

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1969–1976

VOLUME XLI

**WESTERN
EUROPE;
NATO, 1969–1972**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

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Volume XLI

Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This specific volume documents U.S. regional and bilateral relations

with Western Europe from January 20, 1969 to January 20, 1973, and complements several other volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series. Indeed, in an important sense, this volume picks up where other volumes leave off; as such, many of the most important issues in U.S.-Western European relations are covered elsewhere in the Nixon-Ford *Foreign Relations* subseries. Readers interested in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security. For the Nixon administration's response to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's policy of Ostpolitik, as well as the September 1971 Berlin quadripartite agreement, readers should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972. On the United States' relations with Greece and Turkey, two of its NATO allies, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972. For U.S.-West European energy relations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974. Finally, for more information on U.S. economic relations with Western Europe (including Nixon's August 1971 New Economic Policy, defense burden-sharing, offset negotiations with West Germany, and specific trade issues involving the European Community), readers should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972.

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations,
1969–1976, Volume XLI*

The documentation printed in this volume highlights U.S. policy regarding European economic and political integration, U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as U.S. bilateral relations with Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The first chapter focuses on U.S. policy toward Western Europe and Canada as a whole, with a focus on two key issues that faced the Nixon administration: 1) how to maintain the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance at a time of reduced tensions with the Soviet Union, and 2) how to respond to the emergence of serious economic tensions among the advanced industrialized nations. The country chapters in this volume represent a departure in country coverage in the *Foreign Relations* series. Previous volumes covered bilateral relations in breadth, including documentation on economic and military issues, as well as matters of politics and diplomacy. Although the country chapters in this volume cover such issues, especially when decision-making was at a high level, more extensive documentation on security, international economics and energy appears in the thematic

volumes mentioned above. The country chapters in this volume are limited to the key issues that affected each bilateral relationship in depth.

Like all recent *Foreign Relations* volumes in the Nixon-Ford sub-series, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation, rather than the implementation of policy or day-to-day diplomacy. As in other volumes in this subseries, the National Security Council and the Department of State were the major players in the policy making process; the Departments of Defense and the Treasury, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, also figure prominently on some issues.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editor for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of the volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in this and other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California, has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require the Nixon Library to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require the Nixon Library formally to notify the Nixon estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are men-

tioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require the Nixon Library to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from the Nixon Library are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President's Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor has made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous *Foreign Relations* volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers' inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in

the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2001 and was completed in 2011, resulted in the decision to withhold 8 documents in full, excisions of a paragraph or more in 12 documents, and minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 24 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of the U.S. policy toward Western Europe and NATO, 1969–1972.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland. The editors also wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace for facilitating that access; additional thanks go to Melissa Heddon at the Nixon Presidential Library at Yorba Linda, California. Thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who were helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. John Earl Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense. Finally, the editors wish to thank the staff of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library for their assistance.

James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook collected the documents, made the selections, and annotated the documents under the supervision of David S. Patterson, General Editor of the series, and Edward C. Keefer, Chief of the Asia and Americas Division. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Carl Ashley and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Additional editorial assistance prior to publication was rendered by Paul Pitman and Kathleen Rasmussen. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
November 2012

Dr. Stephen Randolph
The Historian

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of *Foreign Relations*.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. Nixon's papers were transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, in Yorba Linda, California, after research for this volume was completed. The Nixon Library staff and Ford Library staff are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in the volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XLI

In preparing this volume, the editors made extensive use of the Presidential papers and other White House records at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, then located at the National Archives and Records Administration facility at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). The most important collection for documenting the United States' relations with Western Europe during the first Nixon administration was the National Security Council Files, in particular the Country Files and the Henry A. Kissinger Office Files; also helpful were the Agency Files (particularly on NATO) and the Presidential Correspondence Files. As for so many of the other volumes in the Nixon-Ford subseries, the National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) proved an invaluable source. Within the White House Special Files, the President's Office Files, Memos for the President, contained a substantial number of useful documents, while the White House tapes also yielded some helpful material. The President's Daily Diary, within the White House Central Files, is useful for tracking the President's daily schedule.

Equal in importance to the White House records were the records of the Department of State. The Department's central files contain the cables recording U.S. diplomatic relations; memoranda of diplomatic conversations; and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents can only be found in the Department's lot files. The Conference Files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. The Executive Secretariat also maintained files relating to the work of the National Security Council, such as the National Security Study Memoranda (in Lot 80D212), the National Security Decision Memoranda (in Lot 83D305), as well as the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee (in Lots 83D276 and 81D309), which proved useful for this volume. Finally, the editors found helpful material in the records of some of the Department's foreign posts, located in Record Group 84. The editors also drew on a number of intelligence records. Among the intelligence records reviewed for the volume were those in the various country files in the White House records, the records of the

Central Intelligence Agency, and the historical files of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (the INR/IL Historical Files).

Finally, the editors made extensive use of the Henry Kissinger papers at the Library of Congress. Although much of the material found in this collection duplicates material found elsewhere, it nevertheless proved to be an important source of documentation for the volume.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. *See* National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. *See* National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 46, Records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Records of the Chairman, Carl Marcy Papers

Record Group 56, Records of the Department of the Treasury

Classified Executive Secretariat Files, 1966–1974, NARA Entry A1 716

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Files, 1967–1969

DEF 4 NATO

DEF 6 NATO

DEF 12 NATO

DEF 15–4 SP-US

DEF 15 PORT-US

NATO 3

NATO 3 BEL (BR)

PET 6 UK

PET 6 US

POL 1 AFR

POL 15–1 SP

POL SP-US

POL CANUS

POL PORT-US

POL 16 CHICOM

Central Files, 1970–1973

AID (US) MALTA
AV 12–5 PORT
DEF 4 NATO
DEF 6 NATO
DEF 7 MALTA–US
DEF 15 MALTA–UK
DEF 15 PORT–US
DEF 15 SP–US
FN 12 GER W
POL 1 MALTA–US
POL 1 SP
POL 1 SP–US
POL 7 CAN
POL 7 MALTA
POL 7 PORT
POL 7 US/NIXON
POL 15–1 MALTA
POL 16 CHICOM
POL 23–9 UK
POL CAN–US
POL EUR–US
POL FR–US
POL MALTA–UK
POL PORT–US
POL SP–US
POL UK–US

Lot Files

Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, Lots 70D387 and 73D323, NARA Entry A1 3051B

Executive Secretariat, Daily Staff Summaries, 1944–1971, Lot 73D153, NARA Entry A1 3961

Executive Secretariat, Decision Memorandums of the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, 1969–1977, Lot 83D276, NARA Entry UD WX 1510D

Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NARA Entry P 201

Executive Secretariat, General Files on National Security Council Matters, 1969–1972, Lot 73D288, NARA Entry A1 5002

Executive Secretariat, National Security Council Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D305, NARA Entry P 212 and Entry UD–WX 100021

Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, 1972–1974, Lot 81D309, NARA Entry P 156

Records of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96D695, NARA Entry A1 5550

Records Relating to Spain, 1949–1976, Lot 76D262, NARA Entry A1 5600

Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

Lisbon Embassy Files

Madrid Embassy Files

Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency

National Intelligence Estimates, 1950–1985

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)

National Security Council Files

Agency Files

Country Files—Europe

Canada

France

Germany

Ireland

Portugal

Spain

United Kingdom

USSR

Country Files—Middle East

Malta

Henry A. Kissinger Office Files

Country Files

Presidential Correspondence

President's Trip Files

Saunders Subject File

Saunders Chron File

Secretariat

NSC Unfiled Material

Subject Files

European Common Market

Mediterranean Policy

National Security Decision Memoranda

National Security Study Memoranda

VIP Visits

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)

Minutes of Meetings

Defense Program Review Committee Meeting

National Security Council Meeting

Senior Review Group Meetings

Verification Panel Minutes

Study Memorandums

National Security Study Memorandums

Policy Papers

National Security Decision Memorandums

White House Central Files

President's Daily Briefing

President's Daily Diary

White House Special Files

President's Office Files

White House Tapes

Central Intelligence Agency

DO/EUR Files, Job 79-00399R

DO/EUR Files, Job 90-01383R

History Staff Files

National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files (1950-1975)

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas

Anne Whitman File

Eisenhower Papers as President

NSC Staff Papers

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Melvin R. Laird Papers

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger

Chronological File

Memoranda of Conversations

Miscellany, Record of Schedule

National Security Council, National Security Study Memoranda

Telephone Records, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File

Personal Papers of William P. Rogers

Appointment Books

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Abbreviations and Terms

- ABM**, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACE, Allied Command, Europe
ACW, aircraft control and warning
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFE, Armed Forces Europe
AFSOUTH, Allied Forces Southern Europe
AID, Agency for International Development
AID/AFR/NA, Office of North African Affairs, Agency for International Development
AIRSOUTH, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
ANF, Atlantic Nuclear Force
AR, Albanian Resolution
AREUR, Army Europe
ARMA, Army Attaché
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
- backchannel**, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the Nixon White House, for instance, used backchannel messages to bypass the Department of State
- Benelux**, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
BFR, balanced force reductions
BOAC, British Overseas Airways Corporation
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
BOP, balance of payments
- CAB**, Civil Aviation Board
CAP, Common Agricultural Policy
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCMS, Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CDU, *Christliche Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union), West German political party
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEC, Conference on European Cooperation
CES, Conference on European Security
Chicom, Chinese Communist
Chirec, Chinese recognition (involves bilateral relations between the PRC or ROC and a third country)
Chirep, Chinese representation (United Nations)
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Southern Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, Europe
CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
cirtel, circular telegram
COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls

COM, Department of Commerce
COMECON, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMNAV SOUTH, Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
COMSIXTHFLT, Commander, Sixth Fleet
CONUS, continental United States
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

DAO, Defense Attaché Office
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDR, *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (German Democratic Republic)
DefMin, Defense Minister
Deptel, Department telegram
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DISC, Domestic International Sales Corporation
DND, Department of National Defence (Canada)
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA/EUR, Office of European Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
DPC, Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
DPQ, Defense Planning Questionnaire
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
DPSA, Defense Production Sharing Arrangement

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
E/OA/AN, Aviation Negotiations Division, Office of Aviation, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EC, European Community
EEC, European Economic Community
EFTA, European Free Trade Area
ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
ENI, *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi* (National Hydrocarbons Agency), Italian energy corporation
ESC, European Security Conference
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/AIS, Office of Austria, Italy, and Switzerland Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/BMI, Office of United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malta Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/CAN, Office of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/FBX, Office of France and Benelux Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RPM, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Commission
Exdis, exclusive distribution only

FAA, Federal Aviation Authority
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom
FDIP, Foreign Direct Investment Program
FDP, *Freie Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party), West German political party
FM, Foreign Minister

FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FTA, free trade area

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCI, ground control intercept
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GNP, Gross National Product
GOC, Government of Canada
GOF, Government of France
GOL, Government of Italy; Government of Ireland
GOM, Government of Malta
GOP, Government of Portugal
GOS, Government of Spain
GRC, Government of the Republic of China

HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IBERLANT, Iberia-Atlantic Area
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICC, International Control Commission
IG, Interdepartmental Group
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IQ, Important Question
IRA, Irish Republican Army
IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile
IRI, *Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale* (Industrial Reconstruction Institute), Italian state holding company
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
JCAE, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LARG, Libyan Arab Republic Government
LDC, less developed country
Limdis, limited distribution
LTBT, Limited Test Ban Treaty

MAP, Military Assistance Program
MARAIMED, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean
MATS, Military Air Transport Service
MBFR, mutual and balanced force reductions
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East; Maine
MFN, most favored nation
MIRV, multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle
MLP, Maltese Labour Party
MOD, Minister of Defense

MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MP, Member of Parliament

MPD, missile planning defense

MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile

MSI, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social Movement), Italian political party

MSTS, Military (Seaborne) Transportation Service

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NAFTA, North Atlantic Free Trade Area

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVEUR, Navy, Europe

NDAC, Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

NI, Northern Ireland

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

NLF, National Liberation Front

Nodis, no distribution

Nofor, no foreign distribution

NPG, Nuclear Planning Group (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum

NSC, National Security Council

NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

NVA, North Vietnamese Army

OBE, overtaken by events

OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

OST, Office of Science and Technology

PAF, Portuguese Air Force

PCI, *Partito Comunista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party), Italian political party

PermRep, Permanent Representative

PL, Public Law

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/ISO, Office of International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants

PRC, People's Republic of China

PriMin, Prime Minister

PSDI, *Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano* (Italian Democratic Socialist Party), Italian political party

PSU, *Partito Socialista Unitario* (United Socialist Party), Italian political party

R&D, research and development

REDCOSTE, reduction of costs in Europe

reftel, reference telegram

RG, Review Group; Record Group

RN, Royal Navy

ROC, Republic of China

RV, reentry vehicle

S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command; Supreme Allied Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SATCOM, satellite communications
SCCC, San Clemente Communications Center
SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
SDR, Special Drawing Rights
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State
septel, separate telegram
SETAF, Southern European Task Force
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SIOP, single integrated operation plan
SIOS, *Sevizio Informazioni* (Italian Army Intelligence)
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement
SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Social Democratic Party), West German political party
SRG, Senior Review Group
STR, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
SYG, Secretary General

TACSATCOM, tactical satellite communications (North Atlantic Treaty Organization communications satellite project)
TAP, *Transportes Aéreos Portugueses*, Portuguese national airline
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation

UAR, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
USASETAF, United States Army Southern European Task Force
USC, Under Secretaries Committee
USCINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic
USDOCOSOUTH, Documents Officer, Allied Forces, Southeastern Europe
USEUCOM, European Command
USLOSACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USNATO, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State
USNMR SHAPE, United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VC, Viet Cong
VP, Verification Panel

WEU, Western European Union

WG, Working Group

WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Persons

- Agnew, Spiro**, Vice President of the United States
- Almirante, Giorgio**, leader of the Italian Social Movement
- Alphand, Hervé**, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry until 1972
- Andreotti, Giulio**, Italian Prime Minister from January 1972
- Andronikov, Constantin**, interpreter to President de Gaulle in the French Foreign Ministry
- Angelis, Odysseus**, Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff, Greek Armed Forces
- Annenberg, Walter**, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1969
- Areilza, Jose Maria de (Count of Motrico)**, Spanish Ambassador to the United States from 1954 until 1960
- Arguelles, Jaime**, Spanish Ambassador to the United States
- Armstrong, Willis C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- Attard-Kingswell, Joseph**, Maltese Ambassador to the United States
- Bahr, Egon**, Special Ambassador and Chief of the Planning Staff in the West German Foreign Office until October 21, 1969; State Secretary (Foreign, Defense, and German Policy) in the Federal Chancellery
- Baunsgaard, Hilmar**, Danish Prime Minister from February 15, 1968, until October 9, 1971
- Beaudry, Robert M.**, Country Director for Italy, Austria, and Switzerland, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Beaulne, Joseph Charles Léonard Yvon**, Canadian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1969 until 1972
- Behr, Robert M.**, Colonel, USAF; member, National Security Council staff
- Bennett, W. Tapley**, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal until July 1969
- Benson, Edgar J.**, Canadian Finance Minister
- Bergsten, C. Fred**, member, National Security Council staff from 1969 until 1971
- Blake, Robert**, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Paris until December 1970
- Blancard, Jean**, French Ministerial Delegate for Armaments
- Borg Olivier, Giorgio**, Maltese Prime Minister until 1971
- Brandt, Willy**, West German Foreign Minister until October 1969; thereafter West German Chancellor
- Brezhnev, Leonid**, General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Brosio, Manlio**, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until October 1971
- Brown, Winthrop G.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972
- Buchanan, Patrick**, Special Assistant to the President
- Burchinal, David A.**, General, USAF; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Europe and Special Negotiator on Spanish base issue
- Burns, Arthur**, Counselor to the President from January 1969 until January 1970; thereafter Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
- Butterfield, Alexander**, Deputy Assistant to the President
- Cadieux, Marcel**, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs until 1970; thereafter Canadian Ambassador to the United States

- Caetano, Marcello**, Portuguese Prime Minister from September 1968
- Callaghan, James**, British Home Secretary until June 1970
- Camps, Miriam**, Deputy Director for Planning, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
- Cargo, William I.**, Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State from August 4, 1969
- Carrero Blanco, Luis**, Admiral, Spanish Vice President
- Carrington, Lord Peter**, British Defense Minister from June 1970
- Castiella y Maiz, Fernando**, Spanish Foreign Minister
- Chaban-Delmas, Jacques**, French Prime Minister from June 1969 until July 1972
- Chapman, Leonard F., Jr.**, General, USMC; Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Chou En-lai**, see Zhou Enlai
- Cleveland, Harlan**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until June 1969
- Clifford, Clark**, Secretary of Defense from March 1968 until January 1969
- Colley, George**, Irish Finance Minister from 1970
- Colombo, Emilio**, Italian Prime Minister from August 1970 until January 1972
- Connally, John B., Jr.**, Secretary of the Treasury from February 1971 until June 1972
- Constantine II**, King of Greece until June 1973
- Couve de Murville, Maurice**, French Prime Minister until June 1969
- Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring)**, British Ambassador to the United States
- Davis, Jeanne W.**, Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, from 1969 to 1970; thereafter Staff Secretary, National Security Council
- Dean, Fred M.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
- De Beaumarchais, Jacques**, Political Director, French Foreign Ministry
- Debré, Michel**, French Foreign Minister until June 1969; thereafter Defense Minister
- De Gaulle, Charles**, French President until April 1969
- De Martino, Francesco**, Italian Deputy Prime Minister; Secretary, Italian Socialist Party
- DePalma, Samuel**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 1969 to June 1973
- Diez-Alegria, Manuel**, General, Spanish Army Chief of Staff
- Douglas-Home, Sir Alec**, British Foreign Secretary from June 1970
- Ehrlichman, John**, Counsel to the President from January until November 1969; thereafter Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
- Eliot, Theodore L., Jr.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State
- Ellsworth, Robert F.**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from May 1969 until June 1971
- Fanali, Duilio**, Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff, Italian Air Force
- Fanfani, Amintore**, member, Italian Christian Democrat Party; President of the Italian Senate from June 5, 1968
- Faulkner, Brian**, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from March 1971 until March 1972
- Faure, Edgar**, French Minister of National Education until June 1969
- Feldman, George**, U.S. Ambassador to Malta from July 1965 until November 1967
- Fessenden, Russell H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from July 1971 until December 1972
- Finch, Robert**, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare until 1970; thereafter Counselor to the President

- Flanigan, Peter M.**, Assistant to the President from April 1969 until January 1972; Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs from January 1972; Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy, from February 1972
- Forlani, Arnaldo**, member, Italian Christian Democrat Party
- Foster, John**, Director Office of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense
- Fourquet, Michel Martin Leon**, General, Chief of Staff, French Armed Forces from 1968 until 1971
- Franco, Francisco**, General, Spanish Head of State
- Freeman, John**, British Ambassador to the United States from March 1969 until January 1971
- Fulbright, J. William**, Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Gaja, Roberto**, Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry
- Garin, Vasco Vieira**, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States
- Gaucher, Georges**, foreign policy adviser to French President Pompidou
- George, Scott**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Getz, John**, U.S. Ambassador to Malta from March 1972
- Ginsburgh, Robert N.**, member, National Security Council staff
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valery**, French Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs
- Gonzi, Michael (Mikiel)**, Archbishop, Archdiocese of Malta
- Goodby, James E.**, Office of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Goodpaster, Andrew J.**, General, USA; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe from July 1969
- Green, Marshall**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969
- Gromyko, Andrei**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Haig, Alexander M.**, Brigadier General, USA; Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 until June 1970; thereafter Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Haldeman, H.R.**, Assistant to the President
- Hardin, Clifford**, Secretary of Agriculture from January 1969 until December 1971
- Harrell, Ben**, General, USA; Commander, Allied land forces South East Europe from 1968 until 1971
- Harmel, Pierre**, Belgian Foreign Minister
- Hartman, Arthur A.**, Special Assistant and Staff Director, Under Secretaries Committee, Department of State from February 1969; thereafter Deputy Director for Coordination, Planning and Coordination Staff from August 1969 until July 1972
- Healey, Denis**, British Defense Minister until June 1970
- Heath, Edward**, British Prime Minister from June 1970
- Helms, Richard**, Director of Central Intelligence
- Henderson, Sir Nigel**, Admiral, Royal Navy; Chairman, NATO Military Committee from 1968 until 1971
- Hill, Robert C.**, U.S. Ambassador to Spain until January 1972
- Hillenbrand, Martin J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, February from 1969 until April 1972; U.S. Ambassador to West Germany from June 1972
- Hillery, Patrick**, Irish Foreign Secretary
- Home**, see Douglas-Home, Sir Alec
- Irwin, John, II**, Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until July 1972; Deputy Secretary of State from July 1972

Jarring, Gunnar, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union; detailed to the United Nations to serve as Special Representative, United Nations Middle East Mission

Jenkins, Roy H., British Chancellor of the Exchequer

Jobert, Michel, French Secretary General of the Presidency

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Juan Carlos, Prince of Spain

Karamessines, Thomas, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Kearns, Henry, President and Chairman, Export-Import Bank

Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 1969 until February 1971; Ambassador at Large for Foreign Economic Development from February 11, 1971; U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from March 17, 1972

Kennedy, Richard T., Colonel, USA; member, National Security Council staff from 1969 until 1970; thereafter Director of the Planning Group, National Security Council staff

Kiesinger, Kurt, West German Chancellor until October 1969

Kidd, Isaac C., Jr., Vice Admiral, USN; Commander, Sixth Fleet from August 1970 until October 1971

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Knight, Ridgeway, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from July 1969

Koscuisko-Morizet, Jacques, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations from February 1970 until May 1972; thereafter French Ambassador to the United States

Kosygin, Aleksei, Chairman Soviet Council of Ministers

Laird, Melvin, Secretary of Defense

Lalonde, Marc, Principal Secretary to the Canadian Prime Minister

Landau, George W., Country Director for Spain and Portugal, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Lee Kuan Yew, Singaporean Prime Minister

Lemnitzer, Lyman L., General, USA; Supreme Allied Commander Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Commander, U.S. European Command until July 1, 1969

Leone, Giovanni, Italian President from December 1971

Linder, Harold, U.S. Ambassador to Canada until July 1969

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Vietnam peace negotiations in Paris until December 1969; special envoy to the Vatican from 1970

Lopez Bravo de Castro, Gregorio, Spanish Foreign Minister from October 1969

Lucet, Charles E., French Ambassador to the United States until April 1972

Luns, Joseph, Dutch Foreign Minister; Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from October 1971

Lynch, John, Irish Prime Minister

Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Assistant for Programs and then Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 until September 1970

Malraux, André, French Minister of Cultural Affairs until June 1969

Mancini, Giacomo, Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party from April 23, 1970

Mansfield, Michael J., Senator (D-Montana); Majority Leader

Mao Zedong, Chairman, Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People's Republic of China

Marchesi, Enzo, General, Italian Defense Chief of Staff from January 15, 1970, until July 30, 1972

Martin, Graham, U.S. Ambassador to Italy from September 1969

McCann, Hugh, Permanent Secretary, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs

- McCloskey, Robert**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary
- McCracken, Paul**, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers until November 1971
- McGuire, Ralph**, Director, Office of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Meadows, John**, Director of the Office of Aviation, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
- Meagher, Margaret**, Canadian Ambassador to Sweden
- Meloy, Francis E., Jr.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rome until April 1969
- Merry de Val, Marquis de**, Spanish Ambassador to the United States
- Messmer, Pierre**, French Minister of the Armies until April 1969
- Miceli, Vito**, General, Chief of the Italian Servizio Informazioni, Army Intelligence, from October 18, 1970
- Mintoff, Dominic**, leader, Maltese Labour Party
- Mitchell, John N.**, Attorney General
- Moore, John D.J.**, U.S. Ambassador to Ireland from April 1969
- Moorer, Thomas H., Jr.**, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Moro, Aldo**, Italian Foreign Minister from July 1969 until 1972
- Morris, Roger**, member, National Security Council staff until April 1970
- Morton, Rogers C.B.**, Secretary of the Interior from 1971
- Mosbacher, Emil**, Chief of Protocol, Department of State
- Moynihhan, Daniel P.**, Counselor to the President from January 1969 until December 1970
- Murphy, Daniel**, Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
- Murphy, Robert**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from November 30, 1953, until August 13, 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from August 14 until December 3, 1959
- Nenni, Pietro**, Italian Foreign Minister until July 1969
- Nguyen Van Thieu**, President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam
- Nitze, Paul H.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from July 1967 until January 1969
- Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States
- Nogueira, Franco**, Portuguese Foreign Minister
- Nutter, G. Warren**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from March 1969
- Ortona, Egidio**, Italian Ambassador to the United States
- Osgood, Robert E.**, member, National Security Council staff
- Packard, David**, Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 1971
- Palliser, Michael**, staff member, British Prime Minister's Office
- Patricio, Rui**, Portuguese Foreign Minister
- Pedersen, Richard**, Counselor of the Department of State
- Peterson, Peter**, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy from 1971 until January 1972; thereafter Secretary of Commerce
- Piccoli, Flaminio**, Secretary of the Italian Christian Democrat Party from January until November 1969
- Podgorny, Nikolai V.**, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
- Pohér, Alain**, President of the French Senate; Interim President of France from April until June 1969
- Pompidou, Georges**, French President from June 1969

Pritzlaff, John, U.S. Ambassador to Malta until February 1972

Pursley, Robert E., Brigadier General, USAF; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Reddy, Leo J., Office of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Rein, Bertram, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic Affairs from July 1970

Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State until June 1970; Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from June 1970

Ritchie, A. Edgar, Canadian Ambassador to the United States until January 1970

Rivero, Horacio, Admiral, USN; Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe until May 1972; U.S. Ambassador to Spain from September 1972

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State

Romney, George, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

Roselli-Lorenzini, Giuseppe, Admiral, Chief of Staff Italian Navy from October 22, 1970

Rumor, Mariano, Italian Prime Minister until July 1970

Rush, Kenneth, U.S. Ambassador to West Germany from July 1969 until February 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 1972

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1961, until January 20, 1968

Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Prime Minister until September 1968

Samuels, Nathaniel, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 1969 until April 1972

Saragat, Giuseppe, Italian President

Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council staff

Scali, John, Special Consultant to the President from April 1971

Schaetzel, John Robert, U.S. Representative to the European Community from 1966 until 1972

Scheel, Walter, West German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister from October 1969

Schiller, Karl, West German Minister of Economic Affairs until July 1972; West German Minister of Finance from May 1971 until July 1972

Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget until August 1971; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from August 1971

Schmidt, Adolph, U.S. Ambassador to Canada from September 1969

Schmidt, Helmut, West German Defense Minister until July 1972; Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance from July until December 1972; Minister of Finance from December 1972

Schroeder, Gerhard, West German Defense Minister

Schumann, Maurice, French Foreign Minister from June 1969

Scowcroft, Brent, Lieutenant General, USAF; Military Assistant to the President from February 1972

Sharp, Mitchell, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs

Shriver, Robert Sargent, U.S. Ambassador to France until March 1970

Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until July 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget from July 1970 until June 1972; Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant to the President from June 1972

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Smith, Gerard C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from February 1969; chief negotiator at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Smith, Jackson L., Office of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut**, member, National Security Council staff
- Sophia Margaret Victoria Frederica**, Princess of Spain, wife of Juan Carlos
- Sorenson, Roger A.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Dublin from December 1970
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from August until September 1969; Director, Bureau Politico-Military Affairs, from September 1969
- Springsteen, George**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until June 1972; Acting Assistant Secretary from June 1972
- Stabler, Wells**, Director, Office of Italy, Austria, and Switzerland Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State until June 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Rome from June 1969
- Stans, Maurice H.**, Secretary of Commerce until January 1972
- Stein, Herbert**, member, Council of Economic Advisers, from February 1969; Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers from January 1971
- Stewart, Michael**, British Foreign Secretary until June 1970
- Stoessel, Walter J.**, U.S. Ambassador to Poland until August 1971; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from August 1972
- Strauss, Franz Josef**, West German Minister of Finance until October 1969
- Tanassi, Mario**, Italian Defense Minister; member, Italian Democratic Socialist Party
- Tanguy, Charles R.**, Director, Office of France and Benelux Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Tasca, Henry J.**, U.S. Ambassador to Greece from December 1969
- Thant, U.**, Secretary General of the United Nations until December 1971
- Thieu**, see Nguyen Van Thieu
- Thomaz, Americo de Deus Rodrigues**, Portuguese President
- Trend, Sir Burke**, British Cabinet Secretary
- Treize, Philip H.**, U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development until July 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from July 1969 until November 1971
- Trudeau, Pierre Elliott**, Canadian Prime Minister
- Volcker, Paul A.**, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs from January 1969
- Wagner, Robert**, U.S. Ambassador to Spain until March 1969
- Walters, Vernon A.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Military Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Paris until March 1972; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from May 1972
- Warnke, Paul C.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 1969
- Warnock, William**, Irish Ambassador to the United States from March 1970
- Watson, Arthur K.**, U.S. Ambassador to France from April 1970 until October 1972
- Wheeler, Earle G.**, General, USA; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 1970
- Wilson, Harold**, British Prime Minister until June 1970; thereafter leader of the British Labour Party
- Yost, Charles W.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations from January 1969 to February 1971
- Zhou Enlai**, Premier of the People's Republic of China
- Zumwalt, Elmo**, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations from July 1970

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives ori-

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 90.

ginally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955*, The Intelligence Community, Document 171.

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147-148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate*, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50-51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955*, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250.

other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive"

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.

covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

¹⁵ Public Law 93–559.

¹⁶ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972

Western Europe Region and NATO

1. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

OCI No. 0549/69

Washington, January 21, 1969.

Current Problems in NATO

Introduction

The Czechoslovak crisis² generated a new impulse toward united action in NATO—symbolized by expanded consultation and the postponement of troop reductions. It has not, however, altered the European NATO members' basic view that the danger of an all-out Soviet assault remains low. The allies therefore find themselves in a state of heightened activity and momentum that will be difficult to sustain so long as no new long-range goal or purpose is found. The chances for a meaningful NATO role in the continuing search for détente have been blighted by Moscow's determination to maintain its grip in Eastern Europe. Thus the coming months are likely to see a growing paradox, in which the alliance actually works better while dissatisfaction about it increases. Meanwhile, the growing rivalries among the European members—for influence in Europe and in Washington—make it difficult for them to organize effectively for the larger collective role they believe they should play in the alliance.

Czechoslovakia and After

1. Most of the NATO allies believe that, despite the initial shock, the Czechoslovak crisis has done little more than introduce a new ele-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 254, Agency Files, NATO. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Office of Economic Research. Distributed to Bergsten, Sonnenfeldt, and Haig.

² The Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968.

ment of uncertainty into East-West relations. The crisis has led few of the allies to disavow the goal of “peaceful engagement” with the Soviet bloc. Only the Greeks and the Turks still argue for prolonging the “period of mourning” over the Soviet action. Although the British, Germans, and Dutch view the new “Brezhnev doctrine” of discretionary intervention³ as a new and permanent danger, they have joined Canada and the Scandinavian members in opposing a resumption of cold-war politics. Even the Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean is seen more as a problem of political rivalry than as a direct military threat to NATO’s southern flank.

2. This restored confidence is reflected in the allies’ continuing efforts to develop bridgeheads to the Eastern bloc. Even after the invasion few of the allies were ready to cut down trade or cultural ties with the invading “five.”⁴ After some bickering, several member governments last September endorsed a list of short-term commercial sanctions, such as withholding credits and reducing participation in Eastern European trade fairs. These early intentions, however, were soon forgotten. In late September, for instance, only Greece and the US abided by an agreement not to take part in the Plovdiv trade fair in Bulgaria; most of the other NATO allies were officially represented. By late October, NATO’s economic advisers admitted that there had been no significant change in allied economic policies toward Eastern Europe. The allies will probably renew all low-level commercial contacts with the East during 1969.

3. Most of the European allies also have resumed cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe, though generally on a restricted basis. Visits by top-ranking dignitaries are moving forward after a brief hiatus.

Détente

4. The allies have accepted two conditions in their continued search for détente. First, by pledging to uphold current force levels, they have acknowledged—as they did in the Harmel Exercise⁵—that

³ Reference is to Soviet claims to a right to intervene in the internal affairs of Bloc states. The Brezhnev Doctrine was originally set out by Soviet Communist Party spokesman Sergei Kovalev in a September 26, 1968, *Pravda* article, “Sovereignty and Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries.” A translation is printed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, volume XX, number 39 (October 16, 1968), pp. 10–12.

⁴ The invading “five” refers to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact invasion.

⁵ At the December 1966 NATO Ministerial meeting, the NAC adopted a resolution proposed by Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister, to analyze international developments since the creation of NATO in 1949 and determine ways to strengthen the alliance. This study, known as the Harmel Exercise, culminated in the Harmel Report, which the NAC adopted at the December 1967 Ministerial meeting.

strong defense is the prerequisite for safe pursuit of détente. Second, they have asserted that bridge-building must not jeopardize their newly reaffirmed political solidarity.

5. Thus the central question is not whether to seek to resume détente, but how to achieve it in light of the still-uncertain implications of Czechoslovakia. Previously it was assumed that East-West contacts could so improve the atmosphere that agreements, even on troop reductions, the German question, and European security, might become possible. Now the allies, including the Germans, define détente more as an interim accommodation to the existing order.

6. The earlier concept of détente allowed greater leeway for an active alliance role. For example, when the allies called on the Soviets last June to discuss mutual force reductions,⁶ they were aiming in part at heading off unilateral troop cuts by several allies, but they were also trying to confirm a role for the alliance in the détente process.

7. The Czechoslovak crisis has led to a narrowing of this role, at least temporarily. Mutual force reductions are no longer a priority item on NATO's agenda, and a scheduled review of the subject last September was postponed. Several West German officials have stressed their support for strictly bilateral approaches to the East, while the Danes and the Dutch continue to emphasize the dangers of too deep an involvement of NATO in the détente process. The French, quite predictably, insist on doing business with the Communists as they see fit.

8. Even so, the allies have been able to agree on the need for continued collaboration on détente matters. The British have been particularly insistent on prior consultation and were much offended, along with a number of other allies, by the failure of the US to brief them on a recent proposal to the Soviets for enlarging the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference.⁷ Most of the member governments are reconciled to the fact that the US, by virtue of its power alone, must frequently deal directly with Moscow, but even those who accept this necessity are determined to keep a close check on US initiatives through expanded interallied consultation.

9. Other potentially important functions of NATO in "détente management" may be emerging. NATO's political committee has studied the peaceful and military uses of the sea floor as a guide for allied

⁶ At the June 1968 NATO Ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, the Allies issued a declaration, the "Reykjavik Signal," that invited the Eastern bloc to explore mutual troop reductions. See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XIII, Western Europe Region, Documents 312-316.

⁷ The United States and the Soviet Union, permanent co-chairmen of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, agreed in 1968 to a limited enlargement of the Committee's membership.

positions in UN discussions. Belgium has proposed that NATO develop a common policy on arms sales in the Middle East, although Britain and other “supplier” nations may continue to oppose this. The Council has already agreed in principle that it should establish a disarmament section in the allied secretariat to coordinate NATO’s activity in this field.

10. Whatever comes of these projected extensions of NATO’s role in policy coordination, some basic problems will still remain. For the US, the requirements imposed by its position as a prime architect of détente may on occasion compete with its responsibilities as an alliance member. In responding to European demands for improved relations with the Soviets, the US risks setting itself apart from its allies. Despite the extensive consultations on the nonproliferation treaty, many Europeans remain suspicious that the treaty is an attempt to formalize the hegemonic position of the US and the USSR. A few of the member governments, notably West Germany, view the projected US-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation as a potential threat to the US nuclear guarantee. These fears will be calmed only if the allies can be convinced that the superpowers themselves intend to make real sacrifices in the name of disarmament.

Consultation and Cohesion

11. Since the report of the “Three Wisemen” in 1956⁸ laid down new guidelines, consultation has evolved into a continuous and vital alliance function, with the channels of communications among the members constantly proliferating and improving. NATO’s more recent efforts to equip itself for “crisis management” have created still further possibilities for informational exchange and discussion. Techniques developed in NATO’s situation center have been upgraded to meet the needs of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee in peacetime and periods of tension. High-level exercises, most recently Hilex and Fallex, have tested the Council’s capacity to consult and make decisions under pressure. A major civil-military logistics exercise next May will reveal whether civilian support agencies in the allied capitals can be coordinated in a crisis.

12. Technological innovations are likewise improving consultation in NATO. A new NATO-wide communications system connecting each of the allied capitals and the major command headquarters became operational last May and will be expanded. Nine NATO coun-

⁸ At the May 1956 Ministerial meeting, the NAC appointed a committee of three Foreign Ministers—Gaetano Martino of Italy, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Lester Pearson of Canada—to recommend improved methods for consultation among the Allies in an effort to reach a final European settlement. The NAC adopted the committee’s report at its next meeting in December.

tries are now taking part in the experimental phase of a NATO Satellite Communications Program (SATCOM). NATO also is scheduled to receive two satellites to be operational in late 1970.

13. Two recent crises have led the allies to supplement the regular consultative mechanisms with several less formal ones. During the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus in 1967, the secretary general was given a "watching brief," permitting him to mediate. The Czechoslovak crisis brought still other innovations, including the use of the Situation Center for the dissemination of "political" as well as military advisories. The political committee chairman's report was also developed into a source of continuous instruction to NATO commanders.

Nuclear Planning Group

14. On balance, these numerous commitments to consult have had favorable results. Through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), for example, the allies have arrived at a better understanding of the role of the host country in the storage and release of tactical nuclear weapons, the impracticability of an ABM force for Europe, and the limited usefulness of atomic demolition devices. The US has allayed to some extent European concern that the decision to build a "light" ABM system might point toward a "fortress America" strategy. Of the active members of the NPG, only the Germans continue to belabor the strategy of flexible response, and even they seem concerned less with replacing the strategy than with turning it into a new argument against the NPT.

15. Most important, the NPG has enabled the nonnuclear allies to participate actively in NATO's nuclear affairs. [7 lines not declassified] Not all of these efforts have been successful, but it is clear that the NPG has reduced earlier pressures for more direct access to the US nuclear trigger.

Limitations

16. The gains from consultation should not obscure its limitations. The allies tend to consult formally only after guidelines have been established nationally and only when a consensus is expected. Unlimited consultation will not resolve basic conflicts of interest. Lisbon's cajoling has not induced the NATO allies to rally behind Portuguese policies in Africa. Nor has the US found that consultation necessarily yields support for undertakings outside NATO's traditional purview.

17. After 20 years, NATO's consultative process on political and economic affairs still cannot match the cooperation that exists in the military sphere. Anything like an Atlantic community remains distant, and is probably impracticable. The Atlantic Policy Group, which was supposed to find new areas for common Atlantic action, has created no momentum in that direction. In short, allied consultation is likely to re-

main a constructive and unifying factor only if its objectives are not set too high.

Burden-sharing and European Responsibility

18. The question of whether the European members are bearing their fair share of the burden of the alliance will remain a perennial issue. In a defense system that depends ultimately on the deterrent power supplied by one member, it is difficult for the others to calculate the relevance of their particular contributions or to defend them before their parliaments. The US objects that its allies are purchasing their security at bargain rates; the Europeans respond that the defense of Western Europe is an acknowledged US interest which has involved huge expenditures but has paid huge dividends—political as well as economic.

19. Statistics on relative contributions do not resolve the issue. Since the early 1950s, the European NATO countries have steadily increased their financial support of the allied infrastructure program—from less than 50 percent of the total in 1951–1956 to over 65 percent currently. But the precise return from these projects to the economies of the host countries—all European—can hardly be measured. Although from 1963 through 1967, defense expenditures of the European members gradually increased, these outlays were a declining percentage of GNP, and there was a sharp downturn in the expenditures for 1968. In the same six-year period (1963–68), European manpower levels (minus France) also increased, but the gains were mostly among the southern flank countries, and all the central region countries reduced their forces.

20. In the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, the European allies seem to have realized that, regardless of their past performances, they may have to do better in the future if they are to assure continued US support. In the November ministerial meeting,⁹ 11 of them pledged to maintain and/or upgrade current force commitments, while three—West Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands—offered to increase projected expenditures. These improvements were promised without request for US reciprocity; indeed, in the communiqué, the Europeans recognized formally a vague but unmistakable responsibility to help the US with its balance-of-payments problem.

21. In separate negotiations over troop-offset costs, the Germans have shown a bit more flexibility. While resisting any additional military functions or troop support costs, they have decided to “freeze” existing deposits in the US treasury, and have offered to pay for military

⁹ The November 1968 Ministerial meeting was held in Brussels. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XIII, Western Europe Region, Documents 335–338.

purchases directly without drawing on these funds, in order to benefit the US balance of payments. The Germans have promised that their expenditures for US military goods and services will be maintained at about \$350 million annually in fiscal year 1970 and 1971—a level somewhat less than what the US would have liked.

New Roles for NATO and Europe

22. None of these developments foreshadows a massive shift of responsibility in the alliance, but the European allies are looking for ways to expand their NATO role. The British have been particularly eager to do so—as much perhaps to demonstrate their new commitment to Europe as to assure continued US protection. During the November ministerial meeting, British Defense Secretary Healey and Foreign Secretary Stewart discussed with their continental colleagues a possible “European identity” that might help the allies head off pressures for US disengagement. The talks were inconclusive, but the fact they were held at all reflected the interest of the allies in a stronger European voice in allied affairs.

23. It remains doubtful that promising new formulas will soon be found for redressing unequal burden-sharing within the alliance. Although the French have hinted that they might consider coordinating their strike force with Britain’s in exchange for a resumption of US nuclear assistance to France, the prospects for such cooperation remain poor in view of the massive emphasis De Gaulle places on national sovereignty. Moreover, while the Germans reiterate interest in some kind of multilateral nuclear force—the “European option”—British officials rule it out except in the context of a fully federated Europe. For their part, the Germans will most likely continue to balk at any arrangement that would threaten to subordinate them to a formal British-French directorate.

24. In any case, a truly European nuclear force poses formidable problems apart from the political ones. To illustrate, the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) in London calculates that such a force would have to be two and one half times the size of the British and French deterrents combined, if it is to provide credible “assured-destruction” capabilities. To build, deploy, and protect no more than 500 missiles or supersonic bombers, according to the ISS, would cost \$20 to \$40 billion, entailing an increase in European defense expenditures of between an eighth and a quarter. Only within a “fully federated Europe” with a central tax-levying authority could such outlays become feasible.

25. Other less ambitious schemes might be more immediately relevant. A European technological community, for example, with authority over military as well as civil research and development, might meet the problem of adjusting responsibilities between the US and Eu-

rope. Harold Wilson, eager to underline Britain's European aspirations, has frequently endorsed the idea. The Germans have proposed as an alternative an increase in selective cooperation among European countries, along the lines of the UK–German–Dutch–Italian joint enterprise to produce a multirole combat aircraft (MRCA).

26. Obviously, great problems confront the organization of a European research and development program. Most technological cooperation among the European members of NATO—outside the European community—has been either bilateral or based on American design, as in the construction of the F-104G interceptor-bomber and the Hawk missile. The problems of European Launch Development Organization (ELDO) have tended to dispute the practicability of purely intergovernmental cooperation in technological fields. Even the highly touted MRCA project remains in doubt [*2 lines not declassified*]

27. Many Europeans also fear that greater European self-sufficiency in matériel might in the end drive the US out of Europe by depriving it of the arms markets needed to offset its NATO-related expenditures overseas.

European Caucus

28. Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel has advanced another scheme for organizing a European identity in the alliance. In his report a year ago on the future tasks of the alliance, Harmel urged that a "European caucus" be created to serve as a single mouthpiece for the European allies. The French predictably objected to this on the grounds that their sovereignty would be violated and the idea was ultimately stricken from the working paper based on Harmel's recommendations. Nevertheless, after the Soviet invasion in August, Harmel sought to resurrect the proposal in the seven-nation Western European Union (WEU), which he now regarded as the logical nucleus for any expanded cooperation between Britain and the friendly European "five." His new plan, closely resembling one advanced last January by the Benelux countries, called for the coordination of British and European activities in such non-EEC fields as foreign and defense policy and monetary, technological, and youth affairs.

29. Those sympathetic to the Harmel approach have yet to find a way to overcome basic French hostility to Britain and to any real integration of Europe. In an effort to circumvent a French veto of the creation of study groups needed to put the plan in motion, the Italians last November called several of their European colleagues together and asked them to draw up working guidelines to be submitted as an Italian initiative at the next WEU ministerial meeting in February. The issue will remain on dead center, however, so long as a crucial party to the exercise, West Germany, refuses to offend the French and fears that a European grouping would divide rather than unite the alliance.

30. Thus the idea of a European caucus—whether within NATO, WEU, or independent of any existing structure—is unlikely to produce significant early results, mostly because the individual countries continue to find it easier to deal with the US than with each other.

Traditional Liabilities

31. The varying interests of the 15 allies and the rivalries that lie just beneath the surface of daily relations seem certain to make it hard to solve the immediately visible issues. The tendency to pluralism and fragmentation is obviously aggravated within the alliance whenever tensions in East-West relations subside. With the Soviet threat presumably reduced to manageable proportions, the differences among the allies could mushroom into sources of potential division. Size itself has tended to become a political boundary separating ally from ally. Unlike the larger partners, the small NATO countries much prefer multilateral channels in dealing with the US, and consequently remain the leading exponents of expanded consultations within the alliance.

32. Military and geographic factors have created still other problems. The military withdrawal of France¹⁰ has heightened the importance of the Benelux members well beyond their force contributions. [3 lines not declassified] Two of the three Mediterranean powers, Greece and Turkey, continue to be concerned as much with their bilateral tensions (Cyprus) as with the Soviet threat. Nine other members in or around the Central European theater represent a separate community of interest based on the proximity of the Soviet threat and the immediacy of the German problem. Geopolitical considerations have tended to isolate both Iceland and Canada from the concerns of their European allies, while Canada has been further set apart by its special relation to the senior partner. Distaste for political systems of some members—e.g., the new military regime in Greece¹¹—has added obstacles to interallied cooperation.

33. For the foreseeable future this pluralistic trend threatens the cohesion, but not the continuation, of the alliance. A further erosion of membership down to those ten allies—including the US—whose fate is most intimately linked to the continued division of Europe is conceivable. Prime Minister Trudeau has often emphasized that Canada has not ruled out complete withdrawal. Portugal has likewise threatened to withdraw in an attempt to gain NATO support for the Portuguese policies in Africa. The alliance would undoubtedly be shaken, but hardly doomed, should either country leave. NATO's viability depends less

¹⁰ In March 1966, the French Government withdrew from NATO's integrated military command.

¹¹ A military coup in April 1967 established a dictatorship in Greece.

on the scope of its membership than on its capacity to come to grips with the problems most affecting the pivotal ten members.

34. The tendency to fragmentation impresses upon the alliance the need for expanding consultation and pragmatic cooperation. The infrastructure program, one of the few NATO military efforts in which France still participates, will be more important in the future as an instrument of allied solidarity. Such multinational undertakings as the allied mobile force (important to the protection of NATO's flanks), the newly established on-call force for the Atlantic, and the projected one for the Mediterranean will also help reconcile differences and keep the alliance together.

French Obstruction and Feelers

35. Alliance cohesion will not be helped, however, by the obstructions of President de Gaulle, which continue although on a more subtle level. To be sure, his decision to pull French forces out of NATO's integrated command has not proved so destructive as originally feared. It has not severely tempted any other ally to follow suit, but it has forced awkward adjustments in allied relationships that have hampered consultation and complicated the exigencies of NATO defense. The elimination of France as a base of allied operations has required that supply lines to US forces in Bavaria be strung out parallel rather than perpendicular to the assumed line of engagement, thus making them more vulnerable. France's ambiguous position remains an obstacle to almost every new integrated undertaking. It often necessitates time-consuming and potentially costly examination of the question of what France's relation to such-and-such a project should be.

36. The French again seem to be pushing for a special relationship with the US that could drive a wedge between the senior partner and the rest of the alliance. What they have in mind specifically remains unclear. Since October 1968, they have put out feelers to the US which suggest that they would like the US to grant France equality with the UK in acquiring nuclear equipment and knowledge. The possibility of French-British nuclear cooperation as the basis of greater European responsibility for its own defense has also been the subject of renewed speculation.

37. In support of these feelers, French officials have held out the prospect in word and—to some limited extent—in deed that France might in return increase its cooperation with the alliance. French military men have quietly expanded their contacts with US officers assigned directly to NATO, especially the regularly scheduled talks with General Lemnitzer. Defense Minister Messmer has stated that Paris is willing to undertake appropriate planning for French-NATO coordination of conventional forces in wartime, and a high Defense Ministry of-

ficial has said that some coordination of nuclear forces, including targeting, might be possible.

38. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that Paris is willing to concede very much in return for nuclear help from the US. Messmer has made it clear that such an arrangement would be outside the formal structure of NATO, and he has stated unequivocally that France would not rejoin NATO's integrated command, despite increasing pressure from the French military to do so. Budgetary strictures resulting from the recent monetary crisis are expected to complicate the planned coordination of French and NATO military exercises during 1969.

39. In any case, a US-French nuclear deal would prove highly divisive. The West German Government has leaked a steady stream of stories on the possibility in order to demonstrate its concern. The smaller allies would surely react negatively to any attempt to erect a new edifice of nuclear defense outside the alliance.

German Problems

40. The division of Germany and the problem of isolated West Berlin will also continue to impinge on alliance cohesion. Despite a subtle shift in Western outlook in 1966, which effectively placed détente ahead of German reunification, the allies continue to endorse the German desire for national unity. The November ministerial communiqué echoed a familiar litany when it proclaimed, with the support of the French, that the allies "reject all claims that would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany against the will of the German people."

41. Beneath the facade of unanimity on the German question, however, the depth of Western differences often emerges. The French have occasionally denied that their forces would be automatically available for the defense of Germany. They have also done their best to maintain a distinction between NATO and the problem of Berlin, which they have steadfastly argued is the exclusive concern of the three wartime allies. The rest of the alliance members have generally accepted this view, although they have insisted that any joint statements on Berlin be at least shown to them before publication.

42. Germany's resentment of allied indifference to its principal national aspiration can complicate allied relations in numerous ways. For example, London's recent decision—after speeding up British withdrawal from east of Suez—to re-emphasize its continental defense commitments requires German support. In the latest NPG meeting the Germans agreed to join with London in drawing up guidelines on the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the alliance—a move that serves to reinforce Britain's identification with a clearly European concern. They have also been reasonably generous in meeting Britain's offset require-

ments and have tolerated London's initiative toward a European caucus despite their own reservations.

43. A frustrated Germany could be expected, however, to be far less cooperative than at present. Bonn's unwillingness to challenge De Gaulle directly might well be reinforced if the other Western allies should seem slow in responding to West German interests. Though it is hardly likely that the Germans would let their grievances jeopardize the alliance that has so long assured their survival, their support for British aspirations on the continent could well diminish.

The British Contribution

44. As for Britain, the pullback from east of Suez does not necessarily have as a corollary an expanded military input into the alliance. Despite an expected realignment of forces in the Mediterranean, the army's strength in Europe will not increase, and the Royal Air Force of the 1970s will be hard-pressed to assume a much larger role than at present. By 1970, when London intends to have demobilized more than 75,000 men, its armed forces will quite possibly rank fifth in size in Western Europe.

45. These slashes will discount Britain's credit as an ally and advocate of a stronger Europe. Several political factors could, however, offset these consequences. Well aware of its tenuous standing as a "European power," Britain has sponsored various proposals for developing a European identity and has sought to exploit bilateral contacts with continental governments to improve its image as a "good European." Whether or not these efforts get Britain into the Common Market any time soon, they serve tangentially to further NATO solidarity, which in turn strengthens the affinity between Britain and Europe. In the long term, Britain's fresh concentration on strictly European defense matters may serve to promote not only its own stake in Europe's future, but also the development of the alliance into a more viable organization, combining a continued US guarantee with a much enhanced European role.

2. National Security Study Memorandum 6¹

Washington, January 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

Review of NATO Policy Alternatives

The President has directed a review of US policy toward NATO. The review should consider alternatives with reference to policy in general and to specific issues including US troop levels, German offset negotiations, US nuclear relations with the UK and France, an examination of political consultation practices within NATO and our interests and policies with respect to them, and US attitudes toward intra-European defense cooperation.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe perform this review and that the Secretary of the Treasury designate a representative to sit on the Group for this purpose. The chairman may invite other agencies to send representatives to particular meetings of the Group.

An initial paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by March 3, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 1 thru. Secret.

3. National Security Study Memorandum 9¹

Washington, January 23, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Review of the International Situation

The President has directed the preparation of an “inventory” of the international situation as of January 20, 1969. He wishes the review to provide a current assessment of the political, economic and security situation and the major problems relevant to U.S. security interests and U.S. bilateral and multilateral relations. In order to put this review into effect he wishes to consider responses to the attached set of questions along with other material considered relevant. The review should include a discussion, where appropriate, of the data upon which judgments are based, uncertainties regarding the data, and alternative possible interpretations of the data.

The responses should be forwarded to the President by February 20, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment

[Omitted here are sections not related to Western Europe and NATO.]

West Europe—General Economic

1. What are the most likely courses of development of the European Communities over the next 1–3–5 years? Identify (a) what political and economic circumstances in individual member countries and in the communities as a whole, (b) what policy decisions or actions on the parts of which member governments, and (c) the possible external

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-129, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 9 (1 of 6). Secret. This NSSM covered all regions of the world. The eight-volume response, forwarded to Kissinger by Walsh on February 19, which included 117 pages on the countries of NATO and Western Europe in volume III, is *ibid*.

(i.e., outside the member states) events, which will most affect these courses of development?

2. What possible developments in the European communities over the next 1–3–5 years would be most likely to come into conflict with the interests and aims of the United States? With those of Japan? With those of the various East European members of COMECON? With those of the USSR?

3. What are the prospects for British entry into the communities over the next 1–3–5 years? For the entry of other states? For some sort of relationship short of full membership for the UK and/or other non-member states? How will these various contingencies affect US interests? How will they affect the interests of other non-European developed industrial states?

4. What is the state of West European relations (including EEC) with the USSR and Eastern Europe? Do these pose any problems for us? What is the state of consultations between us and the West Europeans on these matters?

NATO

1. What are the most likely causes of an outbreak of hostilities in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces? What are the circumstances that might surround an actual outbreak? What less likely contingencies are nevertheless planned for by NATO? How capable are NATO forces judged to be in meeting this spectrum of contingencies?

2. What is the state of readiness of the various national contingents assigned to NATO? What endurance would they have? What are their reinforcement capabilities?

3. How effectively could NATO's command structure cope with various likely contingencies of hostilities? What are the areas of most significant weakness?

4. How has the Alliance been affected by the non-participation of France in the affairs of the Military Organization? To what extent do NATO plans assume the participation of French Forces and the common use of French facilities in the event of hostilities? How realistic are these assumptions?

5. What problems does NATO face regarding planning for, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons? In what manner, and how seriously do these problems impair the military efficiency or the political cohesion of the Alliance?

6. Is the Nuclear Planning Group an adequate mechanism of response to NATO's nuclear problems? What are its deficiencies? What are the prospects for Anglo-French, or Anglo-French-FRG nuclear cooperation?

7. How weak are NATO's flanks? What sorts of contingencies might be affected by their weakness? Are these likely contingencies?

8. Is the Greek junta still a divisive issue within NATO? How is the Alliance affected by it?

9. To what extent does the Alliance retain popular political support in its member nations? In what manner is this support likely to change over the next five years? Which nations, if any, might withdraw from the Alliance during this period?

10. How much agreement is there, in fact, regarding NATO's present strategy? To what extent does it contribute actual operational guidance and to what extent is it primarily a general statement of desiderata?

11. What alternative modes of political organization for Western defense have attracted significant support within the governments or informed publics of any of the members of the Alliance?

12. What are the prospects for increased US-European cooperation in weapons development and production? For increased inter-European cooperation?

13. What are the prospects for effective Alliance cooperation and coordination in the handling of extra-European crisis situations such as (a) renewed hostilities in the Middle East, (b) post-Vietnam-war hostilities in South or Southeast Asia, (c) racial conflict in Southern Africa, (d) communist-supported insurgency in tropical Africa?

14. Are major Soviet initiatives in the European security field likely? To what extent do intra-Warsaw-Pact problems inhibit the Soviets in this regard?

15. How much pressure is there for a European security conference?

16. What is the political role of NATO; what is the state of consultations within NATO on political questions?

France

1. What are the prospects for significant economic and political instability in France? What are the primary sources of likely instability? What are the implications of various kinds of instability for French foreign and defense policies?

2. What is the present status (size, effectiveness, patterns of deployment, doctrines for employment) of French nuclear forces? What is their likely course of development over the next 1–3–5–10 years?

3. What sorts of US assistance for the development of French nuclear forces are desired by various groups within France? What would be the effect on the French military nuclear program of US assistance comparable to that which we have given the UK?

4. What Western defense arrangements would be likely to receive what sorts and what degrees of French cooperation? What are the prospects over the next five years for greater French participation in existing NATO military arrangements?

5. What measures to ease the international monetary situation would be most acceptable to the French government and public? Less acceptable? Unacceptable?

6. What is the present state of French relations with the USSR? With the CPR? With the various communist states of Eastern Europe? How are these relations likely to develop over the next five years?

7. To what degree were de Gaulle's world-view—and French policy—affected by the events of May 1968 in France and those of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia?

8. How strong is the commitment of the French Government to a pro-Arab, anti-Israeli Middle-Eastern policy? Is such a policy likely to survive de Gaulle?

9. What will be the effect on US–French relations of various possible outcomes of the Vietnam war?

United Kingdom

1. What is the present status of US–UK military nuclear cooperation? What forms does it take?

2. What is the present status (size, effectiveness, patterns of deployment, doctrines for employment) of UK nuclear forces? What is their likely course of development over the next 1–3–5–10 years, assuming (a) continuation of present levels and types of US–UK military nuclear cooperation, (b) increased cooperation, and (c) reduced, or discontinued, cooperation?

3. What are present deployments of UK military forces outside Europe and the UK itself? What are they likely to be over the next five years? Are they likely to be affected by a change of government in the UK? What actions or policies on the part of the US might induce the UK to alter these deployments? Is it likely that the UK will develop an effective strategic mobility capability? What role is the UK likely to play over the next five years in extra-European security arrangements?

4. What are the prospects over the next 1–3–5–10 years for the UK economy? What are the implications of these prospects for UK foreign and defense policies?

Spain

1. What are the prospects for significant political and/or economic instability in Spain over the next 1–3–5 years? What would be the most

likely sources of instability? In what manner might US interests be affected?

2. Are changes in the regime likely to affect U.S. base tenure?
3. What is the current status of negotiations on renewal of the base agreement?
4. What is the status of Spanish-UK negotiations regarding Gibraltar?

Portugal

1. What is the Portuguese goal in re-opening the question of US base rights in the Azores in December 1968? Is there any evidence that the Portuguese wish to transfer US air bases to the mainland (Beja) and phase out the US presence in the Azores? Should the Portuguese initiative be viewed as an attempt to capitalize on the current unsettled status of US-Spanish base negotiations?

Canada

1. What are the prospects for significant political or economic instability in Canada over the next 1–3–5 years?
2. What is the present strength of the Quebec separatist movement? Is it likely to increase over the above time spans? What factors will affect its strength?
3. Over the next 1–3–5 years will Canada (a) withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance? (b) cease participating in its military organization?
4. What are the most salient problems in present US-Canadian relations? What additional matters of contention are likely to arise over the next 1–3–5 years?

Greece

1. What is the likely course of Greek political development over the next 1–3–5 years? Is it likely that Greece will experience serious political and/or economic instability? Civil War?
2. What are the likely trends in Greek foreign policy over the above time span?
3. Can the U.S. count on unimpeded use of its bases in Greece to respond to non-NATO contingencies?
4. What are the prospects for Greece's full-scale economic integration into the Western European economic community?

Turkey

1. What are the prospects for U.S.-Turkish relations in the next four years?
2. What are the prospects for continued democratic government in Turkey?

3. What are the prospects for economic growth?

[Omitted here are sections not related to Western Europe and NATO.]

4. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, January 23, 1969, 2225Z.

335. Subject: NATO checklist for the new administration: Part I.

1. We thought it would be useful to try to organize in one comprehensive checklist the business the United States Government will be doing with and through NATO in the months ahead. Not all this business will be considered at the April Ministerial meeting in Washington.² But the issues highlighted in this series of messages are never far below the surface. Part I of this message, herewith, characterizes all NATO's main business as a complex transatlantic bargain. It suggests questions often posed in and outside NATO governments, questions which the new administration will face in theory and answer in practice. Part II considers those of the questions that arise in the North Atlantic Council as "political consultation".³ Part III considers the questions about managing and modernizing the NATO defense system.⁴

Part I. NATO as an organized controversy.

2. The lesson of two world wars is deeply etched in bipartisan American foreign policy. The security of Americans requires that Western Europe not pass into hands hostile—or even "neutral"—toward the United States. Underlying the transatlantic bargaining in NATO on all sorts of subjects is an implicit but fundamental accord among the fifteen allies on this proposition: and the most basic US aim in the bargaining process is to keep it that way. The North Atlantic Treaty describes a deal—one for all and all for one—but leaves open what each country will do about it. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an organized controversy about the content and balance of the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Also sent to the Department of Defense, all NATO capitals, Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, the Missions at Geneva and the UN, SHAPE, USCINCLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCEUR.

² April 10–11.

³ Telegram 336 from USNATO, dated January 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 4 NATO.

⁴ Telegram 365 from USNATO, dated January 25; *ibid*.

transatlantic security bargain—who is going to do how much, how soon, to carry out the purposes of the treaty?

3. The United States (which has two-thirds of NATO's GNP, contributes about half of the direct costs of NATO's defense, and provides the nuclear shield) is at the center of the bargain—that is, each of the other members thinks of itself as bargaining primarily with us.

4. On the defense side, our main object is to get the most effective conventional defense effort out of the 90 to 100 billion dollars which the allies (excluding France, and not counting the US contribution) can be expected to put up during the next five years. The main objectives of our European allies are (a) to keep the United States physically committed to the defense of Western Europe, so that the engagement of our nuclear power is assured; and (b) to buy a right to be consulted by the United States on anything affecting their security.

5. Out of this dynamic deal, our allies get not only the protection of our military power but some negotiated degree of participation in US political decisions that affect their destiny. By committing our resources and sharing our discretion in limited ways, we try to get our allies not only to do as much as possible for the common defense, but also to support our efforts to build a workable world order, especially by making sensible security arrangements with the Soviet Union.

6. In the field of political consultation (discussed in Part II of this message), the main NATO questions which the new administration will have to answer and re-answer are these:

A. How do we reconcile our relations with our NATO allies with our need to deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union?

B. What has recent Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe done to our basic assumptions about East-West relations?

C. Can East-West relations in Europe (including trade and credits) be "managed" from the Western side?

D. How do we use NATO to plan for a system of European security more stable than a high-cost military stalemate?

E. How should we handle the special position of France in all this?

F. What can we expect of NAC consultation on action outside the NATO defense area?

7. In the NATO defense system (discussed in Part III of this message), the current and recurring questions are these:

A. Do we need a change in NATO's "new" "flexible response" strategy?

B. What force levels, and what kinds of forces, does NATO really need to make the flexible strategy work?

C. If present allied defense budgets, give or take a little, are the "given" level of resources (in the absence of a new East-West crisis), what can be done to make the NATO deterrent viable in the 1970s?

D. What can be done in the critical area of air defense?

E. Can we bring about a fundamental change in the relative burdens carried by the US and its NATO allies? And how can we best neutralize the balance-of-payments effect of military spending in the common defense?

F. Can we withdraw some of our forces now stationed in Europe?—and how many, when, and how?

G. When, and how, can we get France back in the NATO defense system?

H. How much further do we want to push nuclear consultation and substantive planning in NATO's successful Nuclear Planning Group?

I. Do we want explicit procedures for crisis consultation in emergencies? Do we want—and can we avoid—reexamination of the process by which “NATO goes to war”?

J. How badly do we want the Europeans to “caucus” on NATO defense matters—and on what issues?

K. How about a European SACEUR?

L. How should NATO react to the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean?

M. How can we get the most out of NATO infrastructure (common-funded military construction)? the most for what, and for whom?

N. What projects are the best bets for increased transatlantic cooperations in R&D and armaments production? What changes in US policy and practice are required?

Cleveland

5. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Laird**¹

Washington, January 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

USNATO Checklist for the New Administration

Ambassador Cleveland has presented, in the form of a “checklist,” a review of the main policy problems which the US faces in NATO. This memorandum summarizes for your information his 42-page cable (Tab A)² and presents our views on these major issues. No action need be taken at this time on any of the matters discussed.

The cable comprises a general discussion of current US policy in the areas of (1) political consultation and (2) defense planning; a number of questions in these areas; specific recommendations on certain matters; and, in all cases, his views on the question. A detailed summary of the defense planning questions with USNATO recommendations and rationale, together with ISA comments, is at Tab B.³ Our comments below are in brackets.

Defense Planning

The major defense planning issues concern (1) how the burden of the defense effort should be shared by the US and the Allies, and how resources should be allocated; (2) the US balance-of-payments problem; (3) the possible further redeployment of US forces from Europe; (4) the role of France in the NATO defense system; and (5) consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. A summary of these major issues follows:

1. *Sharing of the Defense Effort, and Allocation of Resources.* The US has been trying for some years to get the Europeans (who average around 5% of GNP for defense as against 10% for the US) to take over a larger share of the defense burden in Europe, to correspond to their spectacularly improved economic position. The thrust of US efforts has been to induce the Europeans to improve the quality—equipment, training, stocks—of their conventional forces. There is plenty of (US) nuclear power in the Alliance. If the Europeans would improve their

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Accession 2001–NLF–020, Box 1, NATO, Vol. 1. Secret. The memorandum is stamped “Sec Def has seen” with the stamped date of January 30, 1969. All brackets are in the original.

² See Document 4 and footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.

³ Attached but not printed.

large standing armies to be fully effective, the US could reduce somewhat the number of US ground forces and air forces deployed in Europe on a permanent basis.

Ambassador Cleveland argues that we cannot reasonably expect a larger effort from the Europeans; that we will be lucky to keep it at the present level; and that to avoid further erosion and give a lead to further improvements in European forces the US should, after Vietnam, consider doing “more” in Europe. [We disagree. We should be getting substantial relief from our Allies. A substantial shift of the burden is overdue. So long as the US goes on carrying a disproportionate share, there is no reason for the Europeans to do more. The US doing even more in Europe will be more likely to retard than to encourage major new European contributions.]

2. *The Balance-of-Payments Problem.* Ambassador Cleveland believes that a multilateral scheme for alleviating balance-of-payments problems has some promise and suggests that we should seek agreement among NATO members on a formal policy of cooperation. [As Mr. Nitze told Ambassador Cleveland very clearly on 15 January, Treasury/State/Defense are convinced that any *multilateral* scheme promises only delay in the *bilateral* negotiations and have instructed Ambassador Cleveland *not* to encourage NATO study of a multilateral payments scheme. Germany is the key NATO country for the US balance of payments problem. Of \$1,790 million of US defense expenditures in NATO countries in FY 1968, half—\$888 million—were in Germany. Any “multilateral” scheme is bound to come back in the end to Germany as the burdened party. A one or two-year study in NATO will give the Germans an easy excuse to avoid substantive negotiations in the meantime, at least in part. State/Treasury/Defense remain opposed.]

3. *Redeployment of Forces from Europe.* Ambassador Cleveland argues that this can only be done if we make “some reasonable promises about keeping the remaining troops in Europe for a predictable period.” He says that, for the time being, we should bargain for European improvements in return for a US freeze of troop levels in Europe. [He does not explicitly comment on the REDCOSTE program, decided in December 1968 by the Secretary of Defense, and providing for the streamlining of forces in Europe—combining headquarters, tightening logistics, redeploying to US miscellaneous support functions—with an estimated savings of \$393 million in budget and \$145 million in balance of payments net outflow by the end of FY 73, plus a return of 45,000 personnel to the US.] Ambassador Cleveland also stresses the need for full consultation, over a long period of time, prior to any major withdrawals.

[There is confusion between reductions through streamlining and support reorganization on the one hand (REDCOSTE), and withdrawals of major US combat units on the other. We have tried to clarify the difference. No major combat unit reductions are currently proposed. The issue rather is how to reduce our BOP and budget problems without impairing combat effectiveness in Europe. We think the best course is to proceed apace with REDCOSTE (the nature and general financial aspects of which have now been revealed in the press)⁴ and tell our Allies promptly and fully just what REDCOSTE is and what it is not.]

[At the same time, we must remain flexible and be able to take advantage of our increasing strategic mobility and—hopefully—increases in the European defense contribution. Where it is clearly in the US interest to make further redeployments in the future without adversely affecting NATO's overall defense posture, we must be free to do so. We should therefore avoid a "freeze" of current force levels or agreement to any form of advance "consultation" with NATO which might unduly restrict our freedom of action.]

4. *The Role of France in the NATO Defense System.* Ambassador Cleveland states that there is no reasonable prospect for a basic change in NATO defense relations with France while DeGaulle is in power. He also cautions against developing US-French bilateral ties in defense, for example in nuclear matters, of a kind which would weaken the solidarity of the integrated NATO defense system. [We believe that we should use every opportunity, including legitimate US-French bilateral discussions, exercises, exchange of personnel, and arrangements for use of French real estate, to develop close de facto French military relations with the US and with NATO. This can be done at a level below the threshold of political visibility. After DeGaulle closer cooperation may become possible even on a higher level. We believe that adequate discussion of our procedures and our reasons with our Allies can avoid an adverse impact on allied interests. The other Allies follow this practice (Germany, UK) without adverse effect on the Alliance. We can, too.]

5. *Consultation on the Use of Nuclear Weapons.*

a. *Discussions of Nuclear Policy in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).* Ambassador Cleveland (1) believes that the advantages of continuing to talk with our Allies in the NPG about "the political and military complexities of nuclear warfare" clearly outweigh the risks of discovery by the Europeans that questions such as how to use nuclear weapons tactically have no easy answers, but (2) cautions that we should not raise too many doubts about the usability of tactical nuclear weapons, since this "would obviously erode the deterrent." [We believe (1) that the

⁴ See, for example, William Beecher, "U.S. Weighing Plan to Reduce Noncombat Troops in Europe," *New York Times*, January 26, 1969, p. 7.

NPG must think hard and in detail about the pros and cons of the various possible concepts for using nuclear weapons (particularly "tactical" weapons) in NATO's defense; (2) that we should give the NPG members the benefit of our analyses of nuclear warfare in Europe (including our doubts); and (3) that we should continue to seek to bring about modifications in our Allies' thinking about defense so that they will recognize the need to purchase and support a force posture that both deters the more likely forms of aggression against Europe and provides options short of widespread nuclear war in Europe or general war if deterrence should fail.]

b. *Consultation in NATO in Crises on the Use of Nuclear Weapons.* Ambassador Cleveland states that the paper on consultation developed by staffs of NPG countries (and the International Staff) in Brussels for NPG consideration represents a relatively harmless statement of principles and assumptions about the "mechanics of consultation", and that US footdragging could cause this subject to become a fairly major political issue. He only hints at the very difficult constitutional issue underlying discussions of "mechanics"—who controls NATO's use of nuclear weapons in wartime, the Council or the US?—noting that the consultation discussion in the NPG involves the "unwillingness of sovereign states to delegate war or peace decisions." [We and the Joint Staff strongly believe that discussions in Brussels about the "mechanics" of consultation are bound (1) to lead to examination of "how NATO goes to war"—an exercise which can prove extremely divisive and is not likely to produce any beneficial results, even of a procedural nature; and (2) to generate pressures for new restrictions that we could well find unacceptable and harmful to the deterrent. Moreover, in our judgment the alleged European desire for detailed consultation procedures does not reflect interest in NATO capitals (except the Netherlands), but rather has been encouraged by NATO Secretary General Brosio, his International Staff, and several Permanent Representatives who have a strong personal interest in consultation procedures. For these reasons, we believe the nuclear consultation question should be reserved for the personal attention of Ministers at the next NPG meeting in London in May, and that in the meantime we should strongly discourage any further PermRep or staff discussions of the matter.]

Political Consultation

In the part of his telegram dealing with the political issues in NATO, which will be addressed primarily by the Department of State, Ambassador Cleveland stresses the need for increased political consultation with the Allies. The most important of his specific recommendations are:

1. That the new Administration give early confirmation that it will consult in NATO about US-Soviet arms limitation talks (SALT), and

that we give this confirmation even before we decide when and how to pursue the subject with the Soviets;

2. That the new Administration initiate a NATO study of the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and its implications for East-West relations, which would form the basis for discussion at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in April; and

3. That a related study be made of the kinds of East-West contacts, which in light of Czechoslovakia, will best advance NATO's interests.

Paul C. Warnke

6. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, February 2, 1969, 1344Z.

504. Subject: European Caucus.

1. In private conversations on a personal basis we have been taking the line, when queried by PermReps and visitors, that the utility of UK Defense Minister Healey's European Caucus idea must turn in the end on what subjects its members decide to caucus about (USNATO 318).²

2. We have taken this line for three reasons:

A. Our traditional support for any manifestation of European unity which does not run contrary to US interests to the broader framework of Atlantic partnership.

B. There are certain subjects on which the Europeans could quite usefully come up with agreements among themselves, e.g. military procurement, standardization, and especially international responsibility among the European members for logistical arrangements including those for the support of US forces redeploying to Europe.

C. If a so-called European Caucus discussed the wrong things or evolved in the wrong direction, it could involve very real difficulties and even dangers for us. For example, the existence of a working European Caucus could easily tempt the Soviet Union to start sounding out

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, all other NATO capitals, SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USDOCOSOUTH, and USCINCLANT.

² Dated January 22. (Ibid.)

its members on the idea of a European security conference without US participation.

3. On present form it now appears to me more likely than not that if this project gets off the ground the members of the Caucus will talk about what we are bound to consider the wrong things. It also seems increasingly evident that this proposal would not reinforce our support for ultimate European unity and will take a path which is quite divergent from that objective: indeed one is tempted to characterize this as a non-institutional way to institutionalize European disunity. We therefore should have a serious look at what tactic we ought to pursue toward this proposal from here on in.

4. The conclusion above that the European Caucus—or the European personality—or the European voice—or just Euro-dinners are likely to get into the wrong subjects is based on the fact that UK DefMin Healey, who is providing the main motive power, is focusing on two areas for discussion among Europeans:

A. Defense policy. But the European members of NATO are painfully aware that the national security of each depends upon the United States; they know that their common security is a function of the US commitment and the US presence in Europe; and they therefore think about the most important of their common problems—defense—in an Atlantic and not in a European context. They do not conceive of their relationship to each other and to the United States in dumbbell imagery but in triangular patterns; on the fundamental issue of security, their relations with each other in effect pass through Washington. To varying degrees this is true of all members of the Alliance: in the case of Germany it is overwhelmingly and critically true. So the system we have constructed, always linked to US national interests, is inherently and inescapably an Atlantic system and will remain so as long as the ultimate deterrent is the American strategic nuclear arsenal. This is to say that the Europeans probably could not agree among themselves on defense issues worth caucusing about.

If they did, however, it probably would be on subjects on which it would not be in our interest for them to agree. They could, for example, agree that the United States must make a more binding or a more long-term commitment to Europe, or should freeze its force levels, or should in some fashion do more (relative to what the Europeans do), or should return to a trip-wire strategy, or should subject nuclear decision making to more rigid procedures. They might, that is, agree on what we should do; but they would never agree that we should do less or be less forthcoming. But they are unlikely to agree in a caucus on putting forth relatively more European effort, increasing European defense spending, or relieving us of specific resource or monetary burdens we

now carry in the common interest. As the local cliché says, “It’s easier to talk back to teacher than to influence the other students.”

B. Issues in litigation, or about to enter litigation, between the US and the Soviet Union. It is not much easier to conceive of a distantly European position emerging on, say, SALT, than on NATO strategy because such matters affect their destiny, and their relationships with each other on destiny decisions also run, in effect, through Washington. If a separate agreed European position did emerge, it would represent the position of an outside group not party to the direct negotiation until it is accepted as the US position or successfully reconciled with the US position. And surely it is less painful and more practical to reach an allied position by transatlantic negotiation within NAC from the word go—as was done in 1967–68 on NPT.³

5. The conclusion that Healey’s promotion of this kind of caucus is divergent from the goal of unity among the Six derives mainly from the anomalies of a group which now seems to include Greece, Turkey, the Scandinavians, and potentially Canada, but does not include France. Such a grouping does not reinforce any of the institutional structures specifically designed to forward the process of unification in Western Europe.

6. With respect to issues that are alive bilaterally between the US and the USSR, we find it difficult to discern what advantages could derive from prior discussion among the Europeans. Indeed what comes to mind is a number of potential disadvantages:

A. More cumbersome and time-consuming procedures. Part of our difficulty in consulting allies about US–USSR negotiations is that the discussions tend to develop their own dynamic—that breaks in Soviet positions tend to come without warning—and that extra-NATO schedules and scenarios, e.g. the GA and ENDC, tend to set deadlines which sometimes are difficult to reconcile with the requirements of NAC consultation. It is hard to believe that a two-stage negotiating process—first within the European Caucus, then within NAC—could do anything but compound the problem of meshing negotiations and consultations.

B. The possibility of irrelevant or impractical European positions. Allied consultations about US–Soviet negotiations can hardly begin realistically except in the light of our best guess as to what the traffic will bear in Moscow. Nor can they proceed sensibly except in the light of the state of play of the actual negotiations. This is not to diminish the high importance of consulting with our allies before US negotiating po-

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XIII, Western Europe Region, Documents 258 and 312.

sitions are set in concrete. It is merely to pose the dilemma: if the Europeans are not clued in at the start and over the course of the exercise, they could well go off on unrealistic or irrelevant tangents; if they are clued in, it looks more and more like a normal NAC consultation.

C. A complication of the bilateral-multilateral relationship. It is hard to see the British and Germans, for example, giving up their practice of going into Foggy Bottom directly on questions under discussion in NAC. If they then returned to the European forum, the British or the Germans would be in the position of telling their colleagues what the Americans think—distorted a little by their own special prisms.

D. Bad imagery. The concept of a European half confronting an American half of the Alliance—or of a split between the big guy and the little guys—is retrograde imagery compared to the concept of an Atlantic partnership, even if the claimed equality of the partners requires a bit of sophistry from time to time.

7. In practice it also is difficult to imagine the development of a solid European position in the first place without benefit of US brokerage. Perhaps the NPT is not a typical case example but it comes to mind—complete with the memory of our intimate role in helping to develop a viable common position of the EURATOM members.

8. In its own narrow context, then, the Healey proposal evidently is based on one or both of two illusions:

A. That an informal, amorphous, non-institutional periodic gathering of Ministers or PermReps over cognac or tea can somehow produce a European “caucus” or “personality” or “voice” which has not been produced by the Common Market, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, the ceaseless trafficking of political leaders between European capitals, by the persistent prodding of the United States for some two decades, or by the Harmel exercise, one of whose original objectives was to find and give expression to the missing voice of Europe.

B. The Eurodinners will somehow facilitate UK entry into the Common Market. The UK will not get into the Common Market until DeGaulle disappears or until the Five are prepared to risk much more than they are now prepared to risk in a power play to override him.

9. Despite all the limitations and dangers, the United States should probably avoid any move that could be interpreted as an effort to strangle the European personality—and for good reasons: our long-term commitment to almost any manifestation of European unity; the need for almost any outlet for the frustrations of the smaller European nations in the shadow of a super power; the utility of evidence that the Europeans are willing to try to get together on anything without France; the opportunity it gives the British to work at being good Europeans; the likely prospect that the Europeans will learn by

experience that it's better to have the Americans on the inside all the way; even the possibility that the quality of our own decision-making would be improved by being kept on our toes.

10. The chances still are that the project will wither if not die—because of inherent procedural difficulties, or divisions among the members, or German fears that it will frighten the Americans away, or a French decision in favor of sabotage, or for some other reason or combination of reasons. This probability suggests a tactic of maintaining a strictly hands-off attitude toward the Healey enterprise, accompanied by soft purring noises about European unity when queried.

11. But there is another tactic available: to make it known officially, either at our own initiative or in response to further inquiries which we undoubtedly shall receive, that the US (a) perceives certain dangers of divisiveness if the European grouping leads to transatlantic confrontations over issues which can be reconciled without confrontation within NAC; but (b) would welcome a European position on problems that would be furthered by a greater degree of European efforts along the lines of para 2B above. We are inclined toward this mildly activist tactic.

12. We are beginning to need explicit guidance on this subject, going beyond the purring noises we were previously instructed to make. My visit to Washington next week provides an occasion for policy discussion; this message is intended as one basis for that discussion.

Cleveland

7. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 14, 1969, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Secretary Laird with the Secretary General of NATO,
14 February 1969

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Manlio Brosio, Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Honorable Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Honorable David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Honorable Timothy E. Stanley, Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO
Honorable Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA (European and NATO Affairs)
M. Fausto Bacchetti, Chef du Cabinet for SyGen Brosio

The Secretary General discussed the attendance of Defense Ministers at the 20th Anniversary meeting in April.² Mr. Laird said that if they attended we might perhaps arrange some visits, such as to Cape Kennedy and SAC, that would be worthwhile. Mr. Packard suggested the Command and Control Center at Colorado Springs. Mr. Laird said that if a satellite launch were taking place at Cape Kennedy at about that time that would be most interesting. There was further discussion about the possible tours.

Mr. Brosio then said he wished to outline the current activities: There was a question of forces which would be discussed at the DPC meeting in June³ at which the Ministers will give guidance for the forces. The problem was the level of US and European forces. The DPC had an interesting discussion at their last meeting⁴ by Mr. Nitze on the need for the Europeans to improve their forces and some decisions were taken by some of the Europeans to improve manning, equipment,

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Accession 2001-NLF-020, Box 1, NATO, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Frederick Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The meeting took place in Laird's office. Brosio spent February 13-14 in Washington in order to discuss NATO-related topics. On February 13 he met with Nixon and Kissinger and attended a dinner party at the White House. (President's Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

² April 10-11.

³ This meeting took place May 28.

⁴ The final communiqué of the January 16 meeting is printed in *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974*, pp. 216-217.

training and mobilization. That effort is part of “balancing” the US forces which are more necessary than ever after Czechoslovakia, and also for the purpose of improving European forces. The Europeans expect US forces not to be reduced, and in time the Europeans could improve their forces. The question is how to give more precision to these general principles in the June meeting (DPC).

Mr. Laird said he was sure Secretary General Brosio understood that the new administration places the highest importance on the NATO Alliance and not only on defense ties but also on economic ties. The President places great importance on having the Europeans understand that we will consult our European friends. Mr. Laird was sure the President’s trip⁵ would get that point across. There is a second problem—and Mr. Laird was well acquainted with this problem from his time in the Legislature—and this was what kind of commitment will our European friends make to the Alliance in the real terms of manpower, of budgets, of dollars and cents. We had come very close, before the Czechoslovakian invasion, to having the Majority Leader of the Senate, Senator Mansfield, pressing for reductions in Europe. That effort has been put on the back burner because of Czechoslovakia. But frankly, many people in Congress had expected a bigger European response to the Czechoslovakian invasion than we got. So far as dollars and cents are concerned, there has not been that much of a response. The staffs of the House and Senate Committees will analyze the budget changes and will inform the Committees. Mr. Laird personally believed that we should show some strength in response to the Czechoslovakian invasion. But we need good arguments to convince the Congress. Any good arguments that Mr. Brosio could give him would be helpful, but it should be clear that argumentation alone will not do it. We need to show the dollars and cents effects of the European efforts.

Mr. Brosio said that there had been some improvements. Above all, there had been “an end to the idea of reductions.” The Germans and the Dutch did do something and the UK also did something although not in the form of new forces. Some others have done something too.

Mr. Laird said that we cannot use older commitments planned before the Czechoslovakian invasion as arguments with Congress—with his former colleagues—that the Europeans were doing something in response to the Czechoslovakian invasion. We need better arguments than that.

Mr. Brosio agreed that not enough was being done by the Europeans. There had been repeated warnings from Mr. Clifford and Mr. Nitze. (He had talked to General Lemnitzer before coming here. Gen-

⁵ February 23–March 2.

eral Lemnitzer wants moderate efforts to bring the 26 divisions in the Center up to standard, plus improvements in the mobilization capability and the reserves.) Mr. Brosio agreed that countries presented as new measures things they had planned before Czechoslovakia. He suggested using the June meeting as an occasion for persuasion of the Europeans to improve their efforts. He did not think President Nixon could do it on his forthcoming trip, but when Mr. Laird came to Europe he could seriously discuss this problem and discuss the force levels for the future. The improvements cannot be done in a year of course.

Mr. Laird pointed out that even before Czechoslovakia he personally opposed the withdrawal of US troops from Europe. But he did have a problem in going before the Senate and the House of Representatives. He had seen the sentiment for withdrawal grow and only Czechoslovakia had changed the situation.

Ambassador Cleveland said that the sentiment for withdrawal, however, had never become a national issue. Mr. Packard said that there has been another factor bearing on the problem—the balance of payments problem. Any help the Europeans could render us there would be all to the good. Mr. Brosio asked whether Senator Mansfield had raised the question again. Mr. Laird said that Senator Mansfield had raised it only once on “Issues and Answers”—about a week ago. Mr. Laird did not think Senator Mansfield would have the same support this time that he had had last fall, but there was still a problem. Mr. Brosio said that he saw the problem the same way. He hoped Canada would keep its review going. He thought we should all try to convince the European countries to do more.

Ambassador Cleveland said that the essential problem was how to get the Europeans to do a little more—about 4–5%. The approach of the last two-to-three years of threatening the Europeans with force withdrawals won’t work. He thought we could trade the maintenance of the present level of US forces in Europe for a European increase in effort. But he thought we could not do this if we wanted to keep the US option for annual reductions open. If the Europeans think that the US believed détente was breaking out, they would follow our lead. Mr. Packard said that the principle was a good idea. The question was how long a commitment one could get from Congress. Mr. Laird said that we could move on the assumption that Congress would agree. In fact, you could never agree for more than a year anyway. We only get money for one year at a time and the Europeans also can only get money from their parliaments for one year at a time so the same problem existed for all. (Mr. Brosio and others confirmed the fact that European defense budgets were granted only one year at a time.) Mr. Brosio asked whether the 4–5% figure that Ambassador Cleveland had used as necessary to fix up the forces included expenditures for reserves. Mr.

Stanley said that the figure did include at least first echelon reserves. Mr. Wyle pointed out that the 4–5% figure must be an average and that the real issue obviously was how much the Germans would increase their defense budget. (There was more discussion about the validity of the figure of 4–5% and whether in the German case the increase would not have to be about 15%.)

Mr. Brosio said he now wished to discuss the NPG. There were two subjects. The first was nuclear consultation. The Alliance had the Athens Guidelines⁶ which were very general. The problem is to give something more detailed to these very very general rules without losing flexibility. We can understand that in addition to multilateral consultations there will be bilateral consultations and indeed it is clear that the important decisions will come out of that bilateral process. But it was very important that there be a plausible way fixed ahead of time which showed that there was a way for all the countries, especially the smallest, to consult in a time of crisis and to show that all will have a chance to be heard. It is important to have a sense of participation, so it was important to have procedures for consultation. Refining consultation was most important, “according to me and to most of the countries of the Alliance” one must keep flexible but there should be a guarantee that no one would be left out of the game. There was hesitation on the side of the nuclear powers, mostly on the part of the US. We have circulated a questionnaire, but there was no answer from the US yet. The US should take an active part in this problem. Without US active and willing participation between now and the May meeting,⁷ in the preparations for the May meeting the subject would not be adequately prepared.

Mr. Laird said that he understood the problem. We have got to move carefully to be sure that we don’t destroy the deterrents we have got. He thought that this subject was one that only Ministers should discuss and that there should not be any staff discussion or discussion by any group below the Defense Ministers. The deterrent was a very important thing and it was not wise to have a great deal of discussion at any level below the Defense Ministers.

Mr. Brosio agreed but said that the Defense Ministers would succeed all the better if the work were prepared for them so that the issues were sorted out ahead of time and so they did not lose time at the meeting. Without such preparation it was difficult to make any progress at the meeting. Mr. Laird said he was concerned about the

⁶ At the May 1962 meeting held in Athens, the NAC adopted guidelines that laid out broadly the circumstances in which NATO might use nuclear weapons in self-defense.

⁷ The NPG met May 29–30.

danger to the deterrent from having all these plans and proposals floating throughout the European governments. This created some danger. He thought it was best to let the Ministers discuss it. Mr. Packard pointed out that the Ministers could have a general discussion about the matter first and if there were any details to be worked out thereafter this could be done perhaps with others. Mr. Brosio said that the Ministers had already decided to give it to the Permanent Representatives and it was in that context that he had decided to circulate a questionnaire. It was being handled very secretly. [Note: News story dated March 21, 1969, attached at Tab A, was not available at time of discussion. FSW]⁸ If we didn't have this preparation he was afraid Ministers again might not reach any conclusions.

Ambassador Cleveland pointed out that the fact is we have been dragging our feet. The Ministers just gave the subject to the Permanent Representatives to get rid of it. Since then the US has stalled saying we should wait for the new Administration. The question now was do we just wait or do we go on trying to pose the question, to "organize the question", without trying at this stage to answer the questions. Mr. Brosio said that in "organizing the question" you do in fact engage in substantive issues because that is the substantive preparation. He agreed that the Ministers gave it to the Permanent Representatives just to get rid of the question and he acknowledged Ambassador Cleveland's description of US procedure since then. Mr. Laird repeated that he thought it would be best for Ministers to handle this one.

Mr. Brosio then turned to the second subject. He said that the UK and the FRG would produce a draft of tactical nuclear weapons guidelines paper which was due on March 31st. "As Chairman of the NPG" I have submitted to the attention of the NPG the problem of the mix of nuclear weapons which exists. It was agreed in the past that the quantity of nuclear weapons was enough but that the mix could still be further considered. The question is, is it possible to improve the armory of nuclear weapons by developing a *small* nuclear weapon. This issue was connected with the question of whether we were only deterring the Soviet use of nuclear weapons with our own, or whether we were contemplating first use by NATO of nuclear weapons to defend itself. This was an important question. Mr. Brosio had raised it because he thinks it should be discussed in the NPG "without hiding from myself the delicacy of the question." I have therefore given a personal paper to the UK and the FRG to explain the first use advantages of small weapons and the advantage of gradual escalation. This issue was left open in the UK/FRG paper and Mr. Brosio thought perhaps it should be addressed. Mr. Laird asked whether in the nature of things this question

⁸ Brackets are in the original. Tab A is attached but not printed.

did not have to be left open for now. Maybe it was something that should be brought into talks with the Soviets at some time in the future. So far they gave no sign of going to small weapons themselves. If the idea was to keep nuclear warfare small, wouldn't the Soviets have to have the same size of small weapons? Mr. Brosio said that we would have a chance to keep it small if the Soviets did not respond with nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke said that the problem is that we might hit them with our smallest nuclear weapons and they might hit us with their smallest nuclear weapons which were much bigger. In that case we would have the worst of both worlds. Mr. Packard made the same point. Mr. Brosio said [1 line not declassified] Perhaps small weapons would be acceptable to them in the defense of Germany. But in any case, he thought this matter should be discussed in the NPG. That is what the NPG was for. Mr. Laird agreed that the NPG existed for the purpose of discussing matters of interest. Mr. Brosio said that the question should at least be left open and at an appropriate time discussed in the NPG. But he thought this was quite aside from any discussion with the Russians. He appreciated the fact that so far there had not been much interest in the matter. In any case, he wanted to give an entirely confidential copy of his paper to Mr. Laird. He had given it only to the discussion leaders (UK and FRG) and had told them that he would give a confidential copy to the US Government. Mr. Stanley said that the problem behind Mr. Brosio's paper really was, are nuclear weapons usable in defense, unilaterally, and on our own territory in a way that would not cause the enemy to respond with nuclear weapons. Mr. Brosio said he thought this should be discussed in the NPG. [8 lines not declassified]

During the course of the discussion General John R. McConnell, Chief of Staff, Air Force; Mr. George Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, State Department; and Brigadier General Rex H. Hampton, Director, European Region, OASD/ISA, joined the group which then repaired to the Secretary's private dining room where further general discussions took place.

8. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

NATO Defense Issues

European leaders and General Lemnitzer are likely to raise with you on your forthcoming trip some important defense issues. For your background information as to how these issues look to us in the DoD, the following summary may prove helpful to you. JCS comments, keyed to this memorandum by footnotes and including differences of view on a number of issues, are attached as Tab E hereto.²

The Adequacy of NATO's Conventional Forces

It is sometimes said that NATO's conventional forces are today so outclassed by the Warsaw Pact that NATO would have to use nuclear weapons within a few days, or even hours, of any substantial attack. General Lemnitzer also believes that his NATO forces are not equal to the opposing Warsaw Pact forces, and that they are not capable of engaging in sustained combat.

The adequacy of the balance of conventional forces in Europe is a subject of considerable differences of view in the Alliance and in the US.

All elements of the DoD are agreed that there is not a hopeless superiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact; but there is considerable difference of opinion about what advantage, if any, the Warsaw Pact does have over NATO, under what circumstances, and how that advantage, if any, should be measured.

The OSD staff and my last two predecessors³ have generally taken the view that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are close to being in balance in a variety of important respects, and that a small increase in expenditures would improve the quality of NATO forces and reserves so that a balance would be unquestionably achieved.

The JCS believe that there is neither a "balance" nor a hopeless Pact superiority; instead they believe that there is a distinct, overall Pact edge in conventional capability which could be decisive unless our Al-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 254, Agency Files, NATO. Secret. Kissinger sent the memorandum to the President under a February 21 covering memorandum.

² Tab A-E are attached but not printed.

³ Clark Clifford and Robert S. McNamara.

lies increase their conventional forces, and unless the US maintains and improves its own forces now in Europe.

We shall review the issue of the balance of forces in Europe and expect to have a report for you shortly. We are, of course, aware of General Lemnitzer's views, and shall take them fully into account.

Some background may be useful:

NATO's current strategy, formally adopted two years ago, calls for a range of adequate forces across the whole spectrum of military capabilities—nuclear *and* conventional—to meet whatever contingency may arise with a response suitable to the aggression. In effect, the strategy calls for greater emphasis on conventional forces, since these had been neglected for years in favor of nuclear forces, which were generally agreed to be adequate.

The United States has for years urged its Allies to provide better conventional forces. (There are some Europeans, of course, who continue to believe that the best defense is the *threat* of an immediate nuclear response to almost any aggression. Having a substantial conventional option makes that threat less credible, in their eyes, and is therefore undesirable. The US has argued that good conventional forces show a determination to fight, and the capacity to engage strong *conventional* forces at once in a forward defense is a better deterrent than the incredible threat to go to nuclear war even over smaller aggressions.)

The debate over the feasibility of good NATO conventional forces turns in part on how close to our goal we are now. Statements as to the effectiveness of NATO's existing conventional forces turn on such matters as how one weighs the effect of larger numbers of Warsaw Pact divisions against the effect of the existing rough balance in numbers of men in the opposing forces in Europe's Center Region; the significance of the various "qualitative" indicia of combat capability, such as different types and quality of aircraft, different amounts and quality of major equipment pieces, and different capacities for support, logistics and ammunition replenishment, etc.; how one gauges the advantage of initiative, the likelihood of warning time, relative speed of reinforcement, and so forth. Some of these factors are discussed in more detail at Tab A.

We will in the near future be reviewing the conventional balance and related issues within the DoD and in the course of the NSC review of NATO strategy and alternative force postures. Without prejudice to the outcome of that review, it is well to remember that some European countries might welcome a convenient rationale for cutting back their own defense effort, in favor of a cheaper, if more dangerous, reliance on the US nuclear guarantee. The idea that NATO is hopelessly outclassed in conventional warfare would be likely to increase Congressional and

domestic pressures in the US to reduce US forces in Europe. It would be said that if the whole conventional effort is pointless anyway, we might as well withdraw some of our expensive conventional forces from Europe and rely more on nuclear weapons.

I would therefore counsel, pending completion of the NSC review, against any suggestion that the United States has departed from its past emphasis on the importance and feasibility of improved NATO conventional forces.

Burden Sharing

The above considerations are closely related to the burden-sharing issue. The United States has told its Allies for the past several years that they can and should take over a greater share of Europe's direct defense. The US now devotes about 10% of its gross national product to defense; our European Allies average around 5%, with Germany at 4.5%. (Arguments that the US devotes far less than 10% of GNP to Europe-oriented forces ignore the fact that NATO is an alliance to defend North America as well as Europe.) Congress has shown increasing irritation with Europe's failure to do more to redress this imbalance, and to help us relieve the US balance of payments deficit on military account caused by our deployments in Europe (about \$1 billion). Pressures for a substantial reduction in our Europe-based forces have grown progressively stronger; Czechoslovakia has provided what may well be only a temporary respite.

The US has urged that the European allies make their existing large conventional forces fully effective by manning, training, equipping and supporting them adequately. We have asked that they provide adequate stocks of war reserves, and design mobilization systems capable of providing selective reinforcements rapidly whenever needed. Our success has been limited. Even in the wake of Czechoslovakia, only modest improvements have been pledged by some countries.

The Europeans will be watching closely for any sign from you that their worries are over; that their effort is adequate; or that balance of payments is essentially our problem, not theirs. I believe we should not suggest, even by silence, that these are our views. To do so would, in my judgment, risk dissipating what little momentum there now is in the European improvement effort, and complicate our forthcoming dialogue with Congress.

US Force Levels in Europe

There is some concern in Europe about the durability of a substantial US military presence on the Continent. Here, I would judge the need to be for a nice balance between (i) reassurances about the American commitment to NATO, which are clearly in order, and (ii) polite

reservations in response to any invitations to “stabilize” (i.e., freeze) US force levels in Europe, which might pose serious Congressional and policy problems for us.

US Forces in Europe

The United States now maintains in Europe and the Mediterranean area about 320,000 military personnel, organized in 4½ divisions, 2 armored cavalry regiments, 32 air squadrons (640 aircraft), the Sixth Fleet of 25 combatant ships in the Mediterranean, and the support and logistic units for these forces. Additional conventional and nuclear forces committed to or available for Europe are described at Tab B.

Balance of payments problems, and Congressional pressures (which stem in part from dissatisfaction with burden-sharing within NATO) have exerted a general downward pressure on US force levels in Europe. Force removals from France in 1967, and last year’s redeployment of some Army and Air Force “dual-based” units from Germany reduced authorized personnel spaces in Europe by roughly 50,000. (Actual reductions in personnel were only about half that number.)

We are currently reviewing (and implementing some minor portions) of a program of streamlining of our headquarters and administrative and logistic forces, designed to eliminate some 34,000 additional military personnel spaces in Europe by mid-1973. No major combat units are involved. The program is designed to save annually \$400 million in budget costs and \$150 million in foreign exchange costs when fully accomplished in 1972/3.

Combat and Logistics Readiness of US Forces in Europe

General Lemnitzer has told my staff that the combat readiness of US forces in Europe needs substantial upgrading; that the forces have no line of communications (LOC); have a critical aerial port problem; lack adequate storage facilities for POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) and ammunition; and are short of tanks and modern tactical vehicles, electronics counter-measures equipment and modern tactical aircraft.

We have looked into this matter and find actions underway to cure many of the problems by June 30, 1969. The fact is that readiness in all Services is not as high as we would like. The basic reasons for our reduced readiness are twofold: (1) the priority diversion of resources to Southeast Asia; and (2) the on-going process of adjustment to the removal of our line of communications and air bases in France. Aging tactical vehicles and ships, lack of facilities (aerial ports, depots and storage space for ammunition and petroleum, oil and lubricants), and shortages of some types of ammunition, vehicles and repair parts are the principal deficiencies. Personnel shortages have largely been made up, but lack of experienced middle range leaders and senior enlisted

technicians obtains in Europe as elsewhere. We are now taking a series of actions and studying others to improve the combat support of our forces in Europe. Although remedial actions will overcome many of the problems by June 30, 1969, it will take two to three years to build all of the storage space that is required.

(More detail on the current logistics posture in Europe is at Tab C.)

Germany

1. *Defense Effort.* The FRG, second largest nation in NATO in both population and economic power, does not make a defense effort commensurate with its strength. The German defense budget is about 4.5% of GNP, compared with about 10% for the US. Of the other principal NATO nations, the UK and France also make relatively greater defense efforts than the FRG. The previous Administration has pressed the Germans for years to do more in the defense field, and after Czechoslovakia urged that they increase their defense budget by about 15%. Such an increase by the Germans would have restored a 9% reduction in projected defense expenditures which the Germans made in 1966/67, and permitted some improvements in their forces, and some help with our foreign exchange problems in Germany. Instead, the Germans plan an increase of only about 3%, to be used largely for pay and benefit increases.

2. *Offset.* Our annual *adverse* balance of payments on military account will, in the absence of special arrangements, average \$700 million in Germany and \$200–300 million elsewhere in NATO Europe for FY 1970–72. We are about to begin (in March) formal “offset” negotiations with the Germans. Both the Germans and we would prefer a long-term solution, to avoid the annual political strain of these negotiations. In recent years the Germans have filled most of the gap by purchasing US securities; this only postpones the problem. In exploratory talks last fall the major new US proposal was that the Germans assume about \$400 million annually of US costs paid out in Germany (mainly local employees’ pay and upkeep of US facilities). The Germans find this proposal very difficult to accept for political and financial reasons, but have suggested no satisfactory substitute.

In my opinion the offset problem is one of the most difficult facing us in the Congress. Clark Clifford discussed it with Chancellor Kiesinger and Minister of Defense Schroeder on behalf of President Johnson in October 1968, stressing the importance to both of us of reaching a satisfactory long-term agreement to offset the foreign exchange cost of our military expenditures in Germany. (You may wish to see especially pages 5–7 of the memorandum of conversation attached at Tab D.)

You will probably meet suggestions that in return for FRG offset agreement the US commit itself to stabilizing US forces in Europe at

their current level. While a satisfactory agreement would assist you to deal with domestic pressures to withdraw American forces from Europe, I am in agreement with the State trip papers⁴ cautioning you against any pledge on this score. We may need our flexibility, not only to streamline and save costs, but also to make use of our growing strategic mobility in the early '70's.

3. *Streamlining of US Forces in Germany.* We have recently informed the German Government (both in NATO forums, and bilaterally) of certain portions of our plan, mentioned above, to save money and foreign exchange by streamlining our military establishment in Europe. If the Chancellor asks about this, or about newspaper reports (which have revealed the scope of the entire plan), you might assure him that what is involved is largely administrative streamlining, that we are reviewing a set of proposals for such streamlining, and that we have no plans to withdraw major combat forces.

France

French defense officials have recently expressed interest in closer cooperation with the US and NATO on military matters, including nuclear questions. Some of these approaches are undoubtedly known to de Gaulle; others may have been deliberately made without informing him.

We shall soon be discussing in the NSC machinery a variety of possible ways of cooperating more closely with France, even in the nuclear area. (For example, it may be possible to talk about nuclear planning without requiring France to join the NATO Nuclear Planning Group outright, by devising, together with our allies, a form of association or discussion with the French acceptable to all.) Until such a thorough examination of the existing and new possibilities has taken place, I would conclude only that (a) closer French cooperation with NATO would be to the advantage of France, as well as of the Alliance; and (b) we should be willing to work toward closer bilateral military cooperation with France whenever possible, and be willing to explore new ideas from any source.

"European Caucus"—a Note of Caution

The US has long advanced the general principle that European unification is our goal. In the defense field nothing solid seems to be on the horizon. The so-called "European caucus" is really British Defense Minister Healey's idea to try to develop common European views on a

⁴ The reference is to briefing papers prepared for President Nixon's trip to Europe, February 23 to March 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 346)

variety of defense issues. So far it has amounted to no more than dinners on the occasion of NATO meetings attended by a number of European Defense Ministers. The Germans are extremely leary of it because they fear trouble with the French over it and also fear that a European grouping could hasten American disengagement. The "European" character of the dinner group is rapidly expanding to include all countries but the US and France. Many Europeans suspect that the main substantive business of the group will be British attempts to sell British aircraft projects to the continental Europeans, and to make a bid for leadership in Europe in a forum where the French are not present.

While we have generally encouraged any sign of greater European cohesion, we have also said that we hoped that any European group would offer positive European contributions, such as greater European defense effort, as well as joint demands upon the United States.

It is not entirely clear that the current trend of the European caucus is an unmixed blessing for the United States. Ambassador Cleveland has strongly warned against the anti-US tendencies latent in the European caucus and has suggested mildly discouraging it. Mr. Nitze, in a conversation with Minister Healey on January 16th, raised a note of caution and expressed his hope that the European caucus would balance any demands upon the United States (for example, positions to be taken with the Soviets in the strategic arms talks, US force levels in Europe, etc.) with constructive offers of what the Europeans as a group could do for the joint defense and to relieve American problems.

Mel Laird

9. **Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for Europe (Hillenbrand) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

NATO Policy Review—NSSM 6

The IG/Europe has considered in detail and at length the requirement levied in NSSM-6² for a) a review of alternatives to policy in general toward NATO and b) a discussion of specific related issues such as US troop levels, German offset negotiations, US nuclear relations with the UK and France, consultations in NATO, and US attitudes toward intra-European defense cooperation.

We have not achieved a fully agreed paper though there has emerged a measure of consensus. Each member has problems with certain aspects of particular interest; for example, Treasury believes that the budgetary and balance of payments aspects of policy are not given sufficient weight. There remains also a divergence of view on the approach taken in responding to NSSM-6, and more particularly on the presentation of the main related issues.

I do not find the differences surprising: the US relationship to NATO involves factors extending across the entire spectrum of our relations with our Allies. Consequently, agreement either on definition of issues or on alternative solutions was not possible in the time allotted for the study. Moreover, I have resisted efforts to “paper over” policy differences by forwarding to you positions reflecting the “least common denominator.”

Our difficulty in reaching agreement is also rooted in the fact that the objective situation has altered since NSSM-6 was received: the President has clearly affirmed his support of NATO. Thus, alternative institutional arrangements for accomplishing US policy objectives are not presently at issue. We assume, however, that modifications are not precluded to the present NATO structure and functions to improve the organization and to achieve a better balance of contributions between us and our Allies in both military and non-military sectors of Alliance activity.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1969. Secret.

² Document 2.

Against this background, I am forwarding to you a paper³ that takes as its premise the continuation of US participation in NATO. It concentrates on the fundamental issues facing the Alliance, and explores alternatives arising from these issues.

These issues confront the Administration with the necessity for choice. Some will require early consideration, and others can be deferred somewhat. All, however, are important, and should be addressed before too much time elapses.

The presentation is organized into main issues requiring choice, and related lesser issues. Detailed background papers covering these questions have been prepared, and a measure of agreement on these papers also has been achieved. But because points of difference between agencies remain, and because some of these disagreements may be resolved through further IG/Europe discussion, the papers are not submitted at this time. However, they can be made available for reference if desired.

In approaching the issues set forth in the attached paper I would recommend that the NSC decide, in the course of an initial discussion, a) those issues which should be discussed further; and b) the preferred order of discussion. IG/Europe could then refine its studies of these issues for NSC use. I would appreciate your comments on this proposal.

Some members of IG/Europe favor exploring long-range alternatives to NATO, against the background of fundamental US interests and current US policies. This approach, in my view, might form the basis for a later study of possible future developments, whereas the immediate focus of our concern, it seems to me, should be on the real issues confronting us today in our relations with NATO.

³ Not attached. Davis forwarded the undated paper prepared by the Interdepartmental Group on Europe entitled "NSC Review—US Policy Toward NATO," to Pedersen, Nutter, Smith, Lieutenant General William Rosson, and Assistant Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness Haakon Lindjord under cover of a March 17 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-035, Senior Review Group Meetings, Review Group NATO Policy—NSSM 6 3/24/69)

10. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Pedersen) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)¹

Washington, March 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Review Group Consideration of Study on NATO. INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM.

At its meeting March 24 on the paper on NATO, the NSC Review Group agreed that the NSC should focus on the following issues needing decision prior to the April NATO Ministerial meeting:²

1. *Offset*: Whether to (a) continue to link our troop levels to offset; (b) drop the link between troop levels and offset but continue to seek German assistance in our balance of payments problems; or (c) seek some German cooperation in international monetary problems in exchange for troop levels.

2. *Troop Levels*: On the general assumption that there is no possibility for an increase in U.S. troop levels and that we are committed to the general current situation, should we (a) continue present troop levels unchanged; or (b) engage in some reductions under the REDCOSTE program—of up to 34,000 military personnel. In either case should we also undertake qualitative improvements and ask others to do the same.

3. *Political Consultation*: What suggestions might there be for improved political consultations (e.g., a new organization for political consultation such as an Under Secretaries group, or strengthening of present procedures). (Kissinger thought the President might want to refer to this subject in his address to the NATO meeting.)

4. *Consultations outside the Political-Military sphere*: What suggestions might there be regarding problems common to modern industrialized societies (e.g. youth, pollution, transportation, crime prevention) and how might consultation be conducted on these subjects (whether in or outside NATO). (Kissinger suggested the President might also want to refer to this subject in his address to the NATO meeting.)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 6. Confidential. Sent through Walsh. Copies were sent to Hillenbrand, Deputy Chairman of Policy Planning Council Miriam Camps, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Philip Farley.

² No minutes of this meeting were found.

5. In addition to presenting alternative proposals on the above issues the revised NATO paper will flag for future longer term NSC issues such subjects as:

1. Strategic doctrine.
2. Nuclear relations with UK and France.
3. Troop levels in the long term.
4. The future shape of the Alliance.
5. The relation of SALT talks to NATO.
6. The relation of bi-lateral discussion to multi-lateral discussions.

Short alternatives papers will be prepared on these subjects by the EUR-IG when asked to do so after the NATO meetings here.

11. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, April 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on US Policy Toward NATO—BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

NSC Meeting Objectives

The NSC will consider on Tuesday, April 8,² the study developed in response to NSSM-6, "US Policy Toward NATO."

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969-70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 6. Secret. Drafted by Smith and cleared by Springsteen and McGuire. Sent through Pedersen and S/S. Copies were sent to Office of the Under Secretary, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Counselor of the Department.

² Only handwritten minutes were taken at the meeting. The NSC discussed the issues that would be addressed at the upcoming NATO meeting, many of which carried over from the previous administration. These included avoiding a French-German clash over Berlin, contributing to the language for a European security conference (although the President doubted whether a conference would ever take place), keeping the Italians from leading others in an attack on the Greeks in the official communiqué, reacting to possible Canadian reduction of troops, determining the effect of the Czechoslovak situation on détente, coping with Congressional pressure to proceed with REDCOSTE while needing to improve military hardware, and discussing the best method of negotiating an offset agreement with West Germany. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1969)

The Department's objectives should be to obtain decisions on:

- US troop levels in Europe,
- Position for offset negotiation with the FRG, and
- Alliance consultation.

These decisions should reflect vital US political interests and security considerations, and accord with the President's statements to European leaders.

Background

NSSM-6 of January 21 directed a review of US policy toward NATO. Following the President's European trip, the NSC Review Group Chairman refined the study requirements and directed that the paper address short-term issues for decision and identify longer-term issues for further study.

The paper the NSC will address (Tab A)³ was prepared by the NSC staff, which drew upon an earlier paper produced by the Chairman of the IG/Europe and divergent views of other Agencies.

Discussion

The paper identifies these short-term issues for decision: (a) degree to which a proposed Secretary of Defense program (REDCOSTE) for reducing costs in Europe by removing troops should be implemented; (b) type of agreement we should seek with the FRG to "offset" US balance-of-payments costs of stationing troops in Germany; (c) means of improving Alliance consultation; (d) possible new areas for NATO consultation. The first two of these issues are as controversial during this Administration as they were during the last.

Short-Term Issues

1. REDCOSTE Implementation:

The issue here is political. While the REDCOSTE problem may be short-term, it is related to the more basic issue of the level of troops the US will maintain *in Europe*.

If REDCOSTE were fully implemented, the US would withdraw from Europe a total of 26,000 troops, almost 10% of our forces there. While many of the reductions would involve non-combat forces, some combat and combat-support forces would be withdrawn.

Reductions of this size would cause Europeans to question the firmness of our resolve to participate in European defense, our will-

³ Tab A is attached but not printed. Davis forwarded the undated paper, entitled "US Policy Toward NATO," to the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness under cover of an April 5 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-021, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting NATO 4/8/69)

ingness to meet our NATO commitments, and our combat capabilities. Such reductions would call into question the President's statements in Europe about maintaining our force levels.

There would be strong, even compelling, motives to characterize the reductions to Congress as a "package," with gross savings of personnel and monies attached. Thus, our Allies would soon learn of the proposed reductions, even though they are time-phased for implementation through 1973.

The Department has agreed to proceed with some of the REDCOSTE reductions. We should be prepared to proceed with some others, dependent upon the outcome of on-going negotiations with Turkey and Spain.

There are four options regarding implementation of REDCOSTE. They are:

1. Halt further implementation of REDCOSTE in place by stopping further reductions (without reversing actions already completed).

2. Proceed only with those REDCOSTE items already agreed to or under discussion with Allies and not consider any further cutbacks for the near term.

3. Proceed with entire REDCOSTE package.

4. Direct State and Defense to examine deferred REDCOSTE items based on additional guidance and make a recommendation on each.

We should support Option 2: Proceed only with those REDCOSTE items already agreed to or under discussion with Allies, and not consider any further cutbacks for the near term.

We should also support making qualitative improvements in our forces in Europe. (Talking Points at Tab B.)⁴

2. *Offset Agreement with FRG:*

We require cooperation from the FRG to offset balance-of-payments costs of maintaining our forces in Germany.

The offset options in the NSC paper are:

1. Push for a "hard" agreement, seeking offset of foreign exchange losses through military purchases, FRG assumption of local support costs of our troops, and possibly non-military purchases clearly additional to those that would otherwise occur, but excluding measures such as loans and bond purchases.

2. Accept a "softer" agreement, settling for an offset which included non-military and financial measures as well as military purchases.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

3. Replace military offset concept with one of German cooperation on broader international monetary matters.

Politically and rationally, we cannot hope for complete offset by means of military purchases alone, nor can we discard this means of offset. We should therefore support Option 2: accept a “softer” agreement. This is consistent with the President’s statement to the FRG that our troop levels are determined on security grounds. It is consistent with the instructions followed by the US representatives at their March 20 offset discussions in Bonn. (Talking Points at Tab B.)

3. Means of Improving Alliance Consultation

This item at the NSC Meeting flows from the President’s statements in Europe about improving Alliance consultation.

Regarding the *Immediate Issues* in the paper on improving consultations:

(a) we should support wide-ranging Alliance consultations through special committees, ad hoc groups, meetings at Under Secretary level, restricted sessions of the North Atlantic Council at ministerial level, and possibly, periodic heads of government meetings;

(b) we should propose and take the lead to establish Alliance meetings at the Under Secretary level to take place between ministerial meetings, and we propose that the President advance this in his statement to the Ceremonial Session April 10.

4. Possible New Areas for Consultation

Regarding the *Immediate Issues* in the paper on new areas for consultation:

(a) we should support the suggestion that the President’s speech to the forthcoming Ceremonial Session of the April Ministerial Meeting be used as a basis for launching a new initiative for cooperation within the Atlantic Community on common problems in technologically advanced societies;

(b) we should support the suggestion that the US propose follow-up work be done in NATO and the OECD, and through US cooperation with European multilateral organizations. (Talking Points at Tab B.)

Medium- to Long-Term Issues

The paper proposes four major subjects for subsequent papers. They are: Strategic Doctrine, US Troop Levels in Europe, Nuclear and other Military Relations with the UK and France, and Future Shape of the Alliance.

We should support all four studies with priority being given to Strategic Doctrine and US Troop Levels in Europe. (Talking Points at Tab B.)

12. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 11, 1969.

Notes on President Nixon's Meeting with NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers

(Note: The attendance was limited by agreement to Foreign Ministers plus two others. In most cases this meant the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Permanent Representative were present. Where there was no Defense Minister, a senior Foreign Office representative usually occupied the third chair.)

The President led off by characterizing the meeting as an "executive session." He said Secretary Rogers had discussed a number of other subjects, including Vietnam, so he would concentrate in his lead-off remarks on his recent decision to proceed with a modified ABM program.

Foreign and Defense Ministers are directly in politics, unlike the Permanent Representatives, the President said. They could therefore understand political problems of the President. The President said it would be very popular for him to announce a reduction of the US defense program, or to announce the withdrawal of divisions from Europe. The peoples of the West are all too ready to believe that in a balance of terror, enough weaponry is enough, and that a conflict involving NATO would have to be conducted with strategic nuclear weapons anyway. We must resist this kind of thinking, the President said, and maintain the strength to negotiate from.

The President presented some facts on which the ABM decision was based:

(a) We used to have four or five to one superiority in nuclear missiles, and the consequent diplomatic strength. But the balance is now drastically changed.

(b) The Soviets have widened the gap in conventional forces and have closed the strategic gap "to a very substantial degree."

(c) There is a big change even from 1967, when the previous Administration decided on the Sentinel system and attributed it primarily to the prospective threat from China. But the Soviets now have 60%

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1321, Unfiled Material. Secret; Exdis. Cleveland transmitted the memorandum, which he derived from his notes, to Kissinger on April 22. (Ibid.) According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 9:58 to 11:28 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The President also delivered a formal address to the ceremonial session of the NAC Ministerial meeting on April 10. The text of the address is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 272-276.

more submarine missile launchers than in 1967, and their ICBMs, not only the earlier versions but the SS-9, have also grown rapidly.

(d) We are not insisting on the overwhelming superiority we once had. It is not possible to maintain it, and in any case it would not be effective negotiation to try to maintain it. Here the key word is “sufficiency”—that is, enough for our diplomatic purposes.

The President said that any power with nuclear responsibility is responsible for avoiding the erosion of its credible nuclear deterrent. In meeting this responsibility, we could have built more bombers, built more submarines, or done more hardening of Minuteman sites. But these additions to our strategic forces might have been interpreted as building our offensive, rather than defensive, capability. Then we looked at the Soviet ABM system, which continues under development. Very recent intelligence indicates that the ABM system around Moscow is being expanded again, and some of the Soviet radars are being turned around to perceive a missile threat from Communist China.

The Sentinel system was primarily oriented against China, with the additional element of creating difficulties for Soviet offensive forces. It was not an effective system for city protection. Even if it reduced US casualties from 80 to 30 million people, 30 million was still too many.

The new Safeguard program establishes an area defense which gives us “almost certain” protection against China for at least ten years, the President said. In this sense an unsophisticated attack on the United States would be “not relevant.” By 1973 the Chinese are estimated to be able to have some 24 to 45 ICBMs. The Safeguard program would be effective against that threat. Beyond area defense, the Safeguard program, “instead of concentrating on the defense of our cities,” will defend two of our missile sites. The significance of this, the President explained, is likewise in the nature of deterrence. In 1962 the Soviets could have wreaked much damage on the United States, but the United States was stronger so the Soviets were deterred. But if a “substantial amount” of US strategic deterrent is vulnerable, then our nuclear deterrent is not credible enough. That is why ABM is required.

The President repeated that it would be easier for the United States to do nothing and let the Soviets achieve superiority. But with the power ratio between the two major nations nearing balance, we want to avoid being in a “second position.” To have increased the offensive forces “would have been escalatory.” The decision actually taken showed we just wanted to defend our deterrent—and in addition have 10 years of protection against China.

Honest men can, and in our politics do, reach differing conclusions about these matters, the President added. But the major fact must be no erosion in the deterrent—because NATO is strong and united, and be-

cause the US backs NATO with a nuclear shield. That is why this “first decision” was to be defensive, to maintain that shield. The annual review provided for in the Safeguard program would permit a change in the program, with any change in the threat or in technology.

The Secretary General said that while he did not assume every Minister would want to speak, he would go around the table counter-clockwise and call on any who desired to discuss the President’s remarks or ask a question.

Denis Healey (UK Minister of Defense) said that he had been very critical of the Sentinel program—and of the absence of consultation on it. (In answer to a question from the President, Healey explained that Secretary McNamara’s ABM announcement in San Francisco came just a week before he had an opportunity to consult about this decision in a scheduled meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.) But Healey said he was not critical either of Safeguard or of the consultative process in the Alliance on the subject. The rationale, he thought, was now very much more persuasive. The United States has to decide the issues of theology and technology involved; he himself had assumed that, since Secretary Clifford pitched his argument for an ABM system on its relevance to the prospective US–USSR talks on strategic arms limitation, it would be hard for the new Administration to drop ABM entirely. Because the ABM plan is related to the US–USSR talks, Healey welcomed the annual review that was part of the President’s plan.

In summary, Healey said there was no way to guarantee the wisdom of a US decision, but the United Kingdom agrees with it and applauds it. He would only warn the United States against down-grading the existing offensive systems—that is, over-emphasizing their vulnerability and effectiveness, for fear of affecting the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent itself.

Michael Stewart (UK Foreign Secretary) said that people were sickened by continuation of missile rivalries, and it was up to NATO governments to make credible to our own people the willingness of the West to negotiate East-West differences. He said NATO would have to address itself to the Budapest appeal,² and more broadly the NATO meeting should say something about “what the Alliance stands for.”

On the President’s proposal (in his speech to the North Atlantic Council the previous afternoon) to establish a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, Stewart said we must think through how to make this practical. It is not enough, he thought, to be willing to defend

² Warsaw Pact leaders, meeting in Budapest, issued an appeal for a European security conference on March 17. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 106–109.

our societies; there should be a “special concern with the value and quality of what we are defending.”

Otto Tidemand (Norwegian Minister of Defense) spoke of his talks in Moscow with Defense Minister Grechko and General Yakubovsky. He thought it was difficult to see any signs that the Russians are stopping their missile build-up.

The President said that there were 67 ABM launchers now around Moscow; “our intelligence is hard on this.” For a while their deployment activity was stopped, but the R&D work evidently continued. What we are seeing now is deployment of a second generation ABM. We are therefore presented with the question, should the United States leave this field to the Russians and do nothing? Nevertheless we will periodically review not only the intelligence about the threat, but also the technological “state of the art”.

Joseph Luns (Netherlands Foreign Minister) said he was especially struck by the President’s emphasis on closure of the strategic nuclear gap. Public opinion in all our countries, he thought, believes the United States has enormous superiority. He recognized that the President was giving this information in private. But it would be advisable to make publicly clear that the gap is no longer so wide.

The President said that if we were weaker than the Soviets, we certainly should not say so. We are of course still ahead in submarines and bombers; in ICBMs, the gap is closed. But we also don’t want to say to the USSR that we are much stronger than they, for that would force them to do more. It is important to say this carefully: we are not behind, but the gap is closing.

Secretary Laird added that defense planners must take into account not only the situation today, but the prospect several years from now, when decisions taken (or not taken) result in changes in the weapons balance.

Luns said he assumed from this exchange that NATO should “cautiously encourage the United States not to fall behind.” The President said if NATO nations believe in the US deterrent, they would best “subtly tell us to maintain it.”

Pietro Nenni (Italian Foreign Minister), in a discursive statement, recommended more “bloc negotiations” between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We are interested very directly in defense, he said. But there is in European public opinion a great urge for peace. And because of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Europeans believe the super-powers have engaged themselves to seek the control of nuclear arms. He said he was glad to find this was a US preoccupation too.

Panayiotis Pipinelis (Greek Foreign Minister) thanked the President for providing a better understanding of the issues he had dis-

cussed. Pipinelis said it came out clearly that defense, like peace, is indivisible. The more we consolidate the nuclear balance of power, the more we make conventional war more likely. Despite the President's emphasis on nuclear defense in his remarks today, Pipinelis said he was sure that the President does not put conventional weapons in a secondary role. The Greeks want an increased defense effort. They view the Mediterranean as "of paramount importance," and they naturally need more help in doing their part of the defense job.

Michel Debré (French Foreign Minister) said Europeans will understand and do not question the analysis as set forth by the President; and they appreciate the effort the US is making. Nevertheless the topic worries Europeans. What bothered him, Debré said, is that the nuclear balance is viewed essentially as a question of assuring US security. The need for the US deterrent is unquestionable and not in question ("indiscutable et indiscuté"), but in the US security plans, what part is played by the need for European security? Here there is an impressive imbalance ("déséquilibre éclatant"). There seems more opportunity for blackmail since European security is not covered by the US measures the President had discussed. The security of US territory is one element, but not the whole of the picture.

Leo Cadieux (Canadian Minister of Defense) asked why Alaska was not protected in the Safeguard program. Was there some "political reason"?

The President said there was no political reason not to protect Alaska, and that Alaska was in fact part of the overall plan for ABM deployment at a later stage. Secretary Laird explained that the special protection for the two Minutemen sites would constitute a "thick" protection of 30% of the Minutemen.

The President, reacting to Debré's comment, said that in defending Minutemen sites we think we are helping the whole NATO Alliance. Perhaps if we would defend our cities, we would have pressure from our allies to provide a city defense in their countries as well. But we have not done this, for them or for us. We believe the area defense against an unsophisticated attack is adequate. The United States can thus prevent blackmail. If the Chinese forces were to attack Canada or Japan or Australia we could knock out the Chinese forces with our offensive capability.

Addressing himself to Nenni's comment, the President said our defensive efforts are a "posture for peace;" he regards the Secretary of Defense as a Secretary for Peace just as the Secretary of State is a Secretary for Peace. The Warsaw Pact should not be allowed to appear to have any monopoly on being for peace. If necessary we will play the propaganda game (of verbal declarations), but we will also go for sub-

stantive negotiations if possible. It was important to maintain initiative at the propaganda level.

On the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the President commented that we hoped our ratification could be timed to coincide with Soviet ratification. Secretary Rogers said we had not yet heard from the Soviets on our proposal to this effect.

Referring to the question of the strategic nuclear deterrent, the President said there is some advantage in a balance, but it is important that the conventional option be there. As we approach talks with the Soviets, it is important that the United States go into them with the ABM chip on the table, and at the same time, it is important that it be quite clear to the Soviets that NATO is not going to disintegrate.

The President said he was very sympathetic to the political urge for peace. We live in a dangerous time, and history will tell whether we have the political skill to survive. As he sees what the Soviet Union has done, the President considered that we are at a watershed: there is a chance to talk, to lessen tension; but some reciprocal action is required. The American people would like nothing better than to “sit on their deterrence,” to spend our money on our cities, to retreat into fortress America. Knowing the facts we do know, we have to make the right decisions, and stand up for them, and explain them carefully. Our dual object is defense *and* negotiation. We have to maintain the defense because that is the way the world is—because without US efforts today, the rest of the world would be living in terror.

13. National Security Decision Memorandum 12¹

Washington, April 14, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT

NATO

The President has made the following decisions with regard to the issues considered at the NSC meeting of April 8, 1969.²

1. REDCOSTE

Items previously agreed should proceed. Items agreed in principle but subject to negotiation and items deferred should be examined on a case-by-case basis and we should proceed selectively. The examination should take into account our desire not to undercut our efforts to get our allies to increase their defense efforts as well as our desire not to reduce our combat capability. Those items which are approved should not be presented as a single package and we should avoid any step which would give a signal of any general reduction of U.S. forces.

The President directed that the Under Secretaries Committee undertake the above examination and submit its conclusions, including remaining differences, with full statements pro and con, to the President for his approval.

2. *Offset*

We should proceed with offset negotiations, for this year, taking fully into account their possible impact on the political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. The subject of support costs should not be raised and we should not seek any substantial increase in the currently anticipated level of German military procurement and should not press the issue to the point of risking possible row with the FRG. At the same time, we should seek to improve the value to us of other measures to be included in the package. We should indicate to the Germans

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) Nos. 1 through 50. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nixon approved an unnumbered version of the memorandum April 12. (Ibid., Box 256, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IV)

² See footnote 2, Document 11.

our willingness to explore a broadening of the discussion in future years to include discussions of monetary cooperation in general.

As this year's negotiations proceed, the President will wish to re-examine the package being negotiated to determine if we should move the offset negotiations into a broader monetary context in the present round.

The President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee coordinate and monitor U.S. preparations for the offset negotiations.

The President has not made any determination about U.S. force levels in Europe over the long run. He intends to examine this question in the fall following the completion of the study directed by NSSM 3³ and a study which will be requested of U.S. force levels and NATO doctrine. In the meantime, he has directed that we make no statements and take no decisions which freeze our position over the next several years.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ NSSM 3, "U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power," January 21, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 2.

14. National Security Study Memorandum 43¹

Washington, April 15, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Implementation of The President's Proposals to the NATO Ministerial Meeting

The President has directed preparation of detailed plans for the implementation of the three proposals he advanced in his address to the NATO Ministerial meeting on April 10, 1969.² These were:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 43–103. Secret.

² See footnote 1, Document 12.

- (1) that Deputy Foreign Ministers meet periodically for a high-level review of major, long-range problems before the Alliance;
- (2) creation of a special political planning group, not to duplicate existing bodies, but to address itself specifically and continually to the long-range problems we face; and
- (3) creation of a committee on the challenges of modern society responsible to the Deputy Ministers.

The President wants to be in a position to make specific suggestions following up these proposals as soon as possible. These suggestions should deal not only with procedures but with substance.

Since the question of policy has been settled by the President's speech, the President has directed the Under Secretaries Committee to submit by April 29 a comprehensive series of recommendations, including a discussion of problems that we may expect to encounter. He wants the American Permanent Representative to be in a position to present our proposals to the Council no later than the second week of May.

Henry A. Kissinger

15. National Security Study Memorandum 44¹

Washington, April 19, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

U.S. Positions for NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

The President has directed the preparation of a study reviewing the principal issues related specifically to the NATO NPG Meeting scheduled for May 29th.

1. The study should include a review of the evolution of the NPG as an institution, with emphasis upon past and present positions and attitudes of NATO Members, and a discussion of the range of broad approaches the U.S. could take towards the NPG itself.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The study should set forth and define in detail the main issues and problems confronting the meeting, focusing upon the critical points of difference between the U.S. and the Allies and among the Allies; it should discuss U.S. options with regard to these issues in light of such factors as the effect on U.S. commitments to full consultation, the effects upon current U.S. military policy and practices in Europe, the potential reactions of NATO members, and basic implications for the future.

The study should not attempt, however, to explore all of the broad issues pertaining to nuclear strategy in NATO.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe perform this study.

The report of this Group should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by May 9, 1969.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² Hillenbrand transmitted the response to Kissinger on May 8 for a meeting of the Review Group on May 15. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-146, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 44) The minutes are *ibid.*, Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1969.

**16. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State
(Richardson) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, May 6, 1969.

SUBJECT:

Implementation of your Proposals to the NATO Ministerial Meeting

In your address at the commemorative session of the North Atlantic Council on April 10, you called for the following three measures to improve Western political consultation:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, NATO 3. Confidential. Drafted by Reddy on May 5; cleared by McGuire and Springsteen. “The President has seen” is stamped on Kissinger’s May 19 covering memorandum transmitting Richardson’s memorandum to Nixon. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 256, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IV)

- Periodic meetings of Deputy Foreign Ministers;
- Creation of a special political planning group;
- Establishment of a committee on the challenges of modern society.

Discussions at the Ministerial Meeting and comments thereafter from capitals and NATO Permanent Representatives indicate considerable interest in implementing these proposals. Predictably, there are areas of resistance from certain quarters: some Allies have expressed concern over an expansion of NATO's current structure; others have taken a conventional view towards expanding NATO's consultative role to include environmental problems. On the other hand, there have been strong expressions of support for your proposals from a number of the Allies; the Germans and Dutch, for example, have evinced enthusiastic interest in NATO discussions on problems of modern society.²

Based on reports we have received thus far, we considered it advisable to instruct Ambassadors in Allied capitals to make bilateral approaches in order to develop support for your proposals at the political level. We also believe it important to try to break this subject out of traditional Foreign Office channels. As a further useful step in this direction, NATO Secretary General Brosio may soon tour Allied capitals in order to obtain high-level views on your proposals.

Specifically, we have taken the following steps on each of your suggestions:

—*Periodic Meetings of Deputy Foreign Ministers:*

We have urged that the first meeting take place in September, leaving to participating officials the question of the schedule for subsequent meetings. We have suggested that topics for consultation by Deputy Foreign Ministers might include European security issues which lend themselves to negotiation with the countries of Eastern Europe; formal establishment of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, and of guidelines for this committee; and a discussion of the work of the Special Political Planning Group.

—*Special Political Planning Group:*

We have called for the establishment of a planning group which would consult on long-term issues beyond current Alliance operational concerns. We believe this body should examine trends in an effort to identify at early stages the problems that might arise, or could be prevented from arising through advance action. If possible, we would like to organize the first session of this group in June.

² As reported in telegrams 60705, April 19, and 69463, May 3, to USNATO. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 4 NATO)

—*Committee on Challenges of Modern Society*:

Our first objective in this area is to obtain early agreement in principle among the Permanent Representatives for establishing this committee. Once this decision is taken, we believe that an ad hoc exploratory group should be convened to discuss topics to be brought before the committee, as well as organizational arrangements for carrying this work forward. We have proposed that Allied representatives to this ad hoc group should be of the caliber of Pat Moynihan, Arthur Burns or James Allen. This ad hoc committee would report its findings to Deputy Foreign Ministers at their September meeting; they in turn would endorse or amend decisions of the ad hoc group. The Committee on Challenges of Modern Society would then be formed to meet in October or November.

The Council at Permanent Representatives level will meet to consider these proposals again on May 14. We will complete our bilateral discussions in capitals before then. In the light of these discussions we will prepare additional instructions to our NATO Ambassador to use at that meeting. That session should result in further clarification of Allied views and be the first step towards an action program.

Elliot L. Richardson³

³ Richardson initialed “ELR” above his typed signature.

17. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meeting

In accordance with your request, Secretary Laird and Acting Secretary Richardson have submitted their memorandum reviewing the major issues to be dealt with at the Brussels meeting of the NATO De-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 256, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action.

fense Planning Committee on May 28.² Secretary Laird is our delegate. (The memorandum is at Tab A.)³

The major question before the meeting concerns policy guidelines for planning force levels for the period 1971–75. The issue is whether the guidelines should include a specific commitment to the effect that NATO members will increase their defense budget commitments by a given amount in this period, or whether the guidelines should acknowledge that only a “moderate” increase in defense allocations can be expected.

We have supported the former position, and the memorandum recommends that we continue to press for a specific commitment. Our position is that each country as a general guide should attempt to increase the NATO account in its defense budget by an annual average of 4 percent during the planning period. This position has met considerable resistance; therefore, the memorandum recommends we be prepared to fall back, if necessary, to a general commitment to budgetary increases, with no specified amount, and as a last resort accept the position which acknowledges only a “moderate” over-all increase can be expected.

The second issue, not formally on the agenda, but certain to be discussed, is the Canadian decision to reduce or withdraw its forces from Europe.⁴ The recommended US position would stress:

- a. Any substantial Canadian reduction may weaken the Alliance.
- b. We welcome Canada’s promise of full consultation on the scope, timing and characteristics of their reductions.
- c. We are willing to discuss a change in the role of Canadian forces in Europe if this would increase the chances of retaining more Canadian forces.

I think both of these recommended approaches are acceptable and consistent with your policy views. I do believe we need to be very careful in handling the Canadian issue. I would prefer we stress consultations and discussions and not directly raise the issue of weakening the Alliance. We are not likely to be able to reverse the Canadian deci-

² The meeting communiqué is printed in *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974*, pp. 222–223.

³ Attached but not printed. In a memorandum dated May 19, which laid the foundation for the joint memorandum, Laird recommended that the United States encourage the Allies to increase their defense budgets by an annual average of 4 percent from 1971 to 1975. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Accession 2001–NLF–020, Box 1, NATO) Kissinger discussed this topic in *White House Years*, p. 393. He stated that the Allies would commit only to a “moderate” increase rather than a fixed percentage.

⁴ Trudeau announced on April 3 that Canada planned to reduce its 10,600 military personnel in Germany and would begin consultations with NATO members later in May. See Documents 93, 94, and 96.

sion, but we may still be able to mold it to the over-all interests of the Alliance by affecting its scale and timing, as the memorandum notes.

*Recommendation:*⁵

That you approve the Secretaries' memorandum (Tab A) as a guide to our position in the Brussels meeting.

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

That I inform Secretary Laird of your approval, and add on your behalf that we should not take a harsh line on the Canadian decision, but seek to open real consultations.

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

⁵ The President initialed approval of both recommendations.

18. Editorial Note

In response to NSDM 12, April 14, 1969 (Document 13), the Under Secretaries Committee sent a report on REDCOSTE (Reduction of Costs in Europe) to President Richard Nixon, dated May 26, examining various scenarios for troop reductions, budget and balance of payment savings, and the effect of those reductions on combat capability. On the basis of its tentative conclusions as well as REDCOSTE proposals previously agreed upon, the Under Secretaries Committee anticipated a possible reduction of about 27,400 U.S. military personnel, 1,800 U.S. civilians, and 7,100 foreign national personnel for an annual budget savings after FY 1972 of \$355 million and \$128 million in the balance of payments. This was 80 percent of the reductions and savings that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird hoped to achieve. The Under Secretaries Committee agreed that the reductions would have some impact on military operations but would not be significant. The President approved the study. The full text of the report is printed in *Foreign Relations*,

1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 22.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Implementation of Your NATO Proposals

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has now discussed your proposal for establishing a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (on May 14), and the proposals for periodic meetings at the Deputy Foreign Minister level and creation of a more powerful Special Political Planning Committee (on May 21).

The discussions in Brussels have made clear that the considered Allied reaction has been generally positive though cautious to the idea of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, and generally negative on Deputy Foreign Minister meetings and a new planning group.

At Tab A² is a memorandum from Elliot Richardson giving details of the status of the proposal for a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, which has been considered in some detail with the Allies. The Permanent Representatives have agreed ad referendum to (a) visits this summer by NATO Secretary General Brosio to Allied capitals to discuss your proposals; and (b) a special NAC meeting this autumn, reinforced by high-level experts on environmental affairs, to discuss this subject.

My own review of the reporting from Brussels leads me to conclude that there are three basic reasons for the slowness and skepticism of our Allies in responding to your proposals:

—first, and most important, the proposals have been advanced through NAC, where the Permanent Representatives tend to see the new structures as challenges to their own prerogatives, and to interpret

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 256, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten note at the top of the memorandum reads: "Pres has seen, 6/3."

² Attached but not printed.

US advocacy of change as implying that NAC has not been doing its job properly;

—second, your proposals tend to cut across bureaucratic lines and suggest a NATO role for agencies of Allied Governments outside the Foreign Ministries, which causes consternation among professional diplomats in the capitals; and

—third, the Allies traditionally are suspicious of plans to create new NATO mechanisms until it is perfectly clear why they are required and how they will be used.

The State Department is currently undertaking a further series of bilateral approaches to the allies both in allied capitals and by calling in Ambassadors or Deputy Mission chiefs here. An aide mémoire giving additional details on how the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society would function is being handed to all allied foreign ministers.

I think this is the right approach since it may cut through some of the inertia. If, after we have obtained responses to these démarches, the pace still seems unsatisfactory we could consider a personal letter from you to NATO heads of government. Elliot Richardson will provide a further progress report in a few days.

20. National Security Study Memorandum 65¹

Washington, July 8, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Relationships Among Strategic and Theater Forces for NATO

As a result of National Security Council discussion of the U.S. strategic posture, prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums 3 and 24,² the President has directed that you prepare a

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 65. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² NSSM 3, “U.S. Military Posture and the Balance of Power,” January 21, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 2; NSSM 24, “U.S. Military Posture Review,” February 20, is *ibid.*, Document 10.

follow-on study to analyze the relationship among U.S. strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional postures in deterring and, if necessary, coping with both conventional and nuclear aggression against NATO. The analysis should be based on scenarios for both large-scale and limited aggression.

It should address the following questions:

1. What capabilities are required if U.S. strategic forces are to contribute to the deterrence of strategic, tactical nuclear and conventional attacks on our Allies and to coping with such attacks if deterrence fails?

2. What capabilities are required if tactical nuclear forces are to (a) contribute to the deterrence of conventional attacks on Allies and of attacks involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and (b) cope with such attacks if deterrence fails?

3. Under what types of circumstances and how might U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces be employed in improving war outcomes?

4. What command and control systems and procedures are required to give the President the force employment options described in the answer to question 3?

5. What changes or improvements, if any, seem indicated for our programmed theater nuclear posture?

6. Based on the analysis, what modifications or additions, if any, should be made to the criteria for strategic nuclear sufficiency?

The study report should be prepared and submitted to the NSC Review Group by the Secretary of Defense by October 1, 1969. Close liaison should be maintained in all phases of the study with the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The analysis should draw as much as possible on the results of the study completed under NSSM-3.

Henry A. Kissinger

21. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 9, 1969.

SUBJECT

German Offset Agreement

Our new offset agreement with Germany was signed and released publicly today. It is far better than its two predecessors. In my judgment it is the best we have ever had, but this depends on the criteria used and views will differ on such a sweeping conclusion. The result fully justified your judgment that we would get a better agreement if we did not push the Germans too hard (The press release is at Tab A).²

The main features of the agreement, which make it so good for us and which should sell it well to Congress, are:

1. More than half the offset will be through German military purchases in the United States, compared with 10–15 percent in the last two agreements.

2. The German loans to us have maturities of 8–10 years compared with a maximum of 4½ years in the past.

3. The loans carry concessional interest rates of 3½–4 percent compared with market rates in all past agreements, which would be at least 6 percent now.

4. The agreement is for two years, for the first time since Erhard fell.

5. The total agreement exceeds \$1.5 billion.

We had to swallow two unpalatable items:

1. Creation of a fund in the U.S. to encourage German direct investment here. This is a Strauss³ favorite which we had to include though it is ludicrous economically. In practice it will probably have little effect and the money will essentially be another loan to us.

2. German government purchase of non-military items in the U.S. including uranium for stockpile purposes, railroad couplers, and components for the prototype of the “European” airbus.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 682, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. III. Limited Official Use. Sent for information.

² Not printed. The joint statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 4, 1969, p. 92.

³ Franz Joseph Strauss, West German Finance Minister.

Nat Samuels did an excellent job in the final round of the negotiations after a shaky start.⁴ Treasury maintained a negative attitude throughout the talks but made no effort to subvert them. I stayed very close to the situation this week and helped to resolve a few of the issues.

I have submitted an item on this to Al Haig for the President's morning brief tomorrow. The Under Secretaries Committee will undoubtedly submit a full report within a few days.

⁴ Reports of the negotiations are in memoranda Richardson wrote to the President on May 29 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 12 GER W) and July 7 (ibid., Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969-1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM 12-4/14/69-NATO). See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969-1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972, Document 24.

22. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Under Secretaries Committee Recommendation on Scenario for Explaining Reduction in Our Force Commitments to NATO

At my request² the Under Secretaries Committee has reviewed the problems involved in informing NATO and the general public that we have had to make certain reductions in our forces committed to NATO, primarily naval forces, and may make some further reductions in the near future. The USC memorandum is at Tab A.³

There are three separate but closely interrelated developments:

1. There have been some reductions in reserve forces, primarily naval, that we would commit to NATO on mobilization.
2. Additional reductions in NATO-committed forces, again primarily in naval units, are in process as a result of defense budget cuts.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 257, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action.

² Kissinger sent this request September 17. (Ibid., RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, 1972-1974, Lot 81D309, NSC U/SM 45-9/19/69-Reductions of U.S. Forces in Europe)

³ Attached but not printed.

3. Further reductions in Army readiness or force levels may be necessary if redeployments from Vietnam do not accord with present budget forecasts. NATO is unaware of this.

My principal concern is that we deal with these issues openly, now, rather than risk recurring crises in NATO as our Allies learn of our plans piecemeal. The Under Secretaries Committee memorandum recognizes this point in their recommendations. Their scenario calls for Ambassador Ellsworth to (a) inform our Allies immediately of those reductions which have already occurred, of those naval reductions currently in process, and advise them that some further reductions may occur as the result of the budget review; and (b) stress our willingness to consult on military consequences, if any, of our reductions, and coordinate public announcements with the statements to NATO.

These points are sound, and I concur, with some additions. First, on the question of possible further reductions affecting the readiness of Army units in the US, I feel we should not merely make a “passing reference” to this but should clearly state it as a real possibility. Second, I feel Ambassador Ellsworth should stress that we have improved in certain areas (e.g. quality, availability of more air units), that the reductions have not been in forces in Europe, but in reserve forces, and that these reductions do not affect your commitment to maintain substantial ground forces in Central Europe. Without such additional emphases there will be speculation that we have opened the door to substantial cuts of ground forces in Europe.

We would not want to create the impression that any further cuts would be more than temporary or that they would involve large withdrawals from Europe. Such reductions, should they become advisable, would be reviewed by the Defense Review Committee, if you approve.

The Under Secretaries’ memorandum also notes that our cost reductions program (REDCOSTE) is proceeding in accordance with your previous instructions. One problem has developed—the critical reactions of the Italians—and the possibility of a stretch-out in the reduction of Italian nationals employed at US facilities is being discussed in Rome.

*Recommendations:*⁴

That you approve the recommended scenario with the additions I have outlined.

⁴ The President initialed his approval of both recommendations on October 20, and Kissinger sent a memorandum to Richardson informing him on October 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM 12–4/14/69–NATO)

I would then inform the Under Secretaries Committee of these additions and the fact that the Defense Program Review Committee would consider further reductions involving our forces committed to NATO, should this prove necessary, and submit recommendations to you. (Draft instruction to the Under Secretaries Committee is at Tab B.)⁵

⁵ Attached but not printed.

23. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the Department of State¹

London, November 6, 1969, 1901Z.

Unsec 17/9129. Subject: Appraisal of November 5–6 high-level NAC meeting on European security issues and CCMS.

1. First high-level Council meeting² held in response to the President's proposal last April was highly successful from standpoint of (a) tone; (b) policy content; and (c) timing. It attracted Ministerial or senior official participation from all Allied countries except Iceland and gave the new German Government its first chance to present its E–W policy to its Allies. (See septel)³

2. On the European Security Conference issue, meeting emphasized necessity for North American participation and careful preparation. It revealed the range of Allied differences on timing and tactics—differences that are reflected in individual delegation statements (septels)⁴ and that will need to be reconciled over the next month to assure a united Alliance position in December. Attitudes on reference to ESC in December communiqué ranged from great reluctance (France) to those who want to depict it as near-term possibility (Norway).

3. All agreed on the importance of the Allies holding steady on the course set last April in emphasizing substantive content of East-West issues, and avoiding defensive or piecemeal reactions to Warsaw Pact.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, NATO 3 BEL (BR). Secret; Priority. Repeated to USNATO, Moscow, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Ottawa, Rome, The Hague, and Reykjavik.

² A report of the meeting is in telegram 5084 from USNATO, November 6. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 5075 from USNATO, November 5. (Ibid.)

⁴ Not found.

It became clear that Allied examination of procedural aspects of European security questions must be undertaken to complement the substantive studies done thus far.

4. Timing of meeting coming on heels of Prague Declaration (septel)⁵ permitted the Alliance to get its side of the story out in a way which provides guidance for governments between now and December.

5. The meeting particularly highlighted balanced force reductions (BFR) as one of the major issues NATO can stress constructively in December. Much work remains however, before we can reach agreement on the content of the “signal” to be given the Soviets in December. While France and Turkey are still reluctant, it clear that if majority wish signal in communiqué (and they appear to do so) all will go along on principle of a signal.

6. The meeting points to need for early and careful work in Bonn Group on Berlin-Germany section of the December communiqué. It also pointed up the importance FRG attaches to Allied backing for its bilateral efforts on renunciation of force.

7. CCMS: Second day of session devoted to discussion of CCMS, with reinforced Council putting final stamp of approval on committee’s establishment. Two major points emerged from discussion:

—There has been a striking change in attitude of our Allies. In early stages of CCMS consideration, following on the heels of President’s April proposal, some were dubious about wisdom of engaging NATO in environmental activities. But November 6 session demonstrated how far Alliance has moved in intervening months. All welcomed creation of committee and stressed their intention fully to participate in its work.

—A number of delegations reported on actions under way within their governments to create structure for coordinating internal work on environmental problems. Thus, necessity for Allies to think about how they can make a contribution to the work of CCMS has stimulated a reexamination of their internal government structure which can only have a beneficial effect on their domestic approaches to environmental problems.

—NATO agreed to press statement on establishing CCMS (repeated septel).⁶

⁵ Not found. The Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact met in Prague October 30–31, and adopted a declaration calling for a pan-European conference in Helsinki during the first half of 1970, which would build on the Budapest appeal of the previous March.

⁶ Not found. The CCMS announcement is described in “NATO Joins the Fight to Save Environment,” *New York Times*, November 7, 1969, p. 3.

8. The Under Secretary's full statements on East-West issues (and CCMS)⁷ were well-received as were significant statements by UK, France, FRG and a number of the smaller countries. We can justifiably maintain the US posture in the meeting reflected the US commitment to full and effective consultation with Allies, and we should be pleased that others made the consultation a genuine two-way street. It also clear that President's April initiative on high level meetings of Council addressing significant issues has now been realized and basis provided for future meetings this type.

Richardson

⁷ The text of Richardson's remarks is in telegram 5070 from USNATO, November 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 BEL (BR))

24. National Security Study Memorandum 83¹

Washington, November 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

U.S. Approach to Current Issues of European Security

In connection with developments in the field of European security, the President wishes to have a meeting of the National Security Council early in the New Year. At that time he wishes to consider the status of our own and NATO actions on this subject and the range of options open to us in the light of East-West diplomatic exchanges and of pertinent strategic issues. As a result of the identification and discussion of the major issues involved, the President will provide guidance for further U.S. actions.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 43-103. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. For further analysis of European security issues including documentation on the European Security Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume XXXIX, European Security.

A paper providing the basis for this NSC meeting should be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Europe and should be submitted for consideration by the NSC Review Group by January 15, 1970.

In the interim, the President's approach to the proposal for a European Security Conference remains as stated in the directive of April 9, 1969.² Pending the NSC meeting, the President wishes to have specific U.S. negotiating proposals in this area held in abeyance.

Henry A. Kissinger

² This refers to Kissinger's memorandum to Rogers detailing the U.S. approach to a conference on European security, which reads in part:

"I believe that we could accept the principle of an eventual conference on European problems but that the actual convening of such a meeting must await signs of progress on concrete European issues. Without such progress, a conference would probably find the East European countries closely aligned with a rigid Soviet position, while the western participants would be competing with each other to find ways to 'break the deadlock.' The net result might well be frustration and western disunity, both of which would tend to set back prospects for an eventual resolution of European issues.

"Consequently, our emphasis should be on the need for talks on concrete issues and for consultations within NATO designed to develop coherent western positions on such issues." (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 83)

25. National Security Study Memorandum 84¹

Washington, November 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO

Pursuant to NSDM 27² and in conjunction with the work being done for NSSM 65,³ the President has directed a study of the alternative U.S. force deployments in NATO, their political and budgetary implications, and their consequences for NATO strategy. This study should examine:

—differences in views as to the threat, including the views of our allies;

—allied views concerning an appropriate NATO defense strategy;

—our best estimates of the defense capabilities these allies will maintain committed to NATO;

—the range of deployment alternatives we have within the context of the current and alternative NATO strategies;

—likely Soviet/Warsaw Pact political and military responses to various US/NATO deployments in Europe;

—the political and cost implications of modifications to current strategy and force postures.

With respect to alternative U.S. conventional force deployments to Europe, the alternatives considered should include different deployments to support the present strategy, different initial defense strategies (for example, 30 or 60 days rather than 90), and different deployment schemes including consideration of more efficient transitions to limited nuclear operations and more effective responses to threats on the flanks. The alternatives considered should include a wide range of U.S. force levels in Europe.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 43–103. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² "U.S. Military Posture," October 11. It is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 56.

³ Document 20.

The study should be supervised by a Steering Committee chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense and including representatives of the addressee agencies, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The completed report should be submitted to the NSC Defense Program Review Committee by 1 February 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

26. Editorial Note

According to Department of State Objectives Paper, NATO/G-2, November 28, 1969, the overriding U.S. objectives at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Brussels, December 4–5, included maintaining “momentum and cohesion in Allied initiatives in the area of East-West relations, denying to the extent possible a Soviet propaganda march, assuring public understanding of the Allied approach, and, above all, making serious progress, where possible, on the hard issues that are the basic causes of East-West tension.” More specifically, the United States should seek to advance the cause of balanced force reductions (BFR), mediate a compromise position on NATO’s formal attitude toward a European security conference, and mitigate Allied fears of imminent reductions of U.S. troops in Europe. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 420) Reports on the meeting are in telegrams 5570, December 4, and 5571, December 5, from USNATO. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, NATO 3 BEL (BR)) The text of the final communiqué and declaration are in *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974*, pp. 226–232.

27. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 20-1-69

Washington, December 4, 1969.

EUROPE, THE US, AND THE USSR

Note

As the title suggests, this estimate deals with broad trends in Europe and in European attitudes toward the two super powers. It is not a survey of all intra-European relationships. The estimate covers a four to five-year period. Its principal conclusions are found in paragraphs 50-54.

Discussion

1. Europe, which was the original scene of the "cold war," has since about 1962 achieved a rather considerable political stability, both in terms of domestic politics and state relations. But during the past year or two a number of events have occurred which have raised the question of whether new forces may be operating on the European scene. Among these events were the riots and strikes in France in May and June 1968 and the subsequent resignation of de Gaulle, Socialist leadership of a West German government for the first time, a rising social malaise in Italy, and—perhaps most significant of all—the events in Czechoslovakia which culminated in the Soviet invasion. These events raise questions, not only about the continued applicability and durability of such institutional arrangements as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but also about the possibility of changes which might challenge the basic assumptions underlying the policies of the major powers.

*I. The State of Western Europe**A. Material Success and Psychological Unrest*

2. Western Europe today is more prosperous, more democratic, and more secure than at any time in modern history. In the past two

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 263, CIA Files, National Intelligence Estimates, 1950-1985. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of his jurisdiction. Distributed to the White House, National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The title page and table of contents are not printed. Superseded by NIE 12-71, "The Changing Scene in Europe," August 19, 1971. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files (1950-1975), Box 413, Folder 1: (NIE 12-71) Changing Scene in Europe)

decades its economic performance—the UK excepted—has surpassed most forecasts, and national prosperity is more pervasive than ever before. Indeed, the economic systems of the major countries are so alike and so interdependent that the differences of detail are less striking than the fundamental similarities: all are mixed economies which are to a greater or lesser extent welfare states grafted upon a base neither wholly “capitalist” nor wholly “socialist.” As a consequence, many of the economic arguments which formerly distinguished Left from Right have become blurred. Both now largely accept the mixed economy and each merely claims to be able to manage it better than the other. Nevertheless, prosperity and technological advance have not eroded all the old antagonisms and have helped to create others, including the generation gap.

3. In the past decade, the pace and extent of economic and social change throughout Western Europe have accelerated. An educational system designed for an elite of gentlemen is slowly being supplanted by one intended for a mass of technocrats and bureaucrats. Thousands of small and medium-sized businesses have been absorbed by larger enterprises. The percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture has appreciably declined and will decline still further. This evolution in social structure and economic organization has been only imperfectly reflected in the political system. As a result, some states (France, Italy) have suffered serious unrest which could recur. Others (Spain, Portugal) have begun a difficult transition toward a less rigid system.

4. It is possible that extremists would see in these difficulties opportunities either to turn the clock back or to effect a revolution by the extreme left. It is unlikely that radical leftist governments will come to power in the absence of a severe economic depression or a collapse of political authority: most of the workers are interested in a better share of the pie, not revolution; the “new left” is small, fragmented, and isolated; the major Communist parties have as their immediate goal to enter a coalition government, not to destroy the political system. Except in Spain and Portugal, where the extreme right has the capability to stifle political and economic evolution, the radical right is small, if not moribund; it would take a serious social crisis to revive it.

5. Despite economic prosperity and greater internal stability and external security, a sensation of drift and dissatisfaction has arisen in Western Europe. The great political projects which formerly gave a sense of mission to political leaders and a feeling of participation in major undertakings to their followers now seem at best to be utopian or distant: supranational, federal Europe, “Gaullist” Europe, Atlantic “partnership” with the US, German reunification through free elections. In the meantime, the bureaucratic problems of managed econ-

omies and the subtle maneuvers of coalition politics arouse either exasperation or boredom, but not enthusiasm.

6. Political leaders are disconcerted by the attacks of intellectuals and middle class students who condemn the "establishment" (in which they include the Communist Party) but who know better how to castigate existing institutions than how to improve them. Neither the "establishment" nor its attackers seem able to galvanize mass or elite support for a cause or a goal; both are frustrated and uneasy. The depth of frustration was demonstrated in Paris in May 1968 and in various acts of violence in Italy during 1969. The trend toward violence and demonstrations, which for the most part is neither influenced nor condoned by the parties of the left, raises difficult questions about the character and direction of modern political (or quasi-political) activity and their relevance to existing constitutional structures. How these phenomena will affect foreign policy and international relations is not easy to foresee. There does seem to be emerging, however, a growing belief, particularly among younger people, that the established ideologies, the traditional patterns of political activity, and the historic rivalries among nations are obsolete, artificial, and irrelevant to the real concerns of the individual and the major goals of society. This is not to say that these ideologies, patterns, and rivalries are about to be swept away; all may well survive, but they will be foci of contest and challenge.

B. National Policies and Preoccupations: France, the UK, Germany

7. *France.* De Gaulle possessed a vision of a new mission for a Europe united behind French leadership. He dreamed of a "European Europe," a confederation of nation-states led by France, excluding the UK, independent of the US and the USSR, able to resist the "hegemonies" of both, and at the same time capable of restraining and containing Germany. He was able to block UK entry into the European Community, but he was unable to rally other European states behind his vision of Europe's future or to convince the US or the USSR to accept France's pretensions to great power status. In these basic respects, French foreign policy, at least during de Gaulle's tenure, thus fell well short of achieving his major objectives.

8. Nevertheless, his successor probably agrees with the principles which informed that policy, although he will be less abrasive in attempting to apply it and more open to compromise on secondary issues. France after de Gaulle will continue to be jealous of its sovereignty and anxious to demonstrate that it has not become a docile member of the "Anglo-Saxon camp." This consideration precludes the return of France to NATO's integrated military structure. The force de dissuasion, begun under the Fourth Republic, is at once the most visible hallmark of French sovereignty and France's most tangible claim to

great power status. The composition of this strategic nuclear force may be altered and its completion delayed, but it will neither be scrapped nor integrated in such a manner as to diminish French control over it. Any US or "European" proposal which might give Germany the possibility of participating as an equal nuclear partner would precipitate a strong French reaction. The German "problem" will remain the focus of French policy in Europe, and France will continue to support the concept of a Four Power responsibility for its solution, or better, its containment. France thus will be suspicious and resentful of US-USSR negotiations or German-Soviet talks; at the same time, France will remain jealous of its special relationship with West Germany which it sees as a means of aligning German policy with French policy to the greatest extent possible.

9. Opposition to enlargement of the European Community is the single most important position taken by de Gaulle which his successor probably will discard. The French have agreed to the opening of negotiations on the British and other applications, but they are also putting pressure on their partners to adopt the agricultural and other policies scheduled to be completed before the end of the transitional period (January 1970). The French aim is to oblige the British and other applicants for membership to choose entry into a Community which they would have difficulty modifying to the detriment of French agricultural and other interests. It is highly improbable, moreover, that France would agree to accept Community regulations and greater Commission authority which would inhibit French diplomatic and commercial independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

10. *The UK.* For most of the postwar period, the UK has sought to play a multiple role as junior partner and principal advisor to the US, as the interpreter of Western Europe to the US and of the US to Western Europe, and as the spokesman of a multiracial commonwealth with global interests. The recurrent weakness of the British economy has made it impossible for the UK to sustain the varied and often contradictory positions inherent in these roles. British political influence in the Commonwealth countries that count in world affairs has steadily declined and probably will decline still further. The "special relationship" with the US has lost much of its psychological hold and in any case no longer confers upon the UK any indispensable benefits. Finally, the French drive to exclude the UK from continental Western Europe forced the British to decide which of their roles would serve their interests best. Prime Minister Macmillan chose the European option in 1961 and Prime Minister Wilson confirmed this choice in 1966.

11. The British government is persuaded that entry into a European Community offers the UK its best chance to play a significant role in world affairs in the future. In submitting their application, the British

declared their acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and, by implication, its tacit political goals. But the official British attitude toward a politically united Europe is still ambivalent. Both Macmillan and Wilson have explicitly rejected supranationalism. There is scant evidence that a majority of British politicians or the British public has undergone conversion to the Monnet vision of a federal Europe. Indeed, objections from special interests to the short-term economic costs have become shriller as the possibility of entry has come closer. Nevertheless, the leaders of all British parties feel that they have no realistic alternative: they probably will accept full membership if they can obtain satisfactory transitional terms in such areas as agricultural policy and Commonwealth preferences.

12. To obtain those concessions, the British require the continued support of West Germany. The British in years past so eagerly pursued any glimmer of *détente* with the Soviet Union that they often appeared to be willing to disregard essential German interests. More recently, the British have become noticeably firmer on preserving allied (and West German) rights in Berlin. UK caution on the German "problem" and sensitivity to West German views are likely to continue so long as entry into a European Community remains a major goal of British foreign policy.

13. *West Germany.* German foreign policy has largely achieved two of its principal postwar objectives: despite lingering but latent resentment in Western Europe over the Second World War and recent but growing uneasiness over German economic power, Germany is a respected and trusted member of the Atlantic Community; despite occasional misgivings in Germany over Allied willingness to conciliate the Soviets at German expense, West German security so far has been assured. In contrast, reunification of the two Germanies remains as elusive and as remote as ever. The efforts to preserve a sound political and security relationship with its Western partners, and at the same time to effect a real improvement in relations with East Germany, will present West German diplomacy with its most severe tests in coming years.

14. The Adenauer policy of subordinating reunification to reliance on US power and West European integration, and the Grand Coalition policy of attempting to put pressure on East Germany and the USSR through a venturesome policy in Eastern Europe, are now seen as inadequate. Moreover, the attitude of the West German public toward East Germany seems to have undergone a profound change in the past several years; it is now at least tacitly acknowledged by most Germans that East Germany will not dissolve, or be allowed by the Soviets to dissolve, into a united Germany run by a regime similar to that of the Federal Republic. The West German government, while continuing an *Ostpolitik* more attuned to Soviet sensitivities and East European realities,

probably will put primary emphasis on direct and parallel negotiations with the USSR, East Germany, and Poland on a wide range of specific issues. Provided the USSR, after considering East German interests, continues to encourage these efforts, Bonn may become less inclined to defer to Western interests and views. This could lead to some disagreement and discord between West Germany on the one hand, and its allies, particularly the US and France on the other, but the West German government will continue to operate within the framework of existing allied structures and agreements.

15. The new Ostpolitik, as it applies to East Germany, is a subtle and long-range policy. It is subtle because it assumes—or hopes—that the cumulative effect of agreements on functional problems ultimately will lower the political and human barriers between the two Germanies, and it counts upon the East German regime to cooperate to this end. It is long-range because, even under the best of circumstances, it would be some years before these agreements and other developments would begin to affect the nature of the East German regime or alter its political relationship with the Federal Republic. In its effort to improve relations with its Eastern neighbors, the West German government probably will agree to most East German demands short of *de jure* recognition. But the East German leaders will be wary of agreements that would compromise their authority or loosen their grip on their population. The Soviets, who are opposed to German reunification and who have mixed feelings about East German sovereignty, nevertheless share these concerns. They therefore probably will be receptive to East German arguments that a genuine normalization of relations between the two Germanies would in the end undermine the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. For its part, the Federal Republic would hesitate to compromise relations with its EEC partners by reneging on past agreements or dragging its heels on proposals to make the Community more cohesive in the future. These considerations place severe limits on the extent of cooperation and intimacy which is likely to evolve between the Federal Republic and the East German regime.

C. European Integration: Status, Prospects, Implications

16. The European Economic Community (EEC) represents a complicated and ambitious attempt by six nations of Western Europe to integrate their economic and commercial policies. Some of its sponsors and supporters also hoped (and still hope) that it would lay the foundation for a federal government capable of recapturing for Western Europe a major role in world affairs. Since the EEC was established on 1 January 1958, its members have abolished tariffs among themselves, agreed upon a uniform system of indirect taxation, and removed most barriers to the free movement of labor. The Six as a group have enjoyed higher rates of economic activity, trade, and growth than before 1958,

although these achievements are not entirely due to the existence of the EEC. Intra-Community trade has almost quadrupled. In 1967, Community trade with the outside world exceeded that of the US.

17. Despite these economic achievements, confidence in the future of the Community as a political entity is at a low ebb. There is now less conviction that the "logic" of the EEC will impose integrated policies on the member states and that the very complexity of those policies will require that they ultimately be administered by a supranational authority possessing independent powers of decision. Since de Gaulle left office, it has become evident that the obstacles to the political development of the Community derive from more complex factors than his abhorrence of supranationalism. One of the objectives which closer European cooperation was designed to promote has been accomplished; Europe is prosperous. But this prosperity has also reduced the impetus to extend cooperation into new and uncertain spheres. Defense policy, which might be a Community function, is pre-empted by NATO. National governments beset by social and economic problems are in any case reluctant to take steps which would irritate entrenched domestic lobbies and weaken their own authority. The lessened fear of communist subversion and Soviet military aggression also has given new play to national interests. These developments, among others, have made the need for supranationalism less demonstrable and weakened the impetus behind it.

18. One of the the most pressing problems the Community faces concerns the entry of new members. The French have lifted their political veto on the admission of the UK, but they have contended that the entry of additional members—the UK, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, and possibly others—would make the adoption of common policies more difficult, slow down or even halt further progress toward economic integration, and transform the Community into little more than a regional trading bloc. It is difficult to challenge the logic of this argument, at least over the short term. On the other hand, and with varying degrees of enthusiasm or conviction, France's five partners have argued that a European Community was not meant to be restricted to six members and that Western Europe without the UK could never be independent of the US or equal to it. This argument is equally difficult to challenge: the UK would contribute significantly to the economic resources, military strength, and political influence necessary to make the European Community at least potentially equivalent in power to the US.

19. Some compromise between these two conflicting views probably will be made; many people in Western Europe, including many in France, still have an emotional and political investment in the idea of a "united" Europe. In an increasingly bureaucratic and technological

world, it remains one of the few political concepts still capable of generating enthusiasm and commitment. It is thus unlikely that the Community will stagnate indefinitely or that it will dissolve. Community efforts to increase and perfect intra-European cooperation will continue and expand, although the necessary compromises will probably dismay doctrinaire defenders of the Treaty of Rome. If they persist, the UK and perhaps other nations will enter a European Community. But for a long time to come this Community is likely to resemble the confederation de Gaulle had in mind more than the supranational government envisaged by Monnet.

20. Moreover, a larger Community—however organized—would inherit some of the problems now bedeviling the nation-states. Much of its energy would be absorbed by difficulties of internal organization and administration. The Commission or a similar executive authority would be preoccupied with establishing its authority and reputation for equitable dealing among its competing national and regional constituents. It is probable that such a Community would have little inclination or interest in adding to its “domestic” problems by adopting “outward-looking” policies or by taxing its heterogeneous populations to pay for greater defense appropriations. The member nations on occasion may find it easier to combine against the US than to agree upon a policy distasteful or harmful to one of their number. But enlarged or not, the European Community will be no more than an economic union for some years to come, with its members pursuing foreign policies based largely upon national interest.

II. Western Europe and the US

A. The Political Relationship

21. Although the policies of the European states and the pace and extent of integration will be determined by the Europeans themselves, they will also be influenced by the attitudes and policies of the US. For the past 25 years, the US has been the single most important political, economic, and military factor in Western Europe. In these circumstances, periodic tension and strain between the US and various nations over specific issues or general concepts is both natural and unavoidable. The US has been the guarantor of West European security, the principal sponsor of Germany’s political rehabilitation, the major source of technological progress, and the mainstay of economic and financial stability. As such, it has been the target of criticism by some but of courtship by all.

22. This is not to say, of course, that the West Europeans have been content to be courtiers. The drive for European unity derived in part from their dissatisfaction with this role, and a widespread receptiveness to Gaullist criticism of some US policies—even in anti-Gaullist

circles—reflected this discontent. There is no conceivable US policy which will satisfy all of the allies. They balked at certain US policies when they were economically impoverished, militarily helpless, and domestically unstable; surmounting these hazards has not made them any more amenable. In recent years, moreover, American prestige has declined because of Vietnam, the well-publicized domestic unrest in the US, and the widespread belief among younger members of the political elites that the US and the USSR are collaborators in defense of the status quo. Thus there will be no lack of disputes in the future; the inclusion of neutrals in a European Community, commercial and monetary questions, the recognition of China, and negotiations with the USSR on East-West relations or European security will be among the contentious issues over which the US and one or more of its allies will frequently disagree.

23. The key question is whether disagreements on these matters could reach a degree of intensity likely to damage the present political relationship between the US and Western Europe or cause a paralysis or disintegration of the institutions through which it operates. In many respects, the US and Western Europe already form a “community” based on many shared economic, political, and military interests. Although US weight in the “community” institutions—NATO, the OECD, the IMF and its Group of Ten—is less overwhelming than it was and will become still less in the future, the ties between the US and Western Europe are strong, extensive, and unlikely to disintegrate. On the other hand, the relationship probably will become more delicate and more subject to strain and misunderstanding. Europe’s greater economic strength and independence, its reduced sense of danger, and its anticipation of a decline in the US military presence in Europe will all contribute to some attenuation of US political influence. In these circumstances, it will prove to be more difficult than in the past to achieve common, or at least mutually acceptable, policies within NATO and between the US and individual allies on such matters as bilateral US–USSR negotiations. Thus, the US probably will find it increasingly troublesome to satisfy its allies and speak for the West on issues affecting European interests: an era of tougher negotiation and greater compromise *within* the Western Alliance probably has begun.

B. The Economic Relationship

24. Most of Western Europe clearly is in the stage of self-sustained growth and mass consumption characterized by rapid industrial expansion, greater production and wider diffusion of durable consumer goods, and a marked increase in the number of persons possessing or aspiring to a bourgeois standard of living. This economic development so far has been very profitable for American business despite the existence of two preferential trading blocs (EFTA and EEC). Thanks in part

to the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of tariff reductions, the US still enjoys a favorable trade balance with Western Europe. Moreover, American firms were very prompt to increase their investments in Europe in order to avoid having to compete from outside the Common External Tariff and in order to take advantage of the large tariff-free European market. The managerial, technological and capital advantages enjoyed by US firms, long accustomed to planning for a large market, have given them a pronounced lead in important sectors over their European competitors. The estimated value of US direct investment in all of Western Europe rose from less than \$7 billion in 1960 to almost \$18 billion in 1967; the total invested by the US in the EEC countries during the same period rose from about \$2.6 billion to about \$8.4 billion.

25. Much of this investment was made in the advanced technological and innovative industries: electronics, computers, telecommunications, precision equipment, and optics. As a result, US firms and subsidiaries control 80 percent of the computer market in Western Europe, 50 percent of the semiconductor market, 95 percent of the market for integrated circuits. In addition, the remaining European-controlled firms in the advanced, science-oriented industries have become heavily dependent upon American technology: in 1966, Europeans paid US firms about \$1 billion for patents, licenses, royalties, and the use of American industrial procedures.

26. These developments aroused concern in Western Europe over the technological "gap," the brain "drain," and the American "challenge." Behind these slogans lay a fear of loss of control of key sectors of the European economy, especially the most technologically advanced. Influential Europeans expressed the fear that Western Europe was doomed to a position of industrial "helotry" unless steps were taken to resist American penetration of European industry and arrest European technological dependence on the US. The Gaullist national solution failed because obstruction of American investment in France simply led to its diversion to other Common Market countries, thus damaging France's competitive position. Nor could France persuade its EEC partners to adopt a similar restrictive policy; they distrusted de Gaulle's motives and they desired American capital, technology, and management techniques for their own economic development. And a common industrial policy for all of Western Europe is unlikely in the absence of much greater political cohesion than now exists.

27. Over time, several trends will attenuate European concern over the American "challenge." The growth of annual American direct investment in Western Europe may already have passed its peak. The degree of control exercised by parent firms in the US over their subsidiaries in Europe has narrowed. European managers are increasingly replacing Americans; their role as decision makers should lessen na-

tional resentment toward US firms in Western Europe. On the other hand, a nationalist or "European" reaction against these firms almost certainly would occur if the US seriously attempted to make them comply with US antitrust decisions or US regulations on the shipment of strategic materials. A similar reaction could occur if a recession in the US or a change in the fortunes of a parent company led to unemployment in one or more of its European subsidiaries. On balance, however, it is unlikely that the problem of US investment in Europe will prove to be either a major disintegrating factor in US-European relations or a major stimulus to European unity.

C. The Security Relationship

28. NATO has endured for twenty years, not because it meets all the needs of all its members, but rather because it satisfies more of them than any other arrangement conceivable under present circumstances. The Alliance provides security for West Germany against the USSR, while relieving the anxieties Western Europe would have about independent German military power. By engaging US power in defense of Western Europe, the Europeans are able to keep their military budgets low enough to be politically acceptable. The expense to the US of maintaining large numbers of troops in Western Europe is high, but most of the foreign exchange costs are covered by offset payments and US military sales to the Alliance. NATO consultation does not give the Allies a veto over US policy, but it does give them a reciprocal influence on each other's defense and foreign policies (including those of the US) which they might not otherwise possess. These considerations make it likely that the Alliance will maintain its present organizational structure and membership until there is a European "settlement" which not only "solves" the German problem, but also convinces the other West European states that they have nothing to fear from the Soviet Union. The chances for such a settlement in the foreseeable future are, of course, slight.

29. On the other hand, the hopes once held that NATO might develop into something more cohesive than an alliance of sovereign nations or that its members might be able to agree on common policies outside Europe are not likely to be realized. The effort to give NATO a social role through the creation of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society has met with a polite response, but it will not materially tighten the already strong bonds between Western Europe and the US. Attempts in the past by France (Algeria), Portugal (Goa and Africa) and the US (Vietnam) to obtain active support for their concerns outside Europe were unsuccessful; there is little reason to suppose that similar attempts will succeed in the future.

30. Hope that West Europeans will contribute more to the common defense effort is probably also unjustified. The percentage of GNP and

of the total budget devoted to defense expenditures is lower today than in 1960, and there is little likelihood, short of an active threat to NATO territory itself, that there will be any political will to increase it. Moreover, Sino-Soviet tension has bolstered the belief in Western Europe that the likelihood of direct Soviet aggression, although latent, has been still further reduced. The combination of static defense budgets and heightened domestic pressure for greater social expenditures will make the offset problem more difficult to resolve in the future, even with some reduction in American troop strength.

31. The nature, extent, timing, and circumstances of any US troop reduction would be of critical importance. But in a general way, minor reductions—if well explained and well managed—could leave European faith in the US nuclear guarantee basically unaffected. On the other hand, a large and abrupt reduction—particularly if it occurred at a time when the political atmosphere in the US was one supporting a broad withdrawal from international commitments—would shake European confidence in the credibility of the American guarantee. A large cutback would also have an unsettling effect upon the ability of the European nations to live in reasonable confidence with each other (and notably with West Germany) as well as with the USSR.

32. In addition, a large cutback might produce renewed interest in a European Defense Community, a European nuclear capability based on the British and French nuclear strike forces, and a European procurement agency. But the obstacles to implementation of such proposals would be formidable. In the end, the West Europeans would be more likely to adapt themselves to whatever degree of protection and support the US was willing to provide than to undertake radical measures, particularly if SACEUR remained an American and if a “tripwire” US force continued to be deployed. In short, they probably would seize upon some comforting rationalization rather than face the domestic unrest certain to be generated by proposals for more taxes for defense and longer terms of military service. Their faith in the US would be weakened and they would tend even more to avoid controversy with the USSR on matters not vital to their interests, but they still probably would not succeed in replacing American power with their own.

III. Europe and the USSR

33. Dissatisfaction over the division of Europe has been growing in Eastern as well as Western Europe. The feeling is widespread that this division is a vestige of the Cold War which détente and internal developments in Western and Eastern Europe are rendering anachronistic. As noted above, many West Europeans believe that the US and the USSR subordinate European interests to their bilateral relationship and therefore collaborate to perpetuate the status quo in Europe. While preserving NATO and the American nuclear guarantee, West Europeans

in the years ahead will continue their attempts to lower the political and economic barriers between East and West. In some cases, this will cause them to disregard American policies or preferences. With more circumspection, and depending upon the situation and the issue, some East European states will adopt a similar attitude toward the USSR. However, the success of these attempts to attenuate in any fundamental way the division of Europe ultimately depends upon the policies and objectives of the Soviet Union.

A. Soviet Policy and Objectives²

34. If one were to take Soviet statements at their face value, the objectives of the USSR in Western Europe are apparent and simple. The Soviets want NATO dissolved, the US expelled from the continent, West Germany isolated, and all of Western Europe turned into a larger version of Finland. If these objectives were realized, concern for Soviet reaction would dictate the political life and determine the economic decisions of the countries of Western Europe. The USSR thus would become the major external influence in those countries, and Soviet interests presumably would be more secure than they are under present conditions. This vision surely caresses the dreams of those ideologists and doctrinaire Leninists in Moscow who sometimes act as if they have learned and forgotten nothing from the events of the past twenty years in both Eastern and Western Europe.

35. Of course, the rulers of the Soviet Union cannot explicitly reject this vision. To do so would go against ingrained attitudes. It would also weaken the ideological justification for their oligarchy at home and undermine some of the rationalizations sustaining their dominant position in Eastern Europe. It would not only impair what remains of their influence over Western Communist parties, but also would provide additional evidence to support the contention of the "new left" that the USSR is a conservative state. Consequently, it is natural, convenient, and perhaps essential for the Soviet leaders to be able to claim and occasionally to act as if NATO were "aggressive," West Germany were "revanchist," and the USSR still sought and promoted revolutionary change in Western Europe. So long as the present type of Soviet leader retains power, their conviction that they need to maintain this posture places limits on the extent of Soviet accommodation with the West. The

² See NIE 11-69, "Basic Factors and Main Tendencies in Current Soviet Policy," dated 17 July 1969. [Footnote is in the original. NIE 11-69, dated February 27, is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970, Document 21. On July 17, SNIE 11-9-69, "Current Soviet Attitudes Toward the US," was issued; see *ibid.*, Document 68.]

USSR thus will continue to probe for and exploit Western weakness and division whenever possible.

36. While the Soviet leaders remain hostile and suspicious of the West in general and of the US in particular, they appear to perceive that the present situation in Europe is, on balance, satisfactory to Soviet national interests. The political obstacles in Western Europe affecting greater commercial and technical exchange with the Soviet Union are minor; it is Soviet suspicion and economic backwardness, not Western policy, which places effective limits on East-West intercourse. The division of Germany holds both West Germans *and* East Germans in check. A drawing together of the two Germanies would loosen these restraints. Any substantial reduction in the barriers between East and West would tend to weaken the Soviet position in Europe. And the Soviets may have some apprehension that a large reduction of US power and influence would have a destabilizing effect.

37. To be sure, their increased concern over China makes it less likely that the Soviets will want to raise tensions in Europe. The Soviets possess the initiative in this area of East-West relations since the USSR and its dependent client, East Germany, are the only states both willing and able to foment tension in Central Europe. It is not now in the Soviet interest to do so, since the USSR is still concerned to erase the impression left by Czechoslovakia and apparently desires to explore with the US the possibility of strategic arms control. Nevertheless, these considerations do not oblige the USSR to sacrifice its essential policies in Europe: the continued division of Germany and the maintenance of a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. It is highly unlikely that the USSR would be willing to abandon these policies even if its dispute with China were to intensify.

38. For all these reasons, it is unlikely that the Soviets really desire (or expect) radical change in Western Europe. Rather, they seek explicit US recognition of Eastern Europe as their private preserve. From the Soviet point of view, this is the primary objective of a European Security Conference. Until the Soviets feel that at least some of the Western allies are agreeable to arrangements which would advance this objective, they are likely to content themselves with fostering dissension among them over the issues to be discussed, the attitudes to be adopted, and the concessions to be considered. Whether or not a European Security Conference eventually convenes, the Soviets might agree to some minor and reciprocal thinning out of military forces in Central Europe which would lighten their economic burdens without endangering their position in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely that the USSR would agree to any proposals acceptable to the West concerning German reunification or the status of Berlin (which would remain a useful pressure point).

*B. The Situation in Eastern Europe**Popular Attitudes and Leadership Problems*

39. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the states of Eastern Europe appear to have achieved a degree of domestic stability greater than ever before in postwar history. This is partly because the Soviets made their point when they invaded Czechoslovakia. But it is more than this. Over the years since 1956 the people and the regimes have arrived at an understanding, a compromise of sorts: the regimes will for the most part avoid terror and will pay some heed to consumer welfare, and the people will generally behave themselves. The terms of this arrangement vary from state to state; the bargain for the people is better in some than in others. But the principal boon to the citizenry is simply that things could be worse, and indeed once were.

40. Yet stability in Eastern Europe is very much of the surface variety. For one thing, the East Europeans do not share in the prosperity which has swept the West. The economies of most East European states are hobbled by sometimes incompetent leadership, by the political and ideological demands of the Communist system, and by suffocatingly close ties to the economy of the Soviet Union. The second industrial revolution—of organizational techniques and of advanced technology—is passing these countries by. And this is one source of serious discontent, both among middle-level functionaries and among the better educated.

41. There is of course another strong and chronic source of dissatisfaction: the widespread resentment among the people that they are not allowed to participate in their national political processes and the knowledge that their countries' interests are subordinated to those of an alien power, the USSR. Nationalism in Eastern Europe, never completely cowed, is now resurgent. This nationalism is essentially anti-Soviet. The various regimes cope with this in different ways—the Rumanian exploits and encourages it, the Polish represses it—but all must deal with it as an increasingly significant fact of political life.

42. Over the long term, nationalism in Eastern Europe is likely to become increasingly difficult for the Soviets to handle. A new kind of leader may be emerging in Eastern Europe. Until fairly recently, a national Communist was often a liberal Communist, ideologically motivated, and a man who identified independence with democracy. Tito came to this, Nagy and Dubcek followed. But the new breed of nationalists may be pragmatic and authoritarian, in the manner of Ceausescu and Moczar. Such men would pose new and subtle problems for the Soviets. They would maintain a tight central control, in the name of communism and the party, and gain public support through appeals to patriotism. With men of this type, it would be, and is, difficult for Moscow to decide where and when to draw a line, and, equally impor-

tant, it would not be easy for the Soviets to contemplate the kind of action which might be necessary if such a line, once drawn, were clearly violated.

The Outlook for Political Change

43. It is clear that the USSR faces a complex of political, economic, and ideological problems in Eastern Europe which defy solution. This is so since a "solution" in one area implies a retreat or a defeat in another; no overall resolution of the conflicting concerns of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is possible. Thus, national communism may keep the Communist Party in power in Romania, but it also attenuates ideological solidarity with the Soviet Union and revives anti-Russian attitudes in the population. Economic decentralization and an embryonic market economy may reduce popular discontent, but only at the expense of ideological orthodoxy and the primacy of the Party. The primacy of an orthodox party, on the other hand, tends to stifle economic development and breed unrest.

44. These contradictions have convinced many observers that the Soviets are faced with an evolutionary process in Eastern Europe which, ultimately, they are powerless to contain. They therefore argue that Eastern Europe in time could attain about the same degree of independence of Moscow in foreign policy as Finland now enjoys. Over the long run, assuming the emergence of effective national leadership in Eastern Europe—the Kadar, not the Dubcek, type—and of a more self-confident leadership in the Soviet Union, this analysis may prove to be correct.

45. Within the period of this estimate, any such optimistic forecast almost certainly would be unjustified. Czechoslovakia demonstrated the limits of Soviet tolerance: preservation of the dominant role of the Communist Party, Party control of communications media, no outspoken criticism of the Soviet Union, membership in the Warsaw Pact. It is unlikely that the present Soviet leadership, or their likely heirs, would soften these requirements. Continuing tension with Red China or greater agitation inside the Soviet Union by writers and other intellectuals probably would increase their uneasiness and thereby sharpen their resolve to impose conformity and docility in Eastern Europe. Given the will, there can be little doubt that they would succeed: there is no shortage of neo-Stalinists and opportunists in Eastern Europe prepared to assist them. After all, the diminished role of the Party, permissiveness toward dissent, and the reduction of the Party and State bureaucracy are not mere theoretical concepts devoid of practical and personal effect; they mean the loss of jobs and power. Consequently, radical political change in Eastern Europe probably can succeed only with Soviet support or at least acquiescence.

The Outlook for East-West Trade

46. The USSR seeks more cooperative relations with Western Europe but is suspicious of comparable policies by its client states in Eastern Europe. The Soviets realize that many East Europeans see in East-West détente an opportunity to lessen their economic dependence and ideological subservience to the Soviet Union through closer economic and political ties with individual West European states. Although the USSR retains the ability to impose its will on most of Eastern Europe, the imposition of harsher measures there would harm its relations with Western Europe and aggravate the economic difficulties of the entire Eastern bloc. Consequently, how to pursue détente, increase trade and obtain credits, and at the same time limit or channel similar efforts by Eastern Europe seriously complicates the formulation of Soviet policies toward Europe and the US. The Soviets may see in Warsaw Pact coordination for a European Security Conference an opportunity to establish both the framework and procedures through which they could monitor and control trade and economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

47. There are severe restraints on the economic independence of Eastern Europe. The rate of growth since 1966 in East European trade with the members of EEC and EFTA has slowed; in 1968, the unfavorable trade balance of Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR) with these regional groups exceeded \$300 million. The East European share of West European imports of manufactured products actually declined from 2.5 to 2.2 percent between the periods 1957–1959 and 1964–1966. Only East Germany exports more manufactures to Western Europe (excluding West Germany) than it imports. Taken as a whole, Eastern Europe (including the USSR) is still to some extent an underdeveloped area supplying foodstuffs and raw materials to Western Europe in return for capital equipment.

48. The prospects for any significant improvement in this relationship are slight. The quality of manufactured goods in Eastern Europe is below Western standards, and the sales network for them is rudimentary. A large increase in Eastern agricultural exports is even less likely. The EEC already is burdened by huge surpluses in various products, and the Community has embarked on a protectionist course which severely restricts imports of foodstuffs from non-member countries. Furthermore, the gradual elimination of trading barriers within the two Western economic blocs (EEC and EFTA) has tended to stimulate trade among member nations and leave less scope for external trade. Finally, the East European countries lack a convertible currency, and their trade with one another is planned on a long-term (usually five-year) basis and coordinated with national economic plans. These impediments, plus their political and economic commitments to the Soviet Union, re-

duce the flexibility with which the East European countries can deal with the West.

49. Consequently, until the East European states substantially modify their economic structures, there can be only a marginal increase in trade with the West through barter deals, “triangular” trade arrangements (East-West-underdeveloped countries), and schemes for joint manufacture and marketing between East and West European firms. Another factor in trade expansion would be the continued availability of Western credits. At the end of 1968, total outstanding credits obtained from NATO countries amounted to \$3.4 billion, of which \$1.8 billion were for over five years. The repayment burden for these loans places a ceiling on the availability and utility of credits from Western sources and obliges the East Europeans to seek the forms of economic cooperation mentioned above. Under the best of circumstances, the economic division and technological gap between East and West are likely to persist for some years to come. As this disparity becomes increasingly apparent, it will heighten Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe.

IV. Conclusions and Contingencies

50. Taken together, most of the judgments given above create the picture of a relatively stable continent over the next four to five years. But there are a variety of events and developments which could—and some probably will—distort this picture; a few could fundamentally alter it. No account is taken, for example, of the possibility of a major economic recession. Nor does our analysis take account of possible major changes in the Soviet outlook; the emergence of new leaders in the USSR with quite different tactical or political ideas—although this appears unlikely—would change things substantially. So would the outbreak of large-scale Sino-Soviet military hostilities or a renewal of Arab-Israeli fighting which threatened to involve the great powers. The continuation of US-Soviet competition in other world areas will not necessarily affect developments in Europe, but an appreciable swing toward the USSR would provoke at least some stock-taking in European governments. Depending upon the particular events and circumstances, such a swing could cause some of the trends noted in this paper to be accelerated, slowed, or even reversed.

51. The restiveness now existing in both Eastern and Western Europe seems unlikely to be stifled. It could manifest itself in a variety of ways and over the longer term provoke significant changes. Much of this restiveness has sprung from the inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with many of the problems of modern life—lagging application of technological change to infrastructure and industrial production, outmoded educational systems, antiquated laws, unresponsive bureaucracies, and the like; for this reason it is elastic, and it

could grow rapidly in direct ratio to governmental ineffectiveness. Restiveness could also spring, in West Germany for example, from foreign policy setbacks such as a precipitate US withdrawal or frustration of the Ostpolitik. Instability could again arise suddenly in Eastern Europe over changes in leadership or over new efforts by East European states to alter their economic policies or relations with the USSR.

52. Barring such contingencies, the changes which are likely to occur will revolve around problems and activities which are now visible: the West German effort to expand relations with the East, which has little room for maneuver but may have some successes; the movement to strengthen and enlarge the European Economic Community, which will probably result in some progress but cause any enlarged community to be even more absorbed in its own problems than at present; the question of the US presence and influence, which seems likely to decline without, however, substantially reducing West European dependence on the US or encouraging the West Europeans to assume more responsibility for their own security; the problem of nationalist resurgence in Eastern Europe, which may produce some greater economic independence and experimentation, but little political liberalization or basic change in relations with the USSR; the Soviet effort to have its primacy in Eastern Europe legitimized by international agreement, with perhaps some give on matters of atmosphere but no fundamental concessions.

53. Whatever may be the pressure for change, there are strong forces at work to contain that pressure. Despite alienation from government and discontent over the course of European civilization among many intellectuals and students in the West, the great majority simply want to live quietly and better. Despite growing nationalism and severe economic problems in the East, Soviet dominion is backed by force which the Soviet leaders have demonstrated a willingness to use. Despite increased restiveness in both East and West over the economic, political, and military weight of the US and the USSR, these two powers have attained positions which can be attenuated only slowly and with their cooperation. Despite West Germany's economic power and its desire to improve relations with East Germany and the USSR, it has little alternative to continued economic integration with the West and reliance upon American nuclear protection.

54. In sum, while there will be movement, it seems unlikely to be convulsive or to change in any fundamental way the structure of European power, at least during the next four or five years. The evolution which is underway in both parts of Europe will erode the influence of the super powers, it may diminish the social and economic division of Europe, and it may provoke political crises and uncertainty. It seems unlikely, however, to produce revolutionary regimes or a European

settlement or, alternatively, to bring the opposing forces into a dangerous confrontation.

28. Paper Prepared in the Department of State and the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated.

DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

Part I—Alternative Structures

We face no imminent crisis in our relations with Western Europe. If anything our multilateral and bilateral relations have improved in the past year. Most observers do not foresee a major crisis arising in the next few years, barring major changes in U.S. or Soviet policy.²

Nevertheless certain developments—the departure of de Gaulle, signs of new interest in an enlarged and more structured Western European community, the Federal Republic of Germany's new emphasis upon Ostpolitik, pressures for a European Security Conference, the evolving strategic relationship between the US and the USSR and their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—all make desirable examination of the basic concepts of our relationship with Europe.

American Interests

US security is bound to that of Europe. Western Europe with 300 million people, a gross national product of more than \$600 billion and an industrial output contributing about one-fourth of the world's total,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. Sent under cover of a January 26, 1970, memorandum from Kissinger to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness. Copies were sent to the Attorney General, the Under Secretary of State, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. In the cover memorandum, Kissinger stated the paper reflected the discussion of an earlier draft of this paper at the January 23 Review Group meeting. The Review Group decided at its meeting that Part I of the draft paper should be revised; that a few key issues from Part II, especially European security, NATO defense, and balanced force reductions, should be selected for NSC discussion; that a revised paper should be distributed to NSC principals; and that a NSSM should be drafted for a study of Germany. (Ibid., Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970)

² See National Intelligence Estimate 20-1-69, "Europe, the US, and the USSR," December 4, 1969. [Footnote is in the original. See Document 27.]

is an area of vital interest to the United States. This interest is reinforced by myriad other bonds: official, commercial, political, technological, cultural, and personal. Our security and our prosperity are both indissolubly linked with the security and prosperity of Western Europe.

Our fundamental objectives are:

—A stable and peaceful situation effectively guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of all European states, based upon a military equilibrium sufficient to ensure that this settlement is on terms satisfactory to the United States and its Allies.

—A strengthened, prosperous and cohesive Western Europe able to bear its full responsibilities for the preservation of peace and stability.

—The resolution of the German question in a manner satisfactory to all concerned.

—Peaceful and positive US relations with the USSR and the other countries of Eastern Europe.

—Diminution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the gradual liberalization of Communist regimes.

Broadly speaking, there are three patterns of relationships (or systems or models) which are sufficiently within the realm of the possible and have enough advocates to be worth examining:

1. *The Present Structure*: The continuation of, essentially, the present relationships, i.e., basically a bipolar structure of power in which the USSR dominates Eastern Europe and the US is the preponderant military and political power in Western Europe; Western Europe is loosely organized economically and politically (although the Common Market has brought its six members partly along the road to economic union) and heavily dependent on the US militarily; Germany remains divided.

2. *Enhanced Western Europe*: A modified bipolar structure in which a more highly organized Western Europe becomes a significant, independent power complex still linked to the US in a defense treaty and relying, ultimately, on a US nuclear guarantee, but which has an increased defense capability of its own. Germany remains formally divided but the Western European complex consciously expands its trade and other relationships with the smaller Eastern European countries, including the GDR. In this situation, even though the Eastern European countries would doubtless remain linked in defense arrangements with the Soviet Union, they might become more independent in their domestic and foreign economic and social policies. (This pattern could evolve from pattern 1, above.)

3. *Disengagement*: A formal European military and political settlement involving the disengagement of American and Soviet forces from at least Central Europe.

Comments on System 3. It might be desirable to look briefly at System 3.

The key to the European security problem is, obviously, Germany. In a system in which both the Soviet Union and the United States have withdrawn from Central Europe and no Western European framework had been developed, the Federal Republic would remain the dominant Western European power. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union would agree to any arrangement that both weakened its control over Eastern Europe and left the Federal Republic strong and uncontrolled. For this reason most disengagement plans envisage a zone which would embrace both Germanies and some adjacent areas in which there would be no nuclear weapons and a thinning out of forces.

A disengagement plan which involved the effective erosion of US power in Western Europe with no corresponding development of Western European power would shift the power balance in Europe toward the Soviet Union and thus not be acceptable on security grounds to the US. Any disengagement plan which did not bear disproportionately on the Federal Republic would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Any plan which satisfied Soviet fears on this score would not be acceptable to the Federal Republic.

Thus, in effect, System 3 is not practical for the present, in part because of the conservatism of Soviet policy. Conceivably some thinning out in the center might be acceptable to both sides and negotiable *if* it were an adjunct of the basic defense posture described in 1, above. And a substantial disengagement of the super-powers could be conceivable *over the long term* as an adjunct of the development of the kind of Europe described in 2.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Present System

The present structure of European relationships is not static. It has encompassed considerable movement toward Western European cohesion and increased self-reliance and self-confidence. Without altering the essential preponderance of the US in European security affairs or in East-West negotiations, there could be further development of the Common Market, of intra-European military cooperation, of European ministerial conferences and of independent relations with Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Developments along these lines have already increased both the feeling and reality of special Western European ties independent of the United States. But in the important area of military affairs it has remained true that the United States Government delimits the major decisions which affect the Alliance.

The United States has not, however, been the only or even the most important factor in inhibiting greater cohesiveness among the Western Europeans. Rivalries (and jealousies) have been and remain important

(for example, UK and Germany, France and the UK), the political will is at times uncertain (for example, the UK) or political instability can at times be of psychologically crippling proportions (France before de Gaulle, Italy) and the smaller powers can be as self-righteous, jealous and parochial as the larger. In some respects the United States has "held the ring" among potential contestants in NATO. Pending a situation in which the French, British and Germans are willing and able to work together, there will inevitably be very finite limits to what kind of a European unit can develop.

Advantages of the Present System

1. It has been stable and has preserved peace in Europe for more than 20 years.
2. It provides responsible management of the most vital sector of the military balance (the US nuclear deterrent).
3. It contributes to US strength on the world political and economic scene which gives us our presently preponderant role in such institutions as the IMF.
4. It has proven advantageous to American industry and at least in the short run to our commercial interests.
5. It avoids the problems in the management of our relations with the Soviet Union which would inevitably accompany the development of another effective center of power.
6. It discourages the development of a European nuclear force—with all its potentially destabilizing consequences.

Disadvantages

1. Our preponderance of military, political and economic power is frequently a source of strain in our relations with our Allies.
2. It tends to freeze the status quo in Central Europe.
3. The present system is tending to erode as a result of changing generations, differing perception of the threat, social restiveness, etc.

Enhanced Western Europe

This structure of European relationships would differ from the present structure primarily by virtue of a materially and politically significant cohesive European entity which could and would assume a significant degree of responsibility. It presupposes the continuation of NATO and America's nuclear protection to NATO. It does not depend upon a single relationship as centralized as a European federal government but upon a variety of intra-European economic, political and military arrangements. By definition, Western European action in political and security affairs would be more structured than today. However, since it is unlikely that Western Europe would exert equal weight

to the US in elements of power—certainly not in nuclear deterrence—inevitably mutual interdependence would be strong with all which that implies with respect to such issues as East-West relations; in this area more or less harmonious policies as between Western Europe and the United States would prevail, if for no other reason than that the Soviet Union will view an Enhanced Western Europe with deep suspicion for some time at least.

Even were Western Europe to become appreciably more structured and independent, it is unlikely that the ties with the United States would disintegrate. These ties are strong and extensive: They are already present in a complex of economic, political and military interests (NATO, OECD, IMF, Group of Ten, investment, etc.). If the prospect of a redistribution of power within the Alliance should result in some reduction in the American presence, it is not clear that, at least in the early stages, either a European defense community or a European nuclear capability would result. In the early years at least the Western Europeans might be more likely to adapt themselves to whatever degree of protection and support the US was willing to provide rather than face the domestic unrest generated by more taxes for defense and longer terms of military service.

Since Western Europe would in all probability organize itself with US support and approval (our consistent policy), it would retain sufficiently close links with the US to make it unlikely that our security and economic interests in Western Europe would be adversely affected.

Advantages

1. It will assist in the development of a mutually advantageous and stable relationship with the US.
2. It would offer the best solution to many of the dilemmas posed by the German problem.
3. In the last analysis, the Western European concept offers the best possibility of solution for certain of the longstanding social/cultural/political problems of individual Western European countries (such as Italian social instability and need for modernization, Flemish-Walloon problem in Belgium).
4. If it is clear that Germany is not dominant, the Soviet Union might in time accommodate itself to this new situation which *could* lead to Soviet relaxation in Eastern Europe and hence possibly eventually open the road to mutual disengagement.

Disadvantages

1. The new Western Europe would be considerably more difficult to deal with in the growing pains period.
2. In the short run, East-West tension would increase.

3. A more independent Western Europe might pursue economic policies which conflicted with our own.

4. It increases the chances that Western Europe would become a more or less independent nuclear power.

Discussion

Regardless of what kind of Europe we want, our views will not be controlling. We can affect the choices which the Europeans will make, but not determine them. To oppose the development of a structured Europe, if the Europeans decide they want to proceed in this direction, would not stunt the new Europe but would certainly poison our relations with it. But if we encourage the Europeans, we should be able appreciably to affect the way they see their relationship with us. The US record in this respect is good.

If we and the Soviet Union both continue to bolster the present system—they by force as in Czechoslovakia, we by persuasion (NATO Ministerials, etc.) we can probably maintain it through the next decade. As indicated above, there are strong reasons why we should try to step up the pace of evolution towards an Enhanced Western Europe, and shape our decisions to that end.

There are signs that processes are at work in Western European relations which are going in the direction of an Enhanced Western Europe.

But at all times we must remember that the view is different through the Soviet end of the telescope. The present structure has brought peace and progress and protected our interests. The pace at which it can evolve towards a more self-confident European structure cannot be entirely dependent upon us, or even upon the Western Europeans.

Part II—Issues of European Security

Many aspects of our relationships with Europe are now being examined in detail in response to various NSSMs. Our decisions on some of the problems addressed in these studies will be directly affected by our assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative concepts discussed in Part I.

This section comments briefly on three issues that the NSC will shortly consider in more detail: (a) East-West Negotiations on European Security; (b) Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR); and (c) NATO Defense Strategy.

East-West Relations and European Security Proposals

1. *The Central Issues Today.* Most of the fundamental political and security problems in Europe which evolved from World War II remain

unsettled: Soviet domination of Eastern Europe; the enforced division of Germany; the status of Berlin; certain border questions between Germany and its Eastern neighbors; and the confrontation of armies in Central Europe.

Although these issues are less marked by recurring crises than in the past, a mutually acceptable basis for resolving them has not yet emerged. The Soviets still seek to consolidate and obtain recognition, particularly US, of their substantial political and security gains from the Red Army's westward thrust during World War II. We and our Allies, who contain further Soviet expansion and maintain the balance of strength, have sought an end to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and to the bisection of the Continent.

However, in contrast with the immediate post-war period, the 1950s and the early 1960s, the contemporary Western approach to East-West negotiations has two new characteristics:

—A realization derived from experience that while major progress on the fundamental issues is not yet possible, agreements can be achieved on discrete, well-defined subjects (e.g., limited test ban, outer space, nonproliferation treaties); and

—the US and its Allies have fully committed themselves to an era of negotiations and to the quest for progress towards resolving the underlying political issues dividing Europe.

2. *NATO Initiatives.* Since the NATO Ministers in 1967 concurred in the "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (Harmel Report), which gave the Alliance a mandate "to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved," NATO has become increasingly engaged in consultations relating to European security.

One of the sharpest indications of this trend has been the Allies' interest since 1968 in mutual and balanced force reductions (discussed more fully below).

Additionally in response to the Warsaw Pact's Appeal of Budapest in March 1969 for an ESC, the Ministers at their April meeting in Washington called upon NATO to prepare a list of specific subjects for possible negotiation with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe. The Ministers believed that an ESC would have to be carefully prepared through prior progress on concrete issues.

The culmination of this study of issues was the NATO Ministerial Declaration of December, which reiterated the Allies' interest in mutual and balanced force reductions and noted that the Alliance would give further study to other arms control measures which might accompany

or follow these reductions.³ Expressing approval for the new German Government's Eastern policies and the tripartite efforts on Berlin, the Ministers also stated that they would attach great weight to the responses from the East to these proposals "in evaluating the prospects for negotiations looking toward improved relations in Europe." Moreover, they cited the Alliance's interest in economic, technological and cultural exchanges, and in cooperation in the fields of environment and oceanography.

In addressing the question of procedures for negotiations, the Declaration stated that progress in bilateral and multilateral problems on some of the fundamental issues of European security would help to insure the success of any eventual European Security Conference.

3. *Basic US Approach to East-West Negotiations.* At this mid-point in East-West relations—in which we are moving away from confrontation but in which there is no clear path for the future—there are three basic approaches available to the US for negotiations, assuming that the US is not prepared to negotiate a settlement directly with the Soviets:

a. Maintain the territorial status quo in Europe, but not actively seek a resolution of the issues dividing Europe. This presumably would entail preservation of NATO's defense shield, and at least tacit US acceptance of a Soviet preserve in Eastern Europe, and of the indefinite division of Germany, that conceivably eventually could be ratified in a treaty of the Locarno type.

b. Continue actively a leadership role in pursuit of a resolution of issues dividing Eastern and Western Europe, looking toward a comprehensive settlement along the lines of the Western Peace Plan (Herter Plan) of 1959.

c. Continue pragmatic efforts to make bilateral and multilateral progress on concrete issues where and when possible. This option—essentially the present US and Allied approach—is predicated on the assumption that the Soviets would refuse to deal meaningfully with the central issues, such as Berlin and Germany, but that in time a European settlement on terms acceptable to the West could be arranged. Under these circumstances, Western security interests might continue to be pursued through an approach entailing separate smaller steps: undertaking negotiations on specific issues bearing on reduction of tensions—even remotely—and dealing with central issues whenever and wherever there appears reasonable prospect of success.

Mutual East/West Force Reductions Balanced in Scope and Timing
(MBFR)

Options: This issue, which is among topics covered in a response in preparation of NSSM 83, has immediate relevance to continuing allied

³ See Document 26.

efforts to find ground for negotiation with the Warsaw Pact countries on concrete issues of European security, and will again be before NATO Ministers for further decisions at the May 1970 Ministerial Meeting. The immediate choices are whether to:

- a. Stalemate the current NATO study;
- b. await the results of further study prior to taking a definitive decision; or
- c. press forward toward an early Allied position to be negotiated with the Warsaw Pact countries.

Discussion

a. *Background:* In December 1969, after similar action in November 1968 and April 1969, NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the 1968 Reykjavik Declaration which called for NATO studies on MBFR in the context of “a substantial and significant step, which will serve to maintain the present degree of security at reduced cost, but should not be such as to risk destabilizing the situation in Europe.”⁴ At their December 1969 meeting, the Ministers also asked the Council in Permanent Session to report as soon as possible on the preparation of illustrative models for MBFR. These models, being developed by an open-ended, NATO political/military working group, are largely based on guidelines drawn up after about two years of study by NATO. The Permanent Council will consider the working group’s report by the end of April, prior to Ministerial consideration in May.

In this process, the Permanent Representatives in April and the Ministers in May will analyze the adequacy of the NATO guidelines upon which the models are based, as well as the feasibility, verifiability, advantages and disadvantages of the specific models prepared.

b. *Political and Military Implications:* The political and military implications of any specific MBFR proposal would of course vary with the terms of that particular proposal. Thus, final decisions on MBFR in any case should await the outcome of the NATO studies currently underway and due to end in April.

The main military risks involved are clearly discernible: NATO is already at something of a military disadvantage vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact because of existing force deployments and because of geographical and corresponding reinforcement/redeployment asymmetries. It can be argued that equal percentage force cuts, particularly large percentage reductions, could place NATO in a proportionately weaker military position, particularly since US forces would have to be redeployed from the US. On the other hand, a verifiable agreement which

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 1.

restricted the re-entry of Soviet troops into Eastern Europe might have military compensations for NATO.

Some of the political advantages ascribed to MBFR are that mutually acceptable, verifiable reductions would constitute a meaningful step toward détente in Europe and their negotiation might reduce existing pressures for other, possibly more dangerous East-West détente initiatives.

Further, MBFR might complement the US-Soviet strategic arms talks and might serve to relieve pressures for unilateral force reductions in the US and other NATO countries. In the latter regard, there would clearly be both military and political disadvantages were unilateral cuts to occur and exacerbate the existing military asymmetries without any quid pro quo from the East.

We do not know the Soviet position with respect to MBFR, though they have indicated that it would not be a suitable subject for a European Security Conference. There has been no clear Soviet response to the NATO MBFR "signals" beyond an indication they would be considered. Further, the Soviets may well feel that reductions in the West are likely to occur without concessions on their part. On the other hand, the state of Sino-Soviet relations may at some point increase Soviet interest in reducing Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Apart from any contribution MBFR might make toward codifying the territorial status quo in Europe, the Soviets might also see an advantage in making West German force levels and US nuclear capabilities in Western Europe the subject of East-West negotiations, which is potentially divisive within the Alliance.

c. Possible NATO MBFR Proposals: Subject to the outcome of NATO studies, the following are the *basic elements* of NATO's proposals which might be put to the Warsaw Pact:

- The geographic area involved would be the FRG and Benelux countries vis-à-vis the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

- All indigenous and stationed (foreign) forces would be involved.

- Conventional, nuclear (delivery systems not warheads) and dual-capable forces would be reduced.

- Air forces may or may not be reduced. If reduced, the reductions would probably be in smaller proportions than ground forces.

- MBFR plans based on symmetrical reductions could be on the order of a minimum of 10% or a maximum of about 30%, and effected in step-by-step increments within these limits.

- An agreed limitation on forces at their present levels might be considered as a first step, but only if part of a reduction agreement.

—Verification would need to be adequate both to insure confidence in compliance with the agreement, and to provide evidence of violations to be used to confront the violator.

The NATO Working Group will also develop MBFR plans based on *asymmetrical reductions*, primarily as a way to compensate for the Soviets' ground force and geographic advantage. The criteria for asymmetrical reductions have not yet been defined, but could include, say, 10% reductions on the NATO side but correspondingly greater reductions in Warsaw Pact forces.

As directed in the Reykjavik Declaration and in subsequent Ministerial decisions, it will be the task of the NATO political/military MBFR Working Group, and of the NATO Governments themselves in formulating Alliance policy on MBFR, to weight the above factors and if possible to find a compatible "mix" meeting NATO's military and political requirements.

NATO Defense Strategy

Introduction: In NSDM 27⁵ a decision was reached for planning purposes that the strategy for our NATO forces should be one of "initial defense." This approximates the previous Administration's stated strategy and is consistent with agreed doctrine adopted by NATO. It assumes that within a period of 90 days after an attack on NATO, the requirements for additional conventional defense forces will fall off because (a) diplomatic settlement will be reached, or (b) the Soviets will reach the limit of their conventional capability, or (c) the fighting will escalate to nuclear warfare. In support of this strategy, existing forces in Europe would be maintained at least for the time being.

In the near term, at least, there are no realistic alternatives to this approach. It is unlikely that we would be able to convince the Europeans of the need for a major reassessment of strategy or obtain much larger commitments of European resources. At the same time, an abrupt and sizeable withdrawal of US combat troops would provoke a considerable crisis of confidence in the Alliance, particularly if there were no evident strategic rationale for it.

Current NATO strategy (elaborated in NATO Document MC 14/3⁶) is described as a strategy of "flexible response," a characterization which satisfies the security needs of the various NATO members but without necessarily conveying the same meaning to each of them. There is probably a general understanding that a Soviet attack on Western Europe would *not* be countered with an immediate US strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there is no agree-

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 25.

⁶ Dated January 16, 1968. (*NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969*, pp. 345–370)

ment that a major Soviet attack could be or should be repulsed with conventional forces alone. The most that Europeans are prepared to accept is that NATO strategy should provide for a conventional response to *limited aggression*. Beyond this, there is no common view of what response NATO should make to Soviet aggression. The opinion in fact is that the Soviet Union should be kept in some doubt as to what kind of response NATO might deem appropriate to the occasion.

The experience of NATO strategic debates is that the strategic concerns of the United States and of Western Europe are not identical and that neither side can wholly persuade the other of the rightness of its own strategic outlook. Thus NATO strategy tends to be the product of compromise between the United States and its European Allies. This is likely to persist and the effect, for reasons explained below, will probably be that:

—NATO strategy will be more oriented to deterrence through the threat of escalation than to developing a superior war-fighting capability.

—It should nevertheless be possible to incorporate a broad band of options in agreed NATO strategy if these can be viewed as links in a chain of escalation.

—NATO strategy will probably be ambiguous on several key points, particularly on conditions justifying the use of various types of nuclear weapons.

—There will almost certainly be several national views about what declared strategy means, to say nothing about what the actual strategic performance might be in the event of war.

Issue: The underlying issue is whether we can and should maintain the current strategy and force levels.

Options

1. We could decide to maintain the status quo for several years (beyond July 1971), using the time for negotiating and implementing a new balance of responsibilities with the Europeans.

2. We could begin planning for reductions:

a. Based on an examination of alternative strategies for planning war-fighting capabilities (e.g., against smaller threats for periods of less than 90 days) or new strategies of deterrence; for example, shifting toward more efficient and earlier resort to tactical nuclear weapons; *or*

b. Based on maintenance of present strategic planning concepts, but openly accepting higher risks and relying more on mobilization, or on reserves, and on the mobility of dual purpose forces.

3. We could plan on reductions with the aim of creating a new distribution of responsibilities and burdens; this could entail deferring any reductions depending on negotiations with the Allies.

*Pertinent NSSMs*⁷

NSSM 60—United States Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France

NSSM 65—Relationships Among Strategic and Theater Forces for NATO

NSSM 79—U.K. Accession to the European Community

NSSM 83—U.S. Approach to Current Issues of European Security

NSSM 84—U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO

⁷ Documents 130, 20, 318, 24, and 25, respectively.

29. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, January 28, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Vice President Agnew
Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Attorney General Mitchell
General Lincoln, Director, OEP
Admiral Moorer, Acting
Chairman, JCS
Director of Central Intelligence
Helms
Under Secretary of State
Richardson

Assistant to the President
Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Walter H.
Annenberg
Prime Minister Harold Wilson
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
Ambassador John Freeman
William Watts, NSC Staff
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff

RN: I am happy to extend my welcome around this table where the most sensitive discussions are held. It is less formal than our Cabinet meetings.

During the Eisenhower presidency, there was a tendency to come in with a single paper. While we do have NSC papers, rather than a statement of recommendations or agreed positions, they present the options. This is of great value to the President's chair. It insures a full discussion.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Secret.

Today we want to concentrate on Europe—we have a new government in Germany, there have been major developments in France, East-West talks are developing, and SALT has begun. I will ask Dr. Kissinger to open, to be followed by Secretaries Rogers and Laird; then Mr. Prime Minister, I hope to get your views.

Kissinger: Outlined the issues, as contained in his talking points and summary in the attached NSC book.²

President: What about European security matters?

Rogers: The problem concerning disengagement as a policy is that the USSR is seeking to create the impression that we have in fact opted for alternative #3. The fact is that we are going from alternative #1 to alternative #2 at a sensible pace.³ We must reinforce this impression.

We are a strong supporter of the present Alliance—for example, the President's trip to Europe, my stand at the NATO conference, and Elliot Richardson's speech on the European security situation.⁴

We must encourage cohesion and give economic aid.

We must also understand what the USSR is up to. We want to negotiate; we will not just be belligerent.

On SALT, we are convinced that they are interested in serious discussions. Concerning our own troop strength, we will maintain it at present levels through 1971. In short, the foundationstone of our own security is NATO.

Concerning the European Security Conference, the Soviets do not give the intention of getting into serious discussions. First of all, they don't even talk to us; rather for 6 to 8 months they discussed as to whether or not to invite us into the party. If they don't talk to all interested parties at the same time, the offer would not have been made in good faith.

Beyond that, the Soviet approach does not deal with real security questions. The issues they have raised—trade and renunciation of forces—for example, have already been covered.

We are certainly prepared to accept and deal with bilateral discussions; such as those now being undertaken as Brandt's advisor, Egon Bahr, has gone off to Moscow.

² The briefing book is *ibid*.

³ Rogers is referring to the three alternative patterns of relationship in Document 28.

⁴ This is presumably a reference to Richardson's speech of November 20, 1969, at a regional foreign policy conference co-sponsored by the Department of State and the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles. (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 22, 1969, pp. 584–588)

RN: Often we read that the columnists say that Europe does not really matter. What is needed is for the United States and the Soviet Union to sit down and cool the whole process. If this means cooling relations with our western European friends they say, then so be it. If it means antagonizing China—again, so be it.

As I said in February and again in August,⁵ I reject this approach categorically. First, there is no reduction of our NATO commitment. Certainly this can be a matter for negotiation, but we cannot reduce our level of commitment except on a mutual basis. Second, on Soviet-US relations, there is not a lack of interest in finding an arrangement, but it is vitally important to establish a relationship within the Alliance. We must know what we are going to talk about before getting into summitry.

On arms discussions, things are underway.

On Berlin, we have just received our toughest note yet.

On Germany, nothing has really moved as far as the Soviets' approach is concerned.

Laird: I am primarily concerned with the more traditional strategic issues, and particularly the Soviet threat. Both the Defense Program Review Committee and the National Security Council are considering this problem. There have been major difficulties in coming to a threat assessment. We must look at intentions as well as capabilities. Denis Healey pointed out so well in the NATO meeting his concern with the change of the threat, particularly in the Middle East and in the dramatic increase in Soviet steam days in the Mediterranean. This affects the entire range of defense planning, including Asia as well.

We place a very high priority on new consultation procedures, such as the Nuclear Planning Group.

I am deeply concerned with the relative security burden over the next five years, and the whole concept of burden sharing. I am delighted that you will be able to move a UK brigade into Germany. We have had some real problems in the Department of Defense as a result of Germany re-evaluation; we had to eat \$150 million.

We are studying the whole area of balance of forces. Certainly as relates to the threat assessment, we must have an agreement with the NATO countries before we can reduce force levels.

RN: Mr. Kissinger, would you touch on SALT, and in particular the Soviet attitudes toward the IRBMs and NATO arrangements.

Kissinger: The key problem is the definition of strategic weapons. We consider that IRBMs which are aimed at Europe are strategic, while

⁵ See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 134–136, 632–634.

tactical weapons are not. On the other hand, the Soviets take the position that weapons aimed at home countries are strategic and others are not. Under their definition, then, IRBMs are not considered strategic, and Polaris missiles are. This gives them an overwhelming advantage vis-à-vis Europe. In the next phase of SALT, the definition question will be crucial.

Rogers: One thing is clear and that is we will have plenty of time for discussion. There will be no quick decisions. There will be plenty of time to consult and debate.

Wilson: I find this discussion fascinating as a form of governmental process. Even the inclusion of a third option for "intellectual symmetry" is most important.

And I agree that this third option is pretty well dead, although we must quiet the critics from time to time. The trouble is that the main danger to NATO is that it can be taken for granted. Czechoslovakia jerked everybody up, but there is a continuing need for external vigilance and more unity.

If we look at the Brezhnev Doctrine, it is interesting to note that the USSR has never chosen a country in the NATO Alliance. Actually Brezhnev has shown a high degree of military efficiency in imposing colonial policies.

As far as the European Security Conference is concerned, it was never really in doubt that the U.S. and Canada would be invited in. The Soviets never meant to be exclusive on this.

The question is just who is taking who for a ride. The right way to respond is not just to say no. But we must be properly prepared and deal with meaningful issues. Perhaps we should show a bit of rigidity, and crowd them a bit. It is my impression that Brandt is doing a bit of this. He is getting away from the old metaphors and pushing Ulbricht around. But he would never sacrifice security.

We must ask you to acquiesce in some economic damage to interests in the United States. It would be worth it for the sake of European cohesiveness. We are prepared to bear some short-term risks on the balance of payments. I hope you can put up with some phrases and slogans which may grate on you. We will do our best to limit them. It is political unity that matters here.

Excluding Defense considerations, and I underline that phrase, one could see an advantage to the U.S. Vietnamization of Europe. As we are more robust in Europe, you don't have to lose sleep on all our internal quarrels.

I want to commend the real success of the Nuclear Planning Group. It is a moving process which is constantly being strengthened. We do have discussions just amongst ourselves and Europe, but this is

not an alliance within an alliance. At the Defense dining club, there is still an empty chair which we hope will one day be filled.

We naturally are concerned about the nuclear Safeguard, and we pressed for reassurance on that when you were in London.

As a general policy, we are more inclined to progressive response, not playing the ace of trumps right off. This gives a longer time for diplomacy to work.

On disengagement, would the Russians be willing to cut back on their IRBMs? The cuts must get those that are targeted on us.

We are grateful to be kept in the picture concerning your arms control talks, and we hope to be kept in. Finally, Mr. President, God bless on SALT.

Stewart: Mr. President, you raised the question that some here want the US and the USSR to settle the whole bag together. It is interesting that at the UN, Gromyko talks about philosophy and we don't.

It is fortunate that the Alliance exists. There is much silliness about the essentials. The fact is that we must keep NATO in existence and formidable. If NATO is to be preserved, this means a stronger Europe, and this will help you—particularly in currency exchange problems.

Concerning our application to the European community, if we hadn't tried to go in, then others in Europe would move to a greater cohesion and keep us out. We *must* apply for psychological reasons. If a strengthened Europe means closer ties with the United States, then that is fine.

It is important to remember that NATO is not just a defensive alliance. I am worried about the opposition to the Alliance. "Is the damsel dead or only sleepeth?" We must try to avoid growth on that strand of opinion which attacks NATO as a waste. NATO is not just an armed camp; its existence does, in fact, relax tension and further relaxation may be attainable.

I would like to make four points:

- (1) We must not underwrite the Brezhnev Doctrine.
- (2) We must not just approve a limited agenda.
- (3) We must present the Soviets with real questions on such things as mutual force reductions and the German question, and
- (4) We must not be too showy. We must get some relaxation.

Wilson: I think we must avoid any big buildup about a European Security Conference—there would be too much hope for nothing.

Rogers: There is no problem here with public opinion. People are amazed at how ready we are to negotiate. We do not want to have some kind of big agreement in public on the agenda. But we do want to show ourselves as forthcoming.

RN: How would some kind of standing committee work?⁶

Stewart: It would have to do some preparatory bilateral discussion. Prime Minister Wilson is going to Moscow, and he may be able to find out if the Soviets are serious. Trade questions can go to existing organizations. As far as mutual force reductions are concerned, the neutrals are not interested. From time to time, certainly, we may want to bring the ministers together.

Wilson: It would be a good idea to have a heavy dose of safe subjects, such as cultural exchange and trade. We can compare notes on these, and give the standing committee a context, not exclusively related to difficult questions.

RN: It would be a good idea to keep the pressure on them, but I have one fundamental understanding concerning any conference. A conference in and of itself helps them; a conference in and of itself does not help us.

Look at Glassboro⁷—there was just an appearance of détente and euphoria.

Our fundamental interests must be involved. The Alliance is a different problem for us than for them. The range of problems in the entire Mediterranean, for example, is enormous and changing rapidly. We cannot lean too heavily on the Israeli side, and remember that the Russians haven't given a thing. It was their client that lost the war; it is tough for our client if we press any harder.

You, Prime Minister Wilson, said that it is a historical fact that the second strongest power tries to strike an accord with the United Kingdom. There are those who see a tendency now that the French and the Germans are competing for Soviet attention. We share your evaluation of Chancellor Brandt. The new French leadership is certainly more flexible than the old.

I would add one thing. In reading the memoirs of Sir Winston Churchill and General Eisenhower, they both made one point—you must not overlook the problem of the enemy. For example, I imagine the Israelis will eventually take the newly purchased Libyan planes out. The new revolutionary forces in the Mediterranean will be difficult for the Soviets to control.

The Soviets themselves have serious internal economic problems and problems with East Europe. East Europe will move increasingly toward Western Europe.

⁶ In a speech to Parliament on December 9, 1969, Stewart proposed the idea of a standing committee on East-West relations consisting of representatives from NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

⁷ Reference to the U.S.-Soviet summit at Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23–25, 1967. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 229–235.

I have never been one who believes the US should have control of the actions of Europe. It is in the interests of the United States to have a strong economic, political and military European community, with the United Kingdom in that community. I have preferred that Europe move independently, going parallel with the United States. A strong, healthy and independent Europe is good for the balance of the world. For the US to play a heavy-handed role would be counter-productive. What we want is friendly competition with the United States.

We will be watching the German problem and its relationship to the USSR.

Our primary interest is to see the United Kingdom in Europe, fully part of it, and brought into the Councils of Europe.

Wilson: Don't under-rate the effect of the top Soviet leaders with contacts in the outside world. Soviet businessmen with whom we have considerable contact are increasingly questioning the rigidity of the system.

RN: That's right; Kosygin is manager.

Wilson: There will be no Rapallo from Brandt; but the USSR is looking for a new Rapallo.⁸

The French approaches under DeGaulle were mischievous more than fundamental.

In the Middle East my colleague, George Brown, has just returned and stressed the growing importance of the Nationalist movements, especially in Jordan. The position of Arafat is tenuous. If anything really happened to Hussein, then Arafat would lose vis-à-vis the wilder ones. It was Brown's believe that the next victim will be Nasser.

He also was deeply concerned about the role of the Middle East Mafia in Aden. We should really ask our intelligence people what is going on there.

RN: Let me add one thing. I have great confidence in European politicians. But as far as dealing with the managers in the Soviet Union is concerned, I wouldn't want to leave the impression that the future of Europe should be left in the hands of the German, French and Italian businessmen.

Wilson: Yes, especially the Italians.

⁸ Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, which allowed Germany to rearm on Soviet soil. The symbolic meaning of "Rapallo" implied that Germany went behind the West's back and sided with the Soviet Union.

30. National Security Study Memorandum 88¹

Washington, February 12, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US Policy on Italy and the Northern Mediterranean

The President has directed a study of political developments in the Northern Mediterranean, particularly in Italy, Greece and Spain.

The study should consider the broad implications for US policy in the short and medium term resulting from the political evolution in this area. The implications of Soviet military, political and economic activities and influence in the Mediterranean should be assessed with particular reference to the effects on the countries of the Northern Mediterranean.

Prime focus should be placed on Italy.² Recommendations should be presented on the scope of action the US might take to enhance political stability and effective government, to reduce the possibility of entry into the government of the Communist Party, and to improve the effectiveness of the US presence and interest in Italy. The President wishes to have Ambassador Martin present for the meeting of the NSC.

The President also wishes to have Ambassador Tasca present to review the situation in Greece and to recommend the degree of speed with which we should move in resuming military shipments. The prospects for the political evolution in Spain and Spain's future role in the Mediterranean should also be reviewed.

The President has directed that the paper be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and NSC staff.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1248, Saunders Chron File, NSSM 90. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

² In an attached February 12 memorandum to the President on the Italian political situation, Kissinger indicated that the NSSM "reflects your desire to have an early NSC meeting on the Northern Mediterranean. . . . The prime stress will be on Italy." See Document 191.

The study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by February 27.³

Henry A. Kissinger⁴

³ See Document 195.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

31. National Security Study Memorandum 90¹

Washington, February 26, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US Interests in and Policy Toward the Mediterranean Area

The President wishes to expand NSC consideration of Mediterranean problems beyond those issues cited in NSSM 87² (North Africa) and in NSSM 88 (Northern Mediterranean).³

Accordingly, he directs that the NSSMs 87 and 88 studies be placed in the context of political developments in the Mediterranean basin as a whole, including the Eastern Mediterranean. Particular emphasis should be given to how US interests in this area will be affected over the next several years.

The study should include consideration of Soviet objectives, policies and prospects and how they affect our interests, and French objectives, policies and prospects and how they affect our interests.

The President wishes to discuss the feasibility of developing policy options with respect to our interests in the area as a whole or in appro-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 252, Agency Files, NSC Mtgs., Vol. 1. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² NSSM 87, "Trends and U.S. Options in North Africa," January 22, is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–5, part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document 5.

³ Document 30.

priate segments of it. He wishes to examine ways of improving the interrelationship of our programs and policies in individual countries in the Mediterranean area. Policy options should take account of political, economic and military considerations.

The President has directed that this study be prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the NSC staff. Work already completed or underway in response to NSSM 88 may be incorporated in the study requested by the present NSSM.

The completed study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by Monday, March 16, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

32. Editorial Note

On March 2, 1970, President Richard Nixon wrote a memorandum to Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman, President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs John Ehrlichman, and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger defining his priorities. In the area of foreign policy, he included "[p]olicy toward Western Europe, but only where NATO is affected and where major countries (Britain, Germany, and France) are affected. The only minor countries in Europe, which I want to pay attention to in the foreseeable future, will be Spain, Italy, and Greece. I do not want to see any papers on any of the other countries, unless their problems are directly related to NATO." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memorandums) The memorandum is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 61.

33. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 90¹

Washington, March 23, 1970.

NSSM 90

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

Attachments

A. INR Research Memorandum INRM-9 of January 30, 1970. "The Mediterranean Basin: A Poor Prospect for Regionalism" (S/NFD/CD)

B. Summary of NSSMs dealing with the Mediterranean Region

C. [3 lines not declassified]

I. A Concept of the Mediterranean²

The Mediterranean is a diverse and complex region that can be viewed in a number of ways.

A recent study of the Mediterranean region (Attachment A) found that:

—aside from oil, the littoral states had relatively little trade with each other,

—they were widely divergent in their economic, cultural, and political positions, and

—they had no meaningful interest in common that arose from their location.

It found no sense of Mediterranean "community" and concluded that a regional approach to the area was not likely to be fruitful.

Yet undeniably there are grounds for viewing the Mediterranean as a whole:

—From a defense planning point of view, it forms a coherent area, and this view is particularly relevant because of the presence of rival US and Soviet fleets.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-170, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 90. Secret; Exdis. Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group on the Mediterranean. NSSM 90 is Document 31. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 272.

² For purposes of this study, the Mediterranean region is defined as the countries touched by the Mediterranean Sea. In specific cases, however, it is useful to draw the picture somewhat more broadly—e.g., in discussing oil, the Persian Gulf cannot be excluded; Iran is an integral part of the "Northern Tier"; and one cannot omit Jordan from a discussion of the Arab-Israeli problem. [Footnote is in the original.]

—The European Community's (EC) growing relationships with the region underline the Mediterranean's position as the "Caribbean of Europe."

—The Mediterranean has been the scene of intense political activity in the past few years. (Of the ninety NSSMs issued thus far, seventeen have dealt with Mediterranean problems directly and several others have had indirect relevance. The most relevant of these are summarized in Attachment B and provide a useful rundown of most of the issues in the area that have concerned US policy.)

It is worthwhile, therefore, to take a look at the Mediterranean region as a whole to see what insights emerge from a broader approach. One way to do this is to see the Mediterranean as the locus of two classes of problems.

—A series of sub-regional interactions, both hostile and cooperative, have developed within the region, and

—A number of larger international concerns impinge directly on it as a whole.

The principal sub-regions are: the Western European countries of the northern coast; the "Northern Tier" countries of Greece, Turkey and Iran plus Cyprus; the Arab-Israeli complex; and the Maghreb.

In addition, of course, there are a number of factors that relate two or more of the regional countries for particular purposes. For example:

—the loss of Wheelus Air Force Base³ made it necessary for the US to seek training facilities elsewhere in the Mediterranean area.

—Oil produced in Libya, Algeria and the Middle East supplies much of Europe's energy needs.

—US-supplied military equipment supporting Turkey's or Greece's NATO role raises mutual apprehensions.

—The coup in Libya raised various concerns in a number of Mediterranean countries, especially Tunisia, Morocco and Italy.

—A US decision to resume military supply to the Greek government may have repercussions on the unstable Italian domestic scene, as would attempts to bring Spain into NATO.

Such sets of interrelationships, plus the many bilateral problems that the US has with Mediterranean countries, present however only the pieces for a mosaic of the region. The picture takes on some shape when we consider the extra-regional influences on the Mediterranean.

Three of the most important elements that affect US interests on a broader scene interact in—and in policy terms define—the Mediterra-

³ The United States agreed in December 1969 to vacate Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya in June 1970.

nean much as, in the high-school physics experiment, overlapping beams of red, blue, and yellow light yield a white area at the point of their convergence. These elements are:

- The Arab-Israeli conflict,
- the US-Soviet relationship,
- and moves towards a “unified Europe.”

The Arab-Israeli conflict has evoked a response from nations well beyond the Mediterranean area, but the nature of the Mediterranean states’ response has been conditioned by their geographic location. Particularly since the 1967 war, the Arab cause has found increasing support around almost all of the Mediterranean. By triggering reactions from France, the Soviet Union, and the US, the Arab-Israeli conflict has become the single most important “Mediterranean” issue.

By interacting with the US-Soviet confrontation, the Arab-Israeli dispute has provided a favorable climate for the increased Soviet activity. The striking increase in the Soviet role has forced the littoral states and others to reassess their positions and relations with their neighbors as well as their ties with the US.

The gradual trend towards unification in Europe is the most promising factor affecting the region. France and Italy are charter members of the Common Market and Europe is a potent economic magnet for all of the littoral states. Spain, Turkey, Greece, Israel and the Maghreb states have already set out upon a path that is likely to lead them to an increasingly intimate economic relationship to a Europe that is moving toward economic integration.

In order to approach the question of the Mediterranean in the most productive manner, a discriminating multi-faceted approach thus seems most useful:

—We *should not* think of each individual country in isolation. The interrelationships are extensive, and especially in the Eastern Mediterranean there is no issue that has implications approaching those of the Arab-Israeli dispute either for our bilateral relationships or for the countries themselves.

—We also *cannot* think of the Mediterranean as a single region (except, perhaps, for some aspects of defense planning) in the sense that Latin America or Western Europe can be dealt with as a region.

—We *can*, however, deal with certain problems within the Mediterranean area within a sub-regional framework (e.g., Cyprus, Maghreb).

—Finally, we *can* enlarge our focus to include factors that reach beyond the immediate Mediterranean region (NATO), the roles of outside actors (the US and USSR), and the three problems described earlier that impinge upon the area from outside.

A Mediterranean area seen as the interaction of outside forces on the one hand, and sub-regional problems on the other, provides a coherent and useful tool for a fresh perception of the problems affecting the region. With such a focus we can better approach the decisions that will have to be made to accommodate our Mediterranean policies and posture to the changes that have taken place there and the changed view that we have of our own world role.

[Omitted here is the body of the 50-page paper.]

34. National Security Study Memorandum 91¹

Washington, March 27, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

SUBJECT

EC Preferential Trade Arrangements

The President has directed that the NSSM 79² study be broadened to cover the preferential trading arrangements proposed by the European Community with countries not applying for full membership, including Spain, on which he has decided to reconsider the decision conveyed in NSDM 45.³ (NSDM 45 remains in force until amended.)

This part of the study should consider the political and economic effects on the United States of each arrangement individually, and all of them collectively. It should be submitted by April 10, the revised due date for the over-all NSSM 79 study. The paper should cover the same aspects of each arrangement cited in NSSM 79 but, to make it possible

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969-70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 91. Confidential.

² Document 318.

³ Document 292.

to meet the April 10 deadline, the studies of these arrangements need not be nearly as detailed as those under preparation on the accession of the United Kingdom and other applicants for full membership.

The paper should make recommendations concerning the U.S. position on each of the proposed preferential arrangements, taking fully into account their over-all foreign policy implications as well as their economic effects on the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger

**35. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State
(Richardson) to President Nixon¹**

Washington, April 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

Courses of Action Regarding NATO Strategy and Forces

Recommendation:

That you approve the course of action indicated below for Allied review of the military strategy and posture of the North Atlantic Alliance.²

Background

In response to Mr. Kissinger's March 19 memorandum,³ there follows a recommended comprehensive schedule for bringing the NATO Strategy Review to fruition by December 1970, or possibly mid-1971, together with our suggestions regarding NATO mechanisms and procedures to be employed, key US decisions required, and how we might encourage French participation to the fullest extent possible.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Decision Memorandums of the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, 1969–1977, Lot 83D276, NSC-U/DM 33. Secret. Drafted by Smith on April 10 and cleared by Goodby, McGuire, and Springsteen.

² Kissinger informed Richardson on April 17 that the recommendation was approved, but stated that "final agreement with the Allies on schedule, procedure, and terms of reference" was "subject to Presidential approval." (Ibid.)

³ In his March 19 memorandum to Richardson, Kissinger informed the Under Secretaries Committee that the President directed the Committee to prepare "a comprehensive schedule of actions" for a review of military strategy and posture of the North Atlantic Alliance and to report by April 3. (Ibid.)

Timetable

Completion of the NATO Strategy Review could have three, or possibly four phases, depending upon the outcome of NSSM-84 and upon whether we and our Allies prefer to examine how best to implement the existing NATO "flexible response" strategy, rather than to consider alternative basic strategies.

The British and others have proposed that the Review be limited to the more narrow focus which would permit it to be completed by the end of this year. Consideration of a broader range of options would extend the Review.

Phase I: From Now until May 1970.

This phase would involve:

(a) preparation at NATO Permanent Representative level of terms of reference and suggested procedures and timing of Study,

(b) presentation of Permanent Representative report for decision by NATO Foreign Ministers at the May 26 North Atlantic Council (NAC) Meeting and by the June 11 Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Meeting of Defense Ministers. It is not yet certain but preliminary indications suggest that a majority of the Allies may prefer terms of reference which call for an examination of better ways to implement the existing NATO strategy, but do not question the basic validity of this strategy.

Phase II: From June to September 1970.

Gathering by NATO political and military authorities of basic data necessary for analysis and for addressing specific strategy, force posture and burden-sharing questions. This would include an assessment of the threat, Allied force contributions, and the relative defense burdens as among Allies.

Phase III: September to December 1970.

Conduct the Study, with decisions by Ministerial Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in December. If the Study deals primarily with better implementation of existing strategy, it should be far enough along by this fall that we might foresee its outcome. We could use even preliminary indications for our own planning purposes in connection with the FY 1972 budget preparation. As a minimum, we require an agreed interim NATO report, which would provide meaningful data useful in budget planning for FY 1972, to be issued in December 1970.

Possible Phase IV: December 1970 to June 1971.

The depth and range of the Study could lead to a Ministerial decision in December that the NATO PermReps should continue certain aspects of the Study after December and make final recommendations to Ministers in June 1971. We should allow for this possibility in order to

facilitate full and meaningful consultations. Particularly if the French, who question current strategy, participate actively, it may be necessary to allow more time for a full examination of alternative NATO strategies. It will remain necessary, for budget purposes, to have an interim NATO report in December 1970.

Procedure

We recommend the following organizational framework in NATO.

An open-ended "Special Committee" should be established at Council level, to be chaired by the Secretary General and to include PermReps and the NATO Military Authorities.

Assuming the Review involves an examination of the premises and execution of the existing flexible response strategy, the Special Committee should make its final report to the NAC in Ministerial Session in December 1970, with perhaps an initial report to a session of Deputy Foreign Ministers in late October or early November. The Special Committee would use all NATO's resources—its Political Committee, Economic Committee, and Military Committee, as appropriate. Because of the important role of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), whose membership includes defense ministers of the key NATO countries, the Special Committee should also invite the NPG to comment on its work from the nuclear aspect.

The Special Committee's report would address the President's suggestion, which has met with widespread approval within the Alliance, for a thorough study of the premises on which current NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe is based.

US Participation

Overall, we should seek a thorough examination of the various strategy issues and a full and candid exchange of views with our Allies. Our objective is to have the Review completed by December 1970. As suggested above, we believe this should be possible if the Review is conducted within the context of the flexible response concept. We should, however, allow for a full Allied expression of views, and should not seem to press for quick judgments. This is obviously a very fundamental Review and support for it will come more easily if the pace is orderly and permitting of full discussion. Our own position should be determined by NSC decisions on NSSM-84,⁴ on which we would hope to receive initial guidance by mid-June 1970.

⁴ Document 25.

French Participation

We would encourage full French participation. Preliminary indications are that France will wish to be associated with the Review. Secretary General Brosio's suggested procedure for conducting the Review (which is compatible with our own suggestions) has been initially discussed in favorable terms by all PermReps, including the French. The matter of French participation would be kept under review and we should bear in mind the possible desirability at a later date of a high-level US approach to the French.

We would seek a tacit assumption of French participation by having the Special Committee report to the Ministerial NAC. Although the French do not now participate in the NPG, we would hope they might wish to establish some relationship with the Group at its November 1970 meeting when we envision NPG discussion of the nuclear aspects of the Special Committee's report.

We should be prepared, however, for any future French decision to disassociate themselves from the Review. In such a case, the Special Committee's report could be submitted to the Ministerial DPC (the fourteen Allies involved in the integrated military command).

In the event the French decide not to participate in the Special Committee, we should propose to NATO that (a) the French be given full access to the data developed by the Study and that (b) their views be solicited.

Scenario for Strategy Review and US Participation

(Note: Dates on which key US decisions will be required are underlined.)⁵

April	Preparation by PermReps of terms of reference.
April 30	Due date for submission of NSSM-84 to the NSC.
<i>Mid-May</i>	Preliminary NSC Meeting on NSSM-84 to provide background for May Ministerial.
May 26	NAC Ministerial Meeting in Rome, probable approval of Terms of Reference for Strategy Review.
June 11	DPC Ministerial Meeting.
<i>Mid-June</i>	NSC considers NSSM-84 Study. President provides initial guidance to US officials for Strategy Review.
Late June	US begins active participation in NATO Review on the basis of Presidential guidance.
<i>July 31</i>	US submits Reply to 1970 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ 1970) covering calendar years

⁵ Printed here in italics.

	1971–1975 with an assumption for planning purposes that US force contributions will remain essentially unchanged but with the clear understanding that NSSM–84 and NATO Strategy Review decisions could affect contributions.
September	US force decisions for FY 1972–76 made by SecDef in light of final decisions on NSSM–84.
October	Preparation of a NATO preliminary report on strategy.
Late October or Early November	Possible Deputy FonMin meeting to assess progress and problems of Strategy Review.
November	Submission of preliminary report to NPG Ministerial Meeting with which France is encouraged to be associated to some degree.
December Ministerial	US undertakes firm force commitments for calendar year 1971. Ministers receive report of Special Committee and take final decisions or issue guidance regarding future course for Strategy Review.
December	Final decisions on US FY 1972 budget.
January 1971	Publication of FY 1972 budget.
January–May	Possible continuation of NATO Strategy Review.
Mid-1971	Ministerial Meetings and possible NATO decisions on strategy.
July 1971	DPQ 1971 submission for 1972–76.
October and November 1971	Consultations with Allies concerning force plans, 1972–76.

Relation to the US Budget Process

The proposed timetable is predicated on full consultation with our Allies prior to any major change in US forces committed to NATO. However, major decisions on the US budget for FY 1972 will be made in the fall of 1970 while the Strategy Review is still in progress.

While FY 1972 force programs are still being formulated, it now appears that the projected changes in the Army and Air Force will not require changes in NATO-committed forces. However, prospective reductions in naval forces are very likely to affect NATO-committed units even in FY 1971.

If such reductions (a) are significant, (b) affect category A commitments and (c) affect our forces in the Mediterranean, we are likely to be

faced with a political problem, especially coming in the midst of a review of basic strategy.

Elliot L. Richardson⁶

⁶ Richardson initialed above his typed signature.

36. National Security Study Memorandum 92¹

Washington, April 13, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, ACDA

SUBJECT

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(MBFR)

The President has directed that a comprehensive study be prepared on the subject of mutual and balanced force reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The study should develop the analysis and supporting evidence related to all the major issues. In particular, alternative approaches to the problem should be examined, and an analysis made of such factors as the extent of reductions, forces and equipment involved, timing, geographic areas covered, verification aspects, problem of negotiability, Allied viewpoints, potential cost savings for the US, and any other factors deemed pertinent. On the basis of the foregoing analysis various Options should be developed to illustrate the differing concepts and variations for each Option. There should also be an assessment of the strategic effect on NATO defense, as well as on Warsaw Pact capabilities.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 92. Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The study should take into account the work already completed or underway in NATO² but should not be bound by it. The overall responsibility for the study is assigned to the Verification Panel established for SALT; the Verification Panel Working Group will undertake the basic work, in the same manner as the SALT studies.

In view of the work proceeding in NATO, it is desirable that the study be completed on July 15, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

² In a memorandum to Richardson, May 8, Springsteen reviewed NATO's MBFR model-building exercise and EUR's thoughts on the relevance of that exercise to the work on NSSM 92. (Ibid.)

37. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Europe (Hillenbrand) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Enlargement of the European Community, NSSM's 79 and 91

NSSM 79 requested us to examine UK accession to the European Community and NSSM 91 asked us to include a study of EC preferences.²

In the attached memorandum we describe the anticipated development of the European Community, appraise its implications for the United States, and lay out an overall strategy to deal with both the immediate problems of UK accession and the longer-term problems of economic relations with a strengthened European Community.

We then set forth more detailed policy issues for: (a) accession to full membership in the Community of the UK, Denmark, Norway and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 91. Confidential. Cleared by Samuels, Pedersen, Camps, and Trezise. Additional documentation on EC enlargement is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 290 and 292. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 40. Kissinger discussed EC enlargement in *White House Years*, pp. 425–429.

² NSSM 79, Document 318; NSSM 91, Document 34.

Ireland; (b) related arrangements for the remaining EFTA countries; and (c) association and other preferential arrangements with other countries, principally in the Mediterranean area and Africa.

The first part of the paper summarizing anticipated developments of the Community (Section I) and appraising the implications for the United States (Section II) is based on a lengthier and more detailed Department of State study paper with annexes which is also submitted herewith.³ In those studies, we examine in greater detail the setting of the negotiations, the various issues which will affect our interests, and set forth the methodology and results of our quantitative estimates of the effects of enlargement on both our agricultural and industrial trade.

Section VI of the memorandum discusses EC preferential arrangements and is in response to NSSM 91. We summarize the main political and economic facts and considerations for each of a number of EC arrangements on which the U.S. will have to take a position. We then discuss the considerations relating to GATT principles and procedures, the problem of protection of our commercial interests and the possibilities and complexities of grouping the countries involved for policy treatment prior to setting forth the options for U.S. policy.

I regret that it has not been possible to reach agreement among the members of the Ad Hoc group on either the substance or presentation of the attached paper. Although the Department consulted interested agencies on the methodology employed, both before and after the quantitative portions of the study were undertaken, a number of agencies do not accept the results as relevant for policy determination. The Department twice extensively redrafted the memorandum in an attempt to meet the agencies' concerns, but we failed to agree on a common assessment or on a common statement of the problem. We then tried to set forth the differences between us within the structure of the summary paper, with STR attempting to supply a position that would reflect the views of the dissenting agencies. This attempt failed as well. The agencies concerned, the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and STR, prefer to submit their own statements rather than to contribute sections which would fit into the structure of this paper. The Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Bureau of the Budget participated at different stages in the work of the Ad Hoc group and may also wish to express positions at a later stage of this policy review.

In the circumstances and in order to meet the deadline of the Review Group, I submit the paper as it is, attaching the combined state-

³ Attached but not printed. The full response and the Department of State paper are also in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-164, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 79.

ment of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture⁴ and the separate statement of Ambassador Gilbert.⁵ No purpose would be served at this juncture by delaying the consideration of the issue by the Review Group. The paper indicates where it is believed dissenting statements on the appraisal and overall strategy could be made if the Review Group feels that only one paper should be submitted to the NSC.

Option No. 3 on policy related to the accession negotiations was drafted in the earlier attempt to set forth the dissenting agencies' views. Following completion of our paper we received the attached statements and recommendations from these agencies. Both papers contain modified formulations of Option No. 3. As these agencies want their submissions presented in single consecutive statements and as there are differences between the two versions of the policy option, we have not attempted at this stage to revise further Option No. 3 in the State Department paper.

Enclosure

[Omitted here are the table of contents and copies of NSSMs 79 and 91.]

Enlargement of the European Community: Implications for the U.S. and Policy Options

Introduction and Summary

For two decades the U.S. Government has consistently supported the policy of European integration. Our continuing support was recently reaffirmed by the present Administration in the President's Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy.⁶ The essential reasons for our continuing support are simply stated: First, an integrated Western Europe can more effectively utilize the talents and resources of its member

⁴ Attached but not printed. The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture expressed concern with "the appraisal of the implications of the enlarged Community for the United States, the discussion of the overall strategy, and the presentation of options with pro and con arguments." Fundamentally, these Departments thought that the United States should more forcefully state its interests during EC expansion, in view of the enhanced economic and bargaining power that would result from EC enlargement. (Statement by the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, April 22)

⁵ Attached but not printed. The STR also favored a more proactive posture for expressing U.S. interests during expansion negotiations. (Enlargement of the European Community: Implications for the U.S. and Policy Options—STR Views and Recommendations, undated)

⁶ The President submitted his first annual report on foreign policy to Congress on February 18; for text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116–190.

nations and thus be able to participate more fully in maintaining the security of the North Atlantic area and in promoting a more stable world order. Second, a coherent structure in Western Europe can provide the indispensable framework within which a dynamic but truncated Germany both fulfills its role as a constructive member of the Atlantic Alliance and develops improved relations with Eastern Europe without concern to its neighbors.

An important conclusion of this paper is that British accession to the Community is essential to the prospects of further European integration. If the accession negotiations should fail the European integration movement would inevitably be set back, and there might well be some back-sliding. We have not thought it necessary to examine the consequences of failure but believe that the economic fragmentation of Western Europe would not benefit American interests and might well leave us saddled with the UK and the pound in a permanent client status.

The problem then is how will our interests be affected by the enlargement and strengthening of the Community, and how can we most effectively advance these interests?

Our study reveals that, as far as one can calculate the transitional effects of the probable tariff changes, the costs to overall industrial exports will be small to moderate, although individual export industries may be unfavorably affected. The longer term effects of EC enlargement will be more important, although they are impossible to predict with any accuracy. Some of the common policies to be worked out as part of the process of integration may impinge on specific American interests. We believe British accession, plus that of Denmark, Norway and Ireland, will on the whole reinforce the basically liberal and responsible economic orientation of the Community.

We see no reason why there should be any sharp reversal during this decade of the satisfactory record of the sixties when the Community was a dynamic market for our exports which increased by 143% during the first eleven years of its existence. During this period, we earned an average of over a billion dollars annually in trade surplus, and the Community was the most attractive field for our foreign investment which increased ninefold. By means of these investments we have penetrated Community and third country markets much beyond what would have been possible by exports alone.

We can however foresee a possible cost to our agricultural exports—mainly grain—on the order of \$100 million if the support price level of the Common Agricultural Policy is not reduced in connection with British accession. Because of the potentially high cost to the British balance of payments of adoption of the Community Common Agricultural Policies, agriculture will be the most critical question in the nego-

tiation. To the extent the U.S., in defense of its own interests, can be helpful in persuading the Common Market to move toward lower CAP price levels, it would be easier for the British to accede, minimizing the danger to sterling and the monetary system.

We believe that active intervention in the enlargement negotiations would be counterproductive. Consistent with our overall policy of support, we believe that the most effective strategy for advancing our interests in connection with enlargement and further development of the Community is one in which we would:

- express support but seek to remain in the background to avoid being tagged with the possible failure of the European effort.

- seek to minimize the costs to us during the enlargement negotiations by reliance on GATT rights and normal GATT procedures augmented by bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

- seek to influence the course of the future development of the Community in an “outward looking” direction through bilateral diplomatic means, exchange of high-level visits, joint working groups with the EC, as well as through multilateral forums such as OECD. We should be prepared to respond positively to a European request to set up a joint high-level U.S.–EC Commission.

- engage the Community in multilateral negotiations, which means pursuing the preparatory work now underway in the GATT and OECD for a negotiating approach on non-tariff barriers and agriculture and gearing up for another major round of reciprocal trade negotiations following conclusion of the enlargement negotiations.

The paper also lays out three policy options for protecting our interests in the enlargement negotiations. These are:

Option 1—Make clear early in the negotiations that we have commercial interests and GATT rights which we expect the parties to the negotiations to respect, that we will examine the results of the negotiation in the light of these rights and interests primarily in connection with the normal GATT examination of the agreement and the renegotiation of GATT bindings.

Option 2—Same as above, augmented during the negotiations by bilateral and multilateral consultation in which we would:

- stress to the parties that EC and UK bindings on soybeans should be maintained and that the incidence of protection for grain in the enlarged Community should be lower than that in the current Community;

- make similar representations for other important trade interests if it develops during the course of the negotiations that they may be adversely affected.

Option 3—The U.S. should not depend solely or primarily on GATT rights and it should include in its expressions of concern economic damage that may arise from the further evolution of the enlarged Community. Furthermore, it should not limit its initial emphasis to agricultural trade. Instead it should:

1. Before as well as during the negotiations for accession express to the participants our serious concern lest the formal agreement of accession or commitments reached affecting future actions by the enlarged EC seriously damage our trade or the international trading system.

2. Make clear that we will defend our economic interests by all appropriate means, including the exercise of our GATT rights.

3. Ask that a continuing consultative mechanism be established through which we can be kept informed of the negotiations and register our concerns.

4. Stress at the outset that we will be alert for all cases where our economic interests in either industry or agriculture are seriously endangered. As examples of problems that can now be identified, make clear that we will oppose any broadening of the CAP without compensating reductions in its protective levels or any extension to other products, and would expect compensation for any increase in the protective effect of non-tariff barriers where this is not the inevitable result of the formation of a customs union.

5. Make clear that the EC member states should not finalize their governmental positions on exchange rates or international monetary issues until there has been an opportunity for full consultation in wider forms such as the IMF and the Group of Ten.

We believe that only the first two options are consistent with the above strategy.

Policy choices are also posed by the arrangements which may be worked out between the Community and the EFTA neutrals. Because of the complexity of the issues involved and the fact that neither the Community nor the EFTA neutrals have developed a clear idea of the relationship to be worked out, we recommend a low profile and a response to queries which (a) stresses our interest in the continuing political development of the Community, and (b) indicates that we will judge any arrangement with the neutrals in the light of its GATT compatibility and its effects on U.S. trade interest. Once the issues have been brought into sufficiently sharp focus and negotiations seem imminent we would adopt the same policy for protecting our interest as in the case of accession of new members.

In Part VI of the paper—responsive to NSSM 91—we discuss EC preferential arrangements with Spain, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, the Yaounde Convention Countries, East Africa, and others. Here the prob-

lem is to choose among a number of courses of action we might follow in the GATT. These range from leaving the GATT status in abeyance to insisting that the agreements be made compatible with the GATT either by subsuming them in the generalized preference scheme for all developing countries, or by converting them into interim arrangements for full customs union or free trade areas. The problem is complicated by the possibilities of applying different options to arrangements with different countries or groups of countries and to choices for how we could defend U.S. trade interests no matter which GATT options are chosen. These possibilities are spelled out in the following sections of this paper.

[Omitted here are the body of the 40-page paper and annexes.]

38. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 13, 1970, 2:50–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Enlargement of the EEC (NSSMs 79 and 91)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Nathaniel Samuels

William I. Cargo

Miriam Camps

Margaret Joy Tibbetts

Donald McHenry

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

Wynne James

CIA

E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr.

JCS

Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Henry Loomis

Treasury

John R. Petty

Commerce

Lawrence A. Fox

Agriculture

Howard Worthington

Labor

Charles D. Stewart

STR

John W. Evans

CEA

Hendrik Houthakker

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. The NSC staff would draft a directive for the President's approval which would:

(a) Call for US stimulation of a European initiative for creation of a US-EEC consultative mechanism;

(b) set up back-stopping machinery in the Under Secretaries Committee for coordination of agency views on the issues to be raised with the EEC;

(c) give substantive guidelines to the Under Secretaries Committee for carrying out its back-stopping activities.

2. The draft directive would be shown to the agencies, and any strong agency disagreement will be stated to the President at the time the directive is submitted for approval.

Mr. Kissinger outlined the objectives of the meeting: (1) to define the issues; (2) to identify our posture choices; (3) to discuss methods of dealing with the problems. He saw the chief issue as how to reconcile the US interest in the political unity of Europe with the economic problems that an expanded European Economic Community would pose for us. He noted the President's statements in Europe and in his Foreign Policy Report² which made support for European unity a national policy. With regard to the applications of additional countries for membership in the EEC, he remarked that we would be "not unfulfilled" without the membership of Norway, Denmark and Ireland, but that we would have a major interest in UK participation. One basis of this interest lay in preventing Germany from becoming dominant in Europe and pulling other European countries into the vortex of its uncertainties. When De Gaulle was in power, Germany was to some extent subordinate to French policy, but this was no longer true. He cited the political chaos in Italy and the return of France to its normal state, and said it was hard to see a stronger Europe without a major UK role. He agreed that an enlarged EEC does not necessarily produce a united Europe but thought it would be a first step. He said the US was prepared to pay some price for a united Europe but the price was not unlimited. He thought the worst that could happen would be greater economic integration and no political movement. He thought the US was willing to pay an economic price but the question was how large and how to reconcile our interests in political unity with the problems that would be created for us by greater economic integration.

Mr. Petty questioned whether looking after our economic interests would frustrate political union.

² See footnote 6, Document 37.

Mr. Kissinger said we could not “look after” our economic interests at the price of wrecking political unity, but that were many things in between the two extremes.

Mr. Houthakker asked to what extent we could influence the negotiations for expansion of the EEC, and did we assume that these negotiations would take place.

Mr. Kissinger replied that we assumed the UK would enter negotiations with the Community.

Mr. Samuels agreed, saying the initial meetings between the UK and EEC were set for July; they would adjourn for the summer and resume in the fall, possibly after the British elections.

Mr. Houthakker asked if we assumed UK–EEC negotiations would be successful.

Mr. Kissinger replied that we did.

Mr. Samuels noted that if the negotiations were not successful we would face an entirely new set of problems.

Mr. Fox said that the President’s statements in Europe and in the Foreign Policy Report had assumed that the US must make economic sacrifices. He said the economic agencies do not believe that the negotiations need be conducted so as to sacrifice our economic interests.

Mr. Kissinger agreed and said the RG had been assembled to discuss how to minimize economic costs.

Mr. Fox commented that the President had prejudiced the US position in this regard by his statements, and that the economic agencies had submitted a dissenting document³ since they thought it necessary to minimize the adverse impact of the President’s Foreign Policy Report in this area.

Mr. Houthakker remarked that, while CEA had not associated itself with the dissenting document submitted by the economic agencies, he agreed with Mr. Fox on the statements in the President’s report. He noted that they had not been cleared by the economic agencies and thought the wording was unfortunate.

Mr. Bergsten commented that the President’s report had not said we favored political unity at any economic cost and that this was an erroneous interpretation.

Mr. Evans said that while STR had not accepted the State paper,⁴ they had chosen to state their position separately⁵ from the dissenting document of the other economic agencies. He thought it was possible to

³ See footnote 4, Document 37.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 37.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 37.

accomplish our objectives within the framework of the President's statements. He thought we could not avoid some costs but that there was a wide range of such costs and of ways in which enlargement of the EEC could be carried out. He thought some things could damage us more than others and we should decide things we could tolerate.

Mr. Kissinger commented that no one intended that we would pay *any* economic price, although he noted that many European economists were scoring debating points on the basis of the President's report. He believed any EEC enlargement would involve some economic cost for the US and that we were willing to pay *some* but that we were here to examine what those should be. He asked what the agencies thought the economic costs would be.

Mr. Samuels argued that there would not necessarily be a net economic cost. He thought the creation of an economic entity in Europe and the resulting economic dynamism would be to our benefit in terms of exports, investments, etc. He thought the net gain or net loss to the US would come from the future policies of an enlarged EEC. We should consider what we should do, in both positive and negative ways, to prevent or minimize the costs to the US of Common Market policies.

Mr. Evans agreed, saying he would not necessarily predict a long term net cost to the US. He thought some costs were inevitable and some were not and we should move to prevent those that were not.

Mr. Samuels agreed.

Mr. Petty thought it was not practical to try to "price" the costs. He agreed that it did not necessarily involve long-term cost and that the variables would be the issues that would arise in the negotiation. The cost would depend on how we conduct our affairs. He had faith in our ability to look out for our economic interests without hurting our political interests.

Mr. Fox had less faith. He said the State paper was written only in terms of agricultural problems and concluded that there was no problem in the industrial sector. He thought this conclusion was not supported either by the paper or by Foreign Service reporting. He said the paper had taken the static price effect of the elimination of tariffs in the EEC which was relevant only if tariffs were the dominant factor. He thought the real problem, however, lay in the dynamic factor. He saw a large group of countries unwilling to cooperate with us and using the specter of a takeover by giant US companies to unify Europe. That course had not been resisted by the US except for the statement⁶ by Bob Schaezel in Bonn. He thought the statement in the President's Foreign Policy Report required interpretation or at least clarification of its

⁶ Not found.

meaning. He cited, on the one hand, attempts to portray the US as the bogeyman and, on the other, statements in the Congress and by farm and industrial leaders. He thought European leaders were exaggerating the protectionist aspects of US statements but that page 32 of the President's Foreign Policy Report had given them carte blanche to proceed as they wished. He thought the US should use clarification of the President's report as a device to intervene in the UK–EEC negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger commented that it was hard to keep the US from being the bogeyman.

Mrs. Camps said we could not tell in advance what the costs of enlargement might be since the major problems would arise from the policies pursued by the EEC.

Mr. Worthington replied that Agriculture knows what would happen. He said we have been hurt and will be hurt more if the EEC is expanded, particularly in grain, soy beans and tobacco.

Mr. Samuels asked what our course should be if US intervention should jeopardize the enlargement negotiations.

Mr. Worthington replied that he did not think US intervention would wreck the negotiations.

Mr. Samuels asked how far we should go. Could we say we should do nothing to jeopardize the success of the negotiations?

Mr. Evans thought we should agree on the level of economic costs that would require us to take another look at our position. He did not think the position in either dissenting document (that of the economic agencies or the STR document) would jeopardize the negotiations. He thought, however, there was freedom to maneuver in that area short of jeopardizing the negotiations.

Mr. Petty said that the Congress and the public believe there is a point beyond which we should not go. He thought the degree to which we are hurt depends on how we conduct ourselves.

Mr. Nutter said he could not identify any serious costs from the Defense point of view. He thought we might lose a few sales of airplanes, but the broadening of the EEC would not present Defense with serious problems.

Mr. Houthakker thought that the accession of the UK would actually change the nature and the structure of the European Community and, to the extent that this provides an opening wedge, we should not miss the opportunity to get changes in EEC policies. He thought we could make our concerns known without jeopardizing the success of negotiations, stressing agricultural and monetary policies and others where our interests were most at stake.

Mr. Samuels thought this was a question of degree. We had made clear to the EEC that we are concerned about their common agricultural

policy and would like to see it develop downward in an evolutionary way. He said we had and would continue to press against any kinds of discrimination against the US and thought the question was how best to do this—by official US intervention in the expansion negotiations or in the normal context of diplomatic discussions. He thought we should avoid formal intervention in the negotiation on specific matters which might interfere with what the Europeans want to do in organizing their own community. If the negotiations failed, the US should not have caused their failure.

Mr. Kissinger said that no one intended the President's Report to mean that we could not defend US economic interests. He thought the issue was whether we intervened in the negotiations while they are going on or whether we make our views known, say that we will insist on our rights, and then negotiate with the new entity once it has been created. He asked if that was a fair statement of the issues.

Mr. Samuels and Mr. Fox agreed.

Mr. Evans thought the position was prejudiced by the phrase "intervene in the negotiations." He thought State's presentation of the STR position was a straw man and that they are not proposing a change in our policy of favoring European unity; indeed, STR wanted a policy which would make it possible for us to continue to favor European unity. He thought we could not continue to do so if the Congress and the public became aroused by European economic discrimination against the US. He thought the chances were extremely slim of influencing EEC policies after the entity had been created. He did not believe the UK would be a liberalizing influence in the EEC. He agreed our GATT rights should be defended but said that was an extremely weak reed and should not be stressed. GATT rights would not help in some areas, e.g., a Buy European policy, or certain financial problems. Even if GATT rights were adequate to protect our interests later, the EEC has a very flexible interpretation of GATT rights, and EEC and US views on these rights differ. He cited Article 24 which grants an exception to MFN in the case of a customs union or free trade area in which barriers are removed on substantially all trade among the members. He noted that in dealing with Africa, the EEC had established 18 separate FTAs, each consisting of six European countries and one African country, in order to take advantage of Article 24.

He thought we should make our positions known to the EEC as early as possible: e.g., that we would never agree to the extension of CAP at its present level or in its present form. He thought we should keep ourselves informed of the course of the negotiations and should exert our influence at the appropriate time. He would go further than State with regard to machinery and would propose a consultative mechanism between the US and the EEC. He thought some degree of

formality would help convince the Europeans we are serious and would improve the chances of our being kept informed. He thought these moves or the lack of them would affect the US ability to continue to maintain support for European unity.

Mr. Samuels agreed that we should make our position clear to the Community as we go along. He asked, if we do not rely on our GATT rights, what should we rely on?

Mr. Fox thought there would be major difficulties in trying to rely on trade negotiations after the EEC expansion negotiations had been concluded.

Mr. Samuels agreed that a consultative mechanism might be desirable but felt that the US should not take the initiative. He said that Brandt floated the suggestion and that we had told him we saw advantages in the idea and had encouraged him to proceed. He noted, however, that the French were concerned that it might become another mechanism for Anglo-Saxon influence in Europe.

Mr. Evans saw some advantage to a US initiative in this regard.

Mr. Petty thought that at least we had an opportunity to respond to the German initiative.

Mr. Samuels replied that we had responded but that we do not necessarily want a formal structure.

Mrs. Camps noted that Brandt could not speak for the Six and would have to get an agreed EEC position.

Mr. Worthington said we have told the Europeans repeatedly what we want in agriculture and they have done nothing. He said our GATT rights have not helped and that we should involve ourselves at the beginning of the enlargement negotiations, making ourselves clear on the specific issues of grain prices and soy beans.

Mr. Kissinger thought the difference in how to defend our rights was a question of nuance. State would rely on the normal diplomatic process and on subsequent formal negotiations with an enlarged EEC. STR preferred a somewhat more active process during the enlargement negotiations.

Mr. Evans saw both a difference in timing and a difference in what we say. He would rather say nothing than say we rely on our GATT rights.

Mr. Samuels thought this, too, was a matter of nuance.

Mr. Evans thought we should not even mention our GATT rights but should stress that we have major interests and should indicate our various forms of leverage early in the game.

Mr. Samuels said we have made all the points that were now being raised in discussions with the EEC.

Mr. Evans said we had been talking about things that have already been done but he thought we should tell them in advance some of our requirements.

Mr. Fox said we had, over the years, thrown away our GATT rights on a variable levy system. He thought any negotiations would be approximately balanced in that we would have to put something in if we take something out. In this case, we would be trying to redress something that had already been done. He thought we should decide on our minimal objectives and communicate them to the EEC at the beginning of the enlargement negotiations and at the same time as a consultative mechanism is discussed. He thought the worst thing we could do would be to let them conclude their negotiations and then say we would negotiate on substance in GATT.

Mr. Samuels said we would continue to make our views known in an attempt to influence the enlargement negotiations. After enlargement, we would plan to move toward a major trade initiative. Simple groupings are not the end-all of our policy and we would continue to press for trade liberalization.

Mr. Fox commented that if we take a supine policy with regard to enlargement, Congress would never agree to broader trade negotiations.

Mr. Samuels thought attempts to push the EEC might be contrary to our objectives.

Mr. Fox said State assumes that the formation of a larger grouping will not in itself prejudice our objectives. Commerce thinks it will. He said the State paper might have been acceptable if it had recognized the negative factors and had concluded we should take a chance, but it had tried to write down the difficulties.

Mr. Kissinger said he was trying to think of the issues in terms of the decision the President can make. He thought anything less than a fairly specific decision would shift the debate to an exegesis of what the President meant by "US interests," "aggressive policy", etc. With regard to the differences in mechanics—an ad hoc arrangement or formal consultative machinery—he thought the existence of consultative machinery would also make it easier to raise problems of concern to the Community.

Mr. Samuels said there was no disagreement on the principle of consultative machinery but the difference lay in the degree of formality.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we are sure the Europeans want consultative machinery.

(Mr. Kissinger left the meeting.)

Mr. Samuels said that, if consultative machinery existed, its use would not necessarily be confined to intervention in the enlargement negotiations. He thought it would be desirable to have a forum in which to air views, apart from the negotiations question. He said we had told Brandt this.

Mr. Evans asked if we know what Brandt had in mind. Was he thinking of a body which would meet continuously and to which EEC members would have an obligation, or of a loose grouping that might meet only once or twice a year?

Mr. Samuels said we did not know specifically what Brandt had in mind. He made a general suggestion and we had told him we would welcome some machinery. We thought Brandt had favored rather an ad hoc arrangement, at least in the initial stages. If we insisted on a formal mechanism we might well destroy US interests in the light of possible strong European feelings. He saw other questions, e.g., would we want to engage in a bilateral US–EEC relationship or work within the broader OECD framework. He said State was in full agreement on the desirability of consultative machinery. We should consider how far and how formally we should go.

Mr. Nutter cited our arrangements through the North Atlantic Council for consulting with our allies on the SALT talks. He said we now want the inverse of this arrangement and we would not be asking for more than we have given generously in other areas.

Mr. Samuels remarked that Brandt was planning to discuss the matter with Pompidou.

Mrs. Camps added that the French did not like the idea and that the six countries must first sort this out among themselves.

Mr. Evans noted that we want consultation with all participants, and that if the EEC turns us down because the French do not agree, we should try to set up some consultation with the individual countries involved.

Mr. Samuels noted the rivalry between the Council of Ministers and the Commission in Brussels, saying that the Council would prefer US bilateral arrangements because of its jealousy of the Commission.

Mr. Petty reiterated that we must make our efforts credible to the Congress.

(Mr. Kissinger returned)

Mr. Samuels said the question was should we go back to the Europeans and encourage creation of consultative machinery or should we wait for them to come back to us on it.

Mr. Kissinger saw something in between—that we let both Brandt and Pompidou know that we would like it and encourage someone to surface it.

Mr. Petty remarked the Dutch would be glad to surface the idea.

Mr. Kissinger noted that Bahr had made the point to us during his talks here but that we had not done much about it.

Mr. Samuels reiterated his point that consultative machinery was not necessarily related to our intervention in EEC enlargement.

Mr. Kissinger asked, if we should decide to encourage creation of consultative machinery, how would we coordinate US activity in order to surface issues of concern to us in the machinery.

Mr. Fox said we should first get an idea of what our objectives were for the use of the machinery. He said he would like to solve our problems by the end of the negotiations for enlargement of the EEC.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could be specific on individual items.

Mr. Worthington said he had a list of agricultural items.

Mr. Evans said it was hard to be specific on items other than the agricultural ones.

Mrs. Camps noted that Brandt had suggested an on-going mechanism between the US and the EEC in which to raise matters of concern, but this would, of course, be a two-way street. The EEC countries would expect to raise their problems, and would back off from consultative machinery if they thought the US would use it primarily to intervene in the enlargement negotiations.

Mr. Samuels noted that if the mechanism would be used by US primarily as a means of intervention, we might well achieve the opposite result to that we desired. If it is used in the over-all context of US-EEC relations, it would be constructive.

Mr. Fox noted that, in fact, the two choices were not those stated in the State paper, which he characterized as "frenetic intervention" or "catatonic withdrawal."

Mr. Evans agreed the mechanism would be a two-way street, and thought we should make sure they understand that one of its purposes would be for them to keep us informed of major developments in the enlargement negotiations which might affect our interests.

Mr. Petty thought the issue of substantial trade negotiations was unrelated to expansion of the EEC, and asked if we should not use this consultative machinery to gear up for later trade negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger thought Mr. Nutter's suggestion of a parallel with the SALT negotiations was particularly apt. He said in this exercise we had gone through the various arguments here and, when we were agreed, had put them before our European allies. We had posed three or four choices, given them the reasons for our decision, and given them a chance to object. In the present case, he assumed that the various agencies would find a way of surfacing their concerns whether we have machinery or not. He did think we needed an intragovernmental

group to decide what issues should be brought into the consultative mechanism. He suggested we might give a watching brief to the Under Secretaries Committee, giving it the responsibility for watching the progress of the negotiations. This would give each agency a forum in which to raise the issues of concern to it, and he thought some 80 per cent of the disagreements might be resolved in the Under Secretaries Committee.

Mr. Samuels agreed with this approach.

Mr. Fox agreed, but only if we could be specific about our objectives and could agree to resolve problems before conclusion of the enlargement negotiations and not store up these problems for future negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger asked what are the nature of our problems; are they matters of policy?

Mr. Samuels reiterated our intention to influence the course of the negotiations as they proceed.

Mr. Fox thought we should have some time frame for achievement of our objectives.

Mr. Kissinger asked if Agriculture had had a formal mechanism for considering agricultural problems.

Mr. Fox remarked that the question in the agricultural area was whether or not to permit a variable levy system. He thought before we undertook any consultation we must decide what are the major issues.

Mr. Kissinger said we can, of course, create a mechanism for raising the issues. However, if the President wishes to delay an expression of our views, he will delay. He said we could try to get a general expression from the President now on which way he would probably wish to proceed, but that he had found that it was usually difficult to get an expression of the President's wishes in the abstract.

Mr. Samuels asked why we need to set out the topics in advance if we have a watching brief.

Mr. Evans agreed with Mr. Fox that we need a definition of our major objectives.

Mr. Worthington said Agriculture did not want to *watch*; they want to step in now on the grain price question.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that we do three things:

(1) stimulate an initiative from the Europeans for some sort of consultative machinery;

(2) set up some backstopping machinery in the Under Secretaries Committee in which each agency can raise the issues they think proper for consultation; if there is disagreement on which issues should be raised, the question would go to the President;

(3) although we probably cannot get a formal expression of the President's attitude, we could try to get him to indicate some guidelines for these discussions.

Mr. Evans asked what happened to the various papers which had been prepared. Do we need a new paper?

Mr. Fox said no, he thought the decision was close to that in Option 3.⁷

Mr. Samuels said we should leave it to Dr. Kissinger to draft a directive.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that we would draft a directive and would let each agency have a look at it, although we could not guarantee them the right to edit. If there are strong disagreements, he would state these disagreements to the President.

Mr. Evans commented that he hoped the directive would reflect a position close to Option 3.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we had to take a position on the neutral countries now.

Mr. Evans thought we should treat the neutrals like the four applying countries and apply the same option. He thought the preferential questions were a little more difficult. He noted a defect in the STR paper which had suggested that we recognize Spain and Israel as less developed countries. He said this suggestion was not intentional, since this would put us under an obligation to extend preferential treatment to Spain and Israel. He thought the category in which these two countries would be placed needs to be settled before we can decide what option they would come under.

Mr. Kissinger noted that Spain had been before us once before and that, for a while, the President had leaned toward subsuming our economic interests to our political interests; however, he had deferred decision pending an over-all examination of EEC issues.

Mr. Samuels noted preferential arrangements have complex political and economic interrelationships and they should be taken up in the backstopping group. He thought it would be hard to determine our policy in advance.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it would be acceptable to throw the preferential issues into the backstopping group.

Mr. Fox thought the Under Secretaries Committee should be instructed to guard US economic interests and that it should be made clear that this applies as well to neutrals and to preferential arrangements. He agreed with Mr. Evans on Spain and Israel.

⁷ The options are set forth in the enclosure to Document 37.

Mr. Samuels commented that the directive to the Under Secretaries Committee must spell out the protection of economic interests but must also take into account political interests.

The economic representatives expressed somewhat caustically their faith in the ability of the Under Secretaries Committee to protect US political interests.

Mr. Evans thought a key consideration was to operate in such a way to maintain or enhance our ability to maintain the MFN system.

39. Minutes of National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:35–3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward the Mediterranean Area (NSSM 90)²

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	<i>OEP</i>
<i>State</i>	Haakon Lindjord
William I. Cargo	<i>USIA</i>
Donald McHenry	Frank Shakespeare
Thomas Thornton	<i>NSC Staff</i>
<i>Defense</i>	Harold H. Saunders
Richard A. Ware	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Robert Pranger	Richard Kennedy
<i>CIA</i>	Jeanne W. Davis
R. Jack Smith	
<i>JCS</i>	
MG Albert J. Bowley	

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Document 31.

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. The Joint Staff would prepare an analysis of the nature of the Soviet threat and our comparative capabilities³ in time for the NSC meeting on the Middle East tentatively scheduled for June 3;

2. the Working Group would revise the Cargo paper⁴ along the lines of the restatement of the approaches done by the NSC staff;⁵

3. the response to NSSM 88 on Italy⁶ would be reviewed and a paper on Greece would be prepared as the basis for a brief discussion of the two countries at an NSC meeting on the Mediterranean.⁷

Mr. Kissinger referred to the comprehensive paper for the meeting and mentioned two problems: (1) how to discuss the substance of the paper and (2) how we could meet the President's desire to talk about Greece and Italy in an NSC meeting on the Mediterranean. With regard to the paper, he asked if it made any sense to talk about the Mediterranean as an area or if it would be better to break it up into component parts.

Mr. Cargo said that geographic influences do exist but that political issues can probably be broken out into separate areas with one exception—that of the US strategic position and force levels. He referred to an INR study⁸ which had concluded that the features of disunity and the lack of commonality in the area were more distinctive than the unifying features. He thought, however, there was some educational and orientational value in looking at the Mediterranean as a whole.

Mr. Kissinger said there appeared to be a number of related but separable issues: e.g., Italy was not particularly influenced by Arab-Israeli developments except insofar as Italy might feel isolated by increasing Soviet influence in the area.

Mr. Ware commented that the question of the Soviet military and political role in the Mediterranean is a unifying factor.

³ This was completed June 12, in time for the June 17 NSC meeting. It is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-170, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 90.

⁴ Document 33.

⁵ Not further identified. Portions of the revised response to NSSM 90, June 12, are published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E-5, part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document 11. A June 12 analytical summary of the response is *ibid.*, volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 24.

⁶ NSSM 88 is Document 30. The final version of the response to NSSM 88 is Document 195.

⁷ See Document 43.

⁸ Not found.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that the Soviet strategic role should be discussed.

Mr. Cargo commented that the area appeared more separable than not. He noted the Arab-Israeli question was being considered in a separate group; Greece was being discussed by the Under Secretaries Committee; Italy and North Africa⁹ were the subjects of separate NSSMs.

Mr. Kissinger suggested we consider this paper as a general introduction to a specific examination of issues as was done in the case of Latin America. We might first take a general conceptual approach which would be followed by a more politically oriented approach.

Mr. Lindjord commented that we might make the case that the Mediterranean had not had any strategic unity since 1945 when British influence was removed.

General Bowley said it was necessary to establish an overall policy for the Mediterranean before one can study the specific issues. He argued that the Joint Staff had not had an opportunity to insert their views into the Cargo paper.

Mr. Cargo replied there had been as much exchange as possible with Defense and JCS within the brief time allowed for the production of the paper.

Mr. Ware said that Defense had not seen the issues and options chapter before the paper came to the NSC staff and that they had serious problems with the paper. He believed that if this paper were to become an introduction for consideration of specific problems, it would be necessary to take a second look at its basic concepts. He added that the paper recently produced by the NATO group also raised serious issues.

Mr. Shakespeare asked the nature of the fundamental disagreement between Defense and State.

Mr. Ware replied it related to the reason for the decline of the US role in the Mediterranean. Was it based on the success of our policy, as the Cargo paper implied, or have we reversed our policy of working with at least the moderate Arab states? He thought we should pay more attention to the political/military aspects of the area, and that the USSR was very successful in weaving together its political and military roles. He considered that the problem of the Soviet threat and of force structures had not been covered adequately in the Cargo paper. He agreed that the JCS had not had a chance to make their views known in the short time period allotted.

⁹ NSSM 87, published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–5, part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Document 5.

Mr. Kissinger said he saw no sense in discussing the Arab-Israeli question in this group since it was already under consideration in another group and would then move to the NSC.

Mr. Pranger referred to the NATO paper, saying that the issue of the Soviet threat was being discussed in the North Atlantic Council if not in Washington.

Mr. Cargo agreed there was no reason to go into the Arab-Israeli question in this group. With regard to force levels, he agreed that the paper did not discuss them in any detail. He referred, however, to the section on the long-range US role in the area (page 64) and the three options discussed, with their implications of different force levels. With regard to strategic comparability in the area, he believed there was a fairly thorough-going statement of Soviet and US objectives (page 11, page 16 and following).

Mr. Shakespeare asked if the JCS had not participated in the drafting of the paper.

General Bowley said JCS had been a member of the Working Group but had merely read the paper, did not like it, but had no opportunity to change it. He recommended, therefore, that the paper not go forward, and distributed a specific recommendation for a new study to "look at the Mediterranean properly."¹⁰

Mr. Kissinger, referring to the JCS recommendation, asked if they were suggesting that the present paper took an "undisciplined and unsystematic approach" to the paper.

General Bowley said yes—that the JCS had found the paper generalized and unspecific. He thought we would have to get into the various regions in order to be specific. The paper lacked a comparative analysis of our interests with those of others. It contained no range of threats with matching strategies and did not adequately discuss the increasing Soviet threat in relation to the decreasing US capability. The paper contained four issues: (1) what is the threat; (2) should the Europeans do more; (3) the relation of the Arab states; (4) the relation of the North African states. He thought the last three questions could not be answered without an answer to the first question, and an answer to the first question would automatically provide answers to the other three. He thought the paper did not meet the requirements of the NSSM and that we needed a new start.

Mr. Cargo did not agree with General Bowley. The paper raised the essential questions, and the Soviet interest and threat was the central issue. He thought the JCS suggestions were additive and would

¹⁰ Not found.

provide more detail but he did not consider them essentially a substitute for the existing paper.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could not add the military analysis and a comparative analysis to the section in the existing paper on the Soviet threat. He asked if we had not done a study of the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean in an earlier WSAG exercise.

Mr. Saunders agreed that such a study had been done but was not as thorough as that now envisaged by the JCS.

Mr. Cargo agreed that we should have an analysis of the Soviet threat but commented that he was reluctant to lose the broader context of the existing paper.

Mr. Kissinger agreed with JCS that, whatever stance we take, we need a clearer idea of what we are taking a stance toward. He asked if we could not try to incorporate a military and strategic analysis of the nature of the threat and our comparative capabilities.

Mr. Pranger questioned the tone of the paper, saying that it implies a fresh approach in viewing the Mediterranean in terms of “the interaction of outside forces on the one hand and subregional problems on the other.” He believed the area had always been viewed in that way and that the existing paper does not add much that is new.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we could distinguish between what is historically true and what has been historically done in the bureaucracy.

Mr. Cargo agreed that we have not looked at the Mediterranean as a whole.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if the JCS wished to analyze various likely Soviet objectives and interests.

General Bowley replied that they wished to examine the nature of the threat in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Kissinger commented that we could agree on the threat without agreeing on what to do about it. He thought we could have an analysis of the threat. However, deciding whether to confront the Soviet Union, let national forces play it out, or a combination of the two—is a political judgment. We need the analysis first. He noted that heretofore he had considered the Mediterranean as an American logistics area, but that he had learned in a WSAG exercise that we probably could not physically move our forces today as we had at the time of the Lebanon exercise.

Mr. Ware said we should not look at the threat as only a military one since the Soviets had integrated the military, political and economic aspects quite well.

General Bowley thought we must make some assumptions as to what the Soviets will do and then consider our options in terms of these various assumptions.

Mr. Shakespeare reminded Mr. Kissinger of the comment by Admiral Moorer at an earlier meeting that next year's budget would involve substantial reductions in US forces in the Mediterranean and that Mr. Kissinger had thought that unacceptable.

Mr. Kissinger asked what sort of comparative projection we would need.

Mr. Ware asked about the timing of the exercise.

Mr. Kissinger replied that the Arab-Israeli situation would probably be discussed in the NSC in about two weeks. He thought the threat portion of the Mediterranean paper should be ready by then. He thought we had a little more time on the rest of the paper but noted that the President was anxious to discuss Greece and Italy. Since the Italian elections were so close, he suggested we might delay this NSC discussion until after those elections.

Mr. Ware said the Working Group had not been able to function because of the deadlines imposed and suggested that we let the Working Group revise the basic paper.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, except for the threat study which would be useful for the NSC discussion of the Middle East.

Mr. Saunders agreed that the threat study would be useful background and asked how elaborate it would be. He assumed that work had already been done on the Soviet threat in the area and that someone could collect existing material and summarize it in usable form.

General Bowley said the study could be completed in two weeks.

Mr. Smith asked how we could separate the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean from the Arab-Israeli problem. He thought it would be extremely difficult to define except in those terms.

Mr. Kissinger asked if he meant that you could not separate the SA-3's and Soviet aircraft in Egypt from the Soviet threat in a larger area. He asked what would be the effect if Soviet aircraft in Egypt were used against the Sixth Fleet.

Mr. Saunders said there were two questions: the Soviet naval threat and what would a Soviet air system operated out of Egypt do.

General Bowley commented that it was larger than this, noting possible extension to Wheelus. He said we were watching Soviet influence build and should ask where it is leading.

Mr. Kissinger asked why it would be so difficult to estimate the importance of Soviet air bases on US Mediterranean operations.

Mr. Ware referred to the implications in a Soviet use of Malta.

Mr. Smith explained that he meant a study of the threat must *include* Egypt.

Mr. Cargo saw no problem in expanding this discussion. He noted, however, that the existing paper was interlarded with references to Soviet power in the Mediterranean, citing pages 20 and 23.

Mr. Shakespeare agreed, however, that the paper does not lay out clear estimates of probable Soviet moves and how we should be prepared to meet them.

Mr. Smith agreed. He noted, however, that just as we have difficulty in treating the Mediterranean as an area, the Soviets have also found it difficult. He referred in this connection to their Syrian fiasco. He repeated that we would find it hard to agree on the nature of the threat.

Mr. Cargo cited the estimate of Soviet objectives in the area (page 24) which concluded that the Soviet threat to the littoral states is now mainly psychological and political. However, the security of Europe would be seriously threatened if the North African coast and the Mediterranean Sea should come under hostile domination.

Mr. Kissinger remarked that one of the JCS concerns had been with hardware, but that the extent of Soviet political influence was more difficult to measure. He said the paper raised the issue of whether we should deal with the area in terms of a US-Soviet confrontation or to what extent we should rely on regional forces. He asked if this was a real issue—must it be one or the other? Does anyone want a straight military confrontation with the USSR? Does anyone think a military confrontation plays no role? He thought the issue must be a mixture and was, in fact, a question of emphasis. He wondered if it was possible to decide in the abstract where the emphasis should be placed at any given moment in any given situation. He asked to what extent the countries concerned have an interest in reducing Soviet influence in the area.

Mr. Cargo agreed the sense of nationalism is a positive element insofar as the US is concerned, but that it was one factor and must be related to other factors.

Mr. Kissinger commented that, by putting it in the “either/or” context, it was not a live option. He thought an attempt to expel the Soviets by military power alone was simply not in the cards and that there must be a political component. He wondered if we would be more likely to reduce Soviet influence by relying on national forces or by creating a balance of power so that those who want to resist the Soviets will know that they have a friend.

General Bowley agreed this was very important, particularly with regard to Turkey and Greece.

Mr. Cargo said they had tried to get at this question in discussion of the long-range US role in the area. He referred to the options (pages

66–68), saying that Option A was weighted on the military side; Option B saw a shifting of the balance to the Europeans without severing our ties; and C envisaged retrenchment.

Mr. Ware cited the US withdrawal of 1600 troops from Leghorn, ostensibly for budgetary reasons. He said the Italians simply did not believe that a nation such as the US would withdraw 1600 troops for budgetary reasons alone. They assumed other reasons. Then, when they saw the Soviets moving more and more ships into the Mediterranean they would feel they had to decide which way to turn. This would have an impact on the US posture.

Mr. Shakespeare suggested that the novelty of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean has focused attention on Soviet power as opposed to the acceptance of the established Western presence in the Mediterranean. He thought any unexpected development now, such as the downfall of Hussein in Jordan or a strong leftist election victory in Italy, could have serious psychological effects. It would add to the momentum, would make people in the area exceedingly nervous, and would affect our ability to maneuver.

Mr. Smith did not agree, saying that US standing in the Arab world was now so low because of the Arab-Israeli situation that other things would not have much impact. Nor did he think Italy would be too unhappy or concerned, since they felt tied to NATO and would see it as a NATO problem.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if Hussein fell and a radical regime took over in Jordan, would not the unsettling effect in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc., be more severe than it would have been two or three years ago?

Mr. Smith replied the effect would be different in different countries. He thought they would not be startled by the fall of Hussein which they had anticipated for some time and would not attribute it to US weakness or to Soviet strength.

Mr. Shakespeare asked, if the Italian elections went strongly left, would not Turkey feel increasingly isolated and react more tentatively to the US and move closer to the Soviets? Would there not be a serious psychological reaction?

Mr. Smith replied no, that Italy was too tied up in its own internal problems.

Mr. Shakespeare disagreed.

Mr. Smith replied that the area was simply not that homogeneous and that each region would be affected separately. He thought the Arab countries might all be affected in the same direction but this was not necessarily true in Turkey and Italy.

Mr. Cargo asked if Mediterranean force levels would not be included in the European force level study.

General Bowley said they would.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Arab-Israeli study includes only local balance.

Mr. Saunders replied it included the implication of the Soviet threat on the local balance.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could draw up certain general approaches and apply them to independent regions. We could use this paper to draw together the elements that are constant, then apply them to different areas and see how they fit. He said he had been impressed by conversations with the Italians in which they seemed very concerned about the Mediterranean.

Mr. Smith explained that he had meant that Italy was not enamored of the Mediterranean concept per se, but thought their salvation lay in NATO. They favored enhancing a NATO capability in the Mediterranean as a counter to Soviet power.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the discussion of the long-range US role in the Mediterranean and a possible division between the US and the Europeans. We can say we should not take a forward role, but this might have different meanings in different areas. We might look to the French in the Maghreb, but in the Arab-Israeli dispute no other European country was able or willing to play a role comparable to that of the US. We could use this paper to state general propositions and outline a basic stance. He commended Mr. Cargo on an “amazing performance” in producing the paper, given the nature of the assignment and the time allowed in which to complete it.

Mr. Cargo commented that the basic difficulty in producing the paper lay in the fact that the common elements in the area are not all that many.

Mr. Kissinger said that we should look at the balance of US and European interests. With regard to the long-range US role in the Mediterranean, no one would consider increasing our military posture, as such, as a solution. It would be consistent with the Nixon doctrine¹¹ that wherever possible we should rely on national forces. They may not be enough in some parts of the Mediterranean and we may have to

¹¹ On July 25, 1969, Nixon met with reporters in Guam. Speaking of U.S. involvement in Asia, he said “that as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.” This policy became known as the Nixon Doctrine. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume I, *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, Document 29.

reach conscious decisions to go in or go out. We could state the general propositions and try to relate them to specifics. He referred to the restatement of the Cargo options done by the NSC staff (pages 7–8 of HAK's talking points) which were not mutually exclusive. He thought we might go through a period of containment to reach equilibrium. He thought this restatement of the propositions might provide an approach to a general stance.

General Bowley, Mr. Smith and Mr. Thornton all agreed with Saunders' approach.

Mr. Ware asked if the Working Group could meet on the paper rather than merely comment on a paper circulated for comment.

Mr. Cargo agreed.

Mr. Shakespeare noted French construction of a radio transmitter on Cyprus which would provide a much stronger signal in the Mediterranean than that of the Voice. He saw this as evidence that the French must care a great deal about talking to the Arabs.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we can best handle Italy and Greece. He thought the President's major concern was to get a feel for the impact of the domestic situations in these countries on their foreign policy and the possible impact of the US on their domestic situations.

Mr. Cargo noted that the Greek situation had been discussed in the arms supply context and said he would talk to the Department to see what type of paper might be useful on Greece. With regard to Italy, he noted that they had already prepared a response to NSSM 88.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the Italian paper be reviewed and that a paper on Greece be considered, with a view to a 15 minute discussion in the NSC on these two countries.

Mr. Smith suggested we might throw in Turkey and consider the three countries with relation to NATO.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that this might be helpful but said the President had not asked for this approach. He was primarily concerned about the domestic policies in Greece and Italy, the problems of the Alliance, their future orientation, and the degree to which these could be influenced by the U.S.

40. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Plans for the NATO Meeting

Just prior to his departure for the Rome meeting of NATO Ministers,² the Secretary sent you a memorandum outlining the problems to be dealt with at the meeting and our objectives (Tab A).³

East-West Relations

Several of the Allies, led by the British, want to come out of the meeting with a very forward looking approach to the Soviets on a European Conference and on balanced force reduction proposals. We have tried to combat this drift and we now have support from a majority including the Germans, French and Italians. The Secretary will plan to move cautiously on these questions, giving some ground on the question of proposals for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, in order to hold the line against a strong move toward the Soviet idea of a European Conference.

Allied Defense in the 1970s

In response to your foreign policy report, the Allies with our participation have drawn up a timetable and terms of reference for reviewing the Alliance Defense posture. This will be formally approved in Rome and the review will begin in late June. We are aiming for a report by December.

Committee on Challenges of a Modern Society

The Rome meeting will take note of the remarkable progress of this committee since it was established last year at your suggestion.

The Greek Issue

The Scandinavians may criticize the Greek government at the Rome meeting, which would probably cause the Greek Minister to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 259, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the first page is the stamped notation: "The President has seen."

² The final communiqué of the May 26–27 meeting is printed in *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974*, pp. 233–238.

³ Tab A, May 21, is attached but not printed.

walk out. We are still trying to divert this into bilateral channels, or have it ruled out of order. But it could turn into a nasty scene.

Madrid Visit

Following the meeting the Secretary will see General Franco. He had hoped to be able to initial an executive agreement on the Spanish base issue, but negotiations are still underway, and the Secretary feels that we may have to submit any agreement to the Senate in light of Congressional problems and reactions to Southeast Asia.

Lisbon Visit

The Secretary also stops in Lisbon where he will indicate our understanding of the situation in Portugal's African territories, and will smooth the way for eventual negotiations on US bases in the Azores.

The Secretary's memorandum does not call for any action, and is for your information. He may be in for a difficult passage in light of the dispute over the "signal" to the Soviets, and the Greek issue. I will keep you informed as these issues develop in the meeting beginning Tuesday.

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 12, 1970, 1730Z.

6764. Subject: Secretary Laird's Talk With FRG Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt.

1. Secretary Laird, accompanied by Ambassador Rush called on FRG DefMin Schmidt on June 12. Schmidt said the US-FRG military offset agreement could not be continued in its present form after the existing agreement expires. Military procurement will not provide much possibility in the future for fulfilling the offset requirement since the Germans have all the basic military equipment they need. Schmidt therefore had proposed to the European Defense Ministers a new type of multilateral contribution from European NATO countries to assist the US in meeting its defense burdens in Europe. Schmidt did not de-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Confidential. Repeated to the Missions to NATO and Berlin, USAREUR, USAFE, USEUCOM, and Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Ottawa, Reykjavik, and Rome.

fine further what he had in mind, other than to say that it would be a fund to meet certain “infrastructure” costs of US forces in Europe (presumably by “infrastructure” Schmidt means operating costs). Schmidt said only the Greeks and Turks had demurred: the others seemed favorably disposed. The Greeks and Turks had wondered whether such a proposal would really appeal to the US and whether there would be concern about “European bloc” developing in NATO. Schmidt said that the other European Defense Ministers did not share these concerns, although he himself wondered how the Canadians would react to the idea. Schmidt hoped to get something concrete developed as soon as possible. He added that any German Government payment into the multilateral burden-sharing would have to come out of his own defense budget and that it would not apply until 1971. Secretary Laird and Ambassador Rush both welcomed Schmidt’s initiative in this matter.

2. Schmidt made a strong plea for maintaining a substantial US troop presence in Europe. He predicted that, if the US cuts its troop level, Germany and other European countries would inevitably begin to accommodate with the East. Schmidt added that, if anything is cut, it should be the long logistics tail. Secretary Laird indicated that he was fully conscious of the seriousness of the US troop presence problem.

3. On the military draft, Schmidt said that new legislation would be introduced by Easter 1971. It would reduce the length of Bundeswehr service from 18 to 15 months, although it would also have the desirable effect of drafting 80 percent of German youth instead of the present 60 percent. Unless he did this, Schmidt said, the draft would be eliminated entirely within a few years because discontent in the Bundestag over the draft is great and increasing. Schmidt said he was, in effect, saving the draft by this measure. Schmidt referred to draft reform proposals in the US, with discussion about a draftless professional army. Schmidt hoped that this kind of discussion could be muted as much as possible because it made it more difficult for the European governments to continue their efforts to preserve the draft system.

4. One specific subject also came up. German Air Force Chief General Steinhoff, who was also present, said that the Luftwaffe wants to create a special force of reserve officers for flying transport aircraft. He requested a briefing on this subject, which Secretary Laird said we would be glad to arrange.

Rush

42. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, June 16, 1970, 4:07–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	ACDA
<i>State</i>	Howard Furnas
William I. Cargo	JCS
Richard Pedersen	Gen. Richard Shaefer
Ronald Spiers	USIA
Martin Hillenbrand	Frank Shakespeare
<i>Defense</i>	<i>Treasury</i>
G. Warren Nutter	Anthony Jurich
Gen. Rex H. Hampton	NSC Staff
Col. James T. Kolb	Larry Lynn
CIA	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
R. Jack Smith	Richard Kennedy
[name not declassified]	Jeanne W. Davis
OEP	John Court
Haakon Lindjord	William Hyland

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was decided that:

1. The basic paper² would be reworked by Mr. Nutter with Dr. Lynn, with a view to providing answers to the questions that had been

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² The draft response to NSSM 84 (Document 25), "U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO (U)," June 5, prepared by an interdepartmental steering group, sought to examine the U.S. and Allied roles in NATO for the long run; evaluate the threats NATO was likely to confront; assess the present military balance in Europe for consideration of current and alternative strategies; and present some alternative force postures and support plans for U.S. forces committed to NATO. The 53-page paper concluded that land forces were the most important element of a conventional deterrence; tactical air forces could be returned quickly to Europe during a crisis though well-stocked bases would have to be maintained; naval forces could return almost as quickly but their withdrawal or return would cause less political concern; a small reduction of about 30,000 troops would cause problems with the Allies if not consulted but would have no appreciable effect on Soviet policy; a large reduction of 100,000 troops would seriously affect U.S. relations with Europe, increase the military risk, and imply to the Soviets an opportunity for increased influence in Western Europe; a more balanced defense posture with the Allies in Europe would have to be worked out over the long-run to improve NATO's posture but reduce the U.S. commitment; and any plan and implementation for reduction should seek a reduced U.S. role by the mid- to late-1970s. (Ibid.)

raised at the meeting and to establish criteria on which to judge the options.

2. Figures would be provided by Defense on the average period we could operate in Europe on supplies in the field.

3. A diplomatic scenario should be developed for consultations on troop withdrawals.

4. The Review Group would meet again to consider the revised paper.

Mr. Kissinger said the President had asked for careful consideration of U.S. strategies and forces for NATO, both for budgetary and for force level decisions. He asked if there were any general comments on the paper, and when he received none, said he wished to raise a number of points.

He noted that the paper started from the premise that the existing policy is the correct one. It examined the number of force cuts and how they should be distributed assuming as little change as possible. It does not, however, address the purpose the strategy is supposed to serve. He noted that the flexible response strategy is supposed to prepare NATO for a 90-day conventional war on the assumption that, by the end of that period, the attacking force would run out of steam, a stalemate would develop, diplomatic efforts would halt the action or we would escalate to nuclear war. The study says NATO forces would be “marginally effective” during the 90-day period, assuming no Soviet mobilization. If the Soviets should mobilize, they would not be effective. He asked what is meant by “marginally effective”—what is its operational significance?

Mr. Lindjord said it meant a 50–50 chance.

Mr. Hillenbrand agreed the meaning was vague and described it as effective “if we’re lucky.”

General Shaefer described it as “touch and go.” He added that we have minimal capacity. If it were increased we would be more confident; if it were decreased we would be unable to hold.

Dr. Kissinger asked if this confidence were related to time or if it would be constant.

General Shaefer replied that this would depend on the nature of attack, the speed of our decisions, and other unknowns.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the uncertainty is related to time, or would we be in a precarious position from Day-1 on, or from the moment the main force is engaged, or as soon as the enemy tank force is engaged, or at what point? He asked what the situation would be if the Soviets mobilize and we did not.

Mr. Shakespeare commented that the Soviets could not mobilize undetected.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Soviets steal a march on us and we do not react in time, does this imply that we are done.

General Shaefer said 'yes' in terms of conventional warfare.

Dr. Kissinger asked if we should then assume either symmetrical mobilization or no mobilization on either side.

General Shaefer said we could probably tolerate a small mobilization on the other side, such as an attack which might be launched out of the military exercise. In this event, NATO could react properly.

Mr. Shakespeare noted that the paper assumes that a conventional war after 90 days without the use of nuclears is not real. He asked if a conventional war went beyond 90 days, would NATO be defeated?

General Shaefer replied that the 90 day period was associated with the preparations for war and related to supplies in the pipeline.

Mr. Pedersen thought there would be two 90-day periods: a 90-day warning period before war comes, during which we would build up and would have a marginal capability of success. He thought the critical point in this period would be at about 30 days. He thought there was an additional 90-day period of conventional war before nuclear escalation.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if NATO could hold indefinitely beyond 90 days in a conventional war.

General Shaefer reported that this would depend on reinforcements and on the capability and will of the allies.

Dr. Kissinger saw three situations: (1) war without mobilization by either side, in which we would be marginally effective; (2) war with slight mobilization by the Soviets, in which our marginal effectiveness would be lower; (3) full mobilization by both sides. He thought we needed a better definition of 'marginal' including a more precise description of what we mean operationally. He also thought we should plot our effectiveness over a time period. He thought we should spell out the three situations, plot the consequences of various types of action over a 90-day period. He thought this analysis would be most important when we consider the nature of any cuts to be made.

Mr. Nutter noted that NATO has been trying for two years to prepare this kind of analysis but the planners have resisted this type of comparison.

Mr. Kissinger said if we cannot analyze the situation in a period of calm, what will we do in a time of crisis when we have to improvise? He asked if the NATO planners had been afraid of the answers.

Mr. Nutter replied that they had been very frank about their inadequacies. He said there are so many if's—the nature of the attack, where it occurred, etc.

Dr. Kissinger saw no magic significance in the 90-day figure. He was, however, concerned by the use of terms such as “marginal” and “point from which you do not recover” and would like to see the evaluation from which they derive.

Mr. Pedersen noted that we might have to face up to nuclear escalation earlier than at the end of the 90-day period.

Mr. Hillenbrand agreed that conventional war would be essentially a stalemate, and that the nuclear action could arise more quickly.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should examine more carefully what we are trying to do. For example, if we should go nuclear within 3 days, we would not need a 90-day stockpile.

General Shaefer disagreed, saying that we would still need a 90-day stockpile.

Mr. Kissinger said he recognized the many uncertainties in this area but thought we were in a better position now to make guesses than we would be in a crisis.

Mr. Nutter agreed that these were good questions and said that NATO had been working on the answers for some time. They are now at the point where they are working on a timetable with a sliding comparison of capabilities. He understood the military’s reluctance to develop anything very positive or give it credence in view of the uncertainties. He thought, under normal conditions of attack, they could make a good fight, which would mean that they could hold in the center but may have to give up some territory.

Mr. Kissinger said he could understand the military’s reluctance to tell us what they are going to do, but that we must have some basic idea of the theories under which they are operating, and should ask them to take a stab at developing some criteria. He asked if we now have a 90-day stockpile?

Mr. Spiers said ‘no’—that is our goal.

General Shaefer commented that we have authority for 90-day stockpiles.

Dr. Kissinger asked in what?

Mr. Cargo replied that the size of the stockpile varies from item to item and from time to time.

Dr. Kissinger asked if our capability was determined by the smallest stockpile in one critical item.

Mr. Nutter said no, that any such item could always be resupplied from the U.S. He said that the military have elaborate charts on what is low at any one time.

Dr. Kissinger asked, from a pure supply point of view, if we have enough on hand with appropriate resupply to operate for 90 days.

General Shaefer replied that it would vary from item to item.

General Hampton cited the example of POL, on which we average an approximate 55–60 day supply. He commented that there had not been enough money to build an underground storage facility.

Dr. Kissinger asked how much it would take.

General Hampton replied many millions.

Dr. Kissinger asked if we would not have a new situation with the destruction of even one critical item. He said it was a purpose of the group to raise questions and not merely to sanction what exists. Ignoring the possibility of destruction, he asked what is the supply situation? Is 90 days realistic from a logistical point of view?

Mr. Nutter commented that we are not necessarily speaking of 90-day supplies on the ground or 90-day supplies in Europe. He said this assumption includes plans for supply lifts and that we have such lift capacity. We could not, of course, be sure that ships will not be sunk.

Dr. Kissinger asked how long we could operate on the supplies in the field; what is the average period—50–60 days?

Mr. Spiers replied the situation changes from day to day. The average would appear to be about 40 days.

Mr. Nutter said it would be easy to get figures on this.

Dr. Kissinger asked that these figures be obtained.

Dr. Kissinger then asked about the supply situation of our allies. Assuming we were the best, who was next best.

Mr. Spiers replied the UK, both in terms of what they had on the ground and the fact that they can get things from their own economy. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, he said the British had approximately 15 days supply on the ground.

Dr. Kissinger asked if it was realistic to assume that they could re-supply from their own country, and if anyone knows what the British have in the way of stocks.

General Hampton doubted that anyone knew, noting that the British could conceal this information.

Dr. Kissinger noted he would be amazed if the British have 75 days supplies in the UK.

Mr. Spiers agreed.

Dr. Kissinger asked what the next country would be in terms of supplies.

Mr. Spiers replied Germany.

Mr. Hillenbrand added that the Germans claim they can live off the country.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt noted that the White Paper says 30 days.

Dr. Kissinger asked what good are our 90-day supplies if the UK has only 15? He doubted that the British have the logistical structure in the UK to resupply their forces.

Mr. Spiers noted that neither the British or the Germans would favor fighting a conventional war for 90 days.

Dr. Kissinger said he had inferred from a conversation with Defense Minister Healey that the British did not put high priority on the supply question.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if they did not presume that we would help with supplies.

General Hampton replied that the U.S. army in Europe was not in a position to support others.

General Shaefer commented that the British use a higher rate-of-consumption factor than we do, although it still does not close the gap.

Mr. Nutter said there was no doubt that our conventional posture in Europe was weak. He said, however, that General Goodpaster said that it was such that we could give them a good fight and could hurt them. He made no pretense that we could defeat them.

Mr. Cargo said he thought we should examine certain elements of flexibility in the allied situation. He did not believe we should assume that their fighting capability would be limited by the smallest stockpile. If we had any warning, he thought we could make adjustments in this area.

Dr. Kissinger agreed that we should not leap to conclusions but should try to get the answers to some of the questions to help determine our best posture.

Mr. Spiers agreed that we needed a more precise definition of our capability on the ground today, but that it was hard to ask the military for precise answers in view of the many uncertainties.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that it would be healthy for everyone if they were asked to give more precise answers. He agreed that major uncertainties would remain, even with the best analysis in the world. It was hard to deal with force levels, except in an arbitrary way, without a more clear understanding. He thought playing around too much with military forces might well create a crisis of confidence. He thought there must be some criteria established.

Dr. Kissinger then turned to nuclear strategy, saying it was assumed that when the conventional phase ends, if we are on the verge of defeat, we will resort to nuclear weapons. He asked what the theater nuclear forces are prepared to do without going into SIOP.

General Hampton replied that theater strike forces can be used flexibly with or without SIOP.

General Shaefer added that a good portion of our aircraft have dual capability, both conventional and nuclear.

Dr. Kissinger asked what we intend to do with the 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Mr. Nutter replied that the 7,000 figure is misleading. He said these were differently positioned and we were not planning to use 7,000 weapons.

Dr. Kissinger noted that the President, on his first visit to the Pentagon, had requested a statement on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. He asked if we would win a tactical nuclear exchange?

General Hampton said it was difficult to say, but that we could do a damage assessment.

Dr. Kissinger asked if we don't know how it would come out, why would we use tactical nuclears?

Mr. Nutter replied that this had been a hard fact for the Europeans to face, but that we are now beginning to consider what the use of tactical nuclears might lead to.

General Hampton commented that tactical nuclear weapons are useful as a deterrent, but that no one would win in a tactical exchange.

Dr. Kissinger said it was agreed that no one would win in a strategic nuclear exchange. The Soviets, however, say that they would win in a tactical exchange. If both sides believed no one would win, or if the Soviets believed we would win, we would have a deterrent. He asked if you can deter with something if you are unsure of the consequences of its use? He thought all of these questions should be considered.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if "tactical" weapons mean that they would be used only against field troops?

Mr. Nutter [*1 line not declassified*]

General Shaefer said that there is no precise definition. It could mean all weapons deployed in a theater or it could mean all weapons applied in the field. This paper defines it as theater weapons, but he agreed that we need a precise definition.

Mr. Shakespeare asked, if the use of tactical weapons implies a limitation, could we add the premise that it would inevitably spread to strategic use.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that it was not inevitable that we would escalate from a tactical exchange that no one would win to a strategic exchange that no one could win.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if we were losing a tactical nuclear war would we not escalate to a strategic war? He thought tactical war, to the extent that it was considered a trigger, would create a deterrent.

Mr. Nutter said that the NPG was now studying this matter.

Dr. Kissinger asked if they were equipped to undertake such a study or would it turn into a political exercise.

General Hampton thought that NORTHAG could do a reasonable analysis.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that he had been watching the debate on tactical nuclear weapons for 10 years and had not made up his mind as to an appropriate role for them in Europe. He thought ambiguity and uncertainty were part of the nature of the operation of a deterrent. The other side has the same ambiguities and uncertainties. Any effort such as that of the NPG to insert knowledge was to the good, although the result will not necessarily be clarity.

Dr. Kissinger asked, leaving aside the NPG and our allies, do we know what we mean by tactical nuclear war—how would it be initiated, how controlled, how conducted? He asked if we had a model for the optimum use of tactical weapons?

Mr. Nutter replied that the military have studied these questions and have plans for their use, if they were sure it would be limited.

Dr. Kissinger said he was not being critical of the efforts, noting that he had written a book on the subject and still did not know the answers.

Mr. Cargo and Mr. Nutter commented that our allies had not been willing to examine these issues.

Dr. Kissinger summed up the conclusions from the paper and where they led in regard to possible force cuts. We are strongest in naval and air forces and weakest on the ground, especially in our tank capacity. The Pact forces have two and a half times our tanks. It was correct to say that we maintain a balanced structure, but this balance won't redress the disparity in ground forces. Our naval, air and logistic strength would help in a condition of parity more than in a condition of inferiority.

General Shaefer remarked that the superior quality of our air would be an advantage.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if we would be holding back planes for a nuclear strike.

General Shaefer said 'yes' noting that a large portion of our dual capacity aircraft are on nuclear alert.

Dr. Kissinger saw four broad choices: (1) maintain existing ground forces by reducing our staying power; (2) maintain our ground forces by reducing our air and naval forces; (3) reduce our forces across the board; (4) maintain air and naval forces at the expense of ground forces. If our analysis of the differences in reinforcement time for air, naval and ground forces is correct, he asked if it would not be better to maintain existing ground forces?

All agreed.

General Shaefer referred to the guidelines on Page 50 of the basic paper, saying these assumptions were based on a degree of mobility and that we would have to pay careful attention to our ability to move and to reactivate forces.

Dr. Kissinger asked, if the choice lay between reduction of air and naval forces and reducing supply units, why would we be better off with a 90-day than a 60-day supply system?

General Shaefer explained the three categories of supply authorization: (1) items committed to NATO; (2) an indefinite combat category (not Southeast Asia and not NATO); (3) items intended for Southeast Asia. These categories had different supply authorizations—the indefinite combat category had approximately 135 days plus, while the NATO category planned a 75-day pipeline plus a 15-day safety factor.

Dr. Kissinger said that the 90-day period then was established by logistics.

General Shaefer agreed.

Dr. Kissinger asked what would happen if we had 60-days' supplies.

General Shaefer said the supplies would dry up unless we had restricted operations accordingly.

(5:15 Dr. Kissinger left the meeting)

Dr. Lynn asked if the 90-days referred to 90-day supplies in the theater.

General Shaefer replied that approximately 60 percent would be in the theater with 40 percent in a CONUS depot with easy airlift capability.

Dr. Lynn asked if supplies would be coming out of production or out of these depots.

General Shaefer said it would vary.

Dr. Lynn asked if we then maintain a 90-day logistical supply so that we can fight an indefinite conventional war.

General Shaefer replied it would be unwise to plan on such a basis.

(5:18 Dr. Kissinger returned)

Dr. Kissinger said the options at the end of the paper were well stated. He thought, however in the absence of the answers to some of the questions he had raised, we had no criteria on which to judge the options. He asked Mr. Nutter and Larry Lynn to take another crack at the paper.

General Shaefer noted that the alternative reduction positions were useful as a basis for consideration but were illustrative only. He

said that they were not derived from analysis and had not been evaluated or tested. He thought we should not grab one and make a decision.

Dr. Kissinger said we should then put forth options that we could grab. He said the President would probably not make a detailed decision, but he would decide which package fits best his conception of where he wants to go. There would be an opportunity to make recommendations in considering how to do what the President wishes to do.

Mr. Nutter noted that there had been some movement in Europe on budget sharing.

Mr. Cargo said that the question of budget sharing, the U.S. defense budget, and the NATO discussions on strategy and forces must all be worked together.

Dr. Kissinger added that we need a diplomatic scenario on consultation on withdrawals. He asked Mr. Hillenbrand to work on this.

Mr. Nutter replied it was already being done.

Mr. Cargo asked if there would be another Review Group on this subject.

Dr. Kissinger replied that there would be.

43. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 17, 1970, 3 p.m.

NSC MEETING

Mediterranean, Greece, Italy: NSSM 90

President: The Mediterranean is a subject that has been under consideration for some time.

Let's start with a briefing from Director Helms. Dick?

Mr. Helms: I propose to focus on the significance of the area as a whole. The American security interest is recent. For 30 years we have

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Briefing papers prepared for the President's use, including talking points, together with a copy of Helms's written briefing paper, a response paper, "U.S. Interest In and Policy Toward the Mediterranean," prepared in the Department of State, and a threat analysis prepared in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are *ibid*.

maintained a strong presence there. Our interests are: the southern flank of Southern Europe; the security of Israel; and the security of oil shipments for Europe from the Middle East.

We have seen a fundamental change in the strategic situation. After the Second World War the Soviet Union soon established itself. In the mid-1950's it began its arms aid to the radical Arab states. By the mid-60's it had established a Mediterranean squadron. They have always viewed the Mediterranean in geo-political terms, as a strategic military zone that protects the Southwestern border of the USSR and provides a path for projecting southward into Africa. The Soviets' naval objective is principally political and psychological. Militarily, they shadow the Sixth Fleet. It is clear they plan to stay in the Mediterranean area.

Recently they have made striking gains:

—Their role and presence in providing the air defense in Egypt represents a major upping of their stakes and risks in the area.

—In Italy they have been steady. The Communists did not make gains in the elections² —they dropped marginally—but the Party is 1.5 million strong. It is definitely not autonomous; the Soviets have used pressure, for example, backing the old guard faction. The elections have given Rumor a boost.

—In Greece and Turkey—Turkey is firmly committed to its NATO ties and is almost certain to remain in NATO. But while they will exert more vigorous influence in the Alliance, they will probably continue to expand their relations with the USSR, particularly in the economic field.

Moscow has played up to both sides in the Cyprus situation.

President: Thank you, Dick. Henry?

Kissinger: We made an intensive examination of American policy toward the whole area, but we also made several special studies of our policy toward specific areas. The discussion today on the operational side will be confined primarily to Greece and Italy.

We have tried to develop conceptual approaches.

There have been substantial changes in recent years.

President: All bad.

Kissinger: There is the increased Soviet military presence (which has its effects in the Israel/Arab context), the fleet, and NATO. There is political unrest in Greece and Italy. There is the relation with NATO—at a time when for Greece the only point of access is the United States. In Italy there is political uncertainty.

² Apparently a reference to regional and local elections held in the spring of 1970.

The countries of the area can be divided into four types: the NATO countries; friendly countries like Spain and Israel; moderate littoral countries like Morocco and Tunisia; and radical governments like Algeria and Syria.

There are three types of struggles going on: the Arab-Israel conflict; parallel groups of outsiders; and the great power confrontation of the U.S. and the USSR.

Several policies could be conducted, and are being conducted:

—In the NATO area, the policy is still basically containment of Soviet power.

—There are efforts for peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

—There is an attempt to let the local balances of forces work themselves out.

—There is a future possibility of a greater influence and role for the Europeans.

Generalizations about the area are difficult. It is clearly a tricky area for U.S. policy.

The questions we face are the following:

—To the extent that we continue to seek containment of Soviet power, can we afford not to have firm relations with Greece and not to look at it from the security point of view?

—To what extent must the Soviet military presence on the southern flank of NATO be contained? If we decide to contain it, how do we do it? It is related to the whole question of NATO force levels.

—Can we afford to reduce the Sixth Fleet?

—What is the role of the Fleet in the new situation?

—What is the relationship of the Arab-Israel dispute to and what is the role of Spain and others in the containment policy?

—To what extent should we try to line up the moderate states? What is the U.S. interest to shore up the moderates?

—To what extent can the U.S. rely on Western Europe to play a role in the area? What kind of role can or should Europe play?

President: I expected this would take several meetings. The question of the usefulness of the Sixth Fleet has been directly raised. Let me ask, what kind of military force does Spain have?

Moorer: A good one. It has a problem in technical back-up, but it will be more influential in the future.

Rogers: There are not many encouraging things there, but the Spanish Government at lower levels are good; they're oriented to closer ties with NATO. With Algeria and Tunisia our relations are closer. Our relations with Algeria are improving. They should have some concern about Libya.

President: There are no Soviets in Libya.

Helms: No.

Rogers: Probably there will be later, but not yet. We seem to have neglected the area. We should strengthen our position there.

President: How could this fall down? Many things are not controllable, but how could we let it go? Both we and NATO need to take a stronger view.

Rogers: But they haven't helped on Malta.³

Moorer: Spain could be helpful in the Western Mediterranean.

President: I've been in Spain twice before 1968. The younger people are good, and the military too.

Moorer: Yes.

Rogers: The new Spanish Ambassador is very capable. The Foreign Minister may take Franco's place.

Brosio is very worried about the future of NATO. He wanted to head the Scandinavians off to avoid a Greek walkout. It was a tough meeting.⁴ The Dane was concerned about the U.S. giving military aid to Greece. We urged the Greeks not to walk out. The Dane finally decided on a milder speech than he earlier planned. The Greek thanked me and agreed to ask his government to move as much as it can. The Norwegians and Danes wanted us to get the Greeks to do something visible before we go ahead with military supply.

President: The decision has to be in two different parts: NATO-related arms, and arms related to internal defense.

Rogers: The decision is as to timing. It's possible that Norway and the Danes may leave. If we could get the Greeks to do something, we'd be O.K. They have already said they will stop the military courts and return to civilian rule. If they could announce this, that would be all that's needed for us.

Amb. Tasca: They will do it.

President: The idea is not to blackjack them but to work out a deal privately.

Tasca: We want to avoid a situation where those who are against us charge that we haven't done anything.

President: [To Sec. Rogers]:⁵ Do the Europeans understand the dangers in the situation?

³ Reference to the decision of Prime Minister Dom Mintoff to remove British and NATO bases from the island.

⁴ The NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at Rome May 26–27.

⁵ Brackets are in the original.

Rogers: Yes, they understand. Any weakening will be a source of great concern.

President: We've got to take a hard look at our military posture. Let us suppose late in the summer we get a request from Lebanon or Jordan for assistance, or something happens in Lebanon. What can we do?

Kissinger: We could put a division—10,000 marines and forces from Europe. The problem is what would the Soviets do if we do it.

President: It's different from 1958.⁶ The issue is the fedayeen now. We must have ready a plan. There comes a time when the U.S. is going to be tested as to its credibility in the area. The real questions will be, will we act? Our action has to be considered in that light. We must be ready.

Rogers: If our friends in Lebanon asked for U.S. troops—if the Syrians move in—what do we do?

Sisco: I lean toward an affirmative decision.

President: Is the question really a military one or is it our credibility as a power in the area? Congress seems to care only about Israel. Many in the Mediterranean area don't think this is right.

Sisco: I would rather say to the NATO allies: "Would you be prepared to move in multilaterally?" But the NATO allies won't do it. We then hold back.

President: What about the French?

Tasca: If the French thought we would go in, they'd stay out.

President: What about the King of Greece? What's his situation?

VP: It's hard to judge, but . . .

Tasca: He's had many faults in the past. There is great opposition to him among the younger and middle officers.

President: What do they want?

Tasca: They want a Republic. The Army is more of this mind than the others because of their background. They think the King might put in older exiled officers. If the King was prepared to make a statement that he wants the Greeks to have arms, that could help reconcile the various groups.

President: I know him reasonably well. He has strong qualities. His father was a decent man. He has good points but was pulled and hauled by the radicals. He's idealistic but he was exploited. Could he be persuaded to do that? The symbol of the King is good in Greece. In his self-interest, he doesn't have the political sophistication to know that

⁶ Reference to the U.S. intervention in Lebanon.

those outside really don't support him. If he could get a statement on arms, action on arms, and go ahead with a promise to have a constitutional government by the end of the year . . .

Tasca: They never have made a promise before to do this by the end of the year.

Rogers: The NATO people don't believe they'll do it.

VP: What is the Soviet attitude?

Tasca: They are knocking on two doors: They're trying to discredit this government, and at the same time they're trying to queer its relations with the U.S. to get us out of Greece.

VP: Who stimulates the public relations figures in the U.S.? The Greek-American Committee is amazed.

Tasca: The International Red Cross tell us—they have free access—that they don't believe the torture stories. This may have been in the first 18 months—on Communists who were in the '40s civil war—but not anymore now.

Rogers: We have to realize that regardless of the facts, the young people in Europe believe them. We can't afford to lose them all. The Europeans say they haven't done anything.

Tasca: They do have serious problems. They don't understand their image problems abroad.

VP: I don't believe there are groupings of "young people," "poor people." These constituencies don't exist. They are diverse.

President: One thing is relevant: The USIA people say that the only major U.S. paper they see in Europe is the *Herald-Tribune*. That's basically the *New York Times* and *Post*. The TV in Europe is state-controlled and leftist-oriented. What is involved is a barrage of propaganda unfavorable to the U.S.—and also a negative picture of the Greeks. The idea is that the U.S. shouldn't give arms and then the Greeks would change. They'd change alright, but the wrong way. In 1947 I visited Greece as a young Congressman. I talked to guerrillas—who were probably properly coached—and I came back convinced that the Greek-Turkish Aid program should go forward. I got a barrage of cards and letters saying, "Don't give arms, give food to Greece." The left was against giving arms. The major difference is that in the 1950's it was unfashionable to support Communists but it is no longer so. People now say they don't care about the security of Europe; they want the Greeks to be pure. I don't know what would happen at the lower levels in Europe. I know what I'd do—we need the Greeks because of 10 divisions, and the Mid-east. We don't like the government but we'd like its successor less. We can't do this, of course. Papandreu is a cold-eyed tough guy of the left. We have to do it right. Constantine should come

back for his interest and Greece's interest and tell them we believe they should move and say they will move.

VP: Has the media and opinion effect really been examined? The media here are not representative. Couldn't this be true in other countries, too?

President: The American leader class—the intellectuals, the media, etc.—they have a viewpoint that makes them no longer fit for leadership. The strength of America is in the “hard-hats”—the stevedores, the working people, some in the colleges. But American opinion in a hard decision could be with you. It's not so in Europe. Luns, who's a tough man, said that on TV.

Rogers: One thing of the difference between the young and the old: The young don't remember the war and they have no sense of history.

President: Tasca, you go back and try to get it done. If we follow the Danes, the Norwegians and other Socialists, the French and Italians, we do nothing. They are weak; we've got to lead. We've got to support the Greeks. It must be made palatable. The others all know if we weren't there, they'd be terrified. We look all the more important because the Europeans can't sell security to their own people.

Rogers: All they really ask us to do is do it wisely—not the Danes and Norwegians—but they help us by taking our problems into consideration.

Tasca: We care about it but we want to talk and bring the Greeks along. The Greeks are very friendly.

President: We want a Sixth Fleet mission—what is its role?

Kissinger: We can cover that as part of our NATO force review.

Packard: We've been talking about the Sixth Fleet but we need strong relations with Spain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, too.

President: But what about the Sixth Fleet?

Moorer: It has two missions: First, a NATO mission, to keep the Mediterranean open and support a land battle. Second, a national mission, to maintain a line of communication and a point of involvement, and project our power overseas to the shore and to take care of the Soviet fleet. We keep all Soviet ships missile-capable-targeted. The Sixth Fleet can handle the Soviet ships in Mediterranean now. But the NATO countries on the littoral would be adversely affected if the Sixth Fleet were to be cut or withdrawn.

President: Is it out of the question to get some support from the other NATO countries for our contingency plans in case there is trouble in the Near East?

Rogers: Why not try?

Sisco: It would have to be discreet. And you can't count on much.

President: If the Greeks work out, would they help?

Tasca: Yes.

Rogers: We should move on the negotiating front in the Near East generally.

44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Urban Affairs (Moynihan) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 1, 1970.

At the end of the fiscal year, I would like to bring you up to date on progress of the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

You will recall that the CCMS was proposed by you in April 1969, and began operations in December 1969.

1. Main Points.

A. CCMS is probably now the most active, and productive international activity of its kind. Our thesis that NATO was a forum in which you could get action has, in the short run at all events, proved correct. (It is to be noted that, especially in environmental issues, there are sharply divergent views as between the developed and underdeveloped countries. For the latter, pollution is a sign of progress. They are extremely suspicious of anyone who would deprive them of it. Hence the UN will have great difficulties with this issue.)

B. CCMS is no longer an American activity, but it is nonetheless sustained by American energy and initiatives. It will take a long time for the program to become self-sustaining. Any relaxation of American effort during that interval is likely to be fatal.

2. Participation. Most NATO countries are now seriously engaged in one or more projects. The Dutch Prime Minister remarked to me privately that he believed CCMS was making an important contribution to the further development of the Atlantic Alliance. And it may well be. A curious but happy factor has been the excellent participation we have been getting from the French. They have been among our best supporters and are currently sponsoring a project on regional development

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 6. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kissinger who sent Moynihan a complimentary acknowledgement on July 14. (Ibid.)

and the environment. The Germans, with strong support from Brandt, are doing a good job and have sent top officials to our meetings. Among the large powers only Britain has shown some reluctance to fully commit themselves to the CCMS. Even here, however, some positive changes have come about and they are now planning to work with the French on their regional development project. The Italians are also actively cooperating with us in the disaster assistance field. Among the small countries, Belgium is doing a first-rate job on piloting a project on sea pollution, and Canada is working up what could be an important project on inland water pollution. Some of the smaller countries such as Norway, Denmark and Iceland are rather inactive, one supposes largely for lack of resources and perhaps their preference for working in other organizations.

3. *Public Awareness.* We have made some progress in publicizing CCMS. Most of the major European newspapers have favorably covered our meetings and we have appeared on TV networks in France, the Netherlands and Great Britain. USIA is planning a series of films on the environment focusing on CCMS projects which we hope will be completed by the end of the year.

4. *Projects.*

A. *Air Pollution.* The National Air Pollution Control Administration now has full-time staff working on development of a project to standardize air quality criteria to develop air pollution models in comparative urban areas, including Frankfurt and Ankara. The Ankara system will be operating in mid-September and the Germans will have a fully integrated system operating next spring. From all this activity we hope to establish NATO-wide agreement on air quality standards. We hope by October to have accurate air pollution projections for the Ankara area. This means that for the first time the Turks will be able to plan in some scientific fashion future pollution levels. Eventually we could have operating "models" for every major urban area in NATO.

B. *Disaster Assistance.* The Office of Emergency Preparedness has been moving forward with three priority projects in this field. They are:

(1) Development of NATO's role in disaster assistance coordination.

(2) Flood loss mitigation, starting with a symposium on flooding this October in Venice in cooperation with the Italians. This meeting will be the first major international exchange of information on this subject.

(3) Earthquake prediction, warning and loss mitigation with a symposium in the spring of 1971, probably at the Western White House in San Clemente.

C. *Traffic Safety.* This project, under the National Highway Safety Bureau, is moving ahead rapidly and has good prospects for significant results through a number of activities.

The first is the foreign development of a small *experimental safety vehicle* (ESV) similar to that being developed here on the large American scale. The ESV is designed so that car occupants can survive crashes into a brick wall at 50 mph. We are discussing with France, UK, Germany and Italy as well as Japan and Sweden the possibilities of these countries undertaking the development and design of these experimental vehicles. We hope to achieve agreement with one or more of these countries within a fairly short period of time.

The U.S. held a major conference this May on automotive passive restraints in Michigan at the GM proving grounds. This conference demonstrated the use of the so-called air bag technique, and representatives included major world automotive manufacturers and their governments.

A further U.S. activity in this field is development of standardized international methods for rating the nature and severity of injuries and vehicle damage produced in crashes. A workshop on this subject was held in June in Brussels, attended by delegations from six countries and over 100 industry representatives and some of the world's leading medical experts in crash trauma.

Italy has agreed to undertake a survey of NATO countries on the provision of medical services to aid crash victims. This is a field in which the Europeans are in advance of the United States and where we hope to gain significant advances on our own techniques in this field.

D. Sea Pollution. The Belgians and Portuguese are sponsoring a conference on oil spills this fall in Brussels. This will be the first broad-gauge international conference to deal with this subject looking at detection, prevention and cleaning up of open water oil spills. The U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Interior and other U.S. agencies under the coordination of the National Council on Marine Resources are planning to make a major contribution to this conference. Specifically, we hope this conference will come forth with major recommendations for international action in this field.

E. Inland Water Pollution. This topic is only now beginning to take form under the leadership of the Canadians who are proposing to examine the problems of water basin management in terms of citizen participation. The U.S., along with the Belgians, is co-piloting this project. The Federal Water Quality Administration is providing the necessary backstopping.

F. Narcotics. The special CCMS meeting on narcotics in June seems to have worked. It was agreed that the NATO countries would request a special fall meeting of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) to deal with the present "crisis." (This is the first time we have used CCMS to launch an initiative elsewhere.) The CND is the "official" world organization for this problem, but it has done nothing whatever

about illicit drug traffic. It will now probably get into the subject, with a push from NATO—including *Turkey*. The U.S. will probably propose a new international convention at this fall meeting. Later, the U.S. has been directed to prepare a report on the illicit drug traffic throughout the world to be presented to the October meeting of CCMS. This will be the first time anywhere that the Turks will have to listen to what they are up to. It could be an important event. I would think it impossible that they would have agreed to any such thing anywhere save CCMS.

5. *Summary*. We have moved a long way from our shaky beginning. But it will take hard work and from time to time an expression of interest by you, especially to the Allies, to insure that this initiative will not flounder as have so many early attempts to do something internationally in this field. We have made a good beginning and the prospects remain bright, but the real work remains ahead.

Daniel P. Moynihan²

² Moynihan wrote his initials above his typed signature.

45. National Security Decision Memorandum 68¹

Washington, July 3, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Labor
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward the European Community

The President has directed that U.S. policy toward the European Community will be based on the following principles, all of which will

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM 68. Confidential.

apply to the accession of new members. As indicated, the principles will also apply to the association of the EFTA neutrals and all new preferential trade arrangements between the Community and other countries. The principles are:

1. U.S. support for expansion of the membership of the Community.

2. U.S. willingness to accept some—but not excessive—economic costs as a result of the accession of new members to the Community. We will assess the extent of any economic costs to the United States as the negotiations proceed and use this assessment as a basis for determining their acceptability to us or any consequent U.S. Government action.

3. Clear indication to the countries involved that we expect them to take fully into account, in their own negotiations, the rights and interests of third countries, including the U.S. and the importance of maintaining an equitable system of multilateral trading rules.

4. Defense of our economic interests in specific agricultural and industrial products by appropriate means, primarily through notifying the countries involved during the course of the negotiations of our intention of exercising our rights under GATT.

To implement these principles, the President has directed that:

—We seek to stimulate a European initiative to propose a U.S. Community consultative mechanism on issues of mutual concern. If necessary, however, we should propose it ourselves. Through the mechanism we would expect the Europeans to inform us of, and be prepared to discuss, the progress of their own negotiations and other European policies of interest to the U.S. We would be prepared to discuss U.S. policies of concern to them.

—The Under Secretaries Committee coordinate the implementation of U.S. policy toward the European Community² in the context of guidelines set out above, including decisions on specific issues to be raised by the U.S. in the new consultative mechanism and all public statements on the subject, and refer issues to the President for decision as necessary. In considering particular issues, the Committee should, of course, be expanded to include representatives of all agencies bearing

² Pursuant to this NSDM, U.S.–EC consultations began in Washington October 15–16. Objective and position papers, transmitted by Arthur Hartman, Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, on October 9 and 10 are *ibid.*, Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee, 1972–1974, Lot 81D309, NSC–U/SM 73B and 73C. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 42–44 and 47.

responsibility for them and take advantage of existing interagency machinery.

Henry A. Kissinger

46. Minutes of a Combined Review Group and Verification Panel Meeting¹

San Clemente, August 31, 1970, 10:08–11:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

US Strategies and Forces for NATO (NSSM 84)
MBFR (NSSM 92)²

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	<i>Attorney General</i>
<i>State</i>	John N. Mitchell
U. Alexis Johnson	ACDA
Martin Hillenbrand	Vice Adm. John Lee
Leon Sloss	Thomas J. Hirschfeld
<i>Defense</i>	<i>Treasury</i>
David Packard	Anthony Jurich
Reginald Bartholomew	NSC Staff
John Morse	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
CIA	William Hyland
Gen. Robert E. Cushman	Wayne Smith
Bruce Clarke	John Court
JCS	Col. Richard Kennedy
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer	Marshall Wright
Col. John Wickham	Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that further analysis was needed to:
... refine the illustrative force requirement estimates;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret. The minutes are dated September 1, but hand corrected to read August 31. On September 14, the Senior Review Group replaced the Review Group, so this was still a combined Review Group and Verification Panel meeting, not a Senior Review Group meeting, as indicated on the minutes.

² NSSM 84 is Document 25; NSSM 92 is Document 36.

... determine more precisely supply situation for the US, the USSR and our Allies;

... evaluate the NATO/Warsaw Pact tactical air balance and the impact of the air situation on the ground conflict;

... develop various packages, including cost and political implications, to rectify known qualitative weaknesses in NATO's present conventional posture, including maldeployment, supplies, aircraft protection, etc.

... evaluate NATO tactical nuclear force capabilities and requirements and possible nuclear alternatives.

This work will be done by the NSSM 84 Working Group.

NSSM 92

It was agreed that the Verification Panel Working Group should develop and analyze specific "building blocks" with a view to dealing with individual parts of the problem which might be put together in various options packages. These topics should include:

... tanks,

... tactical aircraft,

... mobilization and reinforcement (including prepositioning of supplies and equipment)

... tactical nuclear weapons, and

... manpower reductions.

U.S. Strategies and Forces for NATO (NSSM 84)

Mr. Kissinger: It seems logical to consider NSSM 84 and NSSM 92 together, particularly since parts of the NSSM 84 paper will affect the discussion on MBFR. I would propose that we go easy on the tactical nuclear question since it has not been as fully analyzed as some of the others. I appreciate that these papers were produced under great pressure and that the numbers have been used only as illustrations and not as agency commitments. We will not hold the agencies to the data used in the various strategies. I believe we might get some sense of the order of magnitude from an initial discussion of NSSM 84 and can then proceed from there. Do you all agree?

All agreed.

Mr. Kissinger: The NSSM 84 paper is a comprehensive analytical study of the issues concerning NATO strategies. I find it more encouraging than the more abstract discussions had led us to believe, but I have a few questions.

Our flexible response strategy assumes a 90-day conventional stage which involves a number of capabilities. The most flagrant imbalance appears to be in tank forces, with the ratios in all other categories

not unfavorable to the West. If we assume the necessity of a 3-to-1 superiority for an attack, the ratio appears good. Is this a fair statement?

Admiral Moorer: We believe several factors in the paper require correction. I don't agree with the treatment of relative aircraft strengths. The paper does not consider the interrelationship between air and ground activity. It makes several invalid assumptions of relative strength. It is not realistic to say that we would not attack airfields in Poland. It does not cover Soviet superiority in air defense nor the impact of the air picture on ground activity. We should be very careful about drawing firm conclusions from this paper. The Navy forces in the illustrative strategies appear way out of balance. Also, the shift from conventional to nuclear war would not be a clear-cut shift and would probably retain elements of both.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

Admiral Moorer: Under a selective release of tactical nuclear weapons, we would not necessarily release such weapons to be used everywhere.

Mr. Kissinger: I assume that we would release the weapons where they would do us the most good and that the Soviets, in doing the same thing, might release them elsewhere. I agree that there might not be general nuclear war, but if we release weapons on land they will certainly release them on land.

Admiral Moorer: There will not necessarily be a clear-cut shift across the board, however. There might be selective releases in the center region or on the flanks or on the ocean. It would be invalid to develop logistical requirements on the base of a clear-cut across-the-board shift. It is dangerous to plan on a 30 or 60 or 90-day war. The 90-day plan is related to NATO logistical requirements and should not be considered a strategy to conduct a war. I also question other figures. There is not much treatment of the flanks, and the paper seems to be concerned only with targets within the 250-kilometer range.

Mr. Kissinger: I do not conclude from the paper that this commits us to a war of any particular duration. It does permit us to understand our capabilities in various situations, but capabilities do not equal commitments. The President may order the use of nuclear weapons on the first or second day. If, however, he does choose to fight a 90-day conventional war, we must be able to tell him what he would need. This paper involves no commitment to any strategy but is merely an analysis of our capabilities.

Admiral Moorer: I understand that. However, the paper focuses on the central region. The Soviets would undoubtedly move on both flanks and at sea and the action would be much broader.

Mr. Kissinger: If it is broader, is that better or worse for us?

Admiral Moorer: It is worse insofar as it involves resupply from the U.S. I believe that an overview of the paper reaffirms that our current strategy of flexible response is the best available at the moment. If our flexibility is reduced by cutting forces, this would automatically move us toward the use of nuclear weapons. I consider it ill-advised to pass any of these figures to NATO for discussion. I also consider many of the assumptions in the tables subject to correction.

Mr. Kissinger: The tables tend to confirm that the present balance of forces makes it not preposterous to think in terms of a conventional phase. These figures are planning figures. They assume we have 90 days' supplies. Is that true? What is the lowest critical item without which we could not fight a conventional war? Is it possible to get any estimate on this?

Mr. Packard: It would be very difficult.

Admiral Moorer: We are particularly weak in electronic countermeasures.

Mr. Kissinger: For example, do we have a 90-day supply of aircraft ammunition?

Admiral Moorer: In conventional weapons probably, but not in Shrike and other advanced weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: Will we then run out of all supplies simultaneously? Will there be no significant differences—no critical categories where we have 20 days' supply? How about POL? Can we get some estimate of the lowest critical item and how many days' supply we have in that item?

Admiral Moorer: We have practically everything, but I will check.

Mr. Packard: There has been some pull-down of our supplies for Vietnam but they will be built up again.

Mr. Johnson: The uncertainties, of course, are in the losses.

Mr. Kissinger: Are our allies fairly uniform on supplies?

Admiral Moorer: The Germans aren't.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get an estimate of the lowest critical US item? Also, what is the lowest critical allied supply situation? I am told the UK could not fight more than ten days. The Germans certainly have much less than 90 days' supplies. Is there anyone else besides the US with 90-day supplies?

Admiral Moorer: Not across the board.

Mr. Kissinger: If it is not across the board, it does not help, since we could run out of any critical item.

Admiral Moorer: There could be certain adjustments, for example, smaller bombs could be substituted for larger ones.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get an estimate of the British, German and French supply situation by lowest critical item. Assuming that their supplies are significantly less than ours, what does this do to our planning? What is the sense of our maintaining a 90-day capability? Is it not true that the most likely avenue of attack would be protected by the countries with the lowest supply level?

Mr. Morse: Our 90-day supply level is based on what we would need if we ran into real trouble and had to fight our way out. Our commanders in Europe want the capability to fight a Dunkirk operation if necessary.

Mr. Kissinger: It's a long way from Bavaria to Dunkirk. If our supply situation is less than 90 days we could probably resupply and keep going. Whatever the US capability is, the European capability is probably not such that they could fight a war comparable to ours. Can we assume that the Europeans have significantly less than 30 days' supplies?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, in some critical categories.

Mr. Kissinger: In order to make some sense of our deployment in Europe we must have a good base to avoid reductions. Our supply situations should be somewhat homogeneous.

Admiral Moorer: We have been working on this with our allies for ten years. They argue of course that they would be fighting in their own country with short supply lines from their factories.

(Mr. Kissinger left the room)

Mr. Johnson: To what degree have the Europeans proceeded on the assumption that in extremis we would draw down our supplies to help them?

Admiral Moorer: There is no plan for such, although it has been considered on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. Johnson: Aren't they assuming that we would?

Admiral Lee: It would be mechanically undoable. Rather, they are assuming that the war would not last 90 days.

Mr. Johnson: Would we not need air superiority within the first two or three days?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, that would be a key factor.

General Cushman: The Soviet aircraft have better shelter now.

Admiral Moorer: They are better sheltered, better defended and better dispersed.

Mr. Johnson: We would have to have air superiority in a 90-day war.

Admiral Moorer: We have not considered attrition. What chance do the Soviets think they have of breaking through in a conventional

role? What do they think the US would do? We should have enough to provide a deterrent and more than one option if an attack takes place. We cannot produce quantitative answers by equating types of weapons systems—tanks matched against antitank guns. The 106 recoilless rifle has half the range of the Soviet tanks. The Soviet tanks are more accurate.

(Mr. Kissinger returned)

Mr. Kissinger: We all recognize that the Europeans are worried about US force reductions. Is it unrealistic or unreasonable to see if they will cooperate with us to make sense of our strategy? It does not seem reasonable to discuss political points unless they are willing to solve the logistical problems.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have been discussing this for many years at NATO. I doubt if the Europeans will build up their stocks to any significant degree. They argue that the figures are not as desperate as they seem since their armies have a lower requirement level and can live off the land.

Mr. Kissinger: What does the phrase “live off the land” mean? It should be subject to some concrete analysis—it has got to be quantifiable in some way.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We should also be comparing US and Soviet stock levels.

Mr. Kissinger: That seems less important, since we are not going to attack them. If they have only ten days’ supplies, they will not attack us until they have built up their stocks.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There are weak spots in the NATO deterrent but we should look at the operation of the deterrent as a whole rather than at its separate components. It has worked despite the deficiencies.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree it has worked in the past but we now have two problems: (1) the strategic balance is considerably different from that of the 50s and 60s and (2) there is greater pressure in all countries for force reductions. Lower force levels, which might bring quicker collapse, create greater uncertainties. In political terms, over an indefinite period, it is difficult for the European countries to say that the US must be there with 90 days’ supplies in order not to shake their confidence. Confidence in what?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Europeans are more interested in divisions than they are in supplies. I agree that, in purely military terms, we can only supply inadequate answers.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it unrealistic to say that if there are to be substantial US ground forces in Europe it is politically imperative that we are able to justify them in some way other than as hostages?

Mr. Johnson: Is there any hope for making more progress in lowering the cost?

Mr. Hillenbrand: We can hope for progress in burden-sharing; however, it is unlikely that the Europeans will move forward concurrently with improved burden-sharing, increased supply levels and maintenance of force levels.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we have any figures on what it would cost the Europeans to get their stocks up to one-half of ours?

Admiral Moorer: We can get such figures. I would estimate hundreds of millions.

Mr. Kissinger: I assume over a period of years.

Admiral Moorer: We would not want to have 4-1/3 divisions overseas in confrontation with the Soviets without being sure that they could fight a war without our allies. We would not put our men in a position where they would not be adequately supplied.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree, but we do need some discussion to rectify the anomalies of the situation. Table 6 outlines force ratios in attacks. How would these be altered if it were necessary for US forces to be re-deployed? Can we assume that the Soviets would accept a one-to-one ratio where they are not attacking and would mass troops at points of attack?

Mr. Packard: (Showing Mr. Kissinger some force ratio figures) We can't be sure of the significance of any force ratio by itself. There are other factors, although they have to have the basic capability. How well are they organized—what is their will, their leadership? These questions are wide open in NATO.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we not ask ourselves (not necessarily our NATO allies) if our present deployment is one with which we would want to [wage?] a war or has it just grown and would have to be altered to fit?

Admiral Moorer: Redeployment would increase our defense position but it would cost a good deal of money. What we would accomplish depends on how much warning we would have.

Mr. Packard: That is a key question. If there were a reasonable period of warning we could redeploy successfully. We would be wide open in the event of a surprise attack.

Admiral Moorer: There is also the question of a political warning. At what point would we interpret a political warning as such. How long would it take for NATO to do something if it became apparent an attack was likely?

Mr. Kissinger: Have we ever undertaken any redeployment in any crisis situation—Czechoslovakia, for example?

Admiral Moorer: No.

Mr. Packard: We could have a stronger defense with fewer forces, although it would cost money. The figures show that we are not getting the maximum advantage for the US and our allies for the money spent.

Mr. Kissinger: For example, simple revetments and better dispersal would save aircraft.

Admiral Moorer: Dispersal is a problem since tactical aircraft operate from only six fields on the continent. With the SA-2 and 3 missiles, the Soviets have a better coordinated air defense system than ours. Air superiority would be the key.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there no chance of achieving air superiority unless one attacks first?

Admiral Moorer: This goes back to the question of warning. If we were on the alert, we would have a much better chance than if we were caught like the Egyptians in the six-day war.

General Cushman: Soviet strength would be different with and without a period of mobilization. They would have some 37 divisions for a surprise attack but could have 81 divisions after mobilization.

Mr. Packard: The Soviets also have a different kind of air force—their aircraft capability is better for defense than for attack.

Mr. Kissinger: It is argued that our present flexible response strategy gives us a greater possibility of avoiding nuclear war. However, when we probe the various components of the strategy we find that we simply haven't got it in the NATO context. Are we not then being forced into the very situation our strategy is designed to avoid. Is it unreasonable to say that all pressures in NATO are in the direction of turning us into hostages?

Mr. Packard: This is certainly the result, even if it is not intended.

Mr. Kissinger: Should we not try to find out what we would really have to have to move in the direction of avoiding nuclear war?

Admiral Moorer: In total forces or in supplies?

Mr. Kissinger: The assumptions of total forces in NSSM 84 appear okay. In terms of numbers we might be close to having what is needed if we could identify and fix some things—the supply situation, airfield concentrations, maldeployment. DPRC studies had indicated that we were not far from the right numbers even with the contemplated defense cuts.

Admiral Moorer: The cost would be high.

Admiral Lee: Our allies simply do not believe in a war lasting several weeks. They will not spend money to prepare for it.

Mr. Kissinger: At some point we will all have to face facts. The Soviets have 1500 IBMs [*ICBMs?*]*—*we have 1,000. Some Soviet targets cannot be covered. What happens after that first week? We may at

some point have these facts pushed down our throat. It may be that we can't do the right thing because of the cost or because the political price would be too high. We should at least know what we should do even if we are not able to do it.

Mr. Packard: These questions have been discussed in NATO for ten years.

Admiral Moorer: With regard to the use of tactical nuclear weapons we *do* have a valid plan. SACEUR has a plan for the selective use of tactical weapons and has been working up illustrative situations. It is a hot potato politically, however.

Mr. Kissinger: The paper indicates that in a constrained use of these weapons even 1300 of them would not work. Can our command and control system withstand an activity of this magnitude with the expected Soviet response?

Admiral Moorer: If they had any contact at all SACEUR could order selected release of these weapons. The question would be how many would survive in battle. SACEUR has a Priority Strike Plan (part of SIOP), a general strike plan and a tactical strike plan under which commanders would release to selected targets. They train and drill continuously on these plans including loading and dispersal of aircraft. They could do these things as long as they had any communications. It is possible to improve on the operational plan but it is not correct to say that we have no plan.

Mr. Kissinger: I am sure that there is such a plan, but where does the plan leave us once it has been executed? Does it improve the situation? Is it politically conceivable or would it maximize a defeat?

Admiral Moorer: The question is would it lead to a major nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union? The Europeans would, of course, like to see us trade New York for Moscow.

Mr. Kissinger: Where would they be if we did?

Admiral Moorer: They say this willingness would be a deterrent. The Soviets would not be willing to trade Moscow for New York.

Mr. Kissinger: If the threat to Moscow is that overwhelming, the Soviets must assume that it would happen at the earliest stage. Any delay would weaken this deterrent. If that is their argument this confirms the role of US troops as hostages. It deprives the President of a free choice. He simply cannot go to the Congress with that strategy. If a slow attrition of US forces in Europe is inevitable there is no logic in maintaining 200,000 versus 120,000 hostages.

Mr. Hillenbrand: After ten years of effort the Europeans have finally accepted the doctrine of flexible response. They would never accept the argument that they consider our role as hostages.

Mr. Kissinger: If we do it more delicately than we did with the Germans why would they not face the full implications of flexible response? Can we make them face it?

Mr. Hillenbrand: It is feasible.

Mr. Sloss: We should consider the priorities. The Europeans have only limited resources and we will have to judge where we wish to push them harder. With regard to burden-sharing, whatever support they give to US forces weakens their own forces.

Mr. Packard: We can't afford to live with the current burden-sharing arrangement too long. We must spend money to build up our own forces. We must decide where to go then how to get there.

Mr. Kissinger: With regard to NSSM 84, could the Working Group try to see, without any commitment to carry out any strategy or without discussion with NATO, what analysis would show we need to give meaning to our strategy. What steps would have to be taken to rectify the supply situation and other weaknesses? We could leave the tactical nuclear question aside until we have more analysis. Is this agreeable as the way to proceed?

All agreed.

[Omitted here is discussion of MBFR and the Response to NSSM 92, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 32.]

47. Editorial Note

NSSM 102, September 21, 1970, directed the preparation of the President's Annual Review of American Foreign Policy, which would include topics relating to NATO Europe, Western Europe outside NATO, and International Trade Policy. As stated in the NSSM, the "Review should outline: (a) major trends, events, and issues of 1970; (b) the Administration's approach in dealing with these developments; and (c) the principal tasks the U.S. Government faces in 1971 and beyond. The 1971 Review will refer to the broad guidelines of Administration policy represented in the 1970 Review, but primary emphasis should be placed on the issues of 1970 and the evolution of Administration policy." A copy of NSSM 102 is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 43–103. The President submitted his Second Annual Report on U.S. Foreign Policy to Congress on February 25, 1971; for the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pages 219–345.

48. Report on a NATO Commanders Meeting¹

Naples, September 30, 1970.

PRESENT

The President	Admiral Mondt
Secretary Rogers	Lt. General Lemley
Secretary Laird	Vice Admiral Kidd
Admiral Moorer	Admiral Henderson
General Goodpaster	General Angelis
Dr. Kissinger	General Marchesi
General Burchinal	General Tagmac
Ambassador Ellsworth	General Harrell
Admiral Zumwalt	Admiral Roselli-Lorenzini
Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand	General Cassone
General Haig	Lt. General Dean
Mr. Sonnenfeldt	Brig. General Pursley
Mr. Earle	Brig. General Hughes
Mr. Ziegler	Commander Salva
Admiral Rivero	
Secretary General Brosio	

General Goodpaster welcomed the President's visit to AFSOUTH as a sign of NATO solidarity and called on Admiral Rivero, CINC-SOUTH, to make a presentation on NATO activities and interests in the southern region as a basis for discussion.

Admiral Rivero welcomed the President and his party, The Secretary General of NATO, Saceur, Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Armed Forces,² and the Chief of the Defense General Staff of Italy;³ addressed his responsibilities; then introduced his principal subordinate commanders.

He noted that Air Defense Systems ANF Forces of Greece, Italy and Turkey are his sole peacetime forces: all others are under national command. He pointed out that his command is isolated geographically from Central Europe by neutral and non-committed states; its fragmented, with Italy, Greece and Turkey each occupying individual land masses, thus NATO must control the Mediterranean Sea.

Admiral Rivero then compared NATO forces quantitatively and qualitatively against the threat to the southern region from the Soviet

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 468, President's Trip Files, The President's Visit to NATO Headquarters (AFSOUTH) Naples, Italy. Secret. The meeting was held at AFSOUTH Headquarters. The President visited Europe September 27–October 5.

² General Angelis.

³ General Marchesi.

Union and its satellites. He noted that NATO lacked numbers of troops and aircraft; that NATO lacked mechanized or motorized divisions; that NATO lacked modern aircraft. NATO naval forces in the area, including the U.S. forces, are at an advantage because of naval air power. Finally, Warsaw Pact forces have a preponderance of tactical nuclear weapons systems.

Admiral Rivero then described the geographical assests and liabilities to the defense of southern region boundaries. Coupling these facts with the force comparisons previously made, he stated the urgent need for early reinforcements and the related effect on the threshold of use of nuclear weapons.

At sea, he said, the need is for improved surveillance which he developed from a discussion of the status of the current surveillance activities.

Both of these assessments, ashore and at sea, were reviewed then in light of a possible new Soviet threat from North Africa.

He pointed out that the current NATO naval superiority, which rests primarily on our ability to control the air over the sea, could change to NATO's disadvantage were the Soviets to establish substantial tactical air forces in North Africa. The potential danger to the lines of communication from enemy aircraft based in Algeria is ever present and a formidable new threat could arise for which NATO is not prepared and which would radically change the strategic balance in the Mediterranean.

Having mentioned problems, deficiencies and needs, Admiral Rivero then outlined some positive factors.

Foremost is the moral strength and solidarity of the Alliance in this region. The people and the military forces of these three countries are intensely dedicated to the defense of their national territory and the preservation of their freedom, in the knowledge that their Allies in NATO will come to their assistance if attacked. Their forces, although numerically inferior and deficient in material means, are well trained, well led, and possess a high morale. They believe in NATO, they place their faith in the principle of collective security, and living in the shadow of powerful and traditional enemies, they have seen their borders preserved for twenty years by the effective operation of the Alliance.

Together with the forces of the U.S. and U.K., they participate in an extensive NATO exercise program. These exercises, frequently involving the forces of all the five nations not only improve readiness but also are a demonstration of Alliance solidarity and indeed because of this serve as a deterrent.

As an example, in October a large scale exercise in Greek and Turkish Thrace and in the Aegean Sea will include forces from eight

NATO nations. This will be the largest exercise ever held in the region. Recently the NATO naval on-call force, with destroyers from five navies, had a most successful exercise.

The NATO infrastructure program has been highly successful. The over one billion dollars spent have provided a valuable network of airfields, radar stations, communications nets, naval bases and logistics depots.

There are excellent relations with the French naval command and there has been French participation in some of our naval exercises. This is important, since the French Mediterranean Fleet can make a very valuable contribution.

After this presentation, the President stated that the purpose of his visit was to underline U.S. commitment to NATO. The U.S. knows that the Mediterranean is an essential area, indispensable to any viable European defense policy. For public opinion in the U.S. as well as in other NATO countries, it sometimes takes a crisis such as the Jordan crisis⁴ to point up the critical importance of maintaining a credible strength in the area so that any enemy would consider that it might be used to deter the spread or escalation of a conflict. Although the enemy may have numerical strength in tanks, planes and men, this is not decisive if we have adequate strength and mobility but particularly a determination and will.

The President stressed the firmness of the U.S. policy of non-isolationism. Although there are many voices heard in the United States the policy is established by the President and the Europeans can be assured there will be no unilateral withdrawal. Although the U.S. does not want involvement in an additional conflict in the Middle East, the U.S. has made it clear that where our vital interests are involved the U.S. would take a strong position. He also wanted to visit with the military commanders, officers and men to show his respect for the armed forces. The President explained that the U.S. had embarked on a peace initiative in the Middle East but he saw instability for the foreseeable future in the area as the order of the day, and hence it is important to maintain a strong and stable force.

Turning to the question of burden sharing, the President said that there is an impression in the European press that the U.S. wishes to obtain from NATO countries some financial arrangement whereby the NATO countries would assume the burden or a substantial part of the burden for supporting U.S. forces. Taking a long view, rather than having members of the NATO Alliance in effect subsidize U.S. forces in Eu-

⁴ Reference to the civil war that broke out in September as a result of Palestinian efforts to topple the government of King Hussein. The Jordanian Government repressed the insurrection and drove Syrian forces supporting the Palestinians out of Jordan.

rope, he would welcome having the funds used to shore up and build up the local strength of the member countries' armed forces. He was confident that as far as the U.S. public is concerned, were the NATO partners to do more in their own defense that would be quite decisive in firming up U.S. support for making our present contribution to the Alliance.

Referring to the Admiral's remarks, he stressed the importance of the positive aspects of his analysis. It was true that the enormous U.S. and Free World military advantage has been dissipated because of the growth of the Soviet Union's nuclear capability and the size of its conventional forces. He stressed, however, that it would have an enormously dangerous effect on our diplomacy if we considered ourselves in an inferior position. The Soviet Union might be tempted to adventurism in following its expansionist policy. We must maintain our strength and talk positively and act with a will.

General Goodpaster responded, stating that NATO commanders were very conscious of this point and that while recognizing the strength arrayed against NATO there is no lack of confidence on our side. NATO has no aggressive mission and for its mission a respectable collective posture of defense kept modern will provide an adequate deterrent.

General Angelis, speaking for Greece, said that the Warsaw Pact forces are much larger in his area and hence Greece feels like a buffer because the depth of the terrain in Thrace is so narrow that the Soviets have the initiative and could present NATO with a *fait accompli*. Greece, Italy and Turkey cannot confront the Warsaw Pact and must simply give time for the Allied Forces to come into action.

General Marchesi noted that the policy of East-West contacts is giving the European people a feeling that the danger is not real. It is up to the military men to explain that the threat has not lessened but is increasing, and the politicians should assist the military men in this effort.

Secretary General Brosio described President's visit as very encouraging, timely, and one which would have positive effects. Following up on Admiral Rivero's remarks, he expressed his concern at the potential danger of Soviet actions against NATO based on the North Africa Littoral should the situation change radically politically. He was concerned at certain countries' dependence on Soviet arms. NATO, he found, was in an anomalous position because it has responsibility for the Mediterranean area but no direct responsibility for the Middle East or North Africa. As a practical matter, NATO could not extend its area of responsibility but it should strengthen NATO consultation on the Middle East and Africa and the U.S. could help very much in this regard.

Secondly, the Secretary General welcomed the President's remarks about ways of reinforcing the European nations' contribution to NATO. NATO and the international staff were already discussing the problems of burden sharing, not only financial but military burden sharing. The international staff's viewpoint was that as far as possible the improvement of military burden sharing in Europe should take place rather than financial burden sharing. Military burden sharing is of course a slower process than finding financial methods to share the NATO burden. In sum, Brosio agreed with the President's viewpoint that the ultimate solution should be the improving of the military contribution by European partners and not only the financial contribution. He also agreed that NATO should not give the impression to the Soviets that we recognize their military superiority.

The President in concluding referred to a number of positive factors. Free Europe has significant military forces which, although not as large as the Communist forces, are entirely for use to meet the threat from the East. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has more ground divisions committed against China than against Western Europe. It has inner weaknesses and has had to use armed forces on three occasions against other communist countries. Furthermore, the free European countries have made tremendous economic strides, whereas the economic growth rate in the Soviet Union for the last few years has been flat. The free economic system works and that is why NATO has the wherewithal to build the strength that its political leadership can get its people to support. NATO has a formidable defensive strength and if and when there is a probe or an attempt to move into an area of instability we should stand firm. The Soviet Union with its problems in the East will think twice before it moves into a confrontation with the West.

The President added that the defense of Europe is not only defending our friends in Europe but defending ourselves. We must be on our guard in a period of instability because Soviet expansionist policies will only be able to prevail if there is a vacuum. We need strong political leadership which must come from political as well as military men to assure that we stand very strong and firm. In concluding, the President paid high tribute to the work of Secretary General Brosio.

General Goodpaster closed the meeting by thanking the President and stating that NATO, standing and working together with the assets that he so inspiringly described, need have no fear of inferiority.

49. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, October 14, 1970, 9:35–11:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
 Vice President Agnew
 William P. Rogers, Secretary of
 State
 Melvin Laird, Secretary of
 Defense
 George A. Lincoln, Director,
 Office of Emergency
 Preparedness
 David M. Kennedy, Secretary of
 the Treasury
 Adm. Thomas H. Moorer,
 Chairman, JCS
 George Shultz, Director, OMB
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant
 to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 John N. Irwin, Under Secretary of
 State

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman,
 Deputy Director of Central
 Intelligence
 Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant
 Secretary of State for
 European Affairs
 Robert E. Ellsworth, U.S.
 Ambassador to NATO
 Kenneth Rush, U.S. Ambassador
 to the Federal Republic of
 Germany
 Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
 Deputy Assistant to the
 President for National
 Security Affairs
 Col. Richard T. Kennedy (USA,
 Ret.), NSC Staff
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

Meeting of the National Security Council: Berlin and Germany (NSSM 83)²

[Omitted here is discussion of Berlin and Ostpolitik; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 126.]

President Nixon: A related issue is the offset problem. Let me state a few basic propositions to start with. There is growing sentiment here to reduce our defense costs and to reduce our commitment in terms of men. In terms of the European situation there are different views. The majority view is that the Europeans deep down still believe that the key to successful defense in the NPG strategy is the U.S. presence—which more than anything they can do for their own forces guarantees the deterrent. Also the bigger our presence, the more likely we are to be willing to use the deterrent. Some European countries would be willing to give money to us rather than devote it to improving their own forces. On our side, we need to work on the German offset to get the best pos-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room.

² For NSSM 83, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 12.

sible deal we can, but for the long haul for us to get into the position that we can't finance our forces abroad and can stay only if Europeans will pay this would be bad. We have to look at a new NATO strategy. The need for maintaining adequate conventional forces may be infinitely greater than ten years ago.

Secretary Laird: The Germans are not very responsive now.

President Nixon: We must not be shortsighted. We must not show that our primary interest is in cost covering but rather in the mutual responsibility to ensure our defense.

Secretary Rogers: If we start reducing forces unilaterally it will play into the hands of those who support Ostpolitik. A troop withdrawal will cut our leverage.

President Nixon: We are at a sensitive point. With all our budget decisions and political actions we have to be careful that we do not imply that reductions will be made.

Amb. Rush: Chancellor Brandt considers that your statement, Mr. President, that you will maintain American forces in Europe, was essential from his point of view.

Secretary Laird: We must face up to the question of our ability to implement it. Our dealings on defense issues are with committees other than Foreign Relations. The situation in Europe now is that the other countries are just not cooperating in improving their forces. They haven't done what they needed to do to have the Alliance move to a new strategy. Their forces are going down. I have to take a tough line on the burden sharing mix. Germany isn't going forward to improve their forces. We are paying for aircraft shelters, which should be covered by the infrastructure account. Here is an example of what they can do to be helpful. I have to take some of the additional \$1 billion '71 cut from NATO forces—I can't take any from Southeast Asia. We must avoid tying ourselves down to numbers of planes, ships or personnel. The appropriations committees took a hard look this year at the costs in Europe and the contributions of the others. I must take a tough line.

President Nixon: If we look down road it is not a viable strategy for them to reduce their forces and pay for ours.

Secretary Kennedy: There are no real inconsistencies there. We can get more help from them in terms of support for our operations. The Congressional pressures are tough. Offset is no good; it costs us money.

Secretary Laird: I think we should wait for them to come up with a plan; it's not for us to make a plan.

Secretary Rogers: But the Germans are confused.

Secretary Laird: There is no new policy.

Amb. Rush: The Germans do think there is a change. I agree with the Secretary of Defense that we should get them to pick up a fair share

of the costs. We make about \$500 million in payments to German personnel; we should press them to pay for this. Schmidt says that no government in Europe could get an increase in the defense budget through its parliament.

Secretary Kissinger: In the broad sense of burden sharing—this is no change in policy—the question is whether they should pay for our non-military costs or whether they should put more in their own defense expenditures. All the studies I see show there are serious maldeployments; they’ve been taking a free ride on our forces. They won’t face up to the issue. If the European effort goes down and we just sit there, our strategy is unviable. We must face up to it now.

Secretary Kennedy: Do they come up if we stay?

Dr. Kissinger: They must and they must accept our view of burden sharing.

Secretary Laird: They must be made to understand it’s not a new policy. They think they are off the hook.

Amb. Ellsworth: They may feel they are slightly off the hook. The Italians and Dutch may have in mind each step. We must clarify this.

Admiral Moorer: They are living in a dream world about our nuclear support. They believe there will be an immediate shift to nuclear weapons in any war and thus conventional forces are unnecessary.

President Nixon: The easy way for them is to let them give us the money and we keep our forces there. I’m concerned that we should get all we can, but the most important thing is that our strategy has to be made viable, and that means they need more forces. We must change their thinking. We must avoid getting in the position of saying that if they contribute we won’t reduce our forces—that means we accept their strategy. We cannot accept that proposition. This lets them deal easily with their own domestic problems.

Secretary Laird: The problem is that their forces are going down.

[The meeting adjourned at 11:15.]³

³ Brackets are in the original.

50. National Security Decision Memorandum 88¹

Washington, October 15, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Treasury

SUBJECT

US Force Levels in Europe and "Burden-Sharing"

In light of the discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council on October 14, 1970,² the President directs that, in connection with internal US Government planning for force levels and other aspects of defense policy relating to our commitments to NATO, for purposes of Congressional appearances and in any contacts with foreign governments and their representatives, it will be US policy that:

1. There has been no change in US Government interest in the broad concept of burden-sharing. We have long felt and continue to believe that all NATO partners should contribute their full share to the effort required to maintain an effective deterrent and that the present US share of the burden is disproportionately large. In this connection, as stated by the President at the NSC meeting:

"Our primary interest should not be directed simply to covering costs of our own forces but rather to assuring that there is a mutual sharing of responsibility for the defense of Europe."

2. Our basic and long-term preference is as stated by the President at Naples on September 30, 1970,³ in the following terms:

Taking a long view, rather than having members of the NATO Alliance in effect subsidize US forces in Europe, the President would welcome having the funds used to shore up and build up the local strength of the member countries' armed forces. The President was confident that as far as the US public is concerned, were the NATO partners to do more in their own defense that would be quite decisive in firming up US support for making our present contribution to the Alliance.

3. The President does not exclude financial support as one form of burden-sharing. Financial support plus offset would be one form of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM 88. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² See Document 49.

³ See Document 48.

visible evidence of the willingness of the Europeans to increase their share of Alliance burdens. Such financial support could serve to cover, for example, local taxes, infrastructure costs and costs of local employees.

4. Financial support may be easier to provide in the short term than force improvements. However, the desirability of our accepting financial contributions or other forms of financial relief, if offered at the initiative of a NATO Ally or Allies, should be judged by us in terms of whether such contributions would impede or prevent fundamentally more desirable steps by the contributing country or countries to shore up their own defenses in conformity with agreed NATO strategy and requirements, including the results of AD-70.⁴

5. The desired mix of budgetary support and force improvement is a matter to be worked out in accordance with differing circumstances among countries. However, in conformity with paragraph 4, above, we must keep in mind that we should not sacrifice the long-term need for a viable strategy and for commensurate military contributions based thereon to any short-term benefits of immediately available financial contributions. As the President stated at the NSC meeting on October 14:

“The easy way of dealing with the problem is to let the Europeans give us money in return for our keeping our forces in Europe. I am concerned that we do get all the financial help that we can, but most important is the development of a viable strategy; and that requires more adequate forces from the Europeans.”

6. It will be our position that our ability to implement the President’s commitment will depend on the full range of measures taken jointly and severally by ourselves and our Allies in the interests of the military defense of Europe in conformity with agreed defense concepts and strategy. As the President stated at the NSC meeting:

“We must avoid getting in a position of saying that if they will contribute more to us we won’t reduce our forces—that would simply mean that we would be accepting their view.”

7. The positions set forth in paragraphs 1 to 6 above provide the basis for our working with the Europeans in the light of the agreed minute of the EuroGroup, dated October 1, 1970,⁵ and appended hereto.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ The Defense Planning Committee of NATO commissioned a study in May 1970, “Alliance Defense Problems for the 1970s,” also known as AD-70, to discuss the problems the Alliance would face in the next decade, determine priorities of the Alliance, and propose solutions. See Document 55.

⁵ EuroGroup Defense Ministers met at NATO headquarters on October 1 and agreed to the attached statement of policy. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 260, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IX)

Attachment

Text of the Agreed “EuroGroup” Minute, dated October 1, 1970

1. Ministers consider the presence of substantial United States armed forces in Europe as vital for the security of the Alliance and thus for maintaining peace and ensuring conditions for progress in the policy of détente.

2. Any substantial reduction of American forces in Europe, except in the context of mutual and balanced force reductions, would dangerously destabilize the situation in Europe, and could have gravely damaging political and military effects.

3. Ministers reaffirm the necessity of further improving the effectiveness of the defense contribution of the European members of the Alliance within the limits of their capacities. Closer European defense cooperation would contribute materially to this end, and the Ministers agreed on the need to strengthen joint endeavor.

4. Ministers recognize further that a burden-sharing arrangement would be of considerable importance to the United States in maintaining forces in Europe at substantially their current levels.

5. A collective European effort in burden-sharing—by a financial contribution, or by clearly identified additional measures to enhance national forces (especially in the shortage categories emerging in the AD 70 study), or by a combination of methods—would be a significant token of European solidarity, and would also have considerable value in its own right for the policy of European cooperation. The impact of any burden-sharing effort would be enhanced by a broad participation of European countries within their means.

6. Ministers therefore agreed to pursue a serious effort to work out arrangements [that] should be governed by the following principles.

—Any burden-sharing arrangements should contribute to maintaining US forces in Europe at substantially current levels. Burden-sharing cannot go hand-in-hand with substantial US force reductions.

—Contributions to any burden-sharing arrangements should not detract from the defense efforts of European members of the Alliance or impair the effectiveness of their forces.

—Burden-sharing must be on a European rather than US financial scale, yet must be sufficient, in terms of both money and national efforts, to demonstrate the earnestness of the European wish to retain US forces and to offer realistic support for the purpose.

7. Ministers discussed the problem of burden-sharing and examined various possible types of arrangement. They agreed that in the meantime their governments should continue to consult closely together on this subject.

8. Ministers instructed Permanent Representatives to prepare a draft basis for an offer to the US in the light of progress in governmental decision-making, and agreed to meet again early in November in Brussels.

51. Minutes of a Combined Senior Review Group and Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, October 28, 1970, 10:35 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT

US Strategies and Forces for NATO (NSSM 84)
MBFR (NSSM 92)

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin, II

William I. Cargo

Martin J. Hillenbrand

Ronald I. Spiers

Defense

David Packard

Philip A. Odeen

Armistead I. Selden, Jr.

John H. Morse

CIA

LTG Robert E. Cushman

Bruce C. Clarke

JCS

General John D. Ryan

LTG Richard Shaefer

Col. Robert Fiss

ACDA

VADM John M. Lee

Philip J. Farley

OMB

James R. Schlesinger

NSC Staff

K. Wayne Smith

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

John C. Court

Robert J. Ryan, Jr.

Wilfrid L. Kohl

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed to:

1. get an estimate of what needs to be done to remedy the supply situation so as to bring our NATO allies up to the level required to per-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

mit an indefinite conventional war, how long it would take and how much it would cost;

2. get an analysis of the meaning of a 60-day supply concept for us and for our allies in terms of number of forces, combat capability, cost, and the nature of the deterrent;

3. study the various ways of looking at the problems of use of nuclear weapons in Europe;

4. get an analysis of the ways in which the situation would be affected by a 10 percent symmetrical reduction, a 30 percent symmetrical reduction and asymmetrical reductions, including the military costs and the political benefits, if any;

5. get an analysis of the various elements of an MBFR agreement, similar to the SALT analysis, and their verifiability.

Mr. Kissinger: Has everyone seen the summary papers?² I consider both of these studies first-class and appreciate the agencies' efforts on them. Let's consider NSSM 84 first—where we stand on doctrine and on capability. I note in Table 2 on page 5a of the Summary the Army has 77 days of ammunition, the Air Force 37 days, and the Navy 88–90 days. (to General Ryan) What would happen after the 37 days?

General Ryan: We would be out of ammunition.

Mr. Kissinger: Then the Air Force would be out of action?

General Ryan: Unless it were resupplied.

Mr. Kissinger: Could you be resupplied in time to do any good?

General Ryan: Yes, depending on the base in the US.

Mr. Packard: At present, of course, we have a lot of ammunition in the Southeast Asia pipeline.

Mr. Kissinger: Can the Air Force be resupplied faster than the Army?

General Ryan: No.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Air Force cannot be resupplied faster, then your level would govern the entire operation.

General Ryan: It isn't that simple. It depends on the specific time you would be talking about.

Mr. Packard: We will look at this problem again and see if we can't get a more specific answer.

Mr. Kissinger: For analytical purposes, may we not assume that the lowest level of supplies would govern the entire operation? If the

² Not found.

37-day figure stands up, is not the problem of resupply for the Air Force more urgent than for other elements?

Mr. Packard: It isn't a problem if we were willing to divert munitions from Southeast Asia. We have good supplies in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Kissinger: How long would it take, assuming we made the decision to divert?

Mr. Packard: It could be done easily in the 37 days. We are operating on the basis of an either/or situation. As we begin to phase out the war in Southeast Asia, this pipeline will be cut back.

General Ryan: We don't want to have the pipeline full and then cut off the war. This would leave us with large excess stocks similar to those in Korea.

Mr. Kissinger: I note the UK has ten days' supplies for its Army; the FRG has 20–30 days for its tanks, 60 days for mortar and small arms and 20 days for its Air Force; France has 27–30 days for its Army and 15–30 days for its Air Force. There is no common theory which in any way relates these levels to each other. The UK would run out of ammunition after ten days.

Gen. Shaefer: The UK has a shorter pipeline, particularly for essentials.

Mr. Kissinger: Shorter than ten days? What essentials? How would they get them in—by air or land? Does anyone know what the British plans are?

Mr. Odeen: These figures are total UK stocks, including those in the UK itself—not just stocks stored in Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: These figures could be off by 50 percent and they would still raise problems. The key question is that it is generally agreed that from M plus 15 to M plus 30 would be the most dangerous period of the mobilization schedule. The situation would improve after M plus 30. However, we would be beginning to run out of supplies after M plus 10. Where does that leave us? What sense is there in planning to have reserve divisions arrive on M plus 120 if we are out of the war on M plus 30? According to these figures, the UK and Germany would be out of action by that time either because they had run out of supplies or because of mobilization difficulties.

Mr. Packard: The point is that our European allies simply do not take the idea of a conventional deterrent seriously. They expect the war would go nuclear before that time.

Mr. Kissinger: For political reasons, any readjustment of our force levels could be dangerous. However, it is politically impossible to tell the American people that we have to follow a course of action which makes no sense. I have been scolded by my staff for taking a position which would accelerate withdrawals. But I think this would be politi-

cally unavoidable if we don't fix the discrepancies that exist. Personally, I would much prefer to fix up the situation than to move to withdrawals.

Mr. Packard: We might even be in better shape if we reduced our forces and if we fixed the things that need fixing. This would be true even in the Sixth Fleet.

Mr. Irwin: We would be better off than we are today but not better off than if you fix the things that need fixing and still maintain the forces at their current level.

Mr. Kissinger: If we are talking about the general purpose forces in Europe, our maximum weakness would occur between M plus 10 and M plus 30, assuming we had some strategic warning. If we had no warning, it could be M plus 5.

Mr. Irwin: What would be the source of supplies for countries like Belgium and The Netherlands after their original supplies were exhausted? The US? Germany?

Mr. Packard: Some of our NATO people argue that these countries could resupply using their own resources faster than we could. The situation is not as bad as the figures indicate.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get a chart or table of where these supplies would come from, and what would be needed to remedy the supply situation so as to bring all countries up to some specific level.

General Ryan: We should look at the production base in being.

Mr. Irwin: Some of these items may be supplied to some countries by the US in which case their pipelines would be as long as ours.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two questions—what we tell ourselves and what we tell our allies. If our allies want US forces in Europe as a trigger for nuclear war, all right. But we believe that our forces should be maintained in Europe in order to preserve the option of a conventional war. We need a study on whether this belief is valid.

Mr. Packard: We have studied this question, and it is agreed that all critical stocks in all allied countries could be brought up to a 30-day level with a one-time expenditure of \$500 million. The real issue is for our NATO friends to decide what they want to do.

Mr. Irwin: If we reduce our forces, we must be prepared to move away from the philosophy of a conventional deterrent.

Mr. Kissinger: I think the objective of a respectable defense in Europe is not that far out of reach.

Mr. Packard: I agree. If our forces were organized, deployed and equipped properly, we could do it.

Mr. Irwin: This is what the President said at the NSC meeting on burden-sharing.³

Mr. Kissinger: It is agreed then that we will try to get an estimate of what needs to be done in time for the NSC meeting.

How can we state what a reasonable objective is for our own stock level? I understand that our 90-day level gives us in fact the capability for an indefinite conventional war since our forces can be resupplied in 70 days. We may be prepared to fight an indefinite war, but is that true of anyone else?

Mr. Packard: It could be, although possibly not with 30 days' supplies. The Europeans could probably keep going at lower stocks levels.

Mr. Irwin: Is our Army thinking of using our stocks to supply the allies?

Mr. Packard: The Europeans are beginning to build their own weapons. They are moving away from their dependence on US weapons.

General Ryan: This varies by country. Germany and the UK are building their own, but the others are still dependent on us.

Mr. Irwin: Are they also moving away from standardization?

General Ryan: No, standardization is still effective, but they are producing the items in their own countries.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get an estimate by the NSC meeting? If European forces were organized on the same theory as ours, what would be the level of supplies required to permit an indefinite war, how many days, how much money?

Mr. Packard: We can get such an estimate.

Mr. Kissinger: Of course, we could estimate that the other side would run out of supplies before that time.

Dr. Smith: They would fix that situation before they attacked.

Mr. Kissinger: I have some questions on which I would like the judgment of the military people. On page 8 of the Summary we say that if the Pact makes a surprise attack after limited mobilization, it might not penetrate NATO defenses but would probably cause NATO to give ground. What is the difference between "penetration" and "giving ground"? Does giving ground mean falling back in good order?

General Ryan: It means fall back to another defense line.

Mr. Kissinger: How far?

General Ryan: It is hard to be specific. Penetration would mean a breakthrough along a contiguous line.

³ See Document 49.

Mr. Packard: If you look at Table 1 on page 4a, although the Pact shows superiority, there isn't that much difference in the force levels. The man with his heart in it will win.

Mr. Kissinger: The Germans won in the west in 1914 and in 1940 with inferior forces by concentrating most of those forces at one point and rolling up the front. I don't draw absolute comfort from the numbers alone. Who made the judgment that the NATO forces would give ground?

Dr. Smith: That is a working group judgment.

Mr. Kissinger: You didn't say how much ground.

Mr. Morse: It isn't that precise an exercise.

Mr. Kissinger: The history of European wars indicates that, without a breakthrough, you can still knock countries out of the war by getting a good part of their territory. If the Germans withdrew in good order to the Rhine, I question whether we would really have a German army fighting on the West Bank of the Rhine. We need some conception of how far back they would go.

Mr. Odeen: No one can agree on how far. They can agree that NATO forces would lose some ground. This would be relatively minor because the Pact would not have a chance to build up its forces. Penetration means a major breakthrough. Giving ground means some local penetration, some losses, but the ability to maintain some defense.

General Shaefer: If the NATO forces were caught in a surprise attack, there are different judgments as to where they would hold.

Mr. Kissinger: But if NATO allows the Pact a two week jump in mobilization, there is a high probability that NATO forces would be penetrated. Look at the Germans in World War II.

Mr. Irwin: Aside from local defenses, are there plans covering where the best lines of defense are?

General Ryan: Yes.

Mr. Irwin: Have we planned our preferred lines of withdrawal?

Admiral Lee: One estimate indicates that if we withdraw 75 kilometers back from the front we would require nuclear support within 24 hours.

Mr. Kissinger: I think Jack Irwin's question is exactly the point.

Mr. Packard and General Ryan: We have all sorts of plans.

Mr. Kissinger: These may be paper exercises unless we can define the assumptions behind the plans. It's a question of definition.

I have another question. We are relying on reserve forces which are supposed to arrive in Europe on M plus 120. For what purpose? I have seen no scenario to which these forces arriving at that time would be relevant.

General Ryan: The 90-day period is a logistical planning factor, not an estimate of the duration of the war.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand that. However, I can perceive no situation in which the war could last 120 days. If there is simultaneous mobilization, our allies will run out of supplies in 10–30 days unless we fix the pipeline situation in such a way that they could fight indefinitely.

General Ryan: We assume we would get strategic warning.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Russians tell us on July 1 that they will attack on September 1 they will still break through and exhaust the allies. There is no way our allies can last for 60 days unless they have the same pipeline we do. We don't need any reserves until we can fix the pipeline situation.

Mr. Packard: This goes back to the question of whether they want to fight for 30 days.

Mr. Kissinger: But we may need those reserves for the Middle East or some other place. We don't want to pull out of Europe for political reasons. But if we can't hypothesize a reason for maintaining these reserves, possibly we should reconsider what we are spending the money for.

Mr. Packard: I agree.

Mr. Farley: The figures indicate no mobilization, but it may be that mobilization will precede hostilities. Maybe the Europeans need a better mobilization base. If they were faced with Soviet mobilization, could they bring their forces up in the time allowed?

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with Mr. Farley. I would prefer to fix up the situation so that they could.

Dr. Smith: We will get an estimate for you of the allied pipeline figures, what it would cost to fix them and how long it would take.

Mr. Packard: With regard to the table on page 4a, there can be different assumptions as to what would be deployed. We could deploy 4,000 tactical aircraft if we made adjustments in other areas. We would also have to make certain assumptions as to what the Soviets would do. Would they move all their aircraft to the front or would they keep some behind for defense of their cities?

Mr. Kissinger: Is it really as urgent to keep our Air Force deployed as fully as our ground forces? Would it be better to keep our Air Force back and move them in as the situation develops? Aren't our planes more vulnerable in Europe than they would be elsewhere?

Mr. Packard: That's a good point.

Mr. Kissinger: As long as our ground forces are there, our allies will know that we would bring in aircraft if they were needed.

General Ryan: Of course we have some national forces not committed to NATO.

Mr. Kissinger: Even our committed forces, why must they be in Europe?

General Ryan: To be in a position to render support. They have much greater utility if they are kept in Europe. This is the reason we are building shelters to give them more protection. We do have dual based squadrons.

Mr. Spiers: Isn't that expensive?

General Ryan: Yes, it is more expensive to keep two sets of bases.

Mr. Packard: Our revetment program needs more attention. We also need more room to operate from in Europe.

General Ryan: CINCEUR has recently been authorized to negotiate with the Germans for more room.

Mr. Kissinger: We have identified one possible objective—to maintain enough forces to fight an indefinite conventional war. What is the next step down? Can we identify another objective other than an indefinite conventional war? What about a 60-day concept? We might be able to reduce our forces and increase our combat capability and still cut costs by juggling logistics. We would, of course, lose staying power. What would a 60-day concept mean?

Mr. Packard: We would cut down our staying power but increase our capability. If, by doing so, we would create a better deterrent there might be some merit in it.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Wayne Smith) Have we an analysis of where a 60-day situation would leave us in terms of various mobilizations?

Dr. Smith: We have some judgments.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to get, before the NSC meeting, the number of alternative ways of looking at the problem. What would a 60-day concept mean for us? What would it mean for our allies? If our allies won't build for an indefinite war, is there anything else they will do? Would we be better off with an overall 60-day level as compared to 90 days for the US and 30 days for our allies? Let's get some analysis on this and include Mr. Packard's point about the possibility of creating a better deterrent.

Mr. Packard: We might be able to put 2,000 more tanks in with what we would save on logistics.

Mr. Odeen: We could also add 24,000 men.

Mr. Court: Our analysis showed that with what we would save if we went to a 30-day concept, we could create two new US divisions. On a 60-day concept we might finance 25,000 new combat forces with the logistical savings.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's look at it in terms of where it get us and what the corollaries are for our European allies.

Mr. Irwin: Why are there such big differences in the estimates on tactical aircraft in the table on page 4a?

Mr. Packard: It is the difference in judgment as to their employment. We, of course, have a lot more aircraft.

Mr. Irwin: Which one would be guiding in the present situation?

Mr. Packard: The JCS estimates higher deployment than do the Systems Analysts.

Mr. Odeen: JCS counts all aircraft. OSD has excluded certain aircraft—e.g., OSD has not included aircraft which might be retained for defense of Pact cities.

Mr. Packard: We should remember that many of our aircraft are maintained on training bases. If they are not being used for training they could be sent to fight.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we now turn to the nuclear issue, which I don't really know how to tackle. (to General Ryan) When do nuclear weapons get used in the scenario?

General Ryan: They are not included in the scenario at all.

Mr. Kissinger: If we fix the maldeployment, the pipeline deficiencies, etc., there is a chance that conventional forces can hold. If we do not, and our allies run out of supplies and we are pushed against the Elbe, nuclear weapons won't help. Could nuclear weapons restore the situation if the British and Germans should collapse?

General Ryan: If we use nuclear weapons, they will, too. If we begin with tactical nuclears, it will probably escalate to general war.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming that it does not become general nuclear war, can we envision any use of tactical nuclear weapons that would restore the situation?

Mr. Packard: No, because the weapons are not symmetrical. We can't assume symmetrical use of tactical weapons. The Soviets just don't have that type of weapon. They have area-type weapons which could devastate a general area so that their troops could go through. They have an entirely different approach. There is no scenario for going to nuclear weapons that makes any sense or that has any realism whatsoever.

General Ryan: I agree—their deterrent value is their main value.

Mr. Kissinger: How can we deter with something that doesn't make sense?

Mr. Packard: Because their use would be so horrible to contemplate.

Mr. Kissinger: If a part of the front should collapse and we should use tactical nuclear weapons could we stop them? I have seen an indi-

cation that 1400 nuclear weapons would not necessarily stop an advance.

Mr. Morse: No one knows. We have not had enough experience and analysis cannot substitute for experience. This is the great unknown.

Mr. Kissinger: So you are saying that the uncertainty produced by the nuclear weapons provides the deterrent. No one is saying we should pull out our nuclear weapons. But can we find a rational use for them? (to General Ryan) If we were on the verge of losing, would you recommend we use them or not use them?

General Ryan: We would probably recommend we use them.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

General Ryan: We might give the Soviets pause to stop and think about whether to use them.

Mr. Kissinger: For demonstration purposes, in other words. But we don't need 9400 weapons for demonstration purposes.

General Ryan: We must assume the Soviets know how many we have and that this would have an effect.

Mr. Irwin: This might be possible on one assumption—if they were used defensively in our own territory and not in Pact territory. We could take the position that if the Soviets use them in Germany, we would use them in the Warsaw Pact area. It would be a question of targeting.

Mr. Packard: They are already targeted on [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and the like.

Mr. Kissinger: I am not pushing a particular point of view. I am asking what it is we want to do with our nuclear establishment in Europe. What do our commanders think they will do with it?

Mr. Packard: They hope to keep it in the barn. They plan to use it like other weapons except that it gives them more fire power.

Mr. Kissinger: We don't know whether nuclear weapons could restore a situation, but could they prevent defeat?

Mr. Packard: If the other side does not use them.

Mr. Kissinger: What if both sides use them? If we can't make this judgment now we certainly can't make it in the crisis atmosphere of ten Russian divisions heading for Hanover. What decision would we ask from the President if this should happen? Would we tell him to release a few tactical nuclear weapons? Can we get a judgment on this?

Mr. Morse: We can't get it.

Mr. Kissinger: Then how can we ask the President to make a decision? We must have some theory of what we are trying to do.

Mr. Packard: The most rational theory would call for the use of a few tactical weapons in the hope that the situation would not escalate to general nuclear war.

Mr. Kissinger: In other words, hope for a shock effect.

Mr. Schlesinger: If we are considering use of nuclears for demonstration purposes we should adjust our whole nuclear setup. Our present structure was inherited from the 50's. If we contemplate demonstrable use, these weapons should be made secure and relatively invulnerable. If we wait for a breakthrough to use them they will be overrun.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get a statement of the various ways of looking at this problem?

Mr. Morse: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: If we plan to consider asymmetrical reductions under MBFR we might consider trading some of our nuclear weapons for some of their tanks. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

Dr. Smith: There are two in the paper—battlefield use and demonstration use.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's look at them in terms of what we are planning to do.

Mr. Court: There are three possible variations of our current strike plan in the paper dealing with survivability and target acquisition.

Mr. Kissinger: If we are serious about this we must address Mr. Schlesinger's question. If we contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, what would we have to do to adjust our forces? I recall the President raised this question the first time he visited the Pentagon.

Mr. Packard: I agree we need this badly. We don't know what to do in planning future nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger: We need to establish some criteria so we could tell the President what he would be getting into. I agree it is tough but it won't get any easier in a time of crisis.

Mr. Irwin: Have these questions been war-gamed?

Mr. Morse: For years.

Dr. Smith: All the studies have concluded that there would be no favorable outcome.

General Cushman: Their response would probably be strategic nuclear attack, Europe-wide.

Mr. Irwin: What about the political side?

Mr. Kissinger: I think we might get that decision after we have seen these other studies, so we are not trying to settle it in the abstract. This will be one element which could come from the NSC discussion.

Could we now turn to MBFR. The decisions on MBFR will be partially determined by the judgments on NSSM 84. If it is decided that an effective conventional defense is within reach, MBFR decisions will be heavily influenced on the security side. If, however, we agree that our forces are in Europe for political reasons, the MBFR decisions should be made on the basis of the political factors. We might leave aside the political considerations for now since we haven't made the necessary judgments on 84. If we assume our troops play a security role then we would have to analyze MBFR on the basis of security considerations.

I want to express my appreciation to all the agencies for this MBFR study. It is first class. For the moment I would like to take the security or arms control approach to MBFR. Assuming our own military objectives, and assuming that we are trying to get MBFR to improve the security situation for both sides, we should analyze on the basis of the defense capability of both sides. Are we agreed that it would be good to enhance the defense capability and reduce the offensive capability and that this would contribute to reducing the likelihood of war? Is this a fair statement of the security way of looking at it?

All agreed.

Mr. Kissinger: What worries us most in the existing situation is the Pact tank force. In their potential, we are most worried by their reinforcement and mobilization capability. It would be nice to get something that would reduce their edge in tanks and would reduce their reinforcement and mobilization capability vis-à-vis our own. There are three ways to do this: 10 percent symmetrical reduction, 30 percent symmetrical reduction, and asymmetrical reduction. Is it true that symmetrical reduction would magnify our problem from the military point of view? Can we analyze in what way these problems would be magnified? How much would it reduce the time? Would it be M plus 10, for example, as opposed to M plus 50? Can we make that kind of judgment?

Dr. Smith: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: The Working Group has spent weeks on this problem and we have spent hours. Our principals will probably spend 45 minutes with it at the NSC; therefore, we should make it as specific as possible. We should say these reductions would reduce the time by X so they would know what risk they are running.

Mr. Morse: We can set a bracket.

Mr. Kissinger: A ten percent reduction may not make our situation too much worse. Is there anything good we could get out of it?

Mr. Packard: Not militarily.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we benefit politically? Could we buy a ten percent reduction of their forces in exchange for something we are going to do anyway?

Mr. Irwin: To the degree we show some political movement it may lessen the desire of the Europeans to demand more military movement.

Mr. Kissinger: If it might result in an improved security situation, why not? A ten percent reduction might be a way of making political gains although at some military cost.

Mr. Irwin: It depends on what the military costs are.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a good statement of the military costs, if any, and of the political benefits.

Mr. Packard: Even without MBFR, some things could be done to better our force situation without costing too much. We should be careful that MBFR doesn't stop us from doing things we should do anyhow—fixing deficiencies, modernizing, etc. We should fix these things first. If we become involved in a ten percent reduction it will be more difficult to fix the things that need it. We might not do the things that we should do anyway.

Mr. Kissinger: A 30 percent reduction just magnifies the ten percent reduction problem even if it is symmetrical. We haven't done the same kind of work that we did on SALT. Although I have seen vague references to verifiability, they have not been developed with the precision as in SALT. We need to get a detailed judgment on the range of error. How sensitive would any MBFR agreement be to verifiability? Would reductions be made from actual strength or from authorized strength? How would we convince the other side of the base from which we were drawing down? What if they say they will pull out ten percent of each unit rather than pulling out entire units? Could we verify this?

General Cushman: It would be very difficult.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we insist that they could only pull out whole units?

Mr. Packard: This is a very important point. Speaking of a ten percent reduction is a vast oversimplification of the problem. We would have to be specific on what would be reduced and how.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Wayne Smith) We need a study on this: how would we find out, how would we confirm, what countermeasures could we take, what lead time would be required?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We also need a definition of what would be permitted by way of replacement or modernization.

Mr. Kissinger: We would need this for any kind of reduction. Since symmetrical reductions aren't good on security grounds, how about asymmetrical reductions? In SALT we tried to find trade-offs for the SS 9's which worried us. Is there anything we could trade off for tanks and reinforcement and mobilization capability? How could we inhibit their reinforcement capability? How can we define it? What can we of-

fer in an asymmetrical reduction? Tactical nuclear weapons might be one example. We might give up some forward deployment of aircraft. How can we assess these questions? These are only ideas, not an instruction of any kind.

Mr. Schlesinger: We might consider sustaining support units.

Mr. Kissinger: We need an analysis of the basic restraints and collateral restraints as we did for SALT.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Will this procedure lead to anything in time for the NATO Ministerial Meeting? Do we have the same NSC date?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, November 18. At some point we should bring the Europeans into the thinking we have done. Should this be done at the NATO Ministerial Meeting?

Mr. Irwin: We would prefer it before.

Mr. Spiers: We have prepared a sanitized version of the paper for circulation.

Mr. Kissinger: I think that would be premature.

Mr. Irwin: It would not be premature in time but it might be premature given the status of this discussion.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Ministerial Meeting is December 3–4.

Mr. Irwin: We have raised so many questions here today that I doubt they will be resolved by December. The basic political question does need solution, however. By the time of the Ministerial Meeting we have to know whether or not to hold firm on the basic force structure.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we can probably make this decision, at least in a preliminary way, by the Ministerial Meeting.

Mr. Irwin: We may have to make the political decision separate from the military decisions within the next brief period.

Mr. Kissinger: We are talking only of a three-week delay. When the inevitable questions come, we would be better prepared to answer them if all these questions had been considered and if we have some expression from the President of where we want to go.

Mr. Irwin: We may have to make the force level decision apart from the decisions within the US.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's try to keep the discussion confined to the US until after the NSC meeting.

Mr. Farley: In the meantime, we might look at the sanitized version of the paper and get it ready to go so that we can move quickly after the NSC meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: This might raise all the other questions, however.

52. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

The President's Summary

For 20 years, we have viewed a strong cohesive NATO supported by the presence of substantial U.S. forces as essential to the pursuit of basic U.S. objectives in Europe. In this context, we now face major decisions on U.S. strategy and forces for NATO over the next five years. The key issues are:

- the likely Warsaw Pact threat and the present military capabilities of NATO;
- the military strategy consistent with our overall objectives in Europe and the forces required to support it;
- the possible improvements in NATO forces and alternative ways of sharing the defense burden;
- the approaches to reductions in U.S. forces either unilaterally or as part of a mutual force reduction by NATO and the Pact.

Although designed to counter a military threat, the U.S. commitment and support for NATO make it a “European power” offsetting the political influence the Soviets could otherwise exercise.

The Warsaw Pact Threat

We and our NATO Allies believe that the Soviets will be deterred from an attack on NATO within the foreseeable future. In particular, the Soviets probably find that there is:

- a high risk that even a limited conflict in Central Europe would escalate to general war;
- a strong possibility that NATO's forces would prevent Soviet conventional forces from achieving their objectives.

Nevertheless, events such as an uprising in an Eastern European country or a miscalculation in a test of wills over Berlin or the Middle East could trigger a crisis leading to hostilities.

Should hostilities break out, the Soviets would probably attack in the Center Region of Europe. While this attack would be initially conventional, the Soviets do not believe that the conventional phase of a conflict would last more than a few days because of the weakness of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-167, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 84. Secret; Sensitive. This paper summarizes both a 66-page “NATO Issue Paper (NSSMs 84 and 92)” and separate “Basic Papers” for NSSMs 84 and 92. (Ibid.) The paper was prepared for the NSC meeting of November 19, 1970 (see Document 53). Additional material on this meeting is located *ibid.*, Boxes H-029 and H-030, NSC Meeting—NATO and MBFR 11/19/70.

NATO's conventional forces. If NATO used tactical nuclear weapons in an attempt to halt the Soviet attack, the planned Soviet response would most likely be a large theater-wide nuclear strike, including attacks on cities, followed up by a strong ground offensive penetrating through the holes in NATO's defenses created by a nuclear attack.

At present, Soviet doctrine, exercises, and force design suggest that the Soviets neither plan for nor are capable of carrying on hostilities in Europe in which large numbers of nuclear weapons are not used.

The Military Balance

Worldwide, NATO has a very significant advantage over the Warsaw Pact in the resources available for and devoted to its defense effort. Including the U.S. contribution, NATO outnumbered the Pact 3:1 in population, almost 2:1 in defense expenditures, and has about 25% more men under arms during peacetime. With this overall resource advantage, NATO is able to maintain forces in Europe that are roughly comparable to the Warsaw Pact forces. In the critical Center Region for example:

—*In manpower*, NATO has an active ground strength of about 757,000 men, slightly less than the Pact's 818,000 men.

—*In aircraft*, NATO is numerically inferior to the Pact by a large margin. However, NATO has larger external aircraft reserves, its aircraft are qualitatively superior to the Pact's, and a large portion of Pact aircraft are designed for a defensive role.

—*In tanks*, NATO has an inventory of about 11,000 tanks compared to the Soviets 13,000 tanks. At present, only about half (6,000) of NATO's tank force, however, are in active units and the Pact would have an immediate numerical advantage of about 2:1. The NATO forces here again are qualitatively superior.

—*In naval forces*, NATO has a 2:1 numerical advantage over the Pact except in attack submarines. Our NATO allies alone have as many major warships as the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviets.

While NATO's strength is in manpower and air/naval forces, the Pact has a major advantage in its mobilization and reinforcement capability and armored forces. Whereas the Pact can mobilize and deploy a force about twice the size of its peacetime deployment within three weeks or less, NATO is relatively slow in mobilizing, largely because of the low readiness of U.S. ground forces. For example,

—The NATO Allies, like the Soviets, can mobilize and deploy their forces within three weeks.

—The U.S. is unable to deploy any ground forces in less than 20 days (the period required for full Pact mobilization). Deployment of our strategic reserve (3-2/3 divisions) is planned to take at least 45 days but, given current readiness, would actually take a month or two longer. U.S. reserve units would not be ready for deployment for about six months.

Because the U.S. is slow to reinforce with ground forces, the Warsaw Pact could gain a clear advantage if the time available for mobilization were short and the Pact started before NATO. For example, a detailed comparison of the Pact and NATO capabilities led to the conclusions that under present circumstances:

—If the Pact makes a surprise attack after a few days of mobilization, it would have superior forces but probably could not penetrate NATO's defenses near the West German border.

—If the Pact achieves a two-week level in mobilization and attacks, there is a high probability that NATO defenses would be penetrated.

—If both sides mobilize simultaneously for more than 30 days, NATO forces rapidly improve their position relative to the Pact. After 60 days of mobilization, the Pact's chances of breaking through NATO's defenses would be greatly reduced.

While the Pact might overwhelm NATO following a Pact mobilization to which NATO did not respond, NATO has sufficient strength to deny the Soviets any real assurance of success if there is either very limited or nearly complete mobilization by both sides. Since a full-scale Soviet attack would probably be preceded by some warning, this means that NATO has sufficient conventional forces overall to carry out a conventional defense under most circumstances. The principal uncertainties bearing on this judgment are:

—*Warning.* The intelligence community believes that we would have indicators of Pact mobilization "possibly almost immediately but certainly within a week" after it had started. This delay could alone give the Pact a significant advantage since it only takes them three weeks to mobilize and deploy their forces. Moreover, even if clear warning were received, there is a real risk that our NATO Allies would not respond by making military preparations lest they provoke the Soviets.

—*Mobilization Time.* Given the delays involved in receiving a warning of Pact mobilization and reacting to it, it is unlikely that NATO would mobilize simultaneously with the Pact. If the Pact led NATO by several weeks early in the mobilization process, it could gain a nearly decisive advantage.

—*War Outcomes.* There is some risk that a NATO defense could fail even if NATO had very large forces. At the start of World War II 2.5 million Germans were able to overwhelm the 2.7 million men in the Allied force. Later in the war, the Soviets frequently failed in offensives even with five to ten times as many men as the Germans. Clearly, leadership and morale are as important in warfare as the relative size of the contending forces.

In spite of these uncertainties, we probably have large enough forces to have a real conventional option in case of Soviet attack. The real problems are a number of qualitative deficiencies in the NATO force posture that badly need correction and could prove critical in time of war. These deficiencies and the force improvements needed to correct them are discussed below:

—*Insufficient tank and anti-tank weapons.* While NATO forces in Europe match the Pact in manpower on M-Day and exceed them thereafter, the Pact forces could have up to three times as many tanks available for combat. While NATO has large tank reserves and an effective anti-tank capability, NATO forces need more tanks and anti-tank weapons if they are to have a good capability against a Pact armored attack. A suitable program would cost between \$500 million and \$1.5 billion per year.

—*Insufficient Sustaining Capability.* At present, our Allies would be unable to continue fighting for more than 20 days because of shortages of ammunition and other reserves. The U.S. currently stocks about 90 days of most war materials in Europe. Since supplies from the U.S. could reach Europe in 75 days, these reserves would allow us to sustain our forces indefinitely. The Allied capability could be increased to 30 days for only \$100 million per year, and to 60 days for \$240 million per year.

—*Aircraft Vulnerability.* A significant portion of U.S. aircraft and all Allied aircraft are not sheltered against surprise attack. All Soviet aircraft are sheltered. A surprise attack on NATO's airfields early in a conflict could destroy a large portion of our force on the ground. Providing shelters for all aircraft would cost \$100 million per year.

—*Mobilization and Reinforcement.* Our active divisions could probably not be deployed to Europe for several months. We and our Allies have had little experience in mobilization or reinforcement on the scale needed. In contrast, the Pact has had several partial mobilizations, including the one preceding the Czechoslovakia invasions, and regularly holds large exercises. Some improvements in U.S. and Allied readiness could be made for only \$140 million per year.

Unless we solve these problems by pressing for a joint U.S./Allied force improvements package, we may find our conventional forces weak despite the availability of enough manpower and equipment. On the other hand, if we and our Allies do make these improvements, at relatively little cost, we will have a strong conventional option should a conflict break out. The willingness of our Allies to make these improvements would be enhanced if they were assured that the U.S. would assist them by maintaining strong forces itself.

The U.S. Strategy for NATO

There are three principal strategies that NATO might consider in the event of Warsaw Pact aggression.

- Use of conventional forces exclusively.
- Early response with nuclear weapons to any unambiguous attack.
- A “flexible response” strategy that does not preclude either response. Whether and when nuclear weapons would be used would depend on how the conflict develops.

NATO has formally adhered to a “flexible response” strategy since 1967. This strategy envisions responding to a Warsaw Pact attack in kind or through deliberate and “controlled” escalation. While NATO

commanders have a variety of war plans intended to cover the large number of possible contingencies, the emphasis is on defending NATO's territory as far forward as possible using conventional forces.

Within the NATO "flexible response" strategy, you have approved a U.S. posture of "initial defense" for NATO. This means that forces in Europe and reinforcements from the U.S. should be able, with Allied forces, to defend conventionally for about 90 days against a full-scale invasion following a period of political crisis and military preparations by both sides. NATO forces should, under this strategy, be able to cope with smaller attacks or ones developing more slowly, but not with a massive Warsaw Pact attack following a concealed mobilization.

To implement this strategy, the U.S. presently maintains substantial forces for the support of NATO.

In Western Europe, the U.S. has deployed 4-1/3 Army divisions, 21 tactical fighter squadrons, and two carrier task groups in the Mediterranean. Total military authorized for June, 1970, was about 327,000. Because of drawdowns for Southeast Asia, the actual strength of our forces in Europe is about 300,000 of whom about 206,000 are stationed in the FRG. The U.S. direct budget cost of this force is about \$3 billion a year and the net balance of payment outflow is about \$1.7 billion.

Outside Western Europe, the U.S. also has substantial other forces that are planned for NATO. These forces, although earmarked for NATO, are not maintained solely for that purpose and some might be allocated to other theaters to implement national strategy. Active forces currently planned for NATO include 8-1/3 Army divisions, two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 41 Air Force squadrons, eight attack carrier task groups, and four ASW carrier task groups.

In assessing the adequacy of the forces there are a few key variables:

—*Defense Objectives*. We plan to defend "forward" along the FRG border. If less demanding defense objectives, such as defense at the Rhine were chosen, NATO would be able to hold a Pact attack with substantially fewer forces than at present. Such strategies would be unacceptable to the Allies, particularly the West Germans.

—*Allied Contribution*. Our Allies now contribute about four-fifths of NATO's manpower and equipment. For this reason, small changes in our Allies' forces, such as the improvements outlined above, could have a greater effect on NATO capabilities than relatively large changes in U.S. forces. Moreover, there is little doubt that the Allies are economically capable of further increasing their contribution. While they have a collective GNP about equal to the U.S.'s, they spend about one-third as much on defense.

—*War Length*. We currently structure our forces for NATO to fight an indefinite war in Europe. Since our Allies are not able to logistically sustain a conflict for more than 45 days, even if they shared U.S. supplies, and the Soviets also plan for a short war, this assumption may not

be reasonable. If the U.S. planned on a 60-day or shorter war, it might reduce its support forces to increase immediate combat capability and maintain overseas deployments since external reinforcement would be difficult.

—*Budget.* The cost of all the forces we maintain for NATO (in place forces plus other forces in the U.S. clearly earmarked for NATO) is about \$14 billion per year. It is clear that less than one-fifth of the total cost of U.S. forces for NATO results from the U.S. forces stationed in or near Europe. If large budgetary savings were necessary, they could probably be best obtained from U.S. forces outside Europe.

—*Reinforcement.* We can rapidly reinforce NATO with air and naval forces. Ground forces cannot be rapidly deployed unless their equipment is prepositioned in Europe and they are ready to be committed. At present, a large portion of the ground forces that we plan for NATO could not be deployed rapidly enough to have any significant effect on the outcome of a war in Europe. Our reserve divisions, for example, are not planned for deployment until 26 weeks after a conflict had started.

With large reductions in the size and readiness of our overall force structure, the importance of maintaining adequate forward-deployed forces is increased because external reinforcement becomes more difficult. *Given our present strategy and defense objectives, therefore, there is good reason for substantial U.S. forces, particularly ground units, to be retained in Europe unless the Allies prove willing and able to increase their defensive capabilities.* The reduction of forward-deployed air or naval forces would decrease NATO's military capabilities to a lesser degree since these forces can be rapidly re-introduced.

NATO Nuclear Strategy

At present, we place primary reliance on conventional and our strategic forces to deter and, if deterrence fails, defend against a Warsaw Pact attack. If it were feasible to deter the Soviets through tactical nuclear weapons, this could allow us to make major reductions in our conventional strength. The fact remains that NATO could be placed in a position where a decision would have to be made between accepting conventional defeat and using tactical nuclear weapons.

Under such circumstances, it would be very difficult to rely on tactical nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

—The NATO forces contain many small-yield nuclear weapons that could be used to limit damage. There is little assurance, however, that the Soviets could respond in a similar manner since they have few small-yield weapons.

—The NATO and Pact tactical nuclear forces each contain large numbers of survivable nuclear forces. Even if NATO struck first against the Warsaw Pact forces, the Pact could counter-attack killing half the urban population of Western Europe, using only its non-strategic nuclear forces.

—The facilities and forces of NATO are probably more vulnerable to attack than the Pact's. With fewer than 100 nuclear warheads, the Pact could close NATO's major ports, cripple its depot system, and destroy a substantial portion of its forces.

While we have much to learn about nuclear weapons, there is little or no reason to believe that their use would result in an outcome favorable to NATO. Given present Pact doctrine and capabilities, it is also likely that any extensive first use by NATO would result in a massive Pact counter-attack against Europe's cities and escalation to strategic warfare.

While our tactical nuclear forces should probably be maintained, there is broad agreement that the U.S. cannot place primary reliance on them for either deterrence or war-fighting capability. We should plan to retain a strong conventional capability.

Mutual Force Reductions

Since 1967, the U.S. has taken the lead in pursuing MBFR studies in NATO and in seeing that signals to the Pact favoring MBFR were incorporated in NATO communiqués. In June of this year, the Pact responded cautiously but favorably to these signals by suggesting discussion of the reduction of "foreign forces on the territories of European states."² We are now faced with the operational question of formulating an answer to the Pact signal in the communiqué resulting from the NATO Ministerial Meeting this December. Our Allies will be pressing us to approve a favorable response.

There are essentially 3 courses of action open to us:

—*Back off* from our support of MBFR.

—*Actively seek a politically based approach* in the form of a small reduction in stationed forces linked to possible later reductions in indigenous forces.

—*Continue to give general support* to the concept of MBFR and encourage further studies to identify approaches which would improve NATO's military position. These could be either a major arms control approach involving large symmetrical reductions and constraints on the Pact mobilization and reinforcement capability or a corrective approach involving so-called mixed package tradeoffs which could, for example, reduce the Pact advantage in armor.

We need to think very carefully about the advantages and disadvantages of all these approaches in both military and political terms since

—*There appears to be no symmetrical approach to MBFR which would improve NATO's military position although preliminary analysis indicates that small mutual reductions would have a minimal effect on the military balance.*

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 30.

—We have not been able to identify negotiable collateral constraints which would inhibit Pact mobilization and reinforcement without harming NATO at the same time.

—The feasibility of an approach embodying “mixed package tradeoffs” has not been established.

—We have just scratched the surface in thinking about verification problems.

—The political advantages of seeking an MBFR agreement could prove to be illusory if the Soviets tried to use MBFR to weaken the will of the Alliance to maintain adequate defense forces.

Options for Decision

Earlier discussion of the key issues we face in NATO indicates that crucial decisions must be made regarding:

—The military strategy for NATO preferred by the U.S.

—The level and structure of U.S. forces for NATO in both the short run (e.g., FY 72) and the long run.

—The force improvements to be made by the U.S. and its Allies and their relationship to financial support and offset arrangements.

—U.S. support for the concept of mutual and balanced force reductions and possible for a particular approach to MBFR.

A variety of alternatives for dealing with all of these problems has been presented. They could be combined in many ways to construct options encompassing our overall approach to NATO. From the set of possible options, five have been developed which are believed to be representative of the wide range of feasible choices. All of these options assume continuation of the “flexible response” strategy to which NATO has formally adhered since 1967 although there is some variation in the supporting strategy adopted by the U.S.

The attached chart summarizes the principal features of the five options, two of which contain a variant. The advantages and disadvantages of each would be briefly as follows:

—*Option 1: Initial Conventional Defense Strategy with Sustaining Capabilities and Force Improvements* would improve U.S. and Allied war-fighting capabilities, assure our Allies of our continuing commitment to NATO and discourage the Soviets from playing a waiting game on MBFR and other European security issues. It would be resisted, however, by those in the U.S., particularly in Congress, who want to see substantial U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe and would result in increased balance of payment and budgetary costs. *This option is recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

—*Option 2: Initial Conventional Defense (60 Days) With Restructuring and Force Improvements* would have substantially the same advantages and disadvantages as Option 1 except that it would increase immediate combat capabilities while reducing staying power.

—*Option 3A: Initial Conventional Defense with Small Reductions (25,000 men in Forward Deployed Forces) but no Definite Approach to MBFR* would at least maintain immediate combat capabilities and would result in small balance of payments and budgetary savings in the long-run. It would, however, reduce U.S. sustaining capability for a conventional war but still leave a capability greater than the Allies and possibly the Pact and could also reduce U.S. credibility with its Allies in the light of past reductions and recent assurances. In addition, it might not be sufficient to satisfy groups in the U.S. which want to see substantial withdrawals from Europe. This option is the short-term policy recommended by Secretary Laird.

—*Option 3B: Initial Conventional Defense with Small Reductions (25,000 men in Forward Deployed Forces) Through a Basically Political Approach to MBFR* would have substantially the same advantages and disadvantages as Option 3A except that it would maintain U.S. credibility with the Allies. This option is recommended by Secretary Rogers and ACDA.

—*Option 4A: Initial Conventional Defense with Significant Reductions (50,000 men in Forward Deployed Forces) and No MBFR* would satisfy groups in the U.S. who want immediate and substantial withdrawals from Europe and would result in substantial balance of payments and budgetary savings. It would, however, substantially reduce NATO conventional combat capabilities and make it difficult to obtain Allied force improvements while causing the Allies to doubt U.S. credibility and weakening their perception of the U.S. commitment to NATO. In addition, it could weaken the prospects for détente and cause the Soviets to perceive the existence of a military advantage which could be exploited in peacetime as well as in wartime.

—*Option 4B: Initial Conventional Defense with Significant Reductions (50,000 men in Forward Deployed Forces) Through an Arms Control or Corrective Approach to MBFR* would result in significant cost and balance of payments savings once the MBFR agreement was negotiated and would probably provide enough leverage to get the Allies to make at least some force improvements. It could also quiet some of the opposition in the U.S. to current deployments in Europe (but not satisfy those who want immediate withdrawals), discourage the Soviets from playing a waiting game on European security issues and enhance the prospects for détente. Depending on the content of the MBFR agreement, it could, however, reduce relative warfighting capabilities and give the Soviets the opportunity to try and weaken the will of our Allies to maintain adequate defense forces.

—*Option 5: Initial Conventional Defense with Very Substantial Reductions (in Forward Deployed Forces roughly 150,000 men) and a Major Shift in Force Burden to Allies (Or Increased Reliance on Nuclear Weapons)* would

defuse domestic opposition to our present [apparent omission] and budgetary savings. It would, however, have a number of major disadvantages:

—It would be strongly resisted by the Allies, would cause them to doubt U.S. credibility, and would probably remove their incentive to maintain present forces, much less make force improvements.

—It would, therefore, substantially reduce NATO warfighting capabilities and make U.S. troops appear more as “hostages.” In addition, should deterrence fail, there would be no assurance that use of nuclear weapons would assure an outcome favorable to NATO.

—It would make MBFR a dead letter and thus reduce the prospects for détente while causing the Soviets to perceive a military advantage which could be exploited in peacetime as well as wartime.

This option is the long term policy for NATO recommended by Secretary Laird.

53. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, November 19, 1970, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon	David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State	John N. Irwin II, Under Secretary of State
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense	Philip J. Farley, Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness	George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury	Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John N. Mitchell, Attorney General	Dr. Edward David, Science Advisor to the President
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	Col. Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence	Dr. K. Wayne Smith, NSC Staff
George P. Shultz, Director, Office of Management and Budget	Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Amb. Robert F. Ellsworth, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO	
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe	

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:09 a.m. to 12:12 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) In Kissinger's briefing memorandum to the President, he wrote: "*Since we cannot expect to deter the Soviets with our strategic forces, we and our Allies must maintain strong enough conventional forces to be able to meet Soviet aggression or the threat of it implicit in their substantial forces.* Unless we and our Allies rework our NATO strategy and forces so that they can provide this capability, we will soon experience the gradual 'neutralization' of Western Europe. To avoid this situation, we must act vigorously to maintain NATO's conventional capability while developing a strategy for its use that makes sense in this fundamentally new strategic situation." Kissinger proposed doing more than give general support to the concept of MBFR, including consideration of various approaches to the subject, in order to improve NATO's military position for the following reasons: "We have not been able to identify negotiable 'collateral constraints' which would inhibit Pact mobilization and reinforcement without harming NATO at the same time. We have just scratched the surface in thinking about verification problems. The political and arms control advantages of an MBFR agreement could prove to be illusory if the Soviets tried to use MBFR to weaken the will of the Alliance to maintain adequate defense forces." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 260, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IX) Kissinger wrote about these comments in *White House Years*, pp. 401-402.

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting: NATO & MBFR

[The meeting began with a briefing by Director Helms² on the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance in Europe.]³

President Nixon: The assumption used to be that any war in the NATO area would escalate automatically into general nuclear war. That was the view in the old McNamara⁴ period. Is there an estimate now in the NATO area that there is less chance of escalation to nuclear war?

General Goodpaster: The estimates are much more qualified now.

President Nixon: I really don't see why. It seems more likely that they might use nuclear weapons now.

General Goodpaster: Our capability for assured destruction against the Soviets is very high.

President Nixon: But what about the risks we would take if we do that?

General Goodpaster: The Soviet attitude seems to be this. Since the Cuban missile crisis, they have a much more sobered view of the risks to them of a high-intensity provocation of the U.S. The same is true in Europe; they have shown more inhibition than before. The Europeans are convinced of this; they see the U.S. assured destruction capability as inhibiting the Soviet use of their MRBM's or IRBM's against Europe.

President Nixon: But Americans are more afraid than previously.

[Director Helms resumes his briefing with a discussion of MBFR.]

President Nixon: Are there any questions of Director Helms?

Director Lincoln: What is the view of the NATO countries on the results of a nuclear exchange?

General Goodpaster: They haven't any positive views. They are sensitive to the location of our nuclear weapons in our forward bases, particularly those countries where our forward-based Tac Air are located.

Acting Director Farley: The Soviets are concerned in SALT about our forward-based aircraft. They want to limit them in the agreement.

Secretary Laird: Only a few of them can reach the Soviet Union. The F-111's will increase the number, however.

Admiral Moorer: The Soviets don't distinguish between tac-nucs and strategic weapons if they are landing in the USSR.

² No written record of this briefing has been found.

³ All brackets are in the original.

⁴ Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

President Nixon: Henry? Could you review the issues?

Dr. Kissinger: I want to emphasize two basic points:

First, at the height of the period of American nuclear superiority, the Europeans always asked us for a tangible guarantee of our commitment. They wanted U.S. forces to be stationed in areas we considered vital. Thus even during the period of the massive retaliation doctrine, we had large American conventional forces in areas where a nuclear thrust was most plausible. Thus, secondly, we were trying to give our forces a military role and our allies wanted them to have a political role—for them it was not so much a military role as a role in eliminating the threat of general nuclear war.

The problem now is to work out what objectives we seek and can achieve with these forces. We want to avoid any actions which would lead our allies in the direction of neutralism but we also want to avoid a situation in which our forces exist there but without any viable strategy.

Thus we did a comprehensive study and we found the following:

- NATO is within reach of a capability to defend against large-scale Soviet conventional attacks.

- They—the Soviets—have a faster capability for mobilization than NATO.

- There is a serious supply imbalance.

- An important consideration is our intelligence capability and our ability to make quick political decisions. If they get a two-week jump, they have a big advantage.

- Whether NATO wants to close the gap is a question.

- There is also the fact that we know more about what goes on in East Germany than in Western Russia, and that is a problem.

- If we can get warning and can react quickly, we can do reasonably well.

- The best-equipped of our forces are deployed in the Southern NATO area, whereas this is not the likely major attack route. That is also the location of our major supply backup.

- If the President wants the Alliance to have a substantial conventional capability in Europe, it is within reach. The Allies can and should move. If the gaps are not closed, then we should look at other alternatives which would make the forces we have there relevant.

- We have large tactical nuclear weapons storage in Europe. How would they be used? Would it help in defense? Would it be an irrevocable move toward strategic war? We have improved our command and control procedures. But the study we did could not develop a clear picture of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

- Against this background we looked at MBFR. Tactical nuclear forces have an important bearing in this area.

The tentative conclusions of the MBFR study are the following:

- Symmetrical reductions favor the Warsaw Pact, unless they are so small as to be purely symbolic.

—Ideally, reductions should favor the defense over the offense in order to reduce the incentive for attack.

—Thus we should look at asymmetrical reductions. We are now doing so, in order to develop trade-off packages. These analyses are not yet sufficiently advanced to make recommendations.

The basic guidance needed is what strategy you wish to pursue. If we depend on our strategic nuclear forces, then the question of American forces in Europe is not so relevant. But if our forces are geared to an intermediate objective, we need a doctrine for the use of theater nuclear weapons. If we think the nuclear threat is diminishing or if we want our forces on the continent for political reasons, we still need a strategy which makes them militarily relevant if their continued deployment is to be supported by the American people, the Congress and our allies. We need then to make the improvements that we have discussed.

Our approach to MBFR is then cast in the light of our decisions.

Secretary Rogers: The word, “balanced” in MBFR means they have to be balanced. That is the key. Balanced does not mean symmetrical. Secondly we must not negotiate under time pressure. It is clear that the Soviets are not thinking about negotiations. It’s a convenient way to delay a European Security Conference which we don’t want. And we should not move to unilateral reductions. We have to decide whether we want to reduce unilaterally—I am against it. Our policy of keeping them there is sound. Our forces are essential to the security arrangements in Europe and to the credibility of our policy. Unilateral reductions would concern our allies and lead them to seek deals with the USSR that would be harmful to our security.

We should not decide anything on MBFR now. We should continue to study it. But we should give a clear signal to our allies that we intend to keep our forces there and will not unilaterally reduce them. But we should make clear that they need to do more; that is important for our Congressional attitudes.

Secretary Laird: The primary objective of our military strategy is to give the President a choice other than between losing Western Europe and going to an all-out strategic exchange. Our strategy has to give us more than a few days of conventional defense. We need a conventional force which is a major deterrent—and that involves a tactical nuclear capability.

We have to depend more on our allies’ contribution if we are going to have this posture. The allies don’t want to recognize this. Their assumption is that the U.S. has a sufficient deterrent so that any conventional attack means an inevitable strategic exchange. This idea has permeated allied thinking. We must get the allies to see that things have changed. They can afford it and so can we. Their GNP is a third greater

than the Pact's; their manpower is equal to that of the Pact and the USSR. We have to provide for sufficient forces to assure a conventional deterrent.

I don't think the paper faces up to the manpower, fiscal and political problems that we face in the United States. NATO problems are fortunately handled by the right Congressional Committees; we have these commitments before the Armed Services Committees which are favorable to the Administration.

It is important to talk about capabilities, not specific numbers. We should talk not about specific numbers of personnel or items of equipment—we should talk about capabilities. The allies have the ball in their court; they are for the first time discussing ways in which they can share the burden and increase their own forces. They admit they are not sharing the burden properly. Schmidt is discussing in the UK now; Carington will be here next week. They are pressing each other. Our contribution has increased annually over the last ten years, and this is not the case for most of the allies.

Ambassador Ellsworth: The trend of the thinking in the NAC ministers' meeting is this: There is increased awareness by the allies of the changed nature of the strategic balance. There is increased awareness of the need for a local conventional balance. The Allied study (AD 70)⁵ has got them thinking of the need for improved and increased efforts in specific areas to make meaningful a viable conventional strategy. The trend of their thinking, therefore, is toward a real conventional defense strategy, and the defense ministries want to support this.

There must be follow-up both in NATO and in governments. We need a shift of focus in the NATO organizations and in governments toward conventional forces and the related budgets. This should be the glamour side now, not the nuclear side.

Our presentation must be that US force levels are tied to our strategy. I hope all of us will relate to the basic questions of our strategic objective and to the political facts, rather than to our own budget process.

President Nixon: Are you selling the Senators? [to Ambassador Ellsworth]

Ambassador Ellsworth: I'm not sure they've been sold but I'm making strong efforts.

Secretary Laird: There have been many statements by the Parliamentarians. They unanimously favored financial assistance to ease the US burden of keeping our forces there. Rivers brought them along.

⁵ See Document 55.

Vinson⁶ has been pressing Armed Services on the grounds that because the Germans are agreeing with the USSR, we should make substantial reductions.

President Nixon: The key to what we do is what effect does it have on Germany. Isn't it possible that reductions could result in the opposite reaction by the Germans? Some Europeans would think to move toward the Russians because they are uneasy about more US reductions. Will we reassure them if we retain our forces, or will we shock them into doing more by reducing ourselves?

Ambassador Ellsworth: I agree that reductions would push them toward the Russians.

Secretary Rogers: I agree with Ellsworth.

General Goodpaster: Brandt will accelerate his policy if we reduce. If the other party comes in, it would be unpredictable.

Secretary Rogers: Some in the German government would want to move more toward the USSR, and a move on our part to reduce our forces would play into their hands. If we stay firm we can keep Brandt firm; otherwise we can't.

Can we set up a group like the NPG for conventional forces?

Secretary Laird: It's being discussed by the DPC.

Secretary Rogers: Can we move faster?

Ambassador Ellsworth: We need to set up machinery to follow up on the AD-70 study.

Secretary Laird: We will do this at the next meeting.

Secretary Rogers: Unilateral reductions would be wrong.

Secretary Laird: The manpower problem has a serious effect on our strategy. The FRG has a short-term draft and is moving in the direction of a shorter term of service. This has a bad effect on readiness.

President Nixon: Andy, how do you see the problem?

General Goodpaster: Mr. President, the work we have done is substantial. It's ten years since we have had a real NATO policy. There is promise now that the Europeans see they need to take on more of the burden and improve their own forces. This has gotten to the political levels now.

Much of the ammunition and POL is common. They know we have stocks and they have planned to use them. We should press them to increase their own stocks. Given our assumptions about the length of a war, it would be unsound to make the decision not to provide unin-

⁶ Representative L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and apparent reference to Carl Vinson, former Representative (D-GA) and Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

interrupted support for our forces. Reserve stocks of Soviets remains a major question. We don't know what they have beyond 30 days even though their facilities exist far beyond this. 60 days is not a finite limit. You would ration to extend this on both sides in practice, but this means the forces are less than fully effective.

We shouldn't forget that there is a normal process of adjustment of forces. New systems come in and make some forces redundant and permit some reductions.

Let me say something about the strategy question we've been discussing and the role of nuclear weapons. Our strategy is more concrete than just a doctrine of flexible response. It is based primarily on the deterrent but it cannot be divorced from our actual defense capability. It is a strong deterrent based on a limited defense capability, at medium risk and medium cost. A full conventional defense capability would be a low-risk/high-cost strategy. A high-risk/low-cost strategy would be the tripwire approach.

A limited defense capability means the following: At present, we have a high prospect of success against small-scale or limited attacks. That is important.

Against a full-scale sustained attack, we have a limited capability in time. We just can't say how long we could hold exactly but we expect we could hold for a significant period but not indefinitely. But we are not even certain of that. The crucial factors are not assessable—like leadership, the direction of attack, etc.

What about the tactical nuclear option? We have a near full capability, probably superior to the Pact's. But the outcomes are rather murky; our requirements are based on the premise of destroying the enemy order of battle. Escalation is always possible but perhaps unlikely because of the strategic deterrent. Soviet officers have an acute sense of the importance of protection of the homeland. Assured destruction is always the back-up which supports the other elements of the strategy.

We have some problems. One is redeployments. A change of boundaries to the north would probably result in having fewer Belgians forward. On tactical nuclear weapons, there are divisive problems here. The Europeans want to see nuclears used but on the Green Belt theory, i.e., on territory that is not their own. On the question of theater use of nuclear weapons, the first concept is selective use to meet the local situation with the maximum possible constraint. Many of the above aspects of this strategy would be the subject of debate if we wanted to make them more explicit.

We need to hold firm.

The consensus seems to be that we must keep our conventional forces in SACEUR. The fact that the Russians are looking both ways—

they have even more divisions on the Chinese border—adds validity to this imperative.

Director Lincoln: We would have less of a danger of having to use tactical nuclear weapons if our conventional force are stronger.

President Nixon: It is clear from the discussion that any strategy without a credible deterrent would mean the Soviet domination of Europe. In the 1950s massive retaliation and the tripwire approach were valid. When in the 1960s we accepted nuclear parity, it became no longer credible that a conventional force attack would result in a tactical or strategic nuclear attack—but at the same time it is not now credible that a conventional attack could be met with a purely conventional response. Under these circumstances, if the deterrent too is credible we must have nuclear parity and also a significant conventional capability in which we are an important part. If we are without that capability, the Soviets could move.

This discussion must center on the effect on the Germans of what we do. Their response will not necessarily be rational; probably it will be emotional. They are a vigorous people, denied the use of their own weapons, who will make a deal with whoever is Number One. If they reach the conclusion that the U.S. is withdrawing, they will go into a psychological frenzy.

It is not insignificant that the Russians always emphasize that they think they are superior to the US in nuclear forces. They say this to get France, the UK, Germany and Japan to have doubts about the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and also to show who is Number One. We lose leverage as Number Two. We know the facts but we want to emphasize them to those who don't know them. So no one should concede that the USSR is ahead. We should point out, as we do, that they are moving ahead with SS-9s and nuclear subs—but we should stress that our overall strength is sufficient. Otherwise we are in a dangerous position with the Japanese and our NATO allies, particularly the FRG.

We need to rethink our whole NATO strategy. We never will use the tactical nuclears, but we let the USSR see them there. Without a credible conventional force that can hold for 90 days or more, the Russians could be tempted.

General Goodpaster: This is why we should press on making improvements and not debate about reductions. Confidence and standing firm is the keynote. The note of readiness to act and to act affirmatively is important to our allies.

Mr. Packard: We can't do this with lower budgets.

President Nixon: I know that.

[The meeting adjourned.]

54. National Security Decision Memorandum 95¹

Washington, November 25, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
 The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO

On the basis of the discussion at the NSC meeting on November 19, 1970,² concerning U.S. Forces and Strategy for NATO, the President has decided that U.S. policy will be guided by the following principles:

—In view of the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it is vital that NATO have a credible conventional defense posture to deter and, if necessary, defend against conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces.

—Increased emphasis should be given to defense by conventional forces.

—Accordingly, Allied forces, including U.S. forces in Europe and reinforcements from the U.S., must be capable of a strong and credible initial conventional defense against a full-scale attack, assuming a period of warning and of mobilization by both sides. The immediate combat capability of NATO forces, both U.S. and Allied, should also be enhanced to provide greater assurance of defending against attacks made after the Pact gains a lead in mobilization.

The President has directed that the following specific steps be taken to give effect to his decisions:

1. *U.S. Force Planning*

The President directs that the size and structure of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces maintained in support of NATO commitments, both in Europe and elsewhere, should be consistent with the strategy of initial conventional defense for a period of 90 days against a full-scale Warsaw Pact attack assuming a period of warning and mobilization by both sides. This strategy shall apply to all aspects of U.S. force and resource planning.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM 95. Top Secret; NoFORN. Copies were sent to the Attorney General; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Director, Office of Management and Budget.

² See Document 53.

In particular, U.S. forces for NATO should be developed so as to enhance the immediate combat capability of U.S. forces in Europe and elsewhere to provide maximum assurance that an initial conventional defense would be successful.

Consistent with this overall strategy, the President directs that the end FY 71 authorized level of U.S. forces in Western Europe (319,000) shall be maintained and the actual strength of these forces kept as close to this level as possible. Any proposed changes to this level should be referred to the President for his consideration.

2. U.S. and Allied Force Improvements

The President reaffirms the principle established in NSDM 88³ that priority emphasis should be given to Allied and U.S. force improvements. Illustrations of areas where our ongoing studies have identified the need for force improvements are: NATO's armor and anti-armor capabilities, NATO's aircraft and logistic systems vulnerability, Allied war reserve stock levels, U.S. and Allied mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, and Allied deployments.

By March 1, 1971, the Defense Program Review Committee will prepare for consideration by the National Security Council: (a) a comprehensive program of the U.S. measures, relating to all U.S. forces committed to the support of NATO, necessary to implement the conventional defense strategy directed in this memorandum, providing for a 90-day initial defense; and (b) a five-year program of U.S. and Allied force improvements to be used as the basis for internal U.S. planning and consultations with our Allies.

Nuclear Strategy and Forces

While tactical and theater nuclear weapons contribute to deterrence of an attack, the President is concerned that we have not yet developed an adequate understanding of their role or strategic implications. He has directed, therefore, that our concepts for using tactical nuclear weapons as well as the level and mix of tactical nuclear weapons systems in our force structure be thoroughly re-examined in the light of the emphasis on conventional force defense. The Defense Program Review Committee should develop alternative doctrines and force structures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and submit a report to the National Security Council by April 1, 1971.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The President also has decided that the United States should continue to give general support to the concept of Mutual and Balanced

³ Document 50.

Force Reductions in Europe. Further studies of MBFR, both within the U.S. Government and in NATO, will be necessary to provide a realistic evaluation of approaches (particularly asymmetrical force package approaches) to MBFR which would operate to maintain or enhance NATO's military security relative to the Warsaw Pact. Until these studies have been completed by the Verification Panel and reviewed by the President, the U.S. shall assume no commitments as to specific elements of a formal MBFR proposal or agreement.

Allied Consultations

The President has directed that the U.S. position at the NATO Ministerial meetings in December 1970 shall be based on this memorandum. This memorandum will also be the basis for renewed offset agreements and other financial arrangements with the FRG, and for consultations with our Allies. All consultations should stress the importance the United States places on a strong and credible conventional defense for NATO, our willingness to maintain and improve our own forces to implement such a strategy, and our view, therefore, that it is essential that the Allies improve their forces, in order to effectively implement this strategy. Every effort should be made to enhance the role of conventional force planning in NATO organizations.

In addition, the President has noted recent Soviet efforts to influence our Allies by claims of Soviet superiority in numbers and characteristics of strategic weapons. We should continue to provide our Allies with the facts, as we know them, concerning Soviet strategic capabilities and reject Soviet claims of "superiority." We should continue to emphasize the sufficiency of our strategic forces to meet the objectives and on our intention to maintain that sufficiency in the face of any strategic weapons programs the USSR may undertake.

The President wishes to review positions to be taken by the United States at the December 1970 NATO Ministerial Meetings and thereafter of the approaches being developed for consultations with our Allies to implement the terms of this memorandum.

Henry A. Kissinger

55. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, December 3, 1970, 1545Z.

4533. Subject: Alliance Defense for the 70's.

1. Text quoted below was released by NATO International Staff on evening of 2 December in accordance with an earlier decision by DPC Ministers on public presentation of AD-70.

2. The same text is also expected to be attached to the NATO communiqué to be issued on 4 December,² covering both NAC and DPC meetings.

3. Secretary Laird informed DPC Ministers on 2 December that he would refer to the paper as the "Declaration of Brussels."

4. Washington may wish to repeat text to other posts. *Begin text:*
"Alliance Defence for the Seventies

1. The Allied countries participating in the integrated defence efforts decided at a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in permanent session in May of this year to examine in depth NATO defence problems for the next decade.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has made a practice over the years of periodically conducting major reviews and adapting its policies to accord with the changing circumstances of the times. A notable recent example was the study undertaken in 1967 which resulted in the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance establishing defence and détente as complementary pillars of its activities. That report stated that "collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions." Against this background, governments earlier this year recognised the particular timeliness of a full and candid exchange of views among the Allies on their common defence over the next ten years. This examination of NATO's defence capability in the light of current and prospective military and political developments has now been completed.

3. NATO's approach to security in the 1970's will continue to be based on the twin concepts of defence and détente. Defence problems cannot be seen in isolation but must be viewed in the broader context of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 4 NATO. Unclassified; Priority. Repeated to the Department of Defense, SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USLOSACLANT, and all NATO capitals. Kissinger wrote about the NATO paper in *White House Years*, p. 401.

² See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1969-1970, pp. 24348-24352.

the Alliance's basic purpose of ensuring the security of its members. There is a close inter-relationship between the maintenance of adequate defensive strength and the negotiation of settlements affecting the security of the member states.

4. The 1970's could develop into an era of successful negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Alliance and those of the Warsaw Pact. On Western initiative, there are now negotiations under way between East and West which could lead to a real relaxation of tensions. It is hoped that there will be satisfactory progress in on-going talks on a limitation of strategic nuclear weapons and on an improvement of the situation in and around Berlin, and in other current negotiations between individual members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance will continue to seek improved East-West relations, and in the framework of this effort, one of its principal aims will be to engage the Soviet Union and its allies in meaningful talks on mutual and balanced force reductions and other disarmament measures. Progress in this field would facilitate dealing with the defence problems of the next decade. This period might also see convened one or more conferences on European security and co-operation.

5. On the other hand, the Allies cannot ignore certain disturbing features in the international situation. The evidence thus far suggests that the USSR, intent on extending and strengthening its political power, conducts its international relations on the basis of concepts some of which are not conducive to *détente*. In particular, its concept of sovereignty is clearly inconsistent with United Nations' principles. At the same time, Soviet military capabilities, besides guaranteeing the USSR's security, continue to increase and provide formidable backing for the wide-ranging assertion of Soviet influence and presence, persistently raising questions regarding their intentions. In real terms, there has been a continuous rise in Soviet defence and defence-related expenditures between 1965 and 1969 of about 5 per cent to 6 per cent per year on average and the evidence is that the USSR is continuing to strengthen its military establishments still further. The contrast between these figures and the corresponding information relating to the Alliance may be seen from paragraph 10 below. Whether East-West relations can in these circumstances be significantly improved will depend mainly on the actions of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, and on the attitudes they bring to negotiations now in progress or in prospect.

6. The position of the Alliance and its member countries during this period of exploration and negotiation, with special reference to European security and mutual force reductions, would be weakened if NATO were to reduce its forces unilaterally, especially those in the European area, and in particular at a time when it is confronted with a

steady growth in Soviet military power, which manifests itself above all in the strategic nuclear and maritime fields. NATO member states must, therefore, maintain a sufficient level of conventional and nuclear strength for defence as well as for deterrence, thus furnishing a sound basis from which to negotiate and underlining that negotiation is the only sensible road open. Progress towards a meaningful détente in an era of negotiation will, therefore, require the maintenance of a strong collective defence posture.

7. The present NATO defence strategy of deterrence and defence, with its constituent concepts of flexibility in response and forward defence, will remain valid. It will continue to require an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

8. It is to be hoped that success in strategic arms limitation talks will be achieved. Allied strategic nuclear capability will in any event remain a key element in the security of the West during the 1970's. At the present time, adequate nuclear forces exist and it will be essential to ensure that this capability, which includes the continued commitment of theatre nuclear forces, is maintained.

9. The situation in the field of conventional forces is less satisfactory in view of certain imbalances between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities. Careful attention needs to be paid to priorities in improving NATO's conventional strength in the 1970's. In the allocation of resources, priority will be given to measures most critical to a balanced Alliance defence posture in terms of deterrent effect, ability to resist external political pressure, and the prompt availability or rapid enhancement of the forward defensive capability in a developing crisis. In addition to a capability to deter and counter major deliberate aggression, Allied forces should be so structured and organized as to be capable of dealing also with aggressions and incursions with more limited objectives associated with intimidation or the creation of *faits accomplis*, or with those aggressions which might be the result of accident or miscalculation. In short, Allied forces should be so structured and organized as to deter and counter any kind of aggression. Important areas in NATO's conventional defence posture to which attention should be paid in the next decade include: armour/anti-armour potential; the air situation including aircraft protection; overall maritime capabilities, with special reference to anti-submarine forces; the situation on NATO's flanks; the peacetime deployment of ground forces; further improvements in Allied mobilization and reinforcement capabilities as well as in NATO communications, for crisis management purposes.

10. The Alliance possesses the basic resources for adequate conventional strength. However, member countries are confronted with diverging trends in the pattern of expenditures and costs. On the other hand the cost of personnel and equipment continues to mount and

most NATO countries are faced with major re-equipment programmes; on the other, in many member countries the share of GNP devoted to defence has declined and, even if outlays in money terms have risen, outlays in real terms have diminished owing to inflation. In marked contrast with the trend in Warsaw Pact countries' military expenditure, defence expenditures of the NATO European countries taken as a whole and calculated in real terms went down by 4 percent from 1964 to 1969.

11. It is of paramount importance that there be close collaboration among all member states to ensure the most effective collective defence posture. It is equally important that the burden of maintaining the necessary military strength should be borne co-operatively with each member making an appropriate contribution.

12. The commitment of substantial North American forces deployed in Europe is essential both politically and militarily for effective deterrence and defence and to demonstrate the solidarity of NATO. Their replacement by European forces would be no substitute. At the same time their significance is closely related to an effective and improved European defence effort. Ten of the European countries have therefore consulted among themselves to determine how it would be possible for them individually and collectively to make a more substantial contribution to the overall defence of the treaty area.

13. As a result the ten countries have decided to adopt a special European defence improvement programme going well beyond previously existing plans and designed to improve Alliance capability in specific fields identified as of particular importance in the current study. This programme will comprise:

(A) An additional collective contribution, in the order of \$420 million over five years, to NATO common infrastructure to accelerate work on the NATO integrated communications system and on aircraft survival measures;

(B) Numerous important additions and improvements to national forces, costing at least \$450–500 million over the next five years plus very substantial further amounts thereafter; the forces concerned will all be committed to NATO;

(C) Other significant financial measures to improve collective defence capability, costing \$79 million over the next two years.

The United States and Canada have welcomed this programme, and have reaffirmed their intention to maintain their forces in Europe at substantially their current levels.

14. After careful review of the proposals emerging from the examination of defence problems in the seventies, the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial session on 2nd December, 1970, adopted con-

crete proposals aimed at improving NATO's defence capabilities. *End text.*

Ellsworth

56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

NATO Ministerial Meeting

The December 2–4 NATO Ministerial meetings were characterized by a new degree of Allied unity, a realistic reading of East-West détente possibilities, and a re-affirmation of the need to maintain and improve Allied conventional defense capabilities.

There was universal appreciation for your statement affirming U.S. intent to maintain forces in Europe at current levels in the absence of reciprocal reductions and given a similar approach by our Allies.² The decision by most European members of the Alliance on a long-term burden-sharing program reflected a recognition by our European allies of their responsibility to do more. Indeed, I sensed at the meeting an enhanced degree of understanding with us, based at least in part on Europe's rising confidence in itself and in NATO's prudent policies of the past two years.

The meeting concluded with a strong communiqué which is compatible with our policies and objectives in the European area. For the immediate future there is unanimity that the touchstone of future progress toward détente is the Berlin negotiations. Should these reach a satisfactory agreement, there will be increased pressure to move towards a European Security Conference.

¹Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 479–482. Confidential. On December 19, Sonnenfeldt drafted a cover memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, but a notation of January 2, 1971, reads: "OBE'd by HAK's office. Memo did not go to President." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 260, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. IX)

²Rogers read the President's message at the December 3 opening session of the North Atlantic Council meeting. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 1086–1087.

On mutual and balanced force reductions we are agreed to continue to seek exchanges with Eastern Europe. The NATO proposal is to discuss a balanced reduction of "stationed" forces as an integral program including indigenous forces and to do so through bilateral "exploratory talks" now. (The Warsaw Pact had talked about "foreign" forces, had not referred to any balance, and had sought to defer discussions until after a security conference.)

Mediterranean security was discussed by both Foreign and Defense Ministers, and there was general recognition of the need to improve NATO's presence there.

Many Ministers spoke highly of the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society. It is now solidly launched, and its action on oil-spills marks a tangible achievement widely praised in Europe.

The meeting also provided me opportunities to talk to the Greeks and the Turks. I urged the former to impress on the Prime Minister the need to move more quickly to return to constitutionalism. The Turk indicated that his Prime Minister had postponed visiting Washington until he secures legislation on controlling opium production.

My German, British and French colleagues joined me in a constructive discussion of Germany's Eastern Policy and on Berlin. We all affirmed that it was up to the Soviets to be forthcoming if agreement on Berlin were to be achieved.

William P. Rogers

57. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

German Offset Negotiations

Issue

The Under Secretaries Committee has forwarded a memorandum (Tab A)² proposing an opening position for our negotiations with Ger-

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 307, Under Secretaries Committee. Confidential. Sent for action.

² January 19, attached but not printed.

many to replace the current offset agreement, which expires on June 30. It examines how well any practicable offset arrangement would meet U.S. objectives, and concludes:

1. The U.S. balance of payments situation and a marginally favorable impact on Congress argue for continuation of the offset arrangements. The negotiation need not impair our relations with the Federal Republic, which expects us to seek continuation.

2. The offset arrangement should focus first on those elements contributing to increased NATO strength, and second on those offering real economic benefits to the U.S. (Both the Executive Branch and the Congress recognize that some elements of previous offset arrangements are relatively valueless on either count, since they have only temporary effects or would have taken place even without formal arrangement.)

Committee Recommendations

The Committee recommends that we seek a two-year offset package totaling about \$850 million annually. We would shoot for inclusion of the following items, which add up to more than the desired total in order to leave room for fallback positions:

—Direct German support for U.S. budgetary costs in Germany (\$300 million).

—German takeover of costs of U.S. military assistance to Turkey (\$75–90 million).

—German military procurement in the U.S. (\$300 million).

—German procurement of civilian items in the U.S., such as stockpile surpluses (\$100 million).

—Financial measures: German loans to the U.S. Government at subsidized (hopefully zero) interest rates, sales of Export-Import Bank assets to Germany, and freezing of German funds already on deposit with the Treasury (\$200–250 million).

The first three components are much more useful to us than are the others, because they help our budget as well as our balance of payments, and because at least the first two would be wholly additional to what we would get without an agreement. However, we will have to aim at the broader range of measures to get a total annual package which will compare favorably with the \$810 million which we get under the current arrangement, and to maximize our bargaining position. We would consider the offset arrangement as additional to the \$125 million German annual contribution to the new European Defense Improvement Program, which the allies proposed after your decision to seek force improvements rather than straight budgetary payments for maintenance of our forces. This would bring total German contributions to about \$975 million annually, or about 80 percent of the \$1.2 billion current balance of payments costs of U.S. forces in Germany.

In negotiating the package, the U.S. would stress the importance of military procurement, German budget support for our activities, and German military aid to Turkey. The Committee asks that the negotiators be authorized to reduce the total package to \$700 million or so if necessary to improve its quality.

Comment

The proposal is reasonable. The Germans expect a new offset agreement on the same order of magnitude as the present one. A new agreement along the recommended lines would have positive effects on the U.S. balance of payments, Congressional sentiment, and therefore on our ability to maintain our NATO force levels. Its effects would not be of great significance in any of these areas, however.

The paucity of reward plus the risk of exacerbating our German relations at this particularly delicate time call for caution in the negotiations. However, we will not know the sensitive areas until we get the German reaction to our proposal. I expect that the major issue will not be the dollar total of the package, but how hard we should press certain of the constituent elements more attractive to us. I am dubious that the Germans will agree to anything like \$300 million of support costs, for example; they have never accepted *any* such payments before, but they have recently done so for the British and appear ready to do so for us to at least some limited extent.

My staff and I will follow the negotiations closely to monitor potentially serious difficulties, however, and I plan to insist that the agencies submit such problems to you for subsequent decision. In addition, Deputy Under Secretary of State Samuels will be doing the negotiating, and can be counted on to handle the talks in a low-key way.

*Recommendation*³

I recommend that you accept the Under Secretaries Committee recommendations for an initial position in our forthcoming offset negotiations with Germany. State, Defense, Treasury and all other agencies support the recommendations.

³ Nixon initiated his approval. Kissinger informed the Under Secretaries Committee on February 17. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 307, Under Secretaries Committee) The negotiations began in March and finally concluded in December. See Document 77.

58. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

West European Political Cooperation and US-European Community Relations

The memorandum from Secretary Rogers at Tab A² reports on recent steps taken by the Six³ for regular consultations on foreign policy, which will also involve the four current candidates for EC membership.⁴ An outgrowth of the Davignon report,⁵ commissioned at the Hague European summit in December 1969 and adopted by the Community last July, the new procedures call for meetings of foreign ministers at least every six months, quarterly meetings at lower levels, and regular consultations among ambassadors accredited outside the Community on international problems of common interest. Since last November, three consultative meetings have been held. The Middle East has been discussed twice and will be a subject for further study. On the eve of the December NATO Ministerial meeting, the Six and the four candidates coordinated their position on a European security conference, agreeing that movement toward it be contingent on progress in the Berlin talks.

While too early to assess their significance, these new consultations do represent a step forward in expanding European political cooperation. The Eurogroup meetings on defense burden sharing last fall are a further advance. Noteworthy is the fact that the new political consultations are linked to the Community framework, which does augur for eventual expansion of the Community's competence beyond purely economic affairs. But this is likely to take some time to develop.

As State's memorandum suggests, we should encourage the new European consultation initiative, which is consistent with our support for European unity. It could lead to greater European interest in problems outside the NATO area. We will want to stay in close touch

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 322, Subject Files, European Common Market, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped: "The President has seen."

² January 23; attached but not printed.

³ France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

⁴ United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and Ireland.

⁵ The Davignon report, named for Belgian diplomat Etienne Davignon, called for coordination of foreign policy as a way to begin political cooperation among the EC members.

with this development, which could, of course, yield more coherent European views that diverge from our own on certain questions.

The Secretary also refers to possible new forms of US-European consultation, as suggested by Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel, Chancellor Willy Brandt, and others. Recently Harmel proposed the establishment of a formal committee or liaison group between the US and the Community, going beyond the existing informal Samuels-Dahrendorf consultations begun last fall,⁶ to address economic questions in more systematic fashion. State has encouraged Harmel to discuss this idea with other Europeans, indicating that we would welcome a European initiative. However, given the growing strains in our economic relations, it is not clear that a mere formal consultative mechanism would by itself aid much in settling points of contention. A related question also being discussed is the possibility of enhancing the Community's representation here in Washington. We would favor such a development, but believe it will be some time before the Europeans can agree on a formula. The French remain reluctant to upgrade the status of the EC Commission.

⁶ These consultations began in October 1970. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969-1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969-1972, Documents 44 and 47.

59. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

ELEMENTS OF POSSIBLE MBFR AGREEMENTS

A. *The Geographic Area of the Reductions*

A number of geographic areas could be proposed as the basis for MBFR. Possible areas include:

—The "NATO Guidelines Area" (East and West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland and Czechoslovakia).

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. The Department of State transmitted the paper to USNATO in Airgram A-7, March 17. Kissinger approved its transmission. (Memorandum from Smith to Kissinger, March 13; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 261, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. X)

—The “Rapacki Plan Area” (East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia).

—East and West Germany.

—The NATO Guidelines Area plus the three Western Military Districts of the USSR.

—“Territories of European States” as stated in the Budapest Declaration if and when defined by the Warsaw Pact.

For a number of reasons, the NATO Guidelines Area seems to provide a good framework for MBFR.

—It has been generally accepted in NATO.

—It focuses attention on the main area of confrontation between NATO and the Pact.

Expansion of the area under consideration to include the three Western military districts of the USSR might be desirable in a corrective type of approach to MBFR since it would open the way for some limitations on Soviet reinforcement capability, which is a major source of concern for NATO, as well as for some limitations on nuclear weapons on Soviet soil. This would, however,

—Pose difficult political problems of limiting activity on Soviet soil.

—Probably be unacceptable to the Soviets without some compensation such as including the U.K., France and possibly even part of the U.S.

On the other hand, the Rapacki area, which has been proposed by the East in connection with nuclear free zones, might be useful at least as an initial negotiating position since it would subject fewer NATO forces to reduction. In addition, an area limited to the FRG and the GDR might be considered for symmetrical reductions in stationed forces. The balance of stationed forces in East and West Germany is approximately equal.

B. The National Status of Forces Considered for Reduction

It has often been assumed that MBFR should apply to both stationed and indigenous forces in Central Europe:

—This would allow a number of allied countries to share in reductions and thus to meet domestic pressures for force reductions.

Reductions in both stationed and indigenous forces should be considered. On the other hand, a number of arguments have been made for including only stationed forces:

—Stationed reductions would deal with the greatest threat to NATO, that is, Soviet forces.

—Reductions of indigenous units would be difficult to verify because it might not be possible to determine the ultimate disposition of

disbanded units, and the disposition of equipment would pose special problems.

—The Soviets have suggested consideration of reduction of “foreign forces.”

—Stationed reductions favor NATO because fewer NATO forces in the Central Region qualify as stationed as compared with the situation with respect to Pact forces in that area. In addition, NATO indigenous forces in the Center region are thought by many to be better trained and equipped than their Pact counterparts; and in the Czech case, at least, there may be Soviet doubts over reliability.

C. Provisions Regarding Manpower

1. Definition of the Manpower Base

An MBFR proposal could conceivably include consideration of ground, naval and air forces but a number of arguments have been advanced for including only ground forces (which can be unambiguously defined as Army personnel).

—The significant unit for reduction of air strength is aircraft not manpower.

—Naval forces are difficult to include because naval vessels, which are the significant units for reduction of naval strength, are not unambiguously identified with specific land areas. In addition, there are relatively few Naval personnel stationed in Central Europe.

—Ground forces represent the primary manpower element in Central Europe.

In terms of the categories of personnel included, the manpower base for MBFR could be defined to include:

—Only presently assigned active duty personnel.

—Authorized peacetime or wartime strengths of units presently in the force structure.

—Active duty personnel plus reserve and possibly paramilitary personnel.

—Personnel based permanently in the area of reduction as well as dual-based personnel which are only there for some part of the year.

A number of problems would be encountered, however, in trying to include more than active duty personnel.

—It would be difficult to compare the functions of reserve and paramilitary personnel and to establish reliable verification procedures to account for them.

—It would be difficult to agree on authorized manning levels or, for example, to establish the number of reservists and paramilitary personnel to be counted.

—Reductions of personnel presently held in reserve status would impair NATO capability in the key area of mobilization and reinforcement.

—Inclusion of dual-based personnel would increase the total NATO forces subject to reduction. Furthermore, the Soviets could

claim that several of their divisions are dual-based, thereby raising definitional problems.

2. The Basic Technique for Manpower Reductions

Studies of possible MBFR agreements have included extensive discussion of the relative effects of reductions by a given percentage, reductions by an absolute number and reductions to an absolute number. In a situation where the Pact has a numerical manpower advantage (which is the case for a base including either stationed or stationed and indigenous ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Area), the effects would be roughly as follows:

- Equal percentage reductions might favor NATO since the absolute level of Pact reductions would be greater.

- Equal absolute reductions would favor the Pact since NATO would have to remove a slightly larger proportion of its forces.

- Reductions to an absolute number would be most favorable to NATO.

In fact, given the small difference in total manpower balance in the NATO Guidelines Area the differences between these methods are not great and any one of them could be considered depending on the military and political implications of the agreement as a whole. Percentage reductions might be easiest to negotiate since they seem the most balanced and have gained acceptance in NATO as the basic technique for reductions. On the other hand, equal absolute reductions could avoid the problem of defining the base for reductions. So could reductions to an absolute number.

3. Treatment of Combat and Support Personnel

Any reduction of NATO forces should logically be predicated on maintaining an optimal balance between combat, combat support and service support elements of residual forces. Emphasis on the reductions of only combat elements or only support elements in NATO forces could result in post-reduction imbalances, which could degrade operational capabilities. In general, a balanced reduction of combat and support elements in NATO appears to be the most desirable form of reduction since:

- Support-heavy reductions could reduce NATO's "staying power" as well as its mobilization and reinforcement capability since reception facilities for reserve units entering the force structure would be curtailed.

If a balanced reduction of both support and combat forces were applied to both NATO and the Pact:

- Reductions of combat and support personnel by an equal percentage would reduce Pact combat forces more than those of NATO be-

cause, the Pact force structure contains relatively more combat personnel than that of NATO.

—The force structures of the Pact and NATO are very different. In particular, the Pact maintains its men and matériel for combat replacement in additional whole units while NATO plans to use a variety of techniques to maintain acceptable strength levels in original combat units. There would, therefore, be real problems in comparing the support and combat units of the two sides.

Arguments have been made, however, for reducing only divisional manpower on the grounds that such reductions would hit at the basic Pact threat to NATO and that previous unilateral NATO reductions have been support-heavy. Conversely, some believe that NATO reductions might be taken predominantly in support units, while Pact reductions might be taken in combat units.

4. Sources of Manpower Reduced

Treatment of the sources of manpower reductions essentially depends on the type of MBFR agreement sought.

—In an agreement where small reductions are made for political purposes, reductions could be in manpower alone and made at the discretion of both sides. Under such provisions, thinning out of units could be allowed, making reliable verification of reductions which had taken place virtually impossible. Alternatively, in order to enhance verification, there could be some procedures for counting forces out of the area during reductions and/or for having each side announce specific units to be reduced.

—In an approach embodying larger symmetrical reductions or one designed to correct imbalances in present force structures, it would probably be necessary, as a part of the negotiations, to designate specific units or at least types of units to be reduced as well as to specify post-reduction ceilings by type of unit. Otherwise, verification would be difficult and there would be considerable uncertainty regarding the actual military effects of the reductions.

5. Disposition of Units Reduced

Stationed forces subject to reduction would obviously have to be withdrawn from the area or, in the case of Belgian and Dutch forces in the FRG, returned to their own territory. It would appear difficult, however, to require that stationed units be disbanded since verification of such a provision would be fraught with problems. Similar problems would be encountered in disbanding indigenous units even if collateral constraints were put on the use of vacated facilities and equipment held by these units was destroyed.

6. Collateral Constraints

Collateral constraints can be classified conceptually as to their intended effect:

—Measures which enhance our ability to verify an MBFR agreement (e.g. special observers to monitor reductions, aerial observation provisions).

—Measures which enable us to receive earlier, less ambiguous indications of Pact mobilization and reinforcement (e.g. restrictions on troop movements across geographical areas, prior notification of exercises).

—Measures which actually impede/constrain mobilization and reinforcement (e.g. requirements that reduced forces be disbanded and associated equipment destroyed).

Some examples which have been discussed are:

—A declaration by each side of forces in the area of reduction, units to be reduced, routes of withdrawal, the timing of withdrawal, and units remaining in the area (at least by type).

—Prior notification of significant troop rotations.

—A ban on the reintroduction of troops into the area except for preannounced exercises.

—Limitations on the size, frequency and duration of exercises.

—Limitations on the deployment of forces in given areas.

—Limitations on exercises in these areas.

Logically, it might also be possible to limit redeployment of forces remaining in the reduction area after an agreement but this would be undesirable from NATO's point of view because it would foreclose a significant way to improve the Alliance's basic posture and flexibility (e.g., it might affect the operations of the ACE Mobile Force).

7. Timing of Reductions

In MBFR agreements calling for large reductions, it might be desirable to conduct the reductions in a number of phases, for example three phases of 10 percent each to get to a 30 percent reduction. Such provisions would not be necessary in agreements calling for small reductions up to 10 percent. (However, we could consider an arrangement where stationed forces were reduced first and indigenous forces in a latter phase.) In all agreements verification would be facilitated if each side announced in advance the periods in which withdrawals would be completed.

D. Provisions Regarding Mobilization and Reinforcement Capabilities

The relative NATO/Pact mobilization and reinforcement capabilities are the most important determinants of military capabilities over time in the Center Region. In general, both sides have a substantial capability to mobilize while the USSR has a clear advantage in reinforcement.

—The Pact can build a force in the Center Region of 80–85 divisions in about 10 days but would probably take three weeks for full mobilization and integration. The major mobilization and reinforcement capability of the Pact derives from its maintenance of many low

strength divisions. These divisions contain one-quarter to one-half of their personnel and 45 to 65 percent of their equipment (including most of the major combat items except armored personnel carriers) during peacetime. This provides a nucleus which can be quickly fleshed out with reservists and support equipment from the civilian economy without further training as soon as they are at strength; this provides a quick combat force but one of uncertain quality compared to active Soviet forces in Germany. If there is a protracted period of tension before hostilities, these divisions could be expected to train and increase their effectiveness.

—Most of the manpower and almost all of the equipment the West Europeans plan to contribute to NATO could be mobilized within 15 days after the appropriate NATO countries have made the necessary political decisions. In the Center Region at M+30, assuming simultaneous mobilization by both NATO and the Pact, the NATO Allies could mobilize more total active ground manpower than the Pact, but less divisional manpower and fewer tanks. (NATO M-Day may lag behind the Pact M-Day due to time required for NATO to receive and act on strategic warning.)

It might be possible to design a series of “collateral constraints”, which would constrain the mobilization and reinforcement capabilities of each side. Constraints of this type would be complicated and could be difficult to negotiate and verify. They could also lead to serious tension in a post-agreement environment because of differing interpretations and unverified suspicions of violations. They might in fact exacerbate the serious imbalance that already exists in the relative reinforcement capabilities of the US and USSR. Constraints which might be considered include the following:

—Requirements that facilities occupied by withdrawn or disbanded forces be vacated permanently or put on some sort of caretaker status.

—Controls on stockpiles of pre-positioned equipment and that available as a war reserve.

—Limitations on manning levels of active units, reserve call-ups or integration of civilian personnel and vehicles into military force structures. Such limitations presumably could not be applied within the USSR, where most of the Pact mobilization takes place. On the other hand, applying them to NATO’s area of reduction could foreclose actions which NATO can take outside of the framework of any MBFR agreement to improve its mobilization and reinforcement capability.

E. Special Verification Provisions

Verification of an MBFR agreement would probably have to rely principally on national or unilateral measures. There are, however, a number of provisions which could be incorporated in an agreement in order to enhance verification capabilities. They include the following:

—Freer movement for attaché personnel and/or military liaison missions.

—Special observers to monitor reductions as they are carried out. These observers could be static and/or mobile and would be withdrawn once the reductions were completed.

—Special provisions for aerial observation during the period when reductions were being carried out.

—Periodic aerial observations of limited areas in the post-agreement period.

—Permanent observers to monitor compliance with the agreement.

In addition, collateral constraints which might be considered for other reasons (e.g. exercise constraints, anti-jamming agreements) could enhance verification.

F. Provisions Regarding Equipment

One of the most perplexing conceptual problems in designing an MBFR agreement is the question of how to handle equipment reductions. At the most basic level, there are three possibilities.

—Particularly in the case of small reductions, it might be possible to make no provisions regarding equipment.

—In an approach envisioning large symmetrical reductions, it might be appropriate merely to require that equipment organic to manpower units being reduced be withdrawn from the area or to the nation of proprietorship with stationed units or destroyed or removed from the area in the case of indigenous forces.

—In approaches designed to correct NATO-Warsaw Pact imbalances, it would probably be necessary to negotiate special provisions which specified the amounts of various kinds of equipment to be reduced and attempted to take account of qualitative differences in the equipment held by the two sides. Such provisions would probably be complicated, detailed and difficult to negotiate.

Digging deeper into the problem, a number of additional complications become apparent. Questions which need to be considered include:

—Is equipment organic to manpower units being reduced to be withdrawn from the area, destroyed or allowed to be put into stockpile?

—Should any provisions be made regarding equipment which is presently stockpiled? Possibilities include:

—Placing a ceiling on present inventory levels.

—Reducing these inventories by taking the equipment in them out of the area or destroying it.

—Withdrawing or destroying all equipment presently stockpiled, effectively placing a ban on pre-positioning of supplies.

—Should the equipment levels of active units which are not reduced be frozen?

—What collateral constraints are necessary to insure that equipment withdrawn from the area is not reintroduced, except possibly for exercises?

—In order to enforce any equipment ceilings, is it necessary to constrain military manufacturing facilities in the area of reduction?

—What provisions should be made regarding the replacement of equipment remaining after an MBFR agreement with new equipment of the same type? With better equipment?

An agreement which attempts to improve the military balance by changing the equipment holdings of the two sides, which many view as particularly important in the case of tanks, if it were to be effective and verifiable, could well involve acceptance of conditions to which neither side could agree. This is particularly true in the case of requirements that equipment be destroyed, that production facilities be controlled, that qualitative improvements in weapons systems be prohibited, and that constraints be put on pre-positioning of equipment. Considerable uncertainty exists as to the military effects of various equipment reduction packages in terms of different relative mobilization scenarios. Several gross effects can be noted, however, from the NATO point of view.

—NATO relies on stockpiled equipment for reinforcing units. The Pact does not. This means any controls on equipment stockpiling would constrain NATO's reinforcement capability more than that of the Pact.

—Equipment withdrawn from the reduction area or returned to the nation of proprietorship could be placed a relatively short distance away in the Soviet Union and reintroduced into the area quickly and easily. It would be much more difficult for equipment withdrawn to the US or even the UK to be reintroduced.

The problems involved in negotiating equipment reductions are illustrated further in the following sections covering tanks and tactical aircraft.

G. Tanks as an Element in an MBFR Agreement

1. The Base for Tank Reductions

There are a number of ways of defining the base for tank reductions depending on:

- The area considered for reductions.
- The availability of tanks for combat.
- Whether or not tanks in reserve stocks outside active units are counted.

2. Tank Reduction Packages

There are several different approaches to tank reductions which might be considered:

- In the case of small reductions, it might be possible to make no explicit provisions regarding tanks.

—In significant symmetrical reductions, it would be appropriate to specify that tanks organic to active manpower units should be reduced along with them. Reductions of tanks in active units in the NATO Guidelines Area, if taken in this manner, would actually favor NATO. NATO tanks held in stockpiles outside active units would not be affected while all Pact tanks in the area would be counted (since the Pact keeps all of its tanks in active units).

—In approaches designed to correct NATO-Warsaw Pact imbalances, there are other possibilities, for example:

—Proportional tank reductions at percentages greater than those used for manpower reductions, effectively converting some armored units on each side to infantry units.

—A “mixed-package tradeoff” in which tank-heavy reductions on the Pact side were offset by NATO reductions in some other area (e.g. tactical aircraft or tactical nuclear weapons).

—Reductions to a common or fixed ratio ceiling.

Reducing tanks in the area of reduction more than manpower might lessen the chances of either side gaining a quick conventional victory but it would also enhance the importance of Pact tanks maintained in the Soviet Union (assuming that the three Western military districts were not part of the area), which could be rapidly introduced into Central Europe.

A “mixed-package tradeoff” in which the Pact took tank-heavy reductions might be a way to reduce significantly the Pact’s numerical advantage in armor. NATO might take disproportionate reductions in the areas of tactical air or tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for Pact tank reductions. An approach of this type would, however, also present some real problems.

H. Tactical Aircraft as an Element in an MBFR Agreement

1. The Base for Aircraft Reductions

The area used as a base for aircraft reductions should be at least as large as that used for ground force reductions. The area could be larger, however, in order to include all aircraft immediately available for operational missions in support of ground units in the area of ground reductions. Defining the area in this way may not, however, be to NATO’s advantage since the generally longer-range/higher payload NATO aircraft have a greater capability to fly effective missions from adjacent areas.

2. Arguments for and Against Reducing Tactical Aircraft in MBFR

There are arguments both for and against including tactical aircraft reductions in an MBFR agreement. Those opposing inclusion contend that:

—The present air balance favors the Pact. NATO essentially has nothing to trade for disproportionate Pact reductions and proportionate reductions would have a number of disadvantages including:

—The fact that such reductions could induce a battle for qualitative superiority where improvements in technology and training would compensate for numerical restrictions. Such a contest would favor the Pact which in the past has chosen to substitute numbers of aircraft for technical complexity. NATO on the other hand, would have to make major improvements to increase its air capabilities.

—NATO's theatre strike capability to deliver nuclear weapons depends more on tactical aircraft than does that of the Pact. Proportionate reductions of tactical aircraft would, therefore, have more effect on NATO.

—The Pact can bring aircraft back into the area more quickly.

—Limitations on the reintroduction of forces after a MBFR would argue against including aircraft in a reduction package. The mobility of tactical aircraft and their capability to be reintroduced rapidly could be negated by such constraints. A situation such as the Berlin crisis of 1961–62, when 11 squadrons of tactical aircraft were deployed to Europe to emphasize US resolve, might not be possible post MBFR. There certainly would be serious political inhibitions about introducing augmentation forces during a period of tension. Moreover, deployments which bordered on violation of the arrangements could trigger the crisis we hoped to avoid.

There are, however, a number of arguments in favor of including aircraft:

—The overall tactical air balance in Central Europe is now roughly equal when all relevant quantitative and qualitative factors are considered. In addition, despite differences all agree that the outcome of the air battle cannot be accurately predicted.

—An agreement which withdrew some US forward-based aircraft from the area could induce the Soviets to make some concessions in other areas (e.g. tank reductions). Also, the Soviets have expressed concern in SALT about US forward-based aircraft.

—It should be possible to specify the plane for plane tradeoffs which would be an essential element in any agreement calling for substantial aircraft reductions. For example, some models of the US F-4 and the Russian MIG-21 appear to be roughly equivalent in air-to-air capability, a function which could dominate the early part of an air war.

—If aircraft withdrawn from the area are also taken out of commission, substantial budgetary savings could result.

3. Methods of Reducing Tactical Aircraft

The design of the tactical air portion of an agreement obviously requires resolution of a number of outstanding differences of view regarding the relative capabilities of the two sides. It is possible, how-

ever, to specify in a general way the types of provisions which could be included.

—A ceiling on the number of aircraft presently in the region might be an appropriate supplement to small reductions in ground forces.

—Proportional reductions in the 10–30 percent range could complement similar manpower reductions.

—Equal absolute reductions in specified types of aircraft, which would avoid problems of defining the base for reduction but could favor the Pact because the Pact starts with more aircraft, might be a workable part of an approach emphasizing arms control objectives.

In general, disproportionate reductions could be considered to reduce imbalances:

—Disproportionate numerical reductions on the Pact side to reflect qualitative superiorities in some of NATO's aircraft.

—Disproportionate reductions on the NATO side to compensate for Pact concessions regarding tanks and/or MR/IRBM. Such an arrangement could run great risks if as a result the Pact gained a greater tactical air capability. Reductions of tactical aircraft would clearly have some effect on NATO's ground forces. However, the multi-purpose capabilities of tactical aircraft pose difficulties in determining the effects of tank-aircraft trade offs.

4. Collateral Constraints

It might be desirable to accompany any tactical aircraft reductions with constraints on the reintroduction of aircraft into the area or limits on the number and frequency of military flights in certain areas without prior notification. Such reductions could be more detrimental to NATO than the Pact, however, by limiting the inherent flexibility of aircraft.

In addition, a number of other collateral constraints which could in theory be applied to make reductions more meaningful appear to be undesirable and destabilizing from the NATO point of view. They include:

—Controls on the deployment of related systems, such as aircraft shelters, air defense missiles, radars and GCI networks. Such controls would foreclose important NATO options to reduce the vulnerability of its aircraft.

—Requirements to close air-bases or put them on stand-by status. This would make it more difficult for NATO to disperse its aircraft while providing little constraint on the Pact which has many airfields and whose aircraft are designed to be operated from prepared sodfields.

60. National Security Study Memorandum 121¹

Washington, April 13, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

June NATO Ministerial Meeting

The President wishes to have a meeting of the National Security Council² before the Lisbon NATO Ministerial meeting³ to review the major issues that are to be considered. The President desires, in particular, to examine the status of work on East-West relations in progress within the NATO framework, as well as developments in the area of NATO defense since the last Ministerial meeting. U.S. strategy and force guidance for NATO remain as set forth in NSDM 95.⁴

In preparation for the NSC meeting, a paper should be submitted setting forth (1) the major issues expected to arise at Lisbon, and (2) problems requiring decision, including recommendations or choices, where appropriate. The paper should discuss our objectives and highlight any important Allied differences. It should also outline the problems that will have to be dealt with after the Lisbon meeting.

The NSC IG/EUR, constituted appropriately in the discretion of the Chairman, should submit the paper to the Assistant to the President for preliminary consideration in the Senior Review Group by May 1.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² The SRG met instead of the NSC; see Document 65.

³ June 3–4

⁴ Document 54.

61. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, April 23, 1971, 3:40–4:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

MBFR

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

George Springsteen

James E. Goodby

Ronald L. Spiers

Seymour Weiss

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

Robert Pranger

J.W. Morrison

CIA

Richard Helms

Bruce Clarke

JCS

LTG Richard T. Knowles

M/Gen. Marvin C. Demler

ACDA

Philip J. Farley

Thomas Hirschfeld

OST

Dr. Edward David

NSC Staff

Dr. K. Wayne Smith

J. Andrew Hamilton, Jr.

William Hyland

Wilfrid L. Kohl

John Negroponte

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The Working Group would make a new analysis of the comparative impact of reductions assuming a lag of 7 days in NATO mobilization.

—The Working Group will try to answer some of the questions raised in this meeting in terms of some specific options: e.g., two types of symmetrical reductions; two types of asymmetrical reductions, including common ceilings; and one or two mixed packages. These options should include the collateral restraints that would be required to overcome disadvantages to the NATO forces. They should also include consideration of our nuclear weapons.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The participants considered yet another version of the NSSM 84 report dated April 12, a copy of which is *ibid.*, Box H-168, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 84 (3 of 3).

—The Working Group will prepare a sanitized version of the current IG paper for transmission to the North Atlantic Council.²

Mr. Kissinger: I have gone over this paper in detail but I don't think it is particularly useful to discuss the subject in terms of a political vs. a military approach. Would we say that a political approach makes no sense but might be cosmetically useful? I would rather we look at the various approaches, with their advantages and disadvantages, and make a judgment. I see three different approaches: symmetrical, asymmetrical, and mixed packages. I suggest we discuss these in terms of various criteria rather than discuss theology. This way we can focus the discussion on the substantive merits of each approach. Is this a fair method of proceeding?

All agreed.

Mr. Kissinger: Having read the paper, I have come to the conclusion that none of the approaches are any good. Let's look at the symmetrical approach first. The paper indicates that a symmetrical reduction of, say, ten percent is not likely to affect the situation on M-day but it will on M plus 21. The situation will begin to reverse itself again at M plus 30. We had understood that we were in trouble in any event on M plus 21. How much worse off will we be with a ten percent reduction? Will we be worse off by the amount of Americans that have been withdrawn under a ten percent reduction?

Mr. Hamilton: This would depend to some extent on the disposition of the Belgian and the Dutch forces that were reduced. We would be withdrawing approximately 17,000 Americans.

Mr. Kissinger: That is two to four percent.

Mr. Farley: It is interesting that that is the percentage of the margin of error in the calculations.

Mr. Kissinger: What conclusions do we draw from that?

Mr. Farley: Given the uncertainties as to what would happen in mobilization on either side, a two to four percent difference is not very great.

Mr. Kissinger: On M-day the paper makes the assumption that we would be no worse off and possibly even slightly better off. However, the military has explained that we would be worse off with a symmetrical reduction because the defenders would have fewer troops spread over the same front while the enemy could concentrate its forces in selected parts of the front and leave others uncovered. (to General Knowles) Why have you changed your mind?

Gen. Knowles: We haven't.

² The sanitized version was not found.

Mr. Kissinger: Then do you agree with the judgment that on M-day the ten percent reduction would not change the situation or would slightly improve it?

Gen. Knowles: It certainly won't improve it.

Mr. Spiers: It may not improve it but it would be less detrimental to NATO.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's say it is equally detrimental to NATO. What has happened to the argument that symmetrical reductions will result in spreading a smaller force across the same front but does not affect the ability of the attacker to concentrate his forces?

Mr. Hamilton: Our analyses lead us to the conclusion that the defense would be too thin but that the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces would be relatively balanced except along the main avenues of attack. The effect would probably be greater in the ability of the NATO forces, after MBFR, to get into position against a Warsaw Pact attack. It is a fluid problem.

Mr. Kissinger: It is just as fluid with 18 divisions as with 20 divisions.

Mr. Hamilton: If each side has 20 divisions and reduces by two, there is no additional advantage to the attacker.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless one argues that the defenders would have to cover the same area while the attacker could concentrate his forces.

Mr. Hamilton: The question is whether this would change materially after MBFR. We haven't tested this point adequately.

Gen. Knowles: Our quarrel is not with the mathematics but with the impact.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we improving the situation, keeping it the same, or worsening it? If the latter is true militarily, are there political gains that are worth it?

Gen. Knowles: We would be worsening the situation.

Mr. Kissinger: Where would we on M-day?

Mr. Hyland: Table III-4 (page III-14) has a comparison of the forces after a ten percent cut.

Mr. Kissinger: Will someone translate this table for me?

Mr. Hyland: The table compares the ratio of Pact and NATO forces after reductions. It shows some improvement for NATO in both of the cases of a weighted attack; in the North German plain and the Hessian corridor.

Mr. Kissinger: So we would be actually improving the situation.

Mr. Hyland: Slightly.

Mr. Kissinger: This proves only that if we are right, we won't be run over on M-day. But we would be starting on M plus 7, since we are assuming a 7-day lag in our mobilization.

Mr. Hamilton: We could make the same analysis on the basis of M plus 7.

Mr. Kissinger: That should be done. The paper assumes a lag of 7 days in our mobilization. I think that is generous.

Mr. Hamilton: The real difference would come in the situation at M plus 21.

Mr. Kissinger: M plus 21 for the Pact is M plus 14 for us.

Dr. Smith: All the tables are based on simultaneous mobilization. We can do the analysis with a 7-day lag.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's do it. On M plus 21 the assumption is that the other side will have gained by the number of American troops that had been withdrawn under a symmetrical reduction. This is based on the fact that they can return their withdrawn troops by that time and we cannot. Even without that, we would be in bad shape on M plus 21. If we are decisively behind on M plus 21, can four percent make the difference between success and failure? Can we do some analysis on that? It isn't enough to show that we would be suffering unless we can demonstrate whether or not it makes this difference.

Gen. Knowles: Of course, this has all been done on a static basis. In that case, four percent does not make too much difference. However, in a dynamic context in which we were holding on by the skin of our teeth, it could make a difference.

Mr. Kissinger: I remember NSSM 84 which indicated we would be in bad shape anyway on M plus 21. Would we still be holding on or would we be defeated by that time? (to Wayne Smith) Your analysis never got us from M plus 14 to M plus 30.

Dr. Smith: There was a small period in which we would have serious problems, so we decided not to assess war outcome during that period. We would be in a very difficult situation.

Mr. Kissinger: Would four percent push us over the brink?

Dr. Smith: We don't know—it certainly won't help. We had originally thought that small symmetrical reductions would not have that much impact, but our analysis shows us differently—not on M-day but on M plus 21.

Mr. Kissinger: What about asymmetrical reductions—ten percent for NATO and 30 percent for the Pact, for instance. Would we be in the same position on M plus 21?

Gen. Knowles: Unless the Pact had disbanded the troops that they had withdrawn.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless one argues that at M plus 21 we would already be in a hopeless position beyond the possibility of fixing, if our M plus 21 situation might be decisively affected by a four percent shortfall, we would have to build into any symmetrical cuts sufficient collat-

eral restraints to overcome our M plus 21 disadvantage, or discard this idea. Is that a fair statement?

Dr. David: Is the four percent figure meaningful in terms of the analysis? The margin of error may be four percent.

Dr. Smith: It is proportionate, whatever the margin of error.

Mr. Kissinger: If the margin of error is four percent and we fail by four percent, we could argue that we are not that badly off. It could be covered by the margin of error. But the margin of error could work the other side, too; it might be eight percent.

Gen. Knowles: We are talking about a breaking point. We would have some very dark days from M plus 10 on. We could trade space for time for a while but by then we would be running out of space. We would have a helluva time getting reinforcements between M plus 14 and plus 45. We would be beginning to hang on and, if everything went right during that period, we would be O.K. But in order to do that, we have been trying to get all of the improvements we can in the forces of our allies. If we are now talking about going in the other direction, we would be going below the breaking point.

Dr. David: If our analysis should find a big difference, we would not go into reductions without collateral restraints, but four percent is not that meaningful.

Mr. Kissinger: We know that we could not get our forces back in time and they could. There is no margin of error there. The margin of error is that our intelligence cannot get closer than X percentage of their capability. There is no challenge to the idea that they could get back ten percent of their forces in 21 days if these forces were stationed in Western Russia. That is not in the margin of error. The margin of error pertains to the ability of our intelligence to identify what units are where.

Gen. Knowles: Right. We can't forecast within four percent what we can do.

Mr. Kissinger: Also, we don't know what the collateral restraints should be, although there is a list of possible restraints in the paper. (to Wayne Smith) I suggest we put together an option for a symmetrical reduction, putting down the precise collateral restraints which would be needed to overcome our problem, if indeed the problem can be dealt with by collateral restraints.

We might consider various symmetrical packages: say, ten percent and 25 percent and 30 percent. Let's do two of those.

Gen. Knowles: Let's do ten percent and 30 percent.

Mr. Kissinger: O.K. Can we now consider asymmetrical reductions. Do we have any models?

Dr. Smith: We know that without collateral restraints we would be in the same position at M plus 21 with ten percent NATO reductions and 30 percent Pact reductions as we are with symmetrical reductions. When we develop some collateral restraints we might be better off at M plus 16. We have some restraints in mind and we think some of them have a chance of success. These are included in the table at III-7 (page III-21).

Mr. Kissinger: What about other types of asymmetrical reductions? A common ceiling, for example, on total forces.

Mr. Spiers: We think that is a good one to look at in some detail.

Mr. Hamilton: Under a common ceiling, NATO would not reduce at all so there would be no mobilization or reinforcement disadvantage. If the Soviets took half of their forces back to the Soviet Union, it is hard to believe that they could still get back, plus the necessary reinforcements, in time.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's do some asymmetrical packages. Could we look at some mixed packages now. I like the one that has us trading 83 F-4s for 1400 Pact tanks. I think the President would like that. We should have a table showing the impact of various packages on various situations along the mobilization spectrum and the means available to fix our shortcomings, if it is possible to fix them. Also, we need a more precise definition of how to count each unit. How do we count our 4,000 reserve tanks in Europe, for example? Do we not count our reserve equipment? Do we count on active forces? This would give us 4,000 tanks free.

Gen. Knowles: No, we would pick them up in our reinforcement capability. We would also have a sustaining capability.

Mr. Hamilton: We think all the Pact tanks are in active units.

Mr. Kissinger: In working out some mixed packages, let's get some that are more realistic than 83 F-4s for 1400 tanks. That is a reinforcement time of two days vs. two weeks.

Gen. Knowles: We should also do some more work on building blocks. We should design a building block for us which would include our reinforcement and sustaining capability. Then we should do the same thing for their side. This would show us our equivalent capability on M-day, M plus 21, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: I haven't seen any particular mixed package that fits the concept of what we are trying to do. We are trying not to give a mobilization advantage to either side; to see if we can reduce without affecting either side at any time. Also, we have done nothing with our nuclear weapons. They may be our greatest superiority and we have no clear doctrine as to what to do with them. Let's try to grind them into the equation.

This is a first class paper—extraordinarily illuminating. But there are light-years between our understanding of this problem and that of our NATO allies. I am afraid they will be grinding out position papers without any analytical framework. How and at what point should we get them into this thing? In SALT, we gave them a detailed rundown at an early stage of our evaluation. Can we at least give them our method of analysis and the types of questions we have been asking ourselves?

Mr. Springsteen: Yes, that would be very helpful.

Mr. Spiers: We should give them more if we can.

Mr. Farley: And in fairly concrete terms.

Mr. Spiers: We have given them a sanitized version of the response to NSSM 92.

Dr. Smith: We gave them only Part II without the numbers.

Gen. Knowles: They are still struggling to understand that. We could give some material to [General]³ Milton.

Mr. Kissinger: Who is Milton?

Mr. Springsteen: He is our man who works on MBFR on the NATO staff.

Mr. Kissinger: How did we handle SALT?

Mr. Farley: We made a presentation directly to the Council.

Mr. Kissinger: Why not do this the same way?

Mr. Springsteen: It would be greatly appreciated.

Mr. Kissinger: We could make a presentation to the Council and give more detailed information to Milton. This would also give them some confidence that we are not selling them out to the Soviets.

Mr. Springsteen: It will also prevent them from going off on their own in the wrong direction.

Mr. Kissinger: Who should do this?

Mr. Spiers: We did a sanitized version of the NSSM 92 paper and circulated it within the working group.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's try it with this paper in the working group, and try to get it within the next few weeks. This is a damned good paper; all our refinements are growing directly out of it.

If I may sum up, we will try to answer some of the questions we have been asking today in terms of specific options: say, two symmetrical, two asymmetrical, and one or two mixed packages. We should include the political factors and try to grind in our nuclear weapons, particularly in the mixed packages.

³ Brackets are in the original.

Mr. Spiers: We might also start looking at phasing in terms of how it might impact on the approaches.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean phasing in the negotiations?

Mr. Spiers: Whether we might do something before we get to reductions. We might start with a freeze, for example.

Mr. Farley: That would be an easy first step.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's make it one of the options.

Mr. Springsteen: It's already part of the German proposal.

Mr. Kissinger: We went through the same thing in SALT.

Mr. Farley: We might also look at the collateral restraints in terms of what concept each is based on. We may need sooner rather than later to get criteria for collateral restraints that are generally desirable. This might accompany our looking at the options.

Mr. Kissinger: All right. And we will also prepare soon a sanitized version of the paper for use with NATO. I have learned a helluva lot today. I think we are proceeding in a fruitful way.

62. Minutes of a Legislative Interdepartmental Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 12, 1971, 12:12–12:44 p.m.

SUBJECTMansfield Resolution²**PARTICIPANTS**

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. David Abshire

Defense

Mr. G. Warren Nutter

Mr. Rady Johnson

Treasury

Mr. Paul Volcker

White House

Mr. Clark MacGregor

Mr. John Scali

NSC Staff

Gen. Alexander Haig

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Mr. John Lehman

Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. *Basic Policy.* All USG agencies must clearly understand the President's firm commitment to support for NATO and the maintenance of US force levels in Europe. The Administration rejects the Mansfield Resolution and opposes any compromise proposal.

2. *Coordination.* The LIG will act as the coordinating body for the Administration campaign against the Mansfield Resolution. It will assign action responsibilities to individual agencies.

3. *Senatorial Contacts.* State, in close coordination with the White House Congressional Relations Office and with the NSC Staff, should draw up a target list of Senators. State should also provide recommendations on how the President can assist in enlisting support for the Administration position.

4. *Presenting Administration Views to the Senate.* State will seek to have hearings scheduled on the Mansfield proposal and will also seek an opportunity for the Secretary of State to address the Senate in executive session.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 137. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Kissinger provided an account of the background to this meeting in *White House Years*, pp. 938–949.

² The Mansfield Amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1971, introduced on May 11 by Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield (D-MT), called for a one-half reduction in the United States military presence in Europe. The Senate defeated the resolution 61–36 on May 19. On November 23, the Senate voted 39–54 to reject an Appropriations Committee provision that limited the number of U.S. troops in Europe to 250,000 and called for the cessation of funds in excess of that limit by June 15, 1972. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. III, 1969–1972, pp. 214–215)

5. *Informational Material.* State will assemble a fact sheet covering the rationale for US forces in Europe and providing data on costs and on contributions made by the Europeans.

Speech material on individual issues should also be assembled. This should be cleared through the NSC staff and channeled to Ken Belieu of White House Congressional Relations.

6. *Outside Groups and Individuals.* By 5 p.m., May 12 each Department will submit a list of groups and individuals whose support should be sought, together with suggested means for contacting them. George Ball³ will be asked to come to Washington full time, and Clark MacGregor will provide a list of Senators for him to contact. General Goodpaster is to come to Washington immediately, and State will approach Harlan Cleveland.

7. *Media.* John Scali will prepare by 5 p.m. May 12 a list of proposed media targets and ways of approaching them.

8. *German Statement.* State will seek to have the German Government provide some indication of its willingness to assist the US in meeting the burdens imposed by maintenance of US troops in Germany.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought that we should have a general strategy meeting on how to proceed on the Mansfield resolution. We can see who should do what, and I can also give you some sense of where the President and the Secretary stand at the moment. I talked to the Secretary this morning, so I think we are all together on this. The President feels very strongly that there is no acceptable compromise. This is not only because of the text of the resolution, but because once we accept the principle of such a resolution, we will be giving up one of the basic principles of our post-war foreign policy that has been supported for four administrations.

It is one thing to have a debate on how we withdraw from Vietnam. That is an issue on which all agree that we should get out. It is another thing to strike at our whole foreign policy without even consulting our allies and with no idea of where this might be taking us. I don't know any issue on which the President feels more strongly. He does not want to get into a situation like the one we presently have in Vietnam in which we have agreed to withdraw and are merely arguing about the rate at which we pull our troops out.

The President has just given a commitment to the Europeans. Every Department has to understand that this is Presidential policy and that it cannot be attacked by discussion in the Senate. It is an issue

³ Under Secretary of State, 1961–1966.

that cannot be reopened. The Secretary of State is going to have the leadership in contacting Senators. He will coordinate closely with Clark MacGregor.

Mr. MacGregor: Yes. We talked about this this morning. I urged him to use the stature which he has with many Senators to oppose the Mansfield resolution. He said that he would.

Mr. Kissinger: We can use this group as a clearing house to keep everyone informed. We can also use it to assign responsibilities. For example, approaches to Senators will be made by the Secretary of State in close coordination with MacGregor and with me. Clark and I are in automatic contact anyway.

Clark and I had a talk this morning with Senators Scott and Griffin.⁴ They agreed to try to hold off a vote until next Wednesday.⁵ In the meantime, we can see how much public support we can generate for holding the line. This can take the form of editorials and of enlisting the support of leading people connected with our post-war foreign policy. We have about a week more or less to get a counterfire built.

Mr. MacGregor: I want to make clear that it is no more than a week. We could have less time.

Mr. Kissinger: But we will have at least the rest of this week?

Mr. MacGregor: Yes.

Mr. Abshire: The Secretary is going to talk to Mansfield.⁶ He will make a plea for hearings. He may also ask if he can't address the Senate as he did on the Middle East. That is, he would be invited by Senators Scott and Mansfield to talk to the Senate. All of this will help to delay a vote.

Mr. Johnson: The Secretary has already talked to Scott. He is trying to get in touch with Mansfield.

Mr. MacGregor: We should realize that a strategy of delay may reach the point of diminishing returns. It places into the hands of Senators like Gravel,⁷ who want to filibuster on the draft bill.

Mr. Volcker: Shouldn't we consider that we may be getting into an unsustainable position if we take a stand that we will never move troops out of Europe? Obviously, we don't want the Mansfield resolu-

⁴ Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA), Minority Leader, 1969–1977; and Senator Robert Griffin (R-MI), Republican Whip, 1969–1977.

⁵ May 19.

⁶ Rogers called Mansfield at 11:17 a.m. and 2:50 p.m. on May 12 and met with him on May 13 at 11:30 a.m. No further record of their conversations has been found. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books)

⁷ Senator Mike Gravel (D-AK).

tion, but we ought to look into the possibility that we are not going to be able to sustain our present position.

Mr. Kissinger: We have every intention of sustaining this position for another year.

Mr. A. Johnson: The President has made his decision.

Mr. Volcker: I wonder whether you can really do that.

Mr. A. Johnson: What is the vote count?

Mr. MacGregor: We estimate about 60 for the resolution to 35 or 40 against.

Mr. Volcker: We are already in this position after a little flurry on the exchange markets. Where will we be if something really serious happens?

Mr. Kissinger: We are not going to give up our whole post-war foreign policy. This is not the issue. This question was the subject of a study that took 1-1/2 years.⁸ It was the State Department's unanimous conclusion that we had to maintain our position in Europe.

Mr. Volcker: There are two separate questions: our desire to stay in Europe and our ability to sustain that position.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you mean about our ability to sustain our position?

Mr. Volcker: I am not sure that we can hold off Congress for a year as a result of the exchange problem.

Mr. A. Johnson: What do you mean?

Mr. Volcker: The public is aroused by the attack on the dollar in Europe.

Mr. Scali: I don't think the public is much aroused.

Mr. Volcker: What we had this week was just a minor flurry. I am not arguing that we should accept the Mansfield resolution.

Mr. Kissinger: You just want us to accept the substance of the resolution.

Mr. A. Johnson: Are you saying that our troops in Europe make a major contribution to our exchange problem?

Mr. Volcker: There is no question about it.

Mr. A. Johnson: I don't accept that.

Mr. Volcker: They do. But regardless of whether they do or not, the link will be made.

Mr. Kissinger: I am going to be blunt about this. Whatever your view may be, during this crisis we have to have a united government.

⁸ This is presumably a reference to the often-revised NSSM 84 study.

There is going to be no implication that we are moving in the direction of withdrawing from Europe because we are not doing so.

Mr. Abshire: We can pick up some votes by pointing this out.

Mr. MacGregor: Yes. We need to get some factual material together.

Mr. Kissinger: That is what we need. Alex (Johnson), you take the lead on that.

Mr. A. Johnson: We have done a paper on the cost of our force commitment to NATO.⁹ It includes a discussion of what the Europeans are doing. We would like to get your comments immediately on it.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a statement like that. We need something that will give the whole rationale. It should explain why we should not cut forces when MBFR is a prospect. It should explain why we cannot make unilateral cuts. This would completely undermine our position vis-à-vis the Soviets. We should point out why last year we judged that the political impact of a force cut would be disastrous. This is especially so if it were to follow 6 months after a formal Presidential commitment not to remove forces during his term in office.¹⁰ Whatever the impact of Vietnam in Europe, to withdraw from both Vietnam and Europe would be calamitous.

Mr. MacGregor: To give you an idea of the reality we are facing, I would point out if you were to talk about MBFR, 75 percent of the Senators would only give you a blank stare. If you referred to mutual and balanced force reductions you might find a few more had some idea of what you are talking about. The point is that the Senators don't really know a great deal about the whole NATO question. They think that it is a simple situation of our insisting on maintaining all of our troops in Europe 25 years after World War II. That is why anything which we can disclose on MBFR will be helpful.

Mr. Kissinger: It is a brutal fact that with the present strategic balance our withdrawal will mean that Europe will seek nuclear autonomy or will move in the direction of Finland or possibly do both things simultaneously.

Now the strategic balance is at a point where we cannot use strategic war for the contingencies that were envisioned in the 1950's and 60's. In addition, the political situation in Europe is in flux. Nothing could be more calamitous than a US withdrawal at this moment.

Mr. A. Johnson: We have got to get across the point that our troops are serving U.S. purposes. They are there for the defense of the U.S.

⁹ Not further identified.

¹⁰ See footnote 2, Document 56.

Mr. Kissinger: What we need is a fact sheet covering all of the issues and then material on individual issues to be used for State speeches.

Mr. MacGregor: Once the Senators have the basic material, they can stretch it out into a full speech.

Mr. A. Johnson: (to Nutter) I understand you are doing a speech for Senator Jackson.¹¹

Mr. R. Johnson: No, that is not exactly the case.

Mr. Nutter: We are briefing him today.

Mr. A. Johnson: I thought I heard yesterday that Gardiner Tucker¹² was doing a speech for him.

Mr. R. Johnson: What he is putting together is just factual material.

Mr. MacGregor: Ken BeLieu of my office will be stationed in Senator Scott's office. Anything that you put together should be given to him.

Mr. Kissinger: We need to make sure that everyone sings from the same tune. All of this should be cleared by our people.

Mr. Scali: Whatever we put out should be strong and pungent. This sort of style would be fully in keeping with the importance of the issue.

Mr. Kissinger: If we don't get the establishment with us on this one, it is hard to know whether we will ever be able to get them.

Mr. A. Johnson: We will put together a fact sheet.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It should include what the Europeans are doing.

Mr. Kissinger: Dave Abshire will be working with MacGregor on approaches to individual Senators. The President has indicated that he is willing to help. You should let the President know what he can do.

Mr. Abshire: I take it you don't envision a large Presidential meeting with members of the Senate.

Mr. Kissinger: He is open to suggestions. He is prepared to do anything.

We need a list of outside groups and individuals that should be approached. Every agency should submit to me by 5 o'clock today a list of such groups together with an indication of who should contact each one of them.

I talked to George Ball this morning. He said that he was willing to work full time on this and asked to have a list of Senators and said that

¹¹ Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA).

¹² Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis.

he would also go to the newspapers. I am sure that McCloy¹³ will help. This is one issue where we can get all of the foreign policy groups to help out. Ball will be calling me back at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. MacGregor: We will get a list for him.

Mr. Scali: I would suggest we make good use of Ball. We should bring him down here full time. This would be a concrete demonstration of the bipartisan nature of this.

Mr. A. Johnson: We are having a State Department breakfast Friday. It would be useful to have him talk to that group. Could you put that on his list of things to do?

Mr. Kissinger: Certainly. We will get him down here tomorrow.

Mr. MacGregor: One of the first things he should do is call on Senator Humphrey.¹⁴ They have a very close relationship.

Mr. R. Johnson: Humphrey has asked for information material on this. He apparently hasn't taken a position yet.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Haig) Would you get General Goodpaster back here tomorrow.

Mr. Scali: How about Brosio?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: What about Harlan Cleveland?

Mr. Scali: Brosio can speak for the reaction of our allies.

Mr. MacGregor: We would have to treat that carefully.

Mr. Kissinger: We should have Goodpaster here immediately.

Mr. Nutter: General Lemnitzer could also be useful.

Mr. Scali: And General Gruenther.¹⁵

Mr. Kissinger: I am sure that Norstad¹⁶ and others will help.

Mr. Abshire: Harlan Cleveland would have good connections among the Democratic Senators.

Mr. Scali: What Senator could we make a hero out of by letting him lead the fight on this? How about Chuck Percy.¹⁷

Mr. Kissinger: Oh no.

Mr. Abshire: I think he will be with us on this. The financial thing is what bothers him.

¹³ John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner in occupied West Germany after World War II and Chairman, Council of Foreign Relations, 1953–1970.

¹⁴ Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN).

¹⁵ General Alfred M. Gruenther, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1953–1956.

¹⁶ General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1956–1963.

¹⁷ Senator Charles H. Percy (R-IL).

Mr. Kissinger: My experience with Percy is that on every hot issue something bothers him. He manages to keep on the fence until he isn't needed. He won't lead anything.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Maybe we could use Mathias?¹⁸

Mr. MacGregor: He is on record with his alternative proposal. It would be difficult for him to back off.

Mr. Kissinger: Who will call Harlan Cleveland?

Mr. A. Johnson: I will call him.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think this economic issue ought to be knocked in the head. A U.S. withdrawal would be far more deleterious to our economic position than the \$1.3 billion that Mansfield is talking about.

Mr. Scali: A lot of Senators are going along with Mansfield because they think the Germans are screwing us.

Mr. A. Johnson: We have sent out a cable to Bonn and told them that now is the time for them to give some indication of their willingness to help.¹⁹

Mr. R. Johnson: Even Senator Bellmon²⁰ is ticked off about the Germans.

Mr. Scali: We have to get the Germans to do something publicly.

Mr. Abshire: Even barring publicity, any sort of message from the Germans would be helpful.

Mr. Kissinger: It would be very helpful. It would even affect Muskie.²¹

Mr. Abshire: I think Muskie will be with us on this one in view of his statements after his visit to Europe.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Scali) Can you give me a list of media groups that might be helpful. (to Volcker) The best thing we can have out of you [Treasury]²² is a little constructive silence.

Mr. A. Johnson: (to MacGregor) I am confused about the procedural situation. Can an amendment be referred to a Committee?

Mr. MacGregor: You can have an informal agreement that it will not be voted upon until the issue has been ventilated in the Foreign Re-

¹⁸ Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) proposed a compromise that called for negotiations on troop reductions with both Europe and the Soviet Union without mentioning specific cuts. It was defeated 73–24. (John W. Finney, "Senate Bars a Reduction in American NATO Force; Mansfield Defeated, 61–36," *New York Times*, May 20, 1971, p. 1)

¹⁹ Telegram 83041 to Bonn, May 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)

²⁰ Henry Bellmon (R-OK).

²¹ Senator Edmund R. Muskie (D-ME).

²² Brackets are in the original.

lations Committee or in response to some action such as a request by the Secretary of State to address the Senate on this issue.

Mr. A. Johnson: We are thinking about repeating the Middle East scenario on this.

Mr. Scali: Would it be closed session?

Mr. A. Johnson: That is my thinking.

Mr. Kissinger: This group should meet again later today. Let's make it at 6 o'clock.²³

²³ Apparently the group did not meet again before the meeting the following day with Nixon; see Document 63.

63. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 13, 1971, 4:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Former High Government Officials and Military Officers on the Mansfield Amendment, Thursday, May 13, 1971, 4:35 p.m.

After personally greeting those present, the President began by expressing his appreciation for their coming to the meeting on such short notice. He would not have suggested it if it were not vitally important to mobilize on a bipartisan basis those who had supported NATO from the beginning.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 278, Presidential File. Secret. Sent for information. Sonnenfeldt drafted the memorandum on May 24. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon and Haig left the Oval Office at 4:31 p.m. for the meeting in the Cabinet Room. The following people also attended: Kissinger, Rogers, McCloy, George Ball, Dean Acheson (former Secretary of State), Henry Cabot Lodge (former Ambassador to the U.N. and South Vietnam), Nicholas Katzenbach (former Attorney General), General Alfred Gruenther, General Lauris Norstad, Goodpaster, Lemnitzer, General Lucius Clay (former High Commissioner for Germany), Cyrus Vance (former Deputy Defense Secretary), Laird, Moorer, and James Roche (Chairman, General Motors Corporation). The President returned to the Oval Office at 6:03 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Kissinger made numerous telephone calls on May 12 to many of the participants in this meeting, trying to enlist support for defeat of the Mansfield Resolution. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

The President went on to say that what Senator Mansfield was doing was not new; the Senator strongly believed in it and he had greater support than previously. The President thought we could lose in the Senate although not in the Congress as a whole. But Secretary Rogers was going to NATO meetings and in the event of a loss, even in the Senate, his position would be untenable, as Secretary Acheson knew from his own experience.

The President said that the men in the room honestly disagreed with some of his foreign policies. There had been traumatic events in connection with certain of our foreign policies and he would not ask those present for their support. But we were now facing another subject. We had never disagreed on NATO; this was what united us. The President recalled that since the 80th Congress, when President Truman proposed NATO and related programs and a Republican Congress supported them, we had always been united on this subject.

The President asked whether the reasons for supporting NATO were no longer relevant, commenting that he himself had very strong feelings on the subject. One could talk about the importance of Asia, of Latin America and the Middle East, which indeed had a very high level of importance, but NATO was the blue chip. Secretary Rogers would be going to NATO at a time of great success for the Alliance and of opportunity for progress on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), which would not occur if we cut our forces unilaterally. What Senator Mansfield was proposing just at this time, therefore, made no sense.

Perhaps, the President continued, it was unsophisticated, but he remembered that as a freshman Congressman he saw three reasons for NATO: the threat from the Soviet Union, the weakness of Western Europe and the need for a home for the Germans. Today, arguments could perhaps be made that the threat was less. (In an aside, the President referred to a forthcoming meeting in Indianapolis under NATO aegis on common problems of the cities.² Ten thousand demonstrators against NATO were expected.) It was also true that Western Europe was stronger economically, that the UK may be entering the Common Market, and that Europe's military potential was rising. But the Germans, while today the strongest and most dynamic, also posed potentially the most difficult problem in the heart of Europe. A unilateral reduction would significantly affect the balance and would have a bad effect on relations with the Russians. On the Germans, the effect would be catastrophic. Thus, one could perhaps debate the first two of the original reasons for NATO, but the third still existed. The problems would be serious if the Germans left the fold and the umbilical cord were cut.

² This was a combined meeting of the CCMS and the Conference of Mayors and Local Authorities.

The President went on that in opposing the Mansfield amendment, he was acting not only as the man now sitting in the President's chair. He, too, had been "present at the creation," and we were now perhaps at a breakthrough with the Soviets and the East Europeans if we stayed strong within the Alliance. It would be a tragedy if we now pulled back.

Concluding, the President urged that Senators be told that regardless of partisanship, we must support NATO. The objective of all of us was to reduce forces, to achieve better relations with the Russians and to get the Europeans to do more. But unilateral withdrawal was not the way to do it.

Secretary Rogers, referring to his recent and forthcoming trips, stressed how successful our policy had been and that we have accomplished the assurance of our Allies. The last NATO meeting had been the best in years and the Allies were doing more. All had agreed that we would only reduce forces in an orderly way and after consultations. The Secretary said he could not understand Senator Mansfield. This subject had to be dealt with in an orderly way and with hearings. But the monetary crisis had given emotional appeal to the Mansfield amendment. The Secretary had asked Senator Mansfield why he had moved in the way he did and why we could not have hearings.

In response to the President's question about the effect on the Middle East, Secretary Rogers said that the Mansfield amendment would completely undercut our position. We would seem frenetic and things could get very dangerous with the Soviets. Telegrams had arrived from all over Europe expressing alarm. The President added that the amendment would also undercut our SALT position.

Mr. McCloy said the President was preaching to the converted. The question was what to do. Mr. McCloy reported that he had talked with the publishers of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* and that they were receptive to running articles over the weekend. (The President indicated his approval.) Mr. McCloy cautioned that we should not give away too many arguments. He recalled that not everybody was scared of the Soviets. But we had wanted to give assurances to the Europeans. The terms of the NATO treaty itself were illusory but our troops were an earnest of our commitment. Senator Mansfield was not concerned with money; he wants our commitment taken out. Mr. McCloy concluded that the Germans were not disloyal but they had a serious Eastern problem.

Mr. Ball, commenting that he had been in Germany six times of late, said he totally subscribed to what the President had said. The situation in the SPD was alarming. A new generation had emerged and there was again the historic debate between Eastern and Western policy. Eastern policy frequently won. Mr. Ball said he was depressed by

what he saw on the whole, and that it would take an enormous amount of convincing to beat the amendment. Mr. Ball then asked the President whether he would accept a compromise if Mansfield had the votes. This might be better than going to the conference committee. Mr. Ball asked for guidance.

Secretary Rogers felt there were second thoughts on the Hill and that it was a mistake to consider a compromise now. He had told Senators that there was going to be no accommodation by the President. We feel, the Secretary said, that the amendment should be voted up or down. There was some movement in our direction and we should stay hard.

The President said we should stay hard now. He had yet to see a compromise that was any good. Dr. Kissinger commented that all the compromise texts were bad. The President continued that if defeat was inevitable, we should perhaps move, but now we should plow straight ahead. The people on the Hill had to stand up and be statesmen. Public opinion would undoubtedly be against our troops in Europe but Senators have to stand up. They could cater to feelings about the military—given all the problems of drugs and Vietnam, the uniform to some had become a symbol of dishonor. People also talk up the monetary crisis but really did not know enough about it. In any case, the leaders of the country had to stand up and buck the tide. The President believed we could win. Referring to Mr. Ball's question, the President could not say now what might happen later.

Secretary Rogers said that Senator Mansfield had been rather sheepish when he saw him earlier and may in fact not believe he can win. In any case, it was clear that we had to beat him.

Secretary Acheson said he could not disagree more with the position put forward by Mr. Ball. Senator Mansfield simply could not beat the President. "You have got the power. You are the President." Mr. Ball interjected that he had deliberately asked the question in order to draw from the President the statement that he had made. Secretary Acheson commented that this was "too damn subtle for me."

Mr. Vance reported that Senator Humphrey wanted to mobilize opposition to Mansfield and that Senator Muskie would be a possible opponent to the amendment. The President stressed the need to get the three Democratic candidates. Mr. Ball thought that Senator Kennedy³ did not look promising since he would not go against Senator Mansfield.

General Gruenther then reported comments by businessmen in Cincinnati that the Mansfield amendment would save us \$14 billion.

³ Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA).

Secretary Rogers commented that Senator Mansfield would save no money at all. The President stressed again that Senators Humphrey and Muskie were crucial since they would carry others along.

Mr. MacGregor then reported on the nose count as it stood at the time. There were 38 for Mansfield, 37 against him, though some of these were soft, and 24 were undecided. There ensued a brief discussion about the firmness of the positions of various senators, at the end of which Mr. Ball stressed that there was an important psychological factor. The assumption on the Hill was that Mansfield had the votes and he felt this had to be turned around.

Mr. Katzenbach felt that we should seek to win by talking to people rather than making a big public issue. The President should make his position clear, but would be better off not making a big case. The President responded that Senators are affected by what important papers say. However, he understood Mr. Katzenbach's point. It was important to separate the present issue from all the other things we argue about. We had to draw the line with NATO. It would be bad if it became fashionable to talk about unilateral reductions. Mr. Katzenbach thought that many senators would be going along with Senator Mansfield as Majority Leader, and others would make the assumption that the House would kill the amendment and they could safely vote for it.

The President commented again that it would be bad for Secretary Rogers to go to the forthcoming NATO meetings if there had been a vote for Mansfield. Secretary Acheson suggested that we should not worry too much about Secretary Rogers' position at NATO. The argument on this score would not persuade many. Mr. Acheson recalled that he went to a crucial NATO meeting in December 1950 while at home there were demands that he be fired.

General Norstad recalled that there had been many past instances of pressure on our forces in Europe. He used to think that we needed to be flexible but right now was the time to stand firm. But perhaps it was desirable to be flexible down the road. After all, the troops have a political purpose and one should perhaps develop a rationale to which the levels could move. Many in the hinterland thought the troops had been in Europe too long. After reviewing the reasons for NATO and the success achieved, General Norstad concluded that we should develop for ourselves a rationale for flexibility so that we would not have only a black or white position; however, right now we should be uncompromising.

General Lemnitzer, referring to the innumerable speeches he had given on this subject, thought that the best arguments were that NATO had kept the peace—this was an especially good argument at universities—and that at Reykjavik, we had supported MBFR and had come

out against unilateral reductions.⁴ Adoption of the Mansfield amendment would be repudiation of our solemn word.

General Goodpaster thought it was also important to stress the solidarity argument: that if we acted unilaterally the Allies would not work together and would quarrel. NATO suppresses these tendencies. This point had appeal even to far out youth in the US and in Europe. Admiral Moorer thought the point had special force with regard to Greece and Turkey, and in this connection was also important in connection with the Middle East.

Secretary Acheson then suggested that the President might perhaps issue a statement which would be signed by past senior officials. He thought that currently serving officials and officers should not sign, in order not to create the impression that they had a choice of supporting the President. Mr. Acheson then read out a proposed Presidential statement. Mr. Vance had some doubts that there should be a commitment not to reduce any forces at all since it might be desirable at some point to make some minor changes. Secretary Rogers felt that the idea of a Presidential statement should be held in abeyance until we saw how things were going. Perhaps it should be held until Sunday.⁵ People might look for the omissions among the signatories and that might get more publicity than the statement. Secretary Acheson did not think Sunday was a good day since nobody could be reached then. In any event, most of the proposed signatories would go along. The President, responding to Mr. Vance, said we were not rigid on force levels and had indeed moved to some extent. There was also, of course, the MBFR approach.

Dr. Kissinger, in response to the President's request, referred to the detailed studies on NATO and MBFR that had been undertaken by the Administration and which were all being put before NATO. We were not frozen. We were asking what purposes other than political ones our forces served and we were making good progress. But we could not make progress if Congress puts us over a barrel.

The President noted that the Soviets were showing signs of interest in mutual force reductions. He would not predict that an agreement would result but the success of NATO, economic problems, China, and the state of the nuclear balance all might lead to a more receptive attitude provided we did not throw away the opportunity. In regard to General Norstad's comments, the President recalled that President Eisenhower had urged that we examine the six division level in Europe. At the moment, however, the President was convinced that we could be at a break point and should stay with our present forces.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 1.

⁵ May 16.

Secretary Rogers then said he had thought about Dean Acheson's proposal and now felt that the suggested statement should go ahead. The President agreed with Mr. Katzenbach's comment that there were perhaps too many military signatories suggested for the statement. It was agreed that only former SACEURs would be asked to sign. The President also indicated that drafting changes could be made to take care of Mr. Vance's point. He also proposed getting former High Commissioners in Germany as signatories, pointing out again that things in Germany were on the move and recalled that German CDU leader Barzel⁶ had recently mentioned this to him.

General Goodpaster observed that the possibility of a dissolution of NATO petrifies Germany's allies. Regarding Mr. Vance's comment on the Acheson draft, General Goodpaster distinguished between adjustments to keep forces moderate and the fact that we were now at a point where a major cut in a short time would be dangerous. He pointed out that it had been possible to reduce forces by some 120,000 in an eight-year span.

The President said that Mr. MacGregor would be the contact point for the group and that the Acheson draft would be worked over in the White House.

Mr. McCloy then referred to the German commitment not to convert dollars into gold—although he noted that a recent story in the German magazine *der Spiegel*, concerning a conversation between him and the late Bundesbank President Blessing leading to the German commitment, was inaccurate. The point, however, was that the Germans could start converting dollars and we could all get into an extremely serious situation. Thus the problem raised by the Mansfield amendment far transcends the military aspects.

The President then said that in making our case we should point out that nobody has a monopoly on reducing troops. We are doing this not only in Vietnam but, under the Nixon Doctrine, also in Thailand, Korea and Okinawa. We are stressing the line that the US cannot do it all alone. In Europe, we are getting the Europeans to do more, because under the nuclear balance that exists now, conventional forces were much more important than before. We do have plans to reduce American involvement but to do so consistent with our commitments. And in Europe only in consultation with our Allies and in the light of what the Soviets do.

Secretary Rogers reiterated that the best approach was to meet Mansfield head on and that we wanted no amendments. Mr. Ball

⁶ Rainer Barzel, Chairman of Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union coalition in the West German Bundestag.

stressed that Senators had to be convinced that Mansfield could not win or else they would try to be heroes with compromises. Senator Stevenson⁷ was with us but thought Mansfield would win and, therefore, was looking for a compromise. The President strongly agreed that the mood should be turned around and that no one should talk defeat or compromise. The President again said that the Acheson statement would be modified—Dr. Kissinger would take care of it—and that we should then go ahead with it.

Mr. McCloy asked if it was all right to go ahead with an article in the *New York Times*. The President agreed and also urged that some hardliners on the right be enlisted to counter the economic arguments. He then said he wanted General Clay to have the last word.

General Clay stressed the continuing fear of the Germans in Europe and its intensification if we pulled out. The President said it was amazing how fear of the Germans still lingered on.

The meeting ended with the President again personally thanking each of the participants for having come.⁸

Helmut Sonnenfeldt⁹

⁷ Adlai Stevenson (D-IL).

⁸ On May 15, the White House released a statement by Nixon at Key Biscayne that said that the unilateral reduction of the United States' or any other NATO ally's troops in Europe "would be an error of historic dimensions." The White House also released a list of former U.S. officials who supported the statement, messages from former Presidents Truman and Johnson, and a letter from Brosio to Nixon. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 635–636.

⁹ Sonnenfeldt initialed "HS" in front of his typed signature.

64. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, May 14, 1971.

NSSM 121—Issues at the June, 1971 NATO Ministerial Meeting

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

The US will face three East-West political issues at the NAC Ministerial meeting at Lisbon:

- the current allied attitudes to issues relating to Germany and Berlin;
- allied conditions and preparations for a CES, and the question of using a CES to establish permanent East-West machinery; and
- MBFR and its possible relation to CES.

(Questions to be addressed by the Defense Planning Committee, especially NATO force improvements, are not thoroughly treated in the study but will be handled through the DPRC. They are discussed briefly at the end of this summary.)

I. Germany and Berlin

Ministers can be expected to review progress and prospects in the Berlin negotiations and other East-West talks relating to Germany. *However, given the current impasse on Berlin, and the linkage between a Berlin agreement and the ratification of FRG bilateral accords with the USSR and Poland, there is no real issue to be resolved at Lisbon.* The study suggests that NATO communiqué formulations will likely be limited to a reaffirmation of allied support for Four Power rights and FRG objectives. State plans to seek allied support in reiterating that a “satisfactory conclusion” of the Berlin talks be obtained before the allies move toward multilateral East-West explorations.

After Lisbon it could become more difficult to maintain allied consensus on this subject:

—If the Berlin talks should fail, or appear to drag on without noticeable progress, some allies may wish to abandon the Berlin linkage, especially as regards a CES.

—Alternatively, a very modest accord on Berlin might not be accepted as sufficient progress to justify forward movement toward a CES (especially if the FRG government did not use the agreement to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-182, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 121. Secret. This paper is a summary of the 29-page NSSM 121 Response. NSSM 121 is Document 60.

submit the Moscow Treaty² to the Bundestag for ratification). The study suggests, however, that the majority of the allies will consider *any* Berlin agreement acceptable to the Three Western Powers as adequate for proceeding with multilateral CES preparations. A complicating factor is that a Berlin agreement might seem to warrant a CES, but would not lead to ratification of the Eastern treaties.

II. CES Issues

A. Allied conditions for a CES

The study points out that as yet no firm allied consensus exists on the specific aims of a CES, its venue and its timing. Nevertheless, many allies believe that a CES is inevitable, and that it can serve Western interests even if it does not lead to a new security system or "peace order" in Europe.

—A CES, it is felt, could increase East European freedom of action vis-à-vis the West and perhaps ameliorate living conditions in the East.

—Some believe a CES might result in the establishment of a mechanism for negotiating real security issues, such as MBFR.

—A CES would enhance (or at least appear to enhance) the role of the Europeans in East-West relations.

—Some allies contend that the mere atmospherics of a CES would contribute to détente and a reduction of tensions.

On the other hand, it is recognized by many allies that:

—Key European security issues (e.g., Germany and Berlin, SALT) will not be addressed at a CES.

—Moscow could easily use a CES to promote Soviet objectives (e.g., enhance the GDR's status, sanction Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, divide the Western allies, inhibit West European integration, encourage Western Europe to relax its military effort and the US to reduce its military presence in Europe).

*At Lisbon, the study contends, the main issue will be whether or not to go beyond the December, 1970, communiqué position which set two preconditions for allied multilateral explorations regarding a "conference, or a series of conferences, on security and cooperation in Europe":*³

1) Four-Power talks on Berlin must reach a "satisfactory conclusion;" and

2) other on-going East-West talks must be "proceeding favorably."

² The Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Moscow on August 12, 1970. The treaty included an exchange of notes between Germany and the Western Allies on Quadripartite rights and a German letter to the Soviet Government on reunification.

³ See Document 55 and footnote 2 thereto.

Most allies, it is asserted, would now prefer to drop the second precondition of progress in "other on-going talks, retaining only the Berlin precondition. Bonn believes this would focus greater attention on the importance of a Berlin settlement. The study recommends that the US support restatement of the December, 1970, communiqué position at Lisbon, but that we be prepared to join a consensus, should one develop, in favor of eliminating the second precondition of progress in "other on-going talks." (No analysis is presented in support of this recommendation from the standpoint of US interests.)

B. Preparations for a CES—the Current Drift

The appendix to the paper outlines three basic concepts of a CES:

1) a CES with very limited objectives, in which the Europeans take the lead and the US plays a less active role, with the aim of convening an early one-time conference;

2) a CES involving active US participation with clearly defined, but still limited, objectives that might promote further East-West contacts in the security and cooperation areas; and

3) a CES as a serious policy objective, to be used to establish permanent machinery for the resolution of outstanding East-West issues in Europe.

By our support for specific CES agenda items in previous NATO communiqués, and the role we have recently played in the NATO East-West negotiations study, *the US is currently pursuing the second of the above conceptual approaches to a CES. This will lead to a primarily hortatory conference with limited tangible results, as the study points out. According to this approach and current studies, the agenda of a CES would include the following:*

a. Principles governing relations between states, including the renunciation of the use of force.

—NATO communiqués have already stated that these principles should include "universal respect of the sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity of each European state, regardless of its political and social system." The intent has been to oppose or limit the Brezhnev doctrine.

b. Issues of cooperation in Europe, including enhanced technical, economic, scientific and cultural exchanges and cooperation on the environment.

—The Study also notes the idea, informally discussed by the US and some allies, that these essentially non-military issues could be discussed at a Conference on European Cooperation (CEC) as an alternative to a CES, should there be no prospect that concrete security issues such as MBFR would be addressed at a CES.

c. Freer movement of people, ideas and information.

—Already affirmed as an agenda item by NATO Ministers, the objective would be to elicit from communist governments actions or commitments which would facilitate an expansion of East-West contacts.

d. Other issues, including possible negotiations on MBFR in an appropriate forum, and possibly consideration of permanent machinery (although these issues have so far not been thoroughly addressed and analyzed).

Procedural approaches: So far the US has expressed a preference for “careful exploratory and preparatory phases,” aimed at reaching maximum East-West consensus prior to a formal CES. Believing that the Pact will not be prepared to reach a preliminary consensus on issues prior to a CES, the French have suggested an early conference of Ministers following multilateral explorations, in order to discuss positions, refine them through subcommittees, and later debate them further in later phases of the conference.

—The paper points out that the French approach would probably focus undue attention on the initial Ministerial gathering, without any assurance that the Soviets would deal meaningfully with issues proposed by NATO in subsequent phases.

Assuming as it does the continuation of the present approach, aimed at hortatory and limited tangible results, the study asserts that no definitive new positions need be taken at Lisbon.

—It is suggested that Ministers will note the work done to date and request further studies. State recommends forceful language in rebuttal of the Brezhnev doctrine (while asserting that we may wish to weaken in a trade-off later), and an endorsement of early NATO attention to East-West environmental cooperation if Italy proposes an initiative in this area. Suggesting that Ministers will give only cursory attention to possible permanent machinery beyond asking for further study, the paper offers no US position in this area.

(Comment: The study presents no solid discussion of US interests or objectives in a CES or whether we are adopting the approach which is in our best interest. However, if we are interested in another approach it would necessarily have implications for our posture at the Lisbon meeting. For example, if we were to decide to adopt the third conceptual approach listed above [i.e., to give our full support to a CES provided that it address real security issues, such as MBFR, and establish permanent East-West monitoring and enforcement machinery]⁴ the US would presumably want at Lisbon to emphasize steps toward permanent machinery as an essential element of a CES. Alternatively, if we see no US interests served by a CES, we should retreat from our recent active role in NATO CES studies.)

⁴ Brackets are in the original.

III. MBFR

Recalling positions of recent NATO communiqués in favor of exploratory talks with interested Warsaw Pact states on MBFR, and noting the recent statement of the US position in the President's Foreign Policy Report,⁵ the study points out that the allies have yet to reach an agreed position on whether MBFR is feasible or advantageous to the Alliance, or how to approach MBFR negotiations.

—The UK maintains that NATO's public position is ahead of its preparedness to actually engage the East in MBFR talks.

—The FRG has recently proposed a phased process of MBFR negotiations, beginning first with principles in the pattern of SALT, then discussing constraints and possible freezes, before addressing the shape of actual reductions. Though precluding multilateral MBFR explorations before a satisfactory Berlin agreement, the Germans argue that their new approach would enhance NATO's détente image and militate against unilateral troop cuts.

—While remaining aloof from NATO deliberations on MBFR, the French are now giving the subject more serious consideration.

At Lisbon, the study suggests, attention will focus on whether the communiqué should signal greater interest in MBFR and the program for further NATO MBFR studies. *There are two specific issues:*

1) *Our response to recent statements by Brezhnev and Kosygin expressing Soviet interest in MBFR.*

—Several allies are expected to support a statement in the communiqué of allied interest in the recent Soviet position. The paper proposes that the US agree to noting the Soviet statements on the assumption that they contrast with previous Soviet reticence on the subject and may reflect genuine Soviet interest.

2) *Linkage of MBFR and CES.*

—The FRG supports some connection in the communiqué between CES and MBFR, including a linkage in exploratory discussions prior to a CES. The German contention is that this would ensure that real military security issues be the focus of any eventual CES.

—Some, but not all, other allies are expected to support the FRG approach.

—*State proposes to refer in the NATO communiqué to the relationship of MBFR to issues of European security and to discussions related to a CES, but to keep separate from a CES detailed explorations and negotiations on MBFR.* Under this formula, MBFR negotiations could go forward before, during or after a CES in a separate forum. Multilateral MBFR talks would not be contingent on a Berlin settlement.

⁵ The President's Second Annual Report to Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy, February 25, 1971, is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 219–345.

(*Comment:* The analysis in the study of the pros and cons of MBFR–CES linkage is skimpy and not satisfactory. The linkage issue is not cast against a discussion of what kind of CES might best serve US interests.)

Noting that further NATO MBFR studies will be needed after the Lisbon meeting to seek an allied consensus on US substantive and procedural approaches, the paper also suggests that *the issue of GDR participation* in MBFR, as well as in CES, will require further attention. GDR participation on the basis of full equality could have adverse consequences for our position in the Berlin talks.

IV. Defense Issues

The paper suggests in summary fashion that NATO force improvements will be reviewed at the meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), especially:

- progress in implementing the recommendations of the AD-70 study adopted last December; and
- progress of the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP).

(*Data on actual progress in these programs is not analyzed in the study.*)

It is suggested that the DPC meeting will provide an opportunity for the US to:

- support the implementation of AD-70 and EDIP in close consultation among the allies, with initial priority to West European aircraft shelter construction;
- urge that EDIP be considered only the first step toward even greater European force improvement efforts;
- reaffirm our intention to maintain and improve US forces in Europe, if the Europeans do their share in improving their forces;
- encourage improvements in Allied defenses in the Mediterranean.

65. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 14, 1971, 3:25–4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

June NATO Ministerial Meeting

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson

George Springsteen

Ronald Spiers

Defense

Armistead I. Selden

Brig. Gen. Harrison Lobdell

Lt. Col. Edward O'Connor

JCS

Vice Adm. J.P. Weinell

Capt. R.A. Kamorowski

CIA

Richard Helms

Peter Dixon Davis

ACDA

Philip Farley

NSC Staff

Col. R.T. Kennedy

William Hyland

Wilfred Kohl

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

John Court

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

1. the IG for Europe will prepare a paper on what strategy we want to follow with regard to a Conference on European Security, including the question of permanent machinery;
2. the IG will do a paper on a negotiating scenario for MBFR;
3. an NSC meeting on the NATO issues will not be necessary; they will be dealt with in a memorandum to the President.²

Mr. Kissinger: The principal purpose of this meeting is to go over the issues which will come up at the NATO meeting and to decide whether an NSC meeting is necessary.

Mr. Johnson: We have no differences on the issues.

Mr. Kissinger: I see no major issues. I originally thought we would need an NSC meeting but it now appears we can handle it in a memo to the President.

Mr. Helms: The issue is pretty thin for an NSC meeting.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Not found.

Mr. Kissinger: We also have Brezhnev's statement on MBFR.³ Are our allies reasonably content with our position that a satisfactory Berlin agreement is a precondition for a Conference on European Security? Is there any pressure to break the linkage, particularly since there has been no obvious progress on Berlin? When are they meeting next?

Mr. Springsteen: They are meeting in London Monday and Tuesday.⁴

Mr. Kissinger: And our position will be to maintain the linkage between Berlin and CES. Do we expect any challenge?

Mr. Springsteen: No. The only cloud on the horizon is the confusion over what went on with regard to CES when Schumann went to Moscow. We do not have a full reading on his conversations, but we do have two conflicting press versions—one saying he maintained the linkage and another indicating that he did not. It's probable that Schumann said more to the press than he did to Gromyko. We think the linkage will prevail, however.

Mr. Kissinger: There would be a problem if an agreement were reached on Berlin and the eastern treaties should fail in the German Parliament. Barzel has told me he would vote against a treaty. What about the other condition—that "other on-going talks" were proceeding favorably. I'm not sure what that means.

Mr. Springsteen: Before the NATO Ministerial meeting last December the Germans said there could be no CES without a satisfactory outcome on Berlin and in the inter-German talks. Harmel added "other on-going talks" to the Berlin condition to head off a more specific condition from the Germans. There is a split within NATO on this. Some people want to get rid of the condition, or convert it to language on the "general atmosphere." We think there is some merit to keeping the present wording, since removing or changing it could be interpreted as a signal of some sort. We won't take the lead on this, though.

Mr. Johnson: Could they think it refers to SALT?

Mr. Springsteen: We have clearly indicated that it is *not* SALT.

Mr. Helms: Then it's a mystery as to what it does refer to.

Mr. Kissinger: If it's not SALT and if the internal German issue is wrapped up, who else is negotiating?

Mr. Johnson: It has no meaning.

Mr. Kissinger: It may have some advantage in keeping the Russians on their toes. Am I correct in saying that we don't know to what it refers, but if someone proposes that we drop it, we won't oppose it?

³ See Document 66.

⁴ May 17–18.

Gen. Lobdell: By leaving Berlin as the only precondition, are we putting pressure on the quadripartite powers to bring Berlin to a conclusion?

Mr. Kissinger: The biggest pressure on this comes from the Germans, not the allies. Would we apply this to the preliminary discussions of the Ambassadors in Helsinki—that there would be no discussion of CES before a Berlin agreement?

Mr. Springsteen: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming Berlin is out of the way and we are moving toward a CES, do we know what we want to accomplish? There are two issues: (reading from Mr. Sonnenfeldt's memo)⁵

—“the principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of forces;

—the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment.”

Since we won't go to a conference such as this to attack the Soviets, isn't it a meaningless psychological exercise? Won't it make it harder to make progress in NATO?

Mr. Springsteen: There is a risk that it might create a state of euphoria which would make holding the allies together that much more difficult.

Mr. Kissinger: There are a number of things we could do. We could make it a damage limiting operation; we could try for a series of conferences on specific items; or we could take it more seriously and wrap it up with MBFR, which is the only real issue.

Mr. Johnson: The Soviet concept is that the Ministers get together, say nice nothings and appoint sub-groups to do any work.

Mr. Springsteen: That's the French position on procedure. The Soviet desires are clear. They want a renunciation of force agreement, recognition of the status quo in Europe, an opening wedge for increasing economic and cultural contacts with the West, and creation of a sense of euphoria for what divisive effect it can have.

Mr. Kissinger: I don't see this as a major issue now, but we need to know what strategy we want to pursue on CES. Let's ask the IG to do a paper taking another look at CES in the light of the Soviet Party Congress.

Mr. Johnson: Okay.

⁵ For Sonnenfeldt's May 10 briefing memorandum to Kissinger, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 48, footnotes 1, 3, and 7–10.

Mr. Kissinger: How about MBFR?

Mr. Johnson: We will have to take account of the Brezhnev statement. It will obviously be a subject of discussion at Lisbon. How do we handle it? We should do some probing—send our Ambassador in to find out what the statement means.

Mr. Springsteen: A possible scenario would be to discuss it with the allies in Brussels, while we probe bilaterally with the Russians to see what the statement means. Then we can develop a position that the Ministers can agree on as to how to handle the issue in the post-Lisbon period. The Russians are no more prepared than we are to negotiate on MBFR. Whatever emerges from Lisbon, we should probably intensify our efforts to find out what the Russians have in mind.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Farley) Weren't we going to brief NATO on MBFR?

Mr. Farley: The paper is being sanitized now for that purpose.

Mr. Kissinger: I think this is essential. We are light-years ahead of the Europeans in our thinking on this. How quickly can we do this?

Mr. Court: In about two weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's push our own discussions so when the Soviets start pressing we'll be ready. Let's get a paper on what strategy we want to follow. Should that be done by the IG or by ACDA? Who would handle the negotiations? Let's ask the IG to do a paper on a negotiating scenario. We can't have all of Europe in the room. Who will do the negotiating. Would we negotiate simultaneously with SALT? What would the first meeting look like—would it be a meeting of principals?

Mr. Farley: We might consider a phased approach. Brezhnev is out ahead of us on this. He was much more pointed as to negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger: There would be no condition to an MBFR agreement?

Mr. Johnson: No.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There might be a problem with the GDR.

Mr. Springsteen: That would not be unmanageable. NATO will probably try to avoid the term "negotiations" and use "exploratory discussions."

Mr. Johnson: We have to get ourselves in position for this.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a position next week in connection with the Mansfield resolution. We have to answer those Senators—tell them we are ready to negotiate.

Mr. Helms: Damn right!!

Mr. Johnson: We can't appear any less ready than the Soviets.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the question of permanent East-West machinery? Are we opposed?

Mr. Johnson: We can make this part of the CES study.

Mr. Springsteen: The question has already come up. The British proposed permanent machinery as a substitute for CES. The Russians are talking in the context of CES. This could be one of the alternatives we might consider.

Mr. Kissinger: On the defense issues, these won't be coming up at this NATO meeting, will they? Are we agreed that we don't need an NSC meeting? If so, we will produce a memorandum for the President.

Gen. Lobbell: Could we consider this matter of "on-going talks" a little more?

Mr. Springsteen: That is not our phrase.

Mr. Kissinger: How can you give up something you can't define?

Capt. Kamorowski: That's the basis of many a love story.

Mr. Kissinger: What Department are you from?

Capt. Kamorowski: Department of Defense.

Mr. Johnson: That sounds like "make love, not war"!

66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

Brezhnev on Mutual Troop Reductions in Europe: Help in our fight against Mansfield Amendment, but Problems Later.

In a major speech in Soviet Georgia, Brezhnev went out of his way to emphasize Soviet readiness to begin negotiations over mutual troop reductions in Europe.² This is a logical follow up to his Party Congress speech, which also mentioned mutual reductions of troops and armaments in Central Europe, but without specifying the previous Soviet

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 715, Country Files—Europe, USSR, Vol. XIII. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped: "The President has seen."

² Brezhnev gave the speech on May 13 in Tbilisi. It was summarized in the *New York Times*, May 15, 1971.

condition that the issue had to be tied to the European Security Conference. Brezhnev's more forthright offer also seems to bear out my earlier speculation that after the Congress he would want to demonstrate some tangible results of his "peace program."

In noting speculation in the West about his Party Congress speech, Brezhnev said that Western spokesmen were asking "whose armed force—foreign or national—what armaments, nuclear or conventional, are to be reduced." He compared such speculation to a man who tries to judge the flavor of wine by its appearance without imbibing it.

Brezhnev's answer to this rather playful recitation was:

"you have to muster the resolve to try the proposals you are interested in according to its taste. *Translated into diplomatic language this means—to start negotiations.*"

While such a flat offer to negotiate is a windfall in terms of the debate in this country over the Mansfield Amendment, Brezhnev's main target may well be the NATO meeting in Lisbon. One of the issues at that meeting is how the Alliance should respond to Brezhnev's previous remarks. *This new speech will no doubt strengthen sentiment in Europe for a positive move toward early negotiations for mutual reductions.*

The major question is why, after considerable stalling on this issue, the Soviets seem ready to negotiate.

—It may be that there are genuine economic pressures resulting from the continuing buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East, which recent intelligence indicates is continuing.

—It could also be related to Czechoslovakia, and a Soviet desire to lower their profile there. In this regard the Soviet greetings to the Czech Party Congress noted that the situation has been "normalized"; such a claim could be a justification for some withdrawal of some Soviet forces there. Brezhnev may try to trade in any such withdrawal for Western cutbacks.

—The Soviets may be coming to see negotiations on force reductions as a way to get to their goal of a European Security Conference. The West has made progress on Berlin a precondition for such a conference but not for troop negotiations. Any such negotiations would almost certainly have to involve the GDR, a major Soviet goal in the European security conference proposal.

—Finally, the Soviets may be convinced that this is a serious Western offer, and see some advantage in exploiting the desire among all Europeans for reductions in military spending. As we move into the more intensive phase of improving the quality of NATO forces through the plans worked out last year, the prospect of negotiations on troop re-

ductions with the Soviets could slow down or undermine the effort.³ This risk has always been inherent in the Alliance's dual approach to mutual force reductions, negotiations and improvement of forces.

In short, *Brezhnev's offer "to start negotiations" can be turned to our advantage in the next few days*. At the same time, it means that we may be entering the path of new negotiations, which our studies have shown could be turned against the Alliance, if not handled properly and with prudence.

³ Nixon underlined this entire sentence. In the margin, he wrote: "Probably a major factor in his move."

67. Editorial Note

On May 21, 1971, K. Wayne Smith and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff sent an urgent action memorandum to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger that discussed the need for an official statement of the U.S. position on MBFR, particularly with the upcoming NATO Ministerial meeting in Lisbon. "The events of the past two weeks undoubtedly have created the expectation within the U.S. bureaucracy, the Congress, and NATO that we will now take a vigorous lead in moving the alliance into 'Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions' in Europe. The Soviets (and Mansfield) have put the ball squarely in our court.

"The problem is that we have no agreement within the U.S. Government—much less with our allies—concerning either what kinds of possible elements of 'MBFR' we are most interested in pursuing nor the procedural approach to be taken leading up to or in negotiations."

As a result, Kissinger issued NSDM 108, "Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions," on May 21. The NSDM approved formal negotiations with the USSR or the Warsaw Pact only after the development of an Allied consensus. The United States would "distinguish between (1) diplomatic explorations, which can be pursued at this time; and (2) the first phase of formal negotiations, which we will not begin until further preparations are accomplished." Smith and Sonnenfeldt's memorandum and NSDM 108 are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Documents 52 and 53.

After meetings of the Verification Panel on June 11 and the National Security Council on June 17, Kissinger issued NSDM 116, "The

U.S. Policy on Mutual Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR)," on June 28, which outlined the administration's approach to consultations with the NATO allies and the Soviet Union. Regarding NATO, the United States planned to "develop a consensus within the NATO Alliance governing the substantive elements of its position on mutual reductions of forces in Europe." Though materials would be prepared to send to the NAC, the United States would not discuss specific reduction figures until the President considered the available options. The minutes of the June 11 Verification Panel meeting and the June 17 NSC meeting and NSDM 116 are *ibid.*, Documents 58, 63, and 65.

68. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Lisbon, June 4, 1971, 1943Z.

Secto 26/1859. For the President from the Secretary. Subj: Re NATO Meeting.

1. This was the most constructive and least contentious NATO Meeting² I have yet attended. When we finished our work today we did so in complete agreement on the procedural steps NATO should take toward force reduction talks and on the necessity of a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin negotiations before multilateral consultations on a European security conference are undertaken. I also had several good bilateral talks.

2. Your active leadership in defeating the Mansfield Amendment made a deep impression on our Allies and contributed to a sense of confidence in us which helped pull the Alliance together in spite of diverse opinions on details of the force reduction issue.

3. I think we now have a process going which will help us avoid any unilateral reductions and give us time to prepare serious negotiating proposals.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 521. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Pedersen, cleared by Hillenbrand and Nicholas Platt, Deputy Director, Secretariat Staff, and approved by Rogers. On June 11, Kissinger transmitted the telegram to Nixon with a cover memorandum, which is stamped: "Pres. has seen." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 294)

² The meeting was held June 3–4 in Lisbon. See *Keessing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971–1972, pp. 24661–24663.

4. *Berlin*—On Berlin I found the UK, France and Germany all more optimistic than we have been on the progress recently made in the talks. Soviet willingness to state its own responsibility for maintaining civilian access to Berlin has particularly impressed them. I stressed that many of the most difficult issues lie ahead and that progress really would not be assured until we have an agreement, but agreed in the communiqué to wording expressing “satisfaction” the negotiations had “enabled progress to be registered in recent weeks.” All three also are prepared to concede Soviet consular representation as well as other increases in Soviet presence in West Berlin as part of the next phase of negotiations. I told them I understood their views but was not now in a position to express a view. We will have to re-examine this matter upon my return.

5. *Security Conference*—Based on statements from Gromyko that the Soviet Union recognized in fact that a European security conference could not precede a Berlin settlement, Schumann tried at some length to alter the communiqué language so that it no longer would clearly state that a satisfactory conclusion was a precondition. With the support of Scheel and Sir Alec³ I insisted that the language must be as clear as last year, though its tone could be more positive. Schumann finally conceded. The communiqué expressed the hope that before our next meeting negotiations “will have reached a successful conclusion” and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and cooperation “may then be undertaken.”

6. *MBFR*—Real opinion on MBFR ranges from the French, who again refrained from participation; to the British, who have some doubts that reductions can be brought about without some security disadvantage; to the Germans, who favor the idea but do not want it to get ahead of Berlin; to the Scandinavians, Canada and Belgium, who want to push forward promptly, mainly for domestic public opinion reasons. But in the light of Brezhnev’s recent remarks and of our own political battle over unilateral reductions everyone agreed NATO needed to maintain the initiative.

7. Our proposals for (a) bilateral contacts to probe Soviet intentions more fully over the next few months, accompanied by preparation of NATO negotiating positions, (b) a Deputy Foreign Minister or comparable level meeting in the fall to assess results and to take necessary further decisions hit just the right balance between prompt action and prudence. Several other countries suggested that we might appoint a single representative to consult for us now. I added this to our sugges-

³ Walter Scheel, leader of the West German Free Democratic Party; Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Secretary.

tion as a step that might ensue from the Deputy meeting. This produced full agreement.

8. The course of MBFR talks as now agreed will be:

(a) Transmission of the communiqué to the Soviet Union and others by Moro.

(b) Bilateral explorations with the Soviet Union and preparation of our negotiating views.

(c) A Deputy Foreign Minister or "high official" level meeting at an early date (in the fall) to consult on "substantive and procedural approaches to MBFR."

(d) Willingness to appoint "at the appropriate time," a representative or representatives responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks, and a willingness eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to NATO.]

Rogers

69. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Sanitized MBFR Evaluation Report

We now have two different versions of the MBFR Evaluation Report ready for transmittal to our allies. One accommodates General Goodpaster's views; the other doesn't. You should decide which to send.

The Issues

In May an interagency working group prepared a sanitized version of the April 12 MBFR Evaluation Report for transmittal to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with your instructions. (It is at Tab A.)² This paper has been approved by David Packard for the De-

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 15. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent action. Kissinger initialed the top of the first page.

² Not attached. Neither of the sanitized versions has been found. The Verification Panel considered the full report at its April 23 meeting. See Document 61.

partment of Defense (including the JCS), and has the strong support of the State Department. Earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the paper, with some caveats regarding static force ratio analysis, but submitted it to SACEUR for comment.

As you know, General Goodpaster had a number of substantive objections to the report, largely related to the presentation of the military balance and the use of static force ratios. He also questioned the tactic of pursuing MBFR ahead of force improvements, and expressed the fear that the view of the military balance set forth in our studies, by taking a “rosy” view of the situation, would undercut our efforts to obtain meaningful allied force improvements in the coming years.

The Joint Staff prepared comments on the Evaluation Report based on Goodpaster’s position. These have been reviewed and adjusted by working-level officials from State and Defense, and a revised draft is now available which meets 90 percent of the JCS objections.³

State can live with this revised version, but isn’t ecstatic about it.

But David Packard believes the original paper should go forward without revision. He finds that:

—Final polishing, approval and transmittal of the revised version effectively preclude a U.S. analytic input to NATO’s current MBFR work until after the August holidays. This in turn could mean a very hurried review in the fall of substance prior to the Deputy Foreign Ministers’ meeting (now set for October).⁴

—Procedurally, it would be unwise to reopen agreed papers as this creates a precedent. We will have to fight the same tactical battle over again when time comes to present our force improvements work to the alliance. Further delay in that area would effectively preclude any significant U.S. influence on the detailed force planning of our allies.

Needless to say, the objections of Defense and presumably State to accommodating General Goodpaster raise real bureaucratic difficulties to our distribution of a report that we ourselves have developed. In this situation, your choices are to:

—*Send the Original Sanitized Report.* This would, of course, leave General Goodpaster unhappy but satisfy the agencies in Washington.

—*Send a Report Satisfying Goodpaster’s Criticisms.* Under this approach, we would distribute for final agency review the revised Report and send it to NATO when agreement was reached. If you want to accommodate Goodpaster in this way, you will have to call Dave Packard and Jack Irwin to smooth the way.

³ Not found.

⁴ The meeting took place October 5–6 in Brussels.

—*Delay Sending a Report.*⁵ This avoids the problem created by General Goodpaster but would infuriate parts of the bureaucracy and get us into trouble with our Allies, particularly the British, who badly want a U.S. input.

My Views

This has become a no-win proposition for the NSC, particularly for me as chairman of the MBFR Working Group which is preparing the sanitized versions of the papers. At the root of the problem is the fact that we can't continue to push NATO force improvements and MBFR simultaneously. Goodpaster believes the threat assessment (particularly the M+60 figures) in the Evaluation Report will kill any chance of getting force improvements. State, ACDA, and OSD(ISA) take the position that the Report has already been reviewed and agreed to by all agencies, including the JCS, that both the Verification Panel and the NSC have approved transmitting it to the NAC, and that revising the paper again will just waste time and further irritate the Allies who are already impatient over the lack of a U.S. input. Both sides are right. I think we must provide some kind of input to the Allies. I also think we should try to accommodate Goodpaster—*not* because I agree with his substantive objections to the threat assessment (I don't)—but because I think we should make every effort to obtain the force improvements and that will probably require slowing down the rush toward MBFR.

Recommendation

That you call Dave Packard and Jack Irwin to smooth the way for a Working Group review of the revised report prepared by my staff and the JCS which meets most of Goodpaster's objections.

Approved⁶

Disapproved

See me

⁵ No record was found that any sanitized report was sent to the NAC.

⁶ Kissinger initialed this option. A handwritten comment at the end of the recommendation reads, "notation for HAK to make calls put on his phone list."

70. Minutes of a Defense Program Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 4, 1971, 3:55–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

NATO Force Improvements

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson

Leon Sloss

Ralph McGuire

Seymour Weiss

Defense

David Packard

Philip Odeen

Henry Gaffney

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

B/Gen. Francis J. Roberts

Lt. Walter B. Ratliffe

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

Mr. [name not declassified]

OMB

Casper Weinberger

Kenneth Dam

ACDA

Philip Farley

CEA

Paul McCracken

OST

Edward David

NSC Staff

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Wayne Smith

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Mr. John Court

Adm. Robert O. Welander

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed to obtain:

—Information on how much of our equipment is in storage.

—A realistic estimate of the combat readiness of stored equipment.

—More and better information on the war reserve situation of our allies.

Mr. Kissinger: We have three issues today: 1) the relationship of MBFR to force improvements; 2) to review what we're trying to do; and 3) which package to push as a first increment. With regard to the first—MBFR and force improvements—I am told that some think these are mutually exclusive. If so, that is a somber conclusion. The justification for the initial increment of MBFR was that it did not change the existing strategic balance. We had concluded that the balance was ade-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-103, Defense Program Review Committee Meetings, DPRC Meeting NATO Force Improvements 8-4-71. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The August 16 cover memorandum from Jeanne Davis to Kissinger is stamped: "HAK has seen, Sep 7, 1971."

quate but that there needed to be some alterations within the balance. If we don't make the force improvements, we will be freezing the anomalies in the situation which the alterations were designed to correct.

Mr. Packard: This is true if we're talking about increases in numbers, but not if we talk about increased readiness.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. We can't increase the numbers but we can do other things.

Mr. Johnson: We're after qualitative improvement.

Adm. Moorer: The problem is partly psychological. We've got to keep up the will of the NATO countries to do what they have already agreed to do.

Mr. Packard: You may ask if it is consistent to increase the number of tanks while talking about MBFR. We certainly shouldn't hold up qualitative improvements. But I don't believe either we should hold up on 1,000 additional tanks for NATO.

Adm. Moorer: I think they should go ahead with the improvement program.

Mr. Kissinger: That's our view, but I wanted to be sure that everyone understood it.

Adm. Moorer: The problem is keeping our allies interested.

Mr. Kissinger: They've just got to believe that the situation is serious. A Mansfield resolution will surely pass if they don't make a bigger effort.

Mr. Johnson: Our allies will say MBFR and force improvements are inconsistent but we will just have to marshal our arguments and deal with that problem.

Mr. Kissinger: I just wanted to be sure all of us were aboard on this.

Now, I'd like to clear up my understanding on some things. The number of tanks fluctuate from meeting to meeting. I hope our intelligence on the Soviets is better than it is on ourselves. Do we now believe the Soviets have 8,200 tanks rather than 10,000?

Gen. Cushman: That is our conclusion. (The subsequent dialogue indicated that General Cushman had misunderstood and thought the discussion was on aircraft rather than tanks.)

Mr. Smith: I think the basic difference (in overall strength) relates to the Polish and Czech divisions.

Mr. [name not declassified]: We don't define them as being at full strength, but DIA thinks they should be included. CIA doesn't differ with DIA on the number of tanks.

Gen. Cushman: We're talking about the combat readiness of the division as opposed to the total numbers.

Mr. Kissinger: About our anti-tank capacity; are we equating one anti-tank weapon for each tank? Do we consider that a balance?

Adm. Moorer: It depends on the type of anti-tank weapon—they have different ranges. You can't equate them on a one-for-one basis. You can kill tanks with other things—land mines, planes, etc.

Mr. Kissinger: Have we found some additional anti-tank weapons too?

Adm. Moorer: Some very old ones in storage and in reserve.

Mr. Odeen: In the NSSM-84 study we considered only heavy anti-tank weapons and compared them to tanks for the sake of convenience. The absolute numbers are not as important as the trends. The Army has done a detailed analysis of the equation of tanks to anti-tank weapons but I don't believe it's one-for-one.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm told that counting tanks this way is a mistake because most of them can't run. Can we get an estimate of combat readiness of our stored equipment?

Adm. Moorer: That's the purpose of the REFORGER operation—to break out our equipment once a year to make certain that it would run.

Mr. Odeen: They had more problems in the last exercise than anticipated. The Army has increased its funds so as to perform more and better maintenance.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get a realistic estimate of how ready we are?

Mr. Packard: We don't have a comparable estimate of Pact readiness, but I'm sure our equipment is as ready as theirs.

Mr. Kissinger: How much of their equipment is in storage?

Mr. Smith: 35%.

Adm. Moorer: They flesh out existing units rather than create new units.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get a rough estimate of ours?

Adm. Moorer: Sure.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we talk about war reserve stocks. I was reassured by the proposition that the Germans have 37.5 days of 105 mm ammunition which, at US consumption rates, amounts to 80 days. But whereas the Germans report having 37.5 days of 155 mm ammunition, by US standards they have only 31 days. This 37.5 days transferred into 80 days can be consoling if it is consumed at US rates. But suppose it is consumed at German rates. Either the Germans must change their standard operating procedure to conform to ours or they will run out of ammunition. Or their rate of consumption is more realistic than ours.

Adm. Moorer: It is a question of the planning factor. NATO has a standard day of supply, and we have multiplied that figure and matched it to the US planning factor. NATO includes an intensity fac-

tor—they assume a higher expenditure the first month, a leveling off in the second month, and the third month the same. We straight-line it. The NATO intensity factor means that their estimate is different after 30 days than it is at 90 days.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Germans can go 37.5 days, they don't care what happens after 38 days. Either the Germans must adjust their planning to our expectations or run out of ammunition.

Adm. Moorer: I have a letter from General De Maiziere, my German counterpart in which he points out that their ammunition dependency is 60% from the US; 10% from the UK; 10% from France; 10% from Belgium; and 10% from all others. After six months of war, the FRG could be independent in the production of ammunition, if war conditions permit.

Mr. Kissinger: If they weren't overrun. If he thinks he has 37.5 days of ammunition that's his own planning factor.

Adm. Moorer: No, that's based on the NATO planning factor. They consider the expenditure will be greater initially, then will taper off. We straight-line.

Mr. Kissinger: But if the NATO planning factor is correct, the Germans will run out of ammunition after 37.5 days. If they're right about the expenditure rate, we will run out about the same time as they do. If we're right, we will both have 80 days.

Adm. Moorer: Not if you take into account the intensity factor.

Mr. Kissinger: That won't change the rate once the operation starts. If they are expending at that rate and the combat goes as they think it will, they will run out.

Adm. Moorer: But they will have an additional procurement capability by 1972—they will be able to resupply in 60 days.

Mr. Kissinger: Either they're right or we're right. If they're right, we will be expending at the same rate they are.

Mr. Odeen: The paper says we need a better understanding of how this system works. How much is expended depends in part on how much we want to conserve.

Mr. Kissinger: Of course they can stretch it out if they are given an arbitrary allocation. But where we have two different planning factors, only one of them is likely to be correct. We can't convert one to the other. If the higher rate is realistic, we would sacrifice combat effectiveness by expending less, or they could expend what they are planning and jeopardize the length of the operation.

Adm. Moorer: We should start with the stockpile and use the same planning factors for both.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we do that?

Adm. Moorer: If the intensity is great initially, it shouldn't be as bad later on.

Mr. Packard: You also have lots of variables, in tactics for example.

Mr. Odeen: We know the SHAPE rates but we don't know the rates of the others.

Mr. Johnson: It would certainly help the discussion to use a common factor.

Mr. Kissinger: Or know the implications of the two factors.

Adm. Moorer: What are we talking about when we say we will fight a 90-day war? Is this strategic or logistic guidance? Are we planning to fight 90 days and then go nuclear or surrender, or is this a logistic figure?

Mr. Kissinger: I have always considered it a logistic figure.

Adm. Moorer: Phil Odeen doesn't. I agree it should be logistic.

Mr. Johnson: I've assumed that in 90 days we could get our re-supply going.

Mr. Kissinger: That's been our assumption. We never thought we would surrender after 90 days if the front were intact. There is a question, of course, of whether we stretch out our forces all along the line or concentrate our war-fighting capability. I'm not convinced we can get to 40 days, much less 90 days. There is a tremendous gap between an M-15 and M-30. If we can last 90 days we will have our logistic system operating and can fight indefinitely. If we don't improve our war-fighting capability we won't get to 90 days.

Adm. Moorer: You're not assuming we're not going past 90 days.

Mr. Kissinger: We're not assuming we will stop at 90 days.

Mr. Packard: In talking about expenditure rates, you have to use the standards of the country. The UK supplies will be used up in 30 days according to their standards. But if you convert this to US standards, some items will last 70 days and some 4 days.

Mr. Kissinger: But that's unrealistic. They will fire at their own rates. They either have to change their tactics or their stocks.

Mr. Odeen: We don't really know their rates.

Col. Kennedy: They just can't mount sustained fire at some of the rates indicated here. They would have no tubes left.

Mr. Kissinger: We're not planning at stopping at 90 days, but we have to give immediate attention to our war-fighting capability. The problem is how to get started on an improvement program. The shortages are patent in every category. We have three sets of priorities—to concentrate on M-Day or deal in the longer term. I suggest we concentrate on M-Day forces initially, without prejudice to the longer term.

Adm. Moorer: The minute war starts, I assume we will start pushing all supplies to Europe as fast as we can get them there.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand the 90 days as logistic guidance.

Mr. Johnson: No question about it.

Mr. Odeen: The guidance in the paper is consistent with this.

Mr. Kissinger: As long as you keep in being the capacity to reinforce during the 90 days. Let's move to some specific packages we can discuss. Let's restudy the war supply reserve situation.

Adm. Moorer: The State Department has to help in the forthcoming meeting on MBFR—to keep prodding our allies to go ahead on their December commitments.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, we must not present MBFR as an alternative to force improvements.

Adm. Moorer: They were all enthusiastic in December, but there was a marked difference in their attitude at the recent MPD meeting.

Mr. Weiss: That's inevitable. It's tough to get Ministers to go to their Parliaments and say they want to increase their defense budgets while they're talking reduction of forces.

Mr. Kissinger: They just have to face facts. The party is over.

Mr. Johnson: This is a problem we'll just have to deal with.

Mr. Packard: We're not giving our allies enough credit. They are increasing at the rate of \$3 billion a year. They are doing lots of things they don't get credit for.

Adm. Moorer: But they will back away if we press on MBFR. They will fight for cuts and against increases.

Mr. Kissinger: We will have trouble with our Congress too. I think all agree that we should have a strong brief for the NATO meeting.

Adm. Moorer: There was considerable let-down at Lisbon.

Mr. Kissinger: That was right after the Mansfield debate and we were all a little shell-shocked. We will have to come back stronger this time.

71. National Security Decision Memorandum 133¹

Washington, September 22, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO; Allied Force Improvements

The President has reaffirmed the basic principle guiding U.S. strategy and forces for NATO set forth in NSDM-95.²

In view of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, it continues to be vital for NATO to achieve and maintain a credible conventional defense posture to deter and, if necessary, defend against a Warsaw Pact attack. In support of this objective, the President has approved in principle the program of U.S. and allied force improvements reviewed by the DPRC on August 17, 1971.³ Given a similar approach by our allies, the U.S. will improve its combat forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of a mutual and balanced force reduction with the Warsaw Pact.

1. U.S. Planning and Forces

The President has directed that U.S. planning for NATO shall be based on the following guidelines:

—It should be assumed for planning purposes that a Warsaw Pact attack would be preceded by some degree of mobilization by both sides with NATO mobilization probably a week or more behind the Pact.

—Our objective shall be to ensure that the size and structure of U.S. forces is consistent with a strategy of initial conventional defense for a period of 90 days during which NATO's warfighting capabilities would stop a Pact attack and stabilize the military situation without major loss of NATO territory.

—In specific force and resource planning, priority shall first be given to enhancing our assurance of a conventional defense in the initial period of a conflict, particularly the first 30 days. The forces and re-

¹Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM 95. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

²Document 54.

³This is presumably a reference to the DPRC meeting that actually took place on August 4. See Document 70.

sources needed to stabilize a military situation beyond this period shall next be given priority with selected items retained on a case-by-case basis.

The end FY-71 authorized level of U.S. forces in Western Europe shall be maintained and the actual strength of these forces kept as close to this level as possible.

The Defense Department shall prepare by October 25, 1971, a detailed review of U.S. non-combat missions in Europe together with an evaluation of the manpower required to carry them out. The purpose of this review shall be to identify specific options for the elimination of some non-combat missions and reduction of personnel that could result in corresponding increases in combat capabilities within current manpower levels.

2. Allied Planning Force Improvements

The President has determined that continued steady improvement of our allies' conventional combat capability is a requisite for achieving and maintaining a credible conventional defense option for NATO. In this context, the President has noted and welcomed our allies' plans, as reported to NATO, to maintain their forces and undertake substantive improvements over the next five years. The President is gratified that, in addition, the European Defense Improvement Program will contribute substantially to reducing the vulnerability of our allies' tactical aircraft through an extensive shelter-building program, and to the construction of a NATO Integrated Communications System.

The President has directed that the United States Government must take every opportunity to urge its allies to carry out their current five year force plans as reported to NATO, and to fulfill the EDIP program.

The President has noted, moreover, that even if allied plans are carried out there will continue to be some conspicuous deficiencies in NATO's immediate combat capability. These include a questionable defense against armored attack, a lack of ready combat reinforcements in the period from M-Day to M+30, shortages in selected ammunition reserves, electronic warfare capabilities, limited effectiveness of air defense and air offensive forces (including munitions), and maritime and air ASW surveillance capabilities.

Therefore, the President has decided that the United States should undertake a concerted effort to urge our allies to make a commitment to correct these deficiencies. The allies should undertake an improvement program similar to that specified in Priorities A and B of the program presented by the Department of Defense to the DPRC on August 4, 1971.

Our allies should be asked to commit a minimum of about \$2 billion over the next five years to these purposes in addition to the European Defense Improvement Program already planned.

The Department of State, in close cooperation with the Department of Defense, should prepare by October 15, 1971, a detailed plan and schedule for presenting the U.S. position and supporting analyses in the appropriate NATO forums. This will require the preparation of “sanitized” versions of the various studies which support specific force improvements, to serve as the basis for discussions with our allies.

Henry A. Kissinger

72. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Irwin to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 24, 1971.

Dear Henry:

Following the Verification Panel discussion of MBFR September 21,² I have been working with my staff on a short paper covering the is-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. A handwritten note indicates the letter was signed by the Under Secretary and that the drafting office was omitted.

² At the meeting, the Verification Panel agreed that:

“—A preferred U.S. position cannot be ready in time for the NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting in early October, but we must present something at that meeting. We require a clear elaboration of the options open to us and a specific statement of the mandate the Explorer is to be given. The Working Group will prepare a paper along these lines.

“—The U.S. proposal must be reasonable, realistic, attainable and must represent a serious effort.

“—The Allies cannot be permitted to use MBFR reductions as a rationale for further cuts of their national forces or defense budgets.

“—The Rapacki Plan Area is our first choice of area, but we could accept either the NATO Guidelines Area plus Hungary or the NATO Guidelines area alone as fallback choices.

“—The Explorer should not present alternatives to the Russians. His visit is intended merely to feel them out and ascertain their thinking on MBFR.

“—The Explorer should visit Moscow first, report back to the NATO Foreign Ministers and then go to Eastern Europe only if his Moscow visit showed signs of promise. There appears to be no compelling reason for the Explorer to visit neutral nations and this should not be encouraged.

“—Another meeting of the Verification Panel will be held on September 30 to discuss the options to be presented to the Explorer.” The full text of the minutes is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 70.

sues for the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting on which I believe Panel discussion and decision will be necessary so that I am in a position to participate most effectively in the October 5–6 meeting.³ This paper covers the essential issues requiring US decision prior to the meeting of Deputies both with respect to launching the explorer and to establishing an MBFR work program in NATO leading to the Ministerial meeting in December.⁴ I am sending copies of the paper, which is enclosed, to members of the Verification Panel.

This Department of State paper is intended to provide a useful basis for our discussion at the September 30 Verification Panel meeting.⁵

I understand that the Verification Panel Working Group is further refining our thinking on the issues involved in MBFR Elements and reviewing a Preliminary Report on MBFR Options and Analysis.⁶ Although it will not be essential for the Working Group to have completed this work prior to the Deputies meeting, I will want to indicate in my remarks that our Mission will be providing further US input of this sort shortly. Such input will be necessary if we are to achieve our objective of having the allies begin to move towards possible negotiating approaches prior to December.

In my remarks at the Deputies meeting, as well as during my brief European trip following it, I will take the opportunity to stress the importance the US attaches to allied force improvements. NSDM 133,⁷ and some points I have received from Dave Packard on specific allied force improvements, will be most helpful in that regard.

With warm regards,
Sincerely,

Jack

³ The meeting took place in Brussels.

⁴ The meeting was held December 9–10 in Brussels.

⁵ Draft minutes of the September 30 Verification Panel meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 72.

⁶ Apparent reference to an NSC Staff Draft Paper on MBFR Issues prepared on September 29 for the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 NATO)

⁷ Document 71.

Enclosure⁸**Paper Prepared in the Department of State**

Washington, September 24, 1971.

MBFR—Major Issues for the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting

The following topics will be considered at the October 5–6 Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels:

- the naming of an MBFR explorer.
- the delineation of his mandate.
- the setting out of October-December MBFR work program.

In addition, the meeting will serve as an occasion for stressing the importance we attach to Allied force improvements.

A certain amount of agreement has already been reached among the Allies on the explorer and his mandate:

—everyone accepts Manlio Brosio,⁹ and it remains only to appoint him officially. Brosio is arriving in Washington on September 28–29 and has indicated his interest in discussing MBFR. He is specifically concerned at the limitations on the explorer's mandate, and the fluctuating pace of US leadership in MBFR preparations.

—there is a general consensus that he will be accompanied by a small staff, including an American and several other allied representatives, including probably one from the UK and the FRG.

—there is general agreement that he should explore and not negotiate.

There are, however, some issues outstanding concerning where the explorer should go and what he should or should not say to the Soviets. The Allies will look to us for a strong lead in resolving them, and also in indicating the appropriate next steps. While some of these disputes reflect deep-seated concerns among the Allies, many of them can for the moment be managed by compromise phraseology. The most critical of the issues to be addressed before the Deputy Foreign Ministers Meeting are outlined below, together with recommended US positions on each.

The explorer's itinerary—No alliance consensus has emerged to date on the exact itinerary to be followed by the explorer. None of the Allies object to his beginning the explorations in Moscow; most also support

⁸ Secret.

⁹ Brosio accepted an official invitation to assume the position at the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting.

subsequent visits to certain Warsaw Pact capitals; a few further think that he should go to certain neutral capitals as well.

The Department of State believes that the explorer should begin his soundings in Moscow, and that the specifics of his later itinerary should be scheduled on the basis of Allied decisions following his Moscow trip. Possible East European capitals that might be visited are Warsaw and Prague. Visits to Pact capitals other than these might suggest a different area of reduction than those now being considered. We do not favor a visit to neutral capitals, which we feel would be irrelevant to his basic mission and might subsequently tie the neutral countries to the negotiating process.

The explorer's mandate

1. *Geographic Area*—The Alliance agrees that any negotiations should consider Central Europe as the area for reductions. Although several allies, including the US, would prefer the Rapacki area (FRG, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia), all, bowing to FRG insistence, are prepared to accept the NATO Guidelines area (Rapacki plus Benelux). In addition, at this point Belgium is insisting that if it is to be included, Hungary should be added to the Guidelines area.

Addition of Hungary to the reduction area expands the area on the Soviet side and may be desired by the Hungarian Government. For the moment it appears acceptable to all but the Netherlands and us.

The US has recently stated to the allies that it was not prepared to accept the inclusion of Hungary pending examination of the political and military aspects of the issue. These include:

- the question of negotiability if the NATO Guidelines Area is expanded on the Warsaw Pact side alone;
- the possibility that the Warsaw Pact may seek to add territory on the Western side to the reduction area;
- the possibility that the USSR may take its reductions relatively more in Hungary than elsewhere, i.e., on the Central Front.

Because of the strong FRG views and also because of considerations of negotiability, the Department of State believes we should support the NATO Guidelines Area. At the October meeting, we should resist either the addition of Hungary to or the unilateral withdrawal of Belgium from the reduction area. The reason for opposing Belgium's withdrawal is that if it withdraws, Luxembourg would almost certainly follow, and possibly the Netherlands as well. The result would be the Rapacki area which would be unacceptable to the FRG. However, we should be prepared to accept the addition of Hungary in preference to the withdrawal of Belgium, if this is the only choice.

2. *Nationality of forces*—The majority of the Alliance favors reductions of both stationed and indigenous forces with little or no emphasis on stationed forces.

The Department of State believes that the US should continue to make clear its strong preference for emphasizing stationed force reductions so that Soviet and US withdrawals would be maximized. To reach a consensus in Brussels, we may need to accept, at least for the present, a formulation in line with that preferred by the others, i.e., that stationed forces “could” be emphasized.

3. *Categories of forces*—Differences persist within the Alliance concerning the degree to which special attention should be paid to manpower, combat aircraft, tanks, and where appropriate, nuclear delivery vehicles. Brosio would prefer to be as specific as possible on this issue.

The Department of State believes that it would not be appropriate for the explorer to be more specific than a statement that the Allies envisage ground force reductions, that they do not envisage naval reductions since the geographic focus is Central Europe, and that other categories of reductions have not yet been excluded, i.e., air and nuclear weapons.

Future MBFR Preparations—The United States faces the need to join in developing a design for allied work, and a possible approach to negotiations. The period between the October Deputies Meeting and the December Ministerial must be used by the Alliance to focus its thinking on possible reduction objectives and negotiating approaches so that the Ministers will be in a position to make necessary decisions to continue forward movement towards actual negotiations. Otherwise the Congress may well question MBFR as a viable alternative to unilateral reductions.

This focus will not be possible without some indication of our thinking on the subject, including an idea of the type or magnitude of reductions that the US envisages. We continue to believe that the best way to do this would be to table a preferred US symmetrical option in a sequential framework, as outlined in my memorandum to you of September 17.¹⁰ If it is impossible to reach a consensus within the USG on a particular approach, we could submit selected options from among those under US study with a signal as to American preferences.

We believe that the attainment of eventual reduction objectives could be approached sequentially. This approach would entail refinement of the basic FRG proposal. Depending on the political climate, proceeding sequentially could give us more flexibility to begin negotiations at a time of our choosing, and subsequently to slow down or accelerate the process.

¹⁰ Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 92)

73. National Security Decision Memorandum 134¹

Washington, October 2, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Policy Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The President has reviewed the results of the Verification Panel meeting of September 30, 1971, and the memoranda prepared by the Under Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.² He wishes the following guidance to be followed at the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Brussels and in all other consultations and discussions with our NATO [Allies] on the subject of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

1. General Approach to MBFR

We seriously seek to achieve a more stable military balance in Europe at lower levels of forces. Therefore, the U.S. endorses the Alliance's exploration with the Warsaw Pact of the framework for possible mutual force limitations and reductions. In this regard it is critical that our Allies understand that further improvements in NATO's conventional forces are integral to successful MBFR negotiations as well as the U.S. commitment to maintain its forces in Europe.

The U.S. has not yet arrived at a preferred approach to mutual reductions. For this reason, our approach shall be to hold open for consideration alternative approaches ranging from limited symmetrical reductions to more elaborate verification provisions and collateral constraints. Our objective shall be for an Alliance consensus on negotiations to arise out of a careful and systematic consideration of the full range of possible approaches to MBFR.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) Nos. 97-. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² See Document 72 and footnote 5 thereto for the memorandum from Irwin and the Verification Panel meeting of September 30. Laird's September 29 memorandum to Kissinger is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-009, Verification Panel Meetings, Verification Panel Meeting MBFR 9/30/71.

2. The U.S. Position for Explorations

The U.S. position on the specific framework for explorations shall be as follows:

—At this time, the United States has the following order of preference with respect to the area of reductions: (1) the Rapacki Area, (2) the NATO Guidelines Area plus Hungary, and (3) the NATO Guidelines Area. These preferences are without prejudice to possible force reductions or limitations that may involve other areas.

—The United States favors initial emphasis on the reduction of Soviet and American (or stationed forces) in size and timing. Indigenous force reductions should, however, not be excluded from reduction.

—The United States would prefer not to exclude particular types of forces from consideration, though it recognizes that as long as the focus is on the Center Region, naval forces should not be considered.

—We are unable at this time to indicate preferences on the size and type of reductions; the broad categories of options being considered within the U.S. government, however, may be described to our Allies to illustrate the direction and scope of our current preparations. It should be made clear, however, that our considerations shall not be limited to these options nor should they be interpreted as representing the preferred U.S. approach to MBFR.

—At this time, we cannot exclude the need for inspection, since this decision would depend on the type and size of reductions.

—We should indicate to our Allies our interest in a more thorough evaluation of the German phased approach to MBFR, and our disposition to consider this general concept favorably.

On the issue of the relationship of mutual force reductions to a European Security Conference, U.S. officials should indicate that we believe these two issues should not be linked at this time, especially in any exploratory discussion of MBFR with Warsaw Pact countries. Moreover, we cannot agree to any preliminary or exploratory multilateral talks on a European Conference, at least until the Berlin agreements come into force and until we have gained a better understanding of what a Conference might achieve in terms of U.S. interests.

3. Further Preparations

In preparation for further consultations, it will be necessary to accelerate our formulation of specific MBFR options and a thorough assessment of their implications. In particular,

—The formulation of a full range of specific options shall be completed by October 8, 1971. In this regard, it will be necessary to consider again the design of appropriate asymmetrical and/or mixed package options.

—The assessments of the military implications of these nuclear and conventional options shall be completed by October 15, 1971. In regard to nuclear options, a special effort will have to be made to assess a variety of nuclear doctrines, the forces required in Europe, and the MBFR options consistent with them.

—The general assessments of collateral constraints and the verification measures required as well as their application to specific options should be completed by October 22, 1971.

These preparations shall be carried out by the agencies responsible under the overall direction of the Verification Panel. Following their completion, an overall assessment of the options shall be completed by early November prior to its consideration by the President in a NSC meeting in preparation for the December Ministerial meetings in NATO.³

Henry A. Kissinger

³ The Verification Panel met on November 18 to discuss U.S. policy guidance on MBFR prior to the December NATO Ministerial meeting. Minutes of the meeting are *ibid.*, Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1971. Briefing memoranda from Smith and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, November 16 and 17, are *ibid.*, Box H-009, Verification Panel Meetings, Verification Panel Meeting MBFR 9/30/71. Subsequently, the NSC met on December 1 to discuss both MBFR and CES in preparation for the NATO meeting. The minutes of the meeting are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 80.

74. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Report on My Trip to Europe

At the end of our meeting on 1 November,² you asked me to include some of the items we discussed in a private memorandum to you.

In this memorandum I will outline briefly what I consider the more important topics, along with my impressions, that were explored during my visit to Brussels for the October Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting.

I will cover:

¹ Source: Ford Library, Laird Papers, Accession 2001-NLF-020, Box 5, NATO, Vol. X. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Laird and Kissinger from 2:55 to 4 p.m. in his office at the Executive Office Building. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

- General Mood in Europe
- MBFR
- Offset Negotiations with Germany
- Drugs in Germany
- Future of NPG
- MOD Peter Carrington's Views on Ireland and Malta
- Chemical Munitions
- Ambassador Porter
- Summary

General Mood in Europe

In my discussions with the Ministers of Defense of our NATO Allies, with NATO officials, and other Europeans, it was very evident that doubt and uncertainty are setting in rapidly in Europe in reaction to your recent initiatives in foreign and economic affairs, as well as in reaction to the rhetoric emanating from the Congress. This was prior to the latest action taken by the Senate to kill your Foreign Aid Bill³ which, of course, will further dilute the waning confidence of our European Allies.

Europeans see US initiatives, like our new China Policy, our new economic policy, your planned trip to Moscow, and Under Secretary of the Navy John Warner's negotiations in Moscow on Incidents at Sea as abrupt course changes. They have been caught by surprise. Surprise has led to conjecture about additional course changes which might directly affect them. When reminded about your promises made last year in Naples and Ireland that the US would not unilaterally cut troop levels in Europe,⁴ they say those promises were made before this series of new initiatives.

Helmut Schmidt in particular reflected a German feeling of mistrust in U.S. future actions. He openly expressed a suspicion that we were deliberately keeping our options open on MBFR so we would be free to make any agreement that best suited domestic political considerations in an election year. He fears that you will make a separate deal with the Soviets when you meet with Brezhnev in Moscow in May, like

³ On October 29, the Senate rejected a House bill that authorized economic and military aid for fiscal years 1972 and 1973. The action represented the first outright defeat of foreign aid legislation in the 24-year history of the foreign aid program. Differences of opinion over U.S. foreign policy included the Indochina policy and the increased involvement in Cambodia, a brewing India-Pakistan conflict over the rebellion in East Pakistan, the entry of China in and expulsion of Taiwan from the U.N., and the controversial U.S. support of the Greek military government. Additionally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which opposed much of Nixon's foreign policy, sought to leverage its control of aid legislation to change the administration's foreign policy. (*Congress and the Nation*, Vol. III, 1969–1972, pp. 876–877)

⁴ These statements were made in the course of Nixon's trip to Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Ireland September 27–October 5, 1970. See *Public Papers: Nixon*, 1970, pp. 786–787, 804–809.

a bilateral agreement to reduce US and Soviet forces by 5% without prior consultation with our NATO Allies. In his view, such an agreement might be all that comes from MBFR, barring the way to additional cuts in either stationed or indigenous troop levels. This, in Schmidt's judgment, would further weaken what little resolve the German people have in maintaining an adequate defense establishment.

The dwindling enthusiasm for the maintenance of Armed Forces is not limited to Germany. Throughout NATO Europe, with the possible exception of Greece, Turkey and Portugal, the general public seems apathetic about national defense and indifferent to NATO's role in preserving peace in Europe. This is particularly true in the Scandinavian countries. For example, Denmark sounds more and more like a nation about to resign from NATO.

It appears that the people of Europe are waiting for an excuse to cut their investment in defense. They may well interpret US initiatives with the USSR and PRC as signals to do less in the area of national security. The NATO governments now in power, already uncertain and confused about US intentions, may have great difficulty defending *increased* investment in defense as called for in the AD-70 study and the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP). Therefore, I believe it is time for you to reassure NATO once again that your promises of 1970 are equally applicable today and that it is only through the maintenance of a strong, united NATO Europe that there is any hope that your initial talks in Peking and Moscow can lead to meaningful negotiations. I have relayed this message to our European Allies, but I feel that it is most important that they hear the words from you. You might consider a stop-over in Europe following your meetings in Moscow to put your over-all foreign affairs program in proper balance and perspective.

MBFR

In my talks with Schmidt and Carrington, it was made quite clear that neither were in any hurry to negotiate any force reductions in Europe.⁵ MOD Tanassi of Italy also favored a go-slow approach to MBFR. From recent talks Schmidt had with French authorities, it is clear that France continues to oppose MBFR at this time. This attitude of caution—particularly on the part of Schmidt—is a complete turn-around from a year ago when he, for one, was pressing me to take the initiative in negotiating troop reductions with the USSR. I believe their main concern today is that the US will move too fast toward troop reductions in

⁵ A memorandum of Laird's conversation with Schmidt, October 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL GER W-US. A memorandum of Laird's conversation with Carrington, October 25, is in the Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 18, Document No. 358.

Europe in order to placate the well-publicized views of some prominent Members of Congress like Senator Mansfield. Once troop reductions start, they believe NATO will gradually fade away and that all this will take place before Western Europe has had an opportunity to resolve its political problems. I am sure that Schmidt would like more time for *Ospolitik* to succeed, and feels that troop reductions now might lessen the Soviet Union's ardor for German political initiatives.

As far as a Conference on European Security (CES) and MBFR are concerned, Schmidt now feels that there is an advantage to combining the two. More than likely his real reason is to slow down movement toward negotiations on MBFR which he senses might bear fruit. But his expressed reason to me was that combining CES and MBFR would be the only way to get the French to participate in MBFR, since they have already said that they would attend the CES. Schmidt feels that it is very important to have France involved in any final MBFR decisions. On this same subject, Carrington differed with his own Foreign Office which favors combining these negotiations; he personally prefers to keep them separate.

I took the opportunity to stress the point that in considering preparations for MBFR negotiations the primary factor must be the security of Europe and that we must not look on MBFR as a tool to solve political problems. Regardless of any enticing overtures from the Soviet Union to reduce forces, we still had to press for force improvements and additions that were agreed to in the AD-70 study and EDIP.

In discussing the kind of organization needed to conduct the actual MBFR negotiations after the Explorer's (Ambassador Brosio) work is finished, it was quite evident that no one had an acceptable plan. SYG Luns figured that Brosio would "fade away" after his exploring mission but offered no substitute solution. Carrington had a scheme which would, for all practical purposes, put a British officer in charge. I believe the US should move quickly to lay a workable plan before our NATO Allies. Therefore, in the next week, I plan to circulate a proposal which would include:

- A prospective main negotiator (Brosio is a possibility)
- A limitation on participating countries
- The establishment of a NATO back-stopping group dominated by US and including countries whose forces would be reduced
- A method to keep the rest of NATO informed
- Emphasis on the importance of adequate Defense Department representation and participation in both preparations for and conduct of these negotiations.

I am convinced that all of NATO is waiting for the US to take the lead in MBFR and that they are most anxious to learn which of the options under consideration we prefer. I am also convinced that we

would encounter a strong opposition to a US proposal which limits cuts to stationed forces only. Our proposals, therefore, should take these feelings into account and provide for some adjustments in indigenous forces in the long run. I recently sent Henry Kissinger a paper on MBFR which suggests approaches which would take these considerations into account.⁶

Offset Negotiations with Germany

My talks with Schmidt on our offset negotiations proved most revealing. He expressed in the strongest terms, in a private conversation with just the two of us present, his utter disgust with the way these negotiations have progressed. His revulsion extended to both the US and Germans involved. He has nothing but disdain for Schiller⁷ and Scheel. He considered our negotiators as overbearing and repulsive as they bargained US soldiers for Deutsche Marks. This whole bargaining process seemed absolutely incredulous to him in view of the pledges he felt you made in Naples and Ireland in 1970. Schmidt has reached the point where he is ready to resign if Germany is forced to buy US soldiers by contributing cash to the US Treasury. He feels he has done as much as he can for his Party and is prepared to walk out. Schmidt admitted that in recent weeks he has collapsed twice in his office. His aides confided to members of my staff that he is suffering from stomach trouble and exhaustion. His chain smoking throughout our talks indicates a nervousness which he otherwise hides well.

Since Schmidt is one of Europe's most enlightened and practical politicians, I believe we should take steps to accommodate him, particularly when, in my opinion, his proposal on offset has decided advantages for the US, through the Department of Defense, and contributes to the defense of NATO directly.

We discussed the particulars of Schmidt's offer last week, so I will not repeat all the details in this memorandum. As you will recall, you told Henry Kissinger to advise State and Treasury that you agreed with the Defense position as explained in my recent memo to Bill Rogers.⁸ I assume that Henry has done that and that, *at a minimum*, DM 800M will be set aside in a German account to rehabilitate our barracks. I am also submitting to State and Treasury additional suggestions for utilization of the extra burden-sharing funds Germany will make available in the final offset agreement.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 73.

⁷ Karl Schiller, West German Minister for Economic Affairs.

⁸ Not further identified.

Drugs in Germany

After expressing my great concern for the spreading drug problem among our troops in Germany, Schmidt suggested that we set up a Joint Task Group with representatives from both countries who were familiar with the problem. We are now arranging for personnel from CINCEUR's staff and American Embassy Bonn to meet with German counterparts, to see if we can get on top of this problem before it gets out of hand. I plan to send Dr. Wilbur, my Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment, to Europe on December 6 to see that the Task Group performs in a meaningful and useful way. Schmidt indicated that his drug problem in Germany was caused by the large numbers of Turks that come and go as part of Germany's working force.

Future of NPG

Carrington proposed to me in our bilateral meeting that we make some changes in the NPG meetings. He thought that at least one of the semi-annual meetings should be held in Brussels in conjunction with the Defense Planning Committee meeting in order to cut down the number of trips Ministers were required to make. He also suggested much shorter agendas and reduced social activities. I believe Schmidt shares Carrington's feelings. Although I agreed whole-heartedly that the social aspects should be curtailed, I explained that I did not feel that it was wise for the US to propose any changes which could be interpreted as a lessening of importance of the NPG. Since the NPG was created for the benefit of NATO non-nuclear members, it would be more appropriate for these members to make recommendations for change. Originally, the NPG was of value to us in exposing non-nuclear members of NATO to the realities and complexities of nuclear issues and a nuclear strategy; [3 lines not declassified] In the future we will have to (a) reassess the objectives of NPG, and (b) insure that NPG activities are consistent with the objectives.

Carrington—Ireland and Malta

Carrington was very upset about the UK's problem in Ireland and indicated he was lost for a workable solution. Terrorist activity was on the rise and he had to find some way to bring it under control. He said, "The Irish are not rational people."

He also had a few words to say about Senator Kennedy who has infuriated not only the English people, but also the people on the Continent, for intervening in the domestic affairs of a foreign power. On the other hand, Kennedy's remarks have been helpful to the UK Government by coalescing British public opinion in support of British actions in Ireland.

Regarding Malta, in Carrington's opinion, Mintoff will not turn to the Russians and he is scared to death of Libya. He feels Mintoff will eventually settle with the West, but if he allows US ships to call at Maltese ports, he will probably also allow some limited number of Soviet ships to also call.

Chemical Munitions

Schmidt gave us a green light to proceed with the shipment of defective chemical munitions now stored in Germany. As plans now stand, the shipment will depart Germany for Johnson Island the first week in February. We will try to move that date up if at all possible, since Schmidt wants to complete the move as soon as possible.

Ambassador Porter

I met with Bill Porter⁹ for an hour in Brussels. I was particularly impressed by his refreshing, hard-charging, enthusiastic approach to our negotiations in Paris. He bubbles over with new ideas and initiatives designed to put the other side on the defensive. So far, few of these ideas have been approved but, I believe, after you make your 15 November announcement,¹⁰ it would be very worthwhile to loosen the reins on Porter and see what he can accomplish. His recent suggestion to propose small Ad Hoc groups to address specific issues may have advantages and should be given a try.

Summary

I believe it is time for the US to reassure our Allies that our new initiatives will not be at their expense. What you are doing will eventually lead to the benefit of all nations. I feel that our Allies must hear this reassurance from you personally. They feel that there are too many US voices now describing US policy, particularly as it applies to Europe. Your last words of reassurance were spoken prior to your announced trips to Peking and Moscow. They question if they still apply.

The people of Europe are not worried about the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. They, particularly the young, do not favor more money for defense against a threat they do not perceive. This attitude makes it most difficult for NATO governments to raise sufficient funds for their armed forces. If our initiatives are misunderstood by the European people, it will make it that much more difficult for our Allies to remain strong. There are already indications that Denmark may be considering quitting the Alliance. I am afraid it would take little persuasion to cause many of the Socialist countries of NATO to reach

⁹ William J. Porter, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.

¹⁰ The President announced further troop withdrawals from Vietnam at a November 12 press conference.

an accommodation with the USSR, which looks more and more like the “good guy” in their eyes.

I feel we must:

- Renew NATO confidence in US policy.
- Do a better job of explaining the threat in terms the people of Europe will understand.
- Persuade NATO leaders to do more to explain the threat and its significance to their own people.
- Emphasize the urgency of standing firm and improving our combined strength as we proceed with negotiations.

Melvin R. Laird

75. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, November 15, 1971.

Tensions in US Relations with Europe

This memorandum (which is admittedly long) addresses a problem of increasing concern: European loss of confidence in the United States. While we have had crises of confidence before, they have not been of the same severity or depth. The situation is not, however, irreparable, and might even provide an opportunity for a positive reordering of our relationship with Europe which will endure throughout the 1970's and beyond. We make certain recommendations which might help to begin this process.

1. Introduction

The basic premise of US relations with Europe is well summarized in President Nixon's statement: “the peace of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world” and that “Europe must be the cornerstone of the structure of a durable peace.”

For the past three years we have sought to play a large, active but not preponderant role in cooperating with our Allies to further our mu-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL EUR–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Hillenbrand, Springsteen, Katz, Sutterlin, McGuire, Tanguy, and Beaudry.

tual interests in Europe. We have strengthened NATO as a mechanism for political consultations, upgraded NATO's defense efforts through the modernization of conventional forces, and added a new dimension to the Alliance through the establishment of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). We have supported the creation of a special trade group within the OECD and have intensified our consultations with the European Economic Community. We have supported the enlargement of the Common Market and encouraged European moves toward greater political integration. We have contributed to a lessening of tensions through undertaking talks on strategic arms limitations, through support of the Federal Republic's Eastern policy, and through negotiation, in the Quadripartite framework, of the first phase of a Berlin accord.

Paradoxically, in spite of these constructive demonstrations of our strong and continuing interest in Europe, it has become increasingly clear that we are entering a difficult if not crucial period in our relations with that area. For European confidence in the staying power of the United States is eroding and giving rise to new tensions in our relationships.

2. Manifestations of Lack of Confidence

While we have had difficult periods in the past, they have not been of the scope or intensity one finds today. From the top of Norway to the tip of Italy there is a growing conviction that the United States will disengage from Europe; the only question is when. The *Economist*, normally friendly, freely talks of "evidence of the apparent withdrawal of the United States into a querulous and indiscriminate rejection of the world." The French press openly discusses "isolationist fever" in the United States and the "fundamental change in American attitudes toward Europe." One local Embassy here reports home that the mood in Washington is reminiscent of 1919 when the Congress vigorously attacked Wilson's programs. Some European wags now speak of US policy as moving to an era of negotiation with the Soviets and confrontation with our Allies!

In the United Kingdom, with whom we have had the so-called "special relationship", we find the Prime Minister stressing that it is fortunate that Britain is moving toward Europe at a time when the US is becoming increasingly concerned with deep-seated problems at home and abroad, and when "everyone concerned with trade and finance knows that rough winds are beginning to blow across the world."

The French for some months now have been forecasting that, despite the President's commitment, the United States would begin to disengage militarily from Europe in 1972 or 1973. This bothers them because they have no illusions about a Europe where they and their

neighbors were left virtually alone with the Russian behemoth. Now our economic measures and the wobbly state of our economy have added a new dimension to French anxiety about our European policy.

But nowhere is the new attitude more apparent than in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Government has been periodically subject to crises of confidence in American intentions. There is a difference of quality in the present malaise, however, since the Brandt Government has undertaken a far-reaching Eastern policy which could lead to unforeseeable consequences if two premises on which it is based are changed. These are the continued existence of a strong and stable defense alliance and the maintenance of the Western European economic community. These two conditions provide the security matrix for Brandt's policy. In German eyes developments in the United States could jeopardize both. Our troop presence appears to them increasingly questionable and the international aspects of the NEP² threaten, in their eyes, the very existence of the European Community. The result is a perceptible change in German attitudes. The FRG has been an extremely constructive force in the formulation of European trade and monetary policies. Now it has given warning that if necessary to preserve the EC it will align itself with the European majority even if this runs counter to US positions. Similarly the FRG has supported MBFR because it saw in such negotiations a means of ensuring maintenance of the present US force strength in Europe. Now it has come to suspect that MBFR will be utilized as a means of US withdrawal from Europe. The predictable result has been German apprehensions rather than support on MBFR.

A new development not unrelated to changing German attitudes towards the US is the growth of neutralist sentiment in the country. A recent poll showed fifty percent of the population favoring such a neutralist position between East and West.

3. Factors Contributing to European Attitudes

The current European state of mind results from their assessment of a United States having great difficulty in solving its own domestic problems, turning more and more to isolationism, undertaking policies that result in confrontation and tension in the economic sphere, and seeking bilateral deals with the other superpower over the heads of our Allies. That many of these same issues exist in their own countries does not alter the severity of their indictment of the United States. It would almost seem that they felt such problems were tolerable in smaller states but not permitted in a superpower lest its effectiveness be reduced.

² President Nixon announced his New Economic Policy on August 15.

a. Trend toward Isolationsim

Many Europeans believe that the failure of the United States to achieve victory in Vietnam has caused American disenchantment with foreigners and less willingness to meet Alliance responsibilities. In their mind, these developments caused the United States to be more inward looking and to cut its losses and run. They study reports by Mr. Laird that the size of the American military establishment will be reduced from 3,547,000 men in 1968 to 2,505,000 men in 1972, a cut of 30 percent.

Such events as the Mansfield Resolution to cut US forces in Europe by half, and the Senate action voting down foreign aid strengthened their feelings about the isolationist trend in the United States and increased their skepticism as to the ability of the Administration to maintain its declared policies in the face of Congressional pressure.

Finally, they tend to think that the achievement by the Soviet Union of relative parity with the United States reinforces the trend toward isolationism as America moves from the first ranking superpower to relative parity. (This in turn leads them to question whether the role of our nuclear deterrent for their defense remains as valid under a policy of "sufficiency" as it did under a policy of "supremacy".)

b. Confrontation and Tension in Economic Sphere

Thinking Europeans admit that NEP was necessary to get our own house in order and to begin the task of reorganizing the world monetary system to conform to the new realities of the 1970's. The more popular perception in Europe, however, is that August 15 marked a turning point in U.S. economic policy from twenty-five years of international economic cooperation to a new pattern of confrontation to achieve our own objectives at the expense of the Europeans. The demands for large and early balance of payments changes mainly through large parity adjustments are viewed as a direct threat to their own economies. The surcharge, job development tax credit and DISC are widely interpreted as classic protectionist or beggar-thy-neighbor devices. Our references to the need for unilateral concessions to right their alleged unfair trade practices are particularly resented and vehemently rejected. They see our opposition to the EC's agreements with Spain and to the forthcoming free trade arrangement with the EFTA neutrals, as well as our attack on the Common Agricultural Policy and our linking of these matters with NEP, as an attack on European integration. Finally, our continued references to burden sharing puzzles them and is beginning to be interpreted as a link between maintaining our troops in Europe and the achievement of our balance of payments objectives.

c. US Bilateralism with the Soviets

There has been a West European syndrome, particularly manifest in Germany, that at some point in time the United States will make a deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of its NATO Allies. The prospect of US–USSR summitry next year, announced without prior consultation with our Allies, has heightened their fears of bilateral diplomacy between the superpowers and increased their anxiety with regard to their principal North American ally. The Europeans fear that this bilateralism may produce some kind of political condominium in which they would become vassals rather than allies.

This syndrome can be seen too in our Allies' nervous reaction to the US–USSR talks on strategic arms limitations. They are particularly concerned that we might make a deal on the Forward Based Systems (FBS) which leaves them denuded of nuclear weapons in Western Europe but exposed to missilery located in the Soviet Union. Intensive consultation with them in NATO has muted but not allayed these fears.

4. Remedies for the Current Situation

Rather than merely wringing our hands or expressing exasperation at what can be construed as the European tendency to use diverse information to reach questionable conclusions, we believe we should recognize that these European attitudes exist and work to remedy them.

If we do not move to do so, the Europeans may decide that they cannot depend on us and therefore must go it alone.

In that event we can expect from them:

- (a) an economic confrontation on many issues without the present basic attitude that as allies we must somehow work out a solution;
- (b) a move toward neutrality between the U.S. and USSR as the only valid defense posture;
- (c) increasing accommodation to the Russians on political and economic issues.

Moreover, the longer the current atmosphere in US–European relations prevails, the greater will be the Soviet opportunities to fish in troubled waters. A key aspect of Soviet foreign policy is to bring about the disintegration of the North Atlantic Alliance and exclude the United States from a large and active role on the European scene. For the Soviets know full well that the more the United States is separated from Europe, the more Europe and the United States are weakened and the Soviet Union strengthened and put in a better position to achieve its post-World War II goal of dominant influence over all of Europe.

Such a development would also affect Soviet interest in dealing with the United States bilaterally. Today they are prepared to negotiate as between two superpowers. To the extent that we are no longer playing an effective role on the European scene, we no longer are as relevant for the Soviets except perhaps in the purely nuclear sphere.

The following are some actions we might take to preclude further development of the situations described above:

a. Move promptly to a joint announcement with the Europeans of the intention to enter major new economic negotiations.

It is essential that we begin the process of engaging the Europeans in a constructive endeavor to address the new conditions of the 1970's. We can never return to the pre-August 15 situation in the monetary field, and a major international effort will be needed to reconstruct an international monetary system—this time one that will have to take account of European aspirations towards monetary union. We will also have to engage in major trade negotiations if we are effectively to advance our export interests in the situation of enlargement of the Common Market and the inevitable related free trade arrangements with the other EFTA countries and the underdeveloped Commonwealth countries.

Therefore, some early initial agreement in the monetary and trade field, which will enable the Common Market to proceed with its own internal program while enabling us to lift the surcharge, is an indispensable prerequisite for any effort to deal with the current crises in US-European relations. In one sense, our failure to act on this matter promptly, can drive the Europeans to greater unity. Unity fostered in this way, however, may not be to our liking. It may entail stiff measures against our own economic interests.

b. Reassure our Allies on MBFR

We should now make clear to our Allies that we do not view MBFR as an isolated negotiation, designed to provide a cover for American troop withdrawals, but rather as an integral part of overall Alliance East-West policy of reducing tensions in Europe. This effort to put MBFR in proper perspective will be greatly facilitated if the new concept of the future role of the United States in Europe (NSSM-138)³ has been approved. (Memorandum summarizing this concept is attached.)⁴

³ NSSM 138, October 2, requesting a study for strategy at a European Security Conference, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 74.

⁴ Undated memorandum is attached but not printed.

c. High level statements of US interests in Europe

Statements by both the President and you can still do much to influence European attitudes toward this country, given their continuing psychological need for assurances from us.

The NATO Ministerial Meeting will provide you with an opportunity to delineate our continuing interest in Europe, to stress that the Nixon approach eschews disengagement from the European scene and envisages greater trans-Atlantic cooperation, and provides an opportunity for you to unveil (or reinforce if you have already spoken earlier) the new concept developed in response to NSSM-138 on the future US role toward Europe in the context of a Conference on European Security, and to assure our Allies that the new economic policy does not imply a change in the President's commitment that, given a similar approach by our Allies, we will maintain and improve our forces in Europe.

What you say could be a prelude to a Presidential statement to the Congress delivered in, perhaps, the State of the Union Message, emphasizing our continuing understanding of the primary importance of our relations with Europe. What the President says in his oral statements before the Congress could be further elaborated upon in his Annual Report to that body and in the State Department Annual Report.

d. Consult early with Allies on Moscow Trip

Early in the new year we should be prepared to inform the Allies of our plans for consultation with them preceding the President's trip to Moscow. He has already indicated that there would be such consultations, but our Allies would be greatly reassured and their confidence in us improved, if we could outline the scenario of those consultations. They then could plan their participation more effectively.

e. Post-Moscow Consultations

We believe it is imperative that on his return from Moscow, the President pass through Brussels and report to the Allies in the North Atlantic Council. Depending on whether developments would make such a meeting desirable, this might be a NATO summit meeting, providing appropriate opportunities for bilateral consultations between the President and the European leaders.

These proposed courses of action encompass a short time frame—between now and spring of next year. It is important that we start them early. With these measures and other measures opportunities for which may arise in the next six months, we believe we can at least begin the process of reversing the trend and moving towards the establishment of US-European relations on a firmer basis for the longer future.

76. National Security Decision Memorandum 142¹

Washington, December 2, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European Conference

As a result of the discussion at the December 1 NSC meeting² the President has directed that the following guidance be followed in consultations with our Allies on the issues related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and preparations for a European Conference.

After considering the discussions at the meeting, the President has concluded that we are not prepared for definitive decisions with respect to MBFR or CES and that our general approach should be to proceed slowly while developing consensus within the Alliance on positions which clearly maintain our security.

It should be stressed to our Allies that the principal criterion for judging any MBFR proposals must be maintenance of Western military security. This will be the U.S. position in Alliance consultations on preferred MBFR models that would serve as the basis for negotiation. U.S. representatives should develop a maximum consensus on this principle.

At this time, the U.S. cannot support any single approach to reductions. We should urge the Allies to continue analysis of possible reduction models. Meanwhile, we should complete ongoing analysis and undertake further studies of asymmetrical models that emphasize limitations and reductions on Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities. We should also complete a study on options dealing with nuclear weapons and pursue further work on collateral constraints.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) Nos. 97-. Top Secret.

² At the NSC meeting, Kissinger first summarized the development of MBFR and CES as separate ideas. The discussion then moved on to how the two issues were related, how the various Allies sought to use one as leverage to move on the other, and how burden-sharing and offset figured in the overall picture. See footnote 3, Document 73.

Our Allies should be told that the U.S. supports the concept of a sequential approach to negotiation similar to that proposed by the FRG. This approach should be applied to further analysis of MBFR models.

In Allied consultations, U.S. representatives should provide reassurance that we will not negotiate bilateral reductions with the USSR.

Until the Brosio mission to Moscow has been completed, the U.S. cannot support other efforts towards MBFR negotiations. While we would consider alternatives to the Brosio mission, if it proves unacceptable to the USSR, it remains essential that an exploratory phase similar to that authorized for Mr. Brosio be undertaken before any multilateral negotiations.

European Conference

We should insist that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed before agreeing to any multilateral preparations for a European Conference.³ Following the signing of the Berlin Protocol, the U.S. should urge a meeting of NATO countries at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to coordinate a common approach to the issues that may be raised by the other side before going into preparatory talks.

At present, Western preparations on substantive issues are insufficiently developed to enter into multilateral East-West contacts. The U.S. will be prepared to contribute to the work of the Alliance on substantive points by submitting more concrete proposals for Western consideration. In particular, security issues (other than MBFR) that might be topics in a Conference will be given more emphasis.

The U.S. has no interest in a conference in 1972 and all preparatory work within the Alliance and with Eastern and other European countries should be geared to this consideration.

The U.S. does not wish to alter its current position of keeping MBFR and a European Conference separate.

Burdensharing

The U.S. should continue to stress to its Allies the importance of additional European force improvements meeting the objectives set by NSDM 133.⁴ MBFR should in no way conflict with the force improvements developed under the AD-70 programs; these two concepts must be complementary.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ This agreement was signed on June 3, 1972.

⁴ Document 71.

77. Editorial Note

U.S. negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany for a new offset agreement took several months longer than expected. The first round of negotiations, which were held in Bonn March 10–11, 1971, revealed just how far apart the two sides stood on the issue even though negotiators remained optimistic. While the United States proposed that Germany cover 80 percent of the balance-of-payments expenditures (approximately \$850 million annually), the FRG suggested \$135 million in direct budgetary support (for the first time), \$287 million for military procurement in the United States, and contributions to rehabilitation of U.S. military installations in Germany. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon enclosing a Department of State report, April 5; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. IX) At the second round of negotiations held in Washington April 15–16, the United States held to its position of \$850 million while the FRG increased its total offer to \$110 million per year in direct budgetary support and \$445 million per year in military procurement. (Memorandum for the President—Evening Report, April 16; *ibid.*, President's Daily Brief, April 17–30, 1971) Despite a delay in the third round of negotiations, originally scheduled for May 18–19 but postponed until June 28–29 in Bonn to allow for additional informal discussions, the two sides remained at an impasse. (Department of State paper on Offset Negotiations—Current Status, July 28; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. IX) After a fourth round of negotiations held in Washington August 3–4, the two sides decreased the differential to \$171 million over two years. (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, September 29; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 12 GER W)

In the months that followed, discussions between Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and West German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt (see Document 74) and between Secretary of State William Rogers and West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (Memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, November 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 685, Country Files—Europe, Germany, Vol. X) became the focus for working out remaining differences. On November 27, a joint State/Defense telegram transmitted a message to Schmidt that signaled an imminent agreement. The telegram stated that President Richard Nixon had approved the U.S. position on offset, which now included Schmidt's suggestion: "Specifically, our negotiators are authorized to agree that DM 600 million from new monies be made available over the two year period for barracks rehabilitation. In addition, they are authorized to agree that DM 100 mil-

lion be transferred from Account No. 2 for interest payments on the offset loan."

The telegram continued: "[W]e very much hope that you can agree to additional sums to be used for agreed defense purposes. The funds might be used for additional procurement, interest subsidy for the remaining 2½ years of the offset loan, or the funds might be deposited in an account in Germany to be used in support of joint U.S.-FRG projects. You might have some additional ideas as to how the resources might best be used for defense purposes. If so, we would be pleased to consider them." (Telegram 214940 to Bonn, November 27; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 12 GER W)

78. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Brussels, December 10, 1971, 1310Z.

Secto 17/5168. Subject: Offset Negotiations—Agreed Minute.

Following is text of US-FRG offset agreement for FY 1972–73 signed in Brussels December 10 by Deputy Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Samuels and Ministerial Director Dr. Axel Herbst.

Begin text:

Minute

The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America agree as follows:

1. Military procurement

A) Between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1973, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will make payments for procurement of US defense goods and services in the field of defense in the amount of DM 3950 million.

B) Part of such procurement in the amount of DM 1650 million shall be financed through utilization of funds now on deposit in the name of the Federal Republic of Germany with the United States Treasury in accounts entitled "Account No. 20X6409—Secretary of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Military Purchases by Federal Republic of Germany" and "Account No. 20X6415—Secretary of the Treasury, Spe-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 12 GER W. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn.

cial Transfer Account, Military Expenditures by the Federal Republic of Germany”.

C) The balance of such procurement, which is DM 2300 million shall be financed by June 30, 1973, by the utilization of German funds not on deposit with the United States Treasury on June 30, 1971, which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will transfer directly to suppliers of defense goods and services in the United States or which it will deposit with the United States Treasury in Account No. 20X6409. Of this amount DM 81 million was paid before July 1, 1971.

D) All military procurement by the Federal Republic of Germany will be made in the light of German military requirements and budget capabilities, given the availability and economic advantage of procurement in the United States of America.

2. Investments for Troop Facilities

A) Between July 1, 1971 and June 30, 1973 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will make available an amount of DM 600 million for services and deliveries for the modernization, construction and improvement of barracks, accommodations, housing and troop facilities of the forces of the United States of America stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Specific projects will be agreed between the two sides. The disbursement of the funds will be made in portions subject to the progress of the building projects, similarly to existing procedural arrangements. Amounts not utilized prior to 30 June 1973 shall remain available for measures as envisaged under this paragraph of this agreement.

B) Structures, improvements and other alterations including built-in equipment financed in this manner will be treated as property owned by the Federal Republic of Germany used by the U.S. forces within the framework of the NATO status of forces agreement and the supplementary agreement thereto.

3. Bundesbank Credits

A) Arrangements will be concluded between the United States Treasury (in cooperation with the United States Federal Reserve Board) and the Deutsche Bundesbank concerning investment by the Deutsche Bundesbank during the period July 1, 1971–June 30, 1973, in special, 4½ years, 2½ percent, dollar denominated United States Government securities. The objective should be the investment by the Deutsche Bundesbank of DM 2 million during the above mentioned period.

B) The Federal Republic of Germany will pay to the United States of America prior to the date when interest falls due under paragraph 3A above an amount of DM 100 million in settlement of the United States interest obligation. Such sum may be paid out of funds on deposit in the name of Federal Republic of Germany with the United States Treasury in Account No. 20X6415.

4. Detailed Arrangements

Detailed arrangements implementing this agreement shall be made by the responsible agencies or ministries of the Governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany.

For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

For the Government of the United States of America

Brussels

December 10, 1971. *End text.*

Rogers

79. Telegram From the Department of State to All North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals¹

Washington, December 11, 1971, 0520Z.

223518. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting: An Overview.²

1. Issues of security and détente dominated the agenda of the NATO Ministerial meeting December 8–10, and restatement by Secretary Rogers of the continuing US commitment to Europe's defense was warmly received. But it was evident in the tone and content of most interventions that Ministers increasingly are becoming aware of the complexity and sensitivity of the issues that lie ahead in preparing for unprecedented multilateral East-West negotiations on CSCE and MBFR. Reinforcing these concerns were uncertainties, expressed by many, over Soviet intentions, in light of the "reverse linkage" of the ratification of the FRG bilateral treaty with the USSR with signature of the final Quadripartite protocol on Berlin, and the Soviet failure to receive Brosio for MBFR explorations.

2. In the security sphere, the European Allies showed new vigor in their collective efforts in the EuroGroup, whose members pledged an additional billion dollars for national defense improvements in 1972, an

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files 1949–72, CF 529. Confidential. Drafted by Streator (EUR/RPM), approved by Pedersen, Hillenbrand, McGuire, Springsteen, and Harrington. Repeated to Moscow, Bucharest, Belgrade, Vienna, Budapest, Warsaw, Sofia, Prague, Helsinki, and Madrid; the Missions to the UN, EC, and Geneva; CINCEUR, SHAPE, SACLANT, COSOUTH, AREUR, NAVEUR, and USAFE.

² The meeting took place in Brussels. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971–1972, pp. 25015–25018.

increase of six percent. Moreover, they completed arrangements for funding the 1970 European Defense Improvement Program, involving a billion dollars in NATO and national defense improvements over five years. These steps to share a greater proportion of the common defense burden are a tangible earnest of European intent to meet the terms of the President's 1970 pledge, repeated at this NATO meeting, and warmly welcomed, that the US would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, provided the Allies do likewise, and in the absence of reciprocal reductions that do not change the military balance.

3. In contrast to the encouraging degree of solidarity in defense matters, less unanimity emerged in the Allied views on next moves toward East-West negotiations, particularly with respect to CSCE. Confronted by the failure of the inner-German talks to be concluded prior to the Ministerial meeting, and by the problem of the "reverse linkage," most Ministers nonetheless strongly favored signalling readiness to open multilateral preparatory CSCE talks only upon signature of the final protocol on Berlin. There was little support for the US proposal for a Deputy Foreign Minister meeting after conclusion of the Berlin agreement, but the Secretary indicated that, since the FRG bilateral treaties would not likely be ratified until April of 1972 at the earliest (Scheel had indicated at the 4-power dinner that this might not be accomplished until June or July), Ministers could deal with the issues next May. A number rallied to the Belgian proposal for immediate acceptance of the Finnish initiative and the start of "multiple bilateral" discussions between ambassadors at Helsinki and the Finnish Foreign Minister. France pressed upon again for opening East-West multilateral preparations following conclusion of the inner-German phase of the Berlin talks and for acceptance of Helsinki as the site of multilateral consultations.

4. A compromise on the language in the communiqué on CSCE was found through reference to the Lisbon Ministerial formulation anticipating multilateral preparations "as soon as negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion." (With German and English opposition to consultations prior to signature of the protocol added to ours, however, only the French remain explicitly favorable to earlier multilateral talks.) To provide a sense of forward movement, all but the US favored accepting in principle the Finnish invitation to hold multilateral discussions in Helsinki. The Secretary argued, however, that Ministers need not take a decision to meet at Helsinki at this time, when we are not absolutely positive about the final conclusion of the Berlin agreement, and should simply note and express appreciation for the Finnish invitation. French FonMin Schumann, joined by the Scandinavians, took strong exception, arguing for acceptance of Helsinki now and for language that would give impression preparations for meeting

in Finland would proceed promptly. Upshot was compromise in which Finnish invitation was noted, Ministers expressed “appreciation” for Finnish “initiative” and agreed to stay in touch with Finns “on the matter.” This was intended to be friendly language but to leave for later final decision whether and when to hold initial multilateral talks in Helsinki. The French translation of the communiqué (on Schumann’s insistence) apparently went further than the English text, however, in saying Ministers “are favorable to” Finnish invitation instead of “appreciate” it.

5. With respect to MBFR, general expressions of regret at the Soviet failure to receive Brosio accompanied a consensus (minus the French of course) that the Allies should continue to press for early explorations in Moscow by Brosio, reflecting Allied awareness that explorations are essential prior to negotiations. Though the FRG and others sought explicit linkage of MBFR to CSCE, the US successfully defended the view that these should be pursued at least for the present on separate tracks. The Allies also agreed that questions of security, including “certain military aspects of security” should figure on a CSCE agenda. They also stated in a separate paragraph of the communiqué that “reduction of the dangers of a military confrontation” should be addressed in a CSCE.

6. Particular concern was expressed by many, and reflected in the communiqué, about the situation in South Asia.

7. Many expressed appreciation for the Secretary’s discussion of the status of SALT. Similarly, many welcomed the Secretary’s comments on the President’s forthcoming visits to Peking and Moscow, and stated hopes for progress in talks there. By stressing the US intention to consult the Allies on the visits, and to avoid dealing bilaterally “over their heads” on matters affecting the Allies, the Secretary gave reassurances about US objectives that evoked generally favorable comment.

8. The domestic situation in Greece was once again raised by Denmark and Norway, and the latter also referred to the situation in the Portuguese territories of Africa. Both the Greek and Portuguese representatives responded by taking vigorous exception to the intrusion of matters of domestic Allied concern in the Council.

9. Many briefly addressed current monetary and trade issues, following the Secretary’s reference to the progress registered to date and anticipated in forthcoming talks. Communiqué reference to the issue, however, was limited to general recognition of the effect continuing difficulties could have on the Alliance.

10. Southern flank representatives gave prominence to the situation in the Mediterranean, and, following the Secretary’s discussions of

the Middle East situation, several echoed his concern over the situation there.

11. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Scheel were present and made statements at the initialing by Deputy Under Secretary Samuels and Minister Director Herbst of the agreement renewing the FRG offset. The Secretary and the Portuguese Foreign Minister also signed and exchanged notes renewing the Azores bilateral base agreement.

12. Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again at Bonn May 30–31, 1972.

Rogers

80. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, March 9, 1972.

SUBJECT

Consultations with NATO Allies Before the President's Moscow Meetings

The President would like you to ensure that the NATO Allies are briefed, and where pertinent, consulted as fully as feasible in connection with our preparations for the Moscow summit talks.²

Accordingly, the President has asked that

—As soon as possible after his confirmation and swearing-in, Ambassador Kennedy³ address the North Atlantic Council. In his remarks, Ambassador Kennedy should review the President's China trip along the lines of the President's letters to heads of government and outline our approach to the Moscow trip as set forth in existing Presidential statements and your Foreign Policy Report to Congress. The draft of the Ambassador's speech should be reviewed in the White House.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 262, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XII. Secret. A copy was sent to the Secretary of Defense.

² The Summit talks were held May 22–30.

³ David M. Kennedy, former Secretary of the Treasury, was appointed U.S. Representative to NATO on March 17.

—Ambassador Smith⁴ should conduct full consultations, according to established procedures, before the next series of SALT sessions.

—A senior official of the Department of State should proceed to Brussels during March to review with the NAC major pending bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.⁵

—A senior official of the Defense Department should proceed to Brussels to review with the NAC the status of the talks on preventing incidents at sea.

The President has further asked that in the first week of April you submit for his review additional suggestions for briefings or consultations in the light of the status of preparations with the Soviets at that time.⁶

The President directs that as part of his coordinating function in the preparations of the trip to the USSR, the Chairman, NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe (IG/EUR) will coordinate all pre-Summit NATO briefings and consultations.

The President has decided not to stop in Western Europe after the meetings in the USSR. He would like you to plan to brief the Spring NATO Ministerial meeting⁷ subsequent to the Moscow meetings.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ Gerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was chief negotiator at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

⁵ Rogers designated Hillenbrand to meet with the NAC. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, March 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 262, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XII)

⁶ Kissinger distributed NSDM 162, "Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe," on April 5. The final section of the NSDM dealt with consulting the NATO Allies on these issues: "The reaction of the NATO Allies to this approach should be sought promptly. The goal of consultations should be to develop a consensus in advance of the NATO Ministerial meeting. An interagency paper on collateral constraints that might be appropriate for discussion at a CSCE should be developed and forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. A separate paper on constraints suitable to MBFR should also be prepared for submission to NATO." (*Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 89)

⁷ A report on the meeting is in telegram Secto 31/2010 from USNATO and telegram Secto 30/301 from Luxembourg, both May 5. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 488).

81. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 31, 1972, 0950Z.

Secto 075/7581. Following is cleared Memcon between Secretary and NATO SecGen Luns May 30.

Quote:

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: May 30, 1972

Place: Bundesrat, Bonn, Germany

Participants:

United States

Secretary Rogers

Ambassador Kennedy

Mr. Goodby

NATO International Secretariat

Secretary General Luns

Assistant Secretary General Kastl

Chef du Cabinet Van Campen

Subject: The Moscow Summit Meeting: MBFR and CSCE

The Secretary General extended his compliments to the Secretary on the success of the President's summit meeting in Moscow.² He remarked that inevitably, however, some people were already asking whether NATO was still important in light of what had been achieved in the summit meeting. In response, the Secretary referred to his Bonn arrival statement in which he had emphasized how important NATO was.³ He added, by way of specific example, that maintaining the strength and cohesion of NATO would be essential if the Allies were to achieve anything in MBFR negotiations.

The Secretary General asked whether the Soviets had explained why they had not received the Brosio mission. The Secretary replied that they had objected to the "bloc-to-bloc" character of the Brosio mis-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-72, CF 497. Confidential. Repeated to USNATO and Moscow.

² Extensive documentation on the Moscow Summit and the discussions there on MBFR and CSCE is in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972.

³ The Secretary's statement on his arrival at Bonn on May 29 was reported in "Rogers Flies to Bonn For a NATO Meeting," *New York Times*, May 30, 1972, p. 4.

sion. However, the Soviets had agreed that MBFR talks could take place in parallel with CSCE preparatory talks.

The Secretary General asked whether the U.S. was still thinking of beginning CSCE preparatory talks in November, after the American elections. The Secretary confirmed that this was the case.

Mr. Kastl cautioned that there might be some comment from NATO flank countries in the Ministerial meeting about their desire to be included in MBFR negotiations. The Secretary replied that there was nothing in the Moscow communiqué which should give rise to concerns by NATO members.⁴ In the ensuing discussions of this question, it was agreed that close NATO consultation on MBFR would be essential to alleviate the participation problem.

Prior to the arrival of the Secretary, Mr. Luns mentioned to Ambassador Kennedy that he intended to raise with Secretary Rogers at lunch a problem relating to American personnel assigned to NATO's International Secretariat. Promotion policies were apparently weighted against such people, a situation which the Secretary General thought was most unfair. The specific case in point was his assistant, John Maresca, an outstanding American Foreign Service officer who had made immense contributions to NATO and who was, nevertheless, unrewarded by advancement. Mr. Kastl also commented on Mr. Maresca's performance during the lengthy Malta negotiations.

Comment: Mr. Luns later stated that he had raised the matter of Mr. Maresca in the same terms with Secretary Rogers.

Unquote

Rogers

⁴ For text of the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit talks on May 29, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 635–642.

82. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon met with the Executive Committee of the Council on International Economic Policy on September 11, 1972, to discuss general trade issues relating to the European Community (EC). The United States supported the enlargement of the EC primarily for political reasons, setting aside its concerns over economic incompatibilities between the Treaty of Rome and GATT. Yet enlargement and expansion of preferences created potential difficulties in the months

ahead. At the meeting, Nixon stated, "more is involved here than just questions of 'horse-trading' between soybeans and cheese. The question is what Europe wants its position to be vis-à-vis the US and the Soviet Union. We hear about Finlandization of Europe. If Europe should adopt a trade policy which is anti-US, it could affect attitudes in the US—bring about an unenthusiastic attitude toward Europe—and will carry over into the political area. There will be pressure to withdraw divisions and NATO would come apart. The idea that Europe can defend itself without the US is 'bull.' If NATO comes apart, they will be an economic giant but a military and political pigmy. The USSR will encroach on them. It will not be in the traditional way but a new-style invasion. European leaders are terrified at that prospect. European leaders want to 'screw' us and we want to 'screw' them in the economic area.

"But political relationships should be overriding for us and for them. What will matter in trade is its relationship to the total problem—what we want our relationship with Europe to be. Between now and the election we should say nothing, but we should give careful thought about how trade relations fit in the context of our overall relations. We should examine what price we might have to pay on the trade side for this political relationship, and they should do so as well. We should not allow the umbilical cord between the US and Europe to be cut and Europe to be nibbled away by the Soviets. We need to strengthen the bonds of trade, monetary relations, exchanges, etc." (Printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 100)

As a result of this meeting, the President authorized CIEP Decision Memorandum 14, "Trade Negotiations with the European Community," September 25, which called for a "policy of modified confrontation exerting controlled but mounting pressures on issues involving both our trade interests and the principles of the present system. This should be done bearing in mind the overriding importance of our political relations with Europe and the probability that our trade problems cannot be satisfactorily resolved except in the context of larger policy considerations. (Printed *ibid.*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 277)

83. Telegram From the Department of State to All North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals and to Secretary of State Rogers in New York¹

Washington, September 27, 1972, 2233Z.

Tosec 66/176990. For the Ambassador. Subject: Allied Participation in MBFR Talks.

1. There follows text of US position paper to be delivered to Governments of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Norway and Denmark, as well as specific guidance for addressees on handling of paper.

Begin text:

This paper conveys US views on the issue of Allied participation in forthcoming talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.

It should be stressed at the outset that the US believes Allied security is indivisible. All Allies have an interest in security issues. The issue raised by the question of participation in MBFR talks, however, is not one of whether our interest in Allied security is shared by all member states, but rather how the Allies can best protect their common security interest.

The US believes there would be risks in expanding participation in MBFR talks beyond those states with forces in the prospective area of reduction (the so-called NATO Guidelines Area plus Hungary). The Allies have emphasized the Central Region of Europe because the greatest concentration of opposing forces is there.

The Soviets have agreed to Central Europe, at least initially, as a focus for MBFR. The inclusion on the Allied side in MBFR talks, however, of states other than those with territories or forces in Central Europe might well encourage the Soviets to try to broaden and complicate the talks in a manner advantageous to them by expanding the geographic area on the Allied side beyond the Central Region. This could lead to the introduction of issues that the Allies would wish to avoid and that might be divisive.

Specifically, the US is seriously concerned that broader Allied participation would give the Soviets a pretext to seek to expand the geo-

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 247, Agency Files, MBFR and CSCE, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Edward Streator, Deputy Director, and Vladimir Lehovitch, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs; cleared by McGuire, Springsteen, Stoessel, William Hyland (NSC), Harry Barnes (Executive Secretariat), Raymond Garthoff (Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs), and Bruce Clarke (CIA), cleared for information by Major General Rexford H. Dettre, Jr. (Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff); and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Moscow. Rogers was in New York at the U.N. General Assembly session.

graphic area to include the flanks, thereby increasing the reduction base for stationed as well as indigenous forces on the Allied side. They might also seek to trade Pact reductions of dubious value to the Allies against reductions of certain types of forces on the flanks and seek "compensation" in Central Europe for not pressing demands related to the flanks. The inclusion of the southern flank in the reduction zone also could, in particular, raise serious difficulties at this time with respect to important stationed force deployments in the southern flank, extending to naval forces in the Mediterranean, as well as to NATO indigenous forces in the area. In the US view, opening these sensitive issues to discussion in this way could call into question the general Allied strategic posture throughout NATO Europe, which the US believes the Allies should avoid by limiting discussions and any ensuing obligations and commitments to Central Europe, the area on which NATO studies have concentrated to date. It could also make difficult a cautious and phased approach to MBFR.

At the same time, the US has been keenly aware of the strong interest of all Allies in MBFR. It is for this reason that the US proposed enhanced Allied consultation in the North Atlantic Council on MBFR before and during East-West multilateral discussions on this subject, as well as the establishment of a special group involving all Allies wishing to take part at the site of MBFR talks for regular Allied consultations and coordination on the progress of the talks. In this connection, the US has proposed a procedure by which SHAPE and NATO military authorities would remain closely in touch with the MBFR process, so that their views could be taken into account at all stages.

The US hopes that the foregoing will serve to clarify the basis for its strong preference that the participants in MBFR talks be limited, and that the governments of Allied countries on the flanks will be prepared to reconsider their positions.

Copies of this paper are being provided to other Allied governments. *End text.*

2. For Athens, Ankara, Rome, Oslo, Copenhagen: You should hand foregoing position paper as soon as possible either (A) to Foreign Minister or (B) in his absence, to most senior available Foreign Ministry official, asking that text be conveyed to Foreign Minister.

3. For all NATO capitals and USUN: The Secretary is being provided with this paper and talking points on this issue for use in his meetings with Foreign Ministers in connection with UNGA.

4. For USNATO: You should convey position paper contained para one, above, to SYG Luns and other delegations, indicating that it is being delivered to Foreign Ministers of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Norway and Denmark.

5. For all NATO capitals, except Athens, Ankara, Rome, Oslo, Copenhagen: You should furnish text of paper contained para one, above, to appropriate level of FonOffs, indicating that paper is being conveyed to Foreign Ministers of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Norway and Denmark.

6. For Bonn: Since the FRG has considerable influence with the Turks, you should explore whether, despite FRG preference for a compromise which would meet desires of flank countries, the FRG might be willing to indicate to the Turks and possibly to others its belief that the considerations we raise have objective weight and should be seriously considered.

Irwin

84. National Security Study Memorandum 164¹

Washington, November 18, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture

SUBJECT

United States Relations with Europe

The President has directed the preparation of a basic study of our relations with Europe, with particular focus on Western Europe. The study should examine the goals we should strive for over the next four years, and the priorities that should govern our policies. Under each major aspect of our relations with Europe—political, economic, military, security, scientific—major issues that will arise in the next year or so should be identified and discussed. The interrelationship of issues should be examined. A range of options for dealing with these issues should be analyzed in terms of advantages and disadvantages.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

The purpose of this study is to provide the President with a framework within which he can make basic decisions on the relative priorities to be accorded the elements in our overall policy toward Europe and to provide guidance on the specific issues within this context.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, comprising representatives of the recipients of this memorandum and of the NSC staff. The President regards this study as of prime importance and he has directed that it be given priority attention. It should be forwarded by January 1 for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

On the basis of the President's decisions, there will be a need for a series of further studies to implement Presidential guidance.

The existence of this directive and the content of the study must be regarded as extremely sensitive. All officials involved will see to it that proper security precautions are taken to avoid public speculation about changes in our European policy.

Henry A. Kissinger

85. **Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State and the Department of Defense¹**

Brussels, November 29, 1972, 1845Z.

5114. Sub: NATO's December Ministerial: some Mission views. From Ambassador Kennedy for Secretary Rogers.

1. *Summary:* A separate message will cover some of the key issues which you will be called upon to address jointly with your NATO colleagues.² In my view, it will be equally important for you to address broader questions of US policy towards Europe, and NATO as an institution for Alliance (viz transatlantic) consultations. Luns plans to raise the latter question at a private meeting with Foreign Ministers. *End summary.*

2. For a variety of reasons, our Allies are deeply concerned and confused about the continuing US commitment to NATO and to European security. A number of factors are involved, several of which are not directly related to us actions.

—The coincidental onset of MBFR and CSCE talks with the further and still uncertain evolution of the FRG's Ostpolitik, suggest significant changes in the shape of Europe the outlines of which are but dimly perceivable as of this date. The Europeans lack experience, policy and leadership with respect to events which they view as transcendental.

—Many Europeans see the US as increasingly interested in developing its bilateral relations with the USSR, even at the expense of its Allies on such matters as troop levels.

—In the Common Market eight of the Allies have been trying to coordinate elements of their policy, such as towards a CSCE. In some respects this development, the first try at developing a European political consensus, has been detrimental to effective political consultations in NATO.

—There is an undefined need for means better to conduct transatlantic business on a variety of matters. In some respects this seems to diminish NATO's role. Those NATO Allies not members of the EC view new and still unstated transatlantic consultative arrangements be-

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 29, Chronological File. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to all NATO capitals, Helsinki, the Mission to the EC, and SHAPE.

² The message was not identified. Nixon approved the text of the statement to the NAC that Rogers delivered on December 7 to the NAC Ministerial meeting, held in Brussels December 7–8. (Memorandum from Haig to Eliot; *ibid.*) The final communiqué of the meeting is printed in *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949–1974*, pp. 282–287.

tween the EC and the US as risking Allied unity on important political and even security matters.

—Most important, and in large measure overriding everything else, there is concern regarding new directions US policy will take toward Europe.

3. In my view, you should deal with these issues in your statements to the Council and in private conversations with your colleagues. Luns can be expected, in the private meeting he has arranged with Foreign Ministers, to be quite direct in posing the question of NATO's future as an institution for political consultation and coordination. US intentions will be considered the key factor, and indication by US leaders of general thrust of future policy is what Europeans crave. Consequently I believe that you should be prepared to state the basic assumptions on which the administration will base its European policy. In addition, I recommend that you:

—Reiterate President Nixon's promise to maintain troop levels, given a similar effort by our Allies, and not to reduce US forces except through reciprocal negotiated reductions.

—Reaffirm that the US will not conclude an agreement with the USSR, on political or military matters, at the expense of our Allies and their needs.

—Reiterate importance US attaches to NATO transatlantic nexus as the focal point of consultations among the Allies, and particularly on CSCE and MBFR. In this connection, remark that the President's plans to visit the North Atlantic Council, should he come to Europe next year, is dramatic and visible evidence of US intention to maintain and strengthen the consultative process.

—Affirm that the European Allies must do their share to strengthen political consultations in NATO. Given proper will by the EC allies and their due regard for the interests of their NATO allies, there is sound reason to believe that EC and NATO consultations can develop in harmony and be mutually reinforcing.

Kennedy

86. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 20–72

Washington, December 14, 1972.

PROBLEMS IN US-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS**Note**

This paper seeks to define and explore the issues most likely to trouble US-West European relations in the next few years. We have had to make some assumptions about US attitudes (e.g., that there will be general continuity in US policies toward Europe) and have in addition discussed what Europeans expect American policy to be—expectations which (whether justified or not) inevitably will color their own actions. Finally, we address some contingencies (e.g., a reduction in the US military role in Europe or a failure to resolve economic differences) which obviously are only hypothetical at this time.

Some of the Estimate's principal judgments—on the general climate likely to prevail in US-European relations, on divergent approaches to European security and détente, on likely consequences of a reduction in US force levels in Europe, and on the effects of continued economic disputes—are to be found in Section V, entitled "Some Broader Judgments".

THE ESTIMATE**I. Introduction**

1. In significant ways 1971 and 1972 have been watershed years in US-West European relations, important not so much for the emergence of new trends as for the visible culmination of important stages in a long-brewing process of change. The Four Power Agreement on Berlin and subsequent accords between the two German states, ratification of Bonn's quasi-peace treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, achievement of an initial agreement on strategic arms limitation between the US and the USSR, enlargement of the European Community, and Washington's New Economic Policy, have marked important political and psychological steps in the restructuring of Atlantic as well as European relations.

2. These changes, in turn, have raised questions vital to the course of US-West European relations: How can both US and West European interests be properly represented and protected in the course of the developing East-West détente? How can Western security best be pre-

¹Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem.

served in the light of pressures in the US for reduced force levels in Europe? How can West Germany's growing disposition to play a role commensurate with its great relative strength be reconciled with the interests of Germany's partners and German interest in continued US protection? How can harmony be achieved between the enlarged and feisty European Community and the US, at a time when the latter is adjusting its foreign commitments and trying to close a large trade deficit? Clearly, these are problems with myriad ramifications. They will be addressed in an atmosphere of considerable European uneasiness about, in some quarters even resentment of, a US which no longer seems to many so wise, so rich, or so beneficent as it once did. And the fact that different aspects of the US-West European political, security, and economic relationship will be up for revision at virtually the same time in a variety of overlapping forums and negotiations assures ample opportunity for the dramatization and aggravation of trans-Atlantic differences.

3. Thus it is important, especially in a paper which deliberately concentrates on "problems," to acknowledge at the outset the enduring sources of strength in US-West European ties. There is a large reservoir of good will toward the US in Western Europe which cannot be entirely eroded by disapproval of specific US policies. There is widespread recognition that most of the Atlantic peoples want to live in essentially the same kind of world, and realization that a common cultural and political heritage promotes common interests. As a corollary, most West European governments continue to believe that American and West European security interests are essentially the same, whatever differences may exist as to tactics and intermediate objectives. This sense of shared outlook will be especially potent whenever the Europeans are dealing with both the US and the (always more "foreign") USSR.

4. And of course there are quite practical bonds. All the West European governments, in and out of NATO, appreciate that their ability to pursue détente with the East confidently is made possible by the existence of close ties with the US. All feel a vital interest in continuation of a strong US security role in Europe, especially during this delicate period of trying to work out new all-European relations. The US, moreover, still is valued as a balancing factor among the West Europeans themselves, a buffer to Franco-German rivalries and a reassurance to smaller states fearful of dominance by one or another of their larger neighbors. There also is widespread recognition of economic interdependence; the Europeans know that a further deterioration in the US economic position could create more trouble for them, and that failure to ease trans-Atlantic economic strains would hurt everyone.

5. There nonetheless are a variety of negative factors in US-West European relations. Disillusion with the US as a social, economic, and

foreign policy model, together with what some perceive as a decline in US power, doubtless has reduced the deference once paid to American views. But this by itself has not made the European governments less willing to cooperate with Washington on a broad range of subjects of mutual interest. A more important source of the problem is that the Europeans are ambivalent about just what it is that they want from the US. Long-standing desires for a lessening of dependence on the US now are complicated by concern over the prospect that there might actually be a significant reduction in that dependence. Similarly, governments which long have urged (and still want) superpower rapprochement nonetheless are apprehensive about how Washington's willingness to deal with erstwhile enemies in Peking and Moscow might affect their own interests. They are worried about the relative importance Washington intends to place on its relations with the USSR and with themselves.

6. Perhaps most fundamental of all, Europeans are uncertain about the direction of American policy and many doubt whether the US itself is clear as to its purpose. There is growing apprehension about whether Washington's interest in détente extends much beyond a desire to reduce the cost *to the US* of the present system of East-West relations in Europe. There also is uncertainty about Washington's approach to US-European economic relations in particular and to the idea of European unity in general. Many suspect that the US really does not know whether it still wants a united Western Europe which might be a stronger economic and political partner (and sometimes rival) or perhaps would prefer to go on dealing with individual West European states in the hope that they would be more amenable to American economic pressures and less of a political nuisance.

7. In the following paragraphs we discuss first how these suspicions and uncertainties are likely to complicate the resolution of differences between the US and the West Europeans in pending negotiations on European security issues and on international trade and monetary reform. We also touch briefly on relations with non-European countries and how these might affect trans-Atlantic dealings. While major emphasis is given to national interests and policies as defined by West European governments, we also discuss domestic political and economic problems of those governments which might limit their flexibility in doing business with the US. Finally, we note some common themes which run throughout the spectrum of US-West European issues, and we discuss how problems in one area might affect those in another and which are likely to prove of most lasting significance.

II. Problems in the Relationship

A. European Security and Détente

8. The one area of foreign affairs to have captured the imagination of West Europeans in recent years is the pursuit of East-West détente.

Whether the players include just about everyone in a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or selected participants from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, or only the US and the USSR in further Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or other bilateral dealings, all the European governments feel their national interests are involved. Current efforts toward *détente* provide a classic example of US-West European frictions and disagreements on the way to essentially shared ends; of how the US can get into a certain amount of trouble with its allies for following a course they themselves have long urged.

9. Certainly there is wide approval in Europe for US and Soviet efforts to reduce cold war tensions. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the first visit of an American President to Moscow, the first Four Power accord to reduce tensions over Berlin, all have won wide popular support throughout Europe and added to the eagerness of West European governments to be—and to be seen by their electorates to be—actively involved in the *détente* process.

10. Part of the problem between Washington and the European governments is simply one of “participation”—including the touchy issue of NATO consultations. Widespread unhappiness with US acceptance of Soviet communiqué language on “peaceful coexistence” during the Moscow Summit was not so much over substance as over the fact that the communiqué seemed to contradict views Washington was espousing in NATO consultations, and thus raised questions about the seriousness with which Washington was pursuing those consultations. The West Europeans also have been distressed over US efforts to limit discussion of security issues to the smaller MBFR forum (rather than the larger CSCE), and to exclude representatives of NATO’s northern and southern “flank” members from MBFR talks. Even those governments which were not especially concerned with the substance of the dispute were alarmed at Washington’s apparent willingness to risk damaging allied unity by ignoring its partners’ wishes. All agree that troop reductions can only be negotiated by the states whose troops or territory are involved and have accepted, however grudgingly, that key decisions will be taken between the US and the USSR. But all want a chance to speak their piece on the East-West stage, not just in NATO councils. And all want some “confidence building” or “tension reducing” security measures to be discussed in the arena of the Security Conference, where smaller countries might hope to make more of an impact, rather than solely in the MBFR forum.

11. This problem of “participation”—perhaps largely cosmetic but nonetheless important to national pride and to internal politics—is complicated by some misgivings about US intentions. In broad terms, many West European officials worry that a disagreement may be

shaping up between themselves and the US as to who should continue to bear the burden of manning anti-Communist defenses (psychological as well as military), and who should get some relief, on the way to that détente presumably desired by all. There is considerable concern that Washington wants a small, tightly controlled group in the MBFR forum fairly quickly to ratify reductions of US forces in central Europe. At the same time, what many see as a primarily defensive US approach to CSCE issues—its repeated warnings against “détente euphoria”—makes them suspect that Washington wants to use that forum essentially to keep European distrust of the USSR alive by embarrassing the Soviets on such issues as freer movement of people, ideas, and information.

12. The approach of most West European governments to these two sets of pending talks is rather different from what they perceive that of the US to be. All (except France) would prefer mutual Soviet and American reductions to the unilateral US troop cuts which they believe are the alternative.² But all want to use (hopefully lengthy) MBFR negotiations first to stave off Congressional pressures for unilateral US withdrawals and so delay the evil day as long as possible. And since most believe that any negotiable reductions will leave the Soviets in a significantly stronger military position relative to NATO, they want the cuts to be accompanied by agreements on constraints in the use of forces (reinforcements, maneuvers, equipment positioning, etc.). These governments tend to view a CSCE, on the other hand, less as a danger to NATO’s defensive cement (as Washington warns) than as an opportunity to improve East-West atmospherics and so set the stage for genuine improvements in European relations (which, *inter alia*, in time would lessen their own dependence on the US)—a scenario which requires not being too beastly to the Russians on such issues as “freer movement.”

13. The West Germans, who believe they have most to lose from US troop reductions, seem to have thought things through most carefully. They would have MBFR talks start with agreements on collateral constraints on the use of forces before going on to negotiate phased and carefully verified reductions. Some German officials talk of a 10-year process, although this probably reflects more hope than expectation.

² The French, too, believe that US troops in Europe will be reduced with or without matching Soviet cuts, and President Pompidou seems sincere in deploring the military and psychological consequences for the European power balance. But the French say they will have nothing to do with an attempt to disguise the situation by presenting US and Soviet troop reductions as “balanced,” when the US forces would retreat some 3,000 miles and the Soviets only about 500. Pompidou argues that the shock of unilateral US withdrawals would do more to keep up the Western guard against the Soviet Union than would a move which was covered by a fig leaf of NATO “approval” as a step toward peace. [Footnote is in the original.]

Bonn also hopes that MBFR talks in time would make possible a reduction of West German as well as US forces, so that neither Bonn's eastern nor western neighbors (nor the economy-minded German taxpayer) will be alarmed at the prospect of a proportionately larger West German military role in Europe. Bonn further insists that other Western territory be included in the reduction zone, so that there will be no hint of a "neutralization" of Germany or any other infringement of West German sovereignty.³ And since the Germans see the West as demandeur for productive MBFR talks, they sometimes speak of the necessity of paying a Soviet price in CSCE, i.e., avoiding contentious issues in favor of general declarations of goodwill and cooperation.

14. French national ambitions are focused on an early, well-publicized, and "successful" CSCE, much along lines advocated by Moscow. There is something here of French desire to nurture the "special relationship" which Paris and Moscow say they have. But the French also hope the Conference might be a step toward eventually overcoming the bloc-to-bloc (read US-Soviet) dominance of European affairs and, in the process, might give France an opportunity to appear as champion of the smaller states, East and West, against superpower "hegemony." This would edge Paris back into the *détente* spotlight recently occupied by Bonn and Washington.

15. The British in large part just want to stay in step with their new European Community partners.⁴ While asserting that not much good can come of the CSCE, London argues that it probably won't do much harm either and that the US will only divide the alliance by taking a tough line. The British view MBFR negotiations as at best a necessary evil, and have come to see the tactical advantage of joining Bonn in pressing for early US commitment to the "phased and integral" approach (i.e., constraints first, reductions later).

16. The Italians, Belgians, Dutch, and Scandinavians are motivated both by long traditions of European peace-seeking and by domestic political difficulties. Emphasis and approach vary among them, with the Belgians and Scandinavians most optimistic about *détente* prospects, the Dutch least so, and the Italians ambivalent. But all tend to view a CSCE as more immediately appealing to their electorates, more likely to lead to genuine improvements in East-West relations, and less risky to West European security, than force reductions. The Italians, Bel-

³ Brandt's very long-range ambitions for a form of German reunification—a European grouping which could encompass both German states—could eventually lead him, with the right conditions and timing, to favor significant demilitarization of central Europe. But the present and still very delicate stage of *Ostpolitik* is not the moment for any apparent diminution in the military protection provided by the US, or for raising questions about new European security arrangements. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ The United Kingdom became a member of the EC on January 1, 1973.

gians, and Dutch are inclined to greater skepticism about the prospect of troop reductions in central Europe than are the Scandinavians, who tend to regard efforts toward force reductions as another facet of détente which deserves their support. But in general, the smaller states of Western Europe probably view CSCE as an opportunity to develop a community-of-interests atmosphere between themselves and the East European countries. MBFR negotiations, on the other hand, will in the view of most Europeans take place in a forum dominated by the superpowers, and will provide the smaller states relatively little room for maneuver and initiative.

17. Frictions in NATO's preparation for the CSCE and the MBFR talks have not in fact dominated the proceedings, which are going on in a cooperative and constructive atmosphere. Nonetheless, doubts about US policies are contributing to a unique sense of unity among the West Europeans—a conviction that they must join together to protect their interests vis-à-vis both superpowers. We have seen examples of the European Community members striking bargains among themselves in order to enhance European influence in NATO discussions. They now seem united in supporting the French proposal to hold an early round of CSCE at the publicity-attracting ministerial level, rather than following US wishes to have working groups do most of the negotiating before giving the Soviets such a propaganda plum; in wanting to word "freer movement" proposals in such a way as to offend Soviet sensitivities as little as possible; and in insisting on preserving an option to introduce further military-security proposals into the CSCE unless the US and USSR satisfy their wish that military constraints precede troop cuts on the MBFR agenda.

18. The particular bone of US-West European contention is of course always changing, as NATO consultations on CSCE and MBFR talks reach a compromise on one issue and move on to another. But the cases cited above are examples of a basic difference of approach which is likely to remain constant. Indeed, there is some danger of a cumulative effect here, as tensions aroused over one disagreement leave a residue of mistrust which complicates resolution of the next. Already there is some softening of the determination to keep differences within the NATO family. Alliance unity is likely to become even harder to maintain as the CSCE and MBFR talks develop and the Soviets have direct opportunity to play upon Western disagreements. The West Europeans will remain especially alert to any sign that the US is trying to restrain West European concessions to the Soviets in the CSCE context, while Washington makes its own arrangements with Moscow elsewhere.

19. Thus, SALT II will be a shadow over the CSCE and MBFR talks. Since SALT II will deal with offensive systems, and since the Soviets will insist on discussing US weapons located in Europe, NATO's nu-

clear protection by the US could be directly at stake—and in a forum from which the Europeans are excluded. Moreover, decisions on US-Soviet nuclear weaponry may be taken more or less in parallel with conventional force changes, as a result of MBFR, which might make NATO more dependent on early nuclear response. West European governments will give general support to any attempt to stabilize the arms race, both from conviction and because the idea is so popular with their electorates. But they will be sensitive to any suggestion of a ban on first use of nuclear weapons, or to any limitation placed on American nuclear relations with themselves. While these governments realize that their security rests ultimately with the US strategic deterrent, they expect Washington to safeguard that in its own interests; they are far more worried about how SALT II might affect US nuclear weapons in Europe (the Forward-Based Systems) which provide Western Europe's trigger to the strategic forces. A "failure" of SALT II, on the other hand, would be a setback to popular hopes throughout Europe and could somewhat tarnish Washington's recently won peacemaking image.

B. The Consequences of Change in United States Force Levels in Europe

20. There is no question that all the West European governments oppose major US troop withdrawals. The US forces in Europe are essential to existing defense plans and to a meaningful effort by NATO's European members. The present military balance on the Continent is one everyone has grown used to, and which therefore provides a comfortable backdrop to the pursuit of improved relations with the East. None of the governments wants to risk charges from domestic political opponents of having "lost" a measure of US support, or to face the economic choices of how or even whether to do more in their own defense. And all want to avoid complicating the first years of the enlarged European Community with the problems of new West European military efforts—problems which could include defining a proper role for West Germany and, for the Germans themselves, deciding whether a larger military role could be reconciled with pursuit of their objectives in East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe. The general reluctance to borrow trouble has made West European governments willing to pay some price—in well advertised efforts at "burden sharing" in defense projects or even in trade and monetary concessions—to forestall any change in the American military role in Europe.

21. All these governments, nonetheless, anticipate that cuts are coming. Obviously mutual US-Soviet troop reductions would better suit the needs of most, if only because the event would seem less dramatic to popular opinion than unilateral US withdrawals and so would require less response from the governments. For similar reasons, the governments (except possibly France) would want to minimize expres-

sions of distress over mutual or even some unilateral US cuts in order to preserve public confidence that Western defenses remained firm.⁵

22. There is virtually no chance that the West Europeans would significantly increase their own defense spending to make up for cuts in US troop strength on the Continent. Rather, a reduction in super-power forces in central Europe would be seized upon by most West European governments as an excuse for defense cuts of their own—a trend likely in any case in response to domestic economic and political pressures. Even a new act of Soviet repression in Eastern Europe—e.g., along the lines of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia—would probably only slow, not halt, the trend toward giving a lower percentage of national wealth to defense efforts and toward reduction or abolition of compulsory military services. (A sustained Soviet return to a more hostile posture, including sabre rattling directed at the West Europeans themselves, would of course require fundamental rethinking of European, and presumably of US, defense policies.)

23. US reductions certainly would put new life into recurring proposals for cooperative defense efforts among the Europeans, who would wish to make the most of the limited resources available for defense and to increase their own influence within NATO. But all the familiar problems of national rivalries and different defense concepts would remain. Moreover, European military efforts, collectively or singly, still would be plagued by the desire to do just enough to convince the US Congress and electorate that Europe “deserves” continued American protection, but not so much as to give the US an excuse for further reductions in its role in European defense. A decline in European purchases of American weapons—likely to follow US reductions if only because the West German commitment to “offset” purchases would decline—might further spur the development of European defense industries, thus in time putting them in a better position to compete for the arms purchases West European governments now make from the US—purchases which totalled nearly one billion dollars in 1971.

⁵ A precedent of sorts might be found in the European reaction to Washington's 1967 decision to redeploy some 33,000 of its ground and air forces from the Federal Republic to bases in the US, but to continue counting them as M-Day forces committed to NATO. All the “dual-based” forces have been returned periodically to Germany for exercises to demonstrate their continued availability and readiness. But the US Government, citing budgetary reasons, postponed 1972's scheduled exercise to 1973. The Allies objected to the removal of these troops in the first place and were further disturbed by the postponement. But all presented the initial redeployments to their publics as a NATO-agreed move (an “improvement” made possible by advances in airlift capabilities), and all tried to keep press and public attention away from the postponement of the 1972 exercise. [Footnote is in the original.]

24. It is widely thought that American influence on European affairs would drop as a result of US troop reductions. But this question is not so simple. A mechanical one-for-one relation between the number of US troops and the degree of US influence obviously is not the real case. It might even prove that the West Europeans would cling ever more closely to the remaining American military presence, much as a man takes fewer chances with a sole remaining eye. But it could also be that the Europeans, once adjusted to the changed situation, would develop a certain immunity to the prospect of further changes. Indeed, many would read the initial reductions as a precursor of things to come. Especially if the current thawing trend of East-West relations continued as US troops were reduced, the "need" factor in European willingness to accept US guidance or even to coordinate foreign policies with Washington would diminish. Certainly the Europeans would demand a larger voice in any revision of NATO strategy prompted by US troop withdrawals. And their experience in European consultations on MBFR and CSCE issues is likely to result in a greater sense of European "identity" vis-à-vis the US in the whole spectrum of NATO activity.

25. It is not likely, however, that a reduction of US force levels in Europe would *by itself* make the West Europeans significantly more responsive to Soviet wishes than their present desire for East-West rapprochement already inclines them to be. Indeed, insofar as fears of "détente euphoria" proved justified—i.e., to the extent that the Europeans saw in US withdrawals further evidence that the threat of Soviet aggression had declined—fear of suffering military consequences for resisting Soviet pressures would diminish accordingly. Even if Moscow should in the future reverse its current peace offensive and show greater menace to West Europeans, it might be that the latter would by then have adjusted to the new military balance on the Continent. Much of course would depend on how the Europeans perceived the US commitment to their defense at that time.

26. This relatively sanguine outlook is based on a belief that widespread expectation of US troop cuts already has tended to soften a psychological shock from reductions themselves, and on an appreciation of the growing sense of confidence and political identity among the members of the European Community. Both these trends are likely to become stronger, of course, if US reductions are delayed for a time—either through MBFR talks with the Soviets or, if those should prove fruitless, by extensive "consultations" within NATO. The manner in which reductions were undertaken—and especially US sensitivity to at least the appearance of deliberate and thorough consultations with its allies—could prove as significant as the cuts themselves.

27. A US military commitment will remain important to West European confidence for a long time to come. But the significance at-

tached to any given number of US troops as an earnest of that commitment has declined. Rather, European confidence in the US security guarantee rests on a complex mixture of the US military presence itself, wishful thinking, fatalism, and growing sophistication about military strategy. There is widespread belief (or will to believe) that if the Soviets actually launched a military attack against Western Europe, the US would intervene in its own interests—or at least that the Soviets must reckon that Washington *might*—even if the number of American troops in Europe were reduced. Moreover, West European participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group and close observation of the SALT dialogue have made strategic planners in those countries aware of the complexities of measuring nuclear "superiority"; a change in the particular *numerical* balance between the US and the USSR, resulting either from MBFR or from SALT II, would not now alarm them so much as it might once have. (The West Germans, in any case, always have had mixed emotions about the US-designed "flexible response" strategy which envisions large military forces fighting a relatively prolonged conventional or tactical nuclear battle on German territory.)

28. The minimum essential military requirement for retention of West European confidence in NATO security arrangements is an integrated military structure in Germany, with American forces and nuclear weapons to help provide an immediate military response (conventional or nuclear) and to threaten early escalation to strategic nuclear warfare. It even is possible that, *if* the Europeans came to believe that a reduced number of American troops met US domestic requirements and thus was not likely to be further reduced, they might feel more confident than with a higher number which was under constant attack in the US. Just as important as the level of forces itself will be how West Europeans rate the depth of America's commitment to their security and its likely response to any open or incipient threat to their safety—a far more complex calculation than merely counting soldiers and warheads in Germany.

C. Atlantic Economic Relations: Partnership or Rivalry?

29. Economic relations are likely to figure increasingly in that calculation. In fact, the greatest dangers to Atlantic harmony over the next few years probably lie less in military-security differences than in the more arcane areas of trade and monetary policy. America's economic problems had been apparent to Europe's financial managers for some years before August of 1971, but the inauguration of the New Economic Policy was a shock to the average European's conception of the US as an economic giant, and perhaps even to his confidence in US willingness to continue providing military protection. While US-European economic disputes largely disappeared from the headlines with the res-

olution of immediate differences, Washington's tough approach has jolted many European government and business leaders.

30. The community of interests between the US and the West Europeans may run less deep on economic than on security issues. Despite widespread appreciation of recent US efforts toward economic adjustment, some resentment lingers over what many West Europeans see as US efforts to avoid monetary and fiscal discipline at home by shifting the burden for correcting past American economic mistakes onto foreign countries. Nevertheless, everybody wants expanding world trade and acknowledges a mutual dependence on it; and the Europeans are aware of their own stake in a healthy US economy. In principle, they recognize the need for the US to restore overall payments balance, and indeed frequently demand that the US do so.

31. But there are important differences in approach regarding balance of payments objectives and adjustment. As part of its efforts to restore balance of payments equilibrium without sacrificing overseas commitments and investments, the US has said it needs a worldwide surplus on current account, which in turn requires a significantly more favorable international trade balance.⁶ The West European current account (world-wide and with the US) is in surplus, as is their world-wide trade account. But they argue that their bilateral trade with the US is in near balance (until recently in deficit). They are most reluctant to accept a reduction of their large world-wide current account and trade surplus and the consequent loss of stimulus to growth in their domestic economies. They find support for this position in the critical attitude of many toward much of Washington's non-European military spending, and in widespread questioning of US firms' "buying up" European industries.

32. Specific differences over economic policy are aggravated by a belief that the US commitment to European unity is at least wavering. Washington's outspoken criticism of European trade policies has led many to fear that America's own economic troubles are making it less willing or even able to pay a price (i.e., acceptance of the European Community customs union) for the sake of its long-declared goal of European political unity and the eventual (presumed) common economic good. (Here, too, there is some nascent suspicion of at least tacit US-Soviet ganging up on West European interests, as each of the superpowers attacks the Community's tariff barriers. This suspicion was made most explicit in *Le Monde's* portrayal of the signing of the US-Soviet trade pact of October 1972, "on the very eve" of the Euro-

⁶ The current account is comprised primarily of merchandise trade, tourism, transportation, military spending, interest on investments, and unilateral transfers. [Footnote is in the original.]

pean Community Summit.) As a consequence of this suspicion of Washington's motives, even some US proposals which might be acceptable on economic grounds alone will be resisted because—despite any verbal disclaimers—they will be seen as attacks on the European Community principle itself.

33. For instance: there is growing discontent among Europe's economic managers with the inflationary impact of the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Similarly, a reduction in the Community's Common External Tariff (CXT) for industrial goods might help reduce general price pressures. But for the present and very likely for some years to come, the CAP and CXT are the most visible accomplishments of the drive toward European unity. France, which profits materially from both, almost certainly will not contemplate replacement of either, even by accepting a decision in principle to work toward a long-term goal of zero tariffs among all industrialized states. And the economic, political, and indeed emotional commitment of the others to preserving at least as much European integration as the French have allowed insures that none would break with Paris on these issues.

34. The British, who would have most to gain from a reduction in EC food prices, realize that acceptance of the CAP was their price of admission into the Community. While seeking to hold down the inflationary effect of the CAP, they will do nothing to invite charges of attempting to renege on that bargain. Rather, British hopes of recovering some of the costs of the CAP from Community industrial and regional policies will make them reluctant to jeopardize steps toward EC industrial cooperation which could include measures potentially damaging to American interests (preferential government procurement and taxation policies to boost European industries, Community subsidies to distressed industries, etc.) in order to resolve Europe's economic differences with the US.

35. Paris of course will not dictate EC positions to the extent that it did under de Gaulle. The enlarging Community is now a far more complex animal. In any case, Pompidou lacks de Gaulle's awe-inspiring mystique and is more disposed to cooperate with his EC partners and with the US than was his predecessor. In preparation for October's Community Summit, for example, several of the other governments demonstrated their ability to bargain hard with Paris and to win significant concessions about the Community's development. Perhaps more important than the concrete accomplishments of that session, leaders of the other eight emerged from the experience with a greater belief in their ability to bargain with the French, *inter alia* on behalf of a more open Community.

36. But especially in the present climate of uncertainty concerning US policies, Pompidou's emphasis on a "European identity," clearly separate from the US even while closely cooperating with it, has considerable appeal. (An appeal doubtless enhanced by its very vagueness as to specifics.) The most important fact of European economic life is that the EC partners mean far more to each other than the US means to any of them, and the EC as a unit means more to the other (non-member) European economies than does the US.⁷ Worries that protectionist or other "neo-isolationist" tendencies are likely to grow in the US, whatever Europe does, are adding psychological weight to the priority accorded intra-European economic relations, at some cost to those with the US.

37. On political as well as economic grounds, the developing sense of a community of interests vis-à-vis both superpowers, together with the expectation of a reduction in the US military presence in Europe, is strengthening the tendency to give intra-European relations primacy over trans-Atlantic. While several of the EC members (notably the Dutch, Germans, and sometimes the British) will work within Community councils toward some accommodation with US economic wishes, it remains possible for Paris (or indeed any other major EC partner willing to take a firm stand) to veto Community compromise with Washington. Therefore, concessions actually offered to the US are likely to be

⁷ SELECTED COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH THE US AND THE EC OF NINE*

COUNTRY	PERCENT OF EXPORTS TO THE US	PERCENT OF IMPORTS FROM THE US	PERCENT OF EXPORTS TO EC OF NINE	PERCENT OF IMPORTS FROM EC OF NINE
The EC of Nine				
Germany	10	13	47	57
Italy	10	9	49	47
France	6	10	61	59
Belgium-Luxembourg	7	6	73	70
Netherlands	4	10	72	60
United Kingdom	12	11	29	30
Denmark	8	8	42	45
Ireland	11	9	64	50
Remaining EFTA Countries				
Austria	4	4	48	64
Finland	5	5	46	43
Iceland	37	10	31	50
Norway	7	6	54	43
Portugal	10	7	43	46
Sweden	7	8	51	55
Switzerland	9	7	47	69
Other				
Spain	15	16	47	42

*All data are for calendar year 1971.

[Footnote is in the original.]

the lowest common denominator of Community agreement. The weakness of Community institutions and resulting agony of Community decision-making seems certain to add to EC inflexibility in international negotiations.

38. Thus the trade negotiations scheduled to begin this summer will be very difficult. The Community probably would negotiate international commodity agreements for major farm products to help divide non-EC markets with the US, or it might resurrect its proposal of a reciprocal freeze on existing margins of protection afforded grains. In the past the US has found neither proposal satisfactory. In general the Europeans will recite all the barriers put in the way of their agricultural exports to the US, and the large surplus the US already runs in agricultural trade with the EC (\$1.4 billion in 1971).

39. Negotiations on reduction of industrial tariffs or non-tariff barriers also will be difficult. As yet, there is not even agreement on what should constitute a list of non-tariff barriers, and the high tariffs remaining after the Kennedy Round of cuts are on especially sensitive items. Recriminations could become quite nasty, with Europeans responding to American complaints—e.g., the tax break West European exporters receive from the Community's Value Added Tax, or diverse technical and sanitary provisions which hurt US exports—by citing, for example, US insistence on "voluntary" controls on a variety of import categories, or the tax break afforded US exports by the Domestic International Sales Corporation scheme. The Community might propose the adoption of common ceilings on tariffs, a move which France contends would require more lowering of US than of European barriers. But the Europeans are not likely to make trade concessions for anything short of fully reciprocal reductions in US barriers to industrial trade. Even then, it is likely to be difficult to negotiate deep cuts in the Community's Common External Tariff.

40. Negotiating a reform of the international monetary system will be at least as difficult as the trade talks. Recent expressions of US ideas on the problem have done much to improve the atmosphere. And indeed there are some broad areas of consensus—most importantly, on the need for comprehensive reforms which will promote balance of payments equilibrium in the context of a liberal trade and payments system. There also is general agreement on the goals of greater flexibility in exchange rates and increased use of Special Drawings Rights in international finance. But agreement on how to implement even these general principles will be hard to achieve. At present, key differences exist over whether to use "objective" or quantitative criteria to determine the existence of disequilibrium and whether the system should impose disciplines or sanctions to induce adjustments. The relative roles of exchange rate changes, domestic economic policies, and con-

trols on trade and payments in the adjustment process also are in dispute. Another important issue will be whether (as the US has suggested) countries with balance of payments surpluses should accept as much responsibility for adjustments as states in deficit.

41. Another complication of monetary reform negotiations is the interest of West Europeans in achieving monetary union among themselves. Paris is insisting that monetary union be the next goal of the European Community, and indeed a condition to progress on economic harmonization and cooperation desired by its Community partners. The French may try to exploit their partners' desire for further European integration in order to mobilize support for French attacks on the dollar's special role in world trade or on US "economic imperialism" generally.

42. There is one area of US-European economic relations which now looks less fractious than a few years ago. As noted above, Europeans don't think they should make any trade or monetary sacrifices to facilitate US investment in their economies. But governments and business leaders, at least, are becoming less hostile to that investment as such. This is partly due to an appreciation of the jobs and technology which multinational corporations bring to Europe, but even more to the benefit to Europeans of the growing flow of their investment to the US. In 1971, West European private long-term investments in the US—largely portfolio—totaled \$2.5 billion, while those from the US to Western Europe—largely direct—were only \$2.1 billion. Moreover, some of the European investors in the US have considerable political clout at home (e.g., major institutional investors, German automobile and chemical industries, and leading French aluminum, chemical, and pharmaceutical firms). Thus important European opinion-shapers are acquiring a vested interest in preventing mutual restrictions on foreign investment.

43. The European operations of US-based multinational corporations doubtless will remain a public relations irritant. And those corporations may be on the receiving end of some de facto discrimination as the EC intensifies efforts to strengthen its own industries—e.g., through mergers, joint production, research and marketing arrangements, development of a European company law, and technological cooperation arrangements. But the only concerted attack on multinational firms is likely to come from European labor unions, and then the aim will not be to drive the foreigners out but to make them accept coordinated collective bargaining agreements with European-wide labor representatives. One of the few points of agreement among European unions these days is that multinational corporations should not be allowed to cow local unions with threats to switch investments and jobs to other countries.

D. Some Economic Consequences of Failure in Trade and Monetary Negotiations

44. The Europeans for the most part see no urgent need for reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The rapidly rising intra-European trade has reduced Europe's dependence on the US market, and governments have learned to take appropriate domestic actions to moderate the adverse effect of fluctuations in their American trade. As a result, European interest in trade adjustments is less to correct an existing situation than to avoid a general deterioration in US-European relations; this interest will be a powerful deterrent to new measures which might further damage American exports to Western Europe.

45. In time, however, if there were stalemate in trade negotiations, together with continued American balance of payments difficulties, European expectations of protectionist moves on the part of the US would grow. If the US should adopt policies which the Europeans saw as protectionist, the latter could take a variety of national or EC measures to support affected European industries and restrict US imports. In such circumstances we would expect to see direct discrimination against US companies operating in Europe. Early targets would be those US firms producing the sophisticated goods (e.g., aircraft, and some electronics products) which West Europeans want to develop themselves.

46. Europe's economic managers believe that US monetary policies, on the other hand, already have caused serious problems for themselves. In 1971, for example, large dollar outflows resulting from divergencies between US and European interest rates, and subsequently from exchange rate speculation, impaired European monetary policies and aggravated inflationary pressures. US suspension of convertibility in August 1971 has added to the unhappiness of West Europeans saddled with large dollar holdings. If large capital flows should again occur, we would expect further tightening of capital controls by the EC partners and possibly by other European states as well. If a climate of pessimism should develop about the success of international financial negotiations, European capital controls would likely be more pervasive than controls instituted to deal with temporary dollar outflows.

III. The European Community, the United States,
and Third Countries

47. Another subject which presently takes the form of an economic difference between the US and the EC but which has broader political ramifications is the Community's growing network of preferential trade agreements with a wide variety of other nations. The EC now has such arrangements with Spain, Austria, and 29 other (primarily African

and Mediterranean) countries. Following Community enlargement the network will be extended to include six additional European states (Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Portugal) and, probably, some 20 less developed countries of the British Commonwealth. With this proliferation of preferential agreements the discrimination against US exports will increase substantially.

48. The problem took on an overtly political tone last October, when the EC Commission proposed to "harmonize" all the Community's arrangements with Mediterranean countries, and to confirm the principle of reverse preferences for entry of EC industrial products into those countries. US objections brought similar responses from several European governments: reminders of Washington's oft-repeated appeals to the Community to be more outward looking; assertions of the political significance of this form of assistance to less developed countries (a form allegedly less wounding to their pride than one-way trade preferences or aid); and emphasis on the Mediterranean's strategic importance and Europe's recurring hopes of contributing to a resolution of Arab-Israeli hostilities. One important European motive for this plan doubtless is concern about long-range energy supplies—aggravated by a fear that in time the US will become a competitor for Middle Eastern oil rather than a supplier of it—and the resulting desire to develop a special West European position with oil producing states in the Mediterranean.

49. France and Italy are the Community members who face most direct competition from Mediterranean agricultural imports and who thus, on economic grounds alone, might be least enthusiastic about the preferential trade arrangements. But they are also those with strongest hankerings after some sort of political role in the Mediterranean area. France's current Mediterranean offensive has two mutually reinforcing aspects. Within Europe itself, Paris seeks to counter the strength of the northern states (principally Germany) by seeking support in the south—from Rome, through appeals to the common Latin and Catholic heritage, and from Madrid, by trying to bring Spain as close to the Community as France's anti-Franco partners will tolerate. Outside of Europe, France wishes to see at least a slight shift in the Community's foreign policy energies from Atlantic concerns to areas where France traditionally has played a strong role.

50. Washington's protests are causing the Community to look for some way to achieve "reciprocity" in its preferential trade agreements other than the highly controversial reverse-preferences scheme. But the EC is unlikely to agree to a moratorium on further extensions of preferential agreements, in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. Rather it will cite the US failure to give generalized preferences to all LDCs. Most Community members have acknowledged in principle a responsibility to

mitigate the impact of these arrangements on the US. But the US suggestion for doing so—reducing tariff barriers world-wide—will be difficult because of the Community's attachment to the Common External Tariff.

51. Competition for world markets and sources of supply is likely to be a growing source of friction between the US and the West Europeans. An additional problem will be European resistance to suggestions that the EC should help take the heat of Japanese competition off the US by making its own markets more open to Japanese products. But in general, except for principally economic issues such as the Mediterranean problem, US and West European differences in the rest of the world are not likely to greatly complicate relations with one another.

52. On the whole, the states of the EC display a certain indifference to US relations with countries which do not directly affect themselves. This reflects the introspection of the Europeans as they turn with some relief from trying to keep up appearances of a "world role" to concentration on Europe's own development. It also reflects their steadily lessening sense of involvement with the US on a worldwide scale. Except where their own perceived economic and security interests are involved (in terms of resource availability and reduced tensions in Europe and the Mediterranean), the Europeans are not likely to put themselves out. This is not to say that they will seek to undermine the US position economically or politically around the world, but it does mean that they will do very little, and that reluctantly, to help. As a younger generation with fewer memories of World War II and its aftermath comes to positions of power and leadership, West Europeans probably will become even more reluctant to involve themselves with US responsibilities around the world.

IV. European Politics and United States-European Relations

53. Domestic political and economic considerations will of course affect the approach of each of the West European governments to the whole range of trans-Atlantic problems. Willy Brandt emerged from West Germany's 19 November election with a clear popular mandate for his ambitious policy of reconciliation with Eastern Europe and for assertion of a strong German role in West European integration efforts. The voters also firmly endorsed the Free Democrats' decision to throw in their lot with Brandt's Socialists—a decision which had cost the FDP severe internal soul searching and the loyalty of several parliamentary deputies. The renewed coalition's weak point will remain domestic policy, and especially its failure thus far to slow inflation or to deliver on promises of (expensive) internal reform measures. These problems, and differences between the Socialists and the more conservative Free Democrats over how to solve them, could limit the government's flexi-

bility in some international economic negotiations. And shortfalls in achieving domestic ambitions probably would continue to make Brandt eager to direct public attention to his championship of West European unity and especially of Franco-Germany amity. But on the whole, the second Brandt government should be a strong and confident voice for compromise within the European Community and between it and the US.

54. Elsewhere, the picture is less bright. France's Pompidou appears at this writing to have a good chance of winning a new parliamentary majority following legislative elections in the spring of 1973. But that majority likely will be reduced, perhaps making Pompidou's own party more dependent on coalition partners. And Pompidou's confidence recently has been shaken by domestic political setbacks (e.g., charges of government corruption and a small majority in the referendum last April on his European Community policy). Mending fences with hardline Gaullists is likely to take precedence over pursuing his own more cooperative inclinations toward the US, at least until the 1973 election hurdle is passed. Pompidou's subsequent behavior will depend in large part on his reading of the results of that election—his sense of regained personal mandate, or of increased dependence either on centrist coalition partners or on his Gaullist "supporters."

55. Prime Minister Heath still is the underdog in British political polls. At least until the next election, which may not come until 1975, all other concerns will be subordinated to resolving the Ulster problem, to attacking Britain's persistent economic troubles, and to demonstrating to a skeptical electorate the wisdom of his insistence on entering the European Community. The precarious Italian Government is involved in little more than a holding action, trying to resolve or delay highly-charged domestic disputes (over such issues as divorce) and to complete the recovery from Italy's 1971 recession.

56. The Netherlands' 29 November election produced a slight gain for the left but no clear victory for anything; its next government is likely to be either a caretaker arrangement, or another shaky four or five party coalition, or a Catholic-Labor partnership eager to attack defense spending and generally less amenable to US wishes on European security issues. Belgium, whose politics remain a fine balance of Flemish and Walloon tensions, is even now undergoing one of its recurring governmental crises over yet another manifestation of the country's social and economic frictions. Denmark's new government still lacks a parliamentary majority and apparently thinks its leftwing supporters—who opposed EC entry—should be placated by some public show of anti-Americanism. And Norway's Government (which also lacks a parliamentary majority and depends on leftist support for its

survival) must give first priority to salvaging something of an industrial free trade arrangement with the EC, following public rejection in last September's referendum of full membership.

57. These internal problems make each of the European governments highly sensitive to a variety of domestic pressure groups. France's always somewhat protectionist business community and volatile, highly organized farmers; the farm groups so important to West Germany's Free Democrats; the (Walloon) grain producers whom Belgium's (usually Flemish) Agricultural Minister must handle with special care—all will make it difficult for national leaders to make even those "concessions" to the US that might actually be in their own overall economic interests.

58. This problem will be magnified by the present in-between state of the European Community's development. The US will have to treat with national governments which reflect a balance of varying domestic concerns and with a Community which reflects an at least equally delicate balance of national interests. Moreover, national positions on European security or international economic relations will be taken with one eye on a jockeying for position within the European Community. For instance: France's refusal to have anything to do with MBFR talks may in some part be based on French hopes of being in a stronger position vis-à-vis West Germany for new bilateral military arrangements if French troops have not been put into the MBFR negotiating pot. The coincidence of European Community enlargement with widespread European expectation of a changing relationship with the US makes this a particularly tense period of position-staking in the "new" Europe.

59. This sort of jockeying for position must inevitably have consequences for the special US position in West German affairs. Bonn's pursuit of all the trappings of full sovereignty—symbol of the completion of its postwar rehabilitation and its rightful position as a major European power—is complicated by its desire not to alarm its neighbors or to lose American military protection. Thus the West Germans themselves are likely to want to preserve two important limitations on their sovereignty: the integration of their military force into a unified NATO command under American leadership, and the Four Power (US, UK, French, and Soviet) rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole. The latter, in addition to guaranteeing German good behavior, also provides one of the few concrete manifestations now available to back up Bonn's insistence on the "special" nature of the East-West German relationship.

60. Within these limitations, and in part because of them, the West Germans will be increasingly sensitive to questions which touch on their sovereignty. The problem of how to word the statements connected with Germany's expected application for UN entry in order to

reaffirm the Four Power role and yet make the Federal Republic seem fully "sovereign," or how to reaffirm that role in CSCE declarations on respect for the full sovereignty of all states, are current examples of this sensitivity. Recently revived proposals to give West Berlin deputies full voting rights in the Federal parliament, attempts to gain permission for overflight rights to Berlin for West German commercial aircraft, and quiet but persistent efforts to win a greater voice in (perhaps even a veto over) the use of American nuclear weapons located in Germany, are examples of German attempts to expand the FRG's area of authority which would require US consent and which might impinge on US interests.

61. If Pankow should become more forthcoming about inner-German relations, at least some influential Germans would be willing to see Four Power status (including the American role in Berlin) diminished for the sake of improved East-West German relations. Such politically different figures as Brandt's Ambassador to Moscow Ulrich Sahm, and arch-Conservative Franz Josef Strauss, have expressed their belief that East-West German relations, or indeed Bonn's ties with West Berlin, are in the end matters for Germans themselves to decide.

V. Some Broader Judgments

62. In the preceding paragraphs we have discussed separately a number of processes which will take place simultaneously and obviously must affect each other. And we have given considerable attention to specific issues pending between the US and the West Europeans which may not themselves prove of great long-run importance for the future of trans-Atlantic relations. But some common threads can be discerned in these various specific issues which do give pointers to the overall future of America's dealing with Europe.

63. The most important common thread is the emergence of a sense of mutual interest among the West Europeans vis-à-vis the US. This is evident in their approach to international trade and monetary negotiations and to European security and détente, and even in gropings toward EC-wide labor union cooperation. It has become a commonplace of late to say that the steam has largely gone out of the drive toward European unity because its chief purposes—economic recovery and resistance to communism as an internal subversive danger or external military threat—have been accomplished. There now is a possibility that apprehensions about US intentions or policies will provide a new motive force behind European unity. Almost all influential Europeans, in and out of government, want to avoid the development of a confrontation with the US. Even those most committed to European unification would rather accept a slower pace of integration than see the process accelerated by a major falling-out between Europe and the

US. (Even France under Pompidou wants to avoid such a falling-out, despite Pompidou's willingness to take some risks with Atlantic ties for the sake of France's own ambitions to "lead" Europe.) Nonetheless, all recognize the possibility of a real divergence between their interests and those of the US.

64. Barring some dramatic reversal of present US policies—e.g., a clear signal that Washington no longer considered the defense of Europe vital to its own security—a radical and public divergence is not likely over European security issues alone. West European resentment over and suspicion of US-Soviet bilateralism will remain a constant irritant and will encourage the EC partners to take independent initiatives of their own toward Eastern Europe and outside Europe as well. While suspicions can be mitigated and the occasions for expressing them reduced by extensive consultation and compromise within NATO, the problem probably cannot be resolved. It is rooted in the awareness of Europeans that major decisions affecting their own future are, and indeed sometimes must be, taken over their heads. But if the present thaw in East-West relations continues, European pleasure at the result is likely to continue to outweigh their distress at being mostly spectators to the process.

65. West European suspicions of US-Soviet bilateralism, and especially a concern that Washington's chief interest in détente is to secure an early reduction in its own military burden, will make it difficult to win allied assent to many MBFR or CSCE proposals favored by the US. Nonetheless, if decisions are taken which the Europeans have resisted (e.g., on reducing the US conventional or nuclear military presence in Europe), the European governments almost certainly will try to preserve at least the appearance of allied unity and to convince themselves that the US nuclear guarantee remains as firm as ever. Reductions in US force levels in Europe might well result in some lessening of US influence on West European affairs, but troop cuts would not *by themselves* make the West Europeans more responsive to Soviet wishes.

66. Reducing the number of US forces in Western Europe will nonetheless be a very delicate maneuver. The timing, the immediate context of East-West negotiations, the actual size of the reductions, and whether the remaining force levels were related to a plausible strategic doctrine, all would be important elements in the West European reaction to the cuts and subsequent assessment of Washington's interest in Europe's defense. A critical factor would be the manner of consultations within NATO itself, and especially US sensitivity to the need for full and deliberate consideration of allied views before decisions seemed to have been reached.

67. Economic relations present a far less tractable set of problems. Mutual concessions doubtless can be negotiated. But European protec-

tion of perceived national economic interests will make it difficult to achieve a substantial reduction of trade barriers. A burgeoning competition between the US and the European Community partners for markets and sources of supply could tend to divide the world into rival trading blocs. Within Europe itself, a spirit of economic competition could spark a US-EC "race" for presumed East European markets and investment opportunities. This obviously would affect allied approaches to economic items on the CSCE agenda and indeed the whole atmosphere of East-West relations in Europe. There may, in fact, be more potential for damage to US influence in Western Europe, and to European confidence in American military protection, from economic differences than from Soviet efforts, or even from changes in US force levels in Europe.⁸

68. The parallelism of interests and policy which has characterized the postwar period can no longer be taken for granted. It is possible to conceive a "worst case" development of European-American relations—one in which the divergence of interests now evident would engender a process of deterioration in those relations. Economic interest groups, certain political forces, irresponsible journalism, Soviet influence, or even bad luck could combine to precipitate a mood of distrust and suspicion which governments would find it difficult to control. Nothing like this seems likely now and it can even be said that European governments will be concerned to manage conflicts of interest in a temperate manner. But clearly some danger signals are up.

69. Even in the best of circumstances, the 1970s will see a further decline of US influence in European affairs. Nonetheless, the US is likely to remain the chief external influence on Western Europe for as far into the future as it is possible to see. Similarity of social and political systems (and of their problems), a European desire for an effective military link with the US, and a continuing interdependence of the American and European economies, are all long-term bonds which Moscow simply cannot match. More important than the diminution of US influence or growth in that of the Soviets will be the Europeans' ever greater reluctance to be influenced by any outsider. The European Community members are confident, perhaps complacent, in their growing material prosperity and their position as the world's largest trading bloc. Their sense of common cultural identity, even superiority,

⁸ Mr. John J. McGinnis, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury, believes that while unresolved differences over economic policies could cause some Europeans to question whether the US strategic commitment would remain firm, it is more likely they would recognize that the economic basis for Europe's strategic importance to the US—namely Europe's economic power and the US share in Europe's economy—would continue to justify our strategic commitment. [Footnote is in the original.]

is strong. They are beginning to show political as well as economic muscle in dealings with both the US and the USSR, and they feel they are doing so successfully. This restoration of Europe as an independent power and influence, an aim of US policy since 1945, promises to affront some US interests and to complicate US policy. But it need not undermine the essential unity of the West.

87. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 164¹

Washington, December 18, 1972.

NSSM-164: US RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

I. Introduction

Europe, with its enormous human and economic resources, is of vital interest to the US. The US and Europe are inextricably linked through myriad ties that continue to multiply. Thus, the central US objective toward Europe continues to be the development of a stable security system providing a framework for political evolution and for a more equitable economic order.

Part I of this paper examines broad US policy goals against the background of US-Western European relations in transition, discusses the inter-relationships among the major aspects of our policies, and presents alternative approaches to the ordering of US priorities.

Part II summarizes specific issues and goals that should be addressed in the economic, political, security, military, scientific, and technological fields.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-194, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 164. Secret. Prepared in the Department of State. The response paper is over 50 pages long. NSSM 164 is Document 84.

88. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, January 31, 1973, 5:00–5:51 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with Western Europe (NSSM 164)²

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	<i>Treasury</i>
<i>State</i>	Paul Volcker
Kenneth Rush	John Hennessy
William Casey	John Hart
Walter Stoessel	<i>CIEP</i>
Ralph McGuire	Peter Flanagan
<i>Defense</i>	Deane Hinton
Lawrence Eagleburger	<i>NSC</i>
John H. Morse	B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
<i>JCS</i>	Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Adm. Thomas Moorer	William Hyland
B/Gen. Keith Christensen	Robert Hormats
<i>CIA</i>	Robert Livingston
Richard Helms	Jeanne W. Davis
James Hanrahan	

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—CIEP would prepare a list of economic negotiations with European countries and what we wish to accomplish in them.

—Defense would prepare a paper outlining what we want from the Europeans in the security field.

—State would prepare a paper on political issues with the European nations.

—The three papers will be considered at a later meeting and a summary consensus paper prepared.

Mr. Kissinger: Dick (Helms), do you have anything for us?

Mr. Helms briefed from the attached text.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-113, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1972–1973. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

² Document 84.

³ Attached but not printed.

Mr. Kissinger: I wanted to have this meeting partly because of the Heath visit,⁴ although it's really too late to have any real input now. But we've been talking about the "year of Europe," and the President at his press conference⁵ indicated we would be paying increasing attention to Europe, but we haven't had any systematic discussion of what that means, of where we are going, what we are trying to accomplish, and the relationship between various elements of our policy. The State paper has given us three options, but they violated Kissinger's law by putting their preferred option last rather than in the middle.⁶ The three options are the present course, plus and minus. I don't necessarily have any better options. But, I think more integration is not likely, and that a conscious policy of attenuation is not likely either, although that may be the result. Moreover, I see some dilemmas in such things as SALT, MBFR and our trade negotiations. If the Europeans understood what we are doing in MBFR, they would see that it is overwhelmingly in their interest. We have avoided substantive discussions, first while Congress was in session and in a position to put pressure on us for US troop cuts in Europe, and now while neither the US or the Europeans really know what we are talking about. But the Europeans have interpreted this as evidence of a US-Soviet deal. On the question of forward-based systems in SALT, they apparently consider the central strategic balance of less concern to them than the weapons in Europe. Ken Rush made a good point at the Verification Panel meeting yesterday⁷ when he argued that any distinction between our treatment of a threat to the US as opposed to a threat to the European bases would make a bad impression on the Europeans. But we must also take into account the devastating impression made on the President by European behaviour during our bombing of North Vietnam. They argue about making our deterrent credible in Europe, but then are the most vicious and least understanding critics of our comparable actions in Indochina.

⁴ February 5–7, 1973.

⁵ A transcript is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1973*, pp. 53–63. Kissinger discussed the "Year of Europe" in *Years of Upheaval*, pp. 128–194.

⁶ See Document 87. In a January 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt summarized the three options: first, "To move towards closer more integrated relations with Western Europe in all spheres"; second, "To attenuate relationships with Western Europe, allowing institutional ties to deteriorate if necessary," with the "corollary" that "the US could move, or not, toward closer bilateral cooperation with the USSR"; and third, "To pursue the present policy of maintaining security arrangements." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-066, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Europe (NSSM 164) 1/31/73) The full document is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–15, part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976.

⁷ The minutes of the January 30 meeting are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Verification Panel Minutes Originals 1973.

In the economic field, both sides have all the incentives to take maximum positions, but there are apparently no incentives to take reasonable positions. We've been talking in general about a global deal—the need for greater political unity, and defense and economic considerations all in one package—but I've seen nothing which puts this in concrete terms. What do we want from the Europeans? What are we willing to do? Maybe our best argument for economic concessions is that our military commitment depends on their showing some flexibility in economic matters. At least, this is something we should begin to discuss.

Another consideration is that Brezhnev will certainly be coming here and we will certainly be continuing intensive discussions with the Soviets. How can we conduct these discussions without eliciting an unreasonable response from the Europeans?

Mr. Rush: I think it's important to separate the economic considerations from the political and military. The strength of our security system depends on people. If we have a major confrontation on agriculture, for example, with our labor unions involved, there will be great pressure to reduce our commitment to NATO with an inevitable effect on Congress. The national security aspect of these problems is one of mutual benefit. If it were not, neither the US nor the Europeans would stick with it. If we hold our security commitment as hostage to economic considerations, we will end up by carrying the load. From the economic and military standpoint we should take a stronger stand on the Europeans carrying a fair share of the load. This situation began when the US was the only strong partner. Now we're in a bad way both in trade and balance of payments. If the Europeans won't take on their share of the load, they're damn poor partners. But I think we can take a strong stand without needless confrontation.

Mr. Kissinger: But we don't know exactly what we want. I think we would find it a help in the timing of the various negotiations if we understood how they are related to each other and had some idea as to the various packages we would like to propose. Then we could make a reasonable decision as to strategy. What do you think, Peter (Flanigan)?

Mr. Flanigan: I think we're tending to overstate the scenario. On agricultural policy, we're annoyed because the European countries are subsidizing exports to third countries while placing restrictions on us. As long as they have these preferential agreements with the European countries, we want them to get their individual tariffs down to a level where the preferences won't hurt us. There aren't such enormous difficulties in our economic disagreements. The broader problem is what to do about relations with Japan in connection with the multilateral economic discussions. The European say all countries have to respond in the same way. If we do that, we will push Japan away. We have to bring

the Europeans to a more realistic position toward Japan. I think we can develop various positions, and then begin negotiations in March on some sensitive items and demand compensation on some of the tariffs set when the European Community was expanded. We should make it clear that we're considering retaliatory action—create a mind set.

Mr. Kissinger: What sort of a mind set?

Mr. Flanigan: Hopefully, that the US means business on this and that we will respond.

Mr. Kissinger: I have no view on this particular issue. I'm trying to get some game plan so that the issues don't come up one at a time. That way we will be in an endless war with the Europeans on economic issues and won't ever get around to the political and security issues. Can't we get a list of issues? Everyone is saying we should tell Prime Minister Heath that he has to be a leader in this regard. If he says 'what do you want me to do?,' what do we tell him?

Mr. Rush: I think a shotgun approach will accomplish nothing.

Mr. Kissinger: Some actions might be counterproductive.

Mr. Rush: On the question of preferences, take Spain. Those bases are important to us. If we fight them on the preferences, we might lose the bases. It would be counterproductive to go after their preferences if that should happen. Let's examine the facts and see how much these things would really hurt us.

Mr. Flanigan: We haven't had a position on some of these things—we have no position on Spain and Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: I see another problem on preferences. Could it be in our interest that some African countries might be influenced in the direction of political stability by reverse preferences? What would we gain by cutting them loose?

Mr. Flanigan: We're not cutting them loose. We are urging the developed countries to help the less-developed countries, but reverse preferences help the developed countries.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it possible to get a comprehensive balance sheet of what everyone wants from our relations with Europe which goes beyond general statements? Get a list of the economic negotiations and what we want to accomplish? Defense could outline what we want from the Europeans in the security field. State could cover the political field. How do we handle the détente problems—in MBFR and SALT? Let's try to get the Europeans away from the symbolic jousting and get them to the main issue. They should realize that a concrete discussion of MBFR is really their only salvation. The Europeans are still fighting the theory. After we get a look at the real issues, then we can decide our strategy—what we might trade off in the security field for some eco-

conomic benefit. I have difficulty in forming any judgment without a clearer idea of the problems.

Mr. Casey: We need some way to relate them.

Mr. Volcker: The problem with our European relations is not particularly a bilateral US-European problem. Our relative external economic position is very weak. This leads to monetary upset and political frictions. These things are all related and we shouldn't talk about trade-offs. The Europeans would be the first to bitch if the dollar is weak. If we trade a weak dollar for security, that's no trade-off. We have a general US economic problem in the world which has its effect on Europe. There is one strand of opinion in Europe which is nationalistic and opportunistic and would pull the world apart. Another strand is Atlanticist and cooperative. Preferences in part are an example of the expansionist trend with implications far beyond their economic impact with regard to dividing the world. There's no reason they should stop at Africa.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless the Japanese get there first.

Mr. Volcker: Yes. We want to counter this whenever it happens. We should look at preferences in this light. The economic and political issues are all tied up together but not in a way in which you can trade off easily. We should both support liberalizing forces in Europe and strengthen the US position internally or we won't accomplish either.

Mr. Kissinger: In the Azores agreement we got Pompidou to go higher not with an economic argument but with a political argument. We didn't want to settle the economic matters without the French, but we made him aware that if he didn't cooperate France would be isolated.

Mr. Volcker: This was an example of European resistance to something that had to be done in both our interests. That was a good agreement.

Mr. Kissinger: Nothing will happen out of a consciousness of harmony. The best policies will run into objections. But we musn't get adhoc-ed to death in a series of separate negotiations. Present day Europe is not distinguished by great statesmanship. It is being run by a series of party bosses obsessed with domestic politics.

Mr. Volcker: It's important to have an overall strategy and to look for something which is in our common interest. But we can take a tough position on specific issues.

Mr. Kissinger: If we can give the Europeans some theoretical rationale for what we're doing, they'll still resist even if it is in their long-term interests.

Mr. Flanigan: But if we don't make headway at home, we won't get anything from them.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Flanigan) Can you work out a paper on the economic issues? State and Defense should make their own inputs. We didn't discuss Japan. How do we handle that?

Mr. Flanigan: The Europeans are not looking at Japan realistically as it exists now. We should use the Europeans' attitude to make Japan take some steps. We should be sure the Europeans don't tag us as pro-Japanese and vice versa, and should point out to the Europeans that Japanese economic policy is not as bad as they think.

Mr. Kissinger: What would be the practical consequences? What do we want the Europeans to do?

Mr. Flanigan: Not to design restrictions on Japan which pushes them out of their orbit and puts greater pressure on the US economy.

Adm. Moorer: I can see trade-offs within one category—Japanese versus European economic steps—but I don't see trading off economic issues for security.

Mr. Kissinger: We could agree to maintain certain troop levels for a certain time if they make concessions in the economic field.

Mr. Rush: That would be very dangerous. Each side should believe that any steps they take are in the interests of both. We want whole-hearted cooperation on the grounds that NATO is in Europe's best interests. If we make economic sacrifices for the sake of security, we will be undermining these policies.

Mr. Flanigan: But it would be easy to sell troop cuts to the American people if they felt they were being economically discriminated against.

Mr. Rush: That would be counterproductive. If NATO is not seen as indispensable, we would be conceding to the Russians. If we try to trade off economics for security, the Europeans would turn more to the USSR. A trade-off would weaken both economics and security.

Mr. Flanigan: We may not have the option of avoiding this, if Congress and the American people felt they're being had.

Mr. Kissinger: There is no inherent reason why an area with a population of 400 million with a GNP larger than the Soviet Union must be protected by the ground forces of a country 3000 miles away.

Mr. Rush: Unless we can persuade the American people that our troops in Europe are in their interest.

Mr. Kissinger: We're carrying 98% of the strategic load and a heavy load in conventional weapons. The most effective land force in Europe is American. With the strategic deterrent as a key element, you could make a good argument that the Europeans should take a far-sighted view. They cannot drive economic disparity to the point that our heavy defense commitment gives them a comparative advantage.

Mr. Rush: I understand the necessity to get a good economic deal. But it will do the reverse if we trade off NATO for economic advantage. It will undermine both.

Adm. Moorer: If they won't assist us on economic matters we can't maintain our military strength.

Mr. Rush: They should support both in their own interest.

Mr. Kissinger: Great! But it is a political fact that we will be under greater pressure on Europe. We had a majority against us even when the Vietnam groups were backing us in Europe.

Mr. Eagleburger: Is this a threat that we could ever perform on? If they don't perform economically, will we talk troop cuts?

Mr. Rush: The American people wouldn't sanction keeping military strength in Europe by economic concessions, and the Europeans wouldn't buy military strength by economic concessions.

Mr. Kissinger: That's not the way to do it. To maintain the proper psychological climate in the US we would have to keep in mind a broader perspective than immediate economic advantage.

Mr. Flanagan: Even on the economic front, they are not an ally for which we would make big sacrifices on the military front.

Mr. Kissinger: They cannot afford to maintain that we have to be hard as nails in Europe, while they have the right to go on moralistic binges when we take hard positions in other areas.

Mr. Volcker: We have a problem of semantics—we shouldn't talk about concessions.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's get the three papers I asked for and we'll have a meeting where we put them all together. We should be looking for some philosophy for the next three or four years which would encompass economic, defense and arms control policy rather than a series of ad hoc negotiations where we don't know where we're headed.

Mr. Flanagan: We have unity, purpose and thrust in the economic negotiations.

Mr. Volcker: Right. We just haven't articulated it properly.

Mr. Kissinger: We'll get a paper out summing up the consensus.

Canada

89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada¹

Washington, February 7, 1969, 0102Z.

19748. Following is based on uncleared memorandum of conversation, FYI, Noform, subject to change on review.

1. Secretary called in Canadian Ambassador February 6 to express views of USG on way in which GOC intends to proceed in negotiating recognition and establishment relations with Communist Chinese. He asked that our views be conveyed to Ottawa as personal message to ExtAffMin Sharp.

2. Secretary made following main points:

(A) USG appreciated prompt notification of Canadian Cabinet's decision to make contact with Communist Chinese. We understood that the initial approach was being made today, but hoped GOC could avoid a public statement on the substance of the talks.²

(B) Any implicit or explicit GOC acknowledgement of Peking sovereignty over Taiwan would pose serious problem for US. One way for GOC to deal with difficulty, Secretary added, would be to make formal denial of any such intent. Perhaps GOC would find it possible to make such a statement in reply to a question. It would be most helpful if they could do so.

(C) The Secretary asked if Canada had yet come to decision on Important Question matter at UN.³ This was a subject which Peking might raise in course of its negotiations with GOC. Secretary saw no need for any country to change its position on IQ; China had indicated it did not want to belong to UN and in fact wanted no part of organization. In

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by J.L. Carson (EUR/CAN), cleared in S/S, and approved in EA. Also sent to Taipei and Tokyo and repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Seoul, Wellington, Luxembourg, Stockholm, Paris, Rome, Hong Kong, the Mission to the EC, and USUN. A copy was included in the President's daily briefing for February 8. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Briefing)

² Initial notification took place in the course of a Ritchie-Brown conversation on January 31. A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM.

³ Items placed before the U.N. General Assembly and designated as "Important Questions" required a two-thirds vote for passage. In 1961, the United States co-sponsored a resolution making the issue of Chinese representation an Important Question. (U.N. Res. 1668 (XVI) adopted December 15, 1961)

light of foregoing, it seems curious other countries should insist on inviting Red China in.

Secretary emphasized it would be serious blow to UN if China, in these circumstances, became a member. He feared survival of whole organization might be at stake. If Red China changed its attitudes toward UN, it would be another matter.

Secretary noted that US financed UN in large part, that organization had fallen short of everyone's hopes in effectiveness, and that American people might reject idea of UN if Peking now taken in.

Since UN question might arise in GOC's negotiations with Peking, Secretary wanted to make sure Canada understood our views.

(D) Secretary asked why GOC could not in negotiations with Peking take the position it wanted to establish relations with Red Chinese but also wanted to maintain relations with GRC. Canadian action, otherwise, appeared to be matter of changing sides as there had been no change in factual situation.

(E) Ambassador Brown suggested Canadians were sometimes modest about the effect of their actions on others. Secretary agreed and said Canadian move would have major impact on world opinion.

(F) Ambassador Brown also expressed hope, which Secretary confirmed, that GOC would not yield on its relations with GRC too easily (1) without getting anything out of it for Canada, and (2) with bad effect on negotiations of others with Peking. The harder Canada played to get on issue, the better it would be for all.

3. Ambassador Ritchie in reply commented as follows:

(A) Canadian Ambassador in Stockholm had today been in touch with ChiCom colleague to arrange for talk February 8. At that meeting, Canadians did not plan to get into substance, but hoped simply to arrange the where and when for negotiations.

(B) ExtAffMin Sharp, who had been under pressure on subject, would make statement in Commons February 10 announcing contact had been made with Red Chinese with view to initiating talks. He would make every effort avoid question of future of Taiwan.

(C) Ritchie made distinction between explicit and implicit GOC support for Peking's claim to Taiwan. GOC would not make explicit statement of support, but when a country recognizes one political body as the "Government of China," it would be hard to recognize another making same claim. Canadians understood that recognition of Peking would mean break with Taiwan but he reiterated that does not imply acceptance of Red China's sovereignty over Taiwan.

(D) Insofar as possible, GOC would protect position of Taiwan and would maintain relations with it to degree possible. GOC had no intention to hurt GRC needlessly.

(E) Ministers have not considered possible Canadian position on UN representation but there would be problem of consistency. GOC would look at UN question in light its discussions with Peking.

(F) Ritchie could see US would want Canada to continue support on IQ. Regardless of IQ, GOC might feel it would have to vote for at least first part of “Albanian-type” resolution.⁴ (Ambassador Brown interjected to say expulsion of the GRC is the crucial part on this matter.) Ritchie emphasized once more that GOC had not yet arrived at decision on UN question. He said Canadians would be talking to US before issue again arises.

(G) Ritchie had reported to Ottawa concern expressed earlier by US on yielding relations with GRC too easily. He was sure GOC not going to volunteer or give up easily on relinquishing relations with Taiwan, but Canada had to face up to inevitability of diplomatic break with GRC at some point. Could not be serious in negotiations with Peking unless that fact accepted.

(H) Canada was making new move to recognize authority of those really in control of Mainland China. Only change in situation came as result of Canadian initiative to recognize fact and law of Red Chinese control. Changed attitude of GOC had obvious implications for Taiwan, though GOC would salvage what it could of ties with Taiwan. In time, Taiwan might come to have a diplomatic status of its own, perhaps if and when US got around to recognizing Peking.

(I) Canada had considered move for long time. GOC did not want Americans to think Canada siding with China or that US should follow Canadian lead. Canadian situation completely different, for example, Canada had been trading with China for a long time. Many Canadians thought it illogical to have trade and not relations, that is, not recognize what is there. Decision to move was not unfriendly act toward US but was being done for Canadian reasons.

4. In closing, Secretary again expressed appreciation to GOC for keeping us informed. Canadian initiative was a difficult one for us, but that did not change fact we were still friends. Secretary noted that the President was personally concerned over cascading effect Canadian action might have, and feared ultimate effect on UN.

5. It was agreed that if queried by press, neither side would say Ritchie had been called in solely to discuss Chinese issue, but rather had seen Secretary for general discussion. US would at some point have to say it had made its concern known to GOC. Furthermore, if

⁴ Since 1963, the Albanian Delegation to the United Nations had annually introduced a resolution that would expel the Republic of China and seat the People's Republic of China in its place.

Sharp queried along these lines in Commons February 10, he would reply US had made views known to Canada.

6. In brief subsequent conversation with Ambassador Brown, Ritchie said he would make clear to Ottawa US concern on IQ matter, and reiterated GOC would not formally acknowledge Peking claim to Formosa. He also repeated that public announcements of contacts with Chinese would so far as possible avoid issue of status of Taiwan.

7. For Taipei and Tokyo—Secretary probably will provide general outline of his conversation with Ritchie to Chinese Ambassador Chow who, at his request, will meet with Secretary morning February 7 to inform US of an action GRC plans take around February 10. Embassies Taipei and Tokyo authorized inform MOFA and FonOff on strictly confidential basis of major points in Secretary's presentation (para 2 above).⁵

8. Info addressees—until GOC makes public announcement of initial contact, you requested continue hold in confidence details of GOC decision and substance Secretary's presentation USG views. Instructions on discussing these subjects with host governments after February 10 under preparation.

Rogers

⁵ In telegram 20761 to Taipei, February 8, the Department of State reported that during his meeting with Rogers, the Chinese Ambassador had urged the United States to act to prevent Canadian recognition. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 CHICOM)

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 24, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Anti-ballistic Missiles

PARTICIPANTS*United States*

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Mosbacher
Ambassador Linder
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Scott
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Carson (reporter)

Canada

The Prime Minister
Minister Sharp
Ambassador Ritchie
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Cadieux
Mr. Warren
Mr. Howland
Mr. Lalonde
Mr. Langley
Mr. Crowe
Mr. LeBlanc
Mr. Head
Mr. Vennat

In response to the Prime Minister's inquiry about the ABM program, the President suggested it would be useful for Mr. Packard of the Defense Department to give the Prime Minister a full briefing during his visit to Washington.² A comprehensive presentation of the problem would require no more than an hour. It would show precisely what the safeguard system would accomplish.

In view of its defensive character, the Prime Minister thought the system could not be considered provocative. The President agreed. It had no relationship to a first strike capability. Furthermore, not even the original Sentinel system would have been effective against a massive attack from the Soviet Union, one of the world's two major nuclear powers.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted by J.L. Carson (EUR/CAN). The meeting took place in the White House. A note on the first page reads, "Part two of five." Memoranda of other portions of the conversation dealing with security issues are *ibid*. Also see Document 91. Trudeau visited Washington March 24–25. For texts of public statements by the President and Prime Minister, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 237–238 and 239–243.

² The briefing took place at 4 p.m. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I.

What the safeguard program *would* do, the President continued, was protect our second strike capability, particularly the Minuteman missiles that were the core of it. The Minuteman sites had become increasingly vulnerable in view of the progress made by the Soviet Union in perfecting the accuracy of the SS9. Obviously, in these circumstances, the United States had to maintain the credibility of its second strike capability.

At the same time, safeguard would provide area defense against attack by a non-major nuclear power such as China. If area defense was irrelevant vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it was nevertheless credible against the Chinese. As an aside, the President added that the Soviets had recently redirected their detector radar to cover both the United States and China.

The President observed that General Eisenhower and the Prime Minister had asked him the same question about ABM's: would the system work? The Soviet Union already had 65 to 70 anti-ballistic missile sites deployed; they apparently believe an ABM system is feasible. In our case, we had to ask the experts. Our scientists thought that—given the limited purposes of the program—it was technically feasible.

The Secretary said he was convinced that the President's decision on ABM's was sound. Abstract research could carry us only so far. If we had not taken the limited step the President had ordered, we might soon find ourselves out of the missile defense business. Obviously, we would then be in a terrible position if the Soviets developed an effective missile defense. The President's decision was the minimum one necessary to keep us in the field. And we had to go ahead now. A delay of six months in making a decision might cost two years delay in actual deployment.

Furthermore, we know the system will work, the Secretary concluded. Except for the nuclear warheads, it had already been tested.

The President noted there was another aspect to the revision of the proposed Sentinel system. If we had gone ahead—at enormous cost—with protection for our own cities, our Canadian and European allies might well have wondered if the United States was only providing for its own defense.

It was agreed that Mr. Packard would brief the Prime Minister on technical aspects of the safeguard system during the meeting with members of the Cabinet March 25. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the briefing, noting that it would be politically important to the Canadians to say on their return to Canada that they had discussed ABM's in detail during their visit to Washington.

The conversation then turned to a discussion of the effect of safeguard on strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.³

³ Trudeau returned to the issue of the ABM system during a March 25 discussion with Rogers and Laird and, noting that much of the projected interception would take place over Canada, requested that the United States consult with Canada regarding the location of launch sites. Laird reassured Trudeau that the impact of high atmospheric explosions on the earth would be limited. (Ibid.)

91. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 24, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Trade Problems

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Mosbacher
Ambassador Linder
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Scott
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Carson

Canada

The Prime Minister
Minister Sharp
Ambassador Ritchie
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Cadieux
Mr. Warren
Mr. Howland
Mr. Lalonde
Mr. Langley
Mr. Crowe
Mr. LeBlanc
Mr. Head
Mr. Vennat

The Prime Minister inquired about a meeting of the Joint Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Policy. It was quickly concluded that the Committee should meet as soon as possible, hopefully before summer.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by J.L. Carson (EUR/CAN). The meeting took place in the White House. A note on the first page reads, "Part five of five." See also Document 90. Memoranda of conversation between senior administration and Canadian officials on trade issues, March 25, are *ibid*.

² The Committee met in Washington June 25–26. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972,

Noting the protectionist movement in the United States, the President said it would be the policy of his administration to promote freer trade and to resist protectionist pressures.

Minister Sharp inquired whether that would be enough. If one had no positive policy on freer trade, the protectionists would force a slide in their direction. The President agreed, saying a forward policy might be required simply in order not to lose ground.

The Prime Minister suggested that the group of advisors would be interested in the comments the President had made about trade between industrialized countries. The President explained that he had found it useful—in refuting the argument that the U.S. was trying to keep people in subjection in the underdeveloped world as a means of extracting trading advantages—to call attention to the fact that the industrialized nations were the world’s major trading partners. It was to the advantage of all, therefore, for the underdeveloped countries to become industrialized.

Document 392. The participants also discussed Canadian forces in NATO; see Document 95.

92. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Final Meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau

You are scheduled to have a final conversation with Trudeau at 11:30 a.m. today (Tuesday); you and he will then make public comments on the results of the visit.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 912, VIP Visits, Trudeau, Vol. 1. Secret. Sent for action.

² No record of the conversation was found. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the two leaders met privately in the Oval Office from 11:30 a.m. to 12:11 p.m. Kissinger joined the discussion from 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. Immediately thereafter Trudeau and Nixon went to the Rose Garden to deliver statements to the press. (Ibid., White House Central Files) For the texts of statements by the President and Prime Minister, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 242–243.

Members of the State Department and the Canadian Delegation have been working overnight on *points that you and the Prime Minister would make in public comments*. These should be ready for your and the Prime Minister's review when you meet at 11:30. Included would be

- a reference to past and future intensive US-Canadian consultations of which this visit was a successful example;

- a reference to your discussions on the ABM; (CAUTION: Your public comment should not in any way seem to prejudge Canada's final judgment on the ABM, which Trudeau has not yet announced.)

- agreement on an early meeting of senior experts on oil problems;
- agreement to reach an understanding among wheat producing states;

- agreement on an early meeting of the US-Canadian Cabinet Committee.

If you have accepted an invitation to Canada you will wish to announce that fact.

In addition, you will wish to make the general point that the frank, productive and intensive talks of the last day and a half confirmed anew the community of objectives and values shared by our two countries.

In your private conversation you may wish to probe Trudeau further on the probable outcome of the Canadian Defense Review. Members of his entourage have expressed concern that he is still flirting with reducing Canada's role in NATO;³ they believe some low key remarks by you in private might be beneficial. In particular you may wish to say that

- your trip convinced you of the continued vitality of NATO;
- your examination of the common threat that still faces us has convinced you of the continued need of the alliance;

- you consider full Canadian participation in NATO one of the alliance's great strengths and mutually reinforcing with our own participation;

- you are convinced that the era of negotiation we are entering requires the maintenance of our joint strength and you envisage NATO as playing a key role through consultation and mutual exchange of information.

³ A March 17 report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (REU-18) noted that a full review of Canada's defense positions, ordered by Trudeau in April 1968, would be ready for Cabinet discussion near the time of his Washington visit. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I)

93. **Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State¹**

Ottawa, April 24, 1969, 0040Z.

566. Subject: Ottawa visit of General Lemnitzer.

1. We understand General Lemnitzer scheduled arrival Ottawa late Monday, April 28, for approximately 24-hour farewell visit. Tentative schedule includes calls morning April 29 on Foreign and Defense Ministers and possibly on PriMin Trudeau. We understand General Lemnitzer scheduled meet with press on afternoon April 29.

2. We are not clear to what extent General Lemnitzer briefed on current Canadian debate over Trudeau decision to reduce Canadian NATO forces in Europe, nor how knowledgeable he may be about 1963 Ottawa press conference experience of one of his predecessors, General Norstad. Department may wish ensure following and perhaps additional background is provided him before his arrival in Ottawa.²

3. When making his farewell visit to Ottawa on Jan. 3, 1963, General Norstad faced persistent questioning by Canadian newsmen about fact that while Canadian ground and air forces in Europe were then equipped with weapon systems which useless without nuclear warheads, nevertheless GOC had not concluded necessary stockpile agreements. Questioning led him to point out, albeit politely, that Canada was reneging on its commitments to Allies.

4. Norstad comments were significant factor in heating up nuclear weapons controversy in Canada, leading to US press statement of Jan. 30 and culminating in fall of Diefenbaker government.³

5. General Lemnitzer will arrive at time when Trudeau government, while it has comfortable majority unlike Diefenbaker government of 1963, is under opposition attack in Canada as consequence PriMin Trudeau's April 3 announcement of intention to remain in NATO but to reduce Canadian forces in Europe.⁴ Government today is in fact in middle of two-day Parliamentary debate about that announcement.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² In telegram 64382 to Ottawa, April 25, the Department of State replied that it had forwarded telegram 566 from Ottawa to Lemnitzer. (Ibid.)

³ For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, Documents 443–446.

⁴ Trudeau made the announcement in a press conference. A summary of the Canadian proposals was forwarded to Kissinger in a May 26 memorandum from the Department of State. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I)

6. Department should also be aware of article written in 1963 about General Norstad's visit by then budding young political writer named Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Following is direct quote: Quote Do you think I dramatize it? How do you think politics work? Do you think General Norstad, former Supreme Commander Allied Forces in Europe, came to Ottawa on January 3 as a tourist to tell the Canadian Government publicly to respect its agreements? Do you think it's by chance that Mr. Pearson was able to rely on the authority of General Norstad in his speech on January 12? Do you think the State Department inadvertently gave newspapers the press release on January 30 which reinforced Mr. Pearson's position and called Mr. Diefenbaker a liar? Do you think it's by accident that this communiqué gave the opposition leader the arguments with which he larded his speech to Parliament on January 31? You think it is coincidental that this led to events which ended in the fall of the government on February 5? Unquote.

7. It should also be borne in mind that at time of European visit last month of Canadian House of Commons Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, Canadian newspapers carried reports of briefings given Canadian parliamentarians by SHAPE officials arguing for continued Canadian contribution to NATO forces in Europe.

8. In questioning General Lemnitzer Canadian newsmen will, of course, tend to regard him only as American General and not as international servant and may seek to elicit from him statements critical of Trudeau government and at seeming variance with recent public comment by Secretary Rogers.

Linder

94. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, May 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

State Department Démarche on Canadian Defense Plan

The attached cable, Tab A,² for your clearance states that Richardson will call in the Canadian Ambassador to object in strong terms to the Canadian reduction plans in NATO. Similar instructions are proposed for the Embassy use with the Foreign Minister in Ottawa.

For several reasons, I think this is an unwise move, before the Defense Ministers' meeting is completed.

—Cadieux's use of "non-negotiable" was privately conveyed to Laird, and is not necessarily the last word.³ If we make a major issue of it now, the Canadian position undoubtedly will stiffen;

—the line proposed by State contains a veiled threat that unless the Canadians change their position we may take some troops out of Europe. Once this becomes known, as it will, all the Europeans will shudder;

—finally, in view of the Canadian attitude on the ABM, we will be asking for major and unwanted trouble if we stress that Canadian decision is inconsistent with the "new era of consultation" initiated at the time of the Trudeau meeting with the President.

In short, if we escalate our language and force a confrontation *now* we will probably magnify the consequences of the Canadian decision out of all proportion. There is still room for negotiation, as hinted by Cadieux. We should not slam the door.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the first page reads: "Today." This memorandum was Sonnenfeldt's second effort to soften the tone of official U.S. response to the Canadian decision to reduce its military forces in NATO. In a May 27 memorandum to Kissinger, following a presentation by Cadieux to Laird, Sonnenfeldt noted Laird's strong negative response and proposed that Kissinger "call the Secretary [Rogers] in Brussels and urge him to go easy on the Canadian presentation, and not to encourage others in their criticism" in order to keep open channels of negotiation. The memorandum was marked "disapproved" with the notation, "HAK says Laird's ok on this." (Ibid.)

² Not printed. There is no indication the telegram was approved or sent.

³ The May 26 Laird-Cadieux conversation was summarized in Sonnenfeldt's May 27 memorandum.

Recommendation: That you call Richardson and discourage him from calling in the Canadian Ambassador or making any démarche in Ottawa.⁴

If you do not agree with the foregoing, at least we should preserve some flexibility by drastically toning down the proposed language in the attached cable.

⁴ A handwritten note reads: "HAK discussed with Richardson on May 29." No record of this conversation was found.

95. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 25, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.-Canadian Delegations, 12th Meeting, Joint Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs

SPOKESMEN

U.S.
The Secretary

Canada
Minister Sharp

SUBJECT

International Situation Review: Canadian NATO Forces

The conversation turned to NATO's military structure.

The Secretary said we had been interested, indeed more than interested, in Canada's proposal to reduce its troops in Europe. We were impressed not only by the quality of the Canadian forces in Europe, they were also important as a symbol of the trans-Atlantic alliance. The Canadian action might suggest to some in the Congress that the United States ought to pursue a policy along the same lines. The prospects of a snowball were not encouraging here or elsewhere in the alliance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Confidential; Limdis. Approved in S on July 22. Handwritten notes on the first page read: "Hold for HAK AH [Alexander Haig]" and "Also sent to S[onnen]feldt—FYI." The original is labeled: "Part Five of Eight." Copies of the other memoranda for the record are *ibid.*; annotation on one of these memoranda indicates that it was drafted by Carson.

We recognized that Canada had a special problem in its domestic situation; we nevertheless looked forward to consultations on the troop reduction proposal.

Sharp said Canada accepted the need to discuss its role in NATO with its allies. It should be clear, however, that Canada had made some fundamental decisions; namely, to remain in NATO and be a part of it. The Canadians had considered neutrality or an alliance with the United States alone, but had rejected both possibilities. Canada had a stake in Europe's security. It therefore intended to stay in NATO and to keep troops in Europe in support of that commitment.

As to Canada's role in the alliance, the present one was not appropriate, and something more compatible with Canada's responsibilities in North America and elsewhere in the world had to be devised. The armored brigade and the air units in Germany, for example, did not fit with Canada's other deployments. The Canadians had decided to change their role, though they continued to believe they could play a strong one. Unless they could contribute constructively to the alliance, they would withdraw. Canada understood the importance of consultation, but its basic position was "non-negotiable." Canada had to have the right to decide on its role. Within that context, it was prepared to discuss the timing of the cuts and, within limits, the extent of the cuts.

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State¹

Ottawa, July 7, 1969, 2122Z.

981. Subj: Canadian force reductions. Ref: State 110808.²

1. *Summary.* Embassy favors line of NATO response outlined para 3a of USNATO 3099,³ although we doubt that GOC will buy it or anything very close to it, since basic decision to reduce Canadian forces in Europe is, as Sharp put it in recent joint cabinet meeting in Washington,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² Dated July 7. It requested comment on telegrams 3094, 3095, and 3099 from USNATO containing SACEUR's proposals on Canadian force reductions. (Ibid.)

³ Dated July 7. It reported on discussions within the NAC on a response to Canada. Paragraph 3a proposed accepting Lemnitzer's alternate proposals for such a response. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 NATO)

“not negotiable”.⁴ (Sharp did say numbers and timing of phased reduction were flexible). SACEUR proposal has advantage of recognizing to some extent need to adjust to Canadian political situation. Nevertheless, I believe SACEUR proposal will not be acceptable to GOC. But burden should be on Canadians to make further counter-proposal.

2. As expressed in Ottawa 830,⁵ Embassy believes that PriMin Trudeau, with full support of most influential members his Cabinet, has taken firm decision to reduce forces in Europe and de-emphasize Canadian military role in NATO. Considerations supporting this decision include (a) budgetary bind and demands for substantial new federal funds for urgent domestic programs in attempt rectify Canada’s economic and cultural disparities, (b) attendant deep and genuine concern about discontent in Quebec, (c) anti-militarist direction of Cabinet which prefers contribution to world peacemaking in form peacekeeping and foreign aid, (d) collateral stress on de-escalation, disarmament, and détente, (e) domestic political need or promise to challenge “conventional wisdoms” and fulfill campaign posture for innovation, and (f) built-in neglect (long pre-dating Trudeau) of any constructive or far-sighted capital equipment plan for military establishment.

3. Any effort by Allies or by Brosio simply to tell GOC what it proposes to do is “unacceptable” will provoke little more than resentment and could freeze earlier GOC proposal as maximum offer. To do so would also run some risk of engendering sufficient resentment to strengthen hand for long term future of those in Cabinet who wish to remove Canadian military presence from Europe entirely.

4. If, however, what is meant by “unacceptable” is that it is militarily unacceptable that Alliance forward line be left with undefended gap, then GOC might regard this as reasonable argument and be at least to some extent responsive to appeals to adjust size and timing of reduction to efforts of Allies to devise means of filling the gap.

5. These considerations make it unlikely Trudeau will accept Lemnitzer proposal, though it is worth trying and should be tried, partly because Canadians expect some such counter-proposal. Lemnitzer proposal runs some risk of making GOC more inflexible, but this is not foregone, and it just might strengthen hands of those in Canadian civil and military bureaucracy who continue have objections to reduction plan. In this connection, we know that the Canadian DND task group is having trouble in formulating “new look” for Canadian military forces which would reconcile reductions with future professionalism in Cana-

⁴ See Document 95.

⁵ Dated June 9. It suggested alternative diplomatic approaches that NATO member states might employ in an effort to win modification of Canada’s decision to reduce its NATO commitment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 NATO)

dian military establishment, particularly in heavier weapons which will be eliminated under present Canadian proposal. SACEUR proposal would meet this problem and is therefore likely to appeal to the military planners here.

6. Difficulty with other three lines of response (para 3b, c, and d, USNATO 3099)⁶ is that they propose status quo or something close to it (d), which Trudeau has clearly and publicly ruled out, and that changes in Canadian forces and roles are made contingent upon the prior coming into being of some substitute forces to be developed by somebody else at some unspecified time in the future (b and c), a proposition which would be equally unacceptable to the GOC.

7. Canadian position is that any shortfall in Canadian forces or contribution is Alliance problem and that European Allies have greater obligation than GOC to improve defense on what after all is their territory. This is a point of view which the Canadian Cabinet has found very persuasive. Arguments about the collectivity of collective security are met by counter-argument that Canada's participation in North American continental security system is contribution to mutual defense and will be increased (in way as yet unspecified). Privately to themselves, Trudeau and his associates are also saying, with conviction, that unless they hold Canada together they will certainly not be able to make any contribution whatsoever to Western security. This is a deep and major concern which adds greatly to the pressure to divert funds from the military budget to other social and economic programs.

8. Though reasonable counter-proposal, SACEUR's alternative plan has, as indicated above, certain features which GOC will find unattractive, and probably unacceptable: (a) size of force proposed is 2-3000 more in Europe than envisaged, (b) land force mix assumes follow-on replacement of some present, (c) air force figure has double the strength contemplated by GOC and assumes continuation Canadian nuclear strike role and 104 aircraft for which Canadians have programmed no replacement.

9. Still, SACEUR proposal can be put as reasonable and practical one, with preamble made to Canadians that Allies are distressed at any reduction and regard any such change as mistake which will be detrimental to peace and Western security.

10. To recap points made Ottawa 830, there may be some give in GOC figures of 3500 and somewhat more in role and timing, though stress on compatibility of forces at home and abroad will no doubt mean no purchase of expensive and heavy equipment. Retention of

⁶ These paragraphs of the telegram outlined alternative scenarios for a response to Canada.

104's nuclear capability is probably negotiable for limited and specified period of time.

11. On specific item of aircraft carrier *Bonaventure*, Embassy agrees with Henderson suggestion that Canadians be urged to retain it in active service until substitute force of helicopter-equipped destroyers is available to NATO. Some elements of GOC place more weight on Canadian ASW role—although Trudeau personally is known to have strong reservations about it. There is no firm Canadian plan to get out of ASW completely, the Eastern sea frontier is more “continental” and less “European”, and the “substitute” force is a Canadian one already programmed. Despite these considerations, budgetary pressures and recent public controversy over expensive overhaul of *Bonaventure* will, in the eyes of the Cabinet, argue against its retention, and we do not wish leave impression we think GOC will easily be persuaded to retain *Bonaventure* in service.⁷

Linder

⁷ In telegram 113695 to USNATO (repeated to Ottawa), July 10, the Department of State expressed its desire to engage in discussions with Canada that would focus on specific military issues and agreed that the United States should avoid any confrontation with the Canadians. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I)

97. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Message from Prime Minister Trudeau on Wheat

Prime Minister Trudeau has sent you a message expressing concern about the possible collapse of the agreed pricing system in the international wheat market. He asks for continued cooperation between the U.S. and Canada on this issue, and states that Canada intends to hold its present price line, providing others do the same, pending an as-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action.

assessment of the situation by the wheat exporters at the meeting of officials proposed for August 1. (Tab A)²

The Canadians are extremely jumpy due to the massive attacks on Trudeau from Canadian farm elements last week. It is conceivable that Trudeau's message is at least partly for possible future public use by the Canadian Government to demonstrate that it made every effort to avoid a price war.

The present U.S. position is fully responsive to the Canadian request. We plan no further price cuts prior to the meeting of officials in London to which Trudeau referred. We are ready to attend the meeting on August 1, as proposed by Canada and have already told them so. Finally, we are urging all other wheat exporters to attend the meeting on that date.

The major problem is that the EEC may boycott the London meeting and cut its export prices for wheat unilaterally. We have not yet developed a position to meet that possibility but we have set the machinery in motion to work out contingency plans immediately. The agricultural ministers of the community are meeting in Brussels July 28–30 and we should know by Tuesday or Wednesday³ what the community plans to do.

*Recommendation:*⁴

I recommend no response to Trudeau at this time. We have already assured the Canadians of our full support for their proposal. The situation will be moving extremely fast over the next few days so any response could quickly be overtaken by events.

² Dated July 26; not printed.

³ July 29 or 30.

⁴ No indication of a Presidential decision is marked. In a September 26 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten noted that a reply to the Trudeau letter had been prepared but not sent and suggested that its value was largely overtaken by events. A note in Kissinger's hand reads: "OK—No reply HAK, 10–2–69." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I)

98. Memorandum of Conversation¹

San Clemente, August 20, 1969, 11:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon and Departing Ambassadors to Australia, Barbados, Canada, Iceland, Peru and Romania

PARTICIPANTS

President Richard Nixon
Ambassador Walter L. Rice, Australia
Ambassador Eileen Donovan, Barbados
Ambassador Adolph W. Schmidt, Canada
Ambassador Luther I. Replogle, Iceland
Ambassador Taylor G. Belcher, Peru
Ambassador Leonard C. Meeker, Romania
Colonel Alexander M. Haig, NSC
Mr. Nicholas Ruwe (Made introductions and departed during substantive discussions)

After introductions, the President invited the newly appointed Ambassadors to sit down in his office and proceeded to review the situation in each of the countries to which the Ambassadors have been designated.

Canada

The President stated that the Ambassadorial challenge in Canada was an exciting one at this point in the history of that country. He noted that the Canadians, although fully cognizant of their economic and industrial dependence upon the United States, are nevertheless increasingly manifesting a degree of independence not heretofore demonstrated. He suggested that our Ambassador would have to be particularly careful about Canadian-NATO relationships emphasizing that Canada's actions and attitudes could have an influence on the attitudes of the other members of the Alliance. Thus it became important for the United States to attempt to influence Canada's attitudes toward NATO. The President noted that Prime Minister Trudeau might present special problems to the Ambassador because he was at times erratic with many of the characteristics so frequently associated with intellectuals. The President encouraged Ambassador Schmidt to establish effective relationships with levels of the Canadian Government just

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I. Secret. The meeting took place in the President's office in the Western White House. An attached August 26 note indicates Haig was the drafting officer.

below the Prime Minister to increase his own assets for influencing the Prime Minister.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Canada.]

² The President announced Ambassador Adolph Schmidt's appointment on July 8. Schmidt presented his credentials on September 11. Regarding the choice of Linder's successor, see *Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*, March 12, 1969.

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 24, 1969, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Bilateral Talk with Canadian Minister for External Affairs—
Canadian Meeting with Chinese Communists

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Canadian</i>
The Secretary	Min for Ext Affairs Sharp
Ambassador Yost	U/Secy Cadieux
Mr. Thompson, SecDel	Amb. Beaulne
	Mr. McGill

Mr. Sharp reported briefly on the recent meeting in Stockholm between Canadian Ambassador Meagher and Chinese Communist diplomats. Sharp said that from the time of the first meeting with the Chinese on possible Canadian recognition of the CPR, the Taiwan issue was the key. The Chinese were asking the Canadians to (a) break off relations with the government on Taiwan, (b) support mainland China in the UN, and (c) explicitly recognize CPR sovereignty over Taiwan. The Canadian Minister said that his government would of course break relations with the Republic of China as soon as they had worked out an agreement with the CPR on recognition. Canada was not promoting a two-China policy now or in the future. Canadian support for Communist China in the UN would, he said, be consistent with the state of their diplomatic relations; i.e., once Canada had recognized the CPR, Can-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CAN-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson on September 25; approved by R.L. Brown on September 27. The original is labeled "Part 2 of 5." The Secretary and Sharp were attending the U.N. General Assembly session. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

ada would certainly support the Chinese Communists in the UN from that time on. Canada was not prepared, however, to make a statement recognizing CPR sovereignty over Taiwan. The Canadians had told the Chinese negotiators that it was not an appropriate question to discuss in connection with the act of diplomatic recognition. The Canadian argument was that such a statement on their part would only indicate that Canada had doubts about CPR sovereignty in a specific area. Sharp commented, "We don't ask the Chinese to recognize our sovereignty over the Arctic waters." The Secretary interjected, "And you'd better not!" The Canadians appeared to appreciate the Secretary's humor.

Mr. Sharp said the Chinese had wanted to have a second meeting. The new Canadian Ambassador in Stockholm, Miss Meagher, had now had a meeting which in many ways the Canadians had found more satisfactory than the previous one. This time the Chinese had not felt they had to say everything three times. The Chinese had asked that the two sides work up a draft communiqué to be issued on the effective date of diplomatic recognition. Ambassador Meagher had agreed and had brought out a draft which simply stated the fact of Canada's diplomatic recognition of the CPR. The Chinese said they wanted more included in the communiqué: specifically, a statement of "certain principles." The Canadian Ambassador told the Chinese she had carefully followed the text of the announcement which had been used by the French and Chinese at the time that France extended diplomatic recognition. The Chinese had not appeared to be embarrassed by this ploy and had said that the earlier communiqué was history now. The Canadians left the meeting with an understanding that the Chinese would draw up a proposed communiqué including any principles which they wished the Canadians to consider.

Sharp commented that the Chinese side at the Stockholm meeting had shown no interest in hearing a report on the Canadian position in the UN concerning the question of Chinese representation. The Secretary asked whether Sharp thought that indicated a present lack of interest on the part of the Chinese Communists in joining the UN. Sharp did not think so. He believed that the Chinese would come back to the Canadians on the question of Chinese representation in the UN. U Thant had told Sharp that he believed the Government of the CPR had a very real interest in UN membership.

At the end of the meeting Sharp asked the Secretary if we knew whether the Italians were conducting substantive talks with the Chinese on the question of recognition. The Secretary said he did not believe so. Ambassador Yost said he understood that the Italians were waiting to see what came out of the Canadian talks with the Chinese

Communists in Stockholm before taking similar initiatives of their own.

100. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Impending Canadian Unilateral Action in the Arctic—Secretary Rogers Wishes You to Telephone Trudeau

On March 11, the Canadians officially informed Under Secretary Johnson that Canada is considering taking certain unilateral actions relating to the Arctic and law of the sea issues, designed to protect the Arctic environment.² By legislative action, the Canadians would deal with issues of sovereignty, pollution control and exclusive fishing zones. The Canadian démarche of March 11 was in effect notification of Canadian intent to act unilaterally.

Secretary Rogers in the attached package³ urges you to telephone Trudeau to express our grave concern and to back up an oral presentation which the Secretary would shortly thereafter make to the Canadian Ambassador.

Deputy Defense Secretary Packard has certain reservations concerning the proposed presentation by Secretary Rogers, particularly to a passage in which he would state that "The United States thus would be required to take lawful and appropriate steps to protect the integrity of its position in these matters." Although Secretary Rogers would not go beyond this sentence the actions contemplated by the State Department would include continuation of passage and overflight through the waters and the air-space in question by US public vessels and aircraft at present levels. As I understand it, Secretary Packard would prefer to have a high-level US team go to Ottawa to discuss the Cana-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 367.

³ Not printed.

dian moves and their implications before such a far-reaching threat is made.

At the same time, I understand that Trudeau would be receptive to intervention by you since it would help him to meet the very considerable pressures to which he has been subjected on the question of the Arctic and which have precipitated the Canadian decision to act.

Your Talking Points

1. That you are gravely disturbed by the presentation Ambassador Cadieux made to Alexis Johnson on March 11 concerning Canada's intention to take unilateral actions with regard to the Arctic and other areas of the high seas;

2. The contemplated Canadian legislation would, in your view, present serious security and economic problems to the United States, which the Secretary of State intends to discuss at greater length in an interview with Ambassador Cadieux;

3. That you share Trudeau's concern for the preservation of the Arctic environment;

4. But that instead of unilateral actions by Canada, you hope we can work together on a cooperative international basis; and

5. That you would be prepared at once to send a high-level US team to discuss these matters with appropriate Canadian officials and to consider various options including the possibility of international cooperative efforts.

If you approve, I will inform Secretary Rogers of the foregoing and suggest that for the time being the more threatening elements of his presentation be withheld, pending the proposed trip to Ottawa by a high-level US group which would include Deputy Secretary Packard. This step would enable us to examine more fully the implications of possible retaliatory measures.

Approve⁴

Disapprove

See me

⁴ Nixon wrote: "I called Trudeau—He agreed to hold up until he talked to Team—I informed Alex [Johnson] of the call—I have one reservation—perhaps appointing Packard puts too much military emphasis." According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon and Trudeau spoke on March 17 from 4:50 to 4:57 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) For the Nixon-Johnson conversation, see Document 101.

101. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, March 17, 1970, 5:10 p.m.

From the President (re Canadian matter)

Pres: I just had a talk with Trudeau as you suggested.² The way it adds up is this: First of all, just to repeat his conversation, he said that no Canadian Government could take the position that they did not own the Arctic; on the other hand, they avoided saying they did own the Arctic. In the meantime, we had these discussions—if we were to send a delegation, that would give him an opportunity to delay legislation until we had an opportunity to discuss the matter with our people. I told him of conversation you had with Cadieux;³ we were prepared to send a delegation headed by Dave Packard. He said they would be glad to receive him and asked that we inform his Ambassador here as to when it would go and I agreed. It would be a high-level team and would be very soon.

J: He will hold up?

Pres: He will hold up until he hears and would be glad to have the matter discussed and receive them, and will delay any decision on his part. The other point he said, not only do we have to consider US/Canada attitudes but multilateral, etc.—international law, etc., and of course I agreed.

J: He seemed receptive to Packard?

Pres: Because of Defense? The way I told him—well, let me say, I have no strong feeling; it's just that the memo that came in mentioned Packard; he has a broad base. When I say he was receptive—as a matter of fact, he did not say anything about not wanting Packard but he did say he would be glad to talk to Johnson. My view is that it could be yourself. Maybe there was a little kernel.

J: I just wondered, because they are sensitive on the military.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96D695, Telecons, March–April 1970. Confidential. A note on the transcript reads: “aprx. 5:10 p.m.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Johnson spoke from 4:57 to 5:01 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

² See Document 100.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 367.

Pres: Another way we could turn it around—to send somebody with a Defense man, but head it with non-Defense man. Maybe if you go up. Shall we leave it this way—that you’ll follow through.

J: Thanks very much, Mr. President; I’ll follow through.⁴

⁴ Johnson telephoned Kissinger at an unspecified time after his conversation with the President. Johnson inquired about the potential selection of Packard as U.S. lead spokesman. Kissinger agreed with his concerns about a Department of Defense team leader and asked about Johnson’s availability. When Johnson said he would accept the job, Kissinger told him to “assume that you will be the designated person.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96D695, Telecons, March–April 1970) Johnson called Packard at 6:05 p.m. to report on his talk with the President and to ascertain Packard’s interest in the position. Packard stated he had no desire to lead the U.S. team. (Ibid.)

102. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Impending Canadian Action on the Arctic—Phone Call This Afternoon from Prime Minister Trudeau

On March 17 you called Prime Minister Trudeau and told him of your deep concern over Canadian intentions to take unilateral actions relating to the Arctic and law of the sea issues.² You advised him that the contemplated Canadian legislation (as outlined for us by the Canadian Ambassador on March 11) would present us with serious security and economic problems. In an effort to head off this unilateral action, you offered to send a delegation headed by Alex Johnson to Ottawa (you decided against sending Dave Packard since it would put too much emphasis on the military). Trudeau agreed to suspend any Canadian action until he heard the presentation by Alex’s team.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action.

² See Document 100 and footnote 4 thereto.

Alex Johnson presented the US case on March 20 and offered some constructive proposals.³ He felt that we caused the Canadians to re-think their position, but in general Alex was not sanguine that they would find it possible to eliminate all objectionable features. Subsequently, the Canadians informed us that they would not introduce legislation until after the Easter parliamentary recess, which ended on Monday of this week.

This morning, the Canadian Ambassador called Alex Johnson⁴ to inform him that, after careful consideration of the points we had made, the Canadian Government still felt it must proceed tomorrow with the introduction into Parliament of legislation providing for the establishment of:

- a 100 mile anti-pollution zone in the Arctic;
- a 12 mile territorial sea; and
- fishing closing lines beyond the territorial sea.

This is essentially the same legislation as they considered in mid-March, except for a partial concession to our representations relating to an exemption from the pollution legislation for naval and other public vessels under certain conditions. Also, the Canadians are not going to take formal action at this time to declare the Arctic waters as internal Canadian waters.

The Canadian Ambassador said that Trudeau would be glad to discuss this matter further with you today. *Trudeau will be calling you this afternoon after 4:30.*⁵

Your Talking Points

1. You had hoped that following your last conversation, there was a strong possibility that an accommodation of our respective interests could be arranged through consultations;
2. After Alex Johnson visited Ottawa and presented the details of our position and offered constructive proposals, you still entertained the hope that Canada would not take unilateral action in this field;
3. Now however, you are deeply disappointed to learn that the Canadian Government has not found it possible to meet our concerns;

³ A March 21 memorandum by Johnson describing the meetings in Ottawa is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 369.

⁴ Johnson's April 7 memorandum describing this discussion is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. II.

⁵ No record of this conversation was found. According to the President's Daily Diary, Trudeau called Nixon at 4:40 p.m., however, "The call was not completed." (Ibid., White House Central Files)

4. It is, of course, for the Canadian Government to decide what legislation it wishes to propose to Parliament, but you wish to make it very clear that if this legislation is introduced, the US will publicly oppose it; our worldwide interests in freedom of navigation for our naval and merchant ships leave us no choice;

5. You recognize that the full public expression of the US position on this issue may cause discomfort to Canadian Government, but it is necessary for the US to take lawful and appropriate steps to protect the integrity of its position.

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada¹

Washington, October 8, 1970, 2347Z.

166457. Subj: Canadian/PRC recognition talks. Ref: State 156914.²

1. Canadian Ambassador Cadieux on instructions called on Assistant Secretary Green October 8 to report on further progress in Canadian/PRC talks.

2. Cadieux stated that GOC “has taken another step,” and although this may not be last, “it appears as if agreement has been reached on text of joint communiqué.” First and final paragraphs would be as previously indicated to us (reftel para 3 a and b). According to text provided by Cadieux, second paragraph now reads: “Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of territory of People’s Republic of China. Canadian Government takes note of this position of Chinese Government.” A new separate third paragraph reads: “Canadian Government recognizes Government of People’s Republic of China as sole legal government of China.” (Molgat³ subsequently indicated to Shoesmith that separation of second and third paragraphs was intentional to protect GOC position on Taiwan issue). Cadieux indicated that acceptability of this wording to GOC was con-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by T. Shoesmith (EA), cleared in EUR and S/S-O, and approved in E. Repeated to Taipei, Stockholm, Tokyo, USUN, and Hong Kong.

² Dated September 23. It transmitted information from the Canadian Embassy on the current status of Canada–PRC talks. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 CHICOM)

³ First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy.

veyed to PRC following approval of text by Cabinet committee subsequent to October 3 Stockholm meeting.

3. In addition to proposed text paragraphs two and three, GOC also has informed PRC that it would accompany announcement of agreement by Minister's statement explaining GOC position. Text of Minister's statement would be that of draft previously provided (reftel para 3). GOC expects that PRC may also issue own statement, possibly challenging GOC position on Taiwan sovereignty issue. In response to Green's query, Cadieux stated that PRC aware of substance of proposed Minister's statement but that statement has not been subject of negotiation.

4. Cadieux stated that if PRC accepts GOC proposals, GOC will suggest that joint communiqué be issued on October 13. He cautioned, however, that it still possible that PRC will object to proposed Minister's statement and it might not be possible to announce agreement on October 13. For that reason, GOC urgently requests that we hold above information most closely.⁴

5. Cadieux stated that if agreement reached so that announcement can be made October 13, GRC will be informed October 11.

6. Green expressed appreciation that GOC keeping US informed of developments and is holding firm on not acknowledging PRC claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, a matter to which we attach particular importance. He expressed hope that GOC will continue to keep us informed and interest in any general conclusions GOC may reach on basis its negotiating experience concerning PRC diplomatic posture.

Rogers

⁴ In telegram 166447, October 10, the Department of State reported to the Embassy in Ottawa that the Canadian Embassy had informed it that a statement on recognition would be made to Parliament on October 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 CHICOM) The joint communiqué was issued in both Ottawa and Beijing on that day.

104. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 24, 1970.

SUBJECT

US-Canada Joint Cabinet Meeting, November 23–24, 1970

The most striking single aspect of our visit to Ottawa for one of our periodic Joint Cabinet sessions was the preoccupying, almost obsessive, concern of the Canadians for the survival of the Confederation.

Canadian ministers and officials spoke freely in private conversations about the possibility of a break-up of the country, even speculating about what choices might then be made by the different regions and provinces. In the formal discussions, the dominating Canadian theme was the search for national unity. And as is to be expected, attitudes toward the United States are colored by this constant concern for holding Canada together. To some extent, in fact, the US serves as a convenient whipping boy for Canadian politicians: at the Liberal Party conference in Ottawa over the weekend, participants wore lapel buttons bearing the slogan “I’m for An Independent Canada,” that is, independent of the United States. I thought that it would be desirable to say that all Americans also favor an independent Canada and I issued a brief statement (copy appended) to the press to that effect.²

Despite the atmosphere and atmospherics, the discussions themselves proved to be quite useful.

We edged closer toward an understanding on trade in petroleum and other fuels and we now should be able to decide promptly on the procedure to govern 1971 imports of crude oil from Canada.³

There was a fairly spirited exchange on environmental problems, with the Canadians taking the view that we are less devoted than we might be to implementing the International Joint Commission recommendations (actually still to be made in final form) for helping to clean

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. II. Confidential.

² Not printed. For the text of Rogers’s statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1970, p. 730. The text of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs joint communiqué is *ibid.*, pp. 730–732.

³ Much additional documentation on U.S.-Canadian discussions on petroleum is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974.

up Lake Erie. I will have this complaint examined as a matter of urgency.

The Canadians expressed their customary worries about the large role of US investors in Canadian economic life. We took the position that Canada must make its own decisions in this area, always assuming that our people will be given equitable and non-discriminatory treatment, and that we do not seek to impose our investments on anyone. (I made a special point to Mitchell Sharp about our absolute opposition to any retroactive rules that might be applied to US investments in Canada.) The Canadians face a dilemma: there is evidently widespread unease at the very large place foreign investment has in Canada's economy; yet without a continuing infusion of capital from abroad it will be difficult to reduce the intolerably high levels of unemployment now prevailing in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. And unless Canada can do something about unemployment, separatist sentiment will grow.

There was a good exchange between David Kennedy and Paul McCracken and Finance Minister Benson and Louis Rasminsky of the Bank of Canada on the economic situation and the balance of payments. Canada has been wrestling with inflation and with very serious regional unemployment and is now seeking to return to a growth economy. The Canadians expect that their unusually strong balance of payments position will deteriorate as the economy expands. This of course will benefit our exports and our balance of payments.

The Canadians emphasized the political sensitivity that attaches to our East-West trade controls as they apply, at least potentially, to US firms located in Canada. I find that Secretaries Stans and Kennedy would be happy to join with State in looking for a way to eliminate this issue from US-Canadian relations, and we shall proceed to see what can be done.

The Canadians saw nothing much more in the way of trade from their new relationship with Communist China, but they believed that recognition was a proper step. They think that the seating of Communist China is foregone. The place of Taiwan in the UN, in Canadian eyes, is a separate issue.

We had the expected debates on our trade policy and on the US-Canada automobile agreement, plus a no controversy conversation about our joint wish that the enlargement of the European Communities will come out in a way compatible with US and Canadian commercial preoccupations.

At Pierre Trudeau's dinner last night for the two Cabinet delegations, he spoke most solemnly about his concerns with Quebec separatism and with the alienation of the young in Canada. He spoke most warmly about your telephone call to him at the time of the kidnapping

crisis,⁴ remarking with some emotion that you had been considerate enough to call him when you were in the midst of a more than usually busy schedule.

William P. Rogers

⁴ Terrorists of the separatist Front for the Liberation of Quebec seized the senior British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, on October 5. On October 10, they kidnapped the Minister of Labour and Immigration for Quebec, Pierre Laporte. Efforts to secure the men's release deadlocked on terrorist demands. On October 17, the terrorists murdered Laporte. The Canadian Government invoked emergency powers and rounded up nearly 400 extremists. The terrorists released Cross in exchange for safe passage to Cuba on December 3.

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada¹

Washington, July 30, 1971, 1535Z.

138419. Subj: Secretary's Meeting with Ambassador Cadieux, July 29, 1971. Ref: State 131743 July 21.²

Summary: Ambassador Cadieux expressed hope Canada would be kept in the picture as our plans re China and President's visit developed;³ Secretary said merely we would keep in touch. No decision yet made on ChiRep but we would try to save Taiwan's seat. Cadieux explained Canada's position favoring AR and opposing IQ as flowing logically from Canadian recognition; US position different since it still in negotiating stage. Secretary stressed importance being realistic rather than legalistic. Eviction GRC would be backward step when there seems to be movement toward more universal UN representation. Agreed PRC and GRC seemed adamant in negotiating positions but neither yet faced with actual decision and history shows (citing Middle East) such positions not immutable. If Canada cannot vote with US, we hope it can be helpful behind scene.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by A.L. Jenkins (EA/ACA); cleared in EUR/CAN (in draft), EA, IO, and S; and approved by Rogers. Also sent to USUN.

² Not found.

³ The President announced on July 15 that he had accepted an invitation to visit China. For text of his statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820.

1. Secretary expressed appreciation for Canadian statement concerning the President's projected visit to Peking.⁴ Cadieux said that this was a welcome development. His government hoped it would be kept in the picture as plans developed, especially since there is speculation that PRC Ambassador to Canada, Huang Hua, may be involved in the preparatory discussions. Another consideration was likelihood Canadian Prime Minister would also go to China eventually.

2. Secretary said merely that we would keep in touch. Nothing definite has been decided beyond what has been publicly stated. We are in process of deciding our position on Chinese representation. We will make an effort to save Taiwan's seat, at least in the General Assembly. Secretary said he understood Canadian Government was not disposed to do so.

3. Ambassador Cadieux confirmed this, saying Peking's position seemed very firm. Secretary said nothing was immutable in such matters, however. We understand the legalistic arguments for the Canadian position but from the practical standpoint we consider that position unfortunate. At a time when there seems to be movement toward more universal UN representation the eviction of the GRC would be a move in the wrong direction. It is troubling that in the four major areas of tension the peoples directly affected do not have UN representation. If we get into the business of deciding which of the representatives of these divided areas are the legitimate representatives this would surely constitute a backward step.

4. Cadieux expressed the opinion that the U.S. position flowed from the present status of our negotiations with the Chinese. The Canadian position is different, since Canada has already recognized the People's Republic of China, and that government feels very strongly on the issue of two Chinas.

5. The Secretary said it was important that we be realistic rather than legalistic. Cadieux observed that Foreign Minister Sharp did indeed tend to talk in legalistic terms but this arose from the fact that Canada was not in a situation of negotiation but had already recognized Peking. The problem was that Taiwan was not prepared "to be Taiwan."

6. Cadieux returned to the theme that while the United States was in the process of negotiation Canada has already recognized, and logic determines that its position must be different.

7. Secretary observed that in the Canadian negotiations, however, the question of the extent of jurisdiction of the Chinese Governments

⁴ The statement was summarized in Jay Walz, "Canadians Eager to Use China Ties," *New York Times*, August 1, 1971, p. 7.

was not resolved. Cadieux agreed that Canada had successfully avoided such issues. The Secretary said he hoped that Canada would use the same sound judgment concerning the ChiRep question. He said it was his recollection, however, that Canada had already announced that it would vote for the Albanian resolution. Ambassador said that was true; they had also voted for the Albanian resolution last year. The new element was opposition to use of the Important Question.

8. Secretary said the view that both Peking and Taipei should be represented in the UN was very widespread. Ambassador Cadieux wondered whether the People's Republic had a fallback position. Secretary replied that most nations will not change their announced policies unless and until they are faced with the problem. He returned to the Middle East example, observing that when the two sides were forced to make a decision they made a sensible one. Neither Peking nor Taipei has yet been faced with the problem. There are two unassailable verities in this question: (1) it is clear that the PRC would like to be a member of the UN and to have the Security Council seat and (2) Taiwan, if faced with the decision, would be very reluctant to give up the Security Council seat. Secretary emphasized that what he was saying was not because of any conversations we had had, but the PRC realizes that the Security Council seat is the linchpin of GRC legality, which makes its stand on this the more determined. We do not know what each side would do if actually faced with the decision even though both sides seem adamant in their negotiating positions.

9. Secretary said if Canada finds it impossible to vote in support of US, we hope it can nevertheless be helpful behind the scene. We fear that an adverse outcome could be harmful to the UN. It would certainly create opposition in the US if a member in good standing were expelled. Passage of the Albanian resolution might at first have its attraction because many want the PRC in the UN, but later appraisals could be different.

10. Secretary said he would be in touch with Foreign Minister Sharp.

Rogers

106. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 2, 1971, 2301Z.

Secto 16/3085. Memorandum of Conversation: Foreign Secretary Sharp, (Canada), Part I of V: US economic measures, October 1, 1971: 4:30 P.M. Waldorf.

1. Participants: Canada—Foreign Secretary Sharp, Ambassador Cadieux, Mr. Goldschlag, Mr. Taylor; US—The Secretary, Mr. DePalma, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Waring (reporting officer).

2. Summary: Canadian Foreign Secretary Sharp made very strong statement on US economic measures.² Canada was extremely disturbed. These measures constituted an ominous package. Mortal blow struck. Canada reviewing long-run foreign policy; which has up to now been based on stable trade relations with US. Method by which US had put through measures made matters even worse. Canada forced to take measures to maintain employment. If US responded with counter-vailing action, such a move would be very badly interpreted. Secretary assured Sharp of our desire to continue our close relationship with Canada and to work out mutual problems in a satisfactory manner. End summary.

3. Foreign Secretary Sharp informed the Secretary that Canada was extremely disturbed by the economic measures taken by the US. These measures constituted an ominous package. A mortal blow had been struck at the economy of Canada. The situation was so serious that a special group under his chairmanship had been set up to review long-run Canadian foreign policy, which, up to now, had been based on stable trade relations with the US. This basic assumption, it appeared, no longer existed. Canada was affected not merely by the surcharge, but the DISC and the investment tax credit were more serious. Eighty-three percent of Canada's trade was with the US. \$2.5 billion of Canada's industrial trade with the US was affected. In a sense, the temporary aspect of the measures made matters worse, as buyers were inclined to wait. There was a grave danger to employment.

4. To make matters worse, Sharp continued, the manner in which the US put through its measures was very disturbing. Canada felt it could have expected some sort of appropriate consultation. When talks

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 CAN. Confidential. Repeated to Ottawa. Rogers was attending the United Nations General Assembly session.

² Reference to the New Economic Policy announced by the President on August 15. For text of his statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 886-891.

about the situation did take place subsequently, the Canadian representatives were informed that Canada should concentrate on raw materials, rather than manufactures. This sort of language was unacceptable.

5. Regarding the last mentioned item, the Secretary assured Mr. Sharp that this was certainly not the policy of the US Government. As for the economic measures, the President felt he had to act. Indeed, there were certain inequities that resulted in the implementation of the domestic program. The Secretary said that the President and he value greatly the US's relationship with Canada and will attempt to work toward satisfactory solutions.

6. Sharp then noted a specific way where we could be helpful. The Canadian Government had been obliged to take measures encouraging firms to retain their employees even in cases where the volume of business dropped. These measures applied to all firms whether their products were sold domestically or abroad. They were employment measures, and he hoped therefore that the US would not take any countervailing action. Such a move would be specially badly interpreted in Canada.

7. The Secretary replied that if the measures taken were unemployment measures, then countervailing action would not appear to be in order. He promised to look into the matter.

8. Sharp concluded this part of the discussion by noting that Canada had avoided retaliation so far and hoped that a satisfactory solution to outstanding problems could be found.

Rogers

107. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Consultation on Multilateral and Bilateral Issues

PARTICIPANTS

Hon. Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Minister for External Affairs

Hon. Marcel Cadieux, Ambassador of Canada

Mr. J. H. Taylor, Office of Minister Sharp

The Secretary of State

Assistant Secretary Martin J. Hillenbrand, EUR

Acting Assistant Secretary Julius L. Katz, E

Mr. W. M. Johnson, Director, EUR/CAN

(The Secretary and Minister Sharp were alone for fifteen minutes before the other participants joined them.)²

In addressing himself to a long list of agenda items, Sharp began by stating that his Government had decided not to sell the Vancouver-made submarine, or deep submersible vessel (DSV), to the Soviet Union. He said his Government would take the line, presentationally, that it had cancelled the sale and that the U.S. position, conveyed earlier in the Secretary's letter of November 4,³ only confirmed it. It was agreed that the DSV in Soviet hands could be a mischief-maker. The plan adopted was that the Government would buy the DSV and offer it, with a Canadian crew, on a charter basis to the Soviet Union for oceanographic purposes. He thought there was little possibility the Soviets would be interested. Prime Minister Trudeau had given Premier Kosygin, at the time of his visit to Ottawa, a hint of this decision, to which Kosygin replied that he did not believe it would have much effect on Soviet war capability.

Sharp then raised the question of our agreement for SAC overflights over Canada and said his Government had approved an agreement specifying a two-year duration at a time.

Regarding the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Sharp said there was very great political pressure in Canada to complete this agreement very quickly. He outlined Canada's steps in trying to eliminate phosphates as an effluent both by banning it from detergents and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL CAN-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by W.M. Johnson. Approved in S "as amended" on December 4.

² No record of their conversation was found.

³ Not printed.

by improving treatment plant removal of it. Johnson said that we had decided to continue the use of phosphates, at least for the time being, since we had not found an acceptable substitute and that we were therefore dependent on sewage treatment only for removal of this pollutant. We were presently computing what target levels for phosphates we could achieve on the basis of financial resources available, but it was certain that we would only be able to agree to lower standards than perhaps hoped and as recommended by the International Joint Commission. Sharp said he hoped that, concerning a timetable for completion of the Agreement, it could be readied for signing before or during the President's visit to Canada.⁴ He said it was not of crucial importance who signed the Agreement. The Secretary suggested that the President's visit represent the outside limit for conclusion of the Agreement.

In response to Sharp's query, the Secretary said he assumed the President's visit remained as previously indicated and that the timing of the next Joint Cabinet Committee meeting might well follow settlement of the current monetary and trade problems which would otherwise represent something overhanging the meeting. Sharp said he had been thinking of a Joint Cabinet Committee meeting in January or February, but acquiesced in waiting to see how things worked out.

Sharp then turned to the most important aspect of the consultation, which he defined as Canada's concern over the import surcharge and the direction of future U.S. policies. He said the President's announcement of August 15 created a shockwave in Canada, though Canadians generally held an attitude of sympathy for the American position and how help could be given to the U.S. to reduce its difficulties. But Canada remained disturbed over the effect of the surcharge on its exports, particularly the nationalists who favored reducing Canada's dependence upon the United States as soon as possible. He mentioned the bilateral talks going on and the discussions of the three points which seem to be of most interest to the United States: the Auto Pact,⁵ Defense Production Sharing, and tourist arrangements.

On tourist allowances, Sharp said he believed they would be increased, though he did not know by how much.

Regarding the Defense Production Sharing arrangement, Sharp thought our purchases of arms in the other country were about in balance or at the most \$4 million out in 1970. There had been U.S. suggestions that the Canadians buy an American aircraft as a follow-on for the

⁴ April 13–15, 1972. Nixon and Trudeau signed the Agreement on April 15.

⁵ For text of the agreement, signed in Johnson City, Texas, January 16, 1965, see 17 UST 1372. Documentation on the accord is in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XII, Western Europe, Documents 316, 318, 323, 324, and 326.

Canadian Argus patrol craft, but he said his Government would have to choose this replacement aircraft on the basis of what was needed, not on the grounds of a balance of payments contribution.

On the third issue, the Auto Pact, Sharp said this was a highly sensitive subject in Canada. At the Secretary's suggestion, Acting Assistant Secretary Katz described the Agreement, its origin, its transitional safeguards, particularly the importance of the third safeguard, and its current results. He said that trade in the amount of \$800 million in 1965 had reached \$6 billion today in the transborder industry. He added that while there was a \$500 million advantage accruing to the U.S. at the outset, we were now running a \$100 million deficit. Sharp responded that Canadians feared removal of the third safeguard most, that which applies to duties on non-manufacturer automobiles. He said the underpinnings to industry which his Government had required at the beginning had already been removed. The Auto Pact had become sacrosanct, and even labor felt this way. Consumers, who might be expected to oppose the safeguards, were not organized and had not voiced much opposition. He thought leaks about changes by Canada served some purpose in preparing the public for adjustments. But he said it was imperative that his Government not act hastily. Katz said the official working group was progressing toward some solution.

Sharp then asked the Secretary about the aspect of the future direction of U.S. policy. The Secretary sought to assure Sharp that the President's new policy was not designed to change the U.S. direction. The U.S. had had a serious problem in convertibility and drastic action was needed. Previous efforts and consultations had been tried but were not producing adequate action. The President's action dramatized the problem and forced others to focus on a solution. The Rome meeting⁶ foreshadowed what will happen, first a realignment of exchange rates and then removal of the surcharge and a working out of trade "irritants." The President was holding "summit consultations" to iron out the difficulties confronting us.

Sharp said Canada wanted to help, but there was a limit to how long it could keep its self-interest in check. He was worried about the implications of DISC in particular. The effect of DISC in third-country markets would produce the most serious problem for Canadian exporters. He said he had already been approached by consulting engineers who were worried about the implications of DISC for their business. Following a discussion of DISC by Katz, the Secretary said it was designed to put us on a more even footing with others, though perhaps it

⁶ The G-10 Ministerial meeting in Rome November 30-December 1. The Group of Ten, or G-10, was created in 1962 to provide financial support to the International Monetary Fund. It consisted of the 10 wealthiest industrial states.

did mean an uneven one with Canada. This possibility would have to be watched; but the U.S. wanted to get back to parity with its partners and desired no change in its previous trade policies.

Sharp voiced his belief that the U.S. as a great power had to act magnanimously, if only to remain as a great power, and said such action also redounded to that great power's own self-interest. The Secretary said he agreed that there was a price for leadership but thought others should not always take for granted what a great power might contribute in aid and financial support.

On NATO matters, the Secretary said he had the impression that the Soviet Union was much less interested in MBFR than in CESC and that it might be looking to the former to spur action on the latter. He said he thought bilateral relations with the Soviet Union were proceeding well enough and that one might safely look to 1973 as a possible CESC date. Sharp responded that both Kosygin and Tito had pressed hard on CESC. Both had admitted their preference for Brandt in office. Canada's policy was that both Germanies come in together to the UN.

In reply to Sharp's query about whether there was any hope of a settlement in the Middle East, the Secretary said that Sadat seemed to be getting close to painting himself into a corner. Gromyko had expressed this same concern to him. He thought it important to give Sadat some alternative; to supply more Phantoms⁷ to Israel at this time would make the situation critical for Sadat. He thought Sadat believed we were in the best position to do something, though he did not think us impartial and he overrated our influence with Israel. Sharp said he did not really see how the Canadians could be of special help, and the Secretary said he hoped that negotiations could be spurred on, by anyone, after the present UNGA session. The OAU⁸ recommended that negotiations be resumed under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, in effect handing Israel a little help. If one could build on this possibility, all well and good, though Jarring's negotiating tactics were not particularly encouraging. The Secretary said he believed it might be possible to work out an interim arrangement if one approached the problem with some very practical arrangement.

Sharp said he believed that one of the Secretary's greatest achievements in office had been his work in bringing about a cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli dispute and in preventing further hostilities.

Sharp informed the Secretary that his Government had requested the Soviet Union to intervene with India to withdraw troops from the Pakistan border area. He did not know what the result would be.

⁷ Reference to the U.S. F-4 fighter aircraft.

⁸ Organization for African Unity.

At the conclusion of the talk, Sharp mentioned the minor problem of the cessation of pre-clearance flight checks of passengers boarding Air Canada 747s at Canadian terminals. The Secretary replied we would look into the matter.

108. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Visit of Prime Minister Trudeau

Canada plays a critical role in our monetary negotiations. As our largest trading partner, with whom we have 24 percent of our trade, Canadian actions are vital not only to us directly but in the achievement of a total solution. The visit of Trudeau could well provide the key to crystallizing this solution.

Essentially the Canadians have the choice of participating in a general realignment by pegging their dollar at \$1.06 or more, or of opting out of a multilateral solution by continuing to float.² Thus far they have tried to play it both ways: supporting the Europeans on the gold price and other issues but insisting that *they* will continue to float. I believe the time has come for them to make this choice. We could accept their desire to float providing that the float is "clean," i.e., that they will allow their dollar to float up to where market forces dictate, and providing they give us active support in future monetary negotiations.

Whichever course they choose, the Canadians should accede to our requests outlined below for symmetry in trading arrangements.

If the Canadians do not wish to cooperate actively with us in the monetary and trade areas and at the same time refuse to participate in a general rate realignment, we should impress upon them that the U.S.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 56, Classified Executive Secretariat Files, 1966–1974, Box 19, Memo to the President, Sept.–Dec. 1971. Confidential; Limdis. For the memorandum for the record of Connally's meeting with Canadian Finance Minister Benson at 4 p.m. on December 6, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1972*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; *International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972*, Document 85.

² On May 31, 1970, the Canadian government announced that it would allow the Canadian dollar to float.

would have no choice but to continue the surcharge for Canada even in the event that the surcharge would be removed generally.

Active Canadian support is of great tactical importance. In Rome³ we won all of the debating points. However, the EC and the U.K. opposed us individually and collectively, while Japan and Canada remained mute. At the next session, it would be helpful to receive strong Canadian support on such critical issues as convertibility.

Monday⁴ we have the opportunity to resolve our problems with Canada. In turn, they should be in a position to support us in the monetary negotiations.

In trade questions what we need from the Canadians is reciprocal treatment:

*Trade*⁵

1. Actual removal or formal agreement to remove *all* three “transitional safeguards” of the Automotive Agreement.

Canada is prepared to remove the first two—Canadian production to Canadian sales ratio, and Canadian content requirements—but is still sticking on the third—no duty-free import by individuals. Americans are free to import cars under the agreement; Canadian individuals must still pay a 15 percent duty on cars imported from the U.S. The principle of “symmetry” requires that Canadians remove this third safeguard.

In return the U.S. could indicate our intention to use your prospective Presidential authority to waive for Canadian automotive products the U.S. preference contained in the pending Job Development Credit. *This would be an important achievement for Trudeau.*

2. The Canadians are probably prepared to make a substantial move toward symmetry in tourist allowances.

3. The Canadians should be prepared to reciprocate the preferential treatment (no duty plus a waiver of Buy America provision) we give them on defense procurement.

4. Removal of the Canadian ban on the import of used cars and used aircraft.

The Canadians may be prepared to effect a staged removal of the used car import ban. The used aircraft import ban has so many excep-

³ At the G-10 Ministerial meeting, November 30–December 1.

⁴ December 6.

⁵ Sub-Cabinet meetings on trade irritants took place in Ottawa November 4 and 15. The Embassy reported on them in telegrams 1816 from Ottawa, November 6, and 1871, November 17. (Both in the National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Daily Staff Summaries, 1944–1971, Lot 73D153, Box 124, Morning Summaries)

tions that its removal would be a concession which would cost the Canadians little.

In return we could waive the Job Development Credit discrimination on Canadian agricultural machinery.

Monetary

Unless Canada appreciates her currency it may well be impossible to achieve the multilateral realignment which we seek. So far they have adamantly refused this course. However, Canada is presently floating at 99 and Finance Minister Benson may be prepared to allow a float up to 105 or even higher if the market, over time, developed in that manner.

On the issue of gold price and convertibility the Canadians have thus far given us no support. Yet, the Canadians have a great interest in beating down the European bid for convertibility: failure to do so would mean continuation of the surcharge. If Canada and Japan can be persuaded to take our side on these issues, the Common Market countries will be forced into the public posture of standing out alone against a reasonable settlement. My judgment is that they will not be able to withstand this pressure. On the other hand, if Canada is unwilling to cooperate with us in arriving at a reasonable settlement, they should know the costs of this position.

Canada has even more at stake in seeing the U.S. position prevail. Revaluation of European and Japanese currencies will benefit Canadian trade—including their highly important agricultural sector—while Canada even more than the U.S. is threatened, economically and politically, by any division of the world into regional trading blocs.

In return we could accede to the Canadian request that she be permitted to abandon her restrictions on capital outflows. These were introduced to justify a Canadian exemption from the U.S. capital controls.

Trudeau—with only a little more give than what we now know to be present—could greatly help our monetary negotiations. In return, he too would receive important visible achievements.

If you approve,⁶ I would propose to explain these views in detail to Finance Minister Benson. However, in your conversation with Trudeau I believe it would be most helpful for you to impress upon him the need to implement long-delayed moves towards symmetry in trade, as well as the fundamental choice of siding with us more actively on monetary

⁶ No evidence of Presidential action is on the original. Nixon did meet with Connally, Shultz, Burns, Rumsfeld, McCracken, and Stein from 11:07 to 11:57 a.m., December 6, for a discussion of the economic situation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

negotiations or participating directly in the multilateral realignment by effecting a substantial revaluation.

John Connally⁷

⁷ Printed from a copy that indicates Connally signed the original.

**109. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, December 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Monday,
December 6, 1971, 4:00–6:00 p.m., the Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Prime Minister Trudeau
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Ivan Head, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister

The opening few minutes of the meeting were filmed by an NBC-TV film crew for a program on "A Day in the Life of the President."

The President began the conversation by saying that he should have thought of such a meeting earlier and was glad the Prime Minister raised the matter. Dr. Kissinger remarked that the Prime Minister accepted the invitation in record time. Prime Minister Trudeau thanked the President for receiving him now. Earlier he had been convinced that a spring meeting would be sufficient, and he had been taking the position publicly that he and the President were always in contact. But when the White House began announcing the series of bilateral meetings with allies, he had no choice but to go along. "We have both had a bad press," the Prime Minister remarked. "Each of us is accused of neglecting the other." The President said that he agreed, and that was why he had agreed so quickly to having the meeting.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Top Secret. Trudeau visited Washington December 6. A tape recording of the discussion is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Conversation 630–18.

At the Prime Minister's suggestion, they turned to the agenda. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister wanted to get into a technical discussion, the President expressing complete confidence in Secretary Connally's handling of the technical side.²

The Prime Minister noted that the President's decisions of August 15 actually only accelerated reconsiderations of Canadian policy that were going on in any event. Canada was in a tough position. She had a trade surplus but a problem with invisibles. If the U.S. was talking about a secular trend where some years the U.S. exported more and other years Canada exported more, this was one thing; but if we were saying that Canada must always be in a deficit position towards the U.S. so that the U.S. could always export capital to Canada—then we were asking them to sell part of their country to us. The Prime Minister did not believe that a country becomes more independent by being poorer. The question for Canada then was, should she choose a common market or free trade area or political integration, or should she gear towards more independence in order to be more autonomous of fluctuations in U.S. policy?

The President noted that the Prime Minister had raised the fundamental question of the U.S.-Canadian relationship. We were clearly eager to have Canada close to us, and many politicians would seek their own interest. The President began with some simple propositions: (1) We all had to begin by looking at the national interest. (2) He did not look at the issue in narrow parochial terms. (3) The U.S. had a world responsibility and we expected to discharge it. We did not like the August 15 decisions but they had to be taken. A strong United States was essential to world stability; a healthy U.S. economy was crucial even to Canada. Much of our problem was due to the transition from war to peace. Henry was the saddest of all when the decisions were taken, from his political point of view. But the U.S. would be a sound and responsible member of the international community.

We could get the Canadian situation into perspective by including all other countries in the solution, the President continued. Thirty per cent of all our exports went to Canada. At the same time, there was the intricate problem of reforming the whole international monetary system. The U.S. did not want to go back to convertibility. But we wanted to understand what Canada wanted. The President thought that it should be a multilateral solution; Secretary Connally had informed him, however, that Canada now wanted a bilateral one. We would do either—but "don't draw me into deeper water." We didn't believe in ganging up. The U.S. should be as forthcoming as possible.

² See Document 108 and footnote 1 thereto.

They could not have anybody more understanding of Canada than he was.

Dr. Kissinger then stressed the U.S. interest in a cooperative rather than divisive solution to the monetary problem. He had made clear in his press briefing of November 30³ that the monetary system by definition was a multilateral issue, and the solution in our view had to be one which all countries perceived as being in the common interest. In Canada's case, Dr. Kissinger continued, it was *not* settled U.S. policy to treat Canada as a safe haven for U.S. investment. The President emphasized that the current measures were not our permanent policy. One could not say what steps were necessary in any one year. Our long-term purpose was to have a continuation of our special relationship with Canada. We would approach matters in this spirit.

The Prime Minister said that the President's attitude was very generous. It was indeed better to try a multilateral approach. Canada's preference was to continue a lean float; if forced into pegging they would try to do it even though they did not know whether they could hold it. In any case, they agreed to wait for the next meeting of the Group of Ten. On this "ganging up," as the President had put it, in truth Canada had gotten together with others in an effort to get the U.S. surcharge removed. All of Canada's industry was geared to letting the two countries trade freely; if this was interrupted, U.S. industry would disinvest in Canada to invest more in the U.S. The President would notice that this was the opposite fear to the fear of the U.S. treating Canada as a haven for U.S. investment.

The long-term trend is freer trade, the President suggested, while the short-term trend is the opposite. The fundamental problem was that there could not be a viable relationship if one side is exploitive and the other is exploited. Everyone agreed with that, even Connally. "Right, Henry?" The Prime Minister smiled and said, "What you are saying is revolutionary." The President again turned to Dr. Kissinger: "Am I not right, Henry?" Dr. Kissinger affirmed that this was the settled policy of the Nixon Doctrine.

The President then asked the Prime Minister what he thought of multinational corporations. Prime Minister Trudeau said he wished there were more of them. It was not a question of liking them; they were here. Mr. Head then explained George Ball's view that the multinational corporation would eventually lead to the economic integration of Canada and the U.S. The Prime Minister noted that some of these philosophical problems antedated August 15 and would remain long afterwards.

³ Summarized in "Cooperation Emphasized," *New York Times*, December 1, 1971, p. 71.

Speaking of George Ball's theory, the President did not know whether anyone could look that far into the future. Take Britain's entry into the Common Market, which we supported; now they were more Gaullist than the French. The President turned to Dr. Kissinger. "But with British methods," Dr. Kissinger replied. The Prime Minister asked what it was that bothered us. The President replied that the loss of the special relationship meant inevitable problems of adjustment.

Prime Minister Trudeau then raised the subject of the situation on the subcontinent, and wondered whether we could keep the other powers from getting involved. The President suggested that Russia would not get in. They were too far away and had no need to; India had the horses. India's purpose was to remove Pakistan as a significant factor. It was absurd to think of it as Pakistani aggression. It was different from the Middle East, but in many ways sadly similar.

Dr. Kissinger provided a run-down of the Indo-Pakistani situation for the Prime Minister. The President then noted the irony that by cutting off arms to Pakistan we made the situation worse. This is why we had to maintain the balance in the Middle East. Actually, by supplying the Phantoms we were keeping the Israelis from attacking. This was all the old power politics. "I wish I could contradict you," the Prime Minister said.

The President then gave an account of the Peking trip,⁴ emphasizing the point that it would not be at the expense of other countries. The opening to the People's Republic of China has helped with the Soviets, he pointed out. The Prime Minister remarked that when the President met the Soviets he would find an almost pathological fear of the Chinese. "Fear or hatred?" the President asked. "Hatred," the Prime Minister replied.

The President explained that we had no illusions with respect to the China visit. A significant change in our own interests was unlikely. But because we both needed each other in certain areas this may be a masterstroke. Prime Minister Trudeau pointed out that the U.S. had to reassure its friends in Southeast Asia. The President replied that we knew the arithmetic.

There were further pleasantries, and the meeting soon ended.

⁴ On November 29, the U.S. and Chinese Governments jointly announced that the President's trip to China would commence on February 21, 1972.

110. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 4, 1972.

SUBJECT

Tough Treasury Position on Canada—A Pointless Crisis

Treasury has rejected the latest Canadian offer on trade.² It feels that the “trade package” is inadequate and has threatened to take a *public* hard line against Canada when we submit the “gold bill” to the Congress in the middle of next week. And, Treasury has raised the possibility of suspending the U.S.-Canadian Auto Agreement and the Defense Production Sharing Arrangement with Canada. Canada, however, believes that it has gone as far as it can go and that to give any more would lead the Government to fall in the next election. The Canadians feel that they are being asked to commit political suicide by Treasury for the sake of concessions that could scarcely make that much difference to the U.S. *This memo is to alert you to the problem and to the urgent need to moderate Connally before an unnecessary foreign policy crisis with adverse domestic implications arises.*

The major issues are:

—Canada wants to declare “inoperative” the first two safeguards of the Canadian-American Auto Agreement by legally eliminating them through an order-in-council (which the Ministers feel would involve unacceptable domestic political consequences). Treasury wants formal elimination. The issue here is more political than economic, since these two safeguards have not actually been adhered to or affected our trade in the last several years.

—With regard to the third safeguard, which limits the duty free import of autos into Canada to manufacturers alone, i.e., no private Canadian citizens can import duty free automobiles from the U.S. Canada has indicated that for both political and economic reasons it cannot give any concessions on this, although it has proposed the establishment of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 671, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. III. No classification marking. Sent for urgent action. Initialed by Kissinger.

² The negotiations began in November 1971; see footnote 5, Document 108. The negotiations deadlocked on February 9.

a committee to examine this problem. Treasury's position is that individual Canadians should be able to import automobiles duty free since Americans can now import automobiles duty free from Canada (although because Canadian prices are higher no Americans have done so).

—In addition, Canada will remove the ten percent ("buy Canadian") differential on defense purchases under the Defense Production Sharing Arrangement, and will allow duty free entry for prime contracts valued at \$150,000 or more as opposed to the current \$250,000. Treasury's position is that because most contracts are not "prime," but "subcontracts," this is of little help to us. (Treasury is probably right.)

—Canada has also offered to increase tourist allowances, which is calculated to increase U.S. earnings by about \$40 million per year. And Canada has indicated that it would eliminate its present five percent duty on citrus juices, although it admits this is unlikely to affect the level of U.S. exports to Canada.

—Canada also points out that the U.S. has done nothing which has the appearance of a reciprocal concession.

Although admittedly Canada has made limited concessions to the U.S., it would serve little good at this time to publicly denounce Canada or to threaten to revoke the Auto Agreement or the Defense Production Sharing Arrangement. Indeed, it might encourage members of the Congress to tack on punitive amendments to the gold bill, and strengthen protectionist pressures.

The foreign policy consequences would be that anti-Americanism will become the major Canadian election issue with the parties outbidding each other. In addition, the Canadians are not incapable of economic retaliation with adverse effects on interests and communities in this country which should be of some concern to the President. Needless to say, any notion of a Presidential trip in these circumstances would be absurd and, as has been previously pointed out to you, the cancellation of the trip will merely add to the momentum of deteriorating relations. (Incidentally, there is evidence that Treasury, either on its own or with White House blessing, has already threatened the Canadians with cancellation of the trip as part of the economic bargaining.) *Instead, the trip ought to be used as a means to keep the negotiations open until the Canadian election,*³ after which Trudeau will be able to make concessions which now would kill him politically.

³ October 30, 1972.

Recommendation:

It is essential that you talk to Secretary Connally on this matter before Treasury freezes the position and goes public.⁴

⁴ There is no indication of action by Kissinger. Kissinger and Connally met for lunch at the Treasury Department on March 7. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) No record of their meeting has been found. A March 16 briefing paper by the NSC Staff for Kissinger suggested that he tell Connally that mutual retaliatory actions during the President's April 13–15 visit to Canada would not be helpful. The paper recommended that Kissinger ask Connally to develop a negotiating scenario for after the Canadian elections. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 290, Agency Files, Treasury, Vol. III)

111. Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, March 29, 1972.

Dear Mel:

I appreciate your early reply to my memorandum of February 16,² concerning our trade arrangements with Canada in the defense area.

There is a need for us to come to grips promptly with the trade problems we have with the Canadians for several major reasons. A large part of our overall trade and payments deficit results from our large payments deficit with Canada. Economic forces are at work which will continue the deterioration in our bilateral position with that country in the years ahead. The trends we anticipate are highlighted in the enclosed analysis³ prepared by my staff.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 472, President's Trip Files, Canada. Confidential. The original is a copy that Connally sent to the White House on April 7. In a covering note to Haldeman, he wrote: "I think the President ought to see this before he goes to Canada." An April 11 memorandum from Lawrence Higby of the White House Staff to Haldeman, also attached, reads: "This should go to Kissinger first. 9:00 A.M.—4/11/72." Haldeman annotated: "Right—but it must go to P.[resident] by tomorrow." Additional annotation on Higby's memorandum reads: "Sonnenfeldt/Hormats have action (HAK has c[opy])." Higby's memorandum was initialed by Haig. A memorandum from Connally to the President, suggesting strategy for his meeting with Trudeau, is *ibid*.

² A copy is *ibid*. Laird replied in a March 3 letter. (*Ibid*.)

³ Not printed.

A significant part of our deficit arises from identifiable U.S. military expenditures in Canada exceeding \$200 million annually. The various U.S. agencies have agreed that the outlook for an increased level of Canadian procurement in the U.S. is bleak. As you point out in your letter, Canadian defense expenditures have fallen. At 2.6 percent of GNP, their defense expenditures are the lowest of all NATO members except Luxembourg. Their policy towards NATO and our common defense appears to be one of retraction rather than acceptance of an equitable sharing of the burden. This situation cannot be ignored as we seek ways of correcting our trade problems.

There are several aspects of the Defense Production Sharing Arrangement (DPSA) which concern me.

The Canadians seem to view the Arrangement not as a security arrangement at all, but as another commercial venture. Indeed, the primary responsibility for the Arrangement in Canada has been transferred from the Defense Ministry to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce.

The arrangement itself is clearly one-sided. It confers on Canada privileged access to our market which we extend to no other NATO ally. At the same time, it acknowledges that Canada need not even *consider* procurement in the United States, if Canadian sourcing is "justifiable." Under the circumstances, withdrawal of the Buy America exemption is hardly likely to lead to further reductions in Canadian purchase here, as presumably they now only buy in the United States what they cannot get in Canada or cannot buy elsewhere at a better price. If Canada must be treated as part of the defense production base of this country, we must at least ensure that U.S. participation in this base we have created is on terms at least as favorable as those enjoyed by Canada.

There is no question in my mind concerning the importance of Canada's strategic role in the joint defense of the North American continent. Both governments have expressed their agreement on this matter. It seems to me, however, that Canada has equally as much interest in the maintenance of this relationship as we do. The Canadian Defense White Paper published last year⁴ emphasizes unequivocally the priority Canada places on its defense relations with the United States.

"The Government concluded in its defense review that cooperation with the U.S. in North American defense will remain essential so long as our joint security depends on stability in the strategic military

⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence in the Seventies: White Paper on Defence*.

balance. . . . Cooperation between Canada and the U.S. is vital for sovereignty and security.”

The Canadians fully appreciate the important advantages they derive from our special arrangements with them. These include not only the security provided by a powerful allied defense force, but also access to our defense market and technology, plus the economic benefits arising from our large supporting expenditures associated with U.S. defense personnel stationed in Canada.

Our defense arrangements, with Canada and others around the world, should be based on mutually agreed acceptance of the security issues involved. If the neutralization of an outmoded, inequitable trade arrangement can call into question fundamental defense ties, how sound is the foundation of that defense relationship?

We can no longer afford the luxury of subordinating our economic interests to the political and military aspects of our international relations. Our defense agreements should bear clearly identifiable, direct budgetary costs to each party. Efforts to “sweeten” these arrangements through corollary agreements conferring economic or commercial concessions can lead to disputes with the foreign government concerned, create difficulties with Congress, and exact an economic cost to the U.S. not supportable by our present international payments position.

I welcome your offer to explore means of eliminating imbalances with Canada in the defense area. I have asked Deputy Assistant Secretary William Cates of my staff to work with the appropriate officials of your Department to expand our knowledge and appreciation of the basic data pertaining to the Defense Production Sharing Arrangement in order to facilitate efforts towards this end.

Sincerely,

John Connally

112. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Ottawa, April 14, 1972, 9:30–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Prime Minister Trudeau

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Ivan L. Head, Legislative Assistant to the Prime Minister

The President was met at the front door by the Prime Minister and was escorted to the Prime Minister's office on the second floor for the head-to-head talks.

Prime Minister Trudeau thanked the President warmly for paying a visit to Canada and for being true to his word. The Prime Minister also expressed appreciation for our letting Canada float its dollar and for the President's letter informing the Prime Minister of the results of the Peking Summit.²

The Prime Minister was eager to discuss global issues, and policy toward China and the USSR. There was the context of interdependence, but there was also the context of independence; this was important to Canada psychologically. Canadians were impressed by the President's attitude as expressed in the Nixon Doctrine.

The Prime Minister continued that it was important that the U.S. understand that Canadians understood our need to take tough steps. In their own minds they were prepared to make substantial concessions on such issues as military procurement, tourist allowances and citrus. The Prime Minister was sure that in Secretary Connally's mind Canada

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Prime Minister's office. Nixon visited Canada April 13–15. For texts of his public statements, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 530–543.

² Nixon and Trudeau exchanged correspondence on the President's trip to Beijing in February. The exchange was sent to the Embassy in Ottawa in telegram 31693, February 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 750, Presidential Correspondence, Canada Trudeau corres.) According to an undated memorandum from Kissinger to the President, the meeting with Trudeau "will provide the opportunity for a review of your trip to Peking." (Ibid., Box 472, President's Trip Files, Visit of Richard Nixon to Canada)

was not going far enough.³ The Prime Minister had great sympathy for the Secretary's position and repeated that Canada was willing to make unilateral concessions.

The President said that he too wanted to spend a substantial amount of time in their conversation on international affairs. In our bilateral relations, we had to bargain hard in the short run. But the negotiations would continue.

The Prime Minister said, "We will give you everything you need" on nine-tenths of the issues on which we differed, except for the auto-trade matter. That we would handle possibly by resuming discussions. The responsibility lay with Secretary Connally.

The President then turned to global matters, noting that Canada had relations with Peking that the U.S. did not have. It was clear that Peking was interested in political relations, not economics. They had a completely different philosophy: The U.S. talked of peace, the Chinese talked of justice. They talked to us because they were in a dangerous situation. They had many motives: contempt for the Indians, fear of the Soviets, fear of Japan. One might have thought that the U.S., being white, was the most unlikely to have a close relationship.

The Prime Minister said that he could see what was in it for them. But what was in it for us?

The President said it had to do with the Russian game. The Russian concern was with the East. When the President had announced the China initiative on July 15, the Kremlinologists were afraid that it would ruin the chances for good relations with Moscow. On the contrary, what would ruin the chances for Moscow was defeat in Vietnam. We would not go to Moscow hat in hand. Neither of the two super powers must do anything to get themselves into a confrontation with each other. The point of the game was that it was a country's own interests and not its affection that determined influence. The President then mentioned SALT, which he said has moved ahead very well. We could have all these things—but not in the context of a U.S. defeat.

The most important part of the Shanghai communiqué,⁴ the President noted, was the part containing the agreement on basic principles.

³ A March 28 briefing memorandum prepared for Kissinger informed him that the Canadian Government had been taking a hard line in the trade negotiations and that Prime Minister Trudeau had criticized the U.S. position on changes in the 1965 automobile pact. Connally reportedly was working on recommendations for the President's April 13–15 trip. The paper noted the "passion" Connally evoked in Canada and questioned whether he should accompany the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 290, Agency Files, Treasury, Vol. III) Connally did not accompany the President to Canada.

⁴ Dated February 27. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 379–381.

Prime Minister Trudeau again expressed admiration for the Nixon Doctrine. What had started out as pulling back had now turned into a beautiful exercise of exerting our influence skillfully, throwing our weight now one way and now another.

Other issues, particularly bilateral ones, were discussed in the course of the conversation. The Prime Minister conveyed his personal interest in expanding cooperation with us in the marine sciences, on which he and the President had corresponded in 1970.⁵

At about 11:45 a.m., the head-to-head talks broke up and the President and Prime Minister walked down the hall to join the plenary talks being held in the Cabinet Room between Secretary Rogers and External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp. After about twenty minutes, the President left the meeting and met privately in Mr. Sharp's office with opposition leader Robert Stanfield for a brief conversation.⁶

⁵ Trudeau's October 20, 1970, letter and the President's December 18 reply are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 750, Presidential Correspondence, Canada Trudeau corres.

⁶ Memoranda of conversation covering the discussions prior to the arrival of the President and Prime Minister and the talks that followed their arrival are *ibid.*, Box 471, President's Trip Files, Canada 1972. No record of the Nixon-Stanfield meeting was found.

113. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 25, 1972.

SUBJECT

US/Canada Trade Discussions

Assistant Secretary of Commerce Harold Scott has written to give you his version of what has taken place in our trade negotiations with Canada since August 15, 1971. He states that in the seven major meetings which have been held at the Assistant Secretary level and above, the US never had an agreed-upon position or objective. Rather,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 671, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. III. No classification marking. Sent for information. Concurred in by Sonnenfeldt. Initialed by Kissinger.

the US probed for areas where Canada might be agreeable to either unilateral concessions or concessions for which the US would pay a minimal cost. He believes, further, that the mood in these discussions—except for the December 6 meeting at the White House²—was conciliatory, courteous and characterized by the Canadians' desire to be helpful without abandoning their traditionally tough negotiating stance and their awareness of their domestic political climate. In Scott's opinion, had the US ever made a firm proposal the Canadians would have gone further than they have. However, not knowing what the US objectives were, the Canadians displayed caution in commenting on individual points until the dimensions of the entire package were clearly visible to them.

Scott believes that, given the importance and magnitude of US trade and investment and its critical contribution to overall US/Canada relations, it is important that the President understand that throughout the trade discussions the Canadians demonstrated a desire to be helpful and at no time displayed an indifferent, intransigent, or truculent attitude.

Scott's observations are on the whole well taken. However, it is true that Paul Volcker—privately and outside of the interagency negotiating context—provided the Canadians with a trade package acceptable to the U.S. This was rejected by the Canadians. And it does appear that in rejecting the Volcker package they backed off at least one commitment which we thought we had obtained from them in earlier discussions.

The moral of this unpleasant saga in our relations with Canada is that in the future we should have a clear picture of the type of package we want and ensure that the country with whom we are negotiating does likewise, and that we should scrupulously avoid "going public" to the point that the issues become so politically charged that it is difficult for either country to enter into compromises necessary to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement.

² See Document 109.

114. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, September 29, 1972, 2042Z.

Secto 29/3577. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Sharp (Canada), September 28, 1972, 12:00 noon, Waldorf 35A.

1. Participants: Canada—Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp, Ambassador Marcel Cadieux, Permanent Rep. Dr. Saul Rae, Mr. Klaus Goldschlag, Director-General, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Mr. J.H. Taylor, Staff Assistant, Mr. Richard Gorham; US—The Secretary, Mr. de Palma, Mr. Stoessel, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Holiday, Mr. Blankinship (reporting officer).

2. *Summary*: The FM explained that his forthcoming article on Canadian foreign policy² is not anti-US—though it might be misinterpreted. Despite some misgivings about the difficulties of defining terrorism, FM said Canada would support US in seeking a UN resolution and convention. The Secretary outlined the US position on the ME, Vietnam, Taiwan, CSCE and MBFR. The Secretary agreed with FM that the GDR should not be given observer status at present UN session. FM touched lightly on bilateral questions since these are being worked upon by many Canadian and US agencies.

3. Foreign Minister's article on US/Canadian relations: The FM explained he asked for ten minutes alone with the Secretary to explain article he is publishing in Canada regarding US/Canadian relations. He rejects the idea that Canada go it alone and a second option, US-Canadian integration. He favors a "third option" which is actually happening—a moderate and pragmatic course—which recognizes that policies of both the US and Canada are rapidly changing and accommodates to them. The Secretary said that no American would be upset by the choice of a third option.

4. Terrorism: FM said that Canada would support the US resolution on terrorism.³ He discussed the complexities of problems the American proposal seeks to meet. Difficult cases arise: for example, a Puerto Rican arrested in Canada for a crime committed in Puerto Rico protested on Canadian TV against deportation to Puerto Rico on the grounds that he could not get a fair trial there. Canada has Croatian na-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 CAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ottawa. Rogers was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly session.

² Canada, Department of External Relations, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," *International Perspectives* (Autumn 1972).

³ A/C.6/L.851; for text, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1972, pp. 643-644.

tionalists who pose a problem. This is not an abstract matter but poses complications for Canadian law enforcement agencies. He suggested introduction of the US terrorism resolution at the outset of the UN session was premature. The Secretary replied that we acted forcefully to a problem needing immediate action, but we encourage views and suggestions of other countries. He said terrorism will have to be defined but the problem needs to be met head on. The US Airplane Pilots Association demands action and even Algeria welcomes action against hijackers. World attention must be focused on the problem. FM concluded that while he wanted the US to be aware of the subtleties of the problem from the Canadian point of view, Canada would not raise such questions in the UN debate.

5. Middle East: Responding to the FM's question about ME, the Secretary said that we intend to take no initiatives for the time being. Until the Munich massacre⁴ we were encouraged but that incident obscured the situation. Still, we are reasonably optimistic about the long term prospects.

6. Vietnam: The Secretary answering FM's query said we still hope to obtain a negotiated settlement but this will probably not be possible before the election. A negotiated settlement within a few months, however, is likely.

7. FM's trip to China: He said that during his recent trip to China he found very little criticism of the US, except regarding Vietnam. The Chinese did not think it would be useful to continue the Control Commission, nor did they see a need for international observers. Most amazing was the depth of hostility toward the USSR. Chou En-lai spent one hour scathingly denouncing the Soviets.

8. Taiwan: The Secretary responding to FM replied we have an agreed formula for dealing with Taiwan and we do not intend to follow the Japanese example. Additionally we support Taiwan membership in the IMF and we intend to continue to help Taiwan out economically. The FM mentioned several possible means by which Canada might approach the Taiwan membership in IMF problem—since Canada begins from an opposite pole. Secretary said perhaps best to put off facing problem as PRC had not applied yet for membership in IMF.

9. 25 percent assessment: FM said Canada would support US on assessment proposal but hoped we would do nothing to encourage others to shirk responsibility. If US acted unilaterally it would give an

⁴ On September 5, Palestinian terrorists belonging to the Black September Organization seized part of the Olympic compound in Munich housing Israeli team members. After a day-long stalemate, German authorities attempted to ambush the terrorists as they tried to board an aircraft taking them to safety. The attempt failed. All eleven athlete hostages, five terrorists, and one German police officer were killed.

excuse to others to do same and fail to support projects with which they do not agree. The Secretary said that the American people are rather disillusioned with the UN and its ineffectiveness. We have decided to be less wary in using the veto.

10. GDR observer status: FM said Gromyko hinted to him about possible observer status for GDR at present session. FM said this would complicate negotiations between GDR and FRG. It would be regrettable to disrupt them. The Secretary agreed.

11. CSCE and MBFR: The FM asked about CSCE and MBFR. The Secretary said that in deference to the Russians we are not using the words "linkage" or "parallelism" but we are preparing for both meetings in the same time frame.

12. Extradition treaty: FM handed over the text of a proposed amendment to the extradition treaty concluded between Canada and the US last year.⁵

13. *Comment:* The FM said there is remarkably little discussion of Canadian US relations in the Canadian election campaign. A few wish to exploit it but receive little support. The basic issue is domestic problems. The FM's presentation was very orderly, efficient and the tone of exchange of views excellent.

Rogers

⁵ The treaty was signed in Washington on December 3, 1971. (27 UST 983; TIAS 8237)

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Canadian Relations (Part 1 of 8)

PARTICIPANTS*U.S.*

The Deputy Secretary

The Hon. W. C. Armstrong, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs

The Hon. W. J. Stoessel, Jr., Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The Hon. G. S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The Hon. R. Z. Smith, Minister, U.S. Embassy, Ottawa

W. M. Johnson, Director, EUR/CAN

Canada

The Hon. A. E. Ritchie, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

The Hon. Marcel Cadieux, Ambassador to the U.S.

The Hon. J. R. McKinney, Minister, Canadian Embassy

The Hon. K. B. Williamson, Minister, Canadian Embassy

K. W. MacLellan, Head, U.S.A. Division, Department of External Affairs

The Deputy Secretary welcomed Under-Secretary Ritchie and his Canadian colleagues and said he looked forward to a meeting in which a free and frank exchange of views could take place. He stressed that the meeting was in no way a negotiating session. As an appropriate way to begin, he suggested that Mr. Ritchie might wish to discuss his views on the results of the recent Canadian election² and also give an appreciation of the article, published in October, prepared by External Affairs Minister Sharp on U.S.-Canadian relations.³

Mr. Ritchie responded that he looked forward to the day's talks and agreed that they should prove most valuable. He concurred that the session was not to be a negotiating one.

Article on U.S.-Canadian Relations

Addressing himself to the Sharp article, Mr. Ritchie said that the Government had decided that a more methodical approach to the con-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CAN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Johnson and cleared in U on January 5, 1973.

² In the October 30 elections for a Federal Parliament, Trudeau's Liberals won 109 seats, losing their existing majority of 155; the Progressive Conservatives also took 109 seats, the New Democracy Party won 31, the Social Credit Party gained 15, and 2 independents were elected. Trudeau announced his intention to govern and reshuffled his Cabinet.

³ See footnote 2, Document 114.

cept and conduct of U.S.-Canadian relations was needed. The papers issued in 1970 on *A Foreign Policy for Canadians* had not included a special section on relations with the U.S., and it had been recognized that there was a gap in the over-all view. The Sharp article was not a bureaucratic or academic production, but a Government paper which had been substantially reworked by Minister Sharp himself. The article's third option of reducing Canada's vulnerability to outside forces, particularly from the U.S., was an "eminently rational" approach which would be regarded as the minimum possible by any Canadian Government. The recent election did not invalidate or lessen the significance of the article, and it might be of even more value given a minority government in Ottawa. It might serve to restrain anti-American feeling. Mr. Ritchie hoped there would be serious discussion of it in Canadian circles.

Canadian Election

Mr. Ritchie suggested the following reasons for Prime Minister Trudeau's set-back in the October 30 election: Trudeau's reputation for arrogance, inadequate explanation to the country of the Liberal Party program, efficient organization by the opposition parties, the issues of inflation and unemployment, the immigration issue and recent influx of East Asians from Uganda, and various local issues. He noted that foreign policy itself was not an issue.⁴

Concerning effects of the election results on U.S.-Canadian relations, Mr. Ritchie surmised that our problems would be greater than in the past, since even more pressure could be expected from Canadians for resistance to the "continental pull" of the U.S. Continentalism, as in the energy field, would be viewed as more questionable. The hope of achieving an energy arrangement would be a degree more unrealistic than in the past. The Government was compelled to take action against unemployment, especially in Quebec and the Maritimes, and to focus more attention on resolving regional disparities. As an aspect of regional development, the Michelin situation could present any government with "extremely difficult problems."

Mr. Ritchie saw as the most troublesome aspect of our relations the possibility that the U.S. would ask most of Canada when it could do

⁴ In a telephone conversation with Kissinger on November 2 at 10:01 a.m., Ivan Head provided this post-mortem of the Canadian election: "the rather unofficial polls that have been taken since [the election] and these are more voluntary polls by persons of all persuasions who have been flooding us with correspondence and telegrams is to the effect that their desire was not to defeat the government and they haven't quite done that but they sure came close, but rather to _____ us to clip the wings of the Prime Minister—to cut the government down to size a bit, they thought it was just being a bit too arrogant and what they wanted to do was build up the strength of the opposition but in a parliamentary system there is no real way of doing that without doing what they almost did." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Blank underscore is an omission in the original.

least. There would be some differences between the parties which would be muted, but others would be sharpened. The New Democratic Party emphasized the problems of inflation and unemployment, but was not ideological. Mr. Ritchie said he hoped that Ottawa had the U.S. "ear" and its understanding. He ventured that perhaps U.S. global policy might have more bearing on Canadian problems and U.S.-Canadian relations. He concluded by saying "don't forget us."

U.S. Outlook

Mr. Irwin thanked Mr. Ritchie for his review and noted that many of Canada's domestic problems had their counterparts in the U.S. The U.S. had had a serious problem of inflation and a balance of payments deficit, which the Administration had taken action to moderate. It had tried to carry forward its economic program, which it had done until August 15, 1971. The Administration had also been faced with non-relations with the PRC and relations with the USSR which were not good. Its objective had also been to moderate these situations. The Administration gave its firm support to NATO, though there were some voices which said that improvement of relations with the PRC and the USSR would mean less emphasis on Europe, Canada, and NATO. The Administration's policy centered on the belief that the best foundation for a strong political and strategic position in the world lay in its relations with Europe.

The Administration was determined to be active and constructive in world affairs, and Mr. Irwin believed that there were few, including members of the Congress, who would challenge this precept. The U.S. had greater flexibility now that the relations had been begun with the PRC and were improving with the USSR. Relations with the PRC would help the U.S. in its relations with the USSR, though the U.S. did not seek to play off one against the other. SALT was of great significance in the broadest context of U.S.-USSR relations, as well as being of intrinsically great strategic importance. There is no denying Soviet expansionist policies, but the world is better off if one tries to work out better relations with the USSR. The CSCE carries the risk of creating euphoria about the possibilities of détente, but there will be no deviation from the U.S. regard of NATO's defense structure as basic to Western security.

Mr. Irwin observed that while our military and defense interests are not less, economic and monetary problems have loomed as greater ones to preoccupy us in the months ahead. This concern is illustrated in the third option of the Sharp article. Mr. Irwin noted that we have strong and fundamental ties with Canada in economic, political and strategic terms. The U.S. placed a high value on Canada's cooperation in NATO, the ICC in Indochina, and the field of environmental protection. But economic relations with Europe and Canada have developed

a critical significance, and they could be troublesome as philosophical problems or, at worst, affect our fundamental relationship.

Mr. Irwin observed that in our handling of economic problems it was important to understand each other. It was recognized that the problems had political, nationalistic, and emotional overlays, but it was important to know what lay behind these feelings. A reading of the Sharp article, for example, gives us misgivings about the emphasis placed on Canadian economic independence in contrast with our hope for freer multilateral trade. To the extent that Canada develops a "new industrial strategy" and more artificial restraint of trade, the U.S. could face trade problems which might be worked out by bilateral consultation or might have to be resolved by unilateral action. The energy crisis faced in the U.S. is one problem for which we hope a mutually satisfactory solution can be found. The U.S. has a very real concern over the way Canada plans to pursue any policy of economic independence.

Mr. Ritchie responded that the article's third option was not an isolationist one, but, rather, called for a more active development of foreign markets. Concerning the U.S. desire to improve relations with the PRC and the USSR, he said Canada could applaud and welcome such efforts. Canada hopes that Canada will not be forgotten. Referring again to the Sharp article, Mr. Ritchie said that it expresses the aim of increasing the efficiency of the Canadian economy, thus reducing Canada's vulnerability to foreign impact. These two aims are the objectives in mind, and the measure of the policy's success will be gauged against their achievement. Mr. Irwin added that we too shared the concern over unemployment and regional depression and that there was no intention of condemning the entire policy outright.

Mr. Armstrong stated that economic problems were in the forefront of our concern. Japan and Canada were first among our trading partners, and we would have to focus upon our trade relations with them in the next couple of years. Economic relations with the Communist countries were not very important and would not produce any solution of our balance of payments problem. Reflecting on Mr. Ritchie's request that Canada not be forgotten, he said the chances were slim of Canada's being overlooked.

Mr. Ritchie stated that Canada was involved in many multilateral economic discussions, and he believed our objectives were much the same. Mutual understanding was necessary to avoid conflict. Mr. Irwin agreed and said we must both exercise wisdom to avoid creating real problems. He urged the most serious efforts to avoid the kind of pitfalls which the democratic process can so often create.

Mr. Ritchie responded that in Canada there was a great tendency to indulge in scoring off the other, Canada versus the U.S. Canada could appreciate the U.S. balance of payments problem, but it felt

strongly about its own problem of running a current account deficit of close to \$1 billion. Canada had to do something about unemployment and regional disparities, but perhaps by discussion and consultation the two countries could get along.

Mr. Irwin cited the Michelin case as an example of how a trade problem was created by Canada for the U.S. The Michelin company was located in Canada with the purpose of exporting to the U.S., and it had received subsidies to start up operations. We could recognize the problem and sympathize with Canada's concern, but a problem was created for us. We have to find an answer for such problems and perhaps work out standards for how to solve them in order to avoid conflict. The U.S. has been engaged in handling the problems of depressed areas in one way, and Canada might be able to handle the Michelin situation in some helpful way.

Mr. Ritchie said that an adverse decision in the Treasury Department's consideration of countervailing duty action against Michelin could "tear things" and have the most serious effects in Canada given its present unstable political situation. The Canadian Government had to look across the board in making its decisions, not just at the Michelin case and the Automotive Products Agreement. Mr. Irwin replied that the third option had inherent problems for the U.S. and appeared to be much different from the first option in the Sharp article. Ambassador Cadieux interjected that the third option was not very different from the first; it is "still female but younger". Mr. Ritchie added that when there was a choice of emphasis for the Government with no difference in cost, the obvious decision was to help export-oriented industries. He said he assumed that the Congress and the American public would be as interested as ever in the auto pact, but stressed that this matter, too, is a very sensitive issue in Canada.

Mr. Irwin stated that the OECD can be an efficient organization in international economic matters and can do some things which cannot be done under the IMF or GATT. He voiced the hope that Mr. Ritchie could attend the "new style" OECD meeting, but Mr. Ritchie replied that he had been unable to make this arrangement. Mr. Irwin stated it was his hope to increase communication with the EC, though dialogue was hard to get going. We did not wish to suggest any structured form of dialogue which could cause resistance, but we did want to achieve better communication with the EC as well as with Japan and Canada.

France

116. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, January 13, 1969, 1820Z.

486. Dept pass immediate USUN eyes only for Ambassador Shriver.

1. When Chargé saw Pompidou today (Jan 13) on another matter (see septel)² Pompidou very clearly indicated he expects "return to power" probably as chief of state within next year. Although he did not say so directly he indicated his belief that de Gaulle would quit or be out of power with coming year, and that he would be called by broad spectrum of political forces to take over. Pompidou said he arranging his own activities accordingly. He making series of visits throughout France. (His latest was to area west of Marseille.) He wants to insure that these visits do not receive so much publicity as to make him a political target. Nevertheless, he wants French leaders in Paris and in provinces to be aware of his ideas about what is wrong in France, while avoiding open clash with de Gaulle.

2. Pompidou said he also plans to make series of visits to other countries to establish himself in public eyes as authority on foreign affairs. His first trip will be to Italy where most important part of trip will be visit to Pope. He leaves for Rome on Jan 15. Thereafter he plans to visit several other European countries, including Soviet Union, and also hopes to visit US later: in latter connection he said it important for him that nothing be said about trip to US at this time.

3. Pompidou quite pessimistic about way France being governed today. He thinks maximum firmness should be used to control students, workers and economic speculators at this time, but he says that for reasons which completely escape him, de Gaulle not reacting with necessary firmness. He predicted that unless firmer measure taken to control dissident elements and to give confidence to French people, "I will be faced by a France with fascist tendencies and fascist demands for strong government by time it comes my turn for power, and that is something which must be avoided at all costs."

4. Pompidou said that Edgar Faure making major mistake in application of educational reform. He, Pompidou, 100 percent in favor of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 485 from Paris, January 13. (Ibid.)

university reforms, but he opposed role assigned to students. He added that he being careful not to say too much on this subject for fear of getting into fight with de Gaulle, but said most French leaders know his position.

5. *Comment:* Pompidou was amazingly outspoken in his remarks about his political ambitions, although most French leaders believe, without knowing for sure, that Pompidou is working hard to be France's next President. Probable reason for Pompidou's frankness with us is his desire that we know of his plans so that we may take them into consideration in our own thinking. It extremely important that what Pompidou has told us be held in complete confidence.

Blake

117. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

The French View of the Four-Power Talks

Nanteuil, head of the Mid-East department in the French Foreign Office, came in to see me with Ambassador Lucet this afternoon. He had spent almost two hours with Joe Sisco in State this noon. As you know, he came on General de Gaulle's instructions to explain France's position. A full summary of the main points of our conversation is attached.²

My reaction after hearing him is that France's position is less pro-Soviet than had been thought and might even turn out to be helpful. It is probable that France is interested for domestic reasons in maintaining good relations with the U.S. They may also be genuinely concerned that we are about to start bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union and hope to participate.

In either case, we may be able to take advantage of the French attitude by pressing for some sought-after concessions with France on a bi-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files, France, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

² Not printed.

lateral basis or, by ultimately entering four-power talks with France and the U.K. lined-up with us on a three-to-one basis against the Soviets. This is the flexible game plan we should seek to follow as we move down the road on this issue.

118. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, March 1, 1969.

PRESENT

President Nixon
General De Gaulle
Mr. Andronikov
MG Walters

After the usual amenities the President said that he hoped that at the enlarged meeting trade and monetary matters could be taken up. He hoped that at this meeting the General would give his evaluation of the European countries and the future as well as his views on Vietnam. As he knew, there was new harrassment in Germany and the President would appreciate his views on any other subject General De Gaulle felt was appropriate.² General De Gaulle said he was quite agreeable to proceed in this manner. The President said that his feeling in regard to Germany was that without being provocative or belligerent we must be firm in defending our access to Berlin because the action being taken had been directed by the Soviet Union and did not bear any relation to the holding of the election of the new Federal President there. The General said that the Soviets were concerned at the fact that the Germans were again becoming a real power on both sides of the Wall. They

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Grand Trianon in Versailles. Presidents de Gaulle and Nixon held discussions focusing on the Soviet Union on February 28, on armaments and the U.S. role in Europe on the afternoon of March 1, and on economic matters and Vietnam on March 2. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid.* The portion of the March 2 memorandum of conversation on economic matters is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 7. For Nixon's recollections of these meetings, see Nixon, *RN*, pp. 371–375.

² Telegram 2501 from Paris, February 19, had reported that de Gaulle was "concerned as much, or more, about the German question than any other political issues he will be discussing with President Nixon." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. I)

would not accept German rearmament. That would involve Germany again having real military power. The election of the Federal President of Germany was not in accord with the Statute of Berlin.³ The Allies were there as victorious powers and not the Federal Republic. For the Federal Republic this was a good opportunity as Germany is gaining political and military consistence. The Soviets had therefore seized this occasion of the election of the Federal President to manifest themselves. For the U.S., France and the U.K. it is a tough situation.

The President said that there was no doubt that under the Statute of Berlin we had the right to military access. General De Gaulle said that the French had no doubt on this. The four powers did have the right of military access to Berlin and the Soviets had not contested this.

The President then said he would like to hear the General's views on the future of Europe, the countries of Europe—Germany in particular—in the light of the effects of a possible détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They had spoken previously of the effects on Western Europe⁴ and he wondered what the effect on Western Europe would be in regard to their will to defend themselves. What would be the effect on the Communist Parties of Europe, particularly in Italy where they were very strong.

General De Gaulle said that as the President had seen in Brussels, London, Bonn, Berlin and Rome,⁵ there was no Europe. There might be someday but there was not at present. These are countries all more or less diminished. Two of them had been defeated and two had won victory with the U.S. but had suffered great loss or diminution. These were the U.K. and France. Two had been defeated, Germany and Italy. There were other countries such as Belgium and Holland which were respectable but did not carry real weight. These four countries were very different. They always had been and were now more than ever. They were different by language, different by customs, and this had been going on for centuries and even thousands of years. England was made for overseas trade. She faced out on the ocean. France and Germany were continental countries and though they had access to the sea, it was not organic to them as it was to the U.K. Italy was a peninsula in the Mediterranean isolated by the Alps. All are different but in what situation

³ Gustav Heinemann had just been elected President of the Federal Republic of Germany. The "Statute of Berlin" is apparently a reference to the Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany, approved September 12, 1944, and subsequently modified and elaborated on June 5, 1945, then by the zonal agreement on the administration of Berlin, July 7, and by agreements on air and land corridors of November 28, 30, and December 6, 1945. For texts of these agreements, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1–6, 38–40, 43–44, 69–75.

⁴ During their February 28 conversation.

⁵ During the President's February 23–March 2 European trip.

did they find themselves? U.K., France and Italy had regained their frontiers and had democratic regimes. But in fact they were lessened and felt this fact. The Germans who were the cause of all the misfortunes of WW I & II were in a special situation. They were cut in two and watched by the Soviets as well as by the Soviet Satellites, especially the Poles. They are in a situation of inferiority and lessened. Not economically but politically they were not really independent. They were obliged to ask for and accept a U.S. protectorate as they could not hold without it. This was not the case with France. She was not at the same level as when Versailles had been built. She had recovered her national reality. She did not need a protectorate though she was happy to have friends and if need be allies, but not a protectorate. Italy needed it less than Germany but she had to rely on the U.S. for arms and for her security. The U.K. could do without U.S. protectorate but for finance, trade and military reasons she felt she had to have a special policy to obtain preference from the U.S. This had been going on since Churchill. The British had been willing to accept being subordinate to the U.S. France, Italy, Germany and the U.K. were fundamentally different. We might regret this and wish it were otherwise. It's a pity they cannot be put together but this is not possible as they are too different—their interests are too different and their situation relative to the U.S. is very different.

The General said he would then speak of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. Though these countries were different in the light of the Soviet threat which had existed and still existed, they had the common interest of not wanting to be invaded by the Soviet Union which had enormous power now which it did not have before. That is why the Atlantic Alliance was natural. If Europe were attacked, the U.S. would stand with them. That was the Alliance and it was a good thing when it was done. So long as a Soviet threat exists and real *détente* was not achieved the Alliance must be maintained. It represented the commitment of the U.S. to Europe and of Europe to the U.S. that in case of a Soviet attack, all would stand together. This must be maintained. The General said he would then say a word about NATO.

NATO is in fact an integration under U.S. Command of the military forces of European countries. This is the real truth. Defense against the Soviets was programmed under U.S. command and if there were war, it would be fought under U.S. command. Such a commitment in advance meant in reality the acceptance of the idea of giving up a real national policy and national defense. Such a concept could be justified at a time when Russia was threatening European countries who were willing to accept anything in order to be defended by the U.S. At the time NATO was organized only the U.S. had nuclear weapons and thus it meant the defense of Europe by U.S. nuclear forces. All of this is now changed, first because the Soviet Union is less threatening. He could

not say she would not again be so in the future. The countries of Europe and France in particular had recovered their national substance and some had even developed nuclear weapons. The U.S. was no longer the only country with nuclear weapons. The USSR also had them. The protection of Europe by the U.S. was no longer the same as in 1947 when NATO was first conceived. France was remaining in the Alliance as an ally of the U.S. She had said this at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis⁶ and on many other occasions. He would repeat it now, that if there was war, France would stand with the U.S. and while favorable and faithful to the Alliance, France did not want to stay in an integrated organization.

The General said that after giving his opinion concerning France, he would say a word about the others later. Integration to him was worth nothing. It was a sort of renunciation of defense. If there were a NATO war, the French would feel it was a U.S. and not a French war. The U.S. could do what it wanted and the French would be at their disposal. This would mean that there would be no national defense. France could not subsist without a national policy and a national defense. If she did not have them, she would revert to a situation where she had 30 political parties. She would have no government and would be greatly weakened. She must have a national policy and a national defense. The best service France could render the Alliance would be to be herself. France with substance would be much more useful than a France who had none.

He would say a word about the other countries. What was true of France was not true for other European countries. It was not true for Germany which needed U.S. protectorate and it was natural for Germany to have it. He had told this to the Germans a hundred times. He had told it to Kiesinger who had perhaps reported it to President Nixon. The French had never suggested that the Germans should get out of NATO. Italy had good economic situation but it was not a strong country and it was normal for it to be under U.S. protectorate also. It was likewise natural for Belgium and the Netherlands to remain in NATO and he had never asked them to get out. The U.K., like France, could have chosen not to be in NATO while belonging to the Alliance but not having its own national defense the British believed it was more practical to be under U.S. protectorate. They had developed atomic weapons with French help. This was not the case with France. For linguistic, commercial and monetary reasons British wished to remain at-

⁶ During an October 22, 1962, meeting with Presidential envoy Dean Acheson, de Gaulle had stated his support for the United States in its confrontation with the Soviet Union over Cuba. See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 46.

tached to the U.S. He had never told them they should get out of the Alliance as had been alleged recently. The Alliance was natural and France remained in it but it was necessary for France to have a national policy and a national defense and not to be part of an integrated organization. The Germans were divided, Italy had no resources, and the United Kingdom had deliberately chosen to be second and subordinate to the U.S. The Benelux, the Scandinavians, the Greeks and the Turks need U.S. protection. For himself, he would say to the Atlantic Alliance, certainly, and to NATO, he would say no. For other countries who wished to belong to the Alliance France had no objection.

The President said that he thought he understood the General's position better than he had previously. Whatever the differences in their approach might be, he felt the best course was to proceed with the facts as they were. Under these circumstances he would like to urge that within the General's concepts the closest military consultation and such assistance as seemed appropriate under the independent position the General had enumerated could be rendered. Secondly, as he had told the French Defense Minister,⁷ he took a different view of the French nuclear deterrent. He thought it was good for the U.S. to have another power like France with a nuclear capability. Looking down the road to the future in nuclear matters and as European cooperation develops the French nuclear capability might well provide a base. The President hoped we could have an extension of military cooperation consistent with the French independent position.

General De Gaulle said that insofar as military relations were concerned, he had no objection to France having military relationships with the U.S., whose allies they were. What they did not like was that these relations were always proposed under a NATO guise. The French did not want NATO. They did not mind talking to the U.S. but did not want to do it through NATO. General Lemnitzer whom he greatly esteems was the head of NATO and when he asked why they did not have satisfactory relations (and we do have some relations), he is viewed by us as the American cloak for NATO. This they did not like. It was different with the U.S. with whom they had dealt before and he hoped they could do it again, but he would point out that there are some military relationships between France and the U.S.

The General felt that the Soviet threat to Europe would diminish because of China and this would increase even further if the U.S. and USSR reached a *modus vivendi*. Relations would change; the atmos-

⁷ The President's Daily Diary does not indicate any meeting between Nixon and the French Defense Minister. The President was at a ceremony with the Minister of War Veterans on March 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

phere would change; the situation of Europe was no longer the same. France, U.K., Germany, and in some measure Italy had recovered the military reality and he felt that this threat would continue. He felt that someday it might be possible to concert the policies of the countries of Western Europe and they might perhaps even do this with their defense arrangements. But this, while very possible, was not for today. It might be possible tomorrow. France had always favored this. This is why she had staged a reconciliation with Germany, and that had required a great effort for France; why France entertained good relations with Italy, and had hoped for a different relation with the U.K. but the latter had not helped. Little by little as the Soviet threat lessened or disappeared and the European States took substance, they might be able to get together. There was no Alsace Lorraine; there was no Schleswig Holstein; no colonial problems such as those which had divided Britain and France. It was very possible that these States might draw together and have a concerted policy and a concerted defense. The Atlantic Alliance itself could change and no longer simply be a U.S. protectorate over Europe.

The U.S. defense burden in Europe could be lightened and if war were unfortunately to occur in Europe, the U.S. and the Europeans would be in it together with all their forces. There would be no need of rigorous and immediate integration. The burden for the U.S. of maintaining forces in Germany and other countries and its heavy financial expenditures could, he believed and hoped, be lessened.

The President said that in regard to the present situation of the U.S. forces in NATO and in Germany, all German leaders had told him that any major reduction of the U.S. forces in Europe would be devastating for German morale. What did the General think at this time concerning the U.S. level of forces not so much in the light of a Soviet threat as in the effect of reductions on German morale?

General De Gaulle said that he had told the Germans and would repeat now to the President that he felt it was perfectly natural within the Alliance for the U.S. to maintain forces in Germany though he did not have any fixed view on the levels. Essentially, he felt that it was important that there be substantial U.S. forces in Germany because of the overall situation. If a *détente* with the East were to develop, the U.S. might find it possible to lower the level of its forces in Germany, but that was a U.S. affair not a French affair and they did not wish to mix in it. France maintained forces in Germany and the Germans did not pay for them. They maintained these forces in Germany for the same reasons as the U.S. They might not stay there forever but presently the French would not withdraw them. It was important for the U.S. to keep more than symbolic forces in Germany. France believed this and the

forces she kept there were second only to those of the U.S. and much more than those maintained in Germany by the U.K.

The President said that if the General agreed they might talk for an hour on Sunday.⁸ He would like to have the General's views at that time on Vietnam and Southeast Asia. By that time the President would have been briefed by Lodge and his team. There was one other matter about which they might talk if time permitted. In 1963 when he had talked to the General,⁹ and he was talking privately now, not for public announcements that might embarrass the Soviet Union whether it might not be wise to develop lines of communications with the Soviets and the Chinese and so to speak not put all of our eggs in one basket. There was considerable sentiment in the U.S. State Dept., not only in favor of a Soviet-U.S. détente but also for a lineup of the Soviets, Europe and the U.S. against Chinese. His own view was that while this might be a good short-range policy, he felt that for the longer range it was more important to recognize that our interests might perhaps best be served by recognizing that China and the USSR were two great powers and it might be better to develop parallel relationships with them. This was of course in some measure largely theoretical as it was difficult to have relations with the Chinese.

General De Gaulle said that they could talk about Vietnam on Sunday but he would like to say a word now to tell the President something that he might wish to know before he saw Lodge and that we might perhaps not know. As the negotiations are taking place in Paris, the French have some relations with the Vietnamese, North and South, with the National Liberation Front not the Thieu-Ky government, that is to say with those who were fighting the United States. On the day before yesterday the Chief of the NLF Delegation in Paris, Mr. Tran Buu Kiem, had come to the Quai d'Orsay as he knew that General De Gaulle and President Nixon would talk about Vietnam. He said that if there was a renewed offensive by the North Vietnamese and the NLF in the South and against Saigon, it was because the Paris negotiations were not going well and therefore they had been obliged to step up their military action, but that if the Paris negotiations began moving they might act differently on the terrain in Vietnam. This was what General De Gaulle had wanted to say.

The President said that his position on Vietnam was that we were going to make every effort to bring the war to an end by negotiations consistent with a viable *modus vivendi* for both North and South Vietnam but that if the North Vietnamese and the NLF do step up the at-

⁸ March 2.

⁹ During a June-July 1963 tour of Europe. Nixon discussed the meeting in *RN*, p. 248.

tacks on the cities, he was not one to react lightly to such attacks. He believed that the war had to be ended one way or the other and would not do anything rash. But if we ran into a stone wall in the negotiations then another road might be appropriate. It took two as the General well knew to make peace. We were prepared to be very open minded in the negotiations. The best way to break the log jam might be to have private talks. The NLF and North Vietnamese did not like to do things in public. Whatever help France and the Soviet Union might give would be appreciated. Did the General believe that the Soviets were interested in helping end the war?

General De Gaulle said that he believed that the Soviets did not want it to go on as they did not know what might happen. It cost them a great deal of money as they furnished many things to the North Vietnamese and they had to do this by land, sea and air under difficult conditions and over great distances. They did not want the war to go on forever and he felt that the Soviets were sincere in their desire to see it end. Naturally, they wanted it to end in a manner in accord with their desires, that is to say that all foreigners evacuate Vietnam. They were obliged ideologically and politically to take this position and would hold to it. The war was convenient for their propaganda and made it possible for them to say that the U.S. wanted war and was oppressing people, etc. He was however convinced that the Soviets really wanted the war to end.

The President said that Kosygin had told him¹⁰ that the war in Vietnam cost the Soviet Union a lot of money. General De Gaulle commented that this was true.

General De Gaulle said that before they went to enlarged talks, he wondered if he might bring in the Prime Minister for a few minutes and he would say a few words about China.

The President said that this was agreeable to him and the Prime Minister joined the talks.

The President said that if General Walters would remind him, he would on Sunday say a few words about his decision on the matter of an anti-ballistic missile system. He would make his decision on Tuesday. He wished to speak of this matter in great confidence as the State Department did not know what his decision would be.

General De Gaulle then said that they had been talking about China. What about the possibility of relations with China and how would this affect relationships with the Soviets? Some said that one should try and play the Chinese off against the Soviets and try to divide them. Others felt that it was worth trying to improve relations with

¹⁰ Apparently during his March 1967 visit to the Soviet Union.

both. The French had relations with the Chinese and it had not brought them much advantage except perhaps economically and a bit culturally, but mostly economically and in some cases some exchanges. They had some and might perhaps have more. The Chinese had great economic requirements and diplomatic relations facilitated economic relations. The French had renewed relations with China but had not expected much of it as the Chinese had appeared to be in a state of ebullition. The Cultural Revolution had been accompanied by great agitation and they had done nothing else except agitate. This was not satisfactory for political relations with them. They now appeared to be calming down and returning to a more normal situation. He believed that there was advantage in having relations with them. They were a huge entity and certainly had great resources. They were working and making progress in industry, in technology, in nuclear matters. They had ambitions and actions everywhere, even in Paris, in Africa and in Asia. As time passed they would have more political weight. What attitude should we adopt—that of isolating them and letting them cook in their own juice—of having no opening or contacts with them? He had no illusions but did not feel that we should isolate them in their own rage. We should have exchanges at all levels and we might eventually see the beginnings of a *détente*. How this would affect the Soviets was difficult to know. The Soviets usually recommended that one should have normal relations with the Chinese. They had such relations themselves even though these were not always easy. That, however, was their business. The West should try to get to know China, to have contacts and to penetrate it. We should try to get them to sit at the table with us and offer them openings. The French felt that this was the best policy and we could see what conclusions could be drawn. If the U.S. began to have relations with China this would mean that China would probably get into the UN. This would have much effect and a lot of dust would be stirred up but he did not believe that the overall results would be bad. The Prime Minister queried on this but the General agreed with him.

The President said that he had talked to Malraux on the previous evening.¹¹ He had seen Mao on the eve of the Cultural Revolution and Mao had said that he had to stir up everything otherwise China would go to sleep.

The President said that as he saw it, there were two policies which might be followed, a short range policy and a long range policy. In the short range policy there could be no changes for a number of reasons relating to their impact on Asia. On a long range policy he felt that it

¹¹ Apparently during the official dinner hosted by de Gaulle. No guest list or memoranda of conversation from that meeting were found.

would be detrimental to the interests of the U.S. in 10 years for it to appear that the West was ganging up with the Soviet Union against China. He felt that it was important for the French to extend their communications and keep a line open into China and in looking down the road towards talks with the Soviet Union we might keep an anchor to windward with respect to China. This did not mean that we would do anything so crude as to suggest we play China off against the Soviet Union. The Soviets would resent this bitterly. In 10 years when China had made significant nuclear progress we would have to have more communications than we had today.

General De Gaulle said that the French already had relations with the Chinese and it would be better for the U.S. to recognize China before they were obliged to do it by the growth of China. He felt that this would be better and that was why the French had chosen to do it earlier. General De Gaulle suggested that they might join the other members of their party and the Prime Minister said that they were already there and waiting.

General De Gaulle then wondered what they might talk about with the others.

The President said that it was probable that Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger might like to hear the General's views on Europe and the Alliance and he would ask him to express them at the enlarged talks meeting and with this the talk concluded.¹²

¹² According to the President's Daily Diary, the two leaders were joined by Rogers, Couve de Murville, Kissinger, and Hillenbrand at 10:03 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

119. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Response to de Gaulle's Message to You Regarding the Dutch-UK-German Gas Centrifuge Project

When French National Assembly President Chaban-Delmas spoke to you on March 20² he conveyed a message from General de Gaulle in which the latter expressed concern about the gas centrifuge project for producing enriched uranium which the British, Dutch and Germans are in process of negotiating.

I have conveyed a response through the French Minister³ here, making the points you approved after the California trip.⁴ In essence, these were that you considered the General's concern with great care; that you have looked into the project and understand that it would be placed under the safeguards required by the NPT; and that as long as this was the case and the European countries concerned themselves want to undertake such a project, we are not in a position to oppose it.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. The first page bears the notation: "Pres has seen. H[aig]".

² A memorandum of their conversation is *ibid*.

³ A memorandum for the record, drafted by Sonnenfeldt who carried out the démarche, is attached.

⁴ March 21–23. A memorandum containing the talking points, which bears the President's annotation, "I agree. Follow up," is attached.

120. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 31, 1969, 10–11 a.m.

PRESENT

The President
General de Gaulle
Mr. Andronikov
General Walters

The President opened the conversation by expressing his gratitude for General de Gaulle's attending General Eisenhower's funeral.² General de Gaulle recalled that the President had told him of General Eisenhower's critical illness during his visit to Paris.³

The President said that General de Gaulle would have noted that he had made his decision on the ABM system⁴ as he had told him he would privately when they met in Paris. This was a very controversial decision, but the President felt that it would be approved by a small majority in the Senate and a larger majority in the House, although it was always difficult to predict the Senate and the House. General de Gaulle said that he noted this and that he was grateful to the President for telling him in advance, but made no further comment.

The President said that he welcomed this opportunity to talk to General de Gaulle again about various matters that had come up since they had met in Paris.⁵

Middle East

On the Middle East, the situation seemed perhaps less hopeful than when they had talked previously. We were insisting that the Four-Power approach be continued and were grateful for the close consultations we had had with the General's representatives.⁶ There were some Israelis who felt they could "go it alone," but the President felt that some sort of consensus of the Four Powers was necessary. The whole problem was complicated also by the fact that the Israelis were

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Yellow Oval Room of the White House.

² Former President Eisenhower died on March 28. The State funeral took place on March 30.

³ No record of this discussion was found.

⁴ For the text of the President's statement on the deployment of an ABM system, March 14, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 216–219.

⁵ See Document 118.

⁶ Sisco had been regularly briefing French officials on these issues.

having an election this fall. The President inquired what General de Gaulle's views were on this matter.

General de Gaulle said he agreed with the President that the situation had not improved in the Middle East, and he felt that the only chance for improvement would be some new fact. Such a fact would be an agreement between the Four Powers with, of course, subsequent sanction by the Security Council.

Vietnam

The President then said that on the matter of Vietnam, General de Gaulle would of course understand that any progress could be achieved only through private discussions rather than through public negotiations. It was being closely held, but there had been already one such private contact. An additional new factor was the fact that President Thieu appeared more disposed towards giving the NLF some role in the government than previously. This could lead to a greater possibility of South Vietnamese getting together, but fundamentally the key of this situation lay with the North Vietnamese whether they thought the time was right and whether they wanted peace now. He would be grateful to hear General de Gaulle's views on this.

General de Gaulle then said that the real key to this situation was what the President did, what the United States did. The U.S. was really the master of the situation, and alongside of it the South Vietnamese or the North Vietnamese amounted to very little. He had told the President in Paris that he felt the U.S. should put an end to this war as quickly as possible and indicate that it was leaving this matter to the Vietnamese themselves. This did not mean, of course, that such a departure should be precipitate. It should be organized and planned. He felt that the problem really had to be solved by the South Vietnamese, by the people who supported Thieu, by the Front, and by others who were supporters of neither one nor the other. He felt that the sooner it was clear the U.S. was leaving, the greater would be the willingness of the Thieu regime and the NLF to get together and work out some sort of a solution. Conversely, the longer they believed the U.S. would remain, the less likely they were to arrive at some solution. He felt that when it was clear that the U.S. was going to leave, they would get together and form some sort of a transition government which would have consistency and enable them to go forward. But he repeated that the essential thing was for the U.S. to end the war. If we did so, the power and prestige of the United States would be vastly increased and confidence in it throughout the world would be renewed.

The President said that he was hopeful that we might soon make a proposal which would go further than anything that had been put forward before, leading to the possibility of some sort of constructive ne-

gotiations. The probability was that without fixing any time limit or date, by the end of 1969 there would be some progress in the direction of lessening the U.S. commitment there.

A new factor was the apparent disposition on the part of President Thieu to go further than he had been willing previously. His position today was not what it had been in the past. The President felt that the U.S. and he himself in particular had the confidence of the South Vietnamese, and that this would perhaps make progress possible.

General de Gaulle said that he understood the enormous complexity and difficulty for the President in making decisions in this matter, but he still felt that the essential thing was for the U.S. to make the decision to end this war. He said that the President had asked his opinion about whether or not the North Vietnamese were disposed to make peace at this time. He could not answer directly for them, but he could tell the President something that might be a useful indication. The North Vietnamese Government had recently asked the French Government to make agreements on cultural and technical matters. They wanted to send people to France and, conversely, they wished the French to become further involved in cultural and educational matters in North Vietnam, as they had been in the past. This was to him an indication that their thinking was more oriented towards peace than a continuation of the war.

Franco-German Relations

The President then said that he would like perhaps to talk to the General about another matter which had come up since they had last talked in Paris, and this was the question of Franco/German relations. The Franco/German reconciliation was one of the great achievements of General de Gaulle's Presidency. Many people had believed this could not be done, but he had made it a reality. Recently the President had seen the President of the Chamber of Deputies, who had indicated some concern about the Anglo/German agreement to produce enriched uranium by the ultra centrifuge process.⁷ This and other matters had led him to believe that there was some tension in the Franco/German relationship, and while this was, strictly speaking, none of our business, nevertheless matters affecting the relationships between our mutual friends were of interest to us. The President felt that it was most important that a warm and close relationship between France and Germany be maintained.

General de Gaulle said that the Franco/German reconciliation had taken place. They had felt that it was necessary, and he himself had carried it through. This had been consecrated by a treaty which he had

⁷ Chaban-Delmas, on March 20. See footnote 2, Document 119.

signed with Chancellor Adenauer in 1963,⁸ a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Relationships between France and Germany were very close and numerous. France was Germany's No. 1 supplier and also Germany's No. 1 customer. They were cooperating closely in the economic field in the framework of the Common Market. The Germans had been most anxious for these relations, the French understandably less so in the light of their past experience, but nevertheless this had been necessary and it had been done. The French knew the Germans well. This is why they were prudent in dealing with them. They realized all of the tremendous vitality, drive, and capacity of the Germans. They knew that they had a certain *bonhomie*, but they also had driving ambition which, when it became uncontrolled, had led to bitter experience in the past. The French had experienced this under the German empire with Bismarck in 1870, with William II in 1914–18, and even more terribly with Adolf Hitler. For this reason, the French were determined that the Germans should not possess their own nuclear weapons. The Germans were well aware of this because the French had told them so. They were therefore prudent in their dealings with the Germans. They were aware of the Anglo/German agreement to produce enriched uranium by the ultra centrifuge process. They could not stop this agreement, but it did irritate them. General de Gaulle said that when you have enriched uranium and you are Germany with all of its technical capacity, it is not a far step to the production of nuclear weapons, and this the French could not accept.

U.S./U.S.S.R. Relations

The President then said that he would appreciate General de Gaulle's views on the central subject which, in a sense, dominated the formulation of U.S. policies. This was the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. On the one hand, we saw the U.S.S.R. making a tremendous effort to increase its missile capacity, its naval strength, particularly in submarines, and its defense capabilities generally; while on the diplomatic front it appeared more disposed towards a lessening of tensions. The President himself was not personally acquainted with the rulers of the Kremlin. There were reports of doves and hawks in the Kremlin, but he did not know these men personally, and General de Gaulle did. He would appreciate the General's views on what sort of people these were with whom we had to deal.

General de Gaulle said that facing us first of all there was Soviet Russia above all Russia, the power and the drive of a large country

⁸ For the text of the Franco-German Treaty on Organization and Principles of Cooperation, signed at Paris, January 22, 1963, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 834–838.

living at the time of its power. It had tremendous ambitions, but he did not believe they were for conquest in the classical sense, but rather to make itself unassailable and not inferior to anyone, particularly the United States. Concerning the leaders, he would speak of three of them whom he knew personally.

First of all there was Podgorny, “allegedly the Chief of State;” Brezhnev, who was the Secretary General of the Communist Party; and Kosygin, who was the Head of the Government. Podgorny was an aging man without the drive and ardor of Brezhnev, who was The Communist. He was supported by the party and in turn supported it himself in order to maintain the dictatorship. He wished to be the master in the main decisions and, in fact, he was. Kosygin was a skillful, hard-working man who had made a career of government and was more flexible than Brezhnev. According to French information, he had in fact been much more temperate on Czechoslovakia⁹ than his colleagues, but on the main things, such as he had described at the beginning of this statement—namely, Russia and its unassailability—they were in agreement. They might differ on little things like Czechoslovakia which, after all, was a small matter to them, but on the big ones they were united.

In his relationships with them, he had found that one could talk directly to them, that they seemed to answer forthrightly and frankly and, in fact, with sincerity, though this might well have been a pose or an attitude that they assumed with him. Nevertheless, he believed that they were people with whom one could speak. He said that the whole world was waiting for the President to make contact with them, or for them to make contact with the U.S.

The President then asked whether the General thought that such direct contacts would be useful, and the General replied, “Most assuredly so.” General de Gaulle then said that he realized the President was extremely busy and would take his leave, but before he did so, he wished to draw one single matter to the President’s attention. And this was the increasing strength and independence of the Soviet Armed Forces. They were large, powerful, and popular. On May Day, it was no longer the people who paraded, but the Soviet Armed Forces. Their attitude was enigmatic, but it was increasingly important. He felt that he should draw the President’s attention to this fact.

General de Gaulle said that originally he had planned to return to Paris right after General Eisenhower’s funeral, but he understood that the President was having a reception¹⁰ and he would be very happy to

⁹ Reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968.

¹⁰ The reception took place on March 31 from 7:02 to 7:50 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

attend, and had notified Paris in consequence that his return would be delayed in order to enable him to attend the President's reception.

The President thanked him for this and mentioned that Mrs. Nixon would be at the reception and was looking forward to the honor of seeing General de Gaulle. With this, the meeting concluded, and the President escorted General de Gaulle to his car.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, April 18, 1969, 1130Z.

2957. Subj: Gas centrifuge. Ref: State 56541.²

1. In course of conversation on another subject, Quai Political Director de Beaumarchais said de Gaulle very interested in President Nixon's reactions on question of gas centrifuge when de Gaulle raised subject during Washington meeting.³

2. De Beaumarchais asked if we had more information on subject. I said by chance I had appointment tomorrow to see Martin on subject. De Beaumarchais said he very interested and asked that I give him (and Martin) our views without waiting until tomorrow. He then called Martin in and I gave both of them substance of reftel. Neither de Beaumarchais nor Martin posed further questions on the scientific side and only one political question: de Beaumarchais asked whether the United States is really unconcerned about the possibility of German misuse of gas centrifuge process to produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

3. I said that as reftel made clear, we have confidence in the German Government of today. What would happen if another German Government not oriented to the West and frustrated on political and defense problems came into power, it would be impossible to say. Thus our concerns were general and longer-ranged.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² Dated April 12. It transmitted the text of a statement to be read to the French Government on the issue of "U.S. Views on European Gas Centrifuge Cooperation." (Ibid.)

³ See Document 120.

4. De Beaumarchais said he extremely grateful for information and for confidence represented in US making known its frank views on so delicate a subject.

5. I asked whether French had held any further talks with gas centrifuge partners and particularly with Germans. Reports of acute French concern about program were certainly already reaching Germany. Wouldn't it be better to discuss the matter frankly with the partners? De Beaumarchais said French had tried to discuss the program with British but had received only perfunctory reply (famous question and answer exchange reported London's 1990 and Paris 2173).⁴ So far de Gaulle has thought it untimely to discuss problem with Germans but this might come later.

6. Dept repeat as desired.

Blake

⁴ Telegram 1990 from London, March 14, reported British views on the impact of the gas centrifuge project on relations with France. Telegram 2173 from Paris, February 13, summarized a discussion with French officials on this issue. (Both National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AE 11–1)

122. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS/DB 315/01581–69

Washington, April 18, 1969.

SUBJECT

Comments of President Charles de Gaulle on chances of failure and victory in the referendum and on former Prime Minister Georges Pompidou's possible political future

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[4½ lines not declassified]

(Summary. In a conversation [1½ lines not declassified] President Charles de Gaulle admitted that victory in the referendum will be diffi-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. II. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]; Controlled Dissem.

cult to achieve.² He indicated that if the referendum fails, he will leave the Presidency and will never again present himself as a candidate. The General said that "Operation Pompidou" will begin as soon as he leaves and that Gaullism will be finished. Although Pompidou will probably win an election, he will have against him the Communists and the centrists. De Gaulle will not publicly support or oppose Pompidou. De Gaulle said that the conservative right will prove very demanding and that partisans of supranational Europe will once again begin to make themselves heard. De Gaulle does not plan to ask Pompidou to declare on television on 23 April³ that Pompidou will not be a candidate if the referendum fails because de Gaulle believes that Pompidou will refuse to do so. Should the referendum pass, and de Gaulle will remain even if it passes only by one vote, de Gaulle will rapidly make proposals which Minister Couve de Murville will carry out. De Gaulle wants the referendum to succeed to pave the way for participation in business in order to change the nature of capitalism in France and to prevent Communism. *End summary.*)

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

² De Gaulle had proposed referenda that would increase regional autonomy and modify the Senate to reflect the increased power of the regions. In an April 10 interview, he stated that he regarded the outcome of the referenda as a vote of confidence and would resign if they were defeated.

³ Pompidou's televised national speech on April 23 was summarized in Henry Tanner, "Pompidou Bids Voters Back de Gaulle," *New York Times*, April 24, 1969, p. 10. De Gaulle spoke to the nation on April 25. For text of his statement, see *Discours et Messages*, vol. 5, pp. 405-406.

123. National Security Study Memorandum 47¹

Washington, April 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-147, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 47. Top Secret; Nodis; Nofoin. Copies were sent to the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission.

SUBJECT

Military Relations with France

1. The President has directed that a study be made of US policy options with respect to military relations with France. The study should include options in the area of nuclear weapons cooperation. It should include a statement of pros and cons for the options considered. The study should contain a consideration of the effect on our other alliance relationships including specifically nuclear relations with the UK. It should also consider possible French initiatives with which we may expect to have to deal.

2. The President wishes to emphasize that this study must be treated with the utmost discretion within the US Government and that an absolute minimum of essential individuals should participate in and have knowledge of it.

3. The President has directed that this study is to be conducted by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe which, for this purpose, should consist only of representatives of the recipients of this memorandum and the Assistant to the President for National Security. A representative of the Chairman, AEC should participate only in those portions of the study relevant to that Commission's responsibility. The study should be completed by June 20.

Henry A. Kissinger

124. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, April 26, 1969, 1340Z.

6056. For Secretary from Shriver.

1. Odds are so close as to be unmeasurable on the referendum. Thus it is well within the range of possibility that de Gaulle will no longer be President of France on Monday morning.² If he is still President on Monday, it is likely that he will have won without carrying a majority of French voters with him. What do we do under these circumstances?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² April 28. The referendum took place on April 27.

2. If de Gaulle loses, I believe he will resign for good despite possible efforts of the ultra Gaullists like Debré to organize a stay-in-power draft or a new de Gaulle candidacy for President. A Communist move for power or student-labor unrest aimed at establishing a left-wing control with Communist participation is, in my view, not ready to get off the ground. So we would probably be faced with a France governed by Senate President Alain Poher, a friend of the West, for the 30 days before a new Presidential election is held. In those elections Pompidou is the front-runner and a man with whom we can work. Other candidates may well be Giscard d'Estaing, Poher himself, probably someone from the non-Communist left and a Communist candidate probably Waldek-Rochet, unless of course Pompidou proved to be successful in pulling most of these elements together in a broad national unity coalition, a tough political task.

3. If de Gaulle loses President Nixon should send a friendly message immediately assuring the Government of France the full support of the United States in the important pre-election period and should ask for France's continuing help in efforts to re-establish peace. Nothing should be said which could be interpreted as an endorsement for Poher as President. No personal written message from President Nixon to de Gaulle should be sent until the situation settles down some, assuming he wins or loses by a narrow margin, but a personal and oral message would probably be desirable under either circumstance.³

4. A run-on-the-franc is possible but not likely unless there are left-wing disturbances which we do not expect in the immediate future. However, we should be ready immediately and publicly to offer our full monetary support along with the IMF to maintain the franc's integrity if a crisis should come.

5. We are giving considerable thought to what, if anything, the U.S. should do (a) if disorder breaks out or (b) what our interests are if a new Presidential campaign should start next week. For the moment I do not see how any U.S. action impinging upon French internal affairs is desirable as long as a non-Communist government is the most likely result, but we are keeping this question under review.

Shriver

³ The President sent both an official and an informal message to de Gaulle on April 28 following his resignation. The texts of both messages and de Gaulle's reply are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence, France President DeGaulle Corres. The text of the President's official message is printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, p. 326. A summary of Nixon's message and the text of de Gaulle's reply are in Nixon, *RN*, pp. 385-386.

125. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

Thoughts on deGaulle's Resignation

The following are my initial reactions to the de Gaulle resignation.²

1. *With de Gaulle's passing the French political situation will almost certainly deteriorate.* The General's position was such that he was able to stand above party, drawing support from both right and left. He was particularly successful in confounding the Communists, who—because they generally favored his foreign policy line—were never able to bring themselves to all-out opposition to his regime.

The General's overwhelming presence is now gone, and I doubt that any of his likely successors can keep the Communists in a semi-neutral stance for long. Thus, their influence—as the major opposition party—must grow. At the same time, it is probable that the Gaullists will, over time, begin to split to the right and left. If this happens, France will run the danger of moving in the direction of Italy, with a large, well-organized Communist Party on the far left, and a constantly shifting amalgam of left, center and right parties governing through a narrow consensus which permits little in the way of positive programs.

2. *The importance of the French Presidency may diminish.* It may prove difficult for de Gaulle's successor to maintain the strength of his office. He will lack the General's immense prestige, and will find it extremely difficult to remain above the political battles that are likely to develop.

This, combined with a probable shift in power within the French party structure, may bring about a concomitant shift in power from the President to the Parliament and the Prime Minister (who is appointed by the President, but dependent on parliamentary votes of confidence thereafter.)

3. *Who is likely to be the new French President?* My own view is that Georges Pompidou is de Gaulle's likely successor. He will almost certainly be the Gaullist candidate, and will probably be opposed, in the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. II. Secret. The first page bears the stamped notation: "The President has seen."

² President de Gaulle resigned on April 28. The vote had been 52.87 percent against and 47.13 percent in favor of the referenda.

first election, by Francois Mitterand (at the head of a left-Communist coalition), and a center-right candidate.³ It is extremely unlikely that any of the candidates will gain the necessary majority on the first ballot, which would mean a later runoff between the top two men (Pompidou and Mitterand). Since the center-right votes would go heavily for Pompidou on the second ballot, he should have enough strength to win.⁴

4. *How will French foreign policy be affected?* If Pompidou wins (or Mitterand, for that matter) French foreign policy is likely to change but little over the short term. Any move to re-establish ties with NATO would mean heavy opposition from the left; relaxation of the present stance on British entry into the EEC would upset the left *and* raise problems with the French nationalists who have been a substantial source of strength for de Gaulle.

Over the longer term, however, French foreign policy may become more difficult for us to live with. With a less decisive Government, the left may well be able to move into a position—so common in other Western European democracies—of exercising a veto over foreign policy initiatives it does not like.

5. *An immediate problem* may be the effect of de Gaulle's resignation on the franc, and possibly Sterling. If there should be trouble, the Group of Ten will have to consider whether to step in with additional standby credits. Should some action on our part be necessary, we will come to you with a recommendation.

³ It is difficult, at this stage, to predict who the center-right will choose. It could be Giscard d'Estaing, Senate President Poher or Jean Lecanuet. But my own guess is that, for a variety of reasons, none of these men have the necessary strength. Jacques Duhamel, a centrist who is close to Lecanuet may well be the eventual choice. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁴ Following de Gaulle's resignation, Alain Poher, President of the Senate, served as Acting President of France pending new elections. Poher declared himself a candidate for the office. French Presidential elections took place on June 1 and 15. The first round voting eliminated all candidates except Poher and Pompidou. In the second round Pompidou won election with 58 percent of the vote. He took office on June 20.

126. National Security Study Memorandum 55¹

Washington, April 30, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France

The President has directed that a review of options available in our policy toward France be prepared for the consideration of the National Security Council. This review should be guided by the following questions:

1. What developments may take place with regard to France during the next three to four months which will require positive United States reaction? In each case, what will be the alternative courses open to the President, and what will be their comparative advantages and disadvantages?

2. In which areas, if any, ought the United States to initiate action in order to influence the development of events concerning France? What will be the comparative advantages and disadvantages of taking action or doing nothing? What will be the range of options as to timing?

This review should be accompanied by an analysis covering the following points:

1. The anticipated structure of parties, probable candidates, and most likely outcome of the forthcoming French general election;

2. The possibility of public disorders and breakdown of civil administration in France;

3. The possibility of pressure on the French franc; chances for devaluation; the impact of devaluation on other countries and the international monetary system; and the role to be played by the United States in this process;

4. The probable course of development of French NATO policy;

5. The probable changes, if any, in French attitude toward European unity and British entry into the Common Market;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-151, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 55. Secret; Nodis.

6. The impact on our bilateral relations with France, including the areas of military cooperation and possible sharing of nuclear weapons technology information;

7. Other factors pertinent to NSC consideration.

This study should be performed by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe. Additional members from agencies and departments not normally represented on the NSCIG/EUR may be added for the purpose of this study at the discretion of the Chairman. The completed study should be presented to the NSC Review Group no later than Monday, May 12, 1969.

Because of the urgency of this study, the completion date for the requirements outlined in NSSM 47 of April 21, 1969,² is extended to August 1, 1969.

Pending consideration by the National Security Council on United States policy toward France at the conclusion of this study, the President has directed that no department or agency of the Executive Branch shall make any public or private statement, or enter into any commitment, which would have the effect of circumscribing the President's freedom of choice among available policy options.

Henry A. Kissinger

² Document 123.

127. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 55¹

Washington, May 15, 1969.

NSC REVIEW—U.S. POLICY TOWARD POST-DE GAULLE FRANCE

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-151, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 55. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, chaired by Hillenbrand.

I. Introduction

In considering what U.S. policy toward post-de Gaulle France should be in the next few months we must bear in mind that France finds itself in an unprecedented situation. For eleven years Charles de Gaulle dominated the political life of his country and restored French prestige and influence on the international scene. As even his most bitter political adversaries admitted, all policies and political possibilities in France were measured in terms of de Gaulle's positions, known or anticipated. Now suddenly he is gone.

The transition to an Acting President has been orderly and the outlook is for an election campaign that will generate much heat and agitation but no major disturbances. Thus, by June 15 at the latest France will have a new president and even if it is Georges Pompidou a new era will begin. For Gaullism, in the sense that the General conceived and practiced it, cannot long survive without him. In the short span covered by this report (three to four months), however, few if any major changes in French foreign policy are likely. Moreover, the election of a new president will occur only shortly before the traditional vacation season, which will doubtless be observed with the usual fervor by government and public alike.

On the basis of the initial polls and other factors Pompidou should obtain a plurality of votes on the first round of voting on June 1 but not the absolute majority necessary to clinch the election. Acting President Alain Poher, the Center candidate, should also make a strong showing whereas the other candidates will probably come in well behind. The runoff on June 15 promises to be a rugged political battle. The latest poll shows Poher winning by a surprisingly decisive margin, but the situation can, of course, change significantly as the campaign unfolds.

Whichever man is the winner, the United States stands to gain with respect to the longer-term orientation of French foreign policy. Our bilateral relations with France should continue to improve and, barring any breakdown in internal stability, we will have new opportunities to enlist French cooperation in pursuing our major objectives in Europe.

What we will probably gain in French foreign policy we may possibly lose in the French domestic situation. A crisis of the franc this summer or fall is a definite possibility and the whole economy may run into trouble because of high-cost production, inflationary pressures, labor problems and an industrial plant that tends to be outmoded with certain key exceptions. The longer-term political picture is also clouded by the possibility that the next president of France, even Pompidou, may not be able to keep a firm grip on France's fiercely individualistic, centrifugal political forces. This potential danger will be even greater in case an opposition candidate is elected president. Also, there are some

indications, so far unverified, that General de Gaulle may wish to resume a role in French politics after the presidential election. Such a development would probably aggravate tensions and complicate the problem of governing France. Thus, before the end of this year France may conceivably enter a new period of political instability and uneven government that could affect its usefulness and dependability as an ally. In any event, we expect de Gaulle's successor to spend more time and thought on France's domestic problems and less on grandiose foreign policy initiatives.

[Omitted here are Section II, Issues, and Section III, Situation Report.]

128. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, May 22, 1969, 2:10–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France;
U.S. Policy Toward Peru

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Arthur Hartman
Donald McHenry
Charles Meyer (Peru only)
Charles Tanguy (France only)

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Henry Loomis

Treasury

Anthony Jurich

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt (France only)
Viron Vaky (Peru only)
Arnold Nachmanoff (Peru only)
Morton Halperin
Winston Lord

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

France

The paper was considered good and will be forwarded, with some minor changes, to the President.² The Volcker Committee will send over, within the next week or so, some policy options for short-term monetary problems in France. There will also be further consideration of broader monetary questions. NSSM 47, *U.S. Military Relations with France*,³ will be broadened to include political and monetary issues,⁴ with the target date for submission remaining August 1, on the understanding that this could slip if there is a major political realignment in France.

[Omitted here is a summary of the Peru discussion.]

FRANCE⁵

Kissinger noted that the President has requested a paper on the short-term problems in our French policy caused by the de Gaulle resignation. He believed this State paper was very good. As previously agreed, it did not include a discussion of the monetary issues.

Hartman expressed State's concern with the monetary area as the one most likely to require action. He did not believe that the Volcker group was addressing the specific French situation over the coming months. Kissinger added that Richardson had expressed this concern to him, and he noted that monetary issues were the only French problems coming to the White House since the de Gaulle resignation.

Jurich confirmed that the Volcker Committee had not yet treated this problem and said that he would get from it a presentation of the options.

Kissinger stated that the President is often asked to decide on monetary questions that have a high political content. He had agreed to separate handling of monetary problems, but it was becoming clear that the domestic political situation is more crucial for this issue than the strictly technical and financial factors. Here, as elsewhere, he wished to give the President real choices before his options were closed. He said that we might expect another financial crisis in August if any party except the CDU were to win the German elections.

² The Review Group was considering the NSSM 55 Response, Document 127. The revised paper and a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon dated May 27 summarizing the study and requesting approval of NSDM 14 (Document 129) is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 60.

³ Document 123.

⁴ See Document 129.

⁵ This part of the discussion lasted from 2:15 to 2:30 p.m.

Jurich noted also a possible crisis with the U.K. and the pound.

Hartman said that we had to consider the following type of issue. Suppose that the French government were faced with a monetary crisis, but were reluctant to move toward exchange rate adjustments (because of symbolic considerations left over from the de Gaulle era): we would want to see what is in the U.S. interest. For example, if we placed higher priority on revaluing the mark than devaluing the franc, how would this affect the general international situation and how might it help our French relations?

There was further discussion on the type of studies needed. It was agreed that the Volcker group would forward shorter-term options in the context of the French paper currently being discussed, but that there would then be a further look at the broader questions, including the choices between revaluation and devaluation, whether or not to pursue a multilateral solution, etc. Jurich thought that a new French President might want to move quickly to devalue and blame the action on the previous regime. Tanguy disagreed and did not think that a French President could get away with this. Hartman stressed that these issues have to be looked at in a broader political framework, both in France and in Europe generally; we cannot discuss them purely in a monetary context.

Kissinger noted, and there was agreement, that the paper's language implying past U.S. political coordination with France on Biafra was exaggerated. He suggested that the paper was basically sound, did not require a NSC meeting, and could be forwarded to the President with minor changes. The group concurred.

Hartman said that State would like a feedback on the President's reaction so that they would have general guidance on how to play the French situation in the near future. Kissinger agreed to supply this information.

Smith noted that some minor points had been ironed out between CIA and State, but that there remained disagreement on the likelihood of de Gaulle's returning to play a role, at least behind the scene. CIA believed, and Loomis noted USIA concurrence, that de Gaulle will stay aloof, and that in any event a behind-the-scene involvement would not have a direct bearing on our policy. Tanguy believed that we would have to take account of this in dealing with him as an individual. Smith noted that the implication would be that we should not dance on de Gaulle's grave, a poor policy under any circumstances.

In response to Kissinger's query, Tanguy said that he believed Poher would probably win on the second ballot. He and Smith confirmed that a Washington assessment of Poher had not yet been prepared.

Jurich noted a mixing of short and long-term French economic problems on page 2 of the paper which it was agreed would be clarified.

Kissinger then discussed the question of NSSM 47, *Military Relations With France*. He believed that a treatment of military relations alone would give too narrow a focus. Closer military relations with France (except for certain NATO aspects) really rested on political grounds. He therefore suggested that the NSSM become a broader study, merging military and political relations, especially in light of the elections outcome. In response to Loomis' suggestion, Kissinger confirmed that he believed that monetary questions should also be treated in the paper. In every conversation with Debré, he gives highest priority to these questions. The short-term Volcker Committee paper on monetary questions, previously discussed, could serve as a building block for the fuller treatment.

There was some discussion of timing, after which there was agreement to Kissinger's suggestion that we hold August 1 as the target date, with the understanding that this could be slipped if there is a major political realignment in France.

Sonnenfeldt stated that no matter what regime emerges, the military questions in the study raise technical considerations that can and should be studied in the coming weeks, even though the political issues would have to be delayed.

Kissinger noted Presidential interest in looking at various military proposals, e.g. Anglo-French cooperation. Sonnenfeldt and Unger confirmed that NSSM 47 would cover such problems.

Kissinger repeated that this paper was very good and said that a new directive would be sent out broadening the terms of reference for a follow-on study on France.

Sonnenfeldt said that General Goodpaster wants guidance on how to deal with the French and others over the coming weeks, and it was agreed that the paper should be sent to him once the minor changes in it were made.

[Omitted here is discussion of Peru. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Document 599.]

129. National Security Decision Memorandum 14¹

Washington, May 29, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France

The President has reviewed the recommendations in the study requested by NSSM 55,² as reported by the Review Group,³ and has approved them as policy guidelines for the next several weeks.

Please take the necessary steps to ensure that all concerned, in Washington as well as in the field, act in conformity with these guidelines.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-210, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 14. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

² Documents 126 and 129.

³ See Document 128.

130. National Security Study Memorandum 60¹

Washington, May 29, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Secretary of the Treasury

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 60. Top Secret; Nodis.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France

Pursuant to the findings of the Review Group² on the short-term U.S. policy toward post-De Gaulle France (National Security Study Memorandum 55),³ on May 22, 1969, the President has directed the preparation of a more comprehensive review of U.S. policy towards France. This study should set forth the possible alternative courses for U.S. policy in light of the probable course of political and policy developments in France.

Other studies pertaining to U.S. policy toward France should be incorporated into an overall review of the various aspects and options. Consequently, the study requested under NSSM 47,⁴ "Military Relations with France," will constitute a separate section to be prepared in a smaller group and reported directly to the Review Group. As previously agreed, the franc-monetary issues paper will be handled in like manner.

The study of the political issues in U.S. relations with France should take into consideration the possible course of events in France, the relationship thereto of U.S. interests and objectives, and the various options open to the U.S. More specifically, the study should concentrate upon alternatives regarding (1) the developments in French NATO policy; (2) the French attitude and policy toward European unity and the British entry into the Common Market; and (3) any other important developments such as French policy on Vietnam, Africa, the Middle East and the Four-Power Talks.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe perform this study. Additional members from agencies and departments not normally represented on the NSC IG/EUR may be added for the purpose of this study at the discretion of the Chairman.

The completed study, as well as the separate sections on monetary problems and military relations, should be submitted to the NSC Review Group on August 1, 1969.

Pending consideration by the National Security Council on United States policy toward France, at the conclusion of this overall integrated review, the President has directed that all parts of the Executive Branch

² See Document 128.

³ Document 126.

⁴ Document 123.

shall be guided by the findings of the study requested in NSSM 55, as indicated in NSDM 14.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger

⁵ Document 129.

131. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 27, 1969.

PRESENT

Ambassador Shriver
Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Mr. Tanguy

Invitation to President Pompidou to Visit the United States

Ambassador Shriver gave his view that it would be in the U.S. interest to invite President Pompidou to visit the United States in the near future. The Ambassador pointed out that Pompidou does not know our country at all from first-hand experience except for a brief visit to New York City several years ago. The Ambassador also noted that several months ago, Pompidou had made plans to come to the United States as a private citizen and spend one month here visiting different parts of the country including one or two important campuses. The Ambassador concluded that all things considered, it would be desirable if the President could invite Pompidou to come to the United States early next fall even though Pompidou, because of his preoccupation with domestic questions, might not be able to make the visit that soon.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that it would be highly desirable for Pompidou to visit the United States in the near future and he was sure that the President would support the idea. It was pointed out that the in-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 675, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. III. Secret. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office. Shriver was in the United States for consultations.

terim NSC report on U.S. policy toward post-de Gaulle France² contemplated an official invitation from the President to Pompidou.

As to the timing, Mr. Kissinger thought that September might be a little early for the President in view of his existing and anticipated obligations at that time. The simplest solution would be simply to substitute Pompidou, as the new President of France, for former President de Gaulle, who had accepted the President's invitation and had planned to come to the United States sometime in January 1970. However, it might be possible to arrange for Pompidou to come sooner if he was able to.

In response to Ambassador Shriver's suggestion, Mr. Kissinger agreed to speak to the President in the next few days about authorizing the Ambassador to sound out Pompidou with respect to visiting the United States³ sometime in the coming months at the invitation of the President. If the President approved, this preliminary, informal inquiry would enable us to judge when it would be best to send Pompidou a formal invitation. Mr. Kissinger told the Ambassador that he would inform him of the President's reaction after the Ambassador returned to Paris.

Military Cooperation

Mr. Kissinger said that he did not think that the President had made up his mind yet about military cooperation with France although he was well disposed to explore the possibilities. In approaching the question the President would not let "NATO theology" stand in the way of whatever advantages might accrue to U.S. security through an increase in French military cooperation with the United States.

Mr. Kissinger said that he was less clear about the President's thinking on possible nuclear cooperation with France. However, Mr. Kissinger would not exclude the possibility that the President might be interested in developing a certain amount of cooperation in this field. Mr. Kissinger thought that the President would just as soon have it as not to have it. Moreover, Mr. Kissinger felt that the President would be highly sympathetic to French-U.K. cooperation in the nuclear field. He did not think that the McMahon Act would be a serious impediment.⁴

² See Document 127 and footnote 2, Document 128. The report was transmitted to the Embassy in telegram 87840 to Paris, May 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 674, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. II)

³ In a July 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt stated that no decision on an invitation had been made prior to Shriver's departure for Paris. He further reported that Pompidou had informed the Ambassador that he would not undertake any State visits before 1970. (Ibid.)

⁴ Reference to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, modified by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, regulated U.S. control and management of nuclear technology, including the sharing of technology with other nations.

U.K. Entry

The President continues to favor British entry into the Common Market but he does not want to spend a great deal of U.S. political currency to achieve this objective.

The French Role in the Middle East

In answer to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Kissinger said the United States is happy to approach the Middle East problem through the four-power talks provided France supports what the United States is trying to achieve. On the other hand, if the French try to play us off against the Soviets, then we will concentrate our efforts in two-power talks with the latter.

We do not need the French in order to negotiate with the Soviets. It is easy to talk with them directly. The French should realize therefore that there is no brokerage role for them between us and the Soviets. The French should try to get back in a position where they can exert some influence over the Israelis. The United States is not going to allow itself to be put in a position where it has the entire onus for putting pressure on the Israelis to accept proposals agreed upon by the four powers.

132. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 47¹

Washington, October 20, 1969.

MILITARY RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

*I. Current Setting**French Attitudes*

Over the past year there have been numerous indications of greater French interest in military cooperation with NATO and with the US. President Pompidou told Ambassador Shriver on 23 July that France was dedicated to working with its allies for the defense of Western Europe, that France was willing to enter into bilateral military talks with the US, and that no question should be permitted to arise in our

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-147, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 47. Secret. NSSM 47 is Document 123.

minds concerning the commitments of France to its allies and especially to the US. French officials have told us of their interest in early bilateral discussions in Washington concerning US-French military cooperation and how it might be expanded. A noticeable new example of French interest was their decision in mid-August to allow one class (100 cadets) of the French Air Force Academy to visit the US.

Concerning the relationship to NATO, Pompidou has stated that the French alliance with the US “should be carried out within the framework of the [Atlantic]² Treaty and outside of any organization of the NATO type.” There is no reason to believe that the Pompidou Government will move to reintegrate French military forces in NATO. Debré as Minister of State for Defense will remain a powerful voice against such a move. There has been progress, nevertheless, during the past 18 months in expanding US and NATO cooperation with France, and the atmosphere seems generally favorable for exploring additional possibilities.

Incentives to Greater French-NATO and French-US Cooperation

NATO authorities candidly stated in 1966, at the time of French withdrawal from the integrated command arrangements, that the security of Western Europe cannot be at maximum strength without French participation in the collective system. All of the other members of the Alliance would prefer to see France return to the system and a recommitment of its forces to the Alliance. On the French side, we have received reports that their military authorities realize that the security of France is necessarily based on increased participation in the collective effort. While this realization is undoubtedly nothing new to French military planners, the change is manifested in their willingness to say this to others, and to program their own command post exercises to bring out this basic truth. US military planners, on their part, still consider that France’s central geographic location makes it particularly valuable to the Alliance and still regard access to France in wartime as extremely important.

Other factors which favor greater cooperation with France include the problem of increasing Soviet activities in the Mediterranean, growing pressures on the DOD budget which could cause further cut-backs in US military activities, and the growing uncertainty concerning US military access to Spain after 1970. If base rights in Spain are lost, US access to and activity in the Mediterranean area will be complicated considerably, and US contingency and war planning will be seriously affected. Improved military cooperation with France could ease the impact of losses in Spain. For example, loss of beddown capability for

² Brackets are in the original.

transport aircraft provided by the Spanish air bases might be in part compensated for by arrangements for contingency use of French air bases for reinforcement in case of emergency.

Policy Issues and Questions

The policy questions presented in Parts II and III of this paper represent a spectrum of policy options in several areas of military relations with France. If there is a Presidential decision to pursue one or more of these possibilities, the agencies concerned would then proceed to define in detail the possible specific courses of action, for further White House consideration and approval, where necessary. The policy questions include one that is of expressed current interest to the French: participation in the NATO communications satellite project (TACSATCOM). The other options include French participation in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, some form of cooperation in targeting of strategic weapons, possible UK-French cooperation in the nuclear area whether targeting or something more, US nuclear weapons support or assistance to France, possible US use of military facilities in France, and settlement of the US and NATO claims against France. Some of these possibilities for exploration were mentioned to President Pompidou by Ambassador Shriver on a personal basis on 23 July. There has been no French reaction to these suggestions. The visit of General Fourquet, the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, to Washington on 13 and 14 November as the guest of General Wheeler, may provide some clue to French thinking about future specific courses of action in their military relations with the US and NATO. (Fourquet will precede his tour of the US with a one-day visit to London.)

In the discussion which follows, pertinent background material either introduces each of the issues or precedes a group of related issues. Each of these policy questions either requires new US decisions or, if not, must nevertheless be weighed in considering the advisability of close military relationships with France.

Part IV of this paper describes areas in which progress can be made within the present framework of US policy toward France; no new decisions are required. The extent to which cooperation can develop will depend in part on whether a forthcoming or a restrictive interpretation is given to present guidelines.

Additional background materials on French military relations with NATO and the US, remaining ties, and the current status of France-NATO contingency planning are set forth in Annexes A, B, and C.

[Omitted here are Sections II, III, and IV, and Annexes A, B, and C.]

133. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 60¹

Washington, October 29, 1969.

NSC REVIEW—U.S. POLICY TOWARD
POST-DE GAULLE FRANCE

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. Summary

A basic United States interest is a stable and democratic France—a return to weak and frequently changing French governments will be perilous not only for France but for all of Western Europe. In addition to a cohesive, progressive French society with a workable government, our interest is to have a France willing to play a constructive and cooperative role in both Europe and the third world. Where cooperation between us is not attainable, it would be of modest benefit to have a France which refrains from being deliberately unhelpful. Right now the present French Government looks like the best achievable likely to provide the elements which will meet our interests; consequently we should frame our policies and adopt our attitudes with this in mind. At the same time we must not get our hopes too high. The French are not always easy to work with and can be, as they say, a difficult ally; at times it may not be possible to have a further improvement in bilateral relations without damage to other more important interests.

Despite continuing problems of adjustment to the new situation created by General de Gaulle's sudden departure from power, France should be able to look forward to a period of relatively stable, moderately progressive government. However, the economy is in difficulty, confidence in the franc at home and abroad continues to be diluted, and inflationary pressure and labor agitation threaten the success of the government's recovery program.

Behind this lies the more fundamental question of whether "Gaulism without de Gaulle" will lead back to the kind of political fragmentation and disputation that plagued the Fourth Republic. The Frenchman is not easily governable and his representatives generally prefer political combat to prove a point rather than unemotional give and take to avoid confrontation and resolve issues. The new government is a serious-minded, experienced group with a clear sense of purpose. But it will have to reckon with the urge of many politicians,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 60. Secret; Nodis. NSSM 60 is Document 130.

including Gaullists, to play politics as an end in itself after 11 years of a confining, definitely secondary role.

The main lines of Gaullist foreign policy will continue but with changes in both style and substance where the new team judges desirable—as witness the surprise devaluation of the franc on August 8th and the less emotional, more businesslike approach to British entry to the Common Market. On the other hand, despite cautious indications of a more positive attitude towards NATO the French will not alter their conviction that their own independence and necessary freedom of action preclude a return of their forces to NATO or an alteration of their policy of complete independence for their force de frappe; similarly, they will also want to continue their own course in handling relations with Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and will continue to play an active, independent, and in some respects helpful role with respect to Viet-Nam, the Middle East and Africa. Despite the continuance of French independence in foreign policy, however, the removal of its political veto on British accession to the Common Market is important and could in the long run result both in British entry and meaningful U.K.-French cooperation in European problems. However, the political, economic and psychological obstacles are great and we can by no means be confident of ultimate U.K. success.

U.S.-French relations have definitely entered a new and more positive phase. The key element of mutual confidence and respect for each other's point of view has been largely restored. As a result we are consulting frequently and in depth on the crucial issues, notably the Middle East, Nigeria-Biafra and Viet-Nam. We are also engaging in more effective consultations with the French on other matters, such as exports of strategic material to Communist countries, in a determined effort to narrow differences in our respective points of view.

In addition to this signal strengthening of the diplomatic side of our bilateral relations there has been a remarkable increase in high-level visits and other forms of practical cooperation. The desire of this Administration to revitalize relations with France through exchanges and other concrete actions has been matched by a manifest willingness on the French side to extend cooperation in many diverse fields.

There are diverse reasons for the French Government's willingness to enter into a closer, more cooperative relationship with the United States. Among the more important are the weaknesses that have developed in the French political and economic situation, and the U.S. decision to hold peace talks in Paris and de-escalate the fighting in Viet-Nam. Another important factor is that we now respect their right to disagree with us just as they accept our right to attempt to change their point of view in the interest of more effective cooperation toward

common aims. For years the French resented our tendency to take offense whenever they differed with us on an important question. They insisted that it was perfectly natural for two strong and independent allies to disagree from time to time, without in any way impairing their close relationship. The French Government is deeply gratified that we have accepted its point of view on this cardinal point. They no longer feel inhibited in working with us in at least a number of common causes even though our approach or our evaluation of the factors or indeed our interests may differ somewhat.

As we pursue this new course of expanding bilateral relations with France, we should keep in mind our basic long-term interest in NATO and our need for solutions satisfactory to Europe as a whole. Most allied statesmen recognize in fact that good working relations between France and the United States contribute to the health of the Alliance and a broader French point of view toward European questions.

We should also bear in mind that the manner in which the United States deals with possible issues arising from the so-called “special relationship” with the U.K. can have an important influence on the French attitude toward the U.K.’s entry into the Common Market as well as toward the United States.

In sum, the prospects for a stable France and the reweaving of a cooperative and beneficial French-U.S. relationship look promising but by no means certain. France is too important a country to be considered only in the bilateral context—and necessarily a good number of the major points in our relationship deal with other areas and countries beyond the borders of France and the U.S. The experience of later years has shown us that we can operate with an indifferent or even a hostile France; but we also know that poor French-U.S. relations make our tasks more difficult and distress our allies. We should use the present opportunity to establish a more productive and communicative relationship.

The options available to the United States in its bilateral and multilateral relations with France are predicated on the expectation that despite pressures and problems in the economic-financial, labor and political areas Pompidou will be able to avoid a prolonged, major crisis which would prevent him from operating a reasonably effective government. Should this expectation prove false we would have to reassess this report and decide what additional options, if any, should be brought before the NSC and the President.

Issues for Decision

The choices involve both substance and variations of the diplomatic style and tactics. In the military sub-report are posed the basic

nuclear issues. Generally speaking, the options derive from the trend of the guidance, e.g., work for good bilateral relations, consult with the French more often and in greater depth, but accept the fact that French policies will by no means always be in accord with our own.

1. Bilateral Relations Between France and the United States—Options for the United States

a. Mount a major diplomatic effort to strengthen U.S.-French relations and assign equal or higher priority to such an effort than to other aspects of U.S.-European relations.

b. Take initiatives and take full advantage of French initiatives to increase exchanges of visits and practical cooperation in the scientific, technological, cultural and informational, military and other fields, consistent with NATO solidarity and other high priority U.S. interests in Europe.

c. Be responsive to French initiatives or willingness to cooperate consistent with our own interests, but continue where appropriate to make clear that our priority remains effective cooperation among all the major interested countries of Western Europe, both in and out of NATO, on questions of mutual interest.

d. Adopt a negative or skeptical attitude toward the increase of practical cooperation in a number of fields.

2. France and NATO—Options for the United States

a. Take no initiatives to draw France back into NATO and respond to any French overtures, whether bilateral to us or to NATO itself, by advising them they should resume full cooperation with NATO.

b. Evaluate any French initiatives on their individual merits; and explore means of increasing French cooperation with military and non-military aspects of NATO. Look for initiatives we might take.

c. Mount a major diplomatic effort to get France back into the integrated military commands.

3. French Attitudes and Policy Towards British Accession to the EEC—Options for the United States

a. Encourage France directly to move ahead on British entry.

b. Be prepared to respond to inquiries from French officials or private persons as to what our policy is; but stay in the background, take no initiatives with France.

4. French-German Relations—Options for the United States

a. Foster closer Franco-German relations by public statements and diplomatic activity.

b. Indicate discreet approval and support for French and German statements and actions aimed at maintaining close relations.

c. Stay completely in the background and play a discreet watching role.

5. *French Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—Options for the United States*

- a. Take a hard line with the French and attempt to prevent their carrying on a unilateral approach to détente with the Soviets.
- b. Indicate understanding for French approaches to the Soviets but continue to point out to the French the desirability of NATO consultation on the subject of East-West relations.
- c. Make our views known to the French and cooperate with them on improving relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

6. *French Policy in the Middle East—Options for the United States*

- a. Restrict consultation with France and attempt to exclude France from talks by the major powers.
- b. Maintain the close consultation now existing with France but avoid any concerting of policy.
- c. Seek to concert U.S. and French policies in the Middle East.

7. *French Policy Towards Viet-Nam—Options for the United States*

- a. Continue to encourage French cooperation in probing the positions of the other side, in offering moderating counsel in the interests of inducing a more realistic Communist negotiating position, in providing us with accurate information on North Vietnamese positions, and in moderating the previously hostile tone of French media on the United States and South Viet-Nam.
- b. Cease consultation and reduce our contacts with the French on Viet-Nam to a minimum.

8. *French African Policy—Options for the United States*

- a. Pursue an African policy independent of the French with no attempt to coordinate or consult on matters of common concern.
- b. Stay in touch with the French in a limited fashion, where the circumstances appear advantageous to us, but go on the premise that our interests and judgment on key problems will often diverge from the French.
- c. Recognize French interest and presence in Francophone Africa as a positive, stabilizing factor and consult and exchange information on matters of mutual concern.

8a. *France and Nigeria—Options for the United States*

- a. Avoiding cooperation or consultation with the French on Nigeria.
- b. Be receptive to French willingness to exchange views on possibilities for humanitarian relief efforts.
- c. Cooperate with France in encouraging the two parties to the conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement as well as in promoting relief efforts.

8b. *France and the Maghreb—Options for the United States*

- a. Avoid any consultation or cooperation with France.

- b. Respond positively to French initiatives for consultation.
- c. Seek detailed consultation and cooperation with the French.

9. Military Relations with France

Various specific options are available in developing more extensive bilateral military relations with France, and in bringing France closer to NATO. At present the French Government is considering the context of its next five-year military procurement program, which is to be presented to Parliament next year. It has apparently given little consideration to new initiatives or new directions in French military policy. The only approach it has initiated with us to date relates to NATO TACSATCOM, which is discussed at length in the military paper. Most of the U.S. options discussed in this paper were mentioned on a personal basis by Ambassador Shriver to President Pompidou in July, but there has been no French reaction as yet regarding any of these possibilities. The principal question, therefore, remains whether the U.S. should take further initiatives with the French, or await further movement within the French Government regarding any innovative steps.

In the meantime, there is no real impediment to an expansion of existing forms of cooperation, which emphasize exchanges of military students and other personnel, visits by military commanders, participation in joint exercises, and exchanges of intelligence and research and development data, and certain contingency war planning between French and NATO commanders in Germany.

Options for the United States

- a. Resume tactical nuclear weapons support for French forces in Germany.
- b. Seek French participation in or association with the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee.
- c. Seek to coordinate the targeting of French strategic weapons with the U.S. SIOP and/or with SACEUR's nuclear strike plan.
- d. Seek tripartite arrangements for targeting of strategic weapons among U.S., U.K. and France.
- e. Assist French nuclear weapons development and production.
- f. Encourage U.K.-French nuclear cooperation.
- g. Support French entry into NATO TACSATCOM project.
- h. Seek to initiate contingency planning with the French concerning possible use of French facilities in case of war.
- i. Seek a settlement of U.S. and NATO claims arising from forced relocation from France in 1966-1967.

Note:

The foregoing is simply a recapitulation of the key options open to the United States in the field of military relations with France. It does not reflect any gradations in the options or any of the pros and cons.

These and other details are covered in the attached sub-report on military relations with France.²

[Omitted here is the body of the 65-page report.]

² Not printed. See Document 132.

134. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 11, 1969, 11:05 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France (NSSM 60)

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	<i>OEP</i>
<i>State</i>	Stephen A. Loftus
Richard F. Pedersen	<i>USIA</i>
William I. Cargo	William H. Weathersby
Donald McHenry	<i>NSC Staff</i>
Margaret Tibbetts	William G. Hyland
<i>Defense</i>	Robert E. Osgood
G. Warren Nutter	Richard T. Kennedy
<i>CIA</i>	Jeanne W. Davis
R. Jack Smith	
<i>JCS</i>	
Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger	

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. That it was difficult to discuss France without an integrated European policy paper, and that Mr. Kissinger, with Messrs. Pedersen and Cargo, would consider how to develop such a paper for discussion in the NSC in January.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1969. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Review Group was considering the response to NSSM 60 (Document 133). A Department of State issues paper submitted to aid the discussion is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 60.

2. That the French paper would be revised² to cast the bilateral operational issues in the context of the Pompidou visit, and to:

- consider ways in which France might work out an arrangement within the framework of NATO (possibly bilaterally between France and SACEUR) on certain specific military issues;

- consider how we might react if we received many high-level soundings but no actual French proposal for tactical nuclear support;

- include a fuller explanation of the legal situation—the use of an Executive Order to provide warheads in a double-key system but the necessity for Congressional authorization to provide necessary training for the use of such weapons;

- examine the question of indirect assistance to nuclear weapons development and production in France including a statement of conflicting views.

3. Following receipt of the revised French paper, decide whether to have an NSC meeting on France, to submit the issues in a memorandum to the President, or to absorb the French issues in consideration of broader European policy issues.

[Omitted here is the discussion.]

² After Kissinger received a copy of the minutes he wrote a note on the covering memorandum: "When will we get this paper. Must have meeting before State runs with it." (Memorandum from Davis to Kissinger, December 22; *ibid.*, Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1969) The revised paper was completed on January 16, 1970, and the Department of State submitted a "Summary of Military Issues" on February 2. (*Ibid.*, Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 60) Additionally, a January 26, 1970, study (Document 28) considered NSSMs 60 (Document 130), 65 (Document 20), 79 (Document 318), 83 (Document 24), and 84 (Document 25).

135. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, January 9, 1970, 1935Z.

318. Subj: French arms deal with Libya.²

1. In wake unfortunate AP story alleging U.S. “concern” over French-Libyan arms deal, both Dept and this Embassy have made concerted and generally successful effort put canard of “concern” to rest.

2. I admit, nonetheless, to a degree of personal “concern” over this situation. In denying official anxiety over the French-Libyan negotiations, we have been careful to make clear that we neither encourage nor discourage the proposed arms transaction but have merely been seeking to keep fully informed. Despite these efforts at precise definition, however, I fear that our lack of “concern” is being generally interpreted in the press as a green light for French sales—thus putting US, in the public eye and mind, in the position of approving French delivery of Mirage aircraft to Libya.

3. In this regard, it seems from here that Mirages have become the emotional symbol of debates over French embargo policy, probably even more so in United States than here in France. Thus a contract for sale of Mirages to an Arab nation which has recently joined ranks of Israel’s most outspoken foes, even if planes are for significantly delayed delivery, risks producing psychological bombshell in France and in Jewish community worldwide.

4. With the Pompidou visit to the U.S. due shortly, it is hard to imagine less opportune time for French sale of Mirages to any Mideast country while identical airplanes remain embargoed in France. Public declarations of LARG³ simply add fuel to this fire. No matter how reasonable or logical French deal with Libya may seem in context of Western-Soviet rivalry for strategic portion of Mediterranean, public relations effect likely be disastrous.

5. In light of these considerations, I took opportunity afforded when FonMin Schumann sought me out prior Jan 8 dinner to express satisfaction at our recent exchanges on this subj to express on personal basis my concerns outlined above. I suggested to FonMin that GOF action to postpone conclusion of Mirage deal with Libya until after Pom-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 676, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² The arms sale to Libya, which had been the subject of rumors in the French press since late December, was formally announced by Defense Minister Debré in a January 21 statement to the National Assembly.

³ Libyan Arab Republican Government.

pidou visit to U.S. might prove very helpful to success of that visit. I stressed that I was in no way expressing judgment as to whether France should ultimately complete transaction with Libyans or not, but that my personal suggestion was limited to thought that deferring negotiations for couple of months would be in our mutual interest regardless of their outcome. Mirage issue, I explained to Schumann, was matter of psychology rather than logic. Were France to sell tanks and artillery to Libya even on large scale, public impact would not be as great. At end of my remarks, Schumann said he understood completely point I had made and added specifically Quote I agree with you Unquote.

6. DCM made same points Jan 9 to Gaucher, foreign policy adviser to Pompidou, who also commented that Ambassador's remarks to Schumann para 5 above had already been reported to President. Gaucher said he could not predict how negotiations would come out [1½ lines not declassified] but indicated he fully understood and shared our concerns.

Shriver

136. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Message to You from President Pompidou Regarding French Plane Deal with Libya

Ambassador Lucet has presented an oral message to you² from President Pompidou to the effect that the French contract with Libya for the sale of military aircraft has now been completed and that it will involve 100 planes rather than the 50 reported in the press. Among the types to be sold are Mirage fighters—though not the latest models—as well as reconnaissance and training aircraft. Deliveries are to begin this year with four trainers and then continue through 1974. President Pom-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 676, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.

² A memorandum of conversation of the meeting during which Lucet gave the message to Kissinger is *ibid*.

pidou wanted you to know about this privately so that you do not learn of it through leaks or indirectly.

I thanked the Ambassador for this confidential information and for his President's courtesy in giving it to you. In the ensuing discussion, Lucet argued that the French decision to proceed was based largely on the premise that if they did not sell the planes the Soviets would. I pointed out that the timing was unfortunate because it would raise pressures on us to sell more planes to the Israelis and because of the closeness of Pompidou's visit here. Lucet said they had written the contract so as to preclude the use of the planes against Israel but he agreed that there could be little assurance on this score.

I believe the French decision is firm and that there is little to be gained from further expressions of concern. Our misgivings have been clear.

If you approve, I will convey no further response to Lucet beyond what I have already said to him about your appreciating the information and the problems we had with the transaction.

*Recommendation*³

No further response required.

³ The President initialed his approval on January 22. In a January 21 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that Lucet had provided information that 108 aircraft were involved. (Ibid.)

137. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, January 21, 1970, 1130Z.

727. Subject: Libyan arms and French policies. Ref: State 004277.²

Summary: Libyan arms sale was probably personal decision by Pompidou, and fits policy he has espoused of strengthening French presence in Mediterranean. Early contract signing motivated probably by three factors—1. Desire to establish forward position with LARG, 2. Hope that the political repercussions of such a contract would die

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 676, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

² Telegram 4277 to Paris was not found.

down before Pompidou's visit to US, and 3. Expectation that prompt execution of the contract would create an image of more decisive, coherent and coordinated French foreign policy in wake of gunboat affair.³ Only the first of these objectives appears to have been realized. GOF is likely to be reasonably well satisfied with results on Arab-Mediterranean scene but domestic fall-out and possible adverse reaction on Pompidou's U.S. trip appears more severe than French had anticipated. GOF appreciates USG public posture to date and Pompidou is likely to be especially grateful for further evidences of U.S. support in face of criticism deal has provoked in both France and United States. But, from Paris viewpoint it seems unnecessary for USG to go beyond posture already established. Certainly no country has been more sensitive to French initiatives with Libyans than has USG. It is hard to see what more we could obtain by further U.S. support of their position. At the very last nothing further should be done unless we receive a significant quid pro quo. *End summary.*

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Shriver

³ On January 6, 1969, de Gaulle embargoed the delivery of military equipment to Israel. Among the weapons systems affected were five gunboats being prepared for Israel by French dockyards at Cherbourg. Work continued on the ships during the embargo. On the evening of December 24–25, the five ships, now completed, sailed from Cherbourg for Israel. Their departure was discovered by French authorities on December 26. An investigation established that the ships had been purchased by Israel through a Danish intermediary. Two senior French officials were suspended and the senior Israeli military attaché was expelled following the affair.

138. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 16, 1970, noon–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Post-De Gaulle France (NSSM 60)²

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Martin J. Hillenbrand

William I. Cargo

Donald McHenry

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

R. Jack Smith

JCS

LTG F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Frank Shakespeare

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

William Hyland

Richard T. Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Issues Paper³ should be revised to:

a. discuss French entry into the NPG in terms of its advantages and disadvantages and to absorb Secretary Rogers' recommendations;

b. add a sub-option on the joint targeting issue allowing for tripartite US–UK French talks with SACEUR “being kept informed” with an indication that it is the least desirable option.

—In the light of the information that the French did not plan to raise military issues during the Pompidou visit the President should be asked if he still wishes an NSC meeting prior to the visit.

—That the question of the proposed French Mediterranean strategy be raised at the NSC meeting if it takes place.⁴

—That, of the military issues, the US raise with Pompidou only the question of association with the NPG.⁵

[Omitted here is the discussion.]

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Document 130.

³ See footnote 1, Document 134.

⁴ See Document 140.

⁵ The revised paper was completed on February 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-153, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 60)

139. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, undated.

PRESENT

Dr. Henry Kissinger
General Walters
President Pompidou
Mr. Gaucher

Dr. Kissinger opened the conversation by expressing his thanks to President Pompidou for the excellent arrangements that had been made for his trip and also for President Pompidou's kindness and hospitality in having him to lunch. He said he had seen the Vietnamese that morning. President Pompidou asked how things had gone, adding that the Vietnamese were tough bargainers and that it was difficult to deal with them. Dr. Kissinger said that he did not want to say much about it before he had talked to President Nixon; but, if President Pompidou so desired, we could give him a short briefing on the subject during his stay in the United States.² President Pompidou said that he would appreciate this very much. Dr. Kissinger then said that he expected to have an afternoon session with the Vietnamese at 1600 that day.

Dr. Kissinger said that President Nixon was looking forward with pleasure to President Pompidou's forthcoming visit to the United States. We were anxious to do all we could to ensure that this trip would be a success. We had expressed our displeasure to the politicians in New York who were making a political issue out of this. Three or four Congressmen might walk out on the speech, but we expected that this would be compensated by an expression of esteem and consideration for the President from members of Congress.³

President Pompidou said that he was somewhat surprised to find that there was such a distinct Jewish feeling in the U.S. In France Jews, as well as Protestants and Catholics, thought of themselves as French

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 916, VIP Visits, France Pompidou Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place at President Pompidou's apartment, Ile St. Louis, Paris, on February 21. Kissinger was in Paris to carry on secret negotiations with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government. He discussed the circumstances of the meeting in *White House Years*, pp. 421, 438.

² No record of this discussion was found.

³ Pro-Israeli organizations in the United States were planning demonstrations to protest the sale of arms to Libya and the suspension of French aid to Israel. Subsequently Pompidou was subject to hostile demonstrations in a number of stops on his trip, the most vocal of which took place in Chicago.

first of all. He felt that France was perhaps the least racist country in the world and was proud of this.

Dr. Kissinger again said that President Pompidou could be certain that the U.S. Government would do everything it could to ensure this visit would be successful. He then asked how President Pompidou would prefer his talks with President Nixon—like those with General de Gaulle, that is to say just the two Presidents and two interpreters alone, or with a larger group. President Pompidou said that he would prefer the former, that is the more restricted meetings. He added humorously that he had not yet found someone in whom he could repose the confidence that President Nixon had in Dr. Kissinger, but he would eventually find someone.

Dr. Kissinger inquired what subjects President Pompidou might wish to discuss with us. We would not bring up anything that he did not wish to discuss. He could assure him that we would not bring up anything relating to the return of France to the military organization of NATO. President Pompidou nodded appreciatively and said that there were powers like France and superpowers like the United States. France was not an equal of the United States. If she were, it might make the relationship between the two countries easier.

First, he would want to discuss France's relationship with Europe. Then he would want to discuss France's relationship with the Soviet Union which was also a superpower. After all, Moscow was only 2800 kilometers from Paris; that is closer than New York to San Francisco. The USSR was present also on the Oder Neisse Line, and even further west on the border of the DDR and Czechoslovakia, 380 kilometers from Strasbourg. At this point Mr. Gaucher said that he had discovered quite by chance that there was a direct phone from the Elysée Palace to the White House. As far as he could find out, it had only been used once, in an awkward conversation between General de Gaulle and President Kennedy on the subject of Berlin.⁴ After that it had been taken out of General de Gaulle's office and connected with the Elysée switchboard. President Pompidou commented that he believed General de Gaulle really trusted no one.

President Pompidou also said that he might wish to talk about the stability of the dollar as this was vital to the anti-inflationary struggle of most of the Western countries.

Dr. Kissinger then asked whether Mr. Pompidou would want to discuss military matters or not. President Pompidou replied that he did want to discuss such matters and could.

⁴ No record of this discussion was found.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Mr. Pompidou for his opinion of the new German Government.⁵ Mr. Pompidou said that he believed Chancellor Brandt was sincere and that he dominated the Government by his personality. He did not believe that Brandt would ever betray the West. He commented briefly on Minister Scheel and said he felt Minister Schiller's stature was somewhat less than before the revaluation of the Mark. A revaluation was a difficult thing to do. He himself had had to carry out a devaluation and if he had to implement another devaluation, it would indeed be a very difficult thing to do. President Pompidou added that he did not think that the talks on Berlin⁶ were helpful. They gave the Russians a chance to make their presence felt in West Berlin, whereas they would never let us have the slightest influence in East Berlin. President Pompidou said the Germans were a patient and dynamic people. Dr. Kissinger commented that they had been deeply marked by the loss of two world wars and the Nazi period. President Pompidou said that because it had taken the whole world in arms to defeat them, they really did not feel humiliated by their defeats.

The conversation then turned to the Sino-Soviet differences. Dr. Kissinger said that according to our information the Soviets now had more troops facing the Chinese than they did facing Western Europe. They had modern armament as well. Mr. Pompidou said that the Soviets were buying large quantities of foodstuffs in Western Europe and sending them to Siberia. One could draw one of two conclusions from this. Either they were stockpiling foodstuffs against the eventuality of a conflict with China, or the military was looking to their requirements and as usual they tended to magnify the requirements. He tended to the latter belief. It would be insane for the Soviets to fight the Chinese. Yet if they were to attack the Chinese nuclear installations what could the Chinese do? They could not attack the well-armed Soviet forces in the Far East. The Chinese were also a difficult people to understand. The Japanese were also a difficult people. Dr. Kissinger said that they were very self-assured. They had not lost the First World War. Mr. Pompidou said that they had been defeated practically single handedly by the U.S., not by the whole world as was the case with Germany. Mr. Pompidou said that he had read somewhere that around 2020 they

⁵ In September 28, 1969 elections, Brandt's SPD finished second but enjoyed a strong gain in seats. The CDU, its coalition partner, conversely finished first in the popular vote but with a significant loss of seats. Brandt announced his intention to seek a coalition with the Free Democratic Party and after securing an alliance was elected Chancellor by the Bundestag on October 21, 1969.

⁶ On December 16, 1969, the Western powers presented identical notes to the Soviet Union proposing Four-Power discussions for improvement of movement to Berlin and between the Eastern and Western zones of the city. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972, Document 47.

would pass the U.S. in income. Dr. Kissinger noted that this might be so in per capita income but not in gross national product.

Dr. Kissinger said that there were some in the U.S. who felt that the Japanese should make more of an effort in the field of defense. He felt that this would come soon enough without anyone's urging. We were not pushing this. He found it difficult to believe that the Japanese were spending 500 million dollars a year on rockets simply because they wanted to study the weather. Mr. Pompidou nodded agreement.

Mr. Pompidou commented that he had given an interview to CBS's Walter Cronkite.⁷ It had been quite taxing because he had not known any of the questions in advance. Whereas, with the *New York Times* interview he had had such an opportunity.⁸ He then asked whether the questions at the National Press Club would be tough. Dr. Kissinger said that they would. Usually they tried to trap a speaker into revealing something he might wish to keep concealed. President Pompidou smiled and said that he hoped to disappoint them.

President Pompidou said that he had met General Eisenhower at SHAPE. He had met President Kennedy when the latter came to Paris. He had never met President Johnson, who had never been very popular in France. Nor had he met Mr. Nixon. But from all he had heard about him he felt that he and Mr. Nixon had much in common. Dr. Kissinger said he was sure that President Nixon has this same feeling about Mr. Pompidou.

Dr. Kissinger noted that President Nixon was dining at the French Embassy with Mr. Pompidou. It was the first time since he had become President that he had dined at a Foreign Embassy. President Pompidou said he was well aware of this and greatly appreciated it. He only hoped President Nixon would not be disappointed by the food. Dr. Kissinger also noted that Vice President Agnew would be attending the dinner in New York. President Pompidou said he appreciated that also and added that the Vice President was an unusual figure. Dr. Kissinger said that after his statement about the one-sided attitude of the press,⁹ he had built up quite a following and that the press had been more even-handed in their presentations of events since the Vice President's speech.

Dr. Kissinger again thanked President Pompidou for all his courteous help and said that he looked forward to seeing him the following week in the United States.

⁷ No transcript of this interview was found.

⁸ The interview with C.L. Sulzberger was published on February 15.

⁹ The Vice President had strongly attacked press coverage of the Nixon administration in speeches in New Orleans, October 19, and in Des Moines, November 13.

140. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, February 23, 1970.

Minutes of Meeting on Post-DeGaulle France

PARTICIPANTS

The President
 Vice President Agnew
 Secretary of State Rogers
 Secretary of Defense Laird
 Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, General Lincoln
 Director of Central Intelligence Helms
 General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS
 Under Secretary of State Richardson
 Assistant to the President Henry A. Kissinger
 Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand
 William Watts

At the start of the meeting, following some brief comments on recent Israel/Arab air action,² the President asked CIA Director Helms his estimate of the Mirage fighter.

Helms: It is very good.

Wheeler: They have had practice against Migs.

Laird: It is a cheaper plane. On tactics it is ready for the Mig 21s. On simulated flights we have had in St. Louis, the Mig 21 should take care of the Mirages, but the Israel pilots are much better.

Helms: The Chinese Communists are well ahead of the French in nuclear development. They have exploded three thermonuclear weapons, while the French have not exploded any.

RN: What about the United Kingdom?

Helms: They have what we gave them.

Wheeler: One or two of the top Chinese nuclear scientists were trained at Berkeley.

Laird: Debré feels he must represent DeGaulle. He is the top Cabinet Minister. He is giving interest rates of 3¾–4¼% over 15–20 years. He has a mission to sell equipment. He is now in Latin America and will sell everything.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970. Secret.

² During the winter of 1969–1970, Israel and Egypt clashed repeatedly along the Suez Canal Zone. On February 4 air forces from both sides launched air raids. On February 8–9, aerial dog fights took place over the Canal Zone. Israel launched air attacks on Egyptian targets on February 12 and 15–19.

Our sales are going down while French sales are going up. They have a goal of having arms sales represent 10% of all their export sales.

(Mr. Kissinger then outlined the military issues in our relations with France, as set forth in his talking points in the attached NSC book.)³

Richardson: That was a very clear exposition.

Let me give the general reactions at State:

(1) *Nuclear Planning Group*—French participation should be encouraged. We don't need to go back and start all over.

(2) *Targeting*—We would prefer this through SACEUR, but will they be willing? This should be explored.

(3) *Concerning tactical nuclear warheads*, there is no way we can supply them.

(4) On *general nuclear support*, we would like to give assistance to their development. We would take a cautious and reserved position on computer sharing. TACSATCOM may come up. We believe that we should encourage French participation. Dave Packard would add SATCOM to this list. There should be a sharing of costs.

On the question of financial claims, should you bring this up? This is a close one. The United States has claims of \$378 million, and NATO has claims of another \$293 million. Martin Hillenbrand thinks we should leave this to working levels. Dave Packard wants to bring it up. Perhaps we could best determine this in the light of discussions.

RN: What is the feeling about the Mediterranean and Middle East policy?

Richardson: We view the French interest in the Western Mediterranean as constructive. We will need to keep in close touch on this, of course, and we will be discussing it with the Spanish. It is useful to think of a broad area including Italy, France, Spain and the Maghreb. We should show a willingness to accept this kind of thinking. Libya and the Arab countries show a real sympathy to the way the French attempt to limit Soviet influence. We should encourage Libya to look toward the Maghreb, not the UAR.

RN: What about the weapons sale to Libya?

Richardson: I should think you would want to indicate unhappiness over the way the deal was handled, and the incomplete pieces we kept getting. But there is no point in hitting them hard on this. Even with the US and the UK out, this is still a Western deal. We don't see any change in the arms balance for two years.

Laird: It is not a matter of just hustling. The French would just as soon see the U.S. out of the area. This sale further embarrasses us. There

³ Not found.

is a whole Mediterranean policy, and Debré has a mission complex. He is persuading the Cabinet to go along with it.

Wheeler: The military wants to cooperate. They want the 6th Fleet included in their thinking. This is a political decision on non-cooperation.

Rogers: I agree.

Richardson: While Debré wants some kind of French hegemony, we should still try and convert the French. We need to go out of our way with the Spanish and develop a dialog. We also need to deal with the Tunisians and the Moroccans.

Laird: But the French Foreign Minister didn't even know about the military sale until late in the game.

Helms: That is right. The news broke through the intelligence community.

RN: When are we going to have a discussion of Greece and Italy in the NSC?⁴

Kissinger: In the middle of March.

Agnew: There is pressure to get the French to break away from an internal isolationist push. They move toward withdrawal on one side but see an international role on the other.

Kissinger: They have come to the conclusion that we *must* protect them. With their fine gallic logic they have cut through the NATO verbiage. They want to get out of any formal commitments, and the symbolism of this is very bad. In point of fact, the chain of command goes through national channels in peacetime anyway.

We handled the French very badly in 62 and 63. When De Gaulle was getting out of Algeria he tried to give a real sense of purpose. He played a rough, brutal, and cynical game.

Richardson: The French could exercise a greater degree of grandeur by disassociating themselves from the U.S. and going against any policy of blocs.

Kissinger: Yes, and try to break East Europe away; but Czechoslovakia ended all that.⁵ The French now must go to Moscow, but Bonn has more to offer than Paris. If Pompidou wants to race to Moscow, he wants something to offer. He could use the Middle East as a lever.

RN: How does the UK feel about all this?

Laird: They won't say much. They are trying to sell tanks. At the Nuclear Planning Group, everybody disagreed with us on arms sales to the Arabs. I am not quite sure about French participation in the Nuclear

⁴ The discussion took place on June 17. See Document 43.

⁵ Reference to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 20, 1968.

Planning Group. I do agree that they should be in, but on their own initiative. We shouldn't raise the issue. There is no seat there, but it could be reopened.

One thing I am continually pressed on is about hitting the French on money they owe us. I can handle it, but each time I go to the Hill I am asked why we get no reimbursement on facilities.

Kissinger: Aren't you seeing Pompidou Wednesday morning?⁶

Laird: Yes, for breakfast.

RN: I would like to hear some comment on French/German relations.

Hillenbrand: There is a growing resentment of Germany, especially among the Gaullists. There is a fear of German expansionism. There is more and more thinking of the UK as a counter-weight in the Common Market. There is also concern over Germany's Eastern policy. The French see that the Germans have more to offer than they do.

The French are worried that the Socialists will be led down the garden path by the Russians. They basically resent the German socialists.

Kissinger: I agree. The more actively the Germans go toward the East, the more the French will countermove. The French are also worried about our Berlin overtures. This could lead to the French moving closer to the UK, and even to France/UK nuclear collaboration.

Lincoln: Could this also move them more toward the United States?

Hillenbrand: I don't think so. There is a growing European acceptance of the removal of the U.S. They are hedging their bets and they foresee a weakened NATO.

RN: I was recently talking to Wayne Hays,⁷ who said he finds in Europe an almost pathological concern about the United States and our declining support to NATO. Take a look at the map—it is a pretty sorry picture.

Spain—Nothing much will happen unless someone shoots Franco.

Scandinavians—Just look what they mean to us.

Italians—We are opening them to the left.

Greeks—OK, says everybody, they are bad and it is the wrong kind of government.

Turks—They are coming here, and maybe we can save them.

⁶ February 25.

⁷ Representative Wayne Hays (D-OH).

So the French are going to work on the Southern Mediterranean, taking an all-Mediterranean view. We must examine Israeli policy in the light of all this.

Look at the welcome being given to Pompidou. Lester Wolff⁸ has said he will walk out of Congress. The conduct on the part of the New Yorkers has been miserable. I have asked the Vice President to go to New York.

If Daley⁹ is staying away from Chicago, I'll go there myself. This is incredible; when Kosygin comes around, everybody tries to play up to him.

By the way, I saw a decision paper recently on Spain.¹⁰

Kissinger: Yes, you approved it. We have agreed within the government to try and keep all the bases. But we have a priority list. DOD has its own list.

RN: The Mediterranean is really one pie. It is tough to divide it up.

Richardson: Concerning Spain, I think we must do more in trying to establish better relations with the rest of Europe. We need to make out an arrangement with the Spanish as to who will do what. On the Common Market there is a problem, since any special preference for Spain would be a violation of GATT.

RN: I want a policy which moves toward Spain. There is the opening to left of Italy. I am dubious about Greece. And the Arab world is a disaster area—not just because of Israeli policy. Nobody tries to go toward Spain.

We could wind up with a situation where the 6th Fleet could be in the middle of a large unfriendly area.

There are many people who don't like dictators and are not willing to work with them. I can't subscribe to that. Concerning Italy, nothing will happen there unless we take leadership. We have to try to do something with the Algerians. On Libya, the situation is sort of hopeless. I am sure they will furnish some of the planes to the UAR.

We need to look at the whole Mediterranean basin and see where we go. And we need a new relationship with Spain.

Richardson: On the question of GATT, I would like to send Nat Samuels to Europe to see what arrangements can be worked out.

Laird: I would like to visit our bases in Spain.

RN: I ask you now to visit U.S. bases in Spain, and you should go to Madrid and talk with them there.

⁸ Representative Lester Wolff (D-NY).

⁹ Mayor of Chicago Richard J. Daley.

¹⁰ Document 291.

By the way, what is the situation on the plane sabotage/blowup?¹¹ Do we have sophisticated equipment to check baggage? Can this equipment be made available to all carriers? Will the airlines stop going in to Israel? The Israelis can't accept this.

Helms: We don't know all the details on the explosion yet. We will find out from the Swiss.

RN: Again, I say we need to look at the whole area. We should go piece by piece.

Pompidou understands that. The French are thinking of the whole area. We need some strong regional thinking.

Lincoln: Those in New York who are against the French are in fact hurting themselves.

Richardson: We have done two recent memos on the Mediterranean which I would like to bring to your attention. One is on the Western Mediterranean, the other is on the area as a whole.¹²

RN: I would like a more extended meeting on the whole Mediterranean area which would include the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.

Laird: Mr. President, I would like to ask General Wheeler to comment on his recent discussions with French General Fourquet.

Wheeler: Fourquet was very reserved and clammed up completely on NATO. But he had much to say on French relations and interest in North Africa. He said that Napoleon and the Israelis have the same fatal urge. They kept reaching until they over-reached themselves.

He did tend to be critical of NATO strategy. He referred to a speech he had made which said the French would reserve to themselves decisions on when, where and how they would use nuclear weapons in response to attack on NATO. When I talked with him in Norfolk, he said the French would be willing to talk on maneuvers, exercises, etc., but would never join an integrated NATO organization.

RN: It could well be in our interest to have the French, rather than the Soviets, in this area. The French are there for their own interests. Let's us look at *our* interests and see where some deals can be made.

¹¹ On February 21, an explosion aboard a Swissair flight en route to Tel Aviv from Zurich caused the plane to crash, killing all 47 passengers and crew members.

¹² Apparent reference to papers responding to NSSM 87, "Trends and U.S. Options in North Africa," and NSSM 88, "US Policy on Italy and the Northern Mediterranean," both of which were in preparation. On February 26, NSSM 90, "US Interests in and Policy Toward the Mediterranean Area," directed preparation of a policy paper covering the entire region. For NSSM 87 and the summary of the response, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-5, part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972, Documents 5 and 9. NSSMs 88 and 90 are Documents 30 and 31, respectively. The response to NSSM 88 is Document 195; the response to NSSM 90 is Document 33.

141. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 24, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President, President Pompidou
Mr. Andronikof, Maj. General Vernon Walters

The President opened the conversation by saying that if President Pompidou agreed he felt they would have two opportunities apart from the dinner talks to discuss various matters. He understood that even during dinner it would be possible for them to have informal discussions. The President stated that he had no specific agenda and they could discuss any matters that were of interest to both. They could start the conversation today and go forward with this kind of talk. The President felt that discussions with only the two of them and the interpreters present were more useful than larger meetings where people tended to speak for the record. In small meetings he suggested that it was possible to speak quite freely.

President Pompidou agreed that this was a better system if they could speak more freely and more openly.

President Nixon said that it was important, as pointed out by President Pompidou that our two countries have a long history of alliance and friendship in the modern world. Prior to his visit to General De Gaulle last year² there had arisen an idea that perhaps the interests of France and the United States were irreconcilably opposed. He did not agree with this. It is possible for two great nations with the same goals to decide to adopt different methods of achieving their goals. He had begun in his administration to develop a new spirit of Franco-American relations of respect for different points of view and of not insisting that both pursue the same road to arrive at their common goals. Therefore he was prepared for any subject President Pompidou might wish to discuss, including the question of the future of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, East-West relations. But what was really important is that they have a good exchange of views so that they could learn from the other.

President Pompidou said he agreed with this. He was grateful to President Nixon for this new policy. A country like France cherished its independence. There were substantial differences in the available

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The conversation took place in the President's office. Pompidou was in Washington February 23–26.

² See Document 118.

means of military and economic power to the United States and to France; there was tradition involved as well, and this was important to all countries in Western Europe and France in particular. He believed that we must necessarily be united on substance. This did not mean that we must agree on each special situation which sometimes we see with eyes that are not quite the same. The two countries did not have the same geography nor did they have the same economic and military means. He felt it was important at the outset to be frank with one another, to inform one another clearly, to seek significant means of working together and to avoid opposing one another, without necessarily having identical views.

President Nixon then said he felt the future of Europe was a particular case in point, and he noted that President Pompidou felt strongly that France was a part of the alliance but at the same time should maintain an independent position. In his view they should explore in what areas France and the United States while maintaining their independent positions could cooperate on matters of military cooperation. He was not suggesting any change in France's position toward the Atlantic Alliance. He had no reason to question this new policy but he felt that the United States and France should recognize that they were allies and, to the extent they could, find areas of cooperation.

President Pompidou said that he agreed with this and they welcomed on their part discussion of this issue.

President Nixon said that our military and General Wheeler had told him of the great respect we have for the French military and of the consultations which are held between them. We would want to proceed with these in any way which is consistent with President Pompidou's position.

President Pompidou said that he believed that when General De Gaulle withdrew the French forces from the integrated NATO command what was probably the most shocking to the U.S. was that this decision required the removal of NATO installations from French soil. In his view it was possible for allies to have a number of arrangements, staff contacts, advance planning without the need of placing their forces under integrated and central command. He believed that NATO was probably the first instance in modern military history. He felt that this was probably due to the immense differences of force in modern weapons between the partners. Like President Nixon he was quite ready to see where they could coordinate eventual actions and closer contacts between the respective staffs without modifying their basic position. But he felt that they could talk quite significantly. He understood that this part of the discussion would be entirely confidential now and later.

President Nixon replied that he would first like to say that he agreed that what they said in confidence would be held in confidence now and for the future. Perhaps the best procedure in this case might be to let their military people explore what was feasible from a military standpoint and they could then submit their views for consideration. There would be no commitments but only an opportunity to examine what could be done. Generally speaking the military were closer now concerning these matters than political people. In discussing such things as joint targeting he was not himself technically competent and he felt that, if the President agreed, their military could get together and have a discussion and planning on a bilateral basis. This did not involve a change in France's position towards NATO.

President Pompidou said he understood this and he believed that at the present time under the Lemnitzer-Ailleret agreements³ there were discussions concerning the French divisions in Germany. He felt that this could now be extended and broadened to cover the French divisions that were stationed in France and not be limited to those in Germany. In the Mediterranean, which was a particular hot spot right now, there could be talks and discussions between the two navies. Generally the sailors were closer together than others and this could be developed. In the nuclear area there was not a great deal you could say or do for the very good reason that the French strategic capabilities were very weak at the present time. But they would develop across the years. Such targets as the French might have were probably already targeted by the United States, and, in any case, the U.S. would probably continue to target them, since the French were not sure that their means were sufficient to penetrate and reach these targets. Perhaps the situation would be different when the French had their nuclear missile submarines and also when, in two or three years, they have tactical nuclear weapons. This, however, will bring up a serious and immediate problem. Then there was the question of weaponry, that is research and development. There were a certain number of agreements between France and the United States under which a steering committee existed for development in this area. It had more or less been put to sleep. He felt that this might be more difficult because the US had a system of zones and the French felt they could not let themselves be limited to one particular area. He felt that at least something should be done to establish a basis of recognition so that the U.S. navy subs and French sub-

³ Reference to a series of agreements relating to the transfer of NATO headquarters supplies and personnel from France following de Gaulle's decision to remove French forces from the military alliance. The discussions began on November 23, 1966. The French permitted NATO to retain oil pipeline and air corridor rights under the agreements.

marines when they meet could recognize one another and be in direct contact.

President Nixon said that if out of their talks—which would be held on a completely confidential basis because he realized that political overtones involved both of them—they could allow their military people to explore ways in which they could cooperate better, this would be very useful. We had started a certain distance down this road and we could go quite a distance further. As the French acquired tactical nuclear weapons and increased their strategic capability by the construction of their submarines the nuclear question could come up again and could be a subject of talks on cooperation. If we could give a type of direction, a blessing to the military men to discuss these matters he felt this could be useful, and he emphasized that this could be done in an independent manner without giving up freedom of decision. He felt it was important and desirable between allies to find positions of common action on given assumptions.

President Nixon said that he understood that the political decision as to the use of force was reserved to the President. What he was speaking about was tactical cooperation that might come into play once political decisions were made. The political decisions however would be reserved to President Pompidou and to himself. He felt that in case of a conflict it was more likely than unlikely that both would be involved—that both France and the United States would be involved. Eventually, what he was talking about was contingency planning. He respected and understood the decision of France to retain her independence. The basic point is to realize that the Soviet leaders' goal is still expansion but they are not prepared to take the risks their predecessors did. For France and for the U.S. the main goal was defense, not expansion. This does not mean that the U.S. and France should sit in isolation and look at the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy. In the discussions both may have with the Soviet Union we should recognize that their purpose is to gain an advantage over us to serve their own ends. Progress to them is not an end in itself. What we really need, as President Nixon had said to his colleagues, was a healthy dose of French skepticism or cynicism in dealing with the Soviet Union. The President said we should not approach discussions with the Soviets in a state of euphoria and believe that all we have to do is to sit down at a table and all our difficulties will evaporate. Our differences with them are deep and real. We should attempt to resolve them without an ultimate confrontation.

The President noted with regard to the arms talks, in the last few years the Soviet Union has been increasing in significant numbers its forces in submarines and in ICBM's. They are also building an ABM system. The present balance of such missiles is that in ground-based

missiles they are at parity with us or may even be a little ahead. We are still ahead in sea-launched missiles but by 1974 or 1975 they will be equal. That is why in these talks we must be careful not to make an agreement just for the sake of an agreement. We have to be very careful not to make an agreement that would leave the Soviet Union in possession of a substantial advantage.

The President went on to comment that we should not make an agreement that would in any way go over the heads of our European friends or one that would jeopardize our ability to join with our European allies in defense of freedom when we meet again with the Soviets in April.⁴ We approach the arms talks with great caution. President Nixon said we had a responsibility not to weaken the U.S. position in relation to the Soviets and not to say or do anything that would weaken or be in derogation of the European position. While he was in this office there would be no Soviet-American condominium, which would be dangerous, nor a coalition against the Chinese. He had spoken along these hard lines. This does not mean that we are not prepared to explore with the Soviet Union those areas where we can agree in realistic terms to make progress. Above all, we must remember what it is that has deterred the Soviet Union in Europe. It has been the strength of the Alliance and of the United States. Despite our budgetary problems and political problems he would exert all the leadership he could to see that the U.S. plays its role and that there is no lessening of our strength that would encourage a more expansionist and aggressive policy by the Soviet leaders. President Nixon believed that it was both practical and pragmatic to give them reason to decide to live and let live.

This, President Nixon said, brought him to the subject of China. As President Pompidou had noted we had made some moves towards China at Warsaw⁵ and had also taken some initiatives concerning trade. These had not been reciprocated up to this point. The purpose of these moves on our part was long-range. It would be easy for us to fall into error that France, U.S. or the Atlantic Nations should join with the Soviet Union in a Complex of Nations to contain China. In the end this would only serve to build up in 15, 20 or 25 years a nation of a billion people and make it an implacable enemy of all our nations. President Nixon therefore believed that it was important that we try to develop lines of communication with the Soviet Union and China rather than to join one to contain the other. Over a long period perhaps a generation we will see a gradual change in the Soviet attitude and in the Chinese attitude. There will be a change in their situation and in the world and

⁴ Reference to the ongoing SALT talks.

⁵ The approach was made in early December. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 53.

they will have to face that change. In the meantime it is important for the U.S. and the Free World to maintain their strength and to negotiate. We should have discussions whenever possible but we should negotiate with our eyes open. We should have no illusions concerning the deep differences we have with them. These cannot be resolved by a conference or by a treaty. In this spirit we have agreed to negotiate with the Soviets.

Turning to France, the President said he wished to emphasize again that—as distinguished from the positions of some of his predecessors in this office—he would not comment on the independent French policy. He might have his own views but he felt that a strong independent France devoted to the same goals as we are is in the interest of the U.S. A strong Europe in the economic sense might *seem* not to be in the U.S. interest, in the long term it was. What we need is a better balance in the West. It is not healthy to have just two superpowers; in such a situation there is more chance of a conflict than when there are more centers of power. Greater strength of the European economies, an independent French policy, and, in Asia, a stronger Japan, would eventually make for a more stable world. The position of the U.S. at the end of World War II was not healthy. Twenty-five years had passed and things were changed. This we regarded as a healthy development.

In the final analysis with three billion people on earth if civilization is to survive in the last third of this century this will be decided by the Soviet Union, by China, and eventually Japan, by Western Europe, by that he meant France, Britain and Germany and the United States. Africa is moving along, but it is a century away.

Latin America is also moving but it is fifty years or more away. In Asia, India and Pakistan will have enormous difficulty in simply keeping pace with their increase in population. We have a great responsibility to use the power we have to build the kind of a world that keeps the forces of expansion in check and thus give the forces of freedom a chance to grow in their own way and not like tin soldiers lined up behind the biggest one.

President Nixon said he must ask President Pompidou's pardon for talking so long but they would be talking together over the next few years and he felt that President Pompidou should know his basic thoughts. He would be interested in knowing how President Pompidou evaluated these matters.

President Pompidou said that a talk was never too long when it was interesting. He completely agreed with all that part of the President's analysis that it was safer to have different centers of power to avoid the conflict of two blocs. At the end of the war the U.S. was in a position to establish its domination over the whole world. It had not used its power to do so. Power thus established never lasts long. The

existence of more centers of economic and political power makes things more complicated but in the longer term has greater advantages.

President Nixon agreed.

With respect to China, President Pompidou said he could entirely approve our policy. It would be wrong to form a bloc with the Soviet Union against China. Long term it would be folly. The road with China would be long and there were many obstacles. But the time was good for initiatives as China was fearful of Soviet actions.

With respect to the Soviet Union President Pompidou said he would like to make some shades of opinion in the analysis. Like President Nixon he felt that if the Soviet leaders believed they could conquer Europe without major obstacles they would do it at once. They know that they no longer can. First they are haunted by the Chinese problem. Even if they decided to use military force there is the impossibility of conquering China and if the immense masses of China wished to expand they could do so only on Soviet territory. This is therefore a long-term concern for the Soviet leaders. But it is a temptation as they fear the Chinese nuclear capability and the economic burden of maintaining a large army in the Far East so far from their vital centers such as Moscow. They want quiet in the West. They want to try to avoid an arms race with the U.S. that would cost them too much. They want an agreement with the West that would support the status quo perpetually. They have economic difficulties. Brezhnev realizes that they are far behind the free world. This creates an inferiority complex and the desire to use Western technical capabilities.

President Pompidou observed that this is even more accentuated in the satellite countries who want to develop economically and cannot obtain from the Soviet Union the means to do this. These means exist in the West, especially in Germany. Thus their desire for closer relations with the West is not sentimental but a political, military and economic reality profoundly felt by the Soviet leaders. President Pompidou said he had been to the Soviet Union as Prime Minister and he had seen that the generation behind those now in power was a generation of engineers, technicians, technocrats fascinated by the West and more particularly the United States. We should not forget that the economic and technical development of the Soviet Union by the West is a tradition. President Pompidou referred to Soviet fear of Germany, noting that if one looked at Germany today, despite its economic power, one wonders how the Russians can have such fears. But one must recall that 25 years ago the German armies were in the Caucasus, on the Volga and before Leningrad. It took the U.S., the USSR and many others to defeat the Germans. Therefore there was this Soviet urge to try to neutralize Germany and perpetuate its division, and in conversations with us to find means to ensure this neutralization.

To conclude, President Pompidou said he would say two things. First there was the question of more contacts with the east. He believed freedom was contagious. Bismarck once said that the Germans had given the French the republic like syphilis. Freedom was contagious and contacts with the Soviets and satellites would raise the need to shake the yoke of a totalitarian regime. When in Moscow the young newspapermen with him had contacts with their Soviet counterparts that had nothing to do with communism. Mostly the satellite countries that most thirst after independence like the Romanians are the most anxious for the European Security Conference. They want to sit around the table with other countries and not be represented by the Soviet Union in a U.S.–USSR tête-à-tête. President Pompidou said he was looking forward to the opportunity of talking further with President Nixon.

Both leaders agreed to the establishment of a teletype circuit between the White House and the Elysée Palace. A future communications link between the two Presidents would be established in this manner through the diplomatic advisor to the President (currently George Gaucher) and Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger then entered and the meeting concluded.

142. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French

I have taken steps in three areas to implement your wish to move ahead on military cooperation with the French. Subject to your approval, I would propose to do the following:

1. Convey to Andy Goodpaster, in his capacity as USCINCEUR, a directive instructing him to contact the French Chief of Staff for the purpose of exploring expanded practical cooperation between our theater, naval and strategic forces. Arrangements made at the military

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 676, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for action. The tabs are not printed.

level would then be subject to review and approval by yourself and President Pompidou. (Tab A)

2. Direct Secretary Laird to activate promptly the dormant US-French R & D Steering Committee, about which President Pompidou spoke to you.² This body, which has not met since 1966, deals with military technology applicable to weapons and matériel below the strategic missile level. (Tab B)

3. Direct Secretary Laird to submit promptly for your approval a course of action responsive to a number of pending French requests for assistance for their missile development, other than nuclear components (Tab C). This will run up against the terms of a Johnson Administration directive (NSAM 294 of 1964)³ prohibiting all forms of cooperation in this area. The directive to Secretary Laird stipulates that this old NSAM should be set aside in the present instance. Its formal revocation at this time is likely to provoke a bureaucratic battle, leaks and Congressional (Joint Committee) opposition. This matter can be handled later.

4. To meet your commitments to Prime Minister Wilson to keep him informed if anything should develop in the area of US-French military preparation, I have prepared a communication to him on the Pompidou visit. It is couched in very general language and I would convey it orally to Ambassador Freeman (Tab D).

Recommendation⁴

That you approve the directive to General Goodpaster (Tab A).

That you approve the directive to Secretary Laird on the US-French R & D Steering Group (Tab B).

That you approve the directive to Secretary Laird on missile cooperation (Tab C).

That you approve the contents of a communication to Prime Minister Wilson, along the lines of the paper at Tab D, on the basis of which I will talk to Ambassador Freeman.

² The two Presidents discussed U.S.-French military cooperation on February 26. A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 30.

⁴ Nixon approved all four recommendations on March 16.

143. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, April 30, 1970, 1755Z.

5481. Pass Ambassador Watson.

1. I am concerned about the way the French, after a long period of relative quiet about Viet-Nam, are beginning to disassociate themselves publicly from US in that area. So far this has been more implicit than explicit, but Schumann's remarks in his widely circulated statement to the National Assembly April 28 (Paris 5426)² revives and strongly reaffirms the Gaullist line on Indochina which was so harmful to us on previous occasions. Schumann's line on Cambodia, lauding as he did Sihanouk just at a moment when we are offering badly needed help to Lon Nol, is symptomatic and worrying. This more blatant anti-Lon Nol and pro-Sihanouk GOF line is also reflected on the French television which on occasions has presented the Cambodian affair as largely a civil war between two Cambodian factions, overlooking the presence of 40 thousand NVA/VC in Cambodia.

2. My fear is that this implicitly anti-U.S. line on Cambodia could soon be expanded into an explicitly anti-U.S. line on the whole Indochinese question, including Viet-Nam. This could do a lot of mischief.

3. Certainly efforts should be made to prevent such a development. I do not think we could in the short run persuade the French to change their policy, for they seem to be convinced that it is in their interest to maintain a sort of pro-Communist neutrality throughout Indochina. I do feel, however, that by high-level intervention we might get them to shut up or perhaps even take a slightly more benevolent "wait and see" public line towards coming events in Indochina.

4. Therefore, I suggest that Ambassador Watson might carry an oral message on the Cambodian situation from President Nixon to Pompidou which he could deliver during the private conversations after the presentation of credentials ceremony on May 6.³ Before the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 676, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. V. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found.

³ No oral message was prepared. In telegram 5748 from Paris, May 6, Watson reported that during the presentation of credentials ceremony, "Pompidou repeated small quotation of Sihanouk to him that Sihanouk would like us to gradually leave but not all of them. Pompidou stated that he is trying to keep as moderate a view as he can possibly do in the current Cambodian situation, but he is very much against current operation for he fears that the Far East can be as harmful to the US as Algeria was to France, adding that an American undoing would therefore be an undoing of France, Europe and the West." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 676, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. V)

President's statement tonight about the Indochina situation, we do not wish to suggest anything specific.⁴ However, as the aim of the exercise would be to persuade the French to keep quiet, Ambassador Watson could well ask Pompidou to withhold judgment on our policy and maintain a public posture which would not make our efforts to manage the situation more difficult.

Blake

⁴ Nixon gave a speech on southeast Asia at 9 p.m. on April 30. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 405–410)

144. National Security Study Memorandum 100¹

Washington, September 1, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Military Cooperation with France

1. The President has directed that a study be prepared to review all the various areas of current and potential military cooperation with France. The study should include:

a. a status report on bilateral and multilateral areas of cooperation with France relating to NATO (SACEUR), and, specifically, alternative ways to encourage French association with the NPG; future problems and policy choices should be identified;

b. a status report on Franco-American military Research and Development projects under consideration or proposed in the recent meeting of the Steering Group in Paris; potential problems should be identified;

c. a status report on technical discussions thus far with French on their requests for assistance in their missile programs, a discussion of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 43–103. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

alternative courses of action in providing assistance, including an analysis of areas of potential conflict with a possible SALT agreement;

d. an evaluation of prospects for Anglo-French nuclear collaboration and alternative postures that the US might adopt;

e. a discussion of alternatives in regard to dealing with the French request for a relaxation of restrictions on the use of US computers and computer components in the French nuclear weapons program, including as much factual detail as necessary on the status of the program, the contribution of computers and the pertinent legal and political factors involved in our restrictions.

2. Consideration of study items 1c, 1d, and 1e should include an in-depth analysis of American interests in relation to third country (Allied) nuclear capabilities both in terms of separate countries and in terms of any collaboration between Allied powers.

3. In view of the sensitivity of this subject and particularly of study items 1c, d and e, participation in the work of this study must be strictly limited and the entire subject matter handled on a highly classified and restricted basis.

4. This study will be prepared by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Political Military Group. The completed study should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than September 14.

Henry A. Kissinger

145. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

US Flights Monitoring French Atomic Tests

Alphand has registered French Government concern about US flights near the French atomic tests in the Pacific during the recent test

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Colonel Behr.

series.² The French Air Force had asked the US Air Force to file flight plans in advance. These requests went without response because of Defense's procedural restrictions against filing flight plans and the absence of a requirement to do so under international civil air regulations.

The French contend USAF planes posed risks and inconvenience in July and August by flying at the same altitude as French aircraft. Our Air Force confirms that there may well be some substance to the French claim of inconvenience, though less so with the regular monitoring planes than with special B-52 flights (newly authorized in the Monthly Reconnaissance Schedules) which homed in on the test site during countdown.

Regardless of the validity of the French complaint, they are annoyed and would like to avoid any problem in the test series scheduled for the summer of 1971. Defense Minister Debré is reported to be personally unhappy about the situation.

Colonel Behr and I have discussed this matter with people at State and the Air Force who are considering the problem. They are examining what kind of accommodations might be proposed to the French to improve coordination of flight control procedures while avoiding disclosure of sensitive information on our Atomic Energy Detection Systems. State and Air Force hope to propose a means of better coordination to the French within the next six weeks. We have cleared the attached State/Defense message to Embassy Paris requesting that the French be told we are studying the matter and intend to be responsive to their concern.³

However, we thought you might want to be informed of this matter. This incident should not be allowed to recur and become an unnecessary irritant in French-American relations. We have, moreover, a compelling interest in protecting our French overflight rights in Europe.

We plan to follow up and see that an accommodation is reached with the French well before their tests next summer. Since State and Air Force appear to have every intention of being responsive, we believe the issue should be left as low key as possible and that it is unnecessary for you to get involved at this stage.

However, if you should desire to become involved now, you may wish to issue a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense (Tab A)⁴ to emphasize the need for appropriate follow-up and requesting that you be kept informed.

² No record of a meeting was found.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Not printed.

Colonel Behr concurs while expressly recommending that this matter be handled by State and Air Force, in coordination with our offices, without your getting involved at this stage.

Recommendation

That the NSC Staff follow-up on this matter to ensure an accommodation with the French.⁵

Alternatively, if you wish to get involved, a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense at Tab A raises this issue and asks for its resolution.⁶

⁵ Kissinger initiated his approval.

⁶ Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “(no directive) HK”.

146. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

President Pompidou’s Visit to the USSR

The political results of President Pompidou’s eight day visit to the USSR were rather ambiguous and inconclusive.² While given much publicity, including Pompidou’s attendance at a space and missile launching, Franco-Soviet relations are no longer quite so important for either side. Pompidou himself made no effort to match the performance of De Gaulle in 1966 (which he could hardly have done had he tried). The Soviets, for their part, gave the President the full treatment, but it is evident that they consider Germany, not France, their main interlocuter in Europe.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”

² October 6–13. Talks with Soviet leaders took place October 6–7 and 12–13. Subsequently, Pompidou provided Nixon with a personal evaluation of the talks. The text of his undated letter and Nixon’s October 31 reply are *ibid.*, Box 752, Presidential Correspondence, France Pompidou.

The major substantive development of the trip was the signature of a protocol on political consultation.³ The document calls for regular as well as emergency consultations in the event of international crisis. This is a new commitment for the French (not dissimilar from what was contemplated by LBJ in SALT but then discarded under Allied pressure) but qualified by a reference that existing obligations to third countries are not affected.

Both sides want to maintain the concept of a special relationship, but in fact, neither seems to think much more can come out of France-Soviet relations, now that extreme Gaullism is fading under Pompidou.

The French were, however, as forthcoming as possible on the idea of a European security conference. Pompidou's endorsement was more positive than previous French formulations. And the French have accepted the Soviet language with regard to "recognition of the inviolability" of present European frontiers. They also accepted a general European renunciation of force agreement as one of the topics for a conference. It was to be expected that, as German-Soviet relations have come to predominate European politics, the French would become more interested in broader conferences where they can play a role.

In this vein, Pompidou took a firm line on the need for a sound agreement on Berlin, which of course, has the effect of slowing down the German-Soviet rapprochement. Brezhnev, however, is reported to have argued that there could be no connection between the ratification of the new treaty with Bonn and the outcome of Berlin negotiations. Moreover, the Soviets insisted they made this clear to Brandt just as Bahr keeps claiming he and Brandt made *their* position clear to the Soviets. (This issue looks like it is becoming a major one between Bonn and Moscow and we need to be more careful than ever not to get caught in the middle.)

Other parts of the final communiqué referred to continuing progress of Soviet-French collaboration, begun in 1964 and 1966, in the economic, scientific, and cultural fields. The French have undertaken to increase purchases of Soviet machinery and equipment. Mention was made of possible Soviet participation in construction of a steel mill in France. It was made clear that cooperation on the production of trucks in the USSR may involve other European countries as well. The two countries agreed to the opening in the near future of consulates in Marseilles and Leningrad. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny accepted a French invitation for a high level Soviet visit to France in 1971.

³ The agreement was summarized in Bernard Gwertzman, "Soviet and France Sign Agreement To Deepen Political Consultations," *New York Times*, October 14, 1970, p. 5.

Soviet-French agreement was also recorded on the problem of the Middle East and on Indochina. With respect to the latter, both sides agreed to continue their efforts to facilitate negotiations between “all interested parties.” The formulation is less negative than Soviet press response to your proposals,⁴ and at least admits the possibility of a negotiating forum broader than the Paris talks. On the Middle East, the Soviets apparently showed little interest in discussing with the French either four power consultations or the relaunching of the Jarring talks.

As far as our own interests are concerned the visit points up that our relations with France may be entering a period of somewhat greater difficulties. Much of the messy underbrush in our relations has been cleared away and you have established a good personal rapport with Pompidou. It is evident, however, that our differences remain as we come closer to bedrock policy issues—Vietnam, Middle East, European security and especially the growing deadlock between U.S. and the Common Market. The visit also points up the lingering influence of Gaullism on Pompidou who cannot afford to abandon the appearance of playing an independent role in the world, which means that from time to time the French will want to demonstrate they do not follow blindly the American lead.

A second aspect, perhaps more worrisome, is that Moscow is succeeding in stimulating the competition between Bonn and Paris that they have long wanted. While Pompidou has not gone beyond highly visible gestures, from what we know of French comments and views, there is a growing coolness between the Germans and French. The effect of this for us is that we may find ourselves aligned with the French because of the merits of issues, such as the Berlin negotiations, but which creates the impression that we are somehow colluding against Bonn (this was the impression created by the Pompidou rejection of Brandt’s Western summit).

In sum, we can conclude from this visit, as well as our general relations with France, that Pompidou has no intention of reverting to the pure Gaullist policies abroad, but that France will continue to display an independent position that can be a problem for us.

⁴ Apparent reference to the proposals outlined in the President’s October 7 national address. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 825–828.

147. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, November 12, 1970.

PRESENT

The President
President Pompidou
Mr. Constantin
Major General V.A. Walters

President Pompidou opened the conversation by thanking the President for the gesture he had made in flying to France to attend General de Gaulle's funeral.² He said that both he and the French people had been touched by it.

The President replied that he had long known and admired General de Gaulle. In the various meetings he had had with him he had always been impressed with the General's ability to concentrate on the essential and important things. In coming he had wished not merely to represent the American people but also to express his own personal admiration and respect for General de Gaulle. He also wished to thank President Pompidou for his communication after his recent visit to the Soviet Union.³ He had found his comments most interesting. He himself had not met the Soviet leaders and was therefore most appreciative of President Pompidou's views on them.

President Pompidou said that he could of course now tell the President a good deal more than he had in his written communication. First of all, there was President Podgorny. Despite his title, he did not have any real power. Kosygin was essentially an administrator despite his title and had taken almost no part in the political discussions, except that once or twice he had broken in to the conversation to make some anti-German remark (He was from Leningrad). Brezhnev, on the other hand, had behaved like the boss. He was hard as nails, sure of himself and sure of the Soviet Union and its military power. To him power meant military power. Several times he had told President Pompidou that his SS-9 missile was the most powerful in the world and that the USSR now had an advantage in missiles over the U.S. He had said several times that the USSR wanted peace but that "it never draws back." President Pompidou said that his general impression of the Soviet lead-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Elysée Palace.

² De Gaulle died on November 9. The President flew to France on November 12 for a funeral mass in Paris and returned to Washington on November 13.

³ See footnote 2, Document 146.

ers was that while they were tough and wanted above all else to hold their status quo—this was why they were making treaties with the West Germans and trying to put their Eastern European house in order—they were not ready to embark on an adventurous policy like Khrushchev.

President Pompidou said that the Soviets were deeply concerned over their relations with China. Podgorny had told him that there was no reason why they could not have good relations from State to State. They had tried this with the Chinese but it had not worked. The Chinese would make transitory arrangements but did not want to make permanent arrangements that would hamper their territorial claims on the Soviet Union. The Soviets had offered a permanent settlement and the Chinese had refused. President Pompidou said that he had asked Podgorny if the reality was not that there was the long common frontier. On one side of it there were 700 million Chinese and on the other incalculable resources. Podgorny had replied, “Yes, that’s it.” President Pompidou had asked Podgorny whether the death of Mao would make any difference and Podgorny had been emphatic that it would not and the problem with the Chinese would remain. President Pompidou, as a European, did not find it unpleasant that the Soviets were principally concerned with China.

The President said that he was most interested in President Pompidou’s views. Something had happened recently that seemed in some measure to confirm President Pompidou’s views that the Soviets were cautious about embarking on a policy of adventures. Even though it was true that in heavy ground based missiles the Soviet strength was infinitely greater than it had been at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. In this category they had an advantage over us although we had advantages in other areas. He would tell President Pompidou something in the greatest confidence as it was known at only a very few levels in our own government. The Press had reported that the Soviets had been building a submarine base in Cuba.⁴ This was true. Our U-2 photography had shown unmistakable evidence of this. Instead of having a public confrontation, the President said that he had had Dr. Kissinger privately show Ambassador Dobrynin the evidence. Three or four days later TASS Agency had denied that the Soviets were building such a base and had no intention of doing so. Later Dobrynin had confirmed these assurances. The President said that he had handled this matter privately rather than put them in a public position of having to back down, which with their greater than previous strength they might be most reluctant to do.

⁴ Documentation on the Cienfuegos crisis is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

The President then said that on the matter of Germany and Berlin he hoped that French and U.S. policy would remain as they were very close together. Germany must remain oriented towards the West and we must be firm on Berlin.

President Pompidou said that he had never understood the need for the Berlin negotiations in the first place. He had not felt them to be necessary but now that we were involved in them we had to arrive at some result. The President said that when he said we must be firm he did not mean that the Federal Government could not make small concessions regarding the presence of West Germany in Berlin. President Pompidou interjected that the West Germans were quite prepared to make many such concessions. The President went on that we should not renounce our rights in Berlin and that its umbilical cord should lead to the West. President Pompidou said he fully agreed.

The President said that there had been considerable speculation in the press and elsewhere on the possibility of a meeting between himself and the Soviet leaders. He wished to tell President Pompidou that as of now there was nothing of this type in sight. He would not preclude that at some future time, say in a year, such a meeting might not take place. He wished to assure President Pompidou that if such arrangements were to develop he would of course inform the French, British, and German governments so that they could consult together prior to such a meeting. He would, of course, inform President Pompidou so that they could agree on what form their consultation would take.

President Pompidou said that he was grateful for this assurance.

The President then said that in Indochina we would pursue our policy of disengagement, that is, strengthening the South Vietnamese Army as we withdrew. It did not appear at present as though much would come out of the peace negotiations, although private meetings would be held.

President Pompidou said that the really decisive moment would be when South Vietnamese elections were held in 1971. The President said that he agreed.

The President said that he knew how busy President Pompidou must be with all his visitors. He himself had had something similar at the time of General Eisenhower's funeral and therefore he did not wish to impose on President Pompidou's time.

President Pompidou said that he much appreciated their frank talk and it had shown him that whatever the differences on minor matters might be, on all the issues that count our policies are the same.

As he walked the President to the door, President Pompidou said that the President could be pleased with the election results. The Re-

publican party now knew who its boss was. The President had even elected a senator in New York.⁵

The President replied that we had gained 20 percent in the Senate and lost 20 percent in the House, but that it was the Senate that counted in foreign policy.

⁵ Reference is to the election of James L. Buckley, who, running as a Conservative Party candidate, defeated the incumbent Republican Senator Charles Goodell, a persistent critic of the Nixon administration.

148. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 100¹

Washington, January 15, 1971.

Table of Contents—Volume I—Issues Paper

[Omitted here is the table of contents of Volume I.]

NSSM 100

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH FRANCE

ISSUES PAPER

I. Introduction

A. Scope.

This paper has been prepared by an ad hoc interagency group in response to NSSM 100.² It examines the policy options that are open to the US in developing a closer politico-military relationship with France and the major immediate considerations affecting each policy choice. While some reference will be made to the possible broader policy implications of individual actions toward and with France, the detailed examination of those broader issues must take place elsewhere.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-173, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 100. Top Secret; Sensitive. NSSM 100 is Document 144.

² The Group included representatives from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Staff. Staffs of the ACDA and the AEC were consulted regarding specific portions of the study. Per instructions, access to this study has been strictly limited. [Footnote is in the original.]

B. Summary of the Issues.

Three specific issues likely to require early decision are:

1. Whether to lift the US restriction on the use of advanced computers in the French weapons laboratories.
2. Whether, and to what extent, to respond to the present French request to assist them in their ballistic missile programs.
3. Whether we should enter into discussions with the French on nuclear safety.

In addition, there are several other specific issues on which decisions may be required—either at US initiative, or in response to developments in Europe:

1. French relations with the NPG.
2. Possible UK-French military cooperation.
3. The deployment of French tactical nuclear weapons in the FRG.
4. The coordination of French strategic forces with the strategic forces of the US and NATO.
5. Cooperation between France and NATO in non-nuclear areas.

While some of these specific issues can be decided without pre-judging broader policy issues, they raise the more fundamental question of how US interests are affected by the development of third country nuclear forces, and thus, what over-all attitude we should take towards nuclear cooperation with France. This question must be viewed in the context of what future political-military relationship with France and Europe would best serve US interests.

There are two main alternatives:

1. To continue our present course of non-nuclear cooperation.

Choice of this alternative could be based on the following assumptions:

a. That we can make progress in non-nuclear military relationships of interest to us while at the same time remaining aloof from the French nuclear effort, even though the French attribute particular importance to this effort;

b. That the difficulties posed for us by independent French nuclear capabilities (1) are not sufficiently great to warrant undertaking nuclear cooperation that could conflict with other US objectives, e.g., arms control objectives, and/or (2) can be partially alleviated by means other than inducements of nuclear assistance, e.g., leverage exerted via West Germany; and,

c. That our general political relations with France would not be adversely affected to a significant degree by continuation of our past attitudes toward the French nuclear effort.

2. To enter into some degree of nuclear cooperation with the French. At the lowest level this might include initiatives in such areas

as coordination of tactical and strategic nuclear forces, French association with the NPG, and discussions on nuclear safety. At higher levels, it would mean acceding to at least some of the pending French requests, which would have more far-reaching policy implications.

Any change in US policy toward nuclear cooperation with France would, of course, represent a major departure from past US policy and would be seen as such both by other nations and by the US Congress and public. We should expect strong criticism and opposition to such a change in policy from many internal and external sources. Within the government some elements of Congress will be opposed, as will agencies and individuals charged with or interested in safeguarding information or in furthering anti-proliferation and nuclear testing measures. The Soviets will probably oppose any major increase in cooperation and may utilize every move in that direction to stress the hazards of proliferation, to charge US insincerity and jeopardy to SALT, and to arms control in general. A number of news media and public representatives will fight any move toward relaxation for similar and additional reasons. Consequently, we should have clearly in mind the scope and depth of probable opposition and the difficult changes required before this option could be feasible. Although these goals are not mutually exclusive, there are, in general, three broad objectives which we might have in pursuing nuclear cooperation with the French.

a. *Strengthened US-French bilateral political relations.* Under this approach, our purpose would be limited to demonstrating that we no longer reject the idea of cooperating with the French in nuclear matters. Our expectations would be correspondingly limited—that is, by clearing the political air of past friction we might expect a general improvement in US-French relations which could help pave the way for some improvement in military relationships as well.

b. *Strengthened US-French NATO political-military relationships.* This approach would view bilateral US-French cooperation as a means of turning France toward increased cooperation with NATO in both non-nuclear and nuclear matters. We would expect improved US-French relations to lead to greater French willingness to work more closely with NATO, although not re-integrate its military forces.

c. *A strengthened European nuclear role.* This approach would envisage the emergence—over the longer term—of a strengthened European nuclear role, possibly based on collaboration between the UK and France. Under this approach US-French bilateral cooperation would be viewed less as a means of achieving short term improvements in US-French or French-NATO relations than in terms of long-term trends and objectives in US-European and East-West relations. Adoption of this policy would raise a number of questions, including:

1. the over-all security relationship we should seek with Europe in the 1970s and how this will relate to US policies towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;

2. possible major structural changes in NATO and the relative role of conventional forces, tactical nuclear forces and strategic forces in NATO strategy;

3. the possibilities for a European nuclear force and what form might it take, including how French and UK forces would fit into such a concept; and,

4. the approach the US will pursue towards nuclear proliferation in the future.

Obviously, these questions go well beyond the scope of this study. However, they need to be borne in mind as we examine the more specific issue of US-French military cooperation.

[Omitted here is the 50-page body of Volume I—Issues Paper.]

Table of Contents—Volume II—Basic Report

[Omitted here is the table of contents of Volume II.]

NSSM 100

US POLICY TOWARD MILITARY COOPERATION WITH FRANCE

Preface

I. US Policy Toward France

A. General.

France has a unique position in Europe based on its geographic and cultural position, a long and prestigious history and an impressive heritage of diplomatic and political leadership. In the past decade, under the Gaullists, France has regained and expanded its prominent role on the world scene. Moreover, the French are especially influential in non-aligned and Eastern European states, which look to France for political and moral support.

Under this Administration, the US has taken initiatives and responded favorably to French initiatives to promote a frank and continuing dialogue, at the top levels of government, on key international issues. Stimulated and facilitated by our two governments, there has been an impressive increase in exchanges of leaders and prominent groups from government, politics, labor and agriculture, youth and other fields. In response to initiatives by the President, the French have agreed on a substantial increase in practical bilateral cooperation. At present, 20 US agencies are cooperating with their French counterparts in some 100 projects in the scientific and technological fields. The French Government also is extending full cooperation in combating the trafficking in heroin through Marseille. A bilateral inter-governmental

committee meets quarterly and the French have made a significant addition to the number of agents assigned to anti-narcotics work.³

The result of these specific measures of cooperation has been a net improvement in our basic relationship with France. The key element of mutual confidence and respect for each other's point of view has been largely restored. Nevertheless, the French Government firmly desires to retain substantial independence of policy and action and to keep a certain distance from both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In Europe, the rising economic and political role of the German Federal Republic and the psychological after effects of the May 1968 events⁴ have impelled the French Government to agree to move toward an enlarged European Community and greater intra-European political cooperation. However, France continues to seek to limit American influence in Europe. Thus, de Gaulle's successors, while having abandoned his rhetoric regarding a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, are attempting as he did to balance the American role by following an active policy of increased political, trade and cultural relations with the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe.

In the defense field the language now used by French leaders no longer reflects the adversary attitude toward the United States prevalent in de Gaulle's time. Nevertheless, the core of French defense thinking is still self-reliance and independence from NATO, the United States and other allies. France has retained most of the advantages of the defense umbrella provided by the Alliance while not participating in the integrated military command arrangements, and while limiting her financial contribution to those common facilities which are of particular benefit to France. Only the re-emergence of a direct Soviet threat to Western Europe would be likely to persuade the French Government, as a matter of fundamental national interest, to return to NATO integrated military commands.

In this study, we have assumed that our over-all policy toward France is based on the following principles:

1. Given France's important position in Europe and her influence in other areas, e.g., the Middle East, the US should develop as close a bilateral relationship with France as differences in our respective national interest and policy will allow.

2. Particularly in light of current initiatives in East-West relations and the movement toward expansion of the European Communities, it

³ A January 5, 1970, memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon reported on the first meeting of the U.S.-French Task Force on Narcotics and praised the French cooperation. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 159.

⁴ Reference to the large student and labor strikes that began in May 1968.

is in our interest to encourage France to increase cooperation with other nations in Western Europe.

3. It is in our interest to avoid situations where France employs its assets to diminish our international position or thwart our purposes.

4. Our major trading and investment interests in France and the Common Market countries also underscore the need for close French-American cooperation.

5. In view of recent shifts in French defense policy and France's growing nuclear capability, increased US defense cooperation with France may be possible and would be desirable if consistent with our NATO interests.

The above considerations raise the issue of whether we should now explore increased bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with France. Such cooperation might complement ongoing efforts to increase the areas of cooperation with NATO commands and other NATO forces, with a view toward establishing stronger French ties with her allies in the military sphere.⁵ In the shorter term, increased and mutually beneficial military cooperation could have the same salutary effect on our over-all relationship as have the increases in various types of civilian cooperation. Military cooperation with France, both US and NATO, has already increased under existing policy guidelines and some further progress under these guidelines may be possible.

Any significant cooperation with France in the nuclear area would, of course, require important policy changes, and could have major political and military implications for our long-term objectives toward Europe and NATO. On the other hand, maintaining present US policies against any nuclear cooperation would serve to preserve certain French reservations toward the US and the Alliance as a whole.

B. Military Cooperation with France.

The US in 1956 estimated that France might develop nuclear weapons and from that time until 1963 it adopted a conscious policy of not assisting the French in development of either nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles. An offer was made to the French at the end of 1962 that would have reversed this US policy on condition that the French nuclear weapons be assigned to NATO. The French rejected this offer.

Under the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) the US is obligated not to assist any state in conducting nuclear testing in prohibited environments. The US made a second offer to reverse its policy in July 1963 if

⁵ The DOD believes this sentence should read as follows: "Such cooperation should be designed to complement ongoing efforts to increase the areas of cooperation with NATO commands and other NATO forces, with a view toward establishing stronger French ties with her allies in the military sphere and facilitating the ultimate goal of reintegrating French military forces into NATO." [Footnote is in the original.]

the French would sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty. When this offer was also rejected the US decided to withhold all assistance to France that would specifically assist in French nuclear testing as long as they did not adhere to the Treaty.

US policy was formalized in NSAM 294 of April 1964.⁶ This policy makes clear that the US will not engage in significant assistance affecting timing, quality or cost of the French nuclear program as long as the French strategic nuclear weapons are not committed to NATO.

In 1966, when General de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO military commands, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons support from French forces in Germany. However, the US and its other NATO allies have held the door open for selective French cooperation in Alliance military affairs, but have left the initiative up to the French.

The President indicated during 1970 that he wished a French request for cooperation in their missile program to be *considered* in positive terms without regard to the limitations of NSAM 294.⁷

Any change in US policy toward nuclear cooperation with France would, of course, represent a major departure from past US policy and would be seen as such both by other nations and by the US Congress and public. We should expect strong criticism and opposition to such a policy from many internal and external sources. Within the government some elements of Congress will be opposed, as will agencies and individuals charged with or interested in safeguarding information or in furthering arms control and anti-proliferation and nuclear testing measures. The Soviets will probably oppose any major increase in cooperation and may utilize every move in that direction to stress the hazards of proliferation, to charge US insincerity and jeopardy to SALT, and to arms control in general. A number of news media and public representatives will fight any move toward relaxation for similar and additional reasons. Consequently, we should have clearly in mind the scope and depth of probable opposition and the difficult changes required before this option could be feasible.

[Omitted here are the 100-page body of Volume II—Basic Report and Annexes A–E.]

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 30.

⁷ See Document 142.

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 26, 1971, 3:40–3:59 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Ambassador Arthur K. Watson
Arthur T. Downey

After opening greetings and a photo opportunity, Ambassador Watson complimented the President on the State of the Union message² which he termed invigorating, bold and fundamental.

In response to the President's question concerning the state of our relations with France, Ambassador Watson said that there seemed to be an opportunity for genuine movement toward greater cooperation in the defense area. He noted that Defense Minister Debré held a working luncheon for Secretary Laird earlier this month,³ and that the French Chief of Staff, General Fourquet, was meeting today with General Goodpaster at SHAPE.⁴

Another example of potential French cooperation, the Ambassador reported, is the French interest in becoming a part of the NATO Integrated Communications system (NIC). They have already indicated that if such an agreement can be worked out they would make their portion of the system available to the other Allies "under all circumstances." This represents a major breakthrough in French thinking. The Ambassador said he hoped this same principle could be applied to the use of the pipeline which runs through France. If the French could be brought around to this, then there would be little need to construct an expensive (\$78 million) pipeline through Benelux, and so would save the US some \$25 million. The Ambassador said if he knew that the President was interested he would pursue this with the French, though of course it would have to be done in a very delicate way.

The President said this sounded like a fine idea, and that it was important for France to return to Europe. The President knew this would be difficult for President Pompidou, and that the US should not under

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted on January 27, presumably by Downey. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² January 22. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 50–58.

³ The January 7 meeting was reported in Department of Defense message C-6000, January 7. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII)

⁴ No record of this meeting was found.

any circumstances apply pressure on Pompidou to do this. Pompidou must work this out in his own time frame. But, over time, Pompidou will be able to distance himself from the past; the US must allow him to do this gracefully.

The Ambassador remarked that President Pompidou showed himself to be fully in command during his January 21 press conference.⁵ His posture and bearing during that conference was masterful. The Ambassador added that, while he did not have a complete report, he understood that the Brandt-Pompidou meeting went well.⁶ Pompidou apparently convinced Brandt to be more flexible on the question of monetary union within the European Community. He also reportedly told Brandt rather flatly that the two German sides should not discuss Berlin in the course of their own talks, that France would consider this unacceptable.

The President smiled and remarked that it was interesting that Pompidou talked so frankly with Brandt. Pompidou, the President continued, is a strong man, with great intelligence. He is firm and responsible. In many ways Pompidou is similar to Prime Minister Heath. The President commented that he hoped that Heath would be successful, that he represents the last opportunity for Britain to remain close to being a great nation. If the British cannot pull themselves together under Heath's policies, they never will, and Britain will decline to the status of any one of the Scandinavian countries.

Continuing his comments on the British scene, the President noted that Heath had two basic problems to surmount. The first is the African nations in the Commonwealth. So far Heath has been successful in not allowing these nations to control his vital national security policies. Nevertheless, in the longer run, one can only hope that Heath will be able to hold firm in his position. The second problem for Heath is the irresponsibilities of organized labor. If the Wilson policies of compromise and concessions had continued much longer, Britain would have strangled itself. Heath, however, has taken hold of this problem, and, the President added, he will probably be successful.

Concluding these remarks, the President suggested that both Pompidou and Heath were strong and highly intelligent men—the best in Europe. Brandt, on the other hand, was not of their quality. He had charm, and that is important, though when matters become critical, that is not sufficient.

⁵ A summary of Pompidou's press conference together with the English language version of his remarks on foreign policy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII. His remarks were summarized in Henry Giniger, "Pompidou Terms British Unrealistic on Market," *New York Times*, January 22, 1971, p. 11.

⁶ They met in Paris January 25–26.

Ambassador Watson concurred in the President's assessment of Prime Minister Heath, whom he has known for twenty years. The Ambassador noted that his brother-in-law, Under Secretary John Irwin, spent a year with Heath at Oxford and had a similar high opinion of him. President Pompidou genuinely wants Britain to join the European Community, the Ambassador remarked, but Pompidou is still uncertain whether Heath can successfully bring Britain in to the Common Market without insisting on basic changes in the Market structure.

In response, the President confirmed his view of the importance of Britain's entry, and his conviction that Prime Minister Heath could accomplish this task. The President said that the visit of Prince Juan Carlos⁷ reminded him of the equal importance of Spain's entry into Europe. Spain is making tremendous advances, and very much wants to be an effective part of Europe. The President recognized that it was probably impossible for Spain to make any major moves until General Franco leaves the scene, but at that point Spain can offer a great contribution to Europe.

The Ambassador commented that Pompidou wants Spain to join Europe. Indeed, in his press conference, Pompidou expressed the hope that Spain would re-enter Europe through France's intermediary. In the same comment, Pompidou was critical of the recent Burgos trial in Spain and its aftermath.

The President said he had not read the Pompidou press conference, but that such intentions were good to hear. It would be very useful if France could take the lead in easing Spain into Europe. This is something that Pompidou could do, the President said. The British are in no position to do it, though Heath is more able to move in that direction than Wilson was. The Scandinavian countries refuse to forget the events of thirty years ago, and so will not take any action. The President then asked the Ambassador to speak to President Pompidou about this. The Ambassador should tell Pompidou that the President thought his press conference was masterful, and explain that while the President does not want to interfere or to even appear to give advice to Pompidou, it is the President's view that only Pompidou has the authority and stature to take effective action in bringing Spain into Europe. Anything that Pompidou could do in this direction would be most welcome.

Ambassador Watson said he would be pleased to report this to Pompidou. He noted that he had luncheon privately the prior week with Jobert,⁸ one of Pompidou's key advisers, and stressed to him that

⁷ The President met with Prince Juan Carlos on January 26. See Document 302.

⁸ Watson reported on this January 23 meeting in telegram 1074 from Paris, dated January 2, but actually January 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII)

the President clearly wanted a strong Europe and a strong and friendly France. Most importantly, he underscored that the President had no intention to conclude deals over France's head—a rumor he often heard in France.

The President said that was exactly correct. He also instructed Ambassador Watson to tell Pompidou that the US will always continue to consult closely with France on Berlin, Ostpolitik, and other matters. The US has no vision of a bi-polar world. The world of the future, continued the President, will have five power centers: the US, USSR, China, Japan, and a united Europe. We are hopeful that Europe will be fully oriented toward the US, but we also recognize that at times it will have to look to the East. Latin America and Africa may have importance as power centers in a century, but certainly not for the foreseeable future. This is why, the President continued, it is so important for Pompidou and France to take the lead in making Europe stronger. At the moment, the vast energies of the Italian people are being wasted by a clumsy governmental structure; Italy needs a French constitution. The President remarked that the need for a strong central leadership is prevalent throughout the Latin world, and that in general democracy as we have it in the US is at this time not suited to the Latin temperament. The President reviewed developments in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Chile. He commented that some say that the Italian people will not permit a situation such as in Chile to happen in Italy, but, he cautioned, they may not be able to stop it until too late.

The Ambassador noted that, in a sense, the tax laws introduced in the US forty years ago were beneficial in that they encouraged the wealthy to engage in philanthropy. From this, the wealthy and not-so-wealthy have developed the habits of charity. In Latin America, on the other hand, the wealthy have no such habits, and simply send their money overseas without any benefit to the development of their own nations. The President remarked that he had never considered this impact of our tax structure.

Shifting the conversation, the President asked the Ambassador to work on securing a more appropriate residence in Paris. The US, he said, should have a great house in Paris, such as the residence of Ambassador Annenberg in London. The present residence is inadequate, and indeed was too small for the state dinner the President hosted for General de Gaulle.

The Ambassador said he would work on this question, and noted that he had admired the work of Mr. Clement Conger. The President said that Mr. Conger perhaps should assist the Ambassador in this effort, but that in any event the Ambassador should inform Deputy Under Secretary Macomber that this question had been discussed and

that the President was very interested in having a suitably impressive residence in Paris.

Concluding the conversation, the President presented Ambassador Watson with gifts for his daughters. The President encouraged the Ambassador to continue his good efforts in France, and noted that all the reports indicate he is doing an extremely effective job.

150. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 3, 1971, 3:07–4:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Military Cooperation with France²

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson
Martin J. Hillenbrand
Ronald I. Spiers
Leon Sloss
Wreatham Gathright

Defense

Armistead I. Selden
John Morse
Glenn E. Blitgen

JCS

Vice Adm. John P. Weinell
Col. R. L. Whittington

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt
William Hyland
Wilfrid L. Kohl
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

—the consensus of the group, on balance, with a slight DOD reservation, was against lifting our restrictions on the provision of advanced computers to France;

—the group, with a possible DOD reservation, was opposed to providing assistance in the missile field; however, if some distinction

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² NSSM 100, Document 144.

between items was desired the line could be drawn between 1B and 1C on Page 20 of the Issues paper;³

—we should reopen with the French the discussion of nuclear safety begun in 1963; an NSDM will be prepared and circulated to the group for comment before promulgation;

—a memorandum will be prepared for the President on the operational issues of advanced computers and missile assistance with a minimal option in each category if the President wishes to do something;

—an NSC meeting will be required on the more fundamental issues such as coordinated targetting and Anglo-French nuclear cooperation;

—Defense will do a technical study of the planned British test in the U.S. with an estimate of the possible outcome; the issue will be discussed at a later SRG session in terms of whether or not to tell the British that we believe the test will fail and, if so, to tell them why.

Mr. Kissinger: Our first problem today is the set of issues related to French nuclear policy. Then I want to have a brief preliminary discussion on Pakistan.

Mr. Johnson: I was just telling them that at a luncheon today the CENTO⁴ Secretary General had made a speech indicating that everything was rosy in CENTO. The Pakistan Ambassador had replied with a “like-hell-it-is” speech, demanding equal treatment among CENTO members and pointing out, for example, that Iran and Turkey get F-4’s and Pakistan does not. It was quite a go-round but it did inject a note of sober realism into the discussion.

(Dr. Kissinger asked Mrs. Davis to check on invitations to staff personnel for the discussion of Pakistan. She ascertained from Col. Kennedy that it was understood that the Pakistan discussion would take place at the SRG meeting on the Middle East, not at today’s meeting on France.)

Mr. Kissinger: We have two sets of issues: (1) the operational issues of export of advanced computers, assistance for the French missile program and nuclear safety, and the possible quid pro quos for favorable action in this area; and (2) the more fundamental issue of where we want our relations with France to go. First, I want to point out that the President; when he spoke to Pompidou, said we wanted to be more forthcoming. Pompidou complained about discriminatory treatment of France, and the President said we should be more forthcoming but gave no specifics. In this connection, the President has ruled negatively

³ Document 148.

⁴ Central Treaty Organization.

on the French manufacture of integrated circuits in Poland.⁵ There seemed to be some doubt as to whether they were sufficiently "civilian."

I suggest we look at these issues both in the bilateral context and the NATO context. We can go over them one by one, consider the extent of cooperation we should be prepared to extend on each issue and what, if any, *quid pro quo* we should ask for in connection with NATO. As I understand it, the French asked us to lift our restrictions on the export of "*advanced*" computers for use in French nuclear weapons programs.

Mr. Johnson: That is substantively correct. We are sending advanced computers to France for many purposes. The French have to give us a statement that these computers won't be used in weapons laboratories. We have no means of enforcing this prohibition and we have made no effort to verify that it is observed. The issue is whether to continue to ask for the statement.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Also, IBM wants a redefinition of an advanced computer in the hopes of distinguishing between the 360 and 370 series.

Mr. Johnson: We should also consider whether to raise the level at which we ask for a statement.

Mr. Kissinger: There are two issues: whether or not to cease the requirement for a statement, and whether to change the definition of an advanced computer. Is it true that the 370 series is not now approved?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: So the French get nothing for their weapons laboratories. The 360 is approved with the certificate that it won't be used in such laboratories, and the 370 is not approved at all.

Mr. Hillenbrand: This is true on a worldwide basis. IBM needs an export license for all 370's.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we grant them for others and refuse them for France?

Mr. Hillenbrand: This is a new computer that is just coming on the market.

Mr. Blitgen: There are some computers above the restricted level in France but they are not in their weapons laboratories.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose we give up the requirement for certification that the computers are not being used in weapons laboratories.

⁵ The President made the decision on February 25. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969-1972, Document 371.

Could the French then get an advanced computer? Are there not two sets of limiting conditions: the certification on use in laboratories and the fact that we won't grant an export license for computers above a certain level.

Mr. Gathright: We do grant export licenses for computers above the level, provided the French give us the statement.

Mr. Kissinger: So there are no specific restrictions on the 370.

Mr. Sloss: None except for the export license.

Mr. Kissinger: We don't require an export license for the 360?

Mr. Johnson: It takes an export license to sell a 370 to anybody. This is a separate issue and largely for the convenience of IBM.

Mr. Sloss: If we change the definition of an advanced computer, we will either have to raise the level of computer that can be sent to France or discriminate against France.

Mr. Kissinger: So provision of the 360 to France requires a letter saying it will not be used in weapons laboratories. Provision of the 370 requires both an export license and the letter.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There is some question of the ability of the French to use their advanced computers for their weapons laboratories. We don't know for sure, but we suspect they are so using them.

Mr. Johnson: Also, I suspect that if we should remove the letter requirement, the French would make it as tough as they could for us by asking for the 370 specifically for their weapons laboratories.

Mr. Kissinger: And that would be considered a violation of the test ban treaty?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Blitgen: Our information indicates that they could use as many as four advanced computers in weapons work.

Mr. Johnson: And this would involve us.

Mr. Kissinger: Are they asking for the 370?

Mr. Blitgen: So far they are asking for the CDC 6600.

Mr. Kissinger: If we remove the requirement for the letter on the 360 or an equivalent, we wouldn't have to say anything about it since it doesn't require an export license. (to Alex Johnson) Your fears would apply only to the 370. Suppose we abolish the requirement for an export license? They couldn't put us on the spot if it didn't require an export license.

Mr. Sloss: The CDC 6600 is above the restricted level and needs an export license.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the point to be decided—whether or not to remove the requirement for the letter if no export license is required, or to remove it in all cases?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The question of discriminatory treatment relates only to the letter. The requirement for the export license is universally operable.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we do with the UK?

Adm. Weinelt: They are our competitors; they build their own.

Mr. Kissinger: Can the French get these computers from the British?

Mr. Hyland: Yes, and from the Germans and Japanese.

Mr. Blitgen: They are particularly interested in the 6600 as being better suited to laboratory work.

Mr. Johnson: Do the British or Japanese make a comparable computer?

Mr. Keeny: No.

Mr. Kohl: They make comparable computers in the lower range but not in the 6600 range.

Mr. Gathright: The British have an accelerator which is equivalent to the 6600, but the French prefer to do business with us so as not to complicate their software problems.

Mr. Morse: Whatever decision we make now will only be good for two years.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Morse: They can get it from other countries by then.

Mr. Blitgen: You understand that the French are not asking to buy whole computers. They want to assemble the computers in France from components bought in the U.S., then put them in their weapons laboratories.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) What is State's view?

Mr. Johnson: It is hard to be categorical on this issue. The French can be expected to make it tough for us in relation to the test ban treaty, and there is strong legal opinion that we cannot change our position by executive decision without violating the treaty. I assume that we are "being nice" to the French in order to influence French policy. With regard to NATO, the French, for their own reasons and in their own interests, are already making mild changes in such areas as communications and air defense. In other words, they are already taking small steps toward NATO although we are not being "nice" to them. I'm pretty disillusioned over the effects of being nice to the French after their most recent statement on the Laos operation⁶ despite our repeated attempts to get in touch with Pompidou.

⁶ In a February 2 statement, in the wake of increased U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese supply trails, Pompidou expressed concern about widening the conflict in South-east Asia and France's interest in Laotian neutrality and independence.

Mr. Kissinger: Did Pompidou know we were trying to get in touch with him?

Mr. Johnson: I think so. Their outrageous statement doesn't encourage me to think that nice gestures, which will probably cause us serious trouble with our allies and with the Congress, will have any material effect on their position. On balance, I favor continuing to hold off in this area—not to change our policy. We can look for other areas in which to be nice rather than the most sensitive nuclear field.

Mr. Kissinger: What does Defense think?

Mr. Morse: Our views have been coordinated through DOD but have not been personally checked with Mr. Packard, although I know of no reservations on his part. Although I hate to suggest it, we might ask another study group to take a look at the computer issue to see if we could put some negative restrictions on the new computers which would still meet treaty objections.

Mr. Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Morse: I don't know, but there might be something.

Mr. Kissinger: Do you object to giving them computers as long as they are not useful for weapons?

Mr. Morse: Or not useful for testing. There might be a way in which we could appear to be more forthcoming.

Mr. Johnson: Wouldn't that be awfully transparent?

Mr. Morse: Maybe, but we haven't got a better idea.

Mr. Kissinger: And if it can't be done?

Mr. Morse: Then we believe the treaty aspect is so binding that we would get serious criticism if we tried to go ahead.

Mr. Johnson: Do you see political gains with the French? I'm sure we can find ways of doing it if we saw the likelihood of significant shifts in French attitudes resulting from it.

Mr. Morse: Personally I do see some political gain, but this opinion may not be shared in the Defense Department.

Mr. Kissinger: Like what?

Mr. Morse: Coordinated targeting, for example, and possibly other NATO issues.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Morse) So you believe the legal difficulties are serious but you can see some political advantage, although possibly not an overriding one.

Mr. Morse: I have had some experience with our system of restrictions on exchange of sensitive information, and I am aware of how difficult it is to convince the Congress and others on the desirability of being forthcoming. It would be bound to lead to serious criticism and

I'm not sure the President would want to risk it. Of course, the legal point can be stretched depending on the policy decision.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) You don't see enough political gain. (to Gen. Cushman) How do you feel about it?

Gen. Cushman: [2½ lines not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Gen. Cushman: [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: [3 lines not declassified]

Gen. Cushman: The Russians already have access to this information.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we granting export licenses on the 370's as long as the French provide the certification concerning use?

Mr. Sloss: This hasn't come up yet.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the CDC 6600's?

Mr. Spiers: Yes, it's already been done.

Gen. Cushman: But computers are not a security problem.

Mr. Spiers: It's a question of removing a minor irritant for some political advantage. There are few security issues on computers or on the missile question.

Gen. Cushman: It varies with the specific request. I agree that we should think of what other things we might do to be nice to the French.

Mr. Keeny: We agree with State that we don't think it will help our relations with the French. Also, our legal people think it is a violation of the test ban treaty.

Mr. Johnson: What about third country transfers?

Mr. Keeny: This comes up on the missile question, but the basic issue is political.

Mr. Spiers: There is no question that the relation of the computer issue to the test ban treaty could be used against us. We can get around the issue if desired for political reasons but we will be criticized.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The only thing between us and such criticism now is the letter from the French.

Mr. Hyland: And we violate the principle of the agreement by allowing them to use lesser computers in their weapons program. The prohibition is against advanced computers—the 360/65 and the CDC 6600. Below that level they can use them in their programs.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we require both an export license and a letter? Does everything that requires an export license require a letter?

Mr. Hyland: No.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anything that requires a letter require an export license?

Mr. Hyland: Yes. We have American computers in the French weapons program but not the most advanced kind.

Mr. Kissinger: As I understand the issue, the consensus is against lifting our restrictions on the provision of advanced computers to France. The President will have to decide whether he wants to do it on political grounds. Lifting the requirement for the letter concerning use in the weapons program is the least we can do. It would be the best thing to do if we have to do something. But this group, on balance, is against it, with a slight Defense reservation.

Mr. Spiers: If the President decides to go ahead, the problem would be containable.

Mr. Johnson: I agree.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we turn to the question of missile assistance. Are there various degrees of assistance or must we accept or reject completely?

Mr. Hyland: There are various degrees.

Mr. Johnson: State believes that, as far as the particular items which they have requested go, they aren't particularly sensitive. We question, though, whether we should start down the slippery slope.

Mr. Spiers: This is particularly relevant to SALT and the question of third country assistance.

Mr. Keeny: It is relevant to SALT particularly now, since we may be able to get some general treatment of the transfer issue. If we force the issue through some assistance to the French, we may get a more restrictive Soviet reaction than if we were able to treat it in a more general way.

Mr. Johnson: We would also get a reaction from the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

Mr. Kissinger: How about security?

Gen. Cushman: It is a factor to be considered. It is significant in some items and not in others. I agree that it is a question of starting down the slope.

Mr. Kissinger: Is the package broken down in degrees of sensitivity?

Mr. Spiers: Different items are identified in the report.

Mr. Sloss: On page 20–21 of the Issues paper there is a list of the categories as discussed with Johnny Foster last June. Of those, we believe 1A and 1B could be discussed in some detail. 1C could not. 1A and 1B could be discussed without going into information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act.

Mr. Morse: Foster believes a lot could be obtained from the open literature.

Mr. Kissinger: But not the whole business?

Mr. Morse: No, just in the areas of 1A and 1B.

Mr. Johnson: Would any of this information be relevant to development of a booster for non-military use? I've just spent three days on the question of provision of a launch capability to the French and others. Could this help them develop their own independent launch capability for a communications satellite?

Mr. Morse: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: They are being most uncooperative on Intelsat. They want us to furnish them with unrestricted launch capability, either by giving them launchers or agreeing unconditionally to provide launch facilities as a quid pro quo for their participation in the post-Apollo program. In other words, they want all the advantages of the agreement without paying for them.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree the French haven't been a joy to work with. And no one has been more eager to get along with them than this President. Is it correct to say that the view of this group, with a possible DOD reservation, is against providing assistance in the missile field on the grounds that it starts us down the slope and we would be subject to major criticism in terms of SALT and other things? If we want to make a distinction among items, we could make it on the line between 1B and 1C—or on the grounds of information available in the open literature, or information not under Atomic Energy Act restriction, or information otherwise available to the Soviet Union. We are agreed that there is no Restricted Data information in 1A or 1B and that the Soviet Union probably already has access to the information. Is that a fair statement?

All agreed.

Mr. Morse: We could tell the French that we have decided in principle to provide certain information within certain limits.

Mr. Kissinger: If we do it, we should be sure we do not start down the slope in terms of principle. The only information we should consider giving them would be that not considered Restricted Data.

Mr. Sloss: 2A would give them a more accurate weapons system which would only be used as a counterforce. This is inconsistent with the French role.

Mr. Keeny: 2A and 2B would be useful to the Soviets. Even the more limited items might raise questions with regard to SALT. We would hope to get some general formulation which wouldn't preclude giving the French some help in some fields.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand the problem. But I want to give the President an option in each category to do something minimal if he wants to do something. I realize this will involve SALT.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This would get us involved in programs with the British, which raises the issue of discrimination.

Mr. Spiers: One is an on-going program. This is new program.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we turn to the question of *nuclear safety*? This issue becomes current since we have offered to discuss it with the Soviets in SALT.

Mr. Johnson: We have no problem with nuclear safety if it can be talked about without going into design questions.

Mr. Morse: The French are not talking about classified information. They have in mind the same thing AEC Commissioner Ramey offered them in 1963. In fact, Mr. Johnson wrote a finding to AEC at the time saying this was okay. AEC sees no real problem, nor do members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee whom we have approached informally. This would be the safest move if we want to go forward in some way.

Mr. Johnson: It requires no new decision. We could fall back on the 1963 memoranda.

Mr. Kissinger: We can do it. There would be no Restricted Data involved?

Mr. Morse: No. If we give the French an unofficial indication that an overt approach wouldn't be turned down, they would request that the talks resume where they left off in 1963.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone have any objection?

Mr. Johnson: No, but I want to review what I said in my memorandum in 1963.

Mr. Keeny: Do the NATO people think there is any information available that we haven't given them?

Mr. Morse: The Atomic Energy Commission thinks so.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Johnson) Why don't you review your 1963 memorandum.

Mr. Spiers: (to Morse) It would be useful to see the briefing material on this.

Mr. Kissinger: We will draft an NSDM on the issue of nuclear safety⁷ and give everyone a crack at it before it is issued. Do you all agree?

All agreed.

Mr. Kissinger: On the *operational issues*, I suggest we do it by memorandum to the President. On the more *fundamental issues*, such as targeting and Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, I think they should go to an NSC meeting.

⁷ See Document 154.

Mr. Johnson: But they aren't ready yet.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree they aren't ready now. I was making a distinction between NSC and non-NSC issues. Am I correct that the question of *joint strategic targetting* doesn't require an operational decision now?

Mr. Spiers: Our paper reviews the options but there is no early operational decision required.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we know what we want?

Mr. Spiers: Different people want different things. I would like a coordinating arrangement between the French and SACEUR, although this would be the hardest for the French to accept. The British forces are now targetting within SACEUR. It would be wrong to handle the French differently from the British. Any attempt to work out a quadri-lateral arrangement—NATO, the US, UK and France—would pull the British out of the SACEUR arrangement.

Mr. Kissinger: I will review the President's discussion with Pompidou. I believe they agreed they were not ready to discuss joint targetting.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There are two issues: the channel to be used and whether or not French forces are worth coordinating—what do you coordinate?

Mr. Kissinger: Are they technically able to target flexibly with their missiles?

Adm. Weinell: They have so few warheads that they are not difficult to target.

Mr. Spiers: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: I assume if we coordinate with them as part of SACEUR we will want them to hit some tactical targets. Can they do it?

Mr. Spiers: I'm sure we could find some targets the French could handle within SACEUR. Whether they would or not is a different question.

Mr. Morse: We have asked the British and French if they are interested in coordination. The British have indicated that they are not moving toward cooperation with the French at the moment.

Mr. Hillenbrand: During the Heath visit,⁸ Lord Home said the British kept hearing rumors that the French were interested but they never made any move. The British are waiting for the French to take the initiative.

Mr. Spiers: This may be an internal British problem. Heath may now see it as a more complex issue.

⁸ December 16–18, 1970. See Document 335.

Mr. Morse: The French aren't anxious to move on this. Everyone is waiting for everyone else.

Adm. Weinelt: This is a matter of extreme sensitivity for the French. This is their independence from NATO.

Mr. Kissinger: Theoretically the British are not inhibited from having any number of other strike plans. If the French weren't so Cartesian about it they would realize that, by coordination with SACEUR, they would only have to add one option which they would then be free not to execute. If, of course, they have the technical ability to do what they want to do.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Are there some security aspects of sharing targeting data with the French?

Mr. Spiers: There is no problem.

Mr. Kissinger: If the issue came up, do we have a checklist of our options? Do we understand what we want them to do from a military point of view?

Mr. Morse: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: There is one other issue. *The British are planning a test in Utah or Nevada, of which we already know the outcome.*

Mr. Morse: Johnny Foster has sent a memorandum to Mr. Packard on this which he wanted to have better staffed in DOD. Foster personally favors cooperation with the British.

Mr. Johnson: In what way?

Mr. Kissinger: We need to know whether it is true that we already know the test result. Then we need to make a political decision whether or not to tell the British they are wasting \$2.5 million. Do we want them to test or should we tell them the test will fail?

Mr. Spiers: We want to know more about the whole subject.

Mr. Gathright: There is a broader question here. This is the beginning of a series of steps that we know won't work. Some of our technical people think the British are going off on a tangent.

Mr. Kissinger: If the first test fails, will they run others?

Mr. Gathright: There may be additional test requirements which other people think are wrong.

Mr. Kissinger: I realize the agencies are not prepared to discuss this issue.

Mr. Spiers: Some experts believe the tests will fail, will cost the British \$2.5 million and will delay their work two years. Others feel the British may succeed.

Mr. Johnson: We don't know enough about it.

Mr. Spiers: Let's wait for Mr. Packard to have a chance to focus on it.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Morse) Let's get a technical study of this and an estimate of the probable outcome. If we are certain the test will fail, or have serious doubts, then the question is whether or not we tell the British. If so, do we tell them why? We will have another session on this.

[Omitted here is discussion of Pakistan.]

151. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Tensions with the French

You should be aware of a number of recent events which, taken together, are increasing friction in French-American relations. As I have previously suggested, this is to a large extent due to the predictable loss in the momentum of the atmospheric improvements of 1969–70. There simply are certain non-congruent interests that will assert themselves. Also, Pompidou has to operate in a complex political situation and, of course, has his own convictions. But in view of the President's personal investment in relations with the French and the obvious desirability to keep control over any spontaneous cumulative deterioration in our French relationship, I thought it worthwhile to round-up the elements in the current situation.

The Middle East: As already reported to you by Hal Saunders, Assistant Secretary Sisco upbraided Ambassador Lucet on March 9 regarding the lack of French cooperation with us on the Middle East.² Specifically, Sisco rightfully complained about the deterioration in consultation between the French UN representative, Kosciusko-Morizet, and our Mission in New York with respect to the Four Power Talks. Other Sisco objections concerned France's support for Soviet positions in formal meetings of the Four, despite contrary statements in working

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Initialed by Kissinger. Tab A is not printed.

² Reported in telegram 39815 to Paris, March 10. (Ibid.)

sessions, and French criticisms of our stance in European six power discussions on the Middle East.

Sisco's barrage reportedly caused "waves" in Paris. Referring to it in his meeting with Ambassador Watson last week,³ Pompidou indicated that Lucet would make a formal response (expected in a meeting with Secretary Rogers in the next few days). From contacts in Paris we expect the French to counter with complaints about our past failures to consult them on Middle East matters.⁴ However, the Secretary's statement yesterday,⁵ counseling in effect some Israeli withdrawal, does represent a movement toward the French position and may help mitigate our differences over consultation.

Algeria: The recent Algerian nationalization of French petroleum and natural gas concerns has greatly complicated French-Algerian relations, and rumors of a US advisory role to the Algerians have appeared in the Paris press. In his recent talk with Watson, Pompidou, while accepting our Ambassador's assurance that the US Government is neutral in this affair, nevertheless commented that private Americans were advising the Algerians. (He specifically mentioned General Gavin of Arthur D. Little.) Pompidou asked Watson to inform the President of his hope for US cooperation during this difficult period, particularly in deferring the El Paso contract negotiations on liquified natural gas. A day later Pompidou's concern was reiterated by Elysée Secretary-General Jobert to another official of Embassy Paris,⁶ in lieu of his sending a personal message to the President. Again there was specific reference to a possible discreet delay in any decision by El Paso. Ambassador Watson has recommended that US negotiations for investment in Algeria be postponed as long as possible in order to assist the French. Pompidou is reported to be personally vexed over the Algerian action, certainly understandable in view of his personal involvement in French-Algerian negotiations over the past eight months and the challenge the recent nationalizations represent to his overall Mediterranean policy.

Integrated Circuits: The French have been informed of the President's negative decision concerning COCOM assent to French manu-

³ Watson reported on this meeting in a March 12 letter to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

⁴ Telegram 4022 from Paris, March 13, had reported on Lucet's instructions for a presentation to Rogers. (Ibid.)

⁵ For the text of Rogers's statement during a March 16 press conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 5, 1971, pp. 478–486.

⁶ The meeting took place on March 15 and was reported on in telegram 4113 from Paris, March 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII)

facture of integrated circuits in Poland.⁷ Ambassador Lucet is expected to make another appeal on this question when he sees Secretary Rogers.

Indochina: After Pompidou's public disapproval of our Laos operation⁸ the French have yet to respond to our request that they set the record straight on this matter, particularly as regards their lack of recognition of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos. However, the French have not "condemned" the South Vietnamese action, in spite of some Soviet pressure that they do so. (Note: We still have no confirmation that Pompidou actually received and read the President's message⁹ before making his statement in Africa.)

Uranium Enrichment: France has just announced an agreement with the Soviet Union providing for Soviet enrichment of uranium supplied by France, to be used for an atomic power plant in Fessenheim in Alsace. A recent Moscow policy shift now permits Soviet uranium enrichment services to Western countries. In effect this breaks the US monopoly on supplying fissionable materials for peaceful purposes in the West. The French decision to deal with the Soviets appears to be motivated by at least two factors: the recent price rise of US enriched uranium from \$26 to an expected \$32 an ounce; and US evasiveness after French probings last year regarding possible bilateral cooperation on uranium enrichment, together with our preference to supply Western Europe through Euratom, not an approach in favor with the French. Although underlining their independence, the French action probably does not mean they are abandoning hopes of cooperating with us in the enrichment field. France is planning to build eight or nine more nuclear power reactors over the next five years and will need enriched fuel for them.

In a related action, the French government has also announced a feasibility study of a gaseous diffusion plant for civilian purposes, which will be open to other European countries' participation. Again, the lack of response from us to the French interest last year in bilateral sharing of enrichment technology, plus delays in formulating our position, have been factors in the French decision.

On the positive side, it should of course be noted that Franco-American cooperation in other areas, including exchange visits, continues—in marked contrast to the periods of tension during the de Gaulle years. For example, the Attorney General was recently in Paris to sign a protocol on cooperation in curtailing heroin traffic,¹⁰ French Labor Minister Fontanet was just here, and the new French Min-

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 150.

⁸ See footnote 6, Document 150.

⁹ Pompidou was in Africa February 3–13.

¹⁰ Signed in Paris February 26.

ister for the Environment, Poujade, is expected in May. And collaboration between a number of our government agencies with their French counterparts goes on. However, we should be careful not to allow any of the areas of current friction to undermine the basic tone of cooperation and rapprochement set by this Administration in our relations with Paris.

We will be sending you very shortly a decision memorandum for the President on NSSM 100 military cooperation issues,¹¹ recommending limited assistance to the French in all three areas—computers, missiles, and nuclear safety. The present charged atmosphere is of course not the best context for favorable decisions on this subject. On the other hand, a willingness on our part to do something with the French in the military field could help reset the balance and underline again our basic desire to cooperate.

Several relevant telegrams are appended at Tab A.

¹¹ Document 152. NSSM 100 is Document 144.

152. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 25, 1971.

SUBJECT

Military Cooperation with France

We have completed an interagency review of some current issues involved in further military cooperation with France, which Pompidou raised with you generally last year.² Three issues—all raised at French initiative—have been reviewed: (1) a relaxation of our policy of imposing restrictions on the export of “advanced” US computers for use in French nuclear weapons programs; (2) some technical assistance to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 677, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VII. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Tabs A and B are not printed.

² See footnote 2, Document 142. The paper, the Response to NSSM 100, is Document 148.

the French ballistic missile program; and (3) cooperation in the exchange of information in the field of nuclear safety.

1. Computer Restrictions

The previous administration imposed a restriction on the export to France of any "advanced" computers.³ This restriction, still in force, requires the French government to present us with a certificate pledging not to use the computers in French nuclear weapons laboratories. We have no means of verifying whether this pledge is maintained. Foreign Minister Schumann officially asked Secretary Rogers at the time of the Pompidou visit last year that we drop this restriction.⁴

The issues are

—whether we can meet the French request without violating the spirit or letter of the Limited Test Ban Treaty;

—if not, whether we could redefine "advanced" computers so as to relax the restriction, since a new generation is coming along in any case; and

—what return, if any, we could expect from France.

The arguments for removing or relaxing our restrictions are:

—that they are a needless irritant in Franco-American relations, which in practice has not and will not inhibit French nuclear development;

—foreign computers of equal power to some of our advanced models can now be purchased by France from Germany or Japan;

—we apply no restriction such as this on any other country, and the French are justified in arguing that this is an unfriendly discrimination;

—computer technology changes rapidly, and with the advent of new models our old definition of "advanced computers," which applies to our export controls as well as our restrictions on the French, will probably have to be revised.

The arguments against changing our policy are that some may view it as a Test Ban Treaty violation, although this is debatable, and France is not likely to be accommodating in its attitude toward NATO or on other major international issues because of a concession on this particular issue.

³ The policy was outlined in NSAM 294, April 20, 1964. See *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 30.

⁴ Memoranda of their February 24-26, 1970, conversations are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL FR-US.

Our choices are

- maintain current restrictions;
- redefine the level of power for “advanced” computers so that France will receive some of the newer models without restriction;
- drop our restrictions entirely.

State and ACDA favor retaining our restrictions, but do not hold strongly to this view. Defense would relax our policy somewhat, but not entirely, in order to avoid possible difficulties with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Recommendation

There does not seem to be a major gain for us in this issue. In light of continuing difficulties with the French on such issues as Laos, we are under no obligation to bend over backward to accommodate France on an issue that might create problems with the Congress.

At the same time, since this is in effect a test of whether, in fact, we are prepared for more cooperation with France, we should avoid a complete rebuff of the French.

A logical compromise would be to redefine “advanced” computers so that the French will have access to some of the newer models for their weapons laboratories, while we will still maintain the spirit of our Test Ban Treaty obligations.

1. Approve redefinition of advanced computers.⁵
2. Drop restriction entirely.
3. Make no change in current restrictions.

2. Missile Assistance

Following your conversation with President Pompidou, you directed the Department of Defense to explore some outstanding French requests for technical assistance in their ballistic missile programs.⁶ The French subsequently submitted more detailed requests for the kind of assistance they wanted.

An important *argument against* cooperating with the French is possible prejudice to our SALT position, in light of Soviet proposals to prohibit any direct or indirect assistance in development of strategic weapons to third countries. A second argument is that once we enter this area of discussion, we may face more increasingly ambitious requests which could not be met without adopting a completely new policy of major assistance to the French strategic program.

⁵ The President initialed this option.

⁶ See Document 142 and footnote 2 thereto.

The arguments for some cooperation relate to the limited nature of the French request. One category of items includes rather routine technical data covering such questions as missile reliability, quality control, etc., which would not represent major assistance and would probably not provoke Soviet reactions in SALT.

Another category of items, however, would involve us in improving French missile guidance and accuracy, which is quite sensitive.

The Department of State opposes any assistance, mainly because they see no quid pro quo, and are concerned over possible jeopardy to the SALT talks. Defense would extend cooperation only in those items described as the first category above.

The choices are

- refuse any cooperation with France in the missile field;
- extend cooperation, but limited to non-sensitive items;
- extend cooperation in all fields requested by the French.

Recommendation

There is little to be gained at this time by engaging in full cooperation. On the other hand, since we initiated the exploratory talks following the Pompidou visit, we probably cannot afford to be totally negative.

We could therefore proceed on the basis of those French requests which are not strategically sensitive, but in doing so inform the French that our cooperation will remain limited.

1. Approve limited assistance.⁷
2. Refuse any cooperation.
3. Cooperate in exchanges on all items raised by French.

3. Nuclear Safety

This issue is rather straightforward and non-controversial. The French intimated that they would be interested in resuming exchanges of data on safety procedures and devices for nuclear weapons; previous exchanges were broken off in 1963. As long as no sensitive Restricted Data information is involved we can be accommodating, and this is supported by all agencies as clearly in our interest.

Recommendation

That you authorize the opening of exchanges on nuclear safety, subject to limitation on the kind of information we can supply.⁸

⁷ The President initialed this option.

⁸ The President initialed his approval.

In each instance a minimal response has been recommended. Taken together, however, they do amount to a more forthcoming position which is consistent with your conversations with President Pompidou. On this basis we will have made a political gesture to Paris without involving us in a major change of nuclear policies toward third countries. Later, however, we will want to take up the question of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, and what role we might want to, or be called on, to play should it become a live issue. However, we should probably await the outcome of the British negotiations on entry into the European Community before addressing this question.

If you concur in these recommendations, I will issue the NSDMs to inform the interested agencies. Since the questions of computer and missile assistance are politically sensitive, they would be dealt with in a separate NSDM (Tab A), and a second directive would treat the exchanges on nuclear safety (Tab B).

Recommendation

That you authorize me to inform the agencies of your decision in the attached NSDMs (Tabs A and B).⁹

Approve¹⁰

Disapprove

See me

⁹ See Documents 153 and 154.

¹⁰ The President initialed this option and added in a handwritten note: "I favor moving more openly as V. Nam winds down."

153. National Security Decision Memorandum 103¹

Washington, March 29, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Military Cooperation with France

The President has considered the questions studied in NSSM 100 and discussed by the Senior Review Group concerning certain areas of possible military cooperation with the French Government.² He has made the following decisions:

Advanced Computer Export Restrictions

1. The Secretary of State is directed to inform the French Government in reply to the request of Foreign Minister Schumann, that we cannot rescind entirely our restrictions on the export of advanced computers for use in French nuclear weapons laboratories. However, we will redefine "advanced computers" so that in practice some of the models currently falling under the restrictions on end-use will become available without any restrictions. Pending such a redefinition, which will be completed expeditiously, current restrictions will continue in force.

2. The Under Secretaries Committee is directed to prepare by April 7, 1971 for the President's approval a recommended new definition of advanced computers.³ In practice the new definition should permit, without special letter of assurance, the export to or assembly in France of all computers whose strength is rated below that of the IBM 370/165. For the export to France of the latter computer, as well as more powerful machines, a special letter of assurance will continue to be required. This new definition will meet the special circumstances of France, and it is not intended to apply to export controls in general.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² See Document 150.

³ The Under Secretaries Committee forwarded a draft paper, "Redefinition of Advanced Computers," on April 7. A final version of the paper was sent to the President on April 15. Copies of both papers are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-222, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 103.

Missile Assistance

3. The Secretary of Defense is directed to continue discussions concerning assistance to the French ballistic missile program. We will provide assistance but limited to those items which the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, determines will not jeopardize the security of our own weapons programs or provide France with a distinct new capability in such areas as guidance systems, missile accuracies, or re-entry vehicle hardening.

4. The French Government should be informed that there will be definite limits to our technical assistance.

5. Should issues arise that are not covered by this memorandum, the Secretary of Defense will submit them with his recommendations to the President for decision.

6. The Secretary of Defense will submit to the President periodic reports on the status of missile assistance to France.

Henry A. Kissinger

154. National Security Decision Memorandum 104¹

Washington, March 29, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Cooperation with France on Nuclear Safety

The President has directed that discussions with the French Government concerning nuclear safety be reopened. He has decided that we should be prepared for an exchange of unclassified and classified information relating to nuclear safety up to, but not including Restricted Data. Information on nuclear safety standards, safety devices and procedures, safety design and command and control arrangements

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

can be shared with the French consistent with the above security limitation.

In this connection the President desires that:

1. The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (a) arrange to inform the French Government of our willingness to discuss with them an information exchange on nuclear safety; and (b) be responsible for determining the specific areas of nuclear safety on which we might share information with France on the basis of the above security guidelines.

2. The Secretary of State in consultation with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency determine whether any constraints might be placed on such cooperation by our obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Atomic Energy Act.

3. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of our willingness to resume discussions with the French in this area, and that no exchange of Restricted Data will be involved.

Henry A. Kissinger

155. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Follow-up on Military Cooperation with France

This whole subject remains a highly controversial one within the Government and the President's commitment has not been properly communicated to the agencies. Mishandling of this first batch of decisions—within the Executive, with the Congress and with the Allies, especially the UK—could produce

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-222, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 103. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for urgent action. The tabs are not printed. A notation by Haig reads: "Hal—HAK wants Tab A redone". "Apr 12 1971" is stamped below this handwriting.

a situation in which the President's wishes could well be negated and our interests damaged.

I would hope that you could give this subject prompt consideration so that matters will be handled in a disciplined manner, consistent with the President's policy and with the undoubted complexity and sensitivity of the subject.

Three operational issues have arisen which require follow-up guidance on NSDM's 103 and 104² regarding military cooperation with France (copies of the NSDM's are at Tab B).

The Issues

1. *Congressional consultations:* Per instructions in NSDM 104, the Atomic Energy Commission has already informed the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy by letter of our willingness to resume discussions with the French on nuclear safety. This was the only contact the President had authorized with the Joint Committee. *However, we have now learned that the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Affairs, Dr. Carl Walske, has taken it upon himself to tell the Joint Committee staff of the other decisions regarding technical assistance to the French missile program, and making more powerful computers available to French weapons laboratories.* While we do not know the details, we understand that the Joint Committee staff is favorable on the proposed nuclear safety exchange but has some questions about the computer issue. Their reaction on missile assistance is unknown; details have probably not yet been communicated to them.

This breach of the NSDM guidance regarding consultations with the JCAE,³ plus the possibility that information on these decisions could leak to other Congressional committees and the press, emphasize the need for a reminder about the security classification of these NSDM's and the need to clear any Congressional or other agency consultations at the White House. The memorandum from you to the Secretaries of State and Defense at Tab A accomplishes this.

2. *Informing the French:* The Defense initiative with the Joint Committee reinforces our need to inform the French of our decisions immediately before any leaks occur here. State has been properly holding up on the computer issue pending interagency agreement on the technical redefinition of "advanced computers." This is now nearly complete, and a memorandum to you from the Under Secretaries Committee is expected next Tuesday.⁴ But, as far as we know, State has not yet de-

² Documents 153 and 154.

³ A marginal notation by Kissinger reads: "Find out how this happened."

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 153.

cided on the channel to use to inform the French. Defense is preparing a letter from Foster to Blancard on the missile questions, to be followed up in a Foster visit to Paris in early May, but they are holding up on nuclear safety until they get agreement on the specific kinds of information we can share with the French.⁵

In all of these cases, consistent with the President's decisions, we need to urge State and Defense to inform the French as soon as possible. Your memorandum at Tab A also conveys this message.

3. *Shall we inform the British?* Elements in State and Defense believe we should tell the British of our proposed cooperation with France. They rest their case on the so-called Mildenhall agreement and Hillenbrand letter in October, 1969 (Tab C) (cleared by you) under which we agreed to keep the British informed of any "nuclear defense cooperation" we might contemplate with the French, and the British agreed likewise. Although there is no precise record, Secretary Rogers gave some oral assurance to Sir Alec Douglas Home about our intention to consult when the two met at Dorneywood and Chequers in July, 1970 (see August, 1970 Hillenbrand-Galloway exchange, also at Tab D). Moreover, it appears that Foster—without consulting anybody—probably advised the UK Ministry of Defence of his June, 1970 talks with Blancard on possible US missile assistance to the French. A recent cable from London (also at Tab D), relating to unsubstantiated press stories about a possible Heath approach to Pompidou on nuclear cooperation, further supports the impression that the British consider the Mildenhall agreement still valid.

While the assistance we are contemplating with the French in the computer, missile, and nuclear safety fields is not strictly speaking "nuclear cooperation", there are nevertheless some good reasons for keeping the British informed—especially if we want them to keep us posted on any nuclear conversations with France. This would also be consistent with the kind of relationship the President is developing with Prime Minister Heath. (You also made a personal commitment to Healey which Carrington may be aware of.)

If you agree that we should tell the British, the question then becomes, what, when and through what channel. These matters should be promptly addressed by the USC and the attached memorandum (Tab A) so directs.

⁵ Kissinger drew a line along this paragraph and wrote in the margin: "I want us to inform Pompidou through Watson first. Please draft backchannel to him." A copy of the message is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-222, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 103.

Recommendation

1. That you sign the memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense at Tab A.

2. That you consider especially paragraph 3 of Tab A (Allied consultation) and decide whether to include it.

Include

Don't include⁶

Other guidance on UK⁷

⁶ Kissinger initialed this option.

⁷ Kissinger annotated: "Inform them—I'll do it with Cromer."

156. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, April 21, 1971.

SUBJECT

Redefinition of Advanced Computers

In response to the memorandum of April 15, 1971, from the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee² the President has approved the redefinition of advanced computers recommended by the USC for the purposes of special assurances required in connection with export to, or assembly in France. Henceforth, such assurances will only be required for computers with a maximum theoretical bus rate exceeding 200 million bits per second.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, General Files on National Security Council Matters, 1969–1972, Lot 73D288, NSC/USC Memos. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.

² See footnote 3, Document 153.

³ In telegram 68404 to Paris, April 22, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to orally inform the French of the 200 million bits per second threshold and provided examples of the types of computers that were included and excluded by this standard. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VIII)

The President has directed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to undertake a study of the applicability of the foregoing definition to prior clearance procedures affecting transactions involving France and other Free World countries, and to report its findings by May 20, 1971. This study, which should examine particularly the non-proliferation and other security implications of such an action, will be classified SECRET.

The USC is further requested to initiate a review of the desirability of adopting new criteria for measuring the performance of advanced computers, and to forward any recommendations to the President by July 1, 1971.

As previously directed, the USC shall recommend contingency press guidance for use in case issues treated in NSDM's 103 and 104⁴ become public. Should this occur, the Department of State will deal with all inquiries concerning the redefinition of advanced computers in relations with France, and in connection with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Department of Defense will be authorized to respond to any inquiries relating to projected cooperation with France in the areas of missile assistance and nuclear safety.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ Documents 153 and 154.

157. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 4, 1971.

SUBJECT

Status Report on Missile Cooperation with France

Responding to your request of June 29,² Secretary Laird has sent you a report on the June missile assistance talks held by Defense officials in Paris (Tab B). This meeting produced a set of draft ground rules, enclosed with Laird's letter, which will now be reviewed and approved by each government. You will want to look at this document, which essentially repeats the guidance of NSDM 100 regarding the limitations of our assistance in the areas of guidance, accuracy, and nuclear hardening, and confining our cooperation to improving existing French systems, rather than helping them to develop new ones. A number of procedural points are also established, such as a single point of contact in each government (on our side it is Mr. G. R. Barse in Johnny Foster's shop, DDR & E), regular meetings at least every six months, exchanges of written documentation, etc. We recommend that you approve these ground rules in your reply memorandum to Laird at Tab A. The formal adoption of the ground rules will be effected by signature of Dr. Foster and M. Blancard on the final document.

According to Laird, the French were forthcoming in the technical discussions, describing the general nature of their present missile systems to set the context and taking the US team to Bordeaux to tour actual propulsion plants and missile assembly facilities. The atmosphere was cordial, as evidenced by a follow-up letter which Blancard wrote to Foster (also at Tab B). Our side was impressed with the caliber of French personnel and their programs. Again, the overall impression was that the French are asking us for help that will save them time and money on rather specific technical difficulties they are having in areas such as propulsion, reliability, simulation techniques, and safety measures. The French will now pass to us written summaries of their problems, to be followed by our replies and another round of talks in Paris in October. Laird is confident that the possibility exists for signifi-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. At the top of the first page are the handwritten note, "Thru Haig," and Haig's initials. Tabs A and B are not printed.

² A copy of the letter is *ibid*.

cant cooperation which should improve our general political relations with France if we make a sincere effort. In short, a good start has been made. We will want to monitor further developments closely.

One touchy issue we must address soon is whether to authorize use of US contractors on some of the problem areas where the French are asking our advice. Although not yet broached formally in the talks, the question is imminent. Defense feels at this stage that use of our contractors may be essential to achieve meaningful results, including some direct industrial contacts with the French. This will mean some risks, but Mr. Barse, the staff coordinator on our side, believes he has a scheme involving two or three industrial representatives, with whom he already has relationships of trust, as intermediaries which could reduce the possibility of leaks and still achieve results. We will ask for a formal memorandum on this aspect soon and will raise the issue with you then for a decision. Obviously, industry-to-industry contacts will increase the chances of our cooperation becoming public.

Recommendation

That you review and approve the ground rules and sign the reply to Laird at Tab A.³

³ Kissinger signed the memorandum, dated August 10, which reads: "Many thanks for your letter of July 29, 1971, reporting on the most recent talks with the French. The proposed ground rules for US-French missile cooperation seem very sound. I shall look forward to receiving regular status reports on our cooperation with the French. Particularly sensitive issues, such as possible use of US contractors, should be referred to the White House for decision."

158. Memorandum of Conversation¹Terceira, Azores, December 13, 1971, 9 a.m.²**SUBJECT**

Meeting at Junta Geral, Angra do Heroísmo, Terceira, Azores

PRESENT

The President
President Pompidou
Mr. Andronikof
Major General Walters

The President opened the conversation by saying he appreciated this opportunity of having this first of his meetings with Heads of Major Governments with the President of France. Their meeting, quite apart from the usual matters they would discuss, had attracted world attention. Obviously what France and the U.S. could agree upon was of great importance to Europe and to the world. Some of these matters were highly technical in which President Pompidou was more learned than he himself was in such fields as the monetary and trade questions. These were matters they might well discuss at the afternoon meeting after a chance to see what their positions were in other areas. He was prepared to handle it any way President Pompidou preferred and as far as he was concerned the agenda was open. He would like to discuss Europe with its problems, the South Asian situation (India-Pakistan) and, of course, bilateral problems and finally the tough problem of the monetary situation which, if President Pompidou agreed, they could discuss that afternoon.

President Pompidou said he was agreeable to this.

President Nixon then said he was prepared to discuss any other matters that might be of interest to President Pompidou. Did he have any suggestions.

President Pompidou said that if they spoke of Europe, America, the Soviet Union, China, Asia and even Australia, the most interesting

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Beginning December 12, 1971. Top Secret. Nixon and Pompidou met in the Azores December 13–14. The focus of the meetings was monetary reform issues. Memoranda of conversation dealing with the economic portions of their discussions and those of their senior advisers are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 219 and 220. Kissinger discussed the talks in *White House Years*, pp. 963–964.

² The time “1600” is crossed out and “0900 AM” was inserted by hand. According to the President's Daily Diary, however, the meeting took place from 10:05 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

in his view, outside of the monetary problem, but part of it was the relations between Western Europe on one hand and East-West relations on the other, that is relations between Western Europe and the U.S. and the Soviet Union and its allies.

President Nixon then said it seemed to him that in looking at his problem, it was not just a monetary problem but an area involving political relations as well. In this, cooperation between France and the U.S. was the keystone. For that reason if he and President Pompidou arrived at some understanding, it would aid progress in the political field as well and have a great effect on the rest of Europe and the eventual outcome.

There was a curious situation in regard to the monetary situation. Some writers said that France was the key, others the U.K., Germany, Italy or the Japanese. In any event all have different problems in that area. But the relationship between France and the U.S. is central to a solution. This is also true in the political area. One of the major contributions that has been made in the past three years has been the closer relationship that has developed between France and the U.S. Fortunately, we also had good relations with General De Gaulle as President Pompidou knew. President Pompidou and he had carried on in the same spirit that De Gaulle and President Nixon had established in 1969.

One thing that might be useful would be for him to get President Pompidou's appraisal of the Soviets. He himself had not met either Brezhnev or Kosygin. President Pompidou had been to Moscow and had seen them in France.³ The President would like this only for guidance and was not seeking confidential disclosures but he would be interested to get President Pompidou's views of the Soviets, their intentions and his analysis of them.

President Pompidou said that first of all, in reply to what President Nixon had so kindly said about French and U.S. relations, he would sum up in three or four sentences his political philosophy. France is a Western country. This was true historically and in sentiment. She was determined to remain a friend and ally of the U.S. France had close to her the Soviet Armies and the mass of the Soviet Union. In such circumstances only two policies were possible. Either she hid behind a wall or tried to understand one another. In a third area he believed that it was necessary to give Western Europe as much economic unity as possible and later political unity and, if all went well, equally so in the Defense area because this is the only possible counterweight to the USSR. All the more so because he was sure that the U.S. progressively would not want to bear all of the burden of their presence in Europe. As he had

³ Pompidou visited the Soviet Union October 6–13, 1970. Brezhnev visited France October 25–30, 1971.

told the President, he hoped it would not happen soon but it (a U.S. withdrawal) would take place and they needed a United Europe to face the East. This was in part necessary because Germany is at present very strongly anchored to the West but one could never know for sure what form their evolution could take as only the Soviets could give them what they wanted: unification. Perhaps someday the Germans might decide to give priority to this. One could wonder. He also believed that the development of this policy of European Unity and *détente* with the East is favored by the existence of China and the fact that the Soviets are not looking for crises in Europe and are very concerned with Asia. This results as he told Chancellor Brandt in the greatest difficulty in the construction of Europe, that is, the definition of its relationship with the U.S. Fundamentally vis-à-vis the Soviets the Europeans have a common position of *détente* and vigilance. On Asian problems the Europeans can get together because they are not directly concerned. With regard to Africa they would like to tie Africa as close to Europe as possible. France and the U.K., despite difficulties, did have some influence in this area.

The difficulty lay in the equitable distribution of the financial and economic burden and establishing the political relationship as one of alliance but not simple subordination. Herein lay the difficulty. By that he meant, not that it was impossible but delicate to define. Here lay the reason for the fact that France had a role to play that was greater than her intrinsic power. Fundamentally, Chancellor Brandt and Germany needed a France not too concerned by their *Ostpolitik*. They needed her blessing. Everyone in Europe was counting on France to defend certain commercial and financial interests with the United States. It is a comfortable situation for them. In case of any difficulty they can say, "Well, it's the French." In reality there remain in the USSR great apprehensions regarding Germany. These memories mean that the present Soviet leaders prefer France to have an important role in Europe rather than see the leadership go to Germany by default. This is not awkward for the United States. There is in France a Government determined not to let the Communists come to power. He would now return to what the President had said about the Soviet leaders.

He had seen Kosygin three times and Brezhnev three times. He had been to the USSR as Prime Minister and had seen both Brezhnev and Kosygin. He had seen Kosygin as Prime Minister.⁴ He had returned to the USSR as President and, as President Nixon knew, Brezhnev had recently been in France. They were very different men.

⁴ Prime Minister Pompidou visited the Soviet Union July 3–8, 1967, and held meetings with senior members of the Soviet leadership. He met separately with Kosygin during the Soviet Premier's July 1, 1969, visit to Paris.

Kosygin's temperament is not very gay. He was very studious on economic and technical problems. He was fascinated by industrial progress. He was from Leningrad and in this respect he was perhaps more reserved towards Germany than others. He was afraid of the Germans and if pushed might react violently. Brezhnev was a Ukrainian and a Southerner. He was jovial and cordial and liked to eat and drink. He was folksy, liked good cars. He owned a Rolls Royce, a Mercedes, a Citroën and a Maserati. He did not yet have a Mustang. President Nixon commented that Brezhnev had all kinds of cars but not an American one. President Pompidou said that a 21L looked like an American car. Brezhnev liked good living. He was easy in conversation but in depth he was very tough. He was permanently conscious of the importance of military power but was also aware that he had to raise the living standards of his fellow citizens. We were close to a period of anniversaries. The U.S. would soon celebrate its 200th Anniversary, the French were celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the Republic. Brezhnev wanted to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Constitution and to them commemorate means to distribute more consumer goods to the people. Brezhnev counted on France and Germany and the West in general to furnish the means of rapidly producing more consumer goods. He is determined to import consumer goods if necessary. Despite all of this he never forgets the importance of power and at the bottom of things Soviet Policy presents two characteristics:

1. It is like a river—if it finds a hollow, it flows in until stopped by rock.

2. It is obsessed by China constantly.

For now the Soviets are desirous of accentuating détente in Europe and would like to conclude their agreements with the Germans and obtain the ratification of the treaties. They are in a hurry. They watch without pleasure the formation of the Common Market. Above all they are concerned with everything that happens in Asia and try to cut the ground from under Chinese ambitions. They are presently more concerned with Chinese potential than ambitions.

President Pompidou said that he had mentioned that the Soviet leaders were obsessed with China. The dream of Yalta may not be over for Soviets who may still dream of sharing the world with the U.S. This is a deeply rooted idea. China disturbs this idea and they don't like it. President Pompidou said that leaving aside current events (Indo-Pakistan War)⁵ he believed the Soviets would seek to reach agreement with the U.S. But one must understand, and this President

⁵ The war broke out on November 22 when Indian troops attacked in support of the independence movement in East Pakistan. The Pakistani Government accepted a cease-fire on December 17. The war resulted in the dismemberment of the Pakistani state.

Nixon knew as well as he did, that to them an arrangement means retreat nowhere and advance whenever possible. This is true of all powerful people!

President Nixon said that this analysis by President Pompidou was very perceptive and very candid. It was extremely helpful and he could assure the French President that his candor would be respected and his confidence would not be betrayed. He would like to ask a question: Which did the Soviets fear most—China or the U.S.? President Pompidou replied that they feared China most, not immediately but they felt they could do nothing against China which was indestructible by its mass and in 20 to 50 years it will be so enormous that they will not be able to cope with it. Next they fear Germany. They feel Germany is capable of fomenting something. With the U.S. they feel complicity.

President Nixon said that there was one difference. They feared China certainly and Germany possibly because they are neighbors and might be a threat from a territorial standpoint. While they fear American power, they do not fear any U.S. territorial ambitions against them. He believed that in the broad landscape President Pompidou had painted we should now look at the pieces and see how those pieces could be moved to our advantage rather than theirs. To begin with, in respect to the relationship between Western Europe and the U.S., it was no secret that the Germans felt that the U.S. could not be depended on. The reasons were they felt that it was inevitable that the U.S. would withdraw from Europe except perhaps for a small force but the U.S. could not be counted upon to risk its survival to defend Europe in a nuclear war. The actions of the U.S. Senate, the Mansfield Amendment⁶ reinforces that point of view. It was all well and good for us to make the usual protests that the U.S. would stand by the European countries and that we could be counted on. In the final analysis what determines U.S. and French policy is self interest. This was the basis for his contention that the U.S. and Western Europe, despite some differences of which they were aware, were inextricably tied together. In the long term it would be disastrous for the U.S. to leave Europe as a hostage to the USSR. That is why it was necessary for the U.S. and Europe to have close economic relations. Militarily it was vital to the U.S. to preserve Europe and to remain and not to reduce its forces unless on a very clear multilateral basis such as a reduction vis-à-vis the Communist bloc would be disastrous. MBFR had begun in 1968 before he was elected. U.S. policy was that it must be pursued on a multilateral basis. We had yet to find any formula by which such a reduction would not downgrade our interests in relation to the Soviet bloc. We could continue the

⁶ See Documents 62 and 63.

Brosio discussions⁷ and consult to the extent that President Pompidou desired. Personally the President was very skeptical. His concern was that MBFR be used simply to obtain a U.S. withdrawal. Only with a visible U.S. presence could we maintain our interest. The Soviets know this and that is why they want us out as soon as possible.

In the matter of our talks with the Soviets either at SALT or in May when the President would meet with Brezhnev and Kosygin⁸ he wished to assure President Pompidou that there would be absolutely no U.S. Soviet talks apart from or at the expense of the European Alliance. President Pompidou had spoken of the Soviet interest in a Yalta type agreement with the U.S. Many in the U.S. felt that Yalta was very detrimental for Europe politically and economically and basically beneficial to the USSR and detrimental to the U.S. Therefore the President looked on the forthcoming talks as very tough and hard. The Soviets want progress on trade. This is possible but will not be nearly as great as many think. Some progress on arms limitation may be possible if there is an equal deal on other subjects. However, there must be a clear understanding that during this period when the Soviets have nuclear parity with the U.S. this does not mean that the Soviets can get away with a policy to humiliate the U.S. or weaken the U.S. in defense of the position of its allies in Europe.

It seemed to the President that in this framework the maintenance of strength and cohesion was more important than ever. The U.S. in the long run cannot have a viable world without Europe. Europe cannot survive without the U.S. contribution to nuclear strength at this time. The Soviets know this and would like to divide the U.S. and Europe. The Soviets also know that at the heart of the European problem are the Germans. President Pompidou could not be more correct when he pointed out that Germany, which is the heart of Europe, is always potentially, despite its cultural and economic ties to the West, drawn towards the East. The East holds millions of Germans as hostages. This is why we must keep Germany economically, politically and militarily tightly within the European Community. Ostpolitik is a nice concept and can win a Nobel Prize. President Pompidou or himself in Brandt's place might do the same. But politically it was dangerous to risk old friends for those who would never be friends. We should be very tough with the Soviets on the matter of European security. The agreements with Brandt should be signed sealed and delivered. Into this picture now come France, Britain and Germany. If President Pompidou and he, in the course of their meetings, could, without being belligerent (which

⁷ See Document 72.

⁸ Reference to the scheduled U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow, which took place May 22-30, 1972.

neither he nor President Pompidou wanted), reach a strong understanding on principles, it would be helpful and not just for both countries. It would help his meetings with the Germans and with the U.K. to make progress on Europe. We must realize that many cynics and some honest people felt that when France left NATO that this meant the end of the European Alliance. The President was aware that France remains in the Alliance but is outside the Integrated Military Structure. He felt we would play into the hands of our potential opponents if it appeared that France, except for some economic ties, was determined to go her own way in a race to Moscow. The President was not suggesting that France and others should not have independent policies towards the East. This was why he was having meetings with our Western European Allies so as to make crystal clear in our initiatives with the Soviets and the Chinese that our primary allegiance is to the West, not in any sense of belligerence but that is where our interests lie. This will help in making a better deal with the Soviets.

One of the reasons, as he had mentioned earlier, why he sought improved relations with the French by meeting with General De Gaulle. Some people who were whistling in the dark believed we could build a European relationship without France. The President said that it was his belief that there could be no viable Europe without France. Just as France is not viable without Europe and to square the circle he did not believe that even the U.S. could in the long run pursue a policy of isolation. Our fate was tied up with that of Europe.

President Pompidou then said that the President had brought up a number of attitudes by Democrats, Mansfield and others, in the Senate which was really more significant than Pearl Harbor. In other words, in the hypothesis of a major conflict it is not just part of the U.S. Fleet that might be destroyed but Western Europe which would be lost to the Soviets. The U.S. would, of course, revenge them, but this would be small consolation to the Europeans in the cemetery. The President agreed.

President Pompidou then said that he had three remarks to make about what the President had said. Brezhnev had spoken a great deal about MBFR. He drew an idyllic picture of almost no soldiers in Europe in 10 years. In any case, France will not diminish her military effort. She will pursue it whatever happens. The President commented that this was "good".

President Pompidou said that he had told Chancellor Brandt about what the President had said of the danger that negotiations might be a pretext for U.S. opinion to demand the departure from Europe of the U.S. Forces. The Chancellor had replied that the U.S. Forces should not leave unless the Russians went too. President Pompidou said he must admit that he did not understand the German attitude on this point. They should be the most hostile to the reductions envisaged in MBFR.

After all, they would be the first to be endangered. He must say that Brandt had told him that he was hostile to the neutralization or "Finlandization" of Germany. But the day the U.S. leaves Germany, the U.K. and France will not be far behind and then Germany would not be far from neutralization.

President Nixon said that the problem in the U.S. as in Europe was largely psychological. Many Americans were naive and softhearted. Many intellectuals, the media and professors don't believe there is any threat from the Russians. Some of the young also. President Pompidou interrupted to say, "Bishops too." President Nixon said that some of the Protestant and Catholic clergy feel this way too and the inherent difficulties are increased when political leaders who know the Soviets add fuel to the fire. What used to be called the cold war rhetoric is no longer saleable. What was needed was the type of spirit with which President Pompidou had met the Soviets and in which he himself planned to meet them. A totally pragmatic meeting of Eastern and Western leaders. He had no illusions regarding the difficulties of his forthcoming meetings. There would be no "spirit of Moscow or Peking" arising out of his trips. He remembered Khrushchev. He had a sense of humor. He was tough and impressive. He would not allow the almost passionate desire of so many of our people to believe the best about the Soviet leaders' desire to seek peace to blind them to reality. Not because the Russians were Communists but because they were a powerful country who saw their goals as antagonistic to ours. The French had lived too long to be so naive. His attitude towards both the Communist Superpowers was that we cannot live with them but then we cannot live without them. Live and let live based on fantasies of our own. Our society and civilization need to recognize that their attitudes, desires and foreign policies are different from our own basically because they are Communists. From time to time they may recede from their policies of expansion but Communist theology requires a dedication to expansion taking advantage of every temporary circumstance. By that he did not mean that non-Communist nations did not try and take advantages but not in areas of fundamental policy of conquest. The nations of Europe and the U.S. do not have this as part of their national policies.

The President did not know why the Soviet leaders and the Chinese leaders had arrived at the decision to meet with U.S. leaders. Not primarily because they wanted better relations or liked us. If there was not a strong Europe and if the Soviets did not have a threat in the East they would not be interested in talking to the U.S. By the same token he would like to have Dr. Kissinger tell President Pompidou what the Chinese think. He did not believe that Mao would be talking to the leader of the capitalists and courting the U.S. unless he was concerned by the Soviets and to a lesser extent by the Japanese. If one said this publicly

they would deny it. Some in our country said when the President announced his trip to Peking that the Soviets would refuse to talk with us.

Actually the Soviets were more willing to talk SALT, Europe and Berlin after Peking announced the visit than they had been before. After the announcement of his visit to Moscow the Chinese had showed a greater interest in talking to us than before.

President Nixon recalled that he had told President Pompidou before that when he had seen General De Gaulle while he (President Nixon) was out of office and has asked him whether he had any advice for the U.S., President De Gaulle had replied that rather than put all of its eggs in the Soviet basket the U.S. should have a more open policy towards the Chinese like France.⁹ His responsibility was like President Pompidou's. They must go into these things with their eyes open and try to defend our point of view.

President Pompidou said that the U.S. view of things was more world wide than that of France because of our means. This was why he considered the time favorable to commit Europe in a procedure of détente which could backfire but that Soviets could reverse only by a theatrical or forceful move. They are very concerned by Asia, China and their discussions with the U.S. on nuclear matters. They want peace in Europe. He believed that the Soviets harbored the illusion that the French, Germans, Italians and other countries could give them considerable economic aid. These are illusions and he had said so publicly. One could only sell to the Russians in exchange for what one buys and this was not much. No one could give unlimited credit. The European picture was very favorable except on MBFR on which he had already given the President his views. The French were not disposed to reduce their arms effort. One word about the problem of a European Security Conference. This point is evident. A security conference is beginning to be discussed seriously. He believed that all European countries were agreed on holding such a conference but felt that if the U.S. preferred a later date they would be agreeable to keeping the U.S. happy. Until, however, the U.S. agreed, there could be no real serious preparation of such a conference. Why did the French believe that such a conference could be of interest? They felt that Communism as such represented by Communist regimes was false from the economic and social point of view in many so called Socialist nations. Poles, Romanians and especially the Czechs and Hungarians wanted to shake off the tutelage. They believe that with the Western bloc divided and the Eastern bloc united that they lost. He felt that on one side there were the free coun-

⁹ During a 1963 visit to Paris. Nixon mentioned it in describing a similar 1967 discussion with Adenauer in *RN*, p. 281. The issue also came up during the March 1969 meeting between the President and de Gaulle; see Document 118 and *RN*, p. 373.

tries who were independent and France felt that she was. On the other side there were countries who wanted to take steps towards freedom and independence. If the superpowers or the West (that is, the U.S.) feel that this liberty and independence is bad, then harm is done. The Russians feel it is bad but cannot stop it.

President Pompidou had been struck in his last talks with the Romanian President and Foreign Minister by their anguish at the idea that multilateral preparations and meetings on this conference might be delayed. They believe that when all are seated around a table they will be protected and not until then. The U.S. and France did not have exactly the same view. The problem is one of interpretation of the situation rather than that of a disagreement on goals.

President Nixon replied that, first of all, as to the matter of whether there would be a European Security Conference the question as President Pompidou had implied was one of timing and tactics. As President Pompidou had indicated, we believed that until the German treaties are finished plans for a European Security Conference cannot be implemented. We also believed that it was vitally important that extensive discussions among ourselves be held with regard to the agenda. He agreed with the French President that there was some possibility that this conference might not be an unmixed blessing for the Soviets although they very much wanted it. The extent to which it opens up to the West the Eastern countries to whom President Pompidou referred can be a leavening factor in the attitude of those countries. We have in each case to distinguish between the leadership and the countries. The people of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had demonstrated on several occasions that there was nothing that they would like better than to get rid of Soviet influence and leadership. Certainly a country like Romania where Ceaucescu is a devoted Stalinist is also devotedly a Romanian and to the extent that he can safely do so he takes an independent line from time to time. The President's views long term were the same as President Pompidou's. There are risks for the Soviets in such a conference just as they think it contains risks for us. They feel it will have the effect all over Western Europe of creating a false atmosphere of security and will lead to the letting down of our guard and the belief that real peace is just around the corner and that the cold war is finished. His own view in summary was that in a deliberate way we should move towards such a conference but have in mind the fact that we should harbor no illusions as to the Soviet aims in holding it. Our planning should be such as to serve our purposes while they will attempt to serve theirs.

Overhanging the whole area of Soviet-U.S. relations is the sober, sombre fact that if the Soviet leader decided to risk nuclear war and the U.S. was involved, he knew that he had the power to kill 70 million

Americans and we had the power to kill 70 million Russians. The U.S. President knows this too. There are limitations on power and a restraining influence not because of love but because of fear. It was essential that the two nations pursue the negotiating track rather than the confrontation track. We have impressed this on the Soviets with regard to Southern Asia in the last 24 hours. The President wished to add in regard to the desire for détente that he totally agreed with President Pompidou. The people of the U.S. and Europe wanted it, at least a majority of them did. In Europe perhaps for different reasons. The Germans want it because the Soviets can give them East Germany; U.K., France and Italy because they are convinced that we live in a dangerous world. The danger presently represented by nuclear war, not the loss of 3,000 men as at Pearl Harbor. The whole place would be turned into a graveyard. No one wanted that. It was very important to look at the two attitudes on détente. Some sought a European Conference on the naive assumption that the Soviet aims have changed and that their designs in Europe and in the rest of the world are basically peaceful. On the other hand, some who seek détente on our side have no illusions and recognize that a different relationship and good relations between Europe and the USSR and the U.S. and the USSR are a practical necessity, that there are dangers in a policy of confrontation. But we must have no illusions about the basic aims of the Communist States. They are quite different from one another. Even if they wanted it would be impossible for European or U.S. leaders to take an intransigent stand and refuse to talk. Ten years ago this was possible in the U.S. It is no longer. On the other hand, it is important that the leaders recognize that naive public opinion often demands talks that will make the whole world peaceful. We should seek such negotiations but for the right reason. By the facts of Soviet power, the risks of confrontation in the Middle East or elsewhere are unacceptable. Therefore, we should seek to lessen the risk of war and seek, as President Pompidou had indicated, to make Europe a more viable area and to open Eastern Europe whose peoples' hearts are with the West.

The President wished to add in a different sense. He would like to discuss the motives for his trip to Peking in the afternoon. China today was a major power with the largest population in the world. She was a mini economic power with a production less than half of Japan's although she had 800 million people to Japan's 100 million. China was a mini nuclear power in relation to the USSR but we take the long view as do the Soviets and President Pompidou. Twenty years from now China will be a major nuclear power if they so wish. Do we allow that to come about with China isolated. We should make an effort for a new start. The President had made this choice himself with his eyes open to seek by necessity a peaceful relationship with them.

President Pompidou said he believed that the two Presidents were being told to go.

President Nixon said that he understood they would break now. What subjects should be discussed in the afternoon—economic subjects?

President Pompidou said that he had seen Dr. Kissinger earlier that morning concerning monetary and economic problems. He would also like to talk about China since the President had also expressed this desire. He could tell the President what he thought and then Dr. Kissinger could tell them about his impressions in China.

President Nixon said he felt that this would be important. If President Pompidou had no objection he would like to have Dr. Kissinger sit in on the afternoon session. We had had some very interesting contacts in the last few days and he would like to have President Pompidou brought up to date.

President Pompidou then expressed the belief that the Chinese were much more complicated than the Soviets. The President said that they were perhaps more sophisticated and more subtle.

President Pompidou said that Soviet policy was realistic. Their problem was to follow their calendar but one could understand the substance of what they were trying to do. The Chinese were more complicated. The situation in Pakistan interested him very much. He understood their clash with the Soviets but he was not sure that the Soviet policy towards Pakistan was simple.

The two Presidents then agreed that the press and others would want to know what they had talked about and discussed what should be said.

The President said that they could have their Press Secretaries say that they had had a far ranging discussion of bilateral problems, European problems and global problems but that this would still not be much.

President Pompidou said he felt that they should be told that the two Presidents had not discussed monetary problems, otherwise they would be agitated. President Nixon suggested that they might be told that these problems would be discussed that afternoon. "And tomorrow," suggested President Pompidou. The President said that if President Pompidou agreed, they could say that they had discussed the President's forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow to which the President was going only to represent the U.S. and not on behalf of Europe.

President Pompidou said that he understood that the Press had already picked up the fact that Dr. Kissinger had been to see him earlier

that morning¹⁰ and the two Presidents agreed that they would say he had called on President Pompidou to set up the agenda for the meetings.¹¹

¹⁰ A memorandum of this conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Beginning December 12, 1971.

¹¹ For text of press statements, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 1184–1191.

159. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

State's Assessment of French EC Referendum

Attached (Tab A) is a memorandum from State covering an analysis of the outcome of last Sunday's referendum² in France on the European Community (EC). State points that:

—because of the high abstention rate (almost 40% of the eligible) only 36% of *those eligible* voted "yes,"

—32% of *those actually voting*, voted "no." The Communists, who campaigned for "no," are hailing this result as a victory for them, since they usually get only 18–24% of the national vote.

From the results, State concludes that:

—the outcome was clearly disappointing to Pompidou;

—it should not, however, be regarded as a major defeat for him or his European policy;

—the non-contentious nature of the EC enlargement issue for most Frenchmen (except Communists) accounted for voter apathy, and Pompidou was unable to overcome this apathy;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. IX. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten note reads: "Thru Haig." Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

² April 23. Tab A was transmitted with a covering memorandum dated April 25 from Eliot to Kissinger.

—Pompidou's critics within his party will be emboldened, as will the Communists and Socialists;

—Pompidou may reshuffle his cabinet, including Chaban-Delmas;

—Internationally, the consequences may be more serious, with Pompidou's aspirations as a leader of Europe having perhaps been dealt a severe blow;

—There is no reason, however, to think that the President will significantly change his European policy.

Comment: We do not entirely share the emphasis on this assessment that for Pompidou the more serious consequences will be international. To the degree that the President expected to utilize a pro-Europe result to assert his sway over his party, he has lost a great deal domestically. He will have to reconsider any plans which he may have had for dumping Chaban-Delmas or Debré or moving elections up to this summer or autumn. The authority vested in the French presidency under the Fifth Republic, however, makes its incumbent relatively independent of the electorate's views as far as bold departures in international politics are concerned, if he has the will to make them.

Tab A

French Referendum

By a ratio of two to one, those who voted in Sunday's referendum in France signified approval of the EC enlargement treaty. However, this favorable outcome was considerably marred by the exceptionally large abstention rate—39.5%—which set a record in French national voting since World War II, if not before. Moreover, the polls had given Pompidou reason to expect that upwards of 70% of those voting would vote "yes." The actual figure was 68%. The result was that only 36% of the eligible electorate cast an affirmative vote—a clear disappointment for Pompidou and his supporters.

Despite all the Monday morning quarter-backing now going on, we should be careful not to view the results of the referendum as a major defeat for Pompidou or his new departures in European policy. Undoubtedly Pompidou has received a setback and may himself wish that he had not taken the initiative to hold a referendum (legislative ratification of the EC enlargement treaty would have sufficed). However, such setbacks are not uncommon for heads of state or government in complex democratic states.

Victory claims are being made by the French Communist Party, which campaigned for a "no" vote, and by the Socialists who called for abstention. Of those voting, 32% voted "no." Since the Communists have averaged only 18 to 24% of the vote in recent years, they are

crowding loudly that they increased their vote. In fact, part of the “no” vote derived from rightists and disaffected Gaullists who voted “no” more out of spite than conviction. This disaffection factor also explains the 39.5% abstention rate which the Socialists can hardly claim major credit for.

A more general reason for the outcome of the referendum was that the issue of EC enlargement was not contentious for the French electorate (except for Communist-led voters). Even Pompidou’s extensive personal efforts did not succeed in dramatizing the issue or in convincing the average voter that he had a duty to give Pompidou a massive “yes” for his European policy.

Domestically, the results will give new life to the Communists and Socialists and to Pompidou’s critics within the Gaullist movement. Pompidou may take the occasion to reshuffle the government, including the Prime Minister. Over time the fissures in Gaullist ranks will probably widen further. The adverse effects for Pompidou internationally, at least in the short run, may be more serious. His image as a commanding European statesman and his aspirations for France and for himself to play a decisive role in Europe’s future have received a blow. Some Europeans may react with the old feeling that France and its Gaullist leader have gotten a comeuppance. There may also be greater resistance now to recent French efforts within the EC to call the signals and have their way. However, there is no reason as of now to anticipate that Pompidou will make any significant change in the thrust or objectives of his European policy. We will have to await further developments for an indication of how he may wish to modify his tactics.

160. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹

Washington, July 8, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting with French Defense Minister Debré

My conversation with Debré yesterday lasted about 35 minutes and he then had a chat with the President for another 15–20 minutes.² This was quite general and dealt very broadly with the progress in U.S.-French relations.

1. In my conversation Debré expressed great satisfaction about the U.S.-French talks on technical subjects. He stressed the good actions and frankness, and I told him that our people had been impressed with the high quality of the French performance. Debré noted that Blancard would be coming shortly to continue talks.³

2. Debré then expressed at some length the well-known reservations about MBFR, arguing in particular that it would result in a "drop in the spirit of defense" all over Europe. I told him that the tendencies he fears were not in view, that they were reinforced more by pressure from the European Security Conference than by our efforts to have a serious and well-thought out MBFR negotiation. In the latter connection, I stressed the danger of proposals which were put together simply for negotiability and pointed out that we wanted to put together packages that would not weaken Western defenses. I told Debré we would welcome intellectual contributions in this, and he did not react one way or the other. The French Ambassador defended French advocacy of the European Conference by saying that the French did not intend it in any way as undercutting defense efforts. I stressed the point that in connection with any MBFR negotiation, but as a general matter also, the West must have a coherent defense strategy in Europe, one that is credible and that people believe in. This Administration will not reduce its forces unless the threat is reduced and would be able to withstand Con-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 678, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. IX. Secret. Drafted by Kissinger, Haig, and Richard T. Kennedy on July 8. A notation on the memorandum reads: "By messenger to Adm Murphy (OASD Cable Branch to hold for Murphy)."

² Kissinger's meeting with Debré, July 7, took place at 9:50 a.m., at the Western White House, San Clemente, California. A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.* The portions on the European security conference are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 101. No record of the Nixon-Debré discussion was found.

³ Blancard arrived July 16. No record of the meetings was found.

gressional pressures; however, this requires realistic contributions from the Europeans.

3. Debré also raised the Soviet point about British and French submarines in the SALT talks. I emphasized that we had not accepted the Soviet position, and we will not accept any Soviet effort to acquire an additional submarine should the French wish to add to their forces. Debré stressed that French strategic forces will be based on submarines and they might at some point want to consider a sixth boat.

4. Debré expressed his concern about possible German interest in nuclear weapons stemming from their efforts in uranium enrichment for civilian purposes. I said we would do nothing to help or encourage the Germans in this direction.

5. Finally, Debré mentioned that we were approaching an accord in principle regarding port calls by nuclear-powered vessels in French ports. I said I had not heard of this but it sounded encouraging.

Henry A. Kissinger⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

161. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 22, 1972, 8:15–9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

French Foreign Minister Schumann
French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet
Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Kissinger: We very much appreciated President Pompidou's statement on Vietnam.² What is your impression of the North Vietnamese?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 679, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. X. Secret; Nodis; Exclusively Eyes Only. Initialed and probably drafted by Sonnenfeldt. The meeting took place at the French Ambassador's residence. The arrangements for this meeting are documented in the transcript of a telephone conversation between Kissinger and French Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet on September 19, 2:55 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

² On September 21, the French President stated that France continued to support the proposal for a settlement outlined by de Gaulle in his September 1, 1966, speech at

Schumann: I saw Madame Binh and Xuan Thuy on Tuesday³ and the Russian Ambassador on Monday,⁴ the day before. The Russian for the first time told me what is happening in your talks with Le Duc Tho. He said that the US attitude was very intelligent. My impression was that he wanted to see me before I saw Madame Binh and Xuan Thuy and that the Russians are trying to help you. You know that I see the delegation heads regularly. But your Ambassador, Mr. Porter, has never asked. Of course it isn't up to me to take the initiative.

Kissinger: Well, that will change. What is your conclusion from the Russian account?

Schumann: Well, I think the chances are better than 50/50 that there will be an agreement. There is no point playing games and I might as well give you an account of what he said. First about the withdrawal, he said there was the issue of 45 days vs. 3 months.

Kissinger: That is not insuperable.

Schumann: Then there is the question of your military assistance to Saigon. When Madame Binh the next day talked about the time limit I just listened and said nothing. I stayed silent. On the political side he mentioned the question of 5 months instead of 6 and the US proposal for a Presidential election and a Tripartite Commission.⁵ I said nothing but it was the first time I heard that this was the position of the US. Of course the North Vietnamese want the election to be for the Assembly and a Tripartite Government rather than a Commission. Then he told me that on Thieu the Vietnamese still want him out on the settlement date while the US rejects this but agrees that he will go at some point. Then he said there would be a general agreement first, then a ceasefire, then release of prisoners and all this was now agreed. But for obvious reasons I asked no questions except to say, "Isn't it encouraging!" and he said, "Yes." But then the Vietnamese turned up in my office the next day and said there was no improvement and no encouragement. I said to them that this was the third time they had said this but wasn't there going to be another meeting. They said yes indeed, next week. My impression is that they are now clear that the Administration is here to stay but they are scared.

Kissinger: That's right. They shy away. I would appreciate it if you do not say anything to anyone on this because only the President and I know about our proposal.

Phnom Penh. Pompidou's statement was reported in "No Change in Positions Seen at Session of Paris Talks," *New York Times*, September 22, 1972, p. 3.

³ September 19.

⁴ September 18.

⁵ Documentation on the many proposals for a settlement in Vietnam and the course of the Paris Peace Talks is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972.

Schumann: Obviously. I told Pompidou about it and advised him to take the position he did yesterday in his press conference.

Kissinger: Well the South Vietnamese know nearly everything. But we really don't want this discussed in the newspapers as has been the case with the European Conference and MBFR. Since the Soviets have told you I will send you the exact text of our proposal so that you will know what it is.

Schumann: I have asked myself why Abrasimov did it. Was it spontaneous or some other reason. I think it was obviously intended to be done before Madame Binh and Xuan Thuy came to see me.

Kissinger: This was on Monday? Well it could only have been based on information from the Vietnamese because I did not talk to Dobrynin until Monday our time.⁶ We do very much appreciate President Pompidou's attitude. Outside proposals at this point can only be distracting. We will give your Ambassador summaries of what is happening from now on. You know they are the ones that have insisted on secrecy and by and large they have stuck to it. Incidentally, I have never met Madame Binh.

Schumann: Well, she is better to look at than to listen to. She is very forceful but they never reveal anything and they never give anything away.

Kissinger: Actually, they really have never gone public. We have done it a few times when they have tormented us too much. For example, when they were giving us one proposal in private and beating us over the head with another in public. But they now give us much more detailed documents than before.

Schumann: In connection with our President's statement—there will be no public statements by us that interfere.

Kissinger: Yes, he was kind enough to say this to me when I saw him last week.⁷ We'll keep you informed.

Schumann: We have no one in Paris to give information to. Can we make some arrangement.

Kissinger: Well, I could meet you at the end of the meetings with the Vietnamese. This is easier now that secrecy is no longer a problem. Also, when we change Ambassadors you will have a contact. But now

⁶ Kissinger and Dobrynin spoke by telephone twice on September 18, at 3:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. Transcripts of their conversations are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 373, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File.

⁸ They met on or about September 15 in Paris. Kissinger related some parts of his discussion with Pompidou in his telephone conversation with the French Ambassador (see footnote 1 above), but no record of this discussion between Kissinger and Pompidou has been found.

we will use your Ambassador here if you like, but it would have to be for President Pompidou only.

Schumann: Well, the trouble is that we cannot telegraph if we don't want anybody to know.

Kissinger: We have a channel to one man in Paris and we will give you his name.

Schumann: Well, I had wanted to tell you about what the Russians said because I thought it might strengthen your hand.

Kissinger: I appreciate it very much and it is very interesting because the Soviets could have given you a different nuance in their account.

Schumann: As you know I have been in China. Mao was really fascinating. I spent an hour and a half with him. He is obsessed with the Russians and he kept mentioning Czechoslovakia. I said about that that there were three differences. First, Czechoslovakia only had a population of 15 million. Second, the Soviets had kind of a mandate from the other Communist states that what they were doing was not an imperialist venture. The Chinese answer to that was that the Soviets might try to associate their European puppets with some action. Incidentally, we did recently get some information that East European troops are being sent to Mongolia.

Kissinger: I don't think we had heard that.

Sonnenfeldt: I think the only source of that information was when the French told us about it.

Schumann: The third difference I said to the Chinese was that in China there could be no Husak after Dubcek.⁸ That was when Mao got talking about Lin Piao.⁹

Kissinger: Was Chou with you?

Schumann: Yes.

Kissinger: He is less impressive when he is with Mao.

Schumann: With me he actually injected himself into the conversation. Mao said that Lin Piao was against better relations with the West.

Kissinger: I found Mao very impressive. The conversation was like an overture to a Wagnerian opera. Chou always referred to it later. It really was a great intellectual performance to get all the points that later

⁸ Reference to the 1969 replacement of Czech reformer and Party Secretary Alexander Dubcek by the pro-Soviet Gustav Husak.

⁹ Lin Biao, Mao's designated successor, was allegedly involved in a failed coup against the Chinese leader. The aircraft in which he was attempting to flee China was shot down or crashed in Mongolia on September 12, 1971. U.S. information on this incident was still sketchy. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 157.

turned up in the talks with Chou into this first conversation as if it was spontaneous.

Schumann: My guess is that after Vietnam the CPR will openly lead a policy of rapprochement with the US.

Kissinger: I think that may be right. Even now we have three delegations coming and there is the grain deal. But trade is not our motive. Your guess sounds right to me. It is of course partly because of the Russians.

Schumann: Only partly?

Kissinger: Mainly.

Schumann: About Japan, the Chinese said that the 1952 treaty¹⁰ has to go. They insisted on it. Chou asked me about Tanaka and I said I had only met Ohira. Then I asked again about the 1952 treaty and Chou said it will be taken care of in the negotiations. I found this change from the previous insistence interesting.

Kissinger: We are trying to keep out of the Sino-Soviet dispute, particularly out of the border dispute. They have made several attempts to discuss it with us.

Schumann: When Mao dies it is of course possible that there would be a pro-Soviet general or somebody like that who would take over.

Kissinger: I think a Soviet military attack would be a very serious event indeed. Don't you agree?

Schumann: When we saw Brezhnev and Podgorny China was a bee in their bonnet. Did you find the same thing?

Kissinger: They are very emotional about it.

Schumann: When we were in a plane with Podgorny he kept saying that all the land below is on Chinese maps as their territory. Of course, he said, they are not yet dangerous because they are only producing 12 million tons of steel but later they will be very dangerous. When we were at Baikanur they were telling us about their rocket and said they had stopped it after 4 thousand miles but that it could have gone 8 thousand and would have dropped between Canton and Peking.

Kissinger: That is really something.

I saw a report that you had doubts about our Moscow talks on the European Conference and MBFR.¹¹

Schumann: Well it looks like you agreed not only on preliminary talks but on the full conference. Don't you think that is a problem?

¹⁰ Reference to the June 1, 1952, Japan-China trade agreement.

¹¹ Kissinger discussed the European Security Conference and MBFR with Brezhnev in Moscow on September 12; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 112.

Kissinger: Well that was a Soviet note and those were target dates.¹² They are not agreed. In the White House we have no overwhelming urge to have a conference but we were driven to it by the Allies including you.

Schumann: Guilty.

Kissinger: For us the dates on MBFR are very useful with the Congress. They buy a year or even two and take us through a whole Congressional session. To get that we are willing to talk about June for the European Security Conference. But if you or others at Helsinki say that the conference is not warranted I can assure you you will not have a US-Soviet condominium. But my impression is that since the business of the agenda will not be too tough there probably will be a conference. But you won't be confronted by us with a decision.

Schumann: Abrasimov said about the dates that there was no agreement but there was an understanding.

Kissinger: That just isn't true. You recall the conversation our Ambassador Beam had with Kuznetsov.¹³ After that conversation we faced the problem that we didn't want a European Conference without MBFR. So we wanted some parallel phrasing in the communiqué and the question was how to break the deadlock. So I told them that they should make us a proposal for what would happen next year so we could take it up with our allies and they did. We told them how we would interpret the question of the force reduction area but that this was subject to the views of the allies. If the Helsinki preparatory talks do not go well we are ready not to have a conference. But I think the Soviets won't let it fail. So we should go with the attitude of what is it we want, since the Soviets will probably meet it rather than with the idea that a US/Soviet agreement already exists. What I am afraid about is that we will end up with the European Conference but not get MBFR.

Now in regard to MBFR. I sympathize with the French views. In fact, we have assisted you to be an independent military power. And maybe we can do even more after the election. I have always been, as you know, sympathetic to you on this. I also understand your worry about MBFR being cover for unilateral troop reductions. Of course, if McGovern is elected all bets are off anyway.¹⁴ But assuming the President is reelected, which is now probable, we want the conference on

¹² The Soviet note was transmitted in telegram Hako 22 from Moscow, September 13; see *ibid.*, Document 113, footnote 3.

¹³ Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jacob Beam met with Acting Soviet Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on August 21 to ask whether the Soviets were ready to accept an invitation for balanced force reduction talks. See *ibid.*, Document 106.

¹⁴ Senator George S. McGovern (D-SD) was the Democratic Presidential candidate in the 1972 election.

MBFR mainly to prevent unilateral cuts. Secondly, it is an educational device for the Europeans about the real military balance and what changes might be tolerable. I'll tell you, it has been the best educational device for us. We discovered that the threat may be a little less than we thought but also that NATO is much weaker than we thought. The idea to get at is not what's negotiable but what's best for security. For that reason we resisted on proposals for quick small cuts, for a 10% cut. We want painstaking work, detailed concrete work, and not the psychotherapeutic approach of the Scandinavians or the Belgians. And we want you in this because you take defense seriously—you are the only ones, and Britain. What we want is the basis for a middle-term US commitment without having it challenged every year. How France associates itself with this is up to you. I told President Pompidou we will give you all our data and our thinking. So send someone over and we will give them to him and talk to him. A 10 to 15 percent cut is very dangerous but we don't want to say it publicly. But if you say "cut 10% by individuals" you are actually saying nothing because of the margins of error in the intelligence. The basic point is that we want to have detailed careful technical negotiations. Your position would be closer to ours than that of anyone else—if you took a position. We would like to see you mitigate your opposition without giving up your anti bloc-to-bloc approach. Your forces might not even be involved if the cuts turn out to be in the 10 to 15 percent area. But even if you don't associate yourself with MBFR you should not have reservations, because our whole purpose is to strengthen the alliance.

Schumann: This is very important. I must discuss it with Debré. You know, he is very anxious to improve relations with you. But he is afraid of any neutralization of a special area in Central Europe.

Sonnenfeldt: This could only happen if the reductions were drastic.

Kissinger: We should use the next four years to put our relations on a basis that cannot be shaken by a change in Administrations. The Soviets obviously want to create a mood of détente to undercut defense efforts, but we should find a solid basis for working together.

Schumann: You know I am not sure Debré is right about neutralization. That reminds me of Malraux who has always said that the Russians want to swallow Europe.

Kissinger: That is just what the Chinese say.

Schumann: Well, I am not so sure. The question is whether they want to have a secure Western Europe because of China or whether they want a neutralized Western Europe. The discussion of FBS in SALT may give some kind of a clue.

Kissinger: In that they have not tipped their hand yet. Brezhnev was not well prepared when I saw him. He did make some general

comment about air bases but I said maybe it would be better to count airplanes rather than bases. We would then count only 60 F-111's but not the bases. They said they would study this. In other words, we won't make a distinction between bases but between categories of weapons. But of course we would not talk about your weapons. Anyway, we'll be in touch. It really is intellectually difficult.

Morizet: About your press conference. What you said on US/European relations—what exactly did you have in mind?

Schumann: I was deeply impressed.

Kissinger: In the first term we created a lot of fluidity, but fluidity is not an end in itself. So we need to build on it. That was the reason I suggested a meeting between President Pompidou and President Nixon and President Pompidou was very sympathetic. I was very uninterested in economics originally. But now it is different. But we need a political context. The agreements of the Azores would not have been possible without involvement of the political level. Our trade negotiations with the Soviets are the same way. We need an overall context in which to settle economic problems. We are planning to create a little task force and then we want to exchange views with you.

Schumann: This is absolutely essential.

Kissinger: We want your ideas.

Schumann: Above all we must avoid a major clash on trade and economic questions.

Kissinger: That is right. It is essential to get started and last year we just managed to prevent it. If things like soy beans are discussed by themselves they present a great problem. The same is true of monetary matters. We need the political context. Now, we have to make a proposal at the IMF but it will not be conclusive.

Schumann: Let's be careful. We should not have a crisis before the election.

Morizet: I will see Shultz today after what you said in our telephone call yesterday.

Schumann: President Pompidou wants what we call a Christmas truce. We should not let a bone of contention on the table before the election.

Kissinger: We will not force any issue.

Schumann: Well, I had lunch with Pompidou and Giscard D'Estaing and that is what we concluded.

Kissinger: After the election we very much want to consult with you and have a special channel to do it.

Schumann: You can always come to see me privately in Paris.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Ambassador is right I'll come back more frequently. I would like to see you.

162. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting with President Pompidou

Attached is a report from General Walters² who met with President Pompidou to request the French to try to persuade the North Vietnamese to continue the negotiations. President Pompidou responded that he hoped peace would come and would do what he could to hasten it because he wanted peace and felt your reelection was indispensable. He was certain, however, that you would win the reelection easily with or without a Vietnamese agreement.

In a preliminary meeting, President Pompidou's assistant had noted that the French had already done a lot to move the recalcitrant Vietnamese and would again do what they could.

In the course of the conversation President Pompidou also made the following points of interest.

—He felt he would win his own election and by about the same margin with which you would win the U.S. election.³

—The Russians were having economic difficulties.

—He was concerned about rumors that U.S. agencies might be going to provoke a scandal about drugs in France involving political figures. General Walters reassured him on this point.

—He greatly regretted the departure of Ambassador Watson who was a good friend of France.⁴

In closing, President Pompidou asked that his warm personal greetings be conveyed to you and reaffirmed that he would do all he could to hasten peace.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 679, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. X. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "The President has seen."

² Not printed. Walters became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on May 2.

³ The President circled this point and annotated: "K—Be sure I wish him well." In a November 3 memorandum, Haig instructed Sonnenfeldt to ensure that the President's wishes were sent to Pompidou at the appropriate time. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 679, Country Files—Europe, France, Vol. X)

⁴ Watson left post on October 30. John Irwin presented his credentials on March 23, 1973.

163. National Security Study Memorandum 166¹

Washington, December 26, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Transportation
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

SUBJECT

Review of US-French Bilateral Issues

The President wishes to review all bilateral issues that are currently or may soon be the subject of discussions or negotiations with agencies of the French government. As appropriate, this review should include multinational negotiations in which France's role could be major (e.g. negotiations on international trade or on combatting terrorism).

Each addressee agency should prepare a succinct (three or four paragraphs) report of those issues within its jurisdiction which are currently under discussion with France or likely to be within the next six months. All issues should be covered except those that are the subject of NSDM's 103 and 104.² The status reports should include a very brief description of the issue, the US and French agencies primarily involved, the current status, prospects for agreement and obstacles thereto, and the possible interrelationship with other issues under discussion with France. Elements of present or potential controversy with the French should be brought out.

The agencies' reports should be submitted through the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe to be ready for Presi-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-195, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 166. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Information Agency and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

² Documents 153 and 154.

dential consideration *not later than January 10, 1973*.³ The Chairman, NSC–IG Europe will assure a uniform format and should submit, together with the agencies' reports, a short summary of the interrelationships among the issues discussed as well as any appropriate comment. Agencies other than the addressees who consider that there are matters concerning French-US relations that deserve Presidential consideration should arrange to contribute reports on them through the NSC–IG Europe.

The President has further directed that no agreements with France be initialed or otherwise concluded until he has completed his review pursuant to this memorandum.

Henry A. Kissinger

³ The IG completed its 60-page study on January 17, 1973. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-195, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 166) The Senior Review Group met on April 24 to discuss the report and called for supplemental papers (*ibid.*, Box H-113, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes (Originals) 1972–1973) which were received on May 14. (*Ibid.*, Box H-195, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 166) No further action was contemplated.

Ireland

164. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/40

New York, September 22, 1969, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Bilateral Talk with Minister for External Affairs Hillery—
Northern Ireland

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Yost
AsstSecy Hillenbrand
Mr. Thompson, SecDel

Irish

MinExtAff Hillery
SecExtAff McCann
Ambassador Cremin (UN)

The Secretary's meeting with the Irish Minister for External Affairs was carried on in a most relaxed atmosphere. Dr. Hillery made it clear that he had no burning issue to raise with the Secretary. After the Secretary said how sorry he had been to learn of the death of Ambassador Fay,² his good friend and golfing partner, Dr. Hillery began a low-key presentation on Northern Ireland. He said Ireland had a right to have some say about settling the unrest in Northern Ireland. The British have made it clear at the General Assembly that they feel the situation in North Ireland is an internal matter.

The Irish Government believes the problem cannot be solved by treating it simply as a domestic political problem; it is one tragic aspect of several hundred years of Irish history. There are obviously strong feelings involved. The earlier political solution for Northern Ireland has now broken down, Hillery claimed. The parties must search for a new solution which can prove to be acceptable in time . . . and only time will allow for such a new solution to be worked out.

Dr. Hillery observed that the Northern Ireland question had not yet been put on the agenda of the General Assembly. Even if his delega-

¹Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-72, CF 396. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson on October 1 and approved in S on October 2. This meeting took place at USUN.

²William Patrick Fay, Irish Ambassador to the United States from 1964 to 1969.

tion had managed to get the item listed, Hillery said he was not sure how far this would have advanced the Irish case.

The Secretary asked what advantage then the Minister saw in having brought the Northern Ireland question to the UN. Dr. Hillery answered that the Irish Government's aim had been to get the British to live up to the expectations of world opinion in a hearing before the world forum. He felt that his trip to the UN had had some "good effect" in this regard.

The Secretary asked Hillery what his future plans were. Dr. Hillery replied, "To keep trying to get the British to talk on this matter." He characterized the dilemma for the British as either letting the matter lie—and having trouble—or making a decision (on a new solution for Northern Ireland?)—and still having trouble.

The Secretary said that we did not wish to interfere in problems between our good friends. It would be presumptuous of us, with all our unsolved problems, to give advice to the parties to this conflict. There was no doubt, he assured Hillery, in the minds of the British that the United States hopes this problem will be dealt with. The Secretary told Hillery he should feel free to get in touch with Ambassador Moore in Dublin on any specific matters he might wish to raise with the U.S. Government.

Dr. Hillery said that the time may come when the Secretary could give "a little encouragement" to the British on working out a solution in Northern Ireland. He told the Secretary that he appreciated the hearing he had been given and remarked, "I have got all from you that I could have asked."

165. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 2, 1971.

SUBJECT

Irish Airlines: Termination of Landing Rights at New York

There has long been a serious imbalance in our civil air transport agreement with Ireland. Our airline service rights are limited to Shannon, whereas Irish Airlines flies to New York, Boston and Chicago. As of last year, our lines (PAA and TWA)² obtained only some 23% of the Ireland-US traffic. To correct this imbalance, we have been trying to get the Irish to grant us traffic rights to Dublin, and during the course of these twelve years of fruitless attempts, we have progressively softened the terms of our request. But, the Irish have been unmoved.

For the past couple of years, there has been general agreement in Washington that the only hope of bringing the Irish around would be to terminate Irish landing rights at New York, leaving intact their landing rights to Boston and Chicago. Such partial termination, subject to one year's notice is permissible under the terms of our bilateral air agreement. After Ambassador Moore's arrival in Dublin,³ another attempt was made to secure a favorable response from the Irish, but the Irish Cabinet earlier this year decided negatively.

From the viewpoint of our international aviation interests, there seems to be common agreement that we should proceed as soon as feasible to assert equity under the bilateral agreement. This would demonstrate our resolve to obtain for US carriers a fair and equal opportunity to compete, and to take action where US carrier operations are restricted in violation of the principle of reciprocity. Moreover, our action would come at a time when the US carriers are going through a very difficult financial period. The Secretary of Transportation, the CAB and industry representatives strongly support such action to rectify the situation.

Ambassador Moore recommends against giving notice of intention to terminate the Irish Airlines service to New York. He continues to believe that the Irish can be persuaded through negotiation, and has recommended another diplomatic approach. He acknowledges, how-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation reads: "The President has seen."

² Pan American Airlines and Trans World Airways.

³ Ambassador John D.J. Moore presented his credentials on June 23, 1969.

ever, that if the decision is made to terminate, now is as good or as bad a time as any. Secretary Rogers considers that simply another diplomatic approach would not be successful. He recommends that State be authorized to give notice, after consultations with Congress, to the Irish Government of the termination of Irish Airline rights at New York, effective one year after delivery of the notice (Tab A).⁴

The serving of a termination notice on the Irish Government will obviously not serve to maintain the warmth in our general bilateral relations (though the Dublin tourist industry would favor it). Nevertheless, given the serious aviation service imbalance which harms our industry and the long history of our genuine attempts to negotiation of this issue, the time has probably arrived to bite the bullet. I suspect, however, that once the Irish know that we definitely will terminate within a year, they will be more willing to negotiate, and the actual termination may never take place.

Peter Flanigan concurs in this memorandum.

Recommendation

That you authorize the notification to the Irish Government that Irish landing rights in New York will be terminated effective one year subsequent.⁵

That State be instructed that the notification should not be delivered until after (a) consultations with the Congress indicate no serious objection to this course, and (b) that Irish Prime Minister Lynch be advised privately in advance of our intended action, and that (c) our notice of termination be coupled with an indication of willingness to negotiate.⁶

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ The President wrote "No" on the Disapprove line.

⁶ The President wrote "Yes" on the Approve line. Instructions implementing his decisions were sent to the Department of State in a January 12 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland)

166. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Visit of Prime Minister John Lynch

You will see the Prime Minister three times during his "private and unofficial" visit: at the formal arrival ceremony and private meeting on Tuesday, March 16; at the Irish Evening that night; and at 12:15 on the 17th when he presents you with shamrock.² This will also be the third time in six months you have seen him, including your visit in Ireland and his attendance at your United Nations dinner.³

Your Purposes:

- to continue the comfortable and warm personal relationship;
- to demonstrate your interest in Irish views and concerns.

The Prime Minister's Purposes:

- to exchange views on the broad international scene;
- to review the situation in Northern Ireland;
- to discuss the progress of Ireland's negotiations with the Common Market.

Setting:

The Prime Minister won a smashing victory at his party's annual convention in February. His party, the Fianna Fail, emphatically affirmed his moderation policy with respect to the North, and Lynch has now gained clear control of his political base. He is in a much stronger position domestically than he was in six months ago.

On the other hand, Lynch faces continued difficulties over the situation in Northern Ireland, as well as serious inflation stimulated by high wages, and a growing balance of payments deficit.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 920, VIP Visits, Ireland PM Lynch Visit. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: "The President has seen." The tabs are not printed.

² No record of the Nixon-Lynch conversations was found. For text of the President's welcoming remarks for Lynch and his St. Patrick's Day statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 433–435.

³ The President visited Ireland October 3–5, 1970, in the course of his European trip. For the text of his and Lynch's public remarks, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 802–803, 810–818. On July 10, 1970, he hosted a dinner marking the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. For the text of his statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 589–592.

Topics for Discussion

Lynch will wish to discuss the situation in *Northern Ireland*. He has spoken recently of extending an olive branch to the North, of amending Ireland's laws concerning the Catholic Church's special position, and of greater economic cooperation. The Prime Minister fully understands that we are unable to become involved in this problem. *You may wish to:*

—express your appreciation for his policies of moderation and conciliation;

—seek his assessment of the prospects for a resolution of the immediate and longer term problems.

Because of Irish dependence on unfettered trade with the UK, Ireland must enter the *Common Market* whenever Britain does. The Irish negotiations with the Market are progressing without major snags. *You may wish to:*⁴

—reiterate your support for Irish (and UK) entry, noting that the US is prepared to accept the short term economic difficulties this may cause us;

—invite Lynch to comment on the progress and prospects for entry.

In connection with *bilateral trade issues*, Lynch may express concern over US restraints on agricultural products and textiles, as well as what the Irish feel are constraints on US investment.

You may wish to

—emphasize your commitment to a liberal trade policy and candidly review the problems in agriculture and textiles.

There is one issue which Secretary Rogers recommends that you *not* raise, but that Lynch conceivably might. This relates to civil aviation landing rights.⁵ Because of the serious harm to our airlines from Ireland's long-standing unwillingness to grant us *landing rights in Dublin*, you decided last January to authorize the suspension of Irish landing rights in New York.⁶ You expressly decided that the Irish not be formally notified until Congressional consultations were completed, and until Lynch was advised privately in advance.

Since Congressional consultations are not yet completely concluded, it would be premature for you to raise this possibility with Lynch (Ambassador Moore feels quite strongly that you should not discuss this). Secretary Rogers plans to explain to Lynch the pressures

⁴ The President highlighted this paragraph in the margin.

⁵ The President underlined the phrase "relates to civil aviation landing rights."

⁶ See Document 165.

on the Administration over the landing rights problem. If the Prime Minister raises the issue, *you may wish to*

- explain the serious economic situation of our airlines and the pressures put on you to cancel Irish rights;

- note that you hope the landing rights problem could be settled through negotiation.

Additional talking points on the Lynch visit are at Tab A. Biographic sketches are at Tab B. The schedule for the visit and the members of the official party are attached to the inside cover of your briefing book.

There will be a photo opportunity at the beginning of your private meeting.

167. Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Flanigan) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

Determination of Bilateral Agreement with Ireland and Notification of Termination of Aer Lingus (Irish Airlines) Landing Rights in New York

On May 3, I submitted a memorandum to you (attached at Tab I), recommending that you authorize, after private notification of Prime Minister Lynch and an offer to negotiate, the delivery of a notice of termination of Aer Lingus' landing rights at New York effective one year later.

You directed that Ambassador Moore be given two months in which to attempt to negotiate a solution, after which time the matter would be reconsidered (attached at Tab II).

In the interim, Ambassador Moore has been negotiating in Dublin with no success. He has recently reported that in his opinion the Irish will not at this time grant a U.S. flag carrier landing rights in Dublin. Ambassador Moore says that if we insist on formal bilateral talks the Irish must sit and listen, but he does not believe the talks will be suc-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. No classification marking. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "The President has seen." The tabs are not printed.

cessful. While Moore takes no position on whether or not to proceed with termination, he points out that it would have a very harmful effect on relations between the U.S. and Ireland, and that it is imperative to go through the steps of requesting and holding formal negotiations before delivery of notice of termination. Based on the history of these discussions, the State Department does *not* agree that negotiations should precede delivery of notification unless there is some assurance that these negotiations will be fruitful. John Mulcahy,² after talking with members of the Irish government, feels that we have “bent over backwards,” that the Irish government has “acted unfairly” in this matter, and that we should proceed now with notice of termination.

Recommendation

As previously recommended, that you authorize, after private notification of Prime Minister Lynch, the delivery of a notice of termination of Aer Lingus’ landing rights at New York, effective one year later. The Department of State and Messrs. Kissinger and Peterson concur in this recommendation.

Approve³

Disapprove

See Me

² Not further identified.

³ The President initialed this option. Notification of this decision and instructions for its implementation were provided to the Department of State in a July 10 memorandum from Haig. (Ibid.) The notice of termination was delivered on August 18.

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ireland¹

Washington, August 21, 1971, 0055Z.

153852. Subject: Irish Request for US Representation to UK. Ref: State 149588.²

1. Irish Ambassador Warnock called August 20 on instructions and delivered to Acting Assistant Secretary Fessenden copies of Lynch/Heath telegraphic exchange of August 19 and Lynch's statement of August 20 in reply to Heath.³ He then asked about his request of August 13 (reftel).

2. Fessenden replied that we feel deep humanitarian concern over the human suffering in Northern Ireland, that the request of the Irish Government had been considered at high level, but we do not consider that constructive end would be served by any approach we could make to the British.

3. Irish Ambassador replied that he recognized problem but mentioned several times that "even an expression of humanitarian concern would be useful." Fessenden replied that non-intervention was a cardinal point in American policy, and that although he realized intervention was not being requested, it is still difficult for us to see how any step we might take with British would really help situation.

4. Irish Ambassador ended discussion by stating that he expected he would be coming in often to keep us apprised of NI situation during crisis.⁴ He also mentioned that Counselor O'Heideain⁵ would be attending meeting on Northern Ireland situation called by Mayor Daley in Chicago for August 24.

Johnson

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 UK. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Robert DuBose (EUR/BMI), cleared by Scott George (EUR/BMI), and approved by Fessenden. Repeated to London and Belfast.

² Dated August 13. It summarized Lynch's August 12 statement on Northern Ireland. (Ibid.) Lynch called for the restructuring of the Northern Irish Government and spoke against the use of violence as a means to effect political change.

³ On August 16, Heath had stated that he would not recall Parliament to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland. On August 19, Lynch telegraphed Heath, informing him that he would support acts of passive resistance by Catholics unless Britain abandoned the use of "military solutions" to solve the Northern Ireland problem. Heath's reply characterized Lynch's message as "unacceptable in its attempt to intervene in the affairs of the United Kingdom." ("Heath Rejects Wilson Move," *New York Times*, August 17, 1971, p. 7; Anthony Lewis, "Wilson Asks Commons Debate on Ulster," *New York Times*, August 21, 1971, p. 3)

⁴ See Document 346.

⁵ Sean O'Heideain.

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Ireland to the Department of State¹

Dublin, October 15, 1971, 1640Z.

1122. For Secretary from Chargé. Ref: State 189035.²

1. Message contained reftel delivered to PM Lynch this morning, Oct 15, at 10:30 a.m.

2. In setting up appointment with the PM, I had already indicated to his aides the subject I wished to discuss (they had asked if it were landing rights). Upon receiving me the PM said he would have expected this was a matter that would normally be taken up with the Dept of FonAff. I agreed that this would normally be the case, but explained that I was under instructions personally to express the personal views of the President.

3. After reading text and making oral statement contained para 2 reftel, I said we understood there would be a Cabinet meeting this morning at which this matter would be discussed and that this was the reason for my urgent representations on such short notice. (I had already learned that a govt meeting had been scheduled for 11:00 a.m.—30 minutes from the time of my meeting with the PM.)

4. The PM confirmed that there was to be a meeting of the govt. He said however that FonMin Hillery was in Brussels, and that it was therefore very unlikely the Chirep issue would come up for discussion. He said there would be no fixed agenda, that they had not planned to discuss Chirep, although, in view of my representations, the question might be briefly reviewed. He said, however, that no substantive discussion and certainly no decisions would be made on this question in the absence of Dr. Hillery.

5. The PM made no commitment or substantive comment on my representations.

6. The PM said that when he learned this morning that I wished to see him on an urgent basis, he had first assumed that it was with regard to the question of Dublin landing rights. He said there was one aspect of USG's attitude on the question of Chinese representation that was also applicable to the question of landing rights, and that this was expressed in our statement about our concern "to preserve the interests of the weak against the demands of the strong." (Para 2 of aide-mémoire).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Dated October 15. It instructed Sorenson to seek an immediate meeting with the Prime Minister in order to present an oral message seeking Irish support on the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations. (Ibid.)

7. I replied that matter of Chinese representation and the question of Dublin landing rights were two separate issues, although I could fully understand the PM's concern with the latter question.

8. The PM returned to the question, noting that the matter of Dublin landing rights was going to be discussed in Nov. He said he hoped that during these talks we would continue to show concern for the interests of the weak against the demands of the strong, repeating himself on this point.

9. I expressed appreciation to the PM for seeing me on such short notice and the interview concluded.

10. *Comment:* I learned later this morning from FonSec Hugh McCann that Dr. Hillery will be in Brussels until early next week, which means it is almost certain that no decision on Chirep will be made at least until he returns. With regard to the PM's statement about preserving the interests of the weak against the demands of the strong, I reacted as if this were merely to score on an issue between our two countries that is of great sensitivity to the GOI. I believe, however, that by twice pointedly linking the landing rights question to our representations on Chirep, the PM may have been laying the basis for suggestion later that quid pro quo would be in order should the GOI now make concessions to the USG position.³

Sorenson

³ In telegram 193846 to Dublin, October 22, the Department of State commented: "We believe that we could activate the latent incentive to vote with us by a sympathetic response to the PM's comments about the consultations on landing rights." (Ibid.) In an October 28 memorandum to Flanigan, Haig wrote: "Ireland voted against us on the Important Question Resolution and the Albanian Resolution. They have, therefore, deliberately chosen to forego in the air route consultations any advantage that might have been gained from supporting us on the Chirep issue." (Ibid.)

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ireland¹

Washington, November 30, 1971, 1735Z.

215954. Subject: Landing Rights.

Embassy should deliver following message from President to Prime Minister on landing rights:

Quote Dear Mr. Prime Minister: You have my thanks for your letter of November 19 concerning the positions of our two governments on the question of landing rights at Dublin and New York.² I am especially grateful that you were so forthright in outlining your concerns in this matter, and you may be sure that we have given close consideration to the points you have made regarding the effects of the landing rights situation upon Ireland.

The United States has no intention of imperiling the financial position of the Irish airline or injuring the economy of Ireland. Irish Airlines has competed successfully against our airlines in the past and we do not believe that entry of our airlines into Dublin would prejudice the decided competitive advantage of the Irish airline. In regard to Shannon, I have very seriously considered the fears and hopes of the people of that area described in your letter. In order to reassure you that we have no intention of harming Shannon, I am instructing the US delegation to the consultations in this matter to agree that U.S. airlines enroute to Dublin would stop at Shannon provided that other transatlantic airlines do so as well. Inauguration of service to Dublin by three U.S. airlines in this manner would therefore help, rather than hurt, the Irish economy, as these services would clearly create new jobs and new demands for other goods and services in Dublin.

My principal concern in this matter is to rectify an imbalance which is very much to the disadvantage of the U.S. airlines, thus achieving greater equity for all concerned. I cannot disregard the fact that Irish airlines' revenues in the U.S.-Ireland market are more than three times larger than the combined revenues of the U.S. airlines involved. Moreover, U.S. airlines are facing very serious financial problems. They have, for instance, in the past year, furloughed several

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Limited Official Use; Flash. Drafted by Robert DuBose (EUR/BMI) and Ross C. Parr (E/OA/AN); cleared by Bertram Rein (E) in substance; cleared by Haig, Springsteen, Scott George (EUR/BMI), and Miller (S/S); and approved by Robert H. Miller (S/S).

² In his letter of November 19, Lynch claimed that concessions on landing rights would result in damage to Irish development and to its "small national airline." (Ibid., Box 756, Presidential Correspondence, Ireland P.M. Lynch)

thousand employees in the United States; such unemployment is a fact of national concern, and one which is much on my mind.

Please do not feel that I have been insensitive to the interests and needs of your government. As you know from Ambassador Moore's many conversations with you and officials of your government, we have tried for a long time to persuade your government to take some action to bring our aviation agreement into balance, and we have from time to time discussed the possibility of certain concessions on our side, but unfortunately we have had no success. It became apparent that if agreement in balance were ever to be reached, action would have to be taken by our side. Having taken such action and thus having brought the agreement closer toward balance by our partial termination notice, we hope that it will now be possible, starting from a de novo basis, to find mutually acceptable solutions in the consultations now in process.

The solution we seek is, in my view, fair and reasonable for both sides. I hope you will join me in seeking to prevent this problem from impairing in any way the friendship between our countries on which I personally, and the American people in general, place great value. In closing let me say again that I am grateful to you for writing to me directly. Sincerely. End quote.

White House does not plan to release letter but has no objection if Irish wish to make it public.

Rogers

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ireland¹

Washington, February 4, 1972, 0050Z.

20314. Subj: Hillery Call on Secretary.

1. During 45-minute call on Secretary February 3 FonMin Hillery set forth GOI view of Northern Ireland situation in familiar terms. He said HMG seems firmly wedded to ever more disastrous military policy in NI, which growing into war on Irish people, and HMG will no longer even listen to GOI requests abandon present course and strive

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Scott George (EUR/BMI) on February 3, cleared by Hillenbrand and Miller (S/S), and approved by Rogers. Repeated to USUN and all NATO capitals.

for political solution. In these circumstances, GOI hopes that USG as friend of Britain will make quiet approach urging HMG shift policy. Specifically, GOI would like HMG to stop internment and withdraw troops from Catholic areas in North. Hillery said if these two actions taken GOI could guarantee violence will cease and would then be possible work out new political settlement. He said that if present course kept up war of peoples will broaden, and GOI can and will summon up necessary force meet situation and make HMG listen.

2. On question of GOI–HMG talks, Hillery said there have been no genuine discussions, that HMG has used talks with Lynch to advance own ends, that each Heath–Lynch meeting has been followed shortly by stepped-up repressive measures. When Secretary asked whether GOI still interested in talking to HMG, Hillery said yes, but only if talks are meaningful, no point in talking if HMG continues insist on military solution.

3. Secretary emphasized very deep concern of President and American people over tragic situation in NI, said he had spoken to President about it at length today,² and that US desire see end of violence and peaceful solution very strong. However, he said that USG in no position judge, condemn, advocate any particular solution, or intervene in this tragic and complex situation. As good friend of both Ireland and UK, we encourage both to talk and to work out solution to problem. We are prepared consider playing any useful role both sides might wish us play to this end, but USG position can only be that of doing our best to encourage two good friends to solve the problem. He added that he had said same thing to British Ambassador yesterday.³ There was further discussion about conditions for talks, difficulty of deciding meaning of phrase QTE meaningful talks, UNQTE etc., and Secretary said that in situation this kind, what is needed is something damp down passions; if sides could only get into talking without worrying too much about pre-conditions or trying foresee exact outcome, there is hope for progress.

4. Hillery said he understands limitations on USG action but GOI not asking us do anything public or take any action or posture hostile to British. His position throughout discussion was that British simply misguided, stubbornly sticking on wrong course, and perhaps quiet word from friends like USG will help cause them alter policy. Secretary made clear several times that we perceive no useful role for US play

² No record of this conversation was found. The President's Daily Diary indicates he talked with Rogers between 9:52 and 9:55 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

³ The meeting was reported in telegram 21093 to London, February 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 UK)

other than that of urging those concerned get together and work out problem.

5. On specific points of interest, Hillery said planned demonstration next Sunday at Newry most immediate serious problem. When Secretary asked whether GOI permitted such protest-demonstrations, Hillery said matter out of their hands, as was burning of British Embassy,⁴ that there was no way for GOI prevent latter. Re HMG attitude, Hillery characterized as QTE old-fashioned, UNQTE said friends might be able tactfully point this out. In response to question about QTE meaningful talks UNQTE GOI has in mind, Hillery said would have to involve people in North, and that if British continue insist on military solution, Irish will beg, borrow, or somehow build up military force sufficient counter British. Secretary said we are certainly not going to convey this sort of thing to British, but we would be glad tell British GOI would like talk, thinks that if escalation of violence continues whole situation bound get worse, and would like try work out solution. Hillery merely said that he understands our problem, is not urging action hostile to British.

5. At conclusion meeting there was brief discussion press handling. Secretary recapitulated our position, said he would appreciate Hillery's setting it out along lines indicated, and that he also hoped Hillery would not use occasion Washington visit to express views strongly critical of UK. Without making direct commitment Hillery said he had done all he could along this line in public before seeing Secretary.

Rogers

⁴ On January 31, "Bloody Sunday," British troops opened fire under disputed circumstances on a mass demonstration of Catholics in Londonderry, killing 13. On February 2, a mob in Dublin burned the British Embassy in retaliation. A protest march in Newry was announced on February 4. Prime Minister Heath called on Catholic leaders to call off their protest. The Catholics refused and on February 7 approximately 20,000 Catholics carried out a peaceful protest march in defiance of British orders.

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Ireland to the Department of State¹

Dublin, March 16, 1972, 1745Z.

333. Subj: Talks with IRA. Ref: Dublin 0313.²

Summary: During visit to Dublin March 12/13, Labor leader Harold Wilson had long meeting with Army Council of Provisional IRA and found wide areas of agreement on permanent solution to Ireland problem. (Info is sensitive). Although Provos are themselves split, majority of Army Council supports relatively soft negotiating position advanced when Provos declared three-day truce (reftel). Wilson believes that IRA position must be taken into account but that IRA itself should not be represented in negotiations except thru elected politicians. Provos may be willing go along with this. New areas of agreement between British Labor, IRA, and GOI are evident to public (though background is not). After so much violence, political movement is encouraging, but it has certainly raised hopes of all Irish nationalists. It is even more difficult now to imagine successful solution that does not open door to long-term movement toward Irish unity.

1. Following info given to us by Irish Labor Deputy John O'Connell's staff asst, who helped arrange all talks and sat in on them. Important protect source and others involved in IRA meeting. No US source should discuss fact that meeting held. We believe info as given us is accurate as to facts, but interpretations might, of course, be different from other angles. There may well be inputs and angles of which we are not aware.

2. As we know from source in British Emb (reftel), IRA Provisionals have been trying to reach HMG in many ways, but have not been encouraged. On about March 7, Provos told O'Connell of problem and said they had in mind declaring brief truce as demonstration of good faith and capacity to fulfill any agreement made. O'Connell urged them do so and reviewed with them their conditions for extending truce. At first he found conditions much too hard. Provos were eventually persuaded set forth three points that represented sharp departure from their past inflexible position. New points were within negotiating range of PM Lynch's proposals and Wilson's 15-point program of last Nov.³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 UK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London and Belfast.

² Not found.

³ Lynch proposed a 3-point plan for peace in Northern Ireland on February 19. ("Lynch Proposes a 3-Point Plan For Peace in Northern Ireland," *New York Times*, Feb-

3. O'Connell flew to London March 9, had long luncheon meeting with Wilson and his Shadow Sec of Home Affairs, and then met most of Labor Shadow Cabinet. Wilson was impressed by IRA truce and relatively moderate conditions for prolonging it. Wilson was, however, pessimistic about early political initiative from Heath govt. He said PM Heath, though not deeply informed on Irish problem, understood its seriousness, wished to settle it, and understood that radical political initiative would be necessary to do so. Heath's Cabinet and backbenchers were, however, so seriously split that any really forthcoming initiative could endanger survival of govt. Problem growing daily more difficult as unionist resistance given time to build in response to HMG's trial balloons. Wilson was willing work with Heath on solving problem, but, if Heath fails cope, Wilson believes he could be the British PM who finally solves the Irish problem. In either case, Wilson understood that Provos' new attitude presented an opportunity which could not be lost. He said that he wanted to come to Dublin Monday, March 13, and needed a good excuse for it. O'Connell called Irish TV and, of course, found director delighted give Wilson prime time for TV interview. Other Wilson activities in Dublin also fell easily into place, as one would expect.

4. In Dublin, Wilson's TV performance was exceptionally effective in Irish terms, though it has drawn heavy criticism from Northern PM Faulkner. Wilson also had good meetings with PM Lynch and leaders of main opposition parties, as press has reported. Press has not reported that Wilson had three-hour meeting with five top Provos in O'Connell's house. We believe Lynch knows this and fact is likely leak eventually, but it must not come from American source.

5. Wilson and Provos' political leadership reached wide area of agreement. We do not know details, but much overlapping is apparent in Provos' conditions stated reftel and Wilson's points on TV interview (Dublin 325).⁴ (Positions of both Wilson and Provos are also in negotiating range of those urged by PM Lynch at Fianna Fail Convention, as see Dublin 237.⁵) Provos believed IRA must be represented in negotiations as obviously important force and Wilson accepted this, as Americans have accepted negotiations with Viet Cong. Wilson believes, at same time, that it will be easier achieve negotiations between elected representatives of people. Provos plan overcome this problem by running their men under Nationalist Party label in next NI election. In

ruary 20, 1972, p. 14) On November 25, 1971, Wilson presented a plan in the House of Commons for a united Ireland. ("Wilson Resists Party Pressure, Backs Conservatives on Ulster," *New York Times*, November 26, 1971, p. 19)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not found.

meantime, if necessary, they could be represented by someone like Northern MP McManus.

6. Source indicated that most of top Provisional “Army Council” was present at meeting, but was not specific on this point. In another context, however, he gave us following five names as members of Army Council, with comment on each:

A) Ruairi O Bradaigh, Sinn Fein President. Politically sensitive. Favors Provos’ new soft position.

B) Daithi O Conoill (David O’Connell). Same comment.

C) Patrick Ryan. Same comment.

D) Joe Cahill. Basically military rather than political strategist, but quite reasonable.

E) Sean MacStiofain (John Stephenson). Mentally unstable and fanatically anti-British despite fact that his father was English. Does not [know?] any tactic except brute force.

7. O’Connell believes that IRA truce was not rpt not motivated by any weakness, although Provisionals have undoubtedly sustained many losses. They could probably make life in NI intolerable as long as Catholic minority continues support them. O’Connell also believes Catholic support will continue as long as British attempt deal with political problem by military measures.

8. By way of comparison, following is comment on Wilson’s Dublin trip by GOI source. Trip was highly political, aimed at keeping Wilson in center stage as only British politician able cope with Irish problem. Most of his points in TV interview were similar to those he proposed in Nov, though there were some useful variations. (*Emb note*: Lynch may well feel that he has been outflanked or at least upstaged in his own backyard, and he has.) All current positions are undoubtedly pre-negotiating postures, and hence a bit strong. On issues, Lynch, Wilson, and Provos are not far apart, and NI opposition (Catholics) are also close. Unionist positions, however, are hardening by the hour, and it is easy understand PM Heath’s concern.

9. *Comment*: Believe above is important political development in Irish problem. After months of human violence and political paralysis, such movement is inevitably welcome, but we note two aspects of concern:

A) British Govt is much the most important element in problem, and it has not yet been able announce political initiative.

B) Expectations of Irish Nationalists, north and south, have been raised by conspicuously wide area of agreement between British Labor, Dublin, and IRA. This makes it even more unlikely that long-range so-

lution will work if it does not open door to some approximation of Irish unity.⁶

Moore

⁶ In telegram 2440 from London, March 17, the Embassy commented on the impact on British politics of the Wilson visit to Dublin and its implications when, as seemed likely in the Embassy's view, news of Wilson's meeting with the IRA became public. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-10 UK)

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Ireland to the Department of State¹

Dublin, June 15, 1972, 1835Z.

657. Subj: Civair: Landing Rights.

1. Following up landing rights discussions which FonMin Dr. Hillery and PermSec McCann had with Ambassador Moore immediately prior to Ambassador's departure for U.S. June 7, in which they asked us to postpone our August deadline until sometime next year when the political, Northern Ireland, and economic situations here would hopefully look better, McCann further reviewed matter with Chargé in two separate meetings June 8 and 9. We will not here recount McCann's review of this issue nor our defense of the U.S. position since this ground has been gone over innumerable times.

2. In short McCann said that it was unthinkable that we would force his government to capitulate abjectly to all our demands. Chargé suggested that this was precisely why the GOI should negotiate—to see whether some compromise could not be reached. McCann replied that GOI feared to negotiate because once at the table they might still find our demands more than they could accept. He referred to the decline in tourism and Aer Lingus' precarious position and said for these and for political reasons they could not afford a failure in the negotiations. The consequences of either being forced to give too much on the one hand or having the negotiations fail on the other hand had, he said, immobilized the government and brought about the present impasse.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Secret; Immediate; Niact; Exdis. Sent to the White House for Peter Flanigan and Clift, to EUR for Springsteen and Scott George, and to the Economic Bureau for Rein and Meadows.

3. In the interest of finding a way out of the present situation, McCann asked whether, if he could galvanize his own political masters to settle on the basis of a package that would give us essentially what we wanted, we could determine whether the political will to accept such a package existed in Washington so that the outcome of another round of negotiations could be confidentially but absolutely guaranteed to the GOI. If this could be done, the government might be moved from its present frozen position. The Chargé said that the Embassy would, of course, relay to Washington any proposals that the GOI might wish to make. McCann countered that this was not going to be a proposal, but a maximum package resulting from soundings he would take that would guarantee to the Embassy that the GOI would settle on a certain basis if the Embassy could guarantee 100 percent that Washington would also agree. The negotiators could then be brought together to put this agreement in writing.

4. Chargé agreed that we would consider a package but stressed that the success of this initiative would probably depend upon how forthcoming the Irish could be. McCann said he understood this, that he would come back with a maximum package since, if his effort did not succeed, he “frankly did not know where or how this thing would end up.” Mindful of earlier discussions, Chargé emphasized the importance to US of onward rights. McCann said he had already looked at this very carefully, that he would, of course, take new soundings but that the word he got was that Aer Lingus considered this concession would be ruinous and would not accept it.

5. Foregoing discussions took place June 8 and 9. During remainder of that week and up until Wednesday, June 14, McCann told us he canvassed all those in the Irish Cabinet who would ultimately be responsible for a decision. Discussions were very secret, however, and did not extend beyond minimum number of participants in order to minimize risk of any leaks that would bring renewed charges from the political opposition and from the Shannon area of a “secret deal” and a “sellout.” On June 14 McCann called Chargé to FonOffice and gave him a paper on which was written the maximum “deal” that McCann said he was able to get. Following are the contents of this paper:

- 1) One US carrier into Dublin via Shannon each way;
- 2) No onward rights from Dublin;
- 3) Compulsory stop at Shannon each way, it being understood that other transatlantic airlines enroute to Dublin do so as well;
- 4) Irish rights to New York to be continued after August;
- 5) The Irish airline to be permitted to operate via New York and via Boston to Chicago; and
- 6) Starting date for access to Dublin for US airline to be April 1973.

6. In communicating foregoing to the Chargé, McCann emphasized a second time that this was not an "offer" but a maximum package resulting from his soundings. He wanted to know if we could ascertain whether the landing rights issue could be settled on this basis and, if so, give him an "assurance" that another round of formal negotiations would arrive at this solution. If we could do this, he said we were in business; if not, he had done all he could to achieve a political solution and would simply "retire" from the problem to let others try to find a way out. He also stressed the absolute need on our side to keep this initiative secret, that if word of it leaked and the Shannon people and the political opposition learned of what he was trying to do, the government would be forced to back away once again and we would all be back to square one.

7. In seeking clarification of some of the six points in McCann's package, Chargé determined that the right to operate via New York and via Boston to Chicago does not include the right to carry passengers between these points within the United States. McCann insisted that change in Chicago rights, while enabling Aer Lingus to achieve more efficient utilization of its equipment, would in no way diminish the competitive position of the American carriers. It was an essential quid pro quo, he said, which would enable the GOI to save face, while, at the same time, costing us nothing. (We note that PanAm no longer serves Chicago.) He insisted that he had tried once again for onward rights, but that this had been impossible to get. He opined that anything more that we might be looking for was really of marginal economic value and was not worth the damage to our relations which would result if a "reasonable" breakthrough cannot be achieved.

8. We believe McCann is sincere in trying to find way out of what he regards as an impossible situation for the Irish Government. McCann has emphasized that, whatever our response, if positive we must be able to give him a 100 percent assurance so that he can neutralize fears within the Cabinet of a possible failure in another round of negotiations.

Action Requested: Department requested ascertain whether USG can accept or must reject McCann's package as a basis for settling landing rights question and, if so, whether Embassy can convey assurances requested.

Sorenson

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Ireland to the Department of State¹

Dublin, July 7, 1972, 1753Z.

740. Subj: Civair—Landing Rights. Ref: State 119421.²

1. On July 4 Ambassador and DCM met with FonMin Hillery and PermSec McCann to whom PM Lynch has delegated current responsibility for GOI efforts to settle landing rights question.

2. We conveyed contents of Deptel 119421 and pressed GOI to come now to grips with this issue on the basis that we will require some onward rights and will not grant what they call “political optics” such as right to put their Chicago flight through New York/Boston.

3. They pointed out in bitter terms that USG present demands now exceed levels we offered to accept in previous unsuccessful landing rights negotiations, and characterized present USG position as “punitive” and “vindictive” and totally unacceptable to GOI and Irish public. We pressed hard on the need for GOI to formulate some kind of position allowing us onward rights that could form at least the basis for a discussions.

4. Hillery reviewed again the political pressures on the GOI at this critical time and said that GOI had had to bite the bullet hard to make offer of Dublin landing rights conveyed to Dept by Ambassador in January and again to Peter Flanigan and Mr. Katz on June 27 (see Dublin 0657).³ Hillery said they were now willing to incur the hostility of Shannon area politicians, labor unions, clergy, etc. by granting Dublin rights but that conceding onward rights as well would also trigger revolt in Dublin area on part of airline lobby and the large and muscular Dublin labor unions concerned. This, he opined, would be an unacceptable political price which the government would reject.

5. Nevertheless he said he would consult Cabinet and sound out the airline management and union leaders.

6. July 5 we were summoned to FonOff and informed by McCann that Cabinet and airline management had been consulted and simply

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Paris for Governor Ronald Reagan. Sent to the White House for Peter Flanigan, NSC, and U.S. Secret Service; to EUR for Springsteen and Scott George; and to the Economic Bureau for Armstrong, Rein, and Meadows.

² Dated July 1. It informed the Embassy that while the United States could not accept the package offered by McCann, it could accommodate the Irish on some areas of concern and was ready to use the offer as “a basis for negotiation” subject to modifications. (Ibid.)

³ Dated June 15. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 4 IRE-US)

refused to consider granting any onward flights on substantive ground that this concession to American carriers would create a "hemorrhage" that would destroy Irish carrier. Words like "rape", "vindictive" and "unfriendly" were quoted. McCann informed us confidentially that airline financial results to be published "later this month" would show loss of six million dollars on their transatlantic service. He said USG present position makes it appear we are prepared to destroy airline at time of tourist crisis in Ireland and political crisis in North.

7. Re our willingness to make public assurances that we would be prepared to consider remedial measures should the Irish carrier suffer losses, McCann bitterly repeated that they were already suffering severe losses and that GOI attitude was that they would not accept a situation which would worsen their situation and make their survival from year to year dependent on our sufferance. He said that it was unbecoming to the relationship between our two countries that we should wish to force them into a dependent position and queried what they could expect in actual help. He added our language gave GOI no idea of what was specifically meant. He repeated that, having now offered us what we essentially had been seeking prior to our terminating the bi-lateral, what we were now demanding in the way of onward rights was a substantial escalation of our earlier demands and our action appeared unfriendly and vindictive. He said in summary that the Irish would not accept our demands.

8. In discussing with McCann what will happen next, he appeared genuinely puzzled himself, saying he simply didn't know. He reminded us again that the Irish are capable of acting in what we would perhaps consider to be an irrational, even masochistic, way. He said that, as matters now stand between USG and GOI, it appears that "the tragedy will simply have to unfold." He, for his part, now proposes to exit from the stage and is leaving for three weeks vacation.

9. In trying to divine what considerations underlie Irish thinking, we believe that the following are paramount:

A) Political: With the expulsion June 26 of Neil Blaney from the government party, its control of the Dail became tenuous indeed—exactly 72 out of 144 Deputies with a by-election coming up in a Cork constituency formerly held by a government Deputy. In addition, the government expects to name a commissioner to the EEC within the next few months (probably Dr. Hillery himself), which will mean a second by-election—this one in County Clare, home of the "Shannon Lobby." Hillery's strong views on the unacceptability to the government of paying our full price for settling the landing rights issue therefore appear to be based on local political realities. So do McCann's views on the bitterness that will result from our pressing the issue—at least so long as the present party remains in power.

B) Economic: We are told that Irish Airlines has convinced GOI that any onward rights beyond Dublin would result in a diversion of traffic that would ultimately make their transatlantic service uneconomic. They are already in financial difficulty, and it appears they would rather meet the issue head-on in which case the blame for their financial difficulties could be firmly fixed on the USG rather than accede to an agreement that they believe would see their situation slowly wane.

C) Tactical: Although we have warned otherwise, the Irish probably feel that they can't be much worse off, even if they change their minds and come around at the last minute, so that, taking everything else into account, they have simply decided to hold out and force USG to strongarm GOI. It may be that they feel there is not yet sufficient public pressure on them to settle. When we asked about this, however, McCann pointed out that the concomitant to the public pressure we're talking about is what he had always thought would be an unacceptable deterioration of our bilateral relations.

10. For Governor Reagan:⁴ Understand you are fully briefed on landing rights issue. Since it is quite probable that you will be pressed on this question during your Irish visit, this cable is to keep you au courant.

Moore

⁴ Reagan visited Denmark, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Ireland July 2–21. Documentation on the trip is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 830, Name Files, Gov. Reagan. Reagan made reference to the trip in *An American Life*, pp. 187–188.

175. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant (Flanigan) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, August 10, 1972.

RE

Irish Airways Landing Rights in New York

Attached is a copy of the options paper to the President² regarding Irish Airways, which he has had since the end of last week. I have called Haldeman in Camp David and urged him to get a decision prior to the 10:00 A.M. call from Prime Minister Lynch to you.³

Assuming the President accepts the recommendation and approves option 3, I recommend that you tell Lynch that the President strongly believes negotiation, rather than confrontation, should be used to settle this problem between two countries so closely allied as Ireland and the US.⁴ While he recognizes that negotiations have already gone on for 14 years without success, he has decided to take no action *at least for the balance of this year* on the CAB recommendation that Irish Airways rights to land in New York be terminated on August 18, unless satisfactory Dublin landing rights, including some limited beyond rights, are granted to a US airline. To that end he has instructed the State Department to examine further with the Irish Government possible mutually satisfactory solutions to this matter which has been an irritant between us for so long a time.

Should the President not sign the options paper prior to the 10:00 A.M. call, I recommend that you tell Prime Minister Lynch that the President is currently considering the CAB recommendation regarding New York landing rights for the Irish Airways. You should tell him the President has been made well aware of the importance of this issue and is, of course, most sensitive to its effect on the relations between the US and Ireland. As soon as the President has made a decision on the mat-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. No classification marking.

² Not printed.

³ Flanigan wrote at the end of this paragraph: "Haldeman promises a decision before 10."

⁴ Option 3 would have suspended U.S. action on Aer Lingus landing rights to the end of 1972 to permit negotiation. Haig wrote "Pres has approved" and drew an arrow pointing to this sentence.

ter, you can inform Lynch that he will be notified of it before any action, public or private, is taken.⁵

⁵ This paragraph was crossed out. An attached August 10 memorandum from Haig to the Department of State reported that the President had approved option 3 and indicated that Kissinger did not place a phone call. Rogers did, however, call Lynch (see Document 176). In telegram 146884 to Dublin, August 11, the Department of State informed the Embassy of the President's decision and instructed the Ambassador to continue negotiations with the Irish Government in "low-key." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland)

176. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Irish Prime Minister's Reaction to Secretary Rogers' Call on Landing Rights

At the White House's request, Secretary Rogers put in a call to Prime Minister Lynch on Thursday, August 10, to inform him of the President's decision not to take action on Irish landing rights in New York before the end of the year and to continue efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution in the meantime. Rogers was unable to get through to Lynch because of telephone circuit problems and finally delivered this message to Finance Minister Colley, the senior Cabinet officer present in Dublin.

Reports from Embassy Dublin indicate that the delayed telephone call which had the Prime Minister cooling his heels for some time before he turned the matter over to Colley was initially viewed as a discourtesy to the Prime Minister. Ambassador Moore explained the circuit problem and seems to have straightened out this matter.²

More important, Prime Minister Lynch informed Ambassador Moore that he had not wanted to discuss the merits of the landing

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for information. Initialed by Kissinger.

² The Ambassador reported on the mishaps in telegram 935 from Dublin, August 15. (Ibid.) A memorandum of the August 17 conversation between Moore and McCann is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 14 IRE.

rights controversy with the President but rather to inform him of the negative local political implications of the United States' lack of give on its insistence on onward rights from Dublin. Further, the Prime Minister said he was disturbed by Colley's report of Secretary Rogers' message in that it appeared to indicate only a willingness to delay eviction of Aer Lingus from New York not a willingness to continue negotiations that might lead to some US concession in return for Ireland's granting onward rights from Dublin. It would appear, he said, that the United States intends to squash Ireland in the proposed negotiations.

State has advised Embassy Dublin (telegram at Tab A)³ that Secretary Rogers emphasized our desire to settle the landing rights problem by negotiation not confrontation, that we want to bring the bilateral air agreement—which has long favored Ireland—into better balance, and that it is necessary for Ireland to agree to broadened US access to achieve this balance. It is our hope that Ireland will agree to this in negotiations during the balance of this year.

Comment: State's position is in accordance with the President's decision on this issue. It is our understanding that upon receipt of the telegram, Ambassador Moore called Secretary Rogers and asked him to request the President to call Prime Minister Lynch. The Secretary reportedly was abrupt with Moore, told him he would do no such thing, that the US position is both sound and fair. Once this message has been absorbed, I am sure we can expect to hear some more from the Irish.

³ Telegram 148158 to Dublin, August 15, not printed.

177. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Irish Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon

United States Ambassador to Ireland John D.J. Moore

Acting Chief of Protocol Marion H. Smoak

Colonel Richard Kennedy, National Security Council

Irish Foreign Minister Patrick Hillery

President Nixon met with Irish Foreign Minister Hillery for forty minutes, October 6, at the White House. After several minutes of courtesy points, the following subjects were discussed:

1. *Dublin Landing Rights*. The President told Dr. Hillery that he realized this issue was a point of difficulty between our two countries. He assured Dr. Hillery that he had been following the issue personally. All aspects had been thoroughly reported to him by Ambassador Moore and Mr. Mulcahy² and others, and we have also had the views of high-level Irish officials such as Secretary McCann. He asked Dr. Hillery what was the real economic impact of our gaining Dublin landing rights. Dr. Hillery replied that there was no great impact as far as the Irish airline was concerned, but the real economic issue is the west of Ireland. Granting Dublin landing rights threatens to destroy the promising development in the Shannon area.

Ambassador Moore said that as far as the Shannon area was concerned he wanted to mention: (1) The President's letter to Prime Minister Lynch³ which gave assurances that our airlines would be required to stop at Shannon going to and from Dublin as long as the Irish airline did the same; also (2) there has been such a strong tourist industry built up in the west of Ireland that most tourists from America will stop there in any event.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Limited Official Use. Drafted by R.W. DuBose (EUR/NE). An attached November 19 note indicates that Sean O'Heiderian, Counselor the Irish Embassy, was also present at the meeting. In a September 21 briefing memorandum for Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reviewed both the foreign policy and domestic political considerations that a meeting with Hillery entailed for the President. He noted that the Department of State had advised against such a meeting but that the President's political advisers favored it. (Ibid.) A tape recording of the meeting is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Conversation 793–12.

² Not further identified.

³ See Document 170.

The President then brought up the matter of the Irish airline gaining the right to stop at New York and Boston on the way to Chicago, and asked if there were any figures on the effects of such a concession. Ambassador Moore replied that as far as he knew no figures were available, but perhaps the CAB could study the matter. The President concluded this subject by saying that he would review the landing rights matter again, that he wanted to find a settlement that would be fair to both sides, but he could make no promises.

2. *Northern Ireland.* The President expressed his profound sadness at the continuing bitterness and strife in Northern Ireland. He said that he had been looking into the history of the problem, and there were certain parallels with Poland's history. He was shocked to read that the population of Ireland is now less than half of what it was before the famine of the 19th century. He said that he had a keen interest in finding a peaceful solution.

Dr. Hillery said that he had been encouraged by the British Government's recent actions in Northern Ireland. Since February, when he had travelled to the United States to discuss the issue with Secretary Rogers,⁴ the British have seemed to be seeking a political solution rather than a military solution which has the approval of the Irish Government.

The President said that we were not in a position to openly or publicly intervene in Northern Ireland. He wanted Dr. Hillery to know that we appreciate Prime Minister Lynch's constructive attitude in cooperating with the British to find a peaceful solution.

Dr. Hillery replied that his government did not seek open or public declarations by the United States Government but hoped in our private discussions with the British we would make our views known. The President replied that in all of our high level discussions with the British our views on Northern Ireland are expressed.

3. *Economic Development.* The President said he was keenly interested in the economic development of the west of Ireland and he hoped there was some way the United States could contribute to this development.

4. *Irish Entry Into the EC.*⁵ The President congratulated Dr. Hillery upon being named as the Irish Commissioner to the EC and asked about the effects on Ireland of entry into the Common Market. Dr. Hillery replied that Ireland would have tough going for the first two years, particularly in the industrial sector. The President said he agreed that was likely.

⁴ See Document 171.

⁵ A May 11 plebiscite approved Ireland's entry into the European Community effective January 1, 1973.

Italy

178. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, January 28, 1969, 2040Z.

474. Subject: Italian China policy.

1. In conversation with Gaja morning January 28, as reported Embtel 473,² he spoke very frankly and on a personal basis. He is evidently concerned that Foreign Minister Nenni announced so precipitately and without careful advance preparation Italian intention to recognize Communist China. He believes Foreign Minister and his Socialist colleagues see the matter in straightforward, simple terms and have thought about the consequences of this action not at all.

2. Although he did not say so directly, I have the impression Gaja is somewhat surprised by what he considers the relatively mild U.S. reaction. He said the U.S. should be saying this to Italy, not the Italians to the U.S., but he is troubled by possible direct clashes of interest and position between Italy and the U.S. which could flow from Italian recognition of Peking. For example, he is sure Peking will require Italy to break relations with Taipei and that Italy will make this break, thus recognizing Peking as the sole government of China. The next thing he sees is a possible call from Peking to have Italy join in a demand for the withdrawal of all foreign military bases from Chinese territory, a call which will have a strong doctrinaire appeal to the Italian Socialists. Should the U.S. maintain its military connections with Taipei, this could put U.S. and Italian policies at cross purposes.

3. Of greatest concern to Gaja in the long run, is the fear that by taking advantage of Socialist susceptibility and pressing for recognition of Peking and Hanoi, leftist elements really have the ultimate objective of maneuvering Italy into a position where she may be vulnerable at a later date to pressures to recognize East Germany, which would be a fatal blow to Western unity. It is for these, among other reasons, that Gaja is concerned to see Italy start so lightly down this road without adequate study of possible consequences for itself as well as others.

Meloy

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

² Dated January 28. It reported the surprise among Italian diplomats at Nenni's January 24 announcement that Italy would recognize the Communist Chinese regime. (Ibid.)

179. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rome, February 27, 1969.

PRESENT

The President
President Saragat
MG Vernon A. Walters

President Saragat began by saying that he thanked the President for his visit and was most happy to see him again.

Speaking as a friend he would speak with full candor as one should among friends. He would like to present to the President certain considerations concerning Italian political life and after that would be very happy to hear anything that the President might wish to say.

There were in Italy three major parties: the Communists, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. The Communist Party represented about 28 percent of the Italian electorate and with their allies they represented roughly a third of the Italian electorate. This they had achieved by distinguishing themselves in the fight against Fascism and by deceiving many Italians who regarded them as a respectable sort of activist Socialist Party without realizing the true nature of Communism. The Communists were careful and never spoke of dictatorship and almost always of freedom. The Italian Communist Party was more devoted to the interests of Moscow than was, for example, the French Communist Party. Its chief, Luigi Longo, was for all practical purposes a Soviet Officer. The new Secretary General² was completely devoted to the interests of Moscow. Recently the Italian Communist Party had held its Congress at Bologna. During this Congress it had condemned the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia and this had been hailed in the press in Italy and abroad as a sure sign that they were loosening their ties to Moscow. This was a mistake. They had issued the condemnation only because the events in Czechoslovakia had disturbed the Italian electorate and because thus they would feel much freer to attack the Atlantic Alliance whose destruction was their major objective. First, they

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The meeting took place at the Quirinale Palace. Although the memorandum of conversation, prepared by Walters, is dated February 28, the President's Daily Diary indicates that the meeting took place on February 27 beginning at 5:26 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The President visited Rome February 27–28 as part of a six-nation European tour (February 25–March 2). For text of his public statements, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 159–166.

² Enrico Berlinguer. He was elected Vice General Secretary of the PCI at its Bologna Congress, February 1969, to take effective control of the party from the ailing Luigi Longo.

would try to lead Italy to neutralism as a first stage and eventually to the side of the Soviet Union.

Next, there was the Christian Democratic Party. This Party was the mainstay of democracy. Without it democracy would collapse in Italy. It represented around 38 percent of the electorate. It was strong because it was supported by the Vatican. It deserved support because it was the central piece of the structure of democracy and freedom in Italy. In it, however, there was a fringe of far leftists. It was one of the two main partners in the present coalition government in Italy. As stated previously, it did have the support of the Vatican. Pope Paul was a good man but did not understand much about politics. He should be told that he could be Pope in Rome only so long as democracy endured in Italy. If democracy were to be overthrown in Italy, then he would either have to emigrate or share the fate of the Metropolitan Alexei in the USSR.

There was also the Socialists who were the product of the fusion of the old Social Democratic Party which Mr. Saragat himself had headed and the Socialist Party of which the present Foreign Minister Mr. Nenni had been head for many years. The Socialist Party also had a left wing fringe which was more important than the left wing fringe of the Christian Democrats because it comprised a much larger section of the Socialist Party than the similar fringe of the Christian Democratic Party. It was to these two anti-Atlantic Alliance accomplice groups in the Christian Democratic and Socialist Parties that the Communists owed much of their trouble-making capacity.

There was also a Democratic Party on the right headed by Mr. Malagodi.³ This was the Liberal Party, a strongly pro-Atlantic party and it was also devoted to the unification of Europe. It had previously been in the Government with the Christian Democrats but now was in the opposition. The Republican Party polled about a million votes but its representation in Parliament was small. It, too, was strongly pro-Atlantic and pro-European. It was headed by Mr. La Malfa.

The Neo-Fascist MSI Party and the Monarchist Party on the far right were very pro-Atlantic, if not pro-American, and not very nationalistic which was in a sense ironic for nationalistic parties.

President Saragat then said that European Unification was indispensable if Italy were to be a useful partner for the U.S. Italy believed strongly that Great Britain should be brought into the European Common Market and should be integrated politically with the other countries of Europe.

³ Giovanni Malagodi. The President met separately at the Quirinale Palace with Malagodi, Ugo La Malfa of the Republican Party, and Enrico Ferri of the Social Democratic Party following his talks with Saragat. A memorandum of their meetings is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I.

Still speaking frankly he would talk about some other problems that were of concern to him. He hoped that the U.S. in determining its policies would not do anything that would weaken the democratic forces in Italy. He would speak of such problems.

First, he hoped that the U.S. would not give General de Gaulle preferential treatment. This would create many difficulties and strengthen the hands of those who wanted to get Italy out of the Atlantic Alliance, and this continued to be the number one objective of the Italian Communists and their PSIUP (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) allies.

The President said that while giving no preferential treatment, we certainly felt that we should talk to General de Gaulle and the French Government in order to ensure that no "fracture" occurred with the French. He asked whether President Saragat did not feel that this was useful, and President Saragat replied that he did think this useful.

He then said he would speak of another matter and this was Vietnam. He understood that Italy which had not committed a single soldier to this problem was not really in a position to give the U.S. advice on this, but as long as this war went on, it gave the Communists the opportunity to attack the U.S. and portray them as aggressors and as loving war. The suspension of bombings had been well received.⁴ Should it be resumed it would have a very negative effect in Italy.

The President replied that we would do everything we could through negotiations in Paris to ensure that a responsible solution be found to this conflict that would not lead to similar conflicts elsewhere. We were endeavoring to secure the assistance of the Soviets as we did not believe the Soviet Union wanted this war to lead to a confrontation.

President Saragat said he was sure that the Soviets did not want such a confrontation worried as they were by the Chinese.

The President said that President Saragat could be sure that we would do everything in our power to secure a just settlement.

President Saragat then said that another problem for the democratic forces in Italy was the undemocratic character of the Colonels and Generals regime in Greece. He understood that for many valid reasons the U.S. could not expel Greece from NATO, but he hoped we would do everything we could to hasten the return of a democratic regime to this country.

The President said he would take note of President Saragat's observations.

President Saragat then expressed Italy's concern with the situation in the Middle East. He felt that the situation there was very dangerous.

⁴ President Johnson halted the bombing on October 31, 1968.

The President after emphasizing the desire of the U.S. to consult with its friends and allies on such matters as were of interest to them asked whether President Saragat thought it was useful for the U.S. to have bilateral talks with the Soviet Union within the framework of the Four Power talks in the UN or the Middle East.

President Saragat said he thought that this would be very useful. He felt that it would be useful to make it appear that the four powers were acting as the permanent members of the Security Council rather than as the "Big Four." Anything that smacked of a grouping of big powers from which Italy would be excluded would be very bad for the democratic forces in Italy. This applied also to any idea of a "directorate" within NATO. Opponents of the Atlantic Alliance would then emphasize that Italy was a member of the Alliance but no one listened to her.

The President said he was glad that President Saragat felt that talks with the Soviet Union were useful on the Middle East, that we had no idea of a directorate, and that we planned to keep our Allies aware of what was going on both before and during any talks on areas in which they had major interests and Italy, as a Mediterranean power, was certainly interested in the Middle East and had great experience in the area and we would be anxious to have their views on these problems.

President Saragat expressed his satisfaction at hearing this.

The President then said that the Soviets had expressed interest in having talks on the limitation of strategic weapons and in general seemed to want a *détente*. We were interested in this but all history was there to show us that while wars sometimes occurred as a result of arms races, more often than not they arose from the explosion of political tensions. We, therefore, felt that such talks should not be limited to strategic weapons but that we should endeavor also to make progress in other areas such as the Middle East, Vietnam and so forth.

President Saragat said he thought that this was very wise and he felt that such talks might well prove useful.

The President then asked why President Saragat believed that the Soviet Union was interested in a *détente* now.

President Saragat replied that they were concerned with the Chinese, with the cost of strategic arms that was preventing them from giving their people the better life they were demanding ever more vehemently, and because they were fearful that situations such as Vietnam and the Middle East might lead to confrontations which they did not want.

He expressed great satisfaction at the President's undertaking this trip so early in his administration and at the President's desire to consult with our Allies. The President had received a warm welcome from

the people of Rome and this was how the great majority of the Italian people felt. They would never forget the assistance which the American people had rendered them especially in the difficult period right after the war. He himself was very happy to renew his friendship with the President and hoped they would remain in contact. He repeated again Italy's desire to see Britain admitted into the European Common Market for both political and economic reasons. He felt that the British were perhaps the most politically mature people in Europe. He was going to England later this year for a 10-day state visit. He was looking forward to learning a great deal on this trip from his talks with British leaders. He again thanked the President for his visit and wished him well in his talks with General de Gaulle.

180. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 11, 1969.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 11 March 1969

PRESENT

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Packard, and Mr. Helms.

Mr. Thomas Karamessines was present for Item 1.

Colonel Alexander Haig and Mr. William Trueheart were present for all items.

1. *Italy—Covert Political Action Program*

a. The Chairman stated that he wished to explain the origin of his request for an oral presentation to the Committee of past covert support to Italian political parties. Initially, [less than 1 line not declassified] had suggested to higher authority that the U.S. Government should take steps to strengthen the [less than 1 line not declassified] Higher authority asked the Chairman to explore further in a private talk [less than 1 line not declassified] just what the latter had in mind.² In this follow-up discussion [less than 1 line not declassified] made an impassioned plea for U.S. financial support [2½ lines not declassified] He pointed out that Soviet and other communist sources support the Italian Communists at a level in the neighborhood of \$2,000,000 per month. [less than 1 line not

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on March 13.

² No record of this discussion was found.

declassified] did not request support for his own [*less than 1 line not declassified*] saying that he will assure that they raise local funds adequate to their needs. The Chairman stressed that neither higher authority nor he made any kind of commitment to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] but higher authority asked the Chairman to explore what would be involved and what benefits might derive from complying with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] request.

b. Mr. Karamessines gave a detailed briefing on the origins, relationships, funding levels and accomplishments of the Italian covert political support program to various political parties and labor organizations during the years 1948–1968.³ He noted that such support had been drastically reduced in recent years and finally terminated altogether at the end of FY–1968 as it was then felt by the 303 Committee members and higher authority that the Italians were well able to support their own political parties.

c. After some discussion, those present were unanimous that the Italians are still perfectly able to support their political parties and that there is no real justification for resumption of covert funding of these activities.

d. The Chairman asked that CIA prepare a summary paper reflecting the present situation of the political parties in Italy. This paper should cover Soviet and other communist funding, funding sources available to noncommunist parties, the degree of impact that an infusion of U.S. funds might have in line with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] request, and the negative reaction of the Committee members. The Chairman stated that after this paper had the approval of the Committee he would present the Committee's recommendation to higher authority.⁴

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to Italy.]

Frank M. Chapin

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XII, Western Europe, Documents 92, 113, 116, 125, and 133.

⁴ The CIA paper was not found. Kissinger reported on the Committee's meeting and conclusions in a March 25 memorandum to the President. In approving Kissinger's recommendations for no assistance, Nixon wrote: "I doubt the wisdom of such subsidies in the future in *any* country—It just becomes blackmail." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes)

181. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 1, 1969, 10 a.m.

PRESENT

The President
Robert Osgood—NSC Staff
Wells Stabler—State Department

Prime Minister Rumor
Ambassador Ortona
Maj. Gen. Vernon Walters

Prime Minister Rumor opened the conversation by saying that General Eisenhower had enjoyed great esteem and sympathy in Italy and therefore, they had wanted to be represented as significantly as possible in this sad occasion. He was thus representing not only the President of the Republic but the government as well.

The Prime Minister said that he again wished to congratulate the President on the success of his trip to Rome where he had won wide acclaim. Few foreign statesmen had scored such a personal triumph.

He had no great problems to take up with the President since their conversation in Rome,² but there were one or two problems which might seem minor to the President but did have significance because of the peculiar political conditions prevailing in Italy. The Prime Minister said the government had overcome a small crisis arising from the resignation of one of the Ministers but he had been immediately replaced and this had avoided unpleasant political problems. The President would recall that Foreign Minister Nenni had brought up the question of a possible European Conference on Security which the Eastern Bloc had proposed.³ This had now been repeated at the Budapest Confer-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 IT. Top Secret; Nodis. Approved in S/S by Walsh on April 17. The meeting took place in the President's office. Rumor was attending funeral ceremonies in honor of former President Eisenhower, who died on March 28.

² Apparently when the President and Rumor met privately at 9:40 a.m., February 28. No record of that meeting was found. There was an "enlarged group meeting" that began at 10:45 a.m. Memoranda of conversation of this meeting are *ibid.*, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-72, CF 338. Nixon and Rumor also met on February 27 as part of a group meeting between U.S. and Italian officials. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

³ According to the February 28 memorandum of conversation, Nenni brought up the security conference in the context of a broader statement on the "irresistible" movement from the Soviet sphere he believed was taking place among the states of Eastern Europe. The Italian Foreign Minister elaborated on the question during a separate February 28 meeting with Rogers. A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-72, CF 338. For documentation on the European Security Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume XXXIX, European Security.

ence.⁴ For the political reasons of which the President was aware, the Italians felt that such a proposal should not be rejected out of hand, even though they knew its purpose was essentially propagandistic. They would, of course, not conceive of such a conference being held without the participation of the United States and they felt it should be taken up in NATO.

The President inquired as to whether the proposal emanated from governmental sources in Eastern Europe or whether it came from some other source. The Prime Minister indicated that there had been no formal invitation as such, but the idea which had been previously floated by Warsaw Pact sources had now been put forward again by the Preliminary Conference of Communist Parties meeting in Budapest.

Prime Minister Rumor then said that one should expect large demonstrations against NATO in Italy in April and May as this would coincide with the 20th Anniversary of the signing of the treaty. The Italian Government would have both the strength and determination to deal with these.

The Prime Minister then inquired whether there had been any progress on the solution of the Middle East problem since his last talk with the President in Rome. The President said the Four Power talks were going forward but there was great reluctance on the part of the Israelis to accept anything they regarded as an "imposed peace." There were some in Israel who felt they could go it alone, and perhaps they could for a few years, but after that unless the whole question were solved, Israel might well go down the drain. It was important therefore, that some solution be found. He had inquired, when in Rome, of the Prime Minister what influence Italy might have in this area. The Prime Minister recalled this and said he was happy to note that in the United States, there was also recognition of the fact that Israel's ideas of defense sometimes were exaggerated. Italy did have some influence in this area; she did not want to overestimate it, but would do what she could with the Arab countries to help.

Prime Minister Rumor then inquired concerning the talks on Vietnam. The President then said we were convinced that if any progress were made, it could only be on the basis of private talks. Both the South and North Vietnamese had to save face and this could not be done in public. Without going into the details of any talks, he felt that the talks would be long and arduous. The President recalled that in February, Prime Minister Rumor had told him that any resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam would, in Italy, be tantamount to a

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 12.

bombing of Italy. We had therefore done nothing to heat up the situation. He knew that Vietnam was a particularly difficult problem for the Italian Government and we were being careful to neither say nor do anything that would heat up the situation further. During the months ahead, the Prime Minister would undoubtedly hear of impatience of some Senators and Congressmen in the United States but the road ahead would be long. President Thieu had been taking a much more reasonable attitude and on balance, the President felt there had been some movement.

The Prime Minister said he was delighted to note the President was well aware of the difficulties of the Italian internal political situation inherent in the existence of a very large Communist Party, and he was most grateful for the understanding.

The President then asked the Prime Minister whether he thought the strength of the Left was still growing. The Prime Minister replied that while the Communist Party had grown somewhat, its growth was slowing down. However, on balance, as the Socialist Party had been brought to a pro-Atlantic stance, he felt the forces of the West were stronger.

The President then inquired whether, in the Prime Minister's opinion, a détente between the Soviet Union and the U.S. would favor the middle-of-the-road parties in Italy or would it rather be beneficial to the parties of the Left. The Prime Minister replied that such a détente would be beneficial to the middle-of-the-road parties provided it did not take place "over our heads." The President assured him we would make every effort to keep the Italian Government concerned [*informed*] of developments in this area, and Ambassador Ortona said he had been kept very well informed by the Department of State. The President then praised Country Director Stabler to which Ambassador Ortona added his praise.

The Prime Minister then expressed his satisfaction at the President's efforts to keep them informed as well as of his deep understanding of the internal problems which his government had to face.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, September 2, 1969, 1840Z.

5557. Subject: Italy and Chirep. Ref: State 143767, State 145748 (Notal).²

1. Having asked to call on Foreign Minister Moro as soon as possible after his return from vacation to discuss Chirep, Chargé was received morning September 2 by Moro.

Chargé stressed to Moro that there would be no change in our position on Chirep and noted our several initiatives with respect to Chicoms to which there has been no response. We indicated we were strongly opposed to any threat to GRC position in US [UN?] and expressed our concern at damaging effects which Peking's admission on its own terms could have on UN. We considered it an error to pursue Communist China with invitation to join UN on its own terms, and particularly when Chicoms appeared to be so totally uninterested in membership. We pointed out that if GRC were expelled and Peking admitted, Chinese Communists would not permit representation of Taiwan in any form. We also told Moro that expulsion of Taiwan would be matter of grave concern to important sectors of American public opinion and might well raise serious doubts about continued US support for UN. We confirmed to Moro that US would as in past vote for Important Question and against Albanian Resolution³ and we expressed hope Italy would do likewise.

2. Moro reviewed at some length history of Italian position on Chirep including Study Committee proposals which were made during time he was Prime Minister.⁴ He recalled that these proposals were price which his government had to pay for Socialist support, and particularly that of Nenni who viewed admission of Peking and universality of membership in ideological terms. Moreover, he had always found difficulty in explaining to Socialists and others why Italy could

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Confidential; Exdis. Sent with a request to be passed to Brussels, Ottawa, Taiwan, Tokyo, USUN, and Hong Kong.

² In telegram 143767, August 26, the Department of State provided instructions for a discussion of the Chinese representation issue with the new Italian Government. (Ibid.) Telegram 145748, August 28, reported on the discussion. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 CHICOM) The Rumor government fell on July 5 in the wake of the Socialist party split. After failing to secure majority support for a new center-left coalition, Rumor formed a minority all-Christian Democrat government on August 5.

³ See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 89.

⁴ December 1963–June 1968.

not follow same line in UN as that followed by British and Dutch. It had been less difficult to explain French actions. Moro also recalled fact that when Saragat was Foreign Minister, he had raised question of recognition of Communist China, saying it was a question of when rather than whether. In Rumor's first government Nenni had taken position that question of "when" had now become actual and proceeded, as we knew, to explore with Communist Chinese question of recognition. Moro also recalled Nenni's conversation with Secretary last April when he had stated that Italian vote in favor of Albanian Resolution would be logical consequence of Italian policy of recognition.

3. Moro went on to say that recognition of China was not a subject which attracted much attention or interest in mass of Italian public opinion. However, it was a matter which was felt deeply in political circles, particularly among leadership of Socialist Party and certain elements of Christian Democrats. He doubted if Italian Communists themselves were much interested in recognition at this time. As result of these political pressures (although he admitted PSU⁵ was now probably more "tepid" about matter than PSI), and fact that present Rumor government depended on outside support of Socialists, problems of Chirec and Chirep were extremely delicate and difficult for government and "anguishing" for him personally. He said that he had been left to deal with rather extreme positions which had been taken by Nenni on this question and incidentally also on Greece. He was just beginning his consultations within Foreign Office and with government on how to handle Chirec and Chirep. Chinese Communists had drawn close connection between Chirec and Chirep and he indicated that conversations with Chicoms were moving very slowly indeed, in good part as result of Italian reluctance to accept this tight connection and its consequences.

4. Moro indicated that vote for Important Question presented no problem, but that GOI now had to decide between three possibilities in preparing its position on Chirep. First was whether to vote against Albanian Resolution and he indicated that this would not seem likely since it would be inconsistent with position on Chirec which present government has made its own. Second possibility might be some new initiative which might serve purpose of bringing about movement in situation which had remained static for so long. Such initiative might take form of resolution merely supporting admission of Peking. Third possibility was abstention, but this would depend on whether or not agreement could be found for this course within GOI on basis that

⁵ The Socialist Unity Party was formed in July by defectors from the Italian Socialist Party. The party, which consisted of Deputies aligned with President Saragat, subsequently readopted the name Social Democratic Party.

while Italy supported admission of Communist China, it could not accept severe consequences of expulsion of GRC and thus of possible disruption of UN. Moro promised he would remain in close touch with US as Italian position developed as he did not desire to take any action which would be harmful to US interests. He said Ambassador Vinci would be returning shortly to assist in GOI discussions of this question.

5. In expressing appreciation for this full exposition of his thinking, Chargé referred to Moro's comment on possible new initiative and said this would create new situation which could be dangerous. Moro replied that he had been thinking out loud and that no decision along these lines had been made. He would keep fully in mind views which had been expressed recently by Secretary to Ambassador Ortona and statements which had been made by Chargé this morning.

Stabler

183. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, September 3, 1969, 1840Z.

5589. Subject: Military cost reductions in Europe. Ref: (A) State 111102; State 131049; State 145104. (B) Rome 5097; Rome 5437; Rome 5525.²

1. Chargé met alone for an hour September 3 with Prime Minister Rumor to discuss REDCOSTE.

2. Chargé referred to statements made over past year or so putting Allies on notice that US was studying ways in which it could tighten up

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent with a request to be passed to the Secretary of Defense, CINCEUR, USNATO, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, USNMR SHAPE, and CG, USASSETAF.

² Telegram 111102 to Rome, July 4, provided guidance for "developing scenario" for talks with Italy on the REDCOSTE issue. Telegram 131049 to Rome, August 6, outlined plans for consultations with the Italian Government. (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 US) Telegram 145104 to Rome, August 27, outlined the economic rationale for cuts in defense support abroad. (*Ibid.*, PER 4–1) Telegram 5097 from Rome, August 15, outlined Embassy plans for an approach to the Government of Italy and requested more information on U.S. positions. Telegram 5437 from Rome, August 28, reported on an Embassy review of the impact of REDCOSTE on Italian cities. Telegram 5525, September 1, informed the Department of State that the Chargé would meet with the Prime Minister on September 3 to discuss REDCOSTE. (All three are *ibid.*, DEF 6 US)

military establishment in Europe, while maintaining current commitments to NATO. US had indicated that this would be done through simplifying and consolidating administrative and support services and functions. Such tightening could be achieved without compromising our combat readiness or effectiveness in Europe.

3. We then told Prime Minister that in this general framework and with specific reference to Italy, it would be necessary to make certain reductions in SETAF installations during period October 1, 1969, to June 30, 1970, affecting approximately one half of present American and Italian complement of SETAF. We also said that there might be some reductions at Aviano and Naples involving both American and Italian personnel and that it was possible that Med Div Engineers might be relocated from Livorno to US. We also mentioned that in view of certain Italian legal requirements concerning dismissals, it might well be necessary to proceed with some dismissal notices as early as September 15. We showed Prime Minister a breakdown of reductions affecting Livorno-Verona-Vicenza area for period October 1 to December 31, 1969 (covering two quarters), and then by quarters from January 1 to June 30, 1970. We also gave Prime Minister run-down of properties which we wished to return to GOI and of leases we would terminate.

4. Chargé also referred to US statements regarding desirability of greater assumption by our Allies of defense burden and said US would like to propose that Italy take over Sergeant missile battalion. We said that such transferral could take form of sale, lease or barter, depending on preference of Italian Government and subject to negotiations.

5. Finally, Chargé asked Prime Minister if he would designate competent Italian authority with whom US could discuss implementation of foregoing programs, including problems arising from dismissal of Italian personnel. Chargé said he intended to discuss REDCOSTE both with Defense Minister and Foreign Office. We also referred to consideration of possible press treatment once reduction became public knowledge.

6. Prime Minister, who expressed appreciation that we had taken this matter up directly with him rather than starting with other ministries, inquired whether our proposed actions were being taken only in Italy or whether other countries were involved. Chargé replied that other countries in Europe were involved, but did not comment further.

7. Prime Minister left no doubt that our approach had been most unwelcome news to him on his first day back from vacation. He spoke with evident feeling and urgency along following lines: He said that, while he understood our reasons for seeking reductions, he thought this was a most ill-advised moment to reduce our forces not only from general strategic point of view involving Mediterranean and Europe, but also from Italian political point of view. There was also another side

to this matter which involved him personally, (see para. 12) but since he was Prime Minister, it transcended purely personal considerations.

8. With regard to general strategic considerations, Prime Minister stressed that Mediterranean situation, with increased Soviet activity in area and with events in Libya, and problems of European security, all argued strongly against our proposed course. Symbolic and psychological aspects of our reduction were infinitely greater than actual number of men involved. He considered our action to be "a political error."

9. With regard to Italian political situation, he stressed that our proposed reductions could not come at worse time. His government, already facing political tight-rope walk, depending as it does on uncertain outside support of two Socialist parties, was now about to face extremely difficult situation arising from wage contract negotiations in many important sectors of economy. Dismissal of some 800 Italians between now and end of December would add immeasurably to his difficulties in labor field.

10. Prime Minister recalled that in talking with President Nixon, question of Italian neutralism had arisen.³ Rumor recalled he had told President that pressures for neutralism in Italy came from Communists (a known factor), from certain Catholic elements (but these were not important with Christian Democrats in power), and from actions which US itself might take. It was his view that actions we were now proposing were precisely of sort which would encourage neutralist tendencies in Italy. In spite of all efforts to contrary, it would be impossible to persuade public opinion that US reductions were not in fact beginning of US disengagement from Europe. Communists would be handed tailor-made propaganda weapon to encourage Italy's departure from NATO and to argue for accommodation with East.

11. Prime Minister went on that it would be extremely difficult to find reemployment for 1700 or so Italian nationals who would be dismissed. To Chargé's comment that we had the impression that economic and employment situation in affected areas was generally favorable, Prime Minister replied that situation was explosive in Livorno and that in Verona-Vicenza it would be no easy matter to find adequate jobs for those people in light of existing requirements in area. Moreover, in Vicenza-Verona area it was not merely question of some 700 Italians, but fact that some 1600 Americans and their dependents, possibly totalling some 4000, would be removed from economy of this area in some seven or eight months.

³ Not further identified.

12. Prime Minister observed that what we were planning in Verona-Vicenza area was personally disastrous for him as first Prime Minister from this area. This was his constituency and it would be extremely difficult for him to explain how US has had so little consideration for him that it had brought about these cuts. He said he did not intend to overemphasize this personal side of the problem (even though it was extremely painful for him), but he did wish to point out that his political position was closely related to stability of present government and that this was a factor which US must take into account in its appraisal of effects of our proposed action on Italian political scene.

13. Prime Minister raised one other point on which he said he felt strongly. He had been much impressed by President's emphasis in his talks with him here and in Washington on need for consultation between Allies.⁴ He had also just read President's speech in Colorado Springs in which President had again referred to consultation policy.⁵ He was deeply disturbed that we were now proposing to go forward with this program apparently without this consultation and without taking into account considerations deeply felt by himself and Italian Government. He believed that this was "an act of inconsideration".

14. Finally, Prime Minister requested Chargé make clear to USG strength of his feelings on this subject and to request that US suspend action on reductions until there had been further opportunity to examine question with the Italian Government to determine how our objective could be met, but without damaging effects he feared. Rumor said he intended to keep this matter secret and that he would inform only Foreign Minister Moro about today's conversation.⁶ He requested Chargé not to make further approaches at this time to Defense Minister and Foreign Office.

15. Chargé said he did wish make clear that REDCOSTE proposals had been considered and approved at highest levels of USG and that their implementation was regarded as most important. He added that fact he had sought meeting on this subject with Prime Minister directly demonstrated US desire to work closely with GOI. Chargé said he would report on Prime Minister's comments and request.

⁴ See Document 181 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁵ In a June 4 address at the U.S. Air Force Academy. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 432-437.

⁶ In telegram 5616 from Rome, September 4, Stabler reported that Rumor had telephoned to say that he had discussed the issue with Moro who "concurred completely in Rumor's statements reported reftel." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I)

16. Finally it was agreed that should press inquire concerning Chargé's visit, reply would be given that Chargé was paying courtesy call on Prime Minister and there had been general discussion.

17. Our comments and recommendations will follow by septel.⁷

Stabler

⁷ In telegram 5618 from Rome, September 4, Stabler commented that Rumor's reaction "was not unexpected and probably would have been the same whether we had told him many months in advance or only several days as in the present case." He suggested offering Italy the possibility of an offset agreement as a way to stave off the political damage the government and Prime Minister would face. (*Ibid.*)

184. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, October 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Talk with Ambassador Ortona; Italian Political Prospects

Bill Rogers sent you a memo on September 2 describing a recent conversation with Ambassador Ortona (Tab A).² Highlights of Ortona's comments were:

—Stress on the great responsibility assumed by Rumor in forming the current minority Christian Democratic government, and the possible trials he will face on the labor and student fronts this fall; Rumor is trying hard to reconstitute the center-left coalition government which collapsed in June.

—Interest in a visit by Rumor to the US.

—Assurance that the Italian foreign policy line under Foreign Minister Moro will remain essentially unchanged, although the Italians are not certain how they will handle the Chinese representation issue in the UN.

—Solicitation of US support for an Italian seat on an expanded Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Authority.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Not printed.

There was little new or exciting in Ortona's presentation, and of course an invitation to Rumor is already in train. The probability of survival of his minority government through next spring has just been enhanced by the agreement of the socialist parties to a postponement of Italian local elections originally scheduled for November. On balance I expect that Rumor will eventually succeed in forming a new center-left government.

There is some danger, however—which has been underlined by several private Italian visitors to Washington³—that over the next two to three years the Italian Communists may work their way into the government, perhaps in a new Popular Front. Some argue that such a development would be facilitated by the current withdrawal of the Vatican from its former anti-Communist stance in Italian politics.

While this danger can be overstated, I think it would be prudent for us to look into the contingency, and I am asking Elliot Richardson to form an ad hoc group with NSC Staff participation to study the implications for US policy of possible Communist entry of the Italian Government.⁴

³ Paolo Pisano and Pier Talenti, two Italian-born U.S. citizens residing in Rome, had expressed concern about Communist participation in a future government during visits to Washington. A memorandum of conversation of their July 14 meeting at the Department of State is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 IT. Talenti knew the President personally. His views were sketched in a April 18 memorandum from Rose Mary Woods to Nixon. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I)

⁴ On October 7, the President wrote "good" under this recommendation. Kissinger added the note: "Hal [Sonnenfeldt]—get started." A notation in Sonnenfeldt's hand reads: "done." On October 6, Kissinger instructed the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to prepare a contingency study of "possible Communist entry of Italian Government." (Ibid.) A copy of the study, January 22, 1970, is *ibid.* In a covering memorandum to Kissinger, Richardson wrote: "the actions identified in the paper as open to us are pretty limited in character and marginal in potential effect."

185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Political Problems in our Relations with Italy

We have encountered serious political problems in our relations with Prime Minister Rumor as a result of his highly critical reaction to our program for reducing personnel at our military installations in Italy. This program, involving a saving of \$31 million and a reduction of 1,600 Italian nationals and almost 4,000 US personnel and dependents, was approved by you in May² as part of the general cost reductions in Europe (REDCOSTE).

When informed of our plans in early September,³ Rumor became highly emotional and appealed for a reconsideration. His point was that there would not only be economic consequences in the affected areas, but psychological and political repercussions in Italy: the Communists would exploit the withdrawals, and the dismissals would cause problems in negotiating new labor union contracts. He was particularly disturbed that the reductions would be in his home constituency.⁴

State proposed to Defense a compromise to slow down the reductions and dismissals of Italian nationals, but Defense rejected it because of budgetary pressures. Rumor was again informed but he appealed for a "moment of reflection" to confer with Moro after his return from Washington. Moro did not raise the question here.⁵ The Ambassador officially protested to State and the Minister called on a member of my staff.⁶

State and Defense have again tried to work out a compromise but apparently without success. The Under Secretaries Committee will probably submit the issue to you for resolution.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information.

² See Document 18.

³ See Document 183.

⁴ The President underlined the words "home constituency" and put two exclamations points after the underlining.

⁵ Moro was in Washington October 9. Memoranda of conversation are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IT–US.

⁶ Documentation reporting the Italian démarches is attached but not printed.

The Italian reaction was not foreseen in the case by case review ordered by you last spring. It is clear now, however, that this is a political problem rather than a military-budgetary one. The issue will be what price will we pay in our relations with Rumor, whose political position is quite delicate, if we proceed, and will the economic savings justify the price?⁷

⁷ The President underlined the phrase "justify the price" and wrote: "Reevaluate—on this point." A stamped date, "Nov 18 1969" appears under this notation.

186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

Prime Minister Rumor Cancels January Visit; Ultra-Left Suspected in Bombings

On Friday, just before the bombings in Rome and Milan,² Prime Minister Rumor's diplomatic adviser informed our Embassy that the Prime Minister (who still is down with flu) wished you to know that for internal political reasons he will be unable to make the visit to Washington proposed for January 13–14. Rumor believes that by mid-January the situation in Parliament will be such that he cannot absent himself; if he should go, he would probably be confronted on his return with a most difficult parliamentary and political situation, the outcome of which he cannot predict.

Rumor does not wish to embarrass you in any way, and he says it was a mark of his respect for you that he wished you to know at this time about his inability to meet the January dates. The Prime Minister would like to leave open the possibility of other dates being arranged

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I Confidential. Sent for information.

² The December 12 bombings at a Rome branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and a Milan branch of the Banca Nazionale della Agricoltura were subsequently attributed to right-wing terrorists. In the Milan bombing, two right-wing extremists were eventually found guilty, but the conviction was overturned on appeal, and the case remains unresolved. The Milan bombing, commonly identified as the Piazza Fontana massacre, was the first in a long series of violent terrorist incidents in what became known as the "Years of Lead" (Anni del piombo).

later on. He hopes to see Ambassador Martin next week more fully to explain the background to his decision.³

Italy is shocked over the bombings in Milan and Rome which have killed 14 and injured 107 (no Americans). All government leaders have issued strong denunciatory statements and the Minister of the Interior has promised swift action. There are no solid facts on who is responsible, though the official speculation is that the ultra-left (the Maoisti and the anarchists) are to blame. No one has connected the incidents with labor strife. Police are rounding up the extremists of both the ultra-left and right who have terrorist backgrounds. All political meetings have been banned, including a neo-fascist meeting which had been previously scheduled for Sunday.

There is no evidence at this time that these events will lead to an immediate change in the government, which is seen to be acting forcefully. The eventual impact on the Italian political scene is unclear.

³ Martin met with Rumor on December 16 and reported on their conversation in telegram 7940 from Rome, December 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I)

187. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 23, 1969.

SUBJECT

Italian Political Situation

During Secretary Rogers' report of his European trip at the NSC meeting on December 10,² you asked the Secretary and CIA Director Helms to prepare a briefing for you of the Italian political situation for presentation at the following NSC meeting. Since the December 17 meeting dealt with unrelated matters, Secretary Rogers has provided you with a written assessment, drawing from a joint State-CIA analysis

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The tabs are not printed. The memorandum bears the stamped notation: "The President has seen."

² Minutes of the meeting are *ibid.*, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1969.

(Tab A). Mr. Helms has sent a separate CIA report (Tab B) which does not differ in substance, and he is prepared to brief you orally if you desire.

Major Points

Atmosphere

—Consideration of Italy's current political stability should be seen against the general background of the fundamental fact that no government in the post-war period has been able to accomplish needed reforms without years of parliamentary and political maneuver;

—The current atmosphere of instability has been fostered by the coincidence that labor contracts affecting half the industrial force were due for renewal in the last half of 1969, and the labor unrest has resulted;

—Another unsettling factor has been the continuing discussion of the possibility of an evolving role in Italian political life for the Communist Party;

—Economic growth has been a stabilizing factor, but there is some uneasiness about a threat of inflation and the likelihood of continued capital flight.

Current Power Struggle

—The political scene is dominated by a complex power struggle both within and among the parties of the center-left majority over the timing and composition of a successor government to the stop-gap Christian Democratic minority Cabinet of Premier Rumor;

—The current phase of the struggle derives from the collapse last summer of Rumor's center-left coalition caused by the split in July of the Italian Socialist Party;

—Rumor's minority Cabinet was set up last summer primarily to allow for the healing of the wounds of the Socialist split and to make possible their return to government collaboration after local elections now scheduled for the spring;

—The passage of time, however, has exacerbated the bitterness of the Socialist feud;

—Thus, Rumor finds himself caught in the crossfire of that feud and the infighting within his own Christian Democratic Party which the Socialist feud triggers.

Prospects

—The prospect is that a new government will be formed in the first half of 1970, probably after the spring local elections;

—The government most likely will be made up of the four parties of the center-left, dominated by the Christian Democratic Party;

—Senate President Fanfani or Foreign Minister Moro are most often mentioned as probable prime ministers;

—Fanfani or Moro can be expected to adhere to traditional Italian domestic and foreign policies.

Some months ago I asked Elliot Richardson within the NSC framework to prepare a contingency study on the effects to US policy and operations in the unlikely event that the Communist Party enters the Italian Government within the next few years. The study is nearing completion.³

³ See footnote 4, Document 184.

188. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Italy (Martin)¹

Washington, January 22, 1970.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In mid-November Mr. Robert Murphy was in Rome on a private business trip at Italian invitation. During his visit, he had the opportunity to talk informally with several Italian leaders, and he passed on his observations to us. He regretfully reported that a common refrain in his conversations concerned the ineffectualness of the American Embassy. The President wanted me to ensure that you were made aware of this disturbing development.² I must hasten to add the obvious: no criticism was directed toward you; indeed, you had arrived in Rome only two weeks prior to Robert Murphy's conversations.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Confidential; Personal. A notation on the letter reads: "Dispatched via sealed envelope thru S/S 22 Jan."

² Kissinger summarized Murphy's comments for the President in a December 23, 1969, memorandum that forwarded Murphy's report on his conversations in Rome. The President underlined Kissinger's summary of the criticisms and annotated: "K: 1. Be sure Martin knows of this. 2. Are we going to try anything new in Italy or let the 'dust settle'?" The stamped date "December 29, 1969" follows the President's comments. Immediately under the President's comments, Kissinger wrote: "Al [Haig]—Let Sonnenefeldt start study on Italy—immediately." The date "December 29, 1969" is stamped after these comments. A copy of the memorandum and Murphy's report are *ibid*.

In order for you to assess these comments, I want to report them to you in the following full detail:

Prime Minister Rumor said there is lack of contact with American representatives, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and American propaganda is a fizzle. President Saragat reported that the Embassy for a lengthy period has not been close or effective. The Government is eager for *[less than 1 line not declassified]* and close association, but the Ambassador did not provide it. Finally, in a discussion with Girolamo Messeri, General Marchese and General Piccardo, all emphasized the need for more effective propaganda by the US. They volunteered that more competent and better qualified representatives at the Embassy are needed to bring home to the Italian public the merits of the US and its value to Italy. Their criticism related also to the American intelligence officers, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* but not to the military attachés who were considered effective and highly regarded. They pointed out that the Soviet Ambassador and staff are extremely active and effective, and that our Embassy suffers in contrast.

Obviously, I take no pleasure in reporting to you this assessment of the problem which you have inherited. Even if the performance of the Embassy is in fact vastly better than reported, the fact that Italian leaders think our effort is ineffectual is quite serious.

I know that you will treat this information and its source with the confidence it deserves and requires.

Best regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

189. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Italy and the Redcoste Program

State and Defense have now reached an agreed position on how to handle Prime Minister Rumor's request that the Redcoste program be held in abeyance (my memoranda of January 13 and 20—Log # 4970).² The instruction to Ambassador Martin, attached at Tab A,³ has been sent here for clearance. The cable accepts Martin's earlier recommendation,⁴ and makes the following points (pp 2–3 and 7–9):

—Italian employees at Verona and Vicenza (Rumor's home district) will not be issued dismissal notices until May 1, although the dismissals at Livorno will begin on schedule (February 2);

—American departures at these locations will proceed on schedule, but will be carried out as quietly and routinely as possible;

—to counter some of the psychological/political problems of charges of US disengagement from Italy, we will stress the current increased Air Force training program at Aviano (this is an interim measure, until arrangements are made to replace the Wheelus facility), and the planned deployment from Wheelus to Livorno of headquarters materials;

—finally, the Italians will be urged to take initiative within NATO to have the proposed Mediterranean training center located in Italy.

I do not know whether you have had an opportunity to focus again on my previous memoranda and I assume there has not yet been a chance to review this problem with the President. There is now no agency support for either extreme alternatives of cancelling the Redcoste program or ramming it through according to its original schedule. The agreed recommendation contained in the cable strikes me as permitting most of the financial goals of Redcoste to be achieved with the minimum political danger. To go any further would require a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for urgent action.

² The memoranda are *ibid.*

³ Not printed.

⁴ Martin's recommendation for a "disguised" withdrawal of U.S. personnel was transmitted in telegram 140 from Rome, January 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II)

major effort with Secretary Laird since it would reopen Fiscal '71 Defense Budget issues.

I shall be sending you a separate memo for the President concerning the Italian political scene and his most recent request for an NSC meeting within 30 days.⁵

Recommendations

1. That you approve the dispatch of the cable at Tab A.⁶

2. That you ask⁷ State to add to the cable the point that in view of Rumor's special plea to the President on this matter, the adjustments in the program have been carefully reviewed by and have the approval of the White House.⁸

⁵ Sonnenfeldt's memorandum for the President, which was subject to frequent re-drafting due to political changes in Italy, was forwarded to the President on February 12. It is printed as Document 191.

⁶ Kissinger initialed the Approve option.

⁷ Here "consider asking" was crossed out to leave "ask."

⁸ Kissinger initialed the Approve option. The date "1-24-70" is handwritten below this approval. A note on the first page initialed by Kissinger reads: "Sonnenfeldt action. Hal—Please transmit changes via Jeanne Davis to Eliot, to keep their Secretariat happy." A final note by Jeanne Davis, written below the Approve option, reads: "State (Dirk Gleysteen) informed 1/24, 12:40."

190. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency

February 10, 1970, 1010Z.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 79-00399R. Secret; Immediate; Rybat; Keyway. 3 pages not declassified.]

191. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Italian Political Situation

Prime Minister Rumor and his all Christian Democrat government formally resigned on January 7. This pre-arranged step is the first in the series of formalities which is expected to lead to the constitution of a new four-party center-left government within a month. Rumor will undoubtedly remain as Prime Minister. The government is expected to last at least until the spring regional and local elections. It is impossible to predict what will happen then. There is a possibility that President Saragat might dissolve Parliament and call for national elections, particularly if he feels the temper of the electorate is moving toward the center. Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum reviewing the evolution and prospects on the Italian political scene (Tab A).²

President Saragat fears that Communist influence is being enhanced by the Socialist drift to the left, by a defeatist or neutralist stance on the part of Vatican officials and the more active thrusts of the trade unions.³ You have already seen a report of Saragat's views by Ambassador Tasca, sent through Pat Buchanan.⁴ Ambassador Tasca relayed a similar report through Bob Murphy.⁵ As you requested, I have informed Ambassador Martin and Peter Flanigan of these observations.⁶ Saragat has also conveyed his depression over the "inevitable" development of cooperation with the Communist Party through Brosio and Bob Ellsworth to you.⁷ He has hinted that Brosio is available as a com-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Presumably drafted by Sonnenfeldt; see footnote 5, Document 189.

² Not printed.

³ The President underlined the phrases "Socialist drift to the left" and "defeatist or neutralist stance on the part of Vatican officials." He wrote in the margin: "K—Lodge must *hit this hard*. Don't let him take the 'opening to left' line."

⁴ Kissinger sent a summary of the message that Tasca passed to the President in a February 3 memorandum to Flanigan. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II)

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 188. No information on Tasca's role in the preparation of the report was found.

⁶ See Document 188.

⁷ Ellsworth's January 29 memorandum to Kissinger summarizing his 5 hours of discussions with Saragat is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. I.

munications link, but it may be best not to open yet another channel at this time.

Prime Minister Rumor recently requested Ambassador Martin to convey his appeal to postpone the effective date of the implementation of our "Redcoste military" reduction program in Italy.⁸ As you recall, he had a personal dilemma since a good part of the reduction in Italian nationals would take place in his own electoral district (Vicenza/Verona). More importantly, he fears the Communists will seize on the reductions as evidence of lack of US interest in Italy and the necessity of accelerating Italian accommodation with the Eastern bloc. Ambassador Martin, State and Defense found that to stay within the Defense budget, they could not support cancelling the Redcoste program. Political considerations worked against ramming it through according to schedule. I concurred in their agreed recommendation,⁹ according to which:

- Italian employees in Rumor's district will not be dismissed at least until May 1;

- other reductions to proceed on schedule (beginning February 2), but the American departures will be accomplished quietly and as routinely as possible;

- we will urge the Italians to take the initiative within NATO to have the proposed Mediterranean training center located in Italy; and

- to counter the psychological-political problems with Communist propaganda, we shall stress our increased use of Italian facilities as a result of the departure from Wheelus.

I felt that this approach should go a long way toward meeting Rumor's personal problem, and permitted most of the financial goals of Redcoste to be achieved with the minimum political danger to us. Rumor has indicated his satisfaction with our compromise approach which is now being implemented.

I have dispatched a NSSM (copy at Tab B)¹⁰ which reflects your desire to have an early NSC meeting on the Northern Mediterranean and Italy, Greece and Spain in particular. The prime stress will be on Italy, and Ambassador Martin and Tasca are requested to be present at the NSC meeting.¹¹

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 189.

⁹ Document 189.

¹⁰ NSSM 88, printed as Document 30. It was supplemented by NSSM 90, printed as Document 31.

¹¹ The NSC meeting was held June 17; see Document 43.

192. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Rome, April 22, 1970, 1335Z.

315. [7 lines not declassified] When I last saw you and the President,² I told you I would approach you directly only when I thought the circumstances compelled it. I had planned on giving a full report and analysis at the end of six months. I have taken a bit longer because there were a few loose ends, the aftermath of the recent crisis, which I wanted to tie up. A long relaxed luncheon with President Saragat last week added bits to the mosaic and a private session with Prime Minister Rumor at his home this Thursday³ should add the final bits of information that will permit me to make firm recommendations on the course we should follow in the near and medium term. I do not believe this meeting will change my present thinking very much and I am therefore summarizing my present conclusions for you and for the President in this message.

I am grateful to the President for conveying through you the information received directly from others and summarized in your letters last winter.⁴ I think the situation described in those letters has been corrected to the extent that it actually existed and that there is now a different atmosphere regarding the U.S. diplomatic Mission here on the part of all really influential elements, political, diplomatic and military. There will always be complaints from disgruntled elements which, for one reason or another, it is not in our national interest to support.

Out of these six months of intensive observations several conclusions emerge:

1. Whatever the theoretical advantages of the center-left experiment, it has not worked as its sponsors had hoped. Only a fraction of the badly needed reforms have actually been realized. There is little possibility of its survival for very long since the doctrinaire compulsions and rigidities of the Socialist left will continue to paralyze any coherent program.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Subject Files, Backchannel Messages Europe, Mideast, Latin America 1970 [1 of 2]. Secret.

² Apparently during Moro's October 1969 visit. No record of the conversation under reference was found.

³ Martin reported on this discussion in backchannel message 317 from Rome, April 24. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Subject Files, Backchannel Messages Europe, Mideast, Latin America 1970 [1 of 2])

⁴ See Document 188. No second letter was found.

2. Yet with the present composition of Parliament there is little alternative to stumbling along with this formula until the end of the present Parliamentary term in 1973 or until the situation compels a dissolution of Parliament and early national elections.

3. If dissolution had occurred, or if it does in the fall, even the traditional election time cohesiveness of the Christian Democratic Party would not be sufficient to overcome the present deep factionalism within the party which would prohibit it from doing much more than holding its own in the elections. While they were here, I arranged for Rog Morton and Bob Hitt to see Forlani the CD Secretary General.⁵ Although impressed by Rumor whom we saw very quickly for an hour as they were going to the airport, I think Rog was appalled at the archaic state of the CD Party machinery revealed by his conversation with Forlani.

4. Nevertheless, the CD Party remains the bulwark of democratic forces in Italy and we must not lose sight of this essential fact which is central to the United States interest. The two strongest leaders, Fanfani and Moro, remain locked in a bitter rivalry to succeed Saragat as President in November of 1971, a goal which for practical purposes, can be achieved only with Communist support. Since both will have this very much in mind, they are going to be looking askance at positions or programs which might alienate this necessary support.

5. There are a host of minor CD figures—Piccoli, Tavianni, Andreotti, Colombo, etc. all hoping to be Prime Minister, even if only for six months. None of them have the stature or the following to do more than a short holding job. The only major CD figure truly representing the considerable center of the party is Rumor, who has the considerable added advantage of the occupancy of the Prime Minister's chair with its automatic heavy influence on patronage and the other elements of party power. He is acceptable to both Fanfani and Moro, whereas an open protege of either will automatically incur the opposition of the other. This may well give him a longer run as Prime Minister than the current conventional wisdom now contemplates. Even if he would step down, it is quite likely that he would resume the party leadership. Therefore, over the next 18 to 24 months he will continue a key figure in the CD Party.

6. We emerged from the recent crisis with the American position unimpaired by an involvement in support of any CD faction which in the existing circumstances would have been ineffective in any event. I was extremely careful that we remain in a position to assist in mobilizing all the non Communist elements if elections had actually come.

⁵ No record of this meeting was found. "Rog" Morton was Rogers C.B. Morton, Chairman of the Republican National Committee.

7. The regional and administrative elections will now occur on June 7. It would have been preferable to have avoided them but all four parties are committed. There is little that we can do to influence their outcome since they will turn on primarily local personalities and local issues. The Communists may come out well in the so-called Red Belt and, with the Socialists (PSI), may win control of three regions, although this is not absolutely certain. While the psychological effects will be mildly adverse it will by no means be a major victory for them. If their percentage can be reduced from the last elections or held constant, which Rumor will try to do, it may be even damaging to them. The regions are largely “paper” units since Parliament will not yet have fixed their actual responsibilities and authorities.

8. Since the regional elections are now committed to be held on June 7, Rumor is now looking ahead to see how they can be turned into an advantage for the Christian Democrats in 1973. In addition to an attempt to reduce the Communist percentage in the “Red Belt,” he is carefully calculating how he can obtain election of local CD candidates throughout Italy who are centrist and who will strengthen the center. These locally elected officials elect the central committee which in turn elects the DC Directorate which governs the party. His goal is to obtain a Central Committee and Directorate which will be cohesive and which will permit the party to go into the 1973 elections with a modernized machinery and with up-dated techniques.

9. The Communist Party is well financed. Saragat told me that the Communists had available about 8 million dollars from within Italy including contributions from such enlightened industrialists as Agnelli, and with an additional 30 million dollars coming through various devices from the Soviet Union. Rumor has quoted figures slightly under these which are more in accord with [*less than 1 line not declassified*] estimates of overall Communist Party income. This is a hefty figure and beyond the ability of the non-Communist parties to match, particularly since we have eliminated our subsidies to these parties.⁶

10. It is already certain that we will be hit from all sides for contributions for the forthcoming elections. Fortunately, there is not much expectation that we can be persuaded to resume our previous pattern of support. If that is our decision it will not, therefore, cause too great pain, although some of my unofficial assistants who travel frequently to Italy have given contrary indications in an attempt to increase their own stature and influence. This is annoying but not really serious because it is being increasingly recognized by the Italians that I am the only representative of the President in Italy.

⁶ See Document 180.

11. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
12. [1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]
13. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]
14. [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

15. Incidentally, while seeking not to transgress on Peter Flannigan's preserves I have been quietly working, with some success, on ways to engage the Italian hierarchy for the 1973 elections without compromising the Pope's desire to retain the appearance of Vatican aloofness to internal Italian politics. I have found His Holiness to be very understanding. In response to one comment of mine he said "The Ambassador is very wise". Naturally I repeated this to my wife who only said "But of course, he's infallible." That was a nice day. I shall welcome Cabot Lodge's coming.⁷ It will help considerably by allowing me to concentrate more heavily on the Italian hierarchy.

16. I will be in touch later about the details of a longer range program looking to the 1973 elections. I am not at all pessimistic about the long range prospects. We have a very great deal going for us here. I do not expect all the material resources available to my Soviet colleague, but with a small percentage of what he has available, I am confident, with the President's continued support, we can keep this country safely on our side.⁸

⁷ President Nixon appointed Henry Cabot Lodge as his personal envoy to the Vatican on June 5. This arrangement did not constitute diplomatic relations. Lodge was to serve without diplomatic rank or compensation and would visit the Vatican from time to time to provide greater continuity in informal U.S. contacts with the Holy See.

⁸ Martin repeated his request and recommendations in telegram 2397 from Rome, May 12. The telegram was designed for presentation to the 40 Committee meeting of May 25. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes)

193. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, May 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Italy: Ambassador Martin Recommends providing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to assist moderate Leadership and strengthen Organization of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] beginning with Regional and Administrative Elections on June 7, 1970

1. *Justification of Proposal:* Ambassador Graham Martin presented the case for granting [*1 line not declassified*] of May 12, 1970,² as summarized below:

A. The Government of Italy is in serious disarray. The Center-Left Coalition has not worked as its sponsors had hoped. Very few of the badly needed reforms have been accomplished. There is very little chance for the survival of a Center-Left Government because the doctrinaire compulsions and rigidities of the Socialist Left will continue to paralyze any coherent program. [*6½ lines not declassified*] plans to use the regional elections on June 7 to obtain the election of local [*less than 1 line not declassified*] candidates who are Centrist and will strengthen the Center. These locally-elected officials will elect the Central Committee and Directorate which, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] hopes, will enable the party to go into the 1973 elections with modernized machinery and updated techniques.

B. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] told Ambassador Martin that the Communist Party of Italy is well financed, with about \$8 million obtained within Italy and about \$30 million coming from the Soviet Union. Ambassador Martin recommends that the US avoid involvement in the June 7 elections except for a contribution [*12 lines not declassified*]

2. *Background:* Since 1948 United States covert operations in Italy have been designed to strengthen pro-western democratic political and

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Cleared in INR and EUR. A note by INR Director Ray Cline stated that his clearance did not extend to the portion of the memorandum that indicated Martin's recommendation was "incompatible with the President's policy toward Europe." A May 13 memorandum from INR, cleared by Cline, however, stated that INR opposed the Martin proposal. (*Ibid.*) A May 13 memorandum from the Chief of the European Division, CIA, to the Deputy Director for Plans, supported Martin's proposal. (Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 90-01383R)

² See footnote 8, Document 192.

private organizations willing and able to compete with communist organizations and to contribute to the strength of democratic institutions. Over the 20 years from 1948 to 1968 the United States provided nearly [less than 1 line not declassified] in support of political parties, labor unions and various political action programs. [1 line not declassified] The program of covert assistance was phased out entirely in 1968. Since then Italian political leaders concerned have come to realize that annual grants-in-aid cannot be expected from the USG. [1 line not declassified] When American assistance was provided in the past the object was to strengthen the non-communist parties; [7 lines not declassified]

3. Risks: [9 lines not declassified]

We are distinctly cautious in our estimates of the probable efficacy of a project of this nature. The Italian political scene is complex and confused, with a variety of parties and groups, an apathetic and cynical electorate and a tendency to rapidly shifting alliances within and among the parties. We are frankly skeptical about the ability of [less than 1 line not declassified] to attract considerable new strength from the electorate or to create new cadres of effective political supporters.

We continue to believe that the solution to the basic Italian malaise lies in long term political and administrative reforms. The most constructive course of action for the United States is to create a sense of confidence among Italians by underlining the lasting nature of our commitment to our European allies.

The risks must be recognized. We would for the first time be taking sides in an intra-party dispute. [2 lines not declassified] Knowledge of American intervention could be used by the Communists not only in Italy, but throughout Europe to argue that we are again meddling in Europe's affairs. [2 lines not declassified]

However, on both risks involved and the efficacy of the proposal, serious weight must be given to the on-site appraisal of the Ambassador and the experienced appraisal of the CIA.

EUR notes, however, that the proposed operation seems contrary to the expression of the President's policy in "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's".³ The President said:

"After 20 years, the economic prostration, military weakness, and political instability in postwar Europe that had required a predominant American effort were things of the past. Our common success in rebuilding Western Europe had restored our allies to their proper strength and status. It was time that our own leadership, in its substance and its manner, took account of this fact. . . .

³ See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 116-190.

“But what pattern of relations will serve these objectives best today? There is a natural tendency to prefer the status quo and to support established forms and relationships that have served well in the past. But we can see in 1970 that there is no ‘status quo’—the only constant is the inevitability of change. Evolution within Western Europe has changed the region’s position in the world, and therefore its role in the Western Alliance.”

This question must be addressed in the light of Presidential policy. Should we undertake clandestine intervention in the internal affairs of Italy? We can, and perhaps should, help Italy develop its party system as Rogers Morton has suggested. EUR would be prepared to suggest, as being in accord with the President’s policy, an open program to achieve this objective, best accomplished by openly extended technical assistance in response to open requests. However, we believe that risky clandestine activities are not compatible with what we understand to be the President’s policy.

4. *Recommendation:*

That we oppose this program as being incompatible with the President’s policy toward Europe.

194. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 25 May 1970

PRESENT

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Helms

Mr. Thomas Karamessines and Mr. Wymberley Coerr were present for all items.

Mr. David Blee and Mr. Talcott Seelye were present for Item 1.

Mr. [name not declassified] was present for Item 2.

Mr. John Hart was present for Item 3.

Mr. [name not declassified] was present for Item 4.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Italy.]

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on May 27.

3. *Italy—Request by U.S. Ambassador for Financial Support for [less than 1 line not declassified]*

a. The Chairman asked the members for their opinions on Ambassador Graham Martin's request for [1 line not declassified] regional and administrative elections on June 7, 1970.² It was noted that this request was probably stimulated by both higher authority's Italian visit and the blockbusting \$30,000,000 the Soviets are alleged to have fed in to the electoral campaigns.

b. Mr. Johnson said that State felt that it was not a good idea because it inserts the USG directly into [less than 1 line not declassified] disputes, because [less than 1 line not declassified] was not a chosen U.S. instrument and other figures loomed as large or larger, and also because, although such subsidies might be shielded from outsiders, it would be an open secret within [less than 1 line not declassified]. Furthermore, the [less than 1 line not declassified] does have money available to it and does have sources which have not been tapped.

c. A general discussion of the Italian political scene took place, and it was noted that if a Popular Front ever came to the fore it would not be because [less than 1 line not declassified]. Mr. Mitchell then observed that at best it was too late now to apply the election funds. He hinted that another visit by Rogers Morton might be useful since one of the [less than 1 line not declassified] minuses was lack of a modern political organization.

d. The Chairman asked for a solid assessment of the leadership, the names and numbers of the players, and their potential impact. It was suggested that this might take until some time after the election when the shakedown cruise had been made and strengths and weaknesses determined.

e. It was noted that the Secretary of State was in Rome at this time, and the Committee directed that a cable be sent to the Embassy indicating the Committee's decision and their desire for intensified political coverage as suggested above.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Italy.]

Peter Jessup

² See footnote 8, Document 192.

³ The Committee's response was transmitted in telegram 80225 to Rome, May 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II) In a June 18 memorandum to the President summarizing the results of local elections, Kissinger noted that they "have produced a surprise; the center-left coalition parties have been considerably reinforced, and the heretofore steady increase in Communist voting strength has been arrested." (Ibid.)

195. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 88¹

Washington, June 11, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Office of the Vice President
Office of the Secretary of State
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Director, Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Italy (NSSM 88)

Attached is a revised version of the paper on U.S. Policy Toward Italy which was prepared in response to NSSM 88 and distributed on April 1.²

This paper, along with revised papers on Greece³ and on the Mediterranean (NSSM 90)⁴ which will be distributed tomorrow, will form the basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on the Mediterranean scheduled for Wednesday, June 17, at 9:30 a.m.⁵

J.W. Davis
Director
Secretariat

Attachment⁶

Preamble

This paper concentrates on the problems of Italy. These are largely internal, but are importantly affected by international events. The broad implications to U.S. policy resulting from political developments in the area as a whole are being incorporated in NSSM-90.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-169, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 88. Secret. Copies were sent to Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Under Secretary of State, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. NSSM 88 is Document 30.

² The paper dated March 30 is *ibid.*

³ The paper on Greece is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 272.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 39. NSSM 90 is Document 31.

⁵ See Document 43.

⁶ Secret; Nodis.

The Italian domestic situation can only be resolved in the context of a broader evolution, involving not only the Mediterranean but Europe as a whole. If the Italians are to summon the resources of political will required to overcome their domestic weaknesses, it will be necessary for them to consider themselves secure from external threats. If they are to develop the self-confidence required to build a more stable democratic society over the long term, it will be necessary for them to have confidence in the potential of their own role in a more cohesive enhanced European system.

This paper includes an analysis of the situation, outlines the issues and options, and recommends certain courses of action. It should be considered in conjunction with NSSM-90, but is written to be a self-contained examination of the Italian scene.

I. Goals

Italy is a key to the area as a whole and to the United States position. Basically our goals are:

a) a stable and prosperous Italy willing and able to meet its NATO Alliance responsibilities (including real estate for U.S. military facilities) and to play a constructive and cooperative role in Europe and the world scene.

b) a democratic Italy without either Communist or neo-Fascist participation in the government.

II. What is Wrong

Over the last decade the country has achieved economic growth greater than that of any other developed country in Europe and yet the democratic political process is in a state approaching paralysis. Prosperity has seemed to compound the political difficulties. Aspirations rise faster than living standards and impatience with bureaucratic inadequacy grows. Meanwhile the hard core of Communist and fellow-travelling support representing approximately 30 percent of the electorate provides an outlet for increasing unproductive criticism.

Italian political life is dominated by a constant struggle for position within and between the parties. There is little discipline and alliances shift constantly. The two most able Christian Democratic leaders, Fanfani and Moro, are locked in a struggle to succeed President Saragat in December 1971 which inhibits their exercising leadership. None of the other major parties is in much better shape.

Patronage and a long tradition of indifference to the public have created bureaucratic stagnation—it often takes approximately two years to begin to spend an appropriation—and an unwillingness to innovate.

As a result there is danger to the democratic process in Italy with the government unable to cope with its internal problems and the Communists criticizing and obstructing.

III. *The Soviets and Italy*

In considering the crucial issues of Italian society today, the questions of international security, defense, and relations with the Soviet Union are essentially secondary. The threat to Italy is not military nor is it subversion. On the other hand, a reduction in the capability of NATO sufficiently serious to degrade the deterrent could easily tip the balance in Italy toward an accommodation with internal Communism which could ultimately prove fatal to the forces of democracy.

Russian relations with Italy have shown modest success at the diplomatic and commercial levels. Soviet policy has attempted to wean Italy from close association with NATO and the EC. The Russians have also sought to engage Italian self-interest by means of spectacular deals with Fiat and ENI (the state oil company). The Soviets view political instability in Italy as favorable to their long-term objectives. (Despite publicized criticism by the Italian Communists of the Soviets, there is evidence that the Russians acquiesce in this tactic whereby the Italian Communist Party achieves "respectability" within Italy. The policies advocated by the Italian Communists, if achieved, would weaken Italy's pro-Western stance.)

U.S. defense policy toward Italy exists as part of our defense policy toward NATO. While the Italians would react to actions taken to reduce U.S. forces within Italy, the overriding consideration will be the U.S. stance toward the Alliance as a whole. Our options are limited. We must retain the psychological conviction among Europeans that the U.S. presence and deterrence are valid in Europe. If Europeans, including the Russians, come to doubt our will and our capability, the deterrent would be undermined. In Italy, this could have the serious consequence of impelling even the non-Communist forces toward neutralism.

IV. *Factors in the Situation*

The Italian people are energetic, intelligent, productive. The gross national product has risen from \$16.8 billion in 1951 to an estimated \$81.6 billion (in current prices) in 1969. Real growth has been in the 5.5 percent to 6 percent range the past four years. Through migration out and from south to north the unemployment problem has largely disappeared. Monetary reserves are still among the highest in the world at over \$4 billion. Italian industry is a strong competitor in world trade. Yet with all this achievement, Italians have an inferiority complex about their economy. Investment within Italy is inadequate. Those with sufficient resources hedge their bets by investing abroad. Growth of

inflation in the last six months has created uncertainty about the future of the economy.

Organized labor is split between Communist-Socialist, Socialist-Social Democrat, and Christian unions. Throughout the months-long renegotiation of labor contracts in late 1969, the three unions worked in harmony to obtain wage and fringe benefit increases. They ignored political issues in concentrating on pocketbook issues. There is some evidence that the unions may be beginning to usurp the political function at the grass roots from the parties. In recent months they have been cooperating in a series of strikes aimed at pressing the national government to take action on social reforms, i.e., housing, health, and education. The willingness of the Communist unions to cooperate has strengthened the argument within Italy that Italian Communists are "mature" and prepared to work within the system. This attitude has its counterpart at the political level and has been responsible for much of the political controversy since mid-1969.

The Communists (PCI) and the Socialists of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) on the left, the Monarchists (PDIUM) and the Fascists (MSI) on the right do not believe in democratic government. The Socialists, the Unitary Socialists, the Republicans, and the Liberals are all committed to the democratic process, but at least some of the Socialists are prepared to edge up to the Communists; the conservative Liberals and the Unitary Socialists are completely opposed to any such arrangements, either explicit or implicit. The Communists boast a membership of 1.5 million, but collected 8 million votes in the national elections of 1968. There are Communist factions, but apparently under better control than those of the democratic parties.

The Christian Democrats, who traditionally have had about 40 percent of the votes, have dominated the country since the end of World War II. The factional strife which has demoralized them since the demise of the Moro Government in May 1968 is an important debilitating factor in Italian politics. A Church-oriented party, the Christian Democrats have suffered from the withdrawal of the Vatican and some of the Italian hierarchy from day-to-day political concerns. The Church apparently no longer worries as much as it once did about the growth of Communist influence. In a more visible crisis, the Church might rally to the Christian Democrats, but at present is an uncertain political factor.

Some elements of the Christian Democratic left have moved to the point that in rhetoric, at least, they are to the left of the Socialists and would even make some accommodation with the Communists. The size of the Christian left is undetermined, but may be up to 20 percent of the Party. The most active spokesman, Donat Cattin, Minister of Labor, is a young leader of promise. He is tough, articulate, honest. He

is a man who may become a stronger force in the Christian Democratic Party and could well warrant our attention.

Social problems—lack of housing, overcrowded universities, inadequate schools—have produced a situation which cannot be ignored. One reason why the Communists remain a major threat is the common belief that they are efficient administrators; the Italians are tempted to believe the Communists might make the system work.

Even in a period of disarray, it is apparent that Italy's participation in Western Europe is an important element of strength. In the last analysis, it may be a major factor in leading to the modernization of the Italian political process just as it has been fundamental in bringing the Italian economy into the 20th century.

If the democratic forces pull themselves together, they can frustrate adventurers to the left. There is a clear majority against bringing the Communists into the government. Somehow, Italian politicians must liberate themselves from sterile political gamesmanship and revitalize the Christian Democratic Party to believe that the best politics is the achievement of good government.

V. What Will Happen Next?

When Rumor finally succeeded in restoring the center-left coalition on March 27, observers speculated that its life-span would not stretch far beyond the local and regional elections of June 7–8. Any appreciable change in voter attitudes could lead to still another change in government.

The regional elections of June 7 and 8 showed a good gain for the center-left parties as a whole (from 55.4% in the 1968 parliamentary elections to 58.2%). The Communists slipped slightly and the Proletarian Socialists lost sharply, thereby cutting the combined anti-democratic left vote from 32.4% in 1968 to 31.1%. This decline could constitute a significant psychological boost for the democratic parties.

Will the election results lead to any change in government at the national level? On the basis of returns now available, the center-left has done well and there is no trend toward any other governing formula. The question remains as to whether any elements in the center-left feel that their election performance justifies greater representation in the coalition and whether such feelings might lead to a cabinet "crisis." The results do not seem to suggest this probability, but we can never predict with certainty what the highly individualist Italian politician will do in a given set of circumstances. In the present state of party politics, a few individuals, for personal or factional advantage, can cause a cabinet shuffle. It is too soon to exclude this possibility.

One additional question arises as to whether formation of government in the regions will have any play-back at the national level. Within 20 days after the election, the councils are required to meet for the purpose of electing an honorific president of the region and choosing a regional "cabinet." In 12 of the 15 regions, center-left governments will prevail. The Communists and their Proletarian Socialist allies achieved a firm majority in only one region—Emilia-Romagna. In Tuscany and Umbria, there is no majority for either the Communists/Proletarian Socialists or the center-left parties, and the former will require support from the PSI to form a government. The Socialists indicated long before the elections they would join the PCI-PSIUP where PSI support was required to form a government and no center-left was possible. While this situation was widely anticipated and should provide no objective reason for raising questions about the fidelity of the PSI to the center-left, it could conceivably provide a pretext for causing difficulties at the national level.

Due largely to major wage concessions in late 1969 which will increase wage costs 16 to 17% this year, inflation is becoming a problem of increasing concern in Italy. Governor Carli of the Bank of Italy recently warned that prices in Italy are now rising faster than in the majority of other Western countries. However, the Italians will count upon the inflationary trends in their major trading partners to maintain their competitive position in international trade.

It has become widely accepted that the center-left has not done enough to mobilize its forces behind necessary reforms. It is agreed that the Communists will not enter the government during the next two or three years. It is believed unlikely that there will be a coup from the right. Observers are puzzled as to what formula could replace the center-left. Perhaps the relative success of the recent elections will impart new spirit to the center-left forces. The young able element among the Christian Democrats is largely in the left wing of the Party. It is not clear how they can be joined with those in the center who would push for administrative reform to make the existing legislation work.

VI. *What Can We Do?*

There is very little which the United States can do to solve Italian problems. We can take some useful actions as indicated below. Perhaps of more importance, there are possible actions on our part which would make the situation more difficult. If we permit the impression to develop that the United States is "disengaging" from Italy and Europe, if we ignore Italian sensibilities and if we follow policy in nearby areas such as Greece, and to a lesser extent in Spain, which runs counter to Italian public attitudes, then we can undermine our friends in Italy. (The present regime in Greece is highly unpopular with the Italian public and Parliament; the Franco Government in Spain is also tradi-

tionally held at a distance. This attitude is not limited solely to the left, but includes all democratic forces.) It should not be forgotten that Italy has had a recent disastrous experience with Fascism and the regimes in Spain and Greece are considered Fascist by Italians. The question of Greece could become particularly emotional because of Greek membership in NATO, if heavy arms shipments from the United States should be resumed.

We must try to restore confidence among the moderate leaders, support them, seek out younger political figures, urge modernization, and assist by providing training and exchange ideas and advice. We must remain faithful—and be seen to remain faithful—to the concept of Alliance solidarity so that the Italian efforts to reform can be carried out without the conflicting complications arising from an upsurge of fear of an intensified Soviet military threat.

VII. *Issues and Options*

The Issue: To determine the extent to which we can influence developments in Italy in a positive direction. There are two basic postures open to us:

(a) Adopt an active interventionist role which seeks to reverse the drift to the left in Italian politics and to spur the center elements to the performance necessary to reduce political discontent.

(b) Adopt a modest profile while attempting to influence democratic political forces in Italy to withstand the temptation to include the Communists in the central government; to assist as feasible in building the confidence of Italy's leadership in its ability to meet the problems facing the country.

Options for the United States:

(a) *Adopt an active interventionist role which seeks to reverse the drift to the left in Italian politics and to spur the center elements to the performance necessary to reduce political discontent.*

Illustrative Courses of Action

1. Through public statements leave no doubt in the minds of the Italian (and European) public of our political preferences within Italy and our determination to see that Italy remains firmly aligned with the West.

2. Approach the Church to see whether it would be willing to work with us actively on behalf of the Christian Democrats.

3. Provide covert assistance to Italian organizations and individuals working for political stability.

4. Consult urgently with the UK, France, and Germany to make sure they appreciate the seriousness of the situation and urge them to

take steps with Italy to prevent a further deterioration in the position of the democratic forces.

5. Move additional U.S. combat forces into Italy, making clear U.S. willingness to support Italy's continued alignment with the West.

Pros

An interventionist course would provide visible evidence of U.S. leadership in the decade of the 70s; it would underscore the American commitment to defend Italy and would perhaps frustrate tendencies toward neutralism.

Cons

Intervention would expand U.S. commitments to support specific parties and individual politicians within Italy (with attendant risks). It would cast doubt on our public assertions that the shape of Europe is for Europeans to decide. It would cost appreciable sums of money. There would be little likelihood that our discreet activities, including approaches to the UK, France, and Germany, would remain secret. It would alienate other European allies (not to mention many Italians) who would resent U.S. meddling in domestic politics and, finally, it would very probably not succeed in achieving the desired results.

(b) Adopt a modest profile while attempting to influence democratic political forces in Italy to withstand the temptation to include the Communists in the central government; assist as feasible in building the confidence of Italy's leadership in its ability to meet the problems facing the country.

Illustrative Courses of Action

1. Maintain the psychological underpinning provided by our military presence. (A) We should avoid further cuts of our small (10,000 men) military forces in Italy;⁷ and (B) give careful consideration to locating in Italy symbolic military facilities transferred from other areas.⁸

2. Consult publicly with the Italians at high political levels on a broad range of international issues on the same basis that we do with the British, French, and Germans.

3. Intensify the frequency of high-level visits to Italy by American officials.

4. Increase the number of Italian visitors to this country as a means of (A) influencing the younger generation of political and trade union

⁷ DOD language: We could try to avoid additional programs involving cuts in our military forces in Italy. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ DOD notes that further adjustments in U.S. force levels in Europe may occur, dependent on Presidential decisions flowing from NSSM 84 on alternative U.S. strategies and forces. [Footnote is in the original; NSSM 84 is Document 25.]

leaders, and (B) supporting the Italian efforts to modernize their institutions.

Pros

This option has the advantage of building on current policies and programs and avoiding the charge of interference. It would require additional money to expand exchanges, but no new institutional framework. Given the long-term relationship between the U.S. Government and the leaders of the Italian democratic parties, we have understanding and knowledge available to intensify and expand rapidly relationships designed to bolster the confidence of the experienced leadership in Italy. This approach can reassert U.S. interest and influence without inviting charges of meddling. The mere avoidance of certain actions, such as further reduction of U.S. presence in Italy, can achieve a beneficial effect.

Cons

The end results of this line of action may be limited and slow in developing. There may be complaints that the United States is not being sufficiently active in assisting Italy to resist Communist pressures.

Action Program

The attached annex contains a review of current U.S. programs in Italy. There are also suggested activities to improve the situation and enhance our influence. These would be executed when funds are available.

Annex

Military Measures

Present Activities

In order to meet Prime Minister Rumor's concerns about weakening our military presence in Italy, we delayed beginning implementation of the military cost reductions in Italy from September 1969 until February 1970 and are spinning the reductions out over a longer period of time than originally planned. We are considering the possibility of transferring to Italy some U.S. military facilities from other areas in the Mediterranean as a means of reassuring the Italians of our determination to support the Alliance.

Future Proposal

We counsel against undertaking any further cuts beyond those envisaged in the current cost reduction program.

Italian Visitors

Present Activities

We are looking to the State Visit of President Saragat in July. We expect to fund visits by 13 Italians in FY 1970. These to be drawn from the political, trade union, press, and economic fields. This is woefully inadequate. We are also exploiting those important Italians who finance their own trips here by arranging special study and visit programs. We recently programmed the visit of (1) *Professor Gaetano Stamatì, head of the Italian general account-office*, and three assistants, for a study of modern budgeting methods in this country; (2) a high-level delegation of *Italian judges who studied judicial methods* here with a view to modernizing the Italian court system. Under the binational cultural program, there are some 98 Italian students studying in American educational institutions, as well as 31 lecturer-researchers and 16 teachers. Some of these are studying U.S. methods as a guide to educational reform in Italy.

Future Proposals

We propose as a matter of urgency to intensify efforts to increase the number of Italian visitors to this country and expand our cultural-educational exchange. We see these efforts as an effective means of (a) influencing the younger generation of political and trade union leaders, and (b) supporting Italian efforts to modernize their institutions.

Specifically, we plan to seek:

1. A substantial increase in the number of Italian participants in the International Visitors Program. The FY 1971 budget request, drawn up many months ago, provides for a modest increase to 12 or 13 grantees for Italy. A really effective program would call for many more visitors annually (the average unit cost per visitor is \$2,650) and would require increased appropriations.

2. An increase in our contribution to the binational program. The FY 1970 program provides \$160,000 to the U.S.-Italian funded program; the 1971 budget request calls for a U.S. contribution of \$465,000. An expanded program would increase opportunities for the participation of Italian educators in programs which can spur the cause of educational reform in Italy.

In addition to visitors programmed under the International Visitors and Cultural Exchanges Program, we plan to promote the following:

1. A visit to the United States by Italian Parliamentarians active in the Inter-Parliamentary Union group, in return for a U.S. Congressional visit to Italy in 1967.

2. A visit to Washington by the new Italian Defense Chief of Staff, General Marchesi.

3. Visits by Italian cabinet officers and senior civil servants to study budgeting, urban problems, and government management systems. In giving fresh impetus to visit programs in this category, we would hope to open up a broad dialogue with the Italians aimed at encouraging their efforts to reform their administrative structure and bureaucracy.

Visits to Italy by American Officials

Present Activities

Since the beginning of 1969, President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Volpe, and Secretary Stans have visited Italy. These visits were invaluable in cementing our ties with Italians especially the leadership.

Future Proposals

Increase the frequency of high-level visitors by exploiting the presence of cabinet officers and other senior officials in Europe.

Enhancing Our Presence in Italy

Present Activities

The Department of Commerce maintains a U.S. Trade Center in Milan for year-round commercial exhibits. We also participate occasionally in other commercial exhibits and trade fairs, as well as in exhibitions and congresses of an educational, scientific, and cultural nature. Budgetary allocations for these activities have been sharply reduced and our participation has declined.

Future Proposal

Increase the extent and quality of our participation in exhibits, fairs and cultural events. This will require additional money.

Improving the Economic Climate

Present Activity

We recently eliminated a major and long-standing irritant in our relations with Italy by concluding a new civil aviation agreement. Another sensitive area has been increasing Italian concern about rising protectionism in the U.S., particularly proposed bills which would impose quotas on imports of Italian shoes and textiles, major items in their foreign trade. This problem is likely to remain a sensitive issue. In the monetary field, in early 1970 we helped Italy stem a run on the lira by furnishing swaps and loans of \$1.5 billion.

Future Proposals

On trade, we propose to continue to resist protectionist bills aimed at limiting key Italian exports and emphasize the availability of remedies other than trade restrictions. We will continue to cooperate in the monetary field.

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, August 7, 1970, 1205Z.

4247. Sub: Planning for possible coup attempt week of 10 August. Pass White House.

1. Talk of the necessity for a coup to alleviate the seeming inability to form and maintain a stable government has been endemic in Italy since the war, waxing and waning as governmental crises mount and then subside.

2. The prolonged series of crisis over the past year coupled with the rising level of labor unrest has predictably brought the question to the fore again. I would be inclined to dismiss it again as this Mission has correctly concluded many times before were it not for additional factors which seem to me to make such a threat more credible now than before. The PCI seems to share this estimate since on May 25, when another such rumor was afloat, not a single top Italian Communist slept in his own bed that night.

3. Traditionally, such planning has not involved either the "political class" or the Italian military. We have increasing evidence that this is no longer true. On Wednesday, while he was still Prime Minister,² Rumor in conveying to me his current disenchantment with Piccoli, said Piccoli has started playing with the generals, (which we have inde-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.

² Rumor resigned on July 6 after the Socialist and Communist Parties agreed to collaborate in formation of a majority for the regional government of Tuscany. On July 11, President Saragat asked Giulio Andreotti to form a government. When Andreotti could not create a majority coalition, the President, on July 25, asked Emilio Colombo to form a government. Colombo announced agreement on a four-party ministry on August 4. Saragat swore in the Colombo government on August 6; it lasted for 527 days until January 15, 1972. Saragat had asked Rumor to stay in office until a new government could be formed; Wednesday was August 5.

pendently confirmed). Rumor added that now that Piccoli was Minister of State Participation, overseeing IRI, ENI, etc., he had access to unlimited money.

4. General Miceli, Italian Chief of Army Intelligence, has recently made unusual effort to cultivate Col. Clavio, ARMA, and has passed on to Clavio three letters sent to various military commands in Rome purporting to alert these commands to a coup attempt in the second week of August.

5. General Miceli has provided Col. Clavio with a tape recording³ of a monologue by an unidentified Italian (probably a politician) who was making remarks to a person or persons unknown. The tape is a difficult one to understand and ended with vague talk about something having to be done in Italy either before or during Ferragosto. The context of the remarks was such as to leave the impression that a military coup was contemplated. Efforts by Clavio to have Miceli identify the speaker have not succeeded since Miceli claims he was given the tape by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a close supporter of Antonio Cariglia of the PSU and that he, Miceli, does not know who was speaking.

6. On August 4 Miceli told Clavio that in attempting investigate what behind the letters referred to in par. 4 above, he had run into another group, not connected with the supposed author of the letters, who have been known in the past to be coup minded; [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

7. General Miceli has repeatedly emphasized both to ARMA [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that both he and General Marchesi, Chief of Staff of Ministry of Defense, have close and intimate relations with and full support of principal corps commanders. Miceli is General Marchesi's candidate to succeed Admiral Henke as Chief of SID. General Marchesi has just returned from a visit to the north. This is not unusual but the coincidence cannot be ignored.

8. All of the above is circumstantial and nebulous, yet it conveys a mood which is pervasive and consistent. This week a prominent American businessman reported to me that he had been approached by an Italian acquaintance who informed him of a coup planned for the first half of August which would be supported by all elements of the armed services, Confindustria and the Carabinieri. The police were not involved as they were too "infiltrated" by the Communists. The American businessman was asked to ascertain whether the US would recognize such a regime if it came to power and whether he would see another member of the group for more details. I asked him to do so [*3½ lines not declassified*] He was told that:

³ No documentation relating to this recording was found.

- (1) The organization involved is called Fronte Nazionale.
- (2) The head of the organization is Valerio Junio Borghese.
- (3) It is made up primarily of retired military personnel allegedly with broadly based contacts throughout Italian society (industrialists, labor unions and active military personnel), is not tied to any political party, is not monarchist in bent and has a para-military substructure.
- (4) Its motivation is nationalistic, anti-Communist and pro-American.
- (5) It has been meeting and organizing throughout Italy with the intent of having a coup d'etat which will be assisted by the armed forces but once installed the military would be subordinated to civilian authority. Its state of readiness is such that it can be activated in six hours. Ten to fifteen days from now was estimated for effecting the coup.
- (6) [2 lines not declassified]
- (7) They desire the U.S. Government to be informed and to recognize the group once they are installed in power. They ask no specific help and only request that their plans be kept secret and they not be exposed.
- (8) The Italian alleged that a situation report and action program was passed to General accompanying President Nixon to Rome (presumably General Walters) but no reaction was forthcoming.
- (9) It was said specifically that operations would be mounted with or without US support.
9. The record and activities of Valerio Junio Borghese are, of course, well known to us. Prince Borghese visited Embassy on January 26th this year (memcon in Dept.).⁴ One is inclined not to take this current spate of rumors too seriously. Yet it would be a grave mistake not to recognize that a judgment regarding the mood of exasperation mixed with a fear of the future could now cause a coalescence of military support around his movement which might tempt them to try such a coup. And the normal disarray of the "Ferragosto" holidays would be an appropriate time.
10. I do not believe there is the slightest immediate danger of a Communist takeover in Italy. While I think Colombo's government is probably the last chance for the center-left experiment, I think there is much better than an even chance that a movement back toward the center can be worked out within the democratic process. I consider it highly unlikely that a coup attempt such as that apparently being contemplated could succeed. If attempted and unsuccessful, it would

⁴ No copy of this memorandum of conversation was found.

probably cause a massive leftward move in the political spectrum. If attempted, and successful, such a government could not be maintained without violent opposition and consequent necessity for massive oppression. Either outcome would seriously weaken Alliance structure, would likely entail unpredictable repercussions on Mediterranean balance and our Mid-East initiatives, and would likely jeopardize outcome of SALT talks. Current domestic difficulties over matter of Spanish and Greek regimes would also be magnified.

11. I am therefore conveying to Prince Borghese the message that we do not believe recourse to such measures are appropriate in present circumstances, and that our estimate is that, if attempted, they will not succeed. Therefore, he might be wise to emulate his collateral relative, Napoleon, and choose as his current code word the phrase “not tonight, Josephine”.⁵

Martin

⁵ Martin reported on a second meeting between the U.S. businessman and his contact and of discussions between U.S. and Italian officials on the purported coup in telegram 4318 from Rome, August 10. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II) Telegram 128738 to Rome, August 10, transmitted Secretary Rogers’s approval of Martin’s suggestion for a message to Borghese. (Ibid.) In telegram 4342 from Rome, August 11, Martin commented that he had given considerable thought to directly informing Saragat and Colombo of coup plans but finally decided to notify the Italian Government through normal channels. (Ibid.) In telegram 4654 from Rome, August 26, Martin reported that despite “negative U.S. reaction,” the Embassy’s contact within the coup plotters’ group had again approached U.S. officials to report he would seek “proper guidance from Americans” after a successful coup. Martin discounted the likelihood of a coup attempt and reported that he had passed the latest information to Italian intelligence. (Ibid.)

197. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rome, September 28, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Prime Minister Colombo
General Walters
Mr. de Bosis

Prime Minister Colombo opened the conversation by thanking the President for his visit which pointed up the importance of the Mediterranean and Italy in particular. The great majority of the Italian people were happy to welcome the President.

The Prime Minister said that there were two cardinal points on which Italy's foreign policy would continue to be based: friendship with the United States, and loyalty to the NATO Alliance. Italy also was committed to the idea of a United Europe organized within the NATO framework.

He expressed concern to the President over the *ostpolitik* being pursued by Chancellor Brandt. Such a policy has positive aspects, but it could also have negative aspects if it were to lead the Germans too far in the search for new friends in Eastern Europe.

The President said that there had been a number of misleading reports concerning the U.S. attitude towards the German-Soviet Treaty and Brandt's Eastern Policy. Some have said that the United States approved or supported such a policy. This is not true. The United States neither supports nor opposes such a policy. We recognize the right of the German Government to decide its own policies. We simply have felt that it is important for the Germans to know that they have a home in NATO, and that their search for new friends in the East should not lead them to lose their old friends in the West.

Prime Minister Colombo said he fully agreed since if Germany were lost to the Alliance, it would be difficult to keep the Alliance alive.

The Prime Minister said he had recently talked to Foreign Minister Riad of the U.A.R. and he had expressed great concern regarding the situation in the Middle East.

The President said that this was not just a conflict between Israel and its neighbors since the two super powers were also involved. De-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 466, President's Trip Files, Presidential European Trip, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Villa Madama.

spite the truce violations, we were working on the Soviets and the Egyptians to get them to remove the missiles so that the Israelis would agree to talk. Our show of force was also accompanied by intensive diplomatic activity.

The Prime Minister agreed that this was the proper form in which to do this. Italy too had expressed her concern to the parties involved. He had also recently seen the Lebanese Ambassador who had requested him, on behalf of the Lebanese Government, to ask the President to see that the Lebanon was not “abandoned.” The President said that much of the difficulty resided with irrational people like the Syrians.

Turning to the Italian domestic scene, the Prime Minister said that his task was an arduous one. He had to govern with a coalition of four parties and it was very difficult to hold them in line. The President smiled and said it was hard enough to hold one party in line.

In Prime Minister’s view there was no other solution at present than the maintenance of the four-party coalition. He was endeavoring to heal the wounds of the parties and to consolidate the coalition. The President congratulated him on the success achieved so far.

The Prime Minister noted that the Government was attempting to set its financial house in order. The stability of the lira had been restored, and the balance of payments situation was much more favorable since the flight of capital abroad had been stopped.

Perhaps the most important task the Government faced was to carry out certain essential reforms that were demanded by public opinion. The Prime Minister’s Government was endeavoring to do this, and was working closely with the labor unions in this respect. Temporarily at least, the demands of the labor unions had halted; but one of the unions was controlled by the Communists and they were present in the others—and this did not make his task easier.

The President at this point received a note informing him that the freed hostages from the hijacked plane had arrived at Rome Airport. He and the Prime Minister agreed that they would fly out by helicopter to see them.² At this point, the other Cabinet Ministers entered the

² The President and Prime Minister met privately with the former hostages at Fiumicino Airport shortly after noon. The hostages had been held by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine during the Dawson’s Field hijackings in which the PFLP hijacked four planes bound for New York on September 6. The hostages, some of whom were Americans, had been held at Dawson’s Field, a remote desert airstrip in Jordan. The hijacking sparked an international crisis and Jordanian military intervention against the PFLP. After an exchange of PFLP prisoners held in the United Kingdom, the hostages were flown to Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome on September 28. For text of the President’s statement to reporters at the airport, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 774–775.

room and were presented to the President. The discussions then adjourned to a large adjacent room.

**198. Memorandum From the Chief of the European Division,
Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Hart) to
the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
(Karamessines)¹**

Washington, October 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Item of Possible Interest To The Director
Ambassador Graham Martin's Visit to Washington

U.S. Ambassador to Italy Graham Martin came to the United States in early October for consultations. During the past year, the Ambassador has been discussing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in general terms, the need for a political action program for Italy. However, the Ambassador has not discussed a specific program [*less than 1 line not declassified*] opinion that the Ambassador clearly desires to handle any proposal which he has for a political action program by himself in a manner which he believes most likely to produce the results he desires. Although the Ambassador is aware of the need for Inter-Agency coordination on any political action program, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Ambassador is of the opinion that any such program for Italy which requires "Inter-Agency approval" will probably not get off the ground. In view of the foregoing, it is quite likely that the Ambassador, while he is in Washington, may be discussing, with senior U.S. officials, his plans for a political action program for Italy.

John L. Hart²

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 90-01383R. Secret. Drafted by [*name not declassified*] of DDP, October 22.

² A stamped signature [*name not declassified*] appears over the typed signature of Hart.

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, November 3, 1970, 1112Z.

6311. Subject: Chirec.

1. Foreign Ministry Secretary General Gaja has requested Chargé to call on him at 7:00 p.m. this evening, Rome time. GRC Ambassador has been asked by Gaja come at 6:00 p.m. We understand from separate source that purpose is to inform GRC Ambassador and US of GOI's intention to announce recognition PRC.

2. Final Paris meeting now scheduled for tomorrow, November 4, to confirm and sign joint communiqué. If no hitches develop, recognition announcement will take place November 6.

Stabler

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

200. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 24–70

Washington, November 12, 1970.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

PROSPECTS FOR ITALY**CONCLUSIONS**

A. Despite some notable achievements, the center-left experiment in Italy has proved a distinct disappointment to its supporters, not only in its failure to weaken Communist strength and influence, but also in its failure to accomplish many promised reforms.

B. The summer political crisis of 1970 and its resolution have led to a diminution of political squabbling, and the new government has embarked upon a responsible but restrained reform program. Although the chances for an extended run by the present or a successor center-left

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret/Controlled Dissem. Supersedes NIE 24–69. (Ibid.)

government are not very bright, the chances are fairly good that some form of center-left government will survive at least until the parliamentary elections of 1973.

C. For the next two or three years at least, no political group—including the Communists—seems eager to provoke the kind of political crisis which would lead to a crisis of regime. One reason for this is fear that recurrent crises, violent civil unrest, or the possibility of imminent Communist participation in the government might lead to an extra-legal solution. The Communists will probably gain influence during the coming decade, but any attempt to form a coalition including the Communists would provoke severe strains within the Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties and perhaps cause some party splits.

D. Barring the unforeseen, moderate forces should do well enough in 1973 to retain power. But in the race between mounting problems and the capacity to solve them, which will be characteristic of the 1970s, it is impossible to know who will be the victor. In the longer term, a regime with a radical bent, either to the right or to the left, could emerge.

E. Italy's defense posture and psychological orientation remain firmly based upon the Atlantic alliance and the European Communities. Détente in Europe has its attractions to the Italians, but at the same time Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and Soviet treatment of the Czech affair have not been reassuring. In the longer term, Italy's continued strong adherence to the Atlantic alliance will depend not only upon the extent of Communist influence but also—and perhaps more importantly—upon developments outside Italy, including the evolving character of the alliance itself.

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Postwar Italy has in many ways been a resounding success. Parliamentary democracy has survived for 25 years, a rather considerable achievement in a country so long beset by such deep divisions and difficult problems. The economy, once one of the more backward in Western Europe, has performed extremely well, even brilliantly. And, on the international scene, Italy has won a greater measure of respect and security than ever before in its century of history as a modern state.

2. For all that, Italy today is in a troubled, apprehensive mood. Both the economy and the political system have been found wanting by substantial numbers of its people. Popular discontent with backward institutions, inadequate social services, and inequitable economic arrangements is growing. So too is the willingness of the disaffected to express their discontent in new and more disruptive ways. But, while pressures for change are mounting and responsible leaders recognize

that there is a clear need for reform, the road to reform is often blocked by strongly entrenched interests, a self-absorbed and self-serving “political class,” and a swollen and inert government bureaucracy. The principal question for the 1970s thus may be whether or not the frequent crises in the Italian government will intensify, create opportunities for the extremists of both left and right, and weaken society as a whole.

II. THE SETTING

A. Some Basic Problems

3. A center-left coalition made up of Christian Democrats, two varieties of Socialists, and Republicans came into being some eight years ago after a long period of gestation. Proponents of this “opening to the left” believed that it would broaden support within the government for more progressive social and economic policies and enhance the government’s stability by augmenting its majority in Parliament. It was hoped at the same time that the coalition would, by pre-empting some of their social objectives, diminish the appeal of the Communists and, by forcing them into isolated opposition, reduce the power and influence of the Communist Party itself.

4. On most of these counts, the center-left experiment has proved to be a distinct disappointment. Some social issues—e.g., social security reform—have been dealt with competently; many economic questions—e.g., agricultural reform, long-term planning—have been addressed effectively. But little or no progress has been made in solving problems in other major areas of national life and, indeed, some are far more troublesome today than they were in the early 1960s. The state administrative structure is antiquated; the tax system is inefficient and grossly unfair; housing, urban transportation, health services, and the higher educational establishment are clearly inadequate. They have, of course, always been deficient. What is new is that public frustration, resentment, and alienation are widespread and may be growing.

5. In recent years popular unrest has spilled over into violence. Extremist groups of both the left and right, including students, have led or exploited demonstrations resulting in violence in several cities. More important, organized labor has developed a shorter temper and become more militant: wildcat strikes are more common; organized protests have become more frequent and more vehement; and rank-and-file members of the unions have become increasingly impatient with both the government and their own leaders. Some of this labor activism has paid off handsomely—last autumn’s strikes won major wage increases (25 to 40 percent over three years) and reductions in working hours for 5 million workers. Labor activism has subsided, at

least for a time, but the appetites and sense of power of the workers have no doubt been enhanced.

6. The irony is that manifestations of popular unrest have become commonplace during a period of unparalleled prosperity. Throughout the 1950s and during most of the 1960s, Italy's rate of real economic growth averaged more than five percent, and per capita real income rose over 50 percent in the past decade alone. Overall, the economy has been transformed; it is now in many respects advanced, efficient, and competitive, even by the elevated standards of Western Europe. But some problems of long standing persist, such as the severe economic imbalance between north and south, and others have only recently emerged, such as lagging industrial production, serious inflation, and a worsening trade deficit. In any case, the center-left's primary successes, principally economic, have not contributed notably to its popularity with the electorate. The appeal of the Communists among the disgruntled remains as strong as ever, and the political strength of the Communist Party has not in the least diminished.

B. The Current Political Scene

7. The center-left formula has been subjected to intense pressures ever since the initial coalition government was formed in 1963. Partnership survived the successive strains of economic crisis, a Presidential election, and personal political maneuvering during 1964, 1965, 1966, and doubts concerning its viability gradually receded. But Socialist losses and Communist gains in the 1968 Parliamentary elections severely shook the confidence of the major coalition partners. The Socialist Party soon split apart, there were repeated government crises, public confidence waned, and energies needed to grapple with pressing national problems were devoted to increasingly fruitless and seemingly endless political squabbling.

8. Major local elections were held in June 1970. The electorate voted for municipal and provincial councilors, as in the past, but also cast ballots for 15 newly created regional councils, thus providing a test of political strength on an almost nation-wide basis. The results revealed only small shifts in voting patterns, with the center-left slightly increasing its share (to about 58 percent). On the far left the Communists fared about the same as in 1968 (approximately 27 percent), and the Proletarian Socialists lost substantially. On the far right, the Monarchists lost heavily; the Neo-Fascists increased their strength but not enough to compensate for Monarchist losses. As had been anticipated, the center-left parties gained control of 12 of the 15 new regions, and the far left carried one of the three "Red Belt" regions (Emilia-Romagna) and formed a governing majority with the Socialists in the other two (Tuscany and Umbria).

9. While the election results initially had been considered a mandate for moderation and a vote of confidence in the center-left idea, they proved less reassuring as time went on. Among other things, the long-simmering dispute within the center-left coalition over Socialist cooperation with the Communists came to a boil immediately after the June elections. The Socialists set about enlarging their participation in local governments by joining far left coalitions in areas where center-left majorities were not “politically” feasible—thereby somewhat increasing the number of local governments in which Communists and Proletarian Socialists participated. At the same time, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists set up numerous two-party local administrations which excluded the Social Democrats. These developments alarmed and infuriated the Social Democrats who feared an incipient reversion to Socialist-Communist “unity of action” as well as future Catholic-Socialist collaboration at the national level. The whole troublesome question was papered over after Prime Minister Rumor’s sudden resignation in July and after the formation of the new Colombo government in August. In the process, the Christian Democratic right and the Social Democrats appear to have lost ground.

C. The Major Coalition Parties

10. The Christian Democratic Party has either governed alone or dominated every government coalition in Italy since World War II, but respect for the Catholic Church and the desire simply to retain power seem to be the only identifiable motives shared by most of its members. The reformist-minded left wing (a scant one-third of the party) favors more or less open dialogue with the Communists in the interest of both facilitating enactment of the government’s program and encouraging the Communists toward a more reformist course. On the other hand, the conservative right wing (somewhat less than one-third of the party) firmly opposes such a dialogue as well as many of the reform planks in the center-left program itself. Especially since 1968, factional divisions within the Christian Democratic Party have prevented it from exercising effective leadership and, together with the strains within the coalition as a whole, have contributed to governmental drift. So too have the maneuvers of two prominent Christian Democratic leaders—Senate President Fanfani and Foreign Minister Moro—each of whom is seeking to gain control of the party as a step toward winning the Italian Presidency at the close of 1971.

11. The split of the Socialist Party in July 1969 was primarily the result of a bitter struggle for control of the briefly unified party, but the ideological schism is genuine. The Socialists believe the Communists are an increasingly national party and should be encouraged to share some type of responsibility for instituting needed social reforms. The Socialists also appear to link their appeal to labor and their own sur-

vival as a party with their ability to act as a nexus between the Communists and a leftward-drifting Christian Democratic majority. The more conservative Social Democrats generally view the Communists as Moscow-dominated, undemocratic, and unacceptable partners on any level of government.

D. The Communists

12. Still, despite the often equivocal nature of positions taken, no responsible center-left leader now appears to believe that the time is ripe for direct Communist participation in the national government. Christian Democratic left and Socialist spokesmen talk of "dialogue" and acceptance of Communist support on specific, mutually desired programs, but not of outright partnership. Nor do Communist leaders now appear eager to expose the party to the internal and external strains which would accompany the assumption of a share of government responsibility. The Communists have done quite well in opposition—rising from 22.6 percent of the national vote in 1953 to 26.9 percent in 1968—and they have no reason to fear that their fortunes will suffer seriously in the national elections scheduled for 1973.

13. Several factors have enhanced Communist voter appeal over the years. The Roman Catholic Church does not intervene on behalf of the Christian Democrats as directly and as often as it once did (though there are exceptions on some issues, such as divorce). The Church has also eased its stand against members who might wish—principally as a form of protest—to vote Communist. Among voters at large, the Party's reputation has been improving. It has successfully projected an image of national communism (condemning, for example, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) and of pragmatic accommodation (as with both business and the Church in Communist-controlled and well-administered Bologna). Moreover, until recently, the Communists have managed to avoid the really serious factionalism which is endemic in the other major parties. The party considers pro-Chinese Communist groups to be temporary and manageable aberrations. The emergence in 1969 of the so-called Manifesto group made up of extreme left-wing elements, who were read out of the party, could cause the Communists some electoral and organizational problems in the future.

14. Internal migration patterns have helped the Communists at the polls. Having left the conservative influence of the parish priest behind, southern migrants to northern cities (more than 1.2 million made the move in the 1960–1968 period alone) have been welcomed by various Communist-sponsored organizations which are often the only organized groups which seem to care about their welfare. Finally, cooperation among the major labor confederations, advocated by the

Communist-dominated General Confederation of Italian Labor, has paid off handsomely, a lesson not lost on many Italian workers.

15. Seeking to reduce their own isolation by undermining the center-left coalition, the Communists in June warmly welcomed the opportunity provided by the elections for increased cooperation with the Socialists. They now apparently hope for a period of controlled tension, short of violent disruption, under a series of center-left governments in semi-disarray. Such an atmosphere would most suit their purposes while they ascertain what advantage they might extract in return for their support in the secret parliamentary balloting for the Presidency.² They will probably try to avoid a major political crisis before the 1973 elections.

III. SHORT-TERM PROGNOSIS

16. The political future of Italy will in the main be determined—at least up to the national elections of 1973—by the five thousand or so people in Rome—elected representatives, party officials, and hangers-on—who collectively make up the so-called *classe politica*. The behavior of this political class has alienated many Italians from their government and has probably encouraged new doubts about parliamentary government in general. Italians have long been accustomed to having their elected representatives indulge, at times, an almost total disregard for the country's needs in their single-minded pursuit of personal power or advantage. The corrosive effect such behavior has had on political stability was clearly evident during the repeated government crises of the past year when the maneuvers of the Socialists versus the Social Democrats, and vice versa, brought the center-left coalition perilously close to dissolution, while factional struggles within the Christian Democratic Party continued unabated when mutual restraint and accommodation were needed most.

17. Still, prospects for relative stability in the short term are reasonably good. While chances for an extended run by any particular center-left government are not very bright, factors do exist which should help to restrain the tactics of the opposition (including the Communists) and to preserve the center-left formula in one variation or another for the next two years or so. Most of the troublemakers are inclined toward a low profile, at least for a while. For example, the conservatives (the right-wing Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats), who had tried to force early national elections in order to capitalize on what they

² It is politically (and constitutionally) possible to elect a President without Communist support. The probability of this occurring, however, is slim since it would require more agreement within and among the democratic parties than is likely in 1971. Instead, Communist support will probably be needed by current presidential aspirants as it was by President Gronchi in 1955 and President Saragat in 1964. [Footnote is in the original.]

thought was a shift of sentiment to the right, now know they had misjudged the political mood of the electorate; they now see that they have little choice but to join their left-wing colleagues in maintaining four-party, center-left rule. The Communists too have an interest in avoiding trouble and do not wish to dislodge the center-left in the near term; they wish, instead, to consolidate their position on the local and regional levels and to increase their influence in Rome during the bargaining over the election of a new President.

18. Labor, for its part, recognizes that its strength as a force separate and distinct from the party connections of the major labor confederations has registered on the new government. While the leaders of the major confederations expect to have a growing impact on government policy—through direct consultations with high government officials and increased unity of labor action on specific issues—they also apparently recognize the current need for some restraint in pressing their demands. Their problem is to keep ahead of worker aspirations and wildcat activists if they wish to retain control; this could lead them to press for wage concessions and social reform more rapidly than prudence would dictate.

19. Prime Minister Colombo is, in fact, banking on labor's recognition of the need for restraint to permit him to concentrate on Italy's current and potential economic problems. With price pressures and the need to offset rising labor costs in mind, he hopes to encourage savings and productive investment, make up for the losses in production caused by strikes, and, at the same time, show some responsiveness to the strong pressures for social reform. He has relied primarily on practical fiscal measures to accomplish these ends: i.e., raising indirect taxes and using tax incentives to encourage borrowing abroad and to expand the capital market at home.

20. The almost insoluble problem of unequal development in the south of Italy will also continue to occupy government planners. While geographic disparities in average annual income will certainly persist for the foreseeable future, continued improvement in the economy of the South under government-sponsored programs is to be expected. But something will have to give, for labor's demands for reform cannot be fully met *and* industrial capacity expanded *and* the South's problems ameliorated *and* inflationary pressures controlled. And what is most likely to give for the time being is early implementation of some of the reforms demanded by labor. Sufficient concessions will probably be made, however—e.g., in the areas of low cost housing and national health service reform—to keep labor relatively quiet for a year or so. Assuming that there are no major labor disruptions during this period, the real economic growth rate should be maintained at a more-than-respectable five to six percent.

21. The prospects then appear fairly good for a reasonable degree of stability in Italy in the near term. Current economic problems may ease or at least not become much worse, and it may be that some progress will also be made in attacking chronic social ills and deficiencies. No political group, including the Communists, seems eager to provoke the kind of political crisis which could evolve into a crisis of regime. Few Italians will love their government or their leaders, but few will also want to take chances on what would follow if the regime collapsed.

22. Since the founding of the Italian Republic, top military and security figures have for the most part avoided direct involvement in politics, and rumors of extralegal solutions to the frequently unsettled governmental situation have had little basis in fact. But recently a few high military leaders—particularly in the army—have begun to express growing concern over the threat to government institutions posed by recurrent crises, violent civil unrest, and the possibility of Communist participation in the government. A coup attempt engineered by a combination of military and other conservative political and business interests is an outside possibility, particularly in the event of widespread violence. Such an attempt would be vigorously opposed by the Socialists and Communists and by most of the Christian Democrats as well. Unless carried out with extraordinary skill and backed strongly by the military as a whole, it would probably fail. But it might, even in failure, hurt public confidence in democratic institutions, discredit or fractionize the Christian Democrats, and bring into power a left-front government including the Communists.

IV. THE LONGER-TERM OUTLOOK

23. Whatever their particular political stripe, the governments of Italy in power during the 1970s will face a variety of high priority domestic demands but will in all probability possess only limited means of satisfying them. The economy is basically strong, but resources are finite and performance will be uneven. The system as a whole—public administration, economic infrastructure, educational institutions, and social services—works but does not work well. And there is some reason to wonder if, as the problems of the society become more complex, there will ever be enough resolution, knowledge, and talent, particularly in Rome, to make it work much better.

24. The increasing demands of a technologically based economy, for example, cannot long be satisfied by Italy's crowded, poorly equipped, and inadequately staffed universities. Even passage of a number of reforms proposed by the center-left to do away with much of the archaic, elitist-oriented weakness of the higher educational system would not insure rapid and dramatic improvement in the situation. The physical expansion of educational facilities will require

decades, and encrusted academic hierarchies will continue to fight changes that would mean a diminution of their privileged status. Moreover, self-centered academicians are not the only inertial forces in Italian society. Resistance to change is a common bureaucratic failing, and it has achieved pandemic proportions among Italian civil servants. And each step in the reform process must be taken against the resistance of entrenched administrative interests as well as against the powerful conservative political and business forces involved in the legislative process.

25. As the decade progresses, labor's patience with this inertia-laden system is likely to wear thin. There could be renewed widespread strike activity leading to additional concessions, more inflationary pressure, and a probable slowdown in economic growth. In the process, the traditional insulation of the economy from the vicissitudes of Italian politics—one of the major factors contributing to both economic and political stability in Italy over the years—may incur serious damage which, in turn, could only work to the further detriment of Italy's economic well-being.

26. It has long been held that, despite its many problems, the center-left will continue to govern in Italy simply because there is no real alternative. It now appears, however, that significant elements among the coalition parties are conducting an intensified search for just such an alternative. A clearer indication of the direction which the search will take must await the results of the 1973 parliamentary elections. But a pronounced shift to the right in voter preference which would produce a stable centrist or center-right majority is not likely. Strong voter preference may not really be needed, on the other hand, to produce further leftward movement. President Saragat's term of office expires in 1971, and his influence may virtually disappear by 1973, even if he attempts to resume leadership of his old party, the Social Democrats. A relatively small increase by the Socialists could then well justify a Christian Democratic-Socialist version of the center-left formula—with or without the very small Republican Party but with the Social Democrats excluded.

27. The Communists will probably gain influence during the coming decade, but any attempt to form a coalition including the Communists would provoke severe strains within the Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties and perhaps cause some party splits. A significant percentage of the Communist faithful would be seriously opposed to cooperation with bourgeois elements. A potentially more difficult problem would be the Communists' loss of status as the "party of protest," a development which might have major consequences at the polls. Certainly these and other considerations—such as the Soviet attitude and the fortunes of the Communist party under President Al-

lende in Chile—will be much discussed by the party leadership before any decision to cooperate is taken. Perhaps the Communists will choose for a time to delay official cooperation but to provide some unofficial support.

28. The new regional administrations will not become fully operational for at least two years. Proponents of the regions have long held that they will sharpen administrative appreciation of local situations and accelerate response to priority local needs. Effective administration of the 12 new regions controlled by the center-left parties could do much to dispel the pall of frustration, resentment, or indifference which now characterizes the general Italian attitude toward the government in Rome. But if center-left parties view the regions more as a source of patronage than as a tool of reform, they will not only increase the alienation which the average Italian already feels for his government, but they will also increase the attraction of the Communists. In the three “Red Belt” regions, the Communists will set out to prove that they are responsible, responsive, and effective—and this time they will be proving it on the highest administrative level they have attained since their ouster from the national government in 1947.

29. It is perhaps too much to say that the center-left idea is living on borrowed time, in part because a truly vigorous center-left approach has as yet to be tried. But current and future center-left governments are not likely to be more effective than those of the past. Barring the unforeseen, moderate forces should do well enough in the national elections in 1973 to maintain power. But in the race between mounting problems and the political capacity to solve them, it is impossible to know who will be the victor. Moderate government has friends as well as enemies in Italy, but we also must recognize that the strains placed upon the regime by the 1970s may be too much for it to bear. Should this prove to be the case, a new regime with a more radical bent—either to the right or the left—could emerge.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

30. Abroad, Italy’s economy is closely tied to that of Western Europe, and Italian policies during the early 1970s will continue to support expansion of the Common Market and strong trade ties with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and the US. (The EEC, EFTA, and the US accounted for 65 percent of Italy’s total trade in 1969, while the East European Bloc accounted for only about six percent during the same period.) Italy has long been an advocate of British accession to the EEC, and a desire to offset the growing West German influence within the Community has reinforced this support. The Italians will also continue their strong, though secondary, interest in expanding trade with the Soviet Bloc during the 1970s. Here their interests will compete with those of West Germany and other European

countries. And, if the decade brings greater Communist influence in Italy, some slackening of Italian support for strengthening the EEC may become evident, particularly if the Soviets continue to pursue their line on détente and increased all-European economic cooperation.

31. Increased Communist influence during the 1970s would be more clearly evident in the non-economic aspect of Italy's foreign posture. Soviet pressures for a Conference on European Security (CES) awoke sympathetic vibrations among Italians who have hoped for détente even as they have sheltered under the comforting US NATO presence over the years. Italian Communist pressures for détente would thus reinforce rather than contradict an already existing bent in this direction. Italian interest in a CES is likely to increase in any event, even before 1973. Following upon recognition of Communist China, pressures within the government may develop for diplomatic recognition of East Germany and North Vietnam, and there will be a tendency to take action independent of the US example in such matters as the decade progresses.

32. Italian interests in the Middle East are somewhat different from those of the US. For years, for example, the Italians have been on good terms with most Arab states and have displayed a low-key "understanding" of the Arab position, though they have also maintained friendly relations with Israel. The Italians wish to be recognized as a Mediterranean as well as a European power and wish to preserve their commercial foothold in the area—particularly their oil interests. But they exercise very little influence in the Arab states and will almost certainly try in general to remain relatively inconspicuous and out of direct involvement in Middle Eastern quarrels.

33. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev doctrine, and the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean have had many Italians looking over their shoulders in recent years. Even the Communist Party has found it appropriate to hedge on the issue of a one-sided weakening of NATO, both for domestic political considerations and because Italian NATO membership may serve the party's pretensions to independence from Moscow for some time to come. Italy's defense posture and its psychological orientation are still firmly rooted in adherence to the North Atlantic alliance, and it is as disturbed as the other West European allies over the possibility of a US drawdown in Europe in 1971. In the longer term, Italy's continued strong adherence to the Atlantic alliance will depend not only upon the extent of Communist influence but also—and perhaps more importantly—upon developments outside Italy, including the evolving character of the alliance itself. So long as the alliance and the European Communities have vitality, there will be serious economic and psychological obstacles to a reversal of Italy's ties with them.

201. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency

December 4, 1970, 1442Z.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 79–00399R. Secret; Eyes Only; Rybat; KMBALL. 8 pages not declassified.]

202. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Rome, December 21, 1970, 0915Z.

373. Subject: Rome 372, WH 02232.² Deliver only to Kissinger or Haig at opening of business. As requested your WH 02232, following is text of memorandum left with Secretary Rogers on October 28th 70.

To: the Secretary. From: Graham Martin. Subject: Political action proposal for Italy.

1. As you requested, I am summarizing some rather firm conclusions I have reached after almost a year's intensive observation of the internal Italian scene—conclusions which I hope to have the opportunity to present to the President during my current visit to the United States.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Subject Files, Backchannel Messages Europe, Mideast, Latin America 1970 [1 of 2]. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Kissinger annotated the message: "Make summary for Pres. Schedule early 40 Committee consideration." Haig drew a line from this comment and wrote: "Sonnenfeldt Action Rush. Coord[inate] w[ith] Chapin."

² In backchannel message 372 from Rome, December 19, Martin stated that Pier Talenti would be in Washington and suggested that Kissinger meet with him, downplaying Talenti's assessment of the Italian political scene as extreme. The Ambassador stressed the need for a reform of the DC as critical to the containment of the PCI and expressed concern that his recommendations were being ignored in the Department of State and that Kissinger's staff had not passed on his October request for a meeting with Kissinger. (Ibid.) In fact, the request had been forwarded in a November 6 memorandum to Haig. (Ibid.) A memorandum of conversation between Haig and Talenti, December 22, is *ibid.*, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Message WH 2232, December 19, informed the Ambassador that Talenti would meet with either Kissinger or Haig and that an appointment for a meeting with the President would be made for Martin during his next U.S. visit. (Ibid., Box 423, Subject Files, Backchannel Messages Europe, Mideast, Latin America 1970 [1 of 2])

³ Martin was in Washington, at special invitation, for an interagency meeting to discuss NIE 24–70 (Document 200).

2. Due in large part to the success of the President's visit, there is a greatly increased awareness on the part of the senior Italians of the serious intent of this administration to maintain the American commitment in Europe and in the Mediterranean. They are reassured that there is a clear understanding of the vital role Italy can and must play in facilitating the fulfillment of this commitment, and a renewed confidence that they can, in fact, make such a contribution. There is, therefore, a renewed confidence in the continuing validity of the special Italo-American relationship.

3. Colombo has started off well. We had no doubt of his technical qualifications. It now appears that he also has not only the instinct to govern, but also the will to govern. The shock treatment deliberately administered by Rumor in July⁴ has, in part, arrested the internecine warfare within the coalition and within the Christian Democratic Party. Despite the ever-present possibility of an accident that may bring him down, Colombo should last, at least well into the winter and, quite possibly, through until the Presidential elections next year.⁵

4. We have a little time. I hope we can use it wisely. To do so it is necessary that we have a clear understanding of certain basic facts. We must:

A. Recognize that the stakes are very high, for without a friendly and cooperative Italy, the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance and a tenable and effective American position in the Mediterranean is not very likely.

B. Recognize that while the Communists are and will continue to be a formidable force within Italy, they are not nine feet tall; that they have large areas of vulnerability subject to exploitation, and that they can repeat can be prevented from taking over Italy, or from participating in the national government within this decade.

C. Recognize that the center-left formula is dead in the sense that it is alleged to represent a viable party coalition with a common ideological concept capable of being translated into a coherent program of legislative action to achieve the kind of reforms essential to the preservation of a democratic structure in Italy. At present the center-left is merely a mathematical grouping within the present Parliament, held together only by a common abhorrence of again facing the electorate until the last possible moment.

D. Recognize that the Socialist Party (PSDI) as presently constituted, regardless of the personal inclination of its principal leaders, will

⁴ Reference to Rumor's resignation; see footnote 2, Document 196.

⁵ In fact, Colombo's government lasted until January 15, 1972.

be remorselessly pushed by its own internal dynamics into ever-closer collaboration with the Communists.

E. Recognize that basic American interests in Italy are inextricably linked with the survival and revitalization of the Christian Democratic Party, and that while the remaking and revitalization of the CD Party will be difficult and extremely complex, it is, nevertheless, a feasible goal.

F. Recognize that as this process gets under way, it will compel such a realignment within and among the other parties that, even if the Christian Democrats do not win a Parliamentary majority in 1973, a viable coalition oriented more toward the center can be achieved.

G. Recognize that the still existing enormous American moral influence in Italy can be effective only if we choose to utilize it, in ways that will be understandable and credible to Italians to demonstrate the depth of our concern about the future of Italy.

5. A good deal has already been accomplished in the past year. Instead of an Embassy with assorted independent, autonomous representatives of other U.S. departments and agencies, we now have a unified United States diplomatic mission with the activities of each section increasingly reinforcing and complementing the activities of other sections within the framework of overall U.S. policy.

6. Italy is one of the few countries where the right kind of American presence is an asset rather than a liability. Aside from certain further minor military reductions which may be safely made, I do not wish to see American presence reduced below its present level. OPRED and BALPA⁶ were useful in reducing both marginal positions and marginal people. However, after the addition, which I have already requested, of four American positions on the State complement and four American positions on the USIA complement, I now need to freeze the overall diplomatic mission complement, both American and local, at its June 30, 1970 level.

7. We have sharpened the focus of our information activities but we need to do more in this field.

8. We are now in communication with a far broader spectrum of Italian political life. The fact that we really do care what future course Italy may choose is increasingly known. The quiet but intense pressures the Mission exerted were not unrelated to the results of the June regional elections where the Communists failed to gain for the first time in fourteen years.

⁶ For BALPA, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 303 and footnote 5 thereto. For OPRED, see *ibid.*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 25.

9. We have established a relationship with the Italian military establishment of increasing intimacy and trust which has already proven very fruitful [3½ lines not declassified]

10. [7 lines not declassified] I am convinced we have the capability to guide and influence Italian political evolution to a quite satisfactory result [1 line not declassified]

11. [5 lines not declassified] It is a perfectly feasible and attainable goal. I arranged with Rogers C. B. Morton and Bob Hitt of the Republican National Committee to receive a score of young Christian Democratic members of Parliament. This visit was a resounding success, partly because it was private, but primarily because it opened their eyes to the possibility of harnessing modern technology and techniques to the pragmatic tasks involved in winning a political campaign. They now realize that the traditional practice of improvising an organization a month before the election is just not adequate if they hope to successfully compete with the Communists who are working at the grass roots level every day of the year. The enthusiasm of this particular group of young Christian Democratic politicians has been infectious and we have already been approached by other Christian Democratic leaders to expand and intensify this type of cooperation.

12. This is only one example of what we can do. As the process continues we will not only be contributing to the revitalization of the party machinery, but we will be also building a core of able young political leaders capable of gradually influencing formation of a coherent and workable majority within the party. We will benefit from their growing sense of identification with US—an identification they will welcome. All of these things must be done without tying ourselves to any faction or any particular faction leader, leaving ourselves the maximum flexibility to support those who will clearly further our own goals and objectives, and to quietly but firmly withhold our support from others.

13. There is also a fruitful field for furthering our objectives by supporting those elements of the non-Communist labor movement in Italy with which we share common objectives.

14. If we are serious about Italy, we must recognize that for our support to be credible and effective, it must also be material and concrete. This means money, not on the scale of the more than \$20 million a year now provided by the Soviet Union to the Communists in Italy, but at least [less than 1 line not declassified] over the next three years. Money alone will not be enough. We must have the capability to use it flexibly, with great speed when desired, and above all with complete precision to achieve specific goals. Under no circumstances should we resume the scatter-gun approach of the past in the vague hope that if we support everybody, we keep everybody happy. There is no sure way to vitiate what influence we may be able to otherwise bring to bear and to

earn a contempt which would be justified. Rather than do this I would prefer no money at all. Consequently, if the decision is to go ahead, and I believe this to be the decision our interests demand, I would propose that I be given sole authority on how it will be utilized, subject only to such continuous postaudit as may be directed. I just do not believe that a program such as I recommend can be implemented while being continuously nibbled to death by the bureaucratic mattress mice in Washington.

15. When you were staying with me last May in Rome,⁷ I was much impressed by your comment on the apparent inevitability of leaks in Washington on proposals of this sort. Consequently, neither this memorandum nor its substance has been seen by or discussed with anyone other than you. I hope you have the opportunity to discuss its content with the President at San Clemente and I would hope to discuss it with both of you when you return to Washington next week.

⁷ Rogers was in Rome May 26–27.

203. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Current Scene in Italy

The Italian scene does not present a happy picture. While the basic situation has not seriously deteriorated, there has been no marked improvement in essential stability. The events in Chile have, at the least, served to increase general Western European (and Italian) interest in encouraging improvement.

In recent weeks, economic issues have dominated the forefront. The level of production in Italy during 1970 dropped more than any other European country; large enterprises suffered a 25% rise in the cost of labor in the same period. This situation has made more acute the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum bears the stamped notation: "The President has seen."

issue of social reforms. The left and the labor unions are pressing even harder for these reforms, and the right is arguing that in light of economic conditions, and question whether it is correct to add billions of lire to public expenditures necessary to finance these reforms. In a speech on January 9, Prime Minister Colombo took a middle line: insufficient production should not be taken as a pretext for delay or annulment of reforms, but enactment of reforms without a corresponding increase in national resources would mean the reforms would bog down. Colombo has promised a Government "white paper" at the end of the month on the issue of public expenditures. In the meantime, the issue will continue to boil.

Politically, strains continue among and within the coalition parties. Presidential elections are scheduled for December, and several personalities are jockeying for position (Moro and Fanfani remain the leading contenders at this point). But the maneuvering and sub-rosa alliances in the making increase the climate of political uncertainty. There was some speculation that President Saragat might resign early to save Italy from a year of political maneuvering, but a Quirinale communiqué last week laid this rumor to rest.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) this month celebrates its 50th birthday. Objectively, the PCI looks increasingly fat and part of the system, but the parties of the Center-Left seem by comparison even fatter, more tired and perhaps more corrupt. The PCI is taking the public line of moderation not eternal opposition, and certainly not revolution. By playing this moderate game, it hopes to continue its way toward, if not into, the Italian Government. No other party tries hard to compete with the PCI's claim to be the basic party of the Italian worker, even though it in fact receives only a minority of the Italian workers' vote, and of course has championed the cause of social reform.

The issue remains whether the democratic Italian parties can manage to submerge their current near total preoccupation with factional maneuvering and concentrate on taking the reform plank away from the PCI. If they do not, it is possible that the PCI may ease still further toward an established place in the governmental sphere. The next regularly scheduled parliamentary elections will be in the spring of 1973. The PCI is working to increase its vote (some 30% of the vote), particularly in the face of its slight turn-down last June.

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum reviewing the current Italian political scene (Tab A).² With respect to our policy, he judges that we should intensify efforts to ensure that the Italian governing class understands that we would be greatly disturbed by any

² Not printed.

movement toward accepting the PCI into the national government. At the same time, we should not lend any encouragement to the far right for any sort of military adventure.³

³ The President underlined that portion of the paragraph beginning “ensure that the Italian governing” and ending with “military adventure,” and wrote: “We must hit this hard.”

204. Intelligence Information Cable

January 22, 1971.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. II. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*; Controlled Dissem; *[handling restriction not declassified]*; Background Use Only. 6 pages not declassified.]

205. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

CJCS Memo M–21–71

Washington, February 13, 1971.

SUBJ

Situation in Italy

1. Please pass to the President, for his eyes only, the substance of a secure telephone message received by me on Thursday, 11 February, from *[1 line not declassified]*

2. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* said that since I had told him *[less than 1 line not declassified]* to come to me if he had a problem I could help

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive. Instructions on a covering memorandum read: “Msg is to be delivered in sealed envelope marked eyes only, directly to General Haig. File copies will not be retained.”

him with he wanted to inform me of the serious political situation in Italy. This with the idea that during the forthcoming visit to the United States by Prime Minister Colombo and Foreign Minister Moro, the President could indicate his concern and, perhaps, [9 lines not declassified] and others [6½ lines not declassified] If current government should fail, no elections can constitutionally be held during the six months preceeding election of the new President by Parliament in December, 1971 and, consequently, this precludes going to the electorate during that period.

3. [14 lines not declassified]

4. [less than 1 line not declassified] has reported to me when I followed up on this matter that he has heard a number of senior military officers recently express concern about the political situation but none in as urgent terms as [4½ lines not declassified]

5. I am convinced that [less than 1 line not declassified] and the other senior Italian officers are extremely worried [4 lines not declassified]

6. [2½ lines not declassified] There is absolutely no question about his loyalty and pro-U.S. and anti-Communist position.

7. [less than 1 line not declassified] They are both dedicated, loyal and very pro-U.S. As you can understand, [4 lines not declassified]

8. [3 lines not declassified]

T. H. Moorer

206. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 18, 1971, 11 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Colombo

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon

Prime Minister Colombo

Mr. Boniver (Prime Minister's Interpreter)

Mr. Neil A. Seidenman (State Department)

The President said to the Prime Minister that since his last visit in Rome² he had followed with interest the problems he has had to face. It seems so natural in our times that most countries have about one crisis per day, but the Prime Minister has been doing very well. The Prime Minister replied appreciatively that in a sense this was really the way things had to be done.

The President asked about the present political situation in Italy, remarking that one reads so many "horror stories" in the press about what is happening between the democratic forces and the opposition elements.

The Prime Minister replied that one can read "horror stories" in the Italian press as well. On the Italian political scene, a four-party coalition has been re-built, consisting of the two Socialist parties, the Republican Party, and the DC. This is a coalition that has its problems and at times is difficult to hold together. But there is really no alternative to this formula. Specifically with regard to the DC party, the press often exaggerates the significance of what appears to be a new stance taken by DC left-wing factions. Within the DC, however, the fact is that the majority rules out any cooperation with the Communists. Furthermore, the left-wing factions themselves at no time have actually asserted a desire to bring the Communists into the government. To be sure, the Communists pose a problem as the most powerful of the opposition parties. And nowadays they have become especially dangerous in that they are seeking to project an image of respectability, donning the cloak of a party of democratic opposition. The DC, therefore, must make a consistent effort to maintain among the voters the distinction between what the coalition stands for and what the Communists really are. And

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Colombo visited Washington February 18–20.

² See Document 197.

it is important to avoid overstepping to the right or to the left. For example, in Italy, if circumstances seem to strengthen the parties on the right, particularly with reference to the Neo Fascists, the Communists will take advantage of this and try to drum up a common front against Fascism. Hence, the effort must be to continue and preserve the policy of democratic solidarity of the parties that stand against Fascism, maintaining the strength of the democratic parties and keeping the rightist parties in their appropriate historical place.

The President then asked if there was any validity of accounts to the effect that the Communists were growing in strength, to the extent that Italy might be threatened with political disaster.

Prime Minister Colombo replied that the strength of the Communists is a fact of life. But their coming into the government is most unlikely. The DC would never accept cooperation with the Communists.

President Nixon asked the Prime Minister if Italy's link to NATO was harmful with reference to the popularity of the government, from a purely pragmatic political standpoint. The President expressed his conviction that the strength, independence, and progress of Italy is indispensable to the future of Europe, the Mediterranean area, and to the world. Italy has been at the forefront of efforts toward European integration, which the President said he is in agreement with and indeed applauds. All of this is fully recognized. But does Italy's stand in this regard hurt the government's popularity; would it not fare better by adopting a more neutral stance?

Prime Minister Colombo replied that in all of its policy statements, each of the coalitions, including the present one, has reiterated two fundamental points of firm commitment: 1) faithful adherence to the alliance, and 2) the building of Europe. The President inquired further as to whether this constituted a position of popular strength in Italy. We are aware of the things that have been done and are grateful for them. But with the survival in Italy of the Prime Minister's government and party constituting such an important issue, do these things help or harm? The President illustrated his point by referring to a comment made to him by a friend from the Philippines, which of course enjoys a special relationship with the United States. This particular leader told the President that the secret of political success in the Philippines is to "give Hell" to the United States, while in reality no one wants to get rid of the U.S. The President also recalled the warm welcome he has always received in his visits to Italy. But he is aware that in many parts of the world, to speak against the U.S. is politically useful.

Prime Minister Colombo said that there is little doubt that Italy's position of friendship with the U.S. does not make it popular with the Communists or among the extreme left parties. But the President asked

if the GOI's position was harmful to its image with the majority of the people.

The Prime Minister replied that it was not. This policy, of course, must be implemented with the appropriate sophistication and "nuance." Some issues require a subtle approach. For example, the Mediterranean policy, particularly with reference to the problem of the Middle East. Were the Italian Government not to give a very definite impression that it maintains the hope of negotiations and that it is working to bring about fruitful negotiations in that area, then its position would diminish in popularity even among those friendly to Italy's links with the U.S. and the NATO. Another example of "current interest" in this regard; Italy extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China last year,³ while preserving the position it has adopted to date on the Important Question, within the U.N. However, in the event that the GOI fails to find a solution to this problem within the next year or so, it will have troubles, for its position will come in for criticism even on the part of those who support Italian foreign policy formulas. Still another subject of utmost importance is Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister assured the President that his policy of gradual disengagement there has been helpful to the GOI.

The President replied that he could at this time convey to the Prime Minister, confidentially, that the program in Southeast Asia is going well, that in South Vietnam and Laos we are buying time so that they can take over more and more of their own defense, and that should he and the Prime Minister come together again next year at this time, this issue may no longer exist. We, of course, cannot say publicly, the President went on, exactly what our pullout program is. We must hold on to the "negotiating stick" regarding the problem of the prisoners of war, and for other reasons. But the program will lead to the time when South Vietnam will be able to survive as a strong and independent country.

The President made reference to the Middle East. He said it could be assumed that this issue would be delved into at greater length between Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Moro,⁴ as it is a question of great interest to Italy. And indeed it constitutes a very serious problem. The Arabs and the Israelis may go on hating each other for another 1,000 years, just as they have for the last 5,000 years. But the President said he believed that with a renewal of the cease-fire, in March, we should not worry too much about the day-to-day statements and coun-

³ See Document 199.

⁴ Rogers and Moro and their delegations were also meeting at this time. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 923, VIP Visits, Italy PM Colombo Visit.

terstatements by Premier Golda Meir and by President Sadat. After all, if there is a new outbreak of fighting in the Middle East, there will be no winner. Therefore, each side has a considerable stake and must seek peace. And now there is hope of bringing about the re-opening of the Suez Canal.

The President again stressed his concern, from an historical viewpoint, about the internal political situation in Italy, which could affect the future of Europe and the Mediterranean area. If Italy is able to continue its economic progress and its government's orientation to the West and hold down the Communists, this will be a source of strength and stabilization. In the U.S. there is the saying, "As Maine goes, so goes the country!" This is no longer true, but it parallels our feeling that as Italy goes, so goes Europe. What happens in Italy can affect Spain, Greece, all of North Africa, and other countries of Europe. It seems that now, more than ever since the time of the Roman Empire, it is valid to say that what happens in Rome affects Europe. The President said that many of his friends and visitors—from Spain, etc.—have stated to him that what happens in Italy is very important. For this reason, we want to cooperate in any way possible.

The Prime Minister stated that there is definite awareness in his country of Italy's responsibility in this regard, and that he in particular feels the heat of it. He said that he was absolutely certain, however [*moreover*], that were he to propose a policy involving a loosening of Italy's connection with the Atlantic Alliance, he would make more enemies than friends.

The President said that this would seem to indicate that, as is often the case, the enemies are louder, while friends are more numerous.

The Prime Minister said that this is so. He hastened to stress that he was referring only to foreign policy in this regard, and not to some of Italy's domestic issues. He went on to emphasize that Italy's position in the Mediterranean, and the effect of Italian policies on the Mediterranean area and Europe make him very much aware of his responsibility on this level, to the extent that if he did not enjoy majority support for this policy, he would not stay in office for another day.

The President asked Prime Minister Colombo what the major problems were that he is facing internally; in the social, economic, or political area. While he has kept abreast of developments generally, he said he wished to hear directly from the Prime Minister in this regard, as he himself saw the situation in his authority.

The Prime Minister said the economic situation in Italy was very much improved.

The President said that our concern about textiles was directed against Japanese textiles, not Italian textiles.

The President said he is a free trader and does not want to have quotas imposed on shoe imports. This was a delicate position for him to take. He asked that the Prime Minister not reveal publicly what he had just said about shoes.

The President said that if trade obstacles by the EC remain or are raised there would be negative reactions by U.S. trade interests, especially in the agricultural sector.

The President said we should all be sensitive to actions in the trade field so as not to trigger counter actions.

The President does not want to take action that would lead to retaliation.

The Prime Minister said he was grateful to the President for the position he had taken on the Mills Bill⁵ and he realized that it was difficult to take such a position.

The Prime Minister said that shoes and textiles created a very delicate problem in Italy.

The Prime Minister said that the tendencies in agriculture are always protectionist, and against liberalization.

The Prime Minister said that the EC's agricultural policy was too costly and that it would benefit all to modify their agricultural policies.

The President asked the Prime Minister if he could take the leadership in the EC on this issue.

The Prime Minister replied that he had done this and that as a result he is not very popular among farmers.

The Prime Minister said there must be sympathy and mutual understanding on trade issues and that there must be efforts in the EC to overcome problems with U.S.

The Prime Minister said Italy's partners in the EC had suggested that nothing be done to change the EC policies on meat, eggs, and ham but "let's liberalize citrus fruit first."

The Prime Minister said it would be a grave error to trigger a negative spirit of protectionist measures.

The Prime Minister said he has no doubt but that European integration is a very serious problem for the USSR. The President emphatically agreed, saying that while the Soviets have problems in other areas, such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and possibly China over the

⁵ H.R. 14879, introduced by Wilbur Mills (D-AR), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, imposed quotas on imports of textiles and footwear. The President had reluctantly supported the textiles provisions. A bill including the Mills proposals passed the House on November 19 but died in the Senate.

long haul, the prime area of concern is still Europe and unification is very definitely contrary to Soviet objectives.

Meeting adjourned at 12 Noon.⁶

⁶ Following their private discussion, the President and Prime Minister joined the meeting of Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Moro. The President met for a second time with the Italian delegation on February 20. According to a memorandum of conversation of this meeting, the President stated: "We support the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister toward ensuring a strong and unified [Christian Democratic] party. It is clear to us that the case of Chile illustrated how the bad can win when the good are divided. The Prime Minister's party, therefore, represents the best hope for the future of Italy. But only if it is unified so as not to allow a minority to come in and monopolize power." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 923, VIP Visits, Italy PM Colombo Visit)

207. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB-315/00868-71

Washington, February 19, 1971.

COUNTRY

Italy/Greece

DOI

Early February 1971

SUBJECT

Plans of Italian Social Movement to provoke a Greek-style takeover of the Italian Government by the Italian army

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[1 line not declassified]

1. An emissary of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) went to Greece in early February 1971 to seek "indirect financial" assistance from Greek Minister of Coordination Nicholas Makarezos and Secretary-General of the Ministry of Interior John Ladas in provoking a Greek-style takeover of the Italian Government by the Italian army.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]; Controlled Dissem; [handling restriction not declassified]; Background Use Only.

Makarezos did not make a definite response to his plea. The emissary claimed to belong to a conspiratorial group within the MSI [*1 line not declassified*] He said his group intends to provoke fights with the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in order to force the Italian army to step in to restore order “as in Greece.”

2. The emissary said his group has a force of civilians made up of veterans of the paratroops and marines who have arms at home. The group has allies in the army paratroops, marines, Carabinieri and air force, but not the police, nor can they count on army support generally outside the above-mentioned elite units.

3. The group plans to set off bombs within the next three to four months in the PCI headquarters at Reggio Calabria, Turin, Milan, Bologna, Rome and elsewhere to provoke street demonstrations by the Communists. The MSI activists then expect their people to fight the Communists in the street in order to force the army to step in and set up a strict regime.

4. The MSI emissary pointed out that France had a de Gaulle to re-establish discipline, but since Italy lacks such a leader the Italians must look to the Greek example and get the army to act to guarantee against a Communist victory. Once this has been accomplished, the Communist Party will fade away and young people will desert the various Communist extremist “Maoist” and “Ho Chi Minh chanting” groups in favor of national parties. The emissary said the activists consider themselves “rightists,” but they do not share the “archaic views of the monarchists. Their enemies call them Fascists,” but they are not proponents of Mussolini’s fascism.

5. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comment: [*1 line not declassified*] the MSI emissary returned to Italy disappointed at the lack of any concrete results from his talks with Greek officials.)

6. (*Headquarters comment:* While extremist groups of either the far right, such as the group discussed in this report, or of the far left undoubtedly have the capability to engage in individual acts of violence, there is no evidence to date of the existence of a cohesive force that has sufficient backing to pose a threat to the stability of the government. [*3 lines not declassified*])

7. Field dissem: None.

208. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 10 March 1971

1. *Italy—Political Action Program*

Mr. Hart described for the Committee the program outlined in the CIA paper dated 18 February 1971.² He noted that CIA had been involved in political action and labor activities in Italy over some 20 years until 1968 when the 303 Committee agreed that the remnants of these activities should be terminated since it was felt that the booming Italian economy provided ample sources of funds for political parties to support their own activities. Recent Italian political and economic developments suggest that a new political action program be considered.

Mr. Hart stated that the CIA proposal is essentially a broad charter encompassing a number of activities designed to strengthen the center and right center between now and the national elections scheduled in 1973 and that the program could conceivably extend beyond that. He pointed out that the largest expenditures would be in support of political candidates and their parties, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* but that there would also be a fairly major effort against the Italian Communist Party (PCI), *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Kissinger, referring to *[less than 1 line not declassified]* asked if it was in our interest to have a moderate CP and an extreme CP in Italy, since the moderates might wind up in the government.

Mr. Hart opined that any schism would be in our interest because the PCI brags constantly of its monolithic qualities whereas factionalism does exist which might successfully be exploited.

Mr. Hart stated that another portion of the proposal involved resumption of support to *[less than 1 line not declassified]* non-Communist labor union, which support had been discontinued in 1968. This effort would be designed to strengthen the control of the union's leader who is currently coping with a minority faction favoring unification of the labor movement which would result in its being PCI dominated and

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the memorandum reads: "Minutes shown to Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Beaudry, EUR, by Mr. Wellons on 5/10/71."

² Not printed. The paper included a detailed history of covert operations in Italy since 1948 together with a justification for resuming covert involvement and a series of information memoranda. (Ibid.)

thus give the PCI a dangerous degree of control over the Italian economy.

Mr. Hart noted that the proposal calls for efforts in the media field to attempt to get the media to be more responsive to centrist groups. He stated the major problem is with radio and T.V., which are predominately of strong leftist orientation. Mr. Hart commented that this is a problem which has defeated a lot of influential Italians, and he was not certain that these efforts will successfully change this orientation.

Mr. Hart referred to the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] activities outlined in the paper as essential first steps to be taken in order to update our information on the Italian scene and establish firm bases for the other actions.

Mr. Mitchell³ asked if, in view of the magnitude of the problem, there was anything else that could be done.

Mr. Hart responded that the CIA proposal is a broad general charter with a number of activities in support of its objectives and that the degree and emphases of these activities can be varied as necessary as the program develops.

Mr. Mitchell expressed his assumption that there would be periodic reporting back to the Committee as the program progresses.

Ambassador Martin stated he would like to speak to Mr. Mitchell's query concerning the magnitude of the problem and the adequacy of the effort proposed. He noted that he had been pointing out over the past several months the necessity for helping our Italian friends. He felt it essential to assist [*2 lines not declassified*]. He observed that the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] tendency is to get together and work hard only for three or four weeks before an election, whereas the PCI works very hard every day of the year. Ambassador Martin therefore considered it urgent to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and focus now on the 1973 elections.

Ambassador Martin drew a comparison between the scope of the CIA proposal and the total subsidies received by the PCI. He commented that official estimates of support received by the PCI is on the order of \$9,000,000 annually, but based on recent information he had received he judged \$20,000,000 to be a more realistic figure. Addressing himself specifically to Mr. Mitchell's previous query, he expressed the view that while the proposed support under consideration may not prove to be enough, it was enough to make a good start in the right direction. He stated that after initial explorations and talks with appropriate Italians, recommendations for increased efforts might prove to be in order.

³ Apparently Attorney General John Mitchell. No record explaining his participation at the meeting was found.

Ambassador Martin observed that current propaganda from the PCI stresses that the U.S. Government and the President, personally, have effectively written Italy off; the Socialists are being inexorably driven to the left and this will continue; Madame Binh, chief NVN negotiator at the Paris peace talks, on a recent visit to Italy was warmly received at shockingly high levels in and out of the government. For these and other reasons cited, he recommended approval of the kind of program under discussion.

Ambassador Martin strongly endorsed the need for [1½ lines not declassified] emphasized that the program would have to be handled covertly, and recognized additional personnel would be required. He also endorsed the support to [2 lines not declassified] With regard to the political action aspects, Ambassador Martin expressed the hope that this could be carried out with great flexibility. He estimated that if the program was not implemented at all there was a 55–45% chance the elections will come out fairly well from the point of view of U.S. interests. But with the program he believed the net result would be greatly increased DC parliamentary representation and a reduced PCI representation following the 1973 elections.

Ambassador Martin concluded with the hope that the Committee would approve this program and give him the flexibility and authority to direct the mix and implementation of the activities.

Mr. Johnson, noting that the U.S. had put some [less than 1 line not declassified] in covert action funding into Italy over a 20-year period and then decided to get out of this kind of activity in developed countries, expressed his natural reluctance over seeing it resumed. He recalled that the Committee a couple of years ago had concluded that there were ample resources and people in Italy who should be depended upon to save themselves rather than requiring the U.S. to do so. He asked for Ambassador Martin's views on this point.

Ambassador Martin stated that it is hard to envisage Italy as a member of NATO, as an important Mediterranean, European and indeed world power as a neutralist country. He agreed that it is true that money is available in Italy, but despite its long history Italy is really only 100 years old as an independent country and Italians have no faith in government. They have faith in themselves and in their families but tend to ignore their central government and their factionalism is intense. Ambassador Martin stated that there is in fact Italian support for the DC and for other pro-Western parties but they need help. He views the proposed program as exercising a catalytic effect which he hopes will generate additional Italian support for these parties.

Mr. Kissinger asked why the Italians do not do this themselves since they have the money.

Ambassador Martin responded that what is needed is the beginning of a reinforcement of a psychological attitude of confidence that the slide to the left is not inevitable. It will then be possible to enlist the support of the industrialists. The problem is that they do not want to see their money frittered away on factionalism. He reiterated his hope that this program will serve as the catalyst to generate the necessary confidence and elicit the financial support for the pro-Western parties. He expressed his belief that the proposal as constituted will be a good solid start in this direction, but it was certainly conceivable that more funding might be required. Ambassador Martin cited the statement of an Italian financier who told him that if he had \$200 million he could take over all of the left-oriented Italian radio and T.V. and has in fact spent some \$25 million of his own acquiring some radio and press facilities. Ambassador Martin concluded that he was somewhat more optimistic than Mr. Hart that something can be accomplished in reorienting the radio and T.V. media.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it will be possible for our support to remain secret or if the Italians are so cynical that this will make no difference.

Ambassador Martin replied that he believed the operation could be handled securely but conceded that there are probably a number of politicians in Italy who still think the U.S. is providing covert support even though they themselves are not receiving it.

Mr. Johnson expressed his basic reluctance against resumption of a political action program in Italy but commented that Ambassador Martin had made a strong case and he would therefore vote in favor of the proposal.

Mr. Packard stated that he thought it very important to take steps to prevent a further slide to the left and agreed that this program might provide the desired catalytic effect. He also suggested that the program should be strongly supplemented with overt steps such as encouraging the organization of Italian business groups, inviting appropriate Italians for visits and meetings in the U.S., etc. He thought the Department of Defense could help in overt ways and requested that he be provided guidance along these lines. He cited as an example the question of whether or not it might be politically useful to base some U.S. naval ships in Italy. Mr. Packard concluded by urging that the initial [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and public opinion and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] be commenced right away.

General Knowles⁴ expressed his support of the proposal and agreed with the desirability of getting started as soon as possible with the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

⁴ Lieutenant General Richard T. Knowles.

Mr. Mitchell voiced his approval of the program and expressed interest in being kept informed of its progress, particularly on developments in the media field.

Mr. Kissinger noted that it was the consensus of the Committee that the program as submitted was approved with the understanding that Ambassador Martin will control the mix and implementation thereof and will forward recommendations for additional overt activities which might be undertaken in support of U.S. objectives in Italy. He stated that the Committee will look to Ambassador Martin and Mr. Johnson for submission of appropriate progress reports.

209. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Rome, April 2, 1971, 1146Z.

1405. 1. In other messages through normal channels, the Embassy has reported the public reaction to the Borghese affair—the revelation some four months after the fact of the activities of the night of last December 7–8.² The present public attitude is one of amused disbelief that such a childish operation presented a real threat to the state. This was certainly a disappointment to the Communists, both in the fact that their cries of alarm were not credible, and also in encouraging government investigation of the activities of the para-military left.

2. The Borghese affair has had another by-product. Two of the five individuals taken into custody had been in touch with some senior mil-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Martin, Ambassador (Italy). Secret; Sensitive. It was received at the White House and subsequently transmitted from the Situation Room to Haig at the Western White House in San Clemente at 1305Z, April 2, with the instruction "Deliver in sealed eyes only envelope." Martin forwarded a more detailed assessment of the factors, political and personal, motivating unrest in the military high command to the Department of State in telegram 2114 from Rome, April 4. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III)

² Reference to an attempt by right-wing extremists led by Junio Valerio Borghese to stage a coup d'état on December 7, 1970. The "affair" was a plot involving a few hundred neofascists who were supposed to occupy government offices in Rome. Borghese called off the venture at the last moment after his collaborators had already gathered at the pre-assigned locations. According to press accounts, the conspirators improvised a spaghetti dinner together instead and then went home. Several of Borghese's lieutenants served four years in jail for their activities. Borghese himself fled the country and died in Spain several years later. See also Document 196.

itary officers who are uncertain whether the extent of their involvement in alleged coup plotting, not directly but peripherally connected with Borghese, may now come to light. This has led to consideration of accelerating their planning for a military take-over of the government.

3. From a source outside our normal [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and DAO channels, I have received a memorandum giving the essential parts of this plan. Except for the prefatory paragraphs which are summarized, the full text is transmitted in the immediately following telegram.³ Its dissemination in Washington I leave to your judgement. I have held it very closely in Rome.

4. It is a rather fascinating document, more in what it omits rather than in what is included, although its content fills in quite a few gaps in our jig-saw puzzle. From other bits and pieces we have enough corroborating evidence to permit me to conclude that the plan does exist.

5. I do not believe this plan can succeed. The estimates of 70 percent chances of success are considerably inflated. No such plan can possibly succeed without overwhelming support from both the army and the Carabinieri. Without General Marchesi, Chief of Defense Staff, neither will be available. And, for the time being, at least, Marchesi seems committed to work on getting some unity in the Christian Democrats for an orderly evolution. Marchesi realizes that no such plan could really succeed unless the necessity for such action was crystal clear to the public and had the backing of at least some principal political figure to provide an aura of legitimacy. Without this, and neither precondition exists now, Marchesi knows much blood would be likely to flow.

6. Obviously aware of at least the general outline of this plan, General Marchesi spoke at Gaeta yesterday, ostensibly to welcome return of fleet from winter training exercise. In presence of Defense Minister Tanassi and chiefs of army, navy and air force, Marchesi said that Chief of State, Parliament, the government and the Italian people can be sure that the armed forces will never be "corrupted by any anti-democratic current, open or occult, which may intend to divert them from their institutional duties, or by destructive forces of whatever nature which may aim, having recourse to violence, to subvert the established order."

7. In any event, the political evolution we have helped set in motion is moving along. The reiteration by the President and the Vice President of the necessity to achieve some unity within the Christian

³ Backchannel message 1406 from Rome, April 2, 1105Z, was retransmitted to the Western White House for Kissinger at 1527Z, April 2. A note on the message reads: "received at San Clemente ComCen, 8:05 a.m. PST 02 April 1971." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Martin, Ambassador (Italy))

Democrats is sinking in.⁴ I am lunching separately next week with Colombo and with DC Secretary General Forlani. Moro has also said that he wishes to see me privately. I intend to quietly increase the pressure.

[8.] I conclude, therefore, that under these circumstances, the last thing we need is a half-baked coup attempt motivated in its timing largely by the fact that General Fanali is facing retirement this summer and his time is short. I do not believe I will have any difficulty in conveying, quietly and indirectly, but very clearly, that I think any such attempt at the present time would be undesirable and we would not support it.

9. I am having dinner tonight with Admiral Roselli-Lorenzini as a courtesy before his departure on his visit to the United States. You will note from the memorandum quoted above he allegedly is going to inform Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt that they are going ahead. I will report after the dinner if anything significant comes up and will indicate the line I would want Admiral Moorer to take. I am also having lunch with General Fanali next week at his request.

10. Since this is such a long message, I might add one more observation. I was once regarded as one of our better intelligence types, so much so that General "Beetle" Smith and General Lucian Truscott asked me two decades ago to take over control of all U.S. intelligence activities in Berlin where we had some 27 different U.S. intelligence organs getting in each other's way. I refused the offer because I enjoyed so much working with David Bruce in Paris. I mention this only to underscore the point that I am a reasonably patient individual and I almost always find out what I want to know. Al Haig indicated awareness of air force and navy restiveness when I last talked with him and SID Chief General Miceli has made veiled references to White House representatives.⁵ The President has told me not to let this country drift further to the left. I don't intend to, but it just might make the job a bit easier if some better way could be devised to keep me personally informed of the bits and pieces which come to your attention there.⁶

Best regards.

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 206.

⁵ No records of these discussions was found.

⁶ In an April 2 backchannel response to Martin, Kissinger responded that he would be interested in hearing the results of Martin's talk with Marchesi and added: "We of course will keep you aware of anything we may learn. The reference to restiveness which you noted in par. 10 of 1405 came to us from military channels distinct from the attaché system and based on high-level contacts between U.S. and Italian military counterparts. Haig was also informed of the military's restiveness by Pierre [Pier] Talenti during the latter's recent visit to the U.S. You may be sure that no one in the White House has, to my knowledge, done more than listen to these reports." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Martin, Ambassador (Italy)) On the Talenti visit, see footnote 2, Document 202.

210. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Rome, April 5, 1971, 1730Z.

1410. 1. On the night following my dinner with Admiral Roselli-Lorenzini, the four military chiefs, Marchesi, Mereu of army, Fanali of air force, and Roselli-Lorenzini had private dinner. Although they had wrangled in a meeting Saturday morning over service shares of the defense budget, subject of dinner discussion that evening was how best to cope with the Communist situation. They agreed unanimously to follow lead of General Marchesi.

2. Roselli-Lorenzini indicated that when he went to Washington he will speak to President Nixon and other top American leaders in his role as a member of the Italian Chiefs of Staff and ask that there be more tangible American involvement in the current struggle against Communism.

3. General Marchesi has inquired whether Roselli-Lorenzini was seeing the President. I said it would be normal for Washington to ask whether I would think this a good idea. In the absence of such an inquiry, I assumed Roselli-Lorenzini would be received only by Admiral Zumwalt and perhaps by Admiral Moorer if he were in Washington. Marchesi indicated relief and said Admiral Roselli-Lorenzini was an extrovert "with a volcanic personality" and was not really well informed on the complexities of internal Italian politics. General Marchesi concluded by saying he desired "that the Ambassador would be the only one to coordinate Italian armed forces efforts and hoped that there would be no direct links between Washington and Admiral Roselli-Lorenzini."

4. I said I was sure he would have no objection to the continuation of direct service-to-service links on technical naval matters, but that I could assure him that only I would deal with him on matters affecting the political scene.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Martin, Ambassador (Italy). Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only. The White House forwarded the message to San Clemente at 1857Z, April 5, with the instruction: "Deliver in sealed eyes only envelope for Colonel Kennedy." A notation on the original reads: "Recv'd. SCCC 051125Z" and "4/5/71. HAK has seen."

211. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon met with former Italian pharmaceutical industry executive Baron Guido Zerilli-Marimò and Alexander Butterfield and Ollie Atkins of the White House staff between 12:23 and 12:39 p.m., June 11, 1971, for a discussion of the situation in Italy. During the course of their conversation, Zerilli-Marimò told the President: "We have a problem in Italy with your Embassy." Zerilli-Marimò elaborated: "You have a wonderful Ambassador there, this Martin. He's an excellent gentleman. I'm sure he's a man of high integrity." Nixon replied, "Right, right, right," and Zerilli-Marimò continued: "And quite a good officer of the career diplomacy, and so on. But, he's not what—what we need in Italy." Nixon asked whether a "stronger man" was required. Zerilli-Marimò agreed and added that the President needed "a man who has more energy, who has more ability to make judgments." Zerilli-Marimò believed that U.S. Ambassador to Italy Graham Martin was "an old man, but not old by age." Due to the deaths of his two sons, Martin was "old by spirit" and "very sad all the time." Zerilli-Marimò added that Martin had "no contacts." According to Zerilli-Marimò, an Ambassador "should have friends; he should have people who tell him how things are; to investigate," as was the case when James Clement Dunn was the Ambassador to Italy (1947–1952). Nixon agreed with Zerilli-Marimò's assessment of both Martin and the Italian political situation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 517–10)

At 2:40 pm that afternoon, Nixon met with Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, to whom he relayed the details of his conversation with Zerilli-Marimò. The President commented, "But I do think that we need a more vigorous man in Italy. A guy that is outgoing."

Kissinger: "I've come to that conclusion, too."

Nixon: "Henry, the trouble with Martin is, of course, the trouble with most of the State Department. They're—I think Zerilli put his finger on it. He says, 'An old man, not in years, but in spirit.'"

Kissinger: "Now, that's true."

Nixon: "And that's what you've got. They're all washed-out, Bob."

Kissinger: "Martin is on your side, strangely enough, on substance—"

Nixon: "Oh, he is."

Kissinger: "—but, but he suffers from the other defect of the State Department, which is low energy."

Nixon: "That's right."

Kissinger: "I mean, he's not disloyal, but he has no energy—"

Nixon: “No, no, no, no, no. I wish—as a matter of fact, Martin would be a fine guy on the board of one of these damn banks.”

Kissinger: “Yeah.”

Returning to the topic of Martin several minutes later, Kissinger suggested “at the latest, after the December Presidential election, we ought to get him out of there.” (Ibid., Conversation 517–22) The editor transcribed the portion printed here specifically for this volume. Nixon had previously discussed Henry Tasca, U.S. Ambassador to Greece, as a replacement for Martin in a March 25 conversation with Greek-American industrialist Tom Pappas and Attorney General John Mitchell. The tape recording of the discussion is *ibid.*, Conversation 473–10. Martin left post in April 1973.

212. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Rome, October 9, 1971, 1759Z.

1494. 1. These observations may be of some use to the President in determining what he might wish to stress in his conversation with Foreign Minister Moro on Monday.²

2. Aided by a skillful use of innuendo and rumor, a thorough knowledge of the peculiar psychology of the Italian “classe politica” in Rome, and an assiduous wooing of the press by his followers, Moro emerged from the national Christian Democratic Council last week with an enhanced image as a political tactician. The reality is somewhat different. Much more than he would have liked, his personal identification with the left is much greater now than it was two weeks ago. His chances in the Presidential sweepstakes have been diminished, although he cannot be wholly counted out. The fact remains that many more of those who will vote will now oppose him to the bitter end. At the same time, he can take comfort from the fact that the results of the Council were, and have been made to appear even more so, a partial defeat for Fanfani, whose chances in the Presidential race are also now somewhat less than they were two weeks ago. Increasingly, one hears

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Italy Talenti File. Secret; Exclusive; Eyes Only.

² October 11; see Document 213.

talk of turning to Rumor or Leoni as candidates more or less acceptable to the majority of the Christian Democrats and who will have a broader appeal throughout the whole political spectrum than either Moro or Fanfani. Saragat is waiting in the wings ready, if an impasse develops, to be the candidate to whom all may rally. Andreotti is a rather dark horse possibility as is La Malfa of the Republicans. I do not consider De Martino a serious possibility, although Pertini, the Socialist President of the Chamber of Deputies, is an outside possibility.

3. Moro has accepted some obligations to the Socialists, among them to oppose us on the Chirep issue. Moro made a tactical error in his conversation with the Secretary² by strongly inferring that Italian intransigence on this issue is wholly due to the Socialists and, in particular, to the adamant opposition of Nenni. Neither De Martino, the Socialist Vice Premier nor Nenni, still the nominal leader of the Autonomists, will wish to accept such total responsibility, certainly not publicly. Only this morning Nenni publicly disassociated himself from Socialist Party Secretary Mancini's call for "new and advanced equilibriums".

4. In an election which will be decided by the slightly more than 1000 votes of the members of both Houses of the Assembly, plus 50 odd votes from the regions, where the balloting is secret, no one can be sure that any commitment will be kept, even those bought and paid for. We will get a clear idea of the relative strengths only after several ballots have been taken. For this reason, I have determined that no United States interests would be served by permitting us to appear to favor any particular candidate at this stage, particularly so since we have concluded that we can reasonably work well with any of those who seem to have any real chance.

5. In my conversation with Moro on 2 October⁴ I reiterated the American position that while I had made it crystal clear to all that we considered the Christian Democratic Party to be the core of our interests in Italy, and would continue to do what we could to help the party prepare to enter the vital 1973 elections as a unified and hard-hitting party, we did not, as of now, intend to support him or any other candidate as a preferred choice in the December Presidential elections.

6. Moro fully intends to use the appointment with the President in every possible way to further his own candidacy. The agreement not to announce the appointment until Friday was, of course, broken. Stories appeared in the Italian press twenty-four hours before the release date.

³ See footnote 4, Document 206.

⁴ Reported in telegram 6276 from Rome, October 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III)

7. Consequently, I have quietly informed President Saragat, Prime Minister Colombo, and most of the CD faction leaders that the appointment was at Moro's request; that I had recommended the appointment because I was certain that the President would wish to reemphasize his high regard for Italy by receiving Italy's Foreign Minister as he had the Foreign Ministers of other important nations; that I am sure the President thought it appropriate, on the very first celebration of Columbus Day as a newly enacted official holiday, to receive the highest ranking member of the Italian Government then in the United States; and I thought the President might wish to reiterate the representations made by me in Rome and by Secretary Rogers in New York regarding the complete seriousness of the efforts of the United States to insure the continuing representation of the Republic of China in the UN and the full expectation that we would receive complete Italian support on the procedural motion and on the IQ resolution.

8. I hope, therefore, that the President may point out to Moro that we do, indeed, expect full Italian support on both votes, and that, under the changed circumstances now prevailing, we simply would not understand the lack of such support.

9. If Moro again alludes to "difficulties within the coalition" the President might wish to observe that it seemed to him that these difficulties had been rather easily surmounted by Moro last year, that he believes that Moro would have a even easier time this year, and that he has instructed Ambassador Martin in Rome to give him every assistance in this task.

10. Moro's version of what was said will be quickly circulated in Rome. There would appear to be an obvious advantage in informing me promptly of what did actually transpire, so that I may quietly and informally set the record straight in certain restricted but highly important circles in Rome. Warm regards.

213. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

President Nixon's Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro on October 11, 1971, from 11:30 a.m. to 12:20 p.m. in the Oval Office of the White House

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Egidio Ortona
Mr. Neil Seidenman (Interpreter)

The President said he is always glad to see the Foreign Minister, and particularly at this time, while he is in the US for the UN General Assembly, and prior to his return to his country to face some rather serious political problems.

Foreign Minister Moro thanked the President, adding that it was comforting to know that the President has followed the situation in Italy with such close attention and understanding. Indeed, there are problems in that quarter. The Foreign Minister stated that he nevertheless had hope and confidence that even against a background of an agitated situation in the area of social issues, there are other areas of solid ground, in particular that of foreign policy. The President can be assured that in this area, despite the various controversies that crop up among the coalition parties, there is no conflict with regard to the United States and fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance as the mainstay of Italian policy. Even the PSI, which has a number of internal problems, is steadfast on this score. At the present time, looking toward the Presidential elections, it is difficult to foresee what difficulties may arise. Some parties may hold back and shift position according to electoral needs. However, they can surely be counted upon to act with a sense of responsibility, particularly in the light of requirements affecting social issues, while having to work concurrently against the problems of recession. Still, it is likely that they will proceed with greater responsibility in view of decreasing public disorder over recent months. Hence it would seem one is justified in hoping to overcome the critical social issues and to move in harmony with the other members of the European family. It should also be noted that with the political monopoly of the Soviet Union dissolving, repercussions are being felt within the PCI.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret.

Because of this, there is a general trend toward greater freedom of action in the political sphere and strengthened interest in the problems of Europe, with all political forces at work enjoying increasing freedom from pressures from the Soviet Union.

The President observed that as we look at the free world today, we see more than one hundred nations of all sizes. But as we look at these, with their economic, political, and military strength, in being or potential, we can look at the free world as “one hand.” In Europe, the major nations are four: Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain. With the US there are five, and looking at another part of the world, Japan makes six. But what these countries do together, to the extent they are able to develop similar policies in the economic field and other areas, including actions in the area of their foreign policies, they will greatly influence and affect the future of freedom in the world. That is why we consider that we have a special relationship with Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan. However, this does not mean that tiny nations are not important to us, such as Chad. But we must be sure to maintain close consultation among the major powers of the free world about how to face issues that confront us.

The President said he was aware that Secretary of State Rogers had discussed the US approach to the difficult vote coming up at the UN. He said he wished to reaffirm our position on this matter as it was stated to him by Secretary Rogers. The President said he was aware that this represented a hard problem for Italy. However, with reference to the US position, our view is that for the UN not to consider the expulsion of a member country from that body to be an Important Question would constitute a disastrous precedent. Were that position to be approved, the President saw the possibility of future situations, at times when emotions were high, for example, where if one or more nations did something that was not to the liking of a simple majority of members, they would be *out*, and that could mean the collapse of the Organization. This is why we deem it essential to have the issue of expulsion considered as an Important Question. In the second place, support for the UN in Congress would be in jeopardy, if it were felt in that body that the United States could not obtain enough support at the UN to have something of critical importance in our view considered as an important question. The President added that he was not making these statements in order to put pressure on the sovereign and independent government of a good friend, but simply to explain why the US considers this matter to be so essential.

Mr. Moro thanked the President for his very articulate and tactful approach to the issue, especially with reference to the first point he had made. Italy has every wish as an independent nation and as a part of Europe to work with the United States. The emergence of “new centers

of influence" means to Italy precisely that the countries of Europe, Europe as a whole, and the United States will seek common approaches to the greatest number of issues, certainly on all the important problems. It is for this reason that there is confidence that solidarity among friends will enable our countries to find solutions to economic and monetary problems that have come to the fore. With reference to the second subject raised by the President, Italy is very much aware of the weight and seriousness that the US attaches to this question, which has been set forth with great eloquence. For this very reason, the Italians find themselves in very difficult circumstances. The United States, of course, thanks to the President's bold and forward-looking initiative, has taken an important step toward China. Italy has moved further down the road of diplomatic relations with China, and within this context is eminently aware of the weight and importance that China attaches to a vote of recognition, which must be recognition as the only legitimate government of the Chinese people. Then, as the President is undoubtedly aware, the Italian government is at grips with the domestic political considerations involved. Each year Italy has had to face this issue, trying to balance all the pressures surrounding it, personified by Hon. Nenni who has long been one of the staunchest advocates of recognition, as well as for solidarity with the US. Nenni, himself, will visit China October 20. It is in the light of this background that it is useful to gather the views of the US on this particular matter so that they might be fully and accurately conveyed to the Government of Italy and help toward making a responsible decision. The President may be certain that the very last thing the Italians want is to do something that would dismay the US. Every effort is made so that whatever is done will help, not harm the US. Therefore it is with this spirit of friendship toward the US that Italy will take up this question in great earnest, at the same time coupled with an acute awareness of the international implications of the problem, and recognizing the possible domestic repercussions concerned. The Foreign Minister reiterated his appreciation to the President for the delicate manner in which he presented this issue, and again gave assurances that all of the President's comments would be taken very closely into account by the Government of Italy in reaching a decision.

The President suggested that the two governments remain in very close touch regarding the matter. Dr. Kissinger would be back from his trip to the PRC,² before the vote takes place.

Mr. Moro agreed, stating that Ambassadors Ortona and Vinci would be entirely available for consultation.

² October 16-25.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he did not foresee that anything would happen during his visit to Peking that would affect the voting, therefore nothing of an embarrassing nature should be expected.

Mr. Moro asked the President what the strategic outlook was, with regard to China, setting aside the tactical approach, which he understood at this point. What are the prospects for a solution to the problem of Formosa vis à vis China, given Formosa's insistence that its government should represent the Chinese people? Does the President envision an ultimate solution to this problem, or does he think of this in terms of a situation that will endure and which must be accepted by all parties concerned?

The President said that it might be interesting to hear from Dr. Kissinger in this connection when he returns from his trip, barring those aspects of the discussions there that cannot be readily divulged. But essentially it is an historical process.

Dr. Kissinger stated that in the first place, we have been careful at the UN not to take a position with regard to this. The analogy we draw of this is the case of the two votes accruing to the Soviet Union, considering the vote of Byelo-Russia. This would constitute a precedent for two votes by one country within the UN. In the second place, it is a question of taking a historic viewpoint, as pointed out by the President. The fact that both governments involved agree that there is only one China may make an eventual negotiated solution easier. There might be greater difficulty were one of the governments to claim that there are two Chinas. Hence we would not have to make a judgment as to legitimacy of governments involved.

The President at this point said he wished only to stress that the issue must not be settled by force. This is admittedly not a clear answer, but the situation itself is not clear and is very complex. The President emphasized further that he was aware of the domestic implications of this issue in Italy. But he said he could not himself underestimate the problems the US would have regarding our relationship with the UN if Taiwan is expelled from the Organization.

Mr. Moro congratulated the President for the work the US is carrying forward in seeking an end to the problem of the Middle East. Secretary Rogers' quiet, patient mediations has been resourceful and admirable, and while they have yet to produce concrete results, still they constitute the essential thread that holds the parties to the search for an ultimate solution. While Israel and Egypt continue to maintain their divergent positions, there would seem to be some hope that a formula for opening the Canal as a partial solution might constitute a necessary step toward the larger solution that is sought. In this regard, the work

of Secretary Rogers is essential and encouraging as a vital contribution on the part of the US to world peace, and toward avoiding another conflagration in that part of the world.

The President thanked the Foreign Minister for his remarks, and expressed his appreciation for the role of Italy in the Middle East problem, as the major Mediterranean power involved, therefore having much at stake. The President concluded by saying, "Without getting myself into Italian politics: Buona fortuna!"

Mr. Moro thanked the President, expressing the hope that it would be within their power to continue to move toward progress along lines for freedom, justice, and friendship toward the United States.

The President observed that President Saragat has been a strong president who has consistently acted in support of these principles.

At the end of their remarks, Mr. Moro approached the President to ask whether he envisioned early efforts to solve the economic and financial problems at issue. The President reassured him on this score, saying that the US is not going to become isolationist. He said that the IMF meeting was set up so as to work toward establishing a solid structure, and that Minister Ferrari Aggradi was helpful.

214. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Italian Politics [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Al Haig, Art Downey and I met with [*name not declassified*] yesterday and this morning to receive his more specific suggestions in connection with the memo he had previously left with the Attorney General, and which you had had passed (without attribution) to Helms for

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Italy Talenti File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for urgent action.

comment (Tab A).² [name not declassified] pressed very hard for a swift decision either way.

You will now have to decide on the next step—whether to move this to the President immediately, or first to consult with Helms, or to reject it.

Basis. The basis for the [name not declassified] plan is that there is a risk that the Communists or Fascists will take over Italy prior to our November 1972 elections with consequent domestic implications. The main reason for this risk is that the economy is about to collapse, he reports.

(*Comment:* According to the CIA study at Tab A, the Italian economy's current mild recession is not in danger of a serious decline, but recovery is unlikely before mid-to-end-72. In addition, the CIA's estimate is that there is no chance (an uncharacteristically flat assertion) that the new Italian President will come from the Communist or Fascist parties.)

Objectives. The overall objective of the [name not declassified] plan is to centralize the Christian Democratic (DC) Party and move it and the Italian Government to the right, and at the same time to force the Vatican to turn away from its "liberal" course. The *immediate objectives* are to:

- influence the mid-December Presidential elections (by creating a groundswell of pressure via certain Parliamentarians and the core personnel and structure which several months ago secured an unprecedented 1,300,000 signatures on the anti-divorce referendum) to ensure the election of "a decent pro-Western President" who, [name not declassified] feels, should be Rumor; [name not declassified] regards Rumor as weak but honest, moderately intelligent and subject to our influence. ([name not declassified] is personally close to him.)

- arrange for President Rumor to appoint a Prime Minister guaranteed to fail, and then another, and another;

- after quick succession of Government collapses, President Rumor would dissolve Parliament and call for new National elections;

- finally, the new elections would provide the electorate an opportunity to install a Parliament and Prime Minister with a view to the right, just in time to pick the economy out of the depression.

² The CIA paper at Tab A is not printed. Haig received a copy of the memorandum by [name not declassified]. In a September 29 memorandum to Kissinger, he noted that the memorandum had "triggered" an Office of National Estimates assessment of the "upcoming Italian Presidential election." Haig added that he, Sonnenfeldt, and NSC Staff member Sven Kraemer "agree that [name not declassified] proposal is definitely worth exploring" and suggested that Kissinger approve extending an invitation to visit Washington to discuss it further with NSC Staff members. Kissinger approved the recommendation. (Ibid.)

(*Comment:* In the history of the Republic, this would be the first time that a President has prematurely dissolved Parliament. The Presidential election is decided by the 1100 electors by secret ballot: neither the CIA nor Ambassador Martin (Tab B)³ believes it is possible to guarantee the election results or even to offer any speculation.)

If it proves impossible to secure the election of Rumor, then it can be arranged, according to the [*name not declassified*] plan, for Rumor to become Secretary General of the DC. From that position, and with some financial assistance, Rumor can unify the party and shape its direction. The target then will be the 1973 general elections (a left-wing President, [*name not declassified*] argues, would not call for elections in 1972 despite the probable collapse of the economy).

Methods. [*name not declassified*] original proposal called for an expenditure of [*number not declassified*] (Tab C), but we asked him to scale that down to around [*number not declassified*] for 5 months operation (Tab D).⁴ The money would be disbursed to three main groups:

[4 Paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

Tactics. [15 lines not declassified]

That in essence is [*name not declassified*] plan. Without being able to bring special and detailed expertise to bear, it is very difficult to assess its risk and worth. I can only take [*name not declassified*] word that his program would reach his objectives. The objectives themselves seem to me in many respects worthy but perhaps not altogether realistic. There would be some risk of disclosure. Yet, there is always the possibility that the program might be useful. I cannot judge the interplay between Italian and US domestic politics. [*name not declassified*] obviously feels the Italian-American vote is sensitive to what happens in Italy.

[*name not declassified*] is awaiting a signal in Italy, to be sent by a code message [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with whom [*name not declassified*] is in almost daily communication.

*Your choices:*⁵

Move this immediately to the President with a positive recommendation. (I do not recommend this course.)

Discuss it with Helms and request an assessment by his single best Italian expert. (This was done last month, and is the course I recom-

³ Printed as Document 212.

⁴ Tabs C and D are not printed.

⁵ Kissinger did not make any indication of his views. However, in a November 16 letter to [*name not declassified*] Haig informed him that the plan had been rejected. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Italy Talenti File)

mend; there is also the issue of making this program compatible with the current 40 Committee approved program.)⁶

There also remains the question of when and how to break this (assuming approval) to Graham Martin.

⁶ See Document 208.

215. Editorial Note

In telegram 190271 to Rome, October 17, 1971, the Department of State instructed U.S. Ambassador to Italy Graham Martin to personally *démarche* Italian Prime Minister Emilio Colombo on the issue of Italy's support for the United States' position on the Important Question (IQ) to prevent the expulsion of Taiwan at the time the United Nations voted to seat the People's Republic of China. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III) Martin reported on October 20 that he had made the *démarche* to Colombo and that he believed that Colombo and certain elements of his coalition were favorable to the United States' view on the IQ. (Telegram 6693 from Rome, October 20; *ibid.*) At 2:15 p.m., October 22, President Richard Nixon met with Secretary of State William Rogers, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations George H.W. Bush, and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the effort to round up support for the U.S. position on the IQ. During the meeting, the discussion turned to Italy. Bush noted that Giuseppe Lupis, a member of Italy's U.N. General Assembly delegation and a government minister, had privately expressed his desire to support the U.S. position, but stated that the Italian decision would be a "political" one. The President instructed Bush to tell the Italians: "I think it would be very unfortunate for Italy and the United States—who have been together on everything in Europe; we are always together; we consider them our closest, the people that vote with us more often than anybody else—for us to divide on this issue." Rogers noted that "the only thing I think that'll make a difference, now, would be a call from you to Colombo." Rogers also remarked, "If we could get Italy, I think we could win. I think Italy's a very key vote." (*Ibid.*, White House Tapes, Conversation 599–17) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

The President telephoned Colombo at 5:40 p.m. After a few introductory remarks, Nixon turned to the IQ issue. A Department of State translator translated simultaneously for both the President and the Prime Minister and was transparent during the conversation.

Nixon: "Well, when I saw Foreign Minister Moro—"

Colombo: "Yes."

Nixon: "—I talked with him with regard to the Important Question vote in the United Nations that will take place on Tuesday."

Colombo: "Yes."

Nixon: "Translate that. [pause for translation] Now, I—"

Colombo: "Yes, Mr. Moro did tell me that—"

Nixon: "Yeah. Yeah. Now, I realize that, that you feel that there may be some problem because of your government's previous statements on this vote. However, I believe that, that it is completely consistent to take the position that we take, which is we support the admission of the People's Republic, but we oppose the expelling the Republic of China. We believe that expelling a nation from the United Nations would be a very dangerous precedent and that it should be by two-thirds vote. If, for example, it is decided that this can be done by simple majority vote, who knows? Next time it will be Portugal or some other nation that some may—that some group of nations may be at odds with."

Colombo: "Si [Yes]."

Nixon: "And in our country, I would say that a majority of our people, well, they would favor the admission of the People's Republic—of Communist China. They strongly oppose expelling Taiwan, and that is particularly true, I would say, among the very large Italian-American group in our country, who support the position that Taiwan should not be expelled."

Colombo: "Si [Yes]."

Nixon: "And, the—I, I feel, as I told the Foreign Minister, that I would very much hope that if your government could stand with us on this one question—the important—the 'IQ question,' as it's called, the Important Question—that it, that it will—that that will make the difference. I think that Italy—not only your vote is involved, but there are four or five other countries that I think will go the way you go." [pause for translation]

"And, so I wanted you to hear in my own voice, since we did have that very good meeting in Washington and also in Rome. I wanted you to hear it from my—in my own voice, how strongly I felt on this issue, and I—that's the reason I'm bothering you at this late evening."

Colombo: "Mr. President, I wish to say, first of all, that I'm very grateful for this call that you have put through to me at this time, partic-

ularly with regard to this issue, but also it gives me the opportunity to communicate to you a few hints, or somewhat in the way of—something in the way of orientation with regard to our feelings and our concerns on the score of the matter of Italian public opinion.”

Nixon: “Um-hmm.”

Colombo: “Mr. President, I would like to say that I’ve done nothing more, nothing, nothing more over the last ten days—nothing over the last ten days but to try to face and grapple with this particular problem. And the problem stems primarily from the fact that based on our statements and declarations with regard to this issue last year, this brought about a mood among our population to the effect that any procedural vote which would tend to impede or hinder the admission of the Chinese People’s Republic into the United States [*United Nations*] would not be, would not be taken well. This is just the way the—our public opinion has been oriented to this issue.” [pause for translation]

“Well, Mr. President, with regard to the procedural issues, it is true that the situation has changed to some degree, because the Important Question has to do not only with the admission of the Chinese People’s Republic, but now it is linked to the expulsion of Taiwan. However, Mr. President, in view of the fact that we extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China in—within the framework of this rep—of this step that we took, we committed ourselves to the principle—we agreed to the principle that Peking was the only legal representative of the Chinese people. And, in fact, Taiwan, at that point, upon our recognition, withdrew its Ambassador from Rome. And, therefore, at this time, to bring back this issue of the expulsion of Taiwan, in the light of the possibilities of a majority vote having to do with this, I think would fall within the—would fall afoul of the attitude that has been developed with regard to this in view of our acceptance of Taiwan, our commitment to—or rather, Peking, as the only legal government of the Chinese people.” [pause for translation]

“Now, if Taiwan had recognized itself as something different from the identity that it has assumed and not simply insisted on being recognized as the Government of the Chinese Republic, why, then, our task would be a lot easier from the political and the legal standpoint.” [pause for translation]

“Now, in Italy there are political—there are public opinion trends that are conflicting in nature with regard to this, so that my efforts, Mr. President, are directed toward trying to avoid having to vote against the Important Question. Now, I’m not sure that I can get a vote in favor of it, but tomorrow we’re going to discuss this issue, and it’s going to be a very hotly discussed one in the Council of Ministers.” [pause for translation]

"On this score, Mr. President, I would like to assure you that, as far as I am concerned, I have been devoting my best efforts to this particular issue, based on my particular—my personal convictions, to bring together the various opinions and the various viewpoints and, and bring about a decision that will be a true reflection of our friendship toward the United States. And my effort tomorrow will be in the direction of trying to avoid having to come up with a vote against the Important Question, and I do have some hopes of succeeding." [pause for translation]

"I also should note, Mr. President, that Ambassador Martin has discussed this problem very thoroughly and at length with me and he's—has explained to me your concerns, as well as the general concern that exists on this, and my response has invariably been that I am directing my very best and concentrated efforts to this issue."

Nixon: "Well, I want to say to the Prime Minister that I appreciate this difficult problem. I also would emphasize that this vote, of course, will be watched in, in the whole world, and I think it would be very unfortunate if the United States and Italy, the two countries that on all the issues of Europe and on most of the great issues in the world have stood together, that they—it would be very unfortunate if we were to split. And so, I would hope that in the consideration with his Cabinet tomorrow that the Prime Minister, if possible, could help the United States on this vote. We consider it very important that the precedent not be established that by a simple majority a country or government can be expelled from the United Nations. It goes far beyond the China question. It goes to the whole matter of expelling countries. And we think it should require a two-thirds vote. That's why we think an 'aye' vote on the Important Question is so important."

Colombo: "Well, I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that I will do everything within my efforts to assure that our position is as close as possible to that of the United States." [pause for translation]

"On any score—at any rate, I do hope to avoid having to vote against the IQ."

The two men concluded their discussion with expressions of mutual esteem. (Ibid., Telephone Conversation 12–88) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

216. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, November 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Dr. Kissinger and Italian Ambassador Ortona, November 19, 12:40 to 1 p.m.

The Ambassador explained that he was returning to Rome for a meeting of Italy's NATO chiefs of mission, and so he hoped to get Dr. Kissinger's comment on topical issues such as NATO, US force levels, EC enlargement, and then perhaps some comment on the China and Soviet summit meetings.

Dr. Kissinger emphatically stated that we have no intention of withdrawing forces from NATO, and that the Administration will fight the Congress on this point. He added that one would have hoped that, after the Mansfield amendment had been defeated earlier this year,² this issue would not be raised again in this year or session. The Ambassador began to explain a recent meeting he had with Senator Mansfield, but was interrupted when Dr. Kissinger had to leave the room momentarily for a phone call.

Upon his return, Dr. Kissinger continued that the task of the Administration is made more complex when the Europeans do not do enough. The Germans, for example, seem to be convinced that the US and the USSR will arrange a separate deal on reduction of forces. This view, Dr. Kissinger said, is totally false and nonsense. Ortona said that he has heard this same sort of comment regarding Italian viewpoints too, and that he agreed personally that there was no basis for it.

We do not, Dr. Kissinger continued, conduct our policy in a petty manner. It would be folly for us to injure our friends in order to placate an enemy. With great stress, Dr. Kissinger said that force reductions are not on any agenda for the Moscow meeting, the issue has never been discussed with the Soviets, and that MBFR will be discussed multilaterally—or not at all.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Arthur T. Downey on November 23.

² During 1971, Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) made two efforts to scale back U.S. forces in Europe through Congressional action. On May 11, he introduced a proposal to limit to 150,000 the number of troops stationed in Europe. The Senate defeated this proposal 31–61 on May 19. See Documents 62 and 63. In the fall of 1971, Mansfield introduced a rider to the 1972 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 11731) that would have placed a 250,000 man ceiling on troop deployment in Europe. The Senate rejected this proposal on November 23, 39–54. The Defense Appropriations Act was approved without the Mansfield Amendment.

Dr. Kissinger added parenthetically that it was the Europeans (Brosio) who had dreamed up MBFR in the first place. It is most important for us and the Europeans to agree on a rational strategy and on long term allocation of resources with a better sense of sharing the burden. Unless this is done, the Mansfield amendment will succeed.

Ambassador Ortona suggested that burden sharing is part of the monetary problem, but Dr. Kissinger noted that this will not be the central feature of the monetary issue. The Ambassador said that there seems to be opposing views (US and Europeans) on the monetary/commercial problems and on exchange rates. He suggested that some effort might be made on the part of the Europeans to deal helpfully on the question of grains and cereals. Dr. Kissinger said that, in his view, the US will have to be somewhat more cooperative on the question of exchange rates, and that the Europeans must do more on the commercial/trade side. He added that the US would look carefully at the grains and cereals possibility as a first step measure.

The Ambassador said that he intended to report in Rome that the US had no intention of disengaging from Europe, and that in effect Europe was the exception to the Nixon Doctrine. In response, Dr. Kissinger said that the Ambassador was exactly right, that the US had no intention of turning its back on Europe. The Ambassador noted that he had recently talked with Senator Mansfield who agreed that European security was as important to the US as its own security, yet he still desired withdrawal of some 50,000 US forces a year. Dr. Kissinger noted that the same people (and Members of the Congress) will employ the same methods and tactics as they had on Viet Nam, but will turn on Europe.

Concluding, the Ambassador asked Dr. Kissinger about the President's visit to China.³ Dr. Kissinger said that one should not approach both the Moscow and Peking summits with the same concepts and expectations. For example, there may be some agreements that will come from the Moscow meeting—perhaps relating to trade, SALT or even the Middle East. On the other hand, one should not expect any major agreements to result from the Peking visit. The aim there is not major specific agreements, but the start of a direction, an effort to regulate the consequences of hostility. The US plans no shift from Tokyo to Peking, and we will not impair Japanese interests. In short, we are seeking a more stable set of relations.

Arthur T. Downey⁴

³ The President visited China February 21–28, 1972.

⁴ Downey initialed "ATD" above his typed signature.

217. Editorial Note

After a prolonged deadlock, Christian Democrat Giovanni Leone, who had previously served as Prime Minister in two short-lived all-DC minority governments in 1963 and 1968, won election as President of the Italian Republic on the 23rd ballot, December 24, 1971. Prime Minister Emilio Colombo resigned on January 15, 1972, after representatives of the Republican Party withdrew from his government. An effort by Giulio Andreotti to obtain parliamentary confirmation of a minority all-DC government failed on February 26. On February 28, Leone dissolved Parliament before completion of its 5-year term for the first time in Republican Italy's history.

The May elections resulted in only minor changes in the parliamentary representation of the three largest parties—Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist. By now the Socialists and Social Democrats had dissolved their merger; running separately, however, their share of the vote closely followed their combined total in 1968. The Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP), however, lost all 23 of its seats in the Chamber of Deputies and in July formally merged with the Italian Communist Party. Among the smaller parties, the Liberals lost heavily in both chambers of Parliament while the Republican Party showed strong gains. The neo-fascist Italian Social Movement doubled its seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

218. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms

Rome, February 11, 1972, 1418Z.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 90–01383R. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

219. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Italy (Martin) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Rome, February 28, 1972, 1641Z.

495. Reference: WH 20959, 25 Feb 1971.²

1. Until the last moment, there was a bit of uncertainty whether the generally agreed script, ending in an unprecedented dissolution and early elections, would be followed to the end. Leone signed the dissolution decree this morning at 10:07 and we are now faced with elections on 7 May. I am, therefore, now able to respond with more precision to your message of 25 February.

2. The temper of the country definitely is swinging to the right. Almirante will gain most from this trend unless the Christian Democrats make an all-out effort which I believe they are inclined to do. They will need help.

3. The Communist PCI, still smarting from the severe psychological shock of the public humiliation of their miscalculation in the Presidential elections, will go all out and will receive considerable support from the Soviet Union. They are deeply worried about the threat from their left and are desperately trying to prevent the Manifesto Group³ from filing separate electoral lists.

4. Saragat, motivated primarily by a burning desire to recapture control of the PSDI from which he was on the verge of being practically excluded, has succeeded in forcing an electoral line which, while still anti-Communist, will be more to the left than the majority of the rank and file of his party would have liked. Consequently, the PSDI will lose several hundred thousand votes they might otherwise have counted on. These votes will not all be lost to the centrist forces, however, and the PSDI may enter the new Parliament with about its present strength. Saragat's present line may attract some support which would have gone to the Socialists.

5. The Republicans are expected to make considerable gains, while the outcome for the Liberals is uncertain. If they wage an aggressive

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Subject Files, Backchannel Messages Europe 1972 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.

² Not found.

³ Reference to a dissident group of Communists who had been expelled from the PCI in 1969 over issues of policy and party discipline. The dissidents organized their efforts around a small circulation newspaper, *Il Manifesto*, which was influential in intellectual circles.

campaign, they may draw votes away from the MSI on the basis that a vote for the Liberals may contribute to a sound base for a centrist government while a vote for the MSI will be wasted.

6. [1 line not declassified] He has arranged channels to keep the two of us in quiet, unobtrusive but intimate contact. He believes this election to be as important to Italy and to overall American policy as were those in 1948. He has requested that we help as much as we can. I have said that we would do what we could.

7. I have not yet seen [less than 1 line not declassified] but expect to do so in the coming week. I have indicated in previous conversations that we would be inclined to be helpful if the [less than 1 line not declassified] showed more cohesion and compactness than had been evident in recent years. He believes that their success in the Presidential election, and the subsequent cohesion that brings us now to early elections, has met that pre-condition. I agree.

8. We have reviewed the situation this morning and have arrived at the following priorities and general order of magnitude of [less than 1 line not declassified] for a vastly expanded political action program over the period between now and May 7:

[3 paragraphs (7 lines) not declassified]

9. Under existing authority, I have today committed [less than 1 line not declassified] to get the preliminary organizational activities under way. This leaves us with only [less than 1 line not declassified] left from the [less than 1 line not declassified] authorized by the 1971 March 10 decision of the 40 Committee.⁴ I would prefer to keep this separate as a reserve rather than blanket it into the new authorization I have requested in para 8 above. If more is needed as targets of opportunity present themselves during the elections, I shall not hesitate to ask.

10. I do not know whether you actually have to have a meeting of the 40 Committee before going ahead with the additional authorization, but obviously time pressures will be very great. I anticipate no difficulties except perhaps with my inflexible and continuing pre-condition—that the authority for the mix and implementation be left entirely under my authority. I just don't intend to have another Chile here.

11. Our friend mentioned in your last paragraph⁵ is celebrating his birthday in Switzerland. He is happy as a clam since we have helped him untangle some of his personal problems here. He has accepted the fact that there is only one representative of the President here.

⁴ See Document 208.

⁵ [name not declassified]

He would be quite happy with the above program if he were to know about it although he has never learned from me that such a program exists and I do not intend to discuss any details with him. Now that elections are upon us, he will be quite relaxed.⁶

Warm regards.

⁶ In backchannel message 500 from Rome, March 2, Martin reported [1 *line not declassified*] to back the center parties to the fullest extent. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 424, Subject Files, Backchannel Messages Europe 1972 [2 of 2]) In telegram WH21059, February 29, Haig thanked Martin for his evaluation and promised speed action on his request. He added that with the elections set "it will be helpful for you to utilize the services of our friend to the fullest extent feasible." (Ibid., Backchannel Messages Europe 1972 [1 of 2])

220. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency

March 3, 1972, 2315Z.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 90-01383R. Secret; Immediate; Rybat. 6 pages not declassified.]

221. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 7 March 1972

PRESENT

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Rush, Mr. Irwin, Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Helms
Messrs. William McAfee, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Thomas Karamessines, and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] were also present.

Italy—Ambassador Graham A. Martin's Proposed Italian Election Program

Mr. Kissinger: Graham Martin wants to put [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and supporting organizations for the Italian election in May. The two basic questions therefore are: Do we want to put this money in, and how do we dispense it? What do you think, Dick?

Mr. Helms: If I may, I will defer to Tom Karamessines, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Karamessines: I can explain our relation to the program but should point out that this is Graham Martin's program. We have not been intimately consulted . . .

Mr. Kissinger: Oh, you want me to be the fall guy. How is this money to be spent?

Mr. Karamessines: I have reviewed the Martin program with him but am not in a position to provide absolute details. The general thrust is both good and healthy. I discussed the implementation [*4 lines not declassified*] Martin has set a specific figure. Any drastic reductions will cause him to reargue his case. He believes that he is getting the CDU² to work together. He was pleased with their efforts in the presidential elections but insists on total flexibility in how he spends the funds.

Mr. Kissinger: He doesn't lack self-confidence . . .

Mr. Karamessines: [*5 lines not declassified*]

Mr. Kissinger: How do we answer the classic argument that caused us to cut off the funding a few years ago, i.e., that there should be enough money within Italy? [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Karamessines: I can't answer about [*less than 1 line not declassified*] puts his dough across the spectrum. He just can't be counted on.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Records of the 40 Committee, Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on March 8.

² Karamessines was referring to the Christian Democratic Party of Italy rather than the Christian Democratic Union of West Germany.

Mr. Kissinger: And other [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Karamessines: They have never put in very large infusions. On the other hand, the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will use much more money than we can give them.

Mr. Kissinger: How exactly will it be used?

Mr. Karamessines: I just can't tell.

Mr. Kissinger: We'll know after it has been spent . . .

Mr. Irwin: We should ask Martin for more details; for example, re the PCI . . .

Mr. Kissinger: I note that CIA sees real risks of exposure.

Mr. Helms: Yes, it will be the trick of the week to pass [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in four weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: What would we say if caught?

Mr. Karamessines: The answer is not to be caught in the passing.

Mr. Rush: I have to question the efficacy of this program, whether the money will land in the pockets of individuals and how well the ambassador understands the political system there. I'm also deeply concerned about the risk of exposure . . .

Mr. Helms: Theoretically, the Italians should be able to handle campaign financing themselves—that's why we withdrew—but they don't really ever come through.

Mr. Karamessines: The President told Martin to stop the slide to the left. The infusion will be direct evidence of U.S. concern.

Mr. Kissinger: We would be glad to spend [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in Chile if that would make any difference.

Mr. Karamessines: We want a residual carry-over to enable us to work with the center parties in the future.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we have the money?

Mr. Karamessines: No.

Mr. Helms: We call on the Reserve through OMB and are required to notify Ellender and Mahon.³

Mr. Kissinger: What would Ellender say?

Mr. Helms: I don't know.

Mr. Irwin: In spending the money, Martin has said he would be conservative and judicious as in the past. He may not use it all. He has asked for our trust on that basis and with certain caveats and how he

³ Senator Allan Ellender (D-LA), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and Representative George Mahon (D-TX), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

expects to handle the Socialists, we would support it. But I hadn't heard of having to go to Congress.

Mr. Helms: Sometimes they are satisfied with notification. But if they seek details we brief them.

Mr. Kissinger: We probably should give Martin what he asks for but insist on more detail.⁴

Mr. Irwin: Agreed.

Admiral Moorer: I think it's worthwhile to go ahead. We can't allow Italy to go left with the U.S. role in NATO—that would be a disaster.

Mr. Rush: I'm quite simply worried about the effectiveness. I'd be reluctant to authorize but would go along with a consensus.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we must take this to the President.⁵

Mr. Irwin: I think it is a red herring to say it might go like Chile. Chile was a quite different situation.

Mr. Karamessines: You're right, but any drift could lead to polarization.

Mr. Kissinger: Then there is the spectre of a Popular Front . . .

Mr. Karamessines: If there's any substantial reduction, Graham Martin should probably come back.

Mr. Kissinger: No. We should either do it or not. The amounts are not that significant.

Mr. Helms: There's really no time to fool around.

Mr. Kissinger: Jessup, prepare a memo for the President and Mr. Irwin can get answers to the questions raised here. I'll get an answer from higher authority by Thursday.⁶ You can tell Martin that the "basic tilt" is in favor . . .

The basic questions are:

(1) What will he spend money for; we need a breakdown with allocations.

(2) Contingency plans in case of exposure.

(3) [1½ lines not declassified]

(4) If adequate Italian funds exist, won't USG funds be diverted improperly?

What do you think, Mr. [name not declassified]

⁴ This view together with a series of questions regarding the specific uses of the money requested was sent to Martin in telegram 39403 to Rome, March 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 90-01383R)

⁵ A memorandum outlining the proposed operation was forwarded to the President on March 8. The President approved the operation on March 10. (Ibid.)

⁶ March 9.

Mr. [*name not declassified*]: Ambassador Martin has advertised USG interest. This influence is the factor that counts. This gesture has symbolic and psychological importance in Italy.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Italy.]

Peter Jessup

222. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 9, 1972.

SUBJECT

Graham Martin's Backchannel

He has sent you a copy (Tab B) of his response to the questions raised by the 40 Committee (we had already got the Roger Channel). It is vintage Martin and you should read it; it does not really answer the questions but asks for faith. However, I understand that your brethren on the 40 Committee do not propose to pursue their questions and now agree to the program.

A second backchannel (Tab C) tells you that (1) he gathers you did not attend the 40 Committee and (2) he is going ahead. He also tells you (1) [*1 line not declassified*] (2) the Pope is happy to have Billy Graham come to Rome in the spring of 1973 for a Crusade and that he would receive him if Graham (Billy) asks. Graham (Martin) suggests the President may want to tell Graham (Billy).

Attached (Tab A), if you want to send it, is a reply to Martin.²

You may want to mention orally to the President the business about the Pope and Billy Graham.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Initialed by Haig. The tabs are not printed.

² Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Send out backchannel. HK." The message confirmed that he had chaired the March 7 meeting of the 40 Committee, adding, "I appreciate your response and sense of urgency. I anticipate no problem." (Ibid.)

223. Editorial Note

Between 4:50 and 5:06 p.m., April 4, 1972, President Richard Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger met with the departing French Ambassador Charles Lucet. In the course of a discussion of U.S.-French relations, the conversation turned to Italy, Lucet's next Ambassadorial assignment. The President told Lucet, "I would appreciate your keeping in close touch" with U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin, who was "a very intelligent fellow. Not a very great social fellow, but he's very intelligent—knows things." He continued: "We all have an interest in a strong Italy. I mean, we really have, keeping it—keeping that country from—I mean, they're such fine people, but just that lack of leadership. That's what they need." Kissinger added: "And, there may be a coup there if this chaos continues." Nixon queried: "Who? Who would go along? The Left—?" Kissinger interrupted: "Either the Right or the Left." The President then replied: "Well, let's hope to God it's the Right." The conversation concluded shortly thereafter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 702–7) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

**224. Memorandum From the Chief of the European Division,
Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt)
to Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹**

Washington, October 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

Status of the Political Action Program for Italy

1. This memorandum is for your information only. It contains a review of the political action program for Italy and notes activities presently being undertaken by the Ambassador [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to support this program.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DO/EUR Files, Job 90–01383R. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director of Plans.

2. On 10 March 1971, the 40 Committee, acting principally on the initiative of Ambassador Martin, approved a diversified political action program for Italy designed to arrest the growing power of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and to strengthen the political center.² Approximately *[less than 1 line not declassified]* dollars were allotted for the implementation of the program. Although it was not envisioned exclusively as election-oriented, the national elections routinely scheduled for May 1973 were seen as a natural point at which the progress of the program could be assessed. The Ambassador, who directed the program, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* spending the latter half of 1971 analyzing the situation and preparing the groundwork for the program. *[6 lines not declassified]*

3. However, the normal course of Italian political developments was altered in December 1971 when for the first time a President of Italy (a Christian Democrat) was elected without Socialist or Communist support, indicating that an alternative had to be found to the decade-old center-left government formula which had grouped the Christian Democrats with the Socialists in an uneasy coalition. Therefore, national elections were called one year early; i.e., in May 1972 rather than May 1973. This drastically shortened the time available to implement the election phase of the program. The Ambassador *[less than 1 line not declassified]* moved quickly, however, to identify these elements on the Italian political scene which could benefit from a subsidy, and to decide on secure methods for transferral of funds. *[5 lines not declassified]*

4. *[1 paragraph (21 lines) not declassified]*

5. The election results made it possible for the Christian Democrats to form a center coalition government including the Social Democrats and the Liberals, with the outside support of the Republicans, but excluding the Socialists. Although the margin of votes is slim (about 15 in a 630-man chamber), the government has been able to maintain itself and it appears possible it will continue at least through the Spring of 1973 despite the pressure from the left to re-form a center-left coalition with the Socialists.

6. Since the program was directed by the Ambassador, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* the Ambassador should take the lead in presenting to the White House and the 40 Committee a report on the overall results of the program. Although he has not, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* Headquarters' knowledge, made such a report, he has indicated his intention to do so. He might do this personally if he visits Washington in October or November 1972, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* The *[less than*

² See Document 208.

1 line not declassified] interim report, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on the results of the program through the May elections, can be summarized as follows:

The program funds backed a considerable number of winners proportionate to the number of candidates actually given funds, and the parties and flanking organizations to whom assistance was given came out of the elections in condition to fulfill the roles we would like to see them play. In some cases the results were even better than had been anticipated, [*3 lines not declassified*] We have every reason to be satisfied with the results and the prospects for the future, [*6 lines not declassified*] It remains difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a really satisfactory judgment on exactly what weight our aid had in the case of some of the larger operations, but this should not detract from our overall satisfaction with the results.

7. [*1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified*]

8. [*1 paragraph (19 lines) not declassified*]

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.³

³ Roosevelt signed "A Roosevelt" above his typed signature.

Malta

225. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, November 1, 1969, 1857Z.

185479. Subj: Current Situation and Outlook in Malta.

1. In view of current attention to Malta within USG and NATO, Department believes it will be useful for addressees to have following consolidated statement, which draws heavily on Embassy Valletta reporting, of present situation and outlook in Malta. Septel provides statement of US interests, current policy guidelines, and proposed course of action on Malta.²

2. *Begin Summary.* As British influence, assistance, and interest in Malta diminish, the Maltese are disappointed that they are not obtaining greater assistance from other NATO countries, including the US, or from the organization itself. The Maltese feel buffeted by East/West rivalry in the Mediterranean and are worried by Arab pressure. We are concerned that the pro-NATO Maltese Government, which is under heavy opposition pressure, is becoming more cautious about use of Malta by NATO and its members. If, as may happen, the opposition wins the next election, it might in time sever Malta's military ties with the West and admit some form of Soviet presence detrimental to our interests. *End Summary.*

3. Malta's long history under foreign domination left the people with an attitude of dependency that is heightened by a sense of economic insecurity. The Maltese feel buffeted to some degree by great-power rivalry in the Mediterranean. Some Maltese think that their country should be a neutral link between Europe and North Africa and, to a lesser extent, between East and West.

4. Strong British interest and influence have been shrinking and there has been friction in British/Maltese relations. A current cause of friction is the dispute over the loan/grant ratio of British assistance to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 MALTA-US. Secret. Drafted by W.J. Walker (EUR/BMI) on October 30; cleared in EUR/BMI, EUR/RPM, EUR/AIS, DOD/ISA/EUR, AID/AFR/NA, and the Joint Staff; and approved by Springsteen. Sent to Valletta, London, Rome, USNATO, and CINCEUR. Repeated to Moscow, all other NATO capitals, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSNAV-EUR, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSAFE, and CG 16th Air Force.

² Telegram 185478 to the same posts, November 1. It stated that "the chief foreign policy interest in Malta is continued denial of Soviet bloc access to Malta" and listed as the second objective preserving NATO forces' access to Malta facilities. (Ibid.)

Malta during the second half of the 1964/74 financial assistance agreement. Diminishing British aid, drastic reduction of the British garrison, and the permanent Soviet presence in the Mediterranean have caused the Maltese to look for economic and technical assistance (and perhaps some political guidance) from other NATO countries and the organization itself.

5. US relations with Malta are reasonably good but are not close. The Maltese are disappointed by what they regard as our failure to provide “adequate aid” in recognition of their country’s strategic value. Previously committed PL-480/Title II food assistance and Sixth Fleet expenditures are injecting annually over \$3 million into the Maltese economy. Prime Minister Borg Olivier and his Nationalist Party government are disturbed, however, that we cannot approve investment guarantees or further economic assistance for Malta because of occasional Maltese-registered ship visits to North Vietnam and Cuba.³ The Sixth Fleet visits are unpopular with opposition leader Dom Mintoff and his Malta Labor Party.

6. Malta does not have particularly warm relations with other NATO countries. Borg Olivier’s attitude toward the Italians, for example, is that they have done little to help Malta.

7. Borg Olivier has advocated a close Maltese tie with NATO itself, but he appears to be losing enthusiasm for the present tenuous NATO/Malta consultative arrangement. He is disappointed by and criticized over his failure to extract some material benefit from NATO. He is worried by opposition charges that the NATO/Malta relationship, as well as the presence of a NATO naval headquarters in Malta (COMNAVSOUTH), create the risk of unwitting Maltese involvement in any East/West confrontation.

8. Government and opposition alike are worried that Malta’s military ties with NATO countries could hurt her relations with Arab states, particularly Libya, where the Maltese are anxious to expand commercial activities and preserve the welfare of their expatriate community. The Maltese are concerned over recent unfounded Arab charges that Malta, with US and NATO help, is providing military facilities to Israel. The de Carlo case further disturbed them.⁴

³ The S.S. *Timios Stavros*, a merchant ship owned by Cypriot interests and flagged in Malta was involved in trade with North Vietnam and Cuba. Rogers discussed the *Timios Stavros* case and economic assistance questions with Olivier during an October 9 meeting in New York. Memoranda of their conversation are *ibid.*, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 398.

⁴ On September 23, Daniel de Carlo, a U.S. educator employed at Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, attempted to smuggle a Jewish Libyan out of the country aboard an aircraft bound for Malta. (“U.S. Accepts Controls By Libya at Airbase,” *Washington Post*, September 26, 1969, p. A1)

9. Within Malta, the economy is showing some improvement, but the electorate is becoming increasingly unhappy with the government's general ineptitude and failure to tackle pressing social problems. The Maltese bureaucracy is inert and dissatisfied. Mintoff is effectively hammering at the government's reputation, repairing relations with the Church, and building confidence with the younger voters.

10. *Outlook.* As things now look, Borg Olivier stands a chance of losing the general election that must occur by March 1971. He is an astute politician, however, and may have some cards up his sleeve which would help him improve his position.

11. We are nevertheless concerned that, if present trends continue, pressure by Mintoff, disenchantment with the UK and NATO, and concern over Mediterranean developments will likely cause the present government to become more cautious and sensitive about military use of Malta by NATO countries. If reelected, it might have a very slim majority and be even more sensitive to opposition views than at present. In these circumstances it might well recede further from its pro-Western foreign policies, curry favor with Malta's Arab neighbors, and possibly permit a resident Soviet diplomatic mission and Soviet fleet calls.

12. If Mintoff came to power, he might make no immediate change in Malta's orientation. Mintoff, however, is both opportunistic and erratic. He advocates a "neutralism" that would include requests to the Soviets for aid that he could not extort from NATO countries. Depending on the degree of Soviet response and the condition of the Maltese economy, Mintoff might then take one or more of the following steps: admit a Soviet diplomatic mission, permit Soviet fleet visits, sever the NATO/Malta relationship, refuse to renew the 1964-74 defense agreement, and ban Sixth Fleet visits; in time, it is not inconceivable that he might allow some form of permanent Soviet military support activity in Malta.

Rogers

226. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB–315/01339–71

Washington, March 16, 1971.

COUNTRY

Malta

DOI

Early March 1971

SUBJECT

Remarks of Malta Labour Party Leader Dominic Mintoff on Relations with NATO and his Attitude Towards the United States and Soviet Mediterranean Fleets

ACQ

[less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[5 lines not declassified]

1. The following remarks were made in early March 1971 by Malta Labour Party (MLP) leader Dominic Mintoff in the course of conversations concerning MLP foreign policy in the event of an MLP victory in the forthcoming Maltese parliamentary elections.

2. Since time immemorial Malta has been exploited as a strategic base by a succession of foreign rulers. Now, in a corner of the world bedeviled by power politics and warring ideologies, Malta is taking its first steps toward self-determination. Much time will be needed to convert the island's fortress economy into peace-oriented productivity. Malta's main problem in the 1970's is to bring this transitional period quickly to an end. Malta's territory and population are so small that any substantial physical presence of the armed forces of any other country not only obstructs the orderly development of the island's economic life, but also undermines its sovereignty. For example, the establishment of a United States Air Base on Malta would turn Malta into the handmaiden of the United States Air Force. Even the current sporadic visits of the United States Sixth Fleet have already caused economic and political distortions impossible to imagine by people who live in larger lands. It is therefore evident that however much Malta might feel ideologically drawn to the West, she cannot afford to make long-term commitments in which a large portion of her territory or economy are

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*; Controlled Dissem; *[handling restriction not declassified]*; Background Use Only.

devoted to the defense needs of the United States, NATO, or any Western state. This observation applies with even greater force to the Soviet Union and China.

3. Further, it should be in the Western interest to abolish the NATO base on Malta. The Sixth Fleet has been expressly designed to operate without bases, and according to the United States State Department, United States warships come to Valletta Harbor only as a goodwill gesture to boost Malta's tourist trade. The West has every interest in preventing the USSR from establishing a base on Malta; and the sooner Malta learns to live without a base, the sooner it will be impossible for the USSR to cajole the Maltese into giving her such facilities.

4. However, it is not yet possible for Malta to survive without the employment afforded by the British base and the subvention given by the United Kingdom for the base. This is why the MLP intends, on taking office, to negotiate with the United Kingdom the revision of the present defense and financial agreements to meet the changed requirements of the two countries. For Malta to get rid of the base in the foreseeable future, she needs additional economic aid. For the United Kingdom to enjoy a base in the central Mediterranean for a definite number of years, she must be willing to pay adequate compensation.

5. In the MLP's view, an agreement with the United Kingdom would not entitle all NATO members, and particularly not the Italians, to identical rights. This stand would mean that NATO would have to set up its southern headquarters on neighboring Italian soil. However, it would not prevent Malta from having separate talks with some NATO states for identical facilities with an identical duration as those negotiated with the United Kingdom. An agreement could be reached also with NATO in which, against compensation, NATO would be given ample time to prepare alternative and better accommodation for its present very small southern headquarters.

6. Field dissem: None.

227. Editorial Note

[text not declassified]

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Malta¹

Washington, June 29, 1971, 0421Z.

116169. Joint State/Defense message. USDOCOSOUTH, CINCEUR, CINCLANT for POLAD. Subject: US Policy Toward Malta. Ref: Valletta 585.²

1. We agree with your assessment of Mintoff's character and style of operation. We had those considerations in mind in defining our basic policy approach set out in State 108884³ and 11208.⁴ Our general policy at this time will be one of restraint. We want to take no initiatives. Our response to GOM initiatives will be unhurried, and based on a close assessment of US interests and those of our allies, which in some cases (UK and Italy) are more extensively and directly involved than our own are. You will have noted that the UK, Italy, and FRG have all adopted a wait-and-see policy similar to our own.

2. Concerning ship visits, we think that Mintoff may have an exaggerated idea of the value of Malta's facilities to the US. They are useful to us, but by no means essential; it is not vital to us to maintain our ship visits to Malta. You will recall Navy only reluctantly undertook ship visits at Department urging in the sixties as part of effort to bolster GOM. The best way to disabuse Mintoff of the notion that the facilities give him important leverage on us is to show no alarm at what he has done, and no haste to learn what "revisions of general arrangements" he has in mind. *FYI*. We do have a great concern, however, with possible developments involving Soviet interests in the area. We consider it a military necessity that Malta not be permitted to become a base for

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by R.T. Burns (EUR/BMI); cleared by Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in PM/ISO, EUR/RPM, S/S-O, and OSD/ISA; and approved by Hillenbrand.

² Dated June 24, it reported that Mintoff had denied a request for Sixth Fleet visits during the next 3 months. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 7 MALTA–US)

³ Dated June 18, it provided the Embassy with "initial policy guidance" for its dealings with the Mintoff government. (Ibid., POL 1 MALTA–US) Dom Mintoff's Labour Party won the June 14 elections by one seat. Copies of analyses of the elections prepared for the President by Kissinger, June 21, and by Pritzlaff, July 6, are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. During the course of an August 10 briefing in which Zumwalt commented on the "uncertainty" created by the outcome of the Maltese elections, the President stated that he did not understand "how any major country like the United States could allow a stinking election in Malta to be lost. . . . one vote, one member of Parliament, who apparently lost by about 10 votes. We must have a brilliant Ambassador there." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation 68–7)

⁴ Not found.

Soviet naval and air operations. Any concession by Mintoff suggesting this possibility should be watched and reported. Similarly, his recent objection to NATO meetings may be his initial move in forcing the withdrawal of the NATO headquarters. The temporary cancellation of Sixth Fleet visits inhibits US flexibility in the area and appears contrary to both US and Maltese interests. *End FYI.*

3. Therefore, you should take no rpt no initiative to see Mintoff or to discuss the ship visits issue with others in GOM. Mintoff probably expects you to be anxious to know more about his plans. When you show no anxiety, he or others may raise the subject with you again. If that happens, you should say that you have informed Washington of the Maltese position on ship visits, and that Washington is waiting for GOM to tell us in due course what it has in mind with its reference to revisions of general arrangements. If the Maltese ask about our reaction to Mintoff's request for equipment, you should say, without expressing any regrets, that you have reported to Washington and have had no reply.

4. Similarly, you should make no rpt no mention of the Oceanographic Institute project and the *Timios Stavros* case.⁵ Failure provide affirmative response to request for Sixth Fleet visit raises question of entry such vessels for repair in drydocks. For present therefore, we are holding in abeyance provision of list of repair opportunities. If you are queried about the latter, you should say that you understand that a work package had been in preparation, but that you have no information about its present status.

5. In summary, we intend to wait Mintoff out. We can afford to do so because the actions he has taken do not seriously affect US interests, and because to appear to propitiate him would only make him even harder to deal with. Moreover, our assessment is that primary target now is UK and revision of defense-financial agreement. Developments on that issue will be barometer as to how Mintoff proposes treat others. We wish do nothing that enables Mintoff play us off against UK. Your posture for the period ahead should be to take no initiatives, express no concern about the future state of US-Maltese relations, and continue your full and timely reporting and analysis of developments.⁶

Rogers

⁵ The United States had offered to begin a program of cooperation with the Maltese Government in the area of marine sciences prior to the elections. Regarding the *Timios Stavros* case, see footnote 3, Document 225.

⁶ In an attached July 1 note to Haig, Sonnenfeldt commented that these instructions ran counter to NSC planning for an active intervention with Malta over the future of NATO bases.

229. National Security Study Memorandum 135¹

Washington, July 17, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Malta

The President has directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Malta be undertaken. The study should identify U.S. interests in Malta and consider inter alia the implications of the following factors and developments for those interests:

- Foreign policy objectives of the Mintoff administration;
- Maltese domestic needs;
- UK-Maltese relationship;
- Malta's relations with other countries, including Germany, Italy, Libya and the USSR—and the USSR's intentions toward Malta;
- the need for NATO presence on Malta, political and military factors to be weighed in removing that presence, and possible political relationships between NATO and Malta;
- the nature of U.S. strategic interests in Malta;
- present and possible Maltese demands on the U.S.

The study should present options for U.S. policy and programs to advance or protect U.S. interests in Malta. The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC staff, and under the chairmanship of the representative of the Department of State. The study should be forwarded no later than August 2, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was also sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

230. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, July 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Mintoff Pleads for US Support

With the memorandum at Tab A, Dick Helms reports on a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] conversation [*less than 1 line not declassified*] during which Mintoff made an impassioned plea for the US to put pressure on the British through NATO; or to consider what the US could give NATO if the British withdraw; or to send a high-level representative to discuss the situation with him. He repeatedly stressed the seriousness of Malta's financial situation and the need for a solution prior to the reconvening of the Maltese Parliament in August.

The Helms' memorandum would appear to present us with a very important opportunity to work out a successful solution to your Maltese problems. In my memorandum proposing a game plan for Malta (Tab B, Log # 30925X), I suggested that we will have to move quickly and decisively if we are to realize our objectives of retaining a US and NATO presence in Malta. *Mintoff appears to have given us our opening.*

Two immediate steps would appear to be in order:

—Feldman should be immediately contacted (before he unknowingly pays an unofficial visit on Mintoff) and told that you will want to touch base with him before he visits Mintoff.

—Mintoff should be informed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that he can expect to hear from Feldman in the very near future, and that Feldman will be carrying high-level credentials.

Once these steps have been taken, it would be possible to begin working out the details of coordinated UK and US negotiations with Mintoff along the lines suggested in the memorandum at Tab B. (The fact that Ambassador Pritzlaff is aware of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] conversation would appear to ease if not eliminate the difficulties we earlier had with him about having an emissary visit Mintoff.)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for very urgent action. A notation on the first page reads: "thru Haig". The tabs are not printed.

*Recommendation*²

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] inform Mintoff that he will be hearing from a high-level US representative in the very near future.

2. That you have Ambassador Feldman contacted and told to stand by for instructions prior to visiting Mintoff.

3. That you approve the supporting actions recommended in the memorandum at Tab B.

² Kissinger initialed his approval of all three recommendations. In an attached July 29 note, Haig wrote Kissinger: "Hal is exactly right. This is what I have been trying to get done against a degree of bureaucratic stalling on the part of State and Defense—money being the problem on the part of Defense and State Department timidity being the problem in State. I am confident that we can move this thing if we pursue Hal's suggestion with Feldman and the game plan prepared by Hal . . . Please give this your most urgent attention or another critical asset will drift away." Kissinger annotated the note: "let's move."

231. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Pritzlaff Recommends Immediate Aid for Malta

As you are aware, Ambassador Pritzlaff has informed State that he believes Mintoff's deadline for a solution to his immediate cash problem is August 6 or sooner, and *Pritzlaff recommends that the US should act now to provide Mintoff with the two–three million pounds (approximately \$4.8–7.2 million) he requires to meet Malta's cash flow needs for the next 60–90 days.*²

At the same time Pritzlaff believes that the UK must tell Mintoff within the next 24 hours when its negotiating team will return and when its counter offer will be made. He thinks that Mintoff will reject

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for urgent action.

² Pritzlaff's recommendations were contained in telegram 802 from Valletta, August 2. (Ibid.) Kissinger annotated the NSC copy of the telegram: "What are we doing?" The handwritten date "8–8–71" appears below this.

the 6.5 million pound offer, being contemplated in NATO, collapse the negotiations and turn to the Libyans. He believes, however, that Mintoff would not reject a ten million pound package, and that such a package would provide the basis for further negotiations. *He thinks timing is crucial, that Mintoff may try to jump to the Libyans at any time.*

State informs us that AID may be able to find the \$4.8–\$7.2 million on short notice in the AID Administrator's contingency fund if AID agrees to lift the Foreign Assistance Act restriction it has been imposing on Malta because of earlier visits to Cuban and North Vietnamese ports by the Maltese-registered ship *Timios Stavros*. Since this ship has not visited a Communist port since August 1970, it should be possible to lift this restriction.

Other reports would seem to confirm Ambassador Pritzlaff's assessment of the crucial timing involved—the fact that Mintoff may take precipitous action. Pritzlaff's recommended action, however, would have the US unilaterally putting money into Malta *without exacting from Mintoff an understanding with regard to NATO and Sixth Fleet visits that is of importance to US interests*. Unless we have the NATO/Sixth Fleet strings in some way attached from the very beginning we run a major risk of not being able to achieve our objectives in Malta.

In an effort to protect our interests, I think we should tell Mintoff immediately that we are prepared to help him with his near-term financial crisis. If we take this move, it might be wisest to be as forthcoming as possible, i.e., \$7.2 not \$4.8 million. This will take the pressure off Mintoff, and will clearly demonstrate our seriousness. In offering Mintoff this aid, we should take care to identify it as bilateral support—not to be confused with UK negotiations. At the same time we should emphasize the importance we place on working out a satisfactory arrangement for Sixth Fleet visits. We should emphasize the importance with which we view the NATO-assisted UK negotiations, impress on Mintoff that he must give the UK and NATO the time they require to develop a negotiating package, that they are working in good faith to develop such a package, and that we want to reach a satisfactory solution to his broader financial problems.

A decision is immediately required as to who will inform Mintoff that we are prepared to aid him. The logical candidates are Ambassador Pritzlaff or former Ambassador Feldman. Pritzlaff is on the scene, abreast of developments and could move immediately, I do not know where Feldman is or how informed of developments he is. If he is abreast of developments, no matter where he is, he could contact Mintoff immediately by telephone and follow up as soon as possible with a visit.

Dick Kennedy has requested Jim Schlesinger to identify possible sources for approximately \$8 million on an urgent basis. I think we

should proceed on the assumption that we can find the money. State may suggest that we try to get other NATO nations to help solve the immediate financial problem—i.e., get the UK, FRG and Italy to chip in on the \$4.8–\$7.2 million within the next day or two. I think this would be a mistake; we should keep the multinational focus on development of the broader NATO-assisted UK negotiating package (keeping in mind that we may wish to call on the AID funds to fatten that package if necessary). However, we will have to inform the British that we are providing Mintoff with short-term assistance—emphasizing that this is not meant to replace the UK negotiating package.

Recommendations

1. That General Haig ask Alec Johnson to have Mintoff informed immediately that US is prepared to assist him.³

Feldman to inform Mintoff

Pritzlaff to inform Mintoff

2. That General Haig ask Johnson to advise British of the step we are taking.⁴

³ Kissinger checked the Approve line beneath the two options, and the date “8–8–71” was written below. A copy of the message to Pritzlaff approving an approach to Mintoff was forwarded to the State Department on August 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I)

⁴ No indication of Kissinger’s decision is on the original.

232. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 135¹

Washington, August 3, 1971.

NSSM 135—POLICY TOWARD MALTA

[Omitted here are the Table of Contents and Sections I, The Situation in Malta; II, Malta’s External Relations; III, Current Military Importance of Malta; IV, U.S. Interests in Malta; and V, What Does Malta Want of the U.S.?)

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-187, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 135. Secret.

VI. Summary Conclusions

A. Successful renegotiation of UK–GOM agreements leaving the way open to NATO and US use of facilities would obviously be the preferred outcome. A *de minimis* solution would be one leaving the British in and excluding NATO, provided the Warsaw Pact and member nations are at least as rigidly excluded.

B. American affirmative interest in Malta has been historically negligible and is not likely to increase dramatically. Our experience in dealing with the Maltese is likewise limited, a fact that we should recognize as the most basically sound reason for keeping the British in front. We must nevertheless recognize that our attitudes and actions may significantly affect British options in dealing with Mintoff and the Maltese. If we decide we cannot help the British cope with Mintoff's financial demands, this will undoubtedly increase their predilection to wait him out, hoping he might be toppled from within.

C. We cannot make confident predictive statements concerning Malta under Mintoff. There are as yet too many unknowns. If the UK treated Mintoff too stiffly or too generously for example, we could conceive in either case of his calling a quick new election on his own initiative—seeking and obtaining a stronger mandate from the Maltese people. Or he might, citing a crisis situation, seek to rule without Parliament. On the other hand, there are several domestic factors beyond Mintoff's control which will inhibit any precipitate move away from Malta's traditional European ties. The inherently conservative nature of the Maltese themselves and the still powerful influence of the Catholic Church will impose major limitations on Mintoff's initiatives. The economy would have difficulty in adjusting to the jolt of a sudden British withdrawal, even if Mintoff were to accept massive Libyan aid. Moreover, Labor's one seat margin in the Parliament will also subject Mintoff to pressure from the moderate wing of his party, which is already reported to be concerned with his foreign policy tactics and proposals.

D. With our reserve in predicting specific Maltese outcomes noted, our best guess is that if Mintoff categorically rejects a British counter-proposal, presumably setting in train an actual British withdrawal, he will probably precipitate a domestic crisis either economic or political and possibly both. The same European reluctance to contribute which has been notable in NAC discussion of the UK proposal would confront Mintoff in making the approach directly. No one except perhaps the Libyans seems prepared to quickly infuse the massive inputs needed to replace the British in the Maltese economy. A British withdrawal would still mean serious and sudden loss of jobs and local transfer earnings, which may amount to three times what would be lost by the stoppage of subsidy alone—perhaps combining to total a poten-

tial \$45 to \$50 million loss. A sudden turn to the Libyans to avert economic crisis, might, however, galvanize the opposition who, seeing Malta's traditional ties to Europe threatened, could also call on the residual anti-Arabism in the Maltese population. Under such conditions of potential turbulence, the position of the British and their friends on Malta would be strongly enhanced if they could demonstrate that they had done their best and come up with a fair and reasonable offer to help the Maltese.

E. There is no likelihood that modest, independent US programs in Malta of the sort hitherto conducted are likely to have any significant effect.

F. If the British, over time, fail to maintain influence, a preponderant Western European presence, negotiated on whatever terms, would seem to be in the interests of ourselves, the Europeans and the Maltese. West Germany may be the most logical single state to give Malta the longer term economic support it needs on reciprocating terms advantageous to both sides, and to coordinate the contributions of other allies.

G. We should have no objections to modest Libyan investments in Malta as long as they come without meaningful political strings (which we believe would also be objectionable to many Maltese) and do not assume preponderance. Indeed Malta could become interesting in a three-cornered sense for Western businessmen, including Italians, Germans, and Americans, who have assets in Libya that they have trouble operating on the scene.

H. Incident to a settlement with the Europeans, modest expansion of US-Maltese ties along functional lines of mutual interest would be useful: e.g., increased trade, scientific and cultural exchanges and US Fleet visits conducted in an atmosphere of practical usefulness for both sides.

I. While we have no great problem if Mintoff implements a mild program of "political" diversification to attract the economic enrichment the island needs, a more radical "balance politics" could over time make Malta shaky and potentially dangerous. Militarily, we clearly prefer a parity of non-use to a parity of equal access. We could, however, live with a rare and occasional Soviet fleet visit, which might also have self-canceling advantages/disadvantages for the USSR and thus not be a wedge for stepped up pressure on the Maltese.

J. A Maltese break with the West does not necessarily suggest either an immediate or a likely medium term possibility of Soviet penetration or dominance. Mintoff has shown himself to be very careful vis-à-vis the Russians, and the social orientation of the Maltese people provides no apparent ideological footholds of any consequence for Communism. Further there is considerable evidence that an alliance

with the Libyans would militate against Soviet influence in Malta. Qadhafi has shown himself to be highly suspicious and opposed to Russian penetration efforts, as have other North African leaders including Algeria's Boumedienne.

[Omitted here is Section VII, Options for U.S. Policy.]

233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, August 4, 1971, 2037Z.

7248. For the Secretary. Subject: Malta. Ref: State 141021.²

1. Following on my talk with the Foreign Secretary August 2,³ I called on Minister of Defense Lord Carrington this afternoon to discuss Malta situation. I noted that Embassy over the weekend had put to UK Government two proposals for US participation in NATO package of aid or compensation for Malta to be negotiated by UK. I said that while recognizing that Mintoff may be unpredictable, mercurial, and determined to drive best possible bargain with UK, we felt that situation held such potential danger, particularly if opening might be afforded to USSR, that there was high degree of urgency in need to reach agreement with Malta. I observed that we did not sense same degree of urgency in British attitude and stressed belief of US Govt at highest levels that all possible should be done to make quick progress.

2. Lord Carrington said he would like to give me his assessment of Maltese position. Noting that Mintoff had come to power only because Catholic Church had lifted ban of excommunication on anyone who voted for him, Carrington said his remaining in office really depended on Church maintaining its present attitude. Carrington thought this was strongest factor militating against Mintoff turning to Soviets, for that would again bring down censure of Church.

3. Politically, Carrington continued, Mintoff held bare majority. While he had largely ignored his colleagues in his actions to date, there were signs that some of them were beginning to exert some pressure on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found.

³ Reported in telegram 7134 from London, August 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL MALTA-UK)

Mintoff. This had lain behind Mintoff's turn-around in accepting Carrington's visit, and it could be a possible source of restraint in future. In any event, Mintoff had to consider his political situation and must produce something to enhance his standing.

4. Carrington thought Mintoff was really in fairly weak position vis-à-vis UK. If he ousted British forces, he would immediately lose approximately 20 million pounds which accrued from UK defense expenditures in Malta. Considering other economic returns from presence in Malta of many other British subjects and tourism from UK, total economic loss from British sources was estimated to be on side of 40 million pounds annually should there be total separation.

5. Second major economic and political factor was that departure of British forces would immediately cause 7,500 additional unemployed out of total work force of around 100,000, with unemployment rate already fairly high.

6. Against this background, Carrington said that his main impression from his talks with Mintoff was that latter was endeavoring to create elaborate scenario designed to drive wedge between UK and its allies so as to maximize possibility of securing increased aid from Western nations. At one point in private talk between just the two of them, Mintoff had tried to apply shock treatment by suggesting that Malta might turn away from Britain entirely in favor of another European country. Carrington rejoined that presumably this might mean Germany. Mintoff had dismissed that possibility and slyly asked how would Britain react if Malta turned to France. When Carrington immediately replied that Britain would be delighted if Malta could get 30 million a year from France, Mintoff seemed quite taken aback.

7. As for immediate financial outlook, Carrington observed that apparently US and some other governments had information suggesting that situation was critical. I noted that US Embassy in Valletta had reported Maltese view that government would not be able to meet payroll after August 15. Carrington expressed skepticism, commenting that Maltese Government has 70 million pounds in reserves in London.⁴ (He cautioned that this was highly confidential). Also, it was noted that Mintoff had apparently made no attempts at borrowing. I stressed that information available to US Government indicated serious immediate financial problem and asked whether UK officials would investigate this aspect of situation more thoroughly. Car-

⁴ In telegram 142339 to London, August 5, the Department of State requested further information on the status of these funds. In telegram 7311 from London, August 6, the Embassy replied that U.K. officials believed the sum on reserve amounted to \$80 million and that Malta could use it as collateral to obtain commercial bank loans. (Both *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI)

rington's people undertook to do so. Implication left by Carrington was that UK suspects US has been taken in by Mintoff on financial side of his scenario.

8. Carrington made it clear that although UK Government has its reservations about Mintoff's motives, sincerity and reliability, it proposed to carry through with attempt to make up a reasonable offer to him. This would, hopefully result from NAC discussions, following which UK negotiations with Malta could resume. Carrington expressed his strong conviction, however, that the process of dealing with Malta should be deliberate and unhurried. Also, he thought initial offer probably should not go the whole way since it was inherent part of Mintoff's psychology to expect that first bid would be low. I observed that it would be difficult to proceed in this fashion with several governments involved, some of which might leak to Mintoff. Carrington acknowledged that situation had inherent characteristic of sieve.

9. I commented that it was obvious that there was marked difference between US and UK Governments' respective assessments of overall situation and expressed hope that we could stay in close touch. Carrington agreed.

10. Since Carrington is Minister most directly involved in negotiations, I must take his appreciation of situation as most authoritative on UK side. Report of Mintoff's trip to Libya,⁵ which came over ticker shortly before our talk, did not faze Carrington. His attitude was that if Mintoff was able to get aid from Libya, it would not basically alter his national dependence on Western Europe. In view Carrington's general assessment, which seemed persuasive to me, I think there is little question of UK Government entertaining any idea of immediate cash infusion and little choice but to proceed with NATO package and for UK to negotiate with Malta thereafter.

Annenberg

⁵ August 4-5. Between his election in June and the end of the year, Mintoff made four visits to Libya.

234. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms

Washington, September 22, 1971

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 622, NSC Files, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page not declassified.]

235. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 1, 1971.

SUBJECT

White House Role in Malta Negotiations

Since the Maltese elections in mid-June, the White House has been following Mintoff's moves and the development of US policy toward Malta on a close and regular basis. There have been several noteworthy instances when the White House has had to intervene to keep US policy on the desired track.

—Immediately after Mintoff's victory, we revised State's business-as-usual policy guidance message to Embassy Valletta to make it clear that while the US wished to remain on the best of terms with Malta *the nature of our future relationship would depend on the course Mintoff chose to follow.*²

—NSSM 135 on US Policy Toward Malta was issued in mid-July,³ triggered by State's instructions to Embassy Valletta to raise the drydocks/ship visit issue with Mintoff on a bilateral basis at the very

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. A notation by Kissinger on the first page reads: "Bring up to date and put into personal file."

² Apparently telegram 108884, June 18, which provided "initial policy guidance" on Malta. A copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 1 MALTA–US.

³ Document 229.

time when he was attempting through such bilateral arrangements to play NATO nations against each other.

—During the drafting of the NSSM 135 response,⁴ the NSC representative had to insist on the development of options recognizing US interests, including continued NATO presence and future Sixth Fleet visits, at a time when the agencies had decided that Malta was a European problem and our sole interest was in keeping the Soviets out.

—Following exploratory talks with Mintoff in mid-July, the UK informed NATO members that they would have to help share the financial burden of any new UK agreement with Malta. *The White House had to kill State instructions to our NATO representative stating that the US viewed Malta as a European problem, “a concrete test of the Europeans’ willingness and ability to take on added security burdens.”* At White House insistence the instructions were revised to reflect that the US was considering assisting the UK.⁵

—[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

—In late July/early August, when Mintoff was demanding an immediate and unconditional \$4.8 million quick-fix to solve his immediate financial crisis, the State Department adopted the UK view that there was in fact no crisis. On August 4, the White House instructed State to inform Mintoff that we were prepared to give him the quick fix with the understanding that he would proceed to negotiate in good faith with the UK and to recognize US interests.⁶

While State was able to persuade the White House not to take this step, State responded to White House pressure by undertaking to persuade the UK that a quick fix payment would be required. By the time that the UK had reluctantly agreed, Mintoff, of course, had solved his quick fix problem by accepting cash from Libya, *cash paid to him in return for his having ousted NATO from Malta.*

During the Malta negotiations we have had less than complete success in getting State to clear policy-level instructions on Malta with the White House:

—You will recall that on September 14, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to ask what bilateral assistance the US was prepared to offer and to renew his request that you visit him. State, without clearing with the White House, instructed our Chargé to do little more than reiterate to

⁴ Document 232.

⁵ Apparently telegram 140568, August 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I)

⁶ See Document 231.

Mintoff our interest in Sixth Fleet visits, and not surprisingly this produced a negative reaction from Mintoff.⁷

—Following the Mintoff-Heath agreement of September 19,⁸ State, without White House clearance, let it be known to the British that we are not planning to pay our share of the UK(NATO) cash offer for six months, and that our payment will hinge on successful conclusion of the negotiations. *The White House instructed State to inform the UK that we are attaching no new strings to our contribution and that our payment will be forthcoming as soon as we can work out transfer arrangements.*

⁷ Apparently telegram 166415 to Valletta, September 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I)

⁸ The agreement, announced on September 22, enabled the United Kingdom and NATO to continue to use the Malta naval base in exchange for \$22.8 million in rent per year, of which the United Kingdom would pay half; moreover, other NATO members agreed to contribute to the economic development of Malta. This agreement was preliminary: a more detailed agreement was to be negotiated over the following six months. A summary of the deal was published in "Britain and Malta Reach Agreement On the Use of Base," *New York Times*, September 23, 1971, p. 3.

236. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, October 5, 1971, 3:35–3:57 p.m.

SUBJECT

Malta

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

U. Alexis Johnson

Russell Fessenden

Ronald Spiers

Herbert Spiro

Defense

Armistead Selden

Brig. Gen. Harrison Lobdell

Col. Marshall Baker

JCS

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer

Brig. Gen. Francis J. Roberts

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

James Hanrahan

Treasury

Paul Volcker

John McGinnis

OMB

Kenneth Dam

AID

John Hannah

NSC Staff

Col. Richard Kennedy

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

A. Denis Clift

R/Adm. Robert Welander

Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The primary objective of U.S. policy toward Malta is the successful renegotiation of the UK-Malta defense and financial agreement. A successful agreement would: (1) safeguard U.S. strategic interests; (2) deny Malta's military facilities to the Soviet Union; and (3) keep Malta from becoming dependent on Libya for financial assistance. If the negotiations fail, we would not let them disintegrate completely without giving the President the option of taking such actions as may be required to ensure an outcome satisfactory to the U.S.

—The Agency for International Development should provide the U.S. share of the funds pledged by the UK for the Malta negotiations.

—The Under Secretaries Committee should monitor the UK-Malta negotiations.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting—Malta 10/5/71. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original. The meeting focused on the response to NSSM 135, Document 232.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest that we move on to Malta now.

Mr. Johnson: I might as well lead off the discussion since I have been so involved with Malta. In fact, I've practically been the desk officer for the last few months.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you sum up the situation for us?

Mr. Johnson: I think we can point with pride to recent developments. We and the British were engaged in some brinksmanship, and a lot of people were getting nervous at Mintoff's threats. Now we can point to some results. We have the Mintoff-Heath agreement to negotiate for six months on a more detailed defense and financial agreement.

Mintoff had originally demanded 18 million pounds, and the British offered 10 million pounds. We contributed \$5.4 million, or about 2.25 million pounds, to the British package of 10 million pounds. The British also agreed to make the first payment on September 30. We told them we would be prepared to transfer our contribution when things were fixed on the Hill.

In effect, we have a six-month truce, and I hope we will be able to maintain the status quo. We must, however, develop contingency plans for the future. The British said they would try to round up all the bilateral offers within three months. Would we consider making a bilateral offer to Mintoff? Right now we have an AID program of very modest size in Malta.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the ship that went to North Vietnam? Is that no longer a problem?

Mr. Johnson: It's not a problem. If you permit, I will return to it a little later. As I was saying, we have a small PL 480 program on Malta. We also have a \$150 thousand oceanographic cooperation package which we offered to former Prime Minister Borg Olivier before the election. He refused it, but we can still offer it to Mintoff.

We have some CCC loans and a couple of other items which could be put into one package. The problem in trying to put a package together, though, is to decide how substantial it should be. Should we try to put together a relatively large aid program in three months? Our general conclusion is that this is not the time to do that. What we have done so far should be satisfactory. Anyway, at the end of six months, we may very well face the same situation we did three months ago. The negotiations may break down, with Mintoff saying he needs more money, and with the British saying they have put up all the money they can. If that happens, will we be willing to put up 8 million pounds, or \$20–25 million? Would we take over completely from the British if the negotiations break down and if they [the British] are kicked out of Malta? If that were the case, would we set up a major aid program? Or

would we let the British play chicken and brinksmanship again with Mintoff, on the assumption that Mintoff will at the last moment settle for whatever he can get?

If Mintoff kicks the British out, the move would create additional unemployment. With no more British presence on Malta, Mintoff could turn to Libya or the Soviet Union. He may have gotten money from Qadhafi [Libyan Prime Minister]. Nevertheless, it is difficult for us to see the Libyans putting up as much money as the British. But assuming they do, just for the sake of argument, they will probably demand that the British and Soviets be kept out. From our point of view, this is tolerable. If we fail to keep the British in, our primary goal is to keep the Soviets out.

If Mintoff fails to make a deal with Libya, will he turn to the Soviet Union? We are just speculating, of course, but we are inclined to be doubtful that the Soviet Union would put up a substantial amount of money. We also doubt that Mintoff could remain in office if he were to make a deal with the Soviets.

We don't need to face any of these issues now. They will come before us in six months.

Dr. Kissinger: Why in six months?

Mr. Johnson: That's where the Heath-Mintoff agreement ends, assuming they can't reach a new one.

Mr. Fessenden: The issue is 10 million vs. 18 million pounds. There is a good chance the negotiations will fail.

Mr. Johnson: In summary, we recommend that we be prepared to play brinksmanship again, but there is no need for a final decision now.

Dr. Kissinger: Our problem, as I see it, is to make up a difference of 8 million pounds, if it ever comes to that. This could be done by us or by NATO.

Mr. Johnson: The British will try to stay in at 10 million pounds, and 2.25 million of those pounds are our contribution. If the negotiations break down, we must pick up at least 18 million pounds.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't understand why we would have to pick up 18 million. It would only be 8 million if the British stay in. If Mintoff tells the British he accepts their 10 million pounds, the British will stay in. Once the negotiations look like they are breaking down, we can save them by giving 8 million pounds to the British. With skill, we should be able to handle this. If we faced the issue of 18 million pounds, we can face the issue of 10 million.

We could, for example, tell the British to go as close to 18 million pounds as possible and that we will make up the difference. We could have some kind of understanding with the British.

Adm. Moorer: For whatever it's worth, the NATO Military Committee which met in Toronto² heard a very optimistic report on the Maltese situation.

Mr. Johnson: We need to keep a close watch on the situation, and we will do so. This is also a NATO problem. We have received contributions from the FRG and Italy.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to make a couple of observations. First, we obviously have a significant interest in Malta. Second, we want to keep the Soviets out. Therefore, we want the Heath-Mintoff negotiations to succeed. If the negotiations fail, we will not let them disintegrate completely without giving the President the option of filling the gap, if he wishes. Third, we are not willing to let Libya come in, if this can be prevented at a manageable cost. The maximum price now seems to be 10 million pounds.

Mr. Johnson: Assuming the British are out completely, the maximum price is 18 million pounds.

Dr. Kissinger: But I am assuming that with skill we can keep the British going. If we assume Mintoff will settle at 18 million and the British will be willing to stay at 10 million, we can keep them in the negotiations.

Mr. Spiro: Mintoff, as you know, has asked that Dr. Kissinger come to Malta.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. We thought of informing him that it might be possible for me to see him if he came to the UN meeting in New York.

Mr. Fessenden: We just received word today that he is not coming to the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to go to Malta. If my seeing him will make that much of a difference . . .

Mr. Johnson: That hasn't come up.

Dr. Kissinger: It has in the back channels.

Mr. Johnson: Now isn't the time for a meeting. It's best that the British deal with him. They have known him for a long time, and they know how to handle him.

Mr. Selden: That's right. The chief British negotiator was so sure of himself that he took time off to go sailing for two weeks in Greece.

Mr. Johnson: The British have done well.

Dr. Kissinger. Does everyone agree on the principle that before the negotiations break down, you will come back here?

² The Military Committee is NATO's highest military authority, composed of the chief of staff of each member country except France.

[All agreed]

Are there any other matters we should bring up? Hal [Sonnenfeldt]?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There are two things: (1) where will the \$2.25 million come from; and (2) what about Sixth Fleet visits?

Dr. Hannah: We have a problem. This project has not been justified to Congress. If we decided to provide Supporting Assistance funds, Congress would have to be informed, and I would have to lift the Foreign Assistance Act restrictions now in effect. These restrictions were applied, as you know, because a Maltese ship owned by a Greek called at Communist ports.³

Dr. Kissinger: Are we still having trouble with that ship? I thought we had a scheme to buy it.

Mr. Johnson: Mel [Laird] had a scheme, but it didn't work out. [1 line not declassified]

Dr. Hannah: The ship had visited ports in North Vietnam and North Korea. State said we should forget about it because the ship has not made such calls in 18 months.

I just learned today, though, that the ship had been in dry dock. It is now at sea again. Malta, I understand, has done nothing to prevent the ship from calling at Communist ports. The problem is that in order for Malta to qualify for Supporting Assistance, I must find that the proper action has been taken by Malta.

An alternative way of lifting the restrictions would be for the President to issue a Determination stating that this action is in the national interest. It also seems to me that we must justify this project to Passman and Proxmire.⁴ It will be difficult with Proxmire.

Dr. Kissinger: Why will Proxmire be difficult?

Dr. Hannah: He is difficult on everything.

Dr. Kissinger: But in this case we are giving aid to a left-wing government. He would not be able to say that we are supporting a military regime.

Mr. Johnson: That's one reason we told the British to try to get an agreement before we go to the Hill.

Dr. Hannah: If we want to take quick action, I think we must go the Presidential waiver route.

Mr. Johnson: Our lawyers feel that since the ship has not called at the ports in 18 months, it's grounds to take them [the Maltese] off the

³ Reference is to the *Timios Stavros*. See footnote 3, Document 225, and footnote 5, Document 228.

⁴ Representative Otto E. Passman (D-LA) and Senator William Proxmire (D-WI).

list. We would, of course, have egg on our faces if we take them off the list and the ship calls at the ports one week later.

Dr. Hannah: But the ship was in dry dock, and it is now at sea. The Maltese did nothing to prevent it from calling at those ports again.

Mr. Johnson: We certainly can't expect to get a firm commitment from the Maltese. I think we should get our lawyers together and make a finding to take them off the list. We have done this in the past.

Dr. Kissinger: Either way—the legal way or the Presidential Determination waiver—we can take them off the list.

Mr. Johnson: I prefer using the legal way.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: I thought the legal people of AID agreed with this action.

Dr. Hannah: We were in agreement—until today, when we found out the ship was on the high seas again.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we need new lawyers.

Dr. Hannah: The lawyers can argue about it. Congressional consultation won't be so simple. We thought we were in good shape, but now Fulbright⁵ has started out with a 30 percent cut on the authorization bill.

Mr. Johnson: This is also a political matter, and we can give you some help.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: What about the Sixth Fleet visits?

Mr. Johnson: We sent out a telegram, which was cleared by all the agencies, saying there should be no Sixth Fleet visits, if the price is Soviet visits.⁶ Everyone agreed with that position.

Adm. Moorer: The British haven't talked to them about visits of NATO ships yet, only about British ships.

Mr. Johnson: I don't think the British should push on this.

Adm. Moorer: I agree.

Mr. Johnson: There's one other point I should bring up. Our annual commitment to the British is for five years. The Maltese are talking about a seven-year agreement, though. If they do agree on seven years, we are prepared to go along with it. Don't you think that's right?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, no question about it.⁷

⁵ Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

⁶ Document 228.

⁷ A summary of the decisions taken at the meeting were sent to the Embassy in Valletta in telegram 190144, October 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 MALTA-US)

237. National Security Decision Memorandum 138¹

Washington, October 13, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Administrator, Agency for International Development
Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Malta

After reviewing the response to NSSM 135² and having considered the issues raised during the SRG meeting of October 5,³ the President has made the following decisions.

U.S. policy toward Malta shall have as its principal objective the successful renegotiation of the United Kingdom-Malta defense and financial agreement, so as to:

- safeguard U.S. strategic interests;
- deny Malta's military facilities to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations;
- retain use of the UK's military facilities by NATO forces;
- keep Malta from becoming dependent on Libya for financial assistance.

The President has approved provision from resources available to the Agency for International Development of the funds pledged by the United States to the UK for the Malta negotiations. The Administrator, AID, should arrange with the Department of State for the transfer of these funds.

The President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee should monitor the UK-Malta negotiations and make timely recommendations on such actions as may be required to ensure an outcome satisfactory to the United States.

The President wishes to consider all options open to him to prevent the possible breakdown of UK-Malta negotiations in order that he can decide on the future U.S. course of action before any such break-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Treasury.

² Document 232.

³ See Document 236.

down might occur. The Under Secretaries Committee is charged with the development by November 1, 1971 of alternative levels and packages of possible U.S. assistance to Malta for his consideration.⁴ These recommendations should be so formulated as to provide the President with the option of bridging any funding/assistance gap which may exist between the United Kingdom and Malta in the negotiations.

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ A copy of these recommendations is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-228, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 138. A subsequent set of recommendations by the Committee, dated December 7, are *ibid.*

238. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

Malta—Mintoff's Latest Ultimatum

On December 25, Prime Minister Mintoff informed the British that UK forces will not be permitted to stay on Malta beyond December 31 unless the UK accepts Malta's demands for adequate rent. Further, Mintoff said that talks on a new defense agreement can only be resumed if the UK is willing to pay the difference between the 18 million pounds per year requested by the Maltese and the 9.5 million pounds per year offered by the UK, with 4.25 million additional to be paid by December 31 (telegram at Tab A).²

On December 23, Mintoff began preparing the members of his government and the Maltese public—via the press—for a showdown with

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for urgent information.

² Not printed. The text of Mintoff's note together with an analysis of the situation was contained in telegram 1408 from Valletta, December 25. Mintoff's message was dated December 24. The British Embassy delivered a copy to the U.S. Embassy on the morning of December 25.

the UK. And, as you know, this most recent ultimatum follows Mintoff's message to the UK of December 20 stating that unless Lord Carrington returned to Malta before midnight December 24 prepared to discuss Mintoff's demands for 18 million pounds per year, Mintoff would "take all necessary measures to protect Maltese interests." Mintoff repeated this demand on December 22 following receipt of a reply from Carrington which reminded him that Carrington had offered to come the preceding week and was prepared to come the following week, but that he could not now arrange a visit before the end of December or early January.

It is our understanding that the UK plans on Wednesday, December 29, to inform NAC of its proposed response to Mintoff. We are informing State that the White House will wish to clear outgoing instructions to US Mission NATO on this subject. If the US is to prevent a breakdown of the UK-Malta negotiations (in keeping with US policy as stated in NSDM 138—Tab B),³ it is possible that based on the UK position as presented to NAC this Wednesday, a decision will have to be taken on whether or not to increase the US contribution to the UK (NATO) package.

³ Printed as Document 237.

239. Message From British Prime Minister Heath to President Nixon¹

London, December 29, 1971, 1545Z.

Your people have been in close and continuing touch with ours over the crisis which has developed in our relations with Malta. But in view of the common interest which we have in this problem, I thought I should let you know personally how I see things.

We have done our utmost, with your full cooperation, for which we are sincerely grateful, to play this along in the hope that we could achieve a reasonable agreement with Mintoff. Hard as we have tried, the position we have now reached looks critical. Mintoff has forced our hand. In his latest message to me received today he has repeated even

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. No classification marking.

more emphatically than in his last message to Peter Carrington that we must pay up another pounds sterling 4.25 million by the [garble—end?] of this year, or else remove all our forces and their dependants by New Year's Day. This is regardless of the understanding we reached at Chequers last September that the payment of pounds sterling 4.75 million made jointly by ourselves and other members of NATO was for six months to the end of March 1972.

If he maintains this extreme view there is no option for us but to start the processes of an orderly withdrawal in the hope that, when the full gravity of the situation becomes apparent, more sober second thoughts will prevail in Malta.

Your people asked that we should seek to avoid publicity for the situation that had arisen to give time for further consultation between us as well as in the North Atlantic Council. We held up publicity accordingly for 24 hours in the hope that Mintoff might have second thoughts. But in the circumstances we were unable to do so any longer. As the result of Mintoff's recent public pronouncements in Malta, and particularly his Christmas Day broadcast, widespread speculation had started in the press. With the deadline so close upon us it would have been impossible for my government to withhold the real facts any longer.

We will of course continue to keep in the closest touch with you. Notwithstanding the present crisis it remains our aim as and when circumstances may permit to negotiate a new arrangement with the Malta Government beneficial to both sides. We shall continue to make this clear.

240. Message From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath¹

Washington, December 31, 1971, 1649Z.

WH 11243. Your December 29 review of the Maltese situation² is very helpful. I share your concern over the current inflexibility of the Maltese position, as evidenced by the ultimatum contained in Prime Minister Mintoff's message to you of December 29, and I agree that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Edward Heath. Secret; Nodis.

² Document 239.

little good could have come from accepting the terms of that ultimatum.

At the same time, I believe that it is in the interests of both our countries, indeed, in the interests of the North Atlantic Alliance, for you to continue to seek the successful negotiation of a new defense arrangement with Malta, and I am pleased that you share this view. Accordingly, I think it will be essential to continue to keep the door open for resumption of talks as soon as possible. The role played by your forces on Malta has a most important bearing on the strategic balance in the Mediterranean. Removal of those forces could only have an adverse effect on global stability and prospects for peace.

It is with this conviction that the United States has been lending its full support to your efforts to reach agreement with Malta. We are prepared to make an increase in our contribution to your negotiating offer in order to reach agreement with the Maltese.

I look forward to staying in close touch with you on this matter. Although I wish they were included instead in a message on a brighter subject, I also send you my best personal best wishes for the coming year.³

³ In a January 4, 1972, reply, Heath outlined his immediate policy and urged continued close cooperation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Edward Heath)

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Malta to the Department of State¹

Valletta, January 7, 1972, 2255Z.

74. Subj: Malta: Mintoff Message to President.

1. MinCFA Secretary Chalmers delivered to me following message from Mintoff to President 10:00 p.m. local:

Quote. Dear Mr. President,

A. A very dangerous situation is rapidly developing in Malta. As you well know the British Government refuse to budge one inch from their offer of pounds 9.5 million which falls far short of the minimum

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. I. Secret; Flash; Exdis.

annual rent of pounds 18 million requested by the Government of Malta.

B. At the recent NATO Council meeting²—we are reliably informed—Great Britain has even rejected suggestions by other NATO members for a substantial revision of the pounds 9.5 million offer.

C. One would therefore have expected Britain genuinely to cooperate with the Maltese Government for a speedy and orderly withdrawal of her forces. This has not been the case.

D. All Britain's actions have, on the contrary, been directed to browbeat the Maltese people into submission. Their agents and spokesmen have daily incited the Maltese people to overthrow their democratically elected government; they have tried to scare commercial shipping from undertaking repairs at the Malta drydocks; they have started a campaign in the British press against Maltese migrants working in Britain; and they are now trying through B.E.A.³ to divert British tourists from Malta to Cyprus.

E. Although the British Government have undertaken in writing to withdraw their forces with all possible dispatch, nothing was in fact done to implement this promise. Their so-called withdrawal operations have been confined to the packing of belongings of British service families stationed on the island. Whilst even school books have been made ready for transportation, not a single gun or valuable piece of military equipment has as yet been dismantled.

F. All evidence seems to point to the possibility of the British Government hoping for 'incidents' to take place which would justify the use of their well-equipped professional soldiers against our unarmed people.

G. The British Government's representatives in Malta have refused the repeated offers of the Government of Malta to allow the Maltese Government's technicians to run jointly with the British forces common facilities such as the airport, electricity supply, telephones, etc. This joint handling would have ensured not only the swift and peaceful evacuation of British servicemen but also the smooth continuation of these services which remain, after British withdrawal, just as vital to the daily economic needs of the Maltese people.

H. In these circumstances, therefore, the Maltese Government see no alternative but to alert the Security Council of the United Nations to the dangers to peace arising out of these grave happenings.

² Apparent reference to the NATO Ministerial meeting at Brussels December 8–10, 1971. No mention of Malta was made in the communiqué. See footnote 2, Document 79.

³ British European Airways, owned by the British Government.

I. We would, however, feel sorry if an approach to the Security Council would damage the efforts by the United States Government which, according to the message sent to us by the State Department on December 30, 1971, 'continues to believe that a continuation of negotiations (between Malta and Britain) should lead to a mutually acceptable agreement that would prove to be of genuine benefit to all interested parties'.⁴

J. The Government of Malta have shown all the good will necessary for negotiations to be resumed. Indeed last Wednesday we have even readily accepted an Italian suggestion for high level talks to be held in a last minute attempt to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. So far as we know the response from the British Government has not been positive and they still insist on complete and unconditional Maltese capitulation.

K. I would be extremely grateful if as soon as is humanly possible you could let me know what alternative course is open to us to protect our people other than applying forthwith for remedial measures by the Security Council of the United Nations. Sincerely yours, Dom Mintoff. Unquote.

2. Message delivered with covering letter to me full text as follows:

Quote. Dear John,

A. I had hoped that we could communicate with your President speedily and directly in case of an emergency.

B. When you last spoke to me on the telephone a few days ago, you promised to look into this matter and let me know if any direct means of communication is available.⁵

C. As I have not heard from you and as I believe the contents of the enclosed message to your President are of urgent and vital importance to our two countries, I expect you will oblige by transmitting it immediately and directing that a copy be forwarded forthwith to Mr. Ellsworth, the President's personal representative.⁶

D. Please let me know the time the message will have reached the President. Yours sincerely, Dom Mintoff. Unquote.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ In telegram 17 from Valetta, January 4, Pritzlaff reported that Mintoff had tried without success to contact Nixon or Kissinger directly by telephone that day and had expressed his frustration at being unable to speak to them. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II)

⁶ On December 9, the *Washington Post* reported that Nixon had asked Ellsworth to serve as his special envoy to Malta. (John M. Goshko, "NATO Impatient for Soviet Response," *Washington Post*, December 9, 1971, p. A32)

3. Request response last para ASAP.⁷ Lack of early response could provoke precipitate Mintoff action.

4. *Comment:* Text indicates Mintoff laying groundwork for complaint to S.C. if last ditch effort with USG fails. Certainly he expects acknowledgement of receipt soonest. Appears he is in desperate mood and expects USG take the lead in finding solution to present impasse.

Pritzlaff

⁷ In a January 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy suggested a Presidential message might be useful to “cool things down” with Mintoff. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 65, Country Files—Europe, Malta) The White House cleared a message from the President for transmission to Mintoff. It was transmitted in telegram 409 to Valletta, January 8. (Ibid.) The text of a revised version of the telegram, stressing the need to avoid violence but avoiding any mention of time of delivery of Mintoff’s message, apparently sent to the Embassy in Valletta on January 8 is *ibid.*

242. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

US–UK Talks on Malta

On January 4, Prime Minister Heath suggested in a message to the President that the US and UK should undertake an urgent and thorough bilateral review of the Maltese situation.² This was agreed to, and on January 6 a UK team headed by Deputy Under Secretary Sir Thomas Brimelow came to the State Department for talks with Under Secretary Alex Johnson and other State Department representatives (Bob Ellsworth and Hal Sonnenfeldt were also present).

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for very urgent action. The tabs are not printed.

² A copy of Heath’s message is *ibid.*, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Edward Heath.

January 6 Meeting

Brimelow generally took a hard line on the undesirability of increasing the cash being offered to Mintoff in the UK(NATO) package. He was less adamant about other NATO members holding out the prospect of additional bilateral aid to Mintoff. He emphasized the UK's belief that the only reason Mintoff wants more money is to permit him to straighten out the Maltese economy so that he can get rid of the British. *He did agree that if the UK pulls out, it is probable that the Soviets will move into Malta eventually.*

The US side introduced a proposed formula for increasing the UK(NATO) package from £9.5 million to £13 million (Tab B), the US contribution to be £750,000 pounds (with an additional £1 million to be held in reserve by the US for a possible bilateral contribution to Malta). Brimelow said that he did not believe that £13 million would be enough for Mintoff, but that he would advise London of our proposal and seek instructions.

January 7 Meeting

Brimelow again met with Alex Johnson on January 7. His instructions from Lord Carrington, which he provided to Johnson (Tab A-2) were to the effect that the UK could not agree to increasing the NATO package. He made it clear that unless Mintoff lifts his negotiating conditions and other ultimata, the British plan to withdraw and they hope to do so in a peaceful and orderly fashion. Johnson said that this scenario would appear to rule out any possibility of an agreement, including possible efforts by other NATO members to negotiate bilaterally following British withdrawal.

Johnson emphasized the importance of British presence to our mutual primary objective of denying Malta to the Soviet Union. Brimelow said that the UK Ministers would be working on the Malta problem over the weekend and he would make sure that the problem of denial to the Soviets was included in their considerations. Further to assist the UK in its weekend deliberations, Johnson provided Brimelow with a copy of a draft telegram (Tab A-1) which State had hoped that the UK might be able to agree to. (With the understanding, following the second day of talks that we were not planning to send it out because, as yet, we were not in agreement with the UK.)

It was agreed that there would be no mention of the US-UK talks to other countries. It was further agreed that the up-coming meeting of the North Atlantic Council on January 11 will be crucial. Johnson told Brimelow that the US wants to discuss the possibility of increasing the UK(NATO) package with other NATO members, and that State was planning to call in the German, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors for this purpose. Brimelow saw no UK objections to this provided that the discussions were based on past and fu-

ture NAC meetings and not the US–UK talks. He was assured that the talks would not be mentioned. We also informed him that we would not approach the government of Malta prior to the January 11 NAC.

Next Steps

Following the second meeting with the British, Johnson drafted the message to the White House (Tab A) (with the understanding that we would pass it for him, with a copy to Secretary Rogers). Included at Tab A–3 is a proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Heath drafted by Johnson, Getz and myself, and coordinated with Ray Price. Briefly, the message thanks Heath for sending Brimelow, again stresses the importance of maintaining the British presence, and expresses the hope that the UK will find during its deliberations prior to the January 11 NAC that it can agree to a proposition, such as that advanced by the US, increasing the UK(NATO) offer to Mintoff. (Johnson discussed US tactics and the contents of this message with Secretary Rogers by telephone and received his approval of the substance of the message.³

I recommend that the President approve the proposed message to Prime Minister Heath. Brimelow gave the impression that the UK will need to be persuaded by the other members of NATO if it is to consider altering its position for the up-coming NAC. The President's message, together with the results of our consultations with other NATO members and approaches that they may choose to make to the UK should all help to bring home to the British the importance NATO attaches to their following the negotiations through to a successful conclusion.

Recommendation

That you seek the President's approval of the message to Prime Minister Heath at Tab A–3.⁴

³ The phrase "of the substance of the message" was added by hand.

⁴ A handwritten note below the text reads: "Henry:—I talked with Alex Johnson after the meeting. He emphasized that our problem now is getting the UK to agree to stay in. He is now convinced that they really want to get out hopefully without a messy situation on their hands on Malta. The UK will be considering its position for the NAC *this weekend*. I recommend you seek the President's approval of the message to Heath. If you approve we will send directly tonight.—RTK[ennedy]". No indication of a Presidential decision was found.

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Malta to the Department of State¹

Valletta, January 10, 1972, 2308Z.

97. Subj: Malta: Mintoff Jan 10 Message to President. Ref: Valletta 0084.²

1. Following is full text Mintoff Jan 10 message to President:

Quote. Dear Mr. President,

A. In my message of yesterday, I have been too eager to accept at their face value the assurances given by Mr. Heath of an orderly and friendly withdrawal of British troops.

B. In reply to my conciliatory message of last Sunday, I have today received a reply from Mr. Heath³ which imposes conditions for withdrawal more appropriate for a conquered enemy than for a friendly nation whose only blame is to have tolerated a British presence for 171 years.

C. Mr. Heath expects to have sole control of essential facilities on the island, such as the airport, for an unspecified and undetermined period. He wishes to enforce this control by the presence of armed commandos who were originally allowed into Malta for repelling potential aggressions from Warsaw Pact countries against members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

D. I hope it is now clear to you how every time we bend backwards and show sweet reasonableness, we are promptly repaid by the British Government by a blow in the stomach.

E. Britain's intention seems to be at best to prevent Malta from having friendly relations with any of her allies, at worst to hang on in Malta as long as possible in the expectation of overthrowing Malta's democratically elected government.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. Secret; Flash; Exdis.

² Dated January 9. It transmitted the text of a message from Mintoff to Nixon in which, *inter alia*, the Maltese Prime Minister thanked the President for the speed of his reply to his January 7 communication, expressed the view that an accord existed for the withdrawal of British forces, and, while condemning the British Government for its unwillingness to accept his demands, indicated his readiness to negotiate a settlement favorable to Western interests. (*Ibid.*) Regarding the President's message to Mintoff, see footnote 7, Document 241.

³ Copies of the exchanges between Prime Ministers Heath and Mintoff are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II.

F. I am, therefore, at a loss to see in what way Malta can avoid alerting the Security Council of the United Nations to the grave dangers through which we are passing.

Sincerely yours, Dom Mintoff. Unquote.

2. Text of covering letter to me as follows:

Quote.

A. I am very sorry to trouble you again. You will, however, understand how important it is for your President to be kept au courant.

B. I will, therefore, appreciate your transmitting as soon as possible my new message to your President and the enclosed copies of the latest correspondence between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and myself. Unquote

3. Mintoff response to Heath Jan 10 message given to me at virtually same time as delivered to HICOM.

4. In order give wider distribution texts of Jan 10 exchange between Heath and Mintoff transmitted immediately following septel.⁴

Pritzlaff

⁴ Transmitted in telegram 98 from Valletta, January 10. (Ibid.)

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, January 14, 1972, 0038Z.

7525. Subj: Malta. Ref: London 332.²

1. We are most appreciative of Manzini efforts find way out of current impasse and are hopeful Archbishop Gonzi will play supporting

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in EUR; cleared in EUR, S, and by Sonnenfeldt (in substance) for the White House; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.

² Dated January 13, it reported on an Italian plan, already presented to Heath, that called for Archbishop Gonzi to recommend that Mintoff accept a “NATO offer which he (Gonzi) thinks meets the needs of Malta” and then to defend the offer “before Maltese people if Mintoff should reject it.” According to the Italian Embassy, Gonzi was ready to support an offer of between 15 and 16 million pounds. (Ibid.) The Embassy had reported on Italian Ambassador Manzini’s meeting with Heath in telegram 196 from London, January 9. (Ibid.)

role in current effort get negotiations re-established. However, in view very complex state of play at moment and fact Alliance has just agreed after much travail on new approach to Mintoff (USNATO 189),³ we are not disposed join effort empower Gonzi in some special way at this time, lest it confuse already confused situation further.⁴

2. Re level of offer to be made Mintoff, we not able at this time go beyond instructions known to you, i.e., cash in sight is at about 12 million pound level. If Mintoff were willing consider annualizing and folding in bilateral aid already offered, plus whatever additional bilateral aid US and others might provide, we can easily conceive of total benefits-package to Malta amounting to annual 15 million pounds equivalent. He has, of course, shown no disposition to date to add up benefits in this way, but possibility not precluded he will decide do so.

3. You are authorized discuss with Manzini along foregoing lines, emphasizing that US most appreciative. If appropriate, you might also point out to him that US prepared send economic-financial experts to Malta, in line with Ellsworth letter commitment,⁵ soonest after UK/GOM talks re-opened. Purpose would be to consider what additional US bilateral aid might be appropriately given Malta after conclusion satisfactory UK/GOM agreement. We hope others, particularly Italy, and FRG, will be willing take similar actions in effort facilitate successful outcome negotiations.

Rogers

³ Dated January 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MALTA-UK)

⁴ In telegram 391 from London, January 14, the Embassy reported that it had delivered the U.S. response to Manzini who expressed appreciation for the tone of the U.S. reply. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII) Telegram 417 from London, January 16, reported that Manzini had informed the Embassy that during a January 15 meeting with Mintoff, Pope Paul VI had urged Mintoff to be reasonable in dealings with the United Kingdom and had indicated his full support for Gonzi. Manzini expressed his concern that an economic crisis in the wake of British withdrawal would lead to a radicalization of Malta's domestic and foreign policy and open the way for Soviet penetration of the island. (Ibid.)

⁵ For the Ellsworth letter, see Document 246.

245. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, February 18, 1972.

Malta.

State is assuming a basically passive attitude and is rejecting any notion of giving the Brits a bit of a shove.

I don't want a confrontation just yet but I think there would be value in your calling Irwin and telling him

—you want to be sure he understands that the President does not want the Malta negotiations to fail;

—while we agree we should not do anything that upsets the Brits and gives them a pretext for throwing in the towel we also do not want to accept every British position sight unseen because we have a strong suspicion the Brits really want the talks to fail;

—State should give urgent thought to an action plan for next week whereby we can inject ourselves in some way with the Brits and, if necessary to keep the talks alive, with Mintoff (e.g. think again about sending our economic experts);

—we do not rule out some additional US money on a one-time basis—of course conditioned on prior UK-Malta agreement. (State resists this because it fears the money will be taken from another high-priority project and because it fears Congressional criticism.)

Basically what we want is for State to be pushed by its own Seventh floor instead of only by us.²

Sonnenfeldt³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. No classification marking.

² Haig underlined several passages in the note and wrote at the bottom of the page: "Done."

³ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

246. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, February 23, 1972.

SUBJECT

Malta—Recent Developments, Next Steps

I. *Introduction.* To break State out of its passive approach to the Maltese problem you recently called Mr. Irwin² to remind him that the President personally wants the UK-Malta negotiations to succeed. We have already seen an initial reaction to your call; on Saturday, Marty Hillenbrand called in the British DCM to stress the importance the US attaches to the negotiations.³

We are at a point now in the UK-Malta negotiations—as the following paragraphs indicate—where we may find it desirable to take one or more of the following actions on fairly short notice:

1) reassure the Maltese, via Bob Ellsworth, that we intend to follow through in good faith with our economic survey of Malta's short-term and long-term economic needs;

2) accordingly, be prepared to send an appropriately manned US financial team to Malta, with White House-cleared instructions;

3) send a message from the President to Heath, and perhaps to Mintoff, urging one or both to reach agreement.

II. *Recent Developments.* On February 15, Malta's Ambassador to the United States, Attard-Kinswell, saw Secretary Rogers.⁴ He said that Malta would need five million pounds on a one-time basis in addition to the 14 million pound UK(NATO) offer. Rogers asked him why, considering that it had been agreed to make the length of a new UK-Malta agreement 7½ years rather than 7, with retroactive payment from October 1971, making it possible for Malta to receive a total of 9.25 million pounds by April 1, 1972. Attard-Kingswell did not have a clear answer (and Mintoff's position on this one-time cash is still not completely clear). Attard-Kingswell also asked the US to urge the UK to be more

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. Secret. The attachments are not printed. Haig wrote: "OBE" at the top of the page.

² See Document 245.

³ No record of this February 19 discussion was found.

⁴ Reported in telegram 27288 to Valletta, February 16. The two men discussed monetary details of the settlement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MALTA-UK)

forthcoming in efforts to resolve UK-Malta bilateral issues, currently blocking a new agreement: employment levels, rates of pay for Maltese in uniform, extension of the Luqa runway, UK control of Luqa, customs duties problems, and ownership of a submarine cable. Rogers said that the US has no knowledge of these bilateral issues and does not intend to get involved.

On February 17, Mintoff sent a message to Heath setting forth the Maltese positions on the various issues under negotiation, and suggesting that a meeting between the two Prime Ministers might help to bridge the gap. On February 21, Heath sent a reply (without bothering to consult with the US) saying that the UK still wishes to reach agreement with Malta, but that the gap remains wide, and that Mintoff will have to accept the 14 million pound offer as the basis of a new agreement. Heath said he would not rule out a further meeting with Mintoff, but that it would be important to have a lower-level preliminary meeting to iron out some of the differences.⁵

Mintoff read this message to Ambassador Pritzlaff during the latter's farewell call on February 22.⁶ Predictably, Mintoff expressed disappointment at Heath's cool tone and said he felt any meeting would have to be at the top. He added that he was disappointed that Attard-Kingswell's mission to the United States had not produced results. He also spent some time discussing the unacceptability of the UK's position on two bilateral issues—pay of uniformed personnel and level of employment. Briefly, these issues are as follows:

—Uniformed personnel—there are two categories, first Maltese in UK forces not serving in Malta (approximately 1,000 Maltese in Cyprus). Mintoff wants them to receive the same pay as UK forces. The UK is willing to increase their take-home pay to the UK level, but it does not want to increase the pension benefits (this presumably because of the demands it would produce from other foreigners serving with UK forces). Second, Maltese serving with UK forces on Malta. The UK currently pays them on local pay scales; Mintoff wants them to be paid on the UK scales; the UK has indicated willingness only to conduct a pay review (which would probably result in a cost-of-living percentage pay adjustment).

—Level of employment. The British want to reduce the 6,000 man Maltese labor force on UK payrolls to 4,400 by March 1973. Mintoff is

⁵ These exchanges were summarized in a February 29 message from Heath to Nixon. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II)

⁶ Pritzlaff reported on this meeting in which Mintoff expressed his negative reaction to Heath's February 21 communication in telegram 443 from Valletta, February 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 MALTA–UK) Pritzlaff departed Malta on February 24. John Getz presented his credentials on March 9.

willing to have the force reduced to 4,300 by 1975. (*This is a very important issue for Labor party leader Mintoff*); he is vulnerable to the Nationalist opposition if he produces a UK-Malta agreement that results in a sizeable labor force cut during the coming 12 months. It is quite possible, however, that with proper encouragement from the US, the UK and Malta could agree to a compromise 1974 date for the labor force reduction, perhaps phased over the coming two years.

In recent weeks we have confirmed to the UK the importance we attach to treatment of the United States in the "international aspects" language of any new UK-Malta agreement: We wish to be treated as a third country, but we do not wish to be mentioned by name in any exclusionary language. We insist on this point for the following reasons: We are the second largest contributor to the NATO package; it would be very hard to justify any US contribution to the US Congress if US forces are explicitly excluded from Malta in a new agreement; and, *while we have not pressed the point in recent months, we want to keep open the option of resuming Sixth Fleet visits to Malta as a result of US-Maltese bilateral negotiations following successful conclusion of the UK-Malta negotiations.*

On another front, Italy's outgoing Prime Minister Colombo has sent a letter to the President (being staffed separately)⁷ urging the US to advise Malta now of the amount of economic aid we are prepared to give Malta following conclusion of a new UK-Malta agreement. *Finally, on February 22, Bob Ellsworth was contacted by the Maltese UN mission and informed that Attard-Kingswell would appreciate any further information about the level and type of US bilateral assistance Malta might expect.*⁸

The pressures of time are again coming to bear on the negotiations—in summary, the UK has said that it must begin laying off Maltese workers by February 25 (at the same time telling us that this may not be necessary); the negotiations have come a long way, but there are still problems; the UK's cool treatment of Mintoff is not helping; and Mintoff is unhappy with the subordinate, passive role being played by the United States.

III. *Current US Position.* The United States seeks a new UK-Malta agreement that explicitly excludes Warsaw Pact forces from Malta. We wish to be treated as a third country in any such agreement (i.e., the UK and Malta would both have the right to say No to visits by any third

⁷ A copy of the February 22 message is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 756, Presidential Correspondence, Prime Minister Andreotti Colombo successor. Colombo resigned as Prime Minister before the White House could draft a reply. A copy of a reply message sent to the new Prime Minister, Andreotti, is *ibid.*

⁸ No record of the meeting was found.

country forces). We are prepared to send a financial team to review Malta's needs following conclusion of a UK-Malta agreement.

IV. *Next Steps*. I think we must give a very hard look at the type of bilateral offer we are prepared to make to Malta; we should rethink the chairmanship of the US financial team; we should give the Maltese some assurances with regard to our offer; and we should be prepared to send messages to Heath and Mintoff.

—The US Bilateral Offer. Following his mission to Malta, Bob Ellsworth informed Mintoff in a letter of thanks dated December 12⁹ that “the President will be glad to send financial and other experts to Malta in order to be prepared to be as helpful as possible, when the Malta-UK defense agreement is finally concluded on a satisfactory basis. You will understand I am talking about your short-term problems as well as your long-term problem.” (Short term problems means cash). On January 22, Ellsworth sent another message to Mintoff¹⁰ informing him that the US wished to clarify the situation reached in the negotiations “before making firm plans concerning our financial experts so that their stay in Malta will be most helpful.” (The UK had asked the US not to send the team at that time.) In delivering this message Pritzlaff, under instructions, informed Mintoff that the experts' visit would have to await conclusion of a new agreement and, because of the increase in the US contribution to the NATO package, our team would probably be focussing on the long-term rather than the short-term aspects of Malta's economic problems—i.e., no cash.

The question arises: Considering Malta's repeated inquiries, should we be more forthcoming about our proposed assistance at this point, and should we emphasize that we are still considering short-term assistance as well as long-term? I do not think we can go into our proposed assistance in detail at this point. This will have to await the results of the financial team's visit following conclusion of the UK-Malta agreement; and *we will want to use our bilateral offer, if possible, to negotiate resumption of Sixth Fleet visits—i.e., we can't offer you cash and economic assistance unless we can show the Congress that we have received something in return*. I do think, however, that a message should go from Ellsworth via State to Mintoff or Attard-Kingswell this week reassuring the Maltese Prime Minister that the US plans to look at both Malta's short-term and long-term problems. (We would, of course, inform the UK of this message.) This may be the nudge required to keep Mintoff

⁹ Transmitted in telegram 23683 to Valletta, December 12, 1971. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II)

¹⁰ Apparently the message transmitted to Mintoff in telegram 12684 to Valletta, January 22. It declined Mintoff's invitation to a January 24 meeting. (Ibid.)

negotiating with the UK. A message along the lines of the draft at Tab B would do this. If you agree, we can recommend this language to State.

If we are to do this, however, it is important to make sure that there is agreement within the US on the level of bilateral cash assistance we are prepared to offer Mintoff in return for satisfaction of certain US interests. In Mr. Irwin's memorandum of November 13, 1971, to the President,¹¹ the Under Secretaries Committee recommended that the US add no more than 1.75 million pounds to the US contribution which then stood at 2.25 million pounds—a total of 4 million. The US contribution presently stands at 3.67 million pounds, and State accordingly is proceeding on the assumption that the US is restricted to approximately .33 million pounds, or \$800,000, in terms of additional bilateral cash available for Malta. *If we are to make a meaningful bilateral cash offer to Mintoff I think it will have to be at least one million pounds, or \$2.4 million dollars.* I believe you raised the possibility of additional US money for Malta during your recent conversation with Irwin. *AID will have to be directed to plan on earmarking at least an additional \$1.6 million if the US is to have the option of offering Mintoff an additional one million pounds bilaterally. It might be best for you to discuss this with Irwin by telephone prior to the sending of the Ellsworth "reassurance" message later this week.* Talking points are at Tab A.

The composition of the US financial team should be drawn-up and agreed to so that the team can be directed to go to Malta as soon as a new agreement is reached, or before an agreement is reached should this be deemed tactically desirable. At present State plans to have the team headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Springsteen. *I think this is a serious mistake because of the reaction we can anticipate from Mintoff when he learns that a middle level political officer is heading the US financial team.* The purpose of the team, in State's language, is "to acquaint itself with the Maltese economy, its financial problems, and development plans, programs and progress made to assist the United States Government in assessing what self-help efforts the Government of Malta might undertake and what the U.S. Government might consider doing in the way of bilateral assistance." *I have no objection to George Springsteen's being on the delegation, but the team should be headed by financial/assistance type if it is to be credible.* We have already informally questioned State on this matter. I do not think any formal White House action is required now, but, if you agree, I will again informally suggest to State that a person with financial credentials should head the US team.

Finally, as it appears that we are approaching still another crisis stage in the negotiations, we should be thinking about a Presidential

¹¹ See footnote 4, Document 237.

message to Heath (and, perhaps, Mintoff) urging compromise on the issues still outstanding to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. If you agree, I will advise State that it should be thinking about the contents of such a message or messages.

Dick Kennedy concurs.

Recommendation

1) That you tell Irwin that a brief, reassuring message from Ellsworth to Mintoff would appear to be in order, considering Malta's repeated inquiries and the current play of the negotiations.

2) At the same time, that you tell Irwin that the President continues to want the option of a bilateral cash offer to Mintoff, once the UK-Malta negotiations are successfully concluded (talking points at Tab A).¹²

¹² Haig wrote below the Approve/Disapprove lines: "Need to reassess in light of action already taken & London talks w[ith] Mintoff. This is excellent work and responsive to what we're all trying to get done. AH".

247. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

Malta—Prime Minister Heath Reports the Results of his most recent Negotiations with Mintoff

Prime Minister Heath has sent you a "hot line" message² (at Tab A) responding to your message of March 3 (Tab B) and reporting on the results of his March 5–6 negotiations with Malta's Prime Minister Mintoff.

In the most recent round of talks, the British were able to accommodate Mintoff's demands on several UK-Maltese bilateral issues, re-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. The stamped notation "The President has seen" is on the first page, and Nixon wrote the following note: "K—Note to Heath from RN—'You are handling a very delicate situation with consummate skill.'" Tabs A and B are not printed.

² Dated March 8.

solving in principle the key question of the level of Maltese personnel to be employed by the British under the terms of a new defense agreement. Prime Minister Heath says that two bilateral issues, each worth approximately three million pounds, are still in dispute—one involving duty free imports, the other an understanding between the UK and Mintoff's predecessor on improvements to Malta's drydocks. The British have offered to split the difference; Mintoff insists that he must have both.

Prime Minister Heath notes that another issue still unresolved is that involving visits by US warships to Malta. Mintoff has agreed that Warsaw Pact forces will be explicitly excluded from Malta under the terms of a new defense agreement. He continues to insist that there must be explicit mention in the agreement that US forces are also excluded. The United States has insisted that we cannot be mentioned by name as being explicitly excluded: Such mention would not be in keeping with our substantial cash contribution to the UK(NATO) offer; it would make it very difficult to justify this contribution to the Congress; and it is not necessary to mention the US by name since Mintoff would have the right to veto visits by any third country other than the UK. Your new Ambassador to Malta, John Getz, plans to address this issue with Mintoff on March 9.³

Prime Minister Heath states that the central question in the negotiations remains that of money. Mintoff wants a one-time payment of five million pounds in addition to the 14 million pound UK(NATO) offer. The NATO allies are holding firm on the 14 million pound offer. The United States has recently reassured Malta that as soon as a new UK-Malta agreement is reached we will send a financial team to Malta to examine Malta's economic situation, permitting us to determine how we might best assist Malta bilaterally. While the State Department is opposed to the United States' offering Mintoff additional bilateral cash assistance—primarily because of State's concerns over justifying such assistance to the Congress—this option still remains open.

Prime Minister Heath informs you that the British now plan to sit tight. Mintoff has said he must consult with his Maltese colleagues; the British, however, do not believe he has an acceptable alternative to the UK(NATO) offer. Prime Minister Heath warned Mintoff that time is of the essence, that the UK will be gone from Malta by March 31 if a new agreement is not reached. The Prime Minister concludes by saying that

³ During the meeting, which took place at 6:30 p.m., March 10, Mintoff requested U.S. support for Italian diplomatic initiatives and asked for a meeting with either the President or Kissinger. It was reported in telegram 562 from Valletta, March 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MALTA-UK)

he knows you will go on doing what you can to make Mintoff see reason.

The Prime Minister's message is informational in nature, and I do not believe that a further reply from you is required at this point. It will be important to learn what results from Ambassador Getz' first meeting with Mintoff, and what results from Mintoff's consultations with his colleagues. I have sent a copy of Prime Minister Heath's message to the Department of State, and we will continue to watch the Maltese situation very closely. No action is required on your part at this time.

248. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

Malta—Mintoff Sends Message to President

Prime Minister Dom Mintoff has asked Embassy Valletta to transmit the following letter to the President with the utmost urgency and to inform Mintoff when the letter has reached the President.² The text of the letter is as follows:

"Dear Mr. President:

Prior to the agreement we made with Britain in March this year,³ the United States Government had conceded to send an economic mission to Malta which would submit recommendations for your decision.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 758, Presidential Correspondence, Malta Prime Minister Mintoff. Confidential. Sent for very urgent action.

² Mintoff's request together with the text of his letter were forwarded to the Department of State in telegram 1246 from Valletta, July 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MALTA)

³ On March 26 in London, the United Kingdom and Malta signed a 7-year agreement allowing for the United Kingdom's continued use of military facilities in Malta in exchange for a \$37 million yearly payment, of which the United Kingdom would pay approximately one-third. Malta agreed that neither Soviet nor Warsaw Pact forces would be allowed to establish stations on Malta or use its military facilities. The agreement was summarized in "Britain and Malta Agree on Price for Use of Bases," *New York Times*, March 27, 1972, p. 1.

On June 20 I was assured by our mutual friend, Mr. Robert Ellsworth, that the team's report was then being reviewed within the U.S. Government and that the United States Government's responses stemming from the team's visit to Malta will be transmitted as soon as possible. Considering the urgency of the matters which have been reviewed by the team I would appreciate your personal intervention for a quick decision.

With cordial greetings,

Yours very sincerely,

Dom Mintoff"

You have a joint memorandum from me and Dick Kennedy (Log 4912 of July 7)⁴ forwarding a recommended US bilateral assistance package for Malta for decision by the President. As noted in that memorandum, Mintoff's patience is about to wear out, and unless we inform him quickly of our aid offer we can expect a new crisis. *I urge action on the Malta assistance package as soon as possible.*

In a related message from Embassy Valletta, Ambassador Getz has stressed Mintoff's desire to be notified when his message has reached the President.⁵ In order to keep this issue moving at a controlled pace, and unless this gives you a problem, I would like to advise State on Thursday, July 13, to inform Embassy Valletta that the message has been received.

Recommendation

1. Action on Log 4912⁶
2. OK to tell State Mintoff's letter received⁷

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Telegram 1247 from Valletta, July 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MALTA)

⁶ A handwritten note reads: "Has been forwarded to President 7/14/72".

⁷ A handwritten note reads: "Yes—Clift advised 7/13/72".

249. National Security Decision Memorandum 176¹

Washington, July 14, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Bilateral Aid for Malta

The President, having reviewed the findings contained in the Report of the U.S. Economic Team to Malta together with the recommendations set forth in the Department of State's forwarding memorandum of June 19,² has decided as follows:

The Department of State should inform the Government of Malta that the United States is prepared to offer Malta bilateral assistance which would include:

—a \$5 million loan, to be made available from AID Development Loan funds, to be used for the purchase of U.S. equipment, the training of Maltese in the United States, and short-term U.S. technical assistance to Malta;

—surplus equipment on the order of \$1–2 million;

—PL-480 Title II assistance, valued at \$350,000, for Malta's school and other institutional feeding programs; and

—reinstatement of the OPIC private investment guarantee program, subject to resolution of the contract dispute between the Government of Malta and Westinghouse Corporation.

The President requests the Department of State, in coordination with the Agency for International Development, to implement this decision as promptly as possible.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) Nos. 145–. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central Intelligence, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

² Not found.

250. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Malta—Mintoff's Reported Irritation at US Aid Offer

In the intelligence report at Tab A,² a Maltese Cabinet member is reported as saying that Prime Minister Dom Mintoff was, in fact, very irritated with the US bilateral aid offer extended in July, considering it too little, too late and not in keeping with Malta's needs.

Mintoff is reported to have told aides that the small offer and the restrictions planned on its use—i.e., the \$5 million development loan—confirmed his belief that the United States did not seriously wish to help Malta. The offer, he said, was especially galling when compared to the FRG, PRC and Italian offers, "the latter now willing to do anything Malta asks. In comparison, the United States should have given several tens of millions of dollars as an outright gift." Further, Mintoff said he would give nothing to the United States in return for its aid, especially visiting rights for the Sixth Fleet.

If accurate,³ this report is, of course, the exact opposite of what Mintoff has said publicly. On July 19, he announced to his Parliament that "the Government of Malta wishes to show publicly its great appreciation for this offer which the Government of the United States is making . . .," going on to thank the President and Bob Ellsworth by name, as well as the members of the US Aid mission.

It is possible that Mintoff's reported irritation may be nothing more than a passing outburst in keeping with his fulminant personality. If, however, he is genuinely displeased with our offer of assistance:

—he has probably since been sobered by Senator Proxmire's criticism of US aid to Malta, criticism that went unnoticed in the United States but that was carried by Reuters and picked up in the Maltese press;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A note on the first page reads: "HAK has seen."

² Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB312/03690-72, August 15, not printed.

³ In telegram 1502 from Valletta, August 30, the Embassy indicated that it believed the report to be inaccurate. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II)

—it points to the soundness of the US decision not to tie the aid offer to Sixth Fleet visits but rather to make the offer on its own merits—concluding the final step in the UK(NATO)-Malta negotiations—and leaving the Sixth Fleet issue for another day.

From the tone of his remarks, it would appear that Mintoff had not flatly ruled out Sixth Fleet visits before he had our aid offer in hand. I doubt that he has ruled out such visits even now.

Of Mintoff's many interests, two are of particular significance in the context of this memorandum:

1) He would greatly value being received either by the President or yourself. On August 25, Embassy Valletta reported⁴ Mintoff as saying that he had not made up his mind about attending the UN General Assembly this fall, that he did not wish to go just to be seen but that he was fully prepared to go if something useful could be achieved—i.e., an appropriate reception in Washington.

2) He is forever on the lookout for new sources of revenue for Malta.

In my opinion, we would be best advised not to respond to his hints for an invitation, keeping business on a low-keyed, as-normal basis via Embassy Valletta. This should provide Mintoff with the opportunity to reflect both on this "neglect" and on the potential millions of dollars in revenue to Malta that would come with the resumption of Sixth Fleet visits.⁵

⁴ Telegram 1472 from Valletta, August 25. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 MALTA)

⁵ Haig wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "HAK—I agree for present but we must keep a watchful eye on situation H."

251. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Malta

Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff has confronted the British with another year-end deadline with respect to the British bases on the island. Unless the UK and the other Allies agree to compensate Malta in the future for the decline in the value of the British pound (about 10 percent) since the base agreement was concluded last March, the facilities will not be available to the British forces after December 31. Mintoff has raised several other issues with the British as well, but the devaluation question is the one to which he has attached a deadline.

Mintoff tried unsuccessfully last winter during negotiation of the present agreement to get an exchange rate guarantee from the British. He finally gave up the idea, but warned that he might return to the question later. He did so in a letter to Prime Minister Heath on November 17, and since then has tried to make a case that if the British advance rental payment due on January 1 does not include compensation for devaluation, the British, not he, will have terminated the base agreement.

The present agreement gives Malta 14 million pounds a year as rent for the bases. (Our annual share is 3.66 million pounds.) The British have told the Maltese that they will not increase the agreed rental payment. They consider that they made a fair agreement which they intend to honor in letter and in spirit. They have added that they would not try to maintain their forces in Malta against the wishes of the Maltese Government, and that if they are obliged to begin withdrawing their forces again, the process will be irreversible this time.

We have also told the Maltese and our Allies that we firmly oppose an increase in the rental payments to compensate for devaluation. As is the case with the British, our basic concern is to avoid setting a precedent which could have serious adverse implications for our own international agreements. We want to do nothing which could imply an obligation to compensate other countries for changes in the value of the dollar when our agreements do not themselves explicitly provide for it.

The stage is thus set for another exercise in Maltese brinksmanship. There is of course nothing surprising in Mintoff's tactics, although we do consider it puzzling that he would put in jeopardy a fair and lu-

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 622, Country Files—Middle East, Malta, Vol. II. Confidential.

crative seven-year agreement only nine months after he signed it, and on an issue which is not an element of the agreement even by implication.

As we did last year at this time, we are reminding the British of the importance which we attach to their presence in Malta, and are urging them to examine all possibilities for an accommodation with the Maltese. At the same time we feel we must support the British in opposing compensation to Malta for devaluation, and we do not expect the British to change their position on that question. We are satisfied that the British have dealt patiently and reasonably with the Maltese, and we must now face the possibility that Mintoff, for reasons of his own, has deliberately provoked this confrontation on an issue on which he must have known it would not be possible for the Allies to yield because of its precedent-setting character.

If, as appears possible, it is Mintoff's intention to expel the British without regard to the loss to Malta, there does not seem to be any way to stop him. On the other hand, it is barely possible that he may himself be playing brinksmanship, and when faced with an unyielding stand by the UK and the Allies will recede from his present demand. We should know the outcome in the first few days of January. There is, of course, also the possibility that faced with the severe economic loss that would result from the departure of the British, political elements in Malta might seek to oust Mintoff. However, it does not seem likely this would happen in time to be of much help in the present situation.

If the British are expelled, the chances of the Soviets being able to exploit the situation to establish a military presence in Malta appear to be considerably less than they were last year. It seems most likely that Malta will seek aid from the Libyans, who could supply funds and would welcome this opportunity to extend their influence. However, Libyan money alone cannot replace the jobs that would be lost with the departure of the British forces. This, plus traditional Maltese antipathy toward Libyans might well support those internal forces which could bring Mintoff down over time.²

U. Alexis Johnson

² In a telephone conversation with Kissinger, January 4, 1973, at 5:25 p.m., Under Secretary Johnson reported that the Italians had come up with a proposal the same day that "those countries which were buying pounds would contribute to Malta the amount they save because of the pound devaluation." When Kissinger asked for his opinion, Johnson replied that "we should go along with the proposal within the context of our previous offer of increasing our aid, you know. This wouldn't mark any change." Kissinger concurred, and Johnson continued, "And say that this is—what I would like to say is that this is it." Kissinger again agreed and added, "I'm sure the President will go along with that." Johnson then remarked that he had drafted a paper for White House clearance, "which will say that this is it, that we go along with this but we go no further." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Portugal

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 3, 1969, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Bennett's Meeting with the JCS

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., American Ambassador to Portugal
Mr. Philip Farley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs
General McConnell, JCS
Admiral Moorer, JCS
General Westmoreland, JCS
General Chapman, JCS
Captain From, G/PM, Department of State
Mr. Stephen G. Gebelt, EUR/SPP, Department of State

In response to a request of General McConnell, Ambassador Bennett gave a brief outline of some of the problems confronting Portugal. The Ambassador elaborated on the illness of former Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar,² noting that a Salazar press interview in June had shown sufficient evidence of deterioration to him to alert the Department of State to the possibility that Salazar's mental acuteness might be diminishing seriously. Subsequently, as a result of a fall in August, Salazar was hospitalized in September for an operation to drain a cerebral hematoma. After an apparent recovery from that operation, Salazar suffered a massive cerebral hemorrhage and remained in a coma for many weeks and it was assumed by the medical authorities attending the case that he would not survive. Contrary to that expectation, Salazar is still alive, and according to some reports, may linger on for some time. Although it is improbable that he could resume office, the interpretation of any remarks he might make to visitors could cause confusion on the political scene; and his continued presence has placed certain limitations on the activities of his successor.

The Ambassador noted that the new Prime Minister Caetano had been a favorite candidate for some time and had undertaken his job in an effective manner. His public pronouncements have so far been care-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US. Secret. Drafted by Gebelt. The meeting took place at the Pentagon.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1964-1968, volume XII, Western Europe, Documents 171 and 172. Caetano replaced Salazar as Prime Minister on September 26, 1968. Salazar died on July 27, 1970.

fully balanced in order not to upset his followers to either the right or the left. He is confronted by internal economic problems in a country with considerable unemployment, pressures for wage increases, workers who are the lowest paid in Europe, a need for development capital, at the same time as large expenditures are being demanded for the government budget, particularly in view of the heavy military costs necessitated by the conflicts in Africa. The transition has been quite smooth and there is no indication of any dangerous unrest. The military hierarchy seems united at present, but there may develop a problem of "Nasserism" among junior officers who come from less-privileged classes than the traditional officer caste. This is a question which is being followed closely by the Embassy and on which a close watch should be kept in the future.

Portugal is a member of NATO, but Portuguese support is largely passive at present. The presence of the IBERLANT Command is appreciated by the Portuguese and provides a useful reminder of the existence of the Alliance.

Regarding Africa,³ the Ambassador noted that the Portuguese had the security situation in Angola under reasonable control, despite some continuing incursions in the north (the traditionally unstable Dembos region) from the Congo and in the southeast near the Zambian border. He said that during a visit he made there in 1967, he had travelled around the Dembos area in an unescorted vehicle without danger. Angola is prospering, the infrastructure is good, mineral discoveries and the recent Gulf Oil strikes offer important economic prospects for Portugal. Angola is twice the size of Texas, the Portuguese now have a good basic infrastructure, having built hundreds of miles of hard surface roads and installed many landing strips which facilitate movement around the country.

Turning to Mozambique, which is nearly twice the size of the state of California, the Ambassador commented that it was not as prosperous or as unified a country as Angola and lacks infrastructure. Nevertheless, the security situation seemed to be under control, although there are some difficulties on the Tanzanian border.

He then turned to the situation in Portuguese Guinea in West Africa, describing it as considerably more precarious. It is a swampy country of little economic value and is composed of various tribes; the territory lends itself to hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. Given the support in arms and munitions that the rebels receive from the neighboring republics of Guinea and Senegal, an early termination of this seems improbable. He added that the Portuguese Foreign Minister had raised

³ Documentation relating to Portuguese African territories is in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa.

this question in the NATO Council and also in talks with Secretary Rusk, claiming that the real danger lay in the fact that, if Portugal lost control of Portuguese Guinea, it would inevitably lead to the loss of the Cape Verde Islands—the Foreign Minister had asserted that the Soviets would then end up with a base in the Cape Verde Islands.

The Ambassador said that he had dwelt at length on these African problems because they dominated the Portuguese situation, coloring their outlook on NATO, and relations with the U.S. and their attitude toward international organizations generally.

The Ambassador concluded that a specific problem would be arising in the near future regarding our agreement with the Portuguese on the Azores.⁴ He said that the old agreement expired December 31, 1962, but the Portuguese had let conditions continue as they had been before. However, the Foreign Minister had told Secretary Rusk in November in Lisbon that the Portuguese wish to reopen this question and would have proposals early this year.⁵ He said he expected to be given some idea of their dimensions after his return to Lisbon later this month. The Ambassador praised the relations between the U.S. military and the Portuguese military and local population in the Azores.

After thanking the Ambassador, General McConnell asked what price the Ambassador thought we might have to pay for continued use of the Azores bases. Ambassador Bennett replied that this was the difficult question; he pointed out that the Portuguese are particularly unhappy about our restrictive arms policy in relation to their African insurgency problems. They would no doubt like to see a change in our overseas policy in relation to their African possessions, but were particularly bitter over our refusal to sell them arms except for use in the NATO Treaty Area.⁶ They said privately that they were not too upset about what we said or did in the U.N. but we should be more flexible, as they claim the French and Germans are, in supplying them with equipment. They might also ask a straight rental fee for the base.

Admiral Moorer asked about Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira's relations with the military. The Ambassador replied that they had been cool previously but that because Franco Nogueira had defended Portugal's overseas policies so vigorously, he was now understood to have been the favored candidate for the Prime Ministership of many of the

⁴ For text of the Azores basing agreement, signed at Lisbon, September 6, 1951, see 5 UST 2263. The text of the November 1957 extension of the agreement is in 8 UST 2353.

⁵ Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Nogueira discussed the Azores base on November 19, 1968, in Lisbon. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 175.

⁶ In 1961, the United States suspended military shipments to Portugal on the grounds that Portugal was using arms intended for NATO in its African territories.

military. The Ambassador remarked on the Foreign Minister's vigorous tactics as a negotiator and said that in any negotiations on the Azores he would expect him to come and butt right into our stomach in hopes that the U.S. would "disgorge" something.

General Westmoreland asked about numbers and composition of Portuguese troops in Africa, the social status of military officers in the Portuguese hierarchy and the cooperation between the Portuguese African and European troops in the field. The Ambassador estimated 120,000 troops of whom perhaps 30 percent are African. He said he had been impressed during his visit in 1967 by the confidence the Portuguese had in leaving guard and access to vital installations under the control of African troops and NCOs. He said that military officers were highly respected, but noted that there was no longer as large a percentage from the top families. He expressed the belief that this was all to the good, but it did raise one question which he followed closely and had mentioned earlier. He wondered whether some of the officers who came from the less privileged classes might not eventually produce a situation of internal unrest within the armed forces, repeating that a "Nasserist" phenomenon would appear possible in a privileged society like that of Portugal.

General Westmoreland asked about Portugal's relations with Brazil. The Ambassador noted that they were primarily emotional, as there is little trade between the countries. However, the Portuguese are proud of the multiracial society they created in Brazil and often express the conviction that they can accomplish the same thing in Africa if given time.

General Chapman asked if there was a link between the Spanish Base negotiations⁷ and the Azores. Ambassador Bennett said that this question was being watched closely in Lisbon and he was sure that the Portuguese would be anxious to know how much the Spaniards get out of us.

General McConnell asked how relations were between Spain and Portugal. The Ambassador said that the Portuguese have long memories and have not forgotten that Spain occupied Portugal from 1580 to 1640 which may seem a long time ago to us but not to them! Officially, the relations are close and friendly, but there is the normal amount of suspicion between two neighboring countries when one is considerably larger than the other.

Admiral Moorer asked about the status of the air base at Beja, to which the Ambassador replied that both the Germans and the Portu-

⁷ The United States and Spain began discussing the renewal of base agreements in 1967.

guese had been highly secretive about this base which is now finished but will be used on a much more limited scale than was originally planned and will reportedly concentrate on the training of Lufthansa pilots.

Ambassador Bennett then asked the Joint Chiefs what importance they now give to the Azores. General McConnell and Admiral Moorer said that they continue to be extremely important, because long-range aircraft would not eliminate the need for the base to refuel tactical aircraft and it was extremely valuable in anti-submarine warfare.

Admiral Moorer added that the Navy also considers the Cape Verde Islands very valuable. Ambassador Bennett asked whether Ascension Island might not be an adequate substitute. General McConnell said definitely not as it was one of the most inadequate facilities in the world and useful primarily as a staging area.

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 1, 1969, 12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano's Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal

Portugal

H. E. Dr. Marcello Caetano, Prime Minister

H. E. Vasco Vieira Garin, Ambassador of Portugal

The President thanked the Prime Minister for having made the trip on such short notice and said he felt greatly honored that Portugal had

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret. Drafted by Landau. The meeting took place in the White House. Caetano was in Washington to attend the March 30 state funeral ceremonies for former President Eisenhower, who died on March 28. In telegram 626 from Lisbon, April 29, Bennett reported that he had given a copy of the U.S. record of this meeting to the Portuguese Foreign Minister. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I)

sent a man of the high status of the Prime Minister. The President briefly reminisced how he had enjoyed his trip to Lisbon and expressed the hope that he and his family would return some day.²

The Prime Minister said that it would be a joy for Portugal to receive him at any time. He then said that his trip to Washington was justified for two reasons: (1) to show Portugal's esteem for the late President Eisenhower and (2) to stress Portugal's desire for the best possible relations with the United States.

The President replied that he too was looking forward to the best possible relations which were in the interests of both countries and referred to the forthcoming 20th anniversary of NATO as a useful instrument to renew contacts. The Prime Minister said that the Minister of Defense would attend the NATO meeting.³ Speaking about NATO, the Prime Minister said that he would like to explain the thesis of his government that the NATO Treaty was somewhat out of date. Important areas were not covered by the Treaty and as a matter of security the South Atlantic should also be included because it would be difficult for the free world to survive if Latin America or Africa fell into the enemy camp.

The President said he considered the forthcoming NATO meeting important because after twenty years the world had changed and we had to see where we go from here. Twenty years ago, he said, there was not the same ferment in Latin America as there is today, and the African continent did not play the large role it does now. Perhaps NATO should not only look after its relations within the North Atlantic but also in other areas because, after all, the world has become much smaller during the last twenty years.

The Prime Minister said that twenty years ago the paramount concern was a military attack from the Soviet Union on Europe. Now the danger is subversion coming from the same camp.⁴ The President said the danger of subversion is not limited to Africa or Latin America but also exists within the European countries which are part of NATO and in the U.S. He referred to slogans like "peace at any price" or "no danger" and said that this attitude was very destructive to mutual security which is paramount to world peace.

The President said that were it not for the existence of NATO a world conflict could not have been avoided and he agreed with the

² Nixon visited Lisbon in June 1963 during a European family vacation.

³ The 20th anniversary of NATO included a commemorative meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington April 10–11.

⁴ Caetano made a similar presentation to Rogers at an 11:30 a.m. meeting. In the course of this discussion, he also stressed Portugal's desire to see its colonial possessions under a NATO guarantee. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PORT–US.

Prime Minister that although the character of the threat had changed, it still existed. The Prime Minister said that now the problem was that the enemy was out to conquer the minds of the people. The President replied that it was easier to deal with weapons than with corrosion of the mind and spirit.

The President then asked the Prime Minister for his evaluation of the situation in Brazil,⁵ which, considering Portugal's close relations with that country, would be most valuable. The President said that Brazil was very important and that anything which might happen there could have great effect on the future.

The Prime Minister said that what happened in Brazil would be absolutely decisive for other parts of the world. He said that in the first place we should remember that in fact the idea that Brazil is a democracy is pure fiction. There existed in Brazil two forces in their pure form and those are the armed forces and the communists. The question was which of the two would carry it off. If the military experiment could be brought to a successful conclusion by the civilians, the situation in Brazil would come out well. However, should the military not find civilians either capable or willing to take over from them, the communists might well get the upper hand.

The President said that this very apt analysis undoubtedly applied to other Latin American countries and he was generally disturbed about the failure of the civilian establishment in Latin America. He thought the basic problem was lack of governmental stability.

The Prime Minister said that formerly the Catholic Church had been a pillar of strength in Latin America but now it was divided against itself, and that was a victory for the communists. In reply to the President's question on how the Church was divided, the Prime Minister said that there was a great disorientation within the Church and that it had started a very dangerous dialogue with extremists which it was unable to finish.

The President said that he understood that the situation in Portugal was good and that the economy was sound and the prospects good. The Prime Minister agreed with the President but added that his principal concern was the creation of the broadest possible popular base for his government. He said that so far he had received a good response from his people. The President said that he realized that government really is a great mystery. It certainly was not a science but an art and that political scientists had been his poorest advisers because

⁵ The military regime in Brazil, in power since 1964, was facing increasing unrest. On December 12, 1968, President Medici suspended the operations of the Brazilian Congress. A constitutional revision process intended to establish military control more firmly had met strong opposition.

they write only about “how not to do it,” but they cannot make positive suggestions. The best solution would be to put political scientists back into the universities. The President made it a special point of saying that he did not consider Dr. Kissinger a political scientist but a foreign policy expert.

The Prime Minister reiterated his appreciation for having had this meeting and how delighted he was for the opportunity of having this talk with the President.

254. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 19, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

US-Portuguese Relations

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Clement Conger, Deputy Chief of Protocol

Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain and Portugal

Portugal

His Excellency Alberto Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal

His Excellency Vasco Vieira Garin, Ambassador of Portugal

The Portuguese Foreign Minister thanked the President for seeing him and for being so generous with his time at this moment when he faces so many complex and critical issues. Before launching into bilateral matters the Foreign Minister wanted to thank the President for addressing the NATO Council and explaining the ABM question in such a persuasive, convincing and lucid manner.² Armed with this information the Portuguese Foreign Minister said he would be able to explain to his government this problem which affects NATO and the whole world. The President said that the credibility of the U.S. deterrent is of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Landau. The meeting took place in the White House. Nogueira held discussions with Under Secretary Johnson and Secretary Rogers on April 16 and 17, respectively. Memoranda of conversation are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PORT–US.

² For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 272–276. See also Document 12.

course essential to NATO and the solution to the problem depends precisely on our credibility on this subject.

Turning to US/Portuguese relations the Foreign Minister said that it was no secret that these relations had not been very good after 1961 although he did not want to belabor this point.³ Now with new administrations in the U.S. and in Portugal the time had come to start a fruitful dialogue between both countries. Since 1961 there had been no true exchange of communications between the two governments and this was one of the reasons for the deterioration of relations. The President asked whether the view that there had been no useful communications between the two governments was generally shared by his government. The Foreign Minister assured him that the feeling in Lisbon was that the USG had not been interested in hearing the Portuguese view but he hoped all this was now over and that there existed a new climate. The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make two points.

1. He could assure the President that the Portuguese derived no pleasure or amusement out of bad relations with the U.S. and moreover he did not believe it would be in the U.S. interests to have bad relations with Portugal. Therefore as a first step to improving relations there should be a dialogue between the two countries.

2. As the President was certainly aware, the US/Portuguese difficulties arose in the context of Portugal's African policies. There were no problems in other areas as U.S. and Portuguese views on European matters and on the defense of the West largely coincided.

In regard to Africa, Portugal has followed a different policy than the rest of the world. But he wanted to assure the President that Portugal considered this policy vital. Moreover, it was not a personal policy of former Prime Minister Salazar who has now disappeared from the political arena. Portugal's African policy remains unchanged because it fulfills the needs and desires of the Portuguese people. This policy has been carried out for many years and is supported by the vast majority of the Portuguese. Finally, it was his view that Portugal's African policy does not run counter to the U.S. policy but that it is useful to the long-term aims of the U.S. in Africa. This point is important and needs to be discussed further and therefore we must have a dialogue. It was his feeling that in the past the U.S. view had been much affected by the general world position which was against Portugal and by UN doctrine. He said he did not want to use a harsh word but he thought the confrontation should end and the dialogue should start. The President said he did not at all object to the use of the word confrontation and that

³ The Kennedy administration had pressed Portugal to move quickly to grant full self-government to its colonies and embargoed the use of U.S. military equipment to suppress rebellions in the "Overseas Provinces." See footnote 6, Document 252.

he was in favor of fair and tough negotiations. The President assured the Foreign Minister that his was a new administration with a completely open mind. He said he knew Mr. Landau who had been dealing with this area and Mr. Landau in turn clearly understood the President's views. The President said that we wanted the dialogue and that he did not want his administration to continue using doctrinaire views. There were a number of important questions to be discussed between the two countries. The President said his first concern were the U.S. allies in Europe because what they do is important to the U.S. He told the Foreign Minister that he could look to our Ambassador in Lisbon as a channel and we would look to their Ambassador in Washington to talk frankly with Mr. Landau and others or of course at any time with Mr. Kissinger. This was a new game and the U.S. wanted good hard-headed discussions, and good relations with Portugal. The President asked Mr. Landau whether the State Department had already started something in this respect. Mr. Landau said that the Secretary has set up a meeting for next week with the Assistant Secretaries for European, African and UN Affairs to discuss this matter.⁴ The President then asked Mr. Kissinger for any additional views.

Mr. Kissinger expressed appreciation for the important role Portugal has played in NATO. He said that in accordance with the President's wishes the National Security Council has ordered a study of the Southern African problem⁵ and that he hoped this complex matter would come before the Security Council within the next two or three months.

In closing the Portuguese Foreign Minister said that he had found some of the policies of its NATO allies hard to understand because Portugal's allies in the West had placed an embargo on arms sales to Portuguese territories in Africa while at the same time Portugal had a standing offer from the Soviet bloc for arms of any kind and that the Czechs have been very actively offering arms sales to Portugal. Talking about Czechoslovakia the President said he noted with sadness how little

⁴ In an April 22 memorandum to Kissinger, transmitting a copy of this memorandum of conversation, Sonnenfeldt reported: "The Secretary of State is now scheduled to have his meeting with Assistant Secretaries from EUR, AF and IO at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, April 23. As far as I know none of these three gentlemen, nor the Secretary himself, is yet aware of the thrust of what the President said. In particular, I think it important that AF and IO take note of the President's remarks about our having a completely open mind and not using doctrinaire views." Kissinger approved distribution of the memorandum of conversation to the participants at the Secretary's meeting. A notation on Sonnenfeldt's memorandum indicates that the Department of State was informed on April 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I) No record of the April 23 meeting was found.

⁵ NSSM 39, "Southern Africa," was issued on April 10. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 6.

public attention had been paid in the U.S. and in Europe when it became apparent that the last vestiges of freedom in Czechoslovakia had disappeared.

The President assured the Foreign Minister that Portugal would get an opportunity to state its case and that it would have a fair hearing from the U.S. He of course expected that Portugal would give the same fair hearing to U.S. views. Meantime we would work on our policy review and in closing he wanted to assure the Foreign Minister once more that he agreed with him on the importance of a good dialogue between the two countries.

255. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State¹

Lisbon, August 15, 1969, 1012Z.

1663. Eyes Only for General Goodpaster USCINCEUR. Subject: Initial conversation with Prime Minister Caetano.²

1. Summary

A) Azores: Prime Minister Caetano throws out suggestion that U.S. compensation for continued use of Azores might be essentially in form of loans for economic purposes in metropolitan Portugal at low interest rate.

B) Deslandes memorandum: Prime Minister said Deslandes memo was military document provided Goodpaster within NATO context. Caetano's thoughts concerning military hardware limited to up-to-date matériel for one brigade which would be intended to train other Portuguese metropolitan forces "just in case."

C) Portuguese Africa: Caetano seems to have few illusions concerning difficulties facing Portugal in Africa. Faced with racial polarization now rampant in that continent, he sees no alternative to Portugal defending itself until—hopefully—saner and more moderate perspectives open up. Meanwhile he expressed determination to further economic and political progress.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USCINCEUR.

² Ambassador Knight presented his credentials on July 30. Ambassador Bennett left post on July 21.

D) Fall 1969 elections: while Prime Minister Caetano remains firmly of belief that full-fledged parliamentary system and complete political freedom inappropriate for Portugal, he expresses apparently sincere hope that all currents of Portuguese political thought except those he considered extreme will express themselves during limited period of political campaign, that opposition candidates will actually run and, if elected, take their seats. *End Summary.*

2. I had my first talk with Prime Minister Caetano evening August 13. Conversation lasted just under an hour. We spoke in French and were alone since no interpreter needed. After brief exchange of courtesies during which I reiterated the President's appreciation for Prime Minister's presence at President Eisenhower's funeral,³ we discussed Azores, Portugal's policy in Africa and upcoming Portuguese elections this fall.

3. Azores: Caetano introduced subject referring to difficulty which Portuguese people had in understanding apparent discrimination against Portugal in U.S. base arrangements abroad. Whereas other countries seem to receive direct compensation therefor—in addition to U.S. protective umbrella—Portugal had received its share of post-Korean MDAP programs for NATO allies but had let matters ride since expiration of last Azores agreement extension in 1962.

4. Prime Minister referred to improved climate in U.S. re Portugal, looked forward to era of better relations and questioningly referred to friendly informal advice which GOP had received in Washington to effect it would be in Portugal's own interest not to press Azores base negotiations at this time.

5. I told Caetano that U.S. position unchanged since note of February 4⁴ and I would of course forward immediately any proposals which GOP might care to make. However, speaking entirely personally, I could not help but believe that advice to which PM had referred impressed me as being sound. I went on to add that while there was basic friendship for Portugal and great admiration for Portuguese people, there existed honest differences of opinion between us re policies in Africa. While we had no intention of telling Portugal what to do there were large segments of U.S. public opinion who felt strongly concerning the matter and that it might be a mistake on part of GOP to anticipate extensive changes in U.S. policy. I asked PM to accept my frankness as being caused only by my desire to avoid misunderstandings which could be dangerous.

³ See Document 253.

⁴ The note was transmitted in telegram 16700 to Lisbon. (National Archives, RG 84, Lisbon Embassy Files, DEF 15 Bases (Azores), 1969)

6. Prime Minister said [garble—he?] realized difficulties facing USG re US-Portuguese relations. He went on to stress difficulties for metropolitan Portugal which result from policies which both Portuguese people and Government, rightly or wrongly, believe to be in best interest of Portugal and her allies. There exist great needs in Portugal in the fields of public education, national health, agriculture, communication, etc. Might it not be possible to think in terms of U.S. loans to help Portugal over her temporary difficulties. Portugal's credit was excellent; Portugal would repay these loans punctually. As to the advantage to Portugal (in terms of Azores negotiations), this could be in the form of low interest rates.

7. Deslandes memorandum: Since Prime Minister had made no reference to military equipment, I asked the PM about the memorandum given by the Chief of General Staff, General Deslandes, to General Goodpaster during latter's recent visit as new SACEUR.⁵ I inquired whether the memo reflected only military thinking or whether he had seen it and memo represented government's position.

8. Caetano answered that he had not seen memorandum. He had heard about it. He considered that it represented views of Portuguese military given to General Goodpaster under their respective NATO hats. Prime Minister went on to say that since taking office last fall, he had reviewed situation of armed services with senior Portuguese military personnel. As result, he had come to personal conclusion that Portugal could perform her role adequately at sea, could do a reasonable job in the air but that her capability for land operations in Europe had dropped to zero. It was, therefore, his understanding that what the Portuguese armed forces wanted most was modern equipment for one brigade. (Prime Minister said he wasn't quite sure of right terminology but that in any event what he had in mind was considerably smaller than a division.) This brigade's essential role would be to train other Portuguese units which would thus be able to handle modern matériel should this be received at a later date either after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe or at any time when the Alliance might decide to increase ground capability.

9. Portuguese Africa: Caetano expressed his deep concern re situation developing in Africa which he sees as becoming increasingly racist—white racist in South Africa and Rhodesia and black racist elsewhere. If he believed various elements of population could cohabit peacefully—as they do in Brazil—he would favor independence for Angola and Mozambique in immediate future. Under present climate, however, he did not think neighbors of Portuguese territories would

⁵ Not found.

permit such development and that as a consequence the non-blacks would be forced out. This, of course, he—and no Portuguese Government—could accept. Thus Portugal had no alternative but to defend itself against what was essentially aggression from abroad. Waiting for a better time in Africa when perhaps more sensible and less extreme solutions would be possible. At the same time, Portugal would continue her considerable efforts toward improving the conditions of all the inhabitants of Portuguese Africa. Likewise, as he frequently told Salazar, “a mother can stifle a child in her embrace.” Children grow up and must be given more freedom and he—Caetano—is determined to travel down this road as best he can, bearing in mind the other considerations which he had set forth.

10. During this part of the conversation, I commented that I had been personally involved in or had very closely followed events and developments in French North Africa from 1941 on,⁶ and whereas it was my personal view that French policy in Algeria had been theoretical and meaningless and the Algerian integration into France only consisted of words, I did believe French policy in Morocco had been on the whole liberal and farsighted. Yet regardless of these differences, the urge for immediate independence had been as great in Morocco and this quite apart from resulting economic hardships and vast unemployment. Thus, unfortunately, we are dealing with a problem area in which emotions overpower logic. (Caetano commented in the above connection that he was fully aware of futility of French fiction that the Algerian departments were “just other French departments,” and that he would strive to avoid the same mistakes.)

11. Upcoming national elections: I introduced this subject saying that I was a newcomer to the Portuguese scene and would welcome any comments which he might care to make so as to help me understand the elections better.

12. Caetano prefaced his remarks by reminding me of Portugal’s parliamentary instability between 1910 and 1926. Full-fledged parliamentary democracies might work in other countries but not in Portugal in view of the potential volatility of the Portuguese character. This situation is compounded by the characteristics of today’s youth—characteristics which are also prevalent in Portugal. Majority of youth is attracted by the left either by the traditional Marxist or increasingly by the anarchist tendencies which characterize the New Left, be it of Marxist or Catholic inspiration.

⁶ Knight’s service included four years in Oran during World War II as a technical adviser, and two tours in France, 1945–1949, 1955–1957. He had also served in the Bureau of European Affairs and held the post of Consul General in Damascus, 1960–1961, and of Ambassador to Syria, 1961–1965.

13. Therefore, it is not possible to permit complete political freedom at all times. He did, however, want to encourage the presentation of different political points of view during the limited period of the electoral campaign. He specifically wants the opposition to run and to sit if elected. He specifically criticized what he called the opposition's tactics under Salazar of campaigning and then refusing to run at the last minute. I told Prime Minister that I had heard that provincial governors had unlimited *de facto* powers to refuse slates of candidates; I wondered how elections could be meaningful if the governors used any such authority extensively. Caetano answered that in Portugal, as in many other countries, candidates could be forbidden from running but that such action had to be motivated and justified. He recognized that in Portugal more candidates were debarred than in any other non-Communist countries but he vigorously contended that it was much easier to run for election than the international press made out. In sum, Caetano expressed hope for a fair expression of national opinions and political tendencies "while preventing demagogic excesses that could only breed chaos."

14. *Comment:* While Prime Minister Caetano put no direct question to me, it is obvious that he hopes for some reaction to his suggestion of loans as principal compensation for Portugal's extension of Azores base agreement. It is becoming increasingly apparent that we have entered pre-negotiation phase during which Prime Minister—and other elements GOP—are exploring what might be most productive approach for them. It is equally obvious that we are dealing with an extremely cautious and conservative gentleman who nevertheless is giving some indications of flexibility both in domestic and foreign policy. Would appreciate Department's instructions.⁷

Knight

⁷ In telegram 139315 to Lisbon, August 19, the Department of State responded that it was not yet able to formulate specific instructions for dealing with the issues raised by Caetano. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PORT-US)

256. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 31, 1969.

SUBJECT

Relations with Portugal—State Taking Collision Course

I want to be sure you are aware of two actions taken yesterday by State which could have a negative effect on our relations with Portugal and raise questions in Lisbon concerning the President's intentions.

Under Secretary Richardson called in the Portuguese Ambassador yesterday to inform him that the Justice Department intends to prosecute a US company for violating the Rhodesian sanctions regulations.²

This is a criminal action charging that the company imported chrome from Rhodesia after the effective date of the sanctions. It is anticipated that the company will defend the suit by offering in evidence official Portuguese documents issued in Mozambique which state that the chrome had left Rhodesia and entered Mozambique before the date of the sanctions. To counter that, Justice will introduce evidence showing that the official documents were fraudulent.

Many months ago, the Portuguese brought this matter to State's attention pointing out that such action—which calls into question an official document and implies that the Portuguese assisted in circumventing the sanctions—would damage US-Portuguese relations. In explaining the decision to prosecute, Richardson noted that the matter had been carefully reviewed and that Justice was asked to deter public action until after the Portuguese elections. Ambassador Garin said this action would cause "unpleasant consequences."

The second issue concerns the fact that the US Mission to the UN recommended yesterday that we vote *for* a paragraph in a Southern Rhodesia resolution which condemns the policies of South Africa and Portugal for continuing to have relations with Rhodesia. After intervention by Winston Lord and me, State is expected to instruct the Mission to abstain on that provision. Winston is sending you a separate memo explaining this issue in greater detail.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "HAK has seen. Nov. 5, 1969." Copies of this memorandum were sent to Roger Morris and Winston Lord of the NSC Staff.

² Reported in telegram 184314 to Lisbon, October 31, attached at Tab A, not printed.

³ Not found.

Both these matters should be viewed in the light of the President's meeting on April 19 with the Portuguese Foreign Minister Nogueira in which Nogueira pleaded for better understanding of Portugal's African policies, noting there had been no bilateral exchange of communication since 1961. The President assured him that his was a new administration with a completely open mind, and that he did not want his administration to continue using doctrinaire views.⁴

I do not necessarily take issue with the substance of State's decision in the chrome case, but I am disturbed that—although the issue was kicking around State for many months—we learned of it only after the event through the Evening Reading and an information copy of an outgoing reporting telegram (attached at Tab A). The Southern Rhodesian resolution matter points up the fact that State had apparently not gotten the point to the Mission that the voting patterns of the past eight years are no longer sacred.

I think it would be useful if you would speak to Richardson and remind him the President has made clear he wants a fresh approach toward Portugal and her African policies, and that the White House should be kept better informed on this matter in general, and that White House guidance should be sought whenever it appears that we might have to adopt a harsh posture toward Portugal.

⁴ See Document 254.

257. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State¹

Lisbon, January 21, 1970, 0845Z.

187. Subj: US policy toward Portugal. Ref: CA-116.²

Summary: My basic reservation re instructions in CA-116 follows: If Portuguese military losses in Africa (proportionately comparable to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PORT-US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Lusaka, Conakry, Blantyre, Lourenco Marques, and Luanda.

² Dated January 9. It instructed the Embassy in Lisbon to continue a "dialogue" with Caetano on the Portuguese African colonies with the objective of promoting change in Portugal's policy. It is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 89.

ours in Viet-Nam), four year tour of military service, and absorption of half of budget by military expenditures do not suffice to change Portuguese policy, I do not see how my arguing the case with Caetano can do so. Rather I advise continuing present efforts to develop our rapport and dialogue, closely exploiting evolving GOP policy, on matters where our interests coincide and leading gradually to inclusion of Portuguese Africa. For time being we should rest our case as friend of Portugal on need and advantages of increasing pace of “autonomy”, thereby giving her friends grounds for defense of Portuguese efforts.

1. I have some serious reservations about instructions contained in CA-116. In this connection I wish respectfully to express belief that spread and diversity of problems arising from Portugal’s continuing colonial position in Africa require that USG develop policies transcending, as much as humanly possible, our intramural differences in Department as well as in field.

2. Little would be accomplished now or in foreseeable future by an approach at highest GOP level. This has been tried without success by previous Ambassadors and by US special emissaries—including the offer of economic aid as *quid pro quo* for action on self-determination. However Portuguese consider that their essential national interests are at stake in Africa. It is difficult to imagine how GOP could be persuaded to change these policies by verbal expressions by the American Ambassador when they are not moved to do so by the infinitely more compelling pressure of (a) military losses fully comparable with ours in Viet-Nam, (b) by high proportion (about 45 percent) of national budget going to military and security expenditures (at least 59 percent of this spent overseas), and (c) by the minimum four-year duration of military service.

3. The net result of the new suggested approach would undermine the goodwill which has begun to accrue to US as a result of GOP’s high regard for President Nixon personally and of greater moderation in our UN speeches as well as our two abstentions in Security Council, plus local efforts to increase rapport across the board. In the existing climate to initiate a rhetorical dialogue with Caetano based on an exegesis of his remarks to me could only be counter-productive.

4. Caetano’s attitude towards the territories since my discussion with him (Lisbon 1613)³ has hardened as a result of rightwing-military pressures demonstrated on October 6 and 7, 1969 when Caetano was called to task for his “over-liberalism” re overseas policy. Even if Caetano were sincerely inclined towards moderation, the potent rightwing-military/civilian oligarchy—led by President Thomaz to

³ The reference presumably should be telegram 1663, Document 255.

whom Caetano is directly responsible—would not permit a shift in this ingrained national policy.

5. Our best judgment is that Caetano will continue to progress prudently towards “autonomy” for the African territories because of (a) his conviction that lack of social and economic progress lie at heart of the rebellion; (b) his desire to shift some of the financial burdens to the territories and (c) because it is quite clear that personally Caetano does not share the extremists’ conviction that Portugal would be lost without her “ultramar.”

6. On evening January 17 during after dinner conversation new Foreign Minister Rui Patricio expressed himself re Africa in general terms quite similar to Caetano’s last summer. Not only does this provide pleasant contrast with his predecessor Franco Nogueira but it is also an interesting preliminary indication since some observers have inclined to view that Patricio is closer to President Thomaz than to the Prime Minister.

7. While CA-116 views black Africa as trending towards more hostile attitude against Portugal, the expenditures in human and material resources and the strains imposed by the extremely lengthy terms of military service remain politically manageable. Furthermore for the time frame immediately ahead of us, a clearly dominant majority of the Portuguese leadership feels confident about security prospects and economic developments. This is specially true re Angola which is viewed as on verge of profitable takeoff which should ease budgetary strains (on basis, of course, of present level of insurgent activity). While there is muted popular weariness with the African wars, this is still readily controllable.

8. Other basic consideration which deserves to be kept in mind is that for foreseeable future political choice facing Portugal is alternative between Caetano’s cautious moves towards liberalization and a return to Salazarist rightwing. It is not an option of Caetano or democracy, at best still several years away. As a matter of fact I suggest that we should be thinking in terms of conceding something to Caetano (and new Foreign Minister Patricio) so as to strengthen moderates against ultras. Should Caetano’s greater reasonableness not appear to be of some advantage to Portugal in its relations with USG, the hand of his opponents would be strengthened.

9. Yet another important issue in overall situation is the Azores base where we continue on a rent-free basis which situation we see no point in disturbing unless confident of achieving commensurate advantage in return.

10. While I hesitate to add this point because of its possible implications of “blackmail”, still it is a fact which should also be kept in mind that as of present moment and for foreseeable future alternative to

Lisbon rule in Africa is not, in our opinion, independent black republics. Instead, it is spectrum of uncertain and unstable possibilities ranging from geographical and tribal conflicts and secessions to those in which Portuguese white settlers of Angola and Mozambique, in actions necessarily condoned by Lisbon, would seek some form of protection from South Africa and Rhodesia and adjust their racial policies to their security needs.

11. What then could we do to “help the cause of progress” if we put on ice new proposal of a USG move to “lean on” the GOP towards instant liberalization?

12. First of all, I would advise that we continue using every opportunity to stress in a friendly fashion importance of Portuguese moving as fast as they can so as to give their friends abroad arguments and reasons to help Portugal.

13. More specifically I would propose taking advantage of current era of relatively good feeling so as to broaden and firm up a basis of eventual development and broadening of a dialogue with GOP. To this end we should establish a pattern of cooperation with GOP when our interests coincide in Africa. I have in mind the fruitful exchanges of several months ago during the border tensions with Zambia. I am also thinking of any assistance we could render, in close collaboration with our Embassies in black Africa (especially bordering on Portuguese territories), to foster contact and dialogue between Portugal and black African states and/or between GOP and rebel leaders. Likewise I am thinking of assistance which we could render on Portuguese prisoners held in Guinea by PAIGC⁴ and conversely on plane and boat held by Portuguese. Might we not also make a contribution to further improvement of relations between Congo-Kinshasa and GOP?

14. I cannot however agree with suggestion that Lusaka Manifesto⁵ be used as point of departure in discussing Portugal’s African problems. While I do not contest Department’s assessment that African leaders were sincerely attempting a moderate approach, mere fact that GOP feels so strongly that Manifesto is a violent document masked in moderate language destroys value of such an approach.

15. In conclusion I would hope that by gradually establishing ourselves as frank but true friends of Portugal we could with time increasingly and gradually orient Portugal’s African policies in the direction

⁴ The African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde.

⁵ An April 1969 manifesto issued by the East and Central African states. For text of its key passages, see *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1969–1970, pp. 23902–23903. The U.N. General Assembly subsequently endorsed the Lusaka Manifesto by a vote of 113 to 2 with two abstentions. Nixon expressed support for the Manifesto in his February 18 Report to Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy; see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, p. 159.

we think best for our overall interests. Or to look at the other side of the coin, we can become the logical country to whom Portuguese leaders would turn when they are prepared to reconsider their African problems.

Knight

258. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

We Inch Closer to Negotiations with Portugal on the Azores: Our Ambassador is in Town

Our agreement with the Portuguese for use of the Lajes Base in the Azores formally terminated at the end of 1962. Since then we have used the base on a de facto basis. In late 1968 the Portuguese Foreign Minister indicated an interest in "resuming" negotiations with us for a new agreement,² and in January 1969 the Portuguese informed us by note of their desire to begin negotiations. We responded in February last year,³ noting our interest and soliciting their proposals. There had been no further movement on the issue until this weekend when Ambassador Knight met with Foreign Minister Rui Patricio, prior to the Ambassador's return to Washington for consultations.⁴

The Foreign Minister raised the subject of the Azores base, and dwelled on his understanding that our base requirements were under global review, and there were Congressional pressures to limit military expenditures. He indicated that, although the Portuguese position

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 175.

³ The Portuguese note of January 6, 1969, is an attachment to airgram A-7 from Lisbon, January 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PORT-US) For the February 4, 1969, U.S. reply, see footnote 4, Document 255.

⁴ Reported in telegram 350 from Lisbon, February 7. (National Archives, RG 84, Lisbon Embassy Files, DEF 15 Azores, 1970)

would not be firmed up until there was an assessment of the possibilities for US compensation, his general thinking was as follows:

—Portugal is willing to continue its cooperation with us in the Azores;

—any form of US compensation to Portugal would be considered, whether or not contractually linked with the Azores base;

—if military assistance would be difficult, Portugal would equally welcome help toward meeting its economic and/or educational development.

It can be expected that the Portuguese will continue to inch forward toward base negotiations. They are undoubtedly awaiting the conclusion of the Spanish base negotiations before proposing the actual opening of Azores negotiations. After his conversation with the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Knight felt satisfied that there was no basis for a rumor currently making the rounds in Lisbon that the French are dickering with the Portuguese for the Azores base.

Do you wish to see Ambassador Knight while he is here, February 10–18?

Wish to see

Do not wish to see⁵

⁵ Kissinger initialed this option. The handwritten date “2-12-70” appears below his initials. Sonnenfeldt met with Ridgway Knight on February 11 to discuss Portuguese affairs. Knight reiterated most of the themes developed in Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum. A memorandum for the files of their discussion, dated February 13, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

259. **Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, May 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

US-Portuguese Relations and the Azores Negotiations

Our Ambassador in Lisbon, Ridgway Knight, sent a sound telegram to Secretary Rogers for his background in connection with his visit to Portugal May 29–30. The message (Tab A) is worth reading, and provides a follow-up to Knight's conversation with me in February (log #7309, attached at Tab B).

The Ambassador judges that this Administration has succeeded in vastly improving our relationship with Portugal at no cost in terms of economic considerations, concessions in matters of principle or changes in policy. He is concerned, however, by the possibility that this happy state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely without some concrete manifestation to accompany it. Secretary Rogers' visit to Lisbon was considered necessary in order to preserve the friendly climate—a holding operation—until we know how much we want the Azores bases and have a clear idea of how we can pay for them.

The Defense Department feels it is unable to offer a final judgment on the value of the Azores until the base agreement with the Spanish has been concluded. Its preliminary assessment is that the Azores bases [1 line not declassified] State seems to accept this, and so there apparently is a general consensus at this point among the interested agencies that we should retain our facilities.

In principle, the Portuguese consider it in their interest that we remain. Our facilities there give Portugal some respectability in NATO, and provide it with a lever to seek US assistance (economic and military) and at least a kind of benevolent neutrality on Portuguese-African policies. The Portuguese appreciate that we cannot move into negotiations until after the Spanish question is settled, and they have not pressed us hard.

The sticky question remains as to how much we can offer the Portuguese in return. We currently provide them with about \$1 million in MAP a year, and there is no prospect for any increase in amount. They

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger's initials appear on the first page. Beneath them is the stamped date "Jun 2 1970." The tabs are not printed.

have expressed strong interest in economic concessions—long term, low interest development loans. State is looking into the possibility of putting together a PL 480 package which might amount to \$10 million per year, and perhaps ExIm Bank loans for educational reform.

In his cable, Ambassador Knight expresses his fear that the Portuguese might react with great emotion if they abruptly discover that we had absolutely no quid to offer for the Azores, or if we take dramatic actions with respect to Africa which the Portuguese could interpret as directly against them or as unmistakably unfriendly. His word of caution will become even more relevant as the UN General Assembly convenes this fall and, at the same time, the Spanish agreement is concluded.

Once the latter has occurred (hopefully), it will be desirable to review the Azores issue; this is probably best done through the Under Secretaries Committee.

260. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Lisbon, May 30, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Knight

Counselor Pedersen

Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand

Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert J. McCloskey

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PORT–US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Asencio; cleared in S and C on June 25. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry. The memorandum is labelled “Part III of III.” Parts I and II dealing with U.N. matters and Cambodia, respectively, are *ibid.* A summary telegraphic report on Rogers’s talks with Patricio and Caetano, telegram 1598 from Lisbon, June 1, is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. In telegram 93912 to Lisbon, June 16, the Department of State reported that the Secretary and Rui Patricio had also discussed the sale of Boeing 707 aircraft to the Government of Portugal during a luncheon meeting: “The Secretary told Rui Patricio that we would have a problem with the African nations if we sold Boeing 707s to the Portuguese Air Force. The Secretary suggested that instead the sale be made to Portuguese commercial airline TAP and that TAP in turn could sell same number of used equipment to Air Force.” (*Ibid.*) At noon Rogers and Caetano discussed Portuguese and U.S. policies in Africa. The memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 90.

Robert W. Zimmermann, DCM Lisbon
George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain/Portugal
Diego C. Asencio, Political Officer

Portugal

Foreign Minister Rui Patricio
Dr. Jose Luis Archer, Secretary General of Foreign Office
Dr. Goncalo Caldeira Coelho, Director General of Political Affairs
Ambassador Garin
Dr. Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Director General of Economic Affairs
Dr. Antonio Patricio, Chief, International Political Organizations

SUBJECT

Azores: Economic Cooperation in the Fields of Education and Agriculture

The Secretary mentioned the possibility of a closer relationship with Portugal in the field of education and possibly agriculture without any direct link to the question of the Azores. He explained that he was very anxious to avoid any public reference to such problems for the time being since it was a very difficult time in terms of the U.S. Senate. He would prefer to postpone any discussion until September, when he could meet with Foreign Minister Patricio in New York.

Foreign Minister Patricio agreed that there need be no link with the question of a base agreement. He suggested that perhaps the interim period could be used by the United States to study the availability of resources for U.S. assistance for Portuguese agriculture and education in order to prepare for the September meeting.

The Secretary said he understood that the Portuguese had a very extensive program in the field of education. Foreign Minister Patricio replied that the III Economic Development Plan provided for substantial investments in the field of education at all levels and in all sectors. The Portuguese Government wanted to increase the amount of the education budget and he supposed that this would be an important and useful point for possible cooperation with the United States.

261. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State¹

Lisbon, July 10, 1970, 0814Z.

1954. Reference: State 105049 and 107754.² Subject: Boeing 707s for Portuguese Air Force.

1. Following receipt of State 105049 I waited until July 8 to ask for appointment with Foreign Minister since he had told me he would consult further with his government colleagues and in hope TAP would be agreed as purchaser since this formula obviously preferable from USG viewpoint.

2. However it has become increasingly clear from what I have learned locally as well as from State 107754 that Boeing has been keeping Portuguese Government informed of every move made by USG towards sale of aircraft. (It has been equally clear that the company has not been informing GOP with same alacrity of difficulties encountered.) For this reason it seemed clear that should I delay informing FonMin of our willingness to consider sale of 707s to a Portuguese civilian agency as possible alternative to TAP, GOP might have drawn unfavorable conclusions.

3. I informed FonMin that we would be willing to consider a civilian agency as a possible alternative to TAP for purchasing the Boeing 707s. I told him we would of course want to know what particular agency GOP had in mind, specifying that it should be a logical purchaser. I added that TAP remained our distinct preference and that I had not given up hope that GOP would take this step in our direction in order to help USG with its problems.

4. FonMin expressed real appreciation for effort which USG had made to accommodate GOP. He would bear in mind our preference for TAP in further consultations with his government colleagues and specially with Secretary of State for Air General Nascimento. At same time he thought he should tell me that Boeing had let it be known to its Portuguese Government contacts that it did not favor sale to TAP and pre-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

² In telegram 105049, July 1, the Department of State informed the Embassy that “USG willing consider Portuguese civilian agency as possible alternative to TAP as intermediary for purchasing Boeing 707s. We would of course want to know what particular agency GOP has in mind. It should be one which could be considered logical purchaser.” (Ibid.) Telegram 107754 to Lisbon, July 7, reported that Boeing would be informing the Portuguese Government that it was unable to deliver the first contracted aircraft on schedule due to delays in decisionmaking by the U.S. Government. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12–5 PORT)

ferred outright deal with PAF. I responded that I was not familiar with Boeing's corporate considerations but that he could consider my communication as being definitely USG's position.³

Knight

³ In telegram 2058 from Lisbon, July 17, Knight reported that the Portuguese Government was considering purchase through its Civilian Aeronautics Directorate and requested authorization to inform the Foreign Ministry that the U.S. Government explicitly recognized the Directorate's right to transfer or lease the aircraft to the Portuguese Air Force. In telegram 116251, July 20, the Department of State replied: "You are authorized give formal assurances to GOP that it will be able obtain spare parts for Boeing 707's without difficulty even if aircraft subsequently operated by PAF." (Both *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I)

262. Memorandum From Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 2, 1970.

SUBJECT

Azores Base Negotiations

Hal Sonnenfeldt reported to you recently that the Portuguese have raised the question of the next step in the long suspended negotiations for the renewal of the agreement for our peacetime use of facilities in the Azores (Log No. 21444—Tab A). The 1951 Azores agreement ac-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Hormats. The tabs are not printed. Haig drew an arrow to Downey's name and wrote: "Call Haig. AH". Kissinger's handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Al—We must [double underlined by Kissinger] keep State from running wild though I agree with this decision. We should have been in on it. HK". In a September 14 memorandum to Haig, Sonnenfeldt noted that Kissinger at a staff meeting had raised the issue of getting the NSC into "the Act Before a Position is Settled in the Agencies." He continued: "In explanation of Art Downey's memo and in justice to the record, I want to be sure you understand that this year alone we attempted in memos dated February 9, February 13, May 25, August 20 and September 2 to interest HAK in the Azores issue and in relations with Portugal generally." Haig annotated the memorandum: "Thanks Hal—Problem from here on is what happens next and are we on top of it. Al". (*Ibid.*) The memoranda of February 9 and May 25 are Documents 258 and 259. For the February 13 memorandum, see footnote 5, Document 258. The August 20 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger is attached at Tab A.

cords the US the right, as long as NATO exists, to use facilities during any war in which it and Portugal are allied. The use of the facilities in peacetime was initially granted for a five year period, which was extended until 1962. Since then, we have used the facilities on a de facto basis.

Secretary Rogers wrote to Secretary Laird on June 12 and requested his views on the strategic importance to the US of the Azores facilities. Secretary Laird replied in mid-July, and concluded that for the foreseeable future the Azores will continue to be of major strategic importance as a base for anti-submarine warfare activities, as a site for communications and high-frequency direction finding operations, and for mid-Atlantic search and rescue operations. Copies of this exchange of letters are at Tab B; they are bootleg copies.

Secretary Rogers has now written to Secretary Hardin to urge his agreement to a PL-480 program for Portugal of some \$5 million per year for two years beginning possibly in FY-72. Secretary Rogers has sent copies of this letter to you and to Secretary Laird (Tab C). He considers that if he is able to offer this program to the Portuguese Foreign Minister this fall, it might be sufficient quid pro quo to secure a renewal of the base agreement, or at least persuade the Portuguese to continue the status quo which has proved operationally satisfactory since 1962.

Our reading of the initial reaction at Agriculture is that Secretary Hardin will not object to employing a PL-480 program of this magnitude for Portugal. There is, however, a sense of displeasure in Agriculture over the use of PL-480 programs (designed to boost agricultural exports) for political purposes, and over the fact that Agriculture was not brought in earlier in the planning stages in this case. Admittedly, this preliminary work on the Azores seems to have been relatively closely held, for example the copy of Secretary Rogers' letter to Secretary Hardin is the only information you have officially received to date. The EUR/IG might have been an appropriate structure within which the Azores could have been considered. In any event, the matter seems to be moving well at this point, and there is a good likelihood that agreement can be reached quietly with the Portuguese.²

² In telegram 132903 to Lisbon, September 11, the Department of State reported that Garin had met with Hillenbrand that day to request the initiation of negotiations on an Azores agreement: "Garin reiterated the Portuguese view that negotiations take place on two planes: one dealing with Azores base agreement renewal; other with quid which would not be specifically linked so as to avoid problems with U.S. Congress." Hillenbrand informed the Ambassador that the United States was "not quite" ready to initiate discussions due to personnel difficulties but assured him that the United States would be in contact with Portugal as soon as possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PORT-US)

263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal¹

Washington, October 10, 1970.

165146. Subject: Foreign Minister Patricio's Visit to Washington. Ref: Lisbon 2760 and 2795.² For Ambassador from Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand.

1. We are pleased that Foreign Minister Rui Patricio has accepted Secretary's invitation to working luncheon November 9 to be preceded by meeting in Secretary's office.

2. Of concern however is Foreign Minister's continued insistence of drawing parallel between Azores base negotiation and recently concluded Spanish base negotiations. It is important that two apparent misconceptions on his part be cleared up before he comes to Washington.

(a) First and basic is Portuguese gauging expectations to results of Spanish negotiations. Foreign Minister fails to take into account that the quid pro quo arranged with Spain was in lieu of a U.S. security guarantee to Spain. GOS indicated to us many times that Spanish primary interest was in a security guarantee but in the face of our flat refusal to give them such commitment Spain asked for military equipment to carry out its own defense. As NATO member Portugal has for over 20 years had security guarantee Spaniards so avidly desire. As U.S. needed bases in Spain we were forced to develop a quid pro quo package for our continued use of the bases but within the Alliance, where we have many bases, no such quid pro quos are given or appropriate.

(b) Second misconception is Portuguese exaggerated ideas apparently based on erroneous news reports, about the scope and size of U.S. package for Spain. You were right in attempting to disabuse FonMin of idea that price tag amounted to \$500 million. In fact total appropriated funds of entire five-year period of agreement with Spain amounts to \$64 million for both military and non-military projects. \$35 million of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PORT-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Landau; cleared in SCI, PM, CU, AF, and by the Department of Defense (all initialed by Landau), and in EUR; and approved by Hillenbrand.

² In telegram 2760 from Lisbon, September 26, Knight reported that Patricio was "becoming visibly impatient with leisurely pace of USG's preparations for Azores negotiations" and was pressing for a deal that would parallel that made with Spain. (Ibid., POL 7 PORT) Telegram 2795 from Lisbon, September 30, reported that Patricio was pleased with the proposed date for his talk with Rogers and was also interested in a meeting with the President. (Ibid.)

this amount will come from Air Force budget for modernization of ACW facilities largely used by USG forces stationed in Spain.

3. We understand well however that GOP needs to save face internally and show that it derives some direct material benefits from our continued presence in the Azores. In view of the exaggerated and disturbing ideas expressed to you by FonMin we consider it important that prior to any detailed talks on technical level the Secretary in a friendly and frank talk with the Foreign Minister place in proper focus our interests in the Azores and any price we may be willing and able to pay. Any advance discussions by technicians would only tend to exacerbate the problem as Portuguese undoubtedly would not consider our offer sufficiently attractive. Once the Secretary and the Foreign Minister have realistically discussed the scope and nature of possible U.S. assistance, the technicians can take over.

4. FYI: In addition to PL-480 program we are also looking into the possibility of offering the Portuguese an oceanographic research vessel which may be available in a reduced state of readiness. This could be considered as part of closer scientific cooperation between U.S. and Portugal. We are also investigating possibility of obtaining some ASW vessels (DE's) to be transferred to GOP under ship loan legislation. As these vessels can be used only for clearly definable NATO defensive purposes we foresee manageable reaction from African nations. *End FYI.*

5. As we outlined earlier we anticipate no political problems with increased scientific cooperation in oceanographic field. We believe however that any overall agreement, including economic, financial and cultural cooperation as envisaged by FonMin will cause us problems with the African states without commensurate benefit to GOP. From experience we learned that in many cases these agreements are of limited practical value.

6. Should FonMin specifically raise the example in U.S. Spanish agreement of cooperation in educational field, you might point out that our proposed assistance ties into the Spanish educational reform law which patterns Spanish education system along U.S. lines and which was recently adopted after years of study by GOS officials.

Rogers

264. Memorandum From Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Secretary Rogers' Report on the Azores Negotiations

Secretary Rogers met privately for 45 minutes on November 9 with Portuguese Foreign Minister Rui Patricio, followed by a working luncheon which included Deputy Defense Secretary Packard. The Secretary has sent a brief memorandum for the President noting the results of this formal beginning of the discussions with the Portuguese on our continued use of the Azores.² At their meeting, the Secretary told Patricio that the US wanted to remain in the Azores under the present *de facto* status, without any agreement in force. Patricio agreed that no agreement would be necessary. Patricio assigned the Director General for Economic Affairs (Ambassador Calvert) to remain in Washington through the middle of next week to work with a US working party in efforts to determine what technical and advisory assistance the US might offer to the Portuguese development programs. The Secretary offered a PL-480 program of about \$5 million. At Tab A is a memorandum for your signature forwarding the Secretary's memorandum to the President.

Patricio is currently in New York. Evidently he asked Secretary Rogers about the possibility of an appointment with the President, and the Secretary said he would look into it. Patricio is staying in New York until he learns whether the Secretary has been successful in securing an appointment. You will recall that Mr. Haldeman flatly turned down your recommendation that the President receive Patricio.³ In light of the Secretary's comment to Patricio, however, he may intend to take up the question with the President—or already may have during the Paris visit. (Your memorandum for the President at Tab A does not treat the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. Tab A is not printed.

² In addition to the Azores question, Rogers and Patricio also discussed U.N. matters and African issues. Memoranda of conversation are *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PORT-US.

³ Haldeman had turned down a recommendation in a November 2 memorandum from Kissinger to the President that Nixon meet with Patricio, noting on November 5: "Don't submit any more—PM's only!" (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I)

issue of an appointment.) The Vice President has agreed to meet with Patricio on November 17 at 11 a.m.⁴

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.⁵

⁴ A memorandum of their November 17 conversation, which focused on Africa, is *ibid.*

⁵ In an attached November 16 handwritten note, Haig wrote: "Downey, Hold till after HAK & VP see F Min Tues and then redo in light of conversation. AH". No revised memorandum was found. The memorandum to the President apparently was not forwarded to Nixon. Patricio met with Kissinger on November 17. The meeting was devoted primarily to an exposition of Portugal's views on African issues. The relevant portion of the memorandum for the record, dated November 19, dealing with the Azores issue reads: "The Foreign Minister said that he had accepted the U.S. suggestion that public negotiations on the Azores were not necessary. However, in the context of good relations between the two countries, he had to insist that consideration be given to Portugal's needs for economic development. Mr. Kissinger assured him that we would give most sympathetic consideration to their economic problems." In concluding, Kissinger stressed Nixon's interest in Portugal and added "that we would give most sympathetic consideration to Portugal's problems," inviting the Ambassador to "get in touch" if the White House could help. (*Ibid.*)

265. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

Azores Negotiations

We have received Secretary Rogers' memorandum on the Azores (Tab B). As I had previously indicated to you, the Secretary confirms that the negotiations are in serious trouble, and that our previous offer of a \$5 million PL-480 program (as well as an oceanographic research vessel) is inadequate. The Portuguese have requested a minimum of \$25 million in PL-480 for one year, at concessional rates.

To remedy the situation, the Secretary requests authority to offer a PL-480 program of \$30 million, spread over three years, conditioned in

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for urgent action. The tabs are not printed.

the last two years on Portuguese recognition of soybean oil as edible (which would placate Agriculture by opening up a \$15–20 million annual sales of soybean oil—but which the Portuguese may balk at because of their own domestic pressures). The memorandum notes that Agriculture would be willing to increase the previous total \$5 million offer only to \$7 million if it were conditioned on the soybean deal (the Portuguese reject this linkage). In addition, the Secretary notes that Defense is looking into the possibility of using their own contingency fund as was done with the Spanish base negotiations.

In the meantime, the negotiations have continued to sour. Prime Minister Caetano was interviewed by a UPI reporter and publicly made it clear that he was dissatisfied with the negotiations both as to the amounts involved and also as to our handling which is viewed as dilatory. Our Ambassador is convinced that the Portuguese would prefer to have the Azores bases mothballed as a stand-by NATO facility (as provided for in a bilateral 1951 agreement) rather than continue the unilateral US use on the terms of our previous offer.

The immediate question is procedural. USG consideration of this issue has not been in the NSC framework, but has been led by State, bolstered by Secretary Laird's assessment of the continued need for the bases. Agriculture is opposed to the Rogers recommendation, in part because it will have a tough time explaining the PL-480 deal to Congress. Secretary Rogers has sent copies of his memorandum to Secretaries Laird, Hardin and Connally. Before the State memorandum is forwarded to the President, I assume you will wish to have their comments. If you wish to solicit these views by memorandum, one is attached at Tab A; alternatively, Jeanne Davis could contact her counterparts by phone and orally request the agency views. In any event, speed is rather important. The Portuguese have been claiming that they will need to know our proposal by the end of this month (in relation to their own commitment process for grain imports).

Recommendation

That you agree that Jeanne Davis should seek the comments of the other agencies on the Rogers memorandum.

Approve

Disapprove

I'll sign the memorandum²

² Kissinger checked this option and wrote "done." The memorandum requested the views of the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Agriculture by April 20.

(Note: After the agency comments are in, you can decide whether and how to put this into the NSC machinery—maybe the USC with a strong presidential directive that he wants the matter worked out promptly.)

266. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Relations with Portugal

I have noted with some apprehension a recent trend in our relations with Portugal which, if not quickly reversed, may jeopardize our continued access to important facilities in the Azores. I share the evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that for the foreseeable future these facilities will continue to be of major strategic value to the US. In my view, these facilities are taking on added importance as the Soviets increase their naval activities in the Atlantic. [5 lines not declassified]

Two problems in particular are of present concern. The first is the US package for use in the Azores discussions. I strongly endorse Secretary Rogers' recommendation that you authorize him to offer a PL-480 program of \$5 million this fiscal year, \$10 million in FY 72, and \$15 million in FY 73. The Portuguese have indicated a PL-480 program is their preferred quid pro quo; the amounts involved are commensurate with our stake in the Azores; the non-military character of such assistance avoids many of the political complications which direct military aid would arouse. I fear that if the US does not develop a more satisfactory quid pro quo before we resume discussions, the ensuing impasse would seriously harm our interests in the Azores and would weaken Portugal's ties to NATO.

Secondly, I am much concerned over the Department of State's opposition to EXIM Bank financing to allow General Electric to sell important components for the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique. Any final decisions against this undertaking could only be regarded in Lisbon as an unfriendly response to a project of great im-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential. Initialed by Kissinger.

portance to Portugal, and would be taken as a reversal of our 1968 decision to permit up to \$55 million in EXIM Bank financing. Coming on top of present difficulties in the Azores talks, such a position on our part would only strengthen the hand of those within the Portuguese Government who question the utility of cooperation with the US. The implications for our efforts to reach a satisfactory understanding on the Azores are obvious. Beyond this, we would in effect be overriding the interests of an established NATO ally in a questionable attempt to gain favor with those who are not likely to change their attitude towards us no matter what we do—an approach hardly calculated to strengthen the Alliance. I would therefore also recommend that, in addition to increasing the PL-480 program, the EXIM Bank be authorized to support General Electric's arrangements to sell electrical equipment for the Cabora Bassa project.

I am sending copies of this memorandum to Secretaries Rogers, Hardin, Connally and Stans for their information.

Mel Laird

267. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

Azores Base Negotiations: Status Report

Ambassador Knight met with Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano on May 13,² following his stay in Washington on consultations, in an effort to reduce Caetano's inflated expectations on the size and nature of the US quid for the bases. Caetano made it clear that our previous offer (\$5 million PL-480) was so little as to be "not only laughable but also offensive." (In part this was a direct result of the inaccurate and exag-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Knight reported on this meeting in telegram 1552 from Lisbon, May 14. Knight told Caetano that the United States had offered to increase its "quid" for the Azores bases and he outlined what this would be and the motivation behind the offer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 PORT-US)

gerated reporting done by Foreign Minister Patricio following his meeting last fall with Secretary Rogers.)³ Knight explained that, in accordance with the President's recent letter to Caetano,⁴ he expected soon to be able to offer a significantly expanded program.

Knight's judgment, which is sound, is that Caetano believes that the results of his pro-American stance have been so disappointing as to cause him difficulty (not danger) with his right wing opposition, the only opposition with which Caetano is concerned. That opposition has long pressed Caetano to seek some measure of US political support for Portugal's African policies. Notwithstanding, Knight believes that Caetano is still pursuing an Azores agreement in a responsible fashion, leaving aside the African issues.

Most importantly, Knight judges that our new offer on the Azores (not yet advanced to the Portuguese) will be sufficient, but just barely. This offer now includes a \$30 million PL-480 program over two years, a grant of \$2.5 million of excess non-military equipment over five years, and up to \$1 million in educational development projects (funded from Defense contingency funds).

There is one hitch, though. Because of insistence by Agriculture, the PL-480 program offer is conditioned on the Portuguese recognizing soybean oil as edible by the end of this year. Knight is convinced that the traffic will not bear this condition, and that its inclusion will seriously undermine the possibility of Portuguese acceptance of our proposal.⁵ The Embassy has been working over the last couple of years to secure Portuguese recognition of soybean oil, and Knight told me recently that he believes the Portuguese will come around on this within a year—but not so if we make it a condition in connection with the Azores negotiations.

State is now trying to get Agriculture to agree to drop the soybean condition. There is a slight possibility that State will convince Agriculture. But, if this is not possible, this issue will have to be resolved here, and with some speed. The purpose of this memorandum is simply to make you aware of the state of play, and the possibility that the soybean problem may surface here in the coming week.

³ See Document 264. In telegram 1253 from Lisbon, April 22, Knight reported on the expansive nature of the Foreign Minister's demands and his efforts to calm down an agitated Patricio and lower his expectations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PORT-US)

⁴ Not found.

⁵ In an attached May 19 note to Haig, former Ambassador George Anderson reported that in a long telephone conversation with Knight, the latter had expressed his concerns about the addition of the soybean oil issue to the base negotiations package.

268. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Lisbon, June 4, 1971, 1756Z.

Secto 23/1856. Subject: Azores Base Negotiations.

1. During call by Secretary on Foreign Minister June 2 status of Azores negotiations was reviewed. Secretary stressed our willingness to be cooperative but asked for Portuguese understanding of difficulties we faced with Congress. He said that although the Mansfield Resolution was defeated² existing attitude is that US is assuming too much of the burden in Europe. We know that Azores question was bilateral one between US and Portugal and while it is in our interest for Portugal to remain strong we still faced great difficulties with Congress in obtaining any type of financial assistance.

2. Rui Patricio made the following observations on the package proposed to him recently by Ambassador Knight.³

(a) Oceanographic Vessels. He said Portuguese Navy had informed him that two vessels offered were over thirty years old and would be of no value, particularly in view that the Portuguese Navy is retiring all ships older than ten years. We stressed that the age of the hull of oceanographic vessel probably was not important as long as equipment therein was valuable and useful. It was decided that Portuguese Navy would send a qualified technician shortly to Washington to discuss use and value of ships with the Oceanographer Admiral Behrens. *FYI* Landau will be in touch with Behrens June 9 with further details regarding issuing invitation to Portuguese to visit him.

(b) Non-Military Excess Equipment. Patricio said that he was pleased that Secretary had been able to increase previous offer of two and a half million non-military excess equipment to five million but that this figure still insignificant particularly in view that US desires to extend present situation in the Azores for another five years. He asked whether this figure could be further raised. The Secretary said that this would be hard to decide at this moment and that it was probably more important to first make a study to see what material was available. Moreover question was still open whether GOP would take oceano-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-72, CF 579. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Landau on June 3; cleared by Knight and Hillenbrand and in S/S; and approved by Pedersen. Rogers was in Portugal June 1-6 to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting. Memoranda of his conversation with Caetano, June 3, are *ibid*.

² See Documents 62 and 63.

³ See footnote 2, Document 267.

graphic vessels. He stressed again the importance of receiving specific indications from the Portuguese what type of equipment they wanted and what their priority areas of need were. He said that we had probably a great deal of non-military excess equipment but we could not tell the Portuguese what we had until we knew more clearly what they were looking for. Patricio asked whether the offer could be made “open-ended.” The Secretary said maybe it would be possible in the exchange of notes not to specify any amount and in an additional letter assure the Portuguese that they would receive at least five million dollars worth of non-military excess equipment over five years but leave the ceiling open in case more equipment of interest to the Portuguese could be found. He said he wanted to be careful because he did not want to mislead the GOP until we know whether in fact there was sufficient equipment of interest to the Portuguese to justify increased figure.

(c) PL-480. The Foreign Minister urged the Secretary to remove the condition of soybean oil as *sine qua non* to PL-480 transaction.⁴ Secretary outlined the reasons why the Department of Agriculture was insistent on removal of discriminatory regulation. Patricio said it would cause grave internal difficulties if this condition was not removed as public opinion would never understand this onerous requirement which was not directed specifically against the US but was a general worldwide prohibition of soy bean oil imports. He also expressed unhappiness that we offered PL-480 commitments for two years only while at the same time desiring a five year extension for US rights in Azores. Secretary expressed our legal restraints but said we would be willing to consider the matter of continued PL-480 in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time of any new Portuguese request.

(d) Assistance to Educational Reform. Patricio said he was pleased that US would assist Portuguese educational reform plan with one million dollars but asked Secretary to reconsider amount. Secretary made it clear that this was a firm figure and there was no likelihood for any increase.

(e) ExImBank Credit. The Secretary said that if Portuguese would find it useful to have the “global amount” of ExImBank credits it could be announced that the two governments reviewed Portuguese development projects in the metropole valued at 400 million and the USG declared its willingness to cooperate through ExImBank in financing of

⁴ According to a June 1 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger, an effort to give Rogers authority to decouple the soybean issue from the Azores negotiations failed due to opposition from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I) In order to break the impasse, Kissinger approved Haig’s recommendation to inform the President of the problem by memorandum. See Document 269.

these projects. The Secretary added that if Portuguese want to nail down this figure they should apply for preliminary commitments from ExImBank on those individual projects they plan to put into effect in near future. Patricio appeared pleased with this proposal and said it would be useful. He said however the US proposal was still very meager and that he would be criticized for not having done as well as Spain. The Secretary assured him that he had done as well and suggested that he include in any announcement the proposed ExImBank credits in any public statement if and when agreement had been concluded in the same way the Spanish used the 120 million dollar loan from the ExImBank.

3. At the conclusion of the meeting Patricio reiterated it would be important to send a Portuguese technician to United States quickly to decide on the matter of oceanographic vessels.

Rogers

269. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

The Azores Base Negotiations and Soybeans

During his stay in Lisbon for the NATO meeting at the beginning of the month, Secretary Rogers held talks with the Portuguese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on the status of our Azores base negotiations.² The Secretary reported to you that he considered the talks satisfactory, and that he was reasonably confident that we will achieve an agreement—though some adjustments might have to be made in our offer to them.³

Our latest quid pro quo offer included a \$30 million PL-480 program through FY 1973. This offer, however, was conditioned on Portu-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. The tabs are not printed. The memorandum bears the stamped notation: "The President has seen."

² See Document 268.

³ A copy of Rogers's undated report is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I.

guese agreement to recognize imported soybean oil as an edible oil by the end of the year. The Foreign Minister appeared particularly displeased by this condition—which he argued was extraneous and would transfer negotiations for military cooperation into a commercial transaction—and urged that it be removed.

This condition was included in our offer at the insistence of Agriculture in exchange for Agriculture's willingness to increase the PL-480 program from \$10 to \$30 million. On his departure for Lisbon, Secretary Rogers sent you a memorandum (Tab A) requesting authority to waive this condition if, in his judgment, it becomes clear that it will be a stumbling block to a successful conclusion of the Azores negotiations. Secretary Laird concurs in Secretary Rogers' recommendation.⁴

Secretary Hardin does not agree with Secretary Rogers' recommendation. He feels strongly (Tab B) that in the negotiations we should continue to press Portugal on the soybean issue as a condition to a \$30 million PL-480 program. He is particularly concerned about Congressional reactions, and feels that to waive this condition runs the risk of jeopardizing the future of the PL-480 program as well as stimulating protectionist sentiment.

Pete Peterson feels that he can go along with Secretary Rogers' recommendation, provided that a written communication of some kind (a letter from the Secretary or the Ambassador) is sent to the Portuguese which stresses the great importance we attach to the soybean issue and expresses our hope and confidence that the Portuguese authorities will soon be in a position to accept soybean oil as edible.

A successful and swift completion of the Azores negotiations is highly desirable since protracted haggling will increase pressures on Caetano to increase the price. While recognizing the difficulties which Agriculture may face, it seems more important for Secretary Rogers to have the authority he seeks. He has made it clear that he will work diligently toward a solution of the soybean issue even though disassociated from the base negotiations. In my judgment, Pete Peterson's condition of a written communication would be an unnecessary restriction on the Secretary's negotiating authority.

Recommendation

That you agree to authorize Secretary Rogers to waive the soybean condition if that condition becomes a stumbling block to the Azores

⁴ Sonnenfeldt reported in a June 3 memorandum to Kissinger that Laird agreed with the State Department position. (*Ibid.*)

base negotiations, on the understanding that State will exert every effort to get the soybean problem resolved subsequently.⁵

⁵ The President initialed the Approve option. In an attached July 1 memorandum to Rogers, Kissinger wrote: "The President has approved the recommendation contained in your memorandum of May 31, on the understanding that every effort will continue to be made to secure the reclassification of soybean oil even though disassociated from the base negotiations." Rogers's May 31 memorandum to Kissinger is *ibid*.

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Lajes, Azores, December 12, 1971, 10:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Prime Minister Caetano
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Coelho
General Vernon Walters

The President opened the conversation by expressing his thanks to the Prime Minister for all he had done to facilitate the meetings on Portuguese soil; it was very important that we solve the thorny monetary problem and if we could make progress on Portuguese soil so much the better. The President recalled that this was his first visit to Portuguese soil as President. He had been to Lisbon in 1963 and he believed that General Eisenhower had been the last U.S. President to visit Portugal.²

Dr. Caetano said he had been happy to do what he could to facilitate the meeting and if progress could be made in this delicate field on Portuguese soil this would be a source of pride and satisfaction to the whole Portuguese people.

The President said that prior to his visits to Peking and Moscow³ he had wanted to talk to all of our NATO allies but that time had not made this possible and he was therefore particularly pleased to have

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the quarters of the U.S. Commanding General, Lajes Field. Nixon was in the Azores for meetings with French President Georges Pompidou.

² Eisenhower visited Portugal May 19–20, 1960.

³ Nixon visited the People's Republic of China February 21–28, 1972, and the Soviet Union May 22–30, 1972.

this occasion to talk to the Prime Minister and exchange views with him. The President said that he was also happy that the Agreement on the Azores had been successfully concluded.⁴ The Prime Minister said that he too was happy at this but that looking at it realistically, Portugal had received little and given little, yet both he and the President would be criticized for it at home.⁵

The President then recalled that he had told the Prime Minister when the latter had been to Washington for General Eisenhower's funeral⁶ that the new administration would seek ways not to make things more difficult for our friends and allies and Dr. Kissinger could bear witness to the fact that he had himself intervened personally to ensure that our position on various matters in the United Nations was not unfavorable to Portugal. The Prime Minister replied that he was well aware of this and wished to thank the President for this as he knew how much criticism he received at home for it.

The President then said that he would take a few minutes to discuss his forthcoming trips to China and the Soviet Union with the Prime Minister.⁷ He was going to Peking without illusions. He knew that they were tough Communists and did not believe that his trip would dissipate the profound differences between China (Mainland) and the United States. We had gone about this pragmatically. He wished to thank the Prime Minister for the way Portugal had voted in the United Nations on the matter of Chinese representation when we had been abandoned by many of our NATO Allies.⁸ He knew it had been difficult for Portugal and therefore appreciated it particularly. He felt it would be useful if Dr. Kissinger spoke for a few minutes about his trip to China as he had been there and the President had not yet.

⁴ The Azores agreement was extended with amendments on December 9. For text of the agreement, see 22 UST 2106.

⁵ During a December 12 discussion with Rogers, Foreign Minister Patricio made the same point, adding: "He hoped the United States Government would show understanding and good will and noted that, during his last visit to Lisbon, the Secretary had agreed that the five million [dollar] figure on surplus military equipment was not a ceiling. The Secretary commented that he thought things would work out satisfactorily. We would have some difficulties in the Congress, but the agreement was good to have behind us." (Memorandum of conversation, December 12; National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 532)

⁶ See Document 253.

⁷ Caetano had expressed his concern over the upcoming meetings during a July 26 meeting with Vice President Agnew, reported in telegram Vipto 118 from Lisbon, July 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. I)

⁸ On October 24, the United States had sought Portuguese support in its efforts to block the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and the expulsion of Taiwan. The text of the U.S. note, contained in telegram 195062 to Lisbon, October 23, and a report on Knight's discussion with Caetano, in telegram 3611 from Lisbon, October 24, are *ibid.*

Dr. Kissinger then said that preliminary contacts with the Chinese had revealed their concern at being surrounded by nations which they believed for one reason or the other were hostile to them, USSR, Japan and India. They wished to have relations with at least one of the great powers. They were perhaps the most ideological of all the Communist countries but they were also pragmatic and knew that we did not threaten them.

The Prime Minister asked whether the Chinese entry into the UN would not make things more difficult for the U.S. particularly in our relations with the USSR. The President said that the Chinese would undoubtedly oppose us on many issues, but he felt that they would find themselves more often in opposition to the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger commented that they had already had a go at one another over the Indian-Pakistani War.

The President then said that we would not talk with them at the expense of our old friends and allies. We would discuss strictly bilateral matters and all of the problems around the periphery of Asia which were of interest to us as a Pacific power so that these could become matters to be discussed rather than a source of clash or conflict.

Prime Minister Caetano said that his concern was not so much what was done as the way it was interpreted. Many felt that the President's going to Peking would be presented as a loss of face for the West. The President said that he did not believe that this would be the case. The Chinese were not so much interested in making the U.S. lose face as they were in balancing their relations with the Soviets. The Prime Minister then said that he wished to make clear he was not expressing opposition to our policy but merely to express some of his concerns as to how these moves would be interpreted. In Europe today—he did not know what the situation was in the U.S.—there was a tremendous offensive of socialist ideas in the media among the intellectuals and among the professors and the youth. The President said that we faced the same problem in the U.S. The Prime Minister went on to say that he did not find a real conviction in the European bourgeoisie regarding their ideals and having something worth defending. The President said that we faced similar problems at home but one had to consider the alternative of doing nothing at all. He felt that the world would be a safer place.

The Prime Minister expressed some concern that the President's trips to Peking and Moscow would be used to show that the Communists had changed and that the West had been forced to recognize not only that they controlled their countries but that they had now become respectable. The President said that we had weighed this concern and these possibilities against the alternative of doing nothing.

With regard to his trip to Peking, Dr. Kissinger said that indications were that the Communists were tough but pragmatic and there were indications that they might want to talk realistically and establish a relationship with at least one of the superpowers.

The President said that for various reasons they suspected their neighbors who were superpowers or had the potential of becoming powerful like Japan and India. All of them could derive far less advantage from an even-handed U.S. policy toward both China and the USSR than from a policy which favored one to the detriment of the other. If the Chinese talked to the U.S. they would lose some of their aura as apostles of world revolution and become just another Communist country that was talking to the U.S. This too should be considered.

With regard to his trip to the USSR, the President said that he was going to discuss strictly bilateral matters between the U.S. and the USSR. There would be no U.S.-Soviet Condominium over Europe any more than there would be one against China. We would talk about Arms Control, trade and other matters which might be ripe at that time for discussion at the highest level between the two countries. We would not discuss the future of Europe unless that had been agreed with our allies in exhaustive consultation. We did not intend to establish our relationships with the Soviet Union and China at the expense of our allies.

The President said that on the occasion of his 1963 visit to Europe he had talked to both General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer about their views as to what U.S. policy towards Communist China should be. Both had stated emphatically that the U.S. would be better off if it played one off against the other rather than having relations with only one of them.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that it was understood that he was in no way trying to be critical but really just trying to clarify his own thinking. The President said that he fully understood this. He emphasized the importance of the need for real leadership and cited the case of President Medici in Brazil.

The President said that at the present time the USSR was supporting India in a policy that might result in the destruction of Pakistan. Without regard to the fact that one of these countries had 600 million people and the other 120 or 60 depending on how you looked at it, if one country could cross the borders of another country and wage war with the support of the Soviet Union, this would create a very dangerous situation. The Prime Minister fully agreed. The President said that he was under no illusions. He had fought the Communists all over the world for 25 years. But to be absolutely frank, if his initiatives towards Peking and Moscow had been taken by a liberal President he would have been scared to death, but as a conservative whose views

toward Communism were quite clear he felt sure that this would ensure that we would not be deceived by them.

The President then said that his meetings with President Pompidou were very important and that we must try and find a solution to the difficult monetary situation and the problems of the U.S. surcharge. He knew that this had affected a large part of Portugal's exports to the United States but that Portugal had shown great understanding for our position and he wished to thank the Prime Minister for this. We would talk with the French who were very tough and the real stumbling block. If something could be worked out in the way of a general solution we would be quite disposed to review the question of surcharges and remove them. The Prime Minister expressed his pleasure at hearing this piece of good news.

The President once again thanked the Prime Minister for facilitating the meeting and for everything he had done. The Prime Minister said that if a solution was found the Portuguese government and people would be pleased and proud to have made some contribution.

The Prime Minister then said in a jocular vein that he knew that the President would want to get some rest as he had to face President Pompidou the next morning and the French President had arrived much earlier in a downpour of rain and had several hours rest. The President in a similar vein replied that he would then have to sleep faster to equalize things. He noted that President Pompidou had come in a supersonic transport. The Prime Minister said that he had arrived with a French fighter escort and given a little airshow as he arrived in a tremendous downpour of rain.

The Prime Minister said that he was particularly pleased to have this occasion to meet Dr. Kissinger who was one of the most talked about men in the world, especially by women. "Not as much as I talk about them," replied Dr. Kissinger who said that the President would note that there were some conservative professors in the U.S. after the Prime Minister noted that they had this in common.

The President and Prime Minister expressed their satisfaction at this exchange of views where they had found so much in common, and the Prime Minister left.

271. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

Caetano on: US Azores Base; Portugal in Africa; Domestic Politics

Our Ambassador in Lisbon, Ridgway Knight, had a long discussion with Prime Minister Caetano June 29 (Tab B). You should read the "Highlights" at least.

Azores and Case Amendment

Caetano said he wanted us to know that if the Case Amendment² becomes law our forces will have to leave. (The amendment to the military assistance bill would require the Executive to submit the base agreement in treaty form.)

To Knight's observation that this would jeopardize common NATO security, Caetano replied gloomily that Soviet mastery of the Atlantic was in any case resulting slowly because Portugal's allies fail to support her. Without an Azores agreement, Portugal would face the first step into the unknown in its military security relationship with us.

Ambassador Knight, while noting that Caetano is a powerful bargainer, believes that the Portuguese government's reaction if the Case amendment finally goes through will be strong. We should not think he is bluffing.

(Incidentally, Caetano seems to have misread the tactical situation in the Senate. Removing Bahrain from the amendment, which as you know has been done, sharpens the constitutional issue by focussing it solely on the more important Azores agreement rather than shifting away from that issue to a specifically Portuguese one, as Caetano apparently thinks. It sharpens it because, unlike the Bahrainis, the Portu-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 701, Country Files—Europe, Portugal, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. Initialed by Haig, who drew an arrow to Sonnenfeldt's typed name and wrote: "See Haig." The tabs are not printed.

² On March 3, the Senate approved a resolution (S. Res. 214) introduced by Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) requesting the President to submit agreements with Portugal and Bahrain to the Senate for advice and consent. The action followed February hearings on the two agreements. See United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain*. Subsequently, during July and August, S. 596, a bill sponsored by Case requiring the Executive Branch to submit all executive agreements to Congress, passed both Houses with wide majorities.

gueses don't care whether the base is covered by an executive agreement or a treaty. The Executive will thus be unable to point to foreign issues in defending its preference for an agreement rather than a treaty.)

Africa

Caetano remarked that the US seemed blind to the expanding Chinese sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean and on the Eastern coast of Africa, and the expanding Soviet sphere in the Near East and the African West coast. He outlined Portugal's own policy problems in Africa, saying that:

—Portugal's people would not permit him to give up the African territories.

—An attempt at "decolonization" in these territories would likely induce the whites there to act as Rhodesia's whites had—to declare their independence unilaterally.

—When Ambassador Knight reminded Caetano that we hoped to see more evidence of movement toward an integration of society in the African territories, the Prime Minister replied that he had to move carefully and not abruptly, lest passions and sentiment endanger the present structure without compensating advantages. Ambassador Knight believes that Caetano sincerely wants to expedite evolution in the overseas territories but is leery of moving too fast.

Domestic Affairs

Caetano complained bitterly about his country's weak and self-centered upper class. When early in his administration he had experimented with liberalism and "Marxist elements had mushroomed," all the conservatives had done was to run for cover behind him rather than forming a "loyal opposition" against the left wing. Ambassador Knight was surprised at the contempt shown by Caetano for the Portuguese upper classes. The Prime Minister seems to feel that his hopes for a domestic evolution at home have been disappointed. Seeing the left-wing as the only new political force in the post-Salazar period, Caetano has decided to stand firm.

In case you feel that the President should be made aware of Caetano's views on the Case amendment, there is a memo for your approval and signature at Tab A. The President of course has met the Prime Minister twice,³ once in the Azores, and thus has some personal acquaintance both with the man and the base problem. He should also be prepared for the possibility that it could come to a show-down on the Case amendment, with the President being faced with the choice,

³ See Documents 253 and 270.

perhaps, of either vetoing the military assistance bill or resubmitting the base agreement as a treaty.

Ambassador Knight's report is a very competent summarization of the three most important issues in US-Portuguese relations and commentary on Caetano's attitude toward them. I recommend that you let the Acting Secretary of State know by memorandum that you think highly of the report and have drawn it to the President's attention.⁴

Recommendation

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.⁵

⁴ No memorandum was found.

⁵ A note by Kissinger on the first page of the memorandum reads: "Don't bother to send."

Spain

272. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations

You should be aware of the possibility that the current negotiations on Spanish bases may not be completed by the last part of March when the time runs out.²

At the present time a joint military estimate of the threat has been completed. The last week of January joint talks will proceed on tasks and missions.

The following phase will involve the drawing up of equipment lists. This is likely to involve difficult problems, since the Spanish (1) appear to want more than we are prepared to give and (2) appear to feel that the new Administration would view their requests more generously than the previous one.

The final phase of bargaining at the political level ought to be the most difficult one. In the process, it may be desirable to:

—reconfirm just how much we are willing to pay; and

—consider requesting an extension in time period for negotiations. (It might be desirable to make such a request earlier than later. If made by the President, himself, it would probably be honored.)

You will also wish to consider the impact that these negotiations will have not only on U.S.-Spanish relations, but on NATO, a desire by the Portuguese to resume negotiations on the Azores,³ as well as base negotiations in the Philippines, Pacific, etc.

Robert N. Ginsburgh⁴

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret.

²For documentation on the previous base negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XII, Western Europe. The bases agreement expired on September 26, 1968; however, a provision of the agreement allowed the renewal negotiations to continue for six months after the agreement's expiration, until March 26.

³Caetano informed Secretary of State Rusk in November 1968 of Portuguese interest in discussing the Azores base; see *ibid.*, Document 175.

⁴Ginsburgh initialed "G" above his typed signature.

273. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)¹

NSC-U/DM-2

Washington, February 20, 1969.

TO

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiation Actions

As a result of our discussion of the Spanish base question, with General Burchinal present,² a series of actions and requests for further studies were agreed. For the requests made of DOD, it was decided that a working group chaired by Mr. Packard would be established to pursue these matters and report back to the Under Secretaries Committee. Depending on the specific subject, I would like representatives from EUR, J/PM and other elements of State, as required, to participate in the work of the group.

The following are the decisions taken:

1. A report should be prepared on the consequences of our having to withdraw from the Spanish bases in terms of possible cost, changes in strategy, etc. One alternative must be a return to CONUS.—DOD

2. A report should be prepared analyzing the present and immediately foreseeable limitations on our use of the bases—for example, our use in a possible Middle East crisis.—State (EUR and J/PM) with assistance from DOD

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret. The following attended the Under Secretaries Committee meeting on February 20: Packard and Earle (Defense), Wheeler and Orwat (JCS), Helms and Jessup (CIA), Haig and Allen (NSC), and Richardson, Johnson, Leddy, Landau, and Hartman (State).

² General David A. Burchinal, Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Europe, was special negotiator on Spanish bases issues. According to a February 19 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger: "For your lunch with Elliot Richardson you should know the following: Secretary Laird called State today to say that he had asked Packard to set up a group to monitor the Spanish base question and invited State to send John Leddy to a meeting. State got worried and pointed out that the responsibility was with the Under-secretaries group, that if Defense wanted to set up an internal group on this question this was all right. A meeting was then held at Defense with a State officer attending. It turned out that Laird's main concern was to reign in General Burchinal who has gone further in holding out hopes of a security guarantee to the Spaniards than US policy provides for." (Ibid.) Documentation on Laird's approach to the Department of State is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 SP-US.

3. A report should be prepared on possible future political constraints—changing complexion of Spanish Government—on use of the bases over the next five years. This report should include an indication of the Spanish desire for our continued presence.—State (EUR) with assistance from CIA

4. The Committee agreed that in their opinion it was not conceivable that the Administration would be willing to propose a security treaty, requiring Senate approval, as part of a base package. This conclusion will be incorporated in the final recommendation to the President.—State (EUR & L)

5. Although the question of a possible link with NATO has been discussed with the British, I agreed to raise this question once again with the British Ambassador. To prepare for such a talk, I will need proposals for the least visible kind of connection with NATO and arguments relating to the contribution that these bases make to NATO security as a whole.—State with assistance from DOD

6. It was agreed that a contingency plan should be prepared for the relocation of Torrejon activities to another Spanish base. This plan should include costs and a discussion of the pros and cons from both our point of view and the Spanish point of view. This trade-off possibility would be reserved for use in the political negotiations.—DOD

7. General Burchinal is to continue his discussions with the Spanish and to try and get as much information on Spanish desires as possible. He should make it clear that he is not negotiating these lists. He is then to submit his best estimate of Spanish military desires and also his own recommended list. General Burchinal was also cautioned not to discuss money values of equipment, but rather attempt to determine priorities for end-items.—Packard Working Group to backstop these talks.

8. There then should be a Washington review of the lists submitted by General Burchinal, the result of which will be a recommendation to the Under Secretaries Committee.—DOD with assistance from State, BOB, EX-IM and Treasury as appropriate.

9. In connection with the list review, consideration should be given to the implications of the Spanish hardware package for other base negotiations world-wide. If the recommendation is for an increased payment over the 1963 level, we will have to consider the effect of such an increase on countries such as the Philippines and Turkey. Also, consideration should be given to the feasibility of attempting to limit the use of hardware we make available to the Spanish, although most Committee members felt that any such limitation would be difficult, if not impossible, to introduce into the negotiations.

10. Consideration should be given in recommendations regarding military assistance to the funding arrangements for this base rental, i.e., MAP vs. Service funding.

—Both 9. and 10. for action by DOD with assistance from State (J/PM, EUR) and BOB.

11. Wording should be developed for possible incorporation in the agreement which might indicate that if surpluses develop (understood to be post-Viet-Nam), increases could be considered in military assistance to Spain.—DOD and State (J/PM, EUR, and L)

12. We should develop terms of reference for a possible military consultative committee. General Burchinal is not to discuss this with the Spanish military but instead the matter is to be left for later political negotiations.—DOD with State (J/PM and EUR)

13. Contingency plans for withdrawal from the bases should be developed and include an accurate estimate of how quickly we could get out without unnecessary waste.—DOD

14. It was left open for later decision whether General Burchinal would have further talks with the Spanish military after Presidential approval of our negotiating position but prior to political negotiations.

15. It was agreed that General Burchinal would not raise the question of a possible extension of the agreement beyond March 26. If he is asked by the Spanish military, however, he should reply by explaining the factual problem—a new Administration, jointly agreed military talks still underway and therefore difficulty of meeting the March 26 deadline—but he should not in any way indicate a request on our part for an extension.

16. It was agreed that with all of these elements in hand, our next meeting on this subject would take place in early March to reach agreement on a recommendation to the President, including a recommendation on the composition of a negotiating team for the political talks.

I have asked Mr. Hartman to work out appropriate deadlines for these actions.

Elliot L. Richardson

274. **Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Mayo) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, March 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

Quid pro quo for Spanish Bases

In the attached memorandum,² the State and Defense Departments conclude that it is necessary to offer up to \$175 million in military grants—plus post-Vietnam surplus equipment, plus \$100 million in credit to retain our Spanish base rights for the fourth five-year period. Your approval will constitute an Executive Determination to seek future year funds to fulfill the proposed commitment.

In your consideration of the proposal, several points deserve your careful attention:

1. *This is the first base negotiation by this Administration.* It will be taken as an indication of our willingness to pay countries like the Philippines, Turkey, Greece, Ethiopia, Portugal and Iran which also provide base, overflight, and intelligence rights. The proposed 75 percent increase over the 1963–69 grants for Spain could increase the quid pro quo for other countries by \$200 million or more over current planning levels over the next five years.

2. *These bases are very valuable to Spain.* Their existence is integral to Spain's political relationship with the United States. Spain could not refuse to extend our base rights without effectively destroying the basis of our involvement in her security and detracting from the political respectability she derives from the defense relationship with the United States. Spain also derives \$50 million annually in foreign exchange from the bases.

3. *This proposal requires careful Congressional checks.* Spain is a sensitive country on the Hill, especially in light of the current "state of exceptions" restricting civil liberties.³ The 75 percent increase in cost for no apparent increase in military capability will probably raise questions. The proposal to shift funding for the quid pro quo from the Mili-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret.

² Not printed. See Document 275 for a summary.

³ Following the August 3, 1968, assassination by Basque terrorists of a senior police official, the Franco government proclaimed a state of emergency (August 15) and reintroduced laws that effectively placed the Basque provinces under martial law. Large numbers of suspected separatists were arrested under these laws. Trials of those arrested continued after the state of exception was lifted.

tary Assistance Program to the budget of the Department of Defense would require legislation as well as appropriations and would raise old and sensitive jurisdictional issues between the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees and could appear to be an “end run” around the former.

4. Although the State-Defense memorandum requests approval of up to \$175 million, it appears to me that \$175 million will be our initial offering. This increases the possibility that we will end up paying more.

5. We should bear in mind that the Spanish refusal to accept our offer last fall reflected, in part, a desire to see whether they could get more from a new administration.

Recommendation

I believe, therefore, that we should consider a bona fide initial offer of \$125 million or at most \$150 million in grant funds, especially since the fair value of equipment delivered will probably be somewhat higher and augmented by Vietnam surplus. I also believe that we should continue to fund the Spanish base quid pro quo in the Military Assistance Program to avoid congressional problems and a precedent for shift of other country base costs into the larger Defense budget.

Robert S Mayo

275. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

United States Position on Spanish Base Negotiations

Over last weekend we received the final recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee for conclusion of the base negotiations with the Spanish (Tab A).² The State memorandum is long and complex, as is the history of the problem. Here are what I regard as the key issues.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not printed.

1. *Value of the Spanish Bases to US*

Our facilities in Spain—comprising a naval base [*less than 1 line not declassified*] two active and one inactive air bases, and a number of miscellaneous communications, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and logistics facilities—have a complement of roughly 10,000 men and cost about \$400 million to create. The Under Secretaries Committee has concluded that, for the foreseeable future, the bases in Spain will remain “militarily of great importance” to our national security. If we chose to, or were required to, leave Spain, we would no doubt be able to develop military alternatives. But relocation would be a costly process (best estimates run about \$300–350 million), and inevitably would involve at least a temporary loss [*2 lines not declassified*] to operate from the American mainland. However, the best judgment of all concerned is that it will be to our advantage to keep the Spanish bases at least through the end of the current base agreement in 1973.

2. *Value of the Bases to the Spanish*

The presence of our bases and military personnel in Spain is of great value to Spain, both financial and intangible. The Spanish derive some \$50 million annually in foreign exchange from US base-linked expenditures there. In addition, the Spanish have received sizable grants of military assistance and training over the life of the agreement. From 1953–63 we provided Spain with \$500 million in grant military assistance under MAP, in addition to roughly \$500 million in economic assistance not directly related to the Defense Agreement.³ For the first five-year renewal from 1963–68, we supplied grant military assistance of roughly \$100 million. Beyond these very considerable rewards, however, the Spanish gain international respectability through their participation in Western defense with the United States, a factor of great importance since Spain under Franco still has no chance for membership in NATO. Finally, while Spain assumes some risk in providing real estate for US bases, Spanish national security is thereby enhanced. The best judgment, therefore, is that the Spanish also have a strong interest in preserving the existing US base structure in Spain.

3. *What Have We Been Arguing About?*

Since both we and the Spanish agree that our relationship is beneficial and the bases should be preserved, it is not illogical to wonder why the agreement has not already been renewed. The answer is that we

³ For text of this agreement, signed in Madrid September 26, 1953, see 14 UST 1876.

have been far apart on terms. The original Spanish proposal for renewal in June 1968 would have cost us about \$1.2 billion, according to best US estimates. Our initial counter-offer in the September 1968 talks was \$100 million in grant military assistance. By the end of last September the Spanish had lowered their position to roughly \$700 million, and we had raised ours to about \$140 million. It was at that point that the Spanish invoked the six-month limit on further negotiations to expire on March 26, 1969. As a result of the most recent military talks in Madrid, the Spanish shopping list has been reduced to approximately \$568 million. The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that we go into the final negotiations with the Spanish—which can start as soon as we have established our position—with a ceiling of \$175 million in grant military aid, plus up to \$100 million in Ex-Im Bank credit or guarantees for Spanish military purchases from the US, plus an offer of possible Spanish purchase of post-Vietnam excess war matériel from us at no cost to the US.

4. Why We Think the Spanish Will Buy This Package

There have been definite indications that the Spanish have grown progressively nervous since the first of this year that the US might decide to reduce its presence drastically in Spain, or even pack up and go home. The original hard Spanish negotiating posture was basically associated with Foreign Minister Castiella; the progressive softening reflects the apprehension of the conservative and powerful Spanish military, who do not want to risk losing their link to the United States. Reading these signs, Ambassador Wagner has concluded that we now can negotiate a renewal with the Spanish on virtually our original terms. General Burchinal, who has been conducting the military talks in Madrid, feels on the other hand that we may have to pay something in the realm of \$200–275 million in grant assistance. The Under Secretaries Committee in effect has taken the middle ground in its recommendation by raising the ceiling on grant aid to \$175 million, and sweetening the package with an offer of credit assistance for an additional \$100 million, and a promise of an option on post-Vietnam matériel. All things considered, I agree that this should be a saleable package.

5. Ancillary Issues

A. Security Guarantee

Negotiations with the Spanish have been complicated by a variety of ancillary issues, foremost among them the Spanish hint that costs of renewal could be materially reduced if the US were to offer Spain a mutual security treaty, or promote some form of Spanish membership or

partial association with NATO. You made clear in your March 4 press conference that a new security guarantee to the Spanish was simply not in the cards.⁴ Explorations with our NATO allies have left no doubt that there is still widespread opposition to any form of Spanish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, these elements do not form part of the final package.

B. US-Spanish Military Consultative Committee

In addition, the Spanish have asked for creation of a US-Spanish military consultative body, which would lend added legitimacy to their participation in Western defense. While such a body is not high on our desired list, the Under Secretaries Committee feels that we should include agreement to such a committee as an optional part of our negotiating position with the Spanish.

C. Closing of Torrejon

The Spanish have made noises periodically about the need to close the air base at Torrejon, near Madrid, ostensibly to reduce the danger to the inhabitants of the Spanish capital. This has never become a firm demand, however, and we have concluded that the Spanish military—who in the long run will probably have the final say on such matters—would be happy to have us stay in Torrejon.

D. Impact on Other Foreign Base Costs

The Bureau of the Budget is particularly worried lest the terms for renewal of the Spanish base agreement encourage other countries—especially the Philippines, Turkey, Greece, Ethiopia, Portugal, and Iran—to raise new demands for compensation for permitting US base rights. BoB has estimated that agreement on the upper limit of the final package recommended by the Under Secretaries Committee might increase demands from other host countries by \$200 million or more over current planning levels in the next five years.⁵

E. Funding

Since the MAP budget has been declining steadily towards zero in past years, the addition of a substantially increased Spanish package might cause great problems in Congress, and possibly might make it impossible for us to follow through on the terms of our agreement with the Spanish. Hence the Under Secretaries Committee has recommended that cost of the Spanish program be shifted from MAP to the DOD budget.

⁴ For text of the President's statement, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, p. 193.

⁵ See Document 274.

*Recommendation*⁶

I concur in the following recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee:

1. That you authorize the offer to Spain, subject to the availability of funds, of grant military matériel and services at a cost not to exceed \$175 million over the remaining five-year period of the Spanish Defense Agreement, with the understanding that if we fail to obtain renewal of the agreement for that amount, it may be necessary to request your approval for additional funds.

2. That you approve the shifting of the Spanish program from the MAP budget to the DOD budget, with the understanding that we will seek Congressional approval and MAP funding for this purpose if Congress fails to agree to the proposed method.

3. That you approve the offer of military sales credits over the five-year period of up to \$100 million in Ex-Im credit or guarantees, at normal Ex-Im bank rates and terms, should the Spanish so desire.

4. That you authorize an undertaking to Spain that we will review our military matériel resources by September 26, 1971, or following cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, whichever comes earlier, to determine whether and to what extent additional material could be provided to Spain over and above the amounts provided for in the renewed Defense Agreement. Any such equipment would be provided the Spanish on an "as is, where is" basis, at no budgetary cost to the US.

5. That you authorize, as a part of successful negotiations on renewal of the Defense Agreement, the establishment of a US-Spanish Military Consultative Committee, with the terms of reference and inter-agency control mechanism to be agreed by State and Defense.

6. That you decide against including a proposal to conclude a bilateral security treaty with Spain, requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, as a part of these negotiations.

7. That you decide against further efforts to solicit other NATO members to accept Spanish membership in, or association with, NATO institutions, as a part of these negotiations.

8. That you authorize a short extension, by Executive action, of the termination clauses of the present Defense Agreement by one or two months beyond March 26, 1969, if the Secretaries of State and Defense consider that this action would be useful in furthering early conclusion of these negotiations.

⁶ The President initialed the Approve option under the first three recommendations. For the subsequent six recommendations (numbers 4–9), he wrote on the memorandum: "OK RN"; a handwritten note beside the President's note reads: "3/19/69 HAK told U/Secy Richardson. C[op]y sent Donald Lesh."

9. That you authorize the Departments of State and Defense to conduct appropriate consultations with the Congress on those parts of the foregoing recommendations which you approve.

276. Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 22, 1969.

Henry:

I thought I would bring you up to date on the Spanish bases problem. Everything here is based on several telephone conversations I had yesterday.

At 3:30 Friday afternoon Alex Johnson called in Ambassador Merry de Val and read to him an oral statement on which Johnson, Elliot Richardson, and Defense had agreed. Johnson told the Ambassador that we had considered all aspects of the problem, had reviewed the lists of equipment developed in the bilateral military talks in Madrid, and were prepared on that basis to provide the Spanish \$175 million in grant military aid over the remaining five years of the potential life of the Defense Agreement. This, he underlined, was *not* a negotiating figure; it was a final US position.²

Johnson also gave the Spanish the post-Vietnam option of purchasing surplus matériel at no cost to the US Government. He made no mention of credits for military sales; however, the Ambassador raised the question afterwards, and Johnson responded that if the Spanish wished to pursue the matter in the forthcoming political talks, we would be prepared to hear their arguments. All other elements in the package—such as the US-Spanish military consultative body—were left unmentioned. Nothing was given to the Spanish on paper.

Merry de Val agreed to report the offer to Madrid and await instructions. I am informed that he and his Minister-Counselor left the State Department looking crestfallen, but appearances may be deceiving.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret; Nodis.

² A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 SP–US.

Johnson's statement was designed to meet the Spanish request for formal notification of the end of the military talks, with some firm benchmark that could be considered by the Spanish Council of State. Johnson also told the Spanish that Secretary Rogers' schedule would be fully taken up by the Trudeau visit on Monday and Tuesday,³ and by other matters through Wednesday evening. It would appear appropriate therefore for the Spanish to send someone at a lower level than Foreign Minister Castiella to Washington early next week to discuss the terms of the final agreement. If accord was reached, the Spanish Foreign Minister could come to Washington somewhat later when Secretary Rogers would be free for the amenities usually associated with the renewal of the Defense Agreement.

There were several reasons why it was decided to present the Spanish our maximum \$175 million grant figure at the outset as a non-negotiable US position. First and most important, everyone at State got the distinct impression that General Burchinal—who is back in Washington after a flying trip to Madrid, of which more below—already had leaked the information to the Spanish anyway, so that it would be pointless and rather embarrassing to start with a lower negotiating figure. Burchinal merely said that the Spanish almost certainly would have derived something very close to the \$175 million level from the agreed lists of military equipment, and that therefore we ought to play straight with them. Second, since the talks last September ended with our proposal around \$140 million in grant aid, we could scarcely have offered the Spanish less now. If we were to open at the \$150–160 million level, within a short time we would have reached \$175 million anyway. Therefore, it was decided to give the Spanish a firm grant figure, and do our negotiating on the credit sales and peripheral issues.

Choice of this tactic obviously was affected by the latest escapade of Generalissimo Burchinal. I understand, that, when he left the US last weekend for Germany, he was instructed by Packard *not* to go back to Madrid. On Monday, March 17, the Spanish Desk at State got an urgent telephone call from the American Embassy in Madrid, reporting Spanish inquiries why General Burchinal was coming back to Madrid, since the military talks were considered over. State immediately checked with Ralph Earle at Defense, and he flatly denied that Burchinal was returning to Spain. In fact, Defense reported that they had telephoned Burchinal in Germany to verify his travel plans, interrupting the good General at dinner, and he had been highly indignant at being bothered about such nonsensical rumors.

That was Monday evening. On Tuesday morning, March 18, Burchinal arrived in Madrid and met with his Spanish military counter-

³ March 24–25. See Documents 90–92.

parts. He telephoned Earle on Tuesday to request permission to give the Spanish the \$175 million grant figure in writing (it had just been approved by the President that day). Earle told him absolutely not, that the figure would be handled in the political talks; allegedly, Burchinal did not tell Earle that he was calling at the time from Madrid. Earle reported this to Buzz Wheeler, who also called Burchinal to reiterate that no figures were to be given to the Spanish. Burchinal replied that Earle must have misunderstood his earlier request, and that of course he (Burchinal) would do no such thing. The consensus is that he proceeded to do, or already had done, just that.

Meanwhile, George Landau and Richardson have been busy on the Hill working on the Congressional consultations. They report that the big problem is still funding. The dimensions of the probable quid pro quo are less disturbing than the proposed transfer of the Spanish payments from the MAP budget to the Defense budget, with the consequent switch in Congressional committee jurisdiction.

The best guess at this point is that the Spanish will accept the \$175 million grant figures; agree to send someone to Washington early next week; bargain hard to get the full \$100 million extra in military sales credits, about which they almost certainly are fully informed; and finally agree to a package in approximately the form approved by the President. This may be accomplished by the deadline of March 26, or very soon thereafter.

Meanwhile, I wonder whether some means ever will be found to harness the great untamed natural resource that is General Burchinal for the benefit of the US Government.

Don Lesh⁴

P.S. You probably also have noted the news reports today that the Spanish have decided to lift the "state of exceptions" as of next Tuesday, March 25. I am just guessing, but in making that decision they may have been influenced by the fact that some people had been advising us not to conclude any base renewal agreement with the Spanish while the special restrictions remained in effect.

⁴ Lesh signed for Sonnenfeldt above Sonnenfeldt's typed signature.

277. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 26, 1969, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Spain

His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain

His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain

The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry

United States

The President

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Staff

Mr. Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal

Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, Interpreter

The President welcomed the Foreign Minister and said that both he and his family had fond memories of their visit to Spain. He asked the Foreign Minister to convey his best personal wishes to General Franco whom he had called on in Barcelona, during his visit to Spain.²

The Foreign Minister thanked the President and expressed the hope that he would have an occasion to come to Spain as President Eisenhower had done while he was President.³

The President said that President Eisenhower had often talked to him about his memorable trip to Spain and that he had been most impressed with the beautiful dining room where General Franco had hosted a state dinner for him.

The Foreign Minister stated that he had stayed at Blair House as President Eisenhower's guest and that he had also met with President Eisenhower in London at the American Embassy.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 SP–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Landau and approved in the White House on April 4. The meeting took place at the White House. A separate memorandum of the meeting, apparently prepared in the White House, is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President.

² During a June–July 1963 visit to Europe; see Nixon, *RN*, p. 248, for a brief summary of Nixon's impressions of Franco.

³ Documentation on President Eisenhower's December 21–22, 1959, visit to Spain is in *Foreign Relations*, 1958–1960, volume VII, part 2, Western Europe, Document 318.

The President said that he had not had the opportunity to follow the very intricate U.S.-Spanish negotiations closely but that it was his understanding that an agreement in principle had been reached.

The Foreign Minister said that Spain was very friendly to the U.S. and had been so for 15 years. Spain was the best example of a country loyal to the U.S. and therefore it was now very embarrassing to have encountered some small difficulties.

The President stated that true friends can have difficulties but that should not change the nature of their friendship. He knew full well that Spain was a good friend of the U.S. and he stressed that the U.S. was also very friendly towards Spain.

The Foreign Minister congratulated the President on the success of his recent trip to Europe⁴ and the President replied that he had been sorry not to have been able to go to Spain, but that he would visit Spain some time during his term in office.

The President continued that Mrs. Nixon and their two daughters have also insisted that they wanted to visit Spain, especially because both daughters spoke Spanish and would very much like to visit Segovia and Toledo.

The Foreign Minister stated that Spain was fortunate to receive frequent visits of Americans who came not only as tourists but who were interested in developing economic and industrial activities in Spain. Spain had received over 18 million tourists last year and its industry and commerce were steadily growing. In the last five years, the U.S. has had a \$2 billion favorable balance of payments with Spain, which shows that Spain was a good client for the U.S. During that same period the U.S. had provided \$100 million worth of military assistance to Spain but Spain had purchased \$187 million worth of military equipment in the U.S. and had continued to do so after September 26, 1968, although there had been no compensation for this from the U.S.

The President asked the Foreign Minister to evaluate the situation in the Mediterranean for him. He said that he had discussed recent developments in the Mediterranean with our friends in Europe, especially in Italy and France,⁵ in view of the importance of increasing movements of Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean.

The Foreign Minister said that there was a definite arms race going on in the Mediterranean. The President must have been aware of the great friendship that exists between Spain and all of the countries around the Mediterranean as reflected in their unanimous support for

⁴ February 23–March 2. The President visited Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, and the Vatican.

⁵ See Documents 179 and 118, respectively.

Spain at the UN and in other international bodies and of the special bond of friendship existing between Spain and the Arab countries, such as Morocco, Algeria (which the Foreign Minister would visit in early April), Tunisia (where President Bourguiba was an old and trusted friend), and, of course, Greece, Turkey, and Italy, with whom Spain had excellent relations.

The Foreign Minister stated that all countries were interested in buying weapons, for example, Yugoslavia and Algeria, and this has led to some very serious imbalances. For instance, Algeria now has a Soviet-equipped force that is considerably better than that of Spain.

The President stated that it was very important for Spain and other countries to have good relations with nations around the Mediterranean for the good of the rest of the world.

The Foreign Minister said that it was a great honor for Spain to represent U.S. interests in Egypt, where Jewish families had been freed as a result of Spain's good offices,⁶ and where Spain had also assisted the U.S. in similar humanitarian efforts in Mauritania and Iraq and this was something which Jews all over the world appreciated.

The President stated that this was extremely important, especially in view of the current Middle East crisis. It was important that the Arabs should not feel that the Russians were their only friends. In view of the very delicate situation it was important for them to feel that Spain was a loyal friend.

The President then asked the Foreign Minister about Spain's relations with Latin America. The Foreign Minister said that Spain's relations there were fantastically good. Secretary Rusk had told the Foreign Minister on five, ten, or maybe twenty different occasions that relations between Spain and Latin America had made incredibly good progress. The Latin American countries support Spain as a block and this support never fails. The Argentine Foreign Minister would soon visit Madrid and all the other Latin American countries constantly want to improve their contacts with Spain. Trade between Colombia and Spain and between Peru and Bolivia and Spain has also improved very much. The Foreign Minister reminded the President that he had once served as Spanish Ambassador to Peru. He added that Spain can count on at least 40 votes on any issue in the UN thanks to the support of the Arab, Latin American, and most African countries. As a result of this support, Spain was recently elected to the Security Council by 110 votes.⁷ Many of these countries constantly ask Spain for guidance and advice and of-

⁶ Egypt broke diplomatic relations with the United States at the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

⁷ Spain won election for a 2-year Security Council seat, to expire December 31, 1970, during the 1968 General Assembly meeting.

ten ask Spain how to vote on certain issues, which is indeed a great honor for Spain.

The Foreign Minister stated that he wanted to clarify a very important matter. He had very great respect for Secretary Rusk and considered him a true friend whom he had invited to visit Spain with Mrs. Rusk some time in the spring of 1969. The Foreign Minister had been under the impression that Secretary Rusk would have preferred to complete the current negotiations during his term in office. The Foreign Minister said he had heard some reports indicating that Secretary Rusk had expressed the concern that Spain might embark on a policy of isolation and the Foreign Minister now wished to state very clearly that Spain had no intention of becoming isolationist. There were many witnesses in the President's office today who knew that the Foreign Minister had always worked earnestly to improve relations between Spain and the U.S.

He said that in addition to what he had said earlier about support for Spain among Latin American, Arab, African, and Asian countries, it was also fair to say that relations with European nations, especially Germany and France, were excellent.

Unfortunately, now there seemed to be some problems with the U.S. with regard to base negotiations. Spain felt strongly that it did not want to be isolated or to play a passive role in defending the common interests of Spain and the U.S. No other country, not even Greece, had suffered as much as Spain from communism or had gone through such a bloody civil war. Spain does not simply want to offer its geographic location or real estate without being able to participate actively in defending common ideals. Spain had offered its soil, its blood, and its enthusiasm in the defense of American ideals and could not remain content as a passive partner. Spain wanted to help the U.S. share its burdens and not simply provide some military bases. All of this should be a clear indication that Spain would not follow an isolationist policy.

The Foreign Minister said that one of Spain's difficulties was prejudice on the part of many people who had not forgotten the Spanish civil war, primarily Marxists and Socialists all over the world and especially in Europe. For instance, there was a hostile Denmark, which after all was a country that benefited a great deal from trade with the U.S. and a country whose people had not suffered as much as the people of Spain in the fight against communism. Then there was Sweden which allowed German troops on its soil, which is something Spain refused to do even though during the civil war Germany rendered valuable assistance to Spain. The Socialist governments in the UK and in Holland (now temporarily out of office) and the Scandinavian countries constantly objected to full Spanish participation in the defense of the West. Spain was outside of NATO while countries such as Portugal and

Greece with equally or even more authoritarian regimes had full membership in NATO. This was a source of irritation to Spain and Spain frequently felt that the U.S. could do more to redress this unfair situation. The U.S. Congress on two occasions had expressed its hope that Spain would enter NATO.⁸ Informal soundings of certain European countries on the part of the U.S. had only led to comments from such countries as Denmark and the UK opposing Spanish entry into NATO. He suggested that a more forceful stand on the part of the U.S. could well lead to more favorable results. In any event, Spain believes that it deserves to be considered on an equal basis with other European countries, especially because of its important strategic location. Spain expects that if the defense of the Western world is reorganized, as is frequently rumored, it will not be forgotten.

The President replied that he was aware of the problems which the Foreign Minister had mentioned but that they could not be solved immediately. He stated that his Administration wanted the most friendly relations with Spain and that frank discussions about bases, money, and national interests should not be taken as an indication of a lack of friendship. It naturally takes time to reach agreement on such points. The NATO question was a very special problem of which the President was well aware, but he was also pleased to receive the Foreign Minister's views first-hand. He said he had been fully briefed on the matter and would continue to give it his utmost attention in the coming months.

The Foreign Minister stated that he was very disappointed and displeased by some aspects of the negotiations. On October 17, 1968,⁹ he had agreed with Secretary Rusk on the desirability of continuing good U.S.-Spanish relations and in developing a common strategy with regard to Spain. A political agreement had been reached in principle on having closer relations between the two countries and the Foreign Minister and Secretary Rusk had agreed that preliminary military talks were to be very realistic and based on the concept of a common strategy. The military talks were handled with great zeal but they had not been completed until the end of last week. They were to have been followed by very delicate political talks during which the Spanish Government considered that some 14 documents would have to be discussed and the State Department had submitted 10 documents for that same purpose. The Foreign Minister asked himself how anyone could expect both countries to reach political agreements on such vast and

⁸ In 1955 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told a Congressional committee hearing that the United States would be "sympathetic" to Spain's membership in NATO. In 1957, Congress passed a joint resolution that called for Spanish admission to NATO.

⁹ Apparently the October 17, 1968, meeting between Rusk and Castiella. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 220.

delicate matters in the brief span of two days. He felt that this was no way to treat a 15-year old friend and objected to having been asked to sign documents on a take it or leave it basis. Furthermore, having only twenty minutes set aside for a meeting with the Secretary of State during which to discuss such important matters was something that would truly horrify the Spanish people.¹⁰ This is why Spain had proposed an extension of the period of consultation for up to four months in the hope that agreement could be reached, possibly in a matter of only one or two months. The Foreign Minister asked forgiveness for having spoken in such a frank manner, especially in view of the fact that he respected the President so much, and considered him a wise and prudent statesman who was a true and sincere friend of Spain.

The President said that he understood the Foreign Minister's frankness and that he knew that an agreement had been reached in principle between the U.S. and Spain. He knew that negotiations were always difficult and he personally regretted that there might have been some rough edges.

The Foreign Minister said that Mr. Landau and Mr. Aguirre de Carcer were emaciated as a result of all their hard work and that he himself had spent several sleepless nights just working on a simple press release. How could anybody expect serious work to be accomplished on 14 documents if it had taken so long just to agree on a simple press release. Having been Foreign Minister of Spain for 12 years, he was an experienced negotiator and knew that such things took a longer amount of time.

The President said that he was glad that a very good and close personal friend and associate was going to Spain as Ambassador.¹¹ He was

¹⁰ A memorandum of conversation of the Rogers-Castiella meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Rogers had met with Castiella at the Spanish Foreign Minister's request at 9:40 a.m. on March 25. He had departed for meetings with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and his delegation after about 20 minutes and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson continued the talks. A separate memorandum of conversation is *ibid.* In his March 26 briefing memorandum for the President's meeting with Castiella, Kissinger noted that Castiella had proposed a 4-month "extension" of the negotiating period but that subsequently the Spaniards "made clear that Castiella's proposal would have meant deduction of the four-month extension from the year already allotted for US withdrawal if no agreement were reached." He added: "On March 25 the Spanish were given draft papers covering all the points you had approved [see Document 275], with one exception: as a result of Congressional consultations State estimated that it would be dangerous to propose the establishment of a new US-Spanish Military Consultative Committee. Instead they offered the Spanish a technical expansion of existing procedures." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President) In telegram 1131 from Madrid, March 26, the Embassy reported on official Spanish indignation at the "summoning" of Castiella to Washington. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US)

¹¹ Robert C. Hill. His appointment was formally announced on May 1. Hill presented his credentials on June 12.

a man in whom he had complete confidence. The new Ambassador was someone with whom the Foreign Minister could talk as if he were talking to the President himself. He also stated that one of the major objectives of his Administration would be to continue friendly relations with Spain based on mutual respect. The President himself had strong personal convictions about the role that Spain could play in world affairs and he hoped to be able to continue talking about this important matter in the future.

The Foreign Minister thanked the President for appointing such a capable Ambassador and said that next Friday the Council of Ministers of Spain would officially give its agrément. He said that many of those in the President's office today knew that the U.S. had not been adequately represented in Spain in the past. The Foreign Minister had advised the U.S. Government of this frequently, without of course wishing to interfere in American internal affairs. While recognizing that each country had a right to appoint whomever it wished as its Ambassador, the fact of the matter was that the U.S. had not been adequately represented. This was very unfortunate in view of the existence of excellent American diplomats who should have been sent to Spain in order to report more accurately on the situation there.

The President said that he had personally selected the Ambassador and that the Spanish Government should talk with him with great frankness.

The President said that it was important to realize that a whole generation had gone by since World War II and that many who used to be former enemies now worked together hand in hand. The Spanish civil war was 30 years old and while much residue remains in some of the countries the Foreign Minister had mentioned, many of the attitudes in Europe had changed. The President said he liked to look at the world as it is today and not as it was in the past, especially in view of the fact that there already were enough issues dividing the world at the present time.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger whether he wanted to make some comments. The Foreign Minister interjected that he was a great admirer of Professor Kissinger and that his books were very well known in Spain.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had often spoken with the President about Spain and that the difficulties that might have arisen in the last few days should not be construed as affecting the basic friendship that exists between the two countries.

The President stated that the important thing was to go on from here and that the Foreign Minister, the two Governments, and the Ambassadors would have to work earnestly together in the months ahead.

The Foreign Minister said that the dignity, the temperament, and feelings of the Spanish people did not allow them to play a passive role and that it was a serious mistake to view U.S.-Spanish relations as a simple exchange of real estate in return for U.S. guarantees of defense. He said Spain wants to help the U.S. and wants to lighten the burden which rests on the shoulders of all American mothers whose sons are in uniform.¹²

¹² The Department of State Spokesman announced on the evening of March 26 that the United States and Spain had agreed in principle to extend the defense agreement for 5 years, subject to completion of the negotiations. See Benjamin Welles, "U.S.-Spanish Pact On Military Bases Extended 5 Years," *New York Times*, March 27, 1969, p. 1.

278. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 29, 1969, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Spain

The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry
Mr. Jaime de Ojeda, First Secretary, Spanish Embassy
Mr. Francisco Cadiz, North American Section, Spanish Foreign Ministry

United States

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Ralph Earle II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal
Brigadier General Rex H. Hampton, Director, Western European Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Mr. Roland Homet, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs
Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in J on April 15. The meeting took place in Johnson's office.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer, referring to the discussion on March 28² repeated that his comments were preliminary personal reactions to the matters discussed and documents provided him.

Under Secretary Johnson said that he understood and that he wished to make clear that any comments or suggested language changes which he made were also to be considered *ad referendum*.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said that he had a reaction from Madrid on the draft notes and letters which had been given him by the Under Secretary earlier in the week.³ He said that he first wanted to make it clear that the U.S. was in Spain because they wanted to be, not because the Spanish Government wanted them there. He said it was the view of the Spanish Government that some form of de-escalation in U.S. presence should be implemented. He said that Foreign Minister Castiella had raised the question of de-escalation with Secretary Rusk on September 16, 1968⁴ and that the U.S. had suggested that the airbase at Moron could be placed in standby status. This action, he said, would not be of interest to the Spanish Government since it would probably increase the level of U.S. presence at Torrejon which was a "sore thumb." He said that in a conversation between Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Sedo and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze,⁵ the latter had stated that Torrejon could be closed if the Spanish Government insisted, although such action would be extremely costly to the U.S. Government. Under Secretary Sedo had indicated at that time that the Spanish Government would prefer a reduction or closing of Torrejon. Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said this was still the Spanish position.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer then began a discussion of possible Spanish association with NATO. He said Spain would have to be invited to become associated with NATO and would never ask for such association. He referred to a Congressional Concurrent Resolution of 1957 and said that the Spanish Government believed that the U.S. had never seriously tried to persuade its NATO allies to accept Spanish association. He said that with the forthcoming 20th Anniversary of NATO⁶ there would be a unique opportunity to raise the question at the highest level and he hoped that the United States would be willing to do so.

Under Secretary Johnson said that this matter had been raised with certain NATO allies by this administration, and a flat negative response

² A memorandum of conversation is *ibid*.

³ See footnote 10, Document 277.

⁴ September 16. A report of this meeting is in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XII, Western Europe, Document 216.

⁵ No record of this meeting was found.

⁶ The North Atlantic Council commemorated NATO's 20th anniversary at its April 10–11 meeting in Washington.

had been received regarding Spanish association, even at the lowest level.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said that such association was a "key" to the solution of the Gibraltar problem as well as an important factor in U.S.-Spanish relations. He said he had discussed this matter with David Bendall of the UK Foreign Office during a recent visit by Mr. Bendall to Madrid.

Under Secretary Johnson said this was a matter which the Spanish Government would have to continue to pursue on its own.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer, referring to the draft documents given to him earlier, said that the Spanish would prefer the document officially extending the Defense Agreement to be in a form different than that presented by the U.S. (exchange of letters). He suggested a protocol or a joint declaration. He also said that it would be essential to have a reference to the 1963 Joint Declaration in such a document.⁷ He also said that a reference to "political" discussions could be dropped and reference to "matters of common interest" substituted.

Under Secretary Johnson asked if Mr. Aguirre had any language changes to suggest in the U.S. draft classified letter on military assistance. Mr. Aguirre replied that they wanted to have a reference to support for Spanish Defense industries inserted. There then ensued a discussion of various language changes in the draft letter.

Mr. Aguirre referred to the suggested revision of the Technical Agreement and said that the GOS would like to have an exchange of letters or notes on those points where there was mutual agreement on changes in the existing Technical Agreement.

Mr. Homet said that he assumed this was not a "sticking point" in the negotiations for the extension of the Defense Agreement, and Mr. Aguirre replied that it was not.

Under Secretary Johnson said that he would be glad to look at any suggestion Mr. Aguirre wished to make with respect to the Technical Agreement revision. He said the U.S. would be willing to consider the matter but wanted to make it clear that at this point and until we had seen the suggestions we could only agree in principle.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said he wished to include a reference to Spanish eligibility under the Military Sales Act⁸ in the classified military assistance letter. He said that General Warren had told him in their meeting the day before that Spain was eligible under the Act.

⁷ For text of the joint declaration concerning the renewal of the 1953 defense agreement, together with the related exchange of notes signed at New York September 26, 1963, see 14 UST 1406.

⁸ For text of the Foreign Military Sales Act, P.L. 90-629, approved October 22, 1968, see 82 Stat. 1320.

The Under Secretary said that it would be necessary to have our lawyers tailor any such reference to the provisions of the Act although he saw no difficulty with some reference.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer then turned to the draft Eximbank letter and suggested that a phrase be inserted indicating that the \$100 million credit was in addition to normal Eximbank loans to Spain, and another phrase be inserted that the credits could be used for social development purposes in addition to military equipment purchases.

The Under Secretary said this matter would have to be carefully examined and discussed with both Treasury and the Eximbank.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said that he had no change to propose in the letter concerning excess equipment which might become available after the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, and no comment to make regarding the exchange of notes on the ship loan extension. Referring to the draft exchange on Colossus I,⁹ Mr. Aguirre said that it was not accurate to say that final approval had been held up pending these negotiations. He said that he would prefer “final decision” and Under Secretary Johnson agreed that if this were more accurate we would have no objection to such change.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer then referred to the exchange of notes clarifying the duration of the extension of the Defense Agreement and explained that since the 1953 Agreement had been submitted to the Cortes, it would be necessary to have precise language to avoid any misunderstanding on the question of the one-year withdrawal period and the U.S. suggestion that the six-month consultation period also applied. He said that the Spanish Government and Cortes understood the Agreement to be for 20 years and that although they could agree to a one-year withdrawal period following the conclusion of the 20-year agreement they could not accept the logic of any argument also adding a six-month consultation period. The Under Secretary replied that this question had to be studied by our lawyers, and that it was our present position that the six-month consultation period also applied to the second of the two five-year extensions under the Agreement.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer then turned to the question of a Joint Military Consultative Committee and read General Diez-Alegria’s proposed draft of a third agreed minute between Generals Burchinal and Diez-Alegria. He said that in line with the military talks on this subject, the GOS and especially the Spanish military were strongly in favor of a “joint military planning group.”

Under Secretary Johnson explained that he would have considerable difficulty in accepting any reference to a military group, since

⁹ Reference to an intelligence program.

"planning" would be seen as a red flag by members of Congress who were highly critical of just this sort of thing. He said that we would consider the Spanish arguments on this point and study the matter to determine what we could do to meet Spanish concerns.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer launched into a long diatribe concerning the failure of the United States to treat Spain as a partner. He emphasized the Spanish view that the U.S. had refused to cooperate fully with Spain in the field of defense planning. He said that some form of military consultative committee was extremely important to the Spanish military and failure to provide it would hurt their pride and could thereby cause serious difficulties in reaching agreement.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer then said he would like to include a few matters related to the revision of the Technical Agreement (SOFA) in the exchange of documents extending the Defense Agreement.

The Under Secretary said he would defer to Mr. Earle on this question since it principally concerned the Department of Defense and since Mr. Earle had been the U.S. negotiator in the talks on revision of the Technical Agreement.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said the GOS would like some type of document or letter stating that conversations or talks would commence between the U.S. and Spain on the possible modification of facilities provided the U.S. in Spain. He explained that these referred to those facilities which had been originally included in the 1953 Technical Annex but never used. He said such a letter would be very useful vis-à-vis Spanish public opinion to show that U.S. presence was being reduced.

The Under Secretary said we could study this question. He said we would probably have no problem with the substance, but that it would be a matter of the form. If we made public announcements concerning a reduction of our bases in Spain and at the same time increased the level of military assistance, the Congress would again raise questions regarding the judgment of the Executive Branch.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said he would like some kind of open letter on Eximbank credits for normal Spanish industrial development. Mr. Landau said that there would not be any need for this, as the Eximbank letter on military sales referred already to "over and above" normal credits. Mr. Aguirre agreed.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said he would like some kind of confidential letter indicating U.S. support for Spain in various international economic and scientific organizations, similar to the 1963 letter.

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said he wished to raise and discuss the question of movement of aircraft to restricted areas and overflights with nuclear components. This had been raised in the context of revision of the Technical Agreement, but the U.S. negotiator had said that it would have to be handled later at the political level.

The Under Secretary said this was a complex matter and he would prefer to postpone discussion on it until the next meeting (April 1).

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer repeated his earlier statement that in whatever document is finally decided on to provide the formal extension of the Defense Agreement, a reaffirmation of the 1963 Joint Declaration is essential. He also said that an exchange of messages between the President and General Franco would be very helpful. He said one had taken place between President Kennedy and General Franco in 1963.¹⁰

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer then said that the GOS wanted a Secret letter in which the security guarantee as expressed in the 1963 Joint Declaration was repeated. He insisted that this would add nothing new—simply reaffirm the 1963 Joint Declaration. He said mention should be made of Rota and perhaps Colossus I. This was necessary in view of the type and level of use that is being made of Rota and other installations. He said the U.S. should confirm in the letter its intention to carry out its guarantees for Spain's security contained in the 1963 Joint Declaration. The letter would be secret and for "our private bilateral use."

The Under Secretary said he would comment on this suggestion at the next meeting.

¹⁰ An apparent reference to exchanges of oral messages between the two heads of state. See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, Documents 368 and 372.

279. National Security Study Memorandum 46¹

Washington, April 21, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Spain

The President has directed that a study be made of our policy options with respect to Spain. The study should look beyond the completion of the negotiations for the extension of the Base Agreement and examine the pros and cons of various feasible lines of policy both in the period immediately ahead and over the longer term, including the post-Franco period.

The President has directed that this study be undertaken by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe. It is to be completed by May 29 for consideration by the Review Group.²

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-147, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 46. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Work on the study was suspended during the final base negotiations with the Spanish. Once the agreement was signed on June 20, Kissinger had the study resumed for completion by September 15. (Memorandum from Kissinger to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence, July 8; *ibid.*)

280. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 3, 1969.

Please note the item on page 2 of the Daily Staff Summary attached (Tab A).² I am very disturbed at the way the entire Spanish problem has been handled. I am especially concerned about the way Sonnenfeldt as an individual has handled this and interpreted the operative aspects of the problem.

At Tab B are two memoranda from Hal³ which confirm the type of bias to which I refer.

As you know, from the outset State has been strongly opposed to the continuation of bases in Spain. This fundamental bias subsequently became distorted and became an anti-military campaign, resulting in leaks to Fulbright and Symington and Flora Lewis.⁴ It included a character assassination campaign against General Burchinal. My own assessment is that Hal Sonnenfeldt shares State's bias in the issue.

The coup de grâce was made during the week prior to the Spanish visit when an originally agreed upon aid package was drastically reduced by a Packard-Richardson-State cabal, then officiously dumped in the lap of the Spanish delegation in the form of an ultimatum.⁵ There is no doubt in my mind that this was a well-orchestrated, tightly-controlled effort on the part of those who are most anxious to terminate our base rights in the Spanish area.

Since that time, Hal has been reporting that all was not well, but again he has distorted the facts by inferring that the negotiations are off the track because this time the military in Spain have tried to garner all the benefits of the U.S. assistance package for themselves. Hal has implied that this is the root problem in the breakdown. The facts, in my

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret.

² Not printed. The relevant portion reads: "Spanish Foreign Ministry Officials told Embassy Madrid the atmosphere surrounding the base negotiations has changed for the worse. The Spanish claim this is due to US use of press leaks, severe press and congressional criticism of the Spanish Government, and our 'pressure tactics' approaching a virtual ultimatum. Consequently the officials are reappraising the entire situation and are not prepared to sign an extension under the present uncertain and ambiguous conditions."

³ At Tab B, not printed, are April 23 and 24 memoranda by Sonnenfeldt.

⁴ Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO); and American journalist Flora Lewis.

⁵ See Documents 277 and 278.

view, are clearly depicted in the report at Tab A. They confirm a conscious effort to scuttle the negotiations and have very little to do with the peripheral smoke which laces Hal's two memos to you.

I recommend you call Richardson on this problem to insure that the issues are again reviewed by the Under Secretaries Committee. Perhaps a Presidential letter to Franco would help.⁶

⁶ Kissinger wrote in the margin: "Let's do a memo for the President of issues and find out his wishes. Can't be interested in losing bases. In memo state formal situation then list analysis of possible reasons for collapse." No memorandum by Haig was found. A memorandum to the President drafted by Sonnenfeldt, May 12, was not forwarded. A covering memorandum to Kissinger recommending its signature is annotated: "return to Sonnenfeldt OBE."

281. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon¹

Washington, May 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations

Since my memorandum of March 14² and your talk with Castiella,³ the atmosphere surrounding the Spanish base negotiations has worsened and pressures against renewal of the Agreement are building on both sides—for quite different reasons.

In the United States

As you are aware, there is strong opposition among a number of influential members of Congress to extension of the Defense Agreement. The opposition combines a number of elements: dislike of Franco, opposition to what are interpreted as implied security commitments, questions as to the continuing need for the bases, and opposition to an increased payment. While these opinions center in the For-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret.

² March 15. A copy of the memorandum is *ibid*.

³ See Document 277.

eign Relations Committee (Senators Fulbright, Church,⁴ and Symington), it is fair to say that others, including the minority members, have shown no great enthusiasm for the Agreement. There are obvious exceptions (Senator Sparkman)⁵ but support unfortunately is not as vocal as it should be. When the issue goes to the whole Congress, however, I am sure that we can get good backing from both Armed Services Committees and the House leadership.

Moreover, the U.S. press, notably the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, have agitated against our defense relationship with Spain for essentially the same mixture of reasons as outlined above and the hostile views expressed by members of the Foreign Relations Committee have received wide press coverage.

In a letter to Secretary Rogers, Senator Fulbright expressed his apprehension about renewing the Agreement and suggested that the Foreign Relations Committee be given the opportunity for full exploration of the proposed Agreement either by submission to the Senate of the renewal as a treaty, or, at a minimum, as a separate item in the Foreign Assistance Act authorization legislation.⁶ (We have committed ourselves to showing to the Committee the package that we work out with Spain before signature and they have already been briefed on the outline of the elements in the package.)

Congressional consultations as to the source of funds for grant assistance in connection with the Spanish base renewal have shown strong opposition by the Chairmen and most members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to use of DOD funds. In the face of this opposition, to press our preferred course of service funding could put in jeopardy our other military assistance and sales budgets which must go before these Committees for authorization, as well as running the risk of heightening Congressional suspicion of the political aspects of the Spanish arrangement. Although Chairman Fulbright has frankly said that he would vote against the authorization for Spain in the AID/MAP bill, we have replied to him that our funding request in connection with the Spanish base renewal will be included in the foreign assistance authorization legislation. Should Senator Fulbright muster enough votes in the Foreign Relations Committee to strike the Spanish item out of the bill, we hope to have the Spanish item reinstated on the floor. We can expect a close fight in the full Senate and good support in the House. Chairman

⁴ Senator Frank Church (D-ID).

⁵ Senator John Sparkman (D-AL).

⁶ A copy of the April 22 letter is in the National Archives, RG 46, Records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Records of the Chairman, Carl Marcy Papers, Box 8.

Fulbright and other Committee members would be less annoyed to lose in this manner than by an attempt to evade the Committee.

While the Department of Defense feels that service funding offers certain advantages, Secretary Laird has deferred to the judgment of the Department of State on this matter.

In Spain

The Foreign Office. The Foreign Minister returned to Spain highly disappointed over his failure to obtain any political concessions from the U.S. The Foreign Office wants an agreement that will give Spain a security guarantee or a treaty, or, as a minimum, will reconfirm, clarify and hopefully strengthen the 1963 Joint Declaration. Given the U.S. Congressional climate, any meaningful security guarantee seems to be out of the question. The Foreign Office has shown great interest in Senator Fulbright's suggestion that the renewal be submitted to the Senate as a treaty as this coincides with Spanish wishes. It is hard to believe that the Foreign Office is so naive as to suppose that Senator Fulbright wants a treaty in order to approve it. We consider the chances of approval of a treaty commitment virtually nil in the Senate. Moreover, we believe the Administration should not, on policy grounds, seek a bilateral treaty commitment with Spain.

The Spanish Military. The Spanish military are apparently having difficulty agreeing on the distribution of the U.S. offer of \$175 million in military assistance. At a Spanish National Defense Council meeting, the Air Force apparently was given first priority, and General Navarro, the Air Force Chief of Staff, came to Washington on April 16 for further discussions with Generals Wheeler and McConnell. He insisted that the USG supply two squadrons of F-104Gs as a part of the military package and made it absolutely clear that there would be no deal unless the F-104Gs or, as a less desirable alternative, F-4 aircraft, were made available. Our counter-offer for an earlier model of the F-104 was flatly rejected. Before General Navarro left, U.S. Air Force officials agreed with him that other possibilities would be explored which included third-country procurement of F-104Gs from Germany or Holland or the supplying of F-4 aircraft.

DOD is presently seeking information from the Germans and the Dutch, who have F-104Gs, but at best it will take several weeks before we can provide definitive answers, although the initial German response has not been as negative as we had anticipated. Our Embassy in Bonn has expressed concern that any deal involving Spain will put stress on the coalition government in Germany. DOD has given the Spanish Air Force prices and availability data on the F-4. The Spanish appear to be interested in this aircraft and on May 5 asked for additional detailed information, which will be supplied May 9.

Meanwhile, the Spanish Government is increasingly angry about continuing unfavorable press treatment in the U.S. of the Spanish base question, and the GOS, in turn, has manufactured in its controlled press a mounting attack on the negotiations and on US-Spanish relations in general.

Next Steps

Since March 26, we have entered the one-year period during which we must evacuate the bases unless a new agreement is signed. Although the Spanish have told us orally not to worry about the time limit, they have refused to give us any written assurances that they would stop the clock while we talk. We have asked DOD to send a military liquidation team to Spain next week to prepare preliminary analyses of the problems involved in withdrawing from Spain. At the same time, their presence should remind the Spanish that we are prepared to move out if necessary.

The Spanish Foreign Office has indicated that it does not plan any early resumption of negotiations; it has interpreted as “pressure tactics” our warnings that a prolonged delay would make it harder for both sides to reach agreement. Although we have made it clear that Ambassador Hill’s participation will not change the ongoing negotiations, they have great hopes that his arrival might help them to get some political concessions and they have indicated that they may hold off substantive talks until Ambassador Hill arrives. In any event, we do not expect to hear from them until the Spanish military have reached a decision on the remaining questions concerning the military aid package.

Conclusions

We are seriously limited in our negotiating flexibility. Congressional pressure will make any upgrading of the 1963 Joint Declaration or any other political concessions extremely difficult if not impossible. There are serious obstacles to obtaining Congressional approval for the \$175 million grant aid and an increase in our offer to the Spanish seems out of the question.

Thus our options are limited. In essence, we want a base rental for which we are willing to pay \$175 million over five years. The Spanish want a security commitment and they want to be treated as a formal ally and not as a lessor of real estate. This fundamental difference in approach makes a satisfactory solution difficult. We believe that if we are able to make the military package attractive within its present financial limits, the Spanish military will put their full weight behind reaching an agreement, and through Franco’s intervention the renewal might be effected. DOD is providing the information the Spanish Air Force has requested and will do its utmost to meet the Spanish desires. However,

unless the military are fully satisfied the Foreign Office may prevail in its view that the Agreement would benefit neither the Spanish people nor Spain's position in the world and we may face the possibility of having to move out.

Embassy Madrid's roundup telegram of the Spanish base negotiations as seen from there is enclosed. For ready reference there is also enclosed a copy of the 1963 Joint Declaration.⁷

Elliot L. Richardson

⁷ Neither telegram 1658 from Madrid nor the Joint Declaration of 1963 is printed.

282. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 19, 1969, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Spain

The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry

Mr. Aurelio Valls, Minister Counselor, Spanish Embassy

Mr. Jaime de Ojeda, First Secretary, Spanish Embassy

United States

The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser

Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal

Mr. Arthur Downey, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs

Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain

B/Gen. Rex Hampton, OASD/ISA

Mr. Aguirre de Carcer met with Ambassador Johnson at 4:30 p.m. as they had arranged at their meeting on May 14.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in J on May 26. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Johnson's office.

² A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*

In response to Ambassador Johnson's inquiry as to whether Mr. Aguirre was prepared to exchange notes providing for an unlimited consultation period to be followed by a one-year withdrawal period, Mr. Aguirre replied in the negative and said that he had sent the draft note, which he had worked out with Messrs Meeker and Landau on May 16,³ to Madrid for the approval of the Foreign Minister and other GOS officials.

Mr. Aguirre then raised again the Spanish proposal to extend the Defense Agreement for 18 months from September 26, 1968. This would allow seven months for serious negotiations, he said, since we would lose three months during the summer when Spanish Government activity will be at a virtual standstill. He explained that this extension would include the corresponding set of documents appropriately revised which Ambassador Johnson had given him in March. He said that this extension would, of course, have to include the corresponding portion of the military assistance offer made in March.⁴

Ambassador Johnson said that this suggestion would mean, insofar as the military aspect of the negotiations was concerned, that the military would have to open new negotiations on military assistance. He explained that the illustrative list (at least insofar as the major items were concerned) had no meaning in a short time period. This was true because the amount of money involved would be too small to allow for any rational program of military assistance and the time frame would be too short to permit the equipment items to be delivered since the availability and lead time would extend over the five-year period.

Mr. Aguirre said he understood this, and that when General Hampton had raised this point on May 14, he (Aguirre) had said that this was a problem for the Spanish military; that they would have to choose from the illustrative list those items which fell within the limitations of cost and availability. The question of cost, he said, must be looked at taking into consideration the EXIM Bank credits. According to Mr. Aguirre's calculation, this would mean 30 million dollars in EXIM credits and 52.5 million dollars in grant aid for the 18-months' period. Ambassador Johnson interjected that from the U.S. viewpoint such an 18-month extension was not worth the equivalent portion of a five-year extension package. He said that such a short extension raised many difficulties, both political and military.

³ No copy of the draft note was found. According to a May 16 memorandum from Edgar Beigel (EUR/FBX) to U. Alexis Johnson, a luncheon meeting between Aguirre de Carcer and State Department Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker had been set up at Meeker's home to work out remaining difficulties with a draft. (National Archives, RG 59, Records Relating to Spain, 1949–1976, Def 15 Base Negotiations) Telegram 80685 to Madrid, May 21, indicates that the draft note agreed upon at this meeting was forwarded by the Spanish Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for study. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 SP-US)

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 277, and Document 278.

Mr. Aguirre said it should be remembered that we were considering not just an 18-months' extension but, taking into consideration the one-year "grace" period, a two and one-half year period of time. He explained that since the bases would presumably decline in importance in the next few years, Spain would expect the major portion of the military assistance at the beginning with progressive reductions in amount over the period of the extension. He said that since we were now at the end of May and had not yet concluded all of the military aspects of the negotiations, and were still facing lengthy and important political negotiations, the proposed extension would provide the time needed without damaging U.S. security interests.

Ambassador Johnson said that we had had no knowledge of this proposal until Mr. Aguirre had mentioned it in the May 14 meeting and he said it would seem fruitless to consider it until the military talks had concluded.

Mr. Aguirre said that the Spanish proposal was to extend the Defense Agreement for the 18 months now and let the Spanish military make their selection from the illustrative list afterward.

Ambassador Johnson said that the important thing for the U.S. at this point was to stop the clock on the consultation period. He explained that he had not had sufficient time since the May 14 meeting to fully consult with his colleagues within the Government and with Congressional leaders. He said he was very uneasy about pursuing the proposed extension for 18 months or any other negotiation until we had exchanged notes providing for unlimited consultation.

Mr. Aguirre replied that he was unable to exchange notes at this time because he had not had the opportunity to discuss the matter with his colleagues within the Spanish Government and the Spanish Cortes.

Ambassador Johnson reminded Mr. Aguirre that he (Aguirre) had raised the matter of unlimited consultation and an exchange of notes on that subject at the May 14 meeting.

Mr. Aguirre replied that when the Spanish Ambassador had attempted to obtain written assurance from the Department of State on the juridical status of the Defense Agreement, he had not received any such written assurance on the substance. Mr. Aguirre then repeated in a lengthy monologue his version of the exchange of confidential letters of March 26.⁵ He insisted that any notion that the six months' consultation period provided for in the Defense Agreement expired on March 26 was one held unilaterally by U.S. officials. He said that the Foreign Minister and he had not explained the Spanish view that consultations could continue indefinitely at that time because one does not refuse

⁵ Not found.

concessions in negotiations. He also insisted that the so-called deadline of April 26 was exclusively a U.S. idea and that the GOS had done nothing to cause the U.S. to become nervous about the withdrawal period.

Ambassador Johnson said that he had thought, based on what Mr. Aguirre had said in the May 14 meeting, that Mr. Aguirre would have been able to agree to the exchange of notes now and it was for that reason, he said, that he had asked Mr. Aguirre to stay until May 19. He said that he had understood that the proposed exchange of notes was mutually satisfactory and that the GOS had agreed on this procedure.

Mr. Aguirre said that he had come to Washington to propose an 18-month extension of the Defense Agreement and that with respect to the exchange of notes on the consultation period he could only state again that Spain had not been receiving written responses to their inquiries.

Ambassador Johnson then handed to Mr. Aguirre a letter signed by Acting Secretary Richardson⁶ in further response to the Spanish Ambassador's request for a statement of the Department's view of the juridical status of the Defense Agreement and Joint Declaration of 1963. The letter stated that the legal relationship between Spain and the U.S. should remain within the framework of an executive agreement. Ambassador Johnson explained that he had intended to give the letter to Mr. Aguirre earlier in the meeting but had been prevented from doing so by the discussion of other matters raised by Mr. Aguirre.

Mr. Aguirre thanked Ambassador Johnson and said that the Ambassador would acknowledge receipt of the letter. He said that the Ambassador's letter had been drafted in terms referring to the future status of what our relationship should be. He said that he hoped that Ambassador Johnson would understand that the new reply was not exactly as much as the Spanish had hoped. He said he assumed that the U.S. Government had carefully thought out this matter and, therefore, since the relationship was to remain at such a low level (executive agreement instead of treaty) he would now have to continue the negotiations in this context, taking into consideration Spanish public opinion and the views of members of the Spanish Cortes where the lease of bases arrangement was not popular.

Ambassador Johnson reminded Mr. Aguirre that neither party in these negotiations was starting anew, but on the contrary we both were

⁶ It reads: "I am referring to your letter of April 18 and Secretary Rogers' reply of April 25. Further to the Secretary's letter I would like to confirm to you my Government's view, which Ambassador Johnson has outlined to your representative previously, that the legal relationship between Spain and the United States should remain within the framework of an executive agreement as it has since 1953. I can assure you that this position remains unchanged." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 SP–US)

working from the basis of an arrangement begun in 1953. He said that both parties were, to a degree, prisoners of the past in this matter. Ambassador Johnson said he wished to clearly explain that if the GOS assumed that between now and March 1970 it would be possible for the U.S. to agree to a different type of arrangement than presently exists, i.e., a treaty, he personally saw no chance for such a change.

Mr. Aguirre said that he wished to dispel any doubts on this matter. He said that the GOS followed very closely the Congressional debates and that he thought Ambassador Johnson was probably correct in saying there was little chance for a treaty arrangement. He said, however, he thought there might be other ways to work out a new bilateral relationship and that time would be needed for this purpose.

Ambassador Johnson said that one of the purposes in asking Mr. Aguirre to remain a few days in Washington was to obtain a clearer idea of what the GOS desired.

Mr. Aguirre said that one of the suggestions made in March was that there might be a letter from the President to General Franco.

Ambassador Johnson said that he had explained clearly at that time that such a letter, if it were possible, could not be a subject for discussion or negotiation with respect to the language contained therein.

Mr. Aguirre said, withdrawing a paper from his briefcase, that he had prepared some suggestions for possible language to be included in such a letter from the President.

Ambassador Johnson explained to Mr. Aguirre that he did not need nor wish to receive such suggestions and Mr. Aguirre replaced the paper in his briefcase.

In response to Ambassador Johnson's inquiry concerning what the GOS had in mind with respect to the bilateral relationship following the end of the proposed 18-months' extension period, Mr. Aguirre began a half-hour monologue by reviewing a staff study prepared for General Franco on the negotiations. The study contained a résumé of the military discussions, the Congressional interest in national commitments, the letter from the Ambassador to the Secretary on the juridical status of the Agreements, and reached a conclusion that there was a credibility gap in regard to security commitments. The study proposed:

1. An extension of the Defense Agreement until March 26, 1970;
2. All of the rights under the Defense Agreement and its technical and procedural annexes would remain in full force during the 18-months' period;
3. A proportionate share of military assistance should be provided during the 18 months;
4. During the extension period the GOS would study in detail the Colossus Project, the opportunities the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Act

offers to Spanish defense industries, and the possibilities for various arrangements in the educational and scientific fields;

5. U.S. security interests would be respected in the future, but certain facilities of no importance would not continue, such as, permitting F-100 Squadrons to remain based in Spain or the continued operation of PX movies.

Mr. Aguirre said the Foreign Minister would come soon and that he would wish to discuss bilateral executive agreements of cooperation covering political, military, economic, educational, and scientific matters. Mr. Aguirre referred to such agreements as an Accord Cadre. He said that the Foreign Minister would also wish to discuss the Spanish proposed Educational Reform Program, which he had discussed with Mr. Kissinger in his meeting on May 16. He said Mr. Kissinger had expressed great interest in the Program. Mr. Aguirre explained that in a post March 1970 Agreement the U.S. would be able to preserve those military rights which would be important to its security, i.e., overflights, communications, logistic support, MATS and MSTs operations, interlocking AC and W networks, joint military exercises, ports of call, the POL pipeline, et cetera. He said that the main difference between the existing Agreement and such a future agreement would be that there would no longer be "bases" in Spain. He said the present joint-use bases would, in the future, be under complete Spanish command. He added that the status of Rota and the Colossus Project could be discussed apart from that of the existing air bases. He said that such an arrangement would offer the possibility of use of the bases by friendly third countries such as Portugal. He said such an arrangement would, of course, contemplate the continuation of military assistance programs and shiploan arrangements.

Ambassador Johnson inquired whether the Spanish saw this arrangement as a substitute for the 1953 Agreement or as a modification of the 1953 Agreement.

Mr. Aguirre replied that the GOS preferred a new agreement but, if necessary, he believed such an arrangement could be accomplished within the framework of the existing Defense Agreement.

General Hampton inquired whether this future agreement would mean that the 16th Air Force Headquarters and the 401st Fighter Wing would not be permitted to remain at Torrejon.

Although evasive in his reply, Mr. Aguirre replied that they would not be allowed to remain at least in their present status. He added that under a new arrangement it might be easier for the 401st Fighter Wing to use the bases since it would only involve Spanish permission to do so.

Ambassador Johnson said that he appreciated receiving Mr. Aguirre's thoughts and added that he was not at this point prepared to

discuss in detail the proposals. For clarification, Ambassador Johnson asked if it was the official and formal position of the GOS that it would not wish to renew the Defense Agreement for a five-year period on the basis of the documents exchanged in March. He asked further if it was the official GOS position now to propose an 18-months' extension only.

Mr. Aguirre replied affirmatively to both questions.

Ambassador Johnson said he assumed, therefore, that the U.S. must consider whether we wished to accept the 18-month proposal or not. He said that we had already informally considered the proposal and did not find it attractive. He emphasized that this was not a final and formal reply. He explained that the new Administration had taken the position that the United States wished to extend the present Agreement for five years under the terms offered in March. He said this was still the position of the U.S. Government. He asked Mr. Aguirre if he wished to have the Spanish proposal presented formally to the U.S. Government and whether the GOS expected a formal reply.

Mr. Aguirre replied affirmatively. He stated that he had written instructions from the Spanish Chief of State drafted in October of 1968. These instructions stated in summary:

1. There was a firm and unified position between the Foreign Ministry and the Spanish military;
2. The Defense Agreement with the U.S. was a matter of high policy;
3. The military talks should have as their purpose to convince the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military necessity for continued use of the bases in Spain;
4. The military costs to the U.S. of continuing the Agreement would not be lost to the U.S. since such military assistance would be employed by Spain in the defense of the West;
5. It should be emphasized in negotiations that the proposed grant assistance to Spain was an insignificant amount in relation to the overall U.S. Defense Budget;
6. The military assistance should not be proportioned out over the period of the Agreement, but should be provided in the largest amounts at the beginning of the assistance period;
7. The dangerous effects of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean should be emphasized to the U.S.;
8. The military assistance delivered by the Soviets to certain North African countries should likewise be emphasized;
9. Joint military planning between the two countries should be encouraged;
10. The added risks to Spain and changes in the strategic situation since 1953 should be emphasized;

11. Time should be allowed to obtain careful consideration of the new U.S. administration.

Ambassador Johnson asked what the situation would be from the Spanish viewpoint if the formal reply from the U.S. Government to the proposal for an 18-month extension was negative. He explained that he believed it was very important for both parties to understand each other perfectly. He asked if the U.S. reply to the temporary extension were negative, what would the Spanish reply be to the U.S. proposal to extend the Agreement for five years.

Mr. Aguirre replied that he would say, based on “preliminary soundings,” that the answer was negative.

Ambassador Johnson then asked if it was Mr. Aguirre’s wish that he present to the Administration the Spanish proposal for an extension for a temporary period with the understanding that we would, during that time, negotiate a new agreement, and failing this, we were to consider that we were unable to reach an agreement.

Mr. Aguirre replied affirmatively.

Ambassador Johnson emphasized again to Mr. Aguirre that this proposal would open up the 1953 Defense Agreement to the possibility of Congressional action since any amendment of the Agreement might involve considerations legally considered to be in the realm of a treaty. This, he said, was a very different matter than an extension of the Agreement as provided for under Article V of the Defense Agreement. Ambassador Johnson said that he believed he understood clearly the Spanish proposal, but he wished to reiterate that there still remained the problem of the exchange of notes concerning the unlimited consultation period. He asked on the basis of Mr. Aguirre’s oral assurances, if the U.S. answer is “no” and we had thus agreed to disagree, would the United States have one full year to withdraw. He explained that he was puzzled over Mr. Aguirre’s reluctance to give in writing his Government’s assurances on a matter of such importance.

Mr. Aguirre replied simply that the draft note was in Madrid for approval.

Ambassador Johnson asked when the U.S. could reasonably expect to receive an answer as to whether the notes would be exchanged.

Mr. Aguirre replied that, at the earliest, the answer might be forthcoming by the end of the week, i.e., May 23.⁷

Ambassador Johnson asked what channels should be used for communicating the U.S. response to the GOS proposal for an

⁷ The meeting took place on May 26. A memorandum of conversation is *ibid*.

18-months' extension, and Mr. Aguirre replied that the Spanish Embassy could serve as the channel.

The meeting concluded at 7:35 p.m.⁸

⁸ On May 20, Johnson telephoned Wheeler to inform him "that we had had a rough session with the Spaniards." After outlining Spanish positions he suggested further consultations between State and Defense Department officials. (Ibid., RG 59, Records of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96D695, Telecons, April–May 1969)

283. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

Breakthrough on the Spanish Base Negotiations

We have finally achieved a breakthrough in the Spanish base negotiations which I believe will solve the immediate problem of renewal of the Defense Agreement—although for only two years—but which will leave the hard questions on the future of our relationship with the Spanish to be answered in coming months.

Decision of General Franco

Late on Friday, May 30, Aguirre de Carcer (Director General for North America in the Spanish Foreign Ministry) telephoned his counterpart in State from Madrid to announce that General Franco had taken a final decision on the Spanish position that evening.² His decision was:

1. To accept our compromise offer of \$50 million in grant military aid and \$35 million in credits for a two-year extension of the Defense Agreement through September 1970; we would have one year following to move out (plus a "reasonable period" for dismantling even after expiration of the year) if there were no follow-on agreement;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, U.S.-Spanish Base Negotiations. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action. An attached note from the NSC Staff Secretary, June 10, reads: "The attached has been read by the President and is being returned for your information."

² The conversation was reported in telegram 87879 to Madrid, May 31. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 SP-US)

- 2. To sign a “stop the clock” agreement permitting unlimited consultation—until both sides agree that we have reached a dead end—before the one-year grace period for dismantling would begin;
- 3. To seek a \$195 million “line of credit” in the US over the next five years for commercial military purchases with some kind of US Government assistance; this is a new element and the Spanish themselves are still very fuzzy on what they actually want; and
- 4. To extend the NASA agreement for 10 more years as we had requested.³

Next Steps

Aguirre left Madrid quietly and flew to Washington on June 1. On June 2 he met with Under Secretary Alex Johnson at State to present the Spanish decision formally. During the following two days, June 3–4, there were further meetings to work out draft language for the agreement,⁴ in anticipation of signing a two-year extension of the Defense Agreement here in Washington by June 10. There is an outside possibility that Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella might return for the signing; if he does not, Spain will be represented by Ambassador Merry del Val.

How We Reached This Point

Obviously, agreement on an extension of two years is less desirable than the five years we originally sought (and on which the Spanish publicly declared their agreement in principle last March 26).⁵ But the adverse developments of the past two months raised serious doubt that we would be able to achieve any renewal at all. In close consultation with Elliot Richardson and Dave Packard, I therefore had concurred in discussion with the Spanish of terms for renewals short of five years. The range of choice at the time of General Franco’s decision was as follows:

<i>Duration of Renewal</i>	<i>US Grant Aid</i>	<i>US Credits Ex-Im</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Proposed By</i>
5 years	\$175 m	\$100 m	Post-Vietnam Option	US
3 years	\$90 m	\$50 m		US
2 years	\$50 m	\$35 m		US at Spanish request
18 months	\$52.5 m	\$30 m		Spain

³ Not further identified.
⁴ No memoranda of conversation for these meetings was found. Agreement was reported in telegram 91365 to Madrid, June 5. (Ibid.)
⁵ See footnote 12, Document 277.

As you see, the Spanish accepted our terms for a two-year renewal without change.

The Problems in the Background

We reached this critical juncture for a variety of reasons. First, and perhaps foremost, the widespread criticism of our Defense Agreement with Spain in the US press and particularly in Congress raised doubts in the minds of the Spanish about the degree to which they could rely on a US defense commitment to Spain. As a result they followed the tack of pressing for a precise juridical formulation of some kind which would relieve their apprehensions on this point. And we could not offer a more precise commitment, nor am I sure we ought to.

We could not offer the Spanish a mutual security treaty, or assist them in gaining entry to NATO; if we could have done either, we certainly would have been able to push for a full five-year extension. The Spanish requested assistance for educational reform within the context of our base agreement, but our hands were tied because appropriations for the Defense or MAP budgets are not transferable to educational projects, and the funds available for European educational and cultural affairs in the Department of State budget have dwindled with each passing year in the face of severe Congressional pressures.

Finally, there was a growing sentiment—not only in the press and in Congress, but in the Executive Branch as well—that the day had passed when our bases in Spain could be justly termed indispensable. Certainly the Rota installation is the most vital, although even its importance to our national security probably will decline over the coming years. With one of our three air bases already on standby status, and a second soon to follow the same route, however, it is difficult to argue indispensability.

To be sure, the bases are militarily useful and their retention would be desirable—all other things being equal. But the twists and turns of the Spanish negotiations over the past year have partly ideological roots; there are many in the bureaucracy who do not mind failure. Some are, of course, sincerely convinced that the bases are not “worth” it. I have followed the negotiations closely and while I cannot prove it, I strongly suspect that the negotiations and especially the high-handed treatment of Foreign Minister Castiella on his visit here were influenced in some measure by growing disenchantment with the Spanish base issue. Unfortunately, not only are the military bases at stake but the full range of our future relations with Spain. I regret that we have been unable to renegotiate our status there in a more graceful and effective fashion, and I think we should draw a lesson from this experience for the future.

Where To Go From Here

I feel that we should move rapidly to conclude the two-year extension of the Defense Agreement on the terms agreed with the Spanish, as the best available package at the present time. But we should recognize that an era has come to an end. Our future relationship with Spain will depend on an entirely new series of negotiations, for the Spanish have put us on notice that they will no longer accept a lessor/lessee relationship and hope to move up to cooperation extending beyond the military sphere into political, economic, scientific, educational, and cultural fields.

In the immediate future, therefore, our task will be to take a new look at the entire Spanish base question, returning to the fundamental question of what the bases are worth to us in the context of a broader and longer-term relationship with Spain. This new look would include a complete review of the military need for the bases in Spain and a projection of that need into the future. We also should explore acceptable terms for a new agreement with the Spanish which would place our relationship in a broader context.

Recommendations

1. That you approve the conclusion of a two-year renewal of the 1953 Defense Agreement with Spain through September 1970, with a “quid” of \$50 million in grant military aid and \$35 million in credits, and authorize State to work out the details with the Spanish, clearing the final package with me.

2. That you authorize a study of what our relationship with Spain should be in the decade of the 1970s, using the National Security Council mechanism for final decision.⁶

⁶ The President initialed the Approve option under both recommendations.

284. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 6, 1969.

SUBJECT

Spanish Bases

With reference to our telephone conversation today,² I called Aguirre de Carcer and told him that the President was very pleased that we had been able to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding on renewal of the base agreement; that the President also desired to reaffirm his expressions of regard for Spain and desire to maintain a truly friendly relationship which he had expressed to Foreign Minister Castiella on the occasion of his call last March, and would be looking forward with interest to the Spaniards' thoughts on how this relationship can be maintained and strengthened during the course of the discussions contemplated by the understanding that has now been reached.³

Aguirre de Carcer expressed his sincere thanks and appreciation for the message, stating that it is "a good omen" for the future.

My statement to you that I had not detected any unhappiness or dissatisfaction on the Spanish side with the agreement, nor had they expressly or impliedly referred to any unhappiness with Senator Fulbright's statement,⁴ was confirmed by Country Director Landau's informal conversation with Aguirre de Carcer following my last meeting with him today. However, I feel that the President's message was very helpful and useful.

As I also told you, I told Aguirre that if the Foreign Minister desired, we would be very pleased to announce at the time the agreement is signed (probably Wednesday, June 11)⁵ that Secretary Rogers had in-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential; Nodis.

² No record of this discussion was found.

³ A summary of this conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96D695, Telecons, June 1969.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ After further discussion with Spanish officials, the exchange of notes extending the 1953 agreement took place on June 20. The Department of State reported on discussion between Rogers and Castiella following the ceremony in telegram 102136 to Madrid, June 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US) During these talks, Rogers presented the Spanish Foreign Minister with a letter from Nixon to Franco. The text transmitted in telegram 102138 to Madrid is *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres.

vited the Foreign Minister to Washington to a meeting on July 15 to open negotiations on the new arrangements that the Spanish Government envisaged. (The Foreign Minister has already been invited to observe the launching of Apollo XI at Cape Kennedy on July 16.) I told Aguirre that it seemed to me this would be far preferable to having the Foreign Minister come here on June 11 simply to sign the agreement, because at that time Secretary Rogers, who will have just returned from Midway,⁶ will be so pressed with other engagements that it will be physically impossible for him to receive and treat the Foreign Minister in the way that the Secretary would desire.

For your information, Aguirre very privately informed me that he suspected there will be some reorganization in the Spanish Government within the next few weeks, possibly including for the first time the appointment of a Prime Minister, and that Foreign Minister Castiella may be replaced. However, Aguirre indicated that this would not be the result of Spanish dissatisfaction over our base negotiations, which the Foreign Minister considered a political plus for himself, but rather the result of internal factors.

U. Alexis Johnson⁷

⁶ Rogers accompanied Nixon when he met with South Vietnamese President Thieu, June 8.

⁷ Johnson initialed "AJ" above his typed signature.

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, August 1, 1969, 2101Z.

3101. Subject: Succession—Chief of State.

1. At his invitation, I called today on Prince Juan Carlos at Zarzuela Palace. Meeting lasted 45 minutes. I found Prince candid, eager to talk about matters relating to his being named Prince of Spain, and plans for immediate future. I presented Prince model of Apollo XI "Eagle" and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 SP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Lisbon.

an F-100 model in name of President Nixon. Prince will write President directly.²

2. Juan Carlos said many monarchists have said to him that Don Juan was their first choice to which Juan Carlos replies "he was mine too." Prince then recounted following chronology: he had asked for audience with Franco in April but had not been received by time he went to see his parents in Estoril in June. At Estoril he told his father that Madrid was buzzing with rumors Franco planned to name him, Juan Carlos, heir to throne. These rumors reinforced by certain Cabinet ministers inquiring of Juan Carlos about his plans for the summer. Prince told his father that both of them, in his opinion, would know Franco's intentions at about the same time. Juan Carlos said to me, parenthetically, that Franco would not have embarrassed him by telling him early and making him keep a secret from his father. Juan Carlos told his mother when she visited Madrid in late June that he still had no hint of Franco's plans. Juan Carlos praised his mother to me and talked of her help and influence in Juan Carlos' relationship with his father. On July 14, according Juan Carlos, Don Juan telephoned him. Juan Carlos reported to Don Juan that he still had heard nothing from Franco but rumors were thickening. On the morning of July 15 the Pardo called Juan Carlos for an audience that afternoon. Franco told Juan Carlos at that audience that he would name him Prince of Spain and successor on July 22. On July 16 Franco's letter was delivered to Don Juan reporting the Caudillo's decision.

3. Juan Carlos said his father was deeply hurt now, but as a realist would in time accept the situation. Juan Carlos attributes part of Don Juan's problem as being Motrico's failure keep Don Juan up to date on rumors and happenings in Madrid. Also Don Juan believes, according to son, that latter knew of Franco's intentions all along. This Juan Carlos denies.

It is obvious that Juan Carlos dislikes Motrico and believes him to have given bad advice to his father. Prince told of Motrico departing Spanish Embassy in Paris about five years ago telling everyone he was promised high post (perhaps Premier) in GOS. Only when appointment failed to materialize did Motrico, then bitter at regime, contact Don Juan in Estoril with offer to work for him. Juan Carlos makes no secret his feelings that Don Juan would have been well advised to have rejected Motrico's offer.

² Reference is presumably to a reply to the congratulatory message that Nixon sent to Juan Carlos following his July 23 investiture as "Prince of Spain" and legal successor to Franco. No copy was found; however, its contents are summarized in telegram 2993 from Madrid, July 24. (Ibid., RG 84, Madrid Embassy Files, POL 7 Visits)

4. Prince said he feels he must look to future not to past, that he knows monarchy not “popular”, and that it is his job to build a workable modern monarchy with popular support. I strongly endorsed need popular support from my own experience in U.S. politics. I respectfully added that I thought Juan Carlos should concentrate on gaining support of Spanish youth and working class. Juan Carlos drafted his speech to Cortes—first speech he had ever made before an important group—with look to future, not past. He regards ovation to Princess Sophia, after he had left Cortes, as indication of support for him more telling than ovation directly after his speech when he shared platform with Franco.

5. Juan Carlos candidly stated that Spain’s image abroad too long has been centered on person of Generalissimo. He and Princess plan to make trips to major capitals—hopefully including Washington, to project image of new Spain. I mentioned importance of his wife traveling with him to underline family image.

6. Prince’s immediate plans are to go to La Coruna, where Franco is vacationing, next week and stay until August 9. He said he does not yet know what he will do at La Coruna and that he has not yet been asked to sit in on Council of Ministers meeting there. He doubts he will come to San Sebastian so he plans to sail at Mallorca August 14–16 and August 24 with trials before each race. Juan Carlos said he has been in touch with Bob Mosbacher, brother of the Chief of Protocol, who will also be at the Mallorca races.

7. Juan Carlos appears eager for contact with U.S. He told me to call on him whenever I liked on substantive matters without asking permission from MFA. If you ask, he said, they will only tell you they don’t know and if they disapprove they will simply tell me (Juan Carlos) not to discuss such matters with you the next time. In this connection, the Prince asked to be included in any briefing given GOS on President Nixon’s trip (septel).³

8. I discussed my schedule over next two months with Prince and mentioned I would be in Washington for policy-level discussions on U.S.-Spanish bases in early September. I said that this is particularly sensitive period for bases issue and hoped that any statements by high GOS officials would be made with that in mind. Prince took the point and agreed readily.

9. *Comment:* I was again impressed by Juan Carlos’ interest and intelligence as well as by how sensitive he is to the political limitations of his present situation. He is somewhat naive but I take that to be a function of his youth and lack of practical political experience. Juan Carlos

³ Telegram 3097 from Madrid, August 1. (Ibid.)

may or may not survive the stresses of post-Franco Spain, but I am sure he intends to try, by his own lights, to modernize Spanish politics and hopefully govern Spain.

10. I was accompanied by Harry Bergold⁴ who was in the room during most all of the conference.

Hill

⁴ A member of the Political Section of the Embassy.

286. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, December 12, 1969, 1605Z.

5056. Subj: Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand's conversation with Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo.

1. Following is summary of conversation by Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand and Ambassador Hill with Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo December 9. Full text memcon being pouched.²

2. After amenities, FonMin expressed full confidence in Ambassador Hill and said he had had several useful talks with Ambassador on matters mutual interest. While much can be done through Ambassadorial channel, he said it necessary for policy makers meet frequently so problems can be solved. Lopez Bravo noted he disappointed by lack progress on base negotiations. Asst Sec Hillenbrand then described policy review of strategy and bases now underway, and expressed hope decisions regarding US military requirements in Spain would be forthcoming in early 1970. Then, he continued, US would be prepared enter meaningful talks with GOS. FonMin replied as far as he concerned Sept. 26, 1970 very close, "It is the day after tomorrow."

3. Sec Hillenbrand explained need examine these matters on world-wide and then on European-wide basis, and he pointed out need to secure Congressional support before entering into agreement with foreign government. Lopez Bravo commented he had full power nego-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis.

² Not found.

tiate for Spain, and delay in defining problem serves no purpose since political atmosphere both countries is deteriorating. He emphasized that he has full authority negotiate.

4. Turning to \$50 million military aid item, Lopez Bravo said as far as he was concerned US had entered into solemn engagement; and that he felt certain matter was in good hands.

5. Sec Hillenbrand described highlights NATO meeting³ pointing up themes which emerged as meeting highlights: progress on European security conference and mutual force reductions; Sec [garble—Rogers's] pledge US will maintain US combat forces in Europe at present level through June 1971; progress within NDAC and NPG toward greater understanding nuclear strategy by European leaders; and more positive attitude present French Government leaders on NATO political affairs.

6. Lopez Bravo gave Sec Hillenbrand and Ambassador aide-mémoire expressing GOS policy on security conference (copy pouched).

7. FonMin asked for US attitude on proposal expel Greece from Council of Europe.⁴ Sec Hillenbrand noted US not member Council, that matter had come up in bi-lateral talks in Brussels, described continuing US efforts foster revolutionary process in Greece. FonMin urged US use its influence with London and in other key European capitals to prevent them taking action which could have serious consequences. He said he certain Greeks would not wait for resolution condemning them, but would withdraw suddenly and with great emotion. Later Greeks might decide withdraw or disengage from NATO.

8. After Ambassador asked FonMin whether he had matters to raise, Lopez Bravo said he wanted to convey to senior authorities in Washington seriousness Spain's bid for EEC affiliation and eventual membership and Spanish inability understand unfavorable US attitude. He dismissed trade preference arrangement as "scheme."⁵ Sec Hillenbrand explained Spain's case only one of number that could establish precedent harmful to US trade relations. Lopez Bravo rejected this argument, noted US favorable balance trade with Spain, and said US should recognize Spain as unique case. FonMin recalled that when Minister Industry he had created favorable market position for US pe-

³ The meeting was held in Brussels December 4–5. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 29, 1969, pp. 627–630. See also Document 26.

⁴ On December 12, Greece withdrew from membership in the Council of Europe. The decision was taken after a majority of member states lined up in support of a German resolution suspending the Greek Government.

⁵ Documentation relating to U.S. policy toward a preferential trade agreement between Spain and the EC is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972. See also Document 292.

troleum companies whose sales now cost Spain several hundred million dollars each year. While he did not want his statements taken as threat or menace, Lopez Bravo said he wanted Washington policy makers to know if discriminatory action taken against Spain in GATT or elsewhere he could stop Spanish purchases from American petroleum firms and US favorable balance of trade would end. Sec Hillenbrand said he understood seriousness of Spanish policy in this regard, and he assured FonMin US seeks friendly relations in every sphere and that his views would be conveyed to appropriate officials.

9. Finally, Sec Hillenbrand said US had been giving careful attention to Spanish request for credit to buy F-4 planes, and he felt he could now convey to FonMin information there was good reason expect favorable reply within next week or ten days. FonMin expressed thanks for information, and in parting requested Sec Hillenbrand take back to Washington phrase "Sept. 26 is only day after tomorrow".

Hill

287. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 46¹

Washington, December 31, 1969.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN NSSM 46

[Omitted here is the outline and the table of contents.]

I. Introduction

Spain is in a period of transition. General Franco, who has held power for 30 years, still controls the government, but he is showing the effects of age and can no longer devote the same personal attention to every phase of government activity that he has during his long rule. To provide for an orderly succession, he has named Prince Juan Carlos to become Chief of State upon his death or retirement. He has recently appointed a new, younger cabinet whose leading members demonstrate a great interest in economic modernization and closer ties with Western Europe. It is thus an appropriate moment, as Spain moves into the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-147, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 46. Secret. The report is 36 pages long. NSSM 46 is Document 279.

post-Franco era, to examine our Spanish policy alternatives from a broad viewpoint and over a period of years.

Spain's system of government can still be described as essentially authoritarian, although it has generally evolved during the last few years towards more tolerance. Independent labor unions and political parties (except for the "National Movement") are forbidden. There are still considerable restrictions on the freedom of the press and freedom of association. Somewhat less than one-fifth of the membership of the Cortes (Parliament) is popularly elected. Despite the disturbances precipitated mainly by university students and young priests, and, to a lesser extent, workers, most Spaniards are apolitical and many sectors have a strong interest in stability and order. The generation which lived through the Spanish Civil War is largely fearful of any violence and political disruption. The emerging middle class, the product of a sustained period of economic growth, has a stake in the status quo.

The new Cabinet, appointed last October 29, represents a shift of the balance of power in favor of a group of "technocrats" whose emphasis is on progressive business, economic planning, and modernization. They have expressed interest in closer ties with Western Europe and the United States. It is not expected that the new Cabinet will press for political liberalization, but rather a modernization of the government, especially in economic policy. The two strongest figures in the government next to Franco are Vice President Carrero Blanco and Economic Minister Lopez Rodo. It seems probable that one of them may eventually succeed Franco in his capacity as Head of Government. If so, we could expect to see a continuation of the ascendancy of the "technocrats" over the Falangists, military, and other elements represented in the government.

The United States has various interests in Spain which can be categorized generally as political, economic, and security. The country's geographic position makes a Western-oriented Spain of crucial importance for Western security in Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. Though not a member of NATO, Spain makes a major contribution to the Western security system through the facilities it offers to U.S. air and naval forces. Spain and the United States share an interest in strengthening the defense of the West and share a concern over the expanding Soviet influence in the Arab World and the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Spain's policy of support for the Arab countries would probably preclude U.S. use of the Spanish bases in any Arab-Israeli confrontation. In general, it can be said that our security interest in Spain relates directly to our defense strategy for the greater area rather than to Spain in itself.

Because of our need for military facilities, the United States has had an interest in political stability in Spain, since GOS support for our

security interests might not be present in an unstable situation. At the same time, there is a U.S. interest in seeing Spain become closer to Western Europe. This implies an interest in political liberalization, so that Spain will become more politically acceptable to the Western European community. We support Spanish entry into NATO, as a solution to the problem of Spanish defense, to enable Spain to participate more effectively in the Western defense scheme, and as a means of integrating Spain into Europe. Various NATO allies continue to oppose Spanish entry, however, on political grounds. Our ultimate goal remains to get Spain into NATO, which possibility may arise after Franco's death. In the interim, if and when Gibraltar becomes a less divisive issue between Spain and the UK, we might explore again the possibility of establishing a low-level contact through a liaison relationship between Spain and a NATO command in the area of special Spanish interest (IBERLANT, MARAIRMED).

The United States supports the movement toward unity in Western Europe. On the other hand, the U.S. opposes limited preferential trade agreements between the EC and non-members, as we consider that these are damaging to U.S. exports and impair the integrity of GATT. Spain and the EC are presently negotiating a limited preferential trade agreement. The U.S. has considerable bilateral economic interests in Spain, being the largest supplier of goods to Spain (\$590 million in 1968), the largest market for Spanish exports (\$279 million in 1968) and having investments there totalling \$500–600 million.

Relations between Spain and the United States have, since 1953, been based largely upon the existence of and our continuing need for joint-use military facilities in Spain. The U.S., in the early days of the Defense Agreement, sponsored Spain's return to international respectability. Likewise, Spain was at that time dependent upon the U.S. for economic and military support. During the intervening years we have worked closely with the Spanish government, while maintaining discreet contact with the opposition to be aware of the full spectrum of Spanish opinion.

Spain today is in a fundamentally different situation from that of 1953. A period of sustained and significant economic growth has put the country back on its feet economically. Spain is an active member of the UN, the OECD, and other international organizations and has a far greater role than before in the world political arena. GOS expressions of the desire for a new kind of relationship with the U.S. in the future reflect its greater independence.

Two immediate policy issues must be faced—the future of US-Spanish base agreements, and our attitude toward an imminent Spanish-EC limited preferential trade agreement. The first of these, which is the more significant, will require a decision as to whether or

not we should seek to retain military rights and facilities either at the present level or in reduced form in Spain after the present agreements expire in September, 1970.

The options are: to attempt to retain these facilities to the maximum extent, to reduce them in various alternative ways, and to withdraw our military presence from Spain.

Spanish officials have expressed a desire for a new, broader US-Spanish relationship with emphasis on other than military aspects. In particular, they have asked for our support in a far-reaching education reform plan, which, if implemented successfully, will have the effect of modernizing the educational structure of the country. In any event, our bilateral relations with Spain over the past years have been good. They can be expected to remain good with or without a new defense agreement, as long as the other elements of our overall policy are based on realistic objectives and an accurate appraisal of the politics and economics of Spain now and in the near future.

[Omitted here are Sections II, Issues and Analysis, and III, Alternative Policy Options; and Annexes A through D.]

288. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Negotiations on Spanish Bases

The Spanish base issue is again becoming an urgent matter. You will recall that the agreement providing for U.S. facilities and rights in Spain will expire in September 1970 and that efforts to arrive at an agreement last spring were abortive. Therefore, negotiations for an agreement providing for the status of U.S. military presence in Spain in the 70s must begin soon. At the moment, we still have no agreed-upon negotiating position and decisions will have to be taken very soon on the type of military relationship we need and want with Spain for the 70s. We will also need an assessment of which facilities in Spain are re-

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 704, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. I. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action.

quired in the light of a realistic judgment of our ability to offer an acceptable quid pro quo.

Last year, it became evident that the future of our bases in Spain is a highly charged issue, both within the bureaucracy and on the Hill. There are elements both within State and the Congress who will do their utmost to terminate our presence there. This attitude has surfaced most recently with respect to the timing of our formal negotiations with the Spanish. Our Ambassador to Spain and the Deputy Commander of our Forces in Europe strongly support the initiation of negotiations very soon, while State is inclined to begin them later. Both Ambassador Hill and General Burchinal believe that the Spanish are eager to conclude an agreement soon and that we should make every effort to do so before the Symington Subcommittee hearings consider the Spanish issue with all the hoopla that will ensue.² State, on the other hand, feels that the effects of the Symington Subcommittee hearings will be bad regardless of when the negotiations occur. All seem to agree, however, that the negotiations should be conducted in Madrid.

Since the Symington Subcommittee hearings on Spain are scheduled for February, I believe we should press to prepare the U.S. negotiating position this month so that negotiations can begin not later than February 1 before the Symington Subcommittee hearings occur and I am proceeding accordingly within the NSC framework.

It is very apparent that I will have to exercise some unusual leverage in the development of the NSC paper on Spain if you are to be presented with an objective formulation of options for your decision. In order to insure that I am proceeding in a manner responsive to your wishes, I would like to confirm my understanding of what I consider to be the essential ingredients of any acceptable policy option which you would wish to approve. These involve options which would:

—Not jeopardize the maintenance of continued good relations between the U.S. and the Government of Spain for the 70s.

—Provide for a continued, although perhaps scaled down U.S. military presence in Spain.³

² Reference to the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Hearings on the Spanish base agreements held by the Committee on Foreign Relations, August 26, 1970, were printed as United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Spanish Base Agreement*.

³ The President initialed the Approve option. The date "Jan 12 1970" is stamped under his initials.

289. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, January 16, 1970, 2:50–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Spain (NSSM 46)²

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

William I. Cargo

Martin J. Hillenbrand

Donald McHenry

Defense

G. Warren Nutter

CIA

Edward W. Proctor

JCS

Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger

OEP

Haakon Lindjord

USIA

Henry Loomis

Commerce

Kenneth N. Davis

STR

Carl J. Gilbert

NSC Staff

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

C. Fred Bergsten

Richard T. Kennedy

Jeanne W. Davis

Arthur T. Downey

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. State and Defense should revise the basic paper³ by January 23, to include:

- base packages in order of priority with a rough estimate of the sustainable quid pro quos in each instance;
- the costs of relocating elsewhere;
- the source of funds for an educational assistance program.

2. The economic question should be presented to the President in relation to the bases issue, making it clear that the only reason for being soft on the economic issue would be if it were linked to the bases issue.

3. The issues would be presented in a memorandum to the President from the Review Group, attaching the letter from the Secretary of Commerce, unless any of the NSC principals wished to request an NSC meeting.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

² Document 279.

³ Document 287.

4. A separate paper would be prepared by State and submitted in "a few weeks" on the future evolution of the Iberian Peninsula, including the direction in which we want the Spanish to go, the range of choices, and the extent to which we can influence their course.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

290. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Spain: Base Negotiations

In my memo to you of January 3² I reported that we were proceeding within the NSC framework to formulate issues for your decision leading to early negotiations with the Spanish on the future of our military presence there. A Review Group memorandum setting forth the key issues and options is attached at Tab A.³ Secretaries Rogers and Laird have sent you separate memoranda (Tabs B and C) indicating their recommendations.

Background

Spain seems to have entered a transition phase leading to the post-Franco era. Neither the pace nor the outcome of Spain's political evolution is foreordained, though it is expected that a basically authoritarian regime will continue. Spain's foreign policy has taken on a new energy and direction. The principal tendencies are a forceful orientation toward Europe—Spain wants to become part of Europe—and a desire for a broader and more dignified relationship with the United States. These goals are compatible with U.S. interests, whereas Spanish interests in the Middle East and Latin America tend to conflict somewhat with ours.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 704, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. The tabs are not printed. In an attached February 3 note, Kissinger wrote: "Mr. President: I apologize for the length of this package. The importance and complexity of this subject required a rather extensive treatment for you to receive a proper presentation of the issues."

² Document 288.

³ This paper was a revised version of Document 287.

Spanish attitudes towards the U.S. have changed measurably in the last 15 years. The U.S. was instrumental in bringing Spain out of its isolation after World War II; the visible link with the U.S. was our military presence, as recorded in the Base Agreement of 1953. That Agreement has been extended several times, and will expire in September of this year. Thus, we must now decide the nature and extent of our future military relationship with Spain; negotiations should begin as soon as possible. The negotiations will be difficult because the Spanish are in a position to insist on a substantial quid pro quo, while our ability to offer financial assistance is more limited. A complicating factor is that we will have to express the U.S. view of the draft Spanish-EEC preferential trade agreement by mid-February during the annual GATT session. If we oppose the agreement, our base negotiations will be made more difficult; if we accept it, our global trade policy will greatly suffer. Thus, while this issue is separable and is treated in another memo, its resolution will have an impact on the negotiations.

The Bases and Their Importance

The U.S. military presence in Spain involves about 9,000 personnel located at four principal bases:

—Rota: operating base for nine [*less than 1 line not declassified*] submarines and a support base for Navy [*less than 1 line not declassified*] logistics [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in the Mediterranean;

—Zaragoza: air base in caretaker status which could be used as a training range for U.S. aircraft in Europe in the face of the denial of Wheelus;

—Moron and Torrejon: operating and support air bases [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Under present arrangements [*3 lines not declassified*] Spanish authorities have not permitted nuclear overflights since the 1966 Palomares incident.⁴

It has been difficult to assign a value or to state the degree of importance of our current facilities. Necessity of retaining a given military capability in the light of advanced technology, cost of relocation, availability of alternative sites, and political sensitivity are all involved. For example, [*2½ lines not declassified*] Similarly, it is desirable to retain the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing at Torrejon in terms of pilot morale, but the function could be performed from the U.S. (as it was prior to 1966) or from other European bases (such as Italy), and in Spanish eyes the pres-

⁴ A U.S. B-52 aircraft carrying four nuclear devices collided in mid-air with a KC-135 aircraft over the village of Palomares on January 17, 1966. Three of the nuclear devices landed on Spanish soil and one fell into the sea. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XII, Western Europe, Documents 189–191, 194, 195, and 207.

ence of these aircraft just 10 miles outside of Madrid is politically highly sensitive.

The Defense Department considers all present facilities of great importance, and indeed would like to add the increased use of a training range, because of the loss of Wheelus in Libya, [*1 line not declassified*] However, Defense has been unable to present or agree to a priority list of the facilities, although it has prepared a number of illustrative arrangements in descending order of military desirability (Tab A, pp 17-22). My staff has prepared a review of the base priorities, and ranked them in order of necessity, desirability and convenience (Tab D). The priority ranking is quite comparable to a similar list drawn up by State (Tab A, p. 9, and Secretary Rogers' memo at Tab B), and is consistent with what I understand are the views of Budget Director Mayo. According to this study, really *necessary* activities could be continued with a U.S. presence of only a small fraction of its current level, whereas if *desirable* activities were included, a U.S. presence of about two-thirds (6,000) of present levels would be required.

In short, there is general agreement that the facilities are of value to us, but there is no agreement on which facilities are more important than others. I gather that DOD's inability to agree to priorities is a function of the differing viewpoints between the Navy and Air Force.

The Spanish Position

Whereas the U.S. bases once were a mark of respectability for Spain, the bases have more recently become more controversial. The presence of foreign forces in Spain without the accompanying satisfaction of a security guarantee (through NATO or bilaterally) make Spain appear as a satellite of the U.S., and may appear to the Spanish to decrease the flexibility and independence in foreign affairs to which they aspire. Though some Spanish authorities argue that removal of the bases would be popular in Spain, it is probably more accurate to say there is a general lack of enthusiasm for them among the Spanish public.

The Spanish have indicated that they do not wish to endanger our basic security, and so will understand our need for certain essential facilities. They have made clear, however, that they will be receptive only to our genuine requirements which only the special Spanish geography can fulfill. They will resist facilities which are merely convenient. If we wish to maintain our present facilities, the State Department expects the Spanish to seek in excess of \$250 million in grant military assistance and sales credits (over five years), assistance in educational reform, and support for their trade agreement with the EEC and other economic concessions. This is consistent with Ambassador Hill's reports. In general, State is considerably less optimistic than Defense as to Spain's willingness to agree to grant us extensive facilities.

How Do We Pay for the Bases?

It will be difficult to secure grant military assistance. Indeed, we have just informed the Spanish that we will be able to pay at this time only \$25 million of the \$50 million we promised at the time of the conclusion last year of the present extension of the base agreement. Congress failed to provide the MAP funds requested for Spain in FY 1970. I understand that Budget Director Mayo considers that MAP funded military assistance to Spain should be avoided if possible, but if unavoidable, not more than \$5–10 million per year should be offered; he considers it possible to offer in the range of \$25–50 million in Ex-Im Bank military credits.

A very valuable quid pro quo for the Spanish would be some form of link with NATO (full membership being impossible during Franco's tenure). State is not optimistic about this possibility. (The British and Scandinavians reject any NATO link for Spain, but we should probably consider a fresh initiative.) A bilateral security arrangement with the U.S. is generally considered infeasible because of U.S. Senate attitudes. Our willingness to broaden the base of our relations and make the military ties less obvious by negotiating a general treaty of cooperation would be well received by the Spanish. Such a treaty, covering scientific and educational cooperation as well as military, would offer added prestige to our relationship.

On the economic side, Spain would wish our acquiescence in their preferential trade agreement with the EEC, our support for LDC treatment for Spain under a worldwide generalized preferences scheme, and better treatment under our foreign direct investment tax regulations. The first of these would be the most difficult for us.

The Options

All concerned support an attempt to retain the maximum possible level of U.S. military presence in Spain. No one believes that a reduction has a positive value per se. There are two options, one supported by State and the other supported by Defense. They are more in the nature of negotiating tactics, than basic policy divisions.

Option 1. To negotiate with the objective of retaining all of our current military arrangements in Spain, plus expanded use of the weapons training range [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Laird recommends this option (Tab C). He feels that while some activities could be performed elsewhere, the quality of the Spanish facilities could not be duplicated, and that in any event relocation would be costly and time consuming. He feels that it is premature to reduce our posture merely because of the anticipated Spanish demand for unacceptably high quid pro quo. The Spanish cannot be expected to make known their demands, he argues, until the negotiations

have commenced. Only then should decisions be made to reduce our presence if it is clear that the Spanish insist that we reduce or that we cannot afford to pay their price.

Secretary Rogers considers this option inflexible (Tab B). He argues that to seek the retention of all existing facilities and ask for additions would cause the Spanish to present us with impossibly high demands, from which Spanish pride would prevent them from receding. The 1968–69 negotiations failed, he feels, for exactly that reason.

Option 2. Negotiate on the basis that we seek a degree of military presence less than the full amount in Option 1.

Secretary Rogers recommends this option, which he considers offers the flexibility necessary to give greater assurance of successful negotiations. The initial position would be to seek the maximum (minus the air base at Moron—now scheduled to be placed on caretaker status) consistent with our ability to pay the requisite quid pro quo. We should be prepared to reduce our request in order to retain our most important rights and facilities.

Your Decisions

It is necessary for you now to make the basic decision between the two options presented, taking account of the fact that our principal objective is to ensure that we retain, at a minimum, our most important rights and facilities in Spain. It is probably not realistic to believe that we can retain all we now have.

To seek the maximum (plus additional facilities) would probably substantially increase the risk that the negotiations will either abort or be quite protracted. The latter possibility will be dangerous in light of the Symington hearings; the former will harm our security interests. Moreover, to begin negotiations with even more than the 1968 shopping list would seem to the Spanish as if we were simply trying to use Spain and were insensitive to the new directions of Spanish policies. That would not be the best method of establishing a more dignified and honest relationship with the Spaniards.

It is important for our overall objectives and also for these negotiations to place emphasis on a renewed attempt to forge a link between Spain and NATO, and to broaden the scope of our bilateral relationship with Spain. While the NATO link may not prove possible, it is questionable whether an adequate effort to achieve it has been made.

The most important immediate step is for the Government to be clear now about the nature and extent of the quid pro quo which can be offered in the negotiations, sustained over the term of any agreement, and which will avoid an impasse with Congress. Of equal importance is achieving inter-agency agreement on the priorities to be assigned to each facility (taking into account military requirements, duplication or

relocation costs, and political sensitivities) for use as fall backs to a more limited military presence. These steps are necessary to prepare a detailed negotiating position that conforms to your basic approach of maintaining good relations with Spain through the 1970's and retaining a military presence though reduced if necessary.

*Recommendations*⁵

That you approve the following basic choice and consequent steps which when completed will permit drafting of a negotiating position:

1. We should seek to retain as many of the present and desired military rights and facilities as are possible within the limits of a sustainable quid pro quo; negotiations to this end should not be protracted.

2. Prompt agreement should be reached within the Government on a sustainable quid pro quo and on priorities to be accorded to each facility.

3. Priorities and sustainable quid pro quo should be agreed through the DPRC in the context of five-year force and budget projections.

4. With the aim of seeking continued good relations with the Government of Spain through the 1970's, a course of action should be developed with respect to concluding a general treaty of cooperation, and to renewed efforts to develop a Spanish link with NATO.

⁵The President initialed the Approve option after each of the four recommendations.

291. National Security Decision Memorandum 43¹

Washington, February 20, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT

US Policy Toward Spain: Base Negotiations

With reference to the Memorandum of January 26 to the Chairman, NSC Review Group,² and the memoranda to the President from the Secretary of State (January 27), the Secretary of Defense (January 30), and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (February 2),³ the President has decided, with respect to the negotiations with the Spanish, that:

1. We should seek to retain as many of the present and desired military rights and facilities as are possible within the limits of a sustainable quid pro quo; negotiations to this end should not be protracted.

2. Prompt agreement should be reached within the Government on a quid pro quo which can be offered in the negotiations, sustained over the term of the agreement, and which will avoid an impasse with Congress; similarly, prompt agreement should be reached on priorities to be accorded to each facility, taking into account military requirements, duplication or relocation costs and political sensitivities. Priorities should be agreed through the DPRC in the context of five-year force and budget projections, and the quid pro quo should be agreed through the Under Secretaries Committee.

3. With the aim of seeking continued good relations with the Government of Spain through the 1970's, a course of action should be developed with respect to concluding a general treaty of cooperation, and to renewed efforts to develop a Spanish link with NATO.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-214, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 43. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Not found.

³ These memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-147, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 46.

292. National Security Decision Memorandum 45¹

Washington, March 2, 1970.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Spain: Proposed Spanish Trade Agreement with the
European Community

The President has decided that the United States will oppose the Spain-European Community trade agreement as presently proposed, in the context of opposition to all preferential arrangements illegal under the international trading rules of the GATT. We would, however, indicate our acceptance of any arrangement consistent with the GATT rules which Spain and the EC might work out, such as one which provides a definite plan and schedule for the formation of a free trade area within a reasonable length of time. The United States would not seek compensation in return for accepting such a legal arrangement, nor would it seek exception of particular items from the arrangement.

The President also decided that there was no need for any decision on a fallback position at this time.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) Nos. 1 through 50. Secret.

293. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations

Objective:

You requested² that the Under Secretaries Committee prepare recommendations on agreed quid pro quo that can be offered to the Spanish in the forthcoming base negotiations. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Gregorio Lopez Bravo, plans to be in Washington on March 17 and 18. We request your approval of this memorandum as guidance for the Secretary of State in his exploratory discussions with the Spanish Foreign Minister. We will make further recommendations to you with regard to quid pro quo and consultations with Congressional leaders following Lopez Bravo's visit.

We have reviewed the continued requirements for our present facilities in Spain. It is our view that we would not want to abandon or dispense with any of these facilities and rights, even taking into account the projected stringencies of the Defense budget in the FY 72-76 period. We note, however, that the re-examination of U.S. strategy and forces for NATO directed by NSSM 84³ could, depending on your future decisions, alter our requirements for facilities in Spain.

We recognize that while retention of all of these facilities is desirable to support our current strategy, some are more important than others. Accordingly, a listing of priorities is being forwarded through the DPRC.⁴ This listing will indicate the relative importance of the various facilities. If during the course of negotiations it becomes necessary, because of limitations on the quid pro quo which we can offer or because of a Spanish desire for a reduced U.S. presence, to release or to move certain facilities out of Spain or to move to less visible locations in Spain, this list will serve as the guide to our negotiators.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969-1977, Lot 83D305, NSDM-43. Secret. The memorandum was cleared in the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Export-Import Bank.

² In NSDM 43, Document 291.

³ Document 25.

⁴ Not found.

Quid Pro Quo:

As recently as February 27⁵ the Spanish Ambassador speaking on instruction said that Spain did not consider money the primary quid pro quo in a new agreement, but that Spain had “abandoned the idea of granting bases for money.” He said, rather, that Spain wanted to put principal emphasis on obtaining a defense guarantee and protection with U.S. assistance through multilateral arrangements. The GOS, in terms of quid pro quo in the negotiations, he stated, is looking for “a multilateral solution based on the Atlantic or Mediterranean, provided a satisfactory agreement could be reached previous to the expiration of the present Agreements.”

1. NATO Link

Our ability to persuade our allies to accept a NATO-Spanish relationship will be an important element in the negotiations.

While we believe full Spanish membership in NATO will be strongly resisted for political reasons as long as Franco lives, an arrangement short of full membership may be palatable to our allies, if we are prepared to exert strong pressure on the grounds of the importance to NATO defense of our continued access to Spanish bases. Depending upon Spanish wishes, we could explore several kinds of arrangements:

- military liaison arrangements between Spain and those NATO commands in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, i.e. IBERLANT, and AFSOUTH (MARAIMED and/or AIRSOUTH);

- regular consultations between SACEUR and the Government of Spain on military matters of mutual interest;

- establishment of, and full Spanish participation in a “NATO-Iberian Training Complex,” enabling NATO forces to meet weapons training requirements at Spanish and Portuguese facilities, and which might involve the participation of the UK, FRG, Portugal, and Spain (and perhaps France, in granting the necessary overflight rights);

- enhanced political consultation, like current NATO/Malta arrangements;

- possible Spanish involvement in the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

British and German support would be a key to achieving any relationship, and we should be prepared to use all the influence which we can muster with them to achieve their consent. The main problems lie in the political opposition to Franco by the Socialist parties in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, and the UK.

⁵ The discussion was reported in telegram 30170 to Madrid, February 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 SP)

Tactically, we believe that before approaching our allies, we should discuss a possible "scenario" with the Spanish so that we would have a better idea of precisely what arrangements might be of interest to them. We expect Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo to visit Washington on March 17 and 18, and we could discuss all of the possible Spanish-NATO arrangements with him at that time. The Spanish may relate this more to their own desire to move towards Europe and use their own new activist "European" policy—including their rapprochement with France—to gain support from other countries for these arrangements. In any event, we should be prepared to make the strongest possible effort on behalf of a NATO-Spanish arrangement.

The Spanish clearly desire positive results from these NATO initiatives within the lifetime of our present Defense Agreement, i.e., September 1970. We may not, in fact, be able to make any of them materialize within that period. We must, therefore, get the Spanish Government to accept our earnest and sincere efforts as *quid pro quo* in itself.

2. General Cooperation Treaty

Spain has expressed an interest in a General Cooperation Treaty which, in addition to endorsing a continued base agreement, would largely affirm existing cooperative accords in the educational, scientific, space, atomic energy, and other fields. We are presently drafting such a treaty, which would be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. From the Spanish standpoint, the treaty would serve to dignify our bilateral relationship by dramatizing the broad scope of cooperative arrangements. It should, therefore, be helpful in reducing the amount of funds needed for *quid pro quo*. Care will have to be taken in the drafting of such a treaty to avoid language which might be construed by the Senate as involving additional defense commitments. For their part, the Spanish will be anxious to avoid prolonged and hostile Congressional debate.

3. Education Assistance

This is a most promising area for exploration. An important objective should be to strengthen the basic U.S. relationship with Spain through a major program of cooperative assistance to Spain's radical and comprehensive educational reform program. Spain has shown strong interest in U.S. support for its educational reform plan, which is expected to be approved by the Spanish Parliament in early April. The teacher training aspects of the plan would enable us to influence the shaping of Spanish youth for years to come. The Department of State is now spending about \$180,000 on academic exchanges with Spain. This existing program could be expanded to provide additional training in the United States for teachers and administrators and associated in-country assistance for education reform. Such assistance should be preceded by a joint review of Spain's education reform needs. We be-

lieve that \$1–\$5 million per year would let us play an effective role in the reforms. We would need to seek special funds for this program from Congress.

4. Base Payments

We believe that we should be prepared to pay up to \$25 million a year for the bases if it can be included in the Defense Department budget. This would be a proper method of funding, since it would in effect be payment for the maintenance of facilities that are important for U.S. defense and should not be subtracted from funds we count on for the regular military assistance program.

We believe that the first claim on increasingly hard to obtain MAP funds should be for assistance to our allies with whom we have mutual defense commitments. We have no such commitment with Spain, and have no intention of entering into any in the course of the base negotiations.

It should be recognized that the transfer of Spanish facility funding from MAP to the Defense budget might be objected to in the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress. In the past, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees have reacted against this type of funding. Such opposition may in part be overcome, however, by submitting the funding to Congressional review in the General Cooperation Treaty with Spain which would be submitted to the Senate.

If you approve, we will sound out the leaders of the key Congressional Committees on the possibility of Defense funding.

Financing base payments out of the Defense budget may, of course, pose other problems with Congress. At present there is no line-item in the budget for such purposes. In order to re-program funds it would be necessary to secure the approval of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, where resistance may be encountered.

If there is continued Congressional opposition to this approach, we will have to choose between making a major effort—personal efforts by the Secretaries of State and Defense, supplemented by the White House, to obtain Congressional acceptance of Defense funding—and resorting once again to MAP funding.

If, despite our best efforts it becomes necessary to turn to MAP funding, we should not agree to an amount higher than \$5–\$10 million per year, given the competing demands on MAP.

Additionally, excess stocks could be offered to provide a larger military assistance package, but the Spanish are not likely to give much weight to used material.

5. *Military Credits (Ex-Im Bank)*

Spain has shown an interest in Export-Import Bank credits for the purchase of F-4 aircraft. The Bank has earmarked \$85 million this fiscal year for that purpose, in addition to the \$35 million already promised during the last base agreement extension. Additionally, the Bank has outstanding \$445 million of credits and \$270 million of advance commitments for non-military items.

In the negotiations we should state that the Export-Import Bank will continue to consider sympathetically applications for credits involving military as well as non-military equipment and services.

6. *FDIP Reclassification*

The Spanish feel that our classification of Spain in Schedule C (developed countries) of the Foreign Direct Investment Program has reduced American investment in Spain to the detriment of the Spanish economy. They argue that they should have been put into Schedule A (less developed countries). They would undoubtedly be satisfied with a reclassification into Schedule B (countries heavily dependent on U.S. investment, such as the U.K.).

We are prepared to reclassify Spain from Schedule C to Schedule B. When this reclassification becomes public knowledge, other countries which in the past have requested reclassification will probably renew their requests. However, entirely apart from the Spanish question Commerce may consider a merger of Schedules B and C. Even if this is done subsequently, the position of Spain along with the other countries in Schedule C will be improved.

7. *Spain-EC Negotiations*

Our attitude toward Spain's negotiations for a preferential trade arrangement with the European Community will be an important factor in the base negotiations. In accordance with NSDM 45,⁷ we will oppose the Spanish-EC agreement as presently proposed, but will indicate our acceptance of any arrangement consistent with the GATT rules which Spain and the EC might work out, such as one which provides a definite plan and schedule for the formation of a free trade area within a reasonable length of time. If we can convince the Spanish that our position is designed to support their objective of closer ties to the EC we may succeed in mitigating the adverse effect on the base negotiations. If our position should result in the EC giving Spain a firm commitment on economic integration within a fixed period of time the Spanish might be pleased. If, however, the Spanish-EC agreement should not be consistent with GATT rules, we will require your decision on a fallback position.

⁷ Document 292.

In summary, it is evident that the intangible quid pro quo which we can offer the Spanish probably outweighs the tangible. The items of primary importance in the negotiations, therefore, are those which will build Spanish goodwill toward our continued presence, i.e., efforts to develop a NATO link and the offer of a general treaty of cooperation. To the extent that these give the Spanish a sense of partnership with the Western Alliance and with the U.S., we hope that they will weigh heavily in Spanish attitudes toward retention of our military facilities.⁸

Elliot L. Richardson⁹

⁸ In a March 13 memorandum to Richardson, Kissinger reported that the President had approved the recommendations in the Under Secretaries Committee's report. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council National Security Decision Memorandums, 1969–1977, Lot 83D276, NSC-U/DM-29)

⁹ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

294. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations, and Franco letter to the President

As you know, Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo was in Washington April 13–14 to continue negotiations on base facilities and the general cooperation agreement. He met with Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Johnson, as well as the Vice President and Secretaries Stans and Finch.² During his meeting with the Secretary, Lopez Bravo presented a letter from Franco to the President. A brief memo to the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres. No classification marking. Sent for action. The annotation "Haig for" in Haig's handwriting is on the first page.

² Lopez Bravo's discussions with Rogers and Johnson were reported in telegram 56295 to Madrid, April 16 (ibid.) and in telegrams 65025 and 56254, both April 14. (Both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 SP-US) No records of his other discussions were found.

President enclosing Franco's letter is at Tab A,³ should you want to forward it.

Lopez Bravo's visit had been preceded by a series of negotiating sessions between Alex Johnson and Spanish Ambassador Arguelles, during which we exchanged preliminary drafts of the proposed general agreement of cooperation.⁴ Lt. General Diez Alegria also came to Washington last week and brought with him the defense portion of the agreement. The following main differences still remain on the text of the agreement:

- more precision is needed on the degree of internal physical control we would have on the premises of the base facilities;

- the disposition of the residual value of the US investment in the bases; the Spanish would like us to give them clear title now;

- the method of making changes in the use of the facilities; the Spanish insist on express agreement, and we want consultations only;

- although we have agreed to drop the provision in the current agreement permitting automatic reaction by our forces in the event of imminent attack, and have accepted the necessity of prior consultation, we are insisting that it must be clear that without consultation U.S. forces could defend themselves if attacked;

- finally, the Spanish appear to insist on retaining the language of the 1963 joint declaration which comes very close to implying a U.S. security commitment to Spain; to continue this language would cause us difficulties with Congress.

One significant breakthrough was Lopez Bravo's statement that his government was willing to have us maintain all our present facilities, as we had requested. However, this acceptance in principle does not mean that we will in fact be able to retain all facilities. Lopez Bravo hastened to add to his statement that in return Spain wished security through material assistance since we could not offer a security commitment. Alex Johnson and Ambassador Arguelles will meet on April 20⁵ to begin talks on how we compensate the Spanish for the facilities on which Lopez Bravo said Spain would be "flexible." The hard bar-

³ Not printed. Franco's April 10 letter was in response to a March 18 message from Nixon given to Lopez Bravo during his March 17–18 meetings with U.S. officials in Washington. Both messages stressed the respective heads of state's desire for progress on base negotiations. Both are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres.

⁴ The United States presented a draft of a bilateral agreement on April 10. It was described in telegram 53015 to Madrid, April 10. (*Ibid.*, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. II) Initial discussions with Spanish officials were reported in telegram 51926 to Madrid, April 9. (*Ibid.*)

⁵ Their meeting was reported in telegram 59226 to Madrid, April 21. (*Ibid.*)

gaining will follow, and it is possible that we may have to scale down our base requirements.

Lopez Bravo was successful in his attempt to secure an announcement at the end of his visit that the U.S. had decided to reclassify Spain into a more beneficial category in our Foreign Direct Investment Program. This will facilitate U.S. companies wishing to invest in Spain, but it will also lead to pressure on us from other countries seeking a better status under the program. We had hoped to use this re-classification as a bargaining point later during the negotiations, but Lopez Bravo successfully insisted that it not be linked to the defense agreement.

On the question of the Spanish-EC preferential trade agreement, Lopez Bravo told Secretary Stans that Spain considered the agreement consistent with GATT, and assured him that U.S. trade would not suffer. Secretary Stans said that we still lacked adequate information on the agreement to take a position. The issue was left with both Secretary Stans and the Foreign Minister agreeing to have frequent consultations in order to avoid friction over this issue. With respect to our interest in assisting Spain's educational reform Lopez Bravo suggested that we send a team of experts to Madrid to define the areas in which we might help. He told Secretary Finch that Spain's greatest need was US training of professors of mathematics, physics and chemistry.

The question of the Spain-NATO link was not discussed during the Lopez Bravo visit, except that Secretary Rogers did mention that he had raised it during the Brandt visit. Brandt was non-committal, and Danish Prime Minister Baunsgaard was predictably cool when the Secretary mentioned the issue to him earlier this week.⁶ The Spanish have found very attractive our willingness actively to support some form of linkage, and have made clear the Spanish priorities: liaison with SACEUR, a link with NATO commands including Iberlant, some form of link which would give Spain a voice on political matters such as European Security Conference, and finally, association with CCMS. The main Spain emphasis is on the SACEUR link. They recognize that seeking NATO agreement on one or more of these forms of linkage will be difficult, and cannot be expected to be even near accomplishment by the time the new defense agreement is ready for signature.

In short, some significant progress has been made, but hard bargaining remains. Under Secretary Johnson and Assistant Secretary Hiltenbrand may go to Madrid in mid-May for another session with Lopez Bravo. For the moment, the negotiations seem to be going well, and there does not seem to be any need for White House intervention at this time.

⁶ This meeting was reported in telegram 56113 to Madrid, April 16. (Ibid.)

Recommendation

That you sign the memo for the President on the Franco letter at Tab A.⁷

⁷ Kissinger signed the memorandum and forwarded it to Nixon.

295. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Madrid, May 29, 1970, 10:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS*Spain*

Chief of State, Generalissimo Francisco Franco
Foreign Minister, Gregorio Lopez Bravo
Ambassador to the U.S., Jaime Arguelles

United States

Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Ambassador Robert C. Hill
Mr. George W. Landau

1. The Secretary called on Generalissimo Franco at 1005 hours May 29. After introductions and opening amenities, the Secretary extended greetings on behalf of President Nixon and handed General Franco a letter from the President.² General Franco expressed his appreciation, and recalled the good relations he had had with former President Eisenhower. The Secretary said U.S.-Spanish relations were very good at present, and he hoped they would continue to improve. Satisfactory progress had been made in the current negotiations, and he hoped the new agreement would include education, science, and the environment, in addition to military matters. The U.S. continued to seek Spanish association with NATO, perhaps beginning with low key liaison arrangements. Franco expressed his general agreement with the approach being taken in the negotiations.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL SP-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Allen on June 5; cleared by Hill and Landau; and approved in S on June 23. The meeting took place at the El Pardo Palace. Rogers visited Spain May 28-29 following the NATO Ministerial meeting at Rome May 26-27. A memorandum of the Secretary's May 29 conversation with Lopez Bravo is *ibid.*, POL 1 SP-US.

² Not found.

2. Generalissimo Franco raised questions about developments in Indochina. He said that the U.S. action in Cambodia was long overdue,³ but thought that no deadline should have been set for a pull-out. Referring to Viet Nam he said he thought that Ho Chi Minh was more of a patriot than a Communist. The Secretary noted that the U.S. allies were performing very well. He added that the USSR provided 70% and the Chinese Communists 30% of the matériel used by the Communists in Viet Nam. Economic progress, he noted, was impressive everywhere in Asia except in mainland China, which was still very backward.

3. The Secretary asked for a Spanish evaluation of Portugal and Prime Minister Caetano. Generalissimo Franco described Portugal as "Spain's Siamese twin," which it could not allow to fall very far behind economically. He spoke favorably of Prime Minister Caetano, describing him as a "good politician." Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo added that before Portugal could make significant economic progress Caetano would have to pull his team together, as it was seriously divided at present.

4. The Secretary asked for Franco's views of the Mediterranean situation. The Generalissimo said that Spain was very concerned, that the Arab-Israeli war was very damaging to Western interests and favored only the USSR. "The Arabs and the Israelis are like fire and water. They don't mix." A solution to the war must be found, and both sides should be ready for it because they are both very tired. He thought that Nasser might wish a settlement, but might not be permitted to make one. Finally, he wondered whether the USSR wanted war. The Secretary said that the U.S. was also concerned about the Mediterranean, but that Spain should be more so because it was closer.⁴ The Foreign Minister observed that when he visited Nasser recently the latter was completely preoccupied with dominating Libya. The Secretary said that there were 50,000 Soviets in the UAR at present. It appeared that the USSR would soon dominate the UAR completely and that the latter would in turn dominate Libya. The Foreign Minister said that the Libyan Foreign Minister would visit Spain in early July and he would relay to Secretary Rogers what he learned from him. The Secretary said the U.S. had good relations with Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, and that relations with Algeria were improving. In answer to the Generalissimo's question he said he thought the USSR did not want war but a continuation of the present turmoil.

³ Reference to the May 1 U.S. military incursion into Cambodia.

⁴ Six lines of text were covered over at this point. They read: "He complimented the Generalissimo on his use of metaphor, adding that when he dealt with the Israelis he felt that he was getting burned and when he dealt with the Arabs he felt that he was drowning. He agreed that both Arabs and Israelis were too emotional to accept a rational approach."

5. Departure amenities followed, and the meeting ended at 1045 hours. After the Secretary, the Ambassador and Mr. Landau departed the meeting, Messrs. Pedersen and McCloskey, who were in the outer reception room during the conversation, were introduced to Generalissimo Franco.

6. *Comment:* The audience was cordial throughout. The Chief of State appeared to be in good mental and physical condition for his age, except for a noticeable tremor in his hand and leg. He seemed alert and well informed. His handshake was firm. It is noteworthy that he chose not to enter into detail on the current U.S.-Spanish negotiations. Also, that he displayed a sympathetic attitude toward U.S. policies in the rest of the world.

296. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 24, 1970.

SUBJECT

Spanish Base Negotiations: Agreement in Sight But Congressional Problem Looms

The negotiations with the Spanish have entered the final phase. This memo reviews the status and prospects, and encloses a cable from Secretary Laird.

On June 23 Secretary Laird sent an eyes only cable to Secretary Rogers, Deputy Secretary Packard, General Wheeler and you in which he reports his conclusions following his visit to Spain (Tab A). The Secretary will return to the US on June 26, after a stay in the UK. He is convinced that now is the time to move on the agreement. As a result of three meetings with Lopez Bravo (only one of which has been reported),² the Secretary concludes that the controlling issue for the Spanish is US agreement on supply of two F-4C squadrons. The Spanish will modify other military demands if we agree on the aircraft. He

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. The tabs are not printed.

² Reported in telegram 2970 from Madrid, June 18. (Ibid.)

wants to get the agreement firmed up within ten days. Lopez Bravo impressed on him that a July 1 date is important because he must face the Cortes shortly thereafter, and also he feared the existing ExIm Bank credits for Spain would expire on June 30.

The aircraft issue is clearly the essential item for the Spanish in their military quid pro quo list. Spanish General Diez Alegria indicated earlier this month in Washington³ that if we could agree to give one F-4C squadron, coupled with Spanish purchase of another, the other military package issues causing trouble would fall into line. It is also clear that on the Spanish side the approval of the military package is now completely in the hands of Vice President Carrero Blanco, Franco's heir-apparent, and the military ministers. Fortunately, Defense is prepared to agree to the F-4C deal. Deputy Defense Packard informed Alex Johnson on June 17 of Defense's agreement to furnish a second squadron on a grant aid basis, but cautioned that the arrangement must remain classified to avoid facing pressure from other allies (Greece, Turkey and ROC) for equal treatment (Packard's letter is at Tab B). Other difficulties still remain in fulfilling the military equipment demands of the Spanish (the final list was given to Secretary Laird on June 18 and Alex Johnson on June 20, copy at Tab C), but they probably can be resolved once we advise the Spanish we can agree to the aircraft package.

Lopez Bravo's fixation on a July 1 date seems to have been mostly designed to pressure us on concessions on the military package. His appearance before the Cortes is not quite as critical as he suggested. Further, the question of the ExIm Bank credit extension has been resolved: Ambassador Arguelles wrote to Mr. Kearns, and the credits have been extended into the new fiscal year. Another Spanish gambit to apply pressure on us was the more than coincidental arrival of French Defense Minister Debré in Madrid on June 22 (while Secretary Laird was still in Spain) to sign the Franco-Spanish military cooperation agreement. The French have told us that the Spanish idea for the Debré visit came as a surprise just a few days before. Lopez Bravo pressed another pressure point by telling Secretary Laird that if we could not meet Spanish military requirements, our operations would have to be phased down, beginning with the removal of the large air base at Torrejon.

Aside from the military quid pro quo, some points on the non-military side must still be resolved. The Spanish have just presented a proposal for US assistance in training higher education teachers—with a price tag of \$79 million. (They, of course, have no ex-

³ These discussions were reported in telegram 91587 to Madrid, June 12. (Ibid.)

pectation that we could provide any program of that magnitude.) Deputy Defense Secretary Packard wrote to Alex Johnson on June 20 (Tab D) indicating he was prepared to make available up to \$3 million from the DOD FY 70 contingency fund for use in the non-military quid pro package. State will be working up a counter-proposal to the Spanish for a pilot project in educational assistance, drawing on these DOD contingency funds. This will enable State and other agencies to fund educational projects in their FY 72 budgets.

A final potential difficulty in concluding the agreement relates to a letter outlining the proposed joint air control and coordination system. Earlier in the negotiations, Alex Johnson had provided Ambassador Arguelles (at Spanish request) with a confidential letter outlining the functions of the system and proposing that the US be given the specific mission of the defense of Spanish air space where US forces are stationed (copy of the letter at Tab E). This letter was intended to be part of the confidential negotiating history of the agreement. The Spanish now want Secretary Rogers to sign the letter, which would imply that it is an integral part of the agreement. There is a fear that if we accepted the Spanish demand, the letter would ultimately be leaked and would cause great congressional difficulties. State and Defense are reasonably confident that full agreement can be reached with the Spanish on all essential parts of the total quid pro quo package and the text of the agreement within the next 2-3 weeks.

After agreement is reached with the Spanish, the most difficult obstacle will be the Congress. In an earlier memo (log #10846)⁴ I reported on the issue of whether the agreement will be in treaty form or executive agreement form, or whether Congressional approval will be sought by means of a joint resolution (by simple majority of both Houses). During his visit to Spain, Secretary Rogers told the Spanish that he considered a treaty form more desirable, though he made clear that no decision had been taken as to form. The text of the draft agreement (Tab F) is very broad in scope, providing for cooperative efforts in culture, education, science, environmental problems, agriculture, economics, as well as the military cooperation. It can be argued that the total impression made by the agreement is that of an alliance, which the Senate would claim should be submitted for approval as a treaty. State's Legal Adviser considers that the conclusion of the proposed agreement as a pure executive agreement can be defended as a legal matter.

Apparently, Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Johnson plan to meet with Senator Fulbright as soon as the full Spanish package has been worked out to take a sounding on the treaty/executive agreement

⁴ Not found.

question. There is no indication that the Secretary intends to seek White House guidance prior to his meeting with Fulbright. At this point the most probable outcome will be for the agreement to be signed (but not yet enter into force) and then submitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by joint resolution. Although there is no direct precedent for submitting an agreement of this character to Congress for approval by joint resolution after signature, there is also no direct precedent for this unique type of agreement.⁵

⁵ Kissinger wrote a note on the first page: "Make sure there is W[hite] H[ouse] guidance as to the type of agreement."

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, July 4, 1970, 1651Z.

3178. Subj: Spanish Bases: Talk with Foreign Minister.

1. At July 4 reception, Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo asked to speak to me privately.

2. He said he has obtained agreement of military Ministers and Carrero Blanco on U.S. military quid offer. Also he said, at meeting with General Franco this morning, the Chief of State assured him of his full support. Franco went on to commend him on his handling of negotiations. Lopez Bravo implied that Ambassador Arguelles will seek appointment with Acting Secretary Johnson July 6 or 7 to deliver formal GOS acceptance.²

3. Lopez Bravo said he hopes complete negotiations in July and sign before August 1. He said he would, of course, like signature here but understands demands on Secretary Rogers time and will be glad to come to Washington.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCEUR.

² The meeting took place on July 6. It was reported in telegram 107259 to Madrid, July 6. Arguelles explained that Spanish agreement was subject to clarification of a number of specific technical questions regarding the military quid pro quo and certain clarification of the language in the draft agreement. (Ibid.) On July 16 Johnson and Arguelles initialed the texts of the general cooperation agreement. Johnson and Packard presented the draft agreements to a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 24.

4. FonMin said GOS does not repeat not wish to go treaty route, as a failure in the Senate would be seriously embarrassing here. He hopes U.S. will continue to pursue executive agreement. However, Lopez Bravo said over life of new agreement GOS would like to see U.S. move toward preparing Senate for treaty relationship with Spain which should come in the near future.

5. Foreign Minister reported he will have to go before Cortes to report during July and could go either before or after Secretary Rogers goes to the Hill. I advised he should consider waiting until after Secretary has spoken with Senator Fulbright.

6. I pointed out to FonMin problems remaining, i.e. Congressional consultation, non-military quid, and procedural agreements but he remained firmly optimistic that final agreement could be reached this month.

7. MFA Subdirector General Aragones sought out EmbOff to make exactly same points as above.

8. *Comment:* It appears GOS has decided to end the negotiation swiftly on the basis of presently offered quid and feels further dragging out would be prejudicial. Danger is that Lopez Bravo will be in a hurry after Arguelles delivers formal acceptance military quid package, and will underestimate complexity and time requirements of remaining work in Washington, especially consultation and acceptance on the Hill.

Hill

298. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 6, 1970, 4 p.m.

Meeting between President Nixon and Mr. López Bravo, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. López Bravo delivered the letter of the Chief of the Spanish State and the President welcomed him and proposed that Mr. Kissinger be present during the conversation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. A typed note reads: "Spanish Foreign Minister's Record of His Conversation with the President." The original is a translation prepared by the Division of Language Services, Department of State, after August 11 and forwarded to the White House. The Spanish language text was not found.

President: Expressed his gratification over the conclusion of the Agreement that had just been signed.² He well understood who the real friends were, and therefore he had to give orders for signing as soon as possible. It was necessary, however, to allow a few days to go by in order to try to identify the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who were opposing the Agreement.

He added that good relations with Spain were essential for the stability of the Mediterranean. He had no reluctance in admitting that the Agreement was good for the United States and he trusted that it would also be good for Spain.

Mr. López Bravo: He shared the President's viewpoint and he also considered that the Agreement was good. He appreciated the attitude of the American negotiators because of their understanding and realistic approach, qualities not consistent [sic]³ with firmness.

He expressed his concern over the fate that the appropriations might be exposed to in the Congress.

President: He assured the Spanish Minister that he need not be at all concerned, first, because the competent Committee was much more important, and second, because the prestige of the President was committed in this Agreement. He was prepared to speak personally with the Senators who would be handling the credits.

The President continued, congratulating the Spanish Minister for his dynamism and the success of his foreign policy. He advised him to maintain frequent contact with Rogers and suggested that he give special care to relations with the Arab countries.

Mr. López Bravo: He stated that that was the Spanish policy exactly. He referred to the visit paid him on June 29 by the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban, when the latter expressed his desire to establish diplomatic, or at least consular, relations with Spain. The Spanish Minister told him [the Israeli Minister] frankly that in the present circumstances that would not be good for the general interest.

President: If peace were achieved, he thought that it would be to the interest of Spain itself to move progressively toward the establishment of relations with Israel. He regarded Eban as an intelligent and flexible man.

Mr. López Bravo: He agreed with the President in his judgment about Abba Eban. When the situation became normal in the Middle East, it might be opportune to follow his advice. He asked whether the

² For text of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation signed in Washington August 6, see 21 UST 1667.

³ All brackets are in the original.

President believed that the conflict in that area was near to being resolved.

President: There were too many factors acting simultaneously; Jarring's work was not going to be easy, and unfortunately he [the President] could not be optimistic.

Mr. López Bravo: He had some reservations about Jarring's possibilities; in the first place, because he had already attempted a diplomatic solution, without success, and second, because his characteristics as a cold and not very imaginative man did not help his action.

Kissinger: He fully shared Minister López Bravo's points of view but he thought it would be difficult to replace him [Jarring] now; perhaps thought should be given to an assistant endowed with suitable characteristics.

President: He did not know what reasons had led to calling upon a Swede; perhaps thought could be given to an assistant of another nationality, an Indian, a Swiss, an Austrian, for example. He asked him [Kissinger?] to inform Rogers that very evening of his concern about Jarring's mediation.

Mr. López Bravo: He informed him that he had told Rogers⁴ of a suggestion he had received from Arafat for a visit to Spain, and perhaps in September Mr. Buesir, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, would also come to Madrid. The visit of the Palestinian leader held little interest for Spain, although it might be of interest to the United States.

In Spain developments in Libya were being followed very closely and we were concerned over its secret agreements with Algeria to raise the price of crude petroleum and natural gas, and the arrangement that had been established not to accept new supply commitments without the agreement of the other country.

President: He considered it of great interest that he [Mr. López Bravo] should receive Arafat. The United States did not intend to ignore the Palestinians, and it was very important to know what kind of person he was, his points of view, lines of thought to which he appeared to be responsive, and everything else that the Spanish Minister might consider useful. One might even think of winning him over to the cause of peace by means of reasonable formulas.

As for Libya, that was a country that much concerned the United States, in line with what the Spanish Minister had said about the new policy with Algeria, which could so greatly affect the oil companies. He thanked him for the information he had given Rogers on this possible

⁴ Presumably prior to or during the signature of the agreement. No record of their conversation was found.

future contact, and suggested that he keep in frequent touch with the Secretary of State.

Spain, the President continued saying, was a European and Mediterranean “power” and therefore it now had to play a decisive role in the policy of that area, and specifically, of all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. He asked the Spanish Minister to pay careful attention to the African countries.

Mr. López Bravo: He recalled to the President that in the U.A.R. Spain was taking care of United States interests.

Both the President and Mr. Kissinger acknowledged this fact and the President added that, indeed, all of the reports bore witness to the efficiency with which that task was being done.

President: Answering Mr. López Bravo’s question about the possibility of a visit to Spain, the President said that it would be difficult this year because of the November elections, but he hoped to go next year. Spain, he said, was a wonderful country and he advised Mr. Kissinger, who has never been there, to look for time in his work schedule to make the trip. The President recalled very clearly his visit to Spain and named with pleasure the cities he had visited.

A moment before the farewells were said, Ambassadors Hill and Argüelles entered the presidential office.

299. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Madrid, October 2, 1970.

PRESENT

The President
Secretary Rogers
Dr. Kissinger
Amb. Hill
Maj. Gen. Walters

Generalissimo Franco
Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo
Ambassador
Ambassador Aragones

The President opened the conversation by saying how happy he was to come to Spain. He had received a great welcome and had seen many smiles. At this time of instability in the Mediterranean, Spain was very important. It was independent and stable. He was happy at the improvement in Spanish-American relations that had taken place, particularly since 1953 under the administration of President Eisenhower. We had worked together not only in the field of defense but also in the economic field as well. At this time of difficulties in the Mediterranean, the President said he would value the Spanish evaluation of the situation in the Middle East and the consequences of the death of Nasser.²

General Franco said that he was very happy that the President had come to Spain. He would have the opportunity to see that the Spanish people felt genuine friendship toward him and towards the American People. With respect to the Middle East, Franco felt considerable concern over the death of Nasser, since he was the only one who could take certain decisions.

Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo said that he had been very impressed by the fact that there did not appear to be any real leadership in the upper ranks of the Army. He feared that someone in the junior ranks (Majors and Lt. Col.) might move to seize power, just as Nasser had done. These younger officers had been in large part trained in the Soviet Union and had lived with Soviet officers after their return to Egypt. Should they take power they would be even more radical and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 467, President's Trip Files, Europe 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place at the El Pardo Palace. Nixon visited Spain October 2-3, during a six-nation European trip September 27-October 5.

² The Egyptian President died September 28 of a heart attack.

uncompromising. The President agreed and recalled that Nasser had been 34 years old when he seized power.

Lopez Bravo had also been impressed with the Soviet position in the UAR. For example, the Soviets had been given absolute preeminence in all the ceremonies. It was true that Kosygin had been the first head of delegation to arrive, and this had given him precedence. The other stars of the occasion had been Arafat and Qadhafi of Libya. Secretary Rogers asked in what way they had been stars. Lopez Bravo replied that when Acting President Anwar Es Sadat had been taken sick at Nasser's funeral, a committee had quickly been formed to preside. This Committee was headed by Arafat, the President of the Assembly and a member of the Council of the Revolution. At all ceremonies Qadhafi had been the outstanding figure. He had been given more time and prominence than anyone else except Arafat.

The President noted that he was informed that Nimeiry, the Sudanese President, also had great influence. Nimeiry and Qadhafi had been loudly cheered replied Lopez Bravo. Hussein had lost prestige.³ He had had to sign an agreement in Cairo which was humiliating for any Chief of State. Nasser had been almost obsessed with Libya; and the last time Lopez Bravo had seen him, he had talked of almost nothing else. Nasser did not want to repeat his Syrian experience and take Libya into the UAR, but he was seeking some formula for closer cooperation with both Libya and Sudan—something like a Common Market.

Lopez Bravo said that he was concerned by his talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riad. Riad feared the radicalism of the younger Egyptian Army officers and asked him to pass to the President and the Secretary the thought that, unless something additional were offered along with the Rogers plan,⁴ he felt that the situation might become more radical. Lopez Bravo felt that it was essential that the truce be prolonged.

The President said that he was interested to note that Kosygin had come out in favor of an extension of the truce.

The President asked what had been the reaction of the Egyptian masses to Kosygin and the other Soviet leaders who had attended the funeral. Lopez Bravo replied that for security reasons they had had little contact with the Egyptian masses, but he had been impressed at the size of their delegation. In addition to Kosygin, some four Marshals of the Soviet Union and about eighty other dignitaries had attended the ceremonies. The Soviets, the Libyans and the Sudanese had gotten

³ King Hussein of Jordan.

⁴ Reference to a December 9, 1969, statement by Rogers on a formula for Arab-Israeli peace. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1970, pp. 7–11)

most of the attention. The President said that it was Tito who had told him that the Sudanese were very influential.⁵ Lopez Bravo agreed and said that Nimeiry was most influential.

More broadly, the President said that we understood and appreciated the Spanish efforts to maintain good relations with the Arabs. He felt that this was a positive development. He then asked how the Spaniards evaluated the Libyan leaders. Lopez Bravo said that they were in an awkward situation for Revolutionary leaders. They were very young and had too much money. The President then inquired about Morocco.

The main problem Lopez Bravo said was the weakness of the Moroccan Throne. If Hassan⁶ were to be replaced it would certainly be by a group even more radical than the Algerians. The President asked whether the problems connected with the Spanish Sahara had troubled their relations with the Moroccans.

In reply, Lopez Bravo indicated that, despite the meeting at Tlemcen between the Moroccans and the Mauriticians where they had sounded as though they were in agreement on this problem, both King Hassan and President Ould Daddah had both told him separately that they could not accept the results of a plebiscite that was unfavorable to them. He went on to say that he wished the President to know that Spain got nothing out of the Spanish Sahara. On the contrary, Spain was spending (not investing) there \$250 per capita. Spain was currently investing \$200,000,000 there to develop the production of phosphates and the profits would remain in Morocco. The head of the Assembly and another member had been named to the board of the Phosphate company which was controlled by the Spanish Government. They would thus be able to ensure that the profits remained there. The Spanish Sahara had nothing but sand and phosphates. There were only 46,000 inhabitants (nomads for the most part) in an area of 280,000 square kilometers. The Algerians were always dreaming of an outlet to the Atlantic and Spain was quite prepared to give it to them through this area—but without any change in sovereignty. In the matter of the Sahara, the Algerians had kept quiet. They would rather have things go on as they were at present. They felt they would eventually become the strongest power in this area and would then say their piece.

General Franco said that this territory was crucial because it backed up on the Canary Islands. If Spain transferred sovereignty to some other power, they might lease or lend it to the Soviets, who would

⁵ During the President's September 30–October 2 visit to Yugoslavia. A memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 221.

⁶ King Hassan II had ruled since 1961.

then have a base on the Atlantic from which they could threaten both the Atlantic and Mediterranean maritime trade routes and extend their influence further into the area. This is what they had been trying to do: use their presence in the Arab countries to extend their political influence and then stimulate coups by ever more radical groups. On reflection, General Franco felt that it was best for the time being to leave the situation in the Spanish Sahara the way it was.

Secretary Rogers asked about Algeria. Lopez Bravo replied that according to his information there had been a drift towards a more radical position and that for the first time there were indications of corruption at the administrative level, something that had not previously existed in Algeria.

In response to Secretary Rogers' question about Spanish relations with Israel, Lopez Bravo said that he had met Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban at Luxembourg when he was there to sign Spanish agreement with the Common Market.⁷ Eban had made it plain that Israel was anxious to establish diplomatic relations with Spain. Lopez Bravo, however, shared General Franco's concern that such recognition at this time would not assist Spain's efforts to maintain friendly ties with the Arab countries. He emphasized that Spain had no anti-Israeli bias but did not feel that such a step now would contribute to tranquillity in the Middle East. Secretary Rogers said that, while we were by-standers, we would favor such relations. Lopez Bravo repeated his previous comments.

The President inquired whether France's pro Arab stance had gained the French much stature with the Arabs. Lopez Bravo said he did not think so. If he were to rate the European countries in terms of standing with the Arabs, he would probably rate Spain first, Italy second and France in third place. Italian Foreign Minister Moro had asked him to see what he could do to coordinate the position of the three countries vis-à-vis the Arabs. It was not easy as the French were much concerned with their prestige.

The President then turned the discussion to the question of an evaluation of the Soviet intentions. He noted that the US had agreed to discuss the limitation of strategic weapons with them and had indicated our willingness to discuss other matters of common concern. He felt, however, that we should bear in mind that—though the leadership had changed—their aims were still the same. They had the same missionary zeal to expand Communism all over the world and we should not forget this. That is why it was important for the Western countries to maintain their defensive strength. The President stressed the ear-

⁷ Spain and the EC signed a preferential trade agreement on June 29, 1970, as did Israel and the EC.

nestness with which he had said that we should move from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation; but to do this, it was essential that we maintain with NATO and our other friends and allies a strong position.

General Franco cautioned that it was alright to talk to the Communists, but we must remember that they were still seeking to spread Communism and would be seeking to trap and weaken us. We could play the game with them but we should remember this.

It was Lopez Bravo's feeling that as the Russian people became more educated and their standard of living rose they would demand more freedom. The President said that there had indeed been changes in the Soviet Union, but such developments would take a lot more time, more like fifty years than five.

Turning to bilateral issues, Lopez Bravo expressed concern about the possibility of the imposition by the US Congress of quotas on certain Spanish imports into the United States.

The President said that he was aware of this Spanish concern. We would try to show the kind of leadership that would prevent the erection of obstacles to the development of trade between the two countries. We knew that Spain bought far more from us than we did from her and he would bear this in mind. The President noted his pleasure at seeing the great economic progress that had been made in Spain in recent years. Spain had the highest rate of growth in Europe. This had been due to good leadership, stability, and a hard working and dynamic people. The President hoped that the recent agreement between Spain and the United States would open the way for further cooperation, not only in the area of defense but also in economic and trade areas that had not hitherto been explored.

At this point the President thought it would be useful to exchange views about the situation in Latin America, where Spain fortunately had such close and growing ties. General Franco said that Castro and Che Guevara had gained great popularity, but more dangerous than Castro was Castroism. These were more social reform times than Bourgeois times and there were no Latin American countries where real social reforms could be carried out without falling into some form of extremism. Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo pointed to Chile where a Christian Democratic period in power had led to the present situation where Allende had obtained a plurality with the support of the Communists. If he were elected he would probably be moderate for a short period but it would not last long.

If Allende were elected, the President commented, there would probably not be another free election in Chile. This would be the result despite the fact that the Communists had actually polled 4% less votes in this election than in the previous one. General Franco and Lopez

Bravo agreed. Lopez Bravo added that he blamed the Christian Democrats in part for this. Recently in Rome Archbishop Benelli (whom the President knew) had expressed the opinion that the Christian Democratic movement had nothing to offer for the future. They had served a useful purpose for twenty five years in the post war period but were now “played out.” General Franco dryly commented that Mgr. Benelli had been wrong so often that this did not prove much. He added that, should the Communists take over Chile, the Soviets would certainly try to do something in this area (Latin America) to humiliate and embarrass the United States.

The President noted that many of the same people in the media and elsewhere who had been taken in by Castro were now saying that Allende was not so bad. He could assure them that we understood what Allende really was and that there was no one in the State Department who did not understand this too. One of the problems in this area was that a number of members of the clergy were so obsessed with the social problems of the area that they had sided not with the liberals but with ultra-leftists. The Spaniards said they were well aware of this. Concluding, Lopez Bravo said that at the present time there were only three countries in South America where the constitution was being applied—Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile—and who knew now what would happen in Chile.

Secretary Rogers suggested that General Franco might appreciate a word from the President about the situation in Vietnam. The President then said that the situation there had greatly improved since our action in Cambodia had deprived the Communists of one of their main sources of supplies. American casualties in the past week had been far below what they had been a year ago. Our deliberate withdrawal plan was being implemented as the South Vietnamese forces became increasingly capable of handling the situation. They had finally jelled into an effective fighting force. From our point of view and that of the South Vietnamese the situation was most favorable. From the point of view of the Communists there was now no hope of imposing a solution by force. We would continue to explore the possibilities of negotiation with the Communists but this had not so far much hope of results. We would go forward with our plan and program.

Continuing, the President said when he had been elected it would have been very easy and popular for him to have simply withdrawn the troops from Vietnam and washed his hands of the whole thing as a bad business. He could not do this because it would have discouraged all the free nations in Asia from Japan all the way around to Indonesia, and because of the effect it would have had on the American people themselves. A defeat or humiliation would have tempted them to draw in upon themselves and to say if we got out of one foreign adventure

why should we have other foreign commitments. As long as he was President this would not happen. Whatever reports General Franco might have heard about the US withdrawing from its commitments this simply was not true. He knew how important it was to maintain our commitments and to stand by our friends and he also knew what a stalwart friend Spain had been. We knew who our friends were and would not forget them. General Franco expressed his appreciation for this and repeated the importance Spain attached to its friendship with the United States.

Lopez Bravo raised the question of response to the press. It was agreed that they would inform the press of those who had participated in the conversations and note that the talks had been helpful and constructive.⁸ They had discussed matters of common interest to Spain and the United States, trade and economic problems, East-West relations, the Middle East and Mediterranean. Lopez Bravo asked whether the Spanish could announce a visit by Secretary Stans to further implement the non-military aspects of the recent agreement. It was agreed that no names would be mentioned but that it would be said that further exchanges of visits on both sides would take place on these matters.

Both sides expressed their satisfaction at the constructive nature of the talks. The Spaniards again expressed their pleasure at the President's visit, and the President offered his gratitude of the warmth of his welcome in Spain.

⁸ The President and Franco commented on their talks during toasts at a State dinner that evening. For texts, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 799–801.

300. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Dissension in Spain

I have received a letter from Bill Buckley (Tab B)² enclosing a memorandum to you from Jose Maria de Areilza, Count of Motrico, who served as Spain's Ambassador to the United States during the last years of the Eisenhower Administration. The Count's memorandum is an explosive commentary on what he considers the repressiveness of the current Spanish political scene (Tab A).³ I have acknowledged receipt of this memorandum to Buckley in vague terms because of its sensitivity. I believe it would be a mistake for us to send an acknowledgment to the author in writing, although Buckley may well indicate orally to the Count that he has given me the paper and I am passing it to you.

The following is a summary of the salient points in the Count's memorandum:

—The group of Spaniards who unsuccessfully attempted to see Secretary Rogers last May to discuss the bases agreement (they finally sent a memorandum) did so out of a pro-American feeling and a sincere desire that there be full understanding on both sides of the significance of the agreement.

—In contrast to the U.S., total secrecy was imposed in Spain on the agreement and no criticism was permitted. Circulation in Spain of public remarks in the U.S. on the agreement was forbidden.

—Signatories of the memorandum to Secretary Rogers were questioned by the police, fined and forbidden to leave the country.

—General Franco has given Spain a long period of peace and stability in which economic and social progress has been achieved. His important failing, however, has been his lack of understanding of the evolution which has taken place in these years and his not preparing effective channels to guide that evolution toward a democratic and free system of government.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. The first page bears the stamped notation: "The President has seen."

² Not printed. In it Buckley expressed his concern that distribution of the letter be limited to the White House: "I feel that we may be dealing in matters of life and death."

³ Not printed.

—Unfortunately, the young team now in power is more concerned about jockeying for position in the post-Franco succession than in movement toward a democratic system. “We are on the road of a complete regression towards dictatorship of the most crude nature.”

—There are practically no civil liberties in Spain and little possibility of associating for political purposes. The labor movement is tightly controlled by the government and no real negotiations take place between management and labor. Large numbers of people who speak out against the state are condemned to prison as political prisoners.

—Government circles seem to think that there is no way of establishing a democratic system in Spain due to the fact that the people are not prepared to share responsibility.

—The people abhor this attitude of the government and the vast majority of intellectuals, churchmen, students and workers have turned their backs on the regime.

—The Count and his friends intend to continue to speak out and convey their concern to the Spanish people despite the risks involved. They consider themselves progressive conservatives with viewpoints similar to Pompidou, Kiesinger and Heath. They believe you as a “progressive conservative” would agree that one cannot fight Communism with a repressive society.

—The image of America in Spain is good, but could be tarnished badly should the people feel the U.S. endorses without reservation an anti-democratic system of government in Spain, which may well develop into despotic autocracy in the years ahead.

—The Count concludes that he and his friends ask nothing of you (theirs being a domestic problem), and only hope the U.S. and other free world countries will have an understanding attitude for what they are trying to do.

Comment:

The Count’s impassioned picture of the current political climate in Spain and prospects for the future may well reflect a growing concern and activity on the part of many Spanish political groups in anticipation of the post-Franco succession. The Spanish political climate is warming and I suspect that we will be receiving more appeals for “benevolent neutrality” from various contending groups and personalities in the months ahead. We have little choice but to adopt such a posture during the delicate transition period.

301. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 30, 1970.

SUBJECT

Message to President Franco

Ambassador Hill called to report that he had gotten your message through to President Franco prior to the Spanish announcement of commutation of the six death sentences.² Ambassador Hill was unable to say for certain whether your message was a decisive factor in President Franco's decision but he believes that it was, based on the timing of events leading up to the announcement.

Recommendation

In view of the uncertainty as to whether your message was an operative factor, I recommend that we use the same telephone channel to convey to President Franco your great admiration for his statesmanship and demonstration of humanitarianism in this difficult situation.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

² The December 1970 trial of 16 Basque separatists accused of involvement in the 1968 murder of a senior police official resulted in death sentences for 6 on December 28. Franco commuted these sentences to 20 years imprisonment on December 30. In telegram 312 from Madrid, December 31, Hill reported that Senator Edward Kennedy had telegraphed Franco urging clemency "well in advance of decision" and had subsequently cabled his congratulations. Hill believed Kennedy would use his actions for political advantage. (Ibid., Country Files, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. III) In a telephone conversation with Haig, summarized in a December 31 memorandum from Haig to Nixon, Hill had urged that the President refrain from publicizing his parallel efforts to secure clemency. (Ibid.)

³ The President initialed the Approve option, and a note by Haig below it reads: "Hill called 9:15 a.m. 31 Dec. '70. AH."

302. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Spanish Prince Juan Carlos' Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

Prince Juan Carlos
Ambassador Jaime Arguelles
The President
Ambassador Emil Mosbacher
Ambassador Robert Hill

The Prince opened the conversation by thanking the President of the United States for the invitation to visit his country. He expressed his and the Princess' great pleasure and said that they, as well as their countrymen, attached great importance to the visit. He said that General Franco, the Chief of State, was very pleased by the invitation and was asked to convey to the President and Mrs. Nixon their best wishes. He said that he was bringing to the President a personal letter from General Franco.² This was handed to the President. For several minutes there was general conversation, mostly pleasantries and reminiscences about the President's visit to Spain³ and other related matters.

Then the President expressed pleasure with the outcome of the Burgos trials.⁴ He said this really placed the Russians on the spot and undoubtedly saved the lives of the alleged hijackers in Russia.⁵ The Prince agreed. At times he seemed somewhat nervous about discussing the trials and throughout the conference he was ably assisted by Ambassador Arguelles. The President inquired about the background of the Basque movement. The Prince explained that the separatist Basques operate in the northern part of his country and were very much in evidence in northern Spain and southern France near the Spanish border. The Prince pointed out that he was not concerned so much about the nationalist separatists, but rather the terrorists, who from time to time, had caused problems in his country. The President pointed out the wisdom of the Burgos decision and made it clear that considerable

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Secret; Nodis.

² Not found.

³ See Document 299.

⁴ See Document 301.

⁵ On October 15 and 27, 1970, civilian airliners were hijacked over Soviet airspace and forced to land in Turkey.

pressure had been brought to bear on him to speak out. However, he had refused to do so because it was an internal matter. He said for other countries in Europe to take advantage of Spain's internal problem was unfortunate. Both Ambassador Arguelles and the Prince thanked the President for his attitude.

The President then brought up for the first time the necessity for stability in governments and an orderly transition of power when it is appropriate. The President said that he had been interested in Spain for many years and his objective continued to be to encourage Spain's entry into the European Common Market and NATO. He told the Prince that he did not see that full association would be possible for four to five years. The President pointed out that it was short sighted for many of the NATO countries, especially the Scandinavians, to deny entry of Spain because of Spain's importance in Europe and the Mediterranean. He told the Prince that Heath and Home from England were both strong men and that he was encouraged by their attitude concerning Spain. The President asked the Prince if he had any comments about Italy. The President said that Italy was a country that he liked very much, but he was concerned about the current lack of stability there. The President and Prince agreed that Colombo was a strong leader, but the Prince pointed out there were many serious problems. The President agreed. Ambassador Arguelles said he too was concerned, but did not see any immediate danger of a communist take-over.

The President returned to the necessity for stability and orderly transition in Spain and again reassured the Prince that he felt that Spain had acted wisely in handling the Burgos trials. The President pointed out that any weakening of stability in Spain would have a serious effect upon the flow of capital investments and tourists. The President tried to draw the Prince out again on the succession in Spain. The Prince was cautious. He told the President that he was from another generation. He said, of course, he remembered the civil war because members of the royal family lost their lives in defending Spain's institutions, but many of the generation he represents do not remember the war and are not concerned about it. However, he felt the young people are depending on him to bring progress to his country. The youth of Spain are volatile, but do not offer any threat at the present time to the government.

The President seemed pleased and pressed further for more information, but the Prince did not respond. The President pointed out that he had had conversations with Lord Louis Mountbatten about the future of Spain.⁶ The President said he recognized the Prince's relation-

⁶ No record of the conversation was found.

ship with Lord Mountbatten. The Prince then pointed out that the transition was moving in an orderly fashion, but only General Franco knows when any new moves would take place. The President again stressed the need for continued stability and progress and the importance that Spain would play in the future of Europe. The President said that our form of government would not work in many areas of the world. However, certain democratic institutions had been adopted by friendly governments, but this was a matter that was up to the individual countries. The President compared the governments of mainland China and Taiwan, Japan and Thailand. Then the President talked about Iran. In every instance, with the exception of mainland China, the different systems of government seemed to work. What worked in Iran might not work in Spain. The President pointed out that many African countries had adopted democratic institutions, but in many cases they were not working successfully.

The President then talked for several minutes about Latin America, and he said he believed that Spain could play, once again, an important role in the area. The President believed that past grievances were rapidly being forgotten. The Prince agreed. The Prince pointed out that he hoped to travel in Latin America this year, but General Franco was very concerned about security. (Note: No mention was made about the forthcoming trip of the Foreign Minister now scheduled for late March.) The President said he was sorry that the Prince would not be traveling to New York City, but unfortunately we too had security problems.

Once again they returned to Spain and the succession. The Prince pointed out to the President that Franco kept his own counsel and that he did not know until six days before the public announcement that he was heir to the throne.⁷ I mentioned to the President that the Prince had made a very interesting and somewhat progressive speech on July 23, 1969, regarding his acceptance of the role as heir to the throne. The President suggested that I send him a copy. The Prince pointed out that the United States must remember that Franco is much more popular today than he was a few years ago. A general discussion took place on this subject. The meeting then ended with a few more pleasantries.

Comment: The Prince was pleasant and talkative, but at times not very clear in his comments as to his future role in Spain. It was obvious to those present that the President has made very clear to the Prince our interest about the transition that Spain is passing through.

The conference ended at 12:05 p.m. when the President and Juan Carlos talked alone for several minutes.

⁷ See Document 285.

303. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Post-Franco Spain

You recently asked CIA Director Helms to take a look at the prospects for post-Franco Spain. He has now provided the memorandum attached at Tab A.²

The immediate outlook when Franco, now in his 79th year, passes from the scene, is for Prince Juan Carlos to assume titular head of a regime dominated by the Spanish military (the Army in particular). This transition itself will most likely be non-violent but will begin a period of fluidity and shifting alliances among and within various groups, some of whom are now counted as part of the regime and others who may be viewed as the opposition.

Though the situation is rather complex, in essence there are generally three groupings into which the various interests may be placed: those who believe that virtually any change threatens the nation; others who seek the easing or elimination of the more harsh restrictions of the past years; and those who will attempt to seize the opportunity for mischief-making.

The Communists, Anarchists, and Basque and Catalan separatists will undoubtedly seek to exploit Franco's passing. They may attempt to link with labor, students and some elements in the Church to provoke demonstrations marked increasingly with violence. At the other end of the spectrum, the senior Army officers, the diehard Falangists (Franco's old political party), some members of the Church's hierarchy, and some businessman, will probably attempt to take all measures to preserve the form and stability of the regime. If they perceive too strong or violent a threat of change they may very well act with great force and repression.

The great bulk of Spanish life falls into the middle ground, desirous of evolutionary change and continued modernization. The Opus

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 705, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen." The President wrote at the top: "Helms, Excellent analysis." An attached note to the NSC Secretariat reads: "Per Dr. K's office, Dr. K has already called Mr. Helms and passed on the President's remark 'excellent analysis.'"

² Not printed. The memorandum is entitled "Post Franco Spain," March 12.

Dei group (including Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo) is representative, but following the recent financial scandal and their role in the Burgos trial,³ they are vulnerable to political attack from the right. They also lack popular backing, being essentially a wealthy elitist group. Perhaps half of the Spanish Church is now on the "liberal" side, favoring separation of Church and State and a stronger more independent voice for Spanish labor. Many in the business community and the lower officer corps strongly favor gradual economic and political liberalization.

In short, for a period of a year or so following Franco's departure, there will probably be a move to the right—dominated by the Army—while pressures build for a gradual liberalization in the economic and, perhaps the political areas. The general estimate now is that events will then proceed fairly gradually toward this liberalization.

The consequences, over time, of a liberalizing trend are hard to gauge now. If the movement is gradual and relatively controlled and combined with increasing association with a more cohesive Europe, there is a fair chance of political stability, though almost certainly well to the left of the present situation. US-Spanish relations might under these circumstances experience some problems. Spain will probably step up its "even-handed" international game and, economically, it would become part of our overall problem with the European Communities. In addition, there is a possibility—perhaps a probability—that the various factions in Spain will try to use, or abuse, the US in their domestic power struggle, and the US military role in Spain could become a target for the frustrations and defeats of the contending factions. On the positive side, however, there may well be a much better chance to get Spain into NATO with resulting longer term benefits for us.

The basic left-right conflict in Spain could cause serious problems, perhaps in two stages. In the early post-Franco period (1–2 years), when the regime will have moved to the right, and when the extremists (far left and separatists) may foster violence and encourage others to join—the key question will be the way in which those in authority react to this violence. If the reaction is too repressive and too broad (covering groups beyond the extremists), Spain could again plunge into a spiral of violence. We saw a hint of this possibility, albeit with a happy solution because of Franco's moderate decision, in the Burgos trial.

³ Apparent reference to the Maltesa financial scandal in which a Barcelona-based textile manufacturer was charged with diverting government credits for illegal use. Lopez Bravo, the Minister of Industry at the time, was accused of turning a blind eye to the scandal while two former Ministers and Opus Dei members were formally charged with involvement. The reference to Opus Dei and the Burgos trials was not identified. Catholic ecclesiastical leaders led by Pope Paul VI had urged Franco to show clemency for the Basques.

On the assumption that the regime weathers this period by successfully containing violence from the extreme left without employing widespread counterviolence, then we can expect a period of a gradual liberalizing trend. The pressure will be eased. However, extremists might then try to hurry this movement and push it too far left—again, perhaps through tactics of violence. The military might at this point feel constrained to enter, and restore Spain to the right. While this course of events is possible it becomes less likely with each year of post-Franco stability.

304. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon met with U.S. Ambassador to Spain Robert Hill in Washington from 12:40 to 12:59 p.m. on June 11, 1971. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) The discussion focused on the issues of the succession to Spanish Head of State General Francisco Franco and Hill's replacement. Hill reported that Franco's health was declining but that "Nevertheless, he could go on for a long period of time." A transcript of the tape recording of the following portion of their conversation reads:

Hill: "The one thing on that Spanish situation."

Nixon: "The transition?"

Hill: "When you choose whoever goes over there, if it's a left winger, it would just kill us."

Nixon: "A left winger? Spain?"

Hill: "Yeah, I mean—"

Nixon: "Hell no!"

Hill: "They play with the left, it's the kiss of death."

Nixon: "Hell no! Never! The other thing is that what we want you to leave, you must leave a good honest staff there."

Hill: "Yes, sir. I got a super staff."

Nixon: "Well, we'll, whoever we send, that's the thing. Incidentally, I'd like to have Bob [Haldeman] to have a talk with Kissinger in this respect. I want you to analyze your staff."

Hill: "Right."

Nixon: "We don't want to do this through State. You give me whatever you want. We will impose a staff on the new Ambassador there. If you think they're good enough."

Hill: "Yes, sir. We've got a fine fellow as Minister, but he's not strong enough to be Chargé d'Affaires. He'll have to go when I go. You better bring a fellow in that understands the, how the system works in Spain, that is loyal to you, and, uh, I'll make some recommendations."

After a brief digression, the two men returned to the issue of Hill's successor:

Nixon: "What we really need, we haven't got a guy to do as good a job as Ambassador as you did, but if you've got a strong enough staff, this guy will do just what we say. That's what I have in mind."

Hill: "That's—"

Nixon: "And he will be a right winger [unclear] by right winger I mean he ain't going to be a left winger."

Hill: "He'll be a moderate influence in Spain."

Hill then commented on the prospects for a transition from Franco's rule:

Hill: "The Russians are making a major push to try to get into Spain. And the leftists are making a major push to try to affect the transition in government, if anything happens to General Franco. And poor Juan Carlos is just sitting there without portfolio [unclear] not knowing if he's fish or fowl. And if Franco doesn't put him on the throne, in my opinion, before Franco passes from the scene, he has major problems. And the key to Spain's future is who's going to be Prime Minister. And, at the present time, the Vice President of the country—"

Nixon: "Blanco."

Hill: "—is Carrero Blanco. He's a tough, two fisted [unclear] friend of Franco's who can be depended on as a friend of the United States."

Nixon: "He more than Lopez Bravo?"

Hill: "Lopez Bravo is the future of Spain if he would get off the kick of looking in the mirror too much."

Nixon: "Because he's so bright."

Hill: "He's terribly bright."

Nixon: "And, of course, Blanco is a hell of an impressive fellow."

Hill: "Very."

Nixon: "I like him. Could he, could he get the support?"

Hill: "Yeah, he's all right but the unfortunate thing about Carrero Blanco is that he does not aspire to high office. He says, 'I'm here for as long as Franco wants me to be.' And, it's hard to believe, he doesn't have it in his system. I had a dinner party for him the other night and he says: 'You know, I can't wait until the General picks a Prime Minister so I can get back to my grandchildren.'"

The conversation then passed to other issues. The editor prepared the transcript specifically for this volume. (*Ibid.*, White House Tapes, Conversation 517–11)

The President returned to the question of a new Ambassador to Spain later that day at 2:40 p.m. during a meeting with President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman. The President stressed the need for a "tough, seasoned man."

Kissinger: "[7 seconds not declassified]"

Nixon: "Yeah, yeah."

Kissinger: "[3 seconds not declassified]"

Nixon: "[6 seconds not declassified]" (Ibid., Conversation 517–22)

305. Letter From President Nixon to Spanish Head of State Franco¹

Washington, October 19, 1971.

Dear General Franco:

As you know, the United States has put forward a law of the sea proposal which would provide for a right of free transit through and overflight of international straits.² The successful negotiation of this right and of our proposal for a twelve mile territorial sea at the Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for 1973 is of the highest importance to the United States and, we believe, to the security of the West. I was disturbed, therefore, to learn that Spanish officials have expressed opposition to this proposal at various international gatherings, including the General Assembly of the United Nations.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres. Secret. Hill presented Nixon's letter to Franco on October 22. He reported on the meeting in telegram 4815 from Madrid, October 22; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 413.

² See *ibid.*, Document 405.

³ According to an October 12 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Marshall Wright to Kissinger: "Lopez Bravo has become a major barrier to the success of our Law of the Sea policy. He has been very active and effective in opposing our proposal for free passage through international straits. Without international agreement to such free passage, the broadening of territorial waters to 12 miles will very seriously endanger the mobility of our strategic forces." The memorandum continued that following a meeting, senior officials from the Departments of State and Defense "are all agreed that it is time to move hard with Spain on this issue." Hill had suggested an approach to Carrero Blanco and Franco. "To enlist Franco's aid, we need a Presidential communication." Initial plans, subsequently discarded, called for Vice President Agnew to deliver the message personally to Franco. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762,

We believe that the right of free transit is essential for preserving the mobility of both our general purpose and nuclear deterrent forces, not only in meeting our commitments in Western Europe, but in fulfilling our responsibilities in other parts of the world as well. This right would be an objective one, established by international agreement and applicable to all straits used for international navigation. We do not think that the present international law right of innocent passage is sufficient for Western security requirements because it is a subjective standard, does not include the right of overflight, and carries a requirement that submarines must navigate on the surface.

Your Government has closely identified itself with the Western defense effort and we are pleased to know that you anticipate an even more active role in the future. I am confident, too, that Spain shares the concern of many Western nations over the recent increase in Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean. It is to counter this potential threat by maintaining the maximum strategic flexibility for our own forces and those of our allies that we have proposed a right of free transit through and over international straits. We have concluded that an international agreement recognizing this right would benefit all countries interested in maintaining the political and military balance on which world stability is presently based.

We have discussed these issues with officials of your Government⁴ and will continue to do so, but I wanted you to know of my deep personal concern. I will welcome your views on this subject and have therefore asked Ambassador Hill to deliver this letter personally to you and to provide you with any additional information on this issue which you may require.⁵

With warm regards,
Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres.) An October 8 memorandum from Johnson to Nixon provides details on Lopez Bravo's opposition and includes a draft of a Presidential letter to Franco. It is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, Document 410.

⁴ Johnson met with Ambassador Arguelles on October 7 after Arguelles returned from New York where he discussed the issue with Lopez Bravo. See *ibid.*, Document 409.

⁵ In a November 18 reply, Franco linked Spanish opposition to the prosecution of its claims to the Strait of Gibraltar and its concerns about the extension of right of passage to the ships of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Franco added that he believed that the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the United States already gave it access to free passage through Spanish waters. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, Spain Franco corres.)

306. Letter From the Former Ambassador in Spain (Hill) to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 28, 1972.

Dear Mr. President:

On leaving my post in Spain,² I would like to call your attention to a major problem remaining in our relations with Spain and give you my thoughts as to how it might be solved.

Our relations with Spain are excellent, but in recent months, the Spanish Government has begun to take actions in the military field, which if continued, would greatly diminish the value of the bases to us. [10 lines not declassified]

I am convinced that there is a relationship between the recent military difficulties and the Spanish Government's serious concern over our posture regarding their agreement with the European Community, their desire for beneficiary status under our generalized preferences scheme, and their fear that we may impose restrictions on shoe imports from Spain.³

The Spanish insist that if we establish a generalized preferences system and exclude Spain because of the reverse preferences Spain grants to the EC, this would cause political as well as economic problems for them. The Spanish would be satisfied if they could benefit from the system at least until 1975, by which time their integration into the EC will have reached such a point that they could dispense with preferences from the U.S. I urge you to take this course of action.

The Spanish understand the problems which shoe imports represent for us. However, unilateral U.S. action to restrict imports of Spain's leading export product would cause serious difficulties for the Spanish Government. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible politically for the Spanish Government to impose controls on shoe exports unless it can show some concession from the United States in return.

The issues of generalized preferences and shoes might be disposed of by tying them together. We could seek agreement from the Spanish

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. IV. Secret.

² Hill left post on January 12.

³ A memorandum from Laird to Nixon, January 11, expressed Laird's concern that the U.S. position on the Spanish-EC preferential trade agreement might result in restrictions on the freedom of U.S. military operations in Spain. A January 12 memorandum to William Eberle, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, provided information on the status and background of the footwear issue in U.S. trade policy. Both memoranda are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Documents 266 and 267.

that they would establish voluntary controls on shoe exports, along specified lines, to go into effect when the Congress has passed generalized preferences legislation under which Spain could be a beneficiary, at least until 1975.

I propose that the problem of the Spain-EC agreement, which poses an even greater threat to our relations, be solved as follows. We could inform the Spanish that we are prepared to support Spain diplomatically in its forthcoming attempt to obtain a commitment from the EC on ultimate full integration. Assuming Spanish willingness, under our bilateral agreement, to offer adjustments or compensation for any case of *actual* damage to U.S. exports, we would not press our plan to invoke GATT provisions against Spain. In return, we would expect Spain to implement the military provisions of the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation in a fully cooperative spirit. We should start this course of action as soon as possible, because it must be linked to the forthcoming renegotiation of the Spain-EC agreement, which is to take place in the near future.

I do not believe any of these problems can be solved in isolation. They should all be dealt with in one negotiation, which, because of its complexity, would have to be conducted through normal diplomatic channels to stand any chance of success.

Mr. President, Nat Samuels is well-liked and respected by the Spanish officials. He can do the job and it should be done soonest.

With warm regard.

Sincerely,

Robert C. Hill⁴

⁴ Hill signed "Bob" above his typed signature.

307. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

Franco Issues Succession Decree

Last week Spain issued a decree-law which regulates the succession to power by specifying that Franco's Vice-Premier will automatically become the first post-Franco Premier.

The law:

—provides that upon Franco's death, the Vice-Premier, currently the ultra-conservative Carrero-Blanco, immediately succeeds for a normal, five year, term;

—reiterates Franco's titles and prerogatives, thus apparently re-confirming his intention not to share them with anyone;

—repeats a 1969 law that Prince Juan Carlos is to be proclaimed King within eight days after Franco's death.

The main consequences of the law are:

—to signal Franco's intention to project his system beyond his death by designating his closest collaborator, Carrero-Blanco, as Premier;

—to strengthen Juan Carlos' position as future King against the Regency Council or eventual rivals;

—to, on the other hand, reduce Juan Carlos' actual political power by making a decision now on the Premiership.

From the viewpoint of the current balance of political forces in Spain, the decree constitutes a rebuff to technocrats such as Development Minister Lopez Rodo and Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo. They had sought to have a Premier named *now*, before Franco's demise so as to strengthen government efficiency. Their cautious campaign for political evolution in Spain also seems blocked by Franco's retention of full authority during his life-time and by his designation of an ultra-conservative to take over after his death.

Franco has once again elected to do things his way, acting without the counsel of most of his advisors and to the immediate satisfaction of few.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for information. Haig signed the memorandum for Kissinger. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen."

Once Franco is gone, however, Juan Carlos may as a result of the decree be in a better position to act. Although he cannot under this law choose the first post-Franco premier, he can, acting with the Regency Council, dismiss him.

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, October 13, 1972, 1235Z.

4690. Subj: Conversation with Gen Franco, FoMin Lopez Bravo.

1. Following is memorandum of my conversation with Gen Franco and FoMin Lopez Bravo on occasion presentation my credentials at noon Oct 11, 1972.² The conversation was conducted entirely in Spanish. The exchanges on certain subjects (paras 4 and 5 and para 6) have been reported in septels.³

2. Gen Franco received me very cordially. I apologized for my limited command of Spanish. Franco appeared pleased. With some apparent difficulty in speaking, he asked me about President Nixon's health. I told him that the President was well and extremely busy these days in connection with preparations for national elections. Franco nodded understandingly and said he was sure the President's re-election was a foregone conclusion.

3. The FoMin asked me what I thought about the growing strength of the Soviet fleet in the Med. (Lopez Bravo had told me the day before that Franco would bring up this subject. The FoMin apparently raised it because of Franco's difficulty in speaking). I said I thought the action of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

² The President appointed Admiral Horacio Rivero (ret.) as Ambassador to Spain on September 11. Rivero had served as Commander of Allied Forces, Southern Europe, until May 1972. According to a February 2 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to William Macomber, Zumwalt had been promoting Rivero's candidacy for an ambassadorship following his May retirement. Johnson suggested that Rivero be "kept in mind" for an ambassadorial posting where a career officer would not be suitable. (Ibid., RG 59, Records of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96D695, Personnel M-Z)

³ Telegram 4665 from Madrid, October 10, reported further on discussions with Franco. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL SP-US) In telegram 4658 from Madrid, October 10, the Ambassador detailed his talks with Lopez Bravo immediately before the meeting with Franco. (Ibid.) Rivero reported on discussions regarding Soviet activities in the Mediterranean in telegram 4665 from Madrid, October 11. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 706, Country Files—Europe, Spain, Vol. IV)

the Egyptian President in expelling the Soviets from their bases had reduced the effectiveness of the Soviet fleet in the Med since the Russians would now have to depend more heavily on Black Sea bases for their logistics. Of particular importance, I added, was that the Russian fleet was deprived of its air arm in the Med. This would limit their capability for surveillance and reconnaissance. I felt that the loss of the reconnaissance and fighter bases in Egypt represented a substantial disadvantage for the Soviet fleet as compared to the US fleet with its organic air power. Without its air power, I noted, the Soviet fleet would be much more vulnerable. Although the air range from Egypt had been limited to the Eastern part of the Med, this nevertheless represented a development of importance.

4. I said I suspected the Russians would attempt to obtain a replacement for this air component possibly in Syria. Lopez Bravo interposed that he had asked the Syrian FoMin point blank when he was at the UN recently whether the Syrians would bring in the Russians who had been thrown out of Egypt. The Syrian FoMin had replied in the negative stating Quote We do not have a treaty with Russia like the Iraqis. Unquote Lopez Bravo added that the Syrian President was a moderate and would oppose any such concessions to the Russians but he was having trouble with the party. The Russians would surely apply every possible pressure through their friends in Syria.

5. Bravo went on to say that he thought after the US elections would be an ideal time for the US to try to improve relations with Egypt. He believed the Egyptians would be receptive. He didn't think this was possible before the elections but any US moves in this direction would strengthen the position of Sadat, who was subject to attack unless he could show some movement with the West to balance his action against the Russians. Insisting on this point, Bravo asked that I communicate it to the US Govt. The Spanish Govt, he added, would be happy to do whatever it could to further any action the US desired to take and he offered his personal good offices to this end. I replied that I appreciated the FoMin's statement and would forward it to my government.

6. Bravo then said he wanted to bring up a matter outside of protocol with the Generalissimo's permission. I replied I would be very happy to hear him express his views on any subject. The FoMin then expressed concern that there was an apparent intention to reduce the pay of Spanish workers at Rota naval base, which he considered to be a very serious matter. He was going to send me a formal note on the subject, he stated, but he wanted to tell me personally beforehand since he wanted our relations to be as frank and friendly as possible. [2½ lines not declassified] it would be embarrassing to make this concession at the same time that a depressed area like Rota was hit by the intended re-

duction in wages. If this happened in Barcelona or other areas, it would not be of as much concern but the economic situation in the Rota area was so depressed that he was sure there would be political repercussions and the press would seize on this matter to criticize the govt. (Franco's expression indicated approval of what Bravo was saying.) I replied that I would examine this question.

7. Bravo then told the General that I had just arrived in Spain the day before and was going to leave this afternoon to join him in the Canary Islands at the celebration of the Dia de la Hispanidad, which was taking place there this year. The General seemed pleased to hear this.

8. Impressions: Throughout my 20-minute audience, Franco regarded me with a pleased, rather benign, expression, as he would an old friend. His eyes were animated and his mind was evidently clear. He moved in his usual slow mechanical way and the trembling of his hand was not much more apparent than during my previous visit to him about a year and a half ago. The most striking impression, however, was the difficulty he had in speaking. When he spoke, his words were slurred and his voice seemed to come from down in his throat and was hardly audible. A number of times, he seemed to want to say something and his lips moved but no sound came out. On these occasions, Bravo interjected and spoke as if for Franco while Franco appeared to understand and approve what Bravo said. Lopez Bravo carried on most of the conversation. Evidently, Franco understood without difficulty but is losing control of his speech.

Rivero

United Kingdom

309. Message From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Wilson¹

Washington, February 3, 1969, 1554Z.

WH 1019. I was most grateful for your message of January 24,² and for Michael Palliser's follow-up to Henry Kissinger.³ The London meeting of Commonwealth heads of government seems to have gone very well indeed.⁴ It is particularly heartening to see the sense of reality and responsibility demonstrated by your newer Commonwealth colleagues.

I share your high opinion of Prime Minister Lee, and appreciate your remarks about Gorton. I realize that he is worried about the future of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and will try to reassure him. Perhaps you and I can talk over these problems when we meet.

Which brings me to the principal reason for this message.

By now David Bruce will have talked to you about my tentative plans for a West European visit late this month or early in March.⁵ I have long felt that the first order of business for this administration must be an early meeting with you and other Western European heads of government. We have much to talk about if we are to establish the confidence so essential to the maintenance of a strong and healthy alliance.

As I told you in my January 11 letter,⁶ I am intent upon upholding the close relationship that has so long existed between British Prime Ministers and American Presidents. I would, therefore, like to suggest that—if it is convenient for you—I begin the crucial part of my European trip with a stop in London for a day of talks with you and your

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Wilson Corres. Secret; Nodis.

² A copy is *ibid.*

³ Dated January 27, it provided an amplified report on the Commonwealth meeting. (*Ibid.*)

⁴ The meeting was held in London January 7–15. For text of the communiqué, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1969–1970, pp. 23183–23186.

⁵ The President announced on February 6 his plan to visit Western Europe February 23–March 2. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 76–77.

⁶ A copy of the letter, dated January 13, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Wilson Corres.

advisors.⁷ (My first stop will be Brussels, but it will be primarily for a visit to NATO.) I am most anxious to get your views and advice on a wide range of problems before going on to other European capitals.

If such a meeting fits in with your plans, perhaps we can get our people working together on a tentative date for the visit and an agenda of possible subjects for discussion.

One final note. This channel is only useful if you and I can say exactly what is on our minds without pulling any punches. Your “indiscretions” as you call them are extremely useful in helping me to get to know the people with whom I shall be dealing. You can rest assured that anything you send me via this channel will be treated in the utmost confidence.

⁷ A copy of Wilson’s February 19 reply welcoming a visit is *ibid*.

310. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon visited the United Kingdom February 24–26, 1969, during his first official visit to Europe. He met with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson at the Prime Minister’s country residence Chequers on February 24. The two men held further discussions at 10 Downing Street on February 25. A meeting between the President and the British Cabinet also took place. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 340) A summary cable from Secretary of State William Rogers is Document 311. For text of the President’s and Prime Minister’s public statements during the visit, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, 139–141, 144–147, 149–150. The Embassy in London reported on the impact of the President’s visit in telegram 1721 from London, March 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. I) Nixon treated the talks briefly in *RN*, pages 370–371. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger dealt with the meetings in greater detail in *White House Years*, pages 86–96.

311. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

Rome, February 28, 1969, 0050Z.

Secto 16/1217. For Undersecretary from Secretary. Subject: President's visit to UK. Following uncleared by President and subject to revision.

1. London visit was marked by affability and general meeting of minds. Main business sessions were morning meeting and dinner meeting with Prime Minister and afternoon meeting between Stewart and myself. Following are highlights.

2. Morning session.

A. NATO and Europe. (1) President expressed US support for Alliance and ideal of European Community, recognizing that fundamental decisions must be made by Europeans and not by US. Said we now face some difficult problems, stemming from very success of objectives we sought for 20 years. There was less fear and Europe was stronger. Role of US accordingly receded, though US military strength was recognized. There has also been shift in balance of power, especially since Cuban missile crisis, when we still were much stronger than Soviets. Soviets had since closed missile gap and had increased superiority in conventional forces. We remained somewhat stronger in nuclear capability. He thought we should avoid thinking in terms of numbers and concentrate on quality. He knew European opinion favored both SALT talks and limitations of strategic weapons. Talks likely to occur on this with Soviets parallel with political talks. We would have to keep in mind that if we agreed to nuclear equality conventional arms might become more important. Concluded he did not expect a war, as he thought we were dealing with rational men in USSR. (2) Wilson said his views very close to ours, asking FonSec Stewart to outline detailed position. Stewart said:

(A) Firm attachment to NATO is an unquestioned part of UK policy. NATO was not only deterrent but made situation steadier. However, the new generation does not take case for NATO as self-evident. Accordingly, emphasis must not be placed only on deterrence but also on "détente." If NATO held together less by fear it must be more by hope.

(B) On defense, NATO must have agreed strategic doctrine. Flexible response important but he thought time for nuclear decision decid-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to London, Brussels, Paris, Bonn, and USNATO.

edly short. Also thought no European member ready to contemplate major increases in defense expenditures.

(C) Much could be done through increased European cooperation, but there is fear among some Europeans that increased cooperation would lead US to pull back.

(D) There was firm belief in Europe that bilateral SALT talks ought to be undertaken. UK and others wished to be informed as much as possible.

(3) Healey then made following points.

(A) NATO not a total foreign policy but an instrument to prevent war and allow FRG to participate in own defense.

(B) Military problems were easier to handle in total political context.

(C) Right question was what mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, combined with what strategy, will best prevent war? Europe could not survive even conventional war.

(D) Doubts re solidity US nuclear guarantee² would not lead to European build-up of conventional forces, but to move toward European nuclear forces.

(E) Assured destruction capability for "intolerable" destruction was more important than being able to kill more people than Soviets could.

(F) Role of Mediterranean fleet, which now only nuclear, should be reexamined; perhaps it should have dual role.

(G) NATO conventional forces capability could be improved and UK was contributing. Should be capable of handling "accidents" like Czech and East German problem.

(H) Use of tactical nuclear weapons was the difficult issue. Soviets needed be faced with situation where they knew West would always escalate even to strategic exchange rather than surrender. At same time tactical weapons not just larger artillery. NATO NPG group now working on plans for use very small number of tactical weapons as first way to show our interest. [garble] Europeans thought President had to decide on use nuclear weapons; hoped their interests would be considered if ever Presidential decision to use nuclear weapons needed to be taken.

(J) Independent UK nuclear capability, integrated into NATO, increased deterrence toward Soviets.

² Reference to public comments by French President Charles de Gaulle.

(K) Soviets likely use nuclear weapons at outset in any attack on Europe. Wilson concluded by stressing importance of UK nuclear deterrent. He said many Europeans would be unhappy if only nuclear force this side of Atlantic was French. Stressed UK nuclear strategy was to give signal to Soviets in advance West would use nuclear weapons progressively; in case of use to start with small number, presumably using Hot Line at same time.

(4) President agreed UK nuclear power increased uncertainty and therefore the deterrent. Added that he felt that way about French force also. Prime Minister commented "certainty" of use also did. As regards SALT, President said one purpose trip was to make it clear there would be full consultation but also that he wanted to go forward with them as part of a broad negotiating program which included the political side. He disagreed with those who thought that if Europe did more in defense field, US would do less; thought opposite the case. He also agreed with desirability studies re use of small number tactical nuclear weapons. Prime Minister welcomed idea of "associating" political progress with progress on strategic arms.

B. Europe. At President's request Wilson outlined current British views on European unity. Said UK wanted to join European Community and Common Market and "will not be put off by any alluring alternatives." While economic arguments for British joining Europe were "finely balanced," technological argument (computer market) was overwhelming and political argument for greater Eur political community was main one that had persuaded him. He thought NAFTA was a diversion. In long run, most useful contribution to free world trade was to build up Europe's unity. Britain would patiently keep its application on table and avoid going up side roads. UK is on main road, faced with a large road block, but this would not last forever. On wider trade matters GATT was right instrument and UK would be opposed to moves outside GATT.

President agreed that "necessity" would bring European unity about. Best policy for US was to recognize this was basically a European problem and avoid charges of "meddling." Wilson agreed that this posture was entirely realistic. We should make clear that we wanted Britain in Common Market but public US pressure likely be counter-productive in short run. Stewart said UK intended keep up pressures through WEU and elsewhere.

C. Trade policy. President noted that forces of protectionism have been growing in US but that he would resist these forces. If he gave in to pressures for quotas, a destructive trade war would be set off. Hoped to handle textiles by voluntary means. He said that Secretary Stans would come to London for full discussion these matters with Board of

Trade President Crosland,³ since US/UK dialogue was "vitally important."

D. Approach to de Gaulle. President said he felt it could only be useful if he established communications with de Gaulle, although he had no illusions this would change French position on NATO, Common Market and gold. However, an isolated and brooding de Gaulle is not in our interests. Wilson said his first reaction was that a great deal of good would come from this. De Gaulle feels unloved, although much of this he brought on himself. He had power to cause monetary chaos and it was important to leave him with no illusions on gold price. President agreed stating he would be firm on substance, conciliatory in tone. Stewart said that de Gaulle must not feel he can use a relationship of greater warmth as a basis for driving wedges between US and UK or US and FRG.

E. International monetary situation. (1) President said he felt a re-examination of international monetary situation was imperative but that precipitous decisions must be avoided. To convene a monetary summit conference would be disastrous unless we knew precisely what would come out of it. However, we cannot continue to muddle through crisis after crisis. He favored a sure-footed, initially bilateral examination of alternative roads to achievement of a stable monetary system. We could start with initiation of SDR's.⁴ Suggested Jenkins⁵ might come to Washington to discuss general problem with Kennedy. Prime Minister thought Jenkins might be able to come to Washington in April-May on way back from Japan.

(2) At Prime Minister's request Jenkins outlined UK views. Made following points: (a) monetary situation at moment one of "fragile calm." (b) Large scale monetary conference not good idea. (c) There was good possibility of further currency crisis this year, perhaps stemming from substantial speculation against German DM in connection German elections. He hoped sterling would be in stronger position by then, but could not be sure about franc. (d) While this primarily issue for U.S., he saw no attraction in change in gold price, which was an arbitrary, unfair and inflationary way to increase liquidity. French concern not really price of gold but special status of dollar. (e) Saw "crawling pegs" or wider margins as having both advantages and disadvantages. This would be worth examining if it could be done in a quiet bilateral way that would not produce speculation, but he isn't sure this is the solution. (f) He saw increased liquidity coming mainly via SDR scheme and he was also encouraged by new administration's

³ C. Anthony Crosland.

⁴ Special Drawing Rights.

⁵ Roy Jenkins, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

willingness to proceed far and fast. Others might have difficulty but we should not be discouraged. UK was prepared for “quiet examination” on bilateral basis on monetary matters, while maintaining closest cooperation among central banks to prevent speculation from producing crisis.

(3) President said he shared feeling of urgency on this matter, which should not be swept under rug. He recognized US had been partly at fault and said he would make every effort to cool off inflation at home and make trade balances more livable. BOT President Crossland interjected that behavior of US economy was decisive factor. US deficit had been biggest contribution to expansion of world trade and he hoped it would not be too quickly and drastically reduced. If this occurred in isolation we would have major liquidity problem and contraction in world trade. Therefore US measures must be carefully related to expansion of SDR's.

3. Meeting with Stewart.

I met with Stewart in afternoon, covering following subjects: A. Computer sales. Stewart referred to two recent instances (Czechoslovakia and Romania) in which UK had refrained from selling computers under COCOM rules, while French went ahead and made sales. Said French computers (IRIS 50) contained US parts disguised as French and French might not be able to make sales without US consent. Hoped we would make US view clear. Noted difficult for UK to stick to rules if others didn't and expressed doubt about military importance these computers. I said I doubted whether we should discuss this with French during present trip but we would look into it. I also told him we planned to look into whole question of what products continued to need to be embargoed. (Stewart said in response to my query that UK had not spoken to French about sale.)

B. Laos.

Stewart expressed view Laos settlement had to wait for VN settlement. I said this seemed correct to me.

C. Vietnam.

Stewart inquired whether we thinking of ICC role in VN settlement. I said ICC hadn't worked too well and we were thinking of other possibilities; enlarged ICC might be one such. Also told him private talks had not started in Paris. When they did we hoped they would understand if we could not talk about them.

D. Middle East.

I told Stewart we were anxious to work closely with UK. He agreed we must keep in close contact. Hoped there would not be two-two split, much less three-one. He believed Soviets would be more helpful than might be expected. Israelis would have to withdraw.

Perhaps the four could reach agreement on a package that might be carried out step by step. We would then have to consider what do with Israel.

I said most important matter was to get a binding peace that would assure that Israel would continue to exist with satisfactory guarantees. Otherwise there not much point in working out difficult details on other matters. Stewart said he agreed this was the most important matter. Solution could not be reached without this. Very much wanted US-UK coordination, which reason for Arthur visit to US in March. Referred to UK document to US of October as containing UK ideas.

4. Evening meeting.

Discussion after dinner between President and PM at 10 Downing Street February 25 concentrated mainly on Middle East. Large measure of agreement reached between President and Prime Minister that we and British must keep in close touch as situation develops, both at UN and elsewhere. Stressing his own basic sympathy for Israel in face of continuing Arab refusal to accept existence of Israeli state, Stewart urged that Soviets be persuaded to push Arabs in this direction. Only then could Israelis be expected to make concessions.

President said that in recent conversation with Dobrynin⁶ he had sensed Soviets might be helpful if there were bilateral discussions with them. The Prime Minister confirmed that his government fully accepted that we should proceed with such discussions.

Rogers

⁶ February 17. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 14.

312. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 12, 1969.

SUBJECT

Message from Prime Minister Wilson

On March 7 Prime Minister Wilson sent you a personal message proposing US–UK discussion of mutual domestic problems (Tab A). His proposal is a direct result of your suggestion during the meeting with the British Cabinet on February 25 that you would welcome cooperation and contacts between the American and British Governments in fields other than foreign affairs.

The Prime Minister has proposed that Home Secretary James Callaghan, who will be in Bermuda about March 17 for the annual conference of the British-American Parliamentary Group, might go on to Washington after the conference to meet with the Attorney-General, Mr. Mitchell, and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Mr. Finch. In the British Government the Home Secretary has responsibility not only for the maintenance of law and order, but for urban programs in such fields as education, housing, public health, and welfare. Callaghan would be most interested in an exchange of views about law and order, social unrest—especially among students, and race relations.

Prime Minister Wilson added that the British Embassy would make the necessary arrangements for the visit through normal State Department channels.

I believe this is a very positive proposal, and your response will be seen by the British as an indicator of your interest in practical application of the suggestions you made during the trip. I suggest, therefore, that you send a brief reply to Wilson welcoming his proposal, and instruct the Department of State to be prompt and helpful in dealing with the British Embassy on details of the Callaghan visit. Furthermore, I believe that you should suggest that Mr. Callaghan confer with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Romney, as well as with your Assistant for Urban Affairs, Mr. Moynihan, in addition to Messrs. Mitchell and Finch.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Wilson Corres. Confidential. Sent for action. The tabs are not printed. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt.

*Recommendations*²

1. That you approve Prime Minister Wilson's proposal to send Home Secretary Callaghan to Washington for working consultations on domestic problems.

2. That you approve the proposed text of a reply to Wilson at Tab B, to be transmitted by cable for delivery by the American Embassy in London.

3. That you approve and sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab C.

4. That you approve and sign the memorandum to the Cabinet Members concerned at Tab D.

² The President checked each of the Approve options, and a handwritten note on the first page reads: "papers sent out 3/14/69."

313. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 17, 1969, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Exchange between President and new British Ambassador Freeman on Occasion of Presentation of Credentials

PARTICIPANTS*U.S. Side:*

The President

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Asst. to the President for Natl. Security Aff.,

Ambassador Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol,

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Asst. Sec. for EUR

U.K. Side:

Ambassador John Freeman

After the presentation of credentials ceremony, the President and Ambassador Freeman went to the Red Room, where they exchanged

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. I. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting took place in the Red Room of the White House. Freeman, a former Labour Party member of Parliament and Minister, had been a critic of Nixon. Both Nixon, *RN*, p. 371, and Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 95–96, touch upon the smoothing of relations between the President and new Ambassador during Nixon's visit to Europe.

remarks for some ten minutes. The President noted that Ambassador Freeman's last foreign post had been in India. Ambassador Freeman confirmed that he had been there from 1962 to 1965. He had found it a fascinating country, but full of seemingly insoluble problems. In response to the President's query, he noted that a possible emerging strong man might be Chavan, from the Bombay area. The big problem in India was that all politicians tended to be regional in their sources of strength and it was difficult, even in this instance, to imagine that a Maratha from a traditional West Indian warrior tribe could ever obtain the support of Calcutta politicians.

The President referred to the "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain. This was an obvious fact, but it was also necessary to recognize that other countries and their leaders would be sensitive about it. Hence, while it would continue to exist, as it had historically, between the two countries, it was desirable to play it down publicly and to let the facts take care of themselves. Ambassador Freeman said he fully concurred and he could assure the President that he would do nothing which could be interpreted as taking advantage of this special relationship.

Referring to the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington,² the President said that this would be an important occasion, which he trusted would go beyond the ceremonial, and also result in important substantive discussions. He mentioned the possibility of finding new areas of consultation in NATO.

The President noted that, during his visit to London, Prime Minister Wilson had indicated that he would probably wish to come to the United States at some point in the not too distant future. He wondered what the Prime Minister's thinking was as to timing. Ambassador Freeman said the Prime Minister was thinking about sometime early in June, and would probably try to arrange the visit on a semi-private capacity in order to eliminate some of the trappings that go with a more official visit.³ The President observed that this seemed like a good time and we would try to keep clear the schedule so that there would be an occasion for good talks with the Prime Minister. Ambassador Freeman indicated that the Prime Minister would probably be coming here in connection with his receiving an honorary degree from an American university.

² April 10–11.

³ In an April 28 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that Freeman had informed him that due to difficulties in Ireland and within Parliament, Wilson had decided to postpone a visit to the United States. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. I)

The President noted that there had been some misleading commentary about the French portion of his recent trip to Europe.⁴ He wanted the Ambassador to know that he had not in any respect deviated from the American positions on such matters as UK entry into the Common Market, the role of NATO and European unity. However, he had felt it desirable that the unfavorable atmosphere between France and the United States be improved. There seemed little point in treating President de Gaulle as an outcast. Improved personal relations should be possible without any concessions on essentials.

Ambassador Freeman said that the President had made such a favorable impression on the British Ministers during his visit to London that there was no question of their ever doubting the position he would take or had taken in France. The visit to London had, in fact, been an unmitigated success.

The President added that he very much meant it when he had stressed our intention to consult with our Allies. He wanted the Ambassador to know that we intended to consult fully with the British, and this did not mean merely telling them what we were going to do after we had made up our minds to do it. We would find British views valuable in making up our own minds about possible approaches to problems.

After an exchange on the strains of social life in Washington for a British Ambassador, the conversation ended. On the way out, the President mentioned that he would like to meet with Foreign Minister Stewart and Defense Minister Healey when they came to Washington to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting.⁵

⁴ See Document 118.

⁵ The President met with a group of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers on April 11 (see Document 12), but there is no record that he met alone with Healey. Kissinger met with Healey on April 9. A record of their discussion is in a April 11 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. I)

314. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 1, 1969, 10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy H. Jenkins
Secretary of the Treasury, David M. Kennedy
British Ambassador, John Freeman
Chief of Protocol, Emil Mosbacher
Henry A. Kissinger
C. Fred Bergsten

The meeting took place on the terrace outside the President's office on a beautiful spring morning. The discussion was extremely cordial and freewheeling and was largely a get-acquainted session between the President and the Chancellor. A UPI photo of the group appeared in the *Washington Post* on May 2.

The President opened the discussion by commenting that recent developments in Europe made even more imperative the maintenance of a common ground between the U.S. and the UK. Our two countries will not always agree on specific issues but will generally fully understand each other's views. The President expressed the hope that the Chancellor and Secretary Kennedy would develop a close relationship with complete candor its hallmark. Given the latest French development (note: the departure of General de Gaulle),² we can expect a period of uncertainty and potential instability for as long as three months. During this period, as well as into the future, the U.S. does not wish to be alone.

Secretary Kennedy reported that he and the Chancellor had already developed such a relationship. In addition, he would be talking with the Germans in the same way. Minister of Economics Schiller wants to visit the Secretary for a day or two in mid-May.

The Secretary reported that he and the Chancellor had discussed the prospects for German revaluation and the French currency problem. The Germans wanted company for their upward move but had not yet received any. The President asked whether the Italians were not strong enough to move, though he recognized their political

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. Confidential. Drafted by Bergsten.

² The French President resigned on April 28, following the defeat of a referendum he endorsed. For documentation regarding de Gaulle's resignation and its impact on U.S. policy, see Documents 122, 124, and 125.

problems. The Chancellor noted that Italy has a strong current account position, which would get even stronger if Germany revalued, but they face recurring capital flight which reflects their political uncertainties.

The Chancellor expressed the view that German revaluation was inevitable and, in that case, should be done sooner rather than later. The current problem is that the Germans are talking about it but taking no action. The President asked why Strauss is doing so much talking, to which Dr. Kissinger guessed that Strauss wants to delay the revaluation as long as possible and accomplish it at his own initiative.

The Chancellor noted that the Germans can talk without hurting themselves but that the talking hurts others, especially the French and the UK. He expressed the hope that Schiller would not say much publicly unless he was ready to do something. Dr. Kissinger noted that Schiller was not very strong. The Chancellor thought he was a clever man and in many ways not bad, but that he was the worst chairman he had ever seen.

The President then asked the Chancellor for his views on the French situation. Did the Chancellor think that it would change much post-de Gaulle or would the governing establishment simply carry on?

The Chancellor responded that the French bureaucracy was very strong and capable. It had held up the Fourth Republic and would continue to be effective. He was uncertain, however, of Couve's ability to make decisions during the interim period.

The President noted that one of our academic experts foresaw little change. Dr. Kissinger agreed that there would be little change if Pompidou was elected, but he was not sure of this outcome.³ If the Left decides to back the Center, the candidate of the Center (presumably Poher) could win. This could occur even if the Leftist ran second on the first ballot, with Poher running third. The Center would not be able to deliver its votes to the Left, but the reverse could occur. The Left might wish to support Poher in order to dilute the power of the Presidency and shift power back toward the Assembly.

The Chancellor thought this would represent a return to the Fourth Republic and Dr. Kissinger fully agreed. The Chancellor was not sure that the Left would support the Center, but Dr. Kissinger responded that the interest of the Left was to destroy a strong presidency in order to produce a fairly weak government. The Chancellor did not think the Communists would clearly opt for a centrist over Pompidou, but he admitted that they would like to see a weak government emerge. Dr. Kissinger agreed and thought this argued for the thesis he had just

³ The two-round French elections were set for June 1 and 15.

outlined. The Gaullists would not hold together without de Gaulle, but if Pompidou wins there will be little change in the short run.

The President then asked about French economic policy. Secretary Kennedy thought that it would improve because General de Gaulle's interference had been a major problem. Mr. Bergsten noted that the outcome of the wage negotiations was one key element in the situation and a key question was whether the new government could hold them down. The Chancellor and Secretary Kennedy agreed that these were key questions for the longer term but thought they were not decisive for the short run viability of the franc.

The Chancellor asked Secretary Kennedy whether he assumed there would be no French devaluation until their elections. The Secretary replied that the timing was very tight. Germany must move soon in view of their election and perhaps that is why Schiller wants to come earlier than originally planned.

The Chancellor noted that Strauss would be visiting him at the same time and that the U.S. and UK should therefore keep in close touch. If Strauss says the Germans will move but not until the French election, there will be massive speculation between mid-May and mid-June. The Chancellor thought it would be hard for Germany to re-value sufficiently and there was no real pressure on them since they were taking in money. The Secretary noted that such a scenario would bring sterling under pressure, given the British reserve position. The Chancellor noted that sterling had done all right today (May 1) despite flows into Germany, but he reiterated his concern about the Germans' talking and not acting.

The President noted that this could be an explosive year in Europe politically. We do not know who the players will be by the end of the year. We must all therefore remain flexible in our policies while at the same time retaining a force for stability. The Chancellor affirmed that there was now a new political situation in Europe.

The President remarked that it was his understanding that Prime Minister Wilson now wishes to delay his visit to Washington. The Chancellor made it clear that the Prime Minister wishes to come when he can, and the President added that it might be better for the visit to follow the French election. The Chancellor agreed.

The President asked whether the Prime Minister would be able to keep the unions in check with his proposed new legislation.⁴ The Chancellor replied that the legislation was the right thing to do and was necessary. He thought they could get it through by the end of July al-

⁴ Wilson's Labour government had decided to propose legislation against wildcat strikes. There was strong union and left-wing opposition to the proposals.

though it will be a battle. (The President commented that such a proposal was "gutsy.")

Ambassador Freeman commented that public opinion including labor was with the government on this issue. He cited a recent poll showing 60 percent support for the government's proposal. In reply to the President's question of why there was support, the Ambassador commented that the rank and file union members were fed up with their leadership, with the inconvenience of periodic work stoppages, and that they were beginning to understand economic problems. The Chancellor added that the great worry of union members was unofficial strikes. The UK does not lose as many man-days of work per year as does the U.S., but their strikes were less orderly. This particularly incensed the wives of the union members. One advantage of the British balance of payments problem is the development of widespread appreciation of their economic difficulties; the monthly trade figures are widely followed and the people are impatient for progress. Nevertheless, there are significant problems within the union leadership and the Parliamentary Labor Party, which includes 80 to 90 of their 330 MPs.

Dr. Kissinger noted that these back benchers would not vote against the government. The Chancellor said that some would although they would hope others would keep them from voting themselves out of power. The risk is that they would miscalculate on the offsetting votes.

The President said he was interested in discussing the question because popular attitudes reveal something about the character of a country. It was encouraging to him that the British people were undaunted. Governments could do things if their people were willing to take bitter medicine. Many experts said that the UK was finished, but he had said on his last telethon during the campaign that no one should underestimate the resilience of Britain, which asserts itself at unexpected times.

The President then commented that we might be at a watershed in history. With de Gaulle gone we have a great opportunity and need to develop new areas of strength. The character of people, including the U.S. were critical in the making of difficult decisions. Any one nation can affect others significantly by standing up for what is right.

The Chancellor thought that Europe [*the UK*] might now achieve entry into the EEC, although it still might take a year or so. Progress toward this goal would have a great impact on UK morale. Morale was not low at the present time, however, despite the balance of payments, because the economy was in good shape otherwise.

The President commented that we should be thinking of new approaches on several fronts when the situation is as fluid as this. He

would take a gingerly approach to improving the international monetary system since we can't talk too much without exacerbating our problems. He did hope, however, that we could do some imaginative thinking in this period and not just react to crises. We need to decide on what kind of Atlantic Community we wish. It could not develop as originally conceived and the passing of de Gaulle would not make it an easy task since there would still be Gaullists in all countries. It was his hope, however, that we could make some attacks on these problems. If not, more fragmentation would set in due to lack of leadership and the world situation could become quite difficult. He admitted that this discussion might sound esoteric, but he thought strongly that we should not miss such an historical opportunity.

The Chancellor agreed and noted that we must keep monetary questions in their proper place, within the broad political framework. He said that Britain would try to find its way through to its relationship with Europe. The failure to do so to date had meant a total loss of momentum for the European movement. Dr. Kissinger noted that Poher would favor UK entry and that even Pompidou was less hostile than the General. He saw this as the major change likely in French policy.

The President added that the real question is the Atlantic world that would result. The Chancellor replied that the UK wants to enter Europe to strengthen the Atlantic Community. Ambassador Freeman noted that this was precisely the source of de Gaulle's opposition to UK entry, which must now be probed.

The President said that he had reminded the State Department of their argument that our problems with Europe would disappear if de Gaulle were gone, and had asked for a paper on the subject.⁵ We needed to do some hard planning and thinking. A real opportunity existed given a new French government, the German election, and the Italian problem. We cannot seize the opportunity with the old stereotyped approaches, however. A new breakthrough is required. A key element is for us to remain flexible. The President expressed an interest in any new approaches which the UK might suggest, not just in the financial field. If we develop no new approaches but just react to developments, we might see Europe fragment—this tendency was the virus of the day.

Secretary Kennedy stated that he hoped to explore quietly with French officials what the French could do on the exchange rate before their election. He would avoid any intrusion in the political scene. The President asked whether such an approach could be private, and Dr. Kissinger asked whether it would be conducted at the expert level. The

⁵ See Documents 126 and 127.

Chancellor thought an approach could be kept private. Secretary Kennedy said he would do it via Under Secretary Volcker. Secretary Kennedy encouraged the British to make an effort to find out as well, perhaps through Governor O'Brien,⁶ who is also close to the French. A discussion ensued on how to best approach the French.

The President concluded with a reminder that we should not let the movement of history pass us by while important situations change. The Chancellor agreed and Dr. Kissinger concluded that the situation had become unfrozen.

⁶ Sir Leslie K. O'Brien, Governor of the Bank of England.

315. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

UK Request for Nuclear Overflights of the US

As the British phase down and terminate their military operations in Singapore, they must solve the problem of how to return their nuclear weapons and weapons components from the Far East to the UK by the most rapid, direct, and secure means. The attached memorandum from Secretary Rogers (Tab A) reports that the British have requested the right to overfly United States territory and to use selected US air bases for the staging of RAF transports carrying nuclear weapons and components from Singapore to the UK. The British contemplate three or four such flights "fairly soon" for maintenance purposes, and then beginning in January 1970 they would plan on about one flight per week for a period of four months.

Alternative routes and methods of transport have been explored thoroughly and found unsatisfactory. Ship transport, while possible, would expose the nuclear weapons to more handling and correspondingly greater security and safety risks, and would mean the weapons

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Top Secret; Formerly Restricted Data. The tabs are not printed.

would be unavailable to meet operational assignments for a much longer period. Alternative air routes have been rejected either because they are too long or too hazardous, or because they would involve overflying non-nuclear countries where there would be no basis for requesting reciprocal overflight privileges.

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have conducted a joint review of the design of British weapons which would be transported, and of applicable British safety procedures. In addition, all available information concerning British operational reliability and manufacturing standards has been evaluated, and staff discussions have taken place with British personnel responsible for nuclear operations. The AEC and DOD have jointly concluded that the level of operational reliability and safety precautions characteristic of the British nuclear overflights would be equivalent to our own.

The RAF flights of course would avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible, and would observe strict precautionary measures comparable to those we observe for transporting nuclear weapons. Plans now call for staging through US air bases in Guam, Hawaii, California, and North Carolina. The Department of Justice has studied the British request at the request of the State Department, and has concluded that you have the legal right to authorize the overflights under existing law.

As you know, for many years the British have accorded overflight and staging privileges to US aircraft transporting nuclear weapons. In effect they are asking only for limited reciprocity in this case, and refusal on our part might endanger our own future arrangements with the UK.

Legal liability for any damage caused by the British overflights would be governed by the terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,² which is the basis on which the British have sanctioned US overflights and staging of nuclear weapons flights in and through the UK.

No publicity would be planned for these flights, but contingency press materials would be prepared for use in the event of a leak of information.

At present State, Defense, and the AEC are asking only for your preliminary approval so that they can proceed to consult with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and with the Leadership of the House and Senate. After those consultations, if you give your permission,

² For the text of this agreement, signed in Ottawa, September 20, 1951, see 5 UST 870.

State will report the Congressional reaction to you and request a final decision.

I believe that you should grant preliminary approval and authorize Congressional consultations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Congressional consultations on, and give your preliminary approval for, British nuclear overflights of US territory in connection with the British withdrawal from Singapore.

Approve³

Disapprove

See me

³ Nixon initialed this option and dated it "7/1." In an April 18, 1970, memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that following congressional consultations, the British Government was notified of the President's approval. Subsequently the British Government requested a delay in beginning the overflights, which was granted by the NSC on advice from the Department of State without recourse to the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II)

316. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Wilson¹

Washington, September 17, 1969.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of August 4, 1969 suggests that the understandings existing between our two governments with regard to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons be reaffirmed in the usual way.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Wilson Corres. Top Secret; Sensitive. An enclosure is not printed.

² A copy of Wilson's letter is *ibid.* In telegram 2714 from London, April 9, the Embassy in London reminded the Department of State that it was the practice of the British Government to seek confirmation of the U.S.-U.K. agreement with a change of administration in either country. (*Ibid.*) The U.S.-U.K. agreement to cooperate on nuclear weapons use and development was signed on July 3, 1968.

I am pleased to confirm that the understandings set forth in the enclosure to this letter and in President Johnson's letter of November 11, 1965³ remain in full effect under my Administration.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

³ A copy of Johnson's letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 2, Prime Minister Wilson. See also Document 333.

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, October 7, 1969, 2258Z.

170292. For Ambassador Annenberg from the Secretary.

1. Please deliver following letter to Foreign Secretary Stewart for me:

"Dear Michael, I have asked Ambassador Annenberg to deliver this response to your letter of September 20 so as to underscore the serious attention we have given the BP/Sohio merger.²

"As a result of your letter and Ambassador Freeman's discussions here, my staff has been in close and continuous contact with the Department of Justice. The Justice people, I am satisfied, have done everything possible to try to reconcile the terms of the proposed merger with existing anti-trust guidelines. A final effort to this end was made in a meeting on October 3 with representatives of British Petroleum and Sohio. Unfortunately, the parties did not come to an agreement.

"I wish to assure you, in view of the great importance Her Majesty's Government attaches to this matter, that the Department of Jus-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted in EUR; cleared in S/S, E, and EUR; and approved by Rogers.

² In telegram 7931 from London, October 2, Annenberg stated: "I am deeply concerned about foreign policy impact and political effect here and elsewhere in Europe of possible Department of Justice action to forestall BP-Sohio merger." He added: "The interest with which this matter is being watched by the British should not rpt not be underestimated. There is danger of real damage to the climate of international trade and investment." (Ibid.)

tice has approached the merger proposal with sympathetic deliberation and complete fairness. I am fully satisfied that BP is receiving, and will continue to receive, equitable treatment in this matter.

"As a matter of fact, the Department of Justice is not seeking a court injunction to prevent the merger. It has instead stated its intention to sue to have the acquisition declared illegal, and discussions will continue in an effort to arrive at a satisfactory disposition of the matter.

"I hope you will appreciate that we have done as much as we could reasonably do, consistent with the government's responsibilities under the anti-trust laws, to obtain the desired resolution of this matter.

"We, as you, are cognizant of the desirability of maintaining a hospitable climate for international investment. We have welcomed British investment here and see more of it every day. The anti-trust issue unfortunately makes the current question an exceptional one.

"With best regards, sincerely, Bill".

2. I would appreciate your supplementing the message conveyed in my letter with oral comments along the lines of the Under Secretary's telegram to you.

3. There follows text of "personal and confidential" letter dated September 20 in New York from Foreign Secretary Stewart to me:

"Dear Bill, there is one point that I should have liked to have raised this afternoon³ had we had time and which I believe may be a little too pressing to wait for our meeting next Tuesday. This is the question of the BP/Sohio merger. Ambassador Freeman was sympathetically received when he spoke to Mr. Elliot Richardson on 11 September about the merger.⁴ This is a complicated matter and I do not want to trouble you with the details which are available in the State Department. I should merely like to say that it is a matter to which we attach the greatest importance and I hope that it will be possible for the administration to adopt a helpful attitude.

"With best wishes, yours, Michael."⁵

Rogers

³ A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949-72, CF 396.

⁴ A memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Central Files 1967-69, PET 6 UK.

⁵ In telegram 8138 from London, October 8, Annenberg reported that he had delivered Rogers's message to Stewart: "We both shared the hope that a resolution of the problem could be achieved in an equitable fashion and that this problem would not mar Anglo-U.S. relations." Annenberg noted that Stewart "realized that the initiative lies with BP, that the problem would have to be resolved in the United States." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II) After negotiations between BP and the Department of Justice, a settlement was reached on December 2 that permitted BP to acquire Sohio. Documentation on the negotiations and settlement is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PET 6 UK and *ibid.*, PET 6 US.

318. National Security Study Memorandum 79¹

Washington, October 13, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

SUBJECT

U.K. Accession to the European Community

The President has directed the preparation of a study of U.S. policy toward U.K. accession to the European Community. The study should discuss the options open to the U.S. in connection with different forms of proposed accession, how these forms will affect the economic and political unity of the Community, and their bearing on the United States. The study should take into account accession by other countries whose entry might accompany or follow that of the U.K.

The study should analyze the effects on U.S. trade and investment of the probable forms of accession, both in the near and longer terms, directly and in relation to third countries. This should include analysis of the impact of accession on EC trade and monetary policies, including the common agricultural policy and new proposals for its reform. It should consider the possibility of policy changes beyond the EC context itself which might be related to U.K. accession, such as Commonwealth trading arrangements and the problem of the U.K.'s external indebtedness.

The study should examine the effects of British accession, and that of others, on the course of political unity in the EC. It should consider the implications for U.S. relations with the future members and with third countries.

The study should make recommendations concerning (a) any conditions which might cause the U.S. to question its basic support for ac-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's)—Nos. 43–103. Confidential. NSSM 91, March 27, 1970, broadened the scope of NSSM 79 to cover preferential trading agreements with the EC. See Document 34.

cession; (b) the types of accession arrangements which would most benefit U.S. economic and political interests; and (c) the tactics the U.S. should adopt, if any, toward either of these courses of development.

The study should also examine the opportunities open to the U.S., particularly in the fields of trade, international monetary policy, investment, and agricultural policy in order to take the fullest advantage of the fundamental changes attending U.K. accession in order to promote U.S. economic and political interests.

The study should be performed by an ad hoc group under the direction of the Department of State and should include representatives of the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Bureau of the Budget and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The study should be submitted to the Review Group by February 15.

In the interim there should be submitted for approval a memorandum containing guidance for U.S. Government officials during the time until decisions can be made on the basis of the study.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² Eliot sent a memorandum to Kissinger on October 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 79) The NSC Review Group met on May 13, 1970, to discuss NSSMs 79 and 91; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; *International Monetary Policy*, 1969–1972, Document 40.

319. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, January 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

Attendance of British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at Meeting of National Security Council

The President would like to have Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Stewart attend the National Security Council meeting scheduled for Wednesday morning, January 28.² This is intended to reciprocate for the President's participation in the British Cabinet session at the time of his visit to London last year.

Would you please arrange to have the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary informed about this part of the program for their visit. At this time, the President wishes to leave open whether there will be a "plenary" meeting with the British in addition to the NSC meeting or whether to continue his talks with Wilson privately after the NSC meeting.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Confidential. A handwritten note on the first page reads: "M/R 1/22—Mrs. Davis advises distribution to members of the NSC not required."

² For the minutes of the meeting, see Document 29. Kissinger discussed the NSC session in *White House Years*, pp. 417–418.

320. Memorandum of Conversations¹

Washington, January 27–28, 1970.

January 27 Meeting Between the President and Prime Minister Wilson.

Wilson began the conversation with a discussion of the Nigerian problem making an all-out defense of the Lagos Government.² He said

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A memorandum from Haig to Kissinger indicates that copies were sent to the Secretaries of State and Defense. (Ibid.)

that the Nigerians don't want to be pushed around. The Russians have taken an anti-tribal line, and have therefore scored many points in Nigeria. Military discipline is being restored so that there was no danger of unusual massacres in the eastern province. The Western report indicated that most of the starvation in the enclave antedated the occupation by the Nigerians. It proves that starvation was even then endemic. Of course, he concluded, the press takes dirty and slushy pictures. But if one takes a panoramic view, one recognizes that things are as well as they could be, and that many of the reports of starvation are self-serving.

The President asked whether more supplies could be sent in. Mr. Wilson said that the important thing was to get tents for the Federal troops in the Eastern Region so they would not have to live off the population. The President said it was essential that we keep our humanitarian concern front and center in order not to be vulnerable to public opinion. The Prime Minister replied, "Let's make sure that we don't push Lagos into the arms of the Soviets; we have to keep close together. Another week or ten days is likely to get us out of the woods." The President repeated that we should defuse the issue by making clear that our concern is primarily humanitarian.

The President then asked Wilson about his estimate of the European situation. Wilson said that Pompidou was solid but unimaginative and lacked de Gaulle's flair. If British entry into the Common Market was the price that was necessary to get his agricultural policy accepted, Pompidou would be willing to pay it though he would prefer not to. Pompidou does not have de Gaulle's complexes.

The Prime Minister said that talks on British entry will start in the first half of this year. The British strategy will be to concentrate on four or five key issues. The change in the German Government was very fa-

According to the President's Daily Diary, on January 27, Nixon and Wilson, accompanied by Kissinger and Sir Burke Trend, met in the Oval Office from 10:56 a.m. until 12:37 p.m., when they joined their advisers in the Cabinet Room. On January 28, Nixon and Wilson met in the Oval Office from 11:58 a.m. (joined by Kissinger and Trend at 12:05 p.m.) until 12:38 p.m., immediately after the NSC meeting (see Document 319). (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) A separate and somewhat fuller memorandum of conversation covering Nixon's January 27 meeting with Wilson is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, 1970. That memorandum includes a sentence that reads: "Throughout he [Wilson] conducted himself like a clever, small-town banker who, if he was lucky enough to be persuasive, might just succeed in maneuvering the senior partner into a position of carrying out his wishes by making him believe that they were his own." Kissinger discussed the Nixon-Wilson meeting in *White House Years*, pp. 416-417.

² Reference to the attempted secession of the province of Biafra from Nigeria. Documentation on U.S. policy during the Nigerian secession crisis and civil war is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-5, part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972.

vorable. Brandt was honest and subtle and much less tricky than Kiesinger. Brandt, he said, may hold the pistol of agriculture policy to the French head. The French are frightened of Germany and are looking to Britain; Britain may thus be back to its historic role of being solicited by the second strongest country on the Continent as a counterweight against the strongest one.

The President asked if Brandt is capable of managing a *détente*. Wilson said there is no doubt that he can. He's unfrozen the situation; he's gotten the troops out of the trenches; he's done away with stale, cold-war rhetoric.

The President remarked that, "We are in favor of Britain's entry into Europe, though we don't speak of it publicly. Is that agreeable to Britain?" Wilson said, "Yes, the political dividend of a united Europe must compensate the United States for the economic price of European economic unity. The Europeans must accept a larger responsibility. This is true in every field except defense, where it would be dangerous." Britain would not agree to a separate European defense entity—you can't have an alliance within an alliance. NATO cannot be a negative force; it must have some positive programs also.

The President asked about the "prospect of a visit by the Prime Minister to Moscow." Wilson replied that he did not want to go hurrying off on a quick trip and give the impression that he was carrying a message from the President. He is planning to go in the late spring or early summer. The big question is whether there will be an offensive similar to Tet of 1967 or 1968 in the spring and whether this would affect his trip. The President gave him an evaluation of the situation in Vietnam. He said the situation in the countryside has improved, and that we must expect a blow because the enemy will feel it must do something. But their target may well be the South Vietnamese rather than the American forces.

The biggest blow we have struck, the President continued, is the muting of American dissent. The key question now is whether the South Vietnamese are able to do the job. The reports are fairly good. We are not approaching the Russians on Vietnam. To do so is an exercise in futility. They can't afford to appear not to support Hanoi. We are confident that we can end the war by Vietnamization or by negotiations. This does not require our making a new proposal now, because Hanoi has demonstrated that whenever it is ready to negotiate it will certainly let us know.

The President then turned to the discussions with the Chinese. He said the talks have been very forthcoming. We are taking the line that we cannot have one billion Chinese sitting outside the international community. Dobrynin says this is a dirty trick, but we will move at our pace and in our direction. Some of the Kremlinologists believe we

should stonewall the Chinese lest we irritate the Russians, but the SALT talks prove we can talk to the Russians and to the Chinese simultaneously.

The President then turned to a discussion of ABM and MIRV. "You know and I know," he said, "that it is essential that we don't have a nuclear blowup. You recognize that better than any other world leader." The Prime Minister said that the Soviet military leaders have more power than the military in our own countries. The President said our line at the talks is this: First, we want agreement; we want to be forthcoming. Second, we won't give up any cards in advance. On Vietnam, he said, our best position is to accept Russian help, but not to ask for it. They won't help us because we ask them; they will help us because they will face the necessity.

Returning to SALT, the President said that before talks began he had had very little optimism. Now he thinks there's a chance they may need a control on arms because of their problem with the Chinese. A situation may be arising where self-interest requires give and take.

Wilson said he agreed with everything the President had said, and added that it is harder for the Soviet Union to swallow their words on Germany than on ABM or Vietnam. We have told Kosygin, Wilson continued, that the Common Market may be a good way to contain Germany. Wilson said he had the impression that the President, through his very subtle China policy, was trying to use China to ruffle the back hair of the Soviets. The President said we just don't want them to take us for granted.

Wilson said that on Vietnam there are one or two hopeful factors. One was the general acceptance of the November 3 and December 15 statements.³ We are still on a long road, but it now has a goal. Also the British were reassured by Robert Thompson's more optimistic account. It is interesting that a man of his experience agrees with the American assessment. He had also asked the Romanian Prime Minister Maurer what he thought of Vietnam.⁴ Maurer had said to him, "If I were the President, I would do exactly what he is doing."

The President said Abrams is a more effective commander than we've had there before. Infiltration is not heavy enough to permit the other side to build up its forces. But they haven't fought for 25 years to

³ In his speech on November 3, 1969, Nixon discussed his plan to achieve peace in Vietnam through negotiations and Vietnamization of the conflict. On December 15, he provided a progress report to the American people on the plan. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 901-909, 1025-1028.

⁴ Apparently during Maurer's November 24-29, 1969, visit to the United Kingdom. For a summary of the communiqué of this visit, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969-1970*, p. 23801.

play dead now. Still, if they launch an offensive that jeopardizes our forces, we will do something.

Wilson said he had one thing to say on SALT. "We appreciate the private briefings we have received and we have acquaintance with nuclear questions that can be helpful." He recognized, however, that the problem was difficult inside the Soviet Union, too.

This ended the conversation in the oval office. It was continued in the Cabinet Room in the presence of advisors, and is reported elsewhere.⁵

January 28 Meeting Between the President and Prime Minister Wilson.

The President began the conversation with a rather strong statement on Nigeria. He said he is not concerned with who caused the suffering: I don't want to hear "who killed John?" We don't blame the Federals. The fact is that the suffering exists. Quakers and Jewish people in particular are concerned, and the President himself has a Quaker background. Because people are concerned, everyone should help now. We should all try to get Gowon's⁶ cooperation to respond to Nigerian need. We should at least agree on a common factual basis.

Wilson said we should remember *Gone With the Wind's* 700 pages on the situation after the Civil War and that there was always a lot of suffering in such cases. The President said yes, and we don't want a nationalist-socialist combination in Nigeria, but still we have to do what we can.

Wilson turned to Rhodesia and said, "we have an interest in Rhodesia and can only tell you that if you showed any tolerance toward the white regime there you will pay a heavy price in all of black Africa." Commonwealth countries feel very strongly about this, he said, and the issue is used by the Russians and Chinese. The President said he had just sent out a policy directive the other day. We have vocal and articulate defenders of Rhodesia in this country. The policy directive ordered no change in our position until Rhodesia proclaims itself a republic. Then we'll review the situation.

Wilson made a pro forma appeal on the textile issue and asked whether he could send a note. We have suffered, he said, as much or more than anyone else. The President agreed, but noted that it is also a tough political problem.

⁵ A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL UK–US. During this meeting, Wilson and the President reviewed their private discussion for their foreign affairs advisers.

⁶ Major General Yakubu Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria.

The President stressed the imperative need of sticking together on the Middle East. Wilson said that it is not their position to outflank the U.S. with concessions. Britain may have to restate its view in slightly different language, but since Israel has already described the U.S. plan as a sellout, there's no sense in going further.

321. Addendum to Memorandum of Conversation

January 28, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Country Files—Europe, British-US Nuclear Matter. Top Secret; Sensitive. 1 page not declassified.]

322. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 28, 1970, noon.

SUBJECT

US-UK Talks: Trade Topics

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.—Secretary Rogers

U.K.—Foreign Secretary Stewart

Foreign Secretary Stewart said that while HMG was generally pleased by the US posture as regards free trade policy, they were disappointed and disturbed by the lack of response on certain topics—non-cotton textiles, chocolate crumb, the escape clause action on carpets and glass. HMG was not only concerned about the effect on the special articles, but even more about the principle involved. The details should be discussed at official levels.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL UK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Irving Cheslaw (EUR/BMI) and approved in S and U on February 16. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. A full list of the participants is attached but not printed. The original is marked "Part 11 of 14."

As regards textiles, Stewart said that outside the US no one was convinced that American industry was being damaged. He believed there was danger that the US action would be read as a signpost pointing in the wrong direction. HMG and the Government of Japan were following policies of greater liberalization. Any reversal of liberalization would redound to the disadvantage of the developing as well as the developed countries. Stewart said that US shipping policies were also presenting difficulties.

The Secretary said that in this general context of trade discrimination he wished Mr. Hillenbrand to discuss the possible relationship between Spain and the Common Market. Mr. Hillenbrand said we all knew that the Spanish were presently seeking an agreement with the European Community that would provide preferential treatment for the Spanish. Negotiation of the exact terms was still to be completed.

Mr. Hillenbrand added that this placed the US in a rather difficult dilemma because of our own base negotiations with Spain. We have been generally concerned that proliferating trade agreements by the European Community would set a pattern contrary to existing commercial policy and one not consistent with GATT. We have been told by the Spanish that one of their considerations in the base negotiations would be some expectation of a forthcoming US attitude on their relationship to the European Community.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that we probably could not take a passive position on this and we hoped for support from HMG in the GATT if we were to press the issue in this forum. Spanish resentment might be blunted if the US did not play the solo role on this problem.

As regards textiles, the Secretary said we all recognized that there were certain anomalies in our respective positions which arise largely from our own domestic political pressures. He added that we would look into this further.

323. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Wilson¹

Washington, March 25, 1970.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It was thoughtful of you to follow up on our January conversations² and send me fuller details of your views on our textile import problem.³ Your letter and note were very helpful in outlining the possibilities as you see them.

My Administration wants to leave no doubt that it shares your commitment to freer international trade; my messages to Congress and public statements have reiterated this theme. As the world's largest trading nation, the United States cannot but be conscious that expansion and freeing of trade among nations are of very great importance to all of us. We ourselves would suffer heavily from a general increase in world trade barriers, or in damage to the system of liberal world trading rules.

I feel a heavy responsibility for the role of the United States in this process, and I expect that role to be in support of a broader exchange of goods. Both our narrow economic interests and our foreign relations reinforce each other in that choice. The United Kingdom has played a unique role as a valuable contributor to the success we have had in maintaining this path during the past several years, and I am happy to see from your letter that you intend to continue this direction in the future.

At the same time, I have said that we must reach a satisfactory solution to the very special case of textiles to enable us to maintain effectively our overall pursuit of freer trade. The growth of textile imports has been so rapid, and its effect on our own industry so heavy, that the Administration has no choice but to seek effective relief. I believe that the course we are following, and the conversations we are engaged in,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Wilson Corres. No classification marking.

² See Documents 320–322.

³ In a March 9 letter to the President, accompanied by an aide-mémoire, Wilson argued that textile exporting countries were arriving at the view that “the U.S. Government are seeking to establish restraints on almost all non-cotton textiles when no convincing evidence has been produced which shows that the American textile industry as a whole is threatened with serious injury.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Wilson Corres.)

will do that without adverse effect on the movement toward freer world trading arrangements. This is one of our main considerations.

These conversations are now at an advanced stage, and I hope that I may feel free to take advantage of your interest and write to you in greater detail on this subject at a later date.

Your frankness is appreciated, and I particularly value your offer to assist us in working out a solution to this problem, which has been of such concern to wide segments of this country.⁴

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

⁴ In an April 13 letter to the President, Wilson welcomed Nixon's assurances of U.S. commitments to free trade, suggested further discussions, and reiterated the British willingness to join with the United States and other countries "seeking solutions for any immediate difficulties where serious injury exists or threatens." (Ibid.)

324. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 10, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Position on British Entry into the Common Market

Secretary Rogers has sent you an urgent memorandum (Tab A)² reporting that, according to a British démarche at the State Department, President Pompidou is telling people that you, in effect, do not favor early British entry into the Common Market.

Secretary Rogers recommends that you reiterate to Brandt³ that our support for strengthening and enlargement of the Common Market is undiminished—the formula used in your foreign policy report to the Congress.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not printed.

³ West German Chancellor Willy Brandt visited Washington April 7–11.

General Walters' records of your talks with Pompidou⁴ do not indicate that you said anything that would be inconsistent with giving support to British entry into the Common Market.

Recommendation

Consequently, I believe it would be desirable, if the opportunity arises in your further talks with Brandt, for you to state that we remain in support of the Common Market and its enlargement.⁵

⁴ See Document 141.

⁵ A handwritten note by Haldeman at the bottom of the page reads: "K—This arrived for the Pres—*after* Brandt had departed. H".

325. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

Civil Aviation Consultations with the United Kingdom

I refer to my memorandum of April 22² informing you of civil aviation consultations scheduled with the United Kingdom and enclosing a paper describing the issues. The consultations, which were held in Washington from May 18–22, clarified the potential problem of over-capacity in the US–UK scheduled passenger market and its effect on BOAC's efforts to recapture a larger share of the traffic. The British delegation served notice that in the future the UK might have to take unilateral steps because of its concern that capacity increases by US carriers would preempt opportunities for BOAC and result in uneconomic operations for all the carriers. We contested both the necessity of and justification for such unilateral action in the light of expectations that our carriers, as they have done in the past, would for normal commercial reasons adjust capacity to market conditions. However, the conver-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Limited Official Use.

² A copy of the memorandum is *ibid*.

sion to 747³ equipment makes short-term capacity adjustments more difficult, and we are cautioning the US carriers to exercise some restraint in order to forestall unilateral action by the UK and thus preserve the liberal environment we have enjoyed under the US–UK Air Services Agreement of 1946.⁴ The principles of that Agreement have been the cornerstone of all our subsequent air transport agreements with other countries.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.⁵
Executive Secretary

³ Reference to the Boeing 747 series aircraft, whose seating capacity could reach approximately 500 persons per aircraft, depending on the configuration used in the aircraft. These planes were scheduled to go into service with major carriers in 1970.

⁴ For text of the agreement, signed in Bermuda February 11, 1946, and entered into force that day, see 60 Stat. 1499.

⁵ Deputy Executive Secretary Robert T. Curran signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

326. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

The New British Government

The election victory of Prime Minister Heath's Conservative Party² has generally favorable implications for the US. The full scope of the Government's policy will not be known until the Queen's speech on July 2. Until then, the Tories will be reviewing their positions, and arranging their priorities, timing and allocation of resources among domestic and foreign needs.

The new Government can be expected to play a more active and positive role in foreign affairs:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "The President has seen. Jul 2, 1970."

² In the June 18 vote, the Conservatives won 330 seats, Labour won 287 seats, and the Liberals 6.

—attention will be focussed on getting the UK into the Common Market, and on a more active effort to build a politically and economically integrated Europe; the British will also be looking to strengthen NATO's military capabilities, and Heath may continue his interest in moving toward an Anglo-French joint nuclear deterrent (though few consider the concept as ripe yet); there will probably be somewhat of a cooling in Anglo-German relations which had previously been based in part on the Labor-Socialist party ties;

—on general East-West issues, the Tories will be more skeptical than Labor of the possibilities for fruitful negotiations with the Soviets, and will feel less internal pressure for hurried "movement" toward détente; for example, they will want clear evidence that current East-West negotiations are making real progress before they will welcome a European Security Conference;

—in the Far East, the Conservatives will seek to retain at least a modest military presence East of Suez within the framework of a proposed five power defense arrangement (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia); the Heath Government will probably offer more support for our Vietnam policies than Wilson's Government, and may be less timid in pressing the Soviet Union;

—the Tories seem now to be somewhat more cautious about continuing a UK presence in the Persian Gulf than earlier speculation, largely for budgetary reasons; consistent with the long history of Tory interest in the Middle East, the Heath Government will probably be more active but even-handed in the Arab-Israel conflict;

—on Rhodesia, the Tories are committed to another effort to negotiate with the Smith regime, though they recognize the prospects for success are slim; the new Government will also work more closely with South Africa;

—finally, in trade matters, given the free-enterprise approach and the generally sympathetic attitude of senior Tory spokesmen to US business, the climate for US investment will be at least as good as now.

Heath will have some tough and pressing problems to deal with internally. Inflation—the leading campaign issue—must be arrested along with the concomitant deterioration of the balance of payments. The Conservatives must also act on their industrial relations program, an important public factor in the Tory victory, and important step in preparing for entry into Europe.

Fortunately, Heath's Government seems to have sufficient strength to face up to the internal problems, and to change the orientation and force of its foreign policy. The Tories have an absolute majority of 30 seats, but can count on more than 40 as a working majority (the Liberals would follow on most issues). Furthermore, the moderate center of the Conservative Party scored the biggest gains in the election,

indicating that Heath will not have to be drawn to the right by Enoch Powell.³ This factor should help Heath in holding off ultra-nationalists' opposition to UK entry into the Common Market and in allowing him more flexibility in domestic "law and order" issues.

As Secretary Rogers points out in his attached memorandum (Tab A),⁴ we may look forward to a highly constructive and congenial relationship with Heath's Government at every level.

³ Enoch Powell, a Conservative MP, whose anti-immigrant statements during the campaign included a call for the immediate repatriation of all non-whites from the United Kingdom. Heath publicly disavowed the statements. Powell was overwhelmingly reelected.

⁴ Not printed.

327. Editorial Note

Secretary of State William Rogers met in London with British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home on July 11, 1970, and held talks with Douglas-Home and British Prime Minister Edward Heath the following day. The discussions covered a wide range of issues including British participation in the European Community, SALT and European security issues, African policy, relations with Franco's Spain, and trade questions. Rogers's reports on these meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. III.

328. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 15, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Luncheon with John Freeman²

Attached at Tab A is a paper on the Persian Gulf which Hal Saunders did.³

I would make three general points:

a. Labor or Conservative, Britain is a waning power; we will be deluding ourselves if we depend on the UK to play a stabilizing role in the Persian Gulf for any length of time. Moreover, the Iranians don't like it, unless the messy island issue is solved.⁴

b. Any extensive prolongation of UK military presence—probably not in the cards, anyway—is going to run into budgetary binds and affect UK commitments to Europe, where they are a lot more important to us.

c. We and the UK have differing interests on the opening of the Suez Canal. (This is not raised in Hal's memo or in the Secretary's talk with Alex Douglas-Home⁵ but is worth keeping in mind.) They want the Canal for commercial reasons; for *us* the Canal gives our principal international adversary a short route into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

On other matters you might raise with John, you might ask him very personally just why we should continue with the Berlin negotiations when there is almost no prospect for success and the only likely outcome is that we will be blamed by the Germans for torpedoing their Ostpolitik.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the first page reads: "HAK has seen."

² No record of this meeting was found.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Reference to the Shatt al'Arab.

⁵ See Document 327. Rogers's meeting with Douglas-Home was reported in telegram Secto 110 from London, July 12. It is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 86.

Incidentally, you might also broach the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] weapons question in view of the change of Government in London.

On meeting Heath, while I take it this has already been generally discussed, I would think this should be steered in the San Clemente direction where there would be most time to talk and least need for pomp and circumstance.

*British presence in Persian Gulf.*⁶ The issue is not whether the British should stay on in the Persian Gulf after 1971 but in what form. Even the Labor Government planned a substantial residual presence in the form of continuing political residents and military advisers. What they did plan to end was British treaty—and therefore military—responsibility for the shaikhdoms. It appears that even the conservative government is not likely to reverse that plan.

The U.S. argued against the original British decision and has consistently urged the British to play as large a role as possible in the Gulf after 1971. We certainly welcome experienced help. In addition, any buffer between the Iranians and Arabs seems an advantage. We have staked our policy on Saudi-Iranian cooperation, but Iranian power and ambition may make that a weak reed. The British between have helped prevent Iranian-Arab frictions from getting to the point of confrontation.

But the U.S. has also recognized—as have many members of Mr. Heath's own party apparently including Douglas-Home—that the Labor announcement of withdrawal, once made, was in some ways irreversible. Principally, the Iranians have been given hope of becoming the big power in the Gulf and have made clear that they will not react kindly to any reversal of that trend. Even the shaikhdoms—although anxious to retain as much British help and protection as possible—have set their minds on building their own federation. A change in direction could make them the targets of Arab radical attack.

The net judgment in State has been that—apart from a small stretchout in the timetable—it would probably create an unwanted new anti-Western issue on which even Iran would be on the other side if the new UK Government reversed the Labor Government's decision. That is not to say the British should not be active in maximizing their presence after the end of their formal treaty responsibilities. There are a lot of things in the intelligence, anti-subversion and political fields that we are not equipped to do.

⁶ For documentation on the British withdrawal decision and the U.S. response, see *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, volume XII, Western Europe, and *ibid.*, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970.

The question, therefore, is not so much whether the new British Government should think in terms of reversing Labor's decision as it is what the British can do to build a substantial residual presence, strengthen indigenous forces as much as possible and remove as many causes of friction as possible before the end of 1971. [Having settled Bahrain, they are now working on Iranian claims to Arab islands and a dispute over the Buraimi oasis.]⁷

⁷ Brackets are in the original.

329. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Chequers, October 3, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Prime Minister Heath, of Great Britain
Sir Burke Trend, British Cabinet Secretary
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The meeting took place at the end of the President's European trip on a day which had started in Madrid.²

US-UK Relations

The President began the conversation by saying that at the outset he wanted to establish a close personal communication. He continued, "If anything comes up, please call it right. We will keep things in confidence. We will forget it has even been suggested. The need for communication has never been greater. We will continue to face major problems in the Middle East. SALT is quite undetermined. Tell us where you disagree. We will feel free to ask your advice. We do not want to be the only country making foreign policy. We want your par-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² The President arrived in London from Spain at 11:13 a.m., October 3. He took a helicopter from Heathrow Airport to Chequers and met with Heath from 11:50 a.m. to 12:55 p.m. The two men broke off their talks to meet with Queen Elizabeth and attend a luncheon. The talks resumed at approximately 3:25 p.m. The President returned to Heathrow shortly after 4 p.m. and departed for Shannon Airport, Ireland, at 4:29 p.m. (*Ibid.*, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

ticipation east of Suez so that we are not the only non-Asian power present there. The same is true in East-West relations. We will feel free about your relations with the Soviets, and we will keep you informed about ours."

Prime Minister Heath replied that he liked this relationship. He believed that human relationships can be quite important. Maybe the world is moving in a more flexible direction; and, certainly, Britain would like to continue to play a world role. In the Far East, Lord Carington had worked out arrangements with the four Commonwealth countries to keep a composite force in Singapore.³ It was done quietly. The British will talk to Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister Heath added.

Southeast Asia

The President then turned to Vietnam. He summed up the situation as follows: (1) we will continue our withdrawal program; (2) we will make a new initiative in the negotiations; (3) we did not go into Cambodia to save the government,⁴ but it worked out that way; (4) the impact on the American character of a defeat in Vietnam would be catastrophic. We need a psychological offensive in the United States to get a united American people to maintain their role in the world.

Prime Minister Heath replied, "The way you are handling Vietnam is crucial for Europe, but it is also crucial for the Soviet attitude towards Europe. If the Soviets feel you are in retreat and humiliated, they will reactivate their policy in Europe."

Prime Minister Heath said, "One advantage of our presence in the Far East is to keep Australians in Singapore." The President said he hoped this would be so because he wanted to continue to cooperate. Prime Minister Heath responded, "We are concerned with the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are building up. Our strength from Simonstown⁵ is not too great. We will help you via communications equipment and personnel for Diego Garcia. The problem that concerns us is a blackmail situation vis-à-vis us and Europe. No one suggests war is likely, but a blackmail capability along the vital routes around the Cape is serious enough."

³ During the June 19–20 Commonwealth meeting on post-British withdrawal from the Far East, Australia and New Zealand announced they would maintain troops in Singapore and Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew had criticized these arrangements.

⁴ On March 18, General Lon Nol overthrew the government of Prince Sihanouk. On April 29, the United States sent military forces into Cambodia in an effort to destroy North Vietnamese forces and supply lines that enjoyed a sanctuary in that nation.

⁵ Reference to the U.K. naval base in South Africa.

South Africa

Prime Minister Heath therefore said he believes the Simonstown Agreement⁶ should be maintained. He continued that the U.K. was having a major problem with the black African countries about this agreement, but that its position would not change. The President replied that the U.S. would do nothing to embarrass the U.K.

Prime Minister Heath continued, "The disagreements do not seem to me to be enough for other countries to leave the Commonwealth. We do not ask your support but if your Ambassadors could (1) tell the Africans that Heath is not a racist and (2) that they shouldn't leave the Commonwealth on this issue, it would be a big help." The President said the U.S. would do that. Heath said he thought that Apartheid was breaking down for economic reasons.

Soviets

Prime Minister Heath turned to the Soviet issues and asked, "What are the Soviets up to?"

The President said, "Maybe they are confused and without a plan. What disturbs me is the change in the strategic balance." He compared the figures between the 1962 missile crisis and now. "The period of nuclear standoff has at last arrived. I think the Soviets want to weaken the alliance."

The President added that the Soviets did not want a confrontation but if Cienfuegos becomes a nuclear sub installation⁷ we would stand up and we would have a major crisis.

The group then broke for lunch.

⁶ Reference to the June 30, 1955, defense agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa. For text, see 248 UNTS 191.

⁷ Reference to the confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union over the construction of military support facilities at Cienfuegos, Cuba that began in the fall of 1969 with the discovery of Soviet activities and reached its climax during the fall of 1970. The confrontation was defused by a Soviet pledge not to utilize the area as a submarine base.

330. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Failure of Agencies to Clear with Us on Policy toward New U.K. Agricultural Program

Per your instruction, I informed Nat Samuels this morning of your displeasure—particularly in view of the coming Heath visit—that the White House was not consulted before (a) State gave the British a note outlining our unhappiness over the trade implications of their newly announced agricultural policy,² and (b) State's public statement on the subject yesterday.³

Samuels recognized that he should have done so. He apologized, and assured me that any further steps would be fully coordinated with us. As I predicted, he viewed his action as moderating what the economic agencies might otherwise have done.

A related issue is a letter sent by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the President, Secretary of State, and all of the economic agencies recommending a tough U.S. position toward the Common Market,⁴ especially regarding British entry. I reminded Samuels that NSDM 68⁵ gave the Under Secretaries Committee the responsibility for coordinating our public statements concerning EC policy, and that I expected him to do so to avoid any disparate responses from the economic agencies. He assured me that he would.

Substantively, the economic aspects of the EC expansion negotiations remain a major problem. The British move on agricultural trade has exacerbated the problem significantly and accelerated its timetable. I will shortly send you a proposed White House reply to the Chamber of Commerce letter, and an information memorandum outlining the nature and significance of the British move.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt. An note by Kissinger, date-stamped November 13, reads: "Good work—HK."

² Not found.

³ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 30, 1970, p. 677.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Document 45.

331. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

State Memorandum on Heath's New Reform Programs

Acting Secretary Irwin has sent you a memorandum (Tab A)² on "Heath's Quiet Revolution for Britain." It points out that with his proposal to get some control over the unions through a variant of our Taft-Hartley approach³ and the new Tory budget—featuring cuts in taxes, government expenditures, industrial and social welfare subsidies—Heath's domestic program is now taking shape.⁴

Although not likely to have much immediate impact on the British economy, the new actions are first steps in a direction that could produce benefits over the next several years. They represent reversals of a 20 year trend and an important shift toward lessening the role of government in the U.K., and giving greater scope to private enterprise. The immediate effect of the new proposals will come less from their economic potency than from their psychological signaling. Much stronger measures will be required to pull Britain out of her economic difficulties.

Heath has taken a political gamble, however, that the gains of his program in terms of long-run economic growth will offset the political risks of reductions in social welfare expenditures and in putting some checks on the unions. A bitter political battle is already developing with Labor opposition leaders and the trade unions, who may exert new pressures for wage increases and thus hinder Heath's campaign against inflation. Fortunately, Heath currently enjoys a strong political position with a working majority and no elections needed before 1975. However, his new economic actions (especially on social welfare) may erode his popular support.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for information.

² Not printed.

³ Reference to the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Harley) Act of 1947, Public Law 101, June 23, 1947. For text, see 61 Stat. 136.

⁴ The President wrote the following note at the top of the page: "A very courageous program—a political risk—but Britain's only chance to survive depends on his success." The Heath government's economic policy was introduced on October 27 with the release of two White Papers, *New Policies for Public Spending* (Cmnd. 4515) and *Investment Incentives* (Cmnd. 4516).

Internationally, as Secretary Irwin's memorandum states, Heath has put in a bid to preserve Britain's place in world affairs. The new Defense White Paper,⁵ also recently announced, affirms British intentions to maintain some forces East of Suez (which we have encouraged), while at the same time stepping up in modest fashion the U.K. military contribution to NATO and halting the decline in the defense budget.

The current British negotiations with the European Community are crucial, as Heath knows, for Britain's long run economic health and international role. His new fiscal measures at home should help him put his house in order and improve his image in Europe. But there remain serious doubts over the U.K.'s ability to stand the additional strain on its balance of payments of the terms of entry which the Six will undoubtedly require.

Your forthcoming talks with Heath will provide an opportunity to review the major issues he faces—especially the status of the EEC accession negotiations and their political as well as potential military implications. (The British may show renewed interest in military cooperation with France).⁶

⁵ The Conservative government's defense policy was set out in a *Supplementary Statement* (Cmnd. 4521), October 28, 1970. It modified *Statement on Defense Expenses* (Cmnd. 4290) issued by the Labour Party government in February 1970.

⁶ The President wrote on the memorandum: "H[aldeman]—a letter to Heath marked *personal*. Dear Mr. Prime Minister, Since returning from Paris I have had an opportunity to study your October 26 statement. As a not too impartial observer I would call your proposals bold, gutsy and right. There is of course a political risk to taking such controversial steps. But the alternative would have been to let Britain continue to slide into second place position as an economic & political power. I wish you every success and shall look forward to our meeting in December. (bring to RN for signature)". The President visited France November 10–12 for the funeral of General de Gaulle. The President's message was sent on November 18. Heath's November 23 reply is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV. Kissinger's note on the first page, which reads: "I think he has already written this letter," was apparently made after Nixon's letter was sent.

332. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy toward New U.K. Agricultural Measures

Issue

A British delegation will be here on Friday² to discuss the U.K.'s proposed new agricultural policies with State and Agriculture, at the Assistant Secretary level. The meeting is a follow-up to a lower level session held in London three weeks ago, at which the British explained their new approaches and sought U.S. approval for them. Depending upon the outcome this week, Heath may raise the issue with you next month, and seek your support for his proposals.³

State and Agriculture, via the memo from Acting Secretary Irwin at Tab A,⁴ have recommended that you approve a position for use at the meeting on Friday (and thereafter) via which:

—We would first try to convince the British that postponement of their proposed action would have beneficial effects on the world trading system, admittedly with some disadvantages for themselves.

—Failing that, as seems probable, we would indicate that we could not assent to their changes and must reserve our rights under the GATT to defend our trade interests, not committing ourselves to any specific subsequent course of action.

Background

The British have decided to change their basic approach to agricultural policy, as part of Heath's basic economic approach. At present the income of U.K. farmers is supported through direct subsidies from the British budget. Instead, Heath now wishes to support the income of U.K. farmers by setting higher prices for their products and forcing the consumer to pay directly. The British have two objectives: to reduce the budgetary cost of agriculture, and to bring their own agricultural

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. IV. Confidential. The memorandum is attached to a December 15 memorandum from Kissinger to the President that forwarded Heath's November 23 message. See footnote 6, Document 331.

² November 27.

³ Heath visited December 17–18. See Documents 334 and 335.

⁴ Dated November 24, not printed.

system closer to the system of the Common Market, which they will have to adopt anyway if they succeed in entering it.

The U.S. and other third parties are concerned about the shift because of its impact on our farm exports to Britain. We have no firm estimate of the trade effect, though no one expects it to be very great in the short run. There could be a more serious long run effect as higher prices lead to reduced U.K. consumption, and hence fewer imports.

The main immediate effect of the British step relates to trade policy, rather than actual levels of trade. The U.S. agricultural community regards the step as further evidence of European protectionism, and the “coalition” of twelve leading farm groups has written you to urge strong U.S. opposition to the British move. Failure of the U.S. to react strongly will add to Congressional support for the Mills bill⁵ and future protectionist steps.

In addition, we have clear rights under the GATT and other treaties under which the U.K. is bound not to raise its tariffs on the agricultural commodities in question. Prior to July 1, we have a clear legal right to veto the step under the so-called Pentapartite Agreement. Beyond that date, we have a clear GATT right to demand trade compensation for it. Failure to use these rights, or at least reserve them for future use, would be regarded as an extremely soft position.

The issue is enormously complicated by its relationship to the pending British entry into the Common Market. The U.K., as noted above, would adopt this type of agricultural policy anyway when it entered the Community. At that point, U.S. farm exports will clearly suffer because EC farmers, mainly French, will get preferential treatment in the British market. However, the increased high tariffs on agricultural products will presumably be offset by the reduced British tariffs on industrial imports, with no net impact on U.S. legal rights and hence no legal basis for us to seek compensation.

For the British to take the step in the context of Common Market entry would of course cause no less pain to our agricultural exporters, and it is precisely because they fear this result that they have leaped at the opportunity afforded by the unilateral U.K. agricultural move where we do have clear legal rights.

In essence—assuming that the U.K. will enter the Common Market—the step represents merely an acceleration of the U.K. move to the Continental system of agricultural policy, which we would probably have to accept later anyway both because of the foreign policy im-

⁵ Reference to a trade bill introduced by Wilbur Mills (D-AR), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, that included a provision for shoe and textile quotas.

plications and because we would have no legal rights in such a situation. However, the present unilateral step represents a clear violation of our rights and provides us with an opportunity to seek commercial redress while isolating the issue from Common Market entry.

Proposed Course of Action

In view of the legal and economic complexities of this issue, there are a wide variety of courses open to us. At one extreme, we could use the opportunity to try to get leverage on Common Market agricultural prices—the major *bête noire* of our agricultural community—through the U.K. negotiations with the Community. At the other extreme, we could fully accept the British step in recognition of its importance for Heath's economic policy and his effort to enter the Community. State and Agriculture, the two agencies directly involved, recommend a two-step middle course.

They would first try to convince the British to postpone their action until EC entry had been negotiated, to defuse the issue now and thereby provide a modest counter-weight against the general trend of European protectionism which is in turn feeding the supporters of the Mills bill. If the British agreed to postpone, we would not have to take any action ourselves and would fully preserve our GATT rights for later.

Second, if the British—as seems likely—indicate that they were determined to proceed, we would indicate that we could not agree. This means that we would exercise our veto over the step until July 1, when our veto right expires, and subsequently reserve all our compensation rights under the GATT. In doing so, we would make clear that we support Heath's basic economic policy and effort to join the Common Market, but indicate that we intend to pursue our clear legal rights in defense of U.S. trade interests.

In view of the tremendous—and justified—pressure from our agricultural community for a strong U.S. position against agricultural protectionism in Europe, and the risk that it will join labor in defecting from the much-thinned ranks of free trade supporters if rebuffed, I do not see how we could take a softer position. A stronger position, on the other hand, could create significant difficulties with Heath and raise doubts about our support for British entry. I believe that State and Agriculture have found the right balance, which will avoid significant political difficulties but meet the legitimate commercial concern of our agricultural community and display the kind of toughness on trade policy which will be necessary to fend off protectionist moves in the Congress.

A politically softer alternative is to adopt only the second of the two proposed steps: make no effort to talk the British out of their move,

but indicate that we (a) cannot free the British of their obligation to maintain present prices until July 1 and (b) reserve our rights for compensation when they move after that date. This would run less risk of affecting our relations with Heath and of appearing to be a U.S. effort to inject itself into the UK–EC negotiation, but would be less assuring to our domestic interests and would make no practical differences since we would expect to move to the second step anyway.

Recommendation

That you approve the proposed position on U.K. agricultural policy recommended by State and Agriculture.

Approve⁶

Disapprove, prefer only to block the British until July 1 and then reserve our rights without indicating that we oppose the British move at that time

Other

⁶ Kissinger initialed this option for Nixon on November 27. In a November 27 memorandum, Jeanne Davis informed the Department of State that the State-Agriculture Departments' joint position on agriculture negotiations had been approved. (National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, General Files on National Security Council Matters, 1969–1972, Lot 73D288)

333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, December 15, 1970, 0440Z.

203272. SUBJ: Nuclear consultation with the British. The following letter from President Nixon should be transmitted urgently to Prime Minister Heath prior to his departure for the U.S.:

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Country Files—Europe, British-US Nuclear Matter. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Formerly Restricted Data. Drafted in the White House; cleared in PM (in substance) and EUR (in substance), and approved in S/S–O.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter of November 9, 1970² proposes that six amendments be made to the memorandum setting forth the understandings between our governments with regard to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons in order to make these understandings applicable also to United States anti-submarine warfare nuclear weapons stored at [1 line not declassified] and also to consolidate in this memorandum the understanding concerning the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons at [1 line not declassified]

I am agreeable to the amendments as proposed and shall consider the understandings existing between our governments with regard to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons, as so amended, to remain fully in effect. I am enclosing the amended version of the memorandum.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

The Right Honorable

Edward Heath, M.B.E., M.P.

Prime Minister

London

Enclosure: Memorandum

Understandings With the British on the Use of British Bases and
Nuclear Weapons

1. Our understanding on the use of British bases is that the President and Prime Minister will reach a joint decision by speaking personally with each other before certain forces equipped with U.S. nuclear weapons and operating from bases in the United Kingdom [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will use nuclear weapons, namely SAC, British Strike Command (excluding aircraft of such command equipped with British nuclear weapons), forces in the United Kingdom which are assigned or earmarked for assignment to a NATO commander, U.S. Polaris submarines in British territorial waters and U.S. forces [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The basic understanding is contained in the communiqué of January 9, 1952,³ covering the Truman-Churchill talks:

“Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty’s Government and the

² Not printed. (Ibid.)

³ For full text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 21, 1952, pp. 83–84.

United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.”

Procedures for carrying out this basic understanding were agreed upon in the Murphy-Dean agreement of June 7, 1958, which was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. The covering document, the report to the President and the Prime Minister,⁴ repeats almost literally the language of the Truman-Churchill communiqué:

“2. The basic understanding between the United Kingdom and United States Governments, regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces, provides that such use in an emergency shall be a matter for joint decision by the two governments in the light of the circumstances at the time.”

2. There is a second, more general understanding with the British that we will consult with them before using nuclear weapons anywhere, if possible. The basic understanding on this point is contained in a memorandum of conversation of a meeting between the President and Eden on March 9, 1953.⁵ Eden had asked for an assurance of consultation by the President with the Prime Minister prior to U.S. use of any nuclear weapon.

“He (the President) said that the United States would, of course, in the event of increased tension or the threat of war, take every possible step to consult with Britain and our other allies.”

The President reaffirmed this understanding when he wrote to the Prime Minister on October 27, 1960,⁶ in connection with the Holy Loch berthing:

“With reference to the launching of missiles from U.S. Polaris submarines, I give you the following assurance, which of course is not intended to be used publicly. In the event of an emergency, such as increased tension or the threat of war, the U.S. will take every possible step to consult with Britain and other allies. This reaffirms the assurance I gave Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9, 1953.”

3. It should be noted that the agreement for joint decision by the President and the Prime Minister does not extend to all U.S. forces under SACEUR and SACLANC but only covers those forces based in the United Kingdom which are assigned or earmarked for assignment to a NATO commander. The other U.S. nuclear forces under SACEUR

⁴ A copy is in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers as President, Administrative Series, Atomic Energy Commission, 1958, Folder 2.

⁵ No memorandum of conversation was found. A June 10, 1953, memorandum prepared for the use of the NSC Staff summarizes the discussions. (Ibid., NSC Staff Papers, Executive Secretary Subject Series, 3–4 Consultations with the United Kingdom)

⁶ A copy of the letter is *ibid.*, Anne Whitman File, International Series, Macmillan, Harold, Folder 4.

and SACLANT would only be covered by the more general understanding to consult if time permits. The agreement for joint decision does, however, extend to all U.S. forces operating [*less than 1 line not declassified*] whether or not they are under SACEUR or SACLANT.

4. There is also an understanding in respect of U.S. nuclear weapons, destined for release in emergency to maritime aircraft of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which was set out in an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson in 1965. In reply to Mr. Wilson's letter of August 5, 1965, President Johnson confirmed in a letter dated 11 November 1965⁷ that "the nuclear weapons intended for use by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] ASW forces would not be released for use in advance of the joint decision on release for use to United States and British forces of United States ASW nuclear weapons also stored in the United Kingdom under the same NATO plan."

Rogers

⁷ A copy of the August 5, 1965, letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 1, Prime Minister Wilson. A copy of the November 11, 1965, letter is *ibid.*, Vol. 2, Prime Minister Wilson. See also Document 316.

334. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 17, 1970.

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Prime Minister Heath
Sir Burke Trend
Henry A. Kissinger

After an exchange of pleasantries, the President asked Prime Minister Heath about the recent electricity strike. The Prime Minister said that the strike was broken because the people turned against the electricity workers. They didn't say what they normally say, i.e., "Stop inflation, but pay more." Rather, there was a real case of public ostracism of the electricity workers, so that they finally caved.

The President asked what the young people were thinking. The Prime Minister described his economic strategy in relation to the younger voters. He said, "A small cut in income taxes is not impressive enough for them. They are getting so punch-drunk with taxes that nothing but a big cut is enough. This has been compensated for by a slight rise in the cost of social services, especially a rise in the cost of mental hospitals and schools."

The President suggested that we proceed with the agenda. Prime Minister Heath gave a long exposition in which he said he would like to begin with the European Community. He thereupon presented a highly technical analysis of outstanding economic issues. His strategy was to get Britain into the Common Market first, and to use the argument that Britain would then be able to take our side in the Common Market. At the same time, he made it pretty clear that Britain would not make any concessions to the United States view prior to going into the Common Market, partly because they did not want to appear to be an American Trojan Horse.

Talking about protectionism, the Prime Minister said Britain was in a bad position to raise the issue since the community tariffs were

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the President's office. An edited version of this memorandum of conversation was provided to the Department of State. It is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL UK–US. Heath visited Washington December 16–18. For texts of public statements by the President and Prime Minister, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 1142–1143, 1148–1151.

lower than British tariffs. But he couldn't see the community going protectionist in any case and with Britain in the Common Market, the chances were probably nil. The same was true of agricultural policy. In short, Prime Minister Heath argued, "We can best defend your interests inside the Common Market and should not pay a price to you before we get in. The best reason, though, for our entering the Common Market is political, and this is why you were for it to begin with."

The President said, "The problem is what price you are going to have to pay to get in." Prime Minister Heath replied, "This is correct, but this is very hard to quantify." The President said, "The British have the political and diplomatic skills to make Europe into an entity. There are some in this country who don't want you to go in because they are afraid of Europe, but Europe is essential for the balance of power. As for protectionism, we have a serious problem here. Many pressure groups in this country are for protectionism. The strongest pressure, of course, comes from agriculture. They have many lobbyists and half of the Senators are from farm states. If the Senate gets the impression that, as a result of the Common Market negotiations, agriculture is disadvantaged, they will turn protectionist, and then we'll all be in trouble because the agricultural Senators have been the ones who have been carrying the case for a liberal trade policy."

The President then explained our attitude toward the Trade Bill before the Senate. "What makes the issue so complex for us is the textile issue." For all these reasons, he urged the Prime Minister to be cautious on agriculture.

Prime Minister Heath said there are two problems—one is UK policy; the second is the later Common Market policy. The present British system substitutes private for public money. The system isn't important, but the price level is. If we don't raise the price level, the British farmers won't increase production and imports then will not suffer. It will be just a substitution of private for public money; this is not a change in the direction of protectionism but a change that enables us to get more easily into the Common Market.

The President then asked Prime Minister Heath about the German situation. The Prime Minister said, "Our last message is that Brandt has written a letter explaining the situation with respect to Ostpolitik." The President said, "My view, which I've often expressed to every German political leader is this: it's a mistake to risk real friends for new friends. Everything ties into the NATO situation. Our position in a nutshell is this: massive retaliation was viable in the 50's, but the viability of this policy under conditions of nuclear parity is questionable. A conventional capability is essential to prevent adventures. It is essential for Europeans, therefore, to improve their capabilities. We have taken a strong stand in Congress and before our public that the conventional

forces should be strengthened. I don't want European dollars to subsidize our forces. We do not encourage Ostpolitik, but we do not oppose it." He then asked Dr. Kissinger for his comments.

Dr. Kissinger said we have to distinguish between the things that have already happened in Ostpolitik and the longer term danger. What has happened up to now is not dangerous. What the long-term change may be is another matter.

Prime Minister Heath said he was opposed to a Summit Conference on Berlin which had been raised in Brandt's letter or even to a permanent conference on Berlin. The President said, "We better keep a hand on it. The Russians have a negotiating position now where it is all for them and nothing for us." The Prime Minister said, "The probing is being stepped up and, until it is stopped, we won't really know." The President said, "There are no plans now for a possible Summit Meeting." He said, "I told Gromyko that at a European Security Conference, they'll talk about Europe but not about security. We had to reject an ABM agreement only in order to keep pressure on offensive weapons. But we shouldn't go to the other extreme. There shouldn't be a period of extreme coolness. I don't think they have a clear design, but they go back and forth. We reacted strongly to the Cuban thing.² They react when we react strongly. It is very salutary to take the strong position we want to take on NATO because it will show the Soviets that things are not going their way. The defense budget will be bigger than some anticipate.

The President then turned to Africa. He said, "I want to be quite direct about Africa. We will do nothing to embarrass you, and we will not embarrass the Portuguese either, in those areas.³ We won't act like demigods about our position. In the political context, whatever decision we make won't be affected by our domestic politics. On the other hand, we cannot support you. We can only not embarrass you."

Prime Minister Heath said, "The Soviets seem to have a clear design to achieve strategic superiority and SALT seems to be being used to try to get an advantage." The Prime Minister then asked, "What if they service submarines from Cuba?" The President said, "There'll be a confrontation." The Prime Minister asked, "How about killer submarines?" The President said, "We are obviously unable to say this now."

Prime Minister Heath next asked about NATO proposals on mutually balanced force reductions. The President said this was under study.

Prime Minister Heath continued, "We should be constructive toward Middle East talks. Jarring is a post-office box. Otherwise, we

² Reference to the Cienfuegos crisis. See footnote 7, Document 329.

³ Reference to the British decision to sell arms to the Republic of South Africa. Portugal had conducted a raid against Angolan insurgents using Guinea as a safehaven.

will just elicit extreme positions. The difficulty with the Israelis is that internally they can't agree on what to accept. What we should do is work out options for getting a settlement. The Israelis won't state what they mean by secure frontiers. There is perhaps a better chance of getting the UAR to be reasonable and I believe that Hussein would be prepared to go quite far in getting a solution. Perhaps Jerusalem is something that can be worked out."

The President said, "The other side of the coin is—What does anyone else have to offer? Jarring can keep the post-office box open and produce a stalemate. The world 'impose' drives the Israelis up a wall, so we are at dead center about specifics. We are fresh out of ideas. Looking down the road, let's each continue to examine on a private basis where we go."

335. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, Maryland, December 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Prime Minister Heath
Sir Burke Trend
Henry A. Kissinger

Prime Minister Heath began the conversation by raising the issue of the sale of computers to the Soviet Union. He pointed out that there are apparently western scientists in the Soviet Institute of Physics, so that they have access to the computer technology anyway and, in any event, the computer was not useful for military purposes.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger for his comments and he said that the issue was whether the computer would be useful for military purposes. He recommended we send a mission to Britain to make that determination just as we were sending a mission to France on an anal-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons. Secret; Eyes Only. An edited version of this memorandum of conversation was provided to the Department of State. It is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL UK-US.

ogous problem with integrated circuits.² The President said, “We will take a permissive approach towards you.”

Prime Minister Heath then asked about Vietnam. The President said, “The incentive to negotiate is going down for us every day. We are hastening the end of the war and since we are ending it anyway, it doesn’t make any difference to us whether it comes about unilaterally or through negotiations. The only incentive we have left for negotiations is the prisoners.” He told the Prime Minister that he gave a tough warning to North Korea [*Vietnam*] in 1969³ and that since then there have been no incidents. “We will continue to make tough warnings to North Vietnam and couple it with withdrawals.”

The President then asked Prime Minister Heath about détente, and he asked Dr. Kissinger what he thought. Dr. Kissinger said the problem we have to avoid is a differentiated détente in which the Soviets buy themselves time by making a selective relaxation with particular allies. Prime Minister Heath said, “We have no pressure at home to have a visit to Moscow.”

The Prime Minister, turning back to Indochina, said, “Will you be prepared to see Cambodia go down the drain?” The President said, “In effect, yes.” The Prime Minister asked, “Is there a domino theory?” The President then said, “If the United States leaves Vietnam in a way that the U.S. interprets as a failure, we will then have to get out of Asia. The Japanese are then going to switch and confidence in us will erode. This is why we will see it through. If there should be any change in our views, we will warn Britain ahead of time, and we will also warn Britain of any major actions we will take.”

Prime Minister Heath explained Lee Kuan Yew’s position on the Soviet fleet in Singapore⁴ as a pressure on the Australians. The Prime Minister said he had told Lee Kuan Yew that he would lose his reputation for reliability and that the effect would be quite counter-productive. The President said, “There is a danger to the credibility of the American commitment, and this is one of our reasons for being in Vietnam.”

Prime Minister Heath said that the Commonwealth basically agrees with the position on aid to South Africa. They understand we don’t support apartheid. They agree with selling spare parts—even

² See Documents 149 and 152.

³ December 12, 1969. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, p. 1021.

⁴ Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had led Singapore to independence in 1965 by withdrawing from the Malaysia Federation. Thereafter, the issue of restrictions on British use of bases in Singapore had been in contention between the United Kingdom and Lee’s government. Lee had also shown interest in opening formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Zambia trades with South Africa. Kaunda's argument is that if you sell arms, however, we will side with the Soviets.⁵ Our view is that this doesn't make any sense since France is selling more arms and that doesn't induce the Soviets. When this proposition had been put to Kaunda, he did not answer. Kaunda says we are at war with South Africa, but this is double-talk. The Prime Minister continued, "We will consult the Commonwealth, but we've already decided to go ahead. Kaunda and Nyerere⁶ have drawn up a statement of the Commonwealth's aims. If it leads to an effort to bind us vis-à-vis South Africa, it won't come off. Kaunda's attitude that this is a war to the death is depressing. Nyerere rejects the idea of a non-aggression treaty with South Africa on the ground that he has no intention of attacking.

Prime Minister Heath then said, "If they are rational, they won't start on this road," The President said, "My reaction is similar to yours. Some believe we will lose the support of the black countries, I believe that isolating South Africa makes matters worse. We have an embargo and we will maintain it. You'll get the least possible flak from us. In this whole business of burden-sharing, we think you can compete on many fronts. If the others leave the Commonwealth, they won't get anything special from us."

Prime Minister Heath then gave the state of play on the Rhodesian constitution. He said the constitutional situation is that the Parliament has taken all powers unto itself and therefore the sanctions had to be resurrected every November. So by November 10th, we will have either to grant independence or we won't be able to continue sanctions.

At this point, the meeting broke for lunch.

At lunch, Prime Minister Heath said that he needed to discuss one very sensitive matter with the President concerning nuclear business. "Chauvel in 1961 got the impression that there was a possibility of a joint nuclear business with the British Government. When I was in opposition, I thought that in the context of a wider European Community, there was the possibility of a nuclear deterrent held in trust for the Community by Britain and France. Pompidou, before I came into office, said he saw no point in discussing nuclear business because Labor was not interested in European defense. Recently, however, he has said that he recognized that Britain had a treaty arrangement with the United States which governed these matters. It, therefore, will not be raised by the French before the negotiations are completed for entry into the Common Market. However, at that point, it will be raised and we can use it in moving the French closer into the Western defense arrangements. What do you think?"

⁵ Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia.

⁶ Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania.

The President said, “I want you to feel that you have a great deal of running room. If the nuclear business can be a device at any time, and if you can use it to good advantage, go ahead. You can have exploratory talks, but if we pushed it we could destroy it. We are quite outgoing in this respect. We have no good alternatives to having you succeed in getting into the Common Market. We have a crisis rushing in on us. We should not think of the old pre-nuclear world. If we continue divided, they’ll pick us off one by one.”

336. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, February 3, 1971.

SUBJECT

Telephone Call From Prime Minister Heath on Rolls-Royce Problem

Prime Minister Heath called Monday, while you were away, to indicate his concern about the financial problems of Rolls Royce which has contracted to produce engines for the Lockheed L-1011 airbus.² The two firms are currently discussing Rolls Royce’s serious delivery and financial problems. *Prime Minister Heath felt that if they couldn’t find a way out of the dilemma that perhaps he and you could work out a solution. He indicated that he might call you back on Wednesday.*

At Tab B³ is a memorandum from Deputy Secretary Packard summarizing the problem. In brief:

—Because of technical difficulties, Rolls Royce will be at least six months late in delivering the engines.

—Because the company is already technically in bankruptcy it must be publicly taken over by the British government unless some special action materializes in the next few days.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V. Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”

² February 1. An unknown hand wrote “Call put through” and “shortly after 12 noon” on the memorandum. The President was in St. John, Virgin Islands.

³ Not printed.

—In the event of receivership action, Rolls Royce would discontinue production of the engines because costs are well in excess of the present fixed price.

—If Rolls Royce cannot meet its contractual obligations to Lockheed and goes into receivership or is taken over by the British government, Lockheed will also most likely face bankruptcy.⁴

—Bankruptcy would have very serious repercussions for both suppliers and customers of Lockheed. The airline companies, Lockheed's suppliers, and the banks have invested heavily in the airbus program and can only be repaid if Lockheed delivers the aircraft. Losses to US companies and banks could exceed a billion dollars and affect several hundred thousand jobs.

In discussing this problem with Prime Minister Heath, *it is important that you stress that failure of Rolls Royce to deliver engines to Lockheed will cause some very serious problems in the US and that we would hope that he could delay any action or announcement for several weeks to give us a chance to assess the situation and determine whether there are any viable alternatives.* The Chairman of Lockheed was in London yesterday and without further discussions with him, we would not be able to make an evaluation as to whether or not the problem can be solved.

Suggested *talking points* for your conversation with Prime Minister Heath are at *Tab A*.⁵

⁴ In a February 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten commented that Heath's "request boils down to a hint that DOD should increase its subvention to Lockheed, so that Lockheed can increase its payments to Rolls Royce." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V)

⁵ Not printed. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon and Heath spoke on the telephone at 12:18 p.m., February 3. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No record of the conversation was found. In telegram 1006 from London, February 4, Annenberg reported that Heath had summoned him to 10 Downing Street the previous evening to inform him that the British Cabinet had decided that it would not be justified in using public money to subsidize Rolls Royce and was prepared to accept its bankruptcy. The government would, however, preserve the aero-engine capacity of Rolls as a matter of national security. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V) Following a statement of British policy issued on February 4, Rolls Royce declared bankruptcy. In a February 4 message to Nixon, Heath thanked him for an "understanding and constructive approach" during their February 3 conversation. (Ibid., Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Edward Heath)

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 8, 1971, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Presentation of Credentials by Lord Cromer

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Earl of Cromer

Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

George S. Springsteen, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

After the presentation of credentials, the President took the British Ambassador into the Red Room and said that since his was the last of the presentation of credentials for the day, they could have a little longer to chat.

The President welcomed the Earl of Cromer. He said that he did not do this just out of protocol, but also because of the great background in economics and finance that Lord Cromer brought to the job, noting that these were matters which would be very much to the fore in the days to come. The President indicated that of course he and the British Ambassador would be talking about political matters from time to time, citing NATO, the future of Europe and other events arising out of the winding down of the World War.

In terms of the future of the United Kingdom, however, the President said the United States and the United Kingdom are embarked on paths which led him to have great hopes for a burst of energy from the economic side. The President stressed that he hoped that Prime Minister Heath's economic policy will work and asked Lord Cromer to talk about these efforts.

Lord Cromer said that the current wild cat strikes are a phase that must be gone through to get on with the necessary changes in legislation. He noted that existing legislation, much of which was quite antiquated, had built up great vested interests which were now opposed to change.

Continuing, Lord Cromer said that Heath however is in the fortunate position of not being burdened with the past. He said that Heath and his contemporaries—unlike Macmillan and his predecessors—did

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Springsteen and approved with one editorial correction by the White House on February 12. The meeting took place in the Red Room of the White House.

not carry with them the concerns of the inter-war period and the depression era. For Heath and his contemporaries, adult life started with the outbreak of World War II.

The President said that this was an interesting point. He said that he has a feeling—perhaps it is an intuition—that the British people feel deep down that they now have a chance—perhaps a last chance, to become a great economic power. The President said that we often read of British history in terms of battles where the key thing was the character of the British people. Today we need that same kind of character in the people to face economic problems.

Lord Cromer agreed, and noted in this context the Government's handling of the Rolls Royce problem.² In response to a question by the President, he said that most of the editorials in the British papers generally supported the government on its proposed actions.

The President asked what would happen to the automotive aspects of Rolls Royce. Lord Cromer said that it would be sold off to a private enterprise since it was a profitable endeavor anyway. The President said this was the right way to handle this aspect. Lord Cromer said that the Government, however, would concern itself with the future of the aircraft and marine engine aspects of Rolls Royce operations. He indicated that involved here were such matters as the production of the engine for the Concorde and the production of engines for tanks. With regard to the Lockheed engine, he felt that the government was keeping its options open.

The President said that the outcome there depends in part upon what Lockheed can do with its customers and arrangements for the financing of the contract.

Lord Cromer questioned whether the airlines were in a really great hurry to get the Lockheed plane.

The President said that the problems of the air carriers are temporary because more and more people will be flying airplanes. The current situation, however, goes beyond mere day-to-day economic problems. He noted that he had been raising a storm with the US regulatory agencies because they interfered with the airlines ability to handle their difficulties. He noted several of the minor things that airlines cannot do without regulatory agency approval, such as the firing of stewardesses and the cutting back on routes. The activities of the regulatory agencies don't allow competitive forces to be brought into play.

Continuing, the President said that if regulatory agencies can let up then the airlines might be in a better position to agree to delayed deliveries of the new Lockheed planes. The President said that the man

² See Document 336.

who is handling this in the US Government is the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard, who is very knowledgeable in these matters.

Lord Cromer said that a nine-months delay in delivery would be helpful in this situation.

The President then turned to the recently concluded Commonwealth Conference in Singapore³ and commended the Prime Minister for his handling of the situation. He said that he had told the Prime Minister that what the British were proposing to do (arms for South Africa) created problems for us but we would not give Heath any trouble.⁴ Stressing that he was speaking frankly, the President said that we have gone overboard on our handling of the less-developed countries at the expense of our “blue chip” interests, such as NATO and Europe. He traced the history of this policy back to the closing years of the Eisenhower Administration, running on through the decade of the Sixties. If an issue arose, we generally tended to opt for the newer countries. Now we have revised that policy. The emphasis is now on NATO. It was for this reason that early in his Administration he journeyed to Europe.

Continuing, the President said that all countries are important but that the US and Europe must realize that without a strong relationship between the two there is no possibility of a viable foreign policy for either. Concluding, he said that when the chips are down we must ask whether what we propose to do in a given situation would help or hurt where it matters most.

Lord Cromer said that at Singapore the African countries had taken a tack that had racist overtones but that the Prime Minister had reacted by treating all the participants as adults and presenting reasoned arguments.

The President responded by noting that if colonialism is dead, then all former colonial dependencies must act like adults. In this context he said that the Nixon doctrine in the Asian area⁵ was based on this approach.

Lord Cromer said that he wished the President well in the latest operation in Southeast Asia.⁶

The President said that what is being done had to be done this year rather than next year when our personnel will be down to less than

³ January 13–22.

⁴ See Document 334.

⁵ Reference to the statement made by the President on July 25, 1969. For text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 544–556.

⁶ Reference to a South Vietnamese operation launched February 7 into Laos with the objective of cutting off supply trails for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. The offensive had U.S. air, artillery, and logistic support.

100,000. He said that this is really a big show. The operation in Cambodia in May had helped reduce casualties in the lower sixty percent of South Vietnam. He said that the casualty figures coming out on Thursday would be 16, the lowest he can remember in six or seven years. The current operation will do for the rest of South Vietnam what Cambodia had done for the lower half. He noted that it would also help Cambodia. He said that things were going better in Cambodia than we had expected, and the longer they survive the better it will be for all. But the current operation is central to future withdrawal preparations.

Lord Cromer said that success by the South Vietnamese in this operation will also improve the credibility of the South Vietnamese, showing that they had the capability to take care of themselves.

The President agreed and said that this will be a real test. When the South Vietnamese were involved in the Cambodian operation they were fighting against irregular troops. Now they are smack up against main forces of North Vietnamese. If they can "hack it" here it will mean a tremendous boost for their self-confidence.

In concluding the conversation, the President said he looked forward to seeing the Ambassador at the reception that evening and hoped he did not mind appearing so soon in White Tie for a diplomatic reception. He spoke flatteringly of the reception facilities available at the British Embassy and the good use to which they were often put.

As he escorted the Ambassador to the hall, he urged him to get in touch with Arthur Burns, George Shultz, and others involved in the economic field, and perhaps have them over for some candid discussions at the Embassy. In those discussions the President hoped Lord Cromer would feel free to comment on our economic problems and programs.⁷

The President then asked the Ambassador if he had seen the Kennedy portraits in the East Room. When the Ambassador responded in the negative the President asked Ambassador Mosbacher to take Lord Cromer into the East Room and show him the paintings. The President then departed.

⁷ Subsequently the President hosted a March 8 meeting of Cromer and senior Cabinet level officials including Shultz, Burns, and Stein. A memorandum of conversation, prepared by Shultz, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President. A briefing paper prepared by Bergsten for Kissinger in connection with the meeting is *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V.

338. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

UK Agricultural Policy

Issue

You will recall that Prime Minister Heath has proposed that British farm incomes henceforth be supported through high prices for key commodities rather than direct payments from the British Treasury to British farmers.² UK tariffs would be raised to protect the new support prices from foreign competition. Assuming that Britain joins the Common Market, Heath's plan would essentially accelerate British adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy by about two years since his idea is virtually identical to the CAP.

The higher British prices and tariffs could theoretically hurt our exports; however, world prices for the commodities in question are much higher than the new UK prices and everyone agrees that the real impact on us is negligible. The increase in British tariffs violates their international commitments, however; we can exercise our rights either by accepting compensation *now* on our industrial exports to the UK, or retaliating against the UK, or preserving them as leverage against the CAP itself *after* Britain becomes a member.

At Tab I³ is a memo from Pete Peterson outlining five options on this issue. We must convey our position to the British today. Secretary Hardin would like to present his views to you personally, and I recommend a short meeting if your schedule today permits.⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "The President has seen."

² See Document 332.

³ Not printed.

⁴ No record of a Nixon-Hardin meeting or telephone conversation that day was found. Hardin visited the White House on March 8 as part of a group meeting with the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) Both Hardin and Secretary Connally continued to oppose the solution proposed by Kissinger and Peterson. Their views were outlined in a March 8 memorandum from Bergsten to Kissinger. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V)

Analysis

The British action carries no real economic cost for us. In addition, our refusal to accept the British proposal could lead only to (a) our getting meaningless tariff concessions on industrial items or (b) the beginning of a series of retaliatory actions which could cause us major political problems with Heath and even with the EC. The issue is thus whether we accept these realities and accommodate as best we can to the British move, or adopt a tough stance toward the British for domestic political reasons.

Secretary Hardin wants you to call Heath, to try to talk him out of moving. Even Hardin recognizes that the effort would likely fail; he would then have us reject the UK proposal outright and retaliate. The Secretary recognizes that US exports are unlikely to be hurt by the UK move, but wants to convey a tough Administration posture to the domestic farm community.

State originally proposed making one more counter proposal, in an effort to further improve the British changes. However, State was also willing to carry the issue to the GATT and possible retaliation if the UK refused to make further concessions.

Pete Peterson has devised a clever compromise position, which I support. He proposes that we try to get the improvement suggested by State, but accept the UK proposal whether or not we succeed. To meet our domestic political problem, he has developed an official US statement which would quite rightly point out that the UK action as now modified through our efforts would not hurt our exports; we had fully preserved our GATT rights for the crucial negotiations with the enlarged Community; the alternative was a loss of GATT rights and US exports; and that we would go back at the British if the arrangement proved unsatisfactory. He would also seek a Heath statement expressing understanding of our position, which is unlikely to succeed but worth a try if kept low-key.

I do not believe we should trigger a confrontation with Heath on this issue. We have nothing to gain economically, and could even lose our valuable negotiating rights on agriculture in return for meaningless industrial concessions if we let the problem go into GATT at this time. Retaliation on this issue could also cause broader trade and foreign policy problems with the EC. And Peterson has developed an approach which should meet the domestic political problem.

Recommendation

I therefore recommend that you accept Peterson's proposal (Option 5 of Tab I). State and STR concur.

Approve⁵

Disapprove, prefer Secretary Hardin's approach (Options 1 and 2)

Other

⁵ The President initialed this option. The date March 5, 1971, is stamped under his initials.

339. Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Agreement on U.K. Grain Import Policy

We reached ad referendum agreement with the British at the end of last week on an acceptable compromise over the new U.K. grain import policy.

Following the President's decision, the U.S. delegation got a significant improvement over the most recent British offer:

1. Elimination of the tariff on grain sorghum, a rapidly growing item in U.S. shipments to Britain.
2. Total exemption from import levies of corn for industrial purposes, which represents $\frac{1}{3}$ of the U.K.'s total corn imports (corn is 90% of our grain exports to Britain).
3. Slightly lower minimum import prices, and hence a reduced likelihood of triggering the levies at all.
4. Exemption of U.S. exports from any import levies triggered by EC export subsidies.
5. Indefinite duration for the agreement, denunciation rights on short notice by either side, and explicit maintenance of our GATT rights.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V. No classification marking. Sent for information. Initialed by Kissinger.

The negotiators also agreed on the general text of statements to be issued by both the U.K. and the U.S. Governments. The British hope that any problems can be worked out to allow simultaneous announcement tomorrow.²

I believe that the results clearly demonstrate that we handled this issue just right. The President made precisely the right decisions—per my recommendations, through you in January and through Peterson more recently—to negotiate further with the British in the hope of obtaining an arrangement which would be defensible before our agricultural community, but to avoid a confrontation with Heath in the process, à la Hardin's proposals. Phil Trezise and Clarence Palmby did a skillful negotiating job in obtaining further concessions, even though they had to accept whatever they could get. We thereby avoided what could have become a very bitter Anglo-American dispute, as well as preserving all our economic rights for the later battle with the EC where they will really matter.

² Heath announced the agreement in a parliamentary statement of March 18. The U.S. announcement was made on March 17 by Hardin and Peterson. Subsequently, on April 6, Nixon sent Heath a message citing the Prime Minister's parliamentary declaration in order to place the U.S. statement on the same level as the British. The text of the Heath statement, a March 25 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon outlining the reasons for a Presidential message, and a copy of the April 6 message from Nixon to Heath are *ibid.*, Vol. VI.

340. National Security Study Memorandum 123¹

Washington, April 17, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US–UK Nuclear Relations

The President has directed that a study be prepared to review current issues of nuclear cooperation with Great Britain.

In particular, the study should address:

1. The extent to which we are already committed to assist the UK in improving its strategic nuclear force under existing agreements.

2. The implications of US assistance to the British in their efforts to improve the capability of their present Polaris systems through the “project definition phase.”

3. The long run implications for the US of a deeper involvement in the UK effort to develop and deploy an improved Polaris system, including an assessment of British strategic objectives and a possible future UK request for MIRV technology.

This study will be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Political Military Group. The completed study, which will be considered by the Senior Review Group, should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs not later than May 10.²

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–182, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 123. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² Document 344. The SRG did not meet to discuss the completed study.

341. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath¹

Washington, May 4, 1971.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of April 7, 1971,² expressing your agreement to the use of Holy Loch by US Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (Poseidon-equipped) in the same way as their sisters Polaris and under the same arrangements as are set out in the 1964 Memorandum of Understanding on Holy Loch.

I am pleased to give you my assurances that the United States Government will regard the Memorandum of Understanding, last reaffirmed in my letter of December 14, 1970 (concerning consultation between our two Governments before certain forces equipped with United States nuclear weapons and operating from bases in the United Kingdom or [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would use these weapons),³ as applying with respect to Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (Poseidon-equipped) in the same manner and to the same extent as with respect to Polaris submarines.

I accordingly confirm that the amendments you propose to the Memorandum of Understanding concerning consultation are acceptable to me.⁴ I am enclosing the amended version of the Memorandum.⁵

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Country Files—Europe, British-US Nuclear Matter. Top Secret.

² A copy is *ibid*.

³ For text of the 1970 agreement, see Document 333.

⁴ The amendments consisted of placing the words “and Poseidon” in the text of the 1970 memorandum of agreement immediately after the word “Polaris” wherever it occurred.

⁵ Not printed.

342. Editorial Note

In the winter of 1971–1972, the British Government requested U.S. approval for the sale of computers to a Soviet physics laboratory. After review by interested U.S. agencies, the initial British request was turned down inside the Coordinating Committee on Export Control (COCOM). The Heath government then offered a revised proposal designed to meet U.S. concerns regarding the safeguarding of computer technology. Following consideration of the British proposal in the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, forwarded a recommendation for U.S. approval to President Richard Nixon. The President agreed and on May 12, he informed British Prime Minister Edward Heath in a written message. The Presidential letter and other documentation relating to the British computer sale are in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Documents 369, 372, 373, and 374.

343. Editorial Note

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, visited London June 24–25, 1971, for talks with British officials. These discussions covered both international issues and scientific cooperation. Memoranda of his conversations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files—Europe, UK Memcons (originals).

344. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 123¹

Washington, July 2, 1971.

**US ASSISTANCE TO THE UK SUPER ANTELOPE PROGRAM
(NSSM 123)***The Problem*

NSSM 123,² issued on April 17, 1971, requests a study be made of "US/UK Nuclear Relations," with particular emphasis on:

—The extent to which we are already committed to assist the UK in improving its strategic nuclear force under existing agreements.

—The implications of US assistance to the British in their efforts to improve the capability of their present Polaris systems through the "Project Definition phase."

—The long-run implications for the US of a deeper involvement in the UK effort to develop and deploy an improved Polaris system, including an assessment of British strategic objectives and a possible future UK request for MIRV technology.

The specific issue is to what extent the US should assist the United Kingdom in its efforts to develop and deploy an improved Polaris system, in particular the UK Super Antelope program for improving the hardness and penetration capability of the front end of the Polaris missile system. (While the US and UK cooperate in other areas of nuclear weapons technology, there are no issues in these areas requiring NSC consideration at this time.)

The UK has been concerned for some time about maintaining the viability of their Polaris system. The British have concentrated on the problem of penetrating Soviet ABM defenses and striking Moscow and have been chiefly concerned with improving their penetration capability and hardening their re-entry vehicles to nuclear effects. They have considered a number of alternative solutions and have at various times asked our advice and assistance in studying these alternatives.

US assistance to the UK in the field of atomic weapons has been continuous since 1958. A comprehensive interagency review of this co-operation was contained in a letter dated May 10, 1971, from AEC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-182, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 123. Top Secret; Sensitive; Restricted Data. Sent to Irwin, Packard, Moorer, and Helms. Copies were sent to the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. A title page, table of contents, and the enclosures are not printed.

² Document 340.

Chairman Glenn Seaborg to The Honorable John Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. A copy is attached as Enclosure 1.

Since 1963 cooperation has included the UK Polaris force. In recent years we have assisted the British in evaluating the hardness and vulnerability of their Polaris systems, provided them information on modifications to our Polaris systems, exchanged further information on penetration aids, and made available exposure space in US underground nuclear effects tests. US–UK Joint Working Groups (JOWOG's) have been established to exchange information on these subjects.

In November 1970, the UK formally advised DOD that the British Ministers had approved work on Project Definition for the Super Antelope Polaris improvement program and requested US assistance in the matter.

On March 25, 1971, the Deputy Secretary of Defense provided the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a summary of UK Super Antelope programs and informed him of DOD's intention, in response to the British request, to assist the UK in Project Definition. He pointed out, however, that the DOD commitment was made without prejudice to our freedom of action beyond that point, and that further assistance would have to be the subject of a future decision. See Enclosure 2. While no formal reply has been made to the UK letter, there have been a series of meetings with the British, including a conference at the Pentagon on April 26–28, 1971, which have elicited more details of the program and during which the British have been given no reason to believe that the requested assistance in Project Definition would not be forthcoming. US representatives have agreed to have a follow-on session in the UK in late July to provide answers to the questions raised.

Technical details are discussed further on, but essentially the British would like the benefit of US technology in the Antelope Program and assistance in the analysis and design critiques on their approach to re-entry vehicle and pen aid design, including possible use of US contractors. They also want continued access to US underground nuclear effects tests in order to expose UK hardware samples, and possibly the use of White Sands Proving Grounds for flight test of components.

Although the British have requested our assistance only in the Project Definition phase, it is likely that they would seek further US support of some kind in development, production, and testing, if they decide to proceed beyond Project Definition. It is possible that they might request assistance in matters relating to the post-Project Definition phase prior to a UK Ministerial decision to move beyond Project Definition.

While it may be possible to decide the specific issues of continued cooperation with the British without prejudging broader policy issues they do raise fundamental questions of the relationship of the UK Super Antelope project to our own strategic objectives. For example, is it in the US interest to maintain the credibility of the UK Polaris deterrence? Is the design objective of Super Antelope consistent with the role of the UK Polaris force in the NATO strike Plans? Is our control of the initiation of nuclear war and its conduct diminished by such a program as Super Antelope?

In addition, cooperation with the British on Super Antelope raises questions affecting the US negotiating position at SALT and the viability of bilateral agreements with the USSR limiting strategic arms. The possibility at SALT of obtaining agreement on the issue of strategic arms transfers to third countries by a generalized statement of purpose, and the credibility of our declaration that we have no intention of circumventing an agreement through third countries could be undermined if collaboration of Super Antelope extended to production and testing.

Although the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in which the US and UK are participating, are not currently a factor in US-UK nuclear collaboration, a test ban agreement, if one is ever achieved, could affect plans for underground testing for Super Antelope at a future date.

Lastly, the UK request impinges on a complex set of multilateral relationships and how US interests are affected by the development of third country nuclear forces in Europe, and thus the direction of our future European nuclear policy. Our help at this time in Project Definition of Super Antelope will undoubtedly influence and solidify our later relationship with them in the nuclear field and possibly make it less likely that the British would choose, or would be able in the light of the prohibitions of the Atomic Energy Act and our 1958 agreement, as amended, to move toward European military nuclear cooperation, should the US at some time wish to encourage this.

345. National Security Decision Memorandum 124¹

Washington, July 29, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT

US–UK Nuclear Relations

The President has reviewed the NSSM 123 Study² and approves US assistance to the UK Super Antelope missile improvement program. Approval is subject to the qualifications indicated in this memorandum.

Our assistance through the Project Definition phase does not commit the US, necessarily, to continued assistance, should the UK decide to produce and deploy this improved system. That issue will be reviewed and decided by the President at a later date. However, if the British should request assistance related to the Post Project Definition program before the end of the Project Definition phase, we will review such requests on a case by case basis. Moreover, the UK should understand that we will wish to reserve the right to review, on a case by case basis, some of the highly visible aspects of our assistance (e.g., presence of UK personnel at US underground nuclear tests or use of US missile test ranges). Our willingness to cooperate in the Project Definition study cannot imply an assurance regarding the successful outcome of the project, in view of the limited US experience in some of the areas to be studied.

The Departments of State and Defense should, through appropriate channels, inform the UK of our decision and the considerations in the preceding paragraph. [*2½ lines not declassified*]

The NSC Senior Review Group shall assume responsibility for implementing and coordinating our assistance to the UK on the Super Antelope project. All interested agencies will be involved as appropriate, and periodic status reports will be forwarded to the President. Decisions on particularly sensitive aspects of cooperation that might become publicized, or which may have broader international implica-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM's) Nos. 97–. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

² Document 344.

tions, will be referred to the SRG by the agencies involved, and, when necessary, referred to the President. Decisions on any requests for support related to the Post Project Definition program will be referred by the SRG to the President.

This cooperation with the UK is highly sensitive and should be treated by all agencies on a highly classified basis. The UK should be informed of the sensitive nature of our cooperation.

The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to allocate space to the UK at US underground nuclear effects tests as appropriate to meet the objectives of the Super Antelope project. The presence of UK personnel planned for the next test is approved, but the presence of UK personnel at future tests will be referred to the SRG for decisions.

The Atomic Energy Commission, in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, will inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of our proposed cooperation with the UK on this project.

Henry A Kissinger

346. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Heath Informs You on Northern Ireland Situation

Prime Minister Heath has sent you a message through the Chargé of the British Embassy advising you of the decision, announced on August 9, to order internment without trial for IRA guerrillas and to ban all marches and parades (Tab A).²

Brian Faulkner, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, came to London last week. He told the British, Heath reports, that he had come to the conclusion that internment was the inevitable course. This was Faulkner's decision, since the powers under which these measures are taken are powers of the Government of Northern Ireland. However, the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI. Secret; (UK Top Secret Attachment). Sent for information. The first page is stamped: "The President has seen."

² Not printed.

implementation depends on the cooperation of British Army units (British forces in Northern Ireland now total some 12,000).

Heath made it clear to Faulkner that the British forces would not implement an internment decision unless it were accompanied by a complete ban on marches and parades. Faulkner accepted this. As announced, the ban will run for six months, but Heath advises you that he made it clear to Faulkner that the ban will have to be extended beyond that period.

The ban on marches comes just in time. The ban eliminates the August 12 "Protestant Apprentice Boys" parade in Derry, an annual event celebrating the victory over the Roman Catholics in 1689. Irish Prime Minister Lynch on August 7 publicly called for the British Government to stop this parade. Heath notes that he has sent a message to Lynch asking him to react to the internment/parade ban announcement with understanding. Heath also hopes that Lynch will still come to London in October in accordance with a previously scheduled visit.

This clearly has been a difficult decision. The use of internment has been an increasing possibility for the last two months in view of the rising tide of arson, shootings and killings among IRA, British security forces and other groups. Belfast and Derry have been the major scenes of the strife.

I have expressed to the British Embassy, on your behalf, your appreciation for the Prime Minister's thoughtfulness in providing you with such full information on this decision.³ The British understand that we cannot be drawn into the substance of this issue.

³ A copy of Kissinger's letter, dated August 14, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VI. In it Kissinger expressed the President's "gratitude and understanding" for Heath's message.

347. Memorandum of Conversation¹

London, November 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Northern Ireland

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Stewart Crawford, FCO Deputy Under Secretary
Philip Woodfield, Home Office Asst. Under Secretary
Kelvin White, FCO Asst. Head Western European Dept.
Hon. Martin Hillenbrand, Department of State
Hon. Earl Sohm, Minister of American Embassy
Robert M. Scott, American Embassy
Grover Penberthy, Consul General Belfast
Jack Sulser, American Embassy

Mr. Hillenbrand said he had requested an opportunity to discuss Northern Ireland with British officials because he had been invited to appear before the "Irish caucus" of the U.S. House of Representatives about December 1. For this reason he had also just had a two-hour chat with Mr. Penberthy, our Consul General in Belfast. He would like to put some of the questions he expected to be asked by the Congressmen. Sir Stewart explained that, because of the border across Ireland, there was a division of responsibility in London. The Foreign Office was concerned with relations with the Republic of Ireland, and the Home Office was responsible for Northern Ireland. He had thus invited Mr. Woodfield to join the discussion.

Mr. Hillenbrand first asked why internment had been deemed necessary. Mr. Woodfield pointed out that internment had often been resorted to in Ireland, in the Republic as well as Northern Ireland. Irish Prime Minister Lynch had threatened internment as recently as ten months ago when some incidents had occurred which were not nearly as serious as those of the past year in Northern Ireland. Internment had begun in Northern Ireland in August after a heavy build up of IRA violence. A commission headed by a British judge of Roman Catholic faith had been set up at the same time to review cases of internees and advise on those instances when evidence and circumstances did not justify continued detention. Although the commission has only advisory powers, Prime Minister Faulkner had said he "could not imagine" not accepting its recommendations. Of cases reviewed thus far by the commission, it had recommended release in only about 10% of the cases.

¹Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 UK. Confidential.

Although the Special Powers Act did not put a limit on the time a person could be detained without an internment order, the Northern Ireland Government followed the practice of issuing an internment order or releasing the detainee after not more than one month because the advisory commission did not review the cases of detainees. Although the commission was designed as an appeal body, in practice it reviewed the cases of all internees because many IRA men declined to appeal on the ground that they would thereby acknowledge Northern Ireland authority. Sir Stewart pointed out that detention and internment without trial was resorted to largely in cases where trial was impossible because of intimidation of witnesses and jurors.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked whether use of the Army in Northern Ireland was necessary in order to restore and maintain order. Mr. Woodfield replied that, although no one could be certain, it was probable that something like civil war between Protestant and Catholic communities would occur if the Army were withdrawn. The troops had been welcomed by the Catholic minority at the beginning as protection against the Protestants, but IRA attacks on the Army had involved the troops in violence with the Catholics.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked what direction British policy might take. Mr. Woodfield replied that the basic problem is that Stormont has followed for 50 years the Westminster model, in which the certainty of changing majorities acts as a restraint on the Government of the day and as a source of hope and reassurance to the minority. In Northern Ireland, on the contrary, full implementation of the complete reform program would still doom the Catholics to perpetual opposition as long as politics continue to be organized on a sectarian basis. HMG could not prescribe how it should be done, but a way must be found to give the minority a role in government in Northern Ireland. The Home Secretary had invited representatives of all sides to meet with him to examine alternative methods of achieving this, but so far the main Opposition parties had refused to join the talks until internment was ended.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked about the possibility of direct rule of Northern Ireland by London. Mr. Woodfield replied that, although direct rule was the immediate objective of the IRA, it would not end the violence because they would then agitate for unification of Ireland. Prime Minister Heath and Opposition Leader Wilson had both recently spoken against direct rule as a "solution" by itself, but perhaps it would be possible as an interim stage toward some new system for Northern Ireland.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked about the Northern Ireland economic situation. Mr. Woodfield said it was normally weak as a peripheral area separated from the rest of the United Kingdom by a significant stretch of

water. Unemployment was higher than the rest of the U.K. but strangely, at least until recently, so was productivity. Sectarian rivalry and violence did not seem to affect shop floor relations. Sir Alec Cairncross, former Chief Economic Adviser to HMG, was heading a committee to study possibilities for increasing investments in Northern Ireland.

Mr. Hillenbrand inquired about IRA organization and objectives. Sir Stewart explained that the Provisional Wing had broken off from the official IRA a few years ago because it had become too Marxist and insufficiently devoted to violence. Total strength in Northern Ireland was estimated to be between 800 and 2,000 before internment. Others assisted IRA operations occasionally or to a limited extent. There was still some recruitment, but the security forces hoped to deprive the organization of its leadership. The Provisionals wanted to demonstrate by violence that Northern Ireland is ungovernable; to them direct rule would be a step toward unification. Mr. Woodfield said the IRA really comprised three groups: idealistic radicals, revolutionaries, and criminal thugs who enjoyed the violence. Members in Northern Ireland were mostly from the province, but they received support, sanctuary and some guidance from the Republic. In practice, IRA groups in Northern Ireland were fairly autonomous. The Provisionals are closer to IRA traditions than the Officials. MP Bernadette Devlin stated in Parliament last week that she sympathizes with the official IRA, but she is probably not formally a member. She was thrown in politics by the civil rights movement of three years ago and objects to the Dublin Government almost as much as Stormont.

Mr. Hillenbrand said Miss Devlin claimed in America that Northern Ireland Catholics are "in despair." Mr. Woodfield agreed that that was increasingly true. Even middle-class Catholics now see no hope. He said Cardinal Conway had stated a few years ago that the majority of Northern Ireland Catholics would vote for unification with the Republic as long as there was no chance of it being implemented, but the reverse would be true if there were a real possibility. This was presumably because the standard of living is higher in Northern Ireland, the province benefits from British subsidies and higher social benefits, and life under Britain in Northern Ireland is freer and more modern. Liberal Northern Ireland Catholics regard life in the Republic as too old-fashioned and Church-dominated.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked about HMG policies other than ending violence. Mr. White pointed out that the U.K. is perfectly willing to see Northern Ireland united with the Republic if that is what the population wished. It would be in nobody's interest, especially not the Republic's, if one million Northern Ireland Protestants were united with the Republic against their will. Mr. Woodfield summarized HMG policy as

obtaining UK-wide standards in every respect in Northern Ireland, seeking a role for the minority in public life, but not permitting unification with the Republic without the consent of the majority. There was speculation that U.K. and Irish membership in the European Communities might help the Northern Ireland situation. The province and the Republic would have a common stake in EC regional policies. Gradual harmonization of economies and social benefits would reduce disparities between the two parts of the island. Both would become accustomed to a higher authority, giving Dublin some assurance against London domination.

In response to Mr. Hillenbrand's question about organization of the Protestant community, Mr. Woodfield said it was probably less centrally controlled than the Catholics for para-military purposes. Vigilante groups that protect Protestant neighborhoods at night are quite effective. The ability of the Orange Order to command, control or prohibit Protestant violence is unknown. He agreed with Mr. White that no single leader could "unleash" Protestant potential violence.

Mr. Hillenbrand inquired whether the military forces of the Republic could conquer Northern Ireland even if British forces were not engaged. Mr. White said the Republic has only small, poorly armed forces which would probably not be able to subdue an aroused Northern Ireland Protestant community. Even the "Doomsday" plans of the Irish forces only foresaw the possibility of crossing the border to nearby Londonderry to defend the Catholic Bogside against Protestant attack if British forces were not available to do the job themselves. Sir Stewart added that, as a matter of policy, the Republic did not equip or train its forces for offensive operations.

In response to a query by Mr. Scott, Mr. White acknowledged that discrimination against Protestants in the Republic was "not a problem" However, he noted that the Protestant population had declined substantially since independence, perhaps because economic opportunities were better in Britain or elsewhere and because inter-marriage converts the next generation to Catholic. Protestants who could not afford to send their children to private schools had no choice but to send them to Catholic schools.

Asked by Mr. Scott about Northern Ireland Protestants and internment, Mr. White said only one or two non-Catholics had been detained but probably not interned. However, numerous Protestants had been arrested, charged and some convicted, as had some Catholics. That the internees were Catholic was due to the greater problem of getting judicable evidence due to IRA intimidation of witnesses.

In response to Mr. Hillenbrand's question about conditions in internment camps, Mr. Woodfield and Mr. White acknowledged that

they left a lot to be desired. Mr. White said they rather reminded him of life in crowded Army camps of the early 1940s.

Mr. Hillenbrand thanked the British officials for a very useful discussion and said he hoped to be able to leave the problems of Northern Ireland to them.

348. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon and British Prime Minister Edward Heath met in Bermuda December 20–21, 1971, for discussions on a wide range of multilateral issues. On December 20, the two leaders dealt with decolonization, Great Britain's relations with Europe, domestic politics, SALT, China, Japan, India-Pakistan relations, Vietnam, and domestic politics. Their December 21 talks focused on the Middle East and economic issues. Following these private discussions, a general session attended by Nixon and Heath and most of their senior foreign policy advisers continued a discussion of multilateral issues with a focus on China, the Middle East, India-Pakistan, relations with the Soviet Bloc, and Rhodesia. Issues related to relations with the European Economic Community also were discussed. Memoranda of conversation of these meetings are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 950, VIP Visits, Heath Visit (Bermuda), and *ibid.*, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memos for the President.

349. Message From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath¹

Washington, April 4, 1972.

I have received your message of March 30 about the export of integrated circuit machinery,² which gives your views on the assurances that we consider necessary. I believe that this aspect, which has longer range control implications, should now be handled at the COCOM level. As you pointed out in your message of March 28,³ the COCOM system has served a useful purpose for some 22 years. I am sure that close cooperation between the British and United States Governments will help to assure COCOM's continued effectiveness and relevance.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Edward Heath. Confidential. The message was sent "via Cabinet Line."

² A copy is attached. In an April 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt commented that Heath's message "also (1) said it would be difficult to obtain the assurances which the President had requested on the Polish non-reexport of the *finished ICs to other communist countries*; and (2) failed to respond to the President's expressed hope that the British would continue to support denial in COCOM of the export of *IC-manufacturing equipment to other communist countries*." Sonnenfeldt added that he considered a draft State Department response "inadequate" because it "did not (a) sufficiently indicate the irritation we feel at the pressure tactics which the British employed to get a favorable decision; (b) make it clear enough that we want the British to at least try again for the assurances; or (c) refer to the President's hope that we can count on British cooperation on denial of equipment exports." (Ibid.)

³ A copy of the March 28 message is *ibid*. For more information on U.S. policy towards the British and French export of integrated circuit technology to Poland and Romania, see the chapter entitled "Coordinating Committee on Export Controls, 1969–1972," in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972.

350. Editorial Note

On June 23, 1972, the British Government announced that temporarily it would permit the pound to float in relation to other currencies. This action represented a *de facto* devaluation of British currency in response to heavy pressures created by international currency speculators. British Prime Minister Edward Heath informed President Richard Nixon of his decision and the rationale and comment on its effect in messages of June 24 and 26. Copies are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files—Eu-

rope, United Kingdom, Vol. VII. For documentation on the U.S. reaction, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 232 and 233.

351. Message From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath¹

Washington, July 11, 1972, 1345Z.

WH 27140. Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you very much for your personal messages with respect to your decision on the pound.²

I share your conclusion that this latest episode in a series of monetary crises over recent years illustrates the need for fundamental changes in the monetary framework. To the extent this point is generally grasped, the cause of practical reform will have been reinforced—and, I hope, speeded. This can be a highly constructive by-product of otherwise unfortunate turbulence. I particularly welcome your reaction because so much of my own concern in the period since last August 15³ has been directed toward establishing the point that we need to go beyond a simple patching up of the Bretton Woods system.

Frankly, we have felt the point has not been generally accepted in the past, even though certain underlying problems—such as the large mass and volatility of short-term money that you mentioned—have become increasingly evident.

I recognize that our effort to focus thinking on underlying problems could be, and has been, interpreted in some public discussion as an attempt to block or delay progress on specific reform proposals, or to promote purely national goals. Yet, I have accepted that risk in the firm belief that the cause of lasting reform—serving the needs of all—will be advanced only by a willingness to face up to the fundamental

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom Prime Minister Edward Heath. Confidential.

² See Document 350.

³ Reference to the President's announcement on August 15, 1971, of the New Economic Policy. The text of his statement is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 886–891. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 168.

issues, political as well as economic. Any other course invites failure. It is often said that a crisis is required to focus our minds and energies. I am confident we have within our power the ability to grasp this opportunity.

I am the last to underestimate the difficulties ahead. In a situation permitting different avenues of approach and with success totally dependent upon a sense of shared responsibilities and benefits, we have not felt it useful to press for a specific single “American plan”. Similarly, I trust that European thinking will not become frozen prematurely.

Against the background of recent events I do feel the time is ripe for engaging in open-minded and candid exploration of certain basic alternatives with our close partners. We should no longer be inhibited by the fear that certain approaches can be unthinkingly damned by some as too “radical” a departure from the past.

I know that Secretary Shultz looks forward to discussing these matters with the Chancellor at an early date and hope that our thinking can be tested against yours at all stages.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

352. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

Assistance to UK Polaris Improvement Program

Deputy Secretary Rush informs you that the British government has now formally asked for assistance in the next phase of their Polaris improvement program (called Super Antelope, and involving a new warhead with a penetration aid package) (Tabs B and C). The request covers (1) allotting space for underground nuclear testing facilities;

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Initialed by Haig. The tabs are not printed.

(2) flight testing of UK warheads on US ranges; and (3) use of US simulator facilities for weapons effects and RV system separation tests. Other related requests may be forthcoming.

This takes us beyond the Project Definition stage, which was approved by the President in NSDM 124 in July 1971.² This does not yet mean the UK will go to full production, however. Last year the agencies were instructed that further assistance would be referred by the SRG to the President.³ Although this memorandum from Mr. Rush shortcuts the bureaucratic process, it creates no new problems since over the past year we have assured the British that we would continue cooperation.

There is some urgency in answering the British, since planning for the nuclear testing and fabricating warheads for weapons effects involves long lead times.

Rush informs you that he intends to authorize the necessary steps for implementing the British request unless he hears to the contrary within ten days. (In practice, they will wait for your reply.)

While *this does take us qualitatively further than the initial decision*, it is the logical next step implied in our assistance. There is no reason to curtail our cooperation or raise doubts in the UK about our assistance, especially in view of British uneasiness about the non-transfer aspects of SALT II.

Accordingly, Rush should be informed that there are no objections to his proposed response to the UK. A memorandum at Tab A will give Rush your concurrence.

(It might be worth your mentioning our willingness to continue this assistance to Sir Burke Trend.)

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A, concurring in Mr. Rush's decision to proceed with further assistance to the UK program.⁴

² Document 345.

³ No directive other than NSDM 124 was found. Documentation on U.S. policy toward British development of Super Antelope is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 728, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. V.

⁴ Kissinger signed the letter. A signed copy, dated July 31, is *ibid.*, Vol. VII.

353. Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 28, 1972, 2–2:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Sir Burke Trend, British Ambassador Cromer, and Henry A. Kissinger

[Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet, was visiting Washington as the Prime Minister's representative for a day of confidential consultations with Dr. Kissinger.² The President decided to meet with him briefly in order to emphasize the importance to us of this close consultation with our principal allies.]

After opening greetings and pleasantries, the President pledged to Sir Burke and Ambassador Cromer that the United States would not go off bilaterally with the Soviets on any issues which concerned our allies, for example a European Security Conference. That could be a dangerous gimmick, the President said. We and the British had to co-operate not only on substance but also on the propaganda.

The President then raised the Irish question. The U.S. would do its best to show restraint. It would be good if we and the British could possibly come up with a common public line we could develop.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 729, Country Files—Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. A tape recording of this conversation is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Conversation 756–21. Brackets are in the original.

² Memoranda of their conversation are *ibid.*, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files—Europe, HAK London Memcons. A memorandum of conversation of their July 28 meeting is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 62, Memcons, Chronological Files, 1972. The transcript their telephone conversation on July 29 at 12:35 p.m. is *ibid.*, Box 373, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. Follow-up discussions with representatives of the Heath government took place in Washington August 10. Memoranda of these conversations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files—Europe, HAK London Memcons.

³ According to a transcript of a portion of the tape recording of the conversation dealing with this issue, Nixon made the following comments:

"The only difficult problem I see coming up before the elections is the Irish problem. We're under terrible pressure here. I don't know what the other fellow [Democratic Party Presidential nominee George McGovern] is going to say on this. My guess is that he will probably be pressured into saying something stupid"; "I mean he'll say, you know, that we have to intervene in Northern Ireland"; "I will not. I mean, as Henry will tell you, I put my foot down. I had to step on the bureaucracy and everybody else and say 'just stay out of it.' And obviously Teddy Kennedy is pushing [unclear]. My standard line is this: you've got two decent men, Heath and—ah—Lynch working on this terribly difficult and we're not going to add to the agony of Ireland by intervening in the situation"; "We are obviously interested and have many people in this country interested"; "But I do

The President mentioned in passing that he wanted to give a small dinner for Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, when Sir Alec comes here in August before going to Peking.

He also mentioned that Governor Reagan, in reporting to the President on his trip to Europe, had said the West Germans were interested in a larger share in European nuclear cooperation.⁴

Sir Burke Trend replied that he was not sure what Governor Reagan was referring to. He thanked the President for his reemphasis on close collaboration with the Alliance. There were some matters that the British Government was concerned about—for example, how allied interests would be affected in the second phase of SALT. He had come to Washington to hear our views on this and also on the European Security Conference and MBFR.⁵ The only British anxiety on the Security Conference was that our wise and very proper concern for having preparatory discussions for it could slip imperceptibly into being the conference itself.

The President said he would welcome very private President-to-Prime Minister talks through the White House channel on all these matters. He then asked Dr. Kissinger to describe the state of play on SALT II, the European Conference and MBFR. Dr. Kissinger did so. The President then repeated his desire to have a prior understanding with the British on the Security Conference before we proceed into it.

Ambassador Cromer then mentioned the continuing problems in the monetary field, and suggested the same approach. The President agreed. Secretary Shultz was the man to talk to on that area; Burns was too erratic. The President was convinced that we needed a better long-term solution than the Smithsonian arrangement of December.⁶ Lord Cromer again cited the need for U.S.–UK talks prior to any multi-lateral discussions.

The President summed up by emphasizing again that we would not give up our defense of or our commitments to our allies. The coming election period would not be good for the Alliance. But the

think you should know that—ah—because of an election you are likely to hear, I guess. I don't know what Henry's judgment [is] but this other fellow [McGovern] doesn't have much responsibility. They might just pop off one day and our reaction, my reaction, will be restraint." The editors prepared this transcript specifically for this volume.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 174.

⁵ The portion of the memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Trend on July 28 concerning the European Security Conference is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 103.

⁶ Reference to the agreements reached by the G–10 meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington December 17–18, 1971, on the realignment of monetary exchange rates. See *ibid.*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 221.

President wanted the Prime Minister to know that the U.S. Government was not in favor of unilateral détente. We were not going back on our European policy; we were not going back on our NATO commitment.

After closing pleasantries the meeting adjourned.

354. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to Bruce Kehrli of the White House Staff¹

Washington, July 31, 1972.

SUBJECT

Ulster

In your memorandum of July 24th,² you note correctly that the Ulster problem is becoming a difficult political issue and asked what, if anything responsible, could be done. The answer is a simple “nothing.” I can conceive of no more self-defeating initiative than to move one inch beyond our current policy. Thus far, we have avoided a hornets’ nest by confining ourselves to saying that we are concerned about the Ulster tragedy, welcome all responsible efforts to stop the violence, and would consider playing a “useful role” if asked, at the same time emphasizing that it would be “inappropriate and counter-productive” to intervene in any way.

The wisdom of this course is that it keeps us on good terms with the British who insist Ulster is an internal affair and, perhaps even more importantly, keeps us on good terms with the Irish Government which also has no desire to benefit from U.S. meddling. The very fact that U.S. Catholics are heartened by our domestic policies on abortion, busing and aid to parochial schools should more than compensate for a lack of do-goodism on the Ulster problem.

In a domestic sense, there is no way that we can “out-Kennedy” Kennedy on this issue and before the campaign goes very long, McGovern will be way out in left field. Therefore our best posture in the post-Vietnam climate is the overriding need to keep out from the

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Secret.

² Not printed. (Ibid.)

foreign policy point of view and I think, quite frankly, to let McGovern and his supporters get out on a limb from the domestic point of view. Only then should we consider sawing the limb off.

355. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 10, 1972, 3:35–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(at beginning)

Mr. Patrick Nairne, UK Ministry of Defense

Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Colonel Duff, Aide to Schlesinger

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: This is Jim Schlesinger, in whom we have total confidence. I've told him to give you a theoretical idea of what the possibilities are: Poseidon, with or without a bus,² or Super Antelope, with or without reservations. And to give you the costs. And a little later we will make a policy decision.

All communication on this shall be confined to General Haig or myself.

Nairne: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Any communication to Jim shall be through us; it should go through us.

Nairne: This is most helpful to us.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you, Jim, I appreciate it.

[Dr. Kissinger leaves at 3:40 p.m.]

Dr. Schlesinger: As we see it, in addition to the possibility of providing a full Poseidon system—which you see the sensitivity of—there are other possibilities which may be worth contemplating.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files—Europe, HAK London Memcons. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets, except those indicating omitted material, are in the original.

² Reference to the launch vehicle.

Number one: The easiest possibility is full support on Super Antelope. As you are aware, we can answer questions and act as technical support. We have [in the past] answered with some reserve. But we can give full support. \$200 million is our estimate. You have an estimate of \$100 million but that is somewhat low.

There are many things we can do to assist with respect to hardening, penetration, and dispersal, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on a Polaris.

Nairne: This would be a possible direction, which would go in the direction of hardening and dispersal beyond what is already—very helpful—assistance.

Dr. Schlesinger: We would have to provide information on our estimate of the Soviet ABM capability and the degree of hardness required of the warheads. Our estimate is that the warheads would have to be harder than you can presently achieve, and we would provide assistance.

The second possibility—this is an intermediate one—is to provide the design of the Poseidon RV, and for the hardening of the shell. This is for the UK to manufacture themselves. Our estimate is that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] RV's could be put on a Polaris A 3–T. There is a little problem with the configuration. We can't give you a refined estimate but we think [*less than 1 line not declassified*] RV's. Your ability to penetrate the Soviet ABM would be considerably enhanced. You would have to increase the dispersal but it would not involve provision of the Poseidon bus or bus technology.

Nairne: Let me be sure I understand. [He then repeats verbatim Schlesinger's last three sentences.]

Dr. Schlesinger: That would enhance the price the Soviets would be forced to pay with ABM interceptors to intercept such a hypothetical attack.

A third possibility is: We have the ULMS–1 missile in development, which—as soon as money is appropriated—could be back fitted into Poseidon boats. We could provide technical information and assistance with regard to your conversion of Polaris boats to Poseidon boats, and sell you the Poseidon or ULMS–1 missile—ULMS would be the more attractive—and provide the Poseidon-design RV's as specified under Option 2. Namely, the shell and design, with you to manufacture it yourselves and we to work with you.

Again, we think this would substantially enhance the price the Soviets would be forced to pay with their Galosh ABM interceptors.

Nairne: This is to convert Polaris to Trident or Poseidon boats?

Dr. Schlesinger: No, not the Trident submarine. But the Poseidon-C boat can take either a Poseidon C–3 or C–4 missile or an ULMS missile.

Nairne: It includes the sale of non-nuclear components?

Dr. Schlesinger: Yes.

Nairne: In principle, with respect to the RV's, it would be the same as you have done in relation to the Polaris A-3.

Dr. Schlesinger: Exactly. Essentially all the technology with the exception of the bus.

We've costed out these possibilities. Given U.S. analogues, we estimate that the cost at \$480 million to convert to Poseidon using the Poseidon missile without the bus. Some years ago, the figure of \$500 million was used in public, and this is a similar figure.

The Trident system would cost more. To use ULMS-1, the cost in excess is \$40-50 million higher over the cost of the C-3.

Nairne: You are broadly thinking of a bracket, depending on whether we use the C-3, or C-4, of \$480-\$600 million.

Dr. Schlesinger: If your shipyards are more efficient than ours, that may be the low end. The figure we normally use is \$28-30 million per conversion. But this is based on prior U.S. procurement requirements.

The estimate with respect to the introduction of the Poseidon RV on Polaris (Option 2) is difficult to make; it would be a little intermediate. About \$150-\$175 million. It would require additional development to increase dispersal; we don't have this technology in hand. A small development effort would be involved. But it is probably cheaper than the Super Antelope. It would save you the cost of warhead development, flight testing, etc.

Nairne: I took notes. Can you give me this in writing.

Dr. Schlesinger: AI? OK?

General Haig: Yes.

Nairne: I'm not a technical man . . .

General Haig: The estimates are not refined.

Colonel Duff: Super Antelope involves some new R&D which will be needed.

Dr. Schlesinger: We would have to do trade-off studies to understand what is involved. For example, in putting the Poseidon RV on Polaris, you also have to change the dispersal pattern to insure that the UK effort would in fact extract a high price in terms of Soviet ABM interceptors.

Nairne: I have some questions. I don't have a precise breakdown of the figures of our program K8793. But you think the enhanced support in Option 1 would double the cost of the program?

Dr. Schlesinger: U.S. assistance would save you some money, but you may be presently underestimating the cost because new developments are involved.

Nairne: Is this something you've ever discussed with us before? Option 1?

Dr. Schlesinger: We have not. Our assistance has been in the form of answering questions and saying whether you're on the right or wrong track. It's been negative assistance. But we've never given you positive assistance. What we contemplate in Option 1 is to provide complete support.

Nairne: One of the problems exercising us is, as Sir Burke Trend told Dr. Kissinger the other day,³ our Ministers might make a decision to carry forward with Super Antelope; equally they might like to keep the options open in the light of the political considerations that Dr. Kissinger was spelling out. Therefore it would be good to minimize the commitments in going ahead with Super Antelope but also to keep the momentum going. We would like to discuss this with you, through Herman Bondi.⁴

Dr. Schlesinger: The alternatives are not necessarily exclusive. It is possible to contemplate that the U.S. Government would be prepared to go ahead with affirmative discussion with you on Super Antelope, which could enable you to make progress without any outlays on your part, keeping open the possibility of other programs.

Nairne: Since Sir Burke Trend returned,⁵ we have been giving thought to the Poseidon-ULMS option less the bus. Our experts are far from sure whether there is a viable option relating to the Poseidon missile, or the front end minus the bus. The helpful way you've summarized the options implies to me, as layman, that it might make sense.

Are the options based on your own view that from the technical point of view there is a viable option?

Dr. Schlesinger: Yes, indeed. We would have to do some careful work on that, particularly in the case of putting the Mark III on the Polaris, which we have not done ourselves. But we believe it is a viable option and would do further investigating and would discuss it with you. The words I used before were carefully chosen: Such a capability would provide British boats with an enhanced, much enhanced, capability of penetrating the Soviet ABM defense.

There has been, as you are aware, much discussion of the possibility of the Soviets upgrading their SAM's to an ABM role. The Poseidon RV, being a beta RV, can go past any upgraded SAM. The Polaris A-3 RV could be vulnerable.

³ See Document 353.

⁴ Sir Herman Bondi, Fellow of the Royal Society, Professor, University of London; Chairman, National Center for Astronomy, Ministry of Defense; and former Director General of the European Space Agency.

⁵ From his July 28–29 visit to Washington.

Nairne: Yes. I find it difficult to speculate on the possibility of the Soviets doing just that. The possibility is clearly there. What would be the factors which would lead them to do that?

Dr. Schlesinger: Given the nature of the SALT agreement, the constraints are there, for example on radars, assuming they scrupulously abide by the agreement.

Nairne: You judge it would be possible to provide design information about the warheads and in fact sell us non-nuclear components, exactly on the basis you were able to do with Polaris.

Dr. Schlesinger: Yes. Of course it involves a major savings from you especially with respect to Super Antelope.

Nairne: All our discussion this afternoon is on the likely basis that in SALT II there will be overriding objections to the transfer of the bus.

Dr. Schlesinger: There could be constraints. That is a possibility—without prejudging what American Government might do.

Nairne: You have been most helpful.

Dr. Schlesinger: There is one other point. Providing Mark III in other than the design it was developed for—that is for the bus—may have to involve some slight additional work on that RV, which we would discuss. What we have in mind is a protective overcoat against X-rays, which would be desirable with the dispersal scheme we're presently contemplating. A small change and a relatively easy change, from the present configuration.

Nairne: [To Haig] With respect to follow up, we understand that this is to be done through Dr. Kissinger or you, but [to Schlesinger] I'm sure we would want our technical people to come to talk to yourselves. For example, Bondi.

Dr. Schlesinger: Bondi has a wide acquaintanceship in U.S. Government. But he shall follow the same procedures as you, through Dr. Kissinger.

General Haig: We'll capsulize what we've put out here. It will take a half hour. We'll have it for you by 5:30.

Dr. Schlesinger: We would want to add a few things. We'll do it here.

Nairne: The status of the proposal, I will tell the Prime Minister, is these options you have been kind enough to provide with regard to enabling us to maintain effective strategic deterrent.

[The options stated verbally during the meeting by Dr. Schlesinger were then reduced to paper, in somewhat rearranged order. The paper is at Tab A.]⁶

⁶ Not printed.

356. Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath¹

Washington, August 17, 1972.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The most recent steps taken by your government to restore law and order in Northern Ireland have been followed here with the closest interest. In this regard, I greatly appreciated your message of July 29, not only for your advance notification of the British Army's July 31 operations against the terrorists in Londonderry and Belfast but also for your thoughtfulness in laying out in such detail the situation you face.²

This truly complex and tragic situation is, as you know, a matter of deep concern to the American people. As you have noted, there is continuing pressure from various quarters in the United States that would have us in some way intervene in Northern Ireland. You can be sure, however, that I shall continue to resist such pressure.

You have my full support in your determined efforts to bring about the peaceful environment which alone can lead to a satisfactory solution of the problems of Northern Ireland.

With warm regards,³

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom, Prime Minister Edward Heath. Secret.

² On July 31, the British Army launched operations against IRA strongholds in Derry, Belfast, and other Northern Ireland towns. The initial operations met with little resistance. Heath outlined the rationale for the operation in his letter, a copy of which is attached.

³ The President added a handwritten note to the letter. It reads: "You can be sure that despite the pressures of a political campaign I shall not add to your problems on this issue. RN".

357. Editorial Note

Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, visited London September 14, 1972, for discussions with British officials. The organization of the national security bureaucracy and multilateral issues such as the Moscow Summit, the European Security Conference, and disarmament questions were the subjects of these

meetings with British Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend and British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Memoranda of conversation are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files—Europe, HAK London Memcons. Kissinger held follow-up meetings in Washington with British Ambassador Lord Cromer on September 22 and October 6 and with Douglas-Home on September 29, during the latter's visit to Washington. Memoranda of these conversations are *ibid*.

358. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Northern Ireland—Recent Moves by London and Dublin

While bombings and killings continue in Northern Ireland, the Irish have joined the British in meaningful moves against the Irish Republican Army, as well as political moves that may possibly point toward a solution to Ulster's seemingly intractable problems.

Recent Developments

In July, 1972, Prime Minister Heath and his able Minister for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, put Operation Motorman into effect sending British troops into the Catholic ghettos of Belfast and Londonderry to rout the IRA gunmen from their "no-go" safe havens. This successful UK maneuver increasingly has forced the IRA to operate from border areas of the Republic of Ireland.

On October 30, 1972, the British Government issued an official Green Paper (a preliminary review of considerations bearing on the political future of Northern Ireland, to be followed by a White Paper on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 694, Country Files—Europe, Ireland. Confidential. Sent for information. The original is not initialed by Kissinger and bears no indication it went forward to the President. In an attached December 8 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt recommended it be forwarded to Nixon. A notation on Sonnenfeldt's memorandum reads: "January 29 [1973] Secretariat: This was filed with Ed—please close your files. Louise."

the same subject early in 1973)² which was very favorably received in the UK and Ireland as an even-handed and well-reasoned document. Of greatest significance the document seems to have had a very strong, positive effect on Prime Minister Lynch in that it takes great care to identify the “Irish dimension” of Ulster’s problems—namely, that *Northern Ireland is a part of Ireland; no solution to its problems can be found without taking the interests of the Irish Republic into account; and this, in turn, includes obligations on the part of the Republic to reciprocate, taking interests of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into account.* (Addressing itself to the Protestant majority in Ulster, the Green Paper pledges that there will be no change in Northern Ireland’s status without the consent of its people, coupling this pledge with a statement of the UK’s conditions for continuing support—the British Parliament will continue to have sovereign authority over Ulster; and Ulster should be internally at peace and not offer a base for any external threat to the security of the UK.)

Following publication of the Green Paper, there have been clear signs that Prime Minister Lynch is at last earnestly trying to come to grips with the social and political problems that are fundamental to any lasting solution to the trouble in Ulster—with moves against the IRA and toward Constitutional reform in Ireland.

In part because of the growing Irish fear that the bloodshed in Ulster might spread to the Republic, Lynch has cracked down on the IRA (Prime Minister Heath has repeatedly urged him to do so in their private meetings) with considerable support from his countrymen for this law-and-order move. By mid-November, the Irish had put IRA Chief-of-Staff Sean MacStiofain in prison, and on December 3, the Lynch Government’s Offenses Against the State Bill became law—a very tough measure that will, for example, make the word of a senior police officer sufficient for the conviction of an IRA member.

Of equal if not greater importance, *in a December 7 referendum, the Irish electorate voted to delete the Catholic Church’s “special position” from the Constitution of the Irish Republic.* This vote has been viewed as an important test of Ireland’s willingness to work toward unification in a gradual peaceful manner—taking into account the deep-seated fears held by Ulster’s Protestants of future Catholic discrimination.

Looking Ahead

The odds remain long with regard to ending the conflict in Northern Ireland in the near future. The violence of the past three

² United Kingdom, Northern Ireland Department, *The Future of Northern Ireland; A Paper for Discussion*. The White Paper was issued as *Northern Ireland: Constitutional Proposals* (Cmnd. 5259).

years—over 650 dead—has exacerbated traditional divisions to the point where one side's minimum demands exceed the other's maximum concessions. Nonetheless, the determined efforts by Prime Ministers Heath and Lynch offer cause for cautious optimism.

In the near future, the British Government can be expected to continue to display the initiative that has characterized its Ulster policy since direct rule was declared in March 1972. Work on the White Paper is well underway. Prime Minister Heath's visit to Northern Ireland in mid-November launched a new round of consultations between London and the Northern Ireland political groups. Parliament, in its continuing spirit of bipartisanship on Ulster affairs, will complete work shortly on a bill calling for a plebiscite in Ulster. The plebiscite, which is expected to be held in late January, will ask whether northerners want to remain part of the UK or join the Irish Republic.

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of recent developments in Northern Ireland. There is no need for any action on your part at this time.

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