bratteli5 reviewed conference results, expressed hope they would be implemented, and looked forward to continuation of multilateral process begun by CSCE.

8. Romania: In a long speech in which he departed considerably from his prepared text, Ceausescu brought out the principal elements of Romanian foreign policy: equal rights and sovereignty of all states, renunciation of aggression or intervention in the affairs of other countries, banishment of the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes. He called for further steps toward disarmament and cooperation, but qualified his endorsement of Basket III results, noting that information should serve the cause of friendship among peoples.

4 Andre Leon Saint-Mleux.
5 Trygve Bratteli.
Ceaușescu thought CSCE results would be conducive to the elimination of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

9. Liechtenstein, San Marino: These countries gave standard review of conference results, emphasizing role of small states in CSCE.

10. Luxembourg: Prime Minister Thorn also stressed role of smaller states at CSCE, and recalled that implementation of results would be real test of the success of the conference.

11. Holy See: Archbishop Casaroli\(^6\) read personal message addressed to the conference by Pope Paul VI expressing hope for the success of the CSCE enterprise, “in the name of God.”

12. Cypriot interpretive statement: In response to Turkish reservation on Cypriot representation circulated to the conference on July 31,\(^7\) Cyprus circulated a formal interpretive statement that participation in CSCE was on the basis of the full equality of states, and that Turkish statement that it will not apply CSCE results to relations with Cyprus “is of no effect.”

13. Signing: Following last speech, all thirty-five heads of state or government gathered at broad horseshoe-shaped table and signed single original copy in all six languages of the Final Act of the conference. Completion of signing ceremony brought long round of applause. Finnish President Kekkonen made brief closing statement, and adjourned the CSCE.

Kissinger

\(^6\) Archbishop Agostino Casaroli.

\(^7\) Not found.

335. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Bucharest, August 2, 1975, 7–8:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Nicolae Ceaușescu, President of Romania
Manea Manescu, Prime Minister

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Barnes. The meeting took place in the Council of State. Barnes sent the memorandum as an attachment to a letter to Sonnenfeldt on August 8.
George Macovescu, Foreign Minister  
Sergiu Celac, Interpreter  
President Gerald R. Ford  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador—Interpreter  

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]  

President Ceausescu: [Omitted here is an unrelated comment.] As far as European problems are concerned there was so much talk at Helsinki that any other words now wouldn’t have all that much importance. What is important will be to see what can be accomplished, what each country will do to carry out what was declared and signed.

President Ford: I have the impression, though I may be overoptimistic, that there will be honest efforts to live up to these words. After all, in two years there will be the periodic accounting. I think you’ll see done what was promised.

President Ceausescu: I’m by nature an optimist but this time I’m not really all that optimistic. The problems which need to be solved are very serious ones and they require solutions, some of which go beyond by a great deal what was signed in Helsinki. To be sure, if I were to mention economic problems but we can discuss them later. Rather, with regard to some of the other problems concerning Europe, they are really quite serious. Of course I have already had the occasion to touch on some of these with Dr. Kissinger but I would like to use this possibility to share with you a few of my thoughts if you are agreeable.

President Ford: Please.

President Ceausescu: In the first place, 30 years after the war Europe is still living under armistice conditions. The document we signed at Helsinki and for that matter some of the statements made there were intended to say we should continue to live in the spirit of the Potsdam Agreement2 until peace is concluded. This of course implies that those who were victorious in the war, and this has to do with all the rights regarding Berlin, have the right to intervene in places where there is no peace treaty at any time they feel like it. There are of course certain understandable rights but there are also very great risks. I don’t think it’s a secret from anyone that there are very few Germans who approve of this state of things or are in any way enthusiastic about this situation. Hitler as you know came to power thanks to the situation which was created for Germany as a result of the first World War.

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2 For relevant excerpts of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, which established four-power rights in occupied Germany, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 54–65.
President Ford: That’s right.

President Ceausescu: There is a certain existing situation, there is a certain correlation of forces now on a worldwide scale, but this situation will not be eternal nor in my opinion will even last that long. Of course I’m not saying anything new to Dr. Kissinger. What I’m telling you now is that although there is a very clear situation today where the United States and the Soviet Union both control the major military forces including nuclear armaments, even that situation is not immutable. Anyway, in order to solve this problem, to do away with this situation, to achieve a peace treaty, requires putting every state involved on an equal footing including Germany. This it seems to me is one of the problems which it will be essential to be solved for the future of Europe. You know in recent years how quickly many situations have changed with what great rapidity.

President Ford: Would you suggest that these problems be solved on a bilateral or broader basis?

President Ceausescu: To be sure, in the first instance they need to be solved by the four powers and the Germans themselves because first of all the four powers are tied in by the Potsdam treaty with the situation in Germany proper.

Secretary Kissinger: Could I ask the President what problems worry you most in Europe. You were saying just now the situation might change.

President Ceausescu: You know very well some of the changes that have taken place even in Europe in the relative positions of different states. To continue to live under the aegis of the Potsdam treaty means the risk of intervention at any moment. This is the essential problem.

Secretary Kissinger: You would like a solution to the German problem.

President Ford: Unification?

President Ceausescu: Yes. But now a treaty of peace.

Secretary Kissinger: A peace treaty for Germany?

President Ceausescu: Getting rid of the Potsdam status and the achievement of a normal state of affairs in Europe which would exclude such a right of intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

Secretary Kissinger: What about with regard to Berlin?

President Ceausescu: In the context of a peace treaty a solution would have to be found for Berlin. So long as this will depend on the good will of the four powers any one of which could take the initiative to intervene whenever it believed it was entitled to do so. I note that many others as well as you yourself mentioned in their declarations at Helsinki that they agreed with the right of assigning a special status in Germany and Berlin to the four powers.
Secretary Kissinger: We made them.

President Ceausescu: It seems to me others did as well.

President Ford: Yes.

President Ceausescu: Without a doubt preservation of this state of affairs means maintaining a permanent lack of security and constant danger of tension in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: What terms would be in such a treaty?

President Ceausescu: It’s difficult to say now what provisions there might be. In the first place, one has to arrive at the realistic conclusion that it is time to put an end to this sort of situation. The peace treaty should do away with any sort of rights of some states over other states. Granted I’m not talking about the Leninist slogan of no annexations or reparations. That belongs to the past. But a peace, even with reparations and territorial changes, that would still be just.

Secretary Kissinger: In the humanist tradition?

President Ceausescu: I prefer to say the realist tradition.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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336. Memorandum of Conversation

Bucharest, August 3, 1975, 9–10:25 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Romania
Manea Manescu, Prime Minister
George Macovescu, Foreign Minister
Sergiu Celac, Interpreter
President Gerald R. Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Ambassador–Interpreter

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Barnes. The meeting took place on board the train between Bucharest and Sinaia. Barnes sent the memorandum as an attachment to a letter to Sonnenfeldt on August 8. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: “Notes were not taken by the interpreters during this conversation.”
President Ceausescu began by saying that after the CSCE conference it was necessary to think about what problems needed to be tackled next. In his opinion, disarmament was such a problem. The President asked what opinion President Ceausescu had about the MBFR talks, President Ceausescu said “not much.” The sorts of reductions being discussed, on the order of 20–30,000, were of a kind which could be achieved just as well through more efficient organization of any army. In addition, it wasn’t really a question of numbers of soldiers, but rather of armaments, fire power, and in the first instance the US and the USSR. To take an abstract example, even with numbers, it wasn’t right for reductions to be applied across the board, with Romania and Holland being subjected say to the same 10% reductions that would apply to the Soviets and Americans. The Secretary asked why this wasn’t fair, and President Ceausescu replied that for the US this meant 200,000 troops and for the Soviets 300,000, but it still left their basic strength intact. The Secretary asked what 10% would mean for Romania, to which President Ceausescu replied in the order of 20,000. The element of fire power was what counted anyway. President Ford asked if what really bothered Romania wasn’t 10% but what would happen when things got to 50% or 60%. This is exactly right, President Ceausescu said, and then went on to say that what counted, so far as troops were concerned, was not a transfer from say Czechoslovakia to Hungary of a couple thousand men but withdrawals. The Secretary said he wondered whether Romania really wanted US troop withdrawals given the fact that the continued presence of American troops in Europe was useful for preserving equilibrium on the continent from the standpoint of Romania, and in particular Yugoslavia. President Ceausescu said he wasn’t talking about US troop withdrawals but about real reductions which should be balanced and under adequate control. What was needed was a mechanism for ensuring both reductions and control. As a matter of fact, he noted, the Chinese have done more than anybody else to bring about troop reductions in Europe by obliging the Soviets to move substantial troops to the Chinese border. The Secretary recalled that there are about 44 Soviet divisions there now and that whenever he mentions their “northern” ally to the Chinese, they tremble, not from fear of course.

Returning to the subject of disarmament, President Ceausescu said that one error that some countries, including the United States, make at times is to ignore the role of small, less-developed states. So long as the major nuclear powers make no real steps toward nuclear disarmament, the danger exists and will increase that any number of smaller countries will try to acquire nuclear weapons—countries in the Middle East, Asia or even Latin America like Brazil. The Secretary noted
that the Indians may be in that category though they are so very moral and pacifistic. They’re not all that pacifistic, replied President Ceausescu. In any event, these same countries could also develop chemical or biological weapons which are cheaper and may well be more destructive.

President Ceausescu then brought the conversation back to Europe and remarked that he would be involved before long in what would in effect be a follow-up conference to CSCE—the conference of European communist parties. It could well turn out to be even more important than CSCE itself because at it would be decided whether a communist party in say Italy or France could have its own policies or would have to take orders from outside. The President asked what attitude President Ceausescu thought such parties would take. He replied that the Italian and Spanish parties, from all he knew of their leadership, would not accept outside dictation. With regard to the Portuguese party, President Ceausescu observed it was hard to say, but the military leaders he had met, including President Costa Gomes, were definitely committed to a policy of independence. In response to the Secretary’s asking where and when the conference would take place, President Ceausescu said probably in November and probably in Berlin. (After the conversation broke up Ambassador Barnes asked President Ceausescu whether he really thought agreement could ever be reached on a document to be submitted to the conference. President Ceausescu replied that eventually there would be one on the same consensus basis as used at Geneva for CSCE. In any case, he was not looking forward with any great enthusiasm to this conference but Romania would definitely participate.)

Prior to that will be the CMEA (COMECON) summit conference called to discuss integration. When the Secretary asked what would be Romania’s position, President Ceausescu said it was clear—they were against it. What about the other countries in COMECON, asked the Secretary. Some of them have reservations but they’ll go along, said President Ceausescu. In fact the Poles are one of the strong supporters of the plan, as are the Bulgarians. The Secretary interposed “Then you’ll be isolated.” “It won’t be for the first time,” said President Ceausescu.

The Secretary then remarked how several of the Eastern European countries had talked to US representatives at the Helsinki conference about improving their relations with the United States, and asked what would be President Ceausescu’s advice as to how the United States should treat them—in what order for example after Romania of course. President Ceausescu reflected for a while and then said he thought it was worthwhile trying to improve relations with them all. The President recalled that the Bulgarian representative at Helsinki had made a
particular effort to be friendly, and President Ceausescu noted the existence of good Romanian–Bulgarian relations. After he mentioned that the US had already made a good start with Poland, the Secretary asked about East Germany in view of the fact that we had maintained a certain reserve with them. President Ceausescu said that in the recent past Romanian relations with East Germany had improved considerably. At the same time what the East Germans could do was obviously limited by the Potsdam treaty and they too would always go along with the Soviets. Ambassador Barnes mentioned that for that matter all the other European countries in COMECON had Soviet troops on their territory save Bulgaria and this could not help but limit their options. The Secretary said that knowing the Germans he could believe they might succeed in uniting in 15 years. They’re romantics. They’ll probably set themselves up as teachers of communism to the whole world. President Ceausescu responded that he agreed they would reunite though he wasn’t so sure it would happen within 15 years. (At about this point the Secretary picked up the map of Romania which had been brought in at the President’s request and a geography lesson ensued which concentrated on territories lost by Romania to the Soviets—President Ceausescu talking about the “restitution” to the Soviet Union of Bessarabia after World War II and the ceding of Northern Bukovina as “damages” for Romania’s having held Bessarabia for 20 years. In fact, he noted, Romania in some ways fared better at Hitler’s hands because Hitler turned down Molotov’s November 1940 ultimatum to give the USSR a free hand in Romania and Bulgaria which would have meant the Soviets taking a still larger slice of northern Romania. In the context of talking about the differences of railway gauge between the USSR and other countries, President Ceausescu noted that the Bulgarians were urging Romania to build a wide gauge (Soviet type) line across Romania, but the Romanians were not interested.

The Secretary then asked who President Ceausescu thought would succeed Brezhnev. President Ceausescu said it was just hard to say and
the Secretary then asked what he thought about post-Brezhnev Soviet policies, would they be tougher or more flexible. President Ceausescu replied “They could hardly be tougher than they are now.” “What about Shelepin?” asked President Ford. Saying “We’ve had fairly good experience with him,” President Ceausescu proceeded to recount the story of the Romanian gold bullion and royal treasure sent to Moscow in 1916 for safekeeping but which has never been returned. Lenin apparently signed a decree in 1918 stating that all would be restored after the establishment of a workers’ and peasants’ government in Romania. In 1960 the Romanians inquired of the Soviets whether they were yet prepared to believe that such a government had been installed in Romania. The initial Soviet reaction was to deny any knowledge of the gold, but Shelepin subsequently was one of those who was in favor of at least taking a serious look at the Romanian request. The Secretary noted that for someone like Shelepin it’s hard to make a comeback once you’ve lost your power base, and that the ranks of the Soviet leadership is no place for choir boys. President Ceausescu said the truth of the matter is that the whole present Soviet leadership is made up of people who got where they are thanks to Stalin, and only with a change to younger people will there be some real changes in policy.

The Secretary then asked whether Brezhnev had firm enough control to be able to make decisions stick. “On little, unimportant things” responded President Ceausescu, “like—MBFR.” What did he think of Brezhnev’s health? He said he was of course no doctor, but his own personal view was that Brezhnev would finish the same way Pompidou had. When the President wondered whether Brezhnev was aware of this, President Ceausescu said it was hard to say, citing Pompidou as having announced two days prior to his death that he was in good health.

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4 Aleksandr Shelepin, member of the Soviet Politburo until 1975.
Belgrade, August 4, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: The Democrats can’t hurt you from the right. But if SALT blows up they can hurt you from the left, which is where they would then move.

All those guys talking about Helsinki; what frontiers have been recognized? All the frontiers but the German one were signed in ’47–’48—with participation by a Democratic administration. West Germany agreed to the German one.

President: We had more overtures from East European countries than ever before, I think.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

President: Why did the East Europeans want CSCE? To keep the Soviet Union off their backs.

Kissinger: Of course. And whose frontiers have been violated? And by whom?

President: If we lost SALT, etc., shouldn’t we make a speech saying the borders were approved by the Democrats, and the East Europeans wanted inviolability to protect against the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: How about a 15 minute report to the Nation Thursday?2

President: That has some merit. Let’s think about it.

Didn’t Tito go farther than ever before?

Kissinger: I wanted to mention that. Tito is a bellwether of European politics. He obviously liked you—he hasn’t gone to the airport for years. His assessment has to be that you are dominant in world affairs.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14, Secret; Nodis. Brackets, with the exception of those indicating omission of unrelated material, are in the original, which does not indicate the time of the meeting or where in Belgrade the meeting took place. President Ford was visiting Yugoslavia from August 3 to 4. (Ford Library, President’s Daily Diary)

2 August 7.
There was more discussion of Tito.

President: Let’s make sure we deliver on the military equipment for Tito.

I have no hesitancy speaking up for CSCE and the whole thing.

Kissinger: Everything on this trip went right. Not a thing wrong. The Brezhnev problem is not your doing; something is going on.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

338. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 5, 1975, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

President’s First Meeting with Prime Minister Miki

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Takeo Miki
Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
Toshiki Kaifu, House of Representatives and Deputy Cabinet Secretary
Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador James D. Hodgson
General Brent Scowcroft, NSC
James J. Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by Wickel. The meeting took place at the White House. The following day, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft discussed the meeting with Miki. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “The President: What I told the Japanese about Helsinki is already in the paper. Kissinger: They simply leak everything. They are unbelievably tricky.” The conversation continued: “President Ford: I have to be away giving a speech to the American Legion. I thought I would discuss détente. Kissinger: You should also discuss SALT and CSCE. I think you should lay it on the line: What in the hell have we given up or ratified at Helsinki? The Democrats want me to assure them I won’t speak next year. The President: That shows one thing—they are scared. Don’t you promise anything.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1975 August, Folder 2)
Europe—CSCE

Miki: Turning to Europe, Mr. President, you just returned from there last night. In everyone’s eyes the European Security Agreement appears to have resulted from Soviet efforts to realize their original concept of freezing the status quo in Europe. I am aware that the United States and other nations attached conditions to their acceptance of participation in the Helsinki Conference, but what I wish to ask, Mr. President, is what is your foremost diplomatic objective in the United States’ Soviet policy?

President: First, let me comment on the CSCE. I believe there is a lack of sufficient background information on what the CSCE really does. In the first place, with respect to borders, it reaffirms the borders agreed to in treaties signed in 1947 and 1948, and nothing further, except in the case of Germany, where the CSCE reaffirms the borders agreed to by West Germany in 1971. Therefore, the CSCE does nothing more than reaffirm borders agreed to in 1947, 1948 and 1971. This point is not well enough understood.

Second, the CSCE Agreement adds an element of integrity and morality, in terms of the right way of doing things, so that the Soviet Union would not do again what it did in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Eastern Europeans, if I may interpret what they said in the meetings and elsewhere, believe the CSCE is a document that will prevent the kinds of action from being taken as in the instances I described. They do not say this is guaranteed, but they seem to feel they have added protection that they didn’t have before. In that sense CSCE is constructive. We will have a meeting in Belgrade in 1977, to review what happens in the subsequent two years.

My endorsement of CSCE is based on the good faith of those who agreed to it, including the Soviets. I expect all 35 signatories to live up to the agreement language.

In our relations with the Soviet Union we do not agree with their system (nor do they agree with ours). We do not feel that détente between the Soviets and the United States is a solution to all the world’s problems, but it can be used, and has been in some cases, to ease tensions and avoid confrontations. I expect it to continue as a vehicle for those purposes.

Détente is a two-way street; it is not all one-way for the Soviets (and won’t be as long as I am President). It is a mechanism for use at a time of rising tensions and confrontation. In some cases it has been disappointing, in other cases helpful. I do not mean that it is one-sided. It is mutually beneficial, and hopefully, can help solve some of the problems facing the world.
Secretary: If I may add a word, Mr. President, the debate about CSCE is totally cynical. It is generated by those who for 20 years advocated the exact opposite of what they now say. As the President has said, there are two realities in Europe, frontiers and political influence. There has been Yalta, and then the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1948, and the German Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. As a result there are no contested frontiers in Europe. To talk about frontiers is to reaffirm Treaties and legal language.

The political influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe is not related to this conference. The Soviet Union has some 40,000 tanks between the Urals and the Elbe, and no Western nation wants to build that many tanks. Until someone does these critics are only engaging in an exercise of expressing demagogic platitudes.

I’m talking very frankly, but then I didn’t have much sleep last night. I’m reading a new novel about Japan (“Shogun”) and realize everything I’m doing is totally wrong.

Strategically we wish to weaken Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe, not confirm it. And we believe we can weaken it more effectively by détente than we could by cold war. During the cold war period we could use military force, but under détente we must use diplomacy.

If the President can be welcomed by tens of thousands as he was in Warsaw, Bucharest, Kracow, and Belgrade, this weakens the Soviet Union. This could not have happened without détente.

We are under no illusions about the Soviet Union. If they have the opportunity to use pressure, they will do so. We (and you) must adopt positions that our domestic opponents can’t attack if we have to resist. I used the example yesterday of the prize-ring—is it better for us to fight flat-footed in mid-ring where we can be hit easily, or to move around and make ourselves harder to hit? Then if the Soviets do something, and we can tell our people we have done all we can for peace, we will be in a stronger position to resist.

If we look at the Middle East, détente has not helped the Soviet Union. We do not aim at hegemony, and dividing the world between us, because that would be suicidal. We wish to contain the Soviet Union

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2 Relevant extracts from the Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, February 11, 1945, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 10–12.

3 Presumably Kissinger is referring to the Paris Agreements of 1954 between the three Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. For the text of the agreements, see ibid., pp. 425–431.

4 Kissinger is apparently referring to the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, signed at Moscow on August 12, 1970, commonly referred to as the Moscow Treaty. For the text of the treaty, see ibid., pp. 1103–1105.
with modern methods, which are not those of the cold war period but are entirely new.

SALT, MBFR

Miki: Based on the outcome of the CSCE conference what prospects do you see for further progress in SALT and MBFR?

President: I had two meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, in which we made some headway on SALT. There are some problems which are very technical, and some which are very fundamental. I believe the odds on an agreement are better than 50–50, but not certain. We will continue to negotiate. I believe that SALT is in the interest of the entire world as well as US-Soviet relations. We will continue to work at it, but we will insist that whatever materializes must be mutually beneficial.

Regarding MBFR, we recognize that the negotiations have been stalled for some time. We are working with our European allies to try to develop a position that might move the talks forward, but this depends on the reaction the Soviets have.

We believe that a MBFR that reduces military forces on an equitable basis is in the best interest of Europe, but the talks are stalemated. We hope the Soviets will be as flexible as we will. We will continue to work closely with our allies so that our efforts will lead to greater unity and not split us.

When are the MBFR talks scheduled to reconvene, Henry?

Secretary: September, Mr. President.

CSCE Effect on Asia

Miki: Turning to the repercussions generated in Asia by the CSCE, the Soviets extended an invitation on July 30 to (LDP Diet Member) Hirohide Ishida, Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentarians Friendship Association, to hold a meeting to discuss an Asian Security Conference.

In the long term, although it may not be visible yet except in special circumstances, what the Asians are most sensitive to is Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia. The Chinese, for example, view the Asian Security Conference proposed by the Soviets as an attempt to encircle them...

Secretary: They’re right.

Miki: ...and therefore oppose any third nation hegemony. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Japan is negotiating with China, as you know, has been stalled by opposition to the inclusion of the hegemony

5 See Document 329.
clause. It is obvious that the Chinese are vigilant against any increase in Soviet influence in Asia. What do you feel will be the effect of the CSCE on this trend in Asia, in the context of Soviet influence?

President: First let me speak about the United States’ relations with the People’s Republic. Our relations were initiated by Mr. Nixon. I fully support these relations, and believe they are of vital importance. I expect to go to the People’s Republic sometime late this fall. I feel that our relations are moving along on schedule. The Shanghai document is the basis for continuing and expanding our relations. I see no serious problem developing in that regard.

We all recognize that there is competition in Asia between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic. We believe that our continuing relations with China are important in maintaining stability in Asia, and we will make every effort, in a responsible manner, to broaden our relations with the People’s Republic. Secondly, we expect to maintain continued close relations with your government, Mr. Prime Minister. We feel this is vitally important for the stability and security of the Pacific. I have been encouraged by our discussions in Japan, and this morning. Tomorrow we can reaffirm the importance of our relations.

I recognize there are problems in the Pacific area, not in our relations but in peripheral areas. We should be frank in discussing those relations, as they refer to relations between the United States and Japan.

Therefore, we seek to broaden our relations with China, while maintaining and strengthening our relations with Japan. This will have an impact on the influence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific area. Henry, have you anything to add?

Secretary: I was asked in Helsinki about an Asian collective security conference, and said if there is such a meeting, it would take place without the United States. I do not think Asia can be compared with the situation in Europe.

Miki: I agree.

Secretary: We will not participate in an Asian collective security conference, or anything of that kind.

Second, we believe the Soviet Union is trying to encircle China, and in no way do we wish to participate. China has its own aspirations, and in ten years may cause trouble for all of us, including Japan, but at the present time it is not in our interest to weaken China. Therefore, we will not cooperate with the Soviets in any anti-Chinese maneuver in Asia. It was for that reason that we signed the Shanghai

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6 For the Shanghai Communiqué of February 27, 1972, between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, see Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1972, pp. 435–438.
Communiqué, with its hegemony clause. We knew what we were doing, and made it explicit.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

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339. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 8, 1975, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Cabinet Meeting

The first item is a report on CSCE and my trip in general. We stopped first in Bonn and had a good discussion with Schmidt, who is very concerned over the economic situation. I will talk in greater detail with the economic group tomorrow, because Giscard and Wilson are also concerned. From there we went to Poland where we had good talks with Gierek.

Then we went to Helsinki. There has been criticism of the meeting. But it bolstered the West and gave a greater sense of independence to the Eastern European countries. The meeting was a definite plus. The borders were settled by treaty, most of them 30 years ago. The agreement—the Final Act—specifies self-determination and peaceful change of the borders.

From there we went to Romania. That is a tough outfit, but with a fierce sense of independence. Then we stopped in Yugoslavia. I have never seen an 83-year-old sharper. We had good talks.

I met with Demirel and Karamanlis at Helsinki. The Turkish aid decision was the worst decision I have seen in my time in Congress.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Unclassified. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Present at the meeting were the members of the Cabinet, White House staff, and heads of agencies.

2 See Document 324.

3 See Document 326.

4 See Documents 335 and 336.

5 Records of Ford’s conversations with Demirel (July 31) and Karamanlis (July 30), see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 233 and 51, respectively.

6 Congress banned U.S. aid to Turkey as part of the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, which passed on December 11, 1974. On July 24, 1975, the House voted 206–223 to
I hope it will be reversed. I met with others, including Giscard and Wilson.\(^7\)

I had two meetings with Brezhnev.\(^8\) We spoke about SALT, the Middle East and other subjects. We made progress, but more flexibility is needed. That is a quick rundown. Henry—

Kissinger: CSCE was never an element of US foreign policy. We never pushed it and stayed a half step behind our allies all through the process. But we didn’t want to break with our allies or confront the Soviets on it. The complaints we are seeing show the moral collapse of the academic community. They are bitching now about the borders we did nothing to change when we had a nuclear monopoly. Indeed, they beat Dulles about the head for his position. As the President said, the borders were legally established long ago. All the new things in the document are in our favor—peaceful change, human contacts, maneuver notification. At the Conference, it was the President who dominated the Conference and it was the West which was on the offensive.\(^9\)

It was not Brezhnev who took a triumphal tour through Eastern Europe—it was the President. And even if every spectator was paid—which I don’t believe—the leadership in those countries felt strongly enough about demonstrating their independence to put out so much money.

Our relations now with our allies are better than ever since the early Marshall Plan days. Our relations with the Soviets—we didn’t have the impression this group was on the upswing. Anyone observing from another planet would not have thought Communism was the wave of the future.

reject an amended version of S. 846, which would have permitted the resumption of military aid to Turkey. The following day, Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 858–860, 866)

\(^7\) See Documents 328 and 331.

\(^8\) See Document 329.

\(^9\) Kissinger made similar remarks at a meeting with Callaghan, Sauvagnargues, and Genscher, at his suite in the Waldorf Towers in New York during the meeting of the UN General Assembly on September 5: “I was struck at Helsinki by the total bankruptcy of the Communist system where it’s been in power for 30 years. They can keep in power only by a kind of petty bourgeois nationalism of the 1930’s variety. But in the West, with prosperity and security, that is the only place where it is growing. It is an absolutely inexplicable phenomenon.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 12, Nodis Memcons, Aug. 1975, Folder 9)
MBFR, September 1973–January 1977

340. Editorial Note

On July 10, 1973, Phillip Odeen and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff sent President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger a memorandum on “data uncertainty in the U.S. position” on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). They wrote: “As usual when we reach a point of decision in MBFR, the data we have been using for our analysis and to construct options is turning to jelly. This has seriously fouled up our preparations to present the Verification Panel clear choices as to a preferred U.S. proposal which could be given to NATO as we have promised. The short of it is that CIA now reports that the Soviets have 70,000 and possibly 120,000 more ground forces in the reductions area than we thought previously. This means that instead of 390,000 Soviet troops there are probably 460 thousand in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.” The memorandum continued: “If true, an increase in this magnitude means we are going to have to rethink the problem of MBFR. While parity becomes an even more important goal from a security standpoint it is also made more difficult to attain because of the increased asymmetry of the Soviet cuts. The new data effectively wrecks both the stationed force common ceiling and the U.S.-Soviet percentage parity proposals developed in the VPWG. Under the 10 percent stationed force common ceiling, in which the U.S. would cut 34,000, the Soviet reduction, instead of being 83,000 as we had thought, will now have to be 153,000. This much asymmetry makes the common ceiling proposal for stationed forces ridiculous. The percentage/parity cut becomes too expensive for us. If we try to achieve parity with equal percentages then the equal percentage that is required increases from about 15% to 35–50%. This would represent an increase in the U.S. cut which would grow from 32,000 to 60,000–100,000. This is obviously far beyond the size cut we have contemplated in MBFR.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, MBFR/Measures Agreement Subseries, Box 26, MBFR Verification, 1975–76)

After discussing the new data from CIA, the Verification Panel reached the following conclusions at its meeting on July 18, summarized in the meeting minutes: “The Verification Panel Working Group should coordinate a briefing to NATO that: informs the Allies of our new intelligence information; presents the Options 1, 2, and 3A of the negotiating proposals under interagency discussion; stresses the potential negotiating pitfalls of a simple U.S.-Soviet percentage cut; [and] emphasizes the U.S. preference toward a common ceiling approach that 992
is phased with a first phase comprising a 15% U.S. reduction and a 15% Soviet reduction including the elements of a tank army or its equivalent. It was further agreed that the United States should very carefully inform key Allied personnel that we would be prepared to consider a nuclear package in addition to the 15% personnel reduction in order to achieve Soviet reductions in the form of a tank army or equivalent major tank units. Finally, it was agreed that a briefing should be given to NATO as soon as possible.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–108, Verification Panel Minutes Originals, 3/15/72 to 6/4/74)

In a meeting with Odeen, President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, and other members of the NSC staff on July 23, Kissinger discussed the paper being prepared for NATO. The memorandum of conversation reads in part: “Mr. Odeen: On the MBFR paper to NATO. The second draft is out for comment now. We should have a final draft by the end of the week. Mr. Kissinger: I think we should throw in the mixed package. A proposal that we take out 29,000 troops without equipment for their taking out 65,000 troops with equipment. You don’t need NATO to start screaming that we are abandoning them again. Mr. Eagleburger: That is my worry. Dr. Kissinger: We ought to say that is just not possible. You can’t ask them to take out a whole tank army for 29,000 men. Mr. Eagleburger: We can ask. Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and we saw what happened in SALT. Mr. Odeen: There will be a meeting of the NPC on Friday. Dr. Kissinger: Are we going to explain the new intelligence? Mr. Odeen: We will tell them that in preparation for the meeting we had a review of the intelligence and we found this problem and that we will explain it to them. Dr. Kissinger: It won’t do us any good. Unless it gets into Schlesinger’s speech. Mr. Odeen: I don’t think we can do that. I think it is too late. General Scowcroft: It will make us look like fools.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 271, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File)

On July 24, Odeen and Sonnenfeldt forwarded to Kissinger the draft presentation to NATO of the U.S. negotiating proposal for MBFR along with their recommendations on six undecided issues regarding the U.S. negotiating position. Kissinger approved their recommendations. On July 26, the Department of State transmitted the approved U.S. proposal for the Alliance negotiating program to Ambassador Rumsfeld in telegram 146712 to USNATO. On July 27, the Mission to NATO replied in telegram 3582: “Ambassador Rumsfeld read and circulated text of ‘US views on MBFR negotiating approach’ per ref tel in Council meeting on July 27. Initial reaction was positive.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 264, NATO, Vol. XV)
341. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 2, 1973, 3:07–4:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Lord Carrington, Defense Minister of the United Kingdom
Mr. Richard A. Sykes, Minister of the British Embassy
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Miss Kathleen Anne Ryan, NSC Staff Notetaker

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: Then who is holding us up on MBFR?

Carrington: To keep you on your toes. There is no suspicion on the administration but on what it might be pressured into doing.

Kissinger: Our journalists are now engaged in proving everything that is wrong with the administration, even in foreign policy—the agreement with the Russians, etc. Everytime that happens our Congress has to draw the conclusion that if the Europeans feel that we are selling them, why help them.

[to Sykes:] You see our press.

Sykes: I am perfectly certain that nobody hears it in official circles.

Kissinger: We keep hearing from the British that we are selling détente too cheaply. We should get bigger concessions, MBFR, SALT.

Carrington: We put in a paper on MBFR. It doesn’t say that at all.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 25, CATC Natural, 1974, Arab-Israeli War. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation took place in Kissinger’s office at the White House. All brackets, with the exception of those indicating omitted and still classified material, are in the original.

2 In telegram 8745 from London, July 30, the Embassy reported that “Tickell asked Embassy officer to call July 30 to receive copy of British paper on MBFR, which he said British will circulate in NATO today and leave copies at the Dept.” The telegram continued: “Commenting on US MBFR paper of July 27, Tickell said his observations were tentative and preliminary; British are doing a thorough analysis of new US approach.” Tickell, the Embassy reported, made several points: “A. Overall Allied reductions of ten percent are too high. US forces in the guidelines area should not be reduced by more than ten percent”; “B. US paper does not examine problem of withdrawn Soviet forces, which end up in western military districts of USSR”; “C. The US paper by its own logic commits Allies to a second stage more strongly than British think desirable, especially given their conviction that reductions of European forces should not be negotiated until the results of US-Soviet reductions and related measures have been assessed”; “D. As to second phase, British feel strongly that when and if it is reached, no US forces should be included”; and “E. Allied negotiating program should not be presented to the East even in skeleton outline at the early stages of negotiations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 730, Country Files, United Kingdom, Vol. 8)
Kissinger: Let’s not argue about that.

Carrington: I feel cautious about it.

Kissinger: I also feel cautious about it. Then there was this insane Hungarian debate. I find it too early to judge where we stand.

Carrington: All this is in the paper. We would prefer to see judgments in terms of combat effectiveness rather than in numbers.

Kissinger: We need a formula. My experience with the Russians is that they are bloody minded, petty and untrustworthy. The worst mistake is a horse trading position. Then we are caught in an endurance test where they can play on our down situation. The major thing is to find some theory which you can get them to accept. Then there are still bloody fights, but it is easier.

Percentage cuts—if we say equal percentage cuts we prefer to get down to a common ceiling. Percentage will give them a disproportionate cut, also in numbers. I got from Dobrynin that they are willing to have percentage cuts by 5%. But if the cut is too small, it won’t do for us domestically. If it is too large, it will get us into trouble.

Carrington: The initiative should be in terms of combat effectiveness rather than in terms of numbers or tank divisions which seems . . .

Kissinger: Our position was leaked to the Russians. Dobrynin gave it to me briefly and asked if it was accurate. How many days ago did we table it?

Carrington: When?

Sonnenfeldt: A week ago.

Kissinger: Fairly accurate.

Carrington: The last paper.

Sonnenfeldt: Yes.

Carrington: My feeling is that if you start with what you want to end with, you won’t get it.

Kissinger: The Soviets are not eager to make large cuts.

3 On July 16, Kissinger wrote to the President about a meeting between himself and Dobrynin on July 10: “On MBFR he [Dobrynin] asked our reaction to a comment he said Brezhnev made to you in the helicopter to El Toro—that we should begin with modest cuts and then stop for a couple of years. I said we hadn’t realized it was meant as a proposal, but I would give him a reply next week. He said they were thinking of simply an informal understanding to work along those lines.” On July 30, Kissinger reported in a memorandum to Nixon that during a “very cordial luncheon meeting with Dobrynin” on July 26, Dobrynin had “again urged a U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle in advance of the negotiations” on MBFR. Kissinger continued: “He [Dobrynin] suggested a simple 5 percent cut. I replied that the matter was still before NATO, but that we were thinking of 10–15 percent cuts leading to a common ceiling, and less simple formulas than they had suggested.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 18)
Carrington: So they won’t push you up to greater cuts.
Sonnenfeldt: The irony is that it won’t help us here.
Kissinger: If we say 5%.
Sonnenfeldt: Especially if the margin of error is more than 5% for inspection.
Kissinger: That is right.
Sonnenfeldt: We are talking about the concept of an outcome.
Kissinger: The best would be if we get something that required a number of years to get it done. The plan is 10% of ours and 15% of theirs.
Sonnenfeldt: In the second stage the common ceiling forces are larger than ours. The difference between us is 10,000—19,000 to 29,000.
Carrington: All I am interested in is combat effectiveness.
Kissinger: He [Dobrynin] said he had heard we wanted a disproportionate percentage then in the first stage. I just had lunch with him. He didn’t give me the exact figures. He is pushing 5%. I said we have to think about something higher. We have defended the theory. Dobrynin said I understand we have to cut 5% more than you in the first stage. He asked what the theory is. I said, “Why don’t you ask your people who gave it to you?” He said, “They can’t explain it.”
Sonnenfeldt: Actually the President’s report to Congress mentioned a common ceiling.
Kissinger: The 10% NATO cut and the common ceiling of the Warsaw Pact would be a 10% US cut and a 15% cut for them. And the second phase will be both sides. Take the difference between the 10% US and the 15% Soviet that can be composed of both Soviet and other forces. The second phase the Germans explained to them.
Carrington: I talked with Leber after he talked with you.5
Kissinger: I like him.
Carrington: He is a good man. He seemed quite happy about indigenous forces only mentioned.
Kissinger: What is your view?
Carrington: I like the idea about the security; I don’t know about the figures.
Sonnenfeldt: Our military is not happy with the size.
Carrington: The military are always going to say that.
Kissinger: We sneaked a good number out during the Vietnam war and this administration has replaced them. They were not missed.

4 For the relevant section of the President’s Fourth Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, May 3, 1973, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 498–500.
5 No record of Kissinger’s meeting with Leber has been found.
Sonnenfeldt: This can be worked out within NATO.

Kissinger: What can we do about the leak problem if they know about it a week after our position is stated.

Sonnenfeldt: It could be a mechanical problem.

Kissinger: You think so?

Carrington: Then you start unworthy suspicions.

Kissinger: In this town you can be paranoid and have your suspicions found true. [Laughter]

Carrington: We shouldn’t have a repetition of the first talks.

Kissinger: There it is, but this other thing NATO has to recognize—the Russians will not roll over and accept it. I think our position in its numerical form will prove unacceptable to the Soviets. And they have to take a 62,000 cut to 29,000 and tanks against nothing. No Soviet negotiator can sell this to the Politburo. I don’t mind having this as an opening position. We have to keep in mind the elements of a nuclear package or another package. We can’t have another brawl, saying that I have worked it out secretly with Brezhnev or that the United States is double crossing its allies. If we can get a Soviet tank army and tanks out, probably we will have to get something out.

Carrington: This could be said except for the problem of security.

Sonnenfeldt: We have said in NATO what it might be.

Sykes: We have looked at it and taken bits of all three parts. Parts of it was one of our ideas.

Kissinger: This is not a bilateral US/UK undertaking, but we need your help.

Sonnenfeldt: You want a common ceiling defined as “combat capacity” and we want numbers which we consider the same.

Carrington: Depending on what you are doing.

Kissinger: We have to get some work done within NATO.

Carrington: How do you want to see NATO changed to make it more realistic?

Kissinger: Now there are 7,000 nuclear weapons in Europe; [1 line not declassified]

Sykes: A little more.

Sonnenfeldt: [1 line not declassified]

Kissinger: I have every confidence that Goodpaster has ideas if a war starts.

Carrington: I hope so.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger  
Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft  
Lawrence Eagleburger  
Richard Kennedy  
Charles Cooper  
Phillip Odeen  
Richard Campbell

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Mr. Kissinger: [Omitted here are unrelated comments.] What about MBFR?

Mr. Odeen: Well, we are moving . . .

Mr. Kissinger: What about our nuclear policy? We’ve got to get that nailed down and what if the Russians don’t go along? We’re only asking them to withdraw 62,000 troops and supplies, and their whole tank army, in return for 20,000 men with no rifles. Have we projected what happens if we throw in a rifle or two?

Mr. Eagleburger: The Brits are the toughest. No one has focused on the problem you raised. Everyone is looking at it from our side.

Mr. Odeen: The Brits certainly are a problem. They fight everything.

General Scowcroft: They don’t like the problem in the second stage.

Mr. Kennedy: What they want is a flat 10% common feeling [ceiling].

Mr. Odeen: Yes, and our position right now is 29,000 on our side, 65,000 or 68,000 and a Russian tank army on the other side.

Mr. Kissinger: Isn’t that 15% on both sides? Is 29,000 15%?

Mr. Odeen: Yes. Five division equivalents.

Mr. Kissinger: So we have an equivalent percent on both sides.

Mr. Odeen: Yes, but they may reject it out of hand.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s what I have to avoid. With the Russians I found if you can get them to accept in principle what you are trying to do then you have a chance to hammer out something. My problem is that if they reject it out of hand we can’t get anywhere.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential, April–November 1973, 3 of 5. No classification marking.
Mr. Odeen: The Brits want 10% flat out and then quit.
Mr. Kissinger to General Scowcroft: Did you talk to Sykes?
General Scowcroft: Yes.² He was sure Trend would tell his colleagues. I mentioned that that certainly was not our impression but that’s water over the dam. I told him we would like a text of what they said so that we can at least tell our people. He said he would send a cable.

Mr. Eagleburger: Trend is a good guy.
Mr. Kissinger: I don’t give a damn. I judge by action. They can’t milk us for everything in the name of special channel.
Mr. Odeen: On MBFR I will check on the nuclear policy.
Mr. Kissinger: If the Russians turn it down everyone will go home.
Mr. Eagleburger: Well, I see two possible reactions. Either everyone will go home or we’ll get into an argument to fold from the Danish and the Norwegians.
Mr. Kissinger: Who cares about the Danish and the Norwegians?
Mr. Eagleburger: What will the Germans do?
General Scowcroft: I think they’ll go along with us.
[Ommitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

² No record of this conversation has been found.

343. Editorial Note

Throughout the month of August 1973, Soviet officials approached U.S. diplomats regarding mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), and it also became a topic of conversation between President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. On August 1, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger: “A Soviet First Secretary, Bykov, has approached Jock Dean, supposedly on instructions from the Ambassador, to discuss MBFR. I have told Dean to stall. Given Allied sensitivities and state of the NATO debate—just beginning on our latest paper and substantial disagreement with the British—this is obviously a very delicate moment at which to begin any kind of substantive exchanges with Dobrynin. You could, however, make the following substantive points to feed into the Moscow machinery:
“—As they know, we have made extensive studies; our goal has been to devise possible agreements that would enhance each side's defensive position—or reduce each side’s offensive capacity—and thus enhance stability;

“—We have found that small ‘symbolic’ cuts do not satisfy those criteria, be they in absolute figures or in percentages. Moreover, given differing political circumstances, small symbolic cuts would be to our disadvantage and thus violate the principle of undiminished security. Further, equal absolute cuts work to our disadvantage since we start with a lower base; so would straight percentage cuts;

“—For these reasons, as indicated in the President’s last annual report to Congress, we have concentrated our efforts on achieving outcomes that produce substantial equality of forces, i.e., the common ceiling approach;

“—We must also take account of geographic inequalities that favor the USSR, for this reason we have given thought to ways whereby any limitation agreement confined to a specific area in Central Europe would not be vitiated by actions taken in areas adjacent to the limitation area, i.e., the idea of non-circumvention. The Soviets should realize this is a very serious problem for us and should, in their turn, give thought to this problem.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Map Room-D)

Kissinger discussed MBFR in a luncheon meeting with Dobrynin on August 2. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part:

“K[issinger]: Now, one of your First Secretaries, Bykov, has been trying to talk to Dean about MBFR. D[obrynin]: By who? Who was it? K: Jock Dean, the one who is in Vienna. D: About what? K: He wants to discuss MBFR—the force reductions. The Vienna negotiations. D: [omission in memorandum] K: Basically, Dean won’t tell you anything that I haven’t. D: [omission in memorandum] one of my First Secretaries meet someone, [omission in memorandum] specifically doesn’t come from me.” The memorandum continues: “K: Anatol, the only reason it comes to me is because all our people are under instructions when—and therefore, I just wondered whether there was any particular thing here. D: No. K: Okay. Dean won’t really tell him anything so it doesn’t make any difference.” Kissinger continued: “I am seeing Lord Carrington this afternoon—British Defense Minister—and he has just seen our paper. D: Yeah. K: I could tell you what we are thinking because sooner or later you will hear it anyway. D: Yes, but— K: Let me wait. Definitely next week we will devote half an hour to that point, and I will give you a pretty good outline of our thinking. D: Because [omission in memorandum] K: What basically we are thinking is that in that category of 10–15% for our forces and then reducing the War-
saw Pact forces to the level that will then be achieved after we cut back 10–15%— D: [omission in memorandum] first stage I understand. But what is second stage? K: Second stage is— D: Because our mutual [omission in memorandum] K: After we have both cut— D: Yes. [omission in memorandum] 10%? K: No. What we want to do is to get after the first cut the forces on both sides to be equal. D: Yeah. So you mean ours or the NATO-Warsaw? K: No. NATO-Warsaw. D: Yeah. K: But actually according to our calculations, that means we have to cut about 10–12% of our forces and you may have to cut about 14% of yours. It is not a big gap. D: Yeah. But you mean [omission in memorandum] forces or not with NATO or Warsaw? K: NATO and Warsaw, Soviet and American forces, or foreign […] What I am trying to say is what we can do most—and this is why I am a little uncertain yet—it may not be a totally symmetrical cut.” The memorandum continues: “D: Is there [omission in memorandum] proposals then or is just discussed going on his side proposals [omission in memorandum] You have proposed something? K: We have not. D: You haven’t?” The memorandum continues: “K: I think what we should do, Anatol, is to work out between—is to see if you and me can come to some general figure and then conduct a negotiation— D: Yeah. K: In Vienna in a way that’s compatible with this agreement; otherwise it is going to be [omission in memorandum].” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File)

On August 4, Sonnenfeldt wrote Kissinger in another memorandum for “prompt information”: “Following an earlier approach by First Secretary Bykov, Soviet Minister Vorontsov has now asked Stoessel on instruction concerning US intentions in regard to bilateral consultations on MBFR (Tab A). He said Dobrynin was prepared to meet with the Secretary or Stoessel to discuss our respective approaches. Stoessel said we were still preparing our position and he could not comment on the Soviet suggestion.” Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “We want to keep MBFR in my channel. Please put in talker for D[obrynin] lunch.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR)

In an undated memorandum, Kissinger informed President Nixon about his luncheon conversation with Dobrynin on August 9. Kissinger wrote with regard to MBFR: “I explained to Dobrynin conceptually how we were approaching the MBFR question, that is to say, that we were thinking of an overall percentage NATO reduction which would lead to a common ceiling for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, perhaps to be reached at two stages, the first stage of which might be a ten–fifteen percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces. Dobrynin said, did I mean foreign forces? I said that it was still open whether other
countries would join us. In the second stage, then, the composition be-
tween stationed and indigenous forces would be left to the negotia-
tion. Dobrynin said for the Soviet Union it was more important to know
what the end figure would be than what the percentage would be. Do-rynin wondered what end figure we were talking about. I told him I
would have to let him know. And I pointed out to him also that this
was still tentative thinking not fully approved by NATO.” (Ibid.,
Kissinger Office Files, Box 68, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 19)

Kissinger and Dobrynin also discussed MBFR in a meeting on Au-
 gust 16. Kissinger wrote in another undated memorandum to Nixon:
“On MBFR, Dobrynin asked if there already existed an allied position.
I said no, but that I was pretty sure that what I had outlined to him
before would meet substantial agreement. Dobrynin asked what we re-
ally had in mind as between the first and second stages—what time
should the first stage be agreed, and how much later after that the sec-
ond. I said it was our idea that the first stage might be completed next
year and that we might then take another year-and-a-half to two years
on the second. Dobrynin indicated that this might be reasonable.”
(Ibid.)

On September 13, the Soviet Embassy delivered a letter to Kissin-
ger. It reads in part: “Dr. Kissinger’s considerations on some aspects of
the forthcoming talks on reduction of the armed forces and armaments
in Central Europe have been attentively studied in Moscow, and a con-
fidential exchange of opinion with the US side on this problem is con-
sidered therefore as useful. On our part we would like now to express
the following. We note the existence of a common understanding be-
tween us as to the importance of working out a coordinated approach
towards main aspects of the forthcoming talks in Vienna.” The letter
stated that the Soviet Union would “proceed from the premise that the
reductions should not lead to an upset of the developed balance of
forces in Central Europe, but rather should ensure maintaining secu-
rity in this area.” The letter further stated that “in this connection
Moscow shares the point of view that the reductions of equal percent-
age constitute a just and realistic approach” and that “we do not ex-
clude the possibility of an initial, symbolic reduction.” (Ibid.)
344. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 11/12–73


SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MBFR

Principal Judgments

The USSR’s engagement in MBFR negotiations has come as a byproduct of its broader détente policies, and the Soviet leaders view MBFR itself as a vehicle for furthering these policies. They perceive that the US Government is under various pressures to achieve fairly rapid results, and they hope this will give them a negotiating edge.

Neither in MBFR, nor in their broader détente policies for that matter, are the Soviets working for a fundamental reconciliation between East and West nor are they interested in underwriting West Europe’s stability and security. They have no intention of allowing East-West relaxation to lead to an attenuation of Soviet authority or Communist Party control in Eastern Europe. The Soviets would see much greater disadvantages than potential gains in an agreement which substantially altered present force levels or combat capabilities on either the NATO or Warsaw Pact sides. A central and recurring theme in negotiations will be the claim that the Warsaw Pact does not have a significant military edge over NATO in Europe and cannot agree therefore to making unequal cuts in its forces. The Soviets will hold hard to the position that the existing relationship of forces should remain essentially unchanged.

The Soviets would have a decidedly negative first reaction to a Western proposal calling for them to withdraw one of their tank armies, with men and equipment, while the US would have flexibility as to the kinds of units to be withdrawn and the disposition of equipment. The Soviets would also refuse to accept the proposition that a common ceiling for Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces should be the goal of follow-on negotiations. The Soviets might even question whether proposals of this kind were bona fide. And they might, in anticipation of such proposals or in response to them, attempt to alter the bargaining framework by bringing forward their own counterproposals.

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, the AEC, and the Department of the Treasury participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, with the exception of the representatives of the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. The estimate superseded NIE 11/20–73, which was not found.
However they play these issues, they will not want the negotiations to break down or become indefinitely stalemated. Perhaps their tactic would be to attempt to force the Western side to scale down its overall requirements and to make concessions with respect to the separate elements of its proposals. They could, for example, seek a quid pro quo in US armored forces in return for any reduction in their tank formations. They would also want to explore the possibility of trade-offs involving US tactical nuclear forces in Europe.

It will be the aim of the Soviets to have a minimum of collateral constraints attached to a reductions agreement. They would, in particular, oppose measures which could effectively restrict their ability to move forces into or within Eastern Europe. They are sure to contend that the requirements of verification should be met to the fullest extent possible by “national technical means.”

Although the Soviets believe that they are in a strong bargaining position in MBFR, they will want to appear reasonable and to keep the negotiations progressing. How much or how little “give” there will be in their negotiating position will depend partly on their assessment of the urgency of the US need to achieve early agreement. The USSR is likely to recognize, at the same time, that the US and its European allies will regard its position in negotiations as a test of the genuineness of its interest in détente. And as negotiations proceed, the Soviet position will probably be influenced by “linkages” which will be set up between MBFR and other matters, such as SALT and East-West trade.

The outcome of the first phase of negotiations will, of course, be conditioned by the interaction of the positions of the two sides in the negotiating process. In the end, however, the Soviets would probably be prepared to accept an agreement based on the following ingredients:

—reductions limited to US and Soviet forces in Central Europe
—an order of magnitude of 10 to 15 percent applying to reductions of ground forces
—some asymmetry in terms of larger numerical Soviet troop reductions than US troop reductions, with compensating US withdrawal of some tactical nuclear elements
—a minimum of collateral restraints and verification provisions.

They would also see advantages in agreeing to follow-on negotiations, especially because of their desire to secure reductions in West German forces. But they would not agree to having the goals of a further phase (e.g., a common ceiling) laid out in advance.

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]
345. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Washington, November 27, 1973, 3:35 p.m.

PRESENT
The Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger
Kenneth Rush
William J. Porter
Curtis W. Tarr
Fred C. Ikle
Seymour Weiss
George S. Springsteen
Marshall Wright
William H. Donaldson
George C. Denney, Jr.
Carlyle E. Maw
George H. Aldrich
Winston Lord
George S. Vest
Thomas Pickering

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, you have some issues on MBFR.

Mr. Ikle: Yes. The question here is, briefly, how fast we should be moving in MBFR, whether we should be doing anything more before the Christmas recess, now that the two proposals have been tabled.2

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternatives. An attached summary of decisions from the meeting, prepared by Pickering, reads in part: “That in discussing MBFR we are stopping the compulsory reassuring of the Europeans on a nuclear guarantee. More specifically, with regard to the questions raised by Dr. Ikle regarding the ceiling on nuclear weapons and the handling of the second stage of discussions, his instinct is that we not introduce any of these ideas but that we have a verification panel meeting soon and that we form a position and very early after that reassemble.”

2 Telegram 5612 from USNATO, November 21, transmitted the text of the agreed Allied framework proposal to be tabled at the MBFR talks in Vienna on November 22. The Allied proposal stated that with regard to Soviet reductions: “The USSR would withdraw from the area of reductions a tank army consisting of five divisions, including about 68,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,700 main battle tanks. This would be about 15 percent of the total Soviet ground forces of 460,000 soldiers in the area of reductions.” It stated with regard to U.S. reductions that “the United States would also withdraw from the area of reductions about 15 per cent of its total ground force manpower of 193,000 soldiers in the area of reductions, i.e., about 29,000 soldiers.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR) Telephone 5414 from the USNATO, November 10, transmitted the text of a draft Soviet agreement on the reduction of armed forces, tabled at Geneva on November 8. (Ibid.)
The nuclear option will be raised by the UK and FRG and we will have bilateral discussions here.

Secretary Kissinger: Here?
Mr. Ikle: Probably here. We have our view on the nuclear option.
Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?
Mr. Ikle: Roughly 20 percent reduction in F-4’s and—
Secretary Kissinger: The one thing we are stopping is the compulsive reassuring of the Europeans. They cannot request us to reassure them three times a week on the validity of our nuclear guarantee. I mean I am serious. We simply refuse to answer that.
Mr. Weiss: That is not what this—
Secretary Kissinger: I know what this option is. But it will work around to it.

Mr. Ikle: The British question, which has been given to us, raises a particular question—the position we would take in the second stage regarding nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven’t followed those cables. George,3 will you put me on the distribution list of your cables. The Press Officer gets everything.

Mr. Ikle: We have to prepare our position we will take here in this discussion, which might take place—
Secretary Kissinger: What exactly is the nuclear problem? I know what the planning paper was.

Mr. Ikle: The problem with the allies is really answering their questions.

Secretary Kissinger: What have we proposed—the common ceiling.

Mr. Ikle: In Vienna—common ceiling, yes. We have not yet mentioned in Vienna anything about the nuclear reductions on our side. The Russians of course have raised questions about nuclear reductions.

Secretary Kissinger: So the question is whether we are now prepared to introduce—

Mr. Ikle: Introduce that in Vienna, before the recess or after; and secondly, how we want to discuss it with our allies, when they want to see us about it.

Secretary Kissinger: They were given that, weren’t they, when we discussed it at NATO.

Mr. Ikle: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: So the question is tactically when do we introduce it.

3 George C. Denney, Jr.
Mr. Ikle: When do we introduce it and what further we say to our allies about how to handle Soviet pressures for nuclear reductions in the second stage.

Secretary Kissinger: Beyond the twenty percent we are proposing for the first stage?

Mr. Ikle: The nuclear element that we discussed with our allies in Brussels is connected with the tank matter, which would be in the first stage in our proposal.

Secretary Kissinger: And then the question is what do we propose in the second stage.

Mr. Ikle: That is the British question—if indeed the negotiations move in the direction of this first stage and second stage.

Mr. Weiss: Can I comment briefly on this in that respect. There really is a further question here, and that is when precisely in response to what Soviet initiative, or what point in the negotiations do you want to toss this in. As you know, what we have always described as the sweetener, i.e., to presumably induce the Soviets to accept an asymmetrical numerical reduction which favored us—now, our own feeling—

Secretary Kissinger: I forget what the nuclear option is.

Mr. Weiss: A thousand warheads, fifty-four—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Weiss: And our sort of feeling is that this is just very early on in the negotiations. You know, at some point it will be necessary to do that. But I think myself that if you did it this early, you would be sort of frittering away some leverage.

Secretary Kissinger: What is your view?

Mr. Ikle: The broader judgment is that by holding out to spring and summer we improve the outlook for an agreement of the kind we like.

Mr. Rush: If we in essence agree on what we will do in the second stage before we agree on the first stage—and we have only one stage—we have a timing problem.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the British question—what we will do with nuclear weapons in the second stage?

Mr. Ikle: That is one of the questions—how it might relate to FBS, whether it would impose a ceiling on nuclear weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course it imposes a ceiling on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Ikle: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: It is an idiotic question. If you reduce your weapons by twenty percent, you obviously reduce it to a ceiling. But why do we have to commit ourselves now?

Mr. Ikle: We do not. The question is whether we should or not.
Secretary Kissinger: We have two questions. One is when to introduce the nuclear part of it. And I am clear that we shouldn’t do it before the NATO meeting. We are going to have trouble enough there as it is. The next question is what do we answer to the Europeans. And I am trying to understand the purport of their questions. Why should we be in a position to answer now what the second stage of our reductions would be on nuclear weapons before we have even formulated an overall package for the second stage. Can’t we answer that this cannot be—

Mr. Weiss: I think we are unintentionally slightly misleading you because only part of the British questions—and we have a short cable from them here—direct themselves to the second stage. Some of them direct themselves to the present. For example, just to take one here that they raise. “The relationship of nuclear reductions in MBFR to FBS and SALT. We wonder whether the Russians will accept that for technical reasons that nuclear systems in the NATO guidelines area cannot be regarded as FBS. In any case, by indicating that they intend to raise the question of F-4s, they have already given us notice that we will have to discuss dual capable aircraft, including the F-4s whose range enables them to strike the Soviet Union on a one-way mission.” They are simply raising a complexity which we ourselves have not yet totally grappled with and thought through, and they are simply saying we ought to air this more and try to come to grips with it. So it is not all second stage from their point of view.

Secretary Kissinger: What the purpose of this question is, is to get us to put all of the nuclear discussions into the MBFR and therefore not commit ourselves not to raise it as part of the FBS.

Mr. Weiss: Whatever their motives are, ours would be not to get hit on this twice by the Russians, once in SALT under FBS—

Secretary Kissinger: That is clear.

Mr. Weiss: That is why we need to have some discussion.

Mr. Ikle: First we want to have our own position that we want to take with the British.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you going to share your position with others? Are we going to get a clue of what our position is?

Mr. Ikle: We are putting it into the back-stopping committee discussions, and have other agencies come in and have a review.

A related question is whether we want to say anything about a second stage fairly soon or want to wait until January when we discuss the linkage between the first and the second stage.

Secretary Kissinger: When is the recess?

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4 Not further identified.
Mr. Ikle: Probably mid-December.

Mr. Weiss: Here again, we would caution that if you get into the second stage you are going to do a number of things, including deflecting attention from the first stage, which is after all the one that we are primarily interested in, because we are trying to get those forces out. Moreover, we are sort of using the second stage and holding it open in order to tell the allies whenever they raise a question that we find we don’t really want to handle now—“Well, that is something we can talk about in the second stage.” If we begin to get too specific and focus on that now, you have a real problem. For example, it brings up the question of indigenous force reduction versus U.S. force reduction. As you know, you still have a problem within the Alliance with the British saying “We prefer not to have indigenous” which is the position that we ourselves have essentially adhered to, the Germans and others saying they prefer to have some indigenous in.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But the Germans say in order to get a handle on the pressures in their country for unilateral—

Mr. Weiss: I understand that very well. We have of course agreed that in the second stage there would be some indigenous. But now the question comes—do you want at this time to be overly specific on the second stage, when you begin to—

Secretary Kissinger: Fred, what is your view?

Mr. Ikle: It really amounts to making a forecast when we can get the best outcome on MBFR—either early next spring or later during the coming year—as to the speed with which you want to proceed.

Secretary Kissinger: What is your view about the second stage?

Mr. Ikle: The second stage has precisely this danger that Sy mentioned. Given the Soviet pressure for German reductions, they will be exploited for that. And the question is can we get an agreement on U.S.-Soviet reductions alone in the first stage.

Secretary Kissinger: As I understood it, unless there have been some refinements since I last addressed this issue—as I understood it,

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5 Telegram 5414 from USNATO, November 10, transmitted the Soviet proposal of November 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR) In a memorandum to Schlesinger dated November 20, Hill wrote that the Soviet proposal “would result in numerically asymmetric cuts through equal percentage reductions.” Two features, he wrote, stood out in the Soviet proposal. “It hits hard at the Bundeswehr not only numerically, but also because for that force (which contains nearly half of all of NATO’s manpower and tanks in the NGA), ‘reduction’ means disbanding units and destroying equipment,” and “more than that, two-thirds of all reduced allied forces (about 100,000) would be disbanded.” Hill continued: “Taken by itself, the effects of the Soviet proposal would be (1) to withdraw (but not disband) a large amount of Soviet stationed forces in Eastern Europe, and (2) disband a large amount (75,000) of the FRG armed forces strength.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0001, Box 74, NATO 320.2)
we were proposing a common ceiling to be achieved in effect in two stages—a first stage reduction of more or less equal percentage of U.S. and Soviet forces, into which we were willing to throw in the nuclear package, as a sweetener, because our proposal was too one-sided, in terms of numbers, and also probably in terms of—and certainly in terms of equipment. Therefore, the second stage is inherent in our proposal already.

Now, the second issue is that as I understand Leber, the reason he wants some specificity about the second stage is not in order to accelerate reduction of German forces, but precisely to prevent a reduction of German forces, by creating an obligation for a reduction that would enable him to say that since it is internationally agreed that this can only happen by consensus, a unilateral German reduction would be a violation of their agreements. This is as Leber has explained it to me—and he is one of the few German cabinet ministers I trust. And that is not a trivial argument. And it is an argument that actually might carry weight in Germany.

Well—they are going to adjourn about the middle of December?

Mr. Ikle: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: My instinct is that we not introduce any of these ideas, but that we have a verification panel meeting soon, and that we form a position, and that very early after that reassemble, and we make our position clear.

My own preference for negotiating styles is to take a position very close to where you want to come out and stick with it rather than get into an endless haggle, which confuses everybody.

Aldrich was with the negotiation when neither side moved for months.

Mr. Aldrich: Years.

Secretary Kissinger: It only seemed like years.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]
September 1973–January 1977    1011

346. National Security Decision Memorandum 241


TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Chairman, U.S. MBFR Delegation

SUBJECT
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. Delegation in the next phase of MBFR:

1. The U.S. Delegation, in coordination with the Allies, is authorized to begin discussion of U.S.-Soviet ground force reductions with the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Delegations in accordance with Phase I of the agreed Allied proposal.

2. In this connection, the Delegation, together with the Allies, may inform the Soviets that:

—At a suitable time in negotiating the first phase of our proposal, we would be willing to discuss the specific language of a provision in a first phase agreement which would cover the linkage between the two phases.

—We could agree that the second phase negotiations could start within a fixed period of time after conclusion of the Phase I agreement; the precise period would be agreed later in the Phase I negotiations.

3. As for Soviet desire for assurance that the second phase would include the forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Delegation

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–017, Verification Panel Meeting, 3/14/74, MBFR. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

2 Telegram 5679 to Vienna, January 10, communicated the relevant portions of NSDM 241 to the MBFR delegation in Vienna. (Ibid, Box 668, Country Files, Austria, Vol. 1)

3 A memorandum to Walters on "Warsaw Pact Views of the West German Army in the Context of MBFR," December 14, 1973, reads in part: "On 8 November the Soviet MBFR delegation at Vienna proposed a draft agreement specifying equal percentage reductions of both stationed and indigenous forces. One of the effects of this agreement would be that the largest NATO reductions, approximately 47 percent of the total, would be taken by West German forces. The Soviet proposal, therefore, runs counter to NATO's belief that a first phase agreement should be limited to the withdrawal of US and Soviet ground forces from the reduction area. Acceptance of the Pact proposal could result in a reduction for the West German Army of over 50,000 men in addition to other reductions in air force manpower. This could result in a ceiling being placed on the West German Army at approximately 270,000 men." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence Files, Job 82–M00587R)
should emphasize that the common ceiling reduction which should result from Phase II would, on the Allied side, focus on the other direct participants in the area of reductions. The Delegation may informally tell the Soviets that it is our assumption that the Bundeswehr would be included under the common ceiling reduction, but that any advance commitment to FRG reductions in the second phase would require an equivalent Soviet commitment to the common ceiling as the outcome of Phase II.

4. The Delegation should, as appropriate, make clear to the Allies and the Soviets that the only sub-ceilings to result from MBFR, in either phase, should solely apply to Soviet and American forces.

5. As discussed in the Verification Panel Meeting, January 7, 1974, the Delegation should continue to oppose the inclusion of air and nuclear forces and make clear to the Soviets that we are not prepared to address them.

Discussion of nuclear issues with UK and FRG should be postponed until February. A paper with recommended guidance for use in response to the UK/FRG questions, together with an analysis of the underlying issues, should be prepared by the Working Group for the consideration of the Verification Panel by January 28, 1974.

Henry A. Kissinger

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4 At a December 28 meeting, Lodal explained to Kissinger a disagreement between the U.S. delegation at the MBFR talks and Sonnenfeldt regarding German reductions: “As I understand it, the Delegation proposed promising a second phase which would include German forces in return for a first phase concentration in U.S./Soviet forces. Since the Soviets want very much to have German forces included, this is a significant concession on our part. The common ceiling would be pushed to the background and, therefore, might be lost in the process. The real issue is one of emphasis—the degree to which the common ceiling is emphasized now. There is also the issue of whether the Germans are still interested in being included in a common ceiling.” (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 66, Mem cons and Summaries of Discussion) Kissinger also discussed the issue with Resor the same day; a memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, MemCons—HAK & Presidential.

5 The minutes of the Verification Panel meeting on MBFR, January 7, included in its “summary of conclusions”: “there will be no sub-ceilings in MBFR except on U.S. and Soviet forces; a decision on adding a ‘nuclear sweeter’ to the MBFR negotiations would be postponed pending further study; the trilateral meeting with the Allies scheduled for January 21 would be postponed until February.” During the meeting, Kissinger said: “Personally, I don’t think there is a snowball’s chance in hell of getting an agreement without the nuclear package—no chance whatsoever.” At this point, Ikle pointed out that there was a planned trilateral meeting in Washington on January 21 with German and U.K. representatives to discuss MBFR; he suggested that it be postponed until February so that a U.S. proposal for a nuclear package could be discussed. Kissinger said: “I think that once we get our SALT position defined, we ought to talk to them [the Soviets] then about the nuclear package in MBFR. If the Soviets have no interest, well, then, we have at least found out.” (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–108, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 3/15/72 to 6/4/74)
347. Editorial Note

At the Verification Panel meeting on March 14, 1974, the Panel agreed that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) would prepare a paper listing outstanding issues in the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks and recommend positions on those talks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–107, Verification Panel Mtg. MBFR 3-14-74) ACDA Director Fred Ikle sent Kissinger the paper on March 16. Counselor Sonnenfeldt and Jan Lodal of the NSC staff forwarded the paper to Kissinger on March 19 along with their own analysis of its contents in a covering memorandum. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 49, Kissinger Trip Files, March 25–28, 1974, Miscellaneous Papers)

Kissinger discussed the March 14 Verification Panel meeting in a telephone conversation with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on March 23 at 3:40 p.m. The transcript of their conversation reads in part: “S[chlesinger]: Incidentally, Henry, I heard that the MBFR meeting was not a thing of joy and enlightenment. K[issinger]: No. S: I wanted to— K: It was a sorta disaster. S: I wanted to remind you that the discrepancy cut between US and Soviet Union forces is just based on 15% cut on both sides. K: Oh, no, that I did not object to. What I objected to was you know if you take out the Soviet tank army with equipment for 29,000 Americans without equipment it is a little hard to sell. S: Well, I think you are going to have to sweeten it up with tragment (?). K: Exactly. As long as that is understood. And what we may have to do is— S: See we have those 7,000 weapons in Europe some of which we don’t know what the hell we would do with. K: Another problem, Jim, we ought to consider is that when you begin analyzing these equipment ceilings you don’t really know whom they work for because if you take out their men, they probably have to take some of their equipment with them, and if you put a ceiling on theirs and a ceiling on ours you breed another disparity. S: I think the best. It sounds right, I’d have to look at it more closely. K: I don’t expect to get into that in any detail in Moscow. The only thing that may come up in Moscow, but this is simply a guess, I have no knowledge of this, is they may resurrect again the idea of a five to eight percent cut which would work out to about 12 for us and 29 for them. S: That’s all right. K: And in a way since we are not held to taking forces out. S: Listen, I think we can get that kind of stuff out of our headquarters and what not. K: Exactly. It might even be a better way of doing it. S: Yeah. We have positioned ourselves in negotiations far better than the Russians have in that regard, we’ve got more fat. K: Jim, one final thing. S: Maybe that’s a disadvantage, being so combat heavy.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C584.pdf)
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had mentioned the possibility of a five to eight percent cut of U.S. and Soviet forces in MBFR in a meeting with Kissinger on February 1. A memorandum of the conversation reads in part: “Dobrynin then asked whether it might be possible at the summit to agree to a percentage cut of Soviet and U.S. forces in MBFR. I said that I remembered that Brezhnev in June 1973 had recommended only five percent; we thought ten percent would be the minimum. Dobrynin said, ‘Well, maybe we’ll compromise on eight percent.’ I told him it seemed to us that ten percent was the genuine minimum, but in any event the problem was how to relate it to the position of our Allies. Dobrynin said we should both think further about that. I said it would help to do this if we could get a basic plan accepted in the MBFR negotiations as a goal, within which this first stage could be negotiated.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 69, Country Files, Europe, U.S.S.R., Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 22)

348. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 29, 1974, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between SecDef and US MBFR Ambassador Resor

PARTICIPANTS
Visitors
US MBFR Representative—Stanley R. Resor
US MBFR Deputy Representative—Jonathan Dean

Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense—James R. Schlesinger
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Robert Ellsworth
SecDef MBFR Representative—Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)—Donald R. Cotter
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Amos A. Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), European Region—
  Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense—MGEN John Wickham
Director, DOD MBFR Task Force—Col. Louis G. Michael

1. (C) US MBFR Objective

SecDef stated that the major US objective should be to acquire symmetry between Pact and NATO forces in Central Europe. Since the Soviets have asymmetrical deployments, they should take asymmetrical cuts. Asymmetrical reductions are needed not because of diplomatic pressure, but to redress the aggressive deployment of Soviet forces. The outcome of reductions must be equitable, and we want to obtain balanced Pact/NATO ground force dispositions in the end.

2. (S) Overview/Comparison of US and Soviet Positions

SecDef stated that the Soviets always argue from the same position. He said the Soviets historically build up a preponderance of force and then offer to scale down by taking out elements one for one which leaves a “correlation of forces” in their favor. SecDef observed that currently there are 500,000 Soviet troops deployed in Eastern Europe and that the Soviets have built up their total armed forces from 3 million to 4 million men and improved their ICBM and submarine launched ballistic missile position. He stated that the Soviets are in fact seeking a shift in the overall correlation of forces. SecDef further stated that we should not accept the Soviet MBFR argument which is to maintain the correlation of forces; we can interpret the correlation of forces as we wish. SecDef suggested that when the Soviets raise the issue of correlation of forces we throw back at them the SALT issue. They have increased their military force levels, and they are the ones who have been attempting to alter the correlation of forces in their favor. We do not want the force relationship to change to our disadvantage. The only time the Soviets object is in some specific context, but correlation of forces cannot be looked at in any specific area. He suggested the Soviets be told that the correlation of forces cannot be looked at in isolated areas but must be viewed in an overall context. SecDef observed further that the Soviets have built up their conventional forces as a compensatory measure for strategic inferiority. He stated that the US has not increased its strategic force, and thus as strategic forces come into balance, we should expect reductions in their conventional forces.

SecDef challenged any characterization of our proposal for 15% US/Soviet Phase 1 reductions (including 68,000 Soviet men and 1700 tanks)\(^2\) as being “lopsided” in our favor. He did not rule out a reduction of 15% stationed forces on each side, and PDASD Jordan theoretically discussed a 13.5% reduction of Soviet, Canadian, UK, and US forces which would net the tank army while giving up 34,000 on the Western side.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 345.
3. (S) Next Steps

Ambassador Resor outlined his proposals for moving forward in MBFR. He reviewed the requirements for obtaining concrete results in MBFR by the spring of 1975, pointing out the parliamentary demands both within the US and Western Europe and the advantages of our taking the initiative in the negotiations. He expressed the view that the West could not stand on its current position when negotiations resumed this fall, and that we must be prepared to modify our position if we are to take the initiative. He outlined two alternative courses of action that the US could propose to our Allies. The first was to indicate to the East our willingness to include nuclear capability in US Phase 1 withdrawals. The second course of action would be to scale back our objectives and propose an abbreviated Phase 1 focussed on only manpower reductions on both sides (no Soviet tank army) and smaller reductions than envisaged in our current Phase I proposal. Ambassador Resor stated that we need to test the Soviet bona fides by offsetting their perception of our current proposals as being inequitable. He further stated that we need to get them to address equal packages by our offering to include nuclear capability if the Soviets are willing to accept the principle of asymmetrical ground force reductions.

SecDef said he assumed Ambassador Resor wanted to move on the nuclear point because negotiations were “frozen.” He accepted a less pessimistic characterization of the state of play elaborated by Ambassador Resor. With reference to Ambassador Resor’s explanation why Congressional pressures and Allied imperatives indicated a need to show movement by next spring, SecDef asked why it was counterproductive to delay with respect to the Allies. Ambassador Resor responded by an assessment of the implications on Dutch and UK planning for unilateral cuts.

ASD Ellsworth asked Ambassador Resor if he would move to include nuclear capability in reductions this fall regardless of the overall situation at the time with respect to détente and other factors. Ambassador Resor responded affirmatively; however, he said he would not lay down the content of a nuclear package—rather only a signal that we were willing to include nuclear capability in reductions if the East would agree to the principle of asymmetrical ground force reductions.

4. (S) Use of Nuclear Elements in MBFR

SecDef stated that he had no hesitation about including the Option III nuclear package. He directed that the NSC staff chief be informed that we are agreeable to this. He indicated willingness to include ele-

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3 See footnote 4, Document 135.
ments necessary to obtain our objectives and emphasized the need to move ahead.

ASD Ellsworth said our plan of action for proceeding should include high level exchanges in NATO capitals and in Washington to make clear our intent, our plan, and our purpose.

5. (S) Quid Pro Quo for US Nuclear Elements

SecDef expressed the view that we should not push too far in urging an exchange of nuclear elements for the principle of asymmetrical ground force reductions. Nuclears should be applied against the gross preponderance of Soviet tank forces in the area; tactically, the focus should be on the tank army. But there are ultimate limitations to a trade. We should keep driving toward obtaining balanced Pact/NATO ground dispositions in the end.

6. (S) Content of the US Nuclear Package

SecDef said he would be inclined to beef-up our negotiating package with air force reductions rather than ground force reductions. He suggested Ambassador Resor ask General Brown what the Services’ preferences were. He observed that we can move our air forces back to Central Europe within 48 hours while moving Army forces back is more difficult. SecDef expressed some reservations about Pershing reductions in the first instance. However, he indicated that in going forward to the Allies we can include Pershings. SecDef said we should implore the Russians to keep asking for nuclears. Throwing in Option III permits us to remove an albatross from our necks—and gets the tank army. SecDef posed no objection to ATSD(AE) Cotter’s proposal that we denuclearize Nike in the area as part of our proposal.

SecDef approved going to Allies in the first instance with the current Option III.

7. (S) Approach to Soviets

Ambassador Resor expressed the view that we should not degrade our nuclear capability by taking actions to reduce unilaterally. SecDef agreed forcefully that we should not make public our plans to remove nuclear elements from the NGA for efficiency purposes. SecDef stated that we should tell the Soviets in the presence of their allies (so there would be no ambiguity) that we are not going to move a single weapon in the NGA. We are retaining plenty of weapons to use against forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR. Privately, we should tell them we are planning to upgrade through modernization. We are taking some weapons out but we are replacing them with better weapons with longer range. Soviet obstinacy in negotiations is the best incentive for us to make these adjustments. We can meet with them privately and ask how they would like another 1,000 Lance in the NGA and Pershing II.
SecDef stated that we could send the Soviets a personal message from him to the effect that if they delay for a year they will regret it. Unless they get on with it we are going to move a division into the NGA. The Nunn amendment gives us license to increase combat strength, and we are in fact in the process of doing it. Soviet obstinacy is the best incentive the US can have for getting on with the job, that is, making improvements in the US conventional force posture.

8. (S) Other Specific Decisions

In response to questions from Ambassador Resor, SecDef agreed to including air manpower in MBFR so that the common ceiling would cover both air and ground forces. SecDef most unambiguously stated that we are prepared to announce US and Soviet forces are to be included in Phase II reductions. SecDef had no objection to saying that the US reduction package will include units.

9. (U) Congressional Factors

There was a general discussion of the various factors bearing on Congressional decisions with respect to force deployments in Europe.

SecDef said that we should stress with Senator McClellan and others that: the Europeans are making a substantial contribution; the Europeans are not all bad; the French are moving back into the defense picture; 1.2 million FRG troops in the field is a substantial contribution.

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4 The Nunn Amendment to Public Law 93–365, proposed by Senator Sam Nunn (D–GA), provided that “the total number of United States tactical nuclear warheads located in Europe” would not be “increased until after June 30, 1975, except in the event of imminent hostilities in Europe” and called on the Secretary of Defense to study “reductions in the number and type of nuclear warheads which are not essential for the defense structure for Western Europe.” (88 Stat. 402)
Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting

Washington, August 1, 1974, 3:03–3:59 p.m.

SUBJECT
MBFR

PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
Joseph Sisco
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
George Vest
Amb. Stanley Resor
Jonathan Dean
Defense
Robert Ellsworth
Bruce Clarke
Col. Louis Michael

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:
— the Verification Panel Working Group would put together a negotiation package that would link SALT, MBFR and CSCE.
— the Verification Panel Working Group would refine the “nuclear option.”

Secretary Kissinger: (to Gen. Walters) You look poised for a briefing, but you also look like you don’t have anything to brief about.

Gen. Walters: You’re right. Unless you ask me to, I’ll forget the briefing. I’ll be happy to be silent for a change. The only significant thing I have to report is some recent military developments.

Secretary Kissinger: Does anybody want to hear from Walters? We can wait and read it in the Post tomorrow. Go ahead.

Gen. Walters briefed from the attached text. 2

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Verification Panel Meeting Subseries, Box 6, VP (MBFR), August 1, 1974 (1). Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

2 Not found.
Secretary Kissinger: Perhaps the best way to proceed would be to get an assessment of the last round of talks from Stan (Amb. Resor), what decisions he thinks we need to discuss, and then go from there.

Amb. Resor: Thank you. As you know, we have been at it for the last nine months, and to be truthful, we have made little progress. There has been some movement, but not much.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know why not. Maybe we need a better negotiator.

Amb. Resor: If we stick with our present position you’ll need one.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know why you weren’t able to sell them on that—what was it, 29,000 “cooks” for all those tanks? I can’t understand why they didn’t snap it up, especially if we throw in REFORGER (laughter).

Amb. Resor: I think REFORGER was scaled down to 25,000 troops. Anyway, we do have indications that the Soviets are interested in making some progress.

Secretary Kissinger: What progress?

Amb. Resor: Well, there are indications that they will go for two separate successive phases which would lead to two separate agreements. That is, the Soviets would take the largest share of reductions in the first phase. And possibly, agreement to the deferral of non-stationed forces to the second agreement if U.K. and Canadian reductions are included in Phase I.

Secretary Kissinger: Do any other countries have stationed forces other than the Soviets?

Amb. Resor: No. What they argue is that they want equal treatment for all. They have made it clear that what they want in the first phase is reductions in equal numbers. There are indications that they may be willing to give in the asymmetrical area. During this round, we have tried to keep the talks focused on phasing and not on reductions. It is hard to talk reductions with the numbers we have used. So, the first thing I think we need a decision on—what we should consider here—is an overall time frame—that we should get the talks moving. I spent 1½ hours with McClellan yesterday. Our feeling, based on my appearances on the Hill and talking with others, is that we should show some movement in the talks, at least by Spring.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I was up there with him (McClellan) the day before, and I sensed the same thing.

Amb. Resor: He was patient, but he wants to know when he will see some movement, if only to forestall congressional reductions. Moreover, I also think that if the talks are still deadlocked by next Spring, after 1½ years of talks, it could become counterproductive. The Western European governments are also under pressure to reduce unilat-
erally, as you know. The Dutch are thinking of making their own cuts. The plan is now deferred for MBFR, but that won’t last forever. If the Dutch reduce, the Belgians will follow. The United Kingdom has its defense review going. They will probably want their share of the Phase II reductions, maybe even Phase I.

Secretary Kissinger: Didn’t I see a cable today about German willingness to take cuts in the first phase?\(^3\)

Amb. Resor: There are some indications of that. They have made it clear that they are under no pressure, and their defense budget has already passed. We are thinking of a program that we could introduce by next Spring that would have two courses: (1) add the nuclear capability to the negotiating position, or (2) cut back on our objective of asymmetrical reductions. Regarding number one, we suggest that in the Fall we add... .

Secretary Kissinger: Option III?

Amb. Resor: No, what we want to give them is a nuclear signal. Not present the whole package at first. The Soviets have shown no sign of departing from the concept of equality of reductions. Our object has been to reduce the asymmetries of ground forces. We want to achieve a balance by adding something to our side. We want to test their willingness to reduce. We think the nuclear signal would be the only thing that would do it. We think this would lay the groundwork for movement on their side. CSCE will probably prevent them from doing anything right away.

Secretary Kissinger: We have not explicitly linked the two, have we? I think we should do more of that. We must get a sensible European position on Basket III. If we want to push this thing, we have to have some leverage. Right now we have none. The trouble is that the Allies don’t want CSCE and they don’t want MBFR. They want peace and détente and reductions and everything else, but they don’t want to take the responsibility. It’s the heroic period of Western leadership. Don’t misunderstand me, I understand what you are saying. I do think we made a mistake by not linking CSCE and MBFR more explicitly in the first place, however.

Amb. Resor: The Russians may be sensitive to that, but what would we give them?

Secretary Kissinger: We could promise them progress in CSCE, which they want, for progress in MBFR.

Amb. Resor: A big problem is the lead time we have to give the Allies. I think that we ought to get a U.S. decision on the nuclear

\(^3\) Not found.
package first and then do the consulting with the Allies. I think we ought to get it started, because that forces the Soviets to face up to the problem. One of our big problems over there is that we don’t know what the Soviets are thinking. We have no test of their true emotions on MBFR. If we get something on the table, they will have to bear the responsibility for lack of movement. We test them. They have been sitting back enjoying the atmosphere in Vienna—no pressure.

Secretary Kissinger: Is that all, Stan, what about the 2nd alternative?

Amb. Resor: Regarding the second option, we would cut back on our objectives to, say, a 7% percent cut in Soviet and US groundpower. No equipment would be included, just troops. We would defer reductions in tanks and equipment until Phase II. Our view is that it is illogical to cut back on manpower objectives before we have even tried out our full position.

Secretary Kissinger: Who is, “our”?

Amb. Resor: The delegation; also the Issue Paper.\(^4\) We also think that it would be hard to get a 2 to 1 asymmetrical cutback in Phase II unless we start it in Phase I. The Europeans insist on the common ceiling; if we defer the concept, that makes it difficult to get them to agree to Phase I. Also, tanks are relatively easy to verify, manpower less so. Also, we do not want to defer treatment of the level of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. They are a wasting asset. Defense would like to restructure tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; Warnke,\(^5\) Enthoven\(^6\) and Sam Nunn and others are testifying that we should cut back. The Delegation recommends that we reach a Washington decision on the nuclear signal soon and then approach the Allies with it.

Secretary Kissinger: What is your definition of soon?

Amb. Resor: Well, so that we could get a trilateral meeting scheduled by early September.

Secretary Kissinger: We can take a week or two on the nuclear package. We don’t need a decision right away. I would like to have the President focus on several issues at the same time. I’ll tell you about them later. Your schedule is to have the Trilaterals in early September and to the Soviets by what, November? Of course, that means the Soviets will already know about it because once it’s introduced into NATO, the Soviets will know.

\(^4\) Not found.


Amb. Resor: That is a consideration.

Secretary Kissinger: One of my considerations is this: It is inescapable that the Soviets are convinced that Forward Based Systems (FBS) can reach the Soviet Union, and there is something in the Soviet claim. We have to recognize this belief, although we know it will be a problem with NATO. As we develop our SALT positions, we can’t simply say we cannot consider it. We must recognize that an agreement is impossible without inclusion of FBS. The question is the relationship of the nuclear option to SALT. We should think in terms of linking FBS with MBFR. I think this is tolerable to the Allies and to the Soviets as well. Ideally, I would like to see an agreement that would link MBFR, SALT, and CSCE in order to give the Soviets something comprehensive. Otherwise, we will just be diddled to death. I would like for the Verification Panel to put together a total package linking SALT, MBFR and CSCE. I accept the nuclear package as a concept, but it does leave me a bit worried. Without linkage; giving the Soviets a say over NATO nuclear systems. If we can link MBFR to SALT, the whole thing might work.

Amb. Resor: The problem is that it would weaken its use in MBFR.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we would just tell them that we will handle FBS in MBFR. We cannot justify the fact that there is no accounting for FBS in SALT.

Amb. Resor: Would we tell them right off about the F–4s and the Pershings?

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t have to make that decision now, but I wanted you to consider this item. Are you finished?

Amb. Resor: There is one other thing—have we decided to confirm Option III as it presently is? It’s simpler with the Allies if we stick with it.

Secretary Kissinger: Is anyone questioning it?

Amb. Resor: Defense wants a battalion vice a specific number. They want to reorganize and would prefer that the reduction of Pershings be 27 instead of 36.

Secretary Kissinger: What do they want, three launchers per battalion? We haven’t formally put that forward, have we?

Amb. Resor: Yes, four instead of three.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s what I thought. Increase to four, then withdraw one, we still have three. What’s the game, they want more battalions?

Amb. Resor: No. The figures are confusing. A battalion has always been unwieldy.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that’s a question of negotiating strategy. If we put forward a nuclear package, it ought to be one that has a chance.
Dr. Ikle: It should be about the same percentage as manpower.

Amb. Resor: There are 108 Pershing Launchers. A cut to [of] 27 would be a 25% reduction. We got at the number initially to match up with the tank reductions.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I’m not going to fret the numbers. That can be worked out. We don’t need a decision on that now.

Amb. Ellsworth: Except that this option needs to be refined. We wanted a decision in principle at this meeting in order to ready ourselves for the Allies. Can we get agreement to study it seriously?

Secretary Kissinger: That, certainly, so long as it does not require consulting with the Allies.

Amb. Ellsworth: Our view is that we should agree to use the contents of Option III. We should not scale down until we have tried it. There has been no history of nuclear elements in MBFR talks, and we need to show some concrete movement. We need to refine the outline of the nuclear component. Then consult with our Allies in full. We need the nuclear package.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have one suggestion, from someone with a long history of dealing with the Soviets. It has been my experience that the worst way to deal with the Soviets is to show a sense of urgency, and the absolute worst way is to show that you are under domestic pressure. In my experience all they will do is outlast you. You cannot show a sense of urgency. In this regard, I suggest we keep our public relations people in firm check on this, that we not talk about these things. Also, I would suggest we not brief Congress that much. I’m trying to do that. In my appearances up there, I’ve taken a hard line. I am telling them no troop reductions. I understand what you all are saying, and I agree, but you’ll never get an agreement if you show a sense of urgency. An eagerness to conclude an agreement does not help. I’ve had a lot of experience at this. It is important to keep our briefings under firm control. Now, I favor refining the nuclear package for our own purposes but not for use outside. Then link the two (MBFR and SALT) together. I agree that we need a refined nuclear package. But it shouldn’t go too far away from what the Allies have already seen.

Amb. Resor: Secretary Schlesinger sees no need to move quickly.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should. I agree that there is some urgency, but you all should sense it, don’t show it.

Amb. Resor: Our point is that we don’t want to be under the gun in the Spring. We don’t want to have to push it in a matter of a few weeks. We do have this problem with the Allies. They tell us in Vienna that MBFR is not on the front burner in the US yet. We keep pushing them to get some kind of movement.
Secretary Kissinger: They are not getting that out of State!
Amb. Resor: Well, in one instance they were.
Secretary Kissinger: Did you screw up again, Joe (Sisco)?
Mr. Sisco: On some things I am very modest. I know nothing. I’m very modest on MBFR.
Secretary Kissinger: As far as the State Department is concerned, once we have a strategy . . .
Amb. Resor: It would help if at your level you could talk to the Germans and others.
Secretary Kissinger: Good idea.
Amb. Resor: I’m worried about the Allies not understanding.
Amb. Ellsworth: Then you think the July 1973 option^7 should be shown to them?
Amb. Resor: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Then we’ll refine the package and meet again in two weeks. We should be able to get a decision then.
(to Mr. Ellsworth) You are in favor of alternative 1^8 and a refinement of the nuclear package?
Amb. Ellsworth: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: (to Dr. Ikle) And you?
Dr. Ikle: Yes, we agree to the first Alternative. And I think we do buy something in SALT with Option III.
Secretary Kissinger: I’ve talked enough to Brezhnev to know that we cannot have a SALT agreement without something done about FBS. This is not just a bargaining position on their part. They have a military concept of what FBS would do. They have charts and so forth on which they have calculated what US weapons will hit the Soviet Union. I, too, can think of a thousand ploys to keep FBS out, but it won’t work. I’m content to have the nuclear option in MBFR. And, when you are refining the package you must address several other questions. I would like you to consider ceilings and how do you define ceilings. If

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^7 Apparent reference to Option III; see footnote 4, Document 135.
^8 The Verification Panel Working Group prepared a paper, not found, on options for the next round of MBFR. Lodal and Sonnenfeldt summarized Alternative 1 in an unsigned memorandum to Kissinger, July 27: "Alternative 1: Introduce the ‘Option III’ Air and Nuclear Elements—The Option III package consists of 1,000 nuclear warheads, 36 Pershing missiles and 54 nuclear capable F–4 aircraft. It comprises approximately 20 percent of the nuclear elements in the NATO Guidelines area (NGA). It would be offered as an offset to our demand that the Soviets remove 20 percent of their tanks from the NGA. The main issue raised by this alternative is the potential damage done by the ceilings on nuclear forces and aircraft which would result from withdrawal of these elements." (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Verification Panel Meeting Subseries, Box 7, VP (MBFR), August 1, 1974, [1])
only F–4s are to be reduced, then the capability of evasion would be enormous. I’d like recommendations of how to define the ceilings if we withdraw F–4s.

Amb. Ellsworth: And would you like us to speculate on Soviet attitudes as to what effect the ceilings would have on the tanks?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that brings me to my next question. I consider the nuclear package a swap for tanks and a common ceiling. Obviously one has to speculate on ceilings on Soviet tanks and reciprocal ceilings on the other side. My feeling is we should probably not have reciprocal ceilings, but I’m open on this. I have no fixed-views. This raises the question of warheads. But I don’t want to give the answers. Those are the questions, the principal questions that need answers.

Does the second Alternative\(^9\) need further work?

Amb. Resor: No, I don’t think so.

Secretary Kissinger: You feel that if the President wanted to go to a 7%/ option this panel does not need to address it further? Do we know how it would be worked out with the Allies?

Amb. Resor: The Canadians and the British would just take out token numbers.

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Lodal) Could we get a working group together on that?

Mr. Lodal: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. Any other actions we need to take today?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Should we add in a percentage of air manpower?

Secretary Kissinger: Do it as a separate piece?

Amb. Resor: They are pushing for air manpower reductions. It would be an element of either alternative. We could consider it separately.

Gen. Walters: Verification of manpower poses some real problems.

Secretary Kissinger: If our intelligence estimates are correct, air manpower may be roughly equal. They shouldn’t be too excited about it. I see no particular reason not to include it except for the impact of ceilings on air forces. But since the nuclear option leads to that anyway, then it’s no problem.

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\(^9\) Lodal and Sonnenfeldt summarized Alternative 2 in their July 27 memorandum: “Alternative 2: Drop the demand for a tank army and reduce the number of US and Soviet forces to be withdrawn in Phase I—This would lead to a position quite similar to the 5 percent (10,000/20,000) US/Soviet reduction Brezhnev has raised and you discussed in Moscow.” A third alternative was also put forward: “Alternative 3: Stonewall—Make no major moves in Vienna at this time.”
Amb. Resor: Air manpower will be covered anyway, either explicitly or through non-circumvention measures. We have to prevent things like the Herman Goering Division.10

Secretary Kissinger: That is guaranteed here by interservice rivalry. The Working Group will look into it. From a foreign policy standpoint I see no reason not to include it.

Amb. Resor: One last thing. If we decided to go with the nuclear package, we’ll need to establish a target. Rumsfeld wants to play it for the whole Allied objectives package. I suggest as the target, the tank army for Phase I. I don’t want to overload at the start. I think the best way to get a common ceiling is on the basis of a tank army.

Amb. Ellsworth: As long as we don’t lose sight of the common ceiling.

Amb. Resor: No, we won’t. The Allies won’t allow it!

Secretary Kissinger: (to Mr. Sonnenfeldt) I need to have a paper on where we stand on CSCE. The Dutch Ambassador told me . . . (to Lodal) Include air manpower in the Working Group report. We’ll meet again in a couple of weeks; that will still give us time to get to the Allies in September.

10 Reference is to the elite tank division created and placed under the German Air Force by Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering during World War II.

350. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 14, 1974, 12:52–1:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Stanley Resor, Chief of US Delegation to MBFR Negotiations in Vienna
Dr. Henry A Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 5. Secret. The conversation took place in the Oval Office.
President: It’s nice to see you. How do you like the job?
Resor: I enjoy it, except that I am unable to be with my family. The work is significant; if we can get agreement it would be important. It would give us a rational basis for NATO forces.
The Soviets seem businesslike in their approach. We can’t really get into the ratio problem—to the common ceiling—until we offer the nuclear package. We told the Allies a year ago we would raise it at the appropriate time. Secretary Kissinger properly wants to use it in SALT first.
Kissinger: Would it really unlock the door to offer it?
Resor: We can’t be sure, but it would help on their two basic points: that reductions must be equitable and that the overall balance must be maintained. Whether this will do it is hard to say, but we think there is a chance. The non-circumvention clause would give the Soviet Union a handle on West German forces.
Kissinger: But not French forces.
The reductions would result in a ceiling, which is really the significant aspect. That does matter to them.
President: How would we verify manpower reductions?
Resor: We are requesting that there be inspectors at some entry points. They may grant this because they wouldn’t be in the Soviet Union. But we have photography which shows the units.
Kissinger: [less than 1 line not declassified] photography [less than 1 line not declassified] we can tell about units, not individuals.
President: Do we have a preference on where they would withdraw them?
Resor: We have recommended that they withdraw a tank army. They said that would leave a hole, but we have said they could take the forces from anywhere.
Kissinger: Our first proposal was absurd, and Stan needs this package.
President: If things go ahead, when would we get equivalency?
Resor: In the US-Soviet Union phase, we would hope for agreement in principle by spring. It would take six months to implement. They would want the second phase right away to get at the German forces.
President: What is the West German attitude?
Resor: They aren’t right now under pressure to reduce. Their restructuring comes in several years.
Kissinger: But I think it will be a problem in the second phase, because the Soviet Union wants to match the West German against satellite forces.
President: Do the East Germans have rapport with the West Germans?
Kissinger: Yes, in a way. There is this attraction and rapport. I have a friend who says when he wants to go to the “old Germany” of the Twenties, he goes to East Germany. Then, German history is composed of periods of anarchy and discipline. German history is anarchy, and the discipline comes from East Germany. What I fear is a reunified Germany under nationalism. Brandt was too lazy, but that was what Bahr was after. The Soviet Union fears that—and France.

President: Is there that much nationalism left?

Kissinger: The Germans are romantic, and given to excesses. Brandt was lazy but he could have started down that path. The spark would have to come from East Germany, but West Germany would respond.

President: I think MBFR is politically important here, but substantively SALT is more important. If we can combine the two, we could get the best of both worlds.

Kissinger: We haven’t pushed MBFR in the Presidential channel. If the President wanted to move directly with Brezhnev, how would the Allies react?

Resor: It depends on what kind of movement it is. We talk regularly with the British and Germans. The others know that but we keep it quiet. If you told them at a high level, it would probably be okay. The Europeans fear an agreement which would give the Soviet Union the right to meddle in their defense structures.

President: Where would the common ceiling be?

Resor: The end result would be at 700,000.

Kissinger: The tricky part is that any reductions must be accompanied by a ceiling to avoid circumvention.

Resor: The Soviet Union wants ceilings by country.

Kissinger: I predict that if there are reductions, the result one way or another will be a ceiling on German forces. If that is so, together with the nuclear package, the Soviet Union would be getting something.

President: I haven’t gotten into this yet, so I need time.

Kissinger: Stan has enough to talk about for a while. We prefer to wait to tell the Germans and British on the nuclear package until we get the SALT package ready.

President: Yes. Just keep it in the family until we get to you.
TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U.S. MBFR Delegation

SUBJECT
Instructions for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna, September 16, 1974

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. MBFR Delegation. These instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 241.2

1. After agreement has been reached with the NATO Allies, the Delegation is authorized to begin a discussion with the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact delegations on the definition of force categories and exchange of data, subject to the following considerations:

—A single package of redefinition measures should not be proposed; rather, individual anomalies and possible solutions should be discussed.
—Numerical data may be given to the Pact delegations only on a reciprocal basis, except that Alliance agreed revisions to data already released may be given without exchange.
—The Delegation shall not agree to any final definition of force categories without prior agreement on related data. The Delegation should seek guidance from Washington before committing the U.S. to any specific redefinition proposals.

2. The Delegation is authorized to begin discussion of the role of air manpower in the negotiations. In this connection, after agreement

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-040, NSDM/NSSM Originals, NSDMs 251–306. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Lodal and Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the NSDM to Kissinger on September 6 as an attachment to a memorandum about an upcoming Verification Panel meeting on September 7; both ibid., Verification Panel Meeting, 9–7–74, MBFR. No minutes of the meeting have been found. Lodal forwarded a revised version of the NSDM to Kissinger on September 17. In a covering memorandum, he wrote: “I have attached a revised MBFR NSDM (Tab A), reflecting your comments on the earlier draft—i.e., that the NSDM should approve the option III air and nuclear reductions in principle, but defer use of the package until further notice.” (Ibid., NSDM 269) Telegram 211141 to USNATO, September 25, transmitted the instructions to the U.S. delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna. (Ibid., Presidential Agency Files, Box 15, NATO, NATO from S/S, Exdis)  
2 Document 346.
has been reached with the NATO Allies, the Delegation is authorized to inform the Pact delegations that the U.S. and its Allies are prepared to take the following actions:

—Exchange data on air manpower.
—Discuss inclusion of air manpower in the data base for computing U.S. and Soviet Phase I ground force reductions.
—Consider inclusion of air manpower in the proposed “no increase” agreement which would limit Alliance and Warsaw Pact manpower between phases.
—Discuss the possibility of withdrawing up to 15% of U.S. and Soviet air manpower in Phase I.
—Consider inclusion of air manpower within a manpower common ceiling, provided the Pact delegations agree to the common ceiling concept.

The President has approved these additional elements of the U.S. MBFR position:

1. U.S. Phase I reductions may be in the form of units, designated in advance.
2. No U.S. forces in Berlin will be included in the U.S. reduction package.
3. Both U.S. and Soviet forces should participate in Phase II reductions.
4. Phase I post-reduction manpower levels may be exceeded for military exercises by up to 20,000 men for up to sixty days once each year.

The President has approved in principle the introduction into the negotiations of a nuclear proposal along the lines of that included in Option III described in the paper titled “U.S. Approach to MBFR,” approved by NSDM 211\(^3\) and presented to NATO in May 1973. The proposed reduction package should include 1000 nuclear warheads, 48 F-4 nuclear capable aircraft, and 27 Pershing surface-to-surface missile launchers. While approving the use of this package in principle, the President has decided to defer its introduction for the present time. Therefore, Option III and the use of nuclear elements in MBFR should not be discussed with either the Allies or the Soviet and Warsaw Pact delegations without further guidance.

Henry A. Kissinger

\(^3\) Document 137.

Dear Henry

It has been evident that we could not move on MBFR until the SALT stage had been set. However, now I believe it important that we move without delay into NATO with a proposal to advance MBFR by giving the nuclear signal to the East in Vienna before the end of this round of negotiations. The following factors bear on such a decision:

—We see a need to make progress in MBFR soon—as long as we do not damage our basic security interests in the process. We do not know what kind of pressure the new Congress will put on us, but it could be significant.

—The Soviets are making “new” non-substantive MBFR proposals to put the East in a better public position.

—The SALT FBS issue has been set aside for the mid-term future.

—We are planning on drawing down a good number of nuclear warheads. We would want to get MBFR credit for warheads coming out of Central Europe.

—We and our Allies have identified some complexities associated with aircraft and missile reductions. These are not insurmountable, but warhead reductions are less complex, and NATO should be able to agree to them right away.

Equipment constraints can be worked out satisfactorily in connection with the introduction of nuclear elements. The act of agreeing to equipment reductions should establish an obligation on the US and the Soviet Union not to exceed the residual level of armaments specified in the agreement for reduction except for normal rotation and training purposes. Some reciprocal limitations on elements similar to those reduced by the other side should be imposed on each side by some form of non-circumvention provisions. These would be designed not

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1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Steve Hadley MBFR Files, Box 6, Ikle/Lehman Reciprocal Initiative (2). Secret. On November 29, Michael forwarded the text of the draft letter to Clarke in DOD telegram 1751 to the U.S. Delegation to the MBFR talks. Michael wrote that “Mr. Ellsworth hand carried the following draft to JRS this afternoon and subsequently sent word back that it was quote OK unquote.” Michael continued: “Sonnefeldt told Joe Jordan today that they will look at the foregoing carefully but that nucs won’t work. They don’t leave us enough flexibility.” Sonnenfeldt, he wrote, had said “the best next step” would be “to make concessions in the manpower area. No comment.” Michael concluded the telegram: “Scowcroft now has an advance copy of the foregoing letter.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Box 68, NATO 320.2)
to leave NATO at any real or apparent relative disadvantage. Non-circumvention formulations could be as general or as specific as the negotiating circumstances demand, and possibilities cover a spectrum of varying constraint. In any case appropriate constraints are feasible and should not hold back play of Option III elements.

We want to reduce Soviet capability in the Warsaw Pact area through the removal of tank forces; and we want to retain a strong US capability. If we judiciously play out our negotiating hand in MBFR and hold firm to our basic position, the Soviets may accommodate us. Advancing the signal before the break (December 12) would give the Allies a leg on the East and would permit the Allies and the East to use the December-January recess to prepare for serious discussion in the next session.

We might pursue a scenario along the following lines to achieve this end:

—Introduce into the NAC the first week of December a proposal to inform the East in Vienna before the December break that the Allies would be prepared to consider including substantial US nuclear capability in the form of 1,000 warheads in US Phase I reduction provided the East is willing to consider accepting our Phase I objectives, including reduction of a Soviet tank army.

—We would inform the Allies we would not rule out the possibility of following later with other Option III elements (27 PERSHING and 48 F-4), depending on the situation, and this would require further consultation with NATO.

If we are to make this new proposal before the end of this negotiating round we will have to move forward immediately in the Alliance. Assuming we do that in the next several days, you and I then could put the capstone on Alliance agreement at the Ministerials. Because the last plenary session in Vienna is scheduled for 12 December it might be necessary to hold some delegation members in Vienna a few days longer.

James Schlesinger

353. Editorial Note

In December 1974 and January 1975, the Ford administration discussed at the highest levels when and whether to introduce a nuclear option at the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. At the beginning of December 1974, in response to Secretary
of Defense Schlesinger’s letter of December 3 (Document 352), Secretary of State Kissinger discussed with Schlesinger the timing for introducing a nuclear option. At a meeting on December 7 with President Ford, President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft, and Schlesinger, Kissinger said: “At NATO, I would hold the nuclear package for now. About March would be best. I think Brezhnev might be ready to move on MBFR in preparation for the summit.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 431, Subject File, Schlesinger, James R., Memoranda of Conversation) Jan Lodal of the NSC staff wrote in his log on December 7: “Schlesinger and Kissinger met this morning. Kissinger talked Schlesinger out of telling the rump NPG session that we were considering reducing nuclear weapons. He also talked him out of moving on MBFR until March.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70, Daily Log)

On December 10, Lodal sent a White House telegram (Tohak 2) to Kissinger, who was en route to the December 12–13 NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels. The telegram reads in part: “Two items concerning nuclear elements in MBFR showed up in the press today from Brussels. You should be aware of them. Upon arrival in Brussels on December 9, Schlesinger had the following exchange with newsmen, in part: ‘Q: Mr. Secretary, what do you see as the focus of the ministerial meetings at this time? A: The focus of the ministerial meetings will be to achieve a long range strategy for NATO. [omission in the original] I might mention the result of the Vladivostok conference. I think from the standpoint of Western Europe that the results are interesting not only in terms of the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to have equality in terms of the number of central strategic systems, but perhaps more significant is the willingness of the Soviet Union to abandon a position that it has maintained for some years that would require forward based systems to be included in considerations with regard to central strategic systems. Forward based systems were dropped from any discussion with relation to the central strategic systems, and to the extent that there will be any discussion of forward based systems, it would take place within the discussions going on [regarding] mutual and balanced force reductions. This has been a matter of concern to our European allies for some years, and therefore it is particularly noteworthy that the results of the Vladivostok conference have given them cause to rejoice on this particular issue. In addition, I might say that the decision to establish a common ceiling with regard to strategic delivery vehicles would be a harbinger of a decision to accept a common ceiling with regard to forces in Central Europe.’” Lodal commented: “Schlesinger may have been trying to reassure the Europeans that no FBS deal was made with the Soviets as per your conversation on December 6. However, his remarks are certain to be interpreted by some
as an admission that we agreed with the Soviets to discuss FBS in MBFR. As you may know, there has been a good bit of speculation on this point in the European press for the past week or so. In addition to Schlesinger’s comments, the Netherlands’ Defense Minister Vredeling told the Eurogroup that the Dutch would propose to the NATO ministerial meeting Thursday that ‘the alliance’s tactical nuclear weapons be considered a bargaining counter’ in the MBFR talks. West German Defense Minister Leber objected to this proposal, calling it ‘bad and unwise.’ He commented that ‘if the East wants to bring up such a point, it should say what it is willing to reduce.’ All of this has been reported in the press.” On December 11, Scowcroft wrote to Kissinger in telegram Tohak 11: “I mentioned the Schlesinger comments about MBFR to the President (Hakto 1). The President agrees completely with you that such talk should stop, and I am so informing Schlesinger.” (Both in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Trip Files, Box 7, December 14–16, 1974, Martinique, Tohak 12/10–13/74)

Telegram 492 from the United States delegation to the MBFR talks, December 10, recommended “that the US decide to introduce Option 3 into the MBFR negotiations in the near future and begin specific consultations with the Allies on it by the beginning of January with a view to introducing Option 3 in Vienna early in the next round.” Telegram 271497 to the U.S. delegation to the MBFR talks, December 11, responded: “The Secretary has read ref tel. He will consider arguments presented therein further and review the matter in Washington. Meanwhile, he wants no discussion of Option III with foreign representatives. The Secretary has noted speculation that dropping of the FBS in SALT by Soviets in Vladivostok involved some deal on use of Option III or even understanding on unilateral US nuclear cuts in Europe. This is of course totally false. It also makes timing of any use of Option III that much more sensitive.” (Both ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 1, Austria, from SecState–Nodis)

On December 20, Kissinger gave a deep background briefing at a luncheon with foreign correspondents. The memorandum of the conversation reads in part: “Question: How about introducing the nuclear option into the MBFR negotiations? Secretary: I have told my associates never to discuss this in the negotiations. One should not make compromises on matters of national interest until thirty seconds before midnight. The Nunn amendment was not a wise move. If the Soviets know we are being forced to withdraw our nuclear weapons, they will not give in.” The memorandum continues: “Question: When do you expect an MBFR agreement? In the spring? Secretary: I gave no April one deadline to our NATO colleagues in Brussels. The timing is bad as it is too soon after Vladivostok to see a conclusion of the negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P-7425337)
On January 16, 1975, the Verification Panel met to discuss Option III. Schlesinger also attended. Lodal described the meeting in his daily log: “We had an MBFR VP meeting in the afternoon. I met briefly with Kissinger before the meeting (Scowcroft and then Sonnenfeldt joined later). Kissinger started off by saying, ‘Can you tell me what this meeting is all about?’ He wanted to know what the political situation was—why was Schlesinger all of a sudden getting excited about MBFR. Brent and I explained that he wanted to take out warheads from Europe. Kissinger snidely remarked, ‘Take the nucs out of Europe—he’s really the tough guy.’ Sonnenfeldt then came in and digressed about what Ikle would talk about. Kissinger said that if Ikle had suggested it, the one thing we would be sure about is that the idea was no good. He then asked a couple of questions about what the Nunn Amendment issue was, and I explained. Sonnenfeldt told him he had to make a decision. Schlesinger came to the meeting itself, which went very well. Kissinger went through the major options. Schlesinger indicated his willingness to go along with Option III. Resor and Dean did not know what our air manpower position was when asked directly by Kissinger—extremely embarrassing. We came out of the meeting with a fairly clear consensus that we would play Option III and try to get the tank army for it, but not agreement to the common ceiling. Everyone agreed we would have to pitch in [to?] Europeans to get agreement to the common ceiling.” Lodal’s log continues: “Kissinger was quite humorous at the VP meeting—joking with Schlesinger by saying that ‘if people who know something about the issues start coming to these meetings, it will disrupt the entire process.’ Schlesinger also did well—after pointing out that Leber is the German peacetime commander-in-chief, he said this was an idea which ‘would receive some support in this country.’ Kissinger said he thought we were already there. It was quite a humorous exchange.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70, Daily Log)

The minutes of the Verification Panel meeting included the following “summary of conclusions”: “It was agreed that: Defense will prepare a new Option III package; an NSC Meeting will be scheduled the week of January 20, 1975; [and] the options to be decided by the President are: play Option III for a Soviet tank army and agreement on a common ceiling for Phase II; [or] play Option III for both a Soviet tank army and a common ceiling in Phase II, but the Europeans must agree to take token Phase I reductions.” (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–110, Verification Panel Meeting Minutes, Originals)

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than the European security conference or MBFR.]

Kissinger: On the NSC meeting on MBFR, the only issue is when to play the nuclear option—all at once or piddling it out.

The President: Timewise, when should we move?

Kissinger: I wouldn’t decide it at the meeting—just to preserve some flexibility. I would tell Resor he could give it to NATO in February and present it at Geneva in March.

The President: Is there a chance we could have something by the summit?

Kissinger: If there is, it won’t happen at Geneva. If we were willing to agree to equal cuts, we could get one.

The President: It would help with the Congress.

Kissinger: Our original proposal was ridiculous. The problem with cuts is that it indirectly introduces a ceiling. That is significant to the Soviets.

If we get serious about MBFR, we should do it like SALT—give them proposals through your channel before surfacing them.

The President: Schlesinger isn’t a problem on this, is he?

Kissinger: Not at all. [2 lines not declassified]
President Ford: Thank you all very much for coming. As you know, this meeting is on the topic of MBFR. I would like to be updated on where we stand. I’m familiar with our offer and the Soviets’ counter-offer, and when I was Vice President, I had an in depth briefing by Bruce Clarke. But I’ve not had anything since then, except that I talked briefly to Stan last September.2 Stan, you go back Sunday?

Ambassador Resor: Yes. Our first meeting with the other side will be on January 30.

President Ford: Bill, do you have a briefing for us?

Mr. Colby: Mr. President, MBFR focuses on Central Europe, where the largest and most critical elements of military strength on both sides are located. However, the discussions exclude substantial military

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lodal. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Attached but not printed are a series of charts that Colby used in making his presentation.

2 See Document 350.
forces in the flank states of both sides, even though they are important to the overall military balance in Europe. Further, reinforcements from France, Britain, and the Soviet Union are close enough to Central Europe to alter the balance there if time permits. But the reductions area would be the decisive battleground. Should conflict erupt there suddenly, the forces shown on this next board—expanded, of course, by local mobilization—would be the principal combat elements immediately available to both sides. These numbers are based on our most recent intelligence. There are minor disagreements between these numbers and the agreed NATO numbers. It is in Central Europe that the Pact has the greatest preponderance of ground forces, and it is this imbalance that we are addressing in the MBFR negotiations.

The national forces of both sides in Central Europe are approximately the same size. The major disparity between NATO and the Pact strengths stems from the Soviet forces stationed in the reductions area. These constitute approximately half of the forces available to the Pact, and the major part of the Pact’s offensive power. Furthermore, Soviet forces in the reduction area have been increased by about 100,000 men in the past 8 years—and have significant strength in tanks—while NATO forces have not grown appreciably.

The withdrawal of a Soviet Army from Central Europe would reduce Soviet offensive capability significantly. Just as importantly, it would probably force the Soviets to change their plan of attack. I can illustrate this briefly. We have good evidence that the Soviet generals believe their forces in the reduction area are capable of undertaking major offensive operations against NATO’s center region without prior reinforcement from the USSR. Although they clearly expect reinforcement after a week or so, exercises as far back as 1969 consistently indicate that they intend to exploit their initial numerical superiority by a high-speed offensive once hostilities begin. I would like to add, Mr. President, that [3 lines not declassified]

President Ford: Are you still getting that stuff?

Mr. Colby: Yes. There are some very delicate operations involved.

The preferred Pact organization for operations against NATO consists of the three “fronts”—a Soviet term for an army group charged with taking the main strategic objectives of the attack. In this scenario, the Central Front would make the main Pact effort, using the bulk of the Pact forces—five Soviet and two East German armies. The objectives of this force would be to overrun central Germany and Belgium, up to the French border. The Northern Front—a Polish expeditionary force of three armies—would have the mission of seizing the Jutland Peninsula and the Danish Islands.

Secretary Kissinger: Is that just your theory, or based on some information?
Mr. Colby: They have carried out a series of exercises along these lines, although there have been some variations.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, that is essentially the German Schlieffen Plan\(^3\) of 40 years ago. It’s the same theory—they swing around the sides and come through Belgium.

Mr. Colby: It’s more like a punch through the middle, and then a swing around.

Secretary Schlesinger: Von Schlieffen would never have thought of the Poles as his strong right flank. (laughter)

President Ford: It’s better than the Italians!

Mr. Colby: Part of the force would attempt to drive across the northern part of Germany into the Netherlands. The Southwest Front would operate against NATO forces in southern Germany. Two Czech armies and a Soviet army would be committed, with the goal of breaking through to the borders of France and Switzerland.

The objectives of these operations would be to overwhelm the NATO forward defenses, disrupt mobilization, and hinder the movement of NATO reserve forces into their wartime positions. To make these objectives attainable, the Soviets would hope to carry out their attack with great speed, concentrating an overwhelming force, primarily armor and artillery, against narrow sectors of NATO’s front. Their attack would have large-scale air support from tactical aircraft and medium bombers targeted against NATO airfields and nuclear depots.

Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, the quality of U.S. tactical air vastly exceeds the quality of Soviet air. On the overall balance, taking quality into account, the air situation looks quite good. Looking only at the numbers would lead you to be unduly pessimistic. This same analysis does not apply to the tanks—

President Ford: The 2 to 1 aircraft advantage looks awesome.

Secretary Schlesinger: That also leaves out our reinforcement capability. We could have an additional 1,500 aircraft in Europe very quickly.

President Ford: From where?

Secretary Schlesinger: From the U.S. We can’t reinforce quickly with tanks, but we can with aircraft.

President Ford: But you say the quality of their tanks is different?

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\(^3\) Reference is to the plan drawn up by German Army Chief of Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, in 1905. It proposed that in a future war against France and Russia, Germany should concentrate 90 percent of its force on the French front and, before Russia could mobilize, knock France out of the war by means of a massive flanking maneuver through neutral Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.
Secretary Schlesinger: Their tanks essentially match our capabilities.

President Ford: Incidentally, how are you coming with the expedited MC–60 program?

Secretary Schlesinger: Very well. We will be up to 600 in June and up to 1,000 by 1976.

President Ford: Per year?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes sir.

Mr. Colby: They would also hope to achieve surprise to prevent NATO from concentrating its own forces against these attacks. The withdrawal of one of the Soviet armies from the central area would jeopardize Pact chances for a successful campaign.

Pact planners expect NATO defensive operations to involve tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage. They would respond, and are developing command and control capabilities to deliver either limited or massive nuclear strikes. Therefore, I will now turn to the tactical nuclear balance in the reduction area.

The aircraft figures shown on this chart represent the total number assigned to units which have nuclear missions. This comparison exaggerates the Soviet capability, however, as recent information indicates that only some 300 of the pilots in their units are—according to Soviet standards—qualified to fly nuclear strikes. All of the NATO aircraft included are manned by nuclear qualified pilots. There are additional aircraft on both sides capable of nuclear missions, but not assigned to them. The total warhead figure for the Pact is based on estimated storage capacities at known nuclear depots.

The Soviet tactical nuclear force has grown considerably since the late 1960s. The introduction of new aircraft has more than doubled the nuclear delivery capability, and they have longer ranges and improved characteristics at low altitude. The tactical missile force on the other hand, has expanded only gradually.

President Ford: Are those IRBMs?

Mr. Colby: No—Scuds and Frogs.

Secretary Schlesinger: This is only in the NATO guidelines area.

Mr. Colby: It is now less important than air delivery systems. However, it certainly cannot be ignored.

Pact forces used to rely heavily on strategic missiles from the USSR to support theater operations. These figures, however, show that their force modifications over the past several years have brought them to where they could fight to high levels of intensity with the systems located in Central Europe. This growing ability to withhold USSR-based missiles may eventually provide the Soviets a means of isolating a European conflict, and decoupling Soviet territory from it. In any case,
the continuing improvement in Pact nuclear capable systems will be a
trend to reckon with in these negotiations.

The chart does not show chemical weapons. The Soviets, however,
are probably better prepared than the West for chemical warfare in Eu-
rope. Their doctrine treats chemicals as “weapons of mass destruction,”
to be used only after nuclear war has begun. They have put heavy em-
phasis on preparing their forces to defend against chemicals.

Some mention should be made of our Allies and their attitudes to-
ward MBFR. Britain, West Germany, Canada, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg are directly participating in the negotiations—
the other Allies are observers. The West European Allies entered into
MBFR reluctantly. They did not want to see the US military presence
in Europe reduced, and feared that the negotiations themselves would
be divisive. Now, because of economic and political pressures, the
British, Dutch, and Belgians would like to cut their own forces. The
West Germans are of course not feeling the economic pinch so much;
but would expect to be a part of any Western reductions.

Finally, the Soviets have an interest in some progress in MBFR,
since they probably see the negotiations as contributing to their over-
all objectives in East-West détente. They need, at a minimum, to keep
the talks going in order to help maintain movement in the Conference
on European Security. But they also have real security interests in the
MBFR outcome—especially their hope of at least constraining the
growth of, or, ideally, reducing West German military strength. With
respect to the US, they would like to see a reduction in our nuclear ca-
pability in Europe—but not at the expense of an increased West Ger-
man capability. In regard to their own forces, the Soviets can be ex-
pected to drive a hard bargain. They will stress equality of reduction
rather than equality of remaining forces. In particular, they will focus
on US nuclear strength and the German military potential.

President Ford: Thank you very much Bill. Henry, would you like
to bring us up to date on where we stand—

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to sum up the history of the ne-
gotiations, following on to what Bill Colby has said, and review the
modifications which might be made to the Alliance position now.

MBFR originated in the 1950s with Soviet proposals for both a
European security conference and for withdrawal of foreign troops
from Germany. During the 1960s, the Soviets lost interest in European
force reductions, lest they appear to release forces for service in Viet-
am. But during the late ‘60s, their interest seemed renewed for a
variety of reasons. In the end, we went along with MBFR for basi-
cally two reasons: First, as a response to Soviet CSCE initiatives and
second, for Congressional reasons, as a counter to Mansfield Resolu-
tion pressures. The Europeans went along for essentially the same
reasons.

As the talks started, we developed an interest in seeing if we could
use MBFR for rationalizing the analysis of NATO strategic issues. In
NATO, a serious discussion of these issues had not taken place, and
we thought MBFR might be helpful in getting one started.

So we went into MBFR with a mix of motives. It has to be seen in
that context.

The US developed essentially three concepts for the reductions.
The first was a common ceiling on ground force manpower to be
reached in two phases—10 percent withdrawals of stationed forces fol-
lowed by 10 percent cuts of indigenous forces.

The second was an equal percentage in US and Soviet forces which
would lead to a common ceiling on ground force manpower.

The third was a reduction of dissimilar threatening elements, in-
cluding 1,000 nuclear warheads, 36 Pershings, and 54 F–4s. This led to
a discussion with George Brown where he’s been able to change the
size of the squadrons to get the reduction he wants! (laughter) This is
the so-called nuclear option.

The Allies agreed on an approach combining all three of these op-
tions. We would seek a common ceiling on ground force manpower to
be achieved in two phases of negotiation.

There would be a first phase, in which the US and USSR would
reduce equal percentages of the ground force manpower, with the So-
viet cut being in the form of the tank army. We would take out
manpower only, 29,000 troops, while the Soviets would take out 68,000
troops and an additional 1,700 tanks.

President Ford: 68,000 would be included in the tank army?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes—the 68,000 represents the tank army.

Secretary Schlesinger: In addition, each side would take out 15%
of its manpower.

Secretary Kissinger: The percentage cut would be the same. We
figured out that the tank army would be 68,000, and took the same per-
centage cut for the US.

We have had trouble figuring out why Stan Resor has not been
able to convince the Soviets to accept this approach. It must be because
he is a Yale man (laughter).

We also proposed a second phase, in which both sides would re-
duce further to a common ceiling of about 700,000. Again, this would
require a three to one ratio of Pact to NATO cuts in the second phase.

Predictably, the Soviets did not accept our proposal. They put forth
a proposal with several differences. Where we have stressed equal
percentage reductions, they stressed equal numbers. We said the US and Soviets should reduce first, and the Soviets were more interested in NATO and Warsaw Pact allied reductions. This is because the larger the German slice they could get, the more they were able to trade good German divisions for lousy East European divisions.

It is important to realize that the significance of cuts is two-fold: the cut itself, but also that a cut establishes a ceiling. 54 F–4 aircraft is not a large number but it does establish a ceiling on this type of aircraft. This is why the Soviets were anxious on German reductions since even a small cut would have the great advantage of establishing a ceiling on all German forces.

The Soviets have shown some flexibility in their proposal. They have proposed an initial reduction of 20,000, made up largely of US and Soviet forces. But even a reduction of 1,000 Germans would have the additional effect of putting a ceiling on the Germans. They have hinted that their nuclear reductions might be deferred to the second phase, but they have remained adamant that the size of the reductions for the two sides must be equal.

Initially, the Allies were content to let the US and the Soviets reduce only their forces. They saw putting off their reductions to the second phase as a device to keep their forces up. Leber and others stated that if the reductions were in the second phase, they could go to their parliaments and tell them that reductions were eventually coming, but after some time. But the domestic pressures have increased in Europe, and the tendency now is for the Europeans to want to be included in the first phase.

Secretary Schlesinger: Except the Germans who have tended to move in the opposite direction.

President Ford: To keep their forces up?

Secretary Schlesinger: Schmidt has moved in the opposite direction as opposed to Brandt, who wanted to reduce.

Secretary Kissinger: They also don’t want to give up a tremendous bargaining chip, namely a ceiling on their forces.

President Ford: Does their changed attitude follow through to US reductions?

Secretary Schlesinger: No, they are prepared to see us reduce.

Secretary Kissinger: They view our reductions largely as a reaction to Mansfield. The Europeans believe that reductions we take in MBFR would be less than what we would take unilaterally.

NATO and the Pact still disagree on three fundamental issues. First, whose forces should be reduced and when. We believe that the US and the USSR should reduce first, but the Pact insists that all participants reduce from the outset.
Second, what should be the reduction ratio? Our position is that reductions should be asymmetrical and lead to a common ceiling. Our position is equal percentages, but they believe the reduction should be equal numbers, a position not supported by our figures.

Finally, what forces should be reduced. Our position calls for reductions in ground forces only, but we have proposed a freeze on air manpower, and possible US reductions of air manpower. The Pact has insisted from the outset that all types of forces—ground, air, and nuclear—should be reduced in units with their armaments.

These disagreements are why we need to take another look at our objectives in MBFR and in developments that might cause us to reconsider them.

The SALT negotiations at Vladivostok established the principal of equality and gave us a good argument for equality in MBFR. Vladivostok also adds urgency, since the movement to a balance in strategic forces adds urgency on the conventional front. Once strategic equality is accepted around the world as a fact of life, conventional imbalances will be even more important. So, as Bill Colby said, we have taken an approach which attempts to enhance the defense and reduce the offensive capability.

So far, the Soviets have shown no major interest in MBFR. Nothing they have said to you, Mr. President, or to me in our negotiations shows any great interest. They simply repeat to you or to me what they say to Stan in Vienna. This means the Politburo has not yet engaged the issue. We will have to see whether or not in the next six months the Soviets will put this on the front burner. If they have a desire to keep détente going, they will do so.

Secretary Schlesinger: There is an embassy cable in indicating that there might be some growth in their interest in MBFR.4

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. If that is true, some change in our position is imperative if we are to make progress. No Soviet leader can go to the Politburo and say he has traded 29,000 Americans for a tank army including 68,000 Soviets.

President Ford: The tank army withdrawal would reduce tanks by how many?

Secretary Schlesinger: 1,700.

Secretary Kissinger: Intellectually, we have several ways of going:

—We could change what’s asked from the other side. We could bring the numbers closer together. This might make the first phase more salable, but in the second phase, we will have to get even greater

4 Not further identified.
asymmetries in the Pact cuts. This could push the common ceiling indefinitely into the future.

—Secondly, we could add elements to the current Alliance position. For example, we could move up indigenous reductions, something of great interest to the Soviets because of their concerns for Germany, or we could add nuclear elements—a thousand warheads, 54 F–4s, and 36 Pershing launchers. And finally, we could combine these approaches with a slight reduction in the Pact withdrawals we propose and introduce some nuclear forces.

I believe there was a consensus within the Verification Panel that we should go no further at this time than to introduce the nuclear package—a thousand warheads, 54 F–4s, and 36 Pershing launchers.

Secretary Schlesinger: We would like to increase that to 2,000 warheads.

Secretary Kissinger: The nuclear package our Allies know about is a thousand warheads, 54 aircraft, and 36 Pershings. Perhaps in June, after telling them we have been restudying this, we could go to 2,000.

President Ford: Out of 9,000?

Secretary Kissinger: Seven thousand.

Secretary Schlesinger: Out of 5,000 in the NATO guidelines area.

Director Ikle: Forty percent of those in the area.

Secretary Kissinger: In addition, we have to look at the tactical question. The only thing the Allies know about is 1,000 warheads. We could either stick with the present package, or give up the 1,000 additional immediately. The worst thing would be to tell the Allies we want to reduce 2,000, but only put forth a reduction of 1,000. The Russians will know we have something else to offer and wait for it. If we want to hold back, we don’t want to brief the Allies on the additional 1,000.

I believe there is a consensus that it is time to introduce the nuclear package. Some modifications may be necessary as time goes on, but I believe it would be premature to handle these now. We need to get the Soviet reaction to the introduction of the nuclear package first.

There has also been consideration given to introducing the nuclear package piecemeal—

President Ford: Pershings, and then F–4s?

Secretary Kissinger: Right. There is a consensus that we should introduce it all at once. On the question of whether we should add a thousand warheads, we have not had a full discussion. Jim just worked out the agreement that we could get up to 2,000.

Stan will need approval of some kind of approach, Mr. President, before he leaves on Sunday.

President Ford: Jim, do you have anything to add?
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I have two comments. I recommend that we stick with our objective of getting the tank army because our ability to verify manpower reductions is minimal. The intelligence community has increased the estimates by 70,000 in the last year. Verifying the movement of manpower is difficult without a series of collateral constraints which will be almost impossible to negotiate. We have to have something that we can verify.

Second, the Chiefs have recommended reduction of 1,600 warheads as part of the readjustment of US tactical nuclear forces. In addition, we have to give Congress a report on the Nunn Amendment. Personally, I believe it is more likely that Congress will move on warhead reductions than on the Mansfield approach.

President Ford: More likely than on manpower?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. Also, we can move warheads back in rapidly in an emergency. Therefore, I would recommend the package the Chiefs recommend, but add to the package enough to bring it up to 2,000 warheads.

Henry referred to deficiencies in NATO’s strategic discussions. But in the last year, I think there has been much increased understanding in NATO. They’ve accepted our flexible response strategy based on three legs of the Triad. They are coming to understand the importance of conventional defense. That is why it is important for us to emphasize our agreement with the importance of conventional defense.

The Soviets moved in 100,000 men during the Czechoslovakian coup. But the US had made many improvements. For example, the Seventh Army was in poor shape during the Vietnam War, but is now back in good condition.

President Ford: Our Seventh Army?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. And we have added two brigades by converting support forces to combat forces. The Germans can field 1.2 million men in 48 hours. So the balance has probably improved slightly to the advantage of the West in the last year. Over the last six or seven years NATO has been retreating, but last year, it improved.

Our objectives on MBFR have been two. First, to improve security in Western Europe. This had led us to concentrate on getting out the tank army. And we have agreed not to be stampeded into movement that does not serve our ultimate objective of improved security.

Second, we want to get the Allies to do more. If we place limits on Western forces, we cannot get them to increase their manpower and budgetary support.

It is important not to undermine these basic objectives by accepting some short term possible deal held out by the Soviets.
The Soviet objectives are first to thwart movement toward European unity.

Second, their other objective is to get control of the Bundeswehr—the German Army. This, of course, conflicts directly with our own objective of getting the Germans to do more.

We should keep in mind these two objectives. I think so far that the negotiations have gone well.

Finally, I think the Congressional situation on the Mansfield resolution has improved.

President Ford: Even with the new Congress?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes—I have sat down with some of the new Democrats. They are not Bella Abzugs, they want to make a serious appraisal of defense needs, and not only react to Vietnam. I believe we can hold the House, and the climate in the Senate is better than it was a few months ago.

President Ford: I hope you are right, but my visceral reaction leads me to the opposite conclusion.

Secretary Kissinger: I can’t judge votes, but in meetings with them, the new members seem somewhat less ideological, but I don’t know how they will vote.

Secretary Schlesinger: Brock Adams just gave a long speech on security to the New York Delegation which was well received. Getting their ideological mindset out of Vietnam is very important.

President Ford: My analysis is predicated on two events. First, Eddie Hebert was the leader of the anti-Mansfield forces. His being thrown out will lead to less anti-Mansfield sentiment. Second, Phil Burton has become to a considerable extent a force. His voting record, I suspect, has been consistently in favor of Mansfield. I believe the Speaker is on our side, although O’Neill is on the other side. Mel Price has consistently supported Hebert’s view, but he’s not the hard tough speaker and debater that Hebert has been. He will stand up—he’s a good man, but he’s not the tough leader Hebert was.

Secretary Schlesinger: Hebert’s ouster had more to do with personality than policy—

President Ford: I hope you’re right.

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5 Representative Bella Abzug (D–NY).
6 Representative Brock Adams (D–WA).
7 Representative Eddie Hebert (D–LA).
8 Representative Philip Burton (D–CA).
9 Representative Thomas P. O’Neill (D–MA).
10 Representative Charles Melvin Price (D–IL).
Secretary Schlesinger: Even in the press, the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* and other publications are now coming out in favor of NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: They all wanted out of Vietnam, and now they will work on getting out of NATO.

Secretary Schlesinger: I believe they are changing on NATO.

President Ford: This Congressional situation argues for two things—first, a stronger positive public support for national defense. Second, a more realistic appraisal of our MBFR position.

George, do you have any comments?

General Brown: The Chiefs recommended 1,600 warheads. But with some arm twisting, I got them to agree to accept 2,000. They had recently reviewed our deployment plans and concluded that we could take out a total in NATO of 2,200. If we took all these out of the NATO guidelines area, this would bring the total to 2,800. But I have been working for some time to get our number down to a more defensible level. The basis on which our requirements have been stated have been indefensible. For example, a lot of it is based on target lists which include things like each command post. Some of these are mobile, and we don’t have the intelligence to know where they are to hit them.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should avoid loading the nuclear reduction up too much. First, the Allies will think you made some secret agreement in Vladivostok. Second, we have to look at this not only in terms of the inherent capability of the forces, but from broader political considerations. Third, I remember when Secretary McNamara would present detailed analyses telling them how they should change their forces. While he might have been right, although I disagreed with him on many issues of substance, the issue with the Allies was the volatility of the American position.

For example, withdrawal of nuclear [less than 1 line not declassified] would have an effect quite apart from the direct military implications. There would be significant foreign policy consequences.

I don’t mind these withdrawals in the context of MBFR, but I’m worried about any unilateral reductions. The timing would have to be very careful.

I would lean toward presenting only what the Allies heard before Vladivostok, and saving the 600 to 1,000 additional warheads for later.

President Ford: These negotiations as I understand them [less than 1 line not declassified] are totally related to the Western front.

Ambassador Resor: That is correct.

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Secretary Kissinger: It’s somewhat the reverse of what I said in the Verification Panel when I argued against bleeding out elements one at a time, but I am worried that if we throw in the additional thousand warheads, given the mentality of the Europeans, they will say “what the hell has happened?” So I recommend presenting the existing package first, and then do some missionary work on them before adding the others.

President Ford: The thousand warheads, 36 Pershings, and 54 F–4’s—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, which they have heard before Vladivostok and cannot say you made up only because of Vladivostok.

Ambassador Resor: This is the package Don presented to them in July of 1973.

Secretary Kissinger: This is not an insignificant package, especially when you consider that the Soviets also get ceilings on nuclear forces, F–4’s and Pershings. They cannot slough this off. If we have an additional thousand warheads, we can throw them in later.

Secretary Schlesinger: To some extent I believe I disagree with you. Not with respect to diplomatic tactics, and this [less than 1 line not declassified]. But in the NATO guidelines area, the British support substantial US reductions. In Germany, the SPD supports reductions and the CDU has said in its conference that it is prepared to see a reduction from 7,000 warheads to 5,000 warheads, although this is throughout Europe as a whole. With this kind of change, even in the CDU, we can move forward, so long as the US improves its nuclear capabilities.

President Ford: You mean our tactical nuclear capabilities?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. And we would not touch the weapons given to Germany [less than 1 line not declassified] and others under our program of cooperation. Also, I am not sure we can hold onto these warheads with Congress. I would leave the tactics to Henry, but I believe the Allies are ready for the introductions.

Dr. Ikle: I think we can gain a great deal by adding 600 or a 1,000 warheads. This will make the Russians see that we are really in business. On the other hand, it will be sensitive with the Allies. But if we sit on these nuclear reductions, we may get blamed for holding up change for reasons of MBFR.

President Ford: Stan, have you gotten any reaction on these nuclear forces from the Soviets—have you talked to them about these, or have they negotiated only with our NATO Allies?

Ambassador Resor: Not even that really. In July of 1973, Don told the Allies of our recommendation to put in Option III. NATO then got General Goodpaster as SACEUR to do an estimate of the military im-
applications, and SACEUR found it reasonable. We had trilateral discussions with the UK and FRG last spring, and the UK gave us a paper this fall that had been coordinated with the Germans on the nuclear package. It took the line that we couldn’t move in MBFR without using it, that we would have to put it in. But we have not had active discussions with the Allies since last spring, and that was purely academic.

Mr. Rumsfeld: Although, it leaked into the newspapers so the Warsaw Pact countries are not unaware of the proposal.

Ambassador Resor: Yes. The Pact must be wondering why we haven’t used it yet. Their recent tactic has been to propose a very small initial step.

President Ford: A small number of ground force reductions?

Ambassador Resor: Yes, or a freeze on manpower.

Dr. Ikle: Given their knowledge of Option III, perhaps adding the extra thousand warheads would be something new.

Secretary Kissinger: They haven’t seen the package yet, so that must indicate to them that there has been some problem with it. We’ve never had any reaction from them on it. To sweeten it right away might give them the wrong idea, particularly since they are in a state of flux themselves.

President Ford: How long will it take them to react to a proposal such as this?

Ambassador Resor: It is hard to say. It will probably be March 15 before we can get something through the Alliance and therefore March 27 before we can have it on the table. They will have to send it to Moscow, and Henry has a better feel than I on how long it would take to react, but it would be several weeks.

12 Not found.

13 Ikle wrote to Kissinger in a memorandum on March 21, 1974: “Day-long trilaterals with the British and Germans on the MBFR nuclear package took place on March 18. I outline below my assessment of the talks: While neither the British nor the FRG representatives said they could speak for their Governments, they appeared by the conclusion of the meeting to accept the principle of an offer of selected nuclear elements in MBFR. At the conclusion of the meeting, the British and Germans made a procedural proposal: another trilateral meeting and then the US should table a proposal in the NAC in the form of draft guidance to the ad hoc group in Vienna.” Ikle also noted the existence of “two major unresolved issues”: “the role of aircraft in the package” and “the question of limitations on Soviet nuclear arms.” (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 15, MBFR Issues) Kissinger also discussed the trilateral talks in a meeting with NSC Deputies on March 19, 1974; a memorandum of the conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 272, Chronological File.

14 The text of the British proposed language for introducing Option III in Vienna, attached to an undated letter from Thomson to Sonnenfeldt, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 11, POL 3 MBFR # 2.
Secretary Kissinger: I believe it depends, Mr. President, on how they want to gear it to Brezhnev’s meeting with you. If they want to gear it to the meeting, you will hear in your channels about it. That is why I would hold the additional warheads until we get a response. It would probably be a month at least.

This will be the first approach to FBS reductions we will have ever made. In that sense it should be seen as a major breakthrough. I don’t think they will accept the proposal but they can’t ignore it.

President Ford: Anyone else? Before you go back Sunday, Stan, we will give you some guidelines. I do think we ought to find some solution. I think your analysis in DOD has been very helpful. But I would tend toward the lower figure. This is no final answer now, but I believe it would be a better strategic approach. I will let you know by Sunday morning.15

Ambassador Resor: One final point—I have seen several Congressmen recently, and they always ask if we have a realistic position which may initially succeed. I believe that if we can get this down, we will be in a better position to convince them that we do.

President Ford: Thank you all once again.


356. Editorial Note

Jan Lodal of the National Security Council staff recorded his impressions of the NSC meeting on January 23, 1975, in his log: “I worked on the MBFR NSDM before the NSC meeting. We had the NSC on MBFR from 11:30 to 12:30. It went quite smoothly. Everyone was in favor of introducing Option III into the negotiations. The only question is whether or not we should increase the warheads from 1,000 to 2,000. Kissinger argued strongly against doing it at this time. He prevailed with the President.

“After the meeting I talked to Resor and Ikle and tried to calm them down. Resor wants to move full speed ahead. He had a group get together in the afternoon to look over a cable to NATO. I sent Higgins to turn this off.

“Sonnenfeldt and I have talked several times trying to figure out what Kissinger seems to be up to. As Sonnenfeldt says, maybe it is just the old agenda (Soviet policy, détente, etc.) versus his new agenda (en-
ergy, interdependence, a new world order, etc.). Maybe he just no longer takes an active interest in the old agenda. In any event, Sonnenfeldt and I agreed that turning over such a major item (Soviet control over Allied nuclear forces) to people like Resor and Dean is putting fire in the hands of children. Maybe Kissinger thinks that the Soviets will reject it, but that it will buy him some time with Congress by having it on the table. Maybe he just doesn’t want to fight Schlesinger on the issue.

“After the NSC, I walked down the stairs with Schlesinger. He said, ‘I didn’t realize you felt as though we’re such fans of tac nucs.’ I told him that I wasn’t, but I wasn’t a diplomat. We discussed how obvious it was that we should get rid of some of the tac nucs. He referred to them as ‘junk.’ I explained to him that I thought Kissinger was somewhat uptight at present because of the various problems associated with our Soviet relations. Therefore, he was going quite slowly on every issue related to the Soviets.”

On January 30, Lodal wrote in his daily log: “I spent the evening trying to clear out my inbox. Kissinger has not yet acted on the MBFR NSDM, being his usual irresponsible self. I have no idea when we will get out a SALT NSDM. The British are here, and they will want to know about MBFR. I don’t know whether he will tell Wilson or not.” On February 1, Lodal wrote: “Sonnenfeldt and I discussed how frustrating Kissinger’s present mode of operation was. There was really [not] any serious intellectual discussion of issues and all decisions seemed to be made by the seat of the pants. […] Furthermore, the failure to get the SALT and MBFR NSDM’s out on schedule could have major consequences.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70, Daily Log)

On January 30, Secretary of State Kissinger discussed the MBFR NSDM with President Ford and Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “President: Did we give Resor some guidance? Kissinger: I am worried about the impact of the withdrawal of 40% of our nuclear weapons. Ford: I agree.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9)
National Security Decision Memorandum 284


TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U.S. MBFR Delegation

SUBJECT

U.S. Position on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks (MBFR), Vienna, January 30, 1975

The President has decided that the U.S. position on MBFR as reflected in NSDM 269 should be modified as follows:

1. As part of a Phase I agreement, the U.S. would be willing to withdraw the following U.S. nuclear forces from the NATO Guidelines Area:

- 1,000 nuclear warheads;
- 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft;
- 36 Pershing surface-to-surface missile launchers.

The three elements of this proposal should be presented to the Warsaw Pact at one time as an addition to the current NATO Phase I proposal. The objectives of the current Phase I proposal should remain unchanged.

2. The President has directed that full consultation concerning this decision be undertaken with the British and German governments before this proposal is presented to NATO. Until these consultations are completed, the proposal should not be discussed with any of the other NATO Allies.

3. When presented to NATO, the proposal should be accompanied by an explanation of the reasoning leading up to this decision and an analysis of the issues associated with the introduction of nuclear elements.

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–131, NSDM/NSSM Originals, NSDM 284, Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Lodal drafted the NSDM, forwarded it to Kissinger on January 27, and Kissinger sent it to Ford for his approval on February 1. According to an attached routing memorandum, Ford approved it on February 4. The text was then sent as telegram 26621 to the delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna, February 5. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 221, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 1973–75)

2 Document 351.
4. The U.S. air manpower proposals authorized in NSDM 269 do not require Allied air manpower reductions in Phase II and no such reductions should be proposed by the U.S. While the U.S. would be willing to include air manpower in its Phase I reductions, no commitment to the specific size of the U.S. air manpower reduction should be made at this time.

5. Combined air/ground manpower totals for U.S., Soviet, NATO, and Pact forces may be presented in support of an Alliance proposal to include air manpower in the common ceiling. However, additional force strength data should be provided to the Warsaw Pact only on a reciprocal basis, where the Pact has agreed to present comparable figures.

6. In light of the modifications in the U.S. position concerning inclusion of air manpower in the common ceiling, no further proposals should be made at this time concerning the redefinition of ground force categories.

7. No proposal concerning exceptions to post-reduction ground manpower levels, other than that authorized by NSDM 269, should be made at this time. While normal Pact rotations could be permitted under the final agreement, the terms of an exception for these rotations should be negotiated only after the Pact has explicitly proposed the exceptions it desires.

8. Until full consultations have been completed with the NATO Allies, all negotiations and discussions should be conducted within the guidance contained in NSDM 269, as modified by paragraphs 4 through 7 above.

Henry A. Kissinger

358. Editorial Note

During the winter and spring of 1975, Jan Lodal of the NSC staff wrote several entries in his daily log relating to mutual and balanced force reductions.

On February 4, 1975, he wrote: “I arranged to see Wilberforce tomorrow and tell him about MBFR. Hal [Sonnenfeldt] and I still think Henry should discuss this privately with the Soviets first, but he apparently doesn’t intend to, or perhaps already has. Brent [Scowcroft] feels strongly he is playing the MBFR thing perfectly straight.” On February 5, he noted: “I met with Makins and Wilberforce this morning. I
went over Option III with them as to what we plan to do. Wilberforce had a fair number of questions—the expected British ones. I suspect we'll have some trouble.”

His subsequent log entries read in part: “Thursday, February 27, 1975. The Trilaterals with the British and Germans on MBFR started this morning. Ikle ran them, and as usual, didn’t know what he was talking about. Tickell gave his pitch, concentrating on the need for a strong common ceiling agreement at the end of Phase I. Ikle danced around with it, and I finally hit Tickell hard by asking him what the difference was between his approach and the ‘conflation’ approach which does away with the two phases. He said, ‘You have stripped the clothes right off my back.’” The entry for February 27 continued: “I went to lunch at Wilberforce’s house with the MBFR people. I ate with Fred Ruth, the German Foreign Ministry man on MBFR, and with Tickell. We continued our discussions. Ruth is a charming and very bright man. Generally, I think we made progress. Lou Michael also sat at our table and was very helpful. He also thanked me for my comments at the morning meeting, saying he thought they brought the issue to the fore.”

On March 31, Lodal wrote: “I returned to prepare for an MBFR Working Group in the afternoon. The argument about how to handle ceilings issues continues. I am not surprised—I always thought we had failed to come to grips with the ceilings issues. At the Working Group, we reached a tentative agreement that we would proceed according to the ‘Ruth’ plan—vague reciprocal ceilings on warheads, and our original approach on everything else.”

On April 4, he wrote: “We had an MBFR Working Group meeting in the afternoon to go over the now reconstituted Option III ceilings issues. Hopefully, it is all put together.” Lodal’s entry on April 11 reads in part: “I talked to Ikle about MBFR—he’s gotten cold feet on Option III. He has completely lost his mind—as to the extent he ever had one.”

On April 22, Lodal wrote: “We had an MBFR Working Group meeting to get a rundown from Resor on the last round, which just ended Friday. Of course, nothing happened. I feel sorry for Resor’s having to put up with that job.” Lodal’s entry continues: “I gave Lou Michael a note telling him that I am pretty well convinced that Sonnenfeldt and Lehman are in cahoots to get Ikle to undercut our MBFR Option III approach. Sonnenfeldt hates Option III (in my view irrationally) and Lehman hates all arms control, so it is a convenient alliance. I told him that as far as I can tell, HAK sincerely wants to proceed with Option III. I suggested that JRS [Schlesinger] talk to Ikle. Michael answered the note by saying he agreed that Sonnenfeldt and Lehman were working together. He said further they had high-level help in OSD, but not from Schlesinger. He said he would try to get Schlesinger to talk to Ikle.”
On April 23, Lodal wrote: “Haig was in town today and apparently told Kissinger that we have to stop Schlesinger on trying to get the nuclear weapons out of Europe. I made a fairly strong pitch to Sonnenfeldt that we should try to keep Kissinger from taking knee-jerk reaction on every item, such as this. I understand how Kissinger wants to avoid any impression of US pullbacks at this time—but that doesn’t mean he should stop the entire Government and stop all efforts to do reasonable analysis.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 70, Daily Log)

On May 1, Lodal sent a memorandum to Kissinger in which he wrote that “we are having serious difficulties with Fred Ikle.” The memorandum continued: “He is making major out-of-channel efforts to undo our MBFR position. For some reason, he has decided we should not proceed with Option III. There is significant evidence that he is influencing both the British and the Germans in their questioning of Option III, and he is now preparing a memo for the Verification Panel primarily suggesting major changes in our approach. He has continued to work outside the interagency process, rather than using the Working Group.” A notation at the top indicated that Kissinger saw the memorandum. (Ibid., Box 65, Memos and Background Papers)

In May, Lodal wrote additional entries in his log regarding MBFR. On May 5, he wrote: “I had lunch with Chris Makins. He told me Wilberforce will leave in August. He also plans to leave in August to go to New York—the Trilateral Commission. He said the British were not opposed in principle to Option III. We should get their comments in a couple of days. Their main concerns are with the common ceiling (they want it specified numerically in the first phase), equipment ceilings (they say they haven’t worked it out yet), and having the US make a bilateral approach to the Soviets before we table it.” On May 9, he wrote: “Resor had talked to Brent briefly today to see if we are still interested in MBFR. Brent said he reassured him. I feel sorry for Resor—it’s a bad job.”

On May 29, Lodal wrote: “We had a meeting of the MBFR Working Group in the afternoon and made final changes to the next steps paper. I will send it out to Sonnenfeldt and HAK, and we should be able to introduce it in the next week or two in the NAC.” (Ibid., Box 70, Daily Log)
Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Introduction of MBFR Option III in NATO

In your talk with Resor in Vienna\(^2\) you agreed in principle to introducing Option III into NATO for consultations. You also discussed this with Schmidt and Genscher in Bonn\(^3\) and they said the Germans, in NATO, would not make an issue of Option III as long as the FRG was not singled out for special treatment. I have since confirmed this with Genscher in Brussels\(^4\) who promised to keep a personal eye on the NATO consultations to prevent his technicians from staging a divisive debate. You also indicated to Schmidt that in all probability we would not table Option III in Vienna until after CSCE is finished—the NATO consultations will take at least two months anyway. (There may, in fact, be pressure for us to raise the option bilaterally with the Soviets, possibly at the Brezhnev Summit.)

The question now is, therefore, whether to proceed this week in NATO. It was previously felt that the presence of Portugal might be a problem, but at one point you indicated that you felt the Soviets know the Option pretty well in any event. (It is not substantially changed from two years ago.) There is no other NATO forum that can be utilized; any forum excluding Portugal would have to be ad hoc, probably be opposed by several allies and, in any case, become known to the Portuguese. Consequently, in present circumstances, I see no alternative but to proceed in the NAC (with Portugal present) with the Option III consultations.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret. Sent for “Prompt Attention.”

2 Kissinger met with Resor at the latter’s request in Vienna on May 20; handwritten notes of their conversation are in the Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Jan Lodal Convenience Files, Box 6, Memcons and Summaries of Discussion, May 1975, 1. Kissinger was in Vienna from May 18 to 20 to discuss the Middle East and CSCE with Gromyko; see Documents 284–287.

3 See Document 289.

4 No record of this conversation has been found.
Recommendation

That you approve proceeding with Option III consultations in the NAC this week (of June 2). 5

HS

5 Kissinger initialed his approval. Telegram 132089 to USNATO, June 6, contained the final draft of the paper, “US Views on Next Steps in MBFR,” for distribution to the NAC “in connection with introduction of US proposal on Option III.” Telegram 3230 from USNATO, June 11, reported that in the course of the day, Ambassador Bruce introduced the U.S. proposal on Option III to a session of the North Atlantic Council. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

360. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kornienko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sukhodrev

US
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor, State Dept.
Walter Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

SUBJECT

Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Call on The President

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

Gromyko: First, under the general heading of European affairs, I wish to express the satisfaction of our leadership and of Leonid

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 32, USSR, Gromyko File (30). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 3:45 to 7:12 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) In an attached memorandum to Scowcroft, Sonnenfeldt wrote: “Attached is the memcon on the President’s meeting with Gromyko. We have made no distribution here.” The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.
Brezhnev personally that a significant step was taken in Europe with the holding of the European Security Conference. The General Secretary said this to you directly, but I too want to express my appreciation for the cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union in preparing for the conference and bringing it to a successful conclusion.

Now, about the Vienna talks on force reductions. No substantive progress has been made as yet. I don’t want to go into the details and maybe Dr. Kissinger will talk about this. However, no cracks have yet appeared in the sky because of the lack of progress. We will do our part, but one side cannot guarantee success. We hope that both sides will make efforts to achieve success.

The President: I appreciate your kind words about our position concerning the Security Conference. I fully supported the agreement and defended it in the US. I feel the spirit in which we entered it—if fulfilled—can bring fruits in the coming years.

I am glad you mentioned the Vienna talks. There has not been enough progress there. You feel, and we do also, that we can bring this to a point where there can be an agreement on a reduction. I hope the negotiators in Vienna on both sides will take actions toward this end. I assure you the US will do so.

Gromyko: I appreciate your words, Mr. President.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

The President: Mr. Foreign Minister, the world would be safer if the arms race could be discontinued on a world-wide basis. Perhaps the best way to lead in this direction would be for us to conclude a SALT agreement and MBFR. This would show the good faith of both of us and would show the way toward ending the arms race. It would be an example and would lend credibility to what we want to see in the world as a whole.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Washington, September 19, 1975, 8:15–10:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

SUBJECTS

Cyprus; CTB and Ban on New Systems; Korea; MBFR; Middle East

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

MBFR

[Kissinger:] Before we turn to our main subject, do you have any ideas on the direction we might take in Vienna? Or is the present framework...?

Gromyko: First, some time ago you will recall you intimated to me, in Vienna or in Geneva, that you were considering discussing in the framework of the Vienna talks new types of arms. Notice I don’t say “new systems”? But since then we have seen nothing new in the Western positions. So we come to the conclusion there is no new Western view.

That is my first point. My second point is: we feel now that what is being demanded of us by the Western side is completely unjust. All
these bargaining points—and that’s what they are—are impossible. We are told we have too many tanks. And we should just take them out—just for a thank you. And all this is called a mutually advantageous agreement. Maybe I’m exaggerating a little bit, but all this really conveys the spirit of what is happening in Vienna.

Now my third point is: It may well be that soon we may have the urge to discuss this again, maybe on a bilateral basis with the United States, before we decide on what further steps we may take in Vienna. I don’t want to be ahead of myself, but this may happen.

Kissinger: It is not excluded.
Gromyko: Not excluded.
Kissinger: Its rejection is not guaranteed. I’m practicing double negatives. But I’m a minor leaguer!
Can I interpret your beginning remarks about nuclear weapons to mean that if this were included, our proposals might look less unequal?
Gromyko: We said in Vienna that it would certainly facilitate matters if there could be a broader approach, both with the number of states involved and the types of arms. But it seems not to have been developed further.
Kissinger: We are studying it, and the possibility of including it is not excluded.
Regarding your third point, we would be interested in bilateral exchanges on that before major steps are taken in Vienna, because it might facilitate matters.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

362. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 24, 1975, 7–11:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom
James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Alan Campbell, Deputy Under Secretary

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 20, External Classified Memcons, May–December 1975, Folder 4, Secret; Sensitive. The conversation took place in Secretary Kissinger’s Suite (35A) at the Waldorf Towers.
September 1973–January 1977

France
Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Francois de Laboulaye, Political Director
Mr. Constantin Andronikof

Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Deputy Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guenther van Well, Political Director
Dr. Heinz Weber

United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

Mr. Callaghan raised the topic of MBFR. He had seen a report that there would be no new Western proposal. Mr. Sonnenfeldt said it was true that the West would not open with a new proposal, but the Western allies were already discussing Option 3. Mr. Callaghan and Dr. Kissinger both agreed that by the quadripartite dinner in December we should decide. Dr. Kissinger remarked that the present U.S. position had no chance of being accepted. Mr. Callaghan had discussed it with Gromyko. Gromyko had wanted equal proportional cuts and would not agree to a ceiling. Dr. Kissinger agreed that that was unacceptable. The Soviets could not accept strategic parity in SALT and yet not in MBFR. Mr. Callaghan reported that Gromyko had told him of Brezhnev’s strong interest in reaching an MBFR agreement. Perhaps it was possible after SALT II.

Dr. Kissinger denied reports that the U.S. was impatient with the pace of Option 3. Option 3 represented the U.S.’s best thinking, but the U.S. was open minded. We should find another proposal, or agree on Option 3, or else drop the negotiation. Mr. Callaghan hoped that Dr. Kissinger was not serious about the last. The MBFR negotiation was very valuable in Britain because it enabled HMG to counter the advocates of unilateral disarmament. Dr. Kissinger agreed. The U.S. had also discovered in its experience of the SALT negotiations that with agreed ceilings the USG had a better chance in Congress of building up to that level than without a ceiling. Mr. Sonnenfeldt believed that the Four would reach agreement on Option 3 by December.

Dr. Kissinger observed that the U.S. had the advantage at the moment of having a corner on the grain market. The Soviet Union had nowhere else to go. Therefore the U.S. had considerable leverage between now and December. Mr. Sonnenfeldt added that the drop in the gold market also cut the Soviet foreign exchange reserves. Dr. Kissinger felt it was not good, however, to have our whole position depend on a Russian economic crisis.
He returned to his point about Gromyko. He still had an uneasy feeling, even though he could honestly report that things went fairly well with Gromyko. Mr. van Well saw some disappointment on the Soviet side. Some young Soviets had told him they were unhappy with the lack of stamina of their seniors, for example in “caving in” on Basket III at Helsinki. Mr. Sauvagnargues agreed. Mr. van Well said a Soviet diplomat had told him in New York: “The best thing to do is return to the Cold War so the West appreciates the advantages of détente.” Dr. Kissinger reported a similar comment to him by Ambassador Dobrynin: “In the Cold War, there was an important group in America defending a rapprochement; we could legally get credits and the only obstacles were administrative; and we never heard about human rights. Now there is no one defending it, our credits are cut off, and we keep hearing all about human rights.” Dr. Kissinger said this was true!

Mr. van Well said that the FRG meeting with Gromyko had been all right. Gromyko had assured the FRG of the Soviet commitment to détente. Dr. Kissinger had been told the same thing. But he felt it was no longer said with the same conviction.

Mr. Callaghan observed that Brezhnev should be happy with the CSCE document. Dr. Kissinger said that we vastly exaggerated the benefits to them of Helsinki. All the frontiers in Europe had already been recognized by the peace treaties and bilateral agreements that all of us had signed. There was nothing new in CSCE except Basket III—and peaceful change of frontiers. Mr. Callaghan agreed, and said that this answered Dr. Kissinger’s question. They didn’t know where to go, Mr. de Laboulaye added. They were deeply humiliated by what happened in America with the trade bill, and by what the U.S. had done to them in the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger added. They may have no choice. If they went back to the Cold War, they would lose even the credits they were now getting. Plus the China problem, Mr. Sonnenfeldt added. Dr. Kissinger noted that Gromyko seemed convinced that the U.S. was going to make some major pronouncement in China—which was not true.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]
363. Memorandum From William Shinn of the Office of the Counselor of the Department of State to the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

Current Status of MBFR

A series of events in recent weeks has conspired to bog down the MBFR process. Three key issues in Brussels have as yet proved unyielding of resolution. Meanwhile, the EC meeting of October 6 produced added complications which threaten to hamstring the NATO clearance process. The Europeans suspect that we are in the midst of a reappraisal—a feeling which was abetted in large part by Lehman’s conversations in Europe.\(^2\) Schlesinger’s talks with Leber\(^3\) further fanned speculation that we were cooling on MBFR and the DPQ leak has added to European apprehensions over the entire exercise. Finally, the talks themselves which resumed September 26 are largely in a holding pattern with the Soviets waiting for our long-expected move.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret.

2 Lodal and Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger, October 3: “John Lehman has made a trip to Europe during which he discussed privately with Haig and several officials in the FRG and UK the idea of dropping reciprocal constraints from our Option III proposal. (These discussions could prove troublesome later.) Lehman claims that SACEUR, UK, and FRG would follow our lead immediately if we propose that the language in the draft guidance on reciprocal restraints be dropped. Ikle would like to change the US position before NATO clears it and asks that the VP address the matter.” (Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Steve Hadley MBFR Files, Box 61, Ikle/Lehman Reciprocity Initiative, Sept. 1975 (2)) On October 11, Higgins and Richard T. Boverie of the NSC staff also wrote in a memorandum to Scowcroft that “John Lehman convinced Ikle that the US position on reciprocity should be changed and Ikle signed out a memo to HAK on September 4 requesting a VP to reassess the issue” and that on “the following Monday (September 8) we held a VPWG on the subject at which each agency representative stated a willingness to reopen the issue in the USG, but all agreed that we should not change the US position now since that would serve to delay the NATO process of clearing Option II.” They continued: “Lehman then went to Europe where he talked `unofficially’ with Haig and with several UK and FRG officials about changing the US position. Upon his return he informed us that Haig and the Europeans would go along if we changed our position and that he no longer wanted to try to clear the current US language.” (Ibid., Sept. 1975 (4))

3 Schlesinger met with Leber in Bonn on September 28. According to a memorandum of their conversation, October 16, Schlesinger told Leber: “No one can guarantee that MBFR is riskless; if the negotiations continue for a lengthy period, it may not be bad. With respect to Option III, some elements are not costly to give up and others we’d give up with considerable reluctance. But we have to be careful because we should just be prepared to say ‘no’ to some of the Soviet offers.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0058, Germany 333)
German Attitudes

Van Well told Hillenbrand on October 9 that opposition was building in the FRG against MBFR.4 He also said that he was now the chief German policymaker on this subject. The British have told us that Van Well argued at the October 6 meeting for greater EC activity in preserving European interests and called for a study to be made.5 He reportedly voiced special concern over:

—Military limitation in a partial region of Europe, and
—The possible foreclosure of future European defense options.

Although he subsequently assured Hillenbrand that the EC had no intention of producing a common position on MBFR, he admitted that the goal of the discussions was to formulate criteria which could be used in NATO. The danger is that a CSCE type caucus could emerge and that this would produce the very kind of restrictive guidelines which you cautioned Van Well against in your conversation of September 17.6 Luns, of course, is acutely aware of this danger and fearful that NATO’s role in the MBFR process will be diluted.

The principal substantive issue at Brussels which bothers the Germans is the problem of Alliance equipment. Our position all along has been to avoid reductions and limits on Alliance equipment, but we have been reluctant to make binding pledges regarding Phase II. (We have likewise resisted a hard and fast prohibition against any future possibility of supplementing our nuclear offer with additional US elements.) In your talk with Van Well on September 17, he seemed to assume that we wanted a noncircumvention provision on both non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and non-US NATO equipment. This is not our position. We continue to hold that limits on allies’ equipment are not acceptable. Nevertheless, the FRG anticipates that the Soviets will call for such limits and they have put forward a scheme of seeking to reassure the East against non-US NATO equipment increases by arguing that the manpower ceilings would preclude this. We have pointed out that this argument simply doesn’t work when applied to systems such as aircraft and missiles which require relatively little manpower (3,000 men for our entire Option III package), and that it is a de facto agreement that some kind of limit is required. To resolve the impasse on this entire issue, we have submitted compromise wording which continues to state that limits on allies’ equipment are unacceptable in Phase I. We

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4 Telegram 16657 from Bonn, October 10, provided a summary of Van Well’s conversation with Hillenbrand. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
5 Telegram 15692 from London, October 10, provided a British report on the EC–9 meeting and Van Well’s comments. (Ibid.)
6 A memorandum of Sonnenfeldt’s conversation with Van Well is ibid., Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 5, Germany, 1975.
have also agreed to an inter-allied assurance to the FRG that there should be no reduction in non-US allied equipment in Phase II, but on the condition that this not be conveyed to the other side. To introduce Phase II issues such as this into the talks would make phasing impossible, but we are prepared to reassure the Germans that we will not allow the destruction of their equipment in either phase.

The UK and the Common Ceiling

The British have been cool to the use of the EC forum, but at Brussels they have remained firm on the issue which Hattersley raised with you last summer.7 In brief, the UK continues to argue that there should be a numerically agreed definition of the common ceiling in exchange for our Option 3 proposal in Phase I. This of course reflects the continued British interest in “conflation” of the two phases and this is why we object to it. It would open up a Pandora’s box of Phase II issues. Our most recent compromise proposal which the British currently have under consideration is as follows:

The Allies should insist that a Phase I agreement should contain a clear understanding as to the levels of all US and Soviet military personnel in the area of reductions, except for Naval personnel. They should seek a common understanding with the East on the aggregate level(s) of ground and (air) force personnel of both sides in the area of reductions following the Phase I reductions. If the course of Phase I negotiations makes this feasible, the Allies could in addition seek a common understanding with the East as to the numerical level of the common collective ceiling to be reached following the Phase II reductions.

Their initial reaction has been to note that we are still hedging in our language which is of course true. However, they have told us they consider it an acceptable basis for Alliance discussion and compromise.

France

At the October 6 EC meeting, DeRose listed five French concerns over Option III.8 They are as follows along with a suggested rebuttal.

1. The Soviets will press for inclusion of European Tac Nukes.

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7 On June 18, Sonnenfeldt wrote in a memorandum to Kissinger about a conversation with Hattersley: “In the subsequent discussion of MBFR, Hattersley reiterated UK fears that we are weakening on the common ceiling. I stressed that this remained our firm objective and that we would insist on the concept being accepted in some manner in a stage one agreement. The British seem to want a very precise agreement on the substance of the common ceiling in a stage one agreement, but I could not establish whether there is in fact a real difference between us. We agreed that NAC’s eventual guidance to the Vienna negotiators should put Option III in the context of our total negotiating position, including the common ceiling. Hattersley also left a paper on ceilings and constraints which reiterates UK proposals for avoiding common ceilings on US and Western tanks. We will staff this through the VPWG and respond to the UK later.” (Ibid., Box 12, Daily Activities Reports) A memorandum of Sonnenfeldt’s conversation with Hattersley is ibid., Box 4, Britain, 1975.

8 Telegram 15692 from London, October 10, reported on De Rose’s expressed concerns at the EC–9 meeting. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
—Our position is to resist such demands.

2. A ceiling on non-Soviet Warsaw Pact tanks will be necessary and will lead to a ceiling on European and US tanks.

—We can’t have this both ways. If we are concerned over Pact circumvention of tank reductions, we would indeed have to face similar Soviet demands on European tanks. However, our position has been that the danger of Soviet circumvention through its Pact allies is not sufficient to warrant raising the issue with its invariable consequences. If non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries increase their tanks, the West Europeans would be free to do likewise.

3. The non-verifiability of warhead reduction would set a dangerous precedent.

—As you recall, DeRose raised the verification argument in your exchanges with him last spring. Your reply then still holds. We believe the Soviets have means of monitoring reductions of our nuclear warheads as well as the withdrawal and remaining levels of aircraft and launchers. In any case, we doubt they would denigrate their own verification ability by arguing later that they had signed an agreement which could not be verified.

4. Inclusion of nuclear capable F–4’s is inconsistent with the principle of reduced asymmetries.

—We actually have a superior nuclear-capable aircraft force in Europe; the reductions we are contemplating in Option III will have little effect on the nuclear balance and are well worth the improvements in the conventional balance which they are designed to facilitate.

5. Option III could be the first step for denuclearization of Europe.

—We have no intention to denuclearize Europe. Our rationale for Option III is to use an asset which we have in surplus to reduce Soviet armor which is a destabilizing element.

**The Reciprocity Issue**

As a result of Lehman’s trip, the Europeans are aware that we are reviewing our position on reciprocity. That position states that the Soviets “would not increase their armaments analogous to those withdrawn by the US in such a manner as to undermine the basis of the agreement.” At Brussels, only the FRG has failed to clear this wording and the FRG has asked only for clarification. This we could easily provide as OSD has carefully examined possible formulations ranging from a freeze on equipment to a broad noncircumvention pledge.

On October 20, John Thomson told Lodal that the British saw both sides of this issue.9 On the one hand it could be argued as more impor-

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9 No record of this conversation has been found.
tant to retain Western flexibility on tanks than to tie down the East on nuclears. On the other hand, it would be difficult to limit the West but not the East in the politically sensitive area of nuclear arms. Thomson said the British did not feel strongly but would be willing to drop reciprocity if we made it doubly clear that there would be no limits on allies’ equipment. He said that they would be extremely upset if we dropped reciprocity and then later started asking for limits on alliance equipment.

Despite what John Lehman was told in Europe, chances are that we could clear our current position on reciprocity at NATO. However, the issue has now been mooted in the USG and will probably require VP consideration later this month. To bring you up-to-date on the bureaucratic infighting, on October 16 Schlesinger cleared the OSD position personally, calling for retention of the current US position and deferral of any reassessment until after the “pause,” following our initial presentation of Option 3 at Vienna.

Recent intelligence findings indicate the Soviets are building up and modernizing their nuclear forces in the guidelines area. This not only creates a military rationale for reciprocity, but strengthens the political case as well. When this information becomes known, it will be difficult to defend an agreement which failed to take it into account.

Themes to Stress in the Discussion

—As the President has said, we are anxious to move forward in MBFR and to table Option 3. We are not undertaking a major review of our position. There is nothing up our sleeve. Our position is what we have described it to be at Brussels.

—We have said all along that we have no objection to discussion by the Europeans of European issues in MBFR, but NATO should remain the primary focus.

—We remain aware of the pitfalls of the MBFR process and of Option 3; in particular, we have long recognized the possibility that MBFR might be seen as leading to a special zone of military limitations in Central Europe; however, there is little danger of this given the modest dimension of the measures being proposed. Our objective has always been to reduce the instabilities and hazards of the current balance of forces in this region and hence enhance its security as well as the security of all NATO partners committed to the common defense.

—Option 3 is a logical move to further this objective by bargaining forces we don’t need against the Pact superiority in men and armor which is threatening and dangerous.

10 A letter from Michael, October 16, to the Chairman of the Verification Panel Working Group citing Schlesinger’s endorsement is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject Files, Box 13, MBFR (21).
—This move will be complemented by the planned modernization of our forces, both nuclear and conventional, to make them more effective and credible.

—It is possible that the Soviets may elect to defer a response to Option 3 until SALT is wrapped up. However, we see no reason to delay putting Option 3 on the table at the current session in Vienna.

364. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, undated.

Occasion

Meeting in Hal Sonnenfeldt’s office on October 31, 1975, to discuss constraints on Soviet nuclear systems and US tanks in MBFR (reciprocity). Sonnenfeldt called the meeting.

Attendees: Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, Goodby, Shinn and Baraz from State; Lehman from ACDA; Wade from Defense; and Higgins from NSC.

Summary of Discussion

Sonnenfeldt stated that someone had told the British that we were going to change our position on Option III and that he had a call from the Ambassador. He asked who had spoken to the British and what was he to tell them. No one answered.

After some discussion of the issue of whether and how we should address Soviet nuke systems in MBFR, the discussion boiled down to Bartholomew and Lehman arguing that we should say nothing about Soviet nuclear systems or US tanks in MBFR, and Wade arguing that Defense could not foreswear all discussion of Soviet nuclear systems but was willing to defer it. He agreed with Bartholomew that we should drop all references to our willingness to accept limits on US tanks.

Hyland and Shinn pointed out that at the end of the day we had to say something about Soviet nuclear systems in the NGA if ours are to have hard and fast ceilings, and we had better not indicate to our allies that we oppose such discussions only to bring it up later. Higgins reminded the group that John Thomson had made it clear that UK

1 Source: Ford Library, NSC Program Analysis Staff, Steve Hadley MBFR Files, Box 61. Secret. Presumably drafted by Higgins.

2 Not further identified, but possibly a reference to Lehman’s talks in Europe; see footnote 2, Document 363.
willingness to go along on no reciprocity was conditioned on our committing ourselves to not bringing up constraints for alliance systems later in another context,\(^3\) and that the Defense position of calling for a general discussion on nuclear systems in the area later was just what the UK feared. All agreed that we had to make our intentions clear to the allies.

Sonnenfeldt pointed out that we could not “sell the same horse twice”; that is, give the Soviets Option III in exchange for tanks and then try to sell ceilings on Option III elements for something else; Option III reductions imply ceilings on reduced elements. Higgins pointed out that the willingness to accept limits on US tanks was the price for Soviet nuclear restraint and that we probably couldn’t have it both ways as Defense was now asking, i.e., eventual limits on Soviet nukes but no limits on US tanks.

Lehman suggested that we might be able to devise an internal allied understanding that we would address Soviet nukes later but say nothing to the Soviets in our Option III ceilings presentation about Soviet nukes or our tanks. Hyland pointed out that we would still have to have something to say when asked.

There was agreement that the problem is not yet resolved and all parties except Lehman and Sonnenfeldt seemed to think a VP would probably be the best way to resolve it. Sonnenfeldt thought that we needed a VP soon to discuss broader MBFR issues but that the reciprocity question was still not ready for addressal by principals. He asked the group to try again to resolve the issue before the VP meeting. If the solution involved a policy change, we could circulate a cable to principals. He said that the problem would probably come up during the NSC on NATO nuclear issues anyway.

After the meeting I asked him if he thought we should continue to try to arrange a meeting for Saturday, November 8. He said we should take another shot at solving reciprocity\(^4\) and if we can get something settled, then put off the meeting until a little later.

\(^3\) See Document 363.

\(^4\) On November 13, Ikle wrote Resor in telegram 268683 to the delegation to the MBFR talks: “I want to make sure that you are accurately apprised of the situation in Washington with respect to the reciprocal limits issue. The situation is as follows: Three weeks ago, we obtained complete agreement at senior levels in Washington regarding the change to the US position on this issue. Subsequently, State raised an objection regarding one point in the draft cable. State offered several alternative formulations, any one of which is acceptable to ACDA. In subsequent discussions between State and Defense, Defense has refused to compromise on one sentence in the cable. The process is now stalled on this point. I would hope in your conversations with Defense representatives in Vienna that you could have them urge OSD to try harder to reach a common position with State and get on to the NPC with this issue. Because of recent developments the prospect of a VP meeting in the near future is remote.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) and the Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Summary

The MBFR negotiations in Vienna are essentially stalemated. In an effort to stimulate some progress in the negotiations, the U.S. has proposed to the Allies that NATO offer to reduce a package of U.S. nuclear elements. Since June, the Alliance has engaged in prolonged debate over several facets of this offer. Last week, in an effort to conclude the debate, the U.S. offered a series of proposals designed to meet the remaining Allied concerns over:

—reciprocal limits on Soviet nuclear systems; 2
—limitations/reductions of non-U.S. Allied equipment; and
—the form of Phase II reduction commitments.

We also gave an indication of our views on timing. 3 Preliminary Allied reactions have been encouraging. However, we cannot say with certainty whether or not the Alliance will be in a position to table the offer in Vienna before the Christmas break. 4

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 3, HS Official, Chronological. Secret. Sent through Sonnenfeldt. Vest initialed for Hartman. Drafted by John W. Salmon (PM/DCA); cleared by Vincent Baker (PM/DCA), Goodby, Gerald Helman (EUR/RPM), and Philip S. Kaplan (S/P). In an attached note to Kissinger, November 28, Sonnenfeldt wrote in part: “I have made clear to David Bruce and Resor that we are not to press for a deadline, although our various suggestions on how to resolve the remaining issues may well speed up the NATO work on Option III in the next week. If it turns out that the Alliance does indeed complete its work—finally, after months—next week, I will send you a message to give you a further opportunity to review this issue.”

2 Telegram 276242 to USNATO, November 21, contained the guidance. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)

3 Telegram 277369 to USNATO, November 22, contained the U.S. proposal on timing equipment reductions and Phase II reduction commitments. (Ibid.)

4 Sonnenfeldt and Kissinger discussed the timing of the tabling of Option III in a telephone conversation on November 21. A transcript of their conversation reads in part: “S[onnenfeldt]: On the Callaghan thing about the MBFR timing. We are making major effort in NATO to get some of these issues resolved. I wanted to check with you that you still agree that if we can get this done before this session of the MBFR that we should get Option 3 on the table before recess for Christmas. K[issinger]: What do we gain by that? S: I would not kill myself to get it done, but you recall Callaghan says they would like to do it before the defense estimates in February. K: Could we not do it before the beginning of next session? S: We could, but I am not exactly sure of the timing of it. The theory
The Option III Deliberations in Brussels

Last week the US proposed to the Allies a series of compromises designed to resolve differences on major outstanding issues and permit prompt completion of work on the Option III Guidance and Position Paper.5 If the US proposals are accepted, the Allies at the technical level will have completed all the work necessary for tabling Option III in Vienna. The next question, then, will be one of policy—whether and when to table. Some of the Allies want to make the proposal to the Soviets prior to December 18, the end of the current MBFR round. In any event, the policy question promises to be a prominent item for discussion at the forthcoming NAC Ministerials.

On timing, the US has stated that we would like to have the option to table the offer during this round. However, a clear US statement that we wish to proceed promptly would be very helpful if we do indeed wish to table the offer before the Christmas break. In general, the FRG seems prepared to go ahead this round while the UK has not yet given a clear response. The British have asserted, for example, that the US would probably not wish to proceed with Option III because of the difficulties in SALT. Moreover, some Allies may have developed the impression that the US is not very anxious to pursue MBFR. They may have based this impression in part on their reading of high level attitudes in the USG. In addition, the reservations long harbored by many Allies over MBFR’s implications have begun to manifest themselves in a variety of ways—most notably through the FRG-inspired inauguration of EC–9 consultations on MBFR.6 Since the Allies recognize that tabling Option III in Vienna could propel the talks into a far more active stage, we expect them to approach the decision to table with caution.

The principal outstanding issues, on which the U.S. offered compromises last week, include:

—whether or not to seek reciprocal limits on Soviet nuclear systems analogous to the U.S. systems being reduced under Option III;

is the Soviets would have time to mull it over during the recess, and we would not have to answer so quickly so many questions which might not be easy to answer. K: My instinct is to do it at the beginning of the next session though I am open-minded about it. They must know pretty well what we are going to do. S: The issue is how to deal with the questions the British are raising. K: I would not want us to be driving too hard. S: We are going to make suggestions that supposedly take care of what the British and Germans want.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000BCFA.pdf)

5 For texts of Guidance and Position Paper, See Tabs 1 and 2. For texts of US compromise proposal, see Tabs 3 and 4. [Footnote in the original. Tabs 1–7 are not attached.]

6 See Document 363.
—the acceptability of limitations and/or reductions for non-U.S. Allied equipment and the tactics for handling the question; and
—whether the Phase II manpower reduction commitments of the Western direct participants would be collective or national.

Reciprocity

This issue has been vigorously disputed internally within the USG. The initial U.S. position, currently in the Option III Draft Guidance, was a bureaucratic compromise which called for preventing increases of Soviet nuclear systems of such a magnitude as to “undermine the basis of the agreement.” The FRG challenged this language as dangerously vague, and asked us to clarify it.

Subsequently, ACDA, JCS, and State (with the Deputy Secretary’s approval) reopened the issue within the USG with a view to dropping our demand for reciprocity. These agencies argued that seeking such limits would lead to limits on U.S. tanks and buttress WP demands for limits on non-U.S. Allied equipment. Other elements of the government resisted such a change, basing their case on the “presentational” difficulties a total lack of restraint could have in Western parliaments.

Ultimately, the issue was resolved through another compromise. As a result, the U.S. told the UK and FRG\(^7\) that:
— the U.S. was opposed to limits on U.S. tanks (a logical concomitant of reciprocity); and
— the U.S. would defer a decision on whether or not to seek reciprocal limits on Soviet nuclear systems pending a Soviet response on Option III. Such a position would require removing the demand for reciprocity from the guidance.

This U.S. position on reciprocity has thus far only been discussed with the FRG and UK. The Germans stated they could accept the position at the working level\(^8\) and anticipated no difficulties with their senior officials. The UK has accepted the position at the ministerial level.\(^9\)

Limitations/Reductions of Non-U.S. Equipment

Avoiding the limitation or reduction of non-U.S. NATO equipment has been a prime Allied desideratum throughout the Option III debate. The U.S. has agreed to meet the Allies’ demands substantively but has attempted to secure Allied agreement that the WP need not be informed of the unacceptability of such limits or reductions, particularly with re-

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\(^7\) The proposal was transmitted in telegram 276242 to USNATO, November 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

\(^8\) Telegram 19212 from Bonn, November 25, reported the West German reaction. (Ibid.)

\(^9\) Telegram 18074 from London, November 24, reported Thomson’s acceptance. (Ibid.)
The U.S. recently proposed a compromise\(^\text{10}\) which would:

—codify internal Allied agreement that the reduction on non-U.S. Allied equipment is unacceptable to NATO in either phase;

—instruct NATO negotiators to “firmly resist” Eastern attempts to secure such reductions;

—require the negotiators to parry questions regarding Phase II with the statement that Phase II issues will be addressed only in Phase II; and

—authorize the negotiators to state at a fairly early point in the Option III negotiations that limitations on non-U.S. Allied equipment are unacceptable to the West, while leaving ambiguous whether this phrase refers to both phases.

Phase II Reduction Commitments

A central FRG concern in MBFR has been to avoid the establishment of so-called national sub-ceilings (i.e., a specific, codified limitation on the size of the Bundeswehr). The Alliance has adopted such a position and has repeatedly told the East that national sub-ceilings are unacceptable.

However, the FRG fears that should the Western direct participants formally accept commitments to reduce by specified amounts in Phase II, this could act as a backdoor to national sub-ceilings. Thus, in the course of the Option III debate, the FRG has sought to secure adoption of a NATO position under which the Alliance would collectively undertake an obligation to reduce by X amount in Phase II. The East would be informed of the national breakdown of these reductions only after the Phase II agreement is signed.

The U.S. has now offered to accept the FRG proposed language on this issue (it skirts the issue of when the WP will be informed of the national breakdown of the NATO reductions). In contrast to the German position, however, the U.S. proposal would preclude revealing to the East during the Phase I negotiations that NATO’s Phase II reduction commitment must be collective in nature.\(^\text{11}\)

Allied Reactions

The Alliance as a whole has only addressed the Phase II reduction commitments issue and the reductions portion of the reductions/limitations question. They have basically accepted the explicitly

\(^{10}\) Not found.

\(^{11}\) A note in the margin next to this paragraph, written in an unknown hand, reads: “inaccurate.”
substantive aspects of our proposals. However, they, with the exception of the UK, are balking at our desire to preclude Allied negotiators from exposing these NATO positions to the East with respect to Phase II. (Bonn’s preliminary reaction is at Tab 5 and the SPC discussion is reported at Tab 6.)\textsuperscript{12}

The UK and FRG have welcomed our proposals on limitations. With respect to timing, the UK is manifesting some reluctance to table the offer this round, but other Allies seem more anxious to proceed (Tab 7–USNATO 6476 and 6512).\textsuperscript{13}

State of the Negotiations in Vienna

The Vienna talks have made very little progress since their inception in October 1973. Both sides tabled proposals at the outset and with modest exceptions have generally been content to rest on those positions. NATO has offered the East a series of assurances designed to increase the attractiveness of our proposals on phasing and to meet their concerns that air force manpower will be totally unrestrained. The Pact, on the other hand, has proposed a series of cosmetic rearrangements of the basic elements in their opening position but has made effectively no substantive moves in our direction.

During the current round of talks, which began in September, the East has made it quite clear that they are content to await the West’s forthcoming nuclear offer. Recently, the Soviet representative told our representatives in Vienna that it would be very useful if the West could make its proposal before the Christmas recess.\textsuperscript{14} A considered response to a Western initiative, he stated, would take several weeks to develop and would require the presence of the Soviet Delegation in Moscow.

\textsuperscript{12} Telegram 19212 from Bonn, November 25, and telegram 6514 from USNATO, November 28, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.

\textsuperscript{13} Telegram 6476, November 26, and telegram 6512, November 28, from USNATO are ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} No record of this conversation has been found.

366. Editorial Note

On December 5, 1975, Counselor of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt sent an action memorandum to Secretary of State Kissinger, who was departing China, in telegram Tosec 230225. Sonnenfeldt wrote: “While I realize your preference was to wait until January before tabling our nuclear offer at Vienna, the completion of consultations at NATO
has created a situation propitious for going ahead before Christmas.” The telegram continued: “Final NAC approval is expected prior to the NATO ministerial and all the Allies expect timing to be discussed there. At Vienna we have proposed to end the current round on December 18. This would give us just enough time to table our proposal before the break. The guidance provides for a pause after our initial presentation, and this would coincide with the period between sessions. The Soviets have told our delegation at Vienna that they will need to return to Moscow in any case to consider the proposal they have so long been anticipating. They said they would need 4–6 weeks to give us a response.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 11, POL 3 MBFR Cables)

On December 8, Kissinger met with Sonnenfeldt, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs James G. Lowenstein, and other officials from the Bureau of European Affairs to discuss arrangements for his trip to Europe for the NATO Ministerial meeting from December 11 to 12. In the course of their conversation, Sonnenfeldt raised the issue of Option III. A memorandum of the conversation reads in part: “Sonnenfeldt: We also need a decision on MBFR. The issue is whether to table now or later. The Secretary: Since it will leak anyway, you may as well table now. Sonnenfeldt: I agree. The British slightly prefer waiting until January to table. A Soviet rejection before that could mean trouble when they publish their defense estimates. The Secretary: Well, I don’t think the Soviets will reject it right away. Sonnenfeldt: Also, if you prefer, I recommend that we flag our preference to the British and the Germans in advance. The Secretary: Don’t flag it. Let’s wait. Otherwise, the Germans and British will leak it. We can deal with it when we get to the Ministerial. What do you think? Lowenstein: We agree it should be tabled now in Vienna. Sonnenfeldt: Also, the Germans are worried. They have asked us to let them know in advance. If our judgment on balance is that we table, we should let Allies know. The Secretary: OK, go ahead and tell the Germans and British.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File)

On December 9 and 10, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld participated in a meeting of the Defense Planning Committee of NATO in Brussels. Kissinger subsequently attended the NATO Ministerial meeting, December 11–12, also in Brussels. For communiqués of both meetings, which referred obliquely to the introduction of Option III at the MBFR talks, see the NATO Online Library (http://www.nato.int/docu/comm.htm).

On December 11, journalist Drew Middleton wrote from Brussels in an article in the New York Times, “NATO Group Cool to Kissinger Plan”: “Western defense ministers ended a two-day meeting here today on a note that appeared to presage difficulties for a key proposal
of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. This proposal, which will be on the agenda when 15 foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meet tomorrow, calls for the withdrawal of 1,000 United States tactical nuclear weapons from Western Europe in return for the retirement from Central Europe of a Soviet tank army, normally 1,700 tanks and 65,000 men. Ten days ago, according to NATO military and civilian sources, the proposal had an excellent chance for approval by the foreign ministers. It was seen as a means of reviving the moribund East–West talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. [. . .] Several factors have promoted opposition to the proposal among even those NATO delegations, such as that of West Germany, that supported it at the outset. [. . .] One is the detailed description of Soviet military strength provided the defense ministers by NATO intelligence. The ministers, according to the communiqué, ‘expressed their grave concern at current trends altering the relative military strengths of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.’ Donald H. Rumsfeld, the new United States Secretary of Defense, warned about the ‘expanding Warsaw Pact military capability’ and stressed the need for the provision of adequate military resources for NATO. [. . .] A second, less generally understood factor arguing against acceptance of the Kissinger proposal is that the modernization of the United States Air Force in Europe will inevitably lead to a reduction of its tactical nuclear potential. Defense Department spokesmen believe the Secretary of State was unaware of this when he outlined his proposal last summer. The Air Force will introduce the F–15, a sophisticated fighter designed to win air superiority over the battlefield, within the next 18 months. The F–15’s do not have a nuclear capability. The F–4’s they will replace do.” (New York Times, December 11, 1975, page 9)

On December 11, President Ford met with Rumsfeld and President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft in the Oval Office. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part (brackets are in the original): “Rumsfeld: I had good bilateral meetings with the Defense Ministers. The sessions went well—with pluses and minuses. [He gave the President a Leber memo.] MBFR was discussed almost not at all. Scowcroft: Did you see Drew Middleton’s article in the New York Times? It discussed Option III and the DPQ. Rumsfeld: No. President: I did. It is very interesting. It talks about all these things. Rumsfeld: [discussed nuclear modernization, etc., and the dangers of giving the impression of denuclearizing Europe.] I have felt for years that we needed to get our own tactical nuclear strategy put together here and presented to the Europeans on an orderly basis. Haig has the same fears as Henry, Brent, and I are having. The Europeans are gaining the impression of denuclearization. We planned a paper for the NPC which should be revised—maybe into a paper for improving nuclear strategy. If we can agree on what we want to do and then start talking to NATO,
we could defuse the Congress (Pastore, Nunn, etc.) over nuclear weapons in Europe. We could present it to NATO bilaterally, through Haig, or by me in June in Hamburg. President: What would this do to MBFR? Rumsfeld: We would have to handle it in a way that it would have no adverse impact on MBFR. President: If we tabled Option III, and the Soviet Union accepted, what would be the reaction in NATO countries? Rumsfeld: I have stayed out of the tactics. That is Henry’s turf. Defense is involved in developing the US position, but it is up to Henry and you to decide on the negotiations. President: We talked MBFR at Rambouillet and Wilson brought up the point about reducing German forces in the first or second phase. Scowcroft: [Discussed the play on manpower reductions and phases].” Scowcroft summarized the conversation in telegram Tohak 12 to Kissinger in Brussels, December 12. (Ibid., Box CL 221, Geopolitical File, Rumsfeld, Donald, 1975–76)

On December 11, Scowcroft signed a message to be sent to Kissinger in Brussels as Tohak 13. It reads in part: “I also talked to Rumsfeld about the Drew Middleton article. He claimed not to have seen the article nor to be familiar with Drew Middleton. He said he did not know him and had not talked to him or any other member of the press. He agreed readily that Option 3 was not your proposal; in fact, he says he thinks he was first to think of it a couple of years ago. He had no answer at all with regard to the reference to a Defense spokesman and said that he had taken along only a press technician—not a press spokesman. He said that he did not know what you were or were not aware of with regard to nuclear modernization, but that Option 3 was floated long before last summer as claimed in the article. He maintained absolutely there could be no malicious intent, at least within his knowledge. I also discussed the matter with Wickham, who confirmed the essentials above and said with respect to the Defense spokesman reference in the article that Ellsworth had given a backgrounder. He called back later to say he had gone over the transcript of the Ellsworth backgrounder and there was nothing in it which could remotely be construed into what Middleton wrote.” Scowcroft’s message continued: “I see no reason why you should not set the record straight in your press conference tomorrow if you wish to do so, though I do not think association with Option 3, even when inaccurate, is anything one should shun, and I would not discuss the issue in a way which would bring into prominence an obscure article in the Times and give the impression that there may be more there than meets the eye. While there is no way of knowing without doubt, both Don and Wickham addressed the issue with an earnestness which lent credence to their statements.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Trip Files, Box 16, 12/10–17/75, Europe [Brussels, London, Paris, Nuremberg], Tohak [1])
Kissinger did not discuss MBFR or Option III in his news conference after the North Atlantic Council meeting. However, the issue of withdrawing tactical nuclear forces did come up in his interview with German television on December 12. The transcript of the interview reads in part: “Q.: The NATO states will make the offer in Vienna also to withdraw nuclear weapons from Western Europe. Isn’t this a dangerous concession? Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain it in English. I do not believe that it goes too far, because we will be offering a category of weapons of which, due to modernization, some have become dispensable, in return for withdrawal of substantial Soviet ground forces. But the United States remains firmly committed to a strong local defense in Europe, and the United States will under no circumstances participate in anything that will lead to the denuclearization either of Europe or of any part of Europe.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 12, 1976, pages 53–54)

On December 12, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote to Kissinger in telegram Tosec 240119: “Vorontsov just called to say that Dobrynin has noticed in press reports that NATO has adopted new MBFR proposals which will be presented to the Warsaw Pact next Tuesday. Dobrynin asked that I flag for you that it was the Soviet understanding that you had indicated to Gromyko that before any further MBFR proposals were adopted by NATO you would consult with Gromyko. ‘Now,’ said Vorontsov, ‘this seems to have slipped.’ Vorontsov went on to say that they could report from the newspaper articles today on the MBFR proposals, although they would ‘lack substance,’ but that perhaps I could ask if you had any detailed information that you wished Dobrynin to transmit to Gromyko. This, Vorontsov hoped, could be done before the proposals are officially put to the Warsaw Pact on Tuesday. Vorontsov closed by saying the Soviets were anxious that there be no break in the ‘continuity’ of consultations begun between you and Gromyko on MBFR and this was the purpose for his request for any information you might wish to pass on.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 218, Geopolitical File, Soviet Union, Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Chronological File) Sonnenfeldt wrote to Kissinger in a memorandum on December 18: “MBFR. We made our presentation in Vienna. Hyland did a preview with Vorontsov here.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Entry 5339, Box 7, Soviet Union)
367. Telegram From the Delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks to the Department of State

Vienna, December 19, 1975, 1040Z.


1. Begin summary. The final week of the seventh round of the Vienna force reduction negotiations witnessed the formal introduction of the Allied nuclear reduction proposal (Option III). US rep made the offer in a Dec 16 plenary statement in accordance with NAC-approved guidance which NATO Ministers authorized Dec 12 for use prior to the winter recess. At the Dec 18 plenary meeting, Soviet rep Khlestov provided the first official Eastern reaction to the new Western move. Khlestov said that the East would study the proposal. Soviet rep noted that the West had emphasized the one-time nature of the proposal and that it had been preceded by extensive Western press play, involved only US tactical weapons, was conditioned on Eastern acceptance of the Western reduction program, and would not preclude increases in air forces and nuclear delivery systems by non-US Western direct participants. Eastern comments on the offer to the press and in bilateral exchanges with Western reps generally echoed Khlestov’s plenary remarks. End summary.

2. Following months of speculation by Eastern reps here and in the Western press, the Allies this week officially added an offer of US nuclear reduction to their negotiating position in the Vienna force reduction talks. US rep formally made the offer to the East in a special Dec 16 plenary meeting. His presentation followed the NAC-approved guidance which NATO Ministers had authorized Dec 12 for use prior to the end of the current round. US rep emphasized that the possible withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear capable F–4 aircraft and 36 Pershing ballistic missile launchers from the US inventory in the reductions area was a unique offer dependent upon Eastern acceptance of previous Western proposals, all of which remained unchanged, that it was not a step toward further reductions and that...

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret. Also sent to the Department of Defense. Repeated to all MBFR Missions, Athens, Belgrade, Berlin, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Prague, Sofia, Stockholm, Warsaw, the delegation to SALT II, and Ankara.

2 Telegram 623 from the delegation to MBFR, December 16, contained the statement. (Ibid.)

3 Telegram Secto 24038, December 12, reported on the NATO Ministers’ authorization. (Ibid., D750432–0414)
reduction of non-US Western equipment was not included in it, nor would limitations on such equipment be acceptable to the West. In connection with this initiative, US rep stated that the West now proposed a combined common collective ceiling on ground and air manpower which might be set at approximately 900,000 men on each side. US rep stressed that West was taking this initiative because of the need for decisive action to break the impasse in the negotiations and move them toward the successful conclusion of a first phase agreement. His statement ended with an appeal for a considered and positive Eastern response when the talks resume following the winter recess.

3. As agreed by the ad hoc group, US rep met Dec 15 with Soviet rep Khlestov to brief him on the contents of the Western nuclear initiative. While maintaining a noncommittal attitude on the substance of the matter, Khlestov was considerably more relaxed than had been the case during a Dec 13 session in which US rep had discussed with him arrangements for the formal introduction of the new Allied proposal. We would speculate that in the interim Khlestov had received some reassurance that, as he had repeatedly warned might be the case, Moscow would not instruct him to reject the offer out of hand as a Western propaganda ploy.

4. Soviet rep Khlestov made the only presentation at the Dec 18 concluding plenary meeting of the seventh round. A few paragraphs near the end of his statement provided the first official Eastern reaction to the Allied nuclear initiative. He stated that the East, as was customary in such cases, would examine the contents of the proposal. Khlestov observed, however, that the proposal included only US tactical nuclear weapons and that it was conditioned on acceptance of the Western reduction program to which Eastern objections were well known. He noted Western emphasis on the one-time character of the offer and that it would not limit actual increases in air forces and nuclear delivery systems. Further, Soviet rep wondered what conclusions should be reached from the prolonged, detailed and propagandist treatment accorded the move in the Western press given the practice of confidentiality in the negotiations.

5. The balance of Soviet rep’s statement contained a measured criticism of the Western position along standard lines and summed up developments during the latest round. Under the latter heading, Khlestov dwelt on the question of force definitions. He termed resolution of this issue essential and faulted the West for continuing to resist agreement to the principle that similar force types should be allocated to the same armed service.

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4 No record of this meeting has been found.
6. After the Dec 18 plenary, the East, with Czechoslovak rep Lahoda as spokesman, held a press conference. His prepared statement consisted mainly of a low-key synopsis of Khlestov’s earlier comments on the Allied nuclear proposal, including the fact that it would receive Eastern study. The meeting quickly broke up once newsmen discovered that they could not get Czechoslovak rep to expand on the topic.

7. East-West bilateral exchanges during the week were similarly guarded. Eastern reps generally confined themselves to a ritual expression of disappointment with the contents of the new Western offer, particularly its US-only and one-time aspects. They also tended to play upon the press-leaks-equals-propaganda-ploy theme. By Dec 18, Eastern reps were, nevertheless, adding that the initiative would receive thorough examination.

8. The Vienna talks are scheduled to reconvene the week of January 26.

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368. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, January 22, 1976, 6:04–9:42 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
V.G. Komplektov, Acting Chief of USA Dept, MFA
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, MFA
( interpreter)

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East, Box 1, USSR, January 21–23, 1976, Kissinger Moscow Trip (2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting took place in Brezhnev’s office at the Kremlin. All brackets, with the exception of those indicating omitted material, are in the original. Kissinger was in Moscow from January 21 to 23 to discuss further limits on strategic armaments. The full text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976.
Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, the talks on force and arms reduction in Europe have been going on for two years now. And I have spoken on this subject whenever I possibly could—in meetings and abroad, on many occasions. We have been consistently emphasizing that both sides should achieve these reductions without harming the security of either.

We have carefully studied the proposal of the West. The positive element in them is the fact that it recognizes the need for reduction of nuclear weapons, as well. This is something the USSR has favored from the very outset. However, the implementation of that is made contingent on acceptance by us of the entire Western scheme of reduction, which we have repeatedly made clear cannot be the basis for agreement. We have given much thought to a way we could move these negotiations off dead center.

Meeting the wishes of the Western side, we would agree that in the first stage, that is, in 1976, this year, there be a reduction in Central Europe of the armed forces of only the USSR and the United States by an equal percent, let’s say 2 or 3 percent of the total strength of the armed forces of countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in that area. We would be showing an example to all the others. Their forces would be frozen—not increased. We would be setting an example. It goes without saying that an agreement on such a reduction of Soviet and American forces should include the clearcut obligation of all other countries having forces in Central Europe on freezing their forces at the present level, and subsequent reduction in a later phase.

See Document 367.
To implement this proposal, as well as to achieve agreement on subsequent reductions, it would be necessary to reach agreement on what forces would be subject to this agreement and an understanding on the strength of forces in Central Europe.

I should like to hope our new proposals aimed at achieving progress at Vienna will meet a positive response on the part of the United States and other states. We believe they are a step toward reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. So I think we do have important things to consider, and a possibility here of moving the thing off dead center.

Kissinger: May I ask the General Secretary a few questions?
Brezhnev: Please.
Kissinger: By 2–3 percent, you mean of U.S. and Soviet forces or of all forces?
Brezhnev: No, of all forces. The forces reduced would be Soviet and American, but the percent would be a percent of all forces, NATO and Warsaw Pact.
Kissinger: By a fixed percent of the total forces. Of all forces or of ground forces?
Dobrynin/Gromyko: Of all.
Gromyko: Further specification will be done at the talks. Our delegation will receive appropriate instructions.
Kissinger: So will our delegation. That doesn’t mean they’ll agree!
Brezhnev: The next time we meet we’ll speak English. Because Gromyko and Sukhodrev keep confusing me.
Kissinger: I’m convinced the General Secretary understands perfect English.
Brezhnev: Maybe 90 percent.
Kissinger: So he has an advantage. And I speak in German.
Kissinger: They all speak English when they don’t want you to understand.
Brezhnev: That’s right! What can I do about it?
Kissinger: Well, I don’t think this proposal will be rapidly accepted.
Gromyko: Well, accept it slowly. [Laughter]
Brezhnev: Take two to three weeks and accept it!
Gromyko: For friendship’s sake, take a month!
Kissinger: We’ll do it in the spirit of our special relationship.
Brezhnev: As I said at the outset, we do value the fact that in spite of differences and nuances, and while it is easier in our country than in yours, both are pursuing the line of détente, and we appreciate that.

Kissinger: Does this mean we’ll get a formal response to our proposal in Vienna?

Gromyko: There is now a recess. When it resumes, our delegation will give the formal reply to the Western proposal—which will be negative. Our delegation will then be instructed to set out in greater detail the proposal that was set out in general terms by the General Secretary.

Hyland: They’re meeting next week.

Brezhnev: What time will you be leaving town?

Kissinger: I think at 12:30.

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

369. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, January 23, 1976, 9:34–11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Vasilii V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Vasilii G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
V.G. Komplektov, Acting Chief of USA Dept., MFA
Valerian V. Mikhailov, Deputy Chief of USA Dept., MFA
Oleg Grinevskiy, Deputy Chief of Middle East Dept., MFA
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief of International Affairs, USA Dept., MFA
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Dept., MFA (Interpreter)

Kissinger: On the proposal last night with respect to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, do you have the number from which the two-to-three percent is to be calculated?

Gromyko: The General Secretary set out our view of principle, and they give you the line along which we are thinking and which will be set out in detail. And when we submit the specific proposals after discussions resume in Vienna, we will have specific considerations to set forth, and we are now giving deliberation to that aspect.

Kissinger: Because we can’t give a reply until we know what your number is.

Gromyko: We are now giving thought to that aspect and we feel in the very near future we will be able to give a definite reply. It certainly would be a good thing to give a new lease on life to the work in Vienna.

Kissinger: We will study it carefully. I’m not too optimistic, as I told the General Secretary.

Gromyko: So you are not taking away optimism on this?

Kissinger: I’ll have to see your concrete proposal before I make a final judgment.

Gromyko: All right. As long as you don’t carry away pessimism from Moscow on this question.

Kissinger: I think we should make progress this year on mutual force reductions.

Gromyko: That would be good. China will certainly have a lot to blame us for. If there is success. Mostly us.

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2 See Document 368.
Kissinger: China will certainly be very angry. China will certainly be very angry if there is success in SALT.3

[Omitted here is discussion of matters other than MBFR.]

3 On January 25, Kissinger reported to President Ford on his visit to Moscow in a conversation at the Oval Office. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: "President: Anything on MBFR? Kissinger: Yes. They rejected Option III. They proposed a 3% cut in overall forces, taken from U.S. and Soviet forces." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 283, Memoranda of Conversation, Presidential File)

370. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford1


SUBJECT

Soviet Response to Our MBFR Nuclear Proposal (Option III)

At the regularly scheduled informal meeting between Eastern and Western MBFR negotiators on February 17 in Vienna, the Soviets presented a counterproposal to our Option III nuclear offer.2 This new proposal combines certain elements of our Option III offer with the basic Warsaw Pact equal reduction approach laid out in earlier sessions.

We had earlier proposed a two-phased approach in which the USSR would withdraw a tank army consisting of 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks and the U.S. would withdraw a proportionate number of soldiers, about 29,000, in the first phase. In the second phase, both sides would make further reductions of about 180,000 Pact soldiers and 60,000 NATO soldiers to reach a ground force common ceiling of about 700,000 men. Our Option III offer of 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 Pershing missile launchers, and 36 F–4s was intended as a make-weight to offset the unequal manpower and tank reductions we were asking of the other side.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject Files, Box 13, MBFR (4). Secret. Ford initialed the memorandum. Boverie drafted the memorandum and forwarded it to Scowcroft on February 18. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files, Box 33, 7600946, Soviet Response to Our Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Nuclear Proposal, Option III)

2 Telegram 51 from the delegation to MBFR, February 17, reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
The Soviet proposal corresponds closely to the position which Brezhnev forecast to Henry last month:\^3

—Reduction during 1976 of from two to three percent of total NATO and Pact forces, to be taken in U.S. and Soviet forces only. (At two percent, the reduction would be about 20,000 U.S. and 23,000 Soviet men; at three percent, about 30,000 U.S. and 35,000 Soviet men.)

—Withdrawal of equal numbers of specified U.S. and Soviet equipment items, including 300 tanks, 54 nuclear-capable aircraft, an unspecified number of ballistic missile launchers, and 36 air defense missile launchers for each side. Warheads associated with these systems would also be withdrawn.

—A freeze on remaining NATO and Pact manpower, and a commitment, by all other participants in the negotiations, to reductions in 1977–78 such that at the end all parties will have reduced their manpower and equipment by an equal percentage.

The Soviets' proposal has some positive elements. They appear to have accepted the Alliance two-phased approach calling for withdrawal in the first phase by U.S. and Soviet forces followed by reductions by all participants in a subsequent phase. They have also accepted the Alliance position that only selected equipment should be specified for reduction and limitation rather than limiting all equipment items as they had indicated in their earlier proposals. Finally, this new position accepts the Alliance proposal that Allied forces on each side should be frozen during the period between the two phases. However, the new Soviet position indicates little flexibility on the central issue of whether reductions in MBFR should be essentially equal or should lead to an essentially equal outcome in Central Europe.

Before responding to the Soviet counterproposal, we will have to carefully examine several of its implications:

—Withdrawal and limitation of Soviet nuclear systems similar to those in our Option III offer would strip Option III of its value as a trade-off against the larger Soviet reductions of manpower and tanks which we sought in Phase I, and would undermine the central element of the Alliance position, the common ceiling on manpower.

—The proposal would only take out about one Soviet division plus some other units in the first phase rather than the three to five divisions of a Soviet tank army which we had sought as a first phase Soviet withdrawal.

—The proposal would reduce and limit U.S. tanks which are now at very low levels and would prevent us from ever approaching Soviet tank levels.

\[^3\text{See Document 368.}\]
—The reductions proposed would in effect codify in the Warsaw Pact’s favor the present disparities in manpower, tanks, and nuclear-capable aircraft in Central Europe.

—The proposed commitment by Allies to essentially equal percentage reductions in a subsequent phase would very likely lead to national subceilings on individual alliance members, an outcome which the Germans, in particular, strenuously oppose.

The Soviets have told us they intend to table this proposal formally at the plenary session in Vienna on February 19.4 They have also indicated they will respond more fully to our Option III proposal in subsequent sessions in Vienna.

We will be examining the Soviet proposal and working out our response options in the Verification Panel and its Working Group and will provide further details and analysis later.

4 Telegram 60 from the delegation to MBFR, February 19, reported the tabling of the Soviet proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

371. Editorial Note

During the spring and summer of 1976, the issue of data on military manpower for the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization became a key point of discussion in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. A member of the NSC staff wrote in an undated memorandum to Secretary of State Kissinger in May 1976: “Potentially a more interesting development [in the MBFR talks] than either the Soviet response to Option III or their counterproposal is the continued strong interest by the Soviets in resolving the question of what forces should be covered by an MBFR agreement and how these forces should be divided between ground and air. Since last summer, this has been the Soviets’ primary preoccupation and they keep returning to it at every opportunity. In the process they’ve given us many indications that when these discussions reach the right stage, they will be prepared to put some specific numbers on the table. Earlier in these discussions, Pact negotiators seemed to agree with ours that MBFR should cover all active duty military manpower and should exclude reservists, para-military forces, and civilians, as well as naval forces. The principal point of contention was how to divide the active military between ground and air forces.” During the last round of negotiations, the memorandum noted, “the Soviets withdrew their ‘draft
definition’ and argued: that Pact units are not fully manned; that only combat and combat-related forces should be covered by MBFR; that Pact active military forces performing functions performed by civilians for NATO should be excluded; that military personnel in schools, clubs, institutes, etc., should be excluded; and that the FRG Standby Readiness Reserve is actually an active military force and should either be covered by MBFR or the Pact should be compensated by excluding a force of similar size.”

The memorandum continued: “These developments indicate that the Soviets are maneuvering to reduce or eliminate the disparity perceived by the West in the manpower of the two sides. From their remarks in Vienna and intelligence reports, we expected them to follow up at the end of the last session by tabling data, based on their new ‘counting rules,’ which would show a markedly different picture of the force relationship than does ours. However, they did not do this and in the discussions near the end of the session Pact negotiators exhibited a good deal of confusion and uncertainty about the whole process.”

(Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada and Ocean Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 52, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 1976)

According to a history of the MBFR talks prepared by the Department of State, on June 10, 1976, “the Warsaw Pact tabled figures claiming that it had 987,300 troops in the [MBFR] reductions area—805,000 ground forces and 182,300 air force personnel. These figures were only a few thousand more than what the West had declared as NATO force totals in the reductions area, but some 174,700 fewer than NATO estimates of Warsaw Pact strength. The Pact military manpower in the reductions area became the central unresolved issue in the negotiations.” (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks, 1973–1989, Research Project No. 1553, May 1989, page 10)

The delegation to the MBFR talks reported in telegram 351, July 3: “At the June 29 informal session of the Vienna force reductions negotiations, Soviet rep Khlestov refused to answer questions posed by Western reps concerning data tabled by the East June 10, stating that the East was unwilling to discuss these data until the West had tabled comparable figures for NATO forces in Central Europe.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

On September 29, Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the MBFR data issue at a bilateral meeting in New York during the session of the UN General Assembly. A memorandum of their conversation reads in part: “Gromyko: We did not receive a reaction to our latest proposals [in Vienna]. Kissinger: Not to your proposals but to your giving the numbers. Gromyko: You [We?] suspect probably the
United States is holding it. Maybe your brotherly ministry. Kissinger: Sometimes we have problems relating to brother ministries, sometimes problems regarding allies. We have two problems. One is our [your?] figures with respect to your forces differ from our figures on your forces. We have to at some point discuss what is included. The second problem is France refuses to be included in the numbers. We are looking for a way to exclude France but still give you a meaningful number. The numbers we have aren’t significantly different from what we had in 1974, so you can use those. Your intelligence can tell you. The basic problem is the French. We can give you a figure that leaves out France but allows you to compensate for French forces so we can’t use French forces to evade the overall obligation. Gromyko: When can we get an answer? Hyland: October. It would be helpful if we could discuss theirs. Kissinger: Could we begin discussing the basis of your figures? Korniyenko: Not before your figures. Kissinger: That’s what I thought. Hyland: Our figures haven’t changed much. Sonnenfeldt: We are using different criteria to make the count. Kissinger: The problem the Foreign Minister is making is they won’t discuss their criteria until they get our figures. Korniyenko’s pithy remark [sic]. Sonnenfeldt: I understand. Kissinger: We will give you the figures during October. Gromyko: All right. All right.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 29; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger and Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 33, USSR, Gromyko File (33), 9/29/76)

On December 15, the U.S. representative to the MBFR talks, Stanley Resor, tabled Western data in Vienna and, on December 16, he made a statement on behalf of the Western participants at the plenary session of the talks: “The Western figures are as follows: (a) The total number of uniformed active duty military ground force personnel of Western direct participants in the area of reductions was 731,000 as of January 1, 1976. This represents an increase of approximately 14,000 in the total figure for these participants owing to more precise compilation since the negotiations began. (b) The combined total number of uniformed active duty military ground and air force personnel of the Western direct participants in the area of reductions was 921,000 men as of January 1, 1976. I would now like to make clear the basis on which these figures have been computed. All active duty military personnel in the ground and air forces of the Western direct participants in the area of reductions have been counted. Only active duty military personnel are included. Naval personnel, as well as reservists, civilians, and the personnel of other uniformed organizations equipped with weapons are excluded from these figures.

“As regards Warsaw Pact forces, Eastern participants will recollect that, in November 1973, the West tabled its figure of 925,000 men for
Warsaw Pact ground forces. The West now confirms that, on the basis of revised computations, the Western estimate of Warsaw Pact ground force manpower in the area shows an increase. This increase is somewhat larger than the 14,000 man increase in Western manpower of which I have just referred. The current Western estimate to the disparity between Western and Eastern ground force manpower is more than 150,000 men in favor of the East. The West has also told the East that the total of Warsaw Pact air force manpower was somewhat larger than the total of Western air manpower.

“As noted, on June 10, the Soviet Representative presented a different set of figures on Eastern military personnel in the area, based on counting rules whose details the East has not yet elaborated. The fact that there is a large discrepancy between the totals which the East has tabled and Western estimates of Warsaw Pact military manpower in the area leads the West to believe that the two sets of figures now on the table—the figures presented by the East and those presented by the West—were not formulated according to the same counting rules. Western participants believe that there is some rational explanation for this discrepancy and that it is in the interest of both sides to enter on a cooperative effort to identify the sources of this discrepancy. I have just made clear the counting rules the West used in compiling its data. Western participants now need to be fully clear about what counting rules the East has used for compiling Eastern data.” (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks, 1973–1989, Research Project No. 1553, May 1989, pages 40–43)

After Resor tabled the data, Khlestov raised the issue of the exclusion of French forces in Germany from the Western manpower figures. He told Resor that “Eastern representatives were not prepared to discuss data and counting rules until after they had had an opportunity to analyze this data. But at first sight, this data on Western forces did not conform to Eastern estimates of these forces. Soviet rep said that when the West had previously tabled its figures on ground force manpower, it had not limited these figures only to the forces of the Western direct participants. He asked why US rep had emphasized that Western data was for the forces of Western direct participants only. US rep confirmed that data consisted only of the forces in the reduction area of the Western direct participants in the Vienna negotiations.” (Telegram 621 from the delegation to MBFR, December 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) The discussion of data on manpower, including how to organize it, continued at the MBFR talks well into the summer of 1977. (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks, 1973–1989, Research Project No. 1553, May 1989, pages 10, 44–48)
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